POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL SOLUTIONS: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

by

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(Under the Direction of Markus Crepaz)

ABSTRACT

This study focuses on ethnic conflict and the management of that conflict through the use of electoral institutions, tools that are believed to be the most agreeable to design or reform. There is a relatively broad consensus that the use of the proportional representation electoral method (PR) is preferable over the majoritarian form in deeply divided societies. In spite of the ability of the theoretical arguments made on behalf of PR, why does ethnic conflict continue in systems in which it is used? Second, does PR have the same effect on conflict between ethnic groups as it does on rebellion? Through a large-N analysis using logistic regression I find that PR does reduce conflict between groups relative to majoritarianism, but the statistical strength of its effect is modest, suggesting a further need for study of this phenomenon.

INDEX WORDS: electoral system, ethnic conflict, proportional representation, majoritarian
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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my mother, who has been a constant source of support through the challenges and achievements of my life, and to my father, whom I miss dearly and carry in my heart always.
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Chapter 1 Introduction

Plan of Thesis

This study is designed to assess the ability of electoral institutions, specifically Proportional Representation (PR), as a tool of conflict management in ethnically divided societies. PR is regarded by many, including some critics as the most appropriate electoral system for divided societies. Although ethnic conflict continues in societies using PR, assertions that it reduces ethnic conflict are well founded on a theoretical basis as well as through observation. However, two questions emerge from this observation. First, in spite of the ability of the theoretical arguments made on behalf of PR, why does ethnic conflict continue in systems in which it is used? Second, studies suggest that PR reduces conflict between groups and the state. These findings neglect an important dimension of ethnic conflict that may not be explained using the same causal mechanism as conflicts between groups and the state. This in turn, may alter the power of PR to predict reductions in alternative forms of ethnic conflict. Therefore, what is the effect, if any, of PR upon conflict between groups not in control of the state? Inter-communal conflict occurs in PR systems, but it has yet to be determined if this electoral system is more appropriate for divided societies experiencing this form of ethnic conflict.

In the subsequent chapters I discuss the institutionalist approach in general. Of note in this section is the common assertion that institutions are not the sole independent variable in explaining outcomes. I then look at a specific field of institutionalist driven studies, electoral systems and their power in explaining outcomes of ethnic behavior and conflict. I illustrate the dichotomy in choices of electoral institutions for divided societies, and suggest the need to
abandon the tendency to assess the appropriateness of electoral designs in terms of being pure
majoritarian or pure PR. Another option is to explore further an alternative classification of
electoral methods. The alternative classification of appropriate versus inappropriate electoral
institutions should perhaps, as Reilly and Horowitz suggest, be based upon whether or not the
electoral method induces inter-ethnic cooperation before elections.

The third chapter will lay out two hypotheses; one to test the argument of PR supporters
and the second to test the primordialist argument that differences alone predict conflict. If this is
indeed the case, than efforts to design institutions to manage conflict are mute. Second, I will lay
out my theory regarding the relationship between PR and ethnic conflict between groups relative
to the majoritarian system. My theory and expectation of this relationship are themselves
theoretically informed by the seminal works in the field of identity politics and conflict (Connor
1994; Eller 2002; Gurr 1970; Horowitz 2000; Lake and Rothchild 1998). I argue that ethnic
conflict between groups can be explained by the persistence of the salient ethnic identities and
issues, the persistence of the security dilemma, and the absence of inter-ethnic moderation and
bargaining. The ability of institutions to manage these factors should determine their ability to
affect the level of ethnic violence.

Majoritarian systems may foster moderation; however, in ethnically divided societies,
moderation may be a mute point as demographic numbers determine the inclination of groups
towards moderation in the first place. Additionally, the perpetual exclusion of minority groups
that are not deemed instrumental in terms of garnering a majority for winning or for governing,
serves to bolsters ethnic fears of domination. Moreover, exclusion is determined on an ethnic
basis, thus contributing to the salience of ethnic identities and issues. Electoral representation in
PR systems, on the other hand, is much more inclusive. However, political participation in PR
systems is based on ethnic identities; meaning that issues and concerns are largely fought out on ethnic terms. Ethnic politics is a zero-sum game fought on the basis of fixed and uncompromisable concerns rather than those based on more fluid identities. Therefore, its institutionalization in the organs of representative government may lead to the inability of institutions to reduce some forms of ethnic conflict.

In the remaining chapters I discuss my research design, findings, and conclusion. I employ a large-N analysis to determine if PR systems predict an outcome different than that of majoritarian systems. The dependent variable is inter-group communal conflict and the primary independent variable is PR. It is a dichotomous variable indicating systems that are PR rather than majoritarian. I also look at another explanation for ethnic conflict that, if supported, may alter the perception of institutions as powerful tools in managing ethnic conflict. The hypotheses are tested using 569 group-year observations over 31 democracies from 1990 to 1998 using logistic regression. This time period follows profound systemic and domestic changes. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union witnessed, not only the end of a bi-polar era, but the introduction of numerous newly formed states using democratic institutions. Many of these newly emerging states, even those whose transition or independence was not a direct consequence of the fall of the Soviet Union, began using democratic institutions, such as electoral systems in the presence of ethnic divisions. Ethnic tensions were previously contained under strong and interventionist methods. These countries were chosen on the conditions of being democratic and on having communal groups that are at risk in terms of their existing disadvantages or threats to their previously held advantages.

I will also discuss the results of additional explanatory variables meant to control for other possible explanations for decreases or increases in ethnic conflict between groups. These
variables are designed to capture important differences between groups and the role of other institutions, as well as the domestic environment in which these institutions operate.

This study does not claim that institutions are the primary tools of conflict management. Rather, I make the assumption that institutions are perhaps the most malleable tools available. However, there are other potentially important explanations, such as the lack of a democratic or consensual culture. To account for these changes, I control for unit effects, that is, key differences between groups that may cause some to be more or less prone to achieving resolutions through violence than others. Lastly, the conclusion will summarize the findings, discuss their implications, and make general suggestions concerning policy and future research.

The Implications of Democratic Institutions

Beginning in the mid-1970s, the international community witnessed the beginning of what Samuel Huntington referred to as the “third wave of democratization”. Numerous states appeared to emerge from authoritarian rule or were newly created as a result of regime collapse (1991). This wave touched shores all over the globe, including southern, central and Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America. Many of Huntington’s “third wave” democracies, particularly those that are severely divided along ethnic or sectarian lines, have failed to consolidate democracy in varying degrees and continue to suffer from deep ethnic divisions or violence. Democratic institutions, such as laws establishing free and fair elections, were seen as the cure for not only international conflicts, but domestic conflicts as well. However, as the last thirty years have shown, many countries that fit the basic descriptions of democracy, some more so than others, suffer from deep ethnic divisions that manifest as violent contention (Diamond 1996, 20). These democracies hold elections are free, fair, and competitive, have governments in place
that have a minimum respect for individual rights, such as freedom of assembly, and have leaders that are held accountable under the law; but, as some have acknowledged, countries with democratic institutions appear to suffer from ethnic conflict more so than non-democracies (Mousseau 2001, 547; Reilly 2006; Saideman et al. 2004). The greatest tool of autocracies in managing conflict is often the repressive measures implemented through their coercive apparatuses. However, in the hopes of avoiding the pessimism of Rabushka and Shepsle, the institutionalist approach is one avenue through which to view the democratic management of conflict as an attainable goal. The feasibility of such a goal lies in the continued search for the explanation of ethnic conflict and analyses as to the effect of current democratic institutions upon it.

Moreover, ethnic conflict is not the burden of developing societies only (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). The United States, the United Kingdom, and Turkey are among the countries of the developed world that have faced ethnic tensions and violence. However, societies that are politically and economically developed often have the institutional capacity to moderate ethnic tensions and grievances more so than developing societies. Nonetheless, in developing and developed societies, the emergence of democratic institutions has at times appeared to fail in fostering ethnic harmony.

Democratic institutions are expected to foster inclusion and cooperation, yet many democracies are plagued by ethnic strife, some more so after attempts at democratic transition. Nonetheless, democratic institutions are preferable over autocratic institutions as a means of conflict management. Therefore, studies have often sought the ways in which institutions may be manipulated and the appropriate contexts for them in order to foster ethnic harmony. Accordingly, this study focuses on ethnic conflict and the management of that conflict through
the use of electoral institutions, tools that are believed to be the most agreeable to design or reform in an attempt to address the threat to not only democracy, but also to the lives and security of those who reside in conflict driven systems. I ask, what explains ethnic conflict? My question then directs this study towards an assessment of the effect of institutions, particularly electoral institutions, upon ethnic conflict, specifically the causes of ethnic conflict between groups.

Institutions are frequently touted as the preferable means of managing ethnic conflict. Electoral systems are institutions that can be changed relatively quickly, where there is the pressure and willingness to do so, and can have a short-term impact upon political problems, particularly in divided societies. First, a changing of the rules, such as electoral thresholds, district magnitudes, or the implementation of rank voting can alter the incentives and behaviors of voters and political elites. Second, even when institutional changes threaten the power of the dominant group, there may be domestic or international pressure for that group to succumb to reform or to initiate reform itself. Nonetheless, there is widespread acknowledgement that other factors, such as political culture and reform-resistant elite, may challenge the emergence or ability of electoral institutions more appropriate for the management of ethnic conflict (Diamond 1996, 20; Lijphart 1999; Reilly 2006).

Although the debate is ongoing, there is a relatively broad consensus that the use of PR is preferable over the majoritarian form in deeply divided societies. PR, more so than the majoritarian formula, gives minority groups political access, allowing groups a greater say in the policies, personnel, and structure of government. Therefore, PR increases inclusion of minority ethnic groups which is argued to reduce ethnic grievances, and consequently reduce ethnic
conflict. The purpose of this study is to assess the validity of this argument and its application to as a tool of conflict management.

The necessity of this analysis lies in the observation that, against theoretical expectations, there is and remains ethnic conflict within systems with PR. Every five years from 1950-1985, and then every year from 1986-2000, the Minorities at Risk Project provides observations of the occurrence of ethnic conflict between groups. A simple summary of ethnic conflict within PR and majoritarian systems, illustrates the possibility that PR systems have less ethnic conflict of this sort. However, it also points to the ongoing challenge of ethnic conflict within these systems. During this time period, there are 2,205 group-year observations. Of the 988 majoritarian group-year observations, 568 or roughly 56% were indications of group conflict. Of the 1,217 PR group-year observations, 573 or about 47% are coded as instances of group conflict (Gurr 1993; 2005). Therefore, despite the mechanisms of inclusion and power-sharing, ethnic conflict persists, albeit at lower levels relative to majoritarian systems.

Challenges to Democracy: Divided Societies and Ethnic Conflict

During the period of initial transitions new norms of behavior associated with democracy are introduced, such as greater participation and inclusion, the election of representatives, and the application of checks on the power of leaders. Their introduction, however, may foster instability in societies that lack the experience with these democratic norms, or a willingness and capability to develop a democratic culture. Willingness entails a desire to end the corruption and lack of accountability associated with undemocratic practices such as pervasive clientelism. Capability means that society has the means through which to effectively implement policies that benefit the collective good and general democratic practices such as adherence to the rule of law.
Capability implies the existence of strong and efficient institutions which typically include bureaucracies that can effectively implement policies and a judicial system that is fair and independent.

There is a great deal of uncertainty as to election outcomes in newly democratic states and the capabilities of institutions not yet consolidated. Instability and the uncertainty that comes along with democratic transition is particularly a challenge in those countries that lack a democratic culture, whose institutions have been corrupt and rife with patronage, and who face the constant threat of internal conflict. In many cases, ethnic conflict has been at the root of the problem. In severely divided societies, conflict among ethnic groups poses a grave threat to attempts to consolidate democracy as it challenges the ability of democratic norms and institutions to develop and consolidate. Communal groups often have salient cleavages, historical animosities towards one another, and mobilize upon fixed differences. Thus, the political and social atmosphere in divided societies is often defined by mutual fears, the lack of norms of moderation and the absence of incentives to work together.

Recent events in developing and transitioning political systems illustrate that democratic institutions can be the dominant factor in both mobilizing and diminishing ethnic hostilities. This paper takes an institutionalist approach in assuming that institutions, such as electoral systems, have the power to shape incentives and behaviors, perhaps towards moderation and thus lessening the salience of ethnic cleavages. In doing so, I acknowledge that democracy can foster exclusion as well as inclusion. Exclusion can be promoted by democratic institutions in such a way that it appears to be permanent, particularly in divided societies where demographic numbers have often determined which groups holds the reins of political power on a permanent basis. Therefore, ethnic politics within a democratic system take on a much different character.
than politics in more homogeneous societies. The demographics of individual ethnic groups play
the primary role in determining which groups are included and which groups are excluded. Although, there are mechanisms through which minorities can rule majorities, ethnic politics remains a zero-sum game, in which a group that is not able to gain power through elections is excluded as a group, and often permanently (Diamond & Plattner 1994; Diamond & Plattner 2006; Horowitz 1994; 2000). This perhaps is particularly more so the situation in majoritarian systems. Nevertheless, such a situation foreshadows a hopeless future, particularly for groups that are disadvantaged demographically. Given this bleak outlook and the behavior it appears to incite, this paper seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the particular effects of electoral systems upon group conflict, both positive and negative. This study is also pursued in hopes that institutions can be improved upon in such a way as to further reduce all forms of ethnic tensions and conflict.

Discussions regarding appropriate electoral systems for divided societies have centered on the majoritarian and the proportional methods of representation. Because proportional representation gives more groups, particularly minority or previously excluded groups, access to government, it has been frequently praised as the electoral system most successful in diminishing ethnic resentment, and consequently, ethnic conflict. Majoritarian-plurality systems have been purported by some to be the least successful in terms of minority representation, and to even contribute to conflict between groups that are ethnically based. Supporters of the majoritarian model, on the other hand argue that the two-party system that results from the winner-take-all method fosters moderation among both office-seekers and voters. The assertion made by supporters of Arend Lijphart’s “consensus” model, that PR is the optimal form of electoral system design for divided societies, has indeed found support in previous studies. However,
these studies have neglected an important instance of ethnic conflict. Violence between groups is an important dynamic of ethnic conflict as the participants do not consist of an ethnic group on one side and the state on the other. Therefore, the causes and remedy of conflict between groups may not be identical to those of non-violent and violent manifestations of ethnic grievances directed at the group in control of the state.

While the debate hashes out the advantages and disadvantages of both systems in shaping ethnic politics, policy decisions regarding democratizing societies will likely be based upon the end result expected. Therefore, this study is particularly relevant to current foreign policy decision-making and constitutional design of new democracies as ethnic violence has often precipitated failures to consolidate democratic institutions and retreats to authoritarianism. The push for the expansion of democracy must be theoretically informed as to the explanatory power of particular institutions over outcomes. Since the 1990’s and the end of the Cold War, ethnic conflict, which includes violence directed at the state or other communal groups, has reduced dramatically (Figure 1) (The Center for Systemic Peace; Gurr 2000, 52). Additionally, the numbers of countries that can be considered democratic have increased over time (Figure 2) (The Center for Systemic Peace). However, the persisting occurrence of ethnic conflict continues to threaten further consolidation to democracy in political systems that suffer from deep cleavages. Those societies that are severely divided along ethnic lines will continue to face the threat of backsliding into authoritarianism if the proper means of conflict management are not instituted. Thus, studies assessing the ability of electoral institutions can assist policy makers in determining the proper institutional design or reform in a divided and conflict driven society.
As noted earlier, creative political solutions to the problem of ethnic conflict are in dire need for several reasons, all of which underscore the transnational dimension that these conflicts often have. First, ethnic conflict threatens the security and well-being of not just the participants, but of neighboring countries. Groups in conflict often transcend state boundaries which may lead to the contagion of ethnic conflict or the spreading of violence to neighbor border countries.
(Lake and Rothchild 1998). Second, ethnic conflict poses a threat to the general stability of the international system as it may require states to enforce alliances. Additionally, states that are compelled to intervene in an effort to stop ethnic conflict, even under broad international consensus, quickly find that military and financial assistance is a costly drain on their resources. How long will their domestic population support such efforts and sacrifices?

Deep ethnic divisions and conflict also hinder development. Riots and wars lead to the deterioration of emerging or existing political and economic institutions as they drain resources and divert attention from other pressing matters. Moreover, democracy, at least initially, can induce instability, or at a minimum, a fear of it in ethnically divided societies. The potential of a state to fall under non-democratic rule, often inadvertently sought as the means of reducing instability and chaos, increases greatly within divided societies relative to homogenous states and those that are pluralistic, but not severely divided along fixed cleavages. During periods of ethnic violence, a populace that is relatively inexperienced with democracy can lose faith in its ability to keep order. Under such conditions, states have often moved towards praetorianism, which is a tendency towards military, rather than civilian control of the government and its institutions. However, ethnic divisions, even those that have not manifested violently, take their own toll on development. Groups that wield a modicum amount of political power seek to promote their own self-interest at the expense of the public good. Therefore, the diluting of salient ethnic divisions must be a principal goal of policy-makers and reformers. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner in their compilation of contributions to the study of nationalism and ethnic conflict offer a clear and concise explanation for the priority of managing ethnic divisions: “because ethnicity taps cultural and symbolic issues – basic notion of identity and the self, of individual and group worth and entitlement – the conflicts it generates are intrinsically less
amenable to compromise than those revolving around material issues” (1994, xviii). Thus, the diluting and managing of ethnic divisions directly decreases mobilization along ethnic lines which then reduces the number of compromise resistant concerns, as well as the tendency towards violence and underdevelopment that often accompanies these type grievances.

This study is also designed to contribute to the study of electoral systems and to the field of institutional design as a method of ethnic conflict reduction. The idea that ethnic conflict can be managed by institutions, particularly electoral systems, is not new. However, there have been relatively few large-N analyses of the effect of using either proportional representation or majoritarian systems. Previous large-N studies have found that power-sharing features of Lijphart’s “consociational” model reduce rebellion and civil war. PR has been found to decrease protest and rebellion, although one study found that when the relationship between civil war and the number of political parties, an indicator of the electoral method in place, is examined there is a curvilinear pattern (Schneider and Wiesehomeier 2008, 183). Only party systems with few or many parties are associated with a greater respect for minority wishes, and thus a reduction in forms of ethnic conflict directed at the state. Federalism, on the other hand, decreases rebellion, but increases non-violent protest. Yet another study, using the social capital approach, did not find a positive outcome as far as the effect of PR and Federalism. Elkin and Sides, using survey data, find that neither institutional variable is consistently associated with increased attachment to the state on the part of minorities (2007, 693). Lastly, there have been divergent conclusions as to the effect of parliamentary forms of government relative to presidential systems. One study did not find a difference between the effects of these forms of government, while a more recent study found that presidential systems are the setting that is most prone to conflict (Saideman, Lanoue, and Campenni 2002, 103; Schneider and Wiesehomeier 2008, 183). In addition to the
scarcity of large-N analyses of electoral systems and ethnic conflict, this study contributes to the field by calling into question the idea, as portrayed in the current literature, that ethnic conflict is simply defined as conflict between a group and the state or dominant group. Future studies assessing the predictive power of electoral institutions upon ethnic conflict must more thoroughly determine if their effect varies across types of ethnic conflict. This study attempts to add to the debate by examining the relationship between PR and an important instance of ethnic conflict, inter-group conflict.

I hold the assumption that it is hasty to make the claim that institutions are incapable of positively contributing to the management of ethnic conflict. Electoral institutions have been found to reduce certain forms of ethnic conflict, specifically protest and rebellion. Rather, it is not the failure of democratic institutions in general to manage conflict, but the lack of ingenuity or resourcefulness in the application of electoral designs to adequately address alternative manifestations of ethnic violence. I argue that the use of PR in place of the majoritarian electoral system cannot explain changes in communal conflict. Why? Because ethnic conflict between groups, a distinctly different form of ethnic conflict from that of protest and rebellion, can be explained by the salience of ethnic identities, the persistence of the ethnic security dilemma, and the lack of inter-ethnic moderation and bargaining. Diluting ethnic identities, managing the ethnic security dilemma, and fostering inter-ethnic bargaining and moderation are measures that will be accompanied by a reduction in this type of ethnic conflict. Majoritarian and proportional representation electoral systems have both positive and negative effects on these root causes of inter-communal conflict. As such, they have inadequately addressed in some instances, or exacerbated in others, the causes of inter-communal conflict. More specifically for this study, PR fosters inclusion, but reinforces ethnic identities and the ethnic security dilemma, although in
a less severe way, and does not provide for inter-ethnic bargaining and moderation. Therefore, it is expected that there is no statistically significant difference between the effect of PR systems and majoritarian systems upon the instances of inter-communal conflict.

Through a large-N study, I find that PR is indeed effective when it comes to managing ethnic conflict between groups, but the strength of PR explanatory power along these lines remains inconclusive. Additionally, I find that other elements of the consensus model, such as parliamentarianism and federalism, have a different effect upon ethnic violence from their majoritarian counterparts than previous studies have shown when the concept of ethnic conflict is broadened to include a measure of ethnic conflict between groups. This study, however, is not designed to “throw out the baby with the bathwater”. In fact, PR systems may be the optimal institutional arrangement for the management of ethnic grievances and conflict on the whole, as compared to majoritarian systems. Thus, deficiencies in PR’s management of ethnic conflict must not cause reformers to lose faith in the power of PR or in electoral institutions in general, but should instead prompt scholars, policy-makers, and institutional designers to continue to employ creativity in addressing domestic problems.
Chapter 2 Literature Review

The Institutionalist Approach

The focus of this study is ethnic conflict and the role of electoral systems in managing ethnic tension and conflict. An electoral system is a method of allocating votes and then translating those votes into seats. Lijphart also defines it as a “set of essentially unchanged election rules” (1994, 13). Electoral systems are typically classified as institutions, thus the institutionalist approach will be given its due share of attention in this paper. There is considerable debate concerning the explanatory power of institutions and variance as to how far the definition of an institution should be stretched. Sociological institutionalists, for example, claim that macro-level variables such as society and culture are institutions that have an impact upon individual action. Greif and Laitin illustrate this incorporation of society and culture into an institutional classification by treating a cleavage structure as an institution (2004, 633). There is however, agreement among all institutionalists that institutions affect behavior, and thus as Diermeier and Krehbiel suggest, institutions are “those contextual features of the decision-making setting that the researcher regards as essential to understanding how political actors behave in pursuit of their goals” (2003, 127). I also adopt the assumption above, as well as the commonly held definition illustrated by Greif and Laitin that an institution is a “system of human-made, nonphysical elements…that generates behavioral regularities” (2004, 635).

Why Do “Institutions Matter”?: The Arguments of the New Institutionalists

“New institutionalism” emerged in the 1980s with not just the goal of renewing emphasis on institutions, but also to call attention to their autonomous role as an explanatory variable and their importance as a context within which to explain the behavior of political actors (Koelble
In an early publication, March and Olson addressed the inadequacy of previous literature evaluating institutions in society:

“Although there are a number of relatively precise contextual theories, the major theoretical significance of these ideas from the present point of view is less the specific forms of the theories than their general inclination to see the causal links between society and polity as running from the former to the latter, rather than the other way around. It is assumed that class, geography, climate, ethnicity, language, culture, economic conditions, demography, technology, ideology, and religion all affect politics but are not significantly affected by politics” (1984, 735).

Therefore, early institutionalists sought to redirect the causal arrow flowing between society and political institutions. Similarly, institutionalists sought to argue against a prior belief that the preferences and behaviors of political actors are exogenous to the political system; a belief adhered to even by some institutionalists today.

Overall, institutionalists seek to define the relationship between institutions and behavior, and to explain the processes by which institutions originate and change. Institutions seem to matter, and as March and Olson assert, they “are more than simple mirrors of social forces”, but to what extent do these “autonomous” institutions matter is a question commonly addressed by institutionalists (Hall and Taylor 1996, 936; 1984, 739). The core issue, then, is to what degree institutions can affect behavior.

Do institutions, such as electoral systems, whether they are majoritarian or proportional, determine the preferences of individual actors or do they just provide a context within which preferences are shaped, affecting behavior and outcomes? Rational choice institutionalists, those using what Hall and Taylor 1996 refer to as the “calculus approach” believe that actors’ preferences are fixed and that those preferences are exogenous to the political system, in contrast to beliefs held by sociological and historical institutionalists. They assert that institutions are important intervening variables that may affect choices and behavior but are not capable of
determining them. Keolble summarizes the debate among the three approaches as a question of whether structure, culture, or individual action best explains social phenomena (1995). In sum Rational choice institutionalists argue that institutions serve as a context within which strategies are formed, but they do not determine preferences. Therefore, this group does not take into consideration other factors such as historical processes, systemic environments or cultural differences that may determine preferences and influence institutions or be influenced by them.

To address the “preference issue”, sociological and historical institutionalists have sought to make a distinction between “real” or “true” preferences, and “expressed” preferences. Immergut, a historical institutionalist illustrates this distinction, explaining:

“There may be any number of reasons why, under one particular set of circumstances, someone may make a political choice that deviates from the choice the same individual, with the same preferences, would make under other circumstances. For example, they may believe that the outcome they hope for is not feasible and that they should therefore vote for an alternative that is not their first choice but one that has the advantage of being realizable” (1998, 7).

Despite disagreement as to the extent of the influence, scholars among the three approaches, rational choice, historical, and sociological agree that institutions affect, at a minimum the expression of preferences which is indicated by behavior of political actors, and that institutions can be self-enforcing, (Greif and Laitin 2004, 633; Hall and Taylor 1996, 936; Immergut 1998, 5; Koelble 1995, 231; March and Olsen 1984, 734; Norris 2004; Thelen 1999, 369).

Challenging the Primacy of Institutions

The notion of the primacy of institutions is not without its challengers. Sangmpam argues that institutions have failed to explain the success or failure of political development in many countries; Somalia and Kenya being but two of the author’s examples. The author does not negate the value of institutions as an independent variable, but does argue that society-rooted politics, specifically competitive politics, is the pre-eminent explanatory variable to which
institutions must be subordinate to along the causal chain. Sangmpam clarifies this assertion, stating:

“This does not dismiss the role of formal institutions. It recognizes that, once created, institutions do affect politics and, hence, can impact socio-economic outcomes. However, they do not ubiquitously determine or structure politics and the attendant outcomes as claimed by institutionalism. Their role does not occur independently of society-rooted politics. Second, although politics can occur in the absence of formal institutions, it is almost always informed and fed by other informal ‘sociological’ institutions” (2007, 204).

Institutionalists, however, seemingly have a desire to avoid a “chicken and egg” debate while acknowledging that institutions do not have the extraordinary ability to determine what an individual’s preferences will be, at least in the sense of “real” preferences. Immergut asserts that “preferences expressed in politics are…radically affected by the institutional contexts in which these preferences are voiced” (1998, 25). She further clarifies this position, asserting:

“Institutions do not determine behavior, they simply provide a context for action that helps us to understand why actors make the choices that they do. Facing the same sets of hurdles, self-reflective actors can make creative decisions about how to proceed. Thus, institutions – even when defined in the broadest sense – neither mold human perceptions to such an extent that individuals are incapable of recognizing competing definitions and interests nor do they force human action along a single track” (1998, 26).

Additionally, those studying institutional design or origination and change acknowledge the absolute need to take into consideration the societal, as well as existing institutional context within which institutions are to be created or reformed (Alexander 2005, 209; Hall and Taylor 1996, 936). Sociological institutionalists focus on macro-processes. They assert that rather than adopting institutional practices because they are “rational”, forms and procedures are adopted because they conform to practices that are culturally-specific. Therefore, the ability of an institution to affect preferences and behavior may be influenced by its conformity to the cultural environment in which it operates. For example, democratic institutions, such as electoral systems that place power in the hands of the people likely face significant challenges in regions
governed by a culture that welcomes state intervention in all aspects of society. Historical institutionalists argue that this is a perception of an environment characterized by action without agents. Historical institutionalists, on the other hand, focus on features of a society’s past experiences and the notion that institutions are not just borrowed from existing templates, as Immergut’s quote above suggests. The competing interests of actors are too often ignored by sociological institutionalists, as well as the interaction between institutions and ideas or beliefs (Hall and Taylor 1996).

The different aspects of the general institutional debate are mirrored in more specific studies of institutions. In their contribution to the electoral system literature, Diamond and Plattner suggest that “the electoral system does matter quite a lot for the nature of the party system and the character of politics and public policy” (2006, ix). Assuming that political parties are institutions, Duverger’s law that two-party systems are the inevitable result of the majoritarian electoral formula illustrates their effect upon individual behavior, whether participation is acted out by office seekers or voters. Benoit, on the other hand, appears to treat party systems as societal politics, rather than as institutions and argues that party systems can explain electoral systems just as electoral systems can explain party system outcomes. He emphasizes the possibility of electoral laws as political consequences, suggesting that the causal arrow between party system and electoral system flows in both directions (2007, 363). Benoit however, does take on an institutional approach by dealing with the effect of electoral institutions upon preferences and behavior. He asserts, “It should come as no surprise, therefore, that different actors will have different preferences for alternative rules based on their anticipations of these distributive consequences”. He continues, “Different electoral systems,
moreover, have additional properties and associated costs and benefits that motivate preferences among alternative choices” (2007, 378).

In his discussion of party politics and electoral systems, Benoit discusses the concern about endogeneity that institutionalists have sought to address under more general conditions. Benoit notes Duverger’s awareness of the problem of endogeneity in his assertion that electoral institutions act simultaneously as both ‘cameras and projectors’ (2007, 365). Benoit explains that electoral institutions shape party systems, but they themselves are formed in an environment of partisan electoral competition.” Additionally, “political actors adapt to strategic incentives presented by electoral laws, but one of their adaptations is to modify institutional settings that transform their strategies into outcomes” (2007, 364).

Pulling back to generalizations about institutions and behavior, rational choice institutionalists claim that preferences are fixed and are thus exogenous to institutions. As illustrated above, critics of the idea of “fixed” preferences argue that, while institutions may not determine preferences, they shape the ways in which these preferences are expressed. March and Olson illustrate a criticism of the rational choice approach concerning preferences and institutions:

“They are neither stable nor exogenous. If political preferences are molded through political experiences, or by political institutions, it is awkward to have a theory that presumes preferences are exogenous to the political process. And if preferences are not exogenous to the political process, it is awkward to picture the political system as strictly dependent on the society associated with it” (1984, 739). Preferences are to some extent endogenous to institutions because they are influenced and shaped by them, but as Immergut acknowledges the confusion introduced by efforts of historical institutionalists to “endogenize the political construction of interests,” she reminds critics that institutionalists do not “radically resocialize citizens in a revived version of social determinism or that norms dictate to actors what should be their behavior”. Rather, institutions act as “filters
that selectively favor particular interpretations either of the goals toward which political actors strive or of the best means to achieve these ends” (1998, 20).

A similar endogeneity problem arises when considering the origin of institutions. Again, March and Olson highlight this aspect of the institutional debate demonstrating the role of the distribution of political resources, which they assert are determined endogenously. They note that, “political institutions affect the distribution of resources, which in turn affects the power of political actors, and thereby affects political institutions” (1984, 739). This is similar to a contention of Benoit in his examination of Duverger’s hypothesis that multi-party systems are a result of the institutionalization of proportional representation. Benoit asks, and thus raises the question of endogeneity, if proportional representation is a result rather than a cause of the party system? However, Benoit claims that the problem of endogeneity does not really exist. He argues that “because electoral system designers lack complete information at the design stage, they generally make institutional choices whose outcomes cannot be fully anticipated” (2007, 369).

Grief and Laitin also address the endogeneity concern through their discussion of institutional stability and change. They acknowledge the contradiction that seemingly arises when one considers endogenous institutional change. Institutions, they claim are self-enforcing, and sometimes self-reinforcing as well. If institutions are self-enforcing, then the changes in these institutions must have an exogenous origin. However, as they argue, institutions can be self-undermining as “the processes an institution entails can undermine the extent to which the associated behavior is self-enforcing,” but “institutional change will endogenously occur only when the self-undermining process reaches a critical level such that past patterns of behavior are no longer self-enforcing” (2004, 634).
Such questions have a great deal of relevance concerning the potential effect of political institutions, particularly electoral systems, upon outcomes in divided societies. For example, can electoral systems shape preferences in such a way that determine positive outcomes in divided societies? Sangmpam suggests that institutions can affect societal politics. However, society-rooted politics, an umbrella under which the author appears to place social cleavages, constitutes the pre-eminent explanatory variable in determining outcomes and must also be the basis of prescriptions for development problems. With what appears to be a sociological institutionalist approach, Sangmpam places society and culture in the complex web of relationships between and among both formal and informal institutions. Sangmpam focuses on the likeliness of resistance on the part of society-rooted politics to institutions and asserts that they can explain and affect institutional variations and outcomes in individual countries. In discussing the problems of many developing countries, Sangmpam remarks that, “culturally, democracy does not have many strong adherents; it is artificial, weak and formal” and “there is an absence of national consensus, which makes many important topics fall prey to constant strong disagreement” (2007, 215).

Sangmpam neglects, however, the impact of institutions upon societal-politics in divided societies as an explanation for the failure of democratization. In many divided societies where there is this absence of national consensus and lack of democratic culture, social cleavages, particularly those that are based on ethnicity, have played a large role in the inability of societies to consolidate democratically. Colonialism, itself an institution because it governed the behavior of actors and determined who got what, increased the degree of salience of ethnic identities. Groups became the basis of comparison as the colonial power favored one group over the other in terms of status and collective benefits, and defined groups on the basis of similarities or
differences in with other groups (Greif and Laitin 2004, 633; Horowitz 2000). Sangmpam failed to appreciate the role of colonial institutions in structuring societal politics along ethnic lines prior to attempts at self-determination. Attempts to generalize about certain types of competitive politics, such as those that are driven by ethnic divisions, must not neglect the possibility that these politics were conditioned by institutions. Additionally, autocratic institutions have reinforced the salience of societal cleavages and have diminished the capacity of norms of consensus and democracy to emerge due to the institutionalization of coercive, clientelist and patrimonialist methods of governance (Bellin 2005; Clark 2004, 941; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, 1279; Haleem 2003, 463; Kassem 1999; Ottaway 2003; Ulfelder 2007, 995). Furthermore, these institutionalized forms of politics are self-enforcing and have conditioned the behavior and preferences of elite and non-elite actors.

*Integrating Insights*

Nonetheless, advocates for the power of institutions in affecting preferences, behaviors, and outcomes, as illustrated above, do not ignore society-rooted politics and culture. And, Institutionalists do not fail to make important claims regarding the limits upon the explanatory power of institutions and the necessity of giving due attention to context (Alexander 2005, 209; Hall and Taylor 1996, 936; Immergut 1998, 5). For example, Lijphart, who champions the placement of institutions that are based on his consensual model of democracy, warns that “both institutional and cultural traditions may present strong resistance to consensus democracy” (1999, 305).

Also reassuring, is the common tone throughout works that assess the state of the field. Institutionalists often argue that their studies share a common theoretical core and express a
desire to abandon the “chicken and egg” quality stemming from the culture, structure, action
debate in order to appreciate the advantages and insights of each theoretical lens and to integrate
them as well (Hall and Taylor 1996, 936; Immergut 1998, 5; Koelble 1995, 231). Koelble
summarizes the presence of the common theoretical core nicely, stating that each of the lens
“may be criticized as faulty from the perspective of the other approaches, but each also has a set
of features superior to its competitors, depending on the research question” (1995, 243). Such an
integration of insights leads to an important conclusion concerning the role of institutions and
their effects upon individual and collective behavior. Within the context of political competition,
rational choice emphasizes strategic calculations. Preferences remain fixed, only to the extent
that actors seek to survive whether they are politicians seeking political survival in order to
remain in power, or are actors as members of an ethnic group seeking political and economic
power to ensure their survival. Historical institutionalism takes the institutional approach to the
next logical step, in that it distinguishes between an actor’s true and expressed preferences and
asserts that institutions can play a determinant role in shaping their actions.

Thus, institutions guide the choices of actors. For example, it is commonly accepted that
the majoritarian electoral system leads to a two-party system because the rewarding of political
power is based on the “winner-take-all” allocation method. One, and one party only can be
victorious in a narrow sense of the word, unlike in systems of proportional representation. In
order to survive politically, politicians must appeal to a majority of the population. Therefore,
they must build coalitions that encompass a majority of the electorate, if not a plurality. These
coalitions will naturally coalesce into two dominant parties. The effect of the majoritarian
electoral system is not limited to political elites. It is also commonly accepted that the behavior
of voter’s is shaped as well. Because the system is “winner-take-all”, voters will seek to avoid
“wasting” their votes on political groupings that do not appeal to a minimal amount within the electorate required to gain the office up for grabs. Thus, they will vote for one of two parties that have the greatest chance of appealing to a majority or plurality of the voting population, effectively eliminating third parties.

Two conclusions are to be gleaned from the discussions within the institutionalist literature. First, the advantage of incorporating the sociological approach into analyses of institutions is that it allows room for an appreciation of other explanatory variables that may mediate the effect of institutions. Societal politics, such as ethnic competition, and cultural features, such as a long history of animosity between two societal groups, may enhance or degrade the impact of institutions, whether this impact is positive or negative. Additionally, institutions may serve to reinforce these societal dynamics. Such an appreciation of the role of societal politics or institutional context, however, does not diminish the role of institutions as an explanatory variable. Rather, it is a greater appreciation for the context in which institutions operate and it does not dismiss the effect of institutions upon the political, cultural, or economic context itself in the long-run. For example, electoral designs that require strategies based on moderation in order for political elites to survive and for citizens to access the government, may in the long-term reduce the historical animosities among groups within the society and encourage the development of political competition based on less polarizing and fixed identities such as those based on ethnicity. Economic development or the lack there of, may either enhance or retard the process of political development and democratization. However, in the long-run, stable political institutions are necessary for continued economic development. As Hall and Taylor summarize, institutionalists are not arguing that institutions are the only causal force in politics and they do not ignore the potential influence of social and cultural factors upon
individual actions highlighted by sociological institutionalists. Rather “they typically seek to locate institutions in a causal chain that accommodates a role for other factors…” (1996, 942).

As illustrated above, institutionalists argue as to the degree of explanatory power of institutions while those challenging the approach assert that simple incorporation of other factors is not enough and that institutions must not be considered the preeminent explanatory variable. Furthermore, institutionalists acknowledge that there is a “chicken and egg” problem that emerges from findings supporting the dual nature of the causal arrow in their analyses. For example, as discussed earlier, it may be difficult to determine when party systems cause electoral systems and when electoral systems cause party systems due to their ability to re-enforce one another. Upon noting this, the second conclusion drawn from institutional literature is that it often neglects the idea of competing institutions. This concept has not been acknowledged, at least explicitly, by institutionalists, and may serve to better explain the perceived failure of institutions in the eyes of scholars such as Sangmpam (2007, 201).

Institutions may be in competition in the sense that they may alter the impact of another institution and “compete” for explanatory power over outcomes. Ethnic conflict is an important dimension upon which this idea can be further explored. Ethnic politics occur within a cleavage structure, which according to Greif and Laitin is constituted by “the relative salience of cleavages within a society and the number of cleavages that have any salience (along with the categories of membership on each dimension)” (2004, 645). In building upon the 1967 work of Lipset and Rokkan, these authors note that cleavage structure is usually thought of as a social reality rather than an institution (Lipset and Rokkan). Despite this, they contend:

“Yet it (cleavage structure) fits well within our definition of institutions. Consider first our criterion of an institution being human-made. While schools of thought a generation ago held that people were given their social identities, it has become increasingly accepted that in fact people construct those identities” (2004, 645).
Greif and Laitin assess cleavage structures in light of their view that they constitute institutions, by discussing the situations under which they may or may not be self-enforcing or self-reinforcing. Institutions have the ability to be self-enforcing, and as these authors assert, cleavage structures are no exception. Additionally, cleavage structures shape the behavior of actors because they govern a transaction like political support for a policy or distribution of goods (2004, 633).

**Political Institutions in Divided Societies: The Role of Electoral Systems**

There is broad consensus that particular democratic institutions, used in the appropriate context, can be extremely helpful in conflict management and in supporting democratic consolidation in new societies, particularly those with societal divisions (Alexander 2005, 209; Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007, 237; Benoit 2007, 363; Bogaards 2003, 59; Diamond and Plattner 2006; Farrell, Mackerras, and McAllister 1996, 24; Fraenkel and Grofman 2006, 623; Horowitz 2000; Lijphart 2004, 96; Norris 2004; Reilly 2002, 156; Reynolds 2006; Saideman, Lanoue, and Campenni 2002, 103). As Donald Horowitz asserts, in his seminal study of ethnic groups in conflict, “the rules can restructure the system so that the game itself changes” (2000, 601). Reilly recognizes the benefits of “political engineering”, defined by him as “the conscious design of political institutions to achieve certain specified objectives”. Institutional design, according to Reilly, is a common one in that “today, it is widely accepted that some institutions can be purposively designed so as to reward or constrain particular kinds of behavior”. He turns specifically to the acknowledgement of electoral design, stating that “many political engineering strategies focus on the creative manipulation of electoral systems for achieving these aims” (2006, 21). Moreover, the relative ease and short-term impact of institutional design has been
deemed critical as well. Diamond and Plattner, Reilly, and Horowitz remind scholars and policy-makers that elections can shape broader norms of political behavior, and that the institutional structure of a political system amenable to redesign, can be changed relatively quickly, and will produce results conducive to conflict management in a relatively short time frame, as compared to policies, for example, that give preferential treatment to marginalized groups in efforts to manage ethnic tensions (2006; 2006; 2000).

Preferences and Behaviors

How do electoral systems explain outcomes in divided societies in terms of the institutional approach? Scholars focus on the effect of electoral systems upon the preferences, strategic calculations, and subsequent behavior of actors. Immergut suggests:

“Not only may political institutions, political authorities, and political culture play a critical role in the definition, mobilization, and organization of interests, but the structure of political opportunities will shape the strategies of organized interests and their beliefs regarding the efficacy of different types of political action” (1998, 21).

She continues in her assessment of the causal mechanism stating, “preferences expressed in politics are…radically affected by the institutional contexts in which these preferences are voiced” (25). Benoit asserts that actors derive their preferences based on expected distributive consequences in terms of payoffs resulting from the use of certain institutions. He claims:

“It should come as no surprise, therefore, that different actors will have different preferences for alternative rules based on their anticipation of these distributive consequences. Different electoral systems, moreover, have additional properties and associated costs and benefits that motivate preferences among alternative choices” (2007, 378).

Rabushka and Shepsle, in an earlier assessment of the political context similarly discuss the effect upon preferences, stating first that people have preferences and seek to satisfy them subject to the political ‘rules of the game’” (1972, 25). Second, they discuss the role of institutions and the notion of expressed preferences in their suggestion that “particular
preferences do not imply particular kinds of behavior” and that “the behavior associated with any given preference ordering may vary with the political context” (27). Lastly, Rabushka and Shepsle implicitly refer to electoral systems and their explanatory role in stating that “collective choice procedures are instituted to resolve preference conflicts not otherwise resolvable by individualistic mechanisms” and “these collective choice procedures always produce outcomes” (31).

Reilly focuses on party systems, which depending on the scholar are to varying degrees a result of the electoral system, and their effect upon social cleavages. He declares that “as key agents of political articulation, aggregation and representation, political parties are the institutions which impact most directly on the extent to which social cleavages are translated into national politics” (2006, 18). In doing so, Reilly illustrates the importance of analyzing the party system alongside the electoral system, as they are interrelated, in efforts to gauge the impact of both upon ethnic politics in divided societies. In terms of preferences and behaviors, the party system serves to highlight the interaction between societal politics and institutions.

As will be shown below, the particular electoral system employed can determine whether the party system is a two-party or multi-party one, which then affects the representation of social cleavages within the organs of government. Scholars converge along the lines of thinking that electoral systems can manage ethnic conflict; however, where they diverge is at the impact of the resulting party systems upon conflict management. Regardless, the assumptions of the institutional approach are directly applicable to the analyses of electoral systems within divided societies. Whether divided or not, society consists of political actors with preferences. These actors make strategic calculations as to the most beneficial expression of those preferences and the behavior employed to protect them. The institutional context, such as electoral systems
and electoral laws, shapes the expression of preferences, in that the “rules of the game” will determine the advantages or disadvantages of using one behavior over the other. Furthermore, as Diermeirer and Krehbiel point out, institutions not only shape preferences, but impose constraints on behavior as well (2003, 123). This applies to members of ethnic groups as well, whether they political elites or non-elites. Thus, it is widely acknowledged, with the exceptions of a few critics, that electoral institutions can shape the behavior of actors in the expression of their preferences. From this we can generalize as to the ability of electoral systems to aid in conflict management.

Conflict Management with Electoral Institutions: Wishful Thinking?

Criticism of the ability of electoral systems to manage conflict in divided societies is focused on three fronts that comprise the role of the party system, the tendency of fragmented societies to bring about autocratic rule and the subsequent use of autocratic institutions to manage conflict and gain stability, and the cultural and historical context of the society. The first is based upon the argument that under certain contexts, party systems determine the electoral system and not the other way around. Party systems are often an indicator of the electoral laws in place. Majoritarian systems tend to produce two-party systems while systems of proportional representation tend to produce multi-party system (although, electoral laws such as voter thresholds may limit the number of parties that may have legislative or executive representation). Criticism of the ability of the electoral system to produce outcomes concerning conflict management often point to the fact that in many societies electoral engineering is actually electoral reform. Therefore, electoral laws may be the indicator of party systems, as Benoit suggests.
Lipset and Rokkan, for instance, assert that party systems are dependent upon electoral systems, but the same cannot be said in situations where the party system is established. Under such circumstances the party system already in place will determine the electoral system outcome. They contend that “there is little hard evidence and much uncertainty about the effects of later changes in election laws on the national party system: one simple reason is that the parties already entrenched in the polity will exert a great deal of influence on the extent and the direction of any such changes and at least prove reluctant to see themselves voted out of existence (1967, 30). Rabushka and Shepsle put forth a similar assertion, but in terms of the dominant ethnic group: “The ethnic group that comes to power invariably adjusts the electoral machinery to suit its interests” (1972, 89). Similarly, other arguments have echoed the idea changing the nature of a country’s party system by institutional redesign is wishful thinking and represents a utopian outlook (Barry 1991; McGarry and O'Leary 1993).

The response to critics has been that existing party systems do not represent a fundamental barrier to electoral reform under many conditions. These conditions include, but are not limited to, international or domestic pressure on the controlling group to be more inclusive. Under such pressure, the dominant group’s ability to survive and maintain power may be severely threatened. As Benoit suggests, the introduction of PR into a majoritarian system threatens the survival of the dominant majority group, but transforming the electoral system to PR may be a strategy designed to limit damage already done as a result of a rising electoral threat amidst the opposition. Benoit highlights another political context in which electoral reform may take place within an established party system. The dominant group may find that it must make sacrifices in altering the electoral system in order to satisfy other preferences, such as a desire to appease a rival growing in power or a simple realization on the part of the group in power that it
is in their best interests to be perceived as legitimate and fair (2007, 363). This is similar to when Congressman in the United States vote “yea” on a policy they do not support in principle in order to garner votes from policy rivals for legislation that they deem more important. Thus, the basic preference of survival remains, but the best means of surviving may change in light of alterations in the international or domestic political environment. This line of thinking is consistent with the institutional approach as illustrated by Grief and Laitin’s assertion that “institutions can change due to endogenous processes, exogenous shocks, and combinations of both” (2004, 639). Furthermore, proponents of “bounded rationality” within the institutionalist approach argue that actors and groups are limited in their ability to anticipate the consequences of institutional changes, such as electoral system reform (March and Olsen 1984, 734).

Reilly notes that efforts to design electoral institutions that will manage conflict reflect a desire to achieve political stability under democratic, rather than autocratic rule (2006). Nevertheless, as the second line of criticism, scholars have illustrated the challenging social and political environment within which democratic institutions emerge and attempt to consolidate in divided societies. As noted earlier, salient social cleavages intensify the difficulty of building consensus. In the early 1970s, shortly before the world began to witness the third wave of democratization, Rabushka and Shepsle cast a gloomy outlook on the process of political development in divided societies. They contended that “no one electoral system is preferable to another and that fair representation in plural societies is a difficult problem from any angle” (1972, 213). They ask, “Is the resolution of intense but conflicting preferences in the plural society manageable in a democratic framework?” Their answer: “We think not” (1972, 217). The basis of his argument is the idea, also conveyed by Horowitz, that group preferences in divided societies are expressed at the expense of others. Additionally, communal criteria are the
basis for determining the allocation of resources, and who is excluded and who is not (2000; 1972). Under such circumstances, achieving and maintaining ethnic coalitions are challenging at best.

Perhaps, all hope is not lost, for Rabushka and Shepsle incorrectly perceive the failure to hold together multiethnic coalitions in the post-independence period as a result of the absence of the common opponent, the colonial power. They assert that in the pre-independence period, there was ethnic cooperation at the elite-level. The basis of cooperation, however, was not a desire for ethnic bargaining and moderation between groups subjugated by the colonial power. And it was not in response to a common enemy. More often than not, it was the presence or threat of coercive apparatus and institutional features that systematically identified a group’s placement on the political and social hierarchy. Colonial powers typically favored one or two groups over all others they deemed as “backwards”. Thus, contrary to the authors assertions, the “oversized ethnic coalition” that they claim could not be held together in the post-independence period, never truly existed in the first place due to the tendency of colonial powers to induce group comparison in terms of “advanced” and “backwards”, as well as “advantaged” and disadvantage” (Horowitz 2000).

Pakistan, although considered a liberal autocracy for the past 10 years, serves as an example of the influence of the colonial system and the dynamics of group comparison. The roots of Punjabi-Pukhtun dominance of the state can be traced back to colonial policies pre-partition, and more currently to the militarization of Pakistan’s government. Mohajirs, Punjabis, Pukhtuns have benefitted significantly from the colonial policies of the British prior to the partition of Pakistan from India. The Mohajirs (Muslim immigrants from India after partition) gained influence from the colonial administrations dependence on landlords. The United
Provinces of India, from which the Mohajirs migrated, was the traditional power base of the land owning Muslim upper class (Khan 2005). The Punjabis and Pukhtuns, on the other hand, benefitted from the irrigation works of the British in the 1880s. The extent of the ethnic imbalance in Pakistan lies in the overrepresentation of the Punjabis and Pukhtuns in the military apparatus. This overrepresentation stems from the practical implementation of a “martial caste” ideology of the British through the recruitment from “martial caste” communities and regions of the Punjab. Punjabis gained influence within the British Indian army when they helped to put down a resistance movement in 1857 (Khan 2005; Talbot 2002). By 1951, Punjabis were one-quarter of the population, but were represented in 80% of the army posts, as well as in 55% of the bureaucratic positions (Jaffrelot 2002). The Pukhtuns were regarded as good soldiers by the British, and thus were actively recruited into the British Indian army in large numbers. The implications of the colonial pattern of economic development, military recruitment and administration are described by Jack Eller who contends that this system of “communal representation” meant that “group differences were reified, institutionalized, and politicized in unprecedented ways to ensure groups a share of power as groups” (Talbot 2002, 35; Eller 2002).

As indirectly noted, and perhaps unintentionally in the criticism of Sangpam, democratic institutions have often had to compete with the effects or outcomes of colonial institutions. Nonetheless, as Horowitz asserts, attempts at building multi-ethnic bidding are often overshadowed and defeated by ethnic outbidding, because in divided societies with salient social cleavages, political competition of interests and political conflicts are perceived in ethnic terms. Horowitz correctly notes the inherent difficulty any regime has in maintaining the inclusiveness of a polity superimposed on an ethnically divided society. Further, he claims that “ethnicity poses obstacles at the threshold of democratization and obstacles after the threshold is crossed”,
and that “in a variety of ways, direct and indirect, ethnic conflict can be conducive to authoritarianism” (2000, 42). Adding to the conduciveness of ethnic fragmentation to the emergence of autocratic rule is the fact that ethnic politics are often a “zero-sum game”, in which the losers tend to lose big. This characteristic of ethnic politics is likely to foster the practice of extreme forms of exclusion. Horowitz makes an important prediction along these lines as well:

“Extreme forms of ethnic exclusion require a legal framework that is ultimately inimical to democratic principles. They make it impossible to apply uniform conceptions of representation or to treat like cases alike. If, in addition, the excluded groups adopt unlawful methods of protest, there is likely to be a spate of statutes and regulations authorizing arbitrary arrest and search, detention without trial, and restrictions on freedom of expression. Political leaders who advocate ethnically extremist positions are also more inclined than ethnic moderates are to support authoritarian measures. This is another way in which the pursuit of ethnic conflict is likely to foster authoritarianism” (2000, 42).

Despite the gloomy prediction of Rabushka and Shepsle, institutionalists and proponents of electoral system design as a means of conflict management share in the conviction that autocratic rule does not have to be the sole outcome of or response to ethnic politics, as reflected in increasing studies of how electoral system design can achieve optimal outcomes regarding the management of ethnic conflict.

The third line of criticism comes both from outside the world of, and to a certain extent, from within the world of institutionalists. This criticism of the impact of institutions upon ethnic conflict identifies the need, but relative lack of, moderation in society, as well as the presence of historical animosities between groups. Cooperation among ethnic groups requires some degree of reconciliation and moderation in practices, both at the state level and the minority group level. According to Rabushka and Shepsle, Yugoslavia was a prime example of the fact that attempts at reconciliation often have to overcome long-established barriers of hate and mistrust (1972). Similarly, Sangmpam focuses on the resistance of society-rooted politics to institutions. For this author, Kenya serves as an example where institutions strived or perished at the whims of society-
rooted politics. Secondly, Sangmpam asserts the limitations of institutional practices on ethnic conflict, stating that “routine elections and other institutional arrangements have not led to compromise over political competition or prevented its highly contentious nature” (2007, 217). Lipset and Rokkan mention several variables that may stand in the way of electoral changes and workable mergers or alliances. The intensity of inherited hostilities and the openness of communications across the cleavage lines are two such conditions. As such, they assert that “there must be some minimum trust among the leaders, and there must be some justification for expecting that the channels to the decision-makers will be kept open whoever wins the election” (1967, 32). Thus, according to these authors, societal politics, such as ethnic divisions and competitions (histories of animosity) will have the largest affect on the outcome. The question is then, can democratic institutions, assuming the multi-directional flow of the causal arrows, manipulate these?

A Positive, But Not Utopian Outlook

As my pursuance of this study implies, institutions face challenges but are capable of, particularly in the long-term of influencing the dynamics that initially comprise the difficulties faced by them. Lijphart, a long-time proponent of electoral system designs that foster consensus building and the power of political institutions to mitigate ethnic conflict, acknowledges the difficulties that the cultural, political, and institutional contexts may pose. He states, albeit in his work analyzing the electoral systems of developed democracies that do not have, in most cases, strong salient cleavages, that “both institutional and cultural traditions may present strong resistance to consensus democracy” (1999, 305). Lijphart continues:

“Consensus democracy may not be able to take root and thrive unless it is supported by a consensual political culture. Although the focus of this book has been on institutions rather than culture, it is clear that a consensus-oriented culture often provides the basis
for and connections between the institutions of consensus democracy…but, there is a great deal of interaction between culture and structure. …this is especially true of political culture and political structure” (1999, 306).

However, Lijphart then challenges critics by incorporating the ability of the institution to lessen the degree of hostilities and increase the lack of consensus in the long-term in his analysis. He asserts: “This means that, although a consensual culture may lead to the adoption of consensus institutions, these institutions also have the potential of making an initially adversarial culture less adversarial and more consensual” (1999, 307). He is implicitly referring to the multi-directional causal arrow between society and institutions.

More recently, an assertion this study hopes to bolster, preferential electoral methods have been argued to be ideal as far as instilling norms of moderation and bargaining in a society previously resistant. In a recent study, Faenkel and Grofman discuss the impact of one particular electoral design, the Alternative Vote, in fostering moderation in ethnically divided societies. These authors use Fiji, South Africa, and Bosnia as case studies. They support the importance of the cultural context in affecting the ability of institutions to manage conflict through their findings that the Alternative Vote, a majoritarian method of vote allocation, could not induce moderation where it did not already exist. However, these authors do find, that an alternative electoral system, proportional representation, would have allowed moderate parties to fare better as opposed to radical parties by giving the moderate parties greater representation and inclusion in post-election governments (2006, 623).

In re-examining the claims of institutionalists, these conclusions of critics and proponents of electoral design do not convey the sense that political institutions are wholly subject to societal politics and cultural traditions. Institutionalists such as Immergut, have acknowledged that institutions are not the sole explanatory variable, that “contextual factors may affect the functioning and salience of institutions,” and that “historical context, institutional practices, and
the balance of power among social and political actors interact” (Immergut 1998, 22, 25). Additionally, the institutionalist approach does not claim that electoral systems do not necessarily determine the true preferences of actors. For example, two-party systems in which parties must build broad moderate coalitions in order to win office do not cause people to become moderates. In America, the two-party system has not eliminated extreme Liberals, extreme Conservatives, or those whose view allow for the complete exclusion of other groups. Rather, under certain demographic circumstances, electoral institutions can shape behavior by forcing people to express, vote perhaps, their preferences differently from their true preferences. Likewise, the PR system may not get two groups to like one another, but it does compel groups to take the concerns and demands of one another into account. Lastly, scholars have noted that if electoral reforms are given time, hopefully several or more elections, a sort of political learning takes place, after which onlookers may observe significant increases in moderation and cooperation among and between ethnic groups or parties. Reilly claims that this occurred in Northern Ireland in 1998 under the Good Friday peace accords. Voters and candidates experienced this political learning over three decades of erratic usage of STV. It was not until the 1998 election that this contributed, among other factors, to moderate and accommodative outcomes (Reilly 2006).

The Debate: Proportional Representation and Majoritarian-plurality

PR...The Most Appropriate Electoral System?

Democratizing countries have often put into place political institutions, particularly the electoral method, used by the previous colonial power or the successful western democracies. Although for some this has meant implementing a majoritarian or plurality electoral design,
proportional representation has become the dominant system, particularly in divided societies (Lijphart 2006b, 73). While there is agreement regarding the impact of political institutions upon ethnic behavior, there remains debate over which electoral system is more appropriate for democratizing states, particularly those that are severely divided (Horowitz 2006; Lijphart 2006a; Lustick, Miodownik, & Eidelson 2004, 209; Norris 2004; Barkan 2006; Reynolds 2006; Saideman, Lanoue, & Campenni 2002, 103; Reilly 2001). According to Lijphart, electoral systems can be either majoritarian, on one end of the spectrum, or “consensus”, one the other end (1999). Lijphart argues for the consensus based electoral system. In designing a consensus based electoral system, he argues for the use of a “consociational” model that is premised on the idea of power-sharing, and is best exemplified by proportional representation. Consociationalism is designed to allow the political organs of government, whether they be legislative, executive or regional, to be as inclusive as possible and built upon the belief that sharing power with other groups is both democratic and conducive to ameliorating ethnic hostilities (Lijphart 2006; Lijphart 2006, 73; Lijphart 2004, 96; Lijphart 1999; Lijphart 1994).

Reilly similarly frames the debate in terms of two methods of “political engineering”. The first being Lijphart’s consociational approach, and the other being centripetalism. Like consociationalism, centripetalism also seeks inclusion, but not on the basis of ethnic divisions. In contrast to Lijphart’s model which advocates PR, takes ethnic divisions as a given, and results in multiple ethnic political parties, centripetalism is employed to encourage intercommunal moderation and the dilution of salient ethnic identities by promoting multi-ethnic political parties. Reilly claims that the application of the centripetalist model will dilute the ethnic character of competitive politics. As Reilly readily admits, centripetalism is essentially majoritarian in nature, a character that will be assessed in the preceding pages (Reilly 2006a;
In terms of which electoral system is more appropriate for divided societies, the debate has largely led to the coalescing of scholars into two camps: those supporting proportional representation on one side, and those supporting majoritarian systems on the other.

While there are challenges to the attractiveness of Lijphart’s consociational model on the whole, including those to proportional representation by “consensus” supporters, many scholars agree on the disadvantages of implementing the majoritarian-plurality model in severely divided societies. The greatest threats to ethnic harmony within majoritarian systems are disproportional representation, when large parties are systematically overrepresented and smaller parties are systematically underrepresented, and the exclusion of either the minority or the majority, often on a permanent basis. These threats are particularly dangerous in ethnically divided societies, where parties are organized along ethnic lines. Lijphart characterizes majoritarian systems as: (1) government by and for the majority of the people, although often only a plurality; (2) exclusive, competitive, and adversarial; (3) highly disproportional in terms of representation or the translation of votes into seats; and (4) conducive to two-party systems with single-party majority governments. Consensus systems, on the other hand, are characterized as the following: (1) based on a norm that majority rule is better than minority rule, but accepting of majority rule only as a minimum requirement; (2) seeking to maximize majorities, rather than settling with a bare majority; (3) based upon broad, multi-party coalitions; (4) the sharing, dispersion, and limitation of power in a variety of ways; and (5) based upon the norms of inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise (1999).

Lijphart makes no qualms about the fact that proportional representation, the consociational manifestation of a consensus based electoral system, “is clearly better than the
major alternatives in accommodating ethnic differences” (2006b, 83). Lijphart does not appear to be supportive of mixed systems, those that employ PR on one level, and majoritarian on another. He contends:

“the beauty of PR is that in addition to producing proportionality and minority representation, it treats all groups – ethnic, racial, religious, or even noncommunal groups – in a completely equal and evenhanded fashion. Why deviate from full PR at all” (2004, 99)?

Similarly, Andrew Reynolds argues that “the evidence from the emerging democracies of southern Africa strongly suggests that divided societies need proportional representation (PR) rather than plurality elections, and a parliamentary rather than a presidential form of government” (2006, 121). Reynolds continues, saying, “The argument that plurality elections exacerbate regional and ethnic polarization draws considerable strength from the experiences of the fledgling democracies of southern Africa” (2006, 123). In his work on minorities at risk, Gurr emphasizes the importance of recognition and access for minority groups, and thus, seems to implicitly support PR. Referring to pluralism, Gurr states that, “politically, it implies the emergence of institutionalized ethnic politics, with ethnic political parties and guarantees, or expectations, that communal interests will be represented in decision-making” (1993, 309-310).

Or Maybe Not: The Majoritarian Argument

The use of the majoritarian-plurality method in ethnically divided societies, however, is not without its supporters. Barkan, in arguing that in proportional systems there is a lack of linkage between representatives and their constituents, a serious drawback to stability and legitimacy, states that single member district plurality is the “superior formula” when it comes to the “quality” of representation (2006, 142). According to Barkan, plurality is appropriate for developing countries precisely because agrarian societies tend to have a higher geographic
concentration of voters. Under these circumstances, the distribution of seats under single member district plurality systems (SMD) and PR would be closely the same. Barkan makes two important points; the first being that the superiority of representation in SMD systems is worth the “modest” disproportional allocation of seats; second, the level of disproportionality can be reduced with the creation of smaller and more compact electoral districts (2006, 142).

Other critics of proportional representation argue that the two-party system created by the majoritarian-plurality method favors governmental stability, greater capacity and effectiveness, as well as, periodic alternations in power (Lardeyret 2006, 86). Furthermore, they assert that advocates of proportional representation tend to ignore the fact that the small party formations that are encouraged by this system tend to produce ethnic and religious organizations that re-create or institutionalize pre-existing societal divisions (Horowitz 2000; Lardeyret 2006, 86; Quade 2006, 92). Lardeyret asserts that “dividing the electorate in this way tends to exacerbate the conflicts in a society” (2006, 88). Moreover, in a 1940s study Hermens demonstrates through a discussion of the rise of Hitler’s party in Germany and fascists elements in Italy following World War I, that PR gives representation to radical elements and allows them the opportunity to impose their will by force. He argues that “PR tends to create a government of groups, by groups, and for groups” (1940, 12). Thus, he suggests that PR may have been the cause for democratic breakdown in Europe. Like other critics of PR, Hermens asserts that under PR, elections take on a “census” character, while under majoritarian formulas, elections are designed to achieve “consensus”. In a related argument, Quade rebuts the criticism that majoritarian systems are not conducive to moderation:

“Plurality voting encourages the competing parties to adopt a majority-forming attitude. The parties incline to be moderate to seek conciliation, to round off their rough edges – in short, to do before the election in the public view, the very tasks that Lijphart applauds PR systems for doing after the election” (2006, 97).
In response, Lijphart insists that strength should not be confused with effectiveness, and that in proportional systems there is alternation between majority control and minority control (1999; 2006b, 73). In *Patterns of Democracy*, Lijphart finds that consensus democracies have a slightly better record in macro-economic management and a significantly better record in controlling inflation, and on the other hand, finds no clear support for a relationship between consensus democracy and corruption to indicate the majoritarian belief in the lack of alteration in governments under PR. Additionally, he argues that executive strength does not necessarily translate into effective policy-making for the simple reason that a strong executive implies a relatively weak legislative branch and thus the executive branch is dominant in terms of the legislative-executive balance of power. Lijphart does agree with majoritarian proponents that the two-party system does have clear government accountability. However, his counter-argument comprises the following:

“Greater accountability does not directly translate into greater responsiveness to citizen interests. There is no evidence that coalition cabinets in multi-party systems are less responsive than one-party majority cabinets; on the contrary, coalition cabinets are usually closer to the centre of the political spectrum – and hence closer in their policy outlook to the average citizen – than one-party cabinets representing either the left or the right” (1994, 144).

Referring to the assertion of majoritarian supporters that PR allows for the unhealthy proliferation of political parties and for the representation of extremist parties, Lijphart notes that proportional systems can be designed to control the degree of multi-partism through changes in district magnitude and thresholds so as to reduce the tendency of extreme party proliferation feared by supporters of majoritarianism (1999). Lastly, he counters that majoritarian proposals assume that excluded groups will agree to play the role of the loyal opposition and will continue to do so in the long-run. Moreover, in agreement with Horowitz, Rabushka and Shepsle,
Lijphart points to their neglect of the fact that the majority, moderate or not, will remain in power permanently under majoritarian electoral rules (1994; Horowitz 2000).

Moving Beyond the PR-Majoritarian Divide

There does exist, however, a desire to more extensively address the pitfalls of proportional, as well as majoritarian systems. Horowitz and Reilly repeatedly emphasize the disparity between votes won and seats received in majoritarian-plurality systems, as well as other mechanisms through which the majority and the minority may equally find ways of ruling at the expense of the other. However, Horowitz notes that Lijphart’s “consociational” model of power-sharing, in effect, assumes that ethnic divisions can be ignored, and that elites of different ethnic groups will suddenly seek moderation and compromise after elections. He addresses the difficulty of the expectation of consociationalism to advise the participants in ethnic conflict to put their conflicts aside, stating, “why a party that thinks it can win might do this for the benefit of its opponent is, at the least, mysterious” (1994, 49). Andeweg, who also illuminates the theoretical limits of Lijphart’s consociational model asserts, “consociationalism’s intended consequence is stability, but if the leaders of the various segments cooperate, and if their followers allow them to cooperate, this is virtually a foregone conclusion” (2000, 529). In addition, Horowitz echoes the criticism of Barkan and others regarding multi-partism when he asserts that “the election of a too-inclusive multiethnic government (as in Zambia) merely marks the commencement of a new struggle for inclusion and exclusion” (1994, 49).

Horowitz’s aims of an electoral system are not limited to proportionality, but also include fragmentation, moderation, coalition, and fluidity. Horowitz and a handful of other scholars have argued that extremely divided societies need electoral institutions and ballot structures that
provide incentives for interethnic bargaining and moderation (Bogaards 2003, 59; Horowitz 2000; Reilly 2002, 156). Reilly illustrates his and Horowitz’s concern about the practical impact of the consociational model:

“Lijphart has consistently claimed that consociationalism represents the only means of making democracy work in divided societies. While there is no doubt that consociational theories have had a major impact not just on scholarly approaches but also in the real world of institutional design, consociationalism has a decidedly mixed record in practice, and rests on several key assumptions that may not always hold in divided societies. The most important of these is the assumption that ethnic leaders will be more moderate on key sectarian issues than their supporters. While this may hold true in some cases, the experience of ethnic civil wars in countries like Bosnia, Sri Lanka, and Rwanda suggests that it is ethnic leaders who often have the most to gain by maintaining or fomenting ethnocentric politics” (2006, 81).

These authors argue that, in contrast to the consociational model of power-sharing, vote-pooling, done under electoral methods that use preferential voting, operates before an election in creating a priori incentives for moderation since politicians are dependent on votes from other groups.

In contrast to the more popular manifestation of majoritarian-plurality and proportional electoral designs, vote-pooling should better manage ethnic conflict between groups, because “exclusion is most unlikely to be permanent” and the “coalitions are fluid,” meaning that “a change of government simply brings a different multi-ethnic coalition to power” (Horowitz 1994, 50-51). Furthermore, as Horowitz contends, politicians will compete across ethnic lines on the basis of subethnic cleavages. Unfortunately, Horowitz’s and Reilly’s claims have only been put to the test through qualitative methods due to the small number of countries using preferential voting. The alternative vote is currently used in Australia, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea. The single-transferable-vote is used in Ireland and Malta.

Thus, the relatively small amount of large-N analyses have been limited to the dichotomous categorization of electoral systems as majoritarian or PR in nature. However, these large-N studies have supported the argument that PR reduces conflict. Saidemann, et al. finds
that PR reduces protest (nonviolent ethnic conflict) and rebellion (violent ethnic conflict) (2002, 103). More recently, Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino find that parliamentary representation can moderate ethnic conflict, but only when it allows for effective representation in the legislature. Their causal mechanism is that groups are better protected when they have access to decision-makers and can block or veto harmful policies. Groups, however, can only do so under the conditions of effective representation, by which the authors use the group’s number of seats in the legislature as a proxy. Their findings concur with Gurr’s hypothesis that groups that have a voice in the political system are less likely to engage in extra-institutional actions, mainly protest, and when they do, as in the case of rebellion, these actions tend to be more moderate. However, these authors find that PR reduces protest, but not ethnic rebellion (2007, 237). Elkin and Sides use a social capital approach to assess the impact of PR on the attachment of minorities to the state, with the implicit conclusion that greater attachment to the state will lessen the probability of future protest or violence. Their findings support their hypothesis that federalism and PR, both elements of Lijphart’s consociational model, to indeed cause a greater attachment to the state. However, they do find that when they narrow the focus to minority groups, PR does not appear to build attachment to the state because minority groups tend to campaign in part on ethnic issues. As shown, the evidence presented by large-N studies remains somewhat inconclusive as to the overall effect of PR on ethnic conflict.

The debate continues as to what electoral system is most appropriate for democratizing societies that are severely divided, and it is often couched in dichotomous terms comparing and contrasting the effects of the majoritarian and PR systems. This is understandable however, due to the limited application of the many potential varieties of electoral design within these two broad categories. This dichotomous classification is largely based on the number of political
parties each method tends to encourage. Through the resulting party system, both sides of the majoritarian-PR debate assess the impact upon ethnic politics; one arguing that two-party systems dilute ethnic politics while the other acknowledges the continuance of ethnic politics with the hopes that grievances are directed through conventional or non-violent channels of political participation. Supporters of PR argue that there is no other alternative than to allow the inclusion of minority groups in the decision-making process. Majoritarian supporters, on the other hand, essentially argue, in the words of James Madison, that the cure is worse than the disease. They contend, however, that ethnic politics, rather than being reinforced by PR, need to be diluted. Majoritarian systems are the most effective way of creating cleavages not based on fixed identities such as ethnicity, and that they allow for more effective, responsive, and stable government. However, the application of the majoritarian method in divided societies involves a trade off. There may be greater accountability, alternation in control, and the existence of moderate parties; but these gains are at the expense of minority inclusion in societies where group demographic numbers translate into the enjoyment or lack of political power. Both methods have features that are conducive to the maintenance of democratic practices, and thus the barring of autocratic means of managing divided societies. Simultaneously, however, majoritarian and PR systems have their relative features that potentially reinforce ethnic divisions and conflict, albeit through different mechanisms.

There appears to be a perpetual back and forth between the two camps. These authors, with the exception of a few, most notably Horowitz and others assessing electoral institutions on the basis of their ability to foster inter-group moderation and cooperation, have failed to adequately take into consideration the basic elements of ethnic conflict: the salience of ethnic identities and the role of group comparison. They have consistently analyzed the relationship
between groups and the state, while ignoring the relationship between minority groups on the one hand, and between minority groups and dominant groups that are not in control of the state apparatus on the other. On this conflict dimension, do the same arguments of majoritarian and PR supporters still hold? That is what this study hopes to begin to answer.
PR is often held as the most appropriate method of conflict management in divided societies. Therefore, does PR explain ethnic conflict between groups, in that it reduces or increases the probability of this type of conflict relative to single-member district systems? Despite the arguments made that PR is the most appropriate form of electoral system for divided societies, there are conflicts in systems with PR. In my data (democracies), there are 247 observations of minorities at risks (disadvantaged and advantaged) in states using majoritarian methods. Over two-thirds (171) were observations that had inter-group communal conflict (approximately 69%). For PR, totals were 331 and of those, 156 had conflict (approximately 47%). According to the data presented, there does indeed appear to be a correlation between PR and a lesser amount of ethnic conflict. This however, does not imply causation in and of itself. This analysis seeks to determine, beyond a correlation between PR and reduced ethnic conflict, if the difference in the effect of PR relative to majoritarian systems is statistically significant in the presence of variables indicating additional explanations.

Observing that majoritarian systems may suffer from more ethnic conflict between groups than PR systems should not dismiss the importance of determining why, when greater inclusion and power-sharing are fostered, that PR systems do indeed continue to face ethnic conflict at a sizeable level. Why does this happen? This is a relevant question given the argument made by PR supporters, which I seek to answer through a consideration and argument of the causes of ethnic conflict. I also seek to address an alternative explanation that assumes institutions will have no impact upon ethnic conflict. Is this in fact valid, does primordialism explain ethnic conflict; that is does the pure existence of differences predict the probability of conflict?
To reiterate, my research question is, why does ethnic conflict, namely conflict between groups, persist in divided societies? The following hypotheses are tested in this study:

Hyp 1: PR decreases inter-communal conflict relative to majoritarian systems.

Hyp 2: Ethnic differentials and ethnic fragmentation increase the probability of ethnic conflict.

Hypothesis 1 illustrates the expectation that institutions do matter in terms of reducing ethnic conflict and that systems with PR will have a lower probability of inter-communal conflict relative to majoritarian systems. This hypothesis is based on the consensus, or more specifically, the “consociational” model of electoral engineering. According to this hypothesis, proportional representation allows for greater access of minority groups in the political system, and thus, a greater role in decision-making. Additionally, it is expected that groups represented in the legislature should have some degree of veto power over unsatisfactory or damaging policies of the ruling group or groups.

Again, proportional representation gives minority groups a say in the political process and reduces feelings of marginalization. In other words, is expected to give all groups a political voice, a measure of hope regarding their survival as a group, as well as a stake in the political system. The inclusive nature of proportional systems, and the power-sharing that it generates, should reduce group fears of subjugation by other groups, particularly by those in the majority. As Horowitz asserts, “the contest for worth and place is the common denominator of ethnic conflict” (2000, 186). And, equally important is the premise that “power is a confirmation of status” (Horowitz 2000, 187). Similarly, Lake and Rothchild stress that ethnic conflict is a result of fear, an amalgamation of collective fears of the future, fear of domination, of being subject, of being eliminated, and fear of assimilation (1998). Likewise, a reduction in the disparity between
votes won and seats received, and thus, instances of manufactured majorities is expected. This should minimize hostility among minority groups that is likely to occur when other groups are overrepresented in the government in terms of their proportion of the total population. Thus, PR reduces ethnic tensions and conflict because violent contention is no longer the only option and the fear of perpetual exclusion is alleviated.

Therefore, the greater capacity of proportional representation to give minorities a role in decision-making, to reduce fears of subjugation, and to reduce the disparity between votes won and seats received, so that advantaged majorities or advantaged minorities are not overrepresented in the government, implies that it reduces ethnic conflict between minority groups and the state, as well as between groups not in control of the state. If hypothesis 1 were correct we would expect to see a reduction in the probability of inter-group communal conflict, a compliment to previous studies finding a reduction in rebellion within PR systems. A reduction in ethnic conflict between groups, rather than just between an ethnic group and the state when PR is employed instead of the majoritarian method, would bolster the argument in favor of PR in divided societies.

If hypothesis 1 were incorrect in systems with PR we would see either no difference in the effect or an increase in the probability of inter-communal conflict relative to majoritarian systems. Additionally, the findings would indicate that ethnic differences, ethnic fragmentation, and/or group identity levels are better predictors of inter-communal conflict. Such a finding may indicate that ethnic conflict persists in divided societies when ethnicity is salient as a result of ethno-political competition; second, ethnic conflict can be explained by the persistence of the ethnic security dilemma; and third, when there is a lack of inter-ethnic bargaining and moderation ethnic conflict between groups will persist.
PR may not reduce ethnic conflict between groups relative to majoritarian systems because it effectively continues political competition on the basis of group identities. These group identities alone do not cause ethnic conflict; however, when the distribution of goods and security is determined by group membership, as in PR systems in divided societies, groups will mobilize around that identity. Furthermore, PR does not appear to provide for inter-ethnic moderation and bargaining prior to elections at both the elite and non-elite levels. The assumption under PR is perhaps that elite members of opposing ethnic groups, in their competition for goods and security, will cooperate on two levels. One area of cooperation is in the legislature, as votes are necessary for the passage or barring of legislation or executive policies. However, at the electoral level, when candidates must appeal to the population for votes in order to hold office, demographic numbers suggest that these candidates may have no incentive to appeal to members outside of their ethnic group. Additionally, political competition on the basis of ethnic group membership leads to ethnic outbidding. To obtain the plurality of votes within the ethnic group, a candidate seeks to portray him or herself as the hardliner. These hardliners effectively rule out the possibility that moderates can succeed at the legislative level in securing benefits for the group. Lastly, ethnic elites have no incentive to bargain with members outside of their own ethnic groups. PR allows for the proliferation of multiple parties, thus the most identifiable cleavages will form the basis of party lines. If a candidate, operating in such a system can gain power simply by appealing to the members of his or her ethnic group, it makes little sense to moderate his or her views in order to gain the support of other ethnic groups.

This observation and question does not insist that electoral system does not matter and that PR is not more appropriate than majoritarian systems in divided societies. In divided societies, numerical majorities or pluralities are easily formed from ethnic groups. Ethnicity
provides an easily identifiable platform around which to mobilize and easily identifies those who can be mobilized. Thus, the creation of numerical majorities or pluralities is relatively easy when one simply has to appeal to one’s own ethnic group. Additionally, these identities are fixed, rather than fluid, and thus do not require the creation of new coalitions with every election, as is the case in undivided societies where coalitions are built around more fluid differences such as those based on international or economic policies. Therefore, majoritarian methods in divided societies promote exclusion of whole ethnic groups; a dangerous situation which PR supporters rightly seek to remedy.

Other factors such as group concentration levels and the degree of fragmentation within a society will also play a role in explaining ethnic conflict. The majoritarian method may be more appropriate for societies with many ethnic groups since appealing to one under this system would likely not produce enough votes to gain power. However, the concern then arises that coalitions of two or more groups will form with the result of excluding groups that would only provide votes beyond the threshold of those needed to gain power. Second, PR has been found to reduce levels of rebellion, as it addresses ethnic group fears of domination and extinction. That being said, hoping solely for a decrease in rebellion dismisses the magnitude and impact of conflict between ethnic groups not in control of the state. Given the multitude of complications that divided societies face, it would be a shame to settle between two pure alternatives when there are a variety of electoral methods which may be employed. As Reilly discusses, East Asia and the Pacific Island countries have become increasingly creative and resourceful in electoral design, looking towards electoral methods that require voters and candidates to look outside of their ethnic group (Reilly 2006).
To predict decreases in ethnic conflict between groups, an electoral system design must not limit itself to fostering inclusion. Greater results are achievable in systems that provide for measures and incentives resulting in the diluting of salient ethnic cleavages and the application of moderation towards ethnic groups and bargaining among between them. Such measures may be achievable in both a majoritarian and PR setting, as behaviors that are moderate and more inclined to inter-ethnic bargaining can be induced by more narrow electoral system designs than that of the two dominant systems in place. Rules that require candidates to hold moderate views towards and to seek support from other ethnic groups will produce two outcomes: the reduction of salience of ethnic identities and issues, and the fruition of moderate and cooperative behavior towards other ethnic groups. Candidates will be forced to develop platforms that do not rely solely on the improvement of their ethnic group. Rather, they will have to look to policies that are expected to have a collective benefit in order to win over the support of other groups. This will take the ethnic character out of political competition by reducing the salience of ethnic identities and ethnic issues. Rather than fixed differences, fluid differences that are found within ethnic groups and at the same time cut across group lines will form the basis of support or opposition in political competition. The second and closely related outcome of such rules is the inducement of behavior that is moderate and seeks to bargain with those outside of one’s ethnic group. Extremist and intractable views and policies will not garner the support of members outside of one’s own ethnic group that is necessary for an electoral victory.

Hypothesis 2 is based on the primordialist argument that the existence of ethnic differences explains conflict. If hypothesis 2 were correct, we would find that ethnic differences or fragmentation levels alone or in the presence of controls, such as institutions and socio-economic factors, would be better predictors of inter-communal conflict. If hypothesis 2 were
incorrect, as I argue, the evidence would show that ethnic differences and fragmentation have no
effect on inter-communal conflict, or only an effect in the presence of controls. The expectation
that hypothesis two is incorrect is derived from my theory of ethnic conflict between groups. To
reiterate, I argue that ethnic conflict is best explained by the persistence of salient group
identities and the ethnic security dilemma, as well as by the lack of inter-ethnic moderation and
bargaining. My theory stems from the following assumptions, themselves based upon seminal
works in the field of ethnic identity and conflict (Connor 1994; Eller 2002; Gurr 1970; Gurr
1993; Horowitz 2000; Lake and Rothchild 1998). Groups do not mobilize around their
differences simply because they are different. Additionally, grievances are necessary for
mobilization but grievances alone do not imply mobilization. Ethnicity simply provides a
structure through which to mobilize, but not does create mobilization in and of itself. Groups
mobilize around ethnicity when they are consistently identified by others through policies of or
treatment by, those wielding political power or other groups. Often this is the case in divided
societies prior to transitions to democracy due to policies of previous institutions, autocracy or
colonialism, which created the basis for group comparison and subsequently the salience of
ethnic cleavages. Therefore, I assert that the primordialist argument cannot explain ethnic
conflict.

The failure of PR to reduce conflict relative to majoritarianism and the failure of ethnic
differences and fragmentation alone to increase the probability of inter-communal conflict would
support my theory that ethnic conflict is explained by the persistence of salient and fixed ethnic
identities, the robustness of the ethnic security dilemma, and the lack of inter-ethnic moderation
and bargaining. Previous studies have neglected an important indicator of ethnic conflict:
vioence between groups, or inter-group communal conflict. The state is not the sole actor in
position as a potential threat to the security and survival of groups at risk. Other groups that have been systematically advantaged or face the threat of their advantages being removed find rivals among other ethnic groups. Thus, greater representation alone does not remove the security dilemma faced by groups at risk in relation to other communal groups. Analyses that seek to explain reductions in conflict directed at the state are neglecting the role of group comparison in ethnic conflict, which tends to elevate the salience of ethnic identities and ethnic issues.

Furthermore, ethnic conflict is a result of group comparison. As such, politics that re-emphasize ethnic identities may not reduce ethnic conflict. PR has its advantages, primarily in fostering greater inclusiveness in the political system. This positive outcome of electoral design based on PR should not be discounted. However, there is also a negative impact of PR. Representation in divided societies is often based on ethnic divisions. PR is a system that not only acknowledges these divisions, but in divided societies leads to their use as a basis for representation in the political system. New Zealand contains a group designated by MAR as a minority at risk. Also of note is that the country’s electoral system was majoritarian until 1996 when it moved to PR. The country however, has experience no incidences of inter-communal conflict. While the nature of the party system may not be the sole explanatory variable, the fact that the party system is non-ethnically based may play a significant role in the ability of the institutions to manage conflict. The disadvantage of PR is that political competition - in which there are both winners and losers - along ethnic lines reinforces these divisions, and thus reinforces group comparisons. Thus, ethnicity will remain the basis of group comparison, and group comparison will remain the basis of ethnic conflict. The end result is the maintenance of inter-group communal conflict.
Chapter 4 Research Design

The Data, Method, and Primary Variables

This study employs logistic regression using random effects to measure the effect of proportional representation, the primary independent variable, upon the dependent variable, inter-group communal conflict. I use random effects because there are variables in the model that do not vary within the units across years. Additionally, random effects accounts for the fact that the effects of the independent variables may be different for each group due to unmeasured, but significant, group differences. Using random effects allows each group in the analysis to have its own intercept as to the probability of conflict. Therefore, due to differences not directly captured with the variables in the model, some groups may have higher or lower probabilities of engaging in conflict with other communal groups.

The unit of analysis is minority-group year. The unit is minority groups in the Minorities at Risk data set (MAR) (Gurr 1993; 2005). MAR tracks the status of 284 politically-active ethnic groups over time beginning in 1945. Groups coded by MAR are “ethnopolitical”, meaning that they are non-state communal groups that have "political significance". MAR regards groups that collectively suffer or benefit from systematic discriminatory treatment by other groups in the society as having “political significance”. MARs groups are not limited to those who have collectively suffered from discrimination. The group may instead or also have self-defined interests and must be the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defense of those interests. Lastly, it should be noted that groups coded by MAR may be

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1 Although the unit of analysis is group-year rather than country-year, the random effects model will also capture differences referred to in country-level studies.
historically disadvantaged or historically advantaged groups. Advantaged groups are deemed to be at risk when they face discriminate policies designed to strip them of their advantages. These are also coded by MAR when they have mobilized in defense of their interests, which groups may do even in the face of a potential rather than actual threat (Gurr 1993; 2005).

The temporal domain of the study is 8 years, 1990 to 1998. This time period is an era of significant systemic and institutional change. One the one hand, the beginning of this period marked the collapse of the Soviet Union, which brought about the end of a bi-polar era and the collapse of a large autocratic state. This had significant implications upon conflict between and within countries. Communism failed to hold up as a practical ideology in contrast to democracy leading to the marginalization of groups espousing its creed. Second, the world saw an end to the proxy wars waged on behalf of this ideology and on behalf of the domination sought by the Soviet Union and the containment policy employed by the U.S. Additionally, the collapse of the Soviet Union saw the emergence of 26 new states. The breakup has had a tremendous impact upon minority relations in the region. First, although the Soviet Union tended to respect minority differences it did not tolerate dissent. In contrast, democratic politics in the new post-Soviet states has been challenging as groups faced a new form inclusionary or exclusionary politics and response of the state. Third, these groups lost the protection of the central Soviet state. The Soviet successor states are now multiethnic independent states that face their own challenges as groups find themselves in the new position of being a minority at risk, and previous minorities at risk find themselves in the position of being the dominant majority (Gurr 1993).

On the other hand, the 1990s marked the beginning or pinnacle of democratic transitions in not only the former Soviet Union, but in Latin America as well. As noted earlier (see Figure
1), the beginning of the 1990s saw a dramatic increase in democracies and decrease in the number of autocracies. Interesting for this analysis is the fact the PR was the dominant electoral institution adopted by the new democracies of the “third wave”. The introduction of PR was a result of a concern for the multi-ethnic character of these states, and also a response to the previous experiences of minority groups under autocratic rule. Similarly to the challenge faced in the former Soviet Union, the dissolution of autocratic regimes in Latin America and the introduction of democratic politics in multi-ethnic states have likely opened new doors to ethnic conflict. Therefore, this study hopes to capture the repercussions of these institutional and systemic changes in order to, not only bolster the data, but to aid in the generalizations concerning ethnic conflict and electoral systems in very different democratic states. Does the dramatic increase in democracies and the use of PR explain the marked decrease in conflict associated with the 1990s (see Figure 1)?

In this analysis, there are 67 groups across democratic 31 countries, totaling 569 group-year observations. The data was subset to only include observations that occurred in democracies; those given a score of 0 or higher by the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2006). Therefore, the governments under which my group-year observations occur should be using open and competitive elections. Reilly in a few words sums up the necessity of excluding autocracies from studies assessing the affect of electoral systems. He explains that “it is only in democracies that institutional variables and their interrelationship with competitive politics are really consequential for political outcomes” (2006, 7). My data undoubtedly includes some groups existing in countries that maintain some features that are not typical of consolidated democracies. However, to exclude countries that are not autocratic, but are not yet consolidated

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2 The Polity scale ranges from -10 to +10. Those scoring -10 to -4 are considered autocracies; -5 to +5 anocracies; and +6 to +10 democracies.
democracies would lead to findings that may not be generalizable to transitioning or mixed regimes that face the challenges of democratization in divided societies. Additionally, this study excludes those group-year observations occurring in countries with a score below 0, meaning that, in addition to autocracies, I also exclude “anocracies” with more serious democratic deficiencies.

Measures of the independent variable $PR$ were taken from the Quality of Government Time-Series and Cross-Section (QoG) data sets which contain coding of the electoral system used by each country for a given year (Golder 2005, 103; Teorell, Holmberg, and Rothstein). Golder’s variable, “electoral system type 2”, is coded into three groups: “majoritarian”, “proportional”, and “mixed”. This study allows the “proportional” category to absorb the observances of “mixed” systems since they employ proportional electoral rules in one or more electoral tiers. A dummy variable, $PR$, was created to represent uses of majoritarian, coded as 0, and proportional systems, coded as 1.

As noted earlier, the primary purpose of the study is to measure the effect of proportional representation relative to majoritarian systems on the probability of inter-group communal conflict. MAR defines and codes inter-group communal conflict as open hostilities between the minority group and other minorities, as well as the majority or dominant group. It is important to note that this variable does not code conflicts between minority groups and the state or dominant groups exercising state power. Also, the minority group in question may be the target or the initiator of violence. A new variable, $intercomcon$, was recoded as a dummy variable after combining MAR’s two measurements of the presence of inter-group communal conflict from 1940 to 1989 and since 1990. A code of 1 indicates that there was inter-communal conflict involving that group in a given year, and a 0 indicating otherwise. To account for the effect of
conflict occurring in the previous year on the probability of conflict in the year of the observation, I include a variable that is the lag of the dependent variable. Hypothesis 1, designed to test the ability of PR to reduce conflict between groups, is operationalized through a regression of inter-communal conflict \((\text{intercomcon})\) on the PR variable.

**Control Variables**

*Group Level Control Variables*

I include variables that control for the extent of ethnic differences between groups and for the strength of group identity among members of a particular ethnic group. These variables will allow a testing of the primordialist argument, as indicated by hypothesis 2, and the possible effect of the salience of ethnicity as a predictor of ethnic conflict. Additionally, I control for the level of fractionalization of a country through an indicator that measures the probability that two individuals are of separate ethnic groups. The control variables include additional indicators of a consensus based government structure. An indicator of a federal form of government where power is not centralized, but rather dispersed at the regional level is included, as well as an indicator of the use of a parliamentary system as opposed to a governmental institution characterized as a presidential system. I operationalize measures of development through variables indicating levels economic and social development, as well as a measurement of population that may significantly influence these developmental processes. Additionally, I control for levels of political discrimination and experience with democracy, as indicated by regime durability. I also include variables that indicate the occurrence of elections in a given year. Lastly, I control for the possibility that ethnic conflict spreads through contagion, by
including an indicator of the number of border states that are experiencing ethnic conflict in a given year. Beginning with political discrimination, increases in these variables are likely to heighten the propensity of a group to engage in conflict with other communal groups.

I use ethdifxx, an index variable in MAR that is an indicator of the extent of group differences associated with belief, language, custom, and race. I employ this ethnic difference variable to control for greater cultural differences among ethnic groups and to test the effect of the primordialist assertion that greater differences between ethnic groups are the primary causal mechanism for ethnic conflict. Hypothesis 2 tests the claim that ethnic differences increase the probability of ethnic conflict. A significant and positive sign on the ethnic differences variable would support the assertion of the importance of ethnic differences as a cause of ethnic conflict, rather than a correlation. On the other hand, a finding of statistical insignificance would imply a lack of support for hypothesis 2 and greater support for the assertion that ethnic groups do not mobilize simply on the basis of being different; rather, they mobilize in response to environmental conditions such as economic, social, or political policies that are designed to either maintain their disadvantaged status or to strip them of their previously held advantages (Eller 2002; Gurr 1993; Horowitz 2000). Political discrimination, such as laws or policies that are designed in such a way as to exclude whole groups from the political process are likely to cause groups to increasingly identify by their differences as they are perceived as the basis for exclusion and to look toward violent means of implementing change since conventional political channels are not available.

MAR refers to the strength of group identity as “categoriness”. I employ MAR’s catness variable to control for varying degrees of salience of group identity. This variable captures the extent to which a group is self-identified. As Gurr states, this is “the shared perception that the
defining traits, whatever they are, set the group apart” (1993, 3). As discussed previously, I argue that salient ethnic identities are one of the key explanations of inter-communal conflict. Political exclusion also primarily predicts the form of ethnic conflict known as rebellion as groups challenge the state for political access. A strong group identity, on the other hand, is a better predictor of all forms of ethnic conflict, including that between groups, as it indicates mobilization around ethnic differences in response to being excluded as a group and to identification of one’s group as disadvantaged in comparison to other seemingly more advanced groups. Again, Gurr argues that collective identities are “situational and transitory”, and sums up this assertion well stating that “treat a group differently, by denial or privilege, and its members become more self-conscious about their common bonds and interests” (1993, 3-4). Additionally, strong ethnic identities indicate a failure of group members to focus on cleavages that are not based on ethnic issues and differences. As a result of a focus on fixed and uncompromisable differences and concerns such as these, groups are unlikely to be inclined towards moderation and inter-ethnic bargaining, thus leading to a greater probability of conflict with other ethnic groups. Therefore, stronger, more salient group identities should increase the probability of inter-communal conflict.

To account for the political challenges faced by groups at risk, I control for the level of political discrimination experienced by a group. This variable, poldis, is a categorical variable in the MAR data set indexing levels of political discrimination. It measures the extent to which the political representation of a group is neglected. Zero indicates no discrimination and the highest coding, four, indicates exclusion and the use of repressive policies. The level of political discrimination has been controlled for due to the expectation that a group that experiences political discrimination has a significantly higher propensity towards violent contention, as these
groups lack institutional mechanisms through which to address their grievances, experience lower levels of group worth and increased fears of domination and survival.

Each category in MAR’s group concentration variable has been recoded into dummy variables. These new variables indicate whether or not the group is primarily urban or a minority in one region (groupcon1), majority in one region with others dispersed (groupcon2), or concentrated in one region (groupcon3). The reference category will be groups that are widely dispersed. It is expected that the degree of concentration of a group will significantly affect the ability of a proportional electoral method to alter amounts of grievances expressed as a group, as well as the probability of inter-group communal conflict (Barkan 2006; Saideman, Lanoue, & Campenni 2002, 103). I recoded MAR’s categorical group concentration variable into three separate dichotomous variables under the expectation that the effect on the probability of inter-communal conflict would not be linear across all levels of group concentration. Additionally, previous studies have concurred that the level of concentration clearly affects the degree of autonomy related grievances and the propensity towards secessionism or rebellion (Elkins and Sides 2007, 693; Gurr 1993; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Saideman, Lanoue, and Campenni 2002, 103). Second, the degree of group concentration may be an intervening variable in the affect of electoral system on conflict, as it may negate the benefits of a particular electoral method. For example, Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino assert that a majoritarian system is more beneficial for an ethnic minority that is geographically concentrated in one region and clustered around one ethnic party (Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007, 237). Third, I argue that group identity has a significant affect upon ethnic conflict. A group that is concentrated is likely to have a greater amount of group cohesion that contributes to strength of group identities (Gurr 1993).
Therefore, group concentration may affect the strength of group identity, implying that it has the indirect effect of increasing the probability of all types of ethnic conflict.

Lastly, it is important to control for the level of group concentration in a study of conflict between communal groups because it has been asserted that groups that are widely dispersed are less likely to engage in conflict because they are more vulnerable to counter attack (Saideman, Lanoue, and Campenni 2002, 103). However, this may not be the case for inter-communal conflict. Groups that are widely dispersed may have a lower propensity towards rebellion but are expected to be more prone to conflict with other groups due to the increased amount of contact between groups that are intermixed more so than groups that are largely concentrated within their respective regions. Additionally, groups that are concentrated and thus beyond a majority constitute the bulk of the population are less likely to fear domination or elimination. Further, their cohesion leads to a greater ability at building organizational networks. While this in itself may foster a greater potential for political mobilization, as Gurr argues, their concentration and cohesion may indirectly prevent other groups or the state from imposing repressive policies for fear of a coordinated political or violent reprisal (1993). Group concentration levels will have either have no significant effect upon inter-communal conflict, or higher levels of concentration will predict an increase or a decrease in the probability of conflict.

Country Level Control Variables

I account for the degree of ethnic fractionalization within a country in order to control for the effects of higher levels of ethnic pluralism upon ethnic conflict and to further test the primordialist claim. The variable $fe_{etfra}$ was retrieved from a data set created by Fearon and Laitin. It effectively measures the probability of two randomly drawn citizens within a country being members of different ethnic or linguistic groups. This variable measures ethnic
heterogeneity on a scale of 0, completely homogenous, to 1, completely heterogeneous (2003, 75). This variable is also used to test the assertion of hypothesis 2 that greater fractionalization, or ethnic pluralism in a country, increases the probability of ethnic conflict between groups. I expect that the evidence will not produce support for this claim and I basis this assertion on similar grounds as those pertaining to the effect of ethnic differences.

Previous studies have failed to find a connection between increased levels of ethnic heterogeneity and ethnic violence (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75; Fish and Brooks 2004, 154; Mousseau 2001, 547; Horowitz 2000). Relatively ethnically homogenous societies with 2 or 3 groups may be just as likely to engage in ethnic conflict as these groups seek to wrestle control of the state. Moreover, ethnic conflict may be more likely in societies with two or three groups as it is easier for one group or a coalition of two groups to gain control of the political process through majoritarian means and exclude another group. Furthermore, the number of groups within a society, above one, should have no bearing upon the probability of a group engaging in conflict with another. It only takes one dominant group to alter the economic, social, and political environment to their advantage and to the disadvantage of another group. However, if my assertion were incorrect, it may be assumed, as Fish and Brooks have, that fractionalization may significantly hinder development as a large number of groups competing for benefits is problematic for the political system.

I have included three country level socio-economic variables in the model to account for differential levels of development. A measurement of population level (pop) is employed as a control variable for to control for two opposing possibilities. First, higher population levels indicate an economy that is less “out-ward looking” as a result for the necessity of producing for a larger market. Thus, population size is an indicator of economic development (Schneider and
Wiesehomeier 2008, 183). Second, rather than decreasing, larger populations may increase the probability of ethnic conflict as larger populations imply a greater amount of pressure upon the economic and political system in terms of the allocation of benefits. The analysis will control for economic development through the use of a more direct indicator, GDP per capita \((gdp\_cap)\). Political stability allows for a higher capability of the government to manage ethnic conflict. In concurrence with a previous study, GDP is expected to indirectly decrease communal conflict because economic development tends to positively affect political stability as wealthier countries have more resources at their disposal (Schneider and Wiesehomeier 2008, 183).

I also employ the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI), for as Reilly notes the HDI is an improved and more comprehensive measure of each country’s level of human development rather over GDP/GNI. The \(hdi\) variable controls for levels of development indicated by GDP per capita, life expectancy, literacy, and educational attainment. It is expected that higher levels of economic development predict a decrease in the probability of inter-communal violence on the one hand, as states are in better financial shape to address the grievances of the population and are in a better position to award collective benefits to citizens. However, an increase in the probability of conflict on the part of these variables would potentially lend support to the claims of modernization theory and relative deprivation theory regarding ethnic mobilization and conflict. Modernization poses, not only the promises of improved lives, but also new challenges and pressures upon communal groups (Gurr 1993). Additionally, the benefits that often accompany modernization are not distributed evenly, particularly in divided societies where the emerging advantages or disadvantages tend to follow along group lines.
Relative deprivation theory highlights the potential challenges of economic and social development as well. The advantages gained by one group stimulate group comparison due to the fact that on the one hand, development is differential among ethnic groups; and on the other hand, one group's rising development on the whole and of fellow communal groups raises the expectations of all social groups in terms of their social upward mobility. However, this higher expectation typically means a larger gap between value expectations and value capabilities thought to be near at hand. Gurr sums up the implications of economic and social change upon goals and value salience saying that “the event that inflicts the sense of relative deprivation may be simply the realization that a goal thought to be near at hand is still remote” (1970, 72). Therefore, generalizations about the relationship between higher levels of development and ethnic conflict must acknowledge that economic and socially developed societies face unique challenges under salient ethnic divisions.

There are several key institutional variables included in this analysis that I employ as a means of testing additional elements of the “consensus” model upon the probability of all types of conflict. As mentioned previously, studies have differed in their findings concerning the effects of federalism and a parliamentary system upon ethnic conflict. In this study, I seek to ascertain the affect of these variables upon the neglected form of ethnic conflict, that between communal groups. I include two dichotomous variables. In creating the variable federal, I code as 1 those countries in a given year whose governments have a federal structure. A country coded as federal is geographically decentralized in terms of decision-making authority and indicates a government in which there is a power-sharing mechanism advocated by Lijphart, as groups, particularly those that are not dispersed, are accorded greater autonomy. The parliamentary variable codes observations as 1 if the group resides under a parliamentary system.

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and 0 if a presidential system in a given year. In addition to a federal structure, a parliamentary system is advocated for divided societies according to the consensus model. Furthermore, Lijphart insists that executives that are organized as presidential tend to foster majoritarian practices, implying the inclusion of minority groups from the decision-making process, even if the legislative branch is essentially PR. Additionally, it is argued that strong presidents may render parliaments powerless to influence, or veto, the executive (Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007, 237). Therefore, centralized and presidential systems are institutions that may mitigate the affect of PR upon inter-communal conflict and may they themselves increase the likelihood of conflict. A negative sign on the federal and parliamentary variables would support these arguments.

Additional Factors in Explaining Ethnic Conflict

I employ a measure of institutional durability, regime_durable, as an indicator of political systems that have undergone several uninterrupted election cycles. This variable comes from the Polity IV data and indicates the number of years since the most recent regime change or the end of a transition period, as defined by Polity (Marshall and Jaggers 2006; Teorell, Holmberg, and Rothstein 2008). This control is used to account for a degree of political stability, assuming that over time democratic norms of conflict resolution are consolidated politically leading to stable and more mature democratic systems (Mousseau 2001, 547). Additionally, it is a proxy for political learning during which groups adjust to democracy and new electoral rules, as well as a time period for the effects of proportional representation upon group grievances and group conflict to manifest (Putnam 1993; Saideman, Lanoue, & Campenni 2002, 103).
Macnciv is a measure of the number of bordering states with major civil or ethnic conflict. It is a variable created by Monty Marshall and retrieved from the Political Instability Task Force’s Phase III data set (2009). This variable is employed to control for the potential contagion or diffusion of ethnic conflict as emphasized by Lake and Rothchild (Lake and Rothchild 1998).

Lastly it is important to account for the occurrence of elections held in a country within which a group resides. Elections are closely related to political competition and they may mean the difference between a group’s attainment of political power and another group’s loss of it. This is particularly the case in majoritarian societies, where the minority votes beyond the threshold of those needed to win are unlikely to be considered in the policy making process. Additionally, in PR systems the outcome of elections determines the degree of influence a group may have on policies. Therefore, the time period of elections may induce instability in the political, social, and economic atmosphere and thus a greater chance of violence (Brancati 2006, 651). First, the anticipation of elections in the near future may lead to instability particularly in new democracies where their outcome is less certain. Second, there is a politically competitive atmosphere before the election and feelings of resentment after the election among the “losers”, both of which may heighten the probability of violence. However, controlling for the durability of the political institution may negate the effect of election occurrence. Therefore, I have included two dichotomous variables, indicating if there was an election, legislative (leg_elect) or executive (exec_elect) in the group’s country in a given year to control for the possible effect of election occurrence upon the probability of conflict between ethnic groups.
Chapter 5 Findings and Discussion

Proportional Representation and Inter-communal Conflict

The findings reveal modest support for hypothesis 1 and partial support for hypothesis 2 (Table 1). Overall, the findings reject the primordialist argument concerning ethnic conflict. The results of the logistic regression lend modest support to the assertion that PR is the most appropriate model for divided societies. Although, the effect of PR in decreasing the probability of inter-communal conflict relative to the majoritarian system barely crosses the threshold of statistical significance at the 90% level of confidence. Nonetheless, PR appears to have some degree of success in predicting decreases in conflict between ethnic groups. As discussed previously, PR does ameliorate the ethnic security dilemma in that it gives groups the ability, or at least the potential to end the permanent exclusion often suffered under majoritarian systems, as well as to possibly veto potentially harmful policies. Additionally, the inclusive nature of PR likely gives groups a greater sense of having a stake in the political system and fosters an inclination to play according to the rules of the game once groups are given a conventional and less costly opportunity structure through which to operate. Although ethnic identities remain intact in PR systems, norms of moderation may emerge at the elite level after elections that may trickle down to inter-group relationships at the local level. The modest support for hypothesis 1, however, suggests the need to adequately consider the many implications of PR on behaviors and relationships at the elite level and between groups at the local level.
Table 1: Determinants of Inter-communal Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>independent variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>proportional representation</td>
<td>-6.60133* (4.002728)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inter-communal conflict lag</td>
<td>18.91096*** (3.763516)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic differences index</td>
<td>.1814116 (.8963742)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group identity strength</td>
<td>1.100309* (.6619592)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political discrimination</td>
<td>5.347079*** (1.173818)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group concentration 1</td>
<td>-7.166621 (4.687285)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group concentration 2</td>
<td>-9.517766 (5.888877)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group concentration 3</td>
<td>-11.76335** (4.806049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>15.8546* (8.438807)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population</td>
<td>.0001023*** (.0000359)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gdp per capita</td>
<td>-.0019448*** (.0005423)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hdi</td>
<td>161.8028*** (38.23226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>federalism</td>
<td>1.861368 (3.499849)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>-4.012138 (2.796939)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regime durability</td>
<td>.0134933 (.0443833)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>border states with conflict</td>
<td>-3.925837** (1.778835)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>legislative elections</td>
<td>1.943796 (2.608755)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>executive elections</td>
<td>-2.418532 (4.287473)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-130.8218*** (30.6662)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
In the model ethnic differences are not longer statistically significant. Therefore, my analysis fails to find support for the more primordial component of hypothesis 2. When other environmental factors are controlled for, differences alone do not maintain their ability to explain conflict between ethnic groups. Therefore, larger ethnic differences in a society may be correlated with greater instances of inter-communal conflict, but correlation does not imply causation. Ethnic differences do not hold their weight in explanatory power when factors such as the strength of group identity, development, and institutions are accounted for.

Interestingly, however, I find modest support for the assertion of hypothesis 2 that fractionalization increases inter-communal conflict. Contrary to my assertion, higher levels of fractionalization do, although modestly, have a statistically significant impact upon levels of inter-communal violence. Therefore, arguments suggesting that fractionalization hinders development and therefore the ability of democratic regimes to manage conflict and grievances, find modest support in this analysis. Horowitz’s contention that, as one group is placated another is antagonized, finds modest support in this analysis. Furthermore, he notes that “compartmentalized problems cannot be dealt with one at a time; they involve the whole state” (2000, 39). Studies have insisted that pluralism can support, rather than injure democracy when there is free and fair competition and accommodation of different interests. However, diversity along ethnic lines may lead to policies of inclusion or exclusion based on group membership, particularly when ethnic issues and divisions are salient or there is no incentive for moderation. While two rival groups put a great deal of pressure on the state, many groups are likely to present an even greater challenge upon the state’s ability to represent all interests equally and to manage
conflict. Therefore, a greater degree of differences between groups does not predict conflict. However, the more divided a society is, the greater the probability that its groups will engage in conflict with other communal groups.

An increase in the strength of group identity does increase the probability of that group engaging in conflict with another. The impact is however, modest. Nonetheless, this finding supports my assertion that salient ethnic differences and issues, which imply strong group identities, are key explanations for conflict between communal groups. The character of grievances and the potential for group mobilization are influenced by salient group identities. Therefore, the tendency of PR to reinforce fixed identities and to institutionalize ethnic politics may curb its ability to manage ethnic conflict. However, the PR system, as shown in the results does have the effect of reducing inter-communal conflict over majoritarian systems. This effect, like that of the catness variable, borders on statistical insignificance, but still implies that PR may indeed be the optimal system for divided societies.

Given my question and theory as to the explanation for ethnic conflict between groups, I was especially interested in the performance of PR in the presence of varying ethnic differentials and in the presence of varying group identity strengths. I will first examine the bivariate relationships. Then I will discuss a model of inter-communal conflict regressed on PR and other independent variables, but in the absence of measures of ethnic differences and strength of group identities (Appendix A). Then I will compare these to the unrestricted model (Table 1) that is the primary evidence used to support my theory. In the bivariate setting, increases in ethnic fractionalization (more pluralistic societies) and increases in the strength of group identities have no statistically significant effect upon inter-communal conflict. The sign on both coefficients suggest they increase the probability of inter-communal conflict, but only catness, the strength of
group identity, comes close to the 90% level of confidence. On the other hand, in the bivariate setting, ethnic differences do indeed have a statistically significant effect on inter-communal conflict. Higher levels of ethnic differences predict an increase in the probability of conflict between ethnic groups when not controlling for other factors. However, controlling for differences in institutional design, social and economic development, demographic and political domestic attributes, and group concentration levels, does not reverse the effect of these variables, but does alter their significance.

The degree to which a group self-identifies itself is not statistically significant in the bivariate setting. However, in the presence of other independent variables in the unrestricted model, the strength of group identity does have a statistically significant impact. It should also be noted that in the restricted model, in which ethnic differences and strength of group identity were dropped (Appendix B), PR’s explanatory power remained in the negative direction, but was statistically stronger. This suggests that when controlling for both ethnic differences and the salience of those differences, PR loses some of its ability to explain decreases in ethnic conflict between groups relative to the majoritarian system. Additionally, the effect of higher levels of salience in terms of ethnic identities is significant only in the presence of other explanations. As discussed earlier, multiple factors such as the character of electoral systems and political policies may alter the impact of group identities. Therefore, PR, ethnic differences and group identity strength are variables that interact in such a way that they influence the impact of the other as far as their impact upon the probability of ethnic conflict.
Assessment of the Control Variables

Additional Findings Regarding the “Consensus” Model in Divided Societies

The additional “consensus” variables are not statistically significant in the model. Federal and parliamentary had opposite effects upon inter-communal conflict; however the results prevent me from concluding with confidence that the effect is statistically different from zero. There is no difference between the effects of a centralized and a decentralized (federal) system upon conflict between groups. As stated before, previous studies have found federalism to decrease rebellion. Autonomy at the regional level creates an escape valve for grievances, particularly those related to self-rule, directed at the state. However, I conclude that a federalist structure does not have an effect on conflict between groups, as the basis for this type of conflict is not a specific grievance directed at the state. Therefore, local autonomy is unlikely to be beneficial in reducing conflict between groups no matter their level of concentration. Federalism is ideal for groups that are the majority or concentrated in one region, and as such, is more likely to occur in states where groups are geographically concentrated. Federalism, however, should have no appeal for groups that are widely dispersed, as they are unlikely to constitute a local majority that could maintain power at this level.

Again, federalism is likely to produce more benefits for groups that are concentrated regionally, but even under these conditions, a federal system likely offers no incentives for interethnic cooperation or for the diluting of salient ethnic identities in the atmosphere of group comparison relative to more centralized systems. Rather, federalism may serve to reinforce ethnic identities and differences, particularly in societies where groups are geographically concentrated, thus failing to undermine hostilities felt between groups on the basis of perceived
differences. This occurs through the creation of regional parties which serve to reinforce ethnic and regional identities (Brancati 2006, 651).

India is an excellent example of this. Since the mid-1960s, 16 of India’s 26 states have been governed by ethnic parties. Conflict between ethnic groups in India makes up a substantial portion of the data in this analysis. Although, conflict may be attributed to use of the majoritarian method in India, it may be difficult to separate out the effect of the use of PR at the state level. For concentrated groups, federalism is likely to minimize the ethnic security dilemma among them as it offers some power to control their affairs and thus decrease feelings of subjugation or elimination. In sum, however, this is unlikely to be the situation in societies where groups are widely dispersed, and overall, federalism fails to address several key explanations for inter-communal conflict. However, as noted above, group concentration may also mitigate the effect of federalism in reducing ethnic conflict as it may lead to the emergence of regionally based ethnic parties that serve to perpetuate salient ethnic cleavages.

The assertion that presidential systems are the most conflict prone setting fails to find support in this analysis in terms on conflict between groups, thus concurring with Saidemann et al (Saideman, Lanoue, and Campenni 2002, 103; Schneider and Wiesehomeier 2008, 183). Like the federal variable, the effect of a parliamentary system relative to a presidential system is not statistically significant. The coefficient illustrates that parliamentary systems may decrease the probability of inter-communal conflict, but this can be not be concluded with a sufficient degree of confidence. However, the parliamentary variable does appear to perform better than the federal variable in predicting inter-communal conflict. As previous studies have suggested, presidential systems tend to discourage multi-partism, and a strong executive lessens the ability

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3 The p-value of the parliamentary variable was slightly above the 0.1 threshold (0.151).
of parliaments to influence or veto the executive. Therefore, parliamentary systems are better able to foster inclusion and power-sharing in the policy-making process, more so than presidential systems. This in turn may have an effect on inter-communal conflict in much of the same manner that PR does, however, the results do not lead us to any definite conclusions as to the appropriateness of pursuing the establishment of parliamentary systems in states rife with inter-communal conflict.

Latin America stands out in this study in terms of presidential systems. Not one of the 13 countries in the region has a parliamentary system. A presidential system is the norm, at least for those Latin American countries with groups designated “at risk” by MAR. This may be a result of the historical experience with strong leaders in the region. A quick glance at the data shows that in Latin America, there are presidential systems both with and without instances of inter-communal conflict. Lijphart claims that presidential systems have a tendency of making the electoral system more majoritarian in practice. Additionally, strong presidents usually indicate a weak parliament, the channel through which minority groups may find representation and influence in decision-making. Concerning conflict between groups, the cases in Latin America do not appear to be experiencing ethnic conflict between groups as a cause of their systems being presidential. Of the 18 countries in Latin America represented in this study, seven of them (Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Bolivia) had no observations of conflict between groups between 1990 and 1998. However, this does not speak to the explanatory power of presidential systems over ethnic conflict in general. Rather this study finds that the parliamentary variable is not statistically significant in explaining changes in conflict between groups. Moreover, Lijphart does not claim that presidential systems
predict more conflict simply because they are presidential; rather, they may mitigate the ability of the legislature, and thus PR, to manage ethnic conflict.

Sri Lanka provides an interesting example of a presidential system. Prior to 1978, Sri Lankan politics operated under the First Past the Post (FPTP) rules. The country then moved to party-list PR, but operated as a semi-presidential system with a strong executive. Sri Lankan politics are a mixed bag of electoral designs. The legislature is elected through PR, while executive elections, although majoritarian, operate through preferential voting. This however, has not brought about an end to ethnic conflict, partly because preferential voting in executive elections is largely non-existent. Sinhalese candidates do not need Tamil votes to gain power, negating the supposed moderating effects of preferential voting. Here, the size of a minority groups plays a significant role in the ability of a change in the electoral system to produce a change in ethnic conflict between groups.

The Role of Discriminatory Politics

The results of the political discrimination variable (\textit{poldis}) also contribute to the failure to find support for hypothesis 2. Increases in political discrimination increase the probability of inter-communal conflict. On the face of it, this finding is not unexpected. However, it undergirds the importance of understanding that conflict is often the outcome of specific political actions, and thus implies that solutions may require alternate political policies. This is often easier said than done, but it also reinforces the assertion that ethnic differences alone are not the cause of ethnic conflict. Additionally, PR appears to fail in explaining ethnic conflict if levels of political discrimination are not controlled for.\(^4\) This may suggest a degree of colinearity between

\(^4\) Controlling for the effect of political discrimination brought PR from being statistically insignificant to a level of statistical significance.
PR and political discrimination. Policies that are considered discriminatory may be found at a significantly lesser degree in PR systems due to the inclusion in the political system, which plays a key role in policy formation, of the very minority groups that are potentially affected by such policies.

*Disaggregating the “Ethnic Conflict” Concept: The Differential effects of Group Concentration*

Higher levels of group concentration may increase claims for statehood or rebellion, as previous studies have found, but this analysis illustrates that only the highest level of group concentration has the statistically significant effect of decreasing inter-communal conflict. To be clearer, the impact of group concentration is only statistically significant when a group is concentrated in one region (\textit{groupcon3}) as opposed to widely dispersed. The same cannot be said of the variables indicating if a group is a minority in one region with others widely dispersed (\textit{groupcon1}) or if a group is a majority in a region (\textit{groupcon2}), as these variables had no statistically significant impact upon inter-communal conflict relative to the reference category. Group concentration decreases the probability of conflict between groups, thus having the opposite effect on inter-communal conflict, than on rebellion as previous studies have found (Saideman, Lanoue, and Campenni 2002, 103). This difference in findings lends further support to the assertion that analyses of ethnic conflict must go beyond explanations of one type of ethnic conflict. Second, the impact of group concentration found in this model implies that the cohesion that group concentration fosters does not translate into a greater probability for violent mobilization. While the causal mechanism of this is not contemplated to a great extent here, it may suggest that other groups or the state are more acquiescent to groups that are highly
concentrated since they potentially constitute a greater political threat than those groups that are not.

Socio-economic Influences: Wealth and Development in Divided Societies

The development indicators are all found to have a statistically significant impact upon the probability of inter-communal conflict. Interestingly though, they do not have the same impact upon ethnic conflict between groups. Increases in population and increases in HDI have the effect of increasing the probability of inter-communal conflict. Increases in population may have the effect of promoting an economy that is outward looking and thus promotes economic development by turning to domestic production. However, as the results show, population appears to not have the same affect in divided societies. Larger populations add to the challenges already faced in divided societies and likely place added difficulty on the ability of institutions to meet the needs of all citizens. Additionally, in divided societies, the distribution of benefits will often be determined on the basis of group membership.

Higher levels of GDP per capita decrease the probability of inter-communal conflict. This finding supports the common place argument that economic development promotes conflict management. Wealthier societies have more resources at their disposal with which to placate group concerns and, if necessary, to offset a rise in the potential for mobilization. Economic development also contributes to political stability, a necessary condition for the consolidation of democratic institutions and democratic norms, such as the use of nonviolent means of achieving domestic change. The effect of GDP was expected; however, the effect of increasing inter-communal violence on the part of HDI is surprising, unless one thinks of the long espoused
implications of modernization. As asserted previously, modernization advances some groups while marginalizing others. For example, groups that contributed to agricultural production through more traditional means, find themselves at a competitive disadvantage as technological advances allow foreigners or other groups to dominate what was once their market share. In ethnically divided societies, economic and social differences, such as occupational specialization, run along ethnic lines. Therefore, modernization has the potential impact of making advantaged groups more advantaged and disadvantaged groups more disadvantaged. Additionally, modernization, as indicated by high levels of GDP, literacy, and life expectancy, increases the expectation of all groups. However, as time goes on, minority or disadvantaged groups become increasingly frustrated with their diminished capability of attaining these values relative to other groups. Lastly, it should be mentioned that since GDP is a factor in the determination of HDI, there is likely some multicollinearity between the two variables. Nevertheless, I included both variables in the model with the expectation that each variable captured distinct dynamics, as discussed in the research design.

Not So Violent After All: Young Democracies and Democratic Elections in Divided Societies

The length of a regime and the occurrence of elections are factors that have no statistically significant impact upon the probability of inter-communal conflict. The lack of support for the contention that elections mark a period of heightened uncertainty, instability, and competition may be counterintuitive. However, this finding may not be as counterintuitive as first expected when we consider the socio-political context. Elections in divided societies often

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5 A logistic transformation of HDI did not change the sign on the coefficient. However, the logged variable did predict a much smaller impact on inter-communal conflict.
6 Removing either variable from the model results in the insignificance of the one left in. However, the logged version of HDI remains significant and in the same direction when GDP per capita is excluded.
take on an ethnic character. As many scholars have criticized, elections in societies divided along ethnic lines are essentially a “census”; that is, they simply register the existing ethnic divisions (Horowitz 2000, 86). If an ethnic group constitutes 60% of the population in terms of demographics, then it will, more or less, obtain 60% of representation in the legislature. Relatively small minority groups, either have no chance in gaining representation as larger groups due to relatively high electoral thresholds, or are forever relegated to few seats due to their small numbers in the population. Therefore, in ethnically divided societies, elections may not at all induce a period of uncertainty.

The failure of the durability of a regime in explaining group conflict is also surprising as longer-lasting regimes are typically more politically stable and better consolidated institutionally, and thus in a better position to manage grievances and ethnic conflict. In this analysis, however, the durability of a regime had no impact upon conflict between groups, implying that developed and developing societies may be equally prone to this type of conflict. Again, this finding may be counterintuitive but is not without a basis. The length of a regime may affect political stability and thus measures of conflict management. However, as illustrated in the discussion of political discrimination, political choices are often at the heart of ethnic conflict. Regimes, both young and old, practice in varying degrees discrimination against some groups. Further, a regime change may have addressed, whether intentional or not, ethnic conflict that existed under the previous regime. Lastly, overtime, groups that have been excluded become increasingly aware of the perpetual nature of their exclusion. Hence, there appear to be countervailing influences at work when the durability of a regime is considered as to its effect upon inter-communal conflict.
Lastly, the variable indicating the number of border states experiencing conflict was significant, but is found to affect conflict between groups in an unexpected manner. The argument that ethnic conflict in one state leads to the diffusion of ethnic conflict in a neighboring state is without a firm foundation in this model. Diffusion must not be seen as a simplistic concept in that ethnic conflict naturally spills across borders or incites violence in neighboring states. As Lake and Rothchild suggest, diffusion is a powerful force in that ethnic conflict may not remain contained within one state. However, ethnic conflict is not completely determinate of conflict in neighboring states. As these authors assert, the neighboring state must have fertile soil in order for diffusion to take place. Additionally, conflict in neighboring states may not always lead to increases in conflict, but rather, also have the potential of decreasing conflict in other states. On the one hand, an ethnic group that is not contained in one state and finds its brethren fighting in another may direct its resources and grievances into the struggle of their kin across the border. Second, events in other states induce a sort of learning, in that other groups and governments are able to recalculate their anticipated benefits and costs of fighting. The failure of groups in a neighboring state, and or the losses incurred in the fighting can lead other groups to forego violence due to the newly anticipated costs associated with it.

Additional Explanations

Culture and Institutions

The variables used in this study do not exhaust the range of possible explanations for conflict between groups. As noted in the literature review, multiple institutionalists acknowledge
not only the role of institutions as but only one factor in explaining changes in ethnic conflict, but also the importance of other potential contributing explanations. Culture and historical experiences are not directly controlled for in the analysis. Some minority groups, religions, ethnicities, or countries may be more prone to conflict due to cultural characteristics or historical experiences with conflict. For example, Sunni and Shiite Muslims have had a conflictual relationship dating back to the historically episode at Karbala. However, the assassination of Husayn alone does not explain violence between the two sects, and the occurrence of violent conflicts between the two has varied both over time and across countries. Nevertheless, the battle at Karbala is frequently used as a mobilization tool since it reinforces the “us” versus “them” mentality prevalent during periods of conflict.

Culture may play another significant role in predicting ethnic conflict. Groups that have engaged in consensual behavior, thus instilling norms of moderation and bargaining, are more likely to promote inclusion and find non-violent means through which to address their grievances. Second, some cultures may be more “democratic” than others, suggesting that they have, at varying degrees, experience with democratic norms. Therefore, groups in transitioning countries that have had no past experience with democracy may be more likely to engage in conflict as a means to a resolution than groups in countries that have had some experience. These two explanations do not dismiss the institutionalist approach. Institutionalists do not argue that the causal arrow flows in one direction; rather it can flow from societies to institutions, as well as from institutions to societies.

The World Values Survey is often used to assess the cultural leaning of the population of a country. Two questions posed by the survey are particularly relevant to assessing possible cultural challenges to the ability of institutions to manage ethnic conflict. Only 18 of the 31
countries in this analysis are in the World Values Survey. In all of the 18 countries, an overwhelming majority of the population believes that having a democratic system is either “very good” or “fairly good”. Some patterns stand out as to reservations about democratic systems. As a region, Latin America appears to lean more heavily towards believing that a democratic system is “fairly good” as opposed to “very good” or has a split view of this form of political system. Also, the countries that heavily lean towards “very good” are OECD members, with the exception of Japan.

Next, I looked at statistics regarding army rule. Not surprisingly, the countries typically described as the Western democracies, and Japan, are overwhelmingly against the idea of military rule. These countries have not faced significant internal conflict over recent decades and have not experience military rule as recently as those that have a slight inclination towards military rule. In Latin America a majority does not favor army rule. However, support from army rule varies from as little as 12% to as high as in the range of 30-40% (Brazil, Peru, and Colombia). Although Japan has reservations about democracy, it overwhelmingly rejects military rule. Of the OECD member nations, the populations of Turkey and India have a sizeable percentage, 34% and 36% respectively, seeing army rule in a positive light. Again, those democracies that fall outside of the West tend to view to some substantial degree, military rule as being “very good” or “fairly good”.

All of the OECD member nations have a relatively long experience with democracy that may correlate with overwhelmingly positive feelings about democratic institutions. Of those, Turkey and India have sizeable percentages that view army rule in a positive light. This finding is also a testament to the unique experience of these countries. The socialist past of Turkey and

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7Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Chile, France, Germany, UK, India, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Peru, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, and Turkey
the very interventionist nature of the state in the economic and social development of the country under the military leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, has likely fostered some appreciation for a stronger role of the state, particularly the military, in political and social affairs. India also faces a unique challenge that may promote the idea of military rule as a means of attaining order. The conflict with separatists in India, and well as the tension between Pakistan and India, has threatened the country for over 50 years. India is an example of the tendency of the populace to have a sizeable appreciation for security and order, goals typically viewed as the domain of the military, over the values of freedom and equality associated with democracy. Latin America’s recent experience with autocratic rule and the semblance of order that it offers, is also instrumental in the leaning of a sizeable portion of the populace towards military rule.

A direct measure of culture, with regards to positive feelings of democratic institutions is not included in this analysis. Nonetheless, for democratic institutions to work, faith in them may be a requirement. However, over time as institutions consolidate and are better able to deliver outcomes such as conflict reduction, faith in democracy may continue to develop.

*Development Levels between Groups*

I have controlled for social, economic, and political development at the country level. This analysis is at the group level but does not include a measure of development differences between groups. Those groups that are marginalized, not only politically, but economically and socially may be more prone to violence than those that are not. The political discrimination variable may be thought to capture these differences. However, political disadvantages are not necessarily correlated with economic disadvantages (Gurr 1993). The measure of GDP per capita and general development (HDI) do not capture variance between groups. Differential
development levels may play a key role in predicting the probability of violence on the part of a
group at risk. Are the less educated, for example, more prone to violence than groups that are
advantaged in terms of educational attainment?

Minority Group Size

Lastly, this analysis does not control for the size of minority groups. How might the size of a group relative to the population of the country affect a group’s propensity to conflict? Furthermore, is the relationship curvilinear? Are medium sized minority groups, in terms of proportion of the population, more prone to conflict because of their increased numbers in terms of supporters and organizational capacity, but insufficient numbers for applying pressuring upon the state? Additionally, the size of minority groups will play a role in the power of institutions to manage conflict. For example, a country with many small groups, very fractionalized, and no group that constitutes a majority may find that the majoritarian electoral system is most appropriate. On the other hand, the existence of one or two groups that constitute a majority on their own or as a coalition may inhibit the ability of smaller but sizeable groups to participate in the government under majoritarian rules, thus requiring a system of proportion representation to manage conflict. As discussed earlier, politics in Sri Lanka is representative of a situation such as this. Preferential voting rules in presidential elections are ineffective since Sinhalese candidates do not require Tamil second or third preference votes to gain power.

Moreover, rules within electoral systems may impede on their ability to manage ethnic conflict. For example, the variance in electoral thresholds may play a role in predicting ethnic conflict in one country using PR relative to another using PR. The electoral threshold may be too high to allow PR to mediate ethnic hostilities through inclusion and political participation.
On the other hand, a threshold that is too low may lead to the proliferation of political parties in such a way that is detrimental to the ability of the legislature to maintain coalitions and effectiveness in governing. Additionally, institutionalized extremist ethnic parties espousing radical and hostile viewpoints may further heighten the fear of other groups.

Controlling for Key Differences

A theory and model based on that theory must not attempt to find every last explanation for the phenomenon it seeks to address. There is something to be said for parsimony. However, by using a random effects model I attempted to indirectly incorporate group differences that are not directly measured in the model. By allowing the groups to have different intercepts, the random effects model uniquely controls for potential explanations related to group differences, as well as differences between countries since the study covers groups from 31 different democratic states. The high rho value suggests that there is a high degree of variance in the dependent variable due to unit effects. Therefore, groups have significant differences in their propensity to engage in conflict with other groups.
Chapter 6  Conclusion and Implications

This research was designed with hopes of explaining ethnic conflict between groups and assessing the impact of using proportional systems upon this particular violent manifestation of ethnic grievances. My study also took on the specific mission of incorporating an important but neglected dimension of conflict, that occurring between groups. Although the MAR data are problematic (see MAR codebook), and is missing a great deal of data, the number of observations is still quite large or satisfactory in some instances, and allowed for an adequate generalization regarding electoral systems and ethnic conflict. The findings support the conclusion that proportional representation significantly reduces inter-group communal conflict. However, these findings do suggest, through significance tests, that the explanatory power of PR is modest.

The statistical limitation of PR in adequately explaining reductions in ethnic conflict lends support to my argument that PR does not reduce ethnic violence between groups because the causes of this particular violent manifestation of grievances are closely related to the dynamics of group comparison. While the majoritarian model has elements that are not suitable for divided societies, PR also has characteristics that are not conducive in reducing instances of ethnic conflict that are not outright attempts to protest a state policy or to violently wrest power away from the group in control of the state. Violence between ethnic groups is a result of the salience of ethnic identities and divisions, the mutual fear of groups towards one another and of their future status, and the absence of inter-ethnic moderation and bargaining. PR has a positive impact upon the ethnic security dilemma, and to some extent upon inter-communal conflict, but
it should not be ignored that PR reinforces salient ethnic identities and fails to provide incentives for inter-ethnic moderation and bargaining.

That being said, this study, aside from attempting to measure the strength of a group’s identity, does not directly test aspects of the causal mechanism through which the electoral system shapes ethnic conflict. I suggest that PR may lessen the fear of domination among minority groups because, in divided societies, PR serves as an inclusive form of representation. However, there are several factors that may either heighten or mitigate the ability of PR to manage ethnic conflict. Future analyses would do well to incorporate some measure of the strength of representation within the legislature. As stated earlier, the electoral threshold may need to be controlled for as it can allow the proliferation of ethnic parties or prohibit minority parties that are small but have significant numbers through which to pressure the state or other communal groups. Second, is the representation in the legislature sufficient in that it allows a minimal degree of power on the part of minority groups? As noted earlier, presidential systems may lessen the ability of PR to reduce conflict, particularly if the executive is strong.

I control for the strength of a group in terms of to what degree it constitutes a self-identifying force. Future analyses may bolster this argument by finding other operationalizations of the concept of salient identities. One such way, perhaps is to control the organizational networks and capacity of groups. Additionally, the size of a minority group may, on the one hand, determine its ability to become an influential force in the government. On the other hand, however, the size of the group, much like the degree of concentration of the group, may play a role in its propensity to use violence, particularly if the group feels that, because of its size, it deserves to have a voice in the political process. To what extent does a group’s size and level of concentration affect the salience or cohesiveness of its identity? Then, perhaps studies can
attempt to control for the possible intervening effect on the ability of institutions to manage conflict.

Directly related to my argument of the persistence of salient identities is the assertion of many PR critics that it spawns or reinforces ethnic divisions through ethnic parties. India is a prime example of how, institutions such as PR and federalism, may mitigate conflict on some levels, but reinforce it on others. At the national level, India does not have ethnic parties. However, the role of federalism, as well as the degree of concentration of India’s minority groups, has contributed to the salience of ethnic identities through ethnic parties at the state level. Therefore, this research could go further by directly testing the outcome in terms of conflict between groups as a result of characteristics of the party system. Such analyses would go beyond the simple dichotomous categorization of party systems in terms of being two-party or multi-party. Rather, it would also account for the basis of these parties. Are systems with ethnically based parties more prone to certain types of conflict than countries with non-ethnically based parties such as New Zealand?

This study originally sought to assess the impact of vote-pooling, or preferential electoral rules upon inter-group communal conflict to test hypotheses stemming from the arguments of its supporters (Farrell and McAllister 2006, 723; Horowitz 2000; Reilly 2002, 156). This endeavor was fueled by the theoretical argument that a reduction in conflict between groups would require the lessening of salient ethnic identities and issues, to which practices of moderation and inter-ethnic bargaining would contribute. However, the small number of cases where preferential voting is employed means that analysis will have to be limited to the qualitative method for the time being. Diamond and Plattner highlight the increasing significance of analysis of preferential methods: “Preferential systems have yet to be tried on a large scale, but where they
have been employed, their results have been, on the whole, promising” (2006, xxvi). For now, however, large-N quantitative studies of electoral systems will be largely limited to the majoritarian-proportional dichotomy. Therefore, future research should, largely through qualitative studies, consider more closely occurrences of moderation and bargaining at the elite level before and after elections. Do preferential systems have a significant impact upon inter-ethnic relations in such a way that they are better than either pure majoritarian or pure PR systems in managing ethnic conflict?

In sum, the findings support the conclusion, as well as the assumption of many institutionalists, that institutions are not, and are not expected to be, the sole or even pre-eminent predictors of outcomes. The significance of other factors relating to socio-economic development, identity salience, fragmentation, and state practices suggests this to be true. While the relationship between society and institutions is one of mutual interaction, PR does appear to shape the expression of preferences. The inclusion fostered by PR can affect the strategic calculations of actors as to what course of action is most appropriate and beneficial in seeking a redress of their grievances. Lastly, and just as important, access to political institutions, whether electoral systems or regional spheres of influence as a means to a remedy may not govern behaviors to the same extent or in the same manner for conflict between groups as it does for conflicts directed at the state. The lack of statistical robustness of the consensus variables suggests that future research must disaggregate the concept of ethnic conflict and must not assume that the performance of these variables and others, such as group concentration, on one manifestation of ethnic hostilities is the same across other manifestations of violence. Failure to take into account other distinctive manifestations of ethnic divisions and tensions, as well as
causes will incorrectly lead researchers to conclude that PR is the catch-all solution for ethnic conflict.

Martin Luther King, Jr. provides insight into the struggle for political rights by minority groups and the reduction of violence: “All progress is precarious, and the solution of one problem brings us face to face with another problem” (*Strength to Love* 1963). There is an important warning that can be gleaned from advice such as his which undergirds the argument set forth in this study. Neither proportional representation, nor majoritarian systems should be employed as a “one size fits all” solution for problems related to representation and ethnic conflict in severely divided societies. Furthermore, the use of proportional representation has solved the problem of malapportionment, but it has likely fostered other ethnically related difficulties not directly tested in this study. Further studies should emphasize, as Lijphart and Diamond do, the need to look at the many electoral methods available in proportion to the small number actually in use around the world (Diamond and Plattner 2006; Lijphart 2006b, 73). The following remark by Diamond and Plattner serves as an excellent concluding suggestion: “Thus, while some theorists strongly recommend a particular type of electoral system as generally best for all countries, others warn that the challenges of appropriate design very much depends on the particular country context on which danger (for example, the lack of decisive majority or the exclusion of important minorities) represents the most serious threat to democracy” (2006, x).
References


Appendices

Appendix A: Bivariate Analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>proportional representation</td>
<td>-.2752838 (3.422304)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>federalism</td>
<td>-1.548716** (.7784499)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parliamentary</td>
<td>-.2735176 (2.898497)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic differences index</td>
<td>1.184888*** (.2274888)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group identity strength</td>
<td>.6625052 (.4712459)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>3.797335 (10.17154)</td>
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<tr>
<td>political discrimination</td>
<td>1.528284 (1.467505)</td>
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</table>

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
### Appendix B: Unrestricted Model

Unrestricted model: Determinants of Inter-communal Conflict  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportional Representation</td>
<td>-8.34651** (4.292623)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-communal conflict lag</td>
<td>21.668226*** (5.314635)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political discrimination</td>
<td>5.860476*** (1.384466)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group concentration 1</td>
<td>-2.755005 (5.038979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group concentration 2</td>
<td>-4.830029 (4.905627)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group concentration 3</td>
<td>-6.517988 (3.959401)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>16.17538** (8.072163)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>.0000686** (.0000316)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-.0022486*** (.0006221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>182.1459*** (52.34952)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism</td>
<td>2.683918 (3.284733)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>-2.818613 (4.42961)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime durability</td>
<td>-.0079544 (.0677723)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border states with conflict</td>
<td>-3.925837** (1.778835)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative elections</td>
<td>2.492036 (2.638197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive elections</td>
<td>-2.622039 (4.067457)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-134.9496*** (37.95863)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
## Appendix C: List of Countries and Groups in Analysis, including approximations of the minority group’s proportion of population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MAR Groups at Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Indigenous Peoples (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Aborigines (1.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Indigenous Highland Peoples (55%), Lowland Indigenous Peoples (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Afro-Brazilians (48.4%), Amazonian Indians (0.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Quebecois (18%), French Canadians (38%), Indigenous Peoples (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Indigenous Peoples (4.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Blacks (4%), Indigenous Peoples (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Antillean Blacks (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Haitian Blacks (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Blacks (10%), Indigenous Highland Peoples 28.5%, Lowland Indigenous Peoples (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Indigenous Peoples (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Basques (0.44%), Corsicans (0.6%), Muslim (Non-citizens, 3.8%), Roma (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Turks (2.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Muslims (1.2%), Roma (1.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Indigenous Peoples (42%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Black Karibs (2%), Indigenous Peoples (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>MAR Groups at Risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Kashmiris (0.7%), Muslims (11.4%), Nagas (0.3%), Scheduled Tribes (7.8%), Sikhs (2%), Mizados (0.07%), Tripuras (0.08%), Assamese (1.3%), Bodos (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Arabs (18%), Palestinians (29.45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>South Tyrolians (0.5%), Sardinians (2.9%), Roma (0.18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Koreans (0.56%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Maori (9.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Indigenous Peoples (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Blacks (Afro-Peruvians, 1%), Indigenous Highland Peoples (38%), Lowland Indigenous Peoples (1.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Igorots (1.4%), Moros (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Basques (5.4%), Catalans (16%), Roma (1.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Indian Tamils (6%), Sri Lankin Tamils (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Jurassians (2.2%), Foreign Workers (19.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Chinese (11%), Malay-Muslims (3%), Northern Hill Tribes (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Kurds (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Catholics in N. Ireland (1.2%), Scots (9.6%), Afro-Caribbeans (2%), Asians (2.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Blacks(^8), Indigenous Peoples (2.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^8\) No data available
Appendix D: Table of PR Systems, including key observations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Intercomcon observations</th>
<th>Federalism</th>
<th>Parliamentary</th>
<th>OECD member</th>
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<td>Dominican Republic</td>
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<td>Ecuador (Mixed, 1998)</td>
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Appendix E: Table of Majoritarian Systems, including key observations

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Intercomcon observations</th>
<th>Federalism</th>
<th>Parliamentary</th>
<th>OECD member</th>
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<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand (1990-95)</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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### Appendix F: List of Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Summary statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-communal conflict <em>(intercomcon)</em></td>
<td>0/1 dummy variable; coded 1 to indicate open hostilities between the minority group and other communal groups, as well as the majority or dominant group. Conflicts between minority groups and the state or dominant groups exercising state power are not coded. Minority group in question may be the target or the initiator of violence. A new variable, <em>intercomcon</em>, was recoded as a dummy variable after combining MAR’s two measurements of the presence of inter-group communal conflict from 1940 to 1989 and since 1990. Source: MAR</td>
<td>Mean=.5747&lt;br&gt;Std. Dev.=.4948&lt;br&gt;Min =0  Max=1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-communal conflict lagged <em>(lagintercomcon)</em></td>
<td>Intercomcon lagged 1 year Source: MAR</td>
<td>Mean=.5448&lt;br&gt;Std Dev.=.4984&lt;br&gt;Min=0  Max=1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional Representation <em>(PR)</em></td>
<td>0/1 dummy; a recode using Golder’s gol_est2 variable. PR and Mixed coded as 1; Majoritarian coded as 0. Source: QOG</td>
<td>Mean=.5817&lt;br&gt;Std Dev=.4937&lt;br&gt;Min=0  Max=1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic differences index <em>(ethdifxx)</em></td>
<td>Ethnic Difference Index combining measures of language, custom, belief and race. Source: MAR</td>
<td>Mean=6.174&lt;br&gt;Std. Dev.=2.4465&lt;br&gt;Min=1  Max=11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group identity strength <em>(catness)</em></td>
<td>Summary indicator of strength of group identity. Also referred to as Group “categoriness”. It is the extent to which a group constitutes a distinct, self-identifying category (definition from Charles Tilly). Source: MAR</td>
<td>Mean=12.0239&lt;br&gt;Std. Dev.=3.2996&lt;br&gt;Min=5  Max=19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political discrimination (<em>poldis</em>)</td>
<td>Political Discrimination Index, 1980-2000. Coded as: 0 for no discrimination 1 for neglect/remedial policies; substantial under representation in political office and/or participation due to historical neglect or restrictions. 2 for neglect/no remedial policies; substantial under representation due to historical neglect or restrictions. No social practice or deliberate exclusion. No formal exclusion. No evidence of protective or remedial public policies. 3 for social exclusion/neutral policy; substantial under representation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive inadequate to offset discriminatory policies. 4 for exclusion/repressive policies; public policies substantially restrict the group’s political participation by comparison with other groups.</td>
<td>Mean=2.0369 Std. Dev.=1.4069 Min=0 Max=4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group concentration 1 – Primarily urban or minority in one region (<em>groupcon1</em>)</td>
<td>0/1 dummy variable. Recode of MAR’s categorical groupcon variable. Coded 1 if the group is primarily urban or minority in one region. Reference category is widely dispersed.</td>
<td>Mean=.1652 Std. Dev.=.3717 Min=0 Max=1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group concentration 2- Majority in one region with others dispersed (<em>groupcon2</em>)</td>
<td>0/1 dummy variable. Recode of MAR’s categorical groupcon variable. Coded 1 if the group is majority in one region with others dispersed. Reference category is widely dispersed.</td>
<td>Mean=.1371 Std. Dev.=.3442 Min=0 Max=1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group concentration 3-</td>
<td>0/1 dummy variable. Recode of MAR’s categorical groupcon variable. Coded 1 if the group is concentrated in one region. Reference category is widely dispersed.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Concentrated in one region</td>
<td>(groupcon3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>Fearon’s (2003) Index of Ethnic Fractionalization. Indicates the degree of a country’s ethnic fractionalization. Reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country “ethno” or “ethnoreligious” groups. Ranges from 0 (perfectly homogenous) to 1 (highly fragmented).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(fe_etfra)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Population of country in the thousands at mid year. Using Maddison’s mad_pop variable. Source: QOG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(pop)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>GDP per capita using Maddison’s mad_gdppc variable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(gdp_percap)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index. Combination of indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment, and income. Expressed as a value between 0 and 1. Source: United Nations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(hdi)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism</td>
<td>Dummy variable. 1 if the country has a federal political structure and 0 otherwise. Using Persson and Tabellini’s pt_federal. Source: QOG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(federal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(parliament)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime durability (regime_dur)</td>
<td>Measure of regime durability using Marshall and Jaggers (Polity IV) p_durable. The number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three-point change in the Polity score over a period of three years or less) or the end of a transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions. The first year during which a polity is established is coded as 0. A 1 is added to the variable for each subsequent year until a new regime change or transition period occurs.</td>
<td>QOG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border states with conflict (macnciv)</td>
<td>Number of border states experiencing major violent internal conflicts. Variable created by Monty Marshall. Source: Political Instability Task Force Phase III data set</td>
<td>QOG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative elections (leg elec)</td>
<td>Dummy variable. 1 if there is a legislative election held. Using dpi_legelec variable from Database of Political Institutions. Source: QOG</td>
<td>QOG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive elections (exec elec)</td>
<td>Dummy variable. 1 if there is an executive election held. Using dpi_execelec variable from Database of Political Institutions. Source: QOG</td>
<td>QOG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>