ALLIANCE RISK TOLERANCE AND REGIME TYPE:

DETERMINANTS OF ALLIANCE TEXTUAL COMMITMENTS

by

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(Under the Direction of Loch K. Johnson)

ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the relationship between state regime type and observations of risk in alliance textual commitments between 1950 and 1992 (most of the Cold War era). What is the impact of regime type on states' risk tolerance in alliance treaty provisions? More specifically, do democratic states tolerate less risk in alliances than autocratic states? Using Polity data and empirical coding of alliance textual commitment variables from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset I examine member-year-level relationships between regime type and selected indicators of entrapment and abandonment risk drawn from alliance documents. Empirical results provide partial support for my expectation that democracy has a negative association with alliance risk tolerance. The measurement of indicators does not allow me to conclude full support for my argument, but provides enough support to warrant further research regarding the intersection of regime type, alliance risk, and alliance textual commitments.

INDEX WORDS: Regime Type, Alliance Risk, Alliance Textual Commitments, Credible Commitment, Audience Costs, Entrapment and Abandonment Risks, Polity IV, Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP), Correlates of War

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Security alliances are particularly interesting phenomena in the international political arena. Indeed formal alliance documents bear concrete policy relevance; after all, they are documents which may contain stipulations drawing a state into a military conflict on another state's behalf or provide deterrence protection against a potential threat through similar promises made by other states. But they are also documents bearing significant theoretical relevance, being included in a number of dominant theoretical discussions, including those on deterrence, credible commitment, signaling, the security dilemma, and balance of power. In what many argue is an anarchic international system of competing sovereign states, security alliances are one of the most visible and potentially costly forms of cooperation between states. Accordingly, alliances have long held the interest of international relations scholars seeking to understand why states choose to commit to alliances, how states create trust in alliance commitments, and how alliance partnerships are maintained, upheld, or dissolved.

This thesis seeks to contribute to this literature by considering an underdeveloped "slice of the pie": alliance textual provisions. There exists much research seeking to explain why states form alliances in the first place (as opposed to internal military build-up). There also exists a great deal of research on the management, reliability, and dissolution of alliances once formed. Little research, however, considers the nature of alliance commitments themselves as manifested in the alliance treaty documents. Once states have decided to ally, what is the depth of commitment they are willing to make to one another? How much risk are they willing to

assume? And how might one observe this behavior by studying the treaty documents themselves?

I consider the intersection of three concepts in seeking to contribute to this line of scholarly query. First, I consider alliance treaty documents an important level of observation, which has heretofore been underutilized in the literature. This is perhaps because only recently have scholars had access to systematic empirical data on treaty documents (Leeds, et al. 2002). Alliance textual provisions may be considered concrete observations of costly commitment in alliance behavior, as well as ex ante observations of alliance behavior in the alliance management phase. Only through more research in this area can we begin to fully draw out the empirical nuances of alliance textual provisions.

Second, I consider the concept of alliance risk. If alliances are binding and potentially long-term agreements between states in an uncertain anarchic global system, they are inherently risky documents. For alliances are at heart promises; better yet, alliances are costly promises which states have every incentive to break when acting in their own self-interest. As Robert Kann characterizes them, alliances run the risk of being turned into "straightjackets" (1976, 616). Other scholars have considered alliance risk from many angles, often characterizing it as a cost-benefit equation. I focus only on the "cost" side of the equation, operationalizing Glenn Snyder's entrapment and abandonment risks within alliance documents (1984, 1990).

Finally, I consider the impact that regime type, or domestic political conditions and institutions, has on alliance behavior. Despite the long-established neo-realist literature focused only on international conditions for alliance behavior, scholars are increasingly acknowledging the role that domestic institutions play in conditioning alliance behavior (Fearon 1994; Putnam 1988). These scholars have argued that regime type affects partner choice in alliance

commitments as well as alliance reliability. I extend these arguments to alliance risk tolerance as may be observed within alliance textual provisions.

My research seeks to answer the following question: *what is the impact of regime type on states' risk tolerance in alliance treaty provisions*? *More specifically, do democratic states tolerate less risk in alliances than autocratic states*? It is hypothesized that democracy has a negative and statistically significant effect on risk tolerance in alliance textual provisions. I argue that domestic audience costs play a critical role in conditioning leaders' sensitivity to alliance entrapment and abandonment risk. The nature of democratic political institutions, the size of the winning coalition, and the production of public goods give democratic leaders more incentive to be sensitive to alliance risk than autocratic leaders. I suggest a new tool for understanding the relationship between entrapment and abandonment risks, and posit that because democratic leaders are less equipped to redistribute private goods in the event of a failed alliance policy than non-democracies, democratic states will be less likely to engage in alliances of higher risk.

The thesis will proceed as follows. The next chapter discusses the existing scholarly literature for the primary concepts relating to this research question, and the third chapter presents in detail my theoretical arguments regarding regime type and alliance risk tolerance, as well as relevant testable hypotheses. Chapter Four discusses the data and methodological design I use to test these hypotheses, and the fifth chapter presents the empirical results from these tests. The paper concludes with a final chapter summarizing the important findings and discussing future extensions and improvements on this area of research.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In an anarchic political system where issues of sovereignty and zero-sum competition for security, power, and prosperity seemingly force states to act in their individual self-interest, the continued observation of cooperation among states has inspired a wealth of scholarly research. This is no more evident than in the study of military or security alliances among states. Why states choose to ally, how they manage these alliances, and relative success or failure of alliances have long been crucial areas of research in the field of international relations.

The scholars writing on alliance behavior have discussed in detail many of the concepts and relationships crucial to my theory for this paper, including the impact of domestic politics on alliance behavior, credible commitment, audience costs and leadership accountability, and alliance risk. A relatively new area of research in this field is the study of alliance textual provisions, though some prior work has established their importance. My theory seeks to examine the relationship between regime type and alliance entrapment and abandonment risk (both concepts already discussed in the literature) using the observation of alliance textual provisions as the focus of study.

This chapter discusses in some detail the state of the scholarly literature regarding the concepts pertinent to my paper. While it hardly covers the full literature on alliance behavior, it lays the foundation for my own theoretical development. The chapter is sub-divided into conceptual sections, and finishes with a summary outlining the most pertinent conclusions.

Defining "Alliance"

I focus in this paper only on military alliances. While states frequently enter into formal agreements with each other on a wide range of issues, which are sometimes codified in treaty form, only a small number of these agreements may be called military or security alliances. There is a broad consensus in the alliance literature on the appropriate definition for security alliances (Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan 1973; Lai and Reiter 2000; Leeds and Anac 2005; McGowan and Rood 1975; Morrow 2000; Sorokin 1994). Security alliances must meet a certain number of necessary criteria. First, they must be agreements between two or more sovereign and independent states. Second, these agreements must be formally negotiated and codified. And third, they must seek the coordination of some military action, be it deployment or consultation, during the eventuality of a specified (or sometimes unspecified) conflict.

Formally written alliances are hardly necessary conditions for states to cooperate militarily in a conflict. The absence of a written alliance by no means prevents a state from coming to the aid of another. Why do states write alliances down? And why do written alliances consistently prove to be an important point of scholarly inquiry? States' motives in forming such alliances are necessarily the aggrandizement of security or power. Alliance formation also requires some element of shared interests or shared threats between members. Unlike economic or legal agreements between states seeking to create or bring about a desired interdependence of the members, security alliances often seek to deter a potential outcome. Indeed, in making public military alliances the goal is often to communicate to an adversarial state such a high level of commitment between members as to deter any hostile action (Leeds and Anac 185-186). In other words, if alliances are a form of signaling and commitment in international conflict, writing

them down ensures that the signal is strong, both to the members of the alliance, the targeted adversary, and the rest of the international system (Morrow 1999, 106; Morrow 2000, 65).

Less formal security cooperation between states is often called "alignment" in the literature, and it is important that alignments be distinguished from alliances (Kegley and Raymond 1990; Morrow 2000; Snyder 1997; Sorokin 1994). Whereas an alignment may be as simple as an unstated understanding that two states will cooperate with each other militarily, alliances formalize this cooperation in the form of a negotiated and written commitment which specifies the terms of the coordination. Alliances are treated as more meaningful than alignments, because by their formality and documentation they are inherently more difficult to violate than alignments (Sorokin 423). Gerald Sorokin summarizes this point well: "formal alliance agreements signal a commitment whose violation would likely hurt a state's reputation in the international community. Informal relationships, by contrast, permit states greater policy latitude." (423)

States write their security alliance commitments in order to ensure more credible commitment, both within the alliance membership and to actors outside the alliance. While one could argue that the focus of the scholarly literature on formal security alliances obscures the effects of alignments or other informal commitments between states, by focusing on the most costly form of alliance commitment, scholars may better elucidate the causal mechanisms at work in alliance behavior. I follow in these scholars' footsteps.

Alliance Formation Literature

The scholarly alliance literature is vast, but commonly categorized into three substantive branches, with each branch examining a different implication of alliances for international

relations. The first branch examines alliance formation, and provides theoretical and empirical explanations for why states form alliances, which types of states form alliances with other types of states, and the factors influencing alliance formation. The second branch examines alliance management, including explanations for the persistence, disintegration, and abrogation of alliances. Finally, the third branch examines alliances outcomes, such as alliance reliability and whether or not alliances lead to a greater proclivity for war or peace between states.

The first branch – alliance formation – is of primary interest for this paper. One subset of this branch considers why states choose to form alliances from theoretical (Liska 1962; Snyder 1990; Walt 1985; Walt 1987; Waltz 1979), game theoretic (Fearon 1998; Morrow 1999; Morrow 2000), and empirical perspectives (Altfeld 1984; Gibler and Rider 2004). Many of these scholars draw from the neo-realist systemic theories of international relations, arguing that states in the anarchic international system only form alliances to ensure their security by balancing against or bandwagoning with more powerful states (Walt 1985; Walt 1987; Waltz 1979). For these scholars alliance formation decisions are conditioned only by the structures of the international system, not by domestic conditions within individual states. Questions of credibility, commitment, and reputation pertain only to other states via international audience costs, not to domestic audiences.

Other scholars writing on alliance formation behavior argue that attention should be paid to domestic conditions and domestic audiences, particularly from the perspective of how those factors enhance or detract from an individual state's credibility in international negotiations. In brief, these scholars argue that state regime type – including political institutional features and the nature of domestic audiences – has a significant role to play in alliance formation. Again, the literature is vast, covering the influence of regime type on all aspects of alliance behavior, from

formation to reliability to duration. As my paper only considers formation, that will be my focus here.

The majority of scholars who study regime type and alliance formation consider the impact of regime type on alliance partner choice (Gibler and Wolford 2006; Lai and Reiter 2000; Leeds 1999; Leeds and Davis 1999; Simon and Gartzke 1996; Siverson and Emmons 1991). Do states preferentially ally with states of a similar regime type? While there remains a debate in the literature on regime type's effect on partner choice, those scholars who argue that states do preferentially choose alliance partners based on regime type commonly trace the causal mechanism for this preference to the signaling capabilities of domestic institutional arrangements. In other words, they argue that democracies are preferred alliance partners because the institutional restraints on executive decision-making, slow ratification processes, and public accountability of the executive through elections allow democracies to signal inherent credibility for their alliance commitments in ways that non-democracies cannot.

These arguments have important implications for my paper as they emphasize the influence of domestic political institutions and audiences on alliance formation behavior. Moreover, these scholars also note an ability to observe domestic mechanisms at work through observations of foreign policy behavior:

> We believe that domestic political structure systematically influences the
> inter-national decisions of state leaders, and we believe that this influence
> extends well beyond the decision to employ force….we suggest that
> institutional structures may influence inter-national behavior through any
> of several mechanisms, all of which would manifest themselves in a study

of the broader foreign policy behavior of states. (Leeds and Davis,

"Beneath the Surface," 10)

My theoretical arguments make the same assumption, inasmuch as they use observations of

foreign policy behavior in alliance textual provisions to infer theoretical considerations of

domestic audience costs.

Robert Putnam characterizes the interplay of domestic and international factors as a "two-

level game" in which leaders pursue domestic interests and maintain support coalitions via

domestic groups (including the electorate) while simultaneously negotiating foreign conflict and

cooperation (434). Leaders cannot ignore either game. Failure to successfully negotiate with

other states may result in a failed interaction, and failure to satisfy domestic interests may result

in the leader's removal from office (Putnam, 434). Putnam's two –level games manifest in a

number of ways regarding alliance behavior. Fearon notes that in international commitment

leaders simultaneously signal to multiple audiences – domestic and international – as well as the

target state (1997, 84). Likewise, the scholars studying regime type and alliance partner choice

emphasize that leaders experience accountability for their alliance policies on both domestic and

international levels (Fearon, 1997; Gibler 2008).

Commitment and Audience Costs in Alliance Formation

To understand the role of audience costs in alliance formation one must first emphasize

the inherent commitment problem in international cooperation. Actors in the global system often

suffer from a lack of trust toward other actors. Each sovereign and independent state will seek to

pursue its own security and interests when the chips are down, risking betrayal of prior

commitments with other states (Morrow 1999, 91). The pursuit of self-interest in the name of

state survival is a fundamental rule of international interactions according to traditional neorealist thought, and so is the threat of betrayal. Hoffman argues that "if there were no threat of betrayal, the 'problem of trust' would be no problem at all." (378)

As with all forms of international cooperation, alliance commitments suffer from a trust problem. This commitment problem in alliances can be observed historically. While empirical studies have found that most states honor their alliance commitments (74.5%), over a quarter (25.5%) defect on their commitments (Leeds 2003, 803-804). One can also find historical examples of states refusing to enter into alliance commitments out of distrust of their potential partners. For example, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union failed to complete alliance negotiations after Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia in 1938 out a mutual distrust that the other members would honor their commitments (Leeds 2003, 804).

Nonetheless, alliances are a primary form of cooperation in the international system. How do states overcome the commitment problem in alliances? And what implications does this have for understanding the integration of domestic and foreign politics? States overcome the commitment problem by signaling to alliance members (and outside actors) the solemnity of their commitment. In other words, when states make alliance commitments they seek to make them so costly as to make abrogation of the commitment clearly undesirable. This is one of the fundamental explanations for why writing alliance commitments down is a meaningful gesture in international politics; to codify and make public alliance commitments is to make them costly and place states' reputations at risk (Hoffman, 392). States are held accountable for the costly alliance commitments by alliance members, the international community, and even domestic audiences. So while military alliance commitments may clearly incur material costs if invoked during conflict, even at the point of formation they incur audience costs so as to mitigate member

unreliability. Thomas Schelling writes: "The whole purpose of verbal or ritualistic commitments, of political and diplomatic commitments, of efforts to attach honor and reputation to a commitment, is to make the commitment manifestly hard to get out of on short notice." (66)

Having thus far spoken only in terms of "states," it is important to emphasize that the generation of audience costs is a decision felt most acutely by the leader of a given state. For as the public head of the state, a leader must be accountable to both the domestic interests maintaining him/her in power and international interests at future negotiating tables; this is in accordance with Putnam's two-level game theory (434). Audience costs may therefore be conceived of in two forms – international audience costs and domestic audience costs. International audience costs refer to other states in the international system (or, from the perspective of an individual leader, other leaders with whom he/she might in the future interact). A failure to honor an international commitment labels a state as "unreliable" and makes them (and the leader) an undesirable partner for future cooperation (Gibler 2008; Morrow 2000; Simon and Gartzke 1996). Douglas M. Gibler argues that "leaders pay attention to the past actions of other states when considering their alliance partners; leaders seek other leaders who honor their commitments and avoid those leaders who do not." (446) He goes on to argue that alliance reputations extend beyond the scope of future alliance commitments, having implications for conflict as well; states which maintain alliances with disreputable partners are "more likely to be targeted by rival states." (Gibler, 450) Anne Sartori echoes this argument, finding that honest reputations serve as greater deterrents from challenges, and also slightly increase states' chances of successfully defending challenges (95-110).

Domestic audience costs refer to the domestic groups within a given state which are necessary for the leader of that state to maintain his position of power. I will discuss the

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theoretical mechanisms at work and the impact of regime type on domestic audience costs in more detail in the next chapter, so I only discuss them generally here. Domestic interests hold leaders accountable for successfully or unsuccessfully managing foreign policy decisions, including alliance commitments (Fearon 1994; Fearon 1997, 69; Morrow 2000, 72). The domestic interests responsible for audience costs range in size and type, depending on the state; in democracies it may be the voting electorate, while in dictatorships it may only be a small military clique (Morrow 2000, 72). Domestic audience costs may take the form of the leader's removal from power, or may simply restrict the power of the current leader (Morrow 2000, 72). Inasmuch as leaders seemingly suffer under the yoke of domestic audience costs when making alliance commitments, leaders must also seek to generate domestic audience costs. Leaders who generate more domestic audience costs may be said to more effectively convince potential alliance partners of their commitment to a given alliance. Jessica Weeks identifies three factors necessary for domestic audience costs to be generated:

> First, audience costs require that a domestic political audience has the means and incentives to coordinate to punish the leader. Second, domestic actors must view backing down after having made a threat as worse than conceding without having made a threat in the first place. Third, outsiders must be able to observe the possibility of domestic sanctions for backing down. Nondemocratic states vary greatly with respect to these three variables. (37)

Again, one can see Putnam's two-level game theory at work (434).

While one might question whether alliance commitments generate the same degree of concern in the domestic audience as military engagement or economic commitments, the

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literature strongly suggests that the connection between domestic audience costs and alliance commitments is significant enough to be worth continued study (Fearon 1997; Gibler 2008; Leeds 1999; Morrow 2000). I will build on the existing literature, focusing primarily on domestic audience costs as the source of different alliance behavior across states of dissimilar regime type.

Domestic Audience Costs and Regime Type

Given the anarchic nature of the international system, and the large number of actors within it, all states are subject to international audience costs in alliance commitments. Of the two types of audience costs, international audience costs may be said to affect leaders of democratic and non-democratic states with equal vigor. This is not the case with domestic audience costs, which democratic leaders may be said to experience more acutely than autocratic leaders. "The electorate's size and ability to regularly punish leaders at the polls makes the incentives for honest communication especially acute in democracies." (Gibler 2008, 429) This distinction has vitally important implications for my theory regarding how states of different regime types tolerate alliance risk in the text of their alliance commitments, and is one which I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter. I only generally survey the literature on domestic audience costs and regime type here.

Briefly, the foundational explanation for why democracies face audience costs more acutely than non-democracies comes from Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow's consideration of winning coalitions and government production of goods (1999, 2003). Drawing from Fearon's earlier work (1994), Bueno de Mesquita and his co-authors argue that because democracies have large winning coalitions and

governments produce public goods, leaders face high audience costs if they produce failed

policies (1999, 799). In contrast, the institutional political features of autocracies rely on a small

winning coalition and the government provision of private goods to sustain its survival in office;

as a result, autocratic leaders may compensate for failed policies by giving out more private

goods to the winning coalition (1999, 799). In other words, leaders of democracies face higher

and more reliable audience costs if they produce failed policies than leaders of autocracies.

While Bueno de Mesquita and his co-authors apply their model to the democratic peace literature

and military engagement, it has also been adapted into the alliance literature (Gibler 2008; Leeds

1999; Morrow 1999; Morrow 2000).

There is a debate in the literature on whether or not the institutional features of

democracies in fact lead to more acute audience costs than are experienced in non-democracies.

One side of this discussion follows in Bueno de Mesquita and his co-authors' footsteps, arguing

that leaders of democracies do face higher audience costs (Garriga 2009; Gaubatz 1996; Lai and

Reiter 2000; Leeds 1999; Leeds 2003; Morrow 2000). Leeds argues that regular elections force

democratic leaders to concern themselves with successful policies that maintain the support of

their constituents (2003, 813). She goes on to identify two institutional characteristics which act

to ensure this accountability – the domestic audience costs and domestic coalitions which are

required to maintain the leader in power (1999, 986). This concern for successful policy is then

applied to alliance commitments:

> For leaders of democracies, once a public commitment is made, a change
>
> in policy becomes undesirable. The competence of leaders may be judged
>
> in party by consistency in policy and willingness to uphold commitments.
>
> A democratic leader should fear censure for breaking a public agreement,

for not following through on a state course of action, for backing down

and risking the national honor. (Leeds 1999, 987)

Ana Carolina Garriga identifies two additional institutional characteristics which condition democratic leaders' sensitivity to audience costs; first, democratic states have institutional checks and balances, and second, democratic states have more effective channels for voicing opposition to policies through political parties, interest groups, and free media (706). In his argument that democracies face higher audience costs Kurt Taylor Gaubatz identifies three key features of the democratic political system – the stability of public preferences, the stability of democratic leadership, and the stability of foreign policy institutions (114).

The other side of this debate argues that democratic leaders are no less sensitive to domestic audience costs than non-democratic leaders (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004; Simon and Gartzke 1996; Weeks 2008). Weeks argues that to assume autocratic leaders face no audience costs is a flawed assumption; though the autocratic elites required to keep autocratic leaders in office differ significantly from a democratic electorate, these elites are capable of organizing and removing leaders from office if their policies are ineffective (36). I doubt that any of the scholars above would deny the existence of audience costs in the form of autocratic elites, but would argue that due to the stability of democratic political institutions and the relatively low cost of removing a leader from office via elections, audience costs are more consistent and responsive in democracies than autocracies.

The other scholars who criticize the argument for higher audience costs in democracies highlight the role of the leader in a democratic state as being very different from that of a leader in an autocratic state. Because democratic leaders routinely change, and indeed are required by some democratic institutions to limit their tenure in office, the leaders who make commitments

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are rarely the same leaders who are called to honor those commitments; issues of reputation and honor are therefore less acutely felt by the former leader than has been theorized (Gartzke and Gleditsch, 780). Further, Simon and Gartzke argue that in contrast to autocrats, who are direct and indirect beneficiaries of good reputations, democratic leaders have less incentive to be concerned with reputation as "national prestige is seen as less intimately entwined with the promises of specific leaders" and more entwined with the state itself. (622)

In response to the potential problem of leadership cycling as identified by Gartzke and Gleditsch, Gaubatz emphasizes that while democracies may experience more frequent changes in leadership, these changes are peaceful and regularized, which may actually produce more stable and thoughtful policies that expected by Gartzke and Gleditsch (117). Further, because the democratic political system is so stable, leaders are also subject to judicial and legal precedents of their predecessors (Gaubatz, 117). In response to the second potential problem of national reputation, I would suggest that although democratic leaders may have less of a personal attachment to the national reputation than autocratic leaders, that fact does not subsume their accountability for that reputation. In fact, given the increased presence of free media, political parties, and interest groups in more democratic countries as opposed to non-democratic systems, those leaders may in fact experience more accountability for their role in crafting the nation's reputation than theorized.

While the critics of Bueno de Mesquita and his co-authors' theory regarding regime type and audience costs raise valid points which might have some merit in future research, I remain more persuaded by the arguments from the first side of the debate. My theory (developed in the next chapter) will draw heavily on these theoretical explanations for domestic audience costs and regime type.

Conceptualizing the Alliance Risk Literature

If one accepts the argument that because leaders face accountability in the form of audience costs for their actions, then one must also acknowledge that considerations of success – or of risk – must be critical to the alliance formation process. The scholarly literature is firm in the argument that states assess the risk of alliance commitments prior to accession (Altfeld 1984; Bueno de Mesquita 1985; Conybeare 1992; Hoffman 2002; Morrow 1987; Snyder 1984; Snyder 1997). This argument is logical considering the finding that states only enter into alliances they expect to fulfill (Fearon 1998; Leeds 1999). If states did not consider alliance risk, one would expect to see many more failed alliances that scholars have actually observed. The assumption that states do make calculations regarding alliance risk is critical to my paper, as I examine how that risk may be manifested in alliance textual provisions.

Alliance risk is largely considered from an economic perspective in the literature – as a cost-benefit analysis (Bueno de Mesquita 1985; Conybeare 1992; Morrow 1987). Simply put, the argument is that states calculate the relative costs of the alliance against the relative benefits, seeking a favorable balance. Most of the theoretical work in this area has game theoretic or formal modeling foundations. This research in its early forms is found in Bueno de Mesquita's foundational discussion of risk aversion regarding conflict escalation (1985). It is extended to alliance commitments by Morrow (1987). John A. C. Conybeare takes the economic foundations of alliance risk one step further, arguing in favor of a "diversified portfolio" of alliances as the best management of risk and return in alliance investments (53). While this area of research identifies important control variables for my research, the inherent nature of the cost-benefit analysis must be qualitative, relying on detailed case-by-case assessment for accurate measurement. It is not my intention to discount this literature, but simply acknowledge it as

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beyond the scope of my inquiry. My research considers the "cost" side of the cost-benefit

equation, and I acknowledge the limitations of setting aside the "benefit" side.

From this perspective, the foundational theories of alliance risk identify two inversely-

related types of risk – abandonment and entrapment (Cha 2000; Mandelbaum 1981; Snyder

1984; Snyder 1999). According to Glenn Snyder, the risk of abandonment is the risk that one's

alliance partner will defect on its commitments (1984, 466). The risk of entrapment is the risk

that one will be drawn into a conflict by one's alliance partner over interests that one does not

share (Snyder 1984, 467). The risks of entrapment and abandonment vary inversely according to

Snyder, presenting what he calls "the alliance security dilemma." (1999, 181) Increasing

commitment to the alliance may mitigate the risk of abandonment, but will raise the risk of

entrapment; likewise, lessening alliance commitment or restricting commitment to limited

circumstances, but will raise the risk of partner abandonment (Snyder 1999, 182).

Snyder's abandonment and entrapment risks may be seen as extensions of Morrow's

identification of security and autonomy tradeoffs in alliance commitments (1987; 2000).

Morrow defines security as "the ability to preserve the status quo" and autonomy as "the

freedom to pursue changes in the status quo." (2000, 65) States that value security will pursue

alliances with higher entrapment risk, so as to ensure the strength of commitments from alliance

members. States that value autonomy will either not join alliances or pursue alliances with

higher abandonment risk, so as to ensure their ability to extract themselves from undesirable

commitments. Snyder writes: "as the cost of abandonment is a serious loss of security, the cost

of entrapment is an extreme form of lost autonomy." (1999, 181)

I focus my research on Snyder's risks of entrapment and abandonment as the

foundational risks inherent in all security alliance commitments. While entrapment and

abandonment are in part manifested over the course of the alliance (as part of alliance management), they must also be considerations at the time of alliance formation. The next chapter will explicate in greater detail the theoretical considerations of entrapment and abandonment as they relate to alliance textual provisions and regime type.

On the Importance of Alliance Textual Provisions

Despite the vastness of the scholarly alliance literature, only recently has empirical work considered the content and provisions of alliances between states as an important focal point of study. As Brett Ashley Leeds, Andrew G. Long, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell state regarding their finding that alliances are observed to be more frequently upheld than broken only when the specific provisions of the alliance text are considered, scholars should "focus more attention on the formation and design of agreements" (2000, 697). These designs, as observed in the alliance text, may provide important nuances for common causal stories used to explain alliance behavior; only more research into alliance provisions will uncover such nuances.

There exists a large scholarly literature on why states choose to form alliances or choose to avoid alliances, but once the decision to ally is made, the next observable step must be the nature of the commitments made by states to one another. These commitments can vary greatly, in terms of scope, degree of military commitment, conditions and exclusions, and the degree of peacetime institutionalization and cooperation (Leeds and Anac, 185-186). Not only do leaders carefully determine each of these factors, "but they are careful in crafting the language of the treaties as well. Most treaties contain specific language regarding the conditions under which the alliance comes into effect and the actions that the members are required to take under these conditions." (Leeds 2003, 808) Alliance textual provisions become the most concrete point of

observation for scholars wishing to better understand the nature of this step in the alliance process.

Alliance provisions are an important dimension to alliance formation behavior because they serve as an *ex ante* point of observation. Even the very broad branch of alliance research focused on the impact of regime type for alliance behavior and credible commitments overlooks alliance provisions as an important point of observation. Instead, the regime type literature often assumes that partner choice alone is indicative of the level of trust between states (Lai and Reiter 2000; Simon and Gartzke 1996; Siverson and Emmons 1991). The consideration of alliance provisions allows for a more substantive observation of trust insofar as it allows researchers to observe the concrete nature of the commitments states make to each other. For example, Hoffman argues that one can observe the degree to which states trust one another by looking at whether their commitments include "before the fact" or "after the fact" oversight, or whether international agreements are "framework oriented" versus "statute oriented." (391-393) These are characteristics which are concretely observable in alliance textual provisions. Given the earlier discussion on the significance of committing alliances to writing, observing these characteristics in the formal text to which states affix their names and ratifications would appear to be a very important point of observation.

Summary

The review of the scholarly alliance literature presented in this chapter captures but one branch of research into alliance behavior, and is appropriately limited to the scope of my thesis. Out of this review I draw a number of important conclusions which will serve as the foundation for my own theoretical development and proposition of hypotheses. First, alliances based on

written agreements are one of the most costly forms of commitment states can make to each other, and should be distinguished analytically from unwritten alignments. Therefore inquiries regarding the textual provisions of alliance treaties are an important new area of research. Second, domestic political institutions, audiences, and motivations condition state behavior in alliance commitments, pursuant to Putnam's two-level game theory. Third, leaders are accountable to both international and domestic audience costs when making alliance commitments. A large portion of the scholarly literature further suggests that the institutional and societal arrangements of democracies predispose democratic leaders to more acute sensitivity to domestic audience costs. Fourth, states calculate risk prior to entering into alliance commitments, and purposefully pursue what they believe will be successful alliances.

My research contributes to this literature by focusing on the interaction of state regime type and alliance entrapment and abandonment risk at the time of alliance formation. I do this by focusing on the written commitments states make to one another through alliance treaty textual provisions. The next chapter outlines in detail my theoretical arguments.

CHAPTER 3

THEORY

In brief, I argue that domestic audience costs play a critical role in conditioning leaders'

sensitivity to alliance entrapment and abandonment risk. The nature of democratic political

institutions, the size of the winning coalition, and the imperative to produce public goods give

democratic leaders more incentive to be sensitive to alliance risk than autocratic leaders. My

theoretical focus is on entrapment and abandonment risks, and specifically how they are

manifested in the formal commitments of alliance treaty documents. I suggest that

disaggregating entrapment and abandonment risks serves as an interesting analytical tool, and

posit that because democracies are less able to redistribute private goods in the event of a failed

alliance policy than non-democracies, democratic states will be less likely to engage in alliances

of higher risk. This chapter traces my theoretical arguments regarding these concepts in detail,

and also presents testable hypotheses drawn from my theory.

Domestic Audience Costs and Alliance Commitments

My arguments draw heavily from Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow's

The Logic of Political Survival (2003). Like these authors I assume that leaders have a personal

motivation for maintaining their position of power. Leaders are required to collect revenue and

then redistribute spending allotments as necessary for the needs of the state, while also using

these allotments to maintain their office. Bueno de Mesquita and his co-authors identify this

redistribution of revenue as either public or private goods (2003, 91). Public goods are defined

as being "indivisible and nonexcludable" while private goods "go only to members of the winning coalition." (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003, 58)

Whether leaders rely on public or private goods is conditioned by the size of the group in the state whose support is necessary to maintain the leadership office – what Bueno de Mesquita, et al. call the "winning coalition." (2003, 51) The winning coalition is the percentage of the selectorate (the population eligible to choose leadership) necessary to obtain and maintain the leadership position (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003, 51). In democratic systems the winning coalition is often a majority of the voting age public, while in autocratic systems the winning coalition may only consist of party leadership, or military elites (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003, 51-55). Because the winning coalition in democracies is so large, democratic leaders must necessarily distribute more public goods than private goods; in autocracies, the smaller size of the winning coalitions makes the distribution of private goods more effective (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003, 91-92).

The differences in winning coalitions and the differences in distribution of goods between democratic and autocratic systems have an impact on the sensitivity of leaders in both systems to audience costs. Leaders of both systems are subject to audience costs, meaning that they may be subject to removal from office or a reduction in power should they enforce unsuccessful or unpopular policies (Morrow 2000, 72). Autocratic leaders, given the small size of the winning coalition relative to the selectorate, may more easily distribute private goods to the winning coalition to maintain their position in power (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003, 91). Democratic leaders, in contrast, cannot distribute private goods as easily given the large size of the winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003, 92). They must therefore be more sensitive to

producing successful policies in the first place; in other words, they must be more sensitive to audience costs should their policies fail.

There are other features of democratic system which increase leaders' sensitivity to audience costs, relative to autocratic leaders. First, the frequent elections commonly found in democratic systems increase leaders' audience cost sensitivity by holding them accountable for policy outcomes with greater frequency and at a relatively low cost to the dissatisfied selectorate (Leeds 2003, 813). In autocratic systems, opportunities to hold leaders accountable may occur with less frequency, or not at all. Further, in autocratic systems leadership accountability may require a significant cost to the dissatisfied selectorate (for example, the use of a coup d'etat). Second, the policymaking process in democracies often requires leaders to coordinate action among multiple actors (such as legislatures), increasing the visibility of failed policies. Autocratic policymaking processes may allow for unilateral decision-making, or decision-making which relies on only a small group of advisors. Thirdly, the existence of a free media and free opposition groups in democracies enhances leadership accountability by making the expression of dissatisfaction of the selectorate relatively accessible and cheap (Garriga, 706). In contrast, the media in autocracies may be controlled by the leadership, and opposition groups forcibly prevented from speaking out.

Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow apply their theoretical arguments regarding domestic audience costs and regime type to leaders' decisions about policies of war (1999). These arguments have implications for policies of cooperation and alliance formation as well, as has been noted in the literature. Morrow notes that domestic audiences impose real costs on leaders for failures to live up to international commitments, such as alliances (2000, 72). Brett Ashley Leeds cites domestic audience costs along with executive restraint to explain why

democratic alliance commitments are seen to be inherently more credible than non-democratic alliance commitments (1999, 988).

Alliance policies provide the public good of defense in two ways; first through the security assurances of an alliance partner creating a deterrence value for adversaries of the alliance, and second through military support against an adversary of the alliance membership, should a conflict be realized. Like war-making policies, failed alliance policies can be very costly, in terms of financial and material costs, as well as the cost of human lives. Should the alliance fail through a partner's defection the lost aid will increase these costs. And should the alliance fail by entrapping a state in an undesired conflict these costs will not only be high, but perhaps perceived as unnecessary by the population. The costs of alliances extend beyond material costs, however, as failed alliances also often involve some loss in reputation, particularly if the alliance is considered to have failed because a state backs out of the alliance. As was discussed in the previous chapter, reputation costs of failing to uphold alliance commitments are observed at the international and domestic levels (Fearon 1994; Fearon 1997; Gibler 2008; Morrow 2000; Simon and Gartzke 1996). These costs require domestic audiences to be sensitive to the success or failure of alliance policies, and hold leaders accountable for failures.

Therefore if a leader is aware that domestic audiences are sensitive to alliance policy success or failure, it is in the leader's interest to pursue successful alliance policies; in other words, it is in the leader's interest to consider alliance risk when undertaking alliance commitments. Risk becomes especially salient when one considers that formal written alliances are sometimes not observed between countries with deeply similar interests (such as the United States and Great Britain). The argument made in the literature suggests that alliance dyads with

perfect interest alignment will often assume cooperation in the absence of a formal agreement (Garriga, 702; Gibler, 326; Gibler and Rider, 314). In contrast, partners with perfectly dissimilar interests will have no need for cooperation. Following this line of logic, only dyads with some uncertainty as to commitment in the partnership will seek to formalize alliances, suggesting an inherent distrust, or element of risk which must be considered.

Alliance Risk

In conceptualizing the concept of alliance risk I draw primarily on Snyder's identification of entrapment and abandonment risks (1984, 1999). Again, the risk of abandonment is the risk that one's alliance partner will defect on its commitments, while the risk of entrapment is the risk that one will be drawn into a conflict by one's alliance partner over interests that one does not share (Snyder 1984, 466-467). Each type of risk carries an element of cost to the state (and therefore the leader) should the alliance fail. A state experiences entrapment failure if it must choose between backing an ally in an undesired conflict or abandoning the commitment and suffering reputation costs as a result. Conversely, a state experiences abandonment failure if its alliance partner abandons its commitment when the alliance has been invoked. These two types of risk are inherent in all alliance agreements, albeit by varying degrees. By focusing on entrapment and abandonment risks I purposefully highlight the inherent dilemma of international cooperation – the fear that a partner will renege on the agreement counterbalanced by the need to manage the depth of one's own commitment. Alliance policy success is achieved by balancing these two inherent risks. More fundamentally, alliance policy success is achieved by ensuring that one's ally will provide aid when needed, but will not draw a state into a conflict it has no

individual interest in. This is why Snyder characterizes these two types of risk as varying

inversely (1999, 181).

Snyder notes that abandonment and entrapment concerns are sometimes manifested

during the alliance management period of alliance behavior, as states seek to weaken or deepen

alliance commitments in response to key events (1999, 183-186). Snyder also notes that one can

observe risk in terms of partner choice; this argument suggests that factors such as shared

interests and power parity heighten or weaken the overall strength of the alliance security

dilemma (1999, 186-188). I focus my research on the third component which Snyder suggests is

critical to observing alliance risk – formal alliance commitments as manifested in the treaties

themselves (1999, 188). For the nature of the explicit commitments is the most public and

documented factor conditioning the *casus foederis* (the "case of the alliance"). Diplomats give

great thought to alliance negotiations and the exact language of alliance commitments for this

very reason. Regardless of how similar the shared interests are, or how ideal the power parity,

states are necessarily careful to ensure that the formal commitments of the alliance do not exceed

acceptable limits.

Snyder characterizes entrapment and abandonment risk as being inversely related along a

single spectrum (Figure 3.1), and there is a great deal of theoretical and logical support for this

conceptualization of the two risks.

Abandonment
Risk

Entrapment Risk

Figure 3.1: Snyder's Conceptualization of Entrapment and Abandonment Risk
(Adapted from Snyder 1984, 647)

While Snyder's conceptualization certainly presents with a certain theoretical parsimony, disaggregating the two risks provides an interesting analytical tool. According to Snyder's argument, any factors affecting entrapment or abandonment risk would affect both risks equally and in perfect diametric opposition. But not all factors theoretically affect risk in the same way. Some factors (such as degree of military commitment and alliance size) increase both entrapment and abandonment risk. Other factors (such as alliance institutionalization) increase one while decreasing the other. While the same factors have implications for both types of risk, some factors affect risk differently. Further, none of the risks can be said to cancel each other out.

If one allows entrapment and abandonment to be considered as separate concepts, one will likely observe more detailed nuances in the development of alliance commitments than if one assumes that movement toward one is movement away from the other. This proposal requires a member-level analysis of alliance commitments, rather than an alliance-level analysis; Snyder himself acknowledges that entrapment and abandonment risks may differ from member-to-member in an alliance (1999).

The advantages of examining the concepts separately are three-fold. First, it allows for a more nuanced examination of both abandonment and entrapment risks, including the factors which increase or decrease these distinct concepts. This is especially useful when considering the intricacies of alliance textual commitments. Second, it allows for the possibility that some alliance provisions with both low entrapment and low abandonment risks (or vice versa) do not fit with Snyder's theory. Third, it allows one to examine in greater detail asymmetrical alliance commitments, and the ability of states to condition alliance negotiations in such a way as to give them a strategic advantage, perhaps in terms of low entrapment and low abandonment risk. For example, if one observes democracies to be associated with low entrapment and low

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abandonment risk alliances, one can begin to question the negotiation tactics that allowed for this "inequality." Perhaps democracies simply negotiate from a position of strength and are able to achieve an advantage in their alliance commitments (Fearon 1994)? Or perhaps non-democracies are more threatened, and therefore willing to sign imbalanced alliances? Only by disaggregating these two concepts can scholars begin to examine these possibilities.

In suggesting this analytical tool I must also reiterate that a complete picture of alliance risk should include factors outside of alliance textual commitments. Situational considerations are critical to such an analysis. For example, was the alliance signed under duress during wartime? Or is there an imbalance in the likelihood of alliance members being threatened, thus creating an imbalance in alliance risk despite similar commitments? As of yet, no empirical data exists capturing these nuances.

Within the textual provisions of alliance documents, what factors may be said to shape the abandonment and entrapment risks of the commitment? I identify six such factors, each of which may be said to have an effect on both entrapment and abandonment risk (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: Factors Affecting Entrapment and Abandonment Risk in Alliance Treaty Text

Risk Factor (drawn from alliance text)	Entrapment Risk	Abandonment Risk
Degree of Military Commitment	Increase	Increase
Degree of Alliance Institutionalization	Increase	Decrease
Specification of Alliance Conditions	Decrease	Decrease
Alliance Size	Increase	Increase
Alliance Ratification Requirements	Increase	Decrease
Increased Alliance Duration	Increase	Increase

First, the degree of military commitment required by the alliance increases the risk of both entrapment and abandonment. Alliances of higher military commitment (such as offensive

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or defensive pacts) raise the costs of the alliance should it be invoked, making entrapment and abandonment more attractive for one's partner. The differences in material cost between a defense pact and consultation pact are stark. A consultation pact, if failed either through abandonment or entrapment, would theoretically only result in reputation or other non-tangible costs; at most the cost might be manifested latently, in future economic or military interactions between relevant countries. A defense pact if failed, however, could likely result in quite tangible costs in terms of funding, equipment, or even casualties. In this way, higher degrees of military commitment may be seen as compounding the inherent abandonment and entrapment risks in alliance commitments.

Second, the degree of alliance institutionalization may be said to increase entrapment risks while lowering abandonment risk. Greater institutionalization leads to greater specificity in the requirements and conditions of alliance membership, but also leads to increased and more effective public monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, thus making it more difficult for states to abandon an alliance commitment (Leeds and Anac 2005; Rafferty 2003).

Third, the conditions placed on an alliance may be said to affect risk. Alliances often include many necessary conditions for the alliance to be invoked, including limitations to a specific adversary or number of adversaries, location, conflict, certain demands, or a requirement for provocation. These conditions lower the risks of both entrapment and abandonment by specifying in greater detail the scope, or *casus foederis*, of the alliance. By doing so, states may more effectively limit any unexpected or unforeseen risk to the alliance commitments. In a highly specified alliance, states will have very clearly agreed to the scope of the commitment, while in an unspecified alliance, states run the risk of unforeseen challenges to alliance success.

Fourth, the size of the alliance may be said to also increase both entrapment and abandonment risks. More alliance members increases the risk that one will become involved in a conflict that entraps the other members, while also increasing the risk of free-riding and abandonment should the alliance be invoked. Fifth, the nature of alliance formalization has an impact on risk by increasing entrapment risk and decreasing abandonment risk. Similar to the theoretical arguments with regard to alliance institutionalization, if an alliance is both public and formally ratified it inherently raises the costs of reneging on one's commitment, making entrapment more likely; these same costs would apply to one's alliance partner, reducing the risks of abandonment. And finally sixth, the stated duration of the alliance also has implications for alliance risk, with alliances of longer duration, or unspecified duration, increasing the risks of both entrapment and abandonment. While a long-duration alliance may over time lead to alignment of interests among the members (and thus decrease alliance risk), this assumption deals with alliance management, not the point of alliance formation. At the beginning of the alliance relationship long or unspecified duration alliances have the inverse effect as alliance conditions; in this case, less specificity increases alliance risk.

Regime Type and Alliance Risk Tolerance

Having thus discussed the theoretical considerations of domestic audience costs and alliance risk in detail, I turn now to the intersection of the two. My theory argues that the domestic political institutions, sensitivity to audience costs, and the reliance on the distribution of public goods generate more concern for alliance risk in democracies than non-democracies. More simply, I argue that democracies will have a lower risk tolerance in alliance commitments than non-democracies. Such an argument has been briefly suggested by Leeds: "If democratic

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leaders find reneging on agreements particularly costly and risky commitments particularly undesirable, nondemocratic states may accept riskier commitments and in turn may violate alliances more frequently." (2003, 813) However it has yet to be systematically connected to domestic audience costs or empirically tested. The greater sensitivity to alliance risk in democracies is a result of the domestic political conditions discussed above, particularly democratic leaders' heightened sensitivity to audience costs and the disproportionate reliance on public goods over private goods. These mechanisms condition democratic leaders' concern for both entrapment and abandonment risk.

In an alliance policy failure due to abandonment by one's partner, both democracies and autocracies face the cost of lost partner aid. This cost may be observed in multiple manifestations, including the weakening of diplomatic negotiating strength, increased military, economic, or manpower costs to cover the lost aid, or even the loss of the conflict itself; if the public good to be provided by the alliance commitment was greater security through an ally's aid, then the policy failure will be manifested as the detriment or loss of that security while also potentially increasing the revenues required to continue the conflict. Autocracies, or states with a small winning coalition, may more easily atone for this failure through the distribution of private goods to the winning coalition. These private goods might look like any number of payouts, including military contracts as a result of the increased military production, appointments to higher government offices, or promises of protection in diplomatic negotiations. While democratic leaders may distribute some private goods as a result of the alliance policy failure, they will be unable to effectively and cost-efficiently distribute enough private goods to appease the larger winning coalition; in many democracies to do so would require distributing private goods to a majority of the voting age population. As a result, democratic leaders are

more likely to be held responsible for the abandonment policy failure through audience costs than autocratic leaders. Aware of this possibility, democratic leaders will tolerate less abandonment risk than non-democratic leaders.

A similar argument may be made in cases of alliance policy failure due to entrapment by one's ally. In an entrapment failure the public good cost will be manifested as an "unnecessary" redirection of revenue away from other public goods. "Revenue" here would include military resources and manpower as well as economic resources. Because leaders may only distribute public and private goods from finite revenue resources, the distribution of revenue toward the conflict in which one is entrapped necessarily reduces the potential revenue for other purposes. The cost of the conflict may be perceived as unnecessary or too high, especially considering that the cost may be considered a "public cost," borne by the full population. Again, autocratic leaders may more easily atone for this cost by distributing private goods to the winning coalition. Many of the same private goods would be applicable in cases of entrapment as are applicable in cases of abandonment (for example, military contracts). Democratic leaders may distribute some private goods, but will be unable to satisfy the entire winning coalition through private goods. Because they fear accountability for this policy failure through domestic audience costs from the dissatisfied winning coalition, democratic leaders will tolerate less entrapment risk in alliance commitments than autocratic leaders. These arguments are consistent with the literature regarding democratic behavior toward war policy, which argues that because of audience cost sensitivity and the production of public goods democracies are less likely to tolerate high risk in war-making policies (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 1999, 2003; Reiter and Stam 2002)

A further concern for democratic leaders regarding entrapment risk is the limitation on reneging on the alliance commitment. States may always withdraw from an international

commitment to aid their partner, should a conflict be realized. But even this possibility generates

more concern for democratic leaders than non-democratic leaders, as democratic leaders may be

held accountable for "breaking trust" or failing the "democratic spirit of unity." Concern for

reputation and credibility among other democracies in particular further enhances democracies'

concern for entrapment risk.

As the previous discussion suggests, I expect democracy to have a negative association

with both entrapment and abandonment risk tolerance, as manifested in the alliance textual

agreements. This expectation disaggregates the two types of risk, as was discussed above.

Returning to my conceptualization of abandonment and entrapment risk, I would therefore

expect to observe democracies committing to more alliances of low entrapment/low

abandonment risk, proportional to the other combinations of risk (Figure 3.2).

SOME
Low Abandonment/ High Entrapment

FEW
High Abandonment/ High Entrapment

MANY
Low Abandonment/ Low Entrapment

SOME
High Abandonment/ Low Entrapment

Figure 3.2: Expected Democratic Behavior in Alliance Commitments

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To suggest the possibility of observing alliances which do not fall within Snyder's theory of an inverse relationship is to inherently suggest that states may be able to negotiate for unbalanced alliance obligations. We can assume that all states, regardless of regime type, will have an interest in pursuing the most advantageous alliance commitment possible. According to Snyder's theory, this would manifest as a state pursuing less of whichever type of risk (entrapment or abandonment, inversely related) it preferred. By disaggregating abandonment and entrapment risks, I suggest that it may be possible to observe a state which pursues low levels of both types of risk in its alliance negotiations. Exploring this imbalance further would be an interesting extension of this research, and one would likely return to the concept of audience costs in explaining how states accomplish these negotiations. Putnam's two-level game theory would, in particular, be applicable, suggesting that stronger audience costs allow democracies to be stronger negotiators in international commitments than non-democracies, thus generating the possibility of imbalanced alliance risk (434).

Partner Regime Type and Alliance Risk Tolerance

As many scholars in the alliance literature have noted, states may engage in different alliance behavior based upon the level of similarity between their own regime type and the regime type of their partner (Lai and Reiter 2000; Leeds 1999; Simon and Gartzke 1996; Siverson and Emmons 1991). While these scholars focus primarily on whether or not democracies ally more often with democracies than autocracies, the argument that regime type in an alliance partner is an explanatory factor may have some value for my theory as well. If states of similar regime type choose to ally more frequently than states of dissimilar regime types because there is a greater supposed level of trust between states of similar regime type, one

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would also expect to see states of similar regime types engage in more risky alliances than states of dissimilar regime type.

This is not to suggest that alliance members ignore risk altogether simply because all members are democracies or autocracies. Instead, I suggest that members of similar regime type will be *more* tolerant of risk than mixed or dissimilar alliance members. Leaders are still accountable to audience costs for failed alliance policies, but may use partner regime type similarity as a cue for decreasing the possibility of policy failure. This argument is made regarding the democratic peace by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (1999, 2003). They argue that democracies are less likely to fight one another because they use their partner's regime type as a cue for their wartime behavior (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 226). Because democracies tend to fight harder once engaged in a fight and also have been observed to win wars more frequently than non-democracies (in part because they fight harder and also because they carefully select into conflicts they expect to win), they are undesirable adversaries (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 226). Democracy "A" (having these traits itself) will recognize the increased likelihood that Democracy "B" will behave similarly, and seek to avoid a conflict (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 226).

A similar argument may be made regarding state behavior toward alliance policy. If democracies tend to be more reliable alliance partners and are incentivized to uphold their reputations for credible commitment (Leeds 2003; Leeds, Long, and Mitchell 2000), they will recognize this tendency in other democracies and tolerate more risk in their alliance commitments than they might otherwise. I extend this argument to non-democracies as well, suggesting that autocracies will recognize similar behavioral traits in other autocracies. According to this argument, similarity in partner regime type does not eliminate concern for

alliance risk, but serves as a mitigating factor in leaders' calculations regarding the likelihood of alliance policy success.

I would therefore expect to see state committing to alliances of higher entrapment and abandonment risk when partnering with other states of a similar regime type than when partnering with other states of a dissimilar regime type. Again, I would not expect to see a disproportionate number of observations with both high abandonment and high entrapment because I do acknowledge that states will still be concerned with risk even among allies of a similar regime type. Rather, I argue that regime type similarity increases the likelihood of higher risk tolerance, relative to alliances among dissimilar regime types.

Illustrative Case Study: French Risk Tolerance in the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894

The theoretical arguments I have presented in this chapter can perhaps best be illustrated with a brief historical case study. The Franco-Russian Alliance was initially formed as an entente between France's Third Republic and Imperial Russia in 1891, and was formalized as a treaty in 1894. Not only did the alliance bring France out of diplomatic isolation, it was also one of the primary foundations for the Triple Entente between France, Great Britain, and Russia prior to World War I. It is a useful illustrative case study as it eliminates the influence of the Cold War bipolar system, as well as any overt power disparity which might perhaps be observed in a major power-minor power alliance.

At the time of negotiations for the Franco-Russian Alliance France was approximately twenty years into its Third Republic. A constitutional democracy, scholars have coded France's

polity as being "democratic" in institution and practice.[1]   Under the Third Republic the French

legislature was a bicameral parliament. The lower house, called the Chamber of Deputies, was

directly elected by universal suffrage. The upper house, called the Senate, was indirectly elected

by local government officials and had less authority than the Chamber of Deputies. The French

President was popularly elected by the Parliament. Returning to Bueno de Mesquita, Smith,

Siverson, and Morrow, one may identify the winning coalition of France's President under the

Third Republic as being a majority of the members of Parliament, who (being popularly elected

themselves) also consist of an indirect majority of the population. While not as large a winning

coalition as one observes in democratic France today, France's 1894 winning coalition was still

larger than many of the winning coalitions on continental Europe at the time (excepting perhaps

Great Britain).[2]

The French President and Cabinet in 1894 were therefore subject to direct and indirect

audience costs should their alliance policies fail. The cost of alliance failure would fall on the

French public, and the ability to distribute enough private goods to cover such a failure would be

limited by the size of the winning coalition. This would be especially true of an alliance failure

resulting in war with another major continental power, in which the costs would be quite high as

to even potentially affect the direct election of the Chamber of Deputies. Given these domestic

institutional characteristics, according to my proposed theory French leadership would have

more incentive to produce successful alliance policies, and should display significant concern for

abandonment and entrapment risks during the Franco-Russian Alliance negotiations of 1890-

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[1] Polity IV data codes France during the first thirty years of the Third Republic as a "7" on the polity scale. Running from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (constitutional democracy), the Polity IV scale considers anything above a "6" to be a legitimate democracy. (Marshall and Jaggers 2009)
[2] In 1894 Austria had a Polity IV score of "-4", Prussia (Germany) had a score of "1", and Russia a score of "-10". Great Britain had a score of 7. (Marshall and Jaggers 2009)

1894. More importantly, one would expect this concern to be manifested in the provisions agreed to in the treaty document itself.

At the time of negotiations, France was clearly the petitioner, despite the "strong ideological repugnance between the French republic and the Russian autocracy." (Snyder 1997, 109) Symbolically a Franco-Russian alliance would solidify France's reemergence on the diplomatic scene and provide security assurances to balance against the alliances between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy; French leadership was well aware of the public's affinity for such an alliance (Kennan, 4). French leadership was also aware that their public was "peaceably inclined" and was not overeager to engage in a war, even to reclaim Alsace-Lorraine (Kennan, 119). For these reasons, negotiators were determined to produce a successful alliance – in particular to guard against potential Russian abandonment or reluctant mobilization in the event of a German attack, as well as to limit France's commitment beyond the scope of her interests (Snyder 1997, 109). While French negotiators sought to limit the scope of the treaty to Germany, they wanted firm commitments, and were frustrated by Russian reluctance to provide explicit assurances in the scope they desired.

In an early proposal of what would later become the 1891 Franco-Russian entente, France made two proposals. First, that the allies would "concert their efforts in any situation that threatened the peace of Europe" and second, that the allies would "mobilize immediately and simultaneously should any member of the Triple Alliance mobilize." (Snyder 1997, 115) Russian negotiators were displeased. They wanted to extend the scope of the alliance beyond Europe, but also did not want to make prior commitments on military measures, as they felt those commitments would undermine the Czar's decision-making should the event arise (Snyder 1997, 115-116). France saw this Russian reluctance to commit as justifying their concern for potential

Russian abandonment, and continued to insist on explicit commitments regarding the Triple Alliance (Snyder 1997, 116).

In the second round of negotiations seeking to expand the 1891 entente to a military convention, French negotiators continued to push for greater specification, even down to troop commitments; Russian negotiators lamented, saying that they preferred a "gentlemen's agreement." (Snyder 1997, 117-119) But French negotiators were relentless in their insistence on the necessary requirements of the alliance. Final negotiations achieved some deferral from both sides. France received a firm commitment for 700,000-800,000 Russian troops should Germany attack, as well as promises of military coordination in war and communication in peacetime (Kennan, 181). Further, the scope of the alliance was limited to the Triple Alliance, and did not extend beyond Europe as Russia had hoped (Kennan, 181). Russia was able to obtain security assurances in the event of Austro-Hungarian hostilities, and ensured secrecy of the commitment, delaying ratification for up to two years (Kennan, 181). Ratification was confirmed by both parties on January 4, 1894 (Snyder 1997, 122).

Examinations of the final treaty document (Appendix A) illustrate further the French tolerance for entrapment and abandonment risk in the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894 (summarized in Table 3.2).

Table 3.2: Entrapment and Abandonment Risk in the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894

Risk Factor (drawn from alliance text)	Franco-Russian Alliance 1894	Entrapment Risk	Abandonment Risk
Degree of Military Commitment	Defense Pact	Increased	Increased
Degree of Alliance Institutionalization	- Wartime military concert - Peacetime military communication - Troop commitment specifications	Increased	Decreased
Specification of Alliance Conditions	- Limited to Triple Alliance - Requires provocation	Decreased	Decreased
Alliance Size	Bilateral	Decreased	Decreased
Alliance Ratification Requirements	Secret	Decreased	Increased
Stated Alliance Duration	Limited to duration of Triple Alliance	Decreased	Decreased

While France accepted increased entrapment risk in the form of defense pact requirements and increased alliance institutionalization, this risk was minimized by the conditions placed on the alliance, the limited scope (size and duration), and the secret ratification requirements. The entrapment risks France assumed (still being relatively low), were only acceptable in the interest of further decreasing abandonment risk. The specified defense pact and increased institutionalization, while raising France's entrapment risk, significantly lowered potential abandonment risks.

This brief case study should not be considered an exhaustive discussion of French alliance behavior in the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894. It does, however, illustrate the real world applicability of my proposed theory through a concrete historical example. Despite being the petitioner in the negotiation process, France was able to insist on, and achieve many of the

characteristics of lower alliance risk identified by my theory. That said, the Franco-Russian

Alliance of 1894 ultimately was partially responsible for France's involvement in World War I.

Hypotheses

Despite the logical and intuitive arguments of my theory, it is not feasible at this juncture

to empirically test the full scope of its propositions. As the 1894 Franco-Russian Alliance case

illustrates, to truly measure alliance risk behavior would require detailed process-tracing and

other qualitative methods. To simply amalgamate the six indicators of alliance risk drawn from

alliance documents and declare a single measure of entrapment risk or abandonment risk would

be to devalue the complexities of alliance treaty negotiations. And to conduct only a few case

studies would fail to fully account for democratic and autocratic state behavior across the

international system. Ideally, detailed case histories would inform a broad empirical dataset,

accounting for alliance treaty commitments, alliance negotiations, and situational factors in each

case. Such a dataset, as of yet, does not exist. There does exist a dataset accounting for alliance

treaty commitments – the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions dataset, managed by Brett

Ashley Leeds at Rice University (Leeds, et al. 2002). This dataset will allow me to empirically

test implications and indicators of my theory, if not its claims in full. These testable observations

may provide support for the conceptual arguments discussed above, and still produce results

relevant to the overall query of my paper.

I begin by testing each of the six indicators of alliance risk identified above individually.

I follow the analytical tool discussed above and disaggregate entrapment and abandonment risks

in my analysis. Three of these indicators are argued to increase both entrapment and

abandonment risk in alliance commitments – the degree of military commitment and alliance

size. Drawing on my theory I expect that democracy with be negatively associated with both military commitment and alliance size.

>*H1: The more democratic a state, the lower that state's tolerance for high degrees of military commitment in its textual alliance commitments.*
>
>*H2: The more democratic a state, the lower that state's tolerance for large alliance size in its textual alliance commitments.*
>
>*H3: The more democratic a state, the lower that state's tolerance for longer alliance duration as stated in its textual alliance commitments.*

One of the indicators above is argued to decrease both entrapment and abandonment risk in alliance commitments – the specification of alliance conditions. Therefore, drawing on my theory I expect that democracy will be positively associated with alliance conditions.

>*H4: The more democratic a state, the higher that state's desire for specification of conditionalities in its textual alliance commitments.*

The final two indicators – degree of alliance institutionalization and ratification requirements – have an inverse effect on alliance risk, increasing entrapment risk but lowering abandonment risk. My theory argues that democracies will consistently seek both lower entrapment and abandonment risks in their alliance commitments, and considering these indicators individually forces one to consider which type of risk democracies will favor when forced to choose between raising one or the other. My theory argues that because democratic

leaders are so sensitive to failed policies, they will pursue the course of action which, if failed, produces the least cost. In an ideal situation this would mean pursuing both low entrapment and abandonment risks in alliance commitments. When forced to choose, however, democratic leaders will accept higher abandonment risks than entrapment risks. While a failed alliance policy due to partner abandonment could potentially be very costly materially, the fact that the state is already committed to the conflict and may be presumed to have some "national investment" might mitigate the audience costs for this failure, if only somewhat. A failed alliance policy due to entrapment by a partner, however, might be equally as costly materially, but these costs would not be mitigated by a prior national commitment to the conflict. In other words, the democratic audience may view the entrapping conflict as "not their fight," be less willing to make the necessary sacrifice, and hold the leader accountable for the failure with greater conviction. Further, in a policy failure because of abandonment, the blame may be laid on the doorstep of the abandoning partner, while in a policy failure because of entrapment the leader must be held accountable for the alliance commitment. Therefore, I expect that democracy will be negatively correlated with the degree of institutionalization and stringent ratification requirements in alliance commitments. It is worth noting that my hypothesized relationship between democracy and ratifications requirements is directly contrary to the traditional understanding of democratic political institutions, which often require domestic ratification for international treaties. Democracies also often allow for less stringent ratification requirements (i.e.: Executive Agreements in the United States), and this hypothesis allows for the possibility that democratic states may choose these less stringent requirements over full legislative ratification.

H5: The more democratic a state, the lower that state's tolerance for high degrees of institutionalization in its textual alliance commitments.

H6: The more democratic a state, the lower that state's tolerance for more public ratification requirements in its textual alliance commitments.

Having considered each of the six primary indicators, I then consider the interaction of partner regime type. According to my theory, states of similar regime type (given a greater supposed level of trust) will tolerate more risk in alliance commitments than states of dissimilar regime type. I will test this part of my theory using three of the indicators from above. First I consider the degree of military commitment, which I argue would be negatively associated with democracy given that higher military commitment increases both entrapment and abandonment risks. In alliances between partners of similar regime type, however, I expect that partner similarity will be positively associated with the degree of military commitment, regardless of regime type. In other words, alliances between only democratic states will have greater military commitment than alliances of mixed regime type; likewise, alliances between only autocratic states will have greater military commitment than alliances of mixed regime type.

H7: The more similar the regime type between alliance partners, the higher the state's tolerance for greater degrees of military commitment, regardless of regime type.

Next I consider the specification of conditions on the alliance obligations, which I argue would be positively associated with democracy given that more specified conditions decrease both entrapment and abandonment risk. In alliances between partners of similar regime type,

however, I expect that partner similarity will be negatively associated with the specification of conditions. Given the increased trust between alliance partners of similar regime type there will be less of a need to limit the scope of alliance commitments through conditions in the alliance document.

> *H8: The more similar the regime type between alliance partners, the lower the state's tolerance for greater specification of alliance conditionalities, regardless of regime type.*

Finally, I consider the degree of institutionalization, which I argue would be negatively associated with democracy given that democracies would tolerate greater abandonment risk than entrapment risk in those indicators which had an inverse effect on the two types of risk. In alliances between partners of similar regime type I expect this association to reverse. Given increased trust between partners of similar regime type, as well as the increased likelihood of coordination outside the alliance, states will be less concerned with the possibility of entrapment in a conflict outside the state's interests. States will also be less concerned with abandonment, given the understanding that their partner has generated similar audience costs in making their commitment to the alliance. These key differences among partners of similar regime type will allow for greater institutionalization of the alliance than is deemed acceptable among partners of dissimilar regime type.

> *H9: The more similar the regime type between alliance partners, the higher the state's tolerance for greater degrees of alliance institutionalization, regardless of regime type.*

Limits of the Theory

Having discussed in detail the theory I propose in this paper and the testable hypotheses derived from it, I want to give some thought to the limits of the theory. First, I focus only on the provisions of alliances at the time of formation or accession, as manifested in the alliance treaty text. In doing so I purposefully exclude from my analysis questions of why states choose to form alliances in the first place, what types of states ally more frequently with other types of states, what factors affect alliance reliability, or how alliances deepen or weaken over time. As was discovered in the previous chapter, the alliance literature is quite large, and I focus on only a small segment of that literature (alliance textual provisions at the time of formation) which is thus far underdeveloped. We know, however, that facets of an alliance arrangement change over time; this is especially true of institutionalization development, in which later changes may not be codified into the alliance text but would still have an impact on understanding risk in the alliance. The theoretical arguments I use here would be just as applicable to a study of alliance risk as developed over the life of the alliance; such a study is simply beyond the scope of this paper. While acknowledging this limitation, I do not believe it to be as much of a handicap as it perhaps initially appears. As has been discussed, given the nature and purpose of alliance commitments, perhaps the most important decision (or commitment) in alliance formation is in fact the initial commitment, as documented in the public treaty itself.

Second, the consideration of alliance risk proposed in my theory cannot be considered a comprehensive portrait of alliance risk behavior. I focus only on the cost side of the traditional cost-benefit analysis regarding alliance risk. As was discussed in the previous chapter, risk is often conceptualized as a cost-benefit balance; namely, scholars argue that states weigh both the advantages and risks of alliance commitments (Bueno de Mesquita 1985; Conybeare 1992;

Morrow 1987). Given the scope of this thesis, I focus only on indicators of the cost side of the equation. Further, because I limit my paper to only alliance textual provisions, I focus my theoretical considerations of entrapment and abandonment risk only on those features which are capable of being observed in the treaty documents themselves, such as ratification requirements, depth of military commitment, or proposals for alliance institutionalization. Other considerations are relegated to the status of control variables in my methodological design, such as economic interdependence, the existence of a shared threat, or power parity. I expect my theoretical arguments to have implications for observing entrapment and abandonment risk factors from within the alliance treaty document, but do not assume my arguments to be comprehensive of all situational factors affecting alliance risk. My arguments might inform such a study, but I do not presume it to in fact be such a study.

Given the limitations of my hypotheses (testing implications rather than the full theory), the results cannot be said to fully support or disprove the usefulness of this suggestion. The next chapter lays out in detail the methodological design which I propose as a means of empirically testing the hypotheses proposed above.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN

The existing literature on alliance formation behavior greatly informs a number of the

variables included in my research design, including my primary explanatory variable of regime

type. The inclusion of my key dependent variables in an empirical research design is relatively

unchartered territory, however, with a few exceptions. My research seeks to contribute to the

existing literature connecting the empirical study of alliance textual provisions with the broader

study of alliance formation. In this chapter I discuss in detail the empirical research design of this

paper, including data, key variables, operationalization and measurement, and statistical models.

Scope of the Research Design

My empirical analysis considers all formal alliances formed between and among

independent states within the time period 1950 to 1992 (most of the Cold War era). The unit of

analysis is therefore the state-alliance; this was chosen because the unit of study for regime type

is the state, not an alliance of multiple states. Furthermore, a unit of analysis of state-alliance

will allow different obligations for each state in an alliance to be accurately directed according to

their respective states.[3] It is acknowledged that some alliances formed prior to 1950 will not be

included though they are still in effect after 1950. Further, while the 1949 parties to the North

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[3] While we know that oftentimes alliance agreements are symmetric, some alliances include asymmetric obligations for member states. For example, the United Kingdom promises to defend Turkey, but Turkey does not have a reciprocal obligation (ATOP Codebook, 48). The ATOP data codes directed obligations, allowing me to observe these differences.

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are excluded from the data, the majority of NATO

members are included as a result of the 1951 alliance renegotiation. It is not expected that the

exclusion of the 1949 cases would alter the statistical results.

For the purposes of clarity, an alliance is defined as "a formal agreement among

independent states to cooperate militarily in the face of potential or realized military conflict."

(Leeds et al. 2002) Using these domains a total of 269 alliances are considered. However,

because each alliance has, at minimum, two observations – one for each partner – the number of

potential observations (based on the unit of analysis) is the 807 state memberships in these

alliances.

All data on alliance textual provisions is drawn from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and

Provisions (ATOP) dataset (Leeds et al. 2002). This dataset codes the details of alliance

obligations, as observed in the textual documents themselves, for all interstate alliances 1816 to

2003. It has been used frequently in the peer-reviewed literature and other than the Correlates of

War Formal Alliance data is the only published empirical data on alliance commitments (Leeds

2003; Leeds and Anac 2005; Leeds, Long and Mitchell 2000; Long 2003).

Missing data is an important factor in this research design. There is limited data missing

from the ATOP dataset itself, though a very few observations are coded as having missing

indicators if the information could not be found in the initial coding of the dataset. There exists

more significant missing data in the key explanatory and control variables. Approximately 6%

of the Polity IV data is missing, but this is neither a significant enough amount or overly

systematic to be concerning.[4] More concerning is the missing data on trade (11.7%) and shared

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[4] Several of the Caribbean islands are completely missing from the PolityIV data for 1950-1992 (Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Antigua and Barbuda, and St. Kitts and Nevis), along with data on Luxembourg and Malta. Therefore the results may not be generalized to these countries.

interests (19.5%).[5] These are important control variables and should be included for substantive

reasons, but the missing data is significant enough to potentially bias the overall results.

Therefore, for each hypothesis four models are run to allow for both the inclusion and exclusion

of these variables. Model 1 excludes both trade and shared interests. Model 2 includes all the

variables in Model 1 as well as trade. Model 3 includes all the variables in Model 1 as well as

shared interests. And Model 4 includes all variables, including trade and shared interests.

Interpretations of the models excluding either or both variables must be tempered by the fact that

the controlling effect of trade and/or shared interests is missing, and interpretations of the models

including either or both variables must be tempered by the increasing amount of missing data.

Each hypothesis is tested individually, and a statistical model appropriate to the nature of the

dependent variable is used in each test. As a number of the dependent variables (discussed

below) are dummy variables, binomial logit models are used in these cases. As the

institutionalization and alliance duration variables are both linear, an ordinary least squares

(OLS) linear regression model is used in these tests. Finally, as the alliance size variable is

coded categorically, an ordinal logit model is employed in this case. All tests are examined for

robustness using appropriate measures, which are noted in the appendices.

Dependent Variable Measurement

        DEGREE OF MILITARY COMMITMENT. The degree of military commitment refers

to the nature of the commitment made by states in any given alliance. ATOP codes the degree of

potential military commitment into five categories according to the division of alliance

obligations: offensive obligations, defensive obligations, nonaggression pacts, neutrality pacts,

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[5] The missing trade data is limited to minor powers and for the most part the earlier half of my temporal domain.
The data that is missing presents no systematic geographic bias.

and consultation pacts (Leeds et al. 2002). A single alliance can maintain multiple categories at any given time. This is an improvement on the Correlates of War (COW) Formal Alliance data, which only codes alliances as being defense pacts, neutrality agreements, or ententes (Gibler and Sarkees 2004). Only those alliances which include (either alone or in combination with another category) offensive and/or defensive military obligations are considered to have "high military commitment." Those alliances which include in no part an offensive or defensive obligation are coded as "low military commitment." This dummy variable stratification of military commitment has already been established in the literature (Leeds and Anac 2005, 190).

DEGREE OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION. For the purposes of this paper the degree of institutionalization of an alliance refers to the depth of stated cooperation and integration of decision-making procedures during peacetime and wartime. This measure captures only these commitments at the time of alliance formation and does not capture the development of formal or informal alliance institutionalization over time; time-series alliance institutionalization is beyond the scope of the primary research question. A number of indicators may be observed in alliance textual documents pertaining to institutionalization in peacetime and wartime, including: contact among military planners, the specification of military aid provisions, integrated command of forces, subordination of forces, the establishment of one or more formal organizations, the depth of cooperation within such organizations, joint troop placement, and the specification of contributions in troops, supplies, or funds. These indicators have been previously identified as having a substantive relationship to alliance institutionalization, and are appropriately coded in the ATOP data (Leeds et al. 2002; Leeds and Anac 2005).

Each of these concepts may indicate a degree of alliance institutionalization, but none
will adequately represent this latent concept individually. Using statistical factor analysis I am
able to test for correlation among the indicators, and through predicted values generate a single
linear measurement of the latent institutionalization concept drawn from these indicators. Prior
to running the factor analysis, each indicator was coded to ensure similar directionality, meaning
that higher codes in all indicators indicate higher alliance institutionalization. The results of the
factor analysis produced a Factor 1 Eigenvalue of 2.90078, which is sufficient to then consider
the individual factor loadings (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1: Factor Loadings for Alliance Institutionalization Factor Analysis

Variable	Factor 1
Military Contact	0.6344
Military Aid	0.4583
Integrated Command	0.3731
Subordination of Forces	0.5352
Organization (1)	0.6328
Organization Purpose (1)	0.4173
Organization (2)	0.7554
Organization Purpose (2)	0.7424
Joint Troop Placement	0.2853
Contributions	0.2913

Each of the defined indicators has a factor loading higher than, or very close to 0.3, which was
established as the sufficient baseline. Predicted values then generate a single linear measurement
of the unobserved latent concept of alliance institutionalization.

RATIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. The concept of ratification requirements refers to
the stringency required by the mode of ratification. Alliances requiring domestic ratification,

whether by an elected legislature or a council of advisors, may be said to have more stringent ratification requirements. ATOP codes the mode of ratification as a dummy variable, in which alliances requiring domestic ratification are coded as "1" and alliances requiring no domestic ratification are coded as "0" (Leeds et al. 2002).

ALLIANCE DURATION. Alliance duration simply refers to the specification of alliance length in the document itself. The ATOP data measures alliance duration as a count variable, by month.[6] This coding is unsatisfactory for the purposes of my analysis as it considers all alliances which do not specify duration as having a code of "0". Alliances which choose not to specify duration may be inferred to have more risk than alliances that make such a specification, even if for a long period of time. Therefore I consider alliance duration in the form of two separate measures. First, I code a dummy variable noting all alliances that specify duration at all and all alliances that make no specification. Second, of the alliances that do specify duration, I use ATOP's monthly count measure. This allows me to observe whether regime type affects whether or not states choose to specify alliance duration in the first place, and also the length of those states that do specify alliance duration.

ALLIANCE CONDITIONS. Alliance conditions refer to the extent to which states limit their obligations under an alliance by conditions placed on that obligation. Through conditions states may limit their obligations by location, adversary, conflict, number of adversaries, provocation, or any other demands. For each alliance, conditions are coded individually as a dummy variables in the ATOP dataset. Further, conditions are specified by obligation; for example, conditions for defense pacts are only coded for those alliances containing defense

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[6] For example, an alliance which states it will only be in effect for two years is coded as having a duration of 24.

pacts. In this analysis I focus on one example of high military commitment (defense pacts) and one example of low military commitment (consultation pacts). Initial coding of this variable considered conditions as simply a sum of all possible alliance conditions. These results indicated very few alliances with more than one or two conditions and a number with no conditions, which interfered with logit results. The measurement was therefore simplified to a dummy variable to account for whether or not any conditions are placed on alliance commitments at all.

ALLIANCE SIZE. Alliance size in this paper is coded into three ordinal categories. All bilateral alliances are coded as "0". Alliances with between three and ten members are coded as "1". All alliances larger than ten members are coded as "2."

Explanatory Variables

REGIME TYPE. Regime type simply refers to the degree of consolidated democratization for a state's government in any given year. Regime type data is only considered in years of alliance formation. Regime type data are drawn from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). This database considers six component measures which allow the authors to rank states on a spectrum of democratization, from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). Given the dichotomous operationalization of many of the dependent variables, the 20-point scale developed by Polity IV is broken down into three categories: autocracies (-10 to -6), anocracies (-5 to +5), and democracies (+6 to +10). These categorizations are recommended by the Polity IV database, and will provide enough variation in the explanatory variable while still allowing for meaningful observations of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Further, a histogram distribution of the 20-

point Polity IV scale illustrates that the bulk of the observations fall at either end of the distribution, rather than in the middle. This allows one to categorize the data without fearing a substantive loss of information. Democracy and anocracy are each considered as dummy variables, with autocracy as an excluded category. The Polity data is well established in the literature, and many articles using regime type as an explanatory variable have turned to the Polity data (Farber and Gowa 1994; Gibler and Wolford 2006; Lai and Reiter 2000; Leeds 1999; Simon and Gartzke 1996). While the Bueno de Mesquita winning coalition data were considered (especially given the theoretical focus on audience costs), use of the Polity data is more established in the alliance literature. Future research might consider comparisons of the Polity and winning coalition data to examine correlation.

PARTNER REGIME TYPE DIFFERENCE. A second explanatory variable considers the similarity of regime type among alliance partners. For consistency this measurement of this variable draws on the same Polity IV data as the first explanatory variable, prior to the ordinal categorization above. An average was taken of regime type scores across each alliance and then this number was subtracted from each state's individual alliance score. The absolute value was taken of the result, yielding a measurement of the difference between each state in an alliance and the average regime type score of all other states in the alliance. The larger the difference, the greater the difference in regime type between alliance members.

Control Variables

A number of substantively important control variables are drawn from the existing alliance literature, each of which potentially has an effect on alliance behavior and risk tolerance.

NATIONAL CAPABILITIES or consolidated national strength may have an important effect on alliance risk tolerance by conditioning states' sensitivity to entrapment and abandonment risks (Sorokin 1994). As a state's national capability increases their sensitivity to entrapment risk increases because they become a more attractive ally to other states (especially less developed states). And as a state's national capability increases their sensitivity to abandonment risk logically decreases as they become better-equipped to withstand independent conflict. I use the Correlates of War Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score to indicate national capabilities; this index considers military, economic, natural resource, and population indicators and is therefore a viable measure of overall national capability (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).

As much as national capabilities may affect state behavior in alliance commitments, so might the POWER PREPONDERANCE within those commitments. The relationship of power preponderance within an alliance would mirror the theoretical arguments regarding entrapment and abandonment risk sensitivity above. The greater the power preponderance of one state over another, the greater that state's sensitivity to entrapment risk and the lower that state's sensitivity to abandonment risk. The inverse could be state of those states with smaller power preponderance within an alliance. The importance of including power preponderance has been noted by numerous scholars in the alliance field (O'Neal and Russett 1997; Simon and Gartzke 1996; Weeks 2008). To measure power preponderance I again turn to the Correlates of War CINC score (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). Power preponderance is measured as the ratio of a given state's CINC score to the summed CINC score of all alliance members.

Another related control variable which is consistently included in the literature is MAJOR POWER STATUS (Collard-Wexler 2009; Farber and Gowa 1997; Lai and Reiter 2000;

Leeds 2003; Simon and Gartzke 1996). Collard-Wexler suggests that for minor powers the need

for alliances is crucial to survival, increasing minor powers' sensitivity to alliance risk, while for

major powers alliances are merely a tool of projecting influence (2009, 1). Leeds further

emphasizes this point, arguing that for minor powers the fear of retribution should the alliance

fail is exponentially increased as compared to major powers (2003, 813-814). Therefore I

include the Correlates of War dummy variable denoting major power status in my models

(Correlates of War Project *State Membership List* 2008). There was some concern regarding the

possible correlation between major power status and national capabilities variables. A

correlation test indicated a correlation factor of 0.7543. Because the factor is below 0.80 I

include both variables in my model, but it is worth noting the potential significance of this

correlation.

The literature is conclusive on the importance of including a control variable for

CONTIGUITY in empirical studies on alliance behavior (Collard-Wexler 2009; Farber and

Gowa 1997; Gibler 2008; Leeds 2003). Not only do contiguous states tend ally more frequently,

but because they are considered to be inherently "politically relevant" their immediate interests

in the nature of those alliance commitments are more tangible than non-contiguous states.

Further, contiguous states may also have increased economic or even ethnic relations outside the

alliance commitment. I consider states to be directly contiguous if they share a land border or a

water border of 150 miles or less, in accordance with the measurements of the Correlates of War

Direct Contiguity Data (2008). It is coded as a dummy variable. In multilateral alliances an

average is taken of the contiguity among alliance members.

Levels of TRADE between alliance partners have a potentially quite powerful effect on

alliance behavior. States with a high level of economic interdependence may be less concerned

for alliance risk given the establishment of existing relations and potentially even increased trust outside of the alliance. More stands to be lost if the alliance fails, and, in recognizing this fact, both partners have less incentive to renege on their respective commitments. The importance of including trade levels among alliance partners is well-established in the literature (Gartzke and Li 2003; Gibler 2008; O'Neal and Russett 1997; Sorokin 1994). I use the Correlates of War *Bilateral Trade* data, averaging trade flows among all alliance partners to generate a proxy measure of trade levels within a given alliance (Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2008).

Finally, I consider SHARED INTERESTS as an important control variable (Gibler 2008; Lai and Reiter 2000). States with established shared interests are more likely to be engaged in the same conflicts or toward the same strategic purposes, and likely less concerned with alliance risk. In contrast, states with divergent interests may exhibit increased concern for alliance risk. I use Gibler's measures of shared interests, which indentify whether or not states have a) been engaged in the same militarized interstate disputes within the ten years prior to the year of observation, b) whether there existed a shared enemy, and c) whether the states were adversaries in a conflict (Gibler 2008). Gibler's indicators capture both shared and divergent interests, as well as the frequency of interaction. In multilateral alliances, the mean or mode of each indicator is taken (as appropriate).

Having thus laid out the operationalization and measurement of all variables as well as the general scope and methodology of the study, the next chapter will present and discuss the results from the models.

CHAPTER 5

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The statistical results of my analysis provide mixed support for my overall theory. While I cannot claim that the results fully support the theoretical arguments discussed in Chapter 3, they are substantively interesting and indicate important directions for future research on alliance textual provisions, alliance risk, and regime type. Each of the nine hypotheses proposed in Chapter 4 are discussed in turn, along with a discussion of the model control variables and a general summary. Because a total of nine hypotheses were tested, each using at least four different model specifications, full statistical results are presented in the appendices to this paper. Only statistical tables or graphs relevant to substantive interpretations will be presented in this chapter.

I reiterate that the statistical models interpreted here cannot be claimed as complete tests of my theory, but are merely indicators. The dependent variable in each hypothesis is theorized to have a substantive relationship with alliance entrapment and abandonment risk, and therefore results from empirical tests of these variables may confirm or disconfirm this theorized relationship. Overall conclusions should be tempered by this limitation, as well as by the differences in model specifications due to missing data as discussed in the previous chapter on research design.

Degree of Military Commitment

The statistical results of the binomial logit model support the expected relationship between regime type and degree of military commitment. Hypothesis 1 argued that because higher degrees of military commitment increased both entrapment and abandonment risks, democracy would be negatively associated with the degree of military commitment. Across all four model specifications, and holding all other variables constant, the democracy variable is negative and significant at the 5% level (see Appendix B for full results). The anocracy variable presents a negative coefficient, but is not significant. Simply put, the results suggest that there is no significant difference in behavior between anocratic and autocratic states regarding the degree of military commitment. But as states become fully democratic (Polity IV score of +7 or higher), they engage in fewer alliances with a "high" degree of military commitment than anocratic or autocratic states. Based on log-likelihood ratios and the percentage of predicted probabilities correctly classified, the "best-fitting" model is Model 4, which includes all control variables. Model 4 also has the most missing data, however (28.37%). The results are encouraging nonetheless, given the consistency of signs across the regime type variable in all four models.

The odds-ratio is a useful interpreting tool, and provides a more substantive interpretation than merely considering "signs and significance." For Model 4, consolidated democracies decrease the percentage change in the odds of entering into an alliance with a high military commitment by 40.14%, holding all other variables constant. This directional relationship is consistent across all four model specifications, though with different effects depending on the model specification. Model 3, which controls for shared interests but excludes trade, produces the largest percentage change in the odds of entering into a high military commitment alliance

(decreases odds by 60.69%). The percentage change in odds is smaller when controlling for

trade (33.99% in Model 2 and 40.14% in Model 4).

The models that include shared interest variables also have the best model fit, suggesting

that when considering state tolerance of high military commitment it is important to consider

previous military engagements among alliance partners. Interestingly, however, the only

statistically significant shared interest variable is the variable accounting for the number of

shared militarized interstate disputes among partners in the 10 years prior; more interesting is the

fact that this variable has a negative coefficient, suggesting that states with extensive shared

histories are less likely to enter into alliances with high degrees of military commitment (even if

that history is a positive one).

These results may also be represented graphically (Figure 5.1). Because the relationship

of the explanatory variable (in this case, regime type) to the outcome variable (degree of military

commitment) in binomial logit models is not linear and depends on where an observation is on

the logit curve, predicted probabilities are the best way to account for this non-linear relationship

in estimating actual model outcomes. As one can see, the predicted probability of a state being

in an alliance with a high degree of military commitment decreases the closer a state is to the

democratic regime type.

Figure 5.1: Predicted Probabilities, Degree of Military Commitment, Model 4

These results support both the theoretical argument made in this paper as well as the existing literature on democratic behavior in conflict commitment, which argues that democracies are highly selective when entering into military conflicts, and only enter into conflicts they expect to win (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 1999; Reiter and Stam 2002). The results from my research suggest that democracies may also be highly selective when entering into alliances with a high degree of military commitment, and in doing so seek to minimize alliance risk in the same way they seek to minimize conflict risk. By avoiding high military commitment democracies seek to avoid conflicts they cannot win, much in the same way they carefully select war policies they can win (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 1999; Reiter and Stam 2002). Democracies are observed to enter into fewer alliances with a high degree of military commitment, but (much like war) when they do enter into such alliances, they intend to uphold them (Leeds 2003).

Alliance Size

The statistical results of the multinomial logit model do not support the expected relationship between regime type and alliance size. Hypothesis 2 argued that because larger alliances increase both entrapment and abandonment risks, alliance size would have a negative relationship with democracy. The results did not produce statistically significant coefficients for either the democracy or anocracy dummy variables. As with the previous model, Model 4 produces the best model fit, despite its larger amount of missing data.

As the full statistical results (Appendix C) illustrate, alliance size choices appear to be driven more by the power preponderance and contiguity control variables than by regime type. Power preponderance presents with a negative and statistically significant (0.1% level) coefficient across all four model specifications, as does contiguity. Also highly significant are the control variables for shared interests. An interesting finding is the observation that both a shared enemy and an adversarial conflict ten years prior to the alliance produce positive and statistically significant (0.1% level) coefficients. This may suggest that political relevance has more influence on alliance size choice than actual shared interests, though further study would be needed to fully explore this relationship.

Alliance Duration

The statistical results partially support the expected relationship between regime type and alliance duration, and present a more complicated picture of state behavior regarding alliance duration. Hypothesis 3 argued that because increased duration was associated with higher entrapment and abandonment risks, duration as specified in alliance documents would be positively associated with regime type. Testing of this hypothesis was done in two parts. First, a

binomial logit model tested whether or not alliance duration was even specified in the document. Second, an OLS regression model tested for the actual length of those alliances that did make such a specification.

The results from the binomial logit model on whether an alliance chose to specify any duration at all support the hypothesis (see Appendix D for full results). In all four model specifications the coefficient for democracy is positive and significant at the 1% level. Model 1 and Model 3 also produce a positive and significant coefficient for anocracy at the 1% level, though the significance is dropped when trade is included in the model specification. This suggests a more complicated relationship between anocracies and the specification of alliance duration. The results suggest, however, that consolidated democracies are significantly more likely to specify alliance duration in their alliance commitments than autocracies or anocracies. Based on log-likelihood ratios the "best-fitting" model is Model 4, but based on the percentage of predicted probabilities correctly classified, the "best-fitting" model is Model 3, which excludes the trade control variable.

For Model 4, consolidated democracies increase the percentage change in the odds of entering into an alliance which specifies duration by 81.08%, holding all other variables constant. This directional relationship is consistent across all four model specifications, though with different effects depending on the model specification. Model 3, which controls for shared interests but excludes trade, produces the largest percentage change in the odds of entering into a high military commitment alliance (increases odds by 107.32%). The percentage change in odds is smaller when controlling for trade (54.79% in Model 2). These results may also be depicted graphically using predicted probabilities (Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2: Predicted Probabilities, Alliance Duration Specification, Model 4

The results of the OLS regression model on actual alliance duration in those alliances that specified duration at all present mixed results regarding relationship between alliance duration and regime type (results summarized in Table 5.1; see Appendix D for full results). While consolidated democracies were more likely to specify alliance duration, the coefficients for democracy were not significant. The coefficients for anocracies, however, were highly significant (at the 0.1% level), and in all four model specifications were negative. Based on the R-squared estimate, by far the best fitting model is Model 4, which is fully specified (though the model fit is not ideal). Model 4 also has the most missing data, and this should be acknowledged in interpreting the regression coefficients.

Table 5.1: OLS Linear Regression Results for the Effect of Regime Type on Alliance Length in Alliance Textual Agreements, 1950-1992

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Anocracy	-64.7530***	-63.0238***	-62.6556***	-60.5347***
	(13.9853)	(15.5347)	(16.4828)	(17.5320)
Democracy	-11.0721	-6.2517	-11.0565	-13.9863
	(10.6364)	(12.1945)	(13.6518)	(15.0891)
Control Variables in Appendix D	-------	-------	-------	-------
R-Squared	0.0831	0.1131	0.1565	0.2334
N	405	340	308	267

* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
*** significant at 0.001 level

Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors

These results partially support the theoretical argument made in this paper regarding regime type and alliance duration. First, the results of the binomial logit on duration specification suggest that consolidated democracies are more likely to specify alliance duration than to leave it unstated. In other words, consolidated democracies are less likely to tolerate open-ended alliance durations, a characteristic which is argued to increase entrapment and abandonment risk. But of those alliances in which democracies did state alliance duration, there was no significant distinction in alliance duration. Theoretically, democracies should also seek to limit the duration of all alliances as much as possible; this behavior was not observed. Second, while anocracies were not more likely to specify alliance duration than autocracies, they were likely to specify a shorter duration in those alliances in which were specified.

These results may be as result of the inherent deterrent purpose of alliance commitments. If one of the primary benefits of an alliance commitment is its deterrence value for a potential

opponent, then it is in a state's interest to provide the strongest deterrent possible by not overly weakening the alliance with an unnecessarily short duration limit. This consideration may explain why I did not observe democracies placing shorter durations on alliance commitments. The fact that democracies are more likely to place any duration specification at all does speak to their risk tolerance given this line of argument. For the strongest possible deterrent would be one with no established time frame. Democracies are observed to set a specified time frame, regardless, which suggests a desire to limit risk as much as possible (while still preserving the deterrence value of the alliance).

Conditions on Alliance Commitments

The statistical results provide supportive evidence for the expected relationship between regime type and the number of conditions placed on alliance commitments. Hypothesis 4 argued that because greater conditions placed on alliance commitments decreased both entrapment and abandonment risks, the conditions in alliance documents would have a positive relationship with democracy. This was tested based on the type of condition. Two separate panels were considered – one for conditions placed on defense pacts and one for conditions placed on consultation pacts. In doing so one is able to capture conditions in both low and high degrees of military commitment. The statistical results are different across the two panels.

The results are supportive for state behavior in the defense pacts panel. Across all four model specifications, and holding all other variables constant, the democracy variable is positive and significant at the 0.1% level (see Appendix E for full results). The anocracy dummy variable did not produce significant results. Simply put, the results suggest that consolidated democracies place more conditions on alliance obligations in defense pacts than autocracies or anocracies.

Based on log-likelihoods and the percent correctly classified the best model fit is clearly Model

4, but Model 4 also has the most missing data (46.9%).

For Model 4, consolidated democracies increase the percentage change in the odds of

entering into a defense pact with conditions by 694.52%, holding all other variables constant.

This directional relationship is consistent across all four model specifications, though with

different effects depending on the model specification. These results may also be depicted

graphically using predicted probabilities (Figure 5.3).

Figure 5.3: Predicted Probabilities, Defense Pact Conditions, Model 3

The statistical results for the consultation pact panel also support the hypothesis. Across

all four model specifications, and holding all other variables constant, the coefficients for

democracy are positive and significant at the 0.1% level (see Appendix E for full results). In

Models 1 and 2 (excluding shared interest variables), the coefficients for anocracy are positive

and significant at the 1% level, but the significance drops when shared interests are included in

the model specification. Simply put, the results suggest that as states become more democratic, they place more conditions on alliance obligations in consultation pacts, particularly consolidated democracies. Log likelihoods indicate that Model 4 has the "best" model fit, while percentage correctly classified indicates that Model 2 has the "best" model fit.

For Model 4, consolidated democracies increase the percentage change in the odds of entering into a consultation pact with conditions by 323.27%, holding all other variables constant. This relationship can be depicted using predicted probabilities (Figure 5.4). There is a clear positive relationship between regime type and consultation pact conditions. This relationship is consistent across all four model specifications.

Figure 5.4: Predicted Probabilities, Consultation Pact Conditions, Model 4

In both defense and consultation pacts the results support the overall expectation of a positive relationship with democracy, suggesting that democratic states are overall more likely to mitigate alliance risk through increased alliance conditions than non-democratic states.

Alliance Institutionalization

The statistical results do not support the expected relationship between regime type and degree of alliance institutionalization. Hypothesis 5 argued that because greater alliance institutionalization increased entrapment risks, and because democracies would be more concerned with entrapment than abandonment risks, the degree of institutionalization would be negatively associated with democracy. Neither the democracy nor anocracy dummy variables presented statistically significant coefficients (see Appendix F for full results). Based on the R-squared estimate, the best fitting model is Model 3, which excludes the shared interests control variables (though the model fit is admittedly not ideal). Model 3 also has a significant amount missing data, and this should be acknowledged in interpreting the regression coefficients.

Though the results do not support the theorized hypothesis, they are nonetheless informative for future research; in particular, it is worth noting the control variables which did produce significant coefficients. The CINC score indicates that as national capability increases, tolerance for alliance institutionalization decreases, suggesting a concern for entrapment risk in powerful states. This fits with the theorized relationship regarding national capabilities and alliance risk tolerance. These results indicate that national capabilities may have more on an influence on alliance institutionalization preferences than regime type. While these results do not support my hypothesis, they do suggest an interesting area for future research regarding factors influence state tolerance for high degrees of institutionalization.

Ratification Requirements

The statistical results support the expected relationship between regime type and the stringency of ratification requirements. Hypothesis 6 argued that because more stringent and

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public ratification requirements increased entrapment risks, and because democracies would be more concerned with entrapment than abandonment risks, the stringency of ratification requirements in alliance documents would have a negative relationship with democracy. Across all four model specifications, and holding all other variables constant, the democracy variable is negative and significant at the 5% level (see Appendix G for full results). The results for the anocracy variable were not significant. The results suggest that as consolidated democracies engage in fewer alliances that require domestic ratification, relative to autocratic states. Based on log-likelihood ratios the "best-fitting" model is Model 4, but based on the percentage of predicted probabilities correctly classified the "best-fitting" model is Model 3, which excludes the shared trade control variables. This suggests that the inclusion of shared interest control variables is important to model specification for the ratification variable. In particular, the inclusion of a variable accounting for adversarial militarized interstate disputes among allies in the 10 years prior has a negative and highly significant co-efficient.

The odds-ratio is, again, a useful interpreting tool. For Model 4, as states become more democratic, the percentage change in the odds of entering into an alliance requiring domestic ratification decrease by 52.32%, holding all other variables constant. For Model 3, as states become more democratic, the percentage change in the odds of entering into an alliance requiring domestic ratification decrease by 54.50%. This directional relationship is consistent across all four model specifications. This relationship can be depicted graphically using predicted probabilities (Figure 5.5).

Figure 5.5: Predicted Probabilities, Ratification Requirements, Model 4

These results support the theoretical argument made in this paper, but are interesting

given the results regarding institutionalization, which suggest that democracies may be more

concerned with abandonment risk than entrapment risk. The discrepancy between these two

indicators suggests an area for future study. These results are further interesting given the

emphasis placed on domestic ratification – something one generally associates with democracies.

The power of democratic legislatures to ratify treaties is often considered a significant check on

legislative authority, and also enhances the credibility of democratic commitment by indicating

greater domestic resolve and generating higher audience costs for the leader should the

commitment fail (Garriga 2009; Leeds 2003). Many democratic states allow their executives to

make international commitments outside of formal treaty ratification (such as Executive

Agreements in the United States), however. One might expect to observe democracies making

use of these tools for credible commitment. The results presented here, while unexpected to

some, appear to confirm the argument that democratic states will seek to minimize risk in

international commitments, even at the expense of generating higher audience costs through domestic ratification. In particular, when forced to choose between increased entrapment risks and increased abandonment risks, the results suggest that democracies are more likely to tolerate increased abandonment risk over increased entrapment risk. This conclusion is not fully satisfying, however, given the contrary results regarding institutionalization. Again, further study would be required.

Partner Similarity and Degree of Military Commitment

The statistical results partially support the expected relationship between partner regime type similarity and the degree of military commitment. While the logit coefficients support the hypothesis, further analysis indicates that the expected effect is not consistent regardless of regime type. Hypothesis 7 argued that because greater trust existed between states of similar regime type, states in those alliances would tolerate higher degrees of military commitment, regardless of regime type. Across all four model specifications, and holding all other variables constant, the partner regime type difference variable is negative and significant at the 5% level (see Appendix H for full results). Simply put, the results suggest that as the difference in partner regime type increases, states engage in fewer alliances with a "high" degree of military commitment. Model 4 (fully specified) produces the best model fit. In Model 4, as partner regime type difference increases by one unit, the odds of a state being in an alliance with a high degree of military commitment decrease by 7.36%. This relationship can also be represented graphically (Figure 5.6). The graph of predicted probabilities is not "pretty", but does suggest a negative relationship between partner similarity and degree of military commitment (if not a simple linear one).

Figure 5.6: Predicted Probabilities, Degree of Military Commitment and Partner Similarity, Model 4

Given the unexpected predicted probabilities for the complete model, it is worthwhile to examine state behavior, broken down by regime type. Table 5.2 presents the odds ratios for this hypothesis, broken down by categorical regime type.

Table 5.2: Odds Ratios for the Effect of Partner Similarity on the Degree of Military Commitment in Alliance Textual Agreements, by Regime Type

Model	Autocracies	Anocracies	Democracies
Model 1	0.8777	0.9757	1.0329
Model 2	0.8599	1.0353	1.0012
Model 3	0.8629	1.0034	1.1072
Model 4	0.8425	1.1053	1.0579

One observes a stark difference in the odds ratios for autocracies and anocracies/democracies. Across all four model specifications, autocracies have a larger decrease in the odds of entering into alliances of high military commitment (even alliances among similar partners) than the combined odds from the full model. In other words, partner similarity has more of an effect on high military commitment tolerance among autocracies than anocracies or democracies. In contrast, democracies actually present with a positive odds ratio in all four model specifications. Partner regime type differences actually increase the odds of democracies entering into alliances with high military commitment (by 57.90% in Model 4, and upwards of 107.2% in Model 3). This relationship can be observed in greater detail using predicted probabilities. Figure 5.7 presents the predicted probabilities of Model 4 for autocracies only, and one can observe the consistently negative relationship between partner regime type differences and the degree of military commitment. Figure 5.8 presents the predicted probabilities of Model 4 for democracies only. The difference between autocracies and democracies can clearly be observed.

Figure 5.7: Predicted Probabilities for Autocracies, Degree of Military Commitment and Partner Similarity, Model 4

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
**Figure 5.8: Predicted Probabilities for Democracies, Degree of Military Commitment
and Partner Similarity, Model 4**

These are very interesting findings regarding the differences in alliance behavior among

states of different regime type, particularly regarding increased democratic tolerance of risk in

alliances with non-democracies. Democracy decreased the tolerance of high military

commitment in the first model (Figure 5.1), and this trend did not change, even among alliances

with other democracies. The effect of partner regime type difference is more pronounced in

autocracies, and the results support the theorized hypothesis. This provides partial support for

my hypothesis, which argued that the increased tolerance of high military commitment would be

observed regardless of regime type. Partner similarity does appear to have a positive effect on

high military commitment tolerance overall, but it is much more pronounced in non-democracies

than democracies. The finding that democracies engage in higher military commitment with

states of dissimilar regime type is very unexpected and suggests an area of future exploration.

Partner Similarity and Degree of Institutionalization

The statistical results of the OLS regression model do not support the expected

relationship of partner similarity and the degree of institutionalization. Hypothesis 8 argued that

because of increased trust among states of similar regime type, states in alliances with similar

partners would engage in higher degrees of alliance institutionalization because they trusted their

partners not to entrap them. The partner regime type similarity variable did not produce a

statistically significant coefficient (see Appendix I for full results). As in Hypothesis 5 regarding

institutionalization and regime type, only the CINC and shared interest variables presented with

significant coefficients. While the results do not support my hypothesis they reinforce alliance

institutionalization as an area for further exploration.

Partner Similarity and Alliance Conditions

The statistical results partially support the expected relationship between partner regime

type similarity and alliance conditions. Hypothesis 9 argued that due to increased trust between

states of a similar regime type, states would require fewer alliance conditions, regardless of

regime type. As with the earlier discussion of alliance conditions, this hypothesis was tested

using two panels – defense pacts and consultation pacts. The partner similarity coefficients on

the defense pact panel were not statistically significant, holding all other variables constant (see

Appendix J for full results).

In contrast to defense pacts, the statistical results are significant for the effect of partner

similarity on consultation pact conditions and the results support the hypothesized relationship.

Simply put, as partner regime type differences increase, states require increased conditions on

consultation pact obligations. Across all four model specifications, and holding all other

variables constant, the coefficient for partner regime type difference is positive and significant at

the 1% level (see Appendix J for full results). Based on the log likelihood Model 4 has the best

model fit, but based on percentage correctly classified Model 2 has the best model fit. In Model

2 as partner regime type becomes more dissimilar the percentage change in odds of a state

having conditions on a consultation pact increases by 8.36%. In Model 4 the percentage change

is consistent at 8.16%. These results can be depicted graphically as well using predicted

probabilities (Figure 5.9).

Figure 5.9: Predicted Probabilities, Consultation Pact Conditions and Partner Similarity, Model 4

The results regarding alliance conditions partially confirm my hypothesis, indicating that

states do differentiate their alliance behavior regarding conditions on consultation pacts based on

the degree of partner similarity. The hypothesis cannot be said to be fully confirmed given the

lack of significant results in the defense pact panel. However, given the predicted probabilities

from the defense panel, I am inclined to suspect a complex relationship worthy of future study.

Control Variables

A number of very powerful control variables were included in my research design, but they were included because are consistent in the literature and each has an expected effect on the explanatory and outcome variables of interest. I will not dwell excessively on the results of the control variables, but do wish to note a few specific observations and overall trends. The detailed output for each variable may be found in the appendices.

The variable controlling for trade within an alliance proved to be an important variable (as expected). In fact, in the binomial model for degree of military commitment, the inclusion of trade eliminated any statistical significance of the anocracy dummy variable. I expected increased trade to reduce the concern for alliance risk, but interestingly observed the opposite in one instance. Increased trade decreased the likelihood of states engaging in alliances with high military commitment rather than increasing it. Increased trade did decrease the likelihood of alliance conditions in defense pacts; this observation may be said to fit with the expected effect of trade on alliance behavior. Trade was not significant in a number of the models, however, including the models for alliance size, length specification, institutionalization, ratification requirements, and consultation pacts.

The three variables controlling for shared interests also proved to have an interesting effect, if not consistently in the way theorized. I expected a positive shared history to reduce the concern for alliance risk; positive shared history was controlled for by considering whether or not alliance partners had shared a joint enemy in the ten years prior to the alliance. The presence of a joint enemy did increase the likelihood of larger alliances and increased degrees of institutionalization (associated with higher risk), but it also increased the likelihood of consultation pact conditions (associated with lowering risk). I expected a negative shared history

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to increase concern for alliance risk. This was controlled for by considering whether alliance partners had been adversaries in the same militarized interstate dispute in the ten years prior to the alliance. Quite frankly, I expected this variable to have a significant impact on the overall model results. It generally did not. It decreased the likelihood of large alliances and decreased the likelihood of stringent ratification requirements (pursuant to my expectations), but exhibited no other significant behavior. I suspect that the unusual results from these variables may be due to their coding (both were coded as dummy variables). More nuanced coding might produce more significant results.

The power preponderance control variable proved to have consistent significance across many models. It was expected in increase states' sensitivity to entrapment risk and decrease states' sensitivity to abandonment risk. This was observed to be partially true, in that increased power preponderance within an alliance was associated with lower degrees of institutionalization. Increased power preponderance was also associated with more stringent ratification requirements, however. In general, power preponderance was associated with lower alliance risk, suggesting that as states assume more power preponderance within an alliance they become more risk averse. This is not an unexpected relationship, and is worthy of further study.

Summary

In creating the research design for this paper I understood the limitations of breaking the empirical test of my overall theory into indicators – namely, I understood that I could not claim a full test of my theory. Instead, I hoped that the indicators would individual provide support (or lack thereof) for my larger theoretical arguments. Having completed the empirical models I tentatively conclude enough support for my overall arguments to warrant future research into

alliance risk as manifested in alliance textual commitments. Three of my hypotheses are

confirmed with clear significance: Hypothesis 1 regarding the degree of military commitment,

Hypothesis 4 regarding alliance conditions, and Hypothesis 6 regarding the stringency of

ratification requirements. The two hypotheses regarding alliance institutionalization

(Hypotheses 5 and 8) did not produce significant coefficients, suggesting that alliance

institutionalization preferences are motivated by factors other than regime type. Hypothesis 2

regarding alliance size was also not significant. The remaining three hypotheses produced mixed

results. Hypothesis 3, regarding alliance duration, indicated some support for my hypothesis, but

not full support. The remaining hypotheses regarding partner regime type similarity (military

commitment and conditions) produced mixed, but encouraging, results. These results are

summarized in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Summary of Empirical Results

Hypothesis	Dependent Variable	Expected Relationship with Polity	Result	Description
1	Military Commitment	Negative	Negative	Only democracies, not anocracies
2	Alliance Size	Negative	Insign.	Results driven by power preponderance, shared interests, and contiguity
3	Alliance Duration	Positive	Mixed	Democracies more likely to specify length, but not more likely to specify shorter alliances
4	Alliance Conditions	Positive	Positive	Only democracies, not anocracies
5	Institutionalization	Negative	Insign.	Results driven by national capabilities
6	Ratification Required	Negative	Negative	Only democracies, not anocracies
7	Partner Similarity – Military Commitment	Positive	Mixed	Results differ by regime type – positive for autocracies but negative for democracies
8	Partner Similarity – Institutionalization	Positive	Insign.	Results driven by national capabilities and shared interests
9	Partner Similarity – Alliance Conditions	Negative	Mixed	Partner difference is negatively associated with consultation conditions, but defense pact conditions are not significant

From these overall results a few important conclusions can be drawn. First, regime type (or partner regime type similarity) played a significant factor in almost every statistical model, despite the inclusion of a number of very powerful control variables. Only in the models concerning institutionalization was regime type consistently insignificant. This provides very encouraging confirmation for the expectation that states do differentiate their alliance behavior and risk tolerance by regime type – a critical claim of my theory. Second, because a) each of my dependent variables was drawn and measured directly from the text of alliance documents, and b) these variables were associated with statistically significant results in every model, I feel

confident in the theoretical argument that alliance documents and alliance textual provisions do in fact matter and can be used as an important new point of observation in alliance behavior. If this was not the case, I would not have gotten empirical results with the consistency across dependent variables that I did.

Third, the results of the final three hypotheses regarding partner regime type similarity underscore the importance of differentiating state behavior by regime type, even regarding partner similarity (which was not originally hypothesized to be the case). In two of the three hypotheses the behavior of autocracies and democracies was quite different, emphasizing that different regime types do often behave differently in international commitments. Finally, while these results cannot be described as a full description of alliance risk, the results are consistent enough with the hypothesized relationship in each model to warrant future research into alliance risk as manifested in alliance documents themselves. Granted, no portrait of alliance risk may be considered complete without situational factors, but the inclusion of alliance textual commitments in future portraits of alliance risk will be a potentially important improvement on the concept.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This thesis considered the intersection of three conceptual areas of the formal alliance literature – alliance risk, alliance textual provisions, and regime type. It sought to discover the effect of regime type on states' risk tolerance in alliance textual provisions. I argued that the nature of domestic political institutions (namely limitations on the provision of private goods) give democratic leaders more incentive to be sensitive to alliance risk than autocratic leaders. In the broader discussion of my theory I suggested a new understanding of the relationship between entrapment and abandonment risks, particularly how they are manifested in the formal commitments of alliance treaty documents. From this the broader theory proposed I drew six indicators of alliance risk from the provisions of alliance treaty documents. I used these indicators to empirically test nine hypotheses derived from my theory regarding regime type and alliance risk behavior. I conducted a number of appropriate empirical tests on a large-N data population of all formal interstate alliances formed between 1950 and 1992.

While the results of this analysis cannot be claimed a complete test of my theory, and a number of theoretical arguments remain untouched in the empirical analysis, the statistical results provide enough confirmatory evidence to make a few arguments regarding state behavior in alliance commitments. First, state behavior is differentiated by regime type. Second, state behavior as differentiated by regime type can be observed at the level of alliance textual provisions. Third, there exists a somewhat consistent relationship between state behavior and risk-related indicators to suggest that a broader portrait of alliance risk may be drawn from

alliance documents themselves. And fourth, enough confirming evidence exists to encourage future empirical and qualitative research in this small sub-branch of the larger alliance literature. In making these arguments, this paper successfully contributes to the three areas of alliance literature it set out to make contributions toward.

The research design carried out in this thesis suffered from a number of problems. It captured only a forty-two-year period out of a nearly two-hundred-year documentation of alliance behavior (a period of unusual bipolar configuration in global affairs). Many of the control variables presented with a significant amount of missing data; while this was corrected for as much as possible through multiple model specifications, it limits the interpretations. Further, many of the models suffered from less-than-ideal model fit. But perhaps most significantly, because the research design considered indicators of alliance risk individually, it cannot claim a complete test of the overall theory. Nonetheless, despite these limitations, the results were encouraging enough to suggest that there exists some interesting relationship among these concepts which is worthy of further study. This paper is but one initial effort.

The biggest improvement future research on this subject would be to connect the qualitative and quantitative methods of research. As stated earlier in the paper, an ideal research design would conduct empirical research from a detailed database created from a number of individual case histories, capturing the situational nuances of alliance negotiations and commitments in as much detail as possible. This would be, of course, a significant undertaking. Smaller improvements to the research design would improve the project as well, including an expansion of the temporal domain and the dogged pursuit of missing data in the control variables. To further explicate the relationship between alliance provisions and alliance risk,

more detailed considerations of the individual indicators as they relate to alliance risk and regime type would enhance the theoretical development of this thesis.

Three tangential expansions of the research may also be derived from this thesis. First, it would be worthwhile to further consider the theoretical exploration of asymmetrical alliance commitments. Are democracies able to secure more advantageous alliances? If yes, how so? Second, it would be equally worthwhile to explore the tension in democracies between collective defense and self-interested audience costs. Scholars have made arguments that both are the primary motivating factor for democratic leaders and it would be worthwhile to further test these concepts. Third, further exploration of the differences between war-making policies and alliance policies would improve the literature connecting these two concepts. In other words, are these different policies driven by different motivations?

In conclusion, I would like to acknowledge my pleasant surprise with the overall results of this paper. When the project was begun it was a pinprick at a giant in the world of international relations literature. The theoretical arguments were deduced without much concrete evidence of their validity or much expectation that they would be supported by actual data. To have grappled with the design and data of this project has been one of the most frustrating exercises of my academic career, but the results have been more encouraging than I could have expected. For while there are considerable flaws and countless points of improvement, there appear (against all odds) to be the inklings of some support and significance to the theoretical arguments. One hopes future research will expand on these ideas, improving them along the way.

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APPENDIX A

FRANCO RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 1984

Signed August 18, 1894:

France and Russia, being animated by a common desire to preserve peace, and having no other object than to meet the necessities of a defensive war, provoked by an attack of the forces of the Triple Alliance against either of them, have agreed upon the following provisions:

1. If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany. If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.
2.   In case the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of any one of the Powers belonging to it, should be mobilized, France and Russia, at the first news of this event and without previous agreement being necessary, shall mobilize immediately and simultaneously the whole of their forces, and shall transport them as far as possible to their frontiers.
3. The available forces to be employed against Germany shall be, on the part of France, 1,300,000 men, on the part of Russia, 700,000 or 800,000 men. These forces shall engage to the full with such speed that Germany will have to fight simultaneously on the East and on the West.
4. The General Staffs of the Armies of the two countries shall cooperate with each other at all times in the preparation and facilitation of the execution of the measures mentioned above. They shall communicate with each other, while there is still peace, all information relative to the armies of the Triple Alliance which is already in their possession or shall come into their possession. Ways and means of corresponding in time of war shall be studied and worked out in advance.
5. France and Russia shall not conclude peace separately.
6. The present Convention shall have the same duration as the Triple Alliance.
7. All the clauses enumerated above shall be kept absolutely secret.

APPENDIX B

BINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES FOR THE EFFECT OF REGIME TYPE

ON THE DEGREE OF MILITARY COMMITMENT

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Anocracy Dummy	-0.1770	-0.0263	-0.2663	-0.2596
	(0.2094)	(0.2271)	(0.2428)	(0.2652)
Democracy Dummy	-0.8856***	-0.4152*	-0.9.335***	-0.5131*
	(0.1663)	(0.1852)	(0.2108)	(0.2309)
CINC Score	2.4572	0.6103	-10.4206**	-12.0639**
	(2.2705)	(2.4757)	(3.9750)	(4.6225)
Major Power	-0.1299	0.2487	1.0508**	1.3220**
	(0.3245)	(0.3470)	(0.3987)	(0.4274)
Power Preponderance	-0.1532	-0.3347	-0.4209	-0.6720*
	(0.2635)	(0.2862)	(0.3264)	(0.3595)
Contiguity	-0.0068	-0.0497	0.1975	0.0528
	(0.1720)	(0.1962)	(0.2210)	(0.2555)
Trade	-------	-0.0005***	-------	-0.0006***
		(0.0000)		(0.0001)
Joint MIDs (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	-0.0469*	-0.0581**
			(0.0187)	(0.0208)
Joint Enemy (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	0.1701	0.4597
			(0.2240)	(0.2479)
Adversarial MID (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	0.1138	-0.0936
			(0.2205)	(0.2376)
Constant	0.0694	0.0465	0.4234	0.5762
	(0.1363)	(0.1470)	(0.2459)	(0.2726)
Log Likelihood	-520.6265	-417.0607	-404.7602	-350.0069
Correctly Classified	58.23%	59.86%	64.84%	68.69%
N	790	705	637	578

* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
*** significant at 0.001 level
Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors

ORDINAL LOGIT ESTIMATES FOR THE EFFECT OF REGIME TYPE

ON ALLIANCE SIZE

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Anocracy Dummy	0.0052	-0.1821	-0.0129	-0.1924
	(0.2351)	(0.2454)	(0.2804)	(0.2969)
Democracy Dummy	0.2806	0.1687	-0.1198	-0.2801
	(0.1896)	(0.2079)	(0.2416)	(0.2584)
CINC Score	5.9606*	7.1956*	-6.0275	-5.0514
	(2.9622)	(3.1228)	(5.0710)	(5.1697)
Major Power	0.7555	0.7561	1.0938*	1.1704*
	(0.4218)	(0.4353)	(0.5274)	(0.5285)
Power Preponderance	-5.6658***	-5.8801***	-4.4267***	-4.4073***
	(0.4815)	(0.5161)	(0.5442)	(0.5667)
Contiguity	-2.1073***	-1.8185***	-1.4712***	1.1550***
	(0.2561)	(0.2647)	(0.3063)	(0.3160)
Trade	-------	0.0000	-------	0.0000
		(0.0000)		(0.0000)
Joint MIDs (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	-0.0423*	-0.0652**
			(0.0221)	(0.0232)
Joint Enemy (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	1.7221***	1.8022***
			(0.2477)	(0.2639)
Adversarial MID (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	1.4883***	1.5899***
			(0.2332)	(0.2433)
Cut 1	-1.2844	-1.4229	-0.6269	-0.9649
	(0.1619)	(0.1722)	(0.2901)	(0.3104)
Cut 2	-0.0059	-0.1424	0.8938	0.6264
	(0.1519)	(0.1595)	(0.2959)	(0.3120)
Log Likelihood	-542.1934	-503.2160	-396.8625	-370.3289
N	790	705	637	578

* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
*** significant at 0.001 level

Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors
Note: Contiguity variable is eliminated from these models

APPENDIX D

BINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES FOR THE EFFECT OF REGIME TYPE

ON DURATION SPECIFICATION

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Anocracy Dummy	0.5926** (.2179)	0.3386 (0.1843)	0.7268** (0.2562)	0.4713 (0.2707)
Democracy Dummy	0.5768*** (0.1673)	0.4369** (0.1843)	0.7291*** (0.2120)	0.5937** (0.2269)
CINC Score	5.5901* (2.3356)	5.9072* (2.5670)	-6.0052 (3.1702)	-4.3926 (3.7745)
Major Power	-0.0179 (0.3218)	0.1598 (0.3394)	0.7565* (0.3987)	0.7716* (0.4053)
Power Preponderance	-1.6097*** (0.2811)	-1.7081*** (0.3026)	-1.6632*** (0.3435)	-1.6546*** (0.3669)
Contiguity	-0.4209** (0.1778)	-0.3814* (0.1959)	0.1476 (0.2244)	0.0432 (0.2465)
Trade	-------	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-------	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Joint MIDs (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	0.0462** (0.0191)	0.0376 (0.0204)
Joint Enemy (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	0.0561 (0.2211)	-0.0247 (0.2248)
Adversarial MID (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	0.8454*** (0.2200)	0.9180*** (0.2286)
Constant	-0.0248 (0.1385)	0.176 3 (0.1474)	-0.8745 (0.2535)	-0.6523 (0.2709)
Log Likelihood	-506.9971	-457.4754	-390.4156	-359.1363
Correctly Classified	63.42%	61.99%	66.09%	65.22%
N	790	705	637	578

* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
*** significant at 0.001 level
Note: numbers in parentheses are standard error

OLS LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE EFFECT OF REGIME TYPE

ON ALLIANCE LENGTH

Independent Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
Democracy	-11.0721	-6.2517	-11.0565	-13.9863
	(10.6364)	(12.1945)	(13.6518)	(15.0891)
Anocracy	-64.7530***	-63.0238***	-62.6556***	-60.5347***
	(13.9853)	(15.5347)	(16.4828)	(17.5320)
CINC Score	549.8503***	410.0565*	630.4084**	486.4141*
	(170.5441)	(188.5248)	(204.6579)	(217.1618)
Major Power	-45.3034*	-55.5315**	-56.4132**	-54.4501*
	(22.3344)	(22.8431)	(25.4619)	(25.9178)
Power Preponderance	-33.0633*	-25.4269	-31.2830	-26.8675
	(16.0896)	(18.0701)	(18.9816)	(20.4860)
Contiguity	-3.5920	-16.0660	-3.3847	-8.8009
	(10.2515)	(11.9886)	(13.3541)	(14.9862)
Trade	-------	0.0153***	-------	0.0212***
		(0.0039)		(0.0048)
Joint MIDs (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	1.6425	1.5495
			(1.2207)	(1.3000)
Joint Enemy (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	48.0566***	49.8060***
			(13.7130)	(14.3912)
Adversarial MID (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	-55.1894***	-60.4738***
			(16.9050)	(18.0538)
Constant	206.2639	197.0273	188.4031	177.6761
	(9.1538)	(10.2373)	(14.7154)	(16.0611)
R-Squared	0.0831	0.1131	0.1565	0.2334
N	405	340	308	267

* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
*** significant at 0.001 level
Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors

BINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES FOR THE EFFECT OF REGIME TYPE

ON DEFENSE PACT CONDITIONS

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Anocracy Dummy	-0.4029	-0.3433	-0.3664	-0.5671
	(.3667)	(0.4830)	(0.4678)	(0.5879)
Democracy Dummy	1.5286***	1.8166***	1.7113***	2.0725***
	(0.4022)	(0.4819)	(0.5224)	(0.6392)
CINC Score	13.1791*	16.1600**	42.2948***	119.6354
	(4.4858)	(6.3453)	(13.2876)	(77.0528)
Major Power	2.1169 (1.1585)	7.5601*	-1.0899	0.0406
		(3.3318)	(1.7431)	(4.8283)
Power Preponderance	-6.3668***	-14.2337***	-6.1508***	-12.8868**
	(1.1489)	(3.6787)	(1.3649)	(4.2303)
Contiguity	-0.3790	---^---	-0.1905	---^---
	(0.4114)		(0.6155)	
Trade	-------	0.0016*	-------	0.0049**
		(0.0008)		(0.0020)
Joint MIDs (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	-0.0132	0.0410
			(0.0452)	(0.0618)
Joint Enemy (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	1.8108***	0.9482
			(0.5621)	(0.8497)
Adversarial MID (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	-1.8529***	-1.6995*
			(0.5690)	(0.7926)
Constant	-0.2097 (0.2457)	-0.1070	-0.1162	-0.5721
		(0.3124)	(0.4838)	(0.6125)
Log Likelihood	-139.7011	-84.2839	-94.8202	-61.2157
Correctly Classified	79.57%	82.79%	81.43%	85.06%
N	328	215	237	174

* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
*** significant at 0.001 level
Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors
--^-- perfectly predicts failure and is dropped from the model

BINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES FOR THE EFFECT OF REGIME TYPE

ON CONSULTATION PACT CONDITIONS

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Anocracy Dummy	0.8296** (0.3283)	0.7849** (0.3450)	0.6091 (0.3648)	0.5735 (0.3849)
Democracy Dummy	1.3029*** (.2574)	1.5187*** (0.2816)	1.2540*** (0.3077)	1.4428*** (0.3266)
CINC Score	8.4571** (2.9721)	8.3955** (3.2297)	-1.8785 (4.3079)	-2.8229 (4.5587)
Major Power	-0.0189 (0.4193)	0.1400 (0.4478)	0.3946 (0.4824)	0.4081 (0.4960)
Power Preponderance	-1.1850** (0.4434)	-1.4183** (0.4717)	-0.5845 (0.5057)	-0.7748 (0.5361)
Contiguity	-1.1694*** (0.3343)	-1.1479** (0.3702)	-0.2744 (0.4063)	-0.4329 (0.4435)
Trade	-------	-0.0003** (0.0000)	-------	-0.0002* (0.0001)
Joint MIDs (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	0.0072 (0.0276)	0.0194 (0.0291)
Joint Enemy (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	0.4043 (0.2893)	0.4443 (0.3106)
Adversarial MID (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	0.5443 (0.3053)	0.4407 (0.3236)
Constant	-1.2292 (0.2223)	-1.1007 (0.2292)	-1.5992 (0.3767)	-1.6338 (0.3983)
Log Likelihood	-250.7783	-229.1074	-208.8445	-194.047
Correctly Classified	71.11%	72.09%	63.22%	65.85%
N	450	412	348	328

* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
*** significant at 0.001 level
Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors

APPENDIX F

OLS LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE EFFECT OF REGIME TYPE

ON THE DEGREE OF ALLIANCE INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Anocracy Dummy	0.2241*	0.1750	-0.1556	0.1221
	(0.0974)	(0.1087)	(0.1080)	(0.1197)
Democracy Dummy	0.0860	0.0113	-0.0916	-0.1606
	(0.0739)	(0.0850)	(0.0891)	(0.0997)
CINC Score	-2.0367*	-2.1400*	-4.8416***	-5.3056***
	(0.9955)	(1.1191)	(1.4850)	(1.6267)
Major Power	0.1746	0.1585	0.2611	0.2608
	(0.1386)	(0.1518)	(0.1623)	(0.1715)
Power Preponderance	-0.4260***	-0.4220*	-0.3369**	-0.3084*
	(0.1186)	(0.1337)	(0.1375)	(0.1538)
Contiguity	-0.2352**	-0.1798*	-0.1832	-0.1446
	(0.0790)	(0.0925)	(0.0977)	(0.1137)
Trade	-------	0.0000	-------	0.0000
		(0.0000)		(0.0000)
Joint MIDs (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	0.0022	-0.0011
			(0.0079)	(0.0089)
Joint Enemy (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	0.4566***	0.4635***
			(0.0952)	(0.1053)
Adversarial MID (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	0.0506	0.0753
			(0.1051)	(0.1009)
Constant	0.1362	0.2012	-0.0648	0.0104
	(0.0623)	(0.0693)	(0.1051)	(0.1188)
R-Squared	0.0689	0.0550	0.1398	0.1274
N	764	581	619	560

* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
*** significant at 0.001 level
Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors

BINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES FOR THE EFFECT OF REGIME TYPE

ON RATIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Anocracy	-0.4199 (0.2461)	-0.2345 (0.2597)	-0.7120** (0.2902)	-0.5826 (0.3093)
Democracy	-0.6043*** (0.1889)	-0.5035** (0.2015)	-0.7872*** (0.2391)	-0.7404* (0.2530)
CINC Score	0.2632 (2.3456)	-1.5483 (2.4572)	7.5671 (4.0441)	5.3175 (4.0854)
Major Power	-0.9799** (0.3301)	-1.0248** (0.3460)	-1.5865*** (0.4210)	-1.5313*** (0.4294)
Power Preponderance	1.1020*** (0.3177)	1.2475*** (0.3372)	0.8733* (0.3948)	1.0058** (0.4235)
Contiguity	-0.0495 (0.1987)	-0.1434 (0.2152)	-0.7540* (0.2521)	-0.7873* (0.2753)
Trade	-------	0.0000 (0.0000)	-------	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Joint MIDs (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	0.0049 (0.2170)	0.0018 (0.0232)
Joint Enemy (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	-0.1044 (0.2447)	-0.1181 (0.2609)
Adversarial MID (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	-1.2438*** (0.2378)	-1.3945*** (0.2476)
Constant	1.2492 (0.1647)	1.0782 (0.1687)	1.9867 (0.3120)	1.8900 (0.3314)
Log Likelihood	-434.2000	-402.8013	-333.6305	-309.9509
Correctly Classified	74.05%	72.20%	75.98%	74.57%
N	790	705	637	578

* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
*** significant at 0.001 level
Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors

APPENDIX H

BINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES FOR THE EFFECT OF PARTNER REGIME TYPE

SIMILARITY ON THE DEGREE OF MILITARY COMMITMENT

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Partner Regime Type Difference (absolute value)	-0.0556* (0.0248)	-0.0577** (0.0271)	-0.0619** (0.0290)	-0.0716** (0.0315)
CINC Score	3.6579 (2.2313)	1.8220 (2.4571)	-5.1099 (3.6665)	-8.3570** (4.4221)
Major Power	-0.4611 (0.3104)	0.1008 (0.3400)	0.5653 (0.3722)	1.0988*** (0.4121)
Power Preponderance	-0.0145 (0.2603)	-0.3927 (0.2903)	-0.6239** (0.3255)	-0.9867*** (0.3667)
Contiguity	-0.4592** (0.2250)	-0.6984*** (0.2669)	-0.0704 (0.2405)	-0.2138 (0.2879)
Trade	-------	-0.0005*** (0.0001)	-------	-0.0006*** (0.0001)
Joint MIDs (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	-0.0140 (0.0182)	-0.0289 (0.0207)
Joint Enemy (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	-0.2083 (0.2120)	0.3554 (0.2478)
Adversarial MID (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	-0.0171 (0.2299)	-0.2519 (0.2554)
Constant	-0.1389 (0.1322)	0.1442 (0.1575)	0.0742 (0.2212)	0.3993 (0.2569)
Log Likelihood	-507.56767	-424.31434	-387.43093	-322.52401
Correctly Classified	59.37%	60.88%	62.85%	66.53%
N	758	669	603	540

* significant at 0.10 level
** significant at 0.05 level
*** significant at 0.01 level
Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors

OLS LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE EFFECT OF PARTNER REGIME TYPE

SIMILARITY ON THE DEGREE OF ALLIANCE INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
LN Partner Regime Type Difference (absolute value)	0.8689** (0.0332)	0.0671 (0.0370)	0.0373 (0.0361)	-0.0023 (0.0398)
CINC Score	-2.8808** (1.1088)	-2.7652* (1.2083)	-4.9932** (1.5744)	-5.0777* (1.6799)
Major Power	0.1121 (0.1470)	0.1148 (0.1633)	0.1699 (0.1708)	0.2373 (0.1825)
Power Preponderance	-0.2494* (0.1304)	-0.2655 (0.1483)	-0.2463 (0.1513)	-0.2874 (0.1696)
Contiguity	-0.1768* (0.0862)	-0.1013 (0.1007)	-0.1496 (0.1078)	-0.0555 (0.1278)
Trade	-------	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-------	-0.0001* (0.0000)
Joint MIDs (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	0.0021 (0.0086)	-0.0025 (0.0096)
Joint Enemy (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	0.2364** (0.0977)	0.2549** (0.1128)
Adversarial MID (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	0.2147* (0.1047)	0.2549* (0.1128)
Constant	0.1109 (0.0579)	0.1787 (0.0676)	-0.0963 (0.1005)	0.0250 (0.1230)
R-Squared	0.0561	0.0465	0.1097	0.1130
N	632	565	505	456

* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
*** significant at 0.001 level
Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors
Note: Partner Regime Type Difference variable was logged to correct for skew and non-linearity

APPENDIX J

BINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES FOR THE EFFECT OF PARTNER REGIME TYPE

SIMILARITY ON DEFENSE PACT CONDITIONS

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Partner Regime Type Difference (absolute value)	0.0057 (0.0475)	0.0593 (0.0701)	0.0821 (0.0660)	0.1101 (0.1010)
CINC Score	14.9294*** (3.6784)	16.8040*** (6.5638)	34.6023*** (12.2563)	160.6636** (85.6892)
Major Power	2.6946*** (1.1012)	8.4718*** (3.0715)	0.2606 (1.6038)	-1.5857 (4.7884)
Power Preponderance	-6.4803*** (1.0942)	-13.9099*** (3.2643)	-5.9723*** (1.3807)	-11.5031*** (3.5959)
Contiguity	-0.1774 (0.5657)	---^---	0.1466 (0.6424)	---^---
Trade	-------	0.0017*** (0.0004)	-------	0.0057*** (0.0021)
Joint MIDs (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	-0.0210 (0.0436)	0.0513 (0.0603)
Joint Enemy (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	2.1464*** (0.5459)	-0.1857 (0.8897)
Adversarial MID (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	-2.2197*** (0.5950)	-1.1911 (0.6901)
Constant	-0.0637 (0.2399)	-0.2949 (0.3762)	-0.2387 (0.4901)	-0.9918 (0.6901)
Log Likelihood	-143.77504	-75.258078	-93.593452	-48.193193
Correctly Classified	77.35%	87.00%	80.65%	85.23%
N	309	223	217	149

* significant at 0.10 level
** significant at 0.05 level
*** significant at 0.01 level
---^--- contiguity perfectly predicts failure and is dropped from the model
Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors

BINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES FOR THE EFFECT OF PARTNER REGIME TYPE

SIMILARITY ON CONSULTATION PACT CONDITIONS

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Partner Regime Type Difference (absolute value)	0.0965*** (0.0358)	0.0803** (0.0389)	0.0899** (0.0399)	0.0785* (0.0429)
CINC Score	6.1199** (2.6549)	5.8243** (2.8225)	-5.3243 (4.3020)	-6.0162 (4.6569)
Major Power	0.47913 (0.4159)	0.6935 (0.4481)	0.7267 (0.4758)	0.8092 (0.4966)
Power Preponderance	-1.1598*** (0.4439)	-1.2093*** (0.4765)	-0.2133 (0.5030)	-0.4126 (0.5422)
Contiguity	0.4330 (0.4645)	0.2025 (0.5200)	0.3007 (0.4770)	0.2293 (0.5301)
Trade	-------	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-------	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Joint MIDs (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	-0.0136 (0.0278)	0.0028 (0.0298)
Joint Enemy (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	0.7141*** (0.2877)	0.6762** (0.3295)
Adversarial MID (10 yrs.)	-------	-------	-0.0214 (0.3264)	-0.2959 (0.3786)
Constant	-1.0641 (0.1862)	-0.9356 (0.2235)	0.0742 (0.2212)	-1.0658 (0.3498)
Log Likelihood	-247.12019	-209.49668	-198.19972	-169.76502
Correctly Classified	72.07%	73.08%	66.25%	67.03%
N	426	364	323	279

* significant at 0.10 level
** significant at 0.05 level
*** significant at 0.01 level
Note: numbers in parentheses are standard errors