THE STRATEGY OF VOTER MOBILIZATION

by

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(Under the Direction of Paul-Henri Gurian)

ABSTRACT

While many scholars have attempted to assess the impact of voter mobilization on the vote decision, the actual processes of modern voter mobilization campaigns and how modern voter mobilization campaigns are conducted have been largely understudied. This research focuses on the strategic nature of voter mobilization. Specifically, I examine the effect of resources and institutional/contextual factors on the voter mobilization strategies of parties, interest groups, and candidate campaigns.

INDEX WORDS: Voter Mobilization, Get Out The Vote, Strategic, Resources, Political Parties, Candidate Campaigns, Interest Groups, Voter Contact, Voter Communication, Electoral Competitiveness, Districting, Broadcast, Targeted

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CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION: THE STRATEGY OF VOTER MOBILIZATION

While many scholars have attempted to assess the impact of voter mobilization on the vote decision, the actual processes of modern voter mobilization campaigns and how modern voter mobilization campaigns are conducted have been largely understudied. This research focuses on the strategic nature of voter mobilization. Specifically, it examines the effect of resources and institutional/contextual factors on the voter mobilization strategies of parties, interest groups, and candidate campaigns.

Voter Mobilization: What do We Know?

Researchers have long known the benefits of mobilization for increasing voter turnout (Gosnell 1927; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1953; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Tilly 1978). It has often been noted that many potential voters will stay at home unless they are *asked* to participate by someone else; simply contacting a potential voter can mobilize that person to action (Fiorina 2002; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Voter contacting can be crucial to an electoral campaign because voter mobilization has the potential to determine the outcome of an election. In light of the increasing closeness of recent national elections, turning out a few extra voters can have dramatic electoral consequences.

Voter mobilization is the inducement of a person to vote, when he or she otherwise would not. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) define mobilization as:

> the process by which candidates, parties, activists, and groups induce other people to participate. We say that one of these actors has mobilized somebody when it has done something to increase the likelihood of her [his] participation (p. 26)

There are essentially two types of voter mobilization: direct and indirect. Direct mobilization occurs when political elites contact a potential voter directly, often face to face. This may include contacts that are made via phone calls, direct mail, door-to-door canvassing, as well as other forms of personal, "one on one" communication between elites and citizens. Indirect mobilization occurs when political elites contact someone through his or her associates, neighbors, or friends. This is often referred to as "two-step" mobilization, and it can occur within networks of citizens who communicate and disseminate political information and encouragement among themselves (see Katz and Lazarfeld 1955; Lazarfeld et al. 1948). The research presented in this dissertation focuses specifically on *direct* forms of voter mobilization.

Past research on direct voter mobilization has focused on both its effectiveness and the targeting of certain types of potential voters, using survey data, analysis of aggregate turnout, and field experiments (Table 1.1). Because of its importance to electoral outcomes, many scholars have attempted to assess the impact of voter mobilization on the decision to vote. In fact, past research on voter mobilization has focused primarily on the effect that voter mobilization has on those who are mobilized. The bulk of the existing research on voter mobilization examines the influence of party contacting on turnout. Much of what we know about the effectiveness of voter mobilization comes from the use of reported contacts by political party organizations found in survey data, such as the American National Election Studies. Survey research has shown that party contacting can affect the turnout decision; those citizens who are contacted by political elites are more likely to vote than those who aren't (see Abramson and Claggett 2001; Gershtenson 2003; Goldstein and Ridout 2002; Rosenstone and Hansen

1993; Wielhower and Lockerbie 1994; Wielhower 2000). The consensus among scholars is that voter mobilization works.

[Insert Table 1.1 about here]

Survey data has also given scholars a clear indication of which voters are most often targeted by mobilization efforts. Many previous studies of the effectiveness of party contacting on turnout since the 1950s have focused largely on changes in both the aggregate levels of contacting from year to year, as well as changes in the effectiveness of targeting voters based on certain demographic characteristics (such as race, gender, religion, and union membership) and individual traits (such as voting history, socioeconomic status, age, and education) (see Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Wielhower and Lockerbie 1994, Wielhower 2000, Abramson and Claggett 2001, Gershtenson 2003, Goldstein and Ridout 2002). Reports of party contacts have indicated that elites target likely voters. Those who are predisposed to vote (such as past voters, homeowners, older voters, those with high levels of socio-economic status, and those with high levels political knowledge and efficacy) are the most likely to report having been contacted by political elites. And those who are most likely to vote for favored candidates (including partisans) are more likely to be contacted by the party that would most benefit from their participation (Beck 1974; Kramer 1970).[1] Finally, those living in areas with electorally competitive contests are also more likely to be contacted, due to their potential for influencing the outcomes of close elections (see Cox and Munger 1989; Jackson 2002; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).

[1] A more in depth discussion of the party contacting literature can be found in Chapter 3.

Despite many the findings on the effectiveness of voter mobilization, many scholars have questioned whether reliance on survey data is an effective way to show the exact causal effect of voter contacting. As Green and Gerber (2004) have noted, "a GOTV [Get Out The Vote] strategy aims to transform nonvoters into voters" (p. 1). This means that a mobilization campaign (either personal or impersonal) is most effective when it *causes* individuals who would have stayed home on Election Day to head to the polls. However, many voters are targeted specifically *because* they are likely voters. Therefore, it may be difficult to determine whether or not a mobilization effort actually *caused* voters to head to the polls. As a consequence, many GOTV efforts may be effectively "preaching to the choir," or motivating the already highly motivated. Critics of most large-N studies of the effects of voter mobilization have indicated that it can be difficult to determine the actual effects of mobilization on turnout using survey data (Gerber and Green 2000). Because of the difficulty of determining causality using survey reports of voter contacting, several researchers have begun to determine the effect of GOTV by employing field experiments (Gerber and Green 2000a, 2000b; Green and Gerber 2004; Niven 2001).

Other research has focused on the nature of voter contacts, specifically the method of contacting that elites employ when mobilizing voters. Field experiments have shown that different methods of targeting and approaching voters can have varying degrees of success (Gerber and Green 2000a, 2000b; Green and Gerber 2004; Niven 2001). As Green and Gerber (2004) have noted, "to mobilize voters, you need them to feel wanted at the polls" (p. 92). They have shown that personal, face-to-face methods of voter mobilization (such as door-to-door canvassing) are a far more effective way to ensure greater turnout than impersonal methods (such

as recorded phone messages or mailers) (Gerber and Green 2000a, 2000b).[2] Research on voter mobilization methods has found that personal approaches make potential voters feel wanted at the polls, whereas impersonal mass-advertising and pre-recorded phone messages can actually suppress votes, by treating voters like consumers (Gerber and Green 2000).

Voter Mobilization Strategy: What don't We Know?

While there has been a considerable amount of scholarly research on the effectiveness of voter mobilization and efforts to "Get Out the Vote" (GOTV) for increasing voter turnout, the actual *strategies* of modern voter mobilization campaigns have been largely understudied. While we have learned a great deal about the effectiveness of various forms of voter mobilization in recent decades, as well as what types of voters are influenced by mobilization efforts, less is known about *how* modern voter mobilization campaigns are conducted by the political elites who perform them. What sorts of considerations do political elites take into account when planning and implementing a voter mobilization campaign? In short, w*hat influences the voter mobilization efforts of parties, interest groups, and candidate campaigns?* This research focuses on the strategic nature of voter mobilization. Specifically, I examine the effect of *resources* and the *institutional and contextual factors* on the voter mobilization strategies that parties, interest groups, and campaigns employ.

In the chapters that follow, there are two aspects of voter mobilization that are of primary concern: (1) its amount, and (2) the method of mobilization that is employed. The amount of voter mobilization can be measured at the individual level (as the presence of an individual voter contact) or at the aggregate level (as the level of mobilization at a certain point in time or within

[2] In *Get Out The Vote!: How to Increase Voter Turnout*, Green and Gerber show that canvassing can produce one additional vote for every fourteen people who are contacted, compared to one new vote for every 200 pieces of direct mail that are sent during a campaign.

a certain geographic area). Since voter mobilization is often determined by individual-level and contextual factors (including what sort of voters to mobilize and where to mobilize them), both levels of analysis are employed in this research. The methods of voter mobilization of interest in this research include the use of various targeted or broadcasting techniques for communicating with voters, various methods of individual contacts (such as phone calls, mailers, leaflets, and in-person communication), as well as the use of volunteers or professionals for voter mobilization efforts.

Voter Mobilization Strategy: The Role of Resources

An important influence on voter mobilization that is examined in this research is that of available resources. These resources can include money, access to labor/volunteers, organization and infrastructure, and technology. In this research, it is argued that the choice of mobilization strategy is largely dependent on the type and amount of resources available to the mobilizer. Resources affect the amount of voter mobilization that political elites employ and how they employ it. If given unlimited resources, those concerned with winning elections would most certainly attempt to contact any potential voter who would be likely to vote for the preferred candidate or party. Yet, due to limited available resources, not every potential voter is targeted by those involved in voter mobilization. Since mobilization resources are limited, political elites are often forced to make strategic decisions about how to apply those resources (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Therefore, the amount of mobilization that takes place is dictated by the availability of resources, rather than simply by the identity and characteristics of certain potential voters.

In addition, the method of voter mobilization that political elites employ can also be dictated by both the amount and type of their available resources. In fact, changes in the

availability of different types of resources in recent decades may have contributed to the changing nature of voter mobilization in the late 20th century, specifically the increasingly impersonal nature of many voter mobilization activities. Political scientists and campaign strategists have long known that personal methods of voter contact, such as door-to-door canvassing, are a very effective method of getting people to the polls on Election Day (Katz and Lazarfeld 1955, Key 1950, Kramer 1970, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Researchers have shown that many face-to-face, labor-intensive methods of voter mobilization are a far more effective way to ensure greater turnout than capital-intensive impersonal methods such as the use of pre-recorded phone messages or mailers (Gerber and Green 2000a, 2000b, 2004).[3] Yet, as will be addressed in this dissertation, until recently the use of many labor-intensive methods of voter mobilization were in decline. As this dissertation will show, this was likely due to the loss of human resources (i.e., party volunteers) in recent decades. With the decline of party patronage and the rise of the candidate-centered campaign in the 20th century, many of those traditionally involved in neighborhood canvassing efforts (specifically the local party organizations) no longer have the levels of human capital necessary for massive labor-intensive mobilization efforts.

In addition to problems resulting from the loss of party volunteers, much of the shift to capital-intensive tactics by the parties was likely due to the advent of new technology (including television) and the increased role of soft money in elections in recent decades. With greater financial and technological resources at their disposal, political parties, candidates' campaigns, and other electoral actors have adopted quicker, more easily adaptable, and often more

[3] For example, in *Get Out The Vote!: How to Increase Voter Turnout*, Green and Gerber (2004) show that canvassing can produce one additional vote for every fourteen people who are contacted, compared to one new vote for every 200 pieces of direct mail that are sent during a campaign.

manageable methods of mobilizing voters, including TV and radio advertising, mass mailings, and phone banks. While traditional methods of winning elections involved a massive coordination of volunteers, modern campaign strategies have relied more on using more easily managed financial, technological, and professional resources. Therefore, while personal methods of voter contacting have always been the most effective form of voter mobilization, those involved in electoral efforts in recent decades have seen capital-intensive methods as an easier, more feasible application of available resources.

Voter Mobilization Strategy: The Role of Institutional and Contextual Factors

Due to various resource constraints, there are several institutional and contextual factors that determine how voter mobilization is conducted. These include race-specific, geographic, demographic, and electoral districting characteristics. One contextual factor that has been identified in past research is electoral competitiveness. Because of the winner-take-all nature of most US elections, most electoral campaigns within a specific jurisdiction adjust their strategies when races there are more or less competitive. Several researchers have noted that, at the individual level, voters living in a jurisdiction with one or more competitive races are more likely to be contacted to turn out, due to the potential for influencing the eventual outcome of a race. Living in a district with a competitive congressional race, or a state with a competitive Senate or Gubernatorial race, has been shown to have a strong influence on whether or not a potential voter is contacted by a political party (see Cox and Munger 1989, Jackson 2002, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).[4]

[4] With the shift from party-centered to candidate-centered elections that has occurred in the last half century, it is possible that there has been an increase in the influence of these individual races on voter mobilization, given the independent nature of many candidate campaigns (see Aldrich 1995, Aldrich and Niemi 1996, Maisel et al. 1990, Herrnson 1988, Frendreis et al. 1990).

As this research will show, there are additional contextual factors apart from the dynamics of specific races that can determine whether or not voters are contacted. As Huckfeld and Sprague (1992) have noted, "The efforts of parties and their candidates to mobilize the electorate are located geographically and socially within the context of particular structural and institutional settings" (p. 71). Until recent decades, most forms of voter mobilization involved targeting certain geographic areas within an electoral district, using techniques such as the neighborhood canvass. In fact, many campaigns have tended only to mobilize in certain places while ignoring others, often because of resource constraints. Strategic voter mobilization campaigns will concentrate their efforts in places where they can win. Since elections often involve many overlapping national, state, and local electoral races in any given area, it has traditionally made sense to for party organizations to focus voter mobilization efforts geographically, rather than concentrating on election-specific factors alone. For example, Republican GOTV campaigns are very likely to focus on suburban and/or middle-class neighborhoods, because they tend to contain large numbers of potential supporters, while largely ignoring African American neighborhoods or many heavily urban areas. This type of strategy not only prevents mobilizing opposition voters, but it is often the best way to ensure that limited mobilization resources are used in an efficient and effective manner.

Most voter mobilization strategies do not remain stagnant. The effect of geography on voter mobilization strategy has likely changed over time, due to the ability of mobilization campaigns to identify potential supporters in an increasingly sophisticated manner. There has been noticeable growth in recent elections of the practice of "micro-targeting," or individually identifying potential supporters by parties, candidates, and other groups involved in voter mobilization, using large and detailed databases of individual voter information. Compared to

traditional methods of the "neighborhood canvass" (as well as the late 20th century reliance on TV advertising to blanket the airwaves), many of those involved in 21st century voter mobilization are specifically targeting only those voters who are likely to support a favored candidate or political party at election-time. Therefore, it is possible that some forms of voter mobilization (such as phone calls and mailers) are less bounded by geographical constraints than others; and it is also possible that the ability to pinpoint likely supporters has allowed campaigns to venture into neighborhoods which they might have ignored in earlier years.

Finally, the effect of geography on mobilization is likely increased when one considers institutional factors such as different methods of districting for different levels of election. This is because the method of aggregating votes varies by office within the American system of single-member districting. It is quite possible that although two geographic areas are roughly identical in terms of demographics (and other indicators of turnout), only one may be heavily targeted for turnout (due to its potential for influencing a larger outcome, such as a state-wide victory) (Shaw 1999).[5] But, at the same time, there are often multiple races to consider when determining where to target GOTV efforts. In fact, certain precincts, counties, congressional districts, or states might be electorally competitive for some races yet not for others. In light of the fact that many voter mobilization efforts are now led by non-party interest groups and campaigns, it is also possible that these groups take a different approach to voter mobilization than political parties (perhaps focusing their mobilization efforts more on winning specific races than on energizing party supporters in general).

[5] An example would be two states that contain several similar precincts (or counties, or congressional districts), such as Florida and Georgia, but are largely dissimilar states in their presidential voting.

Overview of the Dissertation

This dissertation is comprised of four parts: an historical tracing of the development of modern voter mobilization strategy, an examination of the influences on individual voter contacting, an analysis of candidate resource allocation strategy for voter communications, and an examination of the differing strategies and interaction of parties, candidates, and interest groups, in a single electoral environment. In each chapter, I address the role of resources and institutional/contextual factors on voter mobilization strategy. Chapter 2 is entitled "The Development of Modern Voter Mobilization and Strategy." This chapter is a largely historical account of the development of modern voter mobilization strategy, with an emphasis on the influence of resources on mobilization methods. I examine the nature of late 20th century GOTV, recent 21st century changes in GOTV (including the recent practice of "micro-targeting"), and strategic and resource considerations behind party, candidate, and interest group voter mobilization tactics. In Chapter 2, I begin my examination of the strategic nature of voter mobilization, by addressing some of the broad changes in elections, campaigns, and citizen participation since the 1960s that have had considerable effects on voter mobilization and "Get Out the Vote" efforts. I examine the changing relationships between the parties and the public, as well as the interest group explosion since the 1960s, and how the availability of different resources has affected the behavior of parties and interest groups in the electoral arena. I also discuss how the increased use of professional staff and technology in electoral campaigns by parties, coupled with the loss of their volunteer base, led to a decline in personal face-to-face party contacting in recent decades. Yet, with the rise of non-party interest and advocacy groups in the electoral arena, we have also seen a return to more labor intensive activities.

In addition, I briefly trace the development of campaign finance reform from the 1970s to the present, highlighting its impact on the development of, the resource availability of, and relationships between modern parties and interest groups. While many of the early FECA restrictions on campaign fundraising were designed to protect the voice of average citizens in the political process, the soft money loophole that was exploited throughout the 1980s and 1990s led to a hyperactive growth of money in politics. I discuss how campaign finance law has influenced the capital-intensive nature of modern campaigning, replacing much of the labor-intensive activity of an earlier era. I also address the impact of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act on voter mobilization, focusing on the consequences of soft money restrictions for the electoral involvement of parties and interest groups, the rise of 527s as a response to campaign finance reform, as well as how the issue ad restrictions might lead to new opportunities for grassroots mobilization.

Chapter 3, entitled "Strategic Mobilization: Party Competitiveness and Voter Contacting," contains the initial quantitative analysis for this dissertation, using a set of individual level cross-sectional and time-series analyses of voter contacting in national elections from the 1950s to the present. This section of the research addresses the institutional and contextual factors affecting party contacting of individual voters, as well as changes in their effects over time. As noted previously, there has been a considerable amount of past research indicating that competitive congressional, gubernatorial, and presidential races are positively correlated with the probability of party contacting (due to the increased propensity of additional turnout influencing the outcome of these races). However, I argue that since most voter mobilization has traditionally been performed at the local level (rather than at the district-wide, state-wide, or national level), the local electoral context is an important factor of concern for

those seeking to strategically mobilize potential voters. Using a combination of ANES data and county level Census data and election returns, I show that living in an electorally-competitive county has an additional positive effect on the probability of voter contact, due to the presence of additional local contests within a larger area (which might not have the same level of competitiveness as the national races in which they are often aggregated).

Chapter 4, "Resource Allocation Strategy: Broadcast vs. Targeted Voter Communication," is an examination of the determinants of candidate spending on voter mobilization. Rather than focusing on how much candidates spend, the subject of this chapter is what the candidates spend their money on. I argue that the methods of voter communication that candidates employ are largely determined by the types of districts in which they are running. Using a combination of data on itemized campaign expenditures, districting and Census data, and election data from the 2006 Georgia General Elections, I examine the influence of district characteristics on resource allocation strategy for candidates in state legislative, statewide, and non-partisan judicial elections. Specifically, I show that candidates running in densely populated districts are more likely to use a "targeted" approach to voter communication, rather than a "broadcast' advertising approach, because the former is a more efficient allocation of resources. Conversely, the findings in this chapter indicate that television and radio advertising might be more preferable when a candidate's district is more sparsely populated, or when it is geographically larger.

Chapter 5 is entitled "GOTV by Multiple Entities: Parties, Candidates, and Interest Groups." While the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 examined voter mobilization at the individual and candidate levels, the analysis performed in Chapter 5 examines voter mobilization in the aggregate, within a particular geographic area. While much of the past research on voter

mobilization approaches the topic by examining individual contacts by specific organizations, this may not reflect the realities of 21st Century voter mobilization in practice. Modern voter mobilization often includes multiple political party organizations, candidate campaigns, and other civic and political groups that are all attempting to Get Out the Vote in the same place, or at the same time. In the field, parties, candidates, and interest groups coordinate their activities and compete with each other for votes, and they often adapt their strategies to the environment in which they are working. Therefore, the methodology taken in Chapter 5 approaches voter mobilization holistically, by evaluating the determinants of the voter mobilization that is conducted by multiple entities within a multi-race environment. The analysis is done at the county level, by examining voter mobilization efforts of parties, candidates, and interest groups in 50 Georgia counties during the 2006 general election. By combining Census data, local election returns, and a survey of local journalists in Georgia, I find that both political parties and interest groups are concerned with multiple races during any given election, although they may not be concerned with the same contests. At the same time, the activities of some organizations may be determined by the activities of others, within a single electoral environment.

The conclusion to this dissertation is presented in Chapter 6. In this chapter, I summarize the findings of the research, and I discuss how they can help to shed light on the changing electoral environment in the 21st Century. I evaluate the central argument regarding the effect of resources and institutional and contextual factors on voter mobilization strategy, in light of changes in the voter mobilization environment in recent years. I assess the contributions of this study, and I identify possible areas for future voter mobilization research.

Table 1.1: Past Research on Direct Voter Mobilization

Past Research Question	*Aspect of Voter Mobilization Examined*	*Survey-based Research*	*Analysis of Aggregate Turnout*	*Field Experiments*	*Major Findings*	*Strengths of Research*	*Weaknesses/ Shortcomings of Research*
Effectiveness of Mobilization	Effectiveness of Voter Contacting	Abramson and Claggett 2001; Gershtenson 2003; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, et al 1995	Fiorina 2002; Katz and Lazarfeld 1955; Lazarfeld et al. 1948	Gosnell 1927	*Those voters who are contacted are more likely to vote*	Survey data can show patterns nationally, over time	Difficulty showing causality with survey data, aggregated turnout
	Effectiveness of Different Methods of Mobilization			Gerber and Green 2000a, 2000b; Green and Gerber 2004; Niven 2001	*Personal, face-to-face methods are more effective than impersonal methods*		Field experiments may have limited generalizability
Targeting of Mobilization	Individual-level Influences on Targeting	Abramson and Claggett 2001; Beck 1974; Gershtenson 2003; Goldstein and Ridout 2002; Kramer 1970; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Wielhower 2000; Wielhower and Lockerbie 1994			*Likely voters/supporters are those who are targeted*	Survey data may be examined for changes in targeting patterns over time	Difficulty showing causality or elite strategy with survey data
	Institutional-Level Influences on Targeting	Cox and Munger 1989; Jackson 2002; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993			*Voters likely to influence electoral outcomes are targeted*	Strategic explanation for individual targeting	Assumes that all voters in an area have an equal chance of contact

CHAPTER 2:

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN VOTER MOBILIZATION AND STRATEGY: THE ROLE OF RESOURCES

Introduction

In order to understand the strategic nature of voter mobilization, it is important to look at how these strategies have developed historically. While the objective of any voter mobilization campaign is to get voters to the polls, the identity of the voters who are mobilized and the manner in which they are contacted has changed considerably in the modern era of electoral campaigns. There have been many changes in the voter mobilization environment since the mid 20th century. As will be discussed in this chapter, changes in the availability of certain resources in recent decades, as well as the way in which they have been used within their electoral context, have had a profound influence on the targeting and preferred methods of voter mobilization. Before the 1950s and 60s, most voter mobilization was conducted using virtual armies of party volunteers, who often went door-to-door on Election Day, encouraging potential supporters to "get out and vote." Yet, in the late 20th century, many national electoral campaigns began to focus on capital-intensive TV advertising and telemarketing-style phone banks for communicating to the electorate, rather than relying on the more labor-intensive personal face-to-face contacts of an earlier era (Green and Gerber 2004, Gerber and Green 2000; Fiorina 2002, Margolis 1993, Coleman 1996, Hayes 2000). With the dominance of soft money in the 1980s and 90s, the importance of paid media advertising and professional consultants soon outweighed that of amateur volunteerism in most national campaigns. As a consequence, many national

voter mobilization campaigns have become increasingly professionalized since the mid-20th century. In this chapter, I will discuss several of the important implications of this professionalization, as well as changes in the role of volunteer labor and money for implementing GOTV efforts.

In addition to examining the changes of the late 20th century, this chapter will also address the reasons for the recent return to traditional voter mobilization tactics by modern interest and advocacy groups in the 21st century, the role of the political parties in these efforts, and the effect that it may have on the future of political participation. At the end of this chapter, I will examine the use of coordinated and strategic labor-intensive voter-mobilization efforts in the most recent national elections by both the Democratic and Republican Parties and the interest and advocacy groups that support their candidates.[6] Finally, the identity of those doing the voter contacting also appears to be changing. Historically, voter mobilization efforts were the sole domain of local party organizations, who sought to elect entire slates of candidates to office. Yet, with the rise of the candidate-centered campaign, the strategic nature of voter mobilization has changed. Because most campaigns are now run by the candidates themselves, many voter mobilization campaigns have become more race-specific, focusing on turning out voters in certain districts rather than throughout a wider area. And, unlike the days when voter mobilization was performed primarily by volunteers in local party organizations, many modern GOTV efforts are now planned, developed, and implemented independently by various interest

[6]Since the late 1990s, there have been several changes in the ways that potential voters are targeted and contacted by political elites. Voter mobilization efforts in some of the most recent national elections have begun to reemphasize personal, "face-to-face" contacts, rather than relying solely on impersonal methods such as TV advertising and mass-mailers. In addition, there has been noticeable growth in recent elections of the practice of "micro-targeting," or individually identifying potential supporters by parties, candidates, and other groups involved in voter mobilization, using large and sophisticated databases of individual voter information. Compared to the "shotgun" approaches to voter mobilization taken in the past, such as on neighborhood-wide door-to-door canvassing or broadcast TV advertising, many of those involved in 21st century voter mobilization are specifically targeting only those voters who are likely to support a favored candidate or political party at election-time, in an increasingly sophisticated manner.

and advocacy groups, including professional canvassers hired by many of the new "527" groups made famous in the 2004 election. In this chapter, I will discuss the influence of resources and strategic objectives on the kinds of voter mobilization efforts that these groups and candidates conduct, and why their different electoral objectives might cause their strategies to vary.

The Costs/Benefits Nature of Mobilization: Why Resources Matter

> *"Don't buy a single vote more than necessary…I'll be damned if I'm going to pay for a landslide."*
>
> --Joseph P. Kennedy (1960), in reference to his son's presidential campaign

Many traditional means of voter mobilization have employed somewhat "respectable" methods of engaging citizens. When political activists venture out into the community to talk to potential voters, they are engaging and connecting with their fellow citizens; a seemingly self-less act of personal sacrifice on behalf of the mobilizers. Citizens going door to door, engaging with other citizens, conjures up images of democracy in action. Activists indicate the importance of voting to their audience, when they undertake the effort (and costs) of contacting their fellow citizens. Yet, at other times, voters have been encouraged to turn out on Election Day through less-than-scrupulous means, such as intimidation, threats by employers, and simple bribery in exchange for votes (Argersinger 1985). There are numerous anecdotal accounts of *vote buying* throughout America history, most of which are often reported to have occurred in the late 1800s and early 1900s. The electoral corruption of the period is well-cited. For example, Gist (1961) notes that up to 90% of the residents of rural Adams County, Ohio regularly sold their votes during the 1890s.[7]

[7] It is widely acknowledged that many of the Progressive Era electoral reforms owe their success to vivid newspaper accounts the unscrupulous practice of "buying votes" during the period. Disgust over the mobilization activities of corrupt party machines, coupled with a heavy dose of anti-Irish and anti-immigrant sentiment among middle-class reformers, led to calls to clean up the electoral process by busting up the party machines, and their highly efficient electoral operations. However, while there are numerous accounts of vote buying and electoral corruption during

Perhaps the act of compensating voters for their vote is the most obvious example of the resource-based nature of voter mobilization. Despite questions about the prevalence, extent, and effect of vote buying, its existence highlights an important aspect of voter mobilization: winning votes has considerable costs. Often, mobilizers must expend significant amounts of time and energy convincing otherwise reluctant citizens of their civic duty to participate at election-time. Due to the "paradox of voting" and a common perception that one's vote will not be the decisive one, many citizens are reluctant to incur the costs of voting (such as expended time, energy, and information acquisition) when the marginal benefit of a single vote is perceived to be minimal (Downs 1957, Olson 1965). Self-interest demands that a citizen view the benefits of voting to be greater than the costs. In many elections, the sheer number of voters in the electorate makes the contribution of any single vote seem trivial, leading to a strong desire for many citizens to abstain from going to the polls. Therefore, political elites seeking to influence electoral outcomes must encourage these citizens to participate, often against their initial inclinations.

By addressing the cost/benefits analysis associated with political participation, political elites attempt to encourage citizens to undertake an otherwise seemingly irrational act (that of voting). This can be done by enhancing the benefits of voting, by paying for votes or rewarding voters with patronage or other tangible incentives (common at the beginning of the 20th century). However, since most acts of voter compensation are now widely viewed to be unethical (or are illegal), providing additional benefits to voters is less common. More frequently, the desired effect is achieved by removing many of the *costs* of voting, thereby reducing the desire to abstain

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the Golden Age and Progressive eras, there is little systematic documentation of its prevalence and the degree to which it altered electoral outcomes. In fact, as Argersinger (1985) notes, there is little evidence to support claims that voters were encouraged to vote contrary to their own preferences. More often, voters were being financially compensated for their time spent traveling to and from the polls. By providing additional benefits to potential voters (often in the form of cash payments), many mobilizers have been able to encourage these reluctant supporters.

from voting. Political mobilizers attempt to address the numerous impediments to political participation when they assist citizens in the act of voting, engaging in activities such as registering voters, providing electoral and candidate information to uninformed citizens, and driving voters to the polls on Election Day.

Voter mobilization is basically an effort by political elites to encourage these citizens to participate, often by *incurring the costs of their participation* for them. As Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) explain, voter mobilization is essentially a way to "*subsidize the costs* of citizen activism…by *underwriting* the costs of political participation, the mobilization efforts of political leaders help to overcome the paradox of participation" (emphasis added) (p. 27). The costs of contacting potential voters, printing and distributing informational materials, and assisting those citizens who might wish to vote can be significant. Therefore, political elites must often expend a substantial amount of resources if they hope to mobilize a substantial number of voters.

Voter mobilization, like many other electoral activities, requires the accumulation and efficient application of resources to be effective. Since resources are finite, mobilizers must make strategic decisions about how to apply them to maximize their effectiveness. The most commonly referenced resource in modern electoral politics is, of course, money. For example, Shaw (1999) has shown that presidential candidates allocate their television ad spending strategically in the different states, considering factors such as the size of a state's Electoral College vote, it's electoral history, and electoral competitiveness within a state. But other applicable resources influencing the size, targeting, and effectiveness of voter mobilization include less tangible factors, such as organizational capacity, expertise, and labor resources. As will be addressed in this chapter, the availability of these various resources has had a profound effect on the development of modern voter mobilization strategies and tactics.

Volunteer Resources and the Decline of the Party Canvass

There have been several notable changes in the nature of voter mobilization in recent decades, many of which stem from changes in the availability of certain resources. One of the most often cited changes is the decline of the traditional "party canvass" (Aldrich 1995, Magleby 2000, Mayhew 1986, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Wielhower and Lockerbie 1994). A century ago, local Democratic and Republican Party organizations often engaged in extensive, personal door-to-door canvassing by party volunteers for both local and national elections. In major cities, the life-blood of the party "machines" was the large-scale voter mobilization efforts that were organized to ensure electoral victory throughout the late 19th and early 20th century, using the labor of local party loyalists.[8] These mobilization efforts are often credited for the incredibly high turnout rates at the turn of the century; reaching up to 80% of the eligible adult population in the 1880s (see Hershey 2007, Aldrich and Niemi 1996).[9]

In the latter half of the 20th century, these local party efforts declined dramatically for national elections. Some have suggested that the decline in the party canvass was due to the fact that candidates no longer needed the help of local party organizations and their armies of volunteers (see Reichley 1992). Several researchers have noted the shift from party-centered to candidate-centered elections that has occurred in the last half century, leading to weakening relationships between parties and candidates (Aldrich 1995, Aldrich and Niemi 1996, Maisel et

[8]Although party machines are often associated with the politics of major metropolitan areas, Hershey (2007) notes that machines also flourished in small southern towns and cities, company towns, as well as some suburban areas. For example, she notes that the Nassau County Republican machine on suburban Long Island, New York was as strong and active as many of the urban machines of its day.

[9]It has been argued that voter fraud can explain the inordinately high rates of voter turnout in the late 19th century (see Converse 1972). However, as Argersinger (1985) notes, electoral corruption cannot solely explain the irregularly high rates of turnout during this period, because most of the substantiated claims of electoral corruption were cases of "deflationary fraud," resulting in under-counting of votes. He found that "much substantiated election fraud involved manipulations, miscounting, or discarding of actual ballots by corrupt election officials rather than repeating or ballot-box stuffing" (p. 684).

al. 1990, Herrnson 1988, Frendreis et al. 1990). As candidates adapted to a professionalizing and television-oriented campaign environment in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, they were now able to run their campaigns independently, relying on direct communication with the voters through TV ads and direct mail. Parties were soon delegated to a "service" role (Aldrich and Niemi 1996), in which their assistance to candidates became more advisory and financial.

If parties continued to remain active in electoral politics (albeit more indirectly), why did they largely abandon the traditional party canvass that had proved so effective in the past? Why didn't the parties simply use the reliable labor-intensive mobilization techniques of the past to support their new candidates? Perhaps, it was because they were unable to, due to a lack of necessary resources. One reason that the parties might have shifted away from more labor-intensive forms of electioneering is because of the loss of the large volunteer base that they once had. Several researchers have indicated that this might be true, noting the growing separation between party organization and voters throughout the 20th century (see Aldrich 1995, Aldrich and Niemi 1996, Crenson and Ginsberg 2001, Fiorina 2002). Since the introduction of Civil Service and reforms in the early part of the 20th century, party patronage largely disappeared. Once, when parties were responsible for distributing government jobs, voters had a material interest in becoming loyal party followers, as well as volunteers for the party at election-time (Beck 1974, Brown and Halaby 1987). For example, Hershey (2007) notes that "in its prime, the Chicago Democratic machine controlled an estimated 35,000 patronage jobs in government and influenced hiring for another 10,000 jobs in the private economy" (p. 53).

During the 20th century, local party organizations lost much of their distributional power among voters, and thereby their power to recruit active volunteers (Aldrich 1995, Fiorina 2002, O'Connor 1956, Reichley 1992). With the loss of party patronage, combined with the effects of

reforms over party nominations at the turn of the century and in the 1970s, the power and the electoral capabilities of the old party machines declined.[10] Although there is limited reliable historical data on the decline of party volunteering since the 19th century, survey data from the last 50 years appear to support the suggestion that the party organizations have lost much of their original volunteer base. As Putnam (2000) has noted, by the mid-1990s the number of people reporting to have volunteered for political parties was half of what it was twenty years before.[11] In fact, survey data appear to support much of the existing research regarding the evolution of party organizations and electoral volunteerism in recent decades. As responses from the ANES indicate, the number of people who have worked on behalf of a political party or candidate has declined dramatically since the 1970s. Although, as a percentage of the total adult population the number of Americans volunteering for parties and candidates has always been small (and has tended to fluctuate from year to year), as Figure 2.1 indicates the percentage of ANES respondents reporting to have volunteered at election-time has dropped by over half of what it was 25 years ago.[12]

[Insert Figure 2.1 about here]

[10]After the initial wave of Progressive Era reforms to the party system at the turn of the century, many of the party machines in the Northeast and industrial Midwest continued to operate on a patronage system well into the later half of the 20th century (see Reichley 1992). An often cited example would be the Democratic Daley organization in Chicago.

[11]Putnam notes the decline in party volunteering is evident from various polling data, including the American National Election Studies and Roper polls.

[12] from ANES responses to the following:

"Did you do any {other} work for one of the parties or candidates?"

The years 1958 and 1962 were not included in the data, because these questions were not asked.

Since the percentage of Americans who volunteer at election-time has never been very large, one might argue that the effects of a volunteering decline are relatively unimportant. However, a small reduction in the numbers of people who engage in electoral volunteering could cause a more drastic change in the nature of political campaigns, especially when one considers the activities for which these volunteers have traditionally been used. With the loss of their volunteers, many party organizations lost the ability to conduct massive, labor-intensive GOTV efforts such as the traditional neighborhood canvass. Party organizations simply didn't have the human resources that they once had. It is likely that the loss of the available volunteer resources contributed to the decline in these sorts of labor-intensive activities over time.

[Insert Figure 2.2 about here]

Figure 2.2 shows the changing trends of several variables of interest, including percentage rates party contacting and volunteering from 1956 to 2002. By examining the diverging trends in the number of party volunteers and the percentage of potential voters being contacted, we can see some support for the suggestion that mobilization activity by political parties has gotten less labor-intensive (and therefore less personal) in recent decades. As Figure 2.2 indicates, from the 1950s to the late 1970s, the patterns of party volunteering and party contacting were fairly similar, following similar upward and downward trends. However, since the beginning of the 1980s, while the percentages of respondents reporting party contacts dropped dramatically (then rose dramatically in the late 1990s), the percentage of respondents reporting to have volunteered for a party or candidate declined (leveling off at around 3%, roughly half of where it was at the end of the 1960s). While levels of party contacting activity have increased since the early 1990s, they don't appear to be associated with an increase in party

volunteering. Unless these fewer volunteers are making more contacts, these trends appear to support the suggestion that the parties have shifted away from volunteer based (and therefore labor-intensive) forms of electioneering in recent decades.

The Rise of Capital Intensive GOTV: Professionals, Technology, Soft Money, and the Candidate-centered Campaign

Due to the increased reliance on direct mail, professional and pre-recorded phone banks, and TV advertising by most 20th century campaigns, this is likely the case. With greater financial and technological resources at their disposal, political parties, candidates' campaigns, and other electoral actors have adopted quicker, more easily adaptable, and more manageable methods of communicating with voters, such as TV and radio advertising, mass mailings, and phone banks. As a result, those involved in campaigns have developed the ability to streamline their organizations, as well as to rapidly respond to an ever-increasingly fast-paced electoral environment. Unlike the days when winning elections involved a massive coordination of volunteers, modern campaign strategies have relied more on using more easily managed financial, technological, and professional resources.

As some have noted, the changes in the type of available resources have also affected the nature of the approach that parties and candidate campaigns take in their communications with voters. During the late 20th century, many political elites switched from their traditional focus on mobilization to one of persuasion and conversion (Shively 1992). Rather than focusing primarily on mobilizing a reliable base of supporters, parties and many candidate campaigns began to appeal to growing numbers of independent and undecided voters, often by attempting to market candidates to a broader electoral audience. The shift to a "new style" of campaigning, based on candidate-centered image-based appeals, rather than party-centric appeals, could not have been

possible without this major change in the sort of resources available to political elites.[13] In the latter half of the 20th century, broadcast forms of voter communication such as radio and television became a prominent part of many election campaigns, at both the state, local, and federal level. While party-assisted direct forms of voter contacting remained a viable communication method for many local campaigns with limited money and smaller districts (Hogan 1997), as Herrnson (2008) observes, "changes in technology transformed most congressional campaigns from labor-intensive grassroots undertakings, at which local party committees excelled, to money-driven, merchandised activities requiring the services of skilled experts…most local party committees were unable to adapt to the new style of campaign politics" (p. 21).

The relationship between the candidate-centered campaign and the rise of professional political consultants is well-documented (Herrnson 2008; Sabato 1981; Sorauf 1980). As noted previously, without a steady supply of volunteers to implement a door-to-door campaign, the parties no longer have a monopoly over the resources once needed for successful voter mobilization. In the late 20th century, many independent and private-sector consultants emerged to challenge the monopoly of the party organizations in the campaign politics arena. With the growing importance of broadcast media, public opinion polling, advertising, database technology, and other technological advancements in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, those with specific technical expertise became highly sought after by candidates hoping to mount a successful election campaign (Sabato 1981). In fact, the replacement of the traditionally amateur-run

[13]West (2005) has also noted that the Democratic McGovern Frasier reforms of the 1970s, which made presidential primaries binding, forced candidates to appeal to the voting public in order to receive a party's nomination, rather than party bosses. He notes that changes in the primary system has meant that campaigns "have come to depend increasingly on television as a means of attracting public support" (p. 17). However, since television advertising had become a dominant form of electoral communication well before the passage of these reforms in the 1970s, it is unlikely that the reforms were the sole cause of the TV based campaign.

political party campaigns with those run by highly paid professionals has unquestionably contributed to the sky-rocketing cost of elections in recent decades. While candidates with access to the parties' volunteers and patronage networks had once had a distinct electoral advantage, now those with large amounts of cash had the greatest chance of electoral success.

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, political party organizations reasserted their electoral influence through the very means from which they had lost it decades before: through money. The advent of campaign finance reform in the 1970s led to a strengthened relationship between national, state, and local party organizations, which enhanced their ability to conduct their electoral operations, due to the dominance of soft money in American elections.[14] The rising importance of soft money, or large unregulated funds meant specifically for voter mobilization and "party-building activities," has been noted by many (Jacobson 1985/1986, Herrnson 1989, Corrado et al. 1997, La Raja 2003). Compared with "hard money," or strictly regulated contributions to a candidate's campaign (or on behalf of a candidate), soft money was intended primarily for strengthening the parties and remained largely unregulated since the passage of the original FECA. With soft money, the national parties were able to provide state and local party organizations with much needed financial assistance with local races, as well as financing their voter mobilization efforts (Bibby 1999).[15] By 2000 (the last presidential election cycle before

[14]A generation ago, most of the power in the party system was held by fairly autonomous party organizations at the local level. As Bibby (1999) has noted, before WWII "the national party structure was clearly confederate in character with power flowing from the state parties to the national level" (p. 70-1). But with the growing ability of the national parties to raise lots of money (including unlimited amounts of *soft money* after the passage of the FECA in the 1970s), the power structure became a more integrated (and top-down) system, where the national parties were able to use their power of the purse to both rein in and assist the otherwise autonomous local party organizations.

[15]State and local party organizations had become largely dependant on this soft money to conduct their operations by the end of the 20th century. However, at the same time, the DNC and RNC were able to implement national strategies (or "coordinated campaigns") for national campaigns, directing funds to key areas in national elections (La Raja 2003). Overall, the increased integration of the national, state, and local parties in recent decades has allowed for more coordinated, national GOTV (Get Out the Vote) *strategies* by political parties in national (and presidential) elections. Yet, since the parties' organizational structures are still fairly loosely integrated, their GOTV *operations* have remained too uncoordinated for employing massive labor-intensive strategies.

the soft money ban), nearly $300,000,000 in national party soft money was distributed to the state and local organizations by both major parties in that year, which was almost twice the amount of hard money contributions that were transferred (see Table 2.1).

[Insert Table 2.1 about here]

Although the influx of soft money into the parties during this period increased the spending potential of the state and national committees, the new capital-intensive voter mobilization campaigns undertaken by the parties were very different from the face-to-face canvassing campaigns employed a generation before. By the 1990s, soft-money financed voter mobilization was dominated by impersonal means of communication with voters, such as "air-war" issue advertising. This is likely due to the fact that these methods are easy to coordinate and implement, given the appropriate funds (Green and Gerber 2004). With plenty of soft money available, capital-intensive tactics such as issue ads soon became a highly valued method of communicating with potential voters in most federal elections. Combined with the vast amounts of spending by candidate campaigns, the soft money spending by political parties on TV ads contributed to incredibly expensive elections after the passage of FECA. For example, TV political ad spending for all federal and gubernatorial races went from around $12 million in the 1970 election cycle to nearly $800 million in 2006 (see Table 2.2).

[Insert Table 2.2 about here]

Return to the Grassroots: Interest Groups, BCRA, and Coordinated Voter Mobilization

As noted previously, capital intensive techniques have been the primary form of voter communication and mobilization since the 1970s. As a result, many of the tactics employed by parties have not required vast amounts of volunteer labor. However, since the 1960s and 1970s, political interest groups have also been increasingly involved in assisting the day-to-day operation of recent campaigns, leading to dramatic changes in the voter mobilization environment. Much of what these groups have been able to contribute to election campaigns has been financial; the ability to solicit contributions from group members has given interest groups like the AFL-CIO, the Chamber of Commerce, and the NRA a prominent voice in the modern campaign environment. The Democratic Party has recently relied on labor unions and groups like the NAACP for raising money and developing air-war strategies for national campaigns, while the Republicans have had a close working relationship with trade groups in recent decades (see Mayhew 1986, Bibby 1999, Herrnson 2005).

While the parties (as well as candidate campaigns) have used interest group soft money to revitalize their operations, they have also been heavily dependent on these outside groups for much of the "leg work" involved with assisting candidates' campaigns. While party activity among voters has waned since mid century, membership in a wide array of ideological and issue based interest and advocacy groups has skyrocketed since the 1960s (Berry 1999). These groups often have a steady supply of members who can be called upon to volunteer in a campaign. In fact, door-to-door canvassing has continued to be used in many lower level and congressional races, although the party-based efforts of the past have largely been replaced by the volunteer efforts of local chapters of non-party groups such as the AFL-CIO and the NAACP (Bibby 1999,

Magleby 2000, Biersack and Viray 2005, Herrnson 2005).[16] For state and local races, these groups often engage in some of the more labor-intensive activities involved with an electoral campaign, due to their vast membership network of potential volunteers.

Not all of this labor-intensive activity has been at the lower levels. Biersack and Viray (2003) note that large membership organizations like the AFL-CIO and the NAACP began experimenting with nationwide door-to-door canvassing efforts in the late 1990s.[17] However, these efforts were minor in comparison to those of the 2004 Presidential Election. This is likely due to the problem of organizing large, labor-intensive mobilization efforts among non-party groups. As Bibby (1999) has noted, "the allied groups do not [traditionally] coordinate their activities with the candidates and parties they are seeking to assist" (p. 79). Nor do they often coordinate with each other. He explains that "these partisan allies have their own agendas and often maintain an autonomous organizational structure" (p. 79). As a result, coordinating a large, highly planned and organized national canvassing campaign among non-party groups had never

[16]Some researchers have also found that even with the changes in the nature of party organizations since WWII, local parties still conduct some important door-to-door canvassing for *state and local* races (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992, Frendeis and Gitelson 1999). While canvassing still exists, it is generally considered to be performed *at a much lower rate* than in earlier generations and conducted largely by *non-party groups* on a *much smaller scale* than in earlier times.

[17]The AFL-CIO reconsidered the potential benefits of canvassing due to an unfortunate lesson it learned in 1998: although massive TV ad campaigns have the ability to mobilize supporters, they have the potential to mobilize opposition voters as well (Biersack and Viray 2003, Magleby 2000). As a response to their experiences in 1998, unions conducted "Labor 2000" in the 2000 elections, a strategic effort to *specifically target potential supporters* rather than using a pure "air-war" strategy (that might energize the opposition). Although the effort relied mostly on ads, mailers, and volunteer phone banks, the AFL-CIO conducted a large door-to-door canvassing effort, as well (using a network of 1000 field coordinators and thousands of volunteers, focusing on 75 congressional districts in 25 states, as well as the presidential race). At the same time, the NAACP's "National Voter Fund" and the "Americans for Equality" campaigns used 8000 volunteers to contact roughly 40,000 African-American households door-to-door in 13 presidential swing states (Biersack and Viray 2003). In 2002, labor's nationwide "People-Powered Politics" campaign led to about half a million door-to-door contacts in the mid-term elections, according to the AFL-CIO (2002). The reemergence of canvassing efforts in the last few election cycles indicates that interest groups may have seen the value of face-to-face communications before the 2002 BCRA went into effect. However, before 2004, most of their activity was dominated by blanket issue advertising and impersonal GOTV tactics.

been truly attempted before 2004. This was partly the reason for the use of 527s[18] in the 2004 election. By coordinating their efforts under the largely unregulated 527s, these groups sought to prevent wasteful overlaps in their mobilization campaigns. Cecile Richards, former head of the liberal 527 group America Votes, notes, "what historically has happened on the progressive side…which is, the same ten voters get bombarded by mail and phone calls from every progressive organization in America and meanwhile we leave tons on people that have no contact" [emphasis added] (Goldberg, 2006, p. 17). Yet, through the use of a 527 committee, these groups are now able to have a coordinated GOTV effort, similar to that of the parties in an earlier era.

With the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, the voter mobilization game changed considerably. The 2002 law had several important implications for electoral activity, including raised individual limits for hard money contributions to a candidate's campaign (raised from $1,000 to $2,000, then adjusted for inflation). However, the restrictions put on soft money operations are perhaps the most important aspect of the law when it comes to voter mobilization, because they have the potential to dramatically alter the way these mobilization efforts are conducted. The BCRA bans outright all soft money contributions to the national party organizations, and it severely limits soft money contributions to state and local party organizations (to $10,000 per group, unless otherwise restricted by state law). As a result, the passage of BCRA had the potential for severely limiting the parties' ability to conduct voter mobilization operations, by cutting off their soft money.

Certain loopholes in BCRA allowed other political organizations to collect and spend unregulated funds (a form of "soft" money) for voter registration, issue advocacy, or GOTV

[18]The "527" designation is named after the section of the IRS code that regulates political organizations.

efforts, as long as they did not coordinate with the parties or candidates. In 2004, several pro-Kerry 527 groups were created to take advantage of the soft money loophole in the new BCRA restrictions, and to help reverse the damaging blow that the BCRA inflicted on the Democratic Party's soft money operation. As Herrnson (2005) notes, in 2004 "some of these [527] organizations [had] been created explicitly to collect some of the soft money that previously had been contributed to political parties and to spend those funds to help their parties' candidates" (p. 44). Due to their unique tax-exempt and largely unregulated statuses under FECA, 527 political advocacy organizations were able to raise millions of dollars in soft money from average citizens, labor and interest groups, and a small number of wealthy individuals. By coordinating the efforts and resources of their member groups, they were then able to spend almost unlimited amounts of money in independent expenditures on both capital and labor intensive GOTV tactics, including setting up and operating massive mobilization networks of paid and volunteer neighborhood canvassers in presidential swing states (such as Florida and Ohio).

Ironically, the soft money bans in BCRA did not cripple the national parties' ability to finance electoral efforts in 2004, because they were able to raise an unprecedented amount of *hard* money contributions from individuals (Malbin 2006). However, the *state* parties were largely unable to finance the level of media advertising that they had conducted in 2000.[19] And while 527s like Media Fund, MoveOn, and the Swift Boat Veterans spent massive amounts of money on issue advertising throughout the campaign, their dominant role in the 2004 presidential election was largely stimulated by the regulations imposed on parties by BCRA, which led to their initial formation. As a result, recent campaign finance reforms may have solidified the role

[19]As Raymond La Raja (2006) indicates, Democratic state party spending on media dropped from $139 million in 2000 to $3 million in 2004, largely due to the effects of BCRA. Therefore, BCRA may have had a potentially damaging effect on state and local party organizations, as well as their ability to engage in voter mobilization. This is important to note, because local party organizations are the groups that traditionally conducted person-to-person contacting in the past.

of interest groups and their coordinating 527s in the voter mobilization efforts of future elections (Weissman and Hassan 2006), albeit indirectly. Although the parties were largely able to finance their activities through hard money in 2004, fears about the BCRA-imposed soft money bans led to the redirection of pro-Kerry efforts to non-party groups. In turn, these interest, advocacy, and 527 groups, coordinated under the larger umbrella of "America Votes," were able to conduct a well-planned, efficient, and organized voter mobilization effort on behalf of John Kerry.

The use of 527s is important to note, because it allowed large membership organizations to successfully coordinate their labor intensive mobilization activities, such as door-to-door contacting, on a national scale. As a result, the use of 527s allowed for massive labor-intensive GOTV efforts, unlike anything that had been attempted in recent decades. In the 2004 presidential election, various advocacy groups such as America Coming Together (a consortium of labor unions, environmental groups, and other membership-based interest groups), focused their the bulk of their mobilization efforts in 15 to 17 swing states in an effort to influence the outcome of the presidential election (Dwyer 2004, Bernstein, et al. 2004). Although their efforts did not ultimately ensure a Kerry victory, they were not entirely inconsequential. As *Washington Times* writer Stephen Dinan observes, liberal groups like America Coming Together and MoveOn were able to reach thousands of potential voters at their homes and get them to the polls on Election Day, potentially having a positive effect on Kerry's success in key states:

> …MoveOn, which is three separate entities - a 527, a tax-exempt 501(c)4 and a political action committee - claims to have turned out more than 27,000 voters in Wisconsin, where Mr. Kerry's margin of victory was 11,813 votes…(Dinan 2004)[20]

[20] Obviously, the progresive 527s specifically targeted those voters who were likely to support Kerry. However, the reason that these groups were so successful might not have been simply due to who they contacted. In fact, *how* they contacted these potential voters was just as important (if not more so) for ensuring a high Democratic turnout. It is likely that pro-Kerry groups in 2004 were ultimately able to mobilize more voters on their behalf due to their ability to conduct more effective face to face, yet labor-insensitive, campaigns that have considerable start-up costs (rather than simply using impersonal, yet quickly-prepared and conducted phone-banks and direct mailings).

Conclusions: Resources and Voter Mobilization Strategy

Because voter mobilization is designed to address the participatory dilemma of potential voters, who are reluctant to incur the costs of voting when there are few perceived benefits from casting a single vote, political elites must encourage citizens to participate by subsidizing the costs of their participation for them. As a result, these political elites incur significant costs when implementing a get-out-the-vote campaign. As the evidence and data presented in this chapter have shown, changes in voter mobilization tactics and trends in the last 50 years have been greatly influenced by the availability of certain resources to defray those costs, including labor, technology, soft money, and organizational capacity. The historical development of voter mobilization strategy and tactics has been largely determined by these resource concerns, as party organizations, candidates, and interest groups have sought to conduct effective voter mobilization campaigns, often under considerable resource constraints.

A contrary hypothesis might be that decisions to adopt certain mobilization tactics and strategies are less dependent on the availability of resources, but by the *effectiveness* of the available forms of communication. Perhaps the adoption of new technologies for voter communication in recent decades was because these methods are simply better than the old methods at getting voters to the polls. The rapid growth of high tech approaches such as TV advertising, direct mail, and automated phone banks in the 1970s and 80s would suggest that campaigns saw the potential effectiveness of these new forms of communication, and quickly adopted them. Using television, radio, and direct mail, campaigns would be able to saturate a market with their electoral message, ensuring that no voter was ignored or overlooked. With the lower costs of direct mail technology, the abundance of soft money, and increasingly large

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However, as Meyerson (2004) points out, the 527s' inability to expressly advocate for Kerry (due to various campaign finance regulations) may have ultimately *limited* their potential for mobilizing votes on his behalf.

amounts of financial resources at their disposal, it is possible that resource constraints became *less* of a concern during the time period in question. As Sabato (1981) observed at the time, "to a serious candidate bent on winning...money can be no object to acquiring what he needs to win" (p. 50).

If capital intensive techniques were considered to be more effective than labor intensive methods of voter mobilization, it would not explain why older techniques were also largely abandoned by many of the higher office campaigns. If money (and other resources) were "no object," an organization determined to win would likely employ every tactic that was available, not just the new-fangled ones. Rather than choosing better methods, those employed in voter mobilization chose the methods which were available to them, given their resources. As Sabato (1981) also suggests, the newer technologies greatly increased "the number of voters who can be reached by a limited number of volunteers" (p. 198). In fact, it was the efficient use of resources, rather than the effectiveness of the new methods themselves, that can best explain the rapid adoption of these new approaches to voter communication. As Green and Gerber (2000) have noted, "the shift away from door-to-door canvassing occurred not because this type of mobilization was discovered to be ineffective, but rather because the economic and political incentives facing parties, candidates, and campaign professionals changed over time" (p. 23). If was more likely that older, more personal and labor-intensive methods were replaced because of the considerable start-up costs that they necessitate (including having a network of volunteer labor that is readily available). Professionally orchestrated TV and direct mail campaigns were quickly adopted in the latter half of the 20th century because they were seen as a better fit for a cash-rich, yet labor-poor, candidate-centered campaign environment.

If voter mobilization tactics and strategies are truly determined by resource constraints (rather than simply preference), we would expect to see these resources expended in an efficient manner. For those seeking to mobilize as many supporters as possible at election-time, but who are limited in their outreach capacity due to these resource constraints, we would expect to see voter mobilization campaigns that selectively target only those voters who have the ability to influence electoral outcomes. In order to prevent waste, get-out-the-vote efforts would likely avoid expending valuable resources on voters who are either unlikely to vote, or who are unlikely to alter election outcomes by their participation. In the next chapter, I examine the effect of electoral context on voter mobilization strategy, finding that voters do (in fact) appear to be mobilized in a cost-efficient manner.



Figure 2.1: Percentage of Adult Americans Who Worked for a Party or Candidate (1956-2002)



Figure 2.2: The Party Volunteering/Contacting Gap

Table 2.1: Hard and Soft Money National Party Transfers to the States: 2000 Election Cycle[21]

Rank	*State*	*Total*	*Soft*	*Hard*	*Dem %*	*Repub %*
	National	***$448,363,086***	***$296,831,790***	***$151,531,296***	***53%***	***47%***
1	Florida	$41,228,820	$27,089,064	$14,139,756	53%	47%
2	Michigan	$40,080,209	$24,200,156	$15,880,053	56%	44%
3	Pennsylvania	$33,809,487	$23,458,539	$10,350,948	60%	40%
4	Missouri	$30,954,926	$22,362,561	$8,592,365	52%	48%
5	California	$25,906,715	$18,127,205	$7,779,510	59%	41%
6	New York	$23,810,461	$12,482,097	$11,328,364	82%	18%
7	Washington	$22,045,253	$15,761,958	$6,283,295	47%	53%
8	Ohio	$21,354,237	$14,211,724	$7,142,513	52%	48%
9	D.C.	$19,164,738	$5,966,942	$13,197,796	53%	47%
10	Virginia	$18,471,398	$11,270,071	$7,201,327	58%	42%
11	Illinois	$16,408,976	$12,076,199	$4,332,777	60%	40%
12	Wisconsin	$12,604,514	$7,913,144	$4,691,370	56%	44%
13	Oregon	$11,453,037	$8,605,197	$2,847,840	57%	43%
14	Kentucky	$9,603,970	$7,849,832	$1,754,138	56%	44%
15	N. Carolina	$9,511,757	$8,350,462	$1,161,295	45%	55%
16	Minnesota	$9,012,099	$5,302,236	$3,709,863	58%	42%
17	Iowa	$8,725,062	$5,853,360	$2,871,702	60%	40%
18	Texas	$7,737,732	$6,020,323	$1,717,409	64%	36%
19	Nevada	$7,698,559	$4,196,711	$3,501,848	38%	62%
20	Arkansas	$7,540,429	$5,246,702	$2,293,727	57%	43%
21	Montana	$6,803,618	$4,709,683	$2,093,935	54%	46%
22	Louisiana	$6,441,184	$5,057,248	$1,383,936	55%	45%
23	Tennessee	$6,101,806	$4,050,384	$2,051,422	59%	41%
24	Delaware	$5,868,732	$4,252,877	$1,615,855	85%	15%
25	New Mexico	$5,862,768	$3,972,765	$1,890,003	59%	41%
26	Indiana	$5,242,273	$4,330,475	$911,798	33%	67%
27	Georgia	$4,812,247	$3,277,726	$1,534,521	49%	51%
28	Nebraska	$4,331,335	$2,056,400	$2,274,935	48%	52%
29	N. H.	$3,427,374	$2,940,804	$486,570	32%	68%
30	Maine	$2,896,352	$1,663,839	$1,232,513	52%	48%
31	Mississippi	$2,419,348	$2,234,472	$184,876	24%	76%
32	Utah	$2,291,240	$1,614,031	$677,209	42%	58%
33	New Jersey	$2,068,501	$743,867	$1,324,634	40%	60%
34	Arizona	$1,506,775	$1,349,940	$156,835	29%	71%
35	Vermont	$1,482,877	$1,367,135	$115,742	48%	52%
36	Colorado	$1,369,660	$1,256,778	$112,882	27%	73%

[21]All figures obtained from the website of the Center for Responsive Politics (www.opensecrets.org)

Table 2.1: Hard and Soft Money National Party Transfers to the States:
2000 Election Cycle
(continued)

Rank	*State*	*Total*	*Soft*	*Hard*	*Dem %*	*Repub %*
37	North Dakota	$1,250,266	$1,090,500	$159,766	34%	66%
38	South Dakota	$1,198,632	$1,013,500	$185,132	26%	74%
39	Alabama	$1,174,349	$1,116,601	$57,748	31%	69%
40	Oklahoma	$924,884	$598,038	$326,846	35%	65%
41	Maryland	$782,622	$289,657	$492,965	59%	41%
42	S. Carolina	$500,201	$384,094	$116,107	31%	69%
43	Wyoming	$392,247	$264,350	$127,897	28%	72%
44	Kansas	$388,728	$89,635	$299,093	54%	46%
45	M.A.	$385,525	$146,900	$238,625	24%	73%
46	Rhode Island	$358,565	$65,650	$292,915	34%	66%
47	Idaho	$320,511	$201,550	$118,961	41%	59%
48	W. Virginia	$295,266	$215,000	$80,266	59%	41%
49	Alaska	$184,227	$10,000	$174,227	70%	30%
50	Hawaii	$158,594	$123,408	$35,186	20%	70%

Table 2.2: Political Ad Spending on Broadcast Television, 1970-2006:
Presidential, Gubernatorial, & Congressional Elections*

	Network TV	Station TV	Total
1970	$260,900	$11,789,000	$12,049,900
1972	6,519,100	18,061,000	24,580,100
1974	1,486,200	21,781,600	23,267,800
1976	7,906,500	42,935,700	50,842,200
1978	1,065,800	56,545,000	57,610,800
1980	20,699,700	69,870,300	90,570,000
1982	861,900	122,760,300	123,622,200
1984	43,652,500	110,171,500	153,824,000
1986	459,300	161,184,000	161,643,300
1988	38,520,700	189,379,500	227,900,200
1990	------	203,313,300	203,313,300
1992	73,816,000	225,807,400	299,623,400
1994	------	354,961,400	354,961,400
1996	33,824,000	366,661,900	400,485,900
1998	------	498,890,600	498,890,600
2000	772,600	611,172,500	611,945,100
2002	------	707,077,300	707,077,300
2004	144,000	637,831,900	637,975,900
2006	------	798,217,000	798,217,000

Source: TNS Media Intelligence (2007)

NOTE: Prior to 2001, totals for Spot/Local were based on a 75-market composite. During 2001-2002, totals for Spot/Local were gradually increased to a 100-market composite.

*Includes candidate and on-ballot issue advertising. Off-ballot issues not included.

Congressional Election Years: 1/3 of Senate, all of the House of Representatives and about 3/4 of the Governors.

Presidential Election Years: President, 1/3 of Senate, all of the House of Representatives and about 1/4 of the Governors.

CHAPTER 3

STRATEGIC MOBILIZATION: PARTY COMPETITIVENESS AND VOTER CONTACTING

Introduction

In Chapter 2, I argued that changes in the method and amount of voter mobilization over time have been largely due to the availability of certain types of resources such as volunteer labor, technology, and money. Nationally, aggregate level changes in the availability of necessary resources have altered the voter mobilization landscape. National trends indicate that voter mobilization is a strategic process, based largely on institutional constraints and the availability of certain resources. However, until very recently, most modern voter mobilization has been conducted *locally*, with local conditions affecting how GOTV campaigns have been conducted. In Chapter 3, I examine the effect of local contextual factors on the voter mobilization strategies that parties, interest groups, and campaigns employ, using individual level data on reported party contacting to illustrate the variations in local party activities across locales. Specifically, I propose that political parties focus their voter mobilization strategically, by contacting potential voters in places where additional turnout has the potential to sway electoral outcomes. Because of the existence of multiple races and varying partisan and demographic patterns at the local level, I argue that local party competitiveness has a positive influence on the probability that one is contacted to vote by political elites. Using a combination of individual level party contacting data from the American National Election Studies and county level vote returns from 1964 to 1992, I show that voters in party competitive counties have a

greater probability of being contacted to vote by political parties than those in non-competitive counties. The results suggest that parties often focus on voters living in areas that are party competitive, while at the same time bypassing those who live in places where one party is dominant.

Who is Targeted: Individual Level Influences on Voter Mobilization

It is difficult to determine the exact nature and extent of voter mobilization campaigns in the past, due to a lack of historically accurate data or reliable records. Since there is little consistent data available from the political elites themselves, an alternative method of assessing mobilization strategies is by examining which voters report having been mobilized by political parties (and others involved in get out the vote operations). Much of what we know of voter mobilization trends in recent decades is based on analysis of national survey research, including reports of "party contacting" found in the American National Election Studies.[22] In fact, there has been a considerable amount of research in the last 20 years that utilizes the party contact question (Abramson and Claggett 2001; Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999; Goldstein and Ridout 2002; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wielhower 2000; Wielhower and Lockerbie 1994). Of this research, one of the most common findings is a decline in overall levels of voter mobilization in recent decades. Since the 1960s, fewer respondents have reported being contacted to vote by either political party. While there has been a recent upsurge in the number of Americans that are being mobilized at election time, recent levels of party contacting are probably nowhere near their "heyday" during the parties' golden era of the late 19th century.

[22] from ANES responses to the following: "Did anyone from one (1956,1960,1964,1966,1968: either) of the political parties call you up or come around and talk to you about the (1956,1960,1964,1966,1968: during the) campaign (1976ff: this year)?"

Existing research suggests that although the number of overall contacts fell from the 1950s to the 1990s, improvements in the targeting of potential voters have gradually increased the efficiency of party contacting, over time (see Wielhower 2000). Over time, parties have become better at identifying potential supporters, targeting those voters who are most likely to vote, while often ignoring those who aren't. As Gershtenson (2003) notes, modern parties "target individuals who are likely to respond to mobilization, individuals who are more predisposed to activity by their individual characteristics" (p. 294). Much of the existing research on party-based voter mobilization has found that those factors which lead an individual to vote are the same factors that parties look for when mobilizing voters. Individual level factors such as higher income, education, age, and partisanship have been found to be positively associated with being contacted by one or more political parties (see Abramson and Claggett 2001; Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999; Goldstein and Ridout 2002; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wielhower 2000; Wielhower and Lockerbie 1994). Parties also seek to mobilize politically and civically active citizens, including past voters and those who have contributed financially to campaigns in the past (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). In addition, they tend to focus on those with strong ties to their communities, including homeowners and regular church attendees (Gershtenson 2003; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), as well as those likely to mobilize others within their social networks (Abramson and Claggett 2001; Gershtenson 2003; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). At the same time, parties seek to mobilize people who will vote for their preferred candidate, while often attempting to avoid mobilizing those who will vote for the opposition. Therefore, parties and their interest group allies often target partisans or those with potentially favorable demographics (such as union households or African Americans for the Democratic Party) (Beck 1974; Kramer 1970).

Institutional and Contextual Factors as Influences on Voter Mobilization

As Chapter 1 noted, those concerned with winning elections might naturally want to target any potential voter who would be likely to vote for the preferred candidate or party. But, due to limited resources, modern parties (and others involved in voter mobilization) don't want to waste their efforts on people who are unlikely to vote. Since mobilization resources are limited, political elites are often forced to make strategic decisions about how to apply those resources. As a consequence, the amount of mobilization that takes place is dictated by the availability of resources (and how those resources can be used for maximum effect), rather than simply the identity and characteristics of certain potential voters. Due to various resource constraints, there are several institutional and contextual factors that determine how voter mobilization is conducted, including race-specific, geographic, demographic, and electoral districting characteristics. Because of the winner-take-all nature of most US elections, electoral campaigns tend to increase their mobilization efforts when races are more competitive. As past research on individual level party contacting has shown, voters living in a jurisdiction with one or more competitive races are more likely to be contacted to turn out, due to the potential for influencing the eventual outcome. Several researchers have noted that living in a district or state with a competitive US House, US Senate, or gubernatorial race has a strong influence on whether or not a potential voter is contacted by a political party (see Cox and Munger 1989; Jackson 2002; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).

The presence of an electorally competitive congressional or statewide race may not sufficiently account for fluctuations in levels of voter mobilization or reported party contacting. Despite the influence of electoral competition on levels of voter mobilization, controlling for the overall competitiveness of a specific race might obscure the effect of local context. By focusing

on the competitiveness of the race as a whole, researchers might be overlooking variations in levels of voter mobilization at the local level. This is because most strategic voter mobilization campaigns tend to concentrate their efforts in places where they can win. Traditionally, most forms of voter mobilization have involved targeting certain geographic areas *within* an electoral district, using techniques such as the neighborhood canvass. In fact, many voter mobilization campaigns have tended only to concentrate on certain precincts or neighborhoods within a larger electoral district, while ignoring others. For example, Republican GOTV campaigns are very likely to focus on suburban and/or middle-class neighborhoods, because they tend to contain large numbers of potential supporters, while largely ignoring African American neighborhoods (which are unlikely to be Republican strongholds). This type of strategy not only prevents mobilizing opposition voters, but it is often the best way to ensure that limited mobilization resources are used in an efficient and effective manner.

As was noted in Chapter 1, institutional factors such as electoral districting can determine whether or not an individual is contacted to turn out, despite his or her individual propensity to vote. Because of districting characteristics, certain precincts, counties, congressional districts, or states might be competitive for some races yet not for others. Therefore, it is quite possible that although two geographic areas are roughly identical in terms of demographics (and other indicators of turnout), only one may be heavily targeted for turnout (due to its potential for influencing the outcome of a specific, race).[23] However, there are often multiple races to consider when determining where to target GOTV efforts. Since elections often involve many

[23] For example, in order to win the presidency, one must win in the Electoral College. Therefore, although a Democratic GOTV campaign that was focused solely on winning the presidential election in 2004 might gain votes for John Kerry by mobilizing in a predominantly African American precinct, it might also be a largely fruitless endeavor if that precinct was in a predominantly Republican state (such as South Carolina). By contrast, a similar effort in a swing state (such as Ohio in 2004) could have had the potential to dramatically affect the outcome of the national contest. However, at the same time, if the campaign was mobilizing for a congressional race, the overall district characteristics might be entirely different from those of the larger state (necessitating a different mobilization strategy).

overlapping national, state, and local electoral races (and districts) in any given area, it has traditionally made sense for local party organizations to focus voter mobilization efforts geographically, rather than concentrating on election-specific factors alone. If a GOTV campaign is concerned with multiple races (as has traditionally been the case with many local or county party organizations), it might seek to turn out party supporters in areas where they will have the most influence across the board. In contrast, an individual candidate's campaign might only be concerned with a single electoral race, and he or she would likely mobilize accordingly.

Does Existing Research on Party Contacting Ignore the Local Context?

As noted previously, some national survey-based research examining party contacting trends has attempted to account for the influence of competitive races on mobilization. However, past research has focused primarily on competitiveness for national or statewide races as an influence on mobilization. This can be problematic, because this tends to obscure variations in levels of competitiveness (and the resulting level of mobilization activity) within these larger areas. Therefore, at best, electoral competitiveness for national or statewide races can explain mobilization at the congressional district or statewide level. Yet, there is little reason to assume that levels of mobilization are constant across such large geographic areas. As Wielhower and Lockerbie (1994) have noted, focusing on levels of voter contact at an overly aggregated level "would mask extensive canvassing in some geographic areas while overstating nonexistent party activity in others" (p. 218). Therefore, although two voters within a larger electoral district might be exposed to differing levels of mobilization, simple controls for national or statewide race competitiveness will not capture this contextual distinction. In order to control for this sort of variation, better measures of electoral competitiveness would have to be measured at a smaller scale, such as at the county or precinct level.

Secondly, controlling for congressional, gubernatorial, or presidential race competitiveness also implicitly assumes that parties are only concerned with national and statewide races when conducting voter mobilization. However, there are often many *different races* at all levels of government taking place simultaneously on a single day, many with varying levels of competitiveness. Because of the complexity and variation of local factors and multiple and overlapping national, state, and local elections within any electoral district, individual race competitiveness may not fully explain why some potential voters are mobilized while others are not, unless one controls for all races. Without comprehensive controls for all of the competitive races taking place at the subnational (or local) level, it might be necessary to examine other indicators of electoral competitiveness that are not race-specific.

The partisan and demographic characteristics of areas within a larger district might be more accurate determinants of party contacting than the presence of one or more competitive races. For example, counties with a solid history of voting Democratic, or those with large numbers of union members, non-white, or poor urban voters would be likely places for strategic Democratic Party organizations to engage in intense mobilization efforts (see Beck 1974, Crotty 1968, Key 1949). Assuming that party mobilizers wish to maximize turnout for all of their preferred candidates, controlling for electoral competitiveness geographically (rather than in a purely race-specific manner) could capture the overall electoral context more effectively. In addition, using local context as an indicator of competitiveness (rather than the presence of specific races) can prevent the sort of methodological and substantive problems that arise when making assumptions about the uniform distribution of mobilization activity across an entire district.

Finally, using the competitiveness of a few national races as an indicator of electoral competitiveness can be misleading due to the partisan nature of most electoral districting. Many electoral districts, including a large number of US congressional districts in recent decades, are intentionally drawn to be *non-competitive* (or "safe") districts. Yet, there could be many electorally competitive county-wide, state-legislative, municipal, and other local races within the districts of these non-competitive districts (as well as within most non-"swing" states in the Electoral College). Therefore, any measure of electoral competitiveness that unnecessarily aggregates across local electoral contexts can potentially obscure the effect of local party competitiveness on party contacting. In light of the fact that party contacting has traditionally been performed locally, measuring local party competitiveness is vital to understanding the strategic nature of voter mobilization.

The Effect of County Level Party Competition on Party Contacting

As noted previously, there has been a considerable amount of past research indicating that competitive congressional, gubernatorial, and presidential races are positively correlated with the probability of party contacting, due to the increased propensity of additional turnout influencing the outcome of these races. However, since most voter mobilization has traditionally been performed at the *local* level (rather than at the congressional district-wide, state-wide, or national level), the local electoral context is an important factor of concern for those seeking to strategically mobilize potential voters. As several researchers have found, the nature of the local political environment can influence party activity at the county level. However, there have been few nationwide studies of local party activity over long periods of time. As several researchers have noted (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992; Wielhower and Lockerbie 1994), most national level

surveys involving voter mobilization may not fully capture activity at the local level, making nationwide studies of party contacting problematic.

Many studies of party activity at the local level have employed experimental, case-study, or cross-sectional research designs, due in part to a lack of consistent and reliable local contextual data nationally and over time. Most survey-based research on local party mobilization activity has employed surveys of party elites rather than public opinion surveys (see Gibson et al. 1985), but has not been replicated as consistently or as frequently as national surveys such as the American National Election Studies. This can be problematic, as some conclusions about the influences on party activity might have limited generalizability. While many case-study or cross-sectional studies provide thorough examinations of party mobilization activity, there is always a danger that these conclusions might be specific to the time or geographic context in which they take place.[24] And as voter mobilization strategies evolve, conclusions about what influences these strategies may have questionable validity.

By combining national survey data with data on local political environments, we may be able to examine local mobilization activity across both context and time. This research employs a set of individual level cross-sectional analyses of voter contacting in national elections from the 1964 to 1992, using a combination of survey data and county level political data. I propose the following hypothesis:

> Hypothesis 1: Living in a party competitive county has a positive effect on the probability of voter contact, independent of the effect of national or statewide race competitiveness.

[24] Major changes in the electoral environment in the last half-century, such as the enfranchisement of southern blacks, the role of television in elections, and the rise of candidate-centered campaigns have arguably changed the voter mobilization tactics of both parties. For example, some researchers have indicated that much of the South has become party competitive since the 1970s, thereby strengthening some local party organizations (see Black and Black 2000). And with the shift from party-centered to candidate-centered elections that has occurred in the last half century, it is possible that there has been an increase in the influence of individual races on voter mobilization, given the independent nature of many candidate campaigns (see Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Niemi 1996; Maisel et al. 1990; Herrnson 1988; Frendreis and Gitelson 1999).

Because commonly used measures of electoral competitiveness are measured at the congressional district or statewide level, they obscure the variations in the competitiveness of electoral contexts within the boundaries of the larger district (or state) that can be captured using a county competitive measure. Second, measures of the electoral or partisan competitiveness of a county have the potential to capture the competitive effect of additional local contests within a larger area, which might not have the same level of competitiveness as the national races in whose borders they are often aggregated (using simple measures of race competitiveness). Since there is limited data on the competitiveness of specific local races nationwide, over time, I employ the past vote history of US counties, in order to measure the party competitiveness of the local environment.

Data and Methods

I assess the effect of local partisan competitiveness on the probability of being contacted to vote by either the Democratic or Republican Party, using a combination of ANES data and county level election returns. Survey responses were linked to county level voting data using ICPSR and FIPS county identification codes found in the ANES for the years 1964 to 1992.[25] The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of party contacting (1, 0), coded as 1 if a respondent was contacted by either party. Separate logit analyses are performed for contacts by either party (combined), as well as for contacts by each party (separately). This was measured using survey responses for the traditional party contacting question found in the ANES Cumulative File.[26]

[25] Because of the irregular coding of county level identifiers used in the ANES before 1964, previous years were not included in the analysis. After 1998, the county level identifiers were removed from the publicly available ANES file, therefore the years 2000 to 2004 were also excluded from the analysis. Because there were no readily available county level vote returns after 1990, the analysis presented here covered a shorter time period.

[26] From ANES responses to the following:

The main independent variable, county competitiveness, was measured using past vote returns in the counties, found in the *General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990.* Party competitiveness for a geographic area can be approximated using the party voting history of that area, which can be obtained from past vote returns. Caeser and Salidin (2005) use a "Major Party Index (MPI)" measure of partisanship in the states, based on election returns in the most recent national and state offices. The base measure of party competition at the county level used in this analysis employs a similar procedure, and was generated by averaging the Democratic percentage of the county-wide vote in the most recent presidential, US House, US Senate, and gubernatorial race for each election year. By using past vote returns for several offices to measure partisanship, rather than using a single concurrent election, there is less of a chance that this measure captures race-specific factors such as candidate quality or campaign characteristics. This dichotomous measure of a "Party Competitive County" is coded 1 if the average percentage of the Democratic share in previous elections was between 45 and 55%, 0 if it was not. Therefore, party competitive counties are those with several close elections immediately prior to the year in question.[27] A dichotomous measure was used in order to capture both county competitiveness and county *non*-competitiveness in different versions of the model. However, a different specification of the Party Competitive County measure was also tested, using a percentage measure of the average margin of victory in past elections (see analysis).

As noted previously, there are also several individual level factors that have been found to be positively correlated to party contacting. In each analysis, there are additional controls (not

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"Did anyone from one (1956,1960,1964,1966,1968: either) of the parties call you up or come around and talk to you about the (1956,1960,1964,1966,1968: during the) campaign (1976ff: this year)?"

(IF YES:) "Which party was that (1956,1960: were they from)?"

[27] An alternative measure of county party competitiveness, using a closer 48-52% vote margin, was also tested. The logit results were similar to the base model.

related to the hypothesis) for an individual's past voting history (coded 1 if the respondent voted in the last presidential election), age (in years), gender, race, income, and education. Also included are controls for South/Non-south (1,0),[28] household union membership, church attendance(coded 1-3, "seldom" to "weekly"), homeownership, marriage status, and separate controls for Democratic and Republican Party identification. In addition to these individual level demographic controls, there are also controls for several competitive races, including a control for Presidential vote margin (coded as a percentage), as well as dichotomous measures for competitive US Senate, US House, and gubernatorial elections (coded 1 if the winner of the race received between 45 and 55% of the total vote in the district or state, 0 if he/she did not). Each of these is a simple control on the dependent variable, and they are not related to any specific hypothesis.

Analysis

The results of the initial logit analyses are listed in Table 3.1. In each model, the coefficients for each of the control variables (except gender) appear to have an expected effect on party contacting. In each of the models predicting party contacts, the coefficient for "Party Competitive County" is both positive and statistically significant, as predicted. The effect of county competitiveness on party contacting also appears to be greater than several of the individual and race-competitive variables. However, in each model, the effect of competitive House races on party contacting appears to be greater.[29] Overall, these results suggest that there

[28] Although a respondent's Southern status is often used as an individual level attitudinal control on his or her political orientation or behavior, it can also be considered as a contextual influence on behavior (controlling for certain aspects of the political environment which might affect political activity, such as party competitiveness). Since patterns of party competitiveness have varied historically in different regions, an additional set of analyses were performed using only South or non South states. The results are presented in the appendix.

[29] An omnibus (Pearson) test for goodness-of-fit indicates that each of these models is appropriately fitted to the data Also, a series of Wald and likelihood-ratio tests indicated that the "Party Competitive County" measure had a statistically significant effect on party contacting, suggesting that the measure is capturing an effect separate from those of the race-specific measures. Because partisan gerrymandering can create US House districts that are either

a strong positive effect of county level competitiveness on party contacting, but it does not necessarily outweigh the effect of some individual races.[30]

[Insert Table 3.1 about here]

While these results may suggest that county level competitiveness has a statistically significant effect on party contacting, there are certain methodological and measurement issues that also need to be addressed. Although various tests indicated few problems with intercorrelation between the included variables, there are some measures that may be substantively related. Because many US House districts are often purposely districted (or "gerrymandered") according to demographic and past voting patterns in the various counties and cities within their borders, it is possible that the measures of US House competition and county level competitiveness are capturing much of the same effect on party contacting. An additional analysis was run using only those respondents living in a "safe" House district, or districts where the winner received at least 60% of the district-wide vote (Goldstein and Ridout 2002), thereby reducing the chance that the county level effect is spurious. These results are shown in Table 3.2. Although several of the controls did not achieve statistical significance, the measure of "Party Competitive County" remained both statistically significant and in the expected direction in both the first and second models (but not for Republican contacts). This indicates that county

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competitive or non-competitive, it is possible that the measures of US House competition and county level competitiveness are jointly influencing the measure of party contacting. A Wald test was performed to measure any joint effect that these variables had on the dependent variable. The results of this analysis did not suggest any substantial problems of an interactive effect.

[30] However, in the model predicting Republican Party contacting, the size of the coefficient for "Party Competitive County" is considerably less. Although several post-estimation significance tests for the first and second models do not indicate substantial problems with the data or the fit of either model, Wald and likelihood-ratio tests indicate that the coefficients for "Presidential Vote Margin" and "Party Competitive County" may be correlated (or simultaneously equal to zero) in the Republican contact model. Therefore, it can not be stated with certainty that county level competitiveness has a considerable, independent effect on Republican Party contacts.

level party competition most likely has an effect on party contacting, independent of the influence of competitive House races.

[Insert Table 3.2 about here]

Several alternate specifications of the original model were also examined. Because I propose that parties not only focus their mobilizations where they have the ability to influence electoral outcomes, but that they also avoid wasting resources in both "safe" areas and areas in which they have little chance of winning, an alternative set of models were included to measure the effect of one party dominance in the counties. In place of the single "Party Competitive County" measure, separate dichotomous measures of "Safely Republican County" and "Safely Democratic County" (coded 1 if that party received a least 60% of the vote in the most recent elections) were included in these models.[31] Table 3.3 shows the effect of one party's dominance in a county on the probability of party contacting. In each model, there is a negative and statistically significant effect of single party dominance on the probability of a voter contact, for both parties. These results indicate that both of the major political parties avoid mobilizing in areas where they have little chance of electoral success, as predicted. At the same time, the results suggest that, because of limited resources, parties may also bypass those counties in which they dominate electorally. This lends support to a strategic contacting hypothesis; while

[31] Because of potential problems of high multicollinearity between these two measures, separate analyses were performed using only one of the measures of single party dominance, tested in separate models of same party and opposite party effects. Although the measure for "Safely Republican County" failed to a achieve a statistically significant effect on the probability of a Republican Party contact, the measure of "Safely Democratic County" had a negative and statistically significant effect on Democratic Party contacting. When testing for opposite party dominance effects (ie: the effect of Republican dominated counties on Democratic Party contacts, and vice-versa), the coefficients for each of the variables of interest were both negative and statistically significant at the .01 level.

In addition, measures with a lower threshold of 55% were also tested for all versions of the model in Table 3.3, yielding similar results. Finally, the effect was also measured using only those counties within safe House districts, yielding little change in the coefficients.

parties tend to focus their efforts on voters in places where the mobilization can influence electoral outcomes, they also tend to *avoid* contacting voters where they have little chance of tipping the electoral scales.

[Insert Table 3.3 about here]

As noted previously, a different specification of the Party Competitive County measure was also tested, using a percentage measure of the average margin of victory in past elections. The resulting measure had small values for counties that were highly competitive and larger values where either then Democratic or Republican Party had dominated past elections (similar to the presidential margin control variable). Since large values would indicate party non-competitiveness, it was expected that the measure would have a negative effect on party contacting. The results using the newly specified measure were largely as expected; the margin of party competitiveness in a county had a negative and statistically significant effect on party contacting by either major party. However, while the effect of the margin measure on separate Democratic and Republican contacts was in the appropriate (negative) direction, it failed to achieve statistical significance in these models.[32]

Discussion

Because this analysis covers only half of the time period covered by the ANES party contacting data, there can be few definitive conclusions about the changing effect of local party competitiveness on party contacting over time. Without a wider range of years, it is difficult to

[32] Perhaps the failure to achieve statistical significance in the separate Democratic and Republican Party contacting models is a reflection of the different considerations that parties must undertake when determining their mobilization strategies. Not only do parties have to decide which areas to target, but they must also decide which areas to bypass. Because a continuous measure of the margin of county competitiveness does not discriminate between competitive counties, safe counties, and "hopeless" counties, it can not fully capture the separate effects of party competition in a model of one party contacting.

assess the changing effect of local context on voter mobilization. Because of limitations in the availability of data, this analysis does not cover the last 15 years of party mobilization activity. However, as was noted in Chapter 1, most voter mobilization strategies do not remain stagnant. Levels of party contacting have risen since the early 1990s. In addition, mobilizers have begun to use more efficient methods of "micro-targeting," allowing them to pinpoint likely supporters based on their political attitudes, reading and spending habits, as well as other detailed individual information. The effect of geography on voter mobilization strategy may have lessened over time, due to the ability of mobilization campaigns to identify potential supporters in this increasingly sophisticated manner. It is possible that some forms of voter mobilization (such as phone calls and mailers) are less bounded by geographical constraints than others; and it is also possible that the ability to pinpoint likely supporters has allowed campaigns to venture into neighborhoods that they might have ignored in earlier years. This is a subject that will be addressed in the final chapter.

As noted in the introduction, while parties may attempt to contact those who can influence electoral outcomes, they are also limited by their available resources. An alternative explanation of these findings might be that many potential voters are often bypassed by voter mobilization campaigns because elites are *unable* to contact them, due to a lack of available resources or organizational infrastructure at the local level. Because it has traditionally been assumed that political party organizations are strongest and most active in places where the two major parties are electorally competitive, perhaps the results presented here illustrate not strategy but *organizational capacity* at the local (county) level. Therefore, it is possible that strong local party organizations are attempting to mobilize all of their supporters, while weak party organizations are not, and that all party organizations are merely contacting as many potential

voters as they can, regardless of which races are competitive and which are not. While it is not specifically tested here, it is possible that levels of voter mobilization are influenced by the differing organizational capacity and resource constraints at varying levels of party organization. Due to the nature of the party contacting question in the ANES, it is unknown whether respondents have been contacted by a local party organization, a state party, or a congressional campaign committee. Since each level or organization might be interested in different types of races, the county competitive effects found here might simply be an indirect measure of organizational strength. Furthermore, while this analysis examines the effect of local party competition throughout the US, there is a strong possibility that regional variations in party organizational strength and voting patterns would lead to different patterns of party contacting. Because the South has traditionally been a solidly Democratic region, with generally weak party organizations (see Black and Black 2000, Key 1949), it is probable the dynamics of party contacting trends differ within the Southern states. Additional analyses among south and nonsouth states are included in the appendix.

Several researchers have indicated that party organizational strength encompasses much more than mobilization activity, per se. As Gibson et al. (1985) find, "strong party organizations are not necessarily those conducting a few activities on election day" (p. 146). They cite an extensive set of past research that supports the notion that other characteristics (such as organizational infrastructure, fundraising capabilities, and the ability to find and recruit quality candidates) are valuable indicators of local party strength (see Eldersveld 1964; Crotty 1968, 1971; Janda 1980; Pomper et al. 1980). Therefore, while the party competitive effects on mobilization that are found here might be highly correlated with organizational strength, they are *not simply proxies* for organizational capacity.

Despite the possibility of alternative explanations, the research presented here indicates that the local political climate has an effect on whether or not a person is contacted to vote by a political party, independent of other individual level factors. Living in a party competitive county has a positive effect on the probability that one is contacted to vote by one of the major political parties, even when the separate effect of the competitiveness of certain high-profile races are controlled. Because strategic mobilization campaigns are primarily concerned with winning, they logically focus their efforts on competitive races, while sometimes ignoring those which are unwinnable. Because political parties are often concerned with more than one race at any given time, by focusing their efforts on voters in party competitive locations, they are able to maximize the effect of their mobilization efforts. At the same time, parties may also hesitate to venture into enemy territory. Without the prospect of influencing electoral outcomes, strategic parties may decline to mobilize voters in unwinnable areas.

Table 3.1: Effect of County Level Party Competition on Party Contacting (1964-1992)

	(model 1) Major Party Contact (1,0)	(model 2) Democratic Contact (1,0)	(model 3) Republican Contact (1,0)
Past Vote (1,0)	0.709**	0.670**	0.666**
	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.061)
Age (years)	0.007**	0.007**	0.009**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gender (1,0)	0.003	-0.058	0.018
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Race (1,0)	0.159**	-0.006	0.524**
	(0.055)	(0.060)	(0.076)
Education (1-4)	0.279**	0.241**	0.272**
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.024)
South (1,0)	-0.151**	-0.202**	-0.024
	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Union household (1,0)	0.135**	0.182**	0.063
	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.053)
Church attendance (1-3)	0.105**	0.112**	0.092**
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Homeowner (1,0)	0.253**	0.170**	0.330**
	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.060)
Married (1,0)	0.201**	0.158**	0.287**
	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.051)
Republican PID (1,0)	0.337**	-0.007	0.489**
	(0.068)	(0.079)	(0.081)
Democratic PID (1,0)	0.407**	0.474**	0.130
	(0.066)	(0.075)	(0.080)
Competitive Senate race (1,0)	0.102*	0.032	0.181**
	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.047)
Competitive Gub. race (1,0)	0.060	0.020	0.075
	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.055)
Presidential Margin (%)	0.001	0.002**	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Competitive House race (1,0)	0.238**	0.226**	0.237**
	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.057)
Party Competitive County (1,0)	0.145**	0.126**	0.092*
	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Constant	-3.973**	-3.966**	-4.947**
	(0.150)	(0.170)	(0.185)
N =	17837	17837	17837
LR chi^2 (17) =	1136.17	734.47	1024.27
Prob > chi^2 =	.0000	.0000	.0000
Pseudo R^2 =	0.0570	0.0456	0.0665

Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level

Table 3.2: Effect of County Level Party Competition on Party Contacting, Safe House Districts (1964-1992)

	(model 1) Major Party Contact (1,0)	(model 2) Democratic Contact (1,0)	(model 3) Republican Contact (1,0)
Past Vote (1,0)	0.683**	0.667**	0.597**
	(0.058)	(0.068)	(0.074)
Age (years)	0.008**	0.008**	0.011**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gender (1,0)	-0.054	-0.097	-0.020
	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.054)
Race (1,0)	0.141*	-0.028	0.491**
	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.089)
Education (1-4)	0.290**	0.263**	0.268**
	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.030)
South (1,0)	-0.109*	-0.144*	0.001
	(0.051)	(0.059)	(0.062)
Union household (1,0)	0.147**	0.193**	0.075
	(0.054)	(0.061)	(0.066)
Church attendance (1-3)	0.079**	0.098**	0.050*
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Homeowner (1,0)	0.222**	0.081	0.378**
	(0.057)	(0.065)	(0.074)
Married (1,0)	0.169**	0.122*	0.254**
	(0.050)	(0.057)	(0.062)
Republican PID (1,0)	0.314**	-0.056	0.470**
	(0.084)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Democratic PID (1,0)	0.431**	0.476**	0.079
	(0.081)	(0.093)	(0.099)
Competitive Senate race (1,0)	0.152**	0.085	0.223**
	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.058)
Competitive Gub. race (1,0)	0.027	0.009	0.019
	(0.059)	(0.068)	(0.071)
Presidential Margin (%)	0.001	0.002**	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Competitive House race (1,0)	--	--	--
	--	--	--
Party Competitive County (1,0)	0.135**	0.106*	0.075
	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.058)
Constant	-3.915**	-3.977**	-4.844**
	(0.180)	(0.205)	(0.225)
N =	12568	12568	12568
LR chi^2 (16) =	700.97	477.21	625.74
Prob > chi^2 =	.0000	.0000	.0000
Pseudo R^2 =	0.0518	0.0440	0.0615

Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level

Table 3.3: Effect of One Party Dominance on Party Contacting in the Counties (1964-92)

	Major Party Contact (1,0)	Democratic Contact (1,0)	Republican Contact (1,0)
Past Vote (1,0)	0.708**	0.669**	0.665**
	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.061)
Age (years)	0.007**	0.007**	0.009**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gender (1,0)	0.003	-0.058	0.017
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Race (1,0)	0.144**	-0.013	0.505**
	(0.055)	(0.061)	(0.077)
Education (1-4)	0.278**	0.240**	0.271**
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.024)
South (1,0)	-0.128**	-0.190**	0.014
	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.054)
Union household (1,0)	0.135**	0.181**	0.063
	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.053)
Church attendance (1-3)	0.104**	0.111**	0.092**
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Homeowner (1,0)	0.256**	0.175**	0.330**
	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.061)
Married (1,0)	0.200**	0.156**	0.284**
	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.051)
Republican PID (1,0)	0.340**	0.001	0.487**
	(0.068)	(0.080)	(0.081)
Democratic PID (1,0)	0.411**	0.476**	0.138*
	(0.066)	(0.075)	(0.081)
Competitive Senate race (1,0)	0.101**	0.030	0.181**
	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.047)
Competitive Gub. race (1,0)	0.055	0.016	0.071
	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.055)
Presidential Margin (%)	0.001*	0.002**	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Competitive House race (1,0)	0.220**	0.207**	0.217**
	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.057)
Safely Democratic Cnty (1,0)	-0.244**	-0.210**	-0.253**
	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.060)
Safely Republican Cnty (1,0)	-0.219**	-0.278**	-0.137**
	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.055)
Constant	-3.820**	-3.821**	-4.822**
	(0.150)	(0.170)	(0.186)
N =	17837	17837	17837
LR chi^2 (18) =	1160.48	759.30	1040.95
Prob > chi^2 =	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R^2 =	0.0582	0.0471	0.0676

Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level

CHAPTER 4

RESOURCE ALLOCATION STRATEGY: BROADCAST VS. TARGETED VOTER COMMUNICATION

Introduction

In Chapter 3, I examined the effect of local party competitiveness on the probability that an individual is contacted to vote. As the analysis in the previous chapter has suggested, if an entity such as a political party organization is concerned with multiple races, it would likely seek to turn out supporters in areas where they will have the most benefit to the party. This would suggest that organizations such as parties might consider more than one race when designing and implementing a voter mobilization strategy.

An individual candidate's campaign might only be concerned with a *single electoral contest*, and it would likely mobilize accordingly. In fact, although candidate campaigns are subject to many of the same resource constraints as parties and other mobilizing groups, their primary goal may be very different. Individual candidate campaigns often operate under very different institutional and contextual constraints than other political organizations, because they are often concerned with winning a single race in a single district. In this chapter, I examine the strategic considerations of candidate campaigns, focusing on the resource allocation strategies of candidates for local office. I argue that candidates make strategic decisions about the *level* of resources that they dedicate to "voter communications" as well as what *type* of communication strategy they employ, based on their available resources and the characteristics of the district and race in which they are campaigning. Using a combination of data on itemized campaign

expenditures, districting and Census data, and election data from the 2006 Georgia General Elections, I examine how local candidates in state legislative, statewide, and non-partisan judicial elections allocate campaign spending on "voter communications."

What are "Voter Communications?"

The term "voter communications" is a general term that will be used in this chapter to describe the various ways in which a political organization attempts to reach out to potential voters, in order to win an election. Voter communications are comprised of an array of communication methods that are designed to directly influence the behavior of potential voters, in order to get them to vote for a particular candidate, candidates, or ballot measure. In a sense, voter communications are simply *methods of political campaigning*. This refers to methods of political advertising using television, radio, or other forms of broadcast media (such as the internet), but the term also refers to more selective forms of advertising such as the placement of newspaper or magazine ads (that might be seen by a more selective audience of subscribers). Voter communications also refer to the placement of yard signs, billboards, posters, or other types of "signage" or political displays that are designed to influence voter behavior, by attracting the attention of passersby. They also refer to "leaflets," "door-hangers," flyers, or other types of campaign literature that is often distributed to potential voters in person (or left at their homes, on left hanging on a door-knob). One of the more popular methods of voter communications in recent decades has been through direct mail, by sending letters, postcards, or "roll-fold" advertisements to potential voters at their homes. Finally, voter communications involve direct contacts with voters, either face-to-face, or by telephone.

This chapter will examine the reasons why candidates might employ some methods of voter communication (but not other), as well as the determinants of campaign spending on these

various campaign techniques. The central argument that is posed is that candidates allocate resources to voter communications based on strategic considerations; and that they spend their campaign funds efficiently. While, as Sabato (1981) has noted, "to a serious candidate bent on winning...*money can be no object* to acquiring what he needs to win," because money is a finite resource, candidates will attempt to spend it in ways that will be most effective. Therefore, the level of spending that a candidate devotes to one method of voter communication will necessarily limit the amount that he or she can allocate to other methods.

Facially, this sort of assertion is fairly intuitive. It seems perfectly reasonable to assume that candidates spend their resources based on how much they have at their disposal. However, as will be discussed in this chapter, often there are institutional factors such as district size and density, contextual factors such as race competitiveness, and candidate-specific factors such as incumbency that may determine not only how, but how much of a candidate 's resources he or she allocates to various forms of broadcast advertising or targeted voter communications.

Institutional, District-specific Influences on Voter Communication Spending

One of the more unique aspects of the American democratic system, compared to those of many other countries, is our use of districting to select officeholders. At the federal level, and for most state offices, this is done using a system of single member districts, in which candidates compete for a single electoral office that represents a specific geographic area. Compared to proportional systems of representation, districted methods of electoral selection often lead to a limited number of electoral outcomes; the most commonly observed byproduct of the American single-member districted plurality method is the creation of a two-party system (Downs 1950; Duverger 1963; Key 1953; Liphardt 1994). However, as is often the case in congressional and state legislative districting systems, the way that populations are apportioned into districts can

affect the competiveness of the elections in them. As noted in Chapter 3, many electoral districts are intentionally drawn to be non-competitive (or "safe") districts, which can lead to an electoral advantage for incumbents. As Jacobson (2004) notes, "district boundaries are not politically neutral" (p. 8). The process of gerrymandering, which can increases or decrease the marginal safety of an incumbent's district, advantage or disadvantage certain parties or groups, or alter the eventual makeup of an entire legislature, has become a well-honed skill for those seeking to alter electoral outcomes through institutional processes.

Since the Supreme Court's 1963 *Gray v Sanders* ruling, the standard of "one man, one vote" has ensured that most single member district systems in the United States have equivalently sized districts. Therefore, those attempting to manipulate district lines within a state's boundaries must work within a system of districts that have equal numbers of voters. As a result, the number of votes required to win an election does not vary across single-member districts within a single system.[33]

The size of electorates in districted systems often varies from office to office, however. Within a single state, there are often multiple overlapping electoral districts for state house, state senate, school board, or other state and local offices that can vary greatly in size. Since district electoral size may vary from office to office, candidates campaigning in these different districts often have to make very different resource allocation decisions, due to the varying sizes of the populations they are attempting to reach. As it was noted in Chapter 1, certain methods of voter mobilization are more appropriate to certain conditions. This includes the electoral size of the district. If more votes are required to win in a state-wide election than in a state legislative

[33] This, of course, is much harder to ensure in the US Congress, because district lines cannot cross state borders. This leads to a problem of considerable malapportionment *across* states.

election, it is reasonable to assume that candidates view the relative value of a single vote very differently, according to which district they are campaigning in.

As was noted previously, there is considerable past research indicating that personal methods of voter contact, such as door-to-door canvassing, are a very effective method of getting people to vote. And, they are often a far more effective way to ensure greater turnout than with impersonal methods, such as broadcast advertising, phone messages, or mailers (Gerber and Green 2000a, 2000b, 2004; Katz and Lazarfeld 1955; Key 1950; Kramer 1970; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). However, it is often the case that the more effective the method of voter communication that is used, the more resources that have to be allocated to communicating with each potential voter. For example, while it takes a considerable amount of money to produce and air most television ads, it can be a much more inexpensive way to reach millions of people than other, more time-consuming and potentially expensive methods of communication (such as paying people to canvass). Even direct mail, which is fairly inexpensive to produce and send *per item*, gets prohibitively expensive as the size of the intended voter pool (and therefore the number of necessary mailers) grows. Green and Gerber (2004) have found that due to the relative ineffectiveness of direct mail (vs. canvassing) in actually convincing people to vote, it can be quite expensive to run a successful direct mail campaign.[34] Therefore, in some races, direct mail can be just as expensive as television advertising. For example, in districts with larger electorates, it might make more sense to air a single $100,000 30-second television spot than to pay for $.50 per item to mail 60,000 letters to potential voters in the district.

An additional consideration might not be the number of voters one needs to reach, but *where* those voters are located. In a district of 30,000 potential voters, a labor-intensive method

[34] Using field research, they have found that at least 177 pieces of direct mail have to be mailed in order to get one additional person to vote. Therefore, on average, even the most persuasive types of direct mail cost around $59 per vote.

of voter communication such as door-to-door canvassing is generally more efficient when the population is concentrated in a single area (such as in an inner city). As the population density of a district decreases (such as in a rural district), more time, energy, and resources would have to allocated to simply *traveling* from door-to-door in order to reach those potential voters. As a consequence, one often sees face-to-face communications only in certain areas within a greater district, especially when the population density of the district (or of certain targeted groups of voters) is greater in some areas, but not in others.[35] If a candidate only needs 50%+1 of the votes to win in a district, *where* he or she gets those votes is of little consequence, ceteris paribus. Therefore, it is unreasonable to assume that a strategic candidate would incur the added costs of attempting to reach voters in one area, when the same number of votes can be garnered elsewhere.

Contextual and Candidate-specific Influences on Voter Communication Spending

There are often other intervening factors that can influence a voter communication strategy, however. As Jacobson (2004) observes, "the deepest understanding of the political texture of a state or district will not, by itself, win elections" (p. 60). Perhaps electoral competitiveness is the greatest factor. If an incumbent faces no opponent, or if she faces only token opposition, there might be little reason to raise or expend additional resources on voter communications if her electoral victory is ensured. However, as the competitiveness of a race (or of certain characteristics of the district) increases, strategic candidates would naturally spend as much as was necessary on voter communications in order to win. This might help to explain why some congressional incumbents spend very little on voter communications, while some

[35] For example, as Kristen Saybe of the Georgia Fund for Public Interest Research Group stated in an interview, her organization rarely ventures outside of the greater Atlanta metro area when canvassing for donations for progressive causes. In fact, she notes that because of the high concentration of potentially sympathetic contributors in Atlanta neighborhoods such as Five Points and the Virginia-Highlands area, her organization spends much of its time repeatedly canvassing just a few city blocks in those areas.

municipal candidates might spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on an intensive television ad campaign in a very close race.

If a candidate wants to ensure victory, but is unsure of his or her chances of winning, it makes sense to spend as much as possible on voter communications. This could explain why many candidates raise exorbitant amounts of money for seemingly non-competitive races. Yet, it should also be noted that the relationship between fundraising and competitiveness is not always unidirectional. Often, sizable campaign "war chests" can deter potential challengers, thus reducing electoral competitiveness. At other times, a candidate might raise more money than she needs simply because her opponent has raised more. A lack of fundraising parity among opponents can highlight the inability of one candidate to use certain voter communication tactics that might be available to his opponent. In addition, when one candidate raises millions of dollars more than the other, it might be viewed as a sign of candidate weakness or strength. Regardless, there are few drawbacks to raising more money than one needs, while not raising enough can be devastating to any campaign.

The Influence of District-specific, Context-specific, and Candidate-specific Factors on Voter Communication Spending: Hypotheses

Despite the relationship between competitiveness and spending, *how* that candidate spends his money can be just as important as how much he spends. The spending methods that are examined in this research can be divided into two basic types: "broadcast" and "targeted" communications. These terms refer to the basic approach that political elites take when trying to communicate with voters. The term "to broadcast" is defined in the *Oxford English Dictionary* (1989) as "to scatter or disseminate widely." Broadcast forms of communication are designed to reach large audiences over large geographic areas, by transmitting from a central location.

Broadcast methods of communication are forms of mass media contacting (Hogan 1997), where communication is one-way (from broadcaster to audience) as well as directed toward a general audience. The two traditional methods of broadcast communication are television and radio advertising. In contrast, forms of communication that are specifically addressed to an individual person are "targeted" forms of communication, otherwise known as "narrowcast" (Salmore and Salmore 1985, 203) or "microtargeted" communications. Direct mail, phone calls, leaflets, and face-to-face contacts are all forms of targeted voter communication (Hogan 1997).[36]

Given ample funds and little serious electoral opposition, a candidate can be somewhat frivolous with his spending. This is why, if one can afford it, paying for broadcast advertising might be worth the cost, even in a small district. But, as levels of competition go up, so do levels of spending. Under conditions of considerable electoral competition or equivalently financed opponents, how either of those candidates allocate resources to voter communications becomes increasingly important. In order to maximize one's chances of winning, a strategic candidate must maximize the effectiveness of his spending. Therefore, he or she must consider not only the amount of resources on hand, but the context in which he or she is spending those resources. This is one of the reasons why we have seen a growing trend in micro-targeting of potential supporters in recent years. Broadcast advertising has the potential to reach thousands, if not millions of potential voters. However, it also reaches just as many people who will never vote,

[36] While the basic definitions of broadcast and non-broadcast (or targeted) communication are relatively straightforward, there is some disagreement about whether certain forms of communication can be considered "broadcast" or "targeted." For example, while newspapers are written for a general audience and are not specifically targeted to individual citizens (ie: editors have no control over who reads their papers), this method of print communication cannot be considered a form of "broadcasting." Also, in his examination of spending strategies of state legislative candidates, Hogan (1997) defines yard signs as a form of narrow-casting, although they are meant to be passively observed by passersby. The author notes that campaigners can be selective as to where they place their signs, therefore they are geared toward a selective audience. However, since most signage is not intended to be viewed by particular individuals, it is not considered as a targeted form of communication in this research. In addition, Herrnson (1995) has noted that radio can be used to selectively target certain subpopulations, since different types of voters may listen to different radio stations. However, radio is clearly a form of broadcasting (by definition) and it will be treated as such in this research.

or who might vote for the opposition.[37] In addition, broadcast advertising does not conform well to district lines. When one considers the irregular and twisted shape of many legislative districts, it is easy to see how television (or radio) broadcasts that are intended for viewers in one district might wind up on the TV screens of voters in a completely different district.

Unless the geographic size of a district is considerably large, or one needs to reach more potential voters than is feasible by other, more targeted means, broadcast ads can be a wasteful allocation of resources. In districts where potential voters are densely concentrated, or where there are fewer potential voters to be reached, a targeted strategy of voter communications would make more sense. Conversely, in districts where population density is low (and therefore the districts cover larger geographic areas), or where there are more potential voters to be reached, a broadcast advertising strategy is more reasonable (van Heerde et al. 2006). The percentage of spending that candidates will allocate to different communication methods, and the overall strategy that they employ, can be influenced by these district-specific factors. In this chapter, I will address this type of voter communication spending. Therefore, I propose the following hypotheses:

> Hypothesis 1A: The greater the population density of a district, the greater the percentage of spending a candidate will allocate to targeted forms of voter communication
>
> Hypothesis 1B: The greater the population density of a district, the more likely a candidate is to adopt a targeted (vs. broadcast) voter communication strategy

[37] In fact, Hogan (1997) has found that the population density of state legislative districts can influence the percentage of spending on "broadcast" forms of voter communication, such as TV, radio, and newspapers. He found that the greater the population density of a district, the greater the percentage of spending state legislative candidates would allocate to broadcast communication. While that research addressed the first part of the relationship between district characteristics and spending type, it did not address the relationship between district characteristics and other, *targeted* forms of voter communication spending. In fact, in most state legislative races, a much greater percentage of spending is often allocated to targeted forms of communication, such as direct mail and phone calls. Hogan (1997) found that less than one third of candidate spending was allocated to any form broadcast media by Texas legislative candidates in 1988, despite the fact that the size of the state's legislative districts would warrant such a spending strategy.

Hypothesis 2A: The greater the electoral size of the district, the greater the percentage of spending a candidate will allocate to broadcast forms of voter communication

Hypothesis 2B: The greater the electoral size of the district, the more likely a candidate is to adopt a broadcast advertising (vs. targeted) voter communication strategy

In addition, since the availability of resources should determine how much one spends on voter communications, and certain types of communication cost more to successfully implement than others, one would expect to see a positive relationship between the amount of money a candidate has and the amount of that money that he spends on more expensive forms of voter communication. Due to the relatively high cost of television and direct mail as methods of voter communication, I also propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3A: The more money that a candidate has raised, the greater the percentage of spending a candidate will allocate to television advertising

Hypothesis 3B: The more money that a candidate has raised, the greater the percentage of spending a candidate will allocate to direct mail

Methodology: The Data and Model

These hypotheses are tested by a series of OLS and Multinomial Logit models of candidate spending on various forms of voter communication. Using a combination of itemized spending records and district, Census, and voting data from the 2006 Georgia general elections, I examine the effects of the previously described district-specific, context-specific, and candidate-specific factors on candidate spending in four different types of state elections in Georgia. Previous research on resource allocation spending at the local level has examined the impact of district characteristics on allocation to broadcast media (see Hogan 1997). However, as noted previously, past research has not adequately addressed all important aspects of voter communication spending, especially that of targeted forms of communication. In addition,

because the arguments posed in this research are universal, and do not make assumptions about specific strategic considerations for different types of elections (per se), I argue that it is important to examine the effects of these factors in multiple levels of contests, including state legislative and statewide elections. Also, because the central arguments posed do not make assumptions that candidates in non-partisan, multi-candidate races have different motivations and considerations (outside of the factors addressed in the previous sections), I include districted and statewide non-partisan judicial elections in this analysis. Finally, due to differences between most state campaign finance laws and the laws that govern federal elections, this analysis includes only candidates in state elections from a single state. This can help to prevent methodological problems that might result from comparisons between electoral systems that operate under different spending rules (Hogan 2007).

The Dependent Variable: Candidate Spending for Voter Communications

The dependent variable for this analysis is measured as the percentage of 2006 Georgia general election campaign expenditures that were allocated for several types of voter communication, including television, radio, and newspaper advertising, as well as expenses allocated for signs, billboards, posters, direct mail, phone calls, and the distribution of leaflets and other campaign literature. The data on candidate spending were collected from the Georgia State Ethics Commission online campaign disclosure database.[38] The initial data included every candidate campaign committee disclosure submitted to the SEC between the dates of Jan 1, 2006 and December 31, 2006, except those that were allocated for party primaries, special elections, or run-off elections. There were 384 candidate campaign committees reporting spending in

[38] As required by Georgia law, and as the Georgia SEC notes, "Every public official and every candidate must file a Campaign Contribution Disclosure Report (CCDR) and a Personal Financial Disclosure Statement (PFD) as required by the Ethics in Government Act" (State Ethics Commission 2008). The GA State Ethics Commission website is located at http://www.ethics.ga.gov/EthicsWeb/main.aspx.

Georgia in 2006 for either a state-wide, state legislative, judicial, or district attorney general election. In addition, there were 20 political party committees (representing various county, state, and legislative parties) and 233 other non-candidate committees reporting spending in the Georgia 2006 general elections.

In total, there were 29,778 itemized expenditures for all reporting committees. These data were aggregated by committee (using the eleven digit ID number assigned to each committee), in order to determine the total number of general election expenses for each. Political party and non-candidate committees were removed from the dataset, leaving only candidate campaigns.[39] Once duplicate committees representing the same candidate campaign were identified, and committees representing candidates who were either defeated in a primary or dropped out were eliminated, there were 335 separate candidate campaigns represented in the dataset.

In addition to determining the total spending for each candidate, a series of database word searches were employed to isolate certain types of general election spending in the SEC disclosure database. Particularly, expenditures were classified by voter communication type (including an array of both broadcast and targeted forms of communication). Because of the size of the reported data in question, expenditures were categorized based on several key terms which were used to identify types of spending. Because committees filing expenditures with the Georgia SEC are required to indicate the purpose of every expenditure they report (in a separate search field), they can be systematically searched using certain key terms. In order to isolate spending for various forms of advertising and direct voter communication, the following terms were searched: "advert," "ad," "media," "radio," "news," "TV," "telev," "mail," "post,"

[39] The data on the other types of committees were collected for future analysis. Because of the race/election-specific nature of the analysis being performed in this chapter, spending by committees not associated with a particular electoral contest could not be used.

"phone," "call," "sign," "billboard," "banner," "leaflet," "fly," "hand," "print," "liter," "distrib," "voter," "blackberry," "gotv," "door," "roll," and "fold." These word searches resulted in over 4,500 separate expenditures that were reported by the candidate committees. Once duplicate search hits[40] were identified and eliminated, they were separated and aggregated by spending type. The methodology used to identify and sort these expenditures is explained in greater detail in the appendix.

Once the relevant expenditures were sorted according to expense type, several categories of expenses were compiled for each candidate. Aggregating these voter communication expenses together, as well as by type, resulted in eight different measures of voter communication expenses. Each was divided by the total general election spending, to create the percentage measures that were used as dependent variables in the analysis: "Percentage of General Election Spending on Voter Communication," as well as "Percentage of Spending on TV Ads," "Percentage of Spending on Radio Ads," "Percentage of Spending on Newspaper Ads," "Percentage of Spending on Signage," "Percentage of Spending on Direct Mail," "Percentage of Spending on Phone Calls," and "Percentage of Spending on Leaflets and Literature Distribution" (for general election spending only).

The resulting cases include 29 statewide candidates (for Governor, Lt. Governor, State Supreme Court, State Appeals Court, Sec. of State, Agricultural Commissioner, Insurance Commissioner, Labor Commissioner, Public Service Commission, and Attorney General), 36 State Superior Court candidates (running in judicial circuit districts), 203 state house candidates, and 67 state senate candidates. In all, there are four different types of districts represented by the data: statewide, judicial, state house, and state senate.

[40] A combination of these terms in an itemized expenditure would create a separate "hit" for each term. For example, an expense listed as "phone calls" in a disclosure report would appear twice when each word ("phone" and "call") was searched separately.

Independent Variables and Controls

There are three types of controls on spending that are used in this analysis: district-specific, contest-specific, and candidate-specific (see Hogan 2007). The main independent variable (which is directly related to one or more hypotheses) for this analysis is the "Population Density of the District" in which a candidate is running in the 2006 Georgia general election. This was calculated by dividing the total population of the district by its geographic area (in square miles), multiplied by 1000 (for ease of interpretation in the analysis). As noted previously, the population density of the district is expected to influence the method of voter communication that a candidate employs. It is expected that this measure will have a negative effect on broadcast ad spending (for television and radio) and a positive effect on spending for targeted forms of voter communication (direct mail, phone calls, and leafleting).

Additional district-specific measures include dummy variables for "District Electoral Size" and "Nonpartisan Election" (although the latter is not directly related to any hypothesis). Although district population remains roughly constant across state house races, across state senate races, and across statewide races, the use of county lines to form judicial circuits creates a large discrepancy in voting populations across judicial circuits (because Georgia counties vary widely by population). To account for this, Georgia Superior Court circuits have varying numbers of judges "representing" them, and many elections allow voters in a single circuit to elect multiple candidates within each circuit. Therefore, the size of the potential electorate across judicial circuits has extreme variation,[41] meaning that simply controlling for whether a race was in a Superior Court district cannot accurately capture the effect of district size. Rather

[41] For example, in the 2006 general election, a total 1,008,572 separate votes were cast to re-elect seven different justices in *uncontested* Superior Court seats in the Atlanta Judicial Circuit (each garnering roughly 145,000 votes each). But, at the same time, a total of 88,131 separate votes were cast to re-elect four different justices in the Cherokee Judicial Circuit (each receiving just over 22,000 votes each).

than including separate dummy variables for district type (ie: state house, senate, judicial circuit, etc), a single scalar measure of "District Electoral Size" was employed in this analysis in order to measure district size across contests. This measure is the second main independent variable for this analysis. This allowed for the use of a single 20 point scale, designed to represent the size of the electorate in the district in which a candidate was running.[42] Due to the smaller number of potential voters in state legislative districts, it is likely that state legislative candidates would prefer targeted forms of voter communication (as a more efficient use of resources). In contrast, due to the much larger electorate in statewide contests, it is likely that those candidates would prefer broadcast advertising. Therefore, it is expected that the "District Electoral Size" measure will have a negative effect on broadcast ad spending (for television and radio) and a positive effect on spending for targeted forms of voter communication (direct mail, phone calls, and leafleting).

The remaining controls on spending were not specifically related to any hypothesis. Because the "Nonpartisan Race" measure represents several levels of districting, it is only included to account for non-partisan (rather than district size) characteristics of a race. No predictions for the direction of its effect are made. Contest-specific controls include dummy variables for the electoral status of the seat in question, the electoral competitiveness of the race,

[42] A 20 point scale of district size was created by dividing the raw population of every district by 100,000, assigning an incremental score of 1 for every 100,000 people (resulting in state house contests being assigned a value of 1, state senate contests receiving a value of 2, and the various judicial circuits receiving scores between 1 and 9). Although the actual population of the entire state would lead to statewide contests being assigned a value of 81 under a 100,000 increment conversion, a value of 20 was automatically assigned to all statewide contests. Therefore, statewide contests received a score that was over twice as large as the second largest district, which should be more than adequate for capturing the population discrepancy between statewide and other contests.

In addition to the analysis using this variable, a series of alternate models were run using dummy variables for election type (leaving statewide non-partisan Supreme Court elections unclassified, in order to prevent perfect colinearity). The coefficient for the population density measure remained largely unchanged, although there were some problems with multicollinearity when using the new measures. Because the population density of the state of Georgia is constant, the new measure for state-wide contests was expected to be both statistically and conceptually correlated with that of population density. Therefore, its presence in the final analysis would create serious problems of multicollinearity.

and the fundraising competitiveness between candidates in the same contest. First, a dummy variable for an "Open Seat" contest was included, with the expectation that it should have a positive effect on overall voter communication spending (but with no expectations on the effects for different types of spending). An additional measure of "Vote Competitive" is also included, measured as 1 if the eventual margin of victory in the contest between the winner and loser was less than 10 percentage points, 0 if not (or if there was only one candidate running unopposed). Therefore, a value of 1 would indicate an electorally competitive contest, which is expected to have a positive effect on all forms of spending. Although there is an obvious temporal causality problem that arises from including an independent variable that occurred after the dependent variable (spending), this measure was preferred to other measures of electoral competitiveness (such as past party performance in the district) because of the presence of non-partisan races in the analysis.[43] It is expected that this measure will have a positive effect on all types of spending.

The other contest-specific control, "Cash Competitiveness," is based on the fundraising competitiveness of opposing candidates as measured by The National Institute on Money in State Politics (2008).[44] The institute has developed a "(m)c50" measure of monetary competitiveness for state legislative candidates, which specifies that a race is competitive if one candidate raises at least 50% of the total funds of the other candidate. Therefore, if one candidate has raised more than twice as much money as an opposing candidate, the race is considered non-competitive. The measure of "Cash Competitive" used in this analysis is coded as 1 if one of the candidates in

[43] An additional set of analyses were performed using a percentage variable of 2004 Republican performance in the district, for all (partisan) state legislative cases. Because legislative districts in Georgia have often been drawn based on ORVIS scores, or Optimal Republican Voting Strength (see Bullock and Shafer 1997), measures of Republican vote percentages in the 2004 Presidential, US Senate, and PSC races for each legislative district were averaged and subtracted from .50 to obtain a "Republican Past Performance" measure. Larger percentage values would indicate a safer Republican district. This measure was used in place of the "Vote Competitive" measure in the new analyses. The results were largely similar to the original analysis in each of models (albeit with a different direction on the coefficient, which was expected).

[44] All data on candidate fundraising in Georgia state elections for 2006 were found on the institute's website at http://www.followthemoney.org/.

the race raised at least 50% as much money as the leading candidate, 0 if not. It is expected that this measure will have a positive effect on all types of spending.

Finally, there are three controls for candidate-specific factors that can influence levels of spending. A control for "Total Money Raised" is a measure of the total amount of money raised by a candidate during the 2006 electoral cycle. It is measured increments of $100,000, for ease of interpretation in the analysis. Normally, a control for total fundraising on spending is included when spending is measured as a dollar amount, which is intuitive, and controls for the assumed relationship between resources and spending. However, the dependent variable used in this analysis is a percentage of total spending used for voter communication, therefore it is not expected that an increase in the number of dollars raised should have a similar relationship to percentages of spending. However, due to the high cost of television advertising, radio advertising, and direct mail, it is expected that "Total Money Raised" will have a positive effect on these spending types, specifically. In addition, in order to control for candidate incumbency status and partisanship, separate dummy variable measures for "Incumbent" and "Republican" candidates were also included. The measure for "Incumbent" is expected to have a negative relationship to overall percentage spending on voter communication, due to the fact that many incumbents have greater name recognition than challengers, therefore they do not need to allocate as much spending for this purpose. Neither of the two measures was expected to have a particular directional relationship with the different *methods* of voter communication spending, yet they were included to account for any differences between candidate types.

Analysis, Part 1: Percentage of Spending Allocated to Voter Communication

The first section of the analysis was performed using OLS, in order to determine the effects of the independent variables on the percentages of total spending allocated to each of the

voter communication methods. The initial OLS analysis examines the effect of the independent variables on total voter communication spending (as a percentage of total general election spending), for all races. In addition, separate regressions were run for different types of electoral contests, in order to determine whether there are apparent differences in candidate behavior for different types of contests. Table 4.1 shows the effects on voter communication spending for all candidates, as well as the separate effects for state legislative candidates, statewide candidates, all nonpartisan judicial candidates (at the statewide and judicial circuit levels), and candidates in partisan races (with separate models for Democratic and Republican candidates). In each model, .1 levels of statistical significance are reported for informational purposes, although the standard for true significance was expected to be at the .05 level or better. No expectations are made for the direction of the coefficient for the district-specific controls in this analysis. Finally, robust standard errors are used in order to address potential problems of heteroskadasticity in the model.[45]

[Insert Table 4.1 about here]

As expected the coefficients for "Vote Competitive," "Cash Competitive," and "Total Money Raised" are positive and statistically significant in the combined model, as well as in several of the models of specific races (including state legislative, as well as the partisan campaigns). This suggests that competitiveness and available resources lead candidate campaigns to have higher levels of voter communication, as hypothesized. At the same time, the coefficient for the incumbency variable is statistically significant and negative in the combined

[45] A series of Breusch-Pagan Cook-Weisberg tests for several of the models employed in this chapter indicate that there might be some heteroskedasticity present when non-robust standard errors are used.

model, as well as in the models of state legislative and Democratic campaigns. This suggests that incumbents (in those races) tend to allocate a smaller proportion of their spending to voter communication than non-incumbents. However, it should be noted that a large majority of incumbents in the 2006 Georgia state legislative elections faced no opposition. In fact, of the 180 state house races in Georgia in 2006, 159 had incumbents running, and 115 of those faced no opposition (Common Cause 2006). Therefore, the measures for incumbency and electoral competitiveness are likely to be capturing much of the same effect on spending in the state legislative contests.

The coefficients for population density and district electoral size are not statistically significant in the combined model; yet, this is not surprising because they were not expected to have an effect on *levels* of voter communication spending. However, the coefficient for district size is significant and negative in the model of judicial races, and the coefficient for non-partisan election among the statewide cases shows similar effects. This is likely due to the fact that combining candidates from state Supreme Court and Appeals court districts with Superior Court cases in the judicial model, and isolating the former from other statewide cases in the statewide model (using the non-partisan dummy variable) is driving these statistical effects. Of the four Supreme Court cases in the dataset, 2 were from uncontested races (the incumbent ran unopposed) and two were from a highly *non*-competitive race. The Appeals Court case was in a race were the incumbent ran unopposed. Therefore, there would be little reason for these candidates to allocate large amounts of money to voter communications. When statewide judicial districts are removed from the judicial model, the coefficient loses all statistical significance (suggesting that this assertion might be correct).[46] Overall, there is little reason to expect that

[46] When the model was re-run without the 5 statewide judicial cases, the coefficient for *open-seat status* was positive and statistically significant at the .01 level. On closer inspection of the data, it appeared that there were 4 open seat

district characteristics influence overall voter communication spending, once competitiveness of the district, contest, and fundraising parity among competing candidates are taken into account.

One of the more surprising results of the initial analysis was that the coefficient for "Open Seat" status among state legislative races was statistically significant, yet *negative*. Because open seats are often highly contested, it was expected that these races would see large amounts of voter communication spending. However, on closer inspection of the data, it appeared that out of the 40 cases of candidates running in open legislative contests in 2006, 18 of those were running *unopposed*. This is probably due to the fact that, because both the house and senate seats in Georgia are so well "gerrymandered," even when there was no incumbent running, it was likely that those 18 seats were unwinnable by an opposition party candidate.

Analysis, Part 2: Percentage Spending on Different Types of Voter Communication

The second part of this analysis examined the effects of these variables on certain *types* of voter communication spending: specifically, two kinds of broadcast advertising (television and radio), two kinds of other advertising (newspaper and signage), and three forms of direct, targeted communication with voters (through direct mail, phone calls, and the printing and distribution of leaflets and campaign literature). As hypothesized, both forms of broadcast advertising should have a negative relationship with both district density and electoral size of the district, while the three types of direct targeting should have a positive relationship with these district characteristics. Secondly, it is expected that the "Total Money Raised" by a candidate should have a positive relationship with both the more expensive forms of voter communication, specifically TV ads and direct mail. While we might expect that an increase in competitiveness or the presence of a challenger would lead to an increase in spending on all forms of

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Superior Court races with 4 or more candidates competing in each contest. This led to an unusually high number of open seat races among the Superior Court cases in the dataset (compared to the other types of contests), which was probably driving that effect.

communication, since these are *percentage* measures of total voter communication spending, that sort of relationship should not be expected to appear in this analysis (due to the fact that these percentages are mutually exclusive). Therefore, there are no expectations regarding the sign or significance of the other controls.

[Insert Table 4.2 about here]

A series of regressions were performed on each spending percentage type, using OLS. As in the initial analysis, robust standard errors are reported. The results appear in Table 4.2. As expected, the coefficient for the "District Population Density" is statistically significant and in the expected *negative* direction for both broadcast advertising models, while its coefficient for is *positive* and statistically significant in the models of direct mail and phone call models (although the latter failed to reach significance at the .05 level). This lends support to the hypothesis that candidates are more likely to use direct forms of voter communication in districts with high levels of population density, as well as the hypothesis that they would be less being likely to pay for broadcast ads in dense districts. Secondly, the statistically significant and positive coefficient for "District Electoral Size" in the model of TV ad spending, as well as the statistically significant and negative coefficient for "District Electoral Size" in the model of direct mail spending supports the suggestion that district size has the hypothesized effect on these types of voter communication. Although the coefficients of district size do not reach statistical significance in the models of spending on radio advertising and phone calls, there appears to be some support for Hypotheses 1 and 2.

Secondly, the positive and statistically significant coefficient for "Total Money Raised" in the model of TV ad spending supports the assertion that greater available resources may have

an effect of the type of voter communications that a candidate employs. However, its coefficient in the model of direct mail spending was not significant. Therefore, there is support for Hypothesis 3A but not for 3B. One of the more interesting results of the analysis was that the coefficients for both "District Population Density" and "District Electoral Size" were statistically significant and negative in models of newspaper ad and signage spending. While it was not hypothesized that there would be a particular relationship of the district variable to these types of spending, it is apparent that the effects of the variables are driven largely by the inclusion of state legislative cases. When the models were re-run without those cases, both coefficients lost their statistical significance. However, it is not apparent that this was due to anything more than a dramatically decreased n (which was reduced to 44 cases), which would make achieving statistical significance more difficult.

A series of variance inflation tests indicate that there are no substantial problems with multicollinearity in any of the models. As a whole, the R square values indicate that the models of percentage spending on television ads, signage, and direct mail have the most explanatory value of all of the models. In five of the seven models of spending, one or both of the district-specific independent variables achieved statistical significance at the .05 level. However, none of the coefficients were significant in the model of leaflet and literature spending. This is perhaps due to the way this type of spending was identified and coded, which will be discussed in the conclusion.

Analysis, Part 3: Determinants of Voter Communication Strategy

The third and final section of the analysis for this chapter addresses one of the central questions of this research: do institutional, contextual, or resource availability factors influence the type of voter mobilization *strategy* that candidates employ when running for office? So far,

the analysis has shown some support for the hypothesis that these factors can influence the *levels* of the different forms of broadcast and targeted communication that candidates employ. However, without looking at the total distribution of resource allocation for broadcast and targeted methods (for each of these candidates), little can be assumed about overall campaign strategy. One of the primary assertions of this research is that political elites employ their available resources strategically, in order to maximize the effectiveness of their efforts when mobilizing voters. In this section of the analysis, I employ a multinomial logit model in order to examine what leads candidates to spend more on one type of communication, rather than another.

In order to measure spending strategy, I created a trichotomous measure of voter communication spending, assigning a candidate a value of 0, 1, or 2, depending on the percentage of spending that he or she allocated to various forms of voter communication. If a candidate spent *no money* on voter communication (in any of the categories measured in this chapter), the candidate received a value of 0. If the candidate allocated more money to broadcast advertising than to targeted forms of communication, the candidate received a score of 1. Finally, if the candidate spent more on targeted communication than broadcasting, the candidate received a score of 2. In all, there were 88 candidates reporting "No Voter Communication Spending" (coded as 0), 117 employing a "Broadcast Advertising Strategy" (coded as 1), and 130 candidates employing a "Voter Targeting Strategy" (coded as 2).[47] As hypothesized, the higher the level of population density in a candidate's district (measured by District Population

[47] One might be immediately suspicious of such a high number of candidates reporting $0 on the methods of voter communication that are examined in this chapter, because these methods encompass what "campaigning" largely entails. However, when one examines the raw spending data more thoroughly, a large group of candidate committees spent very little money during their campaigns, all of which was on various filing fees, overhead expenses, and fundraising expenses (which cannot be considered to be "voter communication" expenses, as defined here). In fact, there were four Georgia Superior Court candidates who *reported exactly $3337.35 in total expenses* during 2006. This was the exact amount of the filing fee for candidates running for statewide office!

Density), the more likely he or she should be to prefer a targeted voter communication strategy to a strategy of broadcast advertising. Conversely, the larger the number of potential voters in a candidate's district (measured by the District Electoral Size variable), the more likely that a candidate would prefer a broadcast strategy over a targeted campaign. There are no expectations regarding the effect of partisan factors or incumbency status, however it is expected that levels of competition, resources, and open seats should lead a candidate to prefer any form of voter communication (1 or 2) over none at all (0).

[Insert Table 4.3 about here]

Table 4.3 shows the results of the multinomial logit model. In order to display the pair-wise relationships between broadcast strategy and targeting strategy, as well as each of these strategies compared to the strategy of no voter communication spending, the model was run twice (once with "Broadcast Advertising Strategy" as the base value and once with "Voter Targeting Strategy" as the base value). As expected, the population density of a candidate's district appear to have a statistically significant and *negative* effect on the probability of employing a "Broadcast Advertising Strategy" rather than a "Voter Targeting Strategy" (as indicated by the coefficient at the top of the second column in Table 4.3). Or, as indicated by the coefficient at the top of the forth column, district population density appears to have a statistically significant and *positive* effect on the probability of employing a targeted strategy rather than a broadcast approach (which is simply the inverse of the first relationship). This lends support to Hypothesis 1. Secondly, the statistically significant and negative coefficients for "Total Money Raised" in columns 1 and 3 suggest that increased resources reduce the probability that candidates will forego any voter communication spending, rather than employ

either a broadcast or targeted strategy of voter communication. This lends support to Hypothesis 3.[48]

Although the coefficients for "District Electoral Size" in columns 2 and 4 are in the correct direction, they fail to achieve statistical significance in either pair-wise relationship. Therefore, the results of this analysis do not support Hypothesis 2. In addition, most of the other controls (apart from the Republican dummy variable) do not appear to have any notable relationship to voter communication strategy. As a whole, the results are mixed, yet generally supportive of the main hypothesis that district characteristics and resources have an effect on candidate strategy.[49]

Examining a Counter-Hypothesis: Does a District's *Location* Matter More than Its Size?

One of the central arguments in this chapter is that candidates running in smaller, denser districts are more likely to employ targeted forms of voter communication over broadcast

[48] In addition, the statistically significant and negative coefficients for "Cash Competitive Race" in columns 1 and 3 are as expected, indicating that fundraising parity with the opposition will induce candidates to engage in voter communication. However, a Housman test for the multinomial logit model in Table 4.3 indicated that there might be a violation of the IIA (Independence for Irrelevant Alternatives) assumption. The problem was likely due to the inclusion of the "Cash Competitive Race" control on spending, because it was perfectly correlated with one of the values of the dependent variable. Because none of the cases where no money was spent on voter communications were "cash competitive," the dependent variable value of "No Voter Communication Spending" was the alternative that appeared to be influencing the odds of the other two alternatives. Therefore, a revised model was run without the control for cash competitiveness (see Table A4.1 in the Appendix), with largely similar results to those of the original model. However, a Hausman test of the revised model indicated that IIA was not violated once the control for cash competitiveness was removed. Since the inclusion of the control for cash competitiveness was not related to one of the hypotheses in this chapter (but was merely a control on overall spending from the previous analysis), its exclusion from the model is justified.

[49] An additional set of analyses were performed, excluding those cases where the race was uncontested (ie: where only one candidate was running). Since uncontested races are inherently non-competitive, it is possible that spending strategies are different for contested and uncontested races. However, the results of additional analyses did not indicate major differences when uncontested races were excluded from the data. The coefficient for population density was not statistically significant in the OLS model of spending on TV ads (corresponding to the results in Table 4.2) and the multinomial logit model of "no voter communication spending" vs. "broadcast advertising strategy" (corresponding to the results in column 3 of Table 4.3). Since these analyses are less substantively important than those of the 2nd and 4th columns in Table 4.3, the loss of statistical significance in these models is not problematic. Secondly, the size of the coefficients for population density *increased* slightly in the multinomial logit models of "broadcast advertising strategy vs. voter targeting strategy" and "voter targeting strategy vs. broadcast advertising strategy" in Table 4.3, while there was no change in the direction or statistical significance achieved. Therefore, it is likely that the results reported in the discussion of these analyses in this chapter may slightly *underestimate* the effect of district density on voter communication strategy if only contested contests are included.

methods, because broadcast advertising can be an inefficient use of resources for communication in compact areas (such as urban legislative districts). However, there is another reason why candidates might be reluctant to use broadcast forms of communication in certain areas: often it is due to the high cost of advertising in certain areas. The purchase of TV ads in some media markets can be prohibitively expensive, while relatively cheap in other areas. One of the possible effects of this trend on the analysis presented in this chapter is that a high concentration of districts in a particular area might lead us to incorrectly conclude that district size and density, rather than location, are key determinants of voter communication strategy.

The dataset employed in this research might present such a problem. Because of the very high concentration of Georgia state legislative districts in the greater Atlanta area, almost half of the state legislative cases (122 out of 270) in the dataset are located in just 13% of all counties in Georgia (or the 20 counties which are often referred to as the greater "Metro Atlanta" area) (Carl Vinson Institute of Government 2006). Therefore, in order to examine whether the relationships present in the earlier analysis are spurious, it is necessary to examine whether location has an effect that is equal to or greater than that of district size and density. For this reason, a second multinomial analysis was performed with the inclusion of a "Metro Atlanta District" dummy variable for all candidates and their districts. If at least 50% of the total area of a district was located in one of 20 counties that make up the greater Atlanta area, it received a value of 1 (0 if other wise).[50] The influence of this variable on strategy is expected to have a similar effect to that of the population density measure. The results of the revised model are shown in Table 4.4.

[Insert Table 4.4 about here]

[50] The 20 Atlanta counties are Barrow, Bartow, Carroll, Cherokee, Clayton, Cobb, Coweta, DeKalb, Douglas, Fayette, Forsyth, Fulton, Gwinnett, Hall, Henry, Newton, Paulding, Rockdale, Spaulding, and Walton.

As the results indicate, the statistical effect of the "Metro Atlanta District" variable on spending strategy appears to be stronger than that of "District Population Density," and is in the predicted directions. However, while they lose some of their size and level of statistical significance, the coefficients for the density measure remain in the predicted directions in both versions of the model. This indicates that while its relationship to spending strategy might be weaker than indicated before, the measure for population density continues to have a statistically significant effect on spending strategy. Much of the rest of the model remains unchanged. Since the "Metro Atlanta District" measure was expected to be statistically correlated to that of the other districting variables, a VIF test was run to test for multicollinearity. While there were some indications of intercorellations among the variables in the model, they did not appear to be substantial.

Conclusions

While some methods of voter communications are, on average, more effective than others, there are many intervening factors that can influence the effectiveness of any campaign tactic. Therefore, strategic candidates must consider certain aspects of their districts, the contest in which they are competing, and well as their available resources if they desire to win. When communicating with potential voters, strategic candidates not only have to consider which types of people they wish to target, but they also have to determine how they will target them. As this research shows, factors such as the size of the electorate, the density of the population in a candidate's district, and the amount of money a candidate has on hand have the potential to influence the overall communication strategy that a candidate employs.

One of the primary themes of this research is the effectiveness of certain types of tactics and methods that are used to persuade people to vote. While the analysis presented in this

chapter makes no explicit assumption about whether these candidates were attempting to convert non-supporters or mobilize inactive voters, the strategic considerations that are examined here are relevant to both the persuasion and mobilization approaches that political elites often employ. Institutional, contextual, and resource considerations are important for anyone attempting to win an election, regardless of which voters are the primary targets of an electoral campaign. When communicating with partisans, independents, swing voters, or one's "base," the tactics one employs can be just as important as the identity of the target audience.

While the analysis presented here was largely supportive of the hypotheses posed, there are several important caveats to these findings. While the findings lend support to the argument that districting, competitiveness, and resources can influence strategy, the analysis dealt exclusive with campaign *spending*. As a result, while this research examined the determinants of many of different methods of voter communication, it was limited to those for which there are financial records. As noted in previous chapters, some of the most effective forms of voter communications are *labor*-intensive, rather than capital-intensive. Yet, unfortunately, there are very few reliable records of certain types of voter communication, many of which employ "face-to-face" methods of communication. While the data that were used here are fairly comprehensive, they did not contain reliable records of many forms of labor-intensive voter mobilization, such as door-to-door canvassing. Therefore, while the type of research can help us to better understand how candidates spend their money, there are fewer conclusions that can be made about how they conduct *all* of their campaign activities.

Researchers who wish to study these labor-intensive methods do not need to be discouraged by the lack of reliable data in recent decades. As face-to-face methods of voter communications become more intertwined with sophisticated technology in the 21st Century,

new tools of measuring labor-intensive activities become available. For example, one of the most interesting itemized expenditures that were found in the 2006 Georgia spending data was made by the Georgia Republican Party. The state party organization reported that it spent over $30,000 on "Blackberries" in 2006. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, modern canvassing operations have begun to arm their volunteers with Blackberries, Smart Phones, and other hand-held "personal digital assistants" (PDAs) in order to allow them to collect information from their target audiences when they speak with them face-to-face. Modern PDAs are also equipped with GPS devices that can allow canvassers to find or record the location of potential supporters. By combining data collected in the field with district and precinct level data on patterns of mobility, voter registration, and turnout, modern practitioners of voter mobilization can greatly improve the efficiency of their operations. And as voter mobilization becomes increasingly professionalized, campaign disbursements to professional canvassing operations, payroll records, and receipts for field technology can provide researchers new data on a historically understudied campaign technique.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the research presented in this chapter examines the voter communication practices of candidate campaigns, but as it has been frequently mentioned, political parties, religious and community organizations, and political interest groups are also frequently involved in the targeting and contacting of potential voters. And, as the case of the 2004 presidential campaign reveals, these groups and organizations do not act alone. Often, there is considerable communication and coordination between like-minded groups when they are planning and implementing their voter mobilization campaigns. In the next chapter, I address this pattern of GOTV coordination, by examining the entirety of voter mobilization activity in 40 different Georgia counties in the 2006 elections.

Table 4.1
Resource Allocation for Voter Communication
(2006 Georgia General Election)

Percentage of General Election Spending on Voter Communication (OLS Model)	All Candidate Campaigns	State Legislative Campaigns	Statewide Campaigns	Judicial Campaigns (Nonparty)	Democratic Candidate Campaigns only	Republican Candidate Campaigns only
District Pop. Density (1000s)	-0.0172	-0.0142	0	0.0771	-0.0167	-0.00693
	(0.0153)	(0.0158)	(0)	(0.0592)	(0.0179)	(0.0315)
District Electoral Size (1-20)	-0.00140	0.0152	0	-0.0126**	0.00475	2.00e-05
	(0.00395)	(0.0425)	(0)	(0.00568)	(0.00634)	(0.00844)
Nonpartisan Election (1,0)	0.0132	0	-0.466**	0	0	0
	(0.0518)	(0)	(0.190)	(0)	(0)	(0)
Open Seat (1,0)	-0.0798	-0.139**	-0.103	-0.0395	-0.155*	0.0412
	(0.0569)	(0.0676)	(0.179)	(0.132)	(0.0802)	(0.112)
Vote Competitive (1,0)	0.252***	0.281***	0.157	0.359**	0.253**	0.297**
	(0.0728)	(0.0926)	(0.173)	(0.172)	(0.0992)	(0.130)
Cash Competitive (1,0)	0.242***	0.231***	-0.0617	0.350**	0.198**	0.203**
	(0.0476)	(0.0641)	(0.122)	(0.129)	(0.0838)	(0.0896)
Total Money Raised ($100K)	0.0043***	0.0165	0.00363**	0.0800***	0.00253	0.0037**
	(0.00139)	(0.0214)	(0.00156)	(0.0138)	(0.00314)	(0.00184)
Incumbent (1,0)	-0.214***	-0.244***	0.0708	-0.306**	-0.227***	-0.104
	(0.0455)	(0.0524)	(0.125)	(0.116)	(0.0584)	(0.103)
Repub. Candidate (1,0)	-0.0274	-0.0210	-0.114	0	0	0
	(0.0389)	(0.0410)	(0.120)	(0)	(0)	(0)
Constant	0.464***	0.453***	0.644***	0.430***	0.477***	0.328***
	(0.0454)	(0.0737)	(0.117)	(0.131)	(0.0503)	(0.107)
Observations	335	270	29	41	132	157
R-squared	0.313	0.284	0.329	0.696	0.312	0.259

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table 4.2
Determinants of Candidate Resource Allocation for Voter Communication
(As a Percentage of Total General Election Spending)

Percent of Total Spending	Broadcast Advertising		Other Advertising		Direct Voter Targeting		
(OLS Model)	% Spent on TV Ads	% Spent on Radio Ads	% Spent on Newspaper Ads	% Spent on Signage	% Spent on Direct Mail	% Spent on Phone Calls	% Spent on Leaflets
District Pop. Density (1000s)	-0.00801**	-0.00708***	-0.00623***	-0.0103**	0.0209**	0.0107*	0.000788
	(0.00365)	(0.00188)	(0.00173)	(0.00413)	(0.0106)	(0.00638)	(0.00174)
District Electoral Size (1-20)	0.0134***	-0.000268	-0.00108***	-0.00350***	-0.00903***	-0.000439	-0.000329
	(0.00372)	(0.00108)	(0.000387)	(0.00111)	(0.00136)	(0.000683)	(0.000331)
Nonpartisan Election (1,0)	-0.0136	-0.00526	0.00171	0.0227	0.0104	0.00739	-0.00563
	(0.0298)	(0.0139)	(0.00968)	(0.0183)	(0.0233)	(0.0115)	(0.00507)
Open Seat (1,0)	-0.00156	0.0178	0.00206	-0.0633**	0.00143	-0.0235	4.97e-05
	(0.0248)	(0.0131)	(0.00916)	(0.0272)	(0.0355)	(0.0231)	(0.00499)
Electorally Competitive (1,0)	0.0180	0.000998	0.00866	-0.00395	0.128***	0.00766	0.0213
	(0.0351)	(0.0129)	(0.0135)	(0.0180)	(0.0413)	(0.0350)	(0.0136)
Cash Competitive Race (1,0)	0.0224	0.0250	0.00691	0.0303	0.0997***	0.0280	0.00644
	(0.0283)	(0.0168)	(0.0107)	(0.0187)	(0.0286)	(0.0292)	(0.00806)
Total Money Raised ($100K)	0.00546***	-0.000558	-6.38e-05	-0.000284	0.000270	-0.000344*	-8.42e-05
	(0.00144)	(0.000415)	(0.000122)	(0.000496)	(0.000456)	(0.000197)	(7.55e-05)
Incumbent (1,0)	0.0162	-0.00867	-0.00557	-0.101***	-0.0564*	-0.0233	0.00309
	(0.0211)	(0.0109)	(0.00678)	(0.0258)	(0.0307)	(0.0235)	(0.00819)
Repub. Candidate (1,0)	-0.0377**	0.00146	-0.00190	-0.0288***	0.0317	0.0224	-0.00710
	(0.0146)	(0.00773)	(0.00503)	(0.0110)	(0.0214)	(0.0176)	(0.00621)
Constant	0.00777	0.0260***	0.0241***	0.150***	0.114***	0.0163*	0.00565
	(0.0233)	(0.00998)	(0.00845)	(0.0352)	(0.0307)	(0.00950)	(0.00380)
Observations	335	335	335	335	335	335	335
R-squared	0.453	0.084	0.050	0.202	0.173	0.042	0.057

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table 4.3
Determinants of Candidate Resource Allocation Strategy
(Probability of Spending More on Broadcast Advertising or Voter Targeting)

(base outcome)	vs. Targeted		vs. Broadcast	
Resource Allocation Strategy (Multinomial Logit)	No Voter Communication Spending	Broadcast Advertising Strategy	No Voter Communication Spending	Voter Targeting Strategy
District Pop. Density (1000s)	-0.104	-0.525***	0.420***	0.525***
	(0.129)	(0.145)	(0.161)	(0.145)
District Electoral Size (1-20)	0.0797	0.0640	0.0158	-0.0640
	(0.0803)	(0.0393)	(0.0613)	(0.0393)
Nonpartisan Election (1,0)	0.774	-0.0205	0.795	0.0205
	(0.523)	(0.502)	(0.578)	(0.502)
Open Seat (1,0)	1.078	-0.000840	1.079*	0.000840
	(0.588)	(0.452)	(0.600)	(0.452)
Electorally Competitive (1,0)	-1.713	-0.585	-1.128	0.585
	(1.105)	(0.423)	(1.151)	(0.423)
Cash Competitive Race (1,0)	-34.48***	-0.213	-35.27***	0.213
	(0.442)	(0.374)	(0.441)	(0.374)
Total Money Raised ($100K)	-1.574***	0.0909	-1.665***	-0.0909
	(0.375)	(0.0614)	(0.373)	(0.0614)
Incumbent (1,0)	0.839*	0.0597	0.780*	-0.0597
	(0.452)	(0.359)	(0.472)	(0.359)
Republican Candidate (1,0)	0.0116	-0.634**	0.645*	0.634**
	(0.360)	(0.318)	(0.387)	(0.318)
Constant	-0.0325	0.351	-0.383	-0.351
	(0.462)	(0.360)	(0.467)	(0.360)
Observations	335	335	335	335
Pseudo R-squared	0.186	0.186	0.186	0.186
R-squared	.	.	.	.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table 4.4
Determinants of Candidate Resource Allocation Strategy, with Atlanta
(Probability of Spending More on Broadcast Advertising or Voter Targeting)

	(base outcome)	vs. Targeted		vs. Broadcast
Resource Allocation Strategy (Multinomial Logit)	No Voter Communication Spending	Broadcast Advertising Strategy	No Voter Communication Spending	Voter Targeting Strategy
Metro Atlanta District (1,0)	0.520	-0.825**	1.344***	0.825**
	(0.343)	(0.336)	(0.407)	(0.336)
District Pop. Density (1000s)	-0.173	-0.335**	0.162	0.335**
	(0.143)	(0.151)	(0.172)	(0.151)
District Electoral Size (1-20)	0.0835	0.0520	0.0315	-0.0520
	(0.0790)	(0.0394)	(0.0610)	(0.0394)
Nonpartisan Election (1,0)	0.720	0.120	0.601	-0.120
	(0.531)	(0.486)	(0.587)	(0.486)
Open Seat (1,0)	1.257**	-0.0247	1.282**	0.0247
	(0.584)	(0.450)	(0.585)	(0.450)
Electorally Competitive (1,0)	-1.678	-0.719*	-0.958	0.719*
	(1.070)	(0.425)	(1.098)	(0.425)
Cash Competitive Race (1,0)	-34.73***	-0.123	-35.61***	0.123
	(0.499)	(0.365)	(0.505)	(0.365)
Total Money Raised ($100K)	-1.544***	0.0891	-1.633***	-0.0891
	(0.378)	(0.0612)	(0.378)	(0.0612)
Incumbent (1,0)	0.918**	0.00162	0.917*	-0.00162
	(0.456)	(0.362)	(0.493)	(0.362)
Republican Candidate (1,0)	-0.0774	-0.547*	0.470	0.547*
	(0.368)	(0.319)	(0.399)	(0.319)
Constant	-0.296	0.515	-0.811*	-0.515
	(0.483)	(0.375)	(0.493)	(0.375)
Observations	335	335	335	335
Pseudo R-squared	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205
R-squared	.	.	.	.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses

CHAPTER 5

GOTV BY MULTIPLE ENTITIES: PARTIES, CANDIDATES, AND INTEREST GROUPS

Introduction

Since political parties, candidates, and interest groups are all strategic actors, there are many similarities in the way that each conducts voter mobilization. Although their resources and capabilities may vary, each of these types of organizations has a common goal: to win elections. However, there are also fundamental differences in how each seeks to achieve this goal. In fact, what it means to "win" can be very different for each type of political actor. In Chapter 5, I focus on the different electoral motivations of parties, candidates, and interest groups, by examining the influences of certain factors (and the different effects of these factors) on the voter mobilization activities of each type of actor. In this chapter, I argue that different types of mobilizing entities mobilize differently. I examine the influence of multiple competitive contests on the mobilization activities of each political entity, as well as how each type of organization interacts with the other in a single electoral environment.

The research presented in this chapter examines the total voter mobilization activity of all political parties, candidates, and interest groups in a single geographic area, during a single election cycle, by examining the voter mobilization activity of each organizational type in 50 Georgia counties during the 2006 General Election. This is done using a combination of Census data, election returns, and a survey of local journalists in Georgia. Specifically, it is shown that both political parties and interest groups are concerned with multiple races during any given election, although they may not be concerned with the same contests. At the same time, the

activities of some organizations may be determined by the activities of others. Specifically, in a competitive environment, the voter mobilization of the Democratic and Republican Parties may be influenced by the activities of one another.

Getting Out the Vote: The Different Strategic Considerations and Concerns of Parties, Candidates, and Interest Groups

The central argument of this chapter is that while parties, candidates, and interest groups all desire to mobilize voters to win elections, there are fundamental differences in what motivates them to "Get Out the Vote." In fact, while all of these entities seek to mobilize voters at election time, they have very different reasons for doing so. Because political party organizations desire to control government, they have a natural desire to dominate the processes that select government officials (Schattsneider 1946). This why parties have traditionally sought to promote candidates, "get out the vote," assist government in the operations of elections, and subsume and control the entire electoral process. Because political parties seek to dominate the electoral process, they have historically been the organizations that have mobilized voters at election time. Rather than attempting to influence public policy by persuading officials, the modern American political party was designed to elect multiple candidates to office in order to control government (Aldrich 1995). By ensuring that entire slates of party candidates are elected to office, political parties can control the development of public policy.[51] In fact, political parties have often been referred to as "electoral maximizers." By seeking the maximum electoral impact of their actions, political parties and their leaders act strategically in order to maximize their eventual control of government. This is why, until fairly recently, party organizations'

[51] Parties, as electoral maximizers, exist primarily to influence elections (Aldrich 1995). In fact, as Downs (1957) has noted, winning elections can be more important to political parties and their leaders than influencing policy. As Downs states, in the American system "parties formulate policies to win elections rather than win elections to formulate policies" (p. 31).

primary function was to get out the vote on Election Day. The central premise of party led mobilization was that once at the polls, voters would "vote the party ticket," or elect multiple candidates to office. By focusing on the mobilization of party supporters (or their "base"), rather than a particular race, political parties could ensure that their efforts were fruitful.

As noted in previous chapters, the modern campaign has been largely candidate driven since the 1950s. Candidates develop their own organizations, control their own resources, and largely determine their own electoral destinies. For a strategic (and therefore successful) candidate, winning one's own electoral contest is paramount (Fenno 1978). Therefore, it can be easily assumed that whatever a candidate's campaign does during an election is designed to ensure the election (or re-election) of that candidate. Any concern that a candidate has for fellow partisans, or any assistance that he or she provides for other candidates to ensure their election, is secondary. Although modern leadership committees and party PACs are designed to assist fellow partisans (and are often quite influential), their role is minor when compared to the role of the individual candidate's campaign. This is why, when observing any voter mobilization activity by candidates, one can safely assume that it is not designed to influence multiple races. Most actions by candidates are done for themselves.

As discussed in Chapter 2, labor unions, business groups, religious organizations, and other political interest groups have recently entered the foray of electoral politics. While they once focused primarily on direct lobbying, modern interest groups focus increasingly on electoral activities, especially voter mobilization (Rozell, et al. 2006). In a sense, modern interest groups have largely supplanted the political parties as the organizations that mobilize voters on Election Day. As noted in Chapter 2, much of the party-based voter mobilization activity of the past has been largely replaced by non-party groups such as labor unions,

environmental groups, and the NAACP (Bibby 1999; Magleby 2000; Biersack and Viray 2005; Herrnson 2005). With abundant resources of money and volunteer labor, many interest groups have the ability to "Get out the Vote" as well as or better than political parties.

Despite the similarities between the activities of interest groups and other organizations, their primary motivations for doing so are unlike those of either candidates or parties. Unlike political parties, interest groups are "policy maximizers" (Berry and Wilcox 2007). While they often form allegiances with the major political parties, and seek to mobilize like-minded partisans, interest groups often have their own issue agendas. The ultimate goal of most interest groups is to influence the development of public policy, which is why direct lobbying was the method of choice for most political interest groups for much of the 20th Century. Today, much of their voter mobilization activity reflects this desire to have a maximum impact on the development of public policy. This is why they often focus their electoral efforts on high profile races. For example, the "Labor 2000" campaign of the AFL-CIO in 2000 was designed specifically to influence the outcome of 75 congressional districts in 25 states, as well as the presidential race. In the same year, the NAACP's "National Voter Fund" and "Americans for Equality" campaigns focused on mobilizing African-American voters in 13 presidential swing states (Biersack and Viray 2003). While there are many local groups who focus on local ballot initiatives and elections, a majority of the most organized interest groups focus their efforts on races where they can have the most impact, such as, statewide, presidential, and congressional races.

Although parties, candidates, and interest groups have different motivations for mobilizing voters, they do not operate in isolation from one another. In fact, many of these organizations will adapt to the actions of the other, either in competition or coordination. The

major parties, as competitors for votes, naturally seek to prevent the other from winning competitive contests by increasing their mobilization activities. Huckfeld and Sprague (1992) have suggested that there may be a "symbiotic effect" of one party's mobilization on the others (p. 78). When examining the placement of mobilization materials such as yard signs in their reknowned study of mobilization in South Bend, Indiana, they found that "the presence of Democratic signs and stickers tends to stimulate Republican signs and stickers, and the presence of Republican signs and stickers tends to stimulate Democratic signs and stickers" (p. 78). This might suggest that the parties respond to increases in the opposition's mobilization efforts by increasing their own.

Furthermore, allied groups might be expected to adapt their activities to the activities of one another, or to actively coordinate their mobilization strategies. In fact, there have been many instances of active coordination between parties and interest groups in recent decades, as noted previously. The close relationship between Democrats and unions, as well as Republicans and business groups, is well-documented (Mayhew 1986; Bibby 1999; Herrnson 2005). The effective use of resources is essential for those organizations that wish to achieve the same goals. In an environment of multiple races and mobilizing entities, overlapping mobilization campaigns among like-minded groups can be counter-productive.

Voter Mobilization in an Environment of Multiple Races and Groups: Hypotheses

As noted previously, parties, candidates, and interest groups are different types of political actors, often with different goals. However, there are many similarities in their electoral goals, and in the way that each conducts voter mobilization. In the electoral arena, the common goal between them is their desire to influence electoral outcomes, or to win elections. And although each may focus their efforts on different types of races, or on different types of voters,

each type of organization is bound by similar institutional constraints. All of these actors have to attempt to influence elections that are decided by similar electoral rules: primarily that of single member districted, plurality electoral systems. In a winner-take-all system, *any* actor attempting to win an election would take the competitiveness of that electoral environment (and the race itself) into account. Therefore, when operating in a similar electoral environment, parties, candidates, and interest groups would be likely to determine their level of voter mobilization based on indicators of electoral competitiveness. Because each type of organization must be concerned with electoral competeiveness, I pose the first hypotheses:

> Hypothesis 1: Greater levels of electoral competitiveness in a county lead to greater levels of voter mobilization.

The basic premise of this chapter is that different types of organizations also have different electoral goals; therefore their voter mobilization strategies may vary. For example, party organizations and candidate campaigns often have different motivations when mobilizing voters. As noted previously in Chapter 3, strategic parties would desire to mobilize as many voters as possible in a given area, in order to have the greatest impact at the polls. This means that parties acting strategically would attempt to influence as many races as possible, by contacting potential supporters across a given geographic area (such as a county, by a county party organization).[52] This is why party-run Get Out the Vote activities have historically involved massive mobilization efforts at the county, city, precinct, or block level (such as the use of the neighborhood canvass, has often been implemented geographically, rather than in a micro-targeted manner). However, as was shown in Chapter 4, candidates are often more concerned

[52] This is not meant to imply that parties would never focus their efforts on a select number of races (such as one or more competitive congressional contests), which they have a recent history of doing. Yet, given an abundance of resources, parties would have a natural desire to influence other races down the ballot.

with the characteristics of their own races and districts, rather than the other races in their area. A strategic candidate would not be expected to alter his or her mobilization strategy because of the presence of other competitive races in the area. Because political parties are concerned with multiple races at any given election, yet candidate campaigns are normally concerned with only one race at any given election, I pose the following hypotheses:

> Hypothesis 2A: A greater number of competitive races in a county leads to greater voter mobilization efforts by the political parties, ceteris paribus.
>
> Hypothesis 2B: A greater number of competitive races in a county will not lead to greater voter mobilization efforts by candidate campaigns, ceteris paribus.

But, there are other types of mobilizing entities that might have special goals and concerns when developing and implementing GOTV strategy. As noted previously, because they are policy maximizers *interest groups* would also be expected to focus their efforts on places where they can have the most electoral impact. Like political parties, many interest groups would benefit from influencing multiple races in a single geographic location, in order to maximize the eventual policy impact of their electoral efforts. For this reason, they would be likely to focus their mobilization efforts where there are more competitive races. Because interest groups may be concerned with multiple races at any given election:

> Hypothesis 2C: A greater number of competitive races in a county leads to greater voter mobilization efforts by interest groups, ceteris paribus.

In order to have the most policy impact, interest groups would be expected to focus on those offices that control the most (or the most impacting) policy decisions. Unless an interest group is formed specifically to influence a policy issue that is confined to a particular county or

city,[53] it would be expected to focus its efforts on races that might influence federal or state level policy (rather than local). And, given the greater potential policy impact of electing a *single* statewide executive officer (such as a governor or agricultural commissioner) or justice to a state appellate court, rather than a single legislator, it would also be expected that interest groups would focus on these sorts of races. Therefore, it is likely that they would be more likely to attempt to influence races for *higher offices*, such as congressional and statewide contests. Because interest groups attempt to maximize the eventual policy impact of their electoral activity, I pose the following hypotheses:

> Hypothesis 2D: A greater number of competitive races in a county for *statewide office* leads to greater voter mobilization efforts by interest groups, ceteris paribus.
>
> Hypothesis 2E: A greater number of competitive *US House* races in a county leads to greater voter mobilization efforts by interest groups, ceteris paribus.

Third, strategic organizations (attempting to maximize the effectiveness of their electoral activities) would not only consider their own resources and goals when mobilizing voters, but they would also consider the capabilities and activities of other organizations that are present in the area. In order to maximize the effectiveness of their voter mobilization efforts, a party, interest group, or candidate that was intent on winning would have to adjust their level of mobilization based on what their friends and enemies were doing. Therefore, an additional factor to consider would be coordination and competition among multiple groups. One of the most commonly cited phenomena in the party contacting literature is the tendency of both parties to target voters living in competitive areas (Cox and Munger 1989; Jackson 2002; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Both parties have a desire to win elections, therefore Republicans and

[53] Among the groups reported to have been mobilizing voters in the 50 Georgia counties in this study, all but two were national or statewide organizations.

Democrats in competition should both increase their levels of voter mobilization when electoral competitiveness is high. Yet, if one party has a high level of mobilization, and the other party is not mobilizing, that party might be at a considerable disadvantage (if the former party is able to turn out more of its supporters). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that parties in competition react to the GOTV activity of one another. Because political parties are competitive, I pose the third hypothesis:

> Hypothesis 3: Greater voter mobilization efforts of one party lead to greater voter mobilization efforts of the other political party, ceteris paribus.

Finally, the relationship between the voter mobilization activities of different types of organizations in a single area can indicate whether or not there may have been coordination among these groups. As stated previously, like minded organizations have a long history of overlapping each other when mobilizing voters: often there are multiple groups contacting the same voters (or potential supporters), while many other potential supporters are effectively ignored. Therefore, organizations that wish to coordinate their activities with one another would naturally try to prevent overlap. At the local level, evidence of coordinated GOTV would show one organization mobilizing in one area, and another mobilizing in a different area, but neither of them mobilizing in the same area. For example, if there is a negative relationship between the get out the vote activity of parties and interest groups, this might be evidence of coordination. For this reason, I pose the forth hypothesis:

> Hypothesis 4: Among coordinating groups, higher levels of voter mobilization of one organization lead to lower levels of voter mobilization by the other, ceteris paribus.

However, it should be noted that while Hypothesis 4 assumes a negative relationship between the activities of like-minded groups, it is also based on the assumption that these organizations wish

to mobilize the same voters in the same areas. At smaller levels of analysis, such as a city block or precinct (or a single, individual contact), this sort of coordination might be easily observable. However, as it was noted in Chapter 2, when examining mobilization at an aggregate scale, there is often an implicit and erroneous assumption that mobilization is distributed evenly (or that all voters in the area have an equal chance of being contacted). Therefore, any differences in mobilization within the larger area would be obscured by the aggregation (see Wielhower and Lockerbie 1994). For this reason, the county level analysis presented here can show a lack of coordination at the county level, but any differences in mobilization by different groups in different neighborhoods or precincts cannot be fully captured. Therefore, while Hypothesis 4 suggests that there will be a negative relationship between the activities of coordinating groups, it should not be assumed that organizations are *not coordinating* if no such relationship is found.

Methodology: An Overview

The hypotheses posed in this chapter are tested by a series of ordered logit and logit models of several influences on various measures of voter mobilization by parties, candidates, and other organized (interest) groups. Using a combination of data from a survey of local newspaper editors, Census records, and countywide vote returns, I examine the effect of county demographics, voter registration rates, electoral competitiveness, the presence of multiple races on the ballot, and the activities of multiple types of organizations on voter mobilization by these organizations in 50 Georgia counties during the 2006 elections. First, I examine the effect of these factors on different measures of countywide voter mobilization, or "Get out the Vote." Second, I examine the effects of the aforementioned factors on voter mobilization by parties,

candidates, and interest groups. Finally, I examine the influences of each of these entities' activities on one another.[54]

Collecting Data on Local GOTV Activity: The Local Newspaper Questionnaire

The primary data for this chapter come from the "Local Newspaper Questionnaire," which was specifically designed and implemented for this dissertation. As was discussed in previous chapters, there are few preexisting and reliable records that can enable researchers to study the determinants and processes of voter mobilization effectively. Apart from the limited data that can be obtained from public opinion surveys and campaign finance records, most other information on the strategy of voter mobilization is purely qualitative in nature (and is often based on anecdotal accounts or hearsay). While extensive interviews with practitioners of GOTV can provide insight on how it is conducted, those who mobilize voters at election time might be reluctant to reveal details of their strategy and tactics to researchers, or they might have an incentive to embellish the strength and scope of their mobilization efforts. In fact, information regarding which voters are contacted, how mobilization campaigns are coordinated, and strategic considerations about how resources are allocated is rarely disclosed to those outside of one's own political organization. Because they are in the business of winning elections, most professional campaign consultants and party officials who engage in voter mobilization are reluctant to talk to researchers about their specific practices (Fisher 2006).[55] In fact, when a

[54] An additional exploratory analysis of their effects on different methods of voter mobilization were included in the appendix, including effects on door-to-door contacting, leafleting and other literature distribution, phone calls, direct mail, voter registration, organized rallies and events, as well as TV, radio, and newspaper advertising. Since each of the hypotheses posed in this chapter relate to mobilization by specific types of organizations rather than types of mobilization, no hypotheses were tested in that analysis. Since the creation of separate dummy variables of GOTV method by organization type would not yield enough positive cases for adequate testing, they were not employed in this analysis.

[55] One of the concerns of GOTV practioners is that their strategies might be revealed to their political opposition. In her extensive research of one of the largest progressive canvassing operations in the country, Fisher (2006) found that this information is often closely protected, even from the canvassers themselves, out of fear that it will be used by political opponents.

representative of one the Georgia state party organizations was approached by this researcher, the representative noted that the state party had recently directed each of its county organizations not to cooperate with researchers attempting to survey its local party officials.

Because there are numerous legal restrictions on electoral coordination between candidate campaigns, political party committees, and various political advocacy groups and nonprofits, any information regarding coordination between these groups has the potential to expose violations of certain federal and state campaign finance regulations.[56] FEC and IRS regulations bar certain groups from actively endorsing candidates for office (such as charities and religious organizations). For example, while their 501(c)3 IRS classification allows religious congregations to encourage parishioners to be civically active, any direct endorsement of a candidate or party at election time can jeopardize their tax-exempt status. Since churches and labor unions have recently come to rival political parties in their capability for "getting out the vote," it is possible that a reluctance to reveal their activities could pose serious problems for analysis of voter mobilization at the local level.

Third, because of the lack of comprehensive and detailed data on voter mobilization at the local level, it is often difficult to determine who is mobilizing voters in a single area at any given time. As noted previously, there are often numerous organizations canvassing the same neighborhoods and contacting the same voters during any given election. For this reason, it can be hard for voters to determine who it is that is contacting them, whether it is a candidate's campaign organization, a political party, or a political interest group that is mobilizing on its behalf. Therefore, information obtained from voters themselves might not provide an accurate insight into what is going on in their local communities.

[56] See Corrado (2000) for a discussion of federal restrictions on campaign coordination.

For these reasons, it was important to collect information about local voter mobilization for this research from a source that was more reliable and accessible than accounts by voters or practitioners. At the local level, journalists can be both well informed and well positioned to provide researchers with valuable information about political activity in their area. Because local newspaper editors can be expected to be well-informed about the political activity occurring in their area, surveying these journalists can provide researchers with a valuable source of political information at the local level (Fink 2008). Also, because local journalists have a vested interest in collecting and disseminating information about the political activity in their communities, it was expected that they would be willing to contribute to this research.

In order to get a third party perspective on local voter mobilization efforts, I surveyed the editors of local newspapers in Georgia, asking about voter mobilization in their counties during the 2006 elections. In April of 2008, I sent a four page questionnaire to the managing editors of each of the 238 daily and weekly newspapers in the state. The survey procedure consisted of several stages: a pre-survey contact via postcard, an initial mailing of the questionnaire, a postcard follow-up, and 2 email follow-ups with a web link to an online version of the survey. Copies of each of these are included in the appendix.

For the procedures for the design and implementation of this survey questionnaire, I utilized several acknowledged guides (Dillman 1978, 2000; Gillham 2000; Saris and Gallhofer 2007; Weisberg 2005; Weisberg et al. 1996). In order to increase response rates, an announcement postcard was mailed to each editor in April, 2008, identifying the research project and informing them that they would receive a questionnaire in a few days. A total of 251 postcards were sent, to either the managing editor or chief political writer for each newspaper

that could be identified within the state of Georgia.[57] Although there were several Georgia counties that were overrepresented in the population (because there were multiple newspapers located in some counties),[58] a postcard was sent to at least one newspaper in each of the 159 counties in the state, ensuring a comprehensive survey sample of all counties. Five days later, each potential respondent received a questionnaire packet, including a cover letter, a four page questionnaire, and a return envelope. Each of the questions on the survey pertained to voter mobilization activity in the editor's county in the weeks immediately preceding the November 2006 elections. Respondents were first asked to identify the county in which their newspaper was located (to prime the respondents and to ensure that their answers were for the correct county). They were also asked to recall whether there was any "Get Out the Vote" activity in their county, the level of activity, as well as changes in the level of activity from 2004 to 2006. Second, they were asked to identify any specific races or elections for which any candidate, political party organization, or other organized group was mobilizing. Third, they were asked to identify the types of organizations that were mobilizing, the methods of mobilization that they observed each organization using, as well as the names of the specific candidates or organizations that were active in their county.

One week after the questionnaire packets were mailed, a follow-up postcard was sent to each editor, to thank them for their participation and to remind them to return their completed questionnaires (Gillham 2000). At which time, any packets that were returned by the post office (due to various address errors or insufficient contact information) were resent to the correct

[57] Several newspapers had been discontinued or closed recently, although the contact information that was found online did not indicate that these newspapers were inactive. All initial contact information was obtained online, through the Georgia Secretary of State's list of county legal organs, as well as Mondo Times (www.mondotimes.com) and the US Newspaper Link (USNPL) (www.usnpl.com) websites, two popular search engines for identifying local newspapers in the United States.
[58] Fulton County, in Atlanta, received the most survey requests.

address, after that information was researched and updated. Any newspaper that had its packet returned after three separate attempts was dropped from the pool (yielding a final survey population and sample of 238).[59] A total of 23 respondents answered the request by mail.

After three weeks, those editors who did not respond to the initial request and follow-up received an email reminder, which included a link to an identical online version of the survey (using SurveyMonkey.com, a popular online survey instrument). Two weeks later, nonrespondents received an additional email request. A total of 39 respondents answered the online version of the survey. In total, 62 respondents out of 238 answered the survey request, yielding a total response rate of 26.1%. Although almost twice as many respondents responded to the email request, there were no discernable differences in content between the responses returned by mail or online.[60] Of these 62, 6 of the online responses were dropped from the sample because none of the questions had been answered (the respondents merely opened the survey link), 4 were dropped because they were from editors in the same county (Fulton) and those answers were virtually identical to that of the most complete response, 1 was dropped because it was insufficiently and incorrectly answered (only one questioned was answered, and it was verified that the question was answered incorrectly), and a final response was eliminated because the respondent indicated that he/she had not lived in the county in 2006, therefore that survey was completed based on knowledge of activity from a recent municipal election. This yielded a final sample of 50.

[59] Because every newspaper in the state received a survey request, the sample size was identical to the population size. For efficiency's sake, the entire pool of potential respondents will be referred to as the "sample."

[60] The question wording, placement, and order on the online version of the questionnaire were identical to that of the paper (mailed) version. Additionally, a series of bivariate correlation matrices indicated no statistically significant relationship between a dummy variable for response type and each of the dependent and independent variables used in this research. Therefore, if can be stated with some degree of confidence that there were probably no substantial problems that resulted from the use of two different survey procedures.

The Data

Because each county in the final sample was represented by a single respondent, there were exactly 50 counties represented. Figure 5.1 shows the geographic location of each of the 50 counties that were represented in the sample. As indicated, these counties were fairly evenly dispersed throughout the state, ensuring that most regions of Georgia are represented. The highest concentration of counties that are represented in the sample is located in the Atlanta metro area, followed by those in southeast Georgia (near Savannah). Those counties reporting no voter mobilization activity in 2006 (14 counties) are shaded in light grey; those counties reporting any voter mobilization (36 counties) are shaded in dark grey.

[Insert Figure 5.1 about here]

There are several differences between the demographics of the sample and the population that should be noted. Table 5.1 shows several of the differences between the characteristics of the 50 counties in the sample and the 159 counties in Georgia. A majority of the 109 counties that were not represented in the sample are rural counties. Of the 159 counties in the state of Georgia, 26% were classified as rural counties according to the 2000 Census. Among the 50 counties in this sample, only 16% were rural counties. Additionally, 44% of all Georgia counties were classified as metropolitan (urban) counties, compared to 54% of those in the sample. Therefore, it is likely that rural counties were underrepresented in this sample, while urban counties were overrepresented.[61] At the same time, while there were minimal differences between the percentage of African Americans and the per capita income in the counties and the

[61] The definitions used to determine this classification, as well as the potential effects of rural and urban characteristics on voter mobilization are discussed in greater detail in Part 1 of the analysis.

state, the sample counties appear to have more than a slightly higher Hispanic population than the in the state as a whole. Therefore, it is also possible than counties with higher Hispanic populations are also overrepresented.[62] However, because these were some of the most populous counties in the state, these counties represented over 56% of the total Georgia population (roughly 5,302,273 people). Therefore, although this sample was comprised of only a third of the total number of counties in Georgia, these counties represented a majority of the state's population. Overall, while there appears to be some oversampling of metropolitan counties, it appears that this sample as a whole is fairly representative of the state of Georgia.[63]

[Insert Table 5.1 about here]

In addition, Figure 5.2 displays a breakdown of reported voter mobilization by each type of organization, including Democratic and Republican Party, candidate, and interest group activity. These data were obtained from a series of yes/no questions at the beginning of each page of the survey, asking whether the respondent had observed or was aware of these organizations mobilizing in their county in the weeks immediately preceding the 2006 General Elections.[64] Each of the 50 respondents answered all of the questions relating to general GOTV

[62] While there is only a .6% total difference between the Hispanic population in the sample (5.1%) and the state (4.5%), it is proportionally greater (roughly 1/10 more) due to the small percentage of the Georgia population that is classified as Hispanic.

[63] To test for a possible effect of county type on voter mobilization levels, all of the analysis in this chapter was rerun with the inclusion of a 9-pt "Rural-Urban Continuum" measure, which is assigned to each county in the US Census. This is a measure that is coded from a value of 1 for "Metro area of 1 million population or more" to a value of 9 for "Nonmetro with <2,500 urban pop, not adjacent to metro area" (US Census 2005). With the exception of the loss of statistical significance for a single coefficient in the second model of Table 5.6, all coefficients retained their original level of statistical significance and direction, and the strength of the coefficient values were largely unaffected.

[64] The initial question asked was:

"In the weeks just prior to the November 2006 elections, were there any efforts to 'Get Out the Vote' by any political party, candidate, or other organized group in your county (where the office of your newspaper is located)?

by each type of organization. As noted previously, 36 out of 50 respondents reported voter mobilization activity in their counties. In order to protect the confidentiality of respondents' identity, responses are aggregated by category.[65] As shown, the most frequently reported mobilizers were the candidates themselves (reported in 25 counties), followed by one or both of the state or local party organizations (with 21 Republican Party reports and 18 Democratic Party reports), with interest group activity being reported in 19 counties. Although it is not shown in Figure 5.2, among counties reporting party GOTV, 5 counties reported only Republican activity and two reported only Democratic (12 counties reported both parties mobilizing and 2 did not specify which party was active).

[Insert Table 5.2 about here]

Additionally, Tables 5.1-3 show the response rates for each question in the survey. While the response rate for each of the four primary GOTV questions (indicating whether there was any GOTV activity, party activity, candidate activity, and interest group activity) is high, fewer respondents answered most of the follow-up questions for each organization type. Since several of these questions were relevant only when a previous question was answered affirmatively, this was to be expected. Table 5.2 reveals the levels of general voter mobilization for each of the 36 out of 50 counties that reported some activity. Of the counties in the sample, it appears as though the overall activity was light, as well as fairly unchanged in intensity from 2004 to 2006. The most commonly cited type of race receiving voter mobilization attention was

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This includes any voter registration activity, voter mobilization, door-to-door voter contacting, advertising/awareness campaigns, distribution of information/voter guides, phone calls, etc."

For each type of organization, a separate question was asked for that group type (followed by a series of questions related to specific activities).

[65] Because many of the counties in Georgia have only one functioning newspaper, any descriptions of specific county reports might reveal the personal identity of the respondent.

at the county level (20 out of 79 cited races). Follow-up questions asking for the names of these elections revealed that a majority of these county level races were for county commission seats (11 counties reported commission activity), but there were also reports of mobilization for school boards elections, a sheriff's race, and a countywide referendum. The most commonly reported US House seats receiving voter mobilization activity were the 8th and 12th Districts. This is not surprising, due to the highly contested status of these races in 2006. Among statewide races, there were reports of mobilization for the gubernatorial, lieutenant governor's, and statewide judicial races. Among town/municipal-wide races, there were several counties that reported mobilization for mayoral and city council races (three each).

[Insert Table 5.3 about here]

Among the different types of organizations conducting voter mobilization in the Georgia counties in this sample, political parties and candidates were the most commonly cited. Among the parties, the Republican state and local committees were reported to be the most active (respondents indicated that Republican organizations were more active than the Democrats in 14 out of 25 counties reporting party activity).[66] Among candidate campaigns, mobilization patterns for specific races were similar to those in Table 5.2, with countywide candidates being cited most frequently. Among other organized groups, civic and community organizations were reported to be the most active, followed by churches and religious groups. Among these other groups, the most commonly identified organization was the NAACP, which was noted by

[66] It should be noted that respondents were asked to identify activity by "either the local or statewide Democratic or Republican party organizations," but there was no corresponding question about the DNC, RNC, or other various national committees. This was done in order to prevent respondent confusion between party organizations and other groups that might be affiliated with the parties (such as unions or business groups). Because referring to "any" party organization might have led respondents to identify lesser known non-party organization as parties, this questioned specifically referenced more local organizations (with which the respondents might be more familiar).

respondents in 6 of the 19 counties with reported interest group activity. Among religious groups, most of these were identified as churches (and there was one notation of activity by the Minister's Alliance, a non-congregational religious organization). Among groups that have noted partisan afiliations, the most frequently mention organization type was that of labor unions (Democratic) followed by the Chamber of Commerce (typically Republican). However, since a large majority of these groups were only reported in a single county, there are few generalizations about interest group types that can be confidently made from this small sample.

[Insert Table 5.4 about here]

Table 5.5 shows the specific methods of reported voter mobilization (and other campaign activity) in each of the responding counties. Among the reported activities, it appears that the use of newspaper ads and phone calls were the most commonly observed methods of voter communication, while sending emails tended to be the least frequently observed activity. Among organization types, there were generally more reported activities conducted by candidates than either parties or interest groups. Overall, it appears that within these 50 counties, most of the voter mobilization in 2006 was performed by the candidates themselves, followed by the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, and other organized (interest) groups. Among activity types, it also appears that the candidates were conducting most of the communication methods that are primarily designed to persuade voters of a particular message, such as most advertising, literature distribution and leafleting, and phone calls. This is notable, because these forms of communication are generally the easiest to control. Since each candidate would be expected to be primarily concerned with his or her own race, he or she would want to have more *control over the content of the message* that is being communicated to voters. Conversely, the

two parties (together) appeared to have been conducting more of the purely "mobilization" activities: driving voters to the polls and voter registration. Since these activities are designed primarily to ensure turnout, rather than to communicate a particular message, it is not surprising that the party organizations were observed to have been focusing heavily on registration and election-day transportation. Although candidates were observed to be conducting these activities as well, this is likely a reflection on the parties' interest in ensuring that as many partisans turn out as possible.

[Insert Table 5.5 about here]

The Dependent Variable

As mentioned, the dependent variable for this research is voter mobilization, by both aggregate level, method, and the organization(s) conducting it. Since the majority of questions in the survey dealt with the presence, level, and type of voter mobilization in the counties, there were several different measurements used in the analysis.[67] Aggregate mobilization in the county was measured as a single dummy variable (coded as 1 if GOTV was reported, 0 if not), a 5-point scale of the level of activity (none reported, "not active," "slightly active," "active," "very active"), and a 5-point measure of the approximate number of voters contacted (less than 500, 500-1000, 1000-2000, 2000-5000, more than 5000). There was also a measure of the number of contacts adjusted for the population of the county, calculated as a percentage (dividing the mean number of each of the five ranges of voters contacted by the total number of

[67] See Table 5.2 for question wording and rates of response.

residents in the county that were over the age of 18 as of July 2005).[68] In addition, there was a 6-point measure of the change in the level of voter mobilization in the county from the 2004 to 2006 Elections (no GOTV, "a lot less," "slightly less," the same," "slightly more," and "a lot more" in 2006).[69] Effects on the binary (dummy) variable were tested using a binary logit model; effects on each of the other measures were tested using ordered logit (due to their ordinal measurement). The results appear in Part 1 of the analysis.

Mobilization by either party, the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, candidates, and other organized (interest) groups are each measured by a dummy variable (1,0), in Parts 2 and 3 of the analysis. The value for each dummy variable of GOTV by each organizational type was coded as 1 if that entity was reported to have mobilized in the county, 0 if not. Effects on each of these measures were tested separately, using logit. In addition, an additive measure of the number of other organized (interest) groups reported to be mobilizing in the county was also used in Part 2 of the analysis. The values ranged from 0 to 6, and effects on the measure were tested using ordered logit. Finally, there were several different combinations of measures that were tested (but not reported in this chapter), none of which yielded substantively interesting or statistically significant results.

The Main Independent Variable and Other Controls

The other variables for this analysis consisted of four demographic, institutional, and competiveness measures in all sections of the analysis, as well as separate dummy variable

[68] For example, "less than 500" was coded as 250/population, "500-1000" was coded as 750/population, etc. (the final category was coded as 10000/population, despite no indications of the maximum number of voters contacted). Although this was a rough measure of the total percentage of voters who were contacted, it was included in the analysis in order to account for population differences among the counties. Population data was obtained from the US Census.

[69] The inclusion of a category of "no GOTV" (coded as 0) in this measure was done in order to prevent a sizable drop in the number of cases when analyzing that measure (a drop from 50 to 36). Since excluding those cases would not allow for enough degrees of freedom for the analysis, a 6-point (rather than a 5-point) measure was used. However, an additional analysis was performed without this category (reducing the number of cases to 36), with similar results to those displayed in Table 5.6.

measures for voter mobilization by organizational type (which were employed in the third section of the analysis). While the competitiveness measures were included as main independent variables (directly related to one or more hypotheses), the other measures were included as simple controls, due to their assumed influence on the dependent variables. They were not directly related to any of the hypotheses. Because of the strong relationship between past turnout and voter mobilization (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), a percentage measure of "Countywide Turnout in 2004 (% of Registered Voters)" was included as a control on 2006 mobilization in all models. It was expected to have a positive effect on all measures of voter mobilization. Several institutional controls were also included. First, a measure of the "Registration Rate" in the county was included in all models. This was a measure of the percentage of the voting age population in the county that was registered to vote in July 2006, at the end of the party primary season.[70] Because voter registration is a requirement to voting, and higher rates of registration should be an indicator of higher possible turnout. Therefore it was expected that this variable would have a positive effect on mobilization.

The second institutional variable was a measure of the "Number of Competitive Races in the County." This was the main independent variable for this analysis, and it was an additive measure of competitive races on the ballot in each county in 2006. A race was considered to be competitive if the eventual margin of victory for the winning candidate was less than 10% (or between 45 and 55% of the countywide vote). As Hypothesis 2 suggests, political parties can achieve a greater electoral impact when they can influence multiple races. Yet, candidates

[70] This was the rate of registration before the start of the general election cycle (measured at the time of the party primaries, in July 2006). If voter registration at the time of the November 2006 election was used, such a measurement of countywide registration would also capture some of the Get Out the Vote activity that was employed to achieve it, or activity that was intended to raise the level of voter registration in the county just before the election (meaning that countywide voter registration activity might be measured in both the dependent and independent variables).

running for office in a single race do not have this concern. Therefore, this measure was expected to have a statistically significant and positive effect on voter mobilization by political parties, but it was expected to have no effect on that of candidates.

Additionally, race competitiveness was separated into three levels, in order to test the hypothesis that interest groups focus their efforts on higher tier races (Hypothesis 2E-F). This created three additional main independent variables, in order to specifically address several of the hypotheses. The first was "Number of Competitive Local Races in the County," which is the total number of sub-congressional races that were competitive in 2006 in each county, using a 10% eventual vote margin.[71] The second measure of competitiveness by race level, "Number of Competitive US House Races in the County," was based on the competitiveness of the US House election(s) on the ballot in each county. This was based on congressional Quarterly ratings for competitive House races for the 2006 election cycle. In Georgia, there were two congressional races in 2006 that were considered competitive, and 12 of the 50 counties in the sample were in these districts. Since none of the counties fell within more than one competitive district, it measured as a dichotomous (1,0) variable. This meant that values for the 12 counties in the sample that voted in the 8th House District (Marshall vs. Collins) and the 12th House District (Burns vs. Barrow) were coded as 1, all other counties received a 0 for this measure. This measure was expected to have a statistically significant and positive effect on voter mobilization by interest groups. Third, a measure of the "Number of Competitive Statewide Races in the County" was an additive measure (ranging from 0 to 9 possible values) of statewide races that had eventual competitive vote margins in a county (but not necessarily competitive at the state

[71] Additional race-specific measures for various levels within this group were not included, due to the small sample size.

level). This measure was also expected to have a statistically significant and positive effect on voter mobilization by interest groups.

Finally, there was an additional measure included to capture general party competitiveness in the county. A dichotomous average past party vote measure based on multiple offices (such as the "Party Competitive County" measure used in Chapter 3) was not employed, because it yielded only 4 positive values among the 50 cases. Instead, party competitiveness is measured as the "Vote Margin in the 2004 Presidential Election," which is the difference between the countywide vote totals received by the Democratic and Republican candidates in the 2004 Presidential Election. This was a measure of party competiveness that did not capture race specific factors in 2006, yet was intended to represent the partisan balance of the counties. Since this measure relates directly to Hypothesis 1, it was included as a main independent variable in this analysis. Because the eligible voting populations between the counties vary considerably, this was measured as the difference in the number of votes received by each county, rather than as a percentage measure.[72]

Analysis, Part 1

The first section of the analysis examines the effect of the independent variables on five different measures of general voter mobilization in the counties. The results of the initial analysis are shown in Table 5.6. While a coefficient for the constant was reported for the binary logit model, coefficients for each cut-point were reported in the ordinal models, marking the transition from each value to the next on the ordinal scale (Borooah 2002). In each model, .1

[72] Using the raw vote totals, rather than a percentage measure, can be a better indicator of the countywide party competitiveness that might be considered by those mobilizing for an election. Since mobilizers are attempting to garner enough votes to win, the total number of *votes* needed to reach 50%+1 would indicate how far they would be from ensuring victory. Therefore, this allows for comparison across counties with wide variations in population. For example, in 2004 there were 2,266 total votes cast for president in Clinch County and 336,407 votes cast in Fulton County. If one considered a margin of 5% in each county, it would equate to roughly 116 votes in Clinch but over 16,820 in Fulton (a difference of 16,707 votes to be gained in order to win a "close" election)!

levels of statistical significance are reported for informational purposes, although the standard for true significance was expected to be at the .05 level or better. As predicted, the coefficients for the two measures of electoral competitiveness (those of past vote margin and the number of competitive races on the county ballot) each achieved statistical significance and were in the correct direction in two of the models. The coefficient for "Vote Margin in the 2004 Presidential Election" achieved statistical significance at the .05 level and was positive in the third model. However, while the coefficient for "Number of Competitive Races in the County" achieved statistical significance at the .1 level in the second model, it failed to achieve significance at the .05 level. And, for three of the five models, neither measure appears to have a statistically significant effect on voter mobilization. Therefore, while there is some support for Hypothesis 1, it is mixed. Coefficients for the other controls ("Countywide Turnout in 2004" and "Registration Rate") did not achieve statistical significance in any of the models.[73] Finally, the ordered logit models were also rerun using OLS, with similar results.[74]

[Insert Table 5.6 about here]

A supplemental analysis in Part 1 examined the effects of each of the controls on a series of dichotomous measures of 10 different mobilization methods.[75] While no new hypotheses were tested here, it allowed for an additional examination of the theory that was addressed in the

[73] In fact, a series of Wald tests indicated that these measures have no statistically significant effect on the dependent variable in almost every model (either together or separately). Since excluding them from the base model had very little effect on the other coefficients, they were left in the subsequent models due to their substantive importance. Additionally, a series of omnibus (Pearson) tests for goodness-of-fit indicated that each of the four models was appropriately fitted to the data.

[74] A series of variance inflation tests for each of these OLS models did not indicate that there were substantial problems with multicollinearity, nor did Cook-Weisberg tests indicate problems of heteroskedasticity.

[75] Models of the measures of reported carpooling of voters or emailing were not tested, due to the small number of counties reporting these activities (a total of 9).

previous chapter (albeit with different data and a different level of analysis), and it was included in order examine any expected or unexpected relationships between the independent and dependent variables. In addition to the base model, dichotomous measures of the geographic characteristics of the counties were included (to test for effects similar to those of Chapter 4). Each measure reflected Census "2003 ERS Rural-Urban Continuum Code" classifications of counties, based on their levels of urban development, residency and business patterns. A dummy variable for "Metro County" was coded as 1 if the county was classified as being in a metropolitan area, 0 if not. The second measure, a dummy variable for "Rural County," was coded as 1 if the county was classified as being in a nonmetropolitan area (not adjacent to a metro area) or "completely rural" with fewer than 2,500 urban residents, 0 if not. It was expected that rural counties would have a positive relationship to the presence of broadcast methods of voter communication, while metro counties would be positively related to targeted forms of communication (similar to the effects tested in Chapter 4).[76] The results of the logit analyses appeared in Table A5 in the appendix.

Analysis, Part 2

Part 2 includes the main analysis for this chapter, which is an examination of voter mobilization by different types of organizations. First, five separate logit models were run, examining the effects of the independent variables on dichotomous measures of reported voter mobilization in the county by either party, the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, candidate

[76] A measure of "population density" was not included in this model, because of the widely varying populations in the 50 counties, as well as the clustering of urban populations within some counties (population density is rarely uniform throughout the county or between the multiple districts within it). Since many Georgia counties contain multiple districts with varying degrees of population density, a simple measure of density for the county would unnecessarily aggregate the characteristics of dissimilar districts within it, effectively negating the effect of density on campaign strategy that was the focus of Chapter 4. However, an additional model with a population density measure (in place of the rural county variable) was also tested. The coefficient for density failed to reach statistical significance in any of the models, which was to be expected.

campaigns, and other organized (interest) groups. The results of this analysis (using two-tailed tests) are displayed in Table 5.7.

[Insert Table 5.7 about here]

Coefficients pertaining to Hypotheses 2A-E are highlighted in bold. As Table 5.7 shows, the coefficients for the first two control variables did not achieve statistical significance in any model. Yet, when the coefficients for the "Total Number of Local Races on the County Ballot" measure are examined, there appears to be some support for Hypotheses 2A, 2B, and 2C. Although the coefficients for the basic party model and the Republican Party model did not achieve statistical significance, the coefficient for the measure of Democratic Party is statistically significant at the .05 level and is in the predicted (positive) direction. This suggests that, at least for the Democratic Party, an increase in the number of races in a county leads to an increase in the probability that there will be party-based voter mobilization (lending support to Hypothesis 2A). In addition, the lack of significance for the coefficient of this variable in the model of mobilization by candidates lends support to Hypothesis 2B, suggesting that the number of races in a county does not have a statistically significant effect on the voter mobilization efforts of candidate campaigns. Although there might still be an influence of multi-race competitiveness on voter mobilization by candidates, we cannot be confident of the exact nature of the relationship.[77]

Third, the coefficient for "Number of Competitive Races in the County" was also statistically significant at the .05 level and in the predicted positive direction for the model of

[77] Perhaps the competitiveness of individual races was driving the level of GOTV for each candidate, for his or her respective contest. If this was true, it would be supportive of the hypothesized differences between candidate and party (or interest group) GOTV. However, because there was insufficient data on individual campaigns reported in the survey, this could not be tested.

mobilization by interest groups, which lends support to Hypothesis 2C. This suggests that interest groups, like parties, may focus their voter mobilization efforts in places where they can influence multiple contests. However, the number of competitive races did not appear to have a statistically significant effect on the dependent variables in the 1st and 3rd models. Additionally, since the coefficient for "Vote Margin in the 2004 Presidential Election" did not achieve statistical significance in any of the other models, the findings suggest that Hypothesis 1 was not supported by this analysis.

While the findings suggest that the number of races on the ballot can influence Democratic Party mobilization, there is a possibility that it is merely a spurious correlation. Perhaps it is not the number of races that leads to mobilization by the Democrats, but it might be that there is another factor associated with multi-race ballots that is causing the effect on Democratic mobilization, in particular. Of the 50 counties in question, there are few recognizable demographic or geographic patterns among the 43 counties with fewer than 16 local races on the ballot. However, the remaining 7 counties (with 18 or more races on the ballot) were all counties in major metropolitan areas, where Democrats often have an electoral advantage.[78] Therefore, it is possible that it is not the number of races (per se) that is influencing Democratic mobilization, but the urbanicity of the county. For this reason, an additional model of Democratic mobilization was run with the inclusion of a dichotomous "Metro County" variable. The measure reflected Census "2003 ERS Rural-Urban Continuum Code" classifications of counties, based on their levels of urban development, residency and business patterns. A dummy variable for "Metro County" was coded as 1 if the county was classified as being in a metropolitan area, 0 if not. While the added variable proved to have a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable, the coefficient for the "Number of Competitive

[78] In Fulton County, there were 66 races in addition to the congressional or statewide contests.

Races in the County" was generally unaffected (as were the other coefficients in the model). This suggests that the findings were not spurious.

[Insert Table 5.8 about here]

In addition to the model using a simple measure of total race competitiveness, several models of interest group mobilization were tested, using separate measures of local, congressional, and statewide race competitiveness. This was done in order to test Hypotheses 2D and E, using a series of logit and ordered logit models of several measures of interest group voter mobilization. The results of this analysis (using two-tailed tests) are displayed in Table 5.8. The first model is the same as the one from Table 5.7, and is displayed in Table 5.8 for comparison purposes. The second model is similar to that of the first, yet the measures of race competitiveness by level are substituted in place of the earlier measure of "Number of Competitive Races in the County." In this model, the coefficient for "Number of Competitive Statewide Races in the County" is positive and statistically significant at the .05 level, lending support to Hypothesis 2D. This suggests that as the number of competitive statewide races in a county increases, interest groups have a higher probability of mobilizing there. However, the coefficient for the "Number of Competitive US House Races in the County" did not achieve statistical significance. In the third model, ordered logit was employed to determine the effects of the variables on the number of different interest groups that were reported to be mobilizing in the county in 2006. Once again, the coefficient for statewide races is positive and statistically significant (at the .01 level), lending support to Hypothesis 2D. However, once again the coefficient for congressional races did not achieve significance. Therefore, it can be confidently stated that Hypothesis 2E was not supported in the analysis.

In both models, the coefficient for the measure of local race competitiveness did not achieve statistical significance. While it was not directly hypothesized that it would not, taken as a whole this analysis suggests that the effect of multiple race competiveness in a county on interest group mobilization is driven by races at the top of the ticket, rather than those at the bottom. In summary, it appears that as the number of competitive statewide races in a county increases, the probability and level of interest group voter mobilization also increases. This would suggest that, as policy maximizers, interest groups focus much of their activity in areas where they can influence those offices with the most control over policy.

Analysis, Part 3

Part 3 of the analysis examines the effect of mobilization by different organizations on each other, employing the five dummy variables (from Part 2) for reports of mobilization by either party, the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, candidate campaigns, and the other organized (interest) groups. For each of the separate models of GOTV by organizations, additional measures of GOTV by the other organizations were included, in order to test Hypotheses 3 and 4. The basic expectation was that mobilization by some organizations would affect mobilization by other groups. While it was expected that the inclusion of the GOTV measures would influence voter mobilization in several models, there were some potential problems that needed to be addressed. It was generally expected that voter mobilization as an independent variable would influence voter mobilization as a dependent variable (albeit, by different organizations). However, since several of the controls in the base model had previously been shown to be statistically correlated with measures of voter mobilization, the inclusion of the

GOTV measures as independent variables created substantial multicollinearity with the other controls. But, this was to be expected, having observed the previous relationships.[79]

In order to address this problem, multiple versions of each of the five models of different organizational mobilization were run, including and excluding various combinations of the GOTV controls. In total, 21 separate logit models were run. For each of the five dichotomous dependent variables (Party GOTV, Democratic GOTV, Republican GOTV, Candidate GOTV, and Interest Group GOTV), each of the organizational measures was added, one by one, separately and together. Evidence of support for Hypotheses 3 and 4 would be found if there were consistent patterns of support across models.

[Insert Table 5.9 about here]

The results of this analysis (using two-tailed tests) are displayed in Table 5.9. Among the models of party GOTV, the coefficient for "Number of Competitive Races in the County" was statistically significant at the .05 level in three of the 11 models, which generally supports Hypothesis 2A. And the coefficient was positive and significant in three of the five models of interest group GOTV, supporting Hypothesis 2C. However, the effect on Democratic GOTV only appears to have been significant in one model, and the coefficient for Republican Party GOTV was in the wrong direction in each model. However, since there was a substantial amount of multicollinearity among the measures of GOTV and the electoral competitiveness measures, the loss or gain of statistical significance was to be expected. However, the measure

[79] It should be noted that while this analysis included forms of voter mobilization on each side of the equation, each variable was measured entirely separately from each of the others, as activity by *different* political entities. In short, the same variable was never included as both an independent and dependent variable in the same equation. Therefore, there should be few problems with the specification of the models, resulting from the inclusion of GOTV controls.

in the candidate GOTV models was consistently non-significant statistically, despite the dummy interactions, lending additional support to Hypothesis 2B.

While the support for Hypotheses 2A-C was mixed, the support for the third hypothesis was fairly strong. As Table 5.9 shows, the coefficients for both measures of Democratic and Republican GOTV were positive and statistically significant in each of their respective models (without fail). Additionally, the size of the coefficients for these relationships was the largest of any in Part 3 of the analysis. This lends considerable support to Hypothesis 3, and suggests that the presence of GOTV by one party will increase the probability that the other party will also mobilize voters. While these results are generally positive, there might be an interactive effect among the dummy variables for party, candidate, on interest group GOTV on the dependent variables in both models. While Wald tests indicated that each of these variables had an independent effect on the dependent variable, both separately and together, the coefficients were also moderately intercorrelated with one another. When the party measures were removed from the models of Democratic and Republican GOTV, the coefficient for the interest group measure achieved statistical significance in both models. This suggests that the coefficients for both parties might have been influenced by the inclusion of the interest group dummy in the "Dem Party GOTV 4" and "Repub Party GOTV4" models. However, since the statistical relationship held in both "GOTV3" models, Hypothesis 3 was still strongly supported.

Finally, this analysis reveals several patterns of influence between the activity of various political organizations. In eight of the 10 models where interest group GOTV and some form of party GOTV were included (as either dependent or independent variables), there was a positive and statistically significant relationship. This pattern held for the effect of interest group GOTV on party GOTV in all but two models (the two exceptions were models where a party measure

was also included), and in every model of party GOTV influences on interest groups. This indicates that the voter mobilization activity of parties and interest groups are related. However, in each of the relationships, the coefficient was positive. Therefore, while there is a consistent statistical relationship, it does not indicate that these organizations coordinated their activity. Since the relationship was not negative, there was *no* support for Hypothesis 4 in any of the models.

Additionally, there were several statistical relationships between the activity of candidates and interest groups, as well as between parties and candidates. In each of the models of interest group influence on candidate activity, as well as those of candidates on interest groups, there was a positive and statistically significant relationship when no other controls were added. However, when measures for party activity were included, the relationship failed to achieve significance. Also, there appeared to be a very consistent pattern of positive and statistically significant relationships between candidate activity and Republican Party activity (in the Repub Party GOTV1, Repub Party GOTV4, and Candidate GOTV2 models). However, none of these were negative; therefore they also did *not* support Hypothesis 4. Furthermore, there were no indications of a relationship between candidates and activity by the Democratic Party in any combination of the two (in the Dem Party GOTV1, Dem Party GOTV4, and Candidate GOTV3 models). In fact, there never appeared to be a relationship between candidate activity and activity by the Democrats. While these two patterns suggest an overall pattern between candidate voter mobilization activity and the activity of the two parties, it is not clear what the exact nature of that relationship might be.[80]

[80] Apart from the expected multicollinearity between the GOTV dummy variables and controls for "Number of Competitive Races in the County," there were few substantial problems with any of the models. A series of Wald tests indicated that the individual effects of each control on the dependent variable were largely unaffected in the

Conclusions

In conclusion, the analysis presented here is fairly supportive of the hypotheses posed. Overall, the findings support the assertion that while parties, candidates, and interest groups have a common desire to influence elections, they do not always focus on the same ones. In particular, the results suggest that parties mobilize in areas where there are multiple competitive contests, while candidates do not. Interest groups, like parties, mobilize where there are multiple contests, but they might be primarily concerned with the larger (statewide) races on the ballot. While the suggestion that these entities coordinate their activities with one another was not supported by this research, the suggestion that competitive parties react to each other's actions had some support.

While there were several encouraging findings, limitations with the data prevented a more thorough examination of these phenomena. Although the survey data provided a unique data source for examining voter mobilization in an electoral environment, there are limits to the generalizability of a study of 50 counties in a single state. Due to survey constraints, there were also limits to the breadth and depth of the questions that could be asked. In order to ensure an adequate response rate, some questions simply could not be added to the survey. Future research might be able to provide additional data, more counties to observe, as well as additional insight into the exact nature of voter mobilization by these groups.

In order to best understand how these different types of actors consider multiple contests and how they interact, it is necessary to examine their combined activities holistically, within a single environment. This is because, in the modern political arena, none of these organizations is ever purely independent from the other. The actions of one type of organization has the potential

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first model of each dependent variable type. Also, a series of omnibus (Pearson) tests for goodness-of-fit indicated that each of the 21 models was appropriately fitted to the data.

to influence the resources, and thereby the effectiveness, of the other organizations operating in a single electoral environment. Furthermore, as the rise of the 527s in the 2004 election has shown, multiple organizations that attempt to mobilize the same voters (while ignoring others) might be potentially wasting their resources. Without considering the actions of one's allies and enemies, political actors attempting to win elections may ultimately fail.

For researchers, examining the strategies and activities of each type of organization separately can effectively ignore the reality of the modern voter mobilization environment. The interaction of multiple entities in a single campaign environment, either competitively or in coordination, is an important part of 21st Century voter mobilization. Therefore, it is important to study these groups together. Although the analysis presented here did not provide sufficient evidence of GOTV coordination, this is a subject that promises to provide scholars with ample opportunities for future research.

As this research has shown, there are many strategic differences among those who seek to mobilize voters. While all mobilizers seek to increase turnout of their supporters, they do not always go about it in a similar fashion. As the analysis has suggested parties, candidates, and interest groups have different motivations for mobilizing voters. While candidates and their campaigns do not appear to be concerned with contests apart from their own, parties and interest groups tend to mobilize in areas where there are multiple competitive contests. Parties, as "electoral maximizers," are always seeking to increase their electoral payoff. Therefore, parties will seek to increase their GOTV activities when they can influence multiple contests. Furthermore, interest groups in particular tend appear in places where the potential electoral payoff may be much greater; both the presence of interest group activity and the number of

groups mobilizing tends to be positively affected by the presence of competitive high-profile races.



Figure 5.1: Survey Responses by Georgia County

Table 5.1
County Sample and Statewide Demographic Statistics

	Percent of resident population: African-American	Percent of resident population: Hispanic	Percent of votes for Bush: 2004 presidential election	Percent of votes for Kerry: 2004 presidential election	Percent of Counties that are Rural	Percent of Counties that are metropolitan (urban)	Per capita personal income (dollars)
Population Average: Statewide (GA)	28.0	4.5	62.9	36.5	25.3	43.7	24592.03
Sample Average: 50 GA Counties	26.4	5.1	64.7	34.8	16.0	54.0	26518.48
(Population value) – (sample value)	1.6	-0.6	-1.8	1.7	9.3	-10.3	-1926.45
% difference (population and sample)	*0.057143*	***0.133333***	*0.028617*	*0.046575*	***0.367589***	***0.235698***	*0.078336*

NOTE: Statistics with at least a 10% difference in the values of the population and sample are highlighted in **bold**



Figure 5.2: Number of Counties Reporting GOTV Activity (by Organization Type)

Table 5.2
Survey Responses: General GOTV

Question/Response Choice	Number of Responses
In the weeks just prior to the November 2006 elections, were there any efforts to "Get Out the Vote" by any political party, candidate, or other organized group in your county (where the office of your newspaper is located)? This includes any voter registration activity, voter mobilization, door-to-door voter contacting, advertising/ awareness campaigns, distribution of information/voter guides, phone calls, etc.	
YES	36
1) *If "yes," how would you rate the level of "Get Out the Vote" activity in your county in 2006?*	
level - very active	4
level - active	11
level - slightly active	20
level - not active	4
2) *For which of the following races/elections was there any noticeable "Get Out the Vote" activity?*	
town/municipal-wide	10
county-wide	20
state house race	13
state senate race	9
US House (Congress)	13
state-wide (GA) race	10
other race(s)	4
3) How would you compare the level of "Get Out the Vote" activity in your county in 2006 to that in 2004?	
level - a lot more in 2006	2
level - slightly more in 2006	9
level - the same in 2006	15
level - slightly less in 2006	8
level - a lot less in 2006	2
3) If you were to make an estimate, based on your observations, approximately how many voters do you believe were personally contacted to vote in your county by all parties/candidates/organizations in 2006?	
level - less than 500	7
level - 500-1000	4
level - 1000-2000	7
level - 2000-5000	7
level - more than 5000	8

Table 5.3
Survey Responses: GOTV by Parties, Candidates, Other Groups

Political Parties

Did you observe one or both of the political party organizations attempting to "Get Out the Vote" in your county? This includes either the local or statewide Democratic or Republican party organizations, but not the organizations of individual candidates for office or other outside groups.

	YES	25
	Dem	Repub
In your opinion, which of the political party organizations is the strongest in your county?	12	18
Which of the political parties do you feel had the biggest "Get Out the Vote" effort in your county in the weeks just prior to the November 2006 elections?	8	14

Candidates

Did you observe any of the candidates or members their individual campaigns attempting to "Get Out the Vote" in your county? This includes candidates running for any local and county-wide offices, state legislative races, US House, or any other state-wide race (but not the local or statewide Democratic or Republican party organizations or other outside groups).

YES 25

a) *Which of the following races/elections was there any noticeable "Get Out the Vote" activity by any of the candidates or members their individual campaigns?*

town/municipal-wide	10
county-wide	18
state house race	9
state senate race	7
US House (Congress)	8
state-wide (GA) race	5
other race(s)	2

Interest Groups

Finally, did you observe any other organized group attempting to "Get Out the Vote" in your county? This includes political interest groups, business groups, charities, religious congregations, or any other outside organization (but not the local or statewide Democratic or Republican party organizations or the organizations of individual candidates for office).

YES 19

a) *Which types of organized groups were active in your county?*

labor union	4
church/religious organization	9
civic/community organization	13
environmental/ conservation group	3
trade/business group	5
other	3

Table 5.4
Survey Responses: Names of Organized/Interest Groups Reported to be Mobilizing

Organization Name	Number of Counties Reported
Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity	1
American Federation of Government Employees	1
Central Labor Council	1
Chamber of Commerce	3
Committee to Keep Sole Commissioner	1
GAE Machinists	1
Georgia Coalition for the People's Agenda	1
League of Women Voters	1
Ministers Alliance	1
Mothers Against Crime	1
NAACP	**6**
"No Condos on Ogeechee"	1
North Georgia Progressives	1
The Unity Group	1
Young Democrats*	1
Other mentioned groups	
"several churches"	
"majority of black churches in the county"	
"religious organizations"	
"several churches"	

*the Young Democrats were noted by a respondent as an "other organized group." Since this organization can be considered to be either a party or a non-party group, their mention is noted here.

Table 5.5
Survey Responses: GOTV by Method

Question/Response Choice	Number of Respondents				
Which of the following activities did you observe being performed in your county?	By Democratic party	by Republican party	by Candidates	by Other Organized /Interest Groups	*by county*
door to door contacting	6	5	**23**	5	24
phone calls	12	*16*	**20**	*11*	29
leaflets/"door hangers" left at homes	9	11	**16**	5	22
info. or voter guides distributed	4	7	**9**	6	13
driving voters to the polls	**9**	3	8	6	9
registering voters	**9**	**9**	8	4	18
emails to voters	4	**9**	8	4	9
items mailed to voters	9	***16***	15	4	22
rallies/events	9	13	**17**	9	24
TV ads	7	**8**	7	4	10
radio ads	6	9	**13**	4	15
newspaper ads	*13*	*16*	***25***	8	31

NOTE: the largest number of observations for each GOTV method is highlighted in **bold**
NOTE: the largest number of observed activities for each type of organization is highlighted in *italics*

Table 5.6
Determinants of GOTV Activity in 50 Georgia Counties (2006 General Election)

Different Models of Voter Mobilization Activity	(Logit)	(Ordered Logit: 1)	(Ordered Logit: 2)	(Ordered Logit: 3)	(OLS)
(Measures of Voter Mobilization Activity in the County)	Reported GOTV (1,0)	Level of GOTV (0-4)	Number of Individual Contacts (category: 0-5)	Change in Level of GOTV: 2004 to 2006 (0-5)	Number of Contacts /County Population (%)
Countywide Turnout in 2004 (% of Regis. Voters)	7.393 (8.282)	1.128 (6.784)	-0.652 (6.514)	1.637 (6.231)	-0.581 (0.642)
Registration Rate (% of VAP)	-2.445 (5.178)	4.181 (4.003)	-1.555 (3.716)	2.874 (3.710)	0.424 (0.389)
Vote Margin in the 2004 Presidential Election (1K)	0.0131 (0.0247)	0.0126 (0.0126)	**0.0348**** (0.0156)	0.0172 (0.0133)	-0.000760 (0.00118)
Number of Competitive Races in the County	0.218 (0.256)	**0.295*** (0.177)	0.145 (0.190)	0.168 (0.168)	-0.0140 (0.0175)
Cut 1	--	2.709 (4.762)	-1.662 (4.465)	2.534 (4.474)	--
Cut 2	--	3.148 (4.771)	-1.04 (4.463)	2.732 (4.477)	--
Cut 3	--	5.009 (4.805)	-0.691 (4.458)	3.421 (4.49)	--
Cut 4	--	6.786 (4.828)	-0.00284 (4.455)	4.847 (4.519)	--
Cut 5	--	--	1.001 (4.457)	6.932 (4.544)	--
Constant	-3.460 (5.964)	--	--	--	0.290 (0.458)
Observations	50	50	50	50	50
R-squared Pseudo R-squared	-- 0.0625	-- 0.0449	-- 0.0544	-- 0.0320	0.083 --

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 5.7

Determinants of Fall 2006 GOTV Activity in 50 Georgia Counties: *by Organization Type*

Reported Get Out the Vote Activity in Fall 2006, by Organization Type (1,0)	Party GOTV	Dem Party GOTV	Repub Party GOTV	Candidate GOTV	Interest Group GOTV
Countywide Turnout in 2004 (% of Regis. Voters)	1.312	-2.386	5.469	-1.063	9.472
	(7.833)	(8.008)	(7.619)	(7.334)	(8.858)
Registration Rate (% of VAP)	-2.946	-0.918	-1.810	2.589	-4.547
	(4.568)	(4.673)	(4.502)	(4.581)	(5.135)
Vote Margin in the 2004 Presidential Election (1K)	0.0275	0.00698	0.00481	-0.00890	-0.0380
	(0.0224)	(0.0144)	(0.0135)	(0.0141)	(0.0226)
Number of Competitive Races in the County	**0.179**	**0.443***	**6.23e-05**	**0.398**	**0.537***
	(0.214)	(0.224)	(0.199)	(0.226)	(0.238)
Constant	0.370	1.103	-3.383	-1.270	-5.109
	(5.471)	(5.653)	(5.353)	(5.319)	(6.115)
Observations	50	50	50	50	50
Pseudo R-squared	0.0723	0.0825	0.0161	0.0544	0.147

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Standard errors in parentheses

Table 5.8
The Effect of Levels of Race Competitiveness on Interest Group GOTV Activity in 50 Georgia Counties (2006 General Election)

Different Models of Voter Mobilization Activity	(Logit: 1)	(Logit: 2)	(Ordered Logit)
(Measures of Interest Group Voter Mobilization Activity in the County)	Reported Interest Group GOTV (1,0)	Reported Interest Group GOTV (1,0)	Number of Interest Groups Reported (1-6)
Countywide Turnout in 2004 (% of Regis. Voters)	9.472 (8.858)	23.62 (12.31)	8.498 (8.036)
Registration Rate (% of VAP)	-4.547 (5.135)	-15.64* (7.764)	-7.373 (4.691)
Vote Margin in the 2004 Presidential Election (1K)	-0.0380 (0.0226)	-0.0275 (0.0245)	0.0286 (0.0232)
Number of Competitive Local Races in the County	--	-0.298 (0.476)	-0.410 (0.397)
Number of Competitive US House Races in the County	--	-1.339 (0.997)	-0.392 (0.744)
Number of Competitive Statewide Races in the County	--	**3.609*** (1.503)	**1.513**** (0.403)
Number of Competitive Races in the County (total)	**0.537*** (0.238)	--	--
Cut 1	--	--	2.553 (5.456)
Cut 2	--	--	2.659 (5.456)
Cut 3	--	--	4.107 (5.48)
Cut 4	--	--	5.751 (5.543)
Cut 5	--	--	6.198 (5.55)
Cut 6	--	--	7.447 (5.617)
Constant	-5.109 (6.115)	--	--
Observations	50	50	50
Pseudo R-squared	0.147	0.291	0.154

** p<0.01, * p<0.05 Standard errors in parentheses

Table 5.9
Fall 2006 GOTV Activity in 50 Georgia Counties: Interactions of Parties, Candidates, and Interest Groups

GOTV Activity by Org. Type (1,0)	Party GOTV1	Party GOTV2	Party GOTV3	Dem Party GOTV1	Dem Party GOTV2	Dem Party GOTV3	Dem Party GOTV4	Repub Party GOTV1	Repub Party GOTV2	Repub Party GOTV3	Repub Party GOTV4
Cnty. Turnout (2004)	2.958	-7.585	-3.553	-2.621	-7.979	-26.63	-34.17	6.944	2.972	15.40	23.75
	(8.827)	(10.11)	(10.85)	(8.061)	(9.480)	(18.21)	(20.13)	(8.109)	(8.305)	(13.82)	(16.39)
Registration Rate	-5.485	0.0107	-3.950	-1.486	1.189	3.601	6.691	-3.178	-0.259	-2.085	-3.489
	(5.152)	(5.317)	(6.237)	(4.777)	(5.269)	(8.860)	(12.04)	(4.834)	(4.809)	(8.011)	(9.036)
Vote Margin (2004)	0.0414	0.0649	0.0783	0.00898	0.0241	-0.00575	0.00326	0.00970	0.0162	0.00185	0.00664
	(0.0312)	(0.0337)	(0.0469)	(0.0142)	(0.0177)	(0.0248)	(0.0356)	(0.0144)	(0.0146)	(0.0202)	(0.0190)
# Competitive Races	-0.0194	-0.146	-0.338	0.384	0.280	**1.488***	1.646	-0.170	-0.207	**-0.790***	**-1.612***
	(0.250)	(0.290)	(0.338)	(0.236)	(0.254)	(0.668)	(0.846)	(0.219)	(0.225)	(0.401)	(0.672)
GOTV Candidates	**2.231****	--	**2.085***	0.912	--	--	-1.594	**1.779****	--	--	**3.847***
	(0.735)		(0.967)	(0.655)			(1.500)	(0.679)			(1.682)
GOTV Interest Groups	--	**3.431****	**3.151****	--	**2.157****	--	1.937	--	**1.796***	--	0.196
		(0.951)	(0.992)		(0.772)		(1.354)		(0.720)		(1.408)
GOTV Republican Pty	--	--	--	--	--	**6.840****	**7.785****	--	--	--	--
						(2.328)	(2.805)				
GOTV Democratic Pty	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	**5.598****	**7.882****
										(1.662)	(2.794)
GOTV Any Pty	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Constant	-0.222	4.014	2.690	1.219	3.080	11.33	14.22	-4.395	-3.066	-11.60	-19.19
	(6.187)	(6.864)	(7.486)	(5.801)	(6.709)	(12.55)	(12.90)	(5.727)	(5.776)	(8.929)	(12.83)
Observations	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Pseudo R-squared	0.232	0.350	0.430	0.113	0.217	0.614	0.674	0.130	0.118	0.505	0.644

** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 5.9 (continued)
Fall 2006 GOTV Activity in 50 Georgia Counties: Interactions of Parties, Candidates, and Interest Groups

GOTV Activity by Org. Type (1,0)	Candidate GOTV1	Candidate GOTV2	Candidate GOTV3	Candidate GOTV4	Candidate GOTV5	Interest Group GOTV1	Interest Group GOTV2	Interest Group GOTV3	Interest Group GOTV4	Interest Group GOTV5
Cnty. Turnout (2004)	-4.110 (7.786)	-3.148 (7.930)	-0.581 (7.456)	-2.553 (8.178)	-3.130 (8.269)	10.60 (9.294)	7.046 (9.648)	11.55 (9.920)	12.04 (11.89)	12.50 (11.86)
Registration Rate	4.519 (4.982)	4.411 (5.107)	3.081 (4.722)	5.644 (5.365)	5.912 (5.401)	-6.704 (5.686)	-4.368 (5.952)	-4.142 (6.049)	-3.211 (7.564)	-3.112 (7.522)
Vote Margin (2004)	0.000446 (0.0151)	-0.0157 (0.0152)	-0.0113 (0.0146)	-0.0222 (0.0161)	-0.0185 (0.0179)	-0.0400 (0.0227)	-0.0415 (0.0227)	-0.0509 (0.0295)	**-0.0766*** (0.0363)	**-0.0753*** (0.0356)
# Competitive Races	0.279 (0.258)	0.538 (0.279)	0.339 (0.242)	0.475 (0.294)	0.442 (0.304)	0.459 (0.260)	**0.681*** (0.298)	0.457 (0.279)	**0.776*** (0.372)	**0.745*** (0.379)
GOTV Candidates	--	--	--	--	--	**1.599*** (0.720)	--	--	--	0.487 (0.880)
GOTV Interest Groups	**1.569*** (0.706)	--	--	--	0.402 (0.884)	--	--	--	--	--
GOTV Republican Pty	--	**1.882**** (0.708)	--	--	--	--	**1.847*** (0.761)	--	--	--
GOTV Democratic Pty	--	--	0.932 (0.656)	--	--	--	--	**2.136**** (0.778)	--	--
GOTV Any Party	--	--	--	**2.245**** (0.729)	**2.030*** (0.860)	--	--	--	**3.521**** (1.010)	**3.342**** (1.055)
Constant	-0.723 (5.626)	-1.703 (5.909)	-2.168 (5.474)	-3.117 (6.171)	-2.894 (6.202)	-5.305 (6.557)	-4.296 (6.832)	-7.495 (6.971)	-9.746 (9.059)	-10.30 (9.167)
Observations	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Pseudo R-squared	0.132	0.173	0.0843	0.218	0.221	0.228	0.249	0.276	0.436	0.441

** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The Strategy of Voter Mobilization: the Role of Resources, Institutions, and Context

The role of voter mobilization in US elections is an important one. "Getting Out the Vote" can not only help parties, candidates, and interest groups achieve electoral victory, but it has the potential to engage otherwise uninterested citizens in politics and the electoral process. By reaching out to voters, and encouraging them to participate in the political process, political elites help to bridge the gap between citizens and their government. By actively encouraging their political participation, those who mobilize voters have the ability to instill them with a sense of efficacy, importance, civic duty, and citizenship. By encouraging citizens to participate, political elites encourage them to take an active role in their democracy. In short, the active encouragement of voter participation is the encouragement of citizenship, and it reinforces the legitimacy of the electoral process.

Voter mobilization can be incredibly beneficial to democracy, and its role in US elections should be encouraged by those who desire a strong, vital democracy. But, while voter mobilization can be beneficial to democracy, the primary motivations of those who mobilize are not always so altruistic. The political elites who reach out to citizens want them to participate. Yet most mobilizers only want average citizens to get involved if their involvement helps achieve certain political goals. Parties, candidates, and interest groups want citizens to vote…as long as they vote for the preferred candidate. For this reason, those who actively mobilize voters are often very selective in who they mobilize. Political elites mobilize supporters, or those who

will likely vote a certain way. But seldom do political elites attempt to encourage the participation of the opposition, who might make up a large portion of the overall electorate. Those citizens who do not share the political objectives of the mobilizer are often ignored by "Get Out the Vote" campaigns, or their participation may be actively suppressed.

Additionally, political elites who attempt to mobilize supporters often have to make strategic decisions about *which* voters to mobilize, as well as *where* to mobilize them. Because of resource constraints, political elites are rarely able to mobilize every potential supporter at election time. Although it might be beneficial to a party, candidate, or group to mobilize as many supporters as possible, getting out the vote costs money, time, and considerable human resources. Therefore, few mobilizers are able to contact everyone who might vote for their side. Compounded with these resource considerations are certain institutional constraints. In a winner-take-all, single-member district plurality system of elections, elected officials are chosen by majority rule. This means that only a certain number of votes need to be obtained, in order to win most American elections. For this reason, mobilizers often ignore vast numbers of potential supporters whose participation is not necessary to achieve their primary objective (of winning elections). Unless an election is close, or unless that person lives in an area where his vote can influence electoral outcomes, the added effect of an individual citizen's participation might be minimal. Or, due to resource constraints, political elites may see no benefit to mobilizing that citizen.

Because political elites do not wish to mobilize every citizen, their mobilization efforts are often driven by strategic considerations. As this research has shown, the determinants and processes of voter mobilization strategy are determined largely by considerations of resource, institutional, and contextual constraints. These factors influence which voters are contacted, the

methods used to contact them, as well as where the voter mobilization efforts are concentrated. As the preceding chapters have shown, certain factors such as party competitiveness, districting characteristics, and the presence of multiple and overlapping races can influence the mobilization strategy of parties, candidates, and interest groups. As this research has shown, each of these types of political actors considers a variety of resource and institutional or contextual factors when determining and implementing their vote mobilization strategy.

Contributions of this Study

As mentioned in Chapter 1, while past research has shown that voter mobilization can increase turnout, the subject of voter mobilization strategy has been largely unstudied. Researchers and practitioners have known for over a century that voter mobilization increases turnout, and therefore it can influence electoral outcomes. For this reason, a substantial amount of past research has examined voter mobilization's effect on an individual's propensity to vote, on the aggregate level of turnout among certain groups of voters, and on the effectiveness of certain forms of voter contacting for getting a voter to the polls. The consensus is that voter mobilization works, and that some forms of mobilization work better than others.

This is only part of what the study of voter mobilization can tell us about the processes of American elections. While past research has focused heavily on how mobilization affects the voter, little research has been conducted on the *practitioners* themselves. If voter mobilization is, as Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) describe it, "the process by which candidates, parties, activists, and groups induce other people to participate," then focusing primarily on the participation itself effectively ignores the role of the mobilizer. In short, most past research has focused on the byproducts of voter mobilization, but it has largely neglected to address *why* political elites mobilize the way they do. Although there is little doubt that the study of GOTV's

effects on voters is crucial to our understanding of the electoral process, it is really only half of the voter mobilization equation. The study of the effectiveness of mobilization represents the *output* of a political strategy. Yet, the *inputs* of this strategy (or its determinants) can be just as important (if not more so) to our understanding of voter mobilization.

The research presented in this dissertation is an attempt to identify and evaluate these inputs, and to better understand how they affect those who mobilize. By examining the role of strategy in the voter mobilization process, this research explores new ground in the study of campaigns and elections. In the preceding chapters, I have attempted to show that while many political elites desire to increase voter turnout at election time, factors such as *resource* availability, *institutional* considerations, and the electoral *context* can determine *which voters* they target, *how they target* them, as well as how *different objectives* among political elites can influence their overall voter mobilization strategy. The preceding research has examined and attempted to explain changes in voter mobilization strategy over time, the determinants of individual voter contacts, the influences on the communication methods that are chosen, and the ways in which parties, candidates, and interest groups mobilize in a multi-race environment. By analyzing voter mobilization in several forms, I have provided readers with a comprehensive view of how strategy affects tactics. And by examining voter mobilization historically, at the individual level, at the candidate level, and at the aggregate county level, this research provides a multifaceted evaluation of GOTV strategy.

Future Research: The Study of Voter Mobilization Strategy in the 21st Century

Because voter mobilization has the potential to influence electoral outcomes, the study of the determinants and processes of voter mobilization can help researchers to better understand how elections work. In light of the importance of this topic, future research should address all

aspects of voter mobilization, by studying both the inputs and outputs of voter mobilization strategy. Recent research on the effectiveness of voter mobilization on turnout, using field experimentation, has broken new ground in the study of the outputs of voter mobilization. Likewise, future studies of the determinants of voter mobilization strategy should employ new methods and data, embrace novel approaches, and consider research methodology that is familiar to academics in other disciplines, yet might not be have been considered by political scientists.

One of the biggest dilemmas for researchers who study voter mobilization is the lack of available data. Apart from campaign finance records and reports of party contacting found in a few national surveys, there are few available records of voter mobilization at either the individual or aggregate levels. And, even this data is fairly limited. For those who wish to study historical patterns of voter contacting, the available data is largely anecdotal, consisting of descriptive narratives and embellished stories of party machines and patronage. In fact, since adequate campaign finance records and disclosures were rarely kept before the 1970s, and national surveys of party contacting stretch back only to the 1950s, there are considerable hurdles for those who wish to study voter mobilization in its heyday. In order to study the Get Out the Vote activities of political parties during the Jacksonian and Gilded Ages of the 19th Century, researchers must rely largely on questionable newspaper accounts and testimonials from the machine bosses of that time (such as the famous biography of the former Tammany Hall boss, George Washington Plunkitt).

The opportunities for researchers examining voter mobilization in the modern era are much greater. As it was noted in Chapter 5, reports of voter mobilization from the mobilizers themselves can be embellished, and they often are reluctant to reveal their "trade secrets." And, relying on voters to identify, evaluate, and recall the identities and motives of those who have

contacted them will often provide data of questionable validity. But, while journalistic accounts at the turn of the century were questionably truthful (and exaggerated at best), journalists today can provide academic researchers with a wealth of information about voter mobilization at the local level. There are few avenues for obtaining reliable data about voter mobilization activities in local communities, unless the researcher is willing to go into the field and obtain it, personally. However, as this research has shown, journalists can provide researchers with a well-informed and (most often) unbiased view of what is happening in their communities at election time. In many places in the United States, the local newspaper editor may be the most politically well-informed person in the community, often having lived in the community for decades and been in close contact with the local political leaders. Because, as Alexis de Toqueville once observed, there is a newspaper in almost every town in America, this can provide future researchers with a well-placed data source for nationwide studies of local voter mobilization activity.

Additionally, with the recent advent of online blogs, there are multiple avenues for GOTV research using the internet. While the legitimacy of a blog might be tougher to determine than that of a newspaper, often it is the political elites themselves who post online "diaries" of the activities of their organizations at election time. But, more importantly, internet phenomena such as blogs, YouTube.com, and online video streaming allow political elites to report on the activities *of each other*. As Virginia Senator George Allen (R) learned in 2006, their actions and words are more closely watched by their opposition than ever before, and almost every activity of a modern campaign is well-documented on the internet.[81] Perhaps future researchers studying

[81] Video footage of Allen's infamous "Macaca" comment was posted on YouTube.com within hours of that campaign event.

voter mobilization will be able to catalogue and code useful data from the millions of potential data sources that will be readily available on the internet.

Second, with modern campaign finance reform and disclosure rules, "tracking the money" has become easier than ever. Since interest groups have historically been less regulated than political parties and candidate campaigns, less was known about how they spent their money at election time. But, with new 21st Century campaign finance reform (such as BCRA and the FECA rulings that have followed it in recent years), there are numerous new federal and state level records of itemized campaign disclosures. Many new laws regulating the activities of formerly semi-anonymous 527s and 501(c) groups can provide researchers with hard data on the activities of non-party groups. In fact, although many observers lament the growth of capital intensive GOTV in recent years, this phenomenon can be a gold mine for researchers. This is because, unlike the days of massive labor-intensive machine politics, with capital-intensive GOTV there are legal requirements for mobilizers to keep detailed records of their activities. As publicly available information, campaign finance disclosures may prove to be more important to scholars in the future than ever before.

Finally, in order to truly understand how parties, candidates, and interest groups coordinate their electoral activities, researchers must be able to study the linkages between these types of organizations. Since these groups may be reluctant to reveal their activities, and because some forms of coordination that are regularly practiced may violate existing campaign finance laws, political science researchers must adopt new methods for studying the interconnectedness of practitioners in the voter mobilization environment. Fortunately, there are existing technologies and methods of analysis in other disciplines that could be useful to political science researchers who are attempting to untangle these networks. Scholars in the fields of

economics, sociology, anthropology, and even the biological sciences regularly use methods that might be useful to political science researchers. For example, several researchers have begun to adopt methods that are more commonly used in sociology or economics, such as "social network analysis," in order to study linkages between entities in a larger political network (using quantitative rather than purely qualitative methodology).[82] Additionally, spatial mapping programs such as ArcMap and ArcGIS can provide researchers with the tools to study voter mobilization geography, allowing for studies of the impact of physical space on GOTV strategy (an often cited component to activities such as door-to-door contacting).

In conclusion, this researcher believes that the study of voter mobilization can provide scholars multiple opportunities for future academic research. With newly available data and technologies, and the modern resurgence of this time-honored electoral tactic in recent years, the study of voter mobilization promises to be a fruitful one for future academics. As this research has shown, there are multiple avenues in the field of voter mobilization research that are largely understudied, and they can provide scholars with abundant opportunities to increase our understanding of political campaigns and elections.

[82] For an excellent example of the application of this methodology to the study of extended party systems, see Koger et al. (2005)

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APPENDIX A

Chapter 3: Party Contacting by Region and Time Period

As noted previously, because the South has traditionally been a solidly Democratic region, with generally weak party organizations (see Black and Black 2000; Key 1949), it is probable the dynamics of party contacting trends differ within the Southern states. Due to the unique and non competitive nature of political parties in the South throughout much of this time period, several additional analyses were performed using only South and non South states**.** The results of the analysis for contacting in non South states were largely the same. However, when each model was run using only the Southern states, there were some interesting results. The results of the revised southern models are shown in Table A3.1.

[Insert Table A3.1 about here]

In the first model of party contacting, the effect of county competitiveness was much stronger and roughly equal to that of House race competitiveness. In the second model of Democratic Party contacting, the coefficient did not reach statistical significance at the .05 confidence level. However, in the third model of Republican Party contacting, the effect of county competitiveness was much stronger and also roughly equal to that of House race competitiveness. Perhaps this is due to the declining Democratic hegemony in the one party South throughout this time period. While Southern voting patterns for national (and later, local) offices became gradually more Republican throughout the time period, much of the Republican organizational activity in the South was "top-down," rather than locally inspired (Black and

Black 2000). As Republicans have become competitive in most parts of the southern states, and as their strength has grown, local Republican Party organizations have likely stepped up their mobilization activities. Patterns of county level competition, based on the sample used in this analysis, indicate that this may be the case. Among Southern counties, there is a sharp increase in the number of party competitive counties from 1964 to 1980, followed by a sharp drop after 1980 (see Figure A3.1). This likely reflects the period of party change in the South throughout this period, when Southern voters exhibited differing local and national voting patterns (making county-wide voting patterns appear party competitive), followed by a fairly sharp Republican realignment among Southern whites after Reagan's election in 1980.[83]

[Insert Figure A3.1 about here]

There have been several changes in both rates of party contacting and party competition since the 1960s that might influence the effect of local party competitiveness over time. As Figure A3.1 indicates, the rate of party contacting has risen and fallen several times since 1956. During the time period covered in this analysis (1964 to 1992), there was a gradual increase in rates of contacting by both parties from the early 1960s until 1982, at which time party contacting gradually declined (reaching an all-time low in 1990). But, existing research suggests that although the number of overall contacts fell during the 1980s, improvements in the targeting of potential voters gradually increased the efficiency of party contacting, over time. In fact, the parties have gotten better at locating and targeting potential supporters, based on their individual propensity to vote. For this reason, we might expect that voter contacting strategies changed as well, with parties concentrating a greater proportion of their resources on key races and

[83] For a thorough discussion of these changes, see Black and Black (2000, ch. 7).

competitive locations. Based on the two periods of rising and declining party activity over this time period, an additional analysis was run for each time period: 1964 to 1980 and 1982 to 1992. The results are shown in Table A3.2. While the measure of Party Competitive County appears to have no statistically significant effect for either party during the first time period, the coefficients for the major party and Democratic models are both positive and statistically significant at the .01 level. In fact, these results indicate that the effect of local party competitiveness may be time-specific, driven largely by the increasingly efficient party contacting patterns of the 1980s. At the same time, it appears that the effect of House race competitiveness is much greater in the second time period than across all years, perhaps reflecting a growing emphasis by the major political parties on mobilizing for national elections.

[Insert Table A3.2 about here]

Additional analyses of the two time periods, using only South and Nonsouth respondents, were also performed. Among Southern respondents, county party competitiveness had a positive and statistically significant effect on party contacting in the first period (1964 to 1980) but not the second (1982 to 1992). Among Nonsouth respondents, the exact opposite pattern emerged: the measure of Party Competitive County was statistically significant and positive in both the major party and Democratic Party contact models. Finally, an analysis of the base model from Table 3.1 was run using a series of dummy variables for each year. Although several of the years did not appear to have a statistically significant effect, there was little change in the other coefficients.

Table A3.1: Effect of County Level Party Competition on Party Contacting, South (1964-1992)

	Major Party Contact (1,0)	Democratic Contact (1,0)	Republican Contact (1,0)
Past Vote (1,0)	0.931**	0.847**	0.814**
	(0.092)	(0.108)	(0.115)
Age (years)	0.012**	0.013**	0.015**
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Gender (1,0)	-0.131	-0.162	-0.112
	(0.076)	(0.087)	(0.090)
Race (1,0)	0.005	-0.209*	0.491**
	(0.089)	(0.098)	(0.119)
Education (1-4)	0.432**	0.423**	0.433**
	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.046)
South (1,0)	--	--	--
	--	--	--
Union household (1,0)	0.151	0.207	0.125
	(0.114)	(0.128)	(0.139)
Church attendance (1-3)	0.063	0.092*	0.026
	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Homeowner (1,0)	0.373**	0.304**	0.455**
	(0.098)	(0.113)	(0.125)
Married (1,0)	0.129	0.070	0.188
	(0.083)	(0.094)	(0.101)
Republican PID (1,0)	0.464**	0.095	0.488**
	(0.145)	(0.171)	(0.164)
Democratic PID (1,0)	0.568**	0.558**	0.189
	(0.137)	(0.157)	(0.159)
Competitive Senate race (1,0)	0.212*	0.169	0.231*
	(0.088)	(0.100)	(0.104)
Competitive Gub. race (1,0)	0.184	0.154	0.254*
	(0.099)	(0.111)	(0.118)
Presidential Margin (%)	0.001	0.003**	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Competitive House race (1,0)	0.246	0.207	0.256
	(0.127)	(0.148)	(0.146)
Party Competitive County (1,0)	0.224**	0.086	0.228*
	(0.082)	(0.096)	(0.097)
Constant	-4.808**	-4.974**	-5.597**
	(0.289)	(0.328)	(0.354)
N =	5230	5230	5230
LR chi^2 (16) =	507.13	341.74	405.55
Prob > chi^2 =	.0000	.0000	.0000
Pseudo R^2 =	0.0959	0.0810	0.1013

Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level



Figure A3.1: Party Competitiveness (South)



Figure A3.2: Party Competitiveness (Nationally)

Table A3.2: Effect of County Level Party Competition on Party Contacting

	(Rise: 1964-1980)			(Decline: 1982-1992)		
	Major Party	Dem	Repub	Major Party	Dem	Repub
Past Vote (1,0)	0.657**	0.569**	0.679**	0.861**	0.811**	0.771**
	(0.063)	(0.072)	(0.078)	(0.084)	(0.098)	(0.107)
Age (years)	0.003	0.002	0.005*	0.014**	0.012**	0.016**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gender (1,0)	-0.005	-0.085	0.042	0.008	-0.035	0.001
	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.068)	(0.071)
Race (1,0)	0.137	-0.041	0.520**	0.056	-0.058	0.406**
	(0.083)	(0.091)	(0.117)	(0.082)	(0.090)	(0.113)
Education (1-4)	0.285**	0.240**	0.273**	0.327**	0.275**	0.342**
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.039)
South (1,0)	-0.237**	-0.335**	-0.081	-0.029	-0.047	0.044
	(0.061)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.078)	(0.083)
Union household (1,0)	0.119*	0.175**	0.038	0.110	0.125	0.085
	(0.059)	(0.066)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.082)	(0.088)
Church attendance (1-3)	0.071**	0.083**	0.057*	0.114**	0.116**	0.098**
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Homeowner (1,0)	0.346**	0.258**	0.399**	0.255**	0.163	0.358**
	(0.062)	(0.071)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.089)	(0.101)
Married (1,0)	0.149*	0.096	0.252**	0.153*	0.110	0.231**
	(0.059)	(0.067)	(0.072)	(0.065)	(0.074)	(0.079)
Republican PID (1,0)	0.327**	0.084	0.394**	0.419**	-0.102	0.683**
	(0.090)	(0.106)	(0.104)	(0.116)	(0.132)	(0.142)
Democratic PID (1,0)	0.344**	0.446**	0.062	0.460**	0.476**	0.206
	(0.086)	(0.099)	(0.103)	(0.114)	(0.126)	(0.144)
Compet. Sen. race (1,0)	0.049	-0.036	0.189**	0.092	0.036	0.105
	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.070)	(0.080)	(0.083)
Compet. Gub. race (1,0)	0.205**	0.150*	0.177*	-0.180*	-0.216**	-0.121
	(0.065)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.072)	(0.081)	(0.085)
Presidential Margin (%)	-0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.002**	0.003**	0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Compet. House race (1,0)	0.184**	0.175*	0.216**	0.462**	0.458**	0.395**
	(0.063)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.094)	(0.105)	(0.110)
Party Compet. Cnty (1,0)	0.095	0.074	0.027	0.172**	0.188**	0.104
	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.064)	(0.072)	(0.076)
Constant	-3.420**	-3.421**	-4.435**	-4.700**	-4.509**	-5.789**
	(0.208)	(0.235)	(0.256)	(0.242)	(0.271)	(0.303)
N =	9141	9141	9141	7380	7380	7380
LR chi^2 (17) =	564.23	333.98	523.14	594.58	394.83	527.34
Prob > chi^2 =	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
Pseudo R^2 =	0.0536	0.0392	0.0635	0.0746	0.0613	0.0868

Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level

APPENDIX B

Chapter 4: Terms and Methodology Used To Search Expenditures
(GA State Ethics Commission Disclosure Search)

The following terms were searched to identify the various forms of broadcast and targeted voter communication in question. Several categories of expenses were specifically searched, due to their relationship to known forms of voter communication. They are listed below by the expenditure type that was meant to be identified in each word search:

Forms of Advertising: "advert" "ad" "media" "radio" "news" "TV" "telev"
Direct Mail: "mail" "post" (i.e.: postcard, postage)
Phone Calls: "phone" "call"
Signage: "sign" "billboard" "banner" "post" (i.e.: poster, posts) [cross-referenced with mail category to identify duplicates]
Distributed Leaflets or Literature: "leaflet" "door" "fly" "hand" "print" "liter" "distrib" "voter" [cross-referenced with voter files category to identify duplicates]
Printed Material: "print" [cross-referenced with leaflet/literature category to identify duplicates]
Voter Files: "voter"
Other terms that were searched: "blackberry" "gotv" "roll" "fold" (i.e.: a roll-fold mailer)

After these expenditures were compiled into a spreadsheet, I eliminated duplicates (ex: "TV advertising" would appear three times during the word search, once each for "TV," "ad," and "advert"). I also *closely examined each questionable category* for irrelevant terms (in all but "mail" "radio" "TV" "telev" "advert" "leaflet" "blackberry" "gotv" categories, which were unlikely to produce irrelevant hits). Because some of these search terms would likely produce irrelevant hits, they were examined item by item. The "phone" category was also highly scrutinized for non-voter-communication expenses, such as expenses for personal cell-phones by candidates.

After the expenditures were identified and sorted into categories, a random audit was performed to identify any possible oversights or errors that might have occurred from using an electronic word search to identify these expenses. Twelve candidate committees were selected at random, and any expenditure reported by these committees between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2006 (regardless of purpose, or whether it was reported as a general election expenditure) was individually examined. For over 500 total expenditures that were examined individually during the audit, only two relevant expenditures had not been identified by the word search, and both of these were due to misspellings in the reports.

[Insert Table A4.1 about here]

Table A4.1
Determinants of Candidate Resource Allocation Strategy: Alternate Model
(Probability of Spending More on Broadcast Advertising or Voter Targeting)
(Revised Model without Control for Cash Competitiveness)

(base outcome)	vs. Targeted		vs. Broadcast	
Resource Allocation Strategy (Multinomial Logit)	No Voter Communication Spending	Broadcast Advertising Strategy	No Voter Communication Spending	Voter Targeting Strategy
District Pop. Density (1000s)	-0.0485	-0.517***	0.469***	0.517***
	(0.127)	(0.143)	(0.162)	(0.143)
District Electoral Size (1-20)	0.0613	0.0613	-4.88e-06	-0.0613
	(0.0528)	(0.0401)	(0.0371)	(0.0401)
Nonpartisan Election (1,0)	0.353	-0.0704	0.423	0.0704
	(0.480)	(0.502)	(0.442)	(0.502)
Open Seat (1,0)	0.820	-0.0267	0.847	0.0267
	(0.558)	(0.433)	(0.579)	(0.433)
Electorally Competitive (1,0)	-2.107**	-0.663	-1.445	0.663
	(1.054)	(0.404)	(1.082)	(0.404)
Cash Competitive Race (1,0)	--	--	--	--
Total Money Raised ($100K)	-1.644***	0.0940	-1.738***	-0.0940
	(0.400)	(0.0644)	(0.401)	(0.0644)
Incumbent (1,0)	1.174***	0.0503	1.123**	-0.0503
	(0.432)	(0.356)	(0.452)	(0.356)
Republican Candidate (1,0)	-0.0338	-0.626*	0.592	0.626*
	(0.339)	(0.320)	(0.380)	(0.320)
Constant	-0.352	0.323	-0.675	-0.323
	(0.481)	(0.344)	(0.486)	(0.344)
Observations	335	335	335	335
Pseudo R-squared	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150
R-squared	.	.	.	.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Robust standard errors in parentheses

APPENDIX C

Chapter 5: Effects of Competiveness on Different GOTV Methods

[Insert Table A5.1 about here]

Table A5.1
Determinants of Fall 2006 GOTV Activity in 50 Georgia Counties: *by Method*

Reported GOTV Activity in Fall 2006, by Method (1,0)	Door to Door Contacts	Leafleting /Door Hangers	Other Literature Distribution	Phone Calls	Direct Mail	Register. Voters	Rallies/ Events	TV Ads	Radio Ads	Newspaper Ads
Metro County (1,0)	-0.774	1.062	1.019	0.271	**1.765****	0.129	0.883	1.364	0.806	0.971
	(0.722)	(0.749)	(0.894)	(0.730)	(0.788)	(0.800)	(0.756)	(1.039)	(0.782)	(0.756)
Countywide Turnout in 2004 (% of Regis. Voters)	3.240	-5.318	2.961	-0.764	-6.049	-4.118	-4.338	-7.627	0.160	-3.948
	(7.742)	(8.150)	(10.37)	(8.108)	(8.279)	(8.794)	(8.237)	(10.74)	(8.731)	(7.959)
Registration Rate (% of VAP)	1.251	-1.983	-3.079	2.018	-1.824	-1.156	0.256	2.192	-1.390	0.0520
	(4.533)	(4.709)	(5.386)	(4.836)	(4.776)	(4.827)	(4.808)	(5.701)	(4.915)	(4.823)
Vote Margin in the 2004 Presidential Election (1K)	0.0114	0.0199	0.00978	0.0192	0.00537	0.0143	0.00769	0.0133	-0.00185	-0.00515
	(0.0146)	(0.0178)	(0.0147)	(0.0230)	(0.0143)	(0.0166)	(0.0169)	(0.0148)	(0.0143)	(0.0147)
Number of Competitive Races in the County	0.0447	-0.00618	0.233	0.352	-0.0813	**0.475****	**0.413***	0.216	0.0522	0.180
	(0.202)	(0.210)	(0.223)	(0.242)	(0.209)	(0.234)	(0.242)	(0.233)	(0.209)	(0.231)
Constant	-3.138	4.259	-2.459	-1.172	4.581	2.366	1.943	1.587	-0.588	2.787
	(5.701)	(5.913)	(7.184)	(6.019)	(5.994)	(6.354)	(6.064)	(7.406)	(6.253)	(5.977)
Observations	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Pseudo R-squared	0.0242	0.0779	0.117	0.0845	0.0984	0.109	0.102	0.115	0.0259	0.0413

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses