

THE BODY AFTER DEATH: THE BELIEFS OF PAUL AND TERTULLIAN

BY

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(UNDER THE DIRECTION OF ERIKA HERMANOWICZ)

ABSTRACT

This thesis studies the beliefs of Paul and Tertullian with respect to the body after it has been resurrected. These beliefs will be analyzed in order to qualify the relationship between Tertullian and Paul's writings. Ultimately, Tertullian's interpretation of Paul sheds light on the inchoate nature of the early Christian church and its beliefs concerning the resurrection of the body.

INDEX WORDS: Paul, Tertullian, Body, Soul, Resurrection, Flesh

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## INTRODUCTION

Paul the Apostle and the Latin theologian Tertullian discuss aspects of the human body after resurrection. In 1 Corinthians, the question posed to Paul “How are the dead raised? With what kind of body do they come?” (15:35) signals Christian consideration about the afterlife which Tertullian also addresses during the third century. Tertullian not only uses language in his treatises *De Anima* and *De Resurrectione* concerning the body that parallels Paul’s, but he also directly analyzes Paul’s letters and Paul’s conception of the body after death in *De Resurrectione* and *Ad Marcionem*. Tertullian, however, constructs his own interpretation of Paul’s writings, which at times differs from Paul’s assertions, such as his concept of the body and its constituents after death. In this thesis I establish the difference between the beliefs of Paul and Tertullian on the nature of the body after death. This comparison provides an opportunity to examine the relationship between these two key early Christian figures. This relationship is particularly worth exploring because Tertullian, who uses scripture as the basis for his writing, frequently invokes the letters of Paul yet goes beyond and even contradicts Paul’s arguments in his exegesis.

The common subject and language shared by these two authors implies Tertullian’s dependence on Paul’s writings. Both Paul and Tertullian acknowledge the existence of a body after death; however, there are differences in their respective descriptions. “Οὕτως καὶ ἡ ἀνάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν. σπείρεται ἐν φθορᾷ, ἐγείρεται ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ...σπείρεται σῶμα ψυχικόν, ἐγείρεται σῶμα πνευματικόν,” says Paul, using the phrase σῶμα ψυχικόν to describe what



comprises the body before death and πνευματικόν to describe the body after death.<sup>1</sup> The two adjectives Paul employs, ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν, relate to the *animale* and *spiritale* bodies on which Tertullian writes extensively. These terms have been variously translated by later interpreters as “natural” and “spiritual”, “heavenly” and “earthly”, “physical” and “nonphysical” etc.<sup>2</sup> Scholars debate the meaning of πνευματικόν and whether or not Paul believes that the body will contain a soul after death. The vocabulary analysis in the first chapter of my thesis looks further into the meaning of this word for Paul. Having assessed Tertullian’s engagement with the Pauline vocabulary, I can characterize Tertullian’s engagement with the Pauline text and his reliance on and deviation from Pauline beliefs.

In *De Resurrectione*, Tertullian asserts a belief about the change in body after death that is similar to Paul’s: “a body of soul is turned into a body of spirit.”<sup>3</sup> Tertullian employs these adjectives, *animale* and *spiritale*, in his interpretation of Paul’s ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν. If Tertullian believes he is carrying Paul’s meaning into Latin, then Tertullian’s statements elsewhere that contrast Paul’s become all the more striking. For instance, Tertullian delves into a discussion about the nature of the body after death that, in contrast to Paul’s assertions, claims that the body after death will contain flesh and a soul. In his treatise on the resurrection of the dead, Tertullian explains: “*Ita manebit quidem caro etiam post resurrectionem...*”<sup>4</sup> Here and elsewhere Tertullian asserts that flesh accompanies the body into heaven after death,<sup>5</sup> in contrast to 1 Corinthians 15:50 where Paul states that flesh and blood will not inherit the kingdom of

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<sup>1</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:42: So will it be with the resurrection of the dead. The body that is sown is perishable, it is raised imperishable... it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body.

<sup>2</sup> Thiselton 2000, 1276-8.

<sup>3</sup> Tertullian *De Resurrectione*, LX.4 (Ed. by Evans, S.P.C.K. London: 1960): *animale corpus in spiritale*.

<sup>4</sup> Tertullian *De Resurrectione*, LVII.12: Thus the flesh will indeed remain, even after the resurrection.

<sup>5</sup> Tertullian *De Resurrectione*, LV2.13: *Ita manebit quidem caro etiam post resurrectionem*, etc.

God.<sup>6</sup> In addition to arguing that the body will have flesh after death, Tertullian's ideas of the post-resurrection body include a soul. In several passages Tertullian engages with the concept of *anima*, which he claims to correspond to Plato's philosophy that all soul is immortal.<sup>7</sup>

Furthermore, if Tertullian's use of *animale* is related to the sense of a soul present in his writing, then he is interpreting Paul's πνευματικόν to say that the body will have a soul after death.

Although Tertullian's vocabulary implies an exegesis of Paul's writing, not all the beliefs concerning the body after death are shared by the two authors.

Although they differ in their concept of a post-resurrection body comprised of flesh and soul, Tertullian and Paul are connected by their beliefs in the importance of Christ's resurrection as an example of what is to come for human bodies. Christ's resurrection is the model for human resurrection for Paul in 1 Corinthians, and Tertullian discusses it at length as well. Tertullian uses Christ's resurrection to assert his ideas about the dualistic nature of Christ's nature and the interdependence of flesh and soul within a body. By again considering the vocabulary surrounding both authors' use of Christ's resurrection as examples for human resurrection, I can further examine the relationship between Tertullian and Paul with respect to their beliefs concerning the body after death.

Because Tertullian's belief of a post-resurrection body contains flesh and a soul and Paul's does not, Tertullian's interpretation of Paul is at times very different from what Paul himself intended. For Tertullian, there is a definite sense that the body retains flesh after death, and this thesis will examine whether it is equivalent to Paul's resurrected body (“σῶμα πνευματικόν”) by looking at the parallel vocabulary as well as investigating what is implied by

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<sup>6</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:50: “σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα βασιλείαν θεοῦ κληρονομησαὶ οὐ δύναται.”

<sup>7</sup> Tertullian *De Resurrectione* III.2: *Utar ergo et sententia Platonis alicuius pronuntiantis: 'Omnis anima immortalis.'*

their respective differences. A discussion of Paul's descriptive vocabulary of the composition of the body after death in 1 Corinthians 15 comprises the first chapter of this thesis. In the second chapter, I examine Tertullian's depiction of the post-resurrection body, thus calling attention to the potential linguistic relationship shared by these authors. The third chapter presents Tertullian's engagement with Paul's assertions concerning the body after death and the relationship between the two authors through the lens of their terminology. The conclusion of this thesis summarizes my findings, and also suggests new ways this project's linguistic and theological implications can help to unpack the relationship between these two authors.

## CHAPTER 1

### PAULINE BELIEFS CONCERNING THE BODY AND SOUL AFTER RESURRECTION

#### **Introduction**

In his first letter to the Corinthians, Paul addresses the issue of death. He offers answers to the questions “How are the dead raised? With what kind of body do they come?” In this chapter I shall determine the nature of the resurrection as presented by Paul in 1 Corinthians. What is the condition of the physical body after death? Is there flesh? How does contact with God’s Spirit change the nature of the body? In my third chapter the answers to these questions will be compared to Tertullian’s statements about the post-resurrection body in order to determine how Tertullian interpreted Paul’s writings.

Paul’s correspondence with the Corinthians about resurrection speaks to its prominence as a debated topic among Christians of the time. In *Christ's Resurrection in Early Christianity* Markus Vinzent asserts: “In all honesty it can be maintained that Paul is not here teaching new doctrine. The church is too torn and confused to begin with something new.”<sup>8</sup> Paul’s goal in his response is to inform Corinthians about what he believed to be right according to early Christian teaching.<sup>9</sup> The context of the letter to the Corinthians brings interesting insight to Paul’s presentation of his beliefs concerning the body after death. One interpretation is that “Throughout 1 Corinthians 15, Paul assumes that if the Corinthians reject the resurrection of the body, they must be without hope entirely...the Corinthians probably do expect some sort of

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<sup>8</sup> Vinzent 2011, 113.

<sup>9</sup> Witherington 1995, 291.

afterlife, perhaps in the form of an immortal soul freed from the body.”<sup>10</sup> It can be established then, that Paul did not approve what the Corinthians currently believed about the condition of the body after death.

### **Pauline Beliefs Concerning Death**

In contrast to Tertullian, Paul emphasizes the victory over death that resurrection represents. Paul does not outline the transformation of the human body after death as explicitly or as eloquently as Tertullian does; nevertheless a change appears in the condition of the body. For Paul, there are different categories of flesh and bodies. Paul uses this classification to identify the body which exists before the resurrection (our human/fleshly/earthly body) and the body which exists after the resurrection. A σῶμα ψυχικόν becomes a σῶμα πνευματικόν (literally: “σπείρεται σῶμα ψυχικόν, ἐγείρεται σῶμα πνευματικόν”).<sup>11</sup> The body is sown ψυχικόν, the body is raised πνευματικόν (Paul uses an agricultural metaphor to express that resurrection will take the body, i.e. the seed that has been sown, and change it into a different kind of body.)<sup>12</sup>

### **Pauline Beliefs Concerning the Body After Death: Review of the Scholarship**

Paul stresses that a σῶμα will be raised at the time of the resurrection. N. T. Wright insists that Paul was advocating to the Corinthians a bodily resurrection; there is little room for interpretation otherwise in Paul’s 1 Corinthians. “It is worth noting that Paul, having spoken largely of ‘the dead’ (*hoi nekroi*) up to this point in the chapter, here switches to speak of ‘bodies’ when thinking of that which is to be raised. ‘The dead’, for him, are not simply

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<sup>10</sup> Martin 1995, 107.

<sup>11</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:44.

<sup>12</sup> Based on the ambiguous word order, this line can also be translated “The ψυχικόν body is sown, the πνευματικόν body is raised.”

‘souls.’”<sup>13</sup> A body indeed must exist after the resurrection, according to Paul. Wright also points out that Paul’s use of a seed metaphor is meant to demonstrate bodily resurrection.<sup>14</sup>

Fr. Marie-Emile Boismard goes against these scholars with respect to Paul’s conception of the body at length in *Our Victory Over Death: Resurrection?*. “First, let us note that Paul does not speak of the resurrection of ‘the body’ but of ‘the dead.’”<sup>15</sup> Boismard interprets Paul’s description of the resurrection as a reflection of the transformation of the body into an immaterial and non-bodily being. Moreover, Boismard does not believe that σώματα refers to human bodies. “It is true that if the Greek word *sōma* can mean the human body as opposed to the soul, this meaning is only secondary and derives from philosophical reflection.”<sup>16</sup> Boismard goes on to argue that in verses 37, 38, and 41, *sōmata* should be translated as “beings” instead of “bodies”. I do not find this argument to be persuasive and I agree with Wright and the plethora of other authors who believe Paul intended a physical body by σῶμα; the word σῶμα has a foremost meaning as a physical body dating back to Homeric Greek.<sup>17</sup> While he does not write at length about the condition of the body after its resurrection explicitly, the body remains a main focus in his writings. The nature of the body after death presented in Paul’s writings is more difficult to secure than the existence of a body after death.

In 1884, Heinrich Meyer writes an explanation of Paul’s concept of a body in his *Critical and Exegetical Handbook to the Epistles to the Corinthians*. He helps clarify the connection between the body on earth and the body in heaven: “A reproduction of the present body at the

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<sup>13</sup> Wright 2003, 343 (n92).

<sup>14</sup> Wright 2003, 343.

<sup>15</sup> Boismard 1998, 37 (cf Gooch, 1993).

<sup>16</sup> Boismard 1998, 36

<sup>17</sup> Liddell and Scott 1940, 1749

resurrection was not to be thought of.”<sup>18</sup> Meyer continues to say that “properties of the present body...[are] fashioned like unto the glorified body of Christ.”<sup>19</sup> This claim has roots in verses forty-eight and forty-nine of 1 Corinthians 15: “οἷος ὁ χοϊκός, τοιοῦτοι καὶ οἱ χοϊκοί, καὶ οἷος ὁ ἐπουράνιος, τοιοῦτοι καὶ οἱ ἐπουράνιοι: καὶ καθὼς ἐφορέσαμεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ, φορέσομεν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανοῦ.”<sup>20</sup> Witherington confirms Meyer’s point: “For Paul resurrection means final conformity to the likeness or image of God’s son, even in regard to one’s body.”<sup>21</sup> So far we have established that the body after the resurrection will have the same εἰκὼν as Christ. This notion will be supported by Paul’s other statements related to the body after death and his use of the two adjectives ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν.

Scholarship for the most part agrees that Paul conceives of a bodily resurrection (he does use, after all, the Greek word σῶμα), but *body* itself remains an ambiguous term and scholarship has not decided definitively if Paul was claiming the resurrection of a fleshly body.<sup>22</sup> Scholars have questioned whether or not (according to Paul) the post-resurrection σῶμα will exist in material form after the resurrection. Grant argues that Paul presents the post-resurrection body as an immaterial entity: “Clearly ‘body’ and ‘flesh’ are different...By ‘body’ Paul does not mean anything material...”<sup>23</sup> Witherington, too, discusses at length Paul’s conception of a σῶμα. He argues against the theory of Bultmann and Dahl that claims “that ‘sōma refers to the person as a

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<sup>18</sup> Meyer 1884, 377.

<sup>19</sup> Meyer 1884, 379.

<sup>20</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:48-49: “Just as the earthly man, in the same sort also the heavenly man, and just as the heavenly, in the same sort also the earthly man: and just as we have put on the likeness of the earthly, we shall put on the likeness of the heavenly.” Scholars are divided on whether to read the future indicative “we shall put on” or the aorist subjunctive “let us put on”. This claim also has roots in Philippians 3:21. Cf. Thiselton 2000, 1288-1289; Hays 1997, 273-274.

<sup>21</sup> Witherington 1992, 187. See also Romans 8:29.

<sup>22</sup> Wright, Setzer, Meyer, et al.

<sup>23</sup> Grant 1977, 124.

whole’.”<sup>24</sup> He states that instead, a σῶμα refers to the physical body rather than the personality or soul of a person.

Dale Martin expresses his interpretation of the nature of Paul’s resurrected body in *The Corinthian Body*. “[Paul] sketches a hierarchy of bodies. Initially, he uses the term ‘flesh’ (*sarx*) to refer to these different kinds of bodies... We should also notice that Paul uses the term *sarx* only for these ‘lower’ beings: humans, animals, birds, and fish.”<sup>25</sup> This would explain why he does not explicitly refer to a fleshly body during the resurrection and does lead us to believe that Paul found flesh to be an earthly entity not intended for heaven. Martin extends this line of thought even further and claims that Paul “switches terminology and substitutes the term *sōma* (“body”) for *sarx* (“flesh”).”<sup>26</sup> If Paul exchanged the terms flesh and body, then this implies that he thought of the body as a fleshly entity.

Dag Endsjø discusses as well the assertions of Paul concerning the body after death in his book *Greek Resurrection Beliefs and the Success of Christianity*. Though Endsjø’s findings are inconclusive, he establishes an outline of Paul’s beliefs: resurrection involves the body, not flesh (flesh cannot be immortal or incorruptible); general resurrection is connected with Christ’s resurrection (whom Endsjø refers to as “the pioneer of immortality and incorruptibility”); though the body after death is not fleshly, it is not necessarily immaterial.<sup>27</sup> These conclusions are in line with my interpretation, and I believe that we may determine more specific details of Paul’s beliefs concerning the resurrection by looking closely at his terminology within his description of the transformation of the body after death as well as by looking at Christ as an example for human resurrection.

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<sup>24</sup> Witherington 1992, 197.

<sup>25</sup> Martin 1995, 125.

<sup>26</sup> Martin 1995, 125.

<sup>27</sup> Endsjø 2009, 141-3.



Paul's language becomes complicated if he did not employ the phrase "flesh and blood" to refer to a fleshly body. There are many interpretations for the verse "Flesh and blood shall not inherit the kingdom of God."<sup>28</sup> Setzer, Martin, and Wright are among scholars who argue that this phrase does not deny the possibility of a physical body entering heaven after its resurrection. Setzer states frankly: "'Flesh and blood' then stands for a certain kind of bodily life that will not inherit the kingdom, but not a rejection of bodily resurrection. A wholly spiritual afterlife would be unremarkable in an ancient context and not require Paul's extensive explanations."<sup>29</sup> Boismard also attempts to reconcile the discrepancy between "flesh and blood will not inherit the kingdom of God" and Paul's assertion of an eternal body/being.

In the Bible, the word 'flesh' often designates humanity inasmuch as it is subject to corruption. In Paul's time, the expression in use was rather 'flesh and blood,' but the meaning was the same. Here is Paul's reasoning: the whole of humanity is corruptible by nature.<sup>30</sup>

Martin provides additional clarity: "Paul's use of 'flesh and blood' in 1 Corinthians 15 cannot be taken to refer to the whole body in any sense (that is, not even to what we today would call the physical body); rather, it refers to certain elements that, along with others such as psyche and pneuma, make up most bodies." Martin's association between σάρξ and lowliness (mentioned earlier) can be used to interpret "flesh and blood will not inherit the kingdom of God" as a distinction between earthly fleshly bodies and heavenly bodies. Another argument, which Tertullian himself advocates, informs us that Paul was not referring to our fleshly bodies by "σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα", but the actions that our bodies have accomplished. Wright claims, in contrast to Martin, that "It is the works of the flesh, not its substance, that Paul condemns. The famous saying 'flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom', is not therefore to be seen as a denial of

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<sup>28</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:50.

<sup>29</sup> Setzer 2004, 64.

<sup>30</sup> Boismard 1998, 46.

bodily resurrection (48,50).”<sup>31</sup> While scholarship has demonstrated the ambiguity of Paul’s words, these scholars have pointed out some of the concrete differences between the earthly body and the resurrected body according to Paul.

### **Pauline Beliefs Concerning the Body After Death**

Does Paul believe that a fleshly body will exist after the resurrection? The answer to this question becomes important to my study because, as we will see, Tertullian’s exegesis of Paul claims very strongly a belief in a post-mortem fleshly body. Paul, however, does not tell us the condition of the flesh after death and only stresses that a body will be resurrected. My previous section demonstrates that scholarship has not come to a uniform decision on Paul’s beliefs concerning post-resurrection flesh. At the very least, we must leave open the possibility that Paul promoted the belief in a fleshly body but did not explicitly claim one in 1 Corinthians 15.

Elsewhere in Paul’s letter we find traces of the notion of a fleshly resurrection. In 1 Corinthians 6:12-20 he presents an argument to the Corinthians against the defilement of their earthly bodies. He instructs them to treat their bodies as temples because they will be raised and there should be no corrupted bodies resurrected. Paul states explicitly in 6:14: “ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ τὸν κύριον ἤγειρεν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐξεγερεῖ διὰ τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ.” (and God raised the Lord and He will raise us also by means of His power.)<sup>32</sup>

A Pauline idea of a resurrected body (or at least the existence a post-mortem body) does not clarify whether this resurrected body will be made up of flesh. But is this body material in the same sense that Tertullian later infers? Some interpreters claim that Paul denies that the post-resurrection body will in fact include flesh, which Tertullian stresses (in apparent contrast).<sup>33</sup> My

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<sup>31</sup> Wright 2003, 512.

<sup>32</sup> 1 Corinthians 6:14.

<sup>33</sup> See also Martin 1995, 126.

next approach to this problem will be to investigate whether Paul believed that Christ's body contained flesh after Christ was resurrected, since Paul believed Christ's resurrection was a model for human resurrection.

### **ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν: Review of the Scholarship**

In 1 Corinthians 15:44, Paul states: “σπείρεται σῶμα ψυχικόν, ἐγείρεται σῶμα πνευματικόν.” The body is sown ψυχικόν, the body is raised πνευματικόν.<sup>34</sup> Many scholars have debated the meaning of these two adjectives. Tertullian himself attempts to provide his own interpretation, and asserts his own Latin formula: “ipsa vita transferatur a temporalitate in aeternitatem, sicut animale corpus in spiritale...” (life itself is brought over into eternity from temporality, just as an *animale* body is brought over into a *spiritale* body.)<sup>35</sup> Some scholars attempt to reconstruct English parallels for Paul's Greek based on the substance implied by ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν, while others strive to bring Paul's concept to life by looking at his surrounding beliefs. I believe the most fruitful investigation will be one that discerns what attributes set these two adjectives apart from each other. Interpretations of ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν can be grouped into two categories: those that understand that the difference between these two adjectives is a matter of substance (what makes them up makes them different), and those that understand that the difference is the force of empowerment (that the change from a ψυχικόν body to a πνευματικόν body is a transfer of control over the body).

Anthony Thiselton comments on this distinction of substance in his lengthy commentary on 1 Corinthians. He provides past “substance” definitions before he concludes what other, more modern, interpreters believe: that the πνευματικόν body is dependent upon God's Spirit, and that

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<sup>34</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:44.

<sup>35</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* LX.4.

is how it differs from a ψυχικόν body.<sup>36</sup> If the body after death is to become πνευματικόν, it must take on some spiritual or heavenly characteristics. It may be true that this adjective implies a nonphysical body, but that cannot be the end of our explanation.

What a body is made of and what a body is capable of does not extend to the entirety of Paul's beliefs. Meyer delves into the meanings of these two adjectives and attempts to apply English reconstructions to them that imply their substance. Paul claims, according to Meyer: "The resurrection-body, however, will be πνευματικόν, *i.e.* not an *ethereal* body, which the antithesis of ψυχικόν forbids", thus conferring their Greek syntactical opposition upon their English meanings.

So far we can conceive that a natural, physical body is meant by σῶμα ψυχικόν and that a spiritual body is meant by σῶμα πνευματικόν.<sup>37</sup> As Thiselton points out, "Neither a purely 'nonphysical' nor merely 'bodily' (in any quasi-physical sense) explanation offers an adequate account of 15:44."<sup>38</sup> In a basic sense, however, these two adjectives do in fact delineate a body that is for the human realm and a body that is for the realm of the spirit. It is then fitting that the body is raised and becomes 'composed of πνεῦμα' once it is in the presence of God's Spirit. Furthermore, Meyer also advocates for an interpretation that distinguishes who has power over πνευματικόν and ψυχικόν bodies: "...but a *spiritual body*, inasmuch as the πνεῦμα, the power of the supersensuous, eternal life (the true, imperishable ζωή), in which the Holy Spirit carries on

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<sup>36</sup> Thiselton 2000, 1276: "The late nineteenth-century view of πνεῦμα as 'a transcendent physical essence, a supersensuous kind of matter' was promoted in 1877 by Otto Pfleiderer, and developed by Johannes Weiss in terms of a 'heavenly light substance.'" (Martin has also developed a version of this interpretation.)

<sup>37</sup> Dunn 2003, 40.

<sup>38</sup> Thiselton 2000, 1277.

the work of regeneration...will be its life-principle and the determining element of its whole nature.”<sup>39</sup>

To build a stable idea of these two bodies, before and after resurrection, which can be compared to Tertullian’s, we need to investigate further what is meant by these two adjectives. We can now turn to scholarship that delves more intimately into the distinction between ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν and find that it is deeper than substance. Conzelmann notes: “the new antithesis brings a modification, when the antithesis to the σῶμα πνευματικόν is not a σῶμα σαρκικόν, but a σῶμα ψυχικόν. This of course does not mean one consisting of the substance of the *psyche* or soul, but an earthly one.”<sup>40</sup> Birger Albert Pearson addresses these two adjectives in the second chapter of Paul in his dissertation *The Pneumatikos-Psychikos Terminology*. Pearson first acknowledges that Paul is most likely “accommodating himself to the opponents’ terminology, but is radically re-interpreting it. For Paul the πνευματικός man is the one who walks according to the Spirit of God in the light of what he has received from God...”<sup>41</sup> This definition can easily enough be applied to the fifteenth chapter of 1 Corinthians, when a πνευματικός experiences God’s Spirit after resurrection. Dale Martin supports this sense of the words ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν.

I believe that the contrasts in the chapter are not between physical and spiritual or between matter and nonmatter. Neither Paul nor most of the philosophers of his day considered celestial bodies as ‘immaterial’ in our sense of the term. Rather, the contrasts in the chapter are those of hierarchy and status, not ontology...<sup>42</sup>

Meyer’s interpretation also complements Pearson’s. Meyer states that during earthly life our body is described as ψυχικόν because “the ψυχή, this power of the sensuous of perishable life

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<sup>39</sup> Meyer 1884, 378.

<sup>40</sup> Conzelmann 1969, 283.

<sup>41</sup> Pearson 1973, 77.

<sup>42</sup> Martin 1995, 127.

was its life-principle and the determining element of its whole nature (consisting of flesh and blood, ver. 50).<sup>43</sup> Likewise, for a πνευματικόν body, “the πνεῦμα, the power of the supersensuous, eternal life, in which the Holy Spirit carries on the work of regeneration and sanctification will be its life-principle and the determining element of its whole nature.”<sup>44</sup> At resurrection, Meyer argues, “the ψυχή [will have] ceased to be, as formerly, the ruling and determining element.”<sup>45</sup> Witherington stands in agreement with this line of thought and claims that the change in body is a result of the empowerment by God’s Spirit after the body’s resurrection.<sup>46</sup>

Wright also delves into the meaning of ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν. “This contrast of corruption/incorruption, it seems, is not just one in a list of differences between the present body and the future one, but remains implicit underneath the rest of the argument, not least between the present humanity in its *choikos* (‘earthly’) state, ready to return to dust, and the new type of humanity which will be provided in the new creation.”<sup>47</sup> Wright argues that Paul did not envision the soul retiring among the stars, as other ancients did. Instead, his post-resurrection body changed with respect to “not what something is *composed of*, but what it is *animated by*.”<sup>48</sup> This is in line with several other scholars’ thinking, as we have seen.<sup>49</sup>

Another scholar, Son, presents a list of contrasts that elucidate the differences between ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν bodies in *Corporate Elements in Pauline Anthropology*. Within this list, a pattern emerges concerning the nature of the resurrected body; the vocabulary with which

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<sup>43</sup> Meyer 1884, 378.

<sup>44</sup> Meyer 1884, 378.

<sup>45</sup> Meyer 1884, 378.

<sup>46</sup> Witherington 1992, 199.

<sup>47</sup> Wright 2003, 347.

<sup>48</sup> Wright 2003, 352.

<sup>49</sup> Son, Conzelmann and Witherington.

Paul surrounds the post-resurrection body is influenced by divine aspects, such as immortality.<sup>50</sup> This contributes to our view of a πνευματικόν as indicating a body which has been in the presence of God's Spirit.

Wright also points out the discrepancies between English translations of these adjectives in various Bible versions, none of which captures the fact that Paul's distinction was between who or what had control of the body.<sup>51</sup> Wright goes on to say that the body will change to πνευματικόν when it comes into contact with God's Spirit, thus receiving animation from the Spirit. The body has changed from being animated by the "ordinary breath of life" to being animated by the "Spirit of the living god."<sup>52</sup> I find this argument for a change in empowerment much more compelling than the argument that the major change of the condition of the body was in its substance because Paul uses πνευματικόν to describe the impact of God's Spirit on the body rather than to describe the substance of the body.

### **ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν: A Close Reading**

Paul describes the pre-resurrection and post-resurrection bodies as ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν respectively. These two adjectives have meanings that are difficult to pin down. N. T. Wright points out that, "Paul develops several images, and uses several technical terms, which are not found elsewhere."<sup>53</sup> ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν both occur in Paul's writing more than once, but their occurrences are rare. In addition to appearing twice in 1 Corinthians 15:44, these two adjectives are key terms in 1 Corinthians 15:46 as well: "ἀλλ' οὐ πρῶτον τὸ πνευματικόν

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<sup>50</sup> Son 2001, 50 (his list of the nature of the resurrection body: "imperishable, in glory, in power, spiritual body, last Adam, immortalizing Spirit, second man, from heaven, and of heaven.")

<sup>51</sup> Wright 2003, 348.

<sup>52</sup> Wright 2003, 354.

<sup>53</sup> Wright 2003, 277.

ἀλλὰ τὸ ψυχικόν, ἔπειτα τὸ πνευματικόν.” But first is not the πνευματικόν (body) but the ψυχικόν (body), afterwards it is the πνευματικόν (body).

Of the six times ψυχικόν is used in the New Testament, four of those are in Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians. Of these perhaps the occurrence in 2:14 is the most crucial to our discussion because it is here that Paul contrasts ψυχικός with a πνευματικός ἄνθρωπος found in 2:13. Paul writes: “ψυχικός δὲ ἄνθρωπος οὐ δέχεται τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ θεοῦ, μωρία γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐστίν, καὶ οὐ δύναται γνῶναι, ὅτι πνευματικῶς ἀνακρίνεται...” (The ψυχικός man does not take up the things of the spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him, and he cannot know them, because they are understood by means of the spirit.) Here Paul provides a direct antithesis between a man who has known the spirit of God and a ψυχικός man, a contrast which is similar to the distinction made when Paul describes the resurrection. “The ‘psychic’ man, for Paul, is the one who has only natural possibilities apart from the eschatological gift of the Spirit, and cannot attain to ‘the things of the Spirit of God’ by virtue of anything within himself,” so it is fitting that Paul uses ψυχικός in Chapter fifteen to refer to a body which has not yet come into contact with God’s spirit, i.e. one which is alive and earthly.<sup>54</sup>

Paul’s application of ψυχικός in this manner must have come in part from his Greek reading of the Old Testament. The Old Testament treats the soul as metonymy for the entire living body. If someone had a soul, that soul entailed a body by definition. Throughout the New Testament, however, we find other ways ψυχή is used. In Ephesians 6:5, it is definitively used as an essence more than just a body or life. People are doing the work of God from their heart (ποιοῦντες τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκ ψυχῆς). This use of ψυχή confirms a bodily sense of the word; it is a place that can be a source of good deeds within a person. ψυχή usually translates from the

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<sup>54</sup> Wilken 1975, 55.



Hebrew *nephesh*, the root of which comes from the Hebrew verb “to breathe.” In the Septuagint, we find *nephesh* and ψυχή meaning spirit or life, and πνεύμα meaning soul. A σῶμα πνευματικόν becomes a body into which God has breathed life after death, thus imbuing it with God’s breath and soul.

For Paul, the πνεύμα was a specific characteristic that the body shared with God and/or God’s Spirit. The πνεύμα also appears in the Old Testament to form a direct connection between men and God. In Genesis 6:3, “τὸ πνεῦμά μου ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις”, God declares his soul/spirit/breath will always be with human beings.<sup>55</sup> From this the meaning of σῶμα πνευματικόν may be deduced to mean a being that has a strong relationship with God, having been breathed into by God during his resurrection.

The connection between God and πνεῦμα only becomes stronger in the New Testament. In John 4:24, God is πνεῦμα (πνεῦμα ὁ θεός). As we saw with ψυχή, πνεῦμα not only presents a strong association between body and God, but can also be understood in relation to the “soul,” an intangible source of energy within the body, at the very least a vessel into which God would be able to breathe his πνεῦμα. This being understood, we can see more clearly how a body with ψυχή is more suitable for its time on earth and a body with πνεῦμα is intended for the body’s time with God and God’s Spirit because it will have received the actual πνεῦμα from God. Also interesting is Paul’s use of the same adjective in 1 Corinthians 3:1 “Κἀγώ, ἀδελφοί, οὐκ ἠδυνήθην λαλῆσαι ὑμῖν ὡς πνευματικοῖς ἀλλ’ ὡς σαρκίνοις...” (and I, brothers, was not able to speak to you as πνευματικοῖς people but as σαρκίνοις people...) which implies that σῶμα πνευματικόν is indeed a body with a spiritual relationship with God. If earlier, Paul contrasts

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<sup>55</sup> Genesis 6:3.

πνευματικοῖς and σαρκίνοις, it would seem that σῶμα πνευματικόν is attained after death and that flesh is unlikely to appear in the afterlife.

Two adjectives which are suitable for contrast to ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν are found in 1 Corinthians 15:50: [the flesh and blood are not able to inherit the kingdom of God], οὐδὲ ἡ φθορὰ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν κληρονομεῖ (nor does the perishable receive the imperishable). The juxtaposition of φθορὰ and ἀφθαρσίαν supports the distinction between ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν. Our conception of pre-resurrection and post-resurrection bodies has become fuller: before death our bodies are earthly, fleshly, corruptible, and not πνευματικόν; then, after they are resurrected they become imperishable and πνευματικόν because they have been in the presence of God's spirit directly (although the degree of their materiality is indeterminate).

### **Christ as Example**

Paul corroborates his claims about the resurrection of the dead with the resurrection of Christ; Christ plays a central role in Paul's writings. Paul claimed a personal connection with Christ and was adamant about becoming the instrument through which Christ connected to humankind.<sup>56</sup> Paul is an authority for Christ's resurrection because he claimed a personal interaction with Christ: “ἔσχατον δὲ πάντων ὡσπερὶ τῷ ἐκτρώματι ὄφθη κάμοί.”<sup>57</sup> In 1 Corinthians 15:38, Paul writes that God gives Christ a body explicitly: “ὁ δὲ θεὸς δίδωσιν αὐτῷ σῶμα καθὼς ἠθέλησεν, καὶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν σπερμάτων ἴδιον σῶμα.” (God gives him a body just as he wanted, and its own body to each of the seeds.)<sup>58</sup>

Paul speaks of Christ's resurrection as proof and model for the resurrection of humans. For Paul, as well as Tertullian, “Jesus' resurrection remains, throughout, the prototype and model

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<sup>56</sup> Gathercole 2011, 186.

<sup>57</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:8 “and last of all he was seen by me, the one with an untimely birth.”

<sup>58</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:38.

for the future resurrection. This enables us to work back quite precisely to what Paul meant when he said that the Messiah had himself been raised from the dead.”<sup>59</sup> There are several aspects of Christ’s resurrection that Paul applies to our human resurrection. Both Christ and humans are raised in bodily form, and both resurrections are effected by God and/or his spirit. Wright emphasizes that the verb “raised” is the perfect tense in Greek, implying a finished action with an ongoing result (“that Jesus is now the risen Messiah and lord”), as well as passive, “indicating divine action.”<sup>60</sup> In his treatment of Christ as model for the transformation of human bodies after death, Paul invokes Genesis 2. “For Paul, too, the climax of the story is the recreation of humankind through the life-giving activity of the final Adam, whose image will be borne by all who belong to him.”<sup>61</sup> In 1 Corinthians 15:45 and 49:

οὕτως καὶ γέγραπται, Ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν:  
ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν. . . καὶ καθὼς ἐφορέσαμεν τὴν εἰκόνα  
τοῦ χοϊκοῦ, φορέσομεν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου.

And so it has been written: “the first man Adam was made into a living soul:  
and Adam *eschatos* (was made) into a spirit able to make life. . . and just as  
we put on the likeness of the earthly man, we shall also put on the likeness  
of the heavenly man.”<sup>62</sup>

This is an allusion to Genesis 2:7, which reads in the Greek Septuagint: “καὶ ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν.”<sup>63</sup>

Paul states in 1 Corinthians 15:20-21: “Νυνὶ δὲ Χριστὸς ἐγήγερται ἐκ νεκρῶν. . . ἐπειδὴ γὰρ δι' ἀνθρώπου θάνατος, καὶ δι' ἀνθρώπου ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν” (And now Christ has been raised from the dead. . . for since death [has come] through man, also a rising of the dead [has

<sup>59</sup> Wright 2003, 316.

<sup>60</sup> Wright 2003, 321.

<sup>61</sup> Wright 2003, 341.

<sup>62</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:45 and 15:49. (See Thiselton 2000, 1276 ff.)

<sup>63</sup> Genesis 2:7.

come] through man.)<sup>64</sup> Setzer, however, points out that the uncertainty of Paul's conception of the nature of the resurrected body is related to the possibility that Christ could have gained spiritual immortality in place of a fleshly, physical body after his resurrection.<sup>65</sup> "But it is not enough for Paul, or the early tradition, simply to declare that the Messiah was in fact raised. Witnesses must come forward."<sup>66</sup> That witnesses saw Jesus raised proves that Jesus had a materialized body (at least in certain instances) after his resurrection. Whether or not Paul believed Christ's body to be fleshly after His resurrection affects whether or not he believed humans to be resurrected into a fleshly body. Other authors such as Luke inform us that post-resurrection, Jesus was able to materialize his body at will and so had a material resurrection.<sup>67</sup> If we accept that Christ had varying levels of materiality after his resurrection,<sup>68</sup> then it cannot be determined whether or not Christ had a fleshly body because he had varying degrees of incarnation. Instead, it is fruitful for our purposes to acknowledge that Christ's resurrection marked his "acquisition of a 'spiritual body', which was both immaterial and invisible yet capable of interaction with the world of time and space."<sup>69</sup>

Adam and Christ together are addressed by Paul as two models for human life, death, and resurrection. It is because of Adam that death is required of humans, and it is from the example of Christ that humans may be resurrected.<sup>70</sup> Sang-won Son finds explanation of the different types of bodies in the Adam-Christ typology which he establishes from Paul's writings. He clarifies: "[Paul] simply indicates that while the first man is animated by *ψυχή*, the last Adam is

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<sup>64</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:20-21.

<sup>65</sup> Setzer 2004, 55.

<sup>66</sup> Wright 2003, 322.

<sup>67</sup> Harris 1983, 54.

<sup>68</sup> See Harris 1983, 56-7.

<sup>69</sup> Harris 1983, 56-7.

<sup>70</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:22.

animated by πνεῦμα.” Furthermore, Son claims that Paul draws a parallel between these two Greek nouns and Christ before and after resurrection, respectively. Because Adam arose out of the earth and the second man was out of heaven, we can find “the nature of the resurrection body in the framework of the Adam-Christ typology, by a series of contrasts with the present, soulish body in Adam.”

### **Platonic and Philosophical Influence**

In his letter to the Corinthians, Paul sets himself apart, not only from contemporary Christians but also other belief systems which declare a belief in immortality, by not addressing the idea of a soul in the afterlife. “Unlike most Greek philosophers, Paul does not speak of the *psychē* (“soul”), but rather of the *pneuma* as the entity held in common by human beings...”<sup>71</sup> It was most likely Paul’s intention to assert that it is not that the soul will accompany us into life after death, but, in contrast to Plato, a transformation of body from that which belongs on earth to that with the divine.

Part of the reason Paul does not address the unity of the body and soul after death could be because the belief in an immortal soul is central to Platonic thought. There is no proof that Paul read texts of Plato, but Paul and his readers would have been familiar with the basic tenets Platonic philosophy.<sup>72</sup> I speculate that Paul wished to present his beliefs in contrast to Plato, and so it may be for that reason that he does not speak of the soul as immortal. It does not mean that he did not believe in an immortal soul, but that instead we find his statements disagreeing with any philosophical dialogue. Whether or not Paul was consciously pushing back against Plato, his views strikingly do not address the idea of an immortal soul.

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<sup>71</sup> Martin 1999, 127.

<sup>72</sup> One scholar who asserts that Paul was familiar with Platonic thought is Powell, in his 2004 *Saint Paul's Homage to Plato*.

The adjective *πνευματικόν* also carries additional weight with a philosophical meaning. The Corinthians would have understood *πνευματικόν* as terminology to describe a superspiritual aspect of Christianity to which they adhered. The Corinthians probably believed themselves to be “spiritually refined”, meaning that they did not believe in the resurrection of a body because their spirit was most important to them. “That, however, was just the problem: they were so spiritual that they found the notion of a resurrection *of the body* crass and embarrassing.”<sup>73</sup> This explains why Paul emphasizes a resurrection of *σώμα* without addressing explicitly whether or not it will include flesh and/or a soul.

Plato advocated the belief of body and soul as two separate entities; the soul was immortal and the flesh was not. For Paul, “Spiritual embodiment is the ideal future state of mortal man,” whereas for Plato, man was already immortal with respect to his soul and death emphasized that by releasing the soul from the body.<sup>74</sup>

In addition to expressing claims in contrast to Platonic thought, Paul uses terminology evocative of Stoicism. Boismard views Paul’s verses 44b-49 in 1 Corinthians as an explanation of the two adjectives, *ψυχικόν* and *πνευματικόν*, in verse 42.<sup>75</sup> Boismard claims:

We are led to recognize that in verse 44, Paul’s vocabulary is influenced by that of Stoic philosophy with its distinction between ‘body’ and ‘soul,’ without the soul’s being conceived of as immortal. What is buried in the earth is a ‘psychic body,’ a being made of body and soul but subject to corruption and destined for total disappearance.<sup>76</sup>

Because Paul is dealing with transformations of the body that philosophies also discussed, it is natural that there is overlap between the religious and philosophical vocabulary.

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<sup>73</sup> Hays 1997, 253.

<sup>74</sup> Harris 1983, 203.

<sup>75</sup> Boismard 1998, 40.

<sup>76</sup> Boismard 1998, 45.

## Conclusion

Paul's description of the bodily resurrection leaves the condition of the flesh and soul unaddressed. We may conclude that his passage "flesh and blood will not inherit the kingdom of God" does not necessarily eliminate the notion of a fleshly resurrection because Paul might have been referring to corruptible bodies and stating that our present fleshly bodies will not be resurrected in the same state. Likewise, the fact that Paul does not address a post-mortem soul leaves open the possibility that he did, in fact, believe in one. The contrast between Paul's statements and Platonic philosophy mirror the disagreement between Paul's and Tertullian's (an author who did support Plato's idea of the immortal soul at times) beliefs. Though the degree of materiality of the body after death cannot be determined, we have established that the change in body that occurs at the time of the resurrection reflects the addition of God's spirit ( $\piνεῦμα$ ) and the transformation from an earthly, corruptible, fleshly body to an incorruptible one.

## CHAPTER 2

### TERTULLIAN'S BELIEFS CONCERNING THE BODY AND SOUL AFTER DEATH

#### **Introduction**

In this chapter I shall establish Tertullian's beliefs concerning the post-mortem body and soul by investigating his description of the transformation of the body and soul after death. This description will be compared with Paul's assertions about the condition of the resurrected body in order for me to discern any differences between the two authors about these subjects. The purpose of this chapter is to pinpoint the change in Tertullian's writings between an *animale corpus* to a *spiritalis corpus*, and to clarify what the differences between these two adjectives meant for Tertullian. After establishing the nature of the resurrection according to Tertullian, I shall then look further into his use of the adjectives *animale* and *spiritalis* by observing some of their occurrences outside his description of the resurrection. This exploration will create the most secure interpretation of Tertullian's picture of resurrection so that it can later be compared with the description offered by Paul. I ultimately want to determine in what manner Tertullian altered Paul's concept of the post-mortem body through his exegesis of Paul's writings.

#### **Translation**

Tertullian's balance between the use of his own translations from Greek into Latin and his utilization of an early North African Latin copy of the New Testament is widely disputed among scholars. Tertullian refers to the subject of his translations very few times. Some scholars claim that Tertullian's reference to *authenticae litterae* in *De Praescriptione Haereticorum* XXXVI.1 reveals that Tertullian was using a Greek text of the Bible. His Latin translation of



Greek quotes most closely resembles the Greek of the Septuagint.<sup>77</sup> Tertullian appears to have provided his own translation of the Greek text in some cases and employed an existing Latin translation of the Greek text in others. Dunn makes a compelling argument that Latin translations of parts of the New Testament existed before Tertullian.<sup>78</sup> It has also become clear that the twelve Scillitan martyrs (in the vicinity of Tertullian), who were killed around 180 CE, read Paul's letters, which demonstrates that Paul's letters were available to Tertullian while he was writing his own treatises.<sup>79</sup> Whether or not Tertullian himself translated the Greek terms ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν into the Latin terms *animale* and *spiritale*, the key question for my thesis is whether or not Tertullian differs from Paul in the way that he uses these Latin adjectives to express his understanding of the nature of the resurrection. In other words, by looking closely at the meaning of these adjectives for the two authors we shall be able to ascertain the extent to which Tertullian was interpreting Paul according to Pauline beliefs.

### **Context**

Tertullian was very active in the debate concerning life after death in the third century. In his writings he responded to issues about which Christians of his time were concerned; his works are strongly influenced by the pastoral or controversial considerations of the moment.<sup>80</sup> He lived during the era of the Second Sophistic, and his prose style is powerful.<sup>81</sup> “[His] rhetorical force... won his contests in the second century.”<sup>82</sup> One such topic was the transformation of the body and soul after death. Marcion was largely responsible for popularizing the discussion of the

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<sup>77</sup> I am using the term Septuagint in a general way to refer to the ancient Greek version(s) of the Hebrew Bible. For a discussion of the different ways in which this term is used see K. Jobes and M. Silva, *Invitation to the Septuagint*. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic Press, 2000, p. 30-33.

<sup>78</sup> Dunn 2004, 21.

<sup>79</sup> Wilhite 2007, 164.

<sup>80</sup> O'Malley 1967, 3.

<sup>81</sup> Dunn 2004, 25.

<sup>82</sup> Osborn 2003, xv.

resurrection of the body and soul, but Tertullian often countered him.<sup>83</sup> Tertullian engaged with Marcion's views in his six books *Against Marcion*, as well as elsewhere in his treatises that discuss the body after death. One example of Tertullian's lasting importance on this subject is the fact that Tertullian's treatises contain one of the earliest occurrences of the Latin *resurrectio*. His work addressed a conceptual and practical problem: the existence of a body after death.

### Terminology

In order to elucidate the philosophical and theological message presented by Tertullian, I shall first define the terminology that frequently occurs in his description of the body and soul after death. In addition to *animale* and *spiritalis*, the key terms for my purposes are *corpus*, *anima*, *caro*, and *substantia*.

*Corpus* is an ambiguous word in Tertullian's writings because he believes every entity is contained by a *corpus*. In order to avoid confusion when discussing both *corpus* (as an abstract body) and *caro*, Tertullian sometimes employs *caro* to mean the fleshly human body. For Tertullian, *caro*, the flesh, and *anima*, the soul, combine to form the human *corpus*. The two entities are physically connected from the time of conception, and they are only separated for the period of time between death and resurrection.<sup>84</sup> Both of these aspects of the *corpus* are eternal; the resurrection applies to both *anima* and *caro*.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> See Longenecker 1998, 249 and Vinzent 2011, 88.

<sup>84</sup> Tertullian emphasizes their connection when he describes the origin of human sexuality in *De Anima* XXXVI.2 (Ed. by J. Waszink, Amsterdam: J.M. Meulenhoff, 1947): "Anima in utero seminata pariter cum carne pariter...": the soul was sown in the womb at the same time with the flesh..."

<sup>85</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* VII.13 (Ed. by E. Evans, S.P.C.K.: London, 1960): *Ita caro...animae...consors et coheres invenitur: si temporalium, cur non et aeternorum?*: Thus the flesh is found to be sharing and co-heir to the soul: if of ephemeral things, why not also of eternal things?

After the body's resurrection, the *corpus* transforms from *animale* to *spiritale*.<sup>86</sup> It is difficult to pin down the meaning of *animale* and *spiritale* in Tertullian's writings. He uses *animale* to describe the *corpus* before death and resurrection, and *spiritale* to describe the *corpus* after the transformation. The *animale* body at conception has a soul derived from God's *flatus* (breath). After the resurrection, when the body becomes *spiritale*, the flesh is infused with God's Spirit.<sup>87</sup> It is only after the body's resurrection that the body comes into direct contact with this Spirit. Since Tertullian developed the doctrine of the Holy Spirit (and the Trinity), it is tempting to make this interaction with *spiritus* the Holy Spirit. His writing does not clarify this *spiritus* as the Holy Spirit so I will refer to it as "Spirit", although it is likely that Tertullian had the Holy Spirit in mind when discussing interaction with a *spiritus* after death, and his thought and beliefs preceded his writing and terminology.

A distinction must also be made between *afflatus* and *spiritale*; the body starts out *animale* and inspired by *flatus*, but after the resurrection transforms into a body *spiritale*. A key to understanding this change is the word *substantia*, which represents the essence or material with respect to which the body changes as it transforms from *animale* to *spiritale*. For Tertullian, *substantia* constituted the degree to which an entity was real and the characteristics of that entity.<sup>88</sup> Edgar G. Foster concludes that Tertullian's concept of *substantia* is equivalent to

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<sup>86</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* LX.4: *...ipsa vita transferatur a temporalitate in aeternitatem, sicut animale corpus in spiritale, dum mortale istud induit immortalitatem et corruptivum istud incorruptelam.*: life itself is brought through into eternity from temporality, just as an *animale* body is brought into a *spiritale* body, while that mortal thing puts on immortality and that corruptible thing puts on incorruptibility."

<sup>87</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* LXII.2: *cur non et homines, facti tanquam angeli, in eadem substantia carnis spiritalem subeant dispositionem...?* (Why should not men, just as the angels have been fashioned, in the same substance of flesh sink into a *spiritale* disposition...?)

<sup>88</sup> See Daniélou 1977, 346 and Stegman 1978, 19.

Aristotle's "primary substance," which makes *animale* and *spiritale* particular to the pre-resurrection body and the post-resurrection body, respectively.<sup>89</sup>

For the purposes of this thesis and with a view to ultimately clarifying Tertullian's assertions concerning the state of the body after death, it is necessary to investigate the meanings of *animale* and *spiritale*. A syntactic proximity between these words would elucidate their meaning through antithesis. The instances of these two adjectives used in contrast, however, are rare in Tertullian and so related instances of these terms will be employed in order to ascertain Tertullian's beliefs about the nature of the body after resurrection. A combination of Tertullian's use of these two adjectives in juxtaposition to one another, their individual appearances, and the origins of these two adjectives will be used to create the fullest picture of Tertullian's concept of the post-mortem body.

### **Review of Scholarship**

In his 1924 dissertation *Theology of Tertullian*, Robert Roberts presents an exploration of how Tertullian defines the eschatology that Roberts claims had gone un-investigated until his time. "True, the soul does in the 'lower world' suffer proportionately, or rejoice relatively, but it is reserved for the reunited soul and body to know the fullness of its sufferings or the completeness of its joy."<sup>90</sup> While Roberts acknowledges the importance of the reconnection of the body and soul, he does not investigate Tertullian's precise wording concerning the body after death and the nature of the transformation from an *animale* to a *spiritale* body.

In 1948, Robert M. Grant wrote a comprehensive study *The Resurrection of the Body*, in which he maintained that during the period of Irenaeus and Tertullian, "no essential distinction

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<sup>89</sup> Foster 2005, 84.

<sup>90</sup> Roberts 1924, 213.

was yet made between the resurrection of the flesh, of the body, and of the dead.”<sup>91</sup> Tertullian, however, does in fact speak of the resurrection of the flesh and body separately.<sup>92</sup> Grant elsewhere states that “the question of the kind of body which will rise was not settled in primitive Christianity,” yet that is precisely what Tertullian aimed to do.<sup>93</sup>

Few scholars have investigated Tertullian’s use of *anima* and *spiritus*. Jean Daniélou discusses Tertullian’s adjective *animale*, but alludes to its complicated nature:

In the opinion of his opponents, this ‘living soul’ was a *corpus animale* a ‘living body’... The term *corpus animale*, however, is not one that can be suitably applied to the soul... it is not a *corpus animatum*, or ‘animated body’. How, he asks, would it be animated, since it is itself soul? A better term would be *corpus animans*, an ‘animating body’. If, therefore, the first man is called a ‘living soul’ and the second a ‘life-giving Spirit’, this must, in Tertullian’s opinion, mean that, if both were flesh, the first is characterized by the fact that his flesh had been animated, whereas the second is characterized by the fact that his flesh was spiritualized, without prejudice to the fact that the flesh of the second was also animated (LIII, 16).<sup>94</sup>

Here Daniélou distinguishes between an animated flesh/body and a spiritualized flesh/body. In a related study, Eric Osborn, within his chapter on Tertullian in *The First Christian Theologians*, agrees that the distinction between spirit and flesh was of utmost importance for Tertullian.

In 1995, Caroline Bynum in her study *The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200-1336* wrote that Tertullian focused on the transformation of the body into incorruption after death. Admitting that Tertullian has been criticized for his at-times convoluted prose, she still argued: “these inconsistencies...are exactly the point. It is corruption that puts on

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<sup>91</sup> Grant 1977, 130.

<sup>92</sup> Tertullian emphasizes that resurrection applies to both and addresses them both in *De Resurrectione* XV, when he explains that because punishment applies to both the body and soul, so must immortality and reward in heaven.

<sup>93</sup> Grant 1977, 123.

<sup>94</sup> Daniélou 1977, 403.

incorruption.” I wish to work through these discrepancies between *animale* and *spiritale* to determine the sense of Tertullian’s interpretation of Paul’s language.

A brief survey of Tertullian’s writings concerning the flesh is discussed by Carly Daniel-Hughes in *The Salvation of the Flesh in Tertullian of Carthage*. The *caro* and *anima* are created by God and at this time become *ex dei afflatu*<sup>95</sup> (similar to, but not the same as God’s *spiritus*) and remain inseparable and receive salvation together.<sup>96</sup> While this straightforward review is in line with Tertullian’s thought, it leaves multiple questions unanswered, such as the degree to which the *animale* body that was *ex dei afflatu* at conception was different from a *spiritale* body in Tertullian’s mind, and what the ramifications of these differences meant for his interpretation of Paul’s writing.

Two additional authors, Ann Stegman and N. T. Wright, have written more specifically on this topic, and on the issues I discerned throughout Tertullian’s writing. Rather than introduce them here I shall integrate their findings to my own interpretations below.<sup>97</sup>

### **The Body and Soul before Death**

In several places Tertullian engages with the concept of *anima*, which he claims corresponds to Plato’s philosophy that all soul is immortal.<sup>98</sup> In his treatise *De Resurrectione* Tertullian emphasizes the intimate bond between flesh and soul—*caro* and *anima*—which are the entities to which the resurrection applies.<sup>99</sup> As I mentioned earlier, he often uses the noun

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<sup>95</sup> N. B. Tertullian uses *afflatus* and *flatus* interchangeably.

<sup>96</sup> Daniel-Hughes 2011, 68-9.

<sup>97</sup> Stegman 1978, *The Development of Tertullian's Doctrine of Spiritus Sanctus* and Wright 2008, *The Resurrection of the Son of God*.

<sup>98</sup> Tertullian *De Resurrectione* III.2: *Utar ergo et sententia Platonis alicuius pronuntiantis: 'Omnis anima immortalis.'*

<sup>99</sup> According to Tertullian, man’s body (flesh) was created slightly prior to his soul (though this does not affect my argument that they are entwined from conception until death and again after the resurrection). For this distinction see *De Resurrectione* V.8-9.

*caro* because he has strong beliefs concerning *corpus* that he does not wish to conflate with the human body. Tertullian eulogized the flesh and its validity in the post-mortem incarnation of the soul, and also the divine aspect of flesh before the body died. Osborn argues that, for Tertullian, “Creation by God proves the goodness of flesh, which is the ‘hinge’ on which salvation turns.”<sup>100</sup> The flesh, Tertullian argues, earns its resurrection through its significance from conception to death.

According to Tertullian, the flesh and soul together form the human body. Tertullian believed that human flesh was at first clay;<sup>101</sup> Tertullian explains the transformation from clay to flesh in *De Resurrectione* VII.5: “et testa caro quia ex limo per adflatus divini vaporem.” During creation, *caro* and *anima* interact with divine breath. This makes the human body similar but not the same as God’s *spiritus* in substance. Through this process of inception, there comes into being a connection between *caro* and *anima* that is “Tanta quidem concretione ut incertum haberi possit utrumne caro animam an carnem anima circumferat, utrumne animae caro an anima adpareat carni.” (It can be thought uncertain whether the flesh spreads around the soul or the soul spreads around the flesh, or whether the flesh serves the soul or the soul serves the flesh.)<sup>102</sup> Flesh and soul are so intimately combined that you cannot tell which is attached to which. Tertullian also maintains that the connection between flesh and soul is so close that you cannot apply salvation to one without the other.<sup>103</sup> Tertullian concentrates on this proximity and also

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<sup>100</sup> Osborn 2003, 148.

<sup>101</sup> Job 10:9, 13:12, 27:16, 33:6, 38:14; Isaiah 45:9, 64:8; Jeremiah 18:4, 18:6, 43:9.

<sup>102</sup> Tertullian *De Resurrectione* VII.9.

<sup>103</sup> Tertullian *De Resurrectione* VII.13: *Porro si universa per carnem subiacent animae, carni quoque subiacent: per quod utaris, cum eo utaris necesse est. Ita caro, dum ministra et famula animae deputatur, consors et coheres invenitur: si temporalium, cur non et aeternorum?:* Again, if all things are exposed to the soul through the flesh, they are also exposed to the flesh: through what you use, it is necessary that you use it with this. Thus the flesh, while it is regarded as the

emphasizes it throughout his description of the resurrection. In Chapter XV of *De Resurrectione*, the proximity between flesh and soul is further described: “Nunquam anima sine carne est quamdiu in carne est: nihil non cum illa agit sine qua non est.” (The soul is never without the flesh for as long as it is in the flesh: it does nothing without the soul which exists without it.)<sup>104</sup> Tertullian’s treatment of the relationship between *anima* and flesh leaves little to be interpreted. His point becomes straightforward through repetition: flesh and soul are inseparable at all times (beginning at the time of conception) except between death and the resurrection.

To corroborate his claim that flesh and soul cannot be separated during life or after resurrection, Tertullian cites Matthew 5:28: “Qui conspexerit ad concupiscendum iam adulteravit in corde.”<sup>105</sup> If a man has committed adultery in the flesh by only committing adultery in his heart/soul/spirit, then the body and soul deserve to be resurrected as one just as they are punished as one. It is through this argument that Tertullian claims that resurrection applies to both *caro* and *anima*.

### **The Flesh after Death**

Tertullian is adamant about a fleshly resurrection. Tertullian claims that the body after resurrection will contain both flesh and a soul. Tertullian uses more than one defense to corroborate his claim that flesh is resurrected. He uses the example of Christ to demonstrate the importance of flesh after the resurrection by asserting that Christ maintained dual substances after his resurrection. One of the places this comes out is in his treatise *Adversus Marcion*.

Marcion supposes that Christ lived on earth without a human body and only a spiritual body.<sup>106</sup>

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attendant and servant of the soul, is found to be sharing and co-heir: if of ephemeral things, why not also of eternal things?

<sup>104</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* XV.5.

<sup>105</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* XV:4.

<sup>106</sup> Vinzent 2011, 121.



Tertullian argues against him, saying that Christ was resurrected in the flesh, and that in order for flesh to be resurrected, it had to exist in life. In this argument he also states precisely that death is designated by the “proper suffering of flesh”; the death of flesh signals the death of the body and soul.<sup>107</sup> Another justification Tertullian shapes to confirm the everlasting existence of flesh is the divine nature of flesh. Tertullian praises the flesh in *De Resurrectione* VI-VIII, saying that it is honored because God made it (and only God is able to resurrect it). In his treatise on the resurrection of the dead, Tertullian explains: “Ita manebit quidem caro etiam post resurrectionem...” (Thus the flesh will indeed remain, even after the resurrection...).<sup>108</sup> Because flesh and soul are equally involved in punishment, it is only just of God to reward both – even though the soul, being incorporeal, is unable to experience pleasure or pain.<sup>109</sup>

In addition to arguing that flesh will exist with the body after resurrection, Tertullian expresses a belief that the postmortem body includes a soul. This idea stems from two lines of thought I have already mentioned: the first, from Tertullian’s invocation of Plato’s concept that all soul is immortal; second, from Tertullian’s assertion that the body and soul are eternally and most intimately intertwined (except at the stage between death and the resurrection).

### **The Journey of the Body, Flesh, and Soul after Death**

*mors non aliud determinatur quam disiunctio corporis animaeque*  
*Death is marked out as nothing other than the separation of body and soul*  
 -- Tertullian, *De Anima* XXVII.2

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<sup>107</sup> Tertullian, *Adversus Marcionem* 3.VIII.6 (Ed. by Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971): *Porro si caro eius negatur, quomodo mors eius asseveratur, quae propria carnis est passio... Eadem enim ratione non resurrexit qua mortuus non est, non habendo substantiam scilicet carnis, cuius sicut et mors, ita et resurrectio est.* Again if his flesh is denied, how is his death asserted, which is the proper suffering of flesh... For by this same thinking by which he did not rise up again he is not dead, certainly by not having the substance of flesh, of which both death is and resurrection is.

<sup>108</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* LVII.12.

<sup>109</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* XVII.1: *aliter anima non capiat passionem tormenti seu refrigerii.*

Tertullian's writing forms a series of transformations concerning the soul. In the simplest form, this series is as follows: at conception, body (*caro*) and soul (*anima*) are connected, not able to be separated until death (he notes that during sleep the soul remains active); at death the body and soul are ripped apart. The soul will remain in a lower world until its resurrection. All souls go through this process except for those of martyrs, which go straight to Paradise (this is also where resurrected souls go after salvation).<sup>110</sup> During this time the righteous souls pass to Abraham's Bosom, and other souls are sent to Gehenna.<sup>111</sup> At a later point following death (after the second coming of Christ), the *corpus* (of righteous people) is resurrected and infused with *spiritus* and joined back to the soul which has already been declared as eternal. This salvation and spiritual incarnation must apply to both the flesh and the soul because of their intertwined nature that began at conception.

This process is integral to Tertullian's professed transformation of an *animale* into a *spiritalis* body because after the resurrection the flesh is infused with spirit.<sup>112</sup> As I mentioned earlier, the body, previously born with a soul derived from God's *afflatus*, dies and is separated from its soul, only to be reconnected and made *spiritalis* after resurrection. A distinction must be made then, between a body *ex dei afflatu* and a body *spiritalis*; if they are the same, there is no apparent purpose to death and resurrection if the body is already spiritual beforehand.

Jean Daniélou, in his volume on *The Origins of Latin Christianity*, attempts to reconcile this matter.

In both his substances, moreover, man is called to be transfigured by the Spirit. It is the Spirit which, in this life, gives rise in the *mens*, by an operation common to

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<sup>110</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* XLIII.

<sup>111</sup> Tertullian, *Adversus Marcionem* IV.34.

<sup>112</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* LXII.2: *cur non et homines, facti tanquam angeli, in eadem substantia carnis spiritalis subeant dispositionem...?* (Why should not men, just as the angels have been fashioned, in the same substance of flesh sink into a *spiritalis* disposition...?)

both the body and the soul, to spiritual actions, and which, in the messianic kingdom, bestows incorruptibility on the two substances of which man is composed.<sup>113</sup>

The Spirit is responsible for rendering the *anima* and *corpus* able to operate, but the *corpus* is not eternal and incorruptible until it becomes *spiritale*, which can only occur when the *anima* comes into direct contact with the Spirit during the resurrection. Thus, the body reaches a status of *spiritale* when it is in the presence of God's *spiritus* for the first time. Furthermore, Daniélou helps clarify this distinction with Tertullian's order of reunion after resurrection: "...at the resurrection, he argues, the body will be reunited first with the soul and then with the Spirit."<sup>114</sup>

The *afflatus* that we saw first applied to the soul differs from the eventual *spiritale* body because the *afflatus* is an extension of God's spirit but not the Spirit itself. Ann Stegman corroborates this distinction between *spiritus* and *anima*:

While *anima* is the *adflatus dei* [*sic*] "blown" from God's own *spiritus* [*sic*], nevertheless, it is not God..." So, while an *anima viva* [*sic*] may have God's *spiritus* [*sic*] blown into it, it cannot become *spiritus* [*sic*]; it may only have *spiritale* [*sic*] qualities. The *anima*'s [*sic*] 'similarity' with God's *spiritus* [*sic*] is not 'the same' but a degradation of 'the same'.<sup>115</sup>

This notion also returns us to Tertullian's allusion to Genesis. The clay became inspired by the spirit of God, but it cannot contain the spirit of God until salvation.

### ***Animale and Spiritale in Tertullian***

Finally, with respect to the body and soul after death, a distinction must be made concerning the body before and after the transformation that occurs during resurrection, that is, between an *animale* and *spiritale* body. In Tertullian's description of the transformation of the

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<sup>113</sup> Daniélou 1977, 402.

<sup>114</sup> Daniélou 1997, 403.

<sup>115</sup> Stegman 1978, 306.

body after death, he explains “a body of soul is turned into a body of spirit.”<sup>116</sup> The crux of my argument, namely that Tertullian invokes Paul in language but alters Paul’s interpretation through his exegesis, rests on this phrase. This transformation is a change of the body’s substance—the earthly body transforms into the postmortem body.

For Tertullian, death rips apart *anima* and *caro*, only to have them reconnected at the resurrection. At the resurrection, *spiritus* is added to the *anima* and *caro*. In order to compare Tertullian’s ideas of the body’s transformation after death, I will examine Tertullian’s linguistic depiction of the body after death, particularly with respect to his use of the two adjectives *animale* and *spiritale*. Of these two adjectives, *animale* is more common and appears to be more straightforward. The Oxford Latin Dictionary defines *animalis* as “of the element air,” “living,” and “belonging to a living animal.”<sup>117</sup> This is not an acceptable definition for the purposes of interpreting Tertullian because it needs to stand in contrast to *spiritale*, which the Oxford Latin Dictionary does not define and which cannot mean “not living’ because both the body and soul are resurrected after death.

### *Animale*

A fuller picture of the transformation of the body after death appears in Chapter LIII of *De Resurrectione*. As he often does in his writing, Tertullian contends with another belief system, and we are left to deduce his true beliefs from his assertions against his opponents. He begins by acknowledging those who refer to the *corpus animale* as the *anima*; he identifies a flaw in their belief system according to which the soul dies at the time of bodily death. As I mentioned earlier, the *anima* is a component of the *corpus* and exists both before and after death. Since the body that is to rise again is transformed after death, the eternal *anima* cannot be the *corpus animale*,

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<sup>116</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* LX.4: *animale corpus in spiritale*.

<sup>117</sup> Glare 1992, 133.

which exists only before death. Rather, according to Tertullian's equation, the *corpus animale* must be the earthly body.

In his treatise *De Anima*, Tertullian provides us with pieces of a definition for *animalis*. "Et si quidem inanimale est, extrinsecus mouebitur."<sup>118</sup> If something is not *animalis*, it will be moved by something on the outside. From this we are able to extrapolate that if something is *animalis*, it moves itself. In *De Anima* VI, Tertullian also attributes to the *anima* the power of moving the human *corpus*, in addition to the power of moving itself. *De Anima* LIII also testifies to the nature of Tertullian's use of the adjective *animalis*. He claims that the *spiritus animalis* is the "charioteer of the body"<sup>119</sup> So far, a *corpus animale* is a body that is able to control itself and that is not able to exist in the same substance after the body's resurrection.

The noun *anima* helps us understand his use of *animale*; the function of *anima* in Tertullian contributes to Tertullian's meaning of the adjective *animale* and his distinction of the substance of the body before it is resurrected. The meaning of *anima* is alluded to, but not made explicit, in Tertullian's treatises. In *De Anima* VI, we find Tertullian's most simple statement concerning the *anima*: "For the *anima* is called by the name of its own substance."<sup>120</sup> As mentioned earlier, Tertullian distinguishes between *anima* and *corpus*, so as not to confuse instances in which he uses *anima* as soul: "Tam enim corpus homo quam et anima..." (For as much as man is body, he is as much soul)<sup>121</sup> It is clear that an *animale* body exists while a human body is living, but the functions of the *anima* that control an *animale* body are left undefined.

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<sup>118</sup> Tertullian, *De Anima* VI.1.

<sup>119</sup> Tertullian, *De Anima* LIII.3: *Perinde auriga corporis, spiritus animalis, deficiens uectaculi nomine, non suo deficit, opere decedens, non uigore, actu elanguens, non statu, constantiam, non substantiam decoquens, quia comparere cessat, non quia esse.*

<sup>120</sup> Tertullian, *De Anima* VI.2: *Anima enim dicitur substantiae suae nomine.*

<sup>121</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* XXXII.8.

*De Anima* is a central source for Tertullian's beliefs concerning the origin of the human soul. The soul, as Tertullian says, is an entity (*corpus*) that is moved by an outside force. In Chapter 3, he asserts that the *anima* comes "ex dei flatu."<sup>122</sup> Tertullian explains this further: "and God breathed breath of life into the face of man, and man was made into a living *anima*."<sup>123</sup> Here and throughout this treatise Tertullian presents the *anima* as a vessel receiving the breath of God. In Chapter 25, Tertullian asserts that he will explain "how souls flow back from one".<sup>124</sup> Every soul that is connected with the body at conception comes from one soul, via the breath of God. In

*De Anima* XI:

... quam deum flantem in faciem hominis flatum uitae et hominem factum in animam uiuam, per quam exinde et uiuat et spiret, satis declarata differentia spiritus et animae in sequentibus instrumentis, ipso deo pronuntiante: spiritus ex me prodiuit, et flatum omnem ego feci. Et anima enim flatus factus ex spiritu.<sup>125</sup>

...[nothing other] than that God, breathing into the face of man the breath of life and that man is made into a living *anima*, through which whence he may both live and breathe, with the difference of *spiritus* and *anima* declared sufficiently in the following means, with God himself announcing: the *spiritus* has gone forth from me, and I have made every breath. And breath was made *anima* from (my) *spiritus*.

Here it becomes clearer that the *flatus* creates *anima* out of God's spirit, although the *anima* does not contain God's spirit until after its resurrection. In other words, contact between the *anima* and the *spiritus* is reserved for the reunion after the resurrection. This is an important distinction, and will come further into play in a discussion of Tertullian's use of *spiritalis*. While a *corpus animale* is not the *anima*, it is *anima*-like (an *animale* body has control over itself whereas an *anima* is controlled by an outside force). Aspects of the *anima* shed light on the divine qualities associated with *animalis*.

<sup>122</sup> Tertullian, *De Anima* III.4.

<sup>123</sup> Tertullian, *De Anima* XI.3.

<sup>124</sup> Tertullian, *De Anima* XXV.1: *quomodo animae ex una redundant*.

<sup>125</sup> Tertullian, *De Anima* XI.3.

Of the twenty-three times Tertullian uses a form of the adjective *animalis* in *De Anima*, the bulk occur in Chapter Six, where he argues for both a *spiritale* and *animale* body. The argument is to contrast Platonists, who, as Tertullian explicates, assert that a body can be either *animale* or *spiritale*, but cannot be both: “They say that it is necessary for a body to be either *animale* or *inanimale*.”<sup>126</sup> Here we see Tertullian’s idea of *substantia* become important. Tertullian’s beliefs contrast with those of the Platonists because a body is able to transform from being an *animale* substance to a substance that is not *animale*. For Tertullian, the body has the capability to be both *animale* and *spiritale*, just not at the same time. The change from a pre-mortem body to a post-mortem body is a change of substance in that body.

The Greek origins of Tertullian’s terms provide us with additional opportunity to interpret his language, because from Greek we can derive a stronger sense of his meaning. Because Tertullian would have read the Old Testament in Greek, in which the concept of the soul being a breath of God arises, he had an understanding of the soul as breath. Christine Mohramann furthers the connection between the adjective *spiritale* to the Greek noun πνεῦμα: “Le couple grec de σὰρξ et πνεῦμα fut l’exemple et le point de départ des formations latines, dérivées de *caro*, *spiritus*: *carnalis*, *spirit(u)alis*, *carnaliter*, *spirit(u)aliter*.”<sup>127</sup> In *De Anima* III.4, XI.1, etc. Tertullian asserts that God’s breath transformed man into a living *anima*. The idea of God’s *flatus* inspiring a human *anima* is a delicate one. We must be sure to reserve direct interaction between body and *spiritus* for after the body’s resurrection. Then, explicitly in *De Anima* XII, he asserts “Proinde et animum siue mens est νοῦς apud Graecos.”<sup>128</sup> Also in *De Anima*, however, Tertullian declares explicitly “barbarian and Roman tribes named [*anima*]

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<sup>126</sup> Tertullian, *De Anima* VI.1: *Omne, inquit, corpus aut animale sit necesse est aut inanimale.*

<sup>127</sup> Mohrmann 1961, 25.

<sup>128</sup> Tertullian, *De Anima* XII.1.

ψυχή.”<sup>129</sup> These two Greek words affirm that the *anima* controls both the body’s physical and mental functions. This empowerment complements our definition of an *animale* body as one that has control over itself; this definition can later be contrasted with a *spiritale* body which is empowered by God’s Spirit.

Tertullian’s description of transformation of the body also informs us of Tertullian’s beliefs; a particularly illuminating account of this transformation lies in *De Resurrectione* LIII. This passage will become useful later on in my third chapter because he directly engages with writings “of the apostle,” but for the purposes of this chapter we are able to use it to more clearly discern Tertullian’s thoughts on the *animale corpus*.

Recepta enim anima rursus animale corpus efficitur, ut fiat spiritale: non enim resurgit nisi quod fuit... Caro enim ante corpus quam animale corpus: animata enim postea, facta est corpus animale. Anima vero etsi corpus, tamen quia ipsa est corpus non animatum sed animans potius, animale corpus non potest dici, nec fieri quod facit. Alii enim accedens facit illud animale: non accedens autem alii quomodo se facit animale? Sicut ergo ante animale corpus caro recipiens animam, ita et postea spiritale induens spiritum.<sup>130</sup>

For with the *anima* taken in, again it brings about an *animale* body, so that it may become a *spiritale* body: for nothing rises again except what existed before ... For the flesh was a body before it was an *animale* body: for afterward, having been animated, it was made into an *animale* body. Truly although the *anima* is a body, nevertheless because the *anima* itself is not an animated body, but rather animating, it cannot be called an *animale* body, nor is it able to become what it creates. Since adding something else it makes that (body) *animale*: however, in what way does it make itself *animale*, not adding anything else? Therefore just as before it was *animale* body the flesh receives an *anima*, and so afterward, clothing itself in *spiritus* it is *spiritale*.

This passage demonstrates the fullness of Tertullian’s equation. A body, originally *caro* and *anima*, becomes animated and remains animated throughout life. After death, this animated body

<sup>129</sup> Tertullian, *De Anima* XXV.6.

<sup>130</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* LVII.7-10.



is able to become spiritual through its direct connection with God's *spiritus* after the resurrection. In this formula we see Tertullian reinforce the spatial relationship of a person's *caro* and *anima*. As we have seen through Tertullian's description of the function of *anima*, animated flesh has the power of control over itself as well as the body. After this, and in a similar manner, it gains *spiritus* and becomes *spiritale*. The nature of *spiritale* is more difficult to render into English, but emphasizes a connection between the human body and God that is only able to exist after they have come in contact after the human body's resurrection.

Tertullian continues to describe the nature of the *animale* body further on in his treatise *De Resurrectione*:

Quid ergo dicemus? Nonne et nunc habet caro spiritum ex fide, ut quaerendum sit quomodo corpus animale dicatur seminari? Plane accepit hic spiritum caro, sed arrabonem, animae autem non arrabonem sed plenitudinem. Itaque etiam propterea, substantiae nomine animale corpus nuncupata est in qua seminatur, futura proinde per plenitudinem spiritus insuper spiritale, in qua resuscitatur. Quid mirum si magis inde vocata est unde conferta est quam unde respersa est?<sup>131</sup>

Now what shall we say? Does flesh not have *spiritus* even now by faith, so that the inquiry is in what manner the *animale* body may be said to have been sown? The flesh distinctly accepts *spiritus* here, although a token, however (it accepts) not a token but an abundance of the *anima*. And so for this reason even by the name of the substance it is called an *animale corpus* in which it was sown. Hence in the future through the token of spirit additionally (it shall be) a *spiritale* (body), in which it is raised again. What miraculous thing is it, if then it is called more from where it was filled/pressed together than from where it has been sprinkled/scattered.

I believe what Tertullian is attempting to get across is that the root of the meaning of *animale* lies in its substance. A body which has been animated or takes on *anima* in its material is *animale*.

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<sup>131</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* LIII.18.

Finally, a distinction between *animale* and *spiritale* must be made. Although Tertullian rarely uses these two adjectives in proximity to one another, they both occur in his writing *de*

*Anima* XI:

Primo enim anima, id est flatus, populo in terra incedenti, id est in carne carnaliter agenti, postea spiritus eis qui terram calcant, id est opera carnis subigunt, quia et apostolus non primum quod spiritale, sed quod animale, postea spiritale.

First of all there comes the (natural) soul, that is to say, the breath, to the people that are on the earth, -in other words, to those who act carnally in the flesh; then afterwards comes the spirit to those who walk thereon, -that is, who subdue the works of the flesh; because the apostle also says, that "that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, (or in possession of the natural soul) and afterward that which is spiritual."<sup>132</sup>

The *animale* body, Tertullian states explicitly here, comes before the *spiritale* body. It has been literally inspired by God's *afflatus* and therefore is *flatus* while on earth. It remains the breath of God, and not comprised of His spirit explicitly, until after it is resurrected. It will later become *spiritale* after it interacts with God's spirit. It will become important in my third chapter that Tertullian quotes Paul because he seems to come to different conclusions from Paul concerning the body and soul after death.

That the body is inspired by *dei afflatu* at the point of conception raises two issues. First, it forces us to consider to what degree an *ex afflatu* body is different from a *spiritale* body. This has been reconciled through my conclusion that Tertullian believed that interaction with God's spirit (presumably the Holy Spirit) transformed a body into an *spiritale* body. This issue is related to the second question; for if the flesh is created already from *afflatus*, for what purpose does it need to be breathed into by God with *spiritus* after the resurrection? N. T. Wright offers a solution. He classifies Tertullian's understanding of the resurrection as "a classic Judaeo-Christian view of future judgment: the soul and body must be reunited so that judgment can be

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<sup>132</sup> Tertullian, *De Anima* XI.3.

complete.”<sup>133</sup> A reconciliation of the connection between body and soul torn apart can be made if Tertullian views the purpose of this separation to be the value of judgment.

### *Spiritale*

Further distinctions must be made as to what makes a *spiritale* body, because the body at conception created *ex dei afflatu*. It is with the definition of *spiritale* that Tertullian’s meaning becomes more difficult to elucidate. If an *animale* body transforms into a *spiritale* body after the resurrection, then the previous body did not contain the physical attribute of *spiritus*. However, Tertullian informs us that the body, at conception, was created from *afflatus*.

Sed et exsequitur, Et integrum corpus vestrum et anima et spiritus sine querela conserventur in praesentia domini. Habes omnem substantiam hominis saluti destinatum, nec alio tempore quam in adventu domini qui clavis est resurrectionis.<sup>134</sup>

And as if this were not plain enough, it goes on to say: "And may your whole body, and soul, and spirit be preserved blameless unto the coming of the Lord." Here you have the entire substance of man destined to salvation, and that at no other time than at the coming of the Lord, which is the key of the resurrection.

Here Tertullian makes it clear that *corpus*, *anima*, and *spiritus* are three different entities each human possesses. Ann Bradley Stegman, in her dissertation on “The Development of Tertullian’s Doctrine of ‘Spiritus Sanctus’,” discerns the differences of these three vocabulary words. “Even more technically, the ‘function’ of animus is to enable anima to apprehend incorporeal objects, just as the corpus of anima enables anima to know corporeal ones.”<sup>135</sup> The function of the *anima* is the clearest of these three words, and it is the entity which Tertullian discusses at length.

Tertullian makes it very clear, however, that we should not separate these three bodies by their function, but by their substance. While it is true that the *anima* has a function that is unique to its

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<sup>133</sup> Wright 2003, 511.

<sup>134</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* XLVII.17.

<sup>135</sup> Stegman 1978, 306.

purpose, it gives the human body a substance that is distinct from the substance of a body that contains a *spiritus*. It is this distinction that Tertullian makes when interpreting Paul in his treatise *De Anima*.

Tertullian asserts, in *De Resurrectione* LX.4: “sicut animale corpus in spiritale, dum mortale istud induit immortalitatem et corruptivum istud incorruptelam.” (even as the soul-informed body will be transferred to spirit-informed, when this mortal [body] puts on immortality and this corruptible [body] incorruption.) Tertullian asserts that flesh and spirit will be joined after death in the body that was alive with *anima*. This brings us to incorporate the distinctions I have made between *anima* and *spiritus*. For Tertullian, an *animale* body is animated and living. *Spiritale* here is connected with the English words “immortal” and “incorruptible”; it must also refer to an aspect of the body that is not present during life.

God is spirit. More specifically, God’s *substantia* is *spiritus*. Humans, according to Tertullian, cannot fully contain God’s spirit until after they have been resurrected. Tertullian builds this theory from his interpretation of the substance of man at conception in Genesis 2:7: man was formed in body then his soul was added by means of God’s breath. Tertullian says that soul before death contains the breath of God (*Ex afflatu dei anima*), then later *spiritus* is gained after resurrection.<sup>136</sup> This later *spiritus* must be taken directly from God, and not merely gleaned through His breath.

Tertullian attempts to qualify his use of “spirit” in *De Anima* XI.1: “Sed ut animam spiritum dicam, praesentis quaestionis ratio compellit, quia spirare alii substantiae adscribitur.” (The reasoning of my present question compels me to call the ‘anima’ ‘spiritus’, because to

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<sup>136</sup> Tertullian, *De Anima* XXVII.7.

breathe is ascribed to another substance.)<sup>137</sup> He goes on to say that the soul may be referred to as the spirit because of what it does, not because of its nature. This similarity between soul and spirit is reconciled by once again taking into account Tertullian's focus on *substantia*. It is the substance through which we discern the difference between these two entities, not the function.

### **Additional Evidence: Christ and Adam**

The figures of Christ and Adam further inform our understanding of Tertullian's statements concerning *animalis*, *spiritalis*, and *substantia* because the souls of these figures are examples through which Tertullian infers much of the information he claims about human souls. The substance of Christ's body was of particular interest to Tertullian because Tertullian was a prominent figure in developing the doctrine of the Trinity. He strongly believed that Christ was both divine and fleshly. Tertullian addresses the conception of Christ and the nature of his substance in *Apologia* XXI.14: "That ray of God, as it was spoken of in the past always, having slipped into a certain virgin and fashioned as flesh in her womb is born a man mixed with God. The flesh, equipped with spirit is nourished, grows up, speaks, teaches, works, and is Christ."<sup>138</sup> Human bodies, then, follow Christ in their life but do not contain the same substance. Christ is endowed with God's Spirit from his conception, whereas human bodies only obtain spirit (physical spirit as a divine substance, not spirit gained by faith) directly from God's Spirit after their resurrection. Osborn furthers this point that Christ's spirit remains full throughout his life

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<sup>137</sup> Tertullian, *De Anima* XI.1.

<sup>138</sup> Tertullian, *Apologia*. 21.14: *Iste igitur dei radius, ut retro semper praedicabatur, delapsus in virginem quandam et in utero eius caro figuratus nascitur homo deo mixtus. Caro spiritu instructa nutritur, adolescit, adfatur, docet, operatur et Christus est.* The text of the *Apologia* is drawn from Tertullian and Minucius Felix, *Apology, De Spectaculis, and Octavius*, eds. and trans. T.R. Glover and G.H. Rendall, Loeb Classical Library 250 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931).

and resurrection; “Tertullian insisted that in Jesus, spirit remains spirit and flesh remains flesh.”<sup>139</sup> The resurrection of Christ was a model for human resurrection, and this builds on Tertullian’s idea of an incarnation that retains *caro*. It also corroborates the theory that the distinction between the pre-death and post-resurrection body lies in the substance of the body. Because man does not have spirit until after his resurrection, the *spiritale* body emphasizes a connection to Christ that one gains through salvation.

In *De Carne Christi*, Tertullian once again brings in the distinction of a *corpus animale*. He begins by addressing those “qui carnem Christi animale adfirmant, quod anima caro sit facta” (Who assert that the flesh of Christ was *animale*, that his soul was made flesh).<sup>140</sup> Tertullian admits that Christian believers agree that Christ had a spiritual body, and so he goes on to address the question of why it was necessary for Christ to also take on a fleshly body. Tertullian here denies that Christ was either flesh or spirit; rather, his body contained both substances at the same time. Throughout this treatise he builds his argument that Christ indeed had a fleshly body, and, as he stated in his introduction to *De Carne Christi*, he concludes that Christ’s flesh and spirit were mutually dependent upon each other.<sup>141</sup> This claim is relevant to our understanding of an *animale* body because it modifies flesh (putting the focus on *animale* meaning an earthly body) and emphasizes the juxtaposition between *animale* and *spiritale* bodies.

Another adequate source for distinguishing between these two adjectives is Tertullian’s treatment of Adam. Tertullian presents Adam as a living soul in contrast to Christ, the final Adam: “Si enim et primus homo Adam caro non anima, qui denique in animam vivam factus est,

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<sup>139</sup> Osborn 2004, 146.

<sup>140</sup> Tertullian, *De Carne Christi* X.1 (Ed. by E. Evans. S.P.C.K.: London, 1956).

<sup>141</sup> Note that Tertullian’s argument here is gleaned from his denial of Marcion’s thought: *Marcion ut carnem Christi negaret negavit etiam nativitatem, aut ut nativitatem negaret negavit et carnem, scilicet ne invicem sibi testimonium responderent nativitas et caro, quia nec nativitas sine carne nec caro sine nativitate... (De Carne Christi I.2).*

et novissimus Adam Christus ideo Adam quia homo, ideo homo quia caro non quia anima.” (Thus, then, the first man Adam was made flesh, not soul, who then was made into a living soul; and the last Adam, Christ, thus was Adam because He was man, since man was flesh, not soul.)<sup>142</sup> When discussing Adam, Tertullian asserts that “sine dubio caro erit facta in animam: facta porro in animam, cum esset corpus, utique animale corpus est facta.” (without a doubt flesh will have been made into *anima*: again/further on, when there is a body, it is made into *anima*, certainly it (the flesh) is made into an *animale* body.)<sup>143</sup> Daniélou too incorporates Adam as an example through which he extrapolates on Tertullian’s writing.

The term *corpus animale*, however, is not one that can be suitably applied to the soul. The soul certainly is a body – in the sense in which Tertullian uses the word – but it is not a *corpus animatum*, or ‘animated body’. How, he asks, would it be animated, since it itself is soul?<sup>144</sup>

The figure of Adam is important to both Paul and Tertullian on the topic of human souls because he is a source for all other human souls. Tertullian claims that human substance adopted its nature from Adam. “A primordio enim in Adam concreta et configurata corpori anima, ut totius substantiae, ita et condicionis istius semen effecit.” (For from the beginning the soul was solidified into Adam and formed with his body, as of the entire substance, thus it produced seed of that situation.)<sup>145</sup>

### **Conclusions Concerning Tertullian’s Understanding of Body and Soul After Death**

For Tertullian, the body, a combination of *caro* and *anima* remains *animale* until death. At death, the *caro* and *anima* are ripped apart and reunited at the resurrection, when the body becomes *spiritale* in substance. The key to understanding the difference between *animale* and

<sup>142</sup> Tertullian *De Resurrectione* LIII.12.

<sup>143</sup> Tertullian *De Resurrectione* LIII.6.

<sup>144</sup> Daniélou 1977, 403.

<sup>145</sup> Tertullian *De Anima* IX.8.

*spiritalis* bodies is Tertullian's emphasis on the word *substantia*. The human body continues to exist after death, but with a changed substance. The body is able to gain spirit in substance after its resurrection because it will have come into direct contact with God's spirit. We may also now conclude that another difference, in addition to a changed substance, is the transfer of control of the *anima* after death. Before death it is powered by itself (thus an *animale corpus*), and after it has been resurrected it is powered by God's spirit and becomes a *spiritalis corpus*.

Tertullian asserts that flesh accompanies the body into heaven after death,<sup>146</sup> in contrast to 1 Corinthians 15:50 where Paul states that flesh and blood will not inherit the kingdom of God (though it remains uncertain whether Paul believed in a fleshly resurrection of the body).<sup>147</sup> If Tertullian intended to quote Paul when he used the adjectives *animale* and *spiritalis*, then Tertullian likely believed that he shared the same belief as Paul concerning the transformation of the body after death and resurrection. Although Tertullian's vocabulary implies an exegesis of Paul's writing, not all the beliefs concerning the body after death are shared by the two authors. This requires a reconciliation between the discrepancies in the writings of Paul and Tertullian concerning this subject. A comparison between these findings in Tertullian and my investigation into Paul's meaning in parallel vocabulary will inform us of the nature of Tertullian's interpretation of Paul.

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<sup>146</sup> Tertullian *De Resurrectione* LV2.13: *Ita manebit quidem caro etiam post resurrectionem...*

<sup>147</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:50: “σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα βασιλείαν θεοῦ κληρονομήσαι οὐ δύναται”



## CHAPTER 3

### A COMPARISON OF PAUL AND TERTULLIAN

#### **Introduction**

Paul and Tertullian each assert beliefs regarding the resurrection that describe the body after death. Paul's statements on the human resurrection, which are based on what he believes about the resurrection of Christ, prompted early Christian theologians such as Tertullian to attempt to clarify Paul's writing. In his discussion of resurrection, Tertullian cites (in Latin) and engages with Paul's epistles. Tertullian composes an interpretation of Paul that aligns Paul's view of flesh in the post-resurrection body with his own, and, in doing so, modifies Paul's meaning. At times, Tertullian's assertions complement Paul's statements in 1 Corinthians; for instance, Tertullian recognizes a change of the body that is present in 1 Corinthians 15, but adds significant details, thus providing an interpretation of Paul that Paul himself does not necessarily claim. As we have seen through the investigations of my first and second chapters, Tertullian and Paul did not express identical beliefs; Tertullian asserts explicitly that life after death includes flesh, which is lacking in an explicit manner in Paul's text. The aim of this chapter is to discern the amount of exegetical interpretation Tertullian performs on Paul's text, and to what degree it differs from Paul's beliefs.

There are several topics and rhetorical devices that Paul and Tertullian employ in their writings about resurrection. For instance, in his discussion of the resurrection of the body, Tertullian applies vegetation imagery and allusions to Genesis that are analogous to his

predecessor.<sup>148</sup> Both Paul and Tertullian also syntactically express the action of resurrection as passive for the human body (implying that they view it as accomplished through divine agency). They both acknowledge and emphasize the existence of a body after death; however, there are differences in their respective descriptions. While Tertullian emphasizes the existence of flesh in the human post-mortem body, Paul believes “flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God.”<sup>149</sup> Even if, as I concluded in my first chapter, Paul did conceive of a material resurrection, he does not acknowledge post-resurrection flesh. This is in stark contrast to Tertullian’s constant affirmation of the existence of flesh in the post-resurrection body.

In my previous chapters, I have focused on the definitions of adjectives used to describe the body. We have seen that Tertullian quotes Paul in the basic resurrection transformation: “animale corpus in spiritale [transferatur].”<sup>150</sup> Paul claims “σπείρεται σῶμα ψυχικόν, ἐγείρεται σῶμα πνευματικόν.” (it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body.)<sup>151</sup> Because Tertullian applies terminology in the same way Paul has, the methodology of his interpretation of Paul becomes clearer: Tertullian believed in the same transformation as Paul did, from an *animale* to a *spiritale* body, but that this change affected the body in a different way than Paul asserted (i.e., Tertullian stated explicitly that the post-resurrection body will contain flesh and a soul).

The points of contention requiring reconciliation are related to the two authors’ descriptions of the condition of the body and soul after death, specifically, whether the body will

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<sup>148</sup> Tertullian discusses Genesis 2:7 in *Adversus Marcionem* 1.XXIV.5 (Ed. by E. Evans. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), *Adversus Marcionem* 2.IX.6 (Ed. by E. Evans. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), and *De Anima* XXVI.5 (Ed. by J. Waszink, Amsterdam: J.M. Meulenhoff, 1947.) and Paul references it in 1 Corinthians 15:45. Vegetation imagery is in 1 Corinthians 15:37-38 for Paul and *De Anima* XX.1 and XXV (as well as elsewhere) for Tertullian.

<sup>149</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:50.

<sup>150</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* (Ed. by E. Evans. S.P.C.K.: London, 1960) LX.4.

<sup>151</sup> 1 Corinthians 15:42-44.

be resurrected in the flesh and the nature of the soul after death. I believe these differences reflect philosophical influences on both authors as well as the growth of the resurrection debate in the time between Paul and Tertullian. Looking at these points of contention will confirm the manner in which Tertullian interpreted Paul's writings and ultimately provide insight into the undeveloped nature of the early Christian church.

### **Review of the Scholarship: Tertullian as Interpreter vs. Critic**

Few scholars have looked at Tertullian's writings alongside Paul's, leaving questions about the nature of the exegesis that Tertullian applied to Paul's writing. Some infer that Tertullian admired Paul because he invoked Paul's writings more than any other scriptural author. Others disagree. Tabbernee, Setzer, and Roberts argue that Tertullian's writings lack interpretation or positive engagement with Paul's epistles. Tabbernee recognizes Tertullian as "a rhetorician rather than an exegete or a systematic theologian."<sup>152</sup> Still, it is difficult to separate Pauline quotations from Tertullian's own writings at times, which suggests a complex relationship between the two authors.

While most scholarship positions Tertullian as an interpreter of Paul, one scholar claims that Tertullian was reacting negatively to Paul's writings. Claudia Setzer claims: "No doubt Paul was the favorite of Tertullian's opponents, since he says flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God (1 Cor 15:50), and has a negative assessment of the flesh in Romans 7-8."<sup>153</sup> While Tertullian and Paul do not provide identical descriptions of the body and soul after resurrection, Tertullian's frequent direct quotations of Paul's scripture and his defense and explication of Paul's beliefs confirm that Tertullian provided an exegesis for Paul's writings.

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<sup>152</sup> Tabbernee 2013, 27.

<sup>153</sup> Setzer 2004, 141.

Because Paul and Tertullian differ on the resurrection, scholars claim that Tertullian did not interpret Paul correctly. Roberts emphasizes discrepancies between the two regarding the role death plays in the resurrection of the body, specifically that, for Tertullian, death alone can cause separation of the body and soul. For Paul, death was “a transition from the bodily presence to be with Christ. This was a distinction which Tertullian did not make, and the whole development of his thought upon the subject of death shows this failure.”<sup>154</sup> Tertullian, however, believed he was making an accurate rendition of Paul’s beliefs and offers clarification for apparent discrepancies between himself and Paul.

We may now turn to scholars who find that Tertullian attempted to interpret Paul’s texts correctly and explicate Tertullian’s engagement with Pauline text. Aside from the comments of Tabbernee, Setzer, and Roberts, all other scholarship agrees on what we have come to see: Tertullian intended to provide a deliberate exegesis of Paul regarding resurrection. Tertullian provided what he believed to be a correct interpretation of Paul because he thought he shared common beliefs with Paul concerning the post-resurrection body. In doing this, Tertullian adapted passages of Paul in order to align them with his own beliefs. Scholars who have made similar conclusions include Segal, O’Malley, Witherington, Wright, Daniélou, and Bain. Alan Segal asserts that Tertullian interprets Paul and adapts his writing to his own resurrection theology.<sup>155</sup>

O’Malley addresses Tertullian’s dependence on Pauline scripture for resurrection language in his 1967 book *Tertullian and the Bible*. After investigating Tertullian’s utilization of scripture, O’Malley observes, “We come, finally, to the resurrection. Here, as we will see,

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<sup>154</sup> Roberts 1924, 205.

<sup>155</sup> Segal 2004, 569.

Tertullian follows Paul very closely.”<sup>156</sup> O’Malley not only confirms the influence Paul had on Tertullian, but also looks at specific points at which Tertullian both invokes and strays from Paul’s terminology. O’Malley remarks that Tertullian departs from scripture to develop his own incarnation terminology at times, namely *induere* carnem, which stresses that Tertullian claims a fleshly resurrection.<sup>157</sup>

Tertullian’s texts do not express his level of intentional manipulation of Pauline scripture. Tertullian writes that Paul had a fleshly, bodily resurrection in mind. Ben Witherington III directly addresses the interpretation by Tertullian of Paul’s description of the resurrected body.

Take for instance the issue of the *pneumatikon soma* referred to in 1 Cor 15. This, as it turns out, does not mean a body made up of some ethereal substance called ‘spirit,’ though various exegetes through the ages have taken it that way, any more than *psychikon soma* refers to a ‘soulish body.’ The latter means a body animated by life breath, the former means a body suffused with and animated by the Holy Spirit. Tertullian may be forgiven for misreading Paul at this point, and he is in good company in doing so.<sup>158</sup>

Tertullian appears to present Paul’s beliefs in accordance with his own, although Tertullian’s interpretation of Paul is different from the scholarly interpretation of Paul that has emerged over the past millennia. Wright, too, argues for a strong relationship between Tertullian and Paul. He notes: “We see here,[in Tertullian] as in Irenaeus, that some were starting to quote Paul in a direction that Paul himself rules out. What matters is God’s power as creator. What he made, he can remake.”<sup>159</sup> Thus Wright confirms that, despite the differences in the written beliefs of the two authors, not only did Tertullian perform exegesis on Paul’s text but also that Tertullian’s interaction with Paul’s text does not eliminate the possibility that Tertullian believed he had captured Paul’s meaning without manipulation.

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<sup>156</sup> O’Malley 1967, 93.

<sup>157</sup> O’Malley 1967, 95.

<sup>158</sup> Witherington 2013, 280.

<sup>159</sup> Wright 2003, 511.

In *The Origins of Latin Christianity*, Jean Daniélou states that “the interest of [Tertullian’s] exegesis lies in the fact that he brings in the principles of his anthropology in order to interpret correctly.”<sup>160</sup> Daniélou also supports the validity of Tertullian’s exegesis by providing an example:

Paul’s text, ‘Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God’ (1 Co. 15:50) also provides the point of departure for a consideration of the nature of the body and the soul and of the union. Tertullian points out in this case too that ‘flesh and blood’ do not signify the substance of the body, but man’s evil works (XLII, 11). . . . It is also true in another sense that ‘flesh and blood, in the sense of substance, cannot enter the kingdom on their own, apart from the Spirit’ (L, 4). Finally, how can our flesh and blood, still in the sense of substance, Tertullian asks, ‘not inherit incorruptibility, when Christ has already introduced his flesh and blood into heaven as an earnest of ours’ (LI, 4).<sup>161</sup>

Daniélou here points out that Tertullian uses rhetorical questions to confirm that his own interpretation of Paul’s scripture is the logical conclusion. We will continue to see this device as we study particular passages of Paul quoted by Tertullian.

Tertullian’s explanation of Paul’s phrase “flesh and blood” is crucial to understanding his interpretation of Paul. Tertullian elaborates on the relationship between the flesh (*caro*) and the “works” (*opera*) in *De Resurrectione*. “Artes per carnem, studia ingenia per carnem, opera negotia officia per carnem, atque adeo vivere totum animae carnis est ut non vivere aliud non sit animae quam a carne divertere. Sic etiam ipsum mori carnis est, cuius et vivere.”<sup>162</sup> Tertullian also uses *opera* as the action which a man has not done when he lusts for a woman in his heart

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<sup>160</sup> Daniélou 1977, 401.

<sup>161</sup> Daniélou 1977, 401-2.

<sup>162</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* VII.12: The arts exist through the flesh, works and jobs and duties exist through the flesh, and also the entirety of the soul exists is because of the flesh so much that for any part of the soul to not live would be nothing other than for it to separate from the flesh.)

“Qui conspexerit ad concupiscendum iam adulteravit in corde: adeo et sine opere...”<sup>163</sup> When Tertullian discusses the *opera* as the meaning of Paul’s phrase “flesh and blood”, he is insinuating that Paul believed that flesh was not prohibited from the kingdom of God, but the works that the flesh achieved.

Andrew Bain, who argues that Tertullian treats Paul with without manipulation in his writing, aims to discern the amount of textual overlap between Tertullian and Paul. As Bain suggests, “[Tertullian] is capable of engaging with Paul at great length and depth in the final book of *Against Marcion*, and of ranging dexterously and even, we might say, reflexively across virtually all of Paul’s writings in *On the Resurrection of the Flesh* and *The Prescription against Heretics*.”<sup>164</sup> Bain does admit, however, that “Where Tertullian does refer to Paul, his usage is very much governed by his intended purpose and the issue at hand.”<sup>165</sup> Tertullian is adamant with respect to his claims about Pauline theology, but it is ambiguous whether he truly believes he has captured the meaning of Paul’s scripture or if he is uses Paul’s scripture to get his own point across. With respect to the degree of relationship between Tertullian and Paul’s writing, Bain is sympathetic to Tertullian’s adaptation of Paul’s texts, “especially in an age where there exists a renewed enthusiasm for eschatology.”<sup>166</sup> This “renewed enthusiasm” may very well have compelled Tertullian to clarify Paul for early Christians by means of his own, more explicit, explanation.

As we have seen, the exact nature of Tertullian’s interpretation of Paul remains undetermined. I would like to work through these discrepancies in order to gauge how they affect

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<sup>163</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* XV.4: He who looked upon [a woman] for enjoyment has already committed adultery in his heart: already even without the action...

<sup>164</sup> Bain (in Bird) 2011, 223.

<sup>165</sup> Bain (in Bird) 2011, 223.

<sup>166</sup> Bain (in Bird) 2011, 224.

Tertullian's interpretation of Paul. An analysis of their parallel resurrection terminology, a survey of specific quotations of Paul in Tertullian's writings, and a look at potential philosophic influence for both authors will provide a more accurate picture of the quality of exegesis Tertullian performed on Paul's writings.

### **The Substance of the Body after Death: ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν and *animale* and *spiritale***

With respect to the description of the body after death presented by Paul and Tertullian we need to discern the differences between the meaning of Paul's two adjectives (ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν) and Tertullian's two adjectives (*animale* and *spiritale*). For both authors, these two adjectives reflect the transformation of the body. For Tertullian, *animale* and *spiritale* describe the condition of the body with respect to its substance. The *substantia*<sup>167</sup> that Tertullian emphasizes is not present in Paul's writings.<sup>168</sup> Wright confirms:

...it is generally true that adjectives formed with the ending *-ikos* have ethical or functional meanings rather than referring to the material or substance of which something is composed. Had Paul wanted to contrast 'a body composed of *psyche*' with 'a body composed of *pneuma*', he might have chosen different adjectives...<sup>169</sup>

Rather than focus on the substance of the body before and after it is resurrected, Paul emphasizes the post-resurrection transfer of control of the body to God's Spirit. Despite this discrepancy, there are striking similarities between these Greek and Latin terms. Most importantly, for both Paul and Tertullian, the adjectives πνευματικόν and *spiritale* both mark a transformation from a body controlled by its own power to a body controlled by divine power.

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<sup>167</sup> For Tertullian, the word *substantia* represents the essence or material with respect to which the body changes as it transforms from *animale* to *spiritale*. *Substantia* constituted the degree to which an entity was real and the characteristics of that entity.

<sup>168</sup> E.g., in *De Resurrectione* XLVII.17 and *De Resurrectione* LIII.18.

<sup>169</sup> Wright 2003, 352.



Let us recall what Witherington says about the topic: “It is thus unlikely that Paul means by a *sōma pneumatikon* a ‘body made up of spirit.’ ...He means, rather, that the resurrection body will be animated and empowered by the Spirit...”<sup>170</sup> For Tertullian, after the resurrection, when the body becomes *spiritalis*, the flesh is infused with God’s Spirit. The control of the body is transferred through interaction with God’s Spirit. Thus, Tertullian grasps Paul’s meaning of *πνευματικόν*. The two adjectives may match meanings between the two authors, but the surrounding beliefs about the body and soul after resurrection differ. Because *πνευματικόν* and *spiritalis* constitute parallel terminology for these authors, the discrepancy between their beliefs must rest on a difference between *σῶμα* and *corpus*. For instance, Tertullian advocates a fleshly resurrection, whereas Paul does not state clearly whether he envisioned a fleshly body after death. Further investigation into Tertullian’s interpretation (via his quotations) of Pauline scripture will clarify the nature of this discrepancy.

### **Paul Passages in Tertullian**

Tertullian incorporates Paul’s text into his own in order to build his argument that flesh will be resurrected along with the body, despite the lacuna of this explicit belief expressed in Paul’s writings. Tertullian begins in *De Resurrectione* XL, when he invokes Paul’s second letter to the Corinthians to corroborate his own claim that flesh and soul are entwined in man’s body. Here, Tertullian argues against heretics who claim that Paul expressed two bodies that can exist independently from each other: the inner man (soul) and the outer man (flesh).

Nactae denique haereses duos homines ab apostolo editos, interiorem, id est animam, et exteriorem, id est carnem, salutem quidem animae, id est interiori homini, exitium vero carni, id est exteriori, adiudicaverunt, quia scriptum est Corinthiis, Nam etsi homo noster exterior corrumpitur, sed interior renovatur die et die. Porro nec anima per semetipsam homo, quae figmento iam homini appellato postea inserta est, nec caro sine anima homo, quae post exilium animae

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<sup>170</sup> Witherington 1995, 308.

cadaver inscribitur. Ita vocabulum homo consertarum substantiarum duarum quodammodo fibula est, sub quo vocabulo non possunt esse nisi cohaerentes.

After the heretics discovered that there are two men elevated by the apostle, an inner man, i.e. the soul, and an outer man, i.e. the flesh, they assigned that, indeed, wellness for the soul (i. e. the inner man), is truly destruction for the flesh (i.e. the outer man), because it was written to the Corinthians, “for even if our outer man is corrupted, but the inner man is renewed day by day.”<sup>171</sup> Again neither is the *anima* by itself man, which now has been inserted afterwards to the named man by invention, nor is the flesh a man without the *anima*, as the body is named corpse after the banishment of the soul. Thus in a certain way the name “homo” is the clasp of two joined substances, under which name they are not able to exist except clinging to each other.<sup>172</sup>

In this passage, Tertullian uses Paul’s text to support his own claims in a debate against heretical doctrine. He believes that he has a true understanding of Paul’s beliefs and aligns himself with Paul’s beliefs through his interpretation of Paul. Tertullian clarifies that *homo* is the joined combination of *caro* and *anima*.<sup>173</sup> He claims that he has a better understanding of Paul’s text than the heretics do. Tertullian builds on this interpretation of Paul in many instances to confirm his own belief in the transformation of the body after death.

In *De Resurrectione* XLIII, Tertullian claims in his interpretation of Paul’s text that resurrection applies to the flesh just as much as it applies to the soul.

Ut unusquisque, inquit, reportet quae per corpus secundum quae gessit, bonum sive malum. Hoc iam quomodo legas quaero: quasi turbate enim per hyperbaton struxit: utrumne 'quae per corpus reportanda erunt' an 'quae per corpus gesta sunt'? Sed et si 'quae per corpus reportanda sunt', corporalis indubitate resurrectio est: et si 'quae per corpus gesta sunt', per corpus utique pensanda sunt per quod et gesta sunt.

<sup>171</sup> This is a direct translation of Paul’s 2 Corinthians 4:16 “Διὸ οὐκ [α]ἐγκακοῦμεν, ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ ὁ ἔξω ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος διαφθείρεται, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἔσω ἡμῶν ἀνακαινοῦται ἡμέρα καὶ ἡμέρα.”

<sup>172</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* XL.2-3.

<sup>173</sup> As I discussed in my second chapter, Tertullian defines man (*homo* and *corpus*) as the combination of flesh and a soul. Tertullian also uses *caro* and *corpus* both to refer to the flesh and body at times.

He says, “let everyone receive the things which he has done through his body, then next the things which he has done, whether good or bad.”<sup>174</sup> Now I ask how you read this: for instance as if he phrased it by means of disorderly word arrangement? Whether it is “the things which must be brought back through the body” or “the things which have been done through the body”? But even if it is “the things which must be brought back through the body,” doubtlessly it means there is resurrection of the body. And also (the same conclusion applies) if it is “the things which have been done through the body,” because these things must be judged by all means through the body, through which they were also completed.<sup>175</sup>

We witness Tertullian asserting his own interpretation of Paul. To him, it is a logical conclusion that both body and soul are punished and rewarded together because they are so closely entwined. Perhaps the most compelling section of this passage is Tertullian’s conclusion: “Ita totus hic a capite tractatus apostoli, tali clausula detextus qua carnis resurrectio ostenditur, secundum haec erit intellegendus quae cum clausula consonant.” (Thus this entire treatment of the apostle from the beginning, explained by such a conclusion in which the resurrection of the flesh is demonstrated, must be next understood with respect to the things which are in harmony with the end.)<sup>176</sup> Tertullian maintains that Paul conceived of a fleshly post-resurrection body.

Another passage of Tertullian that engages with Paul’s writings comes from *De Resurrectione* XLVII. In this chapter, Tertullian claims that Paul promises everlasting life to human flesh. I have already discussed in my second chapter how Tertullian incorporates a quote from Matthew 5:28 in order to prove that salvation applies to both flesh and the soul, which he does again in Chapter XLVII. After quoting several verses from Paul’s letter to the Romans, Tertullian makes the same conclusion concerning flesh after the body’s resurrection. “Ita per

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<sup>174</sup> This is a direct translation of 2 Corinthians 5:9 “τοὺς γὰρ πάντας ἡμᾶς φανερωθῆναι δεῖ ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ βήματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἵνα κομισῆται ἕκαστος τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος πρὸς ἃ ἔπραξεν, εἴτε ἀγαθὸν εἴτε φαῦλον.” (For it is necessary that we all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, in order that each may receive things in accordance with the body in exchange for the things it has done, whether good or bad.)

<sup>175</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* XLIII.6-8.

<sup>176</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* XLIII.9.

totam hanc sensuum seriem ab iniustitia et delinquentia membra nostra divellens, et iustitiae et sanctimoniae adiungens, et transferens eadem a stipendio mortis ad donativum vitae aeternae, carni utique compensationem salutis repromittit.”<sup>177</sup> (Thus through this whole series of feelings, separating our limbs from injustice and crime, and joining them to both justice and purity, and transferring the same things from the price of death to the gratuity of life, he certainly guarantees the recompense of salvation to the flesh.) Tertullian claims that Paul’s resurrection theology included a fleshly post-resurrection body in order to once again strengthen his own argument.

Toward the end of his chapter, Tertullian presents the resurrection of Christ as further proof that human bodies will be resurrected in flesh. He argues: “Quomodo 'ita', si non aequè in carne?”<sup>178</sup> (How so, if not equally in the flesh?) Then Tertullian continues to justify his interpretation of Paul’s description of the resurrection:

Ubi enim mors, ibi et vita post mortem, quia et vita ibi ante ubi postea mors. Nam si regnum mortis nihil operatur quam carnis dissolutionem, proinde vitam contrariam morti contrarium oportet operari, id est carnis redintegrationem...

For where there is death, there is also life after death, since there is also life there before, where afterwards there is death. For if the kingdom of death accomplishes nothing except for the destruction of the flesh, then it is fitting that life, which is contrary to death, does the contrary, that is, the revivication of the flesh...<sup>179</sup>

Tertullian brings in one final argument in this chapter. Again he quotes Paul’s letter to the Romans,<sup>180</sup> presenting the questions “Quomodo 'vivam' si peritura sunt? Quomodo 'sanctam' si profana sunt?” (How [are we to be a] ‘living’ [sacrifice] if [these bodies] will perish? How ‘pure’

<sup>177</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* XLVII.8.

<sup>178</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* XLVII.12.

<sup>179</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* XLVII.13.

<sup>180</sup> Romans 12:1 “Παρακαλῶ οὖν ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, διὰ τῶν οἰκτιρμῶν τοῦ θεοῦ παραστήσαι τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν θυσίαν ζῶσαν ἁγίαν εὐάρεστον τῷ θεῷ, τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν ὑμῶν” (I beseech you then, brothers, through the mercies of God to present your bodies as a holy living sacrifice acceptable to God, which is your spiritual service.)

if they are impious?)<sup>181</sup> Here the sense of Tertullian's interpretive nature is strongest. In his rhetorical questions, Tertullian presents a fleshly resurrection as a logical conclusion for the questions that remain concerning Pauline theology of the resurrection.

A final passage that merits attention is unique because in it Tertullian acknowledges that he is interpreting Paul's writing. In *De Resurrectione* XLIX and L, Tertullian engages directly with the text of Paul's first letter to the Corinthians and Paul's expression that "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God." He acknowledges that flesh will be resurrected, but that many have interpreted Paul's writings to imply that flesh will not be resurrected. So, Tertullian addresses this discrepancy and reconciles it himself. According to Tertullian's argument, Paul intended the actions accomplished by the flesh and blood to be meant by "σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα", and not the material fleshly body. He explicates Paul's words with his own:

Plane si nunquam apostolus pro operibus substantiam posuit, nec hic ita utatur: si vero in carne adhuc constitutos negavit esse in carne, in operibus carnis negans esse, formam eius subruere non debes non substantiam sed opera substantiae alienantis a dei regno.

If clearly the apostle never put *substantia* in place of the works, he wouldn't use it thus here: if truly he denied that men who have been created in flesh to this point are in flesh, denying that they are in the works of flesh<sup>182</sup> you shouldn't undermine its form nor its substance but the works of the substance which forbid it from the kingdom of God.<sup>183</sup>

Here Tertullian argues that Paul designated *opera* (perhaps the deeds accomplished by our fleshly bodies, as I have suggested) by "σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα". Tertullian presents his text as a clarification that Paul did not intend to mean that flesh will not enter the kingdom of God. It has become clear through these passages that Tertullian asserted that he had captured Paul's true

<sup>181</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* XLVII.16.

<sup>182</sup> Peter Holmes informs us that this is an allusion to Romans 8:9 "Ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἐστὲ ἐν σαρκὶ ἀλλὰ ἐν πνεύματι" (but you are not in the flesh but in the spirit.)

<sup>183</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* XLIX.11.

meaning which, according to Tertullian, included a fleshly resurrection. Tertullian intended to clarify Paul and explain to other readers of Paul that Paul believed in a fleshly resurrection. This meaning, however, stands in contrast to Paul. Post-resurrection flesh is not the only concept about which Tertullian differs from Paul; we still have to reconcile the contrasting beliefs expressed by Paul and Tertullian with regard to an immortal soul.

### **Influence of Platonic Thought**

Paul, so far as we have conjectured, appears to stand against the Platonic tradition which states that all soul is immortal. Tertullian, however, claims to be in line with this Platonic thought. Although Tertullian states explicitly “Utar ergo et sententia Platonis alicuius pronuntiantis: ‘Omnis anima immortalis,’” elsewhere he qualifies this statement.<sup>184</sup> In *De Anima* IV, he acknowledges that one place Platonic and Christian beliefs differ is with respect to the birth of the soul. “...quantum ad fidem nostram factae nataeue animae, depulsa est philosophi opinio, auctoritate prophetiae quoque.” (Therefore with respect to our belief of the soul that has been made or born, the opinion of the philosopher was cast out, too, by the authority of the prophesy.)<sup>185</sup> Tertullian agrees with Platonic thought when it corroborates his belief in an immortal soul, but since Tertullian also believes that God created the soul and it comes into existence at conception, he separates himself from Platonic thought with the support of Paul’s scripture. It appears Tertullian was aware that Pauline and Platonic beliefs stood in contrast to each other. Setzer thus clarifies Tertullian’s simultaneous use and defusion of Platonic thought. “But to the extent that popular or philosophical ideas support resurrection, he will use them.”<sup>186</sup> Daniélou agrees with Setzer’s line of thought. With reference to pagan philosophers, Daniélou

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<sup>184</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* III.2.

<sup>185</sup> Tertullian, *De Anima* IV.1.

<sup>186</sup> Setzer 2004, 139.

writes, “When the need arises, [Tertullian] makes free use of their doctrines, but he does not identify himself with any of the current philosophical systems.”<sup>187</sup> Tertullian states that he employs the concept of a Platonic soul, but also clarifies that its existence was made possible by God.

### **Christ as Example in Paul and Tertullian**

Scholarship is divided around the issue of Pauline beliefs concerning whether Christ was resurrected in the flesh. We have determined, however, that Paul did believe that Christ’s resurrection was material in some form because Paul claimed to have seen the body of Christ after his resurrection. Whether Paul believed Christ to be fleshly or not influences our interpretation of Paul’s description of the human post-resurrection body. In addition to exposing the correlation between undetermined beliefs of Christ’s resurrection and the general resurrection, Daniélou marks the distinction of the *corpus animale* with reference to Tertullian’s presentation of the first and second Adams. “...this must, in Tertullian’s opinion, mean that, if both were flesh, the first is characterised by the fact that his flesh had been animated, whereas the second is characterised by the fact that his flesh was spiritualised...”<sup>188</sup>

Tertullian quotes Paul explicitly when he uses Christ as a model for human resurrection. In Chapter LV of *De Resurrectione*, he writes: “De quo exemplo instructus et Paulus, Qui transfigurabit, inquit, corpus humilitatis nostrae conformale corpori gloriae suae.” (Instructed from this example Paul also said, ‘He will transform the body of our humility into a body similar the body of his own glory.’)<sup>189</sup> Thus, Tertullian once again claims that Tertullian believed that Paul’s beliefs aligned with his own. Here, in contrast to their beliefs concerning

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<sup>187</sup> Daniélou 1977, 403.

<sup>188</sup> Daniélou 1977, 403.

<sup>189</sup> Tertullian, *De Resurrectione* LV.11. This passage also echoes Philippians 3:21.

post-resurrection flesh, Tertullian demonstrates that both he and Paul held the belief that after our resurrection, humans will resemble with respect to substance Christ (with respect to substance) because he was a model for us through his resurrection. This passage also expresses a notion we have already confirmed about the resurrection according to both Tertullian and Paul: that the passive verb implies divine agency.

### **Conclusion**

The overlap between Paul's and Tertullian's writings inspired my theory about Tertullian's beliefs that qualified the nature of his interpretation of Paul's scripture. Having looked more closely at the passages in Tertullian which invoke Paul's writings, and having compared their terminology specific to resurrection theology and the influence of Platonic thought on their writings, we now have a fuller picture of the extent to which Tertullian and Paul shared actual beliefs.

We have seen several possible reasons for the concept of a fleshly post-resurrection body being much more explicitly expressed by Tertullian than Paul: Paul may have cared more to push against Platonic thought in his letter to the Corinthians, whom he felt needed to be reminded of a bodily resurrection. In addition, resurrection terminology became much more specific (due to the ongoing debate) after Paul's time. The passages of Tertullian we have looked at in this chapter demonstrate that there were many different interpretations of Paul coexisting and that there was a need for a true interpretation of Paul, which is what Tertullian aimed to do. Setzer offers an explanation for the discrepancies between Tertullian and Paul when she points out that "the rapid growth in resurrection apologetic and increasing specificity in language, from 'resurrection' to 'resurrection of the body' to 'resurrection of the flesh'..."<sup>190</sup> Tabbernee expresses a similar line

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<sup>190</sup> Setzer 2004, 149.



of thought: “Tertullian points out that denial of bodily resurrection had been prevalent among heretics even from Paul’s time (1 Cor 15:12; see *De prae. haer.* 33.3; cf. *Adv. Marc.* 5.9.2-3),”<sup>191</sup> and Martin too mentions the specificity that was required of Tertullian in his description of the resurrection because of the defensive nature of his writings:

In the second century, however, the resurrection of the body is adamantly defended by Christian leaders against skepticism (both from outside the churches and from within, from some Gnostics, for instance), and it is in this period that early Christian authors insist explicitly on a resurrection of the actual flesh and blood of the dead body.<sup>192</sup>

Tertullian was more cognizant of a need for an explicit interpretation of Paul in order to dissuade heretics from believing in a non-fleshly resurrection of the body. In his methods of interpreting Paul we find discrepancies as a result of Tertullian’s need to become more specific in his language; i.e. he feels the need to specify that a resurrection of the body (σῶμα), which is explicit in Paul’s scripture, is indeed a fleshly one.

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<sup>191</sup> Tabbernee 2013, 273.

<sup>192</sup> Martin 1995, 124.

## CONCLUSION

In this thesis I have demonstrated the textual relationship between Paul and Tertullian regarding their beliefs on the condition of the body after death. This relationship preeminently rests on parallel terminology between the two authors, specifically the two adjectives they use to describe the body before and after it is resurrected. For Paul, a body changes from ψυχικόν to πνευματικόν and for Tertullian, a body changes from *animale* to *spiritale*. Tertullian engages with Pauline scripture not only with this vocabulary, but also by alluding to Paul's seed/vegetation imagery as well as quoting Paul in his passages.

By interacting with Pauline passages to this extent, Tertullian demonstrates that he has a strong command over the texts of Paul. Tertullian employs this command in order to support his own argument that the post-resurrection body will retain flesh. Tertullian presents an interpretation of Paul in which he modifies Paul's meaning; he states that Paul believes that a fleshly body will be resurrected. Tertullian's interpretation of Paul, however, stands in contrast to Paul's own statements. The assertion that the resurrected body will retain flesh is lacking in Paul and causes a discrepancy between the beliefs expressed by Paul and Tertullian. Tertullian presents Paul's beliefs as support for his own statements, and his motive for doing this is to clarify the correct Christian beliefs concerning the body after death.

In this thesis I set out to pinpoint the discrepancy between Paul's and Tertullian's beliefs about the resurrected body by looking at their vocabulary and Pauline passages quoted by Tertullian. Paul nowhere expresses a belief in a fleshly resurrection, but Tertullian infers that Paul did, in fact, believe in one. In order to claim this, Tertullian courses through passages taken

from Paul's letters and offers an explanation that reinforces his own claims of the existence of post-resurrection flesh.

There are a few possible reasons that Tertullian strays from the meaning of Paul in his writings. It could be that Tertullian was intentionally manipulating Paul's text in order to buttress his own rationalization posed against the heretics. Tertullian has demonstrated that he is able to smoothly maneuver through other authors for the gain of his own argument; we have seen this in both his references to Plato and Paul. Additional proof of this theory is the vehemence with which Tertullian argues against the heretics and Marcion. He begins his treatise *De Resurrectione* by stating that pagans, with respect to beliefs about death and resurrection, "pulsata saltim licet non adita veritate", and then goes on to instruct the correct beliefs about the resurrection for over twenty thousand words.<sup>193</sup> One way to further investigate Tertullian's textual relationship to Paul would be to analyze his other invocations of Paul outside the theme of resurrection.

Another interpretation of this discrepancy takes into account the growth of early Christian doctrine in the time between Paul and Tertullian. It is possible that Tertullian truly believed he had captured Paul's meaning and was clarifying Paul for early Christian readers of Paul. Tabbernee, Setzer, and Martin allude to the growing discussion of resurrection in Tertullian's time and its need for more specific language and clarification.<sup>194</sup> It could be that Tertullian was supplying a more specific iteration of Paul's beliefs in order to establish early Christian doctrine concerning the body after resurrection.

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<sup>193</sup> Tertullian *De Resurrectione* I.6 (Ed. by E. Evans. S.P.C.K.: London, 1960): They [spoke] with truth struck upon but not entered.

<sup>194</sup> Tabbernee 2013, 273, Setzer 2004, 149, and Martin 1995, 124.

The discrepancies between the texts of Paul and Tertullian raise questions for further research. How did other readers of Paul, who were contemporaries of Tertullian, interpret Paul? In what other authors can we find this growing specificity of resurrection terminology? The influence of Platonic thought upon both Paul and Tertullian is also relatively undiscovered, and I believe Platonic philosophy in some way shaped the terminology of both of these authors. To what extent was it Paul's intention to argue against Plato? Looking at philosophical influence would create a fuller picture of Tertullian's and Paul's relationship.

This thesis has uncovered the nature of the textual relationship between Tertullian and Paul. Tertullian provided an interpretation of Paul's 1 Corinthians that was much more specific in order to support his own case against the heretics. This relationship is crucial because it extends to implications about the establishment of early Christian doctrine. The discrepancies between Paul and Tertullian demonstrate that the early Christians did not have fully developed and defined beliefs by the time of Tertullian.

My conclusions could expand with an investigation of Tertullian's use of further terminology. One of these words is *substantia*, a study of which would help more fully define the change Tertullian sees in the resurrection of the body. Tertullian's application of both *caro* and *corpus* to mean both flesh and body has also interested me. An examination of passages in which Tertullian demonstrates a difference between the two nouns would further our conception of his beliefs about the change that resurrection brings upon the body. Establishing the function that God's *spiritus* has in the resurrection of the body would identify more exactly the substance of the resurrected body and also bring into this discussion Tertullian's development of the Holy Spirit. These words deserve studies of their own, and with a full set of Tertullian's resurrection vocabulary our interpretation of Tertullian becomes clearer.

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