CENTERS OF MARGINALITY IN FIFTEENTH-CENTURY CASTILE: CRITICAL
REEVALUATIONS OF ENRIQUE IV DE TRASTÁMARA, LEONOR LÓPEZ DE
CÓRDOBA, AND ALFONSO DE CARTAGENA

by

BYRON H. WARNER, III

(Under the Direction of Noel Fallows)

ABSTRACT

The concepts of center and periphery are not always mutually exclusive; one often resides within the other. This idea is central to my critical evaluations of three historical personages of fifteenth-century Castile: Enrique IV de Trastámara, doña Leonor López de Córdoba, and Alfonso de Cartagena. Each of these figures had a central political function in the kingdom, yet each also lived a dual existence at the margins of Castilian court. In this dissertation, this duality is examined using a combination of historical sources and contemporary psychology. Certain nuances in the historiographical genre of the Castilian chronicle of the fifteenth century stand out as distinct from the chronicle of previous centuries. One of these is the liberal addition of personal commentary by the chroniclers themselves, breaking to a degree with the paradigm of unadorned, historical “fact-telling.” These personal and often politically charged opinions have significantly contributed to the polarization of modern interpretations of the events and people described in these histories. The incorporation of recent psychological research allows for new readings of the chronicles and new interpretations of the mysteries surrounding Enrique IV, Leonor López, and Alfonso de Cartagena.
INDEX WORDS: Fifteenth century, medieval, Middle Ages, chronicle, Enrique IV de Trastámara, doña Leonor López de Córdoba, Alfonso de Cartagena, Castile
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For my wife, Tracy, my parents and siblings, Byron, Cynthia, John, Anne, and Dr. John E. Keller.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</th>
<th>v</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 THE CHRONICLE IN SPAIN: HISTORY AND POLITICS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 THE CASE OF ENRIQUE IV OF CASTILE</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrique IV and the Court Fool</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrique IV: a Psychological Analysis</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 THE CASE OF DOÑA LEONOR LÓPEZ DE CÓRDOBA</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 THE CASE OF ALFONSO DE CARTAGENA</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORKS CITED</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: DIAGNOSIS CRITERIA FOR POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER ..........135
LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Enrique IV of Castile</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Enrique IV of Castile</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cantiga 34, plates 1 and 2 from the <em>Cantigas of Holy Mary</em></td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cantiga 107, plate 3 from the <em>Cantigas of Holy Mary</em></td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cantiga 108, plate 3 from the <em>Cantigas of Holy Mary</em></td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

THE CHRONICLE IN SPAIN: HISTORY AND POLITICS

As noted by Jane Connolly, the *Memorias* of doña Leonor Lópe de Córdoba are often presented at a considerable critical disadvantage: “Critics often read Leonor’s account against the corresponding narrative in Pero López de Ayala’s *Chronicle of Enrique II* (c. 1400), invariably giving the chronicle a privileged position”¹ (6). Critics and historians have clung to a notion aggressively promoted by the chroniclers themselves, that the chronicle of the Spanish Middle Ages is a relatively objective and complete source of historical information among the scraps (literally, at times) of data medievalists have to work with. Connolly continues, “where the two narratives disagree preference is given to the chronicle with *Memorias* being viewed as a ‘reconstruction’. […] Nonetheless, the chronicle does not receive the same label – reconstruction – as the *Memorias*” (6). The point is well taken and not, I believe, overstated.

The historical bias toward the chronicle and kindred historiographical subgenres (e.g. annals, historical monographs) as repositories of reliable facts about the past is one of familiarity and cultural comfort. The structure and the format of the chronicle, the emotional detachment from the events related, and the chronological ordering of things all lend a generic air of authority and objectivity to the chronicle. Other voices attempting to make themselves heard through lesser-known or less popular genres, such as the fifteenth-century “autobiography”, the medium for López de Córdoba’s *Memorias*, are suffocated and judged as unreliable, self-serving “reconstructions” of the “true” events recorded in official histories.

¹ My thanks to professor Connolly for providing me with a copy of this paper, which is as yet unpublished.
The binary oppositional relation truth/fiction will be one theoretical focus of this chapter, underpinned by an investigation of the chronicle as a literary and historical genre. The biography of the Middle Ages will be discussed in a separate chapter. The notion that every history is still “story”, and that this “story” is controlled by those in power is not a new concept. The chronicler Fernán Pérez de Guzmán recorded this thought in his *Generaciones y semblanzas* (c. 1450-1455) when he wrote that one of the problems with the writing of chronicles is that “es mandado de los reyes e principes; por los conplazer e lisonjar o por temor de los enojar, [the chroniclers] escriuen mas lo que les mandan o lo que creen que les agradara que la verdad del hecho como paso” (5). It goes without saying that the simple fact of human agency in history’s recording precludes genuine objectivity and rather lends itself to discourse merely labeled as objective, that is, one in which the narrator never intervenes. This historical discourse is an example of Roland Barthes’ idea ‘Writing Degree Zero,’ which suppresses the “I,” sheds all markings of literary writing, and thus “aims at a presentation of the human predicament” (Moriarty 40), seeming to tell itself all on its own. This has long been an effective camouflage for propaganda, for conveniently obscuring or elucidating information, and for blurring the boundaries between truth and falsehood. How the chronicle plays a part in this from the genre’s early days up through the late Middle Ages can be better comprehended if its parts are broken down and we can see what makes it work as a historical genre unto itself, that is, how it is distinct from other kinds of historical writing. Dissecting the chronicle can also help bring into focus its exact purpose and what role the genre’s development over the years had in shaping Spanish medieval culture, and by extension, modern Spanish culture, as well as Western civilization as a whole.

The chronicle is a difficult branch of historiography to define because of the diversity of its characteristics, as well as its sheer age. Alonso de Palencia’s fifteenth-century *Crónica de*
Enrique IV would most likely not be easily recognizable as a member of the same genre to Eusebius of Caesarea, who wrote his *Universal History* (Παντοδαπὴ Ἱστορία) around 300 C.E., or to the authors of the Gothic chronicles. This is to say, the reader for whom Palencia wrote his history was already familiar with the poetics of the chronicle of that time, just as the fourth to seventh-century reader would have been accustomed to a somewhat distinct historical grammar in the chronicles of their time. The chronicles of these two extremes of the Middle Ages have features that maintain continuity throughout that aid in binding the chronicle as a genre, regardless of any single work’s classification as *crónica general* or *crónica particular*, its place on the timeline, or its specific political agenda. I alluded to some of these on the first page of this chapter. The particular structure and format, the explicit chronological ordering of events, and the emotional detachment from the events narrated comprise a partial list of traits that distinguish the chronicle as a genre.

In Pedro Juan Galán Sánchez’s *El género historiográfico de la chronica: las crónicas hispanas de época visigoda*, the author lists and details four fundamental elements of the genre of the chronicle: chronology, unadorned style, providential vision of history, and universalism. The focus of Galán Sánchez’s work is only the Spanish Gothic chronicle, though, beginning with Eusebius’ Universal History and leaving off in the seventh century with the chronicle of Juan de Bíclaro (ca. 540-ca. 621), and the *Historia Gothorum* of Isidore of Seville (ca. 560-ca. 636). The centuries that most concern this dissertation are the fourteenth and fifteenth. Nonetheless, Galán Sánchez’s work is of interest to this section of my own study because of its focus on the birth of the chronicle. Just as Julio Ortega y Gasset remarked “si no se entiende bien e el siglo XV, no se entiende bien nada de lo que ha pasado después” (141), by the same logic, a familiarity with the origins and evolution of the chronicle is crucial to
understanding the significance of the fifteenth-century chronicle. What follows is a short summary and analysis of each of the four characteristics Galán Sánchez lays out that “constituyen [...] la columna vertebral del género cronístico” of pre-Islamic Spain (16). Of these I find that three of them still hold water to some degree eight centuries later when the chroniclers of Isabel and Fernando were recording for posterity the reign of Enrique IV de Trastámara (1454-74).

One of the most important ways in which we see the chronicle of the late Middle Ages speak back to the elder members of its genealogy is the chronological, linear structuring of events in history. From Eusebius to Palencia’s Crónica de Enrique IV, the use of a universal Christian chronology and the corresponding linear ordering of time is perhaps the most telling distinctive feature of the genre as a whole. Its historical consequence on Western culture is difficult to overestimate. Not only does it signal a break from the historiography of Antiquity, it also marks a shift in the conception of time itself and the inculcation of Christian ideology on most of Western civilization, conjugating one with, and in terms of, the other. Eusebius’ objective for his history of the world was only to locate and include the Jewish and Christian peoples in time, which, until then, had not been included in world histories (Galán Sánchez 17). These “historias paganas”, such as Velleius Paterculus’ Compendium of Roman History (1st century CE) and Pompeius Trogus’ 44-volume Historiae Philippicae (1st century BCE) were histories of the world that were structured cyclically in terms of the succession of empires and temporal power. For example, Paterculus’ work histories the empires of the Assyrians, the Medes, the Persians, the Macedonians, and the Romans as a succession of dominant world powers. Although these empires are ordered chronologically in terms of a rise and fall, broadening the picture a bit, for the author there is no unequivocal “beginning” of time that can
be told as history, and to be certain no apocalyptic day of reckoning and soul harvesting. While the Romans had their own “Genesis”, so to speak, their own mythology, it was not counted as history to be included in that of mankind. The rise and fall of human power pertained to the human realm; divine power was understood as existing on a separate plane completely. As Galán Sánchez explains it, “la historiografía pagana distinguía claramente entre mito e historia” (18). There was no thought that Zeus or Jupiter would come to Earth to fulfill a prophecy.

Not so for Christian historiography. In Christianity, the divine and the mortal have a tangible contract (the Ten Commandments); there are clear instances of direct divine intervention; and there is even a visit to Earth from the son of God. For Christians, history and the end of days are recorded in the Bible, which amounts to the Christian view of eternity in a nutshell: contained, as imprecisely as it may be, from beginning to end. To understand the beginning of time, the Pentateuch was all one needed to know. Likewise, to glimpse humankind’s final days, the cryptic and final book of the New Testament told that story, too. For anyone bookended by the Genesis and the Revelation, in a sense all that was left was to locate one’s point on the timeline, as time itself had been encapsulated. In Spain’s transition to Christianity this became the work of the chronicler.

Galán Sánchez concludes that “la importancia de la cronología fue paulatinamente disminuyendo a medida que progresaba el género de la Crónica [porque] la cronología deja de ser un objeto de estudio para convertirse, sencillamente, en un instrumento” (16, 17). For Eusebius, the chronology was an end in itself; he included no prose development of the events he located on the chronograph. Perhaps in the strictest of interpretations the chronology did diminish in importance over time because the later uses of it were no longer exclusively chronographs. But the simple timeline as an object of study in itself, a skeleton history lacking
the flesh and connective tissues of quotidian human endeavor, may well have reached its potential with Eusebius. In later generations, chroniclers employed chronology in their histories by rote in favor of the carnality of prose. But in my view, this augments the importance of chronology instead of diminishing it. The writers who systematically ordered their historical narratives by year were not likely conscious that their craft originated with Eusebius, so they had no realistic chance to be “chronographical purists”. Even Isidore of Seville, who did recognize Eusebius as his predecessor, decided to take a different route, including a prologue and an epilogue (i.e. a rhetorical frame as well as the chronological one) in addition to the body of his chronicle. Chroniclers fast became dependent on this specific manner of organization, as did their readers. The series of successive years becomes inseparable from the events themselves. Galán Sánchez makes the case himself when he says that in the later chronicles chronology is “el hilo que engarza los sucesos más variados” (17). Without the chronology, there is no other conceivable structure for this type of history, and all of the recorded events would dissolve into a mishmash of unordered coincidence. A Christian chronology buried by text intensifies that chronology’s effect, as well, by making it seem like the natural order of things. In short, chronology in the later chronicle is an established, unquestioned rule, the central supporting element of its structural grammar. Its removal from the nascent chronicle of the fourth century might mean the creation of a different approach to ordering Christian history. Removing this load-bearing column from the chronicle of the thirteenth century, however, would trigger the collapse of an entire system.

The conflation of chronology and Christianity is also a necessary ingredient for the providential vision of history. This approach to history has as much to do with the future as with the past. Historians interpret retrospectively how God’s hand has guided his people up to any
given point in time; and by analogy God’s plan for them for the future is divinable. With the Divine in complete control of everything, humankind exists merely to carry out God’s plans. Galán Sánchez explains it as God’s role as the protagonist in human events. Providentialism in Christian historiography, he explains, manifests itself in three fundamental ways: the notion that history is an ordered and organic entity, according to a pre-established design, with a logical development, with marked phases and a foreseen end; the idea of Providence as the Judge of history; and the idea of the miracle as a normal and accepted part of history, which may be used as a valid explanation of historical happenings (32, 33). Succinctly, there is no part of history of which the Divine is not the whole: it has designed it, set it in motion, and will evaluate it once it has declined; anything not easily containable is direct divine intervention. Though Galán Sánchez only writes about Providentialism with regards to the Gothic chronicle, the idea of a divinely mandated destiny is perhaps nowhere better found than in the Spanish medieval chronicle after the year 718, the very early years of the Christian Reconquest.

José Antonio Maravall describes the Reconquest as “una flecha lanzada hacia un blanco a través de los siglos” (304) because of the increasing conviction of each king and prince that he had descended directly from the Christian-Gothic bloodline that began the insurgency against the Muslims, a war that was God’s will and therefore just. God’s will, and thus a providential vision of history, however, depends on the human conviction that God is paying close attention to human action, moreover the action of the moment, and that he is partisan. This line of thought is essential to medieval Castilian Christian historiography. Likewise, Maravall avers, “la historia a secas es algo que acontece y que sólo puede contarse de un grupo o de unos grupos humanos a los cuales les pasa algo en común, lo que permite construir sobre esa base un relato histórico dotado de sentido” (17). The Saracen invasion is this something in common that happened that
was the catalyst in the creation of a history (common story) endowed with meaning. As history was already ordered in the Bible with a pre-determined Christian triumph at the end of time, the only logical outcome of the Reconquest was a similar Christian victory over the infidel. This is the essence of Providence as the Judge of history.

Before the invasion of 711, providentialism had a different packaging in the pre-Muslim peninsula. Hydatius’ chronicle (ca. 460) paints a foreboding, even apocalyptic portrait of the world (which was to end according to many in the year 482) at the increasing domination of foreigners during the decline of Roman dominance. It serves as a wake-up call to Christians to stay on a path of righteousness by interpreting the recent Suevi invasion and natural phenomena as divine clues to be picked up on and acted upon (Galán Sánchez 72). Punishments and rewards were meted out in direct correlation to God’s judgment of happenings on Earth. Biblical prophecies were fulfilled or interpreted so, as proof of Providence as the preordained organizer of history.

In Juan de Bícclaro’s chronicle (ca.590) there are few if any readings of climatic changes as signs of God. For *el Biclarense* the providence of God is exemplified in the strength of the Visigoths and their conversion to Christianity (112). The chronicler seems to view the Goths as the political future of “Spain,” evinced by the decay of the old Roman Christian presence and the rise of the new Gothic Christian power. In Isidore of Seville’s *Chronica* (ca. 615) the providential view of the world is much more apparent than in Juan de Bícclaro’s. Isidore was profoundly influenced by Augustine, whose *City of God*, also known as *City of God against the Pagans*, was widely consumed by new converts to Christianity as, among other things, an explanation as to what was wrong with pagan religions. Isidore took the providential vision of
history to new levels in Christian historiography in the Peninsula. Augustine’s Six Ages of Man were incorporated into Isidore’s *Historia Gothorum*, but with a very literal interpretation, turning into something real, Galán Sanchez explains it, and directly applicable to human history (190). The conception of “ages” in history was one already very familiar, and established through the previous Roman tradition discussed above. Isidore’s reapplication of it using Christian precepts usurped the well-known conceit for the new theology, and in doing so all but discarded the Greek and Roman idea of history as the cyclical rise and fall of empires (190). The succession of ages belonged to only one reign now: the God of the Christians.

The union of history and Christian theology was achieved with no small thanks to the genre of the chronicle. In addition to the advancement of the religion, this incipient consolidation of Christianity in Spain contributed to the beginnings of a sense of “national”, or at least regional, cohesion. But it was not until after the year 718 when the process would begin that would slowly, over the span of seven and a half centuries, solidify the Spanish identity. With Christianity entrenched among the various regions of the Peninsula, it was the idea of a common and uninterrupted Visigothic bloodline under which the kings of Asturias, León, Castile, Navarre, and Aragón would fight against the Muslims. They were already staunchly Christian by the time of their defeat by the Saracens, so it was a logical move to hold onto the Visigothic culture vis à vis the new power of the Muslims, against whom “se levanta una radical repulsa […] el árabe es un invasor injusto que no podrá alcanzar la legítima posesión del dominio sobre España” (Maravall 252). The Reconquest of Spain from its birth to its culmination, in concept and in practice, is of undeniable interest for any study of the chronicle of the Spanish Middle Ages. I shall take up this thread again below after outlining the third essential element of the

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2 Saint Augustine’s Six Ages of Man start with Adam and Eve and the creation of the world in the book of Genesis, followed by Noah and the Great Flood, the Age of Abraham, the Age of King David, the Babylonian Captivity, and finally the birth of the Messiah, Jesus.
chronicle that conserves a good measure of integrity from the genre’s earliest days up through the early Renaissance: *el estilo plano*.

While the medieval chronicle is not a total departure from the histories of Antiquity – for example, time continues to be divided into periods – other practices were departures from older customs. The *estilo plano*, or unadorned style of writing, is one of these: “Frente a la historiografía clásica, que junto con el *docere* tenía muy en cuenta el *delectare*, las Crónicas cristianas sí se conforman con el *docere*” (20). *Docere* refers strictly to the teaching or instructional aspect of a work, while *delectare* denotes style, most likely a seductive, pleasing one. Each of these concepts was considered integral to how history was written for the Greeks and Romans. To them, the writing of history was considered a literary exercise and a part of rhetoric; it was “not, strictly speaking, an independent and self-contained activity” (Croke, et al. 1). Lucian of Samosata (ca. 125 – ca. 180) was a classically trained rhetorician, potent satirist of the eastern Roman Empire, and author of *How to Write History* (*Quomodo Historia conscribenda sit*). Samosata’s essay constitutes, as the title suggests, a type of instructional manual for those who would venture to take up the task of writing history. These instructions, nonetheless, take rhetorical jabs at aspiring (or current) historians who he believed to be under-informed; Samosata was critical of what he perceived to be a decline in quality of scholarship in his time. He sums it up here in his poetics of historiography, describing the writers who seemed to believe that “there might as well be an art of talking, seeing, or eating [because] history-writing is perfectly easy, comes natural, is a universal gift; all that is necessary is the faculty of translating your thoughts into words” (111). For Lucian, as it was from centuries before, history should be first and foremost useful and true (*docere*). If it “can deal incidentally in the agreeable, [it] will attract a multitude of lovers” (114), but let that agreeableness (*delectare*) be only the
“independent beauties of style [as] these are agreeable without being false” (116). While clearly less substantial than the facts, style was what won over the public that listened.

Samosata was one of the very last of his kind; he wrote during the Roman decadence and the beginning of the end of the Empire. Only 150-200 years after his death, the world had changed considerably: Christianity had taken hold of Western civilization and the Roman Empire was entirely fragmented. One result of this was that historians no longer (or very scarcely) wrote in the classical mold. The emphasis was now on brevity. The new generation of Roman leadership, which now sometimes included non-Romans and foreign invaders, had not received (and were not interested in) a traditional Roman education. Yet, to rule Rome and its territories, one could not be entirely uninformed about the history of the Empire. This meant that “there was now an unprecedented demand for shorter works which summarized the basic facts of Roman history” (Croke 2). Furthermore to this, the aristocracy’s preferences had shifted away from an elastic, malleable conception of history, epitomized by the styles of Thucydides and Herodotus, and toward the biography – a much less flexible form not open for debate.

Although the Classical style of history-telling gradually and inevitably became unfashionable, the desire to write about the past did not. Only now, around the 4th century, when Christian beliefs were diffuse and the emperor Constantine made Christianity the official religion, the “past” took on a new meaning. Time was still measured in “periods” or phases, but also, as illustrated above, in the aggregate as completely conceivable, with a universal beginning and a universal end. The chronicle emerged as a genre that, in theory, did away with literary tropes and stylistic devices, attempting to avoid secondary ideas, intimations, and connotations while telling every world history as a Christian world history. By the time Isidore and Juan de
Bíclaro wrote their respective chronicles, the genre had become a popular research tool “in order to illuminate the Christian scriptures” (Croke 2).

“La Crónica,” states Galán Sánchez, “es un género sin ninguna pretensión literaria,” because the chronicler’s stylistic goal reaches no further than concision and simplicity (20). In the post-Gothic chronicles the estilo plano is ubiquitous. But the impersonal narrative voice of these works regularly tells the stories that come from sources centering on the delectare, such as the cantares de gesta and other legendary material. The confluence of legend, myth, and history, for example, heroes such as Bernardo del Carpio, Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar, el Cid, and the first count of Castile, Fernán González, had widespread and localized resonance that created and maintained stronger bonds among larger numbers of people. Before Alfonsine works, posits D.G. Pattison, chronicles “had tended to restrict their use of legendary material either to that dealing with royal personages (the Crónica Najerense) or to that with a regional origin (the Tudense, whose predilection is for Leonese material)” (3). In the Tudense, written sometime during the reign of Fernando III of Castile and Leon (r. 1217-52), according to Maravall, is found the first fully developed version of the thesis of Visigothic heritage (320). In his El concepto de España en la Edad Media, one of the main points Maravall drives home is that the greater Spanish collective beliefs about their identity were forged slowly under the us/them or center/periphery binary, but that this opposition was based largely on fictional premises. The thesis of direct, uninterrupted Gothic royal bloodline that continued thanks to the uprising of the neo-Gothic king Pelayo, “es probablemente en su origen, no [una] explicación de un hecho real sino una invención culta para dar sentido a una acción, a una serie de hechos bélicos […]” (304). Others attribute the origins of the Reconquista to the Asturian king Alfonso II, who may have drawn a
line in the sand to divide those who would be stolidly Christian against the Saracens and those who would accept the new Muslim presence (254).

That the first fully developed Castilian version of the Gothic bloodline tradition is found in a chronicle of the thirteenth century is telling of its popular, imaginative, and propagandistic development from the time of its written origins in the chronicles around the time of Alfonso III of Asturias (c.848-910). The seeds of the legend are found in the *Crónica Albedense* (c.882), which tells the story of the Visigoths and the Muslim invaders from Pelayo and the Battle of Covadonga (722) through Bermudo I (r. 789-791), but without placing any particular importance on Gothic ancestry. It is thus interesting that the chronicler recounts the reigns of eight kings, arriving at the reign of Alfonso II, before giving any weight to their Gothic past. The contrast created by the importance Gothic heritage took on later, relative to the much lesser attention it received in earlier years, highlights the genealogical manipulation for propagandistic purposes. It is only during the reign of Alfonso II when the *Crónica Albedense* “anuncia plenamente ese programa de goticismo que va a sobrevivir durante toda la Edad Media […]” (Galán Sánchez 309).

The *Crónica de Alfonso III* grabs hold of the belief of direct Gothic lineage, that Pelayo was indeed Gothic royalty and not the beginning of a new line of Asturias. In this work the chronicler reproduces a clearly partisan and propagandistic dialogue between the Asturians’ first king, Pelayo, and the traitor bishop, Oppas, who intends to convince Pelayo to give up his resistance and succumb to Saracen dominance. Pelayo responds that God is on his side and that the Saracens will ultimately be defeated, as it is willed by God. The written elaboration of this infamous dialogue between the one and the other is clearly and purely fabrication, as the restoration of the Gothic order had huge repercussions throughout the Middle Ages and long
afterward. But from the *Crónica de Alfonso III* to the first glimpse of the Gothic legend in the chronicles of Castile, over 200 years elapsed; and it is not for another hundred years following that, in the *Crónica de Fernando III, El Tudense, and El Toledano*, that we see a fully matured thesis of Visigothic heritage, not just assimilated history (318). The idea of Gothic heritage is absent from the Castilian chronicles as it began to take root and flourish in Asturias and León. In fact, the *Crónica Najerense* takes the dialogue between Pelayo and Oppas without yoking it to Visigothic blood.

Maravall signals one particularly ponderous absence of “la tesis goticista” in the voluminous *Crónica latina de los reyes de Castilla*, written around 1236. That there is no mention of direct Gothic ancestry in this “obra de muy amplio desarrollo, sin igual en cuanto a dar noticias de las otras tierras peninsulares,” leads us to deduce that by this year the belief of Gothic Leonese origins had not yet established itself (316-17). Shortly after this, by the time Alfonso X el Sabio (r. 1252-84) was well into his prodigious historiographical project, the direct line from the Visigoths to himself was made out to be indisputable. Two of his main sources for the *Primera Crónica General* and the *Estoria de España* were the *Toledano* and the *Tudense*, both of which relied heavily upon the *Crónica Albeldense’s* insistence that the *Reconquista* had a purely Gothic beginning.

When writing about Alfonsine history it is all but impossible to ignore its transformative power on the writing of Castilian history in the following centuries. One of Alfonso X’s innovations was the synchronization of diverse sources, including many from the kingdoms of León, Aragón, Navarra, and Portugal. He also included those of Muslim authorship and of Classical origin. Under Alfonso X’s direction, teams of historians aptly unified disparate literary and historical sources into one monumental work, the *Estoria de España* that sometimes
appropriated as Castile’s own the histories and legends of these other areas. Control and process in the recording of history were usurped by the king from the church, effectively making these histories royally sponsored, official histories of Castile. Henceforth the contents of the *Estoria de España*, in the words of González-Casanovas, served as a “narrative process of signification for a lay society, as a political contract for an emerging national identity” (7). Alfonsine historiography, in particular the *Estoria de España*, in conjunction with the king’s new law codes and compendiums, had an additional political function to the historical that served as a double social project through which a “national” Spanish identity began to take on a more definite shape.

What Alfonso had in mind was to change the way “Spain” was organized by means of recreating it through centralizing the power in the monarchy. It was a swift change from the lord-vassal pyramidal relationship to the kingdom as “un corpus del que los diferentes grupos sociales[como] los miembros y el rey es la cabeza, el corazón y el alma” (Funes 9). This conception was based in Roman law and Aristotelian philosophy. To Aristotle, this kind of organization – an amalgamated alliance of sorts, united under a king – was natural and good. It is the basis of the state, and was a major shift from the *status quo*.

Alfonso’s *Fuero Real* and *Estoria de España* were two works that made this happen. The conflation of the legislative process and an official Spanish history effectively eliminated the regional legislative and judicial processes, and the enforcement of land rights that had been to that point derived from the oral tradition. The normalizing of history prescribed and accomplished a unifying effect among the Leonese and Castilians, and miscellaneous parts of other regions; and so comprehensive and comprehensible were his histories and codes of law, that they served as a kind of one-stop-shop for those who wished to learn. These works were
accessible as well as didactic in nature, which contributed greatly to their ultimate success: “el texto aspira a proveer toda la información necesaria para una correcta comprensión, sin remisiones a otros textos ni datos presupuestos” (Funes 12). This would be analogous to the contemporary terms “brand recognition” and “market saturation,” effective tactics for dominating rivals. Alfonso’s insistence on the exclusive use of Castilian, a change from the traditional Latin, in these formal historical and legislative works encouraged officials and clergy in more provincial areas, many of whom could not read Latin, to approach these texts. The wide dissemination of his texts fostered stronger common cultural bonds. Alfonso X’s chronicle *Estoria de España* and corresponding didactic socio-political program changed Spanish historiography and identity to a point of no return. It also changed the relations between the monarchy and the aristocracy.

The nobility recognized Alfonso’s restructuring objectives and rejected the new confluence of history and laws he had designed in favor of an absolute monarchy. Since the middle of the twelfth century when Alfonso VII decided to divide his united *Hispania* among his offspring, tensions had been high between the monarchy and the nobility. Alfonso X’s socio-political innovations described here took them to new heights and in a new direction, as he essentially pulled the rug out from under the aristocracy in terms of entitlement and governmental latitude. This was reflected in their respective texts. Leonardo Funes explains, “en cuanto a la función de los textos [alfonsíes], proyectan modelos de conducta y principios de buen gobierno a fin de regular la convivencia política de gobernantes y gobernados […]” (19). In contrast, and as counteraction, “en los textos nobiliarios importa su función testimonial como antecedente jurídico, como registro fehaciente del modo de ser de las cosas según la tradición” (19). Even as the landed aristocracy (the families of Haro, Lara, and Castro, principally) rebelled
in their reactive discourse, their ideas depended completely upon Alfonso X’s originality in thought.

Though Alfonso X’s socio-political blueprints would not come to fruition as he had mapped them out, the Learned King’s genius lay in his use of the past to support and propagate his ambitions, especially his desire to acquire the title of Holy Roman Emperor. Alfonso’s second son, Sancho, in the face of his father’s wishes, banded together with an assembly of nobles to gain the crown of Castile, after his eldest brother, Fernando de la Cerda, died, in 1275. This one political maneuver gave the aristocracy fresh opportunities to promote their own interests again. In the years from Sancho IV to Pedro I and the civil war between Castile and Aragon, Alfonso X’s idealistic social design for Castile was quickly and profoundly adulterated by the upper echelon of the aristocracy.

Following Sancho IV was Fernando IV (r. 1295-1312), who proved to be an unusually weak and ineffective ruler. He assumed the throne in his minority, which proved to be a turbid and lawless span of years for Castile, and which some of the powerful nobles used to their advantage. Following Fernando IV was Alfonso XI (r. 1312-1350), great-grandson of Alfonso X. *El Justiciero*, as he was called, was able to buttress the authority of the monarchy during his reign, and make great strides in the Reconquest by securing the Strait of Gibraltar. This king’s infatuation with his mistress, Leonor de Guzmán, and the several illegitimate children they had together ultimately engendered the eventual murder of his legitimate son and the institution of a new dynasty: the Trastamaras.

Enrique of Trastamara was the eldest of eight children king Alfonso X begat out of wedlock to the same woman, none of whom could legally be recognized as a pretender to the throne of Castile, but many of whom were designing, power-loving aristocrats. Each was also a
half-sibling of Pedro I (r. 1350-1367). As Pero López de Ayala states it in his chronicle of Pedro I, the king was irascible in temperament, and more reactive than thoughtful when it came to relations, be they personal, professional, or political. It is said that Pedro’s will was malleable to his mother, Maria of Portugal, who contributed to a few foolhardy and calamitous decisions during his rule. During the first year of his reign, the 16-year-old Pedro had to contend with a rebellion, lead by his half-brother, Enrique. Although the uprising was quashed, Pedro was uncharacteristically too quick to forgive and forget. The following year, 1350, the queen mother ordered the assassination of Doña Leonor de Guzmán, which was an action of suspect judgment considering the power of Guzmán’s offspring, including Enrique. These actions would return to haunt the king years later, in 1366.

Pedro I made another potent enemy in Ferrando de Castro in the second of two disastrous marriages. The day after the wedding to Doña Juana de Castro, Pedro abandoned her, inciting her family to revenge. Pedro I was taken prisoner in Toledo after an uprising of the nobles involving the king’s treatment of another wife, Doña Blanca de Borbón, of France. Blanca fell from Pedro’s favor quickly and was sent to Toledo. When recalled, she refused to leave, crying to the noble women that she feared for her life. This provided the excuse the local aristocracy was already looking for to rebel against Pedro, which they did almost immediately. Against his better judgment, Pedro made a diplomatic foray to Toledo and was instantly taken prisoner. The rebellion was poorly organized, however, and Pedro was able to escape shortly afterward. Forgiveness was not on the king’s agenda this time, and he spent much of the remainder of his reign bent on exacting revenge with the dissenters, including some of his half-brothers, some of whom fled to France for safety.
In 1356, an event involving questionable Catalan maritime behavior in a Castilian port ignited war with Aragon. Hostilities escalated rapidly and alliances were created. A large part of the Castilian nobility sided with Aragon and King Pedro IV. In 1361, when Navarre threatened to enter the war on the side of Aragon, Pedro forged a pact with England. Subsequently, Aragon allied with France, and the war raged into the important year of 1366. In this year, Enrique of Trastamara, who had a number of his family members assassinated at the order of Pedro, including three brothers, invaded Castile with the aid of the French. Pedro’s support in the peninsula was weak, with most of the nobles backing Enrique, many of them championing him for king. His last recourse was to flee north to beseech the aid of the Prince of Wales, and later, the Muslims. Neither option much benefited Pedro in the long term. Two and a half years later, in 1369, the civil war and the reign of Pedro I ended with his capture and murder. Enrique had a few sobriquets as the first Trastamaran king of Castile, not the least-known of which was el Fratricida. Another was el de las Mercedes, or “the granter of favors,” a characteristic that bore out to be applicable and ultimately disadvantageous to the entire dynasty.

In addition to highlighting the velocity with which Alfonso X’s new social order had deteriorated, the period between 1257 and 1369 is also excellent for illuminating some of the ways in which the concerns of the chroniclers and genre of the chronicle changed from the end of the thirteenth century through the middle of the fifteenth. With the end of the civil war and the installation of a new king and a new dynasty, chroniclers were charged, perhaps not always explicitly, with the rewriting of history to legitimate this “nobleza nueva,” which carried with it a new system of ideological values (Jardin 141). This practice of historical silencing and embellishment are confirmed acerbically and humorously in the prologue to Alfonso de Palencia’s Décadas. Palencia was candid in his assessments of things: “Género de perversión es
éste, que, cierto, yo trataré de destruir con la verdad misma, sin tener en nada el parecer de los que dicen que el historiador ha de callar los crímenes nefandos para que no vaya transmitiéndose de siglo en siglo su memoria” (5). Enfranchising the new ruling family established by Enrique II was no easy task, as he was not only illegitimate, but famous among his peers for fratricide and regicide (Jardin 141).

*Vis à vis* Alfonso X’s *Estoria de España*, which we know tells a multi-faceted yet linear Christian history of Spain (and later, of the world) that subtly supports his personal plans for the kingdom and the peninsula, the chronicles of the Trastamaran dynasty devoted much less space to telling world histories; this form no longer suited their political purposes. This will be important below, as we return to discuss the crucial synchronic elements of the chronicle. As I mentioned above, for the chroniclers of the late Middle Ages it was critical to locate themselves and their kingdoms along the new Christian timeline, effectively cementing a place for themselves on it. Likewise, “Spain” only made sense in the context of world history, of kingdoms that existed before it. Now, in the mid-1300s, Castile’s collective “national” identity was established, thanks in no small part to Alfonso X. Castile was also more relevant as an established force to be reckoned with, as England and France depended on their growing naval power; the Saracen threat could be put on hold in order to devote more resources to other ventures; and the economy was more potent than ever before.

All this added up to what Jean-Pierre Jardin called a “visión profundamente castellanocentrista,” a symptom of a new sense of Castilian identity, self-awareness, and commonality. To Jardin, the new practice of summarizing chronicles in the late Middle Ages exemplifies this, as does Alfonso de Cartagena’s speech that he delivered at the Council of Basel (1431-38), *Discurso sobre la preeminencia de Castilla sobre Inglaterra*, alternately known
as *Discurso sobre la precedencia del Rey católico sobre el de Inglaterra* (1434), and represents “una divergencia de enfoque: es el signo de una verdadera ruptura de la sociedad castellana con el ensueño del Rey Sabio” (149). In the summaries of the chronicles, one tendency was to strip all “superfluous” information from the longer chronicles, leaving only the essential that dealt with Castilla. In Cartagena’s work, the *converso* bishop and Castilian diplomat discoursed on Juan II’s superiority to England’s Henry VI (r. 1422-1461) on the grounds of higher honor, virtue, and nobility.

Cartagena introduces three categories of nobility: theological, natural, and civil. Of the first he says, “quanto alguno es más santo, tanto es más noble”; of the second, “quanto alguno es más virtuoso de moral virtud, tanto es más noble” (208); but because the point Cartagena wishes to drive home concerns civil nobility, he cites an expert, Bartolus of Saxoferrato, as is standard practice for the efficacious rhetorician. Bartolus of Saxoferrato (1313-1357) was a legendary Italian jurist whose writings were so greatly admired in Renaissance Spain that they took only second place to Roman law in esteem. Of civil nobility, Cartagena quotes him, “la noblesa civil es una calidad dada por aquel que tiene el principiado, por la qual paresce que el que la rescibe es más quisto e amado del príncipe que los honestos plebeyos que comúnmente llamamos pecheros” (Cartagena 208). After introducing the importance of “noblesa civil,” which deals directly with lineage, Cartagena extols the uninterrupted bloodline of the Goths that courses through the veins of Juan II, and names it as a reason for the king’s “prescedencia,” as one “señal de virtud a que se suele e deve dar honor, es la antigüedad del tiempo” (212). This belief in a direct gothic bloodline from Rodrigo and Pelayo for the whole of the Iberian Peninsula is unfounded in general, as was argued above, but to an augmented degree for Castile. By 1434, the idea of unadulterated, undisturbed Gothic descent was not even two centuries old. This myth was
propagated heavily in the fifteenth century by chroniclers such as Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo (1404-1470) in his *Historia Hispanica (Compendiosa historia Hispanica)* (c.1470) and denotes a shift in Spanish historiography away from the Alfonsine model. The defenses of the aristocratic value system, adopted by the new monarchy, which arose out of the nobility, and depended on the nobility for support, pervaded the new chronicle (Jardin 150). Although in both cases the monarchy benefited directly from the propagandistic potency of the chronicle, in spirit, what the chronicle was being used to support in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was contrary to Alfonso X’s vision.

One final change I shall mention in the post-Alfonsine chronicle is the movement from authorial anonymity to authorial ownership. In the fourteenth and especially fifteenth centuries, during the onset of humanism and moving toward the Renaissance, the word “author” begins to take on what it most commonly means in modernity. Writers sign their names to the works that flow from their pens or onto the screens of their laptops as a symbol of ownership. By the reader, individual ownership and relative originality of content is presumed. On the other hand, the author of the *Estoria de España* is universally said to be Alfonso X, mostly because of a modern need to establish ownership of property, intellectual or otherwise. We know, nonetheless, that the herculean literary corpus of the Learned King was not penned by him, but by teams of historians who, in turn, assembled these historical works from earlier works, often verbatim. It was not considered plagiarism – that concept did not exist – but simply information available to any who could access it.

Incipient authorial ownership in the late Middle Ages had significant repercussions as well as political ramifications. As ownership, and thus control, of the contents of histories transferred into the hands of the historians themselves, it flowed away from those who had
traditionally and unilaterally exercised that power: the monarchy. Jardin calls it “una privatización de la historiografía,” but asserts that this translation of power does not indicate dissent or refutation of royal power (151-52). True, that is, until we arrive at the reign of Enrique IV of Castile (1454-74), which is the subject of chapter two of this thesis. Although the Trastamara dynasty, particularly Juan II, took measures to consolidate power in the monarchy and limit the clout of the nobility, the nobility only continued to grow stronger. In fact, the king’s methods were quite backward; he deferred nearly all major decisions concerning the realm to his privado, Alvaro de Luna. Years later, under Enrique IV, the aristocracy had procured more power for themselves to the detriment of the monarchy. The high-ranking nobles opposed to the king’s rule were able to rebel against him, ultimately achieving similar results to the Trastamara-led revolt that culminated in 1369. Because the Trastamara had ascended from the nobility to assume the throne, they could not easily pull up their own roots; each successive ruler had, to one degree or another, relied on a symbiotic relationship with the aristocracy to maintain power.

Once historians could write more freely, and usually not under the direct supervision of kings with royally mandated content parameters, or even as officially appointed royal historians, the number of chronicles increased. Chroniclers chose political factions and used their writings as platforms from which to express their party’s viewpoints, often allowing their own personal opinions to be known. This new freedom of speech, so to speak, was not seen much even during the early part of the fifteenth century, but starting with the reign of Juan II, and decidedly more during those of Enrique IV and the Catholic Monarchs, Isabel and Fernando (r. 1474-1504), this tendency increased substantially. Some of these chronicles will be discussed in depth in the next chapter, but listing them here will be useful. During Enrique IV’s lifetime, and shortly thereafter,
chroniclers Diego Enríquez del Castillo (1443-c.1504), Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo (1404-1470), Alfonso de Palencia (1423-1492), Diego de Valera (1412-1488), Fernando del Pulgar (1436-c.1493), and Lorenzo Galíndez de Carvajal (1472-1525) all wrote either chronicles exclusively treating the complete life and reign of Enrique IV, or expounding on it in the chronicles of the Catholic Monarchs.

The first two, Enríquez del Castillo and Sánchez de Arévalo, were partisans of Enrique I, and wrote sympathetic portraits of the king. The second two, Alfonso de Palencia and Diego de Valera, were critical of Enrique, to put it mildly. But Palencia’s opprobrium dwarfed Valera’s. Palencia was the king’s most outspoken opponent of all the chroniclers, perhaps in the entire kingdom, and colluded with Enrique’s opposition and their plans to depose their sovereign. The chronicles of the final two, Pulgar and Galíndez de Carvajal, were more tempered in tone relative to Enrique IV. Although Pulgar evaluated Enrique as having been a generally poor king, his judgments were not acerbic. There is also a widely accepted contention that Isabel compelled her chroniclers to edit, and in some cases completely rewrite, parts of their chronicles to further sully the legacy of her half-brother, Enrique. Pulgar was one of these chroniclers. Of Galíndez de Carvajal, an academician and lawyer of the University of Salamanca who also worked closely with Isabel, he evaluated chronicles of Enrique written before his time, which afforded him some perspective on the issues. About the value of this last chronicler’s work, William Philips, Jr. opines that it is great, “because [Galíndez de Carvajal] was close enough to the events to possess virtually all the facts, and far enough away from them to avoid passionate partisanship” (5). Specific political affiliations aside, the weight that authorial ownership had on the political climate of the fifteenth century is important for understanding the chronicle of that very century, but also for a heightened apprehension of the chronicle of Alfonso X’s time, and before.
Be all that as it may, the three basic components of the chronicle discussed earlier in this chapter largely transcend the changes effected in the chronicle from the thirteenth through the fifteenth centuries. The chronological, linear structuring of events in history (cronología) remained unaffected, for the most part; history was still an ordered and organic entity, according to a pre-established design, with a logical development (providencialismo); and the histories told still conformed much more with docere than with delectare (estilo plano). As for the universalismo, the fourth characteristic of the chronicle mentioned earlier, this brand of history fell from favor after the Estoria de España, as explained above. In order to provide some hard evidence to support this argument, for this final section of this chapter I propose to identify each characteristic in excerpts from select chronicles, spanning 700 years: la Crónica Mozárabe de 754, the Estoria de España, Enríquez del Castillo’s Crónica de Enrique IV, Alfonso de Palencia’s chronicle of the same title.

The Crónica Mozárabe de 754 is the most important extant document used to determine how drastic the transition was from the established Visigothic culture to the new Sarracen domination. It spans the years 610-754 and is a year-by-year account of last century of Visigothic rule and the first years of the Sarracen domination. Some scholars argue that the passing of the torch, so to speak, was scarcely felt, since the mozárabes, or inhabitants of “Spain” who surrendered to the invaders, were allowed to continue to practice Christianity and generally to go about their business as usual. Others, such as Peter Linehan, are convinced of just the opposite, that there was great upheaval and cultural trauma. Of the chronicle’s author, Linehan writes that he was “a survivor of the invasion [who] gave vent to his feelings. He doubted if ‘human nature’ itself was capable of expressing the extent of the calamity that had overtaken ‘Spania’ and the horrors that it suffered” (12). In a cry of desperation, he writes
“¡Quién podrá, pues, narrar tan grandes peligros?! ¡Quién podrá enumerar desastres tan lamentable?! Pues aunque todos sus miembros se convirtiesen en lengua, no podría de ninguna manera la naturaleza humana referir a la ruina de España ni tantos y tan grandes males como ésta soportó” (Mozárabe 73). The exact passage of this infelicitum Spaniam to which Linehan is referring is well into the chronicle, and in tone forms a striking contrast with the text preceding it. This is to say, we have a momentary break from docere, which may be attributable to the subject striking a personal cord with the chronicler. All the preceding text consists of alternating accounts of the pre-invasion Sarracen kingdom and the Visigothic kings, and we see none of the emotion that we see in the above quotation.

Not coincidently, here we also find our first manifestations of providencialismo and universalismo:

Pero para contar al lector todo en breves páginas, dejando de lado los innumerables desastres que desde Adán hasta hoy causó, cruel, por innumerables regions y ciudades, este mundo inmundo, todo cuanto según la historia soportó la conquistada Troya, lo que aguantó Jerusalén, según vaticinio de los profetas, lo que padeció Babilonia, según el testimonio de las Escrituras, y, en fin, todo cuanto Roma enriquecida por la dignidad de los apóstoles alcanzó por sus mártires, todo esto y más lo sintió España […] (73, 75).

In this excerpt, the author has cemented a place for Spain on the Christian timeline of the world. The inclusion of Spain’s woes as the most recent in a long line of some of Occidental history’s most famous civilizations, and starting with the biblical story of Adam and Eve, makes it simply a continuation of God’s ordered and organic plan. The divine is the implied protagonist of this passage, as it is his hand guiding at this juncture. As for cronología, most of the blocks of text are begun by naming the year in which the events took place, for example, “En este tiempo, en la
era 749, año cuarto del imperio Justiniano, nonagésimo Segundo de los árabes, quinto de Ulit […]” (71).

In the *Estoria de España*, one has to look no further than the short prologue to find *estilo plano, providencialismo*, and *universalismo*. Examples of each are, of course, not confined to the history’s preamble, but are manifest throughout, and are essential to the work’s ends. In the prologue of the *Estoria*, the scribes lay out a plan for the books that Alfonso has ordered them to compose. They illustrate that without past works, like the one their king has ordered them to undertake, they would know nothing of the world before them; but that because these histories exist, “connoscremos que por ellas somos sabidores del criamiento del mundo […]” and all that has happened since (33). This is important because it sets the stage for the Learned King to include Spain as a great people included among the most honored and important civilizations of the world. But he also gives himself an authoritative monopoly on Spain’s history in the following passage when it is explained that many of Spain’s historical works were destroyed:

Et escrivieron otrosi las noblels batallas de los romanos et de las otras yentes que acaescieron en el mundo muchas et maravillosas, que se olvidaran si en escripto non fuesen puestas; e otrossi el hecho dEspanna, que passo por muchos sennorios et fue muy mal trecha, recibiendo muertes por muy crueles lides et batallas daquellos que la conquieren, et otrosi que fazien ellos en defendiendose; et desta guisa fueron perdudos los fechos della, por los libros que se perdieron et fueron destroydos en el mudamiento de los sennorios, assi que apenas puede seer sabudo el comienço de los que la poblaron. E por ende Nos don Alfonssso […] mandamos ayuntar quantos libros pudimos aver de istorias en que alguna cosa contassen de los fechos dEspanna […] (34).
The universal anatomy is laid bare in conjunction with Alfonso X securing for himself a large measure of creative control over what was to be included, excluded, and how in his historical compendium. Providencialismo is also found in the prologue of the Estoria as the narrative moves into the Reconquista. After the infamous treason of the count of Yllan and the archbishop Oppa, when they aided the Saracens against the Christians, God is viewed as having overseen the resumption of Christian power and the return to ‘normalcy’ in Spain, as the Muslim forces are driven back toward Granada: “et como fueron los cristianos despues cobrando la tierra; et del danno que vino en ella por partir los regnos, por que se non pudo cobrar tan ayna; et despues cuemo la ayunto Dios, et por cuales maneras et en qual tiempo, et quales reyes ganaron la tierra fasta en el mar Maditarreneo […]” (35). Finally, in writing style there is little that goes beyond the minimum to convey the desired information, as in the Crónica Mozárabe de 754.

The chronicles of Enrique IV, one by Diego Enríquez del Castillo, another by Alfonso de Palencia, were written during the second half of the fifteenth century, three-hundred years after the Estoria de España, and 700 after the Crónica Mozárabe. Both works are notably different in writing style, although each maintains to a degree the unadorned, seemingly objective approach. Each conserves a providential vision of Castilian and world history, and a chronological layout of his respective history. In comparing these two chronicles with those of centuries past, it can fairly easily be observed that chronology, unadorned style, and providentialism are sustained. But it does not take a fine-tooth comb to discover the comparative peculiarities of fifteenth-century chronicles vis à vis those of the thirteenth century or earlier, either. Enríquez’s and Palencia’s chronicles are distinct from each other, too, in how they employ these features as a

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3 The only exception is Lorenzo Galindez de Carvajal’s Crónica de Enrique IV, which was written in the early 16th century.
means to a political end. Finally, universalism is, by and large, absent from both works, unlike most chronicles of the thirteenth century or before, in which it is present. Diego Enríquez del Castillo was the official chronicler of Enrique IV’s reign, appointed by the king himself. As such, his account of Enrique’s person and politics was inevitably positive, even if he did acknowledge less than critically some of his sovereign’s infamous foibles. Since, it can be easily argued, one of Enríquez del Castillo’s intentions for his chronicle was to construct an implicit defense of Enrique IV and his rule, the *estilo plano* is infused with oratorical, formal-sounding rhetoric not found in the chronicles of the high or early Middle Ages. Nonetheless, I believe it can still be labeled as *estilo plano*. The narrative voice is usually still detached from the history it tells, and offers few personal interjections, that is, except when it treats the king directly or when Enríquez considers his own responsibilities as a historian: “Y, pues, conbiene al coronista y es neçesario que sea zeloso de la verdad, ajeno de afición, quito de amor y enemistad, en tal manera que […] escriva syn pasyón y proçeda como juez en las cosas de la fama […]” (133). Here, Enríquez recognizes discursive neutrality as his duty, but as he and his coeval writers began to take authorial responsibility for the works they produced, this became increasingly difficult. As literary and artistic anonymity waned, observed objectivity in their works also diminished.

For the most part, Enriquez’s telling of what he has observed is dry, resembling a slightly spruced-up laundry list of affairs, for example, when he recounts a meeting between Castilian and Aragonese embassadors: “Llegados estos enbaxadores a cerca de la çibdad de Nápol y notificada su yda al rrey, mandó que les fuese fuecho honrrado rreçibimiento y que fuesen, no solamente aposentados bien, más proveydos copiosamente de todas las cosas que oviesen menester […]” (143). The rest of the passage is similarly written, generally devoid of the
author’s opinion and seeming like an index-in-prose of events. That understood, it must also be admitted that the chronicle is no longer a genre “sin ninguna pretension literaria” (Galán Sánchez 20), even if its creative embellishments were infrequent, and varied from writer to writer. In the larger literary world of the fifteenth century, we have to look no further than figures such as el Marqués de Santillana (1398-1458), Jorge Manrique (ca. 1440-1479), and Antonio de Nebrija (1441-1522) to see the incipient influence of Humanism in Spain, and a more intense interest in classical literary and cultural forms. This inevitably spilled over into historiography. We can see in the chronicles of Enríquez del Castillo and Palencia that the emphasis was no longer on concision. In their works we begin to feel once more the sonorous, spirited comingling of docere and delectare of Lucian of Samosata and the classically trained rhetoricians before him. As I mentioned above, for them, the sincerity and veracity of their historiography was preeminent, but if it, and this bears repeating, “can deal incidentally in the agreeable, [it] will attract a multitude of lovers” (Samosata 114). Because each chronicler was no longer simply a monarch’s skilled, literate parrot of sorts, but an advocate and politician for his king, or political party, as it were, he had need of attracting a ‘multitude of lovers’ to his viewpoints. This is decidedly relevant in the case of Enrique IV.

In Palencia’s Crónica de Enrique IV, also known as Décadas, the universal view of history is absent. Instead, Palencia is focused on his present reality, which he does his utmost to convey. The chronicler makes it evident from the start that the core of his history will be the turpitude of Enrique IV’s reign and the evil it has brought to Castile. The villainy is so excessive, he pronounces, that he can barely bring himself to complete his task: “Así vacilé largo tiempo entre emprender o abandonar la presente historia, pues si por una parte mi cargo me impulsaba a escribirla, por otra, lo abyecto de los sucesos me desalentaba, repugnando al ánimo lo que la
obligación me imponía” (5). The prologue is significant where divine providence is concerned. Though the prologue is very short, around 500 words, Palencia mentions God but once. But the providential message is there: Enrique IV has brought evil and ruin upon Castile, and only by God’s grace will the goodness return: “por todo el mundo [Enrique] ha abierto tan ancho cauce al mal,” he writes, “que desde las épocas más remotas hasta la presente, jamás tan copiosa semilla de maldades extendió el cúmulo de crímenes antes inauditos al extremo de no descubrirse apenas lugar para el bien si una mano divina no destruye estos emponzoñados frutos […]” (5). The extent to which Alfonso de Palencia believed the veracity of this statement is not known, but the high degree of verisimilitude for which he strove could scarcely be plainer. In this passage, Palencia utilizes the idea of God’s intimate guidance of the world, and more importantly, of Castile, to construct an antithetical relationship between the monarch and the divine, though he does not say it explicitly.

One must virtually dissect Palencia’s chronicle to encounter any semblance of estilo plano as it is found in chronicles 200 year prior. Although this is inconsistent with my argument that this particular characteristic is universal to the chronicle from its earliest days in Hispania, Palencia’s Crónica de Enrique IV is, in my opinion, at the periphery of what can be considered a chronicle, even at the brink of the Renaissance, as Humanism is making inroads to Spain. Palencia’s work is thinly veiled political propaganda, but it is provides a useful perspective on the genre’s generational trajectory.

Achieving some perspective on the genre of the chronicle, its transformation, and its pragmatic and artistic flexibility from the earliest reaches of the Middle Ages, has been the overarching objective of this chapter. From its earliest and simplest manifestation as a chronograph in the 7th century C.E., with concise indexing of world events as its main goal, to its
fifteenth-century anatomy of expansive prose and obtuse political propaganda, the chronicle is demonstrated to have had immeasurable consequences on Occidental culture. The chronicle’s four principal components – explicit chronology, providentialism, unadorned style, and universalism, the last of which eventually fell to the wayside - comprise the basic infrastructure of a historical genre that otherwise proved to be very dynamic and readily compliant with the cultural demands of any given moment.

In the following chapters, the focus will be primarily on three personages of the fifteenth century in Castile whose representations in the chronicle and in other texts have been a cause of debate in our own time. Because the genre of the chronicle in itself has been a polemical one over the last half century or so, the historical record of critical opinions on each of my three subjects – Enrique IV of Trastamara, doña Leonor López de Córdoba, and Alfonso de Cartagena – are equally polarizing. In each chapter, I offer summaries and critiques of some of the more significant studies by well known critics in each respective area as I make the case for my own critical opinions. My ultimate hope is to contribute, however modestly, to the grand corpus of studies of these three personages, or to offer new perspectives for future investigation.
CHAPTER 2
THE CASE OF ENRIQUE IV

The reign of Enrique IV (1454-74) is almost universally considered among the most disastrous of Castile, and the man himself, one of Castile’s most enigmatic rulers. Most historical accounts of Enrique of Trastámara are critical of the king’s rule to varying degrees, but also of his person, even from his very early childhood. Enrique’s youth is not well documented, but most of the extant sources seem to concur that his behavior was not conventional for a young prince. Throughout his adolescence and until he assumed the throne at the age of 29, the Prince of Asturias raised doubts about his suitability for kingship by reason of his observed eccentricities. Yet there was much optimism about Juan II’s successor; many saw the ascendance of a new king as propitious for Castile’s future.

During the apathetic rule of Juan II, the balance of power in the kingdom shifted somewhat to the landed nobility; the king’s advisor, Alvaro de Luna, usurped much of Juan II’s authority and resources for personal gain; Castile’s powerful neighbor and rival to the east, Aragon, was rapidly growing in power; the war against the Muslims was forestalled because of internal problems. The situation was indeed beginning to look dire, and upon the death of Juan II, Castile needed a strong leader to reclaim control of the monarchy’s powers. The stage was set very well for Enrique to achieve great success and popularity as the new monarch of Castile: Alvaro de Luna did not have the same power over Enrique as he did over Enrique’s father; the debilitated Muslim kingdom was confined to the southernmost part of Andalucía; and Juan of Aragon continued plotting a way to take control of Castile. But critical consensus, among both
the king’s contemporaries and ours, is that the reign of Enrique IV was a political failure, especially between the years of 1464-74.

During Enrique IV’s 20 years on the throne, his extended campaign against Granada came to naught, which did much to aggravate Castile’s grandees. He was every bit as susceptible to the manipulations of don Juan Pacheco, his royal favorite, as Juan II was to Luna. He also surpassed his father in compromising the power of the monarchy, granting innumerable favors, high titles of nobility, great estates, and large sums of the royal income to problematic members of the nobility, usually in the interest of quelling hostilities and keeping the peace in his own court. As Enrique’s vast resources dwindled, so too did the respect he could command from his allies and foes alike. The latter were more multiform. Enrique’s enemies included the Aragonese, the long-standing nemesis of Castile, the faction of rebels who staged the Farse of Avila of 1464 and raised the young prince Carlos of Aragon as the pretender to the Castilian Crown, or war barons, whose ranks included the counts of Benavente, Paredes, Alba, Haro, and, Plasencia.

The chronicles of Enrique IV tell this story, as do the *semblanzas*, or pen-portraits, of Fernando del Pulgar. Although the *semblanzas* take a more humane angle on the king, the chronicle of Pulgar portrays Enrique as a cuckold, incapable of producing an heir, as does the anonymous *Crónica incompleta*. Other chronicles, such as Alonso de Palencia’s *Crónica de los Reyes Católicos*, portray Enrique’s reign as a time of absolute moral and political decay, when anarchy and sin dominated the kingdom. Palencia, Enrique IV’s more infamous detractor, vilified the king’s rule and character to such a degree that ordinarily it might be punishable by death. It should be noted that many of these records of Enrique’s reign were written or revised after his death and were commissioned by the new ruler of Castile herself, Isabel la Católica (1474-1501) as part of a complex political campaign to legitimize her own rule. Isabel painted
“an image of her reign that frequently capitalized on the presumed shortcomings of the preceding rule of her half brother, Enrique IV,” contends Elizabeth A. Fehfeldt, which allowed the new queen to represent herself as everything he was not (32). This was a critical political strategy from the earliest period of Isabel’s reign “that allowed her to transcend the misogynist tropes that attacked female rule” (31).

The verbal assaults on Enrique in the chronicles were not fabricated from nothing or invented for no reason, and it would be difficult to maintain that all the descriptions of the king’s idiosyncratic behaviors are simply propaganda. To varying degrees, each chronicle tells truths about Enrique IV’s unusual behavior and appearance, his personal misgivings and social gaffes, and the extent to which he sparked controversy in his own court. But Enrique IV was plagued by criticism while he was on the throne, as well. The vitriolic Coplas del Provincial (c. 1465), and the subtler, more refined Coplas de Mingo Revulgo, written sometime after 1465 and commentated on by Fernando del Pulgar in 1485, both circulated anonymously and engaged in defamatory rhetoric against the king during his lifetime. For the first time in the history of Castile, a king is directly insulted in writing and defamed with startling disregard. Such prolific, pernicious defamation of a monarch was unprecedented in the Iberian Peninsula to that point in time.

Some studies on Enrique IV dating back to the 1950s have returned to the chronicles and other archival material to question and even rehabilitate his reputation as a sordid, immoral, and cruel king. The aim of this chapter is not to attempt to redeem the historical image of Enrique IV, but to reconsider his literary representation through an analysis of the political propaganda, character defamation, and rhetoric in 15th- and sixteenth-century literature, most particularly in the chronicle. The ultimate goal is to underscore the more human aspects of Enrique in hopes of
better understanding what has arguably made him the most maligned and least understood monarch in Castilian history.

ENRIQUE IV AND THE COURT FOOL

History, we know, has not treated Enrique IV kindly. From his own associates to the contemporary scholar, Enrique has been accused of homosexuality, effeminacy, impotence, perversion, cruelty, savagery, impiety, indolence, etc. We have briefly touched on some of the issues that may have led to his being targeted for these accusations, but it is difficult to separate fact from fabrication. From the (hi)stories available to us in the chronicles and archival data, filtered through what we know about literary tendencies and medieval societal practices, it is possible to separate some of the proverbial chaff from the wheat; and one day it may be possible to pin down a universally accepted explanation – be it medical, psychological, or other – of Enrique’s unregal and, seemingly, incomprehensible behavior. But scientific positing is only one facet; to study Enrique as the central object may lead to some, but not all available answers to the mystery of Enrique the king and Enrique the man. To study him as a figure on the periphery may lead to unexpected conceptions and novel directions of research of the king and his reign. Since Enrique was marginalized in his own court and among his own peers, to understand him better from a contemporary perspective, over five centuries removed from his time, it may be useful to try and view him, as is realistically feasible, as his generation did.

In the prologue of his Crónica de Enrique IV, Alonso de Palencia summarizes clearly his position on Enrique IV and the state of affairs in the kingdom: never has there been a worse time in Castile’s history than the 20 years of Enrique’s reign. The tone of the prologue, and numerous passages in the rest of the chronicle, is one of urgency to set the record straight about the
corruption and tyranny during Enrique’s time in power: “un poderoso estímulo pone […] en mi mano la pluma al ver a principes por todo extreme indignos levantar de su abyecta condición a perversos aduladores, empeñados en ensalzar en sus escritos las más bajas acciones […]” (5). He states that his goal in writing his chronicle is to “destruir con la verdad misma” (5) the kind of perversion and hypocrisy so deeply rooted in the ranks of the nobility that would support a king like Enrique, whom, in the same breath, he associates with “la peste” and “maldades” (5). In the first chapter of Book 1, Palencia mentions the young prince’s future signs of “impotence,” “confirmada luego por los medicos,” the frustrated consummation of his first marriage to doña Blanca of Navarre, and some unspecified “impúdicas relaciones con sus cómplices” (10). Perhaps more interesting, though, is the mention of Enrique’s future royal favorite, Juan Pacheco, whom Álvaro de Luna hand selected, believing that the prince “no se desviaría un punto de sus instrucciones” (10). His estimation of Enrique’s character was correct; Pacheco manipulated Enrique like a marionette for much of the king’s life. And, in the simplest of terms, the tandem of Pacheco’s shrewdness and Enrique’s wealth and malleability was nearly unstoppable.

Palencia continues in chapter two with a pen-portrait of the then-crown prince that includes more information about his “infructuoso matrimonio,” that he made every effort to be “enteramente ajeno al conyugal afecto. Bien claro lo demostraba el escaso trato con la esposa […]” (11). The chronicler also admonishes Enrique for his avoidance of royal protocol and political duty, his awkward social behavior, untidy dressing habits, preference of the style of “la caballería árabe, la gineta,” and ridicules his physical appearance. Relative to this, because of Enrique’s broken nose (“aplastada, rota en su mitad,” states the chronicler (11)), Palencia likens Enrique’s face to that of a monkey, and by extension and simple association, other characteristics
of the king. Diego Enríquez del Castillo, Enrique IV’s official chronicler, also compares the king to a monkey in his own chronicle, but to the opposite effect. He writes, “El aspecto feroz, casi a semejanza de león, cuyo acatamiento ponía temor a los que mirava” (133), ascribing to Enrique nobler qualities in reference to the same peculiarity. Still, it remains that Enrique IV had a curious appearance despite any individual perspective, and a pliant personality, both of which were seized and used against him. And Palencia was far from his only published critic (e.g. Fernando del Pulgar, Diego de Valera, Lorenzo Galíndez de Carvajal), even if he was the most vehement. Each of these chroniclers, whose diverse motivations for writing about the king are discussed below, is to some degree in harmony with the others in his critiques. Palencia’s is simply the most extreme of them and, for this very reason, and not despite it, may be an undervalued resource. Using Alonso de Palencia’s *Crónica de Enrique IV* as a sort of proof-text, as I am doing, may not seem advisable given the current consensus that much of this chronicle is overly biased and, at times, a series of exaggerations. I propose, however, that the chronicle at hand may at present be misjudged and depreciated, not in terms of historical verifiability, but rather in terms of “truth” content. Alonso de Palencia may simply have had the effrontery to state plainly some common conceptions about Enrique IV that others avoided out of duty to the office of chronicler or fear of retribution.

As Aristotle observes, there is truth in both history and poetry. One premise of Aristotle’s *Poetics* is that the differences between the historian and the poet extend beyond the notion that one writes in prose and the other in verse. The differences exist not only conceptually and structurally, but functionally, as well. To illustrate this he says “the work of Herodotus might be put into verse, and it would still be a species of history, with meter no less than without it” (IX). The difference is in the intention. Though both poet and historian search for truth and to execute
that truth in writing, historians express specifically “what happened,” while poetic truths are universal. These will observe “how a person of a certain type on occasion speak or act, according to the law of probability or necessity” (IX). The poet is a “maker of plots rather than of verses […] And even if he writes about things that have actually happened, that does not make him any less of a poet, for there is nothing to prevent some of the things that have happened from being in accordance with the laws of possibility and probability, and thus he will be a poet in writing about them” (IX). This, Aristotle might say, would put the 15th-century chronicler Alonso de Palencia more in the vein of Agathon than Thucydides.

There is no evidence that Palencia ever composed anything in verse, but to the careful reader of his Crónica de Enrique IV, Palencia was indeed the “maker of plots,” of which Aristotle writes, and the “cultivator of the truth” the chronicler himself proclaimed to be (Palencia 5). These two ideas, as I hope to have demonstrated, are not mutually and necessarily exclusive. While the information Palencia includes in his Crónica is “often unverifiable and […] sometimes hard to believe because the author tends to magnify his role as a participant in the events he narrates” (Pardo 160), the truthfulness of his accounts might not necessarily be tarnished.

Palencia’s pronounced anathema for Enrique IV, the king he unabashedly associated with the plague in the opening pages of his Crónica, is indisputable. For that reason Julio Puyol wrote that “men so passionate as [Palencia], and who take a direct part in the politics of their epoch, can make history, but not write it” (Alonso de Palencia xxxviii, qtd. in Phillips, Jr 3). Puyol is correct in his assertion that people as involved in politics as Palencia usually do not make the best historians (i.e. those who record “what happened”). History is not a synonym for

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4 Agathon (ca. 448–400 BCE) was a Greek tragedian known for an embellished style, a penchant for exaggeration, and improbable occurrences in order to surprise the audience. For all his rhetorical brilliance, it is said that his plays lack substance. However he is responsible for certain innovation in Greek theater. Thucydides (ca. 460-ca. 395) believed he could separate fact from fiction and rhetoric, as evinced in his History of the Peloponnesian War (Rusten 8).
truth, however; it is but a kind of truth involving multiple individual perspectives of the past. From Palencia’s political functions, he was aware of the importance of obtaining reliable information, and the difficulty in getting it (Pardo 158). It is possible this is a reason his chronicle of Enrique IV differs in tone and in the information it provides. In his prologue, the chronicler is critical of the truth value of other versions of the king’s life, while he applauds the directness and candor of his own: “yo me esforzaré porque los lectores vean claramente que no ha faltado un amante de la verdad, ya que han existido autores de la mentira a quienes los rodeos de la narración harán con facilidad reconocer, cuando se lea la vida de Enrique IV diversa del relato que sigue” (5).

In my opinion, Palencia’s work may very well be as reliable a source of “truth” – poetic truth – as the other chronicles of the era; and to Aristotle, it might have been “something more philosophical and more worthy of serious attention than history” (Aristotle 43) because of, and not despite, its concerns with universal truths instead of strict historical fact. To adopt the philosopher’s earlier example, it would be possible to put the chronicle of Alonso de Palencia into verse, but it would be no more a poem than it already is in prose. When compared to other chronicles, his creates a particularly sordid, inimical representation of Enrique that has Aristotelian characteristics of a tragedy. “Tragedy,” writes Aristotle, “is the representation not only of a complete action, but also of incidents that awaken fear and pity” (23). The defamatory rhetoric that Palencia launches at his sovereign, occasionally subtle, usually not, is designed to evoke the emotional response of fear from the reader. Much of Palencia’s chronicle is saturated with drama; and this aspect becomes especially pronounced to the reader when compared to Diego Enríquez del Castillo’s Crónica del rey Enrique IV deste nombre, and even Fernando del Pulgar’s portrait of Enrique in his Crónica de los Reyes Católicos.
“En tiempos pasados,” Palencia starts the prologue in his *Crónica de Enrique IV*, “referí con especial complacencia los orígenes de la nación española: hoy no me veo obligado a escribir sucesos que se resisten a la pluma” (5). It reads like a disclaimer and heralds scandal. Pulgar’s, on the other hand, starts, “Comienza la Corónica de la muy alta τ muy eçelente princesa doña Isabel, fija del muy alto τ poderoso rey don Juan el segundo de Castilla τ León” (ed. Carriazo 3). And Enríquez del Castillo’s: “Tanto los prínçipes señalados y antiguos varones de las hedades pasados quedaron famosos y sus virtuosos travajos cuviertos de rrenombre…” (129). Though Pulgar is widely considered the most skilled writer and the most balanced historian of the three chroniclers, in the sense that his writings maintain an air of impartiality, which he considered the chronicler’s duty, Palencia makes a bigger and more immediate impact. When compared, the poetry of Palencia’s chronicle is striking; he begins weaving a plot from the first sentence, which, ironically, he manages to do by suggesting he will suppress the details. Because Alonso de Palencia’s literary representation of the life of Enrique IV is arguably the most polemical of all extant sources, it is also one of the most widely scrutinized, though, in agreement with Madeline Pardo, even he “has not been accorded the scholarly attention that he merits” (160). Because in recent years Palencia’s *Crónica de Enrique IV* has been widely judged as too partisan and too licentious to be an accurate portrayal of the king and his reign, evinced by the earlier Puyol quotation, a reevaluation of Palencia’s *Crónica de Enrique IV* is necessary. The chronicler’s treatment of the king calls for new estimations of the current image of Enrique IV as man and monarch. Instead of discarding Palencia’s account of Enrique IV for the chronicler’s political conceptions, or viewing him as the irascible exception to the rule of the more moderate, diplomatic, and therefore, more “truthful” historian, perhaps Palencia’s perspective, though at least as biased as any other chronicler’s, is closer to the poetic truth Aristotle posits. The image
Palencia creates of Enrique may have been closer to the way many others of the time felt about the king, but never expressed as flatly in writing. Through the defamation of Enrique in his chronicle, Palencia’s personal voice is felt in an outcry of crisis and conflict about the king, but also about the state of political relations of Castile at the time. This can be observed in the following excerpt from Book III of his *Crónica de Enrique IV*:

“Era de ver en aquellos primeros días del reinado de D. Enrique a los mismos que de antiguo conocían su perversidad, aterrorizados y pálidos de espanto, procurar a fuerza de humillaciones captarse el favor del nuevo Soberano y ponerse en contradicción con ellos mismos cuando, olvidados de lo que tantas veces presenciaron, confesaban que debía temerse sobre todo la cólera de un Monarca fuerte, poderosísimo y audaz en extremo, sufridor de todo género de fatigas, nunca vencido por el hambre ni por el rigor de las estaciones, y que por tanto ejecutaría acaso con más extrema después de subir al trono lo que antes no había hecho; opinión unánime del pueblo y de la nobleza que, con otras semejantes, contribuyó a exaltar el nombre de D. Enrique” (59).

Alonso de Palencia clearly and vividly depicts the turbulent relationship between the king and the nobility, and implies the rift between their idea of kingship and their reality of the man who occupied the throne. Those who had been witness to the “perversity” of Enrique were now forced to seek the favor of the new king. They were in conflict with themselves over their duty to pledge allegiance to Enrique IV as their sovereign by divine right, and the overt reality (as paraded by Palencia, and told more moderately by other chroniclers) that he was deficient in multiple ways, even from childhood. Palencia writes that, upon a visit to Castile by Juan of Aragón, “el Rey […] quiso así cerciorarse de si el Príncipe era apto para el matrimonio, pues desde su niñez había manifestado señales de futura impotencia, confirmada luego por los
médicos” (10). Although it was probably only meant it in a corporal sense, this accusation is representative of Enrique IV’s reign and how he was perceived by his contemporaries: weak, malleable, and impotent. Just how “impotent” Enrique’s reign was is debated among scholars of Castile’s Middle Ages, as is the accuracy of many of the allegations made against him. One thing is certain, though: Enrique was uncomfortable as a king; it showed; and many of the members of his court went out of their way to take advantage of him by manipulating his ineffectiveness as a leader, his sense of goodwill, and his apparent need to keep the peace in his court, even at personal expense. His behavior was confusing and often at once laughable and disconcerting: his lack of physical coordination; his ungainly stature and slovenly appearance; his obvious dislike of crowds, as well as ceremony, display, pomp, lavish clothing, and other protocol associated with royalty. Enrique did what he could to avoid these things as well as the company of those associated with it: courtiers, grandees, foreign dignitaries, and the like. And the company he preferred to keep, as if to rub salt in the wound, consisted of ruffians and base and hardened company. To fraternize with such men of low birth was nearly unthinkable. He even elevated some of them to exalted posts in his court, outranking some of the established and landed nobility.

One of these men of ill repute was Diego Arias. Arias once wandered from town to town selling trinkets. This marrano, or converted Jew, attracted crowds of customers by juggling and singing, and one day caught Enrique’s eye. Enrique gave Arias the post of tax collector, and from there he was promoted numerous times, finding his ceiling as the chief of Enrique’s finances. Though it is true that Diego Arias lined his pockets while in charge of the king’s vast riches, such a universally common practice should not be levied against him. What is remarkable, however, is that Arias was typical of Enrique’s company, of low birth, the usual
social background of a court fool, or jester. This, apparently, was whom Enrique identified with most easily, and historians are still nonplussed as to how this could be. But just as Enrique chose the once-jester Arias as chief of finances, and as he sneaked away from court to multiple personal hideaways to spend time with the friends his courtiers considered so contemptible, Enrique shared some of these vulgar characteristics, at least in the eyes of the landed aristocracy. Enrique IV, the central power of Castile, was simultaneously a temporal manifestation of divine power, and viewed as a buffoon; royal by birth, but ridiculous, undignified, and incongruous with the majesty of kingship.

The idea of connecting Enrique IV to the image of the court fool has not yet been explored in scholarship, though the bond between king and fool is not a historically unusual one. Erasmus in *Adages* wrote that one ought to be born a king or a fool, and François Rabelais in the third book of his *Gargantua and Pantagreul* writes, “say the mathematicians, kings and fools are born under the same horoscope” (Otto 45). Additionally, in French, the piece closest to the king in chess is the *fou*, or “crazy” or “fool,” exemplifying the historical propinquity of the two figures. Other monarchs and members of royalty have been compared to court fools by 19th-century scholar, John Doran. Among them are Carlos IV of Spain (1788-1808); George III (1760-1801) and George IV (1820-1830) of England; Ferdinand II, the Grand Duke of Tuscany (1621-1670); and a princess of Asturias, at Madrid, in 1722, who repeatedly replied to the parting comments of a French foreign dignitary with “a loud rattling noise in the trachea” (Doran 381), which the court thought deeply funny. Doran’s work, *A History of Court Fools* (1858), reaches no further back in history than the 17th century, though, most likely because there is a sharp decrease in the proliferation of records in Occidental Europe upon crossing the threshold of the “Enlightenment” toward the “Baroque.” There is another plunge in the number of recorded
historical records, both produced and available now, in the 15th century, around the time of the printing press, the increased use of glasses, and the transition from parchment to paper. Most chronicles of Enrique IV were written (or revised) after the king’s death in 1474, around the time or shortly after the printing press was first put to use in “Spain.” Thus, Doran does not include Enrique IV in his study. Moreover, Doran’s work is primarily about the court fool himself, and devotes only one anecdotal chapter to comparing royalty to jesterdom. Studying Enrique IV in light of the tradition of the court fool in western Renaissance Europe, then, may shed new light on the king.

The jester is an intriguing and somewhat elusive character in the history of the western European court, partially due to his, or her as it happened on occasion, contrast to the nobles they served to entertain. In part, this is also due to the wide variety of jesters there were and the different functions they carried out. Entertainers at court were referred to by numerous titles according to their specific function at court: fool, buffoon, clown, comedian, trickster, and jongleur, for example. While a history of the jester is beyond the scope of this study, there are a few points on the chronology that merit highlighting as related to the fool of medieval and Renaissance Europe, most specifically Spain. Some historians consider the origin of the European fool the comic actors of ancient Rome. Others believe it to be the philosophers of ancient Greece. In either case, although there may have been no formal professional jester, each would have fulfilled the role of the medieval or Renaissance archetype. The Roman comic actors were known for their, at times extreme, histrionics (after all, they had to compete for popularity with other entertainment in the coliseum); and the Greek philosophers appear to have spoken rather freely at will with few negative repercussions, and “to have communicated disagreeable

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5 The printing press was probably first used in Segovia, the town where Enrique took refuge from his royal responsibilities whenever possible, in 1472 by Johannes Parix. The work printed was an updated Sinodal de Segovia. By 1499, a printing house was established in Monserrat, which is currently still running (Griffin 1).
truths to tyrants who would not have accepted an unpleasant innuendo from an ordinary courtier, without rewarding it with torture or death. This very rudeness of speech, on the part of many philosophers, to princes who were their patrons, is the distinguishing feature of the [early-]
modern jester” (Doran 6).

The demands of kingship could leave the monarch feeling isolated, despite frequent lack of privacy in his life. In private, when they were around their jesters were among the few times some kings felt as if they could let their guard down a little and relax, which is one reason some fools were highly esteemed. As Marais, jester to Louis XIII (r. 1610-43) put it: “There are two things about your job I couldn’t handle…eating alone and shitting in company” (Otto 48). This kind of drollness was treasured by aristocrats, and the fools that possessed this wit enjoyed a high measure of favor in royal courts and households of nobles. The few early-modern jesters who were as sharp as Marais, or in Spain, the famous Estabanillo Gonzalez or Martin of Aragon (1394-1410), the latter of which is said to have been worth a ton of gold for his trade business in humor, were prized as counsellors and companions in addition to their talent in comedic matters. But not all jesters and fools were as respected, or even tolerated. The distinction between being a “natural” and an “artificial” fool largely determined how a court-fool was treated (Welsford 119).

A “natural,” as might be inferred, was an individual with mental and/or physical disabilities that those who kept jesters found risible, and who was, thus, ‘naturally’ suited to the post of jester. As many kings and noblemen kept fools at court, recruitment of them was a common practice in much of Western Europe. One of Germany’s most famous jesters, Claus Narr (Fool), was a “natural,” and served four different Saxon noblemen and an archbishop during the last part of the 15th century and the early sixteenth. Claus Narr was recruited by Elector Ernst
(one day while the aristocrat was traveling through Ranstadt on business. The story goes that Claus, who was curious about the excitement caused by the horses and carriages of Ernst’s convoy, went to investigate. But worried that his geese would be stolen, he fastened some of them by their necks under his belt and squeezed the others under his arms. Ernst was instantly fascinated with the boy’s foolishness and asked Claus’s father if he might take him to court, to which he replied: “That would be great, Sir! I’d be relieved of a great encumbrance thereby; the youth is no good to me – he makes nothing but trouble in my house and stirs up the whole village with his pranks” (Otto 4). Claus Narr’s error that resulted in the death or injury of several of his father’s geese is seen as funny because of its innocence. Claus’s transgression of social protocol is anecdotal only because he is not to blame for it. This characteristic is common to every fool in life and literature: “whether ‘fool’ refers to the village tattle-tale, to a privileged royal jester or to a particularly unworldly spirit who bears his worldly burdens with gentle amiability, its implication is that somehow the man is defective in nature or education” (Swain 3). But when the man with such an unworldly, gentle spirit, whose malleability and social awkwardness dominate his personality sits on the throne, his political iniquities cannot be reasonably shrugged off or forgiven.

Enrique’s childhood was a lonely one, we can imagine, and he is described by chroniclers of being of frail health. He had no siblings and spent very little time with his parents, Juan and Maria. At the age of four, in 1429, he was given his own dwellings and effectively handed over to his mentor and educator, Pedro Barrientos. Through no fault of his own he spent little time as a youth with the high nobility, that is, those from whom he might have learned the manners and customs of a king. Luis Suárez Fernández explains that when he tried to make up for lost time, it was too late; the child had already become accustomed to associating with commonplace,
mediocre people, his servants and the like, whom later he would promote to high posts in his
court. A few years later, at the beginning of Enrique’s adolescence, all the chroniclers, whose
political views are so divergent, agree on one thing about the Prince’s personality: he was easily
manipulated and quite apathetic; he depended upon others to make decisions for him. And the
consequences were that he gravitated heavily toward a forgive-and-forget stance on offenses
(Suárez Fernández 14). Enrique was also known for committing social blunders and
embarrassing himself in public and at court. Some were benign indiscretions, for example,
refusing to present the royal hand for the customary kiss, or his habit of addressing children with
the formal pronoun “vos.” Others were offenses with more serious repercussions, such as
Enrique’s inadvertent but very avoidable exacerbation of the negative politics surrounding the
birth of his daughter, Juana “la Beltraneja,” and the proliferation of the propaganda that she was
illegitimate. Many scholars interested in the life and times of Enrique IV have written studies of
his reign, of the composition of his court, of the king’s physiology, his personality, quirks,
unpopular decisions among the nobility, etc. Psychology, too, is explored in Townsend Miller’s
Henry IV of Castile, though Miller’s objective seems to be the painting of a vivid portrait of the
king rather than the labeling of what might have been his particular psychological encumbrances.
In what follows, I will draw upon many past analyses of the last Trastamaran king, including
those of his contemporaries, to assert a firmly psychological evaluation and specific diagnosis of
Enrique IV.

ENRIQUE IV: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Over the centuries, Enrique IV has been amply diagnosed with physical (and mental?) maladies,
particularly in the late 15th century, during the reign of Fernando and Isabel, and the 20th, with
numerous studies that have endeavored to shed new light on the mysteries of Enrique’s persona. Of the former kind, we have heard much of what these chroniclers have said and explored what their diverse motives may have been, from the political to the personal. Five centuries removed from the political pandemonium of late-medieval Castile, scholars inspired by the writings that paint the dim portrait of the king we have today, have no vendetta with Enrique, nothing to gain or lose from the political ebb and flow of his reign.

Starting with the medical analysis of the Spanish endocrinologist, don Gregorio Marañón y Posadillo, *Ensayo biológico sobre Enrique IV de Castilla y su tiempo* (1930), medical science found interest in the mystery of Enrique in an attempt to assess and diagnose the king’s condition, as described in the chronicles, and from an actual examination of his physical remains. Alternative analyses of Castile’s political climate for other explanations of Enrique’s observed eccentricities were already underway by 1912 in J.B. Sitges’ *Enrique IV y la Excelente señora llamada vulgarmente doña Juana la Beltraneja*. Although Sitges’ ultimate objective was to acquit Juana of all charges of illegitimacy, part of the means to this end was necessarily a defense of Enrique, albeit very partial, and evidence against the accusations of impotence.

As historical evidence to write his *Ensayo biológico*..., about which the doctor himself boasted irrefutability, Marañón used the two principal chronicles of Enrique IV’s reign: *Crónica de Enrique IV* by Diego Enríquez de Castillo and the work of the same title by Alonso de Palencia. These two chroniclers do provide the most information about Enrique’s physical appearance, personality, behavior, and idiosyncrasies, at times with surprising detail. And on these Marañón was able to diagnose Enrique as suffering from acromegalic eunuchoidism (79), caused by an imbalance in the endocrine system that combines symptoms of both acromegaly and eunuchoidism, an extremely rare tandem of physical abnormalities. The former is
characterized by atypical growth in the peripheral areas of the skull, jaw, hands, and feet; eunuchoidism, otherwise currently known as hypogonadism, is a defect in the male or female reproductive system that results in low or no production in the gonads. This would have contributed some feminine features to Enrique’s appearance and, according to Marañón, would have also caused homosexuality. It is now nearly common knowledge that there is no biological or chemical link between endocrine abnormalities and homosexuality.6

After Enrique’s body was exhumed, his remains examined, and the diagnosis of acromegalic eunuchoidism was made, all done by Marañón in the early part of the 20th century, the doctor’s verdict was accepted as indisputable for decades. Scholars of celebrity status, such as Ramón Menéndez Pidal, and most recently and curiously, Luis Suárez Fernández, have unswervingly embraced Marañón’s theories about Enrique’s medical conditions. In Daniel Eisenberg’s 1976 study, “Enrique IV and Gregorio Marañón,” he returns to the famed endocrinologist’s disquisition, noting the controversial nature of Alonso de Palencia’s chronicle, one of Marañón’s principal sources, and the extreme rarity of the condition the endocrinologist diagnoses. Eisenberg brings to light that in the history of recorded medicine, only two cases of acromegalic eunuchoidism are found, thus implying the spuriousness of Marañón’s analysis. He adroitly dismantles the formerly airtight interpretation of eunuchoidism. He demonstrates that the doctor admits Enrique “did not suffer from eunuchoidism” after all, but from “displasia eunucoide,” that is, in Eisenberg’s words, “Enrique did not have a disease (acromegaly), nor an approximation of a disease (‘acromegalic eunuchoidism’), but an approximation of an approximation of a disease, and even in this he was more normal than pathological” (24, 5).

6 Daniel Eisenberg gives an excellent and concise explanation of the medical terms of Marañón’s diagnosis of “displásico eunucoide con reacción acromegálica” in his essay, “Enrique IV and Gregorio Marañón,” Renaissance Quarterly. 29:1, Spring 1976, 21-29.
Next, and with amusing simplicity, he underscores the absolute impossibility of any kind of eunuchoidism with the fact that “no source denies that Enrique had an abundant beard” (25).

In the second half of his essay, however, Daniel Eisenberg’s argument begins to lose steam. Just after he discredits the argument of eunuchoidism, he goes one step further in attempting to textually demonstrate Enrique’s sexual potency, as well as support the acromegaly part of Marañón’s diagnosis. One of Eisenberg’s major supporting points for acromegaly is the symptom of loss of libido and potency later in life, which remains relatively unaffected early on. First, Eisenberg sets forth that “no source denies that Enrique was sexually potent before his unhappy first marriage with Blanca de Navarre” (25), but it should be noted that there are very few sources at all that make reference to the king’s sexuality before his coronation in 1454. One of these few references of which Eisenberg makes use is the quotation of Fernando del Pulgar’s pen-portrait of Enrique, which states that the young Prince of Asturias “en…su menor hedad…se dio a algunos deleites que la mocedad suele demandar e la onestidad deve negar” (Pulgar 5). Although Pulgar is probably making reference to sexual activity, the quotation is vague at best. And surely the chronicler was not present during these so-called “deleites,” and would have had no first-hand knowledge of Enrique’s sexual comportment. The other testimony to Enrique’s potency is the controversial accounts of the prostitutes he is said to have visited in his beloved Segovia. The prostitutes’ claim as quoted by Gregorio Marañón from Memorias de Enrique IV de Castilla, II, is also quoted by Daniel Eisenberg in his essay discussed in this chapter. The prostitutes are cited as having said that Enrique “tenía una verga viril firme y daba su débito y simiente viril como otro varón.” Although this quotation might initially raise eyebrows, its reliability is no greater than any other hear-say offered as evidence, most of which is purely speculative.
Two years after Daniel Eisenberg’s essay was published, William Phillips, Jr. authored *Enrique IV and the Crisis of Fifteenth-Century Castile: 1425-1480*, in the 5th chapter of which he critiques Marañón’s and Eisenberg’s theories in conjunction. Although Phillips agrees with Eisenberg that eunuchoidism was invalid, as a diagnosis he also believes that Eisenberg was overly zealous in his staying with the hypothesis of acromegaly. Phillips refers to the 1946 exhumation of the king’s body in the monastery of Guadalupe during which Marañón was given the opportunity to examine the skeleton. “Marañón made no mention of abnormalities,” affirms Phillips, “which would have been apparent if the king had suffered from acromegaly” (94). Had Enrique actually had the disease, Marañón states the manifestations would have included (the emphasis is mine) “pies y manos grandes, talla exagerada, prognatismo mandibular, a veces cifosis, etc.” (80). Phillips cites the references to Enrique’s smallish feet by both the chroniclers Enríquez and Palencia as evidence of the absence of acromegaly.

One of the most recent works on Enrique IV is Luis Suárez Fernández’s *Enrique IV de Castilla: la difamación como arma política*, published in 2001. Similarly to Phillips, Jr., Suárez Fernández writes sympathetically about Enrique as monarch and as man, continuing the contemporary trend of reevaluating the king’s reign. But whereas the principal aim of Phillips’ book is to demonstrate by placing “his actions in their proper perspective” that Enrique was actually a much more effective ruler than had been previously thought (Phillips 1), Suárez Fernández scrutinizes numerable fifteenth and sixteenth-century texts to provide a detailed account of the highly charged political atmosphere of Enrique’s twenty-year reign and how the king was the malleable victim of political propaganda and defamation.

Suárez Fernández also supports through his work that the infirmity of the king is indisputable, which helps us to understand his unwonted personality, his changing attitudes and
moods, as well as other personal characteristics: his love of song, isolation, and repugnant odors, to name but a few; his disgust with fine clothing, pomp and ceremony, and the responsibilities of kingship (8). Relative to this, though, the Spanish historian’s research endorses the findings of Gregorio Marañón, whose medical analysis was over six decades old at the publication of Suárez Fernández’s work, and whose inaccuracy is attested.

In light of both Daniel Eisenberg’s and William Phillips Jr.’s cogent deflation of Marañón’s ideas about Enrique’s condition, Suárez Fernández’s twenty-first-century endorsement of them is difficult to comprehend. Be that as it may, three decades after the explanation of endocrine imbalance had begun to fall from general favor, there have been no new theories postulated about what may have been the matter with Enrique IV. Phillips Jr. continued avowing the possible homosexuality of the king, but offers only links between this and how Enrique was manipulated by those around him. Whatever connection there may or may not be relative to Phillips’ thoughts, the historical relevance of Enrique’s possible homosexuality should be questioned. Historically, homosexuality has not proven an obstacle to effective leadership or “manly” behavior. And so contemporary scholarship finds itself effectively at its point of departure, having only reached some consensus about what the Castilian king was not.

That there was something incommodious and awkward about Enrique seems to be unquestioned, perhaps even unquestionable. Not even the most ardent defenders of his reign deny it. It is true that many of the chronicles of Enrique IV were reworked at the request of Isabel to include propaganda detrimental to her half-brother’s image. By using Enrique’s reign as a sordid backdrop, Isabel was more easily able to foreground a shining image of her own as uncorrupt and virtuous – the perverted past offsetting a pure and Christian present and future. But political rhetoric and vilification of the king aside, a few historians have wondered why
Enrique has been singled out historically as the most miserable failure of a monarch in Castile’s history. Eisenberg cites Alfonso X’s proficiency with the lute, and Juan II’s suggestibility by those around him, contrasting them with the same qualities in Enrique IV and pointing out that in the latter they have been shown as signs of homosexuality (25). Enrique’s love of music and mellifluous singing voice were also pointed out by Suárez Fernández as well as his preference for isolation and alleged impotence as “algunos rasgos esenciales de su carácter” that might aid us in better understanding the king’s “actitudes cambiantes” (8). Suárez Fernández continues, “otros monarcas han tenido dificultades serias con su salud. ¿Por qué en este caso, revistieron tanta gravedad” (8)? Clearly we should carefully consider the political environment and the motives of those who worked and socialized with Enrique. But there seems to be more to it than that, as most would agree. Why in this case? As some have said before, it seems evident that Enrique was not simply the unfortunate victim of defamatory propaganda, but also made himself an easy target and the object of ridicule, as well.

In my estimation, the possibility that Enrique IV’s condition was psychological has been grievously under researched. Some studies have made passing mention of the possibility of, for example, Eisenberg states that Enrique “was…subject to great psychological pressures” but that “circumstances, and no more than that, suggest a psychological cause” to the king’s problems (29). Beyond this, very little is said about the psychological aspects of Enrique’s condition. Only in Townsend Miller’s compassionate biography of the king might one hear whispers of the idea of a mild mental retardation. William Phillips, Jr., who asserts that “the time has come to recognize and acknowledge that many of the standard assumptions about [the] unfortunate king are myths,” lays the failures of Enrique’s administrations at the doorstep of “great forces at work,” politics, and circumstance (128). Yet in the same breath, Phillips freely acknowledges
that Enrique’s successors “were shrewder at judging the tides of their epoch;” that they “had a better appreciation of the complex situations threatening the Castilian crown;” and that to this “their responses were firm and comprehensive, where [Enrique’s] had been faltering and piecemeal” (128). The fact remains that Enrique was bullied by those around him, including those he handpicked to be at his side, while Fernando and Isabel were able to subdue any fractious nobles.

Phillips was precipitous to lay to rest the “standard assumptions” about Enrique, by which he seems to be referring to the king’s vague illness and legacy as an unmitigated failure. However, in agreement with Phillips, Enrique and the Catholic Monarchs responded differently to the crises that confronted them, “in large part because [Enrique] could not devote his undivided attention and energies to any one of the three problems” (128), which were the added threat of Aragonese hostilities in addition to the challenge of the Castilian nobility and the effectual stalemate in Granada. With regards to the long-stagnant Granada campaign, Enrique IV’s failure to “reclaim” the Muslim emirate for Castile was not unique. For approximately 250 years following the Christian victory at the Battle of las Navas de Tolosa, in 1212, Granada was effectively left to the Muslims. The Reconquista was resumed and completed by Isabel and Fernando by means of an alliance with Aragon, stilling hostilities between the kingdoms, and the innovative use of artillery to obliterate the strongholds that hitherto would have required a long and costly siege.

Recent research in psychology offers new directions to explore about Enrique and his evident unconventional behavior. Many of the behaviors described by Enrique IV’s chroniclers, especially Enríquez del Castillo and Alonso de Palencia, that have until recently been thought to be the rare disorders described above, may well be indications of a much more common
Pervasive Developmental Disorder (PDD). The fourth and most recent edition of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Text Revision* (*DSM-IV-TR*) states that these disorders “are characterized by severe deficits and pervasive impairment in multiple areas of development. These include impairment in reciprocal social interaction, impairment in communication, and the presence of stereotyped behavior, interests, and activities” (40). Among these psychological afflictions are included Autistic Disorder, Asperger’s Disorder, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified, the latter a categorization for those who possess some combination of the symptoms of a PDD, but cannot be diagnosed as completely one or another. As Enrique IV is described in the chronicles he exhibits many of the behaviors typical of high-functioning Autistic Disorder or Asperger’s Disorder. The fundamental aspects of Autistic Disorder are “the presence of markedly abnormal or impaired development in social interaction and communication and a markedly restricted repertoire of activity and interests” (*DSM-IV-TR* 70). These features are broken down into three components in a list of diagnostic criteria for Autistic Disorder in the *DSM-IV-TR*: qualitative impairment in social interaction, communication, and patterns of behavior, as can be seen on the table at the end of this dissertation. A total of a minimum of six symptoms must be found present in the subject; at least two from “social interaction,” one from “communication,” and one from “patterns of behavior,” with the remaining two serving as “electives,” so to speak, that can be taken from any of the categories.

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7 The other disorders included in the categorization of Pervasive Developmental Disorders are Rett’s Disorder and Childhood Disintegrative Disorder. Rett’s Disorder will not be counted as a possible affliction for Enrique IV because it has only been diagnosed in females. Childhood Disintegrative Disorder “has a distinctive pattern of developmental regression following at least 2 years of normal development” (*DSM-IV-TR* 83), is associated with “marked degrees of mental retardation” (83), and can thus also be counted out as a possibility as it is clearly not the case with Enrique IV.
The Encyclopedia of Autism Spectrum Disorders states that autism usually “appears before a child’s third birthday […] affecting communication and social skills and impairing the child’s ability to play, speak, and relate to the world” (131). Very little is known about Enrique’s childhood. However, the few glimpses the chronicles afford us may be useful, as they seem to indicate a general frailty of health (Enríquez 101). From the age of 4, Enrique spent his childhood days in Segovia, raised by his Dominican guardian, Lope Barrientos, and “seems, from the first, to have been introverted, uncommunicative, [and] painfully retired” (Miller 11). Barrientos is quoted by Alonso de Palencia as having said that when the time came for Enrique to assume the throne of Castile, he would be the kingdom’s ruin (Palencia 147). Another clue is Alonso de Palencia’s account of the meeting between Juan II of Castile, Enrique’s father, and Juan of Aragon, father of Enrique’s first wife, Blanca of Navarre. One reason for the reunion was apparently that Juan of Aragon “quiso así cerciorarse de si el Príncipe era apto para el matrimonio. Pues desde su niñez había manifestado señales de futura impotencia confirmada luego por los médicos” (11). I earlier brought up the point that the chronicler may not have meant this literally, but because it was a convenient way of communicating a general and poetic truth about Enrique that something was amiss.

The idea of “impotence” deserves special consideration in this particular case, which has traditionally been taken very literally and perhaps ought not to be. Whisperings of sexual impotence, which quickly turned into common gossip, spread throughout Enrique’s court after the failed consummation with doña Blanca. The issue of the king’s reputed lack of virility was, to be certain, an integral part of the Catholic Kings’ smear campaign against their predecessor. But Palencia’s mention of incipient signs of impotence is unexpected – a peculiar detail to include in an account of his youth. That is, unless the young Prince of Asturias was indeed
exhibiting some enigmatic behaviors that were retroactively and conveniently judged to be signs of impotence. We may safely attribute the impossible diagnosis of “future impotence” to Palencia’s antipathy for Enrique, but maybe not the idea that Enrique was displaying symptoms of some other condition that can now be detected in childhood by contemporary science. Every chronicle relating in any depth at all Enrique’s life alludes to his so-called unusual habits and behavior, which may conceivably be interpreted as “the presence of markedly abnormal or impaired development in social interaction and communication […]” (DSM-IV-TR 70). The inability to explain his social attitudes to general satisfaction has transcended the strengthening trend over the past half-century supporting the notion that Enrique’s recorded eccentricities should be attributed to defamatory political propaganda after his death.

Asperger’s Disorder is diagnosed using nearly the same set of criteria and in the past has been used as a synonym for less severe forms of Autistic Disorder. In recent years, however, certain distinctions have been made. For example, researchers have discovered that people with Asperger’s Disorder generally have a higher IQ and more advanced verbal skills than people with autism. Accordingly, they tend to have less difficulty functioning in social situations and with communication. In fact, often their language skills are on a par with those of peers, “although their speech is usually described as peculiar, such as being stilted and focusing on unusual topics” (Turkington 10). People with Asperger’s also tend to be clumsier than their autistic counterparts, and have similar “stereotyped or repetitive behaviors and mannerisms and nonfunctional rituals” (10). Enrique’s use of language has been little commented on, probably because it was generally unremarkable – neither exceedingly good nor exceedingly poor. However, Palencia did note that conversations Enrique engaged in were “a cada paso interrumpida[s]” (11), and Enríquez del Castillo observed that he was “honesto y mesurado en su
hablar” and that “toda conversación le dava pena” (134), which may be a hidden clue to the king’s condition when taken in context of other potential symptoms.

There has been little research done on identifying recognizable psychological or social disorders in literature or historical documents, as the development of unified criteria for diagnosing many such as Autistic Disorder and Asperger’s syndrome did not begin until the latter half of the 20th century. Only recently has a trend begun in academia to return to literary works with a scientific, revisionist eye. For example, two 19th-century works have been signaled as containing possible historical references to autism. The Encyclopedia of Autism Spectrum Disorders points out the Wild Boy of Aveyron (1801) as one example (93). In this study of a “feral” boy found in the woods near Aveyron, French scientist Jean Marc Gaspard Itard (1774-1838) describes his attempts to rehabilitate the child toward civilization. Eventually Itard comes to the conclusion that Victor, as he was referred to, was neither feral nor raised by animals as he had believed, and he did not know how to adequately explain the boy’s condition. In fact, it is coming to light that many past cases of feral children said to have been raised by animals may in reality have been afflicted with a PDD (Koegel 270). The descriptions of Victor’s behavior (limited, intense interests, fixed gaze, rocking motions, etc.) and physical condition when he was found (many scars on the body, but smooth hands and knees) over a century later led to the conclusion that Victor was indeed not a feral child, but very probably an autistic child, beaten and later abandoned by his parents. While the case of Victor is too severe to effectively parallel the descriptions of Enrique IV in the chronicles, the apparent abuse and the subsequent abandonment the child suffered exhibit a social reaction more in line with a 15th-century mentality than to a contemporary one.
The other possible historical reference to autism is in Herman Melville’s short story, “Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street,” originally published in 1853 in Putnam’s Magazine. Melville writes of a business owner who has three assistants who are not very industrious and only marginally stable for various reasons. To remedy the lack of productivity in the office, the businessman, who is also the intradiagnostic narrator, advertizes the position of office assistant, to which responds Bartleby, a “pitiably respectable, incurably forlorn” young man (Melville). Within a short period of time after being hired, Bartleby did progressively less work around the office until his production stopped altogether, stating always that he would “prefer not to” complete any task requested of him. At first, the young man incurred the anger of his boss, which gradually tempered to a mixture of concern and pity. The boss, feeling unable somehow to fire (i.e. harm) Bartleby, moves offices, thinking that would solve the problem. Bartleby, however, refuses to leave the office building and is eventually jailed by authorities for his persistence. His former boss visits him in prison occasionally and procures the services of a “turnkey” to ensure Bartleby stays well fed. Days later, the narrator discovers that Bartleby has died because he “preferred not to” eat.

Ashley Kern Koegel, author of the article “Evidence Suggesting the Existence of Asperger’s Syndrome in the Mid-1800s,” published in 2008, asserts that the behavior the title character exhibits in the short story is indicative of an Autism Spectrum Disorder (or Asperger’s syndrome), “although the appropriate history is not given to ascertain whether or not these symptoms had early onset […]” (270). Koegel, who also uses the DSM-IV-TR to make her assessment, explains that Bartleby displays impairment with nonverbal behaviors, difficulty with conversation, and an inability to develop appropriate relationships with peers, citing one of Bartleby’s working colleagues from the story, “what miserable friendlessness and loneliness are
here revealed. His poverty is great, but his solitude, how horrible!” (Melville, qtd. in Koegel 271). The character also lacks social and emotional reciprocity, “even when confronted with extreme aggression and anger” (271). Each of these signs, as I hope to continue to demonstrate, mirrors much of what can be observed about Enrique IV from the chronicles of his time.

It would not be an overstatement to say that Enrique IV was confronted with extremely aggressive behavior nearly every day of his 20 years on the throne, and almost without exception his passive or evasive responses to the aggression perplexed, worried, even angered those around him. It might be that Enrique was unable to interpret this hostility for what it was. The first of such occasions occurred during the first full year of Enrique’s reign, during the campaign against Granada. With an army estimated between 20,000 and 40,000, Enrique marched south toward the last Muslim stronghold in the peninsula only to command his forces not to attack. As his commanders complained angrily over the next four days of stalemate, Enrique permitted them to destroy the crops, but to leave the trees alone. His obsessions, including trees, wild animals, solitude, and Segovia will be discussed below. At the end of four days, the command was made to pull up camp without thought to the war barons’ sizeable expenses for the preparations for battle; without thought to the nobles’ desires for booty, fame, and glory; without thought to the humiliation suffered before the enemy by those lords who travelled with him; and apparently without thought to the damage dealt to the king’s own reputation and the nobles’ allegiances to the crown.

To date, no answer to this odd behavior has been universally accepted. William Phillips, Jr. agrees with the chronicler Enríquez del Castillo’s explanation that it was all part of the king’s strategy of slow attrition, to exhaust the Muslims’ supplies. But if that were so, why would Enrique have earlier made promises to capture Granada? And why would he have assembled
such a large army and not disclose his strategy? I reject the notion that Enrique was confidently following his own plan, effectively using the nobles and their forces as pawns. At no other time during the following 19 years of Enrique’s life would he manifest such a manipulative and fiercely independent mindset. Enríquez del Castillo himself said that the king “hazía poca estima de sy mismo” (135). It is possible that Enrique simply was unable to grasp the complete situation at hand, and could not interpret the anger of the war barons. A short while later Enrique committed the same egregious offense as his forces closed in on Archidona, a smaller Muslim city. The plan was to attack before dawn, but Enrique had decided to go hunting and did not arrive to the battle site until well after sunrise. The plan was irreparably ruined for a second time, which nearly provoked mutiny, and did precipitate rumors of the king’s sympathy for the infidel.

This perceived abandonment of duty by Enrique was not an isolated case, but a pattern of behavior remarked on by nearly every chronicler that wrote about him. Despite pleas from the nobles, Enrique continued to be absent from court in favor of pursuing his personal interests, which stood out enough to be remarked on by Enríquez del Castillo, Palencia, Diego de Valera, and Fernando del Pulgar: hunting, animals, trees, his private retreats in the nearby woods, and spending time in Segovia. As illustrated above, that Enrique would not heed the pleas of his court and colleagues suggests a lack of social and emotional reciprocity. Relative to his doing it in conjunction with very specific, habitual amusements, the DSM-IV-TR states, “these interests and activities are pursued with great intensity often to the exclusion of other activities” (80), which may indicate a Pervasive Development Disorder such as Asperger’s.

Many small details are included in the chronicles about Enrique’s preferences and aversions, many of which stand out as unregal, or simply strange. Both Enríquez del Castillo and Alonso de Palencia noted that the king would rarely accept the perfunctory royal kiss of the
hand, “contra la costumbre de los principles españoles” (Palencia 11), which Enríquez attributes to his humbleness (135). Enríquez also comments that he “nunca, jamás bevió vyno” (135). Both chroniclers bring to light that Enrique preferred not to dress in the rich, stately garments suited to a king, but that “fue vestir muy onesto, ropas de paño de lana, el trabajo de aquellos sayos luengos, capuzes, e capas” (135). Palencia’s take is antagonistic, as might be expected: “cubría siempre su hermosa cabellera, con feos casquetes o con otra cualquier indecorosa caperuza o birete […]. Todo lo afeaba con su indigno traje y más descuidados calzado” (11). Enríquez del Castillo observes that “el tono de su voz, dulçe muy bien proporçionado, todo canto triste le dava deleyte [y que] preçiávase de thener cantors y, con ellos, cantar muchas vezes en los ofiçios divinales, mucho se deleytava. Estava syenpre rretaydo, tañía dulçemente laud, sentía bien la perfection de la músyca” (134). These seemingly disparate character attributes can all be unified under some common signs of Autistic Disorder. The Mental Retardation Sourcebook states that some people with autism “speak in a sing-song voice” and that they “often have abnormal responses to sounds, touch, or other sensory stimulation. Many show reduced sensitivity to pain. They also may be extraordinarily sensitive to other sensations. These unusual sensitivities may contribute to behavioral symptoms such as resistance to being cuddled” (51). Another of Enrique’s behaviors, hitherto ignored by scholars, which may be a clue to indicate a mild form of autism, is his fixed gaze. It is common for people with autism, especially at an early age, “to look carefully at people and objects” (Shannon 35), or as the The Encyclopedia of Autism Spectrum Disorders states, “focusing intently on one item for long periods of time” (21). While no evidence is available about this from his childhood, correllating to the symptom of “focusing intently on one item for a long time,” Enríquez del Castillo writes, “donde ponía la vista mucho le durava el mirar” (134), while Palencia alleges that “sus ojos feroce, de un color que ya por sí
If Enrique IV did indeed have a form of Autistic Disorder, it would then be no surprise that he showed little affection toward his first wife, Blanca, and that he never consummated his marriage with her. He may have felt aversion toward the skin-to-skin contact of the royal kissing of the hand. That he disliked wine, but “respiraba con delicia la fetidez de la corrupción, y el hedor de los cascos cortados de los caballos, el del cuero quemado y otros aún más nauseabundos” while “cualquier olor agradable le era molesto” (Palencia 12) would not seem so strange.

It has already been stated here that individuals with Asperger’s are usually clumsier than those with autism (although autistic people tend to be less physically coordinated than those without the disorder), and conduct themselves in similar ways, including non-functional repetitive, idiosyncratic, and ritualistic behaviors. Enrique’s preference for riding horses a la gineta, or jennet style, may be an indication of this physical awkwardness, and unease with riding larger horses. Enríquez del Castillo writes positively, saying that the king “hera gran cavalgador de la gineta,” y que “usábalo de contino, tanto que los del reyno a su enxeplo conformados, dexaron la poleçía de ser honbres de armas” (135). In a time when the Muslims were never less popular in Castile, Enrique’s personal choice of jennet style cavalry, not to mention the Muslim garb he sometimes wore and the Muslim servants he had, was odd and easily criticized. Palencia’s more negative spin on the matter is that Enrique, “desdeñó también toda regia pompa en el cabalgar, y prefirió, a usanza de la caballería árabe, la gineta […]. Embrazó la adarga con más gusto que empeñó el cetro […]” (11). The last part of this quotation may be seen as a three-part insult. The adarga from the Arabic word, "al-daraqa" ("shield"), was

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8 Gineta, or horse of the Zenete kind, pertaining to a tribe of Berbers, refers to a smallish horse that was commonly used by the Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula during the Middle Ages.
traditionally used by the Muslim light cavalry, but not by Christian soldiers, that is, until around the time of Juan II (1406-1454). Palencia’s mocking tone that this use of the light weaponry was more appropriate “para algaradas, incursiones y escaramuzas,” that is, skirmishes, is an attack on Enrique’s manhood and religious piety. That the king was more suited to even this than he was to ruling the kingdom (i.e. que empeñó el cetro), assaults his leadership abilities.

Although, as I mentioned, the jennet style of cavalry was adopted by the Christian Castilians sometime in the early 15th or late fourteenth century, and grew in popularity until the use of fire arms became more prolific, it may be that Enrique’s choice of riding style was based as much on physical necessity as anything else. He was certainly a large enough man to ride the noble steed of a king; his skeleton still measured a full six feet after it was exhumed in the early 20th century. He may have simply felt uncomfortable, or unable to control such a large animal due to his possible diminished physical coordination. Enrique is described by the chroniclers as having an ungraceful body, with small feet and a large head and hands. Townsend Miller adds that he had a “slouchy” posture (35) and that his hands were “limp” (3). Studies have shown that individuals with high-functioning Autism, though usually not those with Asperger’s Syndrome, have “involuntary dyskinesia of the extremities, abnormalities of muscle tone […], abnormal body posture and gaits, ‘diminished associated movements of the arms during locomotion’” (Rinehart et. al. 257). Though Enrique’s body may have been massive, his muscle tone and coordination may have been diminished, one possible reason for his preference of a smaller horse.

In the years to come, Enrique IV’s focus in life as Prince of Asturias was not on preparing himself for the onus of kingship, and as monarch his energies converged, not on the management of his reign, nor on the political or social obligations of a man of such high profile,
but rather on the avoidance of duty in favor of his personal affinities. He seemed unwilling or unable to perform as a king should. “Fuya de los negoçios y despachávalos muy tarde,” (134) wrote Enríquez del Castillo, and Alonso de Palencia, “para alejar a las gentes, escogió hombres rudos y feroces que, mientras él se encerraba allí con algnos malvados, recorrían con armas y a caballo las encrucijadas, ahuyentando a los que pretendían saludar al Rey a tartar con él algún negocio […]” (11). Enrique’s interests as they are described by the chroniclers seem to have been more narrow, defined, and intense. Both chroniclers agree that he held himself aloof from those around him, from life at court, and from his first wife in favor of hunting excursions, walks in the seclusion of nearby mountains, and escapes to his beloved city of Segovia, often with his vulgar companions. Palencia’s depiction of the company Enrique kept as “hombre rudos y feroces,” and his asseveration that the king was “entragado completamente a hombres infames [y que] no acogía de buen grado a ninguna persona de esclarecido linaje o de notable ingenio” (11), is more delicately sustained by Enríquez del Castillo: “holgava mucho con sus servidores y criados, avía plazer de dalles estado y ponellos en honrra […]” (134). When compared to the absolute superiority with which the nobility regarded themselves relative to their servants, Enrique’s intimacy with such “malvados” (Palencia 11) was incompatible with the image of power and kingship. In Asperger’s Disorder, as opposed to Autistic Disorder, in which “self-isolation or markedly rigid social approaches” are the typical social interaction patterns, “there may appear to be motivation for approaching others even though this is then done in a highly eccentric, one-sided, verbose, and insensitive manner” (DSM-IV-TR 83).

Townsend Miller’s assessment of this situation in his Henry IV of Castile is that “the complex seek the simple, the low in their own eyes the even lower,” who served Enrique as a “welcome outlet […] from his whorled and troubled thoughts” (16). This is to say, that Enrique
sought out low-born companions so that he could view himself for once at the top of the pecking order. Luis Suárez Fernández believes that his fatal attraction to ruffians was due to numerous variables, including the nearly complete absence of his parents and nobility in his upbringing: “Varios rasgos se marcaron […] en su futura personalidad, aparte el alejamiento de sus padres. Su educación se produce en un ambiente del que la alta nobleza permanence ausente. Cuando trate de recuperar el terreno perdido, será demasiado tarde: el niño se había acostumbrado a poner su afecto en gentes mediana, sus criados […]” (12). Miller’s appraisal infers a conscious selection of companions based on a binarism of superior/inferior, and his selection of the words “whorled and troubled” to describe Enrique’s psychological imbalance. In contrast, Suárez Fernández largely removes the mindfulness of Enrique’s actions by suggesting environmental causality as well as adhering to Marañón’s hypothesis of acromegalic eunuchoidism. While I believe Marañón’s ideas are outdated, I find it difficult to deny that Enrique’s upbringing detached from his parents detrimentally affected his later life. My inclination, however, is to side more with Townsend Miller, whose views, as reflected in his novelesque style of writing, are warmer and more sympathetic toward the king, and seem to gently convey at times a mild mental retardation. People with autism, “as they grow up, […] can become increasingly aware of their difficulties in understanding others and in being understood, and as a result, may become anxious or depressed” (Turkington 93). Enrique may very well have chosen companions who boosted his self esteem. Autistic people, in particular those with Asperger’s syndrome, show a desire to make friends, but lack the social skills “to begin or maintain a friendship” (10). Enrique’s imminent prestige as king of Castile was obviously an attractive vehicle to fame and fortune to anyone who could successfully latch on. The low-born, among them Gómez de Cáceres, Diego Arias, and even doña Guiomar, one of the scandalous attendants of Juana, Enrique’s second wife,
probably seemed the most grateful for Enrique’s known generosity and would feign affection either until they no longer needed him, or until the stream of riches was dammed.

Enrique’s eccentricities, including his neglect of royal functions, aloofness, distaste for ceremony, pomp, and elaborate self-promotion, and his general incompatibility with the vital role of kingship, almost certainly precipitated an increased unpopularity and left the king more vulnerable to rhetorical attack. Not unlike today, much of the power a ruler of the Middle Ages actually had was predicated on the image of power he was able to project, not only the resources he could command. This inability to broadcast the necessary “symbols, images, and gestures that reminded, and taught, those to be ruled about the authority of kings” (Ruiz 131, 2) was one of Enrique IV’s foremost failures as Castile’s sovereign, and perhaps the most devastating to his reputation among the grandees. He seemed to dislike much of that which generated in subjects and rivals alike the fear and respect due him who was supposed to embody the essence of Castile: the “elaborate structure of rituals, ceremonies, cultural artifacts (such as palaces, art, literature, and other such cultural products), dress, and food” (132). Enrique IV’s distaste and disinterest toward these qualities may well be indicators of a Pervasive Development Disorder such as a form of high-functioning autism. Although it is possible that Enrique IV’s condition, whatever it may have been in reality, may be forever lost to history, it is equally conceivable that his humanity may not be as foreign to us as was once thought.
CHAPTER 3
THE CASE OF LEONOR LÓPEZ DE CÓRDOBA

The Memorias of doña Leonor López de Córdoba are, historically speaking, one of the more provocative documents of the Castilian Late Middle Ages. Its unique status as the first piece of autobiographical writing in the peninsula (one of the earliest in all of Europe), the mystery generated by its unknown aims, its informational discrepancies with other historical sources of the time, and its feminine authorship all contribute to the historical allure of the Memorias. In terms of its literary appeal, themes including honor, death, lesbianism, and gynocentricity in Leonor’s document have been taken up, as well as its narrative style and structure. It is also widely considered one of the earliest known examples of feminine narrative voice in Europe, and the first in Spain. But since the autobiographical sketch began to be studied critically in the early part of the 20th century, little has been resolved to universal satisfaction. Arturo Firpo’s 30-year-old study, “Un ejemplo de autobiografía medieval: las ‘Memorias’ de Leonor López de Córdoba (1400),” perhaps still best cuts to the marrow of the issues that continue to confound researchers today relative to the purpose of the text, whose “doble denominación nos habla ya de su ambigüedad”: Memorias or Relación jurada (Sworn Account). He asks, “¿se trata de la historia de una vida, es decir, de una autobiografía, o de un documento escrito con fines prácticas, tal vez en el caso de Leonor con el fin de recuperar su patrimonio y su prestigio” (19). It may be some of both; or there may still be more elements in the document yet to be discovered, clues to be deciphered and textual threads to pull at.

The primary objective of this chapter is not to survey or contemplate in depth any specific literary tropes in the Memorias, nor to espouse a new theory on the meaning(s) or
purpose of the document, as so many prior studies have done. Instead, I will offer new ideas about some overlooked factors that could have affected the *Memorias*’ composition, and which possibly might lead to new avenues of investigation on the document. In the development of my ideas I will at first be paying special attention to the chronicles, other related documents, and the political propaganda and rhetoric of portraiture therein. Afterward, I will proceed to the contents of the *Memorias* themselves, and finally return briefly to the chronicles as support for my own arguments about Leonor López’s autobiography.

With Leonor López de Córdoba (c. 1362-c. 1420) we take a different direction from the previous chapter. In many ways, the cases of doña Leonor and Enrique IV could scarcely be more different. He was a lethargic, emotionally depressed monarch, in all probability, who seemed to be nothing anybody wanted as a king, save for an open coffer. She was an active, even enterprising, aristocrat for whom, in her short autobiography *Memorias*, the Wheel of Fortune was a bumpier ride than for most, and who continuously found herself in hard times. As for Enrique, we possess a veritable fortune of resources, including chronicles, letters, a *semblanza*, and verse about the king. A large part of what we know of him was written by others, whose motivations are oftentimes easily discernable. To the contrary, much of the information in primary sources about Leonor was self-referential (i.e. her *Memorias*), and her unknown motives for composing such a document are the core of what allures students of the Middle Ages to it. Furthermore, other resources written about Leonor are scant by comparison. Nonetheless, like Enrique, she is found in the chronicle, letters, a *semblanza*, and verse, the volume of information about her is less by far.

There are four separate mentions of Leonor López de Córdoba in Fernán Pérez de Guzmán’s *Crónica de Juan II*, another by the same author in *Generaciones y semblanzas*, two
pieces of verse found in the *Cancionero de Baena* of which she is the subject, and of course, there is her valuable, enigmatic autobiography, designated *Memorias* in 1977 by Reinaldo Ayerbe-Chaux. She is also the subject of a letter to all the councils of Castilian nobles, written in 1409 by Fernando de Antequera (1380-1416), during his time as co-regent of Castile (1406-1412), which will be discussed later. Other than a passage in Pero López de Ayala’s *Crónica de Enrique II* about the stand-off in Carmona between Enrique of Trastamara and Leonor’s father, Martín López de Córdoba, there is no other known source that discusses the life of Leonor López. What is more, not one of these sources depicts Leonor in a positive light. Fernando’s letter to the council of nobles recommends Leonor’s dismissal from court; Fernán Pérez de Guzmán names her a “liviana y pobre mujer” (34) in his collection of pen-portraits, *Generaciones y semblanzas*, a description that has had historical sticking power; the *Crónica de Juan II* portrays her as principal among “algunos desleales servidores que buscaban Discordia entre la Reyna y el Infante […]” (some disloyal servants that procured discord between the Queen and the prince) (288); and one of the poems of Gómez Pérez Patiño in the *Cancionero de Baena* comes close to demonizing Leonor López in her relationship with the queen, Catherine of Lancaster (628,30). Only in Leonor’s *Memorias* do we encounter any defense of her person and actions; she was her only advocate.

Nonetheless, both Leonor López de Córdoba and Enrique IV of Castile are at the center of much academic debate, which is where their similarities will begin. Each lived, or is interpreted as having lived, at extremes, both center and periphery. The Castilian king was at once the divinely mandated political center of Spain and seen as a fool by many in his kingdom. This defamation is patently visible in some historical and literary works written during and especially after his reign. Leonor López also received harsh treatment in the same genres, as
mentioned above. The events of her life as she and others bear them out accentuate the intemperate highs and lows of her social and emotional existence. Leonor regularly found herself alternating between positions of privilege and disadvantage in her life, moving back and forth abruptly from center to periphery in a way that vaguely mirrors the rises and falls of heroes of epic poems, such as Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar’s in *El Cantar de Mio Cid*.

In the previous chapter, I examined Enrique IV’s portrayal in the chronicle, and some of the most compelling, essential passages for almost any study of Castile’s last Trastámaran king. His actions and mannerisms, his decision-making, comportment, and personality, even his appearance, all have come under the heavy scrutiny of contemporary criticism for decades. But for all the inquiry on the “impotent king” done during his lifetime and since, we are probably no closer to unambiguous conclusions now than at the outset. The same is true for Leonor López de Córdoba, only for her our primary sources are much scarcer, and we encounter the added uncommon consideration of medieval feminine authorship. In addition to this, the ambiguities and literary imagery of her *Memorias*, in comparison with the superficial truth-bearing language of the chronicles, must be contended with and interpreted.

At this point we may find ourselves well served to momentarily revisit a few of the ideas about the genre of the chronicle from the first chapter, the language of it in particular. The genre’s perfect chronological ordering and generally unadorned style of writing, which we as consumers of linear thinking and lovers of fact find comfortably commonplace, dissolve the impression of authorial bias into disinterest, or even cloak the fact that there is an author at all. In this way, the reader is lured into accepting the narrative’s neutral tone as tantamount to truth. However, in essence, the tonal impartiality and explicit chronological structuring are biased in themselves, harkening to Eusebius and early Roman Christianity in the peninsula. Undoubtedly,
chronicles are as prejudiced as any other genre that retells the past with the intent of making known “true” events. Doña Leonor López de Cordoba’s *Memorias* are included among these. We know this because she makes the claim herself that what she writes is faithful to what happened.

It can often be tempting to take a conscious critical stand for the peripheral or subordinate discourse in the face of the dominant one, recognizing the bias of a publication of the established power or the discursive “trap” of a story that appears to tell itself on its own. Locating, for example, the political ulterior motives in López de Ayala’s and Pérez de Guzmán’s chronicles in favor of giving more credence to Leonor’s *Memorias* was a natural reaction in criticism after the first wave of studies in the 1970s flatly sided with the chronicles’ accounts. Below I discuss a number of studies that attempt to untangle the mysteries of Leonor López’s memoirs from diverse perspectives; but one thread that binds all of these past investigations together is their point of departure: the *Memorias* themselves. Although the *Memorias* are perhaps the most logical starting place for a study on Leonor Lopez’s autobiography, in much the same way that one would do well to initiate an analysis of, say, *Don Quixote de la Mancha* with the novel itself, it would be nearly impossible to deliberate upon the *Memorias* without delving into who the author was and what her motives were for writing. Indeed, in one way or another, those are the reasons for most studies about Leonor López’s autobiography. Conversely, it is often preferable to approach a novel such as *Don Quixote* without touching the idea of authorial intent or autobiographical possibilities. My procedure will be the reverse of these past studies, then. Instead of starting with the *Memorias* and then treating other sources as ancillary gap-fillers, I will commence with the fragments from the chronicles, *semblanzas*, letters, and verse to which scholars would have paid little attention were it not for the inscrutable existence of the
Memorias. My aim is to assemble a characterization of Leonor López from these sources as if we had never seen her manuscript, and then end by fleshing out the portrait of her at which we arrive with her Memorias, hopefully arriving at new ideas about the author, her life, and her text.

Other than that of the Memorias, the only extant reference to Leonor López’s childhood is found in the Pero López de Ayala’s account of the siege of Carmona (1369) in the Crónica de Enrique II. Leonor is not explicitly named, though, as she was only a child of three or four years old and not yet of much political value. Her father, don Martín López de Córdoba, is described by the chronicler as the last stalwart of deposed king Pedro I, and leader of Carmona’s protracted, but unsuccessful, holdout against the forces of Enrique II. López de Ayala tells of how don Martín and the last supporters of Pedro I, including the king’s own children, were finally forced out of the walled city as a result of guile, trickery, and diminished supplies. Enrique II had sworn safety, asylum, and the restoration of all that belonged rightfully to those in Carmona in exchange for the city’s surrender.

In the Crónica de Juan II, the filial connection is made between Leonor López de Córdoba and Martín López de Córdoba. In this chronicle, however, the daughter is of much greater interest to the chronicler than the father. Already an adult, well after the year 1400, Leonor López is described as a royal favorite to Queen Catherine of Lancaster. Pérez de Guzmán records that Catherine loved Leonor to the point where nothing was done without Leonor’s input, even if a course of action had previously been decided upon by the queen and her co-regent, Fernando de Antequera (278). The chronicler writes that Leonor would as a habit say one thing, then contradict it with something else, causing a great deal of confusion at court, to the point where it was making Fernando’s job much more difficult (278). Leonor López was not alone in her conscious efforts to create discord between the co-regents, according to the Crónica de Juan
II, but was one of a band of “disloyal servants” (288) who had plans to ensure an unstable relationship between the queen and Fernando. Pérez de Guzmán writes specifically about one such incident that dealt with split responsibilities of governance in Castile, though he neglects to provide the evidence for his accusation.

Fernando de Antequera, called ‘Antequera’ because of his victory against the Muslims in 1410 at the Andalusian town of the same name, was also Fernando I of Aragón and brother of the deceased Castilian king, Enrique III. Upon the king’s death in 1406, Fernando was named coregent of his brother’s kingdom alongside the queen, Catherine of Lancaster, while Enrique’s son, Juan, was still in his minority. Enrique had ordered that the provinces of Castile and León be divided between the two during the interim rule in order to expedite and facilitate the management of the kingdom. Pérez de Guzmán records that Fernando “walked the right path” in his intentions for Castile, but that the queen’s “crooked path,” designed never to connect with that of her co-ruler’s, was paved by her corrupt advisors (288).

The final mention of Leonor López in the Crónica de Juan II is a relatively lengthy interpretation of the situation surrounding a series of letters that Leonor sent to Fernando de Antequera. By this time she had been ousted from court and told to return to Córdoba by the council of nobles, as in her state, “se seguia poco servicio al Rey é á la Reyna” (in her state she was no longer of service to the King and Queen), the chronicler writes (344). The purpose of the suppliant letters was to try and return to the service of the queen, which weighed heavily on the prince because of the many times “ella habia muchas veces dado ocasion á las discordias que acaescieron entre la Reyna y el Infante” (she had given occasion to the discord that occurred between the Queen and the Prince) (344). Despite the internal conflict Fernando felt, he decided to write to Leonor to invite her to Cuenca, where he was, possibly to assist her. However, when
the queen discovered this plan, she informed her co-ruler that she would not see Leonor; that once Leonor arrived in Cuenca she was to immediately return to Córdoba; and that if ever Leonor attempted to resume her prior position of camarera mayor, head advisor to the queen, the she would have Leonor burned alive.

Taking into account exclusively the information presented in the *Crónica de Juan II*, the received image of Leonor López de Córdoba is clearly not a positive one. The portrait Pérez de Guzmán paints is one of a manipulative, selfish, and shameless woman who appears to be little more than a thorn in the monarchy’s side. The chronicler’s vision of Leonor is emphasized in a quick rhetorical jab in his collection of pen-portraits, *Generaciones y semblanzas*, when he calls her a “pobre y liviana mujer” (useless and wretched woman) (34). Pérez de Guzmán makes no excuses for bluntly expressing his dislike of Leonor López. In fact, he concludes the chronicle chapter about Leonor’s final disgrace and rejection by Catherine with an anecdotal warning to all other royal servants. After Leonor has returned dejected to Córdoba, the queen dismissed the remaining López family members she still had employed, ostensibly to rub salt in the wound. “Lo qual,” the chronicler writes, “debe ser muy grande exemplo á todos que tienen privanza de reyes o señores; é deben mucho mirar que siempre hagan lo que deben, é miren mas al servicio de sus Señores que á sus propios intereses” (This should be a great example to all those who have confidence with kings or lords. They must always care to do what they should, and care more for the service of their lords than for their own interests) (344).

As discussed in chapter one of this dissertation, the moralistic aspect of the chronicle, especially as the chronicler’s personal contribution to a work, is exclusively a post-Alfonsine development in contrast to the unadorned writing style that increased in prevalence through the 14th and 15th centuries. Nowhere is this better seen than in Pérez de Guzmán’s chapter. Given the
chronicler’s known disaffection for Leonor López, it seems as likely that he included the chapter for personal reasons as for the instruction of those at the service of royalty and nobles.

Nonetheless, the general displeasure with the queen’s head assistant seems to be shared by Fernando de Antequera. Antequera wrote a letter to all councils of nobles in the kingdom, dated September 28, 1408, in which he stated his opinion clearly and plainly that Leonor López had been a disruption at court and a source of inefficiency. Antequera writes, “everyone who is close to the aforementioned lady [i.e. Leonor], prelates, doctors, and gentlemen alike, have to do and say everything she commands […]]. Everything they have to clear with the queen, they must also clear with Leonor López […], which has been the source, and continues to be the source, of the stated discordance and arguments between the queen and me” (Torres Fontes 427, 28). Antequera then reminds the council of nobles that Leonor had exploited her position of confidence with the queen for personal benefit, “levando […] grandes contías y joyas” (taking […] great amounts and jewels) (427, 28) from those who wished to have influence with her.

Antequera also writes that he had intervened with the queen about ridding herself of Leonor López and her negative influence: “yo acordé, otrosí, de rogar e perdir mercet a la dicha señora reyna muy afincadamente quite de sí a la dicha Leonor López e la enbie a su casa e la non tenga consigo” (I agreed, also, to very sincerely petition and ask the said queen to remove the said Leonor López from her services, send her to her house, and no longer have the woman by her side) (427, 28). He mentions the other dissenters, including the bishops of Cuenca, Sigüenza, and Mondoñedo, and the doctor Pero Sánchez, but places Leonor as the foremost of them all. The observant reader will notice a possible contradiction between the message conveyed in the co-regent’s letter and the description of his actions toward Leonor after her extradition, as is in Pérez de Guzmán’s chronicle. This will be addressed below. If the reader ignorant of the
Memorias were to take Fernando de Antequera’s words and accusations at face value, and couple the received image with his preexisting one from the Crónica de Juan II, Leonor López would look no better; perhaps worse. The sources are mostly consistent with each other, with more specifics being revealed in Fernando’s letter as to how the queen’s advisor and confidant took advantage of her privileged post.

Another medieval work in which we find Leonor López de Córdoba is the Cancionero de Baena, a collection of poetry of some 56 poets assembled sometime around the year 1430 by Juan Alfonso de Baena. The minor poet, Gómez Pérez Patiño (c.1370-c.1420), wrote two coplas de arte menor about Leonor in 1412, one possible year of her banishment from court. The tone of the first piece is highly critical of Leonor and at times mocking, which is usually achieved through antithesis, paradox, and a multitude of proverbs. The poet seems to express a vindictive jubilation at the turn of events that have precipitated Leonor’s downfall. For example:

Desque es fecho el daño
¿qué pro tiene el consejo? (50)
Muchos vienen a concejo
vestidos de piel d’engaño.
a de lieve veo paño
que sea limpio de raça.
Non se torna más la baça (55)
blanca por seguir el baño. (629-30)

In lines 49 and 50, Pérez Patiño rhetorically asks Leonor López what good her advice is now that the damage is done, that is, now that she has been expelled from court. The poet may also be referring to the advice others might have given to Leonor. Here, he alludes to the popular saying “el conejo ido y el consejo venido,” that is, “hindsight is 20-20” (Dutton, et.al. 629). In the following two lines, the poet says that many give advice dressed in the “skin of trickery,”

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9 Jane Connolly has pointed out that Fernando de Antequera’s letter “to all councils of nobles of the kingdom,” was written in 1408, and that Leonor López’s exile must have occurred in that year.
which is derived from the proverb “debajo de piel de oveja está el lobo robador,” or, the wolf dressed as in sheep’s clothing (630). Given the accusations leveled against Leonor López in Fernando de Antequera’s letter and Fernán Pérez de Guzmán’s *Crónica de Juan II*, the cloaked danger of the wolf in sheep’s clothing is almost certainly meant to invoke the image to the queen’s ex-advisor. The second half of the strophe is identical to the first in that it references more popular sayings that might be seen as cleverly employed by the aristocratic readers. Lines 53 and 54 come from “En el mejor paño cae la raça,” or “even the best cloth can be stained” (have a defect) (630). But in conjunction with the final two lines, which translate roughly as, “brown doesn’t turn white after a bath,” Pérez Patiño may be naming Leonor López as a charlatan at her former position at court and calling out her less-than-regal lineage.

Pérez Patiño’s satirical verse only reinforces the vision of Leonor López de Córdoba created by the *Crónica de Juan II* and Fernando de Antequera’s letter. Little is added to or altered much in the way of the present-day reader’s interpretation of Leonor’s role at court or the opinions of her contemporaries about her. One thing that should be noted is the gleefully derisive tone of the poem when it comes to the disgrace of the queen’s advisor. We might expect that this piece, like many others, would have been performed in various circles at court, as was the fashion of the time. Poetry (i.e. court songs) experienced a boom in popularity in the 15th century in Castile. Writing verse increasingly became an intellectual and self-aggrandizing pastime of aristocrats, who competed to find the *bon mot* of the day and notoriety among their peers. Pérez Patiño, as described by Alfonso de Baena was a “wise and discreet baron […] servant of the bishop of Burgos, don Johan de Villacreçes” (628). He surely knew his audience and wagered that some clever vitriol would be politically popular. The downfall of Leonor López was possibly among the most prevalent gossip topics in 1412.
The poet’s actual motives for writing these two poems cannot be known for certain, but what can be said with certainty is that Pérez Patiño’s assessment of the noblewoman is similar in its tone and negativity to those of Fernando de Antequera and Pérez de Guzmán. For this reason, despite the incrimination this general position has suffered during the past 10 to 15 years, the idea that Leonor López was not blackballed unduly and unjustly, that she did perhaps approximate the depictions of her in the Crónica de Juan II, and Fernando de Antequera’s letter must still be entertained. One approach to the case of Leonor López de Córdoba is to analyze her Memorias first, giving it a privileged position. Another is to grant the defendant (i.e. Leonor López de Córdoba) immunity in the face of fairly consistent evidence and many assenting witnesses. Many critics have not found this evidence sufficiently convincing to reach a verdict, citing a general contempt for the woman among the aristocracy on the basis of her comparatively low pedigree, or her overstepping the boundaries of a woman in politics (Llorca in Hutcheson 183), and rightfully so. The difference maker may be that Leonor López actually points to herself as being guilty as charged in the passages of the Memorias in which she describes her relationship with her aunt’s family. This will be discussed in some detail below. But with regards to this now, we can remember that of all the documents that bear her name, Leonor López was her own and only advocate. Without exception, as far as we can know, even her closest allies abandoned her. We would not know the whole story about that last point were it not for her short, autobiographical epideictic defense, the Memorias. The Memorias are, in fact, the single greatest extant source of knowledge available about the life of doña Leonor López, even if the original was lost from the archives of the royal convent of San Pablo in Córdoba in the 18th century (Ayerbe-Chaux 12), and despite some significant differences among the modern manuscripts.
When the *Memorias* are added to the mix after studying all the aforementioned secondary sources of information about López de Córdoba, our experience with her becomes instantly rich, plush, warm, palpable, and complex. In a word: human. Leonor is no longer a “statistic”, so to speak, that is, just another debauched, avaricious courtier. We “hear” the voice of a woman who lived the life and made the decisions considered by her contemporaries and ours. We learn through her words the horror of the nine years López de Córdoba spent in the Sevillian prison with her family and father’s household; we listen as Leonor tells us about the strained relationship with her maternal aunt and cousins; and we are mystified by some of the events and elements Leonor incorporates into her life’s story, and the varied tones with which she narrates them. From the critic’s perspective, as López de Córdoba fleshes out her own life from the versions of the chroniclers and poets, we are left with a bounty of material from which to draw. Yet hearing the noblewoman’s side of the story leaves us with many more questions than answers. We are no longer to take the “official” story at its word. However, because of the *Memorias*’ poetic qualities, fantastical imagery, mercurial narrative tone, inconsistencies with the chronicles, and elements that seem to impugn common sense, we can not pledge ourselves wholly to its veracity.

Over the last three decades, critics have labored to make sense of the *Memorias*, searching to harmonize its literary and historical qualities, theorizing on authorial intent, exploring feminine and feminist ideas, disputing the date of composition and authorship, and even touching upon psychological considerations. Jane Connolly correctly asserts that with regularity scholars of the *Memorias* “state with absolute certainty their interpretations, never note the tenuous state of evidence on which they base their critical judgments [...] and, in doing so, reveal their modern biases” (1). As I bring doña Leonor López de Córdoba’s landmark piece of
autobiographical writing itself into the fold, I will review many past scholarly assessments of the
*Memorias* before making my own critical offering, caring to observe its fragility, and basing it
more upon what others may have overlooked than what I believe the ultimate meaning of the text
may have been.

The *Memorias* begin with a kind of dedication of a few sentences to the holy trinity and
the Virgin Mary that are written in a formulaic and formal language, typical of that of a
professional scribe. Readers of the *Memorias* agree that this traditional sort of preamble to the
text is evidence of scribal intervention, indicating that López de Córdoba may have dictated her
story to a scribe, though there is some disagreement on the matter. For example, Louise Mirrer
believes López de Córdoba may have had access to education in a religious order after her
release from prison and may have thus been familiar with the technique and practice of scribal
formulae (Mirrer 10). Generally, of those who even give more than brief mention of the
introduction, which does have a distinct tone from the rest of the narrative, most concur that
Leonor probably did dictate to a scribe and that, in keeping with medieval tradition, the purpose
was to secure the good faith of her unspecified target public “by relating the favors granted to her
over the course of her life by the Virgin Mary” (Hutcheson 180). Near the end of this prefatory
passage, López de Córdoba states her intention for the writing to follow: “y es mi intencion que
quede por memoria, mandelo escrevir asi como vedes” (it is my intention to commit it to
posterity, to order it written as the truth) (16). Yet what at first appears to be an autobiographical
and private, personal confession, as Reinaldo Ayerbe-Chaux believes it to be (ficciones
históricas 18), takes an interesting tonal direction. Immediately afterward, López de Córdoba
launches into a protracted and detailed exposition of her lineage and her family’s possessions and
riches.
The contrast in tone between the introduction, dedication, and statement of purpose for López de Córdoba’s text and the subsequent exhibition of exalted family status quickly draws the focus of the attentive reader. As we will see in the present part and throughout the *Memorias*, there seems to be a disparity between the noblewoman’s stated intention for her memoires and what she actually delivers. Some critics have asserted that the author’s true purpose for writing the *Memorias* was more self-centered and focused on the recuperation of her family’s confiscated material goods than a stoic remembrance of a difficult past. C. Randolph Pope’s opinion on the matter in his *La autobiografía española hasta Torres Villarroel* borders on the psychological. He says that her purpose for writing was to reconcile herself with her horrific life experiences, but he ultimately devotes more time and energy to doubting the historical verifiability of the work (Pope, in Hutcheson 181). Clara Estow also focuses on the ostensible gap separating stated and true objective for the *Memorias*. Estow also proposes financial gain as a principal goal of López de Córdoba’s work in a section of her well known article, which centers on the make-up of late medieval Castilian society and López de Córdoba’s place in it. Estow claims that the noble woman exaggerates the prestige of her family name, and suggests López de Córdoba as a precursor to the Golden Age literary trope of the impoverished nobleman by calling attention to various behaviors incongruous to the pious-sounding introduction (30).

The majority of the *Memorias* does put heavy emphasis on, as Gergory S. Hutcheson states it, “her efforts to achieve financial solvency” (181).

Indeed, these unharmonious facets of López de Córdoba’s autobiography generate discordance in her narrative to the very last utterance; and the friction felt is not easily ignored. In the following passage of her text, Leonor recounts the siege of the castle of Carmona, one of the final events of the Trastamaron revolt that would mark the establishment of a new royal
dynasty. In Carmona, she writes, she lived with the daughters of King Pedro I, her future husband, her immediate and extended family, and her father’s household (17). During the last days of the war between the royalist and rebel factions, King Pedro was murdered by his half-brother, Enrique, in the castle of Montiel. When young Leonor’s father, Martín López de Córdoba, learned of Pedro’s capture, she writes that he hurriedly “bajó al Andaluzia á llevar gente para socorrerlo” (went to Andalusia to get people to help him) (17), only to find Pedro had already been slain. At this point, Martín López made haste to Carmona to protect both his and Pedro’s families from the imminent violence Enrique was to inflict. Leonor recalls that the siege of Carmona lasted many months until their supplies were exhausted, at which point Carmona was surrendered and her father apprehended and executed (17, 18).

The events recounted above about the siege of Carmona are agreed upon by nearly every critic because there are few grounds for disagreement, that is, there is solid concordance between López de Córdoba’s version and the chronicles. Where the disagreements are found is in the details. In López de Córdoba’s narration of the siege and afterward she, in Gregory S. Hutcheson’s view, “portrays [her father] as a paragon of loyalty not only for his defense of Carmona after Pedro’s death but also for his protection of the infantas and negotiation of their safe passage to England” (180). Later, as Martín López de Córdoba is lead to his executioner, Leonor cites her father’s constancy to the former king in a brilliant one-liner delivered to “Mosen Beltran de Clequin,” the French mercenary who betrayed Pedro to Enrique, “Mas vale morir como Leal, como Yo lo hé echo, que no vivir como vos vivis, haviendo sido Traydor” (It is better to die loyal, as I have done, than to live as you live, having been a traitor). It is well documented by now that de Clequin (i.e. du Guesclin) was absent from Martín López’s beheading, so that clearly the latter’s final words of loyalty were never uttered, at least in the
theatrical scenario that Leonor López creates. The words our autobiographer put in her father’s mouth, she may have straight from a popular ballad: “más vale morir con honra que con deshonrra vivir” (233). This romance was well known, and a version of it was used by other Spanish writers as well, such as Pedro Calderón de la Barca en El médico de su honra (“es mejor que sin vida, sin opinión, sin honor, viva, que no sin amor, de un marido aborrecida”) (158). It is reasonable to think Leonor López may have been familiar with the saying, too. The author also includes a scene about the siege of Carmona that is not found in the chronicles. She writes that Enrique II, gathering that the siege would not be expedient, employed a dozen of his men to scale the walls, where they were immediately taken prisoner and beheaded. López de Córdoba explains that the king’s objective was to take the fortress surreptitiously vi et armis before feeling compelled to enter into negotiations for the surrender of Carmona.

The problem surrounding the narration of the negotiations is one of framing. It is logical that López de Córdoba is comparatively indulgent with details, since the siege and its aftereffects comprise an important entire section of her writing. In the chronicle, it amounts to little more than an afterthought. Leonor López intimates her father’s power by describing him as dictating the terms of surrender, even though his strategic position was nearly hopeless. Likewise, she places Enrique in a quasi subservient position of having to settle for negotiations after failing to take Carmona by force: “y el Señor Don Enrique visto este fecho, y que no podia por fuerzas de armas entrarle á satisfazerse de este echo, mandó […] tratase de medios con mi Padre, y los medios que mi Padre trató fueron dos […]” (and King Don Enrique, having seen what happened, and that he would not be able to take the castle to his satisfaction, ordered negotiations with my father, and the terms that my father made were two […] (18). These two conditions were that
Pedro’s daughters be set free with their belongings and sent to England, and that Martin López, his family, and his household be pardoned by the king.

Conversely, the Crónica de Enrique II treats the holdout at Carmona and Don Martin López de Córdoba as little more than a political trifle, and only the most noteworthy on a short list of Petrist loyalists. In the chronicle, not surprisingly, there is no mention of a botched attempt to overtake the fortress by scaling the walls or any considerable obstacle to taking possession of Carmona. The first Trastamaran king begins with the offer to put “en el regno de Inglaterra, ó en el de Portogal […] á los fíjos del Rey Don Pedro […], é á Martin Lopez de Cordoba, que se decia Maestre de Calatrava, é á todos los que y eran, con el Tesoro é joyas que fueron del Rey Don Pedro, é con todo lo suyo” (the children of King Pedro in the kingdom of England or Portugal […] and for Martín López, who was head of the Order of Calatrava, and for all those who pertained to him, the treasure and jewels that belonged to King Pedro, and all of his belongings (2). It should be noted that this offer is nearly identical to the one supposedly proposed by Martin López. Only in the chronicle, the last standing chauvinists of the fallen king Pedro “non le quisieron facer pleytesia alguna” (refused to make any concessions whatsoever) (2).

Because of the verifiable historical error of du Guesclin’s presence at Martín López’s execution in the Memorias, and the relative paucity of information (and, thus, lack of contentious information) the Crónica de Enrique II offers, as Jane Connolly has noted, critics have usually given preference to the latter version of the history, even when they advocate for Leonor López and the critical record against her (1). The above portion of López de Córdoba’s text is at least in part what led María-Milagros Rivera Garretas to contest that one of Leonor López’s dominant goals of the Memorias was to defend her father’s honor, and by extension, her own (Garretas, in
Hutcheson 182). Amanda Curry takes a similar stance in her careful analysis on the subject. She also believes that Leonor López was attempting to counteract the negative reputation her father and her family’s name had acquired after the regime change (Curry, in Hutcheson 181).

Martín López de Córdoba was a stalwart ally of Pedro’s and among the very last of his supporters, which put the dead king’s right-hand man and his family in an unfavorable position with the new government. We know now the fate of Martín López, but the fortunes of his family and household were arguably worse: “y estubimos los demas,” Leonor López recalls, “que quedamos presos nueve años […] y nuestros Maridos tenian sesenta libras de hierro cada vno en los pies, y mi hermano Don Lope Lopez tenia una Cadena encima delos hierros en que havia setenta eslabones” (and the rest of us were imprisoned for nine years […] and our husbands had sixty-pound shackles on each foot, and my brother Don Lope Lopez had a seventy-link chain on top of the shackles) (18, 19). Leonor López relates the inhumane conditions of their incarceration and the extreme suffering of her family: her husband’s confinement to a deprivation chamber (el Algive dela hambre) where, she remembers, he endured six or seven days without food or water; and a pestilence that infected and killed her entire family, save Leonor and her husband.

During my investigations on Leonor López de Córdoba’s Memorias, I found it striking how other researchers have paid little to no attention to the space the author dedicates to her nine years in the Atarranzas of Seville, especially considering the possible trauma such horrors could inflict upon a child. Instead, many critics have chosen to focus on what the woman’s practical and/or idealistic strategies might have been for writing her memories: the Memorias as a political treatise (Curry); as a statement of idealism and family honor (Ghassemi); as an act of gender rebellion (Suelzer); as a push for “interpretive power” as a woman (Mirrer). I believe it is an
interpretive error to construe Leonor López an early paragon of women’s agency, such as her coeval, Christine de Pizan (c.1365-c.1430). The magnitude of Pizan’s works aside, she had an extraordinarily fortuitous and aristocratic upbringing that veritably placed her hand on the doorknob of the Louvre’s royal library. As a young girl, her father, an educated man himself, encouraged Pizan to learn science. At 15, she married Etienne de Castel, a nobleman at court, who was also agreeable to his wife’s education (Jewel 146). Conversely, although Leonor López de Córdoba spent the first few years of her life at the royal court of Pedro I, she lived the following ten years under siege at Carmona, and subsequently in prison. Upon release, the disgraced noblewoman and her husband were left to their wits and the generosity of family simply to survive. If the environment in which Christine de Pizan was reared is recognized as an important contributing factor to her later literary production, why should López de Córdoba’s not be considered equally? If so, we may find that in past studies of the Memorias’ author, wholeness of mind and soundness of thought have been simply assumed when perhaps they should not have been.

A handful of critics have touched upon the idea of psychological distress, but for whichever reason have not given it much more than a passing mention. In 1977, Reinaldo Ayerbe-Chaux published an edition of the Memorias which has become the standard text for study. In his introduction of the Memorias, he recognizes that López de Córdoba “sufrió en su juventud los horrores de la cárcel de Sevilla” (suffered in her youth the horrors of the Sevillian prison) simply for being an innocent bystander on the losing side of a brutal political mêlée (11). Afterward, in his pedantic analysis, he approximates the beginnings of a psychological argument

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10 I refer more to Pizan’s works Quarrel of Roman of the Rose (1401-3) and Book of the City of Ladies (1405), the latter written in explicit and “indignant defence of women, faulting the hostile arguments of male writers” (Jewel 146) than to the scholar’s royally commissioned biography (The Book of the Deeds and Good Customs of King Charles V (1404)), or her political and military treatises (The Book of the Body Politic (1406-7) and The Book of the Deeds of Arms and Chivalry (1405 or 1410), respectively).
when he affirms that López de Córdoba reconstructed the past “tratando de hallar respuestas que expliquen el doloroso presente” (trying to find answers that explain the painful present) (25). He explains that when the past is reconstructed, the mind “retouches” what it cannot suppress, bestowing upon the writing meanings that perhaps it never was meant to have. Drawing upon André Maurois’ *Aspects of Biography* (1929), he goes on to say that remembering is a form of artistic escape that makes the past fit more succinctly with “harsh reality” (28). However, Ayerbe-Chaux describes López de Cordoba’s “painful present” in relation to the past, together with the narration from a singular, determined point of view, as literarily valuable. These two attributes are what make the *Memorias* the first manifestation of autobiography in Spain, he says (25). The possible psychological consequences of López de Córdoba’s youth are downplayed in the compositional process of the work itself. In his critical revision in 1990, Ayerbe-Chaux continues touching upon the psychological aspects of the work, writing that Leonor López must have felt a “psychologically” exhausting sensation of guilt (20), but never pursues that avenue of investigation, which brings us to a series of mysterious and occasionally polarizing passages in López de Córdoba’s work.

Leonor López and her husband, Ruy Gutierrez de Henestrosa, upon being released from the Arsenal of Seville, and without any leverage to recover the possessions that had been stripped of them nine years previously, started life from scratch. He went off to reclaim what he could, which was not much. He returned with little more than the clothes on his back and a mule as his mount. She found asylum in the household of her wealthy aunt, Doña Theresa Fernandez Carrillo where, if one reads between the lines of her autobiography, she did quite well for herself. However, because of the ambiguous language and dearth of detail, it is neither clear how she acquired her later possessions (e.g. the plot of land where she had a house and quarters for the
servants) other than to ask her aunt to purchase them, nor how her presence in her aunt’s household affected intra-familial relations. One hotly contested example of this is the passage in which Leonor López discusses the petition she made to her aunt to open a passage from one quarter to another “por que no viniesemos por la Calle á comer á su mesa, entre tantos Cavalleros que havia en Cordoba” (21) (so that we would not have to go through the street to eat at her table with as many noblemen as there were in Córdoba).

The first debated part of this is the issue of why Leonor López would go to the lengths of requesting that a corridor be constructed for the only reason of avoiding contact with nobles. The answer seems obvious – to avoid embarrassment among those with whom she had been a social peer – but very little is known for certain about the Memorias. One thing definite is that Leonor’s desire to open the postigo caused a commotion among some members of her aunt’s household, who subsequently convinced doña García Carrillo to retract her part of the agreement. This discord is meaningful, for one, in that it is one more piece of textual evidence that suggest animosity toward Leonor López; but also this lobbying against the opening of the corridor is what led to one of the most enigmatic statements of the entire text: y fui tan desconsolada, que perdi la paciencia, é la que me hizo mas contradicion con la Señora mi tia se murió en mis manos, comiendose la lengua” (21) (and I was so grief-stricken that I lost patience, and she who argued most with my aunt against my wishes died in my arms, swallowing her tongue).

This statement has consistently astonished new as well as experienced students of the Memorias. Some critics have interpreted it me mean that Leonor López murdered her aunt’s maidservant for reasons such as the servant was a “declarada enemiga de su honra” (Ghassemi 26). Others follow Reinaldo Ayerbe-Chaux’s lead, contending that García Carrillo’s maidservant died from an epileptic seizure (Las memorias 20). It is difficult to believe that López de Córdoba
would kill for such a seemingly trivial reason. However, when discussed in terms of honor, and the fragility of that of López de Córdoba, the possibility is not inconceivable. Otherwise, if we are to believe Ayerbe-Chaux’s argument, the mention of the maidservant’s death seems like a non sequitur immediately after López de Córdoba expressly states her agitation and loss of patience. Nonetheless, the irregularity of the style and composition of the Memorias has been brought up by more than a few critics, so it would not be unreasonable to assert unconventional placement of López de Córdoba’s description of the death. Nor can we say for certain that the death was not brought on by epilepsy.

The controversial passage is bookended by descriptions of López de Cordoba’s petitions to the Virgin Mary for a house and a dream in which she receives said house. Vis à vis the maidservant’s death, it is implied that she was the object of divine retribution. Regardless of the physical cause of death, “the woman brought death on herself by attempting to thwart the divine will” (Hutcheson 181). During the Middle Ages, and even in the present to an extent, the idea of tangible manifestations of punishment as a direct result of belying heaven’s plans for humankind was very real. Death as meted justice was only ordered by the king, queen, or in some cases, the aristocracy, however. If Leonor López murdered her aunt’s maidservant, a potentiality that should not be summarily dismissed given the phrasing in the text, she may have used her aristocratic lineage and the knowledge of the Virgin Mary’s desire for Leonor López to acquire such a postigo as a psychological palliative for her act.

Shortly afterward in the text (it is difficult to know chronologically how much later it was), doña Leonor writes of a dream she had in which she had a religious vision of the heavens and the Virgin Mary, and in which it is all but foretold that the former would build a house on the land she dreamed about. That Leonor López called upon the medieval hagiographical
tradition for the development of that portion of the Memorias has been discussed in other works. Ayerbe-Chaux has said that López de Córdoba’s nocturnal vision pales in comparison with those of Hildegard of Bingen and Isabel of Schonau, both of which have strong allegory for Christian doctrine. Leonor López’s, he believes, is little more than the expression to possess a house on a piece of property like the one she writes of (30). Encarnación Juárez also thinks Leonor López’s expressions of religious piety are included for practical purposes (i.e. to persuade the reader in order to vindicate her family’s honor), even though she probably does believe in divine intervention on her part (156-57).

The next instance of agitation at López de Córdoba comes in her brief remarks that the abbots who sold her aunt the plot of land did not want to: “é á los Abades les pesó que me entregasen el dicho Solar, por que Yo era de grande Linage, y que mis hijos serian Grandes, y ellos eran Abades…” (and it bothered the abbots to give the plot of land because I was of great lineage, and my children would be high nobles, and they were abbots…” (22). The abbots’ reluctant relinquishing of the parcel of land is of comparatively little consequence in the overall series of events in the Memorias, but for the aims of the present study it serves to demonstrate further annoyance at an occurrence in which Leonor López de Córdoba was a catalyst. Furthermore, these are instances which she narrates herself, showing that she is aware of the frustrations others exhibit, yet appears to show little concern. For obstructing López de Córdoba’s way, the maidservant got what she deserved, so to speak, in the form of divine retribution. The abbots, too, appear to have had little choice in the matter of whether to sell their land to Leonor López, both cases of divine will.

The third example of enmity toward Leonor López in the short, nine-page document comes shortly afterward. “En este tiempo,” she writes, “vino una pestilencia mui cruel […] é yo
demandele merced huir con mis hijuelos […] y Yo partime de Cordoba, y fuime á Santa Ella con mis hijos” (22) (And in this time came a vicious pestilence […] and I asked [my aunt] permission to flee with my little children […] and I left Cordoba and went to Santa Ella with my children). In Santa Ella, she took up residence in “la mejor Casa que havia en el Lugar” (23) (the best house there was in the place), given to her gladly by the inhabitants of the town, many of whom were former servants of her father. As the plague spread throughout Córdoba, López de Córdoba’s aunt and cousins also made haste to leave the city, and showed up unexpectedly to Santa Ella, displacing Leonor López to a small room. She then writes, “y sus hijas, mis Primas nunca estaban bien conmigo, por el bien que me hacia su madre […]” (23) (and her daughters, my cousins, never liked me, despite how well their mother treated me […]), acknowledging again awareness of the negative sentiments, and intimating ignorance of any reason why.

The fourth and final example is found in passages that prompted Ayerbe-Chaux to suggest that Leonor López must have suffered from psychological distress, (“ficciones históricas”, 21) from another period in her life that surrounded the woman with death and misery. As the pestilence spread from Córdoba to Santa Ella, Leonor, her aunt, and family relocated once more to Aguilar. The new wave of calamity began the same night they arrived in Aguilar: “entró de Ejiza el Mozo con dos Landres en la garganta, y tres Carboncros en el rostro, con mui grande Calentura […]” (23). The “mozo” whom López de Córdoba refers to is the Jewish child she had adopted, whom she raised in Ecija. At her aunt’s household in Aguilar, to where much of her extended family had come, as well as servants, López de Córdoba was informed that Alonso, her adoptive son, had symptoms of the plague. Grief-stricken, she says, at having brought the plague to her new refuge, she recruited a former servant of her father’s, Miguel, to look after Alonso in his own house, despite the man’s terror and reluctance to do so.
The child’s caretaker contracted pestilence and perished. After the first casualty, twelve more followed for the same reason: “É por mis Pecados treze Personas, que de noche lo velaban, todos murieron” (23).

López de Córdoba turned to prayer again and, upon hearing an answer straight from the crucifix before which she knelt, she told her eldest son, Juan Fernández, to watch over Alonso. Juan Fernández expressed fear of falling fatally ill and, like Miguel, cited the pattern of death of all those who had hitherto cared for the boy. “Señora,” she quoted him, “agora que hán muerto Otros queries que me mate?” (Mother, how that so many others have died, do you want for me to die, too?) to which she responded, “por la Caridad que yo fago, Dios habrá piedad de mi” (because of the charity I have done, God will have mercy on me) (24). Juan Fernández was buried a few days afterward. Interestingly, young Alonso survived all of his caretakers, and finally passed away after Juan Fernández. That Leonor López would sacrifice her son in such a way provoked the ire of doña Theresa, the wife of Alfonso Fernández, López de Córdoba’s cousin, who ordered that Alonso not be buried within the town. There is no mention of Juan Fernández or where he was to be buried. As López de Córdoba returned from interring her adoptive son, her aunt García Carrillo confronted Leonor and asked her to leave Aguilar and return to Córdoba. The narration ends abruptly with the famously heart-wrenching, teary supplication to her aunt in which she declares her innocence in the tragedy that had occured: “Señora, Dios no me salve si mereci por que, y asi Vineme á mis Casa á Cordoba” (My lady, may God not save my soul if I deserved this, and thus I returned to my house in Córdoba) (25).

In the final three pages of the Memorias, López de Córdoba repeats that she does not understand why others are upset with her, including the closing line of the document. She writes that the daughters of María García Carrillo “nunca estaban bien conmigo, por el bien que me
hacia su madre” (23) (never liked me, for all the good their mother did me), here intimating that she does not understand her cousins’ motives. And later, she is confronted by Alonso Fernández’s wife, “por que Doña Theresa me tenia mala intencion, y no savia por que” (24) (because doña Theresa was out to get me, and I did not know why). In the other instances (i.e. the postigo and the death of the maidservant, the purchase of the land from the abbots), she appears to be aware of the reasons for others’ consternation, but is convinced that she is following divine will and pays neither party mind. Furthermore, Leonor López seems to be, again, either oblivious to or dispassionate about the pattern of the unfailing deaths of those who cared for her adopted son. In these examples, the Memorias are rife with dramatic irony. Leonor can only wonder at why she has angered and estranged so many people. However, the repeated pattern of anger expressed toward Leonor López is not to be overlooked. Many other “players” in the narrative share the common denominator of disliking the woman.

Returning to my earlier statement that Leonor López de Córdoba was, for all intents and purposes, her only advocate, we can argue that our subject’s actions were either those of someone who had many allies, or was unaware or did not care that she had few. The allies that she did have, she unfailingly lost (i.e. her aunt María García Carrillo and the Queen Catherine of Lancaster). The example of the opening of the postigo might be explained away because López de Córdoba’s only stated opposition was of a lower social standing and, at that point, she had the support of her aunt. Later, and more significantly, Leonor López resisted the abbots in their wishes not to sell their plot of land. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, are her own observations that her cousins never liked her, and the anger she provoked in doña Theresa that stemmed from the multiple deaths caused by the vigilance of her plague-infected adopted son. About the former, López de Córdoba never writes of a specific event or time that chafed her
cousins, but according to our author, they all disliked her. That cannot have been for nothing. It may have been that Leonor López was ostracized by her cousins simply because she was the newest competitor for limited resources in the family. It may have had something to do with jealousy of the favor her aunt García Carrillo seemed to have showed her. But López de Córdoba’s actions as told in her own words appear to tell a different story. About the latter example, one cannot reasonably think that Theresa was the only individual who considered López de Córdoba’s actions acrimonious; she was surely the one to voice her objections, or the one whose objections were narrated, as this final instance caused Leonor López to lose the favor of her aunt, who had been her staunchest ally up to that moment.

These four moments of the Memorias discussed above are key to my position on Leonor López de Córdoba’s autobiographical sketch, and that which past studies of the Memorias have understated or neglected altogether. Some of these papers and articles acknowledge the anguish Leonor López felt in many parts of her life. Pain and death prevail throughout the work, to the point where death can be explored as a central theme of the work. Psychology, too, has been touched upon in discourses on the Memorias and the author and autobiography. No one, however, has asked if the psychological torment Leonor López experienced, most especially during her childhood, might have affected the recording of her own life’s remembrance, or her personal relationships later in life. Bearing this in mind, and all misogynistic literary tendencies of the age aside, for all that Pérez de Guzmán’s assessment of Leonor López as a “liviana y pobre mujer” has made our hackles rise, maybe he was merely injecting his true personal opinion about a woman whose comportment he deemed consistently and thoroughly inappropriate. The same case can be made for others who wrote about her, her cousins and the García Carrillo side
of the family, the co-regent Fernando de Antequera, and other nobility whose disfavor she incurred.

It is my belief that Leonor López de Córdoba may have suffered serious psychological trauma, the repercussions of which lasted well into the woman’s adulthood. One possibility would be Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, as judged by the criteria of the *Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders IV Text Revision* (DSM-IV-TR). The DSM-IV-TR breaks the criteria for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder\(^\text{11}\) down into six different categories, four of which have various sub-criteria. If a person meets enough of the criteria set forth in the manual, she is considered to have PTSD to some degree. Just as in the case of Enrique IV and my idea that he may have had autism, I am convinced of the idea that Leonor López de Córdoba may have suffered from PTSD, or a comparable psychological disorder. It is my hope that this thesis will offer new considerations for future investigations on the mystery of the *Memorias* and their author. A copy of the criteria for PTSD in the DSM-IV-TR is found in the appendix.

With respect to criterion “A,” there can be little argument that López de Córdoba meets it. No source refutes that she and her family’s household were locked in the *Ataranzas de Sevilla* for nine years, that she was present at the deaths of many of her fellow captives, and that she and her husband were the only two people to survive and be released from captivity. With requirement “A1” met, it is a small step to agree upon “A2,” that López de Córdoba’s response to her friends and family dying of plague and possibly others “involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror” on the girl’s part. Criteria “B,” “C,” and “D” are more problematic and will consume the majority of the discussion here. We will return to those momentarily.

\(^{11}\)“Posttraumatic Stress Disorder” is also commonly referred to as “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder” and “Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.”
Criteria for PTSD according to the *Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders IV Text Revision* (DSM-IV-TR).

Criterion “E” focuses on the duration of symptoms discussed in “B” through “D.” Should it be shown that these last three categories sufficiently pertain to our subject, it should be a given that their manifestations persisted for much longer than one month. Finally, the core of my thesis depends upon criterion “F,” that “the disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.” Leonor López de Córdoba’s possible PTSD may have been the cause of mood swings, depression, issues with control, and possibly feelings of isolation. This dysfunctional behavior in victims of PTSD often causes disturbance in their social and professional lives and, in the case of López de Córdoba, may have been a source of conflict with those around her.

The remaining three categories, “B,” “C,” and “D,” require for diagnosis the persistent “reexperiencing” of the traumatic event, persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the traumatic event and a “numbing” of responsiveness, an increased psychological or emotional arousal, respectively. With regards to the latter, there may be textual evidence to support the subcriteria 2 and 4, “irritability or outbursts of anger,” and “hypervigilance.” Hypervigilance is defined by the DSM-IV-TR as an “enhanced state of sensory sensitivity accompanied by an exaggerated intensity of behaviors whose purpose it is to detect threats.” The mercurial tone of the *Memorias* has been commented on numerous times by critics – the “coldness” with which she narrates the deaths of her father and her aunt’s maidservant contrasts starkly with the highly emotional, if scattered-sounding, retelling of her family’s time in prison, and the finals days of her adopted son, Alonso. The passages in which Leonor López recalls a perceived threat to her own well being or the well being of a loved one are usually the same ones that raise the most
questions among contemporary readers. When some of her aunt’s servants convince their lady not to open a *postigo*, Leonor López recognizes a threat, which, in one way or another, results in the death of one of the maidservants. Details that one would expect in the narration of such an event are left out, the death itself glossed over. In addition to hypervigilance, another symptom of increased arousal is outbursts of anger. If the protracted trauma she surely experienced as a child had psychological manifestations as an adult, it is not too fanciful to imagine that in this instance that López de Córdoba may have been hypersensitive to a perceived threat, which could have resulted in an outburst of anger and the maidservant’s death.

Over the past forty or so years of increasing critical interest in Doña Leonor López’s autobiographical *Memorias*, students of Spanish literature have scoured the enigmatic document, trying to tease out the knotty contradictions and ambiguities in search of ways to make sense of it. As the torch was passed from an era of scholars to the subsequent generation, whose careers as students and professors were backgrounded by decades of social revolution, analyses of the *Memorias* changed accordingly. Criticisms that had tended to favor the negative characterizations of Leonor López de Córdoba written by those who knew her, were rejected in favor of a critical stance decidedly in the noblewoman’s defense. Political idealism, family honor, and gender rebellion were read into Leonor’s autobiography to try and explain the motives for writing her unprecidented work. Given the cultural context and Leonor’s particular circumstances, I cannot accept the arguments that the *Memorias*’s author remained a steadfast Petrist loyalist in her father’s honor, or that she found her voice as an oppressed woman. My critical opinion resides more closely to those that portray Leonor as a “pobre y liviana mujer.” My reasons, however, are distinct. As I attempted to demonstrate with the chronicles of Enrique IV, what have seemed to
be conflicting sides of the same life’s story, in reality may be more complementary than scholarship up to now may have believed.

Recalling from the first chapter of this dissertation Jane Connolly’s disapproval of how contemporary criticism has automatically deferred to the chronicle for historical “truth,” thereby relegating the *Memorias* to an inferior position, I believe the chronicle still has much to offer in the way of truth value, especially if we read between the lines and at the margins, so to speak. The unanimous conclusion in the chronicle and other fifteenth-century texts that Leonor López de Córdoba was the frivolous and wretched woman of Fernán Pérez de Guzmán’s assessment may have been their attempt to describe a behavioral condition in the woman brought on by traumatic childhood events they could not have possibly identified. As I attempted to demonstrate with the chronicles of Enrique IV, what have seemed to be conflicting sides of the same life’s story, in reality may be more complementary than scholarship up to now may have believed.
CHAPTER 4

THE CASE OF ALFONSO DE CARTAGENA

In this chapter, we move to another noteworthy figure of fifteenth-century Castile, Alfonso García de Santa María, more commonly known as Alfonso de Cartagena (c. 1384-1456), bishop of Burgos. Alfonso de Cartagena was born to a prominent Jewish family, but nothing specific, including his Hebrew name, is known about his life before he was six years old. At this age, Cartagena’s father, the esteemed rabbi Selomó ha-Leví (1353-1435), led him, his brother and mother through conversion to Christianity. Selomó took the name Pablo García de Santa María, and twelve years later assumed the miter of Cartagena. As Alfonso García de Santa María matured, he attended the exclusive cathedral school, the University of Salamanca, and fraternized in aristocratic circles. The University of Salamanca had the well earned reputation of producing new recruits to enter service of the monarchy, which is what Alfonso de Cartagena did. He progressed quickly and garnered the favor of King Juan II, becoming a royal adviser by 1419. Cartagena was charged with diplomacy to Portugal intermittently from 1421 to 1431, the Muslim kingdom of Granada in 1431, and Switzerland in 1434 and 1437 for the Council of Basel. From 1438-39 he negotiated peace in Breslau, Poland between King Casimir and emperor Albert of Bohemia, and the next year handled talks between Castile and Navarre to find common ground for a truce. During his mission to the Council of Basel, Cartagena was appointed bishop of Burgos, in 1435. The prominent prelate was an active man, balancing his political engagements with his Catholic ecumenical duties, and writing numerous commissioned works, among them, translations from Latin to Castilian (Dichos de Quinto Curçio, c.1430-1434) and numerous treatises on virtue, (Memoriale Virtutum, 1422), law (Doctrinal de los caballeros, c.
1444), history (Epistula directa ad inclitum et magnificum virum Dominum Petrum Fernandi de Velasco comitem de Haro et dominum antique domus de Salas, serenissime ac invitissime domini, c. 1440), current affairs (Duodenarium, 1442; Defensorium christianaee unitatis, 1449), and genealogy (Anacephaleosis, 1454-1456).

In an analysis of his person, Cartagena seems to resist hasty labeling in ways that Enrique IV and Leonor López do not. He presents the opportunity to appreciate unusually subtle thought and action in his political maneuvers and in the rhetoric of his literature. With Cartagena, it is less tempting and much less easy to take a stance that might be summarized in a few words, as the binary oppositions of good/bad and able/incompetent do not as readily apply to him, at least in the same ways as they do to Enrique IV and Leonor López de Córdoba. All three, however, have traits of “otherness,” Alfonso de Cartagena because of his stigmatized status of *converso* in the Castilian fifteenth century. Cartagena’s reputation as a sincere and devout Christian allowed him to operate near the center of Castilian power, as a powerful episcopate, diplomat, and adviser to King Juan II. Nonetheless, a crescendo of anti-Semitism during the Trastamaran dynasty increased suspicions that the conversions of many Jews were insincere, casting a shadow over the *converso* population as a whole. Despite Cartagena’s “centrality” to Castilian political plans, as a *converso*, and given his sympathetic position toward Jews and obvious identification with other *conversos*, Cartagena, too, in a sense was pushed to the margins.

In this chapter, I will consider Cartagena’s *Defensorium unitatis christianae* – a disquisition into the mistreatment of the *converso* caste during the Toledo riots of 1449, and how to remedy the problem for both sides – as a sort of chronicle, as well as the medium the author uses to voice his repressed Jewishness. I will also utilize the postcolonial manifesto, *Black Skin, White Masks*, of revolutionary Frantz Fanon, in hopes of locating some of the “spaces” between
Cartagena’s devotion to the Christian faith and his identification with Judaism. Cartagena’s bilocational existence at both the center and the periphery of the Castilian court and Christendom, as an associate of political Christian propaganda that often worked to handicap the men and women who shared his Jewish roots, I will contend, may have caused in the converso bishop of Burgos a conflict of conscience and a polarization of spirit. Through working with both historiographical accounts and the Defensorium, I ultimately intend to demonstrate this psychological tension and a similarity in spirit between Cartagena’s Defensorium and Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks.

Though a good deal is known about the professional life of the renowned bishop, very little was left behind (perhaps very little ever written) that gives the modern student an insight into Cartagena’s personal life. “How are we to regard Cartagena?” Luis X. Morera asks. “He was a slippery, ambiguous figure, and this was probably by his own design” (87). To get a sense of his personality, for example, scholars must often rely on extrapolating from the minutia of historical records. Noel Fallows, for example, gathers that Cartagena may have been an affable fellow from a chronicle account of the social events after a complex disquisition into Gallic law (Expositio super legum Gallus) in 1434 (8). “After the presentation,” Fallows writes, “it is said that Cartagena invited his audience to dine with him, a seemingly minor detail that nonetheless provides a glimpse of a warm and congenial personality despite the often dry subject matter of his literary works” (8). Cartagena’s personality also interests María Morrás, who interprets it filtered though her reading of De questionibus hortolanis (The Garden Debate) (c. 1443-47). In this light-spirited rhetorical exercise, Cartagena championed the superiority of the sense of hearing to that of sight, while his student-opponent advanced the other argument. In this debate, according to Morrás, the Bishop of Burgos seizes the opportunities in evidence to display his wit.
So scarcely are clues telling of Cartagena’s personal life found, that Luis Fernández Gallardo found it more expedient and useful to write a political biography “prescindiendo del acceso a la intimidad de la persona” (lacking any access to a familiarity with his personality) (11). These examples serve to illustrate, if minimally, the historical excavation necessary to piece together who Cartagena the person may have been, as opposed to Cartagena the politician. They also evince the paucity of information available about the man’s personal feelings or thoughts on many issues, particularly in comparison with Leonor López de Córdoba and Enrique IV.

Of course, it should not be surprising that Alfonso de Cartagena wrote little about himself. Rarely did he write a work that was not commissioned or done as a function of his position in the royal court. Writing autobiographical information was also considered in poor taste. Any given reader of the Middle Ages would have little reason to be interested in the personal life of the man who wielded the plume, so there was little impetus to supply autobiography. Not coincidently, this is one reason Leonor López de Córdoba’s Memorias are such a rare specimen and of such great interest. Regardless, the modern literary and historical investigator often thrives on reconstructing cultural context, which frequently includes personal histories of individuals. Because of the changing environment in Castile for Jews and even conversos, including a trend of anti-Semitism voiced with steadily increasing fervor in the late fourteenth and especially fifteenth centuries, modern students of Cartagena strain their ears listening for a “converso voice” in the bishop, that is to say, a “personal” voice that might conflict with his “public” one.

It is reasonable to believe that one reason we know less of Cartagena’s private life and personality is because he was secretive or purposefully quiet about it. Few critics will contend that Cartagena was open about his personal politics. Fallows asserts that Cartagena’s “true
political allegiances were ambiguous, doubtless deliberately and necessarily so, in the turbulent political climate that characterized the reign of Juan II” (12). He might not have wanted to be pegged as a Jewish sympathizer, which, in supplying Christian zealots with personal data to interpret as they might, would surely have been alleged sometime. Fallows explains that María Morrás “makes a case for Cartagena’s private persona” by “focusing on the diverse content and contexts of individual works” (10). However, she is referring to the paradox of his being an advocate of both progressive humanistic thought and traditional medieval Scholasticism. About this paradox and Morrás’ resolution of it, Fallows says that much depended “on the intended audience” and that “for Cartagena the *studia scolasticis* and the *studia humanitatis* are complementary as opposed to mutually exclusive” (10).

The fact that Cartagena was able to argue for both sides of any given issue makes it difficult to know his personal stance. In Cartagena’s case, there is the added factor that he was usually, in Morera’s words, a “rhetorical ‘hired gun’ capable of writing on a variety of subjects from a variety of ideological stances” (88). Since the majority of what Cartagena advocated or condemned was what the nobility or the monarchy requested of him, listening for a “converso voice” in his works must be done with great caution. For example, his epistles to Fernández de Velasco (*Epistula directa ad inclitum et magnificum virum Dominum Petrum Fernandi de Velasco comitem de Haro et dominum anrique domus de Salas, serenissime ac invitissime domini*, circa 1440), Fernán Pérez de Guzmán (*Duodenarium*, 1442), and the Marquis of Santillana (*Respuesta a la Qüestion fecha por el Marqués de Santillana*, 1444) each discussed issues such as the differences between useful and unuseful history, the *Reconquista*, and knighthood, and were meant to be instructional yet flattering towards Cartagena’s patrons. The
One exception to the rule of writing purely at the request of others is the *Defensorium unitatis christianae* (1449). This treatise was begun as an unsolicited argument in defense of the converso caste after the violence in Toledo of 1449. In the *Defensorium*, linking the old and the new, (i.e. always thinking of one in terms of the other) was a rhetorical stratagem for Cartagena, just as it was in his disquisition into why the kings of Castile were greater than the kings of England, at the Council of Basel in 1434. At this convocation of Roman Catholic magnates, Cartagena called upon the legendary Gothic bloodline of the Castilian kings to demonstrate the sanctified destiny of the Christians and kings of Castile. In the *Defensorium*, the bishop of Burgos used the same rhetorical tactic to draw attention to the historical/biblical bonds between Christians and Jews. That he would do this on his own volition may lend credibility to the belief that the text expresses Cartagena’s true feelings about the persecution of the conversos and Jews by the Old Christians. Too, in keeping with subject matter of the flexibility and evolution of the chronicle, Cartagena’s *Defensorium* can be shown to be a sort of chronicle, despite the lack of explicit ordering of events by year. Recalling the four essential characteristics of the pre-vernacular gothic chronicles from chapter one – chronology, unadorned style, providential vision, and universalism – the *Defensorium* meets all of them. This will be discussed below. Another way that affiliates this work with the chronicle is the slightly unusual choice of writing in Latin, as opposed to the vernacular. This coincidence may not have been by chance, as it would have linked the work rhetorically with the pre-vernacular Gothic chronicles (i.e. past with present). Through Cartagena’s championing of the spread of Christianity and of Castilian power in the *Defensorium*, he may have been trying to find common ground on a personal level
between what his professional duties demanded of him and his personal identification with Christianity and Judaism.

The Defensorium unitatis christianae is a defense of the conversos and the Jews written in the wake of the Toledo anti-converso riot of 1449. The converso bishop demonstrates a profound, intimate understanding of the culturally toxic oppositions between Christianity and Judaism. His explicit yet lofty aim is to reconcile the two religions and cultures, always privileging Christianity, by foregrounding the common heritage shared, and depicting a common future through miscegenation. In his article, “Alonso de Cartagena: Nation, Miscegenation, and the Jew in Late-Medieval Castile,” Bruce Rosenstock believes that “Cartagena had discerned the ‘shape’ which the Spanish nation was taking and he hoped to provide a model for ethnic unity based on the productive hybridization of people” (193). That Cartagena wrote this treatise at all shows that must have been personally invested in the growing hostilities, as well as the fact that his assessment of Castile’s cultural future was an opinion in the minority. It also shows that he may have been an idealist at heart working within the intractable confines of an increasingly severe social agenda against anyone with Jewish ancestry. In order to continue with this argument, it will be useful to give a brief summary of Jewish oppression in “Spain” for context.

In Iberia, Jewish culture has regularly flourished when it has encountered tolerance, and contracted when it has clashed with suffocating forces. After early persecution by the Romans in the peninsula, the Jews prospered for a time under the conquering and scarcely religious early Visigothic kingdom. In the late sixth century, when the Goths accepted Christian doctrine, anti-Jewish sentiments arose, which predictably led to violence, persecution, and the enforcement of mandatory conversions. Reccared (586-601) was the first Catholic Gothic ruler to undertake a policy of Judaizing, which continued up through the year 711. Ultimately, religious and cultural
division among the Visigoths deteriorated their own power structures, making them an easy target for invading Muslim forces from northern Africa in 711.

For centuries afterward, the Jews prospered to varying degrees under Muslim dominance, and later under Christian. The first three to four hundred years approximately of Saracen power in Iberia are sometimes also referred to as the Golden Age of Jewish culture in Spain. This was a time when the Jews enjoyed high levels of religious and cultural liberty, and cooperated with the Muslims to achieve great advancements in science, literature, and philosophy. Even so, they were always considered second-class, inferior people under whichever hegemonic rule, and subject to the laws, biases, whims, and anti-Semitic flare-ups.

In Christian society, Jews usually lived segregated in areas called juderías and were governed by a council of their own leaders of choice, usually old, wise Jewish men. They were subject to both Christian and Jewish law and justice, depending on the offense. The Jews also paid taxes, like their Christian counterparts, plus an additional thirty dineros per collection period, as a reminder of their eternal shame for Judas’ betrayal of Jesus for the price of thirty pieces of silver (O’Callaghan 464). Up until the final decades of the 14th century, Jews were also permitted to attend synagogue and practice Judaism, with certain restrictions. It was during this time that the tide most forcefully turned against the Jews in Castile, never again to genuinely relent. “There is no doubt, however,” affirms J.H. Edwards, “that Córdoba’s Jewry went into a permanent decline as a result of the attacks made upon it by Christian citizens in 1391” (117). The intensification of violence against Hispanic Jews was not isolated to Córdoba, clearly, and though there were no other major pogroms until the reign of Enrique IV, the incident was a concrete signal of the beginning of the end for the Jews in Spain.
Alfonso X’s *Cantigas de Santa María* and the *Siete Partidas* (1256-65) and dozens of refranes are superior illustrations of Castilian attitudes toward the Jews. One residual effect of the *Cantigas* was the teaching and reinforcement of discrimination against Jews. Through depictions of Jews sinning, blaspheming, and engaging in heretical or immoral activities, which were enhanced by didactic qualities that encompassed visual, verbal, and musical stimuli, Jews were bound even more tightly to the negative image of them society already generally held. In the codex T.I. 1 of the *Códice Rico*, an almost-complete manuscript of the *Cantigas* and a primary source for many researchers, the Jews are depicted negatively most times they are represented. John E. Keller and Annette Grant Cash’s study *Daily Life in the Cantigas de Santa María* does a thorough job of scouring this Alfonsine collection of Marian miracles for insights into quotidian medieval Castilian existence. Among these is a virtual catalogue of every appearance of a Jew (grouped together with Muslims and heretics as “minorities”).

By law Jews were required to wear garments that identified them as such, for instance, a Star of David sewn into their clothing. Many Jews also wore conical hats that could function as a marker. In *Cantiga* 34, a Jew is depicted wearing the one of these hats while following the devil’s instructions by throwing a relic of the Virgin Mary off his balcony. In *Cantiga* 107, the Jewess Marisaltos, whose execution is imminent, is wearing a head covering, emblematic of Jews of the time. A Jewish baby is born with his head backwards in *Cantiga* 108 as the result of the father’s disbelief in the Virgin birth of Jesus to Mary. Of course, Christians are depicted negatively, too, and face divine retribution. One difference between how the Christians and Jews are punished lies in the cognitive approach to the actions for which they are castigated. The Christians are rebuked by Mary for knowingly effacing Christian doctrine in some way (i.e. they are punished for breaking their own rules). The Jews are punished for violating doctrine that
controverts the essence of their own (i.e. they are punished simply for being Jews). In fact, in *Cantiga* 85, a Jew is beaten by Christians for being Jewish; and in 107, a Segovian Jewess is thrown from a precipice for, as one might suppose, the same reason.

Luis Martínez Kléiser’s compendium of popular Spanish sayings, the *Refranero general ideológico español*, includes one hundred hostile and derogatory refranes about the Jews, many of them with medieval origins. Julio Caro Baroja has separated them into theme, among them, physical characteristics (“No hay que fiar de judío romo ni de hidalgo narigudo”), avarice (“Duerme don Sem Tob, pero su dinero no”), vindictiveness (Judío o mujer que jura, malicia segura), and regarding conversos, insincerity in conversion (“Ni músico en sermon, ni judío en procesión”) (94), provide awareness of common attitudes about those of Jewish ancestry, regardless of religious affiliation.

The *Siete Partidas*, the far-reaching and enduring compendium of laws, codifies the second-class citizenry of the Jews. In the seventh and final partida there is a great deal devoted exclusively to how to deal with Jews among Christians. In the first law of the twenty-fourth article of this partida, the Learned King (i.e. his team of writers) defines what a Jew is and the reasons those who “vienen del linaje de aquellos que crucificaron a nuestro señor Jesucristo” (are descended from those who crucified our lord Jesus Christ) have been allowed to live among the Christians for so long (413). The reason the law gives is that the Jews “viviesen como en cautiverio para siempre,” (have always lived in captivity) and that they served as a constant reminder to Christians of who it was that crucified the son of god (i.e. a reason the Jews were inferior to the Christians).

Even taking into consideration the attitudes toward Jews one can learn from these two Alfonsine works, the environment for Jews and Muslims in the mid-thirteenth century was
comparatively sympathetic to the prevailing one 150 years later. As Angus MacKay sees it, “most historians would accept, with qualifications, that thirteenth-century Spain enjoyed a period of relative tolerance and *convivencia*” (160). For instance, in the *Poema de Mio Cid* (ca. 1207) Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar never attempts to convert his defeated enemies. Although the Muslims are the enemy, they are portrayed as dignified adversaries. As well, the Jewish lenders, Rachel y Vidas, with whom el Cid negotiates, are not treated violently, even though the stereotype of Jewish avarice is upheld (85-89). Half a century later, Alfonso X was favorable to Jews converting to Christianity, but did not condone coercion by any Christian or hindrance by any Jew. Law 6, title 24 of *Partida* 7 states:

\[
\text{Fuerza ni apremio no deben hacer en ninguna manera a ningún judío por que se torne cristiano […] Otrosí decimos que si algún judío o judía de su grado se quisiere tornar cristiano o cristiana, no se lo deben impedir ni prohibir los otros judíos en ninguna manera […] Otrosí mandamos que después que algunos judíos se tornaren cristianos, que todos los de nuestro señorío los honren, y ninguno sea osado de retraer a ellos ni a su linaje de como fueron judíos en manera de denuesto […] Y que puedan tener todos los oficios y las honras que tienen los otros cristianos}^{12} (416).
\]

This law resulted in being unenforceable, and was all but forgotten as the cooperative, mutually peaceful attempts at conversion that Alfonso X had endorsed failed. Starting sometime around the bloody bout of ethnic cleansing in 1391, Alfonso de Cartagena’s father, the rabbi Selomó ha-Leví, for example, took it upon himself to actively erase all evidence of his family’s Jewish past

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\[^{12}\text{Neither bribery nor force should be used in any way so that a Jew converts to Christianity […] Also we say if another Jew want to become Christian, no other Jew should impede or prohibit him or her in any way […] Also do we command that after any Jews become Christian, all in our dominion should honor them, and none should dare remind them of their Jewish lineage as an insult […] And they may have all the offices and honors that other Christians can have.}\]
during their conversion. Only in this way could he and his family be guaranteed a smooth integration into Christian society (Fernández Gallardo 15). Most Jews would not willingly compromise their biblical and Talmudic beliefs, as was necessary to accept the New Testament as the logical fulfillment of the Old Testament and, in turn, save their souls through Christianity. “Quite simply,” says Angus MacKay, “the Jews regarded Christian arguments as illogical, not to say absurd” (MacKay 162). This religious and social impasse slowly revealed only a bifurcation in the road: convivencia or forced conversions.

The pogrom of 1391, during the reign of Henry III of Trastámara, was not only a watershed moment for the Jewish and future converso population in Castile, as J.H. Edwards asserts (117), but also for the Christians. A series of anti-Semitic sermons and speeches contributed to inciting riots and violence in Seville against the Jews, which rapidly spread to other cities, such as Córdoba. This resulted in a handful of Jews fleeing persecution, but in many more hastily converting to Christianity out of fear of the alternatives. Although immediate tensions died down after the mass conversions, the longer-term consequences were dire for both Jews and Christians. The new early fourteenth-century peace was even more vitreous than before; and though political power and martial force clearly favored the Christians, the escalating hostilities and mandatory conversions merely seemed to increase paranoia among the dominant Christians in later years.

Feelings about conversos among the non-convert Christians (as well as among Jews) gradually became muddled and more complex, after 1391. As we know, the Siete Partidas mandates that Jews who converted to Christianity were to be given a new beginning. Their Jewish ancestry was not to be used against them, and, in theory, they would have the same opportunities and advantages as any other Castillian Christian. Renée Levine Melammed explains
that the years right around 1391 for the conversos were not very much different than the time before that year, and that “the situation that [later] developed in crypto-Jewish society was clearly the result of a logical progression” (198). Many conversos continued to live in the segregated Jewish communities where they could find comfort and support. They were, however, technically no longer Jewish, and found themselves under the watchful eyes of the Catholic Church, whose rules they were now to follow.

Logically, conversions to Catholicism caused unrest, strife, and anger among the Jews, and serious tension between conversos and the Hebreo-Hispanic community. For instance, the conversion of the ha-Leví family, according to Fernández Gallardo, was seen as a defection and was met with a condemning response initially. Not all conversions were as high-profile as Selomó ha-Leví’s, of course. Levine Melammed demonstrates convincingly how secret organizations of conversos (i.e. crypto-Jews), often headed by women, facilitated ways to maintain active connections to the Jewish faith, and how “in reality, these converts […] were able to do so with relative ease” (198). Although this is undoubtedly certain, continued accessibility to the Jewish faith, a secret channel linking past and present religious realities, was not a panacea for converso woes. It was at best a stent to prevent local collapse.

Melammed’s argument, too, appears to presuppose complete unity among conversos, which was not always the case. The converso communities were sometimes segregated by class, and lived in different areas of a town. This, according to Fernández Gallardo, accounted for distinct attitudes toward conversion between the more affluent and less affluent Jews for reasons of economics, politics, and level of education. The combination of strong ambitions for knowledge in the upper class, the dominance of Arabic and Latin literatures, and the question of religious truth composing the core of the Hispanic-Hebraic educational system created the
perfect environment for “la transición de un credo a otro” (22). The author also adduces a document dated October 14, 1392, issued less than one year after the great pogrom, that offers the king’s protection to the Jewish section of Burgos, Santa María la Blanca for crimes committed by other burgaleses. Santa María la Blanca was the more moneyed of the two juderías of Burgos, and the one where Pablo García de Santa María’s family owned properties. The other, less prosperous Jewish neighborhood was not offered the same invulnerability (24). This bit of Trastamaran politics in the wake of the 1391 Jewish killings, one can assume, induced a significant section of the Santa María la Blanca Jews to convert to Catholicism (25). With regard, however, to Melammed’s position on solidarity amongst conversos and the crypto-Judaism initiative taken up and maintained by the women, it is significant that Alfonso de Cartagena’s mother resisted the proselytizing efforts to remain faithful to Judaism, converting only after much persuasion by her husband. According to Fernández Gallardo, this constitutes an important testimony to the Jewish women’s greater resistance to abandoning Mosaic Law (26).

In the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, a number of things happened to exacerbate Old and New Christian relations. Many conversos secured important offices in the Catholic Church and with the Trastamaran monarchy, becoming leaders, shepherds, so to speak, among Old Christians. The simple idea that these immigrants to Christianity might outstrip the authority of traditional, deep-rooted Christian families stimulated jealousy and anger that simmered for decades while seeking an escape valve. Predictably, some converts had accepted their new religion only as a way to sidestep persecution, and still practiced Judaism clandestinely. Also, conversos were intermarrying regularly into families long established in the Christian tradition. Though this final point should seem to improve relations, and in many
isolated cases it certainly did, on a broader scale, *vis à vis* enduring prejudices toward Jews and conversos, the residuum of miscegenation was intensified paranoia for the Christians.

Fifty-eight years after the pogrom of 1391, a period when many Jews converted to Catholicism to be accepted into the fold and avoid future violence, the rules changed again. While Jews were still heretics, being a new convert to Christianity was seen by many now as suspicious and insincere. 1449 in Toledo marks the next explosion of anger, frustration, and paranoia among the Christians, whose rancor was directed not toward the Jews this time, but the conversos. The reasons for the revolt of 1449 were a mixture of economic, political, social, and religious anxieties for which the New Christians were put in the crosshairs. Toledo had fallen on hard economic times and the people were upset that the Constable of Castile, the locally reviled Don Alvaro de Luna, had levied a heavy tax on some of the citizens. Luna did so in the name of King Juan II in order to finance ongoing confrontations with rival kingdom Aragon, rebellious nobles in Castile, and the Muslims in the south. Luna then ignored the pleas from the citizens of Toledo for a repeal of the levy, who believed they should have been exempt in the first place. The financial deficit and the subsequent new tax did not bode well for the *conversos*, many of whom were well employed as public servants or unfortunately, given the specific historical context, *prestamistas*, or money lenders. Their already abject reputation was not helped when the responsibility of collecting the monies for the royal constable fell to them.

Angry at Luna’s corruption and exploitation, angry at their king’s complacency to effectively hand the reigns of the kingdom to the constable, and angry at seeing those they considered inferior privileged over them, in an outburst of rage, a violent Christian mob converged upon and destroyed the house of the city treasurer and wealthy *converso* merchant, Alonso Cota. Among other conversos killed was another public official, Arias de Silva. Shortly
afterward, the *Sentencia-Estatuto* was published in Toledo, a formal document to Juan II that gave reasons for the illegality of the tax levied and the malfeasance by which so many *conversos* had obtained public offices (Verdín-Díaz 25). Pero Sarmiento, a city official and author of the *Sentencia-Estatuto* cites that king Alfonso “ordenó y mandó que ningun confesso de linaje de los judíos no pudiese haber no tener ningun oficio ni beneficio en la dicha cibdad de Toledo… por ser sospechoso en la fe de nuestro Señor e Redemptor Jesuchristo…” (ordered that no convert of Jewish lineage could have any office or benefit in the city of Toledo… because their faith in our Lord and Redeemer Jesus Christ is suspect) (Verdín-Díaz 26)\(^{13}\). It was probably not a casual coincidence that the leader of the uprising, also Sarmiento, had been passed over for a significant professional promotion by none other than Alvaro de Luna (Fernández Gallardo 243).

This environment, then – one in which Jews were heavily stigmatized and hated, where education reinforced beliefs of Jewish collusion with the devil and in which Jews were occasionally killed simply for being non-Christian – was the one in which Rabbi Selomo ha-Levi converted to become Pablo de Santa María (1352-1435) and in which his second son was baptized Alfonso de García de Santa María (later Alfonso de Cartagena), at the age of six. Cartagena grew up in Castilian society where his ancestors were perennially remembered for killing the son of god, and his Jewish contemporaries were reminded of their unforgivable sin. “The Jew is attacked in his religious identity, his history, his race, and his relations with his ancestors and descendants;” writes psychiatrist and revolutionary Frantz Fanon. “Every time a Jew is sterilized, the bloodline is cut; every time a Jew is persecuted, it is the whole race that is persecuted through him” (142). Fanon was referring most specifically to twentieth-century anti-Semitism. Yet it can be seen that the similarities with the late Middle Ages are striking. As such,

\(^{13}\) Pero Sarmiento never specifies which Alfonso made such a proclamation, though the only reasonable option seems to be Alfonso XI, the Just. It most likely would not have been Alfonso X, who made it law that any *converso* should be given all the rights and privileges that any other Christian has.
I believe that Alfonso de Cartagena felt the hatred of the Jews and the New Christians personally. There is evidence that standing witness to the physical and psychological brutalization of the Jews and converts may have caused deeper confliction for Alfonso de Cartagena than many critics have considered.

As I mentioned above, numerous scholars have sought out a “converso voice” in the bishop of Burgos. Noel Fallows concludes that there is no consistent voice in Cartagena’s writings, converso, humanistic, scholastic, or otherwise, because he usually wrote on specific topics at the request of others (13). Most scholars of Alfonso de Cartagena would probably agree with this. Nonetheless, Rosenstock finds that the Defensorium unitatis christianae resonates with compassion for the Jewish converts to Christianity as well as the unconverted Jews. Perhaps this is because this treatise was written to address the violence perpetrated against the Jews and conversos of Toledo during the uprising of the same year. Guillermo Verdín-Díaz also writes that “El Defensorium unitatis christianae nace como consecuencia directa de los ataques sufridos por los conversos … en la ciudad de Toledo durante el año 1449” (The Defensorium unitatis christianae was conceived as a direct consequence of the attacks inflicted upon the converts… in the city of Toledo in 1449) (15). Additionally, Rosenstock describes Cartagena’s Defensorium as “one of the first defenses of the converso caste’s prerogatives in the long history of the ‘purity of blood’ dispute which erupted in 1449 when the Toledo rebels… issued their anti-converso Sentencia-Estatuto” (185). The pen that wrote the Defensorium, it bears mentioning again, was taken up on the bishop’s own volition – a topic of his choosing – made even more difficult to write by a busy schedule during hectic five-year stretch for Castilian politics.

The vehemence of the rebellion in Toledo, the drafting of the Sentencia-Estatuto, and the demand for political separation from Juan II were reason enough to give Cartagena an excuse to
impugn the insubordination. Nonetheless, the bishop’s *Defensorium* exceeds simple legalistic tactics or defenses of the monarchy as a means of condemning the anti-converso uprising in Toledo. Among the other contemporary defenses of the conversos, such as Pope Nicholas V’s papal bull censuring the Toledo revolt, and the *Instrucción* of the Relator (Mose Hamomo)\(^{14}\), Cartagena’s takes an unorthodox approach, so to speak, that incorporates an unusually personal touch. Though in his prologue to King Juan II, Cartagena begins somewhat predictably by indicating that his work’s priority is to defend the unity of the Christian Church, the bishop’s venture into the topics of the redemption of Jew and Christian alike and “productive miscegenation” in Rosenstock’s words, as the best alternative to build the strongest future for Castile, constitutes a sharp deviation from any other denunciation of converso persecution. It is in this deviation that a converso voice can be heard, and in which symptoms of a psychology of the colonized, as Frantz Fanon has described it, can be detected.

Verdín-Díaz finds it “interesante señalar...la reacción personal de Cartagena quien, al poner la verdad en las Escrituras...antepone la excelencia de la tradición religiosa del pueblo creyente judío...” (89). Taking this idea a step further, Rosenstock’s study makes a strong case for a subversive element in the *Defensorium*. The critic perspicaciously locates features of the postcolonial concept of the “marginal writer” in Cartagena, “who reconfigures signs through which the nation is constituted... and produces a ‘hybrid’ representation of national identity which at once ‘renews’ the nation and unsettles it” (192). Among the signs Cartagena reconfigures are “Jew” and “gentile,” “new” and “old,” “faithful” and “infidel,” and “pure” and “impure” (192), to reveal the doctrinal and logical inconsistencies in the anti-converso

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\(^{14}\) The *Relator del Consejo Real*, Mose Hamomo, was in reality Fernán Díaz de Toledo. The royal secretary was called Mose Hamomo, a Hebrew appellative, because of his Jewish ancestry and was used in a derogatory manner (Benito Ruano 97). The *Instrucción* was a treatise written in defense of the conversos at the time of the revolt, and directed to the bishop Don Lope Barrientos, who was in Toledo at the time.
sentiments behind the persecution. One way the bishop does this has already been touched upon above in the Old Christians’ distinguishing themselves from new converts, creating a superior-inferior qualitative relationship. In *The Location of Culture*, Homi K. Bhabha demonstrates as part of the colonial mentality a tendency to view the “foreigner” in contradictive terms, as both “too old” and “too new” (Rosenstock 188). “Too old” in that the foreigner is bound up in antiquated traditions; “too new” in that she is still a neophyte in the traditions still being learned. In the *Defensorium*, Cartagena recognizes the logical and chronological errors in this dialectic. He argues that the Jews were not as new and ignorant to Christianity as the Christians were when they were first introduced to it (Verdín-Díaz 89). Understood in this way, the Christians are every bit as “too old” and “too new” as the conversos.

Another interesting feature of the *Defensorium unitatis christianae* is the treatise’s similarities to the chronicle, and that Alfonso de Cartagena may have chosen this particular medium through which to represent his Jewishness. One of the key components of the chronicle is the emotional detachment from the events related, which coincides with the Galán Sánchez’s *estilo plano* (unadorned writing style), mentioned in chapter one of this dissertation. Since my argument is that the converso prelate may have been afflicted with a psychological condition affiliated with that of many oppressed peoples, and that his silence on the matter of persecution of Jews and conversos may have been due to fear of speaking out and the instinct of self-preservation, an inscrutable intellectual recourse to history would have been an ideal façade for a personal psychological defense of an inescapable part of his Jewish identity.

Like Cartagena’s other works, the *Defensorium* is logical and unemotional, but that is not the only quality that likens it to the chronicle. Cartagena’s use of a universal Christian chronology and the corresponding linear ordering of time is another, which, in turn, allows for a
cogent providential reasoning for equality between ‘new’ and ‘old’ Christians. The first chapter begins with the book of Genesis, “Un solo Adán fue creado dice la escritura: hagamos el hombre a nuestra imagen y semejanza” (107). Cartagena begins at the earliest point in time and begins a selective Christian history to the present day. As I mentioned in chapter one, from Eusebius to Palencia’s Crónica de Enrique IV, the use of a universal Christian chronology and the corresponding linear ordering of time is perhaps the most telling distinctive feature of the genre as a whole. Cartagena returns to this pre-Alfonso characteristic of the chronicle (i.e. universalism) and (re)incorporates the Jews into this universal Christian history. From there, the bishop combs through the scriptures, using them painstakingly to demonstrate the injustice of discrimination against the conversos as well as the interdependence of Jews and Christians when it comes to salvation. In his second chapter, Cartagena shows how “que por medio del redentor del mundo, Jesucristo nuestro Señor, el pueblo israelita fue completamente redimido” (through the redeemer of the world, Jesus Christ our Father, the Israelites have been completely saved) (142) and that the two peoples must flow together like two rivers into the single sea of the Church (Rosenstock 197).

Many well-known scholars of the “Spanish” Middle Ages and of Alfonso de Cartagena, such as Américo Castro, Noel Fallows, María Morrás, Luis Fernández Gallardo, Angus MacKay, Robert Brian Tate, and Guillermo Verdín-Díaz, have recognized the bishop of Burgos’ marginality. Castro and Tate have even stated that Cartagena was a catalyst in the first recognition and articulation of Spanish national identity, and remarked on the irony that it was a converso, a member of a castigated caste, who played such a pivotal role. Yet, Castro, Tate, and MacKay seem to treat this idea in an anecdotal manner, or as little more than a historical ornament. Maybe these perspectives should not come as much of a surprise, since each of these
three scholars belongs to a generation of academia that predates the heightened popularity of postcolonialism.

Angus MacKay, in describing thirteenth-century depictions in the Cantigas de Santa María, states that it “might be supposed that the Jews in the Cantigas are irremediably evil and satanic. But in fact this is not the case. In comparison to later attitudes, both the Cantigas and the Siete Partidas demonstrate the existence of a religious attitude which may be termed ‘optimistic’” (161). While keeping in mind Alfonso X’s law that conversos were to be treated as equals, MacKay’s assessment has some merit. But optimistic to whom? Surely not the Jews. This “optimistic” attitude may also rightfully be termed oppressive. Immediately afterward MacKay states, “If the Jew was satanic this was because of his religion, not because of his race,” because the Jew as the potential convert was corrigible. “We have no intention of adding to the world’s problems,” Frantz Fanon challenges in Black Skin, White Masks, “but we would simply like to ask… whether… for a Jew the anti-Semitism of Maurras is any different from that of Goebbels” (67). Fanon is asking whether one kind of inhumane behavior can realistically be distinguished from another. To the colonizer, or to one either consciously or unconsciously defending the colonizer’s position, MacKay’s statement might be relevant or have a mollifying effect. To the Jew being labeled as satanic, it probably would not.

Américo Castro’s well known España en su historia “especially wants to explode the notion that Spain has a racially or ethnically defined character … Spain’s ‘identity’ has less to do with any fixed essence than with the effort to imagine an essence which could embrace (or perhaps homogenize) its geographic and cultural diversity…” (Rosenstock 187). Surprisingly, given the postcolonial approach to Rosenstock’s study, he does not seem to take issue with this “essence” of Castro’s history, and after this quotation, continues to use the work as an authority.
When Rosenstock engages Homi Bhabha’s *The Location of Culture*, he makes the link between “marginal writing” and the *Defensorium*, and even identifies a defiant undercurrent in the work. He misses the mark on the most basic and human aspect of colonialism, however. Rosenstock’s intent is to show how Cartagena figures into defining the national identity of Spain, which grew progressively intolerant and colonial, as opposed to entertaining the idea that Cartagena, at least in part, was actually defined by the same identity he articulated.

I find it possible that the psychology of the *conversos* of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries strained the bishop and is heard and felt in the *Defensorium unitatis christianae*, even though his devotion to Christianity was total. Luis Fernández Gallardo provides a perfect illustration of the confusion and anguish among the *converso* ranks that dates to Cartagena’s childhood, to the moment of his father’s conversion. On July 21 of 1390, Selomó ha-Leví defected, in the eyes of many of his former Jewish brethren, to Christianity. In response, another prominent leader in the Jewish community, physician of Alcañiz, Yehosuà ha-Lorqí, wrote an epistle concerning the possible reasons for Selomó’s, and by extension any Jew’s apostasy. Fernández Gallardo is convinced that the letter contains a complete and penetrating look into the psychology of conversion from an intimate Jewish perspective (17). Ha-Lorqí lists four things: personal ambition for social status, false reasoning, fear of the future for the people of Israel, and a true religious revelation (18). The doctor of Alcañiz eventually convinces himself that Pablo García’s conversion to Christianity is sincere, which in turn leads to the latter author’s challenging of his own religious beliefs. Besieged from all sides, the Jews of Castile would erode under the intense proselytizing efforts of the Christians, and the psychological effects were tremendous. In the words of Fernández Gallardo, “Se tambalean las creencias, se busca angustiadamente la certeza que dé reposo al alma tormentada” (Beliefs are shaken, and the
certainty that soothes the tormented soul is searched for) (19). As early as Alfonso García de Santa María’s formative years, there are signs of pressures felt by him and his family that match the above description.

It is unknown today whether or not the conversion of Selomó ha-Leví was sincere, but it would be puerile to argue that the unrelenting pressure to convert by the Christians had a negligible effect. Regardless of whether the celebrated rabbi’s change of heart was borne of spiritual and rational conviction (he did express the importance of carefully and intelligently examining religion) (20), his family’s social security, or otherwise, the forceful and unwanted imposition of will upon the Jews by the Christians (i.e. the act of colonization) seems to have eroded Jewish cohesion in community and conviction in faith. The coincidence of Selomó ha-Leví’s conversion and the anti-converso massacre of 1391, the obliteration of his family’s Jewish history upon baptism, Alfonso de Cartagena’s complete silence on all matters personal (including politics), his excellence in skills of diplomacy (i.e. the peaceful reconciliation of two opposing sides), and the pro-converso, pro-Jewish stance in the Defensorium unitatis christianae, may all be biographical indicators of a lifelong struggle to reconcile his “New” Christian present with his “Old” Jewish past.

In keeping with its title, the Defensorium unitatis christianae has as a stated objective of emphasizing the importance of unity in the Christian Church. While introducing the structure of the Defensorium, the author comments on unity as an essential characteristic of humanity as god has created it, “Escudriñe, pues, mi alma la maravilla de los testimonies de Dios que, amador de la unidad, en la unidad puso el principio del género humano al formarlo, y a la unidad lo redujo al redimirlo. A manera de una defensa de la unidad cristiana toquemos esto sumaria y brevemente en el presente opúsculo…” (104). Cartagena’s other principal aim was to champion
the converso caste after the riots of 1449. This single aim alone would not be sufficient to convince an audience, however. Rhetorically, his defense had to be framed in a way that prioritized the continued solidarity of the Church, but then made that homogeneity dependent on the vindication of *conversos* and their full acceptance as true equals among Christians. Cartagena’s introduction of this strategy, which is repeated frequently in the first part of the *Defensorium*, is found as early as the first page of the prologue. The prelate cites Saint Isidore’s *De Summo bono* to establish that the unity of the Church is born of the great leaders of the world, and that it is through their advocacy of peace and discipline that the Church is strengthened or weakened (102). Cartagena’s next step is to ask Juan II, to whom the *Defensorium* is directed, what could cause more disturbance in the Church, or have more potential to fracture it than an attempt to disrupt its unity by differentiating between some Christians and others. “¿Y qué mayor escisión o alteración de la paz se puede dar que la que restringe la extensión de la iglesia y quiere diferenciar a los unos de los otros según el lugar de nacimiento de carne, intentando separar a los que proceden del pueblo israelita y a los que proceden… de la gentilidad” (102).

In constructing his argument in this way, Cartagena is able to turn the logic of the anti-converso posture on its head, convincingly constructing a case that the Toledo Christians, not the *conversos*, were acting in a heretical manner by denying the absolute sanctity of baptism. Why would one discriminate at all, he asks, when through the spiritual regeneration effected by the holy sacrament of baptism all Christians are unified, coming from the same mother (the Church) and father (God)? Is it not effrontery to both parents to deny the validity of baptism’s power to eliminate the ancient roots of difference (103)?

At the end of the prologue, Cartagena lays out the vaguest of blueprints for his treatise, which, throughout the entire work, results in being as much an endorsement and exoneration of
the conversos and Jews as propagation confined to the topic of Christian indivisibility. Or rather, in conflating the two ideals, Cartagena clears a space for those of Jewish ancestry in the future of Castile, envisioning a new (i.e. improved) Christian identity for the kingdom. Rosenstock probes the converso prelate’s “imagination of the Spanish ‘Nation’” in the *Defensorium* through productive miscegenation (185), and shows Cartagena’s use of the Bible for advocating the coming together of Jews and Christians as the fulfillment of prophecy. He also notes the many metaphors Cartagena employs, some biblical, to exemplify how Christianity and Judaism must meet, combine, and flow together “into the single sea of the church” (197). In short, Rosenstock finds the bishop of Burgos’ “converso voice” and amplifies it so that it cannot be ignored. What is missing is the human element, the possible psychological turmoil that may have incited Cartagena to compose the *Defensorium*, and which is imbricated in it.

From his first years as a child, Alfonso de Cartagena must have experienced symptoms of the tensions created by antipathy between Christianity and Judaism. Although his father Pedro remarked in his work *Additiones* that Alfonso was baptized while he still enjoyed his innocence (Fernández Gallardo 42), the conflict between the two religions during Cartagena’s formative years should not be neglected when investigating the eminent prelate’s later actions. Even early on, the politics of religion invaded his home life. The biographical information about Alfonso de Cartagena’s childhood often made most accessible include the young convert’s acumen for academics, his rapid ascent to prominence through the ranks of the religious and political hierarchies, his intellectualism and wealth of literary discourse, and ultimately the end of the life of a magnificently gifted and privileged individual. Similar to the case of doña Leonor López de Córdoba, some of the details of quotidian endeavor from Cartagena’s childhood up through
maturity, some of which must at times be extracted from context and generalities, may shed light on the strains the bishop faced later in life.

Shortly after the pogrom of 1391, Cartagena’s hometown of Burgos experienced a rash of Jews converting to Catholicism. The Santa María family was baptized the previous year, though we can expect anti-Semitic angers influenced don Pablo’s decision to convert at least marginally. The wave of conversions inexorably created a chasm between those who stayed faithful to Judaism and those who left the religion for their new faith. Many families moved residence to a new neighborhood of conversos that formed as a direct effect of 1391. Friendships ended or were handicapped; intra-familial strife was surely felt as a consequence; children’s education altered dramatically. Fernández Gallardo discusses these little-considered inevitabilities in light of the Santa María family. The effects were undoubtedly polarizing and traumatic on young Alfonso.

When the Santa María family converted to Christianity on July 21 of 1390, Alfonso’s mother denied the new religion in favor of remaining faithful to Judaism, although she later gave in to her husband’s persuasion (26). Despite the fear that it was not uncommon for the matrons of families to keep alive the Jewish religion and way of life, a phenomenon examined in Levine Melammed’s study on crypto-Jews, the demands of separate religions in the same household, as Fernández Gallardo affirms, would necessarily interfere with family affections (43). The Santa María family does not appear to be an exception. Eventually, the former rabbi and his wife left for Paris, for Pablo to continue his theological pursuits. Pablo left Alfonso to the care of his mother-in-law, who had also converted, so that she would see to a Dominican education. About this, Fernández Gallardo says that the departure of Alfonso’s parents left the youngster in an emotionally vulnerable situation that his new Dominican teachers and caretakers were able to resolve. This would be a solid reference point for Alfonso as he matured into an adult (43). As a
final example of stressful change in daily living for young Alfonso, it almost goes without saying that his Dominican curriculum would have been quite distinct from his earlier education.

Successful integration into Christian circles required other major sacrifices and alterations of a personal nature for the Santa María family. Most significant was the complete overhaul of the family’s ancestry (33). Fernández Gallardo contends that although Alfonso’s father demonstrated pride in his noble Jewish lineage, “la transferencia de su condición sacerdotal desde la fe mosaic a la católica constituyó un poderoso estímulo para hacer de ella el eje de su nueva conciencia social” (33) (the transference of his priestly condition from the Mosaic to the Catholic faith constituted a strong stimulus to make it the center of his new social conscious). The openness about his heritage allowed Pablo to exhibit his encyclopedic knowledge of scripture and Judaism, which, as a neophyte religious authority among Christians, he used to directly refute Mosaic Law (34). For a man to devote his life to enrichment and ministering of one religion to turn about-face and use the knowledge of that religion to deny its sanctity in favor of another has echoes of betrayal. Perhaps as Alfonso grew into his own in his positions of religious authority, the extremity of his father’s actions and ambitions began to resonate with him. As he entered the early stages of his career, it is not too fanciful to suggest that instances of the intimate interplay of religion and politics kindled epiphanies about the reasons behind his father’s decisions.

As anti-Semitic/anti-converso zealotry reached ever new heights, the Santa Marías discovered that even they were not exempt from the vitriol. Despite the prestige the family enjoyed as important functionaries of the kingdom (Pablo’s brother was Álvar García de Santa María (1370–1460), court chronicler and author of the *Chrónica del rey don Juan II*), they felt the sting of hurtful rhetoric and accusations of insincerity in the Christian faith (32). Even years
later, Alfonso de Cartagena himself was deprecated for marranismo, as Fernández Gallardo points out, in a satirical document entitled Traslado de una Carta de privilegio que el rey don Juan II dio a un hijodalgo (1449-50) (34).

That the previous text was written at the same time that Alfonso de Cartagena, already in the later stages of his episcopacy, published his Defensorium unitatis christianae, was probably not happenstance. The bishop’s defense of Christian unity, which also happens to be a powerful defense of the conversos and even the Jews, probably angered at least as many people as it pleased. Likewise, the treatise’s impeccable organization and eloquent logic may have been as much a weakness as a strong point. As we know from the later history of Spain, pro-converso stances were largely ignored or punished. The Defensorium was one of these, engulfed in the deluge of negative emotions and agitated by ideologues (e.g. Pero Sarmiento and Marquillos) (246).

We may be able to better penetrate the mystery of don Alfonso de Cartagena’s personality, the capacity of his humanity as opposed to his professional duties to the court and the Church, and what inspired him to take up the pen to compose the Defensorium, through drawing some carefully chosen parallels between his pro-converso treatise and a contemporary anti-colonialist manifesto, Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks. Taking care not to confuse general post-industrial Weltanschauung with pre-Renaissance modes of consciousness, and to remember that Fanon’s conception of “man [as] the potential for self-consciousness or negation” (xii) would not resonate with the man of the Middle Ages, the practice of colonization which Fanon forcefully declaims, Cartagena also counters in a distinct way. Each writer’s cultural context and particular locus respective to the center of power (i.e the colonizer) constitute necessary differences between the two; the act of challenging hateful and automatic
disqualification of their respective marginalized kith is a crucial similarity. And the resulting personal and emotional distress that each suffered as a human being (that I am arguing Cartagena must have suffered) transcends temporal and cultural dividing lines and acted as a major incitation to write their respective works.

“Why am I writing this book?” Fanon muses in the introduction. “Nobody asked me to. Especially not those for whom it is intended” (xi). Fanon’s question may be too complex to be summarily answered to universal satisfaction. However, in a manner, the psychologist answers his own query later in the introduction, “My true wish is to get my brother, black or white, to shake off the dust from the lamentable livery built up over centuries of incomprehension,” and names “those who would recognize themselves in it” as the people he would like to see read his manifesto (xvi). It would be they who would make “a step in the right direction” (xvi). Likewise, it should be noted that Cartagena wrote the *Defensorium* in Latin instead of Castilian in order to extend the work’s reach to other parts of the continent. The converso “problem” was not only a Castilian issue, but something that affected much of European Christendom (Verdín-Díaz 19). The bishop must have wanted the magnates of other nations to consider his message of unity and rethink their official and unofficial relations with their respective converso communities. In short, Cartagena may have wanted other important leaders to “recognize themselves” in the arguments he forged.

Both Cartagena and Fanon advocate the unity of humankind, and each takes an approach suited to his own profession, and one that would resonate with the intended audiences: Cartagena’s argument is based in theology and law, and Fanon relies heavily upon psychology. Both authors also emphasize history as an important factor in their expostulations, but in a very different way. Alfonso de Cartagena looks to the past to justify the justice and necessity of
contemporary converso equality. For him, historical interpretation of the Bible from the book of Genesis was imperative to making a successful case that the “pueblo israelita fue completamente redimido,” (people of Israel were completely redeemed), that all the peoples of the world “recibieron también la gracia de la redención,” (also received the grace of redemption) (142), and that through the sacred purification of baptism, everyone without exception “se convierten en un solo pueblo” (becomes a single people) (103).

Conversely, Frantz Fanon sees history as a potential threat. He is adamant about remaining in the present and looking toward the future, “I am not a prisoner of History. I must not look for the meaning of my destiny in the direction […] I have not the right to become mired by the determinations of the past. I am not a slave to slavery that dehumanized my ancestors” (204-05). Of course, the posture Fanon has taken would have been impossible for Cartagena to assume, but that is neither here nor there. What is important is that through Fanon’s words Cartagena’s propinquity to and Fanon’s distance from the center of power become more apparent. Cartagena attempts to justify to the “Old” Christians the existence and belonging of the “New” Christians. That is, intimately associated with the colonizer’s side, the bishop advocates the colonized caste’s worth to representatives of the colonizing power itself (e.g. Juan II). As often happens, deep-rooted hatred defeated an impeccably structured and reasoned argument against said hatred. Hot emotions won out over logic. Fanon understood that the diplomatic approach used by Cartagena (though not specifically Cartagena’s), similar to that of many other combatants of racism and colonial dialectics, is impotent in effect.

In comparison with Black Skin, White Masks, the Defensorium unitatis christianae comes across as a comparative whisper to Fanon’s shout. Impassioned, fervent writing was restricted mainly to verse (mostly satirical) in the fifteenth century, and clearly poetry was not an
appropriate form in his time for what he had to say. The bishop of Burgos needed refined thought and clear logic to reach his educated, powerful audience. Regardless, as a Christian, Cartagena played by Christian rules and may not have wanted to leave himself too vulnerable to detrimental repercussions for his stance on conversos’ rights. Thus, the prelate, as a member of the colonized caste himself, may have felt more strongly about the conversos’ plight than he allowed himself to show.

Fanon defines a colonized people as “people in whom an inferiority complex has taken root, whose local cultural originality has been committed to the grave” (2). It takes little stretching of the imagination to see that this definition is easily applicable to fifteenth-century conversos. It is true that Cartagena enjoyed great favor at the court of Juan II, but the fact that the Defensorium was born of his own inspiration is evidence of deep conflict within the man. Says Fanon, “the black man possesses two dimensions: one with his fellow Blacks, the other with the Whites. A black man behaves differently with a white man than he does with another black man. There is no doubt whatsoever that this fissiparousness is a direct consequence of the colonial undertaking” (1). Understood in this way, Alfonso de Cartagena’s conscience may well have been split into factions, so to speak. A part of him may have secretly felt inferior. For though he maintained sincerely, logically and with great rhetorical skills that the New Christians were equal in every way to the Old Christians, the pressures of hate toward who and what he was (i.e. a converso and of immediate Jewish ancestry) were unrelenting. He never knew a time or place in which an integral part of his being was not despised.

It is conceivable that Cartagena may have felt trapped by the importance of his political roles as a Castilian diplomat and bishop of one of the most important sees in Spain. Although there can be little doubt about Alfonso de Cartagena’s allegiance to the Christian religion,
diverse factors much be considered when judging tensions that almost certainly disrupted the equilibrium of his professional and personal lives. As an exceptionally important political and religious figure within Castile and to other kingdoms, the burden placed upon Cartagena’s shoulders to ensure outcomes beneficial to the Castilian throne must have been enormous. His indefatigable efforts bore perpetually favorable results for the prosperity of both Church and kingdom.

Many scholars of the Spanish fifteenth century credit Cartagena with first articulating the identity of Spain. Yet, despite the security the diplomat and episcopate had amongst his cohorts, the inescapability of his Jewishness may have caused significant inner turmoil and feelings of insecurity. Like Fanon, Cartagena witnessed a colonial system with all its neuroses and inconsistencies, and spoke out against it. For Spain, however, it was too late. Alfonso García de Santa María’s identity was sealed the moment his Hebrew name was shed in favor of the Christian one, if not before. In the Iberian Peninsula, his people had long since taken on an inferiority complex to the Christians and lost their cultural originality. If the irony that the man to first signify the burgeoning, proud Christian identity of Spain was a converso must be pointed to, the violence inherent in the interaction of any conflicting ideas must also be considered. In this case, the violence inflicted upon a man’s spirit.
CONCLUSIONS

New research in psychology may aid scholars to locate and examine new angles in literature and history. Filtering the stories and rhetoric of the chronicles and other works through a psychological sifting pan in search of indicators of autism (in the case of Enrique IV) Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (for doña Leonor López de Córdoba) has, at best, led to the discovery of gold, or at the very least, allowed for an interesting and unusual reading of medieval historiography. In the cases of these two subjects, about whom researches have constantly attempted to discover what was “wrong,” this approach proved useful for reading between the lines of history. With regards to Alfonso de Cartagena, who was the model diplomat, intellectual, and defender of the Catholic faith in a time when premium was place on that, a different angle was necessary. Cartagena’s simultaneous centrality and marginality is not as immediately visible as that of Enrique IV and Leonor López. Yet, critics have tended to keep an ear out for a “converso voice,” or indications of an internal struggle with trying to reconcile the two religions and world views. For this, turning to postcolonial theory and the dialectics of colonization seemed appropriate. A religious and political magnate shouldering crucially important responsibilities in an aggressive, growing, and colonial (meant in the psychological sense of how a colonizer dominates a subject) European power might feel extreme pressure to suppress feelings contrary to his position’s requirements. This, as I hope to have successfully argued, could have caused problems with self-identity, or a Fanonian split personality.

In this dissertation, I have considered many of the controversial aspects of three well-known figures of the Castilian fifteenth century. Much of what has stimulated debate among scholars with regard to the lives and times of Enrique IV de Trastamara, doña Leonor López de
Córdoba, and Alfonso de Cartagena is the conflicting historical accounts, incomplete records, paucity of available information, and the many differences between two Weltanschauung separated by over five centuries. Another reason for such substantial differences in opinion among critics is the enormous quantity and variety of information available and the increasing speed at which it can be accessed. The idea of the never-ending accumulation of data at one’s disposal can be intimidating, but also liberating to a creative scholar. One advantage to cross-disciplinary research is that it allows for the generation of unusual and previously impossible directions of inquiry. In the case of this study, I have attempted to weave together ideas from two generations of contemporary psychology (i.e. Freud and Fanon with more recent research on behavioral psychology) with medieval historiography and rhetoric. Though not conceptually unprecedented, the specific views presented on each of the three subjects are new and will be, I hope, beneficial to future research.
TABLE 1

DIAGNOSIS CRITERIA FOR POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER

Appendix

A. The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following were present:

(1) the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others

(2) the person's response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror. **Note:** In children, this may be expressed instead by disorganized or agitated behavior

B. The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced in one (or more) of the following ways:

(1) recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including images, thoughts, or perceptions. **Note:** In young children, repetitive play may occur in which themes or aspects of the trauma are expressed.

(2) recurrent distressing dreams of the event. Note: In children, there may be frightening dreams without recognizable content.

(3) acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative flashback episodes, including those that occur on awakening or when intoxicated). Note: In young children, trauma-specific reenactment may occur.

(4) intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event

(5) physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by three (or more) of the following:

1. Efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the trauma
2. Efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections of the trauma
3. Inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma
4. Markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities
5. Feeling of detachment or estrangement from others (?)
6. Restricted range of affect (e.g., unable to have loving feelings) (?)
7. Sense of a foreshortened future (e.g., does not expect to have a career, marriage, children, or a normal life span)

D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma), as indicated by two (or more) of the following:

1. Difficulty falling or staying asleep
2. Irritability or outbursts of anger
3. Difficulty concentrating
4. Hypervigilance
5. Exaggerated startle response

E. Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in Criteria B, C, and D) is more than 1 month.

F. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
Enrique IV

Reproduced from Townsend Miller’s *Henry IV of Castile*
Enrique IV – A Portrait from Life

Landesbibliothek, Stuttgart

Reproduced from Townsend Miller’s *Henry IV of Castile*
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