FUNCTION AND EPIGENESIS IN KANT’S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

by

BRANDON W. SHAW

(Under the Direction of O. Bradley Bassler)

ABSTRACT

In this thesis, I provide a reading of the Transcendental Analytic of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason which is very sympathetic to Beatrice Longuenesse’s interpretation as put forth in her commentary Kant and the Capacity to Judge. I criticize her work, however, as implementing an improper retroactivity which can be corrected by understanding Kant’s architectonic of mind not as a preformed entity, but a product which will develop into an organism. Epigenesis provides the model for this development which culminates in Reason, existing first as Sensibility and then Understanding. This thesis is to function as a prolegomena, since here Sensibility and Understanding, their interaction and the grounds for their similarity, are the topic. I attempt to demonstrate how it is that Kant’s Function is concept which connects Sensibility and Understanding to one another, and that it provides a means to account for their similarities.

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To

My mother,

who taught me to wonder,

and

Brad,

who taught me to wander.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis, as I imagine every other, has a story of its own development, the logical flow seeming less like a concatenation than a tragedy in several parts. I initially hoped to redeem a paper written on the ens realissimium and Kant’s critique of the ontological argument for Professor Bassler during my first semester of Graduate School. My study of the ens realissimium seemed feckless because I did not understand what Kant meant by Reason. Kant wrote often of the nature of Reason, that it seeks the condition for the unconditioned, but he never said why. The principle of Kant’s Reason is lacking. Not the principle of reason that runs, For every thing that is, there is a reason, but the ground for this principle, the principle for this ground. Why should we, or do we, think that there is a reason for things? If questioning is, as Heidegger once held, the piety of thought, why is that so? Again, questions, but no answer to the question of our questioning.

The final answer to my question about questioning seemed to lie in this passage:

“the Idea of Reason is an analogue of a schema of Sensibility, but with this difference: application of the Concepts of Understanding to the schema of Reason is not likewise (as is application of the categories to their sensible schemata) a cognition of the object itself, but is only a rule or principle for the systematic unity of all use of the Understanding” (A 665/B 693).

From this I inferred that somehow Reason’s tendency must lie first in Understanding. Through reading Longuenesse, I came to see that a certain teleology seems to be at work in the production of Thought for Kant, guiding the original apprehension of the manifold
Chapter One: Introduction

so that it can be subsumed beneath the pure Concepts. If, then, it is axiomatic for Kant that form precedes matter, we are left to inquire about the origin of this form. Why does Thought have this form instead of another? Why is it oriented toward producing a certain kind of unity?

Some of these questions seem to be lacking a satisfying response, but it does seem for Kant that our cognition does manifest a certain tendency towards the formation of objects. Chapter One concerns the A Edition of the Transcendental Deduction, focusing upon the “bottom-up” account of the production of the phenomenal object or the object of Experience. There I try to point out a nascent teleology at work in the three syntheses of the Deduction, demonstrating an orientation in the synthesis in Intuition towards Imagination, and in the synthesis in Imagination towards the formation of an object of Experience in the synthesis in Understanding. Following this example of the formation of an object of Experience based upon what is first piecemeal in Intuition, in Chapter Two I introduce a second means of accounting for unity, the Function. In order to understand what the Function is for Kant, several other terms of Kant’s cant are analyzed, especially Thought, the object, Judgment, concepts in general, and pure Concepts. Finally, in Chapter Three I investigate epigenesis as a model of development which makes possible an orientation toward a telos that avoids what Kant considers to be the metaphysical pitfalls of the preformationist account. But I also argue, in the Conclusion, that epigenesis provides a model which can salvage much of Longuenesse’s system even if one rejects her fundamental thesis that the figurative synthesis fully expounded only in the Schematism retroactively effects the entire architectonic of mind.
Chapter One: Introduction

I have capitalized terms of Kant’s nomenclature for two reasons. First I simply wish to draw attention to these terms, since much of the labor of this thesis is made with the hope of clarifying what Kant means by “Judgment,” “Function,” and “Concept,” for example. Second, since it is difficult to write a lengthy interpretation without using such words as concept and understanding, the capitalization obviates a confusion between Kant’s specialized meaning attached to such words of such terms and the “vulgar” value I intend. I have systematically capitalized Intuition and Judgment only as they denote the capacities of mind, and not the intuitions and judgments which are formed by those capacities.

I have used Pluhar’s excellent translation of the Critique of Pure Reason, although I have also consulted the German text. Although I agree with Pluhar—and I hope that anyone who’s spent any time with Kant would also—that Kant’s account of Experience cannot be overly distanced from a strictly representational theory which considers Vorstellungen along lines of impressions made in our malleable brain-matter, I nonetheless have consistently substituted his translating Vorstellung and vorstellen as “presentation” and “present” respectively, for “representation” and “represent.” I have left his brackets as they are found in his translation. Words found between angle brackets (“<” and “>”) represent my own comments. I have used this same method when adding to passages which have no brackets and in using translations other than Pluhar’s or when quoting secondary literature.
Chapter One: Introduction

Finally, I would like to thank my family, friends, professors, and colleagues for their numerous and various contributions which have allowed this thesis to come about. My parents have supported me in every way throughout my education. The brethren at University Church have patiently supported me with prayers and counsel (and food!) not only during the time while I was writing this thesis, but also throughout my undergraduate schooling and time in Germany. Many heated discussions over heated and chilled beverages with fellow students over the years have sharpened me in innumerable ways. I have especially benefited from discussions with colleagues in and on smoke-breaks outside of Professor Bassler’s seminar entitled “Principles and Categories from Leibniz to Peirce,” as well as in the graduate catacombs of Peabody Hall and the aromatic four walls of Espresso Royale Café. Finally I would like to extend my gratitude and admiration to Professors Brad Bassler (Philosophy) and Tom Cerbu (Comparative Literature), who have been as patient, attentive, encouraging, and knowledgeable professors as one could ever have the privilege of studying under.
Chapter 2:
THE A DEDUCTION AS EXEMPLAR OF THE
SURREPTITIOUSLY TELEOLOGICAL SYNTHESIS

Longuenesse’s Kant interpretation is marked by her making explicit the teleological, organic structure of the production of the object of Experience from the given manifold at the beginning of the process of cognition. This chapter is largely a summary, though not an uncritical one, of Longuenesse’s work on the A Deduction. I place emphasis upon the teleological aspect at work in each of the three syntheses; the teleology in such passages is often marked by the “with the aim/goal of...”motif. The A Deduction then provides several examples of this orientation towards a goal which, though initially not specified, is the aim of the three syntheses. This common goal may also ground the intra-cohesiveness and compatibility of the product of the three syntheses in Intuition, Imagination, and Understanding.

The A Deduction introduces and explicates three syntheses which operate in the representations produced by Intuition (a sensation), Imagination (an imaginary object, *Einbildung*), and Understanding (a Concept). These syntheses will only lead to the cognition of a phenomenon, an object appearing in the form of space and time and subsumed beneath its appropriate Categories, if they each “belong to one and the same
Chapter Two: The A Deduction

act of synthesis of the spatiotemporal manifold.”¹ The form of this synthesis lies already prepared in the mind and is a priori, and its product is (1) a synthesis of the manifold of Intuition, presenting this manifold “as” manifold, (2) the image (Einbildung) produced from this manifold by Imagination, and (3) the concept of the Understanding under which other representations may be subsumed.

The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition

By the beginning of the A Edition of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant has already demonstrated in the Transcendental Aesthetic that every Intuition appears according to the Forms of Sensibility, Space and Time. Still, though what is provided to us at this earliest stage of Kant’s account of the formation of Experience is called a manifold, it is not yet the manifold “as” manifold. This proto-manifold, or what Kant calls a “synopsis” of the manifold², provides only “indeterminate empirical intuitions,” given only as an “absolute unity” occurring in a “single moment” and not yet as distinguished. The mind at this stage resembles Hegel’s description of the “feeling soul” at the beginning of his *Philosophy of Mind*.³

The soul, when contrasted with the macrocosm of Nature as a whole, can be described as the microcosm into which the former is compressed, thereby removing its asunderness. Accordingly the same determinations which in outer Nature appear as freely existent spheres, as a series of independent shapes, are here in the soul deposed to mere qualities.

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² A 97. L1, 37, fn. 9. Longuenesse cites the work of Wayne Waxman detailed in his *Kant’s Model of the Mind* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 218-225 as fundamental to her understanding of the synoptic manifold (L1 37).
Chapter Two: The A Deduction

The two means by which this proto-manifold will be distinguished are according to its matter and according to time. Kant writes:

“Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as a manifold only insofar as the mind distinguishes the Time in the sequence of one impression upon another; for each representation, insofar as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything except absolute unity. In order that unity of Intuition may arise out of this manifold (as is required in the representation of Space) it must first be run through, and held together. This act I name the Synthesis of Apprehension.” (A 99)

The synthesis in Intuition then makes possible the manifold “as” manifold (the “unity of Intuition” which “may arise from this manifold”) by synthesizing, i.e., “running through and holding together,” the proto-manifold. Within this Synthesis of Apprehension in an intuition a chronological distinction is made. Thus this manifold is no longer an “absolute unity”—so called because of its lack of chronological discreteness ordering intuitions according to the time of their formation, and not because of a simplicity which it as manifold cannot possess⁴; this manifold is instead distinguished according to the Form of inner Intuition elucidated in the Transcendental Aesthetic. “The temporality we are dealing with here is generated by the very act of apprehending the manifold,”⁵ not according to an externally existing time. The synthesis then distinguishes the proto-manifold according to its parts, or its spatiality (e.g., straight, round, etc), and, if it is an empirical Intuition, also according to its qualia (e.g., red, cold, bitter, etc.).

The aforementioned teleological aspect of the Deduction is already perceivable in this first synthesis. In this instance, the synthesis of the proto-manifold into the manifold

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⁴ Cf. Longuenesse’s response to De Vleeschauwer’s criticism that Kant’s holding this manifold to be an absolute unity and a manifold is contradictory, L1 pp. 38-9, fn. 10.
⁵ Ibid., 37.
Chapter Two: The A Deduction

“as” manifold “aims at unifying what is distinguished,” which is only possible if the proto-manifold is such that it allows for such a unification. The work done by the Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition is not merely the distinguishing of the synoptic manifold, resulting perhaps in a plethora of discrete intuitions, but also the *synthesis of this synopsis*, making its different parts no longer an “absolute unity,” but distinguished according to the sequence of their impressions of the parts of the manifold upon each other.

The picture which this stage of Kant’s phenomenology provides is that of a series of images in which qualia and shapes are perceivable and the sequence of these images is chronologically ordered, but the matter of the images is not yet related to other images, and there are no identifiable objects.

In addition to synthesizing the empirical proto-manifold, the Synthesis of Apprehension also unifies the pure Intuitions of Space and Time. Kant writes

>This Synthesis of Apprehension must also be exercised *a priori*, that is, in respect of representations which are not empirical. For without it we should never have *a priori* the representations either of Space or of Time. They can be produced only through the synthesis of the manifold which Sensibility presents in its original receptivity. We have thus a pure Synthesis of Apprehension. (A 99)

That we have a priori representations of Space is demonstrable by geometry, which has an a priori, pure “matter.” Kant is here investigating the grounds for the possibility of pure, a priori intuitions, which should not be confused with such an investigation of a priori, but synthetic judgments. Longuenesse argues from this passage that this a priori,

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6 Ibid., 38.
7 Cf. “All Theoretical Sciences of Reason Contain Synthetic A Priori Judgments as Principles” from the Introduction to the B Edition (B 16-17) concerning pure geometry.
synthesized manifold “alone makes the sensible manifold perceivable qua manifold.”\(^8\) Such an interpretation, were it of this passage alone, might be considered a misreading since Kant writes, “This <not “thus the”> Synthesis of Apprehension must be also <not “previously have been”> exercised \textit{a priori}...” It is certainly conceivable that these two syntheses are independent of one another, understanding Kant’s “auch” (also) as “this synthesis, while it is to be/ has been exercised a posteriori, must additionally be exercised \textit{a priori}...” and not “additionally/further, such a synthesis must be exercised \textit{a priori}.” Longuenesse bases her interpretation in part upon what she calls the mathematical nature of the A Deduction versus the logical nature of the B Deduction.\(^9\) Kant’s extensive usage of mathematical examples (e.g., lines, points, geometrical features) reveals his intention of establishing the unity of an object upon the foundation of mathematics instead of logic. We will further consider whether Longuenesse is justified in her interpretation when we investigate Imagination. In the mean time, the following passage gives some credence to her view: “<Sense, Imagination, and Apperception can each> be considered as empirical, viz., in its application to given appearances. But all of them are also a priori elements or foundations that make possible even this empirical use of them” (A 115). Nonetheless, it does seem to me that Longuenesse is at least premature, if not unwarranted, in her ascribing a foundational role to the pure synthesis of the manifold; there is not strong enough evidence preceding the Synthesis of Apprehension to support her reading.

\(^8\) Ibid.
\(^9\) Cf. Ibid., 33-35 on the differences between the Deductions and methodological superiority of the B Deduction.
The Synthesis of Reproduction in a Representation of Imagination

Kant does not object to the empiricists’ axiom that any representation which repeatedly follows another will eventually become associated with that former representation; however, he does find the fact that association occurs following such repetition to be an insufficient account—it is indeed no account—of how the capacity to associate arises. According to Kant, this law of reproduction presupposes that appearances are themselves actually subject to such a rule, and that in the manifold of these representations a conjunction or succession takes place in conformity with certain rules. Otherwise our empirical Imagination would never find opportunity for exercise appropriate to its powers, and so would remain concealed within the mind as a dead and to us unknown faculty. (A 199)

According to Longuenesse, Kant provides only a “program for explaining” how it is that the capacity to associate is provided a regularity which occasions its actualization: “There must then be something which, as the a priori ground of a necessary synthetic unity of appearances, makes their reproduction possible” (A 101), which only posits the existence of such a ground. He does not, however, provide a proof of the “a priori ground of a necessary synthetic unity of appearances” by which the reproduction of these appearances is made possible—i.e., he does not derive the capacity to associate. Instead, Kant provides only a model of a pure reproduction of the manifold, upon which the empirical synthesis is to be founded.

I would both underscore and criticize Longuenesse’s denying that the model of pure Imagination is indeed proof of the empirical ability to associate. Kant has his own notion of a proof, at least insofar as it is an item of nomenclature proper to a Deduction.

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10 Ibid., 39.
11 Ibid., 40.
12 Ibid., 43.
Chapter Two: The A Deduction

Kant writes that a Deduction “is to establish the right, or for that matter the legal entitlement” in jurisprudence (§13, “On the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction as Such,” A 85/B 117). Concerning the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories of the pure Understanding in particular, Kant writes, “when I explain in what way Concepts can refer to objects a priori, I call that explanation the Transcendental Deduction of these Concepts” (ibid.). Thus, explaining the possibility of application (“…in what way Concepts can refer…”) provides a Deduction (“…I call that explanation the Transcendental Deduction”). Therefore, if Kant can explain how association might apply a priori to objects Experience as such, or, what I think amounts to the same thing, if he can establish the possibility of Imagination as a function which applies a priori to any empirical object, then he has deduced it, at least according to how he explains Deduction in the passage we have just seen. At this point then, Kant has not yet failed to deduce that the Imagination might ground empirical association by means of pure images in Imagination.

Kant finds that Experience as such depends on the “reproducibility of appearances” (A 101), and indeed, were it not for this reproductive capacity, human “experience” would be nothing other than the series of non-conceptualized images contained in the Synthesis of the Manifold of Intuition. Longuenesse writes, “before an associative reproduction ... the occasion for empirical association must be present, that is, the particular form of combination of a phenomenological manifold and its regular repetition.”13 Our encounters with regularly repeating occurrences thus enable our capacity to associate to become active. But how is this possible? How can we associate before the capacity to associate is enabled? It seems that the manifold must already

13 Ibid., 42.
Chapter Two: The A Deduction

contain some sort of regularity—e.g., similar colors, shapes, the regular perception of a feeling of pain given the sensations of a bright orangeness (i.e., fire)—before we have need to associate. Otherwise, we would have a capacity to associate, but nothing possessing characteristics that we could associate.  

But, according to Longuenesse, the primary model of empirical association is not to be found in the empirical manifold, but in the regularity and orderliness occurring in pure, a priori intuitions. Pure intuitions, such as line, time, and number, provide the model of regularity upon which an empirical association might be based, which is all the more perspicuous because of their simplicity. Kant writes:

> For Experience as such necessarily presupposes the reproducibility of appearances. When I seek to draw a line in thought, or think of the time from one noon to another, or even to represent to myself some particular number, obviously the various manifold representations that are involved must be apprehended by me in thought one after the other. But if I always lost from my thoughts the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the antecedent parts of the time period, or the units in the order represented), and did not reproduce them as I proceeded to the following ones, then there could never arise a whole representation; nor could there arise any of the mentioned thoughts—indeed, not even the purest and most basic representations of Space and Time. (A 101-2)

Thus, a “whole representation” of the appearance is necessary for Experience, and such a completeness must belong necessarily also to pure, a priori representations. As the parts of a line are reproduced when the whole line is represented, so the parts of, say, a street are reproduced if I am walking along it and representing to myself the street, thinking that this section of pavement is like the section before it, not only in its qualities, but also

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14 A secondary though somewhat controversial contention of this thesis is that what is given to the Understanding by Sensibility must already possess some sort of order, an order that is not just formal (indeed all of the manifold is in the forms of Space and Time). We will consider passages where Kant states that the content of the manifold must possess some regularity so that the Categories might be “occasioned” to judge this manifold. But further, the Categories are not even formed, properly speaking, until they have called upon by the Logical Forms of Judgment to produce judgments of Experience, i.e., judgments which determine the manifold.
because it is part of the same street. The tendency toward the production of a complete empirical image remains incompletely explained, but at least a model for the completion it seeks is provided, namely the complete representation of a pure intuition.

At this point in Kant’s argument, we are left only with a model for empirical association and no deduction of the foundational relationship of the pure, a priori representations to empirical representations. It is possible to agree that there is a diremption between Kant’s pure model of objects in Imagination and a complete empirical image in Imagination while still taking issue with Longuenesse’s contention that the capacity to associate, which would provide the foundation for the link between the pure models and empirical images, is not proved. For Kant can deduce the pure Imagination by explaining or grounding the possibility of its relation to the manifold. But, and here I agree with Longuenesse, he has not done so. Kant has shown that we do make empirical associations, and believes that there must be a ground for that; and he has shown that pure images presuppose the association of previous images of, for example, dots in our intuition of the number five. But he has not shown that these are one and the same ground. So he has shown that a ground must exist, but he has not deduced this ground—i.e., explained the possibility of a necessary connection between this capacity and the occurrence in the Imagination.\(^\text{15}\)

Nonetheless, Longuenesse elucidates two important factors present in Kant’s pure model. First, number, line, and time are singular intuitions containing a manifold: the segments contained in a line, the units in a number, and the “now’s’” in time. If we think back upon the manifold synthesized “as” manifold, we can then think of another manifold

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\(^{15}\) The parallel situation would be if there were a Transcendental Deduction proving the a priori applicability of the Categories to Experience without a Metaphysical Deduction linking the Categories to the Logical Functions of Judgment.
which synthesizes all of the previous manifolds, containing all of them in one representation, just as the pure, a priori intuitions contain their parts in one representation. Second, the pure, a priori intuitions provide a model of the “aim to represent a whole”, which is a reoccurrence of the “with a view to” theme I mentioned earlier. The representation of the parts of the pure, a priori intuitions (e.g., the parts of the line) is necessitated by the representation of the whole intuition (the whole line).  

“The reproduction of the elements thus takes place only because the goal of the synthesis is the representation of a whole that guides the successive reproduction.” Due to an ungrounded tendency of the Understanding, a complete representation of experience is sought, and “[t]he reproduction of past representations represented as such, and represented as belonging to one and the same series of successively reproduced elements, occurs only if it is called forth by such a goal.” We will later see that this unexplained tendency of the Imagination has its counterpart in Understanding, but let us first examine why it is that Longuenesse finds such a tendency to operate in the synthesis of Imagination. The elements which are parts of a line, the units of a number, and the now’s of time are crucial to such an understanding of the telos of the Understanding’s tendency to present a whole, for it is in this of-ness that the parts are shown not to be merely self-sufficient or unaffected or non-relational entities, but instead parts of a whole, or parts toward a whole. It is, then, in the representation of the whole that the parts might exist qua parts (of a whole), and then like other parts which are likewise possible divisions of this whole.

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16 I am hesitant to say that the pure, a priori Intuitions contain the parts, since space is to be simple. Cf. L1, 218-9 on B 35.
17 Ibid., 42.
18 Ibid.
We see then that Longuenesse’s interpretation of the passage at A 99, arguing that the pure synthesis precedes and is foundational to the synthesis of the manifold, has conceptual—even if not overpowering textual—credibility; the Synthesis in Imagination of an empirical representation at least mimics, if it is not indeed grounded by—an a priori one. There is, however, an obvious discrepancy between the pure, mathematical model and empirical representations. If we again consider the example of the line and a street, it is obvious that what is the same about the different parts of a line is much more similar than any sections of a street could ever be; this is due to the simplicity of pure intuitions versus the complexity contained in the manifold. But this complexity found only in the manifold might cause us to question whether pure intuition can provide a model for the variety encountered in the manifold. For example, the contour and color of a representation of a snow shovel propped in a corner which a museum-connoisseur examines from different angles seem to adhere in that intuition in a way that is much more complex than how the previous now’s are presupposed in our representation of the present. Is this difference not so great that a pure intuition simply cannot provide a model for the many colors and contours of the shovel, and the fact that these colors and contours will change if the person’s point of viewing the shovel changes at all? Surely the same kind and degree of changes could not occur even if it were possible to perceive a line from another side. This discrepancy is evidence that “...generating the representation of a whole of Experience is a more complex operation than generating a geometrical figure or a number,” due presumably to the purity of the mathematical representations versus the diversity of empirical representations, which would make the distinguishing of discrete parts as belonging to particular wholes (and not others) a greater task. Indeed, such an

19 Ibid.
Chapter Two: The A Deduction

analysis would prove impossible without Concepts, the product of the synthesis of recognition.

The Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept

What Kant intends by a concept in the A Deduction is unique not only to his system but also among his (and our) contemporaries’ understandings of its meaning. In the A Deduction, he writes that the concept is “the consciousness of [a] unity of synthesis” (A 103). This aspect of a concept is in contrast, though not contradiction, with the more common, less provocative definition he provides in the *Logik* (§1, Ak. IX, 91): “The concept is a general (*repraesentatio per notas communes*) or reflected representation (*repraesentatio discursiva*)”\(^{20}\). Instead, in the A Deduction, the concept provides what Longuenesse calls the “generic identity”\(^{21}\) of a representation, affording the knowledge that a representation with multiple components (such as a line) or even representations consisting of largely unshared sense data (such as the cinnabar) is/are representative of a single, though complex or changing, object. In the case of the cinnabar, “...the awareness of this generic identity depends on the consciousness (however obscure) of the unity of the act by which these representations are successively apprehended and then reproduced; which is to say, this awareness depends on the (however obscure) consciousness of the act of constitution of the complete experience to which all particular representations of cinnabar belong.”\(^{22}\) What is at work in this unification of experience is not what Kant treats in his analysis of concepts the *Logik*, and neither is this concept one of the pure

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20 “…der Begriff eine allgemeine (*repraesentatio per notas communes*) oder reflectierte Vorstellung (*repraesentatio discursiva*),” translation mine.
21 Ibid., 45.
22 Ibid., 45-46.
Chapter Two: The A Deduction

Concepts of the Understanding (i.e., the Categories). To this “consciousness of the unity of the synthesis,” the consciousness of the “generic identity” of a complex and/or changing representation, however, the title “concept” nonetheless is attached. This concept of the identity of the representations is itself pure even if the representations are themselves empirical. (We will investigate how this pure concept of unity connected to a changing and empirical object is possible when we consider the Transcendental Unity of Apperception and the object of a logical judgment in the next Chapter.) The sometimes seeming arbitrariness in his selection of and the frequent inconsistency in his application of his nomenclature has frustrated many commentators and critics, often seeking a lexicography or an etymological dictionary for his terminology which might provide them some orientation. Inconsistency and arbitrariness in terminology pertain to form, however, and do not necessarily imply an analogous problem in the matter of the thought, although they may indicate such problems. Therefore, the concept here defined, though anomalous, does not necessarily reflect a deep confusion or disheveledness in Kant’s program, and we are justified in dismissing critiques raising only these objections.

Some explanation of Kant’s identifying the “consciousness of the unity of the synthesis” with a Concept can be offered in an examination of what this synthesis contains and provides. Kant writes,

Without the consciousness that what we think is precisely the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless. For there would be in our present state a new representation which would not in any way belong to the act whereby it must have been successively generated. The manifold of the representation would therefore never form a whole, since it would lack that unity which only consciousness can impart to it....For the concept of a number is nothing but the consciousness of this unity of synthesis. (A103, emphasis mine)
Chapter Two: The A Deduction

This recognition is a recognition first of the sameness of an act and not of an object. What is provided by what is called a concept here is the consciousness that the act of unification at any time is performed by me, first of all, and secondly of one and the same object. Thus Kant insists, “We are conscious a priori of the thoroughgoing identity of ourselves in regard to all representations that can ever belong to our cognition, and are conscious of it as a necessary condition for the possibility of all representations” (A 116).

We will explore the architectonic implications later, but I would like first to point out that we have here a proto-concept, not yet a concept “as” concept (the Logik’s discursive Concept), corresponding to the proto-manifold in the synthesis of apprehension in Intuition. A proto-concept’s consciousness of the unity of an act of synthesis of each intuition and a discursive concept are not at odds, for the ability to identify a unity in the acts of apprehension and reproduction of intuitions precedes and is necessary for identifying the sameness of a discursive concept which is the “universal or reflected representation” of the commonalities of those intuitions. Such a reading is buttressed by the following passage:

This one consciousness <the proto-concept> is what unites into one representation what is manifold, intuited little by little, and then also reproduced. This consciousness may often be only faint, so that we do not [notice it] with the act itself, that is, we do not connect it directly with the representation’s reproduction, but [notice it] only in the act’s effect <the empirical concept>. Yet despite these differences, a consciousness must always be encountered, even if it lacks striking clarity; without this consciousness, concepts, and with them cognition of objects, are quite impossible. (A103-4)

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23 My interpretation is in line with Longuenesse’s. Cf. the quote given in this paragraph, in which she writes of “...the consciousness (however obscure) of the unity of the act by which these representations are successively apprehended and then reproduced; which is to say, this awareness depends on the (however obscure) consciousness of the act of constitution of the complete experience...” (Ibid., 45-46).
Chapter Two: The A Deduction

The Concept as a Rule

Concepts, being concepts uniting many objects, possess a universality; but a concept which does have all objects and all other concepts subsumed beneath it must have rules which allow for the subsumption of some and not others. For example, in the concept of body, Kant finds a universality which functions as a rule. All objects we subsume under the concept of body will conform to the rule of that concept by possessing certain traits, such as extension and impenetrability (A106). Longuenesse finds that “rule” here has a dual meaning corresponding to the two operational definitions provided for Concept, whereby a concept is (1) the “consciousness of the unity of an act of synthesis” and (2) the “universal and reflected representation.”24 First, a concept as a rule is “the consciousness of the unity of an act of sensible synthesis or the consciousness of the procedure for generating a sensible intuition.” It is according to the rules specified in a concept that we might know that the type of intuition being presented is, say, a body, because it conforms to the rules of intuition which are subsumed beneath that empirical concept. This providing of the rules which legitimate the subsumption of specific intuitions beneath specific concepts Kant will later call a schema for a concept. Second, a concept as rule provides the “reason to predicate of this object the marks that define the concept.”25 Intuitions might display some of the certain marks (Merkmale) belonging to the complete description of the concept, but not others. For example, an intuition might show itself to be impenetrable, but not extended. But because the intuition is extended, we have reason to subsume it beneath the concept of body, and likewise to ascribe all of the characteristics of a body to it, even if we have not experienced these attributes of the

24 Ibid., 50.
25 Ibid., 50.
intuition. Possessing some traits which belong to the rule, in the first sense (the schema), of a concept provides a reason for our ruling that intuition to be a member of the extension of that concept. Put differently, on the one hand the rule might be considered constitutive of the concept, and on the other it provides the grounds for the legitimate extension of that concept.

Considering the concept as (1) a consciousness of the rules involved in producing an intuition and (2) as the rule which legitimates the subsumption of such intuitions beneath that concept are not contradictory interpretations, but complementary. Longuenesse writes, “because one has generated a schema, one can obtain a discursive rule by reflection and apply this rule to appearances.” Kant writes that the Understanding constantly searches through our appearances for some rule in order that the manifold might be organized beneath concepts. Longuenesse understands this activity as (1) the searching for conformity of appearances to already formed rules and (2) the formation of new rules to accommodate previously “uncategorized” appearances. This activity of the searching for conformity to rules and formation of new rules is possible only if our Experience is unified. For Kant, that unification of Experience is not incidental, but produced by our mind itself. In her interpretation of the A Deduction, Longuenesse argues that “the recognition of these representations under a concept is possible only if the activities described in the first two <syntheses> were always already oriented toward this goal.” Thus it is one and the same agent who performs the single, though three-part, act of apprehending, reproducing, and subsuming our intuitions. The apprehension of intuitions leads to recognition in a concept because the sensible given is

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26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 51.
28 Ibid.
given in such a way that it is always already “geared toward reflection”\(^{29}\) beneath concepts.

Regardless of whether one is sympathetic to Longuenesse’s ascription to Kant of an incipient, camouflaged teleology—and I am—, it is nonetheless clear that for Kant the sensible given is not simply given. Kant’s system disallows a complete passivity of the mind in the formation of Experience. Although Kant characterizes Sensibility as being a receptivity, the way it receives indicates an activity towards the unification of the manifold, that is, a synthesis. Against the Humean objection that what Kant considers the “numerical unity” of the object unified in the three Syntheses and the unity of consciousness of the agent performing these Syntheses is simply the outcome, and not the condition, of Experience, Kant has shown that, even at the first step (the Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition), it was a synthesis, \textit{an activity oriented towards unification}, which is at \textit{work}. And, to complete the counter, an account of human experience which neglects to account for or acknowledge this fundamental \textit{activity is simply deficient}.

\textbf{The Deduction of the A Edition}

Up to this point, we have not seen much of a deduction of the Categories. At best we have seen a description of the production of an object of Experience and a place where some categories might fit, even a priori Categories, but where does the necessity of Categories, and specifically these and no others, come to bear? What the mind affords a priori has largely been limited to pure intuitions which model, but it seems have not been proved to ground, empirical syntheses. Longuenesse focuses almost exclusively upon

\(^{29}\) Ibid., 33. Longuenesse is here addressing the B Deduction, but the terminology holds nonetheless for her interpretation of the A Deduction.
these three syntheses in her Chapter on the A Deduction, all but ignoring the Deduction’s “top-down” Deduction and the Summary given at the end. But it is in these sections that the actual deduction of the Deduction might be said to take place; and it is through an examination of these sections that we might see how it is that a nascent telos is discernable in each of the three syntheses.

**The Categories**

In addition to a priori images, Kant has also demonstrated another way in which a priori structures are at work in empirical cognition, and here their role as foundations for that cognition is evident. In our consideration of the Synthesis in Intuition, we saw that the manifold displays an activity towards unification, that Intuition automatically synthesizes what it receives. Moreover, this synthesis is oriented towards subsumption beneath concepts. As such, appearances in Intuition, which are subject to the forms of Intuition (i.e., Space and Time), are manipulated such that they might be appearances in Experience, which are subject to the forms of Experience. The final sentence of the third synthesis reads:

...just as appearances must in mere Intuition be subject to the formal conditions of space and time, so appearances in Experience might be subject to conditions of the necessary Unity of Apperception—indeed, this law <the transcendental law> says that through these conditions alone does any cognition first become possible. (A 110)

Cognition has two fundamental conditions: the formal conditions of Intuition and Understanding (what Kant calls “Experience” above). The reader’s attention is called for the first time to a parallel that will be repeatedly emphasized for the remainder of the Deduction: as empirical intuitions are subject to the forms of Space and Time expounded
in the Transcendental Aesthetic, appearances in Experience are subject to the necessary Unity of Apperception. Immediately beforehand, Kant calls this same Unity “a priori rules of the synthetic unity of appearances, a priori rules according to which alone their relation in empirical intuition is possible” (ibid.). In the fourth section of the A Deduction, “Preliminary Explanation of the Possibility of the Categories as A Priori Cognitions, Kant writes, “For the form of Experience consists precisely in this thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of perceptions; and this unity is nothing but the synthetic unity of appearances according to Concepts” (A 110). Although our perceptions might differ according to what we encounter, the Form of Experience is always the same, and, writes Kant, “…the Categories set forth above are nothing but the conditions of Thought in a possible Experience, just as Space and Time embody the conditions of Intuition for that same Experience” (A 111).

Kant had shown in the Transcendental Aesthetic that our receptivity is not entirely passive, but instead what we “receive” is already conditioned by the Forms of Intuition, Space and Time. The three Syntheses demonstrated the process of taking the manifold and ultimately subsuming all of it beneath the Unity of Apperception. Kant is now prepared to elucidate the essential Function and parts of the Unity of Apperception. When Kant recapitulates the Deduction from the “top down” he begins with the pure Unity of Apperception. For it is alone through its a priori unity that Experience is possible. First, the concept of the “thoroughgoing identity of oneself in all possible representations” (A 116) in the last of the three Syntheses provided by the Unity of Apperception makes Experience possible. Were it not for this Unity, our representations would be “less than a dream” (A 112), lacking an agent to whom to belong. And if that were so, it would also
be senseless to call them representations (of anything) or presentations (to anyone). Without an “I” making Experience, there is no object.\textsuperscript{30} Thus a transcendental unity is required for any empirical unity. I think this is what Kant means when he uses the term “empirical consciousness” as opposed to the comparatively frequently discussed “transcendental consciousness.” It seems that empirical consciousness is the recognition of all of the empirical perceptions before me are indeed mine. The transcendental consciousness is “the consciousness of myself as an original apperception” (A 117, fn.) which “precedes all experience” (ibid.), and it provides the “I” of which “mine” is the possessive. The transcendental consciousness is the I which does not change regardless of what is being perceived. The transcendental unity is necessary to any empirical unity. If I perceive anything, I must recognize it as my object. An I, provided here by the transcendental unity, is necessary, as is an object to be thought, or which is produced by being thought. All objects I perceive, whether their matter be pure or empirical, will possess this unifying attribute, that they are mine. This being mine is attributed to them by the empirical unity. The empirical unity joins the I of the transcendental unity with the object, making it my object and allowing me to say, “I think” or “I am thinking this object.”\textsuperscript{31}

Second, the Original Unity of Apperception can be properly said to be the house of the Categories, which in turn make Experience possible not according to its content, which is provided by Intuition, nor in providing the numerically identical agent for any experience, but by providing the logical forms of Experience: “…the Categories are

\textsuperscript{30} Cf. A 111 (a “crowd of appearances”) A 112, and A 113 (“For nothing can enter cognition without doing so by means of this Original Apperception.”).

\textsuperscript{31} Kant further examines the I and the I think in the footnote on pages B 422-423. The interpretation I have offered here of the empirical and transcendental unities is compatible with this passage.
nothing but the *conditions of Thought in a possible Experience*…” (A 111). In its relation to the Transcendental Synthesis of Imagination the Unity of Apperception is properly called the Pure Understanding. “Hence there are in the Understanding pure a priori cognitions that contain the necessary unity of the Pure Synthesis of Imagination in regard to all possible appearances. These cognitions, however, are the Categories, i.e., the pure Concepts of the Understanding” (A 119). Again Kant writes, “hence pure Understanding is, through the Categories, the law of the synthetic unity of all appearances; and it thereby first and originally makes Experience possible in terms of its form” (A 128).

**Kant and the Capacity to Make Rules**

We have earlier explicated the *Understanding* in various ways: as a spontaneity of cognition (in contrast to the receptivity of Sensibility); as a power to Think; or as a power of Concepts, or again of judgments. These explications, when inspected closely, all come to the same. We may now characterize the Understanding as our power of rules. This criterion of an Understanding is more fruitful and comes closer to its nature. (A 126)

The Categories are then the conditions or rules given to Intuition through Imagination which dictate what might possibly be experienced. When the Understanding relates to Imagination, it formalizes or “intellectualizes” (A 124) it, and this Function is performed by and/or through the Categories. But the Imagination does not simply hand Understanding a content which is not already prepared for the Forms of Understanding to be imposed upon it; nor is the Understanding itself inactive in that pre-preparation. The Unity of Apperception, through the Categories, must be the basis for the “affinity” which is found in the Imagination:

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32 This intellectualization is the point of origin, logically, not temporally understood, of the Categories. Cf. A 124.
Hence there must be an objective basis (i.e., a basis into which we can have a priori insight prior to all empirical laws of the imagination) on which rests the possibility—indeed, the necessity—of a law extending through all appearances: a law whereby appearances are throughout to be regarded as data of the senses that are intrinsically associative and subject, in reproduction, to universal rules of a thoroughgoing connection. This objective basis of all association of appearances I call their *affinity*. This basis, however, we cannot find anywhere except in the principle of the Unity of Apperception in regard to all cognitions that are to belong to me. (A 122)

As my perceptions, the manifold already possesses a kind of unity, even if my experience has been limited to objects which have no secondary qualities in common. An inquiry into the ground for the unity of the manifold will be a search for an “objective basis” for the contingent and changing empirical manifold. Some of relations of objects in this manifold are more than mere associations or rules which are contingent; they possess a necessity by virtue of which they are properly called not rules, but laws. An inquiry into these laws seeks the ground of Experience, or the laws making Experience possible, which is what the Categories are. And if we are to search out the Whence of the Categories, we will find that they have their root in the Unity of Apperception. Thus Kant writes, “… we see nature in its unity merely in the root power for all our cognition, viz., in Transcendental Apperception; we there see nature in that unity, viz., on whose account alone it can be called object of all possible Experience, i.e., nature” (A 114).

Indeed, the Unity of Apperception is at work in all three Syntheses: “All possible appearances belong, as representations, to the entire possible self-consciousness….Hence appearances are subject to a priori conditions to which their Synthesis (of Apprehension) must conform thoroughly” (A 113). Thus it is evident why it might be called the “root power” for all our cognition. “The Understanding,” Kant writes near the end of the A Deduction, “is always busy scrutinizing appearances with the aim of discovering some
rule in them” (A 126). Some of these rules are found through our experiences and become naturally associated, some we find through experience to be necessary in Experience, and some we discover, independently of Experience, to be necessary to Experience. The latter case is the result of Kant’s transcendental investigation into the conditions of Experience, which allows him to conclude, “Hence Understanding is not merely a power of making rules for oneself by comparing appearances; Understanding is itself legislative for nature” (ibid.). Understanding is then a power of rules insofar as it determines the manifold through one of these rules—i.e., the Categories, a process which is called Judgment in the B Deduction.

Kant seems quite satisfied that he has, through the dependence of Experience upon the Unity of Apprehension, deduced the Categories. It is obvious, however, that if he has succeeded, the work is not complete, for the Categories still have not been sufficiently connected to the Table of Logical Forms of Judgment. Although it would have been simple to redirect the reader to the Metaphysical Deduction, which derives the Categories from the Logical Table and thereby shows how it is that the logical forms of Experience—i.e., the Categories—have as their source the Logical Functions of Judgment, and thus how the activity of the Categories is indeed that of making judgments, Kant neglects to tie the A Deduction to the Logical Functions of Judgment explicitly. Indeed, Judgment and the nomenclature associated with it are conspicuously absent in the A Deduction, although the machinery to discuss it and even emphasize its crucial function in Experience, was already in place.\(^{33}\) Kant attempts to amend this

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\(^{33}\) For example, at A 68/B 93 Kant writes, “Judgment, therefore, is the indirect cognition of an object, viz., the representation of a representation of it.
Chapter Two: The A Deduction

deficiency and take advantage of the previous accomplishments of the Metaphysical Deduction in the B Deduction, to which we now turn our attention.
Chapter 3:

THE REDUCTION OF THE DEDUCTIONS: 
ESTABLISHING THE CONNECTION OF THE A, B, 
METAPHYSICAL, AND TRANSCENDENTAL 
DEDUCTIONS

Reflecting upon what might be considered the most consequential and dense sections of the Critique, Kant writes:

In the Metaphysical Deduction we established the a priori origin of the Categories as such through their complete concurrence with the universal logical Functions of Thought. But in the Transcendental Deduction we exhibited the possibility of them as a priori cognition of objects of an intuition as such (§§ 20, 21) (B 159, §26 “Transcendental Deduction of the Universally Possible Use in Experience of the Pure Concepts of Understanding”)

The final sections of the B Edition of the Transcendental Deduction, §24 through §26, provide new distinctions and nomenclature, filling in some gaps in the previous sections and nuancing some concepts. It is in §26 that Kant retrospectively uses the term Metaphysical Deduction for his previous demonstration of the strict affinity between the Categories and the Forms of logical Judgment in Chapter I of the Analytic of Concepts.

It is also in §26 that Kant re-addresses his distinction between Space as a form of (outer) Intuition, and Space as Formal Intuition, which is the synthesis of the form of outer Intuition before the activity of the Concepts of the Understanding upon the manifold. (B 160-61) Finally in §27 (B 164-169), the “Result of this Deduction of the Concepts of Understanding” and “Brief Sketch of this Deduction,” Kant applies the conclusions of the

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34 This section is entitled “On the Guide for the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of Understanding”, which lays out both the Table of Logical Functions of Judgment and the Table of the Categories.
35 This is actually the second of three major treatments of Space as Formal Intuition. The first occurs in Section I: Space, §2 “Metaphysical Exposition of this Concept”, particularly numbers 3 and 4 of the B Edition. Second is the above treatment at B 159, and finally in the Schematism.
Chapter Three: A, B, MP, and T Deductions

Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions to the central heuristic question of the *Critique*: Given that synthetic judgments are possible a priori (B 19), how might such judgments be applied to Experience? Here in §26, Kant seems to see the labors of analysis completed and the time for application to be ripe. I would like with this chapter to analyze the key terms used in the Metaphysical Deduction in order to ready ourselves for a detailed examination of the Metaphysical Deduction, specifically focusing upon the epigenetic character of the development of the Understanding. Grafting the findings of our analysis back into the pertinent passage from the Metaphysical Deduction will be postponed until the final chapter of this thesis, after we have also made an investigation of epigenesis.

The Metaphysical Deduction

After having delivered the Table of the Logical Functions of Judgment (B 97) and before unveiling the corresponding Table of the Categories (B106) Kant writes the following synopsis of the Metaphysical Deduction:

Dieselbe Function, welche den verschiedenen Vorstellungen in einem Urtheile Einheit giebt, die giebt auch der bloßen Synthesis verschiedener Vorstellungen in einer Anschauung Einheit, welche, allgemein ausgedrückt, der reine Verstandesbegriff heißt. Derselbe Verstand also und zwar durch eben dieselben Handlungen, wodurch er in Begriffen vermittelst der analytischen Einheit die logische Form eines Urtheils zu Stande brachte, bringt auch vermittelst der synthetischen Einheit des Mannigfaltigen in der Anschauung überhaupt in seine Vorstellungen einen transscendentalen Inhalt, weswegen sie reine Verstandesbegriffe heißen, die *a priori* auf Objecte gehen, welches die allgemeine Logik nicht leisten kann.

The same Function that gives unity to the various representations in a *judgment* also gives to the mere synthesis of various presentations in an *intuition* unity, which, speaking generally, is called the pure Concept of

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36 A further concern for Kant is, how synthetic a priori judgments have been *misapplied* to Experience.
Chapter Three: A, B, MP, and T Deductions

Understanding. The same Understanding therefore—and indeed through the same acts whereby it brought about, in Concepts, the logical Form of a judgment by means of analytic unity—also brings, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition as such, into its representations a transcendental content, in virtue of which they are called pure Concepts of Understanding, which apply a priori to objects, which is something general logic cannot accomplish. (A 79/B 105; translation mine)

An analysis of these few dense sentences should provide us with a guiding star by which we might orient ourselves in the tumultuous Metaphysical Deduction. In this chapter we shall primarily be concerned with gaining an understanding of the primary terms used in this passage—namely Function, Form, Concept, and Judgment—and their relationship with one another.

“The same Function. . .” What is a Function?

Function is the foundation of mind as Kant formulates it. However, it is not a foundation which remains immobile while an edifice is built out from it. It is instead Understanding’s characteristic and characterizing action which manifests itself in many forms. Function has form as its product, and a specific, hierarchical form at that. I will argue in the final Chapter that Function is the “common root” (B 29) from which Sensibility and Understanding—even Reason—grow.

The unity produced by Function is a fitting point of embarkment for comprehending the architectonic of mind. At the beginning of “On the Understanding’s Logical Use as Such” Kant writes

Also ist der Verstand kein Vermögen der Anschauung. Es giebt aber außer der Anschauung keine andere Art zu erkennen, als durch Begriffe. Also ist die Erkenntniß eines jeden, wenigstens des menschlichen Verstandes eine Erkenntniß durch Begriffe, nicht intuitiv, sondern discursiv. Alle Anschauungen als sinnlich beruhen auf Affectionen, die Begriffe also auf Functionen. Ich verstehe aber unter Function die Einheit der Handlung,
verschiedene Vorstellungen unter einer gemeinschaftlichen zu ordnen. Begriffe gründen sich also auf der Spontaneität des Denkens, wie sinnliche Anschauungen auf der Receptivität der Eindrücke. Von diesen Begriffen kann nun der Verstand keinen andern Gebrauch machen, als daß er dadurch urtheilt. Da keine Vorstellung unmittelbar auf den Gegenstand geht, als bloß die Anschauung, so wird ein Begriff niemals auf einen Gegenstand unmittelbar, sondern auf irgende eine andre Vorstellung von demselben (sie sei Anschauung oder selbst schon Begriff) bezogen.

<…> Understanding is not a power of Intuition. Apart from Intuition, however, there is only one way of cognizing, viz., through Concepts. Hence the cognition of any understanding, or at least of the human Understanding, is a cognition through Concepts; it is not intuitive, but discursive. All our intuitions, as sensible, rest on our being affected; Concepts, on the other hand, rest on Functions. By Function I mean the unity of the act of arranging various representations under one common representation. Hence Concepts are based on the spontaneity of Thought, whereas sensible intuitions are based on the receptivity for impressions. Now the only use that the Understanding can make of these Concepts is to judge by means of them. But in such judging, a Concept is never referred directly to an object, because the only kind of representation that deals with its object directly is intuition. (A 68/B 93)

First, Function is the “unity of act” of unification. It is the unity in this action, but it is also the unity which is the result of this unified action. If this resulting unity is the end to be attained, then we see that the Function is the capacity which produces a form when actualized. The kind of unity it brings about is specific, namely one “arranging various representations under one common representation.” This is the primary activity—I resist writing “functional function”—of Function. Concepts rest on Functions, and, coupled with or because of that, they are “based on the spontaneity of Thought.”

Function is “spontaneity of Thought,” the latter can be characterized as the active, as opposed to passive, subsumption of intuitions to Categories, by which these intuitions are made objects. Our investigation of Thought follows, but it can already be asserted that not only this subsumption, but also the organization which is brought to the spontaneous activity of Thought is the product of the Function at work in Thought.
Chapter Three: A, B, MP, and T Deductions

Function is responsible for the organization of specific intuitions beneath empirical concepts which contain the general rules for such intuitions (e.g., the subsumption of physical objects beneath the concept of body), insofar as this unity is emblematic of the “arranging various representations under one common representation” which Function is said to produce. Function is then the action which provides a specific unity for the spontaneous subsumption of intuitions beneath concepts such that these intuitions do not remain disparate or only loosely connected, but it brings about some unity of the whole according to a hierarchy, specifically a hierarchy of the particular subsumed beneath the more general. I hope to show that Function has other roles, but such an investigation should wait until we have considered Thought and its constituent parts—i.e., concepts—and action—i.e., Judgment.

Thought

Thought is a capacity unique to humans, a faculty not possessed in full by animals and which is utterly lacking in God. Even without performing an exhaustive examination of Thought we can establish that it is uniquely human, or that it at least must be unique to sentient beings. Our Thought is different from any animal’s cognition at least in part because it is capable of subsuming several particular intuitions beneath a general concept. So, for example, my pet lemur might recognize the bananas I bring her to eat, and thus have some rudimentary and incomplete concept of bananas, but she won’t subsume these bananas under a general concept of fruit which excludes all vegetables, and she certainly wouldn’t be able to establish, for example, its elliptical shape as being abstractly

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Chapter Three: A, B, MP, and T Deductions

contained in the pure intuition of a circle. God’s cognition, as Kant conceives it, is not founded upon the pure Concepts, nor does God intuit passively, so the kind of cognition God’s mind performs is not properly called Thought.

Kant writes, “Concepts, on the other hand, rest on Functions <…> Concepts are based on the spontaneity of Thought” (A 68/B 93). If Kant does not intend the readers to understand this “rest” (beruhen) and “based upon” (sich begründen auf) as signifying different actions, then we might deduce that Concepts are founded upon Functions and the spontaneity of Thought. Function and spontaneity are similar activities for Kant. He identifies the action unified in a Function as “spontaneity of Thought”—the active, as opposed to receptive, “cognition through concepts” (A 69/B 94). But what is Thought? Shortly after the quote given above, Kant writes “Thought is cognition through concepts; and concepts, as predicates of possible judgments, refer to some representation of an as yet undetermined object.” Kant’s description of Thought in “Phenomena and Noumena” echoes this description. There Kant writes that Thought “is the act of referring intuitions to an object” (A247/B 304). Thought is a kind of action, namely cognition, which involves concepts, and a result of this action is a judgment concerning an intuition of an object. An examination of each of these terms—Judgment, Concepts, and objects—is the substance of the following sections of this chapter.

Kant again treats Thought in the B Deduction, there describing it as “the act of bringing into the Unity of Apperception the Synthesis of the manifold that has, in Intuition, been given to it from elsewhere” (B 145). This description harkens back explicitly to the three Syntheses of the A Deduction, where the Unity of Apperception is the result of the final Synthesis, the Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept. Thought is,
broadly conceived, the action which forms a phenomenon or object of Experience in the A Deduction. At the same time, an intuition becomes an object of Experience in the submitting of the manifold beneath the forms of Thought—i.e., the Categories.

An analysis of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception, which presents the consciousness of the fact that it is the same object which has been synthesized by one and the same person in Intuition, Imagination, and Understanding, concludes the A Deduction and is the beginning of the B Deduction. The Transcendental Unity of Apperception will be fundamentally involved in any action which might be called Thought. For not only does it provide a consciousness of the unity of the object, but also of the agent in whose mind this synthesis and judgment is being performed. Kant implies this unifying of the two objects (which we will soon see are transcendental objects) in this passage:

For the empirical consciousness that accompanies different representations is intrinsically sporadic and without any reference to the subject’s identity. Hence this reference comes about not through my merely accompanying each presentation with consciousness, but through my adding one representation to another and being conscious of their synthesis. Hence only because I can combine a manifold of given representations in one consciousness is it possible for me to present the identity itself of the consciousness in these representations...For otherwise I would have a self as many-colored and varied as I have representations that I am conscious of. (B 133-134)

The object is then unified as one object, and it is my object, i.e., it is one object, and the different representations of it are unified in my making a judgment about it. Both the subject and the predicate of the sentence “I think,” which is produced by the Transcendental Unity of Apperception, are then significant: I, a unified agent, think, that is, judge the diverse as a unified object through a process of whose unity I am conscious.

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38 Cf. B 137: “On this Unity, consequently, rests the very possibility of the Understanding.”
Finally, there is another function which applies to Thought. In the Preface to the Second Edition, Kant distinguishes thinking an object from cognizing it:

In order for me to *cognize* an object I must be able to prove its [real] possibility (either from its actuality as attested by Experience, or a priori by means of Reason). But I can *think* whatever I want to […] All that is required in order for me to think something is that I do not contradict myself, i.e., that my Concept be a [logically] possible thought. (B xxvi, footnote)

Cognition in this sense is then limited to Experience. One might cognize any object in her field of vision, and acts of reproductive imagination are also properly called cognitions. Thought on the other hand is responsible for the establishment of Concepts of which Experience is impossible, e.g., the Concept of God as an *ens realissimum* which, though it is logically possible (if not necessary, according to Kant), cannot be an object of Experience. This understanding of the term Thought, however, is anomalous in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

**The Object**

There is perhaps no more perplexing and fundamental concern in Kantian philosophy than grasping the status of objects, both as they are differentiated in his nomenclature—e.g., there are definite and indefinite objects, objects of appearance, appearances, intuitions, objects of experience, and so on—and their peculiar ontological status. My understanding is that Kant insists that all judgments and intuitions are judgments and intuitions about some thing, about some object. In order to argue for this hypothesis, I would first like to consider again the object of a pure intuition in the A Deduction, then the object of a judgment. In the cases of both pure Intuition and Judgment, the object is
not necessarily logically entailed by Kant’s definition, for it seems plausible that we could simply have at least intuitions which are not intuitions of some thing. Nonetheless, though human Understanding is bound to the same logic to which any creature, and perhaps the creator itself, is bound, that human element carries with it a demand, a demand for an object. That our intuitions and judgments be about something is the pragmatic demand of pure Understanding, and it is perhaps the egg whence came the serpent which led Reason to trespass its bounds.

The Object = X: The Sum of Experience

In the A Edition, Kant writes that all judgments of Experience are judgments about an object x “on which the Understanding relies in order to cognize nonetheless that the predicate belongs to that subject” (A 8). That is, if a judgment of Experience is to make a synthetic judgment attributing to something a predicate which is not contained in the concept of that object, the judgment will be about an object x, which Kant calls the “complete experience of the object” (ibid.). In respect of the judgment, All bodies are heavy, “Experience is the x that lies outside the concept A [of body] and makes possible the synthesis of the predicate B of heaviness with the concept A” (ibid.). In this example, the predicate (here also called a concept) “heavy” does not belong analytically to the concept of body as some other concepts, such as “extended”, might. Therefore, in the judgment “All bodies are heavy” a predicate is synthetically added to the concept of body in a judgment about an object x. But this object x is the “complete Experience of the object” or “the whole of Experience” (B 12) that can be predicated to the concept of body. The concept of body contains (analytically) several other concepts, such as
“extended.” We return to Experience in order to see that heaviness is also properly ascribable to any object in Experience which is also an extended body. The difference between these two predicates of body is that extended is analytically contained in the concept of body, whereas heavy is added synthetically to the concept. Experience informs the synthesis; for it is conceivable that we could live in a world where bodies are not heavy (or are only imperceptibly so), whereas an unextended body is a contradiction in terms. It seems that any second-order qualities, such as color and taste, would also fit into this category of concepts/predicates which are shown through Experience to be properly applied to any object of Experience, which will qua body also have certain first-order qualities, such as “extension, impenetrability, shape, etc.” (ibid.). Experience then is the x which allows putting together in a synthetic judgment two concepts which are not contained in each other.

**The Transcendental Object = X: Guarantee of the Subjective Universality of Judgments**

…[A]ppearances themselves are nothing but sensible representations. But representations in themselves must not in the same way be regarded as objects (outside our power of representation). What, then, do we mean when we talk about an object corresponding to, and hence also distinct from, cognition? We can easily see that this object must be thought only as something as such = x. …We find, however, that our Thought of the reference of all cognition to its object carries with it something concerning necessity. It does so inasmuch as this object is regarded as what keeps our cognitions from being determined haphazardly or arbitrarily, [and as what ensures,] rather, that they are determined a priori in a certain way. For these cognitions are to refer to an object, and hence in reference to this object they must also necessarily agree with one another, i.e., they must have that unity in which the concept of an object consists. (A 104)
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It is certainly tempting to understand the object = x here in the A Deduction as the thing in-itself which “keeps our cognitions from being determined haphazardly or arbitrarily” by being the thing in-itself of which some predicates might be properly ascribed, and others not. This reading is tempting due to what I hold as a defective interpretation of a passage occurring slightly later in the A Deduction, where Kant writes “[A]ppearances are themselves only representations that in turn have their object. This object, therefore, can no longer be intuited by us, and may hence be named the nonempirical object, i.e., the transcendental object = x” (A 109). However, tendencies to interpret this x as the noumenal object should be thwarted by the paragraph immediately following the sentences we’ve just seen: “The pure concept of this transcendental object (which object is actually always the same, = x, in all our cognitions) is what is able to provide all our empirical concepts in general with reference to an object, i.e., with objective reality” (ibid.). This transcendental object is not a transcendent or noumenal object, if by noumenal object we mean a thing in-itself; it provides unity to our cognition and a priori determination of the—of any—object, which should be distinguished from a determination of a noumenal object, which would be an object in a different sense from the objects of Experience which are the goal of such cognitions as the ones being elucidated in the passages we are here considering.

What is at issue is that “the object is actually always the same, = x, in all our cognitions” (ibid.), not the thing in-itself. What is of concern is “objective reality,” not some noumenal reality. Kant seems to be arguing that in making intuitions into objects of Experience through Judgment, we involve something which has nothing to do with our capacity for receptivity, i.e., something which is super-added to whatever might be
loosely said to affect us, and that unifying entity is the transcendental object = x. It is common to understand this as an early inclusion of the noumenal object which is clumsily thrown in the A Deduction and swept beneath the carpet of the B Deduction; but such a reading, I think, is not in keeping with Kant’s project, even when he’s performing his most serpentine maneuvers in the Deductions. Having stressed that what is of concern here in the object = x is necessary unity and a priori determination, Kant continues:

We are, however, dealing only with the manifold of our representations. And since that x (the object) which corresponds to them is to be something distinct from all our representations, this object is nothing for us. Clearly, therefore, the unity that the object makes necessary can be nothing other than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the representations. (A 105)

So what is at issue is a kind of unity which is necessitated in the object, not a causality—nor even an affectation—which has its origin in a noumenal object, namely in the Transcendental Unity or the I we examined in the previous Chapter. Further, this unity is a formal unity, as opposed to a material one, in the synthesis of the manifold. This “formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the representations” seems to be the transcendental unity of the object introduced in the passage we considered above (B 133-134) concerning the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. We saw that the Transcendental Unity of Apperception creates a unity of the agent perceiving

39 Indeed, the noumenal object is not “proved” until the Refutation of Idealism. It might be argued that the noumenal object was removed from the B Deduction after Kant saw his shoddy “deduction” of it in the A Deduction. It seems more likely, however, that the Refutation was added as Kant’s attempt to remove himself from accusations of being an idealist in the Berkeleyan sense, since Kant admittedly denies transcendent reality to space (Cf. A28/B 44: Hence we assert that space is empirically real (as regards all possible outer experience), despite asserting that space is transcendentally ideal, i.e., that it is nothing as soon as we omit [that space is] the condition of the possibility of all experience and suppose space to be something underlying things in themselves.”). That being so, it is more likely that, to Kant’s mind at least, the A Edition did not adequately stress his belief in the noumenal object, which would belie his having understood the A Deduction as deducing the noumena.
the object, and it also creates a unity in the object itself. This Unity is also called the “consciousness of the unity of the act,” a unified, three-step act combining the synthesized manifold of Intuition with the single image synthesizing a changing object in Imagination into a single concept of an object in Understanding. The awareness that this act is a single act unifying one object in one person’s mind yields the consciousness of the unity of this act, which is only possible because of the unities in the act, namely, of the object, the agent, and the syntheses.

If we were to consider the object only formally, thus independent of any determination (including even the determination specifying if the object is pure or empirical), we would be left with the pure concept of the transcendental object. It is the “pure concept of this transcendental object (…the same, = x, in all our cognitions)…” (A 109) which stands over against the “I” of the “I think” which might accompany all representations of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception.41 This x, which is the same object of all our cognitions, pure or empirical, is likewise produced by a transcendental act. Just as the I is produced by the Transcendental Unity, so also the object of this unity, however that object might be determined, is produced by a transcendental act. It is evident that the pure concept of an object as such could have no other source, for if its source were not transcendental, but empirical, it would necessarily be determined and not applicable to any object whatsoever. This pure concept of an object should however be distinguished from the pure Concepts of objects of Experience, which are themselves specified in order to establish the rules allowing the possibility of

40 L1 110: “…the source of this representation <of the x independent of Experience> is the Transcendental Unity of Apperception itself.”
Experience and its objects. Its relation to the x which is the same in all cognition clearly gives this pure concept of a transcendental object as such a different role.

**The X of All Judgments**

Although the B Deduction moves away from an analysis of the Syntheses producing an object of Experience, as was the method of the A Deduction, and towards the Transcendental Unity of Apperception as providing for the possibility of Experience as such, the object = x persists. However, in the B Deduction with its shift away from an empirical account of the formation of phenomena modeled upon the sort of unity found in pure intuitions, such as that of a line, and towards a logico-discursive case for the possibility of Experience at all based upon the model of logic, not mathematics, the x operates under the guise not of a transcendental object of Experience, but as the object of any judgment. We will consider this object of judgment in the later sections entitled “Judgment: Relating the Manifold to the Transcendental Unity of Apperception” and “Concepts: Predicates of Possible Judgments.”

**Function: Foundation of Concepts and Provider of Unity.**

Kant’s description of a Function is provided in the first Section of the “Transcendental Guide for the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of Understanding.” There he writes that, unlike intuitions, which are “affected” or “based on the receptivity for impressions,” concepts “rest on Functions” (A 68/B 93). Unlike an intuition, which is “the only kind of representation that deals with its object directly” (ibid.), a concept’s relation with an appearance is instead “indirect” in that it is only a representation of other representations.
A concept may only refer in this way to other concepts, for concepts are here also described as representations, but some of these concepts must be concepts of direct representations of sensations (i.e., intuitions). What is specifically being avoided is an idealism of the sort in which concepts are constitutive of and prior to the representations which might be beneath them, and in which these representations in turn are themselves representative of nothing else. In the Introduction to the *Critique* Kant rejects the rationalists’ idea that the examination of a concept could afford knowledge which is itself different from that concept. Kant is ruling out Leibniz’ notion that analysis of a concept could yield predicates which are, according to Kant, not contained in the concept itself; so Kant would disagree, for example, with Leibniz’ contention that “denying Christ” is analytically contained in the concept of “Judas.”

“…that gives unity to the various representations in a Judgment…”

*Function and Judgment.*

The activity of a Function “arranging various representations under one representation” corresponds to one characterization of Judgment. “Judgments are Functions of unity among our representations,” (A 69/B 94) ordering the specific representations beneath more general concepts, and these concepts in turn beneath more general ones, and “we thereby draw many possible cognitions into one” (ibid.). Judgment then exhibits a heuristic function, allowing the Understanding to perform as little cognition as possible because of the organization it produces. The primary role of Judgment then is that of organizing representations according to some pre-established hierarchy patterned upon
the unity which Functions have just been said to bring about, namely “the unity of the act of arranging various representations under one representation” (A 68/B 93).42

**Judgment: Judgments Regarding and/or Making Objects**

When Kant explains Judgment in this section, however, it is according not only to this hierarchical arrangement of specific concepts beneath more general ones. The subject-matter of a judgment, namely an object, is also the focus when he describes Judgment as “the indirect cognition of an object, viz., the representation of a representation of it” (ibid.). Here Judgment is described as a mode of thinking about an object, and the means by which such an object is thought has the form of a sentence consisting of concepts and some copula between them. In the example Kant provides, “All bodies are divisible” (ibid.), this judgment is made up of the concepts “body” and “divisible,” the concept of bodies possibly applying to an intuition of an object. Thus an object is cognized in a judgment, albeit through an intuition of that object (hence “indirectly”).

It is Longuenesse’s argument that this bringing about of unity from the multitude provided to it by the Sensibility is the defining activity of the Understanding: “To say that concepts rest on functions, then, is to say that they are produced by the kind of activity that can and does bring receptive intuitions under ‘common representations’: under concepts as ‘universal and reflected representations’.”43 Heavy support is provided for her interpretation by this oft-cited passage from the Critique: “Now since all acts of the understanding lead back to judgments, the **Understanding** as such can be represented as a

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42 I think it is helpful here to understand “representations” not in the narrow sense Kant often employs. A looser interpretation of the word allows us to understand Function as not strictly identical to Judgment, which would be a temptation if we read “Vorstellungen” here as intuitions, but not if we understood it as any sort of thing synthesized so that it might be presented to consciousness.

capacity to judge” (ibid.).\textsuperscript{44} I wish to point out not only the striking similarity between the activity of Functions and Judgment, but also the fact that Judgment might be said to be patterned upon this Function. This is because the Function is architectonically prior to Judgment, since it is at work before concepts are even fully formed. Specifically, the activity described in the three-fold synthesis is only the description of a Function’s bringing the manifold beneath a more general heading. Longuenesse considers this activity to be the capacity to judge. I would agree with her, but would point out that more specifically and in a sense which is true to Kant’s terminology in the architectonic, this capacity which ends in, because it aims for, judgments is properly called a Function. Further, an examination of Function and the refusal to gloss it simply as Judgment or a precursor to judgments provides a means of accounting for the epigenetic character of the architectonic, which we will examine in Chapter Three. In turn, I think it is more accurate to say that Function is at the beginning and center of mind as Kant conceives it, since it catalyzes its fundamental activity of organizing and eventually subsumption. Judgment is one form of this ubiquitous but not radically protean Function. Function is ubiquitous in that its activity of arranging the specific beneath the general is a fundamental process found throughout Kant’s description of Sensibility, Understanding, and even Reason. Function is protean insofar as this fundamental activity assumes different names in each of the capacities of mind—for example, the tendency of Imagination to connect many segments into one line, of Understanding to subsume many intuitions to concepts, and of

\textsuperscript{44} I have modified Pluhar’s translation here. First “zurückführen” has been translated with the more literal “lead back to” instead of Pluhar’s “reduce”. Second, I translate \textit{ein Vermögen zu urteilen} as “a capacity to judge”, as does Longuenesse, and not as “a power of judging” along with Pluhar. First, \textit{urteilen} is the infinitive, not the nominative (which would be capitalized). Second, as Longuenesse notes, subsumption, or the exercise of the \textit{Urteilskraft}, is only one of many capacities of judgment (\textit{Vermögene zu urteilen}). Other capacities of judgment include “the formation of concepts…, inference (reason), and method or system” as is developed in the \textit{logique} of the Port-Royal School and embraced and expanded by Kant in his \textit{Logik} (cf. L2 141-2).
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other concepts to even more general concepts, and of Reason to institute a “subjective law for the management of Understanding’s supplies, [instructing Understanding] to reduce the universal use of its concepts—by comparing them—to their smallest possible number” (A 306/B 362). However, I maintain that such amoebic activity is not radically protean since that fundamental activity of arranging the specific beneath the general can be found throughout the three capacities I have just mentioned. Thus, although Judgment might in some sense be the heart of Understanding, Function is similarly at the heart of Judgment, and therefore, of Kant’s architectonically organized mind.

Judgment: Relating the Manifold to the Transcendental Unity of Apperception

A judgment is nothing but a way of bringing given cognitions to the Objective Unity of Apperception. This is what the little relational word is in judgment intends [to indicate], in order to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective one. For this word indicates the reference of the representations to the Original Apperception and its necessary unity <…in which the representations can be said to> belong to one another according to principles of the objective determination of all representations insofar as these representations can become cognition—all of these principles being derived from the principle of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. (§ 19; B 142)

Kant is surprisingly consistent throughout the B Deduction in holding that Judgment is the act of bringing cognitions to the Unity of Apperception. It is in this “bringing to” that perceptions might become phenomena—i.e., objects of Experience perceived through the forms of Intuition, Space and Time, and judged according to the Categories. The act of production of an object, described by the images produced by the three syntheses in the A Deduction, now takes on a distinctively logical flair. Judgment is then judgment about an object; judging allows one to say more than “x seems to be a and b” (which is a subjective state), but “x is a and b” (which is an objective judgment about x). Further,
writes Kant, “The reference to this necessary Unity <of Apperception> is there even if the judgment itself is empirical and hence contingent—e.g., Bodies are heavy” (ibid.).

In this Section Kant also touches upon the pure Concepts, upon which we will focus following our examination of Judgment. Representations are said to belong to each other according to principles which they all share. We will see that these principles are shared because they are the foundational principles by which objects of Experience might exist at all. The principles are contained in the Transcendental Unity of Apperception, which is also the source of the “I think,” the unity of the transcendental “I” and the transcendental object x. In the sections entitled “The System of the Principles of Pure Understanding,” Kant analyses the “synthetic judgments that under <the conditions of the Forms of Intuition> emanate a priori from pure Concepts of Understanding that lie a priori at the basis of all other cognitions” (A 136/B 175). I will not further address the content of the Section which Kant entitles the “System of Principles,” in which he presents and analyzes the “axioms,” “anticipations,” “analogies,” and “postulates” which are foundational to Experience (insofar as they supply the rules or principles which constitute its very possibility).

Judgment: Logical Functions and Categories

In §20 Kant summarizes the B Deduction thus far. He writes,

The act of Understanding whereby the manifold of given representations (whether intuitions or concepts) are brought under one apperception as such is the Logical Function of Judgments. (§19) Therefore everything manifold, insofar as it is given in one empirical intuition, is determined in regard to one of the Logical Functions of Judging, inasmuch as through this Function it is brought to one consciousness as such. The Categories, however, are indeed nothing but precisely these Functions of Judging
insofar as the manifold of a given intuition is determined in regard to them.” (B 143)

We have just seen that in a judgment an intuition is brought to the Transcendental Unity of Apperception and judged; in this way it becomes objectively valid and not a mere impression or matter of taste. Uncharitable readers might accuse Kant of equivocating on the term Function in this passage. The use in the first sentence is one we’re familiar with, namely the subsuming of the particular beneath the general, but Kant then writes that Functions determine the manifold, and also that the Functions bring the manifold to consciousness. Functions, the critique might continue, have so many functions that they function as a panacea for any malfunction in Kant’s system. As the previous sentence demonstrates, the word function has many meanings in English, as does its cognate Funktion in German.

Nonetheless, I do think that Kant is relatively clear in what he intends when he uses the word Function, and all of its meanings relate to making, bringing, or providing unity. The manifold is brought under one Apperception in the process called the Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept in the A Deduction. This process of bringing the manifold of Intuition under the Synthesis of Apperception (which we have already examined in the previous Chapter) is now expounded upon, using a terminology of Judgment. The manifold of Intuition is determined by the Logical Functions of Judgment through the Categories. When the Logical Functions deal with the manifold, they do so in the guise of Categories; the Categories determine the manifold of Intuition under the auspices of the Logical Forms of Judgment. But we can also say that the Categories have their origin in this organization of the manifold of Intuition by the Logical Functions of Judgment. The Categories are the result of just this organization. They receive their form
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from the logical Functions of Judgment, and their “matter,” by which I mean the nonformal aspect which would, for example, distinguish the Category of Causality from that of Inherence, comes about by nature of what the form deals with. That is, in human cognition, the Logical Functions of Judgment subsume beneath themselves a manifold which is unique to human sensibility. The form (i.e., the Logical Function of Judgment) may yield a different determination (i.e., the Categories) dependent upon the matter (i.e., the manifold given). This process will be addressed again in the final chapter of this thesis, where I attempt to analyze the origin of the Categories through judgments.

Form and Form of Judgment

In §9 Kant writes that, ignoring the content of a judgment (be that content pure or empirical) and heeding only its form, “…we find that the Function of Thought in judgment can be brought under four headings, each containing under it three moments,” the presentation of which he names the Table of the Logical Functions of Judgment (A 70/B 95). We see here that the Function of Thought in a judgment is equivalent to the judgment’s form. Applying this finding to Section 1 of Chapter 1 of the “Analytic,” we can deduce that the Function of Thought in a judgment or the “unity of the act of arranging various representations under one representation,” i.e., the unity of judging, produces the form of judging. What Kant calls the “unity of the act of arranging various representations under one representation” is the unity of the act of unity or the kind of unity produced by this specific uniting. We can then consider this uniting as always

45 Insofar as the form is the specific form which is the corollary of the content or matter of a judgment. (Cf. L2 134-137 on form and content of a concept.)
46 This reading is compatible with and should provide some textual support for Longuenesse’s conviction that “Functions of unity (Funktionen der Einheit) should be understood as “Functions bringing unity
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near to judging; or more precisely, it is the unity which is the result of judging, which is itself a uniting.

I think that the following metaphor is useful in picturing this process. We can consider a petri dish filled with various types of organisms. With a drop of a solution, a process might be catalyzed in which the organisms group themselves according to the presence of four certain enzymes. It is conceivable that there would be other solutions which arrange the organisms differently in the presence of other enzymes, or without enzymes at all but instead in the presence of certain kinds of cells, by having a certain shape, and so on. There are then, many conceivable kinds of unity which might be brought about depending upon the solution applied, but all of these are unities produced in the action of the unity-providing solution.

The Function, i.e., the unity-providing action, goes hand in hand with the form, for the form is what the Function does. Longuenesse writes, “…inasmuch as <form and function> are distinguished at all, they are distinguished as a result can be distinguished from the process that generates it: the form of thought is the result of the function of thinking, namely the unity of the act of bringing representations under a common representation.”47 With this similarity in mind, it is tempting to identify Function and form with one another, but it is the contention of this thesis that such a reduction does away with a distinction which provides for a more trenchant analysis and therefore a richer understanding of Kant’s project. Many of the distinctions Kant makes within the architectonic do not denote separate ontic entities, but are instead new terms given to a

47 L2 143. Longuenesse also mentions that Kant “often uses the terms form and function interchangeably (cf. for instance A 248/B 305, A 254/B 309)” (ibid.)
previously examined part of the architectonic which now shows itself to have another role. For example, it is problematic to ascertain whether Imagination in the B Edition is to be considered a separate capacity of thought, since it is described simply as “the Understanding in its relation to Sensibility.” Considering this statement, one might be tempted to reduce the Imagination to the Understanding, or perhaps an occasional activity of Understanding. Heuristically, the concern is whether it is not better to minimize the number of terms with which one need be concerned.

But if one values developmental architectonic thought, then it becomes evident that, qua developmental, variations and progressions are to be expected and properly accounted for. If it is true that the fundamental activity of the Understanding leads back to Judgment, or, even further back, to Function, then the activity of Function could be said to be responsible for the form of the architectonic. Indeed, our examination of the epigenetic character of Reason in Chapter Three will seek to establish just such a kernel from which the organism might develop. At the same time, in so doing a conscious effort at avoiding reductionism leads, I think, to the richest possible understanding of Kant’s architectonic, though admittedly not the simplest.

**Concepts: Between Understanding and Judgment**

The distinction between Understanding and Judgment is only slightly more pronounced than the one between form and Function. Indeed, the indefiniteness of the boundaries separating these activities of the mind (or Functions of the Understanding “in the broad
sense of intellectual faculty, *intellectus*”)\(^\text{48}\) is due at least in part to the fact that concepts are shared between Understanding and Judgment.

*Concepts* are that by which the Understanding performs its fundamental action of Judgment: “Now the only use that the Understanding can make of these concepts is to judge by means of them” (ibid.). Understanding is “a capacity to judge” and “a capacity of Thought” (A 69/B 94); Thought is “cognition through concepts” (ibid.), while Judgment is the “indirect cognition of [an] object” by means of a “representation of the representation of it” (A 69/B 93). These representations and representations of representations are equivalents to one of Kant’s characterizations of concepts.

The difficulty of distinguishing between Understanding and Judgment is registered in Kant’s statement that “…all acts of the Understanding lead back to Judgment” (A 69/B 94, translation modified). The products of the action of the Understanding, i.e., what results when the Understanding understands, are ultimately judgments. But before Understanding can be said to make judgments, and indeed logically prior to Judgment *per se*, is the formation of concepts (as we’ll see in the next section). Insofar as Understanding is a capacity to judge, when it actualizes this potential and functions properly, Understanding judges by means of concepts (either pure Concepts or pure and empirical ones), although that might not be the exclusive activity of Understanding. Judgment, the Function underlying and uniting all activity of the Understanding, is then the *Leitfaden* (“leading thread”) which runs through the catacombs of the Metaphysical Deduction.\(^\text{49}\) Again, we see that the Functions of Judgment underlie Understanding, even in some sense generating it.

\(^{48}\) L2 143.

\(^{49}\) Cf. L2, especially 142-143. Again, I think the *Leitfaden* is most properly called Function, not Judgment.
Concepts: “rest on Functions” or are “based on the spontaneity of Thought”

Before explaining Function, Kant writes that concepts “rest on Functions” as opposed to being merely affected (as are intuitions, which he also calls passive or receptive). Immediately after having described Function as “the unity of the act arranging various representations under one common representation” (A 68/B 93), he concludes that concepts “are based on the spontaneity of Thought,” or again that there is a “unity of the act” which forms concepts (ibid.). Here, Kant links spontaneity of Thought and a unity of act through the concept: Thought comes about when concepts are created by the Understanding judging intuitions. In judgments of Experience, Understanding judges with intuitions as its matter, and the forms by which it judges are the Categories. Judgment by the Categories is Thought. All judgment, including the judgment whereby the manifold is made into Experience, is my judgment about my object. The manifold as such has a necessary unity, namely, in me or being mine. “Therefore everything manifold, insofar as it is given in one <unified> empirical intuition, is determined in regard to one of the logical Functions of Judgment,” (B 143) which brings the manifold to the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. In this bringing of the manifold to the Unity of Apperception, it will be judged as mine. Kant writes, “the Transcendental Unity of Apperception is the unity whereby everything manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object” (B 139). That is, an intuition in the manifold which might

50 Kant is not clear whether he is here describing the pure Concepts (the title of the Chapter, "Transcendental Guide for the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of Understanding," would lead to that view) or empirical concepts (which is suggested by the example of “metal” in the Chapter), but I believe that his description holds at least for the pure Concepts, and therefore for empirical concepts as well. One need not then be misled by Kant's imperative that concepts, directly or directly, refer to intuitions, because these intuitions could be pure intuitions (e.g., number).
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become an object of Experience is placed in the position of a predicate of the judgment “I think x.” The bringing of the unified manifold to the Unity of Apperception does not yet produce the judgment. The judgment can only be said to occur when the manifold is formalized. This formalization involves the determination of the manifold of Intuition by the pure Understanding. The means by which Understanding determines the manifold is through judgments, and the forms of these judgments are the Categories: “the Categories, however, are indeed nothing by precisely these Functions of judging insofar as the manifold of a given intuition is determined in regard to them” (B 143).

In addition to these two formal, logical characteristics of judgments of Experience, namely that any intuition can be the x of a judgment of Experience and that all objects are judged according to the specific forms of Judgment (i.e., the Categories), all intuitions share two formal qualities. First, they are in the forms of Intuition. Second, the manifold is presented to the Transcendental Unity as a synthesized manifold, as already packaged, so to speak, though not yet judged into Experience. If that is so, then there must be some source for this shared quality of all intuitions in the manifold appearing within the Forms of Intuition, i.e., Space and Time, as well as for the fact that it is synthesized and considered “my” manifold. Kant holds (1) “everything manifold in Intuition is subject to the formal conditions of Space and Time” (B 136) and (2) all intuitions are possibly objects of Experience because they could be judged as such by me. "All my representations in some given intuition must be subject to the condition under which alone I can ascribe them—as my representations—to the identical self, and hence under which alone I can collate them, as combined synthetically in one Apperception, through the universal expression I think.” (B 138)
Kant holds that the combination that we find in the manifold of Intuition cannot come about through mere sensations. At the same time, he rejects that the manifold is contained in pure Understanding. (B 129-130) Instead, whatever unity is present in the manifold of Intuition must be given to it from some other source—namely a source outside sensibility, that is, an a priori source. This source is therefore the Transcendental or Original (not a posteriori or derived) Synthetic (or combining) Unity of Apperception. Because of its role as the transcendental foundation for any unity in the manifold of Intuition, “everything manifold in Intuition is subject to conditions of the Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception” (B 136). In terms consistent with the A Deduction, it is this Unity which unifies the proto-manifold into a manifold of Intuition. As such, the manifold shows that it is “capable of being combined in one consciousness” (B 137). This capacity is demonstrative of the manifold’s being subject to the Unity of Apperceptions and its rules. If a manifold is to be a manifold, it will be the manifold of someone. This someone is outside of this manifold yet still the ground of its possibility: the manifold is not a manifold without being someone’s manifold.

In Chapter One we saw two kinds of concepts. The first was a concept of the unity of the act, a consciousness that it is one and the same act, unifying an empirical object within one consciousness. Second, the concept is that general representation, for example, of body, beneath which other representations might be subsumed. The first understanding shows how concepts “are based on the spontaneity of Thought,” since the activity of the syntheses is united in the concept of “I think.” Second, a unified act forms the discursive concepts, as is evident by virtue of the concepts’ being the final of the three Syntheses of the A Deduction. Here we see that Function and spontaneity can be
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said to characterize the fundamental activity of the Sensibility, Imagination, and Understanding which, through a unified action, forms concepts. My understanding is that the origin of the pure Concepts is at least in part describable along these lines, except that the manifold synthesized by and subsumed beneath the Unity of Apperception would be the pure manifold.

Concepts and the Logical Description of the Object of Experience in the B Deduction

Because of any concept’s dependency upon the spontaneity of Thought and the activity of unification proper to Functions, the connection—via the concepts—between Thought and the Function which provides the unity proper to Thought is clear. In both the A and B Editions, Kant bridges Understanding with Judgment (and Intuition) in contending that concepts are “predicates of possible judgments…[which] refer to some representation of an as yet undetermined object” (A 69/B 94). Kant can then define the project of his Metaphysical Deduction as the tracing of the origin of the Categories back to these Logical Functions of Thought, or the Logical Table of the Judgments active in all logical Thought: “Therefore we can find all the Functions of the Understanding if we can exhibit completely the Functions of unity in judgments” (ibid.). However, in the A Deduction Kant did not explicitly link intuitions to the Logical Functions of Thought. We will now focus on how, with the B Deduction, Kant joins intuitions to the Logical Functions via the Categories.

51 It is noteworthy that here the goal of the Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions is mentioned, namely the connection between Judgment and the Concepts and these Concepts and objects.
A concept is a concept just in case it can refer not only to other concepts, but also to objects, and at least one of the concepts of a judgment must refer to an intuition of an object. (A 68/B 93) But that object is “yet undetermined” (and therefore cannot be called an object of Experience, but is only an object in the broad sense). In the A Deduction, we saw that this determination was described as the production of an empirical object from the manifold which was given in a confused, yet organizable, way. In the B Deduction, this sensible description is placed aside, and the formation of the object is translated into a logical vocabulary. As such, the determination is couched in the logical terms of the ascribing of predicates to a concept of an object, instead of in terms of subsuming objects according to their empirical qualities. The determination of the object is indeed the end—i.e., the result and aim, but in the B Deduction it is the result of a judgment. As such, the logical form of a judgment is emphasized in the B Deduction.

The consciousness of one’s object being one’s own, which is afforded by the “I think” of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception, is retained in the B Deduction. But here an emphasis is placed not upon a consciousness of the unity of the act, a consciousness that the three-fold synthesis is one act producing one object performed by me. Instead, in the B Deduction the emphasis is placed upon “think.” Here Kant describes Thought as “the act of bringing to the Unity of Apperception the synthesis of the manifold that has, in Intuition, been given to it from elsewhere” (B 145). Further, what it is to think is to ascribe necessity and existence to an object by means of a judgment:

A judgment is nothing but a way of bringing given cognition to the Objective Unity of Apperception. This is what the little relational word is in judgments intends [to indicate], in order to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective one. (§19, B 142)
Thus existence is brought to intuitions by the “is,” whereby intuitions become objects. The being is a kind of being, namely being in Experience. If an intuition is brought to the Unity of Apperception and thereby thought, it is thought through certain forms (i.e., the pure Concepts), and the object which is then judged according to those forms is an object of Experience, existing in Experience, being both formed by and subject to the Categories which are the Categories of any object of Experience at all. Thus, the Unity of Apperception ascribes existence and necessity to an object.

Kant then writes

Therefore everything manifold, insofar as it is given in one empirical intuition, is determined in regard to one of the Logical Functions of Judging, inasmuch as through this Function it is brought to one consciousness as such. The Categories, however, are indeed nothing but precisely these Functions of Judging insofar as the manifold of a given intuition is determined in regard to them. (§20, B 143)

Everything manifold is thought when and insofar as it is brought to the Unity of Apperception, as was described in detail in the third Synthesis of the A Deduction. This manifold is then “determined” (ibid.) when it is judged according to the Logical Functions of Judgment. So we have two kinds of relation between the manifold and the Logical Functions which are housed in the Unity of Apperception: the manifold is brought to the Unity of Apperception and a determined by its Functions of Judgment. The determination of the manifold by the Unity of Apperception produces two forms. First, it produces the forms of Judgment in relation to a manifold, which are the Categories. When a Hypothetical Judgment, for example, determines the manifold of Intuition, the Category of Causality originates, and it is through the Concept of Causality that the manifold might be determined in regard to this Function of Judgment. The second form produced is the order or rule thereby established in the manifold. Through
this rule, the manifold is formalized or “determined” (ibid.) into Experience. There are two components of Experience, its form and it matter. The matter is provided by the manifold, and it is determined by the Categories.

This process grants us a top-down perspective on the origin of the Categories. Earlier in our examination of the A Deduction, which might be described as a “bottom-up” presentation, we saw how the pure Concepts can be considered concepts of pure Intuition in a way analogous to how empirical concepts are concepts of empirical Intuition. As such, they were the rules which could be abstracted from pure Intuition, which could retrospectively be said to hold for pure Intuition since they could always be found in it. But with the B Deduction, the Categories are rules to, not from Intuition. “Hence,” writes Kant, “the manifold in a given intuition is subject necessarily to the Categories” (ibid.).

It might seem that Kant is begging the question in assuming this relation of logical judgments to the sensible matter of which they are judgments. Is his assuming that we can judge only by concepts which are themselves only made by judgments circular at best? However the presupposition and expectation of complementarity and compatibility of parts still to come is emblematic of the development, and therefore the description of the activity of any of the parts, of an organon. This methodological observation does not in itself defang the objection of circularity, but it does provide us with the tonsorial tools. For Kant would not be logically presupposing what he hopes to deduce merely by leaving room for that finding. So we might grant autonomy to the description of concepts as referring to representations of objects from any subsequent use of this description in the Transcendental Deduction.
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**Concepts: Products of the Pure Synthesis of the Manifold Given**

A further cause of ambiguity in the sections of the Metaphysical Deduction being investigated is due to Kant’s unannounced variation in addressing two very different kinds of concepts: concepts which are concepts of representations of empirical objects and the pure Concepts of the Understanding. It remains a hermeneutic challenge to the reader to disambiguate these uses, but the task is implicit in our sympathetic reading of the text. Nonetheless, Kant is clear that it is the pure synthesis of the manifold which produces the Pure Concepts: “Now *pure synthesis, conceived of generally* yields the Pure Concept of Understanding” (A 78/B 104). Kant describes a synthesis as “the act of putting various representations with one another and of comprising their manifoldness in one cognition” (A 77/B 103). Note that the first part, “the act of putting various representations with one another,” resembles the description of Function Kant provided earlier: “the unity of the act of arranging various representations under one representation” (A 68/B 93), with the exception that the subsumption of specific concepts beneath more general ones is not the specific goal of synthesis. Nonetheless, although the kind of hierarchy or organizing principle of a synthesis is not made explicit here, synthesis does involve “comprising their <the representations’> manifoldness in one cognition.” That is, the pure synthesis of the manifold is the kind of synthesis the product of which is a single cognition. This unity of, or perhaps in, cognition is the result of the third step of the threefold synthesis generating concepts.\(^52\)

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\(^52\) Further evidence that it is the threefold synthesis which is assumed in the synthesis is given at A 78-79/B 104, where Kant writes that “bringing, not representations but the *pure synthesis* of representations, to concepts is what transcendental logic teaches…” and then mentions the three syntheses of the A Deduction unequivocally.
Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted to provide an explanation of the key terms Kant employs in the Metaphysical Deduction, both exegetically, working out from the text in question itself, as well as para- and eisegetically, drawing from other passages in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and occasionally providing an interpolation where Kant is unclear or I am unable to understand him due to my own limitations. I have attempted especially to draw attention to Function, showing its relation to Judgment as a type of proto-judgment before concepts and objects are even formed. I have also made an attempt to clarify the sometimes ambiguous relationships between Function, Thought and Judgment, Judgment and concept, and concept and object, aspiring to provide a rich, comprehensive grasp of these terms which would **repost** reductivistic accusations of a needless complexity of terms or the opposite complaint that the appellations listed are not sufficient to account for the many capacities Kant is describing, that Kant is subject to a charge of “terminological moonlighting,” requiring his terms to perform double duty. Against both camps which could spearhead these complaints, accusations, or arguments, I have attempted to give an account of these terms which is mindful of the slight but precise distinctions Kant is making, an account which could be the field upon which Kant might defend himself from claims that his terminological distinctions are too many or too few.

Finally, I have shown that Kant has overcome the deficiency of the A Deduction’s neglecting to establish the correspondence of intuitions to the Logical Table of Judgments—a deficiency which could have been remedied by making recourse to the
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Metaphysical Deduction. With the B Deduction, Kant clearly establishes that bridge. The passage we saw above bears a second look:

Therefore everything manifold, insofar as it is given in one empirical intuition, is determined in regard to one of the Logical Functions of Judging, inasmuch as through this Function it is brought to one consciousness as such. The Categories, however, are indeed nothing but precisely these Functions of Judging insofar as the manifold of a given intuition is determined in regard to them. (§20, B 143)

Thus the Categories are the pontifex or bridge between pure Logic and Intuition, pure or even empirical. I have also hinted that the Categories originate from this judgment upon the manifold if we describe their origin from the top down, and are induced as an abstraction of the pure manifold and the rules applying to all objects of the empirical manifold, from the bottom-up. In Chapter Four I will provide a case for this origination of the Categories from the Logical Functions of Judgment in its relation to the manifold and treat this bottom-up induction, which Kant calls an empirical deduction. Finally, we will see how it is that the Categories—because of their pontifical role between Logic and Sensibility—might be considered to be the seed from which Experience develops.
In §27, “Result of this Deduction of the Concepts of Understanding,” Kant writes

Now, there are only two ways in which one can conceive of a necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects: either experience makes these concepts possible, or these Concepts make Experience possible. The first alternative is not what happens as regards the Categories (nor as regards pure sensible intuition). For they are a priori Concepts and hence are independent of experience. (To assert that their origin is empirical would be to assert a kind of generatio aequivoca). There remains, consequently, only the second alternative (a system of epigenesis, as it were, of pure Reason): viz., that the Categories contain the bases, on the part of the Understanding, of the possibility of all Experience as such. (B 166-167)

Concluding the B Edition of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories of Experience, Kant distinguishes his account of the pure Concepts from the empiricists’ accounts of the formation of concepts and precludes the possibility of such pure Concepts being derivative of empirical concepts or experience in general. According to the empiricists’ theory, “experience makes <the concepts> possible” in that these concepts are merely abstracted from experience, and were there no experience, there would be no concepts. That is, there would be no “empirical concepts” such as “dog,” but also no concepts, which Kant will call pure Concepts, such as “causality.” Kant’s “Copernican revolution” declares that the Concepts make Experience possible, and the fact that it is not experience which alone generates all of our concepts may be the most innovative aspect of his philosophy. But because this fundamental notion has been rather thoroughly
examined in the previous two chapters it will not be treated here. I am not concerned with what Kant rules out as describing the development of the Categories, namely along lines of a *generatio aequívoca*. Instead, I would like to investigate what epigenesis is, and what we are to make of Kant’s seminal imagery for the development of Experience and its foundational Concepts. Finally, I would like to examine briefly how it is that the origin of pure Reason can best be described as epigenetic, and why Kant writes of the Categories and Pure Reason with seemingly little regard for their transcendental distance from one another.\(^53\)

**What is Epigenesis?**

**The Essay “Concerning the Different Races of Mankind”**

In his book *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology*, John Zammito treats Kant’s explanation of an anthropological phenomenon in terms of epigenesis. Although Zammito’s treatment of Kant’s 1775 essay *Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen* does not touch directly upon our phenomenological and architectonic concerns, understanding how epigenesis is dealt with in that essay can enrich our comprehension of the term as it comes to play in *The Critique of Pure Reason*. In *Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen*, Kant provides an account for the variety of human races, arguing that “the potential for variation was built into the organism as a part of its species heritage.”\(^54\) Specifically ruled out is the idea that “chance or general mechanical laws <could> bring about such adaptation. Therefore we must see such developments which

\(^{53}\) Cf. A 268/B 324: “ Permit me to call *transcendental location* the position that we assign to a concept either in Sensibility or pure Understanding.”  

appear accidental according to them, as predetermined [vorgebildet].” Kant accordingly felt that natural history must be reconceived to correspond with a structure allowing for “the original natural endowment of the species and explain its actualization in variety over time in different environments.” Both Kant’s thought and even the terms he employs, such as Keime (“seed” or “germ”), are received from a chain beginning with the early endeavors of Leibniz which were refined by Albrecht von Haller and his contemporary Casper Friedrich Wolff. Wolff in particular was concerned with the simplest explanation of the origin of organic bodies, namely a theory which did not necessitate as a premise an initial miracle. Wolff’s Theorie von der Generation (1764) makes a case for a “living nature, which through its own forces produces endless changes.” According to Zammito’s examination of Kant’s precritical essay, we can see that Kant was concerned with finding a means of accounting for variation in organisms which is neither strictly empiricist nor dependent upon the miraculous. That such an appeal for origins, specifically the origin of the Categories, is of concern before and throughout the critical enterprise will be evident from our treatment of some sections from the Nachlass and the Critique of Judgment.

**Epigenesis in the Nachlass**

Kant addresses epigenesis at three places in the documents contained in the Nachlass, two of which are from the pre-critical period, N. 4859 and 4851 dated around 1771, and one, N. 4275, assumed to be written during the time concomitant with the composition of the first Critique.

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55 Akademische Ausgabe (Hereafter Ak.) II, 435. Quotation provided, ibid.
56 Ibid., 304.
57 Zammito, p. 305.
In the first passage to be considered, Kant writes

“Intuitions of the senses (in accordance with sensible form and matter) yield synthetic propositions which are objective. Crusius explains the real principle of reason according to a *systemate praefor Mansionis* (from subjective *principis*); Locke according to *infl oxo physico* like Aristotle; Plato and Malebranche from *intuitu intellectuali*; we according to *epigenesis* from the use of natural laws of reason.” (N. 4275, Ak. XVII, 491)\(^58\)

As in the passage from the *Critique* at the beginning of this chapter, in this note Kant is primarily concerned with distinguishing his transcendental idealism from other theories of the foundation of accurate judgments of Experience. For Kant, such judgments are always synthetic, receiving their content from the manifold given. For example, the judgment “This body is heavy” is a judgment consisting of a concept “body,” a subject-concept materially abstracted from Experience and formally produced in accordance with the Categories, and second a concept “heaviness”, a predicate-concept produced in coming in contact with this specific body, as well as all others. Specifically, Kant sets his enterprise apart from the preformationism of Leibniz and Crusius, in which the concurrence between the perception in me and an occurrence in the world has as its basis a preestablished harmony of the two, which might function as the copula connecting the disparate elements of a synthetic judgment; second, from a lockean/aristotelian empiricism, in which judgments are based upon “impressions” upon the mind and thereby are not even synthetic, as Kant would have it; and finally from a platonic/malebranchian idealism, which again denies the synthetic element of a judgment of Experience, since in Experience nothing is superadded to pure intuition. In contradistinction to these, Kant maintains that the “real principle of reason” which alone

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\(^{58}\) Using Waxman’s translation, Waxman, 250.
can account for the objective validity of the “synthetic propositions” produced by empirical intuitions is neither pure idealism nor empiricism, nor even preformationism—the ostensibly sole mean between the other two. Instead, Kant explains the “real principle of reason” according to the epigenetic system of pure Reason, which could only be found in a transcendental idealism which would embrace all three systems.\footnote{Kant comes as close as he can to giving accolades to precritical philosophers of each of these camps. C.f., the “illustrious Locke” (A 86/B 118) Plato (B 370-380), Wolff (B xxxvi).} Although at this point it may not seem that Kant’s appellation “reason” in the Nachlass is the Reason of the Critique, and indeed the Nachlass’ “reason” seems to correspond more with the Understanding of the Critique since the correspondence of Intuitions with Concepts is of concern. Nonetheless I will maintain that this “reason” is identical with the Pure Reason of the Critique. This will become clear later, when we consider how Reason is the finished organism, the germ of which “speaking generally” (A 79/B 105) can be called the Categories.

The term “the use of the natural rules of reason” (N. 4275) has its correspondent in N. 4865: “The most important primary truths of morality and religion are founded upon the natural use of reason…”\footnote{N. 4865: Die wichtige Grundwahrheiten der moral und religion sind auf den natuerlichen Gebrauch der Vernunft …”} (emphasis and translation mine). In this Nachlass, Kant writes of an “organon” versus a canon and a “doctrin” versus a “disciplin” of Reason, as well as “Glauben” (Faith/Belief), not “Wissen” (Knowing), as being the proper means of approaching what he calls the Ideas of Practical Reason in the Critique of Practical Reason. So it is apparent that the Reason developed within Kant’s critical system is compatible, even if more refined, with the use of reason in N. 4275. Although in this thesis I will not examine how it is that the pure Concepts unfold ultimately into
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Reason, for our present investigation into epigenesis it is noteworthy that here Reason in the “use of [its] natural rules” deals not only with the transcendent realm (in practical Reason and pure speculative Reason), but also with Sensibility, insofar as it might ground the accuracy of judgments which receive their content from it.

The final passage from the Nachlass which we will examine concerns the pure Concepts explicitly and the epigenetic character of their production. At N. 4851 (Ak. XVIII, 8) Kant examines “whether the Concepts are simply educta or producta”: “producta either through physical (empirical) influence or thought consciousness of the formal constitution of our Sensibility and Understanding on the occasion of Experience, hence still producta a priori, not a posteriori…”61 Similarly, at N. 4859 Kant similarly questions whether the “source of the transcendental Concepts [is] per epigenesin intellectualem. (intellectualia intuitive or discursive.).”62 Thus, the source of the Concepts is the “thought consciousness of the formal constitution of our Sensibility and Understanding on the occasion of Experience,” using the nomenclature of N. 4851, and “per epigenesin intellectualem,” as N. 4859 would have it. After our examination of epigenesis in the Critique of Judgment, we will investigate how it is that the antipodes of Experience and pure intellect both contribute to Kant’s account of the origin of the pure Concepts which make Experience possible.

I set this interpretation against Waxman’s. Waxman concentrates upon the epigenetic character of the manifold and excludes any application of his analysis to the “epigenesis of Pure Reason” which is being treated at B 166-167. I think that Kant’s goal in this passage of the Critique is indeed a description of Reason, with the Concepts as the

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62 Translation mine.
“germ” of the epigenesis, as opposed to Waxman’s understanding of the apprehended empirical manifold of Sensibility as the “germ” and the phenomenon as the product/offspring. If it is ambiguous in N. 4275 whether the product of the epigenesis refers to the intuition of the sensible manifold (be that the synoptic or synthesized manifold), the origin of the Concepts is certainly what are being examined in N. 4851, the heading of which reads “Whether the Concepts are simply *educta* or *producta*.

praeformation and epigenesis.” And in N. 4851 Kant mentions the “consciousness of the formal activity of our Sensibility and Understanding” which, prompted or given the opportunity (*Gelegenheit*) by experience, “develops” (A 66/B 91) the Concepts (to use the language of the *Critique*), and that action is a priori, though prompted by the manifold.

It seems that Waxman’s understanding of this Remark is that, between the choices of “physical (empirical) influence” or through the forms already present in the Understanding, Kant goes on to affirm that the Concepts are *producta* of empirical data. Waxman then investigates whether this data is the synoptic or apprehended manifold. I think that Waxman is mistaken in his opting for the first of these two possible grounds, and it seems that to insist that Waxman’s is an investigation of that which occasions the formation of the Concepts, which themselves are the “germ,” would be an interpretation performing hermeneutic gymnastics for the sake of charity.

To summarize then, it is the contention of the examined *Nachlass Remarke* first that Reason, in the use of its natural laws, provides the means by which we might explain the truth of Judgments of Experience. That is, the proper unity of Sensibility’s

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63 The term “judgment of Experience” is used only in the *Prolegomena* (Sec. 18, Ak. IV, 297-98). See also L1 Ch. 7, particularly pp. 167-180. In Chapter 7 Longuenesse makes a convincing case that Judgments of
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Intuitions, Understanding’s Concepts, and the Power of Judgment’s acts of judgment which produce true Judgments is somehow dependent upon the “use of the natural laws” of Reason. The natural laws of Reason dictate the proper functioning of Reason when it actualizes its potential for producing the faculties necessary for accurate judgments. These Judgments will express the necessity Kant requires of judgments of Experience (as he develops these judgments in the Critique). Second, Kant prefers the term epigenesis to describe the origin of this correspondence (N. 4275). Third, the pure, transcendental, and a priori Concepts of the Understanding are the products of this epigenesis. Fourth, the occasion for this epigenesis is provided by Experience, which provokes the “thought consciousness of the formal constitution of our Sensibility and Understanding” (N. 4851). Finally, this epigenetic seed is itself “a priori” (N. 4851) and “intellectualia” (N. 4859), though, I hope to prove, it receives its content from the manifold and is purposed for the formation of objects of Experience.  

Epigenesis in the Critique of Judgment

In the Critique of Judgment Kant analyses epigenesis as the teleological theory of reproduction opposed to preformation or evolution, two competing theories of reproduction. He writes:

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Experience are at work throughout even the A Edition of the Critique and in the Logik, although they have not yet so been named.

64 In securing from the Nachlasse here examined that Kant considers the process of the development of Reason to be an epigenetic description of the coming about of the Categories, I believe to hold evidence which might further destabilize Genova’s interpretation that Kant embraces the “middle course” (B 167) of a variant preformationism over one of epigenesis (moreover, I think that an examination of the text in question disallows such an interpretation). Despite some interpretive differences of specific texts, I concur with Genova’s general thesis that “the principle of epigenesis serves as a key to the interpretation of each of Kant’s Critiques as well as their interrelation” (259), although I part with him in disclaiming that epigenesis provides a perspectival skeleton key only insofar as pure theoretical and practical Reason grow from the Concepts and the Power of Judgments performs its judgments in regard to them.
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The [theory of preestablished harmony] can in turn proceed in two ways: any organic being generated by another of its kind is considered by this theory to be either the educt or the product of that other being. The system that considers the generated beings as mere educts is called the system of individual preformation, or the theory of evolution. The system that considers them as products is called the system of epigenesis. We may also call it the system of generic preformation, since the productive power of the generating being, and therefore the form of the species, was still preformed virtualiter [as a power] in the intrinsic purposive predispositions imparted to the stock. (422-23)

Consider, on the other hand, epigenesis. Even if we were unaware how much easier it is to defend the theory, rather than the theory of evolution, as far as proving it from empirical bases is concerned, still Reason would from the start be greatly in favor of the kind of explanation [it offers]. For in considering those things whose origin can be conceived only in terms of a causality of purposes, this theory, at least as far as propagation is concerned, regards nature as itself producing them rather than merely developing them; and so it minimizes appeal to the supernatural, [and] after the first beginning leaves everything to nature. (But it does not determine anything about this first beginning, on which physics founders in general, even if it tries to use a chain of causes, of whatever kind). (424)

Epigenesis is then a system of reproduction in which the offspring, in its earliest phase, is properly considered a product and not an educt. In epigenetic procreation, it is form, and not matter, which is primary, although the matter certainly has bearing upon the growth of the organism. The form is predeterm ined only insofar as the product will indeed belong to the species of the parent—e.g., a human—, but it is not individually preformed, so that along with the certain characteristics which allow it to be properly determined as belonging to that species—e.g., rational, biped, etc.—also other determinations are to be found which might be considered incidental to the species—e.g., enjoying movies and long walks on the beach.

At this point I would like to consider how three scholars have characterized epigenesis, since Kant seems to assume a familiarity with terms such as epigenesis,
preformation, product, and educt, which is not possessed by present day readers (at least not this one). First, concerning the passage from the third *Critique* provided above, H.W. Ingensiep writes,

> das wesentlich Charakteristikum der Epigenesis-Theorie ist, daß der Organismus nach und nach entsteht und ein völlig neues Product hervorgebracht wird, welches realiter als solches in nichts Vorhergehendem enthalten ist. Dieses Product entsteht immer, wenn folgendes gegeben ist 1. die rohe Materie, 2. die zweckmäßigen Anlagen und 3. der Bildungstrieb als das executive Agent, welches unter Anleitung der legislativen Anlage die spezifische Form des Organismus hervorbringt.\(^\text{65}\)

Second, John Zammito, concerned primarily with epigenesis as a scientific description of the possibility of variation, describes epigenesis as “the scientific effort to discern, describe, and to account for the *immanent capacity* ("force") of nature to *transform itself* to construct higher plateaus of order—discontinuously, *emergetly*, and thus to preserve the idea that, at least *empirically*, it is possible to conceive nature as coherently lawful.”\(^\text{66}\)

Here Zammito emphasizes the qualities of epigenesis which allow for a certain self-development of an organism which displays a consistent lawfulness. Finally, A.C. Genova emphasizes that the “productive faculty of generation <as described in the “product” of epigenesis>, and consequently its specific form, is only virtually performed in accordance with the inner purposive capacities which are part of its stock,”\(^\text{67}\) as opposed to the complete determination of evolutionary succession which obtains if offspring are merely educts.

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\(^{65}\) Ingensiep, 383. “The substantial characteristic of the epigenesis theory is that the organism eventually comes about and a completely new product will be brought forth, the reality of which is not contained in anything preceding it. This product always comes about when the following is given: 1. the raw material, 2. the purposive foundation (*Anlage*) and 3. the inclination to development as the executing agent, which under guidance of the legislative foundation brings forth the specific form of the organism” (translation mine).

\(^{66}\) Zammito, 306.

\(^{67}\) Genova, 264.
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An educt is an offspring which would be simply “unwrapped and enlarged.” The offspring is then simply a miniature version of the parent, and it is inflated, so to speak, over time. As such, preformationism has little need for the influence of experience, since all that an organism is to become is already present in, or rather, present as this miniscule organism. On the other hand, a kind of preformation is still embraced within epigenesis, but it is a “generic preformation” as opposed to an “individual preformation.” A product of epigenesis is an organism which receives from its parents that form which is characteristic of its species, though it is not thereby completely determined.

Putting it All together

Immediately before beginning his Transcendental Deduction, Kant describes his method in terms that are at the very least compatible with considering the origin of the Categories to be developmental, if not outright epigenetic. He writes:

we shall trace the pure Concepts all the way to their first seeds and predispositions in the human Understanding, where these Concepts lie prepared until finally, on the occasion of Experience, they are developed and are exhibited by that same Understanding in their purity, freed from the empirical conditions attaching to them. (A 66/B 91, emphasis mine)

By “dissection” and transcendental “analysis” Kant hopes to show that the pure Understanding is the “birthplace” of the Concepts (A 65-6/B 90-1). I would now like to address the ontological status of such a development. Most commentators who have addressed epigenesis have been quick to assert that the birth, the genesis, at hand is not to be considered as ontological, but that Kant is instead adopting a biological term and

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68 Ingensiep, 384: “ausgewickelt und vergrößert.”
69 Cf. Ingensiep, 384.
employing it purely as an analogy. Although I am persuaded that the most accurate means of considering the ontological status of terms such as Understanding, Functions, and the Transcendental Unity of Apperception is through the “regulative ideas” supplied by Kant’s transcendental logic, rather than considering the capacities as non-spatio-temporal existing forms or functions of thought, I believe that Kant’s appeal to epigenesis should be considered to possesses the proximity and precision of a simile (though the ontological diremption between biological functions and mental functions—if Kant might indeed be defended against accusations of psychologism—is allegorical).

If Kant’s usage of the term epigenesis is more than an appeal to the hard sciences in order to buttress or lend credence to his transcendental proto-physics or else a serendipitous commonality which might be drawn between the two Wissenschaften chanced upon only as he summarized the findings of the Deduction, and it is instead a model of development which Kant had always in mind throughout his writing of the Analytic, then one is justified in applying epigenesis to the development of the pure Concepts.

70 So Ingensiep, “Damit ist noch kein zwingender ontologischer Zusammenhang zwischen den jeweiligen philosophischen bzw. Biologischen Positionen behauptet” (385). See also ibid., 387, where Ingensiep seems particularly concerned with combating Gevova’s “ontologisches Geist-Konzept.” Although I agree with Ingensiep in his resistance to an unuseful ontologizing of the capacities of the mind, he puts himself into a position where he cannot apply the epigenetic structure beyond its function as a description of the seminal qualities of the categories. His ruling out “eine Art von biologischer Fundierung der Kantischen Erkenntnistheorie durch die Epigenesis-Theorie” leaves him unable to account for how it is that Kant is describing an epigenesis of pure Reason, not merely an epigenetic character of the pure Concepts, of which “Erfahrung hat den Charakter eines Produkts” (387).

71 Kant writes that transcendental logic concerns itself with the a priori cognition which makes our cognition possible. (A 56/B 80) In reflecting upon the a priori principles and pure capacities grounding the Understanding and grouping and labeling such principles and capacities, Reason ironically fulfills the role described in the following passage not in creating a hypothetical ens realissimum, but in seeking after the greatest unity, the principle of all principles, internal to Understanding: “<…>the transcendental ideas have a superb and indispensably necessary regulative use: viz., to direct the Understanding to a certain goal by reference to which the directional lines of the Understanding’s concepts converge in one point. And although this point of convergence is only an idea (focus imaginarius), i.e., a point from which—since it lies entirely outside the bounds of possible Experience—the Concepts of Understanding do not actually emanate, it yet serves to provide for these Concepts the greatest unity, in addition to the greatest extension.” (A 644/B 672)
The Metaphysical Deduction Reconsidered

We are now in a place to interpret the following passage from the Metaphysical Deduction and also account for the bidirectionality of the Function of the pure Concept according to the characteristics of an epigenetic growth. I hope with this treatment to provide persuasive means for considering Kant’s selection of epigenesis something more than the most fitting metaphor. Instead, I would claim that the development of both Experience and of pure Reason from the Categories is patterned upon epigenetic development. The examination should show how it is that the Categories are the seed, the fruition of which is Experience while, at the same time, these Categories are themselves pure. As such, Experience cannot be said to be predetermined absolutely, although the Categories which make that Experience possible at all are universal to all agents who have Experience.

The relevant passage from the Metaphysical Deduction runs:

The same Function that gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives to the mere synthesis of various presentations in an intuition unity, which, speaking generally, is called the pure Concept of Understanding. The same Understanding therefore—and indeed through the same acts whereby it brought about, in Concepts, the logical Form of a judgment by means of analytic unity—also brings, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition as such, into its representations a transcendental content, in virtue of which they are called pure Concepts of Understanding, which apply a priori to objects, which is something general logic cannot accomplish. (A 79/B 104-105; translation mine)

Dieselbe Function, welche den verschiedenen Vorstellungen in einem Urtheile Einheit giebt, die giebt auch der bloßen Synthesis verschiedener Vorstellungen in einer Anschauung Einheit, welche, allgemein ausgedrückt, der reine Verstandesbegriff heißt. Derselbe Verstand also und zwar durch eben dieselben Handlungen, wodurch er in Begriffen vermittelst der analytischen Einheit die logische Form eines Urtheils zu Stande brachte, bringt auch vermittelst der synthetischen Einheit des
A Function as it is used in this passage is a bringer, provider, or maker of unity. This unity can appear in the two concepts or the concept and representation joined in a judgment, or it can be the unity which binds together many intuitions into a unified manifold. The former case is the Understanding actualizing its capacity to judge, i.e., the power of Judgment, and the latter activity is the synthesis of the manifold in Sensibility performed by the Understanding, which can also be called an act of the Imagination.

In the translation above I have tried to retain the ambiguity of the original in order to explore what the Concepts might be. In the first sentence, Pluhar has assigned the \textit{welche} after \textit{Einheit} to \textit{Einheit}, translating the sentence in question, “The same function that gives unity to the various presentations \textit{in a judgment} also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various presentations \textit{in an intuition}. This unity—speaking generally—is called pure concept of understanding.” Indeed the proximity of \textit{welche} and \textit{Einheit} warrants such an interpretation, though such a translation might be heavy-handed for a philosopher whose writings are as rich in ambiguities as Kant’s. But it is also conceivable that \textit{welche} modifies not that feminine singular predicate closest to it, i.e., \textit{Einheit} (unity), but the feminine singular subject of the sentence, \textit{Funktion} (Function). I lean towards the latter interpretation, largely because of the sense of activity possessed by some of the words in the passage—e.g., \textit{aufgehen} and “action”, “give”, and “bring.” However, although I do not think that this is a passage where Kant intended to be ambiguous (his writings on God would provide better evidence for such an accusation), I am willing to
grant credence to the former interpretation. My reasons for doing so are not only syntactic, but also semantic.

We saw in chapter two that Functions provide unity, that when Functions function, a unity is the product. If that is so, whether we count the Concepts as Functions which produce unities, or the unities produced by those Functions, is simply a matter of perspective, or, speaking in a temporal sense improper to logical procession, which term is appropriate depends upon which point in the process we are describing. The interpretation I propose will encompass either interpretation. Indeed, according to my understanding of Function, it must.

The analytic unity of all judgments producing its token logical form is, generally speaking, also known collectively as the Categories. In §16 Kant writes that all judgments, whether analytic or synthetic, involve an analytic unity of consciousness, by which they might all be known as belonging to the same act of synthesis which is guided by the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. The synthetic unity of the manifold is produced by the productive Imagination—which is just the Understanding determining Sensibility—by one agent in a single act of the Understanding. This act aesthetically or empirically considered might be called the formation of an object of Experience through a figurative synthesis and consciousness of the unity of this act; from a logical or discursive perspective it is a judgment (of Experience). In either case it is the Understanding which is at work, either through Imagination or Judgment.

But moreover, the Categories are also utilized in both of these activities, bringing a unity through their Function. The unity brought about in Intuition is first the synthetic unity of the pure manifold, or the “manifold of a priori sensibility <which provides> a
material for the pure Concepts of the Understanding” (A 76-77/B 102). This synthesis, Kant writes, “is what first gives rise to a cognition” (A 77/B 103), as it is brought to the Concepts through Imagination. Bringing the pure manifold to Concepts is a Function examined by transcendental as opposed to general logic, the latter accounting for subsumption of particulars under a concept (A 78/B 104). Kant writes that this synthesis “gives rise to cognition” (A 77/B 103) and “yields the pure Concept of Understanding” (A 78/B 104). This synthesis gives rise to cognition in that it begins the process described in the beginning of the “Transcendental Logic”:

“Our cognition arises from two basic sources of the mind. The first is [our ability] to receive representations (and is our receptivity for impressions); the second is our ability to cognize an object through these representations (and is the spontaneity of Concepts) (A 50/B 74). The synthesis might be said to “yield the pure Concept” insofar, I think, as it provides “a material for the pure Concepts of the Understanding” (A 76-77/B 102).

We will now see how the Concepts also bring unity to judgments.

The Origin of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding

How can a synthesis bring a material to a form which is not extant? How are we to consider the origin of the Concepts? If they are not acquired exclusively through sensual experience, are we then only to assume that they are innate, and further that they exist in a being who has never experienced or a child who is not able to subsume objects of Intuition beneath concepts, in the same manner as they do in most adults? Kant resists treating the origin of the Concepts with terms that would suggest their already existing in themselves exactly as they would if they were to encounter sensual objects (making the Concepts educts which develop according to the Leibnizian account of reproduction), and
concomitantly he denies that the pure Concepts—contra definitio—are mere abstractions from experience (as he describes Locke’s account, cf. A 271/B 327). Against these theories Kant holds, first, that the Concepts are pure, but that a kind of change might be said to happen to them which would not come about were they never to encounter Experience—that is, if the manifold were never brought to them, so that it might be subsumed under and unified through the Concepts.

Concepts are exhibited through, but are not properly said to be derived from, their functions upon a manifold, be it pure or empirical. Consider again the following passage, which introduces the method Kant intends to utilize in order to achieve his analysis of the pure Concepts:

we shall trace the pure Concepts all the way to their first seeds and predispositions in the human Understanding, where these Concepts lie prepared until finally, on the occasion of experience, they are developed and are exhibited by that same Understanding in their purity, freed from the empirical conditions attaching to them. (A 66/B 91; emphasis mine)

Previously we focused upon the epigenetic quality of Kant’s description of the development of the Concepts. I would now like to focus upon the words italicized above. The Concepts “lie prepared until … on the occasion of experience” they undergo something of a change guided by the Understanding, a change which Kant calls both a development and an exhibition.

The development and exhibition of the Concepts are concomitant and interrelated activities; the Concepts are exhibited through their development, and they might not be said to develop if they are not likewise being exhibited. Kant describes the Categories as “concepts of an object as such whereby the object’s intuition is regarded as determined in

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By “experience” here it is clear to me that Kant means what might otherwise be called the manifold. This is not the only time Kant refers to the manifold as “experience.”
terms of one of the *logical functions* in judging” (A95/B 128). These concepts which will
determine any object at all “lie prepared” in the mind until they are “occasioned by
Experience.” Perhaps the best example of how Sensation might occasion the development
of a Category through its self-exhibiting determination of an object is the case of
causality. Kant can imagine a world in which all things are random, following no rules,
and such a world would not allow for the association of similar objects or the appearance
of one representation following that of another. Still less could such a world provide the
occasion for judgments exhibiting causality, such as ‘The sun warms the stone’.\(^\text{73}\)
Again, the categorical, empirical judgment ‘All bodies are divisible’ has the form of a
categorical judgment applied to Experience. Through this application the Category of
Inherence originates, and it is exhibited in the manifold as a notion of inherence and
subsistence which becomes not only meaningful in, but also fundamental to, the
constitution of Experience. But again, this application of the logical forms would not be
actualized if the manifold did not provide the occasion for its application. It cannot most
properly be said that experience, as the empiricists’ understood it, makes the pure
Concepts; nonetheless, we might not know of the existence of the Concepts which make
Experience for humans possible were it not for the experience which occasions their
generation, but not their origin.

Put simply, judgments are judgments about something, which reflects Kant’s
dictum that concepts without intuitions are empty.\(^\text{74}\) The pure manifold provides the
transcendental matter—i.e., the determinable—for the Concepts, which are the forms or
rules for the determination of the manifold or, what amounts to the same thing, for the

\(^{73}\) Cf. Prolegomena, §20 and Longuenesse’s commentary, L1 175-78.

\(^{74}\) “Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind” (A 51/B 75).
production of objects of and in Experience. In a sense, a form is not properly a form unless it is the form of a matter.

It might be objected that my interpretation of the exhibition of the Categories upon the occasion of experience affirms a position which Kant dismisses outright. Kant writes that Locke attempts an “empirical deduction” of the concepts applying universally to experience by analyzing the “occasioning causes of <the concepts’> production” from experience. As such, “it is on the occasion of the impressions of the senses that pure intuition and thought are first brought into operation and produce concepts.” However, Kant does not dismiss these findings outright, only the method, for he too would agree with Locke that experience consists of a “matter, for cognition, taken from the senses; and a certain form for ordering this matter, taken from the inner source of pure intuition and thought.” Kant would however state that this form taken from “the inner source of pure intuition” cannot properly be said to produce the universal Concepts in the same way that the universal concept of lemur might be abstracted from perceiving a number of particular lemurs. Locke has made an account for the fact that we possess universal forms applying to our experience (which concerns a “quaestio facti”(question of fact), but that is no deduction. (A 86-87-B 118-119) Kant presents Locke’s view as describing the activation of pure intuition unto the production of the universal concepts applicable to experience when the pure intuition is so occasioned by experience. My understanding of Kant is that he believes that the Categories do indeed develop from the pure Understanding (not intuition, as is the case with Locke) upon the occasion of the manifold, but he does not call an account of such an activity a Deduction of the Concepts’ necessary application to the manifold. Kant’s position, as I understand it, does
have affinities with the Lockian position, but the correspondence is not exact, and Locke’s story is only one sided. Kant writes,

> Hence when I explain in what way concepts can refer to objects a priori, I call that explanation the *transcendental deduction* of these concepts. And I distinguish transcendental deduction from *empirical* deduction, which indicates in what way a concept has been acquired through experience, and through reflection upon experience, and which therefore concerns not the concept’s legitimacy but only the fact whereby we came to possess it. (A 85/B 117)

A Transcendental Deduction would then provide for the a priori application to and *grounding of the possibility* of Experience, which Locke’s position does not attempt at all. Nonetheless, Kant does not dismiss the validity of Locke’s findings (as Kant understands them), only their false characterization as a Deduction.

> The Concepts are Functions which refer a priori to objects and are themselves not “pure or sensible intuitions, but <…> merely acts of pure Thought <…>” (A 57/B 81). The Deduction of the Categories is to provide a case for the necessary connection between the logical Functions of Judgment or pure forms of Thought (cf. A 70/B 95) and the manifold through the exhibition of the Categories. The Category of Causality again provides perhaps the most perspicuous example of formation through judgment and exhibition in the manifold. Under the logical Function of Relation Kant places the Category “Hypothetical.” The Category of Causality originates when this logical Function is applied to the manifold. Put somewhat metaphorically, the hypothetical logical form “if…then” might be translated into the language which properly expresses the causal connection we always encounter in Experience as “whenever…then.” This translation is the origination of the pure Concept, considered top-down. On the other hand, we can say that Causality is exhibited in the manifold insofar as it prescribes a rule
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not only to any sensations which might occasion the judgment, for example “Whenever the sun shines on the rock, then, because of that, it becomes warm,” but also to the manifold in toto, providing the manifold with the rules which would apply to objects of possible Experience.

Thus the material is first brought to the Concepts, before it can be subsumed under them. This action is considered a judgment, but it is not one which would be treated by general or discursive logic. The content brought to the Concepts is the content concerning Space and Time examined by transcendental logic and laid out in the Transcendental Aesthetic. The flip-side of the bringing of the pure manifold to the Concepts is the relation of the Concepts to the manifold which produces a unity Kant calls the figurative synthesis (synthesis speciosa). For the purposes of this thesis, which already investigates the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories expounded in the “Analytic of Concepts” after this passage from the “Guide for the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding”, I believe we can perform a legitimate interpretation of this synthesis without needing to make recourse to the Schematism. My reasons for advancing this interpretation independent of the analysis of the figurative synthesis in the Schematism are not only methodological, although indeed one must pick battles to write a thesis. Additionally, I believe that one can account sufficiently for the activity of the Understanding on Sensibility in the B Deduction without making pre-course to the Schematism. Moreover, to the extent that Longuenesse has done so, she runs the risk of

75 This conclusion is obvious to anyone who’s at all sympathetic to Longuenesse’s reading, but I don’t think that one need to be familiar with her work to see that the figurative synthesis is the “synthesis, we shall see hereafter, <which> is a mere effect produced by the Imagination, which is a blind but indispensable function of the soul without which we would have no cognition whatsoever, but of which we are conscious only very rarely” (A 78/B 103). Cf. the parallel with how Kant refers to the schematism itself as a “secret art residing in the depths of the human soul, an art whose true stratagems we shall hardly ever divine from nature and lay bare before ourselves” (A 141/B 180).
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grafting concepts into the Deduction which are not appropriate. (The Schematism has no Flux-Capacitor!)

This bringing of the manifold to the Concepts provides them with a matter which is “exterior” to them. As a seed is fed by the nutrients in the soil around it, thereby making possible its development according to the ontogeny—the genetic “blueprint”—in it, so what is nascent in the Concepts—before they might even properly be called the Concepts—receives its content, which is exterior to it, in that the manifold is brought to it. The Concepts, after they have received their content, might make judgments upon this content, and thus yield Experience. This full development involves, first, the unity that the Understanding provides to Sensibility as it guides the Syntheses in Intuition, Imagination, and Understanding, by which the Concepts make the indeterminate manifold something determinable. As such, the pure Concepts perform a Function which unifies the manifold. Second, by means of the logical Forms of Judgment, Understanding makes judgments in relation to the manifold, determining the latter through and in respect of the Categories. The pure Concepts, through which the logical Functions of Judgment relate to the manifold, provide a unity to judgment, a unity required by the very form of judgment—namely, two concepts connected by a copula. However the Table of Judgments might be related to the manifold, the intuitions and concepts respectively found in and abstracted from it may be reduced to twelve Categories. Thus all judgments will be unified by the Categories, and at least one of these Categories will necessarily be a predicate of any judgment applied to the manifold.
Chapter 5: CONCLUSION

This thesis simply would not have existed without Longuenesse’s pioneering yet mature interpretation of Kant, specifically as it has been delivered in her *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*. In re-reading the *Critique of Pure Reason* after having studied her book, it is difficult to imagine that Kant could have meant otherwise. Nonetheless, this thesis does put forth grounds of contention with Longuenesse’s. Nevertheless, the two paths I forge run parallel to her own.

First, I hold that it is most proper to call that which initiates cognition, in its formal aspect, Functions, and that Functions are activities already “spontaneously” at work before the formation of concepts; indeed, “concepts rest on Functions” (A 68/B 93). With Functions, Kant has a means other than the figurative synthesis, as it is most fully developed in the Schematism, to account for, first, the spontaneity which characterizes Understanding and, second, Understanding’s constantly present tendency to bring about a unity in which the specific elements are subsumed beneath more general ones. Longuenesse runs the danger, and she has been accused of as much, of applying a top-

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down retro-activity to what is, as I understand it, a bottom-towards-up activity. I think it improper to consider the figurative synthesis at this point in Kant’s enterprise as existing in a dormant state; instead, I would say that the figurative synthesis in the sections of the *Critique of Pure Reason* preceding the Schematism is in a *nascent* state. As such, the figurative synthesis is not as an *educt*, an organism which remains essentially the same, only increasing in size, but a *product* of which we can expect to perceive a substantial difference if we compare its nascent stage with its final, fully developed stage.

To caricature Longuenesse’s position in a way that I’m not certain is accurate, but which reflects some of her critics’ understandings of the significance she attaches to the figurative synthesis, that synthesis would be the educt which inflates to form the Understanding. Thus Longuenesse is mistakenly led to read the three Syntheses of the A Deduction in terms of later capacities. Further, once we exhaustively comprehend what the synthesis speciosa is and does, according to the Schematism, we are to re-read the entire Analytic (and several pre-critical writings) in order to see what it *did*. She writes, “The goal of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories is “fully attained” only when it leads to a rereading of the Transcendental Aesthetic.” Thus, like the end of a *Scooby-Doo* episode, we rip the mask off at the end and find, “Zoiks! It was the Synthesis Speciosa all along!” And it would have gotten away with it, if it hadn’t been for that meddling Longuenesse!

The interpretation I propose is, I think, in Longuenesse’s spirit. According to my reading of Kant and my understanding of the function and significance of the architectonic, during an account of the grounds for the possibility of Experience, it is

77 L1 213.
proper at one point to call a certain unifying activity a Function. But that same type of activity, when its matter is full-fledged concepts, is most properly called a judgment. Likewise, in the last chapter we saw that a pure Concept brings unity, and that unity might be called a Judgment or an object, depending upon whither that unity is oriented and what is unified by it. It might be that Kant does not completely analyze the figurative synthesis in the creation of this latter synthesis because he does not yet have all of the terms available to him which would be necessary for such a foray (such terms being unavailable until the Schematism). Or it is possible that he does not do so because it is not clear that the Transcendental Deduction is incomplete until that activity of the Understanding upon Sensibility mentioned immediately before the Table of Categories—

Synthesis as such, as we shall see hereafter, is the mere effect produced by the imagination, which is a blind but indispensable Function of the soul without which we would have no cognition whatsoever, but of which we are conscious only very rarely. Bringing this synthesis to concepts, on the other hand, is a Function belonging to the Understanding, and it is through this Function that the Understanding first provides us with cognition in the proper meaning of the term. (A 78/B 103)

—is not only sketched, but is grounded through its analysis in the Schematism. Longuenesse holds that the passage above is only a sketch of the figurative synthesis, but it is indeed that synthesis. Indeed, I hardly contend with her, but I contend nonetheless.

My contention begins with an affirmation of the first possible ground for Kant’s not yet treating the figurative synthesis in detail, namely, because he did not yet have the terminology proper to do so. If Kant is simply describing an educt, a miniature version of an adult, then it is acceptable to put off describing any of the organs at any time. After all, the organs will not change, though they might have different functional attributes depending upon the other organs with which they are currently relating. However, if Kant
is describing a product of epigenetic reproduction and development, then his inability to
denominate as a figurative synthesis, for example, the Function provided by the
Understanding which unifies the manifold and brings it to concepts is not due to
pedagogical concerns, but because this activity cannot—at this point—be called the
figurative synthesis. It may be a forerunner to the figurative synthesis and it may perform
a similar role. But I claim that this Function, since we are here considering Understanding
before it has concepts and is capable of discursive Thought, must be distinguished from
the figurative synthesis. That the two are distinguishable is evinced by their distance in
the Critique of Pure Reason itself—the Function of the Understanding is mentioned
before the Table of Categories is even given, and the detailed analysis of the figurative
synthesis is given after the Deduction. On the one hand, we have the description of an
activity which brings the manifold to concepts, which is a bottom-up account; on the
other hand, we have a top-down account of “the schematism of the pure Understanding,”
“the sensible condition under which alone pure Concepts of Understanding can be used” (A 136/B 175). Following this second route, Longuenesse must explain how it is one and
the same figurative synthesis which performs the Function of the Understanding, i.e., the
bringing of the manifold to the Unity of Apperception, while also providing for the
schematization of each of the twelve Categories following the Transcendental Deduction.

Instead of encountering these dilemmas of retroactivity endemic to Longuenesse’s
interpretation, epigenetic development provides a model of teleology in which all that is
necessary for the development of an organism and its interdependent capacities or organs
is already present in the embryo. Pertaining to the organs, at some point that which is
responsible for processing the nutrients fed through an umbilical tube will eventually
Chapter Five: Conclusion

become a stomach; and in the same way, the Function of Understanding unifying the manifold might become the figurative synthesis. But just as it is a misnomer to call that part of a human embryo a stomach, I think it is improper to call this Function the figurative synthesis.

If I am correct in my application of the epigenetic model to the development of Understanding, much of Longuenesse’s interpretation is still salvageable and beneficial. First, her interpretation of the Schematism chapter could remain intact. Second, the full-grown figurative synthesis might shed light on nascent activity of the Imagination. Third, and this is a related point, insights won from her analysis of the figurative synthesis as Kant expounds upon it in the Schematism pertaining to, for example, number, might similarly at least shed light on Kant’s other arithmetic excursions. That is, it seems that the analysis of the figurative synthesis in the Schematism might be used to elucidate writings outside the *Critique of Pure Reason* without running into my objection that such a usage would be anachronistic if applied to previous stages of development. Finally, her understanding of the Schematism could still be applicable to any treatment Kant might make of the Schematism later in the book, such as his statement in the Dialectic that “the Idea of Reason is an analogue of a schema of Sensibility” (A 665/B 693).

Longuenesse’s contention that the forms of Intuition just are formal Intuition is not required on my interpretation. This would be an anachronistic error of the type I mentioned in my third point above. I think it is improper to apply retroactively to all activity of the Imagination the understanding of the figurative synthesis gained after its analysis in the Schematism. In keeping with the model of the human seed I delivered earlier, it would be tantamount to an adult again drinking embryonic fluid.
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