ABSTRACT

LINDSAY ROSS
The Comparative Effects of British and French Colonial Rule on Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Under the Direction of DR. STACEY MITCHELL)

Africa is a unique continent for innumerable reasons, but politically it is exceptional because of its history with colonialism. No other continent on earth has been entirely imperialized as Africa was. European nations such as Great Britain, France, Portugal, Germany, Belgium, Spain, and Italy competed in the 18th century in the "Scramble for Africa" during which they each wanted to control as much African territory as possible. These European nations sought to exploit their territories' resources and to utilize them as secondary markets for their goods. Africa's history of oppression has had detrimental effects on most of its countries as elements of political unrest, disease, climate, geography, and economics have prevented them from political and economic development. Studies of African countries today require understanding of Africa's colonial past as it has had such a pervasive impact on the present and future of the continent as a whole.

This is a study of the effects of British and French colonial rule on democratization in sub-Saharan Africa. Differing colonial goals and policies created a diversity of experiences among the nations ruled by colonialists that have resulted in varied effects in modern-day Africa. In all cases in Africa, colonialism has attributed to the multitude of difficulties that Africans face today in their efforts to democratize and develop economically. The puzzle that inspired this research is: why have former French and former British colonies in Africa had difficulties with democratization?

INDEX WORDS: Colonialism, Democratization, Direct Rule, France, Great Britain, Nigeria, Indirect Rule, Senegal, Elites, Education, Historical Institutionalism, Modernization Theory

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

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because of its history with colonialism. No other continent on earth has been entirely

imperialized as Africa was. European nations such as Great Britain, France, Portugal, Germany,

Belgium, Spain, and Italy competed in the 18th century in the "Scramble for Africa" during

which they each wanted to control as much African territory as possible. These European

nations sought to exploit their territories' resources and to utilize them as secondary markets for

their goods. Africa's history of oppression has had detrimental effects on most of its countries as

elements of political unrest, disease, climate, geography, and economics have prevented them

from political and economic development. Any study of African countries today requires

knowledge and understanding of Africa's colonial past as it has had such a pervasive impact on

the present and future of the continent as a whole.

This is not to say that all African nations shared the same, or even similar, experiences

under colonization. Each of the European imperialists described above had unique goals for its

colonies and thus implemented different types of policies and practices as rulers. These colonial

goals and policies created a diversity of experiences among the nations ruled by colonialists that

have resulted in varied effects in modern-day Africa. In all cases in Africa, colonialism has

attributed to the multitude of difficulties that Africans face today in their efforts to democratize

and develop economically. The puzzle that inspired this research is: why have former French

and former British colonies in Africa had difficulties with democratization?

It is well known that Great Britain and France are Africa's two most influential colonial

powers. Thus, they have had an extremely significant hand in Africa's political and economic

development during and since colonization. Studies of the effects of colonialism in Africa have

found that "former British colonies enjoy a higher degree of democracy than non-British ones"

(Lem, 2005, p. 2)[1]. Because Great Britain and France are "sub-Saharan Africa's two most

prominent colonial powers," and because there seems to be a correlation between

democratization and having status as a former British colony, it is useful to compare and contrast

their colonial practices (White, 1996, p. 9). An analysis of the differences in their colonial

practices will lead to a better understanding of the various difficulties former French and British

colonies in sub-Saharan Africa face in their attempts to democratize. The research question

which this paper seeks to address is: what are the specific differences between former British and

former French colonies in Africa with respect to democratization? This research begins with an

analysis of administrative practices during the colonial era and continues with an analysis of how

those specific colonial practices affected democratization after independence.

The research question relies on the assumption that the present political and economic

state of a country is dependent on events and institutions from that country's past. This

assumption has been central to important institutionalist theories that explore the influence of the

past on a nation's future. The chief political theory that will be applied to this research question

is called historical institutionalism. Historical institutionalists view "the institutional

organization of the polity or political economy as the principal factor structuring collective

behaviour and generating distinctive outcomes" (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 937). Thus, pre-

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[1] Indeed, the most recent Freedom House report indicates that only three out of the sixteen (≈19%) former French colonies are considered legitimate electoral democracies whereas ten of the nineteen (≈53%) former British colonies are considered legitimate electoral democracies (Freedom House).

existing institutions possess institutional inertia which leads to their continued existence and influence over time. This research will begin with an in depth explanation of this theory and a discussion of how this theory relates to the study of Africa's colonial past. Historical institutionalism will be tested against modernization theories that are less concerned with a nation's past and more concerned with a theorized series of steps that are projected as necessary for a country to become 'modern.' The literature review of this paper will also touch on other political development theories relevant to democratization in post-colonial Africa.

In order to more deeply understand the democratic development of former British and former French colonies in Africa, it is first necessary to explore the differences between these two European colonial powers during colonial rule. Any dissimilarity between the two could be the source of important differences in their colonies after independence. So, this research begins with a study centered on the colonial practices of Great Britain and France in their African colonies. Two African nation states will be presented as case studies to aid in this comparative study. First, Senegal was a prominent French colony that served as the epicenter of France's colonial activity on the African continent. It was France's headquarters and also "the territory that France used as a springboard for its colonialist expansion" (Osabu-Kle, 2000, p. 189). Second, the former British colony of Nigeria will serve as the other case study. Nigeria represents the typical British colony in Africa that experienced indirect rule and that was amalgamated solely to serve the economic interests of the crown. Because there is a conception that former British colonies fare better than former French colonies with respect to democratization, I hypothesize that Nigeria has had a better experience with democratization than Senegal.

Three core conceptions embody the most significant differences between the British and French styles of colonialism in Africa: the form of rule, the role of indigenous elites, and the education system. These conventions will be analyzed from a historical institutionalist approach in order to explore the extent to which these leftover colonial practices affect modern-day democratization in former French and former British colonies. The education system in Senegal was directly imported from and run by the French whereas the education system in Nigeria was left to the missionaries. After independence, Nigerian politicians had more of an opportunity to create an education system that was better suited to the needs of their people. All institutions, including education systems, have a path dependent quality to them which led Senegalese politicians to continue using an education system foreign to the local populations. Elites in Nigeria were equipped with legitimacy and institutions of coercion from the British, but they had no experience with the formation or utilization of political parties. On the other hand, elites in Senegal had experience forming their own political parties, but they were subject to strict assimilation policies during colonial rule that undermined their legitimacy and kept Senegal closely tied with France. Finally, because direct and indirect rule did not continue after independence, this paper will instead analyze the neocolonial relationship between Senegal and Nigeria and the Western world through the implementation of structural adjustment programs. The historical institutionalist approach will be tested against the modernization approach in the analysis of structural adjustment programs as these neo-liberal economic policies were inspired by modernization theories. Their widely accepted failure points to the shortcomings of modernization theory. Overall, an analysis of the impact of neocolonialism, elite formation, and education systems in the post-independence era will elucidate issues impeding or fostering democratic development in sub-Saharan Africa. This thesis will address any problems or

successes found in Senegal and Nigeria as a result of French and British colonial rule and will determine if former British colonies really do fare better than former French ones with respect to democratization.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Relevant theories regarding the economic and political development of 'developing countries,' what used to be referred to as 'Third World' countries, have been generated since the mid-twentieth century. Most of them focus on economic and democratic development, but there many lenses through which one can analyze political development. Political development has been explained from varied structural, international, domestic, economic, and institutional approaches. There are two main theories that will be used in this analysis of the level of democratization in Senegal and Nigeria: modernization theory and historical institutionalism. Modernization theory is one of the most important so-called Grand Theories of development. It is labeled a 'Grand Theory' because it attempts to explain everything related or potentially related to the process of 'modernization.' Historical institutionalism is an analytical approach that studies the history of a nation's institutions in an attempt to explain political activity.

Modernization Theory

Modernization theorists lie on an ideological spectrum, but most of them support neo-liberal policies that endorse the free market and democratization as the formula for success. To understand the origins of their beliefs, it is important to know that early modernization theorists were operating in a very specific political environment: decolonization during the Cold War. Most of the important modernization theorists were commissioned by the US government in the 1960s to analyze newly independent Third World countries in order to ascertain if they would

become capitalist democracies or communist. Thus, it can be said that modernization theory was born in a specific time and likely for a specific purpose. Modernization theories have not remained static, however, and have evolved their ideas over time to reflect new discoveries in the field.

Modernization theorists view humanity as progressive and always attempting to improve upon itself. Improvement, to most modernization theorists, is represented by the achievement of a stable democracy along with a capitalist economy. Early modernization theorists assumed that "all good things go together," meaning that economic improvements would necessarily lead to democratization (Packenham, 1973).

One of the first and most influential modernization theorists is Walt Whitman Rostow, who was actually an economist rather than a political scientist. He outlined five distinct 'stages' of development that he posited all countries must go through in order to reach the ultimate and universal goal of 'modernization.' It is clear that he based these stages off of specific and unique experiences of development, those of the industrialized European nations and the United States. The stages are as follows: traditional society, preconditions for take-off, take-off (or industrialization), drive to maturity, and the age of mass consumption. Though many contemporary modernization theorists might contest some of the ideas presented by Rostow, several principals remain relevant to all theorists of this camp. They believe that all nations should prioritize modernization, that economic development is necessary for and promotes political development, and that all nations should strive to achieve this 'age of mass consumption.' To modernization theorists, democracy and capitalism are universally desirable.

Samuel Huntington is a modernization theorist who has addressed the problems associated with the assumption that economic success and political stability go together. Indeed,

most modernization theorists had not predicted the military coups d'état taking place around the developing world in the 1960s and 1970s. To help explicate these events, Huntington introduced the importance of formal institutions into his argument about the effects of economic growth on democratization. He posited that "rapid economic change was inherently destabilizing" and that increasing wealth among a domestic population would only lead to unrest (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997, p. 34). However, he also assumed that economic growth would lead to an "explosion in political participation" that unfledged institutions would not be able to accommodate (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997, p. 34). The problem here is that Huntington continues to apply the modernization theorists' assumption that economic growth engenders progress forward (in this case towards political participation necessary for democracy) when in fact economic growth can produce a range of political reactions, including less political participation among some groups.

For the purposes of this research, the use of modernization theories poses some problems. First, the postulation that economic development leads to democracy is problematic when analyzing Senegal and Nigeria. For instance, though Nigeria has a rich supply of oil, a highly lucrative commodity, the nation has failed time and again in its attempts to institute an electoral democracy. Also, both Nigeria and Senegal have utilized the capital that has been made available through international lending institutions and both continue to experience political instability.

Second, modernization theories do not take into account a country's past. For these theorists, a particular country's past is practically irrelevant because any and all nations have the potential to attain political and economic modernity by implementing specific policies that lead to it (e.g. Rostow). This sort of thinking ignores history and assumes that all countries have the

capability to resemble one another in terms of politics and economics and perhaps that one day, they will.

Finally, modernization theories are problematic when analyzing African nations because they contain an embedded value judgment about political and economic circumstance. To say that some countries are 'traditional' and others have progressed to 'modernity' implies that something is missing in those 'traditional' societies. In addition, modernization theories have a hard time explaining why some countries are modern and others are not and they also have trouble predicting when the process of 'modernization' will begin. Either way, the dichotomy that is presented between 'traditional' and 'modern' societies implies that one is better than the other and that there is something wrong with 'traditional' societies that is holding them back from progress.

Historical Institutionalism

For the purposes of this research, historical institutionalism is the most relevant theory. Unlike modernization theories that do not take a country's past much into account, historical institutionalism focuses on the history of institutions and as well as their present day actions and political influence. Historical institutionalism is an institutional theory, unlike modernization theories which tend to have an economic focus. Institutional theories evaluate the connection between the past and the present through the study of the creation and evolution of society's political institutions. These societal forces are often seen by institutional theorists as broad forces that are out of the control of individuals, shape the goals of individuals, and have their

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own inertia and staying power[2]. Institutions shape individual decisions as well as the preferences of individuals and societal groups. For instance, in electoral democracies, bodies of the legislature set the rules of engagement for creating and enacting new laws, which shapes the behavior of individuals who are seeking to abide by the laws or are seeking to create new laws in their country.

In order to discuss the theory of historical institutionalism it is necessary to have a definition of the term 'institution.' In their article entitled "Political science and the three new institutionalisms" which explicates institutionalist theories, Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor have conceived a definition of 'institution' that they believe theorists would agree on. They say that institutions are "the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy" (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 938). This definition allows us to understand that institutions can range from the formal institutions found in government buildings all the way to the very social mores of a particular society. Institutions are pervasive and shape the world view of the people in society. They influence the thoughts, preferences, and behaviors of the individuals of a society.

Historical institutionalism comprises temporal as well as structural analysis. This theory is often utilized in comparative historical studies because it is used to examine "political and economic development in historical context and in terms of processes unfolding over time and in relation to each other, within a broader context in which developments in one realm impinge on and shape developments in others" (Thelen, 1999, p. 390). This means that political and economic developments are understood to evolve over time and do so under particular

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[2] 'Societal forces' refers to institutions such as legislatures, political parties, civil society organizations, social norms, social mores, etc.

circumstances which affect their actions and political impact. Past institutions also affect future behaviors of new and existing institutions. There are actually two temporal components to historical institutional theory. The first, described above, can be deemed 'path dependency,' which is the term historical institutionalists use to describe the creation and evolution of institutions. This term illustrates the nature of institutions as set on a specific course during the past that affects future actions of the institution as well as individuals and groups. It has been suggested by historical institutionalists that "once a development path is set on a particular course, the network externalities, the learning process of organizations, and the historically derived subjective modeling of the issues reinforce the course" (North, 1990, p. 99). Once an institution has been set on a particular path, it has the inertia to maintain its level and type of activity and to even grow to become independent of the individuals that comprise it. Historical institutionalist theories attempt to take context into account not only over spans of time but also at particular moments in time.

The second temporal component important to historical institutionalism is a 'critical juncture.' Rather than looking at the evolution of institutions over time, an analysis of critical junctures explicates the influence of a particular moment in time, such as the moment an institution was created. The manner in which a critical juncture affects an institution is a function of that institution's past. The assumption when studying critical junctures is that "crucial founding moments of institutional formation…send countries along broadly different development paths" (Thelen, 1999, p. 387). The study of critical junctures reveals the effects of interactions between institutions and political players at important moments in time. What is central to analyzing critical junctures from a historical institutionalist perspective is that it assumes that "not all options are equally viable at any given point in time" due to the context and

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circumstances surrounding critical junctures (Thelen, 1999, p. 385). Decisions made by politicians at critical junctures are affected by other institutions and political precedents. Past institutions affect decisions made at critical junctures. In the context of studying former colonies, analyzing critical junctures such as a country's independence are important because decisions made and processes implemented at that time have further implications in the future.

Analyses of critical junctures and path dependency reveal how institutions produce and react to feedback. Institutions create feedback to which they in turn react. Precedents become set and thus institutions are likely to be resistant to drastic change. Hence feedback mechanisms also contribute to the continued existence of institutions over time. Some institutions become so embedded that they maintain themselves to the point that people in societies simply accept them and would actually lose out on significant benefits by dismissing them. Indeed, "institutions are resistant to redesign ultimately because they structure the very choices about reform that the individual is likely to make" (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 940). Institutions shape the world views of individuals and they produce feedback which influences the future decisions and actions of individuals.

The emphasis on the past provided by historical institutionalism makes this theory quite appropriate for this comparative analysis of post-colonial Africa. Colonialism has been the source of a lot of Africa's political troubles and historical institutionalism helps to explain why. The fact that "institutional edifices have inertia – and social trends have momentum – that generally exceed human intent and control" means that colonial institutions and practices can have lasting effects even after independence (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997, p. 22). Colonial practices that were often undemocratic and authoritarian may have had an effect on present day efforts to democratize.

Historical institutionalism allows an analyst to examine "the ways in which 'institutions structure [political] battles and in so doing, influence their outcomes'" (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997, p. 41). Political battles are waged within and between these institutions and the results are shaped by institutional precedent as well as by the present day interplay of organizations. An examination of the historical and present actions of institutions and their individual actors allows us to find patterns in behavior and explications of why certain actions were taken. In the cases of Senegal and Nigeria, historical institutionalism provides the framework in which to analyze political courses of action over time and to analyze how historical precedent plays into politics.

CHAPTER THREE
COLONIAL ERA

The case studies will begin with an analysis of the differences between British and

French styles of colonial rule. During the 18th and 19th centuries the British and French were

competing for power and prestige on the international stage. Colonialism and imperialism were

at their height and during the 19th century it was said during that time that the "sun never sets on

the British empire." Great Britain and France both sought to increase their power through

colonial and imperial efforts, however the two powerful nations had different goals and priorities

in their overseas colonies. This section of the paper seeks to address the differences in the

colonial goals and efforts of the British and French because differences in colonial rule have

potential impact on future politics.

As effectively the first country to industrialize, Great Britain had a more advanced free

market system than other nations during the 18th century. The laissez-faire ideology posited by

Adam Smith eventually led British entrepreneurs to expand their market beyond their borders.

The empire began largely out of the British capitalists' desire to gain access to primary resources

from around the world and to obtain new markets in which to sell their secondary goods.

Economics was always the primary motivator and the driving force behind British colonialism

and imperial control. Culturally, they perceived themselves as bearing the "white man's burden"

meaning they believed they were bringing civilization and modernization to the indigenous

populations. Using their powerful navy, the British traveled abroad in search of these new

markets and resources and eventually they had obtained arguably the most powerful colonial empire the world has ever seen.

Historically France was just as powerful of an imperial power as Great Britain, especially in terms of their presences on the continent of Africa. During the 17th century the French began to make strategic trading partnerships as part of the foundation of their imperialist efforts[3]. France's empire really began during the Napoleonic era as a means of augmenting the power of the state. During the Third Republic in the 18th century France's goals abroad remained largely the same as those from the Napoleonic era. Their "motives for conquest were geo-political— [the French prized] the strategic, demographic, economic, and symbolic value of the colonies" (Sorum, 1977, p. 21). Surely the French had significant economic uses for their colonies overseas but economics became only one of many motivations for French colonialism[4]. It was important to the French people and leaders that their colonies glorify the state, thus their most prominent colonial goal became the *mission civilatrice*. This "civilizing mission" sought to assimilate colonized peoples into Western culture and political style in order to bring to "savage" indigenous peoples what the French believed to be the universal principals of rationality and the rights of man[5]. Their staunch belief in rationality and the equality of all men led them to believe also that those principals were applicable anywhere in the world (Dimier, 2004, p. 24).

Because Great Britain and France had different goals in their colonialist efforts, they experienced varied outcomes in their respective colonies. Senegal has been chosen as the case

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[3] "It was not until the seventeenth century, on the initiatives of royal ministers Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642) and later Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1661-1683), that the French state began granting trading charters in specified areas as a part of the attempt to extend France's power and wealth" (Le Vine, 2004, p. 30).
[4] An important factor to note is that, "humiliated by their defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, the French developed a 'febrile nationalism' that saw in conquest and victories over their colonial competitors a way to regain national face lost in the disaster of 1871" (Le Vine, 2004, p. 36).
[5] "Given the self-evident superiority of French culture, law, administration, and language, assimilation was not only a worthy goal, but a *duty* that accompanied colonial expansion" (Le Vine, 2004, p. 40).

study of a former French colony and Nigeria has been chosen as the case study of a former British colony. An examination of the two colonies reveals important dissimilarities between the two European powers' colonialist efforts in Africa. The three biggest differences in the African colonies manifest themselves in the forms of rule, the roles of indigenous elites, and the education systems. The study will begin with an analysis of these conventions during colonial rule and will follow with a continued analysis through the post-independence era. The first convention, the colonial education system, is important to analyze because education of the masses can have a democratizing effect in society. Also, in the context of Senegal and Nigeria, the education systems were foreign institutions placed in society by the colonizers, which is significant to the path those institutions took before and after independence.

Colonial Education in Senegal: Making Frenchmen out of the Senegalese

Education is an important institution to study in the context of Senegal's history because it has been said that "the school is perhaps the most vital cog in France's colonial administration" (Whittlesey, 1937, p. 369). France came to Africa with the intent "to make Frenchmen out of the Africans" and the school system became the conduit through which they did so (Whittlesey, 1937, p. 367). Their all-important *mission civilatrice* was disseminated to students through the government-run schools[6]. The French exercised extensive control over the education of their colonies because the civilizing mission was their most important colonial goal[7].

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[6] "Civility" was seen as "France's unique gift, and the candidate for assimilation was expected to receive it with gratitude" (Le Vine, 2004, p. 40).
[7] A decree in 1922 stated that "the establishment of a new school in the colonies required government permission, government-certified teachers, a government curriculum and the exclusive use of the French as the language of instruction" (White, 1996, p. 11).

The widespread use of the French language was central to the *mission civilatrice*, and it remains an important goal for the French in the present day. In the schools, the employment French language was required. French administrators and teachers refused to learn indigenous languages and forced their colonial subjects to learn the French language[8]. There was such a heavy and continued emphasis placed on the use of the French language that it has sustained importance today. Presently the French language is still used in Senegal for all official purposes. The strength of the presence of this language is a testament to historical precedent and the merits of historical institutionalism. The evidence for the potency of historical precedent is demonstrated by the fact that "even in countries like Senegal with a linguistically homogeneous society (90 percent of the population speaks Wolof) and where the recognition of Wolof as an official language would be the most logical course of action, political leaders have refrained from a proposal to change the status quo" (Anderegeen, 1994, p. 97). The widespread use of the French language has been achieved through its implementation in the education system as well as its use in other institutions.

The schools provided a setting not only to promote the use of the French language, but to support other goals of the civilizing mission. They were able to reach young impressionable minds in order to encourage the French ways of life. Some students became so assimilated that they did in fact resemble Frenchmen rather than Africans in their actions and ways of life. It is important to note, however, that education was not universally available to everyone in Senegal. It was initially reserved exclusively for the sons and daughters of indigenous elites and was intended to "prepare future leaders of rural Africa and subordinate professionals needed in

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[8] In direct contrast, in the British colonies "Africans are not encouraged to learn English, and few officials of the native administrations can speak it." (Whittlesey, 1937, p. 371)

medicine, teaching, and commerce" (Le Vine, 2004, p. 46). Formal education quickly evolved, however, into an urban phenomenon because the few jobs provided by the colonial administration were available in the cities and were obtained through education. The earliest so-called 'European' schools in the cities (such as the *quatre communes* in Senegal) were quite exclusive. Access to education was thus limited by one's location and perceived socio-economic status.

The education of these select few students was instrumental in creating a class to serve interests of the colonial powers. The French administrators sought to use the education system now, not only for assimilation purposes, but to educate "an African 'elite' that could eventually fill the lower ranks of the colonial service" (White, 1996, p. 12). Of course, the Africans were never intended to fill important positions of power, but low-level government jobs. However, the Senegalese chosen for these jobs had to be the most highly assimilated.

The availability of education in the *quatre communes* (the four major cities) and the emphasis on assimilation led "the Senegalese of Saint-Louis, Rufisque, Gorée, and Dakar [to consider] themselves favored over all colonized peoples" (Le Vine, 2004, p. 40). Indeed, the setup of the colonial education system led to a strict urban/rural divide that has continued on long after independence. With respect to engendering democracy, the legacy of the colonial education system has been positive in some lights and negative in others. Historical institutionalists posit that diverse and tolerant civic cultures and civil societies are important foundations for the success of democracy. The availability of education, limited as it is, has led to improvements in civic culture with the creation of political groups comprised of students and teachers, for example. As positive as this can be in the process of democratization, the urban/rural divide has severely limited the availability of education in the countryside and thus

contributed to the harmful partition of urban and rural political groups. Overall, the colonial

education system was implemented to serve the needs of the colonial power and can thus be

considered incomplete. The elitism, limited availability, and assimilation of the colonial

education system will have visible implications in the independence era.

Colonial Education in Nigeria: The Partnership with Missionaries to Teach the Masses

In contrast to the French system, the "British Government's involvement in formal

education in Africa came later and was much less visible" (White, 1996, p. 12). In Great

Britain's case, colonial schools were "left mainly to chance," meaning that British administrators

did not place any emphasis (at first) on the education of the indigenous population (Whittlesey,

1937, p. 369). Their main focus was always economic and centered on the extraction of

resources. Thus, much of the first formal education was made available by the Christian

missionaries rather than the British government.

There were different practices in northern and southern Nigeria, however. In the north,

indigenous elites of the Muslim Caliphate were highly autocratic and highly powerful rulers. It

was because of this fact that British administrators were able to implement their colonial system

of indirect rule. This system led them to rely very heavily on the Caliphate rulers. Lord Lugard,

largely trying to expedite his own job, believed that the imposition of the Christian missionaries

in the north would lead to problems with the Muslim rulers. He feared that they might feel

threatened by a missionary presence. Therefore, he banned Christian missionary activity in this

region. In official reports, British colonial administrators stated that, "education should be

adapted to the mentality, aptitudes, occupations, and traditions of various peoples" in order to

explain the lack of education by missionaries in the north (White, 1996, p. 19). What is more likely, however, is that Lord Lugard did not want to stir up any trouble with the Muslim leaders.

The man charged with forming the curriculum in the North was Hanns Vischer who proposed "a scheme of native education on naïve lines" (Ozigi and Ocho, 1981, p. 46). The British were careful not to step on any toes with their devised education system. It intended to preserve the indigenous culture and so British as well as Native instructors and languages were employed in the Northern schools.

In the end, a great disparity was created by the differences in the northern and southern education systems in Nigeria[9]. In the South, out of the jurisdiction of the Muslim Caliphate, British missionaries were in charge of all educational institutions. In opposition to the Senegalese education system, "the educational system was not intended to train Nigerians in the professions and produce manpower for technological and industrial development" (Oyebade, 2007, p. 20). Instead, there was a heavy emphasis on the promotion of Christianity in schools, although the British government provided the missionaries with some guidelines for curricula in primary schools. Because of the heavy emphasis on the Christian doctrine, the schools "initially focused on training for men for service in the ministry as catechists, lay readers, Sunday school teachers, and junior clergy" (Oyebade, 2007, p. 19).

Similar to what happened in Senegal, those who had access to education found themselves to be better off than those who did not. They were considered a new type of elite and therefore it follows that "many people aspired to be like the Europeanized Nigerians; peasants struggled to send their children to school to acquire the benefit of the coveted trophy of Western

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[9] For instance, "by 1914 there were 527 pupils and 35 northern Nigerian teacher in the government or provincial schools as against 1,682 pupils in the mission schools" (Ozigi and Ocho, 1981, p. 49).

education" (Oyebade, 2007, p. 20). The local population quickly caught on to the fact that obtaining an education from the people in power would at least lead to a better understanding of their rulers, if not more access to their power. Scholars consider Western education "a principal instrument of [social and cultural] change" in Nigeria (Oyebade, 2007, p. 19).

Overall, much like the colonial education system in Senegal, the education in Nigeria led to a divide among the local population. Rather than an urban/rural divide, there was a divide between the northern and southern regions of Nigeria. Though it did not begin as an entryway to power and influence, the colonial education system quickly came to be perceived as such.

Discussion of Colonial Education

The education system implemented in the African colonies reveals important differences between the British and French colonial policies. The French used the education system to endorse their *mission civilatrice*, promoting in their schools assimilation and the widespread use of the French language. There was a small missionary presence in the French African colonies such as Senegal, however the French state itself owned and was in charge of the schools. Alternatively, the British made great use of the missionaries when it came to the education system in their colonies. Because the main focus for the administrators of the British colonies was the economy, they were glad to delegate the task of education to another party. When they eventually tried to take over the education system in the north, their policies were too tentative and cared for too poorly in order to succeed. In both cases of Senegal and Nigeria, education was selective and available only to certain sectors of the colonial populations. The French made education accessible to the children of indigenous elites but the number of spots available was dependent upon the availability of low-level jobs in the French colonial administration.

Education was used to train potential low-level administrative employees, but more importantly to assimilate Africans. Education in Nigeria was selective for different reasons. The missionaries made it widely obtainable in Southern Nigeria because the spread of Christianity there did not pose any problems for the administration of that region of the colony. In Northern Nigeria, however, Lord Lugard forbade the missionaries from setting up schools because they would be perceived as threatening by the Muslim emirs and other traditional rulers. For Great Britain and France, education had a dissimilar significance. Using the education system to make Frenchmen out of the Africans can be seen as a way that the French sought to augment the power of their empire. The British did not need to make Englishmen out of their colonial populations because they derived their power not from unity, but from economic means.

As an institution, education generally has a lot of staying power. Local populations understood the correlation between access to education and access to knowledge and power. However, those that did not have access to education in both Senegal and Nigeria had reason to mistrust those that did, especially with Senegal's emphasis on assimilation in the education system. Those promoting education, even Africans, might be mistrusted because formal education was an institution born from the colonial ruler. Education divided society, which had a lasting legacy in both Senegal and Nigeria.

The Role of Indigenous Elites in Senegal: Assimilation for Access to Power

When the French came to Senegal and set up their own federation, they did not really allow Africans to participate in the government. French officials from the French nation state held the important positions in the presiding government. Though it was the case that "before colonialism each of the ethnic groups in Senegal society had its own organized form of politics,"

traditional rulers were not respected by the French government and were no longer seen as legitimate once the French had taken over (Osabu-Kle, 2000, p. 189). Instead of being seen as legitimate, "powerful traditional rulers were deposed, and in achieving their colonial objectives and interests the French appointed or created their own chiefs as they deemed convenient" (Osabu-Kle, 2000, p.190). The only elites who were able to adapt and keep their power were the Islamic *marabouts* in the countryside. The colonial administration had less interest in governing the rural regions and thus allowed *marabouts* to hold some power there.

During the height of their colonial power, assimilation was extremely important for the French. It became well understood through the education practices that "the African elite had to rely on assimilation to gain entry into the French colonial space" (Osabu-Kle, 2000, p. 191). There were some indigenous elites who did not want to compromise their political ideals and thus rejected the notion of assimilation. There were some who embraced it, and there were some who tried to strike a balance between assimilation and loyalty to pre-colonial politics. The traditional Senegalese elites who were the leaders of their political and cultural interests before colonialism were admittedly torn between trying to consolidate their power under the French and maintaining strong traditional political visions. Secular leaders, closer to the French administration, usually had no choice but to assimilate. Religious leaders, as mentioned above, figured out ways to strengthen their power during colonization. This is not to say that they did not compromise their political views, but rather that they were able to manipulate the administration in order to be perceived as necessary to the success of the colonizers. Marabouts

used their religious influence over rural populations to get them to cooperate with the colonial administration[10].

It has already been made clear from the analysis of the educational practices in Senegal that the most important aspect of assimilation was learning and mastering the French language: "the French language seems to be the main instrument of power in the hands of governing oligarchies in all Francophone African countries" (Andereggen, 1994, p. 95). The indigenous elites understood that learning French was their best chance at gaining access to power, as marginal as the power may have been. Indigenous elites had a leg up in this respect because their access to education was greater than that of the general population. However, access to power was restricted further by the fact that there were a limited number of low-level government jobs available for graduates of French schools.

Frenchmen occupied all of the important governmental positions in the AOF and those African elites who chose to assimilate and were granted a job were given only menial roles[11]. The criteria to be considered an *évolué* [civilized] and thus ready for work in the colonial administration were highly restrictive. They were selective to the point that "in AOF, fewer than 500 Africans had become assimilated in this way before 1940" (Le Vine, 2004, p. 46). So, the administrative duties always remained in the hands of Frenchmen rather than Senegalese. *Évolués,* importantly, learned the French customs, political ideals, and language, but were never given practice in the political realm, until the last few years before independence when they were allowed to create political parties and run for some offices.

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[10] Thus it could be said that there was a type of indirect rule system in the rural regions of Senegal where the French administrators did not deem it necessary to directly rule over the population.

[11] "assimilation tended to be highly selective and, over time, increasingly restrictive…In the end, the process created an elite group of 'black Frenchmen' who were culturally and socially assimilated into white French society" (Le Vine, 2004, p. 45).

Overall, the role of indigenous elites was restrictive in the Senegalese context. The French believed that they should be in charge of everything due to their elitist attitude towards Africans. They came to rule over the Senegalese, not to share power with them. In the cases that they needed to use elites, they preferred that "African employees would act as transparent, unthinking conduits who would link white colonial authorities to black African colonial subjects" (Osborn, 2003, p. 36). The Senegalese that they used in low-level jobs were only the most assimilated, which served to reinforce French ideals. Indigenous elites who were heavily assimilated were, more often than not, more affected by the things they had learned about the French way of doing things than they even knew themselves. Thus, when it came time for independence, elites in charge closely resembled the French colonizers in language, political ideals, and ways of life, with the exception being the *marabouts*[12]. From the historical institutionalist perspective, this will be shown to have a significant impact after independence, as a specific path to power and prestige was set during colonial times.

The Role of Indigenous Elites in Nigeria: Propping up Puppets

The use of indigenous elites in Senegal and Nigeria is different due to the nature of the administrative system that was set up by the colonizers. In Senegal, the elites were largely dismissed, with one of the sole 'advantages' granted to them being access to formal education. In Nigeria, the elites played a much more integral role in the colonial administrative system. The British had devised their system of indirect rule, rather than the type of direct rule system employed by the French, whereby indigenous elites were an essential component of the system.

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[12] The *marabouts*, however, had solidified certain practices that would keep them in power. They had mastered how to make themselves necessary to the administration, both before and after independence.

Rather than sending a multitude of British administrators to Nigeria, the British relied on the local elites, such as *emirs, obas,* and *obis* to implement their colonial policies. These traditional rulers made up the so-called Native Authority who answered to British lieutenant governors. In reality, the lieutenant governors were the only ones with any real legislative power whereas the Nigerians themselves could only enact legislation on their populations.

Indigenous elites were essential to the system because, "colonial instructions and laws and regulations reached the people via the traditional authority who also ensured compliance, maintained law and order, settled local disputes, and collected taxes" (Oyebade, 2007, p. 17). This spared the British significant administrative costs. The manner in which they chose which elites to prop up, however, was problematic. The British maintained, in official reports, that they wanted to remain neutral and have a minimal impact on the local populations, however this is goal was obviously unattainable. Because Nigeria is really an amalgamation of peoples that would not have come together except for British colonization, Lord Lugard encountered different sorts of problems with the traditional elites in different regions of the colony.

In order to gain power in the indirect rule system, groups and leaders had to appear as appealing as possible to British authorities. Only those groups that agreed to cooperate and that would pose the least amount of problems to the British would gain power. In order to find out more about potential leaders, the British actually sent in anthropologists to research ethnic groups, which ended up, in reality, multiplying the number of groups and drawing stricter lines between them[13]. Groups that may have allowed people to migrate between them became more restrictive and exclusive as a result of the British system of indirect rule. Ultimately, the

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[13] "Young's analysis of the colonial impact highlights the role of colonial authorities, the British in particular, in promoting ethnic identity and consciousness" (Aborisade and Mundt, 2002, p. 53).

traditional rulers that the British propped up to run their colony were only puppets of the British government because they were the ones who agreed to cooperate.

In the northern region of Nigeria, the rulers of the Muslim Caliphate were much more established than in other regions of the country, which made the system of indirect rule function efficiently there. Just as in other regions, "it was in great part upon their claim to 'noninterference' with Islam that the British sought to legitimize their rule" (Reynolds, 2001, p. 605). Lord Lugard maintained an anti-missionary attitude throughout colonization because he believed the spread of Christianity would cause disorder[14]. However, the British still expressed preferences for rulers in the north: they wanted leaders who were more secular and less fanatical. This was a difficult undertaking and it resulted in a lot of intense competition between Islamic groups who were attempting to appear secular to the British so that they could gain or keep power.

In other regions of the country, the British encountered different problems in their attempts to employ indigenous elites. For instance, traditional rulers in southern Yorubaland, the *obas*, were not as powerful as their counterparts in the North, the *emirs*. When Lord Lugard attempted to prop up certain rulers, they were not respected by the local populations under them and were often met with competition from other indigenous rulers in the region. Also, in eastern Nigeria indirect rule failed because there were no individual indigenous leaders powerful or popular enough to rule over the less well-defined ethnic groups there. Thus, Lord Lugard had to set up his own rulers, known as "warrant chiefs" who had no previous authority at all (Oyebade,

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[14] "While all northern emirs were required to take an oath of loyalty to the British crown, this oath contained the qualification that they would not be required to do anything which was contrary to the laws of Islam" (Reynolds, 2001, p. 604)

2007, p. 17). Because of this contrived authority, they were not respected by the Igbo peoples that lived under them.

Overall, leaders in Nigeria were heavily relied upon by the British colonial authorities. In some cases, such as the *emirs* in the north, the leaders had some previous authority. In other cases, indigenous leaders derived most of their power from the British themselves. In either case, power eventually came to be derived from the crown rather than any sort of traditional authority and indigenous leaders quickly became puppets of the crown. The quest for power under colonialism caused a multitude of problems as ethnic groups became more solidified and different regions of the country operated under different rules and authorities.

Discussion of the Colonial Role of Indigenous Elites

At first glance it seems that the uses of the indigenous elites by the British and the French were quite different. The belief of the French in the centralized state coupled with their *mission civilatrice* led them to consolidate power and authority into their own hands. They sought to depose and assimilate indigenous elites rather than employ them. On the other hand, the British used the indigenous elites more heavily in the running of their colony. The size of Great Britain's empire necessitated the use of existing authorities. However, power was derived from the British rather than traditional sources of power because the British equipped leaders with necessary authority and access to resources.

In both cases, it is clear that no real authority was ever granted to indigenous elites. Surely in Nigeria, elites had more decision-making power, and arguably a bit more freedom from direct rule than elites in Senegal. However, colonial power always derived from the colonial authorities. If British authorities were unsatisfied with the performance of some indigenous

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elites, there was plenty of competition from others ready to take control. In the case of Nigeria,

the treatment of the indigenous elites led to the solidification of ethnic identities in many cases

where those identities were previously considered fluid. After independence this will have

implications, as the fractionalization of society has become a significant source of Nigeria's

problems with democratization. In the case of Senegal, indigenous elites had to become

assimilated in order to gain access to a job in the colonial system. Therefore, once independence

came the elites who would inherit the government were highly assimilated to the French ways of

life and political ideals. Consequently, this has caused a fractionalization of Senegalese society

as well, though in a different capacity than in Nigeria.

Direct Rule in Senegal: The Power of the French Centralized State

In terms of form of rule, the French have always believed in having a strong centralized

state. This belief manifested itself in the way the French chose to administrate and rule their

African colonies[15]. In terms of structure, the French set up a political administrative system that

was decidedly hierarchical and directly linked to the powerful centralized state in France[16]. The

French called their colonies in West Africa *Afrique Occidentale Francaise* (AOF). Between

1902 and 1904 the French set up a federation of AOF colonies, drafted a constitution for them,

and created a general government headquartered in Dakar, Senegal "with its own budget,

bureaucracy, and powers of taxation" (Le Vine, 2004, p. 42). The government of this federation

was strictly hierarchical, "with the governor-general [a Frenchman] at the top assisted by high-

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[15] The beliefs of the French population and its leaders led to "the strong bias toward centralized control of the empire" (Le Vine, 2004, p. 39).

[16] During the 17th and 18th centuries, the monarchy was "intent on centralizing power and unifying populations, [so] France transplanted its institutions overseas while insisting that its colonies remain assimilated politically to the metropole" (Le Vine, 2004, p. 39).

ranking French officials and an advisory council…composed of French citizens and African subjects all appointed by the governor-general" (Le Vine, 2004, p. 42). Below the governor-general were the lieutenant governors of the individual colonies. They had no decision-making powers except for discretion concerning "routine and day-to-day administration" (Le Vine, 2004, p. 43). To keep these lieutenant governors from gaining too much power, the posts were rotated every two to three years. The governor-general himself was still answerable to the minister of colonies (situated in France) and could make recommendations regarding the administration of the AOF but could not legislate for it. The French found their devised system of direct rule to be an effective way to control the goings-on in their colonies and Senegal became their administrative center on the African continent.

In the beginning of French colonial rule in Africa, Senegal was an important port city and trading center. For hundreds of years, France had a presence in Senegal[17]. It was "the territory that France used as a springboard for its colonialist expansion" and "during the colonial period Senegal was the political and economic centre of the Federation of French West Africa" (Osabu-Kle, 2000, p. 189). As the headquarters of the French administration in the colonies, Senegal became highly assimilated, even according to the standards of the other French colonies[18]. The most assimilated and therefore the most privileged Senegalese lived in the "*quatre communes* of Saint-Louis, Goree, Dakar, and Rufisque" (Anderegeen, 1994, p. 6). Because of their level of assimilation, the inhabitants of the four communes were given the right to vote, were given the status of French citizenship, and were represented by an elected *conseil general* in Paris. They

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[17] "Until the 1830s, interests in the Senegal Basin were limited to trading in gum Arabic and slaves through a series of trading posts (*comptoirs*) located along the river" (Anderegeen, 1994, p. 1).
[18] "French assimilationist policies were implemented early in Senegal, and Africans in Senegal so sought assimilation to French political institutions that the country may be said to be a critical test case for the effectiveness of the policy of assimilation in the context of African development" (Osabu-Kle, 2000, p. 191).

could form political parties and other civil society organizations. All other people in French

West Africa were considered subjects, including those rural Senegalese who did not live in the

four communes. So, the Senegalese (particularly those in the *quatre communes*) were among the

first Africans to experience Western style democracy, though "voters did not cast their ballots as

supporters of the indigenous Africans, who were excluded from running" until the very end of

the colonial era (Osabu-Kle, 2000, p. 192). The government leaders and representatives, as

dictated by the French principal of centralization, were always Frenchmen[19].

One could say, based on the description above, that Senegal has had a long history with

Westernized partisan democracy. However, the colonial politics in which some Senegalese

participated can hardly be described as democratic. The French did not fully explain the

democratic processes to the Senegalese[20]. The French took advantage of this dearth of

familiarity with the system and actively bought off votes by giving away goods to voters: to the

Senegalese, "voting was a festival in which the French and the Creoles provided free

commodities for some pieces of papers to be cast into some boxes on their behalf" (Osabu-Kle,

2000, p. 193). So, Senegal has a history with the practice of voting, however, they also have a

history with buying votes. The Senegalese's experience with democracy also comes from a

particular point of view (that of the French) which holds high esteem for centralized state power.

Therefore, after independence Senegalese politicians, always highly assimilated due to

colonialist policies, saw no problem with consolidating power, as the French did, into the hands

of one group, or in this case, political party.

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[19] "Most humanist intellectuals believed that the overseas peoples were not sufficiently mature for independence…the indigenous masses were the greatest cause for worry" (Sorum, 1977, p. 80).
[20] "The Africans, for their part, did not understand the alien political system" (Osabu-Kle, 2000, p. 193)

Indirect Rule in Nigeria: An Amalgam Born of Economic Necessity

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the British had already learned a lot from their mistakes in their multitude of other colonies. They had experimented with both direct and indirect rule and were beginning to shy away from direct rule in their African colonies[21]. The British claimed in official reports that their system of indirect rule was implemented in order to respect indigenous forms of rule. In reality, it seems that the British had learned a lesson from, for instance, imposing too much control on the American colonies, which had obviously caused them considerable heartache and the loss of a lucrative colony. Also, the British had found that they needed to implement a more economical system in their newer colonies in order to reduce expenditures. With such a vast and expansive empire, the "scarcity of money and manpower…obliged administrators to practice 'indirect rule'" (Berry, 1992, p. 328). African clerks and chiefs were cheaper to employ than European personnel; also, by integrating existing local authorities and social systems into the structure of colonial government, officials hoped to minimize the disruptive effects of colonial rule (Berry, 1992, p. 329). Lord Lugard, who presided over the British colony of Nigeria, was particularly keen on meeting this goal of maintaining as much order as possible. Because he was in charge of so much territory in Africa, he sought to facilitate his own job. To do so, he used indigenous rulers where he could and refrained from imposing too much on his colonies beyond implementing taxes and other such economic burdens.

Nigeria is an important and unique British entity because it comprised several different administrative structures and forms of rule in one single colony:

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[21] The unexpected events in the Americas had caused the British to favor indirect rule in some of their remaining colonies.

Initially Nigeria was made up of two regions, the north with headquarters at Kaduna, and the south with headquarters at Enugu, each headed by a lieutenant governor answerable to the governor-general. Each of the regions was divided into provinces presided over by the resident who was responsible to the lieutenant governors[22].

In 1912 Lord Frederick Lugard brought together the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria under his rule as the governor-general, with the official headquarters in Lagos. The northern and southern regions had different histories that lent each of them to different forms of administrative rule. For instance, "indirect rule worked best for the British in Northern Nigeria, among the Hausa/Fulani" peoples but failed in the southern and eastern regions where indigenous leaders were less powerful (Oyebade, 2007, p. 17). In the north the population was accustomed to being ruled by an autocratic Muslim caliphate so the British "maintained and utilized the region's existing forms of administration, from regional emirs to local judges, rather than replacing them with British officers and institutions" (Reynolds, 2001, p. 601). Interestingly, though the British sought to implement a more hands-off system than the French, they still relied on the existence of an autocratic, centralized form of rule. Though the British did not directly arrange it themselves, it just so happened that in northern Nigeria, the people were used to having highly autocratic rulers from their previously instated Caliphate system[23]. The French imposed their form of centralized rule while the British happened upon an African region with that existing form of rule, which they used to their economic advantage. The British lacked manpower and capital to rule all their colonies directly but still always relied on an autocratic style of rule, in this case left over from the Caliphate.

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[22] Adebayo Oyebade, *The Foundations of Nigeria Essays in Honor of Toyin Falola.* (New York: Africa World). 2007, p. 16.

[23] This indigenous system of government was in place from the Sokoto Caliphate formed through jihad in the 1800s (Reynolds, 2001, p. 601).

Though Nigerians in the northern region were used to being ruled under an autocratic Caliphate and the British were able to utilize the rulers that were already in place, there was competition for power during British rule from other Muslim groups. Though the British "sought to legitimize their rule by maintaining a public image of neutrality towards the various Islamic groups found in Nigeria, their investment in the system of Indirect Rule required them to be supportive of those in power and repress those who were perceived to threaten the status quo" (Reynolds, 2001, p. 601)[24]. In reality, the British were unable to remain neutral in their Nigerian colonial state.

In the Southern and Eastern parts of Nigeria, indirect rule did not function as well as it did in Northern Nigeria. The Yoruba in the south "possessed a centralized political system, [but] it was a weak one in the twentieth century" (Oyebade, 2007, p. 17). In Eastern Nigeria indirect rule was totally unfeasible because the Igbo population living there was organized into small rural villages that "lacked the centralized system necessary for indirect rule to work" (Oyebade, 2007, p. 17). In this region, traditional authority was in the hands of village elders, who did not really have much authority at all in practice. Because the British were not able to give power to an authority that was already respected and influential in the eyes of the indigenous populations, the indirect form of rule could not properly function. Thus, in that region, the British were required to have a heavier administrative hand.

Consistent with the theory of historical institutionalism, the setup of the Nigerian colony into three distinct regions, governed in (albeit slightly) different ways, remained a problem after independence. The differences between these regions became exacerbated after independence,

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[24] The British promoted ethnic identity indirectly by highlighting its importance in order to gain power. When they had anthropologists come in and study Africans they sometimes incorrectly identified groups that did not exist based on false reports and poor observations. They also solidified groups that did not previously exist by giving power or privilege to certain groups.

when "the new Nigeria was based upon three largely autonomous regions whose interests tended to pull against any central authority" (Arnold, 2005, p. 189). The regions were never integrated during colonial times, causing strife and competition between regions after independence.

Discussion of Direct and Indirect Rule

Studies of direct and indirect forms of rule have found inconclusive results about their comparative effects on democratization. Though former British colonies have a higher rate of democratization in Africa compared to former French ones, this cannot be directly attributed to the form of rule[25]. It is clear from the analyses above of Senegal and Nigeria that there were differences between the colonial practices of the British and French, but it is important to note that there was a common thread of centralized authority in both cases. The French imposed their system of direct rule on the indigenous peoples of Senegal and set up a strictly hierarchical system answerable to French authorities in France. In contrast, the British relied on the autocratic Caliphate system already in place when they arrived in Nigeria. In the regions not governed by the Caliphate, the indirect rule system floundered. The British also had a much larger empire and thus a more pressing need to cut administrative costs where possible. In both Senegal and Nigeria, centralized rule was important for governing the colonies.

In Senegal, citizens of the *quatre communes* had some practice with voting and the formation of political parties. However, native leaders had been subject to strict assimilation policies that would ensure ties between the colony and colonizer after independence. In Nigeria, the populations had no experience with political parties or democracy at all, and their highly

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[25] The most recent Freedom House report indicates that only three out of the sixteen former French colonies are considered legitimate electoral democracies whereas ten of the nineteen former British colonies are considered legitimate electoral democracies (Freedom House).

regionalized system caused fractionalization that would be difficult to overcome in the post-independence era. The colonial systems of rule, both direct and indirect, certainly affected the path of institutions after independence as well as rules governing access to power, distribution of power, and the administrative setup after independence in both Senegal and Nigeria. This is consistent with historical institutionalist ideas about path dependency.

Path Dependency: From the Colonial Era to the Post- Independence Era and Neocolonialism

The greatest differences to be found between British and French colonialism in Africa are the education systems, the role of indigenous elites, and the form of rule. In Senegal the education system was used to make Frenchmen out of the Africans and to train Senegalese to work in low-level positions in the colonial administration. On the other hand, in Nigeria, education was only available in the south, deepening the north/south divide. The education system in Senegal certainly had a hand in elite formation after independence. Those who had achieved *évolué* status were the ones who formed the first political parties and were the first to inherit the right to rule after independence. The education system in southern Nigeria worked in a similar capacity as those who were educated by the missionaries made political contestations for power after independence. However, the Islamic elites in the north did not attempt to assimilate in order to gain power. They were propped up by the British administrators and then were given instruments of coercion to maintain their power. After independence, this had severe consequences, including several periods of military rule.

The differences between British and French colonial rule certainly had effects after independence. In both the cases of Senegal and Nigeria, "instead of scrapping previous state structures and starting anew…independence reforms reinforced the preexisting structure"

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(Lange, 2009, p. 7). This reinforcement of colonial structures and institutions has had detrimental effects, albeit different detrimental effects, in Senegal and Nigeria. Author Matthew Lange, in his book *Lineages of Despotism and Development*, had found that:

> by building on that state structure and promoting political participation, the states in directly ruled colonies usually became more bureaucratic, more infrastructurally powerful, and –especially—more inclusive as independence approached. The reforms in indirectly ruled colonies, on the other hand, almost always maintained minimal states with very limited legal-administrative capacities and therefore failed to build a state capable of promoting broad-based development.[26]

A continued analysis of the education systems, elites, and neocolonialism after independence reveal that, in fact, Senegal's state became more bureaucratic and powerful whereas Nigeria's state had very low capacity. There is still a lot of mistrust regarding Westernized bureaucracies in Senegal, which has contributed to their problems democratizing. In Nigeria, the only strong bureaucratic systems left over from colonial rule are institutions of coercion, such as the police and military. This has caused problems in the process of democratization as Nigeria has experienced several different eras of military rule between periods of civilian rule.

The analysis of the post-independence periods in Senegal and Nigeria will begin with a look at their education systems and follow with an analysis of the role of elites. Finally, because the conventions of direct and indirect rule do not apply after independence, the paper will address Senegal's and Nigeria's neo-colonial relationship with the post-industrialized world. This political-economic investigation will examine both countries' experiments with neo-liberal structural adjustment programs and their continued exploitive economic relationship with the rest of the world.

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[26] Lange, Matthew. *Lineages of Despotism and Development*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 2009. p. 7

As of today, neither Senegal nor Nigeria has achieved status as an electoral democracy due to issues with elections, fraud, and corruption. There is a clear desire among the populations of both countries to achieve democracy but there are many complex issues hampering this development. Elements left over from the colonial education systems, colonial use of elites, and the continued neocolonial relationship between these countries and the Western world have contributed to the failure of both countries to implement an effective democracy. An analysis of the link between the colonial past and present, institutions, will reveal the source of issues impeding the development of democracy in Senegal and Nigeria.

CHAPTER FOUR
POST-INDEPENDENCE ERA

Theories on the Relationship between Education and Democratization

Many theories about the relationship between democratization and education are subsets of modernization theories. Modernization theorists focusing on education have tended to highlight institutions of formal education and they have posited that formal education engenders democratic attitudes and behaviors in students (Kuenzi, 2005, p. 224). They suggest that education creates more politically informed and thus more politically active citizens. However, the fact is that there is inconclusive and even conflicting evidence about the relationship between education and the development of democracy, particularly in the African context.

Among modernization theorists and historical institutionalists alike there has been the consensus that diverse and tolerant civic cultures and civil societies are important foundations for the success of democracy. Education has been found to have an effect on civic culture (Kuenzi, 2005, p. 224). The idea is that more politically informed citizens will likely lead to more tolerant citizens and citizens who support democratic principles. Almond and Verba, modernization theorists, have noted that civic culture takes a long time to really develop and they suggest that new nations, such as those in Africa, can substitute education for time in trying to create a civic culture that engenders democracy (1963, p. 370). However, the link between education, civic culture, and democratization is much more complex than was once thought, which has lead to conflicting ideas about this theory. Several studies about the relationship between education, civic culture, and democratization have revealed that, "indeed, the effects of education on

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democratic processes are not straightforward and unidirectional" (Kuenzi, 2005, p. 225). In addition, some studies have shown that democratic values are not derived from education systems until the student has reached the highest levels of educational attainment. This is particularly problematic in the context of Senegal and Nigeria because it has been extraordinarily difficult to get public funding for higher education.

Because of the inconclusiveness about the relationship between education and democratization, especially in Africa, it is important to examine formal and informal education practices from a historical institutionalist perspective. Historical institutionalists agree with modernization theorists on a basic level about the relationship between education and democratization; education has a positive influence on students and helps to familiarize them with politics. Education in Africa is problematic, however for two reasons. First, when education is not universally available, as is the case in many African countries, political awareness becomes limited to the students who have access to education. Second, colonial education systems that remained after independence were not implemented to engender democracy. They were transplanted from the colonial powers and foreign to Africans.

This paper will address any democratizing effects of the education systems in Nigeria and Senegal in the post-independence era, considering access to it as well as how the education system as an institution affects the ordering of society as a whole. Schooling in Africa "has an impact on the formation of social classes and helps the civil societies that are emerging throughout the [sub-Saharan] region" (Boyle, 1999, p. 2). The social stratifications that the school systems produce could be equally as important as the ideas presented within them.

Education in Senegal: Path Dependency in Action

The formal education system in Senegal, today popularly called the "modern school," "French school," or "school for whites" is one of the most direct inheritances of French colonization (Huet-Gueye and de Leonardis, 2009, p. 370). The fact that an institution such as the education system could have such staying power is consistent with historical institutionalist ideas. People who had been exposed to the education system during the colonial era, certainly including politicians, had been shaped by it and thus desired its continuation in society. The existence of the education system as well as the norms practiced within it reinforces the idea that education is desirable and necessary for the development of the country. An analysis of the education system in Senegal is really an analysis of critical junctures. There were important political circumstances during independence that influenced the decisions of the political elites with respect to educational policy. Also, studies of critical junctures "divide the flow of historical events into periods of continuity" (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 942). The evolution of the education system can be divided into distinct periods separated by moments of important institutional reform.

Immediately following independence, Senegalese leaders were very preoccupied with learning how to govern because the French administrators ran everything during colonialism. Senegalese elites were rarely allowed to hold offices of power. The first years in office for the new Senegalese rulers required them to pay a lot of attention to pressing economic needs, so education initiatives fell by the wayside. Certainly the new Senegalese leaders put a great emphasis on economic priorities and "because the so-called social sectors (education, housing and health) were not perceived as presenting urgent needs, they were accorded no particular

attention in the first post-independence decade" (Sylla, 1993, p. 372). The colonial education system was seen as sufficient for the time being. With all of the state-building and other political activity after independence, it was easier to accept the relatively successful French education system. Thus the Senegalese had the habit "of seeing the Senegalese school system as an appendage of the French school system" (Sylla, 1993, p. 373). Indeed, the Senegalese education system is still heavily tied to the system in France.

Reforms in the 1970s and again in the 1980s have had their problems. Because education was only available to a very select few during the colonial era, those students who were a product of that system were mistrusted because they had gone through French assimilation. The members of the population who had not been exposed to French education and Western ideals were suspicious of those who had. Schoolteachers themselves were "stigmatized as advocates of assimilation" when they tried to promote democratic ideals (Diouf, 1993, p. 232).

The fractionalization of the population was not the only obstacle in the way of reform. Principally, there was not a lot of funding available for public schools. The rate of attendance was very low due to the exclusive nature of the schools during colonialism: "the old education system was elitist, selective, [and] exclusive; the new system would have to be democratic, inclusive and mass-oriented" (Sylla, 1993, p. 378). The leaders desiring to make these reforms intended for the school system to be democratic in the sense that education was supposed to be free of charge and universally available. The problem with these ideals, however, is that there are not enough resources to keep up with increasing demand. Indeed, "all solutions imagined and all projects initiated since 1985 seem to have been focused on one problem: the gap between educational needs and available resources" (Sylla, 1993, p. 381). The problems with funding for schools has been exacerbated by structural adjustment policies implemented by the World Bank

and International Monetary Fund, which limit social spending and spending on education.
Because Senegal had to take out loans with the international lending institutions, "the World
Bank has taken over the bulk of funding for educational projects," leaving Senegalese leaders
with less decision-making power with regards to their institutions of education (Sylla, 1993, p.
370). Senegal was one of the first country's to adopt a structural adjustment program (SAP) and
its quickness to do so stems from its historical relationship with the Western world and the close
ties between Senegalese leaders and France.

The education system in Senegal is actually still based on the education system in France.
Students must pass their 'baccalauréat,' a high school exit exam, just as French students must. In
order to get into high school, Senegalese students must obtain a 'Certificat de fin d'Études
Primaires Elémentaires' (CEPE) by passing an entry exam, which some scholars have posited
makes the education system less democratic (Huet-Gueye and de Leonardis, 2009, p. 371).
These same scholars also find the cost of education to be problematic in Senegal. There are
some tuition fees, there is the cost to get to and from school, as well the opportunity cost
imposed on some families who need their children to work to help bring in income (Huet-Gueye
and de Leonardis, 2009, p. 371). Consistent with historical institutionalism, schools in Senegal
remain, even after independence, reserved for an 'elite' class that can afford to send its children
to school. Therefore, only 58% of students complete primary school, with numbers decreasing
sharply for secondary school enrollments (unicef.org, 2009).

It is important to include institutions of non-formal education as well in an analysis of
education in Senegal. Senegal's population is primarily Muslim, so Koranic schools comprise an
important part of their non-formal education system. One study has found Koranic schools to be
very important, when paired with formal secular schooling, in engendering progressive attitudes

in students. Students enrolled in both Koranic and secular schools (about 50% of school-going children) are more favorable to modernization and the expansion of obligatory public schools (Huet-Gueye and de Leonardis, 2009, p. 384). Koranic schools also contribute to the functioning of civil society groups by creating commonalities and a stronger rapport between the students who spend their time there.

Looking at education from a broader perspective, the problem for Senegal's education system is not the content of its courses but the disparity in enrollment. Students tend to favor democratic ideals, as education theories would suggest. However, the colonial education system was highly selective and one can see that this has had lingering effects today. The French rarely built schools in rural areas as urban development was their primary concern. There is still a disparity between urban and rural areas as there are hardly enough resources available to expand the education system. This urban and rural divide has come to be significant not only to the education system, but to Senegal's democracy as a whole.

Education in Nigeria: Overcoming Regional Fractionalization

The education system in Nigeria is divided, as it is in Senegal. During colonial times, education was hardly available in the Northern regions because of Lord Lugard's anti-missionary policy there. It was available in the South only through the missionaries. After independence, Nigerian leaders sought to reconcile this problem and make primary education widely available through their Universal Primary Education (UPE) scheme launched in 1976. Wealth from petroleum made the conception and implementation of the UPE scheme possible[27]. This

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[27] The discovery of oil was a critical juncture in Nigeria's history, as it allowed for such expansions in social and political sectors and also as Nigerian politicians actively made choices to use profits from oil in this manner.

education plan was conceived because of the belief among the majority of Nigerians that a school certificate is an important "means to economic and social advancement" (Aborisade and Mundt, 2002, p. 78). Consistent with ideas about path dependency, this idea stems from Nigerians' same beliefs about education during the colonial era.

Nigerian leaders attempted to address the divide that had been made during colonial times between the regions. This created problems, however, in a society that was not yet ready to accommodate for large numbers of graduates: "on the one hand the school system mobilized very large numbers of young people for an economy that was not yet oriented towards the goal of providing unemployment for primary school leavers" (Boyle, 1999, p. 20). This is in line with Huntington's argument about the low level of capacity of new institutions[28]. Nigerian society suffered from an economic institutional debility: it did not possess an economic sector that provided jobs for graduates. The main problem with the UPE scheme that was launched in 1976, however, was not the unavailability of jobs. The fact remained that there was a great disparity between education in the north and south. Graduates from the south who sought jobs in the north were often rejected and inhabitants of the north were threatened by educated southerners (Aborisade and Mundt, 2002, p. 79). The north/south divide that had been created during colonial times with respect to education policy was exacerbated by economic competition for jobs in the independence era.

Recognizing the link between civic education and democratic values, the Nigerian government has implemented reforms recently that incorporate "citizenship education" into the

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[28] The education program experienced infrastructural deficiencies (3 million students signed up for enrollment when they were only prepared for 2.3 million) (Boyle, 1999, p. 21).

public school systems (Omo-Ojugo, Ibhafidon, and Otote, 2009, p. 153)[29]. The National Policy on Education in Nigeria has outlined a social studies program intended to "[inculcate] national consciousness and unity" and "to create awareness of the provisions of the Nigerian constitution and the need for democracy in Nigeria" (Omo-Ojugo, Ibhafidon, and Otote, 2009, p. 155). A study of the citizenship education programs in Nigeria has found, however, that most students and teachers were not even aware of this program because it was not implemented correctly or, in some contexts, not implemented at all. Here it is clear that there is a problem with the implementation of education policies rather than their content.

Corruption has been posited by some scholars as the reason for some infrastructural deficiencies in Nigeria's education system. Patron-client networks prevent work from being completed as members of the network are protected from disciplinary action. For instance, only 42.3% of the classrooms required to be available by the Universal Basic Education program were available for use. This can be partially explained by the fact that, when contractors are commissioned for school building jobs and they do not follow through, "no sanctions are imposed on such contractors because of their political clout" (Ikoya and Onoyase, 2008, p. 14). As in Senegal, resource deficiencies have caused great problems for the education system. Many students go without classrooms, desks, or textbooks. Some Nigerian scholars have posited that the problem comes from poor school inspection jobs that do not adequately address current issues in the classrooms.

Discussion of Post-Independence Education

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[29] "Studies of political culture since the seminal *Civic Culture* have affirmed the effect of education as a predictor of political participation. This is especially true in less developed countries" (Aborisade and Mundt, 2002, p. 81).

In both Senegal and Nigeria, modernization theories about the effects of education on democratization are difficult to apply. It is certainly true that students in both countries show a greater propensity towards political awareness which would likely engender democracy. However, the problem with the education systems in both countries is that they are not universally available. The availability of schools is directly linked to the way education systems were set up by the British and the French during the colonial era. Schools in Senegal were primarily located in urban areas, such as the *quatre communes*. Today there still exists a great urban/rural divide in the education system. The divide that was created in Nigeria is, instead, created along regional lines. In the north during colonialism there were not a lot of schools available due to the anti-missionary policies of Lord Lugard. In the south schooling was more widely available. The disparity in the availability of schools in different regions created a monumental task for Nigerian politicians as they tried to implement their Universal Primary Education scheme. The lack of resources available for the education systems in both Senegal and Nigeria are a result of hindrances of their economic development. Both countries are experiencing high demand for education but they both lack sufficient resources to meet the demand.

In Senegal, one of the problems could be understood to be the fact that their education system is pretty much the same as it was during colonial rule. Colonial institutions were created by men from outside the African context and thus were thus foreign to local populations. French education systems are not perfectly suited to Senegal, though because of path dependency, Senegal has maintained an education system closely linked to the one in France. Some might argue that this gives their institution legitimacy, but others would argue that it makes the education system more exclusive and less relevant to the Senegalese themselves. Their

education system was designed by the French and is based off of a French system that was originally devised for the French—not Africans. However, it can be construed as positive that colonialism left behind a great desire for access to education. It is true that Senegalese leaders have made it a priority on official record to make education universally available to everyone, but enrollment rates remain low and concentrated in urban areas.

In Nigeria, most of the problems with the education system stem from resource deficiencies. There are not enough classrooms or classroom supplies, and the curriculum that was outlined by the government in 1999 for their Universal Basic Education program has not been implemented. Organizationally there are also problems as people who hold administrative positions are not held to a very high standard. In both cases it would be difficult to tell if education has contributed to democratization. Students in both Senegal and Nigeria have been shown to demonstrate propensities towards democratic values, but both of the education systems suffer from deficiencies that inhibit their universality. If education in Africa was both universal and democratic it might actually contribute towards democratization. The problem is that education is not universally available, which creates divides between members of society.

Elites in Senegal: Imitation of the French Consolidation of Power

During colonial rule, almost no Senegalese was allowed to hold a position of administrative power, especially in urban areas like Dakar. The French had deposed traditional rulers to set up their own administration[30]. The only traditional rulers who consolidated some power under French colonial rule were the Islamic marabouts, or religious leaders, who

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[30] "The process led to the disappearance of several traditional power roles and distorted general behavioural patterns within Senegalese society" (Osabu-Kle, 2000, p.190).

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controlled constituents in the rural areas. Otherwise, in order to be considered for low-level

positions in the colonial government one had to become extremely assimilated and achieve

évolué status. Indigenous elites did this through the education system, where they learned the

French language, French customs, French history, and the French political style. At

independence, Senegal's first president, Leopold Senghor, had achieved *évolué* status and was

one of the most assimilated Senegalese citizens. Indeed, Senghor was so highly assimilated that,

"when there was a dispute as to the interpretation of the constitution in the National Assembly

[in Paris] it was as often as not the second deputy of Senegal [Senghor] to whom the President of

the Assembly referred for advice" (Crowder, 1967, p. 52). This level of assimilation would have

implications for the politicians' decisions after independence.

The politics during the independence movement in Senegal were marked by efforts by

Senegalese leaders to create a West African Federation with other French colonies, such as Côte

d'Ivoire and Mali. Senegal actually gained its independence in federation with Mali. However,

Senghor's political party found itself to have different ideals than the party of power in Mali and

so the two nations split a few months after independence. Senghor, highly assimilated to the

French ways of doing things, wanted a slower removal from the French colonizer and wanted to

"adapt European [political] ideas to an African cultural base" rather than break with European

ideas completely (Osabu-Kle, 2000, p. 193). Senghor and the *originaires*, as the African

political elite liked to call themselves, no doubt had been heavily influenced by French

assimilation practices. They had all experienced the French education system and process of

indoctrination and were more influenced by it than they probably even knew[31]. Importantly, "their movement borrowed the concept and structure of the State as envisaged by the nineteenth century European ideology," greatly due to their French education (Diouf, 1993, p. 234). The application of historical institutionalism is clear here as one can see a direct link between the influence of assimilation on the decisions of policymakers in Senegal.

Interestingly, the Islamic marabouts who had learned to consolidate some power under the colonial state were against the policies of the *originaires*. They did not even really want national sovereignty because methods they had institutionalized in order to remain in power would be threatened by such a vast amount of change[32]. The marabouts soon learned that change was imminent and secured their power with the upcoming Senegalese leaders[33]. They controlled the rural vote—their constituents would vote for whoever they dictated. So, leaders like Senghor and his successor Abdou Diouf had to "tap support from patron-client networks run by religious brotherhoods…for support in the rural areas" (Diouf, 1993, p. 252).

Right at independence, Senghor won a lot of support from diverse political groupings in Senegal with his message of cultural nationalism and African unity[34]. The Senegalese population was united in its desire to eradicate the French. This doctrine of unity, however, contributed to the consolidation of power into the hands of Senghor's political party, the Bloc Democratique Senegalais. However, single-party rule was not just a result of one political

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[31] Their political movement which strove to claim back national sovereignty from the French colonial power was led by men who came primarily "from intellectual, civil service, business or trade union backgrounds," meaning that they had all experienced some degree of French assimilation (Diouf, 1993, p. 234).
[32] "The religious leaders campaigned for a Franco-African community under the threat of the French to lower Senegalese peanut prices to world levels" (Mbodji, 1991, p. 120).
[33] "old holders of legitimate authority had become skillful at constantly adapting to changes in the authoritarian colonial system, learning in the process to bargain for privileges through direct or indirect pressure" (Diouf, 1993, p. 235).
[34] "Senghor's cultural nationalism, which emphasized African values, in conjunction with the earlier work of the Islamic marabouts in fusing African culture with Islamic values to bring the aspirations of the indigenous Senegalese to the fore, served as a unifying force" (Osabu-Kle, 2000, p. 201).

party's efforts to consolidate their power. In support of historical institutionalism, the post-independence behavior by the elites also has a lot to do with what they learned from the French during colonial rule. France's love of a powerful centralized state was no doubt imbued upon the Senegalese elite, which continued them along a path of consolidating power, eventually into the hands of a single party. Also, the practice of buying votes was surely learned from the behavior of the French administrators as well.

There was an attitude among the French administrators that they knew better how to rule the Senegalese economy and government. This idea was the basis for their most important colonial goal: the *mission civilatrice*. The French justified their rule in part because they sincerely believed that their system was better. This elitist attitude was certainly adopted by the most highly assimilated Senegalese. Senghor's ruling regime believed "it was the only agency qualified to interpret reality, to organize the endowment of events and phenomena with meaning, and to map the contours of the grand highway to economic development and social justice" (Diouf, 1993, p. 223). In reality, the elites were highly assimilated and the vast majority of their constituents were not. Thus, there was a great divide between the elites and their constituents[35].

The elitist attitude stemmed from assimilation and led to the endorsement of 'technocracy' in Senegalese politics. This type of political rule led to the consolidation of power, specifically, into the hands of the presidency. This office became the source of the most powerful patron-client network in Senegal. There were only a "few juicy patronage-dispensing areas left" outside the office of the presidency (Diouf, 1993, p. 258). Politics became centered

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[35] "Those who were assimilated became aliens in their own land—sometimes becoming more French than the French themselves" (Osabu-Kle, 2000, p. 191).

on the control of resources and resource dispensing rather than on the implementation of effective policy.

The consolidation of power was visible in other ways as well. The alliance of the *originaires* paired with the Islamic marabouts quickly led to one-party rule in Senegal: "From 1950 to 1958, the BDS, thanks to its support network of marabouts and its co-optation of *évolués* from the outlying reaches of the colonial system, achieved a level of dominance that shifted the country towards single-party rule" (Diouf, 1993, p. 234). With the power concentrated so tightly in the hands of so few politicians, coupled with the influence of the international financial institutions and their SAPs, politicians became increasingly removed from their constituents.

The influence of French colonial rule is quite clear from a historical institutionalist perspective. Elites were highly assimilated during colonial rule and, because the education system remained largely the same for several years after independence, elites remained highly assimilated. There was a great interest among Senegalese politicians to continue working with the French even after independence. They still felt dependent on the French, especially since their political platform was inspired by European ideology, entirely foreign to Senegal except for colonization. The centralization of power was also learned from the French but is also a result of the desire of politicians to keep power who believed they were the best suited to run the country.

Elites in Nigeria: Towards Neo-patrimonial Rule

During the colonial era in Nigeria, ethnicity became highly politicized[36]. The British sought to endow certain groups with political power so that they would implement British

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[36] A "significant negative development that emanated from indirect rule was the promotion of ethnicity, which adversely affected Nigeria's colonial and postcolonial politics" (Dibua, 2006, p. 61).

colonial practices. The conception of the British administrators was that every Nigerian belonged to a specific ethnic group, when this was not, in fact the case. They hardened the lines between ethnic groups and made them more prominent than they were before the British presence there. Importantly, "ethnic citizenship rather than civic citizenship became the basis for defining a Nigerian" which has severe consequences after independence (Dibua, 2006, p. 61).

In Senegal, the French did give some of the colonized peoples some practice with democratic processes, such as voting and the formation of political parties. Indeed, Leopold Senghor's political party, the *Bloc Democratique Senegalais* was formed under colonial rule in 1948. In Nigeria, the local populations had no experience with the formation or employment of political parties. Instead, just before independence, the British created political parties for the Nigerians that inevitably fell along ethnic lines: "the British preparation of the colonies for independence involved the formation of political parties and political campaigns, and the political elite's appeals to ethnic ties and traditions in their efforts to gather political support accentuated ethnic sensitivities" (Osabu-Kle, 2000, p. 138). The Nigerians had no experience with voting or the creation of parties and thus did not know what to do with this foreign political system that had been imposed upon them.

The fact that the political parties were formed along ethnic lines was problematic because of how polarizing it was; however, the fact that other colonial institutions of power remained compounded problems and limited cooperation between groups even further. For instance, colonial institutions of control, such as the military and police, were handed over to the elites, who used them for coercion: "in the absence of autonomizing mechanisms in the post-colonial state, the resources of physical coercion become the tools of particular groups, especially the hegemonic factions of the ruling class" (Dibua, 2006, p. 10). Ethnic groups that became the

basis for political parties used the coercive power of force to gain power and access to control over resources. Unfortunately, this quickly led to ethnic violence and civil war shortly after independence in Nigeria

The sharp divide between the north and the south began and was institutionalized by indirect rule during colonial times. Elite formation took radically different paths in the two regions, which has had severe implications for the political development in Nigeria. In the north under colonial rule, Islamic leaders had all of the political control. After independence Islamic elites maintained that control and in 1979, they consolidated their power even further by officially putting Shari'a law in the constitution: "indeed, the northern political clout was reflected in the inclusion of the Shari'a court system into the 1979 constitution under Articles 240 – 244" (Vaughan, 2005, p. 123). Elites in the south, however, were not necessarily the people who ruled during colonial times. The fact that education was widely available in the south led Nigerians to believe that the way to access power was through education, as was the case in Senegal.

In the south, the "system steadily encouraged the political ascendancy of a Western-educated Christian elite" (Vaughan, 2005, p. 117). Truly the Christian missionary education system worked to divide the northern and southern regions sharply: "following six decades of Christian missionary impact since the mid-nineteenth century, Western-educated Christian elites armed with British official approval in the 1920s, 1930s, and the 1940s became agents of modernization in the colonial native authority structures" (Vaughan, 2005, p. 118). This reflects differences in the direct rule practices of the British in the southern regions compared with the indirect practices of the northern region. Similar to direct rule practices in Senegal, the direct rule in southern Nigeria made it necessary for people to work within colonial systems to gain

access to power. In both Senegal and southern Nigeria, those natives who were the most 'Westernized' through their education and indoctrination gained approval and therefore power from the colonial authorities.

Overall the elite formation practices in Nigeria during colonial rule continued after independence in the manner of path dependency. At the critical juncture of independence, the British formed political parties for the Nigerians, problematically along ethnic lines. Colonial practices of using violent force for coercion were institutionalized and also continued after independence. The state "became the primary instrument for surplus accumulation in Nigeria…[and] the control of the all-powerful colonial state guaranteed access to that surplus" (Dibua, 2006, p. 63-64). The continued relationship between the Nigerian state and colonial economic practices led to the ascendancy of patron-client networks that controlled the resources and resource distribution in the country. Elites were well aware of the power that came with control of state offices and therefore contested heavily for as much control over the state apparatus as possible, which quickly led to neo-patrimonial rule.

Discussion of Elites

Elites, though they had different roles in colonial Senegal and Nigeria, have become very important in both of these post-colonial states. The elites that were formed in Senegal gained power and prestige primarily through the French colonial state, and those that did not (the marabouts) quickly teamed up with the other elites in order to consolidate their power. In Nigeria, some elites in the south gained power through their missionary education. Other elites gained their power from the British during colonial rule and were thus in a better position to keep it after independence. Elites in Nigeria and Senegal primarily wanted access to the state's

resources and in both contexts clientelist relationships arose. The difference was that, in Nigeria, institutions of state coercion were much more powerful and the elites already knew how to use them, as they had during colonial rule. On the other hand, elites in Senegal had experience with creating political parties, and those parties were not created along ethnic lines. In both instances, patron-client networks became the preferred manner of doing business, as political contestation for power over state resources became the most important initiative for elites.

Senegal's Structural Adjustment Programs: The Path of Least Resistance?

Many theories concerning the relationship between economic and democratic development are modernization theories. They posit that certain economic developments are necessary for the engendering of democracy, such as a strong private industrial sector, limited or no trade barriers, tight monetary policy, and limited government involvement in economic affairs. These ideas served as the basis for structural adjustment programs imposed by the IMF and World Bank in many indebted former colonies in Africa.

Senegal has had a lot of experience with structural adjustment programs as it was one of the first African countries to implement one (Daffé and Diop, 2004, p. 271). Working with the IMF and World Bank since the 1970s, Senegalese leaders have changed their economic policy several times under the direction and advice of the international lending institutions[37]. The IMF and World Bank operate under the assumptions of neo-liberal economic policy that supposes that "the market is essentially effective while state intervention is crippling and ineffective" (Daffé and Diop, 2004, p. 301). Senegalese leaders, due to their neocolonial relationship with the

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[37] "The economic history of Senegal from independence through the mid-1980s can be divided into four well-defined periods: 1960-1967, 1968-1973, 1974-1978, 1979-1986" (Youm, 1991, p. 21). In this framework, one could also consider the additional SAPs implemented in the 1990s as a fifth period of economic reform.

Western world, became convinced that compliance with the international financial institutions (IFIs) was necessary. This continued neocolonial relationship mentioned above follows with historical institutionalist theory that preexisting modi operandi will, at the very least, affect future policy decisions and will, more likely, endure.

At first after independence, the economic relationship between Senegal and France remained largely unchanged: "these policies were decidedly neocolonial. In the first decade of independence, continuity was the striking feature in patterns of Senegal's commercial and financial ties to France" (Boone, 1991, p 130). Thus the structure of the economy during colonial times affected the development of Senegal's economy after independence. During colonialism, the French enterprises dominated the AOF market. Monopoly by single firms was not only tolerated but promoted and supported by the colonial government[38]. When the Senegalese elites charged with running the government came to power, they thus saw no problem with trying to monopolize the market. They set up parastatals, public enterprises that were owned and operated by the government, which seems to be a direct imitation of colonial practices. Elites were used to the monopolistic nature of their market and, wanting to take over control of capital and resources, created a monopoly of their own. The state became the dominant player in the market as clientelist practices expanded and control of the government progressively equated to control of resources and the market. People looking for jobs increasingly looked towards the political arena for potential employment[39].

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[38] "Advantages were to be had by first entrants [to the market]: the largest firms were granted production monopolies by the colonial administration. All of the Dakar manufacturers were sheltered from international (i.e., non-French) competition by the Franc Zone monetary and trade regime" (Boone, 1991, p. 129).
[39] "As avenues for indigenous capital accumulation in the private sector narrowed, relatively privileged elements within Senegalese society looked to politics and positions within the colonial administration as a means of securing and consolidating advantages gained in the earlier period" (Boone, 1991, p. 135).

Colonial practices influenced the Senegalese market in other ways after independence.

Before 1960 Senegal (and Dakar specifically) was the center of all of France's colonial activities

on the African continent. France had integrated its colonies into its market and had also created

a special market between the colonies themselves. Because of the structure of this colonial

market, "at independence Dakar housed an industrial and administrative infrastructure far too

large for the needs of the Senegalese economy" (Youm, 1991, p. 21). Just after independence

the economy actually had too much capacity. It had been created to service the entire AOF,

which spans a much larger area than Senegal itself. It became difficult for Senegal's leaders to

adjust and scale down to accommodate to the size of the local market, which caused the

underutilization of production capacity and a reduction of foreign investments into the economy

(Youm, 1991, p. 21-22)[40].

Senegal's neocolonial relationship with France led to the continued concentration on the

exportation of its peanut crop[41]. France maintained its subsidy on the crop until 1968, and the

crop's subsequent success left Senegalese leaders with no incentives to diversify their economy.

The benefits that Senegal's farmers received from this subsidy ended when France took it down.

Droughts also hampered production and exports which contributed to the country's increasing

debt during this period.

In the period between the two oil shocks, 1974-1978, Senegal embarked on an expansion

of its economy due to temporarily good economic conditions. Peanut and phosphate prices and

exports rose during this time, leading the government to believe that it was time to expand:

"government expenditures increased 78 percent between 1974 and 1977" (Youm, 1991, p. 26).

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[40] "The closure of the protected AOF market resulted in idle production capacity in Senegal, forcing foreign investors to reduce their investments" (Youm, 1991, p. 24).
[41] "This crop used an increasing share (more than one-half) of national cultivated area in an ecological zone subject to recurring drought cycles" from the period 1960-1967 (Youm, 1991, p. 23).

There was, however, financial crisis in 1978 that led the government to implement a structural adjustment program delineated by the IMF and World Bank[42]. The SAP was implemented in attempts to increase supply, privatize industry and agriculture, and reduce the national debt. Results have been mixed but the fact still remains: "in spite of all these efforts and the progress achieved, the economy is still vulnerable and highly dependent on the support of the international community" (Youm, 1991, p. 30).

The SAP has affected different segments of the economy in different ways. To serve as an example of an industry negatively affected by the SAP, the textile industry had previously been touted by financiers as having great potential to help diversify Senegal's economy. Instead, SAP measures of compressing private demand, restricting domestic credit, and cutting government expenditures had adverse effects on the textile industry's growth. The program "narrowed options for stabilizing the sector or restructuring it on the government's own terms" (Boone, 1991, p. 141)[43]. The continued influence of the IMF and World Bank, due largely to institutional inertia and precedent decisions by policymakers, has made them influential players in the Senegalese government's affairs, rendering Senegalese officials themselves less sovereign in relation to their own policies.

In 1986 the World Bank furnished the New Industrial Policy (NIP) experiment as "one of the most radical reforms ever undertaken in Senegal since the country's economy underwent structural adjustment" (Daffé and Diop, 2004, p. 291). This experiment called for rapid

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[42] "Trade deficits became a permanent feature of the economy. Salary adjustment in the government, maintenance of a level of employment and hiring without relation to the underlying efficiency level of the public sector manufacturing, and recurrent expenditures arising from the expansion of the public service sector constituted the main causes of imbalances in the economy; these could only be eliminated at a high political and social cost for the overall society" (Youm, 1991, p. 26).
[43] "The World Bank assumed that existing private firms would respond positively to liberalization by producing more efficiently, while the government had ample evidence to suggest that this was not so" (Boone, 1991, p. 141).

privatization, liberalization, and the taking down of trade barriers. There were many harmful

consequences to this "shock therapy," however. The private sector, which had previously been

more protected, was not prepared to compete: "the share of Senegal's exports on foreign markets

fell by one fifth of what it was in the 1960s" (Daffé and Diop, 2004, p. 295). Foreign

investments into the Senegalese economy also dropped off with the implementation of the NIP[44].

Privatization and the de-nationalization of parastatals did nothing to improve their efficiency or

increase investment but rather "translated into their being taken over by foreign interests" (Daffé

and Diop, 2004, p. 305). Other problems with the NIP included the lack of transparency in

choosing this particular policy, which alludes to the increased influence of the IFIs and the

ensuing decreased sovereignty of the Senegalese government and its officials. Surely the leaders

played a part in the implementation of this policy, but they were no doubt under pressure from

the IFIs to comply.

The increasing influence of the IMF and World Bank certainly resulted from the

neocolonial relationship between Senegal and the Western world. There was a "multiplication of

sources of pressures on policy decisions and the growing influence of IFIs since the early 1980s

[which] compounded [economic] policy incoherence" (Oya, 2006, p. 221). The structural

adjustments changed several times over the course of the independence period, with continued

mixed results. The fact that Senegal felt the need to borrow from these international lending

institutions at all reflects their neocolonial relationship with the post-industrialized world.

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[44] "from US$ -3 million in 1985, the flow of direct investment from outside fell to US$ -50 million in 1987" (Daffé
and Diop, 2004, p. 295).

Nigeria's Structural Adjustment Program: A Perfect Storm of Unfortunate Circumstances

Nigeria has had a much more tumultuous relationship with the international lending institutions than Senegal. At independence, Nigeria was self-sufficient in food production and was actually one of the main exporters of foodstuffs in the region. Its discovery of oil however, and the consequent involvement of the IFIs in its economic affairs, has hampered Nigeria's ability to reap the benefits of having such a lucrative commodity for export. When Nigeria first discovered oil, it was able to make a lot of profit because there was an international oil boom. Once able to produce all the food it needed, Nigeria stopped concentrating on its agricultural sector and instead used its profits from oil to import food (Aborsade and Mundt, 2002, p. 38). In addition to this turnaround in the economy, Nigerian leaders were advised to take out many loans with the IMF and World Bank in order to expand the economy during this economic boom. However, the oil shocks of the 1970s caused severe problems for Nigeria, as it had become so heavily dependent on income from the export of oil. With oil temporarily unprofitable, Nigeria fell deeply into debt as it had to take out more loans to import food and other primary goods.

By the 1980s, there was a substantial fiscal crisis which was "manifested in balance of payment deficits, huge external and internal debts, heavy budget deficits, a high rate of inflation, smuggling, a low level of capacity utilization in the manufacturing industries and the worsening material condition of the majority of the populace" (Dibua, 2006, p. 249). Because of this situation, Nigerian leaders embarked on more negotiations with the IFIs, against the will of the Nigerian people, who saw relations with the IFIs as detrimental to the Nigerian economy.

Amidst the problems during negotiations, Ibrahim Babangida carried out a coup of the government in order to resolve economic issues[45].

In attempts to win over his new constituents, Nigeria's new leader held public debates about the implementation of IMF loans and structural adjustment programs, but "to Babangida's disappointment, the outcome of the debate was a massive rejection of the loan" (Dibua, 2006, p. 251). It was clear that "by 1986, it was becoming increasingly difficult to service Nigeria's huge foreign debts while the IFIs and other external creditors refused to extend more credit facilities to the country unless the government implemented a structural adjustment program" (Dibua, 2006, p. 252). This demonstrates the fact that Nigeria's leaders felt that they were without choice when it came to their financial and economic situation. They had incurred a lot of debt (partly thanks to advice from the IFIs themselves) and saw the IFIs as the only solution to their debt problems. In the end, Babangida implemented the SAP against the will of his people[46]. Because of the historical precedent of working with the IFIs, Nigerian leaders were led to cooperate with them once again. This neocolonial dependency on the IFIs has created many problems for the Nigerian government.

For one, the manufacturing sector experienced serious decline under the SAP: "the reasons given for the low level of output and capacity utilization include the massive devaluation of the naira [Nigeria's currency], the high interest rates, and the inadequate supply of enterprises, all of which led to the escalation of the cost of production and the prices of finished goods"

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[45] "the *Financial Times* stated, 'it was probably the first time in Africa that a government overthrow has been caused at least in part by failure to reach agreement with the IMF'" (Dibua, 2006, p. 251).
[46] "Indeed, this authoritarian manner of introducing and implementing SAP was in line with the position of the IFIs that only strong regimes with the political will to force the SAP measures on their populace were in the position to effectively implement the reform package" (Dibua, 2006, p. 252).

(Dibua, 2006, p. 260-261)[47]. Just as it happened in Senegal, the privatization of industrial firms did not increase investment or improve efficiency (Dibua, 2006, p. 266).

Agriculture was also adversely affected by the SAP as peasant farmers were left at the mercy "of private traders and the market forces" which left them open to "exploitation, increased prices of inputs and fluctuating prices for their products" (Dibua, 2006, p. 269)[48]. Farmers saw a sharp increase in inflation due to the devaluation of the naira while simultaneously experiencing declines in the global prices of primary commodities. This led many farmers to exercise the "exit option" where many people abandon farming and migrate to the urban centers, "thereby worsening the already acute employment situation in these areas" (Dibua, 2006, p. 271). Also important to note is the fact that social services like health care and education were put out of the reach of many Nigerians because government subsidies for social services were required to end under structural adjustment.

Overall, the implementation of the structural adjustment program in Nigeria has been problematic. It was applied without the consent of the population and has hampered long-term growth. The neo-liberal economic strategies have exposed Nigeria's market to intense international competition and fickle price international economic cycles. Efficiency in industry has not been improved and foreign investment has declined as Nigerians are becoming increasingly impoverished. Nigeria's attempts to break with the West to engender economic and political growth have failed as the country is now heavily indebted to IFIs who dictate their national policy.

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[47] "overall all industries performed universally poorly under SAP" (Dibua, 2006, p. 263).
[48] "It has been observed that the World Bank's strategy of development which is so strongly 'agriculture-based and export-oriented,' only exacerbates 'dependence on hostile foreign markets – and indeed will lead to further impoverishment of those countries which can only export crops for which there is limited, perhaps shrinking, demand'" (Dibua, 2006, p. 270).

Discussion of Structural Adjustment Programs

The implementation of structural adjustment programs in Africa is very interesting from a historical institutionalist perspective. Through colonialism, these countries were first exposed to international capitalist markets. Once the colonial powers left, the men who took over government institutions had already been influenced by the force of the international economy. These men, who might not know much about the international economy except for colonialism (and who also might not be in power except for colonialism), were essentially forced to continue to make attempts to participate in trade with their former colonial rulers as well as other industrialized countries. This relationship is inherently unequal and imbalanced and it exposed local populations to intense global competition.

Attempts to compete in the international capitalist market have caused problems for both Senegal and Nigeria. Senegal has a groundnut economy that has relied heavily on the export of peanuts. Because Senegal depends on an agricultural export, they are subject to the whims of climate and geography. Senegal's attempts to compete have been hampered by declining international peanut prices as well as issues with the budget. Quickly after independence, Senegal fell into debt. Senegal's historical relationship with the Western world led it to feel as if it were necessary to take out loans with the IMF and World Bank, which came with the conditionality of implementing a structural adjustment program (SAP). Nigeria's case differs slightly from that of Senegal. Nigeria is fortunate to have a good supply of oil for international export. However, the oil crisis in the 1970s and 1980s led to balance of budget problems in Nigeria as well and the country fell into debt. Taking advice from international financiers, Nigerian elites were also led to believe that loans from the IMF and World Bank were necessary

as well. In both the cases of Senegal and Nigeria, colonialism and the past interactions with the industrialized world led to a continued relationship wherein their economies were linked in a dependent fashion to the Western world. This continued relationship has been termed "neo-colonial" which highlights the special economic terms of the relationship. Just as under colonial times, the economies of Senegal and Nigeria are still heavily linked to their colonial powers as well as other members of the Western world. Structural adjustment programs from international lending institutions provide a perfect example of the manifestation of this relationship.

Structural adjustment programs have been implemented in the majority of countries in Africa. SAPs are the terms and conditions of loans given out by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Operating with the intent of integrating impoverished and indebted countries into the international capitalist system, the World Bank and IMF give out loans under specific conditions. These conditions reflect the modernizationist paradigm of neo-liberal economic policies. SAPs seek to reduce government spending, monetary tightening, elimination of government subsidies for food, privatization of enterprises previously owned by the government, and reductions in barriers to trade (Naiman and Watkins, 1999). The general failure of the SAPs in most countries in Africa, including Senegal and Nigeria, point to the flaws of modernization theory.

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION

A historical institutional analysis of the conventions mentioned above reveals a lot of the problems associated with democratization in Senegal and Nigeria. A study of the elites, education systems, and neocolonial relationships unveils important blockages to the economic and political development of these two sub-Saharan African countries. Africa's past greatly affects their present state of political affairs. Historical institutionalism allows us to see the connection between the colonial past and neocolonial present. On the other hand, taking a modernization approach in the study of sub-Saharan Africa is problematic, as neo-liberal economic policies have caused more problems than they have helped to solve.

The puzzle that led to this research was: why have former French and former British colonies in Africa had difficulties with democratization? This research has revealed a multitude of reasons for Senegal and Nigeria's troubles. Africa remains the poorest and most afflicted continent earth and there is certainly a correlation with its political and economic development today and its colonial past. Historical institutionalist theory has provided the link between the colonial past and independence era. The hypothesis that former British colonies have done better with democratization than former French colonies does not seem to be supported by these two case studies. Both countries have had their difficulties with democratization, some similar in both contexts and some quite divergent.

In both Senegal and Nigeria, neo-patrimonial rule became the norm as it became clear that control over the state would mean control over resources and wealth. Certainly, the two

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came to this form of rule through different paths. In Senegal, elites inspired by the French colonial model consolidated power into the office of the presidency, and the government set up hundreds of parastatal businesses to generate income. In Nigeria, elites had no experience with political parties and instead used their offices of power, granted by the exiting colonial authority, to make money. Also, the institutions of coercion such as the military and police were used by Nigerian elites to hold several coups d'état and institute military rule, and it is generally acknowledged that a "responsible and democratic system cannot be achieved by the military" (Anifowose, 2002, p. 95). Neo-patrimonial rule has, interestingly, mimicked the type of authoritarian state structures set up by both Great Britain and France during their periods of colonial rule. The colonial administration was set up to extract resources for economic purposes, just as both governments in Senegal and Nigeria came to do during the independence era. Historical institutionalist conventions of path dependency explain this type of behavior of the political elites.

With respect to education and democratization, Senegal and Nigeria have both struggled. It is generally accepted that participation in institutions of formal education eventually engenders democratic ideals of political participation, inclusion, and tolerance. However, both Senegal and Nigeria have had issues, due to their depressed economic conditions, of funding educational institutions that are available to a majority of the population. Also, the system of education in Senegal was transplanted from France and thus did not suit the needs of the Senegalese people for many decades. Schools were concentrated in urban areas, leaving rural areas unattended to. In Nigeria, the disparity in the access to schools among the northern and southern regions created during the colonial era remained throughout the independence era. Historical institutionalism helps to explicate the reasons for the disparity of access in both countries.

Finally, historical institutionalism does a good job of explaining the neocolonial relationship between Senegal and Nigeria and the Western world. Exposed to the international marketplace during colonialism, these countries were advised and instructed to continue the type of colonial trading relationship after independence. Senegalese and Nigerian elites were told by the exiting colonial powers that the way to development was to continue exporting to and importing from industrialized countries. The first Senegalese president, Leopold Senghor, desired to keep strong ties with France and to separate themselves slowly from their colonial power. In Nigeria, when oil was discovered, politicians were encouraged by IFIs to take out loans (going further into debt) in order to expand their economy, which failed with the oil crisis. Both countries found themselves in need of structural adjustment programs, which failed and compounded problems in both contexts. The neocolonial exploitive relationship that has developed in both countries is, undoubtedly, difficult to break away from. Indebted to these IFIs and forced to implement their neo-liberal economic policies, Senegal and Nigeria are stuck between a rock and hard place.

Overall, historical institutionalism does a good job of explaining the actions taken by these two sub-Saharan former colonies. Though they have both failed up until this point to implement legitimate electoral democracies, there is a clear desire in both countries to eventually do so. This analysis of former colonial institutions into the independence era reveals some of the sources of these countries' woes. There are, certainly, many more problems with instituting democracy that were not addressed by this paper, though a similar historical institutionalist analysis of those problems would likely reveal the source to be the colonial past and neocolonial present.

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