PUTTING POWER ON PAPER:
MAJOR POWERS, MINOR POWERS, AND THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF
ASYMMETRIC ALLIANCE TREATIES

by

ALLISON SHELTON TURNLEY

(Under the Direction of Jeffrey Berejikian)

ABSTRACT

Why and how do powerful states institutionalize their military alliance treaties with much weaker partners? I argue the dominant approach to alliance treaty design—mutual capability aggregation—is ultimately too narrow to capture the unique dynamics of asymmetric alliance partnerships where one partner is much more powerful than the other. Instead, I introduce a “complementary exchange model” of asymmetric alliance institutionalization that allows for major and minor power partners to have different motives in the cost-benefit analysis of whether to institutionalize an alliance treaty, such that the major power gains greater foreign policy projection while the minor power gains new security guarantees. This approach, I argue, explains why we should expect to observe more frequent and deeper alliance treaty institutionalization in asymmetric alliances than symmetric partnerships. Using the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset, as well as a new index measure of institutional depth, I evaluate these and other empirical hypotheses derived from this theory in bilateral alliance treaties from 1815 to 2003. The results of my models conform to the expectations of the “complementary exchange model.” I also apply this approach to a qualitative
analysis using four illustrative cases of major power alliance partners—Great Britain, France, the United States, and Russia/USSR. This project moves the alliance design literature forward by illustrating that the concepts of rational design, institutionalism, and relative power together explain the politics of how major powers and minor powers cooperate through the formation of military alliance treaties.

INDEX WORDS: Military alliances, Alliance treaties, Relative power asymmetry, Major powers, Minor powers, Realism, Institutionalization, Institutional design, Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP)
PUTTING POWER ON PAPER:
MAJOR POWERS, MINOR POWERS, AND THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF
ASYMMETRIC ALLIANCE TREATIES

by

ALLISON SHELTON TURNEY

B.S. Berry College, 2008

M.A. The University of Georgia, 2010

A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2017
PUTTING POWER ON PAPER:
MAJOR POWERS, MINOR POWERS, AND THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF
ASYMMETRIC ALLIANCE TREATIES

by

ALLISON SHELTON TURNEY

Major Professor: Jeffrey Berejikian
Committee: Loch Johnson
Brock Tessman
Danny Hill

Electronic Version Approved:

Suzanne Barbour
Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
May 2017
DEDICATION

For Papa,

A life-long learner, whose advice that the hard things in life are worth seeing to the finish is the reason this dissertation exists.

And for Justin, always.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION .................................................................................. iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................... vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................... viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction ........................................................................... 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why Study Alliances? ................................................................. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of the Project ............................................................ 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References .................................................................................. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Asymmetric Alliances and Institutional Design in the Scholarly Literature ........ 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Military Alliance Treaties ............................................... 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Treaty Design ............................................................. 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalization in Military Alliance Treaties ......................... 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References .................................................................................. 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Complementary Exchange Model of Asymmetric Alliance Institutionalization ... 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realism and Alliance Formation .................................................. 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric Alliance Formation ................................................... 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introducing the Complementary Exchange Model ........................... 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References .................................................................................. 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Relative Power Asymmetry and the Scope of Military Alliance Institutionalization ... 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complementary Exchange Model: Predictions for Alliance Institutional Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results and Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Europe’s Imperial Powers: Great Britain and France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain – From Splendid Isolation to Former Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France – Seeking Friends, both at Home and Abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The Cold War Superpowers: the United States and Russia/USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States – Cautiously Playing a Game of Dominoes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR – A Frequent, but Uncommitted, Ally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Discussion for the Four Illustrative Cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Asymmetric Alliance Institutionalization: Looking Forward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions of the Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking Forward: Paths for Future Scholarly Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 4.1: Alliance Institutionalization Index from Leeds and Anac (2005)</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 4.2: Revised Alliance Institutionalization Index</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 4.3: Likelihood of Military Alliance Institutionalization (H1)</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 4.4: Depth of Military Alliance Institutionalization (H2 &amp; H3)</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 4.5: Likelihood of Individual Alliance Institutionalization Mechanisms, 1815-2003</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 5.1: Institutional Depth of Great Britain Bilateral Alliances, 1815-2003</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 5.2: Institutional Depth of French Bilateral Alliances, 1815-2003</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 6.1: Institutional Depth of United States Bilateral Alliances, 1815-2003</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 6.2: Institutional Depth of Russian/Soviet Bilateral Alliances, 1815-2003</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

Page

FIGURE 3.1: Summary of Realist Alliance Strategies, by Relative Power in Alliance Dyad... 69
FIGURE 3.2: Comparative Models of Alliance Institutionalization .................................. 79
FIGURE 4.1: Operationalization Formula for “Alliance Asymmetry” Variable .................. 105
FIGURE 4.2: H1 Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Intervals (Model H1a) .......... 111
FIGURE 4.3: H3 Predicted Probabilities with 95% Confidence Intervals (Model H3a) .... 114
FIGURE 4.4: 3-Way Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Intervals ....................... 121
FIGURE 5.1: Great Britain Bilateral Alliances, 1815-2003........................................ 133
FIGURE 5.2: France Bilateral Alliances, 1815-2003 ................................................... 158
FIGURE 6.1: United States Bilateral Alliances, 1815-2003 ........................................ 186
FIGURE 6.2: Russia/USSR Bilateral Alliances, 1815-2003 ........................................ 207
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Security alliances are among the oldest and most persistent concepts in international politics. From the Hellenic League of Ancient Athens to the 1386 Anglo-Portuguese alliance to the Quadruple Alliance of the Napoleonic Era, alliances have undeniably shaped how political actors interact with one another. Novice scholars routinely study Thucydides’s account of the warring Peloponnesian and Delian Leagues in the 5th Century (BCE) as the ancient foundation for the study of international relations (IR). Shifting alliances between Catholics and Protestants in Europe pre-date the concept of territorial sovereignty, often treated as the starting point of the modern state system. Indeed, the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* (“agreements must be kept”) is considered a core tenet of customary international law, alongside just war theory and immunities for diplomats. It is unsurprising, therefore, that so many scholars, particularly over the last half-century, have devoted themselves to security alliances as a core point of study for IR theory (i.e.: balancing vs. bandwagoning) and document in great empirical detail the topography of modern alliances (i.e.: the Correlates of War and Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions datasets).

Though alliances are one of the most well researched sub-topics in the field of IR, gaps in our knowledge do exist. This project focuses on two relevant, but understudied, aspects of alliance politics: 1) the institutional design of alliance treaties—how the commitments they contain are institutionalized between alliance partners, and 2) the impact of intra-alliance power dynamics on alliance treaty design—specifically the unique imperatives of asymmetric alliance
partnerships where one partner is much more powerful than the other. The guiding research question for the project may be stated thus: *Why and how do powerful states institutionalize their military alliance treaties with much weaker partners?* I argue that the common emphasis on capability aggregation—the sharing of military capability between alliance partners to improve dyadic security—as the best causal explanation for alliance formation and treaty design trends is ultimately too narrow and theoretically unsuited to the unique dynamics of asymmetric alliances. Moreover, the empirical predictions that would follow from the capability aggregation model—such as the expectation that we would observe more frequent and deeper institutionalization in alliances between relatively symmetric (vs. highly asymmetric) partners—do not bear out in the current data. To address this shortcoming, I adapt James Morrow’s (1991) “security/autonomy trade-off” explanation for asymmetric alliance formation to alliance institutional design through what I term the “complementary exchange model” of asymmetric alliance institutionalization. This approach introduces theoretical explanations for alliance design trends that better capture the different dynamics of symmetric and asymmetric partnerships. In the subsequent empirical analysis, I find that this approach offers not only improved theory, but also more accurately predicts data trends, such as the observation of more frequent and deeper institutionalization in alliances defined by a large asymmetric power relationship (vs. a symmetric partnership). These contributions, I argue, provide us with a more complete portrait of alliance institutionalization trends overall.

**Why Study Alliances?**

Given the state of current global politics, it is fair to ask whether alliances remain a worthwhile topic of study in the second decade of the 21st Century? To answer briefly, security
alliances are not relics of the past at all, but remain a significant part of the modern international landscape today. Even the most superficial study of 20th Century history will include the formation of the dueling alliance blocs of the Cold War—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. NATO has not only remained in force in the 21st Century, but has expanded in both membership and mission; policymakers continue to affirm the strategic importance of NATO alliance ties and actively monitor potential shifts in cohesion among the Transatlantic Allies. Its continued relevance to global politics immediately becomes apparent every time its value and primacy in the context of American foreign policy is questioned. In 2011, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton outlined what she envisioned as “America’s Pacific Century” in an article for Foreign Policy magazine—what would come to be known as the Obama Administration’s “Pacific Pivot.” Observers were quick to question the implications of this policy for the Transatlantic Alliance (Valasek 2012). The relevance of the NATO alliance was again emphasized when Russia, led by President Vladimir Putin, engaged in a policy of expansionism toward many of the former-Soviet states, including the very controversial annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Erlanger 2014). Even as recently as the 2016 U.S. Presidential race, commentators responded with alarm when Republican candidate Donald Trump suggested that under his presidency the United States would not, by default, honor its alliance commitments to other European states (Sanger and Haberman 2016). Contemporary observers of international politics have noted the continued significance of other regional multilateral alliances as well, including the Organization of American States (OAS), the African Union (AU), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Naim 2014). Further, current U.S. bilateral alliance commitments with countries in East Asia and the Middle East remain key considerations in any policy analysis of the security challenges in those regions.
Some have argued, however, that the post-Cold War security alliances are becoming increasingly irrelevant in the modern era. As stated by Bruno Tertrais (2004, 135): “…the ever more complex nature of the strategic environment and the diversity of security arrangements devised by contemporary nations test the very notion of ‘alliance,’ causing one to wonder if it even remains a useful strategic concept.” He goes on to point to the rise of ad hoc coalitions of the willing to counter global terrorism as an example of the increasing irrelevance of permanent military alliances, especially multilateral ones (Tertrais 2004). Other scholars echo these arguments. For example, Daniel Byman (2006, 767-768) has described the failure of the United States to quickly modify its alliance portfolio to respond to the needs of a counterterrorism foreign policy as “unconscionable,” and argues that while the idea of alliance remains a necessary part of counterterrorism, the structures and rules must be fundamentally different. Rajan Menon has also been a strong advocate for the erosion of traditional alliance concepts so as to adapt to the 21st Century:

When circumstances change, shared practical objectives, which are far more vital to the health and life spans of alliances than ethereal sentiments, begin to erode. In the words of the nineteenth-century British foreign secretary Lord Palmerston, nations do not have ‘permanent friends, only permanent interests.’ The next decade will reveal the veracity of Palmerston’s dictum. (2003, 2)

In his 2007 book, Menon goes on to explicitly pose the assertion that the United States has reached The End of Alliances. Taken together, these arguments would suggest the scholarly study of a topic like alliance treaty design—how formal alliances are written and institutionalized—is increasingly irrelevant to 21st Century politics and that scholars should focus instead on pressing issues of counterterrorism and civil unrest.

While the caution outlined above against treating the Cold War alliance system as fixed and absolute is certainly valid, it would be equally short-signed for scholars to ignore formal
alliances entirely and focus only on issues of immediate relevance. Historians, especially, appreciate that the global political landscape is far from immutable; quite to the contrary, taking the long view of history affirms that key actors, issues, dynamics, and concepts evolve over time. Moreover, many sub-fields of IR emphasize the constant change inherent in the global system. Scholars of economic development trace the change that occurs as countries transition between different systems of political economy, as well as the change that occurs within so-called “developed” states (Gerschenkron 1962; Hall and Soskice 2001; Moore 1993). Comparative politics scholars outline the dynamics of regime change in countries around the world, including processes of revolution and democratization (Goldstone 1991; Huntington 1993; Skocpol 1979). Realist international relations scholars point to shifting trends of power as important points of change in the international system, via the study of systemic polarity (Waltz 1979), offensive and defensive power interests (Labs 1997; Mearsheimer 2001; Zakaria 1998) and power transitions or cycles (Doran 1971; Gilpin 1981; Modelski 1987). And even liberal institutionalists, with all their focus on the value of creating lasting institutional bonds, acknowledge that institutional design changes over time (Lake 1999; Rafferty 2003; Weber 2000). The fundamental observation of perennial change in the international system—and scholarly interest in change as a point of study—cautions us against only studying the here-and-now, including when it comes to the potential erosion of post-Cold War alliance structures in the 21st Century.

Indeed, the scholarly alliance literature itself affirms that alliances appear to follow cohesive patterns of change that are often cyclical, going through periods of change and alliance realignment followed by periods of stability with little change in global alliance systems. Charles Kegley and Gregory Raymond (1989, 268) observe a cyclical pattern for international norms of alliance cohesion: the period following a global conflict leads to increased norms of
binding commitments to establish a new sense of global order, but the eventual de-legitimization and perceived increased flexibility of alliance commitments leads into the next period of conflict. Using newly compiled data, Brett Ashley Leeds and Michaela Mattes (2007) observe cohesive patterns in alliance design features that vary by historical period, including whether new alliances are predominantly bilateral or multilateral, whether commitments are asymmetric or not, the types of obligations that are specified, whether the obligations are public or secret, and the presence of institutionalization mechanisms. A more recent analysis by Raymond Kuo (2014, 3) shows that alliance patterns can be broken down by periods of major war and that within each period most global alliances are modeled on the alliance structure adopted by the leading state: “Their institutional designs have alternated between deep and broad alliance commitments during the Concert [of Europe], Cold War, and post-Cold War periods, and short-term security cooperation of very limited scope during the Utrecht, Bismarckian, and Interwar eras.”

Historical trends and the scholarly literature do not support the proposition that the 21st Century has put alliances on a linear trajectory such that the dynamics of what critics such as Tertrais and Menon consider “traditional” alliances will never reappear in global politics. Therefore, while some may predict a declining relevance of these formal alliances in the short-term, the scholarly study of their dynamics still holds both real-world and scholarly long-term importance because such insights prepare us for what to expect when the pendulum swings back and formal alliances become relevant again in the future.

Overview of the Project

The next chapter (“Asymmetric Alliances and Institutional Design in the Scholarly Literature”) provides an overview of the scholarly literature on formal security alliances,
including discussions on the conceptual definition of formal military alliance treaties (compared to other types of security cooperation) and the role alliance treaties play as internal and external signals in the inherent commitment problem of alliance partnerships. I place the alliance design sub-literature in context of the broader military alliance literature, illustrating that while several recent studies have accounted for the effects of alliance treaty design (in other words, treating it as an explanatory variable), only a handful of studies have tried to explain the causes of alliance design trends (Mattes 2012; Miller 2003, 2012; Powell 2010). The discussion then focuses on the nature of institutionalization as it relates uniquely to military alliance treaties and the variety of mechanisms that serve as peacetime commitments creating deeper partner cohesion. The final sections of this chapter focus on the role of alliance institutionalization in the cost-benefit analysis of alliance commitments and the dominant theoretical explanation for alliance institutionalization—the capability aggregation cooperation problem. I illustrate the insufficiency of this approach by outlining the theoretical gaps and empirical inconsistencies that result from a wholesale application of the capability aggregation assumption to all alliances.

Chapter 3 (“The Complementary Exchange Model of Asymmetric Alliance Institutionalization”) outlines the core theory of the project—the complementary exchange model of asymmetric alliance institutional design. The chapter begins with a review of alliance theory in context of the realist theoretical paradigm, including the acknowledgement by some branches of realism that alliances can be motivated by more than just capability aggregation; alternatives include “pacts of restraint” (Schroeder 1976), “tethering” (Weitsman 2004), and “bandwagoning” (Schweller 1994; Walt 1985). I then describe how Morrow’s (1991) security-autonomy trade-off approach better captures the nature of asymmetric alliance partnerships than the capability aggregation approach, particularly regarding alliance formation and duration.
Building on the insights of Morrow (1991) and the realist scholars, I propose a new theoretical approach to asymmetric alliance institutional design—the “complementary exchange model.” Unlike the capability aggregation model’s emphasis on mutual material gains (i.e.: joint troop placement), the complementary exchange model allows for major and minor power partners to have different motives in the cost-benefit analysis of whether to institutionalize the alliance treaty—such that the major power gains greater foreign policy projection while the minor power gains new security guarantees. The capability aggregation model is also better suited to acknowledge the potential for major power interests to dominate during alliance negotiations. This theoretical model, I argue, more accurately predicts both the frequency and depth of alliance institutionalization than the capability aggregation approach; we should not only expect to observe more frequent and deeper institutionalization in asymmetric than symmetric alliances, but should also observe more emphasis on the institutionalization mechanisms particularly suited to asymmetric partnerships (i.e.: military basing rights and military aid payments). The chapter concludes with a brief illustrative comparison of two French alliances from the late-19th Century: the 1884 Second Treaty of Saigon and the 1894 Franco-Russian Alliance.

Chapter 4 (“Relative Power Asymmetry and the Scope of Military Alliance Institutionalization”) uses a large-N statistical analysis of bilateral alliances from the period 1815-2003 to test the validity of the complementary exchange model’s empirical predictions. From the core theory I derive four hypotheses which propose that partner relative power asymmetry should be positively associated with the frequency of alliance institutionalization (Hypothesis 1), alliance institutional depth (Hypothesis 2), the interaction of institutional depth and the presence of an active obligation such as a defense or offense pact (Hypothesis 3), and individual institutionalization mechanisms including military aid, military basing rights,
peacetime military contact, and a formal alliance organization (Hypothesis 4). The primary data for this analysis is derived using the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data (Leeds, et al. 2002). The analysis accounts for a number of control variables, including the presence of an active obligation (i.e.: defense or offense pact), geographic contiguity, post-colonial relationship, regime type similarity, joint threat, and partner reputation. For the primary dependent variable, I introduce a new measurement of how deeply an alliance treaty is institutionalized that improves on the current index (Leeds and Anac 2005) by providing greater variance and avoiding ex ante assumptions drawn from the capability aggregation approach. The results of my statistical models demonstrate that alliance treaties between asymmetric partners do indeed feature institutionalization mechanisms more frequently and with greater depth than symmetric treaty partnerships. The comparative effect of relative power asymmetry on institutional depth is over twice that of active obligation, and the predicted probability of an alliance containing the four individual institutionalization mechanisms outlined in the fourth hypothesis all increase as the partnership’s asymmetric increases. In summary, I find that the data largely support the hypotheses derived from the complementary exchange model.

Chapters 5 and 6 ("Europe’s Imperial Powers: Great Britain and France" and "The Cold War Superpowers: the United States and Russia/USSR") deepen the analysis of asymmetric alliances by qualitatively exploring four illustrative cases of major power alliance partners—Great Britain, France, the United States, and Russia/USSR. Each illustrative case considers the overall trend between relative power asymmetry and institutional depth in the major power’s alliance portfolio from 1815 to 2003, followed by a discussion of the major power’s general alliance history and the trends it favored with regard to both alliance aims and institutionalization over time. In three of the cases (Great Britain, France, and Russia/USSR), the observed trend
provides qualitative support to the predictions of the complementary exchange model. That said, in all four cases (including the United States), the deepest levels of institutionalization were almost exclusively reserved for the major powers’ alliances with asymmetric partners, and the individual institutionalization mechanisms argued to be most appropriate for asymmetric partnerships—military basing rights and military aid payments—were heavily favored in those asymmetric alliances. This qualitative exploration uncovers additional insights, including the significance of alternative explanations for alliance institutional design (particularly post-colonial relationships and the presence of an active obligation in the alliance), the observation that each case exhibits a different alliance “character” that evolved over time, and the finding that major power aims in a given alliance substantively impact alliance design outcomes.

The final chapter, Chapter 7 (“Asymmetric Alliance Institutionalization: Looking Forward”), offers summative thoughts on the project’s contribution to our understanding of alliances, including the correction of the theoretical gaps and empirical predictions outlined in Chapter 2. The concluding discussion also identifies several lines of future research to expand our understanding of asymmetric alliances and institutional design, including the disaggregation of this project’s analysis by temporal eras to better account for the impact of systemic polarity on alliance design trends, the study of asymmetric alliances using major power aims as the primary explanatory variable, and future research on the effectiveness of asymmetric alliance institutionalization.

References


CHAPTER 2
ASYMMETRIC ALLIANCES AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN THE SCHOLARLY LITERATURE

Alliances have endured as a cornerstone of international politics over the last two hundred years and across vastly different systemic orders and evolving contextual conditions. The continued primacy of security alliances is unsurprising when we consider the imperative of state security. In pursuit of security—arguably their most fundamental purpose—states balance between unilateral military mobilization and pooling security costs by cooperating with others. Scholars of alliance politics are interested in why and how states navigate the often rough waters of leaning on allies for security. This project fits squarely into this broad goal, but with a much narrower focus—on why and how alliances between states of asymmetric relative power incorporate institutionalization mechanisms into the design of their military alliances.

This chapter traces the relevant literature for this project, beginning with a discussion of the conceptual definition and theoretical significance of formal military alliance treaties as distinct from other types of security cooperation, such as informal coalitions or non-military diplomatic agreements. Also included in this first section is a discussion of the role alliance treaties play as internal and external signals in the inherent commitment problem of alliance partnerships. The second section places the alliance design sub-literature in context of the broader military alliance literature and surveys the state of what we think we know about alliance design. I illustrate that while several recent studies have accounted for the effects of alliance design (in other words, treating it as an explanatory variable), only a handful of studies have tried
to explain the causes of alliance design trends, which represents a gap in our current understanding. The third section focuses on the nature of institutionalization as it relates uniquely to military alliances and the variety of mechanisms that serve as peacetime commitments creating deeper partner cohesion in alliance treaty documents.

The final sections of this chapter focus on the role of alliance institutionalization in the cost-benefit analysis of alliance commitments and the dominant theoretical explanation for alliance institutionalization—the capability aggregation cooperation problem. This approach argues that institutionalization’s primary purpose is to facilitate the sharing of military capability between alliance partners as a means of joint defense. I conclude with a discussion of why this explanation offers an ultimately unsatisfactory explanation for asymmetric alliance institutional design by outlining the theoretical gaps and empirical inconsistencies that result from a wholesale application of the capability aggregation assumption to all alliances, including the (ultimately incorrect) prediction that institutionalization should be more likely in symmetric, not asymmetric, alliance partnerships. In sum, this review of the scholarly literature demonstrates that a more tailored theory of asymmetric alliance institutionalization—such as the complementary exchange model introduced in Chapter 3—is needed to address both the theoretical gaps and empirical inconsistencies in our current understanding of alliance politics.

Formal Military Alliance Treaties

Defining Formal Military Alliances

Military alliances are defined as *formal agreements between two or more sovereign and independent states that seek the coordination of military policy and/or action.*¹ Well-known

---

¹ This definition reflects a consensus in the literature (for example: Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan 1974; Leeds, et al. 2002; Morrow 2000; Sorokin 1994; Wilkins 2012).
examples exemplifying the military alliance include the 1815 Quadruple Alliance between the United Kingdom, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, the 1896 Franco-Russian Alliance, the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty (now the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO), the 1955 Warsaw Pact, and the Cold War-era bilateral defense treaties between the United States and Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. While the content of military alliances is significantly heterogeneous, exhibiting great variance in the type of obligation, scope and specificity of the *casus belli* (terms of invocation), level of institutionalization, and terms of membership, ratification, and renewal (Leeds and Mattes 2007; Leeds, et al. 2002), this definition captures the common thread characteristics of military alliances—formal agreements between states specifying terms for the coordination of military policy and/or action.

States engage in a range of cooperative security efforts, many of which fall outside the scope of this definition. Excluded from the definition are formal agreements whose purpose is to coordinate non-military policies, including economic agreements (such as the North American Free Trade Association) and purely diplomatic agreements (such as agreements relating only to foreign aid allocations). Also excluded are military agreements that do not obligate signatories to coordinated military action or policy, such as agreements relating to non-proliferation, arms sales, intelligence sharing, and military exercises. While such agreements do occasionally require domestic ratification procedures similar to military alliances, and while military alliances do occasionally specify terms relating to military aid and basing rights exchanges, these agreements—by themselves—lack the broad obligations to coordinate military policy that characterize formal alliances (*Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Codebook* 2005, 5).

This definition for military alliances should also not be confused with less formal types of security cooperation collectively known as “alignments” (Kegley and Raymond 1990; Morrow
Examples of these informal security associations include wartime coalitions, such as the 1990-91 Gulf War coalition or the 2003 Iraq War “coalition of the willing” (Kreps 2011; Weitsman 2014), as well as what some have termed “strategic partnerships,” such as ongoing strategic cooperation—in the absence of a formal treaty—between Russia and China, the United States and India, or Israel and Turkey (Wilkins 2012, 67). Alliances go one step further than alignments by formalizing security cooperation between states in a written (often public) treaty, and, as a result, are largely treated as more significant commitments (Sorokin 1994). In many respects, including transaction costs and risks of punishment for abrogation, formal military alliances are more costly forms of security commitment than informal alignments (hence their prominence as a point of scholarly study—they are a “hard case” for costly security cooperation).

Finally, military alliances are distinguished from broader security structures, including collective security arrangements (such as the 19th Century Concert of Europe), security communities (such as the proposed Association of Southeast Asian Nations Security Community), confederations (such as the proposed mid-Twentieth Century European Defense Community), international regimes (such as the nuclear non-proliferation regime), or even protectorates and empires. While alliances can certainly serve as an underpinning component of such security arrangements, they are conceptually distinct. For example, Louise Richardson’s (1999) excellent analysis of the Concert of Europe as a security management institution clearly distinguishes the Concert’s collective security arrangement from its component alliances; while

---

2 Thomas Wilkins (2012, 53) argues for an ontological shift where “alignment” serves as the umbrella term for all variants of security cooperation, with “alliance” as one sub-type and informal agreements characterized as either “coalitions” or “strategic partnerships.”

3 An objection might be viable in referencing the “special relationship” between the United States and United Kingdom, which, while lacking a formal bilateral treaty, is considered among the tightest bonds of joint defense and military policy. A review of recent international politics, however, suggests this to be the exception rather than the rule. Moreover, the US and United Kingdom do share membership in the multilateral NATO alliance.
the 1815 Quadruple Alliance undeniably underpinned the Concert, the Concert itself was much broader in scope than the alliance (50-51). A similar argument can be made with regard to the role of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty underpinning the modern NATO security community, which exists as a much broader security structure than its founding treaty (Rafferty 2003; Wallander and Keohane 1999). The cooperative security structures literature—whose focus is on explaining why states choose one form of security structure over another—consistently differentiates between military alliances and alternate structures, even if an alliance treaty is the foundation for the broader structure (Duffield 1992; Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander 1999; Lake 1996, 1999, 2001; Weber 1997, 2000).

Some have criticized continued scholarly focus on formal military alliances, arguing that security cooperation is shifting away from formal alliances and toward “coalitions of the willing” (Khanna 2008; Menon 2007; Tertrais 2004; Wilkins 2012; Woodman 1997). As discussed in Chapter 1, there is good reason to be skeptical that this represents a permanent shift in alliance trends. The data provide further contradiction of these claims. Brett Ashley Leeds and Michaela Mattes (2007, 187) observe that the number of alliances has risen as the number of states in the international system has increased, including 163 new alliances between 1990 and 2003 alone. Though the number of new alliances including at least one major power member has declined over time, over one-third (37.4%) of new alliances formed since 1990 do have at least one major power member (Leeds and Mattes 2007, 187). Further, while only 13.5% of new alliances formed after 1990 include an active defense or offense pact, the prominence of these “active obligation alliances” has historically fluctuated with the strategic context, dropping by nearly 30% during the Interwar period but rising again by the same percentage during the Cold War (Leeds and Mattes 2007, 191). Recent work on the diffusion of alliance trends following major
world wars underscores the persistence of formal alliances even despite global upheaval (Kuo 2014).

Moreover, the literature continues to affirm the significance of the written alliance treaty itself—the focus of this project. As observed by James Morrow (2000, 63-64), written alliances are “neither necessary nor sufficient” for interstate security cooperation, so “why write them down?” Written military alliance treaties serve as a critical remedy for the inherent commitment problem in security cooperation, facilitating both internal and external assurance signaling through multiple mechanisms that would be difficult to achieve without these formal documents.

Valuable Signals: Alliance Treaty Documents

Security cooperation suffers from an inherent commitment problem. While outsourcing security through burden sharing with other states may have benefits in terms of domestic political considerations, relying on an alliance for security requires a great deal of trust in one’s partner to uphold their alliance obligations. If (potentially insurmountable) material cost is the prohibition against purely self-reliant security, dependence on a self-interested, unreliable partner is the prohibition against cooperative security. States do not join alliances for altruistic purposes, and states have no inherent assurance that their partner will not act outside the terms of the agreement if the strategic setting and their national self-interest demand it. Glenn Snyder (1984, 1990, 1997) consistently outlines the two key risks in military alliances as abandonment—the risk that one’s partner will defect on their commitments when the alliance is invoked—and entrapment—the risk that the alliance itself will embolden an ally to act aggressively, drawing

---

4 Recent studies of the arms versus alliances trade-off affirm that burden sharing and cost-efficiency aspects of alliances, as opposed to unilateral military mobilization, create domestic political incentives favoring alliances, particularly when budget constraints are strong (Kimball 2010; Morgan and Palmer 2003; Narizny 2003).
their partners into an undesired conflict. This dynamic, affecting both partners, introduces a significant amount of uncertainty into the formation of military alliances.

To be sure, uncertainty about a partner’s commitment to uphold their obligations plagues every type of international cooperation (Morrow 1994). This uncertainty is especially high, however, in alliance commitments where the higher stakes of “high politics” security issues render meaningful cooperation especially unlikely (Mearsheimer 1994/5). Alliance partnerships often appear to lack the incremental cooperation (low-level, trust-building cooperation that spills over into larger cooperative enterprises), explicit contributions, continual enforcement (by an independent monitoring agency, for example), and short-term gains that facilitate cooperation in other issue areas (Mattes 2012b, 684). Commitment problems have potential implications outside the alliance as well; if an important purpose of many alliances is the deterrence of an external threat (Waltz 1979), concerns about weak partner commitment will only signal to such threats a low likelihood that alliance partners will intervene on each other’s behalf, thus inviting conflict initiation (Fearon 1997; Leeds 2003b; Morrow 1994; Smith 1995, 1998).

Moreover, the historical record affirms that alliance partner distrust is not empirically unfounded. Recent studies have shown that over one-quarter of alliance partners defect on their commitments when invoked in wartime (Leeds 2003a, 801; Leeds, Long, and Mitchell 2000, 686). One might counter that the relatively high success rate of approximately 75% suggests that alliance partners are actually quite reliable. This conclusion overlooks, however, the inherent challenge of reaching an alliance agreement to begin with. Commitment problems also plague alliance negotiations, and have prevented successful alliance formation, such as when Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union’s shared distrust that the others would honor their commitments against a rising Germany forestalled successful alliance negotiations during the
late-1930s (Leeds 2003a, 804). In his analysis of pre-World War II alliance formation, Paul Poast (2012, 290) finds that of the 308 alliance formation attempts for this period, roughly 41% (127 out of 308 attempts) failed to reach an agreement and are thus excluded from most major alliance datasets assessing alliance formation and reliability.

One way states overcome this uncertainty problem is to signal their commitment to the alliance by making costly, explicit promises in the written alliance treaty. As observed by Morrow (2000, 68): “alliances are one of the strongest types of signals available in the panoply of foreign policy acts.” The value and meaning of written alliance commitments is in their ability to increase the costs of abrogation relative to adherence—even when adherence incurs material costs of military action to support an ally (Hoffman 2002). According to Thomas Schelling (1966, 66): “The whole purpose of verbal or ritualistic commitments, of political and diplomatic commitments, of efforts to attach honor and reputation to a commitment, is to make the commitment manifestly hard to get out of on short notice.” In other words, formal, written alliance treaties are important because they are a tool for ameliorating the alliance commitment problem by serving as both internal and external signals of assurance and commitment.

First, written alliance treaties serve as internal signals of a state’s level of commitment by assuring their partners they intend to uphold their treaty obligations. States’ willingness to incur the ex ante costs associated with formal, written alliances sends a much stronger signal of commitment to their partners than an informal, verbal assurance—akin to a security down-payment. Successful negotiation of a military alliance requires high transaction costs at both levels of the “two-level game” (Putnam 1988, 433). At the international level, diplomatic negotiations are lengthy and require the deft handling of different strategic, cultural, and even legal perspectives (Powell 2010); at the domestic level, ratification requirements “locking-in”
treaty commitments via domestic constitutional and institutional mechanisms often face uphill legislative and public opinion battles (Krutz and Peake 2009), but with lasting pre-commitment for successor administrations (Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel 2009; Mattes 2012a). Moreover, major foreign policy actions, such as the conclusion of an alliance, incur audience costs such that, should the agreement fail (meaning, either partner fails to uphold their obligations), both domestic and international audiences hold leaders accountable.5 A leader’s willingness to stake their political tenure on an alliance treaty signals to their ally the solemnity of their intent.6

Second, written alliance treaties are also powerful external signals. Though states can certainly signal a strong informal commitment to intervene and assist another state in their defense against a third-party threat, formal alliances are a much more powerful ex ante signal. To use James Fearon’s (1997, 68) turn-of-phrase, formal alliances are a more credible means of “tying hands” because of the transactional and reputational costs that are associated with formal diplomatic agreements. External third-parties can observe the level of internal commitment signaling, which then provides information about the likelihood of the alliance being upheld if threatened, doubling as external signaling (Morrow 2000; Leeds 2003b). Moreover, outside observers will be aware that the alliance treaty will have provided a means of peacetime military coordination, thus making any desired military conflict more difficult and costly to pursue. If

---

5 For this discussion, domestic audience costs include the leader’s removal from power or a restriction on their political power by the politically relevant “selectorate” (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 1999, 2004; Fearon 1994, 1997; Morrow 1999, 2000), and are arguably imposed in both democratic and non-democratic political systems (Garriga 2009; Gaubatz 1996; Leeds 1999; Simon and Gartzke 1996; Weeks 2008). International audience costs largely put states in a weaker negotiating position for future alliances (Crescenzi, et al. 2012; Gibler 2008; Mattes 2012b; Miller 2003, 2012), or can refer to a generalized “poor” reputation among other states (Mercer 1996).

6 Moving beyond intra-alliance signals of commitment to uphold terms, recent studies have demonstrated the ability of written military alliance treaties to signal commitments to peace within the alliance itself, leading to less intra-alliance conflict (Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros 2006; Long, Nordstrom, and Baek 2007). Moreover, the dynamics of internal signaling in alliance treaties highlight the institutional nature of alliances, bringing them more clearly into the larger institutionalization literature (Long, Nordstrom, and Baek 2007, 1105).
successful external deterrence is a goal,\textsuperscript{7} states in alliance have an inherent interest in crafting a strong external signal of mutual commitment through a written alliance. Indeed, recent studies find that the clarity of a formal alliance’s defense clause is associated with a decreased probability of the initiation of a militarized interstate dispute (Benson 2011; Leeds 2003b).

In sum, written military alliance treaties incorporate several mechanisms to address the alliance commitment problem, otherwise absent in informal assurances of alignment. These include \textit{ex ante} transaction costs (both diplomatic negotiation and military coordination), the promise of future audience costs (domestic and international) if a state abrogates their alliance commitment, the formalization of the international commitment through domestic political ratification processes and “locking-in” for subsequent leaders, and norms of adherence in international law (\textit{pacta sunt servanda}). Taken together, these mechanisms allow written alliance treaties to serve as powerful signals of commitment to both alliance partners and external third parties. Given their difficulty and significance, diplomats and statesmen thus pay close attention to the design of these alliance treaty documents, carefully specifying the terms of obligation—the alliance design—they are confident will ensure the alliance’s success.

\textbf{Alliance Treaty Design}

\textit{Alliance Design: Understudied and Overlooked}

The literature on military alliances is among the most developed and extensive in the field of modern IR, with studies dating back to the 1960s and 1970s. Despite this wealth of theoretical and empirical knowledge, only in the last decade has the design of alliance treaties become a point of focus for alliance scholars. This minimization and delay is especially apparent

\textsuperscript{7} Signaling commitment to improve deterrence can be targeted at either a joint threat (immediate deterrence) or a threat to an ally (extended deterrence).
when we consider the broad topography of the alliance literature landscape over the last fifty years, which can largely be organized into a handful of sub-sets, each capturing part of the alliance process: alliance formation (when, how, and with whom states ally), alliance design (the terms and features of alliance obligation), alliance management (how effectively allies coordinate their evolving relations), performance (how successfully the alliance achieves its goals), and alliance termination (when and why alliance commitments end).

Of these sub-sets, by far the most saturated is that on alliance formation, which can be even further subdivided. The most broadly known sub-set of the alliance formation literature explores theoretical and empirical trends in the formation of balancing versus bandwagoning alliances (Chiu 2003; Christensen and Snyder 1990; Mueller 1995; Schweller 1994; Sweeney and Fritz 2004; Walt 1985, 1987; Waltz 1979). Countering the argument that alliance formation is motivated solely by external powers and threats, another sub-set outlines the internal motives for alliance formation, including ally restraint, tethering, and control (Cha 2010; Fordham 2010; Palmer and David 1999; Pressman 2008; Schroeder 1976; Weitsman 2004). Another very prominent sub-set of the alliance formation literature views formation through a rationalism lens, whereby states form alliance portfolios seeking to rationally balance inherent risks such as free-riding or the entrapment-abandonment and security-autonomy trade-offs (Altfeld 1984; Conybeare 1992, 1994b; Morrow 1994, 2000; Snyder 1984, 1990, 1997; Sorokin 1994).

Beginning in the mid-1990s, some alliance formation scholars intensified their focus on the connection between domestic political institutions and alliance formation (Barnett and Levy 1991; Gibler and Wolford 2006; Lai and Reither 2000; Leeds 1999; Owen 2005; Simon and Gartzke 1996; Siverson and Emmons 1996; Werner and Lemke 1997). Other sub-sets of the

---

alliance formation literature have considered the effects of specific variables on alliance
formation, including the arms versus alliances debate (Conybeare 1994a; Kimball 2010; Morgan
and Palmer 2003; Morrow 1993; Narizny 2003) and the effects of reputation (Crescenzi, et al.

The literatures on alliance management and performance are also very robust. Alliance
management scholars have addressed generic alliance management negotiations post-formation
(Snyder 1990, 1997) as well as issues of alliance enlargement, restructuring, and institutional
evolution (Kydd 2001; Long and Leeds 2006; Rafferty 2003; Siverson and Starr 1994). A large
portion of the alliance management literature focuses on alliance cohesion and military burden
sharing, in both peace and wartime (Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1997; Conybeare and Sandler
1990; Fang and Ramsay 2010; Malici 2005; Papayoanou 1997; Wallace 2008; Weitsman 2003,
2004, 2014). Alliance performance scholars have explored in great detail the effectiveness of
military alliances in achieving their deterrence goals (Benson 2011; Gibler and Vasquez 1998;
Kimball 2006; Leeds 2003a; Morrow 1994), as well as how well allies uphold their alliance
treaty obligations when invoked in wartime (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004; Leeds 2003b; Leeds
and Anac 2005; Leeds, Long, and Mitchell 2000; Sabrosky 1980). A few studies have even
accounted for how peacefully allies deal with intra-alliance conflict (Bearce, Flanagan, and
Floros 2006; Long, Nordstrom, and Baek 2007). Numerous studies have explored issues of
alliance duration and termination (Bennett 1997; McCalla 1996; Miller 2003, 2012; Morrow
1991; Reed 1997) and at least two studies have explicitly attempted to account for the causes of
alliance termination (Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel 2009; Leeds and Savun 2007).

No empirical studies accounting for variation in alliance design date prior to 2000,
despite a wealth of earlier publications on other aspects of alliance politics, as demonstrated
above. This general oversight is explained in terms of both natural theoretical progression and a lack of empirical data on alliance design. It is reasonable that scholars focused heavily on alliance formation in the nascent development of the alliance literature—when and how alliances form (or do not form) is a “first-order” question to understanding alliance politics. It is also reasonable that alliance scholars have focused on alliance performance and implications for interstate militarized disputes as such questions directly speak to the effect of alliance agreements. As a result, most quantitative studies of alliance formation and effectiveness have used dichotomized or dummy variables (“0” and “1”) to account for whether a state formed an alliance in any given year, with no discussion of the variation across alliance agreements. As noted by Brett Ashley Leeds and Sezi Anac (2005, 184), we should rightly be cautious about folding alliance design into the existing literature on alliance formation; such measurements tell us about the presence or absence of an alliance agreement under specified theoretical conditions, but tell us little about the agreement’s content. Theories of alliance design are best seen as an understudied intermediary step between alliance formation and outcome.

Moreover, until quite recently the field lacked comprehensive data on the specific terms of alliance treaties. In 2002, however, the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset on the design features of alliance treaties between 1815 and 2003 was made available (Leeds, et al. 2002), providing scholars the most comprehensive empirical data on alliances—and particularly variations in alliance treaty content—to date. Since the release of the ATOP data, scholarly interest in studies using alliance design variables has increased.

9 For example, see: Gibler and Wolford 2006; Kimball 2006; Lai and Reiter 2000; Morrow 1994; Sabrosky 1980; Siverson and Emmons 1996.

10 This project uses the most updated version of the ATOP data—version 3.0, which was last revised and published on May 10, 2005. The data is available online at: http://atop.rice.edu/data.

This new sub-set of the alliance literature emphasizes the importance of alliance treaty language. Regarding varying obligation conditionalities in alliance treaty language, Brett Ashley Leeds (2003a, 808) notes that leaders “are careful in crafting the language of the treaties….Most treaties contain specific language regarding the conditions under which the alliance comes into effect and the actions that the members are required to take under these conditions.” It follows that alliance design should be seen as intentional and “recognition of the diversity in alliance contracts raises the question of why and when we observe one treaty design rather than another.” (Mattes 2012b, 682) Further, there appears to be a clear connection between alliance textual design and outcome. For example, Brett Ashley Leeds, Andrew Long, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell (2000, 697) critique prior scholarship’s finding that alliance obligations are only honored at a rate of 25% for not accounting for alliance design; when specific conditions from the alliance treaty text are accounted for, they argue, alliances are actually upheld approximately 75% of the time. As a result of the ATOP data and subsequent studies, the assumption that alliance treaties are universally structured the same way has been discredited, and written alliance treaty commitments have been shown to vary meaningfully in terms of scope, type of military commitment, conditions and exclusions, and the degree of peacetime institutionalization and cooperation. Though the literature on alliance design has certainly expanded in recent years, it has, however, largely remained focused on the effects of alliance design, overlooking explanations for alliance design as a dependent variable.

*What Do We Know About Alliance Design?*

The ATOP data (Leeds, et al. 2002) as well as Leeds and Mattes’ (2007) temporal survey of descriptive trends details the elements of alliance treaty design of most interest to
To reiterate, the alliance design sub-field seeks to explain the terms and features of alliance obligation, as codified in the alliance treaty document. Two prominent aspects of alliance design addressed in the extant literature are the term(s) of obligation—whether the treaty contains a defense, offense, neutrality, consultation, or non-aggression pact, or some combination of pacts—as well as whether the alliance obligations are conditional promises on conflicts relating to specific adversaries, geographic locations, or aggression from an adversary (Leeds, Long, and Mitchell 2000). Scholars also pay attention to the level of alliance formalization, including legislative ratification requirements and whether the alliance is made fully public or kept in partial (or total) secrecy (Leeds and Anac 2005). The level of alliance institutionalization is also an important aspect of alliance design, and includes mechanisms requiring peacetime coordination among allies, including peacetime contact among military officials, basing rights, military aid exchanges, provisions for integrated military command, and a formal bureaucratic organization, among others (Leeds and Anac 2005). Other elements of alliance design include whether the alliance outlines specific ally contributions (in troops, armaments, finances, etc.), mechanisms for dispute settlement among allies (such as an arbitration commission or mediation), and terms linking the military alliance to economic or political cooperation (Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Codebook 2005).

By far, the majority of the contemporary literature on alliance design has studied these elements as explanatory variables. Taken together, these studies affirm the substantive effect of alliance design on a wide range of alliance outcomes, and therefore its continued relevance to

---

A fair criticism of this definition would be that it captures but a narrow snapshot of the alliance design concept at the point of treaty signature, and thus cannot account for the evolution of alliance design after formation. For example, some design features and treaty terms may not be implemented in practice. Or, elements of alliance design of interest to scholars studying treaty documents may evolve over time, outside of the alliance treaty terms, and thus elude scholarly empirics. As noted by Geoffrey Wallace (2008, 229): “employing treaty texts is a good starting point for identifying variation in alliance design and has the advantage of providing an ex ante measure of institutionalization that reduces possible issues of endogeneity.”
policymakers and scholars. The explicit linkage of military alliances to other issue areas in the treaty text—particularly economic issues—is consistently shown to be associated with “positive” alliance outcomes, including increased intra-alliance trade (Long and Leeds 2006) and a decreased probability that the alliance will be abrogated outside treaty terms, even when other strategic considerations, such as changes in relative power, domestic political regimes, and new outside alliances, change (Leeds and Savun 2007). Poast (2012) even demonstrates that economic issue linkage is a critical factor for the successful conclusion of alliance treaties prior to 1945. Leeds, Long, and Mitchell (2000) find that states rely on the specificity of obligation conditions in the alliance treaty text when determining whether to participate in an alliance military conflict, and Benson (2011) finds that unconditional alliance obligations often fail to achieve successful deterrence goals, while deterrence alliances that specify conditions of invocation do increase deterrence success. Recent studies do not demonstrate, however, that the formalization of a military alliance treaty is associated with “positive” outcomes, such as ally reliability when invoked in wartime (Leeds and Anac 2005) or the decreased likelihood that an alliance will be abrogated outside treaty terms (Leeds and Savun 2007).

Studies show that alliance institutionalization is associated with greater and longer intra-alliance peace (Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros 2006; Long, Nordstrom, and Baek 2007), more coordinated military strategy among allies (Wallace 2008), and a greater propensity to engage in conflict management on allies’ behalf (Owsiak and Frazier 2013). While these studies appear to affirm the benefits of alliance institutionalization for intra-alliance peace and cohesion, others find that institutionalization has a negligible effect or even undermines alliance goals. Leeds and Anac (2005) find that alliance institutionalization is not associated with increased partner reliability when the terms are invoked in wartime, contrary to expectations that greater peacetime
military coordination will increase ally reliability. Leeds and Savun (2007) find that alliance institutionalization actually increases the likelihood of the abrogation of the alliance outside treaty terms. While finding that many aspects of institutionalization lead to a longer intra-alliance peace, Long, Nordstrom, and Baek (2007) do find that formal bureaucratic organizations are associated with a shorter peace. Finally, in a qualitative analysis of post-Cold War interventions, Patricia Weitsman (2014) finds that the deeply institutionalized decision-making structures of large alliances can undermine alliance cohesion, war-fighting effectiveness, and interoperability. Of the elements of alliance design discussed above, the literature appears to have achieved the least consensus on the implications of alliance institutionalization, despite persuasive arguments elsewhere for a connection between institutionalization and cooperation (Abbott and Snidal 2000; Keohane 1989; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; Martin 1992; Ostrom 1990).

If the recent alliance design literature has successfully begun to outline some of the effects of alliance design elements—treating them as explanatory variables—the literature has failed to achieve empirical consensus on the determinants of alliance treaty design—treating them as dependent variables. Emilia Justyna Powell (2010, 48-49) finds that a country’s domestic legal system affects military alliance formation and design, such that civil law systems prefer fewer explicit conditions on alliance obligation, while common law and Islamic law systems prefer longer, more explicit conditions in alliance treaties. Gregory Miller (2003, 2012) finds that state reputation influenced the formation, duration, and variation of British alliance choices prior to World War I; regarding alliance design, he finds that when allying with states of poor reputation, Britain chose strategic design elements facilitating a “tighter” alliance treaty design, including lower levels of commitment, more precise treaty language, and more deeply
integrated military command (2003, 76-77). And Michaela Mattes (2012b, 704) finds that symmetric alliances are more likely to include issue linkage and military institutionalization design features (more costly, but more effective, concessions) when one partner has previously violated an alliance agreement, but that asymmetric alliances where one partner has a reputation for unreliability (in every case, the major power) are more likely to place conditions on alliance obligations as a cheaper concession. Thus, Mattes suggests relative power as a conditioning factor on the reputation argument, such that asymmetric relative power undermines the likelihood of the tightest forms of institutional design—issue linkage and military institutionalization. Contrary to this line of argument, Benson (2012, 71) argues that increased uncertainty in deterrent alliance relationships will lead to less-tightly defined alliances—in terms of obligation conditionalities, not institutionalization; states seeking to guard against alliance the “moral hazard” will actually aver from highly-specified alliance commitments, favoring ambiguous commitments about when they will come to their ally’s defense.13 He finds that foreign policy preference, relative power asymmetry, and strategic uncertainty all increase the likelihood of this ambiguous, or probabilistic, alliance design (Benson 2012, 128).

These four studies comprise the total extent of the scholarly literature that has explicitly sought to explain alliance design as a dependent variable. Recalling the established connection between alliance design and outcome, this amounts to a significant gap in our understanding of military alliances. In particular, the literature is especially cloudy on the causes and consequences of alliance institutionalization. This project seeks to contribute to the alliance design literature by clarifying the determinants of institutionalization in military alliance treaties.

13 Essentially, this “moral hazard” is the concept of entrapment risk (Snyder 1997).
**Institutionalization in Military Alliance Treaties**

*Defining Institutionalization*

Beyond the demonstrated gap in our knowledge, institutionalization is a topic of great interest to alliance scholars for at least two additional reasons. First, institutional cooperation in issue areas where gains and losses are perceived as zero-sum—in security issues such as military alliances—is a hard test for both international cooperation scholars (who struggle to explain failures of security cooperation) and international security scholars (who struggle to explain successes).\(^{14}\) Second, institutionalization represents a critical avenue by which alliance design shapes the internal and external signals of commitment that alliance treaties strive to achieve (Snyder 1997). Some scholars describe alliances themselves as institutions, often followed by applications of liberal institutionalist insights to alliance politics.\(^{15}\) Indeed, many recent alliance design studies adopt the label of “institution” onto military alliances (Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros 2006; Leeds and Anac 2005; Long, Nordstrom and Baek 2007; Wallace 2012).

We should, however, proceed with caution in recognition of the fact that great variation exists in the extent to which military alliances adopt mechanisms of institutionalization. As Kirsten Rafferty (2003, 344) observes: “alliances are institutions to the extent that states engage in a formal and contractual obligation to co-operation security matters, and they may choose to create a formal organization to facilitate the pursuit of their collective objectives.” Thus, while alliances may be institutions in the sense that their contractual nature imposes rules on state interaction, not all alliances will achieve the level of institutionalization we commonly expect of prominent international institutions, such as the United Nations or the World Bank.

---

\(^{14}\) For an excellent example of this debate, see Mearsheimer (1994/5) and Keohane and Martin (1994/5).  
\(^{15}\) As noted by Robert Keohane (1989, 5): “alliances are *institutions.*” Similarly, Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohane (1999, 23) claim: “alliances are exclusive security institutions, designed principally to deal with threats from non-members.”
Demonstrating this observation, Leeds and Mattes (2007, 192) find that 62.8% of military alliances in the period 1815-2003 do not specify any of the elements of institutionalization commonly used in the extant literature. Weitsman (2004, 16-17) echoes this caution by pointing out that the theoretical and qualitative literature making this claim has nearly exclusively limited itself to unique 20th Century case studies, and most predominantly, NATO.16 She goes on to argue that the “alliances as institutions” perspective requires a “broadly-conceived” definition of what makes an institution (Weitsman 2004, 17). Perhaps in recognition of this ontological challenge, alliance design scholars have focused not on whether alliances are, in fact, institutions, but rather on the extent to which alliances have incorporated mechanisms of institutionalization into their treaty design. Thus, the phrase “alliance institutionalization” is best conceived in terms of relative degree than absolute categorization.

In this light, the summary definition for military alliance institutionalization adopted for this project refers to *treaty terms that regulate interactions among alliance partners, especially during peacetime, and tighten the constraints of partner commitments* (Leeds and Anac 2005; Mattes 2012b; Morrow 2000).17 In particular, this definition emphasizes the role of institutionalization mechanisms promoting regular peacetime interaction between alliance partners. Many alliance design scholars emphasize the importance of peacetime institutionalization mechanisms for the purposes of military coordination (Leeds and Anac 2005; Wallace 2008), information sharing (Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros 2006; Long, Nordstrom, and Baek 2006), and addressing enforcement problems (Mattes 2012b). While some elements of

---

16 This is the case for both examples in the foregoing footnote. Additional examples include Duffield (1994/5), Ikenberry (2001), McCalla (1996), and Risse-Kappen (1995).

17 As noted by Leeds and Anac (2005, 186), “alliance institutionalization” should be conceptually distinguished from “alliance formalization,” which refers to treaty obligations that specify legislative ratification requirements and whether the alliance is made fully public or kept in partial (or total) secrecy, ostensibly for the purposes of increasing domestic and international audience costs for breaking the agreement.
alliance institutionalization specify tight partner obligations in times of conflict (such as plans for the subordination of troops or mediation clauses in cases of intra-alliance conflict), ex ante peacetime institutionalization mechanisms are largely regarding as more costly, and therefore more meaningful (Leeds and Anac 2005, 186).

This definition of alliance institutionalization is largely consistent with the predominant definition of “institutions” in the broader liberal institutionalism literature: “persistent and interconnected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations” (Keohane 1989, 163). John Duffield’s (2007) excellent analysis of the great ontological debate clouding the broader literature’s definition of institutions aside,18 Keohane’s (1989) variant remains the most widely adopted definition. The definition of alliance institutionalization for this project, while specific to mechanisms facilitating peacetime (and occasionally wartime) institutionalization in military alliances, clearly affirms the conceptualization of institutionalization as rules that constrain (or regulate) state interactions, and is most closely in line with the approach to institutionalization advocated by Keohane and other rationalists.

A number of mechanisms may be incorporated into alliance treaties for the purpose of promoting this definition of alliance institutionalization. The ATOP data codes over twenty variables the authors argue are indicative of alliance institutionalization, including obligations for conflict management, formal mediation and/or arbitration, peacetime military contact, military

---

18 Duffield (2007) demonstrates how multiple definitions developed largely in parallel with the liberal institutionalism literature itself. Whereas early theoretical work sidestepped the hurdle of a precise definition (Bull 1977), the international regimes literature of the 1980s adopted definitions treating institutions in the sociological context of “patterns of behavior or practices” (Young 1983, 93; see also Keohane 1984; Young 1980, 1989). Beginning in the early-1990s, institutions were defined in terms of international organizations (Martin 1993; Stein 1990) and in the rationalist lens as sets of rules facilitating the cooperative pursuit of exogenously-defined state self-interests (Abbott and Snidal 2001; Keohane 1988; Krasner 1999; Martin 1992; Ostrom 1990; Simmons and Martin 2002). Criticizing the rationalist’s approach for overlooking the constitutive role of institutions in shaping members’ interests, the constructivist approach to institutions defines them in terms of “constitutive norms” (Bearce and Bondanella 2007; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Legro 1997; Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1999).
aid provisions, peacetime integrated military command, the subordination of military forces under one state’s command during conflict, a formal organization (for military, political, economic, and/or dispute-settlement purposes), basing rights and/or joint troop placements, and specific troop, supply, and monetary contributions (Leeds, et al. 2002). The most commonly adopted operationalization of alliance institutionalization thus far has been Leeds and Anac’s (2005, 189) summary categorization—coded as “0=none,” “1=moderate,” and “2=high” alliance institutionalization—based on seven indicators drawn from the ATOP data: integrated military command in peacetime and wartime, common defense policy, provisions for troop placements and/or basing rights, official peacetime contact among military officials, a formal military organization, provisions of military training and/or technology, and plans for the subordination of one military to another during conflict. Other studies have highlighted specific institutionalization mechanisms, including a robust formal bureaucratic organization (Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros 2006; Rafferty 2004), mechanisms promoting intra-alliance dispute settlement such as an arbitration commission or mediation clause (Long, Nordstrom, and Baek 2007), and a hierarchical decision-making structure (Weitsman 2014). Taken as a whole, this discussion underscores the great heterogeneity of alliance institutional design, contrary to earlier assumptions, and helps frame this analysis of alliance institutionalization in context with the broader institutionalism approach.

19 Full discussions of these and other institutionalization mechanisms are available in the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Codebook (2005).
The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Alliance Institutionalization

No conceptual discussion of alliance institutionalization is complete without accounting for its associated costs and benefits. If institutionalization mechanisms were cheap and easy they would be included in nearly every military alliance; conversely, if institutionalization was prohibitively costly and produced little benefit no alliance would institutionalize their treaty. A survey of the data shows that neither is the case. Over one-third (37.2%) of military alliances formed between 1815 and 2003 specify at least some level of alliance institutionalization, and that percentage is even higher for the Concert of Europe and Cold War periods (50.6% and 41.3%, respectively), according to Leeds and Mattes (2007, 192). These empirical trends suggest that alliance institutionalization is associated with both real costs and real benefits, which are discussed below.

A core strategic benefit of alliance institutionalization is the reduced risk of future abandonment by one’s alliance partner. According to Snyder (1984, 1997), the risk of abandonment is the likelihood that one’s partner will defect on their commitments, including abrogating the agreement, reneging on promises of aid when invoked in the future, or withholding diplomatic support in a conflict with a shared adversary. Snyder notes that the risk of abandonment can be very high—such as when a state is very dependent on an ally’s security support or their ally has other strategic alternatives—as well as very costly, particularly if the defection manifests as aid refused when called on in a conflict. In the language of the rational design of institutions literature, alliance abandonment risk is a type of enforcement problem inhibiting successful cooperation (Abbott and Snidal 2001; Keohane 1989; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001). Though a number of factors certainly exponentiate abandonment risk, including the scope of alliance obligation (Benson 2011, 2012), partner reputations for
unreliability (Crescenzi, et al. 2012; Gibler 2008; Mattes 2012b; Miller 2003, 2012), adversarial allies (Weitsman 2004), or even changing strategic circumstances (Leeds and Savun 2007), it is arguably fundamental to all alliances.

The incorporation of institutionalization mechanisms in an alliance treaty can reduce projections of partner abandonment risk and mitigate these enforcement concerns. Mechanisms of institutionalization facilitate increased information sharing among allies, improve monitoring of ally commitment levels through regular peacetime interaction, and link alliance reliability to other benefits such as military or economic aid (Keohane 1989; Mattes 2012b; Snyder 1997). Alliance institutionalization further reduces risks of partner abandonment by increasing the domestic and international audience costs associated with abrogating an alliance commitment—failures of institutionalized alliance commitments will be seen as more egregious than failures of weak alliance commitments (Gibler 2008; Leeds 1999; Leeds and Savun 2007; Mattes 2012b; Morrow 2000). The importance of audience costs is all the more apparent when we consider that 95.7% of modern alliances (including their institutionalization terms) require some form of ratification in a domestic legislature and 99.4% are public commitments (Leeds and Mattes 2007, 192). A partner’s willingness to incorporate these higher-order and costly levels of institutionalized obligation thus serves as an internal signal of commitment to the alliance, assuaging concerns of abandonment risk.

A second strategic benefit of alliance institutionalization is the facilitation of joint military capabilities and coordination among allies (Leeds and Anac 2005; Morrow 1994; Wallace 2008). Morrow (1994, 272) offers a foundational formal model endogenizing alliance “tightness,” which he defines as peacetime joint military planning, and argues that while this “tightness” is more costly to negotiate, it increases actors’ joint war fighting ability and the
likelihood that they will win jointly fought wars. Geoffrey Wallace (2008) finds that institutionalized alliance treaties are associated with more cohesive military strategy between U.S. and Russian allies in the Cold War period. An extension of this increased joint war-fighting capability is a strengthened capacity for alliance deterrence, or what Michael Altfeld (1984, 524) described as the security gains in the “security-autonomy trade-off.” Though not explored in the recent alliance design literature, the peacetime military and policy interaction associated with alliance institutionalization signals to external threats the high likelihood that allies will come to each other’s aid if attacked and thus the higher costs of engaging the alliance in a military conflict.

If the reduction of abandonment risk is a core benefit of alliance institutionalization, the parallel strategic cost is increased entrapment risk. Entrapment refers to cases where a state is drawn into an unwanted conflict by an ally because of an alliance commitment (Snyder 1984, 1997). The risks of abandonment and entrapment vary inversely, in the “alliance security dilemma;” in other words, the very means by which alliance institutionalization can decrease abandonment risks also increase a state’s entrapment risk, particularly if allies’ foreign policy preferences are very divergent (Snyder 1997, 180). The costs of potential entrapment can be so significant that the literature affirms state interests in composing alliance treaties to mitigate them (Beckley 2015; Benson 2011, 2012; Kim 2011). Indeed, Tongfi Kim (2011) demonstrates that U.S. bilateral alliances with South Korea, Japan, and Spain have been repeatedly renegotiated in response to perceived shifts in probable entrapment risks. By making alliance

21 While Leeds (2003a) does empirically explore the ability of alliance treaties and the nature of their obligations (offensive vs. defensive) to deter outside aggression, her models do not account for the “tightness” of the alliance in terms of alliance institutionalization.
22 A potential counterargument posits that alliance deterrence is actually strengthened by vague commitment terms—what is called a deterrent “halo”—preventing external threats from only issuing challenges outside the explicit treaty terms. (Benson 2012; Morrow 2000)
23 Benson (2012, 71) calls this the “moral hazard” of extended deterrence in alliances.
commitments more intensive—through regular peacetime interaction, improved partner monitoring and information transparency, and increased international and domestic audience costs—mechanisms of institutionalization ultimately increase risks of entrapment even as they reduce risks of abandonment, and this is one of great costs of incorporating institutionalization into alliance treaties.\textsuperscript{24} Altfeld (1984, 526) describes these costs as “autonomy costs,” referring to the limits on foreign policy freedom that come with joining an alliance.

Entrapment risks and autonomy costs are not the only costs associated with alliance institutionalization, however. The incorporation of institutionalization mechanisms into alliance treaties incurs a significant degree of diplomatic transaction costs as well as high domestic transaction costs in the course of the domestic ratification process, consistent with Robert Putnam’s (1988, 433) “two-level game.” Moreover, implementing many mechanisms of alliance institutionalization can incur a high degree of material cost, including military aid provisions, the costs of sustaining foreign bases abroad, travel arrangements for military officials, and personnel and financial commitments to formalized bureaucracies (Mattes 2012b, 688). Not surprisingly, the equanimity of material burden sharing in institutionalized alliances remains a topic relevant to both scholars (Fang and Ramsay 2010; Hartley and Sandler 1999) and policymakers, as evidenced by former-U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s criticisms of NATO burden-sharing in June 2011 (Birnbaum 2011).

The literature widely asserts that states and decision-makers engage in a strategic cost-benefit analysis when making alliance and other security commitments (Altfeld 1984; Benson 2012; Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 1999, 2004; Cha 2010; Conybeare 1992; Fearon 1997; Lake 1999; Leeds 1999; Mattes 2012b; Morrow 2000; Snyder 1984, 1997; Weber 1997, 2000). This

\textsuperscript{24} A good theoretical discussion of the risks of “binding institutions” and why states (major powers) might accept them despite the risk of being bound themselves in the future can be found in Ikenberry (2001).
argument is commensurate with rationalist explanations for IR, which (in brief) argue that states and decision-makers weigh the relative costs and benefits of a policy choice, take into account the likelihood of both positive and negative potential outcomes, and choose the perceived utility-maximizing option, based on available information at that time—the option that is perceived as most likely to maximize benefits over costs and best achieve their self-interest (Bueno de Mesquita 1980, 1981; Fearon 1995, 1997; Kahler 1998; Lake and Powell 1999; Morrow 1997; Walt 1999). It follows that, in the decision to incorporate mechanisms of institutionalization into military alliances, states and decision-makers also weigh the potential benefits of alliance institutionalization against its associated costs, as discussed above, and should only institutionalize their alliance treaties when the perceived benefits outweigh the perceived costs.

The Capability Aggregation Explanation for Alliance Institutionalization

Recognizing the dilemma of the cost-benefit analysis associated with alliance institutionalization, scholars have sought parsimonious theoretical explanations for why alliance partners institutionalize their treaties. Perhaps unsurprisingly, alliance design scholars have heavily borrowed from broader, more established theoretical explanations from the liberal paradigm of IR theory. The most notable theories accounting for the presence of institutionalized cooperation in world politics fall under the umbrella of “liberal institutionalism.” Countering realist arguments that meaningful cooperation in international politics is unlikely due to the security dilemma and “high politics” (Mearsheimer 1994/5; Waltz

---

25 It is worth noting the many challenges to rationalist assumptions in IR decision-making from cognitive and psychological approaches, including theories on personality and operational code (Etheridge 1978; George 1969; Hermann 1980), groupthink (Badie 2010; Janus 1972), analogical reasoning (Houghton 1996), noncompensatory and poliheuristic decision-making (Mintz 1993, 2004), misperception (Jervis 1976; Levy 1983), prospect theory (Berejikian 2002, 2004; Haas 2001; Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Levy 1997; Mercer 2005), loss aversion (Jervis 1992; Nicic 1997), and even applications of neuroscience to political psychology (Cacioppo and Visser 2003; McDermott 2004). Such alternatives have yet to take root, however, in the alliance literature.
liberal institutionalists argue that states can, in fact, engage in meaningful cooperation through well-designed institutions.

A literature that began by studying international regimes—“patterns of behavior or practices” (Young 1983, 93)—in the 1970s and 1980s through what amounted to a sociological lens (Bull 1977; Keohane 1984; Young 1989), greatly expanded in the early-1990s and 2000s to regard international institutions as critical sets of rationalist rules overcoming challenges inherent in international cooperation (Abbott and Snidal 2001; Keohane 1988; Krasner 1999; Martin 1992; Ostrom 1990; Simmons and Martin 2002). This perspective focuses on the state as a unitary actor with exogenous interests, and explicitly assumes that states will pursue cooperation only when it is perceived to achieve self-interested goals. Formal, rule-oriented institutions—though costly—can mitigate barriers to rational cooperation, such as enforcement and distribution problems, through key mechanisms including: issue linkage, monitoring and enforcement, information provision, dispute settlement, and an extended “shadow of the future” (Keohane 1989). Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal (2001, 762), in particular, demonstrate how states rationally design institutional structures given different challenges to cooperation: “Our basic presumption, grounded in the broad tradition of rational-choice analysis, is that states use international institutions to further their own goals, and they design institutions accordingly.” (emphasis in original quote) They argue that institutions vary in their design along five dimensions, including membership rules, issue scope, flexibility, decision-making control, and—of most interest to this project on alliance institutionalization—institutional centralization (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 763). The arguments of the “rational design of institutions” literature have been widely embraced with regard to intergovernmental organizations (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004; Martin
1993; Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004; Stein 1990), as well as extended to a wide range of international cooperation, including conflict management (Karreth and Tir 2013; Mattes and Savun 2009; Shannon, Morey, and Boehmke 2010; Walter 2002), international law (Abbott, et al. 2000; Abbott and Snidal 2000; Keohane 1997; Smith 2000; Mitchell 2006), and shared water resources (Tir and Stinnett 2011, 2012). 26

Applications of rational institutionalism have also been extended to the security sphere through the cooperative security structures literature. In brief, cooperative security structures scholars argue that institutionalized forms of security structures—such as security management institutions, confederations, or formal empires—emerge when states have an interest in obtaining the security benefits of cooperation (such as security against a shared threat) but fear risks of opportunism by their partners (such as the dual risks of abandonment and entrapment discussed above); structures institutionalizing security cooperation incur ex ante costs and may limit state autonomy, but these costs will be acceptable so long as the benefits of cooperation are worthwhile (Duffield 1992; Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander 1999; Lake 1996, 1999, 2001; Weber 1997, 2000). Katja Weber (1999, 328-329) describes this as a “transaction costs model” and theorizes that even in the “hard test” of security cooperation, states will accept increasingly binding commitments to achieve their security goals. Scholars define the terms of this cost-benefit calculation in different ways, but the basic argument is the same; David Lake (1996, 1999) intersects the expected costs of opportunism and governance costs, while Weber (1997, 2000) intersects the level of external threat and transaction costs, and Keohane and Wallander

---

26 Despite their prominence, the rational design of institutions literature’s assumptions are not without criticism. Constructivists criticize the rationalist approach’s assumption of exogenous state interests and for overlooking the constitutive role of institutions in shaping members’ interests (Bearce and Bondanella 2007; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Legro 1997; Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1999). Realists argue that rational institutionalists overlook the role of cooperative institutions as vehicles of major power interests (Mearsheimer 1994/5; Thompson, 2006, 2010). Even Ikenberry (2001) emphasizes the critical role of powerful states in the nascent stages of institutional development.
(1999) intersect the durability of shared challenges with issue interdependence. Though this literature applies these arguments to the alternative types of security cooperation states engage in, not the unique institutional dynamics of military alliances, it serves as theoretical grounding for the extension of this rationalist explanation of institutionalization to the alliance design literature.

Indeed, the prevailing theory explains the inclusion of institutionalization mechanisms in alliance treaties as a rational solution to the capability aggregation cooperation problem inherent in alliance formation. The undergirding assumption of this approach is that the motivating objective of military alliances is capability aggregation—the goal of improved security against an external rising power or threat through the aggregation of material military means with alliance partners (Christensen and Snyder 1990; Conybeare 1992; Morrow 1994, 2000; Smith 2000; Snyder 1990, 1997; Walt 1987; Waltz 1979). In light of this motivation, the fundamental alliance “cooperation problem” is argued to manifest in light of the risks associated with military capability aggregation—namely, the risk of partner abandonment. As such, the costs of alliance institutionalization (including increased entrapment risk and various transaction, audience, and material costs) will primarily be counterbalanced by the benefits of institutionalization in resolving the capability aggregation cooperation problem. In sum, according to this perspective, alliance dyads will institutionalize only when the capability aggregation cooperation problem is palpable, and will institutionalize deeply only when it is severe.

Examples of this argument permeate the alliance design literature’s discussion of institutionalization. Of the recent studies incorporating alliance institutionalization as an

---

27 For example, Keohane and Wallander (1999, 27) create a typology distinguishing between collective security arrangements, out-of-area coalitions, alliances/alignments, and larger security management institutions. In another example, Lake (2001, 132-133) emphasizes that the range of international security structures available to states can be further expanded to include spheres of influence, protectorates, informal empires, and empires.
explanatory variable, the vast majority approach institutionalization through the capability aggregation lens (Leeds and Anac 2005; Leeds and Savun 2007; Owsiak and Frazier 2013; Wallace 2008; Weitsman 2014). For example, Wallace (2008) and Weitsman (2014) focus on alliance institutionalization as a means of fostering military cohesion among allies, a form of capability aggregation. Similarly, Leeds and Anac (2005, 188), offering the most widely used empirical measurement of alliance institutionalization and the only direct test of said institutionalization’s effectiveness, explicitly predicate their study on the assumption that alliance institutionalization is intended to augment allies’ capability aggregation goals, stating that “high” institutionalization mechanisms are designed to facilitate “the highest levels of joint preparation.”

The most basic cut on the capability aggregation argument conceptualizes the alliance cooperation problem using the scope of obligations, such that institutionalization will be present only in active-obligation alliances (alliances containing some level of defense or offense pact). This approach argues that because the potential risks and benefits are greater in alliances requiring active military aid, as opposed to merely consultation or neutrality, states have an increased incentive to tie down their partners’ commitments through institutionalization. For example, Leeds and Mattes (2007, 184) explain variation in alliance institutionalization trends over time as a function of the prevalence of alliance obligations requiring military action, as opposed to neutrality pacts. In the most cited empirical study of alliance institutionalization, the authors restrict their analysis to offense and/or defense pacts, arguing that institutionalization viewed through the capability aggregation lens is unlikely to be relevant to alliances not requiring coordinated military action (Leeds and Anac 2005, 190). Wallace (2008, 228) identifies the challenge of consistent military strategy in active obligations as the primary motive
for alliance institutionalization. And Andrew Owsiak and Derrick Frazier (2013, 6) only consider alliance institutionalization in defense pacts, arguing that it is irrelevant to other types of alliance obligation.

A closer examination of the data, however, demonstrates that this operationalization of the alliance cooperation problem is insufficient. Over one-third of bilateral, non-active-obligation alliances in the ATOP data do specify some level of institutionalization, leaving this argument unable to account for a significant amount of empirical variance. Moreover, while this operationalization goes a long way toward explaining the conditions under which any institutionalization is likely to be present (or not) in alliance treaties, it does a poor job of predicting the variance in depth and type of institutionalization that occurs. For example, while the 1921 alliance between France and Poland specifies institutionalized interaction through peacetime military contact and military aid, the 1953 alliance between France and Laos outlines a much wider range of institutionalization, including peacetime military contact, a permanent bureaucratic organization, military aid, basing rights, and the subordination of forces under France in wartime. Both alliances outline active military obligations in the form of a defense pact, but exhibit significant variance in the depth of their institutional design.

Two of the recent studies incorporating alliance institutionalization as a dependent variable adopt the argument that institutionalization seeks to ameliorate the capability aggregation cooperation problem, but extend the alliance cooperation problem to include partners’ reputations for unreliability (Miller 2003, 2012; Mattes 2012b). The fact that a potential alliance partner has abrogated a previous alliance treaty, they argue, escalates partners’

---

28 This assessment excludes alliances that contain only a non-aggression pact, which are suggested by the ATOP Codebook to be conceptually distinct from the other types of obligations (Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Codebook 2005, 5).
29 Summary descriptions derived using original codesheets from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset (Leeds, et al. 2002). These codesheets are available online at atop.rice.edu/codesheets.
concerns about reliability and commitment to alliance capability aggregation (and thus escalates the rational cooperation problem); they hypothesize an association between partner unreliability and alliance institutionalization as a result, because institutionalization mechanisms more tightly bind the unreliable partner and improve the prospects of capability aggregation (Miller 2003, 2012; Mattes 2012b).

According to Mattes (2012b, 704), the latent alliance cooperation problem is particularly acute in symmetric alliance dyads where partners share a relatively balanced dependence on the alliance and thus a balanced negotiating strength. Indeed, she finds the effect of reputation to be strongest in symmetric dyads, but not present in asymmetric alliances where relative dependence and negotiating strength favor the stronger party, who is able to extricate themselves from undesirable and costly institutionalization (Mattes 2012b, 704). While certainly a refinement, Mattes thus still represents a continuation of the broad capability aggregation approach to alliance design. Her arguments are especially valuable in that they are the first to acknowledge the theoretical importance of relative power as a causal determinant of alliance design. Two observations emerge from her analysis, however, that demonstrate the need for further research in this area. First, though she theoretically distinguishes between negotiation dynamics in symmetric and asymmetric alliances, her empirical measure of institutionalization assumes the capability aggregation perspective on alliance design. Second, she observes an unexpected trend in her data—even asymmetric alliances where neither partner has violated a prior agreement are more likely to adopt institutionalization measures than symmetric alliances that involve an unreliable partner (Mattes 2012b, 701). She goes on to hypothesize: “thus, while military institutionalization in symmetric alliances is at least in part the result of an attempt to mitigate enforcement problems, in asymmetric alliances it likely reflects the major power’s

30 She uses Leeds and Anac’s (2005) three-category index.
attempt to control the minor power.” (Mattes 2012b, 701) Here, Mattes hints at an important criticism of the current literature—that more may be at work than merely capability aggregation—but the theoretical assumption of capability aggregation undergirding her overall argument prevents her from fully explaining this trend.

While a persuasive argument, the wholesale extension of rational institutionalism to military alliance treaties—in the form of the capability aggregation cooperation problem—risks empirical anomalies and theoretical over-determination. Empirically, the predictions for alliance institutionalization’s likelihood and depth that flow from the capability aggregation cooperation problem approach are ultimately unsatisfactory when we consider asymmetric alliances. First, this approach predicts that deep alliance institutionalization should be a rare event because severe cooperation problems are rare. Mattes (2012b, 694) observes, however, that only 21% of alliances in her data are agreements where one or both partners have a reputation for unreliability, while 30% of alliances include some mechanism of institutionalization (692). In a separate analysis, Leeds and Mattes (2007, 192) observe that 37.2% of alliances since 1815 feature some level of institutionalization. Second, an extension of the capability aggregation cooperation problem approach to alliance institutionalization predicts more frequent and deeper institutionalization should occur in symmetric, not asymmetric alliances. Mattes (2012b, 688) illustrates this argument, theorizing that the cooperation problem will be felt more acutely in symmetric dyads where each partner is relatively equitably dependent on the material capability of their ally in order to provide for their desired level of defense; asymmetric dyads, on the other hand, do not experience this equitable distribution of “dependence.”

31 Asymmetric alliances comprise a significant portion of alliance cases. As noted by Fordham (2010, 685), nearly half of all military alliances are considered asymmetric—47.5% according to Morrow (1991, 922) and 47% according to the ATOP data (Leeds, et al. 2002, 45).
institutionalization across asymmetric and symmetric dyads, however, do not support this prediction. Instead, she finds that 43% of asymmetric alliances include some mechanism of institutionalization, nearly twice the rate of symmetric alliances (Mattes 2012, 701). Indeed, powerful states’ consistent willingness to institutionalize their alliances with much weaker actors unable to add much to their material capability remains a significant puzzle for the capability aggregation approach to alliance institutionalization.

Further, a sub-set of the alliance literature challenges the assumption of material capability aggregation as the primary motivating factor for alliance formation, arguing that some, and perhaps many, alliances are motivated more by intra-alliance goals of control than mutual material aggregation (Cha 2010; Gelpi 1999; Morrow 1991; Schroeder 1976; Weitsman 2004). For many years, scholars largely overlooked Paul Schroeder’s (1976) qualitative account of the internal motives for alliance formation prior to World War II, despite it being a foundational challenge to prevailing approaches. In a more recent application, Weitsman (2004, 21) argues that alliance formation and cohesion is as much determined by adversarial relations within the alliance as without, and introduces the strategy of “tethering,” whereby states join alliances motivated by mutual conciliation and restraint.

It logically follows that if a significant subset of alliance formation is motivated by something other than capability aggregation, alliance institutional design may well be determined by other motives as well. Excepting some recent evidence for an association between alliance institutionalization and the reduction of violent conflict among allies (Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros 2006; Long, Nordstrom, and Baek 2007), this argument is absent in the current literature. This oversight may account for the lack of empirical consensus on both the determinants and effects of alliance institutionalization, and invites scholars to reconsider the value of theoretical
explanations for alliance institutionalization beyond just the capability aggregation cooperation problem. This project takes up the task, applying a theoretical lens that more easily explains the phenomena of deeply institutionalized asymmetric alliances—realism’s emphasis on relative power interests.

References


CHAPTER 3
THE COMPLEMENTARY EXCHANGE MODEL OF ASYMMETRIC ALLIANCE INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The IR literature lacks a clear consensus accounting for the phenomenon of institutional design in military alliances, especially alliances between partners of large relative material power differentials (asymmetric partners). And as discussed in the preceding chapter, the primary explanation for alliance institutionalization—the capability aggregation cooperation problem—has been widely applied to both symmetric and asymmetric alliances. It ultimately, however, offers an unsatisfactory explanation for asymmetric alliance institutionalization that introduces both theoretical and empirical gaps. Considering that almost half of alliances are defined as asymmetric (Fordham 2010, 685; Leeds, et al. 2002, 45; Morrow 1991, 922) and asymmetric alliances account for over 60% of all cases of alliance institutionalization (61.84% in the data for this project), this is a serious gap in our understanding of alliance politics.

This project seeks to move the scholarly literature forward by arguing that asymmetric and symmetric alliances fundamentally differ, and may in fact be better explained by different theoretical lenses. In this chapter, I incorporate the realist perspective on asymmetric alliance politics, adapting James Morrow’s (1991) “security/autonomy trade-off” explanation for asymmetric alliance formation and duration to alliance institutional design through what I term the “complementary exchange model” of asymmetric alliance institutionalization. Unlike the capability aggregation approach’s emphasis on mutual material capability gains, the

---

32 This approach has elsewhere been described using the language of “distribution of capabilities and interests” (Gibler and Rider 2004, 312). I use the “complementary exchange model” to more clearly emphasize the motivating casual mechanism that differentiates it from other approaches to alliance formation.
complementary exchange model allows for major and minor power partners to have different motives in the cost-benefit analysis of whether to institutionalize the alliance treaty—such that the major power gains greater foreign policy influence while the minor power gains greater security assurances. By more accurately characterizing this asymmetric alliance cost-benefit analysis, the complementary exchange model illustrates why institutionalization is actually incentivized more consistently in asymmetric alliances than in symmetric alliances motivated by the capability aggregation cooperation problem. This is particularly true, I argue, when considering the much stronger negotiating position of major powers in such asymmetric alliance relationships. We should not only expect to observe more frequent and deeper institutionalization in asymmetric than symmetric alliances, but should also observe more emphasis on the institutionalization mechanisms particularly suited to asymmetric partnerships (i.e.: military basing rights and military aid payments).

The chapter begins by briefly revisiting the prominent role of the realism paradigm in the alliance formation literature, including the acknowledgement by some branches of realism that alliances can be motivated by more than just capability aggregation, including “pacts of restraint” (Schroeder 1976), “tethering” (Weitsman 2004), and “bandwagoning” (Schweller 1994). The second section explores how prior work has explained asymmetric alliance formation as a unique phenomenon, with particular emphasis on Morrow’s (1991) security/autonomy trade-off. The final section blends and extends these arguments—both Morrow’s work and the realist paradigm—to introduce the complementary exchange model of asymmetric alliance institutional design. The chapter concludes with a brief illustrative comparison of two French alliances from the late-19th Century: the 1884 Second Treaty of Saigon and the 1894 Franco-Russian Alliance.
Realism and Alliance Formation

The argument that power shapes alliance politics is hardly new and particularly well illustrated in the context of alliance formation, where foundational theoretical discussions in the realist paradigm of IR account for the various ways in which power shapes states’ motivations to join alliances. Broadly, realism describes military alliances as a means by which states strive to maximize their security goals and increase their (primarily relative) power in an anarchic system. Classical realist scholars such as Hans Morgenthau (1948) outline the imperative of the national interest, defined in terms of power, with politics being a struggle for power as its own end. As a structural realist, Kenneth Waltz (1959, 1979) theorizes about the effects of systemic power polarities on state behaviors, arguing that alliances are a primary means by which weaker states balance, or aggregate their material capabilities to counter a more powerful state or rising power in the system. For Waltz (1979), relative power imbalances are the primary motivation for state behavior by creating insecurity, and systemic polarities shape the formation and stability of alliances, with unstable multipolar systems being most prone to flexible, shifting alliances. Edward Gulick’s (1967) analysis of shifting alliances in 19th Century Europe exemplifies the formation of balancing alliances in response to shifting relative power on the European continent.

A number of subsequent realist schools modified Waltz’s theories regarding balancing alliances. Stephen Walt (1985, 1987) refines Waltz’s concept of balancing alliances, arguing that states balance against external threats, not solely greater power, through what he terms the “balance of threat.” While for Waltz (1979), threat directly follows power, such that more powerful states are always the greatest threats, for Walt (1985, 8-12), threat includes geographic

---

33 Astutely observed by Patricia Weitsman (2004, 14): “While alliance decisions are subsidiary in structural realism—the main purpose is to explain the larger patterns of interstate actions and reactions—insights regarding alliance behavior may be generated.”
proximity, offensive capabilities (versus defensive), and offensive intentions, as well as aggregate power. Scholars built on Walt’s (1987) identification of offensive capabilities and interests as a critical variable shaping alliance formation; most notably, Christensen and Snyder (1990, 147) argue that systems characterized by a defensive advantage are most likely to result in buck-passing alliance behavior (such as weak or free-riding alliances), while systems characterized by an offensive advantage are most likely to result in chain-ganging alliances (such as unconditional or offensive alliances). Echoing this offense-defense debate are the perspectives of the offensive and defensive schools of realism. Offensive realists posit that anarchy incentives states to maximize relative power at every opportunity such that all states (save for global or perhaps regional hegemons) have revisionist interests and will use strategies such as balancing alliances to continually “jockey” for the best relative position (Labs 1997; Mearsheimer 2001; Zakaria 1998). In contrast, defensive realists view balancing alliances as one means for status quo states to pursue defensive security postures (Snyder 1991; Taliaferro 2000).

Coming at power from a slightly different perspective, insights from power transition and power cycle theories—which seek to account for the propensity for conflict as the systemic power distribution is in transition, particularly as rising and falling hegemons approach power parity (Doran 1971; Gilpin 1981; Modelski 1987; Organski and Kugler 1980)—have been extended to alliance formation, such that alliance formation is argued to be a useful short-term strategy for responding to uncertain relative power dynamics at these “critical points” of transition (Chiu 2003; Doran 1971). From the perspective of these theorists, transition timing and approaching power parity matters most for the formation of balancing alliances and global conflict.

Despite their different nuances, these realist scholars all emphasize the proclivity of states to form capability aggregation alliances that balance against adversarial state powers (especially
if those powers operate in an unstable multipolar system, have notably offensive capabilities or intentions, are geographically proximate, or share a critical point of power transition). Other scholars, however, illustrate that balancing alliances motivated by capability aggregation are not the only type of alliances in the realism paradigm. The foundational work arguing that alliance formation is often motivated by interests of control is Paul Schroeder’s (1976, 230) qualitative account of European alliances intended to be “pacts of restraint (pacta de contrahendo).”

Schroeder observes:

The desire for capability-aggregation against an outside threat has not always played a vital role in the formation of alliances. Sometimes powers entered into alliances even though one party or the other (occasionally both) had no need or desire for capability-aggregation. In certain cases, the formation of alliances served to weaken a power’s military position rather than strengthen it. (230)

For Schroeder, capability aggregation is seen as a surface-level explanation that misses the “painfully empirical” alternative explanations such as interests in ally control (1976, 255).

Nearly three decades later, Weitsman (2004, 21) echoes Schroeder’s arguments, illustrating that in many cases states will actually ally with their adversaries rather than balance against them—through what she calls “tethering” alliances. Unlike bandwagoning alliances (discussed below), tethering alliances focus on mutual control and restraint through a conciliatory alliance agreement between moderately threatening adversaries of relatively symmetric material capability. The 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact and the 1952 Schuman Plan are both examples of such alliances (Weitsman 2004, 21). Tethering alliances are one option for

---

34 It should be noted that Paul Schroeder is, by most accounts, not considered a true realist scholar and has published articles critical of the historical accuracy of neorealist arguments, in particular (Schroeder 1994). I discuss him here only because his 1976 argument represents the foundations of the “alliance-as-restraint” argument, which was later transposed into the realist lens by Weitsman (2004) through the concept of tethering.

35 “Hedging,” in contrast, refers to refusals to make deep commitments among multiple potential adversaries and rivals and often entails low-level promises of assurance and alignment along with the avoidance of overt alliance commitments. For hedging, the operative goal is strategic flexibility, while for tethering it is a strong signal of conciliation (Weitsman 2004, 20-21). Brock Tessman (2012) illustrates that hedging strategies can promote state security interests, while still avoiding overt confrontation with the leading power.
states to pursue security, Weitsman argues, by preempting an adversary from forming other alliances, reducing mutual tension through deeper alignment and arms reduction, close joint monitoring, and even contributions to systemic stability through an obviously defensive alliance posture (2004, 21). In other words, for two states of relatively symmetric power capabilities and threat, tethering alliances are a means of mutual control and conciliation, not capability aggregation: “states may not form alliances to aggregate capabilities but to reduce conflicts and prevent the deployment of the enemy’s capabilities against them.” (Weitsman 2004, 19) Thus, tethering represents a joining of realism’s emphasis on state power and security interests with non-capability aggregation motives (here, the goal of partner control).

Like tethering, “bandwagoning” alliances represent another important type of realist alliance not motivated by capability aggregation goals; unlike tethering, bandwagoning alliances are formed between states of relative asymmetric material capabilities. Like balancing, bandwagoning is largely a response of weaker states to other states’ greater power, but here states ally with the greater power not against it. Originally bandwagoning was discussed as a means by which weaker powers ensured their security through capitulation to their more powerful ally (Jervis and Snyder 1991; Kaufman 1992; Labs 1992; Van Evera 1990/1991; Walt 1992; Waltz 1979). Whereas for balancing alliances, security goals are arguably achieved through the aggregation of weaker states’ capabilities to fight a stronger power, in bandwagoning alliances, minor power security goals are achieved only by the willing grace of the major power state. Randall Schweller (1994) re-conceptualizes bandwagoning to include asymmetric alliances motivated by minor power profit, not security. In particular, he identifies four types of “bandwagoning for profit” scenarios, including: jackals (i.e.: Italy during the rise of Hitler’s Germany), piling-on (i.e.: Japan and China during World War I), wave-of-the-future (i.e.:
communist alliances during the Cold War), and contagion/domino (i.e.: American containment policy during the Cold War) (Schweller 1994, 93-98). Though some criticize Schweller for stepping outside the bounds of realism by bringing in state interests (Vasquez 1997), Schweller (1997, 929) effectively defends the inclusion of opportunistic interests by pointing out that his approach ultimately refines realism by differentiating and incorporating both status quo and revisionist states, while strict Waltzian neorealism only acknowledges status quo states. John J. Mearsheimer (2001) also argues that weaker states will bandwagon with more powerful states, but that such alliances ultimately favor the stronger partner’s expanding power goals more than they benefit the weaker partner. Kevin Sweeney and Paul Fritz (2004) represent a further expansion of Schweller’s approach, arguing that even powerful states form asymmetric bandwagoning alliances based on shared interests (security and non-security). In sum, for bandwagoning alliances, the motivations for alliance are security assurances and/or material profit, and—though very realist in nature—do not fit squarely into the capability aggregation model, especially from the perspective of the major power partner.  

As this discussion illustrates, the realist paradigm has had a profound influence on predominant theoretical explanations for alliance formation. Realism’s emphasis on balancing alliances has arguably played a critical role in the development of realist alliance theories and has greatly influenced assumptions of capability aggregation in the contemporary alliance literature. But as the foregoing discussion illustrates, realism predicts more than just balancing alliances. Indeed, of the three types of realist alliances, two (tethering and bandwagoning) are not motivated by capability aggregation at all (summarized in Figure 3.1). Only viewing alliance

---

36 Unipolarity since the end of the Cold War represents a challenge for both balancing and bandwagoning advocates, as evidenced by the literature on “soft balancing” and “hedging” (Brooks and Wohlforth 2005; Kelley 2005; Pape 2005; Paul 2005; Tessman 2012). Mark Beeson (2007), in particular, argues that bandwagoning strategies are no longer practical under conditions of hegemony and the global war on terror.
design through the theoretical lens of capability aggregation, the recent alliance design literature has largely obscured three-quarters of the theoretical field-of-vision. I argue that a refocusing on the unique dynamics of asymmetric alliances goes a long way toward reclaiming it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weaker State</th>
<th>Stronger State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak State</td>
<td>Balancing</td>
<td>Bandwagoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronger State</td>
<td>Bandwagoning</td>
<td>Tethering*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 3.1 – Summary of Realist Alliance Strategies, by Relative Power in Alliance Dyad

Asymmetric Alliance Formation

That military alliances between states of asymmetric relative power should be governed by fundamentally different motivations and dynamics than symmetric alliances between either two major powers or two minor powers is a fairly intuitive argument. We know that asymmetric alliances represent nearly half of all military alliances (Fordham 2010, 685; Leeds, et al. 2002, 45; Morrow 1991, 922). Indeed, there is a small body of literature asserting that asymmetric relative power dynamics do, in fact, affect alliance outcomes differently than symmetric power dynamics. For example, Morrow (1991, 922) observes that asymmetric alliances have a duration that is, on average, 3 ½ years longer than symmetric alliances; this general trend is supported by

*Weitsman (2004) largely refers to tethering as a strategy for major power states, though minor powers could theoretically also tether each other if the level of analysis were reduced to a regional or lower level and the purpose of the alliance was not intended to balance against a global or regional hegemon.
D. Scott Bennett’s findings (1997). 38 David Bearce, Kristen Flanagan, and Katherine Floros (2006, 614) find that, contrary to prior predictions (Morrow 1991), asymmetric alliances do not experience more frequent intra-alliance conflict, but rather that, all else being equal, asymmetric relationships are inherently more likely to be peaceful. Brett Benson (2011, 1112) demonstrates that conditional extended deterrent promises in asymmetric alliances significantly reduce the likelihood of a violent attack against the minor power partner compared to other types of deterrent alliance arrangements. Geoffrey Wallace (2008) demonstrates the ability of major powers in institutionalized asymmetric alliances to better coordinate smaller allies’ adherence with their own military strategy. And Michaela Mattes (2012) finds that major powers in asymmetric alliances where one partner has a reputation for unreliability are able to avoid costly design mechanisms such as economic issue linkage or deep institutionalization. If relative power differentials indeed affect alliance outcomes, they should affect the dynamics of alliance formation and design as well.

Such an argument has, however, largely been ignored or limited to passing footnotes in the recent alliance design literature. As established in Chapter 2, the majority of the recent alliance literature has assumed all alliances—regardless of relative power parity—to be motivated by capability aggregation (Leeds and Anac 2005; Leeds and Savun 2007; Owsiak and Frazier 2013; Wallace 2008). Insights from bandwagoning arguments in the realism literature (Mearsheimer 2001; Schweller 1994; Sweeney and Fritz 2004) contradict this assumption, and point scholars toward interest-based explanations for asymmetric alliance formation that emphasize power generally and major powers in particular. Victor Cha (2010, 164) astutely observes that: “the notion that [asymmetric] alliances are instruments of control has been well

38 Morrow (1991) also finds that as power shifts toward parity in the alliance relationship, the alliance is more likely to terminate. This is consistent with later conclusions by Leeds and Savun (2007).
established in practice. Still, there has been little theoretical work on the dynamics of control, the conditions under which control is effective, and the types of alliances….best suited for establishing and maintaining control.”

Of the scholars that have addressed the unique motivations and dynamics of asymmetric alliance formation and design, the focus has almost exclusively been on asymmetric alliance formation. Building on Schroeder’s (1976) qualitative claim that alliances are tools of management, as well as Michael Altfeld’s (1984) proposition that alliance commitments involve a trade-off of increased joint security for decreased autonomy among members, Morrow (1991, 905) offers the foundational explanation of asymmetric alliance formation; while common and identical interests characterize symmetric balancing or deterrence alliances, complementary interests in the form of the “security/autonomy trade-off” characterize asymmetric alliances. “Security,” according to Morrow, refers to a state’s ability to preserve a status quo—such as survival, while “autonomy” refers to the ability to pursue changes in the status quo (1991, 908-909). For Altfeld (1984), states in alliance receive joint security benefits from capability aggregation, but pay mutual costs in the form of limits on their autonomy to act outside the terms of the alliance; in other words, both partners pay autonomy costs in exchange for security benefits. This dynamic arguably even characterizes the symmetric alliances motivated by intra-alliance control, or tethering alliances, discussed by Weitsman (2004). But for Morrow (1991, 908-909), the asymmetric security/autonomy trade-off is complimentary, such that minor powers achieve security benefits (in the form of a defense pact) in exchange for autonomy concessions (such as policy control) and major powers exchange the material costs of providing security minor powers for gains in influence over the minor power’s foreign and military policy (and thus gains in their global or regional autonomy).
By detailing how the interests of major and minor powers represent an exchange of fundamentally different interests (security for autonomy), Morrow’s (1991) model of asymmetric alliance formation highlights the unique nature of asymmetric alliances and distinguishes them from both capability aggregation and tethering alliances (where partners are motivated by joint security or joint control interests). Thus, Morrow’s (1991) security/autonomy trade-off refines our theories of alliance formation by elucidating the importance of identical versus complementary alliance goals, and illustrating why the latter is largely unique to asymmetric alliances. These arguments are not, however, without criticism. Douglas Gibler and Toby Rider (2004, 314) argue that Morrow depends too heavily on power-based distinctions in his analysis of alliance formation and overlooks the role of interest similarity; they find that asymmetric dyads with more closely aligned “S-scores” (a measure of interest similarity) are more likely to form alliances than dyads with divergent S-scores. As a whole, their findings reinforce the importance of sufficiently shared interests a priori to alliance formation, but do not conclusively disregard the important role of relative power, which is statistically significant in all of their models (Gibler and Rider 2004, 323).

Two recent articles epitomize the qualitative and quantitative application of the asymmetric alliance literature to alliance formation. Cha (2010, 163) identifies the concept of “powerplay,” or the formation of asymmetric bilateral alliances intended to exert control over a small, potentially rogue ally, and demonstrates this strategy using the US “hub-and-spoke” system of alliances in East Asia during the Cold War. Focusing on alliance size (i.e.: bilateral

39 Bennett (1997, 851) describes it as a “broadening” rather than a “direct refutation” of the capability aggregation model.
40 In comparing predicted probabilities for their models, they do find that the relative effect of interest similarity on alliance formation is larger than that of relative power (Gibler and Rider 2004, 324). This does not, in-and-of-itself undercut Morrow’s emphasis on relative power but merely underscores the assumption in studies of alliance formation of sufficient shared interests.
vs. multilateral), he argues that while structural liberalism has tended to focus on multilateralism in alliances (for example, Ikenberry 2001), bilateral asymmetric alliances are a particularly valuable tool for major power control over strategically valuable small states (Cha 2010, 160). Benjamin Fordham (2010) also considers the puzzle of asymmetric alliance formation, theorizing that trade drives such commitments. Major powers, according to Fordham, will seek to preserve trading advantages in smaller states by exchanging security assurances for control over the state’s trade policies; he argues that this security-trade exchange is only possible in asymmetric dyads because only powerful states have sufficient resources to offer expensive security assurances (2010, 685). An empirical analysis of dyadic trade and asymmetric alliance duration from 1815-2003 supports his hypotheses (Fordham 2010, 691).

Only Mattes (2012) moves beyond alliance formation and acknowledges the theoretical importance of relative power asymmetry as a key determinant of alliance design. Noting the theoretical differences in alliance negotiations between symmetric and asymmetric dyads, she disaggregates her analysis of the effect of reputation on alliance design accordingly. She argues that while concern for partner unreliability will affect both types of dyads, only symmetric dyads where both partners have similar material capability and negotiating power will be able to obtain costly solutions such as obligation conditionalities, issue linkage, or institutionalization (Mattes 2012, 701). Her empirical findings largely support her arguments; she finds that symmetric alliances characterized by prior partner unreliability will be able to extract concessions of issue linkage and institutionalization, but that asymmetric alliances are more likely to include obligations on conditionalities (Mattes 2012, 697-698).

Morrow’s (1991) security/autonomy trade-off and its extensions offer a sound alternative to the capability aggregation assumptions so prominent in the current asymmetric alliance
formation literature. The small literature that has acknowledged alliance asymmetry is largely limited, however, by its focus on formation. For example, Fordham’s (2010) analysis captures only alliance formation, operationalized by a “0-1” dummy variable. And Morrow (1991) extends his security/autonomy trade-off to alliance formation and duration, skipping over its potential implications for alliance design. If asymmetric relative power dynamics have meaningful implications for the motivations of alliance formation, it follows that they should also have implications for the design of military alliance treaties, as suggested by Mattes (2012). The following section outlines such a theoretical argument.

Introducing the Complementary Exchange Model

This section outlines the core arguments of the “complementary exchange model” of asymmetric alliance institutionalization, which I propose addresses the theoretical and empirical gaps created by wholesale use of the capability aggregation approach to alliance design (discussed in Chapter 2). Instead, the complementary exchange model recognizes the importance of relative power dynamics in these asymmetric dyadic alliance relationships and draws on the realist paradigm’s insights (Cha 2010; Fordham 2010; Morrow 1991; Schroeder 1976; Snyder 1997). Fundamental to the complementary exchange model is the assumption that because the major power and minor power cost/benefit analyses (or interests) fundamentally differ, our models of alliance formation and design should take account of these differences. Building on Morrow’s “security/autonomy trade-off” (1991), the causal mechanism in the

---

41 Morrow (1991)’s use of the “security/autonomy trade-off” regarding alliance formation and duration is often conflated with Altfeld’s (1984) earlier use of the same terminology. Altfeld argued that partners in alliance trade joint security gains for joint autonomy losses to the alliance commitment, and represents the more “traditional” use of this language in the broader IR literature.
theoretical approach I employ is therefore the mutual exchange of gains for both major and minor power partners.

Though I have demonstrated that the capability aggregation approach’s explanation for the frequency and depth of alliance institutionalization is ultimately unsatisfactory, there are several important insights from this approach that should not be blithely set aside. First, we should expect the dynamics of military alliance institutionalization to be governed by states’ self-interests; especially in the issue area of security, states do not cooperate for cooperation’s sake (Mearsheimer 1994/5). Second, deeply-institutionalized security cooperation is costly, in terms of negotiation costs, the material costs of implementation, and restrictions on state autonomy once in place; we should only expect alliance dyads to pursue institutionalization when the perceived benefits outweigh these costs (Snyder 1997). Lastly, alliance institutionalization is effective primarily in terms of \emph{ex ante} obligations, rules, and interactions intended to strengthen alliance partner confidence by increasing the frequency with which partners interact, facilitating regular monitoring for cracks in commitment by alliance partners, and functional progress toward joint goals (Leeds and Anac 2005; Mattes 2012). With these valuable assumptions in mind, the following discussion outlines an alternative and improved theoretical approach to the puzzle of asymmetric alliance institutionalization.

\textit{Clarifying the Cost/Benefit Calculus for Major and Minor Powers in Alliance Institutionalization}

The core argument of this project is that the causal logic of alliance institutionalization is fundamentally different in asymmetric than symmetric alliances. The first step in fleshing out my theory is therefore a clarification of how the costs and benefits of alliance institutionalization are calculated differently by major and minor power partners in asymmetric alliances. The
literature clearly argues that the core benefit of institutionalization in alliances is a reduced risk of abandonment; in other words, partners who are more tightly bound to each other through a variety of peacetime institutionalization mechanisms are less likely to abandon the alliance (Snyder 1984, 1997). Though not acknowledged in the capability aggregation literature, we should expect major and minor powers to calculate this benefit in different terms when allying together. Alliance institutionalization is not without costs. As discussed in Chapter 2, the costs of alliance institutionalization include an increased risk of entrapment into an unwanted conflict by one’s partner, the transaction costs of negotiating a complex institutionalized alliance treaty, as well as the material costs of bringing institutionalization mechanisms to life (Mattes 2012; Snyder 1997). Even if we assume static state interest in the benefits of alliance institutionalization, the factors affecting how partners assess its costs are decidedly dynamic across these symmetric and asymmetric alliances. Indeed, key factors affecting the ability of states to successfully pursue institutionalization mechanisms in their alliance treaties with minimal cost reinforce the expectation of more frequent and deeper institutionalization in asymmetric alliances.

As explored extensively in the realist bandwagoning literature, minor powers potentially have a great deal to gain from alliances with a major power, including security assurances (Jervis and Snyder 1991; Kaufman 1992; Labs 1992; Van Evera 1990/1991; Walt 1992; Waltz 1979) and/or material profit (Schweller 1994). Not only does an asymmetric alliance ensure that the major power will not militarily target the much weaker minor power, but through extended deterrence assurances (Benson 2011), the minor power may also achieve security against other actors—and most likely material security at a degree that the minor power would never be able to mobilize unilaterally. Minor powers contemplating forming an asymmetric alliance must
consider, however, the costs associated with these potential benefits, which include granting their major power partner greater access and influence over their policies as well as increasing the level of dependency they have on their major power partner.42

As observed by Fordham (2010), major powers do not achieve significant material security additions to their military capability from asymmetric alliances, and, as such, represent a puzzle for capability aggregation arguments. Indeed, asymmetric alliances can be very expensive for major powers who will bear the brunt of the material costs to support the alliance, as the alliance burden sharing literature has repeatedly affirmed (Fang and Ramsay 2010; Hartley and Sandler 1999; Nelson and Lepgold 1986). Moreover, major powers face a very real entrapment risk when forming alliances with weaker powers, who, emboldened by their new strong ally’s promises of security aid, may act preemptively against a third-party adversary; major powers therefore carefully negotiate agreements that manage their willingness to commit these costs (Beckley 2015; Benson 2011; Lake 1999; Snyder 1997). But major powers can also receive worthwhile benefits from asymmetric alliance commitments, particularly in terms of a greater degree of latitude to influence the military posture and foreign policies of minor power allies. As noted elsewhere in regard to war aims (Sullivan 2012), major powers are not limited to purely military goals (i.e.: material capability aggregation from an alliance partnership), and do often pursue political goals (i.e.: greater autonomy over other states’ actions and international outcomes). Forming alliances with much weaker actors that allow them greater intrusion into those states’ policies are tool for extending major power political interests.

42 It is worth noting that for some minor powers, such dependency serves the short-term goal of subsidizing the costs of security so that revenue can be redirected to other long-term goals, such as economic growth or domestic political “rents.” Rajan Menon’s (2007) discussion of the US-Japanese bilateral alliance illustrates how Japan used its security dependency status to its economic advantage for much of the latter-20th Century.
The unique position of major in powers further allows them an advantage in pursuing a favorable cost/benefit calculus when allying with a minor power partner. First, major powers enjoy a negotiating advantage. Snyder (1997, 75) argues that a critical component of alliance formation and negotiation is the level of alliance dependence each partner has on the agreement, such that potential partners with less alliance dependence hold a stronger negotiating position and more likely to achieve their alliance formation goals. Major powers are thus, by definition of their relative power preponderance, more likely to be successful in achieving their aims in asymmetric alliance negotiations.43 Second, major powers also have more capacity to bear the costs associated with alliance institutionalization, even if they do manage it carefully. The material costs of alliance institutionalization are manifest, and it follows that many individual mechanisms of institutionalization require a sufficient level of material capability to implement successfully.44 Key examples include military aid provisions, the costs of sustaining foreign military bases, travel arrangements for military officials, and personnel and financial commitments to organizational bureaucracies. Weaker actors are less likely to have the material resources to expend in pursuit of such objectives. Moreover, we must consider than many indicators of alliance institutionalization are directional in nature. For example, military aid often flows directionally from one partner to the other; unsurprisingly, this directional arrow almost exclusively flows from the more powerful to the weaker partner. As such, directional indicators of institutionalization (such as military aid) should be less useful in symmetric dyads than in asymmetric dyads, and thus occur with less frequency. Given this combination of directionality and material capability, we should expect many key indicators of alliance

43 Mattes’s (2012) work on alliance reputation illustrates a recent empirical application of this argument.
44 The transaction costs of alliances are also more likely to be more easily borne by powerful states capable of supporting large diplomatic delegations. And while institutionalized alliances imply higher autonomy costs, major powers are not as dependent on alliance obligations as the sole means of security should the alliance fail; major powers are also more likely to withstand any reputation costs associated with a failed alliance.
institutionalization (most likely, military aid and basing) to simply be more relevant and prevalent in asymmetric alliances, making institutionalization more likely in asymmetric than symmetric alliances.

Modeling Asymmetric Alliance Institutionalization

Using what I term the “complementary exchange approach” to asymmetric alliances, I build on Morrow’s theory to illustrate how these core differences in alliance motivation shape the logic of asymmetric and symmetric alliance design in ways the literature has not fully explored. Figure 3.2 summarizes these distinct models. In the “Alliance-Level Symmetric Capability Aggregation Model” I trace out the arguments of the existing capability aggregation literature, which I argue are most coherent for alliances between states of relative symmetric power abilities.

**Alliance-Level Symmetric Capability Aggregation Model**

*Assumes a symmetric relative power capability between Partners A and B*

\[ + \text{Inst.}(A \text{ security benefit} + B \text{ security benefit}) \geq -\text{Inst.}(A \text{ autonomy cost} + B \text{ autonomy cost}) \]

**Alliance-Level Asymmetric Complementary Exchange Model**

*Assumes an asymmetric relative power capability between Minor Partner A and Major Partner B*

1) \[ +/- \text{Inst.}(A \text{ security benefit} + A \text{ autonomy cost}) \approx +/- \text{Inst.}(B \text{ influence benefit} + B \text{ material cost}) \]

OR

2) \[ +/- \text{Inst.}(A \text{ security benefit} + A \text{ autonomy cost}) \prec +/- \text{Inst.}(B \text{ influence benefit} + B \text{ material cost}) \]

**FIGURE 3.2 – Comparative Models of Alliance Institutionalization**

---

45 Note that Figure 3.2 captures alliance-level models, not the individual cost-benefit calculus of a single partner.
The model accounts for Altfeld’s (1984) arguments that states in alliance gain a security benefit (such as a promise of aid or extended deterrence) from their new partner in exchange for a “cost” in terms of autonomy (as specified in the terms of the alliance treaty or subsequent policy negotiations to maintain the alliance relationship). The model extends these arguments to the phenomenon of alliance institutionalization by also accounting for Snyder’s (1997) theory of entrapment and abandonment risks in alliances. We should not expect a symmetric alliance to institutionalize unless both partners perceive the joint reduction in abandonment risks of institutionalization to be greater than the joint entrapment risks of institutionalization.

As the “Alliance-Level Asymmetric Complementary Exchange Model” depicts, I argue that this causal narrative does not hold for alliances between states of relative asymmetric power abilities. In this model the core alliance calculus is not the shared balance of security benefits and autonomy costs. Instead, the cost-benefit calculus for each partner is defined uniquely. For minor powers, they weight the potential security benefits an alliance with a major power (i.e.: reduced abandonment risk, extended deterrence) against the autonomy concessions and increased entrapment risk they are required to make to the major power in exchange for this security (in terms of policy influence). For major powers, they weight the potential extension of policy influence and autonomy over the minor power against the material costs of upholding their extended security commitment. When extending these arguments to the phenomenon of alliance institutionalization, we should not expect an asymmetric alliance to institutionalize unless one of two conditions is met—either the alliance partners perceive their respective cost/benefit analyses to be mutually worthwhile (Model 1) or the major power determines its cost/benefit analysis to be advantageous and exerts a determinative influence over the minor power during alliance negotiations (Model 2).
A handful of preliminary observations about the models depicted in Figure 3.2 are worth noting. First, while in the symmetric capability aggregation model partner costs and benefits are joint and pooled,\textsuperscript{46} in the asymmetric complementary exchange model both partners define their respective costs and benefits independently. For the capability aggregation alliance, Partner A’s security benefits depend on Partner B’s security contributions, and \textit{visa versa}; but for the asymmetric alliance, Major Partner A’s influence gains do not depend on Minor Partner B’s security contributions. Second, while the symmetric capability aggregation model is best conceived as a tipped or weighted scale favoring joint gains over joint losses (Altfeld 1984), the asymmetric complementary exchange model is better conceived as either a balanced scale—Model 1—or a directionally-weighted scale favoring the cost-benefit analysis of the more powerful partner—Model 2. Several scholars have favored the latter option, noting that minor powers in asymmetric negotiations will be unlikely to achieve independent goals that do not align with or complement major power interests due to their weaker negotiating position (Fordham 2010; Mattes 2012; Snyder 1997).\textsuperscript{47} Finally, we clearly observe how alliance institutionalization affects the two models differently. For the symmetric capability aggregation model, institutionalization very accurately models what Snyder (1997) describes as the trade-off between entrapment and abandonment, such that the gains of institutionalization (reduced abandonment risk) fall squarely on one side of the scale, while the costs (increased entrapment risk) fall squarely on the other. In contrast, for the asymmetric complementary exchange model, the benefits and costs of alliance institutionalization are weighted on both sides of the scale as each partner assesses their unique gains and losses independently. This is not to say that the

\textsuperscript{46} This is consistent with the general capability aggregation literature (Snyder 1997; Walt 1987; Waltz 1979).

\textsuperscript{47} Mattes (2012, 689), in particular, explains why minor power partners may seek key design features (such as institutionalization) as a means of more tightly binding the major power to their security obligations, particularly if the major power has violated a prior alliance obligation. She argues that their ability to obtain such binding mechanisms above any major power objections is unlikely.
risks of entrapment from institutionalization are eliminated, however, but it does allow for the benefits of institutionalization (defined differently) to counterweight both sides of the scale.

Disaggregating models of alliance institutionalization in this way allows us to derive unique empirical predictions than would otherwise have been impossible using only the traditional capability aggregation model. Because the capability aggregation model argues institutionalization will only be desirable when the cooperation problem is severe, institutionalization (especially deep institutionalization) becomes a relatively rare phenomenon in both symmetric and asymmetric alliances. In contrast, the complementary exchange model actually predicts institutionalization with both more frequency and depth in asymmetric alliances (vs. symmetric alliances). First, because the asymmetric complementary exchange model incentivizes institutionalization with more consistency than the symmetric capability aggregation model, we should expect to observe some level (vs. none at all) of institutionalization more frequently in asymmetric than symmetric alliances. While some symmetric alliances may incorporate mechanisms of institutionalization, particularly in cases characterized by severe enforcement problems (Mattes 2012), they should do so with less frequency in comparison. Second, we should also expect these trends to be correlated with the degree of asymmetry, such that strongly asymmetric alliance partnerships institutionalize with more depth than symmetric alliance partnerships.

For capability aggregation alliances, the primary benefit of institutionalization is reduced partner abandonment risk (Leeds and Anac 2005; Mattes 2012; Snyder 1997); moreover, as Figure 3.2 illustrates, institutionalization requires a satisfactory joint assessment (arguably a rare occurrence) that these perceived joint benefits outweigh joint autonomy and entrapment costs resulting from greater institutionalization. The complementary exchange approach to
asymmetric alliances, in contrast, illustrates why the joint balance of major and minor partner benefits facilitate more consistent perceived gains from institutionalization.\(^{48}\) Through institutionalization the major power partner achieves greater policy and military influence over the minor power, enabling them to more successfully shape the minor power’s actions in a direction favorable to their own strategic interest. Deeper institutionalization strengthens the major power’s ability to achieve this control, by allowing major powers more “fingers in the pot” to influence, manage, and incentivize favorable policies. In exchange, minor power partners in asymmetric alliances obtain stronger extended security assurances from their major power beneficiary, extending far beyond their own security capabilities. Deeper institutionalization gives greater assurance to the minor power of their partner’s investment in their security, as well as a stronger external signal to potentially threatening third parties. The complementary exchange model outlines how these directional benefits of institutionalization operate in tandem, allowing both partners to individually weight their side of the scale with their unique perceived benefits without necessitating agreement on joint benefits. Moreover, as Model 2 in Figure 3.2 illustrates, we should also expect cases where the occurrence of alliance institutionalization results from the major power’s superior negotiating position and ability to use its power to override any minor power reservations about the alliance agreement.

\textit{An Illustration of the Models in Practice}

These contrasting models can be qualitatively illustrated by comparing two French alliances from the late-19\textsuperscript{th} Century—the 1884 alliance with Annam (Second Treaty of Saigon) and the 1894 alliance with Russia (Franco-Russian Alliance). The Franco-Russian Alliance is a

\(^{48}\) As a precursor to this argument, Morrow (1991) argues that this trade-off of benefits incentivizes more stability in asymmetric alliances, leading to longer durations compared to symmetric alliances.
textbook example of a symmetric capability aggregation alliance in that the shared goal of both major powers was the assurance of military aid in the event of hostilities on the European continent. During negotiations, alliance benefits were defined in joint, pooled terms such that both states’ security benefit against a hostile Triple Alliance depended on mutual military support. The difficulties of achieving a satisfactory “tipped scale” where joint benefits outweighed the alliance costs are illustrated by the fact that negotiations spanned nearly two decades and included multiple rounds of diplomatic back-and-forth and revisions to alliance terms.\textsuperscript{49} Both partners struggled to define alliance institutionalization in mutually satisfactory terms, with Russian negotiators at one point stating that they preferred even a “gentlemen’s agreement” over continued debate (Snyder 1997, 117-119). The dyad finally settled on assurances of low-level peacetime military contact and the specification of troop commitments in preparation for the eventuality of military coordination, with both partners conceding key mechanisms of institutionalization to achieve agreement.\textsuperscript{50}

The 1874 French treaty with Annam (modern Vietnam), stands in stark contrast, and exemplifies the complementary exchange model of asymmetric alliances. As stated in the treaty itself, the alliance was an exchange of complementary minor power security goals for major power influence goals:

France….promises him [the King of Annam] aid and assistance and commits himself to give to the King of Annam…the necessary support to maintain order and tranquility in his state, to defend him against any attack, and to destroy the piracy that afflicts a part of the coasts of the kingdom….In recognition of this protection, the King of Annam commits himself to shape its foreign policies

\textsuperscript{49} These negotiations have been detailed by several scholars: Kennan 1984; Snyder 1997; Weitsman 2004. 
\textsuperscript{50} Alliance terms obtained from original codesheets in the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset (Leeds, et al. 2002). Russia initially favored explicit clauses extending the geographic scope of the alliance beyond the Triple Alliance, while France favored expanded peacetime military coordination and more explicit assurances of mobilization (Snyder 1997).
according to the French and to change nothing in its current diplomatic relations. (Articles 2-3)\textsuperscript{51}

Though complementary, the alliance “scale” very much favored French interests, reflecting their growing political dominance and military occupation of the region; Annam would become a French colony as part of French Indochina in 1887. Complementary interests and French dominance of negotiations thus account for the short negotiation period of a few months and the inclusion of deep institutionalization mechanisms; the treaty specifies both extensive military aid (from France) and the establishment of a permanent diplomatic “Resident” with ministerial rank in Annam, granting France both a physical political presence and extensive aid payments as tools for influencing Annam toward greater and greater French control.\textsuperscript{52} Keith Taylor (2013) thoughtfully puts this asymmetric alliance into the context of France’s colonial relationship with Vietnam in his book \textit{A History of the Vietnamese}.

\textit{Concluding Remarks}

The theory outlined in this chapter offers a refinement on existing explanations of alliance institutionalization by disaggregating institutionalization trends in symmetric and asymmetric alliance partnerships. The foregoing discussion details the theoretical reasoning for this disaggregation using the unique cost/benefit analyses of major and minor powers in asymmetric alliances, introduces in Figure 3.2 the complementary exchange model of asymmetric alliance institutionalization, and outlines the unique empirical predictions we should

\textsuperscript{51} Alliance treaty text obtained from the original codesheet for the 1874 French-Annam treaty, translated from French by Michaela Mattes as part of the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset (Leeds, et al. 2002).

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Ibid.}
draw from this model. Subsequent chapters will explore the validity of this model and its predictions using quantitative and qualitative methodologies.

References


CHAPTER 4

RELATIVE POWER ASYMMETRY AND THE SCOPE OF MILITARY ALLIANCE INSTITUTIONALIZATION

How does relative power (a)symmetry influence descriptive trends in bilateral military alliance treaty institutionalization? Are asymmetric dyads more likely to employ institutionalization mechanisms than symmetric dyads? Do they institutionalize with greater depth than symmetric dyads? These questions are the necessary first-step in a research agenda seeking to uncover how and why asymmetric dyads institutionalize their alliance treaty commitments. To begin answering these questions, this chapter uses a large-N statistical analysis of bilateral alliances from the years 1815-2003 to test the validity of four hypotheses drawn from the complementary exchange model described in the preceding chapter.

For the capability aggregation approach to alliance formation and design, the observation that powerful states regularly form alliances with weaker states unable to add significant material capability to the partnership remains a puzzle (Fordham 2010; Mattes 2012). Even more puzzling is why powerful states regularly employ institutional mechanisms to more tightly bind themselves to such commitments. Empirical examples abound of deeply institutionalized asymmetric alliances for which capability aggregation is not a persuasive argument: Prussia’s deeply institutionalized alliance with Hesse Darmstadt in 1867, Japan’s 1894 alliance with Korea, France’s 1921 alliance with Poland, the United Kingdom’s 1946 alliance with Jordan, France’s 1953 alliance with Laos, the United States’ 1960 alliance with Japan and 1963 alliance with Spain, and Russia’s 1992 alliances with Armenia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Turkmenistan, just to name a few. In none of these cases did the minor power’s military arsenal or troop numbers meaningfully strengthen the major power’s security. As discussed in Chapter 2, the wholesale extension of the capability aggregation explanation for alliance institutionalization not only misses these data trends, but it also risks theoretical over-determination by excluding the possibility that some alliances are motivated more by intra-alliance goals of control than mutual material aggregation (Cha 2010; Gelpi 1999; Morrow 1991; Schroeder 1976; Weitsman 2004).

I proposed in Chapter 3 that an alternate theoretical approach—the complementary exchange model—results in meaningful improvement in both theoretical and empirical accounts of asymmetric alliance institutionalization trends. This chapter draws out and empirically evaluates the primary observable implications of this theory for two key characteristics of alliance institutionalization—frequency and depth. I derive four hypotheses that argue partner relative power asymmetry should be positively associated with the frequency of alliance institutionalization (H1), institutional depth (H2), the interaction of institutional depth and the presence of an active obligation such as a defense or offense pact (H3), and individual institutionalization mechanisms including military aid, military basing rights, peacetime military contact, and a formal alliance organization (H4). The results of the statistical models show that asymmetric alliances do engage in institutionalization more frequently and with greater depth than symmetric partnerships. The comparative effect of relative power asymmetry on institutional depth is over twice that of active obligation, and the predicted probability of an alliance containing the four individual institutionalization mechanisms outlined in the fourth hypothesis all increase as the partnership’s asymmetric increases. Indeed, I find that the data

---

53 Examples were identified using data from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset (Leeds, et al. 2002). These data and case codesheets are available online at atop.rice.edu.
largely support the hypotheses derived from the complementary exchange model, such that we observe more frequent and deeper alliance institutional designs in asymmetric (vs. symmetric) alliances, contrary to predictions from the heretofore-dominant approach.

The next section summarizes the complementary exchange model of asymmetric alliances (discussed in detail in Chapter 3), along with the four empirical hypotheses derived from these arguments. The second section outlines an empirical research design capable of testing the validity of these hypotheses. The primary data for this analysis is derived using the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data (Leeds, et al. 2002).\(^{54}\) For the primary dependent variable, I introduce a new index measuring institutionalization depth that improves on the most prominent index in the current literature (Leeds and Anac 2005) by providing greater variance and avoiding \textit{ex ante} assumptions built on the capability aggregation approach. I also include a number of theoretically relevant control variables, including: the presence of an active obligation, geographic contiguity, colonial relationship, regime type similarity, joint threat, and partner reputation. The final section presents and interprets the statistical and substantive results.

\textbf{Complementary Exchange Model: Predictions for Alliance Institutional Design}

This project explains the puzzle of asymmetric alliance institutionalization as a function of the complementary exchange model of asymmetric alliances discussed in Chapter 3. Unlike the capability aggregation approach—which I argue more successfully characterizes symmetric alliances—the complementary exchange model efficiently accounts for asymmetric alliance institutionalization. This theoretical dichotomy argues that the motivating stories behind symmetric and asymmetric alliances fundamentally differ, necessitating dichotomized analysis—

\(^{54}\) ATOP data and case codesheets are available online at atop.rice.edu. This project uses the most updated version of the ATOP data—version 3.0, which was last revised and published on May 10, 2005.
while symmetric alliances are motivated by the object of material capability aggregation, asymmetric alliances are motivated by the exchange of complementary security (minor power) and control/influence (major power) goals. Similar arguments have been applied to alliance formation and duration (Bennett 1997; Fordham 2010; Gibler and Rider 2010; Morrow 1991).

To further this vein of scholarly research, I apply this theoretical model to the analysis of alliance institutionalization, arguing that these motivating differences set forth fundamentally different models of alliance institutionalization (Figure 3.2). Because the complementary exchange model incentivizes institutionalization in asymmetric alliances with greater consistency than the symmetric capability aggregation model, we should expect to observe a preponderance of institutionalization in asymmetric (vs. symmetric) alliances as a whole, which is contrary to the empirical predictions of the dominant capability aggregation approach. This expectation only strengthens when we consider the dominance of the major power partner in terms of negotiating strength and ability to underwrite costly, directional institutionalization mechanisms (i.e.: military aid provisions).

The literature affirms a great deal of variance in how alliance dyads may institutionalize their treaties (Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros 2006; Leeds, et al. 2002; Leeds and Anac 2005; Long, Nordstrom, and Baek 2007; Rafferty 2004), but this variance in alliance institutional design can be efficiently characterized along two dimensions—likelihood and depth. The likelihood, or frequency, of alliance institutionalization refers to whether an alliance treaty includes any element of meaningful institutionalization, as opposed to none at all. I include likelihood largely as a replication of Mattes’s (2012) finding that asymmetric alliances are much more likely to institutionalize, in general, compared to symmetric alliances.55

55 43% of asymmetric alliances in her data specify some level of institutionalization, compared to only 18% of symmetric alliances; she describes this empirical observation as “a surprising nuance.” (Mattes 2012, 701)
The depth of alliance institutionalization refers to the scope or robustness of treaty institutionalization. A survey of alliance treaties from the last 200 years affirms wide variation in the depth of alliance institutional design. For example, the 1920 alliance between France and Belgium specifies institutionalization that is qualitatively deeper by including four intensive peacetime institutionalization mechanisms—including peacetime military contact, mutual military aid, joint occupation of military bases, and the subordination of Belgian forces in the Rhineland—while the 1930 alliance between the United Kingdom and Iraq includes only two—military aid and basing rights. The comparative depth of alliance institutionalization in asymmetric and symmetric alliances is, I argue, the more interesting test. As noted above, a great variety of mechanisms are available to alliance partners for institutionalizing their commitments, and the cumulative effect of multiple mechanisms creates a wide range of potential institutional depth. Where likelihood can only capture the dichotomous presence or absence of institutionalization, depth allows more a much larger degree of variance. Indeed, the depth of institutionalized cooperation has far-reaching theoretical foundations, going back to European neo-functionalism (Haas 1958). Regime/institutions scholars in the 1990s captured the concept in a number of ways, including the formality of substantive versus procedural rules in regional economic institutions (Kahler 1995), the scope of multilateral cooperation in various types of cooperation problems (Martin 1992), the centralization and independence of international institutions (Abbott and Snidal 1998), and the formality, or legalism, of dispute settlement design (Smith 1998). Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal (2001, 771) define institutional depth as the rationally designed “centralization” of international

---

56 Examples were identified and descriptions derived using data and codesheets from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset (Leeds, et al. 2002). These data and case codesheets are available online at atop.rice.edu.
institutions, or the degree to which activities such as enforcement, information distribution, and bargaining are centralized in a focal entity.\textsuperscript{57, 58}

Drawing on the theory set forth in Chapter Three, I derive four hypotheses for empirical testing. Hypotheses One (H1) and Two (H2) specify the basic empirical propositions derived from the complementary exchange model of asymmetric alliance institutionalization—namely, that because of the nature of costs and benefits in the asymmetric model, these alliances will (as a whole) institutionalize more frequently and deeply than symmetric alliances. To reiterate, Hypothesis One (H1) is largely a replication of Mattes (2012), while Hypothesis Two (H2), capturing the depth of institutionalization, is the more substantively interesting test.

**Hypothesis One (H1)** – Alliance asymmetry will be positively associated with a greater likelihood of alliance institutionalization.

**Hypothesis Two (H2)** – Alliance asymmetry will be positively associated with deeper levels of institutional depth.

I also include two additional hypotheses more fully fleshing out the empirical implications of my theory. In Hypothesis Three (H3) I interact relative power asymmetry and the alliance institutionalization problem, defined in terms of the scope of obligation (in other words, whether the alliance carries an active obligation). Interacting both the cooperation

\textsuperscript{57} This definition of institutional depth, and the definition I use in this chapter, should be distinguished from the “depth” of cooperation referred to in Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1996, 380) or Goldsmith and Posner (2006, 26)’s models of state “compliance.” For these scholars, “depth” refers to the outcome of institutional cooperation—the extent to which states acted differently from how they would have acted in absence of a cooperative agreement. A more accurate term might characterize this as the level of meaningful cooperative compliance. While certainly an important focal point of study in and of itself, it is conceptually distinct from the depth of institutional design, and I treat it as such in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{58} John S. Duffield (2003) criticizes Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal’s (2001) definition, arguing they conflate the concepts of institutional centralization and delegation. In a response to Duffield, Koremenos and Snidal (2003, 71) emphasize the value of generalizing centralization (or depth) in initial studies given that very little work exists parsing out “detailed design principles” like centralization. As the literature on military alliance institutional depth is perhaps even more underdeveloped, I follow in Koremenos and Snidal’s footsteps with a more generalized definition of depth.
problem and relative power asymmetry explanations, we should expect to observe deeper
alliance institutionalization in both symmetric and asymmetric active-obligation alliances
containing a defense and/or offense pact, but we should observe the deepest levels of alliance
institutionalization in asymmetric active-obligation alliances where the incentives of the
complementary exchange model are compounded by the cooperation problem. Finally,
Hypothesis Four (H4) examines comparative trends in specific mechanisms of alliance
institutionalization: military aid, basing rights, peacetime military contact, and formal
organization. If my theory’s argument that the directionality and material cost of these
mechanisms of alliance institutionalization favor asymmetric alliances and the material
advantages of major powers, we should expect to observe more frequent use of these individual
mechanisms in asymmetric alliances.

Hypothesis Three (H3) – Alliance institutionalization will be deeper in active-
obligation asymmetric alliances than either non-active obligation asymmetric
alliances or any-obligation symmetric alliances.

Hypothesis Four (H4) – Alliance asymmetry will be positively associated with
more frequent use of the following individual institutionalization mechanisms:
military aid, basing rights, peacetime military contact, and formal organization.

Before discussing my research design, I wish to note two caveats on the theory discussed
above. First, I assume alliance formation as endogenous to my theoretical arguments. An
alternate approach to the study of asymmetric alliance institutionalization is to use a two-stage
model where the decision to ally is modeled first, followed by the decision to institutionalize an
alliance once formed. Recognizing the space constraints of this project and seeking to achieve
consistency with the most recent research on alliance design (Mattes 2012), I endogonize the
first level. Further, as noted by Poast (2012, 277), the task of capturing the “dogs that don’t bark” in alliance formation negotiations is a significant challenge requiring massive historical and diplomatic research, and initial attempts are more appropriate to rich qualitative methods. The second caveat recognizes the limited discussion of entrapment risks in this chapter’s theoretical development. Even deeply institutionalized asymmetric alliances carry entrapment risks by leading either partner into an unwanted commitment—the major power on behalf of an emboldened, rogue minor power ally or the minor power in obligation to their much more powerful partner (Snyder 1997). The complementary exchange model does not argue the risks of institutionalization are absent from asymmetric alliances, nor does it predict every asymmetric alliance will be characterized by deep institutionalization. It does, however, posit that we should expect to observe more and deeper institutionalization in asymmetric than symmetric alliances. Theoretical extensions of the complementary exchange model to variation in institutionalization among asymmetric alliances are reserved for future work.

Research Design

To test these hypotheses I use a large-N empirical analysis of data on all bilateral military alliances formed between 1815 and 2003. This temporal scope allows me to capture the vast majority of the universe of modern alliance cases. The unit of analysis is the alliance itself. I use multivariate models appropriate to the dependent variables of interest in each hypothesis

---

59 Notable exclusions from this case selection include alliances formed prior to 1815, alliances formed after 2003, and alliances between 1815 and 2003 for which insufficient primary treaty records prevent accurate quantitative data coding (Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Codebook 2005, 5).
(logistic regression for H1 and H4, and linear regression for H2 and H3), with robust standard errors clustered on the alliance dyad to account for potential dependence across cases.\textsuperscript{60} The Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset (Leeds, et al. 2002) is my primary source of data on alliance treaty institutionalization.\textsuperscript{61} The ATOP dataset uses primary-source alliance treaty texts to code the most detailed data available on alliance treaty terms across the broadest universe of cases, including a wide range of institutionalization mechanisms (Leeds, et al. 2002).\textsuperscript{62} Moreover, the public availability of the qualitative coding sheets used in the ATOP data collection process provides researchers with primary-source textual context for quantitative codes (www.atop.rice.edu). Since publication, ATOP data has been widely adopted by the IR literature.

The ATOP alliance-level dataset includes data for 648 unique alliance treaties. Following Mattes (2012), I exclude from my analysis multilateral alliances due to complications associated with translating key theoretical arguments, such as the ratio and effects of relative power balances or the exact trade-off of costs and benefits from institutionalization, to multilateral agreements, where parsing out these dynamics is much more theoretically and empirically complex; moreover, it is very difficult to empirically establish dyadic directionality in multilateral alliances, which is a key theoretical assumption of my argument. I also exclude secret or partially secret alliances because secrecy impedes our ability to make accurate assumptions related to the external signaling effects of traditional deterrence alliances; moreover,

\textsuperscript{60} Given that my institutional depth variable ranges from “0” to “9” an alternate model for H2 and H3 would be maximum likelihood estimation for ordinal dependent variables, or ordered logit. While robustness checks of my model using ordered logistical regression are substantively similar, I use linear regression to facilitate a more intuitive interpretation of the results.

\textsuperscript{61} This project uses the most updated version of the ATOP data—version 3.0, which was last revised and published on May 10, 2005.

\textsuperscript{62} In comparison, the Correlates of War (COW) Formal Alliance dataset (Gibler and Sarkees 2004) includes data on alliance membership and the general alliance obligation (defense, neutrality, nonaggression, or entente), but excludes further detail about the variation in content of these treaties. The ATOP data further differs from the COW data by defining five types of alliance obligation (defense, offense, neutrality, consultation, and nonaggression).
less than 1% of post-1945 alliances are secret or partially secret (Leeds and Mattes 2007, 192). Finally, I exclude alliances containing only nonaggression pact obligations (promises to abstain from military conflict within the alliance), which are considered by many alliance scholars to be a concept distinct from other alliance obligations (Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Codebook 2005, 5). Recognizing that many alliances specify multiple types of obligations, observations that include non-aggression pacts in conjunction with externally oriented obligations (defense, offense, consultation, or neutrality) are included in the data. My data therefore includes all bilateral, public, externally oriented military alliances for the period 1815-2003, totaling 396 unique observations.

Dependent Variables

The primary dependent variable of interest in this chapter is the depth of alliance institutionalization (H2 and H3). The most prominent measure of alliance institutionalization is Brett Ashley Leeds and Sezi Anac’s (2005, 188-190) three-category index (coded as “none,” “moderate,” and “high”), which uses seven institutionalization indicators drawn from the ATOP data. Table 4.1 summarizes this operationalization.

As the first attempt to empirically describe alliance institutionalization, this index represents a valuable contribution to the contemporary alliance literature. It suffers, however, from two critical shortfalls in the context of this project. First, the Leeds and Anac (2005) index is limited in variance to three categories, offering limited insight into the true scope and nuance of alliance institutional depth by obscuring much potential variance in alliances that specify multiple mechanisms of institutionalization. Moreover, the index conflates institutionalization

---

63 The ATOP data identifies nonaggression clauses in 315 of its 648 alliances, of which 217 also include defense, offense, consultation, and/or neutrality obligations (Leeds, et al. 2002). I exclude the remaining 98 nonaggression pacts.
mechanisms with very different functional purposes. A common defense policy and basing rights, for example, receive the same score despite having very different substantive effects.

Second, the Leeds and Anac (2005) index explicitly adopts the capability aggregation model, diminishing potentially meaningful indicators of major power control, such as military aid (which is only considered an indicator of “moderate institutionalization”). In their discussion, Leeds and Anac (2005, 188) state that their definition of “high” institutionalization captures mechanisms providing improved capability aggregation for “the highest levels of joint preparation.”

TABLE 4.1: Alliance Institutionalization Index from Leeds and Anac (2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Institutionalization Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>“None”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No institutionalization indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>“Moderate”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Any ONE of the following:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Peacetime Contact among</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Formal Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Provision of Military Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Subordination of Troops or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specified Partner Contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>“High”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Any ONE of the following:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Common Defense Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Peacetime Integrated Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Joint Troop Placements or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basing Rights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I build on Leeds and Anac (2005) to outline a more nuanced index of alliance institutionalization capable of capturing greater variance in alliance depth (Table 4.2). Moreover, this new conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of building on assumptions derived solely from the capability aggregation approach to alliance institutionalization. In this revised index, institutionalization mechanisms are categorized according to four functional categories of partner interaction (physical presence, policy influence, payments, and military command). Indicators within each category are then labeled as indicative of either “low” or “high” institutionalization. Each “low” indicator is coded as 1 point and each “high” indicator is coded as 2 points. The non-observance of any institutionalization indicator is coded as “0.” The index score is the sum of all observed indicators in each alliance observation, ranging from 0 to 12.\(^6\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical Presence</th>
<th>Policy Influence</th>
<th>Payments</th>
<th>Military Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOW</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Troop Placements</td>
<td>Formal Organization OR Peacetime Military Contact</td>
<td>Economic Aid</td>
<td>Subordination of Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HIGH</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basing Rights</td>
<td>Common Defense Policy</td>
<td>Military Aid</td>
<td>Integrated Military Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My index is consistent with Leeds and Anac (2005) in three out of four institutionalization mechanisms that I also label as “high” institutionalization, including basing.

\(^6\) In my data, the highest observed score for institutional depth is 9. No alliance observation includes all possible mechanisms of institutionalization in Table 4.2.
rights, common defense policy, and integrated military command. I label joint troop placements as a “low” indicator of physical presence because, unlike basing rights which are almost exclusively **ex ante** to alliance invocation, joint troop placements predominantly refers to **ex post facto** coordination in the event of a conflict. I elevate military aid to the level of “high” institutionalization, and include economic aid as a new lower-level alternate source of institutionalized payment.\(^{65}\) I also include formal organizations for the stated purpose of political as well as military coordination (the ATOP data distinguishes the purpose of formal organizations in alliance treaties). Unlike the Leeds and Anac index (2005), I exclude the specification of military contributions from the index, finding this indicator to be more consistent with measures of obligation specificity and conditionality than **ex ante** institutionalized interaction.\(^{66}\)

The revised index results in changed codes for 109 of 385 alliance observations in this project (28.3%). 35% of the observations coded by Leeds and Anac (2005) as having “moderate” institutionalization (“1”) are revised, and a staggering 81.4% of the observations originally coded as having “high” institutionalization (“2”) are recoded to reflect greater variance. In the revised index, 19.5% of the data (75 observations) score between a 2 and 9, which would otherwise have been conflated into a single category. Importantly, the index addresses the two weaknesses of the Leeds and Anac (2005) index identified above. First, it offers greater traction on the true variance of alliance institutionalization and extends the measurable range from three categories to thirteen potential categories. Second, the index avoids the pitfalls of inaccurate founding assumptions in application to asymmetric alliances.

\(^{65}\) While scholars have recognized the strategic value of economic aid linkages in military alliances (Fordham 2010; Poast 2012), they are excluded from the Leeds and Anac (2005) index as they do not speak directly to military preparation and capability aggregation.

\(^{66}\) See Michaela Mattes (2012) for a discussion of the conceptual differences between obligation specificity/conditionality and institutionalization.
I now turn to the remaining dependent variables. I code the *likelihood of alliance institutionalization* (H1) dichotomously, such that an observation is coded as “1” if it includes any institutionalization mechanism used in Table 4.2 and as “0” if it includes none of these mechanisms. 39.7% of my data (153 observations) specify some level of alliance institutionalization. Hypothesis Four (H4) considers four independent mechanisms of alliance institutionalization: military aid, basing rights, peacetime military contact, and formal organization. I draw data on each mechanism from the ATOP data and they are each coded dichotomously. Careful coding ensures this operationalization scheme represents meaningful institutionalization; for example, an alliance is coded as having a formal organization (“1”) if it specifies a named organization with regularly scheduled meetings, but is coded “0” if the treaty only refers to “regular meetings of governmental officials to manage the agreement.” (*Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Codebook* 2005, 43) 10.3% (40 observations) specify military aid institutionalization, 10.6% (41 observations) specify an institutionalized military or political organization associated with the alliance treaty, 13.2% (51 observations) specify military basing rights, and 17% (66 observations) specify institutionalized peacetime military contact.

**Explanatory Variable**

The primary explanatory variable for this chapter is the relative (a)symmetry of power within the alliance dyad. Scholars have measured this concept in several ways. Mattes (2012) uses Melvin Small and J. David Singer’s (1982) identification of systemic major powers to create a dichotomous measure of (a)symmetry, such that an alliance dyad is coded as symmetric if it is composed of two major powers or two minor powers and is coded as asymmetric if it is
composed of a major and minor power. Stuart Bremer (1992, 322) uses a unique three-category operationalization condensing the Correlates of War (COW) National Capabilities Index (or CINC score) ratio of the dyad,\(^{67}\) such that a dyadic ratio less than 3 is coded as a “small power difference,” a ratio between 3 and 10 is coded as a “medium power difference,” and a ratio larger than 10 is coded as a “large power difference.”

Recognizing the methodological risks of discarding empirical variance, I operationalize \textit{alliance asymmetry} using the natural log of the dyad’s CINC score ratio; the mathematical formula is presented in Figure 4.1. This approach preserves the full scope of empirical variance, while correcting for significant skewness in the raw data. The unlogged dyad CINC score ratio ranges from 1 to 7402.592 in my data, with a mean of 74.108. The use of a natural log corrects this range to a minimum of 0 and maximum of 8.91, with a mean of 2.178. I run robustness checks using the alternative measures discussed above and find that the results are substantively consistent.

\[
\text{Alliance asymmetry} = \ln \left(1 + \frac{\text{CINC}_a}{\text{CINC}_b}\right)
\]

\textbf{FIGURE 4.1: Operationalization Formula for “Alliance Asymmetry” Variable}

\textit{Control Variables}

The true causes of alliance institutionalization trends are multivariate, and the extant literature has consistently recognized a number of variables other than relative power asymmetry that are argued to explain this phenomenon. First, I include a dichotomous variable for \textit{active-obligation} that captures the level of obligation specified in the alliance. As noted in a number of

\(^{67}\) Kadera and Sorokin (2004) offer a critique of the CINC score data’s assumptions regarding the system comparison group and offer an alternative in the Geometric Indicator of National Capabilities (GINC). While a potentially important empirical correction for specific areas of study, such as power transition theory, the CINC data remains the most widely used in the military alliances literature.
studies from the capability aggregation approach, because defense and offense pacts are costly obligations that raise the stakes of the alliance, partners are more likely to turn to institutionalization to strengthen signals of commitment (Leeds and Anac 2005; Leeds and Mattes 2007; Owsiak and Frazier 2013; Wallace 2008). This variable is drawn from the ATOP data and is coded “1” if the alliance contains a defense and/or offense pact and a “0” if it contains neither a defense or offense pact (Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Codebook 2005, 38). 43.94% (174 observations) are coded as requiring active military obligations.

I also include a number of additional control variables recognized across the military alliances literature. I include a dichotomous measure of shared borders to account for the effect of close geographic contiguity. Using the COW Direct Contiguity data (Correlates of War Project; Stinnett et al. 2002), I code this variable as “1” if the states forming the alliance dyad share a direct land or river border, or whose borders are separated by less than 24 miles of water (contiguous territorial seas). 43.94% (174 observations) of my data are coded as having a shared border. I also include a dichotomous variable accounting for whether the alliance was formed under conditions of war; this wartime alliance variable is coded by the ATOP data as “1” if either partner was engaged in an interstate war (Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Codebook 2005, 34). 68% (130 observations) of my data are wartime alliances.

I use the ICOW Colonial History Data (Hensel 2009) to code a dichotomous variable for colonial history, accounting for whether the alliance dyad shared an ongoing or former colonial relationship at the time of alliance formation. 9.85% (39 observations) of my data are coded as having a colonial history. Colonial relationships are recognized to affect a number of international phenomena such as foreign aid disbursements (Alesina and Dollar 2000; 68 Interstate war is defined as war prior to 1991 recognized by the COW data or a militarized interstate dispute after 1991 with hostility level 5 (Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Codebook 2005, 34).
Berthelemy 2006); like foreign aid, military alliances are one tool available to powerful states for influencing their current or former colonial dependents. As noted by Mattes (2012, 696), shared memberships in ongoing alliances may shape the dynamics of a new alliance treaty by reducing the need for confidence-building measures such as institutionalization. I therefore include a control variable for *pre-existing alliances* that codes the number of ongoing alliance memberships, bilateral and multilateral, at the time of alliance formation; the data are derived using the ATOP project and range from zero pre-existing alliances to four (Leeds, et al. 2002). 53% of my data (210 observations) shared joint membership in an ongoing alliance at the time of formation.

Another control variable widely recognized in the military alliances literature is domestic regime type, though the literature remains divided its effect (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004; Lai and Reiter 2000; Leeds 1999; Simon and Gartzke 1996; Siverson and Emmons 1991). On the one hand, dyads with very different domestic political institutions may turn to institutional design as a confidence-building mechanism, but on the other hand, dyads with large regime type differences may be unwilling to bind themselves through mechanisms of institutionalization. I include a control variable accounting for *domestic regime type difference* that measures the difference in polity_2 scores for each alliance partner using the Polity IV Project data (Marshall and Jaggers 2009).\(^{69}\) Dyads with identical polity scores are coded as “0” and dyads representing the largest differences in domestic regime types are coded as “20,” with a range of scores in between; the mean score in my dataset is 5.686.

The last two control variables in this chapter’s empirical models are drawn from Mattes (2012) and replicate important indicators of the capability aggregation approach to alliance

---

\(^{69}\) As noted by Mattes (2012, 695), the challenge of regime type data is the large quantity of missing data points, and the Polity IV data represents the best attempt to impute missing data. Even with this improvement, the missing data in this chapter’s models is mostly a result of missing polity data.
institutionalization. I run separate models including these variables because they limit the temporal scope of my data to alliances formed after 1919. First, I control for joint threat, or the degree to which the alliance dyad experienced a severe external threat at the time of alliance formation. Details on coding can be found in Mattes (2012). In my data, this variable ranges continuously from 0 to 1.335, with a mean of 0.493. Second, I control for either partner’s reputation for unreliability, which is a dichotomous variable coded “1” if either partner abrogated a prior alliance treaty outside its terms within the ten years prior to alliance formation (Mattes 2012, 694). 25.7% (92 observations) of my data are coded as having a reputation for unreliability. The combination of these control variables accounts for the literature’s collective wisdom on factors affecting alliance institutional design.

Results and Discussion

My empirical results are largely supportive of the theoretical arguments discussed above. Reflecting the complementary exchange model to alliance institutionalization, Hypotheses One (H1) and Two (H2) posit that relative power asymmetry increased the likelihood of alliance institutionalization in terms of both likelihood and depth, respectively. Hypothesis Three (H3) allows that alliance institutional depth may be conditional on the level of active military obligation required by the alliance, and propose that active-obligation asymmetric alliances would present with the greatest levels of alliance institutional depth, relative to all other alliance types. Finally, Hypothesis Four (H4) outlines a positive association between relative power asymmetry and four individual indicators of alliance institutionalization: military aid, basing

---

70 I extend my gratitude to Dr. Mattes for her willingness to share her data with me.
71 This percentage is slightly different from Mattes (2012, 694) data, where unreliable alliances account for 22% of her cases. Because the parameters of my dataset and other variables do introduce some differences, this variation is not unexpected.
rights, peacetime military contact, and a formal organization. The statistical models discussed below provide compelling support for these associations, and validate the theoretical expectation that, all else being equal, relative power asymmetry meaningfully shapes the institutional design of military alliances.

Empirical Models

Table 4.3 presents the statistical results relevant to the likelihood of military alliance institutionalization (H1). Model H1a captures the broadest temporal scope, but excludes control variables for joint threat and reputation; Model H1b includes all control variables, but excludes all alliances prior to 1919 due to data availability. In both model specifications, the coefficients for alliance asymmetry are positive and statistically significant, suggesting a meaningful positive relationship between relative power asymmetry and the likelihood of alliance institutionalization. Figure 4.2 summarizes the predictive probabilities for Model H1a in graph form.

These results can also be interpreted in odds ratios, where a one-unit increase in the natural log of a dyad’s CINC ratio increase the odds of alliance institutionalization by a factor of 0.55 (Model H1a). The variable capturing the level of active obligation is the only other statistically significant in both models; the inclusion of an active obligation in an alliance increases the odds of alliance institutionalization by a factor of 2.56. The comparative effects of the active obligation and alliance asymmetry variables should be interpreted in light of their relative variance; while the active obligation variable is coded dichotomously, the alliance asymmetry allows for a greater range, up to 8.91.

---

72 Odds ratios are obtained by exponentiating the logistic coefficients shown in Table 4.3.
73 The results for Model H1b are substantively similar.
TABLE 4.3 – Likelihood of Military Alliance Institutionalization (H1)

*Multivariate Logistic Regression*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model H1a</th>
<th>Model H1b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1815-2003</td>
<td>1919-2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Asymmetry</td>
<td>0.4395***</td>
<td>0.5287***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1037)</td>
<td>(0.1132)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Obligation</td>
<td>0.9419***</td>
<td>0.9266***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.2879)</td>
<td>(0.3261)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Border</td>
<td>- 0.3017</td>
<td>- 0.0463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.3400)</td>
<td>(0.3712)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime Alliance</td>
<td>0.4965</td>
<td>0.6103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5407)</td>
<td>(0.6078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial History</td>
<td>- 0.0078</td>
<td>- 0.2054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.4686)</td>
<td>(0.4859)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Existing Alliance</td>
<td>0.1576</td>
<td>0.2057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1355)</td>
<td>(0.1529)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type Difference</td>
<td>0.2285</td>
<td>(0.0177)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0226)</td>
<td>(0.234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Threat</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>- 0.4169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.6306)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputation</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-0.1105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.3692)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>- 1.9188</td>
<td>- 1.9340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.3765)</td>
<td>(0.4706)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>- 168.7446</td>
<td>- 153.4652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correctly Classified</td>
<td>74.39%</td>
<td>74.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at 0.10 level  ** significant at 0.05 level  *** significant at 0.01 level

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on the alliance dyad.
These results are consistent with Mattes’ (2012) initial finding that a greater percentage of asymmetric than symmetric alliances included institutionalization mechanisms. The statistically significant coefficient for the active obligation variable, however, reinforces the continued relevance of whether an alliance contains an active military obligation, argued in the extant literature to be the basic indicator of the alliance cooperation problem.

As I argue above, however, the more substantively interesting question is the relationship between relative power asymmetry and the depth of alliance institutionalization, which captures greater variance than the dichotomous presence or absence of institutionalization. Table 4.4 presents the models’ predictions examining alliance institutional depth (H2 and H3). Models H2a and H2b specify the asymmetry and active obligation variables separately (H2), while Models H3a and H3b include an interaction term for these two variables (H3). The “a” and “b” notation represent the same model specifications as discussed above.

FIGURE 4.2 – H1 Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Intervals (Model H1a)
### TABLE 4.4 – Depth of Military Alliance Institutionalization (H2 & H3)

*Multivariate Linear Regression*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alliance Asymmetry</strong></td>
<td>0.3194*** (0.0676)</td>
<td>0.3414*** (0.0721)</td>
<td>0.1018* (0.0560)</td>
<td>0.1018* (0.0632)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active Obligation</strong></td>
<td>1.3096*** (0.2066)</td>
<td>1.2666*** (0.2354)</td>
<td>0.2782 (0.3133)</td>
<td>0.0028 (0.3232)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asymmetry * Active Obligation</strong></td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.5121*** (0.1358)</td>
<td>0.5760*** (0.1383)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shared Border</strong></td>
<td>-0.2476 (0.1998)</td>
<td>-0.2036 (0.2280)</td>
<td>-0.1484 (0.1943)</td>
<td>-0.0705 (0.2155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wartime Alliance</strong></td>
<td>0.4582 (0.4565)</td>
<td>0.6834 (0.5138)</td>
<td>0.4357 (0.4688)</td>
<td>0.6402 (0.5472)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Colonial History</strong></td>
<td>0.8956** (0.3867)</td>
<td>0.7653* (0.4071)</td>
<td>0.8143** (0.3998)</td>
<td>0.5151 (0.3927)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-Existing Alliance</strong></td>
<td>0.3214*** (0.1148)</td>
<td>0.3257** (0.1277)</td>
<td>0.3189*** (0.1150)</td>
<td>0.3386*** (0.1260)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regime Type Difference</strong></td>
<td>0.0434*** (0.0157)</td>
<td>0.0387** (0.0171)</td>
<td>0.2498 (0.1741)</td>
<td>0.0178 (0.0188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Threat</strong></td>
<td>--- 0.1323 (0.5104)</td>
<td>--- 0.1741 (0.4838)</td>
<td>--- 0.4366 (0.4838)</td>
<td>--- 0.4366 (0.4838)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reputation</strong></td>
<td>--- 0.2510 (0.2402)</td>
<td>--- 0.2519 (0.2168)</td>
<td>--- 0.2519 (0.2168)</td>
<td>--- 0.2519 (0.2168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-0.7218 (0.1974)</td>
<td>-0.8414 (0.2919)</td>
<td>-0.2180 (0.1907)</td>
<td>-0.3980 (0.2749)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R-Squared</strong></td>
<td>0.3687 0.3830 0.4154 0.4374</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>289 265 289 265</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* * significant at 0.10 level  ** significant at 0.05 level  *** significant at 0.01 level

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on the alliance dyad.
The coefficients for alliance asymmetry are positive and statistically significant for both models H2a and H2b. Alliances with asymmetry scores one standard deviation above the mean predict an expected 0.4880 increase in institutional depth, all other variables held constant. These results suggest a meaningful positive relationship between asymmetry and the depth of alliance institutionalization. In other words, all else being equal, greater relative power asymmetry is associated with not only the presence of alliance institutionalization, but deeper institutionalization as well. Consistent with H1, active obligation alliances are more likely to specify deeper alliance institutionalization than solely neutrality or consultation pacts. As with the likelihood of institutionalization, alliance asymmetry has a larger marginal effect on institutional depth than the presence of an active obligation. An increase from the minimum to the maximum of alliance asymmetry predicts a 2.85-unit increase in alliance institutional depth, but an active obligation (dichotomously coded) predicts only a 1.31-unit increase in institutional depth. The comparative effect of asymmetry is over twice that of active obligation.

The foregoing results suggest an interdependent relationship between relative power asymmetry and the presence of active obligations in military alliances, such that the depth of alliance institutionalization is, in part, conditional on the presence of an active obligation (H3). Models H3a and H3b capture this interdependence by interacting the alliance asymmetry and active obligation variable. The interaction coefficient in both models is positive and statistically significant coefficient, affirming H3’s proposition that alliance institutionalization will be deepest in active obligation asymmetric alliances, compared to non-active obligation asymmetric alliances and all symmetric alliances.

---

74 The results for Model H2b are substantively similar.
This finding is best expressed graphically. Figure 4.3 presents the predictive margins of the interaction term in Model H3a, along with 95% confidence intervals. It is apparent that the effect of relative power asymmetry is strongest in active-obligation alliances, consistent with H3. While asymmetry does increase the predictive margins of non-active obligation alliances slightly (from roughly 0.5 to 1.0), asymmetry increases the predictive margins of active obligation alliances at a substantively sharper rate (from just over 1.0 to nearly 6.0), all other variables held constant. Holding asymmetry constant, the presence of an active obligation increases the predictive margin from roughly 0.5 to 1.2, supporting the claim that active obligations are an important predictor for the likelihood of alliance institutionalization as a dichotomous variable.

![H3 Predicted Probabilities with 95% Confidence Intervals](image)

**FIGURE 4.3 – H3 Predicted Probabilities with 95% Confidence Intervals (Model H3a)**

---

75 The results for Model H3b are substantively similar.
But Figure 4.3 concisely demonstrates that the vast majority of the empirical variance we see in alliance institutional depth can be accounted for by relative power asymmetry in the dyad, not active obligation commitments. While active obligation requirements are a very good predictor of whether an alliance will be institutionalized, in general, the depth of this institutional arrangement is best predicted by power asymmetry between alliance partners. Taken together, Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3 provide very strong support for the complementary exchange model to alliance institutionalization, and demonstrate the qualitative difference in asymmetric and symmetric institutionalization trends.

Further unpacking the causal story outlined above, H4 argues that because of the directionality and material cost of key alliance institutionalization mechanisms, relative power asymmetry should be positively associated with individual mechanisms, including military aid, basing rights, peacetime military contact, and a formal organization. Table 4.5 summarizes the statistical results relevant to H4, with each mechanism captured by a different model (Models H4a-d). In all four models, the coefficient for alliance asymmetry is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that, all else being equal, relative power asymmetry increases the likelihood of each individual mechanism of alliance institutionalization. The active obligation variable presents positive and statistically significant effects for all the mechanisms, except peacetime military contact. These results are more intuitively interpreted in odds ratios.77

76 Models H4a-d exclude control variables for joint threat and reputation (Mattes 2012). Robustness checks including these variables and limiting the temporal scope to 1919 are discussed below.
77 Odds ratios are obtained by exponentiating the logistic coefficients shown in Table 4.5.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model H4a Military Aid</th>
<th>Model H4b Basing Rights</th>
<th>Model H4c Peacetime Military Contact</th>
<th>Model H4d Formal Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Asymmetry</td>
<td>0.4003**</td>
<td>0.4799**</td>
<td>0.3252***</td>
<td>0.3165**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1582)</td>
<td>(0.1905)</td>
<td>(0.1021)</td>
<td>(0.1511)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Obligation</td>
<td>2.2244***</td>
<td>3.0712***</td>
<td>0.3223</td>
<td>1.7115***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5751)</td>
<td>(0.6147)</td>
<td>(0.3053)</td>
<td>(0.4272)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Border</td>
<td>-0.5449</td>
<td>-1.1902</td>
<td>-0.3661</td>
<td>0.9333*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.6614)</td>
<td>(0.7823)</td>
<td>(0.3475)</td>
<td>(0.5019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime Alliance</td>
<td>1.1596</td>
<td>1.1129</td>
<td>0.5808</td>
<td>0.1400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.9726)</td>
<td>(0.9661)</td>
<td>(0.4977)</td>
<td>(0.7882)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial History</td>
<td>2.3831***</td>
<td>2.1430***</td>
<td>0.0542</td>
<td>0.3679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.6298)</td>
<td>(0.7823)</td>
<td>(0.4674)</td>
<td>(0.6127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Existing Alliance</td>
<td>0.4027</td>
<td>0.2217</td>
<td>0.3651***</td>
<td>0.5025***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.2469)</td>
<td>(0.3101)</td>
<td>(0.1342)</td>
<td>(0.1771)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type Difference</td>
<td>0.0346</td>
<td>0.1272***</td>
<td>0.0057</td>
<td>0.0033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0517)</td>
<td>(0.0460)</td>
<td>(0.0270)</td>
<td>(0.0447)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.6341</td>
<td>-6.3901</td>
<td>-2.5047</td>
<td>-4.6111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.8121)</td>
<td>(0.3101)</td>
<td>(0.3565)</td>
<td>(0.5433)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-57.1265</td>
<td>-51.5606</td>
<td>-137.9822</td>
<td>-84.2727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correctly Classified</td>
<td>93.15%</td>
<td>92.41%</td>
<td>79.18%</td>
<td>88.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at 0.10 level  ** significant at 0.05 level  *** significant at 0.01 level
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on the alliance dyad.

The effect of alliance asymmetry is strongest for basing rights, where a one-unit increase in the natural log of the alliance dyad’s CINC score ratio increases the odds of an alliance specifying...
institutionalized basing rights by a factor of 0.61. A one-unit increase in alliance asymmetry increases the odds of an alliance specifying military aid by a factor of 0.49, peacetime military contact by a factor of 0.38, and a formal organization by a factor of 0.37.\textsuperscript{78}

Robustness checks that include control variables for joint threat and reputation, but limit the temporal scope to post-1919, offer further nuances on these results. In the post-1919 models, relative power asymmetry is shown to have a larger effect on both military aid and basing rights, increasing their odds to 0.58 and 0.91, respectively. But in the post-1919 models, the odds ratio relationship between asymmetry and the specification of a formal organization drops in statistical significance below a p-value < 0.10. Taken together, these results affirm a meaningful and positive relationship—across multiple model specifications—between relative power asymmetry and the specification of military aid, basing rights, and peacetime military contact, while the relationship between asymmetry and the specification of a formal organization is less impactful, particularly for alliances formed after World War I.

These results are still largely consistent with this project’s theoretical claims. The theoretical argument outlined above argues that the directional nature and material cost of many alliance institutionalization mechanisms makes them more useful and more sustainable in asymmetric than symmetric alliances. Of the four mechanisms discussed above, the most objectively costly and directional are military aid and basing rights, which present with strong and consistent affirmative results. These results provide support for the theoretical argument that major states in asymmetric alliances are most likely to perceive direct benefit and have the resources to sustain these mechanisms. In contrast, while the results for the formal organization

\textsuperscript{78} These results can also be interpreted in terms of predicted probabilities. As an alliance observation’s CINC score ratio increases from its minimum to its maximum, the predicted probability of military aid increases from 0.06 to 0.39, of basing rights increases from 0.08 to 0.46, of military contact increases from 0.15 to 0.69, and of a formal organization increases from 0.09 to 0.42.
mechanism were less confident, this should perhaps not be surprising when we consider that, of the four mechanisms, formal organizations are the least likely to appeal to the interests of major powers in asymmetric alliances. While not as financially costly as basing rights, formal organizations are still politically burdensome and are much less likely to promote major power control interests over their minor power partner; in fact, in light of growing institutionalism in the general post-World War II order, organizations may appeal to minor powers as a means of influencing major power allies (Reiter and Gartner 2001). From the perspective of a major power, a more viable alternative may be institutionalized peacetime military contact as it is less burdensome and less binding, while still providing regular oversight and influence over the minor power ally. Indeed, the statistical results for the model capturing peacetime military contact present consistent and significant odds ratio relationships across both model specifications. Of these four mechanisms, it may in fact be the use of institutionalized peacetime military contact as an alternative alliance institutionalization mechanism that is of greatest interest to future research.

Control Variables

The empirical findings related to the additional control variables included in this research design (active obligation being discussed above) are of further interest. The presence of a colonial history has a consistent and statistically significant effect on alliance institutionalization—a colonial or post-colonial dyadic relationship increases the likelihood of all institutionalization outcomes, except for peacetime military contact and formal organization.79 This is not inconsistent with the complementary exchange model however, as colonial

---

79 Note that the statistical significance for the colonial history variable drops from a p-value < 0.05 to a p-value < 0.10 in Model H2b.
relationships are, by definition, relationships where one partner seeks influence over the other in exchange for security assurances. One potential implication of this finding is that relative power asymmetry is one of multiple alliance characteristics leading to a complementary alliance relationship.

Pre-existing alliance relationships also have a consistent and statistically significant effect on alliance institutionalization, increasing the likelihood of all alliance institutionalization outcomes, except for military aid and basing rights. These findings reinforce Mattes’ (2012) earlier finding, which contradicts the prevailing wisdom of the extant literature that allies with prior alliance relationships will not need institutional reinforcement. Together with Mattes (2012), these findings suggest that existing allies are actually more likely to institutionalize new alliances, contravening the cooperation problem explanation for alliance institutionalization. Though debate exists in the literature over whether domestic regime type differences increase or decrease alliance formation and ally trust (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004; Lai and Reiter 2000; Leeds 1999; Simon and Gartzke 1996; Siverson and Emmons 1991), my statistical results find that greater differences in regime type actually increase the likelihood of alliance institutionalization frequency and depth, as well as the propensity to include clauses relating to military basing rights. These findings lend credibility to arguments that allies with very different domestic political systems are more concerned about partner abandonment risks than entrapment risks, and willing to accept more binding agreements in exchange for greater assurances of partner reliability. The only other control variable shown in these models to affect alliance institutionalization outcomes was the variable accounting for a shared border, which

---

80 Interestingly, the colonial history and alliance asymmetry variables correlate with a factor of 0.28—not high enough to warrant methodological concerns of multicollinearity.
81 Mattes (2012) finds a similar result in her data. It should be noted that the regime type difference variable is not statistically significant with the inclusion of the interaction term in Models H3a and H3b.
returned a positive and statistically significant effect on the inclusion of a formal organization clause.

The remaining control variables did not return statistically significant results. The fact that wartime alliances were not shown to institutionalize with greater likelihood and depth than peacetime alliances reinforces the wisdom of the rational design literature that institutionalization is largely an *ex ante* design mechanism, and will be less useful to alliances formed under conditions of ongoing or imminent conflict (Leeds and Anac 2005; Mattes 2012). Likewise, the fact that conditions of high external threat to the alliance dyad were not shown to increase the likelihood and depth of alliance institutionalization contravenes the predominant capability aggregation approach to alliance formation (Christensen and Snyder 1990; Conybeare 1992; Morrow 1994, 2000; Smith 1998; Snyder 1990, 1997; Walt 1987; Waltz 1979), reinforcing the value of more nuanced explanations for alliance design.

Surprisingly, the inclusion of Mattes’ (2012) reputation control variable was not shown to significantly affect alliance institutionalization trends, contradicting her initial findings. Multiple robustness checks specifying reputation with different operationalizations also failed to achieve statistical significance. Recognizing that Mattes (2012) included an interaction term for partner reputation and relative power asymmetry, I ran a further robustness check for my models that included a three-way interaction of partner reputation, relative power asymmetry, and active obligation clauses (summarized in Figure 4.4). Only with the inclusion of a three-way interaction did reputation achieve statistical significance. This model clarifies Mattes’ (2012) initial finding that even asymmetric alliances are less likely to institutionalize if one of the

---

82 Due to data limitations, the three-way model is limited in temporal scope to the period 1919-2003.
partners abrogated a previous alliance commitment. Figure 4.4 suggests that this finding is largely driven by alliance cases that are solely neutrality or consultation pacts; active obligation alliances, even if a partner has a reputation for unreliability, are just as likely to include the highest levels of alliance institutional depth as alliances where neither partner abrogated a prior agreement. This robustness check further suggests that asymmetric, non-active obligation alliances where at least one partner has a poor reputation are the least likely to specify deep institutionalization. In all other cases, relative power asymmetry is a strong predictor of institutional depth.

FIGURE 4.4 – 3-Way Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Intervals

---

83 It should be noted that in all but two cases in Mattes’ data, the partner with a reputation for unreliability was the major power partner (2012, 695).
Conclusion

By focusing on empirical trends in the likelihood and depth of alliance institutionalization, this chapter explicates the first step in the broader research agenda seeking to explain asymmetric alliance institutional design. In doing so, it offers concrete empirical support to the charge that the predominant capability aggregation model of alliance formation and design obscures important causal factors, such as relative power asymmetry. My theoretical model integrates the implications of the complementary exchange model for the likelihood and depth of alliance institutionalization trends. Empirical analysis using a large-N methodology finds statistical support for hypotheses derived from my theoretical argument. All else being equal, increasing relative power asymmetry is shown to be associated with increases in alliance institutionalization in terms of likelihood, depth, and even individual mechanisms of institutionalization. Taken as a whole, these findings challenge the prevailing wisdom that alliance institutionalization is driven by the alliance cooperation problem, as manifested in capability aggregation goals. This relatively simple and intuitive argument—that, in asymmetric alliances, institutionalization is motivated by the complementary exchange of security and influence benefits under the umbrella of major power control interests and material capability—offers a refraction on the alliance design literature by accounting for a large amount of heretofore overlooked variance in the alliance data.

This conclusion has implications for future studies of alliance design, encouraging greater scholarly attention to the nuances of institutional design in asymmetric alliances. Not only should future work refocus on alliance design as a dependent variable, it should account for the foundational theoretical differences between the symmetric capability aggregation model and the asymmetric complementary exchange model. Perhaps more importantly, by successfully
challenging key assumptions in the extant literature about the causes of alliance institutional design, this conclusion demands a reconsideration of how we conceptualize the effects of alliance institutionalization. These results, for example, go a long way toward explaining Leeds and Anac’s (2005) surprising finding alliance institutionalization was not associated with greater reliability when invoked in wartime. If the goal of asymmetric alliance institutionalization is not capability aggregation, their reliability in wartime is a poor indicator of the institutionalization’s effectiveness. And recognizing that much of the alliance institutionalization we observe in the empirical data may be driven by these asymmetric cases, we should not be surprised that, at least by this measure, institutionalization is not associated with effectiveness. Having thus demonstrated empirical support for the complementary exchange model of asymmetrical alliance institutionalization, the next steps are a richer analysis of these arguments using qualitative methodologies.

References


CHAPTER 5
EUROPE’S IMPERIAL POWERS: GREAT BRITAIN & FRANCE

Together, this chapter and the next further explore the argument that asymmetric military alliances are more likely to institutionalize, and institutionalize deeply, than symmetric alliances by evaluating the alliance portfolios of four major powers—Great Britain, France, the United States, and Russia/USSR—using illustrative cases. Each case considers the overall correlation trend between relative power asymmetry and institutional depth in the major power’s alliance portfolio, as well as the trends it favored with regard to both alliance aims and institutionalization over time. In three of the cases (Great Britain, France, and Russia/USSR), the general correlation trend is positive and provides qualitative support to the predictions of the complementary exchange model. That said, in all four cases, the deepest levels of institutionalization are reserved for asymmetric partners, and the individual institutionalization mechanisms argued to be most appropriate for asymmetric partnerships—military basing rights and military aid payments—are indeed heavily favored. The discussion affirms additional insights, including the qualitative significance of alternative explanations for these trends (particularly regarding post-colonial relationships and the presence of an active obligation in the alliance), the observation that each case exhibited a different alliance “character” that evolved over time, and that major power aims in the alliance had a qualitative influence on the alliance design outcomes.

Unlike the previous chapter’s large-N methodology, a qualitative consideration of major power alliance patterns allows for the illumination of differences between cases, particularly
differences with regard to alliance partners, alliance aims, and specific institutionalization mechanisms. In other words, it provides further testing of this project’s theoretical arguments by digging deeper into the “on the ground” application of alliance institutional design by different partners. Given the depth of the alliance literature in general, there is certainly causal complexity in the process of alliance formation and design; while this project’s theory outlines a parsimonious explanation of the dynamics of asymmetric alliance institutionalization, we should not expect all major powers to behave exactly alike. Indeed, the quantitative results from Chapter 4 identified other factors that play a role in this process, including the presence of a defense or offense pact, post-colonial alliances, and prior alliance commitments between partners. It is also worth noting that deeply institutionalized alliances are still a relatively rare phenomenon and, on that basis alone, worth a closer look.

The four selected cases for these two chapters—Great Britain, France, the United States, and Russia/USSR—were chosen because they are all major powers whose classification of major power status extends for a substantial length of time and each captures very different domestic political contexts and foreign policy postures. Taken together, these four cases represent 185 bilateral, public alliances out of this project’s dataset of 396 alliance observations, or nearly half of the data (46.7%). Other major powers identified in the COW data (Germany, Austria, Italy, China, and Japan), are excluded either due to the relatively short duration of their major power status or comparatively inactive alliance policies. It is valid to question the exclusive focus on major power case studies when many scholars have emphasized the alliance politics of smaller nations (David 1991; Reiter & Gartner 2001; Rothstein 1968; Walt 1987). The intention is not to

---

84 The Correlates of War (COW) data (Correlates of War Project 2011) defines the major power status of each case study as follows: United States (1898 – present), Great Britain (1816 – present), France (1816 – 1940 and 1945 – present), and Russia/USSR (1816 – 1917 & 1922 – present).

85 Taken together, these five major powers only represent 55 cases in the dataset, or 13.8%.
dismiss the theoretical value of minor power partners; to the contrary, the interests of minor
power partners are included in the discussion below. The choice to focus on major powers
reflects both the reality that major powers are the most frequent allies in the data (over 60% of
bilateral, public alliances) and that the superior negotiating strength of major powers in alliance
negotiations is also well established in the broader alliance literature (Fordham 2010; Mattes
2012; Snyder 1997). Indeed, the complementary exchange model of asymmetric alliance
institutionalization presented in Chapter 3 assumes that the outcome of alliance design often does
reflect the weighted interests of major power partners. Some might also question the European
or western focus of the chosen cases. This is certainly a valid criticism and speaks to the
westernization of both 20th Century politics and much of the international affairs scholarly
literature from the same period. Again, this case selection reflects the reality of the data. Most
formal alliances in general are western-centric; in the dataset for this project only 45 alliances
(out of 396) are completely non-western, meaning that neither partner is a European state, the
United States, Canada, or Australia. 86

This chapter begins this qualitative discussion by focusing on two of Europe’s largest
empires—Great Britain and France. Not only do these cases represent some of the longest
temporal spans of major power status (extending back to the early-19th Century), but they also
exemplify a key dynamic related to relationships between major and minor powers: post-colonial
ties. Both Great Britain and France established extensive global colonial empires by the turn of
the 20th Century, which were dismantled in the decades following World War II. Moreover, the
two former-empires crafted very different post-colonial systems—while Britain largely retreated
from an active military role in its former colonies in exchange for the Commonwealth, France

86 Paul Poast (2012, 287-288) notes that 76% of the alliances formed between 1815 and 1945 include only European states.
remained militarily active and created a system of bilateral alliances with its former colonies (in Africa, especially) (Austin and Panter-Brick 1990; Rouvez 1994). In both cases, bilateral alliances became one tool for preserving post-colonial relationships.

Each illustrative case begins with summary data for the major power’s bilateral alliance portfolio between 1815 and 2003, followed by a discussion offering historical contextualization of the alliance portfolio over time. Separate sections highlight the evolving nuances of the major power’s alliance strategy, with special emphasis on alliance aims and specific mechanisms of institutionalization. A final comparative discussion synthesizing the findings of all four qualitative illustrative cases is included at the end of the next chapter, Chapter 6.

**Great Britain – From Splendid Isolation to Former Empire**

The case of Great Britain exemplifies the alliance politics of a 19th Century major power with internationalist foreign policy interests based predominantly in the maintenance of a colonial empire. Great Britain engaged in 64 formal alliances between 1815 and 2003 according to the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data (Leeds, et al. 2002). Of these, 27 meet the criteria for inclusion in the dataset for this project—they are bilateral, public, active-obligation alliances; 36 multilateral alliances are excluded, along with one bilateral alliance concluded in secret (Portugal in 1899). Compared to the French and Russian cases, Great Britain participated in very few secret or partially secret treaties (a total of six). Though Britain’s multilateral alliances fall outside the scope of this project, they include several large, well-known commitments, including NATO (1949), SEATO (1954), the Baghdad Pact (1955), the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975), and the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union (1992). Other multilateral alliances in the British portfolio are
smaller in size and mostly targeted to wartime interests, including the Quadruple Alliance (1815), the Crimean War alliances (1855), the World War I alliances (between 1914 and 1916), and the World War II alliances (between 1942 and 1944).

Summary data on the British bilateral alliances are presented below in Table 5.1 (which categorizes the alliances by degree of institutional depth) and Figure 5.1 (a two-way plot of alliance institutional depth and the dyad’s relative power asymmetry). In Figure 5.1 especially, it is immediately apparent that the bilateral alliances for Great Britain conform very closely to the prediction of the complementary exchange theory in that greater power asymmetry between partners is positively associated with institutional depth; the fitted line has nearly a 45-degree slope. Moreover, the British alliance portfolio features many alliances that are deeply institutionalized (scoring three or higher using the operationalization scheme outlined in Chapter 4); most of these cases are former British colonies or protectorates, providing a good opportunity to qualitatively compare the impact of both the relative power asymmetry and post-colonial arguments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Depth = 0</th>
<th>Depth = 1-2</th>
<th>Depth = 3-4</th>
<th>Depth = 5-6</th>
<th>Depth = 7-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France 1832, 1870, 1912, 1947</td>
<td>Turkey 1878</td>
<td>Iraq 1930</td>
<td>Egypt 1936</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia 1844</td>
<td>Japan 1902</td>
<td>Malaysia 1957</td>
<td>Portugal 1943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China 1846</td>
<td>Russia 1941</td>
<td>Malta 1964</td>
<td>Jordan 1946, 1948</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany 1870</td>
<td>Portugal 1944</td>
<td>Mauritius 1968</td>
<td>Libya 1953</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand 1940</td>
<td>Sri Lanka 1947</td>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq 1955</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt 1954</td>
<td>Nigeria 1960</td>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa 1955</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*"Institutional Depth" defined using the revised alliance institutionalization index described in Chapter 4

87 This simple correlation is (and should not) be used to assess causality as it clearly does not include or control for the other factors that might have an impact on Great Britain’s alliance institutional depth. It is included here as a visual reference for Great Britain’s basic alliance portfolio and to provide context to the subsequent qualitative discussion.
A Brief History of British Bilateral Alliances

Great Britain’s 19th Century alliance strategy of shifting, temporary alignments with other major or moderate European powers very much reflects its overall foreign policy posture of “splendid isolationism,” in that Britain’s lack of reliance on allies and overall isolation was seen as a sign of Britain’s strength and part of the Pax Britanica (Monger 1963, 1).88 Britain engaged in fewer formal alliances during this period than the other major powers of Europe. Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder (1990, 155) argue Britain was the outlier in European alliance policies—particularly in the decades leading up to World War I—because, unlike the other powers, Britain enjoyed clear defensive advantages, including island defenses, a strong navy, and an expansive empire to buffer the economic impacts of war. According to the ATOP data, only approximately one-third of Britain’s 64 alliances were formed prior to 1900,

88 Gregory Miller (2003, 68) argues this characterization obscures 19th Century Britain’s strategy of abstaining from formal defense commitments so as to better act as an offshore balance of power for the rest of the continent.
accounting for only six out of the 27 bilateral alliances included in the dataset for this project (Leeds, et al. 2002). Several events converged in the late-19th Century and early-20th Century to push Britain out of its “splendid isolationism,” including the 1894 Franco-Russian Alliance, late-19th Century imperialist competition among European powers, the mounting expenses (and embarrassment) of the Boer War in South Africa, and the sense of decline relative to its prior status, particularly with regard to naval superiority and trade hegemony (Miller 2003; Monger 1963; Sanders 1990; Self 2010).89 Alliances were thus perceived as the best means to “re-assert Britain’s position in world affairs and allow it to more easily defend its vulnerable overseas colonies.” (Crescenzi, et al. 2012, 259)

Britain concluded eight bilateral alliances prior to World War I that meet the criteria for this project. Of these, all but two are partnerships with other major powers. Thus, the British case offers an important contrast to the U.S. case in that not only does it allow insight into 19th Century alliances, but it also illustrates examples of relatively symmetric bilateral alliances as a contrast to the entirely-asymmetric alliances populating the U.S. portfolio. The only pre-World War I asymmetric alliances formed by Britain are with China in 1846 (resulting from the Opium Wars) and Turkey in 1878 (thus deterring another Russian incursion into the declining Ottoman Empire).90 It is not entirely surprising that Britain’s asymmetric bilateral alliances are mostly a 20th Century phenomenon. In the 19th Century, direct control of the many smaller powers around the world was managed via the colonial system and in the context of the British Empire; only with the process of decolonization in the 20th Century did Great Britain really have to rely on formal alliances as a means of projecting its power abroad. Britain’s most frequent major power ally prior to 1914 is France, including an 1832 alliance limited to the ongoing conflict between

---

89 “Britain’s share of world trade fell from 23 per cent in 1880 to 14 percent by 1913, and its share of world industrial production decreased by a similar amount during this period.” (Self 2010, 16)

90 All cases in the British alliance portfolio were identified using the ATOP data (Leeds, et al. 2002).
Belgium and the Netherlands, an 1870 alliance pledging British neutrality in the Franco-Prussian War, and a 1912 consultation pact (the final Anglo-French diplomatic exchange prior to the summer of 1914). Britain also concluded other major power bilateral alliances during this period, including alliances with Russia in 1844 (a consultation pact relating to the “Eastern Question” about the decline of the Ottoman Empire), Prussia/Germany in 1870 (again pledging neutrality in the Franco-Prussian War), and Japan in 1902. Of these, the Japanese alliance has received the most scholarly attention and is even credited by noted alliance scholar Paul Schroeder (1976, 246) for having brought Britain out of the “splendid isolation” philosophy. A number of scholars have explored why Britain’s alliance negotiations with Germany in the late-19th Century failed, but succeeded with Japan in 1902 (Crescenzi, et al. 2012; Miller 2003; Monger 1963). For Miller (2003, 76) and Crescenzi, et al. (2012, 260) the explanation is reputation; Germany was seen as a less reliable ally who would abandon Britain to pursue its own interests, while Japan was perceived as more reliable given the aid it provided during the 1900 Boxer Rebellion, even if it was a potential entrapment risk for Britain in Manchuria. George Monger (1963, 46-48) adds to this the geostrategic location of Japan as an ally against Russian aggression in Asia.

Unlike France, Great Britain did not participate in the shifting bilateral alliances of the Interwar Era—largely a reflection of the two states’ relative perceptions of geopolitical security. Using the data for this project, while France concluded ten alliances during the years between the

---

91 Notably excluded from this list of major power alliances are the two bilateral agreements that helped form the Triple Entente alliance between Great Britain, France, and Russia prior to World War I. The Entente Cordiale is excluded from the ATOP dataset because it specified no fundamental term of alliance obligation (i.e.: defense or offense pact, consultation pact, or neutrality pact); though the agreement did represent a fundamental and very important shift in British alignment policies during the early-1900s, the actual text of the agreement exclusively focused on British and French holdings in Africa and Asia. Similarly, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 is excluded because the text of the agreement exclusively focused on British and Russian holdings in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. See Glenn Snyder (1997) and Patricia Weitsman (2004) for excellent discussions of both ententes as well as the Triple Entente in general.
World Wars, Britain concluded only two and both are with protectorate holdings (Iraq in 1930 and Egypt in 1936). Otherwise, Britain’s only other bilateral alliances prior to 1945 all occur in the context of World War II, including the 1940 neutrality pact with Thailand, the 1941 formalization of wartime coordination with Russia (the beginning of the Big Three Alliance), two agreements negotiating the continuation of Portuguese neutrality and Allied basing rights in the Atlantic (1943 and 1944), and a 1944 treaty detailing Britain’s role in the newly-liberated Ethiopia following Italy’s defeat in North Africa.

Of greater relevance to Britain’s 20th Century alliance portfolio are the bilateral alliances formed as Britain negotiated the decline of its once-worldwide empire. Of the 21 public bilateral alliances Britain formed after 1900, most (thirteen) are partnerships with current or former colonial powers or protectorates. Prior to the mid-20th Century, Great Britain’s empire was undeniably the largest and most valuable of any other European power, ranging from largely independent “dominions” to very small trading or naval bases (Darwin 1988; Porter 2006). As Britain’s imperial history has been well-documented elsewhere (Cain and Hopkins 2016; Ferguson 2010; Hyam 2010; Johnston 1981, just to highlight a few), and I do not revisit it here. It is worth noting, however, that even as late as 1954, Britain maintained expansive military deployments around the world, including the Mediterranean (Gibraltar, Malta, Libya, Cyprus), West Africa (Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria), East and Central Africa (Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Tanganyika), the Middle East (Suez Canal Zone, Gulf of Aquabha, Muscat), and East Asia (Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore), in addition to security guarantees to the SEATO and Baghdad Pact member states (Sanders 1990, 227).

The disintegration of Britain’s colonial holdings after World War II occurred largely because of the rising economic costs of maintaining such an expansive global empire: “In the
face of escalating indigenous demands for independence abroad and a relatively weakened economic base at home, decolonization was a simple matter of trimming Britain’s overseas involvement to match its declining overseas capability.” (Sanders 1990, 111-112)\textsuperscript{92} One cannot discuss the historical context of Britain’s policy of withdrawal from its global empire without referencing the significance of the 1956 Suez Crisis and its ramifications, including the erosion of Britain’s foreign policy autonomy in the Middle East and moral authority around the world, as well as the loss of cohesion in the Commonwealth itself (Sanders 1990; Self 2010; Sherwood 1990; Stuart & Tow 1990).\textsuperscript{93} Reflecting this overall trend was American former-Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s 1962 observation that “‘Britain has lost an empire and not yet found a role.’” (quoted in many sources, including Darwin 1988, 329) What has become known as the withdrawal “East of Suez” by the end of 1971 was formally outlined in a January 1968 Defense White Paper: “Britain’s defense effort will in the future be concentrated mainly in Europe and the North Atlantic… No special capability for use outside of Europe will be maintained when withdrawal from Singapore, Malaysia and the Persian Gulf is completed.” (Stuart & Tow 1990, 119) Though the 1968 strategy did assume that British ships would maintain basing privileges at key ports—privileges often established via bilateral alliances (Stuart & Tow 1990, 119)—the policy overall called for a significant reduction in British defense commitments and armed forces in its former colonies (Rouvez 1994, 194). Reflecting the ongoing economic downturn, domestic public opinion in late-1960s Britain largely supported the contraction of Britain’s global presence (Dockrill 2002, 159). The withdrawal from “East of Suez” was hardly linear; instead

\textsuperscript{92} Also see: Darwin 1988, Porter 2006, and Self 2010.

\textsuperscript{93} The crisis not only drew very public criticisms from Britain’s Arab allies in the Middle East (Sanders 1990, 101), but also affirmed Britain’s position of deference to the United States. A London Observer editorial in December 1956 commented that “[t]he Suez crisis has shown that Britain has not got the resources to act as a Great Power in her own right, even in a traditional sphere of British interest… where Great Power politics are concerned, we are dependent on America.” (Sherwood 1990, 88)
the nearly 55-year process was characterized by episodes of withdrawal (i.e.: the 1957-1963 Harold Macmillan government) and retrenchment, including Britain’s violent response to the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya and the Falklands War.\(^\text{94}\)

As Britain drew down its global empire, it adapted its foreign policy to include other pillars of support. The British Commonwealth system was intended to provide a surrogate to the declining empire by keeping the former colonies as “useful and stable partners who would naturally turn to Britain for trade, capital, technical assistance, defence, aid and diplomatic leadership” (Self 2010, 69), but within a more acceptable voluntary association structure.\(^\text{95}\) The idea of a British Commonwealth emerged very quickly after World War II (and very much reflected Britain’s traditionally paternalistic attitudes toward its colonies).\(^\text{96}\) A key reason why the British Commonwealth succeeded while the French failed to build a similarly global association of former colonies was that it already existed in precedent via the “dominions” such as Canada (Austin & Panter-Brick 1990, 130). Membership expanded quickly: in 1950 the British Commonwealth claimed eight members but by the end of the 1970s there were over 50 (Austin & Panter-Brick 1990, 133). As it evolved, it became increasingly multi-ethnic—even dropping “British” from its title (Porter 2006, 141)—and ultimately weak in cohesion given that “[I]ts members had little in common with each other apart from the strength of their bilateral ties with Britain.” (Darwin 1988, 153).

Other pillars of support included an independent nuclear deterrent, a “special relationship” with the United States, and a pivot toward Europe (Self 2010, 36). The shift

\(^{94}\) For an extended discussion of the cycles of withdrawal and retrenchment in British post-colonialism, see Robert Self (2010).

\(^{95}\) For example, the Dominions Office was renamed the “Commonwealth Relations Office” in 1947 (Darwin 1988, 150).

\(^{96}\) As early as 1944, Lord Hailey described the intention of the Commonwealth: “Britain is no longer the equal of the US or Russia in material resources and capacity for war, but she can still be the greatest of all countries in helping smaller and more backward peoples towards greater abundance and freedom under law in a world at peace.” (Porter 2006, 140)
toward the Atlantic and European alliances reflected fundamental global shifts away from empire (Stuart and Tow 1990, 59). As the 20th Century wore on, British trading interests were less and less dependent on former colonial partners; whereas in 1936, half of British exports remained within the empire, by 1970 this number had dropped to just over 24%, and by 1980 further dropped to 12% (Self 2010, 59). Moreover, it became clear that Britain’s hopes for political and foreign policy cohesion in the Commonwealth were unfounded; not only did the new global system of the latter-20th Century offer other major powers as possible allies, some key leaders adopted openly divergent foreign policies, such as Kwame Nkrumah’s and Jawaharlal Nehru’s support of the Non-Aligned Movement (Sanders 1990, 148).

Why did some former British colonies signed alliances with their former colonizer, while others did not? John Darwin (1988, 168) argues that the nature of post-colonial relationship (or lack thereof) reflects “the interplay of domestic, international and local politics.” In some cases, such as Burma (granted independence in 1948), the former colony rejected any association with Great Britain, including membership in the Commonwealth. 97 In many other cases, membership in the Commonwealth was seen as a suitable alternative to formal military alliance because it assured the newly independent nation of the same status and rights as the earliest Commonwealth members, such as India (Rouvez 1994, 218). An underlying current (and key contrast to France’s policies during this time period) was Britain’s policy of retreat, not retrenchment, and deference to the wishes of their former colonies. David Sanders (1990) summarizes this approach as follows:

…Britain’s political actions in the Empire ‘circle’ after 1968—with the notable exception of the Falklands War—were those of an imperial power in continuous retreat. To be sure, as the process of withdrawal proceeded, prudence demanded

97 Indeed, Darwin (1988) describes how Burma “insisted upon an independence untrammelled by any surviving links with Britain… in no part of British Asia was the rejection of British influence so complete.” (98)
that help be given to old friends. But it was help generally given on terms determined by the recipients. (127)

He goes on to observe that, even when an alliance or assistance from Britain was rejected, “the rejection was accepted in London with good grace.” (Sanders 1990, 127)

Of interest to this project are the bilateral alliances Great Britain did conclude with many of its former colonies or protectorates during the decolonization process. In the Mediterranean, Britain signed alliances with Libya (1953) and Malta (1964); notably excluded is the island of Cyprus, which, at the time of independence from Britain in 1960, remained a point of dispute between Greece and Turkey. In the Middle East, Britain signed alliances with Jordan (1946 and 1948) and Iraq (1955); the lack of Middle Eastern alliances after the mid-1950s is reflective of Britain’s initial strategy of crafting a multilateral Middle Eastern alliance (i.e.: the Baghdad Pact) and loss of legitimacy following the Suez Crisis. In Africa, Britain signed alliances with Egypt (1954), South Africa (1955), and Nigeria (1960). And in Southeast Asia, Britain signed alliances with Sri Lanka (1947), Malaysia (1957), and Mauritius (1968). Of these cases, the alliances with Malta, Jordan, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Mauritius were concluded in the same year that independence was formalized.

The Aims of British Bilateral Alliances

Great Britain’s aims in its alliance partnerships clearly evolved over time. While the predominantly symmetric alliances of the 19th and early-20th Centuries focused on the defense of its global empire against new major power competitors, including France, Japan, and Russia, its alliances during the World War II period had overtly-wartime goals related to strategic basing rights. The aims of British bilateral alliances in the latter half of the 20th Century reflect the interests of a declining empire who had embraced (for the most part) its retreat—the maintenance
of basing footholds and preservation of useful relationships with its former colonies. Each of these periods is discussed in turn below. Taken as whole, British aims in its bilateral alliances are consistent with the interests of a major power—particularly the dearth of bilateral asymmetric alliances motivated by capability aggregation.

Like the United States, Great Britain rarely signed bilateral alliances that lacked any active defense or offense obligation. Of the 27 British alliances included in this project, only five are purely consultation or neutrality pacts: Russia (1844), France (1912), Thailand (1940), Egypt (1954), and Mauritius (1968).\textsuperscript{98} Given that several of these alliances included moderate-to-deep institutionalization, this provides some evidence contradicting the counter-hypothesis that alliance institutionalization is correlated only with active-obligation terms. Unlike the U.S. case, Great Britain’s alliance portfolio includes a handful of alliances with states of relative power symmetry, including two alliances with France falling below the standard deviation range for the relative power asymmetry variable used in Chapter 4.\textsuperscript{99} Further, while the U.S. portfolio includes relatively few alliances with significantly weaker powers (or extreme asymmetry), the British portfolio includes five asymmetric alliances in which the CINC score ratio falls above the standard deviation range, including Jordan (1946), Libya (1953), Malta (1964), and Mauritius (1968); all of these cases are former British colonies or protectorates.

While most all of Britain’s pre-World War I alliances related to the management of threats from the major powers of Europe, their aims, according to Schroeder (1976, 248), were intended “not as weapons of power for maintaining the European balance, but as tools for

\textsuperscript{98} Most of the discussion of specific alliance treaty contents (obligations, terms, institutionalization mechanisms, etc.) for the British case is drawn from the ATOP data and alliance codesheets (Leeds, et al. 2002). Alliance terms that have been derived from other sources’ qualitative discussions are otherwise noted. The ATOP codesheets are available online at atop.rice.edu/codesheets.

\textsuperscript{99} The dataset for this project measures relative power as the natural log of both partners’ Correlates of War (COW) National Capabilities Index (or CINC score) ratio (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). The mean for this variable is 2.177591 and the standard deviation is 1.692875.
managing imperial problems.” Indeed, Robert Self (2010, 19) describes this strategy of negotiating “mutually acceptable compromises with the Empire’s most threatening enemies” as a policy of “limited liability,” defending Britain’s imperial interests “on the cheap.” Some of these alliances, including the 1832 alliance with France and 1870 alliances with France and Prussia/Germany, related specifically to wartime issues: imposing a settlement on the Belgium king and British neutrality in the Franco-Prussian War, respectively. Great Britain also used alliances to manage the “Eastern Question” about how the European powers would respond to the declining Ottoman Empire, particularly Russia’s openly expressed desire to obtain greater influence in the Balkan Peninsula and Black Sea territories, an outcome Britain regarded as a direct threat to British dominance in the Middle East (Sanders 1990, 19). An 1844 alliance with Russia assured consultation between the two powers should the status quo in the Ottoman Empire change and an 1878 alliance with the Ottomans sought to deter another Russian incursion into Ottoman territories; consistent with the overall strategy of protecting British imperial interests above all else, the latter alliance further established another island base from which the British could defend its trading interests in the Mediterranean (Sanders 1990, 19) and thus represents a clearly complementary exchange of Ottoman security for British naval autonomy.

The 1912 French consultation pact is an excellent example of Great Britain using alliances to manage the decades-long tension with neighboring France, the aim of which Patricia Weitsman (2004, 121) describes as “tethering.” A French alliance accomplished two goals: rapprochement after decades of tension (most notably the Fashoda Incident in Sudan) and guarding against the threat from Russia (Weitsman 2004, 121). Russia had been Britain’s primary threat due to the vulnerability of India to an overland attack through Central Asia as well as Russia’s geographic proximity to British trade interests in Asia generally (Weitsman 2004,
In a letter from Lord Cromer to Prime Minister Arthur James Balfour in 1903, he states: “I cannot help regarding an understanding with France as possibly a stepping-stone to a general understanding with Russia, and that this possibility may again prepare the ground for some reduction in our enormous military and naval expenditure.” (Weitsman 2004, 122)

Tethering itself to Russia’s primary ally—France—offered Britain a potential intermediary to defuse tensions with Russia, a role France played well; for example, when the Russian fleet accidentally fired on British fishing boats (who were mistaken for Japanese torpedo boats) in October 1904 and killed seven, it was France who negotiated a diplomatic resolution to the crisis (Weitsman 2004, 122).

The 1902 Japanese alliance is the only alliance with overt capability aggregation aims in the British portfolio for this period, as Britain sought to shore up its military capabilities in Asia. At the turn of the 20th Century, French and Russian battleships outnumbered Britain’s naval forces in Asia by a 4:9 ratio; a potential Anglo-Japanese alliance would improve these odds to 11:9 (Monger 1963, 49). By shifting a large portion of defending Britain’s Asian interests to Japan, this alliance very much helped Britain reduce its overall imperial burden (Self 2010, 20). Though capability aggregation in Asia may have been the predominant goal, Britain was also concerned about the possibility of entrapment in a war between Japan and Russia (Weitsman 2004, 118) as well as keeping a close eye on Japan’s expanding commercial capabilities in East Asia (Schroeder 1976, 247).

Britain’s alliances during World War II reflect wartime-specific aims. Perhaps the most historically significant bilateral alliance of this period was the 1941 agreement formalizing the Soviet Union’s shift toward the western Allies, including provisions coordinating naval passage.

---

100 Britain had actually been on quite good terms with Germany during the early years of the 20th Century, including nearly signing onto the Triple Alliance (Weitsman 2004, 118).
and a clause assuring that neither party would pursue a separate peace with Germany. Both Thailand and Portugal adopted policies of neutrality when war broke out. The 1940 neutrality pact with Thailand formalized its position of neutrality, lasting until Thailand’s invasion by and subsequent alliance with Japan.\textsuperscript{101} The British also endorsed Portugal’s neutrality; according to the British Ambassador to Portugal in 1943:

\begin{quote}
….if her [Portugal’s] neutrality instead of being strict had been more benevolent in our favour Spain would inevitably have thrown herself body and soul into the arms of Germany. If this had happened the Peninsula would have been occupied and then North Africa, with the result that the whole course of the war would have been altered to the advantage of the Axis. (paraphrased by da Costa Leite 1998, 191)
\end{quote}

As the war wore on, however, the British and American Allies desperately needed basing rights in Portugal’s Atlantic island territories (i.e.: the Azores, to stage naval and air operations in the Battle of the Atlantic), which were specified in two bilateral treaties in 1943 and 1944 (da Costa Leite 1998, 192). The final World War II alliance, with Ethiopia in 1944, specified the scope of British withdrawal from the territory after it defeated Italy in North Africa; perhaps reflecting Ethiopia’s historical strength in the face of European pressure,\textsuperscript{102} Britain conceded a great deal in the agreement, including the withdrawal of all garrisons except for the Ogaden territory. World War II also foretold of the coming decolonization imperative as the United States opposed Britain’s colonialism, seeing it a barrier to American trade and counter to democratic values (Darwin 1988, 38). Britain thus worked hard to begin portraying its colonial system as a positive “partnership” such that during the war “the defence of the British imperial system had become,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{101} Thailand was one of the few Southeast Asian states not to be colonized by a European power at the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} Century, buffering British and French colonies.
\item \textsuperscript{102} Ethiopia was one of only two African territories never to be colonized by a European power in the late-19\textsuperscript{th} Century and early-20\textsuperscript{th} Century. The other was Liberia.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
in the eyes of British leaders, almost as much a diplomatic struggle against their ally as a military struggle with their enemies.” (Darwin 1988, 38-39)

Compared to France, Britain’s aims in its post-colonial bilateral alliances were more limited in scope. The foundations for this divergence were laid decades prior to decolonization; while the British adopted a style of indirect colonial rule, France adopted a more intrusive direct rule system (Darwin 1988; Porter 2006; Rouvez 1994). Though Britain certainly sought to maintain relationships with its former colonies in the latter half of the 20th Century, these negotiations occurred from a mostly deferential negotiating position in the context of overall withdrawal from “east of Suez” and the Commonwealth alternative. In other words, decolonizing Britain was only willing to pay so much for the benefits of asymmetric control, eventually reaching in the late-1970s the point of near total draw-down except for a handful of small island outposts (Self 2010, 58-59). The former colonies and protectorates where Britain did successfully negotiate a bilateral formal alliances between the late-1940s and late-1960s almost entirely reflected the aim of preserving strategic military bases in the Mediterranean, Suez Canal, the southern tip of Africa, and the waterways of Southeast Asia. Consistent with the complementary exchange model, Britain obtained these basing rights via security assurances and asymmetric institutionalization mechanisms, but the overall posture of Britain’s asymmetric alliances appears to be that of selective access, not total control.

The British desire for autonomy the Middle East dated back to the years of competition with Russia over the declining Ottoman Empire (Persson 1998, 38). After the post-World War I San Remo Conference, bases in the protectorates/mandates of Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt were the primary means by which Britain ensured its military autonomy in the Middle East and (perhaps most especially) the Suez passage (Persson 1998, 38-39). Even after the Transjordan became the
independent Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1946, a bilateral alliance treaty preserved British basing rights and extended Britain’s defense umbrella over Jordan; the treaty remained in force until, in the fallout from the 1956 Suez Crisis, Jordan abrogated it (Persson 1998, 39). Britain had similarly institutionalized unilateral control over Iraqi defense policy via the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty granting Britain not only permanent air bases, but also a monopoly on the free transit of British forces through Iraq and supply of Iraq’s military contracts for equipment and training (Darwin 1988, 26; Persson 1998, 39). Undeniably the most contentious partnership was with Egypt, where control of the all-important Suez Canal was at stake. British autonomy with regard to the Canal had been established by the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, “but in practice by the presence of a British garrison and naval supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean.” (Darwin 1988, 26) The treaty was ultimately revised in 1954 to reflect the gradual transition to cooperative control over the Canal, following a fitful eight years of negotiations that included the input of the United Nations Security Council, withdrawal of Egypt from the negotiations to create a multilateral Middle Eastern Command, and overthrow of King Farouk in 1952 (Persson 1998, 145-146). It would be short-lived, with the Suez Crisis occurring less than two years later.

Aside from bases in the Suez Canal zone, British military projection in the Mediterranean relied on permanent bases in Cyprus, Libya, and Malta. The alliances with Libya (1953) and Malta (1964) are excellent examples of Great Britain using bilateral alliances to achieve its aim of securing strategic basing rights in exchange for asymmetric defense guarantees and costly military and economic aid payments. Libya provided not only a permanent headquarters for the 10th Armoured Division, but also a training area for British troops (Rouvez 1994, 245). Malta at first appeared especially vital following the gradual erosion of British autonomy in the region.

---

103 Even after Britain relinquished India, the Suez Canal provided a crucial link between British forces in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean, particularly for staging the security of British oil interests in the Middle East and defenses against the Soviet Union (Stuart & Tow 1990, 123).
indeed, Malta’s 1964 independence was conditioned on a bilateral treaty granting Britain the continuation of its basing rights in exchange for monetary aid topping £50 million (Self 2010, 62). But consistent with the overall contraction of Britain’s foreign projection during the implementation of the “east of Suez” policy, just three years later Britain drastically reduced its troop presence in Malta (Rouvez 1994, 247). Further illustrating Britain’s posture of deference to its former colonies compared to France, Britain withdrew its defense establishment in Malta gradually over four years so as to protect the Maltese economy (Rouvez 1994, 247).

The bilateral alliances with South Africa (1955) and Nigeria (1960) offer an interesting contrast to British aims in its post-colonial African alliances. Though in both treaties Britain promised to aid in the defense of its partners, the strategic value of the two countries shaped the scope of British commitment. The 1955 Simonstown Agreement established an extensive alliance partnership with South Africa, centered on British rights to the Simonstown naval base, of exceptional strategic value for the projection of British forces to protect the maritime routes around the southern tip of Africa (Rouvez 1994, 244-245). According to Alain Rouvez (1994, 244), the agreement was “extremely advantageous” to Britain in that it also provided unilateral overflight rights and a clause committing the South African navy to the command of the British Royal Navy if called on, even if South Africa had no direct stake in the conflict. In contrast, the 1960 alliance with Nigeria—concluded the same year as Nigeria’s independence—established no British basing rights. Whereas the Simonstown Agreement remained in force after South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth in 1961 and Britain continued to deliver some level of arms.

---

104 Reasons for this erosion include the Suez Crisis, instability and civil war in Cyprus followed by the turnover of the island to Greece and Turkey, and the early termination in 1964 of the Libyan treaty (Dockrill 2002, 33).
105 Sam Perlo-Freeman (2014, 83) details how most of Britain’s interests in its former African colonies have been driven by commercial interests, including Nigerian oil, the Anglo American and AngloGold Ahsanti mining companies, and the BAE Systems arms company.
(including Wasp anti-submarine helicopters) to South Africa despite the emergence of an international economic embargo against South Africa’s apartheid policy (Rouvez 1994, 244), Britain adopted a largely non-interventionist approach to the struggles of post-independence Nigeria, including limiting its involvement in the 1967-1970 Biafran War (Nigerian Civil War) to some military aid to the Nigerian government and warnings about the disruption of British oil supplies (Rouvez 1994, 270).  

In Southeast Asia, another stark comparison emerges between the alliances with Ceylon/Sri Lanka (1947) and Malaya/Malaysia (1957). After difficult decolonization experiences in India and Burma, the fact that Ceylon largely embraced a close relationship with Britain after independence (including an extensive military alliance) made “the pattern of decolonization in Ceylon... infinitely more satisfactory” to the British (Darwin 1988, 105). With rising economic and inter-ethnic unrest at the end of World War II, the leader of the majority Sinhalese community, Senanayake, pressed for a rapid conclusion to the independence agreements and accepted Britain’s demands for basing and foreign policy deference (Darwin 1988, 104-105). The 1957 Malaysian alliance was concluded the year independence for the Federation of Malaya was declared. According to Sanders (1990, 122), the agreement actually favored the Malayan government by granting it rights of pre-approval for British defense activities and was largely a “benign” agreement. Yet Malaya was very strategically valuable to the British; it accounted for one-third of the world’s tin production, its overall trade was more than that of New Zealand, and it controlled a key strait into East Asia (Darwin 1988, 108; Self 2010, 47). Unlike the Ceylon case, which embraced a pro-British posture and bilateral alliance

---

106 According to Rouvez (1994, 278), Britain was “ambivalent” about intervening in the conflicts of its former colonies after 1964. Between 1965 and 1979, Britain’s overall posture was that of “mediator,” while after 1980 (with the exception of the 1982 Falklands War), the policy was near-total non-interference; this stands in sharp contrast to both the French and Belgian approaches to their former colonies (278).
smoothly, the Malayan transition to independence and alliance occurred via a costly twelve-year counter-insurgency campaign against communist forces to preserve British access to this valuable former colony.

Notable in several of these cases is the weakening negotiating position of Great Britain over time and the resulting effect on alliance terms. In reference to the Southeast Asian alliances, Sanders (1990, 122) argues: “The texts of these agreements revealed clearly that it was the governments of Malaysia and Singapore which would dictate the terms and conditions of any future British involvement in their defence.” While the 1955 alliance with Iraq was intended to be a continuation of the 1930 treaty, during those fifteen years, British authority and power in the region had diminished considerably and significant factions in Iraq opposed a renewal of alliance with Britain, having successfully derailed earlier treaty negotiations in 1948 (Persson 1998, 145). British negotiators worked very hard to make the 1955 agreement as appealing as possible to Iraq, including couching it in context of the Baghdad Pact negotiations (Persson 1998, 242-243). In what represented “a more equal treaty relationship,” Britain gave up several key rights, including control of Iraq’s air bases (Persson 1998, 244). To the west, Egypt asserted its desire for greater equality in its relationship with Great Britain even prior to the government of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Negotiations to renew the 1936 treaty governing the Suez Canal were opened in 1946 at Egypt’s behest, but ultimately failed when Egypt’s demands for more independence couldn’t be reconciled with Britain’s need for a major base near the canal (Persson 1998, 74-75). When Britain pressured Egypt to adopt the Middle East Command (MEC) proposal in 1951, domestic opposition in Egypt not only rejected the MEC but also abrogated the existing 1936 treaty (Persson 1998, 83-84). Ultimately the 1954 alliance only specified the terms of British withdrawal from the Suez Canal zone (Persson 1998, 86)—quite the step down from the prior
arrangement and reflective of Britain’s declining power status in the mid-1950s. Another instructive example can actually be found in an alliance that Britain never formed—with Israel. Despite being a viable alternative to Egypt as a Middle Eastern ally, Israel proved a tougher negotiator, expressing its frustration that Britain had given such preference to Egypt, rejecting the idea of a permanent British base in Israel, and making clear than any agreement would be conditioned on transparent military consultation on the two countries’ military policies (Persson 1998, 86-87).

*Trends of Institutionalization in British Bilateral Alliances*

The alliance institutionalization mechanisms that appear most frequently in the British alliance portfolio correspond very closely to the expectations of the complementary exchange model. The most common institutionalization mechanisms are explicitly asymmetric, including one-directional military aid (sometimes economic aid) and asymmetric basing rights. Occasionally, British asymmetric alliances also include promises of peacetime coordination through a committee or formal organization. Two trends stand out in the British case. First, while most of Britain’s most deeply institutionalized alliances are with much weaker powers, they are also with current or former British colonies, thus supporting the counter-hypothesis that deep alliance institutionalization is motivated by colonial ties as well as partner asymmetry. Second, as the foregoing discussion of British aims in its post-colonial alliances illustrates, there appears to be some endogeneity with regard to the issue of asymmetric basing rights in the British case. The complementary exchange model posits that basing rights represent a key mechanism by which major powers achieve control over their weaker partners (and in Chapter 4 is operationalized as an outcome variable), but for most British post-colonial alliances it appears
that preserving base access is among the primary aims of the alliance itself (and could potentially be one dimension of the explanatory “control” variable).

Overall, Britain’s pre-World War I bilateral alliances were characterized by very infrequent and limited institutionalization. This is in keeping with the arguments of the complementary exchange model given that most of these alliances are relatively symmetric with aims that are more about managing great power politics and capability aggregation than obtaining control or influence over much weaker partners in exchange for defensive assurances. All but two of these alliance treaties specified no terms of institutionalization, including the alliances with France (1832, 1870, and 1912), Russia (1844), China (1946), Prussia/Germany (1870). The two alliances of this period that did include institutionalization mechanisms are, in keeping with the theory, the most asymmetric partnerships (though compared to the later 20th Century alliances only moderately so). The 1878 Anglo-Turkish alliance was institutionalized via a treaty clause outlining the right of British forces to directly occupy and administer the island of Cyprus; in exchange for providing security assurances to the declining Ottoman Empire against a Russian offensive, Britain protected its imperial trading interests throughout the Mediterranean and projected its naval capability by assuring control over its naval base on Cyprus (Sanders 1990, 19). The 1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance specified regular peacetime military contact between the partners. Though the Japanese alliance offers a stark contrast of both aims and institutionalization mechanism compared to the Ottoman alliance, it too offers qualitative support for the complementary exchange theory; as the best example of a capability

---

107 Again, details regarding British alliance treaty contents—including institutionalization mechanisms—are drawn from the ATOP project’s data and alliance codesheets, unless otherwise noted (Leeds, et al. 2002). The ATOP codesheets are available online at atop.rice.edu/codesheets.
108 Indeed, Britain’s permanent naval bases on Cyprus would remain core components of its Mediterranean military projection until the 1960s (Rouvez 1994, 248-249).
aggregation alliance, it makes sense that the partners turned to an institutionalization mechanism argued to be more associated with capability aggregation than asymmetric control.

Several of the bilateral alliances concluded by Britain during the conduct of World War II formalized British wartime basing rights through complementary exchanges of institutional benefits. For example, the 1943 treaty with Portugal granted Great Britain basing rights in the ports of Horta, Delgada, and Terciera Island, along with rights to the Lagens and Rabo de Peize airbases in exchange for British military and economic aid, as well as regular peacetime military contact. Britain expanded the partnership with a new treaty in 1944 to include granting the United States rights to an air base on the Portuguese island of Santa Maria. Similarly, in exchange for British administration of the “Reserved Area” and Ogaden in Ethiopia, Britain provided one-directional military aid to Ethiopia and provisions for regular peacetime military contact. These alliances illustrate that even wartime alliances can exhibit the qualities of the complementary exchange model of asymmetric alliances. Two of the alliances in this period offer divergent institutionalization trends, but still support the overall theory. The 1940 alliance with Thailand featured no institutionalization mechanisms, but this is hardly surprising for a wartime neutrality pact. And the 1941 alliance with the Soviet Union only specified a joint exchange of economic aid; again, given both the wartime context and relative power symmetry of the partners, this choice of institutionalization mechanism makes sense.

Several of Britain’s post-colonial bilateral alliances were institutionalized using only one-directional military aid and asymmetric basing rights. The Malaya (1957), Malta (1964), and Mauritius (1968) alliances were all operationalized with only these mechanisms; despite being relatively small territories, all three countries contained critical bases for British force projection,
for which aid payments were an acceptable price to maintain (Rouvez 1994, 241-242).\textsuperscript{109} Scholars have commented that the alliance with Malta, in particular, represents the classic case of a post-colonial power preserving its access via basing rights in exchange for assurances of external defense and military aid payments to their former colony (Darwin 1988, 279-280; Self 2010, 61-62). “Britain was to enjoy the right to station her forces there for 10 years in return for grants and loans of some £50 million over the same period.” (Darwin 1988, 280)

Unlike Malta, the 1947 Ceylon/Sri Lanka alliance was institutionalized using only British basing rights; given the generally positive attitude toward a post-colonial relationship with Great Britain adopted by the ruling Senanayake administration, this one-sided arrangement reflects British negotiating strength (Darwin 1988, 104-105). Lastly, the 1960 Nigeria alliance was institutionalized using one-directional military aid only and is reflective of Britain’s limited interests in its former West African colony. Denis Austin and Keith Panter-Brick (1990, 148) emphasize that, like France, Britain actively used foreign aid—especially military aid—to pursue advantageous policies in its former colonies. The largest proportion of British foreign aid has consistently been directed to its former colonies. In 1985, 40.5% of British colonial aid was for ventures that linked back to the British economy and a formal policy statement in that decade admitted Britain gave “greater weight in the allocation of our aid to political, industrial and commercial considerations” in former colonies (Austin & Panter-Brick 1990, 148).

A number of other post-colonial alliances during the latter-20\textsuperscript{th} Century represent even deeper alliance institutionalization—basing rights and military aid plus additional institutionalization mechanisms, including the Jordan (1946 and 1948), Libya (1953), Iraq (1955), and South Africa (1955) alliances. While the 1946 Jordanian alliance included economic

---

\textsuperscript{109} British interests in Malaya must also always be considered in context of the ongoing “Malayan Emergency” and the corresponding weakened British negotiating position (Sanders 1990, 82-85).
aid in addition to the aid-plus-basing rights package, the 1948 renewal was expanded to also include a permanent organization—the Anglo-Transjordan Joint Defence Board—facilitating peacetime contact between the countries. The 1953 alliance with Libya and 1955 alliance with Iraq bear striking similarities with the 1948 Jordanian alliance; the Libyan alliance was institutionalized via military and economic aid, basing rights, and plans for peacetime military contact and the 1955 Iraq alliance was institutionalized via military aid, basing rights, and plans for peacetime military contact. Finally, the 1955 South African alliance includes the same types of institutionalization mechanisms—military aid, basing rights, a joint maritime war-planning committee—but adds a unique mechanism in the form of a clause subordinating South African troops under British command during wartime. Why did Great Britain institutionalize its bilateral alliances with these four partners more deeply than with the partners in the previous paragraphs? One potential explanation might point to the fact that these partners represent more strategically-valuable bases for British force projection; Malta, Mauritius, and Ceylon, for example, represent small island holdings with little economic value or regional influence beyond providing staging grounds for British troops. In contrast, Jordan and Iraq were acknowledged early by Britain to be key regional power players in the Middle East and South Africa represented not only a large economic partner but also a major regional influence in southern Africa. It is therefore unsurprising that Britain agreed to more deeply institutionalized alliances to better secure greater autonomy over these partners. Another potential explanation that should not be overlooked is the likelihood that, as more powerful negotiating partners, these states were able to demand more equality in the alliance partnership in the form of peacetime military contact and formal organizations.
Of the post-colonial bilateral alliances formed by Britain during this time period, the only case lacking any form of institutionalization was Egypt in 1954. While the 1936 alliance featured a number of institutionalization mechanisms, including British military aid, British basing rights in the Suez Canal zone, and a permanent joint committee facilitating peacetime contact, the 1954 alliance did no more than outline the terms of consultation between Egyptian and British civilian technicians regarding the security of the Suez Canal (Persson 1998, 86). After having failed to achieve its standard asymmetric terms during the 1946-1947 negotiations, this alliance stands apart in the British post-colonial portfolio, underscoring the brewing hostility between the countries in the mid-1950s as well as Britain’s declining negotiating posture in the region.

Summary

This qualitative consideration of Great Britain’s bilateral alliance politics certainly confirms the basic predictions outlined in the core theory for this project. There is a distinct positive correlation between the depth of alliance institutionalization and partnership asymmetry in the British portfolio (illustrated quite visibly in Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1). This case is also useful because it illustrates how a major power’s alliance “character” can evolve over time, from hesitant management of shifting power dynamics amid the European powers in the 19th Century to wartime interests in World War II to the management of a gradual process of retreat from empire in the latter-20th Century. A running theme in this case is the significance of colonial and post-colonial relationships—an important counter-hypothesis explaining deep alliance institutionalization; the qualitative insights of the British case certainly appear to confirm the significance of these ties.
France – Seeking Friends, both at Home and Abroad

The case of France offers further qualitative support to the core theory as well as a valuable contrast with the British case; though both cases represent colonial major powers, France embraced the use of bilateral security alliances as a means of preserving global reach even more so than did Great Britain. According to the ATOP data (Leeds, et al. 2002), between 1815 and 2003, France was party to a total of 90 formal alliances. Of these, 50 meet the criteria for inclusion in the data for this project as bilateral, public alliances with some form of active obligation. The majority of the excluded alliances (28) are set aside because they are multilateral. France shares multilateral membership in many of the same large, well-known alliances as Great Britain, including NATO (1949), SEATO (1954), the OSCE (1975), and the European Union (1992). Most of France’s smaller multilateral pacts relate specifically to wartime activities or a narrow interest, such as the Crimean War alliances (1855), the World War alliances (between 1914-1916 and 1942-1944), the 1956 alliance with the UK and Israel, and the 1960 alliance with the Central African Republic, Chad, and the Congo. Ten French bilateral alliances are excluded from the data because their terms were negotiated in secrecy or partial secrecy. Indeed, France more frequently engages in secret or partially-secret alliances in comparison to the British and U.S. cases; almost all of these secret alliances are partnerships with other European powers. Finally, two alliances are excluded due to missing data—an 1830 alliance with Belgium and an 1874 alliance with Annam.

Summary data on the French bilateral alliances are presented below in Table 5.2 (which categorizes the alliances by degree of institutional depth) and Figure 5.2 (a two-way plot of alliance institutional depth and dyad’s relative power asymmetry). Figure 5.2 visually illustrates the basic conformity of the French bilateral alliance portfolio to the predictions of the
complementary exchange theory, though the correlation trend is arguably more muted than the in the British case. Further distinguishing France from Great Britain is the observation that while several of France’s alliances are deeply institutionalized, including one scoring an institutional depth in the highest category of Table 5.2, the bulk of France’s alliances are only minimally institutionalized (or not at all). But then consistent with the British case, most all of the alliances France deeply institutionalized are with former French colonies. It appears the French case offers further qualitative support to the argument that for some major powers, post-colonial interests play an important role.

Table 5.2: Institutional Depth* of French Bilateral Alliances, 1815-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Depth = 0</th>
<th>Depth = 1-2</th>
<th>Depth = 3-4</th>
<th>Depth = 5-6</th>
<th>Depth = 7-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium 1832</td>
<td>Russia 1944, 1990</td>
<td>Mauritania 1961</td>
<td>Belgium 1920</td>
<td>Gabon 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK 1832, 1870, 1912 1947</td>
<td>Libya 1955</td>
<td>Germany 1963</td>
<td>Laos 1953</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland 1925, 1991</td>
<td>Hungary 1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania 1926, 1991</td>
<td>Bulgaria 1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia 1927</td>
<td>Kazakhstan 1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey 1930</td>
<td>Lithuania 1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany 1938</td>
<td>Ukraine 1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey 1939</td>
<td>Armenia 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco 1956</td>
<td>Azerbaijan 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova 1993</td>
<td>Estonia 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Latvia 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uzbekistan 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Albania 1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Georgia 1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan 1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkmenistan 1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*“Institutional Depth” defined using the revised alliance institutionalization index described in Chapter 4

---

110 This simple correlation is (and should not) be used to assess causality as it clearly does not include or control for the other factors that might have an impact on France’s alliance institutional depth. It is included here as a visual reference for France’s basic alliance portfolio and to provide context to the subsequent qualitative discussion.
A Brief History of French Bilateral Alliances

The different approaches to security adopted by Great Britain and France are most simply explained in terms of geography. The English Channel afforded Britain a natural defensive advantage and thus the ability to be more selective in its participation in European affairs, enabling more focus on the expansion of its global empire. In contrast, France’s status as a continental state meant it was inherently embroiled in the frequent conflicts of Europe; more so than Britain, France’s security was preserved through the balance of arms and allies.\textsuperscript{111} Thus, the tradition in France of managing formal alliances as a means of security dates back to (at least) the 16\textsuperscript{th} Century (Raymond & Kegley 1990, 18). It is unsurprising, therefore, that France has concluded approximately 40% more alliances than Great Britain since 1815, according to the ATOP data (Leeds, et al. 2002).

\textsuperscript{111}James Morrow (1993) offers the foundational text on the use of “arms versus allies” to provide for state security. Also see Conybeare (1994) and Sorokin (1994).
Unlike Great Britain, whose policy of “splendid isolation” led to a reluctance to participate in the alliance politics of continental Europe (Monger 1963, Miller 2003), France was actively involved in the shifting alliances that characterized 19th Century Europe. Unfortunately, most of the 25 alliances concluded by France prior to World War I are excluded from the dataset for this project because they are either multilateral or contain secret provisions. The clear theme of France’s alliances prior to 1914 is the preservation of French security in Europe; of the five pre-World War I alliances that are included in this project, all are bilateral pacts with other major European players. For example, in 1832, France signed two separate bilateral alliances with Belgium and Great Britain regarding French obligations in the ongoing conflict between Belgium and the Netherlands. Two other bilateral alliances were concluded with Great Britain in 1870—during the Franco-Prussian War that resulted not only in the loss of France’s control of Alsace and Lorraine, but also the beginning of a decades-long hostility with Germany—and 1912. Undoubtedly, the critical French alliance of this period—both as the most studied and in terms of its significance to later European politics—was the 1891/1894 alliance with Russia that would become one leg of the pre-World War I Triple Entente. The two states, despite being unlikely allies on the surface due to their historical animosity and very different domestic political systems, concluded a consultation pact (a “Definition of Understanding” according to the ATOP codesheet) in 1891, followed by a formal (but secret) defense pact in 1894. This alliance exemplifies the symmetric capability aggregation alliances so often

112 Most of the discussion of specific alliance treaty contents (obligations, terms, institutionalization mechanisms, etc.) for the French case is drawn from the ATOP data and alliance codesheets (Leeds, et al. 2002). Alliance terms that have been derived from other sources’ qualitative discussions are otherwise noted. The ATOP codesheets are available online at atop.rice.edu/codesheets.

113 Leeds, et al. 2002

114 Several scholars offer detailed discussions of the Franco-Russian alliance (for example, see: Kennan 1984; Snyder 1997; Weitsman 2004).
assumed in the alliance design literature, and stands in sharp contrast to the asymmetric alliances France formed with several African nations in the decades of 20th Century decolonization.

While Great Britain largely withdrew into a foreign policy of pacifism during the Interwar Years of the 20th Century, France sought alliances as a means of countering any future German threat. During the Paris Peace Conference, France actively pursued a defensive guarantee from the United States and Great Britain, but in the course of the negotiations failed to achieve it. Combined with the failure to achieve a defensive buffer state along the Rhine River, this left France “deprived of anything which could have ensured her security.” (Nere 1974, 26) France thus turned to a defensive strategy that combined defensive arms preparations (what would ultimately culminate in the Maginot Line along its eastern border) and security through alliances. In particular, France turned to alliances with many newly independent Eastern European states as a means of preventing any future expansion of a German “sphere of influence” in that region (Nere 1974, 39-45). The politics of Eastern Europe, however, were complex after the Treaty of Versailles. While Czechoslovakia had quickly consolidated a new republican government, the reconstituted Poland (for the first time since the mid-18th Century) was still occupied by German troops and lacked international confidence in its new sovereignty; moreover, a general tenuousness existed in French-Polish relations after France failed to defend Poland’s claims to self-determination during the Paris negotiations over concerns it would upset its Russian ally (Wandycz 1962, vii). Meanwhile, the new boundaries of Yugoslavia largely ignored the complexity of ethnic and religious politics of the Balkan Peninsula. In 1921, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia formed a tripartite alliance called the “Little Entente” to deter any potential Habsburg or Hungarian resurgence (Wandycz 1962, 194-195); pursuing its own goal of containing Germany, in the mid-1920s France thus concluded bilateral alliances
with Czechoslovakia (1924 and 1925), Poland (1925), Rumania (1926), and Yugoslavia (1927). France’s efforts in Eastern Europe during the Interwar Years ultimately did little to stem the rise of Nazi Germany, but did complicate France’s relationships with the Soviet Union and Italy, who resented French influence into their spheres of influence (Nere 1974, 42). Additional French alliances during the Interwar Era included a defense pact with Belgium against German aggression (1920), a neutrality pact with Turkey (1930), two alliances with the Soviet Union (1932 and 1935),\(^{115}\) and a consultation pact with Germany (after the Munich Conference in 1938). Finally, France concluded two wartime alliances during World War II with Turkey (1939) and the Soviet Union (1944).

During the Cold War period (1945 to 1989), the focus of France’s bilateral alliances shifted almost entirely to post-colonial interests in Africa; this represented not only a geographic shift, but also a turn toward the asymmetric alliances of control that exemplify the complementary exchange model. Like Great Britain, such non-European alliances with weaker powers were not necessary until the process of decolonization, which created a need to maintain colonial ties without the rights and obligations of empire. In 1955, Edgar Faure referred to France’s approach to decolonization as “independence within interdependence.” (Boulanin 2014, 39) The exceptions to this rule include a post-war defense alliance with Great Britain (1947), a consultation pact with West Germany (1963), and a consultation pact with the Soviet Union (1970).

Reasserting control over its colonies was a key mission for postwar France, framed in the context of Charles de Gaulle’s “la politique du grandeur” and the argument that France was destined to hold positions of supremacy both in Europe and through her colonial holdings.

\(^{115}\) These alliances with the Soviet Union were more a reflection of rising concerns about the Nazi Party in Germany than any cohesion in French-Soviet relations, according to Nere (1974, 155-156). The USSR similarly reached out to Poland in 1932 (Nere 1974, 157).
(Raymond and Kegley 1990, 15). De Gaulle described France’s colonies as a unique source of its strength as well as the target of its “mission civilisatrice,” or civilizing mission (Stuart and Tow 1990, 177; also see Austin and Panter-Brick 1990; Boulainin 2014). To quote Mort Rosenblum, “France did not colonize, it civilized.” (Charbonneau 2008, 35) And it was Africa, especially, that was of special significance to French identity, according to John Chipman (1989, 8): “For de Gaulle, as for subsequent French leaders, France’s natural sphere of influence included Africa and the Middle East no less than Europe.” It was, of course, in its African colonies, that France had the most sweeping unilateral power.116 The task of dealing with the postwar colonies was, however, compounded two-fold. First, after the German occupation and Vichy government of World War II, France faced the domestic challenge of drafting a new constitution—what would ultimately become the Fourth Republic (Austin and Panter-Brick 1990, 131). Second, France’s relationship with the new NATO alliance was tenuous to say the least; frustrated at the alliance’s rejection of France’s Tripartite Proposal, the increasing dependence of Europe on the United States, and the sense that the other major powers didn’t fully appreciate French contributions to European security in North Africa, France would eventually withdraw from NATO for a short time in the mid-1960s (Raymond and Kegley 1990; Sherwood 1990; Stuart and Tow 1990).117 This frustration toward the United States and Great Britain extended to the colonial issue and their refusal to publicly recognize French sovereignty over all its pre-war colonies (Stuart and Tow 1990, 177). At the Brazzaville Conference in February 1944, de Gaulle asserted French colonial sovereignty, stating: “The idea of a possible,

116 For its part, the United States was happy defer to French hegemony in Africa so long as they kept the USSR out, regardless of how they did it (Charbonneau 2008, 55).
117 French policies toward NATO stand in sharp contrast to British policies; whereas Britain sought to revitalize its commitment to the Atlantic Alliance (particularly after the 1956 Suez Crisis), France challenged NATO’s legitimacy in Europe (Sherwood 1990, 112). U.S. President John F. Kennedy wanted an “Atlantic-oriented Europe—led by the United States and dependent on America’s strength as a global superpower,” while de Gaulle sought a Europe “unified politically under French leadership;” Great Britain was largely caught between the two intra-alliance poles (Sherwood 1990, 112).
even ultimate establishment of self-government in the colonies must be discarded.” (Stuart and Tow 1990, 178)

Like Great Britain, it became clear in the post-war era that France could not sustain the costs of global empire (Austin and Panter-Brick 1990, 129). Unlike Britain, however, France never developed a multilateral Commonwealth association among its former colonies (Austin and Panter-Brick 1990, 132). The French precedent favored granting a variety of French citizenship credentials to former colonial peoples—essentially greater integration into France, not greater independence; not unsurprisingly, this was an unacceptable option for many colonies after World War II (Austin and Panter-Brick 1990, 131). De Gaulle did propose a “Communaute” in which the former colonies obtained sweeping domestic autonomy, but agreed to French leadership in foreign policy and the leadership of the French President at the head of the association, but it was clear by 1960 that this proposal lacked support (Charbonneau 2008, 53). The closest post-colonial France would ever come to such an association would be the establishment of annual Francophone summit conferences between French and African leaders (Austin and Panter-Brick 1990, 138).

The failure to establish a “Communaute” did not diminish French interests in maintaining policy autonomy with regard to its former colonies; the key theme of French policies toward Africa was maintaining a “sphere of influence” (Boulain 2014, 39), and according to Chipman (1989, 12): “it is the links created by military co-operation and defence agreements that are most important in explaining the endurance of French influence in Africa.”

Though early-on France had proposed the formation of a similar multilateral union, the alliance policy that emerged toward its colonies in Africa was definitively bilateral (Rouvez 1994, 217-218). Former colonies

118 Boulain (2014, 39-41) identifies three additional tools through which France achieved its desired policy influence in African countries: 1) high-level meetings between African leaders and the French President, 2) promotion of the French franc as a key currency, and 3) extensive economic aid and technical assistance.
were invited to sign one (or both) of two types of bilateral military agreements: defense agreements—through which its partners could call on France for defensive aid—and military cooperation agreements—through which France committed to provide military and technical aid (Charbonneau 2008, 60-61; also see: Chipman 1989; Rouvez 1994). Even as France reduced its footprint (and associated costs) in its African colonies over the coming decades, through these alliances it retained its influence, including embracing an active military interventionist role in conflicts such as those in Zaire, Mauritania, and Chad (Stuart and Tow 1990, 235).

In the dataset for this project, the majority of France’s non-European Cold War alliances were formed with countries in Western Sub-Saharan Africa, including Gabon (1960), Mali (1960), Mauritania (1961), Togo (1963), and Senegal (1974). France also concluded alliances with countries in Eastern Africa—Djibouti (1977) and Comoros (1978)—and Northern Africa—Libya (1955) and Morocco (1956). The major non-African alliance was signed with Laos in 1953. With the exception of Libya, who was colonized by Italy, all of these countries were French colonies.

At first glance, the post-Cold War era appears to be a time of unusually active alliance policy for France, especially compared to other major powers such as the United States and Great Britain (neither of which concluded any alliances after the early-1980s). This project includes twenty French bilateral alliances signed between 1990 and 2003 with post-Soviet states and other partners in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, as well as Russia. On closer examination, however, all of these agreements follow a design structure that alliance scholars might call “treaties of friendship and cooperation”—consultation pacts that are weakly
institutionalized through a general provision for peacetime military contact.\textsuperscript{119} Compared to the British and U.S. cases, France infrequently concludes “active-obligation” alliances; only 15 out of France’s 50 alliances (30\%) require either a defense or offense obligation, compared to over 81\% of U.S. and British alliances. The post-Cold War consultation pacts account for approximately half of these non-active obligation alliances in the French case, and thus a noticeable trend in the data.

\textit{The Aims of French Bilateral Alliances}

Like Great Britain, the general trend of French alliance aims has clearly evolved over time, beginning with the preservation of French security in Europe through alliances with other major powers and the use of treaty relationships to contain a threatening Germany between the World Wars. Then in the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century, shifting to focus on the preservation of policy and cultural influence over former colonies to the conclusion of broad (and weak) agreements with countries in the post-Soviet sphere of influence. These trends are largely correlated with the relative power ratio of the partners as predicted by the complementary exchange model. Most of France’s bilateral alliances fall within the standard deviation range for the mean of the project’s relative power ratio (the natural log of both countries’ CINC scores).\textsuperscript{120} All but one of the outlying partners—thirteen in total—fall above the standard deviation, meaning that, relative to France, they are much weaker in terms of power capability; this is more than either the British or

\textsuperscript{119} Again, details regarding French alliance treaty contents—including institutionalization mechanisms—are drawn from the ATOP project’s data and alliance codesheets, unless otherwise noted (Leeds, et al. 2002). The ATOP codesheets are available online at atop.rice.edu/codesheets.

\textsuperscript{120} The dataset for this project measures relative power as the natural log of both partners’ Correlates of War (COW) National Capabilities Index (or CINC score) ratio (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). The mean for this variable is 2.177591 and the standard deviation is 1.692875.
U.S. cases. The vast majority of these weaker partners are either former colonies in the mid-20th Century or part of the post-Soviet space in the early-1990s.

The aims of French alliance policy in the 19th Century are very clearly focused on the preservation of French security against the threats posed by other European powers. Of the pre-World War I bilateral alliances included in this project, the case that most exemplifies this trend is the 1891/1894 alliance with Russia. After the unification of Germany in 1871 and Germany’s simultaneous industrialization during the later-Industrial Revolution, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck made it his mission to isolate France in Europe—and largely succeeded, up until his dismissal by Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1890 (Keiger 1983; Weitsman 2004). The anchor of Bismarck’s strategy was the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. According to George Kennan (1984, 118), France’s strategy at this time was to preserve a publicly “correct diplomatic relationship with Germany” while simultaneously seeking various security assurances through arms and allies. At first, France’s options for alliance were nil among the European major powers; if Germany was France’s greatest rival at home, Britain was its colonial rival abroad (as illustrated by the 1898 near-conflict over the Fashoda territory in modern-day Sudan), and Russia was party to the Reinsurance Treaty with Germany (Keiger 1983, 17; Kennan 1984, 19). While the Triple Alliance often gets the most credit for precipitating the Franco-Russian alliance in the early-1890s, it was really the growing concern that Britain might join the Triple Alliance that propelled France to seek security through alliance with Russia, who, for its part, was isolated by the Kaiser’s refusal to renew the Reinsurance Treaty in 1890 (Weitsman 2004, 122). Weitsman (2004, 118) thus describes the

---

121 As discussed in the British case study above, France’s later alliance with Britain—while a key leg of the Triple Entente—is excluded from the ATOP data.
122 For a very detailed historical account of the key players and terms of the alliance negotiations between France and Germany prior to 1894, see Kennan’s The Fateful Alliance (1984).
resulting alliance as a clear example of a capability aggregation alliance with balancing aims:

“The Franco-Russian Alliance came into being with the signing of a military convention in 1894. Its purpose was thus underscored: it was an alliance intended to coordinate military planning between France and Russia in the event of a war with the Triple Alliance.”

If the aims of the 1891/1894 Franco-Russian alliance clearly exemplify a symmetric capability aggregation alliance, the aims of France’s bilateral alliances during the Interwar Era are somewhat murkier. On the one hand, these alliances were concluded with weaker partners who added little in terms of military capability to France’s security (with the exception of the three alliances with the Soviet Union and the 1938 consultation pact with Germany); Poland, in particular, was still recovering its national cohesion after nearly two centuries of occupation (Nere 1974, 38). On the other hand, a clear distinction can be made between the containment aims of the Eastern European alliances and the policy influence aims of the later post-colonial African alliances. France’s aim in the Eastern European alliances was clearly focused on deterring German influence and power in the region, a type of policy control. Piotr Wandycz (1962, 21) argues that these Eastern European alliances had the further goal of keeping an “eastern barrier” between Germany and the Soviet Union; despite French concerns about the stability of Poland (211), Poland and Czechoslovakia were necessary geographic lynchpins to this strategy. Thus, the French alliances of the 1920s, while not purely capability aggregation in focus, are more about deterrence of Germany than French control of its alliance partners.

The Belgian (1920), Polish (1925), and Czechoslovakian (1924 and 1925) alliances illustrate these dynamics well. Belgium in 1920 was a poor substitute for the military capability convergence that would have resulted from a French-Anglo-American alliance, but in the

---

123 Kennan (1984, 117) echoes this argument, describing it as a “defensive counter alliance.”
124 Nere (1974) and Wandycz (1962) both offer detailed discussions of France’s interactions with the Eastern European allies in pursuit of German deterrence.
immediate aftermath of World War I France was eager to obtain any security assurances it could, including Belgian support should another war with Germany occur (Helmreich 1964, 361-362). According to Andrew Long and Brett Ashley Leeds (2006, 438), the Belgian alliance was motivated more by economic policy interests than capability aggregation, however. While France sought any kind of buffer against German aggression on its eastern border after having failed to achieve a Rhineland buffer-state, Belgium was unsure about the potential policy intrusion or entrapment that might occur from an alliance with France; ultimately, Belgium agreed to trade its position of neutrality for economic reasons, including expanded access to French markets and a reduction in French tariffs (Long and Leeds 2006, 439). While France certainly gained greater policy autonomy with regard to Belgium, it was not of the asymmetric variety that would characterize its post-colonial alliances; indeed, in 1936, when Belgium became increasingly unsatisfied with the terms of France’s economic policies, it initiated the abrogation of the partnership (Long and Leeds 2006, 439). French interests in an alliance relationship with Poland in the early-1920s were similarly motivated by concerns over German expansion. The territory of Upper Silesia had been in dispute for some time and both Poland and France were concerned that Germany would take action to claim the valuable territory (Nere 1974, 40; Wandycz 1962, 233-234). France did not seek intrusive control over the politics of Poland, nor was it even considered an important contribution to France’s material security by the French diplomats in the Quai d’Orsay, who “emphasized that the exposed position of Poland made her a risky ally, a liability rather than an asset.” (Wandycz 1962, 215) Czechoslovakia in the early-1920s was seen as a much more strategically valuable ally than Poland in terms of geography, domestic political stability, international recognition, and its participation in the

---

125 As part of the treaty negotiations, France also committed to helping Belgium establish a trading relationship with Luxembourg (Long and Leeds 2006, 439).
Little Entente (from which Poland was excluded) (Wandycz 1962, 294). Still, Czechoslovakia offered diplomatic advantages and relative economic stability, it was a demographically small country that contributed limited military capability to the partnership (Wandycz 1962, 372). For its part, Czechoslovakia agreed to the French alliance only after it became clear that the collective security assurances promised by the League of Nations were falling apart; it accepted an alliance as the price for the security France could provide but certainly did not invite French intrusion into Czech policies (Wandycz 1962, 295-296). Taken together, these cases illustrate that French aims in these alliances—while certainly motivated by security concerns vis-à-vis Germany and in partnership with weaker partners—were neither purely capability aggregation nor asymmetric policy control.

In contrast, French aims in its post-colonial alliances in the mid-20th Century were overtly self-interested; according to Charbonneau (2008, 2): “French military presence in Africa has never been one of an impartial arbiter or of an honest broker whose main goal was to favour peaceful resolutions to indigenous conflicts.” And French self-interest was multifaceted; Rouvez (1994, 46) references William Zartman’s four key French interests in Africa: 1) the promotion of the French language, values, and culture, 2) a moral obligation to support developing countries, 3) access and markets for French business interests abroad, and 4) the political benefits of a stable network of allies on the African continent, including support for French policies on the international stage, such as votes in the United Nations. Vincent Boulanin (2014, 42) adds to this list the preferential rights to natural resources, such as oil in Gabon and uranium in Niger. More so than the British case—whose post-colonial alliances largely represented a drawdown of international commitments while preserving select basing rights, France pursued an extensive commitment and presence in its former colonies. But then France had always been motivated
more by the cultural imperative than Great Britain, and took very seriously the perpetuation of the French language and culture it cultivated throughout its empire (Austin and Panter-Brick 1990, 139). Chipman (1989, 4) explains this difference in the French and British cases by highlighting the unique significance of Africa to France’s concept of French power: “France maintains influence in Africa in order to prove she is still a major power… the last vestige of French imperial logic, and its deterioration would, in French official eyes, damage French prestige.”126 In his book, French Power in Africa, Chipman (1989, 29-31) goes on to provide an authoritative explanation of the convergence of these goals during the decolonization period of the 20th Century—preserving French influence and promoting French values such as liberty—and the role that military alliances played; essentially, while France embraced African claims for independence (excepting Algeria, of course), it did so by preserving a unique French role in these new developing countries under the veil of “responsibility” and by “adapt[ing] positive images of her imperial power to the circumstances of a post-colonial order.”

Scholars on French foreign policy toward Africa consistently emphasize the complementary dynamics of its alliance commitments, using language that epitomizes the asymmetric alliances of control highlighted in this project. Rouvez (1994, 11) states: “France’s strong network of bilateral defense and military cooperation agreements with various African countries is a perfect example of the double-edged nature of alliances: to protect against external threats and to preserve control by the dominant ally.” “The very word co-operation disguised the practical effect of the agreements,” which, according to Chipman (1989, 109), constituted “continued development and other aid on the part of the former colonial power in return for continued loyalty and special favors on the part of the newly independent states of Black Africa”

---

126 Chipman (1989, 119) quotes General Revol’s statement in the 1961 Centre Militaire d’Informations et Documentation Outre-Mer: “it is evident that bases are necessary to us—first to go the aid of those of our African partners who might be in difficulties, but equally to hold on to our place in the world.”
Pierre Lellouche and Dominique Moisi (1979, 111) emphasize the continued imperial presence of French military alliances: “contrary to the situation of other colonial powers, French decolonization never meant the end of a military presence; rather it meant an adjustment of such a presence.”

Though in some respects these military alliances appear to grant autonomy to the African partners—the agreements were signed voluntarily, required that the African partners request French defensive aid, and established special access for African leaders to the highest French officials—the primacy of French interests in both the alliance negotiations and terms was never questioned (Chipman 1989, 119). A key French aim in these alliances was certainly preserving basing rights in the over 100 French military bases in Africa (in 1960), especially the bases in Djibouti, Dakar (Senegal), Diego-Suarez (Madagascar), Fort Lamy (Chad), Port Bouet (Ivory Coast), Libreville (Gabon), and Bangui (Central African Republic) (Chipman 1989, 120). Other examples of asymmetric French interests include arms sales—for example, the treaty with Gabon stated that “to assure the standardization of armaments, [Gabon] engages itself to call exclusively on the French Republic for the maintenance and renewal of its materials…”—as well as economic issues such as natural resources, including the assurance that African states would notify France of policies regarding raw materials and give France priority sales of said resources (Charbonneau 2008, 103; Chipman 1989, 119). In contrast to the British case, Chipman (1989, 117) actually argues that most of France’s African partners did not have significant concerns about French intrusion into their domestic politics; quite to the contrary, “a number of African leaders wished the French military to provide for their own personal security… [and] with the

---

127 France further had military alliances with Madagascar, Chad, and the Ivory Coast, though they are excluded from the quantitative data in this project. The 1960 alliance with Madagascar included secret articles regarding military contribution limits and the 1960 alliance between France, Chad, the Congo, and the Central African Republic was multilateral.
exception of Togo and Dahomey, also sought protection from France against internal as well as external threats.” (117) When many of the French alliances in Africa underwent revision in the 1970s (including Niger, Cameroon, Congo, Madagascar, and Togo), the terms were still favorable enough to France so as not to significantly disrupt its military interests on the continent (Rouvez 1994, 49).

By the late-20th Century, French foreign policy had shifted away from NATO-skepticism and a policy in Africa based primarily on post-colonial affinity toward the multilateralism of regional and international institutions (Boulanin 2014, 42). Though the majority of French foreign aid continues to go to former colonies even today, a greater emphasis has been put on considerations of democratization, human rights, and poverty (Boulanin 2014, 43). And France has embraced the principle of multilateral military interventions sanctioned by organizations such as the UN, EU, and African Union; “the era of unilateral interventions was over” in 1996, according to French President Jacques Chirac (Boulanin 2014, 44). The aims of France’s post-Cold War alliances in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the post-Soviet space can thus be considered in light of this context—as extensions of France’s commitment to multilateralism (especially in Europe) and far removed from the asymmetric aims of French alliances in the preceding decades.

*Trends of Institutionalization in French Bilateral Alliances*

Consistent with the other illustrative cases, when France institutionalizes its bilateral alliances, it frequently turns to mechanisms of institutionalization that are particularly suited to asymmetric alliance partnerships. French basing rights and the provision of French military aid are especially frequent throughout France’s alliance portfolio, especially with its post-colonial
partners. Unlike the other major powers, France more frequently includes the institutionalization mechanisms of troop subordination and integrated command of military forces under French officers (again, almost all with post-colonial partners). Finally, France does frequently incorporate institutionalization through peacetime military contact or formal organizations, but most of the alliances where this is the primary mechanism of institutionalization are the consultation pacts (what are sometimes described as “treaties of friendship and cooperation”) concluded with the post-Soviet states in the last two-and-a-half decades.

None of the French alliances prior to World War I specified any type of institutionalization in the alliance treaties. Given that two of France’s three partners during this period (Russia and Great Britain) were also major powers, plus the fact that the aims of these alliances were very limited to capability aggregation aims in the context of European politics, this trend is not all that surprising. Even the famous Franco-Russian alliance lacked institutional depth; the initial 1891 consultation pact featured no terms of institutionalization.\(^{128}\) This is ultimately qualitatively consistent with the complementary exchange model. Russia in 1891 is the only alliance partner to score below the standard deviation for the dataset’s mean measure of relative power ratio; in other words, Russia was France’s most symmetric alliance partner during this period. Furthermore, the alliance scholars who have studied this case in the most depth clearly emphasize the capability aggregation aim of the partnership, as both France and Russia sought to strengthen their military capability against the Triple Alliance (Snyder 1997; Weitsman 2004)—this stands in stark contrast to the aims and levels of institutionalization of France’s alliances with its post-colonial partners in the latter-20\(^{\text{th}}\) Century.

\(^{128}\) The 1894 defense pact—while excluded from this project’s dataset because its terms were kept secret for over a decade—did specify wartime military contact and troop level commitments in the event of war, but neither of these mechanisms would have been included in the operationalization of institutional depth outlined in Chapter 4 anyway.
Deep institutionalization is also largely absent from France’s alliances during the Interwar Era; all but two of the French alliances in the data for this project formed between 1920 and 1945 specified no terms of institutionalization. This observation somewhat contrasts the complementary exchange model, which would predict that we should observe at least some level of institutionalization given that France’s alliance partners during the Interwar era are not—with the exception of Russia and Germany—other major powers. That said, the aims of these alliances did not reflect the asymmetric policy control argued to be associated with deep institutionalization in the complementary exchange model, suggesting that alliance aims are worth further attention.

The 1920 defense pact with Belgium is certainly the outlier case for this period (and French alliances in general) because it was deeply institutionalized, including provisions for integrated military command in wartime, joint military bases near the Rhine River, French military aid to Belgium, and peacetime military contact.129 Though not specified in the treaty text, the partnership was further institutionalized outside the treaty via various economic ties, including a reduction in French tariffs and a French-negotiated economic agreement between Belgium and Luxembourg (Long and Leeds 2006, 439). We might consider a number of potential explanations for this outlying case, including Belgium’s geographic contiguity and strategic value to France along its northern border,130 the general insecurity of European politics in the immediate aftermath of World War I, and Belgium’s own economic aims in the partnership. But a compelling case can be made that this alliance—one of the very few deeply-institutionalized bilateral alliances France concluded with another European partner—could also

129 Again, details regarding French alliance treaty contents—including institutionalization mechanisms—are drawn from the ATOP project’s data and alliance codesheets, unless otherwise noted (Leeds, et al. 2002). The ATOP codesheets are available online at atop.rice.edu/codesheets.
130 Jonathan Helmreich (1964) offers one of the most detailed discussions of the negotiations leading up to the conclusion of the Franco-Belgian Accord.
be accounted for by the scope of France’s perceived security crisis after it failed to achieve the Anglo-American alliance. The only other French alliance of this period to feature institutionalization was the 1944 wartime alliance with the Soviet Union, which specified terms of economic aid for post-war reconstruction.

The post-colonial alliances of the mid-20th Century certainly helped France reduce the costs of empire, while still preserving its influence (Stuart and Tow 1990, 221). Though France did conclude a handful of European bilateral alliances during this period (for example, with Great Britain in 1947 and the USSR in 1970), they do not feature anywhere close to the degree of institutionalization as the African alliances. Yet despite being concluded in the context of decolonization, “France retained considerable influence according to the terms of these separate arrangements.” (Stuart and Tow 1990, 221) The aims of the French defense and military cooperation agreements having been discussed above (also see: Charbonneau 2008; Chipman 1989; Rouvez 1994), I focus here on the institutional structure of these agreements, which largely drew on a combination of French military basing rights, French military aid and technical training, and regular peacetime contact among officials. Several of these alliances feature additional institutionalization mechanisms to these core three, including provisions for the subordination of troops under French command (such as Laos in 1953 and Mali in 1960) and the integrated command in peacetime and wartime of forces under French officers (such as Gabon in 1960).

Most of the French post-colonial alliances included provisions protecting French basing rights in their partner’s territory, including the alliances with Laos (1953), Gabon (1960), Mali (1960), Mauritania (1961), Togo (1963), Senegal (1974), and Djibouti (1977). Contrary to the

---

131 In the data for this project, the only post-colonial alliance not to include any institutionalization is the 1956 Moroccan alliance; this is at least partly explained by the fact that it is only a consultation pact, with no defense or offense commitments on the part of France.
active-obligation counter-hypothesis, two of these cases (Mauritania and Togo) are merely consultation pacts that did not formally establish a defense obligation on the part of France and yet still provided French basing rights. The preservation of these basing rights not only helped cement the alliance partnerships and established extended deterrence, but also facilitated French military projection and rapid deployment (Charbonneau 2008, 60). More so than the other major powers in this study, France assumed an active interventionist role in its alliance partners (Austin and Panter-Brick 1990; Rouvez 1994; Stuart and Tow 1990); on several occasions, France intervened to provide military assistance to support the domestic regime, for example in support of Leon M’ba in Gabon in 1964 and Gnassingbe Eyadema in Togo in 1986 (Austin and Panter-Brick 1990, 145). Though French bases and troop numbers have been reduced since the development of the French nuclear program, technological modernization has continued to perpetuate the French military’s ability to project force onto Africa (Rouvez 1994, 53).

Another prominent institutionalization mechanism to be found in most of the French post-colonial alliances is the assurance of French military aid to the partner country; for example, military aid provisions were outlined in the alliances with Laos (1953), Libya (1955), Gabon (1960), Mali (1960), Senegal (1974), Djibouti (1977), and Comoros (1978). Notably, while the alliances with Mauritania and Togo did specify French basing rights, despite being merely consultation pacts, they did not include French military aid. Compared to Great Britain, France has historically directed a larger proportion of its foreign aid to its post-colonial and other African alliance partners (Austin and Panter-Brick 1990, 147-148; also see: Boulanin 2014; Rouvez 1994). Rouvez (1994, 109-113) identifies three types of military aid and technical assistance provided by France to its allies: French representatives sent by the Ministry of
Cooperation to provide on-the-ground technical assistance to African partners,\textsuperscript{132} the invitation for African officers to receive training in French schools and academies, and the provision of direct military aid. Institutionalization through the exchange of personnel—whether French technicians working in Africa or African officers training at French academies—facilitates alliance cohesion as well as the cohesion of any future joint military exercises (Stuart and Tow 1990, 221).

The third frequent institutionalization mechanism in French alliances during the mid-20\textsuperscript{th} Century is the establishment of regular, formal peacetime contact among military and elite political officials. Though some of this contact certainly takes place in a multilateral setting via the annual Franco-African summit, established in 1973 (Rouvez 1994, 68), the scope of bilateral contact is arguably more important to France’s relationships with its African partners and distinguishes France from the other major power cases in this study. According to Austin and Panter-Brick (1990, 150): “there is no British parallel to France’s policy in Africa and to the meetings which the French president holds with African heads of government.” France’s bilateral alliances frequently institutionalized this peacetime contact via formal organizations, described in the treaty text as either a “permanent joint military committee” (i.e.: Laos in 1953) or a permanent joint “Defence Committee” (i.e.: Gabon in 1960, Mauritania 1961, Senegal in 1974). The 1960 alliance with Mali institutionalized regular peacetime contact via the creation of a permanent office of the French Bureau of Military Aid in Dakar.

Quite in contrast to the deep institutionalization of the French post-colonial alliances (predominantly in Africa), the consultation pacts France signed with numerous Eastern European, Central Asian, and post-Soviet states after the end of the Cold War are weakly

\textsuperscript{132} These French technicians accounted for approximately 60% of the military assistance budget in 1991, according to Rouvez (1994, 109).
institutionalized. These “treaties of friendship and cooperation” all follow a similar design. Excepting the 1990 Russia treaty (which also includes a non-aggression pact), all are consultation pacts and specify no active defense or offense obligation. None specify any conditions on this consultation obligation. Most are institutionalized via a reference to the peacetime contact of the partners’ ministers of foreign affairs and defense, but no indication of a formal organization structure; the 1991 Romanian, 1991 Polish, 1992 Russian, and 1993 Moldovan agreements are the only examples that specify no peacetime contact.

Summary

Like the British case, France’s bilateral alliance portfolio provides qualitative support to the hypothesis that major powers more deeply institutionalize their alliances with weaker partners than partners of relative power parity. And like Great Britain, France’s alliance “character” clearly evolves over time, including embracing weakly institutionalized “treaties of friendship and cooperation” with weaker partners in the post-Soviet space. France’s most deeply institutionalized bilateral alliances are undeniably with its former colonies in the mid-20th Century, offering further qualitative support to the post-colonial counter-hypothesis. Based on the insights of the British and French cases, it certainly appears that a key pre-condition for European major powers to form alliances with much weaker partners is the existence of a post-colonial relationship. To examine whether or not the trends observed in this chapter hold in the alliance portfolios of major powers whose foreign policies did not include such extensive formal colonialism, the next chapter turns to the Cold War superpowers—the United States and Russia/USSR.
References


CHAPTER 6
THE COLD WAR SUPERPOWERS: THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA/USSR

Continuing the qualitative analysis of major power asymmetric alliances, this chapter turns to the two superpowers during the Cold War—the United States and Russia/USSR. The discussion proceeds in the same method established by the previous chapter’s examination of the British and French cases, but concludes with a synthesis of major findings from all four qualitative cases. This concluding discussion summarizes the finding that these cases offer qualitative support to the empirical predictions of the complementary exchange model. These four illustrative cases uncover further insights, including the qualitative significance of alternative explanations for these trends (particularly regarding post-colonial relationships and the presence of an active obligation in the alliance), the observation that each case exhibited a different alliance “character” that evolved over time, and that major power aims in the alliance had a qualitative influence on the alliance design outcomes.

The American and Russian/Soviet cases offer a valuable contrast to the British and French cases in that they are driven by fundamentally different aims—Cold War spheres of influence, not decolonization. They are of further value because they capture a unique period of alliance politics. Noting that “Cold War alliances should be less flexible, more asymmetric, and… [b]eing nonallied or neutral should be more difficult,” Brett Ashley Leeds and Michaela Mattes (2007, 183) offer the only large-N consideration of the effects of systemic pressure (i.e.: bipolarity vs. multipolarity) on alliance design trends. Though their analysis is largely descriptive, it finds that the period 1945 to 1989 accounts for the highest proportion of alliances
(24.1%) requiring what they operationalize as a “high level of peacetime military coordination,” as well as the highest proportion of overall institutionalization in the 20th Century (Leeds and Mattes 2007, 192). It is perhaps an unsurprising oversight that this is the only study of alliance design to disaggregate the analysis temporally, especially when we consider that most of the literature assumes alliances to be motivated by capability aggregation. The causal logic of the capability aggregation argument suggests few implications for ways in which systemic polarity might affect propensities toward institutionalization; enforcement problems (for example, reputations for unreliability) will be consistent across system structures. The insights of structural realists who argue that the alliance choices of major powers should be shaped first and foremost by the incentives of the international system’s polarity (Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979), as well as the findings of Leeds and Mattes (2007), suggest that this chapter’s qualitative consideration of the Cold War superpowers offers a look at a unique component of asymmetric alliance design—design under bipolarity.

United States – Cautiously Playing a Game of Dominos

The alliance politics of the United States are, arguably, the most extensively documented in the scholarly literature. According to the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset, between 1815 and 2003 the U.S. was party to 28 formal alliances (Leeds, et al. 2002). Of these, sixteen are included in the dataset for this project, being both bilateral and fully public. Two alliances are excluded because the terms only include nonaggression pacts and ten are excluded because they are multilateral. Unlike the other cases, the U.S. has not participated in secret or partially-secret alliances—a trend that largely declined in the 20th Century, replaced by treaty transparency via the United Nations Treaty Collection. Though this project focuses on
bilateral alliances, it is worth observing that multilateral alliances appear to characterize a large portion of the United States’ post-World War II alliance portfolio, including many well-known examples such as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance founding the Organization of American States (sometimes referred to as the Rio Treaty – 1945), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO – 1949), the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS – 1951), and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO – 1954).

Summary data on the American bilateral alliances included in this project are presented below. Table 6.1 lists all sixteen alliances and categorizes them according to degree of institutional depth. Figure 6.1 presents a simple two-way plot of these sixteen alliances’ institutional depth and the explanatory variable of interest in this project—relative power asymmetry. It is quickly apparent that the quantitative analysis of the U.S. alliance portfolio does not fully fit the theory. Using the complementary exchange model of asymmetric alliance institutionalization we would expect a positive correlation between partner asymmetry and institutional depth. Instead, Figure 6.1 clearly presents a slightly negative correlation between these two variables. Further, Table 6.1 demonstrates that the U.S. alliance portfolio is filled with only a handful of deeply institutionalized alliances. It therefore appears to provide be an especially interesting case for qualitative study.

---

133 Other, less well-known, examples of multilateral US alliances include the 1921 World War I alliance with France, the United Kingdom, and Japan, the 1942 World War II alliance, the 1962 International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos, and the 1975 multilateral nonaggression pact relating to Europe.

134 This simple correlation is (and should not) be used to assess causality as it clearly does not include or control for the other factors that might have an impact on U.S. alliance institutional depth. It is included here as a visual reference for the United States’s basic alliance portfolio and to provide context to the subsequent qualitative discussion.
Table 6.1: Institutional Depth* of United States Bilateral Alliances, 1815-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Depth = 0</th>
<th>Depth = 1-2</th>
<th>Depth = 3-4</th>
<th>Depth = 5-6</th>
<th>Depth = 7-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines 1951</td>
<td>South Korea 1953</td>
<td>Panama 1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taiwan 1954</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iran 1959</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberia 1959</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan 1959</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey 1959</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Israel 1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*"Institutional Depth" defined using the revised alliance institutionalization index described in Chapter 4

Figure 6.1: United States Bilateral Alliances, 1815-2003

A Brief History of U.S. Bilateral Alliances

The United States alliance portfolio clearly reflects the emphasis on isolationism in American foreign policy prior to World War II; all but three alliances in the ATOP data are formed after 1944 (Leeds, et al. 2002). Post-1945 American alliances illustrate the new
superpower's global foreign policy aims, and include partnerships with states from nearly all of
the world's regions, including Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, East Asia, and Southeast
Asia.135 These Cold War alliances were driven by containment policy,136 especially domino
theory or the concern that a single state falling to communism would instigate others to follow
suit much like dominoes fall one upon the other.137, 138, 139 According to John Lewis Gaddis
(2005), there were two schools of thought about the best way to respond to this fear of dominoes
or communist contagion during the administration of Harry Truman. The first was the concept
of “perimeter defense,” or the need to prevent any communist intrusion along the entire
periphery of the U.S. sphere of influence; the second was the “strongpoint defense,” or the
prioritization of key regions and fault-lines most important to U.S. foreign policy aims, rather
than a full perimeter (Gaddis 2005, 56-57).140 Gaddis (2005), along with Douglas Macdonald
(1991), describes the initial adoption of the “strongpoint defense” by the early Truman
Administration and the gradual transition to the “perimeter defense” by the adoption of NSC 68
in September 1950.

---

135 For more extended discussions of pre- and post-World War II alliance strategy by the United States, see Osgood
(1968) and Menon (2007).
136 Many scholars of U.S. foreign policy have addressed containment strategy. For example, see: Gaddis 2005;
137 Dwight Eisenhower is still often quoted as describing domino theory in 1954—“You have a row of dominoes set
up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very
quickly.” (Macdonald 1991, 112)
138 A similar characterization is that of disease and the need to control the spread of a “contagion” (Schweller 1994,
98).
139 Douglas Stuart & William Tow (1990, 42-45) outline six factions within the U.S. foreign policy team on how to
best contain the USSR, including the “Universalist/Idealist” approach (working through the United Nations), the
“Resource/Geographic Constraints” approach (prioritizing defense of the Western Hemisphere), the “Global
Strongpoints” approach discussed above, the “Europe First” approach (prioritizing defense of Europe), the “NSC
68” approach or perimeter approach discussed above, and the “Nuclear Reliance” approach (favoring reliance on the
U.S. nuclear arsenal).
140 Gaddis (2005, 29) describes the evolution of George Kennan’s conception of what these “strongpoints” should
be, from three regions (the Atlantic rim communities, the Mediterranean/Middle East, and Asia via Japan and the
Philippines) to “five centers of industrial and military power” (United States, Great Britain, Germany/Central
Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan), of which the US had to act to preserve four.
Alliances became a key means of carrying out this containment strategy. Essentially, these formal treaties gave the U.S. three means for preventing the initial domino: 1) deterring Soviet aggression into vulnerable countries via explicit security commitments, 2) expanding the ability of the U.S. to respond to a Soviet action via strategic posts for American military deployments, and 3) preserving the stability of key regions through the control of potentially rogue leaders (Gaddis 2005, 150-152). Given this context, it is therefore simplest to conceptualize U.S. alliances after 1945 by region. In some regions, including Europe and Latin America the U.S. relied on large, multilateral, and deeply-institutionalized alliances—NATO and the OAS; these multilateral alliances have been well-covered elsewhere and, while important to keep in mind, are outside the scope of this project. In other regions, including Asia and the Middle East, the U.S. relied instead on bilateral alliances to preserve its defense against communist dominoes.

In East Asia, the U.S. signed bilateral alliances with Japan (1951, and revised in 1960), South Korea (1953), and Taiwan (1954).\(^{141}\) The U.S.-Japanese alliance has to be understood in the context of Japan’s defeat in World War II and the subsequent American occupation of Japan (Menon 2007, 103). George Kennan once described Japan as the “key to Asia, just as Germany was the key to Europe,” and the resulting asymmetric alliance strengthened the U.S. bulwark against communism in East Asia by allowing Japan to reindustrialize, but only in the context of dependence on the United States (Cha 2010, 182-184).\(^{142}\) The conclusion of the South Korean

\(^{141}\) Most of the discussion of specific alliance treaty contents (obligations, terms, institutionalization mechanisms, etc.) for the U.S. case is drawn from the ATOP data and alliance codesheets (Leeds, et al. 2002). Alliance terms that have been derived from other sources’ qualitative discussions are otherwise noted. The ATOP codesheets are available online at atop.rice.edu/codesheets.

\(^{142}\) Victor Cha (2010) describes how U.S. officials first considered two other pathways to the treatment of post-war Japan. The “Alpha Option” favored by General Douglas MacArthur would have imposed harsh treatment on a demilitarized Japan and was ultimately rejected over concerns that a weak Japan invited Soviet intrusion (Cha 2010, 182-183). The “Gamma Option” favored by John Foster Dulles would have allowed for a fully militarized and independent Japan, but was also rejected, this time over concerns about the resurgence of Japanese imperialism.
alliance was less immediate. In fact, U.S. officials rejected the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) request in 1949 for a defense pact: “From the standpoint of military security, the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining... troops and bases in Korea.” (Steuck 2012, 12) It was only in the post-Korean War context of 1953 that this calculation shifted toward viewing a bilateral alliance with South Korea as a beneficial corollary to the East Asian containment strategy (Kim 2011, 361). Similarly, the United States only took an interest in a treaty with the island of Taiwan in 1954, after the Korean conflict “changed U.S. threat perceptions dramatically” in Asia (Cha 2010, 169). In 1951, the U.S. preserved its military projection capabilities in Southeast Asia (particularly the Subic Bay naval base and Clark air force base) by concluding a bilateral alliance with the Philippines—the only overtly colonial alliance in the American alliance portfolio (Jordan 1988, 8; Root 2008, 89).

Unlike in Asia, where the alliance impetus was purely bilateral and mostly linear, in the Middle East, U.S. bilateral alliances with Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan (all signed in 1959, along with an identical Liberian alliance) emerged out of a decidedly non-linear and regional context. It was Great Britain who dominated the region at the end of World War II and the U.S. initially accepted this arrangement—a matter of cooperation among the Atlantic allies and of convenience, allowing the U.S. to focus its efforts on other objectives (Persson 1998, 37-38; also see: Sherwood 1990; Stuart & Tow 1990). That said, a fundamental divergence of aims threatened Anglo-American cooperation in the region; while Great Britain’s policies focused on the preservation of British imperial interests, American policies were driven entirely by the broader global containment strategy (Sherwood 1990, 59). Since the early-1950s, Great Britain had been pressing for a Middle Eastern defense organization that would be “the equivalent of

---

which would undermine U.S. efforts to stabilize East Asia (Cha 2010, 183). The resulting middle ground was called the “Beta Option.” (Cha 2010, 183-184)
NATO in the Middle East,” but only in the context of the Korean War did the United States embrace this proposal of a “Middle East Command (MEC)” (Persson 1998, 80). After Secretary of State Dulles visited the region in 1953, the U.S. began to express concerns that the conflicts within and among the Arab states would undermine a regional defense organization; instead, NSC 155/1 (July 1953) outlined the strategy of promoting mutual defense treaties among the “Northern Tier” countries that bordered the southern-Soviet Union, beginning with the 1954 Turkish-Pakistani Treaty (Persson 1998, 123). By 1954, the Northern Tier policy had evolved into the Baghdad Pact, which now included Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, & Pakistan but not an increasingly reluctant United States, who argued that any regional pact needed to be a purely “indigenous agreement” (Persson 1998, 249). U.S. reticence toward the Baghdad Pact emerged out of concerns about entrapment as well as the potential reaction from Egypt and Israel; the preference for a bilateral approach crystallized after the 1956 Suez Crisis, representing a fundamental shift in the Eisenhower administration (Persson 1998, 280-287; Stuart & Tow 1990). According to Magnus Persson (1998, 286): “the policy initiated in 1953 to establish a collective defense organization was ended and a new start for American foreign policy was initiated as economic and military support could be given to any state on a bilateral basis regardless of their membership in the alliance.” In the cases of Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Liberia, this support was formalized through bilateral military alliances.

The 1981 U.S.-Israeli alliance represented a significant shift in American policy toward the Middle East. According to Camille Mansour (1994, 150), the alliance with Israel was a

---

143 In 1969, Secretary of State Acheson reflected: “Over the past four years in an unplanned, undesired, and haphazard way American influence had largely succeeded French and British in that part of the world. As ours had waxed and theirs waned… no power had been substituted for theirs to maintain peace and order… As the situation was developing, increasing opportunities were offered for the historic movement of Russia southward to warm water, to oil, and to mischief-making.” (Sherwood 1990, 61)

144 Dulles was the first American Secretary of State to visit either the Middle East or South Asia (Persson 1998, 114).
reflection of the Reagan Administration’s emphasis on Israel, above the other Arab states, as the primary U.S. ally in the Middle East in the broader ideological struggle of the late-Cold War: “Never before, in spite of a long period of special Israeli-American relations, had Washington agreed to emphasize, in a bilateral public text, the idea of a strategic regional cooperation with the state always considered an enemy of the Arabs.” Signed as an executive agreement and “Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation,” this bilateral partnership publicized U.S. commitment to Israel via joint military exercises and would be shortly followed by the 1982 Israeli war with Lebanon (Mansour 1994, 150-151).

Additional alliance partners in the Cold War U.S. portfolio include Portugal (1944), Spain (1963, and revised in 1970 and 1976), and Panama (1977). The 1944 Portuguese alliance was exclusively a wartime alliance facilitating U.S. basing rights on the Portuguese island of Santa Maria in the Pacific Theatre of World War II. The alliance with Spain is among the most well documented of the U.S. alliances due to the intensity of its multiple negotiations. The core of the partnership was the preservation of American bases in Spain as part of the Cold War containment strategy, dating back to the 1953 Pact of Madrid. Hanson Baldwin described their purpose in a 1953 New York Times article as follows: “Spain’s bases help to seal the Western gateway to the Mediterranean… behind the rampart of the Pyrenees, [it] provides a last line of defense if the rest of Western Europe should fall, and offers a springboard for offensive land, sea, and air operations.” (Whitaker 1961, 48-49) Though Spain had been excluded from NATO due to European opposition to the government of Francisco Franco, a series of three alliance renegotiations further formalized the most deeply institutionalized bilateral alliance in the American portfolio, which U.S. officials viewed as a corollary to the European multilateral

---

145 For example, see: Botero 2001; Druckman 1986; Rubottom & Murphy 1984; Vignas 2003; Whitaker 1960.
146 Spain acceded to NATO membership in 1981, several years after Franco’s death.
strategy (Kim 2011, 370-373). Finally, the 1977 alliance with Panama was part of a series of treaties signed by the Carter Administration to reduce ongoing tensions between the two countries by establishing a framework for turning the jurisdiction of the Panama Canal over to Panama, including provisions for U.S. aid in maintaining the security of the Canal (Coniff 2012, 133).

*The Aims of U.S. Bilateral Alliances*

The United States can best be understood as a cautious (even reluctant) ally. Even during the height of the Cold War and under pressure to consolidate its sphere of global influence against communist expansion, the U.S. engaged in relatively few alliances. The caution of this historically isolationist great power is also reflected in the fact that, unlike the other cases, the U.S. very rarely signed treaties that did not involve some sort of active obligation such as an offense or defense pact (what might be called “treaties of friendship and cooperation”). Those alliances that were successfully formed, however, reflected the strategic selection of moderately-weaker partners, a negotiation process dominated by U.S. interests, and favorable alliance terms that furthered containment policy while also ensuring American control over their ally.

All U.S. bilateral alliances are formed with partners of a weaker relative power ratio, but very few are formed with extremely weak partners. In the dataset for this project, only four partners fall outside the standard deviation for the dataset’s relative power measure (Portugal, Philippines, Panama, and Liberia) and only one falls below the measure’s mean (Japan). This stands in contrast to some of the other major power cases whose partners are more frequently

---

147 The two exceptions are Japan (1908) and Liberia (1959).
148 The dataset measures relative power as the natural log of both partners’ Correlates of War (COW) National Capabilities Index (or CINC score) ratio (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). The mean for this variable is 2.177591 and the standard deviation is 1.692875.
much, much weaker, such as France. Much scholarly attention has been paid to the concept of burden-sharing as American alliance partnerships have evolved over the latter-20th Century (Fang and Ramsay 2010; Hartley and Sandler 1999), reflecting an expectation that U.S. allies be able to help contribute at least something to the expenses of maintaining the alliance; this is something that very weak partners would be unable to do.

As the major power (and an often-reluctant) partner, the U.S. consistently had the upper hand in alliance negotiations with its weaker partners, a trend that is illustrated through several examples. In 1955, when Japanese Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu proposed a revision of the 1951 bilateral treaty to make the terms less asymmetric and more favorable, his proposal was rejected instantly; only in 1960, after significant domestic unrest in Japan about the alliance and a resurgence in Japan’s economy, did U.S. diplomats renegotiate the terms to allow Japan the ability to terminate the treaty and have rights of prior consultation on some aspects of American military actions in Japan, including activities relating to U.S. nuclear forces (Kim 2011, 365-368). When the 1953 South Korean alliance document was dispatched to President Syngman Rhee, President Dwight D. Eisenhower included a written corollary refusing to send the treaty to the U.S. Senate without written confirmation from Rhee that he would not unilaterally start another war to reclaim the northern peninsula: “I could not recommend its ratification and I am certain that the Senate would not ratify it.” (Cha 2010, 176) In his detailed account of the negotiations surrounding the Baghdad Pact, Persson (1998, 44) describes American posture toward its Middle Eastern partners as continuing the British practice of an asymmetrical “patron-client relationship.” Indeed, during debates on the ratification of the 1959 alliance, the Turkish Parliament raised concerns about the vagueness of some of the language but approved the treaty anyway knowing they (the client) lacked the negotiating position to change it (Harris 1972, 68-
69). In the case of Israel, the negotiating strength of the U.S. meant that the final treaty was significantly cut back from the original Israeli proposal due to opposition from Pentagon; for example, the final memorandum specified joint air and naval maneuvers in the Eastern Mediterranean, not the joint land maneuvers in Israel that were in the initial proposal from Israel (Mansour 1994, 147-148).

Perhaps the best exception to this trend is Spain. Spain did acquire an increasingly strong negotiating position throughout the alliance renegotiations between 1963 and 1976, due to a number of factors, including its own gains in relative power, increasing acceptance of the Franco government, and the strong desire on the part of the U.S. to maintain its bases (Rubottom & Murphy 1984, 105-115). In the case of the 1970 treaty, this translated into key gains, including the requirement that Spain be granted approval rights on any uses of the bases that amounted to “war use” (Kim 2011, 372). It also translated to very expensive economic and military aid concessions on the part of the U.S. (discussed in more detail below). But throughout the relationship, the United States very much maintained a posture of dominance. For example, Rodrigo Botero (2001, 162) quotes the Spanish diplomatic record on the 1963 negotiations: “the United States is not proposing to Spain a marriage but a concubinage.” Further, only in 1976 did the alliance treaty rise to the level of Senate ratification as a full treaty, while previous versions were approved as executive agreements (Kim 2011, 373).

The aims (and terms) of most U.S. bilateral alliances are clearly consistent with the arguments of the complementary exchange model presented in Chapter 3 in that they reflect asymmetric means of control over the minor partner rather than purely capability aggregation. A qualitative consideration of U.S. objectives in these partnerships emphasizes partner compliance
with U.S. policies in exchange for security assurances and aid. For example, Amos Jordan (1988) summarizes the Asian alliances, stating:

….there was no presumption of automatic, reciprocal obligations as in NATO. Rather, the United States extended its military shield over its weaker partners in what amounted to unilateral guarantees; in return, the partners promised consultation, military cooperation, and, as appropriate, base rights. The glue in these asymmetrical pacts was, of course, U.S. military power; but, in most cases, it was augmented by military and economic assistance. (2)

U.S. alliances in the Cold War have been compared to other types of foreign policy positions based in asymmetrical deference to a great power. Geir Lundestad (1990) draws comparisons between post-1945 American foreign policy and the foreign policy approaches of the 19th Century British Empire. Yuen Foong Khong (2013, 15) offers a persuasive parallel between the ancient Chinese tributary system and the 20th Century American alliance strategy; he details how U.S. allies (as well as informal partners) are offered military protection and access to U.S. economic markets in exchange for two key tributes: 1) acknowledgment of American exceptionalism/global hegemony and 2) the adoption of American-style political and ideological values. By qualitatively comparing modern American alliance politics with the foreign policies of imperial Britain and dynastic China, Lundestad (1990) and Khong (2013) essentially reinforce the application of the complementary exchange model to this case.

The East Asian alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan certainly exemplify these asymmetric aims of control. The importance of Japan’s geostrategic location and industrial capability to the U.S. defense against communism in the Pacific is well-known, but the 1951 alliance also explicitly served the purpose of controlling Japan as it rebounded from defeat in World War II. In exchange for one-directional promises of protection under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the alliance facilitated American political control of post-war Japan, thereby assuring
its regional neighbors and former colonies that it would not resurge as an activist imperial power in Asia (Cha 2010; Menon 2007). Perhaps an even better illustration of the dual aims of American asymmetric alliances is the 1953 alliance with South Korea. Victor Cha (2010, 174) outlines three core functions of the US-ROK alliance: 1) as part of a network of alliances establishing a perimeter around the USSR in the Pacific, 2) a “tripwire” placement for U.S. troops, and 3) as a means of restraining the very difficult President Rhee, who served from 1948 to 1960. The basing rights the U.S. would obtain from the alliance certainly expanded the United States’ ability to counter Soviet expansion in the Pacific and forced the Soviet Union to face the West on two fronts (Menon 2007, 109), but much of the context for the alliance in 1953 emphasizes the aim of controlling South Korea itself. Multiple primary document accounts of American foreign policy leaders emphasize the need to restrain Rhee from perpetuating war to unify the peninsula and the exasperation of doing so.\textsuperscript{149} Similarly, an internal State Department memo outlined the dual goals of the 1954 Taiwan alliance as deterring Chinese communists and keeping the government of Chiang Kai-Shek “under control” (Cha 2010, 170). As with Rhee in South Korea, concerns about U.S. entrapment dominated the negotiations; Chiang Kai-Shek had openly discussed plans to use military force to retake the Chinese mainland, while Secretary of State Acheson promised “Chiang would never draw the United States into a second Chinese civil war.” (Cha 2010, 170) The U.S. even moved the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait while Truman issued a policy warning for Chiang to back down from his aggressive rhetoric (Cha

\textsuperscript{149} Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reportedly sent warnings to Rhee to stop calling for more war to liberate the northern peninsula or risk sparking a nuclear war (Cha 2010, 175). President Dwight Eisenhower described the South Korean President: “[Rhee] wants to get his country unified, but we cannot permit him to start a war to do it. The consequences would be too awful. But he is a stubborn old fellow, and I don’t know whether we’ll be able to hold him in line indefinitely.” (Cha 2010, 175) U.S. officials even considered a policy that would overthrow Rhee and replace him with a more compliant leader for U.S. interests (Steuck 2012, 18).
The alliance was another means of establishing control over the government in Taiwan.

The Middle Eastern alliances, in contrast, appear to be motivated less by the need to restrain expansionist leaders and more by the need to reinforce the loyalty of these geo-strategically valuable states to the West, not the Soviet Union. Both President Truman’s 1951 policy directive, NSC 47/5, and the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine affirmed the Middle East as an important component of American containment strategy (Sherwood 1990, 61 & 92). Writing in defense of the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral alliance, then-Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Aziz Ahmed (1960, 65) explicitly stated that the purpose of the alliance was not to enable a conflict between Pakistan and India or to enable Pakistan to fully defend itself against a Soviet attack, but to publicly affirm Pakistan’s alignment with the West and, deter Soviet pressure, and cultivate domestic policies in line with western values: “It is often forgotten that the object of these alliances is not only to enable America’s Asian allies to stand up to military pressure but to create conditions under which these countries can undertake the urgent task of building up their economies in an atmosphere of security and freedom.” Indeed, in all of these cases, the bilateral alliance affirmed the asymmetric dependence of the weaker partners on their American ally.

Following the Anglo-American covert action, Operation Ajax, to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeg, the unpopular Pahlavi Shah saw the support of the United States as critical to the maintenance of his regime and spent the subsequent decades moving ever-closer toward the U.S. (Lytle 1987; Walt 1990), including being the loudest voice pressuring the U.S. to back up its commitment to the Baghdad Pact members through formal bilateral defense treaties

---

150 Indeed, following the Eisenhower Doctrine, the U.S. Congress approved a three-prong strategy of preventing Soviet expansion in the Middle East: 1) economic and development aid, 2) military assistance programs, and 3) the use of armed force to help any nation “requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism.” (Sherwood 1990, 92)
in 1959 (Harris 1972, 68). As the recipient of huge sums of American economic and military aid dating back to the 1947 Truman Doctrine and 1952 accession into NATO, Turkey remained heavily dependent on their U.S. partner throughout the early Cold War (Harris 1972, 155 & 182; Walt 1990, 60-63). And for Pakistan, alliance dependence on the United States brought much-needed military aid to counter India (Walt 1990, 66).

The remaining bilateral alliances in the U.S. portfolio each feature unique aims by the United States. From the beginning, the U.S.-Spain alliance was driven by American interests in maintaining basing rights and Spain’s desire to be compensated for those rights, not any meaningful policy coordination or capability aggregation; indeed, according to Tongfi Kim (2011, 369): “[t]he United States valued its bases in Spain but otherwise had little interest in its relationship with Spain.” The formalization of the 1963, 1970, and 1976 alliance treaties were aimed squarely at defining the terms of this very explicit *quid pro quo*. The 1981 U.S.-Israel alliance is the best example of a capability aggregation alliance, with both states contributing to joint maneuvers against the threat of the Soviet Union or any Soviet-controlled forces, such as the Cubans in Angola: “In the memorandum of 1981, it is Israel that proposes its services to the United States in order to deter the USSR.” (Mansour 1994, 149) Especially unique is the 1977 treaty with Panama, whose primary aim was neither capability aggregation nor asymmetric control; instead, the dual Panama Canal and Neutrality Treaties sought to addressing the growing tension in the U.S.-Panama relationship over the management of the Panama Canal by returning the Canal to Panama and specifying the terms of continued American involvement in its defense.

---

151 Stephen Walt (1990, 55) argues that these alliances represent détente relationships, not bandwagoning: “Bandwagoning involves *unequal exchange*; the vulnerable state makes asymmetrical concessions to the dominant power and accepts a subordinate role. Détente, by contrast, involves roughly equal concessions in which both sides benefit.” However, his analysis—in the context of his “balance of threat” theory—focuses more on the ways in which these allies moved away from the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, thus demonstrating their non-dependence. In the context of their formation and design at the beginning of the alliance relationship, I suggest that his bandwagoning definition is more appropriate.
(Coniff 2012, 133-134). Though the treaties ultimately granted the U.S. basing rights and the primary responsibility for the defense of the Canal, oversight was vested in a “Combined Board” of military representatives from both countries (Conniff 2012, 133-146).

Trends of Institutionalization in U.S. Bilateral Alliances

Consistent with the aims and objectives described above, U.S. bilateral alliances frequently employ institutionalization mechanisms that correspond to the predictions of the complementary exchange model, including American basing rights in the weaker partner’s territory, American military aid (sometimes also economic aid) to the weaker partner, and even the subordination of the weaker power’s troops to U.S. command. Some U.S. alliances also include a formal committee or organization to facilitate the peacetime coordination of the alliance partnership.

The Japanese alliance, in particular, exemplifies the asymmetric complementary exchange model. In exchange for providing assurances of American defense of Japan, beginning in 1951, Japan granted the U.S. basing rights for its army, navy, and air force on the island of Okinawa and was further prohibited from granting any basing rights to a third party without the prior consent of the United States (Kim 2011, 365). The formal joint committee to facilitate peacetime consultation between the partners provided further institutionalization, but according to Tongfi Kim (2011, 365), this was never intended to be a means of Japan having a meaningful voice of dissent with U.S. policies. The ability of the U.S. to intervene in Japan included a clause in the alliance treaty permitting the U.S. to provide assistance (at the request of the
Japanese government) in quelling “large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.” (Benson 2012, 146)

While the South Korean and Taiwanese alliances also used basing rights as a mechanism of institutionalization, in these cases the U.S. added an additional mechanism of control that was not captured in the quantitative models of Chapter 4—conditions on U.S. defense support. The South Korean alliance specified clear conditionalities on U.S. military action to support South Korea as a means of both minimizing U.S. entrapment and deterring Rhee from provoking a crisis, including a memorandum of understanding that the operational command of all Korean military would fall to the U.S. in the event of a crisis (Cha 2010, 171; Kim 2011, 361-362), the ability of either partner to end the treaty by giving one year’s notice, and a U.S. defense commitment promising “it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes” rather than the automatic response as outlined in the NATO agreement (Steuck 2012, 19). The use of conditionalities as a means of ally control is even more apparent in the Taiwan case as the American defense pact was of even greater necessity to Chiang Kai-Shek’s aims. Having failed to conquer the mainland during the civil war that ended in 1949, Chiang understood that a successful mission required the support of the United States; thus, the U.S. denial of unconditional support and emphasis on a highly-conditional defense pact was enough to control its ROC ally and further policy intrusions (Benson 2012, 152-155). Secretary of State Dulles later described this strategy as “deterrence [of Chiang] by uncertainty.”

152 Another example of policy deference in the alliance can be found in Japan’s adoption of a strategy of “comprehensive security” by using trade in Southeast Asia to deter the spread of communism—an objective of U.S. containment policy, though it undeniably helped Japan’s own economic recovery (Menon 2007, 109).

153 The treaty further clarifies that “it is the understanding of the United States that… nor shall anything in the present Treaty be construed as requiring the United States to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea.” (Benson 2012, 147)
Brett Benson (2012, 150) argues that while the Japanese and South Korean alliances were characterized by “conditional deterents” (assurances of U.S. intervention if the conditions of the casus belli are met), the Taiwanese alliance hinged on a “probabilistic deterrent” (potential U.S. intervention, even if the casus belli conditions are met). He goes onto to argue that while all three alliances were designed to control the weaker U.S. partner, the differences in how they achieved these goals can be understood in terms of the clarity of the trip-wire that would invoke them; the 38th Parallel on the Korean Peninsula was more easily defended and responsibility for a hostile event more unambiguous, than the many islands surrounding Taiwan (Benson 2012, 149-150).

Perhaps surprisingly, these East Asian alliances—all qualitatively described as deeply institutionalized—are coded in the data as but moderately institutionalized. For example, the 1951 Japanese alliance is coded in the models for Chapter 4 as having an institutional depth score of “3” (1 point for a formal organization + 2 points for military basing rights) and the 1953 South Korean and 1954 Taiwanese alliances are coded as having an institutional depth score of “2” (military basing rights). This divergence between quantitative measurement and qualitative insight can in part be explained in the context of the already-existing postwar Japan occupation; the ability of the U.S. to secure its desired control of Japan hardly hinged on the details of the formal treaty. In the cases of South Korea and Taiwan, the treaties emphasized

---

154 Benson (2012) describes how many observers, including academic Thomas Schelling, criticized this strategy as a weak deterrent because it undermined the credibility of the threat that the U.S. would intervene in the event of a PRC incursion against Taiwan.

155 Cha (2010, 159) argues that the U.S. the ability to exert this level of control over its obligations to the East Asian states was only possible through bilateral (vs. multilateral) alliances—what he describes as a “powerplay theory” of alliance formation.

156 Again, details regarding U.S. alliance treaty contents—including institutionalization mechanisms—are drawn from the ATOP project’s data and alliance codesheets, unless otherwise noted (Leeds, et al. 2002). The ATOP codesheets are available online at atop.rice.edu/codesheets.
conditionalities as a means of control falling outside the quantitative measure of institutionalization used in this project.

Falling particularly outside the theory’s predictions is the 1951 U.S. alliance with the Philippines, specified no mechanisms of institutionalization despite qualitatively comporting with the aims of an asymmetric alliance of control and representing a very asymmetric partnership. The Philippines alliance is especially unusual given that it is the only case of an American alliance with a former colony. In both the British and French cases, some of the most deeply institutionalized alliances are with former colonies as a means of perpetuating the major power’s control; yet the United States did not rely on a formal alliance—why? Hilton Root (2008, 86-87) argues that while American interests in early-1950s Philippines were absolutely about controlling the outcomes of the Huk insurgency and weak first Presidential administrations of Manuel Roxas and Elpidio Quirino in addition to assuring extensive basing rights as part of the containment strategy, U.S. intervention in the country was previously established by a decades-long colonial relationship without any third-party interference: “The Philippines was America’s clearest canvas… From the beginning of the American occupation in 1901, U.S. policymakers had more than forty years in which to erect institutions that would transform the Philippines into the first functioning democracy in the postcolonial world.” In other words, the scope of U.S. involvement did not hinge on a detailed and deeply institutionalized treaty.¹⁵⁷

All of the 1959 alliances (with Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Liberia) are only institutionalized in the formal treaty text through clauses assuring another mechanism argued to be associated with the asymmetric complementary exchange model—U.S. military aid to each of the partners. In all of these cases, American military (and often also economic aid) was flowing

¹⁵⁷ David Lake (1999) further expands on the extreme asymmetry of the U.S.-Philippines relationship outside of the formal treaty.
prior to the conclusion of the formal treaties, especially the cases of Turkey and Pakistan.

Indeed, the Congressional response to the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine emphasized the use of both economic and military aid to ensure American interests in the region were protected (Sherwood 1990, 92). The numbers are not unsubstantial; according to Walt (1990, 61 & 66), Turkey received an average $100 million per year between 1950 and 1960 and Pakistan received an average $120 million per year between 1953 and 1958. In return for this aid, the treaties also formalized the expectation that these Middle Eastern partners adopt policy postures favorable to U.S. containment strategy, such as Turkey’s commitment to the NATO mission (including allowing Allied access to Turkish military bases) and Iran’s public endorsement of the Eisenhower Doctrine (Walt 1990, 58 & 61).

But it worth asking why the United States relied exclusively on one-directional military aid payments instead of deeper mechanisms, such as the basing rights used in the Asian alliances? First, unlike in Asia, the U.S. lacked a highly invested prior relationship with the Middle Eastern countries, either in terms of direct occupation (i.e.: Japan and the Philippines) or participation in a large-scale conflict (i.e.: Japan and South Korea), and thus no need to formalize the existing presence of American troops. Second, whereas in the Asian cases the other major power at play in the region was the Soviet Union, in the Middle East the U.S. had to negotiate around both Great Britain and France (who had long-standing colonial investments in the region and at times both proved to be difficult partners). Finally, U.S. aims in the two regions—while both rightly defined as asymmetric control—were fundamentally different; in three of the four Asian cases, the U.S. was engaged in the heavy work of nation-building and therefore had need to formalize an active presence through deep institutionalization, but in the Middle Eastern cases,
the U.S. was primarily focused on deterring Soviet pressure and preserving its partners’ alignments toward the West, which are both goals capable of being “bought” through aid.

As the most deeply institutionalized bilateral alliances in the U.S. portfolio, the three treaties with Spain deserve special attention.\textsuperscript{158} On the one hand, these treaties exemplify the types of institutionalization mechanisms argued to be associated with asymmetric alliances in the complementary exchange model, such as basing rights in exchange for one-directional military aid. The 1963 treaty provided for the provision of $100 million in U.S. military aid to Spain in exchange for U.S. basing rights (land, air, and naval), as well as the formation of the formal “U.S.-Spanish Consultative Committee” to meet monthly. The 1970 and 1976 treaties expanded these terms, including the following: three consultative committees (a “Joint Committee on Defense Matters,” “Combined Military Coordination and Planning Staff,” and a “Joint Committee for Politico-Military Administrative Affairs”), an expanded and more specified military aid package ($2 million in training grants, $120 million in loans for arms purchases, and a $50 million air force modernization grant), and economic aid in the form of $450 million in new credit from the Export-Import Bank.

On the other hand, however, the fact that the U.S. more deeply institutionalized the 1970 and 1976 treaties with Spain, even as the relative power ratio between the two countries decreased, goes against the theory’s prediction that institutional depth should be positively correlated with greater relative power asymmetry. Thus, while U.S. aims in the alliance and the type of institutionalization mechanisms chosen fit the theory, the overall depth of

\textsuperscript{158} The 1963 treaty with Spain is coded in the data for this project as having an institutional depth score of “5,” while the 1970 and 1976 treaties are both coded with an institutional depth score of “6.”
institutionalization does not. This divergence can, in part, be explained as a substantive reflection of the priority U.S. diplomats placed on preserving U.S. basing rights in Spain, regardless of summative power ratios. But perhaps the more interesting explanation is that the deeper institutionalization of the later treaties actually reflected the interests of an increasingly powerful minor partner seeking greater and greater concessions for allowing U.S. military bases in its territory. Given that U.S. aims did not include the type of heavy-handed policy control that existed in other cases (i.e.: Japan and South Korea), greater institutionalization in the Spain case essentially translated into more benefits to Spain than unwanted control.

**Summary**

This qualitative consideration of the United States’ Cold War alliance politics offers some valuable insights into the theory of this project. As illustrated in Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2, the U.S. did not appear to conform to the basic trends proposed by the complementary exchange model. Surprisingly, the foregoing discussion actually illustrates that a number of refractions in the quantitative data—such as the inclusion of obligation conditionalities as a means of control in some cases—would actually result in a pattern of American bilateral alliances that fits more accurately with the theory’s predictions. The case further suggests that major power aims do substantively matter; in many cases, the U.S. altered the institutionalization mechanisms based on the aims of the alliance and, in the case of Spain, the nature of U.S. aims actually caused the minor power’s perception of institutionalization to shift from the negative to the positive.

Moreover, the U.S. still negotiated favorable terms in the later treaties despite expanded institutionalization. For example, the 1976 treaty actually limited U.S. defense obligations by through conditionalities on the alliance that excluding Spanish activities in North Africa (Kim 2011, 373).

205
Russia/USSR – A Frequent, but Uncommitted, Ally

Due to the availability of qualitative information, the alliance politics of Russia (including the period of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or USSR) is a challenging case to consider in depth, but given Russia’s role as major European power and pole during the Cold War period of the 20th Century, it offers nonetheless an important contrast to the U.S. case above, as well as the British and French cases in the preceding chapter. Further, the Russian/Soviet case accounts for the largest single bloc of alliance cases in the extant data; according to the ATOP data, Russia/USSR was party to 138 alliances between 1815 and 2003 (Leeds, et al. 2002). 91 of these alliances are included in the dataset for this project. 21 are excluded because they are multilateral and thus beyond the scope of this study, including a few well-known multilateral alliance blocs such as the OSCE (signed in 1975) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (signed after the dissolution of the USSR in 1992). Of the four major power case studies considered in this project, Russia accounts for the smallest proportion of multilateral alliances and largest proportion of bilateral alliances. Ten Russian alliances are excluded for specifying only nonaggression pacts and no other type of active commitment. Finally, sixteen bilateral alliances are excluded because they were signed in secrecy or their terms were wholly or partially secret; Russia accounts for the most secret treaties of the four qualitative cases, though this trend largely stops after World War II.

Summary data on the Russian bilateral alliances including in this project are presented below in Table 6.2 (which categorizes the alliances by degree of institutional depth) and Figure 6.2 (a two-way plot of alliance institutional depth and dyad’s relative power asymmetry). 160 It is

160 The simple correlation in Figure 6.2 is (and should not) be used to assess causality as it clearly does not include or control for the other factors that might have an impact on Russia’s alliance institutional depth. It is included here as a visual reference for Russia’s basic alliance portfolio and to provide context to the subsequent qualitative discussion.
immediately apparent that while the basic trends in Russian bilateral alliances support the overall prediction of the complementary exchange model, the positive relationship between the partners’ relative power ratio and the depth of institutionalization specified in the treaty document is not as strong as in the British and French cases. Moreover, Russia appears to offer a counter-example to the United States in its proclivity for concluding many alliances with very little to no terms of institutionalization. This case thus offers an interesting point of comparison to all three of the qualitative cases in this project.

Figure 6.2: Russia/USSR Bilateral Alliances, 1815-2003
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Depth = 0</th>
<th>Depth = 1 - 2</th>
<th>Depth = 3 - 4</th>
<th>Depth = 5 - 6</th>
<th>Depth = 7 - 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria 1833</td>
<td>UK 1941</td>
<td>Estonia 1939</td>
<td>Latvia 1939</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK 1944</td>
<td>China 1950</td>
<td>Lithuania 1939</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey 1925</td>
<td>Iraq 1972</td>
<td>Egypt 1971</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan 1926</td>
<td>Somalia 1974</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany 1926</td>
<td>Angola 1976</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania 1926</td>
<td>Mozambique 1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran 1927</td>
<td>Afghanistan 1978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland 1932, 1948, 1992</td>
<td>Ethiopia 1978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy 1933, 1990</td>
<td>Syria 1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia 1935, 1943</td>
<td>Congo 1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia 1936, 1966</td>
<td>Kazakhstan 1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China 1937, 2001</td>
<td>Turkey 1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan 1941</td>
<td>Italy 1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia 1941, 1945</td>
<td>Armenia 1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea 1961, 2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Germany 1964, 1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic 1970, 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada 1971, 1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark 1976</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam 1978, 1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta 1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain 1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan 1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine 1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova 2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*“Institutional Depth” defined using the revised alliance institutionalization index described in Chapter 4
A Brief History of Russian/Soviet Bilateral Alliances

The historical context for the alliance politics of Russia—unlike the United States—extends back through the 19th Century. The Russian case is also unique among the major power cases discussed here in that it experienced tumultuous changes to its domestic political system, transitioning during the 19th and 20th Centuries from three centuries of tsarist rule to the world’s first communist state in 1917 and then into an emerging democracy161 with the fall of the Soviet Union in the early-1990s.162 The discussion below is organized to reflect the different foreign policies of each domestic political system.

Like Britain and France, tsarist Russia was an active participant in the shifting alliance politics of 19th Century Europe, during which Russia firmly advocated for the preservation of conservatism, as illustrated by its leadership in the Holy Alliance and Tsar Alexander I’s slogan of “Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationalism.” (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 8) Robert Donaldson and Joseph Nogee (1998, 31-32) argue that tsarist Russia’s foreign policy in the 19th Century—particularly regarding the Balkans—must be understood in the context of Russia’s perennial mission of expansionism and, beginning with Peter the Great, naval expansionism in particular. Perhaps more so than the other European major powers during this period, Russia favored an alliance policy that frequently clouded its alliances in terms of secrecy. Many Russian scholars have attributed 19th Century Russia’s diplomatic reputation of being “secretive and suspicious, untrustworthy, and displaying unusual hostility” to the autocratic nature and absolutist volatility of the tsarist political system (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 19-20).

---

161 When describing the modern Russian Federation, most scholars account for continuing elements of authoritarianism by using regime descriptions such as “semi-authoritarian” or “modernizing authoritarianism” (for example, see Orvis and Drogus 2014).
162 One could argue that France also experienced domestic political upheaval as well, including the Second Republic, Second Empire, and Third Republic of the 19th Century, and the Fourth and Fifth Republics of the 20th Century.
Therefore, due to operationalization restrictions to exclude secret or partially-secret alliances, only four of Russia’s seventeen pre-World War I bilateral alliances are included in this project. All four of these cases are pacts with other major powers, and all are very limited in scope. In keeping with Russia’s policy of repression toward the nationalist movements that swept Europe beginning in 1830, Russia concluded two separate alliances with Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1833 relating specifically to future resistance movements in Poland.\textsuperscript{163, 164} The 1844 alliance with Great Britain was similarly limited in scope, this time to the declining Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Peninsula, which Tsar Nicholas I famously referred to as the “sick man of Europe.” (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 9) Given that Russian control over the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits would upset the European balance of power, Russia sought to assure Great Britain that Russia would take no unilateral action on the peninsula; this assurance lasted until the Crimean War of the next decade.

As was acknowledged in the French illustrative case from the previous chapter, the best known of Russia’s alliances during this period is what would become the first leg of the Triple Entente—the 1891/1894 Franco-Russian Alliance.\textsuperscript{165} Fearful that Russia could throw its weight to an alliance that tipped the balance of power against Germany, in 1887 German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck negotiated the secret Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, in which both parties promised neutrality barring aggression by Germany against France or Russia against Austria (Donaldson and Nogee 1998; Kennan 1984; Snyder 1997; Weitsman 2004). But in a fateful move, in 1890 Kaiser Wilhelm II refused to renew the treaty. Russia’s resulting sense of

\textsuperscript{163} All cases in the Russian alliance portfolio were identified using the ATOP data and alliance codesheets (Leeds, et al. 2002).
\textsuperscript{164} This policy of conservatism extended to other major powers; in 1849, Russia would send 200,000 troops to repress the Hungarian uprising against the Austrian Empire (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 8).
\textsuperscript{165} As observed in the French illustrative case study, George Kennan’s \textit{The Fateful Alliance} (1984) offers perhaps the most comprehensive historical account of the diplomatic negotiations leading up to the Franco-Russian Alliance.
insecurity, combined with its modernized military (compared to the Crimean War at least), made an attractive alliance partner for France, who had its own reasons for seeking a new alliance partner (Donaldson and Nogee 1998; Kennan 1984; Snyder 1997; Weitsman 2004). The soon-to-follow Triple Entente not only set the stage for the rigid alliances that expanded a limited conflict in the Balkans to a global conflagration in 1914, but arguably also was the first in a series of events, including the Russo-Japanese War, 1905 Revolution, and Russia’s experience in World War I itself, that would precipitate the 1917 Russian Revolution.

With the overthrow of the tsarist system in 1917, the new Soviet foreign policy represented a fundamental shift from expansionism and empire to an ideological rejection of capitalist imperialism, which Soviet leaders argued was the fundamental source of struggle both in Russia and internationally. As an opening act, in March 1918 the Bolsheviks signed an armistice with Germany to withdraw from World War I, accepting the humiliating loss of one-third of Russia’s western territory as the price (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 50; Petro and Rubinstein 1997, 20). Donaldson and Nogee (1998, 73) reference this as an early example of what would become the diplomatic style of the early Soviet Union: “demonstrative diplomacy,” in which diplomatic negotiations—including treaties—provided public forums to project Soviet ideology to domestic publics over the heads of diplomats, regardless of the type of treaty or even whether it was successfully concluded. But the new communist country was limited by both its military capabilities and by the isolation it experienced as a result of the domestic stresses of adopting Stalin’s aggressive policies of rapid industrialization and agriculture collectivization, as well as the skepticism—even hostility—of the other European states (Donaldson and Nogee 1998; Petro and Rubinstein 1997). Thus, even while continuing to advance global communism, Lenin acknowledged the need for diplomatic recognition and “normalization” with non-
communist states (Petro and Rubinstein 1997, 23; Kennedy-Pipe 1998, 25-26). While the USSR did sign several alliances during the years between World Wars I and II, only a handful were active-obligation defense pacts, including Czechoslovakia (1935), France (1935), Mongolia (1936), and, after the USSR’s invasion of Poland in 1938, the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (1939). The remaining alliances of the 1920s and 1930s are all non-aggression and neutrality pacts, including alliances with Turkey (1925), Afghanistan (1926), Germany (1926), Lithuania (1926), Iran (1927), Finland (1932), France (1932), Poland (1932), Italy (1933), and China (1937).

After World War II, Soviet foreign policy shifted to focus on the escalating Cold War conflict with the United States. Much as the United States used strategic defense pacts to contain the spread of Soviet influence, the USSR used alliances to establish its own sphere of influence. It would, of course, be remiss to discuss Soviet Cold War alliances without referencing the multilateral Warsaw Pact—the USSR’s answer to NATO.166 Unlike the United States, however, the Soviets limited defense pacts to countries with geographic contiguity, including China (1945 and 1950), Poland (1945 and 1965), Yugoslavia (1945), Bulgaria (1948 and 1967), Finland (1948), Hungary (1948 and 1967), Romania (1948 and 1970), North Korea (1961), East Germany (1964 and 1965), Mongolia (1966), and the Czech Republic (1970). The remainder of the USSR’s alliances during the Cold War are mostly consultation and non-aggression pacts with members of the Non-Aligned Movement that emerged in 1961, including Egypt (1971), India (1971), Iraq (1971), Somalia (1974), Angola (1976), Mozambique (1977), Afghanistan (1978), Ethiopia (1978), Vietnam (1978), Yemen (1979), and Syria (1980). Exceptions to this rule—Soviet bilateral alliances with western-allied countries—include Canada (1971), Denmark

166 For a selection of recent detailed treatments on the Warsaw Pact see Crump (2015), Heiss and Papacosma (2008), and Mastny and Byrne (2005).
In response to U.S. multilateral and bilateral alliance policies of containment that advocated for express alignment with the West, the USSR adopted a policy promoting neutrality and soft alignment with the USSR as an alternative to deep exploitation by the imperialism of the West (Allison 1988, 181). A key component of executing this strategy certainly involved undermining any multilateral Western treaties, such as NATO, CENTO, and SEATO; instead of creating its own regional multilateral alliances outside of Eastern Europe, however, the USSR used bilateral “treaties of friendship and cooperation”—as well as economic and foreign aid—to formalize Soviet influence (Allison 1988, 217; Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 247). “As a lasting legacy of Lenin’s theory of imperialism, Soviet policymakers continued to demonstrate sensitivity to the common ground between socialist states and underdeveloped countries said to be suffering from imperialist exploitation.” (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 30) Soviet relations with these neutral countries were what Nikita Khrushchev called a “zone of peace” (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 76). Though the 1970s brought about a period of détente in the Cold War, this new relaxation did not reduce Soviet commitment to reducing Western influence wherever it could, including engaging in proxy conflicts, such as in Angola, Vietnam, and Afghanistan (Donaldson and Nogee 1998; Kennedy-Pipe 1997).

The Russian Federation that emerged in the early-1990s faced new restrictions on its ability to project a unilateral global foreign policy, including reduced capabilities, new domestic political restraints, and an economic crisis; the priority for Russia’s reduced resources was undeniably preserving its regional hegemony in the post-Soviet states and Eastern Europe (Petro and Rubinstein 1997). President Boris Yeltsin, in a 1993 official foreign policy plan, described

---

167 Khrushchev certainly embraced a policy shift after the death of Joseph Stalin—what was called “de-Stalinization.” In his 1956 address to the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev included “pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence… building stronger relations among the socialist states…and strengthening friendship and cooperation with neutralist and peace-loving states in Europe and the Third World” among the major aims of Soviet foreign policy (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 70).
Eastern Europe as “in our historical sphere of influence” and “emphasized Russia’s rights and responsibilities in the states of the former USSR” including “the greatest possible degree of integration” with what came to be known as the “blizhnee zarubezhe” or “near abroad” (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 117-118). The prospect of NATO expansion into Eastern Europe undeniably served as strong motivation for this policy. Thus, it is no great surprise that the bulk of Russia’s post-Soviet alliance portfolio focuses on the “near abroad.” The multilateral core of Russia’s regional hegemony was the Commonwealth of Independent States (or CIS), formed in 1991 with eleven of the former Soviet republics (Donaldson and Nogee 1998; Petro and Rubinstein 1997). Russia also concluded bilateral defense pacts with many of these states as well, including Armenia (1991 and 1997), Kazakhstan (1992), Kyrgyzstan (1992), Turkmenistan (1992 and 2002), Uzbekistan (1992 and 1994), Tajikistan (1993), and Belarus (1995 and 1997). In addition, Russia signed consultation and non-aggression pacts with post-Soviet Azerbaijan (1997), Ukraine (1997), and Moldova (2001). Notably excluded from this list are the three Baltic States. Of all the post-Soviet states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have done the most to reject Russian influence, expelling all Russian troops, joining the European Union, and seeking the protection of the United States via NATO membership (Donaldson and Nogee 1998; Kozhemiakin and Kanet 1997; Petro and Rubinstein 1997; Vares 1995).

Not too dissimilar from the neutrality and nonaggression pacts used re-establish the Soviet diplomatic presence in the Interwar Era, the Russian Federation has used numerous “treaties of friendship and cooperation” in the post-Soviet era (including with some NATO and western states): France (1990 & 1992), Germany (1990), Italy (1990 & 1994), Bulgaria (1992), Canada (1992), Finland (1992), Poland (1992), Turkey (1992), Czech Republic (1993), Greece (1993), India (1993), Slovakia (1993), Spain (1994), North Korea (2000), China (2001), and
Romania (2003). These treaties reflect a Russian foreign policy under President Boris Yeltsin of seeking to “join the West”; it also included seeking membership in a number of Western associations, such as the G-7 (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 247). Often these treaties correlated with renewed or expanded economic relations with Russia (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 248-253).

The Aims of Russian/Soviet Bilateral Alliances

Russia’s aims in its alliances clearly evolve in correlation with both Russia’s changing domestic political structure and the international context. While pre-World War I era alliances in the tsarist era focused entirely on managing Russian security in the European context (mostly through secret treaties), the alliances of the early-USSR shifted suddenly to focus on establishing a Soviet diplomatic presence via nonaggression and neutrality pacts. Soviet alliance strategy after World War II reflected the global scope of the Cold War and ranged from defense pacts with strategic countries in geographic proximity to the USSR to treaties of friendship and cooperation with a number of Non-Aligned nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian Federation alliance aims clearly shifted again to preserving Russian control over the “near abroad” and reassuring global partners of Russian diplomatic continuity under the new government.

Though the Russian/Soviet case features the largest number of bilateral alliances (both in general and in the data for this project), in only about one-third of the Russian alliances in the data for this project does Russia conclude treaties that require an active defense or offense pact.\footnote{Most of the discussion of specific alliance treaty contents (obligations, terms, institutionalization mechanisms, etc.) for the Russian case is drawn from the ATOP data and alliance codesheets (Leeds, et al. 2002). Alliance terms} And after 1970, the only active-obligation alliances signed by Russia are with East
Germany (1975) and several of the post-Soviet states, particularly those in Central Asia; the remaining post-World War II alliances—both those concluded by the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation—are neutrality, consultation, or nonaggression pacts (or a combination thereof). This overall trend makes the Russian case unique to the U.S., British, or French cases. But then, like the other cases, Russia’s bilateral alliance portfolio clearly emphasizes asymmetric partnerships. 26 of the Russian/Soviet alliances in this project are with powers whose relative power ratio (using the CINC scores of both partners) falls above the standard deviation for the overall data; in other words, these are very asymmetric alliances between Russia and much weaker powers. Though wide-ranging in terms of geography, all of these very asymmetric partnerships occur after the establishment of the USSR in 1917. Tsarist Russia’s 19th Century alliance politics significantly favor pacts with other major powers (both in general and in the data for this project); that said, Russia/USSR did conclude a number of alliances with other major powers in the 20th Century as well, including Germany (1926), China (1945 and 1950), Great Britain (1941), and India (1993).

Russia’s aims in the 1891/1894 alliance with France clearly exemplify those of a 19th Century symmetric capability aggregation alliance. Russia was sensitive to its insecure position in Europe in the late-19th Century, stemming from both its hostile relationship with Austria-Hungary and its sense of relative military weakness in terms of capabilities, modernization, and industrialization, both of which date back to the Crimean War; its primary aim was to increase its capability against a direct threat through alliance assurances (Weitsman 2004, 102). Patricia Weitsman (2004, 104) observes that relative troop ratios—a basic indicator of capability

that have been derived from other sources’ qualitative discussions are otherwise noted. The ATOP codesheets are available online at atop.rice.edu/codesheets.

169 The dataset for this project measures relative power as the natural log of both partners’ Correlates of War (COW) National Capabilities Index (or CINC score) ratio (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). The mean for this variable is 2.177591 and the standard deviation is 1.692875.
aggregation aims—were on the minds of Russian diplomats in 1890, especially German policy changes to increase the army’s troop levels and military budget, combined with boastful comments by Germany’s Minister of War about Germany’s relative military strength. Diplomats were also likely aware that while Germany’s industrial capabilities were growing as a leader in the Second Industrial Revolution, French and Russian relative capabilities were actually declining; Glenn Snyder (1997, 110) estimates the joint Franco-Russian capabilities had declined by 8% between 1880 and 1890. Seeking to bolster its own capabilities, the Russian ambassador in Paris was instructed as follows:

The situation created in Europe by the manifest renewal of the Triple Alliance, and the more or less probable adhesion of Great Britain to the political aims that this alliance pursues… our respective governments, which being outside of all leagues, are nonetheless sincerely desirous of surrounding the maintenance of peace with the most efficacious guarantees. (Weitsman 2004, 105-106)

Thus, Weitsman (2004, 111) describes Russia’s aims in the 1891/1894 alliance with France as primarily capability aggregation and balancing against three of the other major European powers—Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, and Germany.

The earliest alliances of the Soviet era clearly reflect the need to establish control over its borders via asymmetric control of weaker partners. For example, the alliances with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan in the mid-1920s reflected a concerted strategy to establish Soviet diplomatic relations and disrupt British influence in the predominantly Muslim states to the USSR’s south (Allison 1988; Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 56-57). The 1939 alliances with the three Baltic States expressly fit into Stalin’s plan to create a buffer zone against Germany and the West in Eastern Europe. The French and Czechoslovakian alliances of 1935 were motivated by a desire to prevent the increasingly militaristic Nazi-led Germany from turning its attention to the USSR by assuring French and Czechoslovakian neutrality (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 60). The
treaties the USSR signed with the Eastern European states of Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Romania in the late-1940s similarly served primarily to legalize both Soviet influence and territorial acquisitions—essentially the formalization of Winston Churchill’s “iron curtain” (Kennedy-Pipe 1997, 92-94; Petro and Rubinstein 1997, 50). Of course, the closer to the partner was to the territorial USSR, the more directly the USSR sought to control its partner.

Beginning in the 1950s, Khrushchev began using alliances to build relationships with a number of what were called “Third World” countries. This impressively global array of partners reflected the Cold War strategy of limiting the reach of the United States by denying it committed partners: “Soviet friendship and cooperation treaties with Third World states were intended to displace or counteract the existing alignments and alliances between these states and the Western powers.” (Allison 1988, 181) Most of these alliances were limited in scope, but still “gave varying degrees of encouragement to the policies of Third World elites who found military alliance with Western countries difficult to sustain domestically and who therefore opted for foreign policies ranging from coolness to outright hostility toward the West.” (Petro and Rubinstein 1997, 217) The hope was that the new “neutral” partners would strive to create similar treaties, further expanding opposition to Western influence (Allison 1988, 181). This policy of “normalization,” not “communization” still allowed Moscow’s representatives to promote socialist policies such as nationalizing key industries (Petro and Rubinstein 1997, 218).

But Soviet aims went further than merely encouraging neutrality toward the West—despite being merely “treaties of friendship and cooperation,” they were fundamentally asymmetric. As observed by Roy Allison (1988, 218), most of the Soviet-era treaties of friendship and cooperation included “general provisions on the cooperation of the parties over
certain aspects of their security policies rather than direct commitments to joint military activity.” Though Soviet officials emphasized the weak obligations outlined in the treaties as evidence that they did not violate the neutrality of members of the Non-Aligned Movement, Western officials countered that these treaties were often correlated with deeper military and economic ties between the partners (Allison 1988). Attractive allies in the developing and Non-Aligned worlds were identified, in large part, based on their strategic value to the USSR, including their ability “to provide support facilities—including airports, harbors, or sites for communications stations—for Soviet military activities.” (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 78) As noted by Allison (1988):

> the contractual obligation of cooperation in the military field in these treaties could provide mutual benefits, although the disparity in resources of the treaty parties meant that their contributions in the equation would not be similar in form. In exchange for the Soviet provision of arms and training the smaller and less developed treaty party has usually been expected to provide services to Soviet planes and ships and to permit them to use its military facilities. (221)

To their partners, the purpose of the treaties of friendship was not merely to promote cooperation, nonalignment, and independence—as the USSR publicly claimed—but to obtain Soviet security assistance (Allison 1988, 221). In a clear complementary exchange, Soviet alliance partners were provided with security benefits such as military aid in return for the influence they permitted the USSR. For example, in its 1974 alliance Somalia exchanged the cancellation of Somalia’s $45 billion foreign aid debt to the USSR for Soviet access to key naval, airfield, and communications facilities in its strategically valuable territory along the Red Sea (Petro and Rubinstein 1997, 224). Similarly, the treaties with Iraq, Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, and Mozambique were followed by large influxes of Soviet arms (Allison 1988, 225-227; Holtom 2014, 63). And Soviet policies of normalization certainly did not extend to permitting
nationalist uprisings, as demonstrated by decisive interventions by the Soviet military in East
Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968) (Braun 1997, 50).

The end of the Cold War represented a continuation of Russia’s asymmetric aims (though
under new terms), a new domestic political system, and the challenge of negotiating with newly
independent former-republics. In a notable shift from the Cold War era, “the Third World now
plays a decidedly peripheral role in Russian foreign policy calculations.” (Petro and Rubinstein
1997, 214; also see: Holtom 2014; Kanet, Kozhemiakin, and Birgerson 1997) This included the
closure of Russian embassies and reductions in bilateral trade, as well as alliance policy (Kanet,
Kozhemiakin, and Birgerson 1997, 163-167). This helps us to understand why the only deep and
institutionalized alliances concluded in the post-Soviet era are with post-Soviet states; the core of
Russia’s post-Soviet defense pacts—both in Eastern Europe and Central Asia—reflects its
continuing interest in maintaining regional hegemony in the “near abroad.” Though Russia has
concluded treaties of friendship and cooperation with states outside the traditionally Soviet
sphere of influence, their limited obligations and institutionalization reflect their low
prioritization in Russia’s new foreign policy. For their part, the post-Soviet states remained
extremely dependent on the Russian market after independence, and on Russian oil and natural
gas especially.\footnote{Donaldson and Nogee (1998, 176) offer an excellent analysis of the various post-Soviet states, or what they term the “newly independent states (NIS).”} This was especially true in Belarus; it had never before been an independent
state, its population had a strong cultural affinity to the Russian ethnicity, was extremely
dependent on Russia for both its economy and security, and contained a large number of Russian
military facilities (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 209; also see Paznyak 1995). Thus the 1995 and
1997 alliances with Belarus formalized intense Russian asymmetric dominance of its very
dependent neighbor. Russia sought similar control over Ukraine. Though cultural affinity and economics certainly played a role, Russia’s primary interests in Ukraine had to do with the Black Sea Fleet, comprising approximately 300 ships and based in the strategically valuable Crimean city of Sevastopol (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 162; also see Kulinich 1995). The 1997 nonaggression and consultation pact with Ukraine paralleled an agreement to grant Russia basing rights for the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol for 20 years; during the proceedings, Yeltsin stated: “We respect and honor the territorial integrity of Ukraine.” (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 165) Given the recent Russian annexation of Crimea, the irony of this declaration should not be lost on modern readers. Though some in the Central Asian states expressed a desire for greater independence from Russia, their economic dependence—including currency via the ruble zone—weakened their ability to resist Russian influence (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 202; also see: Karpat 1995; Petro and Rubinstein 1997). Indeed, all five Central Asian former republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—joined the CIS in addition to each signing bilateral treaties with Russia that exemplify the complementary exchange model (Petro and Rubinstein 1997, 118-119). Uzbek President Islam Karimov observed at the time that Russia provided “stability and peace in our region and preserving the integrity of our frontiers…Uzbekistan cannot see its future without Russia.” (Petro and Rubinstein 1997, 119) For its part, Russia saw its regional hegemony over Central Asia in the same vein as the United States asserted its hegemony over the Western Hemisphere in the Monroe Doctrine (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 170).

---

171 Ukraine and Belarus arguably hold a “special place” in Russia’s attitude toward the “near abroad” (Kozhemiakin and Kanet 1997, 37).
As demonstrated in Figure 6.2, of the four major power cases discussed in this project, Russia turns to institutionalization in its alliance treaties with the least frequency, despite concluding the largest number of treaties overall; 59 out of the 91 Russian alliances in this project specify no institutionalization at all, and an additional sixteen are very weak, specifying only economic aid or peacetime contact. As in the French case, the large number of weakly institutionalized treaties of friendship and cooperation in the late-20th Century account for the majority of this trend. Of the alliances that do include deeper institutionalization mechanisms, Russia frequently turns to the asymmetric mechanisms outlined in the complementary exchange model, including Russian one-directional military aid and asymmetric Russian basing rights in the partner’s territory. Not surprisingly, given the alliance and foreign policy aims discussed above, the majority of Russia’s most deeply institutionalized alliances are with the post-Soviet states, particularly in Central Asia.

None of the 19th Century Russian alliances in the data for this project specify any terms of institutionalization.\(^{172}\) This provides support to the theoretical argument of this project given that all four of these alliances are pacts with other major European powers—Austria-Hungary, Germany, Great Britain, and France. Even the 1891/1894 Franco-Russian Alliance lacks meaningful institutionalization. The alliance did ultimately provide very specific conditionalities on the *casus belli* and promised troop commitments in the event of war (both of which are excluded in this project’s operationalization of alliance institutionalization, as discussed in Chapter 4), but did not institutionalize any formal peacetime coordination (Snyder 1997; Weitsman 2004). Given the primary aim of this alliance as a symmetric capability aggregation

\(^{172}\) Again, details regarding Russian alliance treaty contents—including institutionalization mechanisms—are drawn from the ATOP project’s data and alliance codesheets, unless otherwise noted (Leeds, et al. 2002). The ATOP codesheets are available online at atop.rice.edu/codesheets.
pact, the lack of institutionalization is thus in keeping with the expectations of the complementary exchange model.

Despite concluding a large number of alliances between the end of World War I and the fall of the USSR, the Soviet Union deeply institutionalized only a small number of strategically valuable alliances. Reflecting its open goal of direct control over the three Baltic States in 1938, the USSR deeply institutionalized its bilateral alliances with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania using the definitively asymmetric mechanisms of Soviet basing rights and military aid, which was undeniably more to do with facilitating Soviet military efficiency in these countries than any kind of meaningful exchange of benefits. Reflecting its support of the Chinese Communist Party’s new control, the 1945 alliance with China was also deeply institutionalized to include Soviet basing rights at Port Arthur and Soviet military aid to China. It should be noted that at this time China was significantly weaker in terms of capability than the USSR; the Sino-Soviet partnership would eventually disintegrate as Communist China grew in relative power. The remaining alliances from the Soviet era that were institutionalized to at least some degree were all formed with partners outside the Soviet sphere of geographic contiguity and in the Non-Aligned Movement. A number of alliances were institutionalized using only one-directional economic aid, including: India (1971), Iraq (1971), Angola (1976), Mozambique (1977), Afghanistan (1978), Ethiopia (1978), Yemen (1979), Syria (1980), Congo (1981). The remaining alliances concluded during the Soviet era do not specify any institutionalization. Both the 1971 alliance with Egypt and 1974 alliance with Somalia included provisions relating to military aid as well, though interestingly both partnerships fell apart within the same decade. Though Soviet provisions of arms proved critical during the Yom Kippur War, Egypt became unsatisfied with delays in arms shipments, as well as the growing debt to the USSR, and
abrogated the treaty in 1976 (Allison 1988, 222). When the USSR refused to increase military aid to support the Somali offensive against Ethiopia in the Ogaden War, Somalia abrogated its treaty in 1977; the USSR concluded a bilateral treaty with Ethiopia the following year (Allison 1988, 226-227). Given that, with the exception of Congo, all of these cases are alliances of friendship with members of the Non-Aligned Movement, it is not unsurprising that, at least on the surface, the terms of the treaties abstained from terms that might violate the principles of non-alignment. But as was observed in the U.S. case, the formal terms of the alliance treaties perhaps do not fully capture the scope of Soviet asymmetric control over its weaker partners. In many of these cases—including Angola, Mozambique, Congo, and Ethiopia—Soviet military aid and arms sales far exceeded the terms of the alliance treaty (Holtom 2014, 62-63). In the most authoritative account of the USSR’s treaties of friendship and cooperation with the “Third World,” Allison (1988, 217) extensively documents how these Soviet treaties fundamentally violated the principles of non-alignment by requiring a complementary exchange of influence and security that exceeds the terms of the alliance documents themselves: “the implications for the Third World treaty partner have varied from case to case, but it is clear that in certain cases the consequences of these treaties have compromised the non-aligned policy of the Third World state in question.” Allison (1988, 240) goes on to observe, however, that in many of these cases—including Egypt, Somalia, Mozambique, and Angola—it has been the weaker partners who broke the treaty when Soviet expectations for alignment went too far.

The alliances concluded by the Russian Federation after 1990 include the majority of the deeply institutionalized alliances in the Russian portfolio. The majority of these cases are defense pacts with the Central Asian states, reflecting the determination of the Yeltsin government to maintain regional dominance (Donaldson and Nogee 1998; Karpat 1995; Petro
and Rubinstein 1997). For example, the 1993 alliance with Tajikistan outlined the highest institutional depth score in the data for this project (an institutional depth score of “9”), and included the following: Russian basing rights in Tajikistan, Russian military aid to Tajikistan, provisions for peacetime military contact, the integrated command of military forces under Russian command, and a common defense policy. As important historical context, it should be acknowledged that this alliance was concluded in the context of a civil war in Tajikistan between the government of Rakhmon Nabiev and challenging groups; a 25,000-man strong “CIS peacekeeping force” intervened in the conflict (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 174). According to Donaldson and Nogee (1998, 175), “Russia was accused of using peacekeeping as a pretext for establishing its control over Tajikistan, and indeed, for all practical purposes, while the war lasted the country was a Russian protectorate.” The 1992 alliance with Kyrgyzstan specified joint basing rights, peacetime military contact, and the integrated command of military forces. Both the alliances with Turkmenistan (1992 and 2002) and Uzbekistan (1992 and 1994) were institutionalized via the integrated command of military forces and common defense policies with Russia. Finally, the 1992 alliance with Kazakhstan was institutionalized via Russian military aid promises.

Outside Central Asia, the only post-Soviet Russian defense pact to feature significant institutionalization was the 1991 alliance with Armenia (renewed in 1991); it specified peacetime military contact as well as economic aid via the granting of Armenia “most favored nation” status and joint basing rights. “Russia has used the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh to exert influence over both countries.” (Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 179) Russia institutionalized its 1995 alliance with Belarus via peacetime military contact, and when the treaty was revised in 1997, economic aid was added to further

---

173 For its part, Azerbaijan turned to Turkey to bolster its position via alliance (Petro and Rubinstein 1997, 117).
institutionalize Russian influence over its western neighbor. The Azerbaijani (1997), Ukrainian (1997), and Moldovan (2001) alliances were concluded without any terms of institutionalization; all were nonaggression and consultation pacts, not defense pacts. The post-Soviet treaties of friendship that the Russian Federation signed with states outside the former USSR all feature no or very limited terms of institutionalization. The French (1990 and 1992) and Turkish (1992) treaties specify annual peacetime contact among military officials. The 1993 alliance with India specifies economic aid in the form of “most favored nation” status. And the Italian alliance (1990 and 1994) specifies both peacetime military contact and economic aid. The rest are not institutionalized at all.

Summary

Overall, the Russian/Soviet case offers further qualitative support to the complementary exchange theoretical predictions. It further provides important contrasts to both the alliance policies of the United States during the Cold War as well as the European colonial powers of Great Britain and France. Both the United States and USSR used alliance policies to weaken each other during the Cold War, but the types of alliances they pursued differed significantly; while the United States pursued a policy of few, but deep, alliances with geostrategic partners in Asia and the Middle East, the USSR concluded a larger number of alliances that were (at least on paper) much weaker and aimed at disruption-through-“neutrality.” Compared to the British and French cases, the Russian/Soviet alliance policies of the 20th Century were much more affected by its changing domestic political system than by decolonization. And unlike all the other cases, Russia/USSR has pursued a targeted bilateral alliance policy with its neighboring states, even in the modern era.
Summary Discussion for the Four Illustrative Cases

The purpose of this chapter and the previous chapter was to qualitatively examine the alliance portfolios of four major powers, together comprising nearly half of the quantitative data for this project—the Great Britain, France, the United States, and Russia/USSR—for the period 1815 to 2003. By looking at select cases in greater depth than Chapter 4 could provide, the intention was to provide an additional test for the core theory of this project—the argument that because of their fundamental aims, we should expect asymmetric alliances (such as alliances between a major power and much weaker power) to be institutionalized with greater depth than symmetric alliances. In addition, the goal was to examine more closely the alliance aims of the selected major powers and the specific institutionalization mechanisms populating their alliance treaties. The limitations of this undertaking (discussed in the previous chapter) notwithstanding, it has provided useful insights, which are discussed below in turn.

First, these four illustrative cases offered general qualitative support for the project’s theory. Overall, U.S., British, French, and Russian/Soviet alliances have reserved the deepest institutionalization for their asymmetric partners, especially in the 20th Century. Even a quick glance at basic correlation trends between partner asymmetry and alliance institutional depth (provided in Figures 5.1, 5.2, 6.1, and 6.2) illustrates that in three of the cases—Great Britain, France, and Russia/USSR—the correlation is positive; and though the correlation in Figure 6.1 suggests that the U.S. case disconfirms the theory, the analysis revealed more qualitative support than the operationalization from Ch. 4 captured. Additionally, these chapters provide qualitative support to the types of alliance institutionalization mechanisms predicted to be favored in asymmetric alliances—basing rights for the major power partner and one-directional military aid to the weaker partner; these two mechanisms were among the most frequent mechanisms
throughout the four cases. Another popular mechanism was the use of peacetime military contact, sometimes through formal organizations; though often appearing in asymmetric alliances of control, consistent with the theoretical prediction of the complementary exchange model, this mechanism most frequently appeared in the French and Russian “treaties of friendship and cooperation.”

General support aside, the four cases certainly reveal that major powers adopt different alliance “characters” that evolve over time. Despite their similar post-colonial motivations and European major power status, Great Britain and France adopted very different alliance strategies toward their post-colonial partners, with British interests focusing on retreat and the protection of naval bases and French interests focusing on the preservation of cultural ties to francophone Africa and the projection of French power there. Similarly, while both the United States and USSR engaged in Cold War maneuverings, they adopted very different alliance strategies, with the United States engaging in containment through deep (if very select) alliances with its partners and the USSR engaging in disruption-through-neutrality through numerous “treaties of friendship and cooperation.” Moreover, in all four cases, their alliance characters evolved over time; for example, French alliance politics in the late-1800s differed significantly from French alliance politics in the 1960s. Interestingly, across all four cases, asymmetric alliances were the rule, not the exception; the majority of symmetric alliances between these major powers and other major powers occurred in the 19th Century. Raymond Kuo (2014) offers a potential explanation for this trend in his doctoral dissertation, pointing to the influence of systemic shifts and the resulting diffusion alliance norms. Overall, these nuances speak a word of caution about the occlusion that can result from too much theoretical parsimony.
Second, it became clear throughout the findings of the four cases that the counter-hypotheses for alliance institutionalization trends are not without their merit; in particular, post-colonial ties and the inclusion of defense and offense active-obligation terms influenced whether these major powers adopted deep institutionalization. The desire to manage and maintain ties with their former colonies clearly dominated British and French alliance decisions in the mid- and late-20th Century, providing qualitative support to the statistical results of the large-N study in Chapter 4. That said, as illustrated by the U.S. case especially, we do observe other examples of deeply institutionalized asymmetric alliances that lacked the post-colonial context, suggesting that while post-colonial ties may be a significant determinant of major power interests in some cases, others will define their desire to control minor powers on different terms. Similarly, a general trend emerged whereby the major powers were more likely to institutionalize their alliances if they included an active-obligation pact. The Russian/Soviet case illustrated this well in that during both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods defense pacts were much more likely to be institutionalized than “treaties of friendship and cooperation.” The prevalence of these treaties of friendship (usually some combination of consultation, neutrality, and nonaggression pacts) in the French and Russian/Soviet cases help explain why the positive correlation trends depicted in Figures 5.2 and 6.2 are less pronounced than in the British case, where the trend in Figure 5.1 was close to 45 degrees.

Third, the qualitative discussion in two of the cases—the United States and Russia—revealed that sometimes the degree of asymmetric control that existed in praxis between the major power and its weaker partner was not fully captured in either the treaty itself or the quantitative operationalization scheme used in Chapter 4. For example, the Soviet treaties of friendship and cooperation with “Third World” countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Congo,
and Ethiopia appeared to represent a relatively weak degree of asymmetric exchange because they included neither strong security obligations (i.e.: defense pacts, extensive military aid) nor strong means of major power control (i.e.: basing rights, integrated command); and yet, as detailed by Allison (1988), the partnerships often included means of control—particularly military aid—outside the language of the treaty document. Similarly, in the U.S. case, conditionalities on the U.S. defense obligation were frequently used as a means of controlling a potentially rogue leader, even though they were excluded from the operationalization of institutional depth in Chapter 4. This observation illustrates the value of qualitative research in its ability to clarify and refine the rough edges of large-N work.

This observation further offers an opportunity to revisit a portion of the complementary exchange model’s theoretical argument that has not been heavily emphasized thus far—the management of entrapment concerns by major powers in asymmetric alliances. Entrapment risks are an important consideration when both major and minor powers weigh the costs and benefits of institutionalizing their alliance partnership.174 Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 2, the very mechanisms by which alliance institutionalization increase the complementary benefits to the partners inversely raise the risk of entrapment. As illustrated in the illustrative cases above, while entrapment risks in asymmetric alliances do remain a concern, major powers often take steps to manage them in the context of alliance formation and design. Indeed, the fact that asymmetric partners choose to institutionalize their alliance partnerships as frequently and deeply as they do—despite the corresponding entrapment risks—speaks to the strength of other

---

174 Tongfi Kim (2011, 355) offers the best conceptual discussion of alliance entrapment concerns as they apply to major powers like the United States. He argues for the disaggregation of the concept into “entanglement” and the more narrow (and traditional) entrapment: “I define entanglement as the process whereby a state is compelled to aid an ally in a costly and unprofitable enterprise because of the alliance. Entrapment is a form of undesirable entanglement in which the entangling state adopts a risky or offensive policy not specified in the alliance agreement.” (author’s emphasis)
benefits that both major and minor powers achieve in these alliances. Along with Benson (2012), Kim (2011, 358) argues that one of the primary ways that major powers manage their entrapment concerns is through the specification of conditionalities on the *casus belli* of the alliance, such as a specific location or adversary. The U.S. case is particularly useful in illustrating how major powers seek to manage entrapment risks; exhibiting a generally cautious approach to alliances, the United States frequently managed entrapment risks in how it designed treaties with weaker partners, including its alliances with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Spain. As this discussion suggests, conditionalities may be an important component of the cost/benefit calculus for major powers in these asymmetric alliances by providing a means to manage the entrapment risks that will come with deeper institutionalization. It also suggests that in future research, the refinement of how we operationalize alliance institutional depth would better capture the true nature of how it manifests in these asymmetric partnerships.

Fourth, and finally, a key theme to emerge from these four qualitative cases is that major power alliance aims do have causal significance. Within all four cases variations in the alliance aims of the major power often dictated the role of institutionalization in a given alliance treaty—including explaining the differences that emerged between similarly asymmetric partnerships. In Great Britain, the predominance of basing interest aims fundamentally shaped Britain’s preference for basing rights as a mechanism of institutionalization. As a result, the institutionalization mechanism of asymmetric basing rights dominates the British alliance portfolio after the mid-20th Century, and also helps us understand why some alliances were institutionalized more deeply (i.e.: South Africa) than others (i.e.: Nigeria), despite both being asymmetric and post-colonial. French containment aims in Interwar Eastern Europe resulted in fundamentally weaker alliance institutionalization than was pursued in its alliances in post-
colonial Africa, despite both sets of partners being much weaker in material power than France. The Spanish alliance in the U.S. portfolio offers an example of an alliance partnership where the shift in U.S. aims actually resulted in changes to the terms of alliance institutionalization at renegotiation, as Spain became concerned about the possibility of entrapment. Finally, Russia/USSR consistently applied different aims its the alliances with weaker powers in the “near abroad” or geographically contiguous space than partners in Western Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America—despite asymmetric partnerships existing in both areas; in the former, Russian/Soviet aims were more explicitly about asymmetric control (i.e.: Tajikistan), while in the latter, Russian/Soviet aims were more muted in the context of disrupting U.S. access (i.e.: India). Alliance institutionalization trends reflected these differences.

References


CHAPTER 7
ASYMMETRIC ALLIANCE INSTITUTIONALIZATION: LOOKING FORWARD

This project sought to address the following guiding research question: *Why and how do powerful states institutionalize their military alliance treaties with much weaker partners?*

Having established the prominence and significance of formal military alliances to international politics in practice (Chapter 1) as well as the IR scholarly academic literature (Chapter 2), the project attempted to fill two gaps: 1) the institutional design of alliance treaties—how the commitments they contain are institutionalized between alliance partners, and 2) the impact of intra-alliance power dynamics on alliance treaty design—specifically the unique imperatives of asymmetric alliance partnerships. I argued that the current literature has not only overlooked both of these topics, but has largely ignored their intersection. As a result, the alliance literature has relied heavily on a theoretical model—the capability aggregation model—that is ill-suited to addressing the dynamics of alliances formed between asymmetric partners, where one partner is much stronger than the other. In Chapter 3 I outlined an alternate approach called the “complementary exchange model,” capable of capturing the exchange of benefits experienced by both the stronger and weaker partners in an asymmetric alliance using insights from the realist paradigm of IR theory. I argued that the complementary exchange model not only provided a more grounded theory about asymmetric alliance dynamics with regard to the role of power in alliance formation, but also offered new empirical predictions about the trends that we should expect in the institutional design of these alliance treaties.
These empirical predictions were further clarified and evaluated using both quantitative and qualitative methodologies in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 4 offered a large-N statistical analysis of four hypotheses drawn from the complementary exchange model, using data on asymmetric bilateral alliances from the period 1815 to 2003—396 unique alliance observations. The primary source of data was the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset, which has increasingly come to be regarded as the most comprehensive source of data on the content of alliance treaties (Leeds, et al. 2002). The results of this analysis largely supported the empirical predictions of the complementary exchange model. In replication of a key finding from Michael Mattes’s (2012) study on partner reputation and alliance treaty design, I observed a positive relationship between partners’ relative power asymmetry and the likelihood of any level of alliance institutionalization (Hypothesis 1). In Hypothesis 2 I argued that the more interesting empirical question involved the relationship between partner asymmetry and the depth of alliance institutionalization. I created a new index to operationalize the depth of alliance institutionalization with greater range and accuracy in asymmetric alliances, and the resulting model offered statistical support to the hypothesis. Recognizing the prominence of the concept of “active-obligations” in the alliance literature, I ran an additional model interacting this variable with partner asymmetry, finding that while active-obligations in alliance treaties are positively correlated with institutional depth in both symmetric and asymmetric alliances, active-obligation asymmetric alliances are the type of agreement most likely to be deeply institutionalized compared to all other types of alliances, including active-obligation symmetric alliances (Hypothesis 3). Finally, models confirmed that partner asymmetry is positively correlated with the likelihood of a number of individual institutionalization mechanisms,
including military aid, basing rights, peacetime military contact, and a formal organization to manage the alliance (Hypothesis 4).

Chapters 5 and 6 offered a qualitative analysis of the complementary exchange model by considering the alliance portfolios of four major powers in a series of illustrative cases. The resulting discussion offered qualitative support to the core theory of the project and Chapter 4’s statistical models, finding that the alliance “characters” of Great Britain, France, the United States, and Russia/USSR during the period 1815 to 2003 largely conformed to the predictions of the complementary exchange model of asymmetric alliance institutionalization. The discussion offered several additional important nuances to our understanding of these concepts, including suggestions for refinement in how we operationalize asymmetric alliance institutionalization. Most significantly, however, the qualitative analysis offered important insights into the differences in alliance “character” across major powers, suggesting that while the overall model may predict aggregate dynamics, there is more work to do in terms of explaining the differences we see within major power alliance portfolios.

Contributions of the Project

This project offers four primary contributions to the extant scholarly literature on alliance politics and directly addresses several of the gaps identified in Chapter 2’s discussion of this literature. First, this project represents a contribution to the dearth of existing research treating the institutional design of military alliances as a dependent variable. Alliance design as a whole only recently became a point of study in the scholarly literature (Benson 2011; Leeds, Long, and Mitchell 2000; Leeds and Savun 2007; Long and Leeds 2006; Poast 2012), and most studies of alliance institutionalization have examined the concept as an explanatory variable affecting the
likelihood of outcomes such as alliance abrogation (Leeds and Savun 2007), reliability (Leeds and Anac 2005), intra-alliance peace (Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros 2006; Long, Nordstrom and Baek 2007), military coordination (Wallace 2008; Weitsman 2014), and conflict management (Owsiak and Frazier 2013). Only four studies have considered alliance as a dependent variable (Benson 2012; Mattes 2012; Miller 2003, 2012; Powell 2010), and of these only one focuses specifically on alliance institutionalization (Mattes 2012). This project directly contributes to this gap. Moreover, this project also contributes to the gap in the recent literature on the nuances of alliance politics when the partners have a large relative power asymmetry. While we know that asymmetric alliances represent almost half of all military alliances (Fordham 2010; Leeds, et al. 2002; Morrow 1991), very few studies have disaggregated the alliance data to focus on this category of alliances as distinct from symmetric alliances (Cha 2010; Fordham 2010; Mattes 2012). Thus, not only does this project address both the alliance institutionalization and asymmetric alliances literature gaps, it actually brings them together.

Second, this project highlights the weaknesses in the assumptions of the capability aggregation theory of alliance formation and design as it is currently (and frequently) applied to asymmetric alliances. The assumption that the primary aims of alliances are to aggregate partner military capabilities has predominated the alliance literature broadly (Christensen and Snyder 1990; Snyder 1990, 1997; Conybeare 1992; Morrow 1994, 2000; Smith 2000; Walt 1987; Waltz 1979;) and with regard to alliance design specifically (Leeds and Anac 2005; Leeds and Savun 2007; Owsiak and Frazier 2013; Wallace 2008; Weitsman 2014). Building on the scholarly literature pointing to intra-alliance goals that do not easily conform to the traditional capability aggregation approach (Cha 2010; Gelpi 1999; Mearsheimer 2001; Morrow 1991; Schweller 1994; Schroeder 1976; Sweeney and Fritz 2004; Weitsman 2004), this project lays foundation
for questioning the theoretical suitability of the capability aggregation approach to asymmetric alliances. Indeed, the core argument of this project is that the causal logic of alliance design—and specifically alliance institutionalization—is fundamentally different in asymmetric than symmetric alliances. As described in Figure 3.2, while the decision to institutionalize symmetric alliance partnerships may indeed be motivated by joint and pooled capability aggregation gains, institutionalization in asymmetric alliance partnerships is more likely to reflect the complementary exchange of security (for the minor power) and policy autonomy (for the major power), or even the dominance of the major power’s control aims. This argument thus represents an important refinement on our theoretical assumptions regarding asymmetric alliance institutionalization.

Building on these theoretical contributions, the third contribution of this project to the scholarly literature is the correction of empirical predictions that commonly flow from the capability aggregation approach to alliance design. While the capability aggregation approach predicts that alliance institutionalization should be more likely in symmetric than asymmetric alliances, the statistical models of Chapter 4 actually demonstrate the opposite, finding that a one-unit increase in the natural log of an alliance dyad’s relative power ratio\textsuperscript{175} increases the odds of any level of alliance institutionalization by a factor of 0.55;\textsuperscript{176} in other words, I show that asymmetric alliances actually engage in institutionalization more frequently than symmetric partnerships. Further, the capability aggregation model and existing approaches to the alliance cooperation problem predict that symmetric alliances are more likely to deeply institutionalize than asymmetric alliances (for example, see Mattes 2012). Again, the models in Chapter 4

\textsuperscript{175} The dataset measures relative power as the natural log of both partners’ Correlates of War (COW) National Capabilities Index (or CINC score) ratio (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).

\textsuperscript{176} The odds ratio quoted here is derived from Model H1a in Table 4.3, and is calculated by exponentiating the logistic coefficients.
demonstrate that we observe much more depth of institutionalization in asymmetric alliances than would be predicted only by the capability aggregation approach; all else being equal, greater relative power asymmetry is associated with not only the presence of alliance institutionalization, but deeper institutionalization as well. An increase from the minimum to the maximum of alliance asymmetry predicts a 2.85-unit increase in alliance institutional depth, but an active obligation (dichotomously coded) predicts only a 1.31-unit increase in institutional depth; in other words, the comparative effect of asymmetry is over twice that of active obligation. We see consistency in these predictions when looking at the likelihood of individual institutionalization mechanisms; as an alliance observation’s CINC score ratio increases from its minimum to its maximum, the predicted probability of military aid increases from 0.06 to 0.39, of basing rights increases from 0.08 to 0.46, of military contact increases from 0.15 to 0.69, and of a formal organization increases from 0.09 to 0.42. The qualitative discussions in Chapters 5 and 6 offer further support to these empirical findings.

Finally, this project offers a refinement on how we operationalize alliance institutionalization, particularly in asymmetric alliances. While most of the literature has relied on the three-category index for alliance institutionalization created by Brett Ashley Leeds and Sezi Anac (2005, 189-190) (Table 4.1), Chapter 4 proposes an expanded measurement of alliance institutionalization based on four functional categories: physical presence, policy influence, payments, and military command (Table 4.2). This new index not only extends the measurable range of alliance institutionalization from a three-point index to a nine-point index, it also avoids the inaccurate assumptions that the Leeds and Anac (2005) model incorporates based on the capability aggregation model.

177 These numbers reference the results reported in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3.
178 These numbers reference the results reported in Table 4.5.
The contributions of this project extend beyond merely the scholarly literature, however, and offer insights relevant to the real-world application of alliance politics. In an international system that emphasizes formal military alliances, this project encourages policymakers and diplomats to pay careful attention to the textual content of these treaties with regard to alliance institutionalization, and offers both quantitative and qualitative analyses of how such treaties have been written over time and under different contexts. The qualitative chapters, in particular, offer historical case studies for policymakers on how (and how successfully) major powers have achieved their asymmetric aims in the institutional design of their alliance treaties. This project also offers insights for policymakers in an international system that de-emphasizes formal military alliances by highlighting the dynamics of alignments (generally-speaking) as means of asymmetric control by major power partners. The individual institutionalization mechanisms discussed in this project could possibly be incorporated into a partnership even outside of a formal military alliance; while some of the theoretical logic of ex ante textual commitments would be lost, their utility as a means to create a complementary exchange of security and autonomy benefits would still have relevance.

Looking Forward: Paths for Future Scholarly Research

The following discussion outlines four avenues of future research to continue developing our understanding of how the intersection of relative power dynamics and institutional design impacts alliance politics. While this project makes a substantial contribution to this line of research, it will only be through future inquiries that these conclusions are refined and extended. Toward this aim, the proposals below are the first steps I recommend.
Replication, Correction, and Expanded Methodologies

First and foremost, future research should replicate the findings of this project and seek to address its limitations. This project assumed alliance formation as endogenous to its theoretical and empirical models. Future research could address any invalidity in this assumption by using a two-stage model to capture the decision to ally first, followed by the decisions about whether and how to institutionalize the partnership. Such an analysis would require significant historical and diplomatic records research to uncover “the dogs that did not bark” in the model of Paul Poast’s 2012 analysis of issue-linkage and alliance formation between 1860 and 1945. Future research could also expand the universe of cases to include more informal alignments such as non-treaty agreements (on economic exchanges, military aid, non-proliferation, arms sales, and intelligence sharing), wartime “coalitions of the willing” (Kreps 2011; Weitsman 2014), and ongoing “strategic partnerships” not formalized by treaty documents (Wilkins 2012). Such an initiative would need to start by defining an operationalization methodology for identifying and measuring institutionalization mechanisms outside of formal alliance treaties. A difficult task to be sure, but for scholars interested in how to adapt these findings to informal alignments, the effort may prove fruitful. While this analysis excluded some alliance observations on the grounds that they were multilateral agreements, contained secret or partially secret terms, or were only nonaggression pacts, future research could also undertake to incorporate these cases and more fully capture the universe of military alliance observations. Similarly, future research could correct the limitations in the qualitative illustrative cases of Chapters 5 and 6 by introducing a detailed process-tracing methodology and including the 45 alliances from this project’s dataset that were formed between non-Western partners.
Systemic Polarity and Asymmetric Alliance Institutionalization

An interesting potential extension of the project would further explore the insights of the realist paradigm of IR theory by disaggregating the alliance institutionalization analysis temporally and comparing these trends across systemic eras of polarity. As noted at the beginning of Chapter 6, only one study has even attempted to compare the effects of systemic incentives (i.e.: bipolarity vs. multipolarity) on alliance design trends using the latest data (Leeds and Mattes 2007), and even it is purely descriptive in nature. Despite the insights of structural realists who argue that the alliance choices of major powers should be shaped first and foremost by the incentives of the international system’s polarity (Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979), the causal logic of the capability aggregation argument suggests few implications for ways in which systemic polarity might affect the likelihood of alliance institutionalization; enforcement problems (for example, reputations for unreliability) will be consistent across system structures. This consistency should not be the case, however, for asymmetric alliances motivated by major power interests because some polarity structures could theoretically incentive asymmetric alliances of control—and thus the complementary exchange model—more than others.

Drawing on the insights of structural realists (Waltz 1979), we should expect bipolar systems—such as the Cold War Era (1945-1989)—to incentivize more asymmetric alliances of control because bipolarity facilitates the identification of a clear adversary by the major powers, along with the understanding that most minor power countries will be forced to align with one of the two major powers; the advantage of controlling strategically valuable minor powers—even minor powers in other geographic regions—becomes quickly apparent and a strategy emphasizing asymmetric bilateral alliances is suited to this goal. On the other hand, neither multipolar systems—such as the Concert of Europe (1815-1913) and Interwar Era (1914-
nor unipolar systems—such as the post-Cold War Era (1990-present)—incentivize asymmetric alliances of control to the same degree. Because shifting major power allegiances in multipolar systems increase uncertainty about the source of threat, major powers derive greater security from managing relations with other major powers (symmetric capability aggregation) than establishing spheres of influence among minor powers (asymmetric control) (for example, see Snyder 1997). Likewise in a unipolar system, the hegemon’s achievement of a high pre-existing level of foreign policy autonomy reduces its motivation to incur institutionalized security obligations toward minor powers (for example, see Wolforth 1999). Therefore, we would expect to see the relationship between relative power asymmetry and deep institutionalization of alliance treaties occur most profoundly in times of bipolarity. Only by disaggregating the analysis of asymmetric alliances and institutional design temporally can future studies begin to ascertain if these theoretical predictions are valid.

Major Power Aims and Institutional Variance within Asymmetric Alliances

A key focus of this project was the comparison of institutionalization across symmetric and asymmetric alliances, but another direction for future research would be to look more closely at the dynamics within the universe of just asymmetric alliances. Indeed, one of the key insights of the qualitative discussions in Chapters 5 and 6 was that not all asymmetric alliances are the same in terms of aims or institutionalization, even when characterized by similar levels of partner power asymmetry. Great Britain’s overriding interest in maintaining its naval prominence shaped which post-colonial alliances it institutionalized deeply (i.e.: South Africa) or not (i.e.: Nigeria), and also led to an emphasis on basing rights as the primary mechanism of institutionalization. French containment aims in Interwar Eastern Europe resulted in
fundamentally weaker alliance institutionalization than was pursued in its alliances in post-colonial Africa. Russia/USSR consistently applied different aims to the alliances with weaker powers in the “near abroad” or geographically contiguous space (i.e.: Tajikistan) than partners in Western Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America (i.e.: India)—despite asymmetric partnerships existing in both areas. And the type and depth of institutionalization varied across U.S. Cold War alliances as a result of shifting U.S. aims (i.e.: Taiwan vs. Japan). In other words, the four major powers—Great Britain, France, the United States, and Russia/USSR—each presented different alliance “characters” and were motivated by different aims over time, which then shaped how they pursued institutionalization in their alliance partnerships with weaker partners.

These observations suggest that an important next step in understanding the dynamics of asymmetric alliances and how they are institutionalized is to dig more deeply into the impact of major power aims on the resulting alliance partnerships with weaker partners. As discussed in Figure 3.2, in many cases the outcome of asymmetric alliance agreements can arguably be attributed to the superior negotiating position of the major power and the major power’s aims. Disaggregating these aims—first theoretically and then empirically—would allow us to refine the complementary exchange model and the resulting statistical models. In particular, it would enable the model to better capture (and explain) the substantive variance in how asymmetric alliances are institutionalized beyond just frequency and depth. Indeed, in their analysis of alliance formation and termination, Douglas Gibler and Tony Rider (2004, 309) point to the value of incorporating partner aims (what they call “foreign policy interests”) so as to capture more variance in the data; this argument could be applied to the trends in asymmetric alliance institutional design. The obvious third step in this line of research would be to formally incorporate minor power aims into the model as well.
Measuring the Effectiveness of Institutionalization in Asymmetric Alliances

A final extension of these theoretical arguments shifts the focus to alliance institutionalization as an explanatory variable. Having established the significance of partners’ relative power asymmetry as a determinant factor in whether and how deeply alliance treaties are institutionalized, these insights should, it follows, shift how we conceptualize the effectiveness of institutionalization in asymmetric alliances and the effectiveness of these alliances overall. As noted by Leeds and Anac (2005, 186), we study institutional design because we expect design to purposefully help states achieve their goals of successful alliances. Given that the literature has largely over-determined the dynamics of alliances in the context of the capability aggregation model, it arguably lacks an accurate assessment of this outcome in asymmetric alliances. Indeed, most of the alliance literature conceptualizes “effectiveness” in terms most applicable to the capability aggregation model, including whether the alliance deterred military aggression (Benson 2011; Leeds 2003), was upheld when invoked in war (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004; Leeds and Anac 2005; Leeds, Long, and Mitchell 2000),179 or was abrogated outside the terms of the alliance treaty (Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel 2009; Leeds and Savun 2007).

Thus, the literature not only lacks a comprehensive assessment of alliance effectiveness in general, but most definitely lacks an assessment that defines effectiveness in terms of the unique aims and dynamics of asymmetric alliances. First, institutionalized asymmetric alliances should last longer than non-institutionalized asymmetric alliances. Morrow (1991, 922) finds that asymmetric alliances, in general, have a longer duration than symmetric alliances because the complementary interests of the security/autonomy trade-off are more consistent than interests based on shifting external threats; it should follow that institutionalization will only increase the

---

179 As noted by Mattes (2012, 693), however, measures of alliance effectiveness based on whether alliance obligations were upheld when abrogated in war suffer from a severe selection effect in that not all alliances are invoked in war.
degree of this relational stability. Second, institutionalization mechanisms should increase the effectiveness of asymmetric alliances by contributing to the strength of both the minor power security and major power autonomy dimensions of the complementary exchange model. Deeper institutionalization should increase the ability of the major power to influence the minor power’s military and political foreign policies to be more in line with its own goals in an observable way. Deeper institutionalization should also clearly indicate major power interest in the alliance partnership and strengthen the signal of security assurances to both the minor power and external adversaries; thus, institutionalized asymmetric alliances should effectively deter external military threats against the minor power partner. These expectations more accurately capture the unique purposes of institutionalization in asymmetric alliances and corresponding definitions of “effectiveness,” but are notably absent from the current literature. An important line of future research would be to empirically explore the validity of these hypotheses given the insights of this project.

Conclusion

It is the hope of every research project to offer valuable contributions to existing scholarly knowledge while also identifying new directions for future research to undertake, and this project is no different. I am pleased to conclude that this project accomplishes both goals, as the foregoing discussion illustrates. It offers theoretic and empirical corrections to how the current academic literature characterizes the aims and outcomes of asymmetric alliance treaties with regard to institutionalization. And rather than merely closing the door on a finished research agenda, this project also illuminates several paths for expanding this body of research. For both the short-term and long-term future of alliances in global politics, this project offers valuable insights to improve both scholarly understanding and practical application.
References


