PLANNING OUTREACH BETWEEN MUSLIM COMMUNITIES AND POLICE IN THE USA AND THE UK

by

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(Under the Direction of Ronald M. Cervero)

ABSTRACT

In the United States and the United Kingdom, the relationships built between police and Muslim communities have taken on a new importance since the attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington DC, and July 7, 2005 in London. Government, community, and religious leaders have stressed the necessity for collaborative partnerships between police and Muslims, and this topic is discussed at the highest levels of government and receives critical attention in the media. However, the prevalent and pervasive counter-terrorism agenda in both countries also leads Muslims to feel scrutinized by law enforcement and security services. This has led to an environment in which efforts by Muslims and police to work together takes place on a contested and very public stage.

The purpose of this study was to understand how individual and organizational interests influence partnerships between local police departments and Muslim communities as they plan outreach efforts. Thirty-one semi-structured interviews were conducted with individuals who had been involved in planning police-Muslim community outreach, and the interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed for themes. Data analysis led to six primary themes: (a) outreach is planned as a response to difficult circumstances; (b) outreach involves educational

goals; (c) outreach is developed to build communication, relationships, and trust; (d) outreach is developed to promote community participation in government; (e) outreach efforts are planned through relationships; and (f) outreach planning involves negotiating around difficult issues.

The development of these primary themes led to four conclusions: a) outreach between police and Muslim communities takes place in a security-conscious era, and is politicized and publicly debated; b) outreach planning is dependent upon relationships built between individuals; c) outreach is an adult education endeavor, and always involves learning; and d) the outreach planning process is iterative and police and community members must pay attention to the need for relationships, learning, negotiation and flexibility when working in this environment.

INDEX WORDS: Program planning, community policing, Muslims in the United States, Muslims in the United Kingdom, police outreach, cultural competency.

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DEDICATION

To my fantastic immediate and extended family, and especially to my daughter Miriam and my wife, Monira. In your humility, service, and love, you set the example for others. God has truly blessed me with your company.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF TABLES

Page

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Problem

Relationships between police and Muslim communities in the United States and the United Kingdom have taken on a tangible importance in the wake of the terrorist attacks that occurred in the USA on September 11, 2001, and in the UK on July 7, 2005 (Innes, 2006; Ramirez, O'Connell, & Zafar, 2004; Spalek & Lambert, 2008). Although we must dissociate the acts of criminals claiming to be Muslims from the faith of Islam itself, those events ushered in a new era of interest in the effectiveness of partnerships between Muslim communities and government. In January of 2009, US President Barack Obama proposed a refreshing era of openness when he said, "to the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect" (Obama, 2009, ¶ 23). Obama's emphasis on improved relationships between his administration and Muslims was significant, and not surprisingly, leading media outlets and leaders around the world took notice (for example, see Pennington's 2009 list of responses in "The Inauguration of Barack Hussein Obama" on http://muslimvoices.org). When a naturalized American citizen was identified as the perpetrator in a suicide bombing in Somalia not long after the inauguration, the FBI director's response (Mueller, 2009) echoed the President's sentiments by suggesting that increased efforts at outreach between law enforcement and Muslim communities within the United States were needed, a philosophy that is shared in the official counter-terrorism strategy in the UK (HM Government, 2009).

Unfortunately, at the same time media reports suggest serious mistakes made by law enforcement personnel that project an image of government that clashes with the President's and FBI director's messages of outreach. Relationships between Muslims and police are challenged

at times by police mistreatment of Muslims (see, for example "Muslim's Scarf Leads to Arrest at Courthouse," Basu, 2008), and when well-funded police outreach efforts directed towards Muslims are criticized in the British media as efforts to conceal spying (Dodd, 2009). These issues only serve to perpetuate the sense that Muslims have been unfairly targeted by police and security services in the USA and UK that has already been observed in the environment that has developed after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the USA, and July 7, 2005 in the UK (Abbas, 2007; Cainkar, 2002; 2004; Pew Research, 2007).

It is well-documented that Muslims in the USA and the UK feel the pressure. More than half of the American Muslims recently surveyed reported that being a Muslim in the United States has been harder since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 on Washington D.C. and New York City, and similarly a number of respondents observed that Muslims have also been singled out for government surveillance (Pew Research, 2007). Muslims in the United Kingdom in recent years have also stressed the difficulties they have experienced in the security-conscious climate that has developed there as a response to both 9/11 and the attacks in London on July 7, 2005 (Abbas, 2007; Khan, 2009). Some commentators observe a disturbing trend that points to a broad prejudice against Muslims and their victimization in the West—a phenomenon that has been labeled "Islamophobia" (Cainkar, 2002; 2004; Field, 2007; Pontying & Mason, 2007; Spalek, El Awa, & McDonald, 2009; Weller, 2006)–the symptoms of which are unfortunately illustrated in many of the findings of the Pew poll (2007). Far on the other end of the spectrum are authors who suggest that US citizens and their government are apparently ignorantly unaware of some vast underground Islamist conspiracy to subvert democratic systems and implement Islamic law (i.e. Spencer, 2008), while a similarly alarmist story line is suggested to the public in the UK (see the overview in Spalek & Lambert, 2008). Somewhere in the

middle of all of this, approximately 2.35 million Muslims in the USA (Pew Research, 2007), and approximately 1.6 million Muslims in the UK (Office for National Statistics, 2001) live, work, raise families and interact with their neighbors, coworkers, and government officials every day.

Law enforcement organizations and Islamic groups have emphasized that cooperative work between Muslims and police is extremely important (such as in Downing, 2007; HM Government, 2009; Hughes, 2009; Al-Marayati, 2007), perhaps now more than ever. But Muslims in the USA and the UK have also expressed very specific concerns about their interaction between law enforcement and Muslims in both countries (Ramirez, O'Connell, & Zafar, 2004; Spalek, El Awa, & McDonald, 2009), stressing fears of law enforcement practices that appear to discriminate against Muslims. Clearly, these perceptions pose substantial challenges to both Muslim communities and police in their efforts to build beneficial community-police relationships and provide needed law enforcement services.

That members of American and British Muslim communities may find interaction with local law enforcement difficult is especially worrisome given that the foundation of policing in the United States and the United Kingdom expressly relies on the assumption that the police are both part of the public, and also answerable to the public. Sir Robert Peel—the founder of the London Metropolitan Police Force and considered by many to be the father of contemporary policing—noted in 1829 that the role of police includes an unavoidable responsibility to work with, as well as for, the public. Peel's emphasis on the relationship between the police and the public is clear in his admonitions regarding these responsibilities for police personnel:

> To recognize always that the power of the police to fulfill their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions, and behaviour, and their ability to secure and maintain public respect.

> To recognize always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing observance of laws.
>
> To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police… (Myhill, 2006, p. 3)

It is evident from these statements that Peel placed value on maintaining a positive relationship built between the police and the public they serve. A modern iteration of Peel's philosophy in the United States and the United Kingdom can be found in the practice of "community policing," which may be seen as a return to the foundations of the police role Peel outlined early in the 19th century (Myhill, 2006; Peak, Bradshaw, & Glensor, 1992).

Just what constitutes community policing? Vito, Walsh, and Kunselman (2004) suggest that:

> From its title, community policing infers a partnership between the police and the people they serve. This partnership is designed to improve the quality of life in the community through the introduction of strategies designed to enhance neighborhood solidarity and safety. It is expected that the police and citizens of the community will work together to address issues of crime and social disorganization. (p. 2)

Much like Peel approximately 175 years earlier, these modern authors emphasize the relationship maintained between the public and the police. In the most basic sense, community policing is therefore essentially any effort designed to bring together the public and the police, in which this "togetherness" is understood as "a shared understanding of problems that require attention, as well as some degree of joint responsibility in undertakings to deal with those problems" (Mastrofski, 1993, p. 65). The emphasis on themes such as partnership, collaboration, and

relationships are foundational aspects of the human side of community policing, included in nearly every explanation of the topic (Reisig & Giacomazzi, 1998; Ren, Cao, Lovrich, & Gaffney, 2005; Vito, Walsh, & Kunselman, 2004), and the importance of this interpersonal side of community policing is therefore difficult to overstate. It is clear that community policing simply cannot take place without efforts in which the public and police depend on the relationships built between one another. Indeed, Ren, Cao, Lovrich, and Gaffney point out that "the desire to improve the relationship between the public and the police since the 1970s was perhaps one of the greatest driving forces behind the movement toward community policing" (2005, p. 56). The particular type of community policing activity may vary widely (community problem-solving meetings, neighborhood watches, joint crime prevention efforts, etc.), but in the end, it is the relational aspect which is emphasized so often as a cornerstone of the community policing philosophy, without which community policing, by definition, would not exist. As Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, and Miller point out "Almost any activity that increases face-to-face interactions with the public and builds relationship with the community… may qualify as a form of community policing" (2006, p. 6).

When one considers the myriad of factors that affect police-community relations, and for the purpose here, specifically police-Muslim community relations, it quickly becomes evident that efforts to build and sustain these relationships cannot be explained through quick, simple, step-by-step models that suggest that the police or the community saw a need for collaboration, and then implemented a one-size-fits-all planning model to develop partnerships, which then worked exactly as expected (a concern about program planning expressed by Cervero & Wilson, 1994a; 1994b; 2006). Instead, these relationships must be negotiated between real-world actors who operate in politically charged arenas (Spalek, El Awa, & McDonald, 2009) and may have

competing goals and interests. Myhill notes that one of the issues that must be considered when police hope to effectively take part in community engagement is "sharing power with communities," which necessitates understanding that "engagement is not something to be done 'to' communities; they [the community] must participate in planning and choosing approaches and feel equal ownership of the process" (2006, p. vi). Therefore, the challenge becomes developing a manner in which these outreach planning issues can be explored effectively, and in a context which is historically relevant to police practitioners and Muslim community leaders operating in the United States today. This is not to suggest the importance of this topic has not been recognized; indeed, as we have discussed, members of the law enforcement community, Muslim writers, and researchers have already stressed the importance of police-Muslim community partnerships often (see Downing, 2007; Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, & Miller, 2006; Ramirez, O'Connell, & Zafar, 2004; Al-Marayati, 2007; Spalek, El Awa, & McDonald, 2009). However, the experiences of police and Muslims involved in planning police-Muslim community outreach deserve more attention.

Statement of the Problem

The modern practice of law enforcement in the United States largely embraces the philosophy of community policing, an essential element of which is positive community-police relationships, often accomplished through partnerships and outreach. The importance of this interpersonal aspect of community policing has been recognized as a foundational aspect of the development of police-citizen ties through a community-based strategy. Researchers, law enforcement professionals, and Muslim community leaders have all stressed the importance of collaborative relationships between local law enforcement personnel and the Muslim communities they serve in the United States.

The challenges presented to local law enforcement and Muslim communities since the attacks of September 11, 2001 and July, 7 2005, and the international attention that has been focused on the relationships between government in the USA and the UK and the world's Muslims have served to intensify the need for these mutually beneficial relationships, but have also intensified the difficulties. Many American and British Muslims have expressed concern over the increased scrutiny their communities has received from the law enforcement and security/intelligence services, making positive police-Muslim community relations of paramount importance. Especially useful in understanding the reality of planning these partnerships is the model suggested by Cervero and Wilson (2006), which underlines the utility of their model of program planning. Despite its clear applicability in such discussions however, the Cervero and Wilson model has not previously been applied as a lens through which to view the development of partnerships between local police and the community.

Purpose and Research Questions

The purpose of this study is to understand how individual and organizational interests influence partnerships between local police departments and Muslim communities as they plan outreach efforts. In support of this, the following research questions are addressed:

1. What are the goals of police and Muslim leaders in planning outreach?
2. How are outreach efforts planned and negotiated by police and Muslim community leaders?

Significance of the Study

This research has implications to both academic theory and professional practice. In the theoretical realm it will add to the literature on planning theory as well as that on community policing. On the practical side, it offers benefits to law enforcement personnel, community

leaders, and policy makers regarding the development and institutionalization of police-community outreach efforts.

Cervero and Wilson (2006) have gone to significant lengths to illustrate the political nature of planning educational opportunities for adults. Despite a historical tradition that suggests the development and execution of these planning efforts takes place in a linear, logical fashion, Cervero and Wilson have described a reality in which a great deal takes place beyond these step-by-step descriptions. Moving past these historical limitations, Cervero and Wilson describe planning through the "four central concepts that can account for the world that planners experience: power, interests, negotiation, and responsibility" (Cervero & Wilson, 1994b, in the 2006 discussion, *responsibility* has become *ethical commitment*). This emphasis on power, politics and whose interests are represented needs to be studied further, especially as it pertains to aspects of government planning and the effect it has on the communities they serve. Not surprisingly, related concerns are a core issue regarding community policing for some commentators, with varying areas of emphasis (Brogden, 2004; Brogden & Nijhar, 2005; Lyon, 1999; Myhill, 2006). Using the Cervero and Wilson model of program planning further emphasizes its academic utility as well as illustrates its ability to describe government and community efforts in a language that accurately represents what actually occurs in the realm of community policing.

Similarly, this use of the Cervero and Wilson model also offers a new and practical framework through which law enforcement and community leaders can consider the development of their outreach efforts as practitioners, viewing these efforts as educational activities which can be better understood, and therefore, more effectively conducted. Despite the negative connotations often associated with discussions of power and politics, it should not

be assumed that such terms carry some inherently nefarious value. Indeed, it is hoped that this case study-based research may present a type of "best practices" summary for those involved in similar fields who seek to plan outreach partnerships. The outcome of this study should therefore prove useful, and decision-makers in police agencies and in Muslim communities can benefit by better understanding the process that takes place when the police and community leaders plan outreach efforts.

This is especially relevant now as Muslim communities in particular are affected by the shifting priorities and emphases that have accompanied the "War on Terror," with increased government scrutiny. While the importance of partnerships between Muslim communities and law enforcement have been repeatedly recognized in research and professional opinions, very little has been done to systematically study how these efforts are planned. There is therefore a very practical use for a more full description of these partnership efforts and what they accomplish in the eyes of both the community and the police.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

In order to facilitate this research into the planning of outreach between police and Muslim communities in the USA and the UK, four types of literature are reviewed. First, to help set the context for the discussions that take place in this research, a succinct overview of the theories supporting community policing are also provided as an introduction, with a special emphasis on writing that incorporates discussion of police service to Muslim communities in the West. Following that introduction, three more areas germane to the topic at hand are reviewed: (a) multiculturalism and multicultural education; (b) historical discussions in Islam concerning participation in non-Islamic systems of government; and (c) Cervero and Wilson's planning theory.

Community Policing

The prevalence of community policing and its tenets as a guiding philosophy in the practice of the American and British criminal justice systems is substantial. In 1996 Sadd and Grinc observed that "community policing could arguably be called the new orthodoxy of law enforcement in the United States. It has become an increasingly popular alternative to what many police administrators perceive as the failure of traditional policing" (Sadd & Grinc, 1996, p. 1). Innes notes that "a 'new' community policing movement has emerged in the UK" (2005, p. 157), bolstered by support from the national government and now called "Neighborhood Policing," a policing philosophy now entrenched in all of England and Wales (Spalek, El Awa, & McDonald, 2009). Mastrofski, noting that there is indeed disagreement regarding the purpose of community policing, offered his succinct view when he observed in 1993 that "I take it [community policing] in the broadest sense to mean any concerted endeavor to bring together the

police of a jurisdiction and those in that jurisdiction who are not the police (the shorthand for which is the "community")" (Mastrofski, 1993, p. 65). This "bringing together" suggests the importance of human relationships in the process. It is this element of community policing—the human interactions and relationships—that is most pertinent to the study discussed here.

Unfortunately, this collaborative public safety ethic is challenging in application for police forces in the USA and the UK (Innes, 2005; Vito, Walsh, & Kenselman, 2004). Additionally, modern realities faced by police in democratic countries—such as the "War on Terror"—are seen as threatening the continuing practice of community policing (Murray, 2005). This happens despite recognition by many that community policing is indeed worthwhile: "Having a distinctly proactive emphasis, community policing has proven to be a dramatic improvement to the traditional model of policing that is essentially reactive" (Murray, 2005, p. 347-348).

The community policing philosophy is not without its critics and issues. For example, Vito, Walsh, and Kunselman (2004) observed that while "linkage with the community and engaging in partnership with its residents is a major element of community policing" (p. 9), police middle managers have emphasized the experienced difficulties in acquiring and sustaining community involvement in the process. Alluding to a political dimension and questions of power, Brogden pointedly criticized that "police-community forums… for the most part are dominated by the police organizations and come to promote police goals, not community goals" (2004, p. 636), and also overly represent the desires "of a local business or socio-economic elite rather than of the wider community" (p. 636). Brogden and Nijhar (2005) offer "ten myths of community policing" (pp. 46-83) gleaned from their review of literature, and stress that the philosophy of community policing "depends on the qualified acceptance of a number of

mythologies about police models and practices in Anglo-American societies" (p. 47). They also point out, however, "while much is flawed" with community policing, "much is also of value" (p. 47). Despite its detractors, foundational aspects of community policing have been shown to work. Most importantly for the purpose here, Myhill (2006) notes in his review of American (as well as British, to a lesser degree) police community engagement literature that there is "strong positive evidence" (p. 21) that community engagement—a function in the USA of community policing—improves both relations between the public and the police and also improves community perception of the police.

While insufficient academic work has been done in this area in the United States and the United Kingdom, the importance of positive police-Muslim community relationships has been recognized. Two quite useful studies have been conducted that address, at least in part, police-Muslim relations in the United States (Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, & Miller, 2006; Ramirez, O'Connell, & Zafar, 2004). Additionally, at least two US police practitioners have authored theses that address the topic to varying degrees (Jensen, 2006; Stainbrook, 2006).

Ramirez, O'Connell, and Zafar (2004) point out the importance of partnerships between communities and police by noting that:

> When federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies develop partnerships with members of the American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities, they obtain cultural and linguistic insights, information, cooperation, and informed observations that can become part of a productive strategy for crime prevention as well as a catalyst for respectful policing. (p. 4)

Their study represents a broad study of the police-Muslim (as well as Arab and Sikh) community dynamic in several areas in the United States (Southeastern Michigan, Southern California, and

Boston), the emphasis on partnership, and also for their follow up efforts to describe what has happened in some of the studied areas since (see, for example, *The Greater Boston Experience Follow Up Case Study*, Ramirez, O'Connell, & Zafar, 2005). In a limited sample study—which the authors concede is "intended solely as fodder for conversations" (2005, p. 5)—Ramirez, O'Connell, and Zafar conducted interviews and surveys while looking at the Boston experience in particular. They found that Arab and Muslim community respondents felt, for example that "both community and law enforcement respondents… recognize the usefulness of building relationships between the Muslim, Arab, and Sikh American communities and law enforcement…" (p. 14), and that "a majority of law enforcement and community respondents felt that establishing relationships could have a positive impact on both hate crime and terrorism prevention at the national and regional/local levels" (p. 15).

Similarly, Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, and Miller stress that "local police agencies should prioritize initiating or improving communications and dialogue with the Arab American community" (2006, p. 25). Both studies (Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, & Miller, 2006; Ramirez, O'Connell, & Zafar, 2004) refer to the tenets of community policing and stress that they offer a law enforcement philosophy that should be utilized to build positive relationships between police and Muslim communities in the United States. They do not, however, suggest that such efforts towards partnership are without challenges. Ramirez, O'Connell, and Zafar (2004), for example, point to issues such as a limited history of partnership between police and Muslims, Arabs, and Sikhs, misunderstanding on the part of both the police and the community about one another, and concerns about immigration enforcement, as barriers to collaboration. They note, however, that "these challenges… are not insurmountable and have been overcome in a number of jurisdictions" (p. 10).

Jensen (2006) sought to investigate the effectiveness of successful community policing outreach efforts in the African-American community when those same techniques were used in immigrant Muslim communities. Jensen observed that "the true best practice learned from this research is the importance of building trust with the community being served" (2006, p. 92). However, Jensen also noted the importance of adaptability on the part of police, and pointed out that his research found that the characteristics of outreach programs designed for the African-American community do not necessarily translate on the whole into effective programs for immigrant Muslim communities. Interestingly, Jensen describes focus group surveys given to East African Muslims by the St. Paul, Minnesota police regarding the community's opinion of police, including questions on trust, the police role, and the ability of police to help the community. The survey was conducted five months after the department's outreach program to area Muslims began in 2005. While limited in sample size, all respondents noted they "strongly agree" or "agree" that they trust the police department, and responded similarly when asked if the "police serve my community well" (pp. 71-74). All surveys were offered in both English and Somali.

Stainbrook (2006), while also using a limited sample study, found that the perception of Muslims towards law enforcement in the United States has become more negative since September 11th, 2001. Like other authors (for example, see Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, & Miller, 2006; Jensen, 2006), he stressed the importance of education for law enforcement personnel about the Muslim community and noted that "the impetus is on law enforcement officials to improve relationship with Muslim-American communities" (p. 23). Stainbrook, like Jensen (2006), stressed the importance of his research topic in the context of addressing terrorism.

It is not, however, only researchers (Ramirez, O'Connell, & Zafar, 2004; Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, & Miller, 2006) and police personnel (such as Jensen, 2006; Stainbrook, 2006) who advocate this anti-extremist utility in the USA. Salam Al-Marayati, the Executive Director of the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) in testimony to the House Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment noted that "understanding and partnering with the Muslim American community and its legitimate, authentic and credible leadership is the key to countering extremism and radicalization" (2007, ¶ 1). Al-Marayati stressed that community policing and partnerships form an important part of this effort, and discusses the responsibility of community organizations such as MPAC and the need for "an environment of mutual trust and respect" (2007, ¶ 4) between government agencies and the Muslim community with whom they seek to work.

In the UK, a variety of researchers and government reports have stressed the importance of positive relationships between police and Muslims communities. This is a formal function of the "Prevent" strand of the United Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategy (HM Government, 2009), and it has been discussed in recent research work by researchers such as Spalek, El Awa, and McDonald (2009), Spalek and Lambert (2008), Lambert (2008a; 2008b), and Innes (2005).

Of these authors, Lambert (2008a; 2008b) deserves special attention. As a researcher and as a retired member of the Metropolitan Police Service in London who himself conducted outreach with Muslim communities during his career, his academic and professional viewpoint is without equal in terms of experience and breadth. On his own, and in conjunction with Spalek (Spalek & Lambert, 2008), Lambert offers a compelling, research- and experience–based view of outreach that emphasizes a willingness to work with marginalized groups often eschewed by the media and political commentators. Lambert suggests that efforts by specialist police

personnel to build partnerships between police and Muslims offer a practical utility, especially in the counter-terrorism arena given current security concerns. However, at the same time he warns of the stigmatizing effect the discourse on this topic has in the UK, particularly as it seeks to marginalize "Salafi" and "Islamist" community members.

Lambert (2008a; 2008b) is insightful in his observation that the prioritization of some Muslim groups and their opinions in the UK over those seen as Salafi or Islamist effectively pits Muslims against Muslims in a race to define the correct public view of Islam. As this takes place in the very public forum of the media, it deserves attention. His comparison of this model to the experience of Protestant Christian and Catholic Christian communities during the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland serves a particularly useful purpose in helping to contextualize the current challenges as experienced by communities and police in terms of historical experiences not too long past. The media paints some Muslims as mainstream or moderate, offering them a platform from which to speak, while representing others as fringe, and this is therefore especially problematic:

> Such an extraordinary failure to acknowledge religious chasms as wide and significant as existed between Irish Catholic and Loyalist Protestant communities in Northern Ireland during the Troubles is symptomatic of a secular media establishment bias that willfully ascribes legitimacy to quietist Muslim representatives. (Lambert, 2008b, p. 77)

Lambert suggests that using a commentator from one Muslim group to publically disparage another is like appointing "the Reverend Ian Paisley" to the public position of a "'mainstream Christian advisor' when considering a complaint on behalf of Irish Catholic Communities," an action which would show "a crass willingness to inflame religious sensibilities and intra-community tensions" (p. 77).

Innes (2006) specifically stresses the importance of neighborhood policing (or "NP," which he directly links to the idea of community policing; see Innes, 2005; 2006) in working with Muslim communities to improve the flow of intelligence from communities to police. Innes based his research on interviews with police personnel and Muslims, and concludes that:

> The particular advantages of NP are that it provides local communities with a degree of collective influence over how they are policed and that in acting to address locally defined problems, neighborhood police officers are well placed to generate trust and collect community intelligence. (p. 239)

Innes stresses this role as dependent upon relationships between police and communities that engender trust, and notes that "it is an approach that, when compared with other alternatives, is more coherent with the key values of the liberal democratic tradition" (p. 239).

Spalek, El Awa, and McDonald (2009) offer a recent and thorough discussion of police working in conjunction with Muslim communities specifically for the purposes countering the danger of terrorism in the UK. Their in-depth and wide-ranging report was also based on interviews with Muslims and police personnel, as well as their observations of related meetings. They summarize that:

> At the heart of the findings is a recognition of partnerships as a vital process and mechanism for overcoming the complex challenges that are faced and in the development of ways to create security in its most broad and humane sense. (p. 84)

They additionally illustrate that their research emphasizes several key issues. These include "a focus on trust-building, equality and mutual benefit" in partnerships, "space, recognition and acceptance of diverse political and religious beliefs and identities," as well as "emotion, political and social grievance, religion and spirituality and personal perspectives" (pp. 84-85). In their

view, this type of work involves "open channels of honest, long-term communication" and the ability to "negotiate conflict and differing goals or values," but "without compromising the fundamental standpoint of partners" (p. 85). While more in-depth than Lambert (2008a; 2008b) or Innes (2005), it is worth noting that Spalek, El Awa, and McDonald's findings support the consensus from Innes and Lambert that community-based partnerships based on trust are key to countering the threat of violent extremism in the UK.

Islam and Multiculturalism in the West

As several authors outside of the criminal justice researcher/practitioner realm illustrate, the study of Islam in "the West"—especially The United Kingdom and the United States—has taken on a new interest since September 11th, 2001(Ba-Yunus & Kone, 2006; Leonard, 2003; Lyon, 2005; Modood, 2005). In this era of heightened interest in the study of Islam, its history, and relationship to the West, many writers stress the place and impact of a variety of theories of multiculturalism in this particular context (Abbas, 2005a; 2005b; Brighton, 2007; Modood, 2005; Tibi, 2001). This is not to suggest that all of these authors embrace similar ideas of what constitutes "multiculturalism," nor does it suggest that this is an insular field of concern unrelated to other world issues. It is important to recognize the worldwide nature of this topic. Tahir Abbas stresses this particularly in the case of Muslims in the UK, noting also how those issues are international in nature, and particularly relevant now:

> In the post-September 11 climate, British Muslims are at the forefront of questions that turn on what it means to be British or English: issues on the global agenda as well as local area concerns in relation to 'community cohesion', citizenship and multicultural and integration philosophy. (Abbas, 2005a, p. 16)

And while the importance of interaction between police and Muslims communities must not be seen exclusively through the lens of anti-terrorism efforts, the events of September 11th do underscore the current relevance of these relationships in the minds of many, as evidenced by the content of testimony of police and Muslim leaders in Washington (for example, Downing, 2007; Al-Marayati, 2007). Unfortunately, this anti-terror emphasis also overshadows many positive accomplishments, allowing the media and researchers to emphasize this aspect of the study of Islam to such a degree that the topic of terrorism nearly has a stranglehold on any current discussion of Islam in the West (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007; Jacoby & Yavuz, 2008). Sadly, "with few exceptions, when the Western media talks about Islam and Muslim culture, discussion tends to center on religious extremism and global terrorism" (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007, p. 1).

In order to understand where these areas converge—government, Islam, multiculturalism, and the West—some additional areas must be discussed. The term "the West" is used in this context because of its familiarity, and is specifically, but not exclusively, used to refer to the United Kingdom *and* the United States. The history of Islam in the USA and the UK will be briefly covered, as will the term "multiculturalism," and related ideas that have been discussed both in theory and in practice. Lastly, Islam, cultural understanding, and the climate towards Muslim communities in the USA and the UK since the events of September 11 are briefly reviewed, along with a commentary on how ideas like "cultural competence" might be understood to assist in improving relations between governments in the West and the Muslims citizenry they serve. In particular, this is discussed in terms of the applicability of efforts to promote cultural understanding in "Western," democratic police forces—an area in which it might be argued such understanding is most needed, both for the police and the Muslim communities in which they work.

Muslims in the United Kingdom

The influence of Islam in what eventually became the UK has a surprisingly long history. Hussain (2004) refers to coins minted in the area in the 8th and 9th centuries that mention tenets of Islam, one of which is inscribed with the phrase *bismallah* (the Muslim injunction in Arabic: "in the name of God"). Hussain notes there is evidence that there were "trading and diplomatic contacts" with Muslims during the reign of Elizabeth I, and "that there was a small presence of Muslims on the British Isles since the 16th Century" (2004, p. 376). Early Muslim visitors and residents were brought to the coastal area of the UK by sea commerce, and by the early 19th century, some had elected to stay (Hewer 1996; Hussain, 2004; Peach, 2005). By 1889 Britain had built its first mosque, located in Woking (Hewer, 1996). In Britain after World War I there were approximately 11,000 Muslims, and after World War II Muslims from the outlying Commonwealth lands were actively invited to come to the UK to help in rebuilding the nation (Hewer, 1996). Using the 2001 UK census and the current estimate of 1.6 Muslims living in the UK, Peach (2005) extrapolates a useful picture of past populations and growth. Peach estimates that the population "rose from about 21,000 in 1951 to 55,000 in 1961, a quarter of a million in 1971, nearly 600,000 in 1981, [and] a million in 1991" (Peach, 2005, p. 23). Islam currently represents the second most populous religion in the UK, after Christianity (Peach, referring to the 2001 UK census).

Peach refers again to the 2001 census when he notes that slightly more than two-thirds of the Muslim population in England and Wales ethnically originates from South Asia—43% of them from Pakistan (2005, p. 20). The remaining percentage includes Muslims whose ancestry is rooted in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Arab countries. The influence of the ethnically Pakistani community is reflected in terms used such as "Islamabad" (Lewis, 2002) to describe the British

city of Bradford. Peach suggests that as many as 87% of mosques are Sunni, and notes that "The overwhelming majority of Muslims in Britain are from the Sunni tradition" (Peach, 2005, p. 28).

Unfortunately, "the broad picture confirms that Muslims as a whole occupy an underprivileged position" in England and Wales (Peach, 2005, p. 29). More specifically, Muslims of Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent occupy one of the poorest, if not *the* poorest, ethnic economic positions in British society (Anwar, 2005; Peach, 2005, referring to the 2001 UK census). The statistics are sobering: while only 39% of the general population in Great Britain reports making less than £20,000, 61% of Muslims claim the same (Pew Research, p. 19, 2007, citing Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006). According to 2001 census citizens of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin are the least represented in the "higher managerial professions," most represented in unemployment, and have the highest representation of persons without "educational qualifications" (Peach, 2005, citing the 2001UK census). The factors are especially disconcerting when we remember the extremely strong representation of Muslims in the UK ethnically of South Asian origin.

Muslims in the United States of America

While there has been contentious evidence that Muslims may have traveled to what would become America before even Columbus (Nyang, 1999), Islam is generally thought to have been introduced on a long-term and large-scale basis to the United States by Africans very early in the nation's history as a religion among slaves (Curtis, 2004; Leonard, 2003; Turner, 1997). Nyang (1999) suggests that at least 10% of slaves brought to America were Muslims, although the overall number is unknown (Diouf, 1998). Turner (1997) does an excellent job of recounting the stories of a variety of early Africans living in the USA whose stories or likenesses

are captured in early American writing and art, which emphasizes that their religion was a known (if misunderstood) point of identity at the time.

It does not appear likely, however, that this first strand of the faith lasted in a continuous line that maintained the religion in America (Diouf, 1998; Nyang, 1999). In other words, Islam as brought to America during the slave trade does not appear to have made any continuous connection with the faith that developed in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Islam was "reintroduced" after the end of slavery in the United States in several ways, to include: an influx of Arab Muslim immigrants from the Middle East in the late 1800s; the development of a particularly African-American versions of Islam (such as the "Nation of Islam") that often bore little relation at this point to the historical religion in the early 1900s; and South Asian Muslims arriving at approximately the same time (Curtis, 2004; Leonard, 2003).

Leonard offers a distinction in her discussion of the history of Islam in the United States by discussing it in terms of three specific groups, correlating broadly to the three most populous ethnicities of the Muslims found in the United States: African American, Arab, and South Asian (Leonard, 2003). Curtis (2004) divides the modern population in the United States similarly, and suggests that perhaps 25-40 % of American Muslims are African American, 30% are of South Asian origin, and 25% are ethnically Arab. The remaining ethnicities, such as Iranians, Europeans, and Southeast Asians, etc., each make up a smaller percentage of the number of Muslims in the USA. Ba-Yunus and Kone conducted a study in which their sample suggested that about 32% of American Muslims are ethnically Arab, 29% are African American, nearly 29% are South Asian, 5% are Turks, and 2% are Bosnian or Iranian (2006, p. 39), and estimate that approximately 5.745 million Muslims live in the USA (p. 37).

The current population of Muslims in the United States is actually much debated, but "estimates range from 2-8 million" (Curtis, 2004, p. 707). Bukhari (2003) offers a succinct review of several studies regarding the population size of Muslims in the USA, and finds a fairly similar overall range. Unlike in the UK, religion has not been made a part of the census in the USA, and therefore more exact numbers about the Muslim population are not available and estimates "are left to nongovernmental organizations and other interested groups" (Ba-Yunus & Kone, 2006, p. 28). Looking solely at sums and percentages misses a point that is recognized and illuminated by Bukhari: "No other country [other than the United States] has such a rich diversity of Muslims; perhaps the only parallel is the annual Hajj in Saudi Arabia… The American Muslim community is a microcosm of the Muslim world" (2003, p. 9, referring to the 2001 "Project MAPS" conducted by Georgetown University).

Unlike the situation in the UK, American Muslims tend to be very much like their fellow Americans in terms of educational attainment and income, although Muslims are slightly less likely to be homeowners than other Americans (Pew Research, 2007). It is illuminating to compare this situation to that of Muslims in Great Britain, Germany, France, and Spain, who tend "to be much less affluent relative to the general population of those nations" (Pew Research, p. 19). Leonard points out that "while Arabic-speakers often dominate as imams… in mosques and educational settings, South Asians have a higher socioeconomic profile and are arguably more privileged in American society" (2003, p. 5). Note that this contradicts the position of South Asian Muslims in the UK we have already reviewed.

The Effect of September 11th on Muslims in the West

While there was certainly an interest in Islam in the United States prior to 2001, Ba-Yunus and Kone note that "September 11 began a new page in American Islamic history" (2006,

p. ix). Unfortunately, much of the attention in the USA and the UK has not been positive, and in many instances has been manifested in what is now often called "Islamophobia"—seen by many as directly affected by the events of 9/11 (see the discussion in Abbas, 2005a), although prejudices against Muslim minorities were existent prior to the events of September 11 (see discussions in Pontying & Mason, 2007; Amin, 2003). Weller (2006) conducts an excellent review of the term "Islamophobia," finding that the term had its roots in the early 1990s in the USA, as well as sources of proof of the actual existence of the phenomenon—both pre- and post-9/11.

There has been a corresponding sense that since 9/11 there has been an increase in the victimization of Muslims (Cainkar, 2002; 2004; Modood, 2005; Spalek, 2002b), as well as a perception that governments, both in the UK and the USA, have singled out Muslims for government surveillance or law enforcement actions (Cainkar, 2002; 2004; Pew Research, 2007). Even more specifically, a poll published in 2007 reflected that 53% of American Muslims feel it has been harder to be a Muslim in the USA since 9/11; 54% believe Muslims are singled out in government anti-terrorism efforts; 9% report being singled out by police; and 30% of those who have flown report being singled out by security personnel in airports (Pew Research, 2007). Muslims in the UK have also felt the pressure, additionally since the terrorist attacks in London in 2005 (Abbas, 2007; Khan, 2009).

A great deal has been written about the need for multicultural understanding (or cultural competence) regarding Muslims citizens and others who reside in the United States and the United Kingdom. The collection of related writing ranges from those which discuss Islam and multiculturalism (or considering and understanding culture) in the West specifically (examples include Abbas, 2005b; Lewis, 2002; Lyon, 2005; Modood, 2005), to those that specifically

address providing service to Muslims (Hodge, 2005; Morioka-Douglas, Sacks, & Yeo, 2004; O'Hagan, 2001), to those that specifically address cultural concerns for law enforcement serving Muslim communities (Ammar, 2000; Briggs, Fieschi, & Lownsbrough, 2006; Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, & Miller, 2006Jackson, 2006; Sharp, 2002; Spalek, 2002a, 2002b; Shusta, Levine, Harris & Wong, 2002). Literature on these topics ranges from "how-to" books for professionals to research published in reviewed journals. But perhaps the importance of this topic is best emphasized by the opinion expressed by Muslims worldwide in the monumental Gallup poll discussed by Esposito and Mogahed (2007). In it, the authors stress that "Muslims around the world say that the one thing the West can do to improve relations with their societies is to moderate their views and respect Islam" (p. xiii).

From the wealth and diversity of discussions that have taken place, there can be no question that a need for more effort and understanding exists, particularly in terms of government-Muslim community relations, and that the training of police personnel is one of the suggested strategies. For example, Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, and Miller stress that both police and Arab community (obviously including, but not limited to Muslims) leaders place importance on training. They note that law enforcement personnel in the USA ask for "training on religious and cultural issues," such as "Arab culture; basic Arabic words; [and] customary behaviors, such as how to enter a mosque" (2006, p. 25). Similarly, Ammar (2000) calls for better training to help police officers in the United States serve Muslim communities.

An Overview of Multicultural Education

One of the most pressing difficulties is trying to nail down an idea of "multiculturalism" that can be made into something actionable in the modern world, trying to address issues of inequality, marginalization, resources management, distrust, ethnocentrism, and

misunderstanding, especially as these topics related to police-Muslim community relationships and understanding. Multiculturalism as a term has a variety of applications in different fields, with diverse meanings, the effect of which we see as "resulting in a certain amount of theoretical and conceptual confusion" (Galli, 2003, pp. 183-184). Indeed, "Multiculturalism is a political movement as well as a set of philosophical, social, and political ideas" (Arthur, 2003, p. 413). Therefore, one can find discussions of multiculturalism in a variety of contexts. For example: in terms of social justice (Craig, 2007); as an applied political theory or as a political issue (Abbas, 2005b; Modood, 2005; Tibi, 2001); as an educational issue (Moore, Madison-Colmore, & Collins, 2005; Scott, 2004); as an applied issue viewed through anthropology (Lyon, 2005); and in the context of policing in democratic societies (Chui & Ip, 2005).

Cultural Competence

The medical field and related service and "caring professions" (see the use of this term in O'Hagan, 2001) have developed their own field of research and discussion in a usefully related term—cultural competence (for examples of overviews of the term see Betancourt, Green, Carrillo, & Ananeh-Firepong, 2003; Brach & Fraserirector, 2000). There may indeed also be cross utilization of the idea of cultural competence and multicultural education. In at least one instance the term "cross-cultural competence" is used to refer to a needed skill that supports "multicultural education" (McAllister & Irvine, 2000). Jensen in his study of community policing in the East African Muslim community in St. Paul, Minnesota, points out that "the complexity of culture in new immigrant communities requires law enforcement to go beyond traditional community policing efforts to attain acceptable levels of cultural competency" (Jensen, 2006, p. v)

The "seminal" reference to the effect of culture on medical care is attributed to a 1978 article (Kleinman, Eienbuerg, & Good, cited in Brach & Fraserirector, 2000, p. 182), and the root of the general definition of cultural competence is associated with Cross, Bazron, Dennis, and Isaacs, in their 1989 work "Towards a Culturally Competent System of Care," from whom most definitions have developed (Cross, Bazron, Dennis, & Isaacs, 1989; Brach & Fraserirector, 2000). Cross, et al. suggested that "cultural competence is a set of congruent behaviors, attitudes, and policies that come together in a system, agency, or among professionals and enables that system, agency, or those professionals to work effectively in cross-cultural situations" (Cross, Bazron, Dennis, & Isaacs, 1989, p. 13).

A variety of additional definitions for cultural competency exist (Brach & Fraserirector, 2000). Some are attractively simple: "Cultural competence is the ability to maximize sensitivity and minimize insensitivity in the service of culturally diverse communities" (O'Hagan, 2001, p. 235). Alternatively, in the medical field a culturally competent system has been "defined as one that acknowledges and incorporates—at all levels—the importance of culture, assessment of cross cultural relations, vigilance toward the dynamics that result from cultural differences, expansion of cultural knowledge, and adaptation of services to meet culturally unique needs" (Betancourt, Green, Carrillo, & Ananeh-Firempong, 2003). The "framework" for cultural competence provided by Betancourt et al. (2003) includes three levels of interventions: *organizational* (diversity in leadership and employees)*, structural* (having systems, i.e. interpreters, in place that support multicultural needs), and *clinical* (training for the providers themselves). Alternatively, Brach and Fraserirector (2000), in a review of related literature, found evidence of nine techniques (which ran across the spectrum of the Betancourt, Green, Carrillo, & Ananeh-Firempong framework, 2003) used by health care providers.

A common theme we can stress for the purpose here is that the definitions and applications of the idea are worded in a way that would not preclude its adoption by other public service providers—namely, law enforcement. Unfortunately, most literature on cultural competence focuses on only one facet of the field, making it difficult for practitioners to "possess an overview of the options available to them" (Brach & Fraserirector, 2000, pp. 184-185). Some of those options include using interpreters, hiring and keeping minority staff, training, and cultural immersion (Brach & Fraserirector, 2000), all ideas that have clear utility to government service.

Therefore, perhaps the idea of cultural competency has more relevance for the current discussion, and especially as it relates to the goals of government in its service to citizens, than the historical application of the term multicultural education. The term "cultural competency," while strongly rooted in the medical professions, has been used in government as well. A 2005 Vera Institute of Justice study supported by the US Department of Justice described the efforts of the New York Police Department to build cultural competence for police interacting with three specific immigrant groups, including Arab Americans (Khashu, Busch, Latif, & Levy, 2005). Indeed, in that same study an Arab American focus group specifically identified "cultural competence training" as a priority (p.14). Importantly, at least in the medical and related fields, cultural competence has been shown to be something that can be taught and can have a positive effect. Beach, et al., in their analysis of existing literature regarding the effectiveness of cultural competence interventions for health care providers, found strong evidence that it "improves the knowledge of health professionals," "improves the attitudes of skills of health care professionals," and "impacts patient satisfaction" (2005, p. 356).

Utility in Serving Muslim Communities

The relationship government has with promoting, supporting, and defining multiculturalism is important, but also leads to a vexing question: Just what does this term mean when it is used by government officials, both as political rhetoric and as a theoretical plan for peace within communities? As Lyon highlights the challenge in the case of Muslims communities and government in the West, multiculturalism is one of the:

> Pervasive ambiguities in terms often used by politicians but rarely defined… By invoking poorly defined terms to justify a remarkable array of activities, and, further, by suggesting that we all must share in these values, *the state puts at risk the very concept of multiculturalism*. (2005, p. 79, emphasis added)

Thus, we note through Lyon a reference to the high stakes involved when government treads into this realm—however needed and important that trip might be.

As we have seen, there is evidence to suggest that cultural competency training works (Beach, Price, Gary, Robinson, Gozu, Palacio, Smarth, Jenckes, Feuerstien, Bass, Powe, & Cooper, 2005), and that it is considered important in the "caring professions" and in particular has a purpose in the support of service to Muslim communities in the West (O'Hagan, 2001). What this leaves out is a research-based plan, and expected results, particularly suited to the needs of helping professions and the communities of Muslims they serve. It is not enough to point out that misunderstandings exist between cultures and that those misunderstandings can cause real-world problems and need to be addressed. Aronson, Venable, Sievking, and Miller highlight this issue well when they note that "While there is convergence of opinion as to the *need* of intercultural awareness, there is no such agreement about the *means* to teach it" (Aronson, Venable, Sievking, & Miller, 2005, p. 17). The challenging nature of this issue is

even further underlined by the realization that training efforts, no matter how well intentioned or progressive, to change cultural awareness, may not necessarily work (Aronson, Venable, Sievking, & Miller 2005; Chan, 1997), or may only have only moderately successful results (Foster, Newburn, & Souhami, 2005).

This is not to suggest that training on cultural issues cannot be successful. Referring to training in the medical field on cultural competence, Genao, Bussey-Jones, Brady, Branch, and Corbie-Smith stress that "there is an urgent need for the incorporation of nationally accepted standards and guidelines on cultural competence training" (2003, p.139). Perhaps the same is needed in government training on similar topics. As Cross, Bazron, Dennis, and Isaacs noted in 1989, "no matter how proficient an agency may become [in cultural competency], there is always room for improvement" (p. 13). As a reflection of this, they note that cultural competency can be viewed as occurring along a continuum, and not just as a final ideal state. The points along the continuum (in ascending order) are described by Cross, et al., as described as *cultural destructiveness, cultural incapacity, cultural blindness, cultural pre-competence, cultural competence,* and *cultural proficiency*. It may indeed be very useful for government policy makers to consider the abilities of their personnel in working with Muslim communities in the same way, and to consider how they can help them move further along this continuum.

There is good reason to be optimistic regarding the possibilities. In the same way the health field has recognized that "Cultural competence has emerged as an important goal for very practical reasons" (Betancourt, 2004, p. 953), government service providers have recognized that the ability to work with, and within, the Muslim communities they serve is paramount. Ibarra notes that "Multicultural societies pose particular challenges for liberal democratic nations, challenges especially encountered by their police departments" (2003, p. 157). This need for

cultural understanding regarding Islam within caring professions—and specifically police forces—has been recognized both in the USA (Ammar, 2000; Hodge, 2005), and the UK (Briggs, Fieschi, & Lownsbrough, 2006; Foster, Newburn, & Souhami, 2005; O'Hagan, 2001). Betancourt, for example points out that overcoming issues of trust and historically negative experience are factors that can be addressed via cultural competence training in the medical field (2003, p. 954). Extremely similar issues must be overcome in other caring professions, perhaps most acutely with the police. With the new challenges faced by both Muslims and the police in the West since 9/11, it requires little imagination to understand why similar training with comparable goals would benefit police as well. Certainly there is evidence that suggests that police both in the United States and in the United Kingdom display shortcomings in their ability to interact with and within the Muslim, Arab, or South Asian communities they serve. These examples range from evidence of outright racism and prejudice, to poor decision-making based on a lack of understanding, to a reluctance to engage police services for fear of deportment (Ammar, 2000; Cainkar, 2004; Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, & Miller, 2006; Khasu, Busch, Latif, & Levy, 2005). But on the positive side, examples of understanding have shown evidence of making a positive difference in police-Muslim community relations (Briggs, Fieschi, & Lownsbrough, 2006; Foster, Newburn, & Souhami, 2005; Khasu, Busch, Latif, & Levy, 2005), illustrating that specifically in terms of relations with police, there is a better—even if not optimal—situation for which both the government and Muslim communities can strive, and education and training are part of the answer.

Discussions in Islam on Participation in Non-Islamic Government

Because community policing requires that police departments and the communities they serve work together, it is important to consider the permissibility of the participation of Muslims

in non-Islamic systems of government, itself a topic of historical debate. While evidence exists to support several diverse points of view, an important line of discourse has developed in Islam that not only supports the idea of Muslims living in non-Muslim lands, but in some instances suggests that participation in government is obligatory for Muslims who do. The permissibility of Muslims to live in non-Islamic countries and participate in non-Islamic systems of government is therefore an important and relevant topic of discussions among Muslim writers. While it may be easy to dismiss this line of inquiry as academic rhetoric, this discussion is not just a theoretical one; it is a real issue of interest for Muslims, Islamic thinkers, and religious leaders at many practical levels. Muqtedar Khan (2004), for example, points out that in the 2000 United States presidential elections, Muslims in America were grappling with the issue of permissibility of participation in the American democratic system:

> The American Muslim community has traveled far on the path of democratization. *During the 2000 presidential elections the community was still debating the Islamic permissibility of participation in the American political system.* While Muslim political activists were expounding the virtues of voting… the intellectuals were busy establishing the compatibility of Islam and democracy and convincing Muslims that is was not only in their best interests exercise their franchise but is was good Islamic practice to participate… (2004, ¶ 1, emphasis added)

Muqtedar Khan's point emphasizes that questions concerning the permissibility of participation are an issue for Muslims in practice *and* theory, and that it is indeed a topic of significant import for Muslims living in the West today.

Although related discussions have been taking place throughout the history of Islam (see overviews in Abou El Fadl 1994a; 1994b; 1998; Hellyer, 2007; Hussain, 2004), the nature of the

discourse in the West has developed to a uniquely diverse point today. Abou El Fadl points out: "If history is any indication, the responses of Muslims living in America [regarding living in a non-Muslim land] promises to be no less vibrant or innovative [than historical discussions] and, definitely, no less diverse" (1998, p. 48). A wide variety of factors may be viewed as affecting the modern version of this dialogue, including the accessibility of religious knowledge in modern Islam (Mandaville, 2007), the changing nature of religious authority for modern Muslims (DeLorenzo, 2000), and the utilization of historical sources to the questions related to permissibility in application to countries that, prior to the 20th century, had limited populations of Muslims and have never historically been part of the *dār al-Islām* (Abou El Fadl, 1998; Hellyer, 2007; Hussain, 2004;).

Historical Discussions Regarding Participation

Despite historical discussions that have argued the contrary, a tradition has existed in Islam that suggests, perhaps quite simplistically, that Muslims should not live among non-Muslims and should of course not participate in non-Muslim governments (see the discussions of both sides in Abou El Fadl, 1994a; 1994b; 1998; Masud, 1990; Shadid & van Koningsveld, 1996, 2002). This understanding leads to "a great confusion among many contemporary scholars of various disciplines and backgrounds concerning the normative ideas of Islam about the position of Muslims living as a minority in a non-Muslim society or state" (Shadid & van Koningsveld, 1996, p. 88). Adding to this challenge, Abou El Fadl (1994a; 1994b) and Masud (1990) point to the various traditions within Islam regarding the responsibility (or lack of responsibility) of Muslims to migrate away from non-Islamic lands (which can be a foundational point from which to view the permissibility of participation), and how they may be seen as a

practical, personal, economic, or political arguments, perhaps more associated with geography, allegiances, and particular schools of law than with absolute arguments supported by the Qur'an.

The questions surrounding Muslims living in non-Muslim countries have a long—if not always prestigious nor prominent—history in Islam, and they include several related components. As Abou El Fadl (1994a; 1994b; 1998) points out in his excellent historical overviews of Muslims living as minorities, there are several facets to the discussion of this issue, one of which really starts to reflect on the heart of the matter at hand. This includes the following: (a) if Muslims are indeed permitted to reside in non-Muslim countries in the first place; (b) their relationship to *dār al-Islām*; and (c) "*the ethical and legal duties that these Muslims owe* to the *Shari'a* and *to their host non-Muslim polity*" (1994a, p. 141, emphasis added).

Dilwar Hussain (2004) suggests that there are in reality two issues tied to the topic of Muslim participation in non-Islamic government: (a) the permissibility of democracy in Islam; and (b) "sharing power as a minority with a non-Muslim authority" (p. 380). From Abou El Fadl (1994a, 1994b, 1998), and Dilwar Hussain (2004), we begin to see that the question of the "permissibility of participation" (as I refer to it) is interwoven with other historical questions, and related to other studies beyond the scope contained here. What the input of both of these authors provides, however, is recognition that several of these topics—democracy, the concepts of *dār al-ḥarb* and *dār al-Islām*, migration (*hijra*), and participation in non-Islamic government —are so important to one another as to almost ensure that the modern discussion of the permissibility of participation is necessarily linked to the other three. This interwoven linkage can be seen in the writings of several modern authors (who are discussed in greater depth momentarily) who discuss participation in non-Islamic systems of government, including

Ramadan (1999) and Al-Alwani (2003; "The Participation of Muslims in the American Political System," n.d.).

Discussion within the Different Madhhabs Concerning Migration

As might be expected from diverse legal traditions, there have been substantial differences between and *within* individual Islamic schools of law concerning the permissibility of Muslims living in non-Muslim lands. For example, Abou El Fadl notes that while the Maliki school was generally hostile to the idea of Muslims living outside Muslims lands, the Maliki thinker al-Qurtubi seemed to agree with the option if there was the *possibility* for Islam to become dominant (Abou El Fadl, 1994b). Other thinkers emphatically approved of living in non-Muslim countries, or even suggested it was *better*: "Indeed, if Muslim minorities judged that they were free enough (under non-Muslim rule) to spread the Islamic message and thus strengthen the Muslim cause, the Shafi'i jurists expressed a preference against migration" (Abou El Fadl, 1994b, p. 140) to Muslim-controlled areas. Additionally, there are *ḥadīth* that seem to offer the view that Muslims must emigrate to live among fellow Muslims, while others suggest "that the obligation to migrate ended with the conquest of Mecca" (Abou El Fadl, 1994b, p. 131). In general, El Fadl points out that while most jurists would historically prefer, "all things being equal," that Muslims lived under governments that recognized "the primacy of Islamic values," those same jurists "usually articulated (and articulate) a compromising approach" (p. 153).

Obviously, these questions have been asked for quite some time, and 1400 years of opportunity for discussion have not led to consensus answers, either in scholarly circles or in the minds of Western Muslims themselves. As Muqtedar Khan (2002) points out, "the American Muslim community is in its formative stages and is facing many contentious issues, such as whether to participate in American politics or not" (p. 84). And while this topic may be revisited

with more vigor recently (see Shadid & van Koningsveld, 1996, for an excellent understanding of the historical relation to this question), it is as old as the history of Islam itself. Abou El Fadl (1994b) makes an important point when he notes that:

> What is often overlooked by both Muslims and non-Muslims is this: Diversity of opinion on the status and obligation of Muslim minorities is characteristic not only of the contemporary Muslim community but for the history of Islamic juridical debate; *it is not as if some previous clarity or unity of opinion has been lost*. (p. 129, emphasis added)

With this background setting the context, the following overview done by Shadid and van Koningsveld (1996; 2002) are that much more appropriate.

Shadid and van Koningsveld (1996) have provided an extremely useful model through which to understand the historical era in which these varieties of opinions have developed (1996). Within this framework they offer a historical overview that recognizes that "different answers *provoked by various historical circumstances* were crystallized as precedents in Islamic jurisprudence" (1996, p. 89, emphasis added). In short, the questions concerning emigration and Muslims living among non-Muslims were spurred on by instances of historical necessity. They point out that, in this historical context, there have been four phases in which these questions have been addressed: (a) when *individual* Muslims live in non-Muslims countries (by choice, force, or necessity); (b) when *areas* of Muslims were invaded by non-Muslims; (c) when Muslim *governments* were overthrown by non-Muslims; and (d) and "*mainly during the postcolonial period*" and its relation to the "*emergence of the phenomenon of Islamism*" (pp. 89-95). They add that modern discussions of the same issues in the West are "a continuation, within a new historical context, of the above-mentioned age-old tradition of Islamic jurisprudence" (p. 95).

Modern Discussions

Perhaps it only makes sense that with such a long, and at times confusing, history of dialogue on the ability of Muslims to live in non-Muslims lands and participate in non-Islamic systems of government, the discussion continues. Modern thinkers, as one would expect, take both sides of the argument and offer a wide variety of views and supporting documentation for their sentiments, and there is clearly no consensus. When this is considered along with the changing nature of authority in modern Islam and the growing access of Muslims to non-traditional sources of knowledge, it is not surprising that this discussion remains pertinent to modern Muslims.

The Modern Context of Participation in Non-Islamic Governments

As "thirty to forty percent of the world's more than one billion Muslims live in countries with a non-Muslim majority" (Bukhari, 2003, p. 17), the question of participation in non-Islamic government (to include, in the application here, governments not led by Muslims) takes on a very practical urgency. This question of participation is occurring in a new context for Muslims in the West, despite the seemingly similar circumstances Muslim in history may have faced. As Lewis (1993) points out, the modern trend of a large number of Muslims voluntarily leaving their homelands in order to migrate to countries that were never in the past part of the *dār al-Islām* is a relatively new phenomenon that does not have a direct historical precedent. Therefore:

> Not surprisingly, the possibility never seems to have entered their minds [the Islamic jurists] that a Muslim would voluntarily leave a Muslim land in order to place himself in this predicament [emigrating to mostly Christian countries never under Muslim control]. There have always been small groups… but until recent years these were infinitesimally few in number and not remotely comparable with

> the unending flow through the centuries of travelers of every kind from Christendom to the lands of Islam. (Lewis, 1993, p. 56)

Obviously, Muslims have left their homelands *en masse* at other times in history. What Lewis stresses, however, is the sheer immensity of the number of Muslims migrating in modern times, and additionally that they are choosing to move to countries that have never been part of the *dār al-Islām* (in the restrictive view of the term some thinkers have employed). Ramadan (1999) similarly stresses that the sheer size of the Muslim population in Western Europe could not have been foreseen just a short time ago. Whatever the historical cause, this then, is a relatively recent phenomenon, and while Muslim authors use time-honored references to frame their answers, this fairly new historical reality should be seen as underlining the urgency and real-world applicability of the question at hand.

A Modern Argument against Participation in Western Government

Both modern and historical authors have argued that Muslims are not allowed to participate in non-Islamic systems of government nor live in non-Islamic lands. In a useful, but perhaps oversimplified model of some of the issues surrounding this discussion, Muqtedar Khan (2002) divides Muslims into two convenient categories regarding political activity in democratic government. Muqtedar Khan suggests that Muslims can be "isolationists" or "democrats" (p. 27). Muqtedar Khan stresses that isolationists derive support for their view from a variety of realities that face the *umma* in particular regarding the US government and its practices. These include unpopular US foreign policy (especially towards Muslim countries), and the "immoral, sexually decadent, greedy and exploitative" (p. 28) nature of American society, both in the USA and abroad. Perhaps most importantly, Muqtedar Khan points out that isolationists hold a view they see as based in *shari'ā:* that "participation in that system [US government] violates Allah's

decree in the *Qur'an* (5:45) that Muslims shall not rule by anything other than what Allah has decreed" (p. 28).

In this general theme that Islam and the Qur'an have provided all that is required, Asif Khan (2004) explicitly states in a booklet published in London that:

> The shariah hasn't left anything without a ruling from the Qur'an or the sunnah. *The Islamic shariah encompasses all the actions of man, completely and comprehensively, at every time and place…* Hence no Muslim has the right to claim that there are situations devoid of a shariah rule, where the shariah has completely disregarded such a situation and has not established evidence for it. (p. 9, emphasis added)

Asif Khan continues by suggesting that the *ḥadīth* and Qur'an make it known that what has not been discussed clearly in the revelation should not be investigated further: "So when something is not prohibited it is a pardon from Allah… i.e. Allah's silence about its prohibition denotes a pardon from Allah… so do not ask about it" (p. 13). Asif Khan uses this argument specifically regarding the themes of a fiqh of minorities. Asif Khan would thus refute Al-Alwani's contention that it is:

> No wonder [that] Muslims find themselves in a sea of confusion, faced as they are with differences in opinion among jurists: some—to varying degrees of strictness—citing differences between life in Muslim and non-Muslim societies… and others comparing the past and *ignoring the huge social and historic changes that have occurred*. The overall result of these mistaken methods has been to throw Muslims into confusion and disarray… *The problem of Muslim minorities can only be tackled with a fresh juristic vision*… (Khan, 2003, p. 7, emphasis added)

Asif Khan (2004) instead argues that this sentiment—that there may need to be changes in the way discussions of the applicability of *shari'ā* and *fiqh* take place for Muslims in the West—comes from lethargy on the part of some Muslim thinkers as well as misunderstanding.

In this vein, Asif Khan (2004) is clear in his opinion that participation in a non-Islamic system of government is historically forbidden in Islam, and remains so. In fact, he states that "such an action is one of the biggest transgressions against Allah… as it means ruling by kufr. If believed in, it makes the ruler a Kafir" (Khan, 2004, p. 24). Arguments similar to Asif Khan's provide a foundation for the opinion that to be part of a non-Islamic government in the West is anathema to Islam. Many modern authors look to the international group Hizb al-Tahrir ("party of liberation") as a leading example of this anti-non-Islamic government sentiment in the West (Khan, 2002; Hussain, 2004; Ramadan, 1999). As Dilwar Hussain points out, "The Hizb al-Tahrir typifies the anti-democratic, antiparticipation [sic] tradition. The solution is to work for the establishment of the Islamic State or *khilāfa*, but in a way that does not involve any participation with the 'kufr system'" (2004, p. 387).

Authors such as Asif Khan (2004) who are exponents of this or similar views strongly emphasize that what is good for Muslims and mankind *must* come from Islamic revelation, properly understood, and to look towards other extra- *shari'ā*/Islamic/Qur'anic sources for reasons to be part of a non-Islamic system of government is forbidden. This leads to criticisms of democracy in general and the American and British government systems in particular. Tamimi notes that Hizb al-Tahrir believes "that majority rule is considered un-Islamic because it could lead, as has happened in the West, to legalizing forbidden matters… The concept of public liberties, it is claimed, is the worst thing the democratic system has come up with" (2001, p. 183, referring to the Hizb al-Tahrir document *Ad-dimuqratiyah Nizam Kufr*, n.d.). It logically follows

that to participate in such as system would therefore be similarly scorned, as reflected by Asif Khan (2004).

Hizb al-Tahrir stresses that the developments of the four madhhabs and their great thinkers "must by no means controverted" (Ramadan, 1999, p. 141). Asif Khan (2004) seeks to directly answer modern Western Islamic thinkers such as Taha Jabir Al-Alwani and their belief that the plight of Muslims in the modern West have led to the need for Islamic thinkers to reconsider the roots of jurisprudence. Asif Khan suggests that modern "pragmatic" approaches to questions Western Muslims face are attempts "to reinvent shariah for those in the West"—attempting "to base their methodology on assumptions that do not stand up to reality, or to the nature of Islam" (p. 5). Asif Khan associates the beginning of this trend with 19th century Islamic thinkers such as Rifa'a al-Tahtawi and Muhammad Abduh, and points to a historical link between them and Al-Alwani's fiqh for minorities.

Modern Arguments for Participation in Western Government

Of course views such as those expressed by Asif Khan (2004) do not constitute the only view in Islam. A wide variety of modern discussions that support living and/or participating in government in the West, which come from a wide variety of personalities with disparate backgrounds, are currently taking place within Muslim communities and by Muslim thinkers and writers. While the discussion is clearly far from over, some authors feel that the evidence for participation in a democratic system is overwhelming. Take Muqtedar Khan for example, who states quite clearly that "Muslims must participate in American politics. That question is settled" (Khan, 2002, p. 35). Although other Muslim thinkers may echo his sentiments (Al-Alwani, "The Participation of Muslims in the American Political System," n.d.), their viewpoint is far from universal (as we have seen with Asif Khan, 2004).

As has been noted, a number of historical sources are available to modern scholarly writers when looking at the permissibility of participation in non-Islamic government (Abou El Fadl, 1994a; 1994b; 1998; Hellyer, 2007; Hussain, 2004). Like the historical sources themselves, the authors who refer to them to suggest that Muslims should indeed participate in government come from a wide variety of backgrounds. They represent religious arguments, political arguments, and combinations of the two. It is therefore no surprise that as authors they come from both traditionally trained Islamic backgrounds as well as Western-educated "intellectual" backgrounds. Perhaps the most and often sited author who in particular takes up the cause of Muslims in America is Taha Jabir al-Alwani (2003; "The Participation of Muslims in the American Political System," n.d.), who, like Muqtedar Khan (2002) above, feels that the argument for participation in the American government system is obligatory. The difference is that while Khan is a Ph.D. political science professor ("Dr. Muqtedar Khan," n.d.; Khan, 2002), Al-Alwani is a classically trained Islamic jurist (Fishman, 2006). This comparison offers an interesting view into the variety of authors who have argued for participation in non-Islamic governments in the West.

Other examples of Muslim thinkers in addition to Muqtedar Khan (2002; 2004) and Al-Alwani (2003; "The Participation of Muslims in the American Political System," n.d.) who have entered into this and related discussions include scholars, Islamic thinkers and/or religious leaders such Khaled Abou El Fadl (1998) and Tariq Ramadan (1999). Authors involved in related discourse use a variety of mediums to offer their insight and opinions, both electronic and traditional print—both in English and languages from the Muslim world. These modern authors refer to several historical sources for their contention that there is a trend in the history of Islam that allows for Muslims to live under non-Muslims and participate in government. One can only

expect that as this discourse will continue, the list of historical references will grow.

Taha Jabir Al-Alwani

Perhaps Taha Jabir Al-Alwani is the best point at which to start a discussion of modern views of Muslim involvement in non-Muslim government due to the proliferation of his idea of a *fiqh for minorities*, and the effect Al-Alwani's traditional Islamic education background is likely to have on the weight carried by his opinions. Al-Alwani is not the only author using the term "fiqh for minorities," however he has been recognized as the first to use the term and is called "the founder of fiqh al-aqaliyyat" (Fishman, 2006, p. 2).

Dr. Al-Alwani is well versed in *usul al-fiqh*—the science of Islamic jurisprudence—making his contributions to the discussion of modern interpretation of Islamic law especially relevant (see references to Al-Alwani's background in Al-Alwani, 2003; Fishman, 2006). Born in Iraq, Al-Alwani received a doctorate from Al-Azhar in the process of Islamic legal thinking, and has served in a variety of positions related to this field both in the Muslim world and in the United States, and has been the president of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (Al-Alwani, 2003; Fishman, 2006).

Specifically looking at the issue of Muslim participation in Western, non-Islamic governments (in this instance, U.S. elections), Al-Alwani provides a clear opinion and justification:

> Our participation is an obligation in Islam, and not merely "a right" that we can choose to forfeit at will. It affords us the opportunity to protect our human rights, guarantee the fulfillment of our needs, and work for the improvement of living conditions for Muslims and non-Muslims in America and abroad. ("The Participation of Muslims in the American Political System," n.d.)

He contrasts his suggested ways of viewing this issue with an earlier view on citizenship in a non-Islamic government, which grew from a "'culture of conflict,' which Muslims today can better do without" (2003, p. 11). Instead, Al-Alwani argues what is needed to address modern issues for Muslims regarding living among followers of other religions is "a fiqh of 'coexistence' which suits our word in spirit as well as in form," as opposed to a "fiqh of conflict" (p. 11).

Al-Alwani ("The Participation of Muslims in the American Political System," n.d.) bases his views on political participation on several ideas, some of which may be seen by the reader as traditionally religious, and others as more personal, modern, or progressive. For example, he stresses that: all of humanity is one family; Muslims should be fair to non-Muslims; Islam is based on the universal message of the Qur'an; the modern world has no borders; political activity allows Muslims to protect their rights; the U.S. has constitutional guarantees regarding religious freedom; and interaction with non-Muslims allows Islam to spread ("The Participation of Muslims in the American Political System," n.d., second and fourth sections). With these points in mind, Al-Alwani suggests that Muslims become U.S. citizens, vote, and take part in the democratic process, to include becoming a political candidate (section "II"). He states that the ideas of *dār al- ḥarb* and *dār al-Islām* are antiquated, and "do not apply to contemporary world affairs" ("The Participation of Muslims in the American Political System," n.d., last paragraph). Thus, we see that Al-Alwani's efforts to address participation in non-Muslims governments is provided in a manner that utilizes Islamic foundations, associated with modern interpretations, to reach the conclusion that political participation is not only justified, but required, on the part of the *umma* ("The Participation of Muslims in the American Political System," n.d., section "I").

Khaled Abou El Fadl

Abou El Fadl (1994a; 1994b; 1998) is perhaps the most published author who has

investigated the evidence for the historical discussion of the cause of Muslims living in non-Muslim lands. Abou El Fadl, (2006; "Khaled Abou El Fadl," n.d.) with both a J.D. and a Ph.D. as well as traditional training in Islamic law, as a Muslim with an extremely thorough Western education in related areas, offers well-researched historical evidence regarding related topics written in a manner that reflects his desire to cater to secular scholars as well as Muslims. Works such as his book *The Search for Beauty in Islam: A Conference of the Books* (2006) reflect a more personal style in discussing Islam, while his articles on historical discussion of Muslims as minorities (1994a; 1994b; 1998) are presented in a more traditionally scholarly manner.

Abou El Fadl (1998) illustrates the importance of historic sources as a resource for modern Muslims in America. As he points out, "the issues raised in these continuing [historical] discussions have direct ramifications for American Muslims as well as for the many other Muslim communities living in the West" (p. 47). In addition to discussing the opinions of the *madhhabs*, Abou El Fadl (1998) effectively uses the example of the 19th and 20th century Egyptian Muslim thinker Rashid Rida as an additional glimpse of a historic discussion of the permissibility of living and participating in government in a non-Muslim land. Abou El Fadl presents a useful investigation of the opinion of Rida regarding Muslims living under Christian dominance in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 20th century and whether or not they had an obligation to migrate to a Muslim controlled area. Commenting on their situation, Abou El Fadl summarizes Rida's opinion as thus:

> In summary, Rida formulates a three-pronged argument: [1] most lands where Muslims reside are not a part of the abode of Islam and, therefore [2] the civil and criminal laws of Islam are not binding; [3] consequently, within certain moral bounds, Muslims may do whatever is necessary to become politically and economically empowered. (Abou El

Fadl, 1998, referring to Rida, 1970)

The application of these points to modern Muslims in the West, and even more specifically in the United States and the United Kingdom, does not require any stretch of the imagination.

Abou El Fadl's (1998) own summary of the emphases that have developed during the historical discussion among Muslim on the point of Muslims living as a minority suggests that there are four points especially worthy of consideration for Muslims: (a) "the necessity of observing Islamic morality and escaping oppression"; (b) "the natural desire of a devout Muslim to show deference and respect to Islamic legal injunctions and rules"; (c) the need for Muslims to "be able to serve their interests and escape suffering"; and (d) "the moral requirement that a Muslim abide by their promises," which includes "a promise to refrain from harming the host state and to observe the commands of the host state" (p. 61). Abou El Fadl powerfully argues that the need for Muslims living as minorities to balance each of these four injunctions can be seen as a historical Islamic reality. However, he also points out that a "balance cannot be struck in an abstract ahistorical context, and it cannot be struck by the jurists of one historical epoch and set in a stone for all ages to come" (pp. 61-62).

Tariq Ramadan

Tariq Ramadan is a professor of Islamic Studies with a Ph.D. in that field, as well as some education in traditional Islamic scholarship ("Biography of Tariq Ramadan," 2004; Ramadan, 1999). Like A-Alwani, we can perhaps see a reflection of his influence as an Islamic thinker in the fact that others have written books specifically to refute him (for example, Fourest, 2008, who apparently devotes an entire book to scrutinizing Ramadan's moderate credentials). Ramadan is the grandson of Hassan al-Banna, and is recognized as "probably Europe's best-known Muslim intellectual" (Sontag, 2004, ¶ 2).

Regarding the permissibility of living in a non-Muslim country, Ramadan (1999) discourages the traditional binary division of *dār al-ḥarb* and *dār al-Islām*, and suggests instead that Muslims in America and Europe should use "the appellation *dār ash-shahāda* which, in itself, conveys the idea of permission to settle in the West" (p. 165). Ramadan considers the historic sources regarding the obligation to *hijrah*, and concludes that Muslim are indeed allowed to live in non-Muslim countries, "depending on the Believer's intention and under three major conditions: to be free to practise, to bear witness to the Message and to be useful to Muslims and society as a whole" (p. 170).

Like Abou El Fadl (1998), Ramadan (1999) stresses the responsibility of Muslims to live up to the obligations that are inherent in visiting or becoming a citizen of another country, as long as those requirements are not against Islam. Furthermore, and of special importance here, Ramadan contends that Muslims in Western countries "*must* be involved in legal affairs" (p. 177, emphasis added), especially as they relate to issues that affect the *umma* in those countries or the development of a Western Muslim identity. This specific injunction has an obvious importance to the application of community policing in the USA and the UK in Muslim communities.

Muqtedar Khan

Muqtedar Khan ("Dr. Muqtedar Khan," n.d.), is a Muslim living in America of Indian background and a professor of political science at the University of Delaware who received his Ph.D. in related fields from Georgetown University. He is a well-recognized author of several books as well as a website (http://www.ijtihad.org). Muqtedar Khan (2002; 2004) is a vocal proponent of the participation of Muslims in government and politics in the United States.

Muqtedar Khan (2002) describes the involvement of Muslims in the political process in America not as an option, but as a requirement that has clearly been decided. In this manner his

opinion on participation is much like al-Alwani ("The Participation of Muslims in the American Political System," n.d.) and Ramadan (1999). Recognizing that some argue otherwise, Muqtedar Khan suggests "we should avoid wasting time and resources in arguing with those who call all these activities [politics] '*kuffar*' activities. These individuals subvert the activities of Muslims who are working to make a change" (p. 36).

Underlining that Muslims in America *want* to participate in the system in the United States, Muqtedar Khan notes that "American Muslims recognize the validity of the democratic process and are eager to participate in to shape the political environment in which they live" (2004, ¶ 2, referring to statistics from Bagby, 2004). Muqtedar Khan (2002) points out several instances in which the real-world experiences of Muslims in the American political system have made a difference, and are therefore noteworthy and laudable. He observes:

> They [American Muslims who participate] are economic and political liberals and social conservatives. They believe in freedom of religion and the right of all peoples, ethnic as well as religious, to be treated equally. They are aware of their economic and political privileges [in the United States] and grateful to Allah for them. (2002, p. 31)

Muqtedar Khan notes that Muslims can associate with both the Republican and Democratic parties, much as historical Muslims may have themselves been conservative or liberal in the sense we currently use those terms. While Muqtedar Khan's enthusiasm may not be shared by all, his thorough background in both Islam and political science makes his argument compelling.

Muqtedar Khan (2002) draws parallels between Islamic concepts and those of the American government system in an effort to illustrate that participation is indeed an Islamically justifiable virtue, as opposed to the arguments made by "isolationists" (to use Khan's terminology, p. 32-35). Muqtedar Khan likens representational government to the Islamic

concept of the *shūra (*consultative councils), and points out that even "Maulana Maududi and Ayatollah Khomeini, a Sunni and Shia political theorist of Islam, have envisaged a limited role for the democratic process" (p. 33). Muqtedar Khan, in a novel argument that he quite effectively carries out, suggests that the preamble to the United States Constitution is the "*maqasid* of the American constitution" (p. 35), in line with the values of Islam.

Modern Trends in Knowledge and Authority in Islam

A tangential issue that should be recognized is how modern sources of information and/or new ideas of the validity of these sources can affect this discussion of the permissibility of Muslims to live in non-Islamic lands and participate in non-Islamic systems of government. While in the past Muslims may have been more limited in their sources of information for making religious decisions (and some authors such as Asif Khan, 2004, argue they still should be), modern Muslims have a wide variety of sources from which they can chose the answers they wish to employ in day-to-day life. Several modern authors have looked at this and related issues, such as Caeiro (2006), DeLonrenzo (2000), Shadid and van Koningsveld (2002), and Mandaville (2007).

Shadid and van Koningsveld emphasize that "contrary to prevailing misconceptions, Muslims in the West regularly consult a variety of religious authorities about all kinds of problems related to the application of the norms and values of their faith within the Western context" (Shadid & van Koningsveld, 2002, p. 167), although, as would be expected, the opinions offered by legal scholars differ. Shadid and van Koningsveld show, for example, that differences exists among scholars who are located in the Muslim world as opposed to the West concerning whether participation in non-Islamic government is an obligation or just permissible.

The importance of the influence of these sources can be recognized when one considers the opinion of Fattah and Butterfield on a closely related point:

> We do not contend that ordinary Muslims frequently muse on the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Rather, most Muslims turn to certain class of intellectuals and *ulama*… for guidance. These elites act as cultural entrepreneurs who shape the cultural, and therefore intellectual, repertoire along which ordinary Muslims locate themselves. (2006, p. 50)

It is important to add to this a recognition than authority in Islamic legal opinions such as *fatawa* are not static, socially detached proclamations, but instead reflect and respond to "particular social conditions" (Caeiro, 2006, p. 677).

Examples of questions concerning religious authority and the sharing of knowledge in Islam are particularly important as Muslims seek answers for their questions from new sources. Mandaville looks at whether or not "globalization has produced a meaningful shift in the location and nature of knowledge in the Muslim world" (2007, p. 101), and finds that "globalization… makes it possible for an unprecedented range of social actors… to have experience of, and become involved in, the pluralization of authority in the Muslim world" (p. 113). He points out the ways in which Muslims can reach, via modes such as the Internet and satellite, across the world for discussion of religious topics. As we have seen, many of the most well-known authors who are involved in related research and discourse—for secular thinkers and Muslims alike—use a variety of media to share their thinking. The example of the opinions such as those offered on Islamonline.net are intricately involved in discussions related to Muslims in the West via both traditional print media as well as the Internet. This has an important relation to Mandaville's discussion, but it should also be emphasized that "the mere fact alone of more people being able

to serve up a wider range of ideas about religion… does not itself produce a more pluralistic (in the sense of being more tolerant or open-ended) knowledge" (2007, p. 102). For all of the benefit of the world's thinkers like Abou El Fadl and Al-Alwani, there is also the unfortunate possibility of electronically accessible thinkers on the far other end of the spectrum

From the sources and discussions we have considered, we can see that while there are varied arguments against the participation of Muslims in Western, non-Islamic systems of government, there is also clearly a tradition of historical and modern arguments that support the involvement of Muslims, or even make involvement an obligation (Al-Alwani, "The Participation of Muslims in the American Political System," n.d.; Muqtedar Khan, 2002). These conflicting opinions are discussed in a world in which ideas about religious authority are changing for Muslims (DeLorenzo, 2000), and Muslims can utilize technology to considerably expand their sources of religious information (Mandaville, 2007). This confluence of possibilities, developments, and events presents a historically unique scenario in the United States in which Muslims are continuing to look for answers concerning their role in American government. It is in this scenario that we seek to better understand the relationship between Muslims and perhaps the most visible sign of government in the United States and the United Kingdom—local police.

Cervero and Wilson's Planning Theory

Law enforcement efforts towards community policing are often discussed as planned events ("Mount Pleasant Plans Strategy for Shift to Community Policing," 1995; Potter & Campbell, 1995; Rohe, Adams, Arcury, 2001), with steps, considerations, and concerns that would strike the adult education planner as quite familiar. For example, a 1995 discussion of the plan for the Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina police to move towards community policing was

described with the following strategy: "researching problem-oriented policing; setting goals, objectives and tasks for implementation; obtaining council approval; involving the community; training personnel; implementation; and getting feedback and doing evaluations" ("Mount Pleasant Plans Strategy for Shift to Community Policing," 1995, ¶ 5).

Similarities such as these to adult education planning efforts make the questions posed by Cervero and Wilson—just what is it that program planners, acting in the real world and dealing with a myriad of influential factors, scenarios, and people, do?—an appropriate consideration for police program planners as well. This is the question Cervero and Wilson have sought to answer since the publication of their book *Planning Responsibly for Adult Education* (1994a). While a history of educational planning theory exists that has been accepted almost without question for years (Cervero & Wilson, 1994a, 1994b; Wilson & Cervero, 1997), Cervero and Wilson have pointed out that this legacy has, quite unfortunately, failed to account for much of what *actually* happens in the arena of adult educational planning activity. In these accepted step-by-step models, "good planning [theoretically] goes something like this: assess needs; determine objectives; select content, instructors and format; manage logistics and budgets; and evaluate results" (Wilson & Cervero, 1996, ¶ 1). Sadly, despite shortcomings and flaws in describing real life planning activities, "the logic of this orthodoxy has continue unassailed – no one has seriously challenged its scientific and procedural assumptions… planning theory has been seen as one of those safe areas in which all of the theoretical issues were resolved" (Wilson & Cervero, 1997, p. 85).

The Basics of the Cervero and Wilson Model

In addressing what is missing in these common perceptions of what planners (should) do, Cervero and Wilson sought to investigate and describe what instead actually happens, and

proposed that "there are four central concepts that can account for the world that planners experience: power, interests, negotiation, and responsibility" (1994b, p. 253. In the 2006 version *responsibility* has changed to *ethical commitment*). Those concepts focus on what has been often ignored in program planning literature, namely, that in reality, programs "are planned by real people in complex organizations that are marked by historically-developing and structurally organized power relations and human wants and interests" (p. 249). In acknowledging this, Cervero and Wilson question the assumption that the step-by-step processes that have been expounded for so long offer all that is required. Instead, Cervero and Wilson emphasize that their model has proposed that planners need to realize their efforts will have two outcomes: an educational program, and "social and political outcomes by reproducing or changing the social and political relationships that make planning possible" (2006, p. 24).

What this has meant in the development of the Cervero and Wilson model, from their first book in 1994 through their most recent in 2006 (in addition to the variety of related articles), is that they suggest these four areas must be considered to truly account for what happens—as opposed to just what should happen—when people plan programs. Cervero and Wilson here stress a foundational point: planning educational efforts for adults is done by people and is political and social in nature. They point out that "program planning is a social activity in which people negotiate personal and organizational interests to construct adult education programs… they are planned by real people in complex organizations" (Cervero & Wilson, 1994b, p. 249). This idea, that planning adult education is a social act, is a basic theme, which Cervero and Wilson have repeated often (see examples in Cervero & Wilson, 1994a, 1994b; 2006), and have used to explain the nature of adult education planning from their view since their foundational 1994 book and article (1994a, 1994b). As Cervero and Wilson note: "To be optimally useful

then, planning theories must both account for what actually happens when people plan educational programs and also provide a guide to practical action" (2006, p. 24).

Each of these four areas—*power*, *interests*, *negotiation*, and *responsibility* (or ethical commitment) deserve attention, as these concepts help to frame the discussions that take place in the Cervero and Wilson model (1994a, 1994b, 2006). An additional explanatory device needs to be addressed as well, the *planning table*, as the use of this metaphor has moved to the forefront of their theory and its application in real life (2006).

Power

Cervero and Wilson have developed their view of planning to account for "adult education as a struggle for knowledge and power in society" (2006, p. 25). They define power as "the socially structured capacity to act" (1994b, pp. 253-254, citing Giddens, 1979), and its influence can be seen quite practically: adult educators must consider when planning programs "who has the power to do what and which interests will they represent in the planning process" (Wilson & Cervero, 1996, ¶ 5).

Unfortunately, issues of power and politics have in the past been considered an unattractive, and perhaps naively avoidable, byproduct of the planning process—something that "gets in the way of good planning" (1994b, p. 251) and through which planners must suffer, but not recognized as the central part of the process of planning that it is. Instead, Cervero and Wilson (1994a, 1994b) stress that issues of power are omnipresent, cannot be avoided, and should then instead be recognized for the role they play in planning. This is not to suggest they attach some nefarious value to power and its consequences; instead they stress that "power is a characteristic of all human relationships" (1994b, p. 245), and is contingent, constantly shifting and negotiated, and can be fairly equally distributed to those involved in planning (2006).

Issues of power have developed into an additional, but related, field for Cervero and Wilson (for example, see Cervero & Wilson, 2001), that reaches outside of their more traditional focus on planning. Cervero and Wilson concede that "more recently, we have developed our understanding of adult education as a struggle for knowledge and power in society" (2006, p. 25), referring to some of their more recent writing (such as in Cervero & Wilson, 2001).

Interests

Closely related to power are considerations of interest; if power is the terrain on which planners do their work, interests are the direction in which they try to travel (Cervero & Wilson, 1994b). Interests and power thus have a closely intertwined role and application in planning educational programs. Those involved in the planning process "exercise their power in accordance with their own specific interests" (2006, p. 88), as well as the interests of others who may not be at the negotiation table whom they aspire to represent. The importance of interests is difficult to overstate. As Cervero and Wilson point out: "educational programs matter primarily because they are a statement of how the world should be different; people's interests determine their important features" (1994a, p. 138).

Cervero and Wilson stress two points about "how interests play out at the planning table" (2006, p. 88): (a) that the characteristics of educational programs are a result of how interests play out in negotiation; and (b) that while programs and interests have a causal relationship, "there is no sense in which the judgments about specific programmatic features are predetermined" (2006, p. 89). Thus, recognition of interests and their role in negotiation is not the same as saying that one can see from the beginning where a program will end up. There are just too many factors and variables—including who is negotiating, what they want, and the level of power they wield—involved to know where a program will go until it has essentially arrived.

Negotiation

While planning theories may help provide a skill set for program planners, that emphasis alone fails to account for the myriad of interpersonal issues that take place while programs are developed in the real world (Cervero & Wilson, 1994b). Cervero and Wilson address this by emphasizing the place of negotiation within their theory, and recognize that it is an integral part of program development: "We argue that negotiating interests is central to planning" (1994a, p. 13), which is itself a social act, with competing interests and the influence of power, therefore requiring political awareness. Negotiation is the interpersonal act at the forefront of program planning, linking a planner's discretion and constraints (1994a).

Cervero and Wilson note that two things occur as negotiations take place: planners *negotiate with* their power and interests, and they also *negotiate between* "the interests of others involved in" designing a program (1994a, pp. 29-30). Additionally, planners "also negotiate about the interests and power relationships that structure their planning practice" (p. 30). In other words, program planners "both act in and act on their social contexts when planning a program" (1994b, p. 257).

Negotiation takes place in their theory in two forms—*metanegotiations* and *substantive negotiations* (Cervero & Wilson, 1998, citing Elgstrom & Riis, 1992). This emphasis is an addition to their theory, in part a response to the critique of Sork (1996) that suggested that more elaboration on negotiation was needed in the model (Cervero & Wilson, 2006). Substantive negotiations describe the negotiation efforts that take place when "people *act in* the web of power relations to construct the program's purpose," while metanegotiation describes people when they "*act on* the power relations themselves" (Cervero & Wilson, 1998, p. 7). Cervero and

Wilson suggest that both types of negotiations happen at the same time, with metanegotiations producing "important outcomes" (p. 7), and also influencing the substantive negotiations.

Ethical Commitment

Efforts in adult education planning should be committed in an ethical way towards "substantively democratic planning" (2006, p. 26). To Cervero and Wilson, therefore, ethical commitment suggests that it is the planner's responsibility to carefully consider who is, and who should be, involved in the program planning process (2006). This reflects back on the effect of interests. If educational programs truly reflect future possibilities for those they seek to affect, then "these judgments can only be made based on the ethical commitments that people bring to the planning table about what these possible futures should be and how they can be achieved through education" (2006, p. 91). It follows, then, that who is at the planning table suggests a political consideration of both who should benefit from the program being planned, "and whose interests should be represented at the planning table" when decisions about the program are made (2006, p. 92).

The Planning Table Metaphor

Perhaps one of the most useful innovations to the theory has been the development of the emphasis on the planning table metaphor as a tool to discuss practice. While Cervero and Wilson refer back to their 1998 work as the basis for this metaphor (Cervero & Wilson, 2006), it was also thoroughly utilized in their 1996 "Who Sits at the Planning Table" article. The metaphor is now the centerpiece of their model (2006), and provides a tool through which they discuss the four "key concepts [which] provided the structure" (2006, p. 24) of their planning model. Essentially, the planning table metaphor is a vehicle through which all four sections of the model can be visualized.

A History of the Cervero and Wilson Model

Cervero and Wilson have authored complete books on their planning theory (1994a; 2006), edited books on related issues (1996), and have authored, jointly and with others, a wide variety of articles on related research (for example Raik & Wilson, 2006; Umble, Cervero, & Langone, 2001). In 1994 both a book (1994a) and an article (1994b) were published by Cervero and Wilson, which effectively introduced the model. Although Cervero and Wilson generally refer to their 1994 book first (for example, it is the first joint reference in their 2006 book), they obviously had discovered and discussed the roots of the their model before then, and they note in their 2006 book that the overall beginning of their joint project started in 1989. Previous writing by both authors had addressed similar issues prior to 1994 (see, for example, their contribution to the 34th Annual Adult Education Research Conference, Cervero & Wilson, 1993). In a 1993 presentation on planning adult education given at the Annual Adult Education Research Conference, for example, Cervero and Wilson noted their opinion that "planning is always conducted within a complex set of personal, organizational, and social relations of power among people who have similar, differing, or conflicting set of interests" (1993, p. 60). We can see, therefore, that the die had been previously set, and therefore, the "model" has been in development for nearly 20 years. During this time several developments have been made. A few worthy of note include: the addition of *substantive* and *metanegotiations* (Cervero & Wilson, 2006; Wilson & Cervero, 1998) as a response to Sork (1996); the increasing emphasis on power (see comments in Cervero & Wilson 2006; also see 2001); and the change in terminology to emphasize *ethical commitment* (2006) as opposed to the older term *responsibility* (Cervero & Wilson, 1994a, 1994b).

While Cervero and Wilson have recognized that the field is changing, and that new issues are increasingly being brought into discussions of program planning by other authors (Cervero & Wilson, 2006), this has not changed their view that planning models have historically failed to account for all that goes on in program planning. They do concede, however, that their contributions to planning literature have made a difference, and give evidence of several other significant authors in the field who have acknowledged the importance of considering the political side of planning, or have incorporated it into their individual models (Cervero & Wilson, 2006).

Cervero and Wilson's Model Applied

The Cervero and Wilson model for program planning has been utilized by numerous other authors to tackle related issues in both dissertational research and academic articles. For example, quite early on in the history of the model it was used by Mills, Cervero, Langone, and Wilson (1995), to look at the issue of power in cooperative extension education. Not long after that piece, numerous authors contributing to the book edited by Cervero and Wilson, *What Really Matters in Adult Education Program Planning* (1996), and utilized or referenced the model as well, in a variety of applications. This included considerations of the model in terms of education in the health-related fields (Carter, 1996; Hendricks, 1996; Maclean, 1996), university distance education (Kleiber, 1996), environmental education (McDonald, 1996), and planning programs for communities by women (Scott, & Schmitt-Boshnick, 1996). While each of these pieces offer their own insight, perhaps their most useful contribution to the Cervero and Wilson model was the act of illustrating so early in the life of the concept that it could be used in a wide spectrum of applications. In this variety, there were also applications outside of what many may consider traditional education roles. For example, while there would eventually be an

educational component to the health promotion application investigated by Carter (1996), the planning of actual educational programs had very little to do with the case study—it was much more concerned with distributing grant funds and the related negotiations. For this reason, Carter's work, and others like it, have been quite effective in illustrating the real flexibility of the Cervero and Wilson model of program planning.

A variety of additional examples since *What Really Matters* (1996) have continued to reflect the usefulness of the model. For example, it was used by Maruatona and Cervero (2004) to describe the experience of literacy education planners and the power exercised by the government in that arena in Botswana, which contributed an important overseas, international dimension to the model. Yang's published work (Yang, Cervero, Valentine, & Benson, 1998; Yang & Cervero, 2001) has built upon the Cervero and Wilson model "to develop a reliable and valid instrument to measure adult educators' power and influence in planning education programs" (Yang, Cervero, Valentine, & Benson, 1998, p. 228), and the authors note the POINTS scale "showed encouraging evidence of reliability and validity" (p. 241). The contribution of a quantitative application of the Cervero and Wilson model, and its continued use, added depth and variety to the model's range of application. Hendricks conducted a quantitative study using both Cervero and Wilson and Yang's work (Hendricks, 2001, citing Cervero & Wilson, 1994a, 1994b; Yang 1996; Yang, Cervero, Valentine, & Benson, 1998) that sought to study the relationship between factors such as power and experience, and influence in planning programs for adult education. The results of that study, however, were not particularly conclusive and the author herself cautions against drawing broad conclusions.

Rees, Cervero, Moshi, and Wilson (1997) made use of the model in their article "Language, Power, and the Construction of Adult Education Programs." They looked more

specifically at the language utilized in negotiations by adult education program planners, and emphasized the role of language when they noted that "as Cervero and Wilson (1994) conclude, planners negotiate power and interests through talk, and in the process programs are constructed" (1997, p. 75). Their analysis was particular interesting, as it introduced another facet to the equation—the study of the actual language used in negotiation and the way in which that language illustrates applications of power. In a unique manner, it offered a deeper level of support for the theories proposed by Cervero and Wilson.

McLean (2000) used the Cervero and Wilson model to investigate autobiographically the ways in which "technical-rational and political models of programme planning inform our empirical and normative understanding of adult education practices" (2000, p. 495). McLean, in considering his own practice planning Canadian agricultural extension education, actually looked at it through both a traditional step-by-step process, and then also through the Cervero and Wilson model. He noted that the rational model helped to explain the "how" of planning, but the Cervero and Wilson model helped to understand the "why" (p. 499). McLean stressed some of the core components of the Cervero and Wilson model when he concluded that "in this shifting landscape of power and interests, programme planning was very much about negotiating interests and struggling to determine those to whom I am really responsible" (2000, p. 504).

Benson (2003) used the model to look at ideas of "quality" as defined by stakeholders in designing online degree programs, and found that the definitions themselves were negotiated, and affected the utilization of learning outcomes and core curriculum development. Benson's research illustrates how the model can be used to investigate extremely specific issues. Raik and Wilson (2006) used the Cervero and Wilson model to consider the circumstances in which negotiations take place regarding how deer population management decisions are made. Their

application found that traditional linear models of planning did not account for what happened in this environment, but that in looking at it through the Cervero and Wilson lens, "the case illustrates some of the interests and political maneuvering that are often apparent to experienced practitioners but ignored or obscured in our theoretical accounts under such guises as 'collaboration', 'fact finding', and so on" (2006, p. 334). The Raik and Wilson application is noteworthy because of its innovative use of the model in an area that is only nominally related (in this application) to adult education—even less so than the previous example in Carter (1996)—especially as it constitutes a re-examination of planning practice after traditional models failed to account for all of the researcher's experience (Raik & Wilson, 2006).

Smith, Cervero, and Valentine (2006) have used it to look at the effect commercial support has on continuing education in pharmacy. While the article version of this research does not make reference to the Cervero and Wilson model, the dissertational work upon which it was built used it as "the theoretical basis for [the] study" (Smith, 2004, p. 34). The utilization of the Cervero and Wilson model was appropriate given Smith's ultimate conclusion: that "commercial support in the provision of continuing pharmacy education results in significant and diverse consequences for relevant stakeholders" (pp. 105-106). Osborne (2006) used the model to look at media news broadcasts, which she viewed as "an educational program produced by human beings" (p. 7), and inherently affected by the same planning issues addressed by Cervero and Wilson. Osborne's argument for the utility of the Cervero and Wilson model in this application is convincing, and adds yet more range to it as a model for use in research.

Space constraints limit an even more exhaustive review, but it is worth noting that the model has also been used by Umble, Cervero, and Langone "to examine the utility of the distinction between meta-negotiation and substantitive negotiation" (2001, p. 128) in the context

of a public health continuing education, and by Archie-Booker, Cervero and Langone (1999) have also used the model to investigate the effect of social and organizational factors on program planning for AIDS education for women, as well as others.

That the Cervero and Wilson model could be so easily adapted illustrates its flexibility, which is additionally attested to by the extremely wide range of topics the model has been used to tackle. Umble, Cervero, and Langone, in using the framework in their case study of public health continuing education, specifically looked at "the utility of the distinction between meta-negotiation and substantive negotiation" (2001, p. 128) in program planning. They noted the usefulness of Cervero and Wilson's 1998 consideration of Elgstrom and Riis' work in distinguishing types of negotiation (Umble, Cervero, & Langone, 2006, citing Cervero & Wilson, 1998, and Elgstron & Riis, 1992), which had been suggested by Sork (1996).

The Cervero and Wilson Model and Partnerships between Police and Muslim Communities

The next logical step must be to connect the utility of the Cervero and Wilson model to the current concern—planning outreach and partnerships between police and Muslim communities. Cervero and Wilson stress that "in the struggle for the distribution of knowledge and power in social and organizational contexts, educational programs are not a neutral activity" (2006, p. 19). Clearly, in the case of providing police outreach programs to Muslim communities, this is the case. The calls one hears—fair or not—crying that one side or the other has an unspoken agenda can be deafening: law enforcement personnel are labeled as heavy-handed profilers intent on criminalizing Muslims in the wake of September 11th (Cainkar, 2004), or at the least, as stereotyping and taking insufficient steps necessary to understand the Muslim communities they serve (see examples in Ammar, 2000). Muslims in Western societies are broadly branded as unwilling to pledge loyalty to their country, and Muslims are seen as

"enemies of the West" (Amin, 2003); government program planners are only willing to reach out to Muslims they know with whom they are comfortable, denying a voice to those with whom they disagree (Briggs, Fieschi, & Lownsbrough, 2006), and similarly, some groups representing Muslims (as well as other groups) refuse to collaborate with local police, instead focusing on the legislation they perceive as supporting an unfair system, but denying a voice to law enforcement (Ramirez, O'Connell, Zafar, 2004).

Ramirez, O'Connell, and Zafar, speaking to the last example, make an important point: "while dissent in itself can be a positive driving force, opposing opinions that are not heard by 'the other side' (in this case law enforcement) are of no value in effecting institutional change" (2004, p. 61). In other words, who comes to "the table" *matters* in outreach between local police and Muslim communities. Through this quote, we can see that issues regarding the planning table and considerations of power and politics can be seen as both the cause (or the problem), and the solution regarding police outreach efforts involving the Muslim communities they serve.

Summary

While the importance of partnerships between police and Muslim communities have been recognized by police leaders, Muslim leaders, and academics alike, too little has been done to study these relationships. Part of the difficulty may lie in the fact that there is no distinct body of literature from which to draw information and opinions. Perhaps mirroring the real-world challenges that exist when different groups of humans seek to work together, different bodies of literature must be sought to provide a full understanding of the issues involved in this important topic. The philosophy of community policing provides a backdrop with which the historical position of the police regarding community outreach can best be understood. Adding to this terrain, we must further consider multiculturalism and related education, as well as historical

discussions of the participation of Muslims in non-Islamic systems of government. Both topics, while sometimes marginalized, offer a glimpse into some of the challenges faced by Muslims leaders and police personnel when trying to work collaboratively. Fortunately, Cervero and Wilson offer a useful lens through which these challenges in planning partnerships between police and Muslim communities can be understood and perhaps explained.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this study is to understand how individual and organizational interests influence partnerships between local police departments and Muslim communities as they plan outreach efforts. In support of this, the following research questions are addressed:

1. What are the goals of police and Muslim leaders in planning outreach?
2. How are outreach efforts planned and negotiated by police and Muslim community leaders?

In order to describe the manner in which these questions were answered, the following chapter contains sections that outline the qualitative research strategy that was used to gather interview data in both the United States and the United Kingdom. A glimpse into the researcher's background and subjectivity is offered following these sections, as well as a chapter summary.

This research is qualitative and based on a series of interviews with police and Muslim community leaders in the USA and the UK. Also included are observations from a limited number of circumstances in the USA and UK study sites. Any observation added to the data was made in a public place or while attending an event openly available for public attendance. The combination of these international data collection efforts adds both depth and breadth to the description of the outreach planning process and its results within the cities in which it occurs and also offer a view of how outreach is planned. When considered together, the results paint a useful picture of police-Muslim community partnership in large American and British cities.

Myhill (2006) rightly points to issues regarding planning and the sharing of power as "issues [that] must be addressed to prevent implementation failure in relation to community engagement" efforts between the police and the public (p. vi). Myhill's point emphasizes a

reality noted by other authors in their discussions of community policing—namely, that it can be (or is) a politically influenced activity, which incorporates decisions that represent the interests of those involved (see, for example, varying types of related discussions in Brogden, 2004; Brogden & Nijhar, 2005; Lyon, 1999; Myhill, 2006; Rinehart, Laszlo, & Briscoe, 2001; Spalek, El Awa, & McDonald, 2009). Of particular interest here, researchers and law enforcement practitioners have outlined a number of challenges regarding outreach between police and Muslim communities in the United States. These concerns include a lack of cultural and procedural understanding on the part of police, and the perception that Muslims are being unfairly scrutinized by police and intelligence services (Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, & Miller, 2006; Ramirez, O'Connell, & Zafar, 2004; Spalek, El Awa, & McDonald, 2009). These issues can make efforts to reach out and plan police-Muslim community partnerships from each side of the equation difficult, but it is within this context that the applicability of the Cervero and Wilson model of program planning (1994a; 1994b; 2006)—with its attendant emphasis on considering power, interests, ethical commitment and negotiation—shows its utility for the present study. A quote from Cervero and Wilson regarding adult education can be used here to amplify this point in the world of police-community relations:

> We take the stance that planners need an ethical commitment to democratic planning, a political analysis that anticipates threats to and opportunities for enacting this commitment, and negotiation strategies tied to this commitment and analysis to improve the lives of individuals, the functioning of organizations, and the health of communities. (2006, p. vi)

This sentiment could have just as easily come from a community policing "how to" manual as it came from a book on planning adult education. Therefore, this model has informed the

development of this look at outreach between police and Muslim communities, and it is also this lens through which the results are described and framed. In a manner that reaffirms the observations of Cervero and Wilson, I believe that logical, step-by-step understandings of planning fail to account for the politically-charged and intensely human process of program development.

Design of the Study

Recognizing that efforts towards developing outreach between the Muslim community and local law enforcement in the study site required planning, and agreeing with Cervero and Wilson (2006) that this planning process must have been, by its very nature, a negotiated political process involving the interests of those involved, it logically follows that the Cervero and Wilson model of program planning offers much needed utility in describing the components of these outreach planning process within a well-recognized framework. Cervero and Wilson's model thus expressly informs the questions designed for the interviews to take place with Muslim and police leaders.

Therefore, while also following deMarrais's (2004) suggestion that "qualitative interviews are used when researchers want to gain in-depth knowledge from participants about particular phenomena, experiences, or sets of experiences" (p. 52), an interview guide was developed with an eye towards illuminating the issues emphasized by Cervero and Wilson (2006) as being an integral part of real-world education effort planning. The decision to use interviews was based in a desire to give depth to the study, and to give those persons involved in the outreach planning the opportunity to express their own unique insights, opinions, and concerns. This is especially important, as previous studies have specifically pointed to the danger of excluding particular voices (either by the choice of government personnel or by the

decisions of community groups) from inclusion regarding outreach that takes place between government and groups representing Muslims in both the USA and the UK (such as Briggs, Fieschi, & Lownsbrough, 2006; Ramirez, O'Connell, & Zafar, 2004).

Each of the suggested questions for the interview guide was informed by facets of the Cervero and Wilson (2006) description of the planning process. The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, with the main questions used as a starting point from which other topics of discussion could evolve. The principal questions are listed below, with comments regarding the manner in which each was expected to support the usefulness of the Cervero and Wilson model as a framework for understanding how outreach between law enforcement and Muslim communities has been planned. These questions were intentionally developed with the Cervero and Wilson model in mind, and were reviewed with the dissertation chair after the draft was developed.

Describe your involvement as a member of the local police department (or local Muslim community) in researching, planning, or hosting the [outreach event to be discussed]. This provides background information that helps to outline the areas in the agency or organization in which the decisions were made, the level at which they were made, and the police command structure under which involvement was placed. Who was responsible suggests the context in which the law enforcement and Muslim leaders felt the meetings were important.

What precipitated your involvement (who put you on the team, or what assignment do you hold that facilitated your involvement)? This may help to draw connections between decision makers and planners, and help illuminate who held the power to make things happen, or at least who was recognized as having that power by the interviewees.

Describe how the planning for the first event took place. This illuminates the individual perceptions of how planning took place, and the methodology used to make decisions involving the planning effort and its intended outcomes. Follow up questions to this can include: What process was used to decide it (the outreach effort) was needed? Did they have a plan or process they used? What is it? Who decided it was needed? Was it an individual, group, a committee, a response to a formal needs assessment? What events or issues made hosting it necessary? Did a particular event or sentiment make it needed? If so, did that set the context for what the forum was intended to accomplish? Who was responsible for planning it? Was there a planning process? What challenges were experienced in the planning process?

Why are these meetings important for law enforcement? For the Muslim community? This may identify the reason each participant thinks the program matters, and for whom the program matters, and why.

What do you feel is the police department's (or Muslim community's) stated goal in participating in the forum? This helps to identify common goals, stated goals, and perhaps some unstated goals that exist with those involved. It may also point out differences in what participants hope may be accomplished.

If education is a goal, for whom and what do you wish them to learn from participation in the [outreach event to be discussed]? This helps to illustrate if an educational component is explicitly understood to be part of outreach by members of the involved law enforcement agency and Muslim community. It may also point to perceived deficiencies in the mind of one group concerning the knowledge of the other group involved.

What else does the police department (and what does the Muslim community) hope to achieve through the meetings? This helps to identify other, perhaps unstated goals of

participation in the outreach event. Speaking about these goals continues to illustrate how the event likely has several layers of goals, and therefore perhaps planning it has explicit and implicit goals that run parallel to one another, even if left unsaid.

Was planning the outreach affected by political needs or issues? How so? This illustrates the degree to which participants recognized the effect of political trends and needs on the police and Muslim community as they planned the outreach.

Do you have any comments you would like to add on this subject? This last question is designed to allow participants to voice ideas, opinions, facts, or concerns that they may feel are relevant that have not been previously discussed.

The questions used in the United Kingdom were the same as those used in the USA, except that a term such as "outreach effort" was utilized in many instances instead of naming a particular program every time. While the USA study encompasses a case study of one continuing outreach event, the UK study is broader in its goal to describe the process that takes place in planning any potential outreach opportunity between police and Muslims. For interviewees who had indeed worked with or had knowledge of the particular police unit with whom the research data was collected, the unit itself was named because its mandate was indeed outreach. This allowed respondents to refer to any effort they chose when discussing planning outreach between Muslim communities and police in the UK, or to refer only to one unit and its efforts specifically. Additionally, respondents were asked about the influence of "external needs or issues" at the request of the participating police department, and an additional question was asked regarding public perception of the force's outreach efforts, also at the request of the agency.

Case Study Research

Merriam (1988), looking at a variety of sources describing the nature of case study research, proposes that four characteristics (pp. 11-15) of a qualitative case are "essential." Case studies are: (a) particularistic and "focus on a particular situation, event, program, or phenomenon" (p. 11); (b) descriptive; (c) heuristic, hoping to "illuminate the reader's understanding of the phenomenon under study" (p.13), and (d) inductive. In the research presented here, I echo Merriam's suggestion that: "anchored in real-life situations, the case study results in a rich and holistic account of the phenomenon" (p. 32), and because more than one site was involved, this research represents a cross-case study.

While I philosophically agree with many of the points made by Merriam (1988), in this instance a prescriptive step-by-step model for fulfilling the needs of case study research was not utilized. Instead, a research goal was embraced that reflected my hope to accurately describe the experiences of Muslims and police personnel in the USA and the UK who have tried to plan outreach. Merriam observes that "investigators use a case study design in order to gain an in-depth understanding of the situation and its meaning for those involved," and importantly, "the interest is in process rather than outcomes, in context rather than a specific variable, in discovery rather than confirmation" (p. xii). Merriam's comment on process is particularly apt for this purpose, because it is not the effectiveness or the results of police-Muslim community outreach that is being addressed through this research. Instead, it is a description of the "how" and "why" of the process of planning outreach from the viewpoint of practitioners that is sought: an "intensive, holistic description and analysis" (p. xiv) regarding how police and Muslim community members in two major cities seek to work together. Indeed, as the research collection and analysis progressed, my recognition of the need to paint an in-depth, contextually

accurate portrait of the reality experienced by Muslims and police in the study sites grew. Detached answers to a limited number of interview questions would simply not suffice.

Therefore, while the primary source of data was indeed the interviews conducted with 31 police personnel and community members in the USA and the UK, I use the information provided in these interviews in conjunction with a limited number of observations of publicly accessible events as well as references to media coverage and governmental and non-governmental reports to describe the phenomenon of planning outreach between police and Muslim communities in two specific jurisdictions. I have additionally utilized my own experiences spending time in the study sites—most importantly in the UK—to internally check the conclusions I began to draw regarding the interview data, and I am left with the distinct conclusion that my primary themes and conclusions offer a holistic view of the stories presented by the interviewees, and this is how these cases fro two large cities in the USA and the UK are presented for the reader.

Study Sample—USA

For the US portion of the study, three American police departments in cities with large Muslim populations were approached with a tentative overview of the proposed research. In each city, a letter was written to the chief of police describing the general goals of the research, with contact information for both the author and the dissertation chair. While all three agencies had representatives who expressed initial interest, the actual study site was the first to suggest it would be open to participating, and in fact expressed enthusiasm as well as support for the topic of study. The initial focal point for this research consists of a case study of one specific ongoing outreach effort between police and Muslim community members in one of America's largest cities, with a regional Muslim population that is approximated to be several hundred thousand.

The events consist of an open "forum" (a term I henceforth use to refer to this outreach event), often attended by the chief of police, which is jointly planned and hosted by police and influential Muslim leaders in the city.

Table 1
General Demographic Interviewee Overview Based on Observations—USA

Interviewees	Position/Affiliation	Race
4 Muslim community members; all male	Islamic organizations	African; Caucasian (a term which includes "Arab," "South Asian," "Persian" and "European")
3 police personnel; 2 male and 1 female	Command-level management; mid-level management; research	Caucasian

This forum has taken place on a quarterly basis since February of 2008. It is chaired by a high-ranking police manager and two leaders from Muslim communities, one of whom is an *imām*; the other is a leader in a Muslim concerns group. The event takes place at a local Islamic center, and both Muslim community members and police are able to suggest topics for discussion during the forum, which is open to the public for attendance, as well as questions and comments.

The formation of the forum was closely linked to what became a politically-charged police plan to learn more about the city's Muslim communities by working in conjunction with a local university to map the characteristics of those communities. From the police standpoint, this effort was designed to allow law enforcement to better understand the communities within their jurisdiction, and therefore position police to offer better services and protection for the community. From the standpoint of some community members, however, it appeared to be an exercise in singling out Muslims and collecting intelligence. The issue received a great deal of

attention in the media, and the plan was eventually discarded by the police department at the direction of the chief of police. From the cancellation of the map exercise plan came the foundation of a community forum specifically for Muslims and police, which was suggested by the chief of police as a regular way for members of Muslim communities and police to meet, gather for dialogue, and build stronger relationships. Between February 2008 and May 2009, several community forum meetings were held.

The plan for the interview segment of the research represented a purposive strategy as described by Esterberg (2002), "in which you intentionally sample research participants for the specific perspectives they may have" (p. 93). For the interviews, the sample of participants was identified through contact with law enforcement and Muslim community members in the USA and the UK who participated in the planning of outreach between police and Muslims themselves. A key contact was made in the USA law enforcement agency which approved of the project, who in turn made introductions to police personnel in the USA and the UK, who themselves also provided contacts in law enforcement and in Muslim communities. This is similar to the snowball sampling technique suggested by Esterberg (2002, referring also to Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981), in which "you begin with an initial interview—often a key informant. Then you ask that person to refer you to friends or acquaintances or others who might be appropriate to interview" (p.93). However, many of the individuals involved in the outreach program in the study site had already been tentatively identified from historical records, and perhaps less snowballing was therefore required. During contact with likely participants I asked for suggestions and contact information for other participants in the particular outreach effort under study. My experience has been that Muslim leaders and law enforcement personnel at the proposed study site were extremely willing to provide such information. The criteria for

selecting the interview participants was that they had to have been involved in planning the forum in some way for the police department or from the standpoint of a Muslim community. Because of the sensitivities regarding information about Muslims in the study cite due to the map controversy, I intentionally did not emphasize collecting data on the religious, ethnic, or the immigration background of interviewees, and continued this practice in the UK, with police and community members. While much could be inferred by the organization to which interviewees were attached, or via their responses to interview questions, only the most general descriptions of the overall interviewee participant group is therefore included here.

Seven interviews were conducted in this section for the USA city case study (see Table 1). All of these interviewees were either intimately involved in the planning and/or hosting of the continuing forum between police personnel and members of local Muslims communities, or the map initiative that led to it. Three police personnel were interviewed; all had overt assignments to a large counter-terrorism unit, and two continue to be key members of the team that supports the forum. It was not part of the research design that counter-terrorism personnel in particular were sought for interviews; instead this was the pool of police personnel involved in outreach with Muslim communities which became available for participation as the research progressed in both the USA and the UK sites. Four Muslims were interviewed in the United States, and they represented a variety of religious and ethnic traditions, with non-immigrant and immigrant backgrounds from the Arab and Persian world as well as Africa.

While other police personnel and members of Muslim communities have been involved beyond these seven individuals, these seven participants represent a core group of participants who can accurately described both the foundations of the forum dating back to late 2007/early 2008, and also the continuing development of the forum between its inception and when the

interviews took place in December of 2008. This is evidenced from reviewing historical records in which many of their names were repeatedly mentioned, as well as from discussions with other interviewees and others in the city in which the names of activities of other participants came up. One police interviewee was instead involved in the outreach effort that preceded the "forum" studied here, but that employee's input regarding the map proposal offered insights that were useful in providing an understanding of the context in which the forum developed.

Study Sample—UK

The facet of this study conducted in the United Kingdom was made possible by a Fulbright Police Research Fellowship, which provided the funding needed to live in the UK from early January through April of 2009 to conduct this research. The Fulbright Fellowship proposal closely mirrored the outline of the research conducted at the USA site, had Institutional Review Board approval, and was built upon the research proposal that was developed as the dissertation prospectus.

Table 2
General Demographic Interviewee Overview Based on Observations—UK

Interviewees	Position/Affiliation	Race
12 Muslim community members; 8 male and 4 female	Islamic organizations; local government; private business; non-profit; youth outreach; art; law	African; Caucasian (a term which includes "Arab," "South Asian," "Persian," and "European")
12 police personnel; 8 male and 4 female	Mid-level management; supervision; entry-level	Caucasian

In the UK I was able to work closely with one of the country's largest police forces. While I approached individuals in three UK police forces about potential participation in the study, the force represented here expressed the most interest. The jurisdiction in which this

police force is located includes one of the most ethnically diverse cities in all of Europe. It has an extremely large Muslim population, predominately hailing from Pakistan. Substantial sections of the jurisdiction are quite easily identifiable as neighborhoods predominately inhabited by Muslims, and this is visibly evident through signs written in Arabic or derivative South Asian scripts, Muslim business names, religiously-linked graffiti in Arabic, and a large number of mosques, Islamic bookstores and other Islamic centers and organizations.

Unfortunately, the area has also been affected by terrorism. Numerous terrorism-related arrests and convictions have arisen out of the jurisdiction, which is also the home of individuals detained at some point in Guantanamo Bay. The police force has an extremely large counter-terrorism unit, and like other police agencies in the UK, is strongly influenced by the Home Office's counter-terrorism strategy, commonly referred to as CONTEST (HM Government, 2009). One of four sections of the UK strategy within CONTEST is the Prevent agenda, which seeks to affect the roots of violent extremism through outreach and partnerships between communities and law enforcement. Although this agenda is not solely designed for working within Muslim communities, this requirement is recognized and features prominently in the CONTEST strategy. The Prevent agenda is a source for funding as well as other support for counter-terrorism officers and communities, and it is commonly discussed in the media as well as in personal discussions on related issues.

The sample for the interviews in the UK (see Table 2) was developed in much like that in the US, but with less reliance on historical records (there was no singular instance of outreach on which I was focusing like in the USA) and more emphasis on receiving suggestions from police personnel and individuals within communities. I was fortunate in that the police force near the university to which I was attached as a Fulbright Fellow had an extremely active outreach effort

that centered on counter-terrorism concerns. I was introduced to police personnel in this agency through contacts with police personnel in the USA, and those contacts as well as some from the university led me to meet the people whom I eventually interviewed. In each instance my criteria led me to speak to people who had been involved in planning some level of outreach project that involved Muslims and police.

Even though the police personnel were all part of the same unit, and that unit itself was designed as a form of outreach, the individual officers were involved in planning an eclectic set of projects on a variety of scales. Many of the projects discussed by community members and police had yet to come to fruition, and some likely never would. Additionally, while the undeniable emphasis was on working with Muslims, some of the efforts would just as likely include other faiths. It was the planning that was emphasized, not the actual achievement, although success stories certainly existed. Twelve British police officers assigned to the new counter-terrorism team were interviewed, and the potential interviews and introductions were facilitated by other members of the unit. Both male and female officers were interviewed, including several of South Asian descent. Some police interviewees were supervisors nearing retirement, and others were officers with less than 10 years of experience. I spent as much time as I could with the unit as well as other police personnel from the force, including time "off-duty" in a variety of circumstances: many meals, tea, a football match, and tours of areas within the jurisdiction. I made many friendships, and cherished the opportunity to see the city and its police personnel in so many different venues.

Twelve community members were interviewed in the UK, two of whom were participants with an "Islamic background" with family roots in a distinctly Islamic country, but who did not consider themselves to be Muslims. I still use the term "Muslim" when referring to

UK non-police participants, and in their case I utilize it as a cultural descriptor more so than a religious one. As was the case with the USA community interviewees, UK Muslim interviewees represented diverse cultural, ethnic, and religious backgrounds, born both in the UK and abroad. Both males and females were interviewed, with roots in South Asia, the Arab world, Africa, and Iran. As in the USA, I did not seek to specifically collect background data from interviewees, although my experiences and conversations provided some input in this area. Professionally, they were employed in a wide array of areas, including youth work, community service, faith institutions, academia, art, business, and local government. All of the UK community participants had participated in some level of planning outreach with the participating UK police force, but their involvement varied widely and took place in a number of extremely disparate potential projects. The group of UK interviewees—in a manner quite different from those in the United States—was therefore not all part of working on the same outreach efforts, although there was some amount of overlap in project involvement among participants.

Data Collection

As with other aspects of this study, data collection took place in two separate phases. The first focused on interviews conducted with law enforcement and Muslim community leaders in the United States concerning the planning of a specific outreach effort. The second phase included working in a large British jurisdiction, in which participants were asked more broadly about their experience planning outreach between Muslims and police, not always focusing on one example. Observations made in public places or in public meetings were also included, and all of the data was further contextualized by spending significant time with Muslims and police personnel in both cities.

The interviews were conducted in the jurisdictions in which the outreach takes place (with one exception in which the interview was conducted in another city), in a one-on-one format, and in a place of relative privacy. In each instance I provided the involved individuals with a description of my research project's goals, as well as with a copy of the Institutional Review Board authorized recruitment statement and informed consent letter appropriate for the USA and UK portions of the study. I recorded each interview, and took notes as well, as the interviews progressed.

Data Collection—USA

I first visited the study site in October of 2008 to judge whether the research project would be feasible. At that time I was also able to observe one of the outreach efforts, which are open to the public. Between 50 and 60 people attended that event, held in the lower level of a large Islamic center. Perhaps one fifth of the attendees were police personnel, and the rest appeared to come from local communities. I returned and collected interview data in December of 2008, during which time the interviews were conducted. In total, approximately two weeks were spent in the USA study city. Interviews were conducted in locations of relative privacy, and were recorded and then transcribed by me. I also took notes as I conducted the interviews, and allowed data collected in early interviews to affect the direction of questions asked in later interviews. Observations made by me in public or in meetings openly accessible to the public helped to further contextualize my interview experiences.

Importantly, I was able to attend several events and spend time with both interviewees and others involved in the forum outside of the formal interviews. This included spending time with the city police department in some of its day-to-day operations, and attending Friday services and other events at mosques and elsewhere, as well as shared meals and candid one-on-

one conversations with Muslims and police in the study site about issues related to my study. While these experiences were not included as "data," they served a vital purpose in helping me better understand the city, its police, and its Muslim communities. These opportunities to share views and stories were key to the way in which I later sought to frame my experience in the UK. If the time and resources allowed, I made it a practice to never turn down an invitation to an event or location that would add to my knowledge of police and Muslims in the study site, and I learned a great deal through these experiences.

Data Collection—UK

I was allowed a high degree of access to the British community-based counter-terrorism outreach unit over the nearly four month period I spent in the UK, to include high-level meetings, training courses, conferences, and interviews with personnel assigned to the team. I tried to take advantage of every opportunity to see the police force from a variety of angles, and spent a great deal of time observing the organization and its personnel outside of the interviews. I found that one of the managers of the unit was quite interested in having an outside view of the unit in the context I was investigating, and in conjunction with this access, I was asked to give a preliminary summary of my findings before leaving the UK. I was also asked to minimally change the wording of one interview question, and requested to also add one additional interview question about the unit's outreach and the potential for community acceptance of the role, used only when interviewees had an opinion based on their knowledge of the unit's mission (see Appendix H); this included all of the police personnel and about half of the community members.

While only the interviews were used as the formal basis for the data explored here, the ability to see "behind the scenes," and spend such a large amount of time with this new unit and

its personnel allowed me to constantly consider what I had learned through interviews in both the US and the UK in a much larger context—one that truly extended across the globe, to include exposure to national figures involved in the counter-terrorism effort on the largest scale.

In much the same way as occurred with the police personnel, I was fortunate enough to develop relationships in the UK with members of Muslim communities that extended far beyond the interviews analyzed here. I was always upfront about my experience as an American police officer, and while I never experienced anything other than a polite response, in some instances people expressed reservations based on my position and nationality. In this way, I was aware that I engaged in experiencing some of the phenomena I was studying, even more so than in the USA, and with the added dimension of being an American. I had many opportunities for hours and hours of discussion about related issues, including invitations to people's homes and mosques, religious services and meetings, tours of Muslim neighborhoods, tea and meals, and this added a much deeper dimension to my understanding of the current situation in the UK. Indeed, a quick glance at my calendar from my time in the UK would emphasize just how many opportunities I had to expand my horizons through contact with British Muslims beyond just the individuals who were interviewed. As in the USA, my philosophy was to never turn down an opportunity to meet with someone in the community or attend an event if time allowed, regardless of whether or not I thought they might end up as an interviewee. I spent untold time with my many British Muslim friends, and learned much more than I would have had my experience been limited to interviews, although interviews still form the foundation for the data presented here. Because of these opportunities, the themes developed from interviews during analysis became contextualized, and my understanding was significantly deepened, and undoubtedly, my personal opinions were influenced.

After a potential police or Muslim interviewee was identified, I contacted them by email or phone, and gave each an Institutional Review Board approved consent letter. Interviews were conducted in locations that offered some amount of privacy, whether it was a mosque, café, home, or office. The UK interviews averaged slightly more than an hour, and all of the UK interviews were recorded by me and then transcribed by a professional transcriptionist. As I did in the USA, in the UK portion of the study I have included limited observations made by me while in public or at events openly accessible to the public in order to further situate the themes developed in the interview research.

Data Analysis

Within the framework of a case study, the interview data was analyzed as qualitative information, influenced by the suggestions of Hays (2004), Esterberg (2002), and, to a limited extent, Corbin and Strauss (1990). Like Corbin and Strauss suggest, I constantly reviewed and compared the data (within each research site and later between them) as they developed from the beginning and allowed those developments to inform the direction the data collection took as the research evolved. The recordings and transcripts of the interviews were scrutinized as I searched for themes, and those themes were collected and evolved as the analysis continued. The analysis of the interview essentially began as soon as I started the interviews, considering what was said, and later listening to interviews and reviewing the transcripts over and over. I thought of what I learned from each contact, and made mental and written notes of the ideas I developed based on the experiences and what was said. As Esterberg (2002) points out "the goal is to begin to focus on the potential meanings of your data" (p. 158). As themes began to broadly develop, I more thoroughly reviewed and considered the data to reinforce or refute the topical categories, building documents consisting of quotes and notes which supported the emerging theories.

As patterns were clarified, they were further scrutinized and weighed for inclusion as noteworthy in the final analysis. I gave developing themes a working title, and those titles continue to change and develop in an effort to make them more descriptive of the characteristics found in the data analysis. I spoke of my findings with police personnel and Muslims as the themes developed, and had several opportunities to discuss the most general themes with a number of people. I tried to take advantage of every opportunity to discuss my emerging findings with police personnel and Muslims as the research progressed, including developing a preliminary report of my Fulbright Fellowship findings on this topic while I was still in the UK. The broad importance of the learning dimension of outreach, the influence of relationships, and the need for flexibility became evident during this process. Much like member checks as described by Merriam (2002) as a tool for addressing validity, the process of speaking about my research and posing my ideas to involved parties aware or involved in this type of outreach work helped to ensure that the theories that I developed were reasonable in the eyes of persons "in the know." The process of analyzing data constantly involved, as Hays observes, "the sorting, resorting, and labeling and relabeling of data [which] should lead to a set of categories that answer the research questions in a meaningful, thick description that provides a summarization" (p. 232).

I finished transcribing and began analyzing the data from the USA interviews as I began the UK portion of the study. While I remained open to new themes, I was conscious of the influence the USA interviews had on my understanding of the topic and the direction of the UK study, and intentionally searched my experiences collecting research data in both sites for similarities as well as differences. In the end, while the context in which outreach takes place in the study sites was different, the overall similarities developed during the interview analysis was

striking. For this reason, I chose to use the same labels for the most prevalent themes in both the USA and UK facets of the study, even as the sub-themes that support them differed.

Subjectivity Statement

I cannot separate myself from my own background and the manner in which it has informed my study and affected my views and decisions, nor do I feel it is necessary. This may also be seen as a "limitation," but as Esterberg (2002) points out "Because interviewing is essentially a personal relationship, *who* the participants are matters" (p. 90). I believe the reader therefore deserves to know who I am and judge for themselves the way in which my past may affect my views.

I have been employed in law enforcement for approximately 16 years, at the state, local, and federal levels. Most recently I was a captain in a mid-sized local police department in the Southeastern USA that serves a city of approximately 110,000 residents, and in that role I actively sought opportunities to build and sustain a mutually beneficial relationship with my city's Muslim community. My undergraduate degree is in religion, as is my master's degree with an emphasis on Islamic studies, which I completed in 2000. As a graduate student I traveled to Morocco to study Arabic in the late 1990s, and as an employee of the US State Department I was deployed twice to Afghanistan in 2002, spending more than a year in Kabul and the surrounding areas, before also serving with the State Department in Jerusalem. During my time as a special agent with the State Department I undertook missions which involved a great deal of personal risk, and I did so proudly, serving alongside many extremely brave Muslims. I am honored by the opportunity I had to work with them.

While I am not a Muslim, I have family members and a great number of friends who are. I cherish my relationship with them and I remain intensely interested in and concerned about

international events and USA and UK government policies that affect the world's Muslims. Although I am not an "old hand" in the academic study of Islam, I am also certainly not new to the field. Moreover, although I recognize the increased importance of studying the Islamic world in the aftermath of September 11th, my interest preceded those sad events and I am bothered by the prevalent suggestion that the importance of this area of study is somehow exclusively related to the prevention of terrorism, and that such discussions seem to so often take place within some type of "us versus them" framework. Islam had a long, intriguing, and beautiful history as one of the world's most influential faiths before the advent of terrorism, and modern students of the academic study of Islam, *especially* when done to support government service, should keep this in the forefront of their minds. I am also not an apologist, and I fully recognize that horrific things have been done in the name of Islam, by criminals who claim to be Muslims. I do, however, suggest that government personnel must balance their strategies with personal experience, historical knowledge, open minds, and thoughtful, measured, and compassionate action.

All of these factors affected the design of my research and the way in which I frame the results of the study. I am not a scientific clinician looking at the world I am studying from the outside; instead, I am intimately involved in it—professionally and personally. As an American law enforcement official I have lived the phenomena I have sought to study around the world, particularly while conducting my research in the UK. I suggest that the reader therefore consider these factors and the manner in which my they might affect my views. I am clearly not an impartial observer, and I do not pretend to be nor want to be. I sincerely doubt that any human can be truly objective. I do, however, strive to be transparent.

Conclusion

To provide a full and useful picture of the outreach efforts that take place in the study site, interviews were conducted in two study sites. My goal is to provide a case study of the research sites that offers a description of the partnerships planning efforts that take place between local police and Muslim communities in the USA and the UK. Hays (2004), providing a useful summary of the data analysis process for case studies, notes that "Using the research questions as a guide, all of the data needs to be taken apart while the researcher is looking for relationships," which are then "reassembled to tell the story of the case" (p. 232). The view provided via the interviews offers a glimpse of "how and why" partnerships are planned between police and Muslim communities. This collection of information was analyzed and synthesized to then "tell the story of the case" as Hays suggests, which provided a useful snapshot of this important and timely facet of government-community relations as they are developed and perceived in the United States and the United Kingdom.

CHAPTER IV

PLANNING OUTREACH IN THE UNITED STATES

This chapter presents the predominant themes that developed during the analysis of the seven interviews conducted with police personnel and Muslims at the study site in the United States in late 2008. The following chapter presents the findings developed from the 24 interviews of police and members of Muslim communities conducted in the United Kingdom in early 2009. The six principal themes that follow in this chapter (see Table 3) are echoed in the chapter discussing research data from the UK. What will follow in both the USA and UK chapters is a summary of the themes and their relationship to the research questions, supported by quotes and commentary that outlines the supporting evidence developed through analysis of interview data. The following research questions are addressed:

1. What are the goals of police and Muslim leaders in planning outreach?
2. How are outreach efforts planned and negotiated by police and Muslim community leaders?

Table 3 provides a preview of the principal themes developed through this study and how they relate to the individual research questions.

Table 3
Preview of Principal Research Themes

Research Question 1: What are the goals of police and Muslim leaders in planning outreach?
Theme 1: Outreach is planned as a response to difficult circumstances.
Theme 2: Outreach involves educational goals.
Theme 3: Outreach is developed to build communication, relationships, and trust.
Theme 4: Outreach is developed to promote community participation in government.

Research Question 2: How are outreach efforts planned and negotiated by police and Muslim community leaders?

Theme 5: Outreach efforts are planned through relationships.

Theme 6: Outreach planning involves negotiating around difficult issues.

What Are the Goals of Police and Muslim Leaders in Planning Outreach?

Despite the multitude of social, historical, and political challenges that could act to make outreach difficult, there is no denying that police personnel and Muslim leaders in the USA study city put a great deal of effort into working together to make good things happen. The community forum studied here is perhaps one of the more prominent projects in the research site, but it is certainly not the only one. In the time leading up to the interviews and while I was there, as well as in the time since, there have been consistent and tangible signs that this partnership has borne fruit: joint and extremely public events that celebrate the history of Muslim communities, collaborative educational projects designed to engage the public, and an embrace of religious services for Muslims from within the police department's reserve ranks.

Despite these victories, I doubt anyone would be surprised to learn that police and community interviewees viewed the goals of outreach in manners that did not always coincide. This is a truism of police-community relations on the widest scale across America, and expectedly it was no different in the study site. Police participants in the forum that were interviewed understandably represented government interests to include, but which were not limited to, an overarching public safety interest and a counter-terrorism agenda. Muslim participants, while referring to public safety needs, strongly stood behind interests that were in support of the needs of Muslims broadly, as well as particular ethnic communities more specifically.

Quite importantly, however, these interests, while disparate, *were not* described by interviewees in a manner that insisted that they must be mutually exclusive. Police participants expressed a strong interest in the welfare of Muslim communities, just as Muslims conveyed a real concern for the effectiveness of police services. There were no suggestions by those involved that the goals of communities and police could not be jointly accomplished through the forum, even if they were not always exactly the same. The following four themes (see Table 4) related to the first research question that were developed from the interviews underline this point, and reinforce that differing views among police and Muslim participants were not necessarily competing nor antagonistic views.

Table 4
The Goals of Police and Muslims Planning Outreach in the USA

Theme 1: Outreach is planned as a response to difficult circumstances.

Theme 2: Outreach involves educational goals.

- 2.1 Learning about Islam and the diversity of Muslim communities
- 2.2 Learning about government and police and their roles

Theme 3: Outreach is developed to build communication, relationships, and trust.

Theme 4: Outreach is developed to promote community participation in government.

Outreach Is Planned as a Response to Difficult Circumstances

The current community forum that takes place between Muslim communities and police in the study site is a direct response to challenging circumstances from the past. Broadly, police and Muslim interviewees pointed to national security issues and the problems created by government responses to the danger of terrorism in a post-9/11 environment as sources of tension, challenge, and frustration in the study site. Much more particularly, however, interviewees gave specific examples of past difficulties in relations between police and Muslim

communities that gave rise to the need for effective outreach efforts, most emphatically responding to the map initiative.

There is no doubt that the community forum that takes place in the research site was itself an answer to the rising level of negative attention that was focused on the police plan to "map" Muslim communities. Indeed, every interviewee, Muslim community members and police alike, described the failure of the map project as a seed that developed into the forum. In this way, interviewees described that a solution (the forum) to a perceived failure (the map proposal) made later success possible. One Muslim community leader said the forum:

> Developed from the idea of engaging Muslims that [the city police department] first thought was going to be done through its [map] project and then once they realized the map project was not going to work, it was actually going to cause more problems, they decided to transition.

In one manner or another, every other interviewee answered similarly.

The most substantial difference that existed between police and Muslim versions of the turn of events surrounding the end of the map initiative and the beginning of the forum was the actual intent of the map proposal itself. The issue was not whether or not the map project should be shelved and developed into the forum, but instead whether or not the goals of the project were as benevolent and community-centered as police suggested. The view police interviewees expressed of the potential and purpose of the project was clearly not the same as that generally shared by Muslim community members. Indeed, police interviewees linked the purpose of the plan to the overall need for outreach between police and Muslim communities in the study site.

One involved police department employee specifically described the forum as a direct development of earlier outreach efforts in this way, including the map proposal, but stressed that:

> The [community forum] is essentially the latest evolution of an outreach program that was started I would say a couple of years ago, the thinking behind all of this really started when, [our director] came, he came first as commander and then promoted to [his current rank], and he always has been interested in creating positive relationships with Muslim communities throughout [the city]. And we wrestled a lot with how do you do that, what do officers internally need to know in order to do that in order to develop cultural sensitivity and awareness… what sort of outreach is effective and works… to create those positive relationships in an informed and educated way and respectful way that those intentions fed into the creation of the Muslim map… what became, and it wasn't originally called [that] it was called community mapping, but what was later dubbed [an effort to map Muslims].

As a police leader remarked, there was no malicious or hidden intent in the original plan, although it did end up as a politically-charged "firestorm" that evolved into the community forum:

> We [police personnel, academics, and Muslim community members] were going to develop a co-strategy on it [the map proposal]… the idea there was to now that we have this, and we have identified the Somali community here [for example] … that's under-serviced, that's living in poverty, that has language and socio-economic barriers to be the catalyst to infuse… social services and governmental resources… such as street lighting, you know, pot hole filling, all that stuff so that this community see… we do care, we are making efforts to take care of this community and where opportunities exist to integrate, integrate that community into our community based government structure. And so the leadership in the Muslim community recognized that this was important, and said yeah

> this is a natural next step from 18 months of dialogue… how do we find the grassroots community that didn't participate in the 18 months of dialogue? It seems simple, in that we're all involved, there's nothing sinister about it.

It is important to note that this interviewee stressed that it was not just police personnel who were involved in the proposal, but academics and Muslim leaders as well. Additionally, he described it here as an effort that would essentially support the needs of "under-serviced" Muslim communities, and not as an intelligence gathering exercise as critics to the program and the media would claim.

The media, public groups, and others who voiced opposition did not agree that the plan had these benevolent intentions, and it was publicly shelved by the chief of police during a particularly intense week of media scrutiny regarding the proposal. One Muslim interviewee, whose opinion was perhaps more extreme and suspicious than others, felt that the map plan was potentially comparable to the internment of Japanese "Americans [who] were just picked up and taken to camps on the West Coast" during World War Two. This type of public backlash against the proposal led to its eventual dismissal, and directly to the development of the forum. A police leader described that:

> Yeah, I mean we were kind of on our heels for the [map proposal] thing and we needed something to replace it and so the forum was the vehicle that we could, you know, instead of just stopping dead in the water, we can continue what momentum we had.

That "momentum" seemed to largely refer to the relationships that had been built by members of the police department and Muslim communities as they sought to work together during the year and a half preceding the attention received by the map project. This history of efforts to build up

relationships between Muslims and police was also described by some Muslim interviewees, and appears to have been a commonly recognized effect.

That something as positive as the forum would evolve as a development from another project which had been received so negatively should not be seen as a surprising development, however. Recognizing that the birth of the forum was indeed a response to political issues, an influential Muslim leader observed:

> I think it was, but I think that's how good programs are supposed to be produced, is you take problems, and you figure out solutions, and those solutions that become the programs that you need to develop and pursue and these programs don't come out of a vacuum. It's not like we just sit at a desk and think of, you know, things to do, they come from real life problems, real life arguments, real life situations, and you come up with solutions. And the issues, you know, are we in a problem-solving mode or just in [an] espousing grievance mode? *I think we need to be in that problem-solving mode and therefore this community forum came from a problem. It was in my opinion a great solution* (emphasis added).

This provides perhaps the most eloquent example of what everyone interviewed recognized: a potentially substantial and widely discussed problem developed into an excellent opportunity as it grew into the form of the forum.

Outreach Involves Educational Goals

Although they may go unstated or even unrecognized, police personnel and members of Muslim communities always had educational goals they hoped to achieve through the forum. In fact, every interviewee agreed on this point. The litany of topics about which participants hope others will learn is potentially limitless, although several themes appeared quite prominently.

The most important were (a) the need for police to understand Islam and the diversity of Muslim communities, and (b) the need for Muslim communities to better understand government and police and their roles.

Learning about Islam and the Diversity of Muslim Communities

Muslim interviewees as well as police employees stressed the importance of police personnel learning more about Islam ("Islam 101" as one Muslim called it) and very importantly, about the diversity of cultures among believers, and there was evidence in the interviews that this knowledge could directly affect police performance in their service to communities. As one interviewee succinctly observed, "Islam is Islam, but then Muslims they have their flavor, and their shades." The relevance of this quote, and its relationship to the planning for the forum was offered by one Muslim interviewee, who framed a meeting as a chance for police to learn:

> This meeting set up by the police department was an opportunity for the Muslims of different cultures, same religion, but different culture to get to explain… themselves to the police department so they [police] can understand their culture as well as understand their faith.

Here the interviewee suggested both the need for police learning about Islam and the diversity among Muslims, but also the responsibility of Muslims to teach. Another interviewee agreed that Muslims bear this responsibility, and emphasized that his efforts to teach are emphatically not about spreading Islam, but instead, a part of a broad expectation of all Muslims: **"**We [Muslims] are required to explain Islam, to share, but we will never be held account because somebody didn't convert or anything like that."

Other Muslim interviewees also stressed that police need to learn about Muslim communities, and especially about the diversity of these communities in the city in which the forum takes place:

> Well you know, I hope that they [police] learn the… vast diversity within the Muslim community, and they may learn something about the tradition, or the culture within the Muslim community but more importantly, to identify individuals whom they can partner with in their local areas if there's a concern. I think the main issue is when there's an incident, or when there's a case, who to go to in the Muslim community.

Note that this interviewee also tied learning into the need for individual Muslims to act as sources of correct information.

The same Muslim interviewee, when asked about the goals of Muslim communities in participating in the forum, answered similarly regarding the serious importance of this learning component:

> I think it goes back to education. They [Muslims] want to educate these police officers and the top squad, the top notch of [the city police] about Islam and Muslims. They want them to know, listen, we're like any other American group, we're just concerned about our own security and about our children. We don't want them to grow up feeling like they have a handicap because they are Muslim. I think that's a lot of what you hear from people in terms of whether they say it or not, but that's the main issue that comes out for them.

This interviewee made an important point as he observed that this goal matters "whether [Muslims] say it or not." Here he alluded to this educational component that always exists, although it may go unsaid.

Police also recognized this need. As one police interviewee said, "let's not make the assumption of course that there's this monolithic Muslim community." Of course in the iteration as the map project this desire to gain knowledge about Muslim communities, while grounded in a desire to learn, was not well received. Interestingly, however, it may have indeed been an antidote for one particular concern often described by Muslim interviewees: that police were not aware of wide diversity of cultures and backgrounds in the area's Muslims, and needed to put more effort into learning about the differences. For example, a Muslim interviewee said that while the idea behind the map proposal was flawed, outreach needed to be based in:

> Mutually trying to understand each other as a people culturally, because there's a big difference. And then in the Muslim community you have these different cultures and, and all these cultures are different you know, like we have in the Muslim community [Pakistanis], their culture is different from the Arabs… the Arabs even among themselves have different cultures among them.

Stated differently by another Muslim leader: "that's why when you talk about the Muslim community you have to understand the culture of each nation too."

What is perhaps most interesting but also unfortunate is that police interviewees specifically referred to their need to better understand the diversity of the Muslim communities within their jurisdiction as a reason for the original map program proposal: "The point was to study language, culture, ethnicity, integration history." In other words, to learn about diversity. In the end, it apparently was not the police desire to learn about the diversity of Muslim communities that presented the challenge, but the way in which the plan to gain the information was designed and shared with the community. One police participant in particular observed that police personnel could have done a better job of sharing their message and intentions regarding

the map proposal, an educational effort in itself that may have deflected some of the later criticism and turmoil.

Learning about Government and Police and Their Roles

When a police leader was asked if outreach had an educational component, he responded the goal was, in essence, to help communities learn how government works:

> Oh yeah, absolutely, to really understand the idea of community based government and that in this city we have 44 departments I believe, and each department has a function to the running of the city and the quality of life in neighborhoods, and so for them to understand how to use that [to] force multiply their resources, mobilize their community, integrate with that government… that's the goal.

While Theme 4 more fully explores this desire to engender participation in government, it is important to note that this particular police leader framed it in terms of a learning objective, which is itself related to a consistently recurring theme: *learning is always a function of outreach*. This emphasis on learning, and in particular the relationship between learning, interests, and goals, was succinctly described in the following quote by a Muslim leader discussing learning in the forum: "They [forum participants] need to learn what each other's goals are" as well as "what each other's purposes are."

A Muslim leader offered an observation that supported the need to learn about police and government processes in the forum, and at the same time he underlined the gravity of the real-world issues at hand that may be the focus of educational efforts in outreach. Here, he speaks of a police department effort to offer a briefing to explain the investigative procedures behind a recent shooting that involved police and a Muslim man:

> Those of us who went there, five or six, with a fantastic presentation, we left educated, so our answer to our questions were not answered, but we got an education, but the other people didn't know so... So this is important, just to learn that it's not just an open-closed case. No, there [are] debriefings and there are if something happens in the police, something happens in the commission… so people are not aware of things like that because they don't know.

This briefing was itself a response to a request from Muslims for more information on the shooting. Here it is clear that the interviewee was describing this particular police department effort as an educational endeavor. From the standpoint of community members as he said "they don't know," he also framed it as an issue concerning the acquisition of knowledge.

Other police and Muslim interviewees agreed that the topics for forum discussions were based on both the suggestions of police and community members. Another Muslim interviewee also mentioned the shooting in particular as a theme suggested by Muslims, and alluded to the way in which this and similar topics were brought up for discussion as police and members of Muslim communities prepared for upcoming forums:

> The chief's office organizes the place and the time, we just participate and try to, I think, one, help set an agenda that we get from Muslims, and number two try to promote certain programs. For example, the idea of making a movie that talks about the five important things that law enforcement needs to know about Muslims, and the five important things that Muslims need to know about law enforcement. I think that we try to promote certain programs that we think would be of mutual benefit.

During the forum I viewed, members of the public and police engaged in rigorous and insightful dialogue, and at times is was quite probing and deep. Questions could stray from the topic at

hand, and anyone was allowed to comment. Some of the highest-ranking members of the police department gracefully accepted criticism and input, and were at times defended by Muslims who felt the discussion had gone too far.

Supporting the educational environment of the dialogue along these lines, a police interviewee described the forum as an opportunity for him to offer instruction about police practices, and also correct some misconceptions about police activities:

> I try occasionally to put something on the agenda where we can educate the Muslim population as to what we do and how, how it works, and try to dispel fears, myths, rumors that go around… in the community. For example, our SARS project, our suspicious activity reporting project, received quite a bit of negative attention, [it was criticized] as being an infringement on civil liberties… that it was some sort of profiling, which it totally wasn't, SARS is based on actions… and not, not profiles. So, I think that's pretty much, that's been resolved, but still there was fear and rumors in the Muslim community that there was something different.

Here, the police interviewee not only describes his hope that he could correct a misunderstanding, but also that the educational component of that particular forum had a positive learning outcome.

Outreach Is Developed to Build Communication, Relationships, and Trust

Throughout the interviewing process I found consistent and strong indications that Muslims and police alike believed that building relationships was a primary goal of the forum. Along with the omnipresence of educational goals and the recognition that the forum was a response to the map plan, the value of building relationships was the most consistent theme of the USA facet of this study. A Muslim interviewee suggested the importance of this theme, as

well as its breadth, when he said the forum served two purposes for Muslims: "Well number one it gives them a voice and number two is enables them to personify [our city's police department]." Similar sentiments were shared repeatedly by both Muslim and police participants.

"Trust" as a goal of outreach was one of the commonly used terms, obviously suggesting a quite human, personal quality of relationships—beyond just having "input" or a "voice." As one Muslim leader noted, efforts such as the forum "establish trust [and] understanding," while, more personally, "the police get to learn more about the conditions in the community especially for them as many of them have not traveled in the Muslim world." A police interviewee observed that:

> It's all about relationship building really and so, I mean, people that go to the forums obviously either want to tell us something, or want to develop a relationship, or want to become educated, or maybe they don't, maybe they want to throw sticks and stones, but the bottom line is building productive relations… if you build a relationship of understanding and some trust, then when something happens when there's a issue then, then you can figure out ways to resolve it and both the police and the Muslim community feel like they can work together.

This coincides with the comments of a community leader who recalled that Muslims "wanted an opportunity to get to know the police department and the police department to get to know them, because you know two strangers is not going to work, you need two people that know each other." In the study site, there was strong evidence that this was indeed happening.

This same Muslim interviewee offered a vividly descriptive understanding of just how human this contact between police and Muslim communities needs to be. As we spoke during

the interview, he used our meeting in particular as an example: "what happens when this [our discussion] takes place is, I'm listening to how you are expressing yourself in tone, not the words you use, but the tone." He continued, and at the same time emphasized the relationships that are built when Muslims and police meet face to face in an intensely human way:

> So we are listening to each other, we are becoming familiar with each other's language, with each other customs, with each other's mannerisms, with each other's likes and dislikes, I need to know what your dislikes are… it's like the married couple you know in order for two married people coming from two distinct environments to be able to make it as strange as they, come together as strangers, they don't know anything about each other, about their habits, about their likes and dislikes, so they come together as strangers. In order for those two to make it through our life and have children, and have children grow up, and love each other and all that, those two have to talk to each other, they have to get to know one another, what they like and what they dislike.

It would be difficult for the human side of the partnership between Muslim communities and police to be described in more distinctly relational terms than those used above. The analogy of a husband and wife getting know one another may indeed be both apt and accurate. It is in line with the police leader who suggested that Muslims and police need "informal moments where we build tighter more intimate bonds with one another."

A Muslim leader alluded to this relational nature of outreach as he recognized that efforts such as the police department's rapid willingness to create the forum were something needed to creat trust. He then described relationships of trust he had already built with police personnel as an example of how this works:

> That was important to create more trust because people now they know if the chief of the police makes a, you know, commitment it's going to be done, you know. I have a very personal relationship with these [police leaders] and, you know, commanders and the chief and everybody to the point that I am very comfortable. I invite them to my house.

This relational emphasis serves a purpose that goes in both directions. Indeed, relationships lead to learning, therefore affecting the police capacity to more fully appreciate the circumstances in which the public discourse affects Muslims. As a police manager described:

> Just recognize because of the relationship we have that we fully understand that there's two sides to this extremism problem, there's the violent ideologically based extremism groups and then there's the groups over here that want to stir up hate and trouble you know the, the Emersons, the Horowitzes, the Spencers that aren't helpful to the problem, and so we recognize that, and were not partnering with those people, and we shun them pretty much.

It is worth emphasizing the link this interviewee suggested between relationships and learning. His suggestion that he has re-framed his opinion of counter-terrorism "experts" (indeed, he has *shunned* them) such as these due to the educational influence developed through relationships is important. It suggested that the police personnel involved in the forum were strongly affected by the viewpoints and input of the Muslims with whom they work. Undoubtedly, this police interviewee came to this conclusion based in part on his trust of the source, and this trust itself, as well as the effect it had, stand as a testament to the power of personal relationships as a function and mechanism of outreach between Muslims and police.

Outreach Is Developed to Promote Community Participation in Government

Several community and police interviewees made it clear that the forum gave everyone involved a chance to be heard. While this interest went both ways, it was particularly emphasized as a way in which Muslims could have a platform for expressing opinions and having input into how their government operates. This theme can therefore also be described as a learning experience: learning to participate in government, to communicate, and to work collaboratively with police.

This link to learning was suggested by one police interviewee who specifically tied the concept of education to giving the community a platform for their voice to be heard in government:

> Yeah, both ways, you know the Muslim communities in [the city] have a chance to come and tell us of their problems, and not just related to terrorism, which is important, important to know too, because our local police, our primary function is not to take counterterrorism, our primary function is reduction of crime keeping the streets safe, keeping traffic flowing, responding to major incidents, responding to minor incidents, and so the Muslim community needs to know we are a resource and that we can be called because their cat's up a tree, or graffiti in their back alley, you know, if they get something stolen and they're going to be taken care of and the local police care about these issues.

It was indeed quite interesting to note that police personnel and Muslims alike saw this effort towards better connectivity between police and the Muslim communities they serve as an important goal. In a way that suggested a correlation between participation, voice, relationships and learning, a Muslim interviewee put it this way: "I think that the forum is important for the

Muslim community because they will understand they have a venue to voice their concerns and that could eliminate a lot of you know mistrust and lack of understanding."

It was surprising to hear the degree to which police personnel felt they had an obligation to use their outreach efforts as a tool to help communities learn to participate in government processes, and not necessarily just police activities, more effectively. A police interviewee described the manner in which this helps to fulfill a public safety role:

> I think anybody that's been at the forefront of community policing in the last 10 years or so recognizes that the police cannot do everything by themselves and we need to partner with other government agencies, we need to partner with NGOs, community organizations to be effective.

He also observed that this offers "an opportunity to bring [members of Muslim communities] into how government works," along with a sense of "empowerment" and "a voice." Muslim interviewees agreed. As one interviewee observed in a manner which continued to suggest the connection between learning, voice, and participation in government:

> It just helps us become more involved in civic and community affairs, community at large affairs… we are open ourselves and we are liable to adapt, we promote great understanding for our community and our needs. And also, as our numbers grow, the local police can better serve us if they know more about us.

Another Muslim interviewee observed that through the forum Muslims learned about "The inspector general, he has a city council, he has a mayor, and so all these are avenues that Muslims can go to as well in terms of shaping policy." This same interviewee observed that he specifically wants Muslims to learn that police, and their city's police department "in particular,

is working with us and not against us. That we can take grievances to them and they will take it very seriously, which I believe they have on various cases."

Police personnel involved in planning the forum or its predecessor strongly emphasized outreach as a tool to increase the participation of Muslims in government. As one police participant noted, the goal is in part that Muslims "understand how to use their government so they can solve their own community problems, and perhaps we can be the catalyst to support that education process." Another police interviewee offered the opinion that it gives Muslims a "sense of empowerment, I think it gives them a sense of identity in that they're important, and that they have a have a voice, which I think for them they feel like they've been lacking for many years, so any opportunity to bring them into how government works" is therefore "important." Police personnel appeared to value this point a great deal, so much so that this same interviewee recognized that although the map proposal could be seen as a "political defeat" for police, in the end, "their political victory was kind of good I think for [the] psyche" of Muslims who saw how their political action made a difference in police practices. In other words, perhaps the embarrassment and heartache experienced by police over the issue was worthwhile, if through expressing their opinions Muslims saw that government was responsive and their voice was heard. This sentiment in particular pointed to a real desire on the part of this police leader to engender candid community participation in government.

This emphasis on having a participatory voice in a government system was something that was prioritized by police interviews and Muslims alike, although to varying degrees and with differing areas of emphasis. Some Muslim interviewees specifically spoke of the value associated with the ability to have an input into police practices and policies: "by being involved you may not change the law but because police don't make the laws, but you can influence

policies and practices." Another Muslim interviewee made a similar point, and eloquently described his opinion about this potential for citizen input into government affairs:

> And so it's just the greatness of America, that we have this. I am not sure if the members of the forum realize that. Sometimes I think we have to remind them, you know….maybe the chief is not going to agree with you, but there are not too many places where you meet with the Secretary of Homeland Security or the chief of police and say I think you're wrong about this and that… And half of democracy is access, if not the majority of democracy is trying to make… reality out of the access that should be available to everybody.

There was evidence at the study site to show that the input of Muslim communities was truly considered by police personnel, and could indeed make a difference. In one instance, a high ranking manager in the counter-terrorism unit asked another police department division to look into whether or not a crime against a Muslim was appropriately titled for investigation, and did this at the behest of a Muslim leader involved in the forum. Sensing it had not been correctly titled, the counter-terrorism manager exerted his influence to see it was changed to reflect its nature as a hate crime:

> Yeah, and we actually changed a crime that was taken by central bureau that they didn't classify it as a hate crime, we looked into it, did some research called central and said, you know, this is about as close to a hate crime as we've seen, so reclassify it. Got back to them and it was like this is huge. They announced it at their community meeting, it was a huge deal.

That this inquiry was done at the request of another participant in the forum gives value to the claim that police personnel truly wanted to hear the input from Muslim communities, and were willing to act based on the suggestions they receive.

Despite the temptation to see this type of input into government processes as new for Muslims in the study site, in reality it has existed in one form or another for at least three decades. Indeed, several Muslim interviewees offered long histories of their efforts to work in conjunction with police. Notably, many of their examples substantially pre-dated 9/11 and terrorism-related concerns. As one Muslim observed: "my engagement with the [city police] has not increased before or after 9/11, it's the same." Another community leader described a history of working with the police and developing collaborative solutions to problems experienced by Muslims that went back to the 1970s, and offered his historic opinion of the police department and a variety of chiefs throughout this 30-year period. This specific leader would certainly know, given his long experience of working with police to improve police-community relations.

Despite this history of success in influencing police practices, one Muslim, while still enthusiastic about the police department and the opportunities afforded by the forum, lamented that Muslim relations have largely been seen as a law enforcement issue to this point:

> One of the criticisms that we get that we also kind of give into government, is we got to get beyond only engaging with law enforcement as part of our civic engagement. I hope that [non-police] public officials start jumping into the discourse on this, on these and other issues, the Muslim community is not just the law enforcement piece of America's puzzle. There's a lot more that they can offer and also if we were to do other things, health care, education, public diplomacy, then that in and of itself will alleviate a lot of the stress and feeling of marginalization of Muslims at the local level, which as we all I

> think, everybody agrees is part of the problem when they, when young Muslims feel alienated and isolated then you have problem whether that leads to radicalization or not, that's another matter but that's the first step to possible radicalization.

While he was certainly careful with his words, note that this quote includes one of the very few times any Muslim interviewee approached the topic of "radicalization" or terrorism and its potential root causes. This is doubly interesting because he has historically partnered to work on the forum with a police leader well known as the head of the police department's counter-terrorism bureau, and trusts him enough to work with him in a variety of capacities.

In this same vein, the police leader articulated a clear connection between community policing, participation in government, relationships, and fighting terrorism:

> We were trying also to deliver the message that policing terrorism in [our city] was even more about implementing community policing strategies as it was implementing anti-terrorism or counter-terrorism strategies. Really the community policing strategy is integrated into our approach to do this. And so I wanted our people to understand, you know the people in our command, that they, we all have a responsibility to, you know develop relationships, enhance communications, solve problems, get the [terrorism liaison officers] involved in each area so that the precinct commanders recognize these isolated communities, and, and reached out to them and tried to get more membership in their community police advisory boards, neighborhood watch, chambers of commerce, that type of thing.

This quote is particularly effective at illustrating this leader's policing philosophy, seeking to find an effective balance within the community policing ethos at the intersection of all of these

issues. It speaks to how divergent goals are not the same as incompatible efforts and outcomes while planning outreach between police and Muslim communities.

How Outreach Efforts Are Planned by Police and Muslim Community Leaders

As interview data was collected for this study, it became clear that interviewee responses could not be easily divided into categories that fit the interview questions. In the broadest terms, this study broadly seeks to ask *how* and *why* outreach efforts take place between Muslim communities and police personnel in one particular city in the United States, and later the UK. In reality, the "hows" and "whys" of planning are often one in the same, and are rarely easily divided into neatly described, separate sections. Because of this, there is a distinct overlap between the answers to the first and second research questions in the findings. As the themes related to the second research question (see Table 5) are reviewed, it is evident that goals of police-Muslim community outreach we have seen in the previous section are directly linked to the personal and organizational characteristics needed to plan outreach in the first place.

Table 5
How Outreach is Planned in the USA

Theme 5: Outreach efforts are planned through relationships.

- 5.1 Building relationships requires time
- 5.2 Developing relationships are enhanced by interpersonal skills and thoughtfulness

Theme 6: Outreach planning involves negotiating around difficult issues.

- 6.1 The repercussions of an unpopular initiative
- 6.2 Historically rooted negative opinions of police
- 6.3 The influence of media reporting
- 6.4 The effect of international affairs
- 6.5 Feelings of alienation, targeting, Islamophobia, and post-9/11 suspicions

Outreach Efforts Are Planned through Relationships

Despite the politically charged atmosphere that surrounded the development of the community forum as a response to the map failure in the USA study site, the people involved relied heavily on personal relationships that existed prior to the end of the map project as the foundation for building the forum. In other words, important relationships survived through the failure and offered a useful basis upon which the new collaborative project could be built. This is particularly interesting because, as we have seen, one of the goals of the forum project was to build relationships, but relationships were also an important mechanism through which the forum itself was developed and sustained. Therefore, effective relationships serve an iterative purpose in police-Muslim community outreach in this particular city: they are required to plan opportunities for outreach, but they also serve as a goal for outreach as well.

The importance of these relationships to build the potential forum project quickly became evident as I observed individuals involved describe their efforts to work with others on the project. As one police interviewee noted:

> And so the chief believed that as a replacement, so that we don't lose the momentum, to create the forum… let the process be part of the strength of our relationship, and… try to complete our objectives through the forum.

In this quote we see the suggestion that interpersonal relationships were a tool though which outreach was designed and built. As a Muslim leader observed "engagement is important, and engagement has to be built on trust and building confidence." This is not easy, and evidence from the interviews illustrated that (a) building relationships requires time and (b) developing relationships were enhanced by interpersonal skills and thoughtfulness.

Building Relationships Requires Time

It became clear that this relational utility had a distinctly temporal quality; that is, these relationships had been built up over a period of time, and that this timeline was required to develop the kind of interpersonal resiliency that was needed to overcome the hurt feelings and suggestions of political intrigue that surrounded the well-publicized response to the proposed map initiative. The "18 months of dialogue" referred to by a police manager (and similarly alluded to by some Muslims) that preceded the outreach efforts was certainly not in vain. Several interviewees, Muslims and police alike, made at least passing mention to previous events, relationships, or efforts to bring members of Muslim communities and police together, and it became clear that this history of relationship building had had an effect. As one Muslim interviewee recalled:

> Yeah in reality when they wanted to form a forum all they need[ed] was to ask every police department in every corner of the city, what is the [Muslim] organization close to you? And all of the police commanders knew the Muslim organization [and] in the majority of the cases in person.

These past efforts apparently offered a foundation that was able to overcome the significant challenges that Muslim communities and police felt during the upheaval that surrounded the criticism and eventual discarding of the map idea. The same police leader that referred to the 18 months of dialogue observed that the forum "exists to build bridges," *but very importantly, at the same time he also benefited and was able to continue planning in the face of adversity because of bridges he had already helped to construct.* As a Muslim interviewee observed, when the meeting took place to look at the map proposal and start the forum, "several of us we already had [a] good relationship" with the police. This is described with a particular utility that illustrates

how it works, it allows that if a law enforcement person he knows needs "something he can call me up" and ask what he needs to know. This is not unexpected from a leader in the community who has been partnering with law enforcement for some time.

This is not to suggest, however, that these relationships were without their challenges and perils. As one Muslim community leader candidly observed as he spoke of the chief of police, his opinion of police leaders is conditional and cannot be taken for granted: "I have nothing but the highest regards and respect for him [the chief of police] up until now; I don't know what's happening tomorrow, but up until now." This same leader had a long history of working with the police to overcome police-Muslim community issues. As he described his history with the city's police force and his opinion of the history of police chiefs, in this context it was not surprising to hear that he had learned to form his opinion of the relationship between himself and the police chief on a day-by-day basis.

Speaking of this aspect of the relationship between police leaders and Muslim leaders, other interviewees noted that "there was some damage done, you know, in terms of the relationship" between Muslims and the police during the furor over the map issue. This obviously suggests that a relationship already existed. Along this same theme, a police interviewee offered that:

> You know you're going to have, in any relationship you're going to have some bumps along the way, that [the map issue] was a bump. And you know, the relationship started before that event so again it's, it's one speed bump along the way and then… you kind of get [from] there to the [forum].

Whether it was considered a personal, religious, professional, or political affront, we have already seen that everyone involved agreed that the response to the map initiative presented the

impetus for the eventual development of the community forum with Muslims and police. However, it also became clear that were it not for the sound relationships that senior police personnel and Muslim community leaders had already built, the effect of the criticism surrounding the map idea could have been much worse. The time that Muslim leaders and police leaders had already spent together made a difference. As a Muslim interviewee observed, "Yeah the relationship was… somehow even though the trust was tarnished when we heard about the [map proposal] but there was existing trust in between [police and Muslims] to sit down and talk and negotiate." One has to wonder what would have happened if community leaders and police had not previously spent the time and effort required to at least have a foundation upon which they could rely to overcome the uproar.

This is important, because as one Muslim leader noted, relationships cannot just appear at the last minute when they are suddenly needed. They do not start:

> From zero, yeah, if you call, if [one particular police manager involved in the forum] calls me, and I am available, I will answer him… If I don't know him… He's going to call me he's going to introduce himself, and then I will say OK, let me call you back I will go and check somebody, who is this guy should I trust him? But if I have a history with him, they already have inside connections, they have a message they want to send out, if they think there's a crook hiding in the community and they want to flush him out, if you know people they will help you.

Clearly building the trust needed to help things happen takes time, and affects the utility of the relationship. It is abundantly clear that Muslim leaders and police in the study city had taken intentional efforts to build relationships before the map flap, and then later benefited because of it.

Developing Relationships Are Enhanced by Interpersonal Skills and Thoughtfulness

While time is needed to build useful, resilient relationships, it was obviously not the only factor required. As Muslim interviewees commented on police leaders who had taken specific steps which emphasized their thoughtfulness or interpersonal skills as they went about working with Muslim communities, it became clear that the understanding displayed by police personnel made a measurable difference in the opinion of Muslim community members towards these police personnel.

Quite interestingly, the emphasis on relationships was one of the reasons a senior police manager suggested that the counter terrorism unit was taking such a keen interest in developing an outreach effort with Muslim communities, even though the forum itself is not necessarily about terrorism: "I don't think there's a single entity [in the police department] that… is as enthusiastic, or has the focused interest in establishing relations with this particular community." This was reflected in the fact that the police department's public relations personnel were responsible for the logistics of the quarterly forums (time and location), while counter-terrorism personnel worked with Muslim leaders to set the agenda and a high ranking counter-terrorism manager was on the forum leadership committee.

Many comments from interviewees gave descriptions of police leaders an intensely human tone, beyond their specific roles, profession, or organizational affiliation. As a Muslim community member noted:

> I have a very personal relationship with these… commanders and the chief and everybody, to the point that I am very comfortable. I invite them to my house, we sit there on the table and it's, they are very, in… reality [the police chief] is a strong leader,

> on the other hand he is a great communicator and easy person to get along with and the same with, you know [the police manager in charge of the forum].

Another interviewee stressed that the chief of police is "is genuinely, he is a nice person."

A police employee relayed that it was the efforts of one specific police manager in particular that carried through the storm of the map controversy, and that his ability to maintain relationships through that troubled time was:

> A reflection on the character of [this particular counter-terrorism police manager]… you know he's an excellent ambassador for this department and… he's as good as his word and I think that… you know people who interact with him know that and I think that again just like any relationship we all make mistakes, who knows if its only somebody's judgment that that was a mistake anyway, you know what I mean? It's not necessarily a mistake, but bottom line is every relationship has its ups and downs and I think he's been able to maintain and probably strengthen, but again the personal character of the man has definitely factored into that.

Two police personnel in particular—one a high ranking police department counter-terrorism manager, the other the chief of police—were described by interviewees in particular ways that belied the affection others had for them as well as the high regard in which they and their interpersonal skills and thoughtfulness were held. As I considered interviews that had already taken place, and also worked through future interview opportunities, it became quite evident that there was a distinctly affective side to planning the forum that transcended any mechanistic, organizational, or dichotomizing "us vs. them" mentalities. Instead, warm, human descriptions were often used by, and about, the most influential people involved in the program as they

answered interview questions. I sometimes felt as if interviewees were talking about real friends instead of professional acquaintances.

This human side of the interaction between groups was emphasized several times, including two very specific examples of police personnel visiting mosques, in particular during *Eid* celebrations. As one Muslim religious leader recalled, "you know we had a *Eid*… and [this same police manager] came by, I was shocked." This interviewee continued:

> Yeah, yeah, and he came by, he came by about one o'clock and then another policeman he came up later and… well stood out there on the ground and everybody was out there, you know, celebrating, the eating and playing the music and all that stuff, you know, and we did right out here on the yard and [this police manager] said you know, he just wanted to stop by and see how you were doing and see this, this, type of, and I introduced him to some of the Muslims that came by, and they were very kind and respected. See this kind of thing let's you know that that the police [don't] have a general, does not take a general position of animosity towards the Muslim community.

Another Muslim leader in the same city also remarked on the same police manager's decision to visit during a different *Eid* event, and there were similarly stressed comments about other police personnel just stopping by for other reasons. (A third Muslim interviewee specifically mentioned the positive effect caused the mayor of the city attending an *Eid* celebration as well.)

It is interesting to note that these are not examples of police necessarily working on what would commonly be described as "police matters," but instead simply examples of humans reaching out to one another in a way that transcends easy definitions of professional or organizational responsibilities. While there were examples of relationships between police and Muslims that led to good law enforcement outcomes, these examples of visits to mosques are

more subjective, and perhaps not as traditionally expected of police. But some see this interaction as key. Another police interviewee referred to the police manager referred to above, and offered "And that's frankly that's what he wanted to build to begin with I mean that's what policing is in the end, it's less systems and institutions and things than it is personal relationships and interaction."

Perhaps some would feel these relationships should not be too warm or personal, but others seem to believe it is indeed needed. As a Muslim interviewee observed:

> There's nothing wrong with the police chief calling somebody from the forum, says let's have lunch, or one of the forum going to just regular police events like I go to my local, when they open house, my local office here there are things mix socially, you go to any open formal setting, you learn more.

As I recognized the evidence of this interpersonal emphasis, I looked more intentionally for mention of its influence as I continued interviewing, and noted conscious and unconscious evidence that interviewees were often truly fond of the police personnel and Muslims about whom they spoke in both the USA and the UK.

The effect of these types of relationship-building efforts appears to have had an important effect, and extended beyond discussions of the forum or personnel involved in the forum. Some Muslim leaders who were interviewed also mentioned their previous meetings with local police commanders, even if I did not specifically ask about it. As one leader recalled: "before the forum was established, [the chief of police] invited all of his commanders here to see the [particular ethnic Muslim] organization, to talk to the Muslim people to have a better understanding, and I really appreciate that relationship." This same interviewee also stressed how much it meant to him that a very simple thing—like the humility of a new police leader

coming to his office as opposed to having him come to the precinct when they first met—made a real difference:

> One of the things that happened that I really appreciated, that now we have a new lieutenant, chief for our community, and when he was assigned here he called me and he said that he wants to meet with me and I said OK. No he didn't call, his secretary called, and I said OK, I would be happy to meet, I will come to the [police] office, and [the secretary said] no he wants to come to your office. That was a, very, you know, it was a very flattering.... The chief of the police for this community, and he came to my [work] office and we sat there for one hour, and we discussed… I talked about our community.

This participant then referred to these personal connections between police and community members as "ambassadorship in that community," which he suggested would allow police to "get to know the culture and attitude of those people, and then without any question the people who are in the leadership in the community are the people who have the trust of the other people." Similarly, other Muslim interviewees recalled working with local police commanders, either specifically during the events that led to the creation of the forum, or on other community-police issues.

While it is not surprising that this emphasis on relationships extended to personnel within the police department who were not part of the unit studied here, it is noteworthy that interviewees brought up these additional examples, and the effect seems to have the potential to transcend this one specific project. A high ranking police manager that participated in the interviews recalled that "The [community forum]… is the most recent forum that, that we created, and we had about 18 months of dialogue with the Muslims communities with our precinct commanders to try integrate that." This effort to introduce local (at the precinct level)

police personnel to their respective mosques and Muslim community members appears to have been an intentional effort on the part of the police to build up relationships, and also gain participation in government processes:

> That's why we had 18 months of dialogue with the precinct commanders, where we brought them and their senior lead officers in, and we brought the imams and the leadership from the 17 or 18 mosques in the city and we tried to show OK, well in [this area of the city] here's this mosque and in [this other area] here's this mosque, and in [yet another area] there's this mosque, now go out and make these leaders part of your community policing infrastructure.

This "decentralized" effort to build up this capability was deemed not to be working well enough, hence the emphasis on other efforts such as the eventual map proposal and in the end, the forum. However, it was a concrete step towards outreach—one that ultimately led to the relationships needed to overcome the stress created by the map attention, and therefore the creation of the forum.

Outreach Planning Involves Negotiating around Difficult Issues

As one Muslim interviewee stressed, police personnel and members of Muslim communities do not plan outreach events in "a vacuum." Clearly, putting together the community forum required that everyone involved work around current and historic challenges to make the forum happen. Above and beyond the forum itself being a *response* to specific challenges (an issue which was discussed in Theme 1), it was also planned, conducted, and sustained *despite* numerous challenges. While some interviewees mentioned the potential for these issues getting in the way and others did not, they remain clear topics of concern, which should be recognized for the interruptive quality they can present to police-community outreach

planning efforts. The most critical issues that were negotiated included (a) the repercussions of the map proposal, (b) historically rooted negative opinions of police, (c) the influence of media reporting, (d) the effect of international affairs, and (e) feelings of alienation, targeting, Islamophobia, and post-9/11 suspicions.

The Repercussion of an Unpopular Initiative

From the police standpoint, the failure of the map initiative was not just due to a spontaneous release of public sentiment, but was at least in part due to the machinations of one particular politically-minded group. Two of the police interviewees in particular expressed little doubt that the furor over the map plan was engineered and driven by this one particular organization. One police interviewee noted "So we, we realize that's, that's a problem, they [this group] have a hugely extreme political mindset that you have to be careful of." Although a police manager interviewed observed that "leadership in the Muslim community recognized that this [the potential goal of the map initiative] was important," it was also expressed that this original understanding was overcome through the very intentional efforts of the group in question. As the displeasure with the map proposal grew, whatever support existed for the original map plan appeared to quickly erode in the face of the public criticism that took place.

Several Muslims referred to the hurt feelings and the mistrust that was developed in during the controversy regarding the map initiative. This may have been particularly important because it caused a relational hurdle that had to be overcome. As one Muslim interviewee noted "the [map proposal] created the mistrust," and this is despite the efforts to build up a relationship between police and Muslims that preceded the furor surrounding the issue.

Historically Rooted Negative Opinions of Police

The challenges presented by negative opinions of police go beyond the impressions left by the map plan. The experiences of police that immigrant Muslims bring with them from their home countries are also important. As one Muslim interviewee poignantly noted, police have to realize that when working with Muslim communities, police officers "already have one strike against me because I am a police officer, because this person's [an immigrant Muslim's] frame of reference, his experiences are bad. Not with you, but with somebody 3000 miles, 4000 miles, five, 8000 miles away." This interviewee pointed out that:

> In many democratic countries [law enforcement] is an honorable position; in many of the Muslim countries the police officers are an instrument of oppression used by leaders to quell down dissent or to force them like their religious leaders are also used to promote ideas of the government. So all these things, and some people if they come from Iran, they come from Egypt, they come from Saudi Arabia, they come from Syria, Libya, Iraq, their experience with law enforcement is not one that they cherish.

This presents a strong indication of the type of issues those involved in outreach between police and Muslim community members must negotiate. A police interviewee recognized the same issue, and observed that it required action on the part of police to change:

> There's always the issue of new communities that don't understand and think the police are all the same… they don't understand our structure and they also think… that you know, we may do things like they do in other countries and just lock people up for no reason and torture them. So you have to try to get out to those communities too, which are constantly changing.

Trying to counteract misconceptions such as these is a clear function of outreach, but also a practical issue that must be carefully negotiated and balanced. In a manner similar to the police employee quoted above who suggested police have a responsibility to do a better job at getting out correct information regarding media representations, this interviewee recognizes that these challenges must be met, and can be positively affected.

Of course not all of the potential challenges to police-Muslim community relations have an international dimension. In particular, one Muslim interviewee recalled a history of both difficulties and solutions African American Muslims have experienced, as well as collaborative solutions they have developed with the police department in the study. The interviewee told of experiences going back 30 years, working with police commanders to ensure African American Muslims were treated fairly in the 1970s:

> Yes, so you know our relationship was born out of problems that [Muslims] used to have with the police when they were selling the papers, we have a newspaper, it's called Muslim Journal now but it was called Muhammad Speaks back then, and the police the officers on the street used to take it upon themselves to tell the [Muslims selling the paper] to get off the street.

This leader described how it was important to work with supervisors to fix the problem, talking with police leaders to elaborate on what police personnel could and could not do.

Another Muslim likewise recognized that the experience of immigrant Muslims regarding police in the United States is not necessarily that of African Americans: the "African American community, they have a history with [the city police department], good or bad, we [immigrant Muslims] don't have that unless we happen to be Latino or African American and also Muslim." Interestingly, this was the same interviewee who warned that immigrant Muslims would be

affected by their previous negative experiences with police in their home countries. His astute observations underline just how real these issues are, and the tangible effect they can have on the ability of Muslims and police to work together at the local government level.

The Influence of Media Reporting

The effect of media coverage of issues regarding both the map issue as well as other national and international incidents involving police and/or Muslim was discussed several times, by police and Muslim interviewees alike. This sentiment was shared by a Muslim interviewee who observed that issues such as the map initiative have the potential to make the news in the Muslim world:

> [It is reported on the wires that] America is talking about freedom, you are oppressing our Muslims… America comes and says look, you are too tough on this group, or you have civil rights here, or you are putting 20 people in jail, say yeah look what you are doing and they will print something like the [map proposal], here, you [America] are a police state.

This media effect is important because, as police personnel in particular recognized, the influence of media coverage of the map initiative was particularly intense. One department employee noted that referring to it as an initiative to map Muslims may itself have come from the media, and suggested a hint of surprise at the way the city's journalists portrayed the initiative in a biased manner. Interestingly, this same interviewee linked media inaccuracies to other important issues: namely, the responsibility of police to do better in sending out their message, but also that the media suffers from a lack of relationships with Muslims in a manner similar to the police:

> I will say that was an interesting personal experience that I had. And it's not that everybody did it [portrayed the issue in a biased manner]. Again, there is a responsibility on our part to accurately correct information, or make sure that we get the message out there… that's not going to be misconstrued the way it was, but that said it was misconstrued… it was fascinating the way it was covered. [It is] very interesting, I think journalists actually are struggling with ironically a lot of the same issues that police are. I don't know that they have they know exactly who to turn to when it comes to these issues.

This police employee's comments underline the need for those involved in outreach to recognize the challenges that exist, and take steps to negotiating around them. By acknowledging that police could have managed their message better, the interviewee also alludes to the fact that those involved in similar projects are not helplessly beholden to the whims of reporters.

The Effect of International Affairs

That incidents that occur overseas would matter to local police-community issues might surprise some, but the first police interviewee brought the topic up, and other interviewees agreed. When asked to elaborate, that first interviewee observed that there is:

> No question [that international affairs matter], I mean you know that old saying this is no longer a domestic problem of individual countries, it's an international phenomenon that affects the quality of life of everybody in the world. And what happens in Pakistan or Mumbai directly impacts a community or group of people here in [our city]. It affects how they [Muslims] feel about their lifestyle, how they feel about their community, how they feel about being an American, how they feel about interacting with police, so it, it completely impacts that, and that's why our perspective in a place like Mumbai or

> Afghanistan or Iraq or Israel, a local perspective, is so important to understand, so that we can bring back here and deal with those communities, or at least talk to them and encourage them, and support them if they're feeling targeted.

A Muslim interviewee offered even more detail:

> Yeah, and I'll give you an example. For example the concerns about the, beyond Mumbai, maybe Mumbai is going to be something, well I'll give you two examples. The concern in the past where you get young Muslims going to go fight in India or Kashmir and then the second example I heard was Somali refugees coming in and then feeling they don't, they're not integrated well in America, and they are, they're out of place so there's some anti-social behavior that manifests itself and then leads to them going back to Somalia and fighting. So I think I think that whether it is international, or regional, or local it's all interconnected now.

This effect is not just theoretical, but has a real relationship to the events that took place in the study site, especially regarding the map issue. As a police interviewee recalled regarding the international dimension to what might be mistakenly construed as a solely a local issue, "You know, the [map proposal] incident is a prime example, I was pulling things from overseas publications, and if it was not going to be of interest to their readership they would not have run the story."

It was interesting that two Muslim interviewees pointed to police-Muslim issues in the UK, and suggested that UK answers would not work for USA situations: "it's going to mess you up because it's like completely different." Another interviewee more specifically suggested that the police department in the study site adopted the idea for mapping from England, and then offered the opinion that it "couldn't work here in the United States." This was indeed a topic

discussed later in the study while I was in the UK, and this connection may therefore make sense. More importantly for the purpose here, it underlines the real-world need for police and Muslim community members to be aware of the effect of international affairs on local police-community issues, and be able to negotiate their responses appropriately.

Feelings of Alienation and Targeting, Islamophobia, and Post-9/11 Suspicions

Both Muslims and police interviewees recognized the challenge faced by Muslims in a post-9/11 environment. As one police interviewee candidly noted, Muslim communities may feel "targeted" and "suspect": "they're in the spotlight and the majority of the community feels like they're suspect." Another police participant observed "Muslim communities are affected by terrorism in a number of different ways."

Unfortunately, the controversy surrounding the map project was associated with this sensation of targeting. Some Muslim interviewees noted that it suggested that Muslim communities in particular felt as if they were considered suspect by the police, hence they were the emphasis on Muslims for the map proposal. As one Muslim interviewee suggested, it would not have been the case if the entire city were studied as opposed to just Muslims; "I think that that's that could create [an] accusation of racism." Instead, as another Muslim observed, some felt "it sounded too much like the attempt to separate them [Muslims] from the main body of the community, and view them as a suspicious group." Another Muslim interviewee expressed a similar sentiment when he noted "Unfortunately, the way that [map proposal] was displayed, it caused it to isolate the Muslims from the community and treat them differently than other people."

Even a Muslim interviewee who said he himself had never felt "profiled," suggested that the current climate may lead police to bad conclusions. He said police would be crazy not to be

affected by all that is going on, but also suggested it was manageable through the efforts of Muslims:

> As Muslims we should be able to explain our faith to others who are fearful, who are apprehensive, and they have reason to be you see, if all you see is somebody beheading somebody, or somebody coming with a mask, or somebody blowing themselves up, and that is all you are bombarded with, if you are not scared, then there is something wrong with you… the officer would be a nut.

Here, this interviewee made it clear that this issue affects Muslims *and* police, but something can be done about it. Another Muslim interviewee observed that this constituted one of the things police could learn through outreach, and concluded "I think the main thing is that the Muslim American community is trying to overcome this notion of being suspect community after 9/11."

On the other hand, this same interviewee recognized that the barriers to outreach are not one-sided. Pointing out that Muslims as well as "Islamophobes" may have views that offer a "threat" to engagement, he described:

> This threat of people on the outside that want disengagement, either non-Muslims or Islamophobes if you will, who are exploiting 9/11 and the concern over 9/11 to continuously disengage between Muslims and government agents. And then, and then the other issue is… Muslims who feel like it's not worth it, or this is against Islam, you know we shouldn't be… we are losing our purity as Muslims.

So, although the forum may be able to "eliminate a lot of mistrust and lack of understanding," as a Muslim said, this should not be seen as an issue that is exclusively between police and the community. The quote above illustrates how challenges are internal to communities as well as with police. This coincides with the police recognition that "The objectives [of the forum] are to

build trust, to understand the sensitivities of the communities, to try to even bring the disparate communities together." Trust is a central theme to outreach planning between Muslims and police, reflected strongly in both the United States and the United Kingdom, and is a key characteristic of police-community partnerships, without which outreach is almost certain to fail.

Summary

The interviews conducted in the United States with Muslim leaders and police personnel involved in planning the forum illuminated several recurring themes. These characteristics of planning suggest a process that is iterative: many of the goals of outreach were also processes through which outreach is developed. For example, as police and community partners seek to build better relationships through outreach, they also harness the power of past relationships to work through the planning process. This suggests that outreach planning and goals are not so easily separated, and are often one in the same.

Additionally, while police and Muslims often described goals and interests for the forum that differed from one another, they did not suggest that these differences meant that their goals were mutually exclusive nor antagonistic. Indeed, it appears that once the controversy that served as the foundation for the forum was settled, many relationships that had started beforehand continued to be a source for future outreach planning.

CHAPTER V

PLANNING OUTREACH IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

The overarching themes that developed during the UK study broadly matched those developed in the United States. However, the nature and amount of evidence supporting these themes was more substantial—a function perhaps of having more than three times as many interviewees, and it may have also been affected by the added interview question, included at the request of a manager on the counter-terrorism team with whom I was coordinating my work. As the interviews in the UK were conducted, I was also working on analyzing the USA interview data, and was beginning to develop broad research themes from those findings. This process occurred concurrently with data collection in the UK, and affected my views of the UK data and the way in which I began to conceptualize the outreach efforts in both the United States of America and Britain. Because the overarching themes in both countries were so strikingly similar, I made the conscious decision to utilize the same wording for themes in both study sites, which I believed would eliminate confusion.

Despite the similarities between the findings developed in the USA and the UK, it is important to emphasize that the environment in which outreach takes place between Muslims and police in the UK remains quite different from that experienced in the USA. Debates about multiculturalism, integration, religious tolerance, community cohesion and violent extremism in the United Kingdom are omnipresent, public, and at times quite heated. It often seemed as if a day could not go by during my time there without a new television program, newspaper article, governmental or non-governmental report, noteworthy political quote, or widely discussed security service or law enforcement action that would be reasonably expected to affect Muslims,

police, or both. At times, the number of emails I received from friends and colleagues in the UK regarding these new developments was quite surprising.

What follows are the themes that were developed after analyzing the data developed from the 24 UK interviews—12 members of Muslim communities (while I use the term "Muslim," recall that two interviewees were participants from an "Islamic background" who did not consider themselves Muslims), and 12 police personnel. These are broken down between the two research questions, and then more fully into six main themes and the sub-themes that support them. The first four themes relate to research question one, while the last two a linked to question two.

Table 6
The Goals of Police and Muslims Planning Outreach in the UK

Theme 1: Outreach is planned as a response to difficult circumstances.

- 1.1 Balancing the counter-terrorism agenda and its effects
- 1.2 Improving the flow of information
- 1.3 Overcoming general issues with police

Theme 2: Outreach involves educational goals.

- 2.1 Learning about Islam and the diversity of Muslim communities
- 2.2 Learning about police and the counter-terrorism mission

Theme 3: Outreach is developed to build communication, relationships, and trust.

Theme 4: Outreach is developed to promote community participation in government.

What Are the Goals of Police and Muslim Leaders in Planning Outreach?

As in the USA portion of the study, at times police personnel and Muslim community members had divergent views of what they hoped outreach efforts could accomplish. Clearly, police personnel at a strategic and individual level had goals that pertained to the prevention of terrorism, and this comes as no surprise given that the unit which participated in the study falls

under a counter-terrorism command structure. This should not, however, be read as suggesting that police goals were in any way limited to this function, nor to imply that they were not well aware of their ability to support interests that may be seen as outside the usual police responsibilities, such as community cohesion. Indeed, the goals often went hand in hand, a reality to which several officers and Muslim interviewees alluded.

Also like the USA study, there was little to suggest that although police and community members may represent different goals and interests, that these differing positions meant that they could not accomplish their goals jointly. While there was indeed evidence and concern that some communities or groups may be hesitant to partner in police initiatives (especially youth), those community members and police personnel who did choose to work together did not characterize that relationship as one of mutual exclusivity. Indeed, there were many examples of flexibility and fluidity that suggested that police interests and community interests could be pursued side-by-side, even when they differed. Perhaps this is why several interviewees suggested that success in these endeavors entails risk and a willingness to try something different. One Muslim interviewee described her opinion about this potential in this way:

> Well, to be honest, I think Muslim women need empowering anyway and it would be really lovely if, they need empowering in terms of they need their voices heard by policymakers, by people in power. Also, they've got issues and problems, not necessarily linked to PVE [Preventing Violent Extremism] but other things going on that they need to talk to… the police, to government, to local authorities, and, however, it would be really lovely if someone threw money at Muslim women, police or government and say, here you are. Here's money to solve your problems. That's not happening. However, there are pots of money available, labeled, Prevent Violent Extremism. There

> are elements of, or some parts of it are aimed at empowering Muslim women. So although the label isn't right, and I don't really agree, I think Muslim women need empowering anyway, despite the PVE agenda, so I believe that actually why don't Muslim women use that funding to their own advantage, get themselves heard. Get themselves empowered. OK. The police have a different, and the government have a different reason for doing it, and then women may have a different reason for wanting to get involved but at the end of the day, if they can utilize this money that's available to get their voices heard, empower them at the same time, if it helps tackle violent extremism, prevent violent extremism, and it helps the police, then that's surely a bonus. You know, why shouldn't women, Muslim women want that?

Similarly, counter-terrorism officers recognized that while some of the tasks they were asked to address by communities may not be directly related to terrorism or even law enforcement, they were willing to stretch their roles in order to ensure that worthwhile things were accomplished. And while they also pointed out at times that their roles were more in line with other public institutions like local government or education, they realized that in the interest of achieving their overarching goals it was important to be flexible.

Outreach Is Planned as a Response to Difficult Circumstances

Muslim and police interviewees pointed to variety of national and local problems that made outreach efforts involving police and Muslim communities necessary. At times this included the obvious need to address the root causes of terrorism. However, it also touched on less obvious requirements, such as (a) balancing the counter-terrorism agenda and its effects, (b) improving the flow of information between police personnel as well as police and communities, and (c) overcoming general issues with police. In this way, outreach was planned to improve a

variety of conditions and social ills, and may indeed have been having that result. As one Muslim interviewee noted, Muslims have benefited at least some because of the attention, "Because now they are, those who are receiving, you know, services that nobody thought of giving them." It is these secondary, and perhaps less obvious, goals mentioned by interviewees that is the focus here. Because the counter-terrorism role of such a unit is so obviously a function of their job design and responsibilities, it receives little attention.

Balancing the Counter-Terrorism Agenda and Its Effects

While police interviewees were by no means wedded to only working on security or terrorism-related issues, there was no doubt that the foundation of their efforts were designed as a response to the danger posed by international and domestic terrorism, specifically as exemplified in the events of September 11th in the USA, and of July 7, 2005 in the UK. Therefore, it is not surprising that the officers who were interviewed recognized and supported this role, as well the more strategic view offered through the Prevent strand of the UK Home Office counter-terrorism strategy (commonly called CONTEST). They were clear that their job was foundationally about answering the threat of violent extremism through outreach.

However, above and beyond the tangible danger posed by terrorism, there was also evidence of a side-effect caused by all of the security and media attention this topics has attained, and the way in which that in particular affects Muslims in the UK. A counter-terrorism team member explained their unit role as traditional police officers, but with a counter-terrorism emphasis as well:

> People recognize that there is a need to have an effective police service but what they want is an open, honest, accessible, hard working, responsive locally based, recognizable

> service that they can put their trust in. And that is what we're trying to encapsulate, albeit with a particular Prevent focus.

But at the same time, this same police employee recognized that government efforts and media attention have contributed to an issue that is itself problematic:

> I believe there's been significant failures in communication which have tended to associate, unfairly, international Al-Qaeda incidents of terrorism with mainstream Muslim community issues. And this has alienated Muslim communities and they feel it has contributed to the challenges they face day-to-day in achieving essentially health, wealth and happiness as British citizens. They do start largely from the position of very low social and economic status. They are working hard to establish their families and communities to educate themselves with a view to achieving the same goals that all British communities are seeking but they are constantly being held back, suppressed, by this relentless association with one of the most serious problems faced by, I think by the whole of the international community. It's particularly offensive to them because they actually see acts of terrorism as the fundamental opposite of all of the principles of Islam that they hold so dear. *And whereas the state and other commentators and media constantly highlight how Al-Qaeda is twisting Muslim community issues, I think Muslim community issues also see the establishment as practically doing as much damage as Al-Qaeda* (emphasis added).

This extremely open-minded appraisal is telling, and was supported by other comments from police that suggested that the nature of the overall response to terrorism, as well as the priorities within the agenda, while perhaps necessary, were themselves still a part of the problem. It was clear that as some counter-terrorism officers went about their daily partnership work, they were

at the same time trying to ameliorate this effect in their interactions. So although officers certainly agreed with the goal of lessening the danger of violent extremism, they were simultaneously seeking to lessen the effect of national and local efforts that were themselves a result of this counter-terrorism effort. Officers in this way clearly saw facets of their overall goals as diverse, and in application the ways in which they would accomplish them as flexible.

This may be partially reflected as a function of a larger issue in the emphasis some officers put on improving community cohesion, which could itself be both symptomatic and a cause of issues related to extremism. An officer suggested that this type of work is integral to their counter-terrorism assignment, even if the goals appear divergent: "From day one, we, I would say 80% of what we do is community cohesion which had nothing to do with Prevent but had to do with linking in with our communities." Another counter-terrorism officer observed this type of purpose, and said that:

> Because of the community and racial tensions in the area, we're [in conjunction with community partners] running a leadership program and anti-violence program within the local schools to re-educate the kids and also encourage community cohesion within the school itself and the kids that live within the local area to re-educate them about racial tensions and communities and respect each other.

From the outside, this type of responsibility within a police force is striking for the breadth of its goals, largely beyond what may be traditionally considered "police work."

Muslim interviewees likewise felt that community cohesions was an important goal for them in their work. As a youth worker suggested, this also means this type of work must transcend efforts to exclusively focus on Muslims: "It was really important not to concentrate on Muslim communities because actually it's about, we talk about cohesion and understanding.

There has to be that engagement with people in general because it involves everybody and it affects everybody." Another community interviewee likewise recognized that a project she had worked on with PVE (Preventing Violent Extremism) funds was "all about community cohesion," further suggesting that that extremism prevention goals and those of community cohesion are not seen as mutually exclusive.

Improving the Flow of Information

Police personnel often expressed concern that information, whether it was from community members or other police personnel, was not shared with police or did not reach the needed recipients. This problem was particularly linked to terrorism-related intelligence, and according to at least one police interviewee, is not just limited to communication between the public and the police. Indeed, the interviewee noted that while there were indeed gaps between government or local authorities, the police, and the community, "there's an even bigger gap between local station[s] and what the force knows… I mean, the gap is evident. There's just a massive gap of information." This was obviously an issue the police force which participated in the study hoped to affect through their new counter-terrorism initiative, and explains why several police interviewees described their outreach role as having two functions: outreach to the public but also outreach to other police within the department.

Additionally, police personnel expressed a concern that community members might not share information needed to prevent a crime or terrorist attack—either because of a reluctance to speak with police, a lack of faith in the police response, or because of not knowing whom to contact. Some Muslim interviewees agreed that was indeed an important community role: "I mean I always say at public meetings, we are the eyes and, and the ears of the police and the, and the local council." But as one officer noted, after the "7/7 bombings and the fact that there was

so much community intelligence that came out post incident, and so many people saying, well, we didn't know who to tell." Another Muslim interviewee substantiated this broad concern about receiving information from the public. And while helpful for illustrating that outreach is a function of solving problems, the following observation is surely a cause of concern for police:

> I am 100% certain there's people out there with a lot of information who are actually withholding this information because they have this fear. Basically the police cannot do much for them if this information goes up. I'm 100% certain, you know, there's people out there who can actually, you know, tell you a lot of things… information they have. But actually they're too afraid to come forward because they think might not protect them. Do you know what I mean?

A police interviewee acknowledged this problem, and stressed that it was one of the things the new counter-terrorism unit hoped to affect:

> I think the overall ambition is whoever you are, that if you had a concern, an issue or some information, that you would have the confidence to lift the phone and contact the local police department to share that concern because you knew that we would manage the information effectively and sensitively.

A Muslim interviewee noted that it was indeed important to pass on information to police, but interestingly stressed it as a way in which Muslim opinions about foreign policy could be heard and acted upon:

> The other important thing I think that needs to happen from all this is what are the issues, concerns, and problems of the community, in my viewpoint, never get to the people that should know about that information. For example, the issues, concerns... of the community should be taken up the channel and then conveyed across to the politicians

> and the decision makers that these people have a gripe and their gripe is we need to get peace in the Middle East.

His comments were unique and are noteworthy in that they suggest that police personnel can offer a conduit for such information to make its way to national-level foreign policy decision makers. Regardless of whether this is realistic, it reflects the way in which the interviewee tied local police actions with the direction of national government leaders and was thus the foundation of information he felt police should know.

The discussions about information flow were not one way (from the community to the police), and indeed one police participant stressed that part of the problem stems from the manner in which counter-terrorism matters have traditionally been so secretive:

> If we're, the police, are secretive about it, the communities aren't going to openly talk about it or think about it. But now we're going in and saying, OK, then yeah. Before we said, you didn't need to know. But actually now we're going to share information with you. We're going to tell you, if we can, we will share this information, we will tell you what we know. And let everyone think about it. Let's everyone, see what we can do to prevent something happening.

This officer's conclusion, that police openness prompts communities to do the same, reflects a theme I have observed often in the police interviews—that the counter-terrorism officers were willing to look beyond the easy response of pointing fingers outwardly, and look at their own practices as a foundation for larger improvements in conjunction with the community. It also suggests a refreshing rejection of an "us versus them" mentality, a key to communities and police working jointly.

Overcoming General Issues with Police

As one would expect in any democracy, the public is likely to express discontent with the police, and so it was the case in the UK. As one Muslim interviewee noted, relationships with the police can be seen as "taboo." These feelings may have a variety of sources, but they exist all the same. As one officer candidly offered (while again looking inward):

> And to be honest, again I'm being brutally honest, a lot of people have really good reason to have no confidence in the police … As a profession, not as individuals, as a profession. I think a lot of people have been let down and are still being let down. On the other hand, it's small scale, as in you phone up to report something and you don't get a police officer. You walk into a police station, you don't see a police officer.

Police personnel obviously see this issue and others like it as a condition that requires a response, and some Muslims interviewees saw it the same way.

Concerns about police and their interaction with youth led one youth worker to look into teaching youngsters how to formally file a complaint about the police: "we had somebody come from the Independent Police Complaints Commission [IPCC] into the center to do a workshop with young people." This should be seen as an interesting learning opportunity that also required some negotiation. The youth worker's idea, however, then led him to consider trying to work out the issue locally—with the police force about whom youth had complaints. "What we said to ourselves, before we get into the IPCC, let's just see if we can deal with things sort of, very much, you know, internally." This issue led to a project in which police and youths traded places, almost literally, through role playing scenarios in order to feel what one another experienced during negative police-community encounters. It is worth considering whether or

not the later outreach effort would have ever developed had there not been a potential problem that needed to be addressed.

An interesting tangential note to the efforts to improve opinions in the public of police was the oft-repeated theme—by Muslims and police alike—of the need to convince the one another that police officers and Muslims are just "human," or not "aliens." While this suggests the need to build relationships discussed shortly, it also underlines the importance of overcoming negative opinions that already exist. That the term "alien" (as in a space creature) was applied more than once is telling, and that such similar sentiments existed in the police force and among Muslims suggests that more time spent together could indeed be a significant part of the solution.

Outreach Involves Educational Goals

Interviews consistently stressed that Muslims and police personnel always have educational goals as they engage in planning outreach. This was one of the most consistent and strong themes developed during the interview data analysis, and leads one to then see outreach as an educational endeavor with a distinct learning component. Whether it was explicitly stated or not, just as in the USA *all of the police and Muslim interviewese acknowledged that there were things they hoped their partners in outreach would learn*. The topics about which outreach participant need to learn included (a) Islam and the diversity of Muslim communities, and (b) police and the counter-terrorism mission.

Learning about Islam and the Diversity of Muslim Communities

Interviewees suggested a variety of important topics to be learned, but these topics were not particularly surprising. Muslims in particular often spoke of the need for police to know about Islam, and the diversity of Muslim communities, and several officers provided comments that suggested they agreed. One Muslim interviewee suggested "people need to learn the basic

fundamentals of Islam," but others went deeper, into the practical and personal knowledge that could lead officers to be more understanding and willing to approach Muslims they know to ask even more questions about the faith.

In one particular instance, a Muslim interviewee gave a very real example of how this kind of learning can make a real difference in relationships between Muslim communities and police. He suggested that:

> It's very important that those little things and gestures show that the other people know about your religion and that they respect each other's religion. And then there's mutual respect. And I think ignorance leads to wrong conclusions being drawn. So that's why it's very important that the police are aware of why the Muslim community, for example, take their shoes off, do ablution before prayer, and you know, for example, you know, they pray five times a day. So what times do they go to mosque? At certain times of the year, you might find people walking to the mosque in the early hours of the morning at half four.

This interviewee shared a story in which a Muslim man was stopped by police some time ago, purportedly for walking around at an extremely late (or in reality, early) hour. A lack of knowledge can lead to serious mistakes, and in this example the man was detained by police when in actuality he was walking to a mosque for the early morning prayer. As the same interviewee recalled, "He was, he had a beard. He was wearing cultural Pakistani clothes and he was arrested by the police and he was very, very annoyed and angry" at the treatment he received. If the scenario was indeed reducible to a lack of understanding about Islamic practices, one can see how a lack of knowledge about the faith had real consequences. As the interviewee stressed, "And then you have a section of the community that's polarized and

resentful towards the police and less likely to share information and have confidence in the police," which we have already seen is so important. Therefore, "I think that's, it's very important that the police are aware of what the Muslim faith or Islam is all about, at least the basics."

Police interviews also supported that learning about Islam has been important and continues to be needed. As one police participant noted:

> Well, I think it's, it's a great way to understand the Muslim community and feed that back into the organization, i.e. the [our particular jurisdiction's] police. Because I, you know, before I'd actually done this role, I didn't understand Islam. I didn't understand some of the, the way in which Muslim people conduct themselves and why, why they conduct themselves in the way they do. It's, it is about broadening that experience and passing that experience.

Here there is evidence of a theme brought up at other times as well: that the knowledge counter-terrorism personnel gain about Islam should then be shared with other police personnel to improve their understanding of the communities they serve. Interestingly, this also underlines the previously mentioned importance of sharing information, within the police force but also between communities and police.

The sources of information about Islam may come down a variety of paths, and it serves an important function for officers involved in outreach. As a Muslim participant observed "They need to educate themselves of… what the right, you know, Muslims, or the right, and way of Islam is," and importantly for the counter-terrorism assignment discussed here, "they shouldn't just give that role away to anybody [but to] somebody who knows. Somebody with knowledge."

One police officer even suggested a role for former ideological extremists in supporting the educational needs of communities:

> And so those are the people who are already on board, which I was quite surprised and shocked with, to be honest, but again, it comes back to individual responsibility and they feel it's up to them, as a Muslim, to go and educate people and say, look, Islam doesn't say this. The religion actually doesn't say this. I've been radicalized. I've been there. I believed it. And I've come out of it because of these reasons.

While a Muslim interviewee offered a decidedly different take, suggesting that to allow former extremists to teach essentially rewards them for previously going down a dangerous road, there was indeed one particular organization led by a well-known former extremist ideologue that often taught about the extremist path and philosophy during my visit. His influence was a source of debate I witnessed more than once among community members and police.

Several interviewees additionally stressed a quite practical and experiential focus on the learning that can take place. As one community interviewee stated regarding an outreach event at a mosque attended by police:

> I think it was more to do with creating an environment where, you know, people could have those conversations without feeling that they were being watched or they were being judged. And that's really important because that doesn't happen, it just doesn't happen. Where do you do that? You know, how, you see a woman walking down the street and she's wearing the veil, where do you get the opportunity to actually talk to her about that?

Here there is obviously a relationship between identifying the need for inquiry, and having a comfortable relationships and space in which participants can learn. As an interviewee observed police can learn:

> And, wow, so there is a wider function of the mosque in the community by all the other things that have, for example, at [the mosque at which a police-community event was held], so there's a whole burial service and whatever, so actually the mosque isn't just somewhere where you pray. I saw people, for example, sleeping, so quietly, sleeping in a mosque. But you just pray. It's allowing you the space to kind of, without kind of having a formal lesson, just you standing there observing. So even people asking questions of, do I, can I, I've heard that you can't wear shoes in a mosque. Is that right? … it's kind of navigating your way in that safe space without feeling too politically correct as well. And I think that's a problem so how do you then kind of get of this physical correctness? You do it because you have formed a relationship with someone to actually ask, to feel comfortable to actually ask that question.

Here it is important to stress that learning was connected with relationships. Police can ask questions—perhaps about those topics they were too uncomfortable to ask about previously—when they are in a position in which they have a relationship with someone who can provide answers: "a lot of feedback that I'm getting from the Muslim community is ask us, you know, just, you know. I think there is a bit of a fear out there of asking," while in reality, this officer suggests, Muslims welcome the opportunity for these discussions. In this way, some of the tension and hesitance might be alleviated, on the part of both police and Muslims.

Learning about even more specific theology may have an application for police, such as one Muslim interviewee who commented on the need to understand the role of a Muslim in a non-Muslim country regarding that country's laws:

> But you see, this is where I go back to the understanding of the religion by the police officers. Because as you know, what does the Qur'an say? If you're in that country, you respect the laws of that country... That's what the prophet said. You are, if you are in a non-Muslim country and you're in that country, you obey the rules and laws and you're, you know, you sort of obey the rules.... It's a contract, it is. And a lot of our people... don't understand that and certainly the police don't.

While this is an acute example of a topic worthy of police or community attention, it alludes to a practicality that may often appear beyond the usual knowledge needs of government personnel and Muslims. But, perhaps himself seeing the connection, this same Muslim interviewee decried the lack of participation in public life and government systems among Muslims, which itself suggests that this is not a topic without a real-world utility.

In addition to learning broadly about Islam, interviewees suggested more specifically that police needed to learn about Muslims, their communities and cultures, and the diversity they represent. As one Muslim said, learning about Islam in general provides a foundation:

> But then, when you want to get to the bottom of things, you, you shouldn't just look at that because at the end of the day the Muslim community comes from different continents. You know, you've got people from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, you've got people from Africa, you've got people from the Middle East and you can't just lump them all together because they have different languages, they have different cultural aspects that don't sort of, that they tend to sort of marry within their own communities,

> marriages take place within their own communities because they're more comfortable within their own communities. And that cultural aspect needs to be taken into account, which is very important.

Stressing this application, a police officer noted that:

> It's very important for the CTU [Counter-Terrorism Unit] environment to understand our communities that we're serving out there. Each community has its own needs and diversity and everything else and we need to understand them and the only reason we're going to understand that, if you can be out on the ground having that personal interaction with the community we serve.

Or, as another officer suggested, it is important "to have that cultural awareness which is key as well… I'm at a bit of an advantage because I am from that sort of community. I have an understanding. But some of, a lot of the officers won't."

Learning about Police and the Counter-Terrorism Mission

In much the same way Muslims and police recalled the importance of learning about Islam and Muslim communities, several participants also stressed the need for the community to learn more about police and their roles. A particular example of the effort of police to teach communities about the counter-terrorism mission was receiving a significant level of attention during my visit. Developed by the Lancashire Constabulary, the ACT Now (All Communities Together) curriculum was designed to share the decision-making factors involved in a counter-terrorism investigation with citizen participants (Lancashire Constabulary, n.d.). I attended an ACT Now facilitator training course with the counter-terrorism team I studied, and heard positive comments after the fact from police personnel in interviews who had already delivered

the training. As one police officer noted, "it gets community people thinking about why police… operate the way they do."

One Muslim interviewee spoke more broadly about the roles of police, and tied this into a recent sad story of a Muslim mother who asphyxiated while trying to crawl through a window to reach her children locked in a room. He noted that the woman probably did not know she could call the police in the UK for such an issue. He suggested that the need to teach Muslims about the police mission is not just a job for police, but for communities and their leaders as a whole: "we are the… leaders of the community, teachers who should make sure that people know the basic things that save lives, you see."

This same interviewee candidly admitted that his ideas about the counter-terrorism agenda in the UK was changed by what he learned from the counter-terrorism officer with whom he had built a relationship:

> So I think that there was a need to, to cover the whole issue of peace and security, and I think that now, I know this fact now. I didn't know it before, to be honest, until I [worked with this one particular counter-terrorism officer], so now I will put that as part of my planning material, you know, and explain to people no [the counter-terrorism agenda of these officers is] not against Muslims.

While his previous opinion had been negative, the influence of one officer made the difference in this interviewee's views, and I saw evidence of a similar shift in perception from other community interviewees due to relationships with police during my visit. This relationship in particular was doubly important because of the way this interviewee stressed his role in teaching community members about this function of the police. This is especially noteworthy in light of

the related comments of an officer regarding the importance of sharing information with the community:

> If you can change that one person's view, he will change 100 others, maybe more. So that one person, although he may be very small and minor, what he will go out there and spread, you know, negative stuff for example, if we can change his thinking, his perception, an understanding of the police and what the government are trying to do to protect people, because that's what it's all about.

Clearly, however, the skills of the person sharing the information, as well as the importance of a trusting relationship makes all the difference:

> I think it's showing respect for the community we serve and especially the ones in community. You find a lot of them will have, especially to do with terrorism, negative feelings about it because, regardless of their own personal experiences, the media doesn't help and also they hear about other peoples' experiences and believe they think the only reason a CT officer will come and visit you if they're coming to get you and your doors will go off the hinges and those are the reasons why you get a knock from a CT officer. But if you're on the ground and you're speaking and working with them, and you're approachable, they find, wait a minute, you're not so bad after all.

Outreach Is Developed to Build Communication, Relationships, and Trust

It is not an exaggeration to say that policing in a democratic society is foundationally about trust and confidence. Looking back at Peel's admonitions, it is clear that communities must have trust in the police that serve them in order for police to be effective. Referring to a project designed to steer Muslim youth away from terrorism, a senior police official with a national counter-terrorism responsibility was quoted in the UK press during my visit as saying

"The whole ethos is to build a relationship, on the basis of trust and confidence, with those [Muslim] communities" (Sir Norman Bettison quoted in Hughes, 2009). In the UK, and in the city that was the focus of this study more particularly, these terms were everywhere—quoted by police and Muslims alike, and as the quote above suggests, are indeed part of the core mission of police counter-terrorism personnel.

Perhaps because of the prevalence of these two terms in England, police interviewees often bordered on apologizing for using the terms "trust and confidence," recognizing that it had become so ingrained as the philosophy of their force in general, and more specifically, as part of the mantra of the new function of the counter-terrorism unit, that it seems cliché. Making excuses or apologizing, however, they would eventually have to return to using those terms out of a sincere recognition that these ideas accurately described what they hoped to accomplish. As one officer noted, "because it's all about building up trust in the police. Firstly we've got to build the trust with the police, counterterrorism unit will come after that."

An excellent quote from a community youth worker painted a well-developed picture of work between police and Muslims, which seeks:

> To build a relationship with the communities, to actually find out what, you know, what the courses, you know, and what actions are, you know? And to also to let the community know there are key people out there working alongside them and, so basically the communities can actually engage with the police and the police are just human beings in uniform, and who are actually there to protect them.

As we have already noted, relationships take time, which is itself part of the challenge police and Muslims must negotiate in order to plan outreach. But it is also a facet of the overall goals. As another Muslim interviewee observed:

> And that thing about the goal, which I didn't cover, is, you work at times when it's not the bad times but you work when there's a neutral time. It's not the time when I need information from you, it's that time when actually I have nothing in it but to learn from you, so which then fulfills the goal of when that threat happens, I know that person. Let me go and speak to my mate.

This should be seen to underline the interviewee's real-world understanding of what it takes to develop and sustain these relationships. It simply cannot be done at the last minute; time must be spent beforehand to build a foundation that can serve an important purpose later on.

The police unit explicitly made relationships building a part of their mission, in part suggested by the fact the word "partnership" is a part of each officer's title. As one police officer noted, a core function of their missions is to "improve relationships with minority communities within our policing areas." This important facet of their job is not just theoretical—it can develop into practical advantages. An officer relayed a story as proof:

> I'll give you an example in my previous job. I worked as a Neighborhood Officer in an area and, you know, spoke to a lot of the kids on a regular basis. One day we came across, where we did a warrant and it went completely wrong and I stood right outside of this house and the local kids trying to get in to have a knock, and one of the kids from that group came, stood in the middle of the hall and said, no, leave her [this officer] alone. She's all right, she is. And I still remember those words. The reason for that is because, on a regular basis I used to talk to him on a one-to-one basis. I knew his first name. When I told him to go home, he did as he was told. And because of having that confidence to do that and also that trust in that relationship that we had, he felt that he stood in the middle to protect me even though he was part of that gang and said no, leave

her alone. Don't pick on her. She's all right, she is. And I think if we can get that across from the CT world to our local communities, to the youth out there… So people are accepting that the CT officer wants to work with you and that comes across now with all the work that people, and people are approaching us rather than us going out and making contacts with them.

This particular example illustrates both the challenges involved in outreach, but also the importance of good relationships as a goal.

This emphasis on relationship building is, like so many other facets of community-police outreach, a process that goes in both directions. As a Muslim interviewee noted, "I mean, the relationship requires that reciprocity going back and forth… It does, absolutely. Absolutely. You hit the nail on the head. It's when people don't see any response from the police, that's when the, the mistrust comes in." It means police being trusted by the community as well as the community trusting police. This must be internalized by police personnel, not just discussed. As an officer suggested, "it's important for the police because as individual police officers, we need to know the community's on our side as opposed to the organization telling us they're on our side. That's very different."

The relationships and level of trust that can be built pays dividends for communities and police in the sharing of information. As one community interviewee observed:

Once you've got more meaningful relationships, let's say, for example like, in particularly Muslim communities, if… there's something that you want to know or you want to know about that's happened the community, in terms of getting intelligence about what happens, it will be limited if you don't have relationships.

Another Muslim interviewee acknowledged the same thing:

> I think that the government and the police feel that the relationship between the Muslim communities and police need to be improved because at the end of the day, they need, for example, they may want intelligence, could be one reason, from the Muslim community, and you're only going to get that if you have a good relationship.

This is not to suggest that Muslims or police exclusively narrowed down the need for relationships to this application; it is more than just a flow of information. However, the practical side of police work requires that police know about the problems that need to be addressed, and barring catching a suspect "in the act," this can only be done through the development of information that points to the perpetrators of crime. A police interviewee effectively described how all of these factors are related:

> It's through that process of constructive engagement that you will develop a relationship based on trust and confidence. And if you deliver a fundamentally sound policing service which reacts to their difficulties and grievances, you reinforce that trust and confidence which is based on the familiarity and the understanding that you've developed. Then naturally you will start to share problems, not just share problems, you share the information which is at the heart of problems, and that's when you're genuinely working in partnership.

It is absolutely paramount to remember that in the context of this particular jurisdiction there is evidence that these partnerships are built when Muslims and police engage in person-to-person contact, transcending group boundaries and definitions, which develop into relationships based on time spent together and trust. So while it may be tempting to see the purely practical goals of these relationships (such as information flow or "intelligence"), it must also be re-emphasized

that the path to this goal is one paved with understanding and intensely personal shared experiences.

Outreach is Developed to Promote Community Participation in Government

Nearly two hundred years ago, Sir Robert Peel emphasized that police must serve with the consent of the public. Evidence from the interviews in the UK suggests that the passage of time has not left this aspect of British policing forgotten. This is especially relevant, because, as one police interviewee noted, "I believe we do police by consent." The expectation that the public have input into the way in which their society is policed and governed was an important characteristic found in many interviews. It was expressed as an opportunity to express opinions as well as grievance, and was recognized by Muslims and police alike. As one officer said:

> Working with key people within communities is a big factor. Understanding their needs, the fears and concerns and being able to feed that back into the organization is another big part of it or should be. Empowering the Muslim community in many ways.

This may be particularly relevant in immigrant Muslim communities, who, as we have seen, may not be particularly informed about the way in which government and police operate in the UK and USA, and at the same time may be reluctant to participate in actually getting people involved: "That's another thing within our community, I think," one interviewee said, as this Muslim participant observed that:

> Not many Muslims get involved… simple things like school governors. I mean this area is predominantly Muslim… but how many school governors are there who are from the Muslim background? Very few. Very, very few… But if you don't take an interest in what's going around you, then you can't blame the system for working against you.

Through this process he suggests the value of participation, keeping systems working for communities, not against them, and therefore also supporting their needs and giving them a voice.

As we have already noted, the baggage that comes with meeting and potentially working with a counter-terrorism officer can present a challenge that must be negotiated. But it also could lead to opportunities, and more specifically, the chance to hear what community members really feel. As one police interviewee described:

> These individuals, groups, organizations, bodies, etcetera, they, they often the first time [they are] confronted by an individual in uniform who tells them that they work for counter-terrorism police is quite a challenging first meeting of engagement. And it starts frequently with the language of engagement, relationships, trust and confidence, working together, understanding... And what we're discovering is, rather than, than being rejected, there is a catharsis that occurs. *There's an opportunity that hasn't been there previously and there's an outpouring. Now that outpouring can range from extremely receptive, positive, delighted, long overdue, so much we can do together, I just have never known who I can work with… to the other extreme which is advancing of every grievance that has been sustained in an individual or organization's life period*. I'm more than happy with both of those types of engagement (emphasis added).

In this officer's view, negotiating the initial challenge attached with their counter-terrorism role and introduction is a link to gaining input and hearing community grievances. And although this process might be considered uncomfortable, several police personal emphasized its importance.

What was most surprising, however, was the degree to which officers who were interviewed recognized that the government's counter-terrorism agenda was itself a source of

grievance among Muslims, and how important they felt it was to give this sentiment space. As an officer suggested, "The whole agenda is tending to marginalize a significant community of Muslim young people who feel aggrieved by the whole agenda." Therefore, if the police in a democracy serve with the permission and input of the people, they also need to hear their opinions, perhaps especially when it directly involves once of the most important current missions of the police in the UK.

This is not to suggest that police personnel felt that the counter-terrorism mission in general, or more specifically their community-based response, was not necessary or important. There is no doubt that they believed in the overall national mission as well as their particular slice of it. Instead, it revealed a refreshingly open-minded recognition that neither Prevent nor their institution of its precepts were perfect. As one officer suggested as he tied it back into the theme of airing grievances:

> When I looked to the five objectives [of the Prevent strategy], I noted that the fifth one was one that said, addressing the grievances of local communities. And I wondered why that wasn't number one. Because the community would, the last thing they're probably thinking of is supporting individuals subject to radicalization or anything like that. They'd probably say, well, actually I want you to sort out the problem on my street, terrorism isn't, isn't the greatest problem in my life. My problem is the idiot down the road who plays his music too loud or the problem of parking here or the problem of not being able to go down the road without somebody spitting on me or swearing at me. That is my biggest problem. And my housing problem or my social problems. Terrorism is probably the last thing they're thinking of… the goals about terrorism and, you know, preventing radicalism etc., doesn't always sit comfortably with people.

Many officers recognized that bringing up Prevent and other counter-terrorism issues requires tact, which suggests that by and large, they understood what the officers quoted above said, knew that Muslims in the UK may indeed have grievance to air, and saw it as a real issue. Another officer identified community grievances as a learning issue germane to the community-based counter-terrorism role:

> I believe, for the role to exist, is because we find that we're great at looking at people and pursuing them and investigating and then putting them behind bars and putting them forward to the justice system, however, there's no interaction with the community from the counter-terrorist point of view, and for us to better understand the communities we serve in relation to terrorism, we need to understand the tensions and grievances that the community may have.

In much the same way, a Muslim interviewee suggested:

> So it's very important that the engagement is there and the, the authorities are able to gauge the degree of anger, discontent that's simmering in the community. And try and provide some form of explanation and a response as to what they intend to do about it.

Through these quotes one can begin to see just how prominent this sentiment is, and it is worth noting that this feeling comes from both members of Muslim communities and the police.

In much the same spirit, police and Muslim interviewees noted that police-community outreach is a place for Muslims, and even police, to have their say. A community member who had hosted a police-community outreach event stressed that Muslims need to take advantage of opportunities to voice their concerns to police:

> So if you don't like something, there's no point sitting in one corner doing your own little thing, you've got to come out and be vocal.... I don't like this, I don't like this. You

know, I want you to do something about it. You know? So be vocal about it, speak to them, share ideas, so on and so forth. So the police know, hey, there's issues in the community.

Another Muslim interviewee who participates in a public forum with police similarly stressed this need, "It really was ensuring that our needs were being addressed by the police," and unfortunately, "we had nowhere to go to at least say, these are our issues."

Being willing to step up and participate in police-sponsored activities is not without its risk. Although there were no suggestions from any interviewees that police personnel would react negatively to criticisms or challenging input, there could be other difficulties. As one police interviewee noted, it has meant being on the receiving end of pointed accusations at times: "I was at a Muslim meeting recently with somebody, you know… got a bit heated [and] said, well, you think we're all terrorists anyway, don't you? I said, hold it right there. That's not true at all." This same officer continued by recognizing that "part of my role is to discuss issues like this and we're going to be organizing a meeting with that individual and other community people who may feel like that to address that sort of issue." This same officer noted that this ability for community members to get this sentiment out was important:

> Talk to us. You know, sit around a table, rather than not doing anything and not engaging, let's have a meeting with the community and let's sit them around a table. Let them question us. We're the police officers. Give them that opportunity, give them that forum. Sometimes they are difficult conversations and they may not say things we like but let's debate on them. Because if you don't have that debate, we don't have that discussion, we're never going to be able to resolve these problems.

The dangers go much further than just verbal barbs. Even more seriously, a Muslim interviewee said that because of participating with the police:

> People like me do get tarnished because they'll say, oh, well, you know, you're a government spy, you're, accuse you of a lot of things basically and you do, you're image does get tarnished but I always say, I'd rather have my image tarnished if I can influence in a small way, and if I feel that I'm actually not getting anywhere, even 5% of my voice isn't being heard and taking on board, then I can always just step back, you know. So I would say, give it a go and see if you can make a difference.

Comments like the one above serve to underline the need for efforts that build trust between police and communities. However, it also stressed that real, tangible challenges are present for police and communities. While a significant number of police and Muslims are willing to reach out for the overall good of communities, they are indeed risk-takers, pushing the envelope in some ways to get things done. This is likely why several interviewees suggested that a willingness to take risks was needed in this type of work. Indeed, it is easy to see how a risk-adverse mindset in this security-conscious climate would make joint police-community accomplishments even more difficult.

How Outreach Efforts Are Planned by Police and Muslim Community Leaders

Not surprisingly, the nature of planning outreach among the interviewees in the UK is iterative and therefore much like the USA (see Table 7). Factors that are required for outreach planning, such as relationships and negotiation, are also overall goals of the outreach. Therefore, while it is a challenge to differentiate between how outreach is planned and what goals and interests exist, it is still worthwhile to do so in order to emphasize the recursive nature of the process.

Table 7
How Outreach is Planned in the UK

Theme 5: Outreach efforts are planned through relationships.

- 5.1 Building relationships requires time
- 5.2 Developing relationships are enhanced by interpersonal skills and thoughtfulness
- 5.3 Developing relationships requires reciprocity

Theme 6: Outreach planning involves negotiating around difficult issues.

- 6.1 Opinions of police and reluctance and fears regarding counter-terrorism work
- 6.2 Gender, religion, and other individual officer characteristics
- 6.3 Media attention and feelings of victimization, targeting, and Islamophobia
- 6.4 The effect of international affairs
- 6.5 Funding and competition for resources

Outreach Efforts Are Planned through Relationships

For easily understood and well-publicized reasons, police and Muslims in the UK work in a challenging environment in which their efforts to collaboratively achieve mutually beneficial goals are publicly scrutinized and often criticized. Media coverage in particular creates a climate of suspicion and fear (as is discussed in the next section), and this strongly affects the nature of the outreach work that is planned. Again and again I heard phases that suggested that the "media doesn't help" from both Muslims and police participants. Although the USA study site certainly experienced their share of attention, in the UK this type of attention is constant and withering.

This factor in particular meant that Muslims and police often felt as if they were working against the pull of the tide as they tried to accomplish goals together, and it also meant that efforts to build relationships were even more important (while at times also difficult) as a precondition to building partnerships. The need for an emphasis on terms such as "trust" and

"confidence" in this environment, both so prominent in the interviews conducted in the UK, was evident. As one community interviewee related, "I think the more the organization is trusting, or the people that you're working with, the more you can actually create and really make something special happen." This is likely why Muslim and police interviewees would say things such as interpersonal skills represent "98%" of what is required for outreach, are "key," and "absolutely, massively" important. Simply put, it appeared that no one could be reasonably expected to take the political risks necessary to build collaborative efforts between Muslim communities and police without first sensing some level of trust in everyone involved—police and community members alike.

While I became confident in the US study that interpersonal skills, thoughtfulness, and time were important characteristics of outreach planning, I became overwhelmingly convinced of the same issues in the UK. Each and every interviewee in the UK acknowledged the importance of interpersonal skills in making outreach happen. People who already have a relationship, or who are in the midst of building a trusting level of collaboration, are the ones who often work in a uniquely successful yet informal manner to plan outreach. As one Muslim observed, a specific core group of friends helped make things happen:

> I rely on people like [a particular counter-terrorism police officer, a Muslim youth worker, and a Muslim university researcher], whomever, and recognize that they are also, you know, we're all like trees with the various different branches and that's the kind of, I guess, intimate relationships I've got with people at the moment, probably since the last year. So, again, everything works, word of mouth, emails and stuff like that as well. But a solid group of people that I can actually... trust.

This type of sentiment reflects the extremely personal nature of planning in such a politically challenging environment, and underlines the need for (a) building relationships over time, (b) developing relationships enhanced by interpersonal skills and thoughtfulness, and (c) developing relationships through reciprocity.

Building Relationships Requires Time

Relationships take time, and therefore it was quite often people who had already built some sort of connection that worked to plan and make outreach projects happen. As a Muslim observed about a specific police-community project that had already taken place: "I mean, it was kind of, like, a group of three acquaintances or friends" who planned it and made it happen, supporting what another participant recalled about a particularly successful effort: he and a police sergeant planned it together as they "talked informally." This suggests a level of familiarity that could not be built up quickly, and certainly not overnight.

Another example of the informality through which projects get started came from a counter-terrorism police officer who had worked in a community to start a youth football (soccer) league. Far from going down some list of predetermined steps to see where a need existed, he said:

> I went to them and just had a chat explaining what I was hoping to achieve and they, they, they gave me a bit of background on what they do in the community. A message that came from that, that series of, of chats, was that they were saying there's nothing for young people in [this neighborhood] to do.

Importantly, he then relied on a relationship he already had with a local football club to bring the project further along. He recalled, "I knew it was possible because I'd been involved with it in a neighborhood policing role setting up some football activity in another area of [our

jurisdiction]." Had he not already put time into that connection, his new football project in the neighborhood might not have even gotten off the ground, and it certainly would have taken longer to accomplish what he had already done.

Perhaps not surprisingly it was recognized that one of the first steps in planning outreach would be to have the needed contacts. As an officer told me, "And so as for planning, really, I have to say in the early days, it is knock on doors and put your face around... that's as crude as it is." Obviously, relationships do not just happen immediately, and time—itself a valuable commodity—is required to make things happen. However, when contacts are needed, it is often too late to build a relationship: *everyone involved will wish it had already been done*. This proved challenging for some, in part because of tight timelines, but also because in some instances operational command units (or "OCU," what would commonly be called a precinct in the US) had not developed sufficient contacts previously, and counter-terrorism personnel had to start from the ground level.

An officer underlined this issue as he expressed concern over not having the time or contacts needed in his new counter-terrorism post, although he had expected the local OCU and its police personnel should have been much further along in the process:

> Because I thought the tracks were already laid and all I had to do was catch the train. And, and it wasn't there. There were no tracks, there's no train and I'm starting from day one, I'm now building that railroad. So, you know, we haven't even got the connections. So we're starting from zero and building up the connections and slowly we're going to lay the tracks and then we're going to start meeting people. And I didn't realize we were that far behind with engagement with the Muslim community in particular.

Another officer said, perhaps optimistically, "It's so early on. I don't like to think they ever expected within six months that we would be best friends with all our mosques in all our communities." A Muslim interviewee offered a supporting observation, that, "I think they're [these new counter-terrorism officers] going, I think they're going to face barriers at first … it's going to take ages. You have to build up trust."

Unfortunately, operational requirements led some officers and at least one Muslim interviewee to believe the time required for building up this trust just was not available, even if it should have been. This officer offered the opinion that members of the new counter-terrorism team felt:

> Pressure to rush but then, you've got to meet someone for the first time and the next thing you know, you're being asked to go and ask them their views on this and their views on that and as you know, it's, it's not really going to work. So kind of just trying to sort of shoulder the pressure at the moment.

Indeed, one of the only issues about which police interviewees expressed any form of remotely consistent discontent was the tight timeline in which they had to develop relationships, and the challenge they had experienced trying to meet this requirement—this itself perhaps just a function of the challenging nature of police work. It stressed all the more clearly that relationships have a distinctly temporal quality that must be recognized. At least to some degree, it fortunately was. A police leader offered the following opinion that made the same point:

> But we recognize that it's a journey here. And we recognize that there's things we need to do and that starts with us getting to know you [community] better. And I'm not going to presume that I can just walk into your community, particularly into your mosques or,

> you know, into your institutions or bodies or groups, I just think that I can walk into the mosque and ask you a bunch of security and intelligence-related questions.

The police personnel who felt the pressure were probably not alluding to the time challenge without merit; it was indeed a strong and fairly consistent theme and quite likely also affected by national government expectations. But it should also be recognized that a supervisory officer was indeed aware of the need for time for the creation of relationships and trust, and it was therefore not a challenge that went unrecognized.

Developing Relationships Are Enhanced by Interpersonal Skills and Thoughtfulness

Just as in the USA study, several British community and police interview participants painted particularly warm and affectionate pictures of their colleagues with whom they worked on planning. Perhaps the best example, although certainly not the only one, is this, from a Muslim youth worker who works in a particularly tough neighborhood talking about a police sergeant with whom he had partnered on a project:

> He was a gem of a police officer. I'm talking about, you know, and I've got, and I've seen many… different police officers, but he was an absolute diamond of a police officer. He could see, he could come in here. He could sit down in here, have a cup of tea, have a laugh, have a joke with some of the young people. He had a very, very good way about him in terms of, I'm sure he was a youth worker in his previous life. I'm sure that he had something about him… you know, in terms of his skills, his interpersonal skills.

This example was particularly powerful because the sergeant was eventually transferred, leading the youth worker to seek participation in a similar youth project from another police employee. The youth worker was sorely disappointed in the new officer's clear inability to relate to his kids (who are largely Muslims), and felt the project was no longer effective. This dramatically

underlines why another police interviewee said that while counter-terrorism police officer positions required flexibility in other areas, the need for interpersonal skills was "non-negotiable."

Another Muslim interviewee stressed that a community counter-terrorism officer was willing to be particularly human and talk about family issues, which he appreciated, and pointed out the importance of this kind of dialogue in his own culture. The interviewee stressed that he and the officer "talk about our families, [the officer]… tell[s] me about her children, and this is what our culture is, it's that way we build relationships around human issues, and that's how we gain confidence [in] each other." Importantly, he compared this officer to previous police personnel whom he referred to as "ignorant" because of their let's get-down-to business approach to him in the past.

Yet another Muslim interviewee similarly stressed this intensely human side of the equation:

> A smile goes a long way to, you know, building relationships. You know, stretching out your hand and smiling and shaking your hand and understanding goes a long way. And like I said, little things build confidences, you know? And little things are important to people who are members of the community.

Police employees who were interviewed understood this part of the relationship equation. A police manager offered a philosophical view, which explained why this emphasis matters in the wider historical sense of British policing:

> Our absolute core… responsibility is the concept of neighborhood policing in the UK. And that is based on a belief [in the] fundamental community trust and confidence cycle which starts with the premise, and this goes back to the very origins of British policing,

> you know, the romantic vision of the good honest bobby, having cups of tea with locals, known by everybody, knowing every good and bad person, all their passions, resolving every issue, all in the tour of duty.

Other police personnel similarly noted that interpersonal skills and relationship building are an integral part of both the community-focused counter-terrorism mission and, more widely, policing as a whole.

The skills and the thoughtfulness that are required (or a quickly obvious lack thereof) may have distinctly observable characteristics at times, even beyond the smiles and talk about family described above. One topic that came up several times concerned law enforcement personnel and their requests for input or information about potential extremist activity. Apparently, in the past some Muslims had been approached by police or the security service and asked immediately about terrorism—with little or no effort towards building the needed trust and contextual understanding to frame such a sensitive question. Several interviewees recognized the need for police personnel to realize the effect it has when government agents show up at a Muslim's home or place of business and immediately jump into questions such as these. The need for an almost intuitive consideration of message, timing, and interpersonal skills was lauded by police and community partners alike. As one Muslim interviewee observed "I think, you know, when you just knock on somebody's door and say, hey, what do you know about terrorism and extremism, they think, what the heck?" He continued:

> I don't know, it's just this spontaneous questioning they just, they [police] just come out with at times. You just, but I think one thing I have to say that they've learned from generally is… building up relationships and as a result of relationships, then we can move forward and… talk about these issues.

This was not the only instance of this theme coming up among Muslim interviewees, and police personnel stressed its importance in their professional practice as well. Interestingly, these interviewees were not suggesting that police should not seek information from Muslims, but instead they decried the inappropriate and thoughtless way in which it could be done. It required a deft and balanced approach, one that was skilled and aware of the sensitive nature of the topic, and decidedly *not* avoidably clumsy nor insistent on immediate answers.

Relationships Require Reciprocity

One way in which police personnel acknowledged that they should strike this type of balance is through ensuring that they are seen to offer services in addition to making requests (such as for information on crime). Over and over again, both police personnel and community interviewees offered evidence that the needed relationship building required to get things done relied on a sense of exchange—a willingness to get things accomplished for people, and an understanding that this makes a difference. This was emphatically not some seedy, morally questionable expectation of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," but instead a practical recognition that the development of productive relationships is a procedure that takes place on a busy two-way street. As one police interviewee noted:

> Then it comes back to the community. If you're willing to do some work with them, and they'll be more than willing to do some work for you. So if you go out and get their trust and say, look, we're going to schools, we'll do these initiatives, we'll help you deliver what you want to achieve, however, we expect something back from you. This is our PVE agenda. This is what we want to do. This is what we want to achieve. Let's work together and achieve what you want to do, which is make a difference to your community, work within your community, do something positive, which a lot of people

> do and then on the back of that, your PVE agenda and your objectives are also being delivered at the same time. So you find it's that two-way flow of communication and again that, you know, if you do something for me or we work together, that's putting the work, I'll do this, you do this.

This was a common sentiment, and police personnel in particular recognized reciprocity as a necessary facet of their work, and also suggested it was needed to build community confidence in officers and their mission. As one officer remarked, "I just can't do all the taking from people in the community if I'm not going to put anything back." When they spoke of such reciprocity, police personnel often made reference to a willingness to work on issues outside of the usual counter-terrorism or the police mission, and did so in a way that belied their understanding that it was extremely important, even if laborious at times.

These efforts clearly mattered. Time and time again, Muslim interviewees as well as police alluded to this need to be flexible and do things for one another. One Muslim interview suggested that this sense of exchange was a condition of friendship. As another Muslim interviewee colorfully described:

> And that's the kind of thing that you can develop with the police which then can assist both the community and the police. It's a two way process. It's a bit like, you know, Commissioner Gordon having the bat phone, you know? When you need to get a hold of the Batman.

This same community leader recalled an instance in the past where his contacts with police leaders, and the willingness of those police personnel to make things happen on his behalf, helped to overcome potential hurdles in police-Muslim community relations. In one particular instance it was a police commander's willingness to invalidate a number of parking tickets given

outside of a mosque during a religious service. While this might be something viewed as petty in the overall scheme of public safety concerns, it was an issue that had the potential to make a difference to the Muslim interviewee and other members of his community.

Outreach Planning Involves Negotiating around Difficult Issues

Perhaps the greatest difference among the environments in which outreach occurs between Muslims and police in the USA and the UK is not *what* occurs that affects each country, their citizens, and police, but instead the *intensity* and *frequency* with which these things happen. This also means that the difficulties experienced in the UK can be also described as more intense and frequent. A week's worth of print and television media reports from England would likely quickly prove this point. Not just one specific week, but just about *any* week since July 7 of 2005.

The issues around which Muslims and police personnel must negotiate are many. Importantly, the interviews provided evidence of several which I believe well represent the climate in the UK. These topics include understanding that planning requires negotiating around: (a) opinions of police and reluctance and fears regarding counter-terrorism work; (b) funding and competition for resources; (c) media attention and feelings of victimization, targeting, and Islamophobia; (d) gender, religion, and other individual officer characteristics; and (e) the effect of international affairs.

Opinions of Police and Reluctance and Fears Regarding Counter-Terrorism Work

The extremely public and open character of the counter-terrorism unit in the study made the issue of public sentiment regarding counter-terrorism work that much more important. This was above and beyond general opinions of police, negative examples of which existed in some Muslim interviewees, even if they had been largely overcome. This centered instead on the

counter-terrorism mission, as well as the opinion interviewees had of the government agenda surrounding it. Had the unit I studied been "undercover," or relied on covert intelligence gathering as its *modus operandi*, day-to-day public acceptance would have been a much less important issue among interviewees. While community opinion of the British internal security service, the "MI5," is certainly important, it is not as if MI5 personnel are knocking on door after door each day, openly identifying themselves and asking communities to work together in partnership. Therefore, public sentiment on the street about individual MI5 personnel may indeed matter very little in the way it would to a patrol officer.

However, the nearly two-dozen members of the community-centered counter-terrorism team I studied do just that, they openly seek new partnerships daily, and their recognition of these very public feelings, along with their skills at negotiating their effects, clearly had much to do with their ability to plan outreach. They largely operated in uniform (itself an issue which had to be balanced), and were under well-understood orders to quickly and clearly identify themselves as counter-terrorism officers when they met new people. While not without its challenges, this approach really appeared to work, and the sentiment of officers on the team was positive—even if it surprised some. As one police interviewee said, "The path we've gone down is brilliant; it's key," and this was clearly because the officer felt they were "not snooping around, we're not secretive."

The overt nature of their unit and its mission did not mean it was without its difficulties. This links back to a subject I have already covered, *interpersonal skills and thoughtfulness*. As an officer said "If you go somewhere and say [immediately], right, you've got a lot of extremists here, then you're not going to get very far." The approach must be balanced, considering the current sentiment among many Muslims in the UK about counter-terrorism work. Offering an

extremely vivid and personal example of just how strong these community feelings about counter-terrorism efforts and police are, an officer recalled a particular incident:

> But the problem is, at the moment, the community, because we come with the CTU [counter-terrorism unit] badge, still think we're there to spy on them. And they have massive reservations. Even my own friend's daughter, I wanted her to come to the ACT Now ["All Communities Together Now," the educational exercise about counter-terrorism work] because I wanted her to see what we do and I was wondering if she would be willing to work as a facilitator for us because she's a Muslim woman, wears the hijab, etc. And after she spoke to some friends of hers, she decided that coming to this ACT Now wasn't going to be right because it was engaging with the CTU officers. Even though I happen to be the best friend of her dad. That's how scared she is because of the misinformation she's got from her friends at university.

Officers were themselves trying to negotiate this opinion of counter-terrorism work and police, and recognized it. A Muslim interviewee noted that it also affected community members who partner with police, in addition to the police themselves.

A police interviewee recognized this challenge overall as something much larger than just the individual interactions between police and Muslims:

> Because so much of our engagement is skewed by the necessity to discuss and manage counter-terrorism issues when we should be talking about mainstream policing issues. We should be talking about the burglary that happened up the road, the fact that there's vandalism, there's litter on the streets, that people don't feel safe walking to the corner shop at night. But we're necessarily getting drawn into these very difficult and sensitive

> discussions around a very peculiar security problem which hinders the quality of the service we can deliver.

Another officer pointed to the fact that previous contacts Muslims have had with police might not have left the best impression:

> I think it's very important to be honest, not only that they know that CTU exists, but the only insight they have, or knowledge they have of a counter-terrorist officer is either when they're stopped at the ports, which, to be honest is not a great experience for an individual to be stopped and questioned at the ports [airports].

Officers were well aware that these types of issues had the potential to affect their work, even if they worked in a way that was operationally quite separate from the officers who are assigned to ports.

Police interviewees felt that as long as they were candid about the assignment from the beginning, whatever developed afterwards was real and would not be threatened by a later revelation of an undercover assignment or covert mission: "If you say straight away your from the counter-terrorism unit, then that may put up a big barrier to begin with but once you've climbed over that barrier you're on the level… and there's no deception." An officer stressed that success in balancing the counter-terrorism mission with an overt assignment was based in part on the police ability to explain their mission in a palatable way that makes sense: "But it's protecting your community so there is a narrative you can fire back to them, but I've also had, as you say, are you MI5, are you working with MI5?" This emphasis on public safety—recognized by many as the core mission of the police anyway, regardless of assignment—was used by another officer when encountering concerns about intelligence gathering:

> I says, I'm not spying, I make no secret about what I do. If you tell me something, yeah, it could be recorded, but exactly the same as if you tell me something about drugs, recorded. I'm a police officer at the end of the day. It's criminal activity. We've, I've got a job to do. But you tell me you want something [done] or this is how you need supporting, I'll do my damndest to do that. So it's just sort of putting that burden, not burden on them, sort of handing yourself over to them and saying, look, I'm representing you as much as I'm representing the police.

The way this officer suggested that this new counter-terrorism role required police acting as an advocate for community members was interesting, and is illustrative of just how aware many police personnel were of the acute challenges community members themselves face.

None of this should suggest that candidness about their assignment meant that officers had an easy time building up relationships, although some expressed a level of surprise at just how receptive community members had been. At least one Muslim, however, was still not particularly fond of aspects of the community-centered assignment, including its name. An interviewee, while speaking of a Muslim female counter-terrorism officer, suggested that "one of the flaws I think is the title she has. That's not going to go down well if you go into school or speak to a woman's groups and say [I'm] a counter-terrorism officer." And while at least one police interviewee agreed, this opinion was contradictory to that among other interviewees who stridently felt that if an officer kept their assignment secret and it was discovered later, it would have disastrous consequences. In this light, accurately portraying the nature of the individual officer's counter-terrorism role by utilizing the word "security" in their title (as they did), served to add an extra measure of "overt-ness" to the assignment.

Funding and Competition for Resources

An issue that developed in the UK that was absent in USA interviews was the topic of national government funding and resources. No USA interviewees brought up issues related to where government money is directed, or even if was available for local police projects with Muslim communities. In the UK, however, it was often a topic of discussion. This is likely in part due to the fact that the Home Office had utilized more than £140 million for work that could largely be deemed outreach under the "Prevent" strand of the UK counter-terrorism strategy (popularly called "CONTEST," HM Government, 2009). To my knowledge, there is no remotely similar federal project or funding source in the United States.

While national government funding may indeed be useful, and as one police interviewee acknowledge, allowed the police department to develop and pay for the community-centered counter-terrorism effort, it also presented challenges. One of these difficulties, while counteracting public inclinations not to want to partner with police, instead introduced a new issue, as this officer recalled:

> So I have not had the experience of people not wanting to talk [to me as a counter-terrorism officer]. Completely the opposite. The difficulty is, off the back of that is you've got to identify or try and identify where people are truly coming from and that is very, very difficult. Very, very difficult. To give another example, some of the people I'm involved with, they run their own businesses and over and above working with their own businesses they do things in the community. There are other people out there who have set up... companies, charities, groups, solely off of funding off the government ultimately, which is, which is fed out through, maybe through the police or maybe through the council.

Other interviewees noted the same issues, in at least on instance calling some people in the public seeking money for their Prevent projects titles such as "fund chasers."

Within this environment, police and local government personnel were tasked with deciding where Prevent-related funding would go. Referring to the need to develop successful outreach efforts with Muslim communities without alienating others, a police interviewee said succinctly and candidly: "It's a balancing act isn't it, really? It's very hard, it's not easy." This same officer acknowledged that it also causes tension. Other community members ask, "Well, why are they getting, why is the local government giving a particular local authority council 100,000 pound a year to support Muslim communities?" Another interviewee recognized that some Sikhs and Christians getting "very, very, very annoyed" at the perception that Muslim communities are receiving a disproportionate amount of resources and attention. This is particularly interesting because in this instance police and policy makers must not only concern themselves with the opinions of segments of the community directly involved in planning an outreach efforts, but also in the opinions of other parts of the citizenry who may find their lack of inclusion objectionable, in part because of all of the financing that goes along with it. It was an unexpected twist that developed during the interviews, but one that stressed the importance of a broad view of the issues and effective negotiation skills.

Media Attention and Feelings of Victimization and Targeting

Police and Muslim interviewees alike recognized the effect of constant media attention focused on issues regarding Muslims in the UK. Indeed, there were very few, if any, positive comments about the media in the UK, and many recognized that it exacerbated the difficulties experienced by police and Muslim communities as they sought to work together. As a Muslim interviewee noted:

> The media doesn't help. Because what the media does is if you look, if you look at a newspaper and it says, I don't know, let's say shoplifting or, you know, a fight in a shopping area. They'll always mention if it's, if it's an ethnic group. They'll always mention, and the guy was a Pakistani or the guy was an Afro-Caribbean. If it was the other way around, if it's, you know, if it's a white guy, they never mention that.

As another community interviewee noted, "I'm very, very aware and sometimes maybe slightly kind of hypersensitive about how the media treats issues around kind of Islamic countries, Muslim identity." A different Muslim interviewee observed, "Something happens and they bring somebody on the television and they'll [the media] just choose the most extreme person from within the Muslim community to come and talk." Far from just being a theoretical concern, interviewees cited specific examples of the ways in which they felt media coverage affected outreach efforts.

One particular media event during my visit gained a great deal of attention. Police officers spoke of a BBC "Panorama" program about police-Muslim partnerships (Booth, 2009), funding, and spying that aired during my study (which was discussed often throughout my time there), and observed "I mean, that completely just undermines everything we're trying to do." Another officer said "you've got the likes of Panorama on TV saying that we're basically all spies." And yet another officer recalled his plans to meet with an Islamic group at a university, "And two hours before I was going to have the meeting, unfortunately that Panorama program had occurred two days before… So they cancelled it and they've never invited me back."

The feeling that the Panorama special and similar media attention had an effect on police-Muslim community outreach was palpable, and the concern was not just expressed by police. A Muslim interviewee recognized that the Panorama program would have a tangible effect, and

change the mind of Muslims considering funding from the national government: "So I think the, the consensus that's coming along now is that, hey, we don't want no grants anymore." This same interviewee, while perhaps frustrated, offered a practical take on the issue overall, even while noting that good news (such as a recent police-Muslim community event at his mosque) does not get nearly as much attention:

> And as we know, you know, controversy sells more than anything else. So generally when there's a controversial issue, it will sell in the papers. And, and when you have a good event like this [event at a mosque], hardly any people will pick it up or, and even if they do pick it up, they might just put a few lines in here in the end, that's about it and move on. Because I think it, it's not going to sell the paper, it's not going to sell the article or whatever else.

Another Muslim interviewee recognized this same reality, "because sensationalism sells newspapers and if they don't sensationalize stories, then I suppose people wouldn't be buying newspapers," but he also stressed the real-world negative effect it has: "a lot of the time it's the media that's responsible for negative portrayal and giving rise to tensions and Islamophobia really." Where this differed from my experience from USA interviews was that there was much more emphasis on media reporting itself adding to the anti-Muslim sentiments, a condition I noted often in the type and nature of reporting that took place during my visit. In the USA site, the attention was largely directed towards media coverage of the map proposal, and *not* representations of Muslims.

Gender, Religion, and Other Individual Officer Characteristics

Muslim and police participants noted a number of tangible personal characteristics (beyond interpersonal skills and job title) regarding police personnel that had the potential to

effect community interaction with police. These included a fairly wide number of topics, and were certainly not brought up by every interviewee, nor were they agreed upon. Some were simple, such as whether or not an officer chose to go to a specific meeting or location in uniform or in "plainclothes." Other issues were more static and not nearly as easily negotiated: Muslim officers may be more well received than non-Muslims, women in some instances might have an advantage over men, and language and ethnicity could indeed help, although they did not guarantee acceptance. In some instances these factors could promote positive outcomes, and in other circumstances interviewees suggested they would get in the way.

Several of the nearly two-dozen members of the community counter-terrorism team were Muslims and of ethnically similar backgrounds as the population with whom they sought to work, and I have no doubt that their assignment was a conscious effort by police leaders to both broaden the unit's experience and outlook, but also to improve their reception among other Muslims. A Muslim police officer offered that:

> I think I'm better equipped to do that and challenge people on their views than a non-Muslim would be because they would be coming from a more academic, or what they've read, than a personal, so I think I've got another advantage to that effect. And also, again, with the force, it's about the organization. I can provide some information or, to them about traditions. It's not always about the religion, it's also traditions and cultural beliefs.

This opinion is supported later in the section on the importance of learning. It was also emphasized by the opinion of a Muslim community member who stressed the need for Muslim police personnel, because "Unfortunately that is the sort of cultural aspect. And people are sort of wary and fearful and on the defensive of people who perhaps aren't of the Muslim faith or do

not have an understanding of the Muslim faith." And while several police officers noted that their language skills helped them communicate with members of the public, the same community member quoted above offered his opinion that it's not enough to speak the language or share the same ethnicity, to truly be effective an officer must also share the same faith. He observed, "And no disrespect to any of the members of the security team project. It's not the same when they have members of other South Asian communities who are a different faith coming to try and link in."

Similarly, the gender of police personnel and the community members with whom they seek to do outreach was discussed. A police officer noted that he wanted to work on collaborative projects with a female Muslim group: "There's this Muslim women's group that I'm looking to, to get a bit more of that engagement." This same officer recognized that there could be challenges to his involvement as a male, and observed "but unfortunately the barrier is that the female, male-female issue unfortunately with that community." Other interviewees supported his concern about interaction between the genders. In particular, a female Muslim interviewee noted that she felt that gender gave one particular Muslim female counter-terrorism officer a real advantage: "Because if they'd used somebody else, I think it would, the barriers would go up. I think seeing her straight away brings the barriers down because you see her as similar to yourself."

The reason these factors matter is twofold. On one hand, police and Muslim interviewees alike provided opinions that such factors as language ability, gender, and faith have a tangible effect on the access and cooperation police can expect as they seek to work in partnership with members of Muslim communities. But there is a finite number of qualified employees in any organization, even one as large as the police force we have looked at here. So, on the other hand,

there are simply not enough Muslim, female, police personnel with language capabilities to go around. The decision-makers leading the unit, as well as the officers and members of communities on the ground, are therefore likely to find themselves in daily situations in which these competing realities and their effects must be considered and balanced.

The Effect of International Affairs

It is important and worth noting that in the first preliminary meetings I had with a Muslim in the UK involved in outreach with the police, I was invited to attend a nearby conference on the recent war in Gaza. That this was part of my introduction to the challenges of outreach between police and Muslims in the UK was appropriate, and indeed it may be impossible to reasonably separate considerations of Muslims and their relationship with police in the UK from international affairs. In reality, and to apparently so many people's opinion, the two are intimately intertwined.

An officer described the importance of international affairs, and especially Israel and Gaza as "absolutely massive" during an interview, and this sentiment was shared often and emphatically by both police and Muslim interviewees. A Muslim interviewee similarly described the connection:

> I think what happens at an international level always filters down to national and regional level as well. And you know, it has ramifications all over the place. And it's not just locally based you see. For example, what's happening in Iraq or Afghanistan for that matter or, you know, maybe in Iran.

Another community interviewee directly related relations between Muslims and local police to a responsibility of police to refer Muslim opinions of international affairs directly to the highest levels of national government. This connection was echoed in the way another Muslim

interviewee stressed the unfairness of the arrest warrant issued for President Bashir of the Sudan during my visit.

There is no doubt that police personnel involved in outreach expected similar topics to come up often, and were in no way surprised when they did. This is understandable, because as one police interviewee noted, terrorist incidents on an international level have been associated, unfairly, with "mainstream Muslim community issues" in the UK. This point emphasizes the type of concern that must be considered—because it will almost assuredly come up—as Muslims and police seek to build partnerships. While it would be unreasonable to expect police personnel to answer for national policies, or to have expert-level dialogue capability regarding international affairs, it would also be closed-minded to suggest they should not at least aware of the relationship of these topics to building partnerships in Muslim communities. As a counter-terrorism officer so simply suggested while talking about the ability of local police to affect international relations: "The world is a much smaller place than it used to be."

Summary

Both police personnel and community members broadly painted a picture of outreach planning in the UK that mirrors the experiences of police and Muslims in the US study site. The six themes that were developed in the US were similarly important in the United Kingdom, even while the sub-themes that supported these overarching similarities differed. Chief among these characteristics of outreach planning are the emphases that were placed on relationships, the evidence that police and community partners required negotiation skills and flexibility, and that the entire process was infused with opportunities to learn and educate one another. As we will see, these three areas account for much of what occurs as planning takes place, as well as what

everyone involved hopes will occur when outreach opportunities materialize, as police and Muslims in the US and the UK work together.

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The purpose of this study is to understand how individual and organizational interests influence partnerships between local police departments and Muslim communities as they plan outreach efforts. In support of this, the following research questions are addressed:

1. What are the goals of police and Muslim leaders in planning outreach?
2. How are outreach efforts planned and negotiated by police and Muslim community leaders?

This final chapter summarizes the research findings, presents discussion points that offer links between these findings and previously conducted research, and offers implications for practitioners and researchers. This chapter is therefore separated into an overview of the study, a summary of the principal findings, and conclusions and discussion.

Overview of the Study

A qualitative study was undertaken for the purpose of understanding how police and Muslim communities plan partnerships, relying primarily on interviews with police personnel and Muslims in the USA and the UK who had been involved in planning outreach. A guide was developed for the interviews, largely informed by the work of Cervero and Wilson (2006) and their research on program planning. Thirty-one semi-structured interviews were conducted in the USA and the UK with Muslims and police personnel; seven interviews were conducted in the USA, and 24 interviews were completed in the UK. Two short trips totaling approximately two weeks in length were made to the USA study site, and the UK facet of the research was conducted over a nearly four month period in early 2009 in which I lived in England as a

Fulbright Police Research Fellow. In addition to interviews, observations were made as I attended publicly accessible events in both countries that were related to the research topic.

The participating police forces are among the largest in the USA and UK, and both allowed substantial access to specialist units under their respective counter-terrorism commands, each of which were actively involved in programs that could be generally described as embracing community policing for the purpose of countering the threat of terrorism. Although the research was not designed to study counter-terrorism efforts, in both countries the police personnel who were interviewed were indeed involved in counter-terrorism work, albeit while incorporating distinctly progressive approaches. All 15 of the police interviewees had been involved in some level of planning outreach between Muslim communities and their respective police departments.

The 16 community interviewees in both countries had similarly been involved in planning some type of outreach between police and Muslims. All of the non-police interviewees were Muslims, except for two individuals in the UK from an "Islamic background" who did not consider themselves Muslims. The Muslim interviewees occupied a variety of positions in their respective communities, from leading large organizations that focus on the interests of Muslims to working at mosques or for local government. The interview findings were contextualized by the vast amount of time I spent with Muslims and police in non-interview scenarios, in which I was privileged to visit homes, offices, and mosques, meet for tea, share meals, and broadly discuss the topic of my research and related affairs. I therefore experienced a variety of beneficial opportunities to get to know the people and the cities—especially in the UK—in which outreach planning takes place outside of the formal data collection process.

While the interviews were conducted in two distinct phases in late 2008 and early 2009, they were not analyzed as two separate sets of data. Instead, the timeline and logistics involved in completing the USA and UK facets of the study meant that the analysis was often conducted concurrently, and the ideas that were developed as I transcribed and began analyzing the US portion of the study influenced the direction and emphasis of research efforts undertaken in the UK. Therefore, while two sets of data exist (USA interviews and UK interviews), it is more accurate to view the analysis of all of the data as a single process that took place simultaneously over several months. The analysis of the interview data was completed by scrutinizing interview recordings and transcripts, developing and fine-tuning broad categories, themes, and sub-themes, and committing those themes to writing via documents that collected quotes and notes that supported the findings that emerged.

Summary of Principal Findings

Six principal themes were developed during the analysis of interviews (see Table 8). The overarching principal themes developed in the USA and the UK are the same, while the supporting sub-themes differ.

Table 8
Overview of Principal Research Themes

Research Question 1: What are the goals of police and Muslim leaders in planning outreach?

- Theme 1: Outreach is planned as a response to difficult circumstances.
- Theme 2: Outreach involves educational goals.
- Theme 3: Outreach is developed to build communication, relationships, and trust.
- Theme 4: Outreach is developed to promote community participation in government.

Research Question 2: How are outreach efforts planned and negotiated by police and Muslim community leaders?

Theme 5: Outreach efforts are planned through relationships.

Theme 6: Outreach planning involves negotiating around difficult issues.

The interview data indicates that these six themes substantially account for the experiences and expectations of interviewees as they sought to plan outreach efforts between police and Muslims.

While the broad experiences and the themes developed from the interviews in both countries were the same, the supporting evidence which was manifested as the sub-themes illuminated important differences. I believe some of the differences became evident because of direct contextual links to the environment in the UK versus that in the USA, which themselves point to underlying reasons for those disparities.

Although both the police departments and the communities they serve pointed to specific problems from the past that made outreach between police and Muslims needed, and at the same time challenged outreach planning efforts, the USA department and community consistently stressed one historic issue in particular: the map proposal. Because this topic had received so much attention, and was clearly the starting point for the forum that developed from the controversy surrounding it, this was not surprising. In the UK, however, interviewees pointed to broader issues—perhaps because everyone was not talking about just one specific instance of an outreach program, and therefore were speaking more widely about the issues communities and police have experienced that make outreach important. Thus, the emphasis in the UK on balancing the overall counter-terrorism agenda and its effects, improving the flow of information within British police forces and between police and the public, and overcoming general issues with the police and views of police in Muslim communities made sense. Interviewees in the UK spoke of very specific failures to share information in the present or past, and the counter-

terrorism agenda as it is enacted domestically in the UK was, in my experience, discussed in the media much more often than police counter-terrorism efforts or any related policies are in the USA. I feel these factors largely explain the difference in USA and UK responses.

British police personnel emphasized the need for reciprocity—a sense of exchange with the community—more than I experienced in the USA interviews, an observation for which I have two explanatory theories beyond the sheer number of interviews conducted in the UK as opposed to in the USA. First, because UK officers were more clearly dealing with the effects of countering the negative image of the national counter-terrorism agenda in the UK among Muslim communities, they were also in a position in which they had to "prove" their sincerity in working with those communities outside of the counter-terrorism realm before they could expect something (perhaps even trust) in return. Interestingly, I saw evidence of this often, and it suggested to me that the officers defined their roles broadly, and embraced the needed flexibility in their assignment. In this vein, one officer in particular painted their police role as advocating for the community, which powerfully underlines this point.

Secondly, the majority of the police personnel interviewed in the UK were constables or sergeants, as opposed to the key USA personnel who were of higher ranks. Day in and day out, I believe the UK interviewees spend much more time "on the street." This is largely a function of their position, in which building relationships with community members and local leaders at the neighborhood level is their daily responsibility. This is the place I expect candid, even biting, criticism of the counter-terrorism policy as it affects local communities. The USA police interviewees on the other hand do not operate under the mandate of such a national program in their work, and dealt with the leading Muslim figures I interviewed on a citywide *and* national stage. These Muslims had all been working with police for some time in a variety of capacities,

and were not new to the idea of partnerships with police. In the USA, they were also not partnering under the same wide-reaching shadow of arguably unpopular national policies enacted at the local level, as the "Prevent" program is viewed by some in the UK (Khan, 2009). While I did indeed see some evidence for the importance of reciprocity in the USA, and I suspect it was just the tip of the iceberg, it was not nearly as prominent in interviews as it was in the UK.

The Prevent program, while a source for funding and also the potential root of some successes in the UK force I studied, has in particular also been the source of media criticisms leveled at police and Muslims in the UK (Booth, 2009). In this way, the spotlight is *jointly* directed at police and their Muslim partners, undoubtedly having an effect on the potential for future outreach projects. One BBC Panorama program in particular, "Muslim First British Second" (Booth, 2009), was discussed widely during my trip, among police and Muslims, including during interviews. Conversely, the evidence of media attention in the USA city I saw was directed almost exclusively at the police, but *not* in conjunction with criticism of the Muslim partners whom they had already developed. The nature of the effect of the media attention in the UK on the experience of interviewees is therefore, in my opinion and experience, substantially different and scrutinizes collaboration between police and Muslims as a whole, not just the actions of communities or police independently.

The BBC program (Booth, 2009) looked at the issue of national funding for projects, which is disbursed to communities and partner organizations to support projects that are designed to affect potential causes of violent extremism. While officers in both the USA and the UK required some degree of flexibility in order to work around the challenging issues that could pose a roadblock to outreach (such as media attention), UK interviews stressed the effect of financing and individual officer characteristics in a way that was not present in the USA. The

funding issue is simply a reflection of the fact that no program such as Prevent with its attendant £140 million budget (HM Government, 2009) earmarked for activities such as outreach at the local level exists in the USA.

That interviewees spoke of issues such as the gender, ethnicity, and the religion of officers involved in outreach in the UK is not so easily explained, especially in light of the dearth of such discussions in the USA. In particular, interviewees spoke to these characteristics and the effect they could have on the ability of an officer to work with Muslim communities in Britain. Perhaps it was because the police force in the UK had many ethnically South Asian officers that interviewees spoke to it, with a real expectation that their needs could indeed be met by Muslim officers whom they knew to exist in the department. While I received no official numbers (and I am unaware if either agency collects such information), I was told a number that suggested that the USA department likely had less than 20 Muslim officers, while the UK force had several hundred. This is worthy of note, given that the departments are of a roughly comparable size. The counter-terrorism team in the UK was quite diverse itself, with several members at a variety or ranks who were of South Asian origin, females and/or Muslims (the USA team has since been working to diversify as well). Because several interviewees stressed community cohesion in the UK, I am not surprised that some sensitivity existed regarding the need for officers to be demographically representative of the communities in which they work. I do not doubt that officers in the USA experience similar challenges, and overall I feel this issue in particular speaks to the need for police departments in democratic countries to be built with personnel who reflect the communities in which they work.

Despite the differences outlined above as well as the contextual issues that surround outreach work between police and Muslims in the USA and the UK, I remain convinced that the

overarching principal themes developed during the interviews account for the experiences of Muslims and police in both jurisdictions. Based on the consistency of these themes, I therefore offer the following conclusions and discussions in the next section that are founded in the six common principal findings developed from the interview data in both the USA and the UK.

Conclusions and Discussion

Four main conclusions were drawn from these results of the study: a) outreach between police and Muslim communities takes place in a security-conscious era, and is politicized and publicly debated; b) outreach planning is dependent upon relationships built between individuals; c) outreach is an adult education endeavor, and always involves learning; and d) the outreach planning process is iterative and police and community members must pay attention to the need for relationships, learning, negotiation and flexibility when working in this environment. An important element of these research findings and the attendant conclusions is that they are not easily divided into the two sections suggested by the research questions, which is a result of the way in which outreach planning and goals are described by those involved. Successful outreach planning itself requires some measure of the same characteristics it hopes to accomplish. In other words, the goals of outreach and the way in which those goals are realized are largely synonymous and suggest a recursive process in which goals and the mechanisms for reaching those goals are often interchangeable.

The Political Context of Outreach

Outreach between police and Muslim communities takes place in a security-conscious era, and is politicized and publicly debated. While this research was not designed to look at counter-terrorism efforts, it is worthwhile to emphasize that the two substantial and ongoing examples of outreach with Muslim communities studied in the USA and the UK took place in

units under each department's counter-terrorism command. Other outreach takes place in both organizations, but this important fact—that the significant efforts studied here both occur within police counter-terrorism units—underlines the context in which these relationships are developed and outreach is planned. Although many police personnel involved in the research interviews demonstrated substantial evidence of empathy and concern for the perceptions this type of police attention causes, this serves as a strong reminder of the way in which law enforcement relationships with Muslim communities are often framed. Spalek, El Awa, and McDonald (2009) acknowledge the effect of media attention and also note how in the post 9/11 environment communities have felt the pressure of being suspect; numerous other authors have commented on the scrutiny Muslim communities feel as well (Abbas, 2007; Cainkar, 2002; 2004; Khan, 2009; Pew Research, 2007). I believe an appreciation of contextual influences is foundational to understanding the challenges and goals of outreach planning between Muslim communities and police.

The necessity of relationships between Muslims and law enforcement in this environment has been discussed by policy-makers at the highest levels of government in the USA and the UK. For example, both a deputy chief with a large American police department (Downing, 2007) and the leader of a national Muslim institution, the Muslim Public Affairs Council (Al-Marayati, 2007), have spoken to the need of joint police and Muslim community efforts to defeat terrorism during testimony in Washington, DC, and similarly, the UK Government's "CONTEST" counter-terrorism strategy emphasizes the importance of partnerships between Muslims and police, particularly in the "Prevent" strand of the agenda (HM Government, 2009). This vividly illustrates just how important this topic is from multiple angles (in this instance a police leader, a national government agenda, and a Muslim organization), and the influential locations in which

these discussions take place in both countries.

In addition to the attention given to the topic by government, in both the USA and the UK, relationships between Muslims and police receives extensive media coverage (for one of the most recent examples, see "Government Anti-Terrorism Strategy 'Spies' on Innocent," Dodd, 2009). Police in both study sites have experienced rebukes in the media due to their responses to issues regarding law enforcement and Muslim communities, but have withstood the criticism and continued to work enthusiastically with communities to plan partnership initiatives. This is not surprising in the current climate, in which participation in police-Muslim partnerships is itself political, with real risks involved for police personnel and Muslims (Spalek, El Awa, & McDonald, 2009). Cervero and Wilson likewise acknowledge that deciding who should be involved in planning "and how to create the conditions for their substantive involvement is almost always an uncertain, ambiguous, and risk-taking activity" (2006, p. 154).

It became evident in the interviews that many of the people involved in planning outreach between Muslim communities and police are aware of these factors, and it must be recognized to affect their outreach planning environment. Cervero and Wilson (2006) refer to Forester's (1989) suggestion that "ignoring the opportunities and dangers of an organizational setting is like walking across a busy intersection with one's eyes closed" (Forester, 1989, p. 7). I suggest that this analogy has a much broader utility in helping us to understand what takes place when Muslims and police plan outreach, it is not, however, just the organizational setting that offers challenges that must be recognized and negotiated. In the current security-conscious climate in which these planning activities take place, the intersection outreach planners try to cross is itself located on a public, political, and hotly debated stage.

Within this environment, as police personnel and Muslim outreach planners try to

develop partnerships they negotiate the effects of the reality in which they are working as well as the end state they are trying to achieve: "the technical work of planning is also always political" (Cervero and Wilson, 2006, p. vii). Key to the findings of the research presented here is a theme reinforced by Cervero and Wilson who recognize that as adult education planners try to figure out what is needed in a program, they engage in "complex communicative negotiations representing historical trajectories situated in organizational contexts and framed within larger social forces" (2006, p. 123). The current context in which police-community outreach planning takes place (in this instance a security-conscious, political, and media-influenced world) must be a prime concern to those involved. Muslims and police cannot be reasonably expected to disassociate themselves from these external forces, and I would argue that to do so would dangerously undermine the potential success of the very programs they hope to pursue.

Several examples emerged in the research of officers who have recognized the contextual, historical, and social forces that may affect their potential relationships with Muslim communities with whom they hoped to work. Indeed, it became prevalent enough that I began to expect it. Thus, when a British police officer lamented that police interaction with Muslim communities was "skewed by the necessity to discuss and manage counter-terrorism issues when we should be talking about mainstream policing issues," I was impressed, but perhaps not really surprised. Similarly, as community members and police personnel stressed the importance of factors such as international affairs, foreign policy, national government counter-terrorism agendas, and the experiences of immigrant Muslims with police in their native lands, I recognized that this was illustrative of the real awareness they had of the world around them and its tangible effect on relationships between communities and police at the local level. This awareness is absolutely key, and illustrates why "any guide to practical action must address the

complete picture at the planning table, including the multiple outcomes that people seek to achieve as well as the social and political relationships that make planning possible" (Cervero & Wilson, 2006, p. 97).

Thus, the research discussed here stresses that skill at recognizing the contextual, historical, and social issues that are likely to have an effect on the planning process is needed as well as the ability to negotiate the hurdles themselves presented by these issues, and Cervero and Wilson (2006) would assuredly agree. Officers and members of Muslim communities must actively seek to identify and learn about the issues, but then they must also display the forethought and flexibility required to work around them as they present roadblocks in their path. For example, while an officer may hope community members would eventually be willing to share information (often characterized as "intelligence" in what I consider a limiting context) on community concerns, they must recognize and acknowledge that security questions cannot be the first topic of conversation in an emergent relationship. Instead, they must negotiate their need for this information with the extremely sensitive current environment in which Muslim communities can be wary of such queries from officers with whom they have not developed a trusting relationship.

Outreach, Trust, and Power

The success of outreach planning is dependent upon relationships built between individuals. With such high stakes, it is no surprise that so many interviewees stressed the importance of trust and relationships as they described the outreach planning process and their goals. The interpersonal skills and thoughtfulness of individuals have a direct effect on outreach planning, and this itself developed as an important theme within the research. I conceptualize interpersonal skills in a manner much like Bar-On, Brown, Kirkcaldy, and Thomé (2000) as "the

ability to be aware of, understand and to appreciate others' feelings as well as to establish and maintain mutually satisfying and responsible relationships with others" (p. 1108, referring to Bar-On 1997a; 1997b). Indeed, interviewees consistently made some comment on the importance of this type of capability, and it is hard to imagine a successful outreach planning effort in which the primary planners were not empathetic, emotionally intelligent individuals.

Spalek, El Awa, and McDonald (2009) have previously recognized the importance of these factors in partnerships between Muslims and police. In my research, interviewees gave a variety of examples of the intensely personal way in which police and Muslims connected as they sought to work together. They spoke of visits by a police leader to mosques during *Eid*, officers talking about family with community members and avoiding inappropriate questions about terrorism, a "gem of a police officer" who would have tea and some laughs with kids at a youth center, and the value of getting to know officers by their first names. This reflects a process of working on joint community-police efforts which facilitate "informal moments where we build tighter more intimate bonds with one another," as a USA police interviewee suggested. As another police participant in the USA observed, "it's less systems and institutions and things than it is personal relationships and interaction."

If trust is a goal and a way in which the success of relationships can be measured, time is a key factor required for those relationships to be built in the first place. In this way, Spalek, El Awa, and McDonald's (2009) recollection of an officer who visits a Muslim community member in a hospital while off-duty is more than just a professional relationship—it is the type of personal effort that builds "trust and rapport with community members through long-term interaction" (p. 56). This is a view of relationships built between police and Muslims that are much more than rational, organization- and results-driven mandates. Instead, it is much more

akin to the suggestions of Akbar Ahmed: "we can only see into each other's souls if we take the trouble—and sometimes the risk—to visit each other" (2008, p. 252). As Spalek, El Awa, and McDonald recognize, "this kind of interaction, based very much on community policing principles, is, it might be argued, crucial in helping to build trust with communities" (2009, p. 56). *Police and Muslims must spend formal and informal time together, a facet of relationship-building which is absolutely key.* This reinforces what Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, and Miller found regarding relationships between American law enforcement and Arab communities, that "community leaders identified person-to-person contact as an important part of establishing relationships and doing outreach" (2006, p. 25).

It is simply unreasonable to expect police and community members to take the risks that exist without a relationship of trust, and because outreach itself is often planned as a result of a problematic situation, the importance of this trust is heightened. Indeed, while not all relationships start from a problem-solving mode, this characteristic of outreach planning is pervasive and influential. As one Muslim interviewee in the USA noted, "I think that's how good programs are supposed to be produced, is you take problems, and you figure out solutions, and those solutions that become the programs that you need to develop and pursue." That authors such as Spalek, El Awa, and McDonald (2009) frame their studies of police-community partnerships in terms of *counter*-terrorism acknowledges what is perhaps so obvious that it fails to be explicitly said: that engagement between police and Muslims is at least in part designed as a problem-solving effort. But the "problems" from which communities and police start are numerous, and must not be seen exclusively as a counter-terrorism issue. At the most strategic level lie concerns about terrorism and community welfare. At a more immediate level, it can be

feelings of alienation, a lack of voice and participation in government, or not having the contacts and trust needed to share information.

Through relationships comes trust, and via this trust, the ability to build outreach programs that affect problems. As Cervero and Wilson (2006) illustrate, the maintenance of relationships can be key to reaching other planning goals; relationships therefore serve a foundational importance. As officers and Muslim interviewees stressed the role of relationships, they supported the effect of power in planning police-community outreach, even if unknowingly doing so. Indeed, the ability to make things happen through planning is "rooted in a specific socially structured relationship; such a capacity to act is not simply a consequence of individual attributes" (Cervero & Wilson, 2006, p. 85). This is foundational because in Cervero and Wilson's understanding, planning is by definition a "social activity" (p. 85), and it is in part through the exercise of power as it becomes available because of relationships that programs are planned.

Power must be seen here as divested from its exclusively negative connotations, only having undue influence over someone else: "Power is not specific to a particular form of relationship, such as the case when one person gets another to do something she would not otherwise have done" (Cervero & Wilson, 2006, p. 86). Instead, it allows police and Muslims—through the relationships and negotiation inherent in outreach planning—to get things done. In this way, when officers and community members expend the energy and skill necessary to build trusting relationships, they also build and use power to make things happen. This is why it is critical that individuals involved in outreach planning have the interpersonal skills and thoughtfulness needed to effectively build these necessary relationships. The recognition of the existence and effect of power in planning outreach between Muslims and police is important,

especially "in a world of conflicting interests and unequal power relations, producing the uneven tables at which most planning occurs" (Cervero & Wilson, 2006, p. 93). Spalek, El Awa, and McDonald similarly emphasize that it is "important to acknowledge the power differential between communities and police in engagement processes" (2009, p. 27). While it may be attractively simple to assume that all involved in outreach planning enjoy a relationship of perfectly balanced power, reality paints a different picture.

Outreach and Learning

Outreach between police and Muslim communities is an adult education endeavor, and always involves learning. Interviewees consistently recognized that outreach between Muslims and police encompasses learning goals. The prevalence of potential educational outcomes suggests that outreach between police and Muslim communities is itself an adult education endeavor, and we should recall that "educational programs matter because they create possible futures in the lives of people, organizations, and communities" (Cervero & Wilson, 2006, p. 91). The topics about which learning can take place are numerous, but can be identified and therefore they can also be addressed. We can see several themes within the six primary findings developed in this research as having distinct learning components, for example: learning about Islam, Muslim communities, and police, taking part in government processes, hearing grievances and affecting police policies and actions, and sharing information about crime.

Learning is therefore a key component of mutually beneficial outreach, although it is often couched in terms (such the emphasis on collecting "information" or "intelligence") that fail to give attention to the educational component. The connection that exists between police-Muslim community outreach and learning and education has been identified before (for example, in Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, & Miller, 2006, more broadly referring to Arab communities).

Spalek, El Awa, and McDonald (2009) suggest a host of learning opportunities in police-Muslim community partnerships, from communities learning about police counter-terrorism activities from a law enforcement perspective, to police developing a cultural understanding of Muslim communities. This is vital given the previous paucity of attention paid in law enforcement circles to working with Muslims, and "police services, alongside other statutory organisations, have therefore undergone a steep learning curve in relation to understanding and working with Muslim communities" (p. 30). That this endeavor requires, in part, learning about and working with other cultures illuminates the importance of fields such as education in cultural competency, which has been shown to potentially foster positive learning outcomes in professions such as medicine (Beach, et al., 2005). This is especially noteworthy in light of the findings of Esposito and Mogahed (2007), which stress that "Muslims around the world say that the one thing the West can do to improve relations with their societies is to moderate their views and respect Islam" (p. xiii).

Even if we were to simplistically reduce the discussion of police-community relationships to an effort motivated almost solely by efforts to collect intelligence on crime or terrorism, it is still a learning issue. Intelligence, if understood as just information in its most simple form as acknowledged by Innes (2006), does not have to carry the negative connotations it so often does: "For organizations, it is information that has been processed to provide forethought—a predictive capacity about how to act at some point in the future to achieve particular objectives given certain conditions" (p. 229). In this conceptualization, I believe we can accurately see that information (or intelligence) collection and sharing can be seen as a learning experience on the part of police involved in outreach. While I would argue vehemently that an overriding emphasis on intelligence collection is not based on a sufficient understanding

or rationale regarding outreach with Muslim communities, even in this application, learning is clearly of paramount importance.

The field of adult education therefore offers much value to the practice of police-community outreach planning, in particular for our purposes here, the application of the Cervero and Wilson model of adult education program planning (2006), and the overall process they discuss. There is clear evidence from the experiences of Muslims and police collected at both research sites that the model offered by Cervero and Wilson also works in describing the world of police-community outreach development. Especially important are the four dimensions of planning offered by Cervero and Wilson *power*, *interests*, *ethical commitment* and *negotiation*, which themselves have direct links to the conclusions drawn above. As Cervero and Wilson stress, to accurately describe the real-world experiences of planners one must move beyond prescriptive, step-by-step models, which I believe functionally prioritize rationality above reality. In particular, what must be emphasized here is the "fundamentally social character of planning" (2006, p. vii). What does not seem to have been explicitly stated, however, is the understanding that police-community outreach is, by its very nature, an adult education endeavor for both "sides." This oversight clearly deserves more attention in the future.

An Outreach Model

The outreach planning process is iterative and police and community members must pay attention to the need for relationships, learning, negotiation and flexibility when working in this environment. The six principal themes and the three previous conclusions drawn above reveal a recursive and overlapping process, which describes both the goals and mechanisms of planning outreach between Muslims and police. As Muslims and police seek to develop mutually beneficial outreach efforts in the two study sites, participants illustrate that three things are relied

upon: (a) relationships; (b) negotiation and flexibility; and (c) opportunities for learning. Because of the overwhelming importance of each of these dimensions, members of Muslim communities and police personnel should ensure each of these areas receive attention as they work to develop police-community outreach.

Given the recursive nature of the outreach planning process, these three characteristics account for both what planners *want to happen* (their goals) as well as the processes that describes *how it happens* (their planning efforts). Each of these issues is discussed further in the section that follows. While this view of the outreach planning process has not been suggested before, we have seen in the preceding sections that it echoes and finds support in many of the conclusions and concerns expressed in previous research on both program planning and community policing in partnership with Muslim communities. To illustrate these similarities, I have particularly emphasized the applicability of the Cervero and Wilson (2006) theory of adult education program planning and the work of Spalek, El Awa, and McDonald (2009) regarding progressive police initiatives to work with Muslim communities to counter violent extremism.

As we have seen, in each study site outreach was described as an endeavor with a clear (if not always explicitly stated) learning component. Muslims and police *always* have something they feel others need to learn during outreach. Indeed, it appears that police-community outreach may be viewed, by definition, as an educational activity, both in its process and its goals. Partners in outreach have things they themselves need to learn to develop outreach, as well as educational goals for others they hope to achieve through outreach. In the process of building outreach and affecting the learning of others, planners are constantly embarking on a path of negotiation and balance. No police-community programs would take place if all involved were inflexible in their roles, expectations, and requirements. This is especially important given the

political challenges that exist and the risks those involved in outreach incur as they choose to take part. Similarly, very little would be achieved if those involved in planning were not willing to depend on interpersonal skills and thoughtfulness in developing the relationships required for such challenging work—work that is collaborative and therefore never done alone.

To illustrate this inter-relationship between *relationships*, *negotiation*, and *learning*, let us discuss a hypothetical scenario based in part on a real-world experience of interviewees. In our example, a counter-terrorism officer and a Muslim community activist seek to collaboratively build a public forum for issues important to Muslim women. There is no doubt that to do so the officer and activist must rely on the *relationships* and trust they have built and continue to build with one another as they take the calculated risks necessary to get such a project off of the ground. Indeed, the project may go nowhere at all until the foundations of this relationship have been built. To be sure, such a project, especially when funded by police and perhaps the UK's Prevent strand of the national counter-terrorism program, is fraught with political challenges and career dangers and for an officer and activist to engage in such work requires a substantial measure of faith in one another. However, while relying on their own relationships to plan the program, they are also likely to explicitly acknowledge that they hope their forum will allow Muslim women greater access to female police officers, which would itself allow for new relationships to develop, bringing the community and police closer together. No one involved would deny this goal.

As they work on this project, everyone involved in the planning must *negotiate* and balance their own roles and expectations as well as the political challenges associated with this work in order to get things done—at times taking wide steps outside of their respective comfort zones in order to facilitate progress. The police officer, while assigned to a counter-terrorism

team, must balance that role with the need to work on a project that may only have nominal ties to public safety or addressing violent extremism. Similarly, the officer may have to listen, and at times respond to, withering criticisms of foreign policy that often accompany such efforts—even though the officer has nothing to do with those types of policy decisions, has no role in implementing them, and may even disagree with the way in which the policies are worded or carried out. The Muslim planning participant must likewise negotiate her role as a community leader responsible for the needs of Muslim women with the reality of accepting funding that is at times highly politicized and attached to government programs linked in the media to spying. At the same time, she may well have to balance the expectations of her immediate faith community and peers with the newly developing needs of her partnership with a police counter-terrorism team.

The community member, however, can deftly *negotiate* the challenges involved in such work only if she has put effort into *learning* and understanding what those challenges are in the first place. In addition, she may have to be educated about the peculiarities of police practices and policies which govern money disbursement, a process in which she may have never previously been involved. In the same vein, our police officer will only be effective at balancing the distasteful rhetoric associated by the public and media with the government counter-terrorism agenda if our officer has also learned what portions of it are considered by the community to be most problematic. The money needed for the project is tied to unpopular government directives, but it is also needed to give local women a platform from which to discuss issues important to them. As the planners themselves negotiate this balance, they are also hoping that their program leads others to embrace a similar level of flexibility in the future so other community and police

goals may be jointly addressed and affected. The officer and the community member use flexibility and negotiation to induce this willingness on the part of others to do more of the same.

In order that they may actually do this, both the counter-terrorism officer and the Muslim community leader take part in a process of *learning* and education that leads to a joint awareness of one another's experiences, needs, and hopes. This is key to exhibiting the empathy needed to make relationships work in the current climate. The community leader may learn that her previous assumptions regarding police and the national counter-terrorism agenda have been partially inaccurate and unduly negative. Likewise, the police officer learns that past community experiences with police and the media have led to negative, yet perhaps reasonable conclusions about police which have made many Muslims in the city reluctant to embrace the types of programs and goals the police force has previously suggested. As they work through these educational opportunities, the officer and activist also hope to offer educational experiences for others that are similarly transformative in the future, but to get to that point they have a great deal to learn themselves.

Relationships, *negotiation*, and *learning* therefore represent the process through which outreach planning between Muslims and police takes place. As we have seen, these three ideas account both for what does happen as partnerships are planned, and also what those involved hope will happen if their plans come to fruition. These themes do not, however, operate in isolation from one another. Our community activist may not even be willing to negotiate her role as a Muslim activist in order to work with police without first developing trusting relationships with police personnel, while also learning more about the overall police mission. Similarly, our police officer may never learn about the real grievances that exist in a community without a willingness to negotiate the narrow view of police responsibilities that prioritizes

public order above community relationship cultivation. *Each of the characteristics in this model is dependent on the others as a process for collaborative police-community efforts*.

The data from the USA and the UK illustrate that the model of adult education program planning offered by Cervero and Wilson (2006) functions well in describing the world of police-community outreach development. Importantly, Cervero and Wilson (1998; 2006) and Forester (1989) stress that as programs are planned, two outcomes are affected: (a) relationships and the power that emanates from them are changed or solidified, and (b) the details of the program itself are negotiated and hammered out. As police and Muslims negotiate through a variety of issues to plan outreach efforts, they are similarly affecting their world on two intersection paths: they are simultaneously affecting their own relationships with one another, while at the same time conducting the legwork necessary to get an outreach program prepared for the future. This supports the iterative nature of outreach planning between Muslims and police, but it also underlines that each and every contact for the purpose of outreach between police and communities takes place in a constantly shifting political world in which relationships are influenced and potential outcomes are planned.

Implications for Practice

There is evidence of mutually understood and valuable practices developed from the two jurisdictions that were studied here. While I would not suggest that these practices are inherently transferable to other cities or countries, I note that the six thematic findings developed in this study echo portions of what has been illustrated in other police forces, notably found in the research of authors such as Spalek, El Awa, and McDonald (2009), and Lambert (2008a; 2008b) in the UK, and Ramirez, O'Connell, and Zafar (2004) and Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, and Miller (2006) in the USA, as well as others. Based on these similarities, I am confident that police

personnel and Muslim community members who intend to work together for the purpose of developing outreach and partnerships should consider, at a minimum, the way in which they can affect and be affected by the three characteristics of the outreach planning process discussed here. Those characteristics require (a) the need for efforts designed to build strong, personal, mutually beneficial *relationships* between Muslims and police personnel to support overall community welfare (and *not* just counter-terrorism initiatives); (b) the need to be flexible in *negotiating* what is expected and delivered through the planning and delivery of these efforts, as well as in working through the political landscape that contextualizes the outreach planning process; and (c) the need to identify what can and should be *learned* about communities, police, and their histories, goals, needs and expectations.

These and similar issues are certainly not new to the realm of community policing. A US Department of Justice guide to building police-community partnerships (Rinehart, Laszio, & Briscoe, 2001) incorporates attention to many of the same principles addressed in research. Like Spalek, El Awa, and McDonald (2009), the DOJ *Collaboration Toolkit* guide recognizes that: trusting relationships require time, allowing space for community perspectives is important, that information sharing can be affected by concerns regarding sensitivity, and that emotion may play a role in partnership work. Therefore, while these issues may not always be on the forefront of a police officers' mind, they have been recognized in professional literature and have received some attention.

What law enforcement requires is a new emphasis on topics such as emotional and social intelligence (Goleman, 1995; 2006). Although this area and its applicability to police work has been addressed in popular literature to a small degree by Goleman (2006), and in professional literature by Saville (2006) and the Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services (n.d.), the heavy, overriding emphasis on conflict resolution and stress management for police is not adequate. Police personnel certainly need to be able to "talk down" an angry assailant, but those important skills may have little relevance in the world of police-community outreach. What is needed is an attempt to merge what I call "police public diplomacy" and emotional and social intelligence in a way that lends credence to the value of the experiences of police and Muslims in the interviews here who insist that interpersonal skills are integral to planning outreach. Spalek, El Awa, and McDonald (2009) suggest a fuller understanding of the need for emotional intelligence in this type of work themselves, noting the value of "effective partnerships grounded in empathy, reciprocity, and in emotional connections between partners" (p. 57), suggestions supported in the research discussed here. If an era of police involvement in public diplomacy (as suggested by Sullivan & Wirtz, 2009) is indeed on the horizon, the importance of this area must be recognized and harnessed. However, the question of how officers will develop these emotionally- and socially-intelligent diplomacy skills remains to be seen.

The question of greatest importance is how can police departments and communities identify and develop personnel with the needed interpersonal skills, emotional intelligence, and empathy (all issues identified in Spalek, El Awa, and McDonald, 2009) necessary to plan and carry out outreach work? This is so much more than conflict negotiation and stress, areas which are already emphasized in professional discussions of emotional intelligence in law enforcement (Saville, 2006). To suggest that an officer with the emotional intelligence needed to politely issue a citation also has the ability to convince a youth leader in an impoverished and marginalized community to partner with police is to underestimate the issues involved. Conflict resolution may play a part, but it does not account for all that is needed.

Goleman's popular work on social intelligence (2006) may allude to many of the most important issues in other applications, but this type of understanding has yet to be embraced in police work. Indeed, by and large, we are far from it. Police forces are demanding, busy places—to a degree I imagine many in the public would find difficult to conceive. But they are also missing out on the potential to truly affect the future success of community policing if they fail to seek ways to understand and improve on the ability of police personnel to perform with diplomacy in their attempts to build outreach with communities. For government decision-makers, I believe the potential for future success in outreach efforts can be improved by paying close attention to selecting the right personnel. This type of work requires flexible, caring, employees with exceptional interpersonal skills and a willingness to collaborate, a proven dedication to open-minded problem solving, and a real thirst for learning and working in non-traditional police roles. Importantly, these qualities may not be captured in traditional measures of police performance (such as arrest statistics or investigative prowess), and therefore the "right" officer or supervisor for the job may not be the most obvious one. Once selected, these personnel must be willing to sit down and have ongoing—and at times challenging—dialogue with potential community partners, planning what may often be unconventional opportunities for outreach while also spending the required time to build strong personal relationships within the communities they serve.

Implications for Future Research

Significantly, many of the findings that have been discussed here echo the conclusions and concerns expressed by Spalek, El Awa, and McDonald (2009). In particular, it is worthwhile to note the common emphasis in this study placed on topics such as negotiation, interpersonal skills, trust, and allowing for candid discussion of concerns and grievances.

Despite these similarities, the topic of partnerships between police and Muslim communities in the United States and the United Kingdom is still in its infancy, and much work needs to be done. In particular, I believe more effort should be placed on identifying the traits of the most successful police personnel and community members engaged in outreach. Can research assist us in identifying replicable characteristics that described Muslim community members and police personnel who are most accomplished in building partnerships?

Outreach between communities and police is an educational endeavor, and therefore I believe the academic literature on adult education in general, and program planning in particular (Cervero & Wilson, 2006), has an application that has only begun to be tapped. If we re-envision this type of work to recognize that every time we come to the police-public outreach "planning table" (to use the Cervero and Wilson metaphor) we are working towards identifying and achieving educational goals, a whole new genre of literature then has a new application, and vast opportunities for new research open up. For example, how can we better utilize adult education philosophies to improve government-community outreach? What is needed to identify mutually beneficial learning issues and then plan programs to affect the needed change? How does personal and organizational power in the pursuit of outreach enhance and challenge personal relationships and efficacy between police and the public they serve? What police departments and non-governmental groups have been most successful, and how can those successes be viewed in adult education terms?

Much more research attention needs to be placed on identifying and studying the attributes of officers and community members who are most effective in making outreach between police and Muslims work. On an individual level, I suggest that there is an intersection where an aptitude for self-directed learning, relationship-building skills, cultural competence,

dedication, flexibility, and open mindedness all come together, and in that spot we are likely to find the most successful community and police partners. Who are these people, how did they personally and professionally develop, and what skills have they harnessed to make their work successful? How can their success be studied to provide examples for others? As I think of many of the people with whom I interacted during my research, I can clearly envision several examples. The brave way in which they dedicated themselves to their communities and fellow partners in outreach was profoundly inspiring. Their personal qualities and stories deserve much more attention.

Concluding Comments

The success of partnerships between Muslim communities and police in the USA and the UK will undoubtedly continue to be of academic and professional interest for the foreseeable future, and this area therefore deserves a great deal more research effort. I make this observation, however, with a degree of sadness, recognizing that this continuing interest is likely to grow hand-in-hand with an ongoing international emphasis on counter-terrorism efforts. While fully recognizing the important of efforts to fight violent extremism, I am also painfully aware that the future efforts of terrorist criminals will continue to influence the lens through which many in government and academia view the world's Muslims. This is a shame. For while law enforcement action is indeed needed, Muslim communities will no doubt continue to feel that a disproportionate amount of the attention is focused on them.

It has been a decade since I began to study the ways in which law enforcement and Muslims interact in the USA. My personal, professional, and academic experiences in this time have led me to conclude that the "us versus them" mentality that seems to pervade the world when discussing government and Muslim communities is best described as a spreading poison,

the effect of which is evident but too rarely recognized. Disappointingly, a major artery through which this poison can spread is the media, and I fear it will continue to play a largely (even if unintentional) negative role that unfairly affects both police and the Muslim communities in which they serve.

I have seen brave, compassionate, and thoughtful law enforcement personnel and Muslim community members in the USA and the UK strive to accomplish great things, and in their goals they debunk a dichotomized view of the world that pits governments against their citizens, and the West against Islam. Their work has not been easy or without risk. I pray more people follow in their footsteps.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

RECRUITMENT LETTER STATEMENT—USA STUDY

The University of Georgia
College of Education
Department of Lifelong Education, Administration, and Policy

Dear Potential Research Participant:

I am conducting research for a doctoral dissertation that studies outreach that takes place between local police and members of the Muslim community. You have been identified as an individual who has previously been involved in a police-Muslim community outreach program, and I would like to ask you to agree to being interviewed about your participation. I was made aware of your name either through historical records, previous meetings, or via recommendations from another person with whom I have met for this same project.

Very respectfully,

P. Daniel Silk

APPENDIX B

INFORMATION AND CONSENT LETTER—USA STUDY

I agree to take part in a research study titled Outreach between Muslim Communities and Local Police which is being conducted by Phillip Daniel Silk with the Department of Lifelong Education, Administration, and Policy at the University of Georgia, (706) 542-3343, under the direction of Dr. Ron Cervero head of the Department of Lifelong Education, Administration, and Policy at the University of Georgia, (706) 542-2221. My participation is voluntary; I can refuse to participate or stop taking part at any time without giving any reason, and without penalty or loss of benefits to which I am otherwise entitled. I can ask to have information related to me returned to me, removed from the research records, or destroyed.

The purpose of the research is to study the outreach efforts that take place between Muslim communities and local police departments. In particular, this study seeks to describe what outreach activities take place, how these activities are planned by members of police departments and the Muslim community, and how the community and police assess role and outcome of these activities.
The benefits that I may expect from taking part in this study include an opportunity to personally discuss and consider these outreach efforts, their effect, and how they might be improved in the future. There are also significant opportunities for this study to benefit communities in the United States and abroad. Better understanding of what outreach takes place, how it is planned and carried out, and the effect it has on those it seeks to involve has the potential to make a significant difference in practical applications for police and Muslim communities.

If I volunteer to take part in this study, I will be asked to do the following things:

- Meet or speak by phone with the researcher to receive a description of the project and interview process as well as ask any questions
- Meet with the researcher at a location of my choice for approximately 1-2 hours for the purpose of participating in a one-on-one interview
- Answer approximately less than 20 questions regarding the planning, purpose, and effect of outreach efforts between law enforcement and Muslim communities
- Allow the interview to be recorded with an audio recorder

The discomforts or stresses that may be faced during this research are extremely minimal, and would be related to psychological discomfort resulting from the limited discussion of personal religious beliefs and political concerns. No risks are expected.

My identity and the results of this participation will kept confidential. To ensure confidentiality, the following steps will be taken:

- The only people who will know that I am a research subject are the researcher and individuals who facilitate introductions to the researcher. No individually-identifiable information about me, or provided by me during the research, will be shared with others, without my written permission
- Neither my name nor the name of the organization with which I am involved will be identified as being involved in the study
- Recordings and notes of my participation that contain my identity will be kept in a lockable container or password-protected computer. Any individually-identifiable information that is recorded will be destroyed as soon as it is found, unless it would eliminate other important information. In that instance, the identifiable information will be destroyed as soon as the data analysis is complete. In any event, all recordings will be destroyed once the project is complete
- The recordings will not be publicly disseminated

I have the right to review any recordings made during my participation, and I also have the right to require that recordings of my participation be destroyed if I desire. If I elect to answer questions or provide information via email or Internet, I recognize that Internet communications are insecure and there is a limit to the confidentiality that can be guaranteed due to the technology itself. However once the materials are received by the researcher, the confidentiality procedures described above will be employed.

The researcher will answer any further questions about the research, now or during the course of the project, and can be reached by telephone at (706) 248-0988, or by email at pds@uga.edu.

My signature below indicates that the researcher has answered all of my questions to my satisfaction and that I consent to volunteer for this study. I have been given a copy of this form.

Phillip Daniel Silk _____ _____
Name of Researcher Signature Date

Telephone: 706.248.0988
Email: pds@uga.edu

_____ _____ _____ Name
of Participant Signature Date

Additional questions or problems regarding your rights as a research participant should be addressed to The Chairperson, Institutional Review Board, University of Georgia, 612 Boyd Graduate Studies Research Center, Athens, Georgia 30602-7411; Telephone (706) 542-3199; E-Mail Address IRB@uga.edu

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR MUSLIMS—USA STUDY

Interview Questions for Muslim Leaders

1. Why do believe the [insert name or location of project] outreach exists?

2. Why do you participate in the outreach effort?

3. Please describe your involvement as a member of the local Muslim community in researching, planning, or hosting this outreach effort for the Muslim community and local police.

4. What precipitated your involvement (who put you on the team, or what job, position, or title do you hold that facilitated your involvement)?

5. Describe how the planning for the outreach took place.

    a. What process was used to decide it was needed (i.e. how did members of your organization or profession know this type of meeting with the police was needed)? Did they have a plan or process they used? What is it?
    b. Who decided it was needed? Was it an individual, group, a committee, a response to a formal needs assessment?
    c. What events or issues made hosting it necessary? Did a particular event or sentiment make it needed? If so, did that set the context for what the forum was intended to accomplish?
    d. Who was responsible for planning it?
    e. Was there a planning process? Who was responsible?
    f. What challenges were experienced in the planning process?

6. Why are these meetings important for the Muslim community? For the police?

7. What do you feel is the Muslim community's stated goal in participating in the outreach?

8. If education is a goal, for whom is the education intended, and what do you wish them to learn from participation in the outreach?

9. What else does the Muslim community (as much as you know or feel comfortable commenting on) hope to achieve through this outreach?

10. Was planning the outreach affected by political needs or issues? How so?

11. Are there any individuals, groups, or organizations that do not participate in the outreach (or planning the outreach) whom you believe should be involved?

12. Do you have any comments you would like to add on this subject?

APPENDIX D

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR POLICE—USA STUDY

Interview Questions for Police Leaders

1. Why do believe the forum exists?

2. Why do you participate in the forum?

3. Please describe your involvement as a member of the local police department in researching, planning, or hosting this forum for the Muslim community and local police.

4. What precipitated your involvement (who put you on the team, or what job, position, or title do you hold that facilitated your involvement)?

5. Describe how the planning for the forum took place.

    a. What process was used to decide it was needed (i.e. how did members of your organization or profession know this type of meeting with the police was needed)? Did they have a plan or process they used? What is it?
    b. Who decided it was needed? Was it an individual, group, a committee, a response to a formal needs assessment?
    c. What events or issues made hosting it necessary? Did a particular event or sentiment make it needed? If so, did that set the context for what the forum was intended to accomplish?
    d. Who was responsible for planning it?
    e. Was there a planning process? Who was responsible?
    f. What challenges were experienced in the planning process?

6. Why are these meetings important for the Muslim community? For the police?

7. What do you feel is the police department's stated goal in participating in the forum?

8. If education is a goal, for whom is the education intended, and what do you wish them to learn from participation in the forum?

9. What else does the police department (as much as you know or feel comfortable commenting on) hope to achieve through this forum?

10. Was planning the forum affected by political needs or issues? How so?

11. Are there any individuals, groups, or organizations that do not participate in the forum (or planning the forum) whom you believe should be involved?

12. Do you have any comments you would like to add on this subject?

APPENDIX E

RECRUITMENT LETTER STATEMENT—UK STUDY

Dear Potential Research Participant:

I am conducting research for a Fulbright Police Research Fellowship that studies outreach that takes place between local police and members of the Muslim community. You have been identified as an individual who has previously been involved in a police-Muslim community outreach program, and I would like to ask you to agree to being interviewed about your participation. I was made aware of your name either through historical records, previous meetings, or via recommendations from another person with whom I have met for this same project.

Very respectfully,

P. Daniel Silk

APPENDIX F

INFORMATION AND CONSENT LETTER—UK STUDY

I agree to take part in a research study titled *"*Outreach between Muslim Communities and Police in the UK" which is being conducted by Phillip Daniel Silk, a Fulbright Police Research Fellow. My participation is voluntary; I can refuse to participate or stop taking part at any time without giving any reason, and without penalty or loss of benefits to which I am otherwise entitled. I can ask to have information related to me returned to me, removed from the research records, or destroyed.

The purpose of the research is to study the outreach efforts that take place between Muslim communities and local police departments in the United Kingdom. In particular, this study seeks to describe what outreach activities take place, how these activities are planned by members of police departments and the Muslim community, and how the community and police assess the role and outcome of these activities.

The benefits that I may expect from taking part in this study include an opportunity to personally discuss and consider these outreach efforts, their effect, and how they might be improved in the future. There are also significant opportunities for this study to benefit communities in the United Kingdom and abroad. Better understanding of what outreach takes place, how it is planned and carried out, and the effect it has on those it seeks to involve has the potential to make a significant difference in practical applications for police and Muslim communities.

If I volunteer to take part in this study, I will be asked to do the following things:

- Meet or speak by phone with the researcher to receive a description of the project and interview process as well as ask any questions
- Meet with the researcher at a location of my choice or speak by phone for approximately 1-2 hours for the purpose of participating in an interview
- Answer approximately less than 20 questions regarding the planning, purpose, and effect of outreach efforts between law enforcement and Muslim communities
- Allow the interview to be recorded with an audio recorder

The discomforts or stresses that may be faced during this research are extremely minimal, and would be related to psychological discomfort resulting from the limited discussion of personal religious beliefs and political concerns. No risks are expected.

My identity and the results of this participation will kept confidential. To ensure confidentiality, the following steps will be taken:

- The only people who will know that I am a research subject are the researcher and individuals who facilitate introductions to the researcher. No individually-identifiable information about me, or provided by me during the research, will be shared with others, without my written permission.
- My name will not be identified in the research findings as being involved in the study.
- Recordings and notes of my participation that contain my identity will be kept in a lockable container or password-protected computer file, except while in transit or while being transcribed. Any individually-identifiable information about me that is recorded

will be destroyed as soon as it is found, unless it would eliminate other important information. In that instance, the identifiable information will be destroyed as soon as the data analysis is complete. In any event, all recordings will be destroyed once the project is complete

- The recordings will not be publicly disseminated. The only person who may have access to the recordings other than the researcher is someone privately hired to transcribe the interviews.

I have the right to review any recordings made during my participation, and I also have the right to require that recordings of my participation be destroyed if I desire. If I elect to answer questions or provide information via email or Internet, I recognize that Internet communications are insecure and there is a limit to the confidentiality that can be guaranteed due to the technology itself. However once the materials are received by the researcher, the confidentiality procedures described above will be employed.

The researcher will answer any further questions about the research, now or during the course of the project, and can be reached by telephone at 0785 465 4457, or by email at pds@uga.edu.

My signature below indicates that the researcher has answered all of my questions to my satisfaction and that I consent to volunteer for this study. I have been given a copy of this form.

Phillip Daniel Silk _____ _____
Name of Researcher Signature Date

Telephone: 0785 465 4457
Email: pds@uga.edu

_____ _____ _____ Name
of Participant Signature Date

Additional questions or problems regarding your rights as a research participant should be addressed to The Chairperson, Institutional Review Board, University of Georgia, 612 Boyd Graduate Studies Research Center, Athens, Georgia 30602-7411; Telephone (+001) 706 542 3199; E-Mail Address IRB@uga.edu

APPENDIX G

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR MUSLIMS—UK STUDY

Interview Questions for Muslim Leaders

1. Why do believe the [insert name or location of project] outreach exists?

2. Why do you participate in the outreach effort?

3. Please describe your involvement as a member of the local Muslim community in researching, planning, or hosting this outreach effort for the Muslim community and local police.

4. What precipitated your involvement (who put you on the team, or what job, position, or title do you hold that facilitated your involvement)?

5. Describe how the planning for the outreach took place.

    a. What process was used to decide it was needed (i.e. how did members of your organization or profession know this type of meeting with the police was needed)? Did they have a plan or process they used? What is it?
    b. Who decided it was needed? Was it an individual, group, a committee, a response to a formal needs assessment?
    c. What events or issues made hosting it necessary? Did a particular event or sentiment make it needed? If so, did that set the context for what the forum was intended to accomplish?
    d. Who was responsible for planning it?
    e. Was there a planning process? Who was responsible?
    f. What challenges were experienced in the planning process?

6. Why are these meetings important for the Muslim community? For the police?

7. What do you feel is the Muslim community's stated goal in participating in the outreach?

8. If education is a goal, for whom is the education intended, and what do you wish them to learn from participation in the outreach?

9. What else does the Muslim community (as much as you know or feel comfortable commenting on) hope to achieve through this outreach?

10. Was planning the outreach affected by political needs or issues? How so?

11. Are there any individuals, groups, or organizations that do not participate in the outreach (or planning the outreach) whom you believe should be involved?

12. Do you have any comments you would like to add on this subject?

APPENDIX H

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR MUSLIMS (SPO VERSION)—UK STUDY

Interview Questions for Muslim Leaders

1. Why do believe the Security and Partnerships Officer program exists?

2. Why do you participate in Security and Partnerships Officer program (or why might you consider participating in the future)?

3. Please describe your involvement as a member of the local Muslim community in researching, planning, or hosting this outreach effort for the Muslim community and local police.

4. What precipitated your involvement (who put you on the team, or what job, position, or title do you hold that facilitated your involvement)?

5. Describe how the planning for Security and Partnerships Officer program took place.

    a. What process was used to decide it was needed (i.e. how did members of your organization or profession know this type of meeting with the police was needed)? Did they have a plan or process they used? What is it?
    b. Who decided it was needed? Was it an individual, group, a committee, a response to a formal needs assessment?
    c. What events or issues made hosting it necessary? Did a particular event or sentiment make it needed? If so, did that set the context for what the forum was intended to accomplish?
    d. Who was responsible for planning it?
    e. Was there a planning process? Who was responsible?
    f. What challenges were experienced in the planning process?

6. Why is this program important for the Muslim community? For the police?

7. What do you feel is the Muslim community's stated goal in participating in Security and Partnerships Officer program?

8. If education is a goal, for whom is the education intended, and what do you wish them to learn from participation in Security and Partnerships Officer program?

9. What else does the Muslim community (as much as you know or feel comfortable commenting on) hope to achieve through Security and Partnerships Officer program?

10. Was planning Security and Partnerships Officer program affected by external needs or issues? How so?

11. Are there any individuals, groups, or organizations that do not participate in Security and Partnerships Officer program (or planning the program) whom you believe should be involved?

12. Security and Partnerships Officers are locally based police officers who seek to work with communities and partners to Prevent Violent Extremism. They will engage openly with communities to develop a better understanding of the issues, which affect their quality of life. Through this process they seek to develop relationships based on trust and confidence, and expect this to be the basis for sharing concerns and working together to support anyone who is vulnerable to the influence of violent extremists. How do you believe the police officers acting in this role will be received by the community?

13. Do you have any comments you would like to add on this subject?

APPENDIX I

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR POLICE—UK STUDY

Interview Questions for Police Personnel

1. Why do you believe the Security and Partnerships Officer program exists?

2. Why do you participate in the Security and Partnerships Officer program?

3. Please describe your involvement as a member of the local police department in researching, planning, or hosting this outreach effort for the Muslim community and local police.

4. What precipitated your involvement (who put you on the team, or what job, position, or title do you hold that facilitated your involvement)?

5. Describe how the planning for the Security and Partnerships Officer program took place.

   (Example issues to explore below)
   a. What process was used to decide it was needed (i.e. how did members of your organization or profession know this type of meeting with the community was needed)? Did they have a plan or process they used? What is it?
   b. Who decided it was needed? Was it an individual, group, a committee, a response to a formal needs assessment?
   c. What events or issues made hosting it necessary? Did a particular event or sentiment make it needed? If so, did that set the context for what the outreach was intended to accomplish?
   d. Who was responsible for planning it?
   e. Was there a planning process? Who was responsible?
   f. What challenges were experienced in the planning process?

6. Why is this program important for the Muslim community? For the police?

7. What do you feel is the police department's stated goal in participating in the Security and Partnerships Officer program?

8. If education is a goal, for whom is the education intended, and what do you wish them to learn from participation in the Security and Partnerships Officer program?

9. What else does the police department (as much as you know or feel comfortable commenting on) hope to achieve through Security and Partnerships Officer program?

10. Was planning Security and Partnerships Officer program affected by external needs or issues? How so?

11. Are there any individuals, groups, or organizations that do not participate in Security and Partnerships Officer program (or planning the program) whom you believe should be involved?

12. Security and Partnerships Officers are locally based police officers who seek to work with communities and partners to Prevent Violent Extremism. They will engage openly with communities to develop a better understanding of the issues, which affect their quality of life. Through this process they seek to develop relationships based on trust and confidence, and expect this to be the basis for sharing concerns and working together to support anyone who is vulnerable to the influence of violent extremists. How do you believe the police officers acting in this role will be received by the community?

13. Do you have any comments you would like to add on this subject?