THREE APPROACHES TO AGRICULTURAL PROTECTIONISM: SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND IDENTITY

by

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(Under the Direction of Doug Stinnett)

ABSTRACT

Protectionism within an economic sector is contingent upon the interaction of variables from at least three sources: security concerns, domestic forces, and ideational social constructs. This work examines these forces as they affect agricultural protectionism. Three competing theories are operationalized and tested using OLS regression. Variables are constructed representing Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. Empirical analysis shows that domestic pressures most likely drive applied tariff rates for the sample of WTO states examined.

INDEX WORDS: Agriculture, Constructivism, Identity, Liberalism, Protectionism, Realism, Security, Tariff
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Considering worldwide trade trends over the past half-century, variations in protectionist policies among the various trade sectors have been observed. Throughout the course of the 20th century and into the 21st, the growing trend among trading nations was that of liberalizing trade. However, close observation of this trend reveals that the agricultural sector has retained many trade barriers. More striking is the observation of “liberal democracies” continuing the practice of protectionism in their agricultural trade policies, whilst many developing states have lowered tariffs and non-tariff barriers. This leads us to an interesting research question: How do we explain the variations in protectionist agricultural policies among the world’s states? In other words, why do some states have higher agricultural trade barriers than others?

This project seeks to answer this question. In the pages that follow, I shall examine the logic of three fundamental IR theories – realism, liberalism, and constructivism – in attempt to best determine the rationale behind this puzzle. I formulate subsequent hypotheses, drawing potential explanatory inferences from each respective aforementioned theory.

A comparative study of states’ various economic policies presents an often nebulous universe of concepts and inter-connected issue areas. Since many agricultural products are the first stage of longer manufacturing processes, there is an inherent overlapping of economic sectors. For example, forest products such as wood pulp become paper products and grains may eventually wind up as hard liquor. Additionally, protectionist policies often affect multiple industries simultaneously; government monies allocated for farmers might actually be divided
among growers, transportation firms, and warehousing businesses. Thus, it is necessary to make an effort towards the establishment of a clearly defined agricultural sector.

For the purposes of empirical analysis, the farming community will serve as the agricultural sector. Protectionist policies aimed towards the sustenance of the farmer—whether small family-owned businesses or large multi-national corporate firms—are the subject of my analysis. Hence, the agricultural sector as it appears in this work speaks to the production level—the farmer. Protectionism as it is used throughout this paper refers to governmental policies aimed at reducing the import of certain products. A much larger, comprehensive work would surely incorporate the vast array of lucrative subsidies employed by nation-states to circumvent the governance to the World Trade Organization. Tariff barriers are slowly being lowered in all sectors of trade, but many times states protect their farmers through aid in disguise of disaster relief, crop insurance subsidizing, freight reimbursement, or conservation reserve programs. The complexities in which these programs exist make data collection and analysis all the more tedious and unreliable. States are highly reluctant to advertise the extent to which their agricultural sectors are provided aid, as opponents to such practices seize the opportunity to wage protest and carry the cause of less developed nations. For this reason, only tariffs are analyzed in the context of protectionism.

This project is intended to explore a unique nexus of politics, economics, and societal structure. Agriculture is overlooked often times in favor of research within manufacturing or industrial sectors. It should not go without mention, though, that agriculture is different than any other sector of production in that there is an inherent societal connection between the economics and lifestyle of farmers. Not only does agriculture represent a source of food, but there are ideational attachments to the noble task of tilling the land. Domestic forces know this and
organize to promote the fact that without aid, farmers will not be able to survive the pure competition of the agricultural sector. Hence, governments treat agriculture different, as evidence by the exclusion of agriculture from all GATT negotiations for decades. This observation—that agriculture is in a class by itself—makes it a deserving topic for study. Indeed, the analysis that follows below could yield valuable insight into the origins of foreign policy, the power domestic political forces, and the value of cultural norms and values.

Even in the presence of the WTO, the liberalization of agriculture commodities still lags behind other traded goods. Figures vary and are highly contested, but some claim that protectionist policies on agriculture are up to eight times higher than other traded goods. Moreover, some products such as sugar, beef, and other dairy products are viciously defended and subsidized, not only in the US but in the EU and Japan as well. Agriculture appears to be one of the last strongholds the US has to fend off the powers of globalized market pressure. It could thus be hypothesized that US policymakers attempt to retain some sense of autonomy through agricultural policy. Whether or not food security is an issue is highly contested and will require more than political rhetoric to determine; later chapters in this project will attempt to analyze this issue.

We may look, for example, to agricultural protection in Japan that centers primarily on rice production, a staple of the region’s diet and cornerstone of the state’s culture. Agriculture is the nexus of three forces and a result security concerns initiate protectionist policies, domestic forces intensify this push for protectionism, and the shrinking numbers of family farms may warrant agricultural protectionism. As a result, rice tariffs in Japan are the highest of any product imported into the state. Thus, Japan is an excellent example of the three approaches outlined

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throughout this work: protection for security, protection in response to democratic forces, and protection to protect agrarian identity.

In 1998, rice tariffs were raised to an astounding 1,300 per cent. Attempts to curb the importation of rice grown outside the nation were highly successful. The rationale behind these moves was threefold and they comport well with the hypotheses posited in this paper. According to Mulgan (2000), the primary reason for the surge in rice tariffs was the sustainability of Japanese farmers. Pressures from the Korean Peninsula and neighboring China undoubtedly contribute to tension on the Japanese islands about the prospects of war. In such a case, Japan need not be reliant on outside sources of food—in this case the staple of rice. Globalization and interdependence tend to put small farmers like the case of Japan’s out of business. In response, Japan’s Diet reacted with astronomical tariff rates on rice.

Rice tariffs were not only products of security. Interest groups, as mentioned above, are very powerful in Japan and rallied to jump aboard the security bandwagon during the late 1990s. Japan’s interest groups take on three forms: statutory interest groups, rice-roots farmers’ organizations, and institutional interest groups. They relate in similar ways to the world of politics but differ in their structure. Perhaps the single most important actor in Japanese agriculture is Nokyo, Japan's association of agricultural cooperatives. The coops serve as the linchpin, both electoral and bureaucratic, joining the conservative coalition to its rural mass base. Yet while Nokyo is often identified as a key coalition player, it is rarely analyzed as one. Materials on Nokyo involvement in grassroots politics are particularly weak.

The following chapters review the theoretical foundations of the central arguments tested herein; that agricultural protectionism is a result of security concerns, domestic political forces, or attempts at the preservation of an agricultural identity. After reviewing the salient theoretical
foundations of agricultural protectionism, I provide an empirical statistical analysis using OLS regression to test variables related each respective theory. Lastly, I offer a brief exploration of the effects of globalization on agricultural protectionism in the context of four of the main players in the international agricultural trade and posit conclusions that may be drawn henceforth from this project.
Protectionism within an economic sector is contingent upon the interaction of the following variables: national security, domestic lobbying and social constructs of identity. However, this interaction is often overlooked in political economy literature, and the complex economics of the agriculture industry are seldom related to the even more complicated politics of agriculture in political science literature. The crux of political economy literature available fails to combine salient independent variables that are crucial in explaining political phenomena in agriculture. This body of literature has failed to adequately address, either theoretically or empirically, agricultural protectionism and its relationship with political theory.

The bulk of current world farm policy – with some obvious exemptions – can be traced directly to FDR’s New Deal legislation and similar European programs of the era. Price supports, marketing quotas, loan incentives to farmers, import tariffs, export subsidies, acreage allotments, and set-aside programs were designed to rejuvenate the devastated agricultural sector. Hard times were rampant, commodity prices were depressed, and much of the agricultural sector lived in total poverty (Gardner 1995). Moreover, war was just on the horizon and advances in technology would send a generation to the city looking for higher paying jobs and improved living standards. The foundation was thus laid for decades of agricultural policy that focused on protecting the agricultural sector from international competition (Gardner 1995; Clawson 1968; Pasour 1990).

As the number of states’ farms has decreased over time, policy benefits have been increasingly concentrated within the agricultural sector. Interest groups have begun to rely on the
political process more and more, food has become an issue of foreign policy, and postmodern issues of culture preservation have emerged in the political science literature as three distinct sources of agricultural protectionism. The general consensus in available literature identifies three independent variables behind agricultural protectionism: food security and self-sufficiency (Morgenthau 1948), domestic lobbying and preference formation (Moravcik 1997), and attempts to preserve the identity of rural livelihoods of farm communities (Clawson 1968; Allen 2004; Comstock 1987). However, the dependent variable has varied according to the independent variable utilized (Destler 1978).

Issues of food security have historically been linked to the diplomatic power of food and, thus, given the head of states’ (executives) leverage over other competing powers (i.e. interest groups and legislative bodies) when establishing protectionist measure around the security issue (Paarlberg 1982; Goldstein 1997). These studies typically incorporate a perceived need for secure food—either through political rhetoric or international crisis—as an independent variable and a resulting dependent variable in the form of supplemental funding bills where roll call votes are analyzed (see Paarlberg 1982 or Destler 1978). This represents two vertices of what Ross Talbot refers to as the (1982) Food Triad—the Executive’s assertion of power through food policy in the name of national security and the Congress’s power of the purse. The powers of domestic lobbying forces are the third force competing for power.

The liberal approach focuses on domestic political pressures, and have in the past incorporated independent variables based on the number of interest groups (Browne 1988), amount spent on Congressional lobbying (Bailey, et al. 1997), and the size of lobbying groups (Browne 1988; Corden 1985) to explain agricultural protection. Dependent variables in studies of this nature include dichotomous variables measuring the success or failure of policy nature,
roll call votes, and tariff or subsidy levels that result due to interest group or constituent preferences. Similarly, the literature for rural agrarian identity preservation uses dependent variables of roll call voting and farm bill spending funding variations; independent variables focus on the rationale for protecting the way of farm life through legislation (Goetz and Debertin 1996, for example).

This brief review utilizes Talbot’s triad to categorize much of the available literature related to agricultural protectionism policy. Three sections follow; each stands as an independent variable or causal mechanism in past research and represents possible rationale behind agricultural protectionist policy in the modern age of world agricultural production.

I: Food as Security

In the eyes of realists, the necessity for secure food sources will drive all states—powerful and weak (in terms of potential productivity)—to protect their agricultural sectors and in some cases force their will on the weaker states in the system. In order to maximize relative or regional (trade) power and food security, powerful states will seek different strategies depending on their domestic food production capabilities.

Food security has multiple meanings and has generally taken on two forms. The first, explored by Hans J. Morgenthau (1948), refers to a state’s ability to feed itself without relying on outside sources for food. Morgenthau cites the example of Great Britain during World War II, which had been reliant on other European states for food stuffs, was crippled by war and German air attacks, and was cast into devastation. Morgenthau’s stance on food security is typical of other works of the time which posit that states should maintain a strong agricultural policy capable of keeping farmers farming at all cost. Schickele (1952) makes a similar argument, citing post WW II decision-making by executives of the Allied forces who planned policy that would
ensure reliable trading partners for sources of food in the future. In the years following WW II, food stability and food security were used as propaganda tools in the Cold War. Soviet state owned enterprises were sided against the independent American farmer. But, was the American farmer truly independent? The answer is no. “Clearly no political ideology, no economic system, can hope to be successful if it cannot feed its people” writes Pyle (2005, 3); such is the justification used in this section as an explanatory factor for agricultural protection.

The US and the EU were the dominant players in food production for the next five decades following the war, giving them “substantial diplomatic benefits from food power…” (Paarlberg 1982, 37). Thus, according to Paarlberg (1982), it was in the interest of the US’s hegemonic position within the international system to keep its farmers in business and ensure their ability to continue to be the world’s leading producer of food commodities, regardless of the economic rationality involved with price supports and subsidies. Export subsidies (which boost domestic commodity prices) and import tariffs (which block cheaper imported commodities) raise the cost of food on the domestic market. But since the cost of protection is shared by the aggregate population, the ratio of food cost to consumer and benefit received by agriculture is disproportional, an argument often used for the justification of protection—maintaining the ability to produce one’s own food is cheaper than the risk of becoming dependent on outside sources (Gardner 1995). Gardner builds a model using domestic consumption as an independent variable and levels of export subsidies for individual crops as a dependent variable. Levels of protection are rather static over time, but there is noticeable variation between different commodities. Thus, Gardner’s work addresses protectionism in an effective manner by isolating levels of protection by commodity.

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2 Gardner (1995) points out that tariff levels on some varieties of wheat are 0% but sugar tariffs range up to 100% or greater, depending on the trade status of the exporting nation.
Another facet of food security deals with problems of population growth and sustainability. This area of the literature addresses two distinct areas. The first focuses on domestic policy in terms of maintaining enough production for farmers to meet the population growth of a country (Destler 1978). For instance, Destler notes that US food security policy is primarily a product of the United States Department of Agriculture (the Executive), and centers around four policy issues: “1) farm policy; 2) domestic economy policy; 3) foreign policy; and 4) global welfare and development policy (Destler 1978, 617). However, farm policies must balance these issue areas, especially when setting trade policy. Destler (1978) notes that protectionist policies encourage over-production and that surpluses—his dependent variable—are often used for the purpose of foreign aid (the demand for which is his independent variable), and Talbot adds that food is a political instrument of food policy, “both at home and abroad” (1977, 7). In this way the two areas mentioned above are interlinked; farmers are protected to ensure their sustainability domestically and the surpluses are then shipped overseas, making a state’s respective agriculture administration of a state a diplomatic agent of the Executive branch.

Christopher Barrett’s (2001) position on the use of food as a security agent is clear. He notes, “…food aid has long been intensely political, serving many masters.” In that light, the motives behind agricultural protectionism serve a state’s interests as both a means of securing food for the population and maintaining relative power in the international system by using food as leverage over states dependent on larger states’ farm surpluses. Food aid is meant to address food availability shortages and to correct malnutrition in developing states. We should logically assume, therefore, that aid would be doled out on a need basis. Barrett finds that this is not the case with respect to food aid to less developed states (LDCs). Barrett employs a Tobit regression analysis and finds a negative relationship between food distribution and geopolitical motivations.
(see Barrett 2001, Table 3, 343). When ideological differences are present i.e. the politics of a state disagree with those of the president or prime minister, donations—his dependent variable—are limited. His work is one of few that quantitatively analyze food as an instrument of foreign policy. He gives little attention, though, to the greater issue of protectionist policies. Had he taken his work one step further and tied his analysis of the use of food as a diplomatic tool to domestic farm programs, his contribution to the protectionist literature would have been much more significant.

There also exist inherent institutional characteristics that give the executive branch leverage in crafting trade policy. Patterson (1979) cites Section 301 of the US Trade Act as a clear example. The act instructs the president to “take all appropriate and feasible steps” to protect U.S. interests against unfair competition. In the case of the Brazilian-French wheat trade of 1979, the president enacted retaliatory tariffs on European Economic Community goods coming into the US on the grounds that the Brazilian deal undercut American farmers’ competitiveness.

Security concerns will be the motivation for powerful states to keep their agricultural trade barriers high. As was mentioned in earlier sections of this paper, states will not want to be dependent on foreign sources for critical foodstuffs. Having an independent food supply is not only important in times of war when shipping lanes for importing food could be cut-off, but it is also important for leverage in general negotiating. In an extreme example of issue linkage, if country A imports food from country B and the two states are involved in bargaining on a completely unrelated matter, country B will have a degree of power over country A because of B’s control over A’s food supply.
Powerful states that have the ability to produce large amounts of food, the US for example, will provide subsidies for their farmers (and possibly other trade barriers) in order to maintain an independent, domestic food supply. Without subsidies and other trade barriers, undeveloped countries with a comparative advantage (due to low input costs, primarily in the area of labor), would be able to use price undercutting to knock domestic farmers out of business, thus causing a potential security problem for powerful states.

Powerful states with a limited domestic food supply, the United Kingdom for example, will be extremely protective over what little food production they possess. They will also be forced to take measures, such as build a powerful navy, in order to secure foodstuffs from abroad. Powerful states with and without large food production capabilities will seek low barriers in all other countries in order to increase market access for any surplus food supplies.

Powerful states with virtually no domestic food producing abilities, Saudi Arabia for example, will pursue any policy that will saturate the market with as much agricultural products as possible. A saturated market will reduce import costs for countries in this category. These countries will then be able to focus more of their resources on other security concerns. Given this logic, these countries will support agricultural subsidies in developed countries so that more commodities are available on the world market and prices are driven down; but, they will have no reason to put up any kind of agricultural trade barrier in their own country.

Underdeveloped agriculture importing states will have the same interests as powerful non-food producing states. They will want to increase market saturation in order to drive down prices and will also have no reason to put up any barriers to agricultural states. Underdeveloped agriculture-exporting weak states will seek the eradication of subsidies and other agricultural trade barriers in powerful states. This will be done to increase market access as well as keep
prices high for the agriculture they are selling. These weak states will not be able to put up any barrier to protect their own farmers from imports due to their relatively weak power in the international system.

Because realism views the world as one based on relative power, realism predicts that those powerful states that seek to put up agricultural trade barriers, powerful agriculture exporting states, will be able to do. These powerful states will also be able to coerce the lowering barriers in weak states. Underdeveloped agricultural exporting states pushing for low barriers will be virtually powerless and not influential.

The realist influence in the structure of international institutions is pervasive in agriculture perhaps more than in any other arena. How else could one explain the exclusion of agriculture from GATT negotiations for decades? Cooperating powers in the system, especially EU, Japan, and members of the Cairns Group, struggled with the agriculture issue throughout each of the successive negotiations. The US had long threatened to withdraw from trade negotiations if agriculture were included in the agreement. If US farmers were forced to compete with the developing world’s producers, hundreds of thousands of farms would be lost and it would only take one bad year for it to happen. The problem of competition was compounded by the Depression Era policies that encouraged over-production and the mentality that there was a risk of food shortage. Cold War propaganda and institutional inertia combined at the door of the negotiating room to put agriculture out of the GATT negotiations until the creation of the WTO.

Moreover, security in war-torn Europe is, as in the case of the United States, a prime mover in establishing protectionist policies in the agricultural sector. Europe has endured hardships as much as any other continent and the social transformations that have played out on its soil represent, rather well, all three approaches to agricultural protectionism. Security in
Europe is codified in millennia—not decades or centuries—of war. The European mentality is thus haunted by the fear of famine and food insecurity. Logically, methods of protecting European farmers are evident in EU policy. European Union policy is governed by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which highlights the need for self-sufficiency, democratic responsiveness, and preserving the rural producer. The CAP has its roots in 1950s Western Europe whose society had been damaged by years of war. Agricultural supplies had been crippled and production capacities were not guaranteed at that time. The emphasis of early CAP was on encouraging higher productivity in the food chain, allowing consumers a more secure, stable supply of affordable food.\(^3\) Moreover, the CAP sought to make certain that Europe’s agricultural sector was viable; it provided subsidies and guaranteed prices to farmers, incentive to produce. CAP was very successful in meeting its objective of moving Europe towards self-sufficiency, but by the 1980s global pressures of trade liberalization forced policymakers to contend with overproduction of farm commodities. Subsidies helped EU members, just as they have in the US, export much of the surplus commodities; but forces of globalization limited the extent to which both entities could continue to finance overproduction.

The general assertion that food security drives agricultural protectionism is a product of the Cold War and \textit{Realpolitik} ideology. Work in this area suffers from methodological shortfalls such as a preponderance of theorizing without empirical models to justify subsequent policy. Quantitative methods using independent variables related to security threats should be employed to test the theory that agricultural protection is a product of food security issues. Without such, literature from this genre suffers from credibility problems that diminish explanatory capacity.

\(^3\) For more information, visit \url{http://www.europa.eu.int/pol/agr/index_en.htm}.
II: Domestic Lobbying: Liberalism in Agricultural Protectionism

Liberalism may explain variations in protectionism by pointing out the potential power of domestic political forces within a state’s borders. This section will demonstrate that liberalism has the explanatory capacity to predict high variations in ATBs (both high and low tariffs, for example), contingent on the specific state’s domestic economic and political circumstances and positions.

Three aspects of liberalism lend explanation for variations in ATBs—orthodox, democratic and embedded. Orthodox (classical economic) liberalism and democratic liberalism may account for low ATBs and embedded liberalism may aid in explaining high ATBs; together the three features of liberalism have potential to summarize variations in ATBs rather well. In the realm of trade, especially agricultural production, liberalism emerges as a multi-faceted analytical tool because of the diverging tenets of liberal theory.

An examination of liberalism literature reveals the differences between different forms of liberalism existing with the international system. Krasner (1982, 188) clearly distinguishes three versions of liberalism: the first a classical, “orthodox liberalism” that is akin to classical economic liberalism; the second an “embedded liberalism” that prescribes state actions to contain domestic social and economic dislocations; and third, democratic liberalism that reflects the preferences of different domestic actors (Moravcsik 1997). Krasner’s separation of two separate liberal regime types highlights a potential contradiction of liberal theory. The liberal paradigm posits explanations for opposing forces within the agricultural sector of developed nations (Moravcsik 1997). Rosenau (1997) adds the importance of individuals, domestic pressure groups, and (domestic) non-state actors in determining policymaking in modern governments. Rosenau’s work also points toward possible conflicting applications of liberal theory – that

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4 See also Ruggie 2003.
forces can diametrically oppose one another simultaneously through domestic lobbying for both agricultural protectionism (e.g. farmer-centered interest groups) and free, open trade (e.g., MNCs pushing for liberalized trade).

Orthodox liberalism suggests that MNCs and large international corporate farming operations will uniformly seek lower trade barriers throughout the agricultural trading system. Multi-national corporations (agribusinesses) and large, corporate farming operations function within a different economy of scale than smaller producers. Free trade policies that favor lowered ATBs benefit these actors in a two-dimensional manner. Primarily, the pure nature of agricultural MNCs (i.e. their presence in multiple states) is governed by the economics of production. It is often more efficient to produce commodities on a large-scale basis in regions that are under-developed (compared to first-world standards) due to the basics of comparative advantage. Thus, MNCs need lower ATBs within their home states so that their products can be re-sold on the larger first-world markets without the penalty of import tariffs or duties.

Orthodox liberalism can be extended further to trade scenarios involving lesser-developed countries (LDCs). Since LDCs often suffer from a lack of economic diversification in agricultural production, it is imperative that these states seek out open, tariff free markets for the few products they are able to produce. Furthermore, LDC’s often obtain a comparative advantage over larger states because input costs are substantially lower, making their products competitive in a global market. Orthodox liberalism holds that lowered trade barriers should provide open markets in other countries for these types of states, allowing them to market their products at a competitive international price.

Moravscik’s (1997) theory of domestic preferences further adds to the liberal theory. It is highly conceivable, for instance, that within the peanut industry, large peanut butter producers
and peanut shellers would prefer to buy cheap imported peanuts from Argentina or Mexico, rather than artificially inflated, more expensive domestic peanuts. Conversely, domestic farmer would push for higher tariffs on peanuts so that manufacturers would be forced to buy use American products. Thus, domestic preferences of individual actors can explain variations in policies, or at least the forces acting on decision making bodies that ultimately decide trade policy. In either case, albeit first-world MNCs or producers within LDCs, orthodox liberalism sufficiently accounts for lowered ATBs. Hence, orthodox liberalism usually predicts lowered agricultural trade barriers throughout the international system.

The third form of liberal theory is embedded liberalism, and though highly descriptive, does lend potential explanation to variations in policy. Embedded liberalism, as noted above in the theoretical analysis, is akin to constructivism in its recognition of higher trade barriers created to protect valuable domestic assets (Ruggie 2003). But whereas constructivism seeks to protect abstract, intangible ideas of identity and norms, embedded liberalism is more of a tangible, economic approach where economic liberalism is “embedded” in society through government initiative (Ruggie 2003). Embedded liberalism resembles orthodox and democratic liberalism in that it does recognize the influence of domestic actors on state decisions in the international system. However, the forms of liberal theory depart when it comes to ATBs. As we noted above, orthodox liberalism is helpful in explaining lowered barriers to agricultural trade. By extrapolating on this concept, the liberal intergovernmental position (Moravcsik 1997) suggests that higher trade barriers will appear as a means of limiting any type of economic dislocation that may result from the inability of a state’s small-scale domestic producers to compete with other exporting countries that seek market access to exploit their competitive advantage.
Therefore, from liberal theory, we can expect high ATBs in powerful states that suffer from comparative disadvantage, with a preponderance of agricultural interest groups that represent small-scale producers. Conversely, the orthodox aspect of liberalism will predict low ATBs by looking to the influences of MNCs and comparative advantage on state policy.

Liberalism is clearly outlined in available literature. This body of literature examines the impact of domestic political forces such as interest groups and public opinion. Representing the second vertex of Talbot’s (1982) food triad, this is by far the most published dimension of agricultural policy. Research on the public opinion within the agricultural sector highlights a variety of policy preferences by a variety of actors and has been utilized as an independent variable affecting the dependent variable of legislation apportioning farmer funding or failing to fund farmers (Browne 1988; Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Bailey, et al. 1997; Sayre 1939; Soth 1960; Vercammen and Fulton 1990). Small and large farmers alike lobby the Congress, Parliament, Diet, etc., or the Secretary or Minister of Agriculture for protection from cyclical world markets and diseconomies of scale (Patterson 1979). In return, legislation appropriates funding or administrative action for protection that comes in the form of price supports or tariffs. In essence, these policies serve as safety nets for producers.

Interest groups are effective in the establishing and changing protectionist policies (Corden 1985; Grossman and Helpman 2002; Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Browne 1982, 1988). Interest groups play a dominant role in democratic societies by lobbying politicians, contributing to campaigns (when legal), participating in demonstrations, and by educating the public about issues and candidates. Grossman and Helpmann (2002) use OLS regression analysis to empirically test the effects of special interest groups on tariff levels. They find a positive relationship between resources spent by political action committees and specialized private
interest groups and increases in protectionist policies in their time series analysis. Corden (1985) places interest group influence in the context of two forms of agricultural protection: subsidies vs. tariffs. Corden finds that small firms generally lobby for protection in the form of tariffs and that large corporations generally lobby for subsidies. Subsidies tend to be firm specific, whereas tariffs are less transparent, more widely used as a means of protection, and on average provide protection for a large body of firms. In the case of agriculture, tariffs usually protect the small producer; subsidies benefit the interests of large multi-national corporate operations (Corden 1985).

Domestic pressures represent an area of interest for study. It is impossible to know the extent to which domestic lobbying affects political rhetoric, for much manipulation occurs within a state’s “black box” of policy. But there is no doubt that the agricultural lobby of the United States is one of the most organized and strongest of all (Browne 1995). Browne, a prominent scholar of US agricultural policy, points out that, in the US, domestic interests are completely income-oriented. Their biggest weapon is that of coalition formation, and they are most successful at blocking reforms. The age of gaining more entitlements is waning, but the game of stalemate continues between organized groups, legislative bodies, and executive branches of government.

Interest groups have influence in elections and policy. A political endorsement model constructed by Bernard Grofman and Barbara Norrander (1990) explicitly deals with this idea. Grofman and Norrander find that voters respond to interest groups’ endorsements of candidates. A voter’s position on an issue might be obscure, but over time and through a series of

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*It should be noted that a discussion of domestic politics and agricultural policy formulation would not be complete without mention of the corporatist model (see Wiarda 1977). Many comparativists might argue that the corporatist structures of Latin America and Europe play integral roles in the protection of agricultural interests. This claim is duly noted, and though not included in the empirical analysis of the next chapter, the influence of corporatist structures appears to be highly congruent with the overall influence of domestic politics in agricultural protection.*
endorsements, the voter is able to build a framework through which his/her vote is cast. This applies to the special interests of agriculture. Political endorsements by large agriculture PACs or farmer organizations have heavy influence on the voting decisions of those involved in agribusiness (Alsop et al. 2000). Moreover, within the agricultural economic sector, divergent preferences are evident. Large multi-nationals often lobby for lowered trade barriers. As a result, those who lose from increased trade have a greater incentive to organize than those who benefit from the policy. Such is the conclusion of Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast (1997) in their study of the roots of American trade policy. They test interest groups size effects on tariff outcomes (dependent variable) over a number of economic sectors and find that large firms will logically endorse free-trade candidates or candidates that support firm-specific policies. Medium sized and small firms support candidates that support the broader tariffs and higher levels of protection.

In Europe and the US, agricultural cooperatives have become active in the design and administration of agricultural policy; pursued a range of business interests often at odds with the interests of the rank and file; and given birth to large bureaucracies with a vested interest in self-preservation. It is no surprise to find similar developments in Nokyo, although they surpass Western counterparts in both the breadth and depth of their political and administrative and financial dealings. The cooperatives' roots and organizational legitimacy both lie in agriculture, but their business concerns increasingly lay elsewhere. Current reforms promise to strengthen the Nokyo center and its financial position even as they alienate the local membership and push the coops even further from their agricultural roots (Bullock 1997).

William P. Browne specifically addresses agricultural interest groups in his book *Private Interests, Public Policy, and American Agriculture* (1988). According to Browne and his study of the 1985 Farm Bill, the contributions of interest groups to public policy are twofold. First, it
must be realized that each interest group occupies a policy niche with a core set of member concerns. Even the largest and most well-financed agricultural interest groups (such as the National Cotton Council) are not capable of pushing broad, comprehensive policy positions; each group usually occupies a caveat in which they are most likely to win (as in the case of sugar producers). Secondly, Browne’s empirical tests (1988, Chapter 12) use Probit regression and finds that agricultural interest groups are extremely conservative and reluctant to accept change. They lobby both executive agencies and congressmen to preserve current funding levels, often asking for increased appropriations. Agricultural interest groups favor only incremental changes and generally support high export subsidies and even higher import tariffs, a commonsensical conclusion that is empirically tested in Browne’s final chapter. As an independent variable, interest group size is tested on the dependent variable of outcome of appropriations bills. The dependent variable was dichotomous and the analysis employed a time series analysis so that Browne’s \( n \) would be larger. Browne’s work is one of the few that seeks place agricultural protectionism, interest groups, and administrative acts all into the same model; his contribution to the agricultural policy literature is significant. He could improve on this, though, by expanding the scope of his independent variables outside that of interest group dynamics.

Over forty years ago, Lauren Soth (1960) found that domestic pressures—public opinion and organized lobbies—often clashed with the wishes of a state’s legislative branch and/or executive. She points out that in both developed and less developed states, public opinion towards subsidized agriculture is often negative in that the general public is not fond of the idea of funding a welfare program for farmers. However, Soth argues that the costs of protectionism are less than the costs of funding overseas programs with taxpayer money. The increased food costs resulting from import tariffs and export subsidies incur less cost than monies spent overseas.
for foreign development. Thus, the most rational policy, Soth concludes, is to fund domestic farmers and use the surplus foodstuffs as aid, rather than sending taxpayers’ cash overseas.

Public opinion and interest group pressures are part of domestic preferences (Moravcsik 1997). State-society relations affect the foreign policy of states and domestic actors’ preferences are highly influential. Security concerns, as well as trade policy, are affected by the preferences of domestic political actors. This is congruent with the work of Browne (1982, 1988) and Bailey et al (1997). All four works investigate the motivations behind trade preferences of domestic lobbying groups. Browne (1982) writes that, as a result of domestic interest group pressure, agricultural policy is by and large a product of “a small number of congressional, administrative, and lobbying participants formulating and seeing to the passage of most agricultural legislation” (198). According to Browne (1982), three distinct types of farm interest groups affect public policy: general farm organizations that represent large numbers of farmers, commodity groups with specialized members (e.g. wheat or cotton producers), and groups consisting of agribusinesses. Again, as noted above (Bailey, et al 1997; Vercammen and Fulton 1990), interests often clash between actors of the agricultural political economy. As Browne observes:

“the specialization of agricultural production and marketing creates conflict among the participants as the various actors play their specialized roles in providing farm inputs—cattle farmers, for instance are subjected to losses when grain farmers [lobby] for higher prices…cash-crop farmers strongly support disaster payments while both rural agricultural insurers and rural lending institutions oppose them” (1982, 199).

Outside of the micro-economy of agriculture, certain macro-economic policies are heavily influenced by domestic pressure groups (Clark 1987). Trade policy is affected by the efforts of interest groups and trade restrictions provide protection to domestic rent-seeking
entities such as farms or agribusinesses; this can hurt domestic consumers but voters continue to provide protection to farmers. Clark, writing from an economic perspective, does not attempt to address this puzzle but is successful at testing, quantitatively, a theory of tariff maintenance based. He posits that tariffs in the Tokyo round of GATT negotiations were small and that “there was substantial room for political pressure groups to operate (in influencing trade policy)” (Clarke 1987, 304).

Indeed, “the tariff holds a special place in both foreign and domestic politics” (Hansen 1990, 527). Tariff and protectionist policies raise questions of “private power and public responsibility” (527). According to the case study John Mark Hansen, tariffs have historically been most influenced by domestic political pressures, usually coming in the form of organized political lobbies seeking protection from international markets. Hansen’s work is unique in that in places interest groups as a dependent variable and world market pressures are operationalized as an independent variable. As the number of competing countries increases, he predicts an increase in the number of interest groups that will seek protection. Both Hansen and Mayer (1981) conclude that in the presence of agricultural interest groups, pure free trade will not occur and in general, tariffs and protection will remain in place or be incrementally decreased. Extrapolating from the general literature on the role of interest groups, it is conceivable that interest groups are perhaps some of the most important participants outside of government itself; as Kingdon notes, “Because interest groups are among most often concerned with protecting current benefits and prerogatives, the affect the governmental agenda more by blocking potential items than by promoting them” (Kingdon 1995, 67). Gardner (1995, 177) adds several telling hypotheses:

a. The smaller the interest group, the greater its subsidy will be.
b. Agricultural interest groups incorporate mandatory check-off programs to eliminate free-rider programs and garner resources.
c. The greater the potential value of subsidy, the greater the political pressure that will be applied.

These hypotheses appear congruent with the case of agricultural interest groups. Success for domestic agricultural pressure groups is often defined by what they prevented or managed to retain (subsidy, tariff, or other entitlement), rather than what they gained in the states’ capitals (Browne 1995, 41).

The future of agricultural politics is perhaps best summed by E.C. Pasour, Jr. (1991). Pasour holds a differing view than the majority of scholars mentioned above. Whereas the vast majorities who cite domestic forces as causation for protectionism attribute policy to organized lobbies, Pasour holds that the future of agriculture politics should be viewed from a public choice framework. Pasour believes that voters cast votes in the traditional Downsian, rational choice manner (see Downs 1957). Current farm policies are a spin-off of Depression-era market crises. They (farm programs) have successfully been manipulated by farmer-run interest groups in the name of public or national interest and politicians employ seductive rhetoric that gains the votes of the agricultural electorate. Pasour hypothesizes that tides are changing, though. He believes that international pressures combined with a domestic population (his independent variables) reluctant to continue funding farmers will eventually lead to a decline in price supports and tariff rates (dependent variable). Pasour is partly correct. In the decade that has passed since Pasour’s book was published, price supports have declined and tariff rates of some commodities have fallen, but only minimal. Nonetheless, Pasour’s stance on the future of agricultural policy is in sync with much of the developing world. Despite strong domestic forces lobbying for protection, their time is limited and resources will soon be directed to more demanding projects.
The body of literature addressing the domestic forces of agricultural protection pays most attention to interest group politics, little to public opinion, and even less to that of the individual voter. Perhaps this speaks to the strength of interest group politics and their effect on agricultural policy. Whatever the rationale behind the interest groups’ preponderance in literature, those studying domestic forces on agricultural protection should consider two key factors. First, available literature is outdated. Many changes in both domestic and international policy have taken place in the last decade. In the US, a new farm bill in 2002 restructured the methods of farm payments, and new rounds of trade talks combined with recent cotton dispute settlements have occurred within the WTO. It appears as though agriculture has been placed on the “back burner” for other areas of interest. Scholars need a re-awakening to the current political battles over protection between interest groups, the executive, and the legislative branches. Secondly, better methods should be incorporated into studies of domestic forces. Case studies and normative articles are informative, but contemporary academia demands more. Quantitative analyses, especially in political science literature, would offer a unique approach to the study of domestic forces on agricultural protection. To date, very little is available, and that which is there does not completely capture reality.

III. Agrarian Identity: Constructivism in Agricultural Protectionism

The constructivist approach to agricultural protectionism holds that states will raise agricultural tariffs in order to protect their own agrarian identities. The concept of identity can be vague and rather nebulous at times. Identity is part of the body of social science literature that focuses on norms, values, and culture, and the consequential policies that follow as a result of socially constructed structures (Wendt 1995). In the arena of agricultural policy, identity is an impetus for protectionist policy that aids in the preservation of rural agrarian communities and livelihoods.
Identity is part of a new wave of rural sociology, a “revitalization of a field of research that had lost its way since the decline of the rural-urban continuum in the late 1960s” and is grounded in the sociology of agriculture (Newby 1983, 67). The study of the sociology of agriculture is based on the premise that much of the change in rural societies is grounded in the structural transformations of agriculture, especially in the arena of policy formulation (Newby 1983).

For example, agrarian identity in the US is inherently a socially constructed fixture of identity as a whole (Allen 2004). As the industrial revolution began to shift jobs from the countryside to the city, the percentage of the population employed in agriculture exponentially shrank. In order to maintain the livelihoods of rural farm life, protectionist policies were implemented during the Great Depression to subsidize the agrarian ideal. Evidence of US policymakers’ deference to the agrarian ideal is found in Ernest Gellner’s book, Culture, Identity, and Politics (1987, 110). Governments, including the United States, place a certain value—one of intangibility—on agrarian identities. Subsidies and tariffs became necessary to prevent the death of the agricultural institution as a whole.

Agrarian identity is rooted in the notion of long-standing traditions of agrarian ideology (Allen 2004, 119). Agrarian ideology is constructed around the independent land-working producer who is considered the foundation and bearer of American democracy (Allen 2004, 119). The family farm, founded on the idea of the hard-working farmer, has been the basis for most farm policy since the 1800s, and continues to live “in the hearts and minds of both rural and urban (citizens)” (Allen 2004, 119-120).

“Rural areas are known worldwide for their productive farms and agricultural abundances” (Mayer 1993, 80). The movement of citizens from rural areas to towns began in the early years of the 20th century (Mayer 1993). Mayer finds that the rural identity of rural
communities is manifested through agricultural policy that subsidizes the small farm for its survival. Mayer focuses on rural agricultural stability—stabilizing social constructs that are deteriorating as the farm population becomes increasingly smaller due to advances in machinery, technology, and higher paying jobs in the city. Mayer’s analysis of policy addresses two aspects of rural identity. First, a state’s assistance for agricultural communities—his dependent variable—has historically been through programs promoting rural infrastructure, including sewage, communication, and educational facilities. The primary actor in these areas has been the governmental Extension Services. More to the point of agricultural protectionism, though, is Mayer’s observation of farmers’ abilities, under federal law, to form marketing co-ops, supply co-ops and price support programs that enable small farmers to compete with larger corporate farms and smaller countries that operate with a significant comparative advantage. It is the latter of Mayer’s conclusions that adds to the explanation of protectionist policies as a preservation of the rural identity of farm communities—federal programs provide specialized protection to agrarian communities.

The study of rural agricultural society is “an interdisciplinary experience for scholars from economics, sociology, anthropology, home economics, history, philosophy, and political science;” this is the conclusion of Don F. Hadwiger as he writes of rural/agricultural policy (1988, 682). Modern rural policy-makers must now consider non-traditional methods (see also “Alternative Agrarianism”, Allen 2004, 122) of policy creation and draw from multiple disciplines in crafting policy aimed at preserving rural identities. Among others (political theory, political leadership, politics, administration of public budgets, development policy), Hadwiger cites the crafting of international trade policy as a key element in the preservation of rural society. His work lacks with regard to theoretical strength and quantitative models; however, his
logic of the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the complex social structures of agricultural communities is worth noting. Hadwiger also draws an important connection with international trade policies, the price supports and tariff policies that arise from such, and government’s aim at maintaining some sense agricultural identification, though there is little quantitative methodology to test his connection hypothesis.

Rural diversity is a national asset according to Emery N. Castle (1993). Diversity, Castle writes, consists of special social or economic attributes that shape the public policies that affect rural communities and the agricultural, rural people that live within them. Castle hypothesizes that federal governments assume responsibility (her independent variable) for improving worsening conditions in the countryside (her dependent variable) by advancing programs that supported agricultural commodity prices, among other things. The provision of rural credit and the encouragement of rural conservation programs are additional methods by which social agricultural constructs are preserved. These programs are also considered protectionist by international organizations such as the World Trade Organization. Hence, federal programs that seek to preserve the “identity of the countryside” (15) are protectionist policies that treat rural agrarian communities as a “national asset” (21).

Weldon Barton (1976) provides a critical link between rural sociology and Talbot’s (1982) food triad. Barton’s study of agricultural policy and rural migration to urban areas links protectionist policies to the US Congress, Japanese Diet, and other major producing states in the international system. Barton argues that agricultural policy is shaped primarily through constituent interaction with congresspersons, his independent variable, and that his dependent variable, government entitlements—“…flexible commodity support prices, for example” (149)—are intended to preserve and protect rural culture and norms. Barton draws this conclusion based
on content analysis of testimony before the respective states’ legislative agricultural committees over three decades. He concludes that the rationale behind most protectionist farm spending is to protect the idea of the farmer, not rationally sound economic policy.

Janet M. Fitchen (1991) presents a similar argument in *Endangered Species, Enduring Places: Change, Identity, and Survival in Rural America*. Fitchen’s work points out the lack of work available on rural agrarian identities. Her book focuses on communities of upstate New York as they deal with population flight to the City and culture dilution from metropolitan areas. Fitchen reivews a policy for maintaining rural identity that involves price supports for the local dairy farmers under observation as a dependent variable; however her work comes up short in offering a sound theory of agrarian identity and its ties to national farm policy, tariff levels, federal farm programs, or international trade. It is successful, though, in documenting the importance of identities and social constructs to both citizens and US House members. Thus, notwithstanding a general lack of sound modeling, her work illustrates those sources of protectionism outside of food security or interest group politics.

A critical link between rural farm life and the third element of Talbot’s triad, the legislative branch, is made by David Freshwater (1994). Freshwater asks the question, “Why do farm interests outweigh other interests in rural societies throughout the world?” Freshwater further takes issue with the question of, “Why do farmers continue to garner Congressional support as their numbers continue to dwindle?” The answers are twofold. First, though rural agriculturally-dependent communities are dying out, smaller groups are easier to organize and can speak with a more coherent voice (see Gardner 1995 also). Second, farmers have been highly successful in sustaining a connection between rural policy and farm policy. Legislation aimed at supporting rural development often includes language that benefits farmers, in addition
to other rural citizens (such as minorities or non-farm constituents). Goetz and Debertin (1996, 518) use regressions to test this assertion and find conclusive evidence for several key observations. Monies spent on rural areas, the independent variable in this instance, have failed at stopping the shrinkage of the farm population, appropriations are disproportionately allotted between farm and non-farm residents, and the political power of farmers and non-farmers is highly disproportionate in favor of the farmer. These conclusions suggest that subsidizing rural America in the name of preserving identity is failed policy (Fisher 1993). McMichael and Buttel concur, positing, “modern agriculture is increasingly characterized by a decline in its sectoral and national identities” (1990, 89).

One of the main assumptions of a constructivist approach is that identities, norms, and culture play important roles in world politics. Identities and interests of states are not simply structurally determined, but are produced by interactions, institutions, norms, and cultures. Considering these assumptions, the constructivist approach aids in explaining variations in ATBs in several ways.

Firstly, it must be noted that constructivism suffers from a theoretical overlap with liberalism when used as explanatory mechanism for fluctuating ATBs in that both explain domestic concern for preservation of the farm, notably outside of the security arena. The constructivist approach cites norms and identities as critical factors in driving state behavior. Norms are rules, either written or unwritten, that guide an entity’s decision-making process. Thus, a state may enact ATBs in a protectionist manner in accordance with regional, cultural, traditional, or historical norms. Technologies such as GMOs, chemically enhanced livestock production, or foods treated with certain pesticides are only a few of the many lively issue areas being disputed by regional powers such as the EU and NAFTA members today. But the
constructivist paradigm does not necessarily mandate increased ATBs. Just as regional or cultural demographics can lead to protectionist measures; it is conceivable that norms of a given location may dictate cooperation with neighbors or allies. Cooperation, of course, implies lowered ATBs.

Secondly, we must consider constructivism’s theoretical implications for the salience of identity in the international system. Since the constructivists have argued that states draw policy decisions from a “constructed” identity, we can logically infer that states may enact protectionist measures to preserve their own agricultural identities. In the context of IR, identity is rather vague, often ambiguous concept applicable to many aspects of societies. Here we focus on the historical, rural agricultural identity of states. It is in this area of domestic identity that constructivists overlap with liberals. Both recognize that domestic actors can and do influence state policy. However, constructivists lean more towards the innate societal value of an historical agricultural identity; liberals tend to focus on the absolute economic gains to be reaped by the involved players.

It is unlikely that state size or issues of relative vs. absolute power are applicable to the constructionist approach. Rather, more abstract concepts mentioned above serve as a paradigm for policy decisions. In the area of agriculture, perhaps the oldest and most important method of sustaining humankind, constructivism is a logical explanatory tool in analyzing ATB variances. However, given the protectionist nature of ATBs, the body of evidence to be gleaned from observable state actions points toward constructivism as being an approach that best explains higher trade barriers. Thus, I hypothesize that states are more likely to establish and maintain forms of agricultural trade barriers in efforts to preserve both regional and/or culturally-established norms whilst also protecting valuable agrarian identities. Though constructivism, like
liberalism, can theoretically explain higher and lowered ATBs, we hypothesize that constructivism is more useful in the explanation of higher ATBs. This hypothesis should hold true for most states, regardless of variables such as economic power, military capabilities, or levels of development. However, one of three key variables must be existent for this hypothesis to hold true; states must have a history of agricultural production, continue to produce agricultural products, and/or be sensitive to changing agricultural employment sectors.

IV. Agendas for Improvement

The past section reviewed studies of food security, evidence that domestic pressures affect policy, and works that demonstrate governments create policy to protect abstract ideations such as identity. As evidenced, there exist problems with the literature both in theory and in research design. Lacking in the policy literature are analytic models that consider all three explanatory variables simultaneously. Variables representing the need for food security, pressure from domestic actors, and governments’ response to shrinking agricultural communities should be combined into single multivariate analyses in future research to construct more comprehensive models.

The studies of the past have relied heavily on theorizing without empirical support and case study methodology. A more quantitative agenda for establishing directions and magnitude of causation would highly benefit the literature of agricultural protectionism. Past studies, notwithstanding their ability to partially capture agricultural protection policy formulation, have failed to incorporate the three obvious causal mechanisms into one coherent model.

Perhaps Englebert (1954) summarized it best: the environment in which farmers operate is changing rapidly, despite attempts to protect the status quo. Future policy research should not only consider the true origins of protectionism, but also adjustment methods that allow for
international competition. Interesting research paths will then open as forces from all dimensions are incorporated into one coherent model. The following chapters build on this past work, and conclude with an analysis that in fact does build such a model.
Chapter 3: The Model and Findings

The model posited below will test the degree to which the hypotheses mentioned above influence protectionist trade policies in the sampled states. Building on the assumptions of each grand international relations theory, I operationalize security factors, domestic political influences, and the ideational notion of identity.

The methodology employed in this model is basic and straightforward. Ordinary Least Squares regression is used to test variables derived representing each of the major IR theories—realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Again, larger projects might enjoy the option of utilizing more advanced methods of hypothesis testing, but as an initial indicator for such a groundbreaking project basic methodology was selected.

Case selection for this study is based on two primary factors. The first is membership in the WTO, which encompasses most, but not all, independent states and territories governed by the body’s tariff policy. The second, and more telling, factor in case selection is that of information availability. Because the information analyzed is recent in nature, there exist many missing data points from the sources. Given that a larger, broader study could possibly locate reliable data to fill in these gaps, this initial test proceeds with available observations.

I. The Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in this paper is a measure of the level of applied tariffs on agricultural products. Applied tariffs are, as the name implies, the actual tariff applied to imported goods within a state. Applied tariffs are generally lower than bound tariffs, which are the maximum tariff allowed a state under the WTO’s governance. Further, it should be noted that, in general,
tariffs are relatively static in nature. States seldom vary, at least in large degrees, the average agricultural import tariffs. In some cases of trade war, we certainly expect product-specific tariffs to vary. But overall, it is safe to say that the average agricultural tariff for a state’s trade policy is relatively static. This fact aids in the analysis below as it is a year-specific study.

The data presented below was retrieved from the website of the WTO and the CIA World Fact Book (2005).\(^6\) Charts and figures extracted from the WTO website, as noted below Table 2, are a composition of figures and facts from a number of reliable data sources. It is important to note that the analysis below focuses on one specific year, 2004. Without question a more comprehensive work shall utilize multiple data points from a number of years to increase observations and provide a better, more reliable estimation of the effects of the variables presented below. However, as an initial test of the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter, the most recent data-year was utilized in the model.

In the model below, applied tariffs are measured to the tenth of a percent and vary from ‘0’ to ‘108.7’ percent (see Table 2). Additional sensitivity is incorporated in this dependent variable because the tariffs are measure in tenths of percent, essentially increasing by a multiple of 10 the variation in the variable.

It should be noted that an ideal measurement of protectionist policy will and should include variables related to subsidies of farmers. Available data is unreliable and virtually non-existent for smaller nations. A larger project of this nature would surely benefit from the inclusion of such a dependent variable. For the case at hand, I use the tariff as an initial testing subject.

\(^6\) See [www.wto.org](http://www.wto.org) for more information.
II. Self-sufficiency and Security:

The hypotheses predicting that states enact protectionist measures to protect domestic production and avoid reliance on external sources of basic food stores are operationalized and tested through these variables. Here, a number of indicators are evaluated. The first is the amount of agricultural commodities exported less the amount consumed. This variable will represent the state’s ability to be self-sufficient. This component is measure as a ratio of agricultural exports to imports. A negative coefficient indicates an agricultural trade deficit. We should expect a state that has an agricultural trade deficit to erect higher tariffs which would result in a positive, significant coefficient if true. Data for this variable is extracted from import/export data available on the World Trade Organization website.\(^7\)

The second component is a dummy variable and considers the military conflicts or operations the state’s military has been involved with in the last five decades. This should lend knowledge and insight into how aggressive the state is and how much security concerns weigh into foreign policy. The variable is coded 0 for no conflicts and 1 for any military action within the time-frame presented. The third component controls for whether a state is contiguous to a front line of current or past “hot” conflicts. We would expect states, such as those in Europe of Japan, to have high security priorities and thus, a high relationship with trade barriers. It is also a dummy variable, coded 0 or 1, for zero meaning not contiguous and one representing a state’s being contiguous to frontline conflict. Data for these two variables were extracted from the online version of Encyclopedia Britannica and the CIA World Fact Book.\(^8\)

A history of famine or food shortage could influence policymakers to create protectionist policies. This model accounts for such a history by including a dummy variable for any food

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\(^7\) See [www.wto.org](http://www.wto.org).

\(^8\) See [www.britannica.com](http://www.britannica.com) for more detailed search information. Also, see [www.cia.gov](http://www.cia.gov).
shortage or famine that a state has encountered within the last 100 years. I also incorporate a state's population, arable land (as a percent of all land), and GDP as contributing factors to food security issues.

Two variables representing geographical considerations are incorporated into the model, and are presented as security concerns. Data for both variables are retrieved from the World Trade Organization website. Both are continuous in nature and their values are presented in Table 2. The first measures a state’s physical land area to determine if pure state size affects tariff levels. This variable tests the question, *are geographically larger states more protective than smaller ones?* Secondly, I incorporate a measure of the state’s arable land to determine if the relationship of farmland to whole land area affects tariff levels. This variable lends insight to two approaches. First, it could be argued that the “state” (i.e. executive branch) raises tariffs to protect what is sure to be a large national asset. If a state has a high percentage of its total land that is farmable, then surely agriculture will play a predominant role in the national economy and the state will raise tariffs to protect this sector. However, this variable has explanatory capacity for the power of the farm lobby also. It is possible that the ratio of farmland to total land can be related to the power of the domestic farm lobby; the larger the percentage of arable land, the more protectionist a state’s agricultural policy will be, for example.

A state’s ability to feed itself is an inherent part of food security. States who are net exporters are most likely to be less protectionist, since they are able to supply both their domestic markets and export to the world market. States who are net importers may be likely to be more protectionist, since net-import status points to an outside dependency on agricultural products. This variable accounts for this and is summarized in Table 1.
III. Domestic Pressures

As the liberal hypotheses have asserted, governments respond to organized domestic political efforts representing both large and small firms; we would expect the fruits of the former to yield lower barriers, and those of the latter to maintain the status quo or increase protectionist policies.

Reflecting back to the previously mentioned variable, Percentage of Arable Land, it is conceivable to interpret this variable as pointing towards the lobbying strength of a state’s farming community. The logic in this interpretation holds that states with larger percentages of farmland will be much more responsive to those who tend that land; so for most states, the end result would be domestic political pressure to raise tariffs.

POLITY IV scores are for each state are also utilized for measurement of a state’s sensitivity to liberal democracy. Variations for the POLITY variable are presented in Table 1; the higher the score, the more liberal the democracy. This variable tests the sensitivity of tariffs to democratic pressures. Based on past research, we should expect higher POLITY scores to yield a higher tariff coefficient.

Per capita GDP is also considered in the quantitative analysis. Arguably, this variable tests the level of a state’s development against tariff rates. Based on past work and observation, we should expect less developed states to have higher tariffs.9 A resulting inverse relationship should show up significant through the regression coefficient if per capita GDP has a significant influence on applied tariff levels.

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9 As with the variable Arable Land, there exists the possibility that this variable has explanatory power for both the security approach and the domestic political force approach. It is highly conceivable that if the executive branch of a less developed state feels the polity’s agriculture sector is in danger of shrinking he might raise tariffs to keep them afloat. In another vein, domestic political forces (PACs, interest groups, or other lobbies) might apply pressure to point out the poor state of the union, ultimately causing tariffs to rise in order to protect the agricultural infrastructure. For the project at hand, I have elected to interpret the variable through the security approach; future projects would benefit by interpreting significant results through the lenses of all three approaches outlined in this project.
IV. Agrarian Identity

As I noted in previous chapters, measuring agrarian identity is extremely difficult. Little data is readily available for measuring such a vague idea, especially across large samples of states. However, there does exist data that can point towards a state’s agrarian identity. In this model, two variables are created. I measure the percent of a state’s population living in rural areas and the percentage of the workforce employed in agriculture. This data is drawn from World Development Indicators and should reveal state’s sensitivity to its agrarian identity based on the size of its agricultural population. We should expect the smaller the value for these two variables, a higher regression coefficient.

V. Results

The empirical analysis yielded three significant values, all of which are derived from and support the hypothesis that agricultural protectionism is a result of security concerns. Table 2 summarizes the empirical analysis. We notice that variables related to security issues are significant, but a closer look inside these coefficients reveals ambiguous, counterintuitive suggestions. For instance, we should expect a state that has a history of being contiguous to a frontline of warfare to be more protective of its agricultural sector, which should result in a positive relationship between values and variables in the dataset and analysis. However, the security variable Contiguous to Frontline of Warfare shows a negative relationship. Thus, if a state is contiguous to frontlines, tariffs are estimated to be lower. On the surface, this result might appear counterintuitive. But the logic behind this result is perfectly clear. States fighting wars (such as Great Britain in WWII) do not have the resources to operate and maintain farm production. Instead, governments may be inclined to lower tariffs in such times or in cases where there is an established history of warfare. Lowering tariffs on agricultural goods would
encourage the importation of foodstuffs, which in turn would account for the state’s inability to produce during wartime.

Table 3.1:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Variable</th>
<th>No. Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Min. Value</th>
<th>Max. Value</th>
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<td>16.216</td>
<td>41.689</td>
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<td>108.7</td>
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<td>Exports less Imports</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>10.543</td>
<td>25.16586</td>
<td>-49.47</td>
<td>77</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of Workforce Living in Rural Areas</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>53.233</td>
<td>22.17489</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Area</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1009105</td>
<td>2427651</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>1.7e+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Conflict in last 50 years</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>.7231</td>
<td>.4492</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguous to Frontline of War</td>
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<td>.4695</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Famine</td>
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<td>.4884</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Percent of Arable Land</td>
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<td>12.914</td>
<td>.04</td>
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<td>.0021073</td>
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<td>Employment In Agriculture Sector</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>36.31852</td>
<td>19.19098</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3.2: Variables Regressed Against Applied Tariffs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports less Imports</td>
<td>0.0022</td>
<td>0.0507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Workforce Living in Rural Areas</td>
<td>0.0521</td>
<td>0.0612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Area</td>
<td>1.51e-07</td>
<td>4.27e-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Conflict in last 50 years</td>
<td>-5.914</td>
<td>4.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguous to Frontline of War</td>
<td>-7.291**</td>
<td>3.353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Famine</td>
<td>-3.561</td>
<td>2.823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Arable Land</td>
<td>0.3213**</td>
<td>0.1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score</td>
<td>-0.1767</td>
<td>0.2344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita GDP</td>
<td>-0.4148**</td>
<td>0.1488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment In Agriculture</td>
<td>-0.0334</td>
<td>0.0711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>24.97</td>
<td>6.796</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=45.

** Denotes significance at the 95 percent confidence level.

Sources: Eurostat, New Cronos Database; IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics and Government Finance Statistics; UNCTAD, TRAINS database; UNSD and OECD (for their member countries), Comtrade database; World Bank, World Development Indicators; WIPO, Industrial Property Statistics; WTO and national statistics; CIA World Factbook 2005.

Per capita GDP—a variable accounting for states’ levels of development—and Arable Land percentage offer more plausible results in the analysis. With respect to per capita GDP, the analysis proves that it is significant at the 95 percent level and that as states’ per capita GDPs increase, tariffs decrease. This is congruent with free trade observations and sentiments that point towards larger states seeking free, liberalized trade (such as the US pursuing NAFTA or CAFTA). On the one hand, realist theory asserts that richer, more developed and powerful states should be more protective of their agricultural sectors and thus be inclined to raise tariff levels. However, from a political economy perspective, these results seem highly intuitive and point toward states’ concerns for stability of economic elements such as capital and labor. When a state’s GDP increases, so does its level of development and thus labor and capital are much less likely to need protection. Mobility of these important economic elements will decline in
situations where development (per capita GDP) is higher; conversely, these economic elements will be more prone to leave the state in situations where development is lower. In the case of agriculture, states will be more inclined to raise tariffs to protect domestic agricultural interests as their per capita GDP falls.

The variable Percentage of Arable Land is also acceptable and commonsensical result of the project. According to the results the more arable land a state has, the more protective it should be of its agricultural sector. This observation is both intuitive and acceptable as supportive of the food security argument, and yields telling results about the nature of a state’s concerns over production and trade leverage. The more arable land a state has in proportion to its total land area, the more prominence agriculture will have in its economy and political-economic decisions. Thus, the agriculture sector will be more protected. This prominence, however, may be related in fact to domestic political pressure. According to these results, justification for higher agricultural tariffs could lie in the size of the agricultural sector itself, specifically the members that form the production sector. This being noted, without further evidence at hand to support the claim that Arable Land Percentage does in fact represent the strength of domestic forces, I conclude with the original assertion that a state’s percentage of Arable Land (in relation to total land area) is an indicator of the security approach, and thus an indicator that security concerns drive tariff rates.

Future expansion of this project should address the ambiguities presented above. Though we have explored significance results, the substantive value of this analysis requires more work. For the case at hand though, it appears that the food security hypothesis has value in explaining agricultural protection; however the larger projects in the future must strive to expand the interpretation of these initial results.
In the following chapter, I conclude with remarks for future research, the implications of this research project with respect to the liberalization of trade, and the impact of globalization on agricultural policy formulation.
Chapter 4: Conclusions: Agricultural Policy Formulation, Globalization, and Implications for Future Research

Globalization and trade are an interrelated concept in the 21st century. The following chapter concludes this project with a discussion of globalization in the context of agricultural protectionism. I offer an examination into four of the largest, most competitive agricultural policy negotiating bodies (US, EU, Japan, and Cairns Group) and attempt to form a nexus between potential threats posed by globalization and the approaches to agricultural policy laid out in the previous chapters of this work.

As Cloughtery (2001) noted empirically, government institutions respond to globalization through policy initiatives in the form of subsidies as a response to an industry’s market loss due to globalization10. This response, embedded liberalism, attempts to account for displacements, both social and economical, that occur to domestic populations as a result of global or international markets disrupting domestic economies. Now that the world is joined in a global marketplace (Sachs 2001), agrarian sectors of both macro- and micro- economies face competition never before seen in world history. Institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) are continuously mandating agrarian reforms, but states have been reluctant to change. As a result, movements in international trade liberalization have led to increased demands for protection by the electorates of some democratic states (Nielson 2003).

The agricultural sector is important in the development and evolution of a society. According to Han Park, agriculture plays a primary role in the formation and development of a society. Governments will be inclined to protect this basic element of humanity because it feeds

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the population and governments cannot afford to have the agricultural sector disrupted, either by forces of globalization, trade liberalization, disaster due to weather, or any other threats. (Park 1984, 136) The result is protectionist policies aimed at retention of a strong agricultural sector.

Though think tanks and non-governmental organizations often focus their resources on agricultural protectionism, little scholarly literature theorizes the rationale of agricultural protectionism. Indeed economists can explain the inefficiencies of subsidies; but the rationale behind protectionist measures is yet to be fully incorporated into scholarly literature.

Realism explains the need for food security (Morgenthau 1947). Liberalism explains the political reaction of ever-shrinking domestic farm populations (Brock and Magee 1978). Constructivism offers insight into protectionism that seeks to preserve fading agrarian identities (Hopf 1998). It is my theory that there exists an interaction of the three theories resulting in protectionist policies of agricultural commodities, as presented and tested in the previous chapter’s model. I found that security concerns play an important role in the rationale behind protectionist policy, with domestic politics and ideational notions being secondary factors, yet significant contributors nonetheless; that the members’ policies of the free-trade-seeking coalitions (such as the Cairns group, for example) are primarily driven by domestic lobbies of each state and government’s concern for social displacement due to the societal progression from agrarian state to industrial state, with security dilemma being less of a factor in protectionist policy.

Little scholarly literature has utilized IR theory to explain agricultural protection. Furthermore, even less literature addresses globalization’s effects on agricultural protectionism. I have asserted that states raise agricultural barriers due to security concerns and to the reluctance of governments to be reliant on competitors’ production for a secure food supply and that as
states’ agriculture sectors become smaller relative to other economic sectors, political lobbies of farmers and agribusinesses respond by rallying for economic support from domestic governments to account for global trade; and that, as global culture diffuses throughout the world, governments seek to preserve agrarian identities of domestic cultural value through subsidies and tariffs. After a careful study of many cases (observations), I concluded that security concerns were the driving factor of possible policy changes (tariffs in this case) that governments consider in order to meet food security needs, satisfy domestic political demands, and/or preserve valuable cultural identities.

*Country-Specific Implications: US, EU, Japan, and Cairns Group*

Trade policy in the US is most likely to be driven by two factors: primarily national security concerns; and secondarily, responses to domestic politics. The national security argument centers around the concept of food security and self sufficiency—that the US need not become dependent of outside sources of food, especially from states in the international system that either alone, or in coalition with other states, gain leverage over the US through manipulation of foodstuffs.

The Bretton-Woods institutions are one example of US hegemonic policy influence in globalized international agriculture. Structural adjustment policies of both institutions (WTO and the IMF), which are *unarguably* highly influenced by US policy makers, require trade liberalization. Foreigner states are given access to domestic markets and economies, subsidies on agriculture cut, and social programs like health care and education suffer as states struggle to pay back debts (Johnson 2004). This tumultuous cycle is well-documented and frequently appears in media from weblogs (blogs) to the nightly news. The support for the US-centered Realist agricultural policy comes in the form of manipulation of the institutions for its own profit. As
Johnson (2004, 267) notes, “subsidies to agriculture are eliminated, usually rendering (small states) unprofitable, while subsidies to agribusinesses growing export crops such as flowers and fruits are increased.” Hence, the US is able quell production of competitive commodities while simultaneously gaining cheap sources of inputs to feed its multinational corporations.

In Europe, financial assistance for the CAP is provided by EU taxation. Funds are redistributed according to schedules set by the EU Parliament but the European community slowly became reluctant to fund farming operations in the 1990s. Reflecting the second element of causation behind protectionist policies, democratic pressures on leaders to reform the CAP became high. Battles between organized farm interests, the taxpaying public, and large free-trade seeking MNCs resulted (Halpin 2005). Thus, EU trade policy is highly affected by both democratic liberalism and political entities seeking classical economic liberalism (MNCs, public opinion).

Another example, the Cairns Group is unique in that, unlike the US or Japan, it has been an outspoken proponent of agrarian reform. The group has become a recognized name in global trade; it continues to support the lifting of protectionist policies, and all of its member states are adjusted to withstand the impact of agricultural free trade. Over the past nineteen years, the group has been highly successful in placing agriculture on the multilateral trade agenda of the WTO, succeeding at getting agriculture included in the Uruguay Round of WTO talks. In sum, the Cairns group stands for free agricultural trade and opposes trade distorting export subsidies and trade limiting tariffs.\[^{11}\]

The stance of the Cairns Group on free trade sheds light on the causal mechanisms of agricultural protection presented in this work. The nations of the Cairns group, for one, have little security concerns (relative to larger, richer states in the international system). They are not

nuclear powers and rely on other, more powerful states within the international system for
security and do not represent security threats to the major powers of the world.\textsuperscript{12} A future state-
specific analysis might yield insightful results. Whereas security concerns are a major
consideration for states such as the US, Japan, and EU members, domestic politics could be the
prime mover behind the policies adopted within the Cairns group. Farmer organizations within
each member state work hand-in-hand with the Ministers of each government (in a corporatist
manner) in planning policy proposals for negotiations at the WTO trade rounds. Each of the
Cairns Group member states has its own national farmer interest group, which meet in Sydney,
Australia periodically to plan negotiating strategy. Unlike the EU’s CAP, which applies evenly
to all states, the Cairns Group members retain autonomy in establishing trade policy. However,
two important issues are deserving of mention. First, domestic politics plays an important role in
establishing policies; also, the Group is a pro-globalization trade group. Security concerns are
not an issue, and governments of member states show little need to preserve any sort of agrarian
identity. Rather, Cairns group states base their policies on classical liberal economics and wish to
see international agricultural trade based on efficient comparative advantage.\textsuperscript{13}

Globalization presents a problem for powerful economic states in the international
system. The US, EU, and Japan are highly developed and economically integrated; they feel
pressure from developing states that operate with a considerable comparative advantage. Thus,
we see higher trade barriers in these states than in the less powerful Cairns Group.

To globalize means to make worldwide in scope or application. We live in a global
ecosystem; in this, we have no choice; and increasingly, all the world’s states share a common
global culture, a payoff from of past decisions (Ikerd 2002b). The world economy has become

\textsuperscript{12} Member states are: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala,
Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay.
\textsuperscript{13} Retrieved from: \url{http://www.cairnsgroupfarmers.org/hi/cairnsgrp_hi.html}.
increasingly globalized as well. However, within the global ecosystem are boundaries, which
give form and structure to natural systems. In the global culture there exists certain parameters,
which separate various human values and realities. These boundaries allow states to manifest
these differences and boundaries through the formation of trade policy.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is committed to the lowering of barriers which
hinder international trade, to the achievement of more freer trade, and hence, to removing trade
protectionism among nations. When economic boundaries are lowered, cultures should become
more nebulous, and ecological and environmental boundaries might be prone to financial
manipulation. Lowered boundaries will also allow corporations and the small farmer to better
adjust to the global economies of scale. Sadly, the prognosis for the small farmer in the global
marketplace is not so good (Ikerd 2002b).

Globalization is now large issue among both the public and the farm community. Much
controversy has focused on the IMF, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. Under the
WTO (as opposed to its predecessor, GATT), power was expanded to regulate trade in service,
intellectual property rights, and merchandise. Intellectual property rights are now interpreted to
encompass the genetic code of plants and animals, an element that is highly critical in
agricultural production. The WTO now has far greater authority over trade in the agricultural
commodities than had existed under the GATT. Clearly the objective in forming the WTO was
to reduce and eventually remove all restraints to trade, in order to create a unified, coherent
global free market (Ikerd 2002a).

Conclusions

The concept of globalization is much far broader in meaning than is the concept of a global free
market. According to Britannica, globalize means “to make worldwide in scope or application.”
The WTO’s objective is to form a unitary geographic market that is universal in scope, with a unitary code of trade rules that are worldwide in application. However, one cannot change the global economy without simultaneously affecting global society. This is the crux of the current WTO—and globalization—controversies.

The consequences of a free global market, not just for the world economy, but also for the world community and for the world itself are three-fold. First, states will be forced by international institutions to remove trade barriers or else suffer issue-linked repercussions that will affect their economies as a whole. Secondly, states will have to accept the consequences of globalized free trade, albeit reluctantly and irrespective to any security concerns about self-sufficiency. Domestic political agendas that disagree with trade liberalization will be marginalized, raising the ethical question about the impact of globalized politics versus state self-determination. And, ultimately, the endogenous cultures of states that have farming identities will be eliminated. Hence, policy-makers should note this last consideration. Breaking down all protectionist policies will destroy regional cultures, displace native peoples from their land, promote governance by MNCs, and ultimately reshape global society in a fashion few desire. Developing nations, at least when it comes to agricultural free trade, appear to be guilty of the same vices they accuse the larger, protected states of: greed and lust for power.

Implicitly speaking, the ramifications of globalization for powerful states carry much more weight than for weaker states. States seeking trade liberalization and praising market openness are power-seekers themselves and free trade is the conduit through which they wish to gain relative power; states wishing to retain power are the powerful. This observation is perhaps the most striking of all, and if proven true in the next chapter’s analysis, demonstrates that above all else, power politics still drives the international system.
Agriculture is different than all other sectors of economy. Protectionist policies are higher within the agricultural sector than any other area of trade; and, agriculture’s ability to compete for resources, both domestically (within states) and globally (between states), is directly affected by economy-wide policies (Schiff and Valdes 1998). To combat the effects of growing interdependencies resulting from globalized trade, states—both developed and less developed—erect trade barriers to protect their agricultural infrastructure. Protectionist measures raise the cost of food by inhibiting efficient production. In some cases structural adjustment policies often disproportionately affect, in the short run, LDCs; in others, economic development that results from IMF and World Bank policies seem to offer some benefits in the longer run (Crisp and Kelley 1999).

For those who seek to know the true source of protectionist policy within the agricultural sector, such a model presented herein should be added to the literature to better account for all influences contributing to agricultural policy-making in the United States. Such consideration of models posit in this work would allow for better allocation of public monies. More to the point, deriving efficient farm policy will truly be protectionist. It will allow farmers to survive in an increasingly globalized world where the demand for pure and fair competition is in higher and higher demand.

Future research of this nature should juxtapose economic sectors against one another. For instance, we might consider the question as to why the average protection levels of the agricultural sector are much higher than those of other sectors, such as mining or manufacturing. Additionally, an interesting project might examine agricultural protectionism through the lens of comparativists (as opposed to the current project’s focus on international relations theory). Dependency theory has the potential to gel well with food security issues. Corporatism has
similar elements with the domestic politics/liberalism approach and still shows its face in Latin American and European agricultural politics. Comparativists’ development approaches might also shed light on the shrinking agricultural sectors of highly developed nations. Such an inclusion of other theoretical perspectives would only enhance and expound the scope of the study of agricultural protectionism.

Agriculture is overlooked by many scholars as obsolete and backward. However, when placed in the context of international relations theory, agriculture represents an unexplored research agenda that has all the necessary components—variation, institutional structures, domestic and international dimensions—that make it both salient and pertinent to the discipline of political science; hence, the utility of this project.
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