“INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CRISIS RESOLUTION: A DOMESTIC PERSPECTIVE”

by

VIRGINIA SANDERS

(Under the Direction of Patricia Sullivan)

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the role that international organizations can play in the crisis resolution process. Specifically, I examine the ability of states to influence both the domestic population and domestic leaders in favor of crisis resolution, with regime type as an intervening variable in the process. I examine my hypotheses empirically, utilizing the International Crisis Behavior Dataset. The results of my analysis are mixed with international organizations seen as largely ineffective in the crisis resolution process. However, the evidence does support my hypothesis that international organizations may be effective in changing public opinion in favor of crisis resolution.

INDEX WORDS: International Organizations, Regional Organizations, Conflict Resolution, Regime Type, Public Opinion
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Chapter 1

Introduction

The methods by which wars can be thwarted are of particular interest to international relations scholars. More specifically, this paper looks at the role that international organizations can play in the process. Can international organizations help mediate conflicts and by what mechanisms can they do so? The ways in which international are able to influence states to deescalate a crisis is a debated topic in the international relations literature and the role of public opinion as one of these tools is an under researched area of study. Thus, elucidating the mechanisms through which these organizations prevent war outcomes is a valuable research direction.

There are varying opinions in the international relations literature on the ability of organizations to affect significant change in the world system. Reinalda and Verbeek argue that the prevailing literature paints a picture of international organizations as relatively unimportant.\(^1\) However, Reinalda and Verbeek find that, while there are differences between organizations and policy areas, in many instances there has been an increase in the autonomy of international organizations from the sole interests of its member nations.\(^2\) Thus, the effects of international organizations in crisis mediation may be significantly different than the effects of states themselves thus making them an issue of importance for international relations scholars.

The question must then be begged as to what particular mechanisms can be used by international organizations. What are the actual causal mechanisms through which international

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\(^2\) Reinalda and Verbeek, 5-6
organizations may act to bring about crisis resolution? My research will focus on one aspect of
the conflict resolution process- global and regional organization influence on crisis resolution
before the crisis escalates militarily. The main question addressed is if international
organizations can play a part in preventing war.

This research will draw heavily from various existing literatures. First, any such research
direction will by necessity draw upon the debate between realists and liberal institutionalists that
continues in the international relations literature. While the realists argue that long-term effective
cooporation through international organizations is unlikely, the liberal institutionalists argue the
opposite. This topic will be discussed first as the grand theory under which debate of this topic
falls. Next will be discussed the specific mechanisms by which international organizations may
actually affect crisis resolution. This will begin with a discussion of preventative diplomacy.
This is followed by the mediation literature in reference to the efficacy of mediations and the role
that international organizations can play in the process. It will continue with the literature on
sanctions and other enforcement mechanisms in terms of the capabilities of international
organizations to enforce commitments by member states and to facilitate conflict resolution. In
conclusion will be discussion of public opinion as a tool through which international
organizations may influence the domestic politics of a country even in the area of conflict
resolution.

It is easy to see that the role of international organizations is a multi-faceted issue of
concern to international security. My theory argues that international organizations can intervene
in crises to improve the probability of resolving a conflict without escalation to violence. There
are two distinct ways this occurs. The first is by influencing the cost- benefit analysis of key
decision makers while the second is by changing the opinion of the domestic public to favor
crisis resolution. If my theory is correct that international and regional organizations can mediate crisis resolution, then this has practical implications for national policy makers. The literature has yet to produce an empirically tested hypothesis that includes concurrent causal mechanisms for how both elites and domestic groups are influenced by the mediation of international organizations in attempts at preventative diplomacy. My research will attempt to fill this gap in the current international relations and organizational literature.
Chapter 2

**Literature Review**

*Perspectives on International Institutions*

The role that international organizations play in the current global system is the subject of a long strain of international relations literature. The first question that must be addressed is why international organizations are formed. Thomas Princen argues that states “coordinate their expectations by creating institutions, whether formal organizations or, more informally, regimes and conventions. Institutions are feasible when dealing with ongoing relationships and issues that recur, such as those in trade disputes and alliance politics”.

These organizations can include those that are both global and regional in scope. Scheman and Ford point out the importance of regional organizations in mediating conflicts. They argue “that violent disputes occur, for the most part, among neighbors”. If this is true, we might discover differing levels of effectiveness of global and regional organization in conflicts. Thus, we must consider the impact of organizations that are both global and regional.

The ability of international organizations to exert influence must also be addressed. If states themselves choose whether or not to participate in an international organization, then how effective can institutions be at influencing state behavior. There is an ongoing debate between the realists and the liberal institutionalists about the efficacy of international organizations and the possibilities for their continuation in the post-Cold War era. My theory bases itself in the liberal institutionalist literature as many of these key organizations are actually expanding.

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5 Ibid, 199.
Liberal institutionalists argue that institutions provide avenues for cooperation amongst states. Keohane and Martin state that “institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity”. In addition, international organizations can focus states on the long-term benefits rather than merely a short term analysis of the cost of cooperation.

However, there are opposing perspectives on the possible roles that international organizations can play in an anarchic world system. Mearsheimer articulates the realist perspective when he states that “relative gains considerations and concern about cheating” are hurdles that will prevent cooperation among states for extended periods. Joseph Grieco agrees with Mearsheimer’s opinion when he argues that in our anarchic global system, competition often prohibits effective cooperation through organizations. A state may refuse to cooperate even if it will gain in absolute terms because it will worry that others will gain more from the agreement.

My theory bases itself in the liberal institutionalist literature. It is clear that international organizations have not dissipated in the post-Cold War environment and, in fact, we have seen the opposite trend. A commonly cited example of this phenomenon is the European Union. John McCormick notes that in the European Union “Its institutions have the power to make laws and policies that are binding on the member states, and in policy areas where the member states have

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9 Mearsheimer, 12.
11 Ibid, 499.
ceded authority to the EU, European law overrides national law”.  

This is clearly an increase in the amount of cooperation between the European Union member states that was not part of the original conceptualization of the organization.

**Preventing War**

One area that has received attention in international relations studies is the area of preventive diplomacy. One of the reasons it has garnered so much attention is that, as Alexander George states, “once large-scale violence occurs, it becomes much more difficult for members of the international community-the United Nations, regional organizations, individual states acting alone or together, and nongovernmental organizations-to muster the political will and the resources needed for effective conflict resolution and peacemaking”. One reason such research is important is the divide between knowledge of what needs to be done to prevent a conflict and actual policy implementation. Preventive diplomacy is “concerted action designed to resolve, manage, or contain disputes before they become violent”. In addition to this, Bercovitch argues that “other related objectives of preventive diplomacy include stopping existing conflicts from escalating further and limiting the spread of any ongoing conflict”. My research question is concerned with this broad conception of preventive diplomacy- can international organizations play a role in stopping a crisis before violence begins or stop violence from escalating?

It is important to recognize, however, that the effectiveness of preventative diplomacy is disputed. Stedman, for example, argues that preventative diplomacy is more complicated than it

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14 George, 15-16.
is currently touted to be. \footnote{Stedman, 15-18.} First, he cites the fact that it is difficult to predict when and where conflicts will break out. \footnote{Stedman, 16.} Additionally, he recognizes states face the problem of determining what the best course of action will be. \footnote{Stedman, 16-17} Thus, if mechanisms through which international organizations can make preventive diplomacy easier were laid out, then that would be of interest to both policy makers and preventive diplomacy scholars.

In order to understand the role that international organizations can play in preventative diplomacy, we must understand the tools that can be used in this area. Bercovitch argues that preventive diplomacy mainly utilizes three tools—"early warning systems, confidence-building measures; and mediation and related diplomatic missions". \footnote{Bercovitch, “Understanding Mediation’s Role in Preventive Diplomacy”, 244.} Early warning systems rely mainly on gathering and synthesizing information, both historical and current, about the conflict. \footnote{Bercovitch, “Understanding Mediation’s Role in Preventive Diplomacy”, 244-245.} Confidence building mechanisms, on the other hand, deal with mitigating the problems of uncertainty and lack of trust that exists between states while mediation entails calling on a third-party to help resolve a crisis. \footnote{Bercovitch, “Understanding Mediation’s Role in Preventive Diplomacy”, 245-246.} As we will see, international organizations are well-suited to these roles of information provision, creating trust between states, and mediation.

\textit{Mediation}

One of the tools that can be used in preventive diplomacy is mediation which is distinct from other forms of conflict resolution. Bercovitch states that “there are four basic modes by which all conflicts could be managed. These are: (1) avoidance and withdrawal, (2) violence and coercion, (3) various forms of bargaining and negotiations, or (4) the intervention of a third
Since my research focuses largely on preventing crisis escalation to violence using international organizations, I will focus on the effectiveness of this fourth mechanism—third party intervention. While the study of the effect of international organizations in the peace process once war has been declared is important, the focus of my research is on the ability of these organizations to prevent crisis escalation.

One way in which states can help prevent a dispute from escalating into a military crisis is for the organization to act as a mediator in that crisis. Bercovich argues that “Third party mediation can be defined as a process whereby parties involved in a conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or organization to change their behavior”. Though there are many options for possible mediators, international organizations like the United Nations have certain advantages such as that of impartiality- the ability to act as a “face saving device” for states to back down, and its representatives “can be more easily disavowed if necessary”. The problem that these mediators face is that they have the disadvantage of being involved in the most complex of crises.

The literature on mediation highlights two essential components to mediation- it must be voluntarily offered and its goal must be to create an outcome that benefits both parties. Mediators do this by providing several functions—providing information to both sides of the conflict, providing impartial solutions, helping states step back from “mutually incompatible postures”, helping states avoid loss of reputation, supervision of agreement implementation and

26 Ibid, 177.
helping states redefine the nature of their dispute. Through these valuable avenues, mediators may attempt to achieve a peaceful settlement of a crisis. A last criterion for successful mediation is that “a mediator must be available who is acceptable to all sides” in order to achieve successful mediation.

Mediation is a field of study that lacks consensus on several key points ranging from the definition of successful mediation, to the effect of duration, to discussion on when mediation should be initiated. Despite this, mediation is a very common occurrence in the current international system. In essence, mediation occurs when a third party decides to intervene in a dispute or interaction between two or more parties. Then, “the mediator chooses from a number of available techniques and strategies” which “is influenced in part by the mediator’s past experience, instruction as a mediator, expectation about the probable success of different techniques, and so on”. This produces an outcome to the dispute that can then continue to affect all parties involved. Mediation is usually allowed because those involved think mediation will, in some form, aid in the process of resolving the conflict.

According to Bercovitch and Diehl, “In general, less than 26% of rivalries of all varieties experience any international conflict management”. They also found that in rivalries, mediation does not have any significant effect on the severity of conflict. Thus, the practical pacific

33 Ibid. 162.
34 Ibid, 162.
36 Bercovitch and Diehl, 311.
37 Bercovitch and Diehl, 313.
effects of mediation are in dispute in the mediation literature. One reason that international organization effectiveness is contested could be that organizations are focusing on the most long-standing conflicts. The authors do find that “enduring rivalries experience more mediation efforts than other conflicts”. 38

I will take into consideration the tools that mediation theorists argue that third party mediators have in negotiating crisis resolution, most importantly preventing loss of reputation and transparency. Unlike traditional mediation theory, however, my theory does not limit itself to the condition proffered by Susskind that mediation must be acceptable to all sides. 39 This is due to the fact that mediation is only one form of intervention that international organizations may use to resolve a crisis and thus the scope of my theory goes beyond mediation. Other tools that my theory considers may include sanctions, negotiations, information provision, or a variety of other tools that may not be provided at the request of all states involved in the crisis. However, these are tools that are necessary to preventive diplomacy.

Powers of International Organizations

To prevent crises from escalating, international organizations may be able to apply pressure to governments through various enforcement mechanisms. Some organizations have the ability to use force, sanctions, or other forms of enforcement to ensure that members abide by the rules of the organization. Abbott and Snidal argue that “In binding intervention, international institutions issue legally binding decisions with the consent of all parties. The mere possibility of binding external intervention may bring recalcitrant states to the bargaining table and make

38 Bercovitch and Diehl, 299.
negotiating positions more reasonable”. 40 In this vein, Beth Simmons finds that “the prospects of enforcement reduce the willingness to flout an arbitral decision” in territorial disputes. 41 Thus, often it not only the enforcement mechanism that can change the cost benefit analysis for state leaders, but also just the threat of such enforcement.

There are many views of the efficacy of economic sanctions in the international relations literature. Lisa Martin finds that sanctions, when organized through international organizations rather than by individual states, are more effective. 42 Kaempfer and Lowenberg agree in their reply to the critiques of economic sanctions by stating that even if sanctions fail to create economic hardship in the country at which they are directed, they may still serve a purpose by their ability to “communicate signals or threats, not necessarily entailing severe economic damage, which in turn produce policy change”. 43 On the other hand, Robert Pape finds that economic sanctions are effective less than 5 percent of the time. 44 Allen attempts to explain the varying success record of economic sanctions by observing that “the decision to concede to sanctions pressure is dependent on the internal political dynamics in the target country”. 45 In this vein, she argues that sanctions are more effective against democracies due to their larger winning coalitions. 46 This is due to the fact that “with limited resources, both rewards and policy outcomes are compromised. In the face of sanctions pressure, democracies are forced to either

46 Ibid, 123.
concede quickly or to sacrifice some portion of the rewards available to the winning coalition”.\textsuperscript{47}

Thus, we can see that domestic politics plays a role in the effectiveness of this enforcement mechanism.

International organizations also have powers that affect not just decision makers, but also domestic audiences. Barnett and Finnemore argue that one of the strengths of international organizations, ignored by neo-liberal institutionalists, is that “They also create actors, specify responsibilities and authority among them, and define the work these actors should do, giving it meaning and normative value. Even when they lack material resources, IOs exercise power as they constitute and construct the social world”.\textsuperscript{48} The roles that states can play in the formation and perpetuation of normative values is also stressed.\textsuperscript{49} They argue that many international organizations attempt to influence state behavior through norm generation.\textsuperscript{50} Thus, the powers of international organizations go far beyond the simple idea of enforcement into playing a part in constructing the very rules of the game in the global realm. This power of international organizations to create norms is not to be underestimated, particularly in terms of the effects on domestic audiences. For example, if the United Nations deems a conflict genocide, this carries a great deal of power as the UN has defined the term and developed such a deep set international norm in favor of intervention in genocides that it elicits immediate reactions from domestic publics.

The efficacy of global organizations may differ, however, from regional organizations. Michael Barnett argues that there are four key features of regional organizations that make them advantageous in conflict management—shared interests, collective identity, norm agreement and a

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid, 123-124.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, 713.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, 713.
hegemon. However, regional organizations are more likely to be involved at “the earliest stage of the peace operations process” rather than peace-keeping. Thus, there may be some differences between global and regional organizations in overall effectiveness and the timing of their involvement in crisis resolution. In terms of information transmission by international organizations, the increased levels of shared interests between states and norm agreement may make informing the domestic audience easier in regional organizations, thus it will be necessary to test both.

My argument acknowledges the role that global and regional organizations play in influencing public opinion and also in the use of enforcement mechanisms. These additional roles of organizations are factors that must be tested or controlled for in order to run any significant empirical test on the data. It is also theoretically important to see the impact of public opinion on states and on the ability of organizations to influence domestic opinion effectively in addition its effects on the leadership.

Public Opinion

My argument will state the international organizations have the ability to affect domestic publics- to change domestic public opinion to favor crisis resolution. In order for this to have an effect, public opinion must affect policy makers. Thus, to what extent can the domestic public influence the decisions make by key decision makers within a country? Fearon argues that “domestic political structure may powerfully influence a state's ability to signal its intentions and

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52 Ibid, 423.
to make credible commitments regarding foreign policy".\textsuperscript{53} Eyerman and Hart find evidence that Fearon's conclusions are correct.\textsuperscript{54} Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, et al find that “Because leaders in states with large winning coalitions cannot easily compensate for policy failure by doling out private goods, they need to succeed in foreign and domestic policy. Leaders in systems with small winning coalitions can more readily compensate for policy failure by providing private benefits to their few key backers".\textsuperscript{55} Thus, in democracies where there are larger winning coalitions, leaders will have to be more wary of going against the wishes of the public in terms of policy making. These authors show the importance of public opinion in affecting the political decisions of leaders. Additionally, they point out key differences that occur within democracies and autocracies in this area which means that regime type may affect any mechanism which relies on the domestic public influencing decisions makers within a state.

If public opinion can have an effect, what factors are actually influencing decision makers? Trumbore, in his analysis of the Anglo-Irish peace process, argues that “in determining the role that public opinion plays in international negotiation, three factors are of central importance: (1) the preferences of the public relative to those of decision makers and other domestic constituents; (2) the intensity of the issue under negotiation; and (3) the power of the public to ratify a potential agreement".\textsuperscript{56} The power of the public to ratify can be either a direct vote or the indirect power that the public has to express its opinion to leaders through elections.\textsuperscript{57} Thus, the public does play a strong role in effecting the decision making calculus of its leaders.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, 550.
Dai makes an additional argument in stating that one method by which international organizations enforce agreements is to motivate the “political leverage” that the country’s population has. She further argues that international organizations can play a role in this process in that international organizations can enforce agreements because they can “employ victims of noncompliance and empower domestic pro-compliance constituencies to monitor and enforce national compliance”. This happens because “international institutions can influence states’ compliance mechanisms through two specific channels: [1] strengthening the political leverage and [2] improving the informational status of pro-compliance constituencies”. Thus, organizations can directly help people within a country to influence their government in favor of a certain political outcome.

Public opinion has a powerful effect on the foreign policy decisions of states. This effect is even more profound in democracies which have a larger winning coalition than autocracies. We can apply the theories postulated by Fearon, Trumbore, and Dai to crisis mediation by international organizations by looking at its effect on effectiveness with regime type as an intervening variable.

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59 Ibid, 3.
60 Ibid, 106.
Chapter 3

Theory

As a review of the literature has shown, the study of international organizations and conflict resolution tends to focus on the level of the state. International organizations can “directly monitor state behavior, producing credible neutral information necessary for effective enforcement”.61 In addition, international organizations have other potential enforcement mechanisms at their disposal including denying states the benefits of the organization and using their informational advantage to report on the status of states in a conflict.62 Additionally, it has been argued by Hafner-Burton and Montgomery that “interstate military aggression is not simply a result of bargaining failure but is suppressed or encouraged by the relative positions states occupy in the larger network of IGOs, which promote common beliefs and alter the distribution of social power”.63 Their basic argument is that

“States, like individuals, form networks of relational ties in this system through common affiliations. These networks, whether composed of individuals or states, influence the behaviors of their members by endowing some with greater social power and by shaping common beliefs about behavior. These, in turn, make certain strategies of action more rational than others.”64

This is in addition to the methods of sanction and enforcement previously discussed.

These mechanisms may work to prevent nations from risking enforcement once international organizations get involved in a crisis. However, as well as being viewed as a top-down approach, they can additionally be seen as tools that change the domestic context within which political leaders act in a state. Not only can the threat or use of sanctions affect the direct

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62 Ibid, 27.
64 Ibid, 8.
cost-benefit analysis of the major political actors of a state, they can affect the view that
domestic constituents or groups within the constituency have of a conflict. This in turn can
factors into a leader’s decision making calculus.

The argument I propose is largely centered on the idea that the domestic population has a
major stake in the outcome of any conflict as war is very costly. I am focusing my research on
the period in which a crisis has been initiated but violence has yet to escalate. My theory predicts
that global and regional organizations can positively impact the prospects for crisis resolution.
There are two pathways by which global and regional organizations are able to exert independent
effects on the ability of states in a dispute to resolve the crisis before it escalates to violence. One
pathway affects domestic elites and the second effects the domestic population at large through
which decision makers will be affected. These pathways can be used in isolation or can function
together. Findings that support the theory that I have presented would cast doubt on those
theories that question the efficacy of international and regional organizations.

This role that international organizations play in affecting political decisions at an
individual level is understudied. Femke van Esch states that “Most theories on international
relations and many theories on domestic politics either assume the content of states’ preferences,
or they assume that states simply know what they prefer”. Verbeek and van Ufford echo this
opinion when they argue that too much focus is given to those in power and not enough to other
political forces at work in the domestic arena. W. Andy Knight argues in reference to a
rethinking of state-society relations that “the concept of governance is broadening to the point

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where states and inter-state institutions now have no other choice but to share in the process of governing with non-state actors, including forces within civil society”. He also argues that “Profound domestic political or social cleavages also play a role in cases in which various subgroups within the society have exerted greater influence on the state’s multilateral policy, depending on the way in which domestic political arrangements have been constructed”. Thus, my theory is based in two ways in which international organizations can effect key groups in the domestic realm and thus influence the decisions that a state makes.

The first pathway by which international and regional organizations affect conflict resolution is through the elites of a state. This mechanism is well established in the international organizations literature. International or regional organizations can enforce the rules and agreements of the organization. While Simmons’ discusses this idea in relation to territorial disputes, this logic can be expanded to include disputes in other issue areas. Thus, if an international organization intervenes in a conflict and issues a decision favoring one party over another, this should lead elites to be less willing to continue the conflict. In addition to issuances of decisions, elites will be affected by other tools of international organizations such as sanctions and information provision that will influence the cost-benefit analysis of leaders.

This causal mechanism has been disputed in terms of its effectiveness, however. There are critiques of the ability of organizations to provide effective enforcement. As Boutros-Ghali points out, any type of preventative action undertaken by the United Nations is limited in that the member states involved in the situation must agree, there may be no available solution or no

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Ibid, 40.

solution that can be agreed to, and the members of the UN must agree to devote resources to the situation.\textsuperscript{70}

The second way by which international and regional organizations affect conflict resolution is by effects on the domestic audience of a country. Alexander Thompson argues that institutions can be quite good at channeling information to domestic publics and he also focuses on effects on both the elites and domestic audience.\textsuperscript{71} However, Thompson’s focus is on the ability of states to use organizations in order to convince other countries to give international support to their coercive policies.\textsuperscript{72} My focus is not on garnering international support but rather on convincing the states involved in the conflict to de-escalate a crisis. Thus, the audience for information transmission should not be foreign publics but rather key constituencies within states involved in the crisis. Xinyuan Dai, much in this vein, argues that “national compliance reflects the political leverage and monitoring ability of domestic constituencies” which can be spurred by international organizations.\textsuperscript{73}

Dai argues that use of domestic audiences is an efficient way for international institutions to get states who have signed on to an agreement to comply with that agreement even if the institutions are otherwise weak.\textsuperscript{74} Thus, these domestic mechanisms can provide an alternate route by which international organizations can affect the decision making calculus of governments. International organizations can be a source of information to groups who already have a stake in the issue.\textsuperscript{75} In the case of conflicts, those groups that are already in favor of mediation by the international organization or conflict resolution can use the information

\textsuperscript{72} Thompson, 3.
\textsuperscript{73} Dai, Xinyuan. 2007. International Institutions and National Policies. New York: Cambridge University Press, 3
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid, 106.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid, 106.
provided by the more neutral international organizations to mobilize other sectors of the domestic public. This is especially potent given the advantage that international organizations have in information collection. In addition, given that international organizations have the ability to constitute norms of state behavior, arbitral decisions or mediation proposals by an international organization can change the view of domestic constituencies concerning the legitimacy of the actions of the state.

Dai’s central question to which she applies her theory is the question of compliance with international agreements.\(^{76}\) I am applying Dai’s theory to the question of conflict resolution by international organizations. I argue that just as domestic actors have a stake in the outcome of international agreements, so do they have a stake in the outcome of a conflict. International organizations can then exert their ability to transfer information and to create norms to influence public opinion. The question is whether or not these same mechanisms will function during a crisis situation in which, for leaders, the concerns of national security and maintaining political power are at the forefront. I will argue that the same casual mechanisms still apply in situations in which international organizations are facilitating crisis resolution.

Unlike Dai’s theory, I argue that the effect of the second pathway will be transmitted differently based on the regime type of the government. We can infer this from the findings of James Fearon. Fearon argues that democracies are more responsive to their publics due to the fact that democracies have less autonomy in decision making as their elites are elected and thus democratic leader may be punished through elections because of their foreign affairs decisions.\(^{77}\)

Thus, international organizations positively affect the prospects for successful resolution of a crisis between two states before the crisis turns into a militarized dispute. The two pathways

\(^{76}\) Ibid, 1-12.

\(^{77}\) Fearon, 581-582
through which international and regional organizations mediate these crises are independent of each other. They can work in tandem or only one can be present and still affect the outcome of crises. While international organizations and regime type are certainly not the only factors that influence crisis resolution, they are factors that require additional theoretical refining and empirical testing.
Chapter 4

Hypotheses

There is no data available to fully test my argument but there are four hypotheses that if shown to be supported by the data, will give an indication that my argument is plausible. I additionally propose two hypotheses that would more fully test my causal mechanism. At this time there is no adequate data to test these hypotheses however one extension of this project would be to compile the appropriate data and run an empirical analysis on these propositions.

The first hypothesis that I propose is that crises in which global and regional organizations intervene will be more likely to end in crisis resolution. If my theory is correct, then crises in which global or regional organizations intervene should be more likely to end in crisis resolution due to additional pressure placed on elites and/or domestic audiences. If my theory is incorrect, then there would be little or no difference between the cases. Thus, the null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the probability of conflict resolution between crises with and without global and regional organizations.

\[ H_1: \text{Crises in which global and regional organizations intervene are less likely to escalate to violence.} \]

An alternative way to test the first hypothesis is to argue that if mediation by international and regional organizations is more likely to end in crisis resolution, then the actors involved in the crisis are more likely to use nonviolent methods of intervention. The theory argues that international organizations have the ability to influence public opinion to favor crisis resolution within countries that are in crises that have yet to escalate to war. If this is correct, we should see states involved in crises in which international organizations are intervening attempting non-violent methods of crisis resolution. Thus, when looking at the range of possible mediation
methods, my theory predicts that international and regional organizations should use negotiation
and arbitration to a greater extent than other mediators such as states and individuals.

\[ H_2: \text{In conflicts in which international organizations intervene, states will be less likely to use violence as the primary crisis management technique.} \]

The third hypothesis is that the intervention of international organizations will increase public opinion against conflict escalation. Xinyuan Dai provides the theoretical grounding for such an assertion. She argues that one method by which international organizations enforce agreements is to motivate the “political leverage” that the country’s population has.\(^78\) She further argues that international organizations can enforce agreements because they can “employ victims of noncompliance and empower domestic pro-compliance constituencies to monitor and enforce national compliance”.\(^79\) Dai argues that use of domestic audiences is an efficient way for international institutions to get states to comply with agreements even if the institutions are otherwise weak.\(^80\) Dai’s work is theoretically interesting and plausible. My research design includes Dai’s causal mechanism as one of two ways in which international and regional organizations can mediate crises in addition to her arguments concerning compliance. In addition, it will be an empirical test of her mechanism using International Crisis Behavior database data rather than the game-theoretic model that she employs with the addition of regime type as an intervening variable.

The mobilization of these constituencies would result in a rise in public opinion in favor of conflict resolution and international organization mediation. Thus, the null hypothesis is that change in public opinion will have no effect on conflict escalation.

\(^{78}\) Dai, 3.
\(^{79}\) Ibid, 3.
\(^{80}\) Ibid, 106.
$H_3$: *If public opinion on international organization crisis intervention is favorable, then states are less likely to escalate the conflict.*

Fearon argues that democracies are more responsive to their publics due to the fact that democracies have less elite control of decision making as their officials are elected.\(^{81}\) If international organizations have the ability to function through domestic audiences, then the relative political power of those audiences is important to the process of crisis mediation. Fearon argues that in democratic nation’s leaders make decisions on behalf of the people; audience costs are greater because their electoral future may be jeopardized.\(^{82}\) Dai recognizes that accountability of governments to domestic groups “goes well beyond electoral accountability” however.\(^{83}\) Thus, even in states with systems without democratic electoral systems, the domestic public can still influence governmental decision making.\(^{84}\) However, Fearon’s work indicated that the effect would be larger in democracies.\(^{85}\) Thus, regime type will also be a variable in this analysis and I will be applying these findings to crisis resolution research. The fourth hypothesis is then that international organizations will have more success in intervening in a crisis in democracies rather than autocracies and mixed regimes. Regardless of whether the second hypothesis holds true, mobilizations of domestic groups, even if overall public opinion does not rise, will have more effect on the decision making calculus of democracies given their increased responsiveness. If regime type has no effect, then this means that that it does not function as an intervening variable between international organizations and conflict resolution. Thus, the null hypothesis is that there is no statistical difference between the autocracies and democracies in the ability of international and regional organizations to affect crisis resolution.

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\(^{81}\) Fearon, 581.
\(^{82}\) Ibid, 581-582
\(^{83}\) Dai, 72
\(^{84}\) Ibid, 72-73.
\(^{85}\) Fearon, 581-582.
$H_4$: **International organizations will be more successful in conflict de-escalation in democracies rather than non-democracies.**

My theory proposes that the international organizations have unique traits that allow for influencing public opinion within a state in favor of crisis resolution. If this is correct, we will see this change in public opinion occur with more frequency with international organization intervention as opposed to any other third party arbiter. To test this would require detailed public opinion data in each country. Such data is currently lacking but would be part of an extension of this line of research.

$H_5$: **International organizations will more successful at influencing public opinion in favor of conflict resolution than other third party arbiters.**

My theory states that in crises that have a potential to escalate to violence, international and regional organizations can influence domestic opinion on crisis resolution. This is in line with Dai’s theory that organizations can influence domestic opinion on international agreement enforcement. If this theory is correct, we would expect to see mobilization by the domestic population in terms of grassroots efforts in support of crisis resolution. However, this effect will only be seen after the introduction of an international or regional organization into the crisis. There is no dataset currently on grassroots efforts in favor of crisis resolution. To test such a proposition would require such a dataset as well as the exact dates of international or regional organization entrance into a conflict. Thus, this is a hypothesis that is best tested with original data as part of a larger dissertation project.

$H_6$: **There will be increased mobilization of domestic grassroots efforts in favor of crisis resolution after the international organization has become involved in the crisis.**
Chapter 5

Methodology

I will test my argument utilizing the International Crisis Behavior dataset. One of the key differences between the International Crisis Behavior dataset and the Militarized International Disputes dataset is that in the ICB dataset “international crises can evolve from actions other than the threat or use of military force”. This is important to my research as I am dealing with conflict resolution. The cases that will support my theory are cases in which a crisis did not escalate into war, thus the ICB dataset would be more applicable than a dataset that relies on purely military considerations to determine a crisis. The temporal parameter of my study is 1918-2006. The reason behind this temporal parameter is that the data for my study can be found for these years. The ICB data set covers 994 actors in crises spanning the years 1918-2006. In order to give a better understanding of the types of cases that are examined the dataset, I will present two brief examples.

Essequibo Crisis

One example of a crisis resolved before escalation to violence involved the crisis that occurred between Venezuela and Guyana in 1981. It involved a two year territorial dispute between the two countries over land that had been previously disputed. Guyana had plans for a hydroelectric project within the contested Essequibo territory which Venezuela publicly opposed. The crisis escalated into a so-called “war of words” between the two nations until

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89 “Crisis Summary: Essequibo II”.

August of 1981 when Venezuela began to worry that Cuban troops might be sent to Guyana to support the country.\(^90\)

Venezuela began to enter Guyana’s airspace and to move both naval and army troops closer to the disputed territory while Guyana responded with the mobilization of its own troops.\(^91\)

The crisis continued into 1982 with both states continuing to assert their claims to the territory.\(^92\)

The two nations repeatedly went to the General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations to plead their respective cases.\(^93\)

In March of 1983, Guyana and Venezuela agreed to United Nations mediation of the crisis despite personal tensions between Guyana’s President Burnham and then-UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar.\(^94\)

While the negotiations were lengthy, as one would expect given the historical tensions between the two nations, the threat of military action dissipated between the two nations and UN mediation continued intermittently until 1999.

Cyprus-Turkey Missile Crisis

In 1997 Cyprus purchased surface to air missiles and by 1998 had completed a military airfield which would be protected by them.\(^95\) Turkey was especially concerned at this development as the airfield was part of “the development of a Greek/ Greek Cypriot Joint Defense Doctrine” while Cyprus claimed that it was merely for defense.\(^96\)

This lead to a crisis between Cyprus and Turkey for roughly eleven months that year as Turkey felt its airspace to be

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\(^90\) “Crisis Summary: Essequibo II”.
\(^92\) “Crisis Summary: Essequibo II”.
\(^93\) Braveboy-Wagner, Jacqueline, 234-239.
\(^94\) “Crisis Summary: Essequibo II”.
\(^95\) “Crisis Summary: Cyprus-Turkey Missile Crisis”. ICB Data Viewer. 1/5/2004 <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer/>
threatened and responded by threatening force against Cyprus.\textsuperscript{97} Dan Lindley perhaps best describes the situation in terms of an arms race- the missiles can help protect Cyprus in a conflict which means a decrease in Turkey’s relative security and, since both countries know this, it increases tensions between them.\textsuperscript{98}

The background to this crisis must be understood in terms of the European Union. Historically, the EU has tried not to involve itself in the question of Cyprus, particularly in regards to joining the organization, until consideration of Cyprus meant that Greece would not veto the proposed customs union with Turkey.\textsuperscript{99} Both Cyprus and Turkey had applied for accession to the EU but, at this point, it was known that Turkey would not be accepted with the next wave of entrants while Cyprus was a serious contender.\textsuperscript{100} Importantly, “the EU had not refrained from remarking that Turkey needed to show more flexibility in its role in the Cyprus dispute and to take steps to improve relations with Greece in the Aegean”.\textsuperscript{101} It was not only on Turkey that the EU applied pressure. The EU had yet to officially list Cyprus as on the list for the next round of EU accession negotiations stated their reservations on inviting a “divided state to join the EU”.\textsuperscript{102} This norm of resolving conflicts before EU accession convinced the Greek Cypriots that their government should participate in United Nations-lead negotiations to resolve the crisis.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{97} “Crisis Summary: Cyprus-Turkey Missile Crisis”.
\textsuperscript{100} Dodd, 143-144.
\textsuperscript{101} Dodd, 144.
\textsuperscript{103} Baier-Allen, Susanne, 186-187.
Dependent Variables

The dependent variable of my first hypothesis is conflict resolution which can be indicated by the level of violence reached in the conflict. I classify conflict resolution as the resolution of a crisis without resorting to violence. To operationalize this concept, I will utilize the ICB database. The ICB variable “violence” is operationalized as “the extent of violence in an international crisis as a whole, regardless of its use or non-use by a specific actor as a crisis management technique”.104 The variable has a four category scale: “no violence”, “minor clashes”, “serious clashes”, and “full-scale war”.105 This dependent variable will be used in the models for both global organization involvement and regional organization involvement in a crisis.

The dependent variable for the second hypothesis is the primary crisis technique used by the states involved in the crisis. The ICB dataset is used to measure this variable. The dataset utilizes the variable “crisis management II: principle technique” which has an eight category measure.106 This variable differentiates between: “negotiation”, “adjudication and arbitration”, “mediation”, “multiple not including violence”, “non-military pressure”, “non-violent military”, and “violence”.107 In order to make comparison easier in a regression using categorical variables I will combine the categories of negotiation, adjudication and arbitration, mediation, and multiple not including violence. I will combine these four into a larger category of non-military techniques. On a theoretical level, there is no compelling reason to keep these categories separate and thus such separation is an enhancement of my analysis. Thus, this variable will be used as a

104 Ibid, 43.
four category measure: non-military techniques, non-military pressure, non-violent military, and violence.

The dependent variable of the third hypothesis from my theory is crisis escalation. I will operationalize this concept using the “violence” variable in the ICB dataset. The variable “violence” has a four category scale: “no violence”, “minor clashes”, “serious clashes”, and “full-scale war”.108

The dependent variable of the fourth hypothesis is the effectiveness of international organizations in intervening in a crisis. The ICB dataset has a seven category measure that I will utilize to measure this concept.109 The variable “effectiveness of global organization involvement” has the following coding options: “GO not in existence”, “No global organization activity”, “Global organization involvement escalated crisis”, “Global organization involvement did not contribute to crisis abatement”, “Global organization involvement contributed marginally to crisis abatement”, “Global organization involvement had an important impact on crisis abatement”, and “Global organization involvement was the single most important contributor to crisis abatement”.110 I collapsed this measure into a four category measure. The first category is if a global organization did not exist or if it was not active in the crisis. The second category is if the global organization escalated the crisis. The third category is if the global organization did not contribute or contributed only marginally to crisis abatement. The final category includes those cases in which the organization had an important impact or was the most important factor is crisis abatement.

Independent Variables

109 Ibid, 35.
110 Ibid, 35.
The independent variable of the first hypothesis and the second hypothesis from my theory is international and regional organization involvement in attempting to facilitate conflict resolution in a crisis. The ICB measures the “content of global organization involvement” which I will use to determine organization presence in a crisis.\(^\text{111}\) The dataset has a similar measure for regional organizations labeled as “Content of regional/security organization involvement”.\(^\text{112}\) I collapsed this variable into a dummy variable to simply state whether or not a global and regional organization was involved in the crisis.

The independent variable for the third hypothesis is a positive change in public opinion in support of international/regional organization involvement in a crisis. To truly test this, one would need public opinion polling data on public opinion within each country for each crisis in which an international or regional organization has intervened. Since this information is not available, I will use proxy measures that are available to test this concept. First, I will use the variable “Attitude to Global Organization Involvement” which examines the attitude that each actor in the crisis had to a global organization’s involvement in that crisis.\(^\text{113}\) According to Van Esch, “The national preference can, therefore, not be assigned to an institution: it is the outcome of a domestic process, of a political struggle between domestic state institutions (such as ministers, political parties, and departments), and societal actors (such as interest groups, individuals and corporations)”.\(^\text{114}\) The variable is coded as seven categories which include: “Global organization not in existence”, “Global organization activity viewed favorably”, “Global organization activity viewed as neutral or irrelevant”, “Global organization activity viewed unfavorably”, “Global organization inactivity viewed favorably”, “Global organization inactivity viewed favorably”, “Global organization inactivity viewed favorably”, “Global organization inactivity viewed favorably”.\(^\text{114}\)

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\(^{111}\)Ibid, 33-34.
\(^{112}\)Ibid, 40-41.
\(^{113}\)“Codebook for ICB2- International Crisis Behavior Project”, 29-30.
\(^{114}\)Van Esch, 111.
viewed as neutral or irrelevant”, and “global organization inactivity viewed unfavorably”.\textsuperscript{115} I dropped the cases for “Global organization not in existence” as my theory regarding the effects of public opinion support for organization on the level of violence is not valid when organizations did not exist. I further collapsed this measure into four categories. The first category is global organization activity is viewed favorably while in the second category it is viewed as neutral or unfavorable. The third category consists of cases in which global organization inactivity is viewed favorably while in the fourth category it is viewed as neutral or unfavorable.

The independent variable in the fourth hypothesis is regime type. I will distinguish between various regime types by using the ICB dataset. It uses a five categorical measure to differentiate between “democratic regime”, “civil-authoritarian regime”, “military-direct rule”, “military- indirect rule”, and “military dual authority”.\textsuperscript{116} I have collapsed this measure into a dummy variable with democratic regimes in the first category and all other regime types in the second. My theory predicts that because of the public opinion mechanism laid out, regime type will play a role as the ability of the domestic audience to influence the decision making elites should be easier in democracies through electoral mechanisms.

\textit{Control Variables}

There are three variables that I used as control variables in my multinomial logistic models to test hypotheses one and two. These control variables account for some forces in the system level that my theory would recognize as influential. The first is “breakpoint to a crisis” which the ICB describes as “that event, act or situational change which catalyzes a crisis

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Codebook for ICB2- International Crisis Behavior Project”, 30-31.

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Codebook for ICB2- International Crisis Behavior Project”, 48.}
for the earliest actor, that is, which leads decision makers to perceive a threat to basic values, time pressure for response and heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities”. 117  

According to Klieboer, “Mediation research focus on three characteristics of the dispute held to affect mediation outcomes: (a) conflict ripeness, (b) the level of conflict intensity, and (c) the nature of the issue(s) in conflict”. 118 Wall and Lynn state that in mediation those conflicts very high intensity are unlikely to call for mediation they “prefer confrontation (or even war) to mediation. Or because of their hostile orientation, they do not recognize the mediation option” until the situation becomes a stalemate. 119 It has the following coding options: “verbal act”, “political act”, “economic act”, “external change”, “other non-violent act”, “internal verbal or physical challenge to regime or elite”, “non-violent military act”, “indirect violent act”, and “violent act”. 120 This variable is collapsed into a dummy variable to differentiate between low and high intensity breakpoint acts. The options “verbal act”, “political act”, “economic act”, “external change”, “other non-violent act” are coded as 0 and the “internal verbal or physical challenge to regime or elite”, “non-violent military act”, “indirect violent act”, and “violent act” are coded as 1.

The second variable is “gravity of value threat” which “identifies the most salient object of threat identified by any of the actors in the crisis”. 121 It is coded with the following categories: “economic threat”, “limited military damage”, “political threat”, “territorial threat”, “threat to influence”, “threat of grave damage”, “threat to existence” and “other”. 122 I coded the variable into a dummy variable to differentiate between low and high value threats. The categories

117 “Codebook for ICB1 - International Crisis Behavior Project”, 12.
119 Wall and Lynn, 164.
121 Ibid, 15.
122 Ibid, 15.
“economic threat”, “limited military damage”, “political threat”, and “threat to influence” are coded as 0 to show lower value threats. The categories “territorial threat”, “threat of grave damage”, “threat to existence” and “other” were coded as 1 to signify high value threats. Mitchell and Prins state that the issue at stake in a conflict does matter and that historically territorial dispute has been the most prominent cause of disputes.123

The third variable is “geostrategic salience” which “refers to the significance of the location of an international crisis in terms of its natural resources, distance from power centers, etc., measured by the level and number of international systems that are affected by a crisis”.124 Geostrategic salience attempts to control for the fact that international and regional organizations may self-select themselves into crises that have a bigger impact on the international system, which are crises that have the potential to be more difficult to find resolution to. Paul Diehl states that “the closer the location to a state, the more important that issue will be to the state. Events nearby have a greater psychological and direct impact on states than those that take place on the other side of the globe “.125 The variable is coded as “one subsystem”, “more than one subsystem”, “dominant system and one subsystem”, “Dominant system and more than one subsystem”, and “global system”.126 I collapsed this variable onto a dummy variable to reflect higher and lower levels of salience. The category “one subsystem” is coded as 0 while the remaining categories of “more than one subsystem”, “dominant system and one subsystem”, “Dominant system and more than one subsystem”, and “global system” are coded as 1.

124 “Codebook for ICB1- International Crisis Behavior Project”, 47.
126 “Codebook for ICB1- International Crisis Behavior Project”, 47.
My argument, while focusing on the crisis level, does not deny that pressures are exerted in any crisis situation on the systemic level. All three of these variables are factors that have the ability to affect the relationship that international or regional organizations have to a crisis. The number of variables that can affect the ability of states to intervene in a crisis are incredibly large and thus I have limited my control variables to those that the literature indicates are most important in their effects. While this does mean that there is the possibility of omitted variable bias, it is limited in that the major factors have been accounted for by the control variables while keeping the model parsimonious enough to be theoretically viable.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis 1</th>
<th>Hypothesis 2</th>
<th>Hypothesis 3</th>
<th>Hypothesis 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable</strong></td>
<td><strong>Crisis Escalation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Crisis Management Technique</strong></td>
<td><strong>Crisis Escalation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operationalization of Dependent Variable</strong></td>
<td>Violence (4 category scale: No violence, Minor Clashes, Serious Clashes, and Full-scale War)</td>
<td>Primary Crisis Management Technique (4 category scale: non-military techniques, non-military pressure, non-violent military, and violence)</td>
<td>Violence (4 category scale: No violence, Minor Clashes, Serious Clashes, and Full-scale War)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variable</strong></td>
<td>International Organization Involvement and Regional Organization Involvement</td>
<td>International Organization Involvement</td>
<td>Attitude to Global Organization Involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operationalization of Independent Variable</td>
<td>Content of Global Organization Involvement and Content of Regional Organization Involvement (Dummy Variables)</td>
<td>Content of Global Organization Involvement (Dummy Variable)</td>
<td>Attitude to Global Organization Involvement (4 category scale: Global organization activity viewed favorably, Global organization activity viewed as neutral, irrelevant, or unfavorable, Global organization inactivity viewed favorably, Global organization inactivity viewed as neutral, irrelevant, or unfavorable).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 6

Results

Using the independent and dependent variables above, I tested my four hypotheses using multinomial logistical models and crosstabs. I am using these particular models since the intervals between the categories I am using are not uniform. Therefore, these models are the most appropriate models to use. To interpret multinomial logits, you compare results to the base category. A one unit increase in the dependent variable results in an $x$ increase in the independent variable compared to the base category. To interpret the odds ratios, or relative risk ratios, of a multinomial logit you compare the results to the base category. Therefore, for a one unit increase in the dependent variable, the odds of observing the outcome are $x$ percent as compared to the base category. Cross tabulations, on the other hand, tell us the number and percentage of cases that fall into each category. These models will work as indicators of the validity of my argument.

Table 2 shows the result of the test of my first hypothesis that crises in which global organizations arbitrate will be less likely to experience conflict escalation. I will be testing this hypothesis using a multinomial logistic regression and the odds ratios for that regression. I expect to see that increased global organization involvement leads to less violence in crises. Thus, compared the base category of no violence, I should see odds ratios of less than one.
Figure 1: Multinomial Logistic Regression of the Effect of Global Organization Involvement on Level of Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No violence (base outcome)</th>
<th>Minor Clashes</th>
<th>Serious Clashes</th>
<th>War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Organization Involvement</td>
<td>2.135383 (0.006)*</td>
<td>2.204122 (0.007)*</td>
<td>2.62598 (0.002)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakpoint (trigger) to international crisis</td>
<td>4.773965 (0.000)*</td>
<td>9.223465 (0.000)*</td>
<td>8.361537 (0.000)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gravity of Value Threat</td>
<td>1.094982 (0.745)</td>
<td>2.669247 (0.001)*</td>
<td>5.137087 (0.000)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geostrategic Salience</td>
<td>.6212571 (0.111)</td>
<td>.8991904 (0.733)</td>
<td>3.004585 (0.000)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results presented are odds ratios. * Indicates that the p-value is significant.

In the preceding multinomial logit, we can see that the presence of a global organization was significant at each level of violence compared to the base category of no violence. Inconsistent with my first hypothesis, these results had positive coefficients of global organization involvement which indicates that as global organizations intervene, there are more minor clashes, serious clashes, and war as compared to the category of no violence. The odds ratios indicate that as global organizations intervene, the odds of violence occurring increase compare to the base category of no violence. The odds are multiplied by 2.13 for minor clashes, by 2.2 for serious clashes, and by 2.6 for war as compared to the base category of no violence. While these results run contrary to my hypothesis, there are two potential explanations for these results. The first is that global organizations are inefficient at conflict management. The second
could be that global organizations are likely to intervene in crises that are more likely to become violent as a crisis that has no potential towards violence is unlikely to need the help of an organization to negotiate. Minor crises may be easier to resolve, and thus not require outside help, versus crises that threaten integral issue areas or the survival of a state. Ernest Hass found in his study that “disputes referred to the United Nations were more threatening than the nonreferred disputes in terms of intensity and amount of fighting”. 127 Another facet is that, as Suzanne Werner points out, in situations in which attackers know there will be a third party defender they are less likely to move to attack if they feel that the third-party can effectively intervene and they may moderate their level of violence to prevent intervention. 128 Thus, it is possible that escalation to violence may occur between states within those organizations less able to tackle the problem.

Table 3 will test the second part of the first hypothesis. It argues that crises in which regional organizations arbitrate will be less likely to experience conflict escalation. As with the model on global organizations, I will be testing this hypothesis using a multinomial logistic regression and the odds ratios for that regression. I expect to see that increased regional organization involvement leads to less violence in crises. Thus, I would expect to odds ratios less than one.

Figure 2: Multinomial Logistic Regression of the Effect of the Presence of a Regional Organization on Levels of Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>no violence (base outcome)</th>
<th>Minor Clashes</th>
<th>Serious Clashes</th>
<th>war</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Organization Involvement</strong></td>
<td>1.596094 (0.101)</td>
<td>1.86071 (0.041)*</td>
<td>2.099843 (0.021)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Breakpoint (trigger) to international crisis</strong></td>
<td>4.437381 (0.000)*</td>
<td>8.526062 (0.000)*</td>
<td>7.743739 (0.000)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gravity of Value Threat</strong></td>
<td>1.133781 (0.655)</td>
<td>2.810689 (0.001)*</td>
<td>5.434537 (0.000)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geostrategic Salience</strong></td>
<td>.6210171 (0.108)</td>
<td>.9055302 (0.748)</td>
<td>3.043415 (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results presented are odds ratios. * Indicates that the p-value is significant.

In the multinomial analysis of the effect of regional organization involvement in a crisis on violence levels, we see that the results are significant at the .05 level for the categories of serious clashes and war. Similarly to the multinomial logit performed for global organization involvement, the two categories exhibited positive coefficients which indicate that the involvement of a regional organization in a crisis is associated with increased serious clashes and war. The log odds indicate that the odds of other outcomes occurring compared to no violence is multiplied by 1.8 for serious clashes and by 2 for war. These results run counter to my hypotheses for the same reasons explicated for global organizations.

Table 4 shows the results of the multinomial logit run to test hypothesis two. Hypothesis two states that crises in which international organizations mediate will be less likely to use violent crisis management techniques. I expect to see that organization presence leads to lower
incidences of military and violent crisis management techniques. Thus, I would expect odds ratios of less than one.

Figure 3: Multinomial Logistic Regression of the Effect of the Mediator on Mediation Techniques used in a Crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Violent Techniques (Negotiation, Arbitration/Adjudication, Mediation, and Non-Military Pressure) (Base Outcome)</th>
<th>Non-Violent Military Techniques</th>
<th>Multiple Techniques Including Violence</th>
<th>Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization Presence</td>
<td>.8984825 (0.742)</td>
<td>1.891723 (0.012)*</td>
<td>1.433267 (0.200)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakpoint (trigger) to international crisis</td>
<td>1.868112 (0.065)</td>
<td>4.462435 (0.000)*</td>
<td>6.845028 (0.000)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gravity of Value Threat</td>
<td>.8873221 (0.716)</td>
<td>1.982729 (0.008)*</td>
<td>2.58594 (0.001)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geostrategic Salience</td>
<td>2.61887 (0.005)*</td>
<td>1.357227 (0.288)</td>
<td>3.618889 (0.000)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results presented are odds ratios. * Indicates that the p-value is significant.

If my theory was correct, then the mediator should affect the type of mediation techniques utilized. For example, my theory would argue that in crises in which global organizations and regional organizations are involves, states are less likely to have the primary crisis management technique be violence. The regression of these shows that the category of incidences of non-violent military techniques decreases with international organizations involvement however the result is not statistically significant. The variable is significant in comparison to the base category of no violence for multiple techniques including violence
however the coefficient indicates that international organization presence increase use of those techniques which is confirmed by the odds ratios.

Table 5 shows the cross tabulation of opinion levels on violence. This is to give an indication of the validity of my third hypothesis. My third hypothesis states that if public opinion on international organization crisis mediation is favorable, then states are less likely to escalate the conflict. Thus, we should see that in cases where opinion towards organizations is favorable, there are a large number of cases in which non-violent methods are used.

The results from the cross-tabulation of the relationship between the view of the states towards international organization involvement in a crisis and the level of violence are statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. The data has a Pearson’s chi $^2$ of 27.8 with 9 degrees of freedom which confirms that we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the variables. The data shows that in when global organization activity is viewed favorably, 32 percent of cases have no violence, higher than the percentages for minor clashes, serious clashes, and war. This is consistent with my hypothesis. Additionally, when global organization activity was viewed as unfavorable, neutral or irrelevant, we see no larger a percentage of conflicts ending in no war. It is possible that causal mechanism is running the opposite way and that lack of violence is causing the positive public opinion. First, better time series data would help determine if this is the case if this project were to be expanded. Second, the results for global organizations being viewed as unfavorable or irrelevant indicate that whether or not there is violence does not predispose favorable or unfavorable opinion towards organizations. If that were true, we should see a high percentage of cases in which conflicts went to full-scale war and the view of organizations was unfavorable. The data shows however that
roughly the same percentage of cases were viewed unfavorably in the categories of war and no violence.

**Figure 4: Cross-tabulation of the Effect of Public Opinion on Violence Levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Global Organization Activity Viewed Favorably</th>
<th>Global organization activity viewed as Neutral, Irrelevant or Unfavorably</th>
<th>Global organization inactivity viewed favorably</th>
<th>Global organization inactivity viewed as neutral, irrelevant, or unfavorably</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No Violence</strong></td>
<td>89 32%</td>
<td>66 25%</td>
<td>5 23%</td>
<td>169 42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minor Clashes</strong></td>
<td>53 19%</td>
<td>71 27%</td>
<td>6 27%</td>
<td>88 22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Serious Clashes</strong></td>
<td>60 21%</td>
<td>61 23%</td>
<td>6 27%</td>
<td>69 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>War</strong></td>
<td>76 27%</td>
<td>64 24%</td>
<td>5 22%</td>
<td>77 19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>278 100%</td>
<td>262 100%</td>
<td>22 100%</td>
<td>403 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi$^2 = 27.8$ with 9 degrees of freedom

In order to see if, in actuality, international organization intervention works best in states where public opinion is already in favor of such intervention, I ran a multinomial logistic regression. I ran this regression using crisis escalation as the dependent variable as in the previous cross-tabulation. However, I created a variable for the interaction of organization presence and public opinion for the independent variable along with its constituent terms. The results can be seen in Table 6.
Figure 5: Multinomial Logistic Regression of the Effect of the Interaction of
Organization Presence and Public Opinion on Crisis Escalation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Violence</th>
<th>Minor Clashes</th>
<th>Serious Clashes</th>
<th>War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization Presence</td>
<td>.186395 (0.034)*</td>
<td>.1712095 (0.023)*</td>
<td>.7023623 (0.668)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude Towards Global Organization Involvement</td>
<td>.8168575 (0.082)</td>
<td>.7506534 (0.012)*</td>
<td>.8499017 (0.193)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction of Organization Presence and Attitude Toward Global Organization Involvement</td>
<td>1.628052 (0.007)*</td>
<td>1.673799 (0.004)*</td>
<td>1.184274 (0.359)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results presented are odds ratios. * Indicates that the p-value is significant.

The results of this multinomial logistic regression are opposite to that of the preceding cross-tabulation. My results were significant for all categories of violence except for war. The results for the interaction term show that the odds of other outcomes occurring compared to no violence are multiplied by 1.6 for minor clashes and by 1.6 for serious clashes. Thus, the results show that the interaction of public opinion and organization presence does not decrease the chances of violent outcomes.

Table 7 shows the cross tabulation of Global Organization Effectiveness and regime type. This cross tabulation is to examine my fourth hypothesis that international organizations will be better able to facilitate conflict resolution in democracies rather than non-democracies. I would
expect to see more cases in which global organizations contributed to crisis abatement as compared to those that escalated the crisis for democracies.

In analyzing the effects of regime on the effectiveness of global organization involvement, the results show that for democracies rarely did organizations escalate the crisis (2 percent of cases) but they were only an important factor in crisis abatement or the most important factor in crisis abatement in roughly 15 percent of cases. These trends are remarkably similar to those exhibited by non-democratic regimes as well. In addition, there were no statistically significant results in any category. The Pearson’s chi² was 1.937 with 3 degrees of freedom. This confirms the findings of the p-value that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the variables. The lack of significant results for the levels of effectiveness and the similarity in trends shown in the cross tabulation signals that regime type is not a significant factor in this analysis.
Figure 6: Cross-tabulation of Global Organization Effectiveness and Regime Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-democratic regime</th>
<th>Democratic Regime</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Organization Not in Existence or Global Organization Not Involved</td>
<td>253 43%</td>
<td>162 43%</td>
<td>415 43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Organization Involvement Escalated Crisis</td>
<td>12 2%</td>
<td>9 2%</td>
<td>21 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Organization Involvement did not Contribute to Crisis Abatement or Global Organization Involvement Contributed Marginally to Crisis Abatement</td>
<td>250 42%</td>
<td>151 40%</td>
<td>401 41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Organization Involvement Had an Important Impact on Crisis Abatement or was the Single Most Important Contributor to Crisis Abatement</td>
<td>73 12%</td>
<td>58 15%</td>
<td>131 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>588 100%</td>
<td>380 100%</td>
<td>986 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \text{Chi}^2 = 1.937 \text{ with 3 degrees of freedom} \]
Chapter 6

Conclusion

In this paper, I argued that there is a clear relationship between international and regional organizations and crisis resolution. International and regional organizations work through two possible causal pathways to resolve a crisis. The first of these causal pathways affects the elites of the states through the possibility of enforcement. The second causal pathway affects the domestic audience of a country which, depending on regime type, will exert different levels of pressure on decision makers within a country. From this theory I derived four main hypotheses that I expected to be supported by empirical analysis and two hypotheses that I hope to be able to test in the future. The purpose of hypotheses one, two, and four are to see if the overall outcomes that should be the result of these crises are consistent with the outcomes that my theory predicts. Hypothesis three is an attempt to test the causal mechanism of the hypothesis itself. Hypotheses five and six would be the extension of my project to more fully test my causal mechanism. The empirical tests that I currently run can only serve as indicators as to the validity of my argument. To truly test the theory I propose I would need data that currently does not exist in international affairs research. This hole in international relations data availability gives an opportunity for later expansion on this project.

The empirical test of my argument had varied success. The two models for my first hypothesis showed that global and regional organizations were a statistically significant factor in the level of violence in a conflict however the results ran contrary to my hypothesis. The odds ratios of the results were greater than one, indicating that global organization involvement was
actually associated with an increase in violence within a crisis as compared to the base category of no violence. This is likely the result of the fact that international and regional organizations are likely to self-select into more serious conflicts. For example, Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille state that “Protracted and intense international disputes, though they receive far more attempts at mediation than less severe disputes, are not particularly amenable to mediation”.\(^{129}\) If they naturally are involved in more violent conflict than other mediators, then their outcomes will be more prone to violence as well.

The test of my second hypothesis found that while mediation by international and regional organizations did not lead to the use of less violence in any statistically significant category. Thus the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the variables could not be rejected. The cross-tabulation performed for the third hypothesis, on the other hand, showed indications that there may be support for my causal mechanism and thus emphasizes this as an area to expand on in future research. The cross-tabulation showed a statistically significant relationship between the attitude towards international organization involvement and the level of violence in the conflict.

The fourth hypothesis failed to reach the level of significance when tested. Thus, my hypothesis that regime type affects the ability of organizations to effectively mediate a conflict was rejected. This has implications for much of international relations theory since it confirms Dai’s argument that regime type does not matter. Alternatively, this may argue against much of the literature explicating the importance of regime type in transmitting public opinion.

The empirical tests of my hypotheses had mixed results and brought up interesting avenues for future research. The first has to do with the findings of the test of my first

hypothesis. It found that global and regional organizations actually tended to escalate conflicts in which they were involved. It could be either that international organizations are inefficient at conflict management roles described by my theory. Alternatively, it could mean that international organizations self-select themselves into more violent conflicts and thus violence is more likely to be prevalent when they intervene. This deserves more research as the findings that confirm the first possibility would challenge many of the findings of the international organizations literature. On the other hand, if the second possibility is correct, better data would allow for fuller testing of my theory. In this vein, public opinion data from individual countries is needed to test my theory more effectively. The extension of this project would be to code from sources such as newspapers, editorials, and the number and content of protests to code the domestic attitudes towards international organization interventions in each crisis in the ICB dataset. I would also code the number and types of domestic organizations involved in trying to influence the political outcome of the crisis. These measures would give a more exact measure of public opinion to let my third hypothesis be tested more accurately and would allow for testing of my sixth hypothesis. This would truly give us an idea of the efficacy of international organizations and their effects on public opinion.

My research focuses on the issue of preventive diplomacy in international relations research. Specifically, it looks at the ways in which international organizations can affect the domestic population and domestic elites of a country in order to prevent crisis escalation once a crisis has been initiated. However, this is only a small piece of the overall puzzle of crisis resolution. The international system itself may play a part in the effectiveness of crisis resolution. For example, the asymmetries of power between actors or the particular norms of state behavior applicable at that time may play a role. Of course, actors other than international organizations
may intervene in a crisis- other states, non-governmental organizations, and even individuals. Also, the exact mechanisms that international organizations, other states, non-governmental organizations, and even individuals choose to use can play a role. The exact situation of the conflict may make some mechanisms more effective in the conflict resolution process. It does not make sense to apply sanctions, mediation, diplomatic pressure, or any other particular tool for crisis resolution in every circumstance.

These same mechanisms that I have outlined may not work for crises that have already escalated to full war. Once states have begun to accrue massive loses- in terms of human life, money, or materials- the conditions under which peace is trying to be made are vastly different than in conflict prevention. This is why the literature on preventive diplomacy is so important in international relations research- to prevent these kinds of loses whenever possible. However, it is important to recognize that these mechanisms are only a small part of the process.
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