THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE TACTICS OF DISSENT

by

TARA ELIZABETH TRASK

(Under the Direction of K. Chad Clay)

ABSTRACT

This paper examines how a state’s membership in the European Union (EU) affects how dissent groups within that state select their tactics. As one of the strongest international institutions, the EU’s influence on its member states has expanded along with its membership to include its advocacy for democracy and the protection of human rights. Previous research suggests that dissent groups select tactics based upon a cost-benefit system based upon available resources and opportunities. I argue that the requirements of EU membership cause an aspiring state’s domestic political arena to change in such a way that alters dissent groups’ tactics selection. This article shows that when a state proceeds towards EU membership, dissent groups decrease their use of noninstitutional forms of dissent, to varying degrees among violent and nonviolent tactics.

INDEX WORDS: International organizations, European Union, political dissent, political protest, nonviolence, democratization, institutions.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Considered one of the strongest international institutions, the European Union (EU) is one of the most interesting exhibitions of an international institution’s effects on its member states. While its hallmark has been its economic strength, its influence has expanded along with its membership over the years to include its advocacy for democracy and the protection of human rights. While much attention has been given to its top-down influence on member states’ policies and institutions, less attention has been given to the EU’s effects on how dissent groups interact with the government of that state. Dissenters express their views of the government either through existing institutions or through noninstitutional forms of political protest. Their selection of one or a mix of these tactics is often determined by the government’s institutions, policies, and past behavior, which affect the group’s resources and opportunities. So if the EU affects a government in these ways, then how does the presence of the EU affect the behavior of dissent groups within that state?

I argue that the requirements of EU membership alter the domestic political arena in a way that changes the cost-incentive structure dissent groups face when selecting their tactics. When the EU pressures a government to make institutional means more available, dissent groups are less apt to choose noninstitutional forms of dissent. Further, dissent groups that still select noninstitutional tactics will be more likely to select nonviolent tactics than violent ones. This is because they are less likely to face persecution by the
government, and they wish to fall within EU norms in order to gain legitimacy, or at least to avoid the EU’s condemnation.

The Europeanization literature has begun to understand that the interaction of the EU’s external incentives and domestic preference building is more complex than previously thought (Biermann 2014). The EU’s strategy of granting rewards based on conditions shapes candidate states’ preferences to a point, and is complicated by the domestic costs of compliance (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004; Elbasani 2013). Yet, scholars continue to assume that the effectiveness of Europeanization is issue-area specific, and usually focuses on domestic factors such as deeply divided societies, weak institutional capacity, and contested statehood (Freyburg & Richter 2010; Krastev 2002; Noutcheva 2009). Further, the overwhelming majority of these studies are limited to qualitative or theoretical analysis, and focus only on the interactions between the EU and the state’s government.

Likewise, previous political participation literature divided institutional and noninstitutional political activism, whereas newer studies have blurred this distinction in favor of a more inclusive ‘repertoires’ of dissent conceptualization (Norris 2002). Thus, participants seek nonviolent, violent, or a combination of both strategies based upon context specific calculations to increase their political leverage (Shock 2003; McAdam 1983). This paper seeks to apply this shift in how dissenters select tactics to the analysis of Europeanization. Instead of focusing on a specific issue area, such as secessionism or institutional capacity, I take a more general approach by examining how the EU affects the domestic political arena by altering the incentive structure, credibility, and legitimacy for both the government and dissent groups.
This paper seeks to examine the relationship between a state’s membership in the EU, and the tactics used by dissent groups within that state. While the EU is undeniably an economic powerhouse, the institutional changes and policies established at its behest tend to stick once they are created, making their impact particularly important. If the EU assists in mitigating noninstitutional dissent within states, then it may help contribute to the consolidation of democracy and help to stabilize certain regions that have previously experienced political turmoil. It is particularly important for any future rounds of EU expansion, which may include tumultuous states such as those of the Western Balkans.

First, I begin with an overview of the relevant literature on political dissent tactics, Europeanization, and the consolidation of democracy. Then I develop my theoretic argument for why dissent groups should select different tactics within EU member states and propose hypotheses and appropriate models for testing them. My results suggest that when a state applies for EU membership, it experiences a significant decrease in noninstitutional dissent, especially for nonviolent events. I conclude with a summary of my main findings and their implications for future expansions of the EU.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on political activism has begun to work from the more inclusive understanding of tactic selection, rejecting the assumption that nonviolent and violent tactics lay along a spectrum of escalation (Shock 2003; Chenoweth & Stephan 2012; Ackerman & DuVall 2000). It is still clear that while the quality and quantity of participants may vary, groups look to maximize mass participation or to attract a large pool of volunteers from which to select quality participants (Weinstein 2005). Generally, leaders seek to recruit, maintain participation, and deter desertion of participants as the movement proceeds (Gates 2002; Weinstein 2005; Lichbach 1994; Mason 2004). One of the best ways to achieve this is for groups to continually seek for new, more effective tactics to overcome the power disparity between themselves and the government (McAdam 1983). The success of tactical innovations generally increases participation shortly thereafter, and groups that manage high levels of participation are more likely to succeed in attaining their goals (McAdam 1983; Chenoweth & Stephan 2012). Yet, the important factor is the group’s constant reevaluation of tactics, via available resources, past successes, and changes in the political climate.

Within this process, certain characteristics of the political environment allow dissent groups to draw upon small or large numbers of participants, which may adjust what types of tactics the group uses. This paper builds on the literature of democratic consolidation, and the possible influence of the EU on the process. Democratic
consolidation scholars have examined it both as a general process and in regard to specific issue areas. Conventionally, democratic institutions increase the availability of institutional mechanisms for dispute resolution, and thus decrease the likelihood of political violence (Ross 1993; Eyerman 1998). Along these same lines, democratic rule of law and a government’s respect for physical integrity rights reduce the likelihood of domestic and transnational terrorism within that state (Choi 2010; Walsh & Piazza 2010). Yet, there is some disagreement on just how democratization effects dissent groups. While it may decrease dissent groups’ likelihood for using violence, Li (2005) argues that dissent groups may find it more amenable to exist within democratic states, when they have greater opportunities for political participation.

Similarly, some scholars suggest that democratic institutions make it harder for governments to implement effective measures against political terrorist threats (Enders & Sandler 2006; Schaffert 1992). One of the greatest problems for democratizing states is that domestic and international audiences can never be certain just how committed policymakers are to reform. Policymakers could be sincerely desiring reform, or may be weakening emerging democratic institutions to consolidate their personal power; more bothersome may be the consideration that, for policymakers, desirability of reforms may change over time (Mansfield & Pevehouse 2006). A lack of credible commitment generally leads dissent groups to choose tactics that best protect their membership, usually either more secretive forms of violent protest or nonviolence of a large-enough scale to limit the government’s ability for retribution (Chenoweth & Stephan 2012).

The effect of international organizations on democratizing states is inconclusive. Some scholars have argued that democratizing states enter international organizations to
help them more credibly commit to liberal reforms and further consolidation of democracy (Mansfield & Pevehouse 2006). It is clear that those regional organizations which already include many democratic states are more likely to be associated with democratic transitions (Pevehouse 2002a; 2002b; Svolik 2008). There is some evidence that such organizations increase the probability of democratic consolidation, even if they do not protect against authoritarian reversals, since they are unwilling to devote security forces (Poast & Urpelainen 2015). These studies, however, focus on the effect of the regional organization on the state’s government, and not its effect on the choices of dissent groups within that state. By examining only the incentives of the state’s government and its actions we only evaluate one side of the interactions within a domestic political arena. Any true understanding of the process of consolidation of democracy must also include how dissent groups are affected as well.

The particular effect of the EU on states that desire to join it has been theoretically studied in detail. The EU external governance and expansion literature is usually divided between external-incentives and socialization models for the EU’s influence. External incentives, or conditionality, follow the rational-design paradigm where the EU grants rewards based upon previously determined conditions (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004; Biermann 2014). Socialization refers to the way in which states adopt EU policies through exposure and persuasion instead of a quid pro quo agreement (Checkel 2001; Noutcheva 2009; Schimmelfennig 2001; Manners 2002). Both models underscore the EU’s ability to influence member and candidate states in a top-down process that alters their domestic political arenas (Meyer 2003).
Most of these studies are of a qualitative or theoretical nature, with few statistical analyses of the EU’s influence on candidate or member-state policy and governance. In one of the few statistical analyses, Ugur (2013) finds evidence that EU conditionality has a positive effect on governance quality while states are still candidates for EU membership. Yet this study still does not demonstrate the effect of the EU’s governance and rule-transfer on the behavior of dissent groups within these states.

The standards set by the EU in both economics and politics are based upon the EU’s Acquis, emphasizing the stability of democratic institutions and the protection of human rights and minorities, a functioning competitive market economy, and the ability of that state to fulfill the political, economic, and monetary obligations of membership. Each state is individually evaluated and given a timeline to achieve certain levels of compliance in these three areas, with obligations clearly defined and a scorecard publicly available on how well each state is progressing (Dinan 2010, 137). The Acquis marks the particular rules and policies the EU seeks to transfer to candidate and member states. Early scholars argued that the EU’s rule transfer capability is dependent upon the credibility of its conditions and the domestic political costs of the state’s government to comply (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004). The EU is particularly suited to compliance among states, as regional organizations and those involving monetary policy are particularly capable of encouraging compliance without a strict enforcement mechanism (Simmons 2000).

The EU has a history of following through on its conditionality, pressuring both governments and dissent groups to comply. Accession negotiations with Croatia were postponed when Croatia refused to extradite certain war criminals to The Hague.
(Freyburg & Richter 2010). It strictly enforced the conditions of its Association Agreement with Slovakia after mistreatment of political opponents by the President continued after the EU’s warning; it removed Slovakia from its list of applicant countries (Mansfield & Pevehouse 2006). Each of these countries has since complied and joined the EU. Since there is profound mismatch between the EU’s inclusionary norms and the exclusionary norms of secessionist movements, it has opposed each case of Balkan secession, attempting to contain and delegitimize the movements and promote within-state solutions as viable alternatives (Biermann 2014). While reports of the EU pressuring a certain group in a certain context are plentiful, none of these studies have evaluated the influence of the EU on the relationship between a government and its dissent beyond the narrow confines of the extreme, such as secessionism.

The literature on EU integration shows that integration causes a rise in political opposition from diverse groups within a state, further raising the domestic costs to policymakers (Taggart 1998; Della Porta 2008; Havlik 2011). Yet, the EU’s straightforward conditionality has surprisingly seen less domestic opposition than the changes that have been attempted through socialization (Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig 2001). Even those candidate state governments that have a minimal chance of accession push hard to achieve the conditions required by the EU, such as Turkey (McLaren 2007). Once membership is attained, governments seem only to slow down when it comes to reform, with almost no backsliding (Levitz & Pop-Eleches 2010). Further, the EU’s exclusion of a state signals to other states that the incumbent government is the main obstacle to the country’s accession, undermining the governments’ credentials as
reformers, helping to mobilize the electorate, and helping to solidify a fragmented opposition (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004).

The literature on the EU’s influence in the domestic political arena of a state has focused on this phenomenon, the role of the EU as a commitment and certification device. Following the democratic consolidation literature discussed above, policymakers may use the EU as a means to signal their credible commitment to reform by tying their hands to the EU’s clearly defined conditions (Bronk 2002). For dissent groups, the EU may operate as a certification device by recognizing and legitimizing their claims (Tilly & Tarrow 2007; Cisar & Vrablikova 2010). The EU’s support of dissent groups may be less predictable than its reactions to governments. Biermann’s (2014) study of Bosnia since the Dayton Accords has underscored how the EU’s influence on secessionist conflicts fluctuates, and may condemn it at one point, and fan the flames at another time.

This paper involves the process of Europeanization, democratic consolidation, and political dissent. In particular, how does the presence of the EU alter the behavior of dissent groups within a state? I argue that the presence of the EU during a state’s candidacy alters the cost-incentive structure dissent groups use to select their tactics. Since regional organizations seem to be capable of altering the domestic political landscape by increasing the credibility of a government’s commitment to reforms, it should have some effect on dissent groups as well.
CHAPTER 3
THEORY & HYPOTHESES

The EU’s impact on domestic politics when a candidate country adopts EU policies and institutions have been examined for both the 2004 and 2007 round of enlargements. Two models have dominated the debate, socialization and conditionality, backed by the constructivists and rationalists respectively. Socialization is determined by a sense of appropriateness and identity; a state adopts policies after being exposed to and persuaded by the EU. This is a long-term, slow moving approach that follows the changing of identities and interests within a state, reliant upon the compatibility with and legitimacy of the EU within that state. Conditionality is built upon a bargaining strategy of ‘reinforcement by rewards’; a state adopts policies and is then rewarded by the EU for meeting those conditions (Olson 1989). This bargaining strategy predicts that a state will adopt the EU’s rules “if the benefits of the rewards exceed the domestic costs of rule adoption” (Biermann 2014, 486). Thus, it is most effective when rewards are high and domestic costs are low.

Both the structure of national institutions and international institutions affect the incentives and costs for state and non-state actors (Sikkink 2005; Gleditsch & Ward 2006). A change in national or international institutions alters the political economic conditions that determine a dissent group’s choice of tactics (Meyer 2003). During the process and moment of a state’s accession to the EU, the EU causes changes to the domestic political arena, particularly how resources may be distributed, “but also enables
political actors to expand the scope of their activities, and to enter into either direct interaction with European institutions or with EU-supported networks of nongovernmental organizations” (Cisar & Vrablikova 2010, 210; Tarrow 2004).

There are two major ways the EU may affect dissent groups’ choice of tactics. First, it operates as a commitment device. By tying its hands to EU conditions during the accession process, a states’ government is better able to credibly commit to reforms (Bronk 2002; Tilly & Tarrow 2007). When the government is able to signal its credible commitment, dissent groups may now have their grievances considered and addressed in ways previously unavailable. The EU emphasizes protection of certain individual rights and minorities that, when granted, alter the incentive structure for dissent groups. For example, states that have stronger respect for physical integrity rights experience less terrorism (Walsh & Piazza 2010). Dissent groups are more likely to use nonviolent expressions of dissent when they are not likely to be imprisoned or tortured for doing so.

Secondly, the EU also operates as a certification device, recognizing and legitimizing certain actors and marginalizing others (Tilly & Tarrow 2007; Tarrow 2004; Cisar & Vrablikova 2010). Generally, this distinction is made based upon how compatible these groups’ norms are with the EU’s. Thus, it has historically marginalized many secessionist movements, which tend to be violent and exclusionary, but supported protections for political opposition and been amenable to groups that use nonviolent means of expression. For example, the EU removed Slovakia from its list of applicant countries when political opponents of the President were mistreated (Mansfield & Pevehouse 2006). Alternatively, massive farmer association protests were effective in gaining huge EU subsidies in the late 80s and 90s (Rucht 2001).
Dissent groups, such as these, select their tactics from the array of available possibilities using a cost-benefit analysis (Gurr 1979; Pape 2003; Enders & Sandler 2006). The two biggest factors in this decision are available resources and opportunities (Weinstein 2005; McAdam 1983). The dissent group may choose institutional or noninstitutional means of dissent; within noninstitutional means they may choose nonviolent or violent forms of expression. Groups select a proportion of these different types in order to overcome the power disparity between themselves and the government (McAdam 1983). Groups that achieve mass participation are more likely to achieve success (Chenoweth & Stephan 2011). Individuals are more likely to participate when the costs of participation are low, such as when the government is not likely to respond with repression (Nepstad 2013; Weinstein 2005). Thus, states that have greater respect for physical integrity rights and the rule of law are less likely to have dissent groups that use violent means of expression, such as terrorism (Walsh & Piazza 2010; Choi 2010).

Following this logic, the EU’s presence alters the incentive structure regarding dissent groups’ choice of tactics. First, a state’s compliance with EU conditions alters the institutional structure by creating a web of interconnected subnational, national, and European institutions (Della Porta 2008; Meyer 2003). At the domestic level, the candidate state is incentivized to maintain stable, open democratic institutions, and to be more inclusive of dissenters following the above structure. This means that there may be institutional means of expression of dissent that become available for dissent groups, giving them another set of options that are legitimate alternates to noninstitutional tactics.

Secondly, domestic governments are pressured to be make institutions more open for groups to indicate dissent, such as allowance for more competitive political parties,
and to support those institutions that help safeguard against government repression, such as the judiciary. If this occurs, then we should see a decrease in noninstitutional protests. A decrease should indicate that groups either are turning towards institutional forms of dissent or have had their grievances addressed and have less reason to protest in any form. Those groups that choose nonviolence should be relatively easy to be integrated into the domestic political system, either by policymakers granting concessions or simply be included in the process through political parties. Those groups that tend to choose violence more often should also decrease because they are less threatened by government repression, since the government must have greater protections for human rights and have an independent judiciary that gives victims of repression a path for reparation.

The EU is normatively critical of groups that use violent tactics (Biermann 2014). Those dissent groups that continue to use violent tactics, place themselves outside of the EU’s legitimizing certification mechanism. The EU has no incentive to influence the state government to include them. If these groups cannot be included in institutions because they continue to use violence, then they will be further marginalized. Thus, dissent groups that previously choose violence should turn toward other types of expressing their dissent, since that would give them a chance at having their grievances addressed.

Consequently I propose several hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The presence of the EU reduces dissent groups’ overall use of noninstitutional expression due to the opening of institutionalized channels.

Hypothesis 2: The presence of the EU reduces dissent groups’ use of nonviolent noninstitutional expressions of dissent.
Hypothesis 3: The presence of the EU reduces dissent groups’ use of violent expressions of dissent.

Hypothesis 4: The presence of the EU reduces dissent groups’ use of violent forms of noninstitutionalized expression relative to nonviolent forms.
CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN

For my sample, I use the customary 2004 EU enlargement round, the largest round of expansion to date. It includes ten countries which started the accession process generally in the mid-1990s, and all formally became members of the EU in 2004. I analyze the years 1990-2004.

To evaluate my hypotheses, I use event count data for noninstitutional dissent. As these data are discrete and truncated at zero, an ordinary least squares regression does not give efficient parameter estimates. So for the first three hypotheses, I use a Poisson regression for bivariate analysis, which is commonly used to model discreet count data that fit a Poisson distribution. To evaluate my fourth hypothesis, I calculate the predicted count for nonviolent and violent events in relation to EU application and an Association Agreement.

My first dependent variable captures the level of domestic noninstitutional dissent that occurs within a state in a given year. The second must be able to separate between nonviolent and violent protest activities. I draw on data from the Social, Political, and Economic Event Database (SPEED), using their measure for event type, which can be disaggregated into mutually exclusive categories of political expression and political attacks. Similar to other event count data projects, the information is drawn from news sources, such as the New York Times and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Their label of political expression includes events that “are the public
articulation, by non-governmental actors, of threatening or unwelcome political message,” while politically motivated attacks include events that are “physical acts, perpetrated by humans for political reasons, which are intended to damage the person or property of others” (Hayes & Nardulli 2011). Thus, I first create a variable for the total political expression and political attacks that occur, for total noninstitutional dissent. I then separate the political expression and political attack categories specifically to measure nonviolent and violent forms of dissent, respectively. These are each aggregated into country-year counts.

For my independent variable, I generated a country-year dichotomous variable of when states formally applied to the EU. The time between a state’s formal application to join the EU and when they ascend to full membership is an arduous process, often involving multiple large policy changes. This process also occurs at a time when states are under clear and heavy scrutiny by the EU, with the looming threat of the EU denying membership and the benefits that go along with it.

I also generated a country-year dichotomous variable for when each state entered into an Association Agreement with the EU. Association Agreements are treaties made by the EU and its member states with a non-member state that outlines cooperation between them on a variety of relevant policy areas. These agreements usually precede formal application to the EU, or at least provide similar but smaller-scale exposure to EU conditionality as the road to membership. States seeking formal EU membership are more directly scrutinized and can face higher costs for breaking from EU norms than those with Association Agreements. Application to the EU more directly involves EU conditionality, with the end goal of membership serving as a strong incentive for
compliance. Association Agreements lack the same kind of end-goal incentive, but states may still experience socialization into EU norms and face condemnation for actions that fall outside of the EU’s general expectations.
CHAPTER 5
RESULTS & DISCUSSION

I ran three separate Poisson regressions, testing the effect of a state’s application to the EU on nonviolent dissent, violent dissent, and then the sum of noninstitutional dissent. I then repeated these models, replacing the effect of a state’s formal application to the EU with a state’s Association Agreements with the EU. The results for each model are listed in Table 1.

My first hypothesis predicts a decrease in total noninstitutional dissent. I analyzed the effect of a state’s formal application to the EU on the total reported instances of noninstitutional dissent. For my second hypothesis’s focus on nonviolent noninstitutional dissent, I analyzed the effect of a state’s formal application to the EU on reported instances of nonviolent noninstitutional dissent. I ran a similar model for my third hypothesis regarding violent dissent. I then repeated all three models, evaluating the effect of a state’s Association Agreement with the EU instead of its application.

Both analyses of total use of noninstitutional dissent show the expected negative trend and are statistically significant. Thus, I can reject the null hypothesis, and infer that a state’s decision to subject itself to EU authority does alter how domestic dissent groups choose to express their dissent. When a state applies to join the EU, it experiences a decrease in overall events of noninstitutional dissent. Also as expected, the relationship appears to be slightly stronger for states when they formally apply to the EU than for the Association Agreement.
I ran similar models for my second hypothesis, that predicts a decrease in nonviolent noninstitutional dissent, and my third hypothesis, that predicts a decrease in violent dissent. Nonviolent dissent shows the expected statistically significant negative trend. A state’s application to the EU causes that state to experience a decrease in nonviolent forms of noninstitutional dissent. However, while violent dissent demonstrates the expected negative trend, it is not statistically significant. These results may be due to the simple lack of observations within the event data, causing any possible relationship between the two to be washed out. Alternatively, some groups that choose violent tactics tend to select them because their preferences are too extreme for policymakers to accept, such as secessionist movements. For groups with more extreme preferences, like secessionists, neither the EU’s influence nor the state’s growth of institutions would enable these groups to be included as they desire. So they may continue to use violent tactics regardless of the EU’s influence.

Table 1: *Bivariate analyses of reported instances of noninstitutional dissent, 1990-2004*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nonviolent Dissent</th>
<th>Violent Dissent</th>
<th>Total Dissent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal EU Application</td>
<td>-1.8827*</td>
<td>-0.6242</td>
<td>-1.6740*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.6628)</td>
<td>(0.4928)</td>
<td>(0.1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association Agreement</td>
<td>-1.5142*</td>
<td>-0.2557</td>
<td>-1.3055*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.2241)</td>
<td>(0.4928)</td>
<td>(0.1987)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: N = 165. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.*

*p < - 0.05, one-tailed test*
For my fourth hypothesis, regarding the relative decrease in violence events relative to nonviolent, I generated the predicted count of nonviolent and violent dissent before and after the effect of the EU. The results are recorded in Table 2. When a state applies to the EU, the average expected number of nonviolent protest events decreases from 1.5333 to 0.2333 per country in a given year. Similarly, the average expected number of violent protest events decreases from 0.1555 to 0.0833. Although my hypothesis predicts that violent dissent should decrease more than nonviolent, and both these types experience a decrease, the results are inconclusive as to which category is more affected. Nonviolent events occur more often than violent events prior to EU application, but they are both fairly rare as well. The variation between these two before, and the dramatic decrease after EU application makes it difficult to determine any changes in relation to each other.

**Table 2: Predicted count model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nonviolent Dissent</th>
<th>Violent Dissent</th>
<th>Nonviolent Dissent</th>
<th>Violent Dissent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Application</td>
<td>1.5333</td>
<td>0.1555</td>
<td>1.1897</td>
<td>0.1207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[1.1715, 0.3198]</td>
<td>[0.4032, 0.2708]</td>
<td>[0.9090, 1.4704]</td>
<td>[0.0313, 0.2101]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Application</td>
<td>0.2333</td>
<td>0.0833</td>
<td>0.2617</td>
<td>0.0934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.1470, 0.3198]</td>
<td>[0.0317, 0.1350]</td>
<td>[0.1648, 0.3586]</td>
<td>[0.3553, 0.1514]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: N = 165. Numbers in brackets are 95% Confidence Intervals.*

There is a possibility that democratization is a confounding factor, in that democratization could be driving these outcomes regardless of the EU’s presence. A general democratization variable in the model would interfere with my causal mechanism, since I argue that the EU is causing democratization. A future project would
do better by examining an intermediate step within this process, by dividing the analysis into the EU’s effect on democratization, and then that democratization’s effect on dissent groups. However, that is beyond the scope of this particular project.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION & IMPLICATIONS

This project was limited in several ways that may be interesting for future research. First, it dealt solely in the tactics chosen by dissent groups, and not those tactics used by the state’s government to respond to or preempt dissent. Secondly, it dealt only with the EU, a particularly powerful regional organization. While the EU is particularly interesting given its growth and influence over the years, future projects should examine a wider and more diverse range of international organizations that may vary in their goals and influence on domestic dissent.

Overall, these findings allow for the general inference that the EU decreases the level of noninstitutional dissent, and especially decreases nonviolent dissent. As the EU pushes for states to stabilize open, democratic institutions, these groups may have an easier time adjusting their groups toward these institutional avenues. However, the distinct decrease in of all noninstitutional dissent supports the proposition that the EU’s presence provides opportunities for institutional forms of dissent, decreasing dissent groups’ groups need to use its noninstitutional counterpart.

The level of the EU’s influence depends upon how much states have subjected to its authority, more for formal applications and less for Association Agreements. It also has a stronger influence on nonviolent dissent, which is more easily adopted into the framework supported by the EU, than violent dissent, which may not be incentivized
enough to change. This work contributes to the existing literature in several important ways.

First, it adds insight into how democratic consolidation may have implications for how dissent groups behave. Previous work has been mixed as to how democratic consolidation affects dissent groups, since they have isolated certain issue areas or ‘types’ of dissent groups (Li 2005; Walsh & Piazza 2010). By viewing different categories of tactics as an array of possibilities chosen based upon opportunities and resources, and not in isolation of each other, we can begin to clarify just how democratization affects dissent groups’ behavior.

Secondly, these findings help to clarify how international organizations in particular may effect democratization. Previous work has shown how certain international organizations may provide certain incentives for reform, and help political elites to signal their credible commitment (Tilly & Tarrow 2007). If a states’ government can credibly commit to democratic reforms, then dissent groups can alter their own behavior accordingly. It gives evidence that international organizations may assist in providing incentives for the states’ government to reform, and assist in signaling their commitment. Instead of having to gamble on whether political elites are committed to reform, dissent groups can act based upon the knowledge that their grievances may be addressed, instead of being punished or marginalized as before.

Further, this supports the previous theoretical work on the democratizing influence of the European Union. The EU is in a unique position to offer strong economic incentives to those states it considers for membership. Its ability to influence the domestic
political arena for states that wish to become members has particular implications for its future expansion, particularly in regards to the tumultuous Western Balkan region.
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