THE PROPER ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY:
TOWARDS SUCCESSFUL DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

by

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(Under the Direction of Abdulahi Osman)

ABSTRACT

Civil-military relations in transitioning democracies have been a constant source of frustration for scholars. Current literature on the subject insists on the complete subordination of the military to civilian authorities immediately post transition. However, historical analysis of failed transitions and military coups shows that this may not be the best method for success. Historical analysis of Turkey, Bolivia, and Brazil shows that subordination often leads to alienation and the perception of a threat from the civilian government. This threat unifies the military institution and makes the armed forces a serious competitor for political power. Analysis of the military as government in these cases shows that once in power, the unity of the military is markedly reduced by the return of factionalism as rivals compete for power. Including the military in the new government post-transition and using this phenomenon to their advantage will provide new democracies with a far superior chance for success.

INDEX WORDS: Civil-Military Relations, Democracy, Authoritarianism, Corporatism, Brazil, Turkey, Bolivia, Coup, Democratic Transition, Democratization
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

During the 1960’s, a wave of authoritarianism swept across Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Southern Europe. Countries experimenting with democracy devolved back into authoritarianism and military leaders took control in a number of countries. This unparalleled move away from democracy can be attributed to several factors. First, there were severe economic crises in most of these regions. Second, the new democratic regimes failed to bring immediate results to their people. Third, Cold War politics created an international climate where authoritarian regimes received enormous financial and military support from the world’s super-powers. Fourth, nations attempting democratic transition failed to deal with the military institution post transition, a problem that is extremely common in post-authoritarian nations. Eventually, militaries were able to forcefully regain control and oust young, struggling democratic regimes. Despite the trend towards authoritarianism in the 1960’s, the period between the early 1970’s and 1990’s saw a ‘Third Wave’ of democracy sweep across many regions of the globe.

Today, authoritarianism still flourishing in a number of nations. However, military control over government has become increasingly less common. The international context has changed a great deal and where international support of authoritarian regimes was once common, today this behavior is unacceptable. The times have changed and the Cold War is over. Now, the most difficult task of transitioning former authoritarian regimes into stable democracies takes center stage.

History provides numerous examples of the difficulty in transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy. Countries attempting this transition often face economic

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crisis including spiraling inflation and staggering unemployment. Also, the chances of internal armed conflict or civil war increase during the transition as segments of the population who have been stifled under the former authoritarian regime compete for power. Lacking the institutions or a history of democratic governance means that these nations often lack a basic democratic political culture as well. More difficult still is the task of dealing with the former authoritarian regime, especially the military as this institution is often the most organized and powerful political force post transition. It is this specific problem of dealing with the military institution that this work is concerned with.

Scholars concerned with democratization have studied the civil-military relationship at length producing theories and universal goals that have proven to be difficult to implement at ground level. Almost universally, these works have suggested the complete subordination of the military to civilian control. However, a historical analysis of the military as an institution and failed democratic transitions including military coups shows that complete subordination is not only difficult but may also prove counter productive.

The goal of this thesis is to create a theory of civil-military relations that will allow transitioning democracies to reach maturity. In order to complete this task I will use a cross-regional comparative analysis of failed transitions including military coups to understand the forces at work in this situation. In essence this paper represents a double attempt. First, I will flush out the reasons why transitions to democracy have failed in certain instances and not in others. Second, this paper will suggest a method by which
transitioning democracies can deal with the military institution and move towards consolidated democratic governance.

The research question is then: *what is the place of the military in transitioning democracies and what type of civil-military relationship provides the best chance for success?* As the paper will show, there are strong connections between threats, group psychology, and military takeover. In this regard, this paper will contradict much of the literature concerning civil-military relations to date. Where previous theories have their roots in the developed world of Western democracy, I will express a theory that applies to the developing world and armies that often see themselves as the creators of the state. The question of how to handle the military in a democratic transition is of utmost importance as the military is often the strongest, most organized, and politically powerful institution in an authoritarian nation. Further, completely dismantling this institution is not an option as states, no matter their style of government, need security.

What I suggest is including the military as a part of the formal governmental structure in a corporatist fashion. Using historical analysis, I will show that like all large groups, militaries contain factions, which constantly compete for power and when faced with a threat, recede for the sake of group security. History shows that this factionalism is at its highest when militaries are involved in the governing process and at their lowest when faced with a threat from the government or an invading nation. Using this phenomenon to their advantage, young democracies will be advised to avoid military subordination early on and instead, seek inclusion in order to promote factionalism.

Using cross-regional historical analysis may cause concern for some scholars who believe that comparisons cannot be easily made across borders and time frames.
However, I argue that under the legacies of authoritarianism, there are cross-regional similarities in the problems faced during democratic transition. As the argument has been put forward in one recent study dedicated to the topic of civil-military relations in Latin America, “the need for new analytical perspectives on the studies of armies and politics is now more apparent than ever…the Latin American civil-military field (like Latin American area studies as a whole) has suffered by standing in harmful isolation” (Pion-Berlin 2001, 2). Therefore, using this method may not only be beneficial, it may also prove superior to many other choices.

This paper will identify the specific causes for the failure of democracy in the three nations of study Turkey, Bolivia, and Brazil. I believe that examining these failures provides a significant foundation from which a theory of civil-military relations can be built. Further, I believe that the comparative analytical framework offers the best choice in order to demonstrate cross-regional similarities in these nations. In doing so I hope to deny the path dependent arguments that have been used to explain political phenomenon in the developing world. Thus, the goal here is the creation of a theory for civil-military relations that is exportable and universal throughout the developing world.

It must be noted that the focus of this paper and the subsequent theory developed will apply only to transitions to democracy that occur voluntarily from within. This being said, nations that have been invaded and forced into democratic transition remain outside the scope of this study for two main reasons. First, nations which have lost a military conflict against an invading nation or allied force will not contend with the same internal military threat since the power of the domestic military will be greatly reduced by the preceding conflict. Second, conquered nations rarely get to choose the form of
government they will precede with post-conflict. It is often the case that the conquering nation or nations will place in power a government of their choosing whether democratic or authoritarian. Therefore, the method or shape of the civil-military relationship is beyond control in such a situation. Current events in Iraq provide an example of this phenomenon. The previous military institution has been all but eradicated and holds no domestic political power. Therefore, the military’s role in government is not a consideration of the newly formed government.

The cases of Turkey, Bolivia, and Brazil have been chosen for the following reasons. First, these nations belong to two of the classic areas within the study of democratization, Latin American and Eastern Europe\(^2\). Second, these nations are diverse yet share a common history of military intervention in politics. The diversity of these three cases should show that the phenomenon that led to military intervention in politics and the subsequent failure of the military institution to govern are universal and not confined to one region or continent. Third, all three nations represent the developing world and have historically struggled with democracy. It is my belief that a theory for the successful democratic transition of developing nations must be based on situations observed on the ground in these nations and not on the western experience with democracy.

The arguments of this paper will be developed as follows. First, the literature review will provide a discussion of past and present scholarship concerning civil-military relations showing that the prevailing trend in these works suggests the complete

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\(^2\) While including Turkey as a part of Eastern Europe may bring criticism from some scholars, I see no problem in doing so for the purpose of this study. In light of European Union expansion south and east, the growing number of works including Turkey in European policy studies, and the fact the European Stabilization Initiative now holds and office in Istanbul any objections are surely unfounded.
subordination of the military to civilian authorities. From here I will provide detailed recantations of the situations in Turkey, Bolivia, and Brazil showing how these attempts at democracy failed and how the military came to power in each instance. Finally, I will layout a method for civil-military relations that will provide the best chance for successful democratic transition in developing nations. Basing my theory on evidence from the developing world, I will suggest that corporatist structures provide the best opportunity for democratic regimes to effectively deal with the power of the military institution.
CHAPTER 2: THEORIES OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY, THREATS, PERCEPTION AND A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

In the last half century, an extensive literature has emerged on transitions to democracy and the role of the military in politics. This literature has grown out of a global trend towards democracy and the withering of authoritarian regimes. The sheer number of transitions has sparked a stimulating academic debate about the role of the military in government and democratic transitions. Further, scholars have shown great interest in studying and supporting democracy. As scholars have become convinced of the desirability of democracy, the number and quality of works on this subject have grown rapidly.

Beginning with the first wave of democratization that took place in the 1960’s, scholars have sought a theory for how to properly situate the military on the political power spectrum. These works have focused on military professionalism, subordination, social structures, and elite behavior. The overwhelming similarity in most of the works to this date has been the emphasis on the separation of the military and political spheres and a thick description of types and levels of civil-military relations. Separation is supported by many authors who insist on the total subordination of the military to a civilian political authority. This objective of civilian control represents the mainstream postulation within the civil-military relations paradigm.

Typologies of Civil Military Relations

Regarding theoretical models of civil-military relations, Samuel Huntington in his now classic work, *The Soldier and the State*, outlines two main types of civilian control over the military: the subjective and the objective. The subjective way of control,
Huntington argues, is based on the maximization of civilian influence with the risk of diluting the cohesion and professionalism of the armed forces. “The simplest way of minimizing military power would appear to be the maximizing of the power of civilian groups in relation to the military...consequently the maximizing of civilian power always means the maximizing of the power of some particular civilian group or groups” (Huntington 1957, 80).

The objective model outlined by Huntington is based on the maximization of military professionalism. “More precisely, it is that distribution of political power between the military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officer corps” (Huntington 1957, 83). The objective model represents a situation where the officer corps remains politically neutral and sterile. They are prepared to carry out whatever orders the civilian authority hands down regardless of who is in power. In contrast to the subjective model, this approach asserts that civilian control is assured through the recognition of military professionalism rather than civilian interference.

While the above situations are considered ideal, Huntington outlines another situation that is less desirable. Praetorianism, is a term used to describe situations of military involvement in political affairs with the forceful overthrow of the government or coup d’etat, or through the permanent involvement in the political decision making process behind the scenes. In essence, an authoritarian regime can be composed of civilian and military officers and may even be headed by a civilian who does not possess military training or background. The appearance of a praetorian regime is determined by two factors according to Huntington. First, a weakening of the political and institutional
structure of the society and second, a cohesive and autonomous military (Huntington 1957, 93).

From here, Huntington goes on to explain five different ideal types of civil-military relations. These ideals range from high military power and low military professionalism to low military power and high military professionalism. The situation that is most common in the developing world is a situation where military officers are involved in the day-to-day operations of government and leaders rise from the upper ranks of the officer corps. This situation makes the exportation of western institutions of democracy difficult if not impossible and only with great difficulty have nations been able to move from this situation to a more civilian dominated relationship (Huntington 1957, 96).

Of relevance here is a note on Huntington’s proposed ideal of civilian control for countries of the developing world. First, deficiencies arise when we consider that Huntington formulated his ideas after a study of western political history. Second, military professionalism as outlined by Huntington is not likely to lead to the military being sterilized and politically neutral. Even in the most professional armies of the world, the desire for the latest, state of the art equipment and weaponry constantly brings the military into conflict with other branches of the armed forces and civilian leaders. One has to look no further than the current competition for funding between the Navy and the Air Force in the pursuit of a cruise missile defense system here in the United States for an example of this situation. Therefore, military professionalism is not guaranteed to completely rid the military of any desire to intervene in politics.
In fairness to Samuel Huntington, his work did not claim to be universal or applicable to the developing world. Huntington was concerned with nations whose governments had been functioning for decades and who were engulfed in Cold War politics. However, because so many scholars have borrowed from Huntington’s work on civil-military relations, he must be included in any thorough examination of the literature on this issue.

Borrowing heavily from Huntington, Morris Janowitz has developed a theory of civil-military relations based on his sociological understanding of this tenuous situation. For Janowitz, civilian control is a matter of societal control rather than state or institutional control. Accordingly, institutions play a secondary role as an extension of society and societal control is largely a matter of military integration with society. One thing that makes Janowitz’s work noteworthy is the fact that he deals almost exclusively with developing nations. For developing countries, Janowitz identifies five types of civil-military relations: (1) authoritarian-personal control, (2) authoritarian-mass party, (3) democratic competitive, (4) civil-military coalition, (5) military oligarchy (Janowitz 1971, 81).

In the civil-military coalition, the military serves as an active political force, supporting a civilian party or bureaucratic group. Thus, the civilian group is in power because of the military, which acts as an informal or explicit mediator between political parties or groups. At this level of civil-military relations, the military will often set up a caretaker government with a goal of returning power to civilian groups. However, these governments are often unstable and often lead to another level of civil-military relations where the military becomes the political ruling group or military oligarchy. Once in
power, the military may seek mass political support through alliances with civilian
groups or the development of a broad political apparatus. According to Janowitz, it is
possible for nations to fluctuate between these various levels of civil-military relations.

Further expanding on his typology, Janowitz outlines a sub-set whereby the
distinction is made between “reactive militarism” and “designed militarism” (Janowitz
1971, 93). By designed militarism, Janowitz means a predetermined and positive intent
to intervene in domestic politics and to follow expansionist foreign policies. Reactive
militarism on the other hand entails the expansion of military power in domestic politics
due to the weakness or failure of the civilian government accompanied by pressure from
society to expand the military role. This situation can be exacerbated by the desire of
military leaders to take advantage of a weak state. As with Huntington, Janowitz does an
excellent job of describing the various situations that may occur. Further, Janowitz’s
work is a step in the right direction in that it focuses on the developing world. However,
both authors leave us with an ideal type and several less desirable typologies. What is
lacking in both works is any method for how to achieve civilian control.

Largely in response to Samuel Huntington’s work, A.R. Lucham tries to offer a
more complete model. His typology of civil-military relations is based upon three
factors: (1) the strength or weakness of the civilian institutions, (2) the strength or
weakness of the military institution coupled with the coercive, political, and
organizational resources at its disposal, and (3) the nature of the boundaries between the
military and its socio-political environment (Lucham 1961, 9-21). By understanding
these three factors, Lucham’s typology classifies a country’s civil-military relations based
on the role the military plays in political life. He then sets up categories in which the
military exercises objective, constabulary, apparatus, and subjective control and cases where the military has established a praetorian or guardian state or where a political vacuum has occurred (Lucham 1961, 22-35).

In the same vein as Lucham but borrowing Huntington’s definition of praetorian regimes, Nordlinger, Clapham, and Philip have formulated supplementary typologies of civil-military relations. After an examination of the three models of civilian control, traditional, liberal, and penetration models, Nordlinger argues that there is no single model of civilian control that can be widely applicable and effective (Nordlinger 1977, 10-19). Hence, he uses the extent of governmental power exercised by the officers and the ambitiousness of their objectives as criteria for his typology. In doing so, Nordlinger identifies three types of praetorian officers: the moderators, the guardians, and the rulers. The moderators, according to Nordlinger, exercise veto power on government decisions without assuming political power. The guardians overwhelm the civilian government, assuming power for a period of time while protecting the status quo and working to return power to the civilians. The rulers want not only to assume political power but also to transform the status quo in their society and remain in control indefinitely.

Clapham and Philip are not concerned with how officers come to power but instead how they exercise power once in control. In turn, they classify four types of military regimes: Veto, Moderator, Factional, and Breakthrough (Clapham and Philip 1985,6-8). Clapham and Philip go on to list the determinants of their classifications as (1) unity of the military command structure, (2) the level of differentiation of the military from society, (3) the level of perceived threat from civil society, and (4) the level of autonomous political organization (Clapham and Philip 1985, 8-10). Furthermore, the
authors express concern with the results of military governments. They divide these results into six categories: the handback, civilian renewal, authoritarian and factional clientelism, military party state, and the case of an impasse.

Samuel Fitch has suggested three characteristics possessed by democratic systems of government in relation to the military. First, the military must be completely subordinate to the democratic regime. Democracy does not permit any group to have greater legitimacy than the will of the people. Second, there should be policy control of the armed forces by constitutionally designated civilian authorities. This includes the allocation of budgetary resources, the definition of threats to be protected against, and the scope of military use. Third, in democracies, military personnel must be subject to the rule of law. They are neither denied constitutional protection nor given special legal privileges (Fitch 1998, 73).

In contrast to many of the works listed above, Douglas Bland maintains that changes in regimes and the recent trend towards democracy requires a re-evaluation of the previous theories and models of civil-military relations. He has identified four common models present in the previous literature. First, Bland describes the mission model where military compliance grows out of the existence of an outside threat. Second is the institutional model where strong civilian institutions overcome the power of the military organization such as in the United States or Western Europe. The third model Bland identifies is civilian supremacy where civilian leaders are involved in every level of the military decision-making process. Fourth and finally, Bland lists the humanitarian model where military and civilian elites coexist in harmony. From here, Bland suggests a
unified theory of civil-military relations based on the idea of shared responsibility and driven by the assumptions of the theory of regimes (Bland 2001, 532).

**Explaining Military Intervention**

A focus on description is the hallmark of S.E. Finer’s work *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. Here, Finer offers a more comprehensive set of ideas about why militaries intervene in politics. According to Finer, military intervention depends on the factors of “disposition” and “opportunity” (Finer 1988, 22). The disposition to intervene results from a combination of moods and motives which Finer breaks down into one or a combination of the following: (1) manifest destiny of the soldiers, (2) national interest, (3) sectional interest-class, regional, or corporate self-interest, and (4) a combination of the above motives (Finer 1988, 23-78). Finer explains that the mood to intervene is a complex element based on a sense of overwhelming power, high self-esteem at a corporate level, and a grievance against the civilian government. The opportunity for the military to intervene in politics depends on the domestic environment (a crisis or power vacuum situation) and the popularity of the military.

Finer’s work is important since it sheds light on the reasons why militaries intervene in politics. However, there is still no mention of how to prevent intervention or what method would be best for transitioning democracies to achieve a productive civil-military relationship. Also missing from Finer’s examination is any mention of threats and how they lead to intervention. Like Huntington and Janowitz, Finer simply provides a piece of the larger puzzle which is still to be solved.
Democratization and Security Sector Reform

More recently, a trend has developed in the policy and academic worlds that emphasizes the need for an enlarged formula relative to civil-military relations and the need to include this topic as a part of the general process of democratization and transition to market economy. Nicole Ball (2001) among others have attempted to take into account both domestic and external variables in order to explain the dynamics of relations between civilians and the military. This new conceptual lens grew out of the increasing number of democratizing countries and the shift in frequency from inter-state to intra-state conflict. Instead of focusing on civil-military relations, these authors focus on the concept of security sector reform. In this respect, the security sector takes into account the regular armed forces, paramilitary units, the police, national guardsmen, and the intelligence services. Also, the concept of security sector reform includes the legislature, executive, judiciary, and society as a whole.

Group Psychology, Threats, and Perception

In his book Civilian Control of the Military, Michael Desch sets forth a theory for civilian control of the military. Desch makes an outstanding observation about civil-military relations when he contends that the ‘structural threat environment should affect the character of the civilian leadership, the nature of the military institution, the cohesiveness of state institutions, the method of civilian control, and the convergence or divergence of civilian and military ideas and cultures’ (Desch 1999, 12). The key here is in the nature of the military institution and the convergence or divergence of civilian and military ideas.
What we know from group-psychology is that groups contain internal divisions and that when faced with an outside threat, these divisions disappear or are given second billing for the sake of the group. What results is group cohesiveness, which can be a positive or negative phenomenon depending on the situation. ‘Cohesion can have several very powerful effects on group functioning’ (Baron and Kerr 2003, 98). When the military faces an international threat such as that from an invading army, cohesiveness is essential to that military’s effectiveness. However, when facing a domestic threat such as budget cuts or restructuring by the civilian government, military cohesiveness can make that organization a serious contender for political control.

Much research has been done on the psychology of groups. These works have made startling conclusions as to how groups see and interact with one another. Two of the most important foci from the literature on group-psychology as it relates to this paper are competition and threat. While the idea of threat has been discussed, relative deprivation needs explanation. A number of researchers have shown that simply placing people in to groups increases competitiveness. This competitiveness is most likely to increase in times of economic crisis. In these instances, groups may perceive inequities between themselves and other groups. This leads to a situation called relative deprivation in which discrepancies between groups are seen as unfair or illegitimate. It is when one feels unfairly deprived both personally and collectively that resentment is at its highest and conflict is most likely (Baron and Norbert 2003, 54). Further contributing to the feeling of relative depravation is the decline in-group status over a period of time. Attention tends to focus on present inequalities rather than the historical improvements of
the group. These concepts are important for transitioning democracies to understand and work within.

Essential to any discussion of threats is the idea of perception. A threat is only a threat in as much as it is perceived to be by whatever group or individual it affects. If a person or group perceives a threat as real, even though there may be nothing in reality to justify this perception, then the threat is real in its consequences. In the case of international wars, it is hard to argue that the threat is subjective. In times of peace however, threats may be completely subjective. Tim Jacoby explains this situation best when he says that:

_Civilian governments may often perceive themselves to be in a period of geopolitical calm and reduce military expenditure in favor of infrastructural projects such as agricultural mechanization, communications and transportation improvements, welfare programs and power generation. In these conditions, a military elite may threaten or execute an intervention in order to secure a specific financial demand_ (Jacoby 2003, 673).

State threats against the military may include anything from calls by government officials for the dismantling of the military to simple budgetary restructuring and cutbacks. As long as the military feels like its institution is being threatened, a threat exists. This phenomenon of threats leading to cohesiveness is beneficial in times of foreign invasion but extremely detrimental during the transition to democracy. Table 2:1
sums up the relationship between threats against the military and government control of that institution. As mentioned previously, the lowest control for a civilian government will occur when the perception of an internal threat is higher than any external threat to the military (Column 2, Row 1). The highest control or best situation for the civilian government would occur when perceived internal threats to the military are low and the country is faced with an invading external force (Column 1, Row 2).

Table 2:1 Government Control of the Military as a Function of Threat Environment

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<th>External Threats (To Military)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mixed Control (1)</td>
<td>Worst Control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Best Control</td>
<td>Mixed Control (2)</td>
<td></td>
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(1) Preferred since the survival of the military depends on the survival of the state.

(2) Dangerous depending on which threat the military acts upon.

A Note on Methodology

At this point, some consideration must be given to the methods used in this work. Also, the rationale underlying the selection of cases must be discussed. As stated earlier, the research question for this work is: what is the place of the military in transitioning democracies and what type of civil-military relationship provides the best chance for success? In order to pursue an answer to this question, this work will outline the cases of Bolivia, Turkey, and Brazil in order to flush out the reasons why democracy failed in each case.
The cases of Turkey, Bolivia, and Brazil have been chosen because these nations belong to two of the classic areas in the study of democratization: Latin America and Eastern Europe. Further, these cases represent a diverse historical background yet share a common trait of strong military role in government. Much of the research on democratic transition has its foundation in the developed world and has proven to be of little value for nations of still developing world. In order to avoid this common pitfall, this study uses cases from the developing world where a history of colonialism, under-development, and conflict is the norm.

In order to show the specific causes for the breakdown of democracy in each nation, this study will use three in-depth case studies. By using historical analysis, I will show the specific reasons why democracy failed in each case. Further, I will highlight the inherent factions that exist within the military institution. As is the case with many large institutions, internal factions within the military compete for power yet come together when faced with a threat in order to insure the safety of the institution as a whole. The events in each case will show that military factionalism is at its highest when the institution is involved in the day to day operations of government and lowest when the institution is faced from an outside threat.

The method of analysis in this work is a qualitative, case-study design. In order to provide uniformity within each study, a set of relevant questions will be answered as the events that led to democratic failure and the subsequent military control of the government in each case are laid out. First, how many factions existed within the military institution and what was the ideological basis for their competition? Second, what was the democratic government’s policy towards the military and how was this
policy accepted within the military institution? Third, once military control of the
government was achieved did military factionalism return and how did this affect the
military’s ability to govern?
CHAPTER 3: BOLIVIA

The two factions that would compete for power in the Bolivian military were born out of the Revolution of 1952. The party that came to power as a result of the revolution was the National Revolutionary Movement or MNR. Upon taking power of the Bolivian government, the MNR’s first act was to dismantle the professional armed forces. An army of 20,000 men was cut to 5,000 and only 800 of the 1200 officers form the previous regime were retained (Farcau 1996, 113). Under the MNR, the bulk of the national security work was to be handled by armed civilian militias. In the wake of the military cuts emerged the first of the two factions: the Institutionalists. The main interest of this group was the protection of the military institution. It was composed of the officers who survived the dismantling of the military by convincing the government of their commitment to civilian rule.

The armed militias who were expected to provide for the security of Bolivia became a nagging problem for the MNR government. Militias composed of miners were able to ignore government directives and conduct strikes that crippled the tin industry in Bolivia. Facing the problem of the militias and desperately needing the export revenues of the tin mines, the MNR south to strengthen the military it had previously crippled. The first step towards this goal was the reopening of the military academy. When the first graduates emerged in 1955, they were in the service of a bankrupt government facing severe economic crisis. Their pay was low and erratically received. Their equipment was outdated and in disrepair. Thus, it was this situation that led to the formation of the second military faction, the Generationalists.
While also dedicated to the protection of the military institution, the Generationalists regarded military intervention in politics as a corrupting influence. They were committed to the idea of civilian democracy as much as civilian control would allow a powerful and separate military. In the beginning the Institutionalists held higher ranks than the younger Generationalists, which added to the faction’s rivalry. The Institutionalists saw themselves as the rightful heirs of the pre-revolutionary military and their opponents as the product of the corrupt MNR regime.

By the late 1950’s both factions had been firmly established. At this time, the government began another attempt to rebuild the military. Military aid from the United States came in the form of cash and surplus WWII equipment. In 1957, a US training mission arrived in Bolivia and military enlistment rose to around 20,000\(^3\). All of this was aimed at curbing the power of the militias, which were run like private armies by the various political and labor leaders. After achieving their goal of curtailing the militias, the government once again sought to rein in the power of the military. Officers were directed to pledge their allegiance to the MNR. The military viewed this order as an attempt to place the military under the control of President Victor Paz. In 1964 when Paz attempted to amend the constitution so as to allow him to succeed himself in office for what would have been a constitutionally prohibited third term in office, the military reacted without opposition and established a military government.

Unlike in Brazil where the military ruled for years, relinquishing power gradually, the Bolivian military government was characterized by intense power struggles from day one. After the removal of Victor Paz in 1964, General Rene Barrientos, leader of the Institutionalists, became president. Continuing Paz’s policy of controlling the militias,

\(^3\) See figure 3.1.
Barrientos also sought support from the peasantry. The Generationalists were still the weaker faction at this point and focused on strengthening the military schools created by the United States. Their goal was to professionalize the military and gradually grow in opposition to the Barrientos regime. The factionalism that characterized the pre-revolution military became an increasingly problematic issue. The Institutionalists under Barrientos supported the idea of military as government whereas the Generationalists preferred the military as an institution separate from the day-to-day business of government. Many of Barrientos’ senior officers abandoned their positions in the military for higher paying government positions that were gladly handed out to Barrientos’ followers. Widespread corruption became characteristic of the Barrientos regime and loyal military officials were promoted to government positions in an attempt to protect against the growing power of the Generationalists.

In 1969, Barrientos was killed in a helicopter crash and the power struggle between the two military factions intensified. Originally, Barrientos’ civilian vice president succeeded in coming to power but this was short lived. Only six months after his inauguration, another military leader, General Alfredo Ovando took over. Ovando managed to gain the support of the Gerneralalists simply because no one in their ranks was senior enough to take such a high-ranking position as the presidency. Oviedo’s reign was short lived however and after only one year in office he stepped down citing personal reasons. In his place, Juan Jose Torres took office.

Without widespread support from the military, Torres was forced to look to the political left for his base. Eventually this lead to the creation of a Popular Assembly, which became a kind of parallel legislature for leftist labor unions (Farcau 1996, 122).
This did not sit well with the bulk of the military and General Hugo Banzer launched a
coup against Torres in 1971. Following the successful coup, Banzer took control of the
Bolivian government. His reign was the most unstable to date. Surviving numerous coup
attempts, Banzer and the Institutionalists saw their power decrease rapidly. In 1978, the
Gernerationalists saw their chance and launched a successful coup against the Banzer
regime. Between the years of 1978 and 1980, there were a number of attempted coups
with varying degrees of success. There were also civilian elections during this time but
they were unable to return a winning candidate. Finally, in 1982, after 18 years of
military rule, Hernan Siles became president and civilian rule was returned to Bolivia.

The case of Bolivia shows that when the military institution is threatened,
factionalism, no matter how strong, will subside for the sake of the institution. Also, the
Bolivian case shows that once the military assumes power, factionalism will reappear and
seriously handicap the ability of the military to govern. This phenomenon is
characteristic of military institutions throughout the developing world. Based on this
knowledge, the complete subordination of the military to a young democratic regime is
not the best method for success.
Figure 3:1 and 3.2 Bolivian Military Expenditures and Military Personnel Figures 1952-82

Bolivian Military Personnel Figures 1952-1982

Bolivian Military Expenditures X 1000 US Dollars 1952-1982
CHAPTER 4: BRAZIL

In Brazil the previously discussed phenomenon of the factioning of groups is well demonstrated. This factioning of the military grew out of the military’s small contribution to the allied effort in World War II. Brazil sent a single division, the FEB to fight along-side allied forces in Italy. The involvement of the FEB lasted only eight months but was nevertheless important for the men involved. These men had been strongly influenced by their American and British allies. Upon returning, this influence was applied to their native Brazil. The first order of business was the creation of the Superior War College where civilians and military officers would study military strategy similar to military schools in major industrialized nations. This institution would be a major factor in determining the military’s role in the period between 1961 and 1964 (Roett 1999, 76). The FEB provided the instructors and textbooks for the new school as well as writing extensively for the military journal that the school produced. The experience in World War II and the training many of the officers received in foreign military schools gave the FEB an extremely pro-west, pro-US bias. Another group, the duros who were professionally and personally opposed to the FEB, countered this position. The duros group was formed to protect the careers of the officers who had not fought in World War II. Its philosophy was extremely nationalist and anti-American. The duros opposed American involvement both in Cuba and the Brazilian economy.

Where the FEB proposed a policy of economic liberalism, the duros favored state intervention and government control of vital industries such as petroleum and major manufacturing. This was paradoxical as the duros were actually the more anti-communist of the two factions (Farcau 1996, 58). Also, the duros were responsible for
most of the human rights violations during this time and were the least influenced by American Cold War politics. The leaders of these two groups particularly Castelo Branco and Costa de Silva best illustrate the differences between the two factions. Branco led the FEB and had served in Italy. He had his training in the United States and France. He was one of the founders of the Superior War College and was considered pro-American, anti-communist. Costa de Silva on the other hand was the traditional Brazilian soldier. He distrusted the intellectuals of the War College and possessed a hatred for communist subversion. De Silva was extremely anti-American and favored a nationalistic approach to Brazilian development. All this shows that the military in Brazil was sharply divided along ideological lines and had been so for years leading up to the coup.

Despite the enormous gap between the philosophies of these two factions, they were able to cooperate and conspire together to seize control of the Brazilian government in 1964. From 1961 up until this point, Joao Goulart had headed the Brazilian government. From the very beginning, military leaders in Brazil protested the constitutional succession of Goulart following the resignation of President Janio Quandros. Originally the military was able to handicap Goulart with the implementation of the Additional Act. However, by 1963, Goulart was operating in full capacity as the nation’s president. To find support, Goulart was forced to the leftists in Brazilian politics. In April of 1963, Goulart instituted large salary increases for civil service employees. These increases were much larger than those granted to the military and thus Goulart further alienated his most powerful critics. The military would be further alienated when Goulart prohibited the military high command from punishing an uprising
of noncommissioned officers. Then in December of 1963, Goulart promoted a leftist general to commander of the Marine Corps while removing the commander of the second army for his opposition of labor strikes.

Goulart moved further towards the left in the eyes of the military when he attacked the idea of personal property during the 1964 presidential elections. At the same time, the military began to come under attack from various sectors of the Brazilian government for allowing Goulart’s pro-communist stance and attacks on military autonomy resulted. The fear of a Castro-style communist government in which the military would be destroyed and replaced by local militias became a dominant theme in the Brazilian military during this time (Stepan 1971, 103). Facing what seemed to be a threat to the institution of the military from Goulart’s regime, the two factions that had competed for over a decade, came together and ousted Goulart in a 1964 coup. The days leading up to the coup were decisive, military men across the country, only some of whom were active conspirators, rapidly endorsed the coup (Skidmore 1988, 57). This unlikely alliance was forced upon the two factions in order to save the autonomy of the military. This example shows that when a domestic threat appears, inter-military politics take a back seat to the survival of the institution. Also, many scholars have blamed the events of 1964 on the horrible economic conditions within Brazil. However, this is not the case. It is true that Goulart faced accelerating inflation and a balance of payments problem. But, this situation was manageable through the government institutions that were in place at the time and it was Goulart's contempt for these institutions, especially the military that led to his downfall (Gordon 2001, 99).
Once in power, the military regime achieved the support of most of Brazil’s civilian politicians. The initial concern of the new government was to achieve some sort of legitimacy since they had removed Goulart for illegal actions. The presidency was declared vacant until April of 1964 when the congress elected Castelo Branco president. Costa de Silva would be named Army Minister and a system of alternating the presidency was instituted allowing each group to take turns heading the country’s government. Relying on economic improvements for legitimacy, the military regime remained in power for more than two decades. While the differences between the two military factions were extinguished during the coup of 1964, they were rekindled once the military gained power. The political downfall of the military regime is best explained by the rivalry between the two factions. Eventually the struggle for control led to the crippling of the military government and the move towards democratization.

The Brazilian case teaches two important lessons about the role of the military in the government. First, when faced with a threat from that state, factionalism within the military will be suppressed and coups will become more likely. Second, once the military gains power, factionalism returns and hampers the military’s ability to govern effectively. Luciano Martins echoes this second point in his work on the liberalization of Brazil’s authoritarian regime when he says that, ‘crisis situations which may trigger a regime’s transformation tend to occur when the regime’s ability to deal with “internal” or systemic problems diminishes, ushering in a state of unstable equilibrium’ (Martins 1986, 54).

Presently, Brazil stands as what is perhaps the biggest success story in Latin America. Quickly becoming part of the first world, Brazil is among the most advanced
and developed nations in the Latin American region. So the question remains, why has Brazil been so successful? I suggest that a large part of Brazil’s success can be attributed to luck. While the civilian leaders who came to power in 1985 did not intentionally set out to incorporate the military as part of the official structure of the government, they unintentionally proceeded in a manner that is in large congruence with the theory laid out in this paper. The accession of a civilian government in 1985 did not lead to a significant decline in the military’s political power. During the five-year term of President Sarney, six military officials sat in the cabinet; the military controlled its own services, the national intelligence and defense system, and had a large presence in the presidential and general government bureaucracy. By including the military in the government, the early civilian government may have unknowingly protected itself against another military coup. Since then, military power has declined but Brazil’s early success and current position can largely be attributed to the way military leaders were included into the structure of the first civilian government. Brazil’s success further reinforces the ideas set forth in this paper and this theory along with Brazil’s experience can be seen as a paradigm for future transitions.
Figure 4.1 and 4.2: Brazilian Military Expenditures and Military Personnel Figures 1945-85

Brazilian Military Personnel Figures 1945-1985

Brazilian Military Expenditures X 1000 US Dollars 1945-1985
CHAPTER 5: TURKEY

In his presidential speech of 1945, Ismet Inonu opened the door for multi-party politics in Turkey. He apologized for the problems experienced under the rule of the Republican People’s Party (RPP), of which he was chairman, and agreed that an opposition party was needed to put Turkey in line with the atmosphere of freedom and democracy. The next year, the Democrat Party was formed and Turkey’s experiment with democracy began (Ahmad 1977, 50). During this transitional period, the Democrat Party struggled to gain seats in the legislature gradually increasing its power over the next half decade. By 1950, the Democrats had managed to wrestle power away from the RPP in an election that enjoyed more than ninety percent turnout. This was monumental for the transitioning democracy, which had a long history of one-party rule. Upon assuming power, the Democrats elected Celal Bayar as President who in turn, appointed Adnan Menderes as his Prime Minister.

The period immediately following the shift towards democracy was characterized by considerable inter-party strife. As if to retaliate for years of suppression at the hands of the RPP, the Democrats monopolized whole sectors of the media, crippling the ability of the RPP to compete politically. Also characteristic of this period was a struggling economy including rising prices, spiraling inflation and shortage of goods (Ahmad 1977, 52). Economic problems led the Democrats to introduce a number of reforms aimed at stabilizing the runaway inflation. To make matters worse, Turkish agriculture began to struggle and by 1955, Turkey was forced to import American wheat. The RPP blamed the economic crisis on the Democrats in an attempt to gain support. By constantly drawing attention to the economic problem, the RPP forced the Democrats to deal with
the situation. However, the Democrats’ solution which, will be discussed below, would come back to haunt them.

From the very beginning of multi-party politics, the position of the military had been of great concern to the Democrats. Traditionally, the armed forces had been loyal to the RPP and had been the party’s benefactors for years. After the elections of 1950, the Democrats began to systematically purge the military of RPP loyalists and replaced them with men loyal to the new government. To further drive a wedge between the military and the RPP, Democrats instituted a reform of the armed forces later in 1950. At the heart of this reform was a plan to modernize and overhaul the administrative structure of the military. For obvious reasons, these reforms were unpopular with the generals who viewed the Democrats’ program as a threat to their stature in society and as a push towards early retirement. Also, military budgets were decreased relative to the growing expenditures in other areas bringing the economic class of the soldier down below that of blackmarketiers⁴. Feroz Ahmad describes the situation best when he explains, ‘money for the armed forces was not on the Democrats’ list of priorities’ and further ‘Menderes had no intention of spending more money from the budget to increase military salaries so that they would keep up with the spiraling inflation’ (Ahmad 2003, 155).

After Turkey joined NATO in 1952, western advisors came in to train Turkey’s armed forces in the methods of modern warfare. This served only to further alienate senior members of the military who were opposed to this modernization. In contrast, the younger members of the armed forces welcomed the chance to learn new techniques and technologies. In an attempt to protect itself from military uprisings, the Democrats bought-off a small number of senior military officials. This did nothing more than delay

⁴ See figure 5.2.
Once a part of NATO, the average Turkish soldier was confronted with his material backwardness. While other sectors of society were thriving, the Turkish military suffered and soldiers found themselves plummeting on the social structure in which they had once reigned supreme. The Democrats’ plan for the military was for it to wait patiently while the economy grew and once the pie was large enough, they would have their share (Ahmad 2003, 154). Many in the armed forces bought into this promise but eventually the growing gap between the military and other classes in society became too much to ignore.

Neglecting the material needs of the armed forces turned out to be a fatal political error on the part of the Democrats. By 1957, the first indications of a military uprising could be seen. In December of that year, nine officers were arrested for conspiring against the government. Also during this time, members of the army began to retire in order to join the RPP. It was not uncommon for soldiers to retire and join the Democrat Party; however, joining the opposition signaled something new. The arrest of the conspiring officers proved to be only a minor setback for the military’s plan to take power. After the government investigation into the conspiracy died down, military officials resumed their plotting with renewed intensity. In order to be successful, they would need to recruit at least one high ranking general. This was difficult considering the internal divisions within the armed forces caused by the accession into NATO. However, General Necati Tacan who had just been appointed Commander of Land Forces agreed to lead the movement (Ahmad 2003, 157). This role was short-lived for Tacan who died in the summer of 1958. For his replacement, conspirators again went to the Commander of Land Forces, Cemal Gursel, who accepted the position. Under Gursel, conspirators
began to fill key positions within the armed forces including Chief of the Army Personnel Office and the Presidential Guard.

Demonstrating how the factionalism within the armed forces receded during this period of turmoil, many generals involved with the Democrat Party were well aware of the plot to overthrow the government yet remained quiet. Two generals in particular, Fahri Ozkilek and Sitki Ulay were very close to Menderes and were even described by former Democrats as Mendere’s men (Ahmad 2003, 157). Yet both men knew of the conspiracy and proved that their ultimate loyalties belonged to the military. When the plot began to unfold in April of 1960, the military seemed to remain loyal to the government. Student protests erupted and were forcefully quelled by the military. Martial law was declared and order was restored immediately. During this time, the government became aware of the planned coup. The only option was to offer concessions to the soldiers with promises of higher pay and better living conditions. This did not prevent the coup and on May 27th, the military intervention went forward meeting very little resistance. Even those troops considered loyal to the Democrat Party refused to stand in the way. Thus the coup took place with minimal bloodshed.

The officers who completed the coup formed the National Unity Committee (NUC). The NUC represented a broad coalition of factions within the armed forces who had come together during the coup. Once in power, the factionalism became evident once again. Conflicts between the military-as-government and the military-as-institution were most prevalent (Ozbudun 2000, 107). Factions emerged within the NUC between moderates and radicals. Moderates wanted to hand the reigns over to the RPP and return to the barracks while the radicals hoped to establish a military government and undertake
massive structural reforms. Further evidence of factionalism could be seen in 1961 when several officers formed the Armed Forces Union (AFU) in order to counter the NUC. This feud resulted in the moderates exiling many of the radicals to embassies abroad. ‘The inter-military struggle, however, continued to be severe, adding a destabilizing element to post-coup politics’ (Pevsner 1984, 77). Officers who had been kept out of the NUC began to conspire against the government and attempted two unsuccessful coups in 1962 and 1963.

The reason why I have provided such a long and detailed history of the Turkish case is because the situation in this example completely supports the theory of this paper in that comprehensive civilian control of the military is the wrong prescription for a transitioning democracy. When moving from authoritarianism to democracy, the military is often the most powerful and well-organized institution in the post-transition period. Any new government cannot afford to lose the support of the military. Also, a new government must make a strong effort to not threaten the military in any way. The Democrat Party in Turkey failed to provide for the security and well being of the military. They also attempted to subordinate the one institution in society that has a long history of organization and interference in government.

In Bolivia, the government attempted to drastically reduce the size of the military while using armed militias to provide for security. A similar situation occurred in Brazil once a democratic government took power. In both cases, factionalism within the military disappear momentarily in order to take power and protect the military institution. In all of the cases discussed above, the civilian governments went to far in their attempts to subordinate the military. This is a mistake that cost them dearly. Up to this point I
have used the cases of Bolivia, Brazil, and Turkey to show the potential problems caused by outright civilian control of the military in a transitioning democracy. Now, the focus will move towards outlining what I believe is the proper method for creating a successful civil-military relationship in a young democracy.
Figure 5.1 and 5.2: Turkish Military Expenditures and Military Personnel Figures 1945-63

Turkish Military Personnel Figures 1945-1963

Turkish Military Expenditures X 1000 US Dollars 1945-1963
In his now famous book, *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington has suggested three main types of civil-military relations, subjective, objective, and praetorianism. As discussed earlier, most of the scholarship since Huntington’s work has been either based on or in reaction to his ideas. Overwhelmingly, these works have suggested that the complete subordination of the military in all instances. As the cases discussed previously show, this is not always the best way forward for a transitioning democracy. Therefore we are left wondering what is the correct civil-military relationship in a transitioning democracy and what method for achieving this relationship provides the best chance for success?

While Huntington and others insist that subordination is the best or only way for the military to relate to a civilian government, I would like to suggest a different situation or type that is not mention in the previous literature on this subject. The situation that I am alluding to is that of military inclusion through the official structure of the government. I believe that this is the situation most likely to produce success in a transitional democracy. Also, I believe that Douglas Bland is correct when he maintains that:

> Although in most cases the hardware is at least adequate, problems emerge because the civil-military relations software has not been installed in the new structures for the civil control of the military. That is to say, the framework of ideas, principles and norms that shape civil-military behavior in liberal democracies has not been adequately explained or
incorporated into the officer corps, the political structure, and the defense establishments of new democracies. (Bland 1999, 20)

Because of the situation described by Bland and the problems of threatening the military, I suggest that transitioning democracies include the military into the structure of the new government. Accordingly, I believe that the corporatist model provides the best method for obtaining successful civil-military relations.

While corporatism may have several meanings and negative connotations due in part to the Fascist regimes of WWII, the meaning I wish to imply in this work is corporatism as a way of understanding the relationship between the state and the various interest groups competing for power. Thus, “corporatism can be defined as a structure of national sociopolitical organization in which the major societal units (armed forces, religious bodies, employers, labor) are integrated into, and usually subordinated to the state” (Wiarda 2000, 84). In a sense, under corporatism, the government provides a monopoly for each group to speak for and represent a given category or sector of society. The state plays an active role in defining and redefining both the powers of these organizations and the group they control or represent (Manoilescu 1934, 212).

Following the definition provided by Wiarda, I believe that incorporating the military into the government of a transitioning democracy is the best method for obtaining successful civil-military relations for several reasons. First, as the cases outlined in this work show, the military as a group contains deep factions that are in constant competition for power. However, when the group as a whole is faced with an outside threat such as an invading army or calls for cutbacks by civilian politicians, these factions subside for the sake of the group and unity results. In transitioning democracies,
this phenomenon can be devastating when the military becomes a contender for power through the coup de etat. If military officials have a say in the decisions that affect their institution, then the military will be less likely to perceive a threat from the government. Making the military a part of the government eliminates the government as a possible enemy of the institution that is often the most powerful and the most organized post transition.

Second, as the cases in this work show, when involved in governing, the military’s inherent factions are magnified and the military becomes less cohesive as a result. Including the military as a part of the government and benefiting from this phenomenon is an excellent way for the government to insure productive civil-military relations and provide for safety against military takeover. This phenomenon can be generalized based on the evidence in the cases of Brazil, Bolivia, and Turkey. Once the government develops strong institutions and the ‘software’ of proper civil-military relations is learned, a move towards the complete subordination of the military should be made. Instead of attempting to move straight from authoritarianism to western style democracy, I am suggesting a transitional period of corporatist government, which should provide a better chance at success in the developing world.

While at first glance, it may seem that this paper suggests military rule. However, this is not the case. Instead, I advise allowing military leaders a number of legislative seats or chairmanships over committees that deal with military budget and planning. By allowing military leaders a position in the bodies that affect their institution, we will eliminate the chance that military leaders will see the government as a threat to their institution. Furthermore, placing military leaders in competition for these seats will
reduce the cohesiveness of the military and protect against domestic military attacks against the government.

**Conclusion and Policy Implications**

At the time this paper was written, the military’s role in politics around the world ranges from nil to absolute control. However, the later role has become increasingly less common thanks to the most recent wave of democracy. The international context has changed a great deal as well. Before, the international community would allow or even support authoritarian regimes but today this behavior has lost favor and is largely unacceptable. The times are changing, the Cold War is over, and it looks like democracy has taken the forefront as the dominant political ideology. Now the task is transitioning former authoritarian nations into stable democracies. Be certain, this is a most difficult task.

This paper has suggested a way for transitioning democracies to deal with their former regimes, particularly their militaries. I have shown with the examples of Brazil, Turkey, and Bolivia that the complete subordination of the military can be dangerous business for any government, especially a young, weak democracy. Once a nation gains the subordination of their military, any piece of legislation could be seen as a threat and give reason for a military take-over. Again, with cases outlined in this paper, I have shown that when the military is involved in the government process, factionalism is at its greatest and military cohesiveness is at it’s lowest. This is important for transitioning democracies because military cohesiveness has shown to be the enemy of the state. I suggest that if transitioning governments use this phenomenon to their favor and include the military as part of the government, their chances for success will be greatly improved.
The importance of this research lies in the fact that it has its roots in the
developing world. The fact that the suggestions outlined by this paper are developed
from the experiences of the developing world makes this work rare. The overwhelming
majority of the literature on democratization uses the western democratic experience as
the basis for the civil-military relationship. This has proven inadequate and incapable of
being applied to the developing world. While the theory developed in this work has yet
to be applied to a real world situation, I am hopeful that it is a giant step in the right
direction.

In the future, policy concerning civil-military relations in transitioning
democracies should focus on constructing civil-military relations in transitioning
democracies so as to maximize military factionalism and minimize military unity. A
unified military is a dangerous force for a civilian government and the cases outlined here
offer indisputable evidence towards this fact. Including the military as part of the civilian
government in a corporatist fashion offers the best method for achieving this goal.

Further research on the civilian-military relationship in transitioning democracies should
focus on cases in the developing world. Surely we as political scientists can agree that
the developed world cannot be used as a blueprint for nations that do not share any of the
same historical experiences. Also, it is important that we stop viewing democracy as a
static endpoint. The struggle to recreate the role of the military in Brazil, Turkey, and
Bolivia shows that not all roads lead to Rome and it is time that we realize that there may
indeed be various Romes.
REFERENCES


