POLITICAL BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES IN ST. LUCIA: TOWARD A POLICY OF ENGAGEMENT IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN

by

LUANNE SERIEUX-LUBIN

(Under the Direction of Shane Singh)

ABSTRACT

In this study I addressed the contextual application of political development theories in the Caribbean with special reference to the post-colonial, politically independent, small-island developing state of St. Lucia. The study was based on research suggesting democratic political culture is an important aspect of political development, especially in developing contexts. I began with a broad examination of extant data regarding institutional arrangements in countries in the Eastern Caribbean and the broader Caribbean region. I used democracy, electoral self-determination, electoral process, physical integrity index, associational and organizational rights, political pluralism and participation, functioning of government, and voter turnout as indices of institutional arrangements. In general, Caribbean countries scored well on these indicators, with few notable exceptions. St. Lucia scored favorably on all indices, except the physical integrity index, which suggests some problems related to the country’s judicial system. I subsequently collected primary data on a sample of 476 St. Lucian citizens and residents to examine political beliefs, values, and attitudes in relation to political participation. I tested relations between interest, self-efficacy, trust, and participation. The results revealed that all of the variables were positively correlated.
Additionally, for the St. Lucia sample, political interest and self-efficacy predicted participation in political discourse; interest, self-efficacy, trust in national government, trust in international organizations, and trust in local institutions predicted participation in political activities; and interest, self-efficacy and trust in national government predicted electoral participation. I discuss implications for public policy.

INDEX WORDS:  St. Lucia democratic political culture, St. Lucia political attitudes and behaviors, Caribbean political development, Caribbean institutional arrangements, Caribbean political participation, Caribbean development and democracy.
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by

LUANNE SERIEUX-LUBIN

B.A., Cameron University, 2003

B.B.A., Cameron University, 2003

M.A., Florida International University, 2005

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by

LUANNE SERIEUX-LUBIN

Major Professor: Shane Singh

Committee: Jeffrey Berejikian
Ryan Bakker
Angela Fertig

Electronic Version Approved:

Maureen Grasso
Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
May 2014
DEDICATION

To those who feel overlooked and unheard: Stand tall, speak up. You have so much to add to the tapestry of the world. Your voice is important. You matter.

And to my grandmother Madeleine Eldica Serieux, who passed away a few days before my defense: You epitomize strength, perseverance, and living life on your own terms. I think of you often.

May you rest in peace

1922 - 2014
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Researchers and theorists in political science have for some time now focused on defining and analyzing political development (e.g. Charron & LaPuente, 2010; Huntington, 1965; 2006; Inglehart & Weltzel, 2005; Park, 1984; Polanyi, 1944; Rostow, 1960). In simple terms, political development is concerned with the beliefs, attitudes, and values, as well as the institutional arrangements that comprise the political system of a country or society (Pye, 1965). A society experiencing political development has presumably achieved increased resource and organizational capability and has developed institutions and the mechanisms for implementing effective public policies (Dahl, 1971; Boix, 2003). Such a society has embraced democratization, effective governance by rule of law, political and economic stability, and institutional reforms (Pye, 1965).

Additionally, such a society has experienced marked changes in its democratic political culture (Pye, 1965).

Political culture refers to people’s attitudes, beliefs, and dispositions toward their political systems, and how they see themselves as situated within those systems (Almond & Verba, 1963). For example, in participatory or democratic cultures, citizens are involved in the political process and often feel like they have the capacity to effect change (Almond & Verba, 1963). Individuals within such cultures not only show interest, but also feel empowered to participate in local and national politics. Individuals generally
trust the institutions within their political system and also trust that their efforts and participation are valid and valued. Therefore, the attributes of political interest, self-efficacy, trust, and participation are essential aspects of a democratic political culture (Alesina & Wacziarg, 2000; Almond & Verba, 1963; Bandura, 1997; Putnam, 2000; Verba et al., 1995) and are characteristic of well-functioning democracies (Inglehart & Weltzel, 2005; Putnam, 2000). Therefore, political development may be defined as the existence of a well-functioning democracy, characterized by a pervasive participatory political culture.

While the political culture of a community or country plays a vital role in that community’s political, social, and economic development (Inglehart & Weltzel, 2005), the actual character of a political culture differs from one polity to another (Almond & Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1990). Even as attempts are made to understand democratic political culture in terms of the political beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors, it is still not a simple concept to define. Additionally, democratic political culture is an internal attribute of a society and it is debated the extent to which it can be affected from the outside (Bakewell, 2004; Moten, 2011). The logical extension of this deliberation is whether there is any validity in external efforts to promote political development in any society, especially in the case of understudied developing contexts, such as the Eastern Caribbean (EC).

Numerous theories have been posited on how best to address issues of political development and democracy in the developing world. For example, theories of modernization and political development look at how nations could achieve democracy. A common theme of these theories is the integral role of economic development in the
process of democracy. Particularly, these theories seem to suggest that economic development is a necessary precursor to democracy. Economists (Organski, 1965; Polanyi, 1944; Rostow, 1960) emphasize a linear path toward political development. Likewise political scientists like Almond (1965) and Almond and Coleman (1960) firmly believe in the vital role of economic growth. Some sociologists, however, like Deutsch (1961) and Lipset (1959) argue that social prerequisites must be met in order to spur the social modernization. Other researchers including Harrison and Huntington (2000), Inglehart and Weltzel (2005), Nakajima (1994), and Weber (1985) suggest further that the presence of a democratic political culture predates economic development and, as such, it is the nature of this democratic political culture that determines the economic and general development that a polity realizes.

Notwithstanding their theoretical underpinnings, in order to gauge public opinion and to measure these political beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors, researchers often employ the use of scientific surveys and public opinion polls (Abdollahian et al., 2008; Alexander et al., 2011; Norris & Inglehart, 2004). Generally, political research practices are more commonplace in developed societies, such as in Europe and in North America. However, more recently, there has been some increased motivation for conducting this type of research in newly formed, fragile democracies in the developing world, such as in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region (Anderson, 2010; Cabrera & Gómez, 2007; Córdova & Seligson, 2010). In addition to gaining insights into whether the relationships among political attitudes and behaviors are similar across developed and developing nations, by turning their attention to the under-studied political contexts of developing countries, the developed world hopes to identify policy processes and implementation
procedures that are better aligned with today’s realities. Moreover, as political research is being extended more globally, in each new context there are theoretical, methodological, and analytic issues that need to be identified and addressed to ensure reliability and consequential validity.

The Eastern Caribbean (EC) is a useful context for looking at politics. Specifically, the region’s geographical proximity to North America means that problems in the EC can easily impact or influence affairs in that part of the world (Sullivan et al., 2012). The same applies to the neighboring regions of Central and South America. Additionally, most of the countries comprising the EC are newly independent democracies. Most have only been independent since the 1960s or 1970s. St. Lucia for example, is the most developed and populous of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and has only been independent since 1979 – 35 years ago. Moreover, the independent EC states are still politically linked to North America and their former colonizers in Europe, chiefly Great Britain. These countries, developing and developed, have centuries-old commercial, political, and cultural ties and therefore are inextricably linked.

US policy decisions are largely based on the premise of using economic growth to spur social and political growth. Thus, political development theories, which include modernization theories, have been used to explain financial contributions to the developing regions such as LAC. Some examples including, the Alliance for Progress (established to supply economic aid to Latin America), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Peace Corps, were all established in 1961 and still rely on the economically based political development approach. Furthermore, in the United
States, economic solutions for addressing aid and interactions between the US and LAC are guided by the policies outlined in the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1990). It comprises ten prescriptions for economic policy that the US government and various international financial institutions based in Washington DC, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, believe are necessary first steps to foster development in the developing world. The policy prescriptions are underpinned by neoliberal views of globalization, including, the importance of macroeconomic stability and integration into the international economy (World Health Organization, 2013). Other issues related to democratic political culture are not directly considered.

In addition to financial aid, the United States to some degree has engaged in policing the LAC states and has a decided role in the political direction of LAC countries. This means that the US is not exclusively interested in financial and monetary interventions to achieve their goals. Among other actions, the US has deposed governments, invaded or occupied countries, and involved itself in internal elections (Clement, 1997; Gustafson, 2010; Kerbo, 1978; Morley & McGillan, 1997; Strong, 2007; Tulchin, 1994; Williams, 1996) in order to maintain US political interests.

In this paper, I argue that above other methods, interventions targeting political culture may prove most successful in addressing political development. I suggest that contrary to the modernization theories, political development is a precursor to economic development, and that infusing financial resources into a context whose political culture is immature may worsen the political situation, while doing little to nothing for the general economic wellbeing of the country. I further argue that if the developing nations were supported in the pursuit of their own political development, presumably by
internally addressing their democratic political culture, then both the developing nations and their developed counterparts would benefit from the consequent overall development.

Everyone stands to gain from having well functioning democracies in the Eastern Caribbean, as the EC is an important region because of its relationships with other global entities. Assuming that a participatory democratic political culture is fundamental to a well-functioning democracy, and a well-functioning democracy is the goal, then it is important to implement interventions that encourage participation in the political process in the EC region. A necessary first step is to engage in research on the state of the political attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors in the context of the Eastern Caribbean. In this way, the relationships among political attitudes and behaviors in the EC can be revealed. Additionally, a baseline of these aspects of the democratic political culture can be established, from which policy and other interventions may be evaluated.

**Statement of the Problem**

The underlying premise of democracy is that citizens participate in their own political process and development toward independence and autonomy (Kurki, 2010; Monroy, 2012; Paredes, 2011). While developed countries continue to invest large sums of money that target economic development, these expensive policies often may not actually address issues directly related to democracy. Moreover, economically based prescriptions for development have largely been discredited (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997; Przeworski et al., 2000; Zakaria, 2007) and it is argued that pumping money into a country may not be the best way of addressing political development (Ali, 2009; Kennedy, 2010). Indeed, financial aid alone from the developed world can only go so far to change the democratic political culture in the recipient country (Bueno de Mesquita &
Downs, 2005). Furthermore, the US is often viewed as an enforcer and benefactor rather than a cooperative partner in democracy in many parts of the world (Gustafson, 2010; Williams, 1996), especially where authoritarian or corrupt political elites are given access to foreign aid and entrusted with investing and distributing funds (Kuncic, 2011; Travis, 2010), while the populace is left to feel politically disenfranchised.

It can be argued that a better way to achieve sustainable democracy may be to invest in helping develop a culture of participation (Putnam, 2000). One benefit of a culture of participation is that political elites are held accountable (Almond & Verba, 1963) and this serves to distinguish democracy from autocracy (Uslaner, 2013). Additionally, a culture of participation ensures that elites are responsive to the will of their constituents (Bartels, 2002; Sullivan & Uslaner, 1978; Verba et al., 1995; Wright & Berkman, 1986) since “the voices of those who participate are more likely to be heard and heeded by decision-makers” (Uslaner, 2013, p. 1). In this regard, it is first necessary to understand the political situation in developing contexts from the perspectives of the people. It is not enough to simply label a country as a democracy. Empirical evidence should confirm the existence of democracy in the polity. For example, many EC countries are believed to be democracies based on the principles advanced by their constitutions; however, it is debatable the degree to which these constitutional principles are upheld in everyday life. Therefore, it is important to delineate the markers of a democracy (Landman, 2009) and to compare these with the realities in the polity in question.
Purpose Statement

The purpose of the current study was to examine political development and democracy in St. Lucia, an EC country, by examining people’s political attitudes, beliefs, and engagement. Through this research St. Lucia and its neighbors will have access to better information regarding political culture within the region. Therefore, this study was conceptualized to fill in the gap regarding empirical research in the EC region, add to theory in terms of political development and political attitudes and behavior, and provide a means of engaging in policy interventions based on contextually relevant empirical data. Necessarily, this was a two-part study. In the first part, I analyzed extant data from various countries in the Caribbean region to help clarify the context in which St. Lucia exists by looking at the political realities of its closest neighbors and political and diplomatic partners in the Caribbean region. In the second part, I conducted a case study on St. Lucia that involved primary data collection and quantitative analysis. The study was guided by the following research question: What are the relationships among the measures of political attitudes (interest, trust and self-efficacy) and political behavior (participation) in a sample of people in St. Lucia?

Significance of the Study

In terms of significance, the study offers up several intriguing implications for the field of political science. First, this study is the most in-depth quantitative analysis of political attitudes and behavior in St. Lucia at this time. Many developed, and some developing nations have the resources to invest in empirical research and consequently have generated theories and policies based on this research. Unfortunately, a large number of developing nations like St. Lucia lack such resources. Yet in-depth analysis in
the socio-political context of the small island post-colonial developing states can be invaluable regarding to the study of international affairs. Examination of the political situation in St. Lucia shows whether this developing post-colonial country has a political system that classifies as a democracy, or whether another type of political classification is necessary.

A second implication for the study is that it advances discussions concerning long-standing theories of how developed societies emerge and the markers for what constitutes a developed society (e.g. modernization theories). What most developed countries have in common is that they are economically advanced and have democracies. Conversely, developing countries like St. Lucia experience economic scarcity and have nascent, fragile democracies, or otherwise are not democratic societies. The obvious implications for modernization theories are that there should be differences in the patterns of political behavior between developed and developing nations.

Suppose St. Lucia (a notably developing county) classifies as a democracy according to the results of the study. Suppose also that the examined patterns of attitudes and behavior in St. Lucia are similar to those found in developed countries. This might suggest that differences that are found to exist between St. Lucia and other developed societies might simply be a matter of economics. Certainly, St. Lucia has a different history of development than most developed nations; so then what is likely to be distinctive in these societies is opportunities for economic expansion. Such a situation would favor policies that encourage the transfer of money from developed to developing countries to successfully forge development.
However, if St. Lucia classifies as a democracy according to research done by various international organizations, and further if the results of the current study demonstrate that the patterns of political attitudes and behavior are different in St. Lucia than in the developed world, this may suggest that differences are not only a matter of economics, since St. Lucia is a relatively rich country. It would be the case that simply pumping money into a developing context is not enough to forge political development. Thus, finding alternative ways of addressing development, other than economic assistance would be warranted and interactions between developed and developing nations should also focus on non-economic considerations.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Theoretical Perspectives on Political Development

The notion of political development refers explicitly to the evolution of systems of political power within societies. Thus in simple terms, the prevailing beliefs, attitudes, values, and institutional arrangements in a society are all constitutive of its political development (Almond, 1965; Charron & LaPuente, 2010; Inglehart & Weltzel, 2005; Lipset, 1959; Park, 1984; Pye, 1965). Historically, there appears to be an air of preoccupation about this topic on the world stage; as developed societies have continuously engrossed themselves with political development in developing contexts, with or without consent (Farere, 1989; Morley & McGillion, 1997; Rostow, 1960), and often without warrant (Beck, 2013; Kinzer, 2013; Lamrani, 2007). As a corollary, political development has been a topic of extraordinary scholarly and research activity among political scientists, especially those in the field of international affairs (Ikeda et al., 2012; Karp & Banducci, 2008; Pearce, 2010).

Political development may be defined in terms of three broadly shared characteristics: concern with equality in terms of the political culture, the capacity of the political system as relates to authoritative governmental organizations, and specialization or differentiation of governmental organizations concerning non-authoritative structures (Pye, 1965). Park (1984) provides both formal and informal definitions of political
development. His formal definition references the political system’s ability to meet the changing needs of the members of the society, while the informal definition involves the transition from a society having political institutions with the capacity to satisfy only the lower needs of the people (linked to survival), to being able to satisfy the society’s higher needs (linked to thriving). In Park’s (1984) conceptualization, institutional change is derived from individual change and a resultant aggregate need at the societal level. Common to both definitions (Pye, 1965; Park, 1984) is need for fidelity between the political culture and political institutions in ways that are context specific. These definitions also highlight the importance of political culture in political development and the ways in which a society’s political culture evolves. Thus, these and other researchers (Heilbroner, 1963; Park, 1984; Pye, 1965) offer a holistic approach to political development and include economic, social, and even human developments as necessary to achieving political development.

The conceptions of political development mentioned above are in stark contrast to other theories of political development that prescribe specific stages and processes, regardless of context, which when followed ultimately result in a political development – collectively referred to as modernization theories (Organski, 1965; Parsons, 1951; Polanyi, 1944). Modernization theories differentiate political development, social development, and economic development, and further propose a linear progression typically from economic development inevitably toward political development. Rostow (1960) theorized five stages of economic growth starting with a traditional society and ending with an age of mass consumption. In the traditional society, the economic development is at its lowest with an economy based in agriculture, lack of
democratization of power, and low levels of science and technology. After going through three stages of economic development, during the age of mass consumption the society moves away from agriculture toward consumer goods and services, and people have more disposable income to see to their wants, not only their needs materialize. At this stage additional money goes into social services. Similarly, Organski (1965) theorized four stages of development starting with primitive unification and ending with a politics of abundance.

Sociologists, while retaining the primacy of economic development in political development, add a social component to achieving political development. These theorists propose that inevitably economic growth leads to social modernization, which would lead to democratic systems, such as those found in politically developed societies (Lerner, 1958; Parsons, 1951). Like his sociologist counterparts, Parsons (1951) theorized three stages of societal development, starting with primitive society and ending with a modern society through which countries can either be traditional or modern. Lerner (1958) forwarded the idea that modernization would inherently lead to political development. Lipset (1959) and Deutsch (1961) saw a correlation between higher education (higher levels of which were found in more developed societies) and democracy, and thus concluded that before a society could achieve democracy and development there were social prerequisites that had first to be achieved.

A wave of political scientists involved themselves in studying political development in the 1950s and 1960s as a response to the spreading communism and a spate of new nations emerging from colonial rule. Among the best known are Almond and Coleman (1960), who touted the universality of political systems and the functions
that they perform. As such, the researchers devised a theory where all of the functions of political systems are divided into inputs and outputs, in which the state does not impact the process of political development, but acts as a mediator of sorts (Almond & Coleman, 1960). Later, Inglehart (1990) and Inglehart and Weltzel (2005) argued that the starting point for democracy (considered to be political development) was economic development. However, instead of economic development leading to social changes, Inglehart (1990) and Inglehart and Weltzel (2005) posited that economic development leads to cultural development, which in turn leads to democracy.

Not all political scientists have accepted the convention of a necessary and linear shift toward modern society. Nonetheless, even researchers who are not as explicit in the linearity of the process to political development or democracy, still include political culture as important link toward political development (Huntington, 1981). Huntington (1965, 2006) for example, did not believe that modernization was inevitable. However, while he suggested that modernization could be harmful to political institutions, he agreed that increased political participation was a key component of political development. As another point of divergence, he focused on the role of institutions and the idea that stable institutions are necessary for development. Furthermore he believed the developed nations, specifically the US, should support strong political parties as a means of promoting development. Burnell (2004) shares this view of the importance of parties to democracy suggesting that if political parties are not emphasized, strong or charismatic leaders will inexorably fill in the spaces that institutions otherwise occupy, to the overall detriment of a society. Therefore, in a departure from many theories of developmentalism, Huntington’s (1965, 2006) and Burnell’s (2004) theories define
political development in terms of institutionalizing political organizations and procedures.

**Conceptualizing Democratic Political Culture**

It can be concluded based on the above examples that political culture is a vital component of political development. Political culture is the aggregate of the values, beliefs, and attitudes people hold regarding their political system and the roles they imagine for themselves within that political system (Almond & Verba, 1963; Wiarda, 2000). Put another way, it is the orientation of a people toward their political system (Almond & Verba, 1963; Wiarda, 2000). A vital premise of the political culture approach to politics is that the health of a political system depends on the way people posture themselves in regard to this system. This means that most studies on political culture rely on self-beliefs, values, and attitudes at the individual level to determine how well a democracy works at the systems level (Inglehart & Weltzel, 2005).

The political culture is important to the overall performance of a democratic political system (Inglehart & Weltzel, 2005). The actual character of a political culture differs from one polity to another, and while they may be difficult to change, they are not immutable and can have significant political effects (Inglehart, 1990). Almond and Verba (1963) for example, described three types of political culture: parochial, subject, and participatory or civic. The researchers theorized that the parochial political culture was found in poorly developed societies, where the largely poor and illiterate citizens were concerned with their own narrow circumstances and associations, such as the family and immediate community, and had little regard for the larger political system. The subject culture was a transitional culture where citizens had an awareness of their larger political
context, but did not view themselves as participants in this system. As such, they were essentially subject to their political system and had little rights in such a system. Finally, the ideal participatory or civic culture exists in a democratized or democratic system, where citizens vote, have rights that are protected, and are active participants in their political process (Almond & Verba, 1963). In this advanced democratic system the citizens believe that they are an integral part of society and that is it their responsibility to keep their government in check (Almond & Verba, 1963). In such a context, people demonstrate elevated levels of political interest and involvement partly because they are trusting of their political system and feel that their personal efforts are valuable and could result in meaningful changes.

Correspondingly, in political science research, the form of democratic political culture in a context is thought to be influenced by a number of factors including political interest (Campbell et al., 1960; Dalton, 2004; 2008; Verba et al., 1995), political self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997; Blais & St. Vincent, 2011; Caprara et al., 2006; Gerber et al., 2009; Vecchione & Caprara, 2009), political trust and/or distrust (Alesina & Wacziarg, 2000; Diamond, 1998; Hardin, 2002; Lenard, 2008; Martin, 2008; O’Neill, 2002), and social capital (Inglehart, 1990; Putnam et al., 1994; Putnam, 2000).

Social capital is an aggregate concept based in individual behavior, attitudes and predispositions (Brehm & Rahn, 1997). It refers to the connections that exist in the relationships among persons and describes the features of social organization (Putnam et al., 1994; Putnam, 2000). The components of social capital are trust, social networks, and voluntary associations (Jackman & Miller, 1998). Trust and tolerance abound in cultures that are high in social capital, and consequently, extensive voluntary associations emerge
(Inglehart, 1990). Additionally, Jacobs and Tillie (2004) assert that membership in such voluntary associations generate generalized trust, which then leads to higher levels of political trust and political participation. Unlike physical and human capital, which are considered to be private goods, social capital is considered to be a public good. It is therefore vulnerable to neglect and free-riding and often suffers from underinvestment (Coleman, 1990). It is also closely associated with a society’s democratic political culture. Although social capital is considered an important part of a democracy (Putnam, 2000), it is often difficult to define, measure and, ultimately influence, and like political interest, self-efficacy, and trust it is only one component of a democratic political culture (Wood, 1997).

**Conceptions of political attitudes, values, and behaviors.** The study of political attitudes and behaviors, within the broader area of democratic political culture and development, is not new to political science. Numerous researchers have studied the political attitudes of interest, self-efficacy, and trust, and the behaviors associated with political participation and the relations among these constructs (Blais & St. Vincent, 2011; Caprara et al., 2006; Cook & Gronke, 2005; Karp & Banducci, 2008). The results of these research efforts have differed from one study to the next, and from one context to another. Therefore, it might be prudent is discuss relations between political attitudes and behaviors from different world contexts. The prevailing view, to which I subscribe, is that attitudes drive behavior. However, there are some researchers who claim the opposite – that behaviors drive attitudes. In the sections that follow, I will first discuss how these constructs have been conceptualized in the research literature, and then I will discuss how researchers have examined their relations in various international contexts.
**Participation.** Uhlane (2001) suggested that there is not a universally accepted definition of political participation. However, a common thread among the various definitions are the notions of citizens aiming to influence government decisions and actions by directly influencing public policy (Huntington & Nelson, 1976), or indirectly by choosing the people who make the public policy decisions (Verba et al., 1995). Others define political participation more broadly as any activity influencing political agenda or outcomes (Ekman & Amnå, 2012).

Ekman and Amnå, (2012) suggest two main categories of political participation: latent and manifest. Latent political participation, which is also referred to as civil participation, centers on involvement and civic engagement. It includes personal interest and attentiveness to political and societal issues and participating in activities based on these interests. It involves belonging to groups outside of family and friends regardless of whether there is a distinct political profile or agenda within these groups.

On the other hand, manifest political participation is divided into formal political participation and activism or extra-parliamentary participation. Formal participation comprises participation in elections and contact activities at the individual level. It also comprises organized political participation at the group level and membership in groups like political parties, trade unions, and other such organizations. It includes the typical activities that are expected of ‘good citizens,’ like voting, donating money, time or other resources for a political campaign, serving in public office, and being part of an activist group.

Activism or extra-parliamentary participation includes legal activities such as participating in protests and demonstrations, supporting boycotts, and signing petitions.
These are also called unconventional participation, as they are viewed as protest-type activities. Finally, activism may also include violent and illegal activities. Breaking the law through illegal activism may take the form of illegal protests, demonstrations, riots, squatting, sabotaging campaigns through vandalism or theft, terrorism, and confrontations with police or political opponents (Ekman & Amnå, 2012). Like much of the political science literature, the present study focuses on legal manifest political participation.

There are other ways in which political participation can be categorized. For example, some research distinguishes electoral participation from governmental participation (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). Electoral participation simply refers to voter turnout in general elections, while governmental participation refers to other types of political participation that involve the government. Governmental participation can be further divided into contact-type participation, protest-type participation, and also a separate category called political discussion (Ikeda, 2013). Contact-type participation involves interactions with government that focus on people making contact with persons in public roles like government officials and other personnel. On the other hand, protest-type political participation includes activities that can be seen as speaking out against the government and can take forms like demonstrations, boycotts, and signing petitions: this seems most closely aligned with unconventional participation. Political discussion is simply involving in discussion centered on politics. Individuals’ self-beliefs, values, and attitudes influence their political participation and are often interrelated. Thus, as I discuss the concepts of interest, self-efficacy, and trust/distrust in the following sections, I also discuss how they relate to political participation.
**Interest.** Lupia and Philpot (2005) define political interest as “a citizen’s willingness to pay attention to political phenomena at the possible expense of other topics” (p. 1122). Importantly, some researchers conceptualize political interest as an enduring, lifetime orientation (trait), while others conceptualize political interest as a malleable attitude (state) that can result from concentrated media attention and specific political events (Butler & De La O, 2011). Some researchers believe that higher levels of political interest are beneficial to democracy since persons who display such high interest are less partisan and tend to think more carefully about the options before them (Dalton, 2004; 2008; Verba et al., 1995). Conversely, others are of the opinion that high political interest actually results in more partisanship, ideological extremities, and less openness to persuasion (Campbell et al., 1960; Gopoian & Hadjiharalambous, 1994).

Political participation can be examined by looking at people’s personal characteristics (Blais & St. Vincent, 2011), and among individual characteristics, political interest is the most or one of the most powerful factors in a person’s propensity to participate politically (Campbell et al., 1960; Verba et al., 1995). Campbell et al., (1960) looked specifically at psychological factors and offer interest as a major factor impacting participation. Furthermore, Blais and St. Vincent (2011), who examined electoral participation in Canada, found a dual role of interest. First, the researchers found that interest is one of two political attitudes that most influence one’s propensity to participate electorally - the other was civic duty. Second, the study found that political interest mediates the effects of personality traits like self-efficacy, extroversion, and altruism in electoral participation. In sum, while some researchers (Blais, 2000; Clarke et al., 2004; Martin, 2008) refer to interest only as one of the most important attitudes that impact
participation, others (Verba et al., 1995) go as far as suggesting that political interest is the most powerful attitude in the behaviors related to political participation.

**Political self-efficacy.** Political efficacy is described by Campbell et al., (1954) as “the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process...the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change.” (p.187). Goel (1980) more simply defines political efficacy as “the feeling that one is capable of influencing the decision-making process” (p.127). Self-efficacy is considered by many researchers (e.g. Almond & Verba, 1963; Campbell et al., 1954; 1960; Clarke et al., 2004; Verba et al., 1995) to be an important political attitude that directly impacts political participation.

Other researchers consider self-efficacy to only indirectly influence political participation. For example, Blais and St. Vincent (2011) suggest that self-efficacy is a personality trait that influences a person’s interest in participating in politics. This line of research conceptualizes political self-efficacy as a personality trait, rather than an attitude, whose impact on political participation is influenced by other political attitudes. Personality traits, unlike attitudes, predate social and political influences, and ultimately are not caused by external influences (Gerber et al., 2009). Therefore, according to this view self-efficacy can be construed as a distant variable that, in addition to environmental factors, shapes the attitudes that are usually included in political science research (Blais & St. Vincent, 2011). Regardless of whether political self-efficacy is considered an attitude or a personality trait, political attitudes are thought to correlate with personality traits, and therefore play an important role in political participation (Caprara et al., 2006; Gerber et al., 2009; Vecchione & Caprara, 2009).
Some researchers more explicitly place self-efficacy at the root of human agency, and highlight the role of the self-beliefs in influencing individuals’ capabilities and in influencing their participation in politics and all other aspects of life. In other words, self-efficacy is a fundamental aspect of the psychology of agency and behaviors (Bandura, 1997, 2001; Caprara et al., 2009). Conversely, a minority of researchers including Gastil (2004), Morrel (2005) and Smith (1999) emphasize the effects of behaviors on attitudes by asserting that deliberative actions cause people to feel more or less efficacious in their abilities and roles in a society. Additionally, Dardis et al. (2008) found that people who watch more negative advertisements about a candidate’s policies experience lower levels of self-efficacy as they come to see the political system as overly complex.

Other research regarding political self-efficacy deconstructs it into two separate variants: internal efficacy and external efficacy (Balch, 1974; Converse, 1972). “Internal efficacy refers to beliefs about one’s own competence to understand and participate effectively in political life, while external efficacy refers to beliefs about how responsive the government will be to citizens’ needs and demands” (Pasek et al., 2008, p. 28). Internal efficacy specifically is necessary since it motivates people to participate in politics, and is an important predictor in political participation (Caprara et al., 2009; Delli Carpini, 2000; Jennings & Niemi, 1981; Pasek et al., 2008). It has also been shown to encourage political participation when it occurs with an interest in politics (Cohen et al., 2001; Morrell, 2003). On the other hand, external efficacy refers to the extent to which people perceive themselves as being able to exert political influence because of the manner in which the political system actually functions. External efficacy also encompasses the belief that the system can be changed via individual as well as group
influences (Caprara et al., 2009). External efficacy is associated with general trust in the political system and its institutions (Niemi et al., 1991). For example, Beierlein et al. (2011) found that collective self-efficacy moderated the effect between participation in activist-type of political activities and one’s belief in a just world.

**Trust.** Trust may be defined as a set of emotions and assessments that interact with each other and change over time (Young, 2006). Trust develops through life experiences and is prone to change through personal interactions and new social and/or political situations (Hardin, 2002). Others consider trust to be a moral worldview that is developed during early socialization, is deeply engrained, and is difficult to change (Uslaner, 2002). In either case, trust involves one party having faith in another party based on competency, reliability, and openness (Mishra, 1996) and can occur among individuals as well as collectives like organizations and institutions (Nooteboom, 2003).

Like political interest and self-efficacy, many studies center on the effects of trust on political participation. Several researchers (e.g. Bennett, 1986; Lenard 2008; Uslaner, 2002; Verba et al., 1995) have evaluated the effects of trust on political participation and on democracy. Thus, it is not in question that trust plays an important role as an independent variable in levels of political participation (Anderson, 2010). Researchers including Uslaner (2002) and Anderson (2010) venture beyond whether and/or how trust influences participation and instead engage in research related to the roots of trust and how levels may be changed. In a study on a sample in Armenia, Pearce (2010) conducted factor analysis and found that trust broke down into three factors: trust in civil society, trust in elected government, and trust in unelected government. She found that while levels of trust were generally low, as in most other post-communist countries (Miller et
people in Armenia were able to differentiate among three separate categories of trust (Pearce, 2010).

The general consensus is that when trust is used as a predictor of political participation it can be differentiated as two separate constructs. The first construct is political trust (Zmerli & Hooghe, 2011), also referred to as confidence in government (Aydin & Cenker, 2012) or trust in government (Hardin, 1998). The second construct is trust in others (Anderson, 2010; Putnam, 2000; Uslaner, 2002), which has been called interpersonal trust (Brehm & Rahn, 1997), social trust (Putnam, 2000), or generalized trust (Uslaner, 2002). Political trust refers to how people evaluate their government based on their performance and whether they align with people’s expectations (Anderson, 2010; Hetherington, 1998). Interpersonal trust on the other hand, refers to placing confidence in others, sometimes strangers (Putnam, 2000; Uslaner, 2002). Although the two varieties of trust may be correlated with each other, and one may influence the other, the two are distinct concepts (Anderson, 2010). Others find that the statistical relationship between interpersonal and political trust is small, though positive in general, and therefore neither can be regarded as an antecedent or result of the other (Kaase, 1999).

Political trust is also discussed as trust in institutions and confidence in institutions. Lenard (2008) suggests that both interpersonal trust and institutional trust are necessary for a successful democracy in which citizens participate. Persons must have trust in their fellow citizens to behave in a manner that is acceptable in the system and they must also trust their leaders and institutions to behave in the appropriate manner (Lenard, 2008). Other researchers believe that lower levels of political trust and/or active mistrust or distrust encourage citizens to participate in their democracy (Martin, 2008;
O’Neill, 2002; Parry, 1976; Waldron, 1993). The more prevalent view however, is that higher levels of trust engender political participation and is better for the political system (Alesina & Wacziarg, 2000; Diamond, 1998; Hardin, 2002; Lenard, 2008; Nye et al., 1997). Trust is central to democratic institutions and democratic political participation (Lenard, 2008). That is, in order for democracy to work well, it is important that citizens trust their elected leaders to have the national interest in mind as well as trust their fellow citizens to follow the democratically instituted rules of the land (Lenard, 2008).

**Mistrust/Distrust.** A number of researchers suggest that mistrust, distrust, and lack of trust are different conceptions from trust and ought to be examined differently (Cook & Gronke, 2005; Lenard, 2008). These researchers further posit that the role of distrust has been underemphasized. Distrust encapsulates the belief that most interactions carry a risk of harm and disappointment that is far greater than the likelihood of success. Distrust is therefore detrimental to community and democracy (Lenard, 2008). On the other hand, Warren, (1999) suggested that mistrust is “healthy suspicion of power upon which the vitality of democracy depends” (p. 310). Warren, (1999) further suggested that mistrust leads to vigilance, which only strengthens democracy and is not inconsistent with trust (Lenard, 2008; Pettit, 1997).

This follows the debate between Miller (1974) and Citrin (1974) on the interpretation of the results of the same political trust items in American National Election Studies (ANES). Miller (1974) believed that low levels of political trust were detrimental to society, while Citrin (1974) argued that lower levels of trust showed the presence of cynicism and only served to make a stronger democracy. Some researchers (Lenard, 2008; Pettit, 1997; Warren, 1999) posit that in many studies where distrust is
seen as integral to democratic institutions and participation, the attribution should in fact be made to mistrust. Similarly, others suggest that the role of distrust in the demise of democracy have been severely overestimated (Citrin & Luks, 2001; Cook & Gronke, 2005).

Cook and Gronke (2005) agree with Abramson (1983) that low trust in government and low confidence in institutions does not automatically mean distrust in government and institutions. Instead, it reflects skepticism and “an unwillingness to presume that political authorities should be given the benefit of the doubt” (Cook & Gronke, 2005 p. 785). These authors therefore suggest that the measure of trust from the National Election Studies (NES) and the General Social Survey (GSS) are incomplete, and that a measure of distrust needs to be included in any measure of trust. Cook and Gronke (2005) accordingly suggest that trust in government and confidence in institutions should both be measured by using a scale that includes distrust. This is modeled after the Mischler-Rose (1997) measure in nine post-communist East European countries of people’s expectation that their government will do what is wrong. This study showed that although there were low levels of trust, there were only moderate levels of distrust (Cook & Gronke, 2005).

**Examples from around the world.** Mannarini et al. (2010) studied the political participation of people in Italy. They found that institutional trust was actually not important to participation. They suggested that the most important considerations were cost-benefit analyses done by individuals in deciding whether or not to participate in politics.
Martin (2010) examined the relationship between trust and electoral participation in Australia, where voting is compulsory and levels of trust are low. Martin (2010) asked people to respond to the questions assuming voluntary voting. He found that although the two were only modestly related, trust would positively impact electoral voting were it not compulsory and that non-trusters were more likely to participate in protest-type political action.

Patterson (1999) found that the African-American population in the US does not trust the ruling elites because the latter have not acted in the former’s interest in the past. Patterson (1999) explicitly says that the “distinctive historical experience…as descendants of a slave population” is the primary reason for the distrust among African-Americans toward political institutions and processes (p.191). This may be an important consideration for people in the Caribbean, who share a similar history of imperialism.

Ikeda et al. (2012) studied seven countries in East Asia - Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Mongolia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand - based on data from the Eastern Asia Barometer Project. They found a positive relationship between self-efficacy and participation. This puts them in agreement with Karp and Banducci (2008) who found the same in their study of 27 democratic societies. However, Ikeda et al. (2012) did not find a positive relationship between political trust and political participation in East Asia.

Ikeda (2013) suggests that there may exist different routes or ways via which political trust can lead to political participation. The first route is that higher levels of trust lead to higher levels of participation as researchers from Europe and the US assert (Alford, 2001; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; Norris, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Uslaner & Brown, 2005; Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999). The second route more closely links
distrust and political participation by asserting that people who support and trust the idea of democracy at the systems level will become more politically active when they distrust the current government (Ikeda, 2013). Therefore, this is a kind of “protest-prone participation [that] invites more radical participation” like partaking in demonstrations (Ikeda, 2013 p. 15). In routes one and two people support the democratic system or have high systemic-level institutional trust (Ikeda, 2013). Ikeda (2013) describes a third “private-life orientation”. That is, regardless of whether persons trust or distrust the government, they believe that the government and their private lives are separate and that their involvement is unnecessary and/or irrelevant (Ikeda, 2013). Therefore, in this orientation political attitudes like interest, internal efficacy, and trust would be irrelevant and unrelated to political participation.

In his analyses, Ikeda (2013) separates political participation into “contact-type political participation” and “protest-type participation” (p. 35). Ikeda’s (2013) study included the eleven East and Southeast Asian countries of Japan, Korea, Mainland China, Mongolia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and Malaysia. In aggregate, Ikeda (2013) found that higher levels of self-efficacy predict higher levels of contact-type political participation. Additionally, he found that persons who scored both high and low in political trust participated in protest-type actions. Although both trusters and non-trusters participate politically, the overall trend is that persons who score higher on trust participate more in the political sphere and that the countries with more traditional values as opposed to liberal democratic values tend to score higher in trust.

Eggert and Giugni (2010) studied political interest, trust, and participation of Italians, Kosovars, and Turks immigrants in Switzerland. Contextually, this is difficult to
neatly organize since Italians, Kosovars, and Turks do not all align as either developed or developing countries. Additionally, the study takes place in Switzerland, which is considered a developed nation. The results indicate that political interest and political trust were related for the Kosovars and Turks, but not for the Italians. It was also found for samples from these countries that political attitudes had very little impact of individuals’ political participation and that political interest was related to political participation only for the Turks. Additionally, in general participants’ political trust impacted their interest, but not political participation. All three groups had low levels of trust.

Summary. I take the stance that attitudes drive behaviors. This is the view that is supported by the majority of researchers including Moy and Pfau (2000) and Verba et al. (1995). However, there are some researchers like Delli Carpini et al. (2004) and Morrell (2005) who suggest that it is behaviors that drive attitudes, and still others like Burkhalter et al. (2002) and Stenner-Day and Fischle (1992) who propose a reciprocal relationship between political activities and actions.

Clearly, the relationships among political attitudes and behaviors are complex. Some examples of this complexity include the research finding that the behavior of listening to and/or watching negative advertisements creates the attitude of distrust, which leads to lower levels of the attitude of self-efficacy (Austin & Pinkleton, 1995), which in turn may influence behavior by causing people to turn away from the political process and not participate electorally (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Schenck-Hamlin et al., 2000). Dardis et al. (2008) also found that exposure or activity that entails engaging with/watching negative political advertisements affects the attitudes of distrust and self-
efficacy. Additionally, Gastil (2004), Morrel (2005), and Smith (1999) found that deliberative action positively affected people’s self-efficacy, which in turn encouraged people to participate in other political actions. On the other hand, Ikeda (2013) in his study in East and Southeast Asia found that political discussions negatively influenced trust, while positively influencing self-efficacy. He found that both efficacy and trust influenced participation.

Even though the studies discussed above suggest a complex relationship between political attitudes and behaviors, I concur with the dominant view that it is political attitudes that affect behaviors, and not the other way around. The present study is conceptualized with this directionality in mind.

**Political Development, Political Culture, and Democracy: The Limits of External Influences**

A politically developed society is typically characterized by a political culture where people feel that they are a part of the social and political system and are active and free participants in that system. In such a society citizens are no longer concerned with merely having their basic needs for surviving satisfied; citizens are more concerned with how well they can thrive in their society (Park, 1984; Rostow, 1960). In many cases, the character of the development society is similar to that of a democratic society (Deutsch, 1961; Lipset, 1959). Correspondingly, in many ways, societies that have functioning democracies are often viewed as having attained at least some level of political development. Or perhaps it is simply that the more developed political systems have characteristics that are also present in democratic system, so much so that political development and democracy often seem to be conflated and co-defined.
On the basis that political development resembles democracy, developed countries typically advance policies to promote political development in lesser-developed contexts in hopes of creating democracy. The motives for involving in the affairs of developing societies are varied, but developed countries often reference their need to protect national or regional security, ensuring their own economic stability, and protecting their own sovereignty as warranting such interventions. These interventions could be cooperative, that is mutually agreed upon by the developed and developing countries, or they could be imposed, as in the instances where cooperation is forced between the parties.

However, given the ways in which democratic political culture is implicated in political development, it would seem that in order for a nation to experience political development, the changes that occur in that society need to be internal ones. That is to say it would seem to be a fatuous exercise for an external society to try to change the prevailing culture, attitudes, and values regarding politics, or the institutions that are present and the way in which they operate in a given society. This implies that external efforts to influence political development are bound to be inadequate, at best. Furthermore, developing contexts that have been subjected to forced rule by external parties, as in the case of colonial rule or slavery, may be particularly sensitive and averse to external efforts to effect political development – especially, the kind that requires changes in political culture. Importantly, the Eastern Caribbean has been subject to both slavery and colonial rule.
Democratic Political Culture in the Caribbean

**A brief account of the history and demographics.** The islands of the Eastern Caribbean are similar in their culture and development. More importantly, they are similar in terms of their history of colonialism, which it can be argued is the root of the culture and development that exists today in the region, including the patterns of political beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors that prevail.

The Caribbean geographic region (hereafter referred to as the “wider Caribbean”) includes the nations that are bordered by the Caribbean Sea. In addition to the Caribbean islands, the region includes many Central and South American nations stretching from Mexico in the northwest, to Venezuela in the southeast. However, when many persons from the region speak of the Caribbean, they refer to the islands that are bordered on at least one coast by the Caribbean Sea as well as other mainland countries like Guyana, French Guiana (also known as Cayenne), Belize, and Suriname (Heuman, 2006). This wider Caribbean is very large and diverse with territory sizes ranging from about 37 square miles in the case of St. Martin to about 4,000 square miles in Jamaica. Some areas are highly forested like in Suriname, while others are largely barren as in the case of Barbados. The main languages spoken include English, French, Spanish, and Dutch. Also, there are the many European-lexified creole languages that largely follow grammatical rules from African and Amerindian languages. Religious affiliation includes Hinduism, Catholicism, and Rastafari, among many others. In spite of the differences that the diversity affords, there are still many shared socio-cultural characteristics and many vestiges of a shared history of this region (Heuman, 2006).
The wider Caribbean shares a similar history of slavery, colonialism, and exploitation, although there were differences based on who was the colonizing country. The institution of slavery was abolished in the British territories in 1834, in the French territories in 1848, in the Dutch territories in 1863, and in Cuba in 1886 (Heuman, 2006). These countries all became independent at different times.

Caribbean persons share a rich cultural identity. The first inhabitants of the Caribbean were the native Amerindians, also known as Kalinago or Caribs – after which the Caribbean is named. These indigenous islanders migrated from South America via the Orinoco River area centuries before the first European settlers. The natives were nearly all annihilated by Europeans who came to the region. Some died of diseases like measles and smallpox, which while not lethal to the Europeans had tragic consequences for the Amerindians. Other Amerindians died from more directly hostile actions from the Europeans like war and overwork due to slavery in the colonies. Once the Amerindians were no longer assets, Africans were forcibly brought into the region to work as slaves on the many plantations that had emerged in the Caribbean. By this time the Caribbean was significant in the Atlantic economy and had became the epicenter of the European empire. This region therefore was of economic importance because it relied on the African slave trade structure. Finally, after the abolition of slavery, indentured workers from India were also brought into the Caribbean to work on the plantations (Heuman, 2006).

These are the ancestors of the persons who make up the Caribbean, along with other groups of people who came later to the region primarily as businesspersons. Today, the Caribbean consists of descendants of native Amerindians, European colonizers,
African slaves, Indian indentured workers, and a more recent influx of Asians, primarily Chinese, Japanese, and Syrians. Of course, the vast majority of persons in the region are ethnically and culturally mixed.

While the influences of European imperialism still remain in Caribbean society, the British, French, Spanish, and Dutch powers have been largely replaced by the United States, which has emerged as the new world power that intervenes militarily, economically, and politically when it perceives that its interests in the region are under threat (Heuman, 2006). Importantly, in spite of the region’s history, or perhaps as a consequence of it, a major enduring shared theme in the Caribbean is that of self-determination.

**Broader Caribbean.** In the sections that follow when I refer to the broader Caribbean, I write in reference to seventeen independent countries specifically, which are close geographically and diplomatically, and have similarities politically, culturally, and economically. These countries are Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, and Venezuela. The countries have a combined population of about 67 million (US Census Bureau, 2013). See Table 1 for population details.

**CARICOM.** The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is a group Caribbean and Latin American countries. This unifying regional organization was founded in 1973 after a 15-year effort at Caribbean regional integration and provides for “the free movement of labour and capital” and “the coordination of agricultural, industrial and foreign policies” (CARICOM, 2013a). CARICOM seeks to create a single market and economy in the
region and serves as a way to integrate the region into the world economy (Newstead, 2009). CARICOM is intended to affect the everyday lives of its citizens by improving their standard of living, working, and providing a combined and sustainable means of economic, social, and technological development for its member states.

CARICOM is the unified voice that speaks with third party states on behalf of its membership in matters related to trade and economic relations (CARICOM, 2013b). There are 20 CARICOM member states in total from the Caribbean and from Central and South America. The fifteen full members are Antigua & Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, The Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad & Tobago. Of these only Montserrat is not an independent nation. The five associate members are Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, and the Turks & Caicos Islands, none of whom are independent (CARICOM, 2013c). When further references are made to CARICOM, only the fourteen independent countries are included. The population of these fourteen independent CARICOM nations is approximately 17 million (US Census Bureau, 2013). Details are included in Table 1.

**OECS.** The islands of the Eastern Caribbean are a smaller and more uniform group. This may be because of the geographical proximity and similarities, as well as a history that is even more closely shared. More specifically, the Eastern Caribbean (EC) (Note the capital ‘E’ in “Eastern” denotes not simply a point on the compass, but a group designation taken on by some of islands located in the eastern part of the Caribbean) refers to the archipelago in the eastern part of the Caribbean region. Six independent countries and three British overseas territories, which are associate members, unite as the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). The members of the OECS are Antigua & Barbuda, The Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St Kitts & Nevis, Saint Lucia, and St. Vincent & the Grenadines. Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands, which are overseas territories of the United Kingdom are the associate members of the OECS. Additionally, it is important to note that Montserrat is a British dependency. Therefore, these three islands are not included in further references to the OECS, CARICOM, or the Caribbean in this study. Under the OECS, the six independent islands are an economic and political union abiding under the same monetary policy and currency under the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) and the same judicial policy through the Eastern Caribbean Central Supreme Court (ECSC). This organization addresses the unique issues of these small islands in the EC and does not replace membership in other regional organizations like the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). The OECS population is approximately 600,000 (OECS, 2013; US Census, 2013). All of the OECS countries are also members of CARICOM (CARICOM, 2013c).

Table 1

*Population of Caribbean Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Organization</th>
<th>Population</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua &amp; Barbuda*†</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas*</td>
<td>319,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados*</td>
<td>289,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize*</td>
<td>334,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>11,062,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country/Organization</td>
<td>Population</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica*†</td>
<td>73,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>10,220,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada*†</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana*</td>
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<td>Haiti*</td>
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<td>Jamaica*</td>
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<td>St. Kitts &amp; Nevis*†</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent*†</td>
<td>103,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suriname*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago*</td>
<td>1,225,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>28,459,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECS</td>
<td>595,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>16,884,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>66,625,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * denotes membership in CARICOM; *† denotes membership in OECS and CARICOM

**Institutional Arrangement and Voter Turnout in the Caribbean Region**

While it is important to look at the political culture and political development in St. Lucia, the country does not exist in a vacuum. That is, St. Lucia exists in relation to, and as a member of a larger group of countries among which there are shared realities.
For example, when we think of the regions of Southeast Asia, Western Europe, or Sub-Saharan Africa, there are ideas regarding politics, culture, and development that come to mind even before referencing a specific country. The same is true when we think of Latin America and the Caribbean. It is usual for there to be norms and affiliations that exist within the nations that share a geographic region of the world and which allow for a regional identity and culture.

This is precisely the case in the Caribbean and Latin America region, where St. Lucia is located. In this section, I look at institutional arrangements and voter turnout in the Caribbean region to provide a broader context of the Caribbean region. More specifically, the wider region includes independent members from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and a few other countries that are members of neither OECS nor CARICOM but have strong diplomatic, economic, and cultural relationships with the member states. Accordingly, the regional examination includes the 17 nations of Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines from the OECS; the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad & Tobago from CARICOM; and their close friends and neighbors Cuba, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic. Although I include Cuba, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic in the regional examination because of their geographic and cultural proximity, there is a possible caveat. These countries may be outliers in terms of the some of the indices that I use. Therefore, when I provide aggregate or average indices, I provide them separately for the member countries of the OECS, the members of the larger CARICOM group, and
finally I will provide a statistic for the broader Caribbean that includes Cuba, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic.

Institutional arrangement includes indices that are used to determine the existence and level of democracy in a particular nation. I used the specific indices from the April 2013 Quality of Government (QoG) standard dataset because the data provided were relevant and because there were data available for all of the Caribbean countries included in this examination. The values provided are data taken from the Quality of Government dataset for 2009 +/- three years. Such indices include the status of a nation as a democracy, electoral self-determination, the electoral process, physical integrity rights, associational and organizational rights, political pluralism and participation rights, and the functioning of government (Teorell et al., 2013). Voter turnout is also included in this data and it refers to the percentage of eligible voters in a country who turn out to vote in the general elections. I averaged the results of the last three parliamentary elections in each country to help determine the percentage of eligible voters who participated in the constitutionally mandated elections in the various countries (International IDEA, 2013a).

**Democracy.** The question of whether a country is a democracy or not is measured as either 0 or 1, where 0 suggests that the country is not a democracy and 1 suggests that the country is a democracy. The classification as a democracy (1) occurs if the executive and legislature are elected by popular vote, multiple political parties exist in the country and make up the legislature, and the incumbent party has not bestowed powers and advantage unto itself to retain political power (Cheibub et al., 2010; Teorell et al., 2013). Based on this conceptualization of democracy, Cheibub et al. (2010) assess that only three of the 17 countries do not classify as democracies – Cuba, Guyana, and Haiti.
(Teorell et al., 2013). All of the members of the OECS are classified as democracies. Guyana and Haiti are the only members of CARICOM whom Cheibub et al. (2010) do not classify as democratic. Cuba is not a democratic nation by design. See Table 2 for details.

**Electoral self-determination.** Using CIRI data (Cingranelli et al., 2013), electoral self-determination measures the extent to which citizens of a nation have freedom of political choice and the legal right and ability to use free and fair elections to change the officials as well as the laws by which they are governed. This is referred to as the right to self-determination. Countries are categorized as 0, 1, or 2. In a country that has been scored at 0, the right to self-determination is thought to be non-existent in law or practice. In other words, free and fair elections do not exist in that country. When a country is categorized as 1, it means that law provides the right to self-determination, however, there are limitations in practice. Therefore, political participation is conceptualized as only moderately free and fair. Finally, in countries that are categorized as 2, citizens have the legal right to self-determination and to freely and openly participate politically. The average score for the region including Cuba, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic is 1.5, while without those countries the average score for members of CARICOM is 1.6. The average score for the smaller group of the five nations that comprise the OECS is 1.7.

Based on the conceptualization given for electoral self-determination, nine of the Caribbean countries score 2, and are labeled as free, fair, and open in terms of self-determination. They are Antigua & Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, and Suriname.
Seven countries categorize as moderately free, open, and fair with a score of 1: Dominica, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts & Nevis, Trinidad & Tobago, and Venezuela. Finally, only Cuba was labeled with 0 without free and open self-determination by law or through practice (Cingranelli et al., 2013; Teorell et al., 2013). Table 2 contains details.

**Electoral process.** Electoral process measures the extent to which the national legislature and chief authority in the country are elected through free and fair elections. Scores are scaled from 0 to 12, where countries that are considered the “worst” are scored at 0, while the “best” countries are scored at 12. Based on this the region scores quite high with an average score of 10.4. The CARICOM nations score higher with 11.4, and the smaller OECS group scores even higher with 11.7.

The differences in scores highlight that some regional countries do not perform well based on this index. For example, Cuba scores lowest with 0. Haiti and Venezuela fare better, but still only moderately with seven and six, respectively. The other remaining fourteen nations score very high with either eleven or twelve (Freedom House, 2013; Teorell et al., 2013). Details are in Table 2.

**Physical integrity rights.** The CIRI data (Cingranelli et al., 2013) uses the physical integrity index. This index is additive and ranges from 0 to 8. It includes the existence of torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance indicators. 0 indicates no government respect for human rights, while 8 represents full government respect for rights. The Caribbean region average score is 5.7, while excluding Cuba, Venezuela, and Dominican Republic raises the score to 6.1. The OECS countries have a score further to 6.5.
More specifically, six of the Caribbean countries score the top scores of either seven or eight. These countries with the maximum physical integrity index scores are Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St, Kitts & Nevis, and Suriname. Eight other nations score moderately to fairly high with values of 5 or 6: the Bahamas, Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, and Trinidad & Tobago. Finally, the lowest scores in the region are 3 or 4 in the countries of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela (Cingranelli et al., 2013; Teorell et al., 2013). For further details see Table 2.

**Associational and organizational rights.** I also looked at associational and organizational rights index (Freedom House, 2013; Teorell, et al., 2013) to describe the institutional arrangement in the Caribbean region. Countries are indexed from 0 to 12 based on individuals’ freedom of assembly, demonstrations, and open public discussion, as well as the freedom enjoyed by NGOs, trade unions, and professional and private organizations. The score of 0 is given to countries deemed to be the worst in terms of these considerations, while countries that perform best in these associational and organizational rights are scored at 12. On average, the region scores 9.7, while CARICOM scores 10.6, and OECS scores 11.

In terms of individual scores, Cuba scores the lowest in the region with 1, followed by Venezuela with 5, and Haiti with 6. Jamaica and Antigua & Barbuda score higher at 9. The other twelve countries score very high between 10 and 12. Specifically, Grenada and Guyana are scored with 10, the five countries of Belize, the Dominican Republic, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad & Tobago are scored with 11, and finally the five nations of the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, St. Kitts &
Nevis, and St. Lucia are scored with the maximum score of 12 (Freedom House, 2013; Teorell et al., 2013). See Table 2 for further details.

**Political pluralism and participation.** Freedom House (2013) measures political pluralism and participation in terms of the rights of people to freely organize in political parties and the people’s ability to make political choices free of pressure from the military and other powerful groups/parties. This index also takes into account an opposition that can realistically increase its support from the people, as well as the overall existence of full political rights for all groups in the country. The scores are scaled from 0 to 16, where 0 is the lowest possible score and 16 is the highest possible score. The regional average score is 9.6, the average score for CARICOM is 10.8, and the average score for OECS is 11.3.

Cuba and Venezuela are scored lowest in the region at 1 and 3 respectively. Four additional countries are scored from 5 to 8. Another seven countries are scored from 9 to 12, and among the final four countries Belize is scored at 14 while the Bahamas, Barbados and St. Lucia are scored at 16 (Freedom House, 2013; Teorell et al., 2013). Table 2 has more details.

**Functioning of government.** How well a government functions is another valuable indicator of the political development of a country. Freedom House (2013) scores countries from 0, for countries that it considers have the worst functioning governments to 12, for those countries which it believes have the best functioning governments based on its criteria. These criteria are the extent to which the freely elected head of government and legislative determine the policies of the government, whether there is pervasive corruption, and whether the government is accountable to its electorate.
between elections and operates in a manner that is open and transparent. Including the entire region in this measure gives an average score of 8.4, and including only the CARICOM nations provides an average score of 9.1. Including only the OECS nations results in an average score of 9.2.

Of the 16 nations, only one country, Cuba, scores very low with 1. Venezuela also scores a low 4. Two other countries score 6. On the positive side of the scale, seven nations score eight or nine, while the final six nations score 10, 11, or 12. St. Lucia scores 11. (Freedom House, 2013; Teorell et al., 2013). Please review Table 2 for the details.

**Voter turnout.** For the purposes of this study, voter turnout refers to the percentage of citizens in a country who are eligible to vote and then actually took part in the general parliamentary elections. To arrive at this figure, I averaged the results of the voter turnout in the constitutionally mandated elections of the last three parliamentary elections in each country. I used data obtained from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA, 2013a). The regional voter turnout average was 71%, CARICOM voter turnout average was 72%, and OECS voter turnout average was 84%.

Only four countries had voter turnout of less than 60%. Haiti and Jamaica averaged 39% and 49% respectively in voter turnout. Venezuela and the Dominican Republic had voter turnout averages of 46% and 54% respectively. However, it may be prudent to note that the Dominican Republic mandates electoral participation, while Venezuela had mandated electoral participation until 1998. It is only the last four elections that Venezuelan citizens have had the option to not participate in parliamentary elections. It is clear that they have exercised this still relatively new option since, with the
exception of 1993 when voter turnout was about 50%, previous years had voter turnout between 73% and 85%. Additionally, unlike most of the other countries that have only parliamentary elections, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic (like Haiti) have both presidential and parliamentary elections. Further, presidential elections in Venezuela typically have a higher participation rate. The same can be said of the Dominican Republic starting from the year 2000. Before that year, it is difficult to discern a trend in whether there was higher voter turnout in presidential, or parliamentary elections (International IDEA, 2013a).

On the other end of the voter turnout spectrum, only two countries had averages in the 90s. Cuba had a voter turnout average of 91%, while Grenada’s was 95%. It may also be worth noting that in the case of Grenada, the last reported election in 2008 had a voter turnout of 108%. The remaining ten Caribbean countries had voter turnout between 64% and 87%, three of them were between 64% and 70%, four countries scored from 71% to 79%, and the final three nations had voter turnout of 84% or 87%. More specifically, Suriname’s turnout was 64%, while the Bahamas and Barbados tied with turnout of 69%. Guyana had a turnout of 71%, St. Lucia had a turnout of 72%, Belize and Trinidad & Tobago’s turnout was 74%, and Antigua & Barbuda’s voter turnout was 79%. Finally, St. Kitts & Nevis’ turnout was 84%, while Dominica and St. Vincent & the Grenadines’ voter turnout was 87% (International IDEA, 2013a).

In sum, in terms of group ranking, it appears that the OECS always scores higher in the institutional arrangements, followed by CARICOM, which is followed by the broader Caribbean region. This trend seems also to be demonstrated when looking at voter turnout. Details are in Table 2.
Table 2

_Institutional Arrangement Indices & Voter Turnout in the Caribbean_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Antigua &amp; Barbuda</th>
<th>Bahamas</th>
<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Belize</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>Dominican Republic</th>
<th>Dominican Republic</th>
<th>Grenada</th>
<th>Guyana</th>
<th>Haiti</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>St. Kitts &amp; Nevis</th>
<th>St. Lucia</th>
<th>Suriname</th>
<th>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral self-determination</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral process</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical integrity index</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Associational &amp; org’l rights</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pluralism &amp; participation</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Functioning of government</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter turnout (%)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In Venezuela voting was compulsory until 1998. Therefore, only the last four elections were not compulsory.

_St. Lucia: A Case Study_

St. Lucia is the most populous and developed member of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, OECS. St. Lucia also houses the OECS Secretariat. Like most of its OECS co-members, it is a former colonized state. The island was colonized from 1642 to 1979. Between the British and French empires, possession of St. Lucia switched
violently a total of fourteen times. In the final battle in 1814, France ceded control of St. Lucia to Britain in the Treaty of Paris. That same year, the British brought in African slaves to work on the sugar plantations (St. Lucia Electoral Department, 2011).

**The evolution of St. Lucia’s political system.** During the period of colonization, St. Lucia was run as a territorial unit, which meant the political leader of the island was the Governor on the island, who was in direct contact with the colonial office. When the British officially abolished the institution of slavery in 1834, former slaves were forced to work for their former masters for at least three quarters of the workweek for free in apprenticeships. This lasted four years. The same year that these apprenticeships ended, in 1838, St. Lucia became a part of the British Windward Islands, led by the Government of the Windward Islands, which was headquartered in one of the islands (St. Lucia Electoral Department, 2011; United Nations, 2013a).

The 20th century was a time of increasing self-governance for the island. In 1924 St. Lucia had its first experience with representative government, where a minority of the legislative council could be elected in the previously all-nominated council. By 1951 universal adult suffrage was introduced and the elected members came to dominate the legislative council. By 1960 after the abolition of the post of Governor of the Windward Islands (United Nations, 2013a), St. Lucia had its first ministers of government thanks to a newly adopted constitution. Two years later the island joined the short-lived West Indies Federation, as a semi-autonomous dependency of Britain.

The West Indies Federation failed in 1962, followed shortly thereafter by another failure in the attempt of a Caribbean island organization. After this St. Lucia and six other colonies (now all members of the OECS) became associated states of Britain. Thus, from
1967 until its independence in 1979 St. Lucia existed as an associated state of Britain led internally by the Premier. This means that St. Lucia was fully responsible for its internal affairs, while Britain retained control over all its external affairs and its defense. In this arrangement a representative of the British Monarch once again became the Governor. However, this time the Governor was appointed after consulting with the elected leader of the island. Since independence St. Lucia has remained a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and recognizes Queen Elizabeth II as its titular head of state (United Nations, 2013a). It also has a ceremonial leader, the Governor General, as well as the prime minister, who is elected by the people and heads the government.

Since independence in 1979 St. Lucia has held a total of eight elections in which the incumbent party has only lost four times in these eight election cycles. Many of the same persons remain in political and leadership positions. For example, since independence only three persons have been elected to the position of Prime Minister. The island’s Premier between 1967 and 1979 transitioned into the role of Prime Minister after independence, and was elected Prime Minister four more times until his death in that office in 2007. The present Prime Minister has held that position a total of three times.

Voter turnout at the inaugural election in 1979 was approximately 83%. Since then turnout has hovered between 65% and 77% in the following three elections before rising to an all time high of 90% in 1997 and then dropping back to a range between 64% and 77% in the following three election cycles (International IDEA, 2013b).

The current political system in St. Lucia. St. Lucia is a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy (Saint Lucia Electoral Department, 2011). This means that its system of government is modeled after that of the United Kingdom. There are several key
features of this system: the existence of the constitutional head of state whose duties are largely ceremonial; the head of government who leads Cabinet an Opposition led by the leader(s) of the party with the second most seats in the House; an independent, permanent civil service; an armed forces unit that is apolitical and serves the government; and an independent judiciary (Farnsworth, 2013).

In St. Lucia, there is a multi-party system of government that has always had at least three political parties. Despite this, there are really only two major political parties – the Saint Lucia Labour Party (SLP) and the United Workers Party (UWP). Each party has a declared party leader. In St. Lucia, there are seventeen electoral districts called constituencies, where voters elect their representatives by simple majority. The party that wins the majority of the constituencies wins the general elections and will govern the country for the following five years until the next constitutionally mandated general election. An exception is if there is a no confidence vote in parliament in which case general elections may be held sooner.

The Prime Minister therefore is the leader of the party that wins the elections. Dr. Kenny Anthony is the current Prime Minister and head of government in St. Lucia. Although the Prime Minister’s appointment is based on the election results, she/he is appointed to the position by the constitutional and non party-affiliated head of state, the Governor General. Dame Pearlette Louisy is the current Governor General. The UWP won the minority of the constituencies and are therefore the Opposition. There are three branches of government – executive, legislative, and judicial. The Governor General and the Prime Minister make up the executive. The legislative consists of the bicameral parliament. The judicial branch of government comprises district courts and the Eastern
Caribbean Supreme Court (ECSC). The ECSC includes a High Court and a Court of Appeals. Final appeals can be made to the Privy Council in London. However, St. Lucia is considering constitutional reforms to replace the Privy Council in London with the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). As with other Westminster parliamentary democracies, the civil service on the island is permanent and works outside of politics, serving whichever government is in power.

**The Constitution of Saint Lucia**

I examined the Constitution of St. Lucia to ascertain the nature of the democracy that was intended for St. Lucia at the time of its emergence as a sovereign state. Additionally, I analyzed information about the nature of the democracy in St. Lucia that has already been collected and analyzed by various international research and political individuals and organizations. These data help clarify whether the democratic ideals put forth in the Constitution have been met and whether St. Lucia classifies as a democracy by international standards. The results generally show that the rights and freedoms that appear in the Constitution have borne out in practice (Cingranelli et al., 2013; Freedom House, 2013; Government of St. Lucia, 2006; International IDEA, 2013b; Teorell et al., 2013).

Many people from all over the world view democracy as an ideal political system constitutive of liberty, the most important value, and distantly followed by equality and solidarity (Thomassen, 2007). The Constitution of St. Lucia contains within it several proclamations and allowances that seek to advance the ideals of liberty, equality, and solidarity for the citizens and residents of St. Lucia. As a newly independent nation, the
democratic values espoused in the Constitution are those that would become fundamental to the people in the society.

A central tenet in the Constitution is the commitment to democracy and free elections. Also central is the belief “that all persons have been endowed equally by God with inalienable rights and dignity” (Government of St. Lucia, 2006 p.9). This document asserts that these universal inalienable rights depend on fundamental freedoms of the person, of thought, of expression, of communication, of conscience, and of association, and that these freedoms can be protected only by the rule of law. The inalienable dignity speaks to respect for spiritual values, for private family life and property, and for enjoying an “adequate” standard of economic and social wellbeing, which depend on the resources of the State (Government of St. Lucia, 2006 p. 9).

Additionally, the Constitution respects social justices. More specifically, it speaks of using the economic system to distribute material resources in a way that serves the common good, and in neither exploiting nor forcing labor from its people. It also states that labor would be based on merit, ability, and integrity. Lastly, the Constitution expresses St. Lucia’s support for issues beyond the borders of St. Lucia. These include international peace and security, human rights and freedoms, and cooperation aimed at solving economic, social, and political issues worldwide.

**Protection of fundamental rights and freedoms: Liberty and equality.** The Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations avows the freedom of all human beings from birth and their equality in terms of freedoms and rights (United Nations, 2013b). Therefore, the provision and protection of certain rights and freedoms are fundamental to maintaining liberty and equality, both of which are essential values in
a democratic system. An important aspect of the Constitution in St. Lucia, to which the preamble is dedicated, speaks to the fundamentality of equal rights and freedoms for all persons in St. Lucia.

According to the Constitution, every person in St. Lucia is entitled to three fundamental rights and freedoms, provided that protecting these three rights and freedoms for one individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others, nor the public interest. The first of the fundamental rights and freedoms is the right to life, liberty, security of the person, equality before the law, and the protection of the law. Second, all persons have the right to freedom of conscience, expression, assembly, and association. Third, everyone has the right to protection for one’s family life, personal privacy, and the privacy of his/her home and other property, as well as freedom from deprivation of property without compensation.

The Constitution explicitly discusses a number of protections including protection of right to life, right to personal liberty, freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of movement, and protection of persons detained under emergency laws. In addition, the Constitution also explicitly addresses protections from slavery and forced labor, inhuman treatment, deprivation of property, arbitrary search or entry, and protection from discrimination on the grounds of race, etc. The Constitution also deals with securing the protection of law, emergency powers, enforcing protective provisions, and declaring a state emergency.

**The governing system: Legitimacy and the governing structure.** Another important aspect of democracy is whether the government functions as it is intended and to what extent it fulfills its mandate to work on behalf of the people. Put another way, it is
important for a government to be perceived as legitimate. People are more likely to choose leaders whom they view as legitimate (Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999). The Constitution therefore delineates the democratic system of governance in St. Lucia, the roles, functions and powers of this government, and responsibilities of ordinary citizens. It provides a template for interactions between government and citizenry, and also provides for redress when disputes arise. In so doing, the Constitution provides legitimacy for St. Lucian and for foreign countries and organizations.

The Constitution of St. Lucia discusses the specific features of St. Lucia’s Westminster-style parliamentary democracy in terms of the structure of the government, and the roles, powers and internal structures of its component parts. The system has some innate legitimacy by the simple fact that the island has a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy (Farere, 1989) styled after Britain and used in many other Commonwealth and former Commonwealth countries throughout the world. Additionally, the structure of the governmental system specifically in the St. Lucian context as well as the rights and liberties afforded to St. Lucian citizens and residents are explicitly laid out in this document. It also adds legitimacy that the leaders in this system are chosen through democratic elections (Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999).

The governing system is tripartite, comprising the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary, which I already discussed in the section on the political system in St. Lucia. The public service is permanent and exists to serve the people through the government of St. Lucia. There are also precise rules and uses of public funds, so that politicians and the public service are held accountable to their constituents. Additionally, the Constitution describes how and when constituencies may be changed. Since this is the basis upon
which the government is elected, there are rules and procedures surrounding constituency changes such that no one political party can control the process or gain advantage from it.

The Governor General, the Prime Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition, among others, influence the Constituency Boundaries Commission and the Electoral Commission. All these appointments are structured so that the processes, procedures, powers, and limitations in the government are seen as legitimate to St. Lucians and foreigners alike. A government structure that is perceived as sound and fair is both legitimate and legitimizing.

**Institutional Arrangements and Voter Turnout in St. Lucia**

In a previous section, I discussed various indices to highlight the institutional arrangement and voter turnout in the countries that are most proximal to St. Lucia in terms of geography, culture, and diplomatic relations. In this section, I relook at the same indices as they relate to St. Lucia as compared to the aggregate others. This is only the first part of describing St. Lucia’s institutional arrangements. Table 3 includes how St. Lucia scores in terms of its institutional arrangements and voter turnout as well as the average scores for the OECS, CARICOM, and the broader Caribbean region.

As to whether or not St. Lucia is a democracy, the island scored 1 according to Cheibub et al.’s (2010) classification. This means that there are multiple parties in the country, and that these parties are included in the legislature, which along with the executive are elected by popular vote. This also means that the incumbent party has not given itself powers and advantages aimed at keeping it in power (Cheibub et al., 2010; Teorell et al., 2013). In determining a nation’s electoral self-determination, scores of 0, 1, or 2 are awarded to countries based on the extent of citizens’ freedom of political choice,
legal rights, and practical ability to change their officials and laws by way of free, fair, and open elections. St. Lucia scores 2 on this index indicating St. Lucian citizens have the right to electoral self-determination (Cingranelli et al., 2013; Teorell et al., 2013). Additionally, the island also scores the highest possible score of 12 in the electoral process suggesting that the chief authority and the national legislature are elected through free and fair elections (Freedom House, 2013; Teorell et al., 2013). The physical integrity rights index is additive and ranges from 0 to 8, where 8 represents that the government has full respect for persons in the country and does not engage itself in torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance. St. Lucia scored a 5 (Cingranelli et al., 2013; Teorell et al., 2013), which means that there is some question as to how the government handles its judicial affairs.

Associational and organizational rights are measured on a scale of 0 to 12, where 0 is worst and 12 is best, based on whether citizens have rights and freedoms to assemble, demonstrate, and have open public discussions. The rating is also based on whether groups like nongovernmental organizations, trade unions, and other professional and private organizations have these same rights (Freedom House, 2013; Teorell et al., 2013). Since St. Lucia is scored 12, it suggests that the country is among the best for associational and organizational rights and freedoms.

Another index used to measure the level of political development in terms of institutional arrangement in a country is political pluralism and participation. A score of 16 is given to countries where people have full rights to freely organize themselves in political parties and make political choices without pressures from powerful groups, parties, and the military. Additionally, countries that score 16 have full political rights for
all societal groups and an opposition party that is capable of increasing its support from
the people. Because St. Lucia scores the highest possible score of 16, it further means that
the island provides rights of political pluralism and participation for its citizens (Freedom
House, 2013; Teorell et al., 2013).

St. Lucia scores 11 out of a possible 12 in terms of its functioning of government.
This means that to a very large degree, the people freely elect their head of government
and legislative and that these two bodies determine what policies the government
pursues. It also means that corruption is not pervasive and the government is open,
transparent, and accountable to its electorate in between elections (Freedom House, 2013;
Teorell et al., 2013). To calculate voter turnout, I averaged the percentage of eligible
persons who voted in the last three election cycles. For St. Lucia, that resulted in an
average voter turnout of 72% (International IDEA, 2013b).

Table 3

* Institutional Arrangement Indices & Voter Turnout (St. Lucia vs. Caribbean) *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>St. Lucia</th>
<th>OECS</th>
<th>CARICOM</th>
<th>Caribbean Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral self determination</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral process</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical integrity index</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associational &amp; organizational rights</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political pluralism &amp; participation</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functioning of government</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Political Beliefs, Values, Attitudes, and Behavior in St. Lucia

When looking at institutional arrangements as a gauge of democracy it appears that St. Lucia scores favorably on all indices, except the physical integrity rights index, which suggests some problems related to the judicial system. These indices, despite their usefulness, do not tell the full picture of the political culture of St. Lucia. While a look at institutional arrangements can provide useful information about the functioning of the political systems of power, it does not provide a lens to examine the self-beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors of the citizens concerning their politics. This raises the question of whether people's attitudes and behaviors are reflected in the development and democracy that is purported to exist as suggested in the institutional arrangements.

The history of St. Lucia has not been one of widespread political participation. Historically political happenings on the island had either been handled externally, or by small group of political elites. The history of slavery coupled with colonial and external rule has not been conducive to a culture of generalized political participation in St. Lucia. Even so, in the cases where people are interested in politics, it may be that they do not feel able and empowered to participate in the political process. Being such a young democracy, there have been few opportunities for political participation and to see how the political institutions may be responsive to the will of the people. This may manifest itself as low levels of political self-efficacy. Even if persons may be interested and may
feel that have the ability to participate in the process, it is possible that the historical events from colonialism to neo-colonialism to globalization have rendered most persons suspicious and distrusting of the various governing systems. It is also possible that the proximity to those historical events may cause people to still be more trusting of the external systems that they have had to rely on rather than on trusting in their own selves in terms of shaping their own futures.

As an example, the Rastafari is one important religious and cultural group that is widespread in St. Lucia and the wider region. The Rastafari movement came about on the basis of distrust of the governing systems that had served to subjugate the citizenry. According to this group, an important aspect of political and economic development in this post-colonial context is a tendency toward mental emancipation and freedom from Eurocentric values and attitudes imposed in the nation’s past. The state of affairs in the St. Lucia context is exciting and intriguing for political science research, in terms of how the above-mentioned variables will be demonstrated.

**Overview of the Current Study**

For the current study I seek to examine political development in a developing context. I chose the Eastern Caribbean as the study context, but purposely focused on the post-colonial, small-island state of St. Lucia as a case study. I examined people’s political interest, self-efficacy, trust, and participation to better understand the nature of their democratic political culture and democracy. I used the following question to guide the study: What are the relationships among the measures of political attitudes (interest, self-efficacy and trust) and political behavior (participation) in St. Lucia? To guide the analysis of the data for the research question I developed the following hypotheses:
• In the Eastern Caribbean island of St. Lucia, political attitudes and behaviors are related.

• In the Eastern Caribbean island of St. Lucia, higher levels of political interest, self-efficacy, and trust will result in higher levels of political participation.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of the study was to examine political development in the context of St. Lucia, a small island developing state in the Eastern Caribbean (EC). Particularly, the study aimed to examine people’s political attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors (participation in their own politics) to better understand the nature of their democracy. I describe the methods and procedures for the study in this chapter. This will include information on the study participants and the context as well as procedures, data sources, and measures.

Sample and Context

Participants were 476 St. Lucian citizens and residents ranging from 18 to 69 years in age. The average age was 34 years, and the mode was 35. In the sample, 51% were between 18 and 34 years old, 40% between 35 and 64 years old, 1% over 64, and 8% did not report their age. The sample was 37% male, 60% female, and 3% who did not report their sex. Of the sample, 64% were single, 31% were in committed relationships, and 5% reported “Other” or did not specify their relationship status. Participants lived in all districts on the island with 45% persons residing in Castries - the capital city, 23% living in Gros-Islet, the second most populous district, and 22% living in the other districts. The remaining 10% did not report their place of residence or lived outside of the island. In terms of the number of persons in each household, 25% lived alone or with one other person, 59% of respondents lived in a household of three to six persons, 5% lived in
households of seven or more persons, and 11% did not respond to this question. In the sample, 24% of persons live in single parent household, 40% report being in nuclear families, 20% report living in a blended/extended household, 4% reported living in a single-person household, and 12% either did not report their family type or reported it as “Other”.

Educational attainment levels differed in the sample where 5% reported having less than a secondary school education, 16% completed secondary school, 56% graduated from undergraduate university, 20% held advanced degrees, and 3% did not respond to the question. Regarding income per month in EC dollars (XCD), (Note: $1 US = $2.67 XCD), 20% of the sample made less than $2,000, 22% made between $2000 and $4000, 21% made between $4,000 and $7,000, 26% of the participants reported making more than $7,000, and 11% did not report on their income. Of the sample, 89.5% reported English as their first language, 3.5% reported Kwéyòl, and 5% reported both English and Kwéyòl as the main language spoken at home, with 2% not reporting.

Regarding religion, 46% of the sample reported their religion as Catholic, 33% reported being Protestant, 7% reported belonging to a non-Christian religion such as Rastafari or Hindu, 6% reported being nonreligious, non-denominational, agnostic or atheist, with 8% not reporting. In terms of whether and how long a person may have lived outside of St. Lucia, 53% of the sample had never lived abroad, 26% had lived outside of the island for 5 or fewer years, 9% had lived abroad between 5 and 10 years, 6% had spent more than 10 years living abroad, and 6% did not report whether or how long they may have lived abroad. On the question of the place of residence at the time of the study, 86% reported living in St. Lucia at the time they participated in the study, 4% reported
not residing on the island, and 10% did not respond to this question. Ninety four percent of the sample consisted of St. Lucian citizens, 2% were St. Lucian residents but not citizens, and 4% did not respond to this question.

Table 4

*Population Parameters and Sample Statistics*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population Parameters</th>
<th>Sample Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Numbers (n)</strong></td>
<td>165,000</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex (% male: % female)</strong></td>
<td>Male: 50%</td>
<td>Male: 37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female: 50%</td>
<td>Female: 60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Place of residence</strong></td>
<td>Castries: 40%</td>
<td>Castries: 45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gros-Islet: 16%</td>
<td>Gros-Islet: 23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remaining 8 districts: 44%</td>
<td>Remaining 8 districts: 22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age range</strong></td>
<td>18-34 years: 39%</td>
<td>18-34 years: 51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35-64 years: 49%</td>
<td>35-64 years: 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 64 years: 9%</td>
<td>Over 64 years: 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Educational level</strong></td>
<td>Less than secondary: 56%</td>
<td>Less than secondary: 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Completed secondary: 27%</td>
<td>Completed secondary: 16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree: 10%</td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree: 56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advanced degree: 3%</td>
<td>Advanced degree: 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income per month</strong></td>
<td>Less than $2,000: 65%</td>
<td>Less than $2,000: 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$2,000 - $4,000: 24%</td>
<td>$2,000 - $4,000: 22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$4,000 - $6,000: 7%</td>
<td>$4,000 - $7,000: 21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, in terms of voting behavior, 66% of the sample voted in the last election, 33% did not vote, and 1% declined to respond to the question. When asked for which political party they voted, 32% said that they did not vote, 29% voted for the St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP), the party currently in power, 25% voted for the United Workers Party (UWP), the party currently in opposition, 2% voted for a third party or an independent candidate, and 12% declined to respond to this question.

Although the sample is fairly representative of the general St. Lucian population, the sample and population characteristics do not match up precisely. Most notably, the sample seems to have a larger percentage of persons who reside in the most populous and developed districts of Castries (the capital) and Gros-Islet. The sample also comprises persons with higher education and income levels than the general population. See Table 4.
for details. Note that when percentages do not add to 100 percent the differences indicate individuals who did not respond, or in some cases responded as other.

**Study Procedures**

The surveys along with procedures for data collection were sent to the University of Georgia’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) to ensure that the research complied with the ethical treatment of human subjects in research. Once IRB approval was secured, I then traveled internationally to St. Lucia, where I remained for a period of three months to immerse into the context and to collect primary data for the study. I administered the surveys using electronic (SurveyMonkey Inc., 2013) as well as traditional paper and pencil formats.

Electronic surveys were distributed via email utilizing the snowball sampling method. This means that after the initial contact with potential participants, they were asked to identify other potential survey participants (Johnson et al., 2008). Social and professional colleagues and friends were the initial points of contact. Email recipients were encouraged to further distribute the survey to groups within which they were members. For example, participants elicited further participation from work colleagues, community groups and/or informal groups of family and friends. Participants were also encouraged to make the survey link available on social media sites such as Facebook. The recruitment email included a link that allowed potential participants to complete the screening questions in order to fulfill the age and residency/citizenship requirements for participation in the study. Potential participants were required to indicate “Yes” or “No” to each eligibility requirement. Individuals who did not indicate, “Yes” for both of the screening questions were redirected to a screen that thanked them for their time. Those
who qualified to participate in the study and clicked “Yes” to both questions were directed to a link to allow them to review the consent form. For the electronic administration that consent form was also used as information sheet. Finally, the participants were informed that by clicking “Next” they were giving their consent to participate in the study. If they consented they were directed to the study questions.

The non-electronic surveys were distributed in hard copy to participants. Since the study was open to everyone in the general public over 18 years of age, all adults were potential participants. Therefore, in recruiting participants, I began by contacting persons with whom I had personal as well as professional relationships or access. This had a snowballing effect as the initial contacts provided access to more participants. My recruitment strategy was to first target social and professional colleagues, and then approach other individuals; based on their membership in various organizations, for example St. Lucia Pensioners Association, then by their place of work, for example, Ministry of Education, and finally, by their place of residence, for example, persons residing in the village of Choiseul.

Thus, I recruited participants by approaching them at organizational meetings, at their workplaces, or at their places of residence. I started by going over the information sheet and by explaining that participation was completely voluntary and that the study data would be kept confidential throughout the study and then destroyed at the completion of the study. I explained participants’ responsibilities and responded to any questions they had. After all participants’ questions about the informed consent were answered, participants then provided consent. I furnished the participants with pencils, paper, and all other materials related to the study.
The surveys were the same regardless of the distribution method. I provided all participants with access to the information sheet, and required them to confirm eligibility before completing the questionnaire. I also asked them to provide demographic information on the Biographical Form, which I placed at the end of the questionnaire to avoid priming participants. All written materials were in English. Participants generally took under 15 minutes to complete the survey, including reading the informed consent forms and other instructions.

Once the data collection phase was complete, I then prepared all the data for analysis. I retrieved the electronic data from SurveyMonkey and exported it to an electronic database. I processed the data from the paper surveys and also entered it into the electronic database. Subsequently, I used correlation and regression analysis to examine the relationships among the variables of the study.

**Measures**

**Interest.** Research indicates that persons who are interested in politics are likely to participate by voting and by being involved in their community in other ways. It is also more likely that interested persons are more easily encouraged to participate (Henn et al., 2005; Pirie & Worcester, 2000; Prior, 2010). I expect similar results in the Caribbean. In this study I measured political interest with a three-item survey. These items asked participants to evaluate their interest on an 11-point scale of zero-ten. A variation of the first question “How much interest do you generally have in what is going on in politics?” has been used to evaluate political interest on samples in many different countries including Britain (Heath et al., 2002; University of Essex, 2007), Switzerland, and Germany (Prior, 2010). Prior (2010) did an analysis of variability in political interest
across these studies. This item has not been evaluated in the Eastern Caribbean. Other items were adapted from the 2008 ANES Times Series Study (American National Elections Studies, 2008). I modified terminology and/or sentence structure to be more contextually appropriate based on my background knowledge of the Caribbean context. A complete version of the interest measure is provided in the Appendix.

**Self-efficacy.** The Perceived Political Self-Efficacy P-PSE scale (Caprara et al., 2009) measures participants’ evaluations of their abilities to influence their elected representatives and to voice their opinions about political candidates and programs. Respondents were asked to report how confident they are in their ability execute the certain actions or behaviors on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (not confident at all) to 10 (completely confident). Samples included, “Play a decisive role in the choice of the leaders of political movements to which you belong, or to which you are near”, “Carry out an effective information campaign for the political movement or party with which you concur regarding beliefs and programs”, “Maintain personal relationships with representatives of national government authorities”, and “Use the means you have as a citizen to critically monitor the actions of your political representatives.” Caprara et al. (2009) reported reliability 0.91 on a sample of 1673. The short form, which I used in this study, included the above four questions and correlated at 0.96 with the long version, which had 10 questions and reliability of 0.91. Vecchione and Caprara (2009) also found reliability 0.93 on a sample of 71 adolescents. A complete version of the scale is shown in the Appendix.

**Political trust.** Political trust refers to how people evaluate their government, based on the government’s performance and whether their performance aligns with
people’s expectations (Hetherington, 1998; Anderson, 2010). An extension of political trust includes trust in institutions and confidence in institutions. This is necessary for a successful democracy in which citizens participate, since persons must have trust in their fellow citizens to behave in a manner that is acceptable in the system, and they must also trust their leaders and institutions to behave in the appropriate manner (Lenard, 2008).

High levels of distrust (O’Neill, 2002; Martin, 2008) or trust (Alesina & Wacziarg, 2000; Lenard, 2008) are thought to predict high levels of political participation. I used an 11-point scale that includes both distrust and trust, and which does not equate distrust with low trust. This was modeled after Mischler-Rose (1997) and Cook Gronke (2005) and was adapted from the World Values Survey confidence/trust in institutions measure. I included institutions that were relevant to the EC and St. Lucian context. For the study, participants were asked to respond on a scale of 0 to 10 on their level of distrust or trust in 13 political institutions and organizations such as the government, parliament, the civil service, labor unions, the OECS and the United Nations. On the scale, 0 indicated “Completely distrust” and 10 represented “Completely trust”. A complete version of the measure is provided in the Appendix.

**Participation.** Political participation is any activity that seeks to influence government decisions and actions by directly influencing public policy (Huntington & Nelson, 1976) or by directly influencing the people who make the public policy decisions (Verba et al., 1995). I designed this study with the view that political attitudes drive political behaviors, even though I recognize there are minority groups who believe that behaviors drive attitudes (Gastil, 2004; Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Morrell, 2005), or that
attitudes and behaviors mutually affect each other (Stenner-Day & Fischle, 1992; Bandura, 1997; Caprara et al., 2009).

I used a fourteen-item measure for participation. I created the first three questions based on my knowledge of the context. They were intended to capture the local political discourse that involves radio programs and personal conversations. The questions asked about participation in call-in radio programs and political discussions with others. Participants were asked to respond on an 11-point scale, with 0 indicating lowest participation, and 10 indicating the highest level of participation. Three more questions were adapted from the World Values Survey and used an 11-point scale, where 0 represented “Certain not to” and 10 represented “Certain to.” These three questions asked about the likelihood of signing a petition, joining a boycott, and attending a peaceful demonstration, respectively. The seventh question was taken directly from the World Values Survey and asked about a person’s likelihood of voting in an immediate general election. Questions eight and nine asked whether, and for which party study participants voted in their last election. Finally, the participation measure included a five-item section, where participants indicated their membership status in organizations, such as religious organizations, labor unions, political parties, and professional organizations. The choices were “Don’t Belong”, “Inactive Member,” and “Active Member.” A complete version of the scale is shown in the Appendix.

**Participant demographic information.** The participants were asked to complete a demographic questionnaire called the Participant Biographical Form, which solicited information such as age, sex, place of birth, occupation, and religious or spiritual background. The demographic form is shown in the Appendix.
CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

The goal of the study was to examine political development in the context of St. Lucia, a small island developing state in the Caribbean. Particularly, the study aimed to examine people’s political attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors to better understand the nature of their democracy. I analyzed the data using descriptive statistics, factor analysis, correlation coefficients, and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analyses. The study was guided by the following research question: What are the relationships among the measures of political attitudes (interest, self-efficacy and trust) and political behavior (participation) in St. Lucia? The analysis of data for the research question was guided by the following hypotheses:

- In the Eastern Caribbean island of St. Lucia, political attitudes and behaviors are related.
- In the Eastern Caribbean island of St. Lucia, higher levels of political interest, self-efficacy, and trust will result in higher levels of political participation.

Item-level Inspection and Missing Data

I conducted an item-level inspection on the data to check for accuracy in the coding and the integrity of the dataset. I found no errors. I then conducted an analysis of missing data. Little’s MCAR Test was not statistically significant with chi-square =
734.63 (df = 808; p < 0.97). This suggested that there were no systematic patterns in the missing data. Further the test revealed that there were no items with more than two percent of missing data. Therefore, I retained the original number of cases (476) for further analysis.

**Factor Analysis**

I conducted a Principal Axis factor analysis with varimax rotation on the proposed variables. The purpose of the varimax rotation was to allow the loading matrix to arrive as close as possible to simple structure for which the data would allow. Simple structure means that each item loads maximally on one factor while loading as near as possible to zero on all other factors. This analysis used the traditional Eigenvalue cut off of 1.0 to determine which factors to retain. I conducted a rotated factor matrix, which revealed items meeting the loading criteria of \( |0.35| \) (Grimm & Yarnold, 1995; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007; Stevens, 2002). I used a criterion in which items that double-loaded (cross-loaded), or loaded on more than one factor with less than 0.15 difference in the loadings, would not be retained (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, Bundick, 2010). I then examined the resultant factors to ensure that the items within each were a good conceptual fit.

The three interest items were designed to measure respondents’ level of interest in politics. The factor analysis revealed one factor Eigenvalue 2.66. A Scree Plot confirmed a one-factor structure. After rotation, the factor accounted for approximately 88.55% of the variance. Further examination of the rotated factor matrix revealed all three items met the loading criteria of \( |0.35| \) (Grimm & Yarnold, 1995; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007; Stevens, 2002) to define one factor. I combined the items to form the interest scale (*Interest*). See Table 5 for the specific factor loadings of the scale.
Table 5

*Rotated Factor Matrix for all Interest Items*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
<td>0.877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attention to political news</td>
<td>0.925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest in government and political information</td>
<td>0.928</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The self-efficacy measure consisted of four items intended to assess respondents’ feelings of confidence in their ability to influence politics. The factor analysis revealed one factor with Eigenvalue 2.99, accounting for 74.55% of the variance. A Scree Plot confirmed a one-factor structure. All four items met the loading criteria of \(|0.35|\) (Grimm & Yarnold, 1995; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007; Stevens, 2002) to define one factor. I combined the items to form the self-efficacy scale (*Self-efficacy*). See Table 6 for the specific factor loadings of the scale.

Table 6

*Rotated Factor Matrix for all Self-efficacy Items*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Efficacy</td>
<td>Choosing leaders</td>
<td>0.824</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

72
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct effective education campaigns</td>
<td>0.831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintain relationships with government</td>
<td>0.842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>representatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Critically monitor political</td>
<td>0.754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>representatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The proposed trust measure consisted of 13 items intended to assess respondents’ trust in various political institutions. The factor analysis revealed three factors with Eigenvalues ranging from 1.07 to 6.44. After rotation, the three factors accounted for approximately 67.63% of the variance (factor 1 = 49.53%; factor 2 = 9.89%; and factor 3 = 8.22%). A Scree Plot confirmed a three-factor structure. Factor one seemed to contain items related to trust in national government; specifically, the factor contained three items about trust in government, political parties, and parliament respectively. Factor two seemed to contain items involving trust international organizations. The items measured trust in OECS, CARICOM, and the United Nations, respectively. Factor three seemed to consist of items measuring trust in local institutions, such as, church, press, labor unions, banks, police, and courts. I combined Factor one items to form a subscale called trust in national government (Trust in national government). I combined Factor two items to form the subscale trust in international organizations (Trust in international organizations). I combined Factor three items to form the subscale trust in local institutions (Trust in local institutions).
Additionally, one item, trust in civil service, cross-loaded on all three factors. However, the differences in factor loadings were greater than 0.15 on this item. This met the criterion for retaining the item (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, Bundick, 2010). The item seemed most conceptually meaningful to be included with factor 3 (trust in local institutions) and this was later confirmed by reliability estimates (discussed fully later). See Table 7 for the specific factor loadings of the scale.

Table 7

*Rotated Factor Matrix for all Trust Items*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Factor 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>0.836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>0.771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>0.765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OECS</td>
<td>0.824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>0.863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>0.659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Church</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Press</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labor unions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Banks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The proposed participation measure was intended to assess respondents’
participation in political activities. The factor analysis revealed two factors with
Eigenvalues of 1.07 and 3.02. After rotation, the two factors accounted for 68.17% of the
variance (factor 1 = 50.30%; factor 2 = 17.87%). A Scree Plot confirmed a two-factor
structure. Factor one consisted of items related to participating in political activities
(Participation in political activities) such as boycotts, petitions, and peaceful
demonstrations. Factor two contained items related to participating in political discourse,
specifically, listening to, and calling in to radio programs, and discussing politics
(Participation in political discourse) with others. See Table 8 for the specific factor
loadings of the scale.

Table 8

*Rotated Factor Matrix for all Participation Items*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Factor 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Likely to sign petition</td>
<td>0.746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Likely to boycott</td>
<td>0.856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Likely to attend</td>
<td>0.695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demonstration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Factor Loadings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Listen to call-in programs</td>
<td>0.712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Call to call-in programs</td>
<td>0.454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discuss politics</td>
<td>0.523</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Instrument Reliabilities**

I computed Cronbach alpha reliabilities for all scales to serve as an index of internal reliability. All of the scales were found to be reliable with Cronbach alpha values ranging from 0.60 to 0.94. See Table 9.

Table 9

*Summated Scales’ Descriptive Statistics & Cronbach Alpha Reliabilities*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Alpha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-efficacy</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in national government</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in international organizations</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in local institutions</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in political discourse</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in political activities</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral participation</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For the variables of political interest, self-efficacy, and participation I asked study participants to score themselves on a scale of 0 to 10. In all instances, 0 represented the lowest possible amount or absence of the attribute, while 10 represented the highest possible amount or the fill of the attribute. The mean scores ranged from 3.23 to 5.22. The lowest score of 3.23 was in participation in political discourse, while the highest mean score of 5.22 was in political interest. The other mean scores were 3.55 for self-efficacy, 4.22 for participation in political activities, and finally, 5.04 for electoral participation. Therefore, the levels of political interest, self-efficacy and the three types of participation were all relatively low. Details can be found in Table 9.

In terms of mode and range, all of the variables had a minimum value of 0 and a maximum of 10. The only exception was participation in political discourse, whose highest score among study participants was 9. In terms of the response most often selected, the mode score for self-efficacy and participation in political discourse was 0. Participation in political activities and interest fared a little better with scores of 3 and 5 respectively. Among all the variables, only electoral participation had a mode score of 10. See Table 9 for details.

The trust scales were different from interest, self-efficacy and participation mentioned above in that 0 represented the highest level of distrust, while 10 represented the highest level of trust. Therefore, scores around the midpoint of 5 represented a sort of neutral attitude where persons neither trusted nor distrusted the institution in question. The lowest mean trust score was 2.98 for trust in national government. This means that in the sample, it not so much that people do not trust the national government - the score of 2.98 means that people actually feel distrust toward the national government. The highest
mean trust score was 4.83 for trust in international institutions. The mean score for trust in local institutions was 4.61. In terms of people’s trust in local institutions and international organizations, people seem to only slightly distrust these institutions since their scores of 4.61 and 4.83, respectively, were just below the neutral midpoint of 5. In relation to the minimum, maximum, and mode values, all three trust variables shared a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 10. Not surprisingly, trust in national government had a mode score of 0. The most commonly reported scores for trust in international organizations and local institutions were 5 and 6, respectively. This suggests that unlike national government, most survey participants did not distrust international organizations and local institutions – they were either neutral or slightly trusting. Details can be found in Table 9.

Overall, the mean and mode scores for responses on all for the political attitude and behavior measures were low. The only notable exception was in electoral participation, which despite a mean score of 5.04 had the highest mode score of 10.

Table 10

*Pearson Product-Moment Correlations among the Variables for Full Sample*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Interest</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Self-efficacy</td>
<td>0.589**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Trust in nat’l gov’t</td>
<td>0.415** 0.469**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Trust int’l organ’</td>
<td>0.300** 0.345** 0.606**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Trust in local inst’s</td>
<td>0.314** 0.282** 0.607** 0.631**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Correlations

I had hypothesized that all the study variables would be related. In addressing this first hypothesis, I analyzed Pearson product-moment correlations among the variables (see Table 10). The results were mostly consistent with my expectations. All of the variables were significantly correlated at \( p < 0.01 \). However, a few of the correlations had \( r \) values of less that 0.35, which is a benchmark for weak to medium strength. Notably, the variables of trust in national government, international organizations, and local institutions correlated lower with the other variables.

**OLS Regression Analyses**

In addressing the second hypothesis, I conducted a series of regression analyses. See Figure 1 for a representation of the model predicting political behavior. Hypothesis two asserted that the higher the levels of political interest, self-efficacy, and trust the higher would be the levels of political participation, specifically participation in political discourse, political activities, and general elections. To address this I conducted three multiple regressions with participation (discourse, activities, and electoral, respectively) as dependent variables and interest, self-efficacy, trust in national government, trust in
international organizations, and trust in local institutions as independent variables. I used a cut-off level of $p < 0.05$.

In Model 1, interest and self-efficacy were statistically significant predictors of participation in political discourse. None of the trust variables were statistically significant predictors of participation. See Table 12.
Table 12

*OLS Regression Estimation: Participation in Political Discourse*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>0.618</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-efficacy</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in national government</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in international organizations</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in local institutions</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** $R^2 = 0.432$, $F = 65.451$, $p < 0.001$

Model 2 was identical to Model 1 except that I used participation in political activities as the dependent variable. All the variables were all statistically significant predictors of participation in political activities. See Table 13.

Table 13

*OLS Regression Estimation: Participation in Political Activities*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>0.929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-efficacy</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in national government</td>
<td>-0.357</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in international organizations</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Model 3, I used electoral participation as the dependent variable. All the variables were statistically significant predictors of electoral participation, except for trust in international organizations, and trust in local institutions. See Table 14.

### Table 14

*OLS Regression Estimation: Electoral Participation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>0.317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-efficacy</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in national government</td>
<td>0.291</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in international organizations</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in local institutions</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.318</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: \( R^2 = 0.296, F = 36.341, p < 0.001 \)
CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION

In this study, I took a closer look at notions of political development, with special reference to post-colonial, politically independent, small-island developing states in the Eastern Caribbean (EC). The basis for the study is research suggesting political culture is an important aspect of political development (Almond & Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1990; Inglehart & Weltzel, 2005; Putnam, 2000) and should not be overlooked, especially in developing contexts (Diamond, 2013; Lipset, 1959). I began with a broad examination of extant data regarding institutional arrangements in some Eastern Caribbean countries. Subsequently, I conducted a more focused, in-depth analysis of one island, St. Lucia. Through this case study approach I measured individuals’ political attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors to gain a better understanding of the democratic political culture in that country.

The study was unavoidably exploratory in nature because of the paucity of research in this understudied context. In fact, this study represents the most in-depth analysis of political attitudes and behaviors to date in the context of St. Lucia. As such, in terms of theoretical significance, I sought to address the theoretical gap regarding empirical research in the area of political development in the EC region. In terms of practical significance, my aim was to use this empirical data to establish baselines from which I could provoke discourse on policy analysis and interventions. To better grasp the
nuances of present-day life in the context of study, I opted for the immersion experience and travelled to St. Lucia for three months for data collection and analysis.

Based on prior research, I tested relations between interest (Clarke et al., 2004; Gopoian and Hadjiharalambous, 1994; Martin, 2008), self-efficacy (Almond & Verba, 1963; Campbell et al., 1954; 1960; Vecchione & Caprara 2009), trust (Anderson, 2010; Bennett, 1986; Citrin, 1974; Cook & Gronke, 2005; Mannarini et al., 2010), and participation (Bandura, 1997, 2001; Blais & St. Vincent, 2011; Uslaner & Brown, 2005; Verba et al., 1995). The results revealed that all of the variables were positively correlated. Additionally, in the current context, political interest and self-efficacy could be used to predict participation in political discourse; interest, self-efficacy, trust in national government, trust in international organizations, and trust in local institutions could be used to predict participation in political activities; and interest, self-efficacy, and trust in national government could be used to predict electoral participation.

In this chapter, I will proceed with a review of the findings, followed by a summary of the study’s limitations, and then the implications and future research. I will continue with a discussion on the potential role of public policy. Lastly, I will end the chapter with a summary and conclusion.

**Review of the Findings**

As already stated, my goal was to examine the political attitudes and behaviors in the EC island of St. Lucia and to explore how public policy may be used to influence political development in this context. Four hundred and seventy six persons participated in this study. This was a fairly robust sample that represented approximately 0.3 % of the population. This sample was fairly representative of the general voting population and
included men and women from 18 to 69 years of age from the various districts, religions, occupations, and educational levels.

I did not have a problem with missing data; once persons agreed to participate in the study, they typically completed the entire survey. I believe there is a cultural-historical explanation for this phenomenon. While there is not entirely a culture of empirical research in St. Lucia (Jules, 2012), individuals are generally acquiescent and often go out of their way to be helpful. Additionally, people generally tend to comply with “rules” or “directions,” whether real or perceived, a legacy of the colonial era (Memmi, 1965; Moten, 2011). Participants may have viewed the survey as an academic, formal procedure, and took the process of filling out the survey very seriously. In most cases, participants read through the entire survey first, often asked questions to clarify what was expected of them, then found a quiet spot to complete their surveys.

**Instrument validity and reliability.** The study consisted of instruments that were intended to measure individuals’ levels of interest in politics (political interest), their confidence in their own abilities to produce a desired outcome in the political sphere (political self-efficacy), their trust in political institutions and organizations (political trust), and their participation in politics (political participation). I either created new instruments or adapted existing ones to suit the St. Lucian context. Additionally, at the time of the current study, I had not identified any other research in the context of St. Lucia or the Eastern Caribbean in which these instruments had been utilized. In this regard, the present study provided the evidentiary basis for further validating these instruments in a previously untested context. Therefore, in order to ensure that instruments were valid and reliable for the present sample in St. Lucia, I conducted factor
analyses and reliability estimates. Results of the tests indicate that the measures showed good construct validity as well as acceptable internal consistency for the sample in this new context. All of the instruments held together. I provide more details below. Cronbach alpha test of reliability was used to test internal consistency of scales. Reliabilities over 0.60 are generally considered to indicate an internally consistent scale. Instrument reliabilities in this study ranged from .60 to .94. See Table 9 for more details.

The political interest scale comprised three items, while the self-efficacy scale comprised four items. Fortunately, factor analysis and a Cronbach alpha test of reliability revealed that, based on the responses from the sample, the questions seem to reliably capture political interest and self-efficacy in the given context. This is consistent with prior research using interest (American National Elections Studies, 2008; Heath et al., 2002) and self-efficacy (Caprara et al., 2009; Vecchione & Caprara, 2009). It appears that on the sample in St. Lucia these scales worked in much the same manner as in prior research.

The trust scale consisted of 13 items assessing individuals’ trust in various institutions and organizations. Factor analysis revealed three factors within the trust measure. This means survey participants seemed to be distinguishing among three types of political institutions. Their level of trust in each type differed. The three factors were named trust in national government, trust in international organizations, and trust in local institutions based on the constituent institutions. Trust in national government included three items that measured people’s trust in the government, parliament, and political parties. Trust in international organizations included three items that measured trust in regional and international organizations, like OECS, CARICOM, and the UN. Finally,
trust in local institutions was made up of seven items that measured individuals’ level of
trust in local institutions including the civil service, the police, and labor unions.

In sum, the initial trust scale was separated into three distinct sub-scales to
represent different types of trust. This is consistent with Pearce (2010), whose study of
political trust in Armenia also revealed a three-factor structure after factor analysis.
However, the factors were conceptualized as trust in civil society, elected government,
and unelected government. This suggests that there may be some nuance in the ways in
which people in the St. Lucia sample regard political trust. Importantly, the three distinct
trust subscales were all found to be internally consistent.

The initial participation instrument included seven items that were intended to
measure general political participation, including how much people participated in
political discourse, how likely participants were to take part in protest political activities,
and finally how likely it was that participants would participate in general elections. The
results of factor analysis showed that based on the responses of individuals in the St.
Lucia sample, my conception of a three-factor structure was indeed reasonable. This is to
say that the St. Lucian survey participants, whether implicitly or explicitly, were able to
distinguish among three different types of participation within the single participation
instrument that I administered. The three subscales were participation in political
discourse, participation in political activities, and electoral participation. The three
separate participation subscales were found to be internally consistent.

**Correlations.** My first hypothesis was that all the variables would be correlated
based on prior research (Blais & St. Vincent, 2011; Eggert & Giugni, 2010; Ikeda, 2013).
Lack of correlation among variables would indicate an assumption violation for
regression analysis. Pearson’s product-moment correlations or Pearson’s $r$ serves as a measure of statistical significance as well as magnitude of the linear correlation dependence between two variables. Values range from $+1$ to $-1$ indicating total positive and negative correlations, respectively. A value of $0$ indicates no correlation. All correlations among the variables were found to be statistically significant, although some pairs of variables were more strongly correlated than others. Participation in political discourse showed lower correlations with trust in local institutions, and trust in international organizations. Similarly, participation in political activities correlated weakly with trust in local institutions as well as with trust in national government. Additionally, low correlations were also evident between participation in electoral politics and trust in international organizations. Finally, trust in local institutions and self-efficacy showed a low correlation.

The fact that interest and self-efficacy were highly correlated with most of the other variables is not surprising, as this is in line with the literature that suggests they are important political attitudes that are related to political participation (Blais & St. Vincent, 2011; Caprara et al., 2009; Verba et al., 1995). Conversely, the low correlations of many of the trust subscales was interesting, as this not consistent with other researchers including Ikeda (2013), Martin (2010), Miller (1974), and Putnam (2000), who found high correlations among the variables. This may be unique to the St. Lucia context.

**Regressions.** My second hypothesis was that higher levels of political interest, self-efficacy, and trust would lead to higher levels of political participation. I estimated three regression models. All three models had five predictors: political interest, self-efficacy, trust in national government, trust in international organizations,
and trust in local institutions. The first model predicted participation in political discourse; the second model predicted participation in political activities; and the third model predicted electoral participation.

In the first regression model, I used interest, self-efficacy, trust in national government, trust in international organizations, and trust in local institutions to predict participation in political discourse. The hypothesis was only partially supported in that only interest and self-efficacy were positive statistically significant predictors of participation in political discourse. In other words, high levels of interest and self-efficacy could be used to predict high levels of participation in political discourse. On the other hand, all three trust subscales – trust in national government, trust in international organizations and trust in local institutions – were not statistically significant predictors of participation in political discourse. The statistical significance of interest in this model is consistent with Blais (2000), Clarke et al. (2004), Martin (2008), and Verba et al. (1995). The statistical significance of self-efficacy in the model is consistent with Bandura (1997; 2001), Caprara et al. (2009), Ikeda (2013), Karp and Banducci (2008) and Pasek et al. (2008). Model fit refers to whether the model is a good fit for the data, or in other words, how well the model presented matches up to what is happening in real life. This model fit was approximately 43%. It is worth mentioning that since the model attempts to predict human behavior, a model fit value of more than 50% is generally not expected. Therefore, the model fit was quite good for this sample.

In the second regression model, I used interest, self-efficacy, trust in national government, trust in international organizations, and trust in local institutions to predict participation in political activities. In this model, all of the predictor variables were
statistically significant predictors of participation in political activities. This is consistent with Alesina and Wacziarg (2000), Anderson (2010), Diamond (1998), and Ikeda (2013), who found trust to be a significant predictor of participation, as well as several other numerous researchers including Verba et al. (1995), Clarke et al. (2004), and Caprara et al. (2009), who found that interest and self-efficacy predict political participation. Again the hypothesis was only partially supported as trust in local government was found to be a statistically significant negative predictor of participation in political activities. This relationship is indicated by the negative coefficient (B = -.357). In this instance, lower levels of trust in national government could be used to predict higher levels of participation in political activities. It is only prudent to restate here that the political activities presented in the survey included such behaviors as signing of petitions, boycotts, and peaceful demonstrations. It could be the case that these activities may be seen as somehow working against the national government. Therefore, persons with higher levels of trust in the government would have less reason to participate in these kinds of activities, while persons who have greater distrust of the national government may be more likely to participate in these contra-government political activities. This is consistent with Citrin (1974), Cook and Gronke (2005), Ikeda (2013), and Martin (2010), who found lower levels of trust to engender protest-type political participation. The data fit this model well at approximately 36%.

In the third regression model, I used interest, self-efficacy, trust in national government, trust in international organizations, and trust in local institutions to predict electoral participation. I found all of the predictor variables to be positive statistically significant predictors of electoral participation, except trust in international organizations
and trust in local institutions. This is consistent with Martin (2010) and Verba et al. (1995). In this model higher level of interest, self-efficacy, and trust in national government were found to predict higher participation in general elections. The model fit was approximately 30%.

**Comparing present survey data on St. Lucia to previous international indices.** In chapter two, I discussed institutional arrangements and voter turnout in St. Lucia as compiled by international researchers and organizations. These statistics were intended to provide insights into how St. Lucia fared internationally in terms of its democratic institutions. In comparing the results of the present study with these indices where possible, I found that in general, the data from the two sources were fairly complementary. They mostly suggest that St. Lucia is a strong and viable democracy. Albeit, as is to be expected, the specific comparisons are more varied.

In addition to the Constitution of St. Lucia that allows for multiple political parties, the results of the survey question asking respondents whether and for whom they voted reinforces the presence of two major parties, as well as smaller parties, and independent candidates. In other words, the political system in St. Lucia is such that there are multiple parties and independent candidates for whom survey participants felt free to vote and support politically. This aligns with St. Lucia’s high score of 1, marking the island as a democracy in the democracy. There exists multiple political parties that through the popular vote can be represented in the branches of government. The survey results also align with St. Lucia’s high score of 2 in electoral self-determination, which states that citizens have freedom of political choice, legal rights, and practical ability to influence laws and officials through free, fair, and open elections. Finally, the survey
results also support the fact that St. Lucia had the highest possible score of 16 in political pluralism and participation. Both the survey results and the score for political pluralism and participation lend support to the idea of St. Lucians’ political freedom of choice in that all people and societal groups can freely organize in political parties and make political choices without pressures from public and private groups. This index also states that the opposition should also realistically have the chance to increase its support from the electorate. The varied responses of the present sample regarding political candidate and party choice, also suggest that opposition parties in St. Lucia are truly able to increase their support from the populace.

Trust in national government had the lowest score on all of the variables in my survey. More accurately, the low score signaled a distrust of the national government felt by survey respondents. This distrust aligns with the relatively low score of 5 out of a possible 8 that the island received in the physical integrity rights index. This score suggests that there may be problems regarding respect for countrymen on the part of the national government and the possible occurrence of torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and/or political disappearance. Conversely, this distrust of national government seems contrary to the island receiving the highest possible score of 12 on the index for electoral process. This index states that the chief authority and legislature are elected through free and fair elections. The same applies for the functioning of government index, where St. Lucia scored 11 out of a possible 12. This index includes a measure of the lack of corruption and a government that is open, transparent, and accountable to the electorate between elections.
However, the survey results indicate that people do feel free to elect the person, party, and consequently the government of choice. Therefore, this may help account for the high score on the functioning of government index. What may also help account for the high score in the functioning of government as well as electoral process is the relatively high participation in elections, as well as participation in political activities that are often perceived as anti-government. Finally, it is important to keep in mind that low trust in government may bode well for democracy as distrust of the government may actually strengthen democracy (Citrin, 1974) According to this view, distrust may only be in regard to the current government and may indeed indicate a commitment to democracy at the systems level (Ikeda, 2013).

St. Lucia was assessed the highest possible score of 12 in the associational and organizational rights index. This index speaks to rights and freedom to assemble, demonstrate, and have open public elections for people and for private and public groups and organizations. This freedom of association is the second of three fundamental rights to which the Constitution is dedicated (Government of St. Lucia, 2006). Interestingly, the mean score of the present sample on the efficacy to participate in political activities was a relatively high 4.22.

Finally, in regard to voter turnout, 66% of survey participants reported that they voted in the last election, and 1% did not report. However, the average for voter turnout over the last three election cycles was 72% (International IDEA, 2013b). However, since the range for voter turnout in St. Lucia over the last three elections cycles is from 64% to 77% (International IDEA, 2013b), the sample voter turnout of 66% is well within the expected range. Therefore, overall my data corresponded well to international extant data.
Limitations of the Study

One of the goals of this study was to conduct research in a context that is understudied, and therefore, underrepresented in political science literature. Since this study represents the first and most in-depth study of the kind in the Eastern Caribbean (EC) of which I am aware, there are some design and contextual limitations to address.

This study is exploratory in nature in terms of design. As such, the findings must be approached with some measure of caution, as this type of design does not lay claims to providing evidence of causation. This is not to say that any contributions made here should be minimized or denigrated. I am simply applying prudence in requesting restraint when making value judgments based on any interpretations made from these finding.

Additionally, the instruments used in this study (including one developed explicitly for this study) had never yet been tested in the St. Lucia context. The instruments seemed to have held up reasonably well in terms of construct validity and reliability for the sample in the present study. Nevertheless, I must advise that it is important to develop more research in this context or to wait for more research to transpire before the current findings could be validated. Until additional research can confirm the performance of the measures and the findings of this initial study, the findings should be accepted with caution. Fortunately, this situation provides great opportunity for confirmatory research.

Other issues that could be seen as limitations are associated with the administration of the surveys. I intended for this study to include both online and pencil-and-paper administrations. However, I soon realized that the response rate for the face-to-face administrations was much higher than the online version. In fact, the online
administration yielded only ten percent of the overall sample. In the end, I refocused the study to be mostly pen-and-paper, and to use the online surveys simply to supplement the pencil-and-paper ones. The potential problem with that approach is the possible loss of information from the demographic of online users who may have completed the survey given more time. It is conceivable that a certain “invisible,” otherwise “inaccessible” demographic of St. Lucians were missed and I remain curious about how the data might have emerged differently with the inclusion of their responses.

An additional possible limitation of the study has to do with the scale options in each of the instruments. Participants were asked to respond on a scale of 0 to 10 for all the items. 0 represented responses like “No interest at all”, “Not confident at all”, “Completely distrust”, “Never”, and “Certain not to”, while 10 represented responses like “Complete interest”, Completely confident”, “Completely trust”, “Always” and “Certain to”. While these scale representations have been used widely and successfully (American National Election Studies, 2008; Caprara et al., 2009; World Values Survey Association, 2009), they also do not provide a purely objective measure. What I mean is that such measures leave room for an individual’s particular idea of what constitutes the absence or fill of an attribute, and what constitutes notions such as “always” and “never”. For example, “always” may be everyday or seven times a week for one person, but another person may find that frequency to better aligned with a value closer to “often”, not “always”. It may have been more objective to ask participants to respond to a given objective value such as how many times a week they engaged in a particular activity, like listening to a call-in program. My conflict with the more objective approach was that my
conceptualizations would feature more prominently in the options for responding and this could have potentially softened the voices of the research participants.

Finally, there were also some potential limitations related to the context, the most significant of which stems from the fact that there has been limited research conducted in the EC. Therefore, many participants, particularly those who have not lived in more open research environments, were generally unfamiliar with participating in research studies.

For my part, in addition to providing the information sheet, it meant spending more time than I had anticipated explaining who I was, and what the study was about. Also, because of the political nature of the survey and the highly politicized context, some participants seemed to be suspicious of me and questioned whether I was conducting research for sharing with one or more political parties. Others thought that some of the survey questions were too intrusive and personal. Still others feared that their privacy could and would not be protected and that they could face negative consequences if their personal and political views were to be publicized. Even after persons decided to participate in the study, in most cases the surveys were approached with a seriousness normally reserved for more formal, even scholarly endeavors. While this was a little troubling to me at first (I did not want participants to feel that they were being tested), it turned out to be very useful as the vast majority of participants who agreed to take the survey completed it entirely. This resulted in very little missing data. The potential limitation here is the issue of accuracy. In light of individuals’ obvious reservations about the research activity, I am concerned about the veracity of their responses. It is possible that a social desirability effect could have been work, where the participants felt like they needed to respond in a way that was appropriate to please me.
Implications

Implications for theory. With this research, I tested whether well-known political theories have broader applications in developing contexts where they had not been tested. Based on the results of the present research, I conclude that the patterns of political participation in St. Lucia are similar to those of other developed and developing countries around the world. This means that the theories on political participation and development that have been developed and tested in other parts of the world seem to apply in this new untested developing context. The contextual applications of political development in the EC, specifically in St. Lucia seem to hold. The result was that at least in this sample, the measures appear to work in a similar fashion and in the ways in which they were intended, just like in the developed contexts.

In addition, the constructs derived and developed elsewhere, especially in the more developed parts of the world, held together in the EC context. This construct validity provides strong support for the notion of public polling in St. Lucia and the wider EC, which currently is very scant. Therefore, this opens up a market for public polling. Engaging in more public polling in the EC context can provide further construct validity of the instruments and other metrics for examining political science constructs. However, more confirmatory studies will be necessary in such cases. Such instruments and interventions would also need to be made culturally relevant (Jules, 2012).

Implications for public policy. There are also important implications for policy. Among the most basic is the idea of establishing baselines for St. Lucian political beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. The questions arise then as to what exactly to do with these newly discovered baselines of empirical data and whether and how the St. Lucian society
can go about changing these base levels. This is the impetus for further research and for drafting empirically motivated and contextually relevant public policies.

On a related note, there is now empirical data that supports St. Lucia’s position as a democratic nation. Therefore, stakeholders like government officials in St. Lucia can use this data to negotiate in terms of the legitimacy of their democracy. That is, the stakeholders now have an empirical basis for people’s attitudes about and within the political system. This can be used to provide further legitimacy of democracy in the St. Lucian context when relating with foreign nations as well as for domestic purposes. This is particularly salient since Farere (1989) described democracy as the ultimate form of legitimacy.

Since the patterns in the developed countries are similar to those in St. Lucia, it may be the case that the difference in development may primarily be a matter of economics. While St. Lucians welcome exchange with the developed world in the form of trade, training, resources, and aid, the people in Caribbean region are sensitive to being told what to do, and to having unilateral conditions attached to their exchanges. On paper and in practice, as agreed by international organizations and researchers (Cheibub et al., 2010; Cingranelli et al., 2013; Freedom House, 2013; Teorell et al., 2013), St. Lucia and other EC countries are democratic societies. Therefore, there is no reason that exercises in self-determination with regard to political development on the part of the EC societies should be restricted or impeded by external parties. Regardless, it remains clear that these nations need and want assistance in their economic development.

Based on the results, it appears that at least in this sample, people are committed to democracy at the systems level. This can be seen in the institutional arrangements as
well as the demonstrated patterns of the attitudes and behaviors. However, now that we have this information, several policy-related questions are raised. First of all, what is to be with the information? What is the role of external parties in influencing political development in St. Lucia? Do foreign governments really need to be involved in the politics in such a context where people are already systemically committed to democracy? Do foreign parties provide economic aid, social supports, or other forms of nonpolitical assistance?

At the domestic level there is also the question of what to do when you know that people are already committed to democracy at the systems level. In the EC context, an important first question may be how to transfer commitments to democracy at the system level to a commitment at the personal or individual level. A precursor question might be what is one’s personal responsibility in a their democratic society. Without personal commitments, society runs the risk of shifting away from democracy toward a more autocratic system, as ordinary citizens may abdicate their personal responsibility to the government resulting in political affairs being handled predominantly at the government level.

The Constitution itself may have its own part to play in the political culture in St. Lucia. While there is a lot in the document by way of rights, liberties, and the democratic system, what is lacking is the roles and responsibilities of the people and how they can involve themselves directly in the democratic process. The void in the Constitution suggests that the responsibility for the country and its democracy lies heavily with the government, not with the people. For example, the Constitution does not delineate how citizens can initiate the establishment of new laws or the changing of old ones. It also
does not discuss how the nation’s youth may be brought into the democratic system and into their government.

St. Lucia is a democracy by default not by intention. What I mean is that the Constitution that exists in the independent St. Lucia is essentially the same one that existed before the country became independent. The attitudes endure that there is a government upon which people rely to fulfill personal and societal needs and that the government and the people are clearly distinct. This deference to the governing structure is not uncommon in postcolonial culture (Memmi, 1965; Moten, 2011). It seems also to describe what Almond and Verba (1963) called the subject culture. The Constitution’s part in this is that the document is more concerned with how the government can ensure democracy by its structure, by its law, and by protecting the rights and liberties of St. Lucian citizens and residents. It is considerably lighter in its discussion of how citizens themselves can serve to preserve and protect their own rights and liberties and contribute to their society. Targeted public policy may help fill this gap in St. Lucians’ understanding and practice of democracy regardless of whether it is addressed in the Constitution.

The democratic shortcomings are particularly salient when the younger generations are considered. These young persons who were born into the St. Lucian democratic system have largely accepted this system along with the fact that their personal involvement is only marginal, at best. They are not taught the mechanisms for sustaining a democracy and their personal responsibilities in the system. Therefore, there is definitely room for policy in addressing this gap. A role of public policy is to help translate commitments to the idea of democracy into personal commitments about
individuals’ role in their democracy. Policy can help to transform a largely politically subservient and complacent population into people who understand their political system and make continual and meaningful contributions to their society. Persons between the ages of 15 and 29 comprise approximately 26% of the population in St. Lucia. Furthermore, persons under 50 years are a much larger group at approximately 77% of the population (Government of St. Lucia, 2013) A policy mandating a civics curriculum may be a single helpful first step.

**Summary and Conclusion**

In spite of the limitations, the current study was significant in several ways. First, the study advanced the dialectic on political development and added to the efforts to contextualize traditional political science constructs in the Caribbean. Second, the study demonstrated that at least in terms of institutional arrangements St. Lucia and most Caribbean countries score well regarding democratic ideals. One notable problem area for St. Lucia is the low score on the physical integrity index, which suggests there is a problem with the judiciary.

Another significant contribution of the study is that it provided empirical evidence on political beliefs, attitudes, and values and their relations to political participation for the sample in St. Lucia. The results revealed that all of the variables were positively correlated. Moreover, for that sample in the St. Lucia context, political interest and self-efficacy predicted participation in political discourse. Additionally, interest, self-efficacy, trust in national government, trust in international organizations, and trust in local institutions predicted participation in political activities. Also interest, self-efficacy, and trust in national government predicted electoral participation.
Notwithstanding these contributions, the results must be taken with a degree of caution given the exploratory nature of the study. This is especially important if the interpretation of these results is to be used to inform any public policy. In all prudence, further confirmatory research is necessary to get a fuller understanding of political development in St. Lucia.
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University Press.


doi:10.1080/15205430701582512


http://204.188.173.139:9090/stats/index.php/statistics/population


http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/loader.cfm?csmodule=security/getfile&pageid=35167


doi:10.1080/10888690801910526.


Figure 1. General Model Predicting Political Behavior

Political Beliefs, Attitudes, & Values

Self-Efficacy

Interest

Trust

Participation

Political Behaviour
APPENDICES

INSTRUMENTS

Interest
Self-efficacy
Trust
Participation
Participant Biographical Form
### Political Interest

**Directions:** For each of the following items, please rate your level of interest in the specific aspects described. Use the 11-point scales below to indicate your response, 0 indicating lowest interest and 10 indicating highest interest.

0 = No interest at all  
10 = Complete interest

| 1. How much interest do you generally have in what is going on in politics? | 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| 2. How much attention do you pay to news about national politics in the media (television, radio, magazines, newspapers, internet, etc.)? | 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| 3. How much interest do you have in information about what’s going on in government and politics? | 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |

### Political Self-Efficacy

**Directions:** For each of the following items, please rate how confident you are in your ability to execute the specific action or behaviour described. Use the 11-point scales below to indicate your response, 0 indicating lowest confidence and 10 indicating highest confidence.

0 = Not confident at all  
10 = Completely confident

| 1. Play a decisive role in the choice of the leaders of political movements to which you belong, or to which you are near | 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| 2. Carry out an effective information campaign for the political movement or party with which you concur regarding beliefs and programmes | 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| 3. Maintain personal relationships with representatives of national government authorities | 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| 4. Use the means you have as a citizen to critically monitor the actions of your political representatives | 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
Political Trust

**Directions:** For each of the organisations mentioned below, please indicate how much you distrust or trust each. Use the 11-point scales below to indicate your response, 0 indicating completely distrust and 10 indicating completely trust.

0 = Completely distrust  
10 = Completely trust

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Political Participation

**Directions:** For each of the following items, please rate your level of participation in the specific activities described. Use the 11-point scales below to indicate your response, 0 indicating lowest participation and 10 indicating highest participation.

0 = Never
10 = Always

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<td>1.</td>
<td>How often do you listen to call-in radio programmes?</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>How often do you call in to call-in radio programmes?</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>How often do you discuss politics with family members, friends, colleagues, etc?</td>
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0 = Certain Not to
10 = Certain to

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<td>4.</td>
<td>How likely are you to vote in an immediate General Election?</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>How likely are you to sign a petition?</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>How likely are you to join in a boycott?</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>How likely are you to attend a peaceful demonstration?</td>
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**Directions:** Please circle the appropriate answer or fill the information where indicated.

8. Did you vote in the last election?
   Yes
   No

9. If yes, for which party did you vote?
   UWP
   SLP
   Other: _________________________

**Directions:** For each of the following, please state your membership status.

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<th>Do Not Belong 0</th>
<th>Inactive Member 1</th>
<th>Active Member 2</th>
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<tr>
<td>Church or religious organisation</td>
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<td>Labour Union</td>
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<td>Political party</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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Participant Biographical Form

Directions: This information is confidential and will be used to help us learn about the persons who are participating in this study. Please circle the answer that describes you or fill the information where indicated.

1. Age: ________

2. Sex
   a. Male
   b. Female

3. Occupation _______________________

4. Religion
   a. Catholic
   b. Protestant
   c. Specify if Other _______________

5. Nationality _______________________

6. In which district/quarter do you live? _______________________

7. What is the main language you speak at home?
   a. English
   b. Kwéyòl
   c. Other

8. How many persons are there in your household? _______________________

9. How do you describe your family?
   a. Single parent (mother)
   b. Single parent (father)
   c. Nuclear
   d. Extended
   e. Specify if Other _______________

10. What is the highest level of education in your household?
    a. Less than secondary school
    b. Some secondary school
    c. Secondary school graduate
    d. Attended or graduated from technical school or community college
    e. Attended university, did not graduate
    f. University graduate
    g. Completed (post) graduate school/advanced degree

11. What is the approximate total monthly income of your household (in EC dollars)?
    a. Less than $1,000
    b. Between $1,000 and $2,000
    c. Between $2,000 and $4,000
    d. Between $4,000 and $7,000
    e. Between $7,000 and $10,000
    f. More than $10,000

12. Have you lived outside of St. Lucia?
    a. Yes. If yes, how long? _____ Years, _____ months
    b. No

13. Marital Status
    a. Single
    b. Married
    c. Divorced
    d. Other _______________________

14. Where do you currently reside?
    _______________________

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