GENDERING TRUSTEESHIP: POSITIONING FEMALE AND MALE TRUSTEES AT ELITE AAU UNIVERSITIES

by

THERESA ANN WRIGHT

(Under the Direction of SHEILA SLAUGHTER)

ABSTRACT

Trustees are the stewards of U.S. higher education institutions. The governing boards on which they serve have ultimate oversight for colleges and universities making them the linchpins in the governance structure of American higher education. It is with boards of trustees that final fiduciary and social responsibility for institutions of higher education rests. Yet, given their primary position in the governance of and authority over US higher education, comparatively little research is devoted to the study of higher education governing boards, as works on higher education governance tend to highlight other players. This dissertation aims to counter this trend by focusing on trustees at the elite Association of American Universities (AAU) member institutions in the United States and exploring how gender impacts and influences trusteeship at these prestigious research universities. By focusing on elite AAU schools and female trustees, I hope to shed light on how the leaders in U.S. higher education link to the market economy, how these connections are influenced by gender, and how gender shapes the performance of trusteeship at elite schools. Because the literature on trustees is lacking, I draw on multiple theoretical frameworks and literatures to explore trusteeship and to frame my study. No one theory or framework overwhelmingly guides the study, as I use several lenses to help me make

sense of the work trustees do. Informed by the theory of academic capitalism, organizational theories, and liberal, critical, and post-structural feminisms, I argue that trusteeship is always already gendered male. In addition, I suggest that assumptions about what constitutes a good trustee are tied to assumptions about masculinity and about men in the market economy. I argue that most positions on governing boards are not imagined as feminine spaces, but a few feminized spaces do exist. Maintaining these gendered spaces helps to reify trusteeship as male by allowing us to legitimize female participation in certain aspects of trusteeship even while we continue to imagine the work of trustees as a "masculine" pursuit.

INDEX WORDS: Trustees, Governing Boards, Feminist theory, Higher education, Gender, Women

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DEDICATION

For Frederick Finnegan Wright Godfrey who will always be my number one.

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CHAPTER 1

GENDER, GOVERNING BOARDS, AND AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION

Trustees are the stewards of U.S. higher education institutions. The governing boards on which they serve have ultimate oversight for colleges and universities making them the linchpins in the governance structure of American higher education. It is with boards of trustees that final fiduciary and social responsibility for institutions of higher education rests. Yet, given their primary position in the governance of and authority over US higher education, comparatively little research is devoted to the study of higher education governing boards, as works on higher education governance tend to highlight other players. This dissertation aims to counter this trend by focusing on trustees at the elite Association of American Universities (AAU) member institutions in the United States and exploring how gender impacts and influences trusteeship at these prestigious research universities.[1]

The bulk of the higher education governance literature focuses on presidents, administrators, and shared governance while few studies touch on the roles governing boards and trustees play. A review of the articles published in three leading American higher education journals from 2006 to 2009 (*Journal of Higher Education*, *Review of Higher Education*, and *Research in Higher Education*) reveals that articles dealing with governance and administration

[1] The members of the governing bodies of the AAU universities in this study are usually called trustees; however, some schools refer to board members as visitors, governors, regents, fellows, overseers, etc… For the purposes of this study all governing bodies will be termed governing "boards" and all members of such governing bodies will be deemed "trustees."

made up only 17 of the 245 articles published, which is 7%. Of those 17 articles only 2 dealt with trustees or governing boards, comprising 1% of all of the articles published in these journals and 12% of the published articles dealing with governance and administration. The paucity of academic articles dealing with trustees and governing boards belies their positions of power. Trustees and governing boards are the pinnacle of higher education leadership, yet little research explores their activities. Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) point out that, "generally, scholars assume that university presidents (now CEOs) are the key decision makers and institutional leaders" (p. 253).

Much of the literature that does deal with trustees and governing boards has been characterized as descriptive or prescriptive (Glazer-Raymo, 2008; Pusser, Slaughter & Thomas, 2006; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). For example, the Association of Governing Boards (AGB), the leading professional association for higher education governing boards in the United States, tends to publish 'how to' resources for boards focusing on guidance and instruction for new board members and highlighting issues of board effectiveness and efficiency (Chait, Holland, & Taylor, 1991, 1996; Ingram, 1995, 2004). Other works about trustees follow the same tack, aiming to be books for and about trustees and honing in on best practices and core competencies for optimal board performance (Chait et al., 1991, 1996; Hill, Green, & Eckel, 2001; Ingram, 1993, 1995, 2003, 2004; Kezar, 2006). Another set of publications details board and trustee characteristics and provides breakdowns for the various types of higher education institutions by board size, appointment type, gender, race, occupational field, education, and age (Fain, 2005, 2007; "The Chronicle Survey," 2007; Association of Governing Boards [AGB], 1986). While these sources offer broad swaths of information about trustees in general – who they are, what they look like – they tell us very little about the work trustees do, about their positions in society,

about their links to the market economy, or about whether and how trustees differ by institution type.

This dissertation addresses this gap in the literature. By focusing on elite AAU schools and female trustees, I hope to shed light on how the leaders in U.S. higher education link to the market economy, how these connections are influenced by gender, and how gender shapes the performance of trusteeship at elite schools. Because the literature on trustees is lacking, I draw on multiple theoretical frameworks and literatures to explore trusteeship and to frame my study. No one theory or framework overwhelmingly guides the study, as I use several lenses to help me make sense of the work trustees do. How I understand the higher education context is informed by Slaughter and Leslie's (1997) and Slaughter and Rhoades's (2004) theory of academic capitalism. The theory of academic capitalism helps explain how and why universities and the people affiliated with them adopt "market and marketlike behaviors" (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997, p. 11). It helps us grasp the contemporary movement, or transition, from what Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) call a public good knowledge/learning regime to an academic capitalism knowledge/learning regime. For information on trusteeship and governing boards, I draw on the descriptive and prescriptive literature about trustees, governance, and boards in higher education. This literature highlights contemporary understandings of trustees and trusteeship. Organizational studies lends perspective to the way I look at the roles women play in organizations and on corporate boards of directors. In addition, scholarship in organizational studies and higher education helps shape my take on the importance of corporate networks and interlocks. Sociological theories of elites first drew my attention to the need to study elite women and higher education. Most influential in my work, however, are the multiple feminist theories that critique traditional ways of looking past gender, race, class, and sexuality in society.

Much of this dissertation is undertaken in a liberal feminist tradition that aims to seek out and remedy gender imbalances and inequities (Calás & Smircich, 1996; Bensimon & Marshall, 2000; Crotty, 2003). This project benefits from feminist research that works within the liberal humanist mindset to shed light on places where women are underrepresented. Liberal feminist projects generally accept underlying humanist paradigms and material structures, like higher education, as the way things are and pragmatically concern themselves with righting wrongs within these structures, not with undoing the structures themselves. Liberal feminist projects seek reform not revolution. Such work assumes that once unearthed, information highlighting gender imbalances and discrimination will prompt key leaders to remedy these imbalances, which, in turn will lead to more gender equity in society. It is within this vein of thought that the descriptive work in this dissertation is presented. While counting women to show where they are, and are not, is not prerequisite to the critique of gendered subject positions, it certainly soothes our desire for a numerical lay of the land. "As a relational phenomenon," Acker (1990) argues, "gender is difficult to see when only the masculine is present" (p. 142). And documenting the absence of women trustees at elite institutions may help us see the masculine in trusteeship.

But this reliance on tallied women also masks the most political move in the play of gendered subjects—the unquestioned acceptance of coherent subjects as a starting point. Post-structural feminisms critique this notion of the coherent stable subject (Butler, 1992, 1995, 1999; Scott 1988, 1990, 1992; St. Pierre, 2000). According to Butler (1992), coherent subjects should not be the starting point of critique because they are constituted by the very theoretical positions that are being questioned. "The 'I' who would select between them," she writes, "is always already constituted by them" (p. 9). Bouncing off works critiquing the humanist notion of a

timeless and centered subject by Foucault and others, Butler writes "what Foucault suggested was that this subject is itself the effect of a genealogy which is erased at the moment that the subject takes itself as the single origin of its action" (p. 10). In other words, the moment that a subject takes itself to be a constant, coherent entity is precisely the moment that those power relations through which it is created are ignored, erased, and censured. Although this project will not trace the genealogy of the subject position called trustee, it benefits from theories that question the presumption of stable, timeless, and genderless subjects. These theoretical perspectives make me sensitive to power relations and dynamics among trustees and between trustees and managers. Because subjects must constantly reconstitute themselves through interactions that at times may seem both mundane and extraordinary, paying attention to interactions among board members and among boards, institutions and the public is important. At the same time, this research accepts the subject 'trustee' and works within the discourses that constitute it and, in that way, is complicit in the obfuscation of the power relations inherent in the production of subjects.

My work, then, is also informed by critical feminist perspectives that question the whole notion of supposed genderless, or gender neutral, structures. While these critical feminist stances critique presumptions of the gender neutrality of structures, they do so without deconstructing the structures themselves. With Acker (1990) I use feminist theory to help us understand higher education and "organizations as gendered processes in which both gender and sexuality have been obscured through a gender-neutral, asexual discourse, and suggest some of the ways that gender, the body, and sexuality are part of the processes of control in work organizations" (p. 140). Informed by critical and post-structural feminisms, I argue that trusteeship is always already gendered male. In addition, I suggest that assumptions about what constitutes a good

trustee are tied to assumptions about masculinity and about men in the market economy. I argue that most positions on governing boards are not imagined as feminine spaces, but a few feminized spaces do exist. Maintaining these gendered spaces helps to reify trusteeship as male by allowing us to legitimize female participation in certain aspects of trusteeship even while we continue to imagine the work of trustees as a "masculine" pursuit.

This dissertation seeks to address the following research questions:

1. Among Association of American Universities (AAU) member institutions are trustees from private or public universities more likely to concurrently serve on the boards of publicly traded corporations?

2. Among AAU universities are female trustees more likely to serve on the boards of prestigious or less prestigious institutions?

3. Among AAU universities are female trustees more likely to serve on the boards of public or private research universities?

4. Do female trustees at AAU universities in 2007 tend to serve on certain types of committees?

5. Among trustees at AAU universities, do female and male trustee corporate networks differ?

6. Are female and male trustees networked differently through their corporate connections to key industrial sectors?

Significance

These research questions promise to offer new insight into trusteeship at elite higher education institutions in the United States. In doing so, this dissertation fills a substantial gap in our knowledge about American higher education. First, it rounds out the literature on higher education governance by telling us more about trustees and governing boards. Trusteeship and governing boards traditionally have been an understudied area for higher education governance scholars. Second, by focusing on trustees at elite research universities it sheds light on the trend

setters and market leaders of American higher education. These are the schools that most research universities strive to mimic and as such they greatly influence both the national and international higher education landscape. Showing how gender, prestige, and institution type matter even on this elite level allows us to better understand the nuances of the research university. Third, in highlighting issues of gender equity and parity at elite AAU institutions, this project helps us grasp how gender influences trusteeship and governance and shapes the work trustees perform. Further, it complicates our assumptions about the connections between gender, prestige, and power and requires us to think about these connections in new ways. In this way, it also adds to the literature on gender and higher education and gender and organizations. In addition, this dissertation enhances our understanding of how trustees link universities to the market economy through their corporate connections and how these connections are also influenced by gender, prestige, and institution type. Finally, and most important, this dissertation begins to theorize the gendering of trusteeship, encouraging us to give up the notion of a gender-neutral trustee and to think of trustee as a gendered subject position.

Organization

This dissertation is organized in five chapters. Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the topic, highlighting the literature and introducing the research questions. Chapter 2 provides an extensive review of the literature that frames this study. It includes discussions of the higher education context; governing boards and boards of trustees; women and higher education; women and organizations; and corporate boards, networks, and interlocks. Chapter 3 reviews the data analyzed, hypotheses tested, and the methods employed to address my research questions.

Chapter 4 includes the results of the hypotheses tested and discusses how these results inform the literature on trustees and trusteeship. Finally, Chapter 5 serves as a conclusion, highlighting the key findings of the study and implications for future research on gender and trusteeship.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The following sections lay the groundwork for this study by reviewing the literature on the contemporary higher education context; higher education boards of trustees; women and higher education; women and organizations; and corporate boards, networks, and interlocks.

Higher Education Context

While the basic governance structure of higher education in the United States goes back to the earliest colonial colleges, much of the current higher education context was shaped in the twentieth century by the unprecedented growth in enrollments after World War II. However, the most pressing contemporary issues seem to stem from a late-twentieth-century ideological shift from a liberal to a neo-liberal worldview. Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) and Slaughter and Leslie (1997) among others trace the roots of the current U.S. higher education environment to the 1980s and the beginning of increased marketization in higher education. Over the past decade, the market activities of higher education institutions have garnered much deserved commentary and attention (Bok, 2003; Geiger, 2004; Kirp, 2003; Newman, Couturier, & Scurry, 2004; Ruch, 2001; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Washburn 2005). The theory of academic capitalism, for one, seeks to explain how and why universities and the people affiliated with them adopt market behaviors (Metcalfe & Slaughter, 2008; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). It addresses the contemporary movement, or transition, from a public good knowledge/learning

regime to an academic capitalism knowledge/learning regime (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). This transition should not be viewed as complete or total or seamless or without contradictions. Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) "see the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime as ascendant…, academic capitalism has not replaced the public good knowledge regime. The two coexist, intersect, and overlap"(p. 29). We are in the midst of this transition; we are operating (teaching, researching, administering, learning) within this shifting terrain, negotiating between the values of competing mindsets.

But precisely how has increased marketization altered the higher education landscape? The theory of academic capitalism suggests that with the demise of the liberal state and the rise of the neo-liberal state come different attitudes, mindsets, and assumptions about the role of higher education in the state. The liberal vision for higher education stressed the social benefit and public good achieved through education. The individual as a member of society benefited from the higher education of many. The neo-liberal ethos reverses this notion and fixes instead on the private good and the individual, especially economic, benefits of higher education. In the neo-liberal schema individual benefits are primary and the social benefits are spillovers trickling down from private goods. The public good is presumed to flow from the amalgamation of private goods; in other words, the extrapolation of all the independent, economic benefits will result in a lump sum called the social good (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Harvey, 2005).

The ideological shift away from a liberal conception of the state and toward a neo liberal view of the state is impacting higher education in several ways. Since 1980, higher education has witnessed an unprecedented rise in tuition rates, a distinct shift from grants to loans in the financing of undergraduate education, an emphasis on incentives that privilege the middle class, and the maintenance rather than demise of the access gap even though more students than ever

attend college (Baum, 2001; Breneman, Doti, & Lapovski, 2001; Kane, 1999; McPherson & Shapiro, 1998; Mumper, 2001). During the same time period the increasing commodification of knowledge; the privileging of commercial knowledge production; the rising number of part-time and adjunct faculty; and, in some research areas, the decoupling of research (knowledge production) from other duties has altered the material lives of faculty (Bok, 2002; Geiger, 2004; Kirp, 2003; Schuster & Finkelstein, 2006; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). Meanwhile, the proportion of state budgets going to higher education has dwindled even while total funding has risen (McPherson & Shapiro, 1998; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). As higher education budgets continue to grow, increasing costs associated with maintaining adequate healthcare, corrections, K-12 education, welfare, and transportation services often nudge out higher education when state legislators have to make difficult budget decisions. Yet, spending at both public and private institutions continues to climb as increased competition for students, faculty, and research dollars encourages ever burgeoning budgets (Ehrenberg, 2000; McPherson & Shapiro, 1998).

Governing Boards and Boards of Trustees

Within this academic capitalist context of increased marketization, boards of trustees provide a compelling and somewhat enigmatic group to study. Trustees are at once a part of and apart from the university. Formally, the governing boards on which they serve have final fiduciary responsibility for colleges and universities, holding in trust the legal title to the property and holdings of their respective institutions. The responsibilities of trustees vary somewhat by institution type and context, but generally trustees are responsible for appointing and monitoring the president, articulating and honing institutional mission and goals, insisting on long-range planning, ensuring the fiscal well-being of the institution, monitoring governance and

management, maintaining institutional autonomy, and assessing board performance (Ingram, 1995, 2004; Nason, 1993).

While these are the broad responsibilities of governing boards, how and to what extent individual boards participate in the governance of their institutions can vary tremendously with the personalities of the players involved. Indeed, Pusser, Slaughter, & Thomas (2006) point out that some research on trustees assumes that trustees are not active decision-makers who tend to defer to more powerful presidents and chancellors. Jencks & Riesman (1968) argue that late-twentieth-century trustees mainly serve as figureheads, exercising little power or authority (Smith, 1974). Other studies suggest that higher education boards take on active decision-making roles and are essential players in governance (Bastedo, 2005; Chait, 1995; Duryea, 1981; Glazer-Raymo, 2008; Kezar, 2006; Sinclair 1923; Smith, 1974; Veblen, 1918). The extent to which boards intervene in and shape institutional policies and practices also fluctuates with the broader social context. As with corporate boards, some point out, governing boards became more activist in the 1990s, reacting to public scrutiny and calls for greater accountability in not-for-profit higher education settings (Bastedo, 2005; Chait, 1995; Glazer-Raymo, 2008; Kezar, 2006). But this increased activism did not always translate into enhanced board performance, as some boards gained fame for their improper and ineffective use of board power (Kezar, 2006, Killough, 2009). According to Glazer-Raymo (2008) the board activism of the 1990s led to "the appointment of trustees of public universities with political ties to the party in power, the formation of alternative organizations to hold boards and presidents more accountable for academic standards and student outcomes, and increased difficulty in attracting 'strong leadership to highly politicized environments and institutions'" (p. 192). Glazer-Raymo's emphasis on public universities in this characterization reminds us of the importance of

distinguishing between institution type, especially between public and private institutions, when we talk about trustee roles and duties.

Private institution governing boards usually differ from public institution boards in size, authority, and appointment process. The boards that govern the independent colleges and universities in the United States tend to be much larger than those overseeing public institutions. According to a 2004 AGB survey, average board size at private colleges was 30.2 members, compared to 10.5 members at public schools. Private institution board members also averaged shorter term lengths (3.7 years) compared to public school trustees (5.4 years). At private schools, a majority of trustees (52.2%) had business backgrounds, while 47.8 % of public school trustees had business backgrounds. Both institution types had boards that were made up of older, white males. Private boards averaged 88.1% whites and publics 77.7%. Males comprised 71.6% and 71% of private and public boards respectively and 50-69 year olds made up 66.5% of private and 65% of public school trustees (Fain, 2005).

Unlike private institution governing boards, public college and university governance authorities often control more than one campus or institution and may even govern more than one type of institution (research, four-year, two-year, technical). Making sense of the many different forms of governance structures for public higher education in the United States can be daunting. According to MacTaggart (2004), "it is increasingly difficult to talk about 'public systems of higher education' as if they shared common structures, purposes, or even a future as bodies that govern or coordinate colleges and universities in the United States" (p. 104). Trying to find some order in the chaos of state systems, MacTaggart looks to Kerr and Gade's (1989) taxonomy that categorizes public governance structures into three types: consolidated governance systems, segmental systems, and campus-level boards. Consolidated governance

systems include those state systems with either fully and partially consolidated structures. Fully consolidated system boards govern all public four-year *and* two-year institutions; partially consolidated system boards control all public four-year institutions and have another structure for two-year institution governance. Kerr and Gade (1989) characterize segmental systems as those where "separate boards cover separate types of campuses, such as research universities, comprehensive colleges and universities, and community colleges" (p. 116). Campus-level boards may be either autonomous, semi-autonomous with specific delegated authorities, or advisory in nature (Kerr and Gade, 1989). The governing boards of the public AAU schools in this study represent all three types of boards. Governing boards for the private AAU colleges and universities, on the other hand, are all autonomous, campus-level boards. Kerr (1993) notes that "independent boards have greater ultimate responsibility, because public boards share theirs with governmental authorities that appoint and supervise them" (p. xviii).

Public and private institution boards may also differ in how their trustees are appointed. Independent college and university boards are mostly self-perpetuating, meaning that sitting board members themselves nominate and appoint new board members. Generally, at most private schools, a nominating committee suggests new trustees, and the entire board approves new members. Almost all of the AAU private schools have bylaws that limit to some extent the degrees of freedom that their trustees have in appointing new members. For example, boards may be required to have a set number of alumni, specific types of stakeholders, or certain government or religious officials included in their ranks. The by-laws of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), for instance, stipulate a governing board with a maximum number of 78 voting trustees. Of those 78 potential trustee seats, 28 are restricted in some way. At MIT, of the 78 voting trustees 15 must be alumni; 5 must be current or recent students; and 8

serve as voting ex-officio trustees, meaning that they are automatically trustees with full rights and privileges because of the office they hold. MIT's voting ex-officio trustees include the president of the institution, the president of the alumni association, the board chair, the board secretary, the institution's executive vice president and treasurer, the governor of Massachusetts, the chief justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, and the secretary of the Massachusetts State Board of Education. Other schools' bylaws stipulate that proposed board members be approved by the religious groups that helped found the schools. Duke and Emory universities, for example, require that proposed new trustees be approved by specific conferences of the Methodist Church. While MIT represents one of the most complex examples of the board appointment process at the private AAU schools in this sample, it is not unusual at the private AAU schools to find stipulations on types of trustees and how they may be appointed. Indeed, of the 26 private American universities in the AAU only the University of Chicago places no restrictions on the type of new trustees its current trustees may nominate, stipulating solely that the number of voting trustees is limited to 50.

For public colleges and universities the board appointment process also has many variations – governor appointed, popularly elected, board appointed, stakeholder elected, alumni elected, student elected, ex-officio – and frequently the board consists of trustees appointed in several different ways. For example, the Pennsylvania State University Board is a campus-level board that includes 32 members: 5 are ex-officio appointments, including Penn State's president, Pennsylvania's governor, and the state's secretaries of Agriculture, Education, and Conservation and Natural Resources; 6 trustees are appointed by the governor; 9 are elected by the alumni; 6 are elected by state agricultural societies; and 6 are elected by the Board of Trustees to represent business and industry in the state (The Pennsylvania State University, 2008). While Penn State's

board configuration may be one of the more complicated, it is not unusual for public universities to have more than one method of obtaining trustees. Trustees serving on the boards of the University of Michigan, Michigan State University, and the University of Nebraska are elected in statewide elections. In Colorado, the members of the state system board are also elected, and the board that governs the five campuses of the University of Minnesota is elected by the state's legislature. In general though, some mix of governor appointed trustees and ex-officio trustees tends to be the most common board configuration among public schools (Glazer-Raymo, 2008; Pusser et al., 2006). Indeed, for the 27 boards governing the 34 public AAU schools in this study, 22 of the boards have some or all board members appointed by the state's governor.

The different appointment processes may point to differing values in selecting trustees for public and private institutions. Pusser et al. (2006) argue that public board appointments, because they often are gubernatorial appointments, "are generally politically driven, resulting in public governing boards being populated by people from within the state and from business sectors that are state or regionally based" (p. 756; see also Glazer-Raymo, 1999, 2008; Slaughter & Rhoades 2004). With private school board appointments, formal political clout and patronage seem to play less of a role. Trustees at independent colleges and universities, on the other hand, may be more closely linked to the market economy and to other trustees. In addition, Slaughter & Rhoades (2004) suggest, private schools may "define themselves as national in scope through their trustee appointments," using trustees with ties to national and international corporate networks to signal prestige and legitimacy (p. 247).

According to early-twentieth-century descriptions, university trustees served as powerbrokers within a burgeoning market economy (Beck, 1947; Sinclair, 1923; Veblen, 1918). Nearing's (1917) study of 143 institutions and their trustees found that "the college and

university boards are almost completely dominated by merchants, manufacturers, capitalists, corporation officials, bankers, doctors, lawyers, educators, and ministers," these occupations account for nearly four-fifths of the trustees in his study (Nearing, 1917, as cited in Beck, 1947). Nearing muses that "a new term must be coined to suggest the idea of an education system owned and largely supported by the people but dominated by the business world. Perhaps 'plutocratized education' will prove as acceptable as any other phrase" (Nearing, 1917, as cited in Beck, 1947). Later research (McGrath, 1936, as cited in Beck, 1947) supports Nearing's work, demonstrating that men in business and finance controlled the boards of American higher education. Beck's (1947) study of AAU universities also shows the prominence of bankers, brokers, and financiers on boards of trustees.

As noted earlier, contemporary literature on trustees tends toward the descriptive and prescriptive, so little empirical evidence exists that addresses the current market connections of public versus private trustees. Pusser et al (2006), however, found that the private university trustees in their study were "considerably more interconnected to the corporate world through overlapping directorships" than were trustees from the public universities in their sample (p. 756). In addition, those overlaps became even more stark when they limited their analysis to corporate board members in the corporate elite – corporations included in the *Fortune* 1000 or NSF R&D 500. Their work hints at significant differences between public and private and between elite and non-elite universities not only in how and why trustees are appointed but in how trustees connect universities to the market economy.

While they may be appointed for different reasons, trustees from both public and private institutions share somewhat similar backgrounds. As discussed earlier, AGB studies show that trustees are overwhelmingly older, white males from the business sector. However, the AGB

studies do not provide adequate comparative information on trustees at different types of institutions, beyond the broad categories of public and private. And as Pusser et al (2006) and Slaughter & Rhoades (2004) point out, perhaps there are nuanced differences in trustees at different types of institutions that the aggregated AGB data miss. We know very little about if and how trustees at research universities differ from trustees at comprehensive colleges or community colleges or how trustees at private institutions differ from those at public schools. The literature fails to tell us how concerns for gender, racial, and ethnic equity play out at these types of institutions. Are public research university boards more diverse because of their more prominent status in the state, or do more localize comprehensive and community colleges fair better where equity is concerned because of their close ties to local populations? Do prestigious private institutions have better diversity track records because of their elite status as market leaders? How have the boards at these different institution types negotiated the burgeoning academic capitalist knowledge learning regime? Have certain types of boards, through their trustees, become closer to markets? How might this vary by institution type, elite status, or by trustee gender? Unfortunately, most of the contemporary literature on higher education trustees aims too broadly to get at these types of questions.

A couple of exceptions in the literature are Slaughter & Rhoades (2004) and Pusser, Slaughter & Thomas (2006). Both of these studies hone in on trustees at elite research institutions. Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) look at trustees at the 10 top public and the 10 top private research universities according to the National Science Foundation's 1999 rankings for federal funding and explore their connections to the market economy. They suggest that trustees are part of dense networks that serve as "potent mediums for the spread of corporate practices" (p. 234). Their work shows that higher education boards are interlocked with knowledge

economy corporate boards, as university trustees concurrently serve on the boards of knowledge economy corporations. These interlocks create networks of information flows that may influence institutional management. In addition, they show that the governing boards of elite private research institutions are more likely to be interlocked with corporate boards. Using research on corporate boards that argues that "board interlocks encourage adoption of underlying decision processes that can inform many policy issues" (p. 247), they hypothesize that interlocks between private university boards and corporate boards should lead to the earlier adoption of specific corporate strategies by private higher education institutions. To test this theory, they look at faculty pay, executive pay, and equity stakes in companies. The private universities in their sample did have higher faculty and executive pay, suggesting that they were mimicking corporate behaviors. But, the public universities took more equity stakes in companies, which may mean that public schools are rapidly absorbing new practices as well. They conclude that "ironically, public research universities' adoption of practices and strategies similar to privates' may steer public institutions' trustees toward more aggressive market activity (p. 253).

Pusser et al (2006) follow up on the Slaughter & Rhoades (2004) study and also focus on university trustee and corporate board interlocks. Citing the paucity of theoretical literature on higher education boards of trustees, the authors frame their study in the economic, sociological, and organizational literature on corporate boards. Like Slaughter & Rhoades (2004), Pusser et al. argue that "as a key site for deliberation and the enactment of a wide range of institutional policies, governing boards provide a key source of data on the ways in which broader market forces may influence institutional behavior (p. 748). Further, Pusser et al. (2006) conclude, "based on the empirical and theoretical literature on corporate networks, board interlocks in colleges and universities can be conceptualized as networks of authority and legitimacy that

provide a guide to understanding the role of governing boards in establishing and maintaining particular strategies, policies, forms of authority and legitimate behavior" (p. 750). They too use 20 top research universities in their sample – the National Science Foundation R&D top 10 public and top 10 private. For the schools in their sample, significantly more private institution trustees concurrently sat on corporate boards than did public university trustees. In other words, private university trustees had more corporate connections than did their public university counterparts. A *corporate connection* occurs when a trustee concurrently serves on a higher education governing board and a corporate board of directors. The corporate connections of individual trustees, in turn, interlock universities and corporations. Pusser et al. (2006) also show that the private schools in their sample had more ties, through trustee corporate connections, to a wider variety of business sectors than did the public schools. In addition the private university trustees were more likely to overlap with other private school trustees on corporate boards. An overlap occurs when trustees from different schools sit on the same corporate board. The authors argue that "considering the degree to which advantages are accrued through overlaps that provide opportunities for trustees/regents from competing institutions to come into contact with one another, most public institutions are at a decided disadvantage" (p. 760).

The Slaughter& Rhoades (2004) and the Pusser et al. (2006) studies encourage us to ask more questions about the nature of trusteeship, how trustees link to the market economy, and how these connections and networks influence and shape university policies and practices. Because of their limited samples, the studies beg for duplication on a broader scale. Do their initial conclusions hold when the sample includes more research universities? Would we see as many corporate connections as the trustees in their samples have among the trustees from other elite universities with less intensive research programs? Do all elite private intuitions have

closer ties to the market economy than publics? Or do some publics aggressively seek out ties with the market economy though their trustees?

> Research Question 1: Among Association of American Universities (AAU) member institutions are trustees from private or public universities more likely to concurrently serve on the boards of publicly traded corporations?
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> Hypothesis 1A: In 1997 and 2005, among the U.S.-based AAU institutions, private institution trustees are more likely to concurrently serve on corporate boards of directors than public institution trustees.

Women and Higher Education

Over the past century, women have made great strides in higher education. From the late 19th century when women were routinely barred from many institutions of higher education to the early 21st century when females now make up almost 60% of undergraduate populations in the United States, women have progressively improved their lot on our nation's campuses (Solomon, 1985). But the growing presence throughout the 20th century of female students and faculty in its classrooms has not radically altered the structure or ideology of academe. Higher education remains a male-dominated institution. Its values, mindsets, rules of comportment, leadership styles, governance structures, and research traditions – its norms – were cemented in an era when women were largely absent from its hallowed halls. And while female students now constitute a majority of undergraduates, women remain underrepresented in key leadership positions as faculty, administrators, and trustees; are more likely to populate less prestigious types of higher education institutions; and tend to be clustered in certain disciplines and spaces within higher education.

The percentage of female undergraduates has grown significantly since 1979 when females first attained majority status for colleges students. In 2005, women accounted for 57.4 %

of undergraduate enrollments (NCES, 2008). Much of the surge in overall student enrollments between 1995 and 2005 is credited to the overwhelming growth in the numbers of female students. Between 1995 and 2005, college enrollments increased 23%; female enrollments rose 27% while male enrollments climbed 18% (NCES, 2008). When we sort the data by race and ethnicity, the female majority is even greater for some groups. According to Glazer-Raymo (2008), "women students were also in the majority of African Americans (65%), Hispanics (58.8%), Native Americans (61.2%), and Asian/Pacific Islanders 53.9%" (p. 3). Not only do females enroll at greater rates, but they persist and earn a larger percentage of undergraduate degrees. In the 2005-2006 school year, women earned 57.5% of bachelor's degrees (NCES, 2008).

Women also pursue professional and graduate education at nearly equal or higher rates than men. By 2005, women comprised 49.6% of first professional students, up from 41.6% in 1995, earning 49.7% of first professional degrees. Female graduate students made up 59.8 % of the graduate student population in 2005, rising from 55.7% ten years earlier, and accounted for 59.3% of the master's degrees and 48.7% of the doctorate degrees conferred (Glazer-Raymo, 2008). But the overall percentages tell only part of the story. Women do earn almost half of the doctorate degrees conferred, but they tend to earn them in certain disciplines, mainly fields associated with education, health, humanities, and social science. As Metcalfe and Slaughter (2008) argue, a reliance on aggregated data often obscures the complexities of gender relations in higher education, allowing us to (mis)interpret the data as an overly positive or negative assessment of the status of women in academe. In other words, looking at the overall percentages of earned doctorates by women can lead us to believe that parity has been attained in

higher education. But on closer observation, we see that the story is more complicated and messy.

The complexities of gender and higher education also emerge when we consider the spaces female faculty occupy in postsecondary education. While women make up about 40% of all full-time faculty, they tend to fare best in less prestigious institutions (Glazer-Raymo, 1999; Glazer-Raymo, 2008; Metcalfe & Slaughter 2008; Shaw, Callahan, & Lechasseur 2008; Valian, 1998; Wilson, 2004). According to Shaw et al. (2008) prestige, or "'status' is a subjective term; an institution's status can vary among different groups or geographical locations" (p. 212). "But in general," they write, "the status of an institution or educational sector is determined by: a) the selectivity of the institution; b) the 'quality' of the student population as measured by such factors as high school GPA or graduation rates; and c) the endowment or available level of resources" (p. 12). Using this description of status, or prestige, female faculty tend to be overrepresented in lower prestige sectors and institutions like community colleges. Shaw et al. note that "comparatively speaking, women make up a higher proportion of the faculty at community colleges than at any other institutional type: women comprise over 50% of the faculty at community colleges compared to 36% at public four-year colleges and universities" (p. 211). In the four-year college sector, females make up 41% of the faculty at master's level institutions but represent only 33% of research institution faculty (Glazer-Raymo, 2008). Such statistics led Wilson (2004) to observe that "while the nation is doing a good job of turning out women with research doctorates, the top 50 institutions in research spending are not doing such a good job of hiring them" (p. A8). By rank, women account for 25.1% of all full professors, 38.8% of associate, 46% of assistant professors, 52.3% of lecturers, and 52.8% of instructors at all institution types (Glazer-Raymo, 2008). When we sort faculty rank data by institution type,

we again see a correlation between prestige and female underrepresentation as females make up only 19.3% of full professors at doctoral universities but 46.9% of full professors at associate degree-granting colleges (West & Curtis, 2006). Generally, then, the more prestigious the institution type, the fewer women, and the more prestigious the faculty rank, the fewer women.

The disconnect between prestige and female faculty presence also holds true when we explore where women are clustered within universities. Females attain their highest proportions of faculty in disciplines and fields generally associated with less prestige in the academic capitalist mindset: education, humanities, library science, nursing, social work, and social sciences (Glazer-Raymo, 2008; Metcalfe & Slaughter, 2008; Valian, 1998). Many of these fields commanded respect and wielded authority under the public good knowledge/learning regime but have lost status with the ascendancy of the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime (Metcalfe & Slaughter, 2008; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). Often, these disciplines are among those that first welcomed women into the academic ranks and represent areas where women first achieved significant saturation in academe (DuBois, Kelly, Kennedy, Korsmeyer, & Robinson, 1987; England et al., 2007; Solomon, 1985). So while the proportions of female faculty in some disciplines edge toward parity, especially at the assistant professor level, we find women underrepresented in the business, science, technology, engineering, and mathematics fields – areas that are particularly privileged under academic capitalism.

The clustering of female faculty in certain areas within higher education has led some to posit a "tipping point" for the feminization of academic disciplines and fields (Bellas, 1994; Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1987; Tolbert, Simmons, Andrews, Rhee, 1995). Tipping, or saturation, point theories argue that after female faculty achieve a certain percentage of a discipline, the discipline becomes viewed as a feminized field. This may diminish the discipline's status as

women flock to the field and more men leave or avoid the area (Bellas, 1994, Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1987). Tolbert et al. (1995) argue that it may also result in higher status for some men in the field, as "an increase in the proportion of women may enhance male faculty's perceived relative status within the department" (p. 574), causing men to be promoted higher within the field. Most of these saturation arguments pinpoint the tipping point at around 30 to 40%; once that threshold is attained, the field is perceived as feminine. Tolbert et al. (1995) also find that around the tipping point of female representation, turnover and tension among women and minorities subside, but up to that point efforts to increase the numbers of women and minorities seem to result in more conflict and turnover among those groups.

Not only do female faculty tend to be clustered in lower status disciplines and fields within academe, they also are overrepresented in lower prestige appointment types. In the past 30 years with the rise of the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime the number of low status part-time positions has swelled, from 30.2% of all faculty jobs in 1975 to 46.2% in 2003 (West & Curtis, 2006; see also Schuster & Finkelstein, 2006). At the same time, more women earned doctorates and sought academic appointments. These two trends have dovetailed to create a female-dominated underclass of low-status academic workers. In 2005, female faculty made up almost half (49.2%) of the part-time faculty workforce in the U.S. and only 39.1% of the full-time ranks. Women are most likely to serve as part-time faculty at associate degree-granting colleges (51%) and least likely to work part-time at doctoral universities (46.5%), again highlighting the correlation between lack of prestige and the overrepresentation of women (West & Curtis, 2006). In 2005-2006 for all institution types, women made up 52.4% of the non-tenure-track workforce, and this percentage was fairly consistent across institution types. For all institution types, females comprised 45% of not-yet-tenured but tenure-track faculty yet only

31% of tenured faculty positions (West & Curtis, 2006). Female faculty were most likely to hold tenure-track and tenured positions at associate-granting colleges and least likely at doctorate-granting schools. In addition, women held 57% of the lecturer and full-time instructor positions for all institution types (West & Curtis, 2006). Reacting to theses gloomy statistics, Glazer-Raymo (2008) predicts that as the number of part-time and non-tenure-track appointments burgeons and the numbers of female faculty filling these positions continue to rise "it is unlikely that the gender gap in tenure will diminish in the foreseeable future" (p. 9).

Finally, we also see a gender gap in earnings for women in academe. In 2005-2006 female faculty across all ranks and among all institution types average 81% of their male colleagues' salaries (West & Curtis, 2006) . But as Metcalfe and Slaughter (2008) and Valian (1998) remind us, this aggregated figure can be misleading because it ignores the nuances of wage differences among faculty and suggests broad disparities where they may not exist, leading us to look for discrimination and enact policies in inappropriate areas. The overall average approach obfuscates important gender wage differences among institution types. Paying attention to gender averages across disciplines and ranks also ignores how gender wage disparity is a function of wage differences between departments and colleges rather than within them (Bellas, 1997; Metcalfe & Slaughter, 2008). In other words, contemporary female and male colleagues within the same department at similar institutions generally earn comparable salaries (Valian, 1998). The problem, as the tipping point argument discussed earlier suggests, may be that certain disciplines and fields garner lower wages precisely because they are perceived as feminized (Bellas, 1994, 1997). According to West and Curtis (2006), "the overall salary disadvantage for women is a combination of two primary factors: women are more likely to have positions at institutions that pay lower salaries, and they are less likely to hold senior faculty rank" (p. 11-

12). But even after controlling for institution type, they note, "women have not reached overall salary parity with men in any of the institutional categories" (p.12).

While fewer female professors hold senior rank positions and more of them occupy temporary and part-time positions, skewing overall averages, the gender wage gap still impacts female faculty at all levels and at all institution types, just to a lesser degree than overall averages suggest. West and Curtis's AAUP study (2006) found that, on average, full-time female faculty at doctorate-granting institutions fared poorest in relation to their male colleagues when compared to female faculty at master's, baccalaureate, and associate degree-granting institutions. Doctoral universities paid the comparably ranked female professors 90.9% of male full professors' salaries, 92.7% of male associate professors' salaries, and 91.5% of male assistant professors' salaries. Female professors at associate-granting institutions, on the other hand, averaged 95.2% of male full professors' salaries, 95.9% of associate, and 97.5% of assistant professors' salaries. Overall numbers for all ranks show that doctoral universities pay female faculty only 78.1% of what they pay male faculty compared to 95.5% at associate-granting institutions. The disconnect between tenure-track professors and all ranks is due in large part to the fact that doctorate-granting universities employ far more full-time instructors and lecturers. While Porter, Toutkoushian, & Moore (2008) argue in their study of recently hired faculty that "the vast majority of the total wage gap could be attributed to human capital, institutional, and discipline-related differences between recently hired men and women," they also point out that, "nonetheless, a gender-based pay disparity does emerge over time" (p. 482). In addition, Perna (2001) and Umbach (2007) attribute much of the salary gap to human capital and structural differences, but also find unexplained differences in salaries after controlling for these factors.

Many feminist theorists are not satisfied by arguments that attribute the bulk of wage disparities to human capital or structural differences. They argue that notions of human capital are not free from gender ideologies and find that understandings of structural differences include gender bias as well. (Acker, 1990; Bellas, 1994, 1997; Calás & Smircich, 1996; Valian, 1998). According to Valian (1998), our perception of human capital is not value neutral and, thus, when we talk about human capital we are actually enacting values that shore up and reflect male privilege. Women make fewer investments in those activities that get included in measurements of human capital and receive less from those investments when they do so. Valian concedes that "women tend to have lower human capital, which hurts their ability to advance," but adds, "above and beyond human capital, however, is the fact that women benefit less from their qualifications and credentials than men do" (p. 197). It is not clear if women's lower investments in human capital occur because the variables included in human capital represent activities that women are less likely to undertake in the first place or if women invest less because they understand that they will receive lower returns on their investments. Therefore, attributing wage disparities to differences in human capital while accurate on one level, fails to address the underlying issues of how and what gets valued as human capital and how investments in human capital pay differently for men and women. Further, structural characteristics like discipline, job task, and job status (Perna, 2001) import gender bias as well (Acker, 1990; Bellas, 1994, 1997). For example, Bellas (1994) explains that "the comparable worth perspective rests on the theoretical premise that because women are socially devalued, so too is the work that women do" (p. 808). She argues that salary disparities by discipline are not simply matters of differing investments in human capital or structural differences based on comparisons to the private sector. They result from preferences for work that is geared toward markets, work that is valued through

a gender system that privileges characteristics perceived to be associated with maleness (Bellas, 1994, 1997). So, attributing wage disparity to human capital or structural differences imports a gender bias that obscures how gender ideologies influence our value system and our perceptions of what constitutes worthwhile and important work. Human capital and structural arguments, therefore, do not necessarily let us off the hook – those very activities that get counted as human capital and those same structures that explain wage disparities always already include gender bias as well.

This discussion of wage differences for women in academe further highlights the correlation between prestige and disparity, with female faculty averaging lower salaries compared to their male counterparts at the most prestigious institution type, which not coincidentally employs more temporary and non-tenure-track faculty (West & Curtis, 2006; Valian, 1998). For all measurements on the status of women in higher education we find a negative correlation between prestige and equity. Women tend to do better at less prestigious institutions and in less prestigious disciplines. So, even though female students now make up a majority of undergraduates, suggesting gender equity in higher education, women continue to populate less prestigious types of higher education institutions as students, faculty, administrators. Female faculty and students also tend to be clustered in less prestigious disciplines and spaces within institutions and among higher education sectors. Finally, women continue to be underrepresented in important leadership positions as faculty, staff, and administrators, especially at high-status schools. This leads us to ask how women fare as trustees. Does the negative correlation between women and status hold when we are dealing with elite women and elite institutions?

> Research Question 2: Among AAU universities are female trustees more likely to serve on the boards of prestigious or less prestigious institutions?

Hypothesis 2A: Less prestigious AAU universities will have greater percentages of female trustees.

Research Question 3: Among AAU universities are female trustees more likely to serve on the boards of public or private research universities?

Hypothesis 3A: Public AAU universities will have greater percentages of female trustees than will private AAU universities.

Women and Organizations

Significant research on women in business began in the 1970s and escalated in the 1980s and 1990s. Many scholars point to Rosabeth Moss Kanter's 1977 work *Men and women of the corporation* as the watershed publication on women in business. Moss Kanter (1977) focused on structure rather than personal characteristics to explain gender differences and privilege in organizations, arguing that organizations operated under an assumption of male privilege while claiming to be gender neutral spaces. Acker (1990) explains that Moss Kanter observed a "masculine ethic" in organizations, noting that although "organizations were being defined as sex-neutral machines, masculine principles were dominating their authority structure" (p.143). Kanter argued that this masculine ethic constrained the behaviors of both women and men within organizations and her study sought to illuminate how structural forces influence organizational behaviors. This masculine ethic still reigns in contemporary organizations and has both material and discursive impact. It shapes the ways both women and men are treated in organizations and it influences and reifies our perceptions of and assumptions about women in business. Valian (1998) calls these perceptions and assumptions gender schemas and explains how such schemas often play out for women professionals in the business world as follows:

> The immediate consequence for a woman entering a profession is that those around her, both men and other women, perceive her as at least slightly unsuited to that profession, because her gender doesn't fit in. The schema for women is incompatible with the

> schema for a successful professional, resulting in lower expectations of a woman's potential achievement. Those low expectations will, in turn, affect evaluations of her work. There is usually room for disagreement about the quality of someone's work. Observers of women will lean in a negative direction, in line with their low expectations. If she performs badly, that will confirm their low expectations. If she performs well, she may still fail to receive her due because her achievement runs counter to expectation. Or, she may be appropriately rewarded, but seen as an exception to the general rule that women do not make good professionals." (p. 15)

As Valian's description highlights, although women have made great numerical strides in business in recent decades, Moss Kanter's observations are, unfortunately, still relevant for contemporary organizations. Calás and Smircich note that despite significant social improvements for women, "the sex segregation of occupations and organizations persists world-wide, as does pay inequity between women and men" (p. 218). While organizations have eliminated some of the barriers to women's success, significant problems linger. In 2007, although women made up 46.4% of the U.S. labor force and 50.6% of the labor in management, professional and related occupations, they represented only 15.4% of *Fortune* 500 corporate officers, held only 14.8% of *Fortune* 500 board seats, and made up a mere 2.4% of the *Fortune* 500 CEOs (Catalyst, 2008a; Catalyst, 2008b).

Similar to women's participation in business, the amount of research about women in organizations has steadily increased over the past 30 years. However, Bilimoria and Piderit (2007) observe, "despite decades of ongoing inquiry, numerous outlets for knowledge creation, and widespread public interest, research on women in business and management remains a specialized field of study that appears not yet to have reached widespread mainstream acceptance as a scholarly field of inquiry within business and management disciplines" (p.2) They found that the subjects of women and gender took up disappointingly little space in the six key business and management academic journals. Their "search of the keywords 'women', 'gender', 'sex', or 'diversity' in article titles, abstracts, or subjects revealed that only 76 (out of a

total of 2753) articles on these topics were published in these six leading business and management journals during the 10-year period from January 1996 to January 2006" (p.2). "It appears," they conclude, "that the statistics of published research on this subject oddly mirror the stark realities of the numbers of women in business and management: many in the larger field but few at the top" (p.2).

As Bilimoria and Piderit (2007) point out, research focused on women in business is comparatively limited. Traditionally, this was especially true for research on women and corporate boards of directors. Over the past decade, however, more attention has been paid to women corporate directors (Bilimoria, 2000; Burke, 2000; Burke & Mattis, 2000; Daily, Certo & Dalton, 1999, 2000; Fondas, 2000; Joy, 2008; Kesner, 1988; Mattis, 2000; Peterson & Philpot, 2007; Schor, 1995; Singh, Vinnicombe, & Terjesen, 2007; Williams, 2003). Much of this recent research builds on the work of the nonprofit Catalyst organization. Researching and publicizing the lack of women in the upper echelons of organizations has been Catalyst's mission since 1962. Catalyst devotes the bulk of its research to the dearth of women in key management and directorship positions in the top corporations in the United States, Canada, and Europe.

While its research shows that over the past decade women have moderately improved their numbers on *Fortune* 500 boards, women still occupy a paltry 14.8% of directorships compared to men (Catalyst, 2007a). Further, some studies suggest that the modest increase in directorships held by women may in fact represent not more women directors but more directorships held by a few prominent women (Bilimoria, 2000; Daily et al. 2000). Between 1997 and 2007 the percentage of *Fortune* 500 boards seats held by women increased from 10.6% to 14.8% (Catalyst, 1997; Catalyst, 2007a). In 2007, 59 companies in the *Fortune* 500 had no women directors, 176 had only one female director, 186 had two, and 83 companies had three or

more female directors. The number three holds special importance for studies of the presence of women and minorities on boards (Ehrenberg & Main, 2009; Konrad, Kramer, & Erkut, 2008). In studies of corporate boards, three seems to be the number at which women reach "critical mass" and can significantly influence a board's performance. According to Konrad, et al. (2008) most corporate boards have between 9 and 12 members. "Women," they argue, "begin to constitute a numerically important minority when there are at least three of them" (p. 146). Before this critical mass point, they explain, a single female board member is often invisible and two females are often perceived as conspirators. They put forth three reasons why the numbers of women on boards make a difference.

> First, multiple women help to break the stereotypes that solo women are subjected to. Second, a critical mass of women helps to change an all-male communication dynamic. Third and finally, research on influence and conformity in groups indicates that three may be somewhat of a "magic number" in group dynamics, which suggests that having three women may be particularly beneficial for creating change (Konrad, et al., 2008)

Catalyst research on women and corporate boards illustrates the paucity not only of women on boards generally, but of minorities and minority women especially on corporate boards. Of the seats held by women, most were held by white women. In 2006, white females accounted for 13% of *Fortune* 100 directorships while only 4% of those directors were minority women. White males still held the vast majority of *Fortune* 100 board seats in 2006, claiming 71.5% of the directorships while minority males held 11.4% (Catalyst, 2008c). In 2007, women made up only 15.4% of corporate officers and 6.7% of top earners at *Fortune* 500 firms (Catalyst, 2007b). In 2008, Women CEOs headed only 12 corporations in the *Fortune* 500 (Catalyst, 2008b). While the data in this dissertation excludes race as variable because of the likely low numbers of minority trustees, it is important to point to the need to analyze university

boards both in terms of race and ethnicity and, in light of the critical mass arguments discussed above, in terms of the intersections of gender, race, and ethnicity.

These statistics on women and corporate boards reflect a business environment that, both materially and discursively, privileges males and assumed male attributes. Reminiscent of Kanter's "masculine ethic", Acker (1990) develops a theory of gendered organizations which stresses that "organizational structure is not gender neutral" (p. 139). Acker notes that "in spite of feminist recognition that hierarchical organizations are an important location of male dominance, most feminist writing about organizations assume that organizational structure is gender neutral" (p. 139). For Acker, "the positing of gender-neutral and disembodied organizational structures and work relations is part of the larger strategy of control in industrial capitalist societies, which at least partly, are built upon a deeply embedded substructure of gender difference" (p. 139). This substructure of gender difference influences how we understand and conceptualize work; it shapes our perceptions and actions which, in turn, shore up and reconfigure these same gender structures. Acker (1990) observes how "commonsense notions, such as jobs and positions, which constitute the units managers use in making organizations and some theorists use in making theory, are posited upon the prior exclusion of women" (p. 154). "This exclusion," she adds, "in turn creates fundamental inadequacies in theorizing about gender-neutral systems of positions to be filled" (p.154). For her "the concept of 'job' is thus implicitly a gendered concept, even though organizational logic presents it as gender neutral. 'A job' already contains the gender-based division of labor and the separation between the public and the private sphere" (p. 149).

Acker's work helps us to think of business and higher education organizations not as gender neutral, but as gendered. Further, Acker's emphasis on gender as process blends well

with post-structural feminist approaches to gender that see gender as discursive – as produced in practice through images, language, and actions that generate subject positions for bodies to occupy (Butler, 1999; Calás & Smircich, 1996; Scott, 1988; St. Pierre, 2000) . Building on these theories this dissertation will argue that trusteeship itself is gendered male. The presumption of maleness for trustees not only shapes how we think about and imagine trusteeship, it influences the actual work trustees perform.

Research on corporate boards of directors suggests that most of a board's work is carried out in committees (Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994; Kesner, 1988; Konrad et al., 2008; Peterson & Philpot, 2007). Committees constitute the main work units for boards and "much board action and policy making originates in one or more of the committees of the board" (Peterson & Philpot, 2007, p. 177). Indeed, Bilimoria & Piderit (1994) characterize the standing committees of corporate boards as the "innermost circle of corporate power and control" (p. 1454). "These subgroups are critical structures for the conduct of a board's work," they continue, "since each is chartered with specific authorization, strategic, and oversight duties contributing to the board's total corporate governance task" (p. 1454). Research that focuses solely on how many women hold directorships may not in fact tell us much about how effective or powerful women are on boards. This may lead us to suppose that all is well if women hold a set number of directorships. While tallying how many women occupy boards seats is an important step, our willingness to stop our questions about women directors there implies that most board work is conducted by the board as a whole, which we know it is not. It also presumes that once on the board women are dealt with fairly. If most board work is carried out on committees and most discussions calling for more women directors are based on the argument that having women on boards will change board behavior, then it becomes important to look at the gender make-up of board committees.

Some research suggests that women directors play less pivotal roles on boards and have less impact on corporate decisions because they are excluded from the most powerful board committees (Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994; Kesner, 1988; Schor, 1995). Kesner (1988) argues that the audit, nominating, compensation, and executive committees are the most powerful corporate board committees. Her early study on the committee representation of women on the corporate boards of *Fortune* 500 companies in 1983 shows that women were underrepresented on the key nominating and executive committees. Kesner speculates, however, that tenure and experience, not gender bias, explain this lack of representation, as nominating and executive committees tend to emphasize tenure and experience in their appointments.

Bilimoria and Piderit (1994) follow up on Kesner's study and look at the top 300 of the 1984 *Fortune* 500. Their study controls for experience and tenure to test Kesner's suggestions. Bilimoria and Piderit find that after controlling for experience and tenure, female board members were significantly favored for public affairs committees while males were significantly favored for compensation, executive, and finance committees. Their results "indicate an interesting pattern of sex-typing of committees" (p. 1464). "It appears," they continue, "that these committees truly operate under the influence of the 'BOGSAT' phenomenon: 'the idea that the most important decisions in organizations are made by a 'bunch of guys sitting at a table'" (p. 1465, citing Willis, 1989). Bilimoria and Piderit conclude, "in fact, the findings of this study suggest that female directors are generally not in need of further training as, in many cases, they are as qualified as or more qualified that their male counterparts for committee membership: it appears, instead, that their qualifications and competence are not being adequately recognized" (1471). More recent, Peterson and Philpot (2007) revisit the question of gender bias on board committees. They add to Kesner's and Bilimoria and Piderit's studies using a 2002 sample of

Fortune 500 directors. After controlling for experience and tenure among other variables, Peterson and Philpot find that female directors still are less likely to sit on executive committees and more likely to sit on public affairs committees. For other committees, however, they do not see significant gender bias in membership, noting "little if any evidence of systematic gender bias in director assignment to other board committees" (p. 177). The Peterson and Philpot study indicates that gender bias on corporate boards may be improving, as they find scant evidence of systematic bias for committee membership outside of public affairs and executive committees. However, we need to take seriously any indication of bias. Not finding bias on some committees does not forgive the consistent gender bias reflected in other committees and should not be a reason to claim that all is on the mend regarding gender bias on corporate boards.

Unfortunately, no comparable studies dealing with committee membership for higher education institutions exist. We know close to nothing about the committee structures of U.S. college and university governing boards. As with the private sector, the literature tells us that much of the "real work" of governing boards is carried out in committees (Chait, Holland, & Taylor, 1996; Ingram, 1993, 2004). But, other than the names of common standing committees, we know little else about these elusive work units. The research on corporate committees leaves us wondering how female trustees fare in comparison with their private sector counterparts. Are female trustees, like female directors, more likely to serve on less powerful committees? Do female trustees tend to sit on committees that deal with so-called "softer" sides of higher education, like academic and student affairs. Are the most powerful committees (executive, audit, nominating, and finance) composed primarily of men? Are private or public schools more equitable in their committee memberships?

> Research Question 4: Do female trustees at AAU universities in 2007 tend to serve on certain types of committees?

Hypothesis 4A: In 2007, female trustees will be overrepresented on student affairs and academic affairs committees and underrepresented on executive, audit, nominating, and finance committees.

Corporate Boards, Networks, and Interlocks

Because the literature on higher education boards of trustees is theoretically sparse, exploring questions about how trustees connect to corporations leads us to the literature on corporate boards, networks and interlocks. Since the early twentieth century commentators have remarked on the phenomenon of interconnected corporate boards and the network of elites that some argued controlled not only corporate America but higher education in America as well (Brandeis, 1914; Veblen, 1918; Sinclair, 1923). According to the business and sociology literature, an interlock occurs when a person concurrently sits on more than one corporate board, thus interlocking the two corporations. Interlocks then, refer to the connections between two like entities – corporation to corporation, or university to university. I am less concerned with the interlocks between higher education institutions (university to university interlocks), than with the interlocks between universities and corporations. To clarify the distinction between university to university interlocks and university to corporation interlocks, I call the interlocks between universities and corporations *corporate connections*. These corporate connections occur when a trustee concurrently serves on a higher education governing board and a corporate board of directors; thus, connecting the two. The literature on corporate board interlocks provides useful insights into why university to corporation *corporate connections* are important and how they might influence higher education governance.

According to Mizruchi (1996), the literature on corporate boards of directors categorizes the reasons for board interlocks into three main groups: organizational-, individual-, and class-

based justifications. Organizational-based explanations stress how organizations benefit from interlocking directorates. They emphasize opportunities for collusion, cooptation and monitoring, and legitimacy in their explanations of board interlocks. Collusion theories focus on horizontally interlocked boards and suggest that these interlocks allow competitors to restrict competition through price fixing. Cooptation and monitoring theories view interlocks through the lens of resource dependency and see interlocks as an opportunity to reign in potentially threatening outside forces (cooptation) or as way for outsiders to influence and keep tabs on other firms to protect their own interests (monitoring). Other theories argue that interlocks offer a form of legitimacy. "By appointing individuals with ties to other important organizations," Mizruchi (1996) writes, "the firm signals to potential investors that it is a legitimate enterprise worthy of support" (p. 276).

Other theorists view interlocks through individual- and class-based lenses. Theories that stress the individual-level justifications for corporate board interlocks argue that individuals may seek multiple board appointments for financial and personal reasons, often seeking compensation, prestige, and contacts (Mizruchi, 1996; Zajac, 1988). Individuals recognize the potential pay offs of board appointments, seeking an opportunity for what Useem (1984) coins a "business scan" (pp. 45-48) – linkages and networks that benefit both the board's and the individual's business interests. This research thread also highlights the individual reasons current board members recruit new board members, pointing out that the resultant interlocks may be a secondary by-product of individual characteristics. New directors may be selected because they bring prestige, experience, and expertise, or because they have a reputation as a good person: someone who signals good citizenship, cooperation, and social commitment by their presence on the board (Mizruchi, 1996).

Class-based theories see interlocks as a way for the corporate elite to maintain class solidarity. Starting with Mills's (1956) work on elites and continuing through Domhoff (1970), and Useem (1984), these theories argue that interlocks are best understood as "social ties among members of the upper class," as elements of "capitalist class integration" (Mizruchi, 1996, p. 279). And this class integration helps maintain the stratification in U.S. society. In this way, interlocks represent another way that the corporate elite consolidate their influence over not only business, but over political and social life as well (Useem, 1984). Such studies lend credence to "Mills's impression that a relatively small number of mutually acquainted people serving on the same boards of directors had the potential to form a unified and powerful class, influencing the actions of each other's affiliated corporations" (Davis, Yoo, & Baker, 2003, p. 309). Indeed, Useem (1984) posits that even within this small group was an "inner circle" of super elite, arguing that:

> a relatively small number of these directors come to serve on several disparate boards and thus to form a cosmopolitan inner circle of the corporate elite. Through their experiences on multiple boards, members of the inner circle are able to understand and represent the interests of big business in general rather than merely the parochial interests of particular companies or regions. Moreover, these individuals end up being disproportionately represented in policy organizations, in the governance of non-profits, and in government service. (Davis et al., 2003, p. 308)

However, it is important, as Mizruchi (1996) points out, to remember that none of these explanations for why interlocks occur preclude the others. It is possible that interlocks bring organizational, individual, and class benefits simultaneously and that teasing out whether and to what degree each interest is served is improbable, as the interaction among these benefits may be somewhat rhizomatic, situational, and dynamic.

While pinpointing exactly why interlocks occur may be difficult, research assessing their influence on board behavior and governance has had more success. One area of research on

interlocks focuses on their existence, detailing in which sectors and among what firms interlocks occur. Often, this type of research on interlocks assumes that the mere existence of an interlock is important in and of itself because it creates an atmosphere or environment conducive to organizational, individual, and class-based benefits. Other studies have tried to hone in on the impact and influence of interlocks, for example:

> as collusive mechanisms, interlocks are assumed to facilitate communication among competitors. As mechanisms of cooptation, interlocks are assumed to pacify the resource provider's management. As monitoring mechanisms, interlocks are assumed to provide the monitoring firm with information on the receiving firm's operations as well as potential influence on its operations. And as reflections of social cohesion, interlocks are assumed to facilitate the political unity necessary for effective political action. (Mizruchi, 1996, p. 280)

Most of the research illustrates that these assumptions pan out, that interlocks do impact corporate behavior, allowing firms to better control resources, encouraging the spread of new ideas and strategies through board contact, and promoting political and social unity among firms (Burt, 1983; Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 2003, Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Mizruchi, 1996; Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993; Useem, 1984). Davis et al. (2003) also found that the interlock network itself is remarkably resilient and flexible, and although specific actors may change with shifting economic environments, the overall network remained intact. Revisiting Mills they argue that "monthly meetings and a small-world network provide an ideal medium for the rapid spread of practices, strategies, structures, rumors, diseases, or anything else spread by face-to-face contact. It is this small world property," they add, "that can turn a geographically dispersed population of nearly 5000 directors into the compact social and psychological entity described by Mills" (p. 321).

The small world phenomenon used by Davis et al. (2003) to describe the corporate interlock network may also prove an apt description of higher education trustees. As Useem

(1984) argues, the inner circle of elites tend to be disproportionately represented on non-profits boards as well. Currently, the higher education literature tells us little about how trustees at elite research universities link to the market economy through corporate directorships. Based on Slaughter & Rhoades (2004) and Pusser et al (2006), we know that trustees are connected to corporations through concurrent board service, that these connections influence governance, and that institution type matters when we look at the corporate connections of trustees. But few of the studies on corporate boards and none on higher education boards address the gap in the literature regarding gender and trusteeship. Boards are generally assumed to be gender-neutral entities that enact gender-neutral policies. Indeed, we generally only think about gender and boards when we talk about women on boards – we mistakenly think of all male boards as genderless. In this way much of the work on interlocks and boards is gendered from the start – assuming a male director, a male corporation, and a male connection or interlock that results in changed behavior – might connections to other types of social and cultural boards also influence behaviors? How are the assumptions about the importance of corporate networks and interlocks influenced by gendered categories and spaces. Are there differences between the corporate connections of male and female trustees? Does institution type influence these connections? Do the networks of AAU trustees differ by gender?

> Research Question 5: Among trustees at AAU universities in 2005, do female and male trustee corporate networks differ?
>
> Hypothesis 5A: Female trustees have fewer corporate connections than male trustees.
>
> Hypothesis 5B: Female trustees at private AAU universities have more corporate connections than female trustees at public universities.
>
> Research Question 6: Are female and male trustees networked differently through their corporate connections to key industrial sectors?

Hypothesis 6A: Female trustees are less likely than male trustees to represent connections to key industrial sectors.

CHAPTER 3

DATA AND METHODS

To address these research questions, this dissertation mainly relies on descriptive statistics drawn from the University of Georgia Trustee Database. The University of Georgia Trustee Database is a proprietary dataset housed at The University of Georgia's Institute of Higher Education. The dataset includes information collected for an NIH grant "University trustees and conflict of interest" (Slaughter, Feldman and Thomas 2005). At present, the data consist of comprehensive trustee information from 60 U.S.-based member institutions of the Association of American Universities (AAU) for the years 1996 through 2005. While the AAU does count two Canadian institutions among its members (McGill University and the University of Toronto), those schools are excluded from this analysis. Further, in 2010 the AAU added The Georgia Institute of Technology to its membership. Because the dataset for this dissertation is based on 1997, 2005, and 2007 AAU information, this analysis excludes the Georgia Institute of Technology. In 2005, the AAU included 60 American universities: 34 public and 26 private. The member institutions of the AAU are the most prestigious research intensive universities in the United States and as such are the market leaders of American higher education.

Founded in 1900, the AAU began as an association of burgeoning research universities. At the time, very few institutions of higher education in the United States could claim that they were in fact research oriented universities (Rudolph, 1962, 1990; Thelin, 2004; Veysey, 1965). American higher education had only recently embarked on its journey toward research renown

and was navigating its route based on the German university model of "advanced study and laboratory research" (Speicher, 2000, p. 1). No uniform standards existed for awarding the Ph.D. or for claiming to be a "university." The AAU grew out of a meeting at the University of Chicago among 14 research universities convened to address issues related to graduate study. The 14 founding members included:

- Catholic University
- Clark University
- Columbia University
- Cornell University
- Harvard University
- Johns Hopkins University
- Princeton University
- Stanford University
- University of California
- University of Chicago
- University of Michigan
- University of Pennsylvania
- University of Wisconsin
- Yale University

The association hoped to create greater uniformity in graduate study thus raising the standards among American research universities which, in turn, would enhance their reputations and allow them to more effectively compete with European institutions for prestige and for doctoral students. According to Thelin (2004), the formation of the AAU "represented a formal response to concerns about standards and standardization" (p. 147). The creation of the AAU was, for Geiger (1986), also a declaration of both independence and equality from European universities and their monopoly on serious graduate education.

The early- and mid-twentieth century saw enormous growth in American research universities, as both the administrative and intellectual structures of our contemporary research university solidified and stabilized (Thelin, 2004; Veysey, 1965). As American research universities developed and matured, AAU member institutions invited more schools to join their

elite club. By 1950, when the National Science Foundation was created, the association included 35 universities. Post World War II funding opportunities brought new energy and revenue streams to American research universities, and the AAU institutions benefited greatly from Cold War science funding. In the wake of Vannevar Bush's 1945 report *Science, the Endless Frontier* new funding agencies emerged to fulfill Bush's vision of federally-funded, university-based, basic research. Bush's notion that "Big Science" was the "Best Science" and the system of competitive grants that grew out of this belief disproportionately benefited "a small number of powerful, well-funded research universities" (Thelin, 2004, p. 272). During the 1950s and 1960s, The National Science Foundation, the expanded National Institutes of Health, the Departments of Defense, Energy, Agriculture, Transportation and Health all became patrons of and contractors with powerful research universities (Thelin, 2004, p. 272). The AAU universities continue to thrive from this legacy of federally funded research.

In the 1980s, a second legacy evolved which also continues to privilege the AAU universities: the emergence of the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime. According to Slaughter and Rhoades (2004), "prior to the [1980] Bayh-Dole Act, federal policy placed in the public domain discoveries made with federal funds" (p. 50). Bayh-Dole changed that. The act allowed universities to patent the products of federally-funded research and listed technology transfer to private industry as a goal of federally-funded research. This formalized and naturalized the commodification of knowledge in university settings, encouraging institutions to view knowledge as a product with concrete earning potential rather than as a public good. It is not surprising that the schools with the best research infrastructure, often the product of federal dollars, flourished and continue to flourish with the shift to an academic capitalist view of research. The AAU schools have done exceptionally well in research funding and academic

rankings since the 1980s. In both 1997 and 2005, only 1 non-AAU school was in the top 25 of the NSF's rankings for total R&D expenditures – the University of California, San Francisco. Further, for 2005 NSF science and engineering research funding, only one non-AAU school was in the top 20. Only four non-AAU schools made the NSF top 20 for non science and engineering funding, which includes funding for education, business, and humanities research (National Science Foundation, 1997; 2005). In 2005, only two non-AAU schools were listed in the top 20 for *U.S. News and World Report's* "Best National Universities."

Overall, the AAU schools are considered the most prestigious research institutions in the United States. In 2005, the 34 public and 26 private AAU schools in the U.S. were seen as the trend setters and market leaders of American higher education. These are the schools that most research universities strive to mimic and as such they greatly influence both the national and international higher education landscape. In fiscal year 2005, AAU universities "received $14.1 billion in federal academic research funding; 56% of all federal academic research funding to colleges and universities" (AAU Facts and Figures, 2008). AAU universities also fare extremely well in the number of faculty belonging to prestigious national academies. For 2005, 82% of the members of the national Academy of Science, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine held positions at AAU schools. Further, AAU universities are well represented in prestigious arts and humanities academies, as "almost two-thirds of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 2007 Class of Fellows are affiliated with an AAU university" (AAU Facts and Figures, 2008). In 2005, AAU universities claimed 1,044,759 undergraduate students, 7% of national enrollments and awarded 17% of undergraduate degrees. For graduate students, AAU schools had 20% of the nation's graduate students, awarding 19% of master's

degrees, 25% of professional degrees, and 52% of doctorate degrees (AAU Facts and Figures, 2008).

Membership in the AAU is by invitation only. The AAU includes a "standing Membership Committee, which periodically evaluates both non-member universities for possible membership and current members for continued membership, with the goal of ensuring that the association in fact comprises comparable leading research-intensive universities" (AAU Membership Policy, 2010, p.1). Once the membership committee identifies potential member institutions, the schools are evaluated based indicators associated with federally funded research production using National Science Foundation research expenditure data, faculty memberships in national academies, faculty fellowships and awards, and faculty quality ratings. A second tier of indicators focuses on the quality of graduate education, postdoctoral placement, and undergraduate education . Finally, a school is evaluated based on the consistency of its "mission, characteristics, and trajectory" with AAU norms. Nominated universities must be approved by a three-fourths vote of member universities (AAU Membership Policy, 2010, p.2). Table 3.1 includes the list of 2005 AAU member institutions and their year of admission.

In 2005, the AAU consisted of 62 North American institutions of higher education (see table 3.1). Of the 14 founding institutions, all but one (Clark University) remained a member in 2005. There were 34 U.S-based public universities, 26 U.S.-based private universities, and 2 Canadian universities included in its membership. The 34 public schools were governed by 27 different governing boards, as several boards govern more than one AAU school. The Regents of the University of California govern 6 different AAU schools: the University of California Davis, Berkeley, Irvine, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Santa Barbara. The Board of Regents, State of Iowa governs both The University of Iowa and Iowa State University; and, the State University

Table 3.1: 2005 Association of American Universities Membership with Year Admitted

Public:	Private:
Indiana University (1909)	Brandeis University (1985)
Iowa State University (1958)	Brown University (1933)
Michigan State University (1964)	California Institute of Technology (1934)
The Ohio State University (1916)	Carnegie Mellon University (1982)
The Pennsylvania State University (1958)	Case Western Reserve University (1969)
Purdue University (1958)	Columbia University (1900)
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (1989)	Cornell University (1900)
Stony Brook University, the State University of New York (2001)	Duke University (1938)
Texas A&M University (2001)	Emory University (1995)
University at Buffalo, the State University of New York (1989)	Harvard University (1900)
The University of Arizona (1985)	The Johns Hopkins University (1900)
University of California, Berkeley (1900)	Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1934)
University of California, Davis (1996)	New York University (1950)
University of California, Irvine (1996)	Northwestern University (1917)
University of California, Los Angeles (1974)	Princeton University (1900)
University of California, San Diego (1982)	Rice University (1985)
University of California, Santa Barbara (1995)	Stanford University (1900)
University of Colorado at Boulder (1966)	Syracuse University (1966)
University of Florida (1985)	Tulane University (1958)
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (1908)	The University of Chicago (1900)
The University of Iowa (1909)	University of Pennsylvania (1900)
The University of Kansas (1909)	University of Rochester (1941)
University of Maryland at College Park (1969)	University of Southern California (1969)
University of Michigan (1900)	Vanderbilt University (1950)
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities (1908)	Washington University in St. Louis (1923)
University of Missouri – Columbia (1908)	Yale University (1900)
University of Nebraska – Lincoln (1909)	
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (1922)	
University of Oregon (1969)	Canadian:
University of Pittsburgh (1974)	McGill University (1926)
The University of Texas at Austin (1929)	University of Toronto (1926)
University of Virginia (1904)	
University of Washington (1950)	
The University of Wisconsin – Madison (1900)	

of New York Board of Trustees governs both Stony Brook University and University at Buffalo. The 26 private schools each have an autonomous, campus-level governing board. So, there are 26 governing boards representing the 26 private AAU schools.

The research in this dissertation builds on and updates earlier research on Boards of Trustees at American universities. Specifically, I was influenced by the work of Beck (1947) and Smith (1974). Beck's 1947 study of the boards of trustees of 30 prestigious U.S. universities found that close to 50% of the university trustees in his study concurrently served on corporate boards of directors. In addition, Beck's work showed that almost three-fourths of trustees were bankers, industrialist, lawyers, and other professionals. Using a plethora of descriptive statistics, Beck showed that the university boards were populated by an elite group of wealthy and prestigious business men. Smith (1974) followed up on Beck's work but focused solely on the regents of the University of California in the early-1970s. Smith showed that the regents were "people not only of great wealth but of great power, socially, economically, and politically" (p.34). In addition, he found that the regents of the University of California were very similar in class and social background to the trustees and regents of other American universities. He argued that trustees were, thus, part of a ruling class in American society – "an identifiable group of men who control the major institutions in our society, from the corporations to the universities, and who benefit from the continued existence of corporate capitalism and the oppressive social relations capitalism generates and requires" (p. 35). My work, then, is undertaken in this tradition. I build on this tradition of descriptive research on university trustees and augment earlier work through the lens of academic capitalism and feminist theories.

The data for this dissertation were collected between 2005 and 2009 as part of a National Institutes of Health grant investigating university trustees and conflict of interest. As a graduate

student, I was a member of the research team for the grant and assisted in the data collection of trustee names for the AAU schools. To gather rosters of voting trustees for each AAU university, the research team for the NIH grant "University trustees and conflict of interest" (Slaughter, Feldman and Thomas, 2005) initially went to the individual school's website. Lists of current trustees are usually available on university websites. Lists from previous years, however, were often unavailable on the internet. To collect older rosters of voting trustees, we contacted the schools by email and requested voting trustee lists. Some schools complied with the requests while others did not. In addition, some schools make these lists available on their websites and others do not. Public schools were much more open with trustee rosters and information than were the privates. Because some schools complied with our requests and others did not, to maintain consistency, each *public* school was sent a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request asking for voting trustee lists from 1995 through 2005. All public schools eventually complied and the rosters of voting trustees for 1997 and 2005 were generated and verified based on the information sent after the FOIA requests.

The grant research team also contacted the private schools by email, requesting lists of voting trustees from 1995 to 2005. But early on, several of the private AAU schools refused to share lists of board members from previous years. Therefore, we used Internal Revenue Service form 990 "Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax" to obtain yearly trustee lists. Part V-A of the IRS form 990 requires tax exempt organizations to list "current officers, directors, trustees, and key employees" (IRS Form 990). Archived IRS form 990s are available on the internet from the GuideStar database of non-profit entities. Form 990s for each school were downloaded if available from the GuideStar website and lists of voting trustees were compiled for all available years, usually 1996 to 2004. Because the GuideStar 990 archive was not always

complete, individual schools were contacted to obtain yearly lists of voting trustees if GuideStar did not contain a form 990 for a particular year. In addition, some schools failed to return a complete list of trustees on the 990. When that occurred the research team contacted the school and requested a complete voting trustee roster for that particular year or set of years.

Because some trustees serve as non-voting board members, the research team included only voting trustees in the yearly trustee rosters. At some schools, emeritus, ex-officio, student, and faculty trustees serve on boards and participate in board discussions but are not allowed to vote. Non-voting trustees are not included in the yearly rosters for each school. If an emeritus, ex-officio, student, or faculty trustee is allowed to vote with the board, the trustee's name is included in the trustee roster. The 2005 and 2007 trustee lists were pulled from each school's website during 2005 and 2007. Information on board type, size, history, and appointment procedures was obtained from the institutions' websites as were board by-laws when available.[2]

The trustee rosters were organized by year and each individual member was coded as female or male according to the common gender associated with each proper name. When names were gender ambiguous, I searched the internet and school's website for instances of the name until a photo or a gender distinguishing prefix (Mr., Ms, Mrs.) appeared to clarify the trustee's gender category. When a person served as a trustee at more than one AAU school during a specific year, the person was listed as a trustee at each school and was included in the trustee roster, gender, and corporate connection analysis for each school. Therefore, some trustees appear on more than one university board.

[2] Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, is excluded from this analysis because the Georgia Trustee Dataset does not include the correct roster for governing trustees for 1997 and 2005. Texas A&M University is excluded from the 2005 analysis of corporate connections and networks for the same reason. The University of Missouri is excluded from the 1997 analysis of corporate connections because the dataset did not contain corporate connection information for the University of Missouri for 1997.

To learn more about the relative position of female trustees on AAU boards and where female trustees were most likely to be represented, I used the 1997 and 2005 National Science Foundation (NSF) research and development expenditures rankings as a gauge of prestige within the AAU. While all AAU universities are considered prestigious research universities, I wanted to see whether female trustees, as the literature on women in higher education suggests, were more likely to serve on the less prestigious boards within the AAU. The AAU uses NSF expenditure rankings to evaluate potential member universities, so this seemed an apt ranking system to gauge AAU member prestige. In addition, I juxtapose the 2005 *U.S. News and World Report* (*USNWR*) rankings to the NSF rankings. The *USNWR* rankings for U.S. higher education institutions often garner substantial criticism from higher education researchers (Carey, 2006; Ehrenberg, 2002; Jaschik, 2007, 2009). For example, Carey (2006) argues that "the magazine's rankings are almost entirely a function of three factors: fame, wealth, and exclusivity" and tell us little about the quality of education. I use the rankings as a gauge of national reputation, not as a proxy for educational quality. Whether or not the *USNWR* rankings are appropriate measures of educational quality is less important for my purposes than whether they tell us about perceived fame, wealth, and prestige. As flawed as they are, the *USNWR* rankings serve as an additional gauge of prestige within an already elite group of schools.

To begin to understand the relative position of trustees within the market economy, the networks among trustees, and the corporate connections for individual trustees, the NIH grant research team utilized the Security Exchange Commission's online EDGAR database. EDGAR, the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system, database includes all statements, reports, and filings with the Security Exchange Commission from 1994 to the present. EDGAR contains information on all publicly traded corporations, including the names of corporate board

members. Each trustee name was entered into the EDGAR database to determine whether that trustee concurrently served as a director of a *publicly traded* corporation. The board affiliations of individual trustees were compiled for 1997 and 2005 and for this project represent the corporate connections of each trustee. For the research questions dealing with corporate connections, the term *corporate connection* refers to a trustee's connection to a publicly traded corporation through concurrent board service at an AAU school and a publicly traded corporation. When the unit of analysis is the university, as in research question five, trustees who served on more than one university board are included in the corporate connections for both schools.

For a richer understanding of the breadth and depth of trustee corporate networks, research question six includes information on trustee corporate connections to key industrial sectors through concurrent board service. The term *corporate connection* is used for the analysis of links to key industrial sectors through publicly traded corporations. For this question, I analyzed corporate connections of individual trustees to discern the types of industries to which female and male trustees were most connected. To determine key industrial sectors, I used the "1987 SIC Matched to 1997 NAICS, Major Groups (2-digit)" industrial codes provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. In 1997, the federal government replaced the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system with the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) While the NAICS classification system includes twenty major industrial categories, the SIC system used 10 major industrial sectors (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007). For research question six, I used the SIC system to make the data analysis more manageable. The SIC scheme groups industries into ten major industrial divisions:

- Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries
- Mineral Industries

- Construction Industries
- Manufacturing
- Transportation, Communication, Utilities
- Wholesale Trade
- Retail Trade
- Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
- Service Industries
- Public Administration

For the analysis for research question six, the corporate connections of private university trustees who concurrently served on more than one private AAU university board were counted only once because the unit of analysis was individual trustee instead of the school.

Finally, to determine how gender influences the work of trustees, I sought lists of 2007 standing committees for the 26 private and 34 public U.S.-based AAU institutions in that year. Standing committee information is not included in the University of Georgia Trustee Database, so committee data represent 2007 boards instead of 2005 boards. Several schools keep current committee descriptions and lists of committee members on their websites. Others do not. For seven private schools (Brandeis University, California Institute of Technology, Cornell University, Emory University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Syracuse University, Yale University), I gathered standing committee lists and descriptions from the schools' websites. Three other schools (Princeton University, Tulane University, Vanderbilt University) sent limited committee information when requested by email. Many of the other private AAU schools either refused to divulge committee information or never responded to multiple email requests for information. For 33 of the 34 public schools, 2007 standing committee lists were gathered from either the school's website or were sent after contacting the school or board. Only one public school, The University of Pittsburgh, failed to respond to email requests. The data on standing committees, then, consist of 2007 standing committee membership lists from 33 public

and 10 private AAU universities. Table 3.2 lists each research question and hypotheses and the methods used to test the hypotheses.

Table 3.2: Research Questions, Hypotheses, Data, and Methods.

Research Question	Hypotheses	Data	Methods
1: Among Association of American Universities (AAU) member institutions are trustees from private or public universities more likely to concurrently serve on the boards of publicly traded corporations?	1A: In 1997 and 2005, among the U.S.-based AAU institutions, private institution trustees are more likely to concurrently serve on corporate boards of directors than public institution trustees.	University of Georgia Trustee Database: 1997, 2005	Descriptive Statistics
2: Among AAU universities are female trustees more likely to serve on the boards of prestigious or less prestigious institutions?	2A: Less prestigious AAU universities will have greater percentages of female trustees.	University of Georgia Trustee Database: 1997, 2005 National Science Foundation R&D rankings, 1997, 2005	Descriptive Statistics
3: Among AAU universities are female trustees more likely to serve on the boards of public or private research universities?	3A: Public AAU universities will have greater percentages of female trustees than will private AAU universities.	University of Georgia Trustee Database: 1997, 2005	Descriptive Statistics
4: Do female trustees at AAU universities in 2007 tend to serve on certain types of committees?	4A: In 2007, female trustees will be overrepresented on student affairs and academic affairs committees and underrepresented on executive, audit, nominating, and finance committees.	2007 Standing Committee Lists	Descriptive Statistics
5: Among trustees at AAU universities, do female and male trustee corporate networks differ?	5A: Female trustees have fewer corporate connections than male trustees. 5B: Female trustees at private AAU universities have more corporate connections than female trustees at public AAU universities.	University of Georgia Trustee Database: 1997, 2005	Descriptive Statistics
6: Are female and male trustees networked differently through their corporate connections to key industrial sectors?	6A: Female trustees are less likely than male trustees to represent connections to key industrial sectors.	University of Georgia Trustee Database: 2005	Network Analysis

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents the results for the research questions and hypotheses and includes a discussion for each research question analyzed.

Research Question 1

Research question one deals with the relationship between elite higher education boards and the market economy and helps us understand the links between trustees and corporate America. In addition, it sheds light on the differences between elite public and private AAU institutions in how they connect to the market economy through their boards of trustees.

> Research Question 1: Among Association of American Universities (AAU) member institutions are trustees from private or public universities more likely to concurrently serve on the boards of publicly traded corporations?
>
> Hypothesis 1A: In 1997 and 2005, among the U.S.-based AAU institutions, private institution trustees are more likely to concurrently serve on corporate boards of directors than public institution trustees.

To understand whether trustees from private or public universities were more likely to concurrently serve on the boards of directors at publicly traded corporations, I compared descriptive statistics from the University of Georgia Trustee Database for 1997 and 2005. Table 4.1 shows the breakdowns for both public and private AAU schools in 1997. Table 4.2 includes the breakdown for 2005 and Table 4.3 provides the means and medians for both 1997 and 2005.

The data in Table 4.1 show that, as hypothesized, private institution trustees were more likely to concurrently serve on boards of directors of publicly traded corporations in 1997 than were public institution trustees. In 1997, there were 1,194 trustees serving on the 26 private AAU university boards. The average board for the 26 private schools included 46 trustees. The boards ranged in size from 19 trustees at Rice University to 76 trustees at The Johns Hopkins University. The private AAU institution trustees represented 1321 total corporate connections, averaging 51 corporate connections per school. Syracuse and Tulane Universities had the fewest corporate connections with 13 each while Northwestern University logged the most with 123.

In 1997, the public AAU institutions had 332 total trustees. The public schools had much smaller boards, averaging 13 trustees. The median was somewhat lower at 10, indicating that a couple of larger boards were pulling the average upward. Both The Pennsylvania State University and the University of Pittsburgh had substantially larger boards than most public schools. Board size ranged from 7 trustees at Michigan State University to 36 trustees at the University of Pittsburgh. The 25 boards included in the 1997 public school sample[3] represented 141 corporate connections, averaging 6 corporate connections per school compared to the 51 average corporate connections at the private schools. The median for corporate connections at the public schools was 3, indicating that a couple of schools were pulling the average upward – both The Pennsylvania State University and the University of Pittsburgh had substantially higher numbers of corporate connections. Seven public schools had no corporate connections while The Pennsylvania State University had the most connections with 30 and the University of Pittsburgh was a close second with 29.

[3] Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, is excluded from this analysis because the Georgia Trustee Dataset does not include the correct roster for governing trustees for 1997 and 2005. The University of Missouri is excluded from the 1997 analysis of corporate connections because the dataset did not contain corporate connection information for the University of Missouri for 1997.

When we look at the corporate connections and take into account board size we see that the private schools averaged 1.07 connections per trustee and the publics averaged 0.34 connections per trustee. For the private schools, The University of Chicago had the most connections per trustee with 83 connections for 36 trustees, resulting in 2.31 connections per trustee. The lowest number of connections per trustee at a private school was at Syracuse University, with 13 connections for 47 trustees, resulting in 0.28 connections per trustee. At the public institutions, The University of Texas had the greatest ratio of connections per trustee with 10 connections for 9 trustees, resulting in 1.11 connections per trustee, a little over the average ratio for the private schools. Seven public schools had no connections per trustee.

Table 4.2 provides the 2005 corporate connection data for public and private AAU schools. As with the 1997 data we see that in 2005 private school trustees were more likely to concurrently serve on the boards of publicly traded corporations than were public school trustees. In 2005, there were 1,189 private school trustees. The average board for the 26 private schools still included 46 trustees. The private school boards ranged in size from 17 trustees at Yale University to 73 trustees at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In 2005, the 26 private AAU institutions had 846 corporate connections, averaging 33 corporate connections per school, a significant drop from the 1997 average of 51 connections per school. The median for the private boards was 35, indicating that a few schools were pulling the average down somewhat. The trustees at Yale University had the fewest corporate connections with 7, while Columbia University and Syracuse University trustees held 12 corporate connections each. The University of Chicago had the highest number of connections with 60, and Northwestern University had the second highest with 55.

In 2005, the public AAU institutions had 334 trustees. Public school boards continued to average 13 trustees per school. Board size ranged from 8 members at 4 schools (Indiana University, Michigan State University, University of Michigan, and University of Nebraska) to 35 trustees at the University of Pittsburgh. The 25 public boards in the 2005 sample[4] had 110 corporate connections, averaging 4 corporate connections per school, 2 points lower than the 1997 average and still substantially lower than the 2005 private school average. The median for the public school boards was only 2 corporate connections per school, indicating that the average was skewed upward. Both the University of Illinois and the University of Missouri had no corporate connections. The University of Pittsburgh, as in 1997, had an unusually high number of corporate connections for the public boards with 34.

When we consider corporate connections by trustee, we see that, in 2005, the private school boards averaged 0.70 connections per trustee. The public boards averaged 0.28 connections per trustee, with a median of 0.22 connections per trustee. For the private school boards The University of Chicago, as in 1997, had the highest ratio of connections per trustee with 52 connections for 49 trustees, resulting in 1.06 connections per trustee. Similarly, Syracuse University had the lowest ratio of connections per trustee, as in 1997, with 12 connections for 55 trustees, resulting in 0.22 connections per trustee. For the public school boards, The Ohio State University had the highest ratio of connections per trustee with 10 connections for 9 trustees, resulting in 1.11 connections per trustee, which was the highest ratio among all of the AAU schools in 2005. Two public schools had no corporate connections in 2005 – the University of Illinois at Urbana Champagne and the University of Missouri.

[4] Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, is excluded from this analysis because the Georgia Trustee Dataset does not include the correct roster for governing trustees for 1997 and 2005. Texas A&M University is excluded from the 2005 analysis of corporate connections and networks for the same reason.

When we look at the overall results for research question one, it is clear that private AAU institutions have more connections to publicly traded corporations than do public AAU institutions. Second, we notice that the number of corporate connections for both private and public schools dropped between 1997 and 2005. Third, we see that while private schools on average have more corporate connections, some public schools have similar numbers of corporate connections as the private schools. Likewise, some private schools seem more like the publics in the number of corporate connections.

First, these results show that private AAU institutions are more likely than public AAU institutions to be connected to publicly traded corporations, supporting the conclusions of Slaughter & Rhoades (2004) and Pusser et al. (2006). Slaughter and Rhodes 2004 also found that the elite private university boards in their study were more likely than public university boards to be interlocked with corporate boards of directors. These interlocks, they suggest, "are potent mediums for the spread of corporate practices" (p.234) because they provide trustees with opportunities to observe, participate in, and absorb corporate cultures and strategies. In addition, these findings support those of Pusser et al. (2006) who also looked at the corporate connections of elite private and public university trustees. Like Pusser et al., these results show that, overall, trustees from private schools are more likely to be connected to corporate America than are trustees from public schools. These corporate connections, according to Pusser et al., are "significant sources of information and legitimacy for institutional policymaking. Consequently, the number and types of boards with which university trustees are affiliated provides a key window into sources of information, networks of legitimacy and authority, and normative understandings of effective institutional organization and behavior" (p. 748). Trustees who also serve as corporate directors seem more likely to have a corporate mindset, which, in turn, may

lead to the suggestion and adoption of specific corporate strategies and behaviors by higher education institutions. In this way, certain higher education institutions may expect these corporate connections to provide them with a competitive edge in an academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime.

Second, these results indicate that the number of corporate connections dropped dramatically between 1997 and 2005. This result is somewhat puzzling, considering that with the growth of academic capitalism, we would expect more, not fewer, ties to corporate America during this time period. But the reduction in trustee corporate connections may be related to greater calls for accountability and increased trustee activism in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Arfken, Bellar, & Helms, 2004; Bastedo, 2005; Chait, 1995; Glazer-Raymo, 2008; Kezar, 2006). As trustees and directors were held more accountable for corporate and institution policies, they began to play more active roles on higher education and corporate boards. Directorships became more time-consuming and more demanding (Chait, 1995; Glazer-Raymo, 2008). From that perspective, the overall plunge in corporate connections between 1997 and 2005 makes sense. As board service required more time and energy and board members were held more and more accountable for corporate and institutional performance, directors and trustees reduced the number of obligations they had by cutting back on board service. This may explain both why the total number of corporate connections drops between 1997 and 2005 and why the total number of trustees with corporate connections slips as well, as seen in the connections per trustee ratio.

Third, we see that while on average private school trustees have more corporate connections than public school trustees, there are both public and private schools that belie these averages. In other words, although the means are helpful and tell a powerful story, not paying

attention to the specifics may lead us to overlook public schools that are actively pursuing connections to the market economy and assume that all private schools are aggressively seeking market economy ties when they are not. For example, in 1997, The Pennsylvania State University and the University of Pittsburgh had more corporate connections than nearly one-fourth of the private schools, and The University of Texas had a higher connection per trustee ratio than half of the private schools. It is important to remember that both Penn State and the University of Pittsburgh are considered "state-related" universities in Pennsylvania and receive moderate state support (Heller, 2006). Both schools have independent, self-perpetuating boards that resemble private school boards in size. Again in 2005, we see that the University of Pittsburgh had more corporate connections than almost half of the private schools, while The Ohio State University had a connection per trustee ratio that was higher than any private school. So, as Metcalfe and Slaughter (2009) argue, an overreliance on means may obscure the complexities of the relationship between higher education and the market economy. Therefore, it will be important to remember to look for hiccups in the data that may point us toward a more complex story of how private and public higher education institutions are coping with academic capitalism.

Research Question 2

Research questions two and three begin our exploration of gender and trusteeship, focusing on descriptive statistics of females and males on boards of trustees at elite AAU universities. The numbers help us contemplate how gender and prestige complicate our understandings of trusteeship. These research questions again draw on us to think through our conceptions of public and private universities and how and why they might differ with respect to

gender representation on their boards. In addition, the questions in this section sketch how elite research universities in America have addressed and ignored issues of gender representation in their most powerful and prestigious spaces – their board rooms.

> Research Question 2: Among AAU universities are female trustees more likely to serve on the boards of prestigious or less prestigious institutions?
>
> Hypothesis 2A: Less prestigious AAU universities will have greater percentages of female trustees.

Much of the literature discussed earlier concerning women and higher education and women and organizations highlights that women are generally underrepresented in the most prestigious places. Even though women have made great strides in their overall representation in higher education and business, they tend to occupy less prestigious spaces within those sectors (Glazer-Raymo, 1999; Glazer-Raymo, 2008; Metcalfe & Slaughter 2008; Shaw, Callahan, & Lechasseur 2008; Valian, 1998; Wilson, 2004). Research question two asks if these trends hold true when we are dealing with an elite group of universities and looks at data from both 1997 and 2005 to see if the relationship changes over time. Within the prestigious AAU, are women most likely to hold board seats at universities that are considered less prestigious within this elite group? Based on the higher education and business literature, I hypothesized that yes, prestige would make a difference even within the elite AAU.

Figure 4.4 provides a scatter plot for all AAU schools in 1997 illustrating the percentage of female board members by NSF total R&D rankings for 1997, which here is a proxy for prestige. As the scatter plot shows, in 1997 there seems to be no relationship between prestige and the percentage of female board members for all of the AAU schools. Most of the schools have between 10% and 30% female board representation regardless of prestige. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 and figures 4.7 and 4.8 further illustrate this point but parse the data by institution type.

Again, when we sort the data by private and public institution and by prestige, we see no clear relationship between prestige and the percentage of female board members in 1997.

Figure 4.9 provides a scatter plot for all AAU schools in 2005 showing the percentage of female board members by NSF total R&D rankings for 2005, which here again represents prestige. Like in 1997, the scatter plot reveals no clear relationship between gender and prestige for all of the AAU schools. As with the 1997 results, most of the schools have between 10% and 30% female board representation regardless of prestige. Tables 4.10 and 4.11 and figures 4.12 and 4.13 show private versus public schools with female representation by NSF prestige. Again, as in 1997, when we sort the data by private and public institution and by prestige, we see no obvious relationship between prestige and the percentage of female board members for the AAU privates and publics.

One possible explanation for the disconnect between the literature and these findings is that the AAU already is extremely prestigious so, in a sense, we are comparing apples to apples rather than apples to oranges. In other words, a broader sample of schools may be needed to see a correlation between gender and a lack of prestige. In this way, our theories of gender and prestige may need to be re-thought to account for gender consistency in overwhelmingly elite or non elite settings. Future research may also find that among non elite schools, as with elite schools, gender representation remains fairly consistent. These results confirm what Metcalfe and Slaughter (2008) urge us to remember when considering the state of women in higher education – that available data often obscure the complexities of gender relations in higher education. As they point out, some women are doing quite well in contemporary higher education and an over reliance on aggregated data will often miss this. Future research on the

impact of prestige on gender representation should bear these results in mind when deciding on sample characteristics and size.

Another possible explanation for the inconsistency of these results with the literature on women is that perhaps the popular perception of prestige is more important for this type of question than the academic perception of prestige. The NSF rankings for total R&D expenditures are best suited for measures of academic and research prestige. This type of ranking may not be most influential on those who influence board appointments. Whereas other types of rankings, like the *U.S. News and World Report* rankings, hold greater sway over public perceptions of prestige. Given that trustees are generally appointed by public officials for public institutions or by current trustees for private institutions, a ranking that got at public perceptions rather than research expenditures might tell a different story. For example, Princeton University is generally thought of as one of the best schools in the nation. But, in 2005, Princeton ranked 79th in the NSF rankings. Surely, the trustees of Princeton imagine it to be much more prestigious and influential than 79th in the nation. Perhaps the trustees' perception of Princeton as one of the top schools in the nation influences how they conceive of their board as a role model for other higher education institutions. This, in turn, might make Princeton's trustees more likely to think about gender representation and the school's image when appointing trustees. Research on women and corporate boards fails to address ideas about perceptions of corporate importance and corporate influence and the inclusion of women on boards of directors (Bilimoria, 2000; Burke, 2000; Burke & Mattis, 2000; Daily, Certo & Dalton, 1999, 2000; Fondas, 2000; Joy, 2008; Kesner, 1988; Mattis, 2000; Peterson & Philpot, 2007; Schor, 1995; Singh, Vinnicombe, & Terjesen, 2007; Williams, 2003).

To further test this theory, I looked at *U.S. News and World Report*'s (*USNWR*) ranking system for the top 50 research universities in 2005. Table 4.14 and Figure 4.15 provide data on all AAU schools that appeared in the *USNWR* top 50 in 2005. As with the NSF ranking system there appears to be no glaring correlation between prestige and female board representation. However, there does seem to be a slight relationship. Tables 4.16 and 4.17 and Figures 4.18 and 4.19 separate the *USNWR* top 50 according to institution type. When we review the relationship between gender and prestige for the AAU private schools, we see a stronger correlation between female board representation and *USNWR* prestige. These results do lend some support to the idea that public perceptions of prestige may matter more than research prestige when we think about female representation on boards of trustees. While this supposition is limited by the small sample size, the lack of comparative data from other years, and a dearth of literature linking prestige to female representation on corporate boards, this may be a ripe area for future research on both university and corporate boards.

Research Question 3

Research question three also deals with where we are most likely to find female trustees. While research question two grappled with notions of prestige, this question deals with a related concept – private versus public higher education. For this question, I tested the hypothesis that female trustees were more likely to serve on the boards of public AAU universities than private AAU universities.

> Research Question 3: Among AAU universities are female trustees more likely to serve on the boards of public or private research universities?
>
> Hypothesis 3A: Public AAU universities will have greater percentages of female trustees than will private AAU universities.

The literature on women in the labor market stresses that women tend to be over represented in government and public sector employment (Carnoy & Levin, 1985; LeRoux & Sneed, 2005; Preston, 1989; Themudo, 2009). Carnoy and Levin (1985) argue that the public sector "provides opportunities for minorities and women that the private sector is apparently not willing or able to provide" (p. 60). Women and minorities, therefore, tend to seek out opportunities with the state and with public and nonprofit entities. Both private and public universities are nonprofit entities, so there may be a tendency for higher education institutions to have more women and minority representation than for-profit educational institutions and private sector corporations. With the ascendancy of academic capitalism, however, universities have adopted market-like behaviors. Private universities, in particular, have opportunities to situate themselves closer to the market because they are less bound by state policies and oversight. One way to do this is to appoint trustees that represent powerful corporate interests; women are underrepresented in these powerful corporate positions. Further, public universities may be more inclined to have representative boards, as the governors who appoint public school trustees will be more likely to pay attention to women and minority groups as voting constituencies. Therefore, I predicted that public AAU universities would have greater percentages of female trustees than would private AAU universities.

Overall, in 1997, 1535 trustees served on the boards of the AAU schools included in this analysis, 306 females and 1229 males.[5] Table 4.20 provides the numbers and percentages of female and male trustees in 1997 for the boards of the private AAU universities. The 26 private institution boards seated 1194 trustees, 224 of which were female and 970 were male. In 1997, the average board for the 26 private schools included 46 trustees. The boards ranged in size from

[5] Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, is excluded from this analysis because the Georgia Trustee Dataset does not include the correct roster for governing trustees for 1997 and 2005.

19 trustees at Rice University to 76 trustees at The Johns Hopkins University. On average 1997 private boards included 9 female trustees and 37 male trustees. The number of females on the private boards ranged from 3 at Rice University to 17 at both Brown and Cornell Universities. The percentages of female and male trustees show that in 1997 the boards were, on average, 19% female and 81% male. Carnegie Mellon University had the lowest female percentage at 8% and Harvard had the highest at 38%.

Table 4.21 provides the numbers and percentages of female and male trustees in 1997 for the 26 boards governing the 33 public AAU universities included in this analysis.[6] The 26 public boards seated 341 trustees, 82 females and 259 males. In 1997, the average board for the 26 public boards included 13 trustees with a median of 10 trustees. The boards ranged in size from 7 trustees at Michigan State University to 36 trustees at the University of Pittsburgh. On average, 1997 public boards included 3 female trustees and 10 male trustees. The number of females on the public boards ranged from 1 at Indiana, The Ohio State, and Purdue Universities to 6 at the University of Oregon. The percentages of female and male trustees show that in 1997 the boards were, on average, 27% female and 73% male, medians were slightly different at 24% female and 76% male. Female percentages ranged from 8% at the University of Pittsburgh to 50% at the Universities of Illinois, Michigan, and Oregon. To summarize, in 1997, females represented on average 27% of the public AAU boards and only 19% of the private AAU boards, an 8 point discrepancy.

In 2005, there were 1532 trustees, 361 females and 1171 males. Table 4.22 includes the numbers and percentages of female and male trustees in 2005 for the boards of the private AAU universities. The 26 private institution boards seated 1189 trustees, 272 of which were female

[6] Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, is excluded from this analysis because the Georgia Trustee Dataset does not include the correct roster for governing trustees for 1997 and 2005.

and 917 were male. Board size was remarkably consistent with the 1997 numbers, averaging 46 trustees. Board size ranged from 17 trustees at Yale University to 73 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. On average 2005 private boards included 10 female trustees and 35 male trustees. Emory, New York, and Rice Universities had lowest number of female trustees with 5, while Brown University boasted the largest number with 20. On average, the 2005 private boards were 24% female and 76% male, representing a 5 point increase in the female percentage since 1997. New York University had the lowest percentage of female trustees with 10% and, as in 1997, Harvard University had the highest percentage with 41%.

Table 4.23 shows the numbers and percentages of female and male trustees in 2005 for the public AAU universities. The 26 boards included in this analysis represent 33 schools.[7] The 26 boards included 343 trustees; 89 females and 254 males. As with the private schools, but also more predictably because of state statutes, board size remained consistent with 1997, averaging 13. Board size ranged from 8 members at Indiana University, Michigan State University and the Universities of Michigan and Nebraska to 35 members at the University of Pittsburgh. On average, the public school boards seated 3 females and 10 males. The University of Nebraska had the lowest number of female trustees, seating no females in 2005. The State University of New York (SUNY) system board, the University of California system board, and The Pennsylvania State University board had the highest number of female trustees at 6. On average, the public boards were 28% female and 72% male, a 1 point increase in female representation from 1997. The University of Nebraska had the lowest percentage, seating no female trustees in 2005, while the Iowa Board of Regents held the highest female percentage at 56%.

[7] Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, is excluded from this analysis because the Georgia Trustee Dataset does not include the correct roster for governing trustees for 1997 and 2005.

The totals, means, and medians for the private and public AAU schools for 1997 and 2005 are shown in tables 4.24 and 4.25. Tables 4.26 and 4.27 provide the 1997 private and public gender breakdowns by low to high percentages. Tables 4.28 and 4.29 include the 2005 private and public information by low to high percentages. As hypothesized, the boards of trustees representing the public AAU schools have higher percentages of female trustees in both 1997 and 2005. The private school boards, however, have greater numbers of female trustees. Because the private school boards are substantially larger than most public school boards, the private AAU schools included more female board members in both 1997 and 2005 but had lower proportions of female trustees. In 1997, the private school boards were 19% female, while the public boards were 27% female – an 8 percentage point difference. In 2005, the private boards had gained some ground, logging 24% female representation, while the public schools averaged 28% female representation.

These results support the literature on women in business, which demonstrates that women and minorities fare better in government and the nonprofit sector (Carnoy & Levin, 1985; LeRoux & Sneed, 2005; Preston, 1989; Themudo, 2009). In addition, these findings raise important questions about the differences in female representation for elite public and private higher education boards. Further, they encourage us to think about differences among higher education institution types and how this influences board composition and diversity. Finally, the results begin to help us contemplate and theorize the gendering of trusteeship.

In both 1997 and 2005, females held greater proportions of board seats at public AAU universities than at private AAU universities. This is consistent with the literature on women in business that shows that women are more likely to be represented in government and the nonprofit sector. Even though the private AAU universities are formally nonprofit entities, the

results to question number one of this study detailing the corporate connections of trustees, especially private school trustees, and the literature on the corporate connections of boards of trustees (Pusser et al., 2006; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004) illustrate that, on average, private AAU universities are much more connected to corporate America through their boards of trustees than are their public counterparts. Further, all of the private university boards in this study are self-perpetuating boards, which means that sitting board members nominate and approve new board members. This means that private boards have more flexibility in appointing new board members. This flexibility coupled with the proximity to the market of their trustees makes private school boards more likely to reflect corporate values, cultures, and norms when nominating and selecting future trustees. In 2008, females made up only 15.2% of the corporate directors of *Fortune* 500 firms (Catalyst, 2008d), the elite of American corporations. This percentage was up only slightly from the 2005 percentage of 14.7% female board representation at the *Fortune* 500. This may explain why elite private school boards have lower percentages of female board members than elite public school boards. Because elite private schools tend to be more tightly connected to corporations through their trustees, the values and norms associated with corporate boards influence trustee behavior at private schools more than public schools. Therefore, as with the corporate private sector in general, females are less well represented at the private AAU schools than they are at public AAU schools.

Greater female representation on the public school boards is consistent with Beck's (1947) study of AAU schools and the Association of Governing Board's (Fain, 2005) research on trustees. Earlier studies (Beck, 1947; Fain, 2005) along with my results suggest that public boards have been more responsive to gender equity concerns than have private boards. Recent research (Ehrenberg and Main, 2009) shows little disparity in the share of female trustees

between the public and private schools in a larger sample of boards of trustees which includes baccalaureate, masters, and doctoral institutions. Ehrenberg and Main's initial findings, however, do show a substantial gap between the share of public and private boards with a female board chair. For 2005, they found a 10 point discrepancy in the proportion of boards with a female chair with about 25% of public boards having a female board chair while only about 15% of private boards had a female board chair. This hints at a crisis of legitimacy for female trustees serving on private school boards. Among the elite AAU schools, females make up a smaller share of private school boards. This coupled with Ehrenberg and Main's (2009) work showing that females are less likely to chair the boards of private institutions, suggests that elite, self-perpetuating, private institution boards are both less likely to include women and less likely to promote those females included to key leadership positions.

One possible explanation for the gap in female representation and female leadership on private school boards stems from the critical mass argument discussed earlier in the literature review. The critical mass argument, based primarily on social contact theory, asserts that there is a point at which female or minority representation reaches a critical mass of effectiveness. According to Konrad, Kramer, and Erkut (2008), on corporate boards of directors, that critical point is three directors. Up until the critical mass point is attained, they argue, women are seen as either tokens or conspirators in group dynamics. Solo females are often isolated or spotlighted in groups; they risk being ignored, dismissed, and stereotyped for their viewpoints. Including two women in a group lessens the risk of tokenism and often creates a dynamic between the two females, providing comfort and validation. But, they argue, women still are liable to be stereotyped or viewed as conspirators. Three women, they insist, constitute a critical mass. At this point, female board membership is perceived as normal and females are no longer viewed as

tokens, outsiders, or conspirators. At three members, women are more comfortable and supportive of each other, are more likely to raise important issues, and are more apt to be listened to and taken seriously (Konrad et al, 2008, p. 147). Tolbert et al. (1995) also found evidence that faculty turnover declines for women once they achieve 35-40% representation in a department. Using competition theory Tolbert et al. explain that until the 35-40% point the majority perceives the increasing female presences as a threat and takes steps to make the work group environment more hostile. Therefore, they argue, "women's growing representation in work groups leads to an increasingly negative environment for them, thus increasing the likelihood of their leaving the group" (p. 575).

Konrad et al. base their critical mass argument on the average board size of *Fortune* 500 boards, which is 9 to 12 directors. A critical mass point of three equals roughly 25-30% of the board. Tolbert et al. (1995) found that at 35-40% the environment improves for female faculty and turnover diminishes. While many of the private and public AAU school boards include three or more female board members, few have attained a critical mass point of 25-30% female representation, and fewer still have reached the 35-40% mark. Tables 4.20 and 4.21 include the 1997 female and male trustees listed from lowest to highest proportion of the private and public school boards. Overall for both private and public school boards in 1997, only 20 of the 52 boards included in this analysis had 25% or greater female representation. In 1997, for the 26 private school boards, 8 schools attained 25% or more female representation. For the 26 boards representing the 33 public AAU schools, 12 boards had 25% or greater female representation. The trend holds for the 2005 numbers, as tables 4.22 and 4.23 illustrate. Of the 52 boards included in the 2005 analysis, 24 boards achieved 25% or more female representation. Ten private boards in 2005 had 25% or more female representation, while 14 public boards did so.

Therefore, the boards representing the public AAU schools do a better job attaining a critical mass of female trustees than do the private school boards. Public school boards, on average, are much smaller so perhaps it is easier to achieve a critical mass of female trustees on these smaller boards. Without a critical mass it may be more difficult for female and male trustees on self-perpetuating, private school boards to see the value in female board membership. Further, if we accept Tolbert et al.'s (1995) research on competition theory, it may be that until the critical mass point is attained the environment for female trustees is recognized as so bleak that few trustees want to nominate other females. In addition, having fewer than a critical mass of female trustees may lead to a backlash of sorts, as male trustees feel threatened and hunker down to ward off future in roads by females. All of these are likely, and not mutually exclusive, explanations. They may all operate simultaneously to keep the proportions of female trustees lower at private AAU universities. But, something else may also be happening here. Public AAU universities tend to have governor appointed boards. Indeed, of the 26 boards representing the 33 public AAU schools in my sample, 21 of the boards have some or all members appointed by the governor. Higher percentages of female trustees on the boards representing public schools may signal greater concern by governors for courting key voting constituencies in their states. In addition, the public sector tends to be the area that addresses the needs of marginalized populations. According to Carnoy and Levin (1985), "the State does this in response to pressures on the public sector to fulfill the mobility aspirations created by the American ideology of a classless society characterized by equal opportunity for all" (p. 60). Within the elite AAU, then, public universities seem to be fulfilling the traditional role played by the public sector in advanced capitalist societies, resulting in somewhat greater opportunities for women on public boards.

The breakdown of female proportions at AAU universities in this analysis is lower than those reported by the Association of Governing Board's (AGB) 2004 study. The AGB study surveyed 494 private and 352 public institutions and found 28% female representation on private school boards and 29% female representation on public school boards (Fain, 2005), compared with 24% on private and 28% on public boards in 2005 for the AAU sample. In addition, the 2005 female percentages for the AAU schools are lower than those reported in the Ehrenberg & Main (2009) AGB sponsored study which found that women made up 31% of the boards for the 509 schools in their sample. These discrepancies hint at possible gender disparities between elite and non-elite universities. The AAU is comprised of the most privileged and influential research universities in the United States and these elite universities, based on these averages, seem to be less gender inclusive on their powerful boards than their less prestigious counterparts. In this way, institution type matters. The AAU schools, specifically the privates, have, on average, lower female proportions on their boards than the broader samples in the AGB and Ehrenberg and Main studies.

That the AAU research universities seat lower shares of female trustees on their boards than other types of higher education institutions fits with the literature on women and higher education. While we saw in question two that prestige within the AAU seemed not to make a difference regarding female representation on boards of trustees, we see here that prestige within a broader swath of institutions may in fact matter. As the literature on women and higher education highlights, women tend to do best at the least prestigious institution types. As students, faculty, and administrators, women fare better at less prestigious institution types and in less prestigious departments within institutions (Glazer-Raymo, 1999; Glazer-Raymo, 2008; Metcalfe & Slaughter 2008; Shaw, Callahan, & Lechasseur 2008; Valian, 1998; Wilson, 2004).

Therefore, studies that include broader samples of university types and find greater percentages of female trustees should not surprise us.

The question is why? Why do elite institutions especially, but all higher education institution types generally, do poorly at attracting and keeping female trustees. The literature on women and corporate boards suggests several explanations. First, some argue, there is " a lack (real or perceived) of qualified females" (Peterson & Philpot, 2006, p. 178). While this seems unlikely for corporate boards, given the rising numbers of female executives and business school graduates, it seems even more unlikely for higher education boards, as trustees have few, if any, required qualifications (Ingram, 1995, 2004; Nason, 1993). Another theory suggests that there is an "unwillingness of qualified females to serve on additional boards due to liability concerns" (Peterson & Philpot, 2006, p. 178). This theory may indeed have merit, as one repercussion of the board activism and accountability trend of the 1990s was added pressure on board members, which may have caused some qualified females to refuse initial board membership offers or bypass additional boards memberships requests. Third, as Peterson & Philpot (2006) write, theorists speculate that women turn down board appointments due to professional and personal time constraints. This theory plays on the literature finding females more burdened than males by the double bind of home and professional demands (Gatrell & Cooper, 2007). Finally, others postulate that the board "search process is systematically biased against female candidates" (Peterson & Philpot, 2006). This theory seems to relate best to our discussion of the lack of female presence on boards of trustees and leads us to explore how systematic bias may exist on these boards.

The low proportions of female trustees may lead to what Kanter (1977) described as a masculine ethic among boards of trustees, or what later writers began to theorize as the gendered

organization (Acker, 1990; Calás & Smircich, 1996; Valian, 1998). Male board members tend to seek out and nominate potential board members who are like themselves – successful men who will fit in with the culture, norms, and values of the board. While female trustees exist and play important roles, as *female trustees*, male trustees are allowed to see themselves as genderless, as merely trustees. As Domhoff (1970) argues, "all power elite foundations, institutes and associations … are involved in ideological combat" (p. 274). And while Domhoff is referring to the ideological clash of class, I think his point works well for gender ideologies as well. Just as organizational theorists argue that organizations themselves are not genderless structures (Acker, 1990; Calás & Smircich, 1996; Valian, 1998), the position of trustee should not be viewed as a genderless subject position.

The image that is conjured up when one hears the word "trustee" primarily is a male image. We envision bankers, investors, lawyers, and financiers, and those images are traditionally male images. We picture dark, mahogany-clad board rooms filled with soft leather chairs, massive conference tables, and weighty bookcases – rooms dank with the mustiness of tradition and power. In our minds, these imagined spaces play host to meetings fogged with cigar and pipe smoke and soothed with an occasional aged Scotch or Port. We see elderly, pot-bellied, wealthy, and powerful men wheeling and dealing in ways not much different from Upton Sinclair's descriptions of university boards in the 1920s. These figures hold our higher education system in trust. We have entrusted our colleges and universities to these men in whom we grant total authority to direct and guide our institutions of higher education. With such grave responsibility it is hardly surprising that trustee is gendered male.

Overtime, this gendered image of trustee as male shapes societal expectations for what a trustee should be. In turn, these expectations frame our perceptions of what makes a valuable

trustee. It is not that it is impossible to envision a female trustee, it is that our immediate assumption about trustees is that they are men. Traditionally, if we imagine a female trustee, we assume that she is the wife or widow of one of the males described above. She is a substitute, or a fill-in, for a male trustee's absence, not a trustee in her own right. What is strange about this is that none of the requirements or expectations that we have for trustees preclude women. We expect trustees to be successful individuals who are highly committed to the school or the state higher education system for which they serve. Trustees should be well-connected socially and economically and have substantial financial resources or links to financial resources. In addition, trustees should bring some form of expertise to the board (Gale, 1993). Again, none of these ideal conditions rule out women trustees, so why is it that women take up so few of the seats on boards?

One way to think though this question is to look at the critical and post-structural literature on subject positions. As we discussed above, trustee seems to be gendered male – when we imagine a trustee we imagine a male. This means that the subject position of trustee is a male subject position. It may, in fact, also be a white, upper-class, heterosexual male subject position, but for now, let us stick to the male part of this subject position. When I use the term subject position, I use it in the tradition of Althusser (1971), Butler (1992, 1995, 1999), and Foucault (1978, 1979, 1982). For Althusser (1971), ideologies create certain positions in society that humans occupy. He theorizes that individuals are recruited into and then occupy subject positions. Althusser posits the notion of interpellation of the subject – interpellation meaning a hailing of sorts of the individual – ideology hails the individual and the individual occupies its subject position. He points out that "you and I are *always already* subjects, and as such constantly practice the rituals of ideological recognition, which guarantee for us that we are

indeed concrete, individual, distinguishable, and (naturally) irreplaceable subjects" (pp.172-173). He continues, "ideology has always-already interpellated individuals as subjects, which amounts to making it clear that individuals are always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects, which necessarily leads us to one last proposition: *individuals are always-already subjects* (pp. 175-176). For Althusser, then, human beings occupy subject positions that are already imagined and determined. So when someone agrees to be a trustee, they are occupying the subject position of trustee and will comport themselves according to the subject position's expectations and guidelines.

Foucault (1978, 1979, 1982) and Butler (1992, 1995, 1999) use similar formulations of the subject and subject positions but see subject positions as less stable and more tenuous. Throughout his career, Foucault dealt with the subject differently. He argued, though, that the overarching goal of his work had been to "create the history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects" (Foucault, 1982, p. 208). First, he talked about the creation of the subject through discourses that take on the status of science, that focus on economic labor, or that ground the subject in nature and biology. Second, he looked at how the subject was created through dividing practices. Finally, he focused on how the subject created itself through acts – "the way a human being turns him- or herself into a subject" (p. 208). Both *The History of Sexuality* and *Discipline and Punish* deal with the production of the subject as a dividing practice in discourse and through power relations. The subject, for Foucault, is not prior to its discursive production; there is no stable, ever-present, or transcendent subject. Subjects are effects of power relations and, as such, are always under construction.

Butler (1992, 1995, 1999) bounces off these ideas about the subject to theorize a discursive subject created through power relations. "What Foucault suggested," she writes, "was

that this subject is itself the effect of a genealogy which is erased at the moment that the subject takes itself as the single origin of its action, and that the effects of an action always supersede the stated intention or purpose of the act" (Butler, 1992, p.10). The moment the subject takes itself to be a constant, coherent thing is precisely the moment that those power relations from which and through which the subject is created are ignored, erased, and censured. By not claiming a coherent, stable, and static subject, we can more closely recognize the contingency of subjects and the politics inherent in their creation. She writes, "for if the subject is constituted by power, that power does not cease at the moment the subject is constituted, for that subject is never fully constituted, but is subjected and produced time and again. That subject is neither the ground nor a product, but the permanent possibility of a certain resignifying process" (Butler, 1992, p. 13). Subjects are not just assumed; they are created and a subject is "perhaps most political at the point in which it is claimed to be prior to politics itself" (Butler, 1992, p.13).

These theories of the subject help us conceptualize how the subject position "trustee" can be gendered, and gendered male. But these theories also remind us that subject positions are always up for negotiation and resignification, are always in process. In this way, interrogating subject positions to see how they are being reified, perpetuated, and resisted becomes a crucial and never ending endeavor. Indeed, as I move forward and point out the ways in which trustee is gendered male but also the spaces where negotiation and resignification are occurring, it will be important to think of the subject position of trustee as under negotiation. Subjects are never fully constituted, but are best thought of as rhizomatic, as ever-changing, as always in process and under production. According to Deleuze and Guattari (1987) "a rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but

the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree imposes the verb 'to be,' but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, 'and…and…and…'" (p.25).

Research Question 4

Research question four explores the work that trustees perform and how female trustees fit in to that work. As we continue to explore the gendered subject position of trustee, an examination of the work trustees perform can help us see the power relations that reify trustee as a male subject position even while females serve as trustees. Research on corporate boards tells us that committees perform the bulk of a board's work (Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994; Kesner, 1988; Konrad et al., 2008; Peterson & Philpot, 2007). Committees constitute the main work units for boards and "much board action and policy making originates in one or more of the committees of the board" (Peterson & Philpot, 2007, p. 177). Bilimoria & Piderit (1994) describe the standing committees of corporate boards as the "innermost circle of corporate power and control" (p. 1454). Looking at the committee representation of women on university boards, therefore, allows us to explore the locations of power and control for trustees. For this question, I tested the hypothesis that female trustees were more likely to serve on less powerful board committees than their male counterparts.

> Research Question 4: Do female trustees at AAU universities in 2007 tend to serve on certain types of committees?
>
> Hypothesis 4A: In 2007, female trustees will be overrepresented on student affairs and academic affairs committees and underrepresented on executive, audit, nominating, and finance committees.

Table 4.30 provides the percentages of female membership for the available AAU standing committees for 2007. Because not all of the universities that provided committee information for 2007 have the same standing committees, some university standing committees are not included in the analysis. The table includes the most common standing committees types among the 36 schools that submitted committee information. When committee names varied among schools, standing committees were categorized based on the committee descriptions provided by the universities. For example, in Table 4.30, committees that focused on budgeting and finances were lumped together under the category Budget/Finance and those that work on trustee nominations and governance were combined under Nominating/Trustees/Governance. Likewise, committees that dealt with academic affairs, educational policies, and student affairs comprise the standing committee entitled Academic & Student Affairs/Educational Policy. External Affairs, Development, Alumni, and Investment committees were combined, as were Buildings, Grounds, and Facilities committees. Standing committee types were included in the analysis if at least 30% of the universities in the committee dataset had that type of standing committee. So, for example, if a university had a standing committee on academic health centers, it is not included in this analysis because fewer than 30% of the schools that submitted committee information had a similar standing committee.

In Table 4.30 we see that there is amazing diversity of standing committees among the universities submitting committee information, especially among the public schools. The ten private universities in the dataset are much more similar in standing committee structure. This wide array of committee types makes generalizing the data somewhat difficult, as only two of the standing committee types (Audit, and Academic and Student Affairs/Educational Policy) are common among more than 80% of the schools. A third committee type (Budget/Finance) is

common to nearly three-quarters of the schools. Committees that deal with buildings, grounds and facilities are common to almost 60% of the schools. Therefore, I am most confident discussing the findings from those four committee types. However, the percentages from the other committee types provide insight into areas that warrant future research and analysis.

As the literature on corporate board committees suggests, female board members seem less likely to serve on the most prestigious committees for the governing boards in the committee dataset. On corporate boards, the executive, audit, nominating, and compensation committees are considered the most powerful and prestigious board committees (Kesner, 1988). Because no similar studies evaluating the prestige of higher education board committees exist, we will assume that these four committees are also more powerful for higher education governing boards. In table 4.30 we see that on average in 2007, females held 26% of the board seats at the schools included in the committee dataset. On the prestigious executive and audit committees females held only 21% of the seats, substantially lower than their average representation on these boards in general. The mean female representation on budget and finance committees was even lower, female trustees held only 19% of the committee seats. On average, females made up 25% of the committees that dealt with nominations, trustees, and governance. Compensation committees were 23% female. The largest percentage of female trustees served on committees that dealt with academic and student affairs and educational policy (31%). Committees that dealt with external affairs, alumni, development, and investments averaged 23% female, while buildings, grounds and facilities committees also were 23% female.

The medians for the committee dataset in table 4.30 tell somewhat of a different story. The median percentage for females on the boards in the committee dataset was 23%, 3 percentage points lower than the 26% mean, which tells us that the average is skewed upward by

a few schools with high female percentages. Both the University of Michigan (63% female) and Michigan State University (50% female) boards have unusually high percentages of female trustees in 2007. Based on the median percentages, females are overrepresented on all of the committees except for the audit; budget and finance; and compensation committees. This view of the data complicates the analysis to some extent. Females are still underrepresented on key committees with fiduciary and oversight responsibilities. But they are no longer underrepresented on the powerful executive committees. However, when we look at median percentages rather than the means, females remain overrepresented on academic and student affairs committees.

Looking closely at the work of trustees through their committee assignments shows that as with the clustering of women in higher education as a whole, women trustees tend to be clustered within certain types of committees. Female trustees from the 36 universities in the committee dataset were most likely to serve on committees that dealt with academic and student affairs and least likely to sit on committees with fiduciary and fiscal responsibilities. Females averaged 31% (25% median) of academic and student affairs committee members. Only 19% (18% median) of budget and finance committee members were female, while females made up 21% (20% median) of the audit committees. These statistics suggest that higher education governing boards operate with similar gender hierarchies as corporate boards. Research on corporate board committees and gender (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994) finds that after controlling for experience and tenure, female board members were significantly favored for public affairs committees while males were significantly favored for compensation, executive, and finance committees. Their results "indicate an interesting pattern of sex-typing of committees" (p. 1464). "It appears," they continue, "that these committees truly operate under the influence of

the ‘BOGSAT’ phenomenon: ‘the idea that the most important decisions in organizations are made by a ‘bunch of guys sitting at a table’” (p. 1465, citing Willis, 1989).

While the analysis of the committee dataset is less clear-cut and more abstruse for a few of the common standing committee types, it does reveal some interesting trends. First, mirroring the research on corporate board committees, females trustees are less likely than their male counterparts to serve on committees that focus on financial and oversight matters. Female trustees in the committee dataset were least likely to serve on audit, budget and finance, and compensation committees. Second, female trustees are more likely to serve on committees that deal with academic and students affairs and educational policy. This correlates to the research on corporate board committees showing that female board members were more likely to serve on public affairs committees.

These findings further explicate how the subject position of trustee can continue to be gendered male even while females serve on boards of trustees. Even when women serve as trustees at elite universities, they are often relegated to the least powerful board committees. This promotes the circumscription of female trustees to those roles least associated with power. Female trustees serve a purpose and have a role, but they are generally kept away from the seats of power. In this way, the image of a trustee as a person with power excludes women, and the subject position of trustee persists as a male image. But these findings also point to areas where the subject position of trustee is under negotiation. Because the subject trustee must constantly and repeatedly be resignified, interrogating the work trustees perform illustrates how the everyday and the mundane feed in to our conceptions of subject positions. Ultimately, these illustrations offer an opportunity to rewrite and reimagine the subject trustee by shifting our

understanding of the everyday and the mundane and by consciously altering the work female and male trustees perform.

Research Question 5

Research question five further explores the linkages between trustees and power by showing how trustees at elite AAU universities connect to the market economy. Research on board interlocks argues that corporate board interlocks influence corporate behavior, allowing firms to better control resources, encouraging the spread of new ideas and strategies through board contact, and promoting political and social unity among firms (Burt, 1983; Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 2003, Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Mizruchi, 1996; Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993; Useem, 1984). The literature on higher education governance, however, tells us little about how trustees at elite research universities link to the market economy through corporate directorships. Earlier work by Slaughter & Rhoades (2004) and Pusser et al (2006), shows how trustees are connected to corporations through concurrent board service. This research suggests that these connections influence governance and that institution type matters when we look at the corporate connections of trustees. But few studies on corporate boards and none on higher education boards address the gap in the literature regarding gender and trusteeship. Research question five, therefore, draws our attention to gender differences in the connections between universities and corporations. In addition, this question explores the relationship among gender, corporate connections, and institution type.

> Research Question 5: Among trustees at AAU universities in 2005, do female and male trustee corporate networks differ?
>
> Hypothesis 5A: Female trustees have fewer corporate connections than male trustees.

Hypothesis 5B: Female trustees at private AAU universities have more corporate connections than female trustees at public universities.

Tables 4.31 through 4.34 illustrate the gender breakdown for the corporate connections for private and public AAU schools for 1997 and 2005. Tables 4.35 and 4.36 show the means and medians for the data contained in tables 4.31 through 4.34. Tables 4.25 and 4.26 provide the data for 1997.

As shown in table 4.31 and highlighted in research question one, in 1997, the private AAU universities had 1,194 trustees serving on the 26 private university boards. The average board for the 26 private schools included 46 trustees. The boards ranged in size from 19 trustees at Rice University to 76 trustees at The Johns Hopkins University. The private AAU school trustees represented 1321 total corporate connections, averaging 51 corporate connections per school. Syracuse and Tulane Universities had the fewest corporate connections with 13 while Northwestern University logged the most with 122. Of the 1321 corporate connections for the 1997 private AAU schools, 83 came from female trustees while 1238 came from male trustees.

In 1997, 43 female trustees from 21 different private schools concurrently served on the boards of publicly traded corporations. Brown University had the highest number of females with corporate connections with 6, while 5 different private schools had no females with corporate connections. The highest percentages of female trustees with corporate connections were 50% of female trustees at The University of Chicago and 40% at Carnegie Mellon University. Both schools, however, had below average numbers of female trustees, 4 and 5 respectively, so those high percentages are somewhat misleading. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology had the largest number of corporate ties from females with 11 connections from 3 female trustees. Brown University had 9 connections from 6 female trustees; The University of Chicago had 8 connections from 2 female trustees. Cornell University had 7 connections from 5

female trustees, and Harvard university also had 7 connections but from only 3 female trustees. The schools with the largest percentages of corporate connections coming from female trustees were Brown University with 26% of connections coming from female trustees, Rice University with 24% of connections from female trustees, Harvard University with 23% of connections from female trustees, and Yale University with 22% of connections coming from female trustees.

Table 4.32 illustrates that in 1997, the public AAU institutions had 341 total trustees. The public schools had much smaller boards, averaging 13 trustees. The median was somewhat lower at 10, indicating that a couple of larger boards were pulling the average upward. Both The Pennsylvania State University and the University of Pittsburgh had substantially larger boards than most public schools. Again, as noted in research question one, this may be due to their quasi independent status as "state related" universities in the Pennsylvania public university system (Heller, 2006). Board size ranged from 7 trustees at Michigan State University to 36 trustees at the University of Pittsburgh. The 25 boards included in the 1997 public school sample[8] represented 141 corporate connections, averaging 6 corporate connections per school compared to the 51 average corporate connections in 1997 at the private schools. The median for corporate connections at the public schools was 3, indicating that a couple of schools were pulling the average upward – both The Pennsylvania State University and the University of Pittsburgh had substantially higher numbers of corporate connections. Seven public schools had no corporate connections while The Pennsylvania State University had the most connections with 30 and the University of Pittsburgh was a close second with 29.

[8] Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, is excluded from this analysis because the Georgia Trustee Dataset does not include the correct roster for governing trustees for 1997 and 2005. The University of Missouri is excluded from the 1997 analysis of corporate connections because the dataset did not contain corporate connection information for the University of Missouri for 1997.

In 1997, the public AAU schools had 141 corporate connections from 64 different trustees. Only 3 female trustees concurrently served on the boards of publicly traded corporations, while 61 male trustees did so. The 3 female trustees came from 2 different schools and represented 5 corporate connections. Only the Universities of Texas and Wisconsin had female trustees who concurrently served on corporate boards. The female trustee from the University of Texas had 1 corporate connection representing 10% of the school's connections. The 2 female trustees from the University of Wisconsin represented 4 corporate connections, comprising 27% of the school's connections. Eighteen of the 1997 public AAU schools had male trustees who concurrently served on corporate boards.

Table 4.33 provides the 2005 gender and corporate connection data for the private AAU universities. In 2005, the 26 private AAU institutions had 846 corporate connections, averaging 33 corporate connections per school, with a median of 35 corporate connections per school. This represents a significant drop from the 1997 average of 51 connections per school. The median for the private boards of 35 indicates that a few schools were pulling the average down somewhat. The trustees at Yale University had the fewest corporate connections with 7, while Columbia University and Syracuse University trustees held 12 corporate connections each. Northwestern University had the highest number of connections with 60, and the Johns Hopkins University had the second highest with 55.

In 2005, 56 female trustees from 23 of the 26 private AAU universities concurrently served on the boards of public traded corporations, representing a 2% increase in the proportion of female trustees with corporate connections from the 1997 numbers. At the same time, 393 male trustees concurrently sat on the boards of publicly traded corporations, a 7% decrease in the proportion of male trustees with corporate connections from the 1997 data. Harvard University

had the highest number of female trustees with corporate connections with 7, and Princeton University had the second highest with 6. Three schools (Brandeis University, Case Western Reserve University, and the University of Pennsylvania) had no female trustees with corporate connections. On average, the 2005 private universities had 2 female trustees and 15 males with corporate connections. Harvard University also had the highest percentage of female trustees with corporate connections with 47%, while Princeton University logged 46%. Harvard and Princeton also led the way in the number of corporate connections from female trustees, with 11 connections each. The University of Southern California had 9 corporate connections from its female trustees. Yale University had the highest percentage of corporate connections stemming from female trustees with 57% of its corporate connections coming from female trustees. Female trustees at Columbia University accounted for 50% and those at Princeton University represented 42% of the corporate connections at those schools.

Table 4.34 contains the 2005 gender and corporate connections data for the public AAU universities. In 2005, the public AAU institutions had 343 trustees. Public school boards continued to average 13 trustees per school. Board size ranged from 8 members at 4 schools (Indiana University, Michigan State University, University of Michigan, and University of Nebraska) to 35 trustees at the University of Pittsburgh. The 25 public boards in the 2005 sample[9] had 110 corporate connections, averaging 4 corporate connections per school, 2 points lower than the 1997 average and still substantially lower than the 2005 private school average of 33. The median for the public school boards was only 2 corporate connections per school, indicating that the average was skewed upward. Both the University of Illinois and the

[9] Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, is excluded from this analysis because the Georgia Trustee Dataset does not include the correct roster for governing trustees for 1997 and 2005. Texas A&M University is excluded from the 2005 analysis of corporate connections and networks for the same reason.

University of Missouri had no corporate connections. The University of Pittsburgh, as in 1997, had an unusually high number of corporate connections for the public boards with 34.

In 2005, 11 female trustees from 9 public universities concurrently served on the boards of publicly traded corporations. No school had more than 2 female trustees who concurrently served on corporate boards. At both The Ohio State University and the University of Arizona, 50% of female trustees had corporate connections, meaning 1 of the 2 female trustees at each school served on a corporate board. The 1 female trustee with corporate connections at The Ohio State University represented 3 corporate connections, the highest number of corporate connections from female trustees. The University of Pittsburgh also had 3 corporate connections from female trustees, with 3 connections from 2 female trustees. Interestingly, 3 boards had 100% of their corporate connections stemming from female trustees: Iowa's Board of Regents, the University of Arizona, and the University of Oregon. The University of Texas had 50%, or 1 of the 2 corporate connections coming from a female trustee.

Tables 4.35 and 4.36 provide summary data from the 1997 and 2005 private and public AAU school. The summary data should be viewed with caution, especially for the public AAU universities, as some of the means can be misleading. For example, table 4.36 shows that on average 13% of female trustees at public AAU universities had corporate connections. At first glance, this seems promising, hinting at the potential for more power sharing and legitimacy as female trustees become more involved in powerful corporate boards. A closer look, however, reveals that the median percentage is still 0%. The detailed descriptive data in table 4.34 illustrates that only 9 of the 23 universities with corporate connections had female trustees with connections. With such small numbers of female trustees per school, having one or two females with connections can skew the means tremendously. Take The Ohio State University as an

example, 50% of its female trustees have connections, but it only has 2 female trustees. The same type of situation exists for the percentage of corporate connections that come from female trustees. On average, 19% of public school corporate connections come from female trustees. The median, however, is 0%. The 3 schools with 100% of their corporate connections stemming from female trustees are clearly skewing the mean.

The data in tables 4.31 through 4.36 clearly show that, as hypothesized, female trustees have fewer corporate connections than male trustees. In addition, the data show that female trustees at private universities have more corporate connections than female trustees at public universities. These results further our understanding of the gendering of trusteeship by showing how male trustees are more closely tied to the market economy through their corporate connections. But the data also remind us that institution type matters, and matters significantly in female trustee connections to the market economy.

Paying attention to the relative market position of the trustees suggests another layer to gender disparity in trusteeship. If part of the reason trustees are selected is their affiliation with markets as seen through their ties to publicly traded corporations, another explanation for the privileging of males for board membership emerges. For the AAU institutions in 1997 and 2005, male trustees were much more likely than female trustees to serve on other corporate boards. This in itself is not so surprising, as women are underrepresented on corporate boards, and the for-profit, corporate sector remains a male-dominated structure (Bilimoria, 2000; Burgess & Tharenou, 2000, 2002; Burke, 1994, 1997, 2000; Burke & Mattis, 2000; Daily, Certo & Dalton, 1999, 2000; Fondas, 2000; Joy, 2008; Kesner, 1988; Mattis, 2000; Peterson & Philpot, 2007; Schor, 1995; Singh, Vinnicombe, & Terjesen, 2007; Williams, 2003). But it could also hint at a possible preference for certain types of trustees based on gender and market position. In

other words, are female and male trustees appointed for different reasons, serving divergent purposes? Are female trustees underrepresented because they have fewer corporate connections and networks, as the theory of academic capitalism suggests, making them less likely to be viewed as economically beneficial to universities? Or, are certain female trustees selected precisely because they lack connections to the corporations making them, as Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (1998) posit, perfect buffers between elite corporate men and the broader society?

In *Diversity in the Power Elite* Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (1998) argue that there is an ideal role for women in the "male oriented corporate culture" (p. 76). Women "serve as tokens and buffers" and "then become the consultants and corporate directors who are the role models and instructors for the new generations of buffers" (p. 76). In this way, they argue, women serve an important function in the power elite, "they take some of the sting out of an impersonal corporate system" (p. 76). While Zweigenhaft and Domhoff's argument should be critiqued for its essentialism, naturalizing the notion of women as personable, soft, comforting, and care-taking, it does reflect certain societal beliefs in the characteristics of women. According to this logic, women represent the so-called softer sides of the market economy and can help to neutralize the harsh realities of capitalism. For female trustees, this may mean that fewer connections to the corporate sector is seen as a good thing, enabling female trustees to temper the corporate mindset of other trustees. Seen in this light, female trustees serving on committees with "softer" agendas also makes sense. If women are assumed to have certain characteristics (nurturing, caring, emotional, sensitive) that mitigate the assumed characteristics of powerful men, then they will be pushed, and often push themselves, toward committees that value these attributes and away from committees that desire more market-like behaviors. Hence, the

proliferation of female trustees on committees that deal with academic and student affairs and educational policies.

These results add to our sketch of female and male trustees at elite universities by showing how male trustees are more connected to the market economy and thus, more associated with power. This further feeds in to our image of trustee as powerful male, as a person connected to power through the market economy. In addition, these results hint at a possible privileging of females who are not directly connected to the market economy so that they may serve as buffers for powerful men. This opens up a space for female trustees – a space that values female participation because females supposedly temper the image of male trustee.

Further, research on board interlocks suggests that corporate interlocks matter. Board interlocks help consolidate power among the elite. In addition, interlocks allow firms to better control resources, encourage the spread of new ideas and strategies through board contact, and promote political and social unity among firms (Burt, 1983; Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 2003, Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Mizruchi, 1996; Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993; Useem, 1984). These interactions among firms through corporate board and trustee service, then, are primarily male interactions. And the power consolidation that occurs as a result of these interactions, is primarily a male endeavor, making the "small world" phenomenon documented by Davis et al. (2003) more aptly labeled a "small [male] world" phenomenon.

These results, however, also show that there are important differences between the corporate connections of female trustees at elite public universities and elite private universities. Because the number of corporate connections for female trustees at the public AAU universities is so low, it is difficult to make generalizations about their market connections. When only 11 female trustees have corporate connections, even slight alterations in the data can result in

substantial differences in the means. Clearly, private universities value female and male corporate connections more than public universities. Because private university boards are self-perpetuating, private school boards can act on these preferences more readily than public school boards. While the private AAU schools seat, on average, a lower proportion of female trustees, they have greater overall numbers of female trustees. Having more female trustees allows for more corporate connections among the female trustees. But, as discussed with the results of research question three, this also may relate to how private and public boards are appointed. The governors who appoint most public school trustees may be more likely to pay attention to women and minority groups as voting constituencies. In addition, they may be less likely to think about the trustee's market connections than their political capital.

. With the ascendancy of the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime, universities have adopted market-like attitudes and behaviors. Private universities, in particular, have more flexibility to situate themselves closer to the market because they are less bound by state policies and oversight. One way to do this is to appoint trustees that represent powerful corporate interests. While women remain underrepresented in powerful corporate positions, private boards may pay more attention than public boards to the potential for corporate connections among all trustees, female and male. Of course, this complicates Zweigenhaft and Domhoff's (1998) argument that women serve as buffers for powerful corporate men, but it does not preclude it. Female trustees, especially at private schools, may be viewed simultaneously as potential buffers and as prospective links to the market economy. Therefore, female trustees at private AAU schools may illustrate the transition from Slaughter and Rhoades' (2005) public good knowledge/learning regime, where female trustees serve as the buffers of capitalism, to an academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime, where female and male trustees tie universities

to the market economy. Female trustees at private AAU universities, then, represent the tension between these mindsets – at once a part of and apart from academic capitalism.

This tension between knowledge/learning regimes represented by female trustees at private AAU schools also helps illuminate the crisis of legitimacy, discussed in question three, for female trustees at private universities. Ehrenberg and Main, (2009) found that female trustees at private schools were less likely to chair boards of trustees than females trustees at public schools. As female trustees represent the tension between the public good and academic capitalist regimes, it may be more difficult for female trustees to be viewed as leaders in either worldview. This frustrates our desire to pinpoint female trustees as one thing or the other, but it does open up space for resignification. In an academic capitalist framework, we would expect that as universities incorporate market-like behaviors, women will continue to be pushed aside and delegitimized. Academic capitalism pays special attention to structures and restraints. So as university structures become more in line with the market structures that privilege males, women will fare poorly. A poststructural stance, on the other hand, allows us to see the structures as less stable and more susceptible to resistance and redefinition. Where academic capitalism helps us recognize limitations, poststructuralism offers us possibilities. In other words, this may be an important moment in time when the subject position of female trustee is particularly ripe for renegotiation and reconfiguration. Private schools show us female trusteeship in flux - an instability resulting from the shifting terrains of knowledge/learning regimes that allows for multiple legitimate images of female trustee. This figuration of the subject position of female trustee as one in flux with multiple possibilities takes us back to Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) conception of the rhizome. Rather than pinpointing female trustee as one thing or the other, perhaps we should call for a rhizomatic female trustee, one whose fabric "is the conjunction,

'and…and…and…'" (p.25). This would help us conceive of female trustee as "a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or to end" (Butler, 1999, p.43).

Research Question 6

Research question six, builds on the analysis of corporate connections by exploring how female and male trustees are linked differently to key industrial sectors. For this research question, I used the corporate connections for 2005 private AAU trustees only, as the number of corporate connections for the public universities comparatively is so low. The literature on corporate board interlocks suggests that the existence of corporate interlocks is important in and of itself because it creates an atmosphere or environment conducive to organizational, individual, and class-based benefits. As we continue to explore the subject position of trustee and its associations with power through gender and connections to market economy, looking at the types of corporate networks that trustees represent can help us further understand the gendering of trusteeship. This question focuses on how the corporate connections of trustees influence our presumptions about trusteeship and power, which in turn, reify our notions of trustee as male.

> Research Question 6: Are female and male trustees networked differently through their corporate connections to key industrial sectors?
>
> Hypothesis 6A: Female trustees are less likely than male trustees to represent connections to key industrial sectors.

Table 4.37 presents the data for research question six. As suspected, the data show that female and male corporate networks differ in important ways. In 2005, the private AAU university trustees represented 828 individual connections to publicly traded corporations with identifiable SIC codes. Female trustees accounted for 96 of these connections, while male

trustees accounted for 732 connections. On average, 12% of the connections were created through female trustees, and 88% through male trustees. When we look at the corporate connections by key SIC industrial sector, we see that there were no 2005 private school trustee connections to the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries sector. In the mineral industries sector, there were 16 overall connections, all from male trustees. Only 1 trustee had construction industries connections. The manufacturing sector had the most corporate connections, with 322 total connections. Female trustees made up 34 (11%) of those connections while male trustees accounted for 288 (89%) of the manufacturing connections. There were 86 trustee connections to the transportation, communications, and utilities (TCU) sector, 13 (15%) female connections and 73 (85%) male connections. Twenty-seven trustees served on corporate boards in the wholesale trade sector, only 2 of whom were female trustees (7%) and 25 were male (93%). The retail trade sector had 49 trustee connections. Only 3 female trustees concurrently served on retail trade boards (6%), while 46 males (94%) did so. The key financial sector (finance, insurance, and real estate) was linked to 196 private school trustees. Twenty-eight female trustees (14%) sat on finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) boards, while 168 males trustees (86%) were tied to this sector. The service industries were connected to 109 trustees, 15 females (14%) and 94 males (86%).

The data in table 4.37 illustrate some clear differences in the ways female and male trustees network to the market economy. Female trustees represented 12% of all connections to publicly traded corporations in these 10 industrial sectors. For this analysis, percentages above or below that mark tell us where female trustees are disproportionately linked. The data show that, in 2005, private university female trustees were disproportionately connected to the service, FIRE, and TCU sectors. Female trustees were most likely to be connected to corporations in the

TCU sector. TCU industries include passenger, freight, water, and air transportation services, communications firms, and utilities. In addition, both the FIRE and service sectors had higher than average connections to female trustees. FIRE industries include depository and nondepository credit institutions, securities and commodities services, insurance carriers and services, and real estate and investment firms. Service sector industries include health, legal, educational and social services, travel and leisure services, and personal and business services. Female trustees were least likely to sit on corporate boards in the minerals, construction, wholesale and retail trade industrial sectors.

These results are somewhat difficult to analyze, as there is little extant research on the types of corporate boards on which women are most likely to serve. In its 2005 census of *Fortune* 500 female board directors, Catalyst, found that the savings, real estate, household and personal care, health care insurance, temporary help, and food and drug industries had highest proportions of female board members (Catalyst, 2006). The results for question six, in some ways, align with the Catalyst research, as the top industries for female board representation in their research do come from the TCU, FIRE, and Service sectors. The Catalyst research, however, is based on a fuller version of NAICS categories and includes over 70 industrial classifications of *Fortune* 500 firms. Clearly, broadening the industrial classifications of the analysis would allow a more detailed analysis of where female trustees fit in to the market economy. Future research on the corporate connections of female trustees should include subsectors of the ten major SIC divisions or use the NAICS system to provide a richer view of female trustee networks.

The question six results, however, do suggest correlations to research on women in the broader market economy. In 2005, women workers tended to be overrepresented in service

industries, so the overrepresentation of female trustees as board members in service firms is not necessarily surprising (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006). The dearth of research on women and boards of directors leaves major gaps in the literature here, so we are not sure if industries with more female workers are more likely to have female corporate officers and female board members than male-dominated industries. However, Joy (2008) argues that the number of female corporate board members is a predictor of the number of female corporate officers. In this way, more female trustees may lead to more female top administrators and presidents in higher education. Ehrenberg, Jakubson, Martin, Main, & Eisenberg (2010) show that "institutions with female presidents/chancellors and female provosts/academic vice presidents, as well as those with a greater share of female trustees, increase their shares of female faculty at a more rapid rate" (p. 1). Future research on female trustees and female corporate board members should explore the potential correlations among the female workforce, female executives and administrators, and female trustees and corporate board members.

The overrepresentation of female trustees as corporate board members in the FIRE sector may also link back to our discussions of Slaughter and Rhoades' (2004) shifting knowledge/learning regimes. The overrepresentation of female trustees in the FIRE sector could signal that as universities incorporate more of an academic-capitalist mindset, corporate financial ties become even more important for both female and male trustees. Indeed, the higher proportions of female ties to the service and financial sectors may illustrate this tension between the public good and academic capitalism knowledge/learning regimes. Female trustee ties to the service sector may point to Zweigenhaft and Domhoff's argument that women serve as buffers for more aggressive corporate mindsets and embody the public good philosophy. Female trustee links to the FIRE sector may represent the shift to an academic-capitalist mindset where all

trustees are valued for their corporate mindset. At this point, however, it does not seem as though female trustees are privileged for specific types of links to industrial sectors, but the rising numbers of female and male trustees connected to FIRE industries may indicate a growing preference for certain industrial sectors with the ascendency of academic capitalism.

Table 4.1: 1997 Corporate Connections by University.

1997 Private	1997 Total Trustees	1997 Corp Conn Total	1997 Corp Conn per Trustee
Brandeis U	46	45	0.98
Brown U	52	35	0.67
CalTech	53	72	1.36
Carnegie Mellon U	63	96	1.52
Case Western U	54	55	1.02
Columbia U	23	18	0.78
Cornell U	64	67	1.05
Duke U	36	18	0.50
Emory U	37	55	1.49
Harvard U	37	31	0.84
Johns Hopkins U	76	62	0.82
MIT	74	80	1.08
New York U	50	74	1.48
Northwestern U	72	122	1.69
Princeton U	40	31	0.78
Rice U	19	17	0.89
Stanford U	32	38	1.19
Syracuse U	47	13	0.28
Tulane U	25	13	0.52
U of Chicago	36	83	2.31
U of Pennsylvania	60	52	0.87
U of Rochester	38	22	0.58
U of Southern Cal	44	72	1.64
Vanderbilt U	38	51	1.34
Wash St. Louis U	57	81	1.42
Yale U	21	18	0.86
Total	1194	1321	
MEAN	46	51	1.07
MEDIAN	45	52	1.00

1997 Public	1997 Total Trustees	1997 Corp Conn Total	1997 Corp Conn per Trustee
Indiana U	8	7	0.88
Iowa	9	0	0.00
Michigan State U	7	1	0.14
Ohio State U	10	4	0.40
Penn State U	32	30	0.94
Purdue U	10	1	0.10
SUNY	16	2	0.13
Texas A & M U	10	3	0.30
U of Arizona	11	2	0.18
U of California	17	8	0.47
U of Colorado	9	0	0.00
U of Florida	14	0	0.00
U of Illinois	10	0	0.00
U of Kansas	9	0	0.00
U of Maryland	17	5	0.29
U of Michigan	8	0	0.00
U of Minnesota	14	4	0.29
U of Nebraska	8	1	0.13
U of North Carolina	14	5	0.36
U of Oregon	12	0	0.00
U of Pittsburgh	36	29	0.81
U of Texas	9	10	1.11
U of Virginia	16	9	0.56
U of Washington	9	5	0.56
U of Wisconsin	17	15	0.88
Total	332	141	
MEAN	13	6	0.34
MEDIAN	10	3	0.29

Table 4.2: 2005 Corporate Connections by University.

2005 Private	2005 Total Trustees	2005 Corp Conn Total	2005 Corp Conn per Trustee
Brandeis U	46	25	0.54
Brown U	53	39	0.74
CalTech	52	36	0.69
Carnegie Mellon U	56	49	0.88
Case Western U	41	25	0.61
Columbia U	23	12	0.52
Cornell U	62	44	0.71
Duke U	35	19	0.54
Emory U	36	33	0.92
Harvard U	37	27	0.73
Johns Hopkins U	68	55	0.81
MIT	73	37	0.51
New York U	48	47	0.98
Northwestern U	70	60	0.86
Princeton U	38	26	0.68
Rice U	22	20	0.91
Stanford U	31	22	0.71
Syracuse U	55	12	0.22
Tulane U	35	14	0.40
U of Chicago	49	52	1.06
U of Pennsylvania	55	40	0.73
U of Rochester	37	21	0.57
U of Southern Cal	48	43	0.90
Vanderbilt U	45	36	0.80
Wash St. Louis U	57	45	0.79
Yale U	17	7	0.41
Total	1189	846	
MEAN	46	33	0.70
MEDIAN	47	35	0.72

2005 Public	2005 Total Trustees	2005 Corp Conn Total	2005 Corp Conn per Trustee
Indiana U	8	1	0.13
Iowa	9	1	0.11
Michigan State U	8	2	0.25
Ohio State U	9	10	1.11
Penn State U	33	10	0.30
Purdue U	10	5	0.50
SUNY	19	1	0.05
U of Arizona	11	1	0.09
U of California	19	13	0.68
U of Colorado	9	1	0.11
U of Florida	13	6	0.46
U of Illinois	11	0	0.00
U of Kansas	9	1	0.11
U of Maryland	16	4	0.25
U of Michigan	8	2	0.25
U of Minnesota	14	2	0.14
U of Missouri	9	0	0.00
U of Nebraska	8	3	0.38
U of North Carolina	13	3	0.23
U of Oregon	11	1	0.09
U of Pittsburgh	35	34	0.97
U of Texas	9	2	0.22
U of Virginia	16	3	0.19
U of Washington	10	3	0.30
U of Wisconsin	17	1	0.06
Total	334	110	
MEAN	13	4	0.28
MEDIAN	11	2	0.22

Table 4.3: 1997 and 2005 Corporate Connections Means and Medians.

Privates	Total Trustees	Corp Conn total	Corp Conn per Trustee
1997			
Total	1194	1321	
MEAN	46	51	1.07
MEDIAN	45	52	1.00
2005			
Total	1189	846	
MEAN	46	33	0.70
MEDIAN	47	35	0.72

Publics	Total Trustees	Corp Conn total	Corp Conn per Trustee
1997			
Total	332	141	
MEAN	13	6	0.34
MEDIAN	10	3	0.29
2005			
Total	334	110	
MEAN	13	4	0.28
MEDIAN	11	2	0.22



Figure 4.4: 1997 Gender by NSF Prestige All AAU Universities.

Table 4.5: 1997 Private AAU University Trustees with Gender by NSF Prestige.

1997 Private	1997 Total Trustees	NSF Ranking	1997 Female	% Female 1997
Johns Hopkins U	76	1	13	17%
MIT	74	4	14	19%
Stanford U	32	6	6	19%
Cornell U	64	12	17	27%
Harvard U	37	15	14	38%
U of Pennsylvania	60	16	15	25%
Wash St. Louis U	57	22	7	12%
U of Southern Cal	44	23	8	18%
Duke U	36	25	12	33%
Yale U	21	26	6	29%
Columbia U	23	27	4	17%
Northwestern U	72	38	9	13%
CalTech	53	43	9	17%
Emory U	37	46	4	11%
Case Western U	54	47	7	13%
U of Rochester	38	49	6	16%
New York U	50	51	5	10%
U of Chicago	36	52	4	11%
Carnegie Mellon U	63	60	5	8%
Vanderbilt U	38	69	7	18%
Princeton U	40	75	10	25%
Tulane U	25	91	6	24%
Brown U	52	109	17	33%
Rice U	19	134	3	16%
Brandeis U	46	137	12	26%
Syracuse U	47	145	4	9%
Total	1194		224	
MEAN	46	51	9	19%
MEDIAN	45	45	7	18%

Table 4.6: 1997 Public AAU University Trustees with Gender by NSF Prestige.

1997 Public	1997 Total Trustees	NSF Ranking	1997 Female	% Female 1997
U of Michigan	8	2	4	50%
U of Wisconsin	17	3	4	24%
U of Washington	9	5	4	44%
UC, San Diego	17	7	5	29%
UC, Los Angeles	17	8	5	29%
Texas A & M U	10	9	3	30%
U of Minnesota	14	10	5	36%
UC, Berkeley	17	11	5	29%
Penn State U	32	13	4	13%
Ohio State U	10	17	1	10%
U of Illinois	10	18	5	50%
U of Arizona	11	19	3	27%
U of Florida	14	20	3	21%
U of Colorado	9	21	2	22%
UC, Davis	17	24	5	29%
U of Texas	9	29	2	22%
U of North Carolina	14	32	3	21%
U of Maryland	17	33	4	24%
Purdue U	10	34	1	10%
U of Pittsburgh	36	37	3	8%
Michigan State U	7	40	3	43%
U of Iowa	9	41	4	44%
Indiana U	8	45	1	13%
Iowa State U	9	48	4	44%
SUNY Stoneybrook	16	57	4	25%
SUNY Buffalo	16	59	4	25%
U of Missouri	9	62	2	22%
U of Nebraska	8	73	2	25%
U of Virginia	16	77	2	13%
UC, Irvine	17	78	5	29%
U of Kansas	9	81	2	22%
UC, Santa Barbara	17	88	5	29%
U of Oregon	12	151	6	50%
Total	451		115	
MEAN	14	38	3	28%
MEDIAN	12	32	4	25%



Figure 4.7: 1997 Gender by NSF Prestige for Private AAU Universities.



Figure 4.8: 1997 Gender by NSF Prestige for Public AAU Universities.



Figure 4.9: 2005 Gender by NSF Prestige All AAU Universities.

Table 4.10: 2005 Private AAU University Trustees with Gender by NSF Prestige.

2005 Private	2005 Total Trustees	NSF Ranking	2005 Female	% Female 2005
Johns Hopkins U	68	1	14	21%
Stanford U	31	7	11	35%
U of Pennsylvania	55	9	11	20%
Duke U	35	10	11	31%
Cornell U	62	13	17	27%
MIT	73	14	15	21%
Columbia U	23	18	7	30%
Wash St. Louis U	57	19	7	12%
Harvard U	37	27	15	41%
U of Southern Cal	48	28	11	23%
Yale U	17	30	6	35%
Northwestern U	70	33	13	19%
Vanderbilt U	45	37	11	24%
U of Rochester	37	38	6	16%
Emory U	36	43	5	14%
Case Western U	41	45	8	20%
U of Chicago	49	55	8	16%
New York U	48	59	5	10%
CalTech	52	62	10	19%
Princeton U	38	79	13	34%
Carnegie Mellon U	56	80	11	20%
Tulane U	35	103	10	29%
Brown U	53	104	20	38%
Rice U	22	149	5	23%
Syracuse U	55	150	10	18%
Brandeis U	46	158	12	26%
Total	1189		272	
MEAN	46	53	10	24%
MEDIAN	47	38	11	22%

Table 4.11: 2005 Public AAU University Trustees with Gender by NSF Prestige.

2005 Public	2005 Total Trustees	NSF Ranking	2005 Female	% Female 2005
U of Michigan	8	2	4	50%
U of Wisconsin	17	3	5	29%
UC, Los Angeles	19	4	6	32%
UC, San Diego	19	6	6	32%
U of Washington	10	8	3	30%
Penn State U	33	11	6	18%
Ohio State U	9	12	2	22%
UC, Berkeley	19	15	6	32%
U of Minnesota	14	16	3	21%
UC, Davis	19	17	6	32%
U of Florida	13	20	4	31%
U of Arizona	11	21	2	18%
U of Colorado	9	22	3	33%
U of Pittsburgh	35	23	5	14%
U of Illinois	11	24	2	18%
Texas A & M U	9	25	1	11%
U of North Carolina	13	29	3	23%
U of Texas	9	32	3	33%
Purdue U	10	35	2	20%
U of Maryland	16	39	2	13%
U of Iowa	9	41	5	56%
Michigan State U	8	42	4	50%
U of Nebraska	8	44	0	0%
Indiana U	8	51	2	25%
UC, Irvine	19	58	6	32%
SUNY	19	60	6	32%
U of Virginia	16	69	3	19%
U of Missouri	9	74	4	44%
SUNY Stoneybrook	19	76	6	32%
Iowa State U	9	78	5	56%
U of Kansas	9	83	4	44%
UC, Santa Barbara	19	97	6	32%
U of Oregon	11	159	5	45%
Total	466		130	
MEAN	14	39	4	30%
MEDIAN	11	29	4	32%



Figure 4.12: 2005 Gender by NSF Prestige for Private AAU Universities.



Figure 4.13: 2005 Gender by NSF Prestige for Public AAU Universities.

Table 4.14: 2005 Gender by Top 50 USNWR Prestige All AAU Universities.

AAU School	2005 US News Ranking	2005 Total Trustees	2005 Female	2005 % Female
Harvard U	1	37	15	41%
Princeton U	1	38	13	34%
Duke U	3	35	11	31%
Yale U	3	17	6	35%
Stanford U	5	31	11	35%
MIT	6	73	15	21%
U of Pennsylvania	7	55	11	20%
Brown U	9	53	20	38%
CalTech	9	52	10	19%
Columbia	9	23	7	30%
Emory U	9	36	5	14%
Northwestern U	9	70	13	19%
Cornell U	14	62	17	27%
Johns Hopkins U	14	68	14	21%
U of Chicago	14	49	8	16%
Rice U	17	22	5	23%
Wash St. Louis U	17	57	7	12%
Vanderbilt U	19	45	11	24%
U of Virginia	21	16	3	19%
Carnegie Mellon U	23	56	11	20%
UC, Berkeley	23	19	6	32%
U of Michigan	23	8	4	50%
U of North Carolina	27	13	3	23%
Brandeis U	28	46	12	26%
UC, Los Angeles	28	19	6	32%
U of Rochester	31	37	6	16%
UC, San Diego	33	19	6	32%
New York U	34	48	5	10%
Tulane U	34	35	10	29%
Case Western Reserve	37	41	8	20%
U of Wisconsin	38	17	5	29%
Syracuse U	40	55	10	18%
UC, Davis	41	19	6	32%
UC, Irvine	41	19	6	32%
U of Southern Cal	41	48	11	23%
Penn State U	45	33	6	18%
U of Illinois	45	11	2	18%
UC, Santa Barbara	47	19	6	32%



Figure 4.15: 2005 Gender by USNWR Prestige All AAU Universities.

Table 4.16: 2005 Gender by Top 50 USNWR Prestige Private AAU Universities.

2005 Private	2005 US News Ranking	2005 Total Trustees	2005 Female	2005 % Female
Harvard U	1	37	15	41%
Princeton U	1	38	13	34%
Duke U	3	35	11	31%
Yale U	3	17	6	35%
Stanford U	5	31	11	35%
MIT	6	73	15	21%
U of Pennsylvania	7	55	11	20%
Brown U	9	53	20	38%
CalTech	9	52	10	19%
Columbia	9	23	7	30%
Emory U	9	36	5	14%
Northwestern U	9	70	13	19%
Cornell U	14	62	17	27%
Johns Hopkins U	14	68	14	21%
U of Chicago	14	49	8	16%
Rice U	17	22	5	23%
Wash St. Louis U	17	57	7	12%
Vanderbilt U	19	45	11	24%
Carnegie Mellon U	23	56	11	20%
Brandeis U	28	46	12	26%
U of Rochester	31	37	6	16%
New York U	34	48	5	10%
Tulane U	34	35	10	29%
Case Western Reserve	37	41	8	20%
Syracuse U	40	55	10	18%
U of Southern Cal	41	48	11	23%

Table 4.17: 2005 Gender by Top 50 USNWR Prestige Public AAU Universities.

2005 Public	**2005 US News Ranking**	**2005 Total Trustees**	**2005 Female**	**2005 % Female**
U of Virginia	21	16	3	19%
UC, Berkeley	23	19	6	32%
U of Michigan	23	8	4	50%
U of North Carolina	27	13	3	23%
UC, Los Angeles	28	19	6	32%
UC, San Diego	33	19	6	32%
U of Wisconsin	38	17	5	29%
UC, Davis	41	19	6	32%
UC, Irvine	41	19	6	32%
Penn State U	45	33	6	18%
U of Illinois	45	11	2	18%
UC, Santa Barbara	47	19	6	32%



Figure 4.18: 2005 Gender by Top 50 USNWR Prestige Private AAU Universities.



Figure 4.19: 2005 Gender by Top 50 USNWR Prestige Public AAU Universities.

Table 4.20: 1997 Female and Male Representation Private AAU Universities.

1997 Private	1997 Total Trustees	1997 Female	1997 Male	1997 % Female	1997 % Male
Brandeis U	46	12	34	26%	74%
Brown U	52	17	35	33%	67%
CalTech	53	9	44	17%	83%
Carnegie Mellon U	63	5	58	8%	92%
Case Western U	54	7	47	13%	87%
Columbia U	23	4	19	17%	83%
Cornell U	64	17	47	27%	73%
Duke U	36	12	24	33%	67%
Emory U	37	4	33	11%	89%
Harvard U	37	14	23	38%	62%
Johns Hopkins U	76	13	63	17%	83%
MIT	74	14	60	19%	81%
New York U	50	5	45	10%	90%
Northwestern U	72	9	63	13%	87%
Princeton U	40	10	30	25%	75%
Rice U	19	3	16	16%	84%
Stanford U	32	6	26	19%	81%
Syracuse U	47	4	43	9%	91%
Tulane U	25	6	19	24%	76%
U of Chicago	36	4	32	11%	89%
U of Pennsylvania	60	15	45	25%	75%
U of Rochester	38	6	32	16%	84%
U of Southern Cal	44	8	36	18%	82%
Vanderbilt U	38	7	31	18%	82%
Wash St. Louis U	57	7	50	12%	88%
Yale U	21	6	15	29%	71%
Total	1194	224	970		
MEAN	46	9	37	19%	81%
MEDIAN	45	7	35	18%	82%

Table 4.21: 1997 Female and Male Representation Public AAU Universities.

1997 Public	1997 Total Trustees	1997 Female	1997 Male	1997 % Female	1997 % Male
Indiana U	8	1	7	13%	87%
Iowa	9	4	5	44%	56%
Michigan State U	7	3	4	43%	57%
Ohio State U	10	1	9	10%	90%
Penn State U	32	4	28	13%	87%
Purdue U	10	1	9	10%	90%
SUNY	16	4	12	25%	75%
Texas A & M U	10	3	7	30%	70%
U of Arizona	11	3	8	27%	73%
U of California	17	5	12	29%	71%
U of Colorado	9	2	7	22%	78%
U of Florida	14	3	11	21%	79%
U of Illinois	10	5	5	50%	50%
U of Kansas	9	2	7	22%	78%
U of Maryland	17	4	13	24%	76%
U of Michigan	8	4	4	50%	50%
U of Minnesota	14	5	9	36%	64%
U of Missouri	9	2	7	22%	78%
U of Nebraska	8	2	6	25%	75%
U of North Carolina	14	3	11	21%	79%
U of Oregon	12	6	6	50%	50%
U of Pittsburgh	36	3	33	8%	92%
U of Texas	9	2	7	22%	78%
U of Virginia	16	2	14	13%	87%
U of Washington	9	4	5	44%	56%
U of Wisconsin	17	4	13	24%	76%
Total	341	82	259		
MEAN	13	3	10	27%	73%
MEDIAN	10	3	8	24%	76%

Table 4.22: 2005 Female and Male Representation Private AAU Universities.

2005 Private	2005 Total Trustees	2005 Female	2005 Male	2005 % Female	2005 % Male
Brandeis U	46	12	34	26%	74%
Brown U	53	20	33	38%	62%
CalTech	52	10	42	19%	81%
Carnegie Mellon U	56	11	45	20%	80%
Case Western U	41	8	33	20%	80%
Columbia U	23	7	16	30%	70%
Cornell U	62	17	45	27%	73%
Duke U	35	11	24	31%	69%
Emory U	36	5	31	14%	86%
Harvard U	37	15	22	41%	59%
Johns Hopkins U	68	14	54	21%	79%
MIT	73	15	58	21%	79%
New York U	48	5	43	10%	90%
Northwestern U	70	13	57	19%	81%
Princeton U	38	13	25	34%	66%
Rice U	22	5	17	23%	77%
Stanford U	31	11	20	35%	65%
Syracuse U	55	10	45	18%	82%
Tulane U	35	10	25	29%	71%
U of Chicago	49	8	41	16%	84%
U of Pennsylvania	55	11	44	20%	80%
U of Rochester	37	6	31	16%	84%
U of Southern Cal	48	11	37	23%	77%
Vanderbilt U	45	11	34	24%	76%
Wash St. Louis U	57	7	50	12%	88%
Yale U	17	6	11	35%	65%
Total	1189	272	917		
MEAN	46	10	35	24%	76%
MEDIAN	47	11	34	22%	78%

Table 4.23: 2005 Female and Male Representation Public AAU Universities.

2005 Public	2005 Total Trustees	2005 Female	2005 Male	2005 % Female	2005 % Male
Indiana U	8	2	6	25%	75%
Iowa	9	5	4	56%	44%
Michigan State U	8	4	4	50%	50%
Ohio State U	9	2	7	22%	78%
Penn State U	33	6	27	18%	82%
Purdue U	10	2	8	20%	80%
SUNY	19	6	13	32%	68%
Texas A & M U	9	1	8	11%	89%
U of Arizona	11	2	9	18%	82%
U of California	19	6	13	32%	68%
U of Colorado	9	3	6	33%	67%
U of Florida	13	4	9	31%	69%
U of Illinois	11	2	9	18%	82%
U of Kansas	9	4	5	44%	56%
U of Maryland	16	2	14	13%	88%
U of Michigan	8	4	4	50%	50%
U of Minnesota	14	3	11	21%	79%
U of Missouri	9	4	5	44%	56%
U of Nebraska	8	0	8	0%	100%
U of North Carolina	13	3	10	23%	77%
U of Oregon	11	5	6	45%	55%
U of Pittsburgh	35	5	30	14%	86%
U of Texas	9	3	6	33%	67%
U of Virginia	16	3	13	19%	81%
U of Washington	10	3	7	30%	70%
U of Wisconsin	17	5	12	29%	71%
Total	343	89	254		
MEAN	13	3	10	28%	72%
MEDIAN	11	3	8	27%	73%

Table 4.24: Means and Medians 1997 and 2005 Private AAU Universities.

Private	**Total Trustees**	**Female**	**Male**	**% Female**	**% Male**
1997					
Total	1194	224	970		
MEAN	46	9	37	19%	81%
MEDIAN	45	7	35	18%	82%
2005					
Total	1189	272	917		
MEAN	46	10	35	24%	76%
MEDIAN	47	11	34	22%	78%

Table 4.25: Means and Medians 1997 and 2005 Public AAU Universities.

Public	**Total Trustees**	**Female**	**Male**	**% Female**	**% Male**
1997					
Total	341	82	259		
MEAN	13	3	10	27%	73%
MEDIAN	10	3	8	24%	76%
2005					
Total	343	89	254		
MEAN	13	3	10	28%	72%
MEDIAN	11	3	8	27%	73%

Table 4.26: 1997 Private AAU University Female and Male Representation by Percentage.

1997 Private	1997 Total Trustees	1997 Female	1997 Male	1997 % Female	1997 % Male
Carnegie Mellon U	63	5	58	8%	92%
Syracuse U	47	4	43	9%	91%
New York U	50	5	45	10%	90%
Emory U	37	4	33	11%	89%
U of Chicago	36	4	32	11%	89%
Wash St. Louis U	57	7	50	12%	88%
Case Western U	54	7	47	13%	87%
Northwestern U	72	9	63	13%	87%
Rice U	19	3	16	16%	84%
U of Rochester	38	6	32	16%	84%
CalTech	53	9	44	17%	83%
Columbia U	23	4	19	17%	83%
Johns Hopkins U	76	13	63	17%	83%
U of Southern Cal	44	8	36	18%	82%
Vanderbilt U	38	7	31	18%	82%
MIT	74	14	60	19%	81%
Stanford U	32	6	26	19%	81%
Tulane U	25	6	19	24%	76%
Princeton U	40	10	30	25%	75%
U of Pennsylvania	60	15	45	25%	75%
Brandeis U	46	12	34	26%	74%
Cornell U	64	17	47	27%	73%
Yale U	21	6	15	29%	71%
Brown U	52	17	35	33%	67%
Duke U	36	12	24	33%	67%
Harvard U	37	14	23	38%	62%
Total	1194	224	970		
MEAN	46	9	37	19%	81%
MEDIAN	45	7	35	18%	82%

Table 4.27: 1997 Public AAU University Female and Male Representation by Percentage.

1997 Public	1997 Total Trustees	1997 Female	1997 Male	1997 % Female	1997 % Male
U of Pittsburgh	36	3	33	8%	92%
Ohio State U	10	1	9	10%	90%
Purdue U	10	1	9	10%	90%
Indiana U	8	1	7	13%	87%
Penn State U	32	4	28	13%	87%
U of Virginia	16	2	14	13%	87%
U of Florida	14	3	11	21%	79%
U of North Carolina	14	3	11	21%	79%
U of Colorado	9	2	7	22%	78%
U of Kansas	9	2	7	22%	78%
U of Missouri	9	2	7	22%	78%
U of Texas	9	2	7	22%	78%
U of Maryland	17	4	13	24%	76%
U of Wisconsin	17	4	13	24%	76%
SUNY	16	4	12	25%	75%
U of Nebraska	8	2	6	25%	75%
U of Arizona	11	3	8	27%	73%
U of California	17	5	12	29%	71%
Texas A & M U	10	3	7	30%	70%
U of Minnesota	14	5	9	36%	64%
Michigan State U	7	3	4	43%	57%
Iowa	9	4	5	44%	56%
U of Washington	9	4	5	44%	56%
U of Illinois	10	5	5	50%	50%
U of Michigan	8	4	4	50%	50%
U of Oregon	12	6	6	50%	50%
Total	341	82	259		
MEAN	13	3	10	27%	73%
MEDIAN	10	3	8	24%	76%

Table 4.28: 2005 Private AAU University Female and Male Representation by Percentage.

2005 Private	2005 Total Trustees	2005 Female	2005 Male	2005 % Female	2005 % Male
New York U	48	5	43	10%	90%
Wash St. Louis U	57	7	50	12%	88%
Emory U	36	5	31	14%	86%
U of Chicago	49	8	41	16%	84%
U of Rochester	37	6	31	16%	84%
Syracuse U	55	10	45	18%	82%
CalTech	52	10	42	19%	81%
Northwestern U	70	13	57	19%	81%
Carnegie Mellon U	56	11	45	20%	80%
Case Western U	41	8	33	20%	80%
U of Pennsylvania	55	11	44	20%	80%
Johns Hopkins U	68	14	54	21%	79%
MIT	73	15	58	21%	79%
Rice U	22	5	17	23%	77%
U of Southern Cal	48	11	37	23%	77%
Vanderbilt U	45	11	34	24%	76%
Brandeis U	46	12	34	26%	74%
Cornell U	62	17	45	27%	73%
Tulane U	35	10	25	29%	71%
Columbia U	23	7	16	30%	70%
Duke U	35	11	24	31%	69%
Princeton U	38	13	25	34%	66%
Stanford U	31	11	20	35%	65%
Yale U	17	6	11	35%	65%
Brown U	53	20	33	38%	62%
Harvard U	37	15	22	41%	59%
Total	1189	272	917		
MEAN	46	10	35	24%	76%
MEDIAN	47	11	34	22%	78%

Table 4.29: 2005 Public AAU University Female and Male Representation by Percentage.

2005 Public	2005 Total Trustees	2005 Female	2005 Male	2005 % Female	2005 % Male
U of Nebraska	8	0	8	0%	100%
Texas A & M U	9	1	8	11%	89%
U of Maryland	16	2	14	13%	88%
U of Pittsburgh	35	5	30	14%	86%
Penn State U	33	6	27	18%	82%
U of Arizona	11	2	9	18%	82%
U of Illinois	11	2	9	18%	82%
U of Virginia	16	3	13	19%	81%
Purdue U	10	2	8	20%	80%
U of Minnesota	14	3	11	21%	79%
Ohio State U	9	2	7	22%	78%
U of North Carolina	13	3	10	23%	77%
Indiana U	8	2	6	25%	75%
U of Wisconsin	17	5	12	29%	71%
U of Washington	10	3	7	30%	70%
U of Florida	13	4	9	31%	69%
SUNY	19	6	13	32%	68%
U of California	19	6	13	32%	68%
U of Colorado	9	3	6	33%	67%
U of Texas	9	3	6	33%	67%
U of Missouri	9	4	5	44%	56%
U of Kansas	9	4	5	44%	56%
U of Oregon	11	5	6	45%	55%
Michigan State U	8	4	4	50%	50%
U of Michigan	8	4	4	50%	50%
Iowa	9	5	4	56%	44%
Total	343	89	254		
MEAN	13	3	10	28%	72%
MEDIAN	11	3	8	27%	73%

Table 4.30: 2007 Female Percentages for Common AAU Standing Committees.

2007 COMMTTEES	% Female Trustees	Exec	Audit	Budget/ Finance	Nom./ Trustees/ Govern	Comp	Acad & Stdt Affairs / Ed Policy	Ext Aff /Alum/ Devlop/ Invest	Bldgs/ Ground/ Facil
U of Arizona	36%		50%	33%			25%	40%	
U of California	36%		22%	27%	29%	44%	23%	20%	45%
U of Colorado	22%		0%	22%			22%		
U of Florida	23%		17%	33%	0%		17%	17%	
U of Illinois	9%		9%	9%	9%		9%	9%	9%
Indiana U	11%		0%				25%	0%	25%
Iowa	44%								
U of Kansas	44%		33%				33%		
U of Maryland	12%		0%	10%		22%	22%		
Michigan State U	50%		25%	50%		25%	50%		
U of Michigan	63%		67%			67%			
U of Minnesota	33%		33%	33%			50%		33%
U of Missouri	33%	25%	25%		40%	20%	50%	50%	33%
U of Nebraska	0%	0%	0%	0%			0%		
U of North Carolina	31%		50%			20%	20%		0%
Ohio State U	19%		0%	17%	17%		13%		
U of Oregon	18%			25%					
Penn State U	20%	30%		18%	20%		9%		18%
U of Pittsburgh	11%								
Purdue U	30%	25%	0%	0%			75%		50%
Rutgers U	18%		0%	0%		20%	25%		25%
SUNY	25%	25%	0%	0%	40%		50%	33%	
Texas A&M U	11%		0%	25%			25%		0%
U of Texas	22%		50%	25%			25%		25%
U of Virginia	6%	17%	0%	0%			11%	0%	10%
U of Washington	40%	40%	33%				33%		
U of Wisconsin	41%	25%	60%				67%	0%	
Brandies U	22%	8%	20%	8%	17%	0%	21%	40%	11%
Cal Tech	19%	13%	11%	7%	33%			33%	30%
Cornell U	25%	11%	22%	24%	10%		31%	27%	25%
Emory U	18%	6%	20%	11%	0%	0%	36%	25%	14%
MIT	21%	25%	0%		25%			18%	
Princeton U	33%	36%	55%	55%	44%		23%	23%	23%
Syracuse U	17%	21%	14%	18%			35%		25%
Tulane U	28%	31%	27%	9%	33%	43%	50%	29%	29%
Vanderbilt U	27%	20%	18%	25%	36%	20%	45%	23%	18%
Yale U	37%		25%	22%	40%	0%	29%	29%	44%
MEAN	26%	21%	21%	19%	25%	23%	31%	23%	23%
MEDIAN	23%	25%	20%	18%	27%	20%	25%	24%	25%
% with committee		46%	89%	73%	43%	32%	84%	49%	57%

Table 4.31: 1997 Private AAU Trustees with Gender and Corporate Connections.

1997 Private	1997 Total Trustees	1997 Female	% Female 1997	1997 Corp Conn Total	# of Females w/ Corp Conn	% of Females w/ Corp Conn	# of Corp Conn from Females	% of Corp Conn from Females	# of Males with Corp Conn	% of Males with Corp Conn	# of Corp Conn from Males	% of Corp Conn from Males
Brandeis U	46	12	26%	45	2	17%	3	7%	14	41%	42	93%
Brown U	52	17	33%	35	6	35%	9	26%	11	31%	26	74%
CalTech	53	9	17%	72	3	33%	4	6%	29	66%	68	94%
Carnegie Mellon U	63	5	8%	96	2	40%	4	4%	34	59%	92	96%
Case Western U	54	7	13%	55	0	0%	0	0%	29	62%	55	100%
Columbia U	23	4	17%	18	0	0%	0	0%	9	47%	17	100%
Cornell U	64	17	27%	67	5	29%	7	10%	23	49%	60	90%
Duke U	36	12	33%	18	1	8%	1	6%	9	38%	18	94%
Emory U	37	4	11%	55	0	0%	0	0%	19	56%	55	100%
Harvard U	37	14	38%	31	3	21%	7	23%	12	52%	24	77%
Johns Hopkins U	76	13	17%	62	1	8%	1	2%	26	42%	61	98%
MIT	74	14	19%	80	3	24%	11	14%	36	60%	69	86%
New York U	50	5	10%	74	1	20%	1	1%	27	60%	73	99%
Northwestern U	72	9	13%	122	1	11%	1	1%	38	60%	121	99%
Princeton U	40	10	25%	31	1	10%	1	3%	12	40%	30	97%
Rice U	19	3	16%	17	1	33%	4	24%	5	31%	13	76%
Stanford U	32	6	19%	38	2	33%	2	5%	10	38%	36	95%
Syracuse U	47	4	9%	13	0	0%	0	0%	8	19%	13	100%
Tulane U	25	6	24%	13	0	0%	0	0%	7	37%	13	100%
U of Chicago	36	4	11%	83	2	50%	8	10%	21	66%	75	90%
U of Pennsylvania	60	15	25%	52	2	13%	3	6%	19	42%	49	94%
U of Rochester	38	6	16%	22	1	17%	1	5%	13	41%	21	95%
U of Southern Cal	44	8	18%	72	1	13%	3	4%	24	67%	69	96%
Vanderbilt U	38	7	18%	51	1	14%	3	6%	19	61%	48	94%
Wash St. Louis U	57	7	12%	81	2	29%	5	6%	31	62%	76	94%
Yale U	21	6	29%	18	2	33%	4	22%	5	33%	14	78%
Total	1194	224		1321	43		83		490		1238	
MEAN	46	9	19%	51	2	19%	3	7%	19	48%	48	93%
MEDIAN	45	7	18%	52	1	17%	3	6%	19	48%	49	95%

Table 4.32: 1997 Public AAU Trustees with Gender and Corporate Connections.

1997 Public	1997 Total Trustees	1997 Female	% Female 1997	1997 Corp Conn Total	# of Females w/ Corp Conn	% of Females w/ Corp Conn	# of Corp Conn from Females	% of Corp Conn from Females	# of Males with Corp Conn	% of Males with Corp Conn	# of Corp Conn from Males	% of Corp Conn from Males
Indiana U	8	1	13%	7	0	0%	0	0%	2	29%	7	100%
Iowa	9	4	44%	0								
Michigan State U	7	3	43%	1	0	0%	0	0%	1	25%	1	100%
Ohio State U	10	1	10%	4	0	0%	0	0%	3	33%	4	100%
Penn State U	32	4	13%	30	0	0%	0	0%	8	29%	30	100%
Purdue U	10	1	10%	1	0	0%	0	0%	1	11%	1	100%
SUNY	16	4	25%	2	0	0%	0	0%	2	17%	2	100%
Texas A & M U	10	3	30%	3	0	0%	0	0%	2	29%	3	100%
U of Arizona	11	3	27%	2	0	0%	0	0%	2	25%	2	100%
U of California	17	5	29%	8	0	0%	0	0%	4	33%	8	100%
U of Colorado	9	2	22%	0								
U of Florida	14	3	21%	0								
U of Illinois	10	5	50%	0								
U of Kansas	9	2	22%	0								
U of Maryland	17	4	24%	5	0	0%	0	0%	3	23%	5	100%
U of Michigan	8	4	50%	0								
U of Minnesota	14	5	36%	4	0	0%	0	0%	1	11%	4	100%
U of Missouri	9	2	22%									
U of Nebraska	8	2	25%	1	0	0%	0	0%	1	17%	1	100%
U of North Carolina	14	3	21%	5	0	0%	0	0%	3	27%	5	100%
U of Oregon	12	6	50%	0								
U of Pittsburgh	36	3	8%	29	0	0%	0	0%	12	36%	29	100%
U of Texas	9	2	22%	10	1	50%	1	10%	4	57%	9	90%
U of Virginia	16	2	13%	9	0	0%	0	0%	6	43%	9	100%
U of Washington	9	4	44%	5	0	0%	0	0%	2	40%	5	100%
U of Wisconsin	17	4	24%	15	2	50%	4	27%	4	31%	11	73%
Total	341	82		141	3		5		61		136	
MEAN	13	3	27%	6	0	6%	0	2%	3	29%	8	98%
MEDIAN	10	3	24%	3	0	0%	0	0%	2.5	29%	5	100%

Table 4.33: 2005 Private AAU Trustees with Gender and Corporate Connections.

2005 Private	2005 Total Trustees	2005 Female	% Female 2005	2005 Corp Conn Total	# of Females w/ Corp Conn	% of Females w/ Corp Conn	# of Corp Conn from Females	% of Corp Conn from Females	# of Males with Corp Conn	% of Males with Corp Conn	# of Corp Conn from Males	% of Corp Conn from Males
Brandeis U	46	12	26%	25	0	0%	0	0%	13	38%	25	100%
Brown U	53	20	38%	39	4	20%	6	15%	15	45%	33	85%
CalTech	52	10	19%	36	2	20%	2	6%	21	50%	34	94%
Carnegie Mellon U	56	11	20%	49	1	9%	3	6%	22	49%	46	94%
Case Western U	41	8	20%	25	0	0%	0	0%	14	42%	25	100%
Columbia U	23	7	30%	12	2	29%	6	50%	3	19%	6	50%
Cornell U	62	17	27%	44	2	12%	3	7%	18	40%	41	93%
Duke U	35	11	31%	19	1	9%	1	5%	9	38%	18	95%
Emory U	36	5	14%	33	1	20%	1	3%	16	52%	32	97%
Harvard U	37	15	41%	27	7	47%	11	41%	8	36%	16	59%
Johns Hopkins U	68	14	21%	55	2	14%	4	7%	25	46%	51	93%
MIT	73	15	21%	37	5	33%	6	16%	22	38%	31	84%
New York U	48	5	10%	47	1	20%	2	4%	23	53%	45	96%
Northwestern U	70	13	19%	60	1	8%	1	2%	25	44%	59	98%
Princeton U	38	13	34%	26	6	46%	11	42%	7	28%	15	58%
Rice U	22	5	23%	20	1	20%	1	5%	8	47%	19	95%
Stanford U	31	11	35%	22	3	27%	4	18%	10	50%	18	82%
Syracuse U	55	10	18%	12	1	10%	1	8%	8	18%	11	92%
Tulane U	35	10	29%	14	2	20%	2	14%	9	36%	12	86%
U of Chicago	49	8	16%	52	3	38%	6	12%	18	44%	46	88%
U of Pennsylvania	55	11	20%	40	0	0%	0	0%	24	55%	40	100%
U of Rochester	37	6	16%	21	1	17%	2	10%	12	39%	19	90%
U of Southern Cal	48	11	23%	43	4	36%	9	21%	16	43%	34	79%
Vanderbilt U	45	11	24%	36	2	18%	4	11%	19	56%	32	89%
Wash St. Louis U	57	7	12%	45	2	29%	3	7%	26	52%	42	93%
Yale U	17	6	35%	7	2	33%	4	57%	2	18%	3	43%
Total	1189	272		846	56		93		393		753	
MEAN	46	10	24%	33	2	21%	4	14%	15	41%	29	86%
MEDIAN	47	11	22%	35	2	20%	3	8%	16	44%	32	93%

Table 4.34: 2005 Public AAU Trustees with Gender and Corporate Connections.

2005 Public	2005 Total Trustees	2005 Female	% Female 2005	2005 Corp Conn Total	# of Females w/ Corp Conn	% of Females w/ Corp Conn	# of Corp Conn from Females	% of Corp Conn from Females	# of Males with Corp Conn	% of Males with Corp Conn	# of Corp Conn from Males	% of Corp Conn from Males
Indiana U	8	2	25%	1	0	0%	0	0%	1	17%	1	100%
Iowa	9	5	56%	1	1	20%	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%
Michigan State U	8	4	50%	2	0	0%	0	0%	2	50%	2	100%
Ohio State U	9	2	22%	10	1	50%	3	30%	3	43%	7	70%
Penn State U	33	6	18%	10	1	17%	1	10%	5	19%	9	90%
Purdue U	10	2	20%	5	0	0%	0	0%	3	38%	5	100%
SUNY	19	6	32%	1	0	0%	0	0%	1	8%	1	100%
Texas A & M U	9	1	11%									
U of Arizona	11	2	18%	1	1	50%	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%
U of California	19	6	32%	13	2	33%	2	15%	7	54%	11	85%
U of Colorado	9	3	33%	1	0	0%	0	0%	1	17%	1	100%
U of Florida	13	4	31%	6	1	25%	1	17%	4	44%	5	83%
U of Illinois	11	2	18%	0								
U of Kansas	9	4	44%	1	0	0%	0	0%	1	20%	1	100%
U of Maryland	16	2	13%	4	0	0%	0	0%	3	21%	4	100%
U of Michigan	8	4	50%	2	0	0%	0	0%	2	50%	2	100%
U of Minnesota	14	3	21%	2	0	0%	0	0%	2	18%	2	100%
U of Missouri	9	4	44%	0								
U of Nebraska	8	0	0%	3	0	0%	0	0%	2	25%	3	100%
U of North Carolina	13	3	23%	3	0	0%	0	0%	3	30%	3	100%
U of Oregon	11	5	45%	1	1	20%	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%
U of Pittsburgh	35	5	14%	34	2	40%	3	9%	15	50%	31	91%
U of Texas	9	3	33%	2	1	33%	1	50%	1	17%	1	50%
U of Virginia	16	3	19%	3	0	0%	0	0%	3	23%	3	100%
U of Washington	10	3	30%	3	0	0%	0	0%	2	29%	3	100%
U of Wisconsin	17	5	29%	1	0	0%	0	0%	1	8%	1	100%
Total	343	89		110	11		14		62		96	
MEAN	13	3	28%	4	0	13%	1	19%	3	25%	4	81%
MEDIAN	11	3	27%	2	0	0%	0	0%	2	21%	2	100%

Table 4.35: Means and Medians 1997 & 2005 Private AAU Trustees with Gender and Corporate Connections.

1997 & 2005 Private	Total Trustees	Female	% Female	Corp Conn Total	# of Females w/ Corp Conn	% of Females w/ Corp Conn	# of Corp Conn from Females	% of Corp Conn from Females	# of Males with Corp Conn	% of Males with Corp Conn	# of Corp Conn from Males	% of Corp Conn from Males
1997												
MEAN	46	9	19%	51	2	19%	3	7%	19	48%	48	93%
MEDIAN	45	7	18%	52	1	17%	3	6%	19	48%	49	95%
2005												
MEAN	46	10	24%	33	2	21%	4	14%	15	41%	29	86%
MEDIAN	47	11	22%	35	2	20%	3	8%	16	44%	32	93%

Table 4.36: Means and Medians 1997 & 2005 Public AAU Trustees with Gender and Corporate Connections.

1997 & 2005 Public	Total Trustees	Female	% Female	Corp Conn Total	# of Females w/ Corp Conn	% of Females w/ Corp Conn	# of Corp Conn from Females	% of Corp Conn from Females	# of Males with Corp Conn	% of Males with Corp Conn	# of Corp Conn from Males	% of Corp Conn from Males
1997												
MEAN	13	3	27%	6	0	6%	0	2%	3	29%	8	98%
MEDIAN	10	3	24%	3	0	0%	0	0%	3	29%	5	100%
2005												
MEAN	13	3	28%	4	0	13%	1	19%	3	25%	4	81%
MEDIAN	11	3	27%	2	0	0%	0	0%	2	21%	2	100%

Table 4.37: 2005 Private University Female and Male Trustee Corporate Connections to Key Industrial Sectors

SIC Industrial Division	**Total Individual Connections All Sectors**	**Agriculture Forestry Fisheries**	**Mineral Industries**	**Construction Industries**	**Manufacturing**	**Transportation, Communication, Utilities**	**Wholesale Trade**	**Retail Trade**	**Finance, Insurance, Real Estate**	**Service Industries**	**Public Administration**
Total Individual Connections	828	0	16	1	322	86	27	49	196	109	0
Female Trustee Connections	96	0	0	0	34	13	2	3	28	15	0
Male Trustee Connections	732	0	16	1	288	73	25	46	168	94	0
% Female	12%		0%	0%	11%	15%	7%	6%	14%	14%	
% Male	88%		100%	100%	89%	85%	93%	94%	86%	86%	

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Over the past century, women have made great strides in higher education. From the late 19th century when women were excluded from many institutions of higher education to the early 21st century when females now make up almost 60% of undergraduate populations in the United States, women have progressively improved their lot on our nation's campuses (Solomon, 1985). Throughout the 20th century, the increased presence of female students and faculty has not substantially altered the structures or operating philosophies of higher education. Higher education remains a male-dominated endeavor even while it is becoming a female-dominated structure. Its values, mindsets, rules of comportment, leadership styles, governance habits, and research traditions – its norms – were cemented in an era when women were largely absent from university life. And while female students now constitute a majority of undergraduates, women remain underrepresented in key leadership positions as faculty, administrators, and trustees.

Based on the research presented in this dissertation, it is clear that significant gender disparity still reigns on elite university boards of trustees. It seems that neither public universities, with supposedly closer ties to the state, nor private universities, with purportedly closer ties to markets, have prioritized gender equity on the boards of elite higher education institutions. In addition, my research indicates that prestige, as represented by the NSF and *USNWR* rankings, does not obviously correlate with greater female representation on elite AAU boards. While the percentages of female trustees relative to male trustees at AAU schools

improved incrementally between 1997 and 2005, gender parity remains elusive. Overall the number of female trustees hovers around the one-quarter mark, indicating that positions of authority and power in higher education remain male dominated. This may also hint at what is presumed to be an appropriate level of female board representation. In other words, has one-quarter become the level at which female representation is deemed adequate? Is gender disparity no longer portrayed as an important equity issue once women achieve one-quarter representation?

In both 1997 and 2005, females held greater proportions of board seats at public AAU universities than at private AAU universities. This is consistent with the literature on women in business that shows that women are more likely to be represented in government and the nonprofit sector. Greater female representation on the public school boards is consistent with Beck's (1947) study of AAU schools and the Association of Governing Board's (Fain, 2005) research on trustees. Earlier studies (Beck, 1947; Fain, 2005) along with my results suggest that public boards have been more responsive to gender equity concerns than have private boards. While private AAU universities are formally nonprofit entities, private university boards, as self-perpetuating boards, have more flexibility in appointing new board members. Because elite private schools tend to be more tightly connected to corporations through their trustees, the values and norms associated with corporate boards influence trustee behavior at private schools more than public schools. Therefore, as with the corporate private sector in general, females are less well represented at the private AAU schools than they are at public AAU schools.

Another explanation for the lag in female representation and female leadership on private school boards relates to the critical mass argument discussed earlier in this dissertation. The critical mass argument claims that there is a point at which female or minority representation

reaches a critical mass of effectiveness. For corporate boards, this point is three directors, or roughly 25-30% representation (Konrad, Kramer, and Erkut, 2008). The boards representing the public AAU schools seem to do a better job attaining a critical mass of female trustees than do the private school boards. Public school boards, on average, are much smaller so perhaps it is easier to achieve a critical mass of female trustees on these smaller boards. Without a critical mass it may be more difficult for female and male trustees on self-perpetuating, private school boards to see the value in female board membership. Within the elite AAU, public universities seem to be fulfilling the traditional role played by the public sector in advanced capitalist societies, resulting in somewhat greater opportunities for women on public boards.

The research in this dissertation also tells us how elite universities and the female and males trustees on their boards connect to the broader market economy. Research question one illustrates how institution type matters when we think about how elite universities link to the market economy. Private AAU universities tend to have much higher ratios of corporate connections per trustee than public AAU universities. But, these results also remind us to take care when we make generalizations based on institution type, as some of the individual public schools have higher corporate connection ratios than some of the private schools.

Research questions four, five, and six help us to theorize the gendering of trusteeship by linking the disparity of female trustee representation illustrated in questions two and three to gender power and corporate power. Focusing on the relative market position of the trustees suggests another layer to gender disparity in trusteeship. If part of the reason trustees are selected is their affiliation with markets as seen through their ties to publicly traded corporations, another explanation for the privileging of males for board membership emerges. For the AAU institutions in 1997 and 2005, male trustees were much more likely than female trustees to serve

on other corporate boards. This in itself is not so surprising, as women are underrepresented on corporate boards, and the for-profit, corporate sector remains a male-dominated structure (Bilimoria, 2000; Burgess & Tharenou, 2000, 2002; Burke, 1994, 1997, 2000; Burke & Mattis, 2000; Daily, Certo & Dalton, 1999, 2000; Fondas, 2000; Joy, 2008; Kesner, 1988; Mattis, 2000; Peterson & Philpot, 2007; Schor, 1995; Singh, Vinnicombe, & Terjesen, 2007; Williams, 2003). But it could also hint at a possible preference for certain types of trustees based on gender and market position. In other words, female and male trustees may be appointed for different reasons and serve divergent purposes. Female trustees may be underrepresented because they have fewer corporate connections and networks, making them less likely to be viewed as economically beneficial to universities. In addition, certain female trustees may be selected precisely because they lack connections to the corporations making them, as Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (1998) suggest, perfect buffers between elite corporate men and the broader society.

My research illuminates how the work trustees perform feeds in to the gendering of trusteeship. As with the research on corporate board committees, my research on trustee committees shows that females trustees are less likely to serve on committees that focus on financial and oversight matters. Female trustees in the committee dataset were least likely to serve on audit, budget and finance, and compensation committees. In addition, female trustees were more likely to serve on committees that dealt with academic and students affairs and educational policy. Female trustees tended to be clustered on committees with "softer" agendas. This connects back to arguments about females serving as buffers for males. If women are assumed to have certain characteristics that mitigate the assumed characteristics of powerful men, then they will be pushed, and often push themselves, toward committees that value these supposed attributes and away from committees that desire more market-like behaviors. This

could explain the proliferation of female trustees on committees that deal with academic and student affairs and educational policies.

The corporate connection and committee results help us understand how the subject position of trustee can continue to be gendered male even while females serve on boards of trustees. Even when women serve as trustees at elite universities, they are often relegated to the least powerful board committees. This promotes the identification of female trustees with those roles least associated with power. Female trustees serve a purpose and have a role, but they are generally kept away from the seats of power. In this way, the image of a trustee as a person with power excludes women, and the subject position of trustee persists as a male subject. This further feeds in to our image of trustee as powerful male, as a person connected to power through the market economy. In addition, these results also hint at a possible privileging of females who are not directly connected to the market economy so that they may serve as buffers for powerful men. This opens up a space for female trustees – a space that values female participation because females supposedly temper the image of male trustee.

The corporate connection results, however, also show that there are important differences between the corporate connections of female trustees at elite public universities and elite private universities. Clearly, private universities value female and male corporate connections more than public universities. Female trustees, especially at private schools, may be viewed simultaneously as potential buffers and as prospective links to the market economy. Therefore, female trustees at private AAU schools may illustrate the transition from Slaughter and Rhoades' (2005) public good knowledge/learning regime, where female trustees serve as the buffers of capitalism, to an academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime, where female and male trustees tie universities to the market economy. Female trustees at private AAU

universities, then, represent the tension between these mindsets – at once a part of and apart from academic capitalism.

As female trustees signify the tension between the public good and academic capitalist regimes, it may be more difficult for female trustees to be viewed as leaders in either worldview. This frustrates our desire to pinpoint female trustees as one thing or the other, but it does open up space for resignification. In other words, this may be an important moment in time when the subject position of female trustee is particularly ripe for renegotiation and reconfiguration. Because the subject trustee must constantly and repeatedly be resignified, interrogating the work female trustees perform and their connections to the market economy illustrates how the everyday and the mundane feed in to our conceptions of subject positions. In an academic capitalist framework, we would expect that as universities incorporate market-like behaviors, women will continue to be pushed aside and delegitimized. Academic capitalism pays special attention to structures and restraints. So as university structures become more in line with the market structures that privilege males, women will fare poorly. A poststructural stance, on the other hand, allows us to see the structures as less stable and more susceptible to resistance and redefinition.

Theories are not ends in themselves. Theories are meant to used, worked, and re-worked. In this way, the theory of academic capitalism itself is in process. It allows us to recognize and see certain things and it keeps us from recognizing other things. Where academic capitalism helps us recognize limitations, poststructuralism offers us possibilities. Academic capitalism forces us to think about values and mindsets, but presents those values and mindsets as more stable and permanent. Poststructuralism encourages us to see those values and mindsets as in flux, unstable, and negotiable. Ultimately, these illustrations of female trustee offer an

opportunity to rewrite and reimagine the subject trustee. By shifting our understanding of the everyday and the mundane and by consciously altering the work female and male trustees perform, the subject position of trustee can be reconfigured. This figuration of the subject position of female trustee as one in flux with multiple possibilities takes us back to Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) conception of the rhizome. Rather than pinpointing female trustee as one thing or the other, perhaps we should call for a rhizomatic female trustee, one whose fabric "is the conjunction, 'and…and…and…'" (p.25). This would help us conceive of female trustee as "a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or to end" (Butler, 1999, p.43).

Finally, I think it is important to consider the assumptions inherent in a project that tallies women trustees. Understanding where women fit into the leadership of elite higher education institutions is an important endeavor, but we also need to acknowledge and persistently critique the foundational ideologies upon which such projects are based. As Judith Butler writes, "the question of whether or not a position is right, coherent, or interesting is, in this case, less informative than why it is we come to occupy and defend the territory that we do, what it promises us, from what it promises to protect us?" (Butler 1995). It is crucial to think about what certain types of questions answered with head-counting help us accomplish, what they allow us to ignore, and what remains unquestioned. For example, is there a specific number of women that will signal gender equity? What does gender equity look like? More important, what does gender equity act like? Do we expect that more women trustees will result in certain types of behaviors? And what do such assumptions say about the way women get constituted and deployed in higher education? If we think about the many different feminisms as theories of

difference, how ethical is it to concern ourselves with gender disparity and ignore inequalities based on race, ethnicity, sexuality, and class?

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