

FROM COMMON PROPERTY TO CO-MANAGEMENT: IMPLEMENTING NATURA 2000

IN SOULE

by

MEREDITH WELCH-DEVINE

(Under the Direction of Theodore Gragson)

ABSTRACT

The Basque province of Soule (department of Pyrénées-Atlantiques, France) contains more than 14,000 hectares of common-pool land. This land provides numerous resources, most notably summer pasturage, to the animal raisers of the province who, for centuries, have collectively managed that land under a common property regime. Under this system, the animal raisers must operate within boundaries first set by the French state and later added to by the European Union, although as long as their management actions do not violate those boundaries they operate with relative autonomy.

Recent years, though, have seen both the French state and the European Union take a more active interest in commons management. At the same time, biodiversity conservation has arisen as a chief concern of the international community and of EU policy-makers. In 1992, the European Commission passed the Habitats Directive, which, together with the Birds Directive, creates a pan-European network of areas to be managed for social, economic, and ecological sustainability. This network, called Natura 2000, is made up of conservation sites on both public and private lands, and the common lands of Soule are covered almost in their entirety by Natura 2000 sites.

The implementation of Natura 2000 is pushing the current system toward one of co-management between resource users, state agencies, and other stakeholders yet to be identified. This dissertation research examines the co-management process that is slowly emerging and compares it to the existing management regime. I discuss how relations between Basques and the French state combine with features of the implementation process to create resistance. I then examine the major themes of resistance and their origins, and explore the particularities that must be considered when moving from common property to co-management.

This research not only involved Basque farmers, but also regional, national, and supra-national authority figures, government technicians, and NGO representatives. As a result, it provides a more complete and clear picture of the implementation process and affords the opportunity to examine how different actors across the scale of implementation define and judge success in conservation policy-implementation.

INDEX WORDS: Natura 2000, conservation, common-pool resources, common property management system, co-management, Basque, transhumance, network analysis, success

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Early in the summer of 2006, almost five months into my stay in Soule (Pyrénées-Atlantiques, France),¹ I was walking through the Pyrenees with an elderly shepherd, listening for the bells that would announce the presence of the sheep we could not yet see. As we walked and talked, rounding up the sheep to bring them in for their morning milking, the fog slowly lifted, revealing a magnificent mountain vista of forests, lush grass, and wildflowers. I commented on the beauty of the scenery and received the following reply:

Yes, it is beautiful isn't it? It was our fathers that made it the way it is, and their fathers before them. Even those that are in the Tomb of the Ancestors were shepherds. We cleared the land and keep it clean. Without us, there would be bramble everywhere and the forest would win out again. There's no better [management] tool than the tooth of the sheep! But everything is changing. No one wants to have animals anymore. In twenty years, everything you see here will be gone; it will be nothing but forest, and we will have lost a great heritage (Francis, June 6, 2006).^{2,3}

The area in which we were walking while having this discussion is common-pool pasturage available to all animal raisers in Soule. Governed and managed for hundreds of years by the resource-users themselves, this land provides vital summer pasturage for almost 60% of Soule's cow and sheep herds (Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche 2000). Traditionally, Soule's animal raisers had a level of autonomy in their decision making unseen in other parts of Europe.

¹At the request of the French members of my committee, I am using the French name (Soule) for the province. In the local dialect of Basque, it is called Xiberoa or Xiberua, and in unified Basque, or *batu*, it is spelled Zuberoa or, less-frequently, Ziberoa. When introducing names of places or organizations, I will give both the French and the Basque and then use the French. When the dialect of Soule differs from the unified Basque, I will also note the unified Basque spelling.

² I have replaced all farmers' names with pseudonyms. See Appendix B for table of informants and a brief commentary on how informants were chosen.

³ The Tomb of the Ancestors refers to a monolithic burial chamber located in the Arbailles forest.

In modern times, however, their decisions have become increasingly constrained by layers of rules and regulations, as well as market forces, at multiple levels of organization.

The aim of my research is to study the common property regime as it is embedded into larger social and political contexts. Analyzing the system in this manner allows better understanding of the varied and interlinking forces and events affecting decision making. Situating this work in Europe is interesting because the European Union introduces an additional level into this network of influence that affects local management of the commons both directly and through its constraints on the rule-making of the nation-state.

Currently, two major European policies affect the commons in Soule: The Common Agricultural Policy and the flagship nature conservation initiative of the EU, Natura 2000 (Council Directives 92/43/EEC and 79/409/EEC). The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has substantially influenced farming practices, but its effect on the commons has been less direct.⁴ The CAP has contributed to larger herd sizes and reduced availability of labor power on the common-pool lands, and these effects will be discussed at some length; however, for this research I chose to focus on the implementation of Natura 2000 because it is poised to have a direct effect on the governance of the commons in Soule.

Natura 2000

Natura 2000 is envisioned as a coherent network of conservation areas managed to be ecologically, economically, and socially sustainable. Created by the 1992 Habitats Directive⁵ and encompassing sites designated under the 1979 Birds Directive,⁶ this network is comprised

⁴ See Appendix A for a list of abbreviations and acronyms.

⁵ Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora. See Appendix K for its text.

⁶ Council Directive 79/409/EEC on the conservation of wild birds

largely of non-state land. Agricultural land is strongly represented, making up 41% of the network in France (Ministère de l'Ecologie du Développement et de l'Aménagement durables 2007). This amounts to 2.78 million hectares, or 9.6% of the country's agricultural land (Ministère de l'Ecologie du Développement et de l'Aménagement durables 2007).⁷ The common-pool grazing lands of Soule are included almost in their entirety (See Figure 1.1).




Figure 1.1. Natura 2000 sites and common-pool grazing lands in Soule.

⁷ In terms of Surface Agricole Utilisé (SAU)

Natura 2000 directly affects decision making by establishing Steering Committees for the management of designated conservation areas. These committees include various stakeholders, such as government officials, resource users, tourism and industry representatives, and environmental groups. As such, they present a strong contrast to the current management arrangement in Soule, in which local elected officials and animal raisers hold all decision making power, within legal boundaries. Local resource users are largely satisfied with their current commons management, and part of their rejection of Natura 2000 thus far is based on the idea that Natura 2000 will drastically change that management. One aim of my research was to examine the likely differences between the two.

Though the Habitats Directive was created in 1992, until recently it has progressed little in the Basque region of France. Political shifts and exhaustion of legal challenges, though, have cracked local resistance and some steps are now being taken toward the establishment of sites in Soule and elsewhere in Ipparalde (northern Basque Country). As the project remains in its early stages in this area, it provides a unique opportunity to study implementation as it is occurring rather than after the fact.

Examining the implementation of Natura 2000 in Soule from an anthropological perspective is particularly relevant because it is an inhabited and contested landscape. What is for some a space for living and working is viewed by others as virtual wilderness, resulting in struggles over the vision for and governance of that space. Anthropology allows a nuanced examination of the engagement of resource users, of the role of ‘external’ forces, of the interplay between different means of management, and of dynamics of power and authority. To date, there has been little anthropological work on conservation in Europe, a gap this research will help fill.

Justification of Research Site

The common property regime in place in Soule dates in its present form to 1838, but has origins in practices that were first codified in the 1520 Coutume de Soule and may date to much earlier (Bidart 1994, Régnier 1991).⁸ It can be argued that the longevity of the system is a sign of its durability and its match with environmental conditions (Etchelecou 1991). Given this apparent long-standing synergy and the current anthropological interest in conservation of species and habitats, it is interesting to analyze the implementation of a conservation initiative in this area. As conceived, Natura 2000 should not change or inhibit human activities that promote biodiversity, and Souletine animal raisers argue that the presence of listed plant and animal species on their common-pool grazing lands is a testament to management practices that favor diversity of habitats and species. Setting this research in Soule allows us to analyze how this policy, constructed on a pan-European level is actually likely to influence human activity, habitats, and species on the ground and to discuss how this large-scale initiative compares to local management for the protection of biodiversity.

Though the common property system in Soule is long-standing and can be considered a good fit for its environmental conditions, it is currently undergoing rapid change and faces more outside influences than at any point previously in its history. In the past thirty years, Souletine animal raisers have seen the construction of roads to their cabins, mechanization, and the advent of European policies and norms. The commencement of European-wide policymaking has affected markets through subsidies, introduced standards for animal welfare and production conditions, and created new environmental regulations, such as Natura 2000. Often, common property studies focus on the enduring aspects of the institution, eliding change because the

⁸ The Coutume was written in Gascon and only later translated into French and Basque.

interest has been in reproducing successful institutions. The current situation of the Souletine institution allows for analysis that includes dynamism and the effects of that change.

Soule is far from being the only area in which the collective management of the commons is being affected by Natura 2000. However, Soule is interesting because it is unique in its *olhatia* system.⁹ Within the larger common property management regime there are sub-units of management that revolve around the shepherds' cabin, or *olha*, wherein several shepherds share decision making authority and care-taking responsibility. In neighboring Baxe Nafarroa, shepherds' cabins are privately owned by individuals, and in Béarn they are owned by the commune.¹⁰ Only in Soule does the collective project extend even to the cabin, producing a complex multi-layered system of checks and balances to protect and develop resources.

The people of Soule constitute more than just a set of resource users. As we will see in the following sections, the Souletines are a community. The definition of community that I am using will be further elaborated in the next chapter, but it revolves around the group of people in question sharing beliefs and preferences and having multiplex relationships. Extending interactions beyond just the realm of the collective action problem moves this set of people from a simple resource user group to a community. Viewing the people of Soule as a community helps make this a coherent unit of research.

Theoretical Framework

My research examines an example of the centralization of management control as the common-pool lands of Soule transition from common property management to co-management,

⁹*Olha* refers only to the shepherd's cabin located in the high pasture area. *Olhatia* refers to the ensemble of buildings, grazing area, forest land, and rights associated with the institution. The French word *cayolar* is equivalent to *olhatia* but is sometimes also used just to designate the cabin.

¹⁰ A commune is the smallest administrative unit in France (except for municipal arrondissements, which occur in only three communes).

or the joint management of the commons by the State and resource users, by way of a conservation initiative. It seeks to advance our understanding of how conservation initiatives can be better designed to achieve biodiversity goals in a manner that is just and equitable for local communities. Because the context is so complex, there is no one theoretical concept adequate to investigate and explain the implementation of Natura 2000 in this area. As a result, my research draws from several closely related bodies of theory.

Work on common-pool resources and common property management regimes, including Institutional Analysis, is relevant and appropriate for studying the management regime that currently exists in Soule. Understanding these institutions in detail is critical to examining how management under Natura 2000 is likely to differ with existing management and how this affects its reception by farmers in the province. It is also critical to examine how these institutions are embedded in other state and international frameworks, and how they are changing, to fully understand the factors shaping them and the challenges they face.

Design principles that were first elaborated in studies of common property regimes and later customized and extended in the co-management literature help us understand the features of Natura 2000 and whether it is likely to succeed. Co-management as a field of study is rather recent, and as a result of its relative lack of theoretical development and defined tools for analysis, scholars have suggested a framework for the investigation of co-management projects. My research employs that framework and comments on its effectiveness.

Though the literature on co-management touches on some of the same ideas as the literature on the anthropology of conservation, I believe there could be a much more fruitful engagement between the two sets of scholars. These two bodies of work treat many of the same themes, such as stakeholder participation and conflict resolution, but there is little explicit

engagement between them. While my research uses the framework and design principles drawn from co-management, it relies heavily on concepts of power and legitimacy, more emphasized in writings on conservation initiatives.

My research uses these three bodies of work to craft a more holistic picture of the implementation of Natura 2000 in Soule. Though I do seek to link these theories and concepts in my research, certain aspects of theory are more relevant to certain components of my observations. As a result, rather than present one theoretical section, I have interspersed my discussions of theory throughout the dissertation.

Research Framework

The guiding framework for this research was established by Lars Carlsson and Fikret Berkes (2005) in order to investigate the co-management process. As efforts to implement Natura 2000 progress, we can apply this framework to the emergent co-management process for the commons of Soule. It is important to note that this process is only just beginning and remains quite uncertain; structuring the research according to this framework produces important insights nonetheless.

The suggested framework is comprised of the following steps:

- 1) Define the socio-ecological system under focus
- 2) Map the essential management tasks to be performed and the problems to be solved
- 3) Clarify the participants in co-management activities and related problem-solving processes
- 4) Analyze linkages
- 5) Evaluate capacity-building needs
- 6) Prescribe remedies

My research adopted only the first four steps. Although I do highlight areas in which the process has broken down, as a neutral observer of the process, I was not positioned to offer remedies.

Many parties to the discussion about Natura 2000 prefer that it not ever come to fruition in Soule.

My approach to the research was largely ethnographic, though there was also a strong component of documentary research, census research, and media evaluation. Much of my time was spent with animal raisers in Soule to understand both their use and management of the commons and their on-farm practices as the two are intimately linked. When possible, I also spent time observing and working with government officials, NGO personnel, and elected officials participating in governance of the commons or the implementation of Natura 2000. When this was not feasible, I conducted in-depth and sometimes multiple interviews with the informant.

In addition to investigating management and problem-solving, I used the interviews to examine the players involved in the co-management process and how they are linked. As suggested by Carlsson and Berkes, I used social network techniques to uncover participants and to analyze their connections.

Cross-scale multi-sited ethnography

“The adequacy of research at any single scale is clearly in question” (Sayre 2005: 277)

‘Multi-sited ethnography’ is very much *en vogue* in anthropology (Hannerz 2003, Marcus 1995), and this research can be classified as such. However, I want to emphasize that not only was this research conducted in multiple locales, it was also conducted at multiple levels of organization. The goal being to understand Natura 2000 across its scale of implementation, I interviewed government functionaries at the European level responsible for the broadest aspects

of implementation, national-level authorities and groups focusing on the transposition into French law and France's execution of the directive, regional and departmental agencies and groups concerned both with departmental coherence and site-level functioning, and individuals affected by the finest details of the process. The term 'cross-scale ethnography' perhaps comes closer to describing this research, but does not necessarily include the notion of multi-sited; research in one location – Paris, for example – could clearly be conducted at multiple levels. A combination of the two terms yields 'cross-scale multi-sited ethnography', and though a bit unwieldy, it is a more accurate way to describe this undertaking.¹¹

The decision to study the phenomenon across its relevant scale, rather than confining the scope of the work to the 'local' or 'European' sphere, grew out of both the framework proposed by Carlsson and Berkes and my desire to trace flows of power, influence, and information and to bypass over-simplifications of scalar phenomena. As actors pursue their goals, they form associations with others on different levels, thereby mobilizing resources and enhancing their power (Murdoch and Marsden 1995, Perreault 2003a). In the process they undermine the validity of discrete categories of classification, and it becomes necessary to consider how the actors in question are embedded in a broader set of relations. Rather than seeing actors as confined to a given level, we can examine ties as a network of relations with varying penetration and characterize actor positions as more local or more global, viewing scale as a continuum with porous boundaries (Cox 1998, Herod 2003). It is then necessary to examine the phenomenon at multiple points along that continuum: "It is apparent that no one scale will provide a full understanding of the geography of agri-environmental policy" (Evans and Morris 1997: 203).¹²

¹¹ Thanks to Pete Brosius for suggesting this term to describe my work.

¹² Here, Evans and Morris use 'scale' the way that I will be using 'level'.

The increasing internationalization of the policy landscape in Europe has increased opportunities for actors on various levels to influence decision making (Cerny 1995, MacLeod and Goodwin 1999). Not only is this added policy ‘layer’ creating opportunities for input, it is also creating the necessity of acting on multiple levels simultaneously to best realize local interests (Cox 1998). ‘Local’ issues continue to mandate action at a ‘local’ level, but the most effective actions will often include pressure at broader levels. The heterogeneous adoption and implementation of European directives makes policy struggles at the national level entirely relevant, but even the power contests at the level of the European Union have concrete consequences for local policy outcomes. Because it is the originator of the directives constituting Natura 2000 and because it is an important site of contestation, this research extends to the European Union level.

Data Collection

For this research I lived in Soule from the beginning of February 2006 until the end of May 2007. The majority of this time was spent participating in the daily lives of sheep and cattle raisers in the province and interviewing them regarding on-farm practices and use of common-pool lands.¹³ Using official declarations to the French government from the Syndicate that manages the majority of Soule’s common-pool lands and from the communes that manage their own high pasture commons, I calculated that there are 480 farms from Soule that send herds to high pasture common-pool lands in the province.¹⁴ Of these 480, I interviewed representatives

¹³ Appendix L contains my research questions and interview protocols.

¹⁴ The data from the communes was for summer 2006. 2006 figures were not available from the Syndicate at the time, so I used the figures from 2005. The communes included were: Sainte Engrâce (Santa Grazi), Larrau (Lorraine) and Ordiarp (Urdinarbe). Other communes do manages substantial communal pastures for their residents, but these are largely used as intermediate areas where herds go before and after spending time in the high pastures. Farms that use high pasture in more than one place were counted only once.

of 60, or 12.5%. In order to gain the clearest possible picture of the management of the commons, I selected the sample in such a way as to include variability in the areas of age, part of the province, farm orientation (sheep, cattle, or both), farm size, and herd size. A table containing the characteristics of those selected can be found in Appendix B. I also found it important to speak with raisers who chose not to practice transhumance to understand the resource and management problems and economic and social factors that would contribute to their decision not to use commons land. These five raisers are not counted among the 60. Only one person refused an interview.

Most raisers were interviewed only once, a process that generally took about an hour and a half. These interviews were most often followed by a farm tour and elaboration on some of the themes discussed in the interviews. Fifteen of these raisers participated in multiple interviews. This smaller set was comprised of extremely knowledgeable informants who guided me through the most intricate details of agriculture in the province, provided insight into subtle and not-so-subtle political and economic influences on their work, and decoded and explained cultural aspects of their practices. They were selected for their varying views on Natura 2000 and for their varying uses of the commons. An even smaller set of five raisers let me become an almost constant presence on their farms. I participated in all aspects of farm work, aided in taking the animals to and from their summer pasturage on the commons, and even stayed with them in the shepherd's cabins during their turns to guard the sheep.

In the course of the research, I also interviewed local elected officials and personnel working for the Syndicate that manages the commons, as well as personnel from important entities to management such as the Departmental Sheep Breeding Center and the Chamber of Agriculture. For one aspect of the research, I interviewed government and NGO personnel at the

departmental level, the regional level, the national level, and the level of the European Union. Those interviews will be discussed in more detail in the chapter dealing with the network of people implementing Natura 2000.

Because my research brought me into contact with so many different types of actors with varying interests and operating at different scales, I found that I had many different demands placed upon me by those with whom I was working. This research was designed neither to provide administrators with tools to implement Natura 2000, nor to provide farmers with tools to resist it. However, that was sometimes what was asked of me. I made a concerted effort to broadcast that I was not taking sides in the debate over Natura 2000, but the fact that I was an ‘outsider’ encouraged some administrators to see me almost as a consultant and made some in Soule wary of my motives.

Those in Soule who saw me as a proxy for the government remained guarded and cautious throughout my time there, but with the exception of those few, I found my informants to be exceedingly open and helpful. I lived in Soule for almost four months before conducting my first interview to give people time to get used to my presence. This delay served me well, as many people knew of me before I first called them and easily consented to an interview and farm visit. Many of my closest friends in the area frequently asked me if I was having trouble getting people to agree to interviews and to talk to me openly because ‘the Basques are so stubborn and guarded,’ and while many had to let the conversation creep along for half an hour or so before they decided that I really was not there to check their compliance with regulations, in the end, the discussions were quite frank. With administrators there was often less candor and more cautiousness, as well as more reliance on official discourses, but in no case did I find this actually hindered our ability to have a productive conversation.

Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation begins with an in-depth consideration of the historical and political context of commons use in Soule. As the common lands and the farm can never be totally separated, this dissertation will include a substantial consideration of on-farm practices, though the focus will be on those that relate to use of the commons. Agriculture is at a critical juncture, and problems and challenges for the system affect the way Natura 2000 is experienced and lived by the animal raisers.

The third chapter focuses exclusively on the commons. In this chapter, I examine management and decision making processes and look at evolutions in the institution and the current challenges it faces. Particular attention is given to the ways in which the system is embedded in larger social and political levels of organization. This examination of the current management relies on Institutional Analysis and facilitates a discussion of how the management envisaged under Natura 2000 differs from that currently being practiced.

The following, or fourth, chapter explains the mechanisms of Natura 2000. Understanding the history behind the directives, the ways in which sites were selected and management is decided, and the power dynamics involved is crucial to evaluating its implementation in Soule. In this chapter, I present the most relevant concepts from anthropological studies of conservation to apply them to Natura 2000.

The fifth chapter explains the overlay of Natura 2000 onto the common property regime in Soule. In it, I examine the characteristics of the process and compare them to successful design criteria outlined by scholars of the commons. These elements are then discussed in relation to the observed perceptions of and reactions to Natura 2000. This research is a departure from previous studies of co-management in that most other studies examine instances of co-

management that are the result of the devolution of state authority while my research examines a setting with increasing centralization of control.

The next chapter narrows to a consideration of the network of organizations and agencies responsible for the implementation of Natura 2000. Following Carlsson and Berkes, I use methodology and analytical concepts from network analysis to discuss how dynamics of power play out through the network, how structure and position privilege certain actors, and how human agency maintains an important role in influencing the process.

The seventh chapter examines the idea of success. Throughout the research it was apparent that success was defined and measured differently by different actors, with local actors focusing on the implementation process and higher-level actors focusing on conservation outcomes. This chapter examines why different actors have different conceptualizations of success and how that affects their assessments of whether or not Natura 2000 is successful.

CHAPTER 2. SOULE

Euskal Herria (Basque Country) is a small area straddling the western portion of the border between France and Spain, and Soule is the smallest of its seven provinces. Soule and the two other Basque provinces in France, Labourd (Lapurdi) and Basse Navarre (Baxe Nafarroa or Behera Nafarroa), seen in the map below, comprise the Northern Basque Country (Pays Basque Français), or Ipparalde in the Basque language Euskara.¹⁵ Ipparalde is located entirely within the French department of Pyrénées-Atlantiques.¹⁶ The four provinces of Vizcaya (Bizkaia), Guipuzcoa (Gipuzkoa), Alava (Araba), and Navarra (Nafarroa) make up the Southern Basque Country, or Hegoalde. The Pyrenean range marks much of the frontier between the northern and southern portions of Basque Country.

¹⁵ The Basque language is referred to as Euskera in the Spanish Basque Country (Hegoalde), but as Euskara in most of the French Basque Country (Ipparalde), including Soule.

¹⁶ France has 100 departments (including those located in overseas territories), which are further organized into regions. The department of Pyrénées-Atlantiques is located in the region of Aquitaine.




Figure 2.1. Basque Country. (Payne 1975: 6)

Local political divisions in the Pyrenees were historically determined by valleys, and the agropastoral communities therein referred to their valley as a *pays*, in this case the *Pays de Soule* (IFOREP 1989). Today, Soule is constituted of the cantons of Mauléon-Licharre and Tardets-Sorholus.¹⁷ The historic *Pays de Soule*, though, included communes that are today located in the canton of Saint Palais. Current residents of Soule have come to think of these ‘lost’ communes as being part of Baxe Naffaroa rather than Soule, defining their province by the two French cantons rather than by its historical reach. The historic boundaries of the *Pays de Soule* encompass 78,595 hectares and have 15,040 inhabitants (INSEE 1999). The communes of Soule are listed in the table below by both their Basque and French names. Those that are starred are

¹⁷ In rural areas, the canton is comprised of multiple communes, while larger communes (such as Paris) may contain several cantons. Each canton elects a representative to the Conseil General of the department.

located in the canton of Saint Palais. Note that the communes are divided into three areas.

These sub-divisions are reflective of units that existed in the medieval period.

Table 2.1. Historic divisions of Soule. Communes marked with * are in the canton of Saint Palais.

Historic Divisions of Soule¹⁸		
Haute Soule (Basabürü)	Les Arbailles (Arbaila)	Basse Soule (Pettara)
Alçay-Alçabehety-Sunharette (Altzai-Altzahabeheti-Zunarreta)	<i>Grande Arbaille:</i> Gotein-Libarrenx (Gotaine- Irabarne)	Ainharp (Ainharbe) Arrast-Larrebieu (Ürrüxtoi Larrabile)
Alos-Sibas-Abense (Aloze- Ziboze-Onizegaina)	Idaux-Mendy (Idauze-Mendi)	Barcus (Barkoxe) Berrogain-Larruns (Berrogaine Larüntxe)
Camou-Cihigue (Gamere-Zihiga)	Menditte (Mendikota)	Charitte de Bas (Sarrikotape)
Etchebar (Etxebarre)	Ossas-Sühare (Ozaze-Suhara)	Cheraute (Sohüta)
Haux (Hauze)	Saugis-Saint-Etienne (Zalgize-Donztebe)	Espes-Undurein (Espeize- Undüreine)
Lacarry-Arhan-Charitte de Haut (Lakarri)	<i>Petite Arbaille:</i> Aussurucq (Altzürükü)	Hôpital Saint Blaise (Ospitalea)
Laguinge (Liginaga Astüe)	Garindien (Garindaine)	Mauléon-Licharre (Maule)
Larrau (Larraine)	Musculdy (Muskildi)	Moncayolle-Larroy-Mendibieu (Mitikile)
Lichans-Sunhar (Lezantxü- Zunharre)	Ordarp (Urdinarbe)	Roquiague (Arrokiaga)
Licq-Atherey (Ligi-Atherei)	Pagolle (Pagola)*	Viodos-Abense-de-Bas (Bildoze- Onizepe)
Montory (Montori)		Aroue-Ithorots-Olhaiby (Arüe- Ithorrotze-Olhaibi)*
Sainte Engrâce (Santa Grazi)		Domezain-Berraute
Tardets-Sorholus (Atarratze Sorolüze)		(Domintxaine-Berroeta)*
Trois Villes (Iruri)		Etxarri (Etcharry)*
		Jestaze (Gestas)*
		Lohitzüne-Oihergi (Lohitzun- Oyhercq)*
		Ozaraine-Erribareita (Osserain- Rivareyte)*

¹⁸ Under the Ancien Regime, Esquiule was Bearnais, and according to the loi Pasqua of 1995, it does not belong to Soule, but for the Souletines, Esquiule is Basque. Esquiule was the destination of choice for many Souletine *cadets* who were able to find land there. The commune is today bascophone, participates in Pastorales and Mascarades, and has a Souletine dance association. The livestock raisers have the right to use the common-pool lands in Soule, but there is no representative from Esquiule in the Syndicate of Soule.

Today these distinctions have been simplified. Souletines speak most often just of Basabürü and Pettara, with Basabürü corresponding to the canton of Tardets-Sorholus and Pettara corresponding to the canton of Mauléon-Licharre. The communes of Saint Palais are considered by residents of the two cantons to be part of Basse Navarre, and communes in the Arbailles are redistributed to Haute Soule or Basse Soule according to their cantons. These distinctions are illustrated in the figure below.




Figure 2.2. Map of Soule showing divisions. In these maps one commune, Aroue-Ithorots-Olhaiby, appears as two polygons. Source: GEOFLA-IGN.

These fluctuations make bounding the research somewhat difficult, but given that my interest lies in the management of common-pool grazing lands, defining Soule becomes easier

because it can be based upon the governing institution of those resources, the Syndicate of Soule (Xiberoko Zindikata). The Syndicate includes representatives from each of the communes that constituted the *Pays de Soule* and that consequently have usage rights on the commons. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, Soule is defined as conforming to the political boundaries of the *pays*, encompassing the present-day cantons of Mauléon-Licharre and Tardets-Sorholus and the seven communes of the canton of Saint Palais that were part of the *pays*. This is not entirely without problems, perhaps the most vexing of which is the situation of the commune of Esquiule. Even though its animal raisers are granted the right to use the high pastures in Soule by reason of *bon voisinage* (which translates to something like ‘good neighborliness’), the largely bascophone Esquiule is part of Béarn and does not have a representative in the Syndicate and is thus not included in this definition of Soule.

Language, Resistance, and the State

I attended and, much to the chagrin of my victim, participated in my first sheep shearing while in Soule. As the adults worked, watched, and commented on the skills of the young men hired to help, the children gathered the fleece to be burned, played with the lambs, and played soccer outside. The youngest of the group, a 6-year-old girl, who proudly announced to me that she was a *bergère*, or shepherdess, insisted that there were many other important things I needed to see on the farm. As we made our way over to see the rabbits and chickens and pigs, chatting all the while in French, she stopped cold, spun around to look at me, and gasped: “But, do you speak *our* language?”

The language to which she was referring was, of course, Euskara, and while none of the situations made quite such an impression on me as that one, I faced some variant of that question

repeatedly during my fieldwork. The question was never hostile; I never felt as though I was being judged for not speaking Euskara, though several people in Sainte Engrâce mentioned that Sandra Ott (an anthropologist who worked there in the late 70s) not only knew their dialect but several others, hastily adding that it was a testament to her brilliance, not my deficiency. As my Euskara got better and I could respond with “*Aminibat*” or “*Ikasten düt*” (“A little” and “I am learning” respectively), the smiles and nods of approval I got from even my most reserved informants reinforced the idea that language is a critically important cultural feature for the Basques (it bears pointing out here that the Euskara word for a Basque person, *Euskaldün*, literally translates to ‘one who has Euskara,’ meaning one who speaks the Basque language). These exchanges also highlighted that they are not accustomed to outsiders making the effort to learn Euskara.

While it was universally acknowledged that my learning Euskara was good, the manner in which I learned it occasioned some critically important discussions about what it means to use the language and transmit it. My most instructive lessons in Euskara came from my neighbors and the farmers with whom I spent the most time. These lessons were practical and focused on the way people really speak, and they sometimes resulted in hilarious exchanges, such as when I responded with an enthusiastic “no” to a shepherd’s request that I feed the sheep breakfast; I thought he had asked me if I, myself, had eaten breakfast. Helpful as these lessons were, though, I am a methodical learner and needed to write things down, to try words in sentences, and to see written lists of verb conjugations. So, two evenings per week I attended *Gai Eskola*, or evening school, run by the association AEK, whose mission is to teach Euskara to adults. When I started, I was oblivious to the political implications.

When I began to respond to queries with “*Ikasten düt*,” I began also to hear a second question: “*Non?*” or “Where?” When I replied “*Gaü Eskolan*” many people said that was great, asked if I thought it was difficult, and inquired about class structure and who my teachers were. Many others, however, simply said “oh” and changed the subject. I was confused by the apparent displeasure with AEK and related these experiences to a woman friend over tea one evening. She explained to me that it was not AEK per se that was the problem but a larger division between those who are seen as *baskoi* or *basquisant* and those who are not. *Baskoi* and *basquisant* are somewhat pejorative terms for someone who promotes Euskara language and Basque culture ‘too much.’

Those that work to promote traditional dances and songs and who send their children to schools that are taught half or full-time in Euskara somewhat jokingly identify some villages in Soule as being “anti-Basque.” At the Masquerade, a folk theatre event, played out in one such village in 2007, the lead character strode around the village square proclaiming, in Euskara, that he had learned the language at *Gaü Eskola*, a well-known young man in the village, who had himself played the lead role in Masquerades past, shouted out: “It shows,” eliciting a mixture of gasps and commentary. The incident underscored the rift, and I went back to speak with some of the people who had responded coolly to my schooling at *Gaü Eskola*. One explained it this way:

Renée: *Gaü Eskola*? It’s worthless. Basque should be transmitted from father to son and from mother to daughter.

Me: But what about the people whose parents didn’t or couldn’t teach them?

Renée: It’s dying anyway. We’re the only ones left who speak it. Teaching it at *Gaü Eskola* isn’t going to save the language. People have to use it. And, they don’t teach our dialect there anyway. They just don’t have any business doing what should be done in the family. It’s good for people like you, but not for Basques.

At its more harmless, the label of *baskoi* is not necessarily an intimation that the person so labeled has nationalistic sentiments, more that they cannot leave well enough alone and that they encourage those with ‘dangerous ideas.’ At its more virulent, the label is used to effectively lump those who promote aspects of Basque culture and language, in with separatists and, by extension, terrorists. This, of course, leaves many in the community feeling alienated and marginalized. I asked a young teacher at an *ikastola*, or school taught entirely in Euskara, if it were ever difficult for her to be an active proponent of the language. Her characteristic smile disappeared and she said gravely “you know they call us bombers, right?” The ‘they’ she is referring to is other, more conservative Basques in the province, and by calling her and those like her ‘bombers,’ they are evoking a tie to the Basque separatist group recognized by France, Spain, the European Union, the United States, and the United Nations as a terrorist group: *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* or ETA.¹⁹

Though this group of people that works to save important cultural features is labeled as terrorists by some of their fellow Basques, most of them are quite far from being separatists:

It’s not important to say whether a person is more Basque or more French, what is important is keeping the history and culture, traditions and language. France needs to work more on keeping this part of its patrimony. Europe is helping push countries to that. I’m proud to be Basque, but to say I’m Basque, not French, is not respectful to your other countrymen. We all served together [in military service]. We’re all the same. France is our *pot commun*, but we’re proud of our [Basque] enigma (Didier, July 19, 2006).

This man and many of his close friends speak only Basque at the house and send their children to school that is taught half in Basque and half in French and to traditional dance classes. Some among them do advocate for a separate *département* in France for the three Basque provinces, but most all stop well short of calling for a separation with France and federation with the provinces on the Spanish side.

¹⁹ Also written: Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna. Translated, this means Basque Homeland and Freedom.

That French Basques can contentedly embrace the idea of being both French and Basque is likely a product of the French state's relatively benign approach to its relations with them. The French Basques never experienced the brutal repression that their southern neighbors suffered under Francisco Franco. The separatist group ETA arose in direct response to Franco, and Pérez-Agote (2006) even argues that the Basque language would have disappeared without the consciousness raised by Franco's regime. In contrast, the French Basques were left to do much as they pleased.

Prior to the French Revolution (1789), the French crown was content to respect the "prerogatives, delays, and imperatives" of the diverse institutions of its *pays* (Braudel 1988a: 79).²⁰ Based on customary law, the French Basques enjoyed freedom from servile obligation, freedom of movement, the right to bear arms, the right to political assembly, and hunting and fishing rights (Jacob 1985). The architects of the Revolution, however, sought to equalize the populace and end these provincial privileges. The French Basques, not eager to see their customary laws dismantled, were suspicious of the Revolution's centralist principles (Douglass 1985). This wariness was not without merit, and the aftermath of the Revolution saw the abolition of the democratic institutions of the Basque country, such as the *Etats de Soule*, and the beginning of a concerted effort to assimilate ethnic groups (Jacob 1985). Before the Revolution, there were more than 30 languages and dialects in France, and the 1790 decision to reorganize France's existing *pays* into *départements* was designed break up ethnic groups and "to combat the persistence of provincial loyalties and localism" (Jacob 1985: 81, Zink 2000).

At that time, the French Basques sought to maintain their identity and language, protesting the decision to combine the Basque provinces with Béarn to create the department of Basses-Pyrénées. The Basque deputy from Lapurdi argued that "the assemblage that is proposed

²⁰ *Pays* is derived from the Gallo-Roman *pagus* and refers to "an area with its own identity" (Braudel 1988: 37).

is physically and morally impossible. Reunite men of which the ones speak one language and the others another . . . they will finish by separating themselves, like . . . the tower of Babel” (Jacob 1985: 82). The subsequent and sporadic calls in the early 1800s for the unification of the Basque provinces of France with those of Spain gained little momentum.

The first real, organized nationalist movement in France appeared in 1933 (Payne 1975). The leaders of the exiled Euskadi government, however, denied any affiliation with or support for the movement, seeking to maintain its cordial relations with Paris. Again, little came of it, and most of the literature and attention to 20th century nationalist activities in France centers on ETA’s use of French Basque territory as a base and training ground. The French government disapproved of Franco’s regime, so before ETA’s 1973 assassination of the Spanish Prime Minister, France largely ignored ETA as long as it did not encourage nationalist tendencies among the French Basques (Clark 1984).

In 1976, though, this policy changed, and it became much more difficult for Spanish Basques to receive work permits in France. Franco’s death subsequently ended the granting of political refugee status, and French authorities began deporting and relocating suspected ETA members. Today, graffiti like that pictured below is pervasive in Soule and the other Basque provinces in France and calls for the return of Basque prisoners to areas nearer their homes.



Figure 2.3. Basque graffiti.

Building on the work of Anthony D. Smith (1979), Douglass (1985) posits an “unfinished agenda” hypothesis for the existence of 20th century nationalism among the Basques. Generally, he argues that nation-building is a process of ethnic assimilation and that the colonial enterprise interrupted that endeavor. During the colonial period, Basques were more interested in participating and gaining their fair share of the colonial spoils than in challenging the hegemony of the French state. At the close of colonialism, however, Basques again had the opportunity to question the state and the desire to do so because they had not been entirely assimilated.

Perhaps in an attempt to make up lost time, the French state did engage in efforts to force the Basques to assimilate. Though never restricted in the streets and shops as in Spain, speaking Euskara was for a period forbidden in the schools of France. The following story, recounted to me by a man in his late 60s, was told in some variation by most of my older contacts and even some as young as 40:

I never heard a word of French before I got to school. We all just showed up and had no idea what was going on – it was really hard, and we couldn't speak Basque in school. The only thing I knew how to say was that I needed to go to the bathroom! My mother taught me that at least. But in school there was something they called the Basque stick. When the teacher heard one of us speaking Basque, we'd be given a stick. Throughout the day, if you heard someone in the schoolyard speaking Basque, you gave it to them. At the end of the day, whoever had the stick was punished (Francis, June 26, 2006).

While this repression likely did contribute to the decline in the number of bascophones, there were more pernicious and effective forces at work. When television finally reached rural Basque homes it took a prominent place in social life. The programming, however, is almost entirely in French. The one Basque channel that reaches Soule is from the Spanish side, and the dialect can be almost unintelligible to French Basques. As children grow up watching cartoons and other programs, French becomes more easy and familiar to them and becomes something that is used in the household, often replacing Euskara. Increasing secularization has also reduced exposure to Basque in everyday situations. Basque clergy have always been a driving force in the use and transmission of the language, but whereas previously every village in Soule had its own clergy, now there are many fewer and they occupy a less central place in village life. The influx of non-bascophones to the province further reduces the extent to which the language is used in public, as speakers resort to French to communicate. Perhaps the strongest force affecting the decline of Euskara in Ipparalde, though, was the stigma among Basques of speaking their own language.

There was a time that having a Parisian accent was a status symbol. Those that went away to work and came back talking like that were admired. Those who couldn't speak French were looked down on as backwards peasants (Céline, May 2, 2006).

The language continues to be best preserved in remote, agrarian communes. In areas such as Sainte Engrâce, Larrau, and Aussurucq, knowledge of Basque approaches 100%.

Recently there has been a recognition among many Basques that the language is endangered. In 1964, the first *ikastola* (school entirely in Basque) was opened by a group of parents in Arrangoitze (Arcangues). The association Seaska was created to oversee the *ikastolas* and to “promote an education model whose aim was to achieve balanced bilingualism” (Seaska 2008). In 1982, the association began receiving funding from the French government.

The heightened linguistic consciousness among Basques is readily apparent in the villages of Soule. Young people in their early 20s have difficulty speaking the language, while young children are being carefully overseen to make sure they only speak Basque with their peers. In some families, older children may speak Basque not at all or only with difficulty while the youngest is fluent.

Despite the advances and the backing of the French government, there are difficulties and frustrations. Road signs in French are often blacked out, and graffiti proclaims that Basque should be the language of the French Basque Country. While the French state and Europe both pay substantial homage to the idea of regions and preserving cultures, it is unlikely that Basque will be recognized as an official language in the near future, and there are still uneasy tensions between French Basques and the state.

The French government can be thought of as having two systems of representation – that of the people and that of the state. The commune is the smallest administrative division in France, and each elects a municipal council, with the number of representatives being

determined by population.²¹ In larger cities, these elections feature two or more lists of candidates between which the voter may choose, but in the smaller villages, such as those in Soule, residents simply vote yes or no for one list of candidates – though they may strike through individual names in protest. The council then elects the mayor from within its ranks. This person is often the person that puts together the list of candidates. The municipal councilors are the representatives closest to their constituents, and in Soule, the mayor and council may be responsible for anything from setting the price of water to dealing with cattle blocking the road. Affairs large enough to concern multiple or all communes of these two cantons are overseen by the Community of Communes of Soule (Communauté de Communes de Soule). Each Municipal Council sends a representative to the Community of Communes.

Each canton elects a representative to the General Council, which is the law-making body of the department. Since 1982, the executive of the department has been the president of the General Council. Previously this role was filled by the Prefect. In contrast to the members of the General Council, the Prefect is appointed by the Minister of the Interior and is the representative of the state in the department. His or her office, the Prefecture, is responsible for communicating and ensuring compliance with national laws and regulations. There is often tension between the General Council and the Prefecture over the appropriate level for governance and who should have authority in any given arena, and this tension carries over to the relationship between the mayors and the Prefecture, with most Basque mayors being loyal to the Council because it is the representative of the people rather than the state. The state is still perceived as the challenge to customary practices and local decision making. This sentiment toward the office of the Prefect presents a hurdle for any individual Prefect trying to create

²¹ Paris, Marseille, and Lyon are subdivided into municipal arrondissements, the only units smaller than the commune.

rapport with local officials and citizens and compounds the difficulty of implementing unpopular projects such as Natura 2000.

At the national level, the representative bodies are the Senate and the General Assembly. Deputies of the General Assembly are directly elected by the citizens, while senators are elected by ‘*grands électeurs*’ who are themselves elected officials. The Senate researches and proposes laws, but only the General Assembly has the authority to vote on them. In the case of Natura 2000, these bodies have frequently clashed with the French ministry charged with implementing the project, the Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development (MEDD).

The legacy of interactions between the Basques of France and the French state has resulted in a populace that resents and resists centralist interference in local affairs, a state administration that is wary of the motives of the populace, and a tacit agreement of tolerance between them. These relations, along with a more thorough understanding of social organization and the position of agriculture, to be explored in the following sections, provide the critical context needed for understanding the implementation of Natura 2000 in this area.

Social Organization

Etchelecou argues that because the social, familial, and spatial customs that make up the Pyrenean system have endured more than ten centuries we can assume an “optimal balance between the system and the natural milieu” (1991: 1250). The cornerstone of this social organization was, and remains, the household (Champagne 2002, Douglass 1988, Goyhenetche 2001, Montoya 1995, Ott 1981). The Basque concept of the ‘house’ or *etxe* encapsulates much more than the dwelling. As illustrated in the figure below, the *etxe* includes not only the home but also the farm buildings, the land, rights on communal lands, the share in the *olhatia*

(shepherds' cabin, other buildings and pens, and surrounding area), the tomb in the cemetery, and the name of the house.




Figure 2.4. Schematic of resources comprised in the 'house'.

The name of the house comes often from a physical trait: the house near the church (Elizondo), the low house (Abehea), or the house above the village (Irigaray).²² When the name of the house does not reflect an identifying characteristic it often has the name of its first proprietor, and it remains the same regardless of its inhabitants. As a result of marriages throughout the centuries, the family name of the inhabitants is only rarely that of the house. Those that live in a house, however, are called by its name rather than their family name, reflecting the central and enduring attachment to and importance of land and home. One of my informants, a female animal raiser who lives and has a farm with her husband in one village but also works her family's farm with her parents in another village explained it this way: "When I call someone from here, I give the name of this house here. When I call from over there, I give the name of that house. People know us like that!" (Marie, November 8, 2006). Though the *etxe* remains central to social organization, there are critical changes underway. In one house, there were customarily three generations living together, presided over by the matriarch of the family. This practice of intra-generational cohabitation helped families pool labor and monetary resources and ensured care of older generations (Soulet 1974). Today, however, young couples are choosing to find another home in the village or to build a new home next to the family home to have more independence and intimacy, and inter-generational cohabitation has virtually ceased in the last fifteen years.

There aren't many couples that live together anymore with their parents. You have your own habits. The older people like quiet, so if you live together you can't have people over at night. This house we have used to be a barn before we redid it and moved in. Before, people lived inside less. They were only together for meals and at night, but when you were in the house, the only privacy was in the bedroom. Now the working conditions are better, so you spend more time around the house, and more time together if you all live together (Dorothee, November 25, 2006).

²² These names have often gone through significant orthographic changes. Irigaray is, for example, a contraction of Herrian Gagnen, which literally means 'above the village'.

Intergenerational cohabitation has persisted longer in Soule than in other rural communities, where it declined sharply just after the Second World War. As the younger generations returned with new ideas and attitudes, their willingness to challenge the moral authority of their fathers increased, often straining relationships and encouraging the establishment of a new household (Duby and Wallon 1975). In my sample of 60 farmers, 36 (60%) were married, which is lower than the rate among the general population of heads of farm in Soule (63% married). Of these 36, 11 (30%) were cohabitating with their own parents or those of their spouse. Only in five of these cases was the farmer in question less than 40 years old, and out of those five, four were living with a widowed parent or other relative. This process of *décohabitation* (establishing separate households for the parents and adult children) was accelerated by subsidies to help young farmers establish their own homes. In 2003, this *aide à l'habitat autonome* could reach 4,550 euros per farmer (Chambre d'Agriculture Aquitaine 2004). For those that have the means to leave the family home but who choose to live with their parents, the decision is often carefully considered and made with the intention of having the grandparents and grandchildren together, to facilitate working together, or to maintain the family home and patrimony.

I grew up with my grandparents always around. My parents worked a lot on the farm, so I spent a lot of time with my grandparents. That's really special, and I wanted that for [my daughter]. It's not always easy. There are often little battles for control with my mother-in-law, but I wouldn't change it. (Anne, May 17, 2006).

Like intergenerational cohabitation, the practice of referring to people by the names of their houses is also becoming less prevalent. All official papers, financial and legal documents, school enrollment forms, and the like use the family name rather than the name of the house. As social expectations change, younger siblings leave the household, marry, and establish homes of their own within the valley. When they move into a home that has a name attached they are not

likely to adopt it as their own but use it more as an address. They then either use their family name almost exclusively or refer to themselves (and are referred to by others) by the name of their ancestral home. “We’re the last ones to go by the names of our houses. I doubt my kids will ever be called anything but their family names” (Amélie, July 15, 2006).

The share in the *olhatia*, which will be examined at length in the next chapter, is also considered a part of the family patrimony. In each *olhatia*, there are usually more co-owners who no longer bring sheep to the mountain than there are active shepherds.

We’re 15 in our cabin, but there are only four who go to the mountain with their sheep. The others don’t go. They’re no longer farmers or they don’t have sheep . . . but they keep their part, their right to go. There are some that have let their parts go, too. There are still 15, but there are 5 that let go or died or just don’t do it. There’s one that’s leaving now, but there might be someone buying his part (Louis, April 12, 2006).

Some farmers keep the share in the event that one day they would like to return to the mountain, others keep it for their descendants, and still others keep it out of attachment. There are numerous retired shepherds who have no descendants who keep the share in the *olhatia* “because you don’t sell it.” Family land is also closely guarded. This attachment to land and patrimony contributes to the reluctance of raisers to participate in forms of collective work on the farm, such as creating a GAEC (a form of shared ownership of a farm enterprise). If something were to go awry and they had to sell the land, the farmer would not only be guilty of a poor financial decision but also of the loss of his or her history, of the heritage of his or her family.

The continuity of the family, almost synonymous with the farm, has long been paramount, and the central position of the family affected all aspects of life. The traditional system of inheritance, primogeniture, functioned to avoid the proliferation of *etxeak* (homes) or the accumulation of goods within any particular family (Etchelecou 1991). Unlike in many other societies, in Euskal Herria, the goods of the family passed most often to the eldest child, male or

female.²³ That child then had the obligation to marry a non-inheritor from another family.

Younger children could stay at the farm if they contributed to the good of the family, a system that could be quite oppressive at times, but those who stayed on were expected not to marry. In principal, there could be only two marriages per family – the inheritor to a non-inheritor of another family, and a younger sibling to the inheritor of another family. One to two others were expected to stay to provide labor power for the farm, and in turn would be provided for by the eldest, who was at the same time “privileged but also sacrificed to the interests of the lineage” (Desplat 1986).²⁴

Transmitting the family farm from one generation to another was and remains a heavy burden. Customarily, with some exceptions, the oldest child was expected to take over the farm regardless of whether or not he or she wanted to stay.

Before, there wasn't really any choice. The eldest took the farm, even if they didn't really want it. There was a certain amount of guilt associated, you felt like you had to keep the chain of transmission going. My oldest brother didn't necessarily have the most interest in the farm. When he was young he was always looking at pictures of African animals, he might have done something there if he didn't feel like he had to stay on the farm (Amélie, July 15, 2006).

Today, however, the child who takes the farm is often the child who likes the work or who has not found another interesting line of work.

I was the third child and the worst at school – now it's the one who doesn't do well at school that stays on the farm! I was the only one that wanted to do it. No one else in the family farms (Didier, July 19, 2006).

Despite the general shift, there are still many farmers in Soule that took over the farm “because it had to be someone” and not because this is their chosen career: “I did it for my parents. I don't

²³ There were some deviations to this rule. In some Souletine villages, only the oldest male could inherit the farm (Montory, for example), and though most of the time the eldest child would take over the farm even if he or she had other interests, there were examples of the inheritance passing to a younger child because the oldest had left to work elsewhere (see the unpublished work Casteret, P. nd. "Le discours de l'enquête et les schémas généalogique ." for a discussion).

²⁴ Author's translation

ever want anyone to do the same thing for me. If my daughter doesn't want to stay on the farm, I swear to you that it won't bother me at all" (Elisabeth, November 6, 2006).

Traditionally, those who chose not to stay on the farm left without requesting anything from the person who remained. Today, though, each child has an equal claim on the familial goods. Transmission of the farm to a single inheritor is no longer legal and has to be completed with the complicity of a lawyer. It is still rather rare in Soule that someone demands a portion of the estate and forces the sale or partitioning of the farm, but it is happening with greater frequency, and toward the coast it is becoming the norm. Even if the others would happily leave the farm to the one who stays if they were sure he or she would continue to work it, they sometimes hesitate out of fear that the one who keeps the farm will sell everything in a few years and they will have missed their opportunity to profit from the work of their parents. There is an uneasy feeling that profit-seeking is replacing solidarity.²⁵ The following exchange took place at a family gathering in spring 2006 and was prompted by an editorial written after a home owned by an English couple was burned. The editorial that provoked the discussion said that the foreigners buying homes should not be targeted because the people of Soule were themselves responsible for the presence of outsiders in their community.

Rachel: The people who sell only care about money, and more and more people are asking for their part of the inheritance. You never used to hear about family arrangements before. It all worked well, but now there are more and more problems. And when they sell, it's foreigners who come in. No one can afford to match what they pay.

Amélie: Of course, the Souletines have to take responsibility if we want to keep the young people and keep the villages alive, but saying [in the editorial that] it's our fault for going to work elsewhere is ridiculous. Everyone knows there aren't enough job opportunities in Soule.

²⁵ One other provision (no longer in vigor) designed to preserve the integrity of the home and elaborated in the Coutume de Soule was the prohibition of all sales of goods not acquired by the person him or herself.

Clément: You shouldn't be able to just sell off barns; it's patrimony that belongs to everyone. But people care less and less about heritage, they're less and less concerned about solidarity. It's all about money.

Along with this new availability of real estate in Soule has come an influx of money.

Between 1966 and 1976, real estate speculation on the coast drove prices for farmland up more than 250%. Similar increases in price are now affecting Soule (Laborde 1985) as the struggle for land that used to take place largely between villagers (cf Champagne 2002), is now, with the advent of real estate agencies and the internet, played out in a much broader context. For the inhabitants of large cities (Paris, London, Bordeaux), Souletine real estate is extremely inexpensive, and the city-dwellers are ready to pay more than the land itself is worth. At the end of the 1990s, older homes in Soule sold for 600 euros/m², while new homes (less than 5 years old) were being sold for less than their cost of construction (Etchebest 2007). By the early 2000s, however, prices had increased to 1000-1200 euros/m².

This introduction of money into the market has augmented prices to the point that properties are inaccessible for young Souletines who wish to buy. When non-Souletines buy properties to use only as vacation homes or investment properties they not only drive up prices and squeeze out young Souletines, they also contribute to the emptying of villages. Homes that could have young couples and families instead stand empty 50 weeks out of the year. The problem has incited several peaceful demonstrations but also criminal actions. In March 2007, a water mill in Aussurucq that had been restored and made into a vacation home owned by an English couple was burned.²⁶ In July 2007, during the Tour de France, homes were destroyed in Licq-Atherey and Larrau, and in other parts of Ipparalde there have been attacks against real estate agencies.

²⁶ See Appendix E for the letter claiming responsibility and newspapers articles regarding house-burnings in Larrau and Licq-Atherey.



Figure 2.5. This poster, in Euskara, encourages young people to defend Euskal Herria against real estate speculation. The phrase “EH ez da salgai” translates to “Basque Country is not for sale.” Smaller fliers of the same design suggest specific measures such as cementing doors of real estate agencies closed.

These actions have been denounced by the majority of Souletines, but even among those who are decidedly non-violent, the desperation is sometimes so great and situation so grave that they feel it merits the destruction of property if there is no risk to the owners themselves. Other Souletines point out that while the conversion of homes to vacation property leaves them empty, this is preferable to letting the homes decay. Often the vacation homes are restored, ensuring

their preservation. They argue that both the burning of the houses and failing to maintain them constitute destruction of patrimony. To one part of the population, the arsonists are defenders, to another, terrorists.



Figure 2.6. These homes in Soule all stand empty, their owner unwilling to sell.

There has been a swift response by the elected officials of Soule. Several mayors and the president of the Community of Communes have condemned the attacks. Even before the attacks were scaled up, another means of helping young farmers afford to start farming was created. The Agricultural Land Group (GFA) is an organization that buys farms that would otherwise be taken out of agriculture using donations or loans from the community. Individuals can give to the GFA as a gift or can later request the return of their investment, but most choose not to retake their funds seeing it as an expression of solidarity. The GFA rents the farm at below market rates to young couples that could not otherwise afford to be in agriculture. The system works to preserve the agricultural character of the villages, to encourage a robust agricultural community, and to aid young farmers.

Collective action and solidarity have long characterized interrelationships among the Souletines. The difficulty of working in the mountainous terrain, technical limitations imposed both by the land and by meager incomes, and a certain degree of auto-subsistence that remains even today make reliance on family members and neighbors essential. As such, neighbors play a very important role in Soule and in Basque society more generally. Described by Montoya as “a network of obligations and reciprocal debts at all levels of existence,” the relationships between neighbors structure village life (1995: 294). The best-known form of relationship, and that most often appearing in the literature, is that of the ‘first neighbor.’ In Soule, a house has between one and four first neighbors, and they can be to the right or to the left of the house, depending on the village (Ott 1981). Traditionally, the first neighbor is the person who is asked for help on the farm, for assistance during births, and for service when there are deaths. The system remains the strongest in the high mountain communes.

On the farm there is a lot of mutual help with the neighbors. We help each other a lot. There are months when I’m at my first neighbor’s house every day to help out. Then I might not go for a month, and then after that it’s every day again (Jean-Marc, December 1, 2006).

Mutual help, *entre aide*, continues to exist even in less-remote villages, but there is less importance given to the role of the first neighbor.²⁷ Farmers often work with brothers or cousins, with the relationships based more on family ties or affinity than on the proximity of the other’s house. The decline of the first neighbor system, in which roles were clearly defined and each expected to be called upon for help, has also led the farmers to be more concerned about imposition. One animal raiser who needed help when his cow had a Cesarean-section called on friends who only had cows, not sheep. It was time for the evening milking, and those with sheep were occupied. His decision of whom to call was also influenced by a consideration of who had

²⁷ Translation of *entre aide* taken from Mendras (1970).

other people to help at the farm. When a raiser is alone on the farm it is more difficult for him or her to find time to help others.



Figure 2.7. *Entre aide* at a bovine cesarean. Here we see two cattle raisers, the veterinarian, and the owner of the cow.

A person's aptitudes and equipment also play roles in the organization of mutual aid. Making silage, for example, requires large tractors that relatively few farmers own.

I don't have a large tractor to help them in exchange, so I invite them to eat. At noon they stop and eat here. Then in the evening they come back with their wives. The corn isn't necessarily done with the four neighbors. It depends on who has the machinery (Marie, November 8, 2006).



Figure 2.8. *Entre aide* in fern collection. One raiser broke his tractor and the round-baler that he shared with his cousins, while another broke his rotary mower. The three families worked together to harvest the ferns. One cut the ferns in the sections of each family, two brothers put them in windrows, and a fourth farmer baled.

The lack of labor power on the farm has increased the need for mutual help at the same time that it has reduced the capacity of the farmers to provide it. The decline in farming has also played an important role in the loss of mutual help. With farm consolidation and conversion to vacation homes, farms are farther apart, which makes mutual help more of a challenge. The Souletines who no longer participate in mutual help lament the loss of collegiality. However, at the same time that demographic and cultural changes induce the decline of this institution, others are being built to recreate the links between farmers and to compensate for the difficulties of farming in the mountains. The newer forms of collectivity are not necessarily based on proximity and include associations of farmers in a CUMA (Collective for the Use of Agricultural

Material) to share the costs of equipment, and the constitution of GAECs (Agricultural Group for Common Work) to work a single farm together. Both help to perpetuate the collective spirit and exchange among raisers. In the department, half of the farmers belong to a CUMA, but this figure is estimated to be higher in Soule (2007).

While the obligations to one's neighbors continue to be well-defined, they are less critical to household functioning than they were previously. The mechanization of agricultural work, the lack of labor power, the distance between farms, the difficulty of working certain farms that requires specific expertise (farms that are on steep slopes), and the telephone have all contributed to the decline of the first neighbor system.

Before, we got together for the ferns, the grapes, the chestnuts. It was more familiar between neighbors. We went to each other's houses each evening to see if there was something to be done, but now you just call if you need them, so you don't see the neighbors as much (Cécile, November 6, 2006).

The role of the first neighbor is still intact for the rituals surrounding death. Four neighbors carry the body, and the fifth carries the cross. This, though, is also undergoing change. Until recently, deaths were at home, and the deceased was kept at the house until burial. The neighbors were charged with sitting with the deceased so that he or she was never left alone. Within the last 5 years, though, funeral homes have become more popular, and the tradition of keeping the deceased at the house is being replaced.

There is among some Souletines a hostility toward strangers, change, and dissidence, which Champagne calls "the peasant conservatism" (Champagne 2002). Living in a small community, everyone knows the actions of everyone else, and interdependence, even if it is now reduced, makes the opinions of others very important. Champagne explains that dissidence is "a challenge thrown at the entire group, like a desire to distinguish oneself that can only be the manifestation of a distancing from the group" (2002: 75). This has several incarnations in Soule.

Those who are more politically active (i.e. those who participate in demonstrations and collect signatures for petitions) are careful only to ask for participation in the cause from those they are sure share their sentiments. In relation to Natura 2000, the Municipal Councils all voted against the measure multiple times. When asked why, the response is almost always “because we had to vote against it.” There was very little debate within the meetings, and even now it can be difficult to open a discussion on the subject of Natura 2000, especially in a group. One animal raiser remarked that it is always the same people who work on the village festivals, who demonstrate for causes, and who promote the use of Euskara. These people are united by a desire to maintain solidarity and customs and the willingness to go against larger tendencies.

Agriculture and the Environment²⁸

The boundaries of Soule correspond roughly to the basin of the Saison river, and its villages are concentrated along the river and its tributaries. The fertile alluvial plain that borders the river gives way to hills and high mountains, with the highest peaks located along the border with Spain. Between the peaks of Anie and Orhy, the karstic plateau is punctuated by the gorges of Kakoueta and Holzarté, today both major tourist attractions. Between the valley of the Saison and the valley of the Nive, which drains Basse Navarre, two forested mountain clusters, Iraty and the Arabailles, provide resources and recreational opportunities.

In the Souletine mountains, oak trees are found below 1000 meters, but from 400 meters to 1300 meters beech are dominant. Toward 1200 meters the vegetation clears, but this clearing is more a function of forestry practices and pastoral activity than elevation (Laborde 1985). Palynological studies in Iraty indicate that the first shepherds arrived there 7200 years ago and practiced an extensive nomadic pastoralism (Braudel 1988b, Galop 2005). Pastoralism in the

²⁸ See Appendix C for a discussion of agriculture in the department.

area developed in a forested milieu, and it was only in 2000 BCE that the forest began to retract in the face of more intensive pastoral exploitation. The greatest transformation occurred between 1400 and 700 BCE, a period during which much forest was cleared and pastoral society became the driving ecological force in the mountains (Galop 2005).

The Souletine climate is generally moderate. Winter freezes are less deep than in Pau – the seat of the Prefecture of Pyrénées-Atlantiques – and are relatively infrequent (39 per year). The average summer temperature in Mauléon-Licharre, Soule's largest town, is 20.5 degrees Centigrade, but the variability of elevations in Soule (almost 2000 meters) results in great climatic diversity. The mountainous communes have much lower average annual temperatures (6.9 degrees Centigrade in Larrau as opposed to 13.4 in Mauléon-Licharre) and receive more rain (Viers 1994). In normal years, the highest ridges will be snow-covered four to five months of the year.²⁹

The difficult terrain and social customs that ensured transmission of the farm have, until recently, kept farm sizes small, particularly in the mountain communes. The resource limitation of these farms encourages use of the commons and has prompted the creation of elaborate mechanisms for their protection, which will be examined in detail in Chapter 3. However, demographics, market forces, European regulation, and changing social norms are driving a shift toward larger farms and larger herds, pushing the system toward increased intensification and away from use of the commons.

²⁹ The winter 2006-2007 was exceptionally warm and dry. The cross-country ski area at Iraty was not able to open due to lack of snow.

Demographics

Between 1962 and 1999, the population of Soule declined 24%.³⁰ This loss was felt more heavily in the mountain communes, though. The canton of Tardets-Sorholus lost 39% of its population over that period, while the canton of Mauléon-Licharre lost only 17% of its inhabitants (INSEE 1999b). This decline has necessarily affected agriculture in the province, contributing to a lack of labor power, a decline in the number of farms, and the subsequent increase in farm sizes.




Figure 2.9. Population change in Soule. Source: (INSEE 1999a)

³⁰ Since 1836, the population of Soule has declined by 50% (Bidart 1994).

Emigration to North and South America played an important role in the demography of Soule in the nineteenth century. For political, social, and economic reasons, the non-inheritors of a farm – almost always young men – left Soule to become shepherds in other countries. The primogeniture system of inheritance, the difficulty of maintaining a large family on a small farm, and the promise of work elsewhere often made it easier for these young men to leave than to stay (Laborde 1985). The military draft also accelerated the exodus of young Basques from Ipparalde:

Under the Second Empire [1852-1870], the department of Basses-Pyrénées³¹ had the highest level of insubordination, sometimes close to half of the insubordinates of France, so much so that the Ministry of War refused to grant passports to young people in their nineteenth year. From 1860, 40% of the emigrants were less than twenty years old (Mathy 1986:101).³²

In general, the Basques of Ipparalde emigrated toward California and Nevada, as well as to Argentina.

Soule also lost residents to the large cities of France. In the nineteenth century, the rural exodus in France accelerated and for the first time brought about a decline in the rural population (Sauvy 1971). For many, the city was the symbol of a better life. It offered non-agricultural work during a period when there was a stigma associated with agriculture, promising higher wages and stable income. For men, the city was also an escape from a controlling father, and for women “the city seemed emancipating, allowing [them] to escape being entrapped in the functions of reproduction” (Laborde 1986).³³

Laborde argues, though, that the rural exodus is now diminishing: “Some signs reveal a change of attitude in Northern Basque Country; despite a difficult situation and feeble revenue,

³¹ The former name of Pyrénées-Atlantiques, the department in which Ipparalde is located.

³² Author’s translation

³³ Author’s translation

young people want to stay there” (1986:52-53).³⁴ Franques also studied the Souletine population decline and found that since 1990 “the valley of Soule is far from corresponding to the classic schema of a Pyrenean valley that would be emptied of its life force by emigration” (2005: 189).³⁵ Despite the relative optimism among scholars, the population decline remains disturbing to locals.

There’s still life here during the summer, but during the winter it’s empty. I needed help lowering a ramp on my tractor today, so I figured I’d just head to the field and as I passed through the village I’d see someone that could help me. I got all the way through the village and didn’t see a single person. It’s just empty. (Clément, April 8, 2007).

The 1999 census shows that in the two cantons of Mauléon-Licharre and Tardets-Sorholus in the age category 0-4 there were 232 boys and 233 girls. However, in the age category of 20-24 there is a substantial difference between the number of males and the number of females – almost 134 men for every 100 women (INSEE 1999b). Though these data are for only one year, the relative equivalence of numbers between the sexes from the ages of 0-19 suggests that the sex ratio at birth is near normal and that the disparity is due to selective outmigration of females starting around age 20. Many attribute that outmigration to a lack of work in the province, particularly for women.

There’s nothing here. Especially for the girls. At least the men can work at the slaughterhouse or as a mason. There’s always work for masons! But for the girls, nothing but secretarial work, and even that’s hard to find. And when even more farms close, it’s over. There won’t be anything left. (Adrien, February 7, 2007).

Even so, Franques argues that “emigration is not a characteristic of Soule . . . if the demographic decline exists, it cannot be explained only by migration” because the residents tend

³⁴ Author’s translation

³⁵ Author’s translation

to stay in their valley (2005: 192).³⁶ Though outmigration certainly is a substantial force in Soule, as Franques suggests, it is also necessary to examine internal population fluctuations and their causes. In the two cantons of Mauléon-Licharre and Tardets-Sorholus more than 30% of the population above the age of 15 is single (INSEE 1999b). The rate is even higher among farmers: 33% of the heads of farm in the two cantons are single. At the departmental level, this figure drops to 26%, and at the national level, it is only 18% (Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche 2000). It is likely that the skewed sex ratio contributes to the high number of unwed people in Soule, but the difficulty of farm life also makes it harder for heads of farm to find a life partner (Salvi 2005).

From November to June there isn't a day of rest. For my girlfriend, that will work for a year, maybe two, then she'll say 'I'm out of here'. They (non-farmers) don't work enough, we work too much. We don't earn enough, they earn too much. That distresses me every day. The goal is to have a child. It's a handicap to be a farmer. We need to get women to accept that for six months of the year we can only see each other from 7pm to 7am (Dominique, January 19, 2007).

The life of the farmer is getting harder and harder. Salaried people have more vacation, especially now that they've gone to the 35-hour work week. Agricultural people work all the time, and there's not a lot of money. You have to be really passionate about it. Women don't want to marry into the farm life. In the city, you have culture, activities, everything (Jean-Michel, June 20, 2006).

The high number of single males on the farm is often cited as one of the prime reasons for the decline in agriculture, as fewer unions exist to produce children who might one day take over the farm.

Those Souletines that do find a partner are having fewer children than before. Laborde points out the need to "realize that the rural mentality, which in this domain approximates that of urban areas, no longer favors births. From 16-17% in the 1950s, the birth rate fell to 12% in

³⁶ Author's translation

Northern Basque Country between 1968 and 1975” (1986: 53).³⁷ Though the statistics are not available by canton, the numbers for the department give some idea of what birth rates in Soule might be like. Pyrénées-Atlantiques has one of the lowest birth rates in the country. In 2004 the total fertility rate for women in the department was estimated to be 1.68 children. Among my informants of less than 40 years old who had children, the mode was two children. Among my informants 60 and older with children, none had fewer than four. Changing life goals and working conditions both contributed to the desire to have smaller families, and the advent of the contraceptive pill helped give more control over birth spacing and number of children:

Two kids is enough! I want to give them my time and attention, and now they’re expensive. Before, you could have a large family and take care of them on the farm, but now you can’t” (Amélie, March 3, 2007).

My father was one of eleven, but there wasn’t any television then so there was nothing else to do. As soon as we got television, there weren’t any more big families! (Francis, June 26, 2006).

Families were much bigger before. A family of five kids was small! I remember when the pill came along, talking about it with the other guys: ‘It seems that if the woman takes the pill, she doesn’t risk getting pregnant. Oh my god, I don’t believe it!’ (Paul, May 17, 2006).

Even those that do have children are more frequently finding themselves in a position where none of the children wishes to continue farming. There are currently 1100 heads of farm and working spouses in Soule on 1021 farms, but between the last agricultural census in 2000 and the previous one in 1988, Soule lost 286 farms, or 21.88% (Ministère de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche 2000). The farms that are not passed on to the next generation most often serve to enlarge the neighboring farms, and during that period the average Utilized Agricultural Area

³⁷ Author’s translation

(SAU) per farm in Soule climbed from 18.90 hectares in 1988 to 31.26 hectares in 2000.³⁸ The graph below (Figure 2.10) shows the increase in SAU for all farms as broken down by canton, while the following graph (Figure 2.11) shows the dramatic increase in the number of farms larger than 30 hectares. The final figure in the series (Figure 2.12) shows the average farm size for each commune. Here we can see that the southerly and more mountainous communes generally have smaller farms.




Figure 2.10. Average SAU per farm. Source: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche 1979, 1988, 2000

³⁸ SAU, *superficie agricole utilisée*, includes arable lands, permanent grasslands, and permanent cultures. For these calculations and the graphs that follow, only farms having SAU were included. For 2000, there were 1021 farms recorded, but only 1015 with SAU. This only changed figures by at most .15%. Only in one case did it result in a change in the rounded figure – The canton of Tardets-Sorholus in 1988 had an average of 19 hectares SAU if calculated only by farms actually having SAU and 18 hectares if calculated using all farms.




Figure 2.11. Farms of more than 30 hectares. Source: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche 1979, 1988, 2000.³⁹

³⁹ These figures are somewhat lower than in reality. Due to the *loi sur le secret statistique*, when there are so few cases within a particular category that the person or farm could be identified, the cell is given a value of *c*. In 1979, 14 communes had a value of *c*, in 1988, 15, and in 2000, 3. The lowest value entered for a commune is 3 farms greater than 30 hectares. Thus it is probably safe to assume that each of these represents one or two farms. In this graph, I represent only the recorded farms.




Figure 2.12. Average SAU by commune. Source : Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche 2000

Figure 2.12 shows that the average size of farms in some mountain communes is less than 20 hectares, which is substantially smaller than the departmental average of 26 hectares. Much of the land of these smaller farms is unsuitable for haymaking. Because these farms cannot produce adequate forage stores for winter at the same time that animals are pastured there, the farmers practice summer transhumance, moving herds to higher, common-pool pastures for the summer and returning to the farm for the rest of the year.⁴⁰ The lower and flatter areas of

⁴⁰ Transhumance is the practice of seasonally and temporarily moving animal herds to a different location and later returning them to the farm of origin. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the livestock raisers of Soule also practiced

northern Soule feature slightly larger farms and are less reliant on transhumance. As can be seen in the table below, almost 68% of the farms in the most mountainous canton, Tardets-Sorholus, have transhumant herds, while only 44% of farms in Mauléon-Licharre and 16% percent of the farms in the communes of interest in Saint Palais do. The farms of Tardets-Sorholus are also closer to the mountains, making transhumance more feasible.

Table 2.2. Percentage of farms with transhumant herds by canton. Source: Syndicate of Soule, City Hall of Larrau, City Hall of Sainte Engrâce, City Hall of Haux, City Hall of Aussurucq, City Hall of Ordiarp.

Canton	# of farms using high pasture	Total # of farms	% using high pasture
Tardets-Sorholus	215	317	67.82%
Mauléon-Licharre	242	550	44.00%
St. Palais	23	148	15.54%

Even when they do practice transhumance, many farmers must supplement their forage stores with purchased hay. As farm sizes grow, some farmers are relieved of the necessity of using the commons, leading to fears that the mountain will be deserted.

Ovine production

Between 1979 and 2000, the average number of sheep per farm increased dramatically, as shown in figure 2.13. Increased farm sizes, the desire to improve quality of life, stagnant prices for products, and subsidies linked to the number of animals all figure into the increase of herd sizes. The increase also corresponds in part to a tendency to switch to a non-local sheep breed, the Lacaune, which are raised in more intensive, non-transhumant systems.

winter transhumance, taking their herds as far as Bordeaux to spend the winter months (Cavaillès 1931, Urrutibehety 1972).




Figure 2.13. Average number of sheep per farm. Source: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche 1979, 1988, 2000.

On average, the sheep farms in the canton of Mauléon-Licharre have more head than the farms in Tardets-Sorholus. This is attributable in part to larger farm sizes in Mauléon-Licharre and in part to easier working conditions there.

In Soule, there are three local dairy sheep breeds, and one non-local: Black-Faced Manex, Red-Faced Manex, Basco-bearnaise, and Lacaune. The three local breeds account for almost 90% of the head in Soule, buoyed by the forces of tradition and heritage, fit with conditions and suitability for transhumance, and the higher prices of AOC products which as proprietors of local breeds they can access. Lacaunes are chosen for their superior production quantities. Most Lacaune sheep are found in Mauléon-Licharre because they fare better in the lower, flatter areas.

The Basco-bearnaise, considered well-suited to the mountain, makes up 16% of the sheep in Mauléon-Licharre, but more than 37% in the canton of Tardets-Sorholus.

The decision of an increasing number of animal raisers to replace local breeds with the Lacaune is unsettling for other raisers, the Syndicate of Soule, and local collectivities. The Lacaunes are not suitable for transhumance, which contributes to the loss of shepherds in the mountains and the subsequent lack of shepherding and labor-power. In general, Lacaune production is more intensive, with increased requirements for food and care and animals that spend more time in the barn. The Lacaune is attractive to farmers because it is a better milker, but with the additional costs involved in its care, the raiser does not necessarily finish ahead. The Departmental Sheep Breeding Center, created to promote local breeds, is trying to combat the change to Lacaunes by improving local breeds, although this effort has brought about some perverse effects, such as leading farmers to keep herds at home rather than send them to the mountains.

Bovine production

Presently in Soule there are very few dairy farms – two in the canton of Tardets-Sorholus, 21 in the canton of Mauléon-Licharre, and five in the seven communes of Saint Palais (Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche 2000). Because the dairy cattle are non-transhumant, I will focus here on beef production. The Blonde d'Aquitaine breed is largely dominant in Soule, though many cattle raisers keep one or two Montbéliards or other breeds considered to be both beef and dairy breeds to supplement the milk production of the Blondes for the calves. As with sheep, the average herd size is larger in the lower, flatter communes. In the canton of Tardets-Sorholus, there are 255 farms with beef cattle, and 71% of them have fewer than 20 head. Only 2% have

more than 40 head. Out of 428 farms in Mauléon-Licharre, however, 63% have fewer than 20 head, and five percent have more than 40 head.

Herd sizes increased in the period between 1979 and 2000 (Figure 2.14) as has the total head in Soule (Figure 2.15).




Figure 2.14. Average number of cows per farm. Source: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche (1979, 1988, 2000).




Figure 2.15. Total number of cows compared to number of farms with cows. Source: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche (1979, 1988, 2000).




Figure 2.16. Average number of nursing cows per farm with nursing cows. The two previous figures were based on total herd sizes, including young cattle. This figure uses the number of nursing cows, which is the number used to calculate the most important subsidy and is most often used by the farmers themselves. Source: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche 2000.

Organization of farm work

The guiding maxim for agriculture in Soule is “*C’est le temps qui commande!*” (It’s the weather that decides!) Winter months are largely occupied with the feeding and care of the livestock. The short days and heavy workload leave little time for day-to-day maintenance. Summer months are calmer but are punctuated with periods of intense labor. With the majority of the animals in the mountains, the farmer can perform needed repairs, clean buildings, and clear around fence lines. The hay harvest in late May and June requires long hours, as do the

second and third cuts when there is adequate rain and sun. The final cuts must be finished in time to let the pastures regrow before the animals come down from the mountain. Because most farms have both sheep and cattle, in this section I will discuss the organization of the work as a whole, distinguishing between activities that are only relevant to sheep or cattle but not separating them.

For a sheep raiser, lambing generally starts mid-November, the bulk taking place in the two weeks that follow. At the age of two weeks, the lambs can be sold to the cooperative and milking begins. The milk is generally sold to the Chaumes creamery in Mauléon from December through May, though those without transhumant herds may sell through July or even August. Sheep raisers who do not make cheese at the mountain cabin may do so at home for a week or two at the end of the season to dry the milk supply. For sheep that will be milked at the cabin, the ascent is usually in May. For those going to Syndicate of Soule land, the opening date for the pasture is May 10th. Dry sheep are brought up in mid-June, after others in *olhatia* have finished making cheese.




Figure 2.17. Seasonal Rhythm.

Individual livestock raisers vary this timeline based on personal preferences and situations. A sheep raiser can alter the time of lambing; some prefer to have the births grouped so that there are only one to two weeks of intense work, while others prefer to spread them out over a few months so that they are not overwhelmed. The age at first lambing can also be altered, and is increasingly young. In the summer of 2006, there was an increase in the number of livestock raisers that inseminated young sheep for the first time several months earlier than usual. It is still unclear why this trend is emerging and where it will lead. The most significant variability among farmers is in the length and timing of the milking season. In Soule there are very few families left that make cheese at the *olhatia* for more than the length of time it takes to dry the milk supply. The few that make cheese for commercial purposes continue milking until

the third week of July. Others milk until the tenth of June, keeping the cheese for personal consumption and sometimes giving or selling some to family and friends. The date of the ascent varies in function of the elevation to which they are going, weather, and breeding preferences. Shepherds who prefer to breed at home often wait longer to send their sheep to the *olhatia*. By doing so, they can insure that their sheep are bred with their own rams. Those who use artificial insemination often breed the sheep earlier and send them to the mountain in May. The descent is most often near the 20th of September, but there are shepherds that are still in the mountains as late as November 15th. Staying later conserves resources on the farm and is more enjoyable for those who like being at the cabin. Shearing is completed either shortly after the descent or before the ascent.

The cycle for cattle is less structured. There is more variability in the timing of calving, some raisers preferring to group births in the fall, others spreading them throughout the year. Many do not plan the timing at all, just breeding “*quand on peut*” (when we can). The unifying feature is that most cattle raisers try to arrange births in order to send the most cows possible to the mountains. Most raisers do not send young calves and thus try to avoid births in the months preceding the ascent. For cattle, the opening date of the collective pasture is the 15th of May. Syndicate technicians wanted to change the date to the 20th to give the grass more time to grow before the arrival of the cattle, but the initiative was met with too much resistance from raisers. Cattle generally descend near the end of September, but this depends on weather, pasturage at home, quality of forage in the mountains, and the physical condition of the cattle. In summer 2006, many raisers brought down their cattle as early as the first week of August because drought conditions created a lack of forage. The early descent had a cascading effect, and the

raisers had to feed hay stocks sooner than anticipated. Many were forced to buy forage to finish the winter.



Figure 2.18. Transhumance.

This seasonal rhythm has seen numerous changes in recent years. Most significant for the purposes of this research are the changes to transhumance patterns. Previously, animals, particularly sheep, went to the mountain earlier and stayed longer. The decision to stop making cheese at the *olha*, increased attention to breeding, emphasis on production, lack of forage, and European subsidies all contribute to the animals making their ascent later in the spring.

When not making cheese, animal raisers stay longer at the farm for multiple reasons. To avoid potential problems with mastitis, raisers prefer to dry their sheep before going to the high pasture. By staying at the farm longer, the raiser also has the opportunity to sell more milk, increasing profits. In *olhas* where some members still make cheese, the remaining co-owners usually cannot bring their dry sheep until the milking season has finished to avoid creating difficulties for those who are milking.

Sheep raisers practicing selection either through insemination or natural breeding must keep the animals at the farm until they are pregnant so they do not breed with rams from other farms while in the high pasture. Selection for more milk production can also lead to animals that are less hardy, leading some raisers to stop practicing transhumance entirely. The following explanation is from a young farmer who stopped practicing transhumance when he took over the farm from his father:

I don't go to the mountain with the sheep anymore, just the cows. It's been 10 years now that the sheep aren't sent the mountain, for so many reasons. With sheep, you have to do the *tour de garde* (taking a turn staying in the cabin and watching the sheep). It's hard because there's a lot of work at the farm. Also, there are diseases in the mountains – everyone brings their sheep that were sick at the house and they all mix up there. A sheep is very fragile. There are also all the different breeds up there and I can't control breeding like I can at home, so I couldn't pay attention to the genetics like I would like to (Guillaume, December 11, 2006).

Attention to production in ways other than breeding also affects transhumance. Some raisers will bring animals down sooner, or will not transhume at all, in order to feed more. The additional feed increases milk production, and while some raisers feed in the high pasture, most find it too difficult.

Recent years have also seen raisers complaining about the quantity and quality of forage in the high pasture.

There's not enough grass in the mountains. It's open to everyone, and there are no quotas. Everyone just brings however many he wants. Some places are badly overstocked, and this is the 3rd or 4th year in a row that it's been dry. The spring was cold so the grass didn't grow like it did (Jean-Marie, December 11, 2006).

This animal raiser, like many others, points out that there is uneven grazing pressure. As a result, some areas of the high pasture are over-grazed, but others are actually being taken over by blackberries due to lack of grazing pressure. The combination of overgrazing and closing up of grazing lands leads to a reduction in available grass, prompting some raisers to bring their animals down earlier than they did before. It has also affected the condition of the animals. Whereas before they maintained or even gained weight in the mountains, most now have more difficulty passing the summer. "The animals used to do well in the mountains. They'd come down fatter than they went, but now they come down in worse shape. There's not enough grass" (Arnaud, May 22, 2006). The effect is particularly marked in cattle, which sometimes need several months of feeding before being in appropriate condition to calve. The lack of grass has not, however, contributed to raisers taking their animals up later in the season. There is a sense that those who go first will get 'the good grass' and that those who wait will have a doubled disadvantage. Some raisers see the situation as so severe that they have either stopped practicing transhumance or have started sending their animals to the mountains of Béarn.

European subsidies have also contributed to change. Raisers have always made transhumance decisions based on tradition, forage abundance, animal condition, and weather, but they must now also include calculations of the effect that changing dates or number of head will have on their stocking rates. Stocking rate at the farm is calculated such that practicing transhumance increases the effective size of the farm, which in turn decreases animal density. To receive certain subsidies, the stocking rate of the farm must fall between certain figures.

Spending too much time in the high pasture can lead larger farms to fall below the minimum stocking rate.

At the same time, subsidies have contributed to increased herd sizes. In the 1970s and 80s the introduction of subsidies led to increases in mechanization. The greater overhead occasioned by the purchase of such machinery, even subsidized, has made it impossible for raisers to live by a herd of 40 sheep as they did before. Jean-Marc took over the farm from his uncles when he was 17:

The farm was about 12 hectares when I came. After about 3 years, I started renting some land to bring up the total to 17.5 hectares. My uncles had 20 cows before. When the older one retired they got rid of the sheep because they couldn't take care of them all anymore. They lived easily on 20 cows because they had fewer expenses. But with all the building and machinery and other costs, I had to increase the herd. Now I have 35 cows and 80 sheep (December 14, 2006).

In 1992, the CAP subsidies were changed to link payment amounts to the number of animals on the farm, leading to an increase in herd sizes. Between 1979 and 1988, sheep herd sizes increased by 23% in the canton of Tardets-Sorholus and 37% in the canton of Mauléon-Licharre. Between 1988 and 2000, the increase was 36% in Tardets and 73% in the seven communes of Saint Palais (Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche 1979, 1988, 2000). Despite the decrease in the number of farms, this has also resulted in an overall increase in the number of sheep in Soule. Increasing farm sizes and the need for additional revenue also contributed to these increases. Despite the increase in absolute numbers of sheep and cows in the department, the Syndicate of Soule has not seen a notable increase in the number of animals in the high pasture. Though each raiser is sending larger herds, the number of raisers participating has diminished.

The decline in agriculture is a disquieting phenomenon for Souletine leaders. In 1998 as part of LEADER II, INRA conducted a study of agropastoralism in Ipparalde (INRA 1998). They indicate that the period 2010-2015 will be critical for farms in Ipparalde because a large

number of their proprietors will reach retirement age. The move away from primogeniture and transitions that are sometimes strained because of differences between the parent and child exaggerate the problems associated with the population decline and perceived unattractiveness of agriculture as a career.

The Agricultural Commission of the Community of Communes commissioned a study of the attractiveness of agriculture as a career and currently manages a program to aid young farmers as they start farming (Salvi 2005). They hope to promote the transmission of the farm to a new farmer rather than the sale of the land to neighbors to increase their farm size or the conversion to a non-agricultural use. However, farmers tend to be wary of transferring their land to someone outside of the family (Hors Cadre Familial, HCF). They do not want to leave their farm to someone who could be from a non-agricultural background and who they think will not persevere and who may not be Basque. They are also not ready or able to leave their home to someone else. Even if they did have the means to live elsewhere, losing the patrimony would be unacceptable, and there often is not enough land or the resources for the newcomer to build a house next to the existing one (Salvi 2005). An HCF transfer is even more difficult in the mountainous communes.

First of all, we're not going to leave the house. And moreover, they may be from the city – they don't know the country. They think that the country is pretty, but they don't understand the work it takes to keep it all up. We'd prefer to give our land to the neighbors and stay in our homes. Here it's even more difficult because it's so steep. It's not easy to work the slopes (François, November 6, 2006).

There are, however, some animal raisers without a child to take over the farm who strongly wish to see the business continue. These raisers are the most likely to participate in an HCF transfer, but it remains a difficult process. In spring 2007, a young couple was looking for a farm to buy

in Soule, but they were unsuccessful. They left for another region of France where they were able to find a farm.

The succession of the farm has always been a decisive moment for family patrimony, and today as well decisions are often made as a function of whether or not there is a successor. If a farmer does not have a potential successor, he or she is less likely to engage in major improvements or mechanization. The uncertainty for the future can go so far as to occasion a change in orientation for the farm. If the children do not wish to stay, or if there are no children, the farmer may decide to no longer practice transhumance or to no longer keep sheep. When there is someone to take over the farm, the current owner begins to see his or her work as the facilitation of the succession.

Now we're not going to increase the head or the size of the farm. We're going to try to do a little less, spend time with the kids. Maintain, not increase. Keep the farm clean and wait for the succession (Hélène, November 6, 2006).

The decision to continue the farm or not is not always made at the moment of succession. Young farmers who have already taken over a farm struggle with the decision as well, and an increase in the number of animal raisers with a viable farm who decide to leave farming is troubling for the local authorities. Among the farmers trying to keep a vibrant agricultural community, it also occasions a shock. The choice not to take over a farm with old buildings that is in need of much investment is more understandable, but to leave a farm that is “a good work tool” is disquieting because it signals that agriculture is losing attractiveness as a career.

Agriculture in Soule is undergoing rapid changes that subsequently affect the management of the commons. Prices that have held steady for 20 years while expenses augment have cut sharply into revenue, and European norms have forced costly improvements and required enormous amounts of paperwork. Ever increasing mechanization and emphasis on

production further cut into profit margins and strain the land. To some farmers, this combination seems insurmountable, and as more people leave agriculture, management problems on the farm and in the high pastures increase.

Conclusion

“There are fewer and fewer animal raisers now. The state is doing what it can to get rid of us – the [CAP] compliance checks alone would be enough! And what’s more, the CAP is dwindling. Transhumance is in a precarious position – there aren’t many people at the farm, so going to the mountain, it’s almost a constraint” (Guillaume, December 11, 2006).

In this chapter, I have sought to paint a picture of Soule that shows the complexity of Basque identity, explains the sometimes tenuous relationship between the Souletines and the state administration, describes the customs and social features that have contributed to the ability of these people to use and maintain the land, and examines the difficulties confronting agriculture in the province. This description of Soule not only provides background and context to understand the implementation of Natura 2000 but also will be used to help explain how the Souletines construct their vision of nature and why they have reacted to Natura 2000 the way that they have.

CHAPTER 3. COMMON-POOL RESOURCES IN SOULE

Roughly nine percent of France's 547,030 km² is covered by commons (Vivier 2002). These lands were traditionally used as a source of stone for construction, wood and coal for heating, tanner's bark, water for residential and farm use, as well as a place for fishing, hunting, pasturing animals, and collecting fruits. Common lands continue to be used as a source of wood for heating homes and as a place for hunting, fishing, and other types of recreation. These lands are also indispensable to the agropastoral production system of Soule. Herds from almost half of the farms in the province use the common-pool high pasture, which covers more than 93.52 km² of Soule.⁴¹ The farmers of Soule view the high pasture as an extension of the farm and depend on the additional resources it provides to compensate for inadequate on-farm forage resources.

All resources can be rated according to their subtractability and excludability (Ostrom et al. 1994). Common-pool resources such as the high pasture in Soule have high subtractability because one person's use of the resource decreases the amount available to the next user. However, it is also difficult to exclude or limit the number of herders who can access the high pasture because it is too large to effectively patrol or fence in its entirety. Managing a common-pool resource thus presents a social dilemma in that the costs to individuals for cooperating on the management of such a resource can exceed or appear to exceed the individual benefits of using the resource. Although it was long thought that common-pool resources were doomed to over-exploitation, research has revealed that well-organized communities can solve the social dilemma through collective action (Acheson 1988, Berkes 1986). To understand how this is

⁴¹ Calculated using the declared SAU of the Syndicate of Soule, Larrau, and Sainte Engrâce.

possible, it is important to distinguish between the kind of resource and the management regime associated with the resource.

In this chapter I will examine the most salient concepts that emerge from research into common-pool resources and common property management regimes, discussing the major lines of inquiry and findings so as to lay the foundation for a discussion of the Soule common property regime. The current attention in the literature to the embeddedness of these regimes in larger social and political structures along with increased interest in global problems has recently led to an explicit consideration of scale in commons research. My research engages directly with this line of inquiry. The local institutions to manage the common-pool resources of Soule have been in place a very long time, but they can only now be understood in the context of the influences of the French state and the European Union.

Theoretical Background

One of the most important early breakthroughs in thinking about the commons was the distinction between resources that are open to all and resources that are subject to access restrictions even though they are not privately or publicly owned. Garret Hardin's (1968) seminal work on the commons equated 'the commons' with 'tragedy.' In this work he argues that humans will inevitably overexploit resources that are open to all. Using the now well-known example of the herdsman, Hardin asserts that for each cow the herdsman adds, he receives almost the entire benefit of having one more animal. The costs of the additional grazing, however, are shared by all herders who have animals in the same grazing area so the individual herdsman only bears a fraction of this cost. A rational actor seeks to maximize his or her benefit, adding more and more cattle, eventually leading to the collapse of the system.

Hardin's solution of "mutual coercion mutually agreed upon" opens the possibility of social controls to regulate access (1968: 1247).

Building on this idea of social control, Vayda and Rappaport pointed out that the tragedy of the commons could be avoided by implementing institutions that promote action in the collective interest (1968). Though there may not be a 'technical fix' to the problem, social controls can be effectively employed in these situations. Berkes and Farvar further argued that the previous overlooking of cultural mechanisms for access regulation is "western ethnocentric," overemphasizing the individual and competition (1989: 2). Similarly, Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop point out that "common property" institutions have played "socially beneficial roles" since prehistory (1975: 713). They argue that those who have used the term 'common property' to describe situations in which there are no institutional arrangements for access to and use of the resource are incorrect – the use of the term 'property' entails ownership and the possibility of exclusion. Resources owned by no one, such as high seas fisheries, are instead said to be subject to an 'open access' regime. The situations Hardin described as 'commons' are more accurately characterized as open access. Table 3.1 outlines the distinctions between the various types of property regimes that are available for a given resource.

Table 3.1. Types of property regimes. Source: Adapted from Berkes (1989).

Open access	Free-for-all; access and withdrawal rights are neither exclusive nor transferable; exclusion and alienation rights are not controlled by anyone
State property	Nation-state or crown holds alienation and exclusion rights and may grant rights of access withdrawal and management to individuals or groups
Common property	Alienation and exclusion rights are controlled by an identifiable group and are not held privately held or managed by governments; access, withdrawal, and management rights are specified and exclusive
Private property	All rights are held by an individual or group acting as a collective (such as a family or corporation)

The difficulties with terminology did not end with the distinction between ‘open access’ and ‘common property’. The term ‘common property’ has been used both for categories of resources and for governance schemes. Ostrom and others urge a differentiation between the resource and the regime, suggesting ‘common-pool resources’ and ‘common property management system’ as the more refined terms (2002). This distinction is necessary because a common-pool resource can be exploited under different regimes. Common-pool resources such as high sea fisheries and the global climate are typically subject to open access regimes. Other resources, such as scenic areas, though, are often held as state property and managed for the

public by the government. Common-pool resources such as grazing areas or inland fisheries that have been territorialized may be exploited by common property regimes.

A property regime can be thought of as a bundle of rights, with different types of rights allocated to different participants in the common property management system (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). These rights are as follows:

- Access – The right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy nonsubtractive benefits (for example, hike, canoe, sit in the sun)
 - Withdrawal – The right to obtain resource units or products of a resource system (for example, pasture animals, catch fish, divert water)
 - Management – The right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource by making improvements
 - Exclusion – The right to determine who will have access rights and withdrawal rights and how those rights may be transferred
 - Alienation – The right to sell or lease management and exclusion rights
- (Ostrom 2000: 339)

These rights are held differentially by different participants in the management system, as explained in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2. Rights allocated to different participants. Source: Ostrom and Schlager (1996: 133).

	Owner	Proprietor	Claimant	Authorized User	Authorized Entrant
Access	X	X	X	X	X
Withdrawal	X	X	X	X	
Management	X	X	X	X	
Exclusion	X	X			
Alienation	X				

An authorized entrant, such as a vacationer visiting the high pastures of Soule, would only have the right to enter the area in question and engage in nonsubtractive uses such as hiking. A

proprietor, however, would have the right to engage in management activities and participate in the decisions of how to allocate rights.

Institutions

Institutions in a common property regime are the ‘rules of the game’ (Acheson 2003 following anthropologist Frederick Bailey) or the ‘ways of organizing activities’ (Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003). They are the social controls that permit the resolution of the collective action dilemma and provide for control of the resource. Crawford and Ostrom (1995) identify three approaches to thinking about what an institution is: institutions-as-equilibria, institutions-as-norms, and institutions-as-rules.

The institutions-as-equilibria approach “places the responsibility for a social order on the individuals who are part of that order, rather than on some external ‘state’ or ‘third-party enforcer’” (Crawford and Ostrom 1995: 583). The focus is on regular behavior patterns rather than on rule-following. Though this approach helps prevent one from reifying institutions, it elides the differences between shared strategies, norms, and rules. Using such an approach in Soule, the focus would be on what shepherds do to manage the high pasture and not why they do so. Viewing institutions as norms emphasizes the thought that the group of people in question shares ideas about what their behavior ought to be. In Soule, this approach would lead us to conclude that shepherds engage in the management activities they do because there is shared agreement that these behaviors are what people should be doing. Though this approach adds an element of motivation, like the equilibria approach, it neglects the role of enforcement. Similar to the institutions-as-norms approach, the institutions-as-rules approach focuses on the constraints on behavior. However, it emphasizes constraints that are backed up by monitoring

and enforcement. Using this approach in Soule risks overemphasizing the role of the Syndicate and official, explicit rules to the exclusion of shepherds and norms.

Crawford and Ostrom argue that these three approaches simply highlight different opportunities and constraints. They suggest that rather than arguing the merits of one approach or another, the ideal course of action is to examine what they term “institutional statements” (Crawford and Ostrom 1995: 583). These statements are the shared strategies, norms, and rules that govern behavior by permitting, forbidding, or prescribing actions. These terms are frequently used interchangeably in the literature, or one term or another is used to convey the entire spectrum of institutional statements. For example, what Crawford and Ostrom (1995) refer to as shared strategies, Axelrod (1986) calls norms, March and Olsen (1989) call rules, and Bourdieu (1977) calls doxic elements of action. For this chapter I will be following the distinction made by Crawford and Ostrom.

The clearest way to understand the differences between these types of institutional statements is to examine their composite elements. Crawford and Ostrom (1995) outline a ‘grammar of institutions’ made up of five constituent parts. The parts that an institutional statement contains allow us to classify it as a shared strategy, a norm, or a rule.

The five components are symbolized by the letters ADICO.

- A ATTRIBUTES is a holder for any value of a participant-level variable that distinguishes to whom the institutional statement applies
 - D DEONTIC is a holder for the three modal verbs using deontic logic: may (permitted), must (obliged), and must not (forbidden)
 - I A/M is a holder that describes particular actions or outcomes to which the deontic is assigned
 - C CONDITIONS is a holder for those variables [that] define when, where, how, and to what extent an AIM is permitted, obligatory, or forbidden
 - O OR ELSE is a holder for those variables which define the sanctions to be imposed for not following a rule
- (Crawford and Ostrom 1995: 584)

An example from Soule would be: All shepherds (A) must not (D) bring sheep to the high pasture (I) before May 10 (C) or face sanctions decided by the Assembly of the Syndicate (O).

Shared strategies refer to those actions that people generally take or avoid not because there is moral or social pressure to do so or because there are externally-imposed consequences for doing so but because they feel that it is the most beneficial course of action in itself. As such, they contain no deontic (must, may, or should) and no ‘or else,’ leaving only the components A, I, and C. As an example from Soule, we can consider the ways in which shepherds tend their sheep in the high pasture. Though the practice is diminishing, it was traditionally standard for shepherds to remain with their herds throughout the day, guiding them across the pasture area to ensure even grazing. There were and are no imposed consequences for not doing so, and any guilt or shame the shepherd might have felt 20 years ago for leaving his or her sheep alone during the day has largely disappeared. As such, we can say that this is an AIC statement: Shepherds (A) stay with and guide their herds throughout the day (I) in the high pasture (C). This statement is then best-characterized as a shared strategy.

By taking the component parts of a shared strategy and adding a deontic, we arrive at a norm. A norm can be learned by participants and represents a particular “internal valuation” that a participant has habituated for an action (Ostrom 1998: 9). The deontic, the must, may, or must not of the institutional statement, signals that there is either internal or external pressure to behave in a conforming manner. Noncompliance with a norm can result in guilt or shame. Shepherds in Soule are expected to participate in controlled burns of their grazing area whenever they are organized. Not doing so would occasion the disrespect of all the other shepherds in the *olha*. This norm is so internalized that when asked to discuss the normative content of their actions and the repercussions of nonconformance, my informants had trouble even imagining

what might happen to someone who did not participate when asked. It is interesting to note that cattle raisers with transhumant herds share this norm only in low frequencies. Very few participate in the burns.

In contrast to a norm, a rule contains the final component of the ‘grammar’ outlined by Crawford and Ostrom, the ‘or else’. As such, a rule has an attached sanction that is known to and agreed upon by the participants (Crawford and Ostrom 1995, Ostrom 1998). Effective monitoring and enforcement are critical to the force of the rule. The example given to explain the ADICO structure is a rule because it contains not only a directive for behavior but also a specified consequence for noncompliance. In practice, distinguishing between shared strategies, norms, and rules can be difficult, particularly when the system is well-established and participants internalize rules and norms to the degree that they have difficulty recalling the consequences of noncompliance.

Levels of Institutional Analysis

Scholars in many different disciplines study the effects of institutions on behavior. The first major attempt to draw on these different, and largely disconnected, literatures was Kiser and Ostrom’s (1982) *The Three Worlds of Action*, which sought to create a meta-theoretical framework for understanding the link between institutions and behavior (see Ostrom 2007 for a discussion of subsequent work in Institutional Analysis). In this framework, they distinguish between three inter-related but separate levels of analysis: operational level, collective choice level, and constitutional level.

The three levels can be thought of as a hierarchy, with the decisions and actions of one level circumscribing those that can then be made at lower levels. On the operational level,

individuals engage in day-to-day actions and adopt strategies for future actions. In Soule, this might mean an animal raiser deciding the day on which the herd will be taken to the high pasture or a shepherd deciding to no longer make cheese in the mountain cabin. On the collective choice level, officials make decisions that determine, continue, or change which actions are authorized. At this level in Soule, the Syndicate determines the opening date of the high pasture, thereby constraining the range of possible decisions that can be made by individual shepherds at the operational level about their personal ascent date. The constitutional level is the arena for determining how future collective choice decisions are made. At the creation of the Syndicate, each commune that formed part of Soule at the time was given the right to one representative in the decision making body of the Syndicate. Those representatives, given their authority by constitutional decisions, make collective choice decisions that in turn affect the operational level decisions of individual actors on the commons.

Carlsson and Berkes (2005) extend the idea of these three levels by distinguishing between their rules and the actions taken at these levels. Operational actions and decisions (e.g. taking the sheep to the high pasture on May 15th) must adhere to operational rules (no shepherd may bring sheep to the high pasture before May 10th). Those operational rules are decided by actions at the collective choice level (a Syndicate deliberation that sets the opening date of the pasture). Similarly, collective choice rules (each commune gets one representative) are decided by actions at the constitutional level.

Analyzing Institutions in a Complex World

Though the ways in which resource users design, implement, and maintain institutions for resource management are incredibly diverse (Ascher 1995, Bromley 1992, Gardner et al. 2000,

Peters 1994), in the most successful cases, both the impetus for management and the coercive measures are user-based. Studies of the role of national (McKean 1992) and supra-national policy (Daw and Gray 2004) and of regulation (Azhar 1993) have shown that failure in common property systems seems often to result from government undermining the authority and independence of local institutions or from the failure of external regulation. The state, though, has an integral role to play in assuring the successful management of the commons (Agrawal 2003), providing enabling conditions and in some cases supplying financial, human, or technical resources (Singleton 2000). Given that actors, institutions, and agencies from the local level through the nation state, and sometimes even beyond, are critical to commons management, it is necessary to examine the ways in which these systems are embedded in larger socio-political structures (Agrawal 2003).

Recently, scholars have begun to do just that, increasingly moving beyond heroic assumptions of autonomy and stasis and examining the role of outside forces in shaping local institutions (Brantenberg 1995, Lam 1998, McCay and Jentoft 1998, Poteete and Ostrom 2004, Robbins 1998). Interplay between institutions, market forces, and higher-level policies all affect commons management and deserve attention, and multiple actors across multiple levels are likely to have a diverse set of goals and expectations. Volume 2(1) of the *International Journal of the Commons* is devoted entirely to the issue of scale and how the interplay of multiple levels affects commons governance (see particularly: Armitage 2008, Berkes 2008, Carlsson and Sandstöm 2008).

The Commons in Soule

Property in Soule is privately owned by individuals or houses, owned by individual communes, or owned collectively by all the residents of the province. In the commons literature ‘communal’ is often used as a synonym for common-pool resources or common property management. Because the adjective for lands held by French communes is ‘communal,’ I will avoid using communal in the sense it is used in the literature. In this chapter, ‘communal’ refers specifically to the lands owned and managed by a commune, which may use them for its own ends – such as timber sales for municipal revenue – or make them available to their residents for wood, pasturage, and similar uses. Of the 42 communes in Soule, only Larrau and Sainte Engrâce control substantial amounts of communal high pasture used for transhumance. The majority of common-pool land belongs to all residents of the province and is managed by the Syndicate of Soule.

The governance of the commons in Soule is complex and multi-layered. Multiple entities, including the *olhatiak*, individual communes, the Syndicate of Soule, the French state and the European Union, are involved in decision making at various levels. In this section, I will focus on the institutional arrangements in place for the management of the common-pool high pasture overseen by the Syndicate of Soule. I will use the idea of different levels of action outlined by Kiser and Ostrom (1982) as an organizing framework for describing the regime in place in Soule.

Constitutional Level

During the *Ancien Régime* – 15th to 18th centuries – common-pool resources in France were managed according to customary laws (Vivier 2002). In Soule, these laws were based on earlier oral customs that were recognized as early as 1358, when the King of England reprimanded his chatelaine for their non-respect following a complaint lodged by the Souletines (Jacob 1985).⁴² King François I later ordered the codification of the customary laws, which was completed in Soule in 1520 with the drafting of the *Coutume de Soule*. The *Coutume*'s major contribution to commons management is to specify who is eligible to benefit: "All the grasses, pastures and acorn crops (*glandées*) of 'vacant' commons, waters, fisheries, and hunting grounds of the land of Soule are common and open for all people of this *pays*" (1520: 45).^{43,44} This rule is two-fold. Not only does it grant right of access to all Souletines, it excludes non-residents, thereby limiting the number of eligible users. The *Coutume* limits access to pasturage even further by tying the right to and degree of benefit from the commons to the possession of property: "No one may graze in these common pastures a greater number of animals (his own or those of others) than he has wintered and fed hay and straw coming from the property that he possesses [in Soule]" (1520: 46).⁴⁵ This provision is similar to those that Netting (1981) recorded for transhumant herds in the Swiss Alps.

The French Revolution (1789) led to the disruption of this system as the organizations that had been established for the management of the commons were officially disbanded, and management reverted to the communes in which the common land was located. In Soule,

⁴² Soule and Labourd passed from England to France in 1451 under the Treaty of Ayherre following the Hundred Years' War (Jacob 1985).

⁴³ Author's translation

⁴⁴ In 1639 the king sought to sell land near Tardets that the Souletines regarded as part of the common land falling under their customary laws, provoking a violent uprising that only ended in 1661 with the beheading of its leader, Matalas. Even today, one of the most moving Basque songs, one that I learned to sing "almost as well as a Xiberotar," tells the story of his demise.

⁴⁵ Author's translation

management by individual communes persisted until the creation of the Syndicate of Soule (*Commission Syndicale du Pays de Soule* or *Xiberoko Zindikata*). This organization was created by royal decree June 3, 1838, at the request of the Prefect of the department (at the time called *Basses-Pyrénées*) (Achigar-Elichondoborde and Baudon-Gelber 1988). Its creation was an application of article 70 of the law of July 18, 1837, an *Ordonnance du Roi*, that provided for the establishment of a *commission syndicale* for the management of common goods belonging to multiple communes in response to a request by one of those communes (Poumarede 1984). That its creation was actually initiated by the Prefect rather than by the communes concerned was pointed out to me by a mayor who contests the Syndicate's legitimacy, and indeed, despite the professed function of setting up a commons management institution 'of the people', the creation of the Syndicate served to bring that management further under the aegis of the state.

Today, like at its inception, the Syndicate is tasked with managing the common-pool lands of the communes of the historic configuration of Soule, including the communes that are now part of the canton of Saint Palais. For the management of common-pool goods, or *biens indivis*, the Syndicate has the same authority as would a Municipal Council on its land, and most decisions regarding the management of the commons, except sales of property, are reserved to the Syndicate. The Syndicate also has the right to collect fees for the use of these lands and to create and execute a budget. Drawing on the idea of a bundle of rights as outlined above, the Syndicate has all rights up to and including exclusion (access, withdrawal, management, exclusion). The communes of Soule have only the right of alienation over this land, and it can only be exercised in unanimity.

Within the Syndicate, decisions are made by the 43 elected representatives that make up the Assembly. These representatives are designated from within the Municipal Councils and

thus can change with municipal elections, held every six years.⁴⁶ In many small communes, such as those in Soule, there is only one electoral list, and voters simply choose to accept or reject the list in its entirety. One person takes on the task of compiling a ticket and is most often the person who is later selected as mayor by his or her fellow council members. This system concentrates power in the hands of very few people, and it can be difficult to mount an opposition. Because those wishing to participate in the Assembly of the Syndicate must first be elected to a Municipal Council and because Municipal Councils can effectively be constituted by the decisions of one person, the rights to participate in decision making are not always equitably distributed. The Assembly elects a Syndic (president) and two vice-syndics from within its ranks, and delegates organize themselves into commissions oriented toward various aspects of management (forest, tourism, pastoralism, etc). There are no term limits, though successive terms are contingent upon being reelected to the Municipal Council, and approximately 50-55% of its members are farmers (David Tourreuil, Chargé des Missions, Syndicate of Soule, interview May 23, 2006).⁴⁷

The high pasture that is managed by the Syndicate, shown in the figure below, is divided into five sectors: Ahuzki, Bostmendietta, Malta, Irati, and Igueloua.

⁴⁶ Those elected in 2001 will actually serve a seven year term. The electoral calendar was sufficiently crowded in 2007 that municipal elections were pushed back one year.

⁴⁷ Municipal Councils also do not have term limits.




Figure 3.1. Sectors managed by the Syndicate of Soule. Sector names are presented in bold, while names of some communes are provided in regular type for reference. Data from David Tourreuil of the Sydicate and IGN. GIS manipulation by John Devine.

These grazing lands are located within the boundaries of seven communes: Alçay (Altzai), Aussurucq (Altzürükü), Camou-Cihigue (Gamere-Zihiga), Licq-Atherey (Ligi-Aterei), Lacarry (Lakarri), Larrau (Larraine), and Musculdy (Muskildi). Though these lands are located in the territory of only seven communes, they belong to all the communes of Soule in *indivision*. In French civil law *indivision* refers to a situation in which multiple people or entities are together owners of a right to a good or collection of goods without any material division of those goods.

Management and decision making in Soule are at the same time nested, overlapping, and level-skipping. While the Syndicate is the overarching organization ensuring commons

management, the *olhatiak* play pivotal roles and enjoy considerable authority. Though some of the rights of the *olhatia* are subject to operation within the bounds of Syndicate decisions (such as the right to pasture sheep, which must respect opening dates), others function irrespective of the Syndicate (the ownership of the cabin). The current rights of the *olhatia*, conferred directly by the state, were fixed in an *arrêt* of the *cour d'Appel* of Pau on April 6, 1881, and include:

- the ownership of a cabin (the *olha*) and an adjacent terrain for the placement of pens or a stable
- the right to pasture sheep on the associated grazing area
- free use of wood necessary for the construction or maintenance of the cabin and pens, heating, and cheese-making

In Euskara, the word *olha* designates the shepherds' cabin (pictured below). The French word *cayolar*, a derivative of the Béarnais word, designates the cabin, the pens, any buildings for milking, woodlands, and the grazing area, or *builta* in Euskara. In Euskara, the word for this ensemble is *olhatia* – the contraction of *olha* and *altia*, 'the surroundings.'⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Younger shepherds, however, sometimes use *cayolar* and *olha* as translations of each other depending on the language in which they are speaking.



Figure 3.2. Uruthanze in the sector Bostmendieta during a Syndicate-organized controlled burn.

Each of the five sectors managed by the Syndicate is sub-divided into the territories of these *olhatiak* (Figure 3.3). Each *olhatia* is named, and the shepherds of that *olhatia* are referred to by that name. For example, when referring to the shepherds who use the *olhatia* Nabolegui, one would say ‘*Naboleguiiko txotx dunak*,’ which means ‘those who have a *txotx* at Nabolegui.’ The territories used by these groups range from 45 hectares to 495 hectares, and there are from one to twelve herders in each group. The smallest territories are found in the sector of Ahuzki, where they range from 45 to 266 hectares with an average size of 188 hectares. The largest are found in the sector Irati, where they range from 102 to 495 hectares and average 300 hectares. Fifteen of the groups are comprised of one to three *txotx dunak*, 18 have four to six *txotx dunak*, and eight have seven or more *txotx dunak*.




Figure 3.3. Topographic map showing boundaries of *olhatia* territories in the sector of Igueloua. Source: David Tourreuil, Syndicate of Soule

Currently, there are 41 such territories on Syndicate land, but there are only 39 groups that use their cabins. The two remaining groups have only one or two herds left and simply leave them in liberty in the high pasture, though in principle these sheep remain in their designated grazing areas. These two groups are unlikely to continue the practice of transhumance for much longer. With the decline in the number of farms and the trend toward keeping herds at the farm year-round there is a decline in the number of *olhatia* groups, which is shown in Table 3.3. For the years 1506, 1861, and 1993, taken from Richer (1998), there is no indication of the scope of his

figures. Given that one of his counts dates to before the creation of the Syndicate of Soule, we can probably assume that he is counting for all of Soule. Even making this assumption, though, we still do not know if he is counting only the *olhatiak* in the high pasture or if he has also included those that are located in the intermediate zones, or *zones intermédiaires*. The +2 in the figure for 2007 designates two *olhatiak* in such zones and located on land belonging to the communes of Urdinarbe and Aussurucq. Of the 50 that remain, seven are on the communal land of Sainte Engrâce (one of these is owned jointly with Haux), four are shared between the Syndicate and Larrau, and four are on territory belonging only Larrau.

Table 3.3. Evolution of number of *olhatiak*. Source: Richer (1998), Syndicate of Soule, City Halls of Larrau, Sainte Engrâce, Haux, Aussurucq, and Ordiarp.

Year	Number of <i>olhatiak</i>
1506	107
1861	83
1993	54
2007	50+2

Collective Choice Level

Collective choice decisions take place both within the Syndicate and within individual *olhatiak* and set the boundaries for operational decisions made by individual shepherds and cattle raisers. The Syndicate's activities, though, are not limited to the pastoral domain. In fact, less than half of the 14,132 hectares it manages is in pasture. The Syndicate devotes considerable staff time to the management of timber resources, to operating a ski station, and to renting hunting cabins for the *palombe* (wild pigeon) season. The non-pastoral activities augment the Syndicate's revenue and help subsidize the maintenance of pastured areas. For our purposes, I will be focusing on the management of the pastoral areas. Within the pastoral domain, the

Syndicate is responsible for such decisions as: the opening date for the high pasture, whether or not to approve new transhumance requests, how to meet water needs (adding new troughs, hauling in water in droughts), how to divide the CAP subsidies between the farmers and the Syndicate, and the amount the farmers must pay per animal.

One of the biggest challenges the Syndicate faces in overseeing the pastoral domain is regulating grazing. In its routine decisions, the Syndicate has tools to address issues of over-stocking. It can shorten the length of the transhumance period, deny access to new users, and make pasturing animals expensive enough to limit herd sizes. In principle, it could even simply place a limit on the number of animals each herd can contain. However, in practice, this can be extremely difficult. It is important to remember that the Assembly is made up of elected representatives, and its president also sits on the General Council. Because they are often looking forward to the next election cycle, Assembly members can be reluctant to take measures that would be viewed as too draconian, even in years when the condition of the pasture might warrant such action.

The Syndicate staff argues that absolute over-stocking is not a problem in Soule but that un-even grazing is. Since 1993, the average stocking rate, which is calculated using different values for individual animals of different species, has increased 5.5% over the totality of Syndicate land. However, during that time, grazing has become more localized. Sectors with good watering points and roads are the most over-grazed. Table 3.4 shows the evolution of stocking rates over the totality of the pastoral domain, while Table 3.5 shows the same for the densest sector, Ahuzki. Between 1993 and 2004, Ahuzki's stocking rate increased by 28%, and in 2004, the stocking rate for Ahuzki was 250% of the average for the whole of the Syndicate's grazing area.

Table 3.4. Evolution of stocking rates over the totality of land managed by the Syndicate. Source: data is from Syndicate of Soule. Calculations are my own using the declared SAU of 6426 hectares.

Total	1993	1997	1999	2002	2004	2005
Bovine UGB ⁴⁹	2672	3277	3492	3373	3208	3158
Ovine UGB	3957	4388	3625	3901	3794	3885
Equine UGB	290	461	405	350	354	301
TOTAL UGB	6919	8126	7522	7624	7356	7344
Stocking rate	1.08	1.26	1.17	1.19	1.14	1.14

Table 3.5. Evolution of stocking rates in the highest density sector, Ahuzki. Source: data is from Syndicate of Soule. Calculations are my own using the estimated SAU of 1118 hectares.

Ahuzki	1993	1997	1999	2002	2004
Bovine UGB	1311	1629	2060	1798	1771
Ovine UGB	1078	1287	1275	1223	1272
Equine UGB	89	163	171	147	144
TOTAL UGB	2478	3079	3506	3168	3187
Stocking rate	2.22	2.75	3.14	2.83	2.85

To combat the issue, the Syndicate tries to send new large animal raisers who are not inheriting a certain grazing range to areas that are not overstocked. The Syndicate also tries to spread out the animals within sectors by strategically placing watering points in areas that are becoming overtaken with bramble to draw the animals to those areas. In addition to political constraints – in its operational activities Syndicate staff must abide by the collective choice decisions made by the Assembly – other factors also make more direct measures difficult to implement. It would be extremely difficult to tell someone who has been bringing animals to the same place for generations to use another area, particularly shepherds. The share in the *olhatia* is

⁴⁹ UGB – Unité Gros Bétail. Equal to one adult cow or horse. One sheep is .15 UGB. There are also adjustments made for non-adult cows and horses.

part of the patrimony of the *etxe*, making it culturally and legally difficult to ask shepherds to give it up. Furthermore, these groups of shepherds have a coherent group identity and history of devising solutions to their social dilemma, which in most cases contributes to their continued ability to manage their territory.

It is also unfeasible to cap the herd size, at for example 90% of current herd size, because of the way in which the agropastoral production system is embedded in larger socio-political structures. Subsidies under the CAP are linked to stocking rates on-farm, and the calculations include time spent in the high pasture as effectively increasing the surface area of the farm and lowering stocking rates. If the Syndicate were to limit herd size, this would likely disrupt the careful calculations of the farmers, perhaps costing them subsidies.

Though the influence of the European Union on the commons in Soule is largely felt through the linkage of on-farm decision making, the Syndicate itself is also directly influenced by the European subsidy system. Under the CAP, the Syndicate as the land manager receives the *Prime Herbagère Agri-Environnementale* (PHAE). Farmers have requested that the Syndicate fence off more dangerous areas to prevent cattle from falling down steep slopes, but the Syndicate wants and needs to keep these areas open and cleared because they are declared under the PHAE. Thus, the collective action decisions of the Syndicate are not only influenced by the rules established at the constitutional level but also by policymaking that could be considered external to the system.

Within each *olhatia* group the major collective choice decisions have been codified in a *règlementation intérieur*, or internal constitution, that lays out the most important rules for behavior and consequences for noncompliance. These are unique to the individual *olhatia* and are elaborated by their co-owners, but most are very similar. These agreements most often

specify the conditions under which shepherds may come to the cabin, how many sheep they may have, the provisions for transferring ownership shares, and how shepherds must participate in its upkeep. These documents are short, the shepherds preferring to write as little as possible to maintain flexibility. The following points are translated from the *réglementation intérieure* of Uthurchara in the sector Irati:⁵⁰

- The *olhatia* is for agricultural use only
- One *demi-txotx* (or half-share) is composed of 150 milking sheep
- There are 13 *demi-txotx* in the *olhatia* for a total of 1950 allowed milking sheep, the carrying capacity of the grazing area. If a shepherd brings more milking sheep than that, for each one he or she must pay the price of 1.5 liters of milk into the *olhatia* treasury
- All co-owners must pay for upkeep regardless of whether they bring sheep
- Only those that use the cabin are required to pay for utilities and supplies
- Shares can only be sold to other shepherds, and they must be from Soule
- If a co-owner wishes to transfer his or her share to a non-farmer, it can only be given, not sold.

Each group has an annual meeting in the spring, called *Artzainbidea* (path of the shepherd), to set the date of the ascent for that year, to determine the details of the rotation of stays at the cabin, to settle the accounts of the previous year, and to discuss any other decisions that need to be made.

The number of shares in an *olhatia* (e.g. 13 at Uthurchara) cannot be changed, and each share (or *txotx*), has an associated number of sheep that a shepherd can bring to the *olhatia*. These figures are said to have been fixed by the original co-owners as a function of the carrying capacity of their allotted grazing land, and though this restriction in loosening in many *olhatiak*, this remains an important regulator of local stocking rates for those that still have the provision because it provides a ceiling on the number of sheep that can be in the grazing area (e.g. 1950 at Uthurchara)(du Peyrat 1875, Lespinasse 1878). The Syndicate sees sheep herd size regulation as the domain of the *olhatia* group. Only the Syndicate, though, can regulate the number of large animals. As seen in the regulation enumerated above, in some *olhatiak* the herd size limit can be

⁵⁰ Author's translation.

characterized as a rule because it has a specific, elaborated ‘or else’ or sanction, in this case, the payment of a penalty for each sheep over the limit. In others, however, the number in a *txotx* functions more as a shared strategy and shepherds are simply expected to keep their herd sizes to approximately that defined in a *txotx*. In these *olhatia*, only increasing the herd substantially would warrant making some sort of agreement with the other co-owners.

Today in many *olhatia*, the *txotx* no longer corresponds to a specific number of sheep at all, simply granting the right to transhume to the territory of that *olhatia*. Driven by farm consolidation, subsidies, and market factors, on-farm herd sizes have increased dramatically, and as a result, herd sizes in the mountains have increased as well. Despite losing its function as a strict limit on the number of sheep in the high pasture, the *txotx* does still limit the number of herds because no sheep may be brought to the high pasture by shepherds that do not possess a *txotx*.

When cheese-making was more prevalent, a shepherd was not only permitted to bring the number of sheep associated with his or her *txotx* but required to bring that number to ensure equal contributions of milk. In 1860, the *txotx* was fixed at 45 milking ewes by the Syndicate of Soule (Richer 1998), but as many shepherds did not have a full complement of ewes, several would pool their herds to create a full *txotx* (Saint-Sens 1940). Both Ott (1981) and my informants stated that in the early 1900s a *txotx* was usually somewhere between fifty and sixty. At this point, a herd of 45 was often too small to be economically viable, and shepherds fixed amongst themselves the *txotx* size for their own *olhatia*.⁵¹ At the end of the season, shepherds divided the cheese relative to the portion of a *txotx* that they had. In an *olhatia* with a *txotx* of 50 ewes, the shepherd with a half *txotx* would be responsible for bringing 25 milking ewes and

⁵¹ What is unclear is if this was done with the tacit approval of the Syndicate, if the Syndicate was largely unaware, or if the rules were revised.

would take home half the number of cheeses as the shepherd with a full *txotx*. While the herd size limit imposed by the *txotx* served to regulate stocking rates, the requirement that it simultaneously imposed served to keep all of the shepherds on equal footing (Cavaillès 1910). Each contributed equally, and each benefited equally.

Because shepherds in the *olhatia* share the time and responsibility of caring for each other's animals, some *olhatiak* have been able to institute rules to limit stocking rates even when the *txotx* is no longer a strict limit. In six of the 39 *olhatia* groups in Syndicate territory the number of days the shepherd must spend in the cabin each summer is tied to his or her herd size and results in differences in the number of days different shepherds spend at the cabin. There are two main ways that these provisions are organized:

- By using a cut-off point above and below which a different number of days is mandated e.g. Less than 140 milking ewes – shepherds stay for 3 day tours; more than 140 milking ewes – shepherds stay for 5 day tours
- By establishing a rate of one day per certain quantity of sheep e.g. For every 10 milking ewes the shepherd must spend one day at the *olhatia*. A herd of 140 sheep would translate into 14 days throughout the summer, which are then broken into shorter stays.

This acts as an incentive not to augment the herd and ensures an equitable work distribution among the members. These arrangements are found in the sectors of Igueloua, Irati, and Malta. In the sector Bostmendietta, the sheep are all either left to roam at liberty or are kept all season by the same shepherd. In Ahuzki, the provision either does not exist or herd sizes are close enough in size that the provision does not result in differences in time spent in the cabin.

Establishing provisions such as these has not resulted in universal success, and there is much debate in Soule about the future of the *olhatia* system. On May 16, 2007, the Community of Communes organized a discussion forum on the issue. What follows is an excerpt from my notes:

Shepherd: Things were different before. 500 years ago when the *réglementations intérieures* were put in place, everyone had the same interests – now that’s not at all the case. Everyone is oriented toward the individual, and management has become much more difficult -- it’s no longer about what’s good for the collective, it’s about what’s good for the individual. Maybe it’s time to do a reorganization of the *olhatiak* and put people with the same projects together – the cheese-makers, the people who just go with dry ewes, etc . . . Maybe it’s even time to engage in Natura 2000 before *ça tombe sur le coin du nez* like the [European] sanitary regulations. [This was the only mention of Natura 2000 that evening, and it elicited no response or discussion]

Shepherd from *olha* Lecharegatia: Only six of us go now. No one makes cheese anymore. It’s disastrous. People don’t have the same plans, and it’s hard to get along. We need a new way of reflecting on problems and solving them – on a collective level.

This concern about the rise of individualistic thinking and the demise of the collectivity was a prevalent theme, recurring in discussions about mutual help on the farm, the use and teaching of Euskara, and environmental issues.

Operational Level

Day-to-day decisions and activities are regulated by the operational rules decided at the collective choice level and are influenced by forces that result from the embeddedness of the regime in its larger socio-political structure. The institutional statements outlined in the preceding section are explicit and well-recognized, but there are others that are tacit and habituated (see Crawford and Ostrom 1995). As such, it can be difficult for a field researcher to observe instances of noncompliance and witness punishment, and it may be difficult for participants in the management system to articulate the full range of norms and rules under which they operate and the likely consequences for noncompliance. In Soule this is certainly the case, and while the major structuring rules and norms are readily apparent, their repercussions often are not. As a result, examining the system in the field required careful attention to the subtleties of the normative statements of the participants.

Cattle and sheep raisers have different rights and responsibilities in the high pasture. Shepherds have the right of access, withdrawal, management, and to a certain extent, exclusion, as they may forbid the grazing of other sheep in their territory. However, they may not prevent cattle and horses from entering, and this right of exclusion is only valid for their own grazing area. On the commons as a whole, they do not enjoy the right of exclusion. Cattle raisers have rights of access, withdrawal, and management. Cattle raisers do not stay with or herd their animals and do not actively participate in *olhatiak* (unless they also bring sheep to the high pasture). As a result, and because cattle are less affected by the quality of the forage available, cattle raisers participate less in management actions such as controlled burns. Because shepherds are more active in commons management, I will focus the remaining discussion on them and on their major organizing institution, the *olhatia*.

The *olhatia* operates within the boundaries prescribed by the Syndicate of Soule for some aspects of management. It does not have the authority, for example, to authorize its members to bring up animals before the opening date set by the Syndicate or to permit shepherds that have not been admitted by the Syndicate to bring sheep to the *olhatia*. However, the hierarchy is not absolute. The Syndicate does not have the authority to grant permission to a shepherd to bring sheep to the high pasture if that shepherd does not possess or has not rented a *txotx* in an *olhatia*. The Syndicate also does not interfere with decisions made regarding the organization of work and fiscal responsibilities within the *olhatia*, sheep breeds permitted in the group, types of parasite treatments, or sale of *txotx* (with the exception that only those from Soule may bring sheep).

Within the *olhatia*, individual shepherds rotate the responsibilities of caring for each other's animals according to a system they decide amongst themselves. In some *olhatiak* the

stay in the cabin may be as short as two days, while in others it is as much as seven. *Olhatiak* with families that are short-handed at the farm tend to opt for shorter mountain stays, while those with someone at home to make hay tend to opt for longer stays. The number and frequency of turns a shepherd takes varies according to the number of shepherds in the group and the length of the stays. In an *olhatia* with equal stays of three days for every shepherd and 7 shepherds, each will go to the *olha* every 21 days. In households with more than one generation, it is often the older generation that does the turn at the *olha*, usually as a couple, while the younger farmer stays at the farm to make hay. In many households, there is a heavy reliance on the voluntary labor of the older generations. As a result, many young farmers no longer know how to make cheese and are less familiar with the best use of the grazing area.

Over the past 100 years much has changed in the organization of the *olhatia*, and most of that change can be directly linked to a decline in available labor power. The overall number of co-owners in each *olha* has declined.⁵² In the sector Ahuzki, there are three *olhatia* with only one herd, and in the sector of Bostmendieta most sheep are simply left unattended. Only eight *olhatiak* have seven or more co-owners that are active. The sectors of Irati and Malta have the largest numbers of remaining co-owners per *olhatia*. At the same time that the number of active co-owners has declined, so has the number of shepherds staying in the cabin at any give time.

In the 60s there were 11 families at Naboulegui. They stayed there with 4 shepherds at a time. Each sheep was milked two times morning and evening because you always managed to get a little bit more out the second time. They made big cheeses then, 8 or 9 kilos, but they were harder to conserve because it was hard to get out all the *petit lait*. The cheese was better then. The rennet was made from a lamb that was killed at the house. The stomach with milk in it was dried and used for the cheese making. Now we just get some that people who work at Chaumes (the commercial creamery) ‘liberate’. . . In the 70s, we dropped down to 3 shepherds at a time and went from a stay of four days

⁵² It is difficult to give precise data on the number of co-owners still bringing sheep to the *olha*. Though most shepherds declare their *olha* on their CAP paperwork, some only put the sector. Using Syndicate studies from 2000, I have been able to mostly reconstitute which shepherds go where and with how many sheep. Interview data, though, cautions that in the interim, some of these shepherds have changed *olhatiak*.

to a stay of three days. The first thing to go was the double-milking. Then in the 80s, we dropped down to two at a time, and in 2002 or 2003 we started just doing it by house. (Paul, May 17, 2006)


Until the early 1900s, each family possessing a share in the *olhatia* sent a family member, usually a younger brother or a single uncle, but always a male, to the cabin for the summer. Seven shepherds shared the cabin, each fulfilling a different role, as outlined in Table 3.6.

Table 3.6. *Olhatia* roles. Source: Dendaletche (1978)

<i>Etxekandere</i>	Woman of the house
<i>Neskato</i>	Domestic servant
<i>Axurzain</i>	Guardian of the lambs
<i>Hor-uzkia</i>	rest day
<i>Antxuzain</i>	Guardian of the non-lactating ewes
<i>Artzain muthil</i>	Servant shepherd
<i>Artzain nausi</i>	Master shepherd

The *etxekandere* was the most powerful member of the *olha*. This man, fulfilling a female role, was charged with cooking, cleaning, and making the cheese. These roles were held only for 24 hours before being rotated among the shepherds. The *etxekandere* of one day became the next day's *neskato*, at the bottom of the order of importance.

Figure 3.4. Rotation of *olhatia* roles. Source: Dendaletche (1978: 94).



Each year a different shepherd started as *etxekandere*. This system served to equitably divide tasks among members and ensure equality among the *olhatia* members.⁵³ By the 1920s, though, the number of shepherds staying at the cabin had already declined to four, and then further decreased to two. Today, shepherds do their stays at the cabin individually or as a married couple. In only six groups are there shepherds from two households present at the same time, and in these groups, it is only during the cheese-making portion of the season.

Of the 39 active *olhatia* groups, only 14 have shepherds that make mountain cheese (36%). Many of these only make cheese for two weeks to help dry the milk supply of the ewes. In 2000, 18 *olhatia* groups were making mountain cheese, and there were an additional eight that stopped the practice over the course of the 1990s (Hegoburu 2000). Individual shepherds that stop making cheese often do so because they wish to keep their sheep at the farm to facilitate

⁵³ See Ott (1981) for a detailed description of these roles and their rotation. Her account differs slightly from that presented here and is focused on the commune of Sainte Engrâce (Sainte Engrâce).

selective breeding. As a group, the *olhatia* members stop making cheese either because they find it too costly to comply with European sanitary regulations⁵⁴ or because too many of the members have stopped making cheese and there is not enough labor power for the members that remain to continue.



Figure 3.5. A shepherd at Naboulegui marks his cheese with the letter ‘A’ to distinguish it from the cheese made by others. It is also important to note that A is the first letter of the name of his *etxe* and not of his family name.

In *olhatiak* where there are some families that make mountain cheese and some that do not, those that do not make cheese keep their sheep at the farm until those in the mountain have finished their cheese-making. This avoids placing an additional burden on those in the *olhatia*.

⁵⁴ Very few *olhatia* have the special fabrication and storage rooms required. Those that make cheese without these special facilities are not permitted to sell their cheese, though many do.

One of the changes that has perhaps had the most effect on the ecology of the grazing lands is the sharp decline in the number of shepherds that actually spend the day herding the sheep. Lack of labor-power at the farm means that many shepherds have resorted to returning to the farm during the day. They will leave for the *olha* before sunrise, gather the sheep and treat any injuries or infections, and send them out to graze. They will then return to the house to eat and to make hay before returning to the *olha* in the evening or the next morning. The sheep are left to graze on their own. As a result of continuity in the herds, the sheep rarely leave the grazing area of their *olhatia*, but they cease to exploit it fully. With no shepherd to guide them, they stay in the areas that are most tender, leaving other areas to be overtaken by bramble and sometimes over-stressing the favored areas. Traveling back and forth between the farm and the mountain during the appointed mountain stay, or *tour de garde*, is most frequently done in the sectors that are best served by roads and closest to villages, such as the sector of Ahuzki. This is least frequently done in the sector of Igeuloua, which is more difficult to access.

All shepherds in the group are expected to participate in any work days or controlled burns scheduled by their *olhatia*. There are, however, no written or agreed-upon sanctions for non-participation. Non-compliance would usually, though, result in guilt and shame. Norms like these within the *olha* group are so ingrained that defection has become almost unthinkable. When I asked my informants what would happen if the group scheduled a time to burn the grazing area and a member did not participate, the response was always some variant of “but, they would!” The small group size and closeness of the relations among members contribute to the extremely low level of defection. Within each *olhatia*, groups are not larger than 12 families, and many people are related by blood or marriage. Even when the *txotx dunak* are unrelated, their families have shared ownership of the cabin for generations and most often expect to

continue doing so. Past cooperation engenders trust, and current cooperation helps ensure future cooperation.

While compliance with norms and rules within any given *olhatia* is quite high, on the scale of the entire high pasture there is more of a problem with defection. For example, when an *olhatia* does not have enough members or resources to organize a burn or when areas not used by an *olhatia* group need burning, the Syndicate will organize the work day and recruit participants. In these cases, individual animal raisers are less likely to participate than when it is organized by an *olhatia* group of which they are a part. Another point of non-compliance is the non-respect of the opening dates of the high pasture. Though the high pasture is not open until May 10 for sheep and May 15 for cattle, I frequently observed animals, particularly horses and cattle, on the grazing lands before those dates.

Punishment for such transgressions is at the discretion of the Syndicate and some level of defection is tolerated.

There are always 10 to 15 raisers who don't respect the dates, but we don't do too much about it, even though it does slow down the re-growth of the grass. Most of those people are in the areas that are on the boundary with Larrau. They have certain privileges, so we kind of leave them alone. One guy has horses that are up there all winter – he's 55, has no inheritor, and doesn't have much space at the farm, so we just let it go. The Syndicate is run by elected officials; they aren't always going to do what needs to be done. (Syndicate employee 12.1.2006).

Consistent with the idea that graduated sanctions are important to success (Baland and Platteau 1996, Ostrom 1990, Wade 1994), the absence of defined consequences allows the Syndicate to be flexible and to consider the severity of the offense, if it has happened multiple times, and the situation of the offender. If the offender is older, has no help at the farm and little land, it is more likely that he or she will be tacitly permitted to ignore opening dates or only mildly punished, and as a result of a long-standing land dispute, farmers from Larrau are not punished for

non-payment of grazing fees on Syndicate land. While the Syndicate sees this as a calculated trade-off of loss of revenue in exchange for peace, Larrau sees it as a recuperation of their rights on land that should belong to them. Regardless of viewpoint, it represents a compromise that maintains social order and prevents escalation of a simmering power struggle.

Embeddedness of the System

As Figure 3.6 shows, though the *olhatiak* and the Syndicate of Soule form the basis for the common property management regime, these entities are linked by funding and taxation flows, rule-making and compliance, information and labor sharing, and by virtue of having representatives in other organizations.




Figure 3.6. Relationships between those involved in the management of the common-pool high pasture of Soule.

Pastoral burning provides a particularly interesting example for examining the interlinkages between the component parts of the system. As outlined above, either an *olhatia* group or the Syndicate may initiate a burn. If it is done by an *olhatia*, the Syndicate must be notified and will often take the lead on organizing it. Burning, though, must be done within the context outlined by the state. There is an acceptable range of dates for burning, and based on weather conditions the Prefect may forbid burning on certain days. Those that burn are also required to notify the Mayor's office and the fire department and must have at least three participants. In certain areas, burning must also respect dates designed to avoid the nesting period of birds identified by French and European legislation as endangered.

As shown in the example above, regulations that cannot be considered part of the constitutional or collective choice decisions made within the common property management regime do come to bear on operational activities. The main instrument through which the EU and the French state affect commons decision making and management in Soule is the Common Agricultural Policy. For example, the stocking rate provision in the CAP aims to keep on-farm herd sizes from augmenting to the point that they degrade pastures or from falling so low that areas are overtaken by bramble. However, these on-farm provisions can actually prevent management actions that would address those same two concerns on the commons.

The CAP, which couples financial support to production output, has been criticized for promoting larger, intensified agriculture (Berger, Kaechele, and Pfeffer 2006).⁵⁵ In an effort to address those deleterious effects, the 1992 MacSharry reforms lowered the level of direct subsidies, de-coupled some subsidies from production, and added other measures for

⁵⁵ On July 4, 2008, 700 farmers demonstrated in the street of Bayonne to protest rising prices and falling revenue and to demand a reevaluation of the distribution of CAP subsidies, which currently go mostly to large grain farms. See Appendix D.

environmental actions.⁵⁶ De-coupling is designed to stop driving increases in herd sizes. Each Member State has implemented de-coupling in a different manner. In France, sheep subsidies are 50% decoupled, meaning that the sheep raiser will continue to receive 50% of his or her established subsidy even if he or she no longer has sheep. The remaining payment is determined by the number of sheep. Mother cow payments, however, remain 100% coupled. A farmer is only paid for the number of reproductive female cows that he or she has, though there are most often not enough subsidy rights to cover the entire herd. It is feared that if cow subsidies were to be de-coupled many farmers would sell their herds, leading to the collapse of the livestock industry in certain areas as well as its associated professions (veterinarians, feed suppliers, etc.).




Figure 3.7. Example of coupled and de-coupled aides for a farm of 12 hectares with both sheep and cattle.

⁵⁶ These environmental measures account for 5% of the budget of the guaranty section (Berger, Kaechele, and Pfeffer 2006).

Through its contribution to larger herd sizes and the regulation of on-farm stocking rates, which affects how long shepherds can send their animals to the mountains, the CAP influences both stocking rates and concentration patterns in the mountain pastures. The link is inexact and will be discussed further in Chapter five, but it is critical here to note the magnitude of seemingly external forces weighing on commons management.

Similarly, the decision of individual shepherds of whether or not to continue the practice of transhumance is influenced by a multitude of factors. Larger farm sizes that permit more forage production at home, increased revenue that permits purchase of forage, re-orientations in breeding strategy that demand keeping the animals on-farm year-round, and labor shortages as outlined in the previous chapter all contribute to the decision of whether or not to use the high pasture. A decline in the number of shepherds with transhumant herds weakens the *olhatia* system and increases difficulty in regulating grazing.

Conclusion

Common-pool resources present a social dilemma that is critical to resolve if the resource is to be managed sustainably. At least as early as 1520, there were efforts to do so in Soule through the regulation of who can benefit from the commons. Animal raisers who use the high pasture have since developed sophisticated norms and rules to regulate stocking and promote participation in management actions on the commons. These institutional arrangements have, for at least 170 years, been developed under the umbrella of or even in tandem with the state.

Today, more than ever, operational level actions and even collective choice decisions are constrained by state and supranational policymaking. Existing agricultural policies defined at the level of the European Union and implemented by France influence the on-farm behaviors of

individual raisers that then have spill-over effects for the commons and influence the commons directly by providing subsidies to and through the Syndicate and by establishing standards for cheese production and animal care.

At the same time, the commons management institutions in Soule that have long provided for a high level of benefit for those who use the high pasture are at a critical juncture.

Agricultural decline and changes in farm strategies are emptying the mountains of shepherds and contributing to a reduction in the number and strength of the *olhatia* groups. It is against this backdrop that the Natura 2000 sites of Soule will be implemented. In the following chapters, I will discuss Natura 2000 and the likelihood that it will be able to support, incorporate, and build on the local institutions to create a project that can coexist with the extant system.

CHAPTER 4. NATURA 2000

Natura 2000 is a pan-European conservation initiative that incorporates both public and private lands with the goal of preserving habitats and halting biodiversity loss. Its goals are ambitious and rather novel and have prompted various levels of resistance across the European Union. In Soule, this resistance has been dramatic, though by no means unanimous, and is rooted in the coincident demand for space by animal raisers for pasturage and by the state for conservation. In Chapter 2, I explained how relations between Basque farmers and the state, land use customs, and the situation of agriculture in the area have influenced, grown out of, and supplemented that struggle for space. In this chapter, I will continue this effort at explaining both resistance and engagement by looking more closely at the policymaking underpinning Natura 2000 and by exploring conceptions and constructions of nature and conservation by the animal raisers of Soule.

I will begin this chapter with a brief discussion of the anthropological interest in conservation and will then proceed with a specific consideration of environmental policy and policymaking in the European Union. After detailing the process of Natura 2000 site designation and management and explaining the implications of these processes for local acceptance of the project, I will finish with a discussion of the Natura 2000 sites in Soule and the difficulty that local raisers have had in understanding their scope, status, and purpose.

Conservation as an Object of Anthropological Study

The anthropological interest in conservation centers largely on the effects of conservation on local populations and interactions between these populations and the conservation project in question. Much of that writing focuses on protected areas, a catchall phrase covering parks, reserves, sanctuaries, and other such designations. Protected areas have proliferated since the early 1970s, and anthropological writings on them have flourished since the 1990s (Orlove and Brush 1996). More recently, attention has turned to the politics of protected area creation, conservation outside of park boundaries, and conservation at ever-broader spatial scales.

Studies of the effects of conservation projects on local communities have looked at such diverse topics as displacement (Brockington 2001, Chatty 1998), the interplay of conservation and livelihood (Coomes, Barham, and Takasaki 2004, Hulme and Murphree 2001), and changes in gender dynamics (Dey 2000, Schroeder 1993). In this body of literature, the negative effects of conservation are emphasized. Land-use rights are lost, people are forced from their homes and ancestral domains, livelihoods are disrupted, gender inequality is exacerbated, and often conservation goals are not met.⁵⁷ At its more authoritative, the state may engage in unilateral control of resources, excluding local populations (Neumann 1992) or resort to violence either to achieve conservation goals or to pursue its own ends under the guise of conservation (Peluso 1993). Several authors, though, have offered positive stories of conservation that not only achieves biodiversity goals but also empowers local communities. The showcased approaches are largely community-based (Berkes 2004, McShane and Wells 2004, Western and Wright 1994a), and arguments that local populations should be included in protected area management are based either on the grounds of social justice (Brechtin et al. 2003) – local communities should

⁵⁷ West, Igoe, and Brockington (2006), in a comprehensive complement to the 1996 Orlove and Brush article, review the literature on anthropology and conservation. They note the lack of literature on protected areas in Europe and suggest that it is due to the relative “lack of hardship” experienced.

have a say in the management of their resources, or on practical grounds – communities that participate are more likely to buy-in to the conservation project (Agrawal 1999), or both (Western and Wright 1994b).

Recent years have also seen increasing attention to the politics of protected area creation, including examination of the roles of NGOs and donors (Fisher 1997, Lewis 1997, Weber and Christophersen 2002), who speaks for communities (Brosius 1997, Brosius, Tsing, and Zerner 1998), and how those images are used (Li 1996). In order to address some of those concerns, there have been calls to move social science studies to earlier in the design process and to integrate social and biological research for a more holistic picture of the social and ecological context of the project (Mascia et al. 2003).

The recognition that biological zones of interest do not usually map well onto political boundaries along with a backlash against community-based approaches has increased interest in large-scale conservation planning, including transboundary or transfrontier initiatives (Brosius and Russell 2003, Goodale 2003, Wolmer 2003). These large-scale projects, though, raise many questions about equality and participation of local communities and often rely on rapid appraisal methods to gather any social data that are deemed necessary. Anthropologists fear that these approaches ignore heterogeneity among communities and do not adequately include local actors in the conservation planning process.

Of course, not all conservation occurs within the boundaries of protected areas. Conservation outside of protected areas gained in popularity with the advent of the concept of “sustainable development” (Brandon, Redford, and Sanderson 1998). Writings on the subject have highlighted the need to protect species that do not stay within the confines of a park (Margules and Pressey 2000), discussed the role of community involvement (Lewis, Kaweche,

and Mwenya 1990), and explored the validity of the concept of sustainable use (Redford and Richter 1999). Natura 2000 sites are predominantly located on private, non-park, lands, and as such, it primarily articulates with this last body of work and that on transboundary projects. Because the network is being established in working landscapes, issues such as the role of local communities, traditional practices, and property rights are particularly salient. Living in a developed, Western nation, the people of Soule have also had access to legal tools and media outlets that might not be available in less-developed areas.

Much of the research on Natura 2000 has been biological in nature, emanating predominantly from studies in forestry or soil conservation. However, social scientists have been involved, largely in studying reactions and attitudes of local communities (Hiedanpää 2002), contingent valuation and willingness-to-pay (Pouta et al. 2000), or distribution of costs and benefits associated with compliance with the directives (Rojas-Briales 2000). In France, social science studies of Natura 2000 focus overwhelmingly on the failures of the implementation process (Alphandéry and Fortier 2001, Billaud et al. 2002), though there has been some research that looks toward the future, assessing likely implications of implementation (Milian 2003).

Conservation in Europe

France was an early leader in conservation efforts in Europe. As early as 1945, France established agencies for nature protection, and in 1971 created the first nature protection ministry in Europe. It also issued early conservation legislation with the 1969 restrictions on bird hunting. At the same time, France has long shown interest in the well-being of rural actors and preservation of rural populations. Subsidies to maintain rural populations were introduced in

1967 and extended in 1977 and reflect the early power of the agricultural lobby, which has often been at odds with the environmental community (Alphandéry 2002). Table 4.1 outlines the major developments in French, European, and global environmental policy (For a more complete list, see Appendix F).

Table 4.1. Timeline of major developments in French and European environmental policy and history.

Year	Event or legislation	Level
1945	Conseil de la Protection de la Nature (Council for the Protection of Nature) created	France
1957	Treaty of Rome established European Economic Community; goal of rejuvenating post WWII economy; environmental policy absent, came into force January 1958	Europe
1969	Measures to limit hunting of birds introduced in France	France
1970s	French environmental movement, focused on anti-nuclear campaigns	France
1971	Creation of the Ministère de la Protection de la Nature et de l'Environnement in France (Ministry of the Protection of Nature and the Environment); first environmental ministry in Europe	France
1972	European Community issued an environmental policy declaration and asked Commission to create proposal for the First Environmental Action Program	Europe
1979	Bern Convention on European Habitats and Species	
1979	Birds Directive; based solely on article 235 of the Treaty of Rome	Europe
1980s	Creation of the association Chasse, Pêche, Nature, Traditions (Hunting, Fishing, Nature, Traditions)	France
1986	Single European Act; changed name of EEC to European Community, laid out environmental protection as an objective for the EU, formalized EU environmental policy and gave it stronger legal basis, ratified in 1987	Europe
1992	MacSharry reform of the CAP; lowers direct support, decouples some aides from production	Europe
1992	Habitats Directive	Europe
1996	Juppé government freezes implementation of Natura 2000	France
1997	Jospin government unfreezes Natura 2000	France
1998	France referred to the European Court of Justice for non-compliance with Natura 2000	France

The 1957 Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC) with the goal of reinvigorating the post-war economies of the original six members (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). The Treaty makes no specific mention of the environment, and all environmental policymaking before the 1986 Single European Act was forced to rely either on Article 100, which references the establishment of the common market, or Article 235, which gave the Community power to act when action was needed but the Treaty had not granted the authority. Despite the slow start, political shifts, and economic difficulties, environmental policy in the EU has steadily grown into a large body of legislation. Since the 1960s, there have been more than 200 directives and regulations on the environment (Glachant 2001).

As shown in the table above, the late 1960s and early 1970s saw a rise in environmental consciousness, and 1972 heralded two major environmental developments concerning the Community. In June, the United Nations Environment Conference in Stockholm sparked the first concerted efforts at environmental action at the European level, which until this point had been piecemeal. The conference stimulated increases in institutional capacity and environmental legislation. In October of the same year, and fueled by the events in Stockholm, the heads of state, in an effort led by the French, asked the European Commission to craft the First Environmental Action Program (EAP). This program, enacted in 1973, marked “the beginning of a coordinated and purposeful” environmental policy in Europe (Jordan 2002: 4). Second and third Action Programs were instituted in following years, and with the Third EAP in 1983 it was suggested for the first time that environmental concerns be included in other policymaking.

In the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, article 130r states that the Community will “preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment,” “contribute towards protecting

human health,” and “ensure a prudent and rational utilization of natural resources” and gives the Community authority to negotiate with third parties, thereby establishing a firm legal basis for environmental policymaking in the EU. The same article highlights the need for preventative action and an espousal of the ‘polluter pays’ principle. In addition to defining environmental policy, it expands majority voting for environmental measures, enabling environmental legislation to be passed more quickly than through unanimous voting. Perhaps most significantly, the SEA mandates that environmental protection be a component of all European policies. Hildebrand notes that 1986 was a critical juncture for environmental policy in the EU (2002). Until the Single European Act, environmental policy was largely responsive and reactive to developing situations. With the Act, the EU moved into what Hildebrand calls the ‘initiative phase’ seeking to develop a comprehensive policy.

Building on the SEA, the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) of 1993⁵⁸ solidified the legitimacy of environmental policymaking in the EU, emphasizing sustainable growth and elevating the importance of environmental protection.⁵⁹ At the same time, Article 5 of the Maastricht Treaty establishes what is known as the subsidiarity principle:

In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.

This nod towards decentralization corresponds to a similar movement in France a decade earlier that saw state functions turned over to regions and departments, but it does not halt growing integration, or upward movement of policymaking (Barnes and Barnes 1999, Decker 2002,

⁵⁸ Signed February 1992, entered into force November 1993.

⁵⁹ It is worth noting that the Treaty does not speak of sustainable development.

Wilkinson 2002). Subsidiarity is retained as a general principle in the Reform Treaty, which replaces the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and is currently in negotiation.

Policymaking and implementation

Jessop argues that the functions of the state are continually moving away from the state – upwards towards international governance, downwards to regional authorities, and sideways to transnational cooperation (1997), though this movement results more in a re-conceptualization of the role of the state than in a loss of state power (Jessop 2002). The creation of the European Union is perhaps the prime example of the internationalization of policymaking, as EU law is granted precedence over Member State law. The two major policy instruments of the European Union are directives and regulations. Directives give broad descriptions of the policy outcomes that must be achieved but do not specify the exact actions a Member State must take to achieve them. They are meant to provide flexibility and to respect the differences in cultures and regulatory and market structures among the Member States. Directives must be transposed into national law before they can take effect, and Member States are responsible for their implementation. Regulations, though, are slotted directly into national law without transposition. They therefore result in provisions that are applied in exactly the same manner across all Member States.

A concurrent trend in policymaking is the increased engagement of non-state actors in the process. This change from the location of power in the formal institutional structures of the modern state to a “distribution of power both internal and external to the state” that focuses “on the interdependence of governmental and non-governmental forces in meeting economic and social challenges” has been described as a shift from government to governance (Stoker 1997:

10). The influence of NGOs and other pressure groups in European policymaking increased in the 1990s and has been critical to the decision making surrounding Natura 2000 (Weber and Christophersen 2002), and certain groups are beginning to stand out as consistently important to environmental legislation. Global groups such as IUCN and WWF have strong presences in Brussels, and the European Commission, which is responsible for proposing new European laws and running EU programs, has also started to rely heavily on European NGOs such as the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) and the Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP). While these groups have slightly different strategies, more neutral policy analysis for some and more forceful lobbying actions for others, they do have commonalities. Reputation and trust are key (Favoino, Knill, and Lenschow 2000). Good working relationships with bureaucrats are also critical factors, and the line between social and professional is sometimes blurred:

Parliament is in this area with bars and whatnot, and we meet up after work, and also because I studied in an agricultural university I know a lot of people who now work for the agriculture lobby, in a way lobbying from a completely different point of view in a completely different way than I do. Or they're working in Commission or they're assistants to MEPs. We're all sort of young people from all over Europe who either work for institutions or lobby for business... So there's always sort of informal contact. I try to separate work and social because I don't want to mix them too much. You don't use your friends. Of course, you do sometimes discuss things when it's not too critical and pass on information. In a way it's also sort of a bit about, the farm organizations always have completely different objectives than we do, in the end it's probably more about building trust, getting to know each other. . . so that kind of communication is also important (NGO employee, interview, March 29, 2006).

Lobbying at the European level is in some way different from lobbying at the national level. In France, power is more centralized while in the EU, decision making is spread out among the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the European Union. The number and variety of decision making bodies gives NGOs and other pressure

groups more opportunities to influence policymaking (Favoino, Knill, and Lenschow 2000). Mazey and Richardson, contrary to most other authors, argue that this is not an unqualified positive for these NGOs because they can no longer hope to have a monopoly on influence (2002). Because the institutions at the EU level are so open to lobbying, national and regional interest groups sometimes choose to bypass their own governments and lobby directly at the European level. Representatives of the Chamber of Agriculture of Pyrénées-Atlantiques met with personnel of the Directorate General of the Environment, the department of the European Commission that handles Natura 2000, to emphasize the role of agricultural interests in the constitution of the network.

At the same time that the locus for policymaking is shifting upward, responsibility for policy implementation is shifting downward. In the case of Natura 2000 in France, regional authorities such as the Regional Directorate of the Environment (DIREN) have become the primary agents of implementation. While national-level agencies in France oversaw the selection of sites, regional, and even departmental, agencies and organizations are charged with overseeing management decisions and enforcing them. However, the EU has a strong interest in the success of its policies for its own legitimacy, and in the case of Natura 2000 because Member States and their regional agencies have done a rather poor job of achieving local community buy-in, the EU is increasingly concerning itself with the full range of the policy process. Though Member States still have authority over how the directives are implemented, the EU has begun to aid the implementation process. Because European agencies cannot themselves be responsible for local actions such as stakeholder consultations, communication and education, and collection and dissemination of best practices, the European Commission has begun to engage NGOs in the implementation process. The Natura Network Initiative (NNI) and the Natura 2000 Networking

Program (NNP) both serve to increase communication and build capacity and are run by a grouping of three NGOs, Eurosite, Europarc, and the European Landowner's Organization (ELO).

Environment and nature in France

France has long had a complicated relationship with environmental policy, particularly conservation measures. The creation of the Ministère de la Protection de la Nature et de l'Environnement in France in 1971 introduced the first environmental ministry in Europe, but this early statement of the importance of environmental protection in France has always been tempered by the counter-weight of the rural lobby. France's population was predominantly rural until the Second World War, and traditional rural actors have retained considerable power in French politics. The rural lobby has historically found itself both opposing state efforts at conservation and arguing that rural actors are the best custodians of nature. These environmental discourses – “linguistic devices articulating arguments about the relationship between humans and the environment” – are both dependant upon and contribute to social constructions of the environment in France (Mühlhäusler and Peace 2006: 458).

Greider and Garkovich argue that social groups “construct and redefine their realities . . . through ongoing social interactions” (Greider and Garkovich 1994). Those that argue that aspects of reality, such as nature or the environment, are constructed do so in one of two main ways: 1) saying that it is our concepts and understandings of a particular thing that are constructed, or 2) saying that the thing itself is materially constructed or produced (Mühlhäusler and Peace 2006). When I use the term ‘social construction’ I will be referring to the first definition, and I will use ‘social production’ to discuss physical human processes that materially

alter the landscape. Though examinations of the social construction of nature are theoretically diverse, their common element is attention to power (Demeritt 2002), and there is a recognition that “struggles over nature, land, and meaning are simultaneously struggles over identity” (Braun and Wainwright 2001, quoted in Demeritt 2002). The theoretical development of the idea that these struggles over concept construction occur not only between groups but also within them is new, and Brosius (2006) cautions that the process of social construction does not produce a monolithic concept and that we must look at the role of agency in these processes.

Szarka (2002) identifies two main trends in the social construction of the environment in France. The first is what he calls the “managed rurality perspective.” This way of seeing the environment equates agriculture and other rural pursuits, such as hunting and forestry, with the protection of nature. The environment is construed as ‘nature’, and ‘nature’s’ primary designation is serving human needs. Habitats and species are not imbued with intrinsic value. The second main theme is termed the “resource management approach” and is more concerned with arenas such as energy-generation.

Building from this managed rurality perspective, farmers in Soule use environmental discourses to construct their conception of nature in a way that positions them not only as caretakers of the land and landscape but also as its creators. This conceptual construction of the social production of nature argues that their ancestors have raised animals in the Pyrenees ‘since before time’ and that if there are rare species and valuable habitats in the high pasture it is due to and not in spite of their management practices. The farmers use this romanticized image of themselves as caretakers of nature to argue that they have no need for state intervention. At the same time that they cast themselves as the ideal caretakers of the mountain, they reject very similar characterizations of themselves when they are employed by the state in an effort to pacify

the residents of Soule.⁶⁰ They bristle at the thought of being the gardeners of Europe, emphasizing that their work is important socially, culturally, economically, and even ecologically. “Our practices are what make the mountain beautiful, but that’s not why we do it. I don’t raise my sheep just so they can be the bear’s next meal. I’m taking care of my family and continuing what my ancestors built” (Hubert, December 13, 2006).⁶¹ This theme is differentially employed according to its intended recipient and desired effect. When those who are disseminating the message are striving to be non-confrontational, the emphasis is on the role of grazing in maintaining the beauty and function of the mountain ecosystem, but in particularly challenging situations, the tone becomes harsher and the argument turns toward the idea that the antiquity of their practices and their role in shaping the landscape gives Basque farmers more right than others to control the land.

Also consistent with the idea that rural actors are and should be the primary protectors of nature, farmers in France have long had an adversarial relationship with environmentalists (Alphandéry and Fortier 2001).⁶² *Ecolo*, the diminutive of the French word for environmentalist, is used as a slur, and even those who are in organic agriculture are somewhat hesitant to characterize themselves in this manner. *Ecolo* conjures images of a “long-haired ’68-er” and indicates someone who is uninformed about the realities of environmental issues (Thierry, May 23, 2006, and Martine, January 5, 2007). In Soule this is somewhat tempered. Many farmers who say they take care to avoid fertilizers and pesticides when practical and not to overstock their land call themselves ‘*un peu écolo*’ (sort of environmentalist) and say that all farmers in

⁶⁰ For example: “Natura 2000 isn’t a punishment. It’s a recognition of good practices” (DIREN, September 2006). And “Europe recognizes the quality of these landscapes and practices” (Prefect Marc Cabane, as told to me by a Prefecture staff member).

⁶¹ This farmer, like many in Soule, has equated Natura 2000 with the bear reintroductions being conducted in the Pyrenees.

⁶² Environmentalist is translated as *écologiste* in French. Someone who practices the discipline of ecology, little known in France, would be an *écologue*.

Soule are because their farms are small-scale and relatively light on chemical inputs. The stigma of environmentalism remains, however. The *écologo* is seen as neglecting ‘important’ issues such as climate change in favor of promoting such actions as bear reintroduction in the Pyrenees.⁶³ In regards to Natura 2000, the environmentalists are equated with city dwellers. For rural actors, the distinction is that they live and work in the landscapes under discussion, but city dwellers use them only as places for recreation. As a result, Natura 2000 offers very different constraints for rural and urban actors: “For us, it’s ‘alter your entire mode of production and deal with the bears.’ For them, it’s ‘don’t use so much water when you brush your teeth and get a low-flow toilet’” (Armand, January 30, 2007). Inherent in these arguments is the intimation that environmentalists care more about the appearance of ‘nature’ than its ecologic functioning and that as a result they want to remove agro-pastoral activities from the mountains. “If they really want to do Natura 2000, just take away our CAP subsidies. All the farmers will disappear. It will be nothing but bramble. It will be dirty, but it will be empty. That would be Natura 2000!” (Hélène, October 12, 2006).

The environmental movement does not have the same force in France as the rural lobby. In the 1970s, the environmental movement focused almost exclusively on opposing nuclear energy generation, and their defeat and the subsequent widespread adoption of nuclear energy in France left the movement severely crippled (Szarka 2002). The environmental lobby is also disadvantaged by its scope of interests. One group of actors deals with such myriad issues as energy, air quality, water pollution, and nature conservation. On any one issue, it will face different adversaries and sometimes unlikely coalitions. On the national level, France Nature

⁶³ Climate change was frequently brought up in my interviews with farmers. This can be attributed partly to the fact that they equate more sporadic rains and more extreme weather events with climate change and are troubled by the implications for their livelihoods but also to the fact that they realize that climate change has a good deal of political currency (cf. Nygren 1999 for discussions of how indigenous groups use the concept of sustainability).

Environment, the country's major environmental NGO, was presented with a rural lobby that coalesced on the issue of Natura 2000 and included hunting, forestry, fishing, and agricultural interests.

For environmental issues there is also tension over the appropriate level for regulation. Until the decentralization laws of 1982 and 1983, which devolved power to regions and departments, the French state was highly centralized. The state has retained a substantial amount of power, which it exercises through its agencies in departments and regions, but since the decentralization movement, local authorities have also become important players in the domain of the environment (Zimeray and Barnier 1994). With this newfound strength comes conflict. Not only is there disagreement over whether environmental issues should be decided at the national, regional, or local level, there is also disagreement over whether the environment should be under the jurisdiction of elected officials (such as the General Council) or that of state agencies such as the Regional Directorate of the Environment (or DIREN).

The struggle between the Basques and the French administration is also sometimes painted, by the Basques themselves, as a scalar struggle. In the fight to create a branch of the Chamber of Agriculture or a new agency that would be specific to the French Basque Country, Basque farmers argued that department-level officials were too far removed from their concerns and that they were overshadowed by larger interests in other parts of the department. Though the Basques argue that it is more an issue of scale than autonomy, this conflict with the department forms part of a larger history of resistance in the valley. Chalking resistance to Natura 2000 up to this same pattern, though, is overly simplistic. Among the farmers I interviewed, those who were most adamant about the friction with the state and the need for more autonomy were actually more likely to support Natura 2000. There are two plausible explanations for the

paradox, and it is most likely a combination of the two that adequately addresses it: 1) These farmers form part of a political left that is generally more concerned about environmental protection and species conservation, and 2) Natura 2000 comes from Europe rather than the French state, and the history of relations between Europe and the Basques does not have the same baggage; many French Basques are also receptive to Europe's efforts to promote regions and regional languages.

The Habitats and Birds Directives

The Birds Directive was created in response to the 1979 Bern Convention and provides for protection of wild birds, particularly threatened and migratory species. With the goal of restoring and maintaining 'favorable of conservation status,' the directive works both through establishing protected areas and through species protection. Under the Birds Directive, 181 species and sub-species have been classified as threatened and more than 3000 sites have been classified as Special Protection Areas (SPAs). The creation of Special Protection Areas brings certain restrictions and provisions into vigor within its boundaries. In contrast, Annex I lists threatened species and migratory species to receive special protection regardless of their location. The directive also prohibits certain methods of hunting and lays out the conditions under which Member States may deviate from the directive.

The 1992 Habitats Directive establishes Special Conservation Areas (SCA) and encompasses all species in need of protection as well as habitats 'of Community interest,'⁶⁴ resulting in more than 200 animal species, more than 500 plant species, and 189 habitat types to be protected. The sites designated under the Habitats Directive, along with those designated

⁶⁴ 'Of Community interest' means of interest to the broader community of the European Union and contributing to the overall coherence of the Natura 2000 network.

under the Birds Directive, together form the Natura 2000 network. Sites designated under either directive are Natura 2000 sites. Both of the types of sites include both public and private lands and have the same process for deciding management and the same funding mechanisms.

The Habitats Directive includes the unique provision that conservation in these sites must be ecologically, socially, and economically sustainable, taking local characteristics into account, and provisions exist to encourage human activity that favors biodiversity. Under the directive, Member States must move to maintain favorable conservation status for the habitats and species listed and report on their progress every six years. Table 4.2 recaps the distinctions between the Habitats and Birds directives.

Table 4.2. Habitats and Birds directives

	Habitats Directive	Birds Directive
Year	1992	1979
Focus	habitats and species	rare and migratory birds
Site name	Special Conservation Area	Special Protection Area
In French	Zone Spéciale de Conservation	Zone de Protection Spéciale

The Habitats Directive is also interesting in that it applies the precautionary principle to conservation areas for the first time. Any project planned within a Natura 2000 site must be preceded by an Impact Assessment. These projects may only proceed if they are deemed to have no adverse effect on the site or if there is no alternative possible and the objectives are of overriding public interest, in which case mitigation will be required. An amendment makes this provision applicable to SPA sites as well.

Because Natura 2000 is based on directives rather than regulations, Member States choose how to implement the project. While some countries create their own national

regulations, France chose a contractual approach.⁶⁵ Rather than passing laws that must be followed, management actions, rewards, and consequences are agreed upon in voluntary contracts concluded between the state and land owners. In these contracts, which will be described in more detail, landowners can choose from a variety of management actions.

Site designation procedure in France

Site propositions in France are initiated by the Prefect of the department, who sends the proposed site limits and the reasons for its inclusion to the communes concerned and to the larger inter-communal bodies such as the Community of Communes. Originally, there was to be a sharp distinction between the scientific process of selecting site boundaries and the social process of deciding management of those sites. In response to heavy opposition, the French government issued a decree dated May 5, 1995, that said the Prefect “must consult the town mayors concerning the boundary project, the measures that could be envisaged, and the potential difficulties” (quoted in Alphandéry and Fortier 2001: 314). In this stage, though, communes are asked only to comment on the site boundaries and must use scientific criteria in their replies (decree of November 8, 2001, Art. R. 214-18). Municipal Councils must return their deliberations within two months or their decisions will be counted by default as approving the site boundaries. If a negative deliberation is based on criteria deemed inappropriate, the Prefect has the authority to discard that deliberation (Representative of the Environmental Service of the Prefecture, Interview August 24, 2006). Small communes, though, are highly unlikely to have scientists on staff or to have the resources to hire them. The Municipal Councils of Soule, orchestrated by the Departmental Association of Elected Officials of the Mountain (ADEM),

⁶⁵ Only France and the United Kingdom have taken the contractual route (Pinton 2008).

instead responded with letters asking the Prefect to suspend Natura 2000 in their territories arguing that it was not legal.

Because these arguments did not meet the necessary criteria, the Prefect then transmitted the list of proposed sites to the Minister of Ecology and Sustainable Development. The experts at the National Museum of Natural History examined the proposed sites and those that were retained were validated by the Minister of Ecology as well as by other Ministers. At that point the Birds Directive sites were directly established by Ministerial Decree, while Habitats were transmitted to the European Commission.

Upon receiving the list of Habitats Directive sites from a Member State, the Commission decides which proposed sites to keep and can ask the Member States to provide more sites, which it did in the case of France. Retained sites are published in the Official Journal of the European Union after which the Member States must designate them as Special Conservation Areas within six years. This process is outlined in the figure below (4.1).




Figure 4.1. Site designation process in France.

In Soule, site designation has not proceeded smoothly. In response to the Prefect invalidating their negative deliberations and sending the sites to the European Commission, the communes of Soule joined with other mountain communes in the department to mount a legal challenge to Natura 2000 on the grounds that the Prefect overstepped his authority in creating sites. All of these attempts were denied by French courts. Resistance to Natura 2000's implementation, though, has continued, and its major themes will be discussed in Chapter 5.

Site-level management

After a site is designated in France, the Prefect convenes a Steering Committee responsible for overseeing the creation of a site management plan, called a Document of Objectives (DOCOB), and executing that plan. According to instructions from the group within the Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development charged with implementation Natura 2000, dated January 21, 1993, “particular attention will be paid to the possible risks of abandoning or modifying traditional human activities that contribute to maintaining the habitats concerned at a favorable conservation status, whereas the conservation of biodiversity can, in some cases, necessarily involve maintaining or even encouraging human activity” (quoted in Alphanbéry and Fortier 2001:313). Furthermore, under article 144 of the 2005 *Loi relative au développement des territoires ruraux* (Law relative to the development of rural territories) the Steering Committee must include local collectivities⁶⁶ – e.g. communes, the General Council – and representatives of those who live and work within the site. State agency representatives are present in a consultative capacity, and these Committees can reach as many as 180 members, though most fall between 10 and 50 members (Pinton 2008). The Steering Committee selects its own president, which should be a local official if possible, as well as the Operator responsible for the creation of the DOCOB. If no local collectivity accepts the presidency, the Prefect may assume it himself, and if no DOCOB is created within the specified time frame, usually two years, the Prefect may take over the process.

The site Operator is charged with the elaboration of the DOCOB and must link knowledge bases, coordinate meetings, and ensure communication (Pinton 2008). Several different types of organizations may be chosen as Operators. As seen in Figure 4.2, the Operator

⁶⁶ Technically, the term for these institutions is territorial collectivity – *collectivité territoriale*. However, in popular usage they are referred to as local collectivities – *collectivités locales*.

is most often either an association (31%) or a public establishment (30%). However, it may also be a collectivity or a private *bureau d'études* (research organization).




Figure 4.2. Graph of the types of actors that serve as Operators for Natura 2000 sites in France. Source: ATEN, February 2006.

To give an idea of what kinds of groups are encompassed under the headings Collectivity, Public Establishments, and Associations, I have provided further breakdowns in the table below.

Communes and General Councils (listed under Territorial Collectivities) have both served as Operators for Natura 2000 sites in other parts of France. Of the Public Establishments, The National Forestry Office (ONF) is particularly active. In Pyrénées-Atlantiques, ONF is the Operator of La Rhune, a site that will be discussed for its comparability to sites in Soule. Of the

Associations, nature protection organizations and CREN (also an environmental group) are the major players.

In Soule, there are not yet any Steering Committees and thus no Operators, but there is some precedent for non-nature protection rural actors to be Operators. Hunting and fishing associations have been Operators in other departments, as has the Chamber of Agriculture. At La Rhune the Chamber of Agriculture of Pyrénées-Atlantiques serves as co-Operator. Communities of Communes have served as site Operators as well.

Table 4.3. Further breakdown of types of operators. Source: ATEN, February 2006

Territorial Collectivities		Public Establishments		Associations	
Mixed Syndicates	11%	National Parks	8%	LPO	8%
Intercommunal Syndicates	13%	National Hunting Office	5%	development associations	3%
Communities of Agglomeration	2%	Chambers of Agriculture	7%	nature protection associations	28%
Communities of Communes	7%	Littoral Conservatory	4%	ADASEA	8%
General Councils	7%	DIREN	1%	Natural Reserves	3%
Communes	6%	CRPF	12%	CREN	42%
Regional Parks	51%	ONF	63%	CPIE	5%
Other	3%			hunting associations	1%
				fishing associations	2%

To create the DOCOB, the Operator oversees scientific studies, such as a catalog of habitats, species, and human activities within the site, and orchestrates sessions of Working Groups, which suggest specific measures in specific locations. Working Groups vary from site to site, but may consist of such interests as agriculture, tourism, forestry, and industry. The Operator is responsible for synthesizing the measures across Working Groups, reconciling contradictions, and finding and assigning funding sources to each measure. This process is the

same for both types of sites. If a Habitats site and a Birds site overlap but do not have identical boundaries they should, in principle, have two DOCOBs. However, the Prefect does have some discretion in this area, and sites with similar boundaries may be combined.

When the DOCOB is complete, the Steering Committee must validate it and send it to the Prefect. The Prefect must also give his or her blessing before the project is complete. This is generally done through the environmental service of the Prefecture in conjunction with DIREN. After the DOCOB is accepted, the Steering Committee selects an Animator. This person may or may not be the same person as the Operator and is responsible for negotiating contracts with landowners.

The contracts can take two forms. For non-agricultural lands, they are called Natura 2000 Contracts, and the funding originates in the Ministry of the Environment. Funding for agricultural contracts under Natura 2000 comes from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing (MAP), passes to the Regional Directorate of Agriculture and the Forest (DRAF), and then is distributed by the Departmental Directorate of Agriculture and the Forest (DDAF). For agricultural lands, contracts follow the same format as already used for the Sustainable Agriculture Contract (SAC), simply becoming a Natura 2000 SAC. SAC measures that apply to a farm within a Natura 2000 site garner a 20% increase in payments. For example, if a farmer with a normal SAC under the Common Agricultural Policy was to receive 100 euros/hectare for delaying hay cutting, in a Natura 2000 he or she would receive 120 euros/hectare for the same action.

Another tool available to the Animator is a Natura 2000 Charter. Under this charter a landowner agrees to engage in or refrain from certain actions but is not immediately paid for doing so. The landowner does receive some preferential tax treatment and can use his or her

participation as a status or quality marker. There are efforts underway to develop Natura 2000 as a *signe de qualité* (sign of quality) in hopes that consumers will be willing to pay a premium for products produced in a Natura 2000 site.

The contractual approach that France has taken is almost entirely voluntary. No one can be forced to sign a contract. There are, however, measures that apply to all EU citizens regardless of whether or not they have signed contracts or charters:

- Annex IV species (animal or plant) cannot be taken without permission even when outside of a Natura 2000 site. Most of these species are already protected by national law.
- Within a Natura 2000 site, projects must be preceded by Impact Assessments.
- Within a Natura 2000 site, introduction of invasive species is prohibited.

Failure to comply can result in fines, and for farmers, a loss of 3% of CAP subsidies (Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche 2005). However, enforcement is only likely in cases of police notification by another citizen. In Soule, the heavy reliance on subsidies has led to fear and anger among farmers because other occupations do not have fines tied into their livelihoods. As we saw in Chapter 2, subsidies on average make up 34% of the revenue of an intermediate transhumant livestock raiser in the department, or 21,471 euros (Observatoire économique de la Filière Ovine Laitière 2005). A loss of 3% of the subsidies would be 644 euros. While this does not perhaps seem to be a large sum of money, it is more than 5% of the net profit of these animal raisers (11,887 euros).

At the same time that we see a great deal of fear and miscomprehension by rural interests in Soule, we also see lack of enthusiasm among some environmental protection associations. Because contracts are voluntary, these groups complain that the directive is ‘without teeth’: “For me, Natura 2000 protects nothing” (Representative of environmental NGO, December 15, 2006). These environmentalists view Natura 2000 as relatively powerless as it is conceived in France

and too costly for what it accomplishes. They are frustrated that it has not helped in efforts to fight a high-speed rail line or a high-voltage electric line, both planned for Ipparalde, the power line in Soule.

Locating Natura 2000 in Soule

The high pasture of Soule is covered almost in its entirety by overlapping and interlocking Natura 2000 sites. The map of Soule below shows the grazing areas of the *olhatiak* in relation to these sites. Birds Directive sites are denoted by diagonal striping, while Habitats Directive sites appear shaded.




Figure 4.3. Map of Soule showing Birds and Habitats Directive sites in relation to *olhatia* grazing areas.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ In this dissertation, I focus on the terrestrial sites because, due to the number of relevant stakeholders and the complexity of the projects, the Prefect is, for the time being, not working on the aquatic sites.

Natura 2000 sites also cover many private farms and communal holdings in the following communes: Aussurucq, Camou-Cihigue, Alçay, Etchebarre, Laguinge, Licq-Atherey, Haux, Sainte Engrâce, Larrau, Montory, Musculdy, Ossas-Suhare, Ordiarp, and Lichans-Sunharre. Individual farmers are notified of their inclusion when they receive their paperwork for the Common Agricultural Policy subsidies (Figure 4.4).

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Date de la photographie : juillet et août 2003
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Commune :

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d'lot (voir notice)

1 En tenant compte des observations ci-dessus, mettre à jour vos lots avec un angle rouge fin - contour et numérotage des lots représentés - hachurer les lots que vous n'exploitez plus - dessiner et numérotiser vos nouveaux lots non représentés

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Surface en double
Lots inférieurs à 10 ares
Lots non localisés

0 50 100 Mètres Echelle: 1:5 000
N° de photographie : 4 sur 4
Référence de la photographie : 00-4010611-004-4

Liste des sites Natura 2000 présents sur cette photographie : LE SAISSON (COURS D'EAU); MASSIF DES ARBAILLÈS

Figure 4.4. Common Agricultural Policy paperwork. Notification of inclusion in a Natura 2000 site is located in the bottom left corner.

The extent of Natura 2000 sites in Soule in relation to the pastoral domain exacerbates farmers' fears that the project will harm their livelihoods. This fear is compounded by uncertainty and confusion. Sites designated under the Birds Directive and under the Habitats Directive sometimes are created to cover the same areas. For example, the Birds Directive site FR7212004 HAUTE SOULE: FORÊT DES ARBAILLES has a very similar name to the Habitats Directive site FR7200752 MASSIF DES ARBAILLES but very different boundaries (Figures 4.5 and 4.6 below).



Figure 4.5. Birds Directive site



Figure 4.6. Habitats Directive site

Farmers may notice on their CAP paperwork that they are in a Natura 2000 site named for the Arbailles (as in Figure 4.4) but then see a map like that in Figure 4.7 and think their property is actually not included in a Natura 2000 site. The name confusion sometimes leads them to believe that the site boundaries have been changed and makes them unsure of what the most up-to-date information actually is. Furthermore, the topographic maps depicting Natura 2000 sites that are sent to the communes often have been copied so many times that they are almost illegible (Figure 4.7). Acknowledging that the mayors' complaint about the quality of the

information they receive is valid, one staff member of the Prefecture remarked to me: “We gave them the stick to hit us with!” (August 24, 2006).




Figure 4.7. Map sent to mayors of communes included in the Natura 2000 site: Haute Soule: Forêt des Arbailles.

Conclusion

The concentration of environmental policymaking at the European level has made such politics seem increasingly far-removed from local interests and concerns. The sheer size of the Natura 2000 project, the physical distance between Brussels and Soule, and the divergent interests that are salient at one level or another, have contributed to local processes being invisible to European policymakers. Also, as a result of the importance of the EU level, regional NGOs and pressure groups are starting to change tactics and scales and lobby directly at that level. As will be shown in Chapter 6, they also affiliate and network with other groups to achieve the desired reach.

To help ease the creation of Natura 2000, the EU issued its constituting legislation as a directive, allowing Member States leeway in their implementation. Several key aspects of the French application have contributed to negative reactions in Soule. As first designed, the French approach aimed to separate the process of site creation from the process of site management and to do the first with only scientific input. In response to overwhelming pressure, the plan was revised and local-level input was accepted on the designation of site boundaries. However, this participation did not satisfy those in Soule. Not only was it too late, it asked them to respond using competencies they did not have. The process generated substantial ill will that persists today. Another outcome of the lobbying campaign by rural interests was France's adoption of a contractual approach. However, in Soule, this approach has neither allayed fears among farmers nor engendered support from environmental associations. The vast extent of Natura 2000 in Soule and its near-total coverage of the high pasture compound the fears and uncertainties of animal raisers in the area.

As the directive is written, there are provisions to maintain and support human activity within sites and include stakeholder input. Thus far, though, these provisions have not much helped Natura 2000 to be accepted in Soule. In the following chapter, I will analyze the specifics of implementation in Soule and discuss how these aspects have affected reactions in Soule, as well as discuss the likelihood that Natura 2000 could co-exist with the existing management regime described in Chapter 3.

CHAPTER 5. CO-MANAGEMENT IN SOULE

“Any adjustments in established practice are bound to entail a redistribution of social costs and, consequently, provoke a struggle over what sort of change is to be effected and how the burdens are to be divided” (Meadowcroft 1999: 227).

The struggle over Natura 2000’s implementation in Soule has centered on several key themes, primarily: Basque farmers as stewards of the land, poor state and local relations, fear of uncertainty, budgetary issues, equation of Natura 2000 with bear reintroduction, and the question of who is a legitimate stakeholder in high pasture management. The conceptualization of nature as a product of Basque agropastoral activities, discussed in Chapter 4, lays the foundation for the construct of the Basque farmer as caretaker, and, as I will explain below, this image has been taken up, polished, and disseminated by savvy political actors. Similarly, hundreds of years of friction between the state and localities have made relations between state agents and local politicians more adversarial and have engendered distrust of the state among the residents of Soule. Other emergent themes, such as the fear of uncertainty and concerns about the monetary viability of both Natura 2000 and the farming system under it, derive more from the particulars of Natura 2000’s implementation in France. It is particularly important, though, to consider the final theme listed above, the discussion over who is a legitimate stakeholder, which is a product of the unusual context of transitioning from common property to co-management. In this chapter, I will discuss the major features of the co-management process being implemented in relation to those features that have been shown to lead to successful projects and examine how they have contributed to the themes of resistance that have emerged.

Why Study the Implementation of Natura 2000 as Co-management

The boundary between what constitutes a common property management regime for common-pool resources and what constitutes co-management of common-pool resources can be fuzzy. Common-pool resources in Soule are currently managed under a common property regime – entirely by locals and their elected representatives. However, this is done within the constraints of state and European regulations. At its base, Natura 2000 is just another European policy. However, it pushes the system to co-management because it does more than simply set parameters within which the system must operate. By creating committees of governmental and non-governmental actors to delineate management actions, Natura 2000 initiates a process of power sharing rather than just nested action (cf. Jentoft 1989, Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). Chapter four discussed the precursors and the creation of Natura 2000, as well as outlined the general process. In this chapter, I will focus on the specific aspects of implementation in Soule and the characteristics of Natura 2000 as a co-management process, concentrating on the design principles that have been identified as necessary for a successful co-management regime.

Examining the implementation of Natura 2000 in Soule as a co-management process rather than simply analyzing the effects of an imposed regulation on the common property regime allows greater attention to the interplay of the various levels involved and how management is embedded in larger social and political structures. Co-management involves many kinds of stakeholders engaging in different kinds of relationships, and the different actors with whom one is linked and the different types of relationships that are formed influence motivations, value formation, attitudes, and behavior. Management of Natura 2000 sites involves actors ranging from site-level to the level of the European Union who are linked by complex relationships that are horizontal (on the same level) and vertical (linking more than one

level) and that can also, skip levels (Young 2002). The resulting institutions can be thought of as cross-scale, by which I mean “institutions that span the scale from local to regional and national levels” (Berkes 2004: 265). The lens of co-management and the use of network analysis also facilitate emphasis on the power relations between the agencies, groups, and individuals on these different levels and the analysis of strategies and techniques that groups use to influence management outcomes. When emphasizing organizations within networks, though, extra attention must be dedicated to the role of individuals and agency. Chapter six will cover the implementation network in detail.

Many scholars agree that co-management falls within the domain of research on common-pool resources and their associated management regimes (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). Like studies of common property regimes, much of the work on co-management focuses on questions of collective action, and there is much ground for fruitful interaction (Pomeroy 2001). However, to date the commons research community has had little exposure to the literature on co-management (Berkes 2002). Similarly, though the co-management literature does draw on commons research and generally examines the management of common-pool resources, almost all of that work focuses on co-management as the result of the devolution of state authority or as a transition from an open-access regime.⁶⁸ Little work on co-management has been directed towards resources that had been managed collectively. However, there is emerging interest in how common property regimes shift to co-management systems that include state-level authorities (for examples see: da Silva 2004, Steins and Edwards 1999).⁶⁹ My research in Soule is an example of such work, focusing on the centralization of a management process.

⁶⁸ Here again it is important to note the distinction between common-pool *resources* and common property *management regimes*.

⁶⁹ Ykhanbai et al. (2004) also describe a case study of increasing centralization, but in the context of absent or failing common property management.

For the high pasture of Soule the Syndicate of Soule, though not the owner of the land, is the entity with the authority to negotiate the management contracts that are used in Natura 2000. Individual animal raisers that use the high pasture would then be subject to the terms of the contract agreed to by the Syndicate. Because the Syndicate and the farmers are critical actors for the advancement of Natura 2000 in Soule, I will be focusing the following discussion on these two groups. In discussing how those reactions have been shaped and conditioned, however, I will broaden the consideration to the other actors in the co-management process.

Defining Co-management

Collaborative or cooperative management has been defined in many ways but is generally thought of as a power-sharing arrangement between the government and resource user groups. Other definitions, such as “a situation in which two or more social actors negotiate, define and guarantee amongst themselves a fair sharing of the management functions, entitlements and responsibilities for a given territory, area or set of natural resources” (Borrini-Feyerabend, et. al. 2000:1), introduce the possibility that co-management may not include government at all. Under this definition, the current common property management institution of Soule livestock raisers could be termed co-management. In other writings, Borrini-Feyerabend has explained co-management as an agency or government with jurisdiction over an area developing “a partnership with other relevant stakeholders (primarily including local residents and resource users), which specifies and guarantees their respective rights and responsibilities” (1996:8). One can certainly imagine, though, a situation in which respective rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis a resource are specified and guaranteed but that, even so, cannot be characterized as co-management. The World Bank’s definition is perhaps the most pointed: “the sharing of

responsibilities, rights and duties between the primary stakeholders, in particular local communities and the nation state; a decentralized approach to decision making that involves the local users in the decision making process as equals with the nation-state” (1999:11). Taking the position that a system can only be co-management if local communities and the nation-state are equals in decision making places an extremely heavy burden of proof on the system. My research relies on a broad definition of co-management as “the sharing of power and responsibility between the government and local resource users” (Berkes et. al. 1991:12). This definition leaves sufficient flexibility for the definition of the system but highlights my interest in the interactions between state and non-state actors.

It is important to note that this interaction of ‘the government’ and ‘local resource users’ should not be thought of as one homogenous entity interacting with another. The state is comprised of various agencies on multiple levels, resource users are diverse in their interests, priorities, and use of the resource (Brosius, Tsing, and Zerner 1998), and numerous other entities, such as business interests and NGOs, take part in co-management arrangements. For Natura 2000, the relevant components of the state include such varied agencies and departments as the Ministry of the Environment, the Regional Directorate of the Environment, the Departmental Directorate of Agriculture and the Forest, the Prefect of the department, and the sub-Prefect of the particular area. In the high pasture of Soule, resource users include shepherds, cattle raisers, foresters, skiers, hunters, hikers, and cavers. There are also hotel and restaurant owners and naturalists with a vested interest in management decisions. All of these groups and individuals will have the opportunity to participate in the co-management of Natura 2000 sites that cover the high pasture. Because the players are diverse and the relations among them are

multiplex, Carlsson and Berkes suggest that conceptualizing co-management systems as networks best reflects the complex realities of these systems of governance (2005).

After having settled on a definition of co-management, it is also important to define its corresponding terms (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1. Definition of terms associated with co-management.

Term	Definition	Key citations
Collaboration	The pooling of resources by multiple stakeholders to solve environmental problems	Plummer and FitzGibbon (2004); Ostrom (1990)
Community	A set of people with some shared beliefs and preferences beyond the collective action problem	Singleton and Taylor (1992); but see also Berkes (1989)
Decentralization	Systematic and rational dispersal of power to lower levels of organization	Pomeroy and Berkes (1997)
Management	The right to regulate use patterns and to transform the resource	Ostrom and Schlager (1996)
Participation	Having responsibilities; sharing rights and duties	Pimbert and Pretty (1995)
Power	The ability to control, potential to influence, and capability to exercise authority	Plummer and FitzGibbon (2004)

Theoretical Background

Case studies of the co-management of common-pool resources have proliferated in recent years, but as of yet there has been relatively little theoretical development (Berkes 1997, Carlsson and Berkes 2003). Most of the synthesis work focuses on when and how co-management develops, what forms it takes, and under what circumstances it is likely to be successful. Newer analyses are starting to pay more attention to power relations and cross-scale interactions. In this section, I will discuss the major efforts at meta-analysis and some of the most significant case studies, paying particular attention to a synthesis of design principles for

co-management that incorporates power and scale and allows the evaluation of whether a co-management process is likely to be successful.

Establishing co-management

Co-management as a governance tool has become popular with the convergence of several trends. Degradation of natural resources, recognition of the limits of governmental regulation, and acknowledgement of the rights of local resource users have all contributed to its rise in popularity. Co-management offers the opportunity to draw from the strengths of the different participants in the process, outlined in Table 5.2 below.

Table 5.2. Strengths of the state and communities. Source: Adapted from Srinivasan (2005).

State	Community
Can better deal with externalities	Informed about local conditions; can better devise rules, procedures, and sanctions
Has the power to enforce legal right to resources and impose sanctions (Swallow and Bromley 1994)	Self-monitoring is less costly (Baland and Platteau 1996)

Though co-management should not be thought of as a panacea, it does present the opportunity to address the shortcomings of management that is entirely community-based or state-driven (Lawry 1989).

Co-management is often implemented by a government in response to a crisis of the resource. Many times, co-management is initiated as a solution for managing resources that had

been open-access and are thus suffering degradation. Castilla and Fernandez (1998) examine the creation of a co-management project in a severely degraded fishery, finding not only that co-management could aid in reestablishing stocks but also that it could help reduce conflict between artisanal and industrial fishers. Ykhanbai et al. (2004) argue for the creation of such a project on the state-owned pastures of Mongolia, where pasturage is essentially open-access. Traditional collective management in Mongolia was erased during the Soviet era, and the state control of that era was not replaced after its conclusion in the early 1990s, leaving the area without any robust governance regime.

In other cases, co-management has been suggested and implemented as an alternative when state regulation has failed to protect the resource in question (Persoon and Van Est 2003, Srinivasan 2005) or when financial and technical difficulties render state control impractical. In these cases, state regulation has not been met with compliance and it is hoped that by giving some control to the community the management regime can achieve resource-user buy-in. Udaya Sekhar (2000) examines the creation of the Joint Forest Management Policy (JFMP) in India, which came about both as the result of research showing that state control was not adequate and as the result of pressure from grassroots groups. Results are not yet clear, but it is argued that resource users will have a new sense of ownership over the forest and will thus be more likely to comply with management plans.

Many times, like in the case of the JFMP, co-management is initiated by the state as part of a decentralization project (Gelcich, Edwards-Jones, and Kaiser 2005). In addition to relieving the government of the cost and burden of enforcement, co-management is used as a means of improving livelihoods (see Tyler 2006 for case studies on co-management and development). It is often argued in the conservation literature that locally-based initiatives are more likely to be

just and equitable for local populations (Brosius and Russell 2003, Brosius, Tsing, and Zerner 1998, Western and Wright 1994a). Given that decentralization can increase local community autonomy (Pomeroy 2001), it is reasonable to assume that giving communities more control in co-management arrangements could also result in more just and equitable outcomes in addition to higher levels of compliance.

Despite co-management's many success stories and strong popularity, Carlsson and Berkes caution that it should not be viewed uncritically.

Before suggesting co-management as a general remedy for various [common-pool resource] problems, one must ask if the call for co-management is caused by the fact that power has been taken away from the local community in the first place. If so, contracting . . . out might as well be an attempt of state authorities to increase the legitimacy of their domination. To offer a co-management agreement might, in fact, be a means of codifying an existing situation, or it might be an attempt by the state to offload a regulatory function too costly to manage. Thus, co-management is not good or bad *per se* (2003: 11).

Carlsson and Berkes also repeatedly emphasize that co-management is a process and that it must be evaluated as such rather than as an endpoint.

Forms of co-management

There is an enormous variety of co-management arrangements, which vary in function of: the nature of the resource to be managed, local rights to the resource, the institutions governing those rights, and how the resources are exploited (Tyler 2006). Power-sharing in these systems comes in many forms, ranging from almost total local autonomy to almost complete government control (Pinkerton 1994, Sen and Nielsen 1996). One interpretation of the types of co-management is depicted in the figure below.




Figure 5.1. Scale of community power. Source: Adapted from Tyler (2006)

Using a slightly different set of typologies than that used by Tyler, Sen and Nielsen (1996) found that the following variables were the most important in determining the type of co-management process that evolved:

- Capabilities and aspirations of the local resource user group
- Type of approach selected (top-down or bottom-up)
- Difficulty of decision to be made
- Stage in the process
- Boundaries
- Types of user groups
- Political cultures and social norms

When weak user groups are combined with top-down approaches, governmental involvement is likely to be higher. In contrast, when decisions and tasks are very specific, community control is likely to be stronger.

There is no consensus among scholars or practitioners on which mix of community and governmental control produces the best results. The optimal point may well depend on the objectives set for the co-management process (Carlsson and Berkes 2005). Given that co-management is often part of a project of power devolution, it is important to recognize that the state must retain the responsibility for the overarching structure of the co-management arrangement. Meadowcroft (1999) stresses that co-management must operate within a clear framework established by national level government policies, and Tyler (2006) argues that the most important functions of the government in a co-management arrangement are creating enabling conditions, providing technical support, and enforcing local management regimes. Marschke and Nong (2003) concur that national level support is essential to adequate functioning but also emphasize the importance of regional-level government support.

Too much governmental intervention, however, is counter-productive. Situations in which the local community is given responsibilities but has no decision making authority do not achieve local buy-in (Nagendra, Karmacharya, and Karna 2005). Implementers must also take care to incorporate all relevant local user groups, as explicit inclusion of only vocal groups may lead to the complete exclusion of others (Reed 1995).

Closely related to co-management is the concept of Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). Community-based approaches focus on the human inhabitants of the area and are centered on the local community. Co-management approaches, in contrast, are partnerships between these local resource users, the government, and other stakeholders, providing a broader scope and larger scale (Pomeroy 2001). Community-based approaches can form part of the co-management process, and when community-based management is a large component of a co-management process, the result can be thought of as “community-centered

co-management” (Pomeroy 2001). Such an approach would be toward the maximum end of Tyler’s community power continuum in the figure above.

What makes co-management work?

The search for what makes successful regimes work is a major component of research on the commons. The realization that rational choice theory does not account for successful collective action opened the way for theorizing on institutional choice (Klooster 2000, Ostrom 2007, Shepsie 1989). Institutional choice departs from the assumption that actors are rational but adds that they are constrained by institutions. The question then becomes how they devise and maintain these institutions.

Numerous case studies of common property management have outlined the design principles that facilitate successful management of their individual sites. The richness of these case studies has laid the foundation for several meta-analyses of this data, the most notable syntheses coming from Ostrom (1990), Wade (1994), and Baland and Platteau (1996). In one of the few explicit connections between the literature on common property management regimes and that of co-management arrangements, Pomeroy et al. (1998) build on Ostrom’s (1990) “Empirical Design Principals of Long-Enduring CPR Institutions” to create a list of 28 conditions and principles for successful co-management:

Table 5.3. Conditions and principles for successful co-management. Compiled from Pomeroy et al. (1998).

Condition	Explanation	Condition	Explanation
Individual incentive structure	What induces individuals to participate? They have to see incentive before project begins	Coordinating body	Independent body with representatives from different partners
Overlap of interests	Partners are affected in similar ways, no big winners or losers	Effective enforcement	Vigorous and fair
Recognition of resource problems	Resource users recognize resource problems	Enabling policies and legislation	Helps partners to assert their rights
Capacity building	Strengthen capability of partners for collective action, cooperation, power sharing, etc.	Government agency support	Links between government agencies that are free from short-term political pressures
Sense of Ownership	Feel that they are being benefited and that they have a say	Organizations	Legitimate organizations with clearly defined membership
Stakeholder involvement	Well-balanced representation. Partners need to understand each other's positions	Partnerships and contractual agreements	Written contract that specifies role, function, authority
Trust between partners	Requires good communication	Property rights over resource	Address legal ownership and mechanisms and structures for allocating use rights
Fit with existing traditional social and cultural institutions	Should strengthen and revitalize these structures	Provision of financial resources	Partners have to be confident enough to put in own resources and time
Flexibility	Management should be able to change plans	Effective communication	Forums for discussion
Leadership	Community leaders may not always be appropriate leaders for co-management	Empowerment	Transferring access to resources from a few to the impoverished majority
Local political support	Cooperation of local power structure - incentives for local politicians	Networking and advocacy	Bringing together information and expertise

Appropriate scale	Includes size of physical area and how many people are involved	Social preparation and value formation	Social preparation phase should proceed technical and material interventions
Clear and simple objectives	Partners need to agree on issues to be addressed	External agents	Change agents from outside who assist in defining problem and provide advice
Conflict management	Arbitration and resolution of disputes at local level	Political and social stability	No grave threats to life, property, and livelihood

These design principles provide a powerful analytical tool for determining whether a project is likely to succeed, so I incorporated them into my examination of the co-management process emerging in Soule. Though I examined them all, I found that not all were useful in thinking about Soule or required little effort to analyze because of the different context for which these principles were developed. Pomeroy et al., like many scholars of co-management, focus on fisheries and particularly on developing nations. They thus include conditions that can rather safely be assumed to exist in Western Europe. For example, that southwest France enjoys relative political stability needs little discussion in this paper. Of these 28 principles and conditions, I found the following seven to be the most relevant to the situation of Soule: recognition of resource management problems, leadership, political support, stakeholder involvement, effective communication, trust between partners, and congruence with existing management institutions. In the next section, they will be discussed at some length, while the remaining 21 principles will be presented briefly in a table.

Most co-management studies have focused on contributing to this body of work on what makes a successful co-management process. There have been, though, a few notable studies of instances in which co-management has failed. Harkes and Novacze (2003) examined the loss of a traditional management institution in Indonesia, *sasi*. Weak leadership, conflicts within

government and churches, confusion over land rights, and changes in administrative boundaries were major factors in the decline of *sasi*. Worsening economic conditions and crop failure, as well as lack of effective enforcement, also contributed to its loss. Nadasdy (2003) also studied a less-than-optimal co-management process, finding that partners were far from being equal and that certain forms of knowledge production were privileged over others.

Whether or not an individual thinks a particular co-management project has been successful depends on his or her frame of reference (Persoon and Van Est 2003).

Environmentalists are likely to have a different vision for the high pasture of Soule than are farmers, and certain stakeholders may be more focused on outcomes, while others focus on process. This phenomenon will be discussed in Chapter seven.

Natura 2000 and Co-management Design Principles

Despite the common representation that Soule has unanimously rejected Natura 2000, many farmers with whom I spoke expressed a cautious curiosity and openness to the project. Fifteen of the 60 farmers indicated that they are “not against” Natura 2000. Hesitancy to disagree with friends and neighbors on a sensitive topic or to be labeled as fringe dampens discussion of Natura 2000 and ensures that negative feelings are perpetuated to the detriment of positive ones, but in private conversations, more people than I had expected were willing to admit that they actually favor the creation of Natura 2000 sites in Soule. Rather than seeking the immediate creation of a Steering Committee, though, these farmers tended to suggest starting an open dialogue on the benefits and constraints that can be expected.

For farmers, in addition to the elements that will be discussed as part of the design principles, reactions to Natura 2000 are conditioned by the effects of European agricultural

policies, previous interactions with Europe in the context of those policies, general sentiments toward European integration, and farming difficulties. Chapter two provided detail on this contextual backdrop.

In this section, I will examine how the existence or non-existence of criteria recognized as necessary for success have affected responses to Natura 2000 in Soule. I investigated these design principles mostly through in-depth interviews with farmers, environmental, hunting, forestry, and fishing organizations, elected officials, and state agencies. I supplemented these interviews with an extensive review of official documents pertaining to Natura 2000, the internal documents of various organizations, and news articles, as well as with an examination of a Natura 2000 site in the neighboring Basque province that is farther along in the process. During the course of these interviews, conducted over a span of 14 months, I found that some of these conditions, such as political and social stability, were less relevant to the situation in Soule as a result of its location in a politically stable region of the world and its relative lack of extreme poverty. Other criteria, such as the existence of enabling policies and legislations, were fairly straightforward to uncover and discussing them at length here would add little to our consideration of Natura 2000. To facilitate an in-depth consideration of the most important principles, I will discuss only the seven that were the most salient for Soule. The other 21 will be briefly presented in the table below.

Table 5.4. Evaluation of design principles in Soule.

Condition	Assessment	Condition	Assessment
Enabling policies and legislation	Habitats and Birds directives, transposition into French law, various revisions such as the Loi de Montagne	Political and social stability	Stable land tenure, no imminent threat of death or displacement
Partnerships and contractual agreements	Contracts between landowners and the government specifying management actions	Coordinating body	Steering Committee - but only established after sites have been selected
Property rights over resource	All lands remain under the same rights regime or are transferred by fee simple	Organizations	Organizations involved must be recognized by French government
Empowerment	Does not address livelihood improvement. Little serious impoverishment to address	External agents	Absent. Participants are all stakeholders or observers
Overlap of interests	Diversity of stakeholders leads to varied and sometimes opposing interests and differential repercussions of management decisions	Effective enforcement	Unclear. DDAF has indicated that it is unlikely to enforce provisions that lead to a docking of CAP subsidies
Capacity building	Little explicit effort at capacity building	Government agency support	Intra-agency linkages between DDAF, DIREN, etc. See Chapter six. Relatively free from political pressure
Sense of Ownership	Diverse stakeholders such as farmers and environmental groups in Soule have felt like their input does not matter. Seen as the "baby" of DIREN that no one else can access	Networking and advocacy	Substantial network, for more information see Chapter six
Flexibility	Short term - little flexibility, contracts cannot be altered. Longer term - greater flexibility, contracts may be dropped or renegotiated every five years	Provision of financial resources	Unclear. Budget for 2006 was not actually allocated until October of that year. Even if funds are available, perception may be more important than reality. Farmers have experience with

			subsidy programs being cut after only a short time due to lack of funding and are wary that Natura 2000 will be more of the same
Appropriate scale	Both the size of the areas to be managed and the size of the committees make for costly and sometimes unwieldy processes. Breakdown of Steering Committee into smaller Working Groups facilitates easier group work. The transnational nature of the project poses unique challenges	Social preparation and value formation	Public information campaigns were started late; due to general failure in Member States to accomplish this goal, the EU has stepped in and contracted certain aspects out to NGOs
Clear and simple objectives	In some areas there is relative agreement on what needs to be addressed, in others there is not	Individual incentive structure	Incentives largely come from own beliefs and motivation; some monetary recompense
Conflict management	Steering Committee serves this function during the creation of the management plan. Afterwards, there is little provision for conflict management		

The remaining principles – recognition of resource management problems, leadership, political support, stakeholder involvement, effective communication, trust between partners, and congruence with existing management institutions – were the most important to influencing the process in Soule.

Recognition of resource management problems

There is relative agreement across groups as to the management issues affecting the high pasture in Soule, but there is uncertainty and disagreement as to whether Natura 2000 can be used to address those agreed-upon issues. One issue on which there is agreement among almost all stakeholders is the detrimental effect of unequal grazing pressure exerted on the high pasture. In areas that are over-grazed, farmers see poorer animal body conditions and are forced to shorten the grazing season, but in other areas, bramble is overtaking under-grazed lands, lessening the amount of pasture available and jeopardizing subsidies. The subsequent abandonment of these overgrown areas in turn increases pressure on the desirable areas. There is some disagreement as to the cause of the problem, though. Farmers blame labor shortages, and other stakeholders blame increasing herd sizes. Interestingly, one representative of an environmental organization that is trying to work more closely with farmers talked about labor shortages in response to my query about this problem. When I asked why he did not mention herd sizes, he quickly jumped to the defense of the animal raisers, saying that if their herds were growing it was due to market pressures and that the farmers really had little to no choice in the matter.

A smaller number of farmers agreed with environmentalists that Natura 2000 could help preserve the rural character of the mountain pasturage:

Natura 2000 could be good for the mountain, to not make thousands of little roads. All the cabins should be served by roads, but we don't necessarily need paved roads between them all, criss-crossing all over the mountain (Jean-Marc, December 14, 2006).

There is also a strong recognition that farmers rely on a healthy environment for their livelihoods: "We need the environment in order to live. I can't really say concretely why Natura 2000 is important, but I think it is" (Martine, January 5, 2007).

Keeping traditional pastoral activities in the mountains is a goal espoused by a multitude of different actors, and members of government agencies think that Natura 2000 could be a way to help strengthen pastoral activities in Soule by providing additional revenue. They argue that Natura 2000 could compensate for falling subsidies from the CAP and combat the difficulties that generally accompany rural abandonment. A few farmers agreed: “Maybe there could be an exchange. We’ll do Natura 2000 if they’ll keep services in our towns” (Laurence, February 3, 2007). However, farmers largely think that additional subsidies will be inadequate to compensate for their additional efforts. Ten farmers, both favorable towards and against Natura 2000, invoked the idea of monetary loss. Experience with under-funded European programs has bolstered this fear. A major example, given by more than half of those ten, was the *Contrat Territorial d’Exploitation* (CTE). These farmers either had themselves applied for the program and were denied due to lack of funding or had friends who applied and were denied. They fear that they will sign contracts under Natura 2000 and either not be adequately compensated or not be compensated at all if the project runs out of money: “There’s never enough money for everyone to be able to do it, and in this kind of contract, there’s never enough money to cover the totality of the constraint” (Henri, January 5, 2007). Their budgetary fears do have some merit. The 2006 budget for Natura 2000 contracts was only released in late fall of that year, and until that time it was unclear how much funding would be available.

Despite these areas of relative agreement, there remains much disagreement over what management problems exist in the high pasture, and indeed over what the resource in question should be. These conflicts are not just the result of the proliferation of types and numbers of stakeholders; they also stem from the fact that these groups and individuals have different conceptualizations of the resource (Jentoft, Mikalsen, and Hernes 2003). Most farmers simply

do not agree with government officials and environmental groups that the species selected for management under Natura 2000 are threatened or of interest: “What concerns me is that there are more things out there to protect birds than the farmers who take care of this place” (Martine, January 5, 2007). In the preceding chapter, I explained how constructions of nature and the environment in Soule position the farmer as both the creator and the reproducer of the landscape. The farmers use that image to argue that current management has safeguarded species and that no other actions are required and that the focus should be on preserving rural actors and their relatively environmentally-friendly form of agriculture rather than on species protection: “There are times when it just seems like [Natura 2000] is something they’re bent on doing. I’m all for an ecological equilibrium, but a species focus is too much” (Henri, January 5, 2007). For the farmers, then, the appropriate resource to be managed is the high pasture as an economic, environmental and cultural resource, while for other stakeholders it is specific species and their habitats, as dictated in the directives establishing Natura 2000.

Many farmers argue that one of the most pressing resource management problems facing them is climate change.⁷⁰

I don’t know if there are problems in the high pasture that Natura 2000 can help with. Really, the farmers themselves need to fix any problems. They’re mostly linked to the evolution of agriculture. The cows clean the pastures less well than the sheep do, and there are no more shepherds. . . The system of leaving animals alone does a lot of damage, and Natura 2000 is not going to be able to change that, for example, and global warming is a huge problem that won’t be solved by it (Maryse, January 5, 2007).

In the winter there was always water in the little creek here. Since global warming, it’s often empty, but then it fills faster than before and goes back down faster than before. Everything is changing (Marie, November 28, 2006).

⁷⁰ In an interesting corollary, Szarka found that people tend to always think their local environment is fairly clean and stable but that the global environment is degraded (2002 see page 27).

More than one-quarter of the farmers interviewed mentioned climate change as a major problem for management. For these farmers, the species and habitats approach of Natura 2000 is misguided. They argue that the attention should not be on their area, but on cities and the burning of fossil fuels: “We’re not the ones driving climate change. You can put Natura 2000 in here and drive us out, but it will still be 42 degrees [centigrade]!” (Hubert, January 28, 2007). These arguments are certainly partially motivated by the political currency that climate change discourse enjoys at the moment. Foresters similarly argue that climate change is a pressing problem that should be addressed and that Natura 2000 does not give them the tools to do so: “What we really need to be thinking about is planting trees that will survive in the climate that’s coming” (Forester, speaking at a meeting on the Multi-use Approach to land management, January 30, 2007). Environmentalists, in contrast to the farmers and foresters emphasize that Natura 2000 is necessary in addition to work on climate change because different issues require different approaches.

Farmers in Soule acknowledge that there are problems with agricultural pollution on-farm, including fertilizer and pesticide run-off, but tend to ignore pesticide applications in the high pasture. Foresters and environmentalists, though, point out that anti-parasite treatments used in the high pastures can have a sterilizing effect on the soil and can sometimes make their way into mountain streams. Farmers argue that these problems are being addressed by their local elected officials and through such measures as AREA (*Agriculture Respectueuse de l’Environnement* – Agriculture that is Respectful of the Environment) contracts and that Natura 2000 is not necessary to combat these types of pollution.

Furthermore, there are actions that are problems in the eyes of some groups and positive management actions in the eyes of others. The primary conflict over specific management

actions involves controlled burns. The departmental hunting association sees burns as problematic for small game animals and issues articles and statements against it in their newsletters. Some environmentalists also argue that the burning leads to erosion. Among environmentalists, though, positions on burning are particularly heterogeneous: “Most environmentalists just think that burning causes erosion, and it can, but I’ve been there with the shepherds [when they burn]. They have an enormous amount of knowledge, and fire really serves to keep a mosaic of habitat types” (representative of environmental NGO, December 15, 2006). Almost all farmers argue that controlled burns limit forest encroachment, remove undesirable species, and improve grass. The lower areas of the high pasture are considered worthless when not regularly burned, and the Syndicate is beginning to reopen areas that have not been recently burned. Many farmers acknowledge that burning can lead to erosion when done improperly. However, again invoking the longevity of their presence in the landscape, they argue that their intimate knowledge of fire and the landscape lets them use appropriate burning techniques that do not result in harm. Burning, though, has become more difficult to conduct regularly, due to the labor shortages experienced on-farm and in the high pasture (Tourreuil 2002). In discussing the situation with an official from the Community of Communes, I asked if he was concerned that the more nuanced aspects of knowledge about burning, such as the different types of fires to use in different situations, would be lost. He firmly replied that it was not the knowledge that was being lost, only the people to do it. Under frequent pressure from outsiders for the practice, Basque animal raisers find it necessary to represent that they still possess the knowledge of fire and the landscape that makes burning ecologically sound. If this official harbored private concerns about the state of that knowledge, he was not going to share them with me.

One of the most interesting components of the implementation of Natura 2000 is that, in going from the common property management regime that is in place to the broader co-management process that is being implemented, the participants in decision making have expanded from users of the resource to include stakeholders with varying interests in the high pasture. As a result, the conversation over management has shifted from a conceptualization of the high pasture as an economic and cultural resource to a discussion of the same area as a space for the conservation of biodiversity. The resulting failure among participants to identify the same resource management problems has been an important factor in the rejection of Natura 2000 by farmers in Soule. Because few of them see the interest of a species-based approach, and because farmers believe they have already successfully solved their collective action problem, they focus solely on the constraints of Natura 2000, rather than on the benefits it could bring.

Leadership

For co-management to be successful there must be local leaders who drive the process, creating energy and setting an example for others to follow. Officially, the Operator of the site is charged with the task of providing “energy and direction,” and this person is almost never a member of the resource user group. The Operator must have technical capacities that most resource users do not possess and should ideally be a neutral figure. The leadership capabilities of this person are instrumental in bringing together disparate actors and building consensus.

Because Soule does not yet have any Steering Committees, I observed parts of the DOCOB creation process at the Natura 2000 site of Massif de La Rhune et de Choldocogagna (FR7200760) in Basse Navarre (Baxe Nafarroa) and conducted interviews with the Operator and participants. Participants credit the Operator with changing opinions toward Natura 2000.

Though not quite as visceral as in Soule, opposition to Natura 2000 was fierce in Basse Navarre: “When we heard from [the site Operator], we were reassured. If other people listened to him, they’d be reassured too. He really listens to us, to what we need” (Robert, October 26, 2006). The Operator chosen for LaRhune is likely to also be an Operator for sites in Soule.

Unofficially, local leaders could play an important role in directing the co-management process. Certain key farmers in Soule are particularly invested in the high pasture and in pastoralism more generally. They are well-respected for their efforts to promote transhumance and for spurring the creation of ways to sell their products directly to consumers. These figures, along with the presidents of the *olhatiak*, would be natural leaders for Natura 2000. To date, they have not been courted and have not expressed any interest themselves in driving the project. In fact, very few people in Soule have even publicly admitted that they are interested in learning more about Natura 2000 and what it could bring to the province. One notable exception is the president of the fishing society of Soule who, at their annual meeting in March 2007, tried to open a dialogue on the subject until a powerful local official intervened.

Local leadership is distinct from local political support, and both would be necessary for co-management to progress in Soule.

Local political support

Local political support for Natura 2000 in Soule has been completely absent, and a consideration of the roles of key figures in denying that support drives home the importance of agency to co-management success or failure. For local officials, Natura 2000 lacks legitimacy: “They’re going to take the management of the mountains away from the people of the mountain. It will be managed by people who don’t know what they’re doing. It would be like if we went to

manage the ocean. Just as ridiculous as that” (Mayor of Souletine commune, Interview February 20, 2007). There is also fear that Natura 2000 will strip mayors of their capability to manage their own communes, a sentiment magnified by the Departmental Association of Elected Officials of the Mountain (ADEM). In a letter to the mayors dated February 6, 2001, the association wrote that they should be wary of Natura 2000 because “we know well that the desires of Paris and Brussels are, tomorrow, to manage our territories.”⁷¹ Wood sales are key for the revenue they bring in, and road construction is sometimes necessary both for logging access and for servicing new and existing homes. Many mayors believe Natura 2000 will stop or severely limit these practices. In 2001, 71 mayors in the Pyrénées, led by ADEM, demanded the annulment of the *ordonnance* (regulation or order) transposing the directives into French law.

When I first began my inquiry into Natura 2000 in Soule, I began hearing stories about its most formidable opponents. One story that was relayed to me by no fewer than five people tells about a meeting in which the Prefect came to explain Natura 2000 to local officials and citizens. What follows is the most complete account I recorded:

The Prefect started talking about his childhood and playing in the streams of the Pyrenees and showed us all kind of pictures of fish and whatnot. He was reminiscing about seeing these things when he was a boy when [a particular local official] stood up and said that there hadn’t been any of those here in 20 years. But he just kept going! The Prefect ignored him and just kept prattling on about these fish. Then later on, he brings up the *écrivisse à pattes blanches* (*Astacus pallipes pallipes*). . . [the same official] says ‘They were there, they are there, and they will be there. Can we talk about something serious now?’

The local official depicted in this story has been a leading proponent of the idea that mountain management should be the domain of mountain-dwellers.

The argument for mountain management by and for the people of the mountain and the image of the Basque farmer as the caretaker of the land have repeatedly employed in the battle

⁷¹ “on sait pertinemment que les volontés parisienne et bruxelloise sont demain, de gérer nos territoires.”

against Natura 2000. Politicians have used these two concepts, particularly the image of the farmer as the steward of nature, to mobilize their constituencies against Natura 2000. As a result, farmers in Soule use some variant of ‘if the environment is healthy here, it is because of our practices, not in spite of them’ as their primary justification for the rejection of Natura 2000. In discussions with the larger public and media releases, however, this romanticized notion of the farmer is less-used. Instead, they employ the idea that people of the mountain know better how to manage the mountain than those who try to intervene from afar because they live and work there: “They design their projects from Paris. They believe that one manages the mountain like a city park. . . . but here, we live with the mountain”⁷² (Gabizon 2001).

In many ways, the mayors of Soule are opinion leaders rather than being reflective of their constituents. Municipal Council deliberations against Natura 2000 were not done with the input of the citizens. They were conducted, and then citizens received the explanation that they were to be against Natura 2000. Many accepted these explanations as adequate, saying that they had no need to search for their own information on Natura 2000 because “we can trust our mayors” (Fabrice, February 7, 2007). Those on Municipal Councils voted against the measure because: “The mayor said we needed to vote against it” (Arnaud, May 22, 2006) and “The mayor said to vote against it” (Ximun, February 3, 2007). The support of the mayors is key for three reasons: 1) ideally they should be the ones to request the formation of a Steering Committee for a site, 2) as long as they maintain their opposition it will be extremely difficult to convince individual farmers to sign Natura 2000 contracts, and 3) without their support, delegates to the Syndicate of Soule will not vote to comply with the formation of a Steering Committee on the territory it manages.

⁷² “*Ils conçoivent leurs projets de Paris. Ils croient que l’on gère la montagne comme un parc en ville. . .alors qu’ici, nous vivons avec la montagne*”

Stakeholder involvement

Stakeholders are groups and individuals who have a “specific, direct and significant stake in the resource” (Pomeroy, Katon, and Harkes 1998: 8). Stakeholder participation should be organized in such a way that it facilitates politically neutral discussions, and stakeholders should be able to come away with a clear understanding of the positions of the other participants. Generating understanding among stakeholders, though, can be a delicate process. Different stakeholders have both different conceptions of the resource – the high pasture is to some important habitat, to others it is a place for recreation, and to others it is an economic tool – and different ways of knowing about the resource – direct experience managing it, scientific studies, etc. As a result, some see over-grazing on the same land where others see under-grazing, and some see fire as an important part of the ecosystem while others see it as a threat.

It is sometimes difficult for resource users to view others as legitimate stakeholders in the management of their resource, but Pomeroy, Katon, and Harkes point out that such broadening is a necessary feature of successful stakeholder involvement: “Partners in co-management need to recognize that the stakeholder community is broader than the local resource user community” (1998: 8). So far in Soule, farmers have been slow to accept the idea that environmentalists or the government have a legitimate interest in the high pasture. It is particularly difficult for them to envision the entire European community as a stakeholder, and several of my informants mentioned that the phrase “of Community interest” used in Natura 2000 documentation to justify the selection of species and habitats was difficult for them to understand.

As stakeholders themselves, farmers have not yet felt included in the process. Though there are not yet any Steering Committees, farmers have had experience with the consultation over site boundaries. Even the farmers who are open to Natura 2000 are unhappy over the

process of implementation as it has proceeded thus far and as they think it will proceed in the future: “What I can’t accept is that the decisions are made elsewhere and imposed here” (Xabier, January 20, 2007). They feel as though the power they have traditionally enjoyed over their land is being pulled away to higher levels, and they are concerned that their interests will be overridden by more powerful actors: “I’m just afraid that they’re going to freeze everything here and just make it pretty for the tourists, that everything will be dictated from above. We want to be actors and have the liberty to chose, not just suffer through Natura 2000” (Françoise, January 8, 2007). Frustration in previous dealings with Europe and questions about the legitimacy of European policymaking, as well as the tension generated by interactions spanning multiple levels, pointed out by Young (2002), contribute to these feelings.

As part of a block of interviews conducted around the idea of whether or not Natura 2000 is successful, I re-interviewed a subset of 10 farmers. Of those 10, six said they would definitely participate in a Steering Committee or Working Group if asked to do so. Their motivations were overwhelmingly to make sure that pastoral concerns were included:

I’d like to be able to participate in the reflection on Natura 2000. We’re against the bear because of the way it was done. Natura 2000 can’t be done the same way. It can’t be imposed by people not from here. . . We can’t let Natura 2000 just be an imposition from the city, we have to be actors (Françoise, January 8, 2007).

Of the four who would not participate, one indicated that he would like to but would be unable to because of a labor shortage at the farm. The remaining three, all from either Sainte Engrâce or Larrau, simply did not think Natura 2000 was interesting or had no interest in working with *écologes* and people who would not understand them or their way of life. Similarly, the mayor of Larrau has publicly rejected the principle of participating in order to take charge of the implementation project on the grounds that Natura 2000 is fundamentally unjust for those that live in mountain communes and bear the largest part of its weight (Accoceberry 2007).

Effective Communication

Poor communication has been another sticking point in the implementation of Natura 2000. Farmers have repeatedly complained that they know little to nothing about the project, that what information they do have has been through non-official channels, and that they are unsure what the Natura 2000 entails. Those that are open to Natura 2000 often are because they have done their own research on the project, supplementing information sent by the Departmental Hunting Federation and received through the mayors. Of the 11 in my sample that are favorable to Natura 2000, seven told me that part of the reason they were favorable was that they had read about Natura 2000 and that they did not think that Natura 2000 would affect them as adversely as they had heard from the hunters or the elected officials.⁷³ Some attribute their attitudes to the efforts of a skilled interlocutor:

Other people are against it [Natura 2000] because the right person didn't go talk to them about it. My father doesn't agree with me about it, but I went to the coast for a study trip a year or two ago, and there was a young guy there who explained it really well. He was an *écologiste*, but not in the pejorative sense. Here if there's an *écologiste* trying to tell you something, the immediate response is "*tu dégages*," but if everyone were talked to by him things would have been different. But he can't do it. He doesn't have the time, and he's not being paid. In groups it doesn't work as well, it should be one on one (Dominique, January 19, 2007).

Much of the negativity surrounding Natura 2000 can be attributed to confusion over what Natura 2000 is and what kind of constraints it will entail. Those that are against Natura 2000 see it as a threat to the continued existence of pastoralism in the mountains. They most often voiced fears that controlled burns (*écobuage*) and transhumance would be limited or forbidden and that Natura 2000 could snowball into other, stricter, programs. All of these concerns are wrapped into an overarching fear of uncertainty:

⁷³ I mentioned earlier that 15 were 'not opposed' to Natura 2000. Of those 15, 4 were neutral, and 11 were favorable.

We just don't know what it [Natura 2000] is. No one knows what's going to happen. If *écobuage* or taking animals to the mountain are forbidden, it will be a big problem. The other problem with Natura 2000 is that today it's the bear and tomorrow it will be the wolf... (Mayor of a Soule commune, November 24, 2006).

The equation of Natura 2000 with the policy of bear reintroduction further increases the already-volatile nature of the conversation. Though there is no official relationship between Natura 2000 and bear reintroduction, major elected officials, such as Député Jean Lassalle, have repeatedly linked the two in their arguments against Natura 2000. The argument is made so powerfully and the image of the bear is so salient that talk of the bear begins to dominate conversations about Natura 2000 and the program is rarely actually debated on its own merits.⁷⁴

Trust between partners

As elaborated in Chapter 2, historically, Soule has had a somewhat difficult relationship with the state, and, predictably, local distrust of the state is a common theme in discourse surrounding Natura 2000. There is near-constant suspicion that the state seeks to reign in local autonomy and impose policies against the wishes of inhabitants. Several informants highlighted the role of history in this distrust. More than one referred to Natura 2000 as the third of “the three traumas.” The first was the creation of the National Park of the Pyrenees, which 30 years later still evokes negative responses from farmers in Soule: “They’re going to do to us what they did to the Béarnais – create a park and close the door” (Christian, October 12, 2006). The second, and much more recent, trauma is the introduction of the Slovenian bear into the mountains used by transhumant herds. The reintroduction has been highly politicized and emotionally charged, and in the minds of the shepherds, and even for many implementers, the bear reintroduction is

⁷⁴ In a meeting organized by the youth group, AZIA, the fact that no one talked about the bear was counted as a success by the organizers.

linked to Natura 2000. They see Natura 2000 and the bear as complementary efforts – the shepherds viewing them as ways to simplify and consolidate agriculture by driving out smallholders; the implementers viewing them as ways to restore the ecosystem. The French maxim “never two without three” is for many local actors coming to pass with Natura 2000. There is also a credibility problem specifically in regards to Natura 2000. Successive governments announced various changes to Natura 2000, at one point even freezing its implementation, few of which remained in effect. As a result, many people simply do not believe what they hear about Natura 2000 from the state.

In addition to a general lack of trust in the state, many in Soule do not trust the Prefect of the department. Not only is there the opposition to the Prefect as the representative of the state, this position changes frequently, as does the position of sub-Prefect, leaving little opportunity for building rapport. Certain Prefects have been inflammatory, telling Soule mayors that if they did not acquiesce, Natura 2000 would be implemented forcefully. In practice, the sub-Prefect interacts more with the mayors than does the Prefect. The current sub-Prefect has taken a different approach than his predecessors, and rather than advocate Natura 2000 he simply presents technical and legal information and responds to questions. As such, he is much less of a target for those opposing Natura 2000. This is not to say that he has garnered the trust of the officials. At this point, many are willing to say that ‘he seems okay’ but that it is too early to be certain.

The lack of trust is not uni-directional. There is distrust on the part of the state that certain actors will comport themselves in an appropriate manner if named Operator. Similarly, in some government agencies there is unwillingness to work with the Syndicate on Natura 2000 because they do not trust its direction.

Fit with existing institutions

The rules and values of established institutions are difficult to change, and those proposing to do so will always encounter a fight (Acheson 2003). It is therefore interesting to explore the actual changes Natura 2000 is likely to bring to current management. The most important difference between current management and Natura 2000 is a change in who has decision making power and a broadening of the stakeholder group:

Table 5.5. Differences between collective management of the high pasture and management under Natura 2000.

	Collective Management	Natura 2000
Decision maker	Management actions decided by <i>olhatia</i> groups for their grazing areas and by the delegates of the Syndicate of Soule for the sectors in their entirety	Management actions decided by Steering Committee and implemented by those who choose to sign contracts
Likely actions	Burning, mowing or shredding, creation of new watering points, efforts to graze abandoned areas	Burning or not burning, creating new watering points, possible hunting restrictions, possible restrictions on treatments, possible changes to dates of transhumance
Incentives	Desire for better pasture quality; social and cultural norms, rules enforced by the Syndicate	Monetary compensation; feeling of improving environment

As outlined in the table above, rather than having management decided by the Syndicate, which is composed of locally elected representatives, and by the *olhatia* groups, management actions under Natura 2000 will be decided by the Steering Committees, which will include representatives from multiple domains. The shift from an almost exclusively pastoral focus to an approach in which pastoral interests are only one component will likely lead to a less-privileged

role for farmers in high pasture management. The Steering Committee might include representatives from the Syndicate and *olhatiak*, but will differ fundamentally from these structures, increasing the perception that the new co-management process will be run by outsiders.

Farmers in Soule fear that the inclusion of non-rural actors in decision making will result in management measures that speed the decline of pastoral activities. These opponents argue that the additional regulations make herding more difficult and drive young people out of the business⁷⁵:

They won't want us to do things like we do them now. . . If you make farming too much more difficult, people won't stay. You have to have people here, and people that work in these mountains need to be left in peace. There are already enough people in France who don't work. It's better to leave us a little peace and let us work than have us all out of work and being paid by the state (Olivier, January 9, 2007).

Only four of the farmers interviewed did not express some fear that the constraints imposed would be too difficult. Even those that are favorable to Natura 2000 almost all added the caveat that restrictions would need to be reasonable and not interfere too much with traditional mountain management.

In contrast, the 1972 creation of *groupements pastoraux* (pastoral groups) very closely mirrored the existing *olhatia* institution. The *groupements* were created to recognize and codify existing practices in order to make the groups eligible for European subsidies. *Groupements* incorporate the same members as the *olhatia*, though some only include those that continue to bring animals to the mountains, and their internal regulations are the same as they would have been without the *groupement*. As a result, these have been very well-received in Soule, and almost every *olhatia* group has created one. The willingness to incorporate this new feature is a

⁷⁵ Others dismiss this concern, arguing that it is the CAP and globalization that are the real agents of change, intensifying production and lowering prices.

direct result of its fit with the existing *olhatia* institution and the access to new subsidies that it allowed.

Conclusion

Early inadequacies in these seven design principles have amplified wariness about Natura 2000 and encouraged its rejection by farmers in Soule. The principles, though, must be considered within the particular context of agricultural decline, a pervasive agricultural policy that strongly affects decision making, and contentious relationships between rural actors and environmentalists, the Basque region and the state, and the state and Europe. They must also be seen in the particular context of moving from common property management to co-management. The farmers of Soule have already solved their commons management problem to their satisfaction and, in effect, implementation of Natura 2000 asks them to give up a measure of their control. As a result, certain aspects become even more important for determining success: the necessity of the transition in the eyes of the resource users, agreement on the appropriate level and processes for decision making, and the inclusion of locals in early stages of project design, not just project execution.

France is determined to proceed with Natura 2000 in the department, and some highlights in the design principles make future success a possibility. Because Steering Committees can now be presided by local collectivities, some elected officials and citizens are becoming less resistant to their creation and, once created, the process within the committees has been satisfactory to rural actors participating at the site of La Rhune. Furthermore, as we will see in the next chapter, individuals, organizations, and agencies are networking to influence the implementation of this co-management process, resulting in changing opinions.

CHAPTER 6. NATURA 2000: AN ECOLOGICAL NETWORK AND A HUMAN NETWORK

Natura 2000 is a network in more than one sense. In addition to being designed as a network of conservation sites, it is also a network of organizations and agencies exchanging information, resources, and expertise to create and manage these sites. Network forms of natural resource governance, such as co-management, are thought to enable better distribution of environmental information, thereby aiding network members in dealing with the increasing complexity of environmental management (Dilling 2000). The efficiency of these exchanges, and the concurrent co-management process, is to some degree affected by the overall structure of that network, and position in the network has consequences for individual actors. For example, a network that has a high degree of density is likely to promote efficient exchanges among its members (Carlsson and Sandstöm 2008), and the access of a particular actor to certain resources and the ability to influence others is conditioned by that actor's embeddedness in the network.

To best understand the co-management process, Carlsson and Berkes suggest the use of network analysis to identify actors, to reveal the linkages between them, particularly those that cross levels of management, and to analyze the capacity of individual actors to influence others and thus the management outcomes (2005). A focus on networks is particularly appropriate because it allows us to move beyond images of the state and resource users as two homogeneous entities interacting with each other. It acknowledges that the state is multi-faceted and often has internally competing interests, that resource users can vary in their conception and exploitation

of the resource, and that other stakeholders are often party to discussions of resource management. Employing network analysis can also allow for a more thorough and nuanced examination of the production of scale and its use by actors hoping to secure advantages in their political, economic, and social struggles over the resource in question.

In previous chapters I have explored the ways in which the particular context of Soule and the current common property management regime have influenced reception of Natura 2000, examined the application of the Birds and Habitats directives in the province, and analyzed how design features of the envisaged co-management process have affected and continue to affect local willingness to accept Natura 2000. In this chapter, I will focus on micro-analysis of the network, examining how certain actors work to make themselves more global or local and how the resulting networks of these actors have allowed them more power and influence. However, some attention to the structure of the whole network is important to gain an understanding of efficiency in the system and patterns of behavior within it (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1993, see also Monge and Contractor 2003 for a discussion of the importance of multi-level analysis).

Theoretical Background

“When human responsibility does not match the spatial, temporal or functional scale of natural phenomena, unsustainable use of resources is likely, and it will persist until the mismatch of scales is cured” (Lee 1993: 561).

The concept of scale is increasingly present in discussions about environmental concerns. In conservation and development projects, for example, there is often talk about ‘scaling up’ or taking lessons learned in small-scale projects and applying those to larger efforts. However, scaling up has proven more difficult than anticipated, due to the different ways in which

processes are played out on different scales, and can only be effectively undertaken in particular circumstances (Binswanger and Aiyar 2003, Igoe 2003, Sayer and Campbell 2001).

Scale also makes an appearance in decisions about conservation planning. There is ongoing tension between the idea that conservation needs to be planned at regional, national, and even global scales – to protect the ranges of migratory species and large predators (Roca et al. 1996), to ensure protection of globally important or threatened species (Myers et al. 2000), and to protect representative slices of habitat (Kelleher 1996, Olson and Dinerstein 1998) – and the idea that local people are best suited to conservation planning and management because they know their environment and have a vested interest in protecting it (McShane and Wells 2004, Western and Wright 1994a). Climate change is also being cited as making planning at broader scales more important as it accelerates habitat and species loss (Totten, Pandya, and Janson-Smith 2003) and shifts habitat types, necessitating connectivity so that floral and faunal species may move into more appropriate contexts.

Explicit considerations of scale in ecology and related biological sciences are numerous and focus on how the choice of particular temporal and spatial scales for observation affects those observations (Levin 1992). Similar considerations are newer in social science discussions of conservation and environmental management (Folke et al. 1998, Young 1994, Young 2002). However, there is a long tradition of theorizing scale in other contexts in human geography, upon which we can draw to conceptualize scale and to better understand scalar effects.

The general consensus in geography is that scale is a real phenomenon and not just a way of seeing and framing the world. It is not, however, a given backdrop of hierarchical categories upon which life is played out. Rather, scale is socially constructed (Marston 1990, Taylor 1981). Herod (2003) explains that scale is the result of political struggles and social processes, and

Brenner argues that scale is “an arena, a hierarchy, and a product of capitalist social relations” (2000: 367). Marston defines scale as a “contingent outcome of the tensions that exist between structural forces and the practices of human agents” (2000: 220). For example, the national scale was created by processes that consolidated smaller nation-states and by the agreements laid out in the Treaty of Westphalia (Herod 2003). That scale is socially constructed rather than given does not diminish the fact that it is tangible and has material consequences (Smith 2003).

Scale has been illustrated through various metaphors. In one, the global, national, regional, and local scales occupy separate rungs of a ladder, forming a discrete hierarchy; in others, they form concentric circles or Russian nesting dolls. More recently, scholars have concluded that scales cannot be so neatly separated and categorized. For example, Brenner argues that scale processes create “a mosaic of unevenly superimposed and densely interlayered scalar geometrics” (2001: 606). In this spirit, scale has been likened to tree roots or earthworm burrows, both metaphors that conjure the idea of scale as network, as proposed by Latour (1993). The network metaphor’s main contribution is to foreground the realization that it is impossible to concretely separate scales (O Tuathail, Herod, and Roberts 1998). Latour argues that the world is “constituted through a series of networks that link different places” and that the local and the global are merely points of view on networks that are neither inherently local nor global “but are more or less long and more or less connected” (1993:122). As Latour construes it, global and local are no longer rooted in place but become descriptors for networks of differing lengths and densities (Herod 2003).

In framing networks in such a way, Latour loses sense of place and brushes over the fact that networks of identical lengths and densities rooted in different areas of the scalar spectrum will offer very distinct and differing opportunities and constraints. Furthermore, discussions of

scale have tended to center on ideas of capitalist production and, to a lesser extent, social reproduction. They have largely failed to include cultural features that help create scale and that contribute to making some actors and processes more local or global than others. A third point of critique of the existing theoretical discussion of scale is the conflation of scale and level. Sayre (2005) argues that many human geographers simply use the two terms interchangeably and that those who do not have not adequately theorized the distinction between the two. For example, Sayre explains Smith's (1990) distinction between scale and level as simply a distinction between that which is fluid and that which is fixed. To remedy the problem, Sayre suggests that human geography borrow the distinction between scale and level from ecology, where scale describes the "processes and relations among units of analysis," and level refers to a "locus of organization or observation" (2005: 282). Under this distinction, Sayre argues that "what Smith terms the 'urban scale' is not a scale in and of itself; it is a level that has a (historically determined) scale based in a spatiotemporal process: the daily commute of laborers between home and work" (p. 285).

Howitt (1998) similarly argues that scale should not be equated with level, subsuming level as one aspect of scale. He argues that scale has three facets: size (province, continent), level (local, regional, national), and relation. This last facet of scale is, Howitt asserts, underemphasized and complements his argument that scale should be understood dialectically rather than hierarchically. Though Sayre's argument does not seem to have gained much traction in the human geography literature, Howitt's emphasis of scale as relation was picked up and used by Marston (2000) in her discussion of the social construction of scale and in many subsequent treatments of the concept. In the analysis that follows, I will use scale and level as outlined by Sayre, and focus on the relational element of scale, as suggested by Howitt. However, we must

recognize that it is not only scalar processes but also levels of organization themselves that are becoming more difficult to classify as cross-scale and rescaling processes proliferate and as globalization and the Internet create an increasingly networked society (Castells 1996, Castells 2000).

In examining the implementation of Natura 2000 and the resistance of certain actors, much of what I will discuss involves how actors use their networks of association to wield influence. In doing so, they often invoke the power of scale by using these connections to mobilize social, political, and economic resources located primarily at other levels of organization. Cox (1998) admonishes that moving from the local to the global is not moving from one discrete arena to another, rather it is a process of developing networks of associations that allow actors to shift between various spaces of engagement. These actions, such as large corporations investing in a local workforce (Herod 2003) and, moreover, explicit political engagement at scales other than that in which the action is primarily being played out (for examples see: Herod 2001, Perreault 2003b), are helping to dissolve the boundaries between levels and scales. As these techniques – such as using the Internet to organize global pressure on a corporation or government to achieve local results – multiply, it must be asked if these strategies will lose their effect by becoming necessary, routine components of resistance rather than additional, innovative methods that succeed when other strategies have failed.

The Carlsson and Berkes research framework that I have employed for this dissertation calls for the use of network analysis as a way of examining players and examining how they are linked across levels. Conceptualizing the political arena of Natura 2000's co-management process as a series of networks is indeed beneficial and facilitates attention to the effects of scale on that process. However, what is less clear is if the well-established formal techniques of

network analysis can be fruitfully applied in this context. In the remainder of this section, I will explore the history and theoretical underpinnings of social network analysis. Then I will apply it to my case study and finally discuss its utility in this context.

A social network can be defined as “an ensemble of relations among an ensemble of actors” (Forsé and Langlois 1997).⁷⁶ The relations may be of many types, including, for example, friendship, monetary exchanges, and information provision. Actors may be discreet individuals or organizations, and relations between them are often multiplex, encompassing several different types of relationships (eg. both friendship and monetary exchange). Network analysis focuses attention away from the individual and toward the relationships between them (Degenne and Forsé 1994, Forsé and Langlois 1997).

Network analysis was developed and refined in several different disciplines at once. Wellman and Berkowitz identify three traditions contributing to the rise of network analysis: British anthropology, increasing American interest in quantitative methods, and an interest in explaining political processes structurally (1997). In sociology, Georg Simmel in 1908 was the first ardent proponent of studying interpersonal relations, though even earlier Emile Durkheim used a definition of density in his work on suicide (1897) that resembles the one used today (Forsé and Langlois 1997). Work on small groups and graph theory in the 30s, 40s, and 50s by researchers such as Moreno (1934), Heider (1944), and Cartwright (1959) solidified the position of network analysis in sociology (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1993). These authors drew heavily on graph theory as developed in mathematics, directly importing terminology such as centrality, reciprocity, and transitivity (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1993). During the 1950s, and 60s, network analysis was less used by sociologists, though there were some important works and methodological advances. These developments prepared the foundation for

⁷⁶ Author's translation

significant growth in the 1970s and a split between micro and macro analysts (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1993).

In anthropology, studies of urbanization and complex societies opened opportunities for the use of new theoretical and methodological tools, and the subsequent network analyses applied terms such as span, connectedness, social circle, and density (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1993). British anthropologists, among them Radcliffe-Brown (1940), Firth (1954), Barnes (1954), and Bott (1957), were more interested in network concepts than their American counterparts, and Barnes is credited with being the first anthropologist to explicitly analyze the structures of relations among actors (Boissevain 1979, Mitchell 1974, Wolfe 1978).

As a form of structural analysis, the network approach argues for weak determinism and tries to bridge the divide between individualism and holism. For anthropologists, network analysis presented an optional explanatory framework for those who found the structural-functionalist approach too constraining:

Network analysis opened a door to permit the entry of interacting people engaged in actions that could alter and manipulate the institutions in which they participated. This introduced a new dimension into the self-regulating structural-functional edifice of formal groups, systems, and moral order which was seen as impinging upon people, socializing them, moulding their character, and determining their behaviour (Boissevain 1979: 392).

Wolfe (1978) points out that the interest in social networks was also fueled by the convergence of four key theoretical trends:

- 1) An interest in relations rather than things
- 2) An interest in process rather than form
- 3) Seeking out elementary phenomena rather than institutions
- 4) Construction of generative models rather than functional ones

He also argues that certain developments made network analysis more feasible, including an ethnographic approach that inherently positions the researcher for a network orientation,

advances in mathematics that paved the way for more sophisticated modeling, and innovations in data storage, retrieval, and processing (Wolfe 1978).

The late 1960s saw a renewed interest in network approaches after a decade of relative quiet, and researchers such as Boissevain (1974) and Kapferer (1969) began to try to link social network analysis to theoretical assumptions (Boissevain 1979). During this time there was a good deal of debate over whether social network analysis constituted a theory or rather a set of basic ideas and “orienting statements” (Homans quoted in Mitchell 1974: 282). The consensus settled on the latter, with the comment that the theoretical underpinnings for network analysis rested in exchange and transaction theory (Mitchell 1974).

Current applications of network analysis vary in their different fields. Research in sociology and in the field of management discusses interlocking directorates (shared members on the board of directors) (Burt 1983, Mintz and Schwartz 1981), intraorganizational ties of different types (Lazega 1994), supply chains (Uzzi 1997), and partnerships between competing corporations (Alter and Hage 1993), to name only a few. Political scientists apply network analysis to study resource exchanges among nations (Smith and White 1992). Public health studies investigate contagion (Morris 1993) and likelihood to adopt healthy or unhealthy practices (Ennett and Bauman 1993) as well as disaster response (Moore, Eng, and Daniel 2003). Geographers use the idea of networks, as described above, to study scale and political movements (Herod 2001, Perreault 2003a) and explicit network analysis to study human mobility (Larsen, Urry, and Axhausen 2006). Anthropologists have used network analysis to study anything from kinship (Foster and Seidman 1981, Killworth, Bernard, and McCarty 1984, White and Jorion 1992) to alliances (White and Johansen 2006) to NGOs and development (Fisher 1997) to how actors are embedded in their socio-cultural environment (Schweizer 1997).

There are also studies that, like my research, use networks as a way to study stakeholder collaboration in environmental management (Poncelet 2001).

The sheer number of fields using network analysis and the many different possible applications thereof raise questions about the coherence of its associated theory and methodology (Monge and Contractor 2003). The different threads of network analysis are unified by five key common characteristics (adapted from Wellman and Berkowitz 1997):

- 1) Behavior is interpreted in terms of structural constraints
- 2) Analysis focuses on relations between units rather than trying to sort units into categories
- 3) Studies how the patterned relationships among multiple alters jointly affect network members behavior
- 4) Structure is treated as a network of networks
- 5) Analytic methods deal directly with patterned relations to supplement or supplant mainstream statistical methods that demand independent units of analysis.

Methodology

In examining the network of actors involved in implementing Natura 2000, I was investigating a total network, rather than a personal, or ego, network. Studying total networks can be challenging due to the greater time and resources they often demand. In function of the definition of the network, total networks can have many more members (Baldwin, Bedell, and Johnson 1997, Newman 2001), and these members may be more geographically distant, such as in studies of international trade (Gereffi 1999, Smith and White 1992). Accordingly, my research required interviews with actors across France (within Soule and in Pau, Bordeaux, Montpellier, and Paris) and in Brussels.

Approaching the data collection through ethnography can further tax temporal and financial resources. Unlike studies that gather data using membership lists (Burt 1983, Fennema and Schijf 1978), computer databases (Newman 2001), or questionnaires (Ennett and Bauman

1993, Haythornthwaite, Wellman, and Mantel 1995), or that simply count contact frequency (Freeman and Freeman 1980), ethnographic research requires spending time with the informant and introduces many more shades of nuance into the quality of the relationships being discussed. This richness is both an argument in favor of using ethnography to uncover networks and a caution of the conceptual and methodological difficulties it injects into the research.

The “perennial problem” in network research is establishing the boundaries of the network (Forsé and Langlois 1997: 31). Though my focus is on Soule, I was interested in the range of the Natura 2000 organizational network across the scale of implementation. Two substantial issues complicate boundary definition in this case. Foremost among them is that there are currently no Steering Committees established for Soule, and thus there is not yet a network of actors at the local level involved in site-specific activities. Second, the diversity of site-level arrangements elsewhere in France makes it impossible to do more than establish a general schema for Steering Committee and Working Group compositions and structures. An investigation of the complete Natura 2000 network for France, including all the various actors involved at site-level across the country, would not substantially contribute to the understanding of Natura 2000’s evolution in Soule and is outside of the scope of this research. I therefore defined my network as those actors influencing the management of Natura 2000 sites in an arena that will ultimately affect Soule, and I discuss the specific site-level actors that are currently involved in trying to influence the process. As a result of this definition, actors such as the Regional Conservatory of Natural Spaces of Aquitaine (Conservatoire Régional d'Espaces Naturels d'Aquitaine - CREN Aquitaine) that participated in the discussion about site boundaries for the designation phase but who are only involved in management at sites where they are designated Operators are excluded. Actors such as the National Federation of Syndicates of

Farmers (Fédération nationale des syndicats d'exploitants agricoles - FNSEA) that do not participate in site-level management (though their departmental affiliates would) but that exert pressure at the national level to influence laws and regulations regarding funding mechanisms and enforcement are included.

Studying total networks rather than ego networks does provide the comparative luxury of being able to start interviewing at any point in the network and to complete the interviews in any order. I began my interviews on the Natura 2000 organizational network with the Prefecture of Pyrénées-Atlantiques.⁷⁷ As new contacts were named by an interviewee or uncovered in my documentary research, I proceeded to interview them using the same set of questions designed to elicit their role in the network, their connections to other actors, and their impressions of the network's function. I continued interviewing governmental and non-governmental actors in the department as I researched players on the national and European levels, and I traveled to Brussels when I had identified the actors with whom I needed to speak. I completed all of the interviews with organizations in Brussels (except one) in face-to-face interviews in Belgium. Due to scheduling issues and the difficulty of getting an interview, one was conducted as a phone interview. I was only able to meet one of the Paris-level governmental officials in person. The other governmental and NGO interviews on the national level were over the phone. Meetings in Bordeaux (regional-level groups and officials) and Pau (departmental-level) were conducted in person. I considered the network complete when my documentary research uncovered no new relevant actors and when my interviewees named no new actors. In most cases I interviewed only one representative from each organization, but in large, complex groups such as the Environmental Directorate of the European Commission and the Regional Directorate of the Environment (DIREN), I interviewed multiple representatives.

⁷⁷ See page 14 for a description of French governmental stratification and the role and importance of the Prefect.

During the interviews, I collected data on multiple types of relationships:

- Passing information
- Sitting together on committees
- Lobbying or other methods of influence
- Creating papers or publications
- Giving instructions or other methods of domination
- Granting or conveying funding
- Combining resources for greater strength and influence

Before the interviews, I had decided to ask about ‘passing information’, ‘influence’, and ‘working together.’ Each interviewee was asked to thoroughly describe his or her organization’s relationships, and the more refined categories of ‘committee co-membership’ and ‘co-publishing’ and the category of ‘domination’ emerged during the coding process. When not otherwise stated in the discussion of a particular graph, I aggregated these types of relationships into ‘collaboration’ for analysis.⁷⁸ For each relationship, I also recorded if it occurs in the context of official collaboration on Natura 2000 (government agencies working together, NGOs providing technical expertise or disseminating information to members) or outside of the official structure (organizations working together to create alternative methodologies for the elaboration of a Document of Objectives, associations pressuring actors not to accept Natura 2000).

For some of the actors in the network I was unable to conduct interviews. Network data for these actors was gathered by proxy, reconstituted from the other actors that named them as a contact and from documentary sources. For these groups, my data on relationship content is less rich.

In addition to simply conducting interviews, I spent time in the offices of these organizations and attended their planning meetings whenever possible. Doing so, I was able to

⁷⁸ If the only relationship between two nodes was a committee co-membership at the national or departmental level they were not recorded as being linked in the aggregated ‘collaboration’ matrix. These committees meet infrequently, and ties between their members are weak if committee co-membership is their only link.

observe office culture and interactions, to get a better feel for interpersonal struggles within the organization, and to understand how their messages and tactics are selected and crafted.

For each actor, I assigned attributes to describe their membership in a larger forum, their attitude toward Natura 2000, and their inclusion or not in the official project.⁷⁹

Table 6.1. Actor attributes.

Attribute: Group	Attribute: Attitude	Attribute: Status
1 - member of the European Habitats Forum	1 - promoting biodiversity interests	1 - official participant
2 - member of the Natura 2000 Users' Forum	2 - promoting social and economic interests	2 - unofficial, influential
3 - member of the Group of 9	3 - opposing entirely	3 - trying to become involved
	4 - neutral	

The left-most column of Table 6.1 indicates the groups to which an organization might belong. Using recognized groups allows us to take these clusters of actors as given and then to examine how these larger groups function in the network. The first group listed, the European Habitats Forum, is a platform for “green and dark green” NGOs to collaborate and communicate with the European Commission (Representative of group affiliated with Natura 2000 Users' Forum, March 4, 2007). The European Environmental Bureau (EEB), WWF's European Policy Office, and IUCN are among its prominent members, and the secretariat is currently housed at IUCN. The Natura 2000 Users' Forum is also a European-level forum. It was created for rural actors to have a privileged voice with the European Commission after its founding members were denied

⁷⁹ It is important to keep the distinction between *actors* that are outside of the official structure and *relationships* that occur outside. One governmental service oversees Natura 2000 contracts but also funds a group of actors that are promoting an alternative methodology for the DOCOBs. As an actor, it is within the official structure, but while some of its interactions are as well, others are not.

access to the European Habitats Forum. The Group of 9 is another collaboration among traditional rural actors. This national-level group was formed among hunting, fishing, forestry, and agricultural interests and played a large role in the early discussion of France's implementation of the Habitats Directive. These groups will be discussed further below.

The attribute category 'status' explains whether an actor is an official Natura 2000 collaborator or not and whether the organization would like to be a part of the official network or not. There are unofficial but influential actors who wish to remain external to the official project (eg. Chasse, Pêche, Nature, Traditions (Hunting, Fishing, Nature, Traditions) (CPNT) – the association vehemently opposes Natura 2000 and will continue for the time being to lobby against it), but there are also unofficial actors who would like to become official (eg. Centre Départemental de l'Elevage Ovin (Departmental Sheep Breeding Center) (CDEO) – the center would like to be named Operator of a site along with its partners). By official collaborator I mean an agency or organization that transfers or receives funds allocated by the ministry for Natura 2000, that participates in the creation or enforcement of Natura 2000-related policy or regulations, or that sits on a recognized Natura 2000 committee.

The remaining attribute category, 'attitude', is substantially more problematic. Promoting biodiversity interests and promoting social and economic interests are not mutually exclusive categories. However, given that attitudes and behaviors of a given actor are influenced by his or her network, it is important to understand if certain actors are participating more with a priority on habitat and species protection or more with a priority of ensuring as little economic and social disruption as possible. Those groups given an attribute label of 'one' all expressed their goals in a similar manner to this:

Our world is in trouble. Climate change, species loss, we have to act. Natura 2000 is good even if it does nothing more than raise awareness. It's a tool. It's a powerful tool

to change the way we interact with the environment. It helps us realize what our impact is and that we need to live more lightly on the land (NGO representative, December 15, 2006).

In contrast, the following statement is representative of actors given an attribute label of ‘two’:

Our organization is there to defend private property and actors whose activities are linked to the land. Our activity on the land depends on good environmental conditions; that’s why we want to bring precisions to Natura 2000 and make sure that it’s good for the land and land users (NGO representative, January 29, 2007).

The oversimplification and dichotomization into the two categories does a disservice to the actors who are not eager to be labeled as one or the other and loses complexity, but is interesting and necessary from an analytical standpoint. ‘Opposes entirely’ is also not without problems due to the dynamic nature of networks and management processes. The implementation of Natura 2000 has been a lengthy process, and some actors that were staunchly against it at the beginning are now starting to consider involving themselves in the effort.

I first entered network data into a spreadsheet in Microsoft Excel and then imported them into UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002). I used the NetDraw application to create all of the network graphs and used UCINET to run all of the network analyses. In the analysis and in the graphs presented in this chapter, both the mayors and individual farmers are represented by single nodes. Because I was particularly interested in flows of information and influence rather than the network features affecting the attitudes of any given mayor (at the time I was conducting this research, the mayors of Soule all held very similar positions on Natura 2000), and because the mayors are all structurally equivalent (occupying the same structural position), this aggregation is possible. The same argument largely holds for the individual farmers with the caution that some among them have missed information from some of the groups they are shown to link with and some have forged additional links to learn more about Natura 2000. It remains, though, that they are largely structurally equivalent, and separating

them for analysis would only be beneficial in the context of a micro-analysis focusing only on the local portion of the network. One of the most interesting aspects of this network, however, is how it is evolving. As different groups are seeking to forge relationships with particular mayors and individual farmers, subsequent analyses will need to disaggregate these categories and fully examine who decides to participate, with whom, and why.

The organizations and agencies involved in the implementation of Natura 2000 form a vast and complicated network, pictured below in Figure 6.1. Links between these groups influence attitudes, information flow, and resource mobilization throughout the network.

Figure 6.1. The Natura 2000 implementation network.

Network structure

The organizational network behind the implementation of Natura 2000 includes many types of actors with many differing interests, even within the government and even within particular agencies of the government. Government agencies across the scale of implementation are influenced by and partner with NGOs and quasi-governmental associations, some of which work on the global level (eg. WWF, IUCN), and priorities range from a biodiversity-centered approach to conservation to a focus on business and industry interests. Locally, traditional rural actors are heavily present, but because Natura 2000 is such a far-reaching initiative and because it is interesting for a broad range of actors, even a youth group, AZIA, has chosen to get involved.

Subgroups and bridges

Within a network graph, there are often subgroupings of actors. Isolating and defining these groups can be done in many ways, some more restrictive than others. The subgroup with the most difficult criteria to satisfy is a clique, which is a “maximally connected subgraph” or group in which all members have ties to all other members (Alba 1973). When looking at the network graph, the three cliques become readily apparent and represent the three groups discussed in Table 6.1: the European Habitats Forum, the Natura 2000 Users’ Forum, and the Group of Nine. In the graph below (Figure 6.2), these three cliques are highlighted.




Figure 6.2. Nodes colored by attribute ‘Group’. Green represents the European Habitats Forum, gray the Natura 2000 Users’ Forum, and blue the Group of Nine, which was also the original core of the National Natura 2000 Committee. Purple shows the actors that have since been added to the National Committee. There is also a Departmental Natura 2000 Committee, which has more than 40 members. Its members that do not have links to other nodes in the context of Natura 2000 were excluded from these graphs for clarity.

The European Habitats Forum (EHF) is an umbrella organization for a group of NGOs to provide input and advice to the European Union’s Environment Directorate General (DG Environment), particularly regarding the creation of Natura 2000.⁸⁰ “It’s a way for us to have a coordinated message, to share information, and to make sure we have a stronger presence in Brussels” (representative of an NGO affiliated with EHF. March 31, 2006). The EHF meets formally with DG Environment staff after each Habitats Committee meeting and may supply

⁸⁰ DGs handle the work of the European Commission and are overseen by a Commissioner. The current Commissioner for the Environment is Stavros Dimas.

reports or engage in lobbying between formal meetings. Primary among its interests are developing legislation, finding funding for policy implementation, developing indicators for sustainability, and conducting public outreach and education. EHF provided technical expertise for the identification of sites during the Biogeographic Seminars and produced ‘shadow’ lists of species and habitats to be included to use in assessing the lists made by member states. EHF also assessed the conservation status of 20 species and 8 habitats. These case studies will provide examples for the member states, which are required to produce the same reports. In many ways, this coalition of NGOs is taking on functions that are in principle reserved to the Member States or to the European Commission. Within the EHF, members engage in a variety of relationships in the context of Natura 2000. They convey information, generally through the Secretariat, on Natura 2000 and potential funding sources, and work together on priority activities. Members meet every six months and are represented by the EHF on the Habitats Scientific Working Group and other European Commission expert groups.

The Natura 2000 Users’ Forum is another European-level group that has been actively involved in drafting and implementing conservation and management legislation. It was founded in 1999 by farming, forestry, hunting, fishing, and tourism interests to promote the role of rural stakeholders in resource management and to provide a platform for communication with the DG Environment. “We asked to be part of EHF, but it was not possible, so we made the Users’ Forum. We originally wanted to be part of EHF, but they wouldn’t permit it because in their bylaws it says EHF is for environmental groups only. That’s why we organized ourselves” (representative of an NGO affiliated with the Users’ Forum, January 29, 2007). The Federation of Associations for Hunting and Conservation of the EU (FACE) and the European Landowners’ Organization (ELO) are major players in the Forum. Although individual farmers in Soule are

not part of the group, and almost all are unaware of it, they are in a sense represented there. The departmental hunting association, FDC, is a member of the national association, which is a member of FACE.

The Group of Nine is a national-level group. Originally formed in 1996, it has representatives of hunting, fishing, forestry, and agricultural interests:

Table 6.2. The members of the Group of Nine, by their organizational names at the group's creation and by their current names.

Name at Founding of Group of Nine	Current Name
Assemblée Permanente des Chambres d'Agriculture (APCA)	Same
Centre National des Jeunes Agriculteurs (CNJA)	Jeunes Agriculteurs (JA)
Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles (FNSEA)	Same
Fédération Nationale des Syndicats des Propriétaires Forestiers Sylviculteurs (FNSPFS)	Forestiers Privés de France (FPF)
Fédération Nationale des Communes Forestières (FNCoFor)	Same
Association Nationale des Centres Régionaux de la Propriété Forestière (ANCRPF)	Centre National Professionnel de la Propriété Forestière (CNPPF)
Union Nationale des Fédérations Départementales de Chasse (UNFDC)	Fédération Nationale des Chasseurs (FNC)
Fédération Nationale de la Propriété Agricole (FNPA)	Fédération Nationale de la Propriété Privée Rurale (FNPPR)
Union Nationale des Fédérations Départementales de Pêche et de Protection du Milieu Aquatique (UNFDPPMA)	Fédération Nationale de la Pêche en France et de la Protection du Milieu Aquatique (FNPF)

The Group of Nine no longer functions as a group on the national level, but has been incorporated in its entirety into the National Natura 2000 Committee (Comité National de Suivi). I have chosen to discuss it as a group because of its historic importance to the process of implementation in France, the continued work of its members on the issue at the national level

that directly affects implementation processes in the department of Pyrénées-Atlantiques, and the fact that farmers in Soule invoke it as though it exists today:

I don't know much about Natura 2000 except that it's not just farmers who are against. Lots of people who usually don't get along got together and formed the Group of 9 to fight Natura 2000. They're trying to stop it from coming to the countryside, but I don't think it's going to work" (Adrien, February 2, 2007).

Subgroups such as these cliques are linked to the rest of the graph and sometimes to each other through ties that may function as bridges. The term 'bridge' in network analysis has a strict interpretation: "an edge is a bridge between two parts in a graph when it is the only link that spans the two parts, i.e. every node in one part can only reach a node in another part via that link" (Degenne and Forsé 1999: 110). This criterion is obviously quite difficult to satisfy in reality, and the concept of a 'local bridge' takes into account the distances involved in linking one node to another (Granovetter 1983). Though an edge may not be a bridge in the strict sense, it can be considered a local bridge if other paths between the nodes in question are too long to be practical. What constitutes a practical path will vary with the network in question and the particular relations it encompasses. Because true bridges are rare, these local bridges can be considered *de facto* bridges (Degenne and Forsé 1999). Friedkin asserts that because bridges connect two somewhat distinct populations, "one might argue that such information as does flow by means of local bridges is crucial to the social integration of differentiated populations" (1980: 422). Consistent with his argument, when we look at the European Union-level cliques in this dataset, we do see a few important bridges between them that serve to promote cooperation (Figure 6.3).




Figure 6.3. Portion of the network expanded to show bridges between the two EU-level cliques

As can be seen in the graph, each member of a forum can reach an actor in the other forum by a simple path link of 2 through the European Commission. However, due to the types of collaboration between the groups and the Commission, such a path is not practicable. For example, if EEB is lobbying the European Commission or receiving European funds to produce a report, FACE is unlikely to be able to use that connection to seek information from EEB, to try to influence its activities, or to contact it in any other manner. In this case, it is not the path length that makes such a connection impracticable, but the content of the relationships in question. As a result, the links between ELO and Euparc, ELO and Eurosite, and FACE and IUCN can be considered *de facto* bridges (Table 6.3).

Table 6.3. Relationships between nodes connected by de facto bridges.

Link	Context
Europarc and Eurosite with ELO	Collaboration on the Natura Network Initiative (2004-2006) and the Natura 2000 Networking Program (2007). The organizations contract with the DG Environment to improve site management and communication skills with a series of training event and workshops designed to share best practices
FACE with IUCN	FACE is a member of IUCN
FACE with Birdlife	The former adversaries signed a formal agreement in 2004 that acknowledges the Birds Directive as the appropriate tool for bird conservation and supports the implementation of Natura 2000 while agreeing to meet at least twice a year to promote dialogue and cooperation.

One of the most prevalent arguments in the discussion about Natura 2000 is that its success has been tempered by poor communication and lack of learning across sites. As the EU cannot be directly responsible for local-level communication and because Member States have largely failed in their attempts to promote Natura 2000, the EC has turned to NGOs. In doing so, the Commission is extending its network toward a more local scale, leveraging the ties that NGOs have in particular communities, their different forms of expertise, and the different – and sometimes superior – legitimacy enjoyed by non-governmental groups. The Europarc/Eurosite/ELO collaboration is an example of one such effort. In October 2006, I attended a workshop that these groups organized under the Natura Network Initiative (NNI) that

was geared specifically towards helping press officers generate excitement about Natura 2000 sites. “There’s a diversity of perspectives and experience here, and we need to pull out shared messages. We can work together to distill the benefits of Natura 2000. Local characteristics vary, but it’s a network linking countries” (Activity leader, October 18, 2006). Workshop activities included everything from education on the technical elements of Natura 2000 to crafting press releases. After successfully completing the NNI, the partnership was granted the contract for the Natura 2000 Networking Program (NNP). This program will continue the focus on communication and information dissemination from the NNI but will focus more heavily on trainings and sharing of best practices. Under the NNP, these NGOs will gather success stories from the site level, synthesize them, and spread the ideas to different sites. The program is funded by the DG Environment.

The agreement between The Federation of Associations for Hunting and Conservation of the EU (FACE) and Birdlife International marks a large advance for nature conservation in Europe, allying actors that are traditionally in opposition. In 2004, FACE and Birdlife signed a formal agreement that supports the implementation of Natura 2000. Though the collaboration is not welcomed by all hunting advocates, the director of FACE sees such alliances as necessary and fruitful.

We try to get hunters and non-hunting conservationists to work together - our Birdlife agreement functions well. CPNT thinks it’s a pact with the devil, but, not to compliment ourselves, it was a brave and intelligent move. It will be a long-term success (Interview, March 4, 2007).

This compact allows each of the partners to have some measure of assurance that the other will not behave as an adversary. Birdlife is granted that FACE will not try to halt the creation of Natura 2000 sites or to alter the enforcement of the Habitats Directive, and FACE can reasonably

believe that Birdlife will not seek to expand the directive without further discussion between the parties. Additionally, the partnership helps each group reach out to very different constituencies.

It is also interesting to note the position of the Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP). IEEP has a direct link to the European Commission and to several members of the European Habitats Forum but is not part of that forum.

We're in a bit of a different situation than most. We're not an advocacy group *per se*. . . We have a staff of scientists and scientists in our network, and we produce reports for our clients and for the European Commission. We're neutral, so what we say is maybe viewed a little differently (IEEP representative, March 31, 2006).

WWF, EEB, and IUCN are all clients of IEEP.

Microanalysis

Turning our attention to how structure affects individual actors and how the decisions of those actors affect structure, we see that the network structure of the organizations and people involved in the implementation of Natura 2000 has contributed to the difficulties in advancing the process in Soule. Souletine farmers and their mayors are pivotal in the eventual adoption or rejection of Natura 2000, and network analysis helps understand their attitudes and behaviors by elucidating where their information comes from and what attitudes surround them and by revealing which actors have increased power derived from their position in the network and how they leverage those positions.

Motivation for linking

When studying the participants in a network it is critical to understand why they participate. The standard reasoning in network theories is that actors in an activist network participate because they have an intellectual and emotional commitment to the issues and share knowledge about them. When dealing specifically with networks organized in the context of

natural resources and conservation, Rodrigues (2004) argues that material interests must also be considered in analyzing an actor's motivation: "Since they tend to be directly affected by changes in the local environment, they have a material interest in preserving their way of life and/or pursuing the betterment of their quality of life through environmental preservation" (Rodrigues 2004: 6). However, participation in a network does not necessarily entail advancing some agreed-upon goal; some actors involved in Natura 2000 are clearly participating to defend their way of life and ensure their material benefit by resisting environmental preservation or by trying to change its character. As discussed in Chapter 5, there is not agreement in Soule over how to conceptualize the resource to be managed. For the animal raisers, the focus is on pasturage, and the setting is a working landscape, whereas for many in the implementing organizations this landscape is seen as relatively pristine, and the species it harbors are of greatest concern.

Beyond just deciding to participate in Natura 2000, or being required to (eg. state agencies), each actor must decide with which other actors it will link. Choices are constrained, with some links being almost impossible and others effectively obligatory. Most local actors, for example, do not have the option of a direct connection to the Ministry of the Environment. Conversely, actors that wish to participate in the official initiative rather than promote an alternative must link with the Prefecture. Within the boundaries of those constraints, several factors influence the relational decisions of these actors. Theories of network formation rely heavily on the concept of trust, arguing that actors must trust that the actor with whom he or she is linking will not behave in a way that will be detrimental to the trustor (Buskens 2002). Similar to what is seen in a repeated Prisoners' Dilemma exercise, learning allows an actor to make a more informed trust decision, and the opportunity to sanction a partner who behaves

detrimentally, referred to as control, makes actors more confident in entering relationships (Buskens 2002).

Trust requires information about the other actor, which can be acquired in a few key ways. Actors that have had relationships in the past and that expect to have them in the future, actors that are “temporally embedded,” have more opportunities for learning about each other (Buskens 2002: 4). Ideally for network functioning, these learning experiences lead to increased trust between actors and increased willingness to link. However, it can have the opposite effect. Farmers in Soule have extensive experience dealing with the European Union and the French agencies that implement its agricultural policies through their participation in the CAP. Delays in receiving payments and experience with compliance checks they say are too rigid have made farmers reluctant to participate in any new European program:⁸¹

Europe and the documents and controls are crazy. You have to be really rigorous and that's not easy with the way we work. They want us to work like everyone else. We don't have the liberty anymore to make our decision based on the relief of the land, the weather, the condition of the animals. You almost have to preview the dates that you're going to the mountain . . . The paperwork is amazing, and it has a lot of pressure behind it. You never know what they're going to get you for. I know we make mistakes because it's all so hard to keep up with, so we're always worried. You have to even mark down the number of liters you get from the sheep – this isn't our job. We've had them check on the number of sheep at home and at the mountain to make sure we don't have other sheep there than the ones declared . . . but, you can't live without the subsidies, and everything is calculated according to them. Rent is up in the mountain because they know you get subsidies for going there. Without subsidies, all the products would have to be more expensive. Not many people could buy them . . . I'm afraid Natura 2000 will be more of the same. Yes, maybe it's more money, but is it also more things I can't keep up with? (Marc, January 23, 2007).

We did a Sustainable Agriculture Contract (SAD), and it's always a little bit of extra help, but it's extra work, too. We had a misunderstanding about the stream bank. We understood that we just had to take out fallen trees, but we also had to clear out all the bramble all the way through the pasture, keep the good trees and get rid of the bad ones – we're not trained to do the selection of trees! The compliance checks are very strict. They took away a year of our subsidies for that little misunderstanding. It's getting

⁸¹ 45 of the 60 farmers I interviewed mentioned the inconvenience or difficulty of the controls.

stricter and stricter, so we probably wouldn't choose to do a Natura 2000 SAC because we lose too much freedom (Marie-Louise, January 21, 2007).

There are also cultural aspects to the development of trust. Studies of buyer/seller relationships traditionally argued that the proliferation of links was based on distrust. Buyers believed that if they bought from only one supplier that the seller would take advantage of the lack of competition and charge unfairly. Studies of the Japanese car industry, however, argue that the observed profit-sharing arrangements grew out of a long tradition of cooperative relationships in Japan (Alter and Hage 1993). In areas without such a tradition, other factors may lead to cooperation. In heavily research-dependent industries in the United States, for example, Alter and Hage (1993) argue that a concentration of research and development activities, such as in Silicon Valley, creates a climate of trust and leads to more collaboration. One can certainly argue that the FACE-Birdlife agreement is an example of a link that was originally forged as a result of distrust. In the example of buyers and sellers above, distrust between two partners leads to the creation of links with other partners. In the case of FACE and Birdlife, however, distrust leads to creation of a link between the two distrusting partners. Relationships are dynamic, however, and continued successful collaboration is likely to change the relationship from one of distrust to one of trust (Nooteboom, Berger, and Noorderhaven 1997). It is important to note that trust and distrust are not mutually exclusive. An actor may simultaneously trust and distrust the actor with which he or she is linking (Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies 1998).

On the national level, the Permanent Assembly of Chambers of Agriculture chose to enter the implementation network partly because they thought it important to not let others make decisions on Natura 2000 without agricultural input and partly because their position as a quasi-governmental group dictated a certain level of cooperation:

We're Chambers of Agriculture, public establishments, so we had to have a less radical position than the syndicates. We tried to dialogue and to communicate the fears to the Minister. We realized that it was better to participate and be a real actor and master the phase of delineation of sites so they are not just imposed (Representative of l'Assemblée Permanente des Chambres d'Agriculture, February 2, 2007).

This idea of participating to monitor the process and to ensure representation is a recurring theme.

Hunters try to get in on the DOCOBs, try to lead the discussions. We took that position 3 years ago, and now we try to stay up on Natura 2000. We still don't know what's in it, that's what makes us uncomfortable and what makes us stay vigilant (Hunting association representative, January 22, 2007).

Closer to the local level, we also see clear examples of actors forming relationships out of distrust. The agricultural syndicate FDSEA chose to enter the implementation process to defend agricultural interests:

The empty chair is the worst. I said that we should sit on two to three committees [Steering Committees] to try to reduce the effects. We were treated as traitors [by some farmers for agreeing to participate], but if there is a consultation opportunity we have to be there (Representative of FDSEA, Interview, February 8, 2007).

Individual Souletine farmers expressed a similar feeling that they need to become involved to protect their livelihoods and lifeways: "We have to become actors. With the subsidies [in the CAP] there are eco-conditionalities, so we're getting Natura 2000 whether we want it or not. . . the machine is advancing, and we need to be at the table" (Françoise, January 8, 2007).

Feelings of trust and distrust, as well as other attitudes and behaviors, are shaped not only by repeated interactions but also by the relational networks in which a person or organization is embedded (Buskens 2002, Degenne and Forsé 1999). An actor's "network embeddedness," or connection to third parties, may supply him or her with additional information on a potential partner (Buskens 2002: 5, Weesie, Buskens, and Raub 1998). Third parties can supply important information about the reliability of a potential partner (Gulati 1995), and negative information

from a third party amplifies already existing distrust (Burt and Knez 1995). If we look just at the egonet of the Souletine mayors when it is shown with tie directions (Figure 6.4), we see that there is a link going from the Prefecture to the mayors that is not reciprocated.




Figure 6.4. Souletine mayors' egonet. Nodes in black represent official actors with a priority of biodiversity conservation. Nodes in blue are official actors with a primary priority of defending economic or social interests. In gray are actors that promote an alternative strategy and are who are trying to become involved in the official process. Actors in red are those that are, on balance, against Natura 2000.

This unreciprocated tie represents the Prefect sending information on Natura 2000 to the mayors of concerned communes as well as informational meetings his office conducts for groups and efforts at contact with individual mayors. The mayors in Soule have not, however, engaged in Natura 2000 and have thus not reciprocated the link. The mayors are particularly important because it is their acceptance of Natura 2000 that opens the way for the formation of a Steering

Committee. In principle, the Prefect can create a Steering Committee without the accord of the mayors of the communes concerned, but on the ground this would prove extremely difficult to implement due to both the structure of Natura 2000 implementation in France and the power of small-town politicians.

Because they are such important players, third parties have sought to influence their opinions of Natura 2000. Looking at how the mayors are embedded in the network, we see that one connection is with the Departmental Federation of Hunters (FDC). The federation is currently engaged in Natura 2000 as an official participant, however this is a fairly recent development. Until a significant change in leadership in April 2004, the federation was staunchly opposed to Natura 2000 (FDC representative, Interview 1.22.2007). It communicated its stance directly to the mayors of Soule and to the individual hunters saying that the state was not to be trusted. Most of the farmers in Soule are also hunters, and all hunters must be part of FDC, which then sends them newsletters with articles about Natura 2000. When I asked both mayors and farmers where they had received their information, many pointed to simply FDC or said that the maps and lists came from the Prefecture but that the real information about the intentions of Natura 2000 came from FDC.

Position and power

In the case of Natura 2000, Basque farmers are facing the specter of losing access to and control over ancestral lands, and ‘power’ essentially comes down to the influence various actors have in that struggle for control (cf. McCarthy 2002). In network analysis, ‘power’ is defined as an actor’s capacity to influence other actors and is thought to derive from his or her position in the network (Borgatti and Everett 1992). Knoke, for example, defines power relations as “asymmetrical actual or potential interactions among social actors that enable one actor to exert

greater control over another's behavior" (Knoke 1993: 24). To unravel the power relations at work in the Natura 2000 network, I use both the network measures designed to reveal power and ethnographic research to dig deeper into the actual forces at work.

Because network theories argue that well-connected actors have access to more useful information than those on the periphery and are thus thought to be more influential than their less-connected counterparts, an actor's centrality is generally considered a good indicator of his or her power (Galaskiewicz 1979, Laumann and Pappi 1976). Bonacich (1987) argues, though, that simple measures of degree centrality are inadequate because they do not consider links that extend beyond the actor in question. Between two actors that have the same number of connections, the actor whose connections are better-connected will be more central and more influential because he or she can spread information to many other actors. However, this actor will not, according to Bonacich, be powerful because his or her alters, being well-connected, have many options to provision themselves with information or resources. Conversely, the actor whose connections are less-connected will be more powerful because his or her connections are dependent on him or her for information and resources (Bonacich 1987). While the first actor, the one with well-connected connections, would appear as powerful using a calculation of degree centrality, the second would not.

In order to account for both centrality and influence, Bonacich created an algorithm that can be run with both positive and negative attenuation factors. Using a positive factor yields high scores for those actors that are connected to other well-connected actors and who are thus the most central. Using a negative factor reveals those that are more powerful. I ran the algorithm with both positive and negative attenuation factors (also called beta coefficients). For the positive beta (Table 6.4), the chosen value must remain under the reciprocal of the

eigenvector of the network (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002).⁸² For this network, the reciprocal of the eigenvector was .009, and I chose a beta coefficient of .008 to stay under the maximum while still exaggerating the differences between actors.

Table 6.4. Bonacich power index scores using a positive beta coefficient. (Influence). Highest scoring actors only. For full table see Appendix G.

Actor	Influence score
WWF	19.335
EEB	19.335
IUCN	19.404
Birdlife	20.424
MEDD	30.661
European Commission	31.255

This table shows that the most central, and by extension influential, actors are the high-level originators of legislation and rule-making: the European Commission with a score of 31.255 and the Ministry of the Environment (MEDD) with a score of 30.661. The field data support the prominent role of these two government agencies. The European Commission is the source of the original directives creating Natura 2000 and the guidelines for implementing specific articles of the directives. As a result, there are two organized coalitions of actors, as well as other less-affiliated groups, trying to influence its policymaking. The Commission then passes information back to these groups and to nodes, both governmental and non-governmental, at the national level. The Ministry's role is similar. It houses the Nature and Landscapes Directorate, which in turn houses the Natura 2000 project group. As a result, it is responsible for managing the implementation of Natura 2000 and coordinating the public relations campaign.

⁸² Eigenvector uses factor analysis to find the most central actors in terms of the entire network, downplaying power that is more local.

The field data do suggest an inconsistency with Bonacich's theory that these actors would only be influential and not powerful. Both the degrees (number of ties) of the Commission and the Ministry and the content of their ties (regulatory authority and control of information flow) contribute to the power of these actors.

Other important players include BirdLife (20.424), IUCN (19.404), WWF (19.335), EEB (19.335), and Eurosite and Europarc (each with 18.367). These NGOs are all members of the European Habitats Forum, the density of which substantially boosts their influence scores. They are also all engaged in other partnerships related to Natura 2000. BirdLife, as previously discussed, has an agreement with FACE not to try to modify the directive; WWF and EEB have national memberships also working on Natura 2000, and Europarc and Eurosite run the Natura 2000 Networking Program with ELO. These additional activities allow them to reach a greater number of actors, thereby influencing their behaviors.

When these results are stratified by level, the mayors emerge as the most power group on the local level. (9.366). This measure is well-supported by the ethnographic data. Animal raisers that I interviewed said they "looked to the mayors for guidance" (Jacques, July 26, 2006) and that they "don't need [their] own position on Natura 2000" because they "can trust [their] mayors" (Fabrice, February 7, 2007). At the departmental level, the Chamber of Agriculture is the most influential (11.871). This is a function of its connections with both official and unofficial actors in the network.

When running the algorithm with a negative beta coefficient, thereby emphasizing the actors that have connections to alters that are not well-connected, different actors emerge as powerful (Table 6.5)

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Table 6.5. Bonacich power index scores using a negative beta coefficient. (Power). Highest scoring actors only. For full table, see Appendix H.

Actor	Power
COPA-COGECA	14.069
Farmers	10.713
JA	8.677
ONF	8.283
FACE	8.05
CNPPF	7.302
FNPF	7.302

This measure, however, is less appropriate in this context. In the Natura 2000 network, being another actor's sole source of information only translates to power in very restricted contexts, if at all. For example, if the mayors or individual raisers had only one or two incoming communication sources, those nodes would have great power to influence their acceptance or rejection of Natura 2000. Being the main source for any particular NGO, though, while it may influence the attitudes and behaviors of that actor is unlikely to have major consequences for the implementation process as a whole. In Table 6.5, we see that farmers rank quite high, as do numerous national and European-level NGOs.

Returning to the use of a positive beta coefficient to examine the least influential actors provides an opportunity to discuss power more thoroughly and to question the utility of these measures in this situation. Three actors – The General Council, The Patrimonial Institute of *Haut Béarn*, and the Syndicate of Soule – received scores of zero because they are unconnected to other actors in the network. However, this does not mean they have no power over the process.

The General Council is the department-level elected body. In France, there is a sharp divide between the state and directly-elected governing bodies. The Prefect is the representative

of the state in the department, and DDAF and DIREN are decentralized agencies of the state. The General Council, however, is designed to represent the department. As a result of the state/local divide, mayors are much more closely aligned with the General Council than with the Prefecture, and there is a tendency to wait on higher-placed officials, the “*grands élus*,” to decide a position before the mayors pronounce their own. The General Council of Pyrénées-Atlantiques has been very vocal in its opposition to Natura 2000. Though it has not issued directives to mayors, it sets a firm example for them to follow; Councilors have refused to attend CoPil meetings and have sent their own environmental technicians to watch and report back on the proceedings.

In addition to modeling that opposition for the mayors, the General Council funds an alternative nature conservation initiative, the Sensitive Natural Areas (ENS) plan, which one representative of a General Council agency described like this:

It's done by the General Council and the agencies that are here. We are in contact with the local elected officials and the local population. We can get a message through, convince people. We don't impose things by regulation. We only act if the commune wants us to. The state doesn't care about the opinion of the mayors, they just impose. That's what the state has never understood, and that's why the ENS approach works better. . . The state, for the last time, has imposed its view from Paris. It needs to be done at the local scale. With decentralization we don't know how it's going to work out, but the state doesn't have the means anymore to impose its will from afar (February 23, 2007).

ENS proponents also argue that the approach is better for the department because it is based on local information and field studies rather than CORINE biotope classifications and bibliographies, like Natura 2000.

Natura 2000 rests on a network that is false. There are important errors. The inventories are old, done in the 90s – there have been changes since then, and in France, they were all done by volunteers. . . For example, we [the General council in the context of a transboundary exchange with Euskadi and Navarre] did a study on the Barthes de l'Adour, which is an area that is really rich ornithologically. The studies done by the bird people for Natura 2000 identified certain areas to protect, and when the General Council

did their study, they found that these areas were poor in birds while other areas a few hundred meters away were rich (February 23, 2007).

Some conservation experts point out that the ENS plan and Natura 2000 are more complementary than substitutable approaches, but many of the Councilors see it as a way to show the state that they can handle their own conservation without its interference. The General Council officially has seats on any Steering Committee created in the department, but thus far they have refused those seats.

The Patrimonial Institute of Haut Béarn (IPHB) has been another vocal opponent of Natura 2000. It is not directly connected with any of the other network members, but its position is generally known. Though it is not a Basque group, there are strong ties between Basque and Béarnais shepherds in other contexts, and Souletine raisers keep abreast of its actions. IPHB's president is Jean Lassalle, who is part of the Departmental Association of Elected Officials of the Mountain (ADEM) in his capacity as mayor of Lourdios-Ichère, and who also serves as a Deputy at the national level. Lassalle's position is an interesting one. His role in the Assembly, along with his larger-than-life persona, make him somewhat of a celebrity, even on the international stage. His theatrical approach to governing (including singing in the Assembly and going on hunger strike) and celebrity status have allowed him to rally farmers (his brother is a sheep farmer in Béarn, so he does also have some popular legitimacy) and mayors alike to his fight against Natura 2000. In the Assembly, though, he has been unable to pass legislation against it. Undeterred by this failure, he declared to the sub-Prefect of Oloron that the fight is not over: "As long as I have one drop of blood in my veins, I will oppose Natura 2000!" (General Assembly of ADEM, November 25, 2006). It must also be noted that IBHB has been a major player in the controversy over bear reintroduction in the Pyrenees. Originally created as an instrument to implement the *Charter for the sustainable development of the Béarnaise valleys and the*

protection of wild bears, IPHB was to be a way for local people to participate in decision making about bear reintroduction and management. However, relations soured between IPHB and the state, and in June 2007, the Prefecture refused to approve IPHB's 700,000 euro budget.

The final unconnected actor is the Syndicate of Soule (CSPS). The Syndicate of Soule, as we saw in Chapter 3, is responsible for current management of the common property pasture lands. Even though the majority of their territory is covered by Natura 2000, the Syndicate has not yet been consulted on the project or received any information on the sites from the Prefecture.

The biggest problem is that we never had a sufficient presentation on Natura 2000. The CSPS is very important here, but we were never consulted because we're not a local collectivity. The mayors were consulted by the Prefect, but the CSPS and the shepherds got nothing in the way of documentation and presentation on the subject" (CSPS elected official, September 5, 2006).

This lack of access to information has made the Syndicate wary and unfavorable to cooperation, as has the perception that Natura 2000 is something that is being handed down from on high, as shown in this remark from one of Natura 2000's most vocal critics in Soule.

We're not necessarily opposed to Natura 2000, but to the principal of imposition. It was rather like a meteorite falling, so we don't accept it. In collective management there is a profound respect for nature. Management that was good for nature has been done naturally for hundreds of years. Now some intellectual comes to say how it must be done" (CSPS elected official, August 24, 2006).

As it is the manager of the common lands, it will be the Syndicate's decision and responsibility to sign management contracts under Natura 2000 and to ensure compliance by the shepherds that use the land.

Both AZIA, a youth group, and the Soule Fishing Society (Société de Pêche de Soule) are minor actors in Natura 2000. AZIA organized an open informational meeting on the topic, and the Society president has been reaching out to fishers, who are often also farmers, to promote the

idea that Natura 2000 could help clean polluted rivers. At a meeting of the Fishing Society in spring 2007, the president was highlighting the benefits that could be had from Natura 2000 when he was effectively stopped by the aforementioned Syndicate official, who also holds other elected offices in the department.

The Departmental Association of Elected Officials of the Mountain (ADEM) is also scored here as not being very influential. Similar to what we saw with the General Council, network measures are inadequate for revealing its true influence. ADEM is an association of all the mayors and municipal council members from mountain communes, and it has been able to use its larger scale and reach to exert more influence than any one commune could. The notoriety of its leading figures and the extent of their personal networks have also contributed to ADEM's ability to organize the mayors within the group and to its success in broadcasting its message more widely than the department. Two of ADEM's best-known members have ties in individual communes as their mayors but also have roles at the national level. Its president is a former Senator, and he, along with the current Deputy Jean Lassalle, has been a leading opponent of Natura 2000. ADEM decided as an organization to all stand against the project and to challenge it in court, each commune contributing to legal fees. ADEM lost each of the court battles but emphasized that the Prefect would be unable to enforce Natura 2000 as long as they continued to organize an opposition. While the Prefect has the authority to implement Natura 2000 without the consent of the mayor in question, in reality it would be extremely difficult to sign contracts with individuals or with the Syndicate of Soule if the mayors instructed them not to do so. Because up until this point mayors have adhered to the position of ADEM, the organization has been extremely influential.

Cross-scale linkages

One of the theorized strengths of multi-level co-management is that it can help resource users tap into new financial and technical resources and pools of expertise, thereby increasing learning and increasing the possibility of adaptation. Multi-level or cross-scale linkages can also facilitate problem-solving in resource management as biophysical processes often cross levels (Marshall 2008). As such, it is important to understand how actors at one level are connected to actors on other levels. Analyzing these cross-scale linkages, part of the Carlsson and Berkes research framework, allows us to examine how central decision making bodies are linked to local-level groups and how geographical areas are connected (Figures 6.5 and 6.6).




Figure 6.5. Nodes have been arranged to approximate a continuum of global-local. Due to legibility constraints, within levels (indicated by color) a node farther to the left or right is not necessarily more local or more global than its counterparts in the same level. Of interest here are the links between different levels.




Figure 6.6. Here only the links that cross levels are shown.

Placing actors on a distinct level is no less difficult than characterizing processes or actors as having a certain scale. In the graph above, the Prefecture is characterized as a departmental-level actor. However, as mentioned previously, the Prefect is appointed by the Minister of the Interior as the representative of the state. The scale of his actions is particularly ambiguous, sometimes dealing with national issues as played out on more local scales, sometimes dealing with village concerns that have been elevated to him. Here, I have called the Prefecture a departmental entity because that is where it is seated and where most of its actions are played out. DIREN is another actor that operates at multiple scales. DIREN is the regional-level environmental authority for the state; however, no such authority exists on the departmental level. In contrast, DRAF has its departmental affiliate DDAF. Because there is no departmental

environmental agency, DIREN works at both the regional and the departmental level. It has a one-person office in the department with the goal of having someone closer to the field-level. ONF also works at multiple scales. A national-level agency involved in broad policy crafting, ONF can also be involved in the minutest details of site management when called upon to act as site Operator.

Keeping these concerns in mind, we see that the most prevalent cross-scale linkages occur in the official flows of funding and information. As explained in Chapter 4, The European Commission passes advice and information to the French Ministry of the Environment, which in turn passes instructions to the Regional Directorate of the Environment (DIREN), which provides site maps and information to the mayors and to the Community of Communes. Funding for agricultural contracts under Natura 2000 comes from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing (MAP), passes to the Regional Directorate of Agriculture and the Forest (DRAF), and then is distributed by the Departmental Directorate of Agriculture and the Forest (DDAF). Information about site-level activities and results are transmitted back toward the national level.

Cross-scale linkages also regularly occur between actors who are members of a higher-level group. The regional NGO Federation of Societies for the Study, the Protection, and the Management of Nature in the South-west (SEPANSO) is a member of France, Nature, Environment (FNE), which operates on the national level. FNE is in turn a member of both the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) and WWF. SEPANSO is further divided into subgroups, with one that specializes in the Basque Country. For SEPANSO, the affiliations increase access to information and expertise as well as representation at higher levels:

FNE has representatives in Europe, both in other organizations and in government. The president of the Landes SEPANSO is the secretary general of FNE, and he's named as a representative to Parliament. (SEPANSO Basque Country representative, December 15, 2006).

SEPANSO itself is run entirely by volunteers who do not have specialized environmental or political backgrounds. FNE, however, has a large paid staff that follows national legislation very carefully and transmits its knowledge to SEPANSO. EEB provides FNE with information about European legislation, rule-making, and funding:

FNE sends down information on laws to its affiliates. They comment on the text of the law and make sure everyone has it. If we don't have enough information, we contact FNE. We get our information first from the Internet site and then get specialized information from FNE (SEPANSO Basque Country representative, December 15, 2006).

The flow of benefits is bi-directional. SEPANSO provides FNE, and as an extension EEB, with local difficulties or success stories that can then be used in lobbying efforts or communicated to other sites as best practices. Another link in this category is that between the Departmental Federation of Syndicates of Agriculturalists (FDSEA) and its national federation (FNSEA) and the European-level Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations in the European Union - General Confederation of Agricultural Co-operatives in the European Union (COPA-COGECA). These links also serve to pass information and assist in lobbying effort.

There is a direct link between the Pyrénées-Atlantiques Chamber of Agriculture and the European Commission. In an example of a regional group lobbying at the EU-level, representatives of the Chamber of Agriculture met with the DG Environment to discuss the implementation process and to pass along concerns about the potential effects of Natura 2000 for farmers (Pôle Aménagement Espace Environnement 2003; Chamber of Agriculture representative, Interview, September 20, 2006). Efforts such as these contribute to re-scaling the policy process by involving actors that would previously have been excluded due to the organizational level on which they generally operate. For the time being, lobbying by a regional group is still relatively novel and draws a certain amount of attention as a result.

It is also interesting to note the two nodes (in light aqua) just one level to the left of the most local actors (in white). These two organizations, Basque Farmers United (ELB) and the Basque Country Chamber of Agriculture (LG), are both organized on the scale of Ipparalde, the northern or French Basque Country.⁸³ Engaging primarily in regional-scale activities and positioning themselves as regional-level actors has both advantages and disadvantages for their relationships with Souletine mayors and farmers. Many believe that because LG and ELB are more local than other farming syndicates they can be more responsive to the needs of small raisers.⁸⁴ For others, however, the locality is a constraint. They see FDSEA as more able to represent their interests in the department and in the state because of its more extensive network.

ELB is more local, they know what it's like to work here, but maybe FDSEA can put more pressure on at the level of the department than ELB can because it's bigger and has more members. ELB should be less political and more about helping us. They should stick to the agriculture – and I'm not the only one here that thinks that (Jean-Marc, December 14, 2006).

As the above quote makes evident, the choice between being part of ELB or being part of FDSEA is also tied to Basque politics. ELB and LG are considered more pro-Basque. In the last election for the assembly of the Pyrénées-Atlantiques Chamber of Agriculture, FDSEA and ELB split the vote almost evenly among those in Soule, though FDSEA had a slight edge.

Above, I discussed organizations that themselves work on multiple levels or at multiple scales. However, in this network, many individuals are part of more than one relevant organization, in some cases working at multiple scales as a result. In previous sections, I explained the role of Jean Lassalle as a Deputy, a leading member of ADEM, the president of IPHB, and the mayor of a Pyrenean village. As a less dramatic example, the director of the Syndicate of Soule (CSPS) also serves as an advisor to the National Federation of Forested

⁸³ The department of Pyrénées-Atlantiques is composed of the Basque Country and Béarn.

⁸⁴ Towards Pau the agricultural landscape becomes dominated by large cereal interests.

Communes (FnCoFor). He thus receives information on the national level that is not necessarily readily available in Soule, resulting in him having a much more favorable attitude towards Natura 2000 than others in the organization. Though he has the ability to serve as a conduit of that information, given the political climate in Soule and the perceived overwhelming rejection of Natura 2000 he cannot feel entirely at liberty to share information that does not conform to the governing perception.

Forms of interaction

The relationships represented in these graphs are not necessarily those of cooperation with the broad goal of implementing Natura 2000. Some of the actors at the more local levels are engaged in efforts to try to stop the implementation of Natura 2000 or to change the form it will take. It is interesting to note that some of the actors participate in both official collaboration and forms of resistance. For example, the Chamber of Agriculture and DDAF have ambiguous stances that depend on with which other actors they are linking. As mentioned above, the Chamber of Agriculture is involved in Natura 2000 to protect agricultural interests. At the same time, it promotes other conservation and management measures by participating in the Multi-use Approach, a participatory management initiative requested by local officials and facilitated by the Chamber, CDEO, and the Center for Pastoralism Resources. The partners have proposed their methodology as a way to elaborate a Document of Objectives, but DIREN and the Prefecture have expressed reservations. The duality is not unproblematic. As a result, the Chamber is seen as not fully executing its job as co-Operator at a non-Souletine site in the department. Similarly, DDAF is responsible both for promoting and policing Natura 2000 contracts and financing the Multi-use Approach.

Evolving Networking Strategies and the Role of Agency

One important challenge in defining relationships is their dynamic nature (Marsden 1990). This is particularly true at the local level in Soule as actors become more favorable to Natura 2000 and new linkages are attempted. At the same time, pressure strategies are changing. As the site identification process was completed and the creation of Steering Committees began, interest shifted from the designation of sites to their day-to-day management and the locus of action shifted from the national level to departmental and local levels. This called for a concurrent shift in strategy. Groups such as the departmental hunting group and agricultural syndicates that previously conducted most of their lobbying and influence efforts through their national-level umbrella groups began to decentralize operations. The national groups still serve as conduits of information and technical advisors to their members, but now generally allow the local affiliates to choose whether or not to integrate themselves into a Natura 2000 project. The national groups do continue to work together and remain alert to policy developments both at the national and the European level, while local and departmental groups focus on site-level management.

Several of the members of the original Group of Nine that resisted the implementation of Natura 2000 and argued for a restructuring of the consultation process have now turned into active proponents of the initiative. The National Federation of Forested Communes (FnCoFor), for example, has started an outreach program to convince mayors of forested communes of the value of Natura 2000. This change of attitude began with a few key actors at the national level and has been slow to filter down toward the local level, despite the efforts of national-level groups. In the case of Natura 2000, actors at the national level are densely connected and linked directly to the Ministry. These relationships are more substantially temporally embedded, and as

a result these groups have had more time to develop trust in the state and confidence in the initiative and have more directly affected its current form themselves. As a result, they are not only more pleased with the process, they are more invested in seeing it succeed. At the departmental level, groups are just starting to engage in Steering Committees and to let their own experiences complement information received from their national counterparts, aiding the transmission of positive attitudes along the network.

Issues of scale and inertia are certainly not the only components of the variable adoption of Natura 2000; human agency has played a large role in the evolution of organizational positions on the project. The president *délégué* of FnCoFor was a driving force in its decision to promote Natura 2000:

We're getting to a multi-functional view of the forest. Before, FnCoFor dealt with the monetary aspects of the forest. The new president *délégué*, Jean-Claude Monat, though, promoted the idea of managing natural heritage so that everything works together the best it possibly can. We can put the evolution in our position on Natura 2000 alongside that. Before, it was 'don't touch my forest,' but now there's a new vision of management, that of the whole, that was brought about by Monat. He is very important in that. The President *délégué* gives general direction to our work, and he saw the multi-functional management as compatible with Natura 2000. The President has lots of other functions too, so it's really the president *délégué* who makes a lot of decisions. He's the one that decided to get us into Natura 2000. It's really him that gave force to the idea of 'I management my territory as an ensemble, all of its composing parts (Representative of FnCoFor, December 11, 2006).

Similarly the Departmental Hunter's Federation (FDC), has long been run by a staunch opponent of Natura 2000 who was also a founding member of CPNT. The last elections, however, saw him replaced by a new president who feels that a politic of engagement is more useful.

Three years ago [April 2004] there was a revolution in the department. Jean St. Josse, who was the emblematic head of the FDC for 25 years, was replaced. He used the federation as a political tool, which displeased some people. He didn't want to know about Natura 2000. All the administration changed 3 years ago. Now we tell people they need to go to meetings [about Natura 2000] with the Chamber of Agriculture, the state, other associations. We have to take advantage of opportunities. We're not more stupid than anyone else. That other people – environmentalists and such – have ideas for

management is good, but they aren't users of Nature like we are (FDC representative, January 22, 2007).

FDC now requires the communal hunting groups that are their members to have a representative on Steering Committees.

Even the president of ADEM has recently decided that it would be better to cooperate with Natura 2000, taking charge of the process, than to have it imposed. His new stance has opened a schism in the organization. Rather than having a united position against Natura 2000 for all of the mountain mayors, in late 2006 he indicated that each should decide what is best for his or her commune. Now instead of being united against the Prefecture, the mayors are divided. What follows is a brief excerpt from my notes on the association's General Assembly in November 2006:

Louis Althapé (addressing elected officials and representatives from DDAF and the Prefecture): Where are we in the process of Natura 2000? We want to know exactly where we are. Do we continue the combat (largely emblematic) or do we try to figure out how to live with it. We were fighting with the idea that we were fighting not to be included in Natura 2000, but in fact, we are already included. Now we're going to have DDAF and the sub-Prefect tell us what's going on.

...

Sub-Prefect: [introductory remarks]

DDAF: [explains differences between the two directives that constitute Natura 2000]

[At this point Jean Lassalle makes his second snide comment and as the DDAF representative is speaking. The representative asks Althapé if he should just leave if Lassalle is going to continue to be so disrespectful. Althapé tells Lassalle to tone down the rhetoric and listen, and Lassalle argues that he has the right to speak. The mayors and council members in attendance speak up from the audience saying that Lassalle really should not be behaving in that manner, so he does stop making comments for awhile.]

Althapé: Now the question is to decide what we want to do. We're in Natura 2000 even if we don't have a decree in hand.

...

Question from the audience: So we've lost the battle?

Lassalle: We were NEVER consulted on Natura 2000. We've been playing this game for 5 or 6 years now. What's going on? [to DDAF representative] Now you're saying to us 'You're in there [in Natura 2000]'. But why and how? We have Syndical

Commissions, which are the oldest democratic institutions in the country, and now we're stuck in a decision by someone else. [to Althapé] Now we're in and you say we shouldn't resist – Take [that picture of] DeGaulle off your wall [lots of gaps from the audience], I'll resist by myself if I have to. It's not worth saying we're against the bear if we're going to do a DOCOB to repair habitat. If we want to be in an Indian Reserve, all we have to do is go forward with it. The battle hasn't even started. We'll keep finding new ways to resist. [in response to an earlier comment from a mayor participating in a DOCOB saying he was pleased with the process] Things don't hurt at first, then they'll make it worse. When you start out with a DOCOB, they'll praise you and give you money and tools, and then it will get bad later [applause].

Althapé: This Association led the fight against Natura 2000 like no other. I called this meeting to see where everyone is. You've been a Deputy 3 or 4 years now and haven't passed a law to repeal Natura 2000. I'm not taking sides here, as President, I'm just showing where we are, not telling mayors what to do. Sénateur LeGrand was the one who got elected officials the possibility of being presidents of the Steering Committees. The elected officials will do what they want. Go ahead with the DOCOB or resist, but we need to figure out what's going on to figure out what to do. Each one should do what is right for himself. I'm not 'turning' – I'm making sure you understand the stakes. Baigorry [the town of Saint-Étienne-de-Baigorry] has the right to go ahead with a site if they want. Maybe it will fail, but they have the right. [applause, very loud from some mayors, but not as many as for Lassalle].

Lassalle: We fought this together. It's not because we lost 2 or 3 battles that we lost the war. Our friend in Baigorry – it will be great for him at first, then it will change. We have to stay solid. I'm sure we'll work together again.

...
Remark from audience: We put our confidence in you, and we're going to be disappointed if really you're going to say 'each one go do what you want.' Maybe we need to all go forward with Natura 2000 together.

Lassalle: We're stronger if we keep saying no together.

Althapé: Look, people are already being required to do Environmental Impact Assessments if they're in Natura 2000 sites. It's a reality.

Sub-Prefet: This is a political debate that's internal, so I'm not going to comment on that. But there are rules that apply to you as soon as you are in a site. You have to do a study on the effect of any project on the fauna and flora. For the DOCOBs, France decided to use contracts instead of imposing things. Local actors are the ones who decide through the DOCOB what to accomplish and how.

...

This schism has changed the relationship between the Prefect and both the association and the individual mayors.

In meetings before, the Prefect or sub-Prefect would go and talk about Natura 2000, and then people would start attacking the state. There was a real anti-bureaucrat sentiment. But now there's been a major change. The fights are between them and not against the state (Sub-Prefect of Oloron, December 4, 2006).

It also creates the possibility for the state to approach individual mayors about starting a DOCOB.

As mentioned early in this chapter, this new development will necessitate a different approach to analyzing the linkages of these actors. At the same time that the Prefecture can begin reaching out to the mayors, DDAF has begun quietly informing individual farmers of the additional subsidies that are available when they sign a Natura 2000 SAC in the hopes that they will in turn persuade their mayors to ease the pressure against the initiative.

State actors are not the only entities trying to establish new ties. Figure 6.7 shows that Laborantxa Ganbara, the Basque Chamber of Agriculture, is trying to partner with the Prefecture. Laborantxa Ganbara has selected a target Natura 2000 site and is proposing collaboration on a DOCOB to the mayors of the communes affected. However, the state is rebuffing their efforts. Laborantxa Ganbara is considered illegal. As there is already a sanctioned Chamber of Agriculture, creating a body in competition with it is against regulation. Additionally, some of the funding for Laborantxa Ganbara comes from the government of Euskadi (the Unified Basque Government) and from private donors in Hegoalde, which exacerbates the reluctance of the state to recognize it as a legitimate organization. At the same time, many farmers trust the advice and council of this organization and are ready to sign management contracts at its urging.

Conclusion

This research has shown that in some cases temporal and network embeddedness do not increase trust. However, in the case of Natura 2000 distrust has been a strong driver of link formation, particularly between distrusting partners. It appears that lack of trust is not necessarily detrimental to network formation. It could, however, have implications for network efficiency. It is easy to envision a scenario in which an actor participating out of distrust could attempt to stall the collaboration process.

This research also highlights the importance of ethnographic contributions to network research. The combination of network analysis with in-depth interviews and observation allows the researcher to complement the insights gained from network analysis with a more nuanced view of the way actors actually interact, privileging the content of the relationships.

Ethnographic research allows us to evaluate quantitative measures of power, sometimes cautioning that they do not reveal the reality of a situation, and it also helps uncover the role of human agency in decisions to link or not and in driving the position that an organization ultimately takes.

A striking feature of this network is that the current actors managing the areas in Soule that are encompassed by Natura 2000 sites are all but absent from the implementation network. In Chapter 5, I discussed the importance of working through existing organizations when implementing a new management regime. That same idea can be extended to working through existing networks because networks provide opportunities for learning and adaptation. Given the difficulty involved in establishing new networks (Berkes 2004) and the observation that the current management of the high pasture is largely satisfying to its users, it can be argued that if Natura 2000 is to be accepted in Soule, the Prefecture will have to involve local organizations

and work through the existing relations linking them. An integration of not only the Syndicate of Soule into the implementation of Natura 2000 but also the actors with which it works closely on current management is likely to strengthen the effort.

CHAPTER 7. DEFINING SUCCESS

Though the literature on co-management is largely oriented toward discovering the design features that create ‘successful’ projects, there is a failure to define success or to discuss how it is conceptualized by different actors. In the field, however, it is clear that actors on different levels and with varying interests have different ways of envisioning and measuring success. Throughout my time in the field, I heard many, very distinct, and often opposing, explanations of the concept of success. This chapter will attempt to address this shortcoming in the literature by examining how different actors define and evaluate success and why these differences exist.

Theoretical Conceptions of Success

Much of the literature on co-management discusses the organizing principles that must be included or followed to craft a successful co-management process. McConney, Pomeroy, and Mahon assert, for example, that “transparency and participatory monitoring and evaluation are important ingredients for success” and that “sustained collective action is necessary to make co-management successful” (2003:10 and 24). Similarly, Natcher, Davis, and Hickey tell us that the “ultimate success of . . . co-management regimes in general depends on the participants’ abilities to engage rather than subvert differences in knowledge and cultural experience” (2005:241). The 28 design principles used to examine the likelihood of success in this research are presented by Pomeroy, Katon, and Harkes as “key principles and conditions, which facilitate the successful

implementation of co-management” (1998:1). These studies and others like them, while explaining the necessary ingredients for successful co-management, do not explain what success in co-management actually is.

There are a few notable exceptions to this lack of precision. Acheson (2003) discusses defining success in the context of fisheries, explaining that the temptation of deeming a policy successful when it results in conservation of fish stocks should be avoided because the complexity of oceans renders it nearly impossible to determine whether outcomes are results of specific policies. As a remedy, he suggests that two criteria be used simultaneously to define success: 1) “the people involved need to be able to solve the collective action dilemmas they face to devise the conservation rules they want” 2) “those rules must have a positive effect on fish stocks” (Acheson 2003: 11). Acheson acknowledges that this last criterion may be difficult to ascertain and that it can be difficult to prove success.

Success, though, means different things to different people (Nadasdy 2003, Stern et al. 2002). Acheson’s definition of success opens the discussion to a consideration of different viewpoints by basing the definition partly on the people involved devising the “rules they want,” but he does not explicitly examine how those desires can and do differ among various stakeholders or discuss how certain voices are privileged when there is disagreement. In contrast, Nadasdy (2003), in his study of the co-management of Dall sheep in the Yukon, explains that members of the Ruby Range Sheep Steering Committee came away with very different impressions of the process. Scientists and resource managers thought the process was a success, while First Nation people thought it was a dismal failure and that the government had betrayed them by allowing game hunting. The vast rift between the opinions of various stakeholders in Nadasdy’s study can be attributed largely to failure of knowledge integration

across the participants and placing higher priority on certain (ie. 'scientific') ways of knowing about the resource.

One of the most concrete efforts to enhance our understanding of success has been the Ring et al. paper "Measuring Co-management" (1998). Ring et al. examined local resource users' perceptions of the performance of the co-management arrangement across three indicators: equity, sustainability, and efficiency. They found that resource users perceived increases in almost all of the performance indicators. Local-level users indicated that they were more involved in management, that household well-being had increased, that community compliance with rules was higher, and that collective decision making was functioning well. Ring et al. did differentiate between resource users who were members of a fishers' association and those who were not. They did not, though, administer questionnaires to other members of the co-management team, such as government officials or other non-user groups, thereby missing the opportunity to investigate differences among more types of users and those differences induced by scale.

Because co-management arrangements are most often multi-level, involving resource users, government officials, and other stakeholders at the local level and higher, Persoon and Van Est (2003) introduce the idea that scale is important to defining and measuring success. They argue that when some actors think that a co-management process is successful and others do not, part of the reason may be that they are looking at the system from different levels.

Natura 2000 and Definitions of Success

In an effort to better understand the concept of success, I explicitly integrated an examination thereof into my research design. Participants were asked both to define success and

to explain if they thought that Natura 2000 has been successful to date. As expected, definitions of success varied widely. In order to understand how and why they varied, I analyzed conceptions of success according to level (local, departmental, regional, national, European), type of actor (governmental, NGO, individual), and the interest or activity of the group or individual (cultural, pastoral, hunting or fishing, environmental, tourism, forestry). The most salient of these variables was level, though the interests of the group also introduced a degree of variation.

Local level

Local-level actors in Soule, be they farmers or elected officials, were most likely to define success in terms of process. For actors at the local level, process refers largely to the way sites were designated, the way sites were communicated to local actors, and the ways in which management will be decided for those sites when Natura 2000 is further along in the implementation process.

There was a contingent of farmers, mostly located in the villages of Larrau and Sainte Engrâce, who argued that the only success possible would be if Natura 2000 is not implemented in their area. Their reactions are embodied in this quote by the mayor of one commune: “There is no success with Natura 2000. They’re going to take away the management of the mountains from the mountain people” (Interview, February 20, 2007). About half of the farmers interviewed, though, thought that success could be achieved and largely focused on procedural elements, particularly the inclusion of traditional rural managers in all discussions about management. These farmers also emphasized that local actors needed not only to be a part of management decision making but also a part of the problem-definition phase: “A success for Natura 2000 or other projects will be when the conception of the project is done with people

from here. When their opinions are taken into account and it's more respectful...when it's not just the technocrats involved" (Maryse, January 5, 2007). These respondents also invoked the idea that decisions about goals and ways to reach them needed to be made at the appropriate level, which for them is the local level or close to it. This emphasis on locality is in part a reaction to an implementation process that, at first, explicitly reserved stakeholder input until management phases. Exclusion from earlier phases in which species and habitats of interest were determined has deeply touched the local stakeholders: "We've been completely shut out. They just sat up there in Paris and drew their little circles [site boundaries]. No one asked us what we think – of course we're against it!" (Patrick, August 3, 2006).

The second major theme invoked in defining success was not related to process or the outcomes targeted by Natura 2000 but instead to the production of a broader environmental consciousness. Those who defined success in these terms said that Natura 2000 would be a success if it "helps people think about their relationship to the land but sees people as an integral part of that land" and if it promotes "an alternative form of production and care . . . something that helps us find equilibrium" (Françoise, January 8, 2007, and Henri, January 5, 2007). Many of the farmers who expressed similar sentiments also brought up the uncertainty of climate change and the need to think beyond species protection.

Both of these ways of defining success were punctuated with the idea that a successful project would do no harm to local farmers: "Things are already so difficult that I'm afraid Natura 2000 will kill agriculture here. I guess I'd say Natura 2000 is successful if it doesn't hurt farming here" (Nicolas, November, 2006). While acknowledging that their practices are not perfect and that some farmers are more destructive than others, local farmers and officials again invoked the idea of the Basque farmer as the steward of the land and expressed a deep sense of

injustice at having management removed from their control. They argue that a successful Natura 2000 must not jeopardize the ability of these farmers to stay and work the land both because keeping livelihoods intact should be a goal in itself and because the disappearance of these farmers would in turn jeopardize management.

Because there are currently no Natura 2000 Steering Committees in Soule, and because farmers so heavily linked success to processes of inclusion, I conducted several interviews with actors involved in the site Massif de la Rhune et de Choldocogagna (site FR7200760) where the Steering Committee has finished its DOCOB. In many ways, this site is similar to those in Soule in that it covers large expanses of pastoral lands and involves many of the same kinds of stakeholders. However, there are important differences that officials from Soule are quick to point out:

Some people think that to avoid things being imposed on us, that it is good to appropriate the process and become actors ourselves. There have recently been stories reported about the benefits of Natura 2000, but in fact, these areas, by their nature, don't risk any sort of additional constraints (case of La Rhune) (Accoceberry 2007).

While the differences between La Rhune and sites in Soule make some farmers less likely to listen to these testimonies, it is still instructive to examine their experiences because the La Rhune site is one of the closest cases to Soule both in terms of land use and of historical political context.

The farmers engaged in the process in La Rhune were all pleased with Natura 2000, and I expected them to say that the success achieved was that the process was participatory and they felt they had a good deal of influence. However, that was not the case. These farmers exclusively defined success in biological terms and said it had not yet been achieved: "It will be successful if it improves the condition of the prairies of Sara and the forests of Sara as well" (Robert, February 23, 2007). One might argue that these farmers are involved in a Natura 2000

working group because they are less wary of the project and more pre-disposed to concern about the biological aspects of conservation than are the farmers of Soule, but that does not seem to be the case. The farmers on the agriculture working group of La Rhune joined the process as a defensive mechanism, much as we saw in Chapter 6 with other actors joining out of distrust. They hoped that by participating they could impede the implementation of measures that would affect farming. However, over the course of the process, many of their fears disappeared. As they became less concerned that their livelihoods would be adversely affected, their focus shifted from the process to its outcomes. If Natura 2000 does continue in Soule, re-interviewing the actors that defined success in terms of process to see if that definition changes, and why, will be critical to advancing our understanding of how stakeholders conceptualize success.

Departmental level

At the departmental level, I interviewed a variety of actors on the topic of success. Among them were influential elected officials active in department-level associations, members of the Prefecture and sub-Prefecture, farming organizations such as the Syndicate of Soule and the Sheep Breeding Center, and Ipparalde-level organizations such as Laborantxa Ganbara. I included the Ipparalde organizations in the departmental group because they were too few to effectively constitute their own level in this analysis.

Definitions of success at this level were exclusively based on process and the creation of a broader environmental consciousness. At this level, process is defined as it is on the local level, but the emphasis is placed on the site-level mechanisms for deciding management. “Success will be when there is a DOCOB that engages local partners to work together to save places and keep livelihoods intact” (Representative of Prefecture, December 4, 2006). Those

who focused on the process emphasized the idea of collaboration: “putting everyone who doesn’t have the habit of getting along ‘at the table’” or if “it were participatory...getting all the actors together before deciding something so that we could define the project together” (Representative of ELB and CSPA, respectively). The focus was not only on collaboration among groups that are traditionally in opposition and a sense of equality but also on being able to define goals together, not just outcomes.

The focus on changing environmental consciousness was most prevalent in discussions with DDAF, the authority charged with overseeing Natura 2000 contracts. The people I spoke with in DDAF envision success as:

When the locals – the collectivities and the inhabitants – become interested in biodiversity . . . such that it becomes a daily preoccupation. It will be a success when the farmer that is plowing a field asks himself where he should make a new prairie and takes into account what he might be doing to natural prairies and biodiversity by plowing. Natura 2000 will give him constraints now. That’s short term. The success will be when he says himself ‘I can’t do that’ (February 1, 2007).

In interviews with DIREN and Ministry officials, I heard almost verbatim phrasings. This discourse seems to have originated in the Ministry of the Environment and filtered down through the implementing agencies DIREN and DDAF. Invoking the idea that regulation is a necessary short-term evil and that Natura 2000 is the way toward a future of environmental harmony can be motivational for agency personnel, who often feel they are constantly fighting and rarely winning.

Regional level

At the regional level, process as the defining element of success almost completely disappears. Instead, we begin to see language of “attaining objectives” and “maintaining or improving conservation status” (Representative of DIREN, January 19, 2007), shifting the focus

to biological outcomes and to compliance with the directive itself. At this level, definitions of success also become more complex. All of the regional-level actors interviewed characterized success as two-fold. Not only was maintaining or improving conservation status a requisite element, but local actors internalizing conservation behaviors was as well. Thus, in a way, the focus for regional-level actors is on short-term and long-term outcomes.

The only actors to include participation of locals as a key criterion were representatives of environmental organizations: “There are two aspects to success – the participation of local actors and real conservation interventions” (December 15, 2006). This desire to include local stakeholders was partly a function of these groups recognizing grazing as necessary for ecosystem health and partly a function of their own marginality. Farmers and environmentalists in France are usually in opposition. However, because environmental groups are relatively under-represented in Natura 2000, they must work with traditional land managers to achieve their own objectives. At this level, for the first time, we also start to see some wariness on the part of government officials regarding the participation process: “We have to ask ourselves if the application [of Natura 2000] is being done in a sense of restoring species and habitats or if it’s something that’s taken over by the locals for goals that aren’t necessarily concerned with biodiversity” (Representative of DIREN, January 19, 2007).

National level

The definitions of success employed at the national level are similar to those at the regional level. Though the emphasis on internalizing environmental actions remains, “...that everyone understands that trying to preserve biodiversity is not just for the environmentalists and the whatever-butterfly...but that it’s the entire environment we must protect” (Representative of

FnCoFor, December 11, 2006), the focus shifts heavily toward goal attainment. Across multiple types of actors – environmental, hunting, forestry – success is defined by maintaining or improving conservation status: “That we achieve good conservation of biodiversity without harming traditional activities” and “Simply that the objectives of the directive are met, that there is a good conservation status for species, that the number of individuals of a species grow, and that habitats are in a good state” (Representative of FNC, January 18, 2007, and Representative of FPF, December 5, 2006). The homogeneity of perceptions can be explained in part by the high density of the national-level portion of the network. These actors have worked together extensively to influence the implementation process and in the course of doing so crafted a common message. After investing so much time and energy into opposing then engaging in Natura 2000, these organizations also have a vested interest in seeing Natura 2000 succeed to protect their own credibility.

Again at this level we see very little mention of the idea of process. Procedural elements specific to the national level include the designation of sites and policymaking regarding implementation (such as the decision to allow local officials to preside over Steering Committees), but even at this level an interest in site-level management remains. The one interview that speaks to process emphasizes the changes that the Group of 9 fought for: “If we were heard about the right to consultation, if there are elected officials on the Steering Committees, if there are contracts that lay out the constraints – that’s a success” (Representative of FNSEA, November 29, 2006).

Also like the regional level we see a two-part definition of success involving both the conservation of species and habitats and a human component: “One part of success is biological – that we make things better, and the second is more human – that the people understand the

sense of [Natura 2000] and engage”(Representative of MEDD, February 22, 2007). “We can say that success is stopping the loss of biodiversity, but that’s somewhat disconnected from reality...we have to add that people will say ‘I can try to change, to change my habits, and I’m going to do it because I want to do it” (Representative of FnCoFor, December 11, 2006).

European level

At the European level, success is defined almost exclusively in terms of goal attainment. Informants spoke of assessing the “magnitude of progress toward pre-determined objectives,” and whether Natura 2000 is “delivering better conservation status” (Two different representatives of the DG Env, December 8, 2006). Despite the fact that one function of the implementation network is to bring site-level success stories and problems up to higher levels, Natura 2000 is so vast that site-level processes are largely invisible to EU actors. At the same time, much of what is considered process at the level of the EU, confirmation of sites and issuing implementation guidelines, has already been completed for the original Member States. Procedurally, the focus has shifted to establishing the network in new Member States and to enforcement, and these aspects were rarely mentioned in interviews.

Though this focus on goal attainment exists regardless of the type or interest of the organization or agency in question, there is a slight distinction in its expression. Governmental agencies frame their discussion in terms of the directive they are charged with implementing “The success for us is in terms of the directive, in terms of achieving ‘favorable conservation status.’ That’s an objective of the network” (A third representative of the DG Env, December 5, 2006). Landowner and environmental groups, however, speak more in terms of the actual protection of biodiversity “that biodiversity is put first” (Representative of ELO, January 29,

2007). The environmental groups that work most closely with the European Commission exhibit more of a focus on the directive than do their counterparts with weaker ties to the EC: “Meeting the original goals of the directive, so getting habitats and species into favorable conservation status” (Representative of IUCN, November 22, 2006).

At this level, there is a distinction made between success for Natura 2000 as a whole and small successes along the way: “As far as the process for creating the network goes, we will say that it is successful as soon as certain spaces and zones are conserved, but to have a success for the whole network, we need to wait for evaluation and see that there has been no loss of biodiversity” (Representative of the DG Env, December 5, 2006). Similarly, at this level, actors make a distinction between successes at different levels: “Things are generally going a bit better at the European level than at national levels. . . . There’s a common interest between hunters and non-hunting conservationists. Some places they don’t work well together – like in France, or Italy, where it doesn’t work at all” (Representative of FACE, March 4, 2007). These definitions of success reflect the more holistic approach that working across many different Member States necessitates.

Natura 2000 and Assessing Success

In discussing different actors’ perceptions of whether or not Natura 2000 is a success, it is important to remember that Natura 2000 has not yet been implemented in Soule. While actors at the EU and national levels can speak to the progress in creating the network as a whole, actors at the departmental level in Pyrénées-Atlantiques have seen the establishment of very few Steering Committees and those in Soule have seen none. Actors at these levels, then, are discussing their perceptions of the designation of sites and the communication of those sites to local actors.

Without fail, actors at the local level in Soule see these aspects of Natura 2000 as a failure. Their definition of success as procedural and their experiences of a ‘too little too late’ consultation process clearly pre-condition this assessment. “It would have been different if it weren’t just the technocrats doing things. Maybe it wouldn’t be seen as an imposition. The local people need to see it as presented by people like them. Meetings were held to inform us but not to ask us” (Maryse, January 5, 2007).

Similarly, there was a measure of consensus at the EU level. Here, however, Natura 2000 was deemed successful. They perceive that though some areas have been more problematic than others, overall, real conservation is taking place and many targeted species and habitats are indeed seeing improved conservation status.

Yes, we can safely say that Natura 2000 has been successful so far. Its objective, to protect habitats and species, has been and still continues being fulfilled as seen by improved conservation status of most targeted habitats and species. This year, the EU 15 Member States finished with the process of designating sites, and next year [2007] they will have the first reporting exercise. Work on Article 10 of the Habitats Directive (about connectivity), which is necessary to create a true "network" is starting to gain momentum (helped by the threat of rapid climate change). The new Member States (EU 10), although with some understandable delay in relation to EU 15, are also progressing on the same path (Representative of DG Env, November 25, 2006).

Conservation NGOs, however, are slightly more cautious than government representatives about touting Natura 2000’s successes.

I would say [that Natura 2000 has been a success], but I can’t quantify that. Even if a goal is not being met, and I’m sure not all the sites are in favorable conservation status, that’s not because of Natura 2000, it’s because of other things, confounding factors. Biodiversity is under extreme pressure, and Natura 2000 relieves some of that pressure. If biodiversity is declining it’s not b/c Natura 2000 isn’t working. If you were to take away Natura 2000, it would decline much faster. . . I suppose there are two ways of thinking about measuring success for this project:

- 1) By looking at biodiversity monitoring information, how species and habitats are doing, but in light of other EU policies and confounding issues
 - 2) In terms of to what extent is it being implemented. Have countries done what they’re supposed to do? Have the EIAs been done? How is the whole system working?
- (Representative of IUCN, November 22, 2006).

As alluded to in this last quote, measuring success is somewhat complicated by the fact that there is not yet agreement on what constitutes favorable conservation status in the legal sense of the directive.

All of the levels in-between were characterized by qualified and varied responses – “yes,” “no,” “I don’t know,” “in some ways,” “not yet,” “we’re on the way to success.” Farming organizations all responded that Natura 2000 could not be qualified a success at this stage because the availability of funding was still uncertain.

It’s more than a concern. There is still a great deal of distress over the financing measures for management. If we don’t finance them, will they be enforced anyway? Would farmers be forced to hold up their end of the bargain even when they’re not getting paid for it? (Representative of APCA, February 2, 2007).

For them, a successful process and realized outcomes both hinge on the ability to conclude contracts with landowners and for those landowners to be compensated for their conservation actions.

Design principles

Co-management scholars assert that the design of the co-management process is the key component determining its success or failure. In Chapter 5, I evaluated the presence or absence of the key conditions for success proposed by Pomeroy, Katon, and Harkes (1998). In my research design, I planned to evaluate how the presence or absence of these design principles correlated with the perceptions of success held by various actors. However, because Natura 2000 is in such early stages in Soule, this was not possible. What follows is a discussion of how the evolving project’s current conditions affect current perceptions and how the efforts to change the network discussed in the previous chapter are influencing further developments.

To recap from Chapter 5, of the 28 design principles outlined for a successful co-management intuition, at this point only eight of them exist in an unqualified manner for Natura 2000 in Soule. These eight include such considerations as having enabling policies and legislation, secure property rights over the resource in question, political and social stability, government agency support, networking between organizations involved, a clear legal status for the participating organizations, and partnerships and contractual agreements.

Another set of principles could be classified as partially extant. For example, to the extent that the overarching interest can be said to be better management of the area in question, most actors will agree on ‘overlap of goals.’ However, as soon as the terms ‘biodiversity’ and ‘habitat’ are introduced, opinions begin to diverge, and as goals become more specific, such as improving conditions during the nesting period of a particular species, we see very little overlap among actors. Similarly, Natura 2000 can be viewed as flexible in that contracts last only five years and the DOCOB must be periodically reviewed. However, many farmers view the contracts themselves as extremely inflexible. Stakeholder involvement is another principle that fits into this liminal category. As a result of stakeholder consultation being excluded from initial phases, there is an overriding impression among local resource users that there is no stakeholder input allowed for at all. This is a situation in which perception may be more important to influencing buy-in than is reality, and this perception has contributed strongly to local actors viewing Natura 2000 as a failure at this point. However, the local actors participating in the process at La Rhune have thus far been pleased with their participation through the Steering Committees and Working Groups, so when these are implemented in Soule, the perception that stakeholder inclusion is lacking may change.

There are another ten principles that can clearly be said to be lacking in Soule at this point. Foremost among them is local political support for the initiative. We can also clearly say that communication has thus far not been effective and that trust between partners is less than what it would need to be. The current efforts by the Prefecture to reach out to individual mayors and by DDAF to reach out to farmers, as well as efforts by other groups to engage in the process are aimed largely at rectifying the lack of local political support. As the network becomes denser, network theories predict that both communication and trust will increase as well. As those design principals are satisfied, revisiting stakeholders' assessments of success would provide critical insight into the importance of these particular principles.

The 28 design principles are presented as prerequisites for successful co-management in general. As previously described, local-level actors are more likely to focus on process when defining success, and higher-level actors are more likely to focus on goals and outcomes. Given that these visions of success differ substantially, I had hoped to investigate whether the outlined principles lead to evaluations of success by actors at the local end of the scale or toward the global end of the scale, if not both. However, because the project is still in such early phases in Soule, this has proved impossible. At this point, very few actors view Natura 2000 as a success (those at the European level being the major exceptions), but as the project progresses if more people begin to see it as successful it would be fruitful to return to this line of inquiry. If satisfaction of the design principles leads to a condition that is described as successful by only limited subgroups of stakeholders, the principles themselves – and perhaps even the idea of establishing such a framework – will need to be revisited.

Conclusion

When defining success, actors in this research tend to focus either on process or on outcomes, but rarely both. In a study of EU environmental policy, Knill and Lenschow (2000) studied proponents of top-down approaches and proponents of bottom-up approaches and found that those promoting top-down approaches measure “effective implementation” by looking at policy outcomes. Bottom-up promoters, however, judge effectiveness based on process. In the case of the present research, however, this difference seems to stem more from the effects of scale than from implementation philosophies. An actor’s level influences what becomes visible and what is most salient. Site-level actors have very clear perceptions of whether they feel included in decision making and management but often feel less comfortable evaluating the status of the resource for any area larger than that which they know well. In contrast, these site-level processes are largely invisible to higher-level actors because they must coordinate across many sites and, in the case of Natura 2000, many nations. Focusing on outcomes is also attractive to higher-level actors, often the policy originators or those that have had input into its creation, because they need to justify the continuation of the project, funding flows, and sometimes, their own jobs.

Scale also seems to be important to the evaluation of success, though the link is more difficult to prove given that Natura 2000 is still in early phases in Soule. Natura 2000 has many constituent parts, and implementation across the EU has been variable. Local-level actors may look at overall outcomes in judging success but focus mainly on the experience of their own site. National-level actors base their judgments across the country’s progress as a whole, and EU actors look even more broadly at pan-European experiences. Level not only conditions what is visible to a given actor but also what will be prioritized by that actor. Local-level actors are

likely to be content with a project that satisfies their requirements for an equitable process or achieves agreed-upon outcomes, but higher-level actors are more interested in halting biodiversity loss on a pan-European scale, even if processes or outcomes at some sites are compromised. As Natura 2000 progresses, if more actors judge it successful it would be possible to analyze this phenomenon more thoroughly.

Though absent at the EU-level, the theme of creating a broader ecological consciousness that would lead actors to assess their own behaviors in terms of environmental impacts and then act according to those assessments was cross-cutting throughout all other levels. This raises the question of whether this preoccupation is uniquely French or if it occurs in other Member States but is absent at the supra-national level as an artifact of the political culture of the EU. Many of the actors at the EU level seem to have experienced some level of activist burn-out. Somewhat jaded by the political process, whether working within the government or trying to influence it from the outside, many of them seem skeptical that environmental goals can be met without a strong emphasis on enforcement.⁸⁵ This might explain the absence at this level of the idea that environmental behavior could eventually be internalized and guide people's actions.

⁸⁵ Two notable exceptions to this observation are FACE and BirdLife, which emphasize voluntary agreements.

CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION

Research Significance

In essence, when examining a conservation initiative we are exploring how people solve, or fail to solve, social dilemmas involving natural resources. In Soule, the implementation of Natura 2000 is particularly interesting because there is already a long-standing collective action solution to the resource management problem. The creation of Natura 2000 Steering Committees involving resource users, government officials, and other stakeholder groups to decide management actions will shift the system from one of common property management to one of co-management. As of yet, though, “our tools for conceptualizing and analyzing co-management are strikingly blunt” (Carlsson and Berkes 2005: 72). As a result, this research was based broadly, drawing on several relevant theoretical bodies of work and employed a new framework proposed by Carlsson and Berkes for examining co-management processes.

To understand management of the high pasture as it currently exists, my research drew on the substantial literature surrounding common-pool resources and common property management regimes. This work has helped us understand and map institutions for collective action by moving beyond strict assumptions of actor rationality, introducing the idea that well-organized groups of users can sustainably manage a resource, and distinguishing between resource and regime. I used this body of work to examine and illustrate that the different levels of decisions and decision making in the Soule common property regime are nested, overlapping, and level-skipping, to explain the roles of the different actors involved, and to describe how the

regime functions with *olhatia* groups and the Syndicate partitioning or sharing responsibility depending on the situation.

Building on the wealth of case studies of the management of common-pool resources, several notable syntheses have outlined conditions under which user groups can successfully manage resources. Work on co-management of common-pool resources is less theoretically developed than work on common property management of those resources, but by drawing on the work done on common property management, scholars of co-management have also outlined guiding design principles specific to management involving both user groups and the state. I employed the most well-developed set of these conditions to examine the new management process that Natura 2000 brings and found that failure to win the support of powerful local officials, distrust between partners, and incongruence with existing local institutions have been leading factors in making implementation more difficult. Carlsson and Berkes argue that the attention to design principles is not sufficient for examining co-management, and as a result propose a framework that cautions us to be attentive to the relationships between actors, to the effects of scale, and to the differential distribution of power among actors. Similarly, Agrawal (2003) argues that analyses of resource management need to recognize that management systems are embedded in larger social and political structures and that we need to examine the role of forces that have generally been considered external to the system.

Though writings on common property and co-management have provided many useful concepts for the evaluation of Natura 2000's implementation in Soule, there are also important insights in the literature surrounding conservation initiatives that are particularly relevant and that address the concerns raised by Agrawal and Carlsson and Berkes. This body of work highlights such issues as heterogeneity within communities and within the state itself, exercise of

power, and political maneuverings, all of which I have employed in my examination of Natura 2000.

Though my research is based on these areas of study, it does more than just build on what has been done previously. My research framework and questions derive directly from questions and gaps in current understanding, advancing our ways of thinking about co-management. In employing the research framework outlined by Carlsson and Berkes, I used social network analysis to identify participants in the process and to examine the linkages between them. This approach proved useful in understanding why actors have the attitudes that they do and how both information and attitudes flow through the network.

Carlsson and Berkes suggest that network analysis can also tell us who has the capacity to influence other actors, but while I found network techniques to be quite fruitful for uncovering actors and thinking about the relationships between them, it was less helpful in revealing power. In the case of Natura 2000, network measures of power fail to reveal the importance of several pivotal groups and must be combined with ethnography to yield an accurate picture of power and influence in the network. It is necessary to understand the procedural steps for implementing Natura 2000 and the degree to which citizens follow the lead of their elected officials to understand the influence wielded by the mayors of Soule. Similarly, network analysis fails to reveal the influence of the association of elected officials, ADEM, which until recently has successfully orchestrated the resistance to Natura 2000. Methodologically, my research is an argument for ethnography as a critical component of network analysis on issues dealing with human relations (in contrast to simply studying international trade or interlocking directorates) and for using network analysis more for its qualitative and illustrative properties than for its quantitative measures.

My research also responds to calls by Agrawal and others to look at the role of outside forces in shaping institutions and to examine how these institutions are embedded in larger structures. In the preceding chapters I have shown that the policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy, which are not designed to affect commons management, have done so through the linkage of on-farm practices. The CAP both affects how management is carried out now, by forcing resource users to calculate time spent on the commons as a function of their herd-to-pasture ratio at the farm and by increasing herd sizes, and affects how farmers view Natura 2000. Their experiences both with CAP payments and CAP compliance checks and their reliance on CAP subsidies make them less favorable toward new regulations.

Furthermore, my research addresses a serious lack in the co-management literature of studies that examine a system that is transitioning from a functioning common property management regime to co-management. Almost all of the studies in the literature deal with co-management established in what had been an open-access situation or as a response to failure in state regulation, though there are also cases of co-management being established when common property management has failed. In transitioning from a working common property management regime to co-management, however, participation is widened from the resource user group to include state actors and non-user group stakeholders. As a result of this transition away from user group autonomy toward more state control, several factors become much more important in determining success: is the transition necessary in the eyes of those that have already solved their collective action dilemma to their satisfaction, is there agreement on the appropriate level and processes for decision making, and are locals included in early stages of project design.

In most all studies of co-management, what constitutes success has been taken for granted. My research demonstrates, however, that success is defined and evaluated differently

by different actors. While some focus on process, others focus on outcomes, and a large component of the distinction is a result of on what level the actor is situated. Those that are farther removed from management decision making are less likely to consider process an important component of success, while process is very important for the actors participating at the local level. Level is not the only important feature to consider, particularly when examining what the different outcomes desired are. It is important to remember that even within levels actors have differing interests and goals, and resource management and biodiversity conservation can be particularly contentious. Increasing the number and type of stakeholders increases the potential for conflict.

Benefits to Society

My research was intended neither to advance Natura 2000 nor to vilify it, but to understand why its implementation has been contentious and what is likely to happen in the future. Few people, though, will deny that the world and its lifeforms are in need of attention, and biodiversity has even been called a “global heritage” that belongs to all people of the world (Sanderson 2002). The difficulty lies in finding solutions to conservation problems that are just, equitable, and effective, and my work contributes to that discussion, not by providing a roadmap for practitioners to win local acquiescence, but by explaining the particularities of imposing state-driven conservation in areas with a strong local tradition of management.

Conservation projects are increasingly being conceived at global scales to try to save what is unique or threatened across the globe, and there is a sense among some in the conservation community that the overriding public interest of biodiversity conservation must sometimes take precedence over local livelihoods. At the same time, there is much cultural and

ecological value to small-scale farming systems and management regimes. In Soule, the common property management regime has unique cultural features, such as the *olhatia*, and is an elegant solution to a collective action problem. It can also be argued that these small and relatively extensive farms are more sustainable than larger factory farms and that the local collection of milk and distribution of meat products reduces CO₂ emissions.

These two interests – biodiversity conservation and sustainable management – are currently in confrontation in Soule, and the question becomes: can we create conservation initiatives that achieve biodiversity goals, while helping people protect cultural features they want to protect and aiding respectful practices, without taking away autonomy and the right to self-determination? My research suggests that this can be done by respecting local solutions to resource problems and by working through existing organizations and networks for management. By moving the resource users themselves upstream in the planning process, state agencies can then form real partnerships with those that manage the resource, providing technical and fiscal aid without coercion. At the same time, the onus does not rest entirely on the state. For conservation to be effective, just, and equitable, the local resource users must engage in and drive the process themselves.

This research has the potential to benefit future conservation projects by providing policymakers and conservation practitioners with insight into how local context shapes policy as it actually is implemented on the ground. It shows why simply putting in provisions to take “account of economic, social, cultural and regional requirements” and acknowledging that the protection of biodiversity “may in certain cases require the maintenance, or indeed the encouragement, of human activities” is not adequate to ensure local buy-in. In addition to crafting high-level policy that allows for inclusion of local interests, regional-level implementers

must make real strides towards integrating existing resource managers. Previous studies of co-management have highlighted the need to work through existing organizations and institutions, but this work extends that principle to working through existing networks of groups and individuals. The existing synergies that contribute to the resolution of collective management problems must be mobilized to enact conservation that respects local institutions and incorporates best practices. Furthermore, as we have seen in the case of Natura 2000, for a large-scale policy to succeed globally, those responsible for its implementation must work simultaneously at multiple levels of organization.

Unintended Consequences

Although I am hesitant to attribute too much to my presence in Soule, I do feel strongly that my questions brought new attention to Natura 2000 and re-awakened a beast that had been more-or-less slumbering. Not long after my departure, the Mayor of Larrau held a meeting on Natura 2000, attended by Deputy Lassalle, that emphasized that Natura 2000 had been imposed, rejected the positive testimonies of farmers from La Rhune, and again linked Natura 2000 to bear reintroduction (See Appendix J).⁸⁶

At the same time, in all this questioning and discussing, I did supply some missing information for many farmers. Quite often, at the end of an interview or sitting around after dinner or a party, the conversation would turn to what I knew about Natura 2000. At the end of my field season, I held a public meeting in Aussurucq to discuss some of my preliminary thoughts on my research and provided some time for discussion at the end. At that point, some

⁸⁶ The mayor of Larrau has also renounced the Sustainable Development Charter for the Basque Mountains on the grounds that it is linked to Natura 2000. See Appendix I.

farmers ventured to say, in front of a crowd, that they thought Natura 2000 was not actually as bad as it had been made out to be.

Future Research

Young (2002) argues that when institutions are active at the same time and place, their interplay will result in changes to both. As Natura 2000 continues to progress and management plans are eventually enacted in Soule, it is likely that the common property regime will change as a result. Likewise, the common property regime is likely to influence exactly what form Natura 2000 management takes in the high pastures of Soule. As the two institutions, one long-standing and one emergent, interact it would be fruitful to examine the changes that each undergoes. Ideally, Natura 2000 would strengthen the existing institution, leaving it more capable of sustainably managing resources. However, it is possible that the additional constraints on farmers could lead to a decline in the use of the high pasture and in farming more generally.

Second, as outlined in Chapter 7, as implementation continues, it will become possible to elaborate on the concept of success by examining how and why definitions of success change as the project progresses. Farmers affected by the Natura 2000 site of La Rhune focuses more on outcomes than their counterparts in Soule, and future research could investigate whether this is a result of their longer experience with the project, if it is related to the relative lack of hardship experienced as a result of Natura 2000, and whether the farmers of Soule shift from a procedural definition of success to one based on outcomes as they advance in the process. Similarly, as the implementation progresses in Soule, it would be possible to look more closely at assessments of success rather than just definitions.

The application of Natura 2000 in Soule also presents a unique opportunity for an interdisciplinary follow-up project. Social and biological scientists could partner to examine social aspects, such as the evolution of the process of implementation, effects on livelihoods, and adaptation strategies, as well as ecological outcomes, such as the effects on habitats, species, and grazing land quality. My research, along with technical evaluations already done by the Syndicate and studies that will be done in the context of Natura 2000, have provided and will provide social and ecological baseline data for such a study and would permit a concrete assessment of the social and ecological contributions of Natura 2000 in this area.

A related line of inquiry would be to focus on the evolution of the common property regime in Soule in the twilight of the CAP. Research questions might include: 1) How are farmers reacting to the decrease in available subsidies? 2) How does this affect their usage of the commons? 3) How are institutions for managing the commons adapting to changes in subsidies and changes in use patterns?

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Appendix A

Abbreviations and Acronyms

There are more than 130 acronyms regularly employed in discussions and documents concerning Natura 2000. What follows is a listing of those that occurred in my dissertation, along with those pertaining to other institutions discussed in my work.

- **ADASEA** : Association départementale pour l'aménagement des structures des exploitations agricoles – Departmental Association for the Improvement of Farm Structures
- **ADEM** : Association départementale des élus de la montagne – Departmental Association of Mountain Elected Officials
- **ANEM** : Association nationale des élus de la montagne – National Association of Mountain Elected Officials
- **ANCRPF** : Association nationale des centres régionaux de la propriété forestière – National Association of Regional Centers of Forest Property
- **AOC** : Appellation d'Origine Contrôlée
- **APCA** : Assemblée permanente des chambres d'agriculture – Permanent Assembly of Chambers of Agriculture
- **ATEN** : Atelier technique des espaces naturels – Technical Workshop on Natural Areas
- **CDEO** : Centre départemental de l'élevage ovin – Departmental Sheep Breeding Center
- **CNASEA** : Centre national pour l'aménagement des structures des exploitations agricoles – National Association for the Improvement of Farm Structures
- **CNJA** : Centre national des jeunes agriculteurs – National Center of Young Farmers
- **CNRS** : Centre national de la recherche scientifique – National Center of Scientific Research
- **COPIL** : Comité de pilotage d'un site Natura 2000 – Natura 2000 Steering Committee
- **CREN** : Conservatoire régional des espaces naturels – Regional Conservatory of Natural Spaces
- **CSPS** : Commission syndicale du Pays de Soule – Syndicate of Soule/Soule
- **CTE** : Contrat territorial d'exploitation – Territorial Farming Contract
- **CUMA** : Coopérative d'utilisation de Matériel Agricole – Cooperative for the use of Agricultural Machinery
- **DDAF** : Direction Départementale de l'Agriculture et de la Forêt – Departmental Directorate of Agriculture and the Forest
- **DG Env** : Direction générale de l'environnement (Commission européenne) – Environment Directorate General
- **DIREN** : Direction régionale de l'environnement – Regional Directorate of the Environment

- **DOCOB** : Document d'objectifs (d'un site Natura 2000) – Document of Objectives
- **FDC** : Fédération départementale des chasseurs – Departmental Hunting Federation
- **FNCofor** : Fédération nationale des communes forestières françaises – National Federation of French Forested Communes
- **FNE** : France nature environnement – France, Nature, Environment
- **FNSEA** : Fédération nationale des syndicats d'exploitants agricoles – National Federation of Syndicates of Farmers
- **FNSPFS** : Fédération nationale des syndicats de propriétaires forestiers sylviculteurs – National Federation of Syndicates of Foresters
- **MAP** : Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche – Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing
- **MEDD** : Ministère de l'écologie et du Développement Durable – Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development
- **MNHN** : Muséum national d'histoire naturelle – National Museum of Natural History
- **ONF** : Office national des forêts – National Forestry Office
- **PCB** : Prime Compensatoire Brebis et chèvres – Compensatory Subsidies for Sheep and Goats
- **PCO** : Prime Compensatoire Ovine – Compensatory Subsidy for Sheep
- **PHAE** : Prime Herbagère Agro-Environnementale – Agri-environmental Grass Subsidy
- **PMSEE** : Prime au Maintien des Systèmes d'Élevage Extensifs – Subsidy for the Maintenance of Extensive Farming Systems
- **PMTVA** : Prime au maintien du troupeau de vaches allaitantes – Subsidy for the Maintenance of Herds of Lactating Cows
- **PSB** : Prime Speciale Bovins Mâles – Special Subsidy for Male Cattle
- **pSIC** : proposition de Site d'intérêt communautaire (directive Habitats) – Proposition for a Site of Community Interest
- **SAU** : Surface Agricole Utile ou Utilisée – Used/Usable Agricultural Area
- **SEPANSO** : Fédération des Sociétés pour l'Étude, la Protection et l'Aménagement de la Nature dans le Sud-Ouest – Federation of Societies for the Study, Protection, and Development of Nature in the South-West.
- **SIC** : Site d'intérêt communautaire (directive Habitats) – Site of Community Interest
- **UNFDPPMA** : Union nationale des fédérations des pêcheurs et de la protection des milieux aquatiques – National Union of Federations of Fishers and of the Protection of Aquatic Areas
- **ZICO** : Zone importante pour la conservation des oiseaux – Important Area for Bird Conservation
- **ZNIEFF** : Zone naturelle d'intérêt écologique, faunistique et floristique – Natural Area of Ecological, Faunistic, and Floristic Interest
- **ZPS** : Zone de protection spéciale (directive Oiseaux) – Special Protection Area
- **ZSC** : Zone spéciale de conservation (directive Habitats) – Special Conservation Area

Appendix B

Selection of Informants and Informant Pseudonyms and Characteristics

The farmers that participated in this research were chosen to approximate the age and sex distribution of heads of farm in Soule, as well as the size (surface area) and geographical distribution of their farms. To recruit participants, I asked for recommendations and introductions from mayors, from the Syndicate of Soule, and from other farmers. I also tried to include diverse political viewpoints and different farm orientations (sheep/cattle). The table below presents each farmer's pseudonym, sex, birth year, age at time of research, when they began farming, herd sizes for cattle and sheep, usable farm size in hectares, and the canton in which the farm is located. Following that, I compare the characteristics of my sample to those of heads of farm in Soule.

Heads of Farm		Birth	Age in	First Year			SAU	
Pseudonym	Sex	Year	2006	Farming	# Cows	# Sheep	(hectares)	Canton
Adrien	Male	1978	28	2003	33	190	28	Tardets
Alain	Male	1942	64	Retired	-	-	-	Mauléon
Andre	Male	1960	46	1993	20	270	57	Mauléon
Arnaud	Male	1965	41	1990	20	180	30	Mauléon
Benat	Male	1968	38	1991	20	130	21	Mauléon
Cecile	Female	1956	50	1977	35	10	20	Mauléon
Celine	Female	1948	58	1971	16	200	35	Mauléon
Christian	Male	1963	43	1983	40	220	54	Mauléon
Christophe	Male	1975	31	2001	22	150	21	Tardets
Clement	Male	1961	45	1994	31	0	28	Mauléon
Daniel	Male	1956	50	1979	16	120	19	Mauléon
David	Male	1951	55	?	15	220	37	Mauléon
Didier	Male	1956	50	1986	20	120	20	Mauléon
Dominique	Male	1981	25	2005	20	250	28	Tardets
Elisabeth	Female	1955	51	1983	20	125	20	Mauléon

Fabrice	Male	1973	33	1996	100	400	66	Tardets
Francis	Male	1938	68	?	20	170	20	Tardets
Francois	Male	1958	48	1988	22	180	24	Mauléon
Francoise	Female	1967	39	1990	35	230	46	Tardets
Gerard	Male	1949	57	?	35	0	20	Tardets
Guillaume	Male	1970	36	1991	33	220	33	Mauléon
Helene	Female	1957	49	?	25	220	42	Mauléon
Henri	Male	1954	52	1980	25	220	28	Tardets
Hubert	Male	1967	39	1988	28	160	24	Tardets
Jacques	Male	1952	54	1990	15	120	26	Mauléon
Jean	Male	1975	31	1997	0	200	32	Mauléon
Jean-Baptiste	Male	1959	47	?	40	0	25	Mauléon
Jean-Francois	Male	1940	66	?	18	80	22	Mauléon
Jean-Louis	Male	1976	30	?	33	0	19	Mauléon
Jean-Marc	Male	1978	28	1996	35	80	17.5	Tardets
Jean-Marie	Male	1960	46	1984	13	260	23	Mauléon
Jean-Michel	Male	1975	31	Retired	-	-	-	Mauléon
Jean-Paul	Male	1962	44	1991	0	140	12	Tardets
Jean-Pierre	Male	1970	36	1995	42	0	20	Tardets
Jerome	Male	1940	66	Retired	-	-	-	Tardets
Johane	Male	1969	37	1994	85	0	78	Tardets
Laurence	Female	1960	46	?	14	150	22	Mauléon
Lorraine	Female	1977	29	1998	31	230	26	Tardets
Louis	Male	1963	43	1991	43	0	26	Mauléon
Marc	Male	1964	42	1986	0	500	57	Tardets
Marcel	Male	1948	58	?	8	280	45	Mauléon
Marie	Female	1971	35	1995	20	200	28	Mauléon
Marie-Claire	Female	1976	30	2006	12	60	24	Tardets
Marie-Louise	Female	1956	50	1978	20	200	34	Tardets
Martin	Male	1978	28	2000	0	200	38	St. Palais
Martine	Female	1964	42	1995	30	0	25	Tardets
Maryse	Female	1950	56	1982	10	120	31	Mauléon
Mattin	Male	1955	51	1987	0	130	40	Mauléon

Michel	Male	1948	58	Retired	-	-	-	Mauléon
Milou	Male	1948	58	1975	7	200	28	Tardets
Monique	Female	1941	65	Retired	-	-	-	Mauléon
Nicolas	Male	1969	37	1995	36	140	31	Mauléon
Olivier	Male	1962	44	1989	18	350	35	Tardets
Patrick	Male	1935	71	?	12	120	15	Tardets
Paul	Male	1940	66	?	0	145	21	Tardets
Philippe	Male	1952	54	1971	20	0	17	Mauléon
Pierre	Male	1960	46	1990	24	130	18	Tardets
Pierrette	Female	1969	37	?	18	0	26	Tardets
Rene	Male	1965	41	1985	50	0	30	Mauléon
Renee	Female	1943	63	?	0	25	11	Tardets
Robert	Male	1962	44	1991	16	120	40	St. Palais
Sebastien	Male	1959	47	1988	20	120	22	Mauléon
Serge	Male	1949	57	1976	13	90	15	Mauléon
Xabier	Male	1968	38	1990	10	240	22	Mauléon
Ximun	Male	1965	41	1990	18	280	44	Oloron- Ouest

Non-heads of farm

Anne	Female	teacher	wife of animal raiser	Mauléon
Dorothee	Female	secretary	wife of animal raiser	Mauléon
		sales		
Amelie	Female	clerk	wife of animal raiser	Mauléon
Thierry	Male	technician		Mauléon
Armand	Male	technician		Mauléon
Marcus	Male	technician		Mauléon
Rachel	Female	Retired		Tardets

Active Population Only

	My Sample	%	High Pasture	%
By canton	(2006)		(2000)	
Mauléon	32	53.33	230	53.49
Tardets	25	41.67	164	38.14
other	3	5.00	36	8.37
	60		430*	
By age	My Sample	%	Soule	%
	(2006)		(2000)	
> 30	5	8.33	58	6.33
30-39	15	25.00	229	25.00
40-49	19	31.67	282	30.79
50-54	9	15.00	158	17.25
55-59	7	11.67	80	8.73
60-64	1	1.67	32	3.49
65+	4	6.67	77	8.41
	60		916**	
By sex	My Sample	%	Soule	%
	(2006)		(2000)	
Male	46	76.67	700	76.42
Female	14	23.33	216	23.58
	60		916**	

Farm Size

	Hectares	My Sample	Soule
By Canton		(2006)	(2000)
Mauléon		28.63	31
Tardets		29.14	28
Other		40.67	40

*In the dissertation I calculated 480 farms using the high pasture from declarations to DDAF by the Syndicate and by communes managing their own high pasture. However, not all of those names had communes or cantons attached, so the 430 used here is from AGRESTE because it is broken up by cantons.

**916 is the number of heads-of-farm in the two cantons of Mauléon and Tardets. AGRESTE did not provide these figures by commune, so I had to use the figures by canton instead.

Appendix C

Overview of Agriculture and Economics in the Department of Pyrénées-Atlantiques

Farms in Pyrénées-Atlantiques average 26 hectares, compared to 29 hectares in the region and 46 in France⁸⁷ (Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche 2000). The dominant agricultural system in the department varies with the terrain. In the plains of the northeast portion of the department, grain culture is dominant, while in the piedmont and the mountains, animal raising is more prevalent. The department is second in the nation in sheep raising and first in production of cheese on the farm.

Table C.1. Sheep population figures. Source : Economic Observatory of the Dairy Sheep Industry (2005). Between censuses, the Observatory used figures for the Sheep Compensatory Subsidy (PCO) and for the Sheep and Goat Compensatory Subsidy (PBC) to estimate herd sizes. However, not all exploitations benefit from subsidies. After the age of 65, a farmer no longer has access to subsidies.

Pyrénées-Atlantiques	Census 1988	PCO 1996	Census 2000	PBC 2005	Evolution PBC 2005 / Census 1988
Farms with milking sheep	3228	2596	2524	2180	-32.47%
Head of milking sheep	408,002	480,260	473,677	486,114	19.15%
Head of sheep/farm	126	185	188	223	76.98%

Looking at the above table, we see that at the same time that the department lost 32% of its ovine farms, it increased the head per farm by almost 77%. Between 1988 and 1996, more than 70,000 animals were added, but since 1996 the number has remained relatively stable. The introduction of subsidies linked to production could help explain this increase and its subsequent leveling. Other important explanatory factors are an increased orientation toward productivity, market difficulties, and increasing farm sizes.

⁸⁷ 64.22 acres, 71.63 acres, and 113.62 acres respectively

Table C.2. Distribution of sheep breeds. Source: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche 2000

	Pyrenees-Atlantiques	Mauléon-Licharre	Tardets-Sorholus	Modern Soule ⁸⁸	% of the breed found in Soule	% of Souletine sheep in this breed
Basco-béarnaise	80,430	8,272	9,422	17,694	22.00	23.23
Lacaune	18,395	7,209	1,000	8,209	44.63	10.78
Black-Faced Manex	114,798	12,654	7,951	20,605	17.95	27.06
Red-Faced Manex	274,958	22,958	6,693	29,651	10.78	38.93
Total sheep	488,581	51,093	25,066	76,159		

There are also differences in herd sizes according to the sheep breed. In the canton of Mauléon-Licharre, the average per farm is largely superior among the Lacaune raisers. In Tardets-Sorholus, the effect is less noticeable.




Figure C.1. Average number of sheep per farm by breed. Source: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche 2000.

⁸⁸ The data on sheep breeds are not available by commune and thus the seven communes in the canton of Saint Palais cannot be added.

Forty years ago, sheep raisers who sold their milk did so to companies producing Roquefort (Néguéloua et Soulas 2000). The exit of these companies in the eighties left an opening for the development of dairies promoting a new product – Pure Sheep Cheese of the Pyrenees. The effort to increase value for sheep cheese led to the creation of the AOC Pur Brebis Ossau-Iraty in 1980, much of which is sold directly to consumers by the farmers themselves.⁸⁹

A study of 151 sheep farms in the department by the Economic Observatory of the Sheep Industry shows the differences in revenue by type of farm (2005). The study includes farms with local breeds that transhume and those that do not, as well as those with Lacaunes. The selected farms are not representative of farms in Soule, but the study is interesting to show the differences in the systems of production. The sample has an average herd size (290) substantially larger than the average size in Soule (147 per farm) and the department (223 per farm) (Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche 2000). Soule also has a greater percentage of Basco-bearnaise and fewer Red-faced Manex.

In the sample, illustrated in Table C.3, for the local breeds the average production per sheep is 101 liters for the season. Among the local breeds, only the non-transhumant sheep exceed this figure, with an average of 127 liters. Lacaune raisers produce more than two times per sheep as much as transhumant sheep raisers and 172% the production of non-transhumant raisers with local sheep. Lacaune raisers produce on average 80,827 liters per farm, more than three times the departmental average of 25,446 liters.

Table C.3. Characterization of farm types. Source: Modified from the Economic Observatory of the Dairy Sheep Industry (2005).

Description	Number in sample	Number of UMO		SAU	Head sheep	Volume	Volume/ Sheep	Head Cattle
		Head of Farm	Total					
Traditional Transhumant	39	1.29	1.77	18	269	24,064	89.4572	13
Intermediate Transhumant	37	1.44	1.67	30	259	24,528	94.7027	15
Non-Transhumant	37	1.34	1.76	33	293	37,232	127.072	16
Cheese-makers	26	1.71	2.17	33	322	34,711	107.798	11
Lacaune raisers	12	1.77	2.02	48	370	80,827	218.451	12

The gross revenue of the different types of farms varies greatly. For the traditional transhumant system, the average is 62,293 euros, and for the Lacaune systems, 124,209 euros. Subsidies, shown below ranging from 18% to 35% of gross revenue, make up a larger percentage of gross revenue for transhumant herds than for those that stay year-round on the farm. Subsidies are proportionally the least important for Lacaune raisers.

⁸⁹ AOC, appellation d'origine contrôlée, is better known for its application in the wine industry. It functions similarly for sheep cheese, serving as a mark of quality.




Figure C.2. Income sources as percentage of gross revenue. Source: Economic Observatory of the Sheep Industry (2005).

We see in the figure above that the additional revenue of the Lacaune raiser is accompanied by higher expenses, which vary from an average of 51,704 euros for the intermediate transhumant to 105,067 euros for the Lacaune raiser. Looking at farm expenses relative to gross revenue, we see that the cheese-maker has the lowest charges relative to revenue. Expenses for the cheese-maker are 77% of the revenue. For the Lacaune raiser they are 84%, for the intermediate transhumant 82%, for the non-transhumant 83%, and for the traditional transhumant 86%.

Deducting the expenses from the revenue gives the net profit of the farm. Here, it is the cheese-maker who retains the greatest revenue. The cheese-maker's profit is 24% higher than the Lacaune raiser and 167% higher than the traditional transhumant. Dividing the profit by the UMO, which does not take into account un-remunerated labor, the cheese-maker has the greatest profit per labor unit. The cheese-maker receives almost two times the profit for each liter of milk than does the farmer who sells his or her milk. (Fidelle 2006).




Figure C.3. Profitability by farm type. Source: Economic Observatory of the Sheep Industry (2005).

The major sheep products in Soule are lamb and milk. Of the 556 sheep farms in the two cantons of Mauléon-Licharre and Tardets-Sorholus, only 79 have sheep for meat. The creamery Chaumes, producer of Etorki, is the largest milk buyer for Souletine sheep-raisers. Before selling to Chaumes, Souletine farmers sold to creameries producing Roquefort. Chaumes was established in 1980 and recruited the farmer as the Roquefort creameries stopped doing business in the area. The farmers try to keep the price of sheep milk at approximately two times the price of cow's milk and to have local breeds more expensive than the Lacaune.

A smaller number of farmers sell their milk to creameries in Aramits or Pau or to the cooperative Azkorria. Azkorria was created by 17 sheep raisers who wished to focus on quality and tradition rather than production. Azkorria raisers must allow their sheep to graze outside every day, cannot use fermented feeds or those made with GMOs, and must limit their production. The farmers themselves make and sell the cheese on a rotating basis, each one working three half-days per week. There are only two organic sheep raisers in Soule. These raisers sell to SARL Garazi in Saint Michel. SARL Garazi makes both an organic cheese and an AOC cheese. The milk sold for the organic cheese garners a 20% premium.

As previously discussed, there are sheep raisers who make their own cheese. This cheese can be sold from the house, in the museum at Tardets-Sorholus, in restaurants or by a cooperative that also ages the cheese (eg. AOC Basco-Bearnaise d'Accous). European regulations require those making cheese at home to have a special fabrication and aging room. Cheese-makers estimate that they earn 1.53 euros per liter rather than the 98 cents earned by

those who sell their milk. This premium comes with added labor input, but for the raisers in the most remote communes, the additional time required is not necessarily substantial. Though milk is collected from most raisers, farmers in Sainte Engrâce and Larrau must often bring their milk down to the village for collection.

The milk collector doesn't come here. We have to take the milk down to the school, next to the departmental road. So, it takes a good deal of time. The time to take the milk, the time to wait for the milk collector, the time to drink a coffee with your friends...during that time, my wife has already made her cheese (Pierre, December 14, 2006).

In nine of Soule's communes, more than half of the farms engage in direct sales (Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche 2000).⁹⁰ Sainte Engrâce and Larrau figure among these nine.

Cattle raising in the department centers almost exclusively on the breed Blonde d'Aquitaine. A large portion of the production of veal is sold for consumption in Spain and Italy, though the meat is highly regarded in France, as well, and there is growing interest in marketing directly from farmer to consumer. Those who continue to sell their products through vendors who, in turn, sell them in Spain and Italy do so because it facilitates the process. They do not need to find the clientele or to prepare and deliver the packages. Among those who sell directly, often they sell only the females themselves and continue to sell the males to a dealer. They have not yet built a clientele that can absorb their entire production, so they sell the best meat (the females) themselves, and sell the rest through the dealers, who also tend to pay more for males.⁹¹ The decision to begin selling directly is often made in response to outside pressure – either family and friends begin to ask for meat or the farmer is motivated by crisis periods: It takes a crisis to change things.

We started selling direct during the Mad Cow crisis. We asked our family if they wanted veal. We're lucky to have Axuria that put in place the structure for slaughtering and sale. There were people that did it [sold directly to the consumer] before, but there weren't many and it was under the table. . . We're always afraid to start with something new like that. It's another kind of work. We're not sellers. But there are really good aspects to it. When I sell to someone, they always have something nice to say. And when I work, I know something good will come of it. It's produced here and consumed here (Johane, November 2006).

These same family members often help sell the products. Those living in other towns ask friends, coworkers, and neighbors if they'd like farm-direct veal and beef. The Blonde d'Aquitaine is well-known throughout France for the quality of its meat, as are the farms of Soule for their expertise. Meat is sold in packages of 5, 6.5, or 10 kilos. The price per kilo ranges between 11 and 12 euros, and the cuts are mixed. The prices in the supermarket are generally higher:

⁹⁰ In the statistics it is not possible to distinguish between sheep and cattle products.

⁹¹ 1000 euros for the average male calf and 770 euros for a female of the same size. Though the calves may be the same size at the time of sale, the male calf will grow faster and larger.

Table C.4. Supermarket meat prices. Prices recorded at Champion in Maule April 24, 2007.

Veal		Beef	
Scallops	18.95 €	Rib-eye	17.95 €
Filet	15.95 €	Beefsteak quality 1	14.20 €
Chest	9.95 €	Beefsteak quality 2	9.91 €
Shoulder	10.53 €	False filet	17.50 €
		Filet	27.55 €
		Flap meat	14.20 €
		Chuck	7.50 €
		Assorted	5.33 €

The consumer who buys directly has the opportunity to meet the raiser and to discuss the conditions on the farm and the animals' feed. There are also raisers that sell their calves to be added to the herds of others. This permits them to earn more for their calves, but there is also a greater investment required because the animals stay longer on the farm.

Cattle raising operations are less studied in Soule than are sheep raising farms, so there is not as much information available regarding their economics. Studies on dairy cattle in other parts of France show that more extensive farms that buy less feed have a greater net profit than more intensive farms. It is difficult to translate these results to Soule because the farms are smaller than in almost all other parts of France and they do not have the option of producing all of their forage on the farm. The sentiment among many Souletine farmers is that even if the animal that is fed less is smaller, the expenses of the farm will also be smaller and that the farmer will earn a greater profit. This feeling does not stop many of these same farmers from entering into a system of production that tries to increase production by supplementing feeding.

On-farm labor and off-the-farm work

Two generations of family members work on two-thirds of farms in Ipparalde (INRA 1998). Often, these are retirees who work without a salary, reflecting both the history of the head-of-farm providing for those who contribute to its well-being and the financial necessity of inexpensive labor. This amounts to more than one unpaid worker for each head or co-head and an average of 2.39 workers per farm (Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche 2000). For those who have neither a co-head nor parents who work on the farm, the work can be long and hard.

Of the 1100 heads-of-farm and co-heads-of-farm in Soule, only 762, or 69%, work full-time on the farm (Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche 2000). To be the principal farm worker and to have another job is extremely difficult without help from family members on the farm. Farm work easily constitutes more than the 35-hour work week instituted by the French state, but some in Europe are promoting a model of smallholder agriculture that includes part-time employment off-farm. Mariann Fischer Boel, the European Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development, argues that the agricultural sector will need to change dramatically to cope with subsidy changes in 2013: "I think everyone knows there will be less money available . . . so let's have a discussion with the member states and farmers about how to adapt...I think you will see an increase in the number of part-time farmers. They would live in the countryside but need an income outside the farming sector" (Bounds 2006).

More often, it is the spouse or partner of the head-of-farm that has the off-farm job. In the two cantons of Mauléon-Licharre and Tardets-Sorholus, there are 531 spouses and partners that are not considered co-heads of farm. Of these 531, 96 work on the farm, and 72 are retired. Two hundred and eleven have a job off the farm (Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche 2000).⁹² Men generally work as masons or at the creamery Chaumes, while women have more difficulty finding work. There is some secretarial and sales work available, but many women must look outside Soule for jobs. Working in Dona Paleu (Saint Palais), Oloron, and even Baiona (Bayonne) means commutes of 35 minutes to an hour and 20 minutes each way. However, working off-farm is not only necessary for survival but also provides security, options for health insurance, and liberation. Of the women I interviewed who work off-farm, 80% would continue to do so even if their revenue were not necessary because they enjoy the work or the freedom and sense of accomplishment it provides.

While most women who work off-farm are happy to have the independence and interaction with the outside world that it brings, an increasing number are returning to the farm, or trying to, taking up the positions that their mothers and grandmothers held years ago. "My mother was my father's right hand. She did everything he did and was indispensable on the farm" (Anne, June 22, 2006). The lack of interesting work for intelligent women means that they often have to accept jobs that are not gratifying. In these cases, returning to the farm allows them to use creativity and skills they cannot otherwise exercise and to spend more time outside and with their husbands. "There's a great harmony working together as husband and wife. People don't want to do it anymore because the culture has changed, but it gives richness to life" (Jean-Marie, December 11, 2006).

A livestock raiser used to be able to support his or her family solely with income from the farm. Today it is sometimes difficult even to support a couple, much less children or brothers and sisters. Those who manage to pull in enough revenue to support a spouse and children without an off-farm job or a working spouse are often those who sell their products directly or who have put great care into their breeding program and into reducing expenses. Of the 36 married heads-of-farm interviewed, only 17 lived solely from the farm, and of those 17, only one had a spouse who did not contribute by working on the farm.

⁹² These data are not available by commune and thus cannot be figured for the 7 communes in the canton of Saint Palais that are part of Soule.

Appendix D

Farmers Protest in Bayonne

Journal du Sud Ouest – July 4, 2008

Les éleveurs face à la crise

:Cécile Bourgneuf

Il est 11 h 20. Les 700 manifestants venus des allées Paulmy arrêtent leur marche devant la sous-préfecture de Bayonne devancés par quelques tracteurs. Le message délivré hier est clair : les éleveurs basques souffrent. Et pour cause : ces paysans doivent affronter deux problèmes. D'un côté, les coûts augmentent avec la hausse du prix du gasoil, de l'énergie et des matières premières. De l'autre, les éleveurs n'arrivent pas à écouler leurs produits.

Baisse de revenus. La conséquence est sans appel : leurs revenus baissent fortement. Stéphane possède une exploitation de 30 hectares à Itxassou et n'arrive plus à joindre les deux bouts : « Mes revenus ont baissé de 20 à 30 %. La hausse du prix du gasoil me fait perdre beaucoup d'argent mais je ne peux pas m'en passer, on l'utilise beaucoup pour les engrais par exemple ». Christine, gérante d'une petite exploitation de brebis laitières à Urrugne est davantage touchée par l'augmentation du prix des céréales : « On est dépendant des céréales. On doit bien nourrir le bétail ! Alors on se prive pour sauver l'exploitation mais on ne sait pas si on pourra tout payer. » Pour le secrétaire général d'ELB, Christian Harlouchet : « Nous n'avons jamais connu une telle crise. Nous avons enregistré une moyenne de 5 000 euros de perte par exploitation. Un éleveur gagne environ 75 % du SMIC, alors imaginez aujourd'hui ! » Face à cette situation, le syndicat réclame une détaxation sur le prix du fuel et une aide forfaitaire de 4 000 euros par actif sur une exploitation.

Table ronde. Reçu par le sous-préfet Eric Morvan, ELB a approuvé un accord après une heure de concertation. Il s'agit d'abord de réfléchir à une répartition plus juste des aides européennes qui sont surtout distribuées aux céréaliers. La PAC, Politique agricole commune, ne prend pas en compte les spécificités du Pays Basque qui compte de nombreuses exploitations de petites tailles. La deuxième décision concerne la mise en place d'une table ronde d'ici au 20 juillet. L'objectif ? Réunir tous les acteurs concernés, de la chambre de l'agriculture aux coopératives, en passant par les collectivités territoriales : tous doivent se concerter pour trouver des solutions. En attendant, les quelque 5 000 éleveurs du Pays Basque vont devoir se montrer patients.

Appendix E

Fax Claiming Responsibility for House-Burning in Aussurucq; Newspapers Articles Regarding House-Burnings in Larrau and Licq-Atherey

Fax reçu de : 05 59 28 02 07

-AVR-2007 10:37 DE : AXURIA MAULEON

. 03.2007 09:55 +0559283426

05 59 28 02 07

XIBEROKO BOTZA

A : 00559287573

Pg: 1

P.1/1

BATTITA QUEHEILLE

Xiberoko Botzeta

Egün on,

Altuérrikuko oihararen kontrako ekintza gure gain hartu nahi dugu eta Euskal Herriaren garapenaren baldintzatzeko tresna eraginkorrak sortu dituen Estatu Frantziarrari buruteman nahi deio. Halaber, tratu hontan ari diren gúzier, gure herriaren saltzen ez dutugilla útzioko argiki agerü nahi deiegu. Turismoan hoinarriturik den ekonomiak, Frantziari burüzko herriaren menpekotartzina indartzen du. Bena, ezagütgabeak ote dea politika hau? EZ! Ontsa arauturik den burdintze egindua batetan sarturik da.

Mentez eta mente laborantxalako begiraturik izan den lurraldean, jauntio eta aberatsen opor gúne bilakarazi nahi dñe. Hala da Euskal Herria blderren egoitzaz estaltzen ari eta soslúnak euskallurretan plantatzen. Donen hontartzina: lurre, etxe ta horiekin batean gure izaten eta nortarñin osoa, jakitez nahtatez aldaturik eta kalteturik diratekeala, zatika-zatika soslúnner saltzen deitzeenek, dihartjoko edo espekulazioaren ondorio larrien igurtzera behartzen gütñe.

Funtsean, Zuberoaren geroa dugu jokñan. Euskal Herriarena.

Euskal Herriaren geroa eskütan dugu. Gure geroaren eraikitze, erabakitzeko, herriaren kudeatzeko, tresnak, gük, sortu behar dütñe. Hizkuntza, ekonomia, kultura, gizarteazko sailetan, egündanik eraikiren dütñe egitñe, Euskal Herri libre baten sortzeru eramamen gütñe.

Hizkuntza galtze, dihartjokoaren gizarte arrazu eta ekonomiaren suntsitze egoera larri hñen útñrian den Frantziako Gobernuaren burdintze politika maltzurari buruteman!

Par cette lettre, nous souhaitons revendiquer l'action menée contre le Moulin d'Aussurucq et répondre à l'Etat français qui a créé et crée des outils afin de conditionner le développement du Pays Basque. Ainsi, à tous ceux qui vont dans le même sens, nous voulons faire savoir que nous ne les laisserons pas vendre notre pays. Une économie, basée sur le tourisme, renforce la dépendance de notre pays envers la France, et ceci est bien connu et utilisé.

Les notables et les riches veulent faire de notre terre un lieu de vacance alors que, siècle après siècle, elle a servi à l'agriculture. Le Pays Basque se remplit de maisons secondaires et de bourgeois. Tout est détruit : notre terre, nos maisons ainsi que notre identité et culture. On nous condamne à de graves conséquences. Ce qui est en jeu, c'est la Soule, le Pays Basque.

L'avenir du Pays Basque est entre nos mains. Nous devons créer nos propres outils afin de gérer notre pays, de décider et de construire notre avenir.

Nous ferons face à l'Etat français et à sa politique qui mène à la mort de notre langue, qui détruit notre économie et qui veut la fin de notre pays.

EUSKAL HERRIA EZ DA SALGAI!

HERRIAK BIZI BEHAR DÜ!

Nouvelle résidence secondaire détruite par un incendie

Une maison du quartier des Forges à Larrau a été entièrement détruite par un incendie, avant le passage du Tour

La colonne de fumée était visible loin dans la vallée. Une résidence secondaire a été pratiquement détruite par un incendie hier matin à Larrau, à deux kilomètres du passage du Tour de France. La maison située dans le quartier des Forges, sur le flanc de la route menant à Iraty, appartient à un Landais. Un artisan de St-Paul-lès-Dax selon France bleu Pays Basque qui l'aurait acquise voici 20 ans. La maison, vide, était en cours de rénovation.

"Je me préparais pour le Tour de France" relate cet habitant du quartier quand il a vu le déploiement de gendarmes et de pompiers arriver sur les lieux, ajoutant "on ne sait pas si c'est accidentel ou quoi". L'inscription laissée sur la façade de la villa, "Le Pays Basque n'est pas à vendre" laisse peu de place au doute. C'est "une formule habituellement utilisée par les nationalistes basques", a indiqué le directeur de cabinet du préfet de Pau, Nicolas Honoré. "On peut faire un lien entre cet attentat et la volonté de publicité des auteurs, car cette maison se situe à proximité de l'itinéraire emprunté actuellement par les coureurs du Tour de France", a-t-il ajouté.

Aucune piste privilégiée

Le parquet de Pau, qui a ouvert une enquête, confirme l'acte "volontaire" mais ne privilégie encore aucune piste ni aucune hypothèse. "Une inscription liée au contexte basque, écrite en Français a été trouvée mais on ne peut encore rien affirmer. Il peut s'agir d'un voisin jaloux, d'escroquerie à l'assurance, de terrorisme. Il est beaucoup trop tôt pour affirmer quoi que ce soit", a déclaré le procureur de la République de Pau. La gendarmerie se refusait hier à toute déclaration, en particulier sur le mode opératoire.

Ce sont les voisins en face de la maison qui ont averti les secours qui sont arrivés sur les lieux un peu avant 10h. Ils y sont restés toute la journée. La première voisine a confirmé que pour la maison "tout est à refaire, le toit a brûlé, il ne reste que les murs". Y a-t-il beaucoup de résidences secondaires dans cette commune de Haute-Soule? "De plus en plus" estime cette dame âgée habitant le quartier des Forges. "Les gens disparaissent, et après ils vendent..."

Le tenancier de l'auberge à Logibar confirme que la fumée se voyait de loin. Pour autant l'événement n'a pas été commenté à son auberge, "il n'y a que des touristes". Ce restaurateur a plutôt souligné une saison qui est "catastrophique", et invité "ceux de la Côte" à se rendre à Holzarte.

Il s'agit du 18e attentat en quatre mois au Pays Basque nord. La plupart visent des résidences secondaires ou des agences immobilières. Une campagne d'attentats en corrélation avec la situation immobilière particulièrement tendue au Pays Basque. Le 4 juillet dernier ce sont deux résidences secondaires qui avaient été partiellement détruites dans des attentats à l'explosif. Un correspondant avait alors prévenu les pompiers peu avant les explosions en ajoutant que "le Pays Basque n'est pas à vendre".

Une maison endommagée par un engin incendiaire dans la commune de Licq-Atherey

Un attentat contre une maison inhabitée située à Licq-Atherey (Soule) a causé des dégâts importants sans faire de victime dans la nuit de mercredi à jeudi, a-t-on appris auprès des gendarmes. "Il n'y a que des conséquences matérielles. La maison est très endommagée", a indiqué un gendarme, précisant qu'un incendie s'était déclaré vers 23H30. Cette maison, inhabitée au moment des faits, est située à l'écart du village. Des inscriptions en français telle que "Le Pays Basque n'est pas à vendre" ont été retrouvées sur l'habitation. La demeure se trouve non loin de la maison prise pour cible mercredi à Larrau à l'occasion du passage du Tour de France dans la région. La même inscription avait été tracée sur sa façade. Il s'agit du 19e attentat en Pays Basque nord depuis le début de l'année.

Appendix F

Timeline of Environmental Events and Legislation

Year	Event or legislation	Level
1945	Conseil de la Protection de la Nature created	France
1946	CPN becomes Direction Nationale de la Protection de la Nature and is placed under the Minister of Agriculture	France
1957	Treaty of Rome established European Economic Community; goal of rejuvenating post WWII economy; environmental policy absent, came into force January 1958	Europe
1957	Creation of Réserves Naturelles (Natural Reserves)	France
1960	Creation of Parcs Nationaux (National Parks)	France
1967	Creation of Parcs Régionaux (Regional Parks)	France
1967	Aides for defavorized zones to maintain population introduced in France	France
1969	Measures to limit hunting of birds introduced in France	France
1970	Loi des plans d'aménagement rural	France
1970	Nixon declares Year of the Environment; Georges Pompidou speaks on the "Morale de l'Environnement"	Global
1970s	Rise of environmental sentiments in the general public	Europe
1970s	French environmental movement, focused on anti-nuclear campaigns	France
1971	Creation of the Ministère de la Protection de la Nature et de l'Environnement in France (Ministry of the Protection of Nature and the Environment); first environmental ministry in Europe	France
1972	European Community issued an environmental policy declaration and asked Commission to create proposal for the First Environmental Action Program	Europe
1972	UN Environment Conference in Stockholm; first European efforts at environmental policy	Europe
1972	Paris Summit; French presidency pushes for decision to create the Environmental Action Program	Europe
1973	First Program of Action on the Environment; beginning of coordinated European Policy	Europe
1976		France
1977	Loi sur la protection de la nature (Law on the protection of nature)	France
1977	Loi sur les zones défavorisées	France
1977-1981	Second Environmental Action Program	Europe
1979	Bern Convention on European Habitats and Species	

1979	Birds Directive; based solely on article 235 of the Treaty of Rome	Europe
1970s and 1980s	EU environmental policy was decided by agreement of the council of Environment Ministers	Europe
1980s	Creation of the association Chasse, Pêche, Nature, Traditions	France
1981	Second Environmental Action Program extended	Europe
1981	Environment and Consumer Protection Service upgraded to Directorate General for the Environment, Consumer Protection, and Nuclear Safety	Europe
1982-1983	Decentralization laws in France	France
1983	Resolution on a Third Action Program, covering 1982-1986; new introduction include an integration of environment into other policies, led to increase in environmental legislation	Europe
1985	Lois sur la montagne et sur la forêt (Law on the mountain and the forest)	France
1985	Brussels session of the European Council; made environmental protection an economic imperative	Europe
1986	Single European Act; changed name of EEC to European Community, laid out environmental protection as an objective for the EU, formalized EU environmental policy and gave it stronger legal basis, ratified in 1987	Europe
1987	Fourth Environmental Action Program	Europe
1987	Brundtland Commission report; introduction of term 'sustainable development'	Global
1980s and 1990s	Increasing importance of global environmental challenges, e.g. ozone layer, climate change	Europe
1992	MacSharry reform of the CAP; lowers direct support, de-couples some aides from production	Europe
1992	Earth Summit I, Rio; disagreements between global north and global south; CBD	Global
1993	Maastricht Treaty; created European Union with 3-pillar structure, reinforced legitimacy of EU environmental policy, emphasis on sustainable growth (not sustainable development), introduced subsidiarity principle	Europe
1996	Juppé government freezes implementation of Natura 2000	France
1997	Earth Summit II	Global
1997	Jospin government unfreezes Natura 2000	France
1998	France referred to the European Court of Justice for non-compliance with Natura 2000	France
1998	French bill 'legalizing' Prefects' decisions to allow hunting in France; puts France in non-compliance with European law	France
1998	Demonstration in Paris to protest Birds Directive and Voynet's decision to enforce it.	France
1999	Jospin government proposes fonds de gestion des milieux naturels to finance Natura 2000	France

Appendix G

Bonacich Power Index - Influence

	Influence
ADEM	1.075
APCA	13.26
CNPPF	11.094
ENF/ATEN	5.435
AZIA	1.033
Birdlife	20.424
CDEO	4.271
CRP	4.249
JA	12.18
CEPF	9.931
Chamber of Agriculture	11.871
CNASEA	4.469
Conseil General	0
COPA-COGECA	11.036
CPNT	2.495
CSPS	0
DDAF	8.415
DIREN	10.686
DRAF	4.469
EEB	19.335
ELB	2.092
ELO	12.198
Europarc	18.367
European Commission	31.255
Eurosite	18.367
FACE	13.251
FDSEA	2.2
FDC	3.205
FNPA	11.121
FNC	12.147
FNCofR	12.147
FNSEA	13.183
FPF	12.147
FNE	4.571
IEEP	4.628
IPHB	0
IUCN	19.404

	Influence
Laborantxa Ganbara	2.092
LPO	3.515
Mayors	9.366
MAP	8.803
MEDD	30.661
ONF	6.62
Prefecture	6.392
SEPANSO	2.088
Societe de Peche	1.033
FNPF	11.094
WWF	19.335
MNHN	3.581
Community of Communes	1.85
Eurogites	8.842
European Anglers Alliance	8.842
FeCoF	9.931
USSE	8.842
A Rocha	17.278
CEEWEB	17.278
Euronatur	17.278
Planta Europa	17.278
Fedenature	17.278
IMCG	17.278
SHE	17.278
Coastal Union	17.278
Wetlands International	17.278
Farmers	4.117
RNF	2.289
APCG	1.245
AMF	1.245
ANEM	1.245
Confederation Paysanne	1.245
FPNR	2.289
FFRP	1.245
APCCI	1.245
Association des regions	1.245

Appendix H

Bonacich Power Index - Power

	Power		Power
COPA-COGECA	14.069	Association des regions	1.954
Farmers	10.713	ELB	1.124
JA	8.677	Laborantxa Ganbara	1.124
ONF	8.283	RNF	0.817
FACE	8.05	FPNR	0.817
CNPPF	7.302	ADEM	0.686
FNPF	7.302	Mayors	0.627
ELO	6.771	Chamber of Agriculture	0.624
FDSEA	6.143	FNCoFoR	0.13
CDEO	5.459	FPF	0.13
FNC	5.3	Conseil General	0
WWF	4.755	CSPS	0
EEB	4.754	IPHB	0
CNASEA	4.716	CEPF	-0.363
DRAF	4.716	FeCoF	-0.363
CPNT	4.569	FNPA	-0.721
IIEP	4.392	Community of Communes	-0.85
ENF/ATEN	4.273	Europarc	-1.141
MNHN	3.719	Eurosite	-1.141
DIREN	3.701	MAP	-1.252
A Rocha	3.63	Prefecture	-1.346
CEEWEB	3.63	FNE	-1.516
Euronatur	3.63	MEDD	-1.907
Planta Europa	3.63	DDAF	-1.974
Fedenature	3.63	CRP	-2.196
IMCG	3.63	Eurogites	-2.233
SHE	3.63	European Anglers Alliance	-2.233
Coastal Union	3.63	USSE	-2.233
Wetlands International	3.63	European Commission	-3.231
SEPANSO	3.431	APCA	-3.391
LPO	2.669	AZIA	-4.357
APCG	1.954	Societe de Peche	-4.357
AMF	1.954	IUCN	-4.811
ANEM	1.954	FDC	-5.34
Confederation Paysanne	1.954	Birdlife	-5.481
FFRP	1.954	FNSEA	-8.91
APCCI	1.954		

Appendix I

Larrau Refuses the Sustainable Development Charter

Journal du Pays Basque – September 22, 2007

Larrau refuse la future Charte de développement de la montagne

Le conseil municipal a signé une motion rejetant cette initiative qui doit être évoquée aujourd'hui à Tardets

La Communauté des Communes de Soule aurait bien voulu faire des Journées de l'Agriculture qui ont lieu jusqu'à aujourd'hui à Tardets, un grand moment de promotion de l'agriculture de montagne. Mais Marcel Accoceberry et son équipe municipale sont venus ternir la fête. A la veille de la présentation des travaux d'élaboration de la future Charte de développement durable de la montagne basque, l'un des temps forts de ce matin, le maire de Larrau a publiquement fait savoir hier que sa municipalité refusait ce document, fruit pourtant d'un processus de concertation de plusieurs mois auprès de 200 acteurs de la montagne (bergers, élus, exploitants forestiers, chasseurs, randonneurs, naturalistes, professionnels du tourisme, etc.).

"Le seul objectif qui transparaît clairement dans ce document est en définitive celui de vider la haute montagne de ses habitants pour la réserver uniquement aux espèces dites protégées", peut-on lire dans la motion adoptée lors de la réunion publique organisée jeudi soir en mairie de Larrau. Selon les Larraindar, la Charte est une "manière déguisée de faire passer les contrats d'objectifs de Natura 2000". Et de critiquer le fait que le document de synthèse des ateliers préparatoires de la Charte, dont Marcel Accoceberry vient d'être destinataire, "a la prétention de demander aux habitants de la montagne d'apprendre à connaître les espèces prédatrices" telles que l'ours ou le loup, "et leur fonctionnement écologique". Or Larrau fait partie des communes fortement opposées à la réintroduction du plantigrade dans les Pyrénées.

"Sous prétexte de vouloir valoriser ou renforcer l'agriculture de montagne, cette Charte ne fait que donner davantage de pouvoir aux associations naturalistes pour mieux sacrifier les habitants et éleveurs vivant toute l'année en haute montagne" dit également la motion avant d'ajouter : "c'est toujours un véritable désastre pour nous lorsque les bonnes solutions' pour gérer la montagne viennent de la plaine ou du littoral".

La réalisation d'une Charte de la montagne basque a été initiée en début d'année par la fédération des Commissions syndicales de Soule, Oztibarre, Garazi et Baigorri suite à des préconisations du Conseil de développement. En effet, la montagne est un espace qu'un public de plus en plus nombreux fréquente, avec souvent des problèmes de cohabitation entre les différents usagers. La Charte, "document novateur" selon ses concepteurs, se veut un moyen

pour les acteurs locaux de "construire en commun le devenir de la montagne basque afin que celle-ci reste vivante et entretenue". Le document final devrait être validé en fin d'année.

Pour Marcel Mirande, vice-président de la Commission syndicale de Soule et de la Communauté des communes, Natura 2000 n'a rien à voir avec la Charte de la montagne. Il rappelle d'ailleurs que les deux instances auxquelles il appartient se sont prononcées "contre Natura 2000 tel que l'on a essayé de nous l'imposer". La réaction de Larrau relève selon lui davantage de "l'incompréhension".

"Marcel Accoceberry réagit sans doute car le document est en cours de finalisation. S'il essaie de faire un bout de chemin avec nous il va en comprendre la finalité", affirme l'élusouletin.

Il confirme que "le but de la Charte est de revigorer les politiques d'entretien de l'espace, d'encourager la transhumance et l'utilisation de la montagne par les éleveurs avant tout".

L'élaboration se faisant par zone, chacun pourra choisir les actions proposées par la Charte qu'il veut mettre en œuvre, a ajouté Jean-Pierre Mirande. "Avec un esprit de non-ouverture, on se condamne soi-même. On ne peut pas tout rejeter car l'idée ne vient pas de soi. C'est dans la paix que l'on réussit à avancer", a estimé le vice-président de la commission syndicale de Soule.

Appendix J

Text Reproduction of Invitation to Meeting Regarding Natura 2000 Sent by the Mayor of Larrau

LARRAINEKO HERRIKO ETXEA

Le, 10 décembre 2007

MAIRIE DE LARRAU

Le Maire

à tous les administrés et utilisateurs du territoire

REUNION DU SAMEDI 15 DECEMBRE 2007 à 21 H A LA MAIRIE DE LARRAU

Par la superposition de plusieurs sites, les uns inscrits au titre de la directive « oiseaux » et les autres proposés d'importance communautaire, la commune de LARRAU a 98 % de son territoire couvert par Natura 2000.

Certains pensent que pour éviter que les choses nous soient imposées, il convient de s'approprier de la démarche en devenant soi-même acteur. Des témoignages ont été rapportés récemment sur les bienfaits de gestion de territoire soumis à Natura 2000 mais en fait, de par leur nature, ces territoires ne risquent aucune contrainte supplémentaire (cas de la Rhune).

Pour nous, Natura 2000 signifie, au titre de la directive habitats, la cohabitation avec les espèces « emblématiques ». Aussi, nous constatons que ceux qui ne seront jamais confrontés à la présence des grands prédateurs (ours, loups, etc), n'hésitent pas à adhérer à la démarche, pour en retirer quelques subsides. Ainsi, par leur action, ils engagent les territoires, aux lieux et places des habitants permanents concernés, qui subiront seuls tous les inconvénients.

La charte de développement durable de la montagne basque actualisée, a quant à elle, été validée par la Communauté de Communes de Soule, le 04 décembre 2007. Elle contient toujours l'article 10 concernant la préparation de l'espace de concertation, en vue de l'élaboration des DOCOB Natura 2000, **pour les collectivités qui le souhaitent !...**

Comme convenu, lors de la réunion organisée dans l'urgence, le 20 septembre dernier, j'ai l'honneur de vous inviter à participer à une nouvelle réunion d'information qui se déroulera le : **Samedi 15 décembre 2007 à 21 heures à la Mairie de LARRAU**

Des intervenants extérieurs (dont Jean LASSALLE) vous expliqueront plus amplement la démarche Natura 2000 et les possibles contraintes applicables sur le territoire (aussi bien sur les biens privés que communaux ou indivis). Ainsi chacun sera plus à même de juger des meilleures orientations stratégiques à adopter individuellement ou collectivement, compte tenu de la complexité et gravité de l'enjeu.

Comptant vivement sur votre présence,

Le Maire,

Marcel ACCOCEBERRY

Mairie de LARRAU

64560 – (Pyrénées-Atlantiques)

Tél 05 59 28 62 80 - Fax 05 59 28 72 13

COMMUNE-DE-LARRAU@wanadoo.fr

Appendix K

Habitats Directive

Council Directive 92/43/EEC

of 21 May 1992

on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular Article 130s thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission(1),

Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament(2),

Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee(3),

Whereas the preservation, protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, including the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, are an essential objective of general interest pursued by the Community, as stated in Article 130r of the Treaty;

Whereas the European Community policy and action programme on the environment (1987 to 1992)(4) makes provision for measures regarding the conservation of nature and natural resources;

Whereas, the main aim of this Directive being to promote the maintenance of biodiversity, taking account of economic, social, cultural and regional requirements, this Directive makes a contribution to the general objective of sustainable development; whereas the maintenance of such biodiversity may in certain cases require the maintenance, or indeed the encouragement, of human activities;

Whereas, in the European territory of the Member States, natural habitats are continuing to deteriorate and an increasing number of wild species are seriously threatened; whereas given that the threatened habitats and species form part of the Community's natural heritage and the threats to them are often of a transboundary nature, it is necessary to take measures at Community level in order to conserve them;

Whereas, in view of the threats to certain types of natural habitat and certain species, it is necessary to define them as having priority in order to favour the early implementation of measures to conserve them;

Whereas, in order to ensure the restoration or maintenance of natural habitats and species of Community interest at a favourable conservation status, it is necessary to designate special areas of conservation in order to create a coherent European ecological network according to a specified timetable;

Whereas all the areas designated, including those classified now or in the future as special protection areas pursuant to Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds(5), will have to be incorporated into the coherent European ecological network;

Whereas it is appropriate, in each area designated, to implement the necessary measures having regard to the conservation objectives pursued;

Whereas sites eligible for designation as special areas of conservation are proposed by the Member States but whereas a procedure must nevertheless be laid down to allow the designation in exceptional cases of a site which has not been proposed by a Member State but which the Community considers essential for either the maintenance or the survival of a priority natural habitat type or a priority species;

Whereas an appropriate assessment must be made of any plan or programme likely to have a significant effect on the conservation objectives of a site which has been designated or is designated in future;

Whereas it is recognized that the adoption of measures intended to promote the conservation of priority natural habitats and priority species of Community interest is a common responsibility of all Member States; whereas this may, however, impose an excessive financial burden on certain Member States given, on the one hand, the uneven distribution of such habitats and species throughout the Community and, on the other hand, the fact that the "polluter pays" principle can have only limited application in the special case of nature conservation;

Whereas it is therefore agreed that, in this exceptional case, a contribution by means of Community co-financing should be provided for within the limits of the resources made available under the Community's decisions;

Whereas land-use planning and development policies should encourage the management of features of the landscape which are of major importance for wild fauna and flora;

Whereas a system should be set up for surveillance of the conservation status of the natural habitats and species covered by this Directive;

Whereas a general system of protection is required for certain species of flora and fauna to complement Directive 79/409/EEC; whereas provision should be made for management measures for certain species, if their conservation status so warrants, including the prohibition of

certain means of capture or killing, whilst providing for the possibility of derogations on certain conditions;

Whereas, with the aim of ensuring that the implementation of this Directive is monitored, the Commission will periodically prepare a composite report based, inter alia, on the information sent to it by the Member States regarding the application of national provisions adopted under this Directive;

Whereas the improvement of scientific and technical knowledge is essential for the implementation of this Directive; whereas it is consequently appropriate to encourage the necessary research and scientific work;

Whereas technical and scientific progress mean that it must be possible to adapt the Annexes; whereas a procedure should be established whereby the Council can amend the Annexes;

Whereas a regulatory committee should be set up to assist the Commission in the implementation of this Directive and in particular when decisions on Community co-financing are taken;

Whereas provision should be made for supplementary measures governing the reintroduction of certain native species of fauna and flora and the possible introduction of non-native species;

Whereas education and general information relating to the objectives of this Directive are essential for ensuring its effective implementation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:

Definitions

Article 1

For the purpose of this Directive:

(a) conservation means a series of measures required to maintain or restore the natural habitats and the populations of species of wild fauna and flora at a favourable status as defined in (e) and (i);

(b) natural habitats means terrestrial or aquatic areas distinguished by geographic, abiotic and biotic features, whether entirely natural or semi-natural;

(c) natural habitat types of Community interest means those which, within the territory referred to in Article 2:

(i) are in danger of disappearance in their natural range;

or

(ii) have a small natural range following their regression or by reason of their intrinsically restricted area;

or

(iii) present outstanding examples of typical characteristics of one or more of the five following biogeographical regions: Alpine, Atlantic, Continental, Macaronesian and Mediterranean.

Such habitat types are listed or may be listed in Annex I;

(d) priority natural habitat types means natural habitat types in danger of disappearance, which are present on the territory referred to in Article 2 and for the conservation of which the Community has particular responsibility in view of the proportion of their natural range which falls within the territory referred to in Article 2; these priority natural habitat types are indicated by an asterisk (*) in Annex I;

(e) conservation status of a natural habitat means the sum of the influences acting on a natural habitat and its typical species that may affect its long-term natural distribution, structure and functions as well as the long-term survival of its typical species within the territory referred to in Article 2.

The conservative status of a natural habitat will be taken as "favourable" when:

- its natural range and areas it covers within that range are stable or increasing, and
- the specific structure and functions which are necessary for its long-term maintenance exist and are likely to continue to exist for the foreseeable future, and
- the conservation status of its typical species is favourable as defined in (i);

(f) habitat of a species means an environment defined by specific abiotic and biotic factors, in which the species lives at any stage of its biological cycle;

(g) species of Community interest means species which, within the territory referred to in Article 2, are:

(i) endangered, except those species whose natural range is marginal in that territory and which are not endangered or vulnerable in the western palearctic region; or

(ii) vulnerable, i.e. believed likely to move into the endangered category in the near future if the causal factors continue operating; or

(iii) rare, i.e. with small populations that are not at present endangered or vulnerable, but are at risk. The species are located within restricted geographical areas or are thinly scattered over a more extensive range; or

(iv) endemic and requiring particular attention by reason of the specific nature of their habitat and/or the potential impact of their exploitation on their habitat and/or the potential impact of their exploitation on their conservation status.

Such species are listed or may be listed in Annex II and/or Annex IV or V;

(h) priority species means species referred to in (g) (i) for the conservation of which the Community has particular responsibility in view of the proportion of their natural range which falls within the territory referred to in Article 2; these priority species are indicated by an asterisk (*) in Annex II;

(i) conservation status of a species means the sum of the influences acting on the species concerned that may affect the long-term distribution and abundance of its populations within the territory referred to in Article 2;

The conservation status will be taken as "favourable" when:

- population dynamics data on the species concerned indicate that it is maintaining itself on a long-term basis as a viable component of its natural habitats, and
- the natural range of the species is neither being reduced nor is likely to be reduced for the foreseeable future, and
- there is, and will probably continue to be, a sufficiently large habitat to maintain its populations on a long-term basis;

(j) site means a geographically defined area whose extent is clearly delineated;

(k) site of Community importance means a site which, in the biogeographical region or regions to which it belongs, contributes significantly to the maintenance or restoration at a favourable conservation status of a natural habitat type in Annex I or of a species in Annex II and may also contribute significantly to the coherence of Natura 2000 referred to in Article 3, and/or contributes significantly to the maintenance of biological diversity within the biogeographic region or regions concerned.

For animal species ranging over wide areas, sites of Community importance shall correspond to the places within the natural range of such species which present the physical or biological factors essential to their life and reproduction;

(l) special area of conservation means a site of Community importance designated by the Member States through a statutory, administrative and/or contractual act where the necessary conservation measures are applied for the maintenance or restoration, at a favourable conservation status, of the natural habitats and/or the populations of the species for which the site is designated;

(m) specimen means any animal or plant, whether alive or dead, of the species listed in Annex IV and Annex V, any part or derivative thereof, as well as any other goods which appear, from an accompanying document, the packaging or a mark or label, or from any other circumstances, to be parts or derivatives of animals or plants of those species;

(n) the committee means the committee set up pursuant to Article 20.

Article 2

1. The aim of this Directive shall be to contribute towards ensuring bio-diversity through the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora in the European territory of the Member States to which the Treaty applies.

2. Measures taken pursuant to this Directive shall be designed to maintain or restore, at favourable conservation status, natural habitats and species of wild fauna and flora of Community interest.

3. Measures taken pursuant to this Directive shall take account of economic, social and cultural requirements and regional and local characteristics.

Conservation of natural habitats and habitats of species

Article 3

1. A coherent European ecological network of special areas of conservation shall be set up under the title Natura 2000. This network, composed of sites hosting the natural habitat types listed in Annex I and habitats of the species listed in Annex II, shall enable the natural habitat types and the species' habitats concerned to be maintained or, where appropriate, restored at a favourable conservation status in their natural range.

The Natura 2000 network shall include the special protection areas classified by the Member States pursuant to Directive 79/409/EEC.

2. Each Member State shall contribute to the creation of Natura 2000 in proportion to the representation within its territory of the natural habitat types and the habitats of species referred to in paragraph 1. To that effect each Member State shall designate, in accordance with Article 4, sites as special areas of conservation taking account of the objectives set out in paragraph 1.

3. Where they consider it necessary, Member States shall endeavour to improve the ecological coherence of Natura 2000 by maintaining, and where appropriate developing, features of the landscape which are of major importance for wild fauna and flora, as referred to in Article 10.

Article 4

1. On the basis of the criteria set out in Annex III (Stage 1) and relevant scientific information, each Member State shall propose a list of sites indicating which natural habitat types in Annex I

and which species in Annex II that are native to its territory the sites host. For animal species ranging over wide areas these sites shall correspond to the places within the natural range of such species which present the physical or biological factors essential to their life and reproduction. For aquatic species which range over wide areas, such sites will be proposed only where there is a clearly identifiable area representing the physical and biological factors essential to their life and reproduction. Where appropriate, Member States shall propose adaptation of the list in the light of the results of the surveillance referred to in Article 11.

The list shall be transmitted to the Commission, within three years of the notification of this Directive, together with information on each site. That information shall include a map of the site, its name, location, extent and the data resulting from application of the criteria specified in Annex III (Stage 1) provided in a format established by the Commission in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 21.

2. On the basis of the criteria set out in Annex III (Stage 2) and in the framework both of each of the five biogeographical regions referred to in Article 1 (c) (iii) and of the whole of the territory referred to in Article 2 (1), the Commission shall establish, in agreement with each Member State, a draft list of sites of Community importance drawn from the Member States' lists identifying those which lost one or more priority natural habitat types or priority species.

Member States whose sites hosting one or more priority natural habitat types and priority species represent more than 5 % of their national territory may, in agreement with the Commission, request that the criteria listed in Annex III (Stage 2) be applied more flexibly in selecting all the sites of Community importance in their territory.

The list of sites selected as sites of Community importance, identifying those which host one or more priority natural habitat types or priority species, shall be adopted by the Commission in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 21.

3. The list referred to in paragraph 2 shall be established within six years of the notification of this Directive.

4. Once a site of Community importance has been adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in paragraph 2, the Member State concerned shall designate that site as a special area of conservation as soon as possible and within six years at most, establishing priorities in the light of the importance of the sites for the maintenance or restoration, at a favourable conservation status, of a natural habitat type in Annex I or a species in Annex II and for the coherence of Natura 2000, and in the light of the threats of degradation or destruction to which those sites are exposed.

5. As soon as a site is placed on the list referred to in the third subparagraph of paragraph 2 it shall be subject to Article 6 (2), (3) and (4).

Article 5

1. In exceptional cases where the Commission finds that a national list as referred to in Article 4 (1) fails to mention a site hosting a priority natural habitat type or priority species which, on the basis of relevant and reliable scientific information, it considers to be essential for the maintenance of that priority natural habitat type or for the survival of that priority species, a bilateral consultation procedure shall be initiated between that Member State and the Commission for the purpose of comparing the scientific data used by each.
2. If, on expiry of a consultation period not exceeding six months, the dispute remains unresolved, the Commission shall forward to the Council a proposal relating to the selection of the site as a site of Community importance.
3. The Council, acting unanimously, shall take a decision within three months of the date of referral.
4. During the consultation period and pending a Council decision, the site concerned shall be subject to Article 6 (2).

Article 6

1. For special areas of conservation, Member States shall establish the necessary conservation measures involving, if need be, appropriate management plans specifically designed for the sites or integrated into other development plans, and appropriate statutory, administrative or contractual measures which correspond to the ecological requirements of the natural habitat types in Annex I and the species in Annex II present on the sites.
2. Member States shall take appropriate steps to avoid, in the special areas of conservation, the deterioration of natural habitats and the habitats of species as well as disturbance of the species for which the areas have been designated, in so far as such disturbance could be significant in relation to the objectives of this Directive.
3. Any plan or project not directly connected with or necessary to the management of the site but likely to have a significant effect thereon, either individually or in combination with other plans or projects, shall be subject to appropriate assessment of its implications for the site in view of the site's conservation objectives. In the light of the conclusions of the assessment of the implications for the site and subject to the provisions of paragraph 4, the competent national authorities shall agree to the plan or project only after having ascertained that it will not adversely affect the integrity of the site concerned and, if appropriate, after having obtained the opinion of the general public.
4. If, in spite of a negative assessment of the implications for the site and in the absence of alternative solutions, a plan or project must nevertheless be carried out for imperative reasons of overriding public interest, including those of a social or economic nature, the Member State shall take all compensatory measures necessary to ensure that the overall coherence of Natura 2000 is protected. It shall inform the Commission of the compensatory measures adopted.

Where the site concerned hosts a priority natural habitat type and/or a priority species, the only considerations which may be raised are those relating to human health or public safety, to beneficial consequences of primary importance for the environment or, further to an opinion from the Commission, to other imperative reasons of overriding public interest.

Article 7

Obligations arising under Article 6 (2), (3) and (4) of this Directive shall replace any obligations arising under the first sentence of Article 4 (4) of Directive 79/409/EEC in respect of areas classified pursuant to Article 4 (1) or similarly recognized under Article 4 (2) thereof, as from the date of implementation of this Directive or the date of classification or recognition by a Member State under Directive 79/409/EEC, where the latter date is later.

Article 8

1. In parallel with their proposals for sites eligible for designation as special areas of conservation, hosting priority natural habitat types and/or priority species, the Member States shall send, as appropriate, to the Commission their estimates relating to the Community co-financing which they consider necessary to allow them to meet their obligations pursuant to Article 6 (1).
2. In agreement with each of the Member States concerned, the Commission shall identify, for sites of Community importance for which co-financing is sought, those measures essential for the maintenance or re-establishment at a favourable conservation status of the priority natural habitat types and priority species on the sites concerned, as well as the total costs arising from those measures.
3. The Commission, in agreement with the Member States concerned, shall assess the financing, including co-financing, required for the operation of the measures referred to in paragraph 2, taking into account, amongst other things, the concentration on the Member State's territory of priority natural habitat types and/or priority species and the relative burdens which the required measures entail.
4. According to the assessment referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3, the Commission shall adopt, having regard to the available sources of funding under the relevant Community instruments and according to the procedure set out in Article 21, a prioritized action framework of measures involving co-financing to be taken when the site has been designated under Article 4 (4).
5. The measures which have not been retained in the action framework for lack of sufficient resources, as well as those included in the abovementioned action framework which have not received the necessary co-financing or have only been partially co-financed, shall be reconsidered in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 21, in the context of the two-yearly review of the action framework and may, in the meantime, be postponed by the Member States pending such review. This review shall take into account, as appropriate, the new situation of the site concerned.

6. In areas where the measures dependent on co-financing are postponed, Member States shall refrain from any new measures likely to result in deterioration of those areas.

Article 9

The Commission, acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 21, shall periodically review the contribution of Natura 2000 towards achievement of the objectives set out in Article 2 and 3. In this context, a special area of conservation may be considered for declassification where this is warranted by natural developments noted as a result of the surveillance provided for in Article 11.

Article 10

Member States shall endeavour, where they consider it necessary, in their land-use planning and development policies and, in particular, with a view to improving the ecological coherence of the Natura 2000 network, to encourage the management of features of the landscape which are of major importance for wild fauna and flora.

Such features are those which, by virtue of their linear and continuous structure (such as rivers with their banks or the traditional systems for marking field boundaries) or their function as stepping stones (such as ponds or small woods), are essential for the migration, dispersal and genetic exchange of wild species.

Article 11

Member States shall undertake surveillance of the conservation status of the natural habitats and species referred to in Article 2 with particular regard to priority natural habitat types and priority species.

Protection of species

Article 12

1. Member States shall take the requisite measures to establish a system of strict protection for the animal species listed in Annex IV (a) in their natural range, prohibiting:

- (a) all forms of deliberate capture or killing of specimens of these species in the wild;
- (b) deliberate disturbance of these species, particularly during the period of breeding, rearing, hibernation and migration;
- (c) deliberate destruction or taking of eggs from the wild;
- (d) deterioration or destruction of breeding sites or resting places.

2. For these species, Member States shall prohibit the keeping, transport and sale or exchange, and offering for sale or exchange, of specimens taken from the wild, except for those taken legally before this Directive is implemented.

3. The prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) and paragraph 2 shall apply to all stages of life of the animals to which this Article applies.

4. Member States shall establish a system to monitor the incidental capture and killing of the animal species listed in Annex IV (a). In the light of the information gathered, Member States shall take further research or conservation measures as required to ensure that incidental capture and killing does not have a significant negative impact on the species concerned.

Article 13

1. Member States shall take the requisite measures to establish a system of strict protection for the plant species listed in Annex IV (b), prohibiting:

(a) the deliberate picking, collecting, cutting, uprooting or destruction of such plants in their natural range in the wild;

(b) the keeping, transport and sale or exchange and offering for sale or exchange of specimens of such species taken in the wild, except for those taken legally before this Directive is implemented.

2. The prohibitions referred to in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) shall apply to all stages of the biological cycle of the plants to which this Article applies.

Article 14

1. If, in the light of the surveillance provided for in Article 11, Member States deem it necessary, they shall take measures to ensure that the taking in the wild of specimens of species of wild fauna and flora listed in Annex V as well as their exploitation is compatible with their being maintained at a favourable conservation status.

2. Where such measures are deemed necessary, they shall include continuation of the surveillance provided for in Article 11. Such measures may also include in particular:

- regulations regarding access to certain property,
- temporary or local prohibition of the taking of specimens in the wild and exploitation of certain populations,
- regulation of the periods and/or methods of taking specimens,
- application, when specimens are taken, of hunting and fishing rules which take account of the conservation of such populations,

- establishment of a system of licences for taking specimens or of quotas,
- regulation of the purchase, sale, offering for sale, keeping for sale or transport for sale of specimens,
- breeding in captivity of animal species as well as artificial propagation of plant species, under strictly controlled conditions, with a view to reducing the taking of specimens of the wild,
- assessment of the effect of the measures adopted.

Article 15

In respect of the capture or killing of species of wild fauna listed in Annex V (a) and in cases where, in accordance with Article 16, derogations are applied to the taking, capture or killing of species listed in Annex IV (a), Member States shall prohibit the use of all indiscriminate means capable of causing local disappearance of, or serious disturbance to, populations of such species, and in particular:

- (a) use of the means of capture and killing listed in Annex VI (a);
- (b) any form of capture and killing from the modes of transport referred to in Annex VI (b).

Article 16

1. Provided that there is no satisfactory alternative and the derogation is not detrimental to the maintenance of the populations of the species concerned at a favourable conservation status in their natural range, Member States may derogate from the provisions of Articles 12, 13, 14 and 15 (a) and (b):

- (a) in the interest of protecting wild fauna and flora and conserving natural habitats;
- (b) to prevent serious damage, in particular to crops, livestock, forests, fisheries and water and other types of property;
- (c) in the interests of public health and public safety, or for other imperative reasons of overriding public interest, including those of a social or economic nature and beneficial consequences of primary importance for the environment;
- (d) for the purpose of research and education, of repopulating and re-introducing these species and for the breedings operations necessary for these purposes, including the artificial propagation of plants;
- (e) to allow, under strictly supervised conditions, on a selective basis and to a limited extent, the taking or keeping of certain specimens of the species listed in Annex IV in limited numbers specified by the competent national authorities.

2. Member States shall forward to the Commission every two years a report in accordance with the format established by the Committee on the derogations applied under paragraph 1. The Commission shall give its opinion on these derogations within a maximum time limit of 12 months following receipt of the report and shall give an account to the Committee.

3. The reports shall specify:

(a) the species which are subject to the derogations and the reason for the derogation, including the nature of the risk, with, if appropriate, a reference to alternatives rejected and scientific data used;

(b) the means, devices or methods authorized for the capture or killing of animal species and the reasons for their use;

(c) the circumstances of when and where such derogations are granted;

(d) the authority empowered to declare and check that the required conditions obtain and to decide what means, devices or methods may be used, within what limits and by what agencies, and which persons are to carry out the task;

(e) the supervisory measures used and the results obtained.

Information

Article 17

1. Every six years from the date of expiry of the period laid down in Article 23, Member States shall draw up a report on the implementation of the measures taken under this Directive. This report shall include in particular information concerning the conservation measures referred to in Article 6 (1) as well as evaluation of the impact of those measures on the conservation status of the natural habitat types of Annex I and the species in Annex II and the main results of the surveillance referred to in Article 11. The report, in accordance with the format established by the committee, shall be forwarded to the Commission and made accessible to the public.

2. The Commission shall prepare a composite report based on the reports referred to in paragraph 1. This report shall include an appropriate evaluation of the progress achieved and, in particular, of the contribution of Natura 2000 to the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 3. A draft of the part of the report covering the information supplied by a Member State shall be forwarded to the Member State in question for verification. After submission to the committee, the final version of the report shall be published by the Commission, not later than two years after receipt of the reports referred to in paragraph 1, and shall be forwarded to the Member States, the European Parliament, the Council and the Economic and Social Committee.

3. Member States may mark areas designated under this Directive by means of Community notices designed for that purpose by the committee.

Research

Article 18

1. Member States and the Commission shall encourage the necessary research and scientific work having regard to the objectives set out in Article 2 and the obligation referred to in Article 11. They shall exchange information for the purposes of proper coordination of research carried out at Member State and at Community level.
2. Particular attention shall be paid to scientific work necessary for the implementation of Articles 4 and 10, and transboundary cooperative research between Member States shall be encouraged.

Procedure for amending the Annexes

Article 19

Such amendments as are necessary for adapting Annexes I, II, III, V and VI to technical and scientific progress shall be adopted by the Council acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.

Such amendments as are necessary for adapting Annex IV to technical and scientific progress shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission.

Committee

Article 20

The Commission shall be assisted by a committee consisting of representatives of the Member States and chaired by a representative of the Commission.

Article 21

1. The representative of the Commission shall submit to the committee a draft of the measures to be taken. The committee shall deliver its opinion on the draft within a time limit which the Chairman may lay down according to the urgency of the matter. The opinion shall be delivered by the majority laid down in Article 148 (2) of the Treaty in the case of decisions which the Council is required to adopt on a proposal from the Commission. The votes of the representatives of the Member States within the committee shall be weighted in the manner set out in that Article. The Chairman shall not vote.
2. The Commission shall adopt the measures envisaged if they are in accordance with the opinion of the committee.

If the measures envisaged are not in accordance with the opinion of the committee, or if no opinion is delivered, the Commission shall, without delay, submit to the Council a proposal relating to the measures to be taken. The Council shall act by a qualified majority.

If, on the expiry of three months from the date of referral to the Council, the Council has not acted, the proposed measures shall be adopted by the Commission.

Supplementary provisions

Article 22

In implementing the provisions of this Directive, Member States shall:

- (a) study the desirability of re-introducing species in Annex IV that are native to their territory where this might contribute to their conservation, provided that an investigation, also taking into account experience in other Member States or elsewhere, has established that such re-introduction contributes effectively to re-establishing these species at a favourable conservation status and that it takes place only after proper consultation of the public concerned;
- (b) ensure that the deliberate introduction into the wild of any species which is not native to their territory is regulated so as not to prejudice natural habitats within their natural range or the wild native fauna and flora and, if they consider it necessary, prohibit such introduction. The results of the assessment undertaken shall be forwarded to the committee for information;
- (c) promote education and general information on the need to protect species of wild fauna and flora and to conserve their habitats and natural habitats.

Final provisions

Article 23

1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive within two years of its notification. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
2. When Member States adopt such measures, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such reference on the occasion of their official publication. The methods of making such a reference shall be laid down by the Member States.
3. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive.

Article 24

This Directive is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 21 May 1992.

For the Council

The President

Arlindo Marques Cunha

(1) OJ No C 247, 21. 9. 1988, p. 3 and

OJ No C 195, 3. 8. 1990, p. 1.

(2) OJ No C 75, 20. 3. 1991, p. 12.

(3) OJ No C 31, 6. 2. 1991, p. 25.

(4) OJ No C 328, 7. 12. 1987, p. 1.

(5) OJ No L 103, 25. 4. 1979, p. 1. Directive as last amended by Directive 91/244/ECC (OJ No L 115, 8. 5. 1991, p. 41).

Appendix L

Research Questions and Interview Protocols

- Q1. How does the implementation of the Habitats Directive complement or contradict the practices of the existing Souletine common property regime?
- What activities are being performed and what types of decisions are being made?
 - How is the leadership of all facets of the process organized?
- Q2. What are the characteristics of the new management process?
- Who are the participants, and what is their capacity to influence other actors?
 - What are the cross-scale linkages between participants and organizations?
- Q3. a. Does the process have the features identified by scholars as necessary for success?
- What resource management problems are identified by different stakeholders?
 - What support is there for the process from leadership at all levels?
 - What is the level of stakeholder involvement in the process?
- b. Do participants in the process identify the **project** (the Habitats Directive itself) as successful?
- How do actors on different levels define success? And how are those definitions similar or different?
 - Why do actors on different levels characterize this project as successful or not? And how do those reasons vary across the scale of implementation?
- c. Do participants in the process identify the **process** (the directive's decision-making process) as successful?
- How do actors on different levels define success? And how are those definitions similar or different?
 - Why do actors on different levels characterize this process as successful or not? And how do those reasons vary across the scale of implementation?

Interview Protocol for Research Question 1:

L'évolution du système cayolar

- Qu'apportait ce système à l'activité pastorale?
- Qu'apporte aujourd'hui ce système pour vous et les autres bergers?
- Quels sont les changements, pourquoi ?, et qui en est responsable?

Le travail

- Comment se déroule une journée de travail pour vous?
- Quelles activités faites-vous ?
- Quelles décisions prenez-vous ?
- Quels sont les problèmes que vous rencontrez dans la journée?
- Quels sont les problèmes importants que vous pouvez résoudre?
- Ces problèmes dépendent des bergers ou d'autre chose?

Des rapports

- Quel est le rapport entre les bergers et la Commission Syndicale de Pays de Soule?
- Est-ce qu'il y a des autres agences et groupes avec qui vous travaillez ?
- Est-ce que le département, la région, France, ou l'Union Européenne influence votre prise de décisions? Et comment?

Natura 2000

- Que pensez-vous de Natura 2000 ? de sa mise en œuvre ? de ses objectifs ?

Interview Protocol for Research Question 2:

- How has your agency/organization been involved in influencing policy regarding Natura 2000?
- What do you expect your role to be in management of sites?
 - Will you play any role in decisions about management?
- What is the updated timeline for the Natura 2000 process?
- What efforts have been made toward stakeholder participation?
- What efforts are planned in the future?
- What governmental agencies do you most work with?
- What non-governmental groups do you work with?
- How would you characterize those working relationships?

Interview Protocol for Research Question 3:

Type d'organisme / groupe: gouvernemental associatif individuel
Interêt: culturel pastoralisme chasse/pêche protection de la nature industriel forêt
Elected office: yes no _____
Niveau : Europe France Région Département Pays Basque Soule Site Commune

Age : _____ #chevaux : _____ # brebis : _____ # vaches : _____ # hectares : _____
Commune : _____ Cayolar : _____

Natura 2000 et idées de succès

- Pensez-vous que la mise en place de Natura 2000 en Soule est jusqu'à aujourd'hui un succès? Pourquoi ou pourquoi pas ?
- Quel est votre définition du succès ?
- Comment est-ce que vous savez que 'le succès' est atteint ? Comment est-ce que vous mesurez le succès ?
- Perspective pour le futur :
 - a) pour éleveurs : Quelle est votre perspective pour votre futur dans le contexte de Natura 2000 ?
 - b) pour des autres : Quelle est votre perspective pour le futur de Natura 2000 ?

Participation

- Si vous aviez l'opportunité, participeriez-vous à un Comité de Pilotage? Pourquoi ou pourquoi pas? Un Groupe de Travail ? Pourquoi ou pourquoi pas ?

Communication

- Comment avez-vous reçu l'information sur Natura 2000 (par ex. d'un journal, d'un élu, de vos amis) ? Etes-vous satisfait par la qualité de cette information ? Qu'est-ce que vous voudriez savoir de plus ?
- Avez-vous assisté à une réunion sur Natura 2000 (par exemple ceux qui ont été fait par le sous-Préfet, Laborantxa Ganbara ou AZIA) ? Est-ce que cette réunion a changé votre avis sur Natura 2000 ? Comment et pourquoi ?

Nécessité / Gestion des ressources

- Pensez-vous que Natura 2000 soit nécessaire ? Pourquoi ou pourquoi pas ?
- Pensez-vous qu'il y a des problèmes de gestion des ressources naturels dans les estives ? Et parmi eux, est-ce qu'il y en a pour lesquels Natura 2000 serait d'un apport bénéfique ?
- De quelle manière Natura 2000 pourrait il aider financièrement les éleveurs ?
- Natura 2000 pourrait il aider les éleveurs d'une autre manière (par ex. en préservant leur mode de vie) ?