OPENINGS AND EXPECTATIONS:

INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS AND THE STATE IN MEXICO AND CHILE

by

Jessica Jean Price

(Under the Direction of Christopher Allen)

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the factors that determine the types of goals that indigenous movements adopt and the factors that influence whether they pursue political alliances to reach those goals. I divide the goals that indigenous movements pursue into three broad groups: recognition, redistribution, and autonomy. Specific historical and institutional factors in each country shaped how the Mexican Zapatistas and Chilean Mapuche movements understand the duties and obligations of their states and the role that their movements should play in relation to the state apparatus and political parties. I argue that two principle factors, the openness of the political system towards rural leftist groups and the level to which the process of national construction and nationalist mythmaking included rural peasants and indigenous people, explain the differences in the ways the Mapuche and Zapatistas understand the state.

INDEX WORDS: Indigenous movements, Mapuche movement, Zapatista movement
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INTRODUCTION

The 1990s witnessed a surge of indigenous mobilization throughout Latin America as indigenous people in many Latin American countries began to address their states as Indians in search of greater rights, recognition, and government aid. The Zapatista movement in southeastern Mexico became one of the most vocal and visible mobilized indigenous peoples in the region by skillfully garnering national and international attention after their initial uprising in January 1994. Newly mobilized indigenous groups like the Zapatistas provided only part of the increase in mobilized indigenous people. In other countries, indigenous people had begun mobilizing as early as the late 1970s and continued to advocate for their rights from the 1980s onward. The Mapuche in Chile launched a broad movement in the late 1970s against the policies of the Pinochet dictatorship, and by the 1990s, this movement had diversified and multiplied within the Chilean political scene.

Mobilized indigenous organizations appeared in many Latin American states during the same period that Latin America began to undergo profound institutional changes. In the 1980s and 1990s, Latin American states slowly tipped towards democratic governments, and by 2000, even Mexico broke the PRI monopoly on national power. At the same time, profound economic difficulties in the 1980s allowed neoliberal economic ideas to proliferate throughout the region as elites scrambled for new ways to create economic growth.
On the international level, the late twentieth century brought another type of changes. The late nineteenth century had heralded the apex of scientific racism in Europe and the Americas. Political thinkers who subscribed to racist thought were able to justify their prejudices with so-called “scientific” proof, while leaders in Latin America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries grappled with the impact of racist thought in societies that did not fit the European ideal. In the early twentieth century, Latin American intellectuals developed ideological currents like those that celebrated *mestizaje* and the indigenous heritage of their societies, in part, as a counterpoint to scientific racism. Yet throughout the early twentieth century, Latin American thinkers continued to approach the “Indian problem” from the standpoint that indigenous people must be “civilized” and integrated into the dominant society. Both *mestizaje* and *indigenismo* existed within a world-view that considered racial “types” to have a factual basis rather than be constructed by human ignorance. Practitioners of these ideologies also tended to laud past Indian civilizations while marginalizing and patronizing contemporary indigenous people. Their ideas about indigenous people reveal a casual racism that would take more virulent forms in countries like Guatemala, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador, in which politicians tried to exclude large indigenous populations from a say in government and, in the case of Guatemala, launched a campaign of extermination against highland indigenous people as part of anti-guerrilla operations in the 1980s.

By the late twentieth century, on the contrary, the casual racism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that had persisted well-past the mid twentieth century in many counties was no longer acceptable in most societies. The international spread of ideas about human rights and civil rights had erased the previous racist consensus.
Racism did not disappear within Latin American politics once it became less acceptable; instead racist ideas took less obvious but still virulent forms. In this new environment discrimination against indigenous people continued, but politicians could no longer openly ignore the indigenous people in their societies, and mobilized indigenous people found support for their aspirations towards recognition and rights from an international indigenous rights movement.²

Contemporary indigenous people are mobilizing in a new environment in which being indigenous allows people to claim rights that are justified by an international indigenous rights movement. Legal agreements like the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) convention 169 promote limited rights of self-determination for indigenous people. Because indigenous people experienced centuries of discrimination and marginalization in the countries in which they live, Indians tend to be among the poorest of the poor in most Latin American states. Economic need couples with the desire for rights to provide the impetus for many indigenous movements. From the late 1990s onward, many mobilized indigenous peoples have begun to embrace the goal of autonomy based on their status as separate peoples. In the Latin American context, autonomy often does not imply a complete break from the state; rather it implies some level of local or regional self-governance and the right of indigenous people to make decisions about policies affecting their lives and livelihoods. Indigenous movements make demands of their states that follow three overarching and intertwining goals: recognition and acknowledgement as indigenous people; the redistribution of state resources and inclusion in state projects; and the autonomy to control their own affairs.
Each group of demands, those for recognition, redistribution, and autonomy, rests on a slightly different logic that justifies these goals. Previous state policies and the international indigenous movement both help to provide a legal justification for indigenous peoples’ wishes to be recognized as peoples. Redistributive concerns, on the contrary, find their best justification in the ways that the state historically treated its citizens. Past obligations towards redistribution buttress current demands. For some movements, autonomy becomes the primary demand into which demands for recognition and redistribution become subsumed. In the case of autonomy demands, while the international indigenous rights movement stresses indigenous peoples’ rights to autonomy, states have been very reluctant to grant any type of autonomy. Unlike demands for recognition and redistribution, indigenous people cannot argue convincingly that they are entitled to autonomy due primarily to their status as citizens. Rather, autonomy demands become the special demands of indigenous people and find legal justification from the international indigenous rights movement level. To some degree demands for autonomy encompass elements of indigenous recognition and redistribution of state resources, yet autonomy is more than simply a change in how states’ recognize indigenous people and distribute their resources. For mobilized indigenous peoples, autonomy can act as a rallying idea for their movement. Autonomy resonates with what being indigenous means throughout Latin America because to claim autonomy is to acknowledge the illegitimacy of the historical conquest of indigenous peoples and to recognize that Indians have a right to self-determination as peoples. Although autonomy broadly defined means some level of indigenous self-determination and independence
from state control, different indigenous movements develop varied ideas about what autonomy should mean for their peoples.

Indigenous peoples’ experiences of inclusion and exclusion during the lengthy formation of current Latin American states vary among counties and regional blocks. Mobilized indigenous peoples’ level of identification as citizens of their states and how completely they are willing to buy into their states’ nationalist projects also varies throughout Latin America. I argue in this paper that variations in these two processes are related. States that included campesinos and indigenous people as parts of the nationalist project helped to build a sense of identification with the state among resident indigenous peoples. Citizenship in these cases mattered because it provided its bearers with rights and benefits. Granted, inclusion created its own problems. Inclusion tends to encompass a drive for assimilation that could destroy indigenous identities and revealed a profound racism on the part of state elites who might be willing to recognize the indigenous heritage of their country and its modern indigenous populations but only if those indigenous people assimilated in the manner set by these elites. Inclusion could also further damage indigenous peoples’ ability to direct their own lives if the state co-opted indigenous governance as part of the process of inclusion. Exclusion from the state worked in the opposite manner. It offered the chance for cultural survival at the expense of state aid and benefits.

Processes of inclusion and exclusion work in a dialectical manner; no Latin American state has pursued entirely exclusionary or exclusionary indigenous policies. Indigenous people could be excluded from political life, yet still heavily taxed or conscripted into labor. Indigenous people who faced social exclusion and
marginalization might still gain state aid. Likewise inclusion might require that indigenous people shed their indigenous identities and become campesinos or might only reach into certain levels of society or politics while avoiding others. States could also pursue radically different indigenous policies towards different indigenous peoples living within the state.

Mexico and Chile are among the states in Latin America in which indigenous people comprise a distinct minority of the population. Only about 10 percent of Chileans and 15 percent of Mexicans are indigenous. In Chile, the vast majority of indigenous people are Mapuche. In contrast, the Mayan peoples of Chiapas, Mexico make up only a fraction of Mexico’s diverse indigenous population. Indigenous people comprise a larger fraction of the population of the state of Chiapas. 24.62 percent of chiapanecos report speaking an indigenous language, the third highest percentage in the country. The actual number of people who identify as indigenous in the state is almost certainly considerably higher because not all indigenous people speak a language other than Spanish.3

Chile and Mexico have also been among the most successful Latin American states economically, and the governments of both states have embraced neoliberal policies as a means to create economic stability and growth. Despite their differing degrees of visibility, both the Zapatistas and the Mapuche movement have worked to redefine the relationship between indigenous people and government in their states.

Mexico and Chile experienced fairly recent democratic transitions. In Mexico, the PRI controlled politics within a one-party state for much of the twentieth century. Although Chile developed strong political parties and a relatively stable electoral democracy after the early years of the twentieth century, the military coup of 1973
ushered in the repressive and long-lived Pinochet dictatorship. The current Mapuche movement and the EZLN both organized to combat government policies that harmed indigenous peoples. The movements persisted and changed throughout the period of transition towards democracy.

Neither democratic transition has conquered fully the legacies of authoritarian rule, but in both states, viable leftist parties exist. In the case of Chile, the *Concertación*, an alliance among several leftist and centrist political parties, has consistently occupied the presidency since the transition to democracy. In Mexico, the PRD, the main leftist party splintered from the PRI before the 1988 election. Despite its failure so far to gain the presidency, the PRD has remained a viable leftist party to date.

These movements present a puzzle because their willingness to identify with the state in which they live and their expectations of proper state behavior do not correspond to their willingness to work with formal political forces. The Zapatistas and their supporters boycott elections and have not tried to build alliances with the electoral Left even though the PRD, which has successfully won several governorships including that of Chiapas, presents a viable option for electoral alliances. Many organizations in the current Mapuche movement formed alliances with political parties of the Left and Center in the years leading up to the Chilean transition to democracy and transferred those alliances to the Concertación. Other Mapuche organizations consistently rejected alliances with political parties. After the Concertación demonstrated repeatedly its lack of commitment to indigenous rights in the mid-1990s, the Mapuche movement as a whole distanced itself from the state and the older partisan Mapuche organizations faded from relevance.
Important historical elements within the modern Mapuche movement rejected political alliances, and most of the current movement rejects working through the state a method to advance their goals. Groups that argue for working with the state and those that argue that the Mapuche people should remain independent from the state or political parties form two opposing currents that have existed in one form or another throughout the history of twentieth-century Mapuche mobilization. Currently, most Mapuche activists have adopted the idea that the Mapuche people will be best served through independent mobilization rather than through working with the often-discriminatory state. The changes and divisions in the Mapuche movement over time, in terms of Mapuche organizations’ willingness to work with political parties or the state, and the Zapatistas’ unwillingness to work with or support political parties raise the question of what conditions lead mobilized indigenous peoples to form alliances with political parties or the state and what conditions lead indigenous peoples or organizations to reject such alliances.

Despite the Mapuche movement’s willingness to make alliances with political actors during the Chilean transition to democracy and Zapatistas’ unwillingness to ally with the electoral Left during Mexico’s long process of transition from PRI rule, the Zapatistas have embraced their state’s national project far more strongly than the Mapuche. The Zapatistas consider themselves to be Mexican nationalists and patriots in addition to oppressed indigenous people. They launched a rebellion in January of 1994, in large part to protest what they viewed as the Mexican government’s abandonment of its duties to campesinos. The Zapatista movement transformed over the course of the 1990s from an army of indigenous campesinos, who justified their claims for inclusion in
the Mexican nation and redistribution in terms of their status as good Mexican nationalists, to an explicitly indigenous movement that forwarded demands for autonomy and indigenous recognition in addition to demands for redistribution.

The current Mapuche movement arose in 1978 partially in response to news that the Pinochet government planned to implement a program to divide Mapuche reducciones, or communities, so that their land could be sold. The land law the dictatorship created besides dividing Mapuche communities into individual plots, also stated that once the division had been completed the inhabitants of the communities would no longer be considered indigenous. The Mapuche movement during the dictatorship viewed the Pinochet regime’s policies as a threat to their rights and existence as an indigenous people. In addition to its efforts to preserve Mapuche territory and communal autonomy, the Mapuche movement also encompassed aspects of cultural revival and celebrated indigenous identity. Once the movement splintered in the years prior to the transition to democracy more radical sectors advocated indigenous autonomy while more pragmatic sectors pinned their hopes for improved indigenous rights to alliances with newly resurgent leftist and centrist political parties.

A sense of Mapuche collective identity underlies today’s increasingly diverse Mapuche movement. Mapuche activists tend to refer to their identity as a people much more frequently than their identity as Chileans. In addition, in recent years, Mapuche intellectuals and some elements in the general Mapuche movement have begun to advance a concept of Mapuche nationalism based on the Mapuche’s distinctness as a people and to press for regional autonomy. The Mapuche movement tends to justify its goals based on the Mapuche’s identity as an indigenous people who suffered historical
losses from colonialism. Many Mapuche activists identify autonomy with the idea or reclaiming historical Mapuche territory and preserving or increasing Mapuche self-governance in areas where the Mapuche lived before the Chilean conquest.

Over the course of the 1990s, the Zapatistas gradually shifted the primary goals of their movement from restoring land reform and gaining government support and limited recognition for indigenous campesinos towards goals that follow more directly from their indigenous identities. The Zapatistas began to emphasize their indigenous identities and to make explicitly indigenous demands, such as their demand for the government to provide free bilingual education, during their first year of mobilization. The Zapatistas also made demands for autonomy during the first round of negotiations with the government in 1994, but they framed their demands as adding another layer of governance to Mexican federalism that would allow indigenous peoples to control their own local affairs within the existing Mexican system rather than advocate independence from state intervention. The Zapatistas embraced demands for autonomy during the San Andrés negotiations. After 1998, the EZLN and their supporters formed autonomous Zapatista governments in indigenous regions of Chiapas that have cut themselves off from state aid and interference in order to survive. Although the EZLN and the state negotiated the San Andrés Accords during the administration of Ernesto Zedillo, his government refused to honor the accords or pass legislation to implement them. Once the EZLN and its supporters absorbed the reality that the government would neither recognize their communities nor honor agreements with the movement, autonomous Zapatista communities cut themselves off entirely from the state.
This paper examines why these movements evidence varying degrees of identification with the state and willingness to make alliances with political parties. It studies the factors that determine the types of goals that indigenous movements adopt and the factors that influence whether movements pursue political alliances to reach those goals. I divide indigenous movements’ goals into three broad categories, those dealing with recognition, those dealing with redistribution, and those dealing with autonomy. I argue that two primary factors, the openness of the political system towards rural leftist groups and the level to which the process of national construction and nationalist mythmaking included rural peasants and indigenous people, explain the differences in the ways the Mapuche movement and Zapatistas understand the state. These primary factors filter the influence that the secondary international factors of neoliberal ideology and the growing indigenous rights movement have on each indigenous movement.
I. SURVEYING THE LITERATURE

Previous studies have not examined explicitly how mobilized indigenous people determine the types of goals that their movements pursue or why some movements are more willing than other movements to make alliances with political parties to achieve their goals. Although scholarship on indigenous movements and the state does not explicitly address these topics, it does shed important light on how indigenous people relate politically to their states. In addition, specific scholarship about both cases and the processes involved in Latin American state formation provide additional insights. This chapter examines the controversies and insights within the current scholarship on the Zapatistas and Mapuche movement. It then addresses how other scholarship about indigenous mobilization holds insights about how mobilized indigenous people determine the goals that their movements will pursue and why movements create alliances with political parties. The final section reaches beyond work on indigenous mobilization to explore how important works on state formation, peasant consciousness, and the relationship between ideas and politics illuminate the Zapatista and Mapuche movements.

Literature on the Movements

A greater number of researchers, especially scholars who write in English, have examined the Zapatista uprising than have addressed Mapuche mobilization. Few researchers who study the Zapatistas have examined explicitly the EZLN’s relationship
with the Mexican state. Scholars of the Zapatista movement tend to explain its goals through some combination of campesino needs and indigenous culture. Although many academics have traced the origins of the Zapatista uprising and present competing explanations for why indigenous chiapaneco campesinos decided to take up arms against their government, far fewer researchers actually delve into how and why the movement’s goals changed over time. Although many scholars note that the Zapatistas initially made peasant-based demands and only begin to advocate for indigenous autonomy after the initial period of their mobilization, no comprehensive explanations exist for this shift. In contrast, several scholars have advanced sometimes competing explanations for why the EZLN boycotts Mexican elections.

In the case of Mapuche movement, recent scholarship has begun to explain the origins and current shape of the current wave of Mapuche mobilization. Chilean scholars have written detailed histories of the Mapuche experience in Chile, and other scholars have traced the origins of the Mapuche movement and illuminated how Mapuche activists understand their state. Much work remains to be done on the Mapuche movement, but current studies have begun to broaden scholarly understanding of Mapuche mobilization in important and often fascinating ways.

The Zapatistas

Writing about the Zapatistas proliferated in the years following their emergence as a mobilized indigenous group. As scholars worked to explain the EZLN’s origins and its role in Mexican politics and society, they embraced different interpretations about the Zapatistas’ views of the Mexican state and political parties. Although the fact that the
Zapatistas and their supporters are indigenous campesinos remains uncontested, scholars disagree about how best to describe the EZLN’s initial mobilization. Some researchers assert that the January 1994 uprising stemmed most directly from the Zapatistas concerns as campesinos. Others argue that the Zapatistas mobilized primarily to expand their rights as indigenous people.

Scholars in the first school of thought sought explanations for the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas’ previous history of campesino mobilization. They linked the Zapatistas’ views of the Mexican state and political ideas to their status as campesinos in a state with a rich tradition of campesino mobilization.

George A. Collier, a noted anthropologist, makes one of the strongest and most compelling arguments that the Zapatistas initially tried to access the state and gain benefits for their communities as peasants. He argues that agrarian concerns primarily motivated their initial uprising. In his words, the Zapatista uprising, “began primarily as a peasant rebellion, not an exclusively Indian rebellion…first and foremost calling attention to the plight of Mexico’s rural poor and peasants, both indigenous and nonindigenous” (Collier with Lowery Quaratiello 1999, 7). Collier argues that the Zapatistas emerged out of an environment in which recent economic changes were placing increasing stress on indigenous communities. The possession of adequate land provided chiapaneco campesinos with their only assurance of family subsistence. Collier argues that the end of land reform spurred some indigenous campesinos to join the EZLN. In the frontier of the Selva Lacandona, where the Zapatistas originated, the land reform bureaucracy provided existing communities with their only hope of official
recognition and legal possession of land they had already colonized (Collier with Lowery Quaratiello 1999).

Similarly to Collier, Neil Harvey elaborates the history of campesino organizations in Chiapas. He argues that these organizations formed networks among activist campesinos that helped to create the EZLN. He notes that the Zapatistas embraced themes of land reform and the state’s obligation to campesinos that earlier organizations also advocated. Harvey also points to the ways in which the ruling Partido Revolucionaro Institucional (PRI) caused increasing resentment among poor indigenous people by awarding preferential land grants and state aid to its supporters and often siding with large landholders rather than campesinos. Campesinos affiliated with independent unions saw the PRI’s preferential treatment of its partisans as evidence that the state had abandoned its role as the patron of the poor (Harvey 1998).

Among the scholars who trace the origins of the EZLN to local historical processes, the noted historian John Womack Jr. advances one of the most nuanced explanations for the origins of the Zapatistas. Womack elaborates an explanation for the Zapatista uprising that draws on a rich variety of factors present in Chiapas in the late 1980s and early 1990s. He particularly stresses the role of the Catholic Church in training indigenous catechists and providing links between indigenous communities as helping to awake a political consciousness among many poor indigenous chiapanecos. He also credits the work of Bishop Samuel Ruiz and the networks of indigenous catechists that Bishop Ruiz helped to create with providing indigenous chiapanecos with the means to organize in increasingly sophisticated ways after the mid-1970s by spreading education and social networks among indigenous communities where the state
sarcely reached. Womack argues that the Zapatista uprising resulted because of a Mexican social and political structure that marginalized indigenous people in Chiapas and caused many indigenous chiapanecos to decide that the only way to remedy the state’s neglect of their communities after the state jettisoned agrarian reform was to take up arms (Womack 1999a).

Womack asserts that militancy in religious organizations and campesino unions developed indigenous peoples’ political consciousness. The Church and campesino organizations all agreed that the state had a moral duty to aid the poor. Different campesino organizations represented different strategies of engagement with the state. Although all worked for increased land or access to credit and implements to increase the productivity of existing land, campesino organizations disagreed profoundly over the proper degree of engagement with the one-party state (Womack 1999a).

Harvey, Collier, and Womack agree that the EZLN’s advocacy of guerrilla warfare formed in direct contrast to the non-violent campesino organizations that proliferated in Chiapas. Faced with the state’s history of repression or co-option of peasant organizations that pursued non-violent struggles the members of the EZLN decided that a guerrilla uprising provided their best hope for change. Its leaders argued that instead of trying to work through a corrupt legal system to access a government that was willing to abandon campesinos and the legacy of land reform, indigenous campesinos should take up arms because peaceful struggles had failed to improve markedly the lives of indigenous campesinos (Harvey 1998, Collier with Lowery Quaratiello 1999, Womack 1999a).
Gemma van der Haar remains one of very few scholars of the Zapatistas to explicitly study the Zapatistas’ ideas about the state. She argues that the land reform bureaucracy provided the chief mechanism of contact between Chiapas’ indigenous peasants and the state. In her formation, the Zapatistas, as campesinos, based their views of the Mexican state on their experiences with the state during land reform. In her words, the Zapatistas’ “perceptions about the State and the capacity of indigenous people to govern themselves … are rooted in the peasantry’s experience of and articulation with the State from the late 1930s,…which took shape principally through land reform” (van der Haar 2006, 585).

In the Selva Lancandona and eastern Chiapas, state agencies allowed land-reform communities local administrative autonomy. Van der Haar traces some of the mechanisms and ideas behind the Zapatistas’ autonomous communities to the ways in which these land-reform communities functioned. She also argues that the state’s neglect of agrarian claims and its somewhat arbitrary process of awarding ejidos, or land-grant communities, taught Chiapas’ peasants that the government could not be trusted. She asserts that the Zapatistas turned away from the state and towards de facto autonomy projects because they quit expecting that the government would help their communities (van der Haar 2006).

In contrast to placing the Zapatista uprising within a tradition of peasant activism, the other main way of understanding the Zapatistas emphasizes how they negotiate their existence as indigenous people in Mexico. Scholars working in this tendency emphasize the indigenous nature of the Zapatista uprising and draw on the ways in which
chiapaneco Mayan indigenous people filtered state ideologies and global phenomena through their own local experiences to create new ways of understanding politics.

In a detailed ethnographic study, Lynn Stephen traces the emergence of current-day Zapatismo as a political ideology among the Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Cho’ol, and especially Tojolabal Mayan people who would join or support the EZLN. Stephen considers the Zapatista struggle to be a struggle for indigenous rights, and she traces how indigenous people transformed the Mexican State’s discourse about nationalist heroes, including Emiliano Zapata, to support their own local struggles for land and representation (Stephen 2002).

Shannan L. Mattiace argues that rural indigenous people in Chiapas who are active Zapatistas or support the Zapatista cause consider themselves indigenous campesinos. She asserts that indigenous campesinos understand their place in Mexican society very differently than non-indigenous campesinos because their indigenous identities reshape their class identities (Mattiace 2003).

Stephen argues that the Zapatistas’ demands, such as their demand for autonomy, arose out of the Zapatista’s cultural understandings and experiences as indigenous people in Chiapas (Stephen 2002). Mattiace also studied how demands for indigenous autonomy developed among the Zapatistas and other Mexican indigenous people after the 1994 uprising. She argues that autonomy becomes an umbrella demand that embraces other indigenous concerns such as issues of development, cultural rights, and land rights. Mattiace argues that indigenous people embraced autonomy demands based on their experiences as a way to govern themselves as Indians. She connects the spread of autonomy as an indigenous demand to the international indigenous rights movement and
the justifications that discourses about indigenous human rights provide for autonomy as a legitimate demand (Mattiace 2003).

June Nash also asserts the indigenous nature of the Zapatista movement and argues that the Zapatistas understand the role of the Mexican state and their objectives as a movement through the prism of their local indigenous cultures. Nash recognizes indigenous culture and the Zapatista reaction to processes of neoliberal globalization that force indigenous communities to confront global economic currents as two of the most important factors that shape the ideas that the Zapatistas hold about politics and mobilization strategies (Nash 2001).

In a somewhat similar manner to van der Harr, Rosalva Aída Hernández Castillo in an important 2006 article confronted directly the ways in which the Zapatistas understand the state and political parties. Unlike van der Haar, she focuses on the Zapatistas and their supporters as mobilized indigenous people. Hernández Castillo argues that the Zapatistas have distanced themselves from political parties and the Zapatista leadership has urged its members to boycott elections because they do not think that any of Mexico’s three major parties serves the needs of indigenous people. The Zapatistas decided to abandon the possibility of political alliances, in part, because they observed abuses by political party members of all ideological spectrums against indigenous people. They also felt rejected by the Mexican political Left when the major leftist party, the PRD, did not champion indigenous rights in congress (Hernández Castillo 2006).

Much of the scholarship on the Zapatista’s ideas and practices of indigenous autonomy tends to examine Zapatista autonomy regimes non-critically. Scholars like
Mattiace, Stephen, and Nash, view autonomy as the logical extension of indigenous rights. Other recent scholarship, in contrast, has reevaluated what the Zapatistas mean by autonomy and begun to reveal the inequalities that are inherent in many Zapatista autonomous governments by investigating the ways in which these governments function. The Mexican activist and scholar, Araceli Burguete Cal y Mayor’s important examination of the Zapatista’s de facto autonomous governments firmly situates the EZLN and Zapatista supporters’ processes of building official autonomous regimes within a pattern of factional rivalry throughout indigenous areas of Chiapas that the Zapatista rebellion exacerbated (Burguete 2003; 2005).

Burguete supports the Zapatistas’ wishes for autonomy but she argues that the de facto process by which the EZLN consolidated many of its autonomous municipalities tends to exacerbate local tensions because EZLN supporters live alongside indigenous people who are neutral or hostile towards the Zapatista project. In addition, the state’s failure to recognize processes of autonomy leaves autonomous communities in direct conflict with official communities. Burguete argues that state actors are aware that as long as autonomy regimes remain de facto, conflict between indigenous people over local government will continue. She suspects that the government’s failure to officially recognize indigenous autonomy is a ploy to undermine the Zapatistas and other indigenous organizations working for autonomy by letting communal-level conflicts continue indefinitely (Burguete 2003).

Most scholars who choose to study the Zapatistas view the movement in a positive manner. Juan Pedro Viqueira, a Mexican historian whose work concerns Chiapas, cautions, however, that much of the enthusiasm for the Zapatistas among
scholars and especially among ordinary Mexicans rests on an incomplete understanding of recent history in Chiapas. The image of Chiapas that many activist Mexicans share as a state that did not experience land reform in which indigenous people have clung to their time-honored traditions without state interference is a misinterpretation that the Mexican Left embraced to justify the Zapatista rebellion and explain its goals. In reality Chiapas experienced extensive land reform and indigenous communities are neither isolated from the state economy or national politics. Although cattle ranches, which were immune to land reform, offer a possible source of land for poor peasants, land reform cannot solve the problems of poverty in Chiapas. There is not enough land left in areas with large campesino populations. In addition, indigenous customs do not draw on an ancient pre-hispanic way of life, but rather are fairly recent in origin and reflect diverse cultural influences (Viqueira 1999).

Viqueira is one of small number of serious academics who remains highly critical of the Zapatistas’ political tactics. He argues that the leftist tendency to sympathize with the Zapatistas has led many scholars to justify the Zapatista uprising rather to explain it. Viqueira forcefully supports electoral democracy and Mexico’s recent democratization. His chief criticisms of the Zapatistas concern characteristics of the movement which he views as antithetical to electoral democracy (Viqueira 1999; 2000).

In his work on the Zapatistas, Collier detailed how economic stress from the agrarian crisis and economic austerity of the 1980s has exacerbated communal divisions in the highlands of Chiapas. In response to the crises of the 1980s, some members of indigenous communities found alternate means to generate income. Class and political divisions began to rupture many communities along factional lines. Conflicts between
factions within highland indigenous communities increased after the Zapatista uprising. Collier points to the existing divisions in these communities to explain why Zapatista supporters and other community members clashed so intensely in the highlands in the years following the Zapatista uprising (Collier with Lowery Quaratiello 1999).

Viqueira presents a slightly different explanation for the increase in factional violence. He blames the PRI’s discriminatory policies and the Zapatistas’ refusal to vote in elections for provoking the violence that plagues many indigenous areas of Chiapas. Viqueira accuses the Zapatista leadership of lacking respect for electoral democracy. Most scholars of the Zapatistas view their boycott of elections as a misguided attempt to protest the federal government and carve out local autonomy. Viqueira, in contrast, suggests that the Zapatista leadership may have had more instrumental reasons to avoid electoral politics. He proposes that the Zapatista leaders demanded that their followers abstain from elections in order to ensure that their supporters would look toward the EZLN rather than the state to solve their problems, which would increase the EZLN’s local power (Viqueira 1999; 2000).

The Mapuche Movement

In contrast to the extensive literature on the 1994 Zapatista uprising, fewer scholars study the Mapuche in Chile. José Bengoa is among the most prominent Chilean scholars of Mapuche history. His study of Mapuche history from the colonial period until the early twentieth century remains one of the pioneering studies of the Mapuche experience in Chile (Bengoa 2000). Other scholars, such as Jorge Pinto Rodriguez, have followed Bengoa and written histories about the Mapuche people. Pinto, for example,
focuses on the ways in which Chilean leaders dealt with the Mapuche question during the formation of the Chilean state (Pinto Rodríguez 2003).

Histories of the Mapuche peoples’ experiences under Spanish colonialism and after Chilean independence illuminate the antecedents of modern Mapuche relations with the Chilean state but provide only limited insights into the current Mapuche movement. Other works, such as Rolf Foerster and Sonia Montecino’s examination of Mapuche organizations from the turn of the twentieth century through 1970, provide important context about how Mapuche views about politics and organizational strategies have evolved over the course of the twentieth century (Foerster and Montecino 1988). In addition to outside scholars, Mapuche intellectuals, several of whom are quite prolific, have also written descriptive and analytical articles about the Mapuche movement as well as policy prescriptions that set forth their desired goals for future mobilization.⁴

Among the authors who write about current Mapuche mobilization, Florencia Mallon and Patricia Richards have been particularly successful at foregrounding mobilized Mapuche’s views about appropriate political strategies and covering Mapuche relations with the state (Richards 2004, 2005; Mallon 2005).

Mallon (2005) constructed a compelling history of the coastal Mapuche community of Nicolás Ailío through oral histories, interviews, and archival research. Through her detailed twentieth-century history of one Mapuche community, Mallon illuminates the ways that rural Mapuche people experienced the major changes in recent Chilean politics from the rise of land reform in the 1960s and early 1970s, to the brutality and repression of the Pinochet dictatorship, to the transition to democracy and the new opportunities that the current Mapuche mobilization brought to ordinary Mapuche
communities. Through the story of the residents of Nicolás Ailío, she reveals some of the competing ways that members of Mapuche communities have understood their place in Chilean society. She argues that two major currents of thought, one that embraced radical collective action and the other that justified following legal avenues of conflict resolution and enduring life’s difficulties from a moral high ground, competed for influence within Nicolás Ailío and to some extent throughout Mapuche society (Mallon 2005).

Richards (2004) takes a broader approach. She compares how Mapuche women and pobladoras, or poor urban women, experience Chilean citizenship differently and pursue different types of claims and activism toward the post-dictatorship Chilean state. She argues that Mapuche women activists base their advocacy around their experiences as members of a distinct indigenous people. She asserts that although many of the demands that Mapuche women make towards state agencies are redistributive most Mapuche activists underscore even their redistributive demands with a clear sense of Mapuche identity. Their relationship with the state rests on their understanding of themselves as part of an indigenous people (Richards 2004).

Richards’ emphasis of the strength of Mapuche identities and Mallon’s insight that Mapuche activism often simultaneously followed competing legal and radical routes provide a valuable vantage point to expand our understanding of how activists in the Mapuche movement have understood their state and political parties.
Deciphering Indigenous Movements: Beyond the Cases

Studies of indigenous mobilization in countries other than Mexico and Chile also shed light upon the question of why different groups of mobilized indigenous people pursue distinctive types of goals and form different degrees of alliances with political parties. As indigenous mobilization increased markedly throughout Latin America in the late 1980s and 1990s, scholars hailing from disciplines such as anthropology, political science, sociology, and history adopted the task of explaining the rise in indigenous mobilization. Some of these researchers worked to illuminate the reasons why organized indigenous people had begun to mobilize in novel ways to demand greater rights, while others examined the varying relationships between indigenous citizens and their governments throughout the region.

Distinct theoretical schools have not developed among scholars of indigenous mobilization. Controversies within the literature occur primarily over the proper interpretation of specific movements and events rather than over what overarching theory best explains indigenous mobilization. Although some scholars study indigenous mobilization in general and address cross-national topics such as constitutional reform or indigenous party formation, the vast majority of studies of Latin American indigenous mobilization examine movements within single countries or sub-regions.

Single Case Studies

A large and diverse group of scholars have tackled the question of indigenous mobilization by studying the dynamics of mobilization within a single country or sub-national region. In their attempts to understand specific facets of indigenous activism in
diverse states, they have greatly expanded scholarly knowledge about modern indigenous people as political actors throughout Latin America. Their studies of specific cases of mobilization have begun to reveal how indigenous people in states like Guatemala, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua understood their own identities and why groups of mobilized indigenous people formed in each state.

Scholars of indigenous mobilization gravitated to areas of Latin America with large indigenous populations or particularly notable movements. Like the scholars who studied the Zapatistas and Mapuche, most scholars who focused on studying how and why indigenous people had mobilized in specific states did not generalize beyond their own single-case studies. Understanding the dynamics of mobilization within a single country proved such a difficult and intriguing enough task that for many authors generalizations about the breadth of indigenous mobilization throughout all of Latin America seemed unwarranted or unnecessarily speculative.

Many scholars of indigenous movements who focus on issues of indigenous identity and mobilization within single countries focus on states with large indigenous populations. Scholarship on Guatemala, Bolivia, and Ecuador has proliferated, while fewer studies focus on Latin American states in which indigenous people comprise fairly small minorities of the total population.5

Thinking of Latin American indigenous mobilization as a large mosaic that spans many Latin American states, individual single-case studies are like tiles in the mosaic. Scholars who focus on a single case of mobilization or mobilization within a single country focus on the tiles rather than on the entire mosaic. They pursue important questions that are necessary for understanding local or national mobilization and can shed
important light on indigenous movements other than those they study. Despite the
important work that is being done in single case studies, the questions that scholars of
specific movements or countries ask and the level of detail with which they describe their
cases, while appropriate for their studies, do not form an overall picture of indigenous
mobilization in the region. Adopting a broader perspective becomes necessary to answer
questions that involve indigenous people across multiple states and mobilizations.
Stepping back to view the mosaic, some of the details of the tiles disappear, but other
details that seem unimportant on the local or national level suddenly pop into bold relief
as part of an overarching pattern.

_Indigenous People and the State: Charles R. Hale and Neoliberal Multiculturalism_

Charles R. Hale developed the concept of “neoliberal multiculturalism” based on
his study of Guatemala’s indigenous politics. He defines “neoliberal multiculturalism” as
an ideological system “whereby proponents of neoliberal doctrine pro-actively endorse a
substantive, if limited, version of indigenous cultural rights, as a means to resolve their
own problems and advance their political agendas” (Hale 2002, 487). Neoliberal
politicians embrace the idea of a “shrinking state” that intervenes in a minimal manner
within society in order to allow economic markets and individuals maximum room to
exist without state intervention. As such, neoliberal states do little to remedy preexisting
inequalities. Because neoliberalism removes the responsibility for social welfare from
direct state control, neoliberal politicians look to civil society or independent
organizations to fulfill some social needs. States pursue neoliberal multiculturalism when
state actors’ embrace of neoliberalism coupled with their simultaneous realization that
discriminating against indigenous people is unacceptable creates a situation in which state actors support indigenous movements’ claims based on diversity but reject other claims that conflict with the basic tenets of neoliberalism (Hale 2002).

Hale argues that from the 1990s onward, the neoliberal Guatemalan state, far from unilaterally rejecting the claims of mobilized Mayans, attempted to channel indigenous mobilization towards demands that state leaders found acceptable. State leaders accepted indigenous peoples’ demands for recognition-based concessions, such as officially recognizing indigenous people as an integral part of the nation and providing bilingual education. They did not object to integrating indigenous people politically while recognizing their cultural differences. In contrast, neoliberal leaders tried to minimize indigenous peoples’ demands to alter neoliberal policies and reframed these demands as radical and unacceptable (Hale 2002).

Hale developed the concept of neoliberal multiculturalism to explain the Guatemalan government’s current behavior towards Mayan indigenous movements. Rosamel Millamán and Hale later theorized that state leaders’ embrace of some indigenous organizations and demands at the expense of others creates the category of “indio permitido” or authorized Indian within the indigenous movement. State leaders contrast indigenous organizations or individuals that pursue demands that remain within bounds that do not challenge the neoliberal state with indigenous organizations and individuals who pursue more challenging demands. When state leaders and other elites view indigenous people who are willing to work within the limits that the state sets as the legitimate representatives of mobilized indigenous peoples, or “indios permitidos” and treat them accordingly, it becomes easier for these elites to reject indigenous
organizations or individuals who make demands that challenge the neoliberal state as radical and marginal to the “legitimate” indigenous movement. Hale and Millamán note that in the case of Chile, the state’s distinction between Mapuche organizations that advocate autonomy and contest state polices and other Mapuche organizations and activists that fall into the category of “indio permitidos” is entirely arbitrary because both “groups” overlap considerably (Hale and Millamán 2006).

Yun-Joo Park and Patricia Richards (2007) applied the concept of neoliberal multiculturalism more directly to the Chilean Mapuche movement. They studied the ideas that Mapuche individuals who hold state jobs possess about the Mapuche movement and the state. Park and Richards asked the question of whether Mapuche workers who took on state employment could act in their own interests and in the interests of the Mapuche people by following their own ideas of appropriate behavior or whether they became “authorized Indians” who only pursue courses of thought and action in keeping with the government’s goals. They found “that when Mapuche workers enter state employment, the historical struggle of their people as well as contemporary anti-state sentiments are present in their minds. They are undeniably participating in neoliberal multiculturalism, yet many simultaneously resist it” (Park and Richards 2007, 1324).

Hale’s theory of neoliberal multiculturalism and subsequent authors’ efforts to test and elaborate his theory provide a strong insight into how the ideologies that government leaders hold shape their value as allies for mobilized indigenous people.
General Studies: From Constitutional Reform, to Political Party Formation, to

Explaining Mobilization

In contrast to the researchers who concentrate on understanding particular cases of mobilization, some scholars of indigenous mobilization use cross-national comparisons to illuminate the rapid proliferation of Latin American indigenous movements. These scholars attempt to explain the mosaic of indigenous mobilization rather than concentrating on particular details in the design. Scholars who study Latin American indigenous movements across multiple states focus on three major phenomena in terms of how indigenous people interact with their states.  

Several scholars of Latin American politics have studied the process of constitutional reform that some Latin American states have pursued to inscribe indigenous rights and official recognition into their national constitutions. Studies of constitutional reform, while fascinating in their own right, tend to concentrate on the state-level and international phenomena that make reform possible rather than on why indigenous movements pursue constitutional recognition. As such, these studies provide little aid in deciphering the reasons behind mobilized indigenous peoples’ differing appreciations for state and political party allies and differing expectations of proper government behavior.

Nowhere is the impact of indigenous mobilization on state structures more visible than in the Andean countries of Ecuador and Bolivia, where powerful indigenous movements have reshaped the political process. In several pioneering studies, Donna Lee Van Cott has examined the factors behind the evolution of ethnic indigenous parties. Because successful indigenous parties exist primarily in the Andean states of Bolivia and
Ecuador, studies of indigenous parties tend to focus on these states. Van Cott argues that declining confidence in traditional political parties and an overall absence of leftist alternatives to the neoliberal consensus motivated indigenous people to form their own parties. A permissive institutional environment in which creating new parties and gaining ballot access proved relatively easy facilitated the development of indigenous parties. The fragmentation of traditional parties and the presence of strong indigenous social movements in the states in question also facilitated the emergence of indigenous political parties (Van Cott 2003; 2005). While Van Cott’s work illuminates why national-level indigenous parties developed in Ecuador and Bolivia and have not emerged, for example, in Peru, studies of indigenous parties tend to only apply to countries with large enough indigenous populations or permissive electoral rules that make the success of indigenous parties feasible. Neither Mexico nor Chile has developed national-level indigenous parties although there is a strong recent push for a regional Mapuche party in the IX Region of Chile.

Scholars of indigenous parties have paid little attention to what leads indigenous parties to make different types of demands. Van Cott assumes that indigenous people compete politically for state control for the same reasons that non-indigenous people want to control the state (Van Cott 2001). Raúl L. Madrid notes that indigenous parties that gain significant representation are extremely unlikely to make exclusionary ethnic appeals, and even parties that appeal primarily to members of one indigenous ethnic group must forge alliances with other parties once they come to power (Madrid 2005b). Although studies of indigenous political parties provide important insights about how indigenous people in some states have begun to access political power and how large
indigenous populations affect party politics, they provide little aid in understanding the goals of indigenous movements beyond the instrumental goal of gaining access to state power.

Theorists who examine the factors that have caused an upswing in indigenous mobilization from the 1980s onward provide some insights about how indigenous people react to changes in their states’ political systems and international trends. Alison Brysk argues that indigenous people throughout Latin America were able to turn “weakness into strength” by appealing to international human rights networks whose participants saw indigenous people as exotic and deserving of aid. She argues that indigenous people have reached out to international networks in order to gain allies and pressure their states from the early emergence of indigenous movements in the 1960s and 1970s until present (Brysk 1996; 2000). Brysk asserts that: “The Indian rights movement was able to act globally because it acted as a new social movement based on identity and consciousness rather than objective material position” (Brysk 1996, 39). Actors in the international human rights movement were willing to ally with indigenous peoples in ways they did not ally with comparable poor Latin Americans. Brysk views democratization as naturally leading to more respect for human rights and indigenous rights. Her optimistic view of democratization is problematic in light of the work of other scholars like Hale, and in light of the limited gains that indigenous movements have been able to achieve in democratic states. Brysk’s work strongly suggests that indigenous leaders must adopt the discourse and norms of the international indigenous rights movement in order to take advantage of international networks of resources (Brysk 1996; 2000).
Deborah Yashar, in contrast, focuses on trends in Latin American domestic phenomena to explain the increase in indigenous mobilization after the 1980s. Among the scholars who study indigenous mobilization, Yashar is among the most heavily referenced. She argues that the Latin American indigenous movements emerged out of the context of changing citizenship regimes. The corporatist citizenship regimes of the mid-twentieth century provided indigenous people with an incentive to organize as peasants while still providing indigenous communities with local autonomy that preserved indigenous identities. After the switch to neo-liberal citizenship regimes that accompanied the region-wide trend of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s, indigenous people lost their access to the state. They then began mobilizing as Indians to redress discrimination and demand community rights. Yashar argues that the presence of transcommunity networks and public associational space facilitated mobilization, and that the difference in these conditions in different societies helps to explain the differences in the strength and timing of their indigenous movements (Yashar 1998; 1999; 2005).

Although Yashar formulates a theory of indigenous mobilization that applies to all of Latin America, she primarily has tested her theory on the three Andean states of Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. Her analysis spans the middle to late twentieth century and she does not concern herself with explaining late colonial indigenous rebellions or why indigenous people did not widely mobilize as Indians during the period after the end of the colonial period and before the spread of corporatist citizenship regimes in the middle of the twentieth century.

One of the principal flaws in Yashar’s conception of indigenous relations with their states is that she assumes that all states and movements have similar characteristics.
Her work implies that the motives of state elites who crafted indigenous policies and the ability of state structures to penetrate rural indigenous communities are roughly equivalent throughout the region. The work of several prominent Latin American historians draws Yashar’s basic assumptions about the motivations of Latin American elites and the strength of Latin American states into question.

Insights from Other Literatures

*Nationalism, State Formation, and Peasant Politics*

Theorists like Yashar consider indigenous relations with the state as a linear process. In Yashar’s formation, indigenous people are able to persist in their communities only in regions into which the assimilatory power of the state cannot reach. However, work on state penetration of indigenous communities, most notably Jan Rus’ study of the PRI co-option of government structures in the *Los Altos* region of Chiapas, reveal that state penetration does not necessarily lead to the demise of indigenous communities. To the contrary, state actors may have a vested interest in the persistence of indigenous structures of governance if they are able to co-opt these structures. The Mexican experience in Chiapas suggests that assimilatory impulses and policies of co-option that aim to bind indigenous communities to the state while maintaining the ‘indigenous’ nature of these communities can exist simultaneously within the same state bureaucracy (Rus 1994).

One of the main faults of cross-national scholarship of indigenous mobilization is that when researchers pause to consider how indigenous people in different countries understand their states, they treat the state as a single entity. Many studies of indigenous
mobilization focus on indigenous movements as reactions to policies of the state rather than as actors in their own right whose motivations stretch beyond current state policies. States are not static entities. Groups within society must work to shape and form states. Because different groups work to influence the form that their state will take, indigenous peoples and other groups who mobilize to change their societies have an opportunity to alter state policies through their mobilization. Several prominent historians have advanced influential theories about state formation that help to disaggregate the state and to conceptualize how movements can change states. I argue that movement actors develop different understandings about the roles that state leaders should take towards their movements based on their experiences with the processes of state formation that occurred and are currently occurring in their states.

Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent (1994) introduced new ideas about Latin American state formation in collaboration with other prominent scholars of Mexico in an effort to apply notions of state formation to better understand the Mexican Revolution and postrevolutionary Mexico. Drawing on Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer’s influential book, *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution*, about how the industrialized English state formed through centuries of cultural transformation, Joseph and Nugent argued for a Gramscian conceptualization of the state as an arena in which subaltern and dominant cultures and ideas vie for influence. In their words, “values, visions, and memories embedded in local society [are]…constructed and reconstructed or, better, “imagined” …. in specific political contexts inflected by distinctions of class, ethnicity, and gender” (Joseph and Nugent 1994, 23). Their idea of the state as an arena of ideological contestation in which different groups compete for influence suggests that
even when dominant groups monopolize societal resources, weaker groups still have the potential to shift processes of state formation to meet their own needs.

Florencia E. Mallon elaborates on how processes of ideological and political competition influence state formation. In her words: “State institutions are locations or spaces where conflicts over power are constantly being resolved and hierarchically reordered” (Mallon 1995, 10). She argues that because different groups within society never have equal power, dominant groups tend to win conflicts over the form of the state. Subaltern groups are not quiescent, and to a greater or lesser degree, their ideas also shape the state. Mallon differentiates between “hegemonic process” in which “power and meaning are contested, legitimated, and redefined at all levels of society” and “hegemony” as the precarious end point of these contests (Mallon 1995, 6).

To Mallon, nationalism is not an ideology that hegemonic elites impose from above; rather subaltern people and even peasants can become nationalists. She argues that the rural community members, such as local political officials, teachers, elders, and healers, who mediate between rural communities and the outside world are “local intellectuals” who influence the dominant ideas within their communities. As Mallon notes, and the work of James C. Scott makes abundantly clear, peasant communities are not undifferentiated, static societies and instead contain powerful and less powerful individuals enmeshed in local hierarchies. In rural communities, whether in Latin America, South East Asia, or some other area of the world, some members of the community have better access to money and influence than other community members (Scott 1976, 1984; Mallon 1995). These influential community members are key in
shaping the dominant ideas of the community and creating peasant nationalisms (Mallon 1995).

Peasants became local nationalists by embracing the elements of the national project such as freedom, liberty, and democracy that promised them the possibility of better lives through inclusion in the state. When dominant groups accepted the ideas of peasant nationalists, however haltingly, and peasants won incorporation into the state, states were able to expand with greater popular support. For example, Mallon argues that a central distinction between Mexico and Peru is the distinction “between a Mexican state that emerged as hegemonic because it incorporated a part of the popular agenda and a Peruvian state that never stabilized precisely because it repeatedly repressed and marginalized popular political cultures” (Mallon 1995, 311).

Mallon’s work suggests that state strength is never independent of state form. States that rest on narrow bases are less stable or strong than those that extend their reach to incorporate the popular sectors into the project of state formation. Her work also reveals that while excluded groups can become nationalists, peasant nationalism is more likely to persist in states in which local communities gain some degree of incorporation into the national project that allows them to develop strong identifications with their states.

James C. Scott’s pioneering work on how peasants cope with their position in society has important implications for the study of how mobilized indigenous people understand their states. Scott focuses on peasant farmers in Southeast Asia in his scholarship, but presents ideas that suggest parallels to other agrarian societies. Scott (1976) argues that the experience of living as subsistence farmers causes peasant
communities to develop certain “moral economies” based on their notions of appropriate behavior. He asserts that: “Woven into the tissue of peasant behavior…whether in normal local routines or in the violence of an uprising, is the structure of a shared moral universe, a common notion of what is just” (Scott 1976, 167). He argues that common ideas about justice and proper behavior motivate outrage and collective action among peasants and that peasants’ moral universe usually functions around a norm of reciprocity in which the state or wealthy individuals should not demand taxes or rents that interfere with subsistence or abandon paternalistic behaviors while still expecting peasants to provide them with equal resources (Scott 1976).

Scott identifies a “moral economy,” or a certain normative understanding that peasants share due to the common pressures of living as peasants. To Scott, most peasant rebellions look “backward” rather than forward and attempt to restore previously tolerable orders rather than crafting new societies. In his words, “far from hoping to improve their relative position in the social stratification, peasant rebellions are typically desperate efforts to maintain subsistence arrangements that are under assault” (Scott 1976, 187). Most Latin American indigenous movements do not fall within the parameters of Scott’s backward-looking peasant revolts. In addition, more recent scholarship has called the once orthodox idea that peasants tend to be backward-looking reactionaries into question. Steve Stern, for example, urges that scholars of peasant politics “should treat peasant consciousness as problematic rather than predictable” and not ignore the role of ethnicity and agency in shaping peasant politics (Stern 1987, 15). Stern bases his suggestion on the results of numerous studies of Andean rebellions, but his suggestions serve as a general caution against determining any group’s motivations
primarily through structural characteristics of the group. In any case, indigenous people no longer occupy primarily the structural position of substance farmers in most Latin American societies. In Chile, most Mapuche live in urban areas. In Chiapas, Mexico, even though most indigenous people are campesinos, most indigenous farmers grow at least some cash crops and ride the perilous divide between subsistence and ruin in response to fluctuations in national and international prices.

*Ideas, Movements, and Critical Julctures*

Studies of state formation suggest that the ideas that people hold strongly influence the ways that they interact with their states. Mark Blyth, a political scientist, further elaborates how ideas can become vital tools in contests to shape the state. His work on how economic ideas affected twentieth century governments’ economic policies during periods of depression represents one of the best articulated theories of how the ideas that economic actors hold determine their behavior. Blyth developed his theory of the importance of ideas for institutional change to apply to economic crises in which uncertainty predominates and actors have no factual way of evaluating what institutional changes will prove most beneficial to their interests. He asserts that in such situations, economic actors must rely on their ideas about proper behavior and how the world works in order to make decisions because regardless of how much information they gather, no objective criteria exists to determine the proper plan of action. Although Blyth only theorizes about economic actors in crisis periods, his insights are applicable to other situations in which people must make complicated decisions about how to act collectively (Blyth 2002).
The argument that the ideas and ideologies that political actors hold fundamentally shape their behavior, while an acknowledged fact to most historians, went out of fashion among political scientists and economists with the advent of rational choice theory and only recently has begun to reenter the theoretical mainstream, permeating both rational choice studies as well as more institutional or constructivist approaches. Blyth argues that the separation that many political scientists make between ideas and institutions as two discrete elements that can affect political behavior independently is inherently wrong because it does not acknowledge that how political actors think fundamentally influences their choice of institutions. To Blyth, ideas serve as weapons in that they allow actors to delegitimate existing economic institutions and as resources that bind actors to a specific collective goal. In his words: “Put simply, economic ideas not only facilitate collective action and radical policy change but are in fact prerequisites for them” because they allow agents to argue for policy change by pointing out the flaws in existing institutions (Blyth 2002, 39). Shared ideas serve as an organizational resource that facilitates mobilization around a common cause (Blyth 2002).

Blyth’s theory echoes work by Mallon, who asserts that universalistic ideas can motivate groups to collective action by creating an avenue for marginalized groups to argue that they deserve the benefits of citizenship based on the principles that state elites espouse. Mallon notes that from the seventeenth century until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, nationalist and democratic discourses “identified the potential autonomy, dignity, and equality of all peoples, and people, in the world” while states whose elites espoused these discourses promoted colonialism and denied liberty and
citizenship to whole classes of people (Mallon 1995, 9). According to Mallon, “This contradiction between promise and practice became a central tension in the historically dynamic construction of discourses and movements” (Mallon 1995, 9).

Mallon argues that Mexican and Peruvian peasants between 1850 and 1910 who experienced the struggles to defend the countries from foreign invasion became nationalists in part because of the promises that being Mexican or Peruvian held for their communities. In her words: “Throughout the world between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, the discourse of universal promise inspired struggles to break open the notions of citizenship” (Mallon 1995, 9). Blyth and Mallon present concrete evidence that ideas can become weapons to tear down existing orders. In addition, the ideologies that dominant groups espouse may hold the seeds of the old order’s downfall. When generations of state leaders justify their leadership and form their states through universal promises yet keep those promises only to a privileged few, subaltern groups acquire a way to gain representation and equality by turning the state’s own discourse against it.

An emphasis on the role of ideology as a weapon and mobilizing force that dispossessed groups can use to better their lives, should not obscure the very real material considerations that also shape how people think. As Scott’s work reveals, subsistence farmers build their own moral economies in part due to the stresses and circumstances that they face as peasants. Peoples’ structural place in a society can influence their ideas, as can culture and other aspects of their daily experiences. Alan Knight’s caution that, “the importance of ideology and identity can be fully appreciated only when these ‘subjective’ elements are in turn related to the structural and material circumstances—circumstances not of their own making—within which men (and women) made history,”
applies to all studies of ideology (Knight 1992, 114). Nevertheless, understanding how mobilized indigenous people think about the roles that political leaders and the state should take towards their movement sheds important light on the factors that led to the variation and similarities among indigenous’ movements goals and willingness to craft alliances with other political actors.
II. THEORY

Building a strong explanation for why mobilized indigenous people in Chile, Chiapas, Mexico, and throughout Latin America adopt different types of goals and pursue varied strategies of engagement with the state and political parties to forward their goals, requires an examination of the domestic and international pressures that influence mobilized indigenous peoples. The goals that indigenous movements pursue fall into three broad categories that correspond to the desire for recognition, redistribution, and autonomy. Domestic and international factors influence the degree to which indigenous movements pursue each of these goals.

The transnational rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and the strengthening of the international indigenous movement in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s provide partial explanations for why indigenous organizations pursue different goals and vary in their willingness to ally themselves with political parties and the state. Hale’s work on neoliberal multiculturalism suggests that if state elites embrace neoliberalism and do not believe that discrimination against indigenous people is acceptable, they will answer mobilized indigenous peoples’ demands for recognition but ignore demands that challenge neoliberal principles. Indigenous movements will be able to gain from an alliance with the state if they pursue demands that do not conflict with the neoliberal state. Some redistributive demands may conflict with neoliberalism, while others may not. Whether state leaders recognize a conflict between indigenous movements’
redistributive goals and the neoliberal order will depend on the extent of the movement’s redistributive aspirations and the state leaders’ interpretations of neoliberalism. The rise of neoliberalism offers little insight into whether political elites will accept indigenous peoples’ demands related to the goal of autonomy. Neoliberalism, in principle, encourages the decentralization of the state and the delegation of state resources, yet some neoliberal states remain highly centralized and autonomy demands can undermine neoliberal policies if the groups advocating for autonomy do not accept neoliberalism.

In contrast, the indigenous rights movement provides legal justification for indigenous peoples to pursue some degree of autonomy from their states. It also has facilitated the spread of the idea that indigenous people deserve recognition as important members of their states and that states should act to preserve rather than assimilate indigenous identities. Neither the degree to which states or political parties embrace neoliberalism or the degree to which indigenous people and political elites have absorbed the tenants of the international indigenous rights movement fully explain the differences in indigenous movements’ goals and political strategies.

International shifts acquire meaning through their interactions with national politics and ideas. The differences in the historical process of state formation throughout Latin America led to different levels of inclusion and exclusion for indigenous people. Governments have the ability to alter how residents in a given state live. They can also influence how members of the country think by propagating ideas through social and political programs. States do not exist outside of history. People form states. As the work of Latin Americanists like Gilbert M. Joseph, Daniel Nugent, Alan Knight, and Florencia E. Mallon reveals, issues of inclusion and exclusion and whether the popular
classes would have a say in the shape of their state and its programs featured prominently in the formation of modern Latin American states in the nineteenth and early to mid twentieth centuries.

States whose leaders included indigenous people as campesinos and recognized the indigenous heritage of their societies attempted to assimilate indigenous peoples. Assimilation could destroy indigenous identities and denied indigenous people self-determination and the right to make decisions about their lives as Indians. Inclusion in the national project, however, also facilitated a reliance on the state among indigenous people and led indigenous campesinos to form specific expectations of proper state behavior based on the promises that past nationalist leaders had made to campesinos. In contrast, indigenous peoples who faced state elites who primarily excluded them from the national project and who denied the presence of indigenous people as an integral component of society developed a lesser reliance on state institutions and fewer expectations that the state should provide for the people. Excluded peoples did not face as strong a pressure to assimilate as peoples who were included more strongly in their states’ nationalist projects. Exclusion did not necessarily take the form of isolation from state processes; it could also take the form of the denial of indigenous peoples’ rights to expect benefits and aid from the state. The nationalist project could explicitly treat indigenous people as a group that might supply tax revenue but to whom the state held few if any duties and who could not expect to participate in government. In addition, indigenous peoples who found themselves excluded from public life or unrecognized as part of society might still receive some benefits from the state.
No states relied on firmly excluding or incorporating indigenous people. Over time state leaders might alternate exclusion with incorporation or make distinctions between so-called “civilized indigenous peoples” who they could claim deserved membership in the state and “barbarous Indians” who they argued did not. Nevertheless, by the middle of the twentieth century, Latin American states had firmly crafted nationalist ideologies that gave various degrees of emphasis to the contribution of indigenous people to their societies and the possibility that the state would act as a patron for rural people.

The expectations that the members of indigenous movements hold about appropriate political behavior on the part of state actors and other political leaders and the degree to which the leaders of indigenous movements recognize opportunities to build alliances with political leaders depend in part on how national-level characteristics filter through to the local level. Indigenous people build their understandings of the motives and behavior of political actors based on their observations of these actors in action. Even if a political party or state leader is nominally receptive of indigenous rights or demands on a national level, if the party or the leader’s followers engage in behaviors that disrupt local indigenous communities these communities will be highly unlikely to support alliances with political actors that do not support them in their local struggles. Members of indigenous movements understand state behavior through both national and local politics. Political parties’ actions on the local level or in specific areas inform indigenous peoples understanding of their national agendas.
Goals and Expectations

Mobilized indigenous organizations hold varied ideas about proper political behavior. Indigenous people and communities, like all groups of people, develop specific ideas about how people in power, whether members of the state or of a political party, should behave towards them. Indigenous peoples’ understandings about the duties and responsibilities of these leaders developed out of historical patterns of state formation that set national norms of behavior for politicians with access to state resources in terms of their treatment of indigenous people and campesinos. As a result of these same processes, leftist parties gained differing degrees of power and representation in different Latin American states.

The values that indigenous people who united within a given movement hold shape their understanding of how their movement should interact with the state and political parties. The manner in which historical processes of national construction and nationalist mythmaking included rural peasants and indigenous people influence modern indigenous organizations’ judgments about what types of behavior they can expect from political leaders. State rhetoric matters as well as state behavior. Ideas serve not only as a motivating force that unites mobilized groups but also as an avenue of access to the state. The contradiction between universalistic ideas that promise inclusion and the reality of social exclusion in a society does not cause ideas about equality to lose their relevance for the rural poor. As Florencia Mallon demonstrated, gaps between state rhetoric and reality allow rural people an avenue to contest current state behavior to open up citizenship to their communities by drawing on rhetorical promises of inclusion.
The work of James C. Scott suggests that the structural position that a group of people occupy in a given society helps to shape their understandings of legitimate state behavior. Specific logics of legitimacy underlie any group’s conceptions about proper state behavior. Most indigenous Latin Americans are campesinos, small agrarian producers who provide for their families either through subsistence farming or through strategies of production that allow them to access cash-based markets, or have ties to rural communities. Indigenous people form part of the increasing trend of rural to urban migration within all Latin American states as strategies of survival in the countryside become less viable and attractive to campesinos. In countries in which the majority of the indigenous people have moved to urban areas, urban indigenous people still tend to hold strong emotional ties to their ancestral land and often have family members in rural areas. In states in which indigenous people still occupy lands that their ancestors held before the conquest, the preservation of rural communities matters because they are indigenous territory. The structural position of indigenous communities within the national economy clearly matters for movement formation because despite patterns of migration, agrarian questions and community preservation hold a vital place within indigenous mobilization.

To the agrarian poor, land provides a vital component for survival. Without sufficient land, it becomes increasingly difficult for rural farmers, regardless of their farming strategies, to provide a minimum standard of living for themselves and their families. I argue that while Scott arrived at an important insight through his assertion that peasants ascertain when elites’ behaviors become unacceptable by relying on a set of moral principles that develop within peasant communities, he relies too heavily on the
structural condition of being a peasant rather than ideological components from living in a given society to explain how “moral economies” form. Moving away from pure subsistence farmers or peasants and towards more economically-complicated sectors of the rural poor or urban populations makes Scott’s structural distinction lose explanatory power.

Many political scientists are uncomfortable with the notion that people’s understandings of the world shape human behavior. Building on the work of Mark Blyth and the work of many historians, I argue that the shared ideas that members of an indigenous movement hold allow them to mobilize around common grievances and to form common goals and demands. Shared memories of different histories of conquest and different experiences with the state form ideological foci around which indigenous people can mobilize. The reasons why indigenous people in different societies make distinct and sometimes similar judgments about what goals their movements should pursue stem from indigenous peoples’ views of the proper behavior of national political leaders and from indigenous activists’ views about what the state owes indigenous people. In states in which national leaders and general society symbolically incorporated indigenous people into the nationalist mythology, indigenous movements can draw on nationalist myths to gain national as well as international justification for pursuing the state’s formal recognition of indigenous peoples and advocating for state programs to protect indigenous culture. If new state leaders refuse to recognize indigenous peoples, mobilized indigenous people are likely to feel that the state has failed in its obligations. Indigenous movements can also find justification through past state behaviors for material benefits that fall under the broad rubric of redistribution. When state leaders
emphasized the importance of campesinos or the poor within the national project and took on the obligation to redistribute land or provide other types of aid, the state acquired an obligation to campesinos or other popular sectors. Once the nationalist project has lauded campesinos or other popular groups as integral parts of the state and the state bureaucracy has become a patron to the poor, a future rejection by state leaders of their historical duty will cause campesinos or other popular groups to perceive that these leaders are betraying important national obligations.

I argue that in modern societies, poor rural and urban people can develop much more complicated ideologies than “moral economies” based on their structural position in the economy. Nationalist myths and processes of state formation shape people’s understandings of the duties and obligations of national political leaders. Rural and urban indigenous people evaluate the behaviors of past state leaders and the ideological discourses that buttress their states’ current forms to ascertain what types of treatment they can expect from elite politicians and bureaucrats. If nationalist discourse celebrates campesinos and past state leaders have pursued policies to benefit rural people, in the mind of many campesinos future leaders take on an obligation to continue these policies. Where indigenous and campesino identities overlap, indigenous campesinos can use their campesino identities to claim benefits from the state. The state develops an obligation to the rural poor because past nationalists argued that state structures should serve campesinos that supported their state as nationalists. If processes of state formation and nationalist rhetoric acknowledge the existence of indigenous people and provide them with avenues, however poor, to access state services, mobilized indigenous people can point to the distinction between their own social positions and this celebratory rhetoric to
argue for greater acknowledgement and rights as a vital part of the national community. In contrast, if exclusionary behavior became the norm within state indigenous policies and state actors did not acknowledge often the contributions indigenous people made to their state, these indigenous people will be less likely to identify with the state as nationalists or criticize political leaders for not living up to past norms of interaction.

The level to which the process of national construction and nationalist mythmaking include rural peasants and indigenous people influences mobilized indigenous peoples’ understandings of how their communities fit within the state in which they live and helps to guide their expectations of proper state behavior. The degree to which indigenous people feel that they are an accepted part of the greater society in which they live influences their willingness to identify as members of their state, for example, as Mexicans or Chileans, in addition to their identification as indigenous people.

Alliances and Opportunities

What members of indigenous movements think about the roles that their governments should play towards their movements influences the goals and direction of indigenous mobilization. When some leaders within an indigenous movement calculate that allying with like-minded political parties will bring them greater access to state resources than remaining independent, their movements stand a greater chance of becoming involved with formal politics and state structures then when many leaders within a movement perceive a hostile state. Although racism and discrimination against indigenous people exists to varying degrees within all major political currents, the
electoral Left has often provided the best avenue for indigenous people to form alliances with preexisting political parties.

Mobilized indigenous peoples who form alliances with the existing Left tread a tenuous line between using their new allies to achieve some of the goals of their movements and becoming supporters of an existing political order that lacks a strongly developed commitment to indigenous rights. Hale details how Latin American elites who embrace neoliberalism have been able to accept strategically some indigenous demands while marginalizing others. Although open discrimination against indigenous people lost its social acceptability throughout Latin America by the 1990s, other types of discrimination continue. The lingering effects of the racist consensus, including the idea that strong states must have a unified national people, reverberate through the ways that political actors, including the Left, treat indigenous people. Rightwing political forces often justify denying recognition and autonomy to indigenous peoples based on the factious argument that such recognition will destroy the viability of current states and lead to violent “ethnic conflicts.” Like the elites of earlier times who evoked the threat of “race war” to brutally suppress indigenous and campesino mobilization, modern elites evoke “balkanization” or the “necessity of preserving national unity” to justify their opposition to indigenous rights. Leftist parties provide a better avenue than the Right for indigenous people to make electoral alliances because politicians on the Left, in general, carry their prejudices about indigenous people less openly than those on the Right and leftist goals overlap more fully than conservative goals with the goals of the vast majority of mobilized indigenous people.
Indigenous peoples who form clear minorities in their states have fewer options to provoke political change than indigenous peoples who live in states with large indigenous minorities. Reshaping the political scene by forming indigenous parties becomes a viable option in states in which indigenous peoples comprise a large percentage of the population. In these states, access to resources and the ability of different indigenous peoples to unite within unified parties rather than the size of the potential indigenous vote limits indigenous peoples’ ability to enter electoral politics. In states in which the total indigenous population comprises a relatively small minority of the total population, even if individual indigenous peoples band together based on the shared indigenous identities, they cannot advance their goals in the electoral arena without making alliances with other political forces. The electoral Left provides the best option for alliances because some indigenous concerns fit well into the redistributive agenda of leftist politics and leftist parties tend to be more willing to accept multiculturalism than rightwing parties.

In states in which the Left developed a strong political presence, the presence of leftist parties that allied with rural people created an avenue for mobilized indigenous people in the 1980s onward to access state resources by allying with the existing Left. Indigenous people are more likely to ally with leftist parties that have access to the state than with parties that have uncertain chances of gaining power. Urban-based leftist parties are less beneficial than leftist parties that rely on rural support because they may be able to maintain power while ignoring indigenous concerns which are often strongly linked to issues of rural land rights. If leftist parties that are willing to open the political process for the rural poor control the state, the members of indigenous movements will be
more likely to view the state in a positive manner and work through state agencies to accomplish their goals.

In a political system that contains multiple political parties, mobilized indigenous organizations observe whether their governments or key opposition parties with a chance of controlling government are likely to support them. Political systems that are open towards rural leftist groups offer mobilized indigenous people a better chance of realizing their goals using allies from the government or opposition political parties than political systems that shut out the rural Left from government. Governments that are more open to the interests of rural indigenous people embrace ideologies that support the rural poor and consider it important for their own or their parties’ political standing to court the rural Left. Even leftist governments often discriminate against indigenous people, but parties that rely on rural workers and subsistence farmers for support will be more likely to appeal to indigenous people than parties that do not need their support.

Many indigenous people do not live in rural areas, and members of indigenous communities in increasing numbers have migrated in the past several decades to urban areas in search of work and better lives. Although large portions of many states’ indigenous populations are urban, successful indigenous movements encompass rural communities. For indigenous people to work successfully through the state, government leaders must be open to the concerns of rural indigenous people because rural communities form an important and organized portion of the indigenous population in Latin American states. Even in situations in which the majority of the indigenous population has become urban, some indigenous people living in cities maintain ties with their communities of origin. Even when such ties are weak, urban indigenous people will
be unlikely to identify with any government that discriminates against or fails to provide for rural segments of the indigenous population.

Some caveats exist in this argument. Indigenous people mobilize in order to protest discrimination, to improve their current situations, and most importantly to gain historical *reivindicaciones*, or to reclaim those things which the process of colonialism took from them as peoples. Mobilization is more likely in situations in which indigenous people face real threats. Initial mobilization, is therefore, more likely to occur in situations in which supportive leftist parties do not control the government. Hale’s argument suggests other caveats. If all political parties have absorbed neoliberal ideas, indigenous activists will gain limited benefits from an alliance with the electoral Left. State elites’ ideas about neoliberalism limit what policies political parties offer their constituents.

In a dictatorship or one-party state, indigenous movement activists evaluate the potential for bargains and alliances with state actors based on the ruling party or group’s past and current behavior. In a democracy, when indigenous organizations evaluate their relationships with the state, they must consider not only the behavior of current leaders but also the behavior of viable political parties that may become leaders in the future. Members of indigenous movements gauge a political party’s viability at the national level and its responsiveness toward indigenous and campesino concerns when formulating ideas about the party. The degree to which an indigenous movement enmeshes itself in existing party politics depends on how deeply political party ideologies and platforms appeal to the movement’s leaders and members. A movement’s engagement with political parties also depends on how likely guiding members of the movement judge the
party to take power. Indigenous leaders are more likely to associate with political parties that will lead to viable opportunities for their movement than with less viable parties. Parties that have a history of aiding campesino causes provide better opportunities for mobilized indigenous people than parties that have ignored the rural poor. A history of support for agrarian reform and other campesino causes will not be enough to convince indigenous activists that they should ally with a given party if the party does not continue to embrace policies that aid indigenous people. Mobilized indigenous people should be more willing to work with political parties and to embrace state programs when their favored political parties are in power than when these parties have less influence.

Many Latin American states have weak or corrupt party systems or have suffered from authoritarian rule. Indigenous movements’ relationships with political parties are path dependent. Consequently, in situations in which indigenous activists established positive relationships with parties in a democratic setting and are then faced with a dictatorship, their appreciation for their favored political currents is unlikely to vanish. Indigenous activists remember which parties have aided their communities, and ideological beliefs do not change with a change of regime. If political parties that appealed to indigenous leaders in the past have a good chance of emerging from a dictatorship intact, indigenous activists are likely to continue to support their chosen parties while opposing the state. A functioning party system with a viable Left that supports campesino concerns is the best indicator that indigenous movements or organizations within fragmented movements will ally themselves with existing viable leftist parties and embrace state intervention and programs to institutionalize the movement once their allies control the government.
Political identifications persist. The political parties that indigenous movement actors decide to ally themselves with at one point in time constrict their range of choices for political alliances in the future. Indigenous leaders reflect on past party behavior in order to understand the most probable ways a given party or political current will treat their organizations. Once indigenous activists become enmeshed in politics, continued political involvement becomes easier in the future because the networks and benefits that support such involvement are already in place. Ideologies also help to cement indigenous leaders to a particular political current, and their importance in determining an indigenous movement’s political alliances should not be underestimated. People are more likely to associate with political organizations whose tenants are in accord with their own values. Because most individuals’ political values persist through time, alliances between political actors and indigenous leaders tend to persist to the point that these alliances no longer benefit the movement.
III. METHODOLOGY

This paper examines the ways in which mobilized indigenous people in Mexico and Chile understand the roles that their states and potential state leaders should play towards their movements. It analyzes how the expectations that the members of indigenous movements develop about appropriate state behavior shape the goals that these movements pursue. Indigenous people who identify as patriots and nationalists will be likely to argue that the state has a duty to redistribute resources to their communities and provide for the rural poor. Their view of the state’s responsibilities makes them likely to base their claims for state resources, such as land, primarily on their national citizenship rather than on notions of indigenous rights. Indigenous rights provide an alternate justification for some redistributive claims and especially for land claims. Advocating for a right to autonomy provides an avenue for indigenous people to gain control of their own lives when their communities are not being served by the state.

The degree to which a mobilized indigenous group identifies with the state should determine, in large part, the strength of their demands for autonomy. Indigenous people who were faced with exclusion and marginalization are more likely to make intense autonomy demands early in their mobilization than indigenous people who identify strongly as members of their country. Demands for recognition are ubiquitous among indigenous movements, and recognizing indigenous people as an important part of society provides the easiest way for state leaders to deal with mobilized indigenous people without making drastic changes in terms of state programs and functions. This
paper consequently focuses primarily on the degree to which indigenous organizations
range from professing goals based on the redistributive obligations that past governments
have established towards campesinos to advocating for autonomy and benefits based on
their standing as indigenous people.

Hypotheses

If I restate my primary arguments as hypotheses, the following conditions should
occur in situations in which indigenous people comprise a minority of the state
population and have mobilized:

\( H_{1a} \): The greater the degree to which the process of national construction and nationalist
mythmaking included rural peasants and indigenous people in a given state, the
greater the degree to which mobilized indigenous people will identify with the
state and expect legitimate political leaders to serve their interests.

\( H_{1b} \): The greater the extent to which mobilized indigenous people identify with the state
and expect legitimate political leaders to serve their interests, the more likely they
are to make redistributive demands based on their national citizenship;
Conversely, the lesser the extent to which mobilized indigenous people identify
with the state and expect legitimate political leaders to serve their interests, the
more likely they are to make demands for increased autonomy justified by their
standing as indigenous peoples.

\( H_{2a} \): The greater the current openness to the Left within the state, the more likely that
indigenous movement activists and leaders are to view engagement with the state
as an opportunity.

\( H_{2b} \): The greater the presence of viable leftist parties in the state, the greater the chance
that indigenous movement activists and leaders will pursue allies in political
parties.

Reframing the arguments of this paper as hypotheses lessens some of the
historical specificity and variation in the theory, but does provide a guide to how my
primary arguments generalize across the cases I study and might apply to other states
with moderately-small indigenous minorities. In addition to my primary arguments, the literature suggests other explanations for why indigenous people in different states possess different understandings of appropriate state behavior and engage political parties and the state through different means. The most compelling explanations deal with international shifts in how indigenous people and political actors view appropriate state behavior. The spread of neoliberal ideology and the growing acceptance among national and transnational actors of human rights in general and indigenous rights in particular have undoubtedly influenced the ways mobilized indigenous people conceptualize their relationships with political parties and their states. The spread of human rights norms helps to explain why different movements have adopted similar discourses and demands. In addition, if even leftist political parties embrace neoliberalism, alliances with the electoral Left will not forward indigenous movements’ redistributive goals. In my argument, domestic-level factors provide the principle explanations for indigenous movements’ ideas about proper state behavior and indigenous leaders’ cognizance of political allies. International ideational shifts provide mitigating factors that filter domestic phenomena.

Rather than processes of state formation and national-level phenomena providing the primary explanations for indigenous movements’ different goals and levels of willingness to make alliances with political parties and the state, international shifts could alternatively provide the most important influences. Transnational organizations are sometimes able to reach indigenous people directly without going through state channels. In addition, if all political parties embrace neoliberalism, even leftist parties will not aid
indigenous organizations who strongly pursue redistributive goals and fight against large corporations.

The spread of neoliberalism has not created new logics of appropriateness about politicians’ behavior within indigenous communities. In general, indigenous movements have positioned themselves against neoliberalism rather than accepting neoliberal ideas. Politicians who adopt neoliberal policies earn the ire of mobilized indigenous people when these politicians abandon the duties towards campesinos that previous political actors constructed as part of the normal way of doing politics.

In contrast to neoliberalism, international human rights discourse provides an accepted avenue through which indigenous people can assert their rights. If mobilized indigenous people absorb ideas from the international human rights movement, they will begin to justify their existing demands and to make new demands based on international norms. To some extent, demands for autonomy and official recognition show the influence of the transnational indigenous movement.

Neoliberal ideologists embrace the idea that economic decisions should be made by private corporations rather than the state and argue that national governments do not have an obligation to redistribute wealth and provide for the economic needs of their citizens. An explanation that privileges the spread of neoliberalism would argue that the more political leaders embrace neoliberalism the fewer spaces indigenous people gain to engage the state to make redistributive demands.

Charles R. Hale has revealed through his studies of Guatemala that, rather than destroying indigenous peoples’ ability to access their states, the spread of neoliberal ideologies channels how state leaders and agencies deal with mobilized indigenous
people by creating a dichotomy of legitimate and illegitimate demands. Hale, through his concept of “neoliberal multiculturalism” in which state actors support indigenous organizations’ pursuit of diversity-based demands while ignoring and delegitimating demands that require economic aid or changes in government structure provides a clear insight into how the ideological positions of state leaders and prominent politicians can complicate indigenous peoples’ relationships with their states.14

The spread of neoliberalism does not predict how neoliberal elites will view the goal of indigenous autonomy. Neoliberalism embraces decentralization and the delegation of state power as a way to shrink and reform the state. Neoliberal citizenship, however, finds its basis in the classical liberal ideas of individual rights. Neoliberalism does not provide a guide to whether states should allow groups to possess distinct rights in society. Classical liberal theory tends to be leery of any situations in which groups might limit or violate the rights of individuals because it argues that individuals are the ultimate bearers of rights. In contrast, the neoliberal multiculturalism that Hale asserts is a natural correlate of neoliberal ideologies does provide some levels of rights towards groups such as bilingual education and cultural protections. In order for neoliberal multiculturalism to occur, state leaders must accept that diversity in their societies is acceptable and that indigenous people have a right to recognition and some benefits from the state based on their status as Indians. The spread of neoliberalism does not provide concrete predictions about whether political leaders will accept indigenous demands for autonomy because these leaders’ willingness to accept autonomy demands is dependent on their interpretations of neoliberal ideology.
Different individuals and groups in different states embrace transnational ideas at different rates and for different reasons. Conceptualizing the spread of human rights norms and the spread of neoliberal ideas as two international phenomena that have occurred over roughly the same period of time but have been accepted at different rates among different groups creates multiple possible scenarios. It is likely that the spread of both ideas interacts to create openings or form limits on how likely state actors are to support mobilized indigenous peoples. Table 1 illustrates the manner in which state leaders’ acceptance of human rights norms and neoliberal ideas interact to create different situations that affect the potential for indigenous movements to make alliances with political parties and the state.

Table 1: The Effects of the Spread of Human Rights and Neoliberalism on Indigenous Movements’ Opportunities to Form Alliances with Political Elites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Elites Adopt Human Rights</th>
<th>Political Elites Adopt Neoliberalism</th>
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<tr>
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<td>high</td>
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- decreased opportunities to access the state for indigenous movements
- “neoliberal multiculturalism”
- low international impact on political elites
- increased opportunities for indigenous movements

I argue that indigenous activists will be more likely to engage with political parties which are leftist and have a history of supporting campesino concerns than with other political parties. In addition, indigenous leaders are more likely to ally themselves with viable leftist parties than with parties that have less chance of entering government. If all parties adopt strongly neoliberal ideas, indigenous organizations whose demands
contradict neoliberal ideologies would find only limited benefits from allying with any political currents. In this situation, politicians’ ideas rather than their political affiliations would provide the limiting factor in terms of how indigenous leaders conceived their opportunities to ally with political parties. Even if the electoral Left embraces neoliberalism, indigenous movements may still gain benefits from allying with leftist parties if these parties accept the idea of indigenous equality. This situation mirrors Hale’s neoliberal multiculturalism and should provide similar benefits and constraints to mobilized indigenous people.

Alternative Hypotheses:

$H_{3a}$: The greater the degree to which political leaders accept neoliberalism and the argument of the indigenous rights movement that indigenous people have rights as Indians, the greater the degree to which they will be receptive to indigenous movements’ demands for recognition and the greater the chance that indigenous movement activists and leaders who adopt goals that involve recognition will pursue alliances with political parties.

$H_{3b}$: The greater the degree to which political leaders accept neoliberalism the less likely the chance that indigenous movement activists and leaders who adopt goals that involve redistribution will pursue alliances with political parties.

$H_{4}$: The greater the degree to which an indigenous movement develops ties to the international indigenous rights movement, the greater the degree to which members of the movement will pursue the goals of autonomy and recognition.

Research Design

This paper examines the ideas that the Zapatista leadership and leaders in the Mapuche movements possess about appropriate behavior on the part of their states and political parties and how their ideas influence the goals that their movements have adopted. It also examines these groups’ views of different political parties and their propensity to make alliances or work in conjunction with formal parties. It covers the period from the initial mobilization of the each movement through the year 2005 and
focuses on the national phenomena in Chile and Mexico that affected each movement. In order to better understand the current movements, I reference Mexican and Chilean history, and in the case of Mexico, I connect Chiapas’ history of campesino mobilization to the formation of the Zapatista movement.

In Mexico and Chile, indigenous people are relatively small minorities at the national level. Indigenous people living in states in which they comprise a relatively small minority of the population cannot access the state or direct electoral politics by weight of numbers alone. In terms of determining movement strategies, the size of the overall indigenous population and mobilized indigenous population should matter. Because both Mexico and Chile have relatively similarly-sized indigenous minorities some care must be taken when generalizing the results of this study to states with substantially larger or smaller relative indigenous populations.

In order to understand the Zapatistas’ relationship with the Mexican state and political parties, I examine the official communiqués that its leadership released from December 1993 through 2005. I also look at the historical predecessors of the Zapatista movement and the changes in Mexican politics that have affected the Zapatistas. I reference Mexican patterns of state formation to better understand why the indigenous campesinos that formed the Zapatista movement developed the distinctive understanding of appropriate government that is evident in the communiqués. I pursue a sort of cross-sectional research design across the Zapatistas’ period of mobilization by focusing on import junctions that the movement faced and how these junctions caused it focus on new themes and goals and reinterpret its relationship with Mexican political actors. The Mapuche movement is far more fragmented than the Zapatistas and a systematic data
source like the Zapatistas’ communiqués does not exist for the movement. Because the Mapuche movement is so varied, instead of focusing on major themes in the movement, I concentrate on major shifts in the movement over time. This research focus causes me to take a much more linear approach to understanding the Mapuche movement than the Zapatistas which emphasizes overall changes in the movement during different critical time periods. In order to understand the Mapuche movement, I examine testimonies and published interviews by movement leaders and activists. I also explore official documents and proposals from a variety of Movement organizations. In addition, I balance my account of Chilean political shifts by examining national electoral data.

Within the social sciences, concepts provide organizing principles for theorists to communicate their understandings of reality to their readers. Concepts are useful as organizational tools, and people could scarcely communicate without them. Simplifications aid the construction of theory, and commonly used words like state or movement are discursive shorthand for complex phenomena. However, when theorists allow listing concepts to become a substitute for nuanced description, they risk their concepts becoming hollow shells that bear little resemblance to the things they are trying to describe.¹⁵ I try to avoid this particular pitfall by clearly tracing my arguments using concrete data about each movement.

This paper examines two dependent variables: the types of goals that indigenous movements advance, and whether the movements studied formed alliances with political parties. I measure the types of goals that each indigenous movement advanced over time, by examining the demands that each movement made in relation to its overarching goals.
I examine what types of alliances actors within each movement made with political parties by tracking each movement historically.

I argue that the degree to which process of national construction and nationalist mythmaking included rural peasants and indigenous people in each state determines indigenous peoples’ degree of identification with their states. Their degree of identification with the state, in turn, determines their willingness to make demands for redistribution of state resources based on their standing as patriots or citizens. I measure each movement’s degree of identification with the state based on the degree to which movement leaders and activists have made nationalist statements or have made positive statements about their state’s historical behaviors or nationalist heroes. I measure the degree to which processes of national construction and nationalist ideologies included campesinos and indigenous people by tracing a history of how ideas about indigenous people and campesinos and their roles in the state developed among influential elites in each country. I measure the openness of the state to the electoral Left by examining whether viable leftist parties exist. My criteria for viable Leftist parties are national-level parties that follow leftist ideology and have won or come close to winning national elections.

In terms of alternate explanations, I measure the degree to which political leaders in each state adopted neoliberal concerns based on whether they pursued neoliberal policies when in power. I measure their receptiveness to indigenous rights based on rather they advocate for indigenous rights after being elected. I track the internationalization of each movement to examine possible ties to the international indigenous rights movements.
IV. THE ZAPATISTAS: MEXICAN NATIONALISTS AND INDIGENOUS CAMPESINOS

On January 1, 1994 a group of mostly indigenous rebels calling themselves the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) seized several municipalities in the southeastern Mexican state of Chiapas. Their arrival as a militant force took Mexican and international observers by surprise. Although multiple campesino organizations had struggled in Chiapas for at least two decades, few people outside of the state had any inkling of the strength and organization of Chiapas’ discontented indigenous campesinos or of these indigenous peoples’ determination to have their voices heard at the national level (Mattiace 2003; Stephen 2002; Womack 1999a).

On January 12, 1994, after several days of fighting, the Mexican president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari declared a unilateral ceasefire. Rather than attempt to crush the EZLN, Salinas decided to take the political route. While the Zapatistas could not defeat the Mexican army they could feasibly melt into the Chiapas countryside and conduct a war of attrition. Salinas wanted to avoid a public, bloody, difficult, and politically costly counter-insurgency campaign. He hoped to neutralize the Zapatistas through negotiations rather than military operations. A short time after the government’s announcement, the Zapatistas began tentative negotiations with the Mexican government (Womack 1999a).

Although the government agreed to negotiations it also tried to discredit the Zapatistas by arguing that leftist agitators had incited the uprising among impressionable
indigenous campesinos who did not really share the ideals of the Zapatista leadership. Once hostilities ended between the EZLN and the state, the Zapatistas emerged as an indigenous movement rather than simply a socialist revolutionary force. They emphasized the indigenous nature of their movement and its unified nature in part to counter the government’s claims that poor, rural indigenous people in a backwater state like Chiapas could not possibly serve as the real commanders of the movement (Womack 1999a). On January 6, 1994 in their conditions for dialog with the government the Zapatistas state explicitly that their movement was an indigenous movement under indigenous control. Although they acknowledged the EZLN’s non-indigenous members they stated that, “the political direction of our struggle is totally indigenous; 100 percent of the members of the Comités Clandestinos Revolucionarios Indígenas [the political committees that directed the movement] in all territories in combat belong to the [indigenous] Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Chol, Tojolabal, and other [indigenous] ethnicities” (CCRI-CG, 6 January 1994).

The Zapatista uprising became one of the most visible Latin American indigenous movements. This chapter traces its history through several critical junctures and reveals how the EZLN developed its goals as a movement. It also examines why the Zapatista leadership has ordered its supporters to boycott elections and why the Zapatistas have refused to craft alliances with Mexican political parties. The Mexican state’s inclusion of campesinos and acknowledgement of indigenous people within its nationalist project led the indigenous chiapanecos who would create the Zapatista movement to identify as campesino nationalists. The Zapatistas’ Mexican nationalism led them to argue that the PRI had betrayed the principals of the Mexican Revolution and to justify their
redistributive goal of land reform on the basis of their standing as poor people who work the land.

I argue that while the Zapatistas based the initial goals of their uprising on their status as campesinos, once the Zapatistas realized that their standing as indigenous people would not undermine Mexican support for their movement, they began to shift their goals towards indigenous recognition and some degree of autonomy in addition to redistributive concerns. The Zapatistas’ earliest writings framed their movement as a socialist campesino uprising in which the rural poor of Chiapas rebelled to create a more just state and to rectify the current governments’ abandonment of its obligation to provide state aid, services, and land reform to campesinos. The Mexican government attempted to discredit the Zapatistas by arguing that leftist agitators had taken advantage of poor, impressionable indigenous people in order to launch the uprising. The Zapatistas countered this charge by emphasizing the indigenous nature of their movement and its leaders and by stating firmly that indigenous people are capable of launching their own movements.

In addition to diffusing the government’s efforts to delegitimate the movement, the Zapatistas’ emphasis that they were indigenous people in rebellion and their adoption of explicitly indigenous demands served another purpose. Shortly after the January 1, 1994 uprising, a domestic and international solidarity network sprang up around the Zapatista cause. The EZLN realized that their identity as indigenous people in rebellion had captured the imagination of many Mexicans and catapulted their movement to international celebrity status by tapping into common Mexican conceptions about indigenous people and the international indigenous rights movement. As their
mobilization progressed, the EZLN increasingly focused on goals concerning indigenous recognition and autonomy.

Once the San Andrés negotiation process began in earnest in October of 1995, the Zapatistas concentrated their energy on securing indigenous rights first before addressing their other campesino-based concerns. After accepting San Andrés Accords in February of 1996, the Zapatistas focused almost exclusively on indigenous rights and getting the government to implement the agreement. Despite adopting indigenous recognition and autonomy as their primary goals, the Zapatistas did not abandon their original goal to gain official recognition of their land claims and communities. Once they realized that the Mexican state had no intention of reinstating land reform, they pushed for land rights and communal recognition under the rubric of indigenous autonomy rather than land reform. Faced with a hostile Mexican state that refused to recognize their communities, the Zapatistas used the creation of de facto autonomy regimes to carve out spaces for their partisans.

**Frameworks and Origins**

**Frameworks: Mexican Politics in Transition, Limited Openings for the Zapatistas**

By the late 1980s, Mexico’s political structure limited rural leftist groups’ access to state resources. The strong Mexican state penetrated rural communities in even the most remote areas of the country. In indigenous areas of rural Mexico, the PRI provided services and aid to poor communities for a price, only PRI partisans received direct benefits from the state. Indigenous people who tried to organize outside of state-controlled unions or patronage networks received repression rather than benefits. In the
highlands of Chiapas, PRI patronage alone could not support indigenous communities, and growing socioeconomic stress coupled with corruption among indigenous PRI bosses ripped holes in the fabric of these communities (Collier with Lowery Quaratiello 1999). As indigenous people of predominantly Mayan descent began to colonize areas of the state without entrenched PRI bureaucracies, they developed their own independent campesino unions to advocate for land and social services. In Chiapas, most campesino organizations mobilized around agrarian issues and many focused their efforts on obtaining land reform or title to the lands that their members worked. Although the PRI favored its own supporters and self-serving PRI officials in Chiapas and elsewhere favored large landowners and repressed peasant mobilization, even independent campesino organizations understood that they could sometimes win concessions from their state or national governments. After the 1988 election of Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the already bleak national situation darkened for campesinos who wanted to gain benefits from the federal government.

Salinas came to power after elections that most observers considered fraudulent. He was the latest in a long line of Mexican politicians from the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) which controlled Mexico by feigning democracy while maintaining corrupt one-party rule. Early PRI politicians built the modern Mexican state using patronage to cement their political support. The PRI adopted new political ideologies as the years passed, but although the PRI’s leaders and policies changed, its control of Mexican politics remained largely intact. Salinas styled himself as a reformer despite his fraudulent election and embraced neoliberal politics. He argued that neoliberal reforms would modernize the Mexican state and decrease corruption and
inefficiency in the government. His designated successor Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León also embraced neoliberal economic polices as a way to end patronage and “reform” the Mexican state (Stephen 2002; Collier with Lowery Quaratiello 1999). During his six year presidency (1934-1940), Lázaro Cárdenas, who became a hero to the Mexican Left, incorporated workers and campesinos as discrete social sectors in a powerful national party. In mid-1938, he transformed the old official party, the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PRN), into the more centralized Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM). Future politicians would transform Cárdenas’ PRM into the PRI (Skidmore and Smith 2001; Gonzalez 2002). Cárdenas was the first Mexican president to engage in extensive land reform through the creation of ejidos, or collectively owned rural property that belonged to a given community. An elected board of representatives usually managed the ejido. Members of an ejido could farm the property collectively or divide it into individually-worked plots while maintaining some common areas (Stephen 2002; Gonzalez 2002). Land reform built campesino support for the national government. In the words of George A. Collier, “It is difficult to overstate the power of land reform in winning peasants to the side of the state… By positioning itself, at least symbolically, as the champion of peasants and the poor, the government was able to inspire tremendous popular support for its programs” (Collier with Lowery Quaratiello 1999, 31).

By the time that Salinas took power, the Mexican state no longer embraced rural campesinos as one of its primary constituencies. Salinas ended the process of land reform in Mexico and encouraged existing ejidatarios to convert their ejidos into individually-owned plots. His changes to Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution ended
the Government’s obligation to distribute land. The end of land reform ended all hopes among many indigenous people in Chiapas that their communities could rely on the Mexican state for any benefits (Stephen 2002; Mattiace 2003).

Opposition parties finally broke the PRI monopoly on the Mexican Presidency in 2000, when Vicente Fox won the presidential election. Fox hailed from the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN), the PRI’s long-term conservative opposition. He continued the neoliberal economic policies that Salinas and Zedillo had begun. The transition away from PRI control of Mexican politics failed to open opportunities for rural indigenous people to make alliances with the national government (Pastor 2001; Mattiace 2003).

The fall of PRI control of the presidency did not create a new political opening for the Left. As of 2006, a leftists candidate has not secured the Mexican presidency. The leftist Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) that Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the son of the revered former president Lázaro Cárdenas, formed before the 1988 elections has won control of state governments but continues as a opposition party at the national level. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas had been projected to win the 1988 election when the PRI resorted to fraud to guarantee Salinas’ presidency, however, it was the PAN not the PDR which oversaw Mexico’s transition from PRI rule (Pastor 2001; Eisenstadt 2004). Moving from the corrupt and increasingly neoliberal PRI to the conservative PAN altered the balance of power among Mexico’s major parties. The PRI’s monopoly on the spoils of government broke slowly in the 1990s leading up to its loss of the executive in the 2000 election. The PRD gained control of several governorships in the years leading up to 2000, but federal politics remained conservative. Even where the Left came to power the presence of PRD officials in the upper echelons of government did not guarantee that
indigenous people struggling for recognition and benefits would receive aid from their governments.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{Frameworks: Mexico’s Ruling Party and Indigenous Chiapaneco Politics}

At the time of the Zapatista uprising, the state of Chiapas stood as a PRI stronghold within the Mexican political system. The PRD and PAN had made some progress in the state by the mid 1990s, but the PRI still clung tenaciously to its control of state politics. Within \textit{Los Altos} of Chiapas where established indigenous communities persisted, the PRI maintained its control of local politics through alliances with the leaders of these communities who guaranteed a steady stream of PRI votes come election time.

In the late 1930s, \textit{Cardenistas} and Chiapas’ established elite politicians engaged in an often violent struggle for control of the state’s political apparatus. The ruling politicians of Chiapas survived through political cronyism and close ties to rich influential families who monopolized state politics. Cárdenas’ drive to centralize Mexican politics and to institute social reforms in order to build a base of support for the Mexican state and its official party among workers and campesinos conflicted immediately with the established norms of Chiapas’ politics. Over the course of the 1930s, Cardenistas fought a long battle for control of state politics. Although Cárdenas and his supporters made some reforms in Chiapas, their incorporation of chiapaneco politics under the control of the national government proved the most lasting alteration to state politics (Lewis 2005; Benjamin 1996).
Cardenistas worked to build firm electoral bases in Chiapas. In the highlands, PNR statutes had excluded “Chamulans,” residents of the largest indigenous municipality, and likely a catch-all phase for highland indigenous people, from voting in party primaries on grounds that they were “intellectually incapacitated” (Lewis 2005, 142). The Cardenistas lifted these restrictions in 1936 and set out to gain control of the chiapaneco PNR in part by controlling the indigenous vote. Indigenous support would aid the Cardenistas because the highland Tzotzil and Tzeltal populations comprised around one third of the state’s total population in 1930. No one had tried to organize highland indigenous people politically, and they represented a population in which the Cardenistas could make headway in a conservative state (Lewis 2005; Rus 2004).

Jan Rus argues that instead of the Mexican Revolution, the spread of Cardenista reforms became the defining historical “revolution” for Chiapas’ Mayan peasants. From 1936 until 1940, Cardenistas in Chiapas allied with indigenous people to decrease the political power of large landholders and ensure perennial indigenous support. By the 1920s, the leaders of indigenous highland communities were engaged in an unending struggle to defend their communities from the interference and control of the state’s ladino (non-indigenous) population. Cardenista efforts to spread land reform and other reforms to indigenous communities would break open the leadership of these communities to create new leadership structures that would support the Cardenistas in their struggles to gain control of Chiapas’ politics (Rus 1994).

Erasto Urbina, Cárdenas’ representative in charge of land reform, gained land for indigenous people while undermining their traditional community organization. Respected old men who were monolingual in their native indigenous languages
controlled the highland communities. Urbina developed a way to penetrate community politics and to create a new, politically-loyal community leadership. He placed young, bilingual, indigenous men loyal to his cause as *escribanos*, or scribes, in the communities. Urbina’s scribes took on functions within the PRN and later PRM and tied their communities to the Cardenista party apparatus. By the 1940s, the scribes-*principales* had used their government positions and salaries to gain effective leadership of their communities. They then entered the traditional religious cargo systems to justify their own legitimacy, and many eventually succeeded in reshaping community traditions.

Even after Urbina and the Cardenistas had faded from the political scene, the scribes-principales, now leaders in their own right, used their connections to the official party to build a network of patronage and control in their communities. They provided a steady source of support for the PRM and later PRI (Rus 1994). In the words of Rus, “by the mid-1950s, what anthropologists were just beginning to describe as ‘closed corporate communities’ had in fact become ‘institutionalized revolutionary communities’ harnessed to the state” (Rus 1994, 267).

After Cárdenas’ presidency, Mexican politics shifted towards a period of consolidation. As the twentieth century progressed, links of interdependence between indigenous bosses and the national PRI developed within the highlands. When Chiapas’ state politics turned conservative again from 1944 to 1951, after two Cardenista governors, the scribes-principales consolidated power in their communities by taking on traditional positions of leadership and led the struggle against conservative impositions. In Chamula, in particular, former scribes-principales gained increasing wealth through control of liquor, soft drink, and trucking enterprises and dominated community politics.
These leaders were able to manipulate traditional sanctions to control their communities and channeled their communities’ votes for the PRI. By the mid-1960s, young members of highland communities and especially young Chamulans began to contest the scribes-principales domination of their communities and nepotism. Chamula’s leaders discovered that mass expulsions of dissidents, who often became mainstream Catholics or later Protestants, for violating communal traditions allowed them to maintain control of the community. By masking political control under the guise of preserving tradition, they were able to maintain their own power and to ensure that Chamula continued to vote almost uniformly for the PRI (Rus 2004). Between 2,500 and 30,000 people were expelled from Chamula or left because of violence and intimidation from the 1960s onward.19

The PRI’s partnership with indigenous-bosses throughout the highlands greatly influenced the ways in which indigenous people understood the PRI. Members of highland communities who faced expulsion or fled to escape repressive boss rule learned firsthand how repressive the PRI’s power structures could be and how little the PRI cared about indigenous people. So long as indigenous municipalities continued to vote for its candidates, the PRI would continue to support corrupt indigenous bosses. By the 1960s, many indigenous people in the state had realized that the PRI was not a party that supported their interests and looked towards independent organizations to secure land reform, credit, and other needs (Harvey 1998).
Frameworks: Indigenismo and Celebrated Campesinos as Mexican Entry Points

Despite the problems with the PRI that many indigenous chiapanecos experienced, Mexican nationalism, as it developed after the Mexican Revolution, provided an inclusionary discourse that promised campesinos and even indigenous people that they too were part of the Mexican people. Old processes of state formation gradually began to incorporate campesinos and even indigenous people as integral parts of the Mexican nation in the years following the Mexican Revolution.

In Mexico and other Latin American states, the processes of state formation that would result in these states’ current forms began during the colonial era. In Spanish Latin America, colonial rule built bureaucracies and other state structures that would carry over in modified form into the post-independence period. The processes of assimilation and exclusion that would help shape current indigenous populations’ size and relationships with the dominant societies in their states also began in the colonial era (Mallon 1992; Knight 1992).

In the two great centers of Mesoamerican population, which later became Mexico and the Andean countries of Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, Spanish rule followed different patterns. In the Andes, indigenous communities tended to remain separate and culturally distinct from populations of Spanish decent who identified as white. Important differences exist between the modern Andean countries in terms of race relations and the construction of indigenous identities. These distinctions, however, pale in comparison to the distinction between Mexico and the Andes. Substantially fewer Mexicans now identify as indigenous than Ecuadorians, Peruvians, or Bolivians. This difference in levels of indigenous identification stems in large part from the success of processes of
assimilation in transforming Mexican indigenous people into Mexican campesinos who identified more strongly with their Mexican identities than their indigenous identities (Knight 1992; Mallon 1992).

When independence came to Latin America, Mexican campesinos, many of whom were of indigenous origin, participated within the Mexican independence movement. Conservative forces eventually controlled the independence movements and the popular movement that rallied around the push for independence faced strong repression both at the hands of Spanish forces and from the eventual victors of the independence movement. Despite the continued repression of popular movements in the 1800s, the Mexican state was able to incorporate a large portion of its original indigenous population as campesinos. In the central region of the state, indigenous villages gradually lost their indigenous identities. Campesinos in the core region of the country began to identify as Mexican peasants rather than indigenous people. In the words of Mallon, in Mexican national mythology, “the Indians of central Mexico are identified as impoverished peasants, pure and simple, and they are supposedly looked down upon as rural poor rather than as Indians” (Mallon 1992, 36). The Zapatistas of the Mexican Revolution faced claims from elite critics and hostile newspapers that they were rebellious Indians with a firm insistence that they were campesinos and Mexican patriots engaged in a Mexican rather than indigenous struggle (Knight 1992; Womack 1999a; 1999b).

In contrast to the central regions of the country, the northern frontier and extreme south held indigenous populations who did not assimilate as mestizos and instead maintained indigenous identities. Several southern Mexican states including Chiapas
developed regional economies that grew from the exploitation of indigenous labor. For the Maya of Chiapas and the Yucatán, marginalization, exploitation, and a strong sense of distinctness from the regional *ladino* population defined their lives. On the northern frontier, “hostile” indigenous people, such as the Apache, and indigenous peoples such as the Yaqui who fought to maintain indigenous control of their territory faced brutal campaigns of extermination beginning in the 1800s, and lasting, in the case of the Yaqui, until 1926 (Alonso 1995; Knight 1990).

The process of incorporation and *mestizaje* that occurred in central Mexico, allowed Mexican elites and intellectuals to claim that Mexico was a mestizo nation, in which a blending of Spanish and Indigenous people created the Mexican people. In the 1850s, European racial theories based on a racist interpretation of genetics and evolution became increasingly popular among intellectuals in Europe and the United States. Mexicans and other Latin Americans whose societies did not fit the European racial model scrambled for ways to contest the dominant ideological paradigm of scientific racism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. From the mid 1800s onward, Mexican intellectuals adopted the European idea that each country must have a distinct and unified national character in order to persist as a nation. They struggled to define the Mexican nation and to deal with Mexico’s indigenous people and the mestizo origin of many Mexicans in an international context in which scientific racism was the norm (Knight 1990; Alonzo 2004).

Mexican nationalism took a profound turn after the Mexican Revolution. The victors of the Revolution, although members of Mexico’s established upper class, recognized the contribution that campesino mobilization had brought to the revolutionary
They set out to create a strong state to unify all of Mexico and to prevent violent struggles over national control. Mexico’s new leaders consolidated their power by providing concessions to mobilized groups while centralizing the state apparatus and crushing potential political rivals. The strong state that emerged after the Revolution was not an inevitable product of Mexico’s new class of Revolutionary elites’ efforts to consolidate their power. Mexico’s one-party state emerged out of a period of intense struggles over who among the surviving elite Revolutionary leaders would control national politics, and the one-party state took years to spread its tendrils through state and local politics and penetrate the entire country (Knight 1992; 2005).

In Mexico and the rest of Latin America, mestizo identities contained both racial and cultural components. To many Mexicans, mestizaje signified the process of interbreeding between Spanish colonists and native populations that accompanied Spanish colonial rule. In this conception, *mestizo* became a racial identity that signified someone of white and indigenous heritage. For most Latin Americans, mestizaje also implied cultural change. Therefore, Indians could become mestizos by abandoning their indigenous culture and way of life (Knight 1990; Alonzo 2004).

The Revolutionary leaders and intellectuals, who built the nationalist ideology of the post-revolutionary state, faced the challenge of incorporating indigenous people who still identified as Indians into their new national project. A new ideology of *indigenismo* developed within official state circles. Indigenismo valued the historical indigenous contribution to the Mexican state. It located the beginnings of Mexican identity in the pre-conquest Aztec empire and acknowledged that indigenous people formed a fundamental part of the Mexican nation. Indigenismo was an elite ideology; the
individuals who developed and practiced it were not Indians themselves and looked for ways to incorporate indigenous people into the Mexican nationalist project rather than asking what these people desired for themselves. In the words of Alan Knight, “revolutionary indigenismo included a range of emphases and positions. But its varied protagonists shared a common belief in the need to integrate the Indian, albeit in an enlightened, noncoercive fashion” (Knight 1990, 80). The Mexican state used federal education and patronage to incorporate indigenous people into state networks and created a nationalist ideology that valued Indians as part of the Mexican nation in an attempt to assimilate indigenous people into their nationalist project (Knight 1990; Lewis 2005).

According to Florencia Mallon, in Mexico, “the postrevolutionary state was built on an implicit contract, in which the pay-off for suffering the authoritarianism of political mestizaje would be social and economic redistribution, plus an indigenista model of development” (Mallon 1992, 52).

As a corollary to indigenismo, the intellectual architects of the post-revolutionary state embraced the mestizo as the Mexican “national type.” The idea of the mestizo as the basis of the Mexican nation gained force after the 1910 Revolution. In the words of Ana Alonzo: “The new revolutionary mythology of mestizaje revalued mixture in positive terms and became the cornerstone of a new nationalist project, a state-led ‘cultural revolution’ that was explicitly anti-imperialist and anticolonial (Alonzo 2004, 462). Mexican nationalist thinkers valued mestizos as the epitome of Mexican nationality. They acknowledged that indigenous people contributed to forming the Mexican people and that indigenous people still lived in Mexico but stressed integration
and assimilation as the proper path for indigenous Mexicans to become true Mexicans (Alonzo 2004; Knight 1990).

Both indigenismo and mestizaje embraced elements of racial determinism that had their roots in scientific racism. Indigenismo lauds the indigenous past while considering contemporary Indians in need of aid to integrate into “civilized” main-stream society. Mestizaje discourses depend on strict racial categories and implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, value whiteness over indigenousness. Even though some indigenistas argued that indigenous people who assimilated into Mexican society could discard “bad” aspects of their Indian cultures while maintaining “good” cultural traits, in practice, the fact that dominant groups tend to consider specific behaviors evidence of indigenous identity throughout Latin America and tend to consider people who deviate from these behaviors mestizos meant that indigenous people had to deal with a society in which moving beyond their communities of origin negated their indigenous identities in many people’s eyes (Knight 1990).

Many of the concepts of indigenous identity that dominant social groups in Latin American states perpetuate reference specific cultural behaviors and living in rural areas as traits that define indigenous people (Wade 1997; Nelson 1999). In Guatemala, for instance, cultural as well as supposed racial distinctions define what it means to be indigenous. “Thus,” in the words of Diane Nelson, “any indigenous person who speaks Spanish, has earned an academic degree, or holds a desk job has historically been redefined as ladino [belonging to the dominant ethnic group] (Nelson 1999, 249). A similar division exists throughout the Andes. In other parts of Latin America with smaller indigenous populations, being simultaneously indigenous and part of the
dominant society may or may not be possible in terms of traditional notions of identity. In Mexico, despite the pressures to assimilate many indigenous people maintained their indigenous identities over the course of the twentieth century.

Careful studies by anthropologists reveal that the degree to which being indigenous becomes a culturally-defined identity that precludes becoming part of the dominant national culture varies throughout Latin America in response to differences in ideology and state formation. Despite this variation, indigenous identity usually follows what Peter Wade calls a “logic of place” in which rural communities become the arbitrators of “authentic” indigenous culture and a vital element in the preservation of indigenous identity (Wade 1997). Because Latin American ideas of ethnicity tended to equate indigenous identity with certain behaviors including residing in indigenous communities, indigenous people who have launched successful movements must cope with these notions of being indigenous.

If the post-revolutionary state included indigenous people as Mexicans somewhat ambivalently, Mexico’s elite Revolutionary leaders made certain to incorporate campesinos’ concerns into the new state. Mexico’s post-revolutionary leaders knew that they would have to incorporate some aspects of the popular struggle into their governments if they were going to be able to quiet agrarian discontent. The 1917 Constitution reflected popular demands and planted the seeds of radical agrarian reform. The most radical provisions of the Constitution would not take institutionalized shape until years later, but its provisions provided concrete support for campesinos within the Mexican state. In response to their country’s turbulent history, the elite politicians who controlled the federal government after 1920 developed a preoccupation with national
unity as a means to strengthen the state. In order to defuse popular tensions, Mexican leaders began to use the state as a tool to mollify and control social protest (Stephen 2002).

During the 1920s, Presidents Alvaro Obregón and Plutarco Calles tried to consolidate the state by strengthening the federal government. Obregón began the process of incorporating the popular sectors. His modest reforms paved the way for a new pattern of Mexican political culture. Obregón and Calles shrewdly recognized that they could mobilize popular support without compromising their own rather conservative modernizing agendas by granting strategic concessions to bind the masses to their regimes without large-scale reforms. After Obregón was assassinated before he could become president for a second, non-consecutive term, Calles controlled national politics as the power behind the scenes through his Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) until the election of Lázaro Cárdenas in 1934 (Boyer 2003; Stephen 2002).

Beginning with the first generation of post-revolutionary leaders, Mexico’s political elite realized that by incorporating campesinos into the Mexican national project they could diffuse rural people’s potential to protest the state. Cárdenas’ presidency in the 1930s initiated federal land reform and education efforts that would bind campesinos closer to the Mexican state. The ideological project that began with Cardenista supporters and officials in the late 1930s and carried forth through subsequent presidential regimes valued campesinos as a critical component of the Mexican people and taught that the Mexican Revolution and the post-revolutionary state responded to campesino concerns (Stephen 2002).
Official Mexican ideologies continue to exalt indigenous people and campesinos as important components of Mexican society. Mexican nationalism embraced assimilation rather than exclusion of indigenous people. Racism against “Indians” is an underlying component in modern Mexican society, yet the nationalist discourse that the post-revolutionary generation built to justify their project of state formation and which the PRI state nominally embraced until the late 1980s gave indigenous people an important part in Mexican nationalism. Paternalistic notations that the state should protect and provide for its indigenous citizens remained a part of Mexican Leftist thought which validated indigenous peoples’ efforts to access the state and demand benefits as Indians. International currents that stigmatized racism and spread ideas about racial equality, gradually began in the later half of the twentieth century to create a climate within Mexico in which a good number of Mexicans were willing to acknowledge the important parts that indigenous people play in Mexican society and were uncomfortable acting against indigenous people in ways that could publicly be construed as racist or discriminatory.

**Origins: From Ideas to Action, How the Zapatistas’ Expectations of Proper State Behavior Impacted Their Interactions with the State**

The Zapatistas launched their uprising with a clear understanding of how the Mexican state had failed indigenous chiapanecos and other poor rural people. In the initial days of their uprising, the Zapatistas hoped to initiate a revolutionary national government that would serve the poor and to institute sweeping social democratic reforms. After the Zapatistas gained Mexican and international sympathy as repressed
indigenous people, they rapidly disavowed their revolutionary agenda and reshaped their movement as a way to bring national attention to Mexico’s rural poor and indigenous peoples.

The ways in which the Zapatistas understood the appropriate role of the Mexican state towards indigenous people and campesinos shaped the direction of their movement and the goals that they professed. The indigenous campesinos that launched the Zapatista uprising bought into the discourse of campesino nationalism and the Mexican state’s corresponding duty to campesinos that Mexican elites had propagated in order to garner campesino support. Their anger at the abandonment that their communities faced from the state and at the government for ending land reform motivated the Zapatistas to rebellion. That the EZLN initially made demands that focused on rectifying the Mexican state’s abandonment of its perceived duties to campesinos reflects the degree to which the Zapatistas accepted the idea of campesino nationalism and expected this idea to resonate with the Mexican public. The Zapatistas struggled for land reform, access to government services, and indigenous rights because they believed that their demands for these things were justified and appropriate. In the Zapatistas’ analysis, recent Mexican leaders had failed to behave appropriately toward the rural poor and other popular classes. The Zapatistas’ expectations of appropriate state behavior and their reaction to the government’s failures fueled their struggle to alter the ways the Mexican state dealt with indigenous Mexicans.
Origins: From Mobilized Campesinos to Zapatistas

The 1994 uprising and Zapatista movement sprang from over twenty years of active campesino organizing among the indigenous poor of Chiapas. Campesino organizations that were independent from the ruling PRI sprang up in eastern Chiapas in the 1970s (Collier with Lowery Quaratiello 1999, Harvey 1998). Although the Confederación Nacional Campesina (CNC), a state-run campesino union originally created by Lázaro Cárdenas had once provided an effective means for campesinos to access the state and gain land reform, by the 1970s, the CNC no longer represented campesino interests (Stephen 2002). In the Selva Lacandona and other areas in which PRI-affiliated bosses did not dominate politics, the Catholic Church and leftist organizations made inroads in organizing indigenous people as campesinos (Harvey 1998). The independent peasant organizations that formed in opposition to the PRI competed with each other in addition to competing with PRI affiliated groups in the decades that followed. The leaders of those organizations that resisted PRI co-option faced intense repression, and many leaders lost their lives at the hands of gunmen affiliated with the PRI or local landowners (Harvey 1998).

Observing that the leaders of nonviolent movements faced death and repression helped to convince the future members of the EZLN that nonviolent struggle could not succeed in Chiapas. According to Comadante Tacho, indigenous campesinos who joined the EZLN “saw that, instead of advancing us, in la lucha pacífica the leaders sold out and some died. They were killed, in the case of CIOAC [a national independent peasant union active in Chiapas]. I saw all the work of these good people and how they fought for indigenous people and, yes, they died” (qtd. in Stephen 2003, 150).
The Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional (FLN), a small guerrilla group, was one of the many mobilized groups that thrived among the organized, angry, and politically-aware indigenous campesinos of Chiapas. It held the distinction of advocating armed struggle. The FLN soon attracted indigenous adherents. By the early 1990s, an indigenous leadership and membership had replaced most of the original FLN cadres to become the EZLN. This new leadership transformed the FLN’s mission of national socialist revolution to include other goals such as land reform that appealed to the indigenous population of Chiapas (Womack 1999a).

The established conditions in the highlands of Chiapas, where PRI-affiliated bosses ruled many indigenous communities, help to explain why the Zapatista movement formed within new communities in the tropical Selva Lacandona. By the 1970s, the now established scribes-principales had consolidated their power and began to expel young reformers and Protestants from their communities in large numbers. Many indigenous individuals who found themselves expelled from their communities migrated to the Lacandón rainforest (Rus 1994).

Mayan campesinos started to colonize the sparsely populated Selva Lacandona in the 1960s. Many of the colonists had been expelled from the highland communities by PRI-affiliated indigenous bosses who controlled most communities in Los Altos. Others left because expanding populations led to a shortage of land in their communities and the government promised land in the Selva for those people willing to claim it (Collier with Lowery Quaratiello 1999; Womack 1999a).

Many highland indigenous communities had provided the ruling PRI with guaranteed support because of PRI efforts to control their leadership and enmesh the
communities in patronage ties. In contrast to their efforts to control highland communities, the PRI neglected the Lacandón communities and never even delivered ballot boxes to them before the 1994 uprising. June Nash argues that because the governing party failed to provide basic services and did not try to co-opt members of the Lacandón communities, their members developed a sense of solidarity as oppressed indigenous people (Nash 2004). In her words: “The Zapatista movement was, from the local perspective, a revolt of communities incorporated without rights, resources, or basic services into established townships” (Nash 2004, 180).

The population of Los Altos increased by at least forty percent during the 1970s and by an additional fifty percent in the 1980s. By the 1980s, demographic tensions coupled with economic troubles exacerbated the already tense political situation in many communities leading to more expulsions. Many expelled people gravitated to the available land of the Selva Lacandona and formed new communities. The inability of farmers to make a living on ever smaller plots of land led other indigenous campesinos to search for better lives in the Selva (Womack 1999a; Collier with Lowery Quaratiello 1999).

The government encouraged colonization as a way to relive tensions for land reform and to consolidate a Mexican presence on the border with Guatemala. The state readily granted ejidos to early settlers in the region and, “By 1970 some 60 percent of the Lacandón was in ejidos” (Womack 1999a, 18). In the years that followed, the government vacillated between encouraging colonization and taking measures to preserve what remained of the rainforest from indigenous campesinos and powerful ranchers who were rapidly clearing the forest (Womack 1999a; Nash 2001).
Although highland indigenous communities are almost without exception ethnically homogenous, in the new settlements in the Selva Lacandona, indigenous people formed mixed communities. People of different Mayan ethnicities and communal origins settled together, and some new communities contained Protestant and Catholic families living in the same area without conflict (Nash 2001; Collier with Lowery Quaratiello 1999; Womack 1999a). The residents of the new communities coped with the difficult circumstances of their lives and built communal unity through frequent assemblies in which women attended as well as men in contrast to the common practice in Los Altos (Womack 1999a; Nash 2001). In the words of John Womack: “In the jungle then there were no principales. There the community in its assembly ruled….Having authority there meant working for the community. These were frontier democracies, improvised soviets” (Womack 1999a, 19).

But by the early 1980s, ejido grants were no longer easy to obtain. The government land grant program favored communities affiliated with the official CNC and marginalized communities that favored the opposition. In early 1992, all hopes for settlers to gain title to the communities they had carved from the Selva dried up with President Salinas’ reforms of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution (Stephen 2002; Womack 1999a). News of Salinas’ planned reforms reached Chiapas in 1991, a year before their implementation. Although the government attempted to explain the proposal by arguing, in the words of John Womack: “that hardly any land remained to give away, [and that] agrarian reform for the last 25 years had increasing been only on paper, a trick on poor country people,…the poorest of the poor Chols, Tzotzils, Tzeltals, and Tojolabals heard the national government’s final judgment on them: fend for yourselves” (Womack
1999a, 21). Land created the basis for substance for Chiapas’ rural indigenous poor. Without titles to their lands, indigenous colonists in the Selva Lacandona could not legally protect their claims. The strong communities that indigenous people formed in the Lacandén in response to the difficulties of frontier life in an isolated region with an unfamiliar climate became a vital resource for the indigenous colonists. Losing their communities would prove devastating, and the highly organized residents of the Selva were willing to struggle for land and to protect their communities. The sense of abandonment that most indigenous campesinos felt when the Salinas administration announced the end of land reform led many to sympathize with the Zapatista cause.

**Comunicados from the Lacandón: Understanding the Zapatistas in Their Own Words**

“Hoy Decimos ¡Basta!,” “Today We Say Enough!,” with those words the Zapatistas emerged on the Mexican national scene in January of 1994. The opening lines of the “Declaración de la Selva Lacandona” which the EZLN released in the first days of their uprising, “Today We Say Enough” became the rallying cry of the Zapatista movement. By situating their movement in Mexican history as the direct descendent of other struggles against exploitation by country people who finally said ¡Basta!, the Zapatistas tapped into national sentiment and justified their movement as a rebellion against exploitation by people who had:

- absolutely nothing, neither a dignified roof, nor land, nor work, nor health, nor food, nor education, [who lived] without the right to freely and democratically elect their leaders, without independence from foreigners, without peace or justice for themselves and their
In order to communicate with the Mexican public, the EZLN harnessed the power of the press. Within the opening months of 1994, the “Declaración de la Selva Lacandona” became only one of many Zapatista comunicados and the first of a current total of six declaraciones from the Selva. The PRI did not control the print media, and Mexican newspapers were willing to print the Zapatistas communications to the Mexican people. The Mexico City-based independent newspaper, La Jornada, picked up the Zapatista cause. It printed their comunicados and interviewed Zapatistas. The Zapatista movement’s leadership released frequent comunicados, especially in the opening years of their mobilization.

Although the Comandancia General del EZLN signed the first statements from the movement, within the opening weeks of January 1994, a newly public group, the Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena-Comandancia General del Ejército Zapatista del Liberación Nacional (CCRI-CG) signed all important announcements. Although the Zapatistas attributed their important official announcements to the CCRI-CG, Subcomandante Marcos, the movement’s charismatic, non-indigenous spokesman, also wrote his own comunicados. Marcos’ witty and sometimes playful writing style and his use of stories and anecdotes distanced the Zapatistas from previous leftist revolutionary groups that followed a dry, official, communist doctrine. By 1995, Marcos also began to write documents for the CCRI-CG that he signed “Marcos for the CCRI-CG” or “Marcos in the name of the CCRI-CG.”

For this study, I examined only the Zapatista comunicados that the CCRI-CG or EZLN signed and those that Marcos openly wrote for the CCRI-CG. Although
Marcos’ own writings added to the movement’s national and international reception, he did not speak for the entire Zapatista movement in his writings. Only those comunicados that the CCRI-CG or EZLN signed were official statements of the movement’s entire leadership. As one of very few highly literate members of the EZLN, Marcos likely wrote many more comunicados than those he signed. In terms of ideas, however, the comunicados from the CCRI-CG or EZLN aimed to capture the consensus of the movement and as such are the written Zapatista sources that most accurately reflect the EZLN’s goals as a movement and its views of the Mexican state and political parties.

The number of comunicados that the Zapatistas released started to decrease appreciably after the first year of their uprising. During 1995 and 1996, the CCRI-CG still released a prolific number of comunicados, but by 1998 and especially after 2000, the Zapatistas began to rely less on official written documents. Despite the decline in Zapatista comunicados over time, the writings of the CCRI-CG and of Marcos for the CCRI-CG and other official organs of the EZLN provide scholars with access to how the Zapatistas understood their on-going interactions with the Mexican state.

Figure 1:

![Zapatista Comunicados from December 1993 through 2005](chart)

- comunicados by Marcos for the Sexta
- comunicados by Marcos for the CCRI-CG del EZLN or in the name of the CCRI-CG del EZLN
- comunicados by the EZLN or the CCRI-CG del EZLN

![Chart showing the number of Zapatista comunicados from December 1993 through 2005.](chart)
Campesino Nationalism from Indigenous Communities

“We are the heirs of the true forgers of our [Mexican] nationality” (Comandancia General del EZLN, December 1993a, Declaración de la Selva Lacandona).

Mexico’s political configuration during the process of transition from one-party rule and even after the 2000 election limited greatly the Zapatistas’ access to allies within the national government. Although the federal government neglected the needs of indigenous chiapanecos, the Zapatistas were able to argue the government possessed a duty to serve their needs as campesinos by referencing the Mexican nationalist mythologies that included campesinos as a vital part of the Mexican nation. Nationalist retellings of the Mexican Revolution glorified the role that mobilized campesinos had played in the Revolution. In addition, Mexican leaders had built patronage networks over the years that linked campesinos to the state in order to gain campesino support and channel mobilization in the countryside through official institutions that would diffuse its ability to threaten or alter the state. These buttressed their incorporation and co-option of campesinos by developing a nationalist discourse that referenced the importance of campesinos in Mexican society. Through its campesino policies, PRI state developed a rhetorical commitment to fulfill campesino needs. The Zapatistas’ status as campesinos gave them a platform from which to argue for the resumption of land reform and a transformation in governance that would supply services and state aid to their communities.

Although the Mexican government never actively pursued policies to forward indigenous rights, Mexican nationalists acknowledged their country’s indigenous heritage. Proponents of Mexican indigenismo focused on assimilating indigenous people
into the national project rather than accepting modern indigenous people as Indians. The indigenista glorification of the indigenous past, however, never denied that indigenous people helped to create Mexico. Unlike the Mapuche, the Mayan Indians of southern Mexico never needed to doubt, despite the presence of racism and discrimination, that many Mexicans considered them part of the historical Mexican nation. Once the Zapatistas mobilized they were able to use this open acknowledgement of Mexico’s indigenous heritage to rally support for indigenous rights among substantial sectors of the Mexican population who understood supporting indigenous people as a vital component of being good leftists (Stephen 2002; Mattiace 2003).

Even if the benefits of the Mexican state came unevenly or not at all to the Mayan colonists of the Selva Lacandona, the indigenous people who would come to direct and serve in the EZLN identified strongly with the Mexican state and a legacy of campesino collective action that drew on the state as a patron to solicit land reform. In contrast to the post-dictatorship Mapuche movement, which despite strong ties to the Left tends justify its calls for land reform on its prior claims to land, the Zapatistas prefaced their call to land reform on the idea that land should belong to the campesinos who work it.

In the “Declaración de la Selva Lacandona,” the EZLN declared war against the Mexican army and President Salinas, who they called the “maximum and illegitimate chief” of the government’s corrupt executive branch (Comandancia General del EZLN, December 1993a, Declaración de la Selva Lacandona). Rather than justifying their struggle through revolutionary principles or complicated ideology, the Zapatistas drew on their standing as Mexican citizens to justify rebellion. They argued that because Article 39 of the Mexican Constitution invests national sovereignty in the hands of the Mexican
people, Mexican citizens have a right to rebel against governments that ignore their needs if other forms of struggle fail. Although they called their movement “the product of 500 years of struggles” in a nod to indigenous history, the Zapatistas included Mexican nationalist struggles as part of the animating forces of their movement. The revolutionary genesis that they created for their uprising drew on the Mexican struggle against Spanish colonialism, the Mexican expulsion of the French imperial occupation, and the legacies of the populist heroes of the Mexican Revolution, Francisco (Pancho) Villa and Emiliano Zapata, and placed their uprising as the latest in a sequence of nationalist Mexican uprisings. The EZLN eloquently evoked this populist legacy, claiming:

We are the heirs of the true forgers of our [Mexican] nationality, the dispossessed, we are millions, and we speak to all our brothers to join in this call as the only road to not die of hunger before the insatiable ambition of a dictator of more than 70 years at the head of a congress of traitors who represent the groups that are the most conservative and the most willing to sell their country (Comandancia General del EZLN, December 1993a, Declaración de la Selva Lacandona).

Through their first declaration, the Zapatistas positioned themselves within a Mexican tradition of men who revolted against rulers who denied their communities and their country rights and freedom and thereby became nationalist heroes. The EZLN justified their uprising as a rebellion against an illegitimate government that denied the Mexican people, including the indigenous people of eastern Chiapas, the right to live in a country in which the government represents their interests and provides for their material needs. Against the PRI, Salinas, and the army, the Zapatistas positioned themselves as true Mexican patriots acting within their constitutional rights to depose a dictatorship.
Along with the “Declaración de la Selva Lacandona,” the Zapatistas distributed a set of revolutionary laws in early January 1994 that explained how they would govern the areas of Mexico that they liberated. These laws reveal the early Zapatista vision of the ideal state. Any mention of indigenous rights or autonomy is notably absent. The EZLN would only begin making demands based on indigenous identity when its members realized that working for indigenous rights would gain them adherents rather than isolate them from possible leftist supporters. The revolutionary laws detailed the type of world that the Zapatistas wished to create using prescriptive, although not legalistic, edicts to reshape the nation. They envisioned a new reality in which workers would receive fair salaries and the government would provide pensions and other forms of social security to ordinary people, provide social services, set fair prices for agricultural crops, fund education, and supply household goods like stoves and refrigerators to rural people. Although their revolutionary laws mentioned urban workers who subsisted on wages rather than agriculture and made special provisions for women, the most important and highly developed functions of the Zapatistas’ proposed government related to agrarian issues. In the “Ley Agraria Revolucionaria,” the Zapatistas advocated a radical agrarian program focused on land reform (Comandancia General del EZLN, December 1993b; December 1993c; December 1993d; December 1993e; December 1993f).

Chiapas had experienced extensive land reform beginning in the 1930s, and by the 1990s, most estates remaining in the state either did not contain enough productive hectares of land to be eligible for expropriation or had been set aside as cattle ranches that were immune to reform by grants from the state government. Outside the swiftly
dwindling frontier, opportunities for land reform had diminished in Chiapas even before Salinas ended federal land reform (van der Haar 2005; Viqueira 1995; 1999).

It is not particularly surprising, in light of the situation in Chiapas, that the subsistence farmers and poor peasant producers who comprised the EZLN argued for stricter limits on the amount of land that individuals could own than Mexico’s previous land reform provisions had contained. As John Womack notes: “The new [EZLN] limit on private farms…50 hectares (nearly 125 acres) of good land, [or] 100 ha. of poor land, would be one of the strictest in Latin American history” (Womack 1999b, 251). In contrast to the Zapatistas’ proposal, the 1917 Constitution had allowed “from 100 ha. of good land to 200 ha. of poor land” before Salinas’ reforms (Womack 1999b, 251).

Campesinos throughout Chiapas hungered for land in the mid-1990s. The Zapatista call for land reform beginning with the revolutionary agrarian law and continuing in multiple comunicados from the CCRI-CG in the months and years that followed the initial uprising tapped into strong sentiment among indigenous and non-indigenous campesinos in Chiapas. As Gemma van der Haar recounts: “After 1 January 1994, Chiapas experienced a wave of land occupations, both inside and outside the conflict region…their scale was unprecedented both in Chiapas and in Mexico as a whole” (van der Haar 2005, 490). Mobilized campesinos engaged in over 1,700 land occupations after the Zapatista uprising and occupied almost 148,000 hectares. The first occupations occurred under EZLN auspices, but by the middle of the first year of the uprising, campesino organizations throughout the political spectrum had seized the opportunity to settle out standing land claims through occupation. This wave of peasant mobilization affected properties below the Mexican constitution’s original limit for
expropriation. Not even peasant farmers were exempt from losing their lands and homes to other mobilized peasants who coveted their land or wished to expel people of different political persuasions from their communities.22

The Chiapas state government dealt with many of the occupations pragmatically. Through a package of agrarian accords, the state government and land reform bureaucracy purchased occupied land and distributed it to peasant organizations willing to cooperate with the state and refrain from further occupations. Although the state engaged in land reform, its actions marginalized the more radical campesino organizations. The EZLN also refused to enter into the agrarian accords. Zapatista supporters managed to retain much of the land they seized and according to van der Haar, “the EZLN today [2005] controls around 60,000 hectares of occupied private ranches” (van der Haar 2005, 492).

The Zapatistas did not simply envision a return to the past. Instead of attempting to resurrect old laws and practices, they built on the past principles of Mexican agrarian reform and campesino nationalism in order to argue for a more expansive program of land reform than Mexican authorities had ever attempted. Elements of socialism bled into the Zapatista ideology. These socialist tendencies, for example the fact that the EZLN valued collectively run agriculture rather than individually farmed plots, could have undermined the EZLN’s claims to speak for other poor campesinos and indigenous people. In practice, however, once the EZLN began to negotiate with the Mexican government, its leaders moderated elements from their early written documents and initial revolutionary plans that might have alienated possible supporters.
Squarely defeated by the government after one day of minor military success, the EZLN dropped its initial calls to institute a revolutionary government throughout Mexico. Having abandoned the revolution, the Zapatistas now focused on improving the lives of the indigenous people of Chiapas. Once the Zapatista leadership became aware that large sectors of the Mexican Left disapproved of violent revolutionary struggle yet sympathized with the EZLN’s grievances and desperation, the movement adapted to its new constituents. In a January 6, 1994, comunicado, the CCRI-CG explained the movement by stating, “our Zapatista troops initiated a series of political and military actions whose primary objective is to make known to the Mexican people and to the rest of the world the miserable conditions in which millions of Mexicans, especially the indigenous, live and die” (CCRI-CG, 6 January 1994). Within days of their uprising, the Zapatistas’ official pronouncements reflected the immediate reasons why many indigenous people joined the EZLN. To members of the EZLN, after witnessing the government’s repression of existing independent campesino organizations, armed struggle appeared to provide the only path to better their lives and have their grievances heard.

The EZLN transformed rapidly in January 1994. What began as a guerrilla army intent on overthrowing the Mexican executive to bring liberty and justice to marginalized Mexicans became a guerrilla army intent on improving the economic and political situation of indigenous people and fighting for a more democratic Mexico through propaganda and negotiations rather than armed engagements. The EZLN leaders argued that “the grave conditions of poverty of our compatriots have a common cause: the lack of liberty and democracy” and called for a democratic transition (CCRI-CG, 6 January
1994). They justified their choice of Bishop Samuel Ruiz García to mediate negotiations based on his Mexican patriotism. In the words of the CCRI-CG, “we invite him [Bishop Ruiz] formally to participate as a Mexican patriot and not as a religious authority” (CCRI-CG, 12 January 1994).

In late January 1994, the EZLN argued in response to a card from PRI negotiator Manuel Camacho Solís, that negotiations should cover national politics because while they did not pretend “to forge national accords” they had “the right to form opinions about diverse aspects of Mexican political life and to make these opinions known” because, in the words of the EZLN, “we are, all the members of the EZLN, Mexican by birth” (CCRI-CG, 31 January 1994).

Self-proclaimed “Zapatistas” the men and women of the EZLN drew on the legacy of Emiliano Zapata and his commitment that land should belong to those who work it to place their struggle into the Mexican nationalist tradition. Beginning with the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1930s, the Mexican post-Revolutionary one-party state used agrarian reform as a way to cement campesinos’ support for the government (Gonzales 2002). Cardenistas used Zapata as a figurehead to advance their program of agrarian reform and began the process of educating Mexicans from all regions of the country about why Emiliano Zapata was a Mexican hero (Stephen 2002).

In their first list of demands which the EZLN released on the first of March 1994, the Zapatistas used the memory of Emiliano Zapata to call on the government to restore Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution. According to the CCRI-CG: “Article 27 of the Constitution should respect the original sprit of Emiliano Zapata: the land is for the
indigenous people and campesinos that work it. [It is] not for the latifundistas” (CCRI-CG, 1 March 1994b).

The EZLN connected its struggle for land to Emiliano Zapata and Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution, yet as John Womack, Jr. notes, neither Zapata nor the Constitution made any specific provisions for *indígenas* or *indios*. Indigenous people were incorporated in the original Zapatista struggle and the post-Revolutionary Mexican state’s programs of land reform as campesinos when they were incorporated at all. Mexico’s tradition of agrarian reform never contained special provisions to preserve indigenous cultures or to treat indigenous people differently than other campesinos (Womack 1999a; 1999b). Regardless of the marginalized place that indigenous people played in Mexican history, EZLN leaders and members connected with the Mexican nationalist mythology that made campesinos, even indigenous campesinos, a crucial part of the Mexican nation. The Zapatistas who rose against the state in 1994 had no doubts in their minds that they were Mexicans and that as Mexicans they deserved a government that would protect their interests.

The popular heroes and mythology of the Mexican Revolution cemented the place of agrarian rebels fighting for land rights and their own communities into the Mexican nationalist conscious. Although none of the popular leaders of the revolution gained power, the 1917 Constitution reflected popular demands and planted the seeds of radical agrarian reform. John Womack notes that: “The Mexican Revolution that was a national movement of working people by working people, for working people is a myth” and that the real Mexican Revolution consisted of many competing groups. The few of which that were actually revolutionary faced eventual defeat and containment (Womack 1999a, 7).
Popular education efforts that accompanied land reform in the Cardenista era took Emiliano Zapata, the peasant revolutionary leader, and made him an icon of Mexican nationalism and land reform (Stephen 2002).

The Zapatistas linked their cause to Emiliano Zapata and called themselves, “the lowest of the Mexican citizens and the greatest of the Mexican patriots” who fought to bring “liberty, democracy and justice” to their country (CCRI-CG, 20 January 1994b). In a February 8, 1994, comunicado addressed to the Coordinadora Nacional Plan de Ayala, the CCRI-CG of the EZLN spoke of “a new more just and more equitable Mexican countryside where the stern gaze of general Emiliano Zapata keeps watch so that oppression does not now repeat itself under another name” (CCRI-CG, 8 February, 1994).

In 1994 and again in 1995, 1996, and 1999, the CCRI-CG released a comunicado on April 10, honoring Emiliano Zapata on the anniversary of his assassination. In 1997, the Zapatistas released a comunicado written by Marcos for the CCRI-CG. These comunicados linked the EZLN to the historic Zapatistas and helped to legitimate the EZLN’s claim to be a “Zapatista Army.” Reflecting on their present situation, the CCRI-CG argued that: “Like in 1919, the land is not for those who work it. Like in 1919, arms are the only route that the bad government leaves for the landless” (CCRI-CG, 10 April 1994a). The Zapatistas used the anniversary of Zapata’s death to connect their movement to his historic struggle. In 1995, they introduced the concept of Votán-Zapata, an indigenization of the sprit of Zapata’s struggle that symbolizes part of the driving force behind the EZLN. To the Zapatistas, Zapata’s name “designates a struggle for justice, a cause for democracy, a thought for liberty” (CCRI-CG, 10 April 1995). The
EZLN called themselves “the children of Zapata” and argued that modern peasant groups had taken up the Zapatista cause (CCRI-CG 10 April 1996). In the words of the CCRI-CG:

The Zapatista flag of Land and Liberty today is lifted by the rural workers, by the campesinos without land, by the impoverished ejidatarios, by small and medium property owners, and by those that are the last in wealth and in life [and] the first in misery and in death: the indigenous Mexicans…We the Zapatistas know very well that Zapata lives, that the fight for land and liberty has not terminated. The anti-Zapatista reforms of Article 27 are so that the powerful can legalize their robberies and spoils. To these robbers that live in the government, in the bank, and abroad, it does not matter what the land produces, they are not interested in working it…They are interested in selling it… (CCRI-CG, 10 April 1996).

The Zapatistas identified Presidents Salinas and Zedillo as betrayers of Mexican nationalism who sold Mexico through their neoliberal policies. The EZLN claimed that Zedillo’s ties to foreign capitalists and his wish to control the petroleum reserves of Chiapas helped motivate his decision to launch military operations against the Zapatistas and their supporters (CCRI-CG, 9 February 1995). They accused Zedillo of wasting Mexican money “to move hundreds of tanks and helicopters and millions of federal troops [to Chiapas] to kill Mexicans and indigenous people” (CCRI-CG, 10 February 1995). Once Mexicans learned that Salinas’ brother Raúl had engaged in criminal activities, the Zapatistas capitalized on the information to argue that Carlos Salinas was also a criminal who used his neoliberal policies to enrich himself at the expense of most Mexicans (Marcos for el CCRI-CG, 14 December 1995).
The leadership of the EZLN used their official communications with the Mexican public and government to argue that their movement continued the struggle of previous Mexican patriots who fought to create a just and free country. In contrast to Zedillo and Salinas, who the Zapatistas claimed had betrayed Mexico, Zapatista rhetoric placed their movement as part of a long Mexican history of struggling against oppression. To Zedillo they wrote, “Señor Ernesto Zedillo, we accuse you of being a traitor to the patria (fatherland or nation) because all of the money that you receive from the United States you spend in order to kill Mexicans, you Señor Zedillo are selling our country piece by piece” (CCRI-CG, 10 February 1995).

The EZLN contrasted their own role as protectors of the Mexican poor who would fight selflessly to improve their country despite being among the most impoverished and miserable of Mexicans with the willingness of neoliberal politicians to sell Mexico to the highest bidder. They wrote in a pointed reminder to Zedillo that “Hidalgo, Allende, Aldama, Morelos, and other revolutionaries like Zapata and Villa” also struggled against “powerful people like yourself [who] wanted to end them, to erase them from our Mexico” (CCRI-CG, 10 February 1995). “[I]f you can destroy our bodies,” the Zapatistas wrote, “you can never destroy the idea of those who struggle” (CCRI-CG, 10 February 1995).

Some of the Zapatistas’ portrayal of themselves as Mexican patriots is clearly revolutionary rhetoric. Their contrast of their movement with the “thieving” “bad government” that they claim is betraying its people is designed to elicit sympathy for their cause. Despite this revolutionary rhetoric, the Zapatistas’ campesino nationalism is not just for show. Their views of the Mexican government and argument that it betrayed
its people stem both from socialist ideology and from a logic of appropriate government behavior that follows the campesino nationalism that developed after the Mexican Revolution. To the Zapatistas Salinas was the “usurper” and the “illegitimate” president not only because of the electoral fraud that surrounded his victory but also, importantly, because he reformed Article 27 of the Constitution to remove the government’s obligation to peasant farmers and thereby betrayed what the EZLN viewed as the meaning of the Mexican Revolution.

In the eyes of the Zapatistas, the government revealed that it had betrayed the Mexican people through ending land reform and by selling the resources of the Mexican nation for its members’ enrichment rather than using them to aid the popular classes. In the early years of their uprising, the Zapatistas accused the government and the PRI repeatedly of being traitors to the state who wasted money and sold Mexico’s resources to foreign capitalists for their own benefit. The Zapatistas argued that they were fighting against “those that are in power who enrich themselves, decree the death of the history of the nation, and sentence millions of Mexicans to poverty with neoliberalism” (Marcos for el CCRI-CG, 19 September 1996).

Salinas’ changes to Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution mobilized many members of the EZLN and Zapatista supporters. From the first days of their uprising, the EZLN called on the Mexican government to reintroduce land reform, provide material aid and educational services to poor Mexicans, and allow Mexico to democratize. By advocating the return of land reform the Zapatistas evoked an idealized Mexican state that provided for its people. Although the Zapatistas argued that the Mexican government should act as a just patron for the poor, they did not base their argument on
an idealized notion of how the government had aided campesinos in the past. The Zapatistas evoked an ideal of good government behavior based on the 1917 Constitution and on the legacy of revolutionary peasant heroes that called for the government to aid campesinos. They openly acknowledged, however, that no actual Mexican government had ever fulfilled this obligation to the indigenous people of Chiapas. Instead of gaining government aid, indigenous people in Chiapas found discrimination and neglect. In a February 8, 1994, comunicado, the Zapatistas asserted that they rebelled against the government because they wanted to improve their lives and the lives of their children. They wrote that: “there are neither schools nor medicines for our children, no clothes and no food. We do not have a dignified roof in which to guard our poverty. For our children, there is only work, ignorance, and death” (CCRI-CG, 8 February 1994). They recounted how peaceful struggle had failed: “we looked to peaceful roads to obtain justice and we encountered mockery, and we encountered jail, and we encountered beatings, and we encountered death; we always encountered suffering and pain” (CCRI-CG, 8 February 1994). In the minds of the Zapatistas and their supporters, peaceful resistance in Chiapas had failed to better appreciably the lives of indigenous people in the state. They argued that peasant mobilization in peaceful organizations had led, for the most part, to the repression of the organizations, the death of many of their leaders, or the PRI’s cooption of independent groups. Neil Harvey has documented that in southeastern Chiapas the assessment by many indigenous campesinos that peaceful organizing had failed to better their lives lead some of these individuals to join the EZLN or become Zapatista supporters (Harvey 1998).
On February 15, 1995, the CCRI-CG reported that one of the main problems that the Zapatista base had with the San Andrés negotiating process was that the negotiations did not provide a solution to “the national agrarian problem” and did not “restore the spirit of Emiliano Zapata” to Article 27 (CCRI-CG, 15 February 1995). The Zapatistas argued that “the problem of land is the most important problem for the Zapatistas and for all indigenous people and campesinos in Mexico,” yet after the San Andrés Accords, Zapatista comunicados would abandon almost all references to traditional land reform (CCRI-CG, 15 February 1995). Instead of advocating for a return to land reform, the Zapatistas found other ways to push for land for indigenous people by focusing on autonomy.

Zapatista Concepts of the Duties of the State

“In our dreams…we have seen another world. A true world [that is] definitely more just than the world in which we walk today” (CCRI-CG, 1 March 1994a).

The members of the EZLN developed an expansive definition of what constitutes democratic governance. Their ideas about democracy stemmed from their experiences with local self-governance in the Selva Lacandona and from their ideas about appropriate political behavior. To the Zapatistas, the Mexican state existed to serve the Mexican people. Government officials had a duty to support the popular classes and to make decisions based on the interests of a broadly defined “Mexican people” rather than their own self-interest or the interests of business. Ideas about the discriminatory nature of neoliberalism and the painful consequences of free trade professed by international human rights and other leftist advocates resonated on the local level for Zapatista
supporters. They experienced fluctuations in the market price of primary commodities like corn and beans and in the international coffee markets as direct changes in their families’ standards of living. The process of opening Mexican markets that the PRI had embarked upon since the early 1980s and the Salinas administration accelerated in preparation for the North American Free Trade Agreement or NAFTA exacerbated the decline of the Mexican countryside. By launching their rebellion on January 1, 1994, the day that NAFTA went into effect, and positioning their movement in direct opposition to neoliberalism the Zapatistas gained national and international attention (Nash 2001).

The EZLN deliberately cultivated Mexican and international civil society, and their uprising resonated both on a national and international level. Thomas Olesen notes that a strong transnational solidarity network arose in support of the Zapatistas in part due to the EZLN’s efforts to frame its struggles in internationally understood concepts. By tying their uprising to criticisms of NAFTA, the Zapatistas tapped into ideas shared by many NGOs and leftist activists that neoliberalism creates injustice for the poor and socially marginalized. Their uprising seemed to present living proof for Mexicans and international activists who had argued against the NAFTA agreement based on its harmful effects on the Mexican countryside. The Zapatistas firm argument that the Mexican government needed to democratize also resonated with national and international solidarity networks (Olesen 2005).

Despite its ability to attract intense international and Mexican support, the EZLN did not understand democracy in the same manner that most Mexicans or international activists understood the concept. This gap in understanding became most evident after 2000, while Mexican and international activists were celebrating Mexico’s election of an
opposition president as the end of the PRI’s stranglehold on Mexican politics and the beginning of a new era in Mexican democracy. The EZLN, in contrast, considered Vicente Fox and PAN to be part of the same anti-populist, anti-democratic trend in recent Mexican politics that had led to the rise of Salinas and Zedillo in the PRI. The Zapatistas’ campesino nationalism and their indigenous background influenced their movement’s views of proper government behavior. To the Zapatistas, the government should serve its people. Their idea that governments should be subservient to those they govern led the Zapatistas to criticize the Mexican state for failing to provide for its people and failing to behave democratically. This idea also underlies the Zapatistas drive for a socialist transformation of the relationship between the Mexican state and society.

On March 1, 1994, the Zapatistas released their first major set of demands to the Mexican government. The Zapatistas claimed that they took up arms “against misery and the bad government” and cited their experiences of repression, marginalization and lack of land to explain their rebellion (CCRI-CG, 1 March 1994b). They called for a transition to democracy and noted the unfair treatment that poor and indigenous Mexicans often received from the government. In terms of land rights, they called for the government to restore Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution to reflect the spirit of Emiliano Zapata. The Zapatistas argued that indigenous people and campesinos are entitled to land because the Mexican state has a fundamental and historic duty to distribute land to those who work it. The Zapatistas asserted that in addition to distributing land, the government should also provide campesinos with “agricultural machines, fertilizers, insecticides, credit, technical assistance, better seeds, cattle, and just prices for rural products like coffee, corn, and beans” (CCRI-CG, 1 March 1994b).
They called on the government to provide basic services and free schooling, including bilingual schooling, to rural communities and to devote some of the profits that it earned from petroleum and electricity produced in Chiapas to improving the chiapanecos’ standards of living. The Zapatistas advocated for an independent indigenous radio station and for the state to enforce the rights of people whom highland indigenous leaders had expelled from communities like San Juan Chamula (CCRI-CG, 1 March 1994b).

The CCRI-CG made their first demands for autonomy in this proclamation. Autonomy first emerged as one of many goals of the movement. In their March 1994 list of demands, autonomy and demands relating to the state’s recognition of indigenous peoples shared the Zapatista agenda with the restoration of agrarian reform and socialist aspirations to transform the Mexican state to better serve the poor, especially the agrarian poor, through increased state services and the redistribution of wealth. Of 34 total demands, three dealt primarily with autonomy and seven primarily demanded rights and recognition for indigenous peoples other than autonomy. As their 29th demand, they included a women’s petition. The majority of their demands to the government, ten in total, dealt with primarily redistributive concerns and transforming the government to better serve the poor. Their next largest category of demands dealt broadly with ending hostilities between the EZLN and the government, state compensation of civilians who suffered material losses or were widowed or orphaned due to the army’s actions against the Zapatistas, and issues of legal reform and justice. Eight demands fall primarily into this category, and the Zapatistas’ call for independent human rights groups and commissions in Chiapas can also be seen as a demand relating to the government’s
actions in its conflict with the EZLN. The first two points in the Zapatistas’ agenda related to national democratic reform. They called for free and fair elections, independent electoral monitoring, and a transitional national government as steps to democratize Mexico because: “Without democracy no one can have liberty or justice or dignity. And there is nothing without dignity” (CCRI-CG, 1 March 1994b). In their fifth demand, the Zapatistas called for new democratic elections in Chiapas (CCRI-CG, 1 March 1994b).

The Zapatistas framed some of their autonomy demands as a new form of federalism that would recognize the right of local de facto governments to control their own affairs. They called for “a new pact among the integral parts of the federation that ends centralism and permits regions, indigenous communities, and municipalities to govern themselves with political, economic, and cultural autonomy” (CCRI-CG, 1 March 1994b). In their other demands for autonomy, the Zapatistas referred explicitly to indigenous peoples. They stated that: “As the indigenous peoples we are, we want to be left alone to organize ourselves and govern ourselves with proper autonomy because we do not want to be subject to the will of powerful nationals and foreigners” (CCRI-CG, 1 March 1994b). They also asserted that in indigenous communities, “justice should be administered by the proper indigenous peoples following their customs and traditions without intervention by illegitimate and corrupt governments” (CCRI-CG, 1 March 1994b). In this conception, autonomy means indigenous self-determination. In calling for autonomy, the Zapatistas did not reject the state; they rejected the state’s imposition of distant and usually corrupt governing structures on their communities. Even when calling for autonomy, the Zapatistas still argued that the state had an obligation to enforce
justice and to supply goods and services to its indigenous citizens. Later Zapatista projects for autonomy would reject the state’s role in their communities, but their early comunicados still asked for state support.

In contrast to scholars like Juan Pedro Viqueira’s emphasis on electoral democracy, the Zapatistas do not understand democracy as elections alone. To the Zapatistas, democracy has social connotations that free and fair elections do not encompass. Democratic leaders must serve the people who elected them. The Zapatistas identified democratic culture with a pluralistic culture that respects the rights of indigenous people and other marginalized groups. They argued that because democracies follow the will of the people, in a democracy, the leaders “command obediently” (CCRI-CG, 6 October 1994). In the words of the EZLN: “The electoral struggle [for free and fair elections] is only one aspect of the struggle for democracy” in Mexico (CCRI-CG, 6 October 1994).

June Nash relates that in most indigenous communities in Chiapas good leaders were expected to listen to their people and to make decisions based on the communal consensus. In practice, women found themselves barred from most communal assemblies in the highlands, and rank and wealth both mattered in communal decision making. In frontier communities in the Selva Lacandona, the harsh circumstances of life had a leveling effect on status, and all adults, including women, began to participate in assemblies (Nash 2001). Even though the leaders of indigenous communities did not always listen to other community members, Mayan norms towards responsive leaders and consensus-based decision making permeated the Zapatistas’ ideas of democracy.
The Zapatistas evoked their idea of representative democracy with the phrase *mandar obedeciendo*, or to lead while obeying. This concept, which drew on norms of government that had developed among the Mayan indigenous people of Chiapas, became the Zapatistas’ idealized notion of democratic government. In the ideal democracy, the Zapatistas argued, leaders would listen to their constituents when making decisions and act in the best interests of all of their people. They would not assume these interests, but would instead consult with ordinary people before making decisions. The Zapatistas hoped that if government leaders listened to their people they would not longer engage in paternalistic behavior or act only for their own benefit.

In the “Segunda Declaración de La Selva Lacandona” and other official writings in 1994, the EZLN advocated for a National Democratic Convention to unite diverse elements of Mexican civil society and to rewrite the Mexican Constitution to reflect the will of the people. The Zapatistas soon realized that other actors in civil society would neither rally behind the EZLN’s call to reform the constitution nor support the Zapatistas’ calls for a formal transitional government to bring democracy to Mexico. By the end of 1994, while the EZLN still advocated electoral reforms to protect against fraud, it no longer called for a constitutional convention or a transitional government.

The Zapatistas favored “a nation that is open politically to democratic causes and a reorientation of the economy to benefit the majority” of Mexicans (CCRI-CG, 30 June 1995). They called for a reform of the current political parties and argued that for Mexico to become a democracy the government should obey the wishes of the people (Marcos and el CCRI-CG, 1 January 1999).
The manner in which the Zapatistas understand the responsibilities that leaders in any society hold towards those they govern helps to explain the EZLN’s emphasis on democracy as a way to transform Mexico. To the Zapatistas, democratic governance has social as well as electoral implications. Although many political scientists and intellectuals try to define democracy as a political system with free and fair elections and protections for civil rights and liberties, the Zapatistas never understood democracy in such limited terms. They argued instead that good, democratic leaders “command obediently” and follow the will of the people rather than their own desires when making policy. The Zapatistas explained democracy as “the right to choose the government that will obey us [the poor masses] in its directives” (CCRI-CG 1 May 1994). The Zapatistas expected democratic leaders to use the wealth of the state to provide for their people. In the words of Mercedes Olivera, the Zapatista movement “advocates…the construction of a real economic and political democracy, in which those who lead do so in obedience to the wishes of their subordinates (mandar obedeciendo)” (Olivera 2005, 610).

In their calls for democracy, the Zapatistas evoked a Mexican state that would serve as a patron for the poor. They argued that state leaders had a duty to redistribute state resources to provide for the poor rather than using the state for self-aggrandizement. The exact origins of the Zapatistas’ idea that the state has a direct obligation to the poor are unclear. Under socialism the state redistributes wealth in order to provide for the needs of society and to ensure that all citizens benefit from a basic standard of living. The idea of the state as a patron is new to neither Mexican history nor socialist ideology. The post-revolutionary Mexican state, for example, co-opted workers and campesinos...
through social patronage. Certain other aspects of the Zapatista members’ lives may also have led them to emphasize this role as a moral imperative.

The Zapatista notion that good leaders redistribute government wealth to the people while bad leaders use state resources to enrich themselves may stem in part from the cargo-based redistribution norms that used to exist in many chiapaneco indigenous communities. The Zapatistas’ criticisms of the PRI-affiliated bosses who use their control of highland indigenous communities for personal gain, and some Zapatista members’ experiences of being expelled from these communities may also have helped to heighten the Zapatistas’ sensitivity to corruption. Another source of the Zapatista assertion that the state has an obligation to provide for the poor is undoubtedly the teaching of liberation theology which spread along with indigenous catechists in the Selva Lacandona.

The EZLN and Party Politics

“the relief from a dictatorship does not signify democracy” (CCRI-CG, 1 January 1996 Cuarta Declaración de la Selva Lacandona).

The Zapatistas drew on their common understandings about democratic governance in order to critique Mexico’s existing political parties. The Zapatistas emphasized the importance of elections and gained national and international support based on their firm assertion that the Mexican government needed to democratize. Their definition of democracy included many of the elements that comprise the emphasis on democracy as free and fair elections that transnational activists tend to emphasize. The Zapatistas’ definition of democratic governance emphasized the government’s duty to
redistribute national resources to the vast majority of Mexicans who lived in poverty as a fundamental characteristic of democratic governance. The EZLN’s understanding that democratic governance only exists when the government acts to redistribute wealth and serve the interests of the majority of the country who are members of the popular sectors developed in stark contrast to the most common transnational understandings of democracy and party politics.

The Zapatistas applied their view of democracy and proper government behavior to their relations with political parties. In the “Cuarta Declaración de la Selva Lacandona,” they stated that: “Whoever views with hope the ascent of neopanismo ignores that the relief from a dictatorship does not signify democracy” (CCRI-CG, 1 January 1996). The Zapatistas identify the PAN with the neoliberal policies that PRI also endorses. They argued that “The Partido Acción Nacional [is] the most faithful ally of Carlos Salinas de Gortari” and accused the PAN of learning to be “repressive, intolerant, and reactionary” like the PRI (CCRI-CG, 1 January 1996). The Zapatistas consider neither party democratic because both the PRI and the PAN are engaged in a neoliberal project that “implies the total destruction of the Mexican nation, [and] the negation of [Mexican] history” (CCRI-CG, 1 January 1996). The EZLN argues that the PRI is the “criminal face” of neoliberalism and “the PAN [is] its democratic mask” (CCRI-CG, 1 January 1996). Contrasting their nationalism against the PRI and PAN’s willingness to exploit the Mexican people, the Zapatistas argue that in the new, neoliberal world, “destabilization and insecurity” have become “the national program” and “repression and intolerance…the plan of development” (CCRI-CG, 1 January 1996).
To the Zapatistas: “The project of transition to democracy is not a transition through a pact between the powerful which simulates change while everything remains the same” (CCRI-CG, January 1, 1996). Instead, “the transition to democracy [stands] as a project of reconstruction for the country” (CCRI-CG, 1 January 1996). They argue that democracy brings with it “the defense of national sovereignty, justice and hope for those who long for them, the truth, and obedient leadership from the governing class” (CCRI-CG, 1 January 1996). It leads to “the stability and security that come from democracy and liberty, dialog, tolerance, and inclusion as the new way of doing politics” (CCRI-CG, 1 January 1996).

It is easy for outside observers to acknowledge that the Zapatistas’ conceptualization of the fruits of democracy is idealized. Democratic governance alone cannot solve all of the problems of social and economic marginalization that the inhabitants of a country like Mexico face. That said, to reject the Zapatistas’ overly optimistic views on the utility of democracy as naive or even factious without examining their origins would be to ignore a vitally important part of how the Zapatistas understand the proper role of Mexican leaders towards ordinary Mexicans. The Zapatistas developed a profound distrust of Mexican party politics. In Chiapas, the PRI’s corruption permeated local politics and influenced the ability of campesino organizations to gain government aid or recognition for their members. Mexico never had a tradition of successful multiparty politics. The 2000 election marked the first peaceful transition of the presidency from one political party to another in Mexican history. Politics in Mexico often brought violence and corruption at the local level, and in the indigenous regions of
Chiapas many of the problems with Mexican political parties loomed in a starker light than in other regions of the country.

The EZLN adopted and then reinterpreted ideas of presidentialism and the role of political parties that circulated throughout academia and international movements that promoted democratic governance. Subcomandante Marcos probably played a major role in articulating the EZLN’s official views of about the proper path of Mexican democratization. Speaking for the CCRI-CG, Marcos argued that presidentialism in Mexico provided an obstacle to democratization. Even though the 2000 elections might have led to an opposition-party’s candidate in the presidency, the Zapatistas asserted that because Mexican presidentialism concentrates power into the hands of one individual the structure of the presidency itself impedes the democratic process (Marcos for el CCRI-CG, 19 June 2000). The EZLN argued for the power of the legislature as a counterweight to presidential power. Evidencing a distrust of political parties, they asserted through Marcos that members of the legislature should be free to make decisions independently from their parties. In the words of Marcos: “To legislate is not the prerogative of political parties, but of those who are elected democratically by this land” (Marcos for el CCRI-CG, 19 June 2000).

Although they strongly criticized the past 70 years of PRI rule, the Zapatistas argued before the 2000 election that leftist Mexicans should not sacrifice their principles to join an electoral alliance under the PAN’s Vicente Fox in order to defeat the PRI. In Marcos’ words, “The renunciation of engineer Cárdenas of the electoral struggle for the presidency and his incorporation into Vicente Fox’s campaign will not only signify the renunciation of one person…It will also signify the disappearance of an electoral option
Marcos asserted that the Zapatistas refused to vote pragmatically and would not sacrifice their principles to vote for candidates they did not support whether to place PRD members in power in Chiapas or overthrow the PRI in the national elections. Marcos defined democracy as more than elections. In his words, democracy is “the exercise of power by the people all the time in all locations” (Marcos for el CCRI-CG, 19 June 2000). Furthermore, “democracy” is “the power of the people to sanction whoever is in government based on their capacity, honesty, and efficacy” (Marcos for el CCRI-CG, 19 June 2000). The EZLN’s expansive view of democracy contrasted with the ideas about democracy that members of Mexican civil society most often professed. This contrast helps to explain why the Zapatistas’ efforts to rally civil society to their cause resulted in Mexican Left’s embrace of the Zapatistas as an iconic indigenous movement, but did not garner any sort of consistent support for the Zapatistas’ goals to develop a new constitution through a popular convention or to alter radically the way Mexicans practiced party politics.

Of the main criticisms of the Zapatistas from the Mexican Left stems from the EZLN’s refusal to make alliances with the PRD and its orders that Zapatista supporters boycott elections. Scholars like Viqueira have accused the Zapatista leadership of being anti-democratic based on its preference that its followers construct autonomous local governments rather than vote in elections that they could easily win in many cases. As a movement, the Zapatistas are not against electoral democracy per se, rather, they have developed a definition of democratic governance that precludes politicians who do not embrace populist goals from being democratic. To the Zapatistas, neoliberalism and
democracy exist in inherent opposition. Their expansive definition of proper governance which focuses on what they consider to be Mexican politicians’ duty to serve the Mexican people and emphasizes a profound level of local self-determination clashes with current Mexican political norms. The Zapatistas’ ideas about proper governance are not realistic as the basis of a multiparty system, but neither do they preclude the EZLN from supporting the existing electoral Left. Other reasons than the Zapatistas’ so-called lack of respect for democracy better explain why the EZLN has not crafted alliances with the PRD.

Once the PRD began to gain power in Chiapas and neighboring states, the experience of transition to PRD rule at the local and state level left Zapatista supporters disillusioned with the party. Although the Zapatista communities held local municipal elections that often went unrecognized by the state and federal government, the Zapatistas boycotted national and state elections. Although some observers such as Juan Pedro Viqueira have harshly criticized the Zapatistas for advocating national democracy while not participating in the democratic processes, the PRD as well as the EZLN leadership is to blame for the Zapatistas’ rejection of leftist electoral politics. As Rosalva Aída Hernández Castillo relates, “Indigenous people’s concrete needs have not been among the priorities of either the PRI, which monopolized power for 70 years, or the left parties that came together to form the PRD, much less of the historical right represented by the PAN…all three have long histories of confrontation with and even repression of indigenous and campesino organizations” (Hernández Castillo 2006, 118).

Further compounding existing problems, once the PRD came to power on the state level in Chiapas, rather than improving the situation of opposition groups in many
highland indigenous communities, the new power structure simply caused indigenous bosses who were previously affiliated with the PRI to switch parties to the PRD in order to continue to reap political spoils (Hernández Castillo 2006). In addition, in some highland communities in which the power structure remained biased towards the PRI, supporters of the PRD failed to vote because of outright intimidation (Rus and Collier 2003).

Hernández Castillo argues that the decisive break between the Zapatistas and the Chiapas PRD occurred on April 10, 2004, when municipal authorities allied with the PRD in the highland community of Zinacantán attacked a peaceful demonstration of Zapatista supporters demanding access to potable water. Thirty-five people were injured and over 500 became refugees after the confrontation. The national PRD failed to distance itself sufficiently from the actions of its local supporters. Its actions proved to members of the Zapatistas who were suspicious of the motives of national political parties that even the Left does not have their best interests at heart (Hernández Castillo 2006).

Repression of indigenous people who protested the construction of a major dam by the PRD governor of Guerrero also confirms that Mexican political parties do not always care about their indigenous constituents. Although she chides that Zapatistas for abandoning electoral politics as a poor strategic decision, Hernández Castillo notes that: “much of the Mexican political class shares a racist and exclusionary vision of indigenous people, regardless of party or ideology. For decades, this political class has considered indigenous peoples obstacles to the nation’s progress or to the rise of a proletarian consciousness” (Hernández Castillo 2006, 119).
Conflict between the Zapatistas and the PRD in Mexico is not particularly surprising in light of the work of Donna Lee Van Cott. In her studies of the rise of indigenous political parties in the Andes, Van Cott found that in Bolivia and Ecuador, where strong indigenous parties formed, indigenous people also faced marginalization and discrimination from the traditional Left. In these states, a weak political party system, large indigenous populations, a declining traditional Left, and electoral rules that allowed indigenous people to create their own parties heralded the rise of indigenous people as an organized political force (Van Cott 2005). A similar process is not likely to occur for the Zapatistas who are concentrated in Chiapas, because Mexican national political parties face a spatial registration requirement which requires that political parties have “at least 3000 affiliates in ten out of the thirty-two states, or 300 affiliates in at least 100 of the 300 federal districts” (Birnir 2004, 11). The Zapatistas who became disillusioned with existing political parties lack the electoral alternative to create a viable national party which indigenous people in the Andes pursued when faced with an unresponsive left. Instead, the Zapatistas and their supporters turned towards the promise of autonomy to carve out political spaces for their movement and in some cases to secure their communities’ claims to land.

The Push for Indigenous Autonomy

“Today, after a year, the country that calls itself Mexico abandoned its shame in its indigenous past and present… to have indigenous blood is not shameful, it is an honor” (Marcos and el CCRI-CG, 1 January 1995).
Within the first month of their uprising, the Zapatistas made a point of identifying their membership and especially their leadership as indigenous people from Chiapas. On January 20, 1994, the CCRI-CG addressed a brief communiqué to “other indigenous organizations” in which they characterized themselves as an indigenous group struggling to improve their own lives and to improve the lives of indigenous people and campesinos throughout Mexico by forcing the government to acknowledge the plight of Mexico’s rural poor (CCRI-CG, 20 January 1994a).

To reinforce the indigenous character of their movement, the Zapatistas connected their uprising to Mexico’s indigenous history. To the Zapatistas, their own struggle stemmed from a Mexican history of both indigenous and nationalist rebellion. In the process of establishing their movement’s indigenous credentials, the EZLN sometimes relied on folkloric, stereotypical depictions of indigenous Mexicans as those Mexicans who are closest to the land. In an October 1994 comunicado they claimed that the EZLN struggled against neoliberalism because its members felt the sorrow and pain in the hearts of animals and plants and other elements of the Mexican landscape that the government exploited for money (CCRI-CG, 12 October 1994).

This depiction of the Zapatistas and their supporters as noble and persecuted Indians who understand nature better than other Mexicans tapped into commonly held stereotypes of indigenous people while ignoring the reality of Mayan settlements in the Lacandón. The Mayan campesinos that colonized the Selva Lacandona cleared the rainforest to grow corn and coffee and to create pasture for their animals (Womack 1999a). Despite the ecologically harmful reality of many indigenous settlements in Chiapas, the Zapatistas capitalized on images of themselves as spiritual Indians who lived
close to nature. The Zapatistas coupled their images of themselves as ecologically aware indigenous people with statements of indigenous pride. “We are indigenous Mexicans,” the Zapatistas wrote, “the smallest people of these lands but the first people. The most forgotten people but the most resolute people. The most disdained but the most dignified” (CCRI-CG, 12 October 1994). The Zapatistas attempted to turn being an indigenous Mexican who had endured miserable living conditions and discrimination into a badge of honor rather than a source of shame.

The CCRI-CG skillfully tapped into international and Mexican support for indigenous rights once it began to emphasize the indigenous nature of the EZLN in its comunicados. Other indigenous organizations that had originally formed to protest the 1992 Quincentenary of Columbus’ arrival in the Americas increased their activism in the wake of the Zapatista uprising. Mobilized indigenous people from other areas of Mexico including Oaxaca embraced the idea of indigenous autonomy and joined the Zapatistas to advocate autonomy regimes in their own states (Stephen 2002; Mattiace 2003; Nash 2001). The Zapatista uprising attracted extensive international solidarity networks. International observers traveled to Chiapas to help stop the Mexican government from violating the human rights of the Zapatistas and their supporters. These observers used their presence to draw attention to human rights violations and violence against indigenous communities that joined the Zapatista cause and to prevent the government from attempting to crush the EZLN. In addition to the Zapatistas’ international support Mexicans mobilized in large numbers to support the Zapatista cause and to protest the government’s military actions against indigenous people in Chiapas (Brysk 2000; Stephen 2002).
Within days of the Zapatistas’ initial uprising the EZLN and the Mexican government moved towards negotiations. On January 6, 1994, the CCRI-CG released a comunicado detailing the EZLN’s conditions for negotiation with the government. Although the Zapatista leaders likely expected few real gains from negotiation, talks with the government would give the EZLN a platform to spread its message and buy it time to consolidate if the government launched another military operation. The willingness of the Zapatistas to engage in negotiations with the PRI-controlled government formed part of a concerted strategy by the EZLN leadership to shift their struggle away from military engagements that they could not win and towards persuading the Mexican people that the Zapatista cause was just and desirable.

The Zapatistas defined themselves in their early communications as members a revolutionary force which struggled for the Mexican people while receiving nothing for itself. Describing the struggle on February 16, 1994, the CCRI-CG stated:

For the indigenous everything, for the campesinos everything, for the workers everything, for the teachers and students everything, for the children everything, for everyone everything./ For us the smallest people of these lands, those without faces and without history, armed with truth and fire, those that come from the night and the mountains, the true men and women, the dead of yesterday, today, and forever…for us nothing. For everyone everything (CCRI-CG 16 February 1994).

Appropriating the imagery of Exodus and other Biblical imagery that catechists had popularized throughout the Selva Lacandona, the Zapatistas positioned themselves through their writings to the Mexican people as saviors who did not themselves expect to be saved. They would give their strength and even their lives for their beliefs and act as
guides to lead their people, their fellow Mexicans who faced marginalization, out of repression and into a future of representation.

The EZLN began to emphasize its standing as an indigenous movement for strategic reasons. The Mexican government focused its campaign to discredit the Zapatistas on the idea that leftist agitators in the EZLN leadership were manipulating indigenous campesinos for their own gain. In order to gain public sympathy and maintain its standing as a legitimate movement the EZLN needed to counter the government’s claims by revealing its indigenous leadership and pursuing specifically indigenous goals.

The Zapatista’s early comunicados give every indication that questions of land, land reform, and access to communal assistance loomed strongest in the minds of the indigenous campesinos that formed the EZLN. Indigenous settlements in the Selva Lacandona faced a lack of resources and recognition from the government. Without formal title to their lands, their existence as self-sustaining local governments remained precarious. The indigenous settlers of the Selva faced insecurity over land. The Salinas administration’s abandonment of land reform signaled to indigenous campesinos that they must take drastic action to reform their government so that it could not abandon its obligations to campesinos with impunity. The Zapatistas and their supporters saw the results of years of peaceful campesino organizing as insufficient and argued that future peaceful organizing would be unlikely to improve their lives. The EZLN represented an avenue to contest the government’s abandonment of their needs.

In contrast to the uncertainty over land, the frontier communities of the Selva did not face pressure from the state to alter their local customs and systems of government.
Unlike in the highlands, the PRI state did not extend its reach into the Selva. The Zapatistas faced initially a state that threatened them as campesinos but did not interfere noticeably with their lives as indigenous people. Even in the highlands where indigenous bosses ensured the PRI’s electoral domination in many communities and expelled dissidents in that name of “tradition” the state did not insert itself between indigenous governments and communities. Instead, the PRI controlled the highlands by allowing indigenous communities to govern themselves while subverting their governing structures (Nash 2001; Mattiace 2003; Collier with Lowery Quaratiello 1999).

The Zapatistas portrayed their armed uprising as the only way that they as poor indigenous campesinos from a backwater state who faced an unresponsive and repressive government could struggle to improve their lives. Once the Zapatistas began to reinforce the indigenous nature of their uprising to counter government attempts to portray them as a group of indigenous peasants being manipulated by sophisticated leftists like Marcos, they began to incorporate elements of indigenous culture and history into their writings.

The Mexican Left embraced the Zapatistas once it became clear that the EZLN advocated indigenous goals and that mobilized indigenous people comprised and directed the Zapatista uprising. Mexicans embraced a fascination with the Zapatistas, and the EZLN’s efforts to advance indigenous recognition and autonomy received sustained support from sympathetic Mexicans. Although the Mexican right viewed indigenous autonomy with suspicion, many other Mexicans supported the Zapatista cause and engaged in protests when the government moved militarily against the Zapatistas (Nash 2001; Stephen 2002).
The Zapatistas emerged from the first round of negotiations with the Mexican government unable to reach an agreement. Although the EZLN and the government reached a minimal set of accords on March, 1, 1994, the Zapatista membership voted to reject the agreement.28 In 1995, the new President Ernesto Zedillo decided to use a show of force against the Zapatistas to rehabilitate his presidency. Zedillo had experienced a series of setbacks early in his presidency including the collapse of the Mexican peso and hoped that a military crackdown against the EZLN would reinvigorate his reputation as a leader. Zedillo miscalculated gravely about how most Mexicans would view military operations against the now peaceful EZLN (Womack 1999a; 1999b; Stephen 2002).

Zedillo launched military operations against indigenous communities known to support the Zapatistas, which resulted in a highly publicized exodus of displaced people who fled into the Selva to escape the army. He also revealed that Subcomandante Marcos was Rafael Sebastián Guillén, a University-educated mestizo, and revealed the names of other leftist-associated members of the EZLN. Zedillo ordered arrest warrants for Marcos and other known members of the EZLN leadership. He, however, failed to capture Marcos or disrupt the movement. Although the government identified members of the EZLN who had been active in the FLN and other leftist organizations, the EZLN’s current Chiapas-based indigenous leadership escaped identification. Instead of rallying support for Zedillo as a strong leader, his actions against the Zapatistas led to a public outcry against his government in Mexico and abroad. The Zedillo administration returned to the negotiating table when confronted by the support that their military actions against indigenous civilians garnered for the EZLN. Despite returning to negotiations, Zedillo never demilitarized Chiapas. His administration pursued a dual
strategy with respect to the EZLN. It destroyed the most mobilized Zapatista villages and instituted regular army patrols around many indigenous communities to intimidate Zapatista supporters throughout the state. To balance the negative consequences of the militarization of Chiapas in Mexican public opinion, the administration kept up the appearance of searching for a peaceful solution by continuing negotiations with the EZLN (Stephen 2002).

The Zedillo administration did not want the Mexican people to view its Chiapas policies as in opposition to the needs of indigenous chiapanecos. The Zapatistas’ use of comunicados and their ability to shift their struggle from an armed rebellion to a rebellion that relied on words and public opinion to shield its members from violent government reprisals relied on the Mexican peoples’ willingness to support poor indigenous people in their contest against the government. Relying more heavily on their indigenous identity than on their identity as campesinos allowed the Zapatistas to tap into the Mexican public’s support for indigenous people. Stressing their indigenous identity also helped the Zapatistas to build an international following for their movement. In Mexico, the widespread characterization of indigenous people as a vital part of the Mexican nation and the willingness on the part of Leftist Mexicans to advocate on the behalf of indigenous people against state repression garnered intense support for and fascination with the Zapatistas.

Negotiations Continue

The original plan for negotiations between the Zapatistas and Zedillo administration called for six sets of accords. The first would cover indigenous rights and
culture, the second democracy and justice, the third welfare and development, and the fourth conciliation in Chiapas. The fifth set of negotiations would discuss women in Chiapas, while the final set of accords would negotiate the end of hostilities between the EZLN and the government (CCRI-CG 10 September 1995). Negotiations would take place at San Andrés Sakmch’en (White Cave) de los Pobres, a Tzotzil community in the highlands of Chiapas. After four sets of preliminary negotiations on April 20 to 21, 1995, May 12, 1995, June 7, 1995, and July 4 to 6, 1995, the government and the Zapatistas began negotiations on indigenous rights and culture in earnest on September 5 through 10 of 1995. The negotiating parties met at San Andrés whose inhabitants strongly supported the Zapatistas and had renamed their town San Andrés Sakmch’en de los Pobres from San Andrés Larráinzar to remove the name of a hated landholding family from the town (Nash 2001; Womack 1999a; 1999b; Mattiace 2003).

By February of 1995, the Zapatistas identified themselves as “indigenous people in insurrection” (CCRI-CG, 9 February 1995). In the spring of that year, the EZLN increased its criticism of some members of the government’s unwillingness to recognize the Zapatistas as an indigenous force. The CCRI-CG wrote that: “The government repeats its error and considers that indigenous people are incapable of organizing themselves by themselves… They are mistaken, we, the indigenous, are capable” (CCRI-CG, 21 April 1995).

Negotiations began in earnest on October 17, 1995. John Womack credits the changing national political situation and the effects of a national poll that the Zapatistas took about their movement that revealed the depth of support for the EZLN throughout Mexico for revitalizing negotiations after five failed negotiating attempts (Womack
The government and the Zapatistas both brought advisors to the talks. The government advisors tended to be affiliated with the government’s Instituto Nacional Indígena (INI). In contrast, many of the Zapatistas advisors were academics who studied indigenous affairs. The first round of talks proceeded smoothly, and both sides’ experts tended to agree about important issues. When the two sides met again in November 1995, the atmosphere became more tense. The government had sent most of its experts away after the first period of serious negotiation. According to Shannan Mattiace: “Critics claimed that the government became disenchanted with the INI because they had ‘gone native’ openly supporting many of the demands expressed by [the] EZLN’s invited guests” (Mattiace 2003, 120).

The experts that the Zapatistas invited to the negotiations influenced the direction that the Zapatista movement would take in terms of advocating for indigenous rights. Mexican academics who study indigenous affairs are highly familiar with the international indigenous rights movement. The Zapatistas advisors were able to use their knowledge of international law and current justifications in the indigenous rights movement for indigenous recognition and autonomy to help craft a compelling argument for indigenous autonomy in Mexico. Other mobilized indigenous groups who added their voices to the Zapatista cause embraced autonomy as the fundamental mechanism necessary to ensure that indigenous people where able to determine their own lives and gain recognition and respect within national politics. The Zapatistas worked to craft a national accord at San Andrés and worked to incorporate the demands and concerns of other indigenous organizations into the negotiation process. The EZLN’s shift towards indigenous autonomy as its principal goal in the San Andrés negotiations owes a
considerable impetus to the degree that experts on indigenous rights and other mobilized indigenous groups considered autonomy to be the central indigenous demand (Stephen 2002; Nash 2001; Mattiace 2003).

The EZLN and the government agreed to discuss indigenous rights before discussing land reform or the Zapatistas’ other major concerns. During the lengthy process of negotiations at San Andrés, the Zapatistas emphasized that they were indigenous people who had mobilized, in part, to improve the lives of other indigenous Mexicans. Alluding to past and present injustices against indigenous Mexicans, they wrote that: “More than 500 years have not been able to exterminate us” (CCRI-CG, 12 October 1995). The Zapatistas drew on Mexican nationalist mythology about indigenous people to ask for support as Indians. They argued that indigenous people form a fundamental part of Mexico. Indigenous people comprise part of the flesh of the Mexican nation: “Indian blood is a nutrient part of Mexican blood” (CCRI-CG, 12 October 1995). They made indigenous peoples’ ability to endure hardship yet remain just into a virtue and claimed that: “skin color does not make an indígena” because indigenous people are defined by their “dignity” and willingness to “always struggle to better themselves” (CCRI-CG, 12 October 1995).

In January of 1996, the Zapatistas reflected on the ways that the San Andrés negotiation process had increased indigenous peoples’ access to the Mexican political process and on the ways that the Mexican government continued to repress the Zapatistas despite ongoing negotiations. The Zapatistas identified themselves with the indigenous people of Mexico. They contrasted their movement’s ability to reveal to the world that indigenous Mexicans exist who are willing to struggle to improve their lives with the
government’s willingness to destroy any structures including cultural centers that the
Zapatistas constructed without government permission (CCRI-CG, 3 January 1996).
Tensions between the government and the Zapatistas ran high in January of 1996. The
Zapatistas argued that the government’s adoption of the “religion of neoliberalism”
caused government leaders to believe that being a Zapatista and by implication an
indigenous person who was unwilling to abandon the struggle for land and equality was a
“mortal sin” (CCRI-CG, 3 January 1996). The Zapatistas contrasted their virtue with the
government’s venality. They argued that: “the world we are trying to construct is a world
where everyone fits without the necessity to dominate others. The powerful do not
accept us in their world; they persecute us and kill us… The government that we have
today has wanted to kill, to buy, and to silence us” (CCRI-CG, 3 January 1996). The
Zapatistas identified their movement with the struggle of all Mexican indigenous people
to be recognized and respected by the government as indigenous. According to the
Zapatistas, “It should be a cause for national shame that only in the last decade of the
twentieth century, almost 200 years after the birth of our country, that the government
begins to show signs of recognition of our [indigenous peoples’] existence and our
rights” (CCRI-CG, 18 January 1996).

**Demanding Autonomy**

By their third year of mobilization, the Zapatistas increasingly stressed the goals
of indigenous recognition and autonomy. They argued that the government should
recognize in its official documents that indigenous peoples have a right to free self-
determination, autonomy, and free association. The government should also recognize
the rights of indigenous peoples to “territory” and to be considered “peoples,” two terms that have legal standing in international law. The government should recognize that indigenous people have the right to representation in national and state politics and the right to live in a country with juridical pluralism that respects their customary law. The Zapatistas explicitly identified their movement as an “indigenous army” and they argued that “one of the principal causes of the uprising of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional has been the oppression, injustice, and marginalization to which the indigenous peoples of Mexico have been subjected” (CCRI-CG, 18 January 1996).

The government and the EZLN signed the San Andrés Accords on February 16, 1996. Experts on both sides had considered some sort of indigenous autonomy to be a vital step in improving the conditions under which indigenous Mexicans lived. Despite the government’s objections to regional autonomy, the final accords included provisions for communal and municipal autonomy. In the words of Shannan Mattiace: “The accords are historic in that government representatives admitted, right from the start, the importance of reforming the relationship between indigenous people and the state,” and acknowledged the presence of discrimination in Mexico rather than subsuming the indigenous question within the framework of underdevelopment (Mattiace 2003, 123).

Although the Zapatistas accepted the San Andrés Accords, they voiced their reservations about the accords and about the negotiating process in a comunicado they issued on February 15, 1996, the day before they signed the Accords. The Zapatistas asserted that EZLN had worked through the negotiations “to resolve the problematic situation and undignified misery in which the Indian people of the country subsist” (EZLN for the comité, 15 February 1996). They stated that although the government had
not accepted all of the EZLN’s proposals for autonomy, the EZLN delegates had been able with the help of civil society to gain some level of autonomy for Mexico’s indigenous peoples. To the Zapatistas, while the San Andrés Accords represented an important first step towards satisfying their demands, the Accords failed to address important reasons behind Zapatista mobilization. Foremost, the Accords failed to provide a solution to Mexico’s agrarian problems. In the words of the Zapatistas: “To solve the grave national agrarian problem, it is necessary to reform Article 27 of the General Constitution of the United Mexican States. This article should recover the spirit of the struggle of Emiliano Zapata summarized in two basic demands: the land is for those who work it and tierra y libertad (land and liberty)” (EZLN for the comité, 15 February 1996). The Zapatistas argued that the reform of Article 27 must also guarantee the territorial integrity of indigenous communities and other ejidos. It should incorporate the International Labor Organizations protocol on indigenous rights, ILO 169 in agrarian legislation and allow women direct access to land. Banks and mercantile societies would be prohibited from owning land (EZLN for the comité, 15 February 1996).

The Zapatistas argued that the other main fault of the Accords was that they did not fully recognize municipal autonomy and ignored the possibility of regional autonomy. The Zapatistas argued that autonomy, including the right of indigenous communities to govern themselves by their own internal norms so long as those norms did not violate the rights of their residents, provided vital means to improve living conditions for indigenous people and help conquer discrimination and racism in Mexico (EZLN for the comité, 15 February 1996). Although the EZLN did not repeat their earlier cry for the government to provide vital services to rural communities they
included demands for modern communications equipment and access for women to
greater government resources in their objections to San Andrés (EZLN for the comité, 15
February 1996).

After the San Andrés Accords: The End of the Negotiation Process

After San Andrés, Zapatista mobilization focused on ensuring that the Accords
became law. Zedillo, in contrast, viewed the accords as a way to temporarily pacify the
EZLN and to distract national attention away from his militarization of Chiapas and did
not treat the San Andrés Accords as a binding agreement. Being seen to negotiate with
the Zapatistas raised the Zedillo administration’s standing in the eyes of many Mexicans
who did not want a war in Chiapas. The unwillingness of Zedillo and the PAN president,
Vicente Fox, to implement the accords as written revealed that neither the majority of
PRI nor the majority of the right-leaning PAN viewed the accords as binding. Zedillo
claimed that the constitutional modifications and legislation proposed in the San Andrés
Accords was unconstitutional and that allowing indigenous people autonomy would lead
to the “balkanization of Mexico” (Mattiace 2003).

By the end of August in 1996, the Zapatistas had realized that the government had
no intention of complying with the San Andrés Accords. The EZLN criticized the
government as “liars” and concluded that the round of talks on democracy and justice
could not possibly be anything other than a sham. The EZLN’s leadership reasoned that
if the government would not respect their first agreement with the Zapatistas, the
government would also not respect future agreements. Without the government
participating in good faith, the Zapatistas reasoned that future negotiations would be
meaningless. Once the EZLN realized that Zedillo had no intention of implementing the San Andrés Accords, they ended negotiations with the government. On August 29, 1996, the EZLN announced that after consulting with their base they had decided to suspend their participation in the San Andrés talks (CCRI-CG, 29 August 1996). The EZLN and the government never made it to the negotiating table to discuss the next round of questions on “democracy and justice.”

After they realized that the Zedillo administration had no intention of fulfilling the San Andrés Accords on its own, the Zapatistas turned their strategy towards using pressures from civil society to shame the government into implementing the Accords. They contrasted the government’s inability to keep its word to indigenous people with their own advocacy of indigenous rights (Marcos for el CCRI-CG, 14 February 1997).

The Zapatistas strongly opposed the Zedillo administration’s proposal for constitutional reforms based on the San Andrés Accords. According to the Zapatistas, the government’s proposal “implies a grave negation of the spirit and the letter of the San Andrés Accords” (CCRI-CG, 12 January 1997). The government’s proposal reduced greatly the provisions for indigenous autonomy from the Accords. The Zapatistas argued that by denying multiple indigenous communities or municipalities the legal right to build their own regional associations, the government had increased the possibility that different indigenous groups would compete with one another. The Zapatistas argued that the government was trying to determine arbitrarily which associations of municipalities and communities were illegal without recognizing indigenous people’s rights to free association because regional pluriethnic communities already existed in Chiapas (CCRI-CG, 12 January 1997). They asserted that the Zedillo administration’s claims that the
Accords “contained unconstitutional elements” and would lead to “the balkanization of the country, the formation of reservations, and the isolation of indigenous communities” were “racist, ethnocentric, and discriminatory” (CCRI-CG, 12 January 1997).

**Conflicts in the Highlands**

In their efforts to craft a positive indigenous identity for themselves and other indigenous Mexicans, the Zapatistas essentialized indigenous people as the “most just” the “most dignified” and the “most deserving” Mexicans. Their folkloric representation of indigenous people may have garnered some sympathy for the movement, but it also overlooked the reality of conflict within indigenous communities throughout Mexico.

The Zapatista uprising occurred in a social context in which indigenous communities in Los Altos of Chiapas divided into factions around political identification. Developments since the late 1980s, created a situation in which religious or party identification became the defining characteristic that separated the members of highland communities who obeyed the old PRI-affiliated network of municipal boss and the members who rejected the “traditional” leadership in their communities. The PRI governor, José Patrocinio González Garrido who took office in 1988, mandated that municipalities must have only one government and bared the parallel governments that members of indigenous communities in Los Altos who were not affiliated with the PRI relied upon for basic social services from receiving municipal funds. As members of highland indigenous communities accelerated their efforts to organize separately from the PRI in the early 1980s, parallel governments sprang up in many Los Altos communities as community members fractured into opposing groups based on party identification. In
the words of George A. Collier: “Even in the tiniest hamlets of Chiapas, political ‘litmus tests’ are used to determine who benefits from government programs and who does not” (Collier with Lowery Quaratiello 1999, 125). Campesinos who found themselves barred from accessing their official municipal government created their own parallel governments. The situation became so extreme in some towns that people affiliated with the PRI had one town hall and went to PRI leaders for help and patronage, while people affiliated with the opposing PRD had their own separate town hall and services (Collier with Lowery Quaratiello 1999). In Los Altos, the PRI-affiliated municipal leaders administered public funds and patronage. They controlled the flow of aid from government programs nominally designed to help the poor such as Salinas’ Solidarity program. This pattern of corruption and patronage angered indigenous campesinos who opposed the PRI and exacerbated their distrust of the government (Collier with Lowery Quaratiello 1999).

The uprising destabilized the already precarious situation in the regions of Chiapas with large indigenous populations. In the wake of the Zapatista uprising, existing conflicts between rival groups in Los Altos and other regions of southeastern Chiapas became increasingly violent. In the words of June Nash: “An undeclared war exists at all levels of civil society in the state of Chiapas” (Nash 2001, 192). Indigenous supporters of the PRI formed paramilitary groups that have gained the backing of the local and state PRI. These violent groups have vied with Zapatista supporters for control of many highland municipalities. The Zapatistas and their supporters who formed an unrecognized Pluriethnic Autonomous Region boycotted elections beginning in 1995 in protest of the military’s presence in the region and the government’s unwillingness to
recognize the new forms of government that Zapatista supporters had created after the uprising. As a result of their boycott, PRI governments took power in many communities in the region, including those with PRD majorities. This situation led to conflicts between the official PRI government and PRD supporters in communities in which the PRD held numerical superiority (Nash 2001).

On December 22, 1997, paramilitary supporters of the PRI from the paramilitary group Paz y Justicia (Peace and Justice) massacred Zapatista supporters from the non-violent group Los Abejas (the Bees) in the Christian Base community of Acteal (Nash 2001). Forty-six Tzotzils died in the massacre when paramilitaries stormed the village church. Most of the dead were women and children who the young paramilitary members shot or murdered with machetes. The brutality of the Acteal massacre, in which young Tzotzil paramilitaries viciously killed their defenseless political opponents, drew international attention to Chiapas. Human rights and advocacy groups from Europe and the United States criticized the Mexican government because members of the Chiapas PRI had consistently abetted, and in some cases armed and funded, paramilitary groups before the massacre (Stephen 2002). The Zapatistas blamed the PRI for facilitating the Acteal massacre. They argued that:

direct responsibility for these bloody facts [of the massacre] falls on Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León and the Secretaría de Governación, who have for two years given the green light to the counterinsurgency project presented by the federal army. This project is intent on displacing the [government’s] Zapatista war into a conflict between indigenous people about religious, political, and ethnic differences (Marcos and el CCRI-CG, 23 December 1997).
To the Zapatistas, the Acteal massacre and other violence in southeastern Chiapas confirmed what Zedillo’s unwillingness to honor the San Andrés Accords had revealed. The government had used negotiations with the Zapatistas as a tactic to neutralize the movement. In the eyes of the EZLN, the process of negotiations had allowed the government to pay lip service to a peaceful settlement while government functionaries encouraged paramilitary violence and militarized Chiapas. The PRI’s role in aiding paramilitaries revealed to the Zapatistas that the government was not interested in bettering the lives of indigenous Mexicans; instead, it only wanted to neutralize the Zapatistas by the most expedient means possible (Marcos and el CCRI-CG, 26 December 1997).

After Acteal, the Zapatistas rejected the possibility that justice or peace for Mexico’s indigenous people could come from the PRI-led government (Marcos and el CCRI-CG, 9 January 1998). They argued that: “For the government, the war against indigenous people is a business” because government soldiers earned higher salaries serving in Chiapas than elsewhere and government and army members earned money off prostitution, selling alcohol, and protecting narcotraffickers in occupied zones (CCRI-CG, 20 November 1998a). These accusations that the government engaged in criminal conduct for profit formed part of a series of Zapatista arguments that the Mexican government was selling the country it was supposed to protect.

**Persistence: de facto Autonomy Regimes and the Struggle for Indigenous Rights**

By the winter of 1998, the EZLN had completely refocused its agenda on indigenous rights. Rather than calling on its allies in civil society to help secure land
reform or ensure that the government provided social services to the poor, the Zapatistas
now focused on representing the concerns of the indigenous people of southern Mexico
on a national level (see for example: CCRI-CG, 20 November 1998b).

The Zapatistas still spoke out against government policies that they claimed
harmed the poor and damaged the integrity of the Mexican nation. They argued that
Zedillo implemented neoliberal policies “against the will of the majority of Mexicans”
and that his policies were “destroying the material base of the nation state (Marcos and el
CCRI-CG, 1 January 1999). To the Zapatistas, the “neoliberal economic model is
criminal and inefficient” because it harms poor and middle class Mexicans while making
the country dependent on international capitalists (Marcos and el CCRI-CG, 1 January
1999). The Zapatistas asserted that in contrast to the government’s self-serving behavior,
civil society was working to bring democracy to Mexico and to improve the lives of
ordinary Mexicans.

The Zapatistas argued repeatedly that the PRI government wanted to sell the
nation. In the words of Marcos and the CCRI-CG, the government, “wants to privatize
the electric industry, petroleum, the cultural patrimony [of Mexico], [and] university
education. [It wants to privatize] history [and] dignity” (Marcos and el CCRI-CG, 12
June 1999). The Zapatistas vehemently rejected Zedillo’s drive to privatize the Mexican
electric industry, writing two comunicados against privatization in early 1999 (Marcos
and el CCRI-CG, 16 February 1999; 18 March 1999). They argued that the government
did not have the right to privatize the electric industry: “Because the electric industry is
not the government’s property. It is the people’s property” (Marcos and el CCRI-CG, 18
March 1999). The Zapatistas argued that privatization was against the national interest
because it would sell the resources of the state which belonged to everyone to a privileged few and was equal to selling the state (Marcos and el CCRI-CG, 18 March 1999).

Despite the end of PRI rule in 2000, Vicente Fox’s election as president did not open the Mexican political system for the Zapatistas. The EZLN rejected the neoliberal policies that Fox and the conservative PAN embraced. The Zapatistas considered neoliberalism harmful to most Mexicans and therefore an ideology that weakened and sold the Mexican nation rather than protecting its citizens. The Zapatista’s perception of democracy which had roots in their indigenous Mayan background maintained that democratic leaders must listen to and obey the wishes of their people rather than making decisions that would benefit one group over others or that catered to political expediency. Neoliberal policies, including the end of land reform, shut the indigenous inhabitants of southeastern Chiapas away from the few positive contacts that they had experienced with the PRI state. The EZLN and their Mayan supporters considered Salinas and Zedillo’s embrace of neoliberal politics and willingness to allow aid programs to be distributed based on party identification evidence that the PRI did not care about indigenous people. Because the PAN also embraced neoliberal economics, the Zapatistas criticized the PAN for some of the same reasons they had criticized the PRI.

That Zapatistas continued to call for state aid and to criticize government officials for “selling the country” instead of providing for its citizens reveals that the Zapatistas would prefer a situation in which the state supported the poor and indigenous peoples rather than corporations and the rich. Autonomous Zapatista municipalities rejected state aid and services in order to avoid the machinations of a hostile state rather than out of a
desire to separate from Mexico. For the Zapatistas, the idea of autonomy encompassed being Mexican while still being indigenous. Autonomy would give indigenous communities and larger groups of people the right to self-determination over their local affairs and the right to live by their own culture as indigenous people. The Zapatistas stressed that autonomous communities and municipalities should have the right to associate freely with each other to form larger, regional autonomous governing structures. That claim, which the government never accepted, helps to illuminate the degree to which the Zapatistas viewed autonomy as a way to allow indigenous communities an increased degree of self-determination.

In 1998, after it became clear that the government would not grant them legal autonomy, the Zapatistas created a series of *Municipios Autónomos Rebeldes*, or autonomous rebel municipalities to be governed independently by Zapatista law. The reach and degree of consolidation of Zapatista autonomous governments varies throughout the state. Municipalities comprise the majority of autonomous Zapatista governments. In addition to autonomous municipalities, other autonomous Zapatista governments function on the community or regional level. None of the Zapatistas’ autonomous municipalities are inhabited entirely by Zapatista supporters. Because the Zapatistas’ autonomous governments exist in parallel to official municipal governments in the same municipalities, the division between Zapatista and official governments often exists between people rather than land. The uncertain legal and human boundaries within the Zapatistas’ autonomous governments help to reproduce and exacerbate existing local conflicts (Burguete 2005).
Members of Zapatista autonomous communities refuse to recognize government authority and reject aid from the government. Burguete notes that: “From the Zapatista perspective, the autonomous government’s power is superior to that of the municipal presidents, and they prefer to maintain themselves as parallel governments rather than compete in elections that in many municipalities they could win without difficulty” (Burguete 2003, 211). Burguete suggests that the Zapatistas have chosen to abstain from occupying official municipal governments in part because they want to govern in ways that the state does not recognize at the municipal level. Zapatista governments concern themselves with dispensing local justice and setting communal laws, for example, beyond the degree at which municipal governments are empowered to act (Burguete 2003).

Juan Pedro Viqueira argues that allowing indigenous peoples to govern themselves by their own customs violates democracy because it allows traditional leaders to maintain control of communities by excluding certain groups from communal decision making (Viqueira 1999; 2000). Although Viqueira notes that democratic reforms will not cause violent political conflicts among indigenous people to “disappear as if by magic,” his faith in electoral democracy causes him to suggest that: “electoral democracy can be an effective way to channel internal conflicts in indigenous municipalities” (Viqueira 2000, 219). In reality, democracy does not have to only encompass elections. Indigenous people are capable of incorporating their local customs with democratic changes in Mexico. For example, discussions in a communal assembly could occur before a formal vote, and making decisions by consensus does not necessarily result in undemocratic decision making processes.
After Fox’s election, the Zapatistas called upon the newly elected president to demilitarize Chiapas, free Zapatista prisoners, and comply with the San Andrés Accords by shepherding their transformation into law (Marcos for el CCRI-CG, 2 December 2000a; 2 December 2000b). When the Fox administration did not push for legislation that followed all of the elements of the San Andrés Accords, the Zapatistas decided to launch a march to the capital to publicize their cause.

Fox, although not terribly knowledgeable about the Zapatistas, tried to establish more positive contacts with the EZLN than the PRI had accomplished. In January 2001, Fox ordered the Mexican army to withdraw from some of its positions in Chiapas and removed several military checkpoints in the state. Although Fox continued to demilitarize Chiapas, he did not end the military presence in the region which remained high in 2002 (Stephen 2002). In addition to decreasing the military presence in Chiapas, Fox also sent a proposal based on the Accords to the Senate four days after assuming office. However, Senators from his own party and from other parties created a watered-down version of the proposal. Their constitutional reform proposal passed in the Senate on April 25, 2001, and became law on August 14, 2001 after being ratified by 19 state legislatures (Mattiace 2003).

Regardless of Fox’s own willingness to promote the San Andrés Accords and to negotiate with the Zapatistas, his inability to pass the Accords in the legislature without members of his own party making modifications disillusioned the Zapatistas about Fox’s willingness to act as an ally. In addition, because Fox embraced neoliberal economics and a “shrinking state” as a way to decrease government corruption and reform Mexican politics, he could not and would not expand state services to become a patron for the
poor. Because the Zapatistas assumed with good cause that other poor Mexicans also wanted a government that would resume land reform and provide them with tangible benefits and that other indigenous Mexicans also wanted the government to honor the San Andrés Accords, they were primed to reject Fox and the PAN as a government that did not follow their concept of democracy and was little better than the PRI. Despite the Zapatistas’ ambivalence about the Fox administration’s willingness to aid indigenous Mexicans, they decided to launch a march to Mexico City in 2001 to push for the Mexican Congress to implement the San Andrés Accords.

On February 25, 2001, a delegation of high-level Zapatista representatives from the CCRI-CG left Chiapas and began a highly publicized trek to the capital to ask for the opportunity to address the Mexican Congress about the importance of implementing the San Andrés Accords. The Zapatistas turned their march into a tour of southern Mexico and stopped to speak in neighboring states on their way to the capital. After several delays, the Zapatista representatives were given permission to address the Mexican Congress on March 28, 2001. The Zapatista delegates addressed the Congress in a mass committee meeting rather than in a formal joint session. Because the Mexican Congress did not pass a version of the San Andrés accords that held true to the original agreement, the EZLN refused to return to the negotiating table (Stephen 2002).

The Zapatistas’ representatives who addressed the Congress stressed their indigenous identity. Comandanta Esthér, an indigenous woman, led the delegation. Comandantes David, Zebedeo, and Tacho also spoke at the Congress, and the delegation read a message from Subcomandante Marcos. When she spoke, Esthér stressed her identity as a *mujer indígena* rather than her role as a Zapatista leader. “My name is
Esthér” she said to the assembled legislators, “but that is not important now. I am a
Zapatista, but that is not important either in this moment. I am indigenous, and I am a
woman, and those are the only things that matter now” (Comandanta Esthér, 28 March
2001). Esthér spoke politely to the assembled Congress men and women. She stated that
“we [the Zapatista delegation] come [here] so that others will listen to us and in order to
listen” (Comandanta Esthér, 28 March 2001).

Esthér introduced the other Zapatista delegates noting that “we are comandantes
[of the EZLN], those who command in common, those who command by obeying our
people” (Comandanta Esthér, 28 March 2001). She hoped that the assembled legislators
would also lead according to the wishes of their people, and that they would listen to the
indigenous people for whom San Andrés promised a better future. She argued that the
Congress must implement the San Andrés Accords to help indigenous women like
herself.

Esthér used her standing as an indigenous woman and a Zapatista leader to paint a
deserving face on the Zapatistas cause. By arguing that the Zapatistas fought for
indigenous women who lived difficult lives, Esthér tried to evoke sympathy among the
predominantly male legislators for the Zapatistas’ cause.

Indigenous women from Zapatista communities used the Zapatista uprising as a
means to challenge communal traditions that subjugated women. The Zapatistas
announced a Ley Revolucionaria de Mujeres or Women’s Revolutionary Law in
December of 1993. They also included women’s demands in their initial demands to the
government, and the last set of negotiations between the government and the Zapatistas
before concluding the negotiating process was to cover women’s issues throughout Mexico.

Prominent Mexican intellectuals and government officials used the excuse of protecting women’s rights as a reason to deny indigenous communities autonomy. In the words of Shannon Speed: “Some [Mexican leaders and intellectuals] went so far as to argue that indigenous people should not be permitted by the state to any measure of autonomy based on their usos y costumbres because they had antidemocratic tendencies and would almost certainly violate the basic human rights of individuals in the community” (Speed 2006, 207). Speed relates that such officials and intellectuals most often referenced women’s rights as examples of the rights that indigenous communities would violate (Speed 2006).

When Comandanta Esthér addressed the Mexican Congress, she confronted directly the argument that indigenous autonomy would harm women. Esthér related the difficult conditions in which indigenous women live in Mexico. She challenged the mostly male legislators to listen to the opinions and testimony of indigenous women before deciding how best to protect these women. The current governmental situation failed to provide women with clean water, good nutrition, health services, schooling, or ways to provide for their families. She argued that: “It is the current law that permits [people] to marginalize us and humiliate us” (Comandanta Esthér, 28 March 2001). She asserted that indigenous women mobilized as Zapatistas to change the status of women in indigenous communities. They are aware of the customs in these communities and are working to use the Zapatista struggle including the autonomy that would be provided with the full implementation of the San Andrés Accords to challenge “bad traditions” and
improve that status of women as full members of indigenous communities. Using polite language, Esthér challenged the assembled legislators to confront their own prejudices about why indigenous women needed saving from indigenous customs (Comandanta Esthér, 28 March 2001).

Despite the Zapatistas’ efforts to lobby the Congress, and the excellent publicity that the Zapatistas’ 2001 tour garnered in Mexico, the EZLN was unable to persuade the government to pass a version of the San Andrés Accords that followed the negotiated text of the Accords. The Zapatistas and their supporters have been unable as of now to gain official recognition for their autonomous governments. Despite a decrease in publicity around the Zapatista cause, Zapatista communities remain “in rebellion” in Chiapas (Mattiace 2003; Hernández Castillo 2006). The EZLN remains dedicated to its goals of indigenous recognition and autonomy and argues that representative governments have a duty to provide for the needs of the poor. If anything the Zapatistas have become more distant from Mexican electoral politics as the years have progressed, and organizational changes in 2005 jettisoned the EZLN’s civil society front further isolating the Zapatistas from outside forces (CCRI-CG, June 2005 “Sexta Declaración de la Selva Lacandona”).

The Zapatistas as a Political Force

The Zapatistas launched their rebellion as Mexican nationalists. In addition to socialist ideology, they drew on the legacies of the Mexican Revolution and the Mexican state’s provision of aid for campesinos for much of the twentieth century to argue that the PRI had betrayed its trust to the Mexican people by embracing neoliberalism and ending land reform. The Mexican legacy of incorporating campesinos allowed the Zapatistas to
mobilize to redress campesino concerns. In addition, although the EZLN did not expect the ground swell of support that it received from the Mexican people based on its standing as an army of poor indigenous people, the Mexican state’s historical recognition of indigenous people as an important part of Mexican society meant that the Zapatistas could simultaneously engage in campesino politics and act as an indigenous movement with the support of many Mexicans. As the Zapatistas realized that their demands for recognition and autonomy as indigenous people found strong domestic support, especially among Mexicans who were connected to the international indigenous rights movement, the EZLN increasingly begin to shift its goals towards indigenous rights and autonomy. The Zapatistas’ call for autonomy, however, did not only come from their connections to the international indigenous rights movement. In the Selva Lacandona, autonomy was the default way of life for the Zapatistas. Despite conflicts, many de facto autonomy regimes developed quickly precisely because they drew on, and in many cases formalized, local behaviors in which Zapatista supporters were already engaged. In addition, aside from ideological concerns forming de facto autonomous governments allowed the Zapatistas to provide services and preserve order among their supporters while distancing themselves from state efforts to destroy the movement.

The Zapatista movement developed in clear contrast to the neoliberalism of the Salinas and Zedillo administrations. The Zapatistas’ view of democracy as a system that obeys the people and provides for their needs contrasts markedly with neoliberal ideas about citizenship. Because the Zapatistas made opposition to neoliberalism one of the principal tenants of their movement politicians’ neoliberal ideologies did indeed limit the Zapatistas potential options for political alliances. Local factors strongly conditioned the
Zapatistas’ opposition to neoliberalism and their views of political parties. Both
indigenous customs and the neoliberal government’s unwillingness to continue with what
the Zapatistas viewed as its obligations to campesinos helped the Zapatistas reject the
PRI and PAN as undemocratic. In addition, the Zapatistas’ failure to make political
alliances or engage with existing political parties did not rest entirely on the shoulders of
neoliberal politics.

The Zapatistas may have decided to reject elections partially for instrumental
corns or more probably to preserve the borders and governing functions of their
communities that the government failed to recognize. However, local politics played a
large role in souring the Zapatistas towards the leftist PRD, which could have proven a
strong ally. Because the national PRD did not strongly discipline or control its local
affiliates, Zapatista supporters faced actively hostile PRD governments in some
municipalities after the PRD won state elections. In addition, the PRD did not actively
court the Zapatistas as potential allies or advocate strongly for the Zapatistas’ political
agenda. Both of these failures helped to eliminate the PRD as an affective ally in the
minds of the Zapatista leadership and made de facto autonomy an attractive option.

The history of the Zapatista movement and the Zapatistas’ goals, as revealed by
their official communiqués, provide concrete support for my primary hypotheses and
indicate that in the case of the Zapatistas, domestic phenomena outweighed international
trends to influence the movement’s goals and pattern of alliances. Outside of the primary
hypotheses, an additional factor, the Zapatistas’ cultural experiences as indigenous people
in Chiapas, greatly influenced the direction of their movement. The Zapatistas’ demands
for autonomy flow most directly from their indigenous heritage, and the international
indigenous rights movement helped to buttress these demands by giving legal justification and outside support to processes of independent government that had already developed to a greater or lesser extent among Zapatista supporters. The Zapatistas understood indigenous rights through the prism of their own experiences. They adopted indigenous rights goals that most closely fit the goals and traditions that had developed in their communities. That is not to say that the international indigenous rights movement and the testimony and expert advice of academics and activists involved with the movement did not profoundly shape the direction of the San Andrés negotiations; rather the Zapatistas’ own personal goals and interpretation of indigenous recognition and autonomy owed more to their experiences as indigenous people in Chiapas than to the ideological influences of international forces.
V. THE MAPUCHE MOVEMENT: FINDING A WAY TO BE MAPUCHE IN THE CHANGING CHILEAN STATE

Although the Zapatista uprising came as a shock to most Mexicans, in part because of its poor indigenous protagonists, indigenous organizing is not a new phenomenon in all of Latin America. The Mapuche in Chile particularly stand out for their continuing indigenous-based activism that dates back to the decades following their nineteenth-century incorporation into the Chilean state. In contrast to the indigenous population of Mexico, the Mapuche in Chile did not experience Spanish colonial rule. After fighting the Spanish to a stalemate, the Mapuche spent the colonial period as an independent nation protected by a series of treaties with the Spanish Crown.\textsuperscript{29} Seventy years after independence, Chilean leaders forcibly incorporated the Mapuche into Chile. Unlike other Latin American indigenous peoples the Chilean Mapuche were never politically quiescent. Shortly after losing their land and independence to the Chilean state, educated Mapuche began to enter Chilean politics to advocate that the state adopt policies that they believed would help the Mapuche people.

The current Mapuche movement in Chile organized in the late 1970s in response to the policies of the Pinochet dictatorship. The movement has changed and diversified with time, and persists as an important avenue for Mapuche people to advocate for their rights and to access and contest their state. Mobilized Mapuche developed drastically different expectations of appropriate state behavior than the Zapatistas despite the fact
that both movements initially formed in response to discriminatory state policies. In the early years of the current Mapuche movement, Mapuche activists mobilized against the Pinochet government’s plans to divide their communities and eliminate the Mapuche as a distinct identity.

The Mapuche’s comparatively long period of independence and late conquest by the Chilean state helped to preserve a distinct idea of Mapuche identity within many Mapuche populations. During the first part of the current Mapuche movement, the Mapuche worked to preserve their communities’ territorial integrity and to gain a level of recognition from a very hostile Chilean state. Once the movement began to forge allies within the underground political opposition to the dictatorship, it continued to work for recognition, to preserve and expand Mapuche communities’ autonomy, and to further redistributive goals. The transition to democracy cemented the alliance between substantial sectors of the movement and the parties of the Concertación. However, once the Center-Left state failed to live up to many activists’ expectations, Mapuche organizations began to distance themselves from the state.

This chapter traces the evolution of the Mapuche movement and the factors that influenced Mapuche organizations’ decisions to ally with political parties or to act independently from existing party politics. It reflects on why the Mapuche movement makes demands for recognition, redistribution, and most importantly for the Mapuche’s right as a people to the autonomy to make decisions that will influence their communities and way of life.
Frameworks and Origins

Frameworks: Towards Marginalization, Conquest and the Myth of the “White” State

Although some Chilean elites romanticized the Mapuche as noble warriors shortly after independence from Spain, the Chilean state developed a nationalist mythology that glossed over the indigenous contributions to Chilean society. Despite the presence of indigenous people in previously conquered areas of Chile, and their forced absorption into the Chilean population, Chilean nationalists were unwilling to acknowledge the indigenous origins of many Chileans during the campaign to conquer the Mapuche in the late 1800s. To Chilean leaders at the time, the Mapuche were Indians; the Chileans were not (Pinto 2003). This dichotomy between Chilean and Mapuche identity remains present in current Chilean thought. During the twentieth century, Chilean leaders vacillated between policies to isolate the Mapuche and policies to absorb them into the “Chilean nation.” When they pursued policies of absorption, they often did so with the assumption that incorporating the Mapuche as Chileans would erase the Mapuche’s indigenous identities (Foester and Montecino 1988; Bengoa 2000).

The Mapuche’s experience of independence during the period of Spanish colonialism followed by the Chilean state’s eventual conquest of Mapuche territory helped to develop a strong sense of shared identity among the Mapuche. The Chilean state and mainstream society’s history of excluding or marginalizing indigenous people ensured that its Mapuche citizens would not develop the same type of nationalist feelings that the Zapatistas developed. This history of exclusion helps explain why the majority of Mapuche intellectuals view their struggle in ethno-nationalist terms rather than as one facet of a campaign for rights and recognition among rural people.
Spanish conquistadors entered Mapuche territory in order to engage the Mapuche militarily for the first time in 1546. By 1550, the Mapuche were at war with the Spanish invaders (Bengoa 2000). From 1560 until 1580, the Mapuche engaged in near-constant warfare to prevent the Spanish from seizing their territory and conquering their people. José Bengoa explains their success, noting that: “In those years, the Mapuche appropriated the horse, the principal weapon of the enemy, transforming themselves into great riders” (Bengoa 2000, 36). Mapuche warriors used mounted infantry to gain mobility for their forces and adopted the steel weapons of the Spanish invaders, although they did not acquire firearms. In 1598, the Mapuche gained military superiority over the Spanish in the territory south of the Bio-Bío River in what is now Chile and destroyed all existing Spanish cities in the region. War with the Mapuche destabilized the early Chilean colony, and Spanish Jesuits worked to encourage a formal peace between the Spanish crown and the Mapuche. Spanish and Mapuche representatives met in 1641, after 91 years of war, in the Parliament of Quilín, and formalized the first of a series of agreements between Mapuche representatives and the Spanish crown that recognized the Mapuche’s right to their territory (Bengoa 2000).

Unlike the indigenous people of much of Mexico and the Andes, the Mapuche retained autonomy from the Spanish. Some parallels exist to indigenous people in the other frontier regions of the Spanish colonial project, such as the present northern Mexican frontier and the Amazon region, who in many cases also managed to maintain local control of their communities. The Mapuche, however, became the only indigenous group to gain official recognition by the Spanish crown, and unlike the indigenous
peoples who survived at the other margins of Spanish rule, the Mapuche were able to build a successful trading and ranching economy (Pinto 2003). Indigenous people occupied the area north of the Bío Bío River in the Chilean colony, and Spanish colonists intermingled with the indigenous population to some degree. By the time of Chilean independence, people who visibly identified as indigenous had all but disappeared from mainstream Chilean society. Chilean elites, in general, understood their society as a bastion of civilization and the Mapuche as a barbarous people in need of civilization. This juxtaposition of a white, civilized, Chilean society of European origin and a neighboring uncivilized indigenous society allowed many Chileans to ignore the indigenous components that had gone into creating their own society. Chilean newspapers and legislators debated what to do about the Mapuche question. José Pinto Rodríguez relates that after 1850, the Chilean government became increasingly concerned about what to do about the Mapuche frontier. Beginning in the 1850s and lasting through the 1860s, the Chilean government began to allow Chilean citizens to buy frontier lands. This process changed the dynamic in the frontier. According to Pinto: “Many of the purchases were fraudulent, and although we can not yet speak of a proper expansion or of the control of the territory on the part of the national state, it is certain that the process [of occupation] had begun already with unmistakable menace to the Mapuche people” (Pinto 2003, 153). In the early 1860s, the Chilean government elaborated a plan of occupation for Araucanía, the Mapuche region, and the Chilean army began an extermination campaign against the Mapuche in 1868. Chilean nationalists justified the brutal occupation and the army’s massacre of Mapuche individuals as a way to pacify and civilize the Mapuche and to incorporate them into the
Chilean state. They viewed the Indian frontier as a liability to Chilean security and argued that it constituted part of the Chilean state. After the Chilean victory in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), the Chilean army finished consolidating its control of Araucanía (Pinto 2003; Bengoa 2000).

After the conquest, the Chilean government moved the remaining Mapuche into land grant communities, or *reducciones*. Each community was established under a *título de merced*, which gave the community legal title to a plot of land. The Chilean state protected the claims of non-Mapuche property holders over the new Mapuche communities’ titles to land. The state’s brutal resettlement of the Mapuche destroyed traditional kinship groups and reconstituted a society that relied on herding into subsistence farmers (Bengoa 2000; Mallon 2005). José Bengoa relates that many Mapuche individuals faced starvation in the years immediately following the establishment of the reducciones as they struggled with inadequate resources to become subsistence farmers (Bengoa 2000).

**Origins: Early Mapuche Activism**

The urban-educated sons of previous Mapuche leaders began to enter Chilean politics in an attempt to improve the living conditions of their communities in the first generation after the Chilean conquest. Several notable Mapuche organizations sprang up during the early part of the twentieth century. Many early Mapuche organizations argued for the incorporation of the Mapuche people and the division of the *reducciones* into private property. Their leaders viewed the segregation of the Mapuche people into collectively-owned communities as discrimination by the Chilean state. Other Mapuche
leaders developed an incipient Mapuche nationalism and argued for the preservation of Mapuche communities and emphasized the struggle of the Mapuche as a distinctive people (Foerster and Montecino 1988; Bengoa 2000).

Even before the advent of the current Mapuche movement and its incorporation of many Mapuche into a politically-savvy mass-movement, Mapuche leaders found ways to advocate for their rights and to contest state policies that they considered harmful. The Mapuche experienced changes to their social organization as the twentieth century progressed. Indigenous people comprise between 4.4 and 10 percent of the current Chilean population, the vast majority of which are Mapuche. Urban migration strongly affected Mapuche communities, and many Mapuche left rural areas to find jobs in the capital. According to current estimates only around 40 percent of Mapuche live in rural areas. Between twenty and fifty percent of Mapuche reside in Santiago today. Despite the urban shift in the Mapuche population, many leaders in the Mapuche movement still foreground the need of rural Mapuche for land and legal protection.

**Openings and Lack Thereof: Party Politics in Chile**

Although instability and military coups plagued Chilean politics in the early decades of the twentieth century, by the middle of the 1930s, Chilean politics stabilized into a pattern of competitive party politics that lasted until the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. In Chile in the 1930s, ideological concerns began to supersede personalistic practices as the driving force behind national politics, and a clear divide emerged among organized political parties of the Left, Right, and Center. From 1932 until the 1973 coup, Chilean parties of differing ideological persuasions competed
fiercely for votes. The realities of Chilean politics led to multiple alliances among political parties and ideological factions within each major party. Differing factions within parties and different ideological blocks formed shifting patterns of electoral alliances throughout this period. These alliances sometimes created a bi-polar electoral contest between the Left and the Right and other times created a tri-polar electoral contest among the Left, Center, and Right for national power (Montes, Mainwaring, and Ortega 2000; Loveman 2001).

The Chilean political system seemed an exception to the instability that many other Latin American counties experienced. In the words of Brian Loveman: “From 1932 until September 1973 Chile was the only Latin American nation in which competitive party politics, uninterrupted by coups, assassinations or revolution, determined the occupants of the presidency, Congress, and higher policymaking positions in the national bureaucracy” (Loveman 2001, 196). Yet, as Loveman notes, Chile’s place as a stable democracy masked underlying social tensions. Until the 1960s, stability in Chilean politics depended on an implicit pact between the Chilean Left and the elite parties of the Right (Loveman 2001).

Chile’s Conservative and Liberal parties which occupied the Right of the political spectrum depended on their control of rural votes to dominate the National Congress. From the 1930s onward, Chile’s rightwing parties changed in name but maintained certain essential traits. In the words of Brian Loveman: “To a great extent the survival of the hacienda system and its extensive subsidization by the state represented the trade-off between Marxists, reformers, and traditional political interests that permitted the establishment and maintenance of Chile’s vaunted ‘stability’ and ‘democracy’”
Rightwing politicians tolerated centrists’ and leftists’ attempts to expand social welfare and labor rights among the working classes so long as these policies did not threaten the interests of large rural landowners. Because elite landowners were able to control through a mixture of bribery and coercion the votes of the campesinos that lived and worked on their estates, the rural vote guaranteed that the Right would maintain its standing in the Congress. After 1932, rightwing parties tolerated increasingly progressive labor and social welfare legislation for urban workers who formed the base of the Chilean Left but squelched any attempt by leftist parties to expand into the countryside. Progressive politicians from the Socialist and Communist parties responded by ignoring campesino interests in order to serve urban workers (Loveman 2001).

In 1958, electoral reforms introduced the Australian ballot in Chilean elections. Before this reform, political parties distributed their own ballots to voters, and landowners could easily monitor and control the votes of their workers. The 1958 reforms made it more difficult for landowners to know how their workers were voting, made voting compulsory, and increased the penalties for bribery and electoral fraud. These reforms opened the Chilean countryside to political competition (Loveman 2001).

Before 1957, the Socialist and Communist parties had competed with each other for control of the Left and formed occasional alliances with the centrist Radical Party. In preparation for the 1958 election, the Socialists and the Communists untied with other leftist parties to form the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP). They chose Salvador Allende as their presidential candidate (Loveman 2001; Skidmore and Smith 2001).
The Communist and Socialist parties that dominated the Chilean Left faced an increasing challenge from emerging Christian Democratic parties for progressive votes as the twentieth century progressed. The First Chilean Christian Democratic party, the *Flange Nacional* developed in 1938 when young Catholic members of the Conservative party who promoted the Church’s new progressive doctrines split from the party. Although populist in orientation, the *Flange* was never able to attract a mass following and dissolved by the late 1950s. Other former members of the Conservative Party formed a second, more conservative Christian Democratic party, the *Partido Conservador Social Cristiano*, in the 1940s. In 1957, this party disbanded, and Christian Democrats of all ideological persuasions united to form the *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC) to compete in the 1958 election (Loveman 2001; Skidmore and Smith 2001).

Jorge Alessandri, the candidate of the Right, won the 1958 election with 31.6 percent of the vote. The other two major candidates, Allende and the PDC’s Eduardo Frei won 28.9 percent and 20.7 percent respectively (Skidmore and Smith 2001). The 1958 electoral reforms opened the possibility that campesinos could become a viable base for socially progressive parties. Alessandri’s victory in the same year provided an impetus for the Chilean Left and Center to court the votes of the rural poor. By the 1964 Presidential election, both the Christian Democrat, *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* and the socialist and communist coalition of the *Frente de Acción Popular* cultivated the votes of campesinos (Loveman 2001).

The elite bosses of Chile’s rightwing parties feared an Allende victory in 1964, as did the United States. In the spring of the election year, the FRAP won a special election in the predominately rural province of Curicó, a former Conservative Party stronghold.
The leaders of the Liberal and Conservative Parties who feared a repeat of this result in the general election decided against running their own presidential candidate and instead allied their parties with the PDC (Loveman 2001; Skidmore and Smith 2000).

Frei won the 1964 election, and although the PDC had benefited from conservative support to gain power, his administration pursued policies that alienated the Right. As the 1960s progressed, Chilean society became increasingly polarized ideologically. During the Frei administration, tensions within the PDC between centrist and leftist members increased as did tensions between the PDC and their conservative allies. In their campaigns leading up to the 1964 presidential election, the Communist, Socialist, and Christian Democratic parties all advocated extensive agrarian reform. Alessandri had passed minimal land reform legislation as a result of pressure from the U.S. Alliance for Progress and progressive Chilean parties, and the Left and Center of the Chilean political system both advocated additional reforms to build a rural base for their parties. The Frei administration embarked on a much more aggressive program of agrarian reform than conservatives had contemplated and managed to alienate many of their conservative allies. The leftwing of the PDC including Jacques Chonchol, the director of one of the government’s principal land reform agencies, promoted land occupations and rural unionization while both were still strictly illegal. The Frei administration’s land reform bureaucracy competed with communists, socialists, and members of radical groups like the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) to mobilize rural workers and small farmers. By the end of the Frei administration, the rightwing parties were dissatisfied enough with the PDC that they decided to run their
own candidate, former President Jorge Alessandri, in the 1970 presidential elections (Loveman 2001; Correra, Molina, and Yáñez 2005).

In the elections, Radomiro Tomic ran on the Christian Democratic ticket. Tomic, a respected leftist in the party, stressed the need for progressive change including extensive land reform in Chile. The 1970 elections became famous for Salvador Allende’s plurality victory. Allende retooled his previous electoral alliance to form the Unidad Popular (UP). Under the UP platform, he promised to bring radical change and democratic socialism to Chile (Loveman 2001).

During Allende’s short-lived presidency, land reform efforts increased in the countryside. Prior to agrarian reform, Chilean landowners dominated the countryside, and many landowners ran their holdings with an emphasis on increasing the family fortune and maintaining or acquiring land rather than pursuing efficient production. In 1955, large landowners held almost 80 percent of agricultural territory. In contrast, 80 percent of farmers subsisted on small farms comprising only 8.4 percent of agricultural land. Martín Correra Cabrera, Raúl Molina Otárola, and Nancy Yáñez Fuenzalida assert that progressive politicians, in part, viewed agrarian reform as a way to increase agrarian production and build new consumer bases among the agrarian poor in order to improve the national economy (Correra, Molina, and Yáñez 2005). In addition, as Loveman notes, the agrarian reform programs that the PDC and FRAP pursued in the 1960s allowed these parties to court campesino votes and build a dedicated base in the countryside where their conservative rivals once predominated (Loveman 2001).

On November 27, 1962, the Chilean government under Jorge Alessandri passed the first agrarian reform law, Ley de Reforma Agraria Nº 150202 that created the
Corporación Nacional de Reforma Agraria (CORA) to implement agrarian reforms. The Alessandri administration designed its reform law as an answer to international and domestic pressure and not as a meaningful system of reforms. In contrast, in the 1964 election, both the FRAP and the PDC advocated ambitious agrarian reform programs. President Frei launched a new project of agrarian reform shortly after taking office. He applied Alessandri’s agrarian reform law aggressively and a formulated new, more progressive law. Congress approved his agrarian reform law, *Ley de Reforma Agraria N°* 16640 in July of 1967. Like Frei, Allende came to power with a commitment to increase land reform. In 1971, his government passed law N° 17280, an even more extensive land reform law (Correra, Molina, and Yáñez 2005).

Correra, Molina, and Yáñez note that Mapuche communities began to recover substantial quantities of land shortly after Frei’s passed his second land reform law in 1967. For some Mapuche communities, land reform provided an opportunity to reclaim lands that had been stolen from their communities early in the twentieth century. For other communities, land reform offered an escape from collective poverty through acquiring the property of nearby landowners and forming agricultural cooperatives (Mallon 2005; Correra, Molina, and Yáñez 2005).

Activists from the *Movimiento Campesino Revolucionario* (MCR) and the MIR became highly active in Mapuche communities during the Allende administration. The MCR even considered naming itself the *Movimiento Indígena Revolucionario* due to the immense Mapuche presence within the MCR’s ranks. The MCR and the MIR, as radical leftist groups, advocated collective action and land takeovers to speed the process of land reform in rural areas. Mapuche communities proved especially receptive to MIR
and MCR organizers because of longstanding conflicts with local landowners, many of whom had seized community land illegally. Members of Mapuche communities who became exasperated with the lengthy and often fruitless process of reclaiming land through legal appeals became open to leftist arguments that they should occupy disputed lands or seize estates that landowners were not using productively. Mobilizations for land by Mapuche communities and organizations continued throughout the Allende presidency, and the UP government often responded by expropriating land in favor of Mapuche communities (Mallon 2005; Correra, Molina, and Yáñez 2005).

For the Mapuche and other campesinos, land reform proved that the political parties of the Left and Center were willing to work to benefit campesinos. Although the divide between winka, or non-Mapuche, society and their own experiences still loomed starkly for some Mapuche, the receptiveness of the PDC and especially of the Socialist and Communist parties to the needs of rural people helped some Mapuche to identify with other campesinos and to adopt Leftist or progressive Centrist ideologies.

Although Chilean society had become exceedingly polarized before the September 11, 1973 coup, the Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Communists all managed to cement significant bases of support among rural Mapuche through their agrarian reform policies. These ideological currents would continue to attract the loyalty of mobilized Mapuche during the Pinochet dictatorship. Many leaders of the Mapuche movement remained committed to their parties of choice despite repression and hardships during the dictatorship. Other leaders within the movement argued against working with political parties. Alliances to the Christian Democratic, Communist, and Socialist parties among Mapuche leaders began to divide the movement as political orientations and
disagreements became awkward when a transition to democracy loomed as a real
possibly in the middle to late 1980s. As the Mapuche movement proliferated and divided
into different organizations, whether each organization advocated alliances with political
parties and the different partisan affiliations of the organizations that were willing to
work with existing political parties became the most salient cleavages that divided the
Mapuche movement. After the transition to democracy, parties affiliated with the
*Concertación* opened a wide spectrum of potential political allies for mobilized Chilean
indigenous people.

**Mapuche Activists’ and Leaders’ Ideas About the State and Political Parties**

**The Movement During the Pinochet Years**

Although the leftist parties of the 1960s and early 1970s advocated land reform
that directly benefited Mapuche communities, leftist politicians and partisans considered
the Mapuche’s status as campesinos to override their status as an ethnic minority. To the
Chilean Left, solidarity in the countryside was more important that specific ethnic-based
cconcerns. Leftist organizations, including those of the radical Left, advocated unified
class struggle as the proper means to fight against oppression. Although the Left did not
recognize the Mapuche as a separate group, agrarian reform provided a new source of
hope in many Mapuche communities. With land reform, some Mapuche leaders saw a
solution to the endemic poverty that had plagued their communities since the process of
resettlement at the end of the nineteenth century (Richards 2004; Mallon 2005). The
Allende administration made some efforts to recognize indigenous people and to create
policies to support indigenous needs, but its 1972 indigenous law had little effect before the dictatorship overturned it after the 1973 coup (Richards 2004).

The Pinochet dictatorship set out to destroy the organized Left. During Allende’s presidency, divisions between the political Left, Right, and Center had stretched to the breaking point. Many Christian Democratic leaders welcomed the September 11, 1973, coup and hoped that a brief military intervention would stabilize their country. The military junta, in contrast, viewed all political parties with suspicion, and in 1977, four years after seizing power, General Pinochet dissolved all political parties. The paranoia with which the military government hunted for signs of a vast leftist conspiracy and its willingness to use extremely brutal methods including torture and summary executions to cow opponents real and imagined created a climate of terror among Chileans who opposed the regime (Loveman 2001; Constable and Valenzuela 1991).

After the coup, campesinos faced intense repression. Mapuche campesinos, like their non-indigenous counterparts, experienced the effects of the military government’s determination to dissolve land reform. The government considered organized campesinos subversives and opponents. It repressed campesino organizing, halted the process of agrarian reform, and began to reverse land reforms. The junta’s policies, in the words of Correra, Molina, and Yáñez, “would affect campesinos in general, but would have specific effects in the Mapuche world where the great majority of los fundos recuperated through the process of agrarian reform would be returned to their old owners under the argument that they were obtained by the Mapuche through illegal occupations or with the use of force” (Correra, Molina, and Yáñez 2005, 246). In addition to returning estates to their former owners who were often not legitimate, the dictatorship
implemented policies to divide existing collectively-owned property and outlawed most campesino organizations and unions (Correra, Molina, and Yáñez 2005).

For the Mapuche in the countryside, the dictatorship brought the end of land reform and the beginning of a period of struggle that galvanized the current Mapuche movement. For some land-reform communities, repression began even before the 1973 coup. In August of 1973, the military began to use an arms control law passed the year before to take over land-reform communities. Military officials claimed that community members were stockpiling weapons to engage in terrorist activities (Correra, Molina, and Yáñez 2005; Mallon 2005).

Florencia Mallon relates how the military occupied the asentamiento, or agrarian reform settlement, of Arnoldo Ríos on August 29, 1973. The military entered the Mapuche community of Nicolás Ailó a day later searching for members of the community who had participated in the land occupation and subsequent legal push to form Arnoldo Ríos. The military tortured and jailed members of the community, using the excuse that community members had collaborated with violent leftists and posed a threat to national security. In the case of Arnoldo Ríos, military officials fabricated a cache of weapons on the property to support their claims, and the military continued to take prisoners from Nicolás Ailó and to create an atmosphere of overwhelming fear and suspicion among community members throughout the dictatorship (Mallon 2005).

The events in Nicolás Ailó that Mallon documented reveal the type of terror and repression that swept Mapuche communities throughout Chile whose members supported the Left or gained benefits from land reform. As Correra, Molina, and Yáñez note: “The repression against the Mapuche had a direct relation to the participation of … [the
Mapuche] in actions to reclaim land” (Correra, Molina, and Yáñez 2005, 277). The *Comision Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación*, or National Commission of Truth and Reconciliation, discovered that the military government conducted its worst period of repression in Region IX between the September 11 coup and January of the next year. The majority of Mapuche individuals who the dictatorship executed or disappeared were not political militants but instead were campesinos and agricultural workers who had been active in the push for land reform and rural union organizing (Correra, Molina, and Yáñez 2005).

The Pinochet dictatorship ended the hope for land reform that the rural poor had cultivated during the Frei and Allende years. The members of land-reform cooperatives faced a new government intent on dividing communally-held lands and returning expropriated estates to their original owners. As the dictatorship progressed, the political climate became increasingly ominous even for Mapuche communities that had not participated in land reform. The dictatorship passed Decree Law No. 2568 in March of 1979 with the intent to divide communally held Mapuche lands into individual properties that could be sold. Land division laws pertaining to Mapuche communities were not new. The earliest land division laws dated back to the late 1920s. Earlier laws required that Mapuche communities’ land possessions correspond to the community’s original *título de merced* and required a communal agreement to petition for division. Some communities used these laws to petition for division to legally reclaim lands that local landowners had seized (Mallon 2005).

The dictatorship’s practice of agrarian counter-reform used the pretense of efficient management and respect for private property and legal norms to mask
profoundly regressive polices. Instead of automatically dismantling agrarian cooperatives by force, the military government used a legalist review policy to bolster its claims to be returning order and legality to the countryside. In the words of Mallon, “the military government, by fashioning an institutionalized process through which it considered, case by case and only by petition of the previous owner, the legal status of the properties affected by the reform, applied a veneer of legality and normalcy to the exercise of violence in the name of the market and of private property” (Mallon 2005, 236). The dictatorship adopted a similar strategy of cloaking its actions in a discourse of legality and efficiency to justify the division of the remaining Mapuche communities (Correra, Molina, and Yáñez 2005; Mallon 2005; Reuque 2002).

Despite intense repression which made political organizing difficult if not impossible in some Mapuche communities, a new movement began to emerge within the Mapuche population in the late 1970s. This movement stressed opposition to the dictatorship worked to protect Mapuche communities and revitalize traditional Mapuche cultural practices to preserve Mapuche culture and build a greater sense of shared identity among the Mapuche. Isolde Reuque Paillalef recalls that a new resurgence of Mapuche mobilization began to gain members in 1978. That year, Mapuche activists began to organize under the protection of the Catholic Church as the Centros Culturales Mapuche, or Mapuche Cultural Centers. She relates that in 1978, Mapuche activists knew that the dictatorship was formulating a law that would divide Mapuche communities. They were able to gain access to a copy of the proposed law and started to organize formally both in opposition to the dictatorship’s policies which they considered harmful to the Mapuche
people and as a way to build unity among the Mapuche people and revitalize Mapuche culture. In her words:

in 1978 we created the Mapuche movement of Southern Chile, and the first formal organization, known as the Mapuche Cultural Centers of Chile, was founded on September 12, 1978. The project took root and grew until it encompassed 1,500 communities, each one with its own steering committee, engaged in concrete local work (Reuque 2002, 107).

Reuque and other activists traveled to Mapuche communities gathering support for the movement. They were able to succeed in organizing, in part, because the dictatorship considered Mapuche organizations cultural groups rather than leftist political opposition. Community members joined the movement despite a heavy and pervasive atmosphere of fear. According to Reuque, “people were scared, very scared. The fear was alive, you could almost touch it” (Reuque 2002, 109). She continued: “When I’d stay with someone, they’d usually tell me the next day, ‘Don’t tell anyone you slept here, don’t mention me, don’t write my name down anywhere.’ But later I’d go back and stay with them again, and I’d say, ‘Don’t worry, you have to be strong, don’t be afraid.’ So people began to take a stand, a lot of people started with us and many of them dropped out along the way” (Reuque 2002, 109).

Archbishop Sergio Contreras of Temuco supported and encouraged Mapuche organizing. The Centros Culturales Mapuches assumed multiple roles in Mapuche communities. Never simply an instrumental response to the Pinochet land law, the resurgence of Mapuche organizing in the late 1970s and 1980s help to revitalize Mapuche communities and to resist repression through a variety of strategies (Stern 2006).
In 1980, the Mapuche movement gained organizational independence from the Church. As the movement expanded, Mapuche leaders searched for a way to continue organizing without facing direct repression from the Pinochet regime. Later that year, the movement found a solution and became an officially recognized trade association (gremio) (Reuque 2002; Marimán 1995). This, according to Reuque, was the only official form that would allow the movement “to stay large” (Reuque 2002, 118). Under the new name of Asociación Gremial de Pequeños Agricultores y Artesanos Ad-Mapu, the movement continued to organize. Although, the independent Mapuche movement existed within a unified organization from 1978 until 1983, tensions within Ad-Mapu began to create divisions in the movement. Although Ad-Mapu presented a unified front against the dictatorship, leaders within the movement divided over what political strategy the movement should follow.

Shifts

By 1979, the Pinochet regime started to consolidate their hold on the country. The dictatorship and its supporters began to cement the changes they had made to the Chilean state through new legal codes and, most ambitiously, through the 1980 Constitution. Pinochet’s new constitution allowed the government to take draconian measures in the name of national security and institutionalized the military’s role as the protector of the Chilean national interest (Loveman 2001; Stern 2006).

Although the early years of the dictatorship brought economic growth, by 1981, profound structural problems in the economy created an economic collapse. Economic difficulties destroyed many small business owners’ and white-collar workers’ support for
the dictatorship. Strikes and public protests by organized workers and civil society became a part of Chilean life as the 1980s continued (Loveman 2001).

During the dictatorship, Chile’s outlawed political parties survived underground. Communist and Socialist Party leaders and militants faced immediate repression after the coup. In contrast, some Christian Democrats initially accepted the Pinochet dictatorship. By the middle of 1974, relations between the PDC and the dictatorship had soured considerably, and by the late 1970s, the Christian Democrats stood firmly in the opposition. On March 11, 1977, the junta passed a degree dissolving all political parties (Constable and Valenzuela 1991). As waves of political protest swept the country in 1983, most of Chile’s leftist and centrist political parties united to form the Alianza Democrática (AD). The Communist Party, a leftist faction of the Socialists, and the MIR rejected the AD’s insistence on a peaceful transition to democracy and instead embraced the objective of overthrowing the dictatorship by means that included armed resistance. They formed the Movimiento Democrático Popular (MDP). The MDP supported all means of struggle while the Alianza argued for a non-violent transition. The profound conflicts among leftist and centrist party leaders who agreed that the dictatorship must end but disagreed over the most effective and legitimate means to provoke the return to democracy echoed among party adherents. As opposition to the dictatorship increasingly reflected distinct political currents, choosing a side in political debates became increasingly necessary within organizations opposing the dictatorship (Stern 2006; Loveman 2001).

As Steve Stern relates: “Between August and December 1983, ‘politics’ in the classic sense once more became a fact of Chilean life” (Stern 2006, 313). In response to
massive public organizing and mass discontent, the dictatorship engaged in the first stage of a tentative dialog with its political opposition. Parties on the Right also resurfaced and formed two alliances. The Unión Nacional that supported a transition to democratic politics, and the Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI) that became the party of regime hardliners (Stern 2006; Loveman 2001).

The early leaders and public activists in the Mapuche movement came from a variety of political backgrounds and experiences. Reuque began organizing with the Church through Catholic base communities and entered the movement without a partisan affiliation. Other movement leaders maintained strong connections to the political parties they had supported prior to the dictatorship. Despite the presence of several prominent women in the Mapuche Cultural Centers and Ad-Mapu, male leaders made most of the decisions in the movement. According to Reuque, the early leaders of Ad-Mapu envisioned a Mapuche organization that would stand independent from political parties and unite Mapuche activism under one umbrella organization. The leaders of Ad-Mapu in its first few years held divergent political views and supported different leftist and centrist parties. Reuque relates that “Mario Curihuentro, our president, might not be a card-carrying Christian Democrat, but everyone knew that, when he got drunk, he’d just say Frei, Frei, Frei” (Reuque 2002, 127). Melillán Painemal, another early leader was a member of the Communist party, although he argued that the Mapuche movement should remain independent from party politics (Reuque 2002).

As Ad-Mapu grew in size, it attracted the notice of the opposition parties, some of which began to court its members in earnest in 1982. Many Mapuche activists hoped that by forming alliances with the parties in opposition to Pinochet and later with the
Concertación or independent leftist parties that they could rectify the damage that the dictatorship wrought in Mapuche communities and gain resources and official support after the transition to democracy. Conflicts over ideology and political strategy came to a head at Ad-Mapu’s January 1983 Indigenous Congress. Communist partisans gained control of the organization and the movement’s old leaders found themselves outside of Ad-Mapu and began to form new organizations reflecting their own partisan tendencies. Reuque, who faced personal rumors and accusations for her allegedly Christian Democratic politics left Ad-Mapu in 1983 and eventually joined Nehuen Mapu, the major Mapuche organization affiliated with the Christian Democrats, which she left to found a women’s organization sometime after the transition to democracy (Reuque 2002).

Under Communist leadership, Ad-Mapu began to engage in more public protests and to evoke solidarity with other Chileans. Ad-Mapu still spoke out against the Pinochet land divisions and now authorized communities to create their own defense committees. Its leaders stated in a 1983 public declaration in response to the proposed division of several communities that the division of these and other communities in contradiction to the wishes of “the great majority of community members…signifies the loss and the robbery of lands like what is already occurring in all those communities already divided in the country” (Ad-Mapu 1983). Ad-Mapu now followed the Communist party line in regards to whether armed resistance was appropriate. Its leaders noted that, in keeping with the resolutions that their national assembly passed in May of 1983, all forms of struggle to impede the division of Mapuche communities were justified and proper (Ad-Mapu, 1983). Two years later, Rosamel Millamán, the general secretary of Ad-Mapu, stressed that the Mapuche movement must struggle for democracy because
“our [Mapuche] brothers are in all of Chilean society…and have problems in common with all of the country” (Jiles, 13 August 1985, interview with Millamán). He argued that the division of Mapuche communities and the government’s attempts to erase Mapuche identities posed the greatest threats to the Mapuche people (Jiles, 13 August 1985, interview with Millamán).

Transitions

As the 1980s wore on, Pinochet’s support dropped to a core sector of followers. The surge of popular opposition from 1983 to 1986 could not dislodge the Pinochet regime, which had firm control of the military and the courts and a “legal” base as well as some domestic support (Constable and Valenzuela 1991; Stern 2006). The 1980 Constitution called for a plebiscite in 1988 to determine whether Pinochet would remain in power or whether Chile would transition towards democracy.

Beginning in 1987, both the dictatorship and the opposition campaigned fiercely in preparation for the plebiscite. In February of 1988, thirteen political parties from the Center and the Left formed the Concertación de los partidos políticos por el NO. This alliance became the main opposition. The October 5, 1988 plebiscite occurred under fair conditions. The 54.7 percent victory of the No vote over 43 percent for the dictatorship, heralded the beginning of the period of transition (Stern 2006).

In months prior to the plebiscite, opposition forces including prominent politicians such as Patricio Aylwin and Ricardo Lagos called for real elections rather than a plebiscite. The political parties of the Left and Center that eschewed a violent transition could not control the shape that a peaceful transition would take. Recognizing their
inability to control the political process, they, instead, took advantage of whatever slim openings the dictatorship provided. Once it became clear that the 1988 plebiscite would occur, opposition politicians set out to mobilize the No vote.

As Steve Stern states, “In the midst of a long dictatorship, victory by the opposition in a plebiscite can seem delusional, not realistic” (Stern 2006, 378). Nevertheless, the opposition’s political leaders and activists faced the plebiscite with determination. Ordinary Chileans voted No to the dictatorship with similar determination. The IX Region, home to many Mapuche, became the only region in the country in which the Yes vote won. The level of electoral support for Pinochet in the countryside of the IX Region gave politicians of the Concertación a good reason to court Mapuche votes. Most of the Mapuche organizations that developed after the polarization of Ad-Mapu also maintained close ties with opposition political parties, and the Mapuche movement had demonstrated the ability to mobilize large numbers of people since its inception in 1978 (Reuque 2002; Stern 2006).

For the Mapuche organizations and the political parties of the Concertación, the 1989 elections heralded a new era of hope. After the politicization of Ad-Mapu, each major Mapuche organization, with the exception of NGOs and organizations serving specific apolitical functions, formed around a political party with which its members were said to associate. Ad-Mapu’s leaders were militants in the Communist party. Nehuen Mapu allied with the Christian Democrats. Lautaro Ñi Ayllarehue and la Asociación Mapuche Arauco drew support from the Socialist party. After losing his leadership role in Ad-Mapu, Melillán Painemal, whose politics followed the Communist party, founded the Centro Cultural Mapuche. Another organization, Callfulican, also
followed a loosely Socialist line (Marimán 1994). As the Chilean people prepared themselves for a new era of party politics, most major Mapuche organizations looked for a way to ensure benefits for the Mapuche and Chile’s other indigenous peoples if the Concertación was able to win the presidency.

An electoral alliance with the Concertación seemed the natural course for many Mapuche activists who had become leftist or Christian Democratic political partisans during the Frei and Allende years. Even activists whose political sympathies fell with the Communist Party or who had worked with the MCR or the MIR before the dictatorship were willing to seize on the idea of a formal alliance with the Concertación as their best chance to remedy some of the abuses that the dictatorship had inflicted on indigenous people and to move the new state towards respecting indigenous peoples. During the transition, significant sectors within the movement refused to work with the Concertación. They rejected existing political parties as illegitimate and questioned the ability of electoral alliances to lead to anything other than the co-option of Mapuche organizations by the state.

In the months preceding the December 1989 election, politically-minded Mapuche organizations began to make arrangements with the Concertación with the intent to create new, respectful indigenous policies in the new democratic state. In early October of 1989, the leadership of the Concertación put forth their proposed indigenous policy after studying the proposals and recommendations of several major indigenous organizations. The Centro Cultural Mapuche, Ad-Mapu, and Lautaro Ñi Ayllarehue, a group of Mapuche organizations that embraced Leftist political thought forwarded their own proposal for new indigenous policies. Nehuen Mapu developed a separate plan.
Although representatives from most major Mapuche organizations and from organizations among the Aymara of northern Chile and the Rapa Nui of Easter Island would sign a landmark accord with the Concertación’s presidential candidate, Patricio Aylwin Azocar, at Nueva Imperial on the first of December 1989, reaching a common position on indigenous issues was difficult. Isolde Reuque relates that: “Reaching agreement on all the points [of the agreement] was extremely difficult within the indigenous movement. It took us a good couple of months, and even hours before the formal signing at Imperial, heated discussions were still going on” (Reuque 2002, 180).

The Concertación’s proposals on indigenous policy and the Nueva Imperial Accord hewed closer to Nehuen Mapu’s proposals on indigenous policies than the proposal by Ad-Mapu and other leftist organizations. Patricio Aylwin was a life-long militant of the Christian Democrat Party, and it is understandable that his administration would favor the proposals of an organization associated with the PDC more strongly than proposals from other organizations. In addition, in the case of Nehuen Mapu and the other Mapuche organizations associated with political parties, their party of choice likely had considerable influence in shaping the types of policy proposals they adopted. From this point of view, the Concertación’s proposals which were highly influenced by Aylwin and the PDC bore a close resemblance to Nehuen Mapu’s proposals because Nehuen Mapu did not formulate its policies in isolation from the PDC. The Concertación’s initial October 1989 proposal took a fundamentally cautious and statist approach to resolving the discrimination and other problems that indigenous people had faced under Pinochet’s regime.
Although the Concertación recognized the fundamental injustice of the dictatorship’s laws dividing Mapuche and other indigenous communities and announced a moratorium on the laws’ application and their intent to nullify the laws should they come to power, the Concertación proposed no measures to undo the divisions of indigenous communities that had already occurred. In keeping with the negotiated nature of the transition, the Concertación decried the injustice of Pinochet’s regime but agreed, for the most part, to honor the dictatorship’s laws and to reform unjust legal statutes through the legislature. The new Chilean state would be a democracy living in the long institutional shadow of dictatorship. The Concertación agreed to press for the Chilean ratification of the International Labor Organization’s Convention 169 on indigenous rights and to reevaluate the Pinochet regime’s plan to create a series of hydroelectric plants on the Alto Bío Bío River that would destroy several Mapuche communities nearby (Concertación, in Nütram, October 1989).

The Concertación adopted a three-pronged strategy to institutionalize indigenous rights. It stressed the necessity of the Constitutional recognition of Chile’s indigenous people, the urgency of a formal, comprehensive Indigenous Law to reform the legal discrimination of Pinochet’s regime and encode a new, progressive indigenous policy, and the creation of an agency in the national bureaucracy charged with promoting development, solving land disputes, and administering a land fund for indigenous people. This new agency, the Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena (CONADI) would have an indigenous majority on its board of directors and administer an ethno-development fund. The Concertación explained CONADI’s proposed objective: “It should have the objective to coordinate the actions of the state and its subsidies in areas
with an indigenous presence” (Concertación in Nütram, October 1989, 9). This broad objective called for an impressive agency, but the CONADI that emerged after the transition to democracy was under-funded and faced severe constraints on its power.

CONADI mirrored Nehuen Mapu’s proposal for a Mapuche development corporation that would “support the development of the Mapuche people in their most varied forms of economic production, deliver technical assistance, promote culture, improve education, health, housing, planning etc…” (Nehuen Mapu in Nütram, October 1989, 39). Although the Comisión Nacional 500 Años de Resistencia Mapuche founded by the leader of Aukiñ Wallmapu Ngulam, or the Consejo de Todas las Tierras, the most radical large Mapuche organization of the time which advocated indigenous autonomy, refused to negotiate with the Concertación and rejected the state’s control of indigenous lands, other major Mapuche organizations embraced the Concertación’s ability to aid the Mapuche.35

Florence Mallon argues that within Mapuche communities and the broader Mapuche movement, two major ideals of behavior tend to shape the way that the Mapuche organize and struggle for their rights. The first way of thinking argues for enduring bad treatment stoically and taking a legalistic approach to address past wrongs and fight for land or increased rights. The second approach, which began to take hold in many communities in the 1960s and early 1970s, rejects legalism as fruitless and argues that land occupation and other methods of collective action provide the best avenue to achieve social justice (Mallon 2005). These tendencies do not necessarily correspond to certain organizations or individuals. People who supported land occupations during the era of agrarian reform may not be receptive to current appeals for radical action.
Nevertheless, the question over legalism versus collective action resonated within the Mapuche movement during the transition to democracy. It echoed through the conflicts among Mapuche organizations about whether the Mapuche people would be best served by allying with the Concertación or by using independent collective action. In the excitement surrounding the transition, the impulse towards legalism triumphed, and, except for the Consejo de Todas las Tierras, major Mapuche organizations signed the Nueva Imperial Accords.

In the Acta de Compromiso de Nueva Imperial, the indigenous organizations agreed “to channel their legitimate demands [and] aspirations of justice in the face of the grave problems that affect indigenous people through the instances and mechanisms of participation that will be created by the future government” if the Concertación came to power (Acta de Nueva Imperial 1 December 1989). In return, the Concertación promised to work to create three legal mechanisms to protect indigenous people and increase indigenous participation. It promised to work for Constitutional recognition of Chile’s indigenous peoples, to create CONADI, and to create a special commission on indigenous peoples to formulate a new, comprehensive indigenous law. The Concertación’s proposed legal mechanisms provided channels of participation and recognition rather than actual guarantees of increased rights or assistance for indigenous people (Acta de Nueva Imperial 1 December 1989).

In their proposals, Nehuen Mapu, Centro Cultural Mapuche, Ad-Mapu, and Lautaro Ñi Ayllarehue’s leaders all viewed the state as a possible benefactor that could provide the Mapuche people with economic benefits and specific guarantees of their rights. All of these organizations voiced redistributive concern although the
organizations affiliated with the leftist parties placed more emphasis on redistribution than Nehuen Mapu. All of these organizations, however, singled out indigenous recognition and the preservation and restoration of Mapuche communities as their most important goals. The leftist organizations stressed the Mapuche people’s right to land and called not only for the repeal of the Pinochet decree law dividing Mapuche communities but also for the reestablishment of recently divided communities and the return of disputed lands to the communities in compliance with the original títulos de merced. Debt forgiveness and protection of national resources from private corporations figured into their agenda, as did free and available medical care and scholarships for all Mapuche students (Centro Cultural Mapuche, Ad-Mapu, Lautaro Ñi Ayllarehue in Nütram, October 1989). These organizations clearly understood state leaders to possess a duty to provide for all Chileans including indigenous Chileans and the responsibility to act as the guarantor of social justice. They based Mapuche communities’ rights to land on their status as indigenous people and on their legal rights to communal lands that the Chilean state provided after conquering the Mapuche.

Nehuen Mapu’s proposal targeted culturally sensitive education and development as well as increased political participation as the most important goals of the Mapuche movement. Before signing the Nueva Imperial Accord, Nehuen Mapu’s leaders had already rejected land occupations and argued that land must be gained through judicial means. They argued that the state should help Mapuche communities to buy land (Nehuen Mapu in Nütram, October 1989). Their proposal for a land fund that would aid indigenous communities to buy land at market price contrasts dramatically with the ideas that underlined the Frei and Allende administration’s policies of land reform. Rather than
arguing that land should belong to the people who work it productively, Nehuen Mapu argued that indigenous people had a right to land because they are indigenous and because the Mapuche had occupied their lands before the Chilean conquest. Instead of using land reform or relying on state gifts of land, the Mapuche under Nehuen Mapu’s proposal would gain the resources to buy needed lands with government subsidies. Most major Mapuche organizations compromised and signed the Nueva Imperial Accord. They accepted the legalist approach with the understanding that working through the Concertación would provide them with a better platform to achieve their goals than working alone.

Reevaluations: The Mapuche Movement and the Concertación

The transition to democracy was both profoundly hopeful and profoundly incomplete. The pacted transition allowed the institutional arrangements of Pinochet’s Chile to linger into the democratic order. The Concertación won the 1989 election. Chile had democracy, but in the legal and electoral systems Pinochet’s “new” order continued to reverberate well past the dictatorship’s demise.

The electoral success of the Concertación created new openings for mobilized indigenous people to access the Chilean state. Pinochet-era electoral rules effectively barred the Communist Party and other smaller parties who did not join either the Concertación or the rightwing electoral alliances from gaining seats in the National Congress. Despite the lack of national representation for the extreme Left, the Center-Left governing coalition offered some opportunities during Patricio Aylwin’s term for indigenous organizations to gain access to and benefits from the state. Under Aylwin, the
government was unable to secure constitutional recognition for indigenous people, but managed to pass a modified version of the indigenous law in 1993 and to create CONADI. Neither the Aylwin administration nor its immediate successors had the institutional means to make sweeping reforms. Consequently, although Aylwin pushed for the Nueva Imperial program of reforms during his term in office, his indigenous policy faced too many Congressional obstacles to pass intact. The Concertación had to make deals with the opposition to pass important polices, and the resulting indigenous legislation reflected rightwing concerns (Richards 2004).

During the dictatorship international NGOs provided funding to many Mapuche organizations. The objectives of foreign NGOs did not align perfectly with those of major Mapuche movement organizations. For NGOs with a Chilean presence, a large portion of their budgets tended to go towards the salaries of their employees rather than towards concrete projects. After the end of the dictatorship, NGO funding decreased considerably, and elements of the Mapuche movement that has relied previously on NGO funding began to rely on state funding (Reuque 2002).

By the time Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagel, another Christian Democrat, assumed the presidency after the 1993 elections, it had become clear to Mapuche leaders and other groups on the Chilean Left that the Concertación would be unable to overcome the limitations of Pinochet’s election laws to gain strong enough control of the Congress to make Constitutional reforms. Even after the fall of the dictatorship, a considerable percentage of the electorate supported rightwing parties. In 1989, the year of the transition, Aylwin won the presidency with 55.17 percent of the national vote. The two rightist candidates Hernán Büchi and Francisco Javier Errázuziz gained 29.40 percent and
15.43 percent respectively. 34.18 percent of the electorate voted for the main rightwing pact in the Congressional elections for the Cámara de Diputados, Chile’s lower house.36

Election results in 1993 followed a similar pattern. Frei won the presidential election with 57.98 percent of the national vote. Arturo Alessandri, running for the rightwing pact of parties, the Unión por el Progreso, won 24.41 percent of the vote. Although several smaller parties and one independent candidate each gained around 5 percent of the national vote in the presidential election, small parties and alliances gained no representation in Congress. In the Cámara de Diputados, only the Unión por el Progresso and Concertación gained representation. Pinochet’s electoral laws purposely over-represented the two largest national alliances at the expense of smaller parties or alliances in order to create a bi-polar electoral system.

During the 1990s and 2000s, Congressional elections followed a very similar pattern. After the 1989 election, the Concertación held 69 seats in the Cámara or 57.50 percent of the chamber. The principle opposition held 48 seats or 40 percent. The remaining three seats, in the 120 seat chamber belonged to a smaller party and one independent candidate. The Concertación gained one seat in the 1993 election, and that year it and the rightwing opposition split the chamber with 70 and 50 seats respectively. Each successive election failed to dislodge the large rightwing minority in the Cámara. In fact, in 1997 and 2001, the Concertación lost additional seats.

In terms of passing legislation, the Concertación possessed a large enough majority through 2005, that the large rightwing presence did not paralyze the Cámara. In the case of the Senado de la República, or Senate, over-representation of the Chilean rightwing caused substantial difficulties. The 1980 Constitution distorted the
composition of the Senate. Nine designated senators, four of whom represented the four branches of the military and three of whom were named by the conservative Supreme Court, gave rightwing forces a guaranteed say in the Senate. Of the designated Senators, only the two chosen by the President were particularly likely to side with the Concertación on most issues (Haughney 2006).

More damagingly, the 1980 Constitution’s system of binomial representation gave the second ranking party or pact in every region representation in the Senate unless the winning party won overwhelmingly. This system assured that the Senate split fairly evenly between the Concertación and rightwing parties. In 1989, the Concertación had 22 elected Senators out of the 47 member Senate or 46.81 percent of the body. Counting the two Senators that the President appointed, the Concertación held 51.06 percent, a very slim majority especially considering that it had won the Presidential election by 55.17 percent. The rest of the body consisted of rightwing and designated Senators who could be expected to support the rightwing pact. Although Frei won almost 58 percent of the Presidential vote in 1993, the Concertación actually lost a Senator that year and only held 44.68 percent of the Senate or 48.93 percent counting the President’s designated Senators. Neither figure constituted a majority. In the 1997 Congressional election, the Concertación lost an additional Senator, and after 1998, Pinochet resigned as Commander of the Army and took the place he had provided for himself in the Senate as a Senator for life. The rightwing Alianza por Chile gathered enough strength in the 1999 elections to force a runoff. Although the Concertación’s candidate, the Socialist Ricardo Lagos, eventually won by a slim majority with 51.31 percent of the national vote and the Concertación maintained its 62 seats in the Cámara, the Alianza gained seats in the
Cámara previously occupied by smaller alliances and now controlled 47.50 percent of the body. The balance of the Senate did not change appreciably in 2001, and the Concertación wrestled with a conservative Senate throughout the 2000s.\textsuperscript{37}

**Disillusionment**

At the transition to democracy, the Concertación promised existing Mapuche organizations a new type of state policy that would respect indigenous people. Although indigenous people gained a new ally in government during the Aylwin administration, as the 1990s progressed it became increasingly clear to many Mapuche that the Chilean state did not consider their interests a priority. The Mapuche organizations with close ties to political parties that had shepherded the movement during the transition lost relevance as the decade progressed, and many of their leaders entered the state bureaucracy to serve as members of CONADI. Many women who had been active in the early Mapuche movement went on to found organizations explicitly designed to meet the needs of Mapuche women (Richards 2004).

The 1993 Indigenous Law departed in several key respects from the law that Mapuche organizations had envisioned. In the case of CONADI, indigenous people only hold 50 percent of seats on the agency’s 16 member council. The President would appoint bureaucrats to fill the other seats and would also appoint CONADI’s national director, who holds the tie-breaking vote on the council. The *Empresa Nacional de Electricidad Sociedad Autónoma* (ENDESA, National Electric Company) began plans for a series of hydroelectric plants on the Alto Bío Bío River during the dictatorship. ENDESA announced construction of the most contentious of these plants, Ralco, in 1994.
The construction of Ralco would flood the communities of 91 Mapuche-Pehuenche families who belonged to a branch of the Mapuche people who had lived in the lower reaches of the Andes mountain range for generations. Although environmentalists and some of the displaced families protested fiercely, the government authorized the construction of Ralco in 1997. A Spanish corporation bought ENDESA in 1999 and decided to proceed with the hydroelectric projects. In order to authorize the construction of Ralco, the Frei administration ignored or reinterpreted several provisions of the 1993 Indigenous Law. The law mandated that the government consider the opinions of indigenous people before making decisions that affected them and that indigenous lands must be exchanged for lands of equal value and quantity rather than sold. In addition, a community’s inhabitants and CONADI were both supposed to authorize a land transfer before it could occur (Richards 2004).

President Frei forced CONADI’s first director, Mauricio Huenchulaf, a Mapuche activist, to resign in April 1997 once it became clear that Huenchulaf would not authorize Ralco. Frei appointed Domingo Namuncura, a Santiago-based human rights activist of Mapuche decent, as the next director. Namuncura rejected Ralco due to his concerns over the poor quality of the land the Pehuenche communities would receive in exchange for their land and due to evidence of coercion by ENDESA in gaining individual families’ consent to relocate. Frei forced Namuncura’s resignation in early August of 1998 and appointed Rodrigo González, a non-indigenous political partisan, to head CONADI in order to ensure that it would approve the project (Richards 2004).

Some Pehuenche families refused to relocate, and the Quintreman sisters, two elderly Mapuche women, led the legal fight and protests against Ralco. Construction
proceeded despite the protests. Frei signed electric concessions to Ralco shortly before leaving office in 2000, and Ricardo Lagos continued the government’s policy of supporting the construction. By 2002, continued pressure from ENDESA and the government began to break the resolve of the six remaining families who refused the relocation. Nicolasa Quintreman accepted ENDESA’s compensation package that year, and in September 2003, the remaining families reached an agreement with ENDESA to relocate (Richards 2004).

The Chilean government strongly supported ENDESA throughout the conflict. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports that Chilean security forces dissolved many of the protests against the dam. The HRW recorded that: “In March 2002, carabineros [members of the police force which is a branch of the military] violently routed a group of families from the community of Quepuca Ralco who were blocking an access road to a construction site. Carabineros indiscriminately hit children, women, and old people and arrested about fifty protestors, who were presented to the military prosecutor in Chillán” (HRW 2004, 15).

The Ralco conflict, although a localized event, resonated through the greater Mapuche movement. Azkintuwe, a Mapuche newsmagazine, covered the events surrounding Ralco extensively once it came into being towards the end of the conflict. To its reporters, Ralco represented concrete proof that relying on the state and the Concertación to support their interests was not a viable strategy for the Mapuche.

In May of 2004, after ENDESA had signed agreements with the last Pehuenche families who had fought against the dam, it flooded an ancestral Pehuenche cemetery without giving prior notice despite previous agreements to relocate the graves or do
something about the cemetery to prevent its complete destruction. In his coverage of the incident, Pedro Cayuqueo, a reporter for Azkintuwe, painted a portrait of a broken or indifferent government bureaucracy that did not know about the flooding until after the fact and in which different agencies claimed that dealing with the cemetery fell outside their jurisdiction (Cayuqueo, Azkintuwe, May 2004). Stories like his helped to publicize the sense of loss and frustration that the Pehuenche communities felt during the long process leading up to the construction of Ralco.

Berta Quintreman reflected on the sense of loss that the Ralco project provoked in her community. In her words, “what our lands leave [is] a good thought, good dreams, good works. I often become very sad…I suffer for all these things, but I am strong (I have a great heart)...I try to walk happily” (Quintreman 1997). Antolin Curriao Pinchulef, the lonko, or traditional leader, of the Pehuenche community of Quepuka Ralko (Quepuca Ralco) also reflected on his community’s suffering. Curriao identified ENDESA’s willingness to flood his community’s traditional cemetery and the state’s unwillingness to help his community in their dispute over Ralco with “a lack of respect not only for us [his own community] but also towards all Mapuche as a people” on the part of the government and ENDESA (Curriao, interviewed in Azkintuwe, May 2004, 6). He died shortly after the interview.

The Frei and Lagos governments’ willingness to push through development objectives such as the Ralco hydroelectric plant despite strong opposition from the Mapuche movement alienated Mapuche and other indigenous peoples. Non-indigenous campesinos allied with some indigenous individuals to protest the state’s emphasis on mega-projects such as Ralco at the expense of local communities. In 1997, fifteen
leaders from Mapuche, Mapuche-Pehuenche, Aymara, and rural women’s organizations signed a public declaration opposing Ralco and other mega-projects. They spoke out strongly against the government’s approval of Ralco and argued that this approval violated the rights of indigenous people established in the 1993 Indigenous Law. They argued that the government’s mega-projects harmed Mapuche, Aymaras, and non-indigenous campesinos by undermining their ability to sustain their livelihoods. In their words: “These mega projects which imply serious problems for the Mapuche people, are far from affecting only the Mapuche. [A]lready, other Chilean indigenous peoples like the Aymara face grave problems concerning water under the Código de Aguas [which] has permitted mineral companies to the acquire [extensive water rights]…rural campesino women and families also have been and are being affected by modernizing projects” (Declaración Publica de Mujeres Indígenas y Campesinas de Chile 1997).

The Concertación governments alienated rural communities through their development projects. In the Chilean countryside, oppositional voices in addition to those in the most visible Mapuche organizations also objected to the states’ emphasis of development as best achieved through industrial growth and mega projects. The vision of development that the women of the Asociación Nacional de Mujeres Rurales ANAMUR and the Asociación de Mujeres Mapuche Rayen Voygüe elaborated in the 1998 “Declaración de Cañete” provides an example of the type of ideas that were circulating around the Chilean countryside as Mapuche organizations began to move away from alliances with political parties and back towards independent collective action as the best strategies to achieve their goals. The women of these organizations articulated a sustainable vision of development based on the idea of community improvement. They
argued that development programs should combat communal disintegration and help halt out-migration from rural communities by fighting poverty and building social and cultural solidarity on a communal level (Declaración de Cañete 1998). The idea of basing development around the needs of the community likely resonated with other Mapuche organizations in addition to the women of the Asociación de Mujeres Mapuche Rayen Voygüe. The Concertación, however, made only small efforts to retain indigenous support and no real efforts to address development projects to the needs of campesinos.

Although the mid 1990s saw deep disillusionment spread among Mapuche activists who had initially argued that working with the state provided the best means to achieve their organizations’ goals during the transition to democracy, the transition from working with the state to advocating collective action and an independent movement occurred in stages in spite of the growing distance between the state and most Mapuche organizations.

Women who had been active in the Mapuche movement during the dictatorship begin to question the current movement’s relations with the state. In early 1995, Isolde Reuque and Ana Llao Llao spoke at the Encuentro Nacional de Mujeres Indígenas in Temuco. Ana Llao, a member of the Communist party and leader in Ad-Mapu, and Reuque, now a leader in Keyu Kleayñ pu Zomo, a Mapuche women’s organization, hailed from different political currents. Both women invoked the idea that state leaders had a duty to help indigenous people and argued that the state had yet to fulfill its responsibilities to the Mapuche people. Llao criticized the government’s current reluctance to protect the environment and noted that the Chilean state’s historical treatment of indigenous peoples, in which it took indigenous land and forced assimilatory
development projects, harmed indigenous people and indigenous women. Although she noted that the Indigenous Law was an achievement of the indigenous movement, she criticized the gaps in the law that did not follow the wishes of indigenous people (Llao 1995). She linked Mapuche identity to a connection with the land and argued against economic policies that forced Mapuche women to migrate from their communities in search of work. According to Llao: “For us [as] women and for our peoples, in general, the land is everything” (Llao 1995).

Reuque viewed the Indigenous Law and the government’s efforts more positively than Llao. She acknowledged, however, that: “The Law certainly is good, but what passed in the Parliament is not totally satisfactory for our people” (Reuque 1995). In a 1997 interview, Elisa Avendaño Curaqueo, a former leader of Ad-Mapu during the communist period who chose to focus on Mapuche women’s rights after 1996, noted that as Mapuche women, “we struggle as a people; we have a vision as a people. We establish as a people that we have to be recognized, we want autonomy, and we are not going to secure autonomy as women, we are going to secure it as a people” (Avendaño, in Calfío 1997a, 105). Avendaño wished that the current Mapuche movement would unite around shared goals and embrace all Mapuche including women as important members of the movement. She argued that contrary to some Chilean notions of development, the concept of development for the Mapuche embraced more than economic progress or education; it also included a notion of development as a way to strengthen Mapuche participation and autonomy by providing resources to the Mapuche community (Avendaño, in Calfío 1997a).
A definite shift took place between 1991 and 1997 in terms of how Mapuche organizations thought about autonomy and in terms of their contentment with state polices. The current within the greater Mapuche movement that emphasized using direct action in contrast to legalist appeals resurged in popularity. As Mapuche organizations distanced themselves from the state they embraced the goal of Mapuche autonomy in increasing numbers. The alliance with the state in the early 1990s provided limited recognition for the Mapuche people but could not pass constitutional reforms. Neither did it result in any type of real organizational independence within the state bureaucracies for the Mapuche or other indigenous peoples.

The idea that the Mapuche are a people who have a right to their ancestral territory formed the basis of the ideas about autonomy that developed within the Mapuche movement. Two respected female Mapuche activists, Llao and Avendaño, both tied Mapuche identity to historical Mapuche territory. Avendaño included gaining autonomy in the process of development and tied autonomy to recovering Mapuche lands. In her words: “from the recovery of lands to formation and understanding of the person, this is development” (Avendaño, in Calfio 1997a, 106).

Even actors in the Mapuche movement who attended state sponsored conferences began to openly reference some type of Mapuche autonomy as an indigenous right and a goal of the movement by the mid-1990s. The differing resolutions that developed out of two state-sponsored conferences on indigenous rights, one in 1991 and the other in 1997, illustrate the degree to which autonomy became an open goal of the movement as Mapuche organizations and activists moved away from their alliances with the state and towards independent collective action. The state-sponsored 1991 Congreso Nacional de
Los Pueblos Indígenas, at which a large number of the indigenous delegates were Mapuche, produced a group of resolutions that made vague references to the indigenous right to autonomy within their introduction (Congreso Nacional 1991). In contrast, the 1997 Congreso Nacional Pueblo Mapuche that the state sponsored in part to ease growing tensions between the government and the Mapuche movement, devoted an entire subsection of its resolutions to the Mapuche right to autonomy. In no uncertain terms, the Mapuche delegates to the Congress agreed that the point on which a new relationship between the Mapuche people and the Chilean state and society must rest “is to take the steps necessary for the autonomy, given that to this moment [the state's] indigenista policies do not permit the equality or the participation with dignity that the Mapuche people have earned themselves in this country” (Congreso Nacional Mapuche 1997, 29). Their embrace of autonomy as the proper relationship between the Mapuche people and the state is particularly significant given that the elements of the Mapuche movement willing to participate in the Congress were among the elements in the movement that had not yet abandoned entirely the possibility of some institutional relationship between the greater Mapuche movement and the state. The Congress defined autonomy by stating that: “Autonomy is the manner in which an intermediate group in society decides about its proper destiny” (Congreso Nacional Mapuche 1997, 29). They proposed that in order to respect the Mapuche peoples’ autonomy, the state should recognize a representative organization developed among the Mapuche people. Their understanding of autonomy did not explicitly reference the importance of Mapuche territory. Yet elsewhere in the document they wrote that: “while the majority of the Mapuche population is in urban
zones, the ideological cultural reference [of the Mapuche people] is the land and the ancestral Mapuche territory” (Congreso Nacional Mapuche 1997, 28).

Despite his affiliation with the state as an indigenous representative in CONADI, José Santos Millao, a former Communist leader of Ad-Mapu, criticized the current indigenous law at the 1997 Congreso Nacional Pueblo Mapuche. In his remarks, Millao drew a parallel between historical Mapuche leaders and the struggles of the current Mapuche movement in order to place the movement into a tradition of Mapuche resistance (Millao 1997). The Frei government had hoped that holding a National Mapuche Congress would help to repair a growing rift between Mapuche activists and the state. Millao, in contrast, viewed the Congress as an opportunity to transmit a unified message to the state that the Mapuche people should have the autonomy to define their own local affairs and as an opportunity for Mapuche activists to take a unified stand against the state’s project to create Ralco. He argued that the primary objective of the Congress should be “to define…what should be the relationship [that] our Mapuche people [have] with the Chilean state” (Millao 1997, 14).

The rise of neoliberal ideologies among Chilean politicians and the transformation of the old Left and Center towards more conservative economic and social policies provides one explanation for why the Concertación mostly abandoned its policy of cultivating indigenous allies by the mid-1990s. After the Pinochet dictatorship, many members of the old Leftist parties and their new counterparts moved towards the political Center. Loveman notes that “many activists and members of the Socialist party, the Party for Democracy PPD, and the Christian Democratic party had been transformed ideologically [during the dictatorship] and now accepted much of the neoliberal
economic program” (Loveman 2001, 311). Patricia Richards argues that before the 1973 coup, the Chilean state acted as social benefactor that fulfilled the needs of Chilean citizens. In her words: “Under the benefactor state, access to health care, education, pensions, and housing were considered rights to which all persons were entitled, simply because they were citizens of Chile” (Richards 2004, 73). The profound social and economic changes that the Pinochet regime wrought destroyed the viability of progressive ideas of citizenship. Worldwide changes including the rise of neoliberal economics helped to ensure that once the Pinochet regime fell many of its changes to the Chilean state and society would remain. Richards argues that the Concertación adopted a policy of trying to integrate the poor into national markets based on the assumption that increased opportunities would lead to decreased poverty. It pursued a market-based policy that no longer followed the idea that citizens have a right to a basic standard of living and that social policy should fulfill that right (Richards 2004).

Despite the obvious acceptance of neoliberalism within the Concertación, a shift in politicians’ economic ideologies provides only a partial explanation for the state’s favoritism of corporations and development projects over Mapuche communities after the mid-1990s. Chilean political parties and Mapuche organizations filter transnational concepts like neoliberalism through a Chilean frame. In the years prior to the 1973 coup, the Chilean political parties of the Left and Center had just begun to compete for rural votes. In the years prior to the 1960s, progressive political sectors left control of the countryside to rightwing parties. Rural campesinos and indigenous people became the last and most contentious sector of the Chilean population to be incorporated within the Left and Center-Left (Loveman 2001). In the years after the transition to democracy, the
Concertación failed to work in the interests of campesinos. Because the parties of the
Concertación had a history of promoting land reform and serving campesino needs,
during the Pinochet regime and the period of transition to democracy, many of the leaders
of major Mapuche organizations were willing to ally their organizations with the political
parties in which they had been militant before the dictatorship. President Aylwin’s
commitments to pass a comprehensive indigenous law to reform Pinochet-era injustices,
to create CONADI as an indigenous development agency, and to gain constitutional
recognition of Chile’s indigenous peoples seemed to confirm to many Mapuche leaders
that working with the new government and state bureaucracy could improve Mapuche
living conditions and secure Mapuche rights.

If the Concertación had hoped to gain an electoral advantage in the IX Region by
courting Mapuche voters, its plans bore little success in Presidential elections. In 1989,
1993, and 1999, the IX Region consistently voted more conservatively than the national
average. 39

The Concertación did not attempt to reverse Pinochet-era agricultural policies.
Although the Aylwin administration halted the division of indigenous communities and
passed legislation to protect indigenous lands, the Concertación has not remedied many
Pinochet-era policies that harm campesinos. In the words of Jorge Nef: “Since the coup
and the undoing of the most populist and redistributive features of the Frei and Allende
administrations’ agrarian reforms, a thorough agrarian counterrevolution has been under
way” (Nef 2003, 18). In the agricultural, forestry, and fisheries industries,
commercialization has allowed the rise of large businesses that have accumulated control
of vast tracts of land and resources at the expense of small farmers and the rural poor
(Nef 2003). Chile’s transition to democracy required the democratic opposition to adopt the institutions and laws that the Pinochet dictatorship created to control the country and to ensure the perpetuation of its social and economic policies. Concertación-affiliated politicians have been willing to work towards changing this framework only in certain areas. In addition, because the Concertación must contend with a strong and overrepresented Right, efforts at reform have been halting and required compromises.

In the case of the 1993 Indigenous Law, government ministers and representatives of the armed forces objected to provisions in the draft law that Aylwin’s Special Commission of Indigenous Peoples had drafted several years before. The military and more conservative elements in the administration objected to provisions in the law that they viewed as weakening the state. They removed indigenous communities’ right to participate in investment decisions that would affect them, placed indigenous development areas under the control of the Ministry of Planning rather than CONADI, and rejected references to indigenous “peoples” and “territory” as undermining the unity of the Chilean state. Rightwing forces in the Congress further weakened the proposed law. They objected to its provisions on the grounds that they undermined Chilean unity or “discriminated” in favor of indigenous people. Rightwing representatives also expressed concerns that CONADI would fall under the control of indigenous organizations rather than under the control of the state and the executive. The final version of the law contained contradictory provisions and was substantially weaker than the initial proposal (Aylwin 2001; Haughney 2006; Mallon 2005).

The government consistently underfunded CONADI following its creation. This lack of funding limited CONADI’s ability to meet indigenous needs. Mauricio
Huenchulaf, the first director of CONADI noted that: “As an institution, CONADI is overwhelmed with demand, and this raises confusions and complications… This is an institution that is intended to attend to 1,250,000 indigenous people, with a low personnel endowment, with an equally low quantity of resources” (Huenchulaf in Calfo 1997b, 115).

After the creation of CONADI, the number of Mapuche organizations expanded drastically. Under the 1993 Indigenous Law, Mapuche groups may gain legal recognition as associations or communities. Over 60 Mapuche associations exist in Santiago and hundreds of associations and thousands of communities have registered in Regions VIII, IX, and X (Richards 2004; Bengoa 1997). Because of the multiplicity of Mapuche organizations, no one position currently exists within the Mapuche movement regarding the overarching goals of the movement or the degree to which the movement should build alliances with the state. That said, a series of critical junctures in the mid to late 1990s revealed profound weaknesses in the strategy of gaining rights and benefits through interactions with the state that many indigenous activists had begun to pursue with the transition to democracy. As the 1990s progressed, elements within the movement that advocated some level of Mapuche autonomy and affirmed the Mapuche as a distinct nation or people gained a greater voice. José Aylwin notes that although some of the older generation of Mapuche organizations such as the Consejo de Todas las Tierras and Liwen incorporated indigenous autonomy as one of their basic tenants, many newer Mapuche organizations have adopted autonomy demands in response to the inability of the state to serve their needs (Aylwin 2001).
During President Frei’s administration, development schemes in rural areas with significant Mapuche populations increased substantially. Under state laws dating to the Pinochet regime, water rights are assigned separately from land rights in Chile. Pinochet’s government also created subsidies for forestry corporations that facilitated greatly the spread of the forestry industry in southern Chile. In the IX Region, the forestry industry replaced agricultural estates as the chief source of conflicts for many Mapuche communities. In the VIII, IX, and X Regions, forestry enterprises possess approximately a million and a half hectares of land. Mapuche communities possess far less land than the corporations. The state recognized approximately 500 thousand hectares of territory in its original títulos de merced that created the current communities. Over the years, Mapuche communities lost significant lands, first to agricultural estates and now to forestry corporations. José Aylwin notes that: “In the province of Arauco alone, it is estimated that around 60 thousand hectares [of land] are today in the possession of forestry enterprises in conflict with Mapuche communities” (Aylwin 2001, 37).

Forestry enterprises have surrounded some Mapuche communities with plantations of fast-growing, non-native pine and eucalyptus trees that require extensive water. These corporations are more likely than Mapuche farmers to own water rights to available water sources. In some communities, residents report that nearby tree plantations’ overuse of water has caused local water resources to dry up and damaged farmers’ ability to grow crops for their own subsistence (Haughney 2006; Aylwin 2001).

Concertación’s embrace of neoliberal economic ideas provides an important part of the explanation for why Mapuche activists began to grow increasingly dissatisfied with
the state’s indigenous policies and disillusioned with the ability of political alliances to
provide tangible benefits for their people as the 1990s progressed. Public statements of
dissatisfaction with the state’s policies by Mapuche leaders, the decreasing relevance of
Mapuche organizations allied with specific political parties, and the rise of Mapuche
media that is openly critical of the government all pointed to a growing chasm between
Mapuche organizations and the Concertación. Mapuche activists learned over the course
of the 1990s and early 2000s that the Concertación’s moderate leftist credentials were not
enough to guarantee that its governments would favor indigenous peoples’ demands over
the promise of major corporations to bring money and development to all Chileans. The
alliance between Mapuche activists and political parties had always been ill at ease and
some elements of the Mapuche movement refused to form alliances with the
Concertación. By the end of the 1990s, even activists who where associated with the
state knew that the state would serve at best as a problematic ally to the movement.

The strongest conflicts between Mapuche activists and the state occurred in the
countryside rather than in urban centers. Organized Mapuche campesinos challenged the
Concertación’s willingness to ignore the plight of rural people and to promote mega
projects as the best route toward development.

During the presidencies of Eduardo Frei and Ricardo Lagos, the Concertación’s
lack of interest in courting campesino support or in pursuing policies to improve the lives
of campesinos and subsistence farmers became increasingly evident. The transition to
democracy did not remove the legal framework that Pinochet built to sustain his regime.
It did not neutralize the armed forces or manage to alter the electoral laws of the 1980
Constitution. Land reform had provided a large part of the motivation for the Right’s
rejection of Salvador Allende as a dangerous Marxist. The Concertación did not need extensive campesino support to survive, and the agrarian reform of the Frei and Allende years remained a faded memory in the new democracy. Whether because of politicians’ actual beliefs in the efficacy of neoliberal policies or because they were unwilling to expropriate property for uses other than development projects that were unlikely to earn the ire of the Right, the Concertación never attempted to reinitiate the progressive agrarian policies from before the dictatorship.

Like the conflict over Ralco, the state’s management of conflicts between rural Mapuche communities and forestry companies spurred further disillusionment with the state among members of the wider Mapuche movement. The radical Mapuche organization, *Coordinadora de Comunidades en Conflicto Arauco-Malleco*, or *Coordinadora Arauco Malleko* (CAM) advocated direct collective action, including the destruction of property and land occupations, against forestry companies involved in disputes with Mapuche communities. The Mapuche organizations engaged in active conflict with forestry corporations and the state are among the most radical Mapuche organizations. The most visible of which was the CAM, which pursued the goal of Mapuche autonomy and self-government until the Chilean government almost entirely destroyed it as an organization.

The state’s campaign against the CAM as an illicit organization and its use under Lagos of antiterrorist legislation to charge Mapuche activists accused of arson of forestry corporations’ land and equipment alienated many in the Mapuche movement. According to the Chilean Minister of the Interior, only 2.4 percent of Mapuche communities have participated in illegal actions such as land occupations or arson against forestry
corporations (HRW, 2004). The government’s harsh reaction against Mapuche activists involved in disputes with forestry corporations coupled with the wretched conditions in which rural people often subsist whose homes border tree plantations created sympathy within the wider Mapuche movement for communities involved in disputes with forestry corporations. The inhabitants of some communities must cope not only with pesticide contamination of their land and water, but also with a virtual quarantine that forestry companies enforce on their communities by forcing community members to gain permission to enter forestry land that sometimes completely surrounds their communities (Reiman 2001; HRW 2004).

The Frei administration began prosecuting Mapuche activists involved in disputes with forestry companies in the mid-1990s. Under Frei, the government used the 1958 Law of State Security to charge activists with threatening national security. Two major Chilean companies, Mininco and Arauco, control the vast majority of the forestry industry. Southern landowners, businessmen from the forestry industry, and members of Congress all pressured the Frei and Lagos administrations to “solve” the “Mapuche problem.” Chilean antiterrorism laws which date from the later part of the Pinochet dictatorship. In a strange twist of fate, Chilean legislators added arson, the crime for which most Mapuche individuals face prosecution, to the crimes that constitute an act of terrorism after the transition to democracy as part of the process of reforming Pinochet-era laws. Although there have been no fatalities from the acts of arson of which Mapuche activists have been convicted or stand accused, the Lagos administration decided to prosecute Mapuche activists with terrorism. Since December 2000, laws in the IX Region, in which most terrorism prosecutions have occurred, have called for “oral,
public, and adversarial hearings protecting the due process rights of the defendant” (HRW 2004, 22). This system replaces an older system of largely written trials in which a single judge weighed competing evidence and has been phased in throughout Chile (HRW 2004). The antiterrorism law allows for anonymous witnesses, and the prosecution has provided protection and resources to anonymous witnesses who are willing to testify against Mapuche defendants. These witnesses are often other members of Mapuche communities and may have long-standing disputes with the defendant’s families. The police, as a branch of the military, are not subject to civilian justice, and reports of police brutality are common in communities in conflict with the forestry industry. Civilians accused of crimes against the police are tried in military courts, and members of the police enjoy virtual impunity for their actions against members of mobilized Mapuche communities (HRW 2004).

In addition the Chilean Supreme Court has rejected innocent verdicts against Mapuche leaders accused under the antiterrorism law and ordered a lower court to reconsider its verdicts, changing an acquittal into a guilty conviction. Terrorism charges carry much stricter penalties than other criminal charges, and people convicted of terrorism lose their right to vote and participate in political organizations (HRW 2004).

Almost all of the Mapuche leaders that the state has charged under the antiterrorism law are members of the CAM, which formed in the late 1990s among Mapuche communities whose leaders believed that the 1993 Indigenous Law was not protecting their interests. Ernesto Carmona asserts that the CAM replaced the Consejo de Todas las Tierras, which had moved towards international activism, as the principal Mapuche organization advocating a radical form of autonomy. The CAM advocates
direct action against forestry corporations and refuses to negotiate with the state or the forestry industry (Carmona, Azkintuwe, March 2004).

The CAM forwarded the idea that its direct actions constitute the only effective way for the Mapuche people to gain their rights. The Coordinadora understood its efforts as the logical outcome of past Mapuche efforts to protect Mapuche territory. It argues that:

The occupation of Mapuche territory by the Chilean state, the usurpation and expulsion of our people from our ancestral lands is a historical process that in no case has terminated. If in the past it was the militaries who through a bloody invasion reduced our vast territory into a set of miserable reduccioines, today it is the transnational businesses who continue with this process” (CAM, March 1999).

The CAM objected to the Concertación’s support of neoliberal policies and rejected agreements with the government as ineffective. It stated that: “this strategy [of negotiation] has not resulted in anything other than the search for sterile political accords that have served only to benefit the reach of the organizations and institutions that have worked for the aforementioned judgments” (CAM, Mach 1999). It rejected the Nueva Imperial Accord, the Indigenous Law, and CONADI as methods that the government used to subordinate the Mapuche movement and the Mapuche people (CAM, March 1999). It argued that the proper purpose of the Mapuche movement was to regain territory and gain “recognition of the existence of the Mapuche Nation” (CAM, June 1999).

The CAM’s intense Mapuche nationalism and its rejection of other Mapuche organizations’ tactics as worthless worked to alienate the CAM from the more moderate sectors of the Mapuche movement. Despite its goals of self-government and the eventual
establishment of an autonomous Mapuche region, the CAM’s methods, which included land occupations and crimes against property, never approached those of the violent separatist movements such as ETA to which the Chilean state compared it. Writing for Azkintuwe, Ernesto Carmona argued that the Chilean government’s repression against the CAM was only the most recent manifestation of the state’s efforts to dominate the Mapuche people and identified that CAM’s struggle with the Mapuche peoples’ quest for autonomy and self-determination (Carmona, Azkintuwe, March 2004).

The state’s overzealous prosecution of the CAM and of Mapuche leaders whose communities or whose factions within their communities openly challenged the forestry industry’s presence on land that historically belonged to their communities under their títulos de merced alienated other Mapuche organizations who viewed the state’s actions as open discrimination. Many of these organizations may not have held a high opinion of the CAM, but they resented the state’s use of disproportionate charges to destroy “inconvenient” Mapuche organizations (HRW 2004).

The current Mapuche movement is extremely complex and multifaceted. In some senses there is not one unified Mapuche movement, but rather a series of Mapuche organizations that may disagree about fundamental questions of strategy and the degree of autonomy from state control that the Mapuche should seek, but agree that the Mapuche people must continue to organize to demand recognition of their rights and state aid for some of their material needs. CONADI lost relevance for many Mapuche after President Frei proved during the conflict over Ralco that if CONADI attempted to block the state’s development plans due to indigenous rights concerns, the President could replace its
director until it made the “correct” decision. Frei’s actions shattered the illusion that
CONADI was a mostly independent organization.

Theorizing Autonomy: Mapuche Intellectuals and Mapuche Nationalism

An increasingly publicized sense of Mapuche nationalism developed in the late
1990s and 2000s among Mapuche movement activists as many activists became
disillusioned with the possibility of political alliances to serve the Mapuche’s collective
interests. In May 2004, in a public letter to President Lagos, Elikura Chihuailaf wrote:

Mr. President…you—through Minister José Insulza—granted me the privilege of inviting
me to be an honorary member of the commission that [will] advise you on the theme of
the [Chilean] Bicentenary. You know that my position—that I expressed in my 1999
“Confidential Message to the Chileans” questions the commemoration and criticized the
declaration surging in the tenor of the discussion…that in synthesis says that ‘Chile is a
white country, where it was not necessary to import blacks and where the indigenous
presence is visible only to the expert eye (Chihuailaf, Azkintuwe, May 2004, 15).

Chihuailaf, a well-regarded Mapuche poet, is one of many Mapuche intellectuals who are
actively grappling in their writings with issues of Mapuche identity and the Mapuche’s
relations with the state. In his open letter, Chihuailaf urges President Lagos and his
administration to establish better relations between the Chilean state and the Mapuche
people. He writes that: “the Mapuche are a people, not an institution…we are also
chilenos, but…we have a language, a history, a vision of a proper world, and an historical
territory that to this day divides us from the Chilean people” (Chihuailaf, Azkintuwe, May
2004, 15). He criticizes the government’s treatment of the Ralco conflict and the
influence that large corporations have in the current government. He asks Lagos to
recognize that antiterrorism prosecutions and the government’s treatment of the CAM violate Mapuche civil rights. Chihuailaf’s appeal to Lagos to meet with Mapuche organizations and to support the majority of the Mapuche people’s wishes for Constitutional recognition and some sort of autonomy rather than treating Mapuche activists as terrorists reflects the developing goals of the Mapuche movement and the ambivalence among many members of the movement about their proper relationship with the state (Chihuailaf, *Azkintuwe*, May 2004).

Like some radical activist groups, a number of Mapuche intellectuals draw on ideas of Mapuche unity and self-determination to advocate a new direction for the Mapuche movement. They argue that the movement should pursue the goals of local or regional Mapuche autonomy and complete independence from Chilean political parties. Underlying their writings is the idea that the Mapuche are a distinct people who hold identities independent from Chileans. Writing in various forums such as *Azkintuwe* or the website mapuexpress, these authors argue that Mapuche communities deserve the autonomy to direct their own political affairs because of their status as a conquered people.

Alfredo Seguel argues that the Chilean and Argentine governments discriminate against the Mapuche by favoring environmentally disastrous development over the wellbeing of Mapuche communities. He accuses the Chilean and Argentine states of “environmental racism” against the Mapuche people because they contaminate Mapuche territory without honoring the Mapuche’s right to territorial autonomy and self-determination. He looks to increased autonomy and self-determination as the best
solution for the Mapuche people in the face of discriminatory state policies (Seguel, November 2004).

Pedro Cayuqueo and Wladimir Painemal also address the topic of Mapuche relations with the Chilean state. Cayuqueo and Painemal argue for an idea of Mapuche exceptionalism. They assert that the Mapuche movement should abandon the concept of “indigenous” (indígena) to describe the Mapuche people. To Cayuqueo and Painemal, the Mapuche struggle is more similar to the struggle of the Palestinians and the Kurds than to indigenous Latin American struggles because the Mapuche are a distinct people who did not experience the effects of 400 to 500 years of colonial rule. They argue that recent policies of indigenismo on the part of the Chilean state have resulted in state institutions designed to deal with indigenous questions that remove questions about the Mapuche people from the possibility of direct Mapuche control. In their opinion, “a new relation [between the Mapuche and the state] should begin…and more than an inefficient ‘new treaty,’ [it should] propose a new type of relation between both peoples based on the formal recognition of our political and territorial rights” (Cayuque and Painemal, Azkintuwe, 2003, 13). They argue against regional Mapuche identities and political affiliations that they claim divide the current Mapuche movement and urge a new focus for the movement towards gaining Mapuche representation and eventually some level of autonomy in historical Mapuche territory (Cayuque and Painemal, Azkintuwe, 2003).

Like other Mapuche intellectuals, Reynaldo Mariqueo views the Mapuche as a distinct people who he argues should work towards self-determination. He urges the formation of a Mapuche political party. He argues that Chilean political parties do not act in the Mapuche’s best interest. To Mariqueo, a Mapuche political party would allow
the Mapuche people to regain control over political decisions in areas with large
Mapuche populations and forge a greater degree of autonomy from the Chilean state
(Mariqueo, October 2004).

Víctor Naguil also embraces the idea of Mapuche nationalism and territorial
autonomy. He advocates that the Mapuche movement should work towards building an
autonomous pluriethnic region out of the IX Region of Chile and views building a viable
Mapuche political party as the first step towards this goal. Naguil’s argument for
regional rather than communal autonomy rests on the Mapuche’s historical claim to the
IX Region and his dissatisfaction with the Chilean state’s economic and linguistic
policies. An autonomous region in a decentralized state could modify these policies on a
regional level. His idea of Mapuche identity and that of many other Mapuche
intellectuals who advocate extensive Mapuche autonomy rests on the idea of Mapuche
territory. In his conceptualization, Mapuche identity gains its strength from the
Mapuche’s historical territorial independence. Mapuche urban migration, especially to
the capital, Santiago, is problematic to theorists like Naguil who understand Mapuche
identity as inherently tied to the land. He proposes that if the IX Region becomes an
autonomous pluriethnic region, that its government should launch programs to encourage
Mapuche living in other areas to return to ancestral Mapuche territory (Naguil,
Azkintuwe, July 2005; August-September 2005).

Not all Mapuche intellectuals agree that the Mapuche movement should focus on
building territorial autonomy for rural Mapuche. José Marimán, a Mapuche scholar and
one of the most prolific writers on the Mapuche movement, argues that the current
movement also needs to encompass the concerns of educated urban Mapuche and that
Mapuche identities should rely on Mapuche heritage rather than living in rural communities. Marimán notes that Chilean nationalism historically excluded the Mapuche from the category of Chileans. By the 1980s and 1990s, Mapuche activists began to dispute strongly the idea of an exclusive Chilean nation. Yet members of the Mapuche movement still referenced urban migration and education as things that diminish Mapuche identities and still continue to do so.\textsuperscript{40} He argues that the division of Mapuche identities into rural and urban groups and local identities and the tendency among some Mapuche to base Mapuche identity on territorial residence or being traditional are problematic ideas that fragment the movement. To Marimán, Mapuche identity stems from Mapuche ethnicity rather than territory or place of residence. He argues that the Mapuche movement needs to better incorporate the Mapuche’s urban intelligentsia and rely on urban intellectuals in addition to campesinos to guide the direction of mobilization (Marimán, \textit{Azkintuwe}, March 2004).

Mapuche intellectuals theorized and formulated concrete plans about how the Mapuche people could best achieve some measure of self-determination and autonomy from the Chilean state because they knew after witnessing the state’s treatment of the CAM that direct attempts to declare autonomy would face intense government repression. The Concertación’s actions from the mid 1990s onward revealed that alliance with the state would not provide consistent benefits to Mapuche organizations or the Mapuche people because successive governments were willing to embrace discriminatory policies and manipulate or ignore national law in order to pursue their own objectives at the expense of indigenous peoples.
The Mapuche Movement and Chilean Politics

The Mapuche’s strong sense of collective identity and their desire for some degree of autonomy for their rural communities, follow, in large part, from their experiences with the Chilean state. The Mapuche’s history of independence and their violent conquest helped to preserve a unified sense of Mapuche identity and to build shared cultural capital among the Mapuche people. The land-grant communities that the Mapuche movement fought to preserve during the Pinochet dictatorship existed because of the Chilean government’s forcible resettling of the Mapuche people at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. Despite their origins, these communities became areas in which many Mapuche were able to create and preserve a sense of collective identity and shared cultural traditions. The Mapuche movement fought to protect their reducciones from division and resale to non-Mapuche not just to protect rural subsistence but also out of the conviction that the communities provided an important component of Mapuche identity.

Because the Mapuche movement is not politically unified, different Mapuche activists and organizations pursue different goals. Many Mapuche organizations pursue redistributive goals but tend to underscore their redistributive aims with a focus on the recognition of Mapuche rights and identity. The Indigenous Law of 1993 preserved existing Mapuche and other indigenous lands as semi-autonomous spaces. In recent years, Mapuche intellectuals and more radical Mapuche organizations have increasingly pushed for increased autonomy for Mapuche communities or areas with large Mapuche populations. Aside from organizations like the CAM, this drive for autonomy is still more theoretical than actual and not all Mapuche activists agree that pursuing
territorially-based autonomy is the proper direction for the Mapuche movement. Some of the Mapuche organizations’ embrace of autonomy comes from their connection to the international indigenous rights movement, but a sense of shared identity based on their history of exclusion from Chilean politics also strongly influenced Mapuche organizations’ understandings of and push for autonomy.

Early Mapuche organizations developed ties to the parties of the Concertación, in large part, because Mapuche movement leaders had become committed leftist partisans in response to the land reform and other positive policies of the Frei and Allende administrations. The parties of the Left and Center-Left offered the promise of concrete benefits to Mapuche organizations able to court their favor. Once the reality of the return to democracy set in, however, members of the Mapuche movement began to realize that the Concertación would not answer all of their goals. The party-based Mapuche organizations that had developed during the transition to democracy became less relevant as disillusionment spread and many of their leaders entered state bureaucracies. Although parties of the Left provided much stronger support than the Chilean Right for the Mapuche cause, neoliberal economic policies and the Concertación’s unwillingness to support Mapuche autonomy or obey its own laws caused the Mapuche movement as a whole to begin to distance itself from its political allies by the mid 1990s.

The Mapuche case provides support for the role of politicians’ neoliberalism in preventing lasting alliances between indigenous organizations and political parties. It also provides support for the role of neoliberal multiculturalism in limiting the utility of alliances with the state for indigenous organizations that pursue demands other than recognition.
The influence of neoliberalism alone, however, does not provide an answer for the Mapuche movement’s pattern of alliances with political parties. The Chilean state’s history of exclusion and discrimination against the Mapuche and other indigenous people provides an added answer to why leftist parties have not always been good allies for the Mapuche. This history helps to allow politicians to dismiss indigenous concerns as less important than national development and to dismiss Mapuche demands for autonomy as detrimental to the Chilean state.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

Indigenous mobilization has produced concrete results by altering the ways that indigenous people access their states throughout Latin America. Periods of social and political disruption leave communities of people primed to adopt new ideas to cope with their changing social situations. At certain critical junctures, old, everyday methods of resistance no longer sustain a community. In cases in which actors within the state threaten established communal structures, members of the community must choose between adopting new methods of resistance or bending to the will of state elites. From the late 1970s onward, many indigenous people chose to mobilize rather than accept detrimental state policies.

The Mapuche in Chile and the Zapatistas in Mexico initially mobilized during periods in which state leaders altered the existing relationships between the state and indigenous communities in ways that threatened the communities and closed old avenues of indigenous access to the state. They drew on preexisting understandings of the role of the state that had developed in their communities to build new shared ideas that sustained and invigorated their movements.

This study supports the argument that indigenous people in different states possess different understandings of how their movements should approach elite members of the state and political parties that derive in large part from the distinct processes of state formation that their countries followed. The exclusion or inclusion of indigenous
people and campesinos within national politics shapes the degree to which mobilized indigenous people can draw on preexisting nationalist discourse to justify their movements and demand the redistribution of resources and recognition as indigenous people. Exclusion from the state also helps to develop a strong sense of distinct identity within indigenous peoples. This identity as a distinct people with rights motivated indigenous peoples like the Mapuche to embrace the idea of autonomy early in their mobilization. In contrast, the Zapatistas initially viewed autonomy as a layer of indigenous self-determination that would fit into the existing Mexican political system. They embraced autonomy as isolation from the government as a tactic to preserve their communities from hostile intervention by the state. The Zapatista’s indigenous identity, their local culture and customs, and their connections with international and domestic indigenous rights movements also played a role in their decision to embrace demands for autonomy.

In contrast, the current Mapuche movement’s and the Zapatistas’ pattern of interaction with the electoral Left reveals that the argument that indigenous people will be most likely to form electoral alliances with governments or political parties of the Left that respect campesino concerns over-predicts the degree to which indigenous organizations form alliances with political parties. Although indigenous movements and the Left often share many common redistributive aims, these ideological similarities are not enough to ensure that leftist politicians will respect indigenous organizations. The lack of respect that leftist parties have for indigenous people strongly helps to explain why the Zapatistas have not formed an alliance with the PRD and continue to boycott elections. In addition, the Mapuche movement has distanced itself from the Chilean state
and the Concertación in very large part because of the callousness with which successive
governments from the Concertación have approached issues of indigenous rights and the
degree to which they have favored the interests of large corporations over the interests of
indigenous peoples. The Concertación has abandoned the Chilean countryside in general,
but the Mapuche movements’ general dissatisfaction with the state goes beyond its
development policies. At the root of Mapuche organizations’ processes of distancing
themselves from the state and their drive for obtainable solutions to gain autonomy is a
very real sense among the Mapuche that the Chilean state does not respect them as a
people and only pays lip service to indigenous rights.

In Latin America many indigenous people are campesinos. In Chiapas, the
indigenous people who formed the Zapatista movement were members of the rural poor.
In contrast to the indigenous populations of many other states, the majority of Chilean
Mapuche reside in urban areas. Because many indigenous people are poor and live in
rural areas and many indigenous peoples incorporate some notion of territory into their
understanding of indigenous identity, how leftist parties behave towards the countryside
does matter to mobilized indigenous peoples. If mobilized indigenous individuals see the
Left ignoring campesino concerns, they can ascertain that leftist parties will be unlikely
to be receptive to a significant number of indigenous concerns as well. For indigenous
movements that pursue goals related to redistributive campesino concerns or territorially-
based autonomy, prior efforts by a leftist political party to cultivate campesino
membership by addressing campesino concerns provides an indication that this particular
party may be receptive to the movement. A leftist political party, on the other hand, that
ignores the countryside and does not need campesino support will probably oppose a good portion of the indigenous movement’s agenda.

As colonists in the Selva Lacandona, the core of the Zapatista movement held tenuous historical claims at best to the land they occupied. In contrast to the Zapatistas, the Mapuche people held clear historical claims to an indigenous territory. The reducciones formed the last remaining remnants of historical Mapuche lands. Territory became intertwined with Mapuche identity. Mapuche activists make autonomy claims not only based on the rationale of indigenous self-determination, but also on the Mapuche peoples’ historical claims to territory. Some Mapuche activists reference land as an important part of their peoples’ identity and the idea of autonomy among the Mapuche intertwines with the concept of territorial control. The Zapatistas, in contrast do not make claims to autonomy based on their historical claims to territory. Instead, the peoples of Mayan origin who comprise the Zapatista movement launched their claims to autonomy based on the idea that indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. As Burguete’s research demonstrates, in many cases the Zapatistas have built their autonomous governments among people rather than based on control of territory. The boundaries of the Zapatistas’ communities are human rather than geographic.

By 1998, the Zapatistas had adopted autonomy as their central demand and began to form self-governing municipalities and regions that rejected state money or aid. Autonomy became a way for the Zapatistas to refuse to be co-opted by the state. It preserved the processes of self-governance that had developed among the indigenous colonists of the Selva Lacandona after years of neglect by the government. For some Zapatista supporters in the Selva, declaring autonomous governments might have seemed
a feasible mechanism to hang on to the status quo that also promised future benefits as indigenous people if the government ever recognized fully indigenous autonomy. Outside of the Selva, declaring autonomous governments allowed the Zapatistas and their supporters to forge political structures outside of the control of existing indigenous bosses and rival factions in their communities. On a fundamental level, the Zapatistas understood autonomy first and foremost as the process of gaining increased self-determination rather than reclaiming their rights to ancestral territory.

In contrast to the EZLN’s gradual shift towards pursuing the goal of autonomy, the Mapuche movement forcefully advocated incorporated autonomy into its goals early in its history. The current of Mapuche mobilization that most strongly rejected alliances with Chilean political parties also strongly embraced autonomy. The Consejo de Todas las Tierras explicitly advocated for Mapuche autonomy. In addition, once most actors in the Mapuche movement became disillusioned with the Concertación’s indigenous policies some degree of autonomy became a common demand among newer Mapuche organizations and Mapuche intellectuals developed plans to move the Mapuche people closer to some degree of autonomy from the Chilean state. In the late 1970s, when the current wave of mobilization began, autonomy and territory already existed as important concerns among the Mapuche people. The fight to preserve existing reducciones and regain usurped land animated Mapuche activism within many communities. The struggle to maintain or rekindle a common sense of Mapuche identity within Mapuche communities also formed an important part of Mapuche activism in the late 1970s and 1980s.
The different historical experiences of conquest and incorporation into the Chilean and Mexican states that the Mapuche in Chile and the indigenous Mayan peoples in Chiapas created radically differing understandings of the importance of territory within the Mapuche and Zapatista movements. Even though the majority of Mapuche live in urban areas, Mapuche movement organizations and intellectuals associate their goals of autonomy with a sense of Mapuche identity that is tied to the Mapuche’s historical control of certain lands. In contrast, although land rights propelled the Zapatista movement, the Zapatistas based their claims to land on the Mexican idea that land should belong to those who work it without referencing their indigenous heritage to justify the claims to land. What the Zapatistas view as land the Mapuche view as indigenous territory. Consequently, autonomy for the Mapuche contains a much stronger sense of territorial rights than it does for the Zapatistas. The Zapatista and Mapuche movements provide evidence that the international indigenous rights movement influences the types of demands that mobilized indigenous people pursue, but that this influence filters through the local concerns and circumstances of the movement.

The present course of the Mapuche movement provides some justification for the idea that politicians’ acceptance of neoliberalism limits their worth as allies for mobilized indigenous people. Neoliberalism creates an ideological justification for politicians to reject some aspects of indigenous movements or indigenous movements’ demands as contrary to the purpose of national development or as illegitimate because they exceed the scope of legitimate state action. The Chilean state’s embrace of neoliberalism does not, however, provide a complete explanation for the difficulties that some sectors of the Mapuche movement have faced during the Frei and Lagos administrations. Opponents of
indigenous autonomy also draw on earlier conservative traditions that stress the importance of a unitary nation-state to reject the idea of indigenous autonomy.

The Mexican and Chilean case studies revealed that in addition to neoliberalism other ideologies that are most commonly associated with the political Right provide the primary justification that politicians use to block indigenous demands for autonomy. Neoliberalism and a racist nationalism that privileges a false notion of national unity over indigenous self-determination combined within the Mexican and Chilean Right to block the Zapatistas’ and the Mapuche’s attempts to create legally recognized autonomy regimes. The relevance of this exclusionary nationalism that privileges a centralized state and a unitary national people reveals an obvious truth; processes of state formation shape the political behavior of national elites as well as that of indigenous movements.
1 See Wade 1997.
2 See Brysk 2000.
3 For figures on Chile see Richards 2004; For Mexico see Mattiace 2003.
4 See for example: (Reiman 2001; Marimán 1994; 1995; 2004; Seguel, 2005).
5 For scholarship on Guatemala see the work of Kay Warren, eg: (Warren 2002), Charles R. Hale, eg: (Hale 2002), and Diane M. Nelson, eg: (Nelson 1999) among others. On Bolivia, Xavier Albó, eg: (Albó 2002), Raúl Madrid, eg: (Madrid 2005a; 2005b; 2005c), Robert Andolina, Sara Radcliffe, and Nina Laurie, eg: (Andolina, Radcliffe, and Laurie 2005), Andrew Canessa, eg: (Canessa 2000), and Pilar Domingo, eg: (Domingo 2005) have all published notable pieces. Of the substantial research on Ecuador’s indigenous movement Amalia Pallares, eg: (Pallares 2002), Melina Selverston-Scher, eg: (Selverston-Scher 2001), Tanya Korovkin, eg: (Korovkin 2001), Robert Andolina, eg: (Andolina 2003) are a few accessible scholars. Some scholarship also exists on Peru, although Peru’s lower levels of indigenous mobilization compared to the other Andean countries has tended to impede scholars of indigenous mobilization from selecting Peru as their primary case. Mexico has proven somewhat of an exception among states with relatively small indigenous minorities in terms of the volume of scholarly research that exists about its indigenous populations. Mexican and American Anthropologists have published extensively about indigenous Mexicans. Copious anthropological studies address the indigenous population of Chiapas, Mexico. Mexican Anthropologists have studied their country’s indigenous regions including those in Chiapas extensively, and American anthropologists, dating back to the Harvard Chiapas Project of the 1950s, made Chiapas, Mexico a base of research. See Jan Rus (2004) for an excellent summary of ethnographic research about the Tzotzil Maya of Chiapas Mexico.
6 Another school of research concerns issues of group rights and international law. I do not include works from this school in the literature review because they examine indigenous movements’ relationships to transnational organizations rather than to states.
7 For example, see Donna Lee Van Cott (Van Cott 2001, 2002) or Willem Assies (Assies 1998)
8 See for example, Rice and Van Cott 2006, and Madrid 2005a; 2005c.
9 See Birnir 2004.
10 See Víctor Naguil, in Azkintuwe, August-September 2005.
11 See Yashar 2005 for her most complete test of her theory. In her 1998 and 1999
articles she limits her tests of her theory to states with large indigenous populations with the exception of Mexico, which has the largest absolute indigenous population in Latin America, but in which only about 15 percent of the total national population identify as indigenous (See Mattiace 2003 for a discussion on the problems with estimating Mexico’s indigenous population). By Yashar’s figures, Mexico has an indigenous population of 12.4 percent. Her other cases have sizably larger populations: Guatemala, 60.3 percent; Bolivia, 71.2 percent; Peru, 38.6 percent; and Ecuador, 37.5 percent (Yashar 1998; 1999). Yashar arguably misinterprets the degree of state penetration of indigenous communities in the Mexican case (see Rus 1994 for a counter example dealing with Chiapas). By limiting her testing primarily to the Andes and Guatemala, Yashar never adequately copes with how regional variations in state formation and politics as well as the differing relative sizes of different states’ indigenous populations influence the emergence of indigenous movements. In her 2005 book, although she still makes a general argument for all of Latin America, Yashar concentrates her discussion of the relevance of her theory to indigenous mobilization in the Andean countries of Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru for which it holds a good deal of explanatory power.


13 For an explanation of path dependence see Pierson 2000 and Thelen 1999.


15 I thank Alan Knight for succinctly spelling out this insight in his 1994 essay “Weapons and Arches in the Mexican Revolutionary Landscape.”

16 For information on the impact of PRI patronage programs in Oaxaca and Chiapas see Stephen 2002.

17 See Harvey 1998 for an extended description of campesino organizing in Chiapas prior to the Zapatista uprising.

18 See Rosalva Aída Hernández Castillo 2006 for a provocative analysis of why the Zapatistas have rejected the possibility of an electoral alliance with the PRD.

19 The lower figure counts Chamulans who personally experienced violent expulsions. The higher figure counts all expatriates. The actual figure is probably somewhere between 15,000 and 25,000 individuals. Although the higher estimate of 30,000 may be valid if most expatriates were displaced due to political tensions (Rus 2005).


21 I read all of the comunicados of these types archived on the Zapatista-affiliated website: http://palabra.ezln.org.mx.
Such expulsions occurred in Zapatista communities as well as in highland communities that opposed the Zapatistas.

See CCRI-CG, 10 April 1994a; 10 April 1994b; 10 April 1995; 10 April 1996; Marcos and el CCRI-CG, 10 April 1999.

See Marcos for el CCRI-CG 10 April 1997.

The Zapatistas called for the following in their March 1, 1994 demands: democracy; recognition as belligerent force; autonomous regional and municipal self-government; that funds gained from Chiapas’ petroleum reserves be used to improve the state; a major revision of NAFTA; The restoration of Article 27 or the Mexican Constitution and provisions for improving land gained through land reform, including access to transport and water; just prices for agricultural products, and state aid to improve the land; hospitals and health care; access to electric light, clean water, other services and appliances; free schooling; indigenous languages recognized as official and used in schools; respect for indigenous rights and dignity; indigenous communities allowed to govern themselves with autonomy, free from the power of national or external groups; the right for indigenous communities to follow their usos y costumbres without corrupt government interference; just salaries for workers; just prices for agricultural goods; debt annulment; free food for children under 14 and fair prices and transport to help end hunger and malnutrition; the government to free all political prisoners; the army and government not to enter communities to harm or intimidate them, and compensation for civilian property that the government bombed and aid to widows and orphans, to be able to live in peace and dignity; to allow legal unarmed protests in Chiapas by modifying the penal code; to stop expulsions from indigenous communities and allow people to return and pay them for lost property; women’s petition: gynecologists, day care, government-supplied food for children, tortilla stores, projects to create bakeries, projects concerning farm animals and veterinary aid, artisan centers with fair prices for crafts, schools for women, preschools, better transportation and transportation to sell their goods; they call for Patrocinio González Garrido, Absalón Castellanos Domínguez and Elmer Setzer M. to be tried for their crimes in Chiapas; they call for independent human rights commissions and groups; they insist that the Comisión Nacional de Paz con Justicia y Dignidad be comprised primarily of people not associated with the government or political parties; they call for the aid for victims of the conflict to be given to the authentic representatives of their indigenous communities.

The Zapatistas defined civil society as all socially and politically active Mexicans who were not affiliated with any political party or members of the state bureaucracy. See:
See, for example, the Polity index.

See CCRI-CG, 10 June 1994b for the Zapatistas’ justification of their rejection of the agreement.

See Bengoa (2000) for an extensive account of Mapuche history and the series of treaties that established Mapuche independence from the Spanish.

2000 CASEN 4.4 percent; 1992 Census around 9.61 percent for the Mapuche population; (Richards 2004; Bengoa 1997).

The 1992 Census gave an estimate of around 50 percent while the 2000 Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómico Nacional CASEN estimated the 20 percent figure (Richards 2004).

Personal communication from Patricia Richards

In this discussion of the formation of the Centros Culturales Mapuches and Ad-Mapu, I rely heavily on Isode Reuque’s published testimony. Several problems exist from relying heavily on one activist’s memories of these events, and her biases and the effect of time on her ability to accurately recall events create potential problems with her account. Unfortunately, her testimony is the only readily available account of the early movement in the late 1970s and 1980s. Other unpublished testimonies or interviews with activists who participated in the Centros Culturales Mapuches and Ad-Mapu may exist, but I was unable to locate such materials. I lacked the ability to conduct interviews in Chile, during the research that when into writing this study, and am unable to balance Reuque’s testimony with that of other activists who do not share her particular views and biases. To further compound the problem, historians have yet to write a comprehensive history of the current wave of Mapuche mobilization. Because this account relies so heavily on Reuque’s testimony, it offers a necessarily partial and preliminary history of the movement.


See Comisión Nacional 500 Años de Resistencia Mapuche in Nütram, October 1989 for its position.

See Appendix.

In 2005, Lagos was able to pass a package of constitutional reforms that reduced the Senate to 38 members by removing the unelected Senators. The effects of this reform on Chilean politics and the Mapuche’s relations with the Chilean state are beyond the scope of this study which only covers events through 2005.

See Reuque (2002) for a dissenting view of the reasons behind Huenchulaf’s dismissal.
For example, Marimán criticizes Isolde Reuque for claiming that urban, university educated Mapuche individuals tend to acquire “colonized mentalities” in her 2002 book (Marimán, Azkintuwe, March 2004). Although Reuque does exhibit a streak of dislike towards some members of the Mapuche movement and criticizes them for being more intellectuals than activists, Marimán’s criticism of her is somewhat misleading because despite her personal animosity towards some other members of the Mapuche movement, Reuque (2002) never claims that Mapuche identity depends on a person’s place of residence or occupation. Marimán’s criticism of the Consejo de Todas las Tierras for limiting Mapuche identity and goals to those of rural communities is more apt.
### APPENDIX: CHILEAN ELECTIONS

#### Chilean Presidential Elections:

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<th>Party</th>
<th>National Vote</th>
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Source: Loveman 2001

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Source: Loveman 2001

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Source: Loveman 2001

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<td>95654 24.23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patricio Aylwin</td>
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<td>3850571</td>
<td>55.17</td>
<td>186200 47.16</td>
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</table>

Sources: Gobierno de Chile, Ministerio Interior; http://www.elecciones.gov.cl; Tribunal Calificador de Elecciones—Chile  http://www.tribunalcalificador.cl/tipos-eleccion.php; winner in bold
### Chile: Presidential Elections 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Total Votes</th>
<th>Region IX</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manfred Max Neef</td>
<td>Ecologista</td>
<td>387102</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>14516</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eugenio Pizarro Poblete</td>
<td>Movimiento de Izquierda Democrática Allendista</td>
<td>327402</td>
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<td>7815</td>
<td>1.97</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arturo Alessandri Besa</td>
<td>Unión por el Progreso (R)</td>
<td>1701324</td>
<td>24.41</td>
<td>120473</td>
<td>30.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>José Piñera Ecchéique</td>
<td>Independiente</td>
<td>430950</td>
<td>6.18</td>
<td>16335</td>
<td>4.12</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Sources: Gobierno de Chile, Ministerio Interior: http://www.elecciones.gov.cl; Tribunal Calificador de Elecciones—Chile http://www.tribunalcalificador.cl/tipos-eleccion.php; winner in bold, rightwing pact marked with an (R)

### Chile: Presidential Elections 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
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<th>Total Votes</th>
<th>Region IX</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>0.51</td>
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<td>Sara María Larraín Ruiz-Tagle</td>
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<td>31319</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>2151</td>
<td>0.54</td>
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<td>Gladys Marvin Millie</td>
<td>Partido Comunista</td>
<td>225224</td>
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<td>1.67</td>
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<td>Alianza por Chile (R)</td>
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<td>225279</td>
<td>56.44</td>
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Sources: Gobierno de Chile, Ministerio Interior: http://www.elecciones.gov.cl; Tribunal Calificador de Elecciones—Chile http://www.tribunalcalificador.cl/tipos-eleccion.php; rightwing pact marked with an (R)

### Chile: Presidential Elections 1999 Runoff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Total Votes</th>
<th>Region IX</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ricardo Lagos Escobar</td>
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<td>51.31</td>
<td>177776</td>
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<td>Joaquin Lavin Infante</td>
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<td>3495569</td>
<td>48.68</td>
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<td>57.03</td>
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</table>

Sources: Gobierno de Chile, Ministerio Interior: http://www.elecciones.gov.cl; Tribunal Calificador de Elecciones—Chile http://www.tribunalcalificador.cl/tipos-eleccion.php; winner in bold, rightwing pact marked with an (R)
Chilean Congressional Elections Since the Return to Democracy\(^1\)

### Chile: 1989 Cámara de Diputados

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>National Vote</th>
<th>% National Vote</th>
<th>Number of Deputies</th>
<th>% Deputies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concertación por la Democracia</td>
<td>3499713</td>
<td>51.49</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>57.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracia y Progreso (R)</td>
<td>2323581</td>
<td>34.18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>40.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unidad para la Democracia</td>
<td>360601</td>
<td>5.31</td>
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<td>1.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independientes (outside the pact)</td>
<td>127941</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [http://www.elecciones.gov.cl](http://www.elecciones.gov.cl)

Notes: Only includes parties that received seats in the Chamber, rightwing pact marked with an (R), the Concertación is in bold

### Chile: 1989 Senado de la República

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Senators</th>
<th>% Senators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concertación por la Democracia</td>
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<td>46.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracia y Progreso (R)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>34.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designated Senators: Armed Forces</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designated Senators: Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [http://www.elecciones.gov.cl](http://www.elecciones.gov.cl)

Notes: Only includes parties that received seats in the Senate, rightwing pact marked with an (R), the Concertación is in bold

### Chile: 1993 Cámara de Diputados

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>National Vote</th>
<th>% National Vote</th>
<th>Number of Deputies</th>
<th>% Deputies</th>
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<tr>
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<td>41.67</td>
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</table>

Source: [http://www.elecciones.gov.cl](http://www.elecciones.gov.cl)

Notes: Only includes parties that received seats in the Chamber, rightwing pact marked with an (R), the Concertación is in bold

---

\(^1\) Please note that within the Chilean Congress, the rightwing pact of parties took on an evolving variety of names from 1989 to 2005. Beginning as *Democracia y Progreso* in 1989 it took the names *Unión por el Progreso de Chile*, *Unión por Chile*, and *Alianza por Chile* in subsequent Congressional elections.
### Chile: 1993 Senado de la República

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Senators</th>
<th>% Senators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concertación por la Democracia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracia y Progreso (R)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designated Senators: Armed Forces</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designated Senators: Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [http://www.elecciones.gov.cl](http://www.elecciones.gov.cl)
Notes: Only includes parties that received seats in the Senate, rightwing pact marked with an (R), the Concertación is in bold

### Chile: 1997 Cámara de Diputados

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>National Vote</th>
<th>% National Vote</th>
<th>Number of Deputies</th>
<th>% Deputies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concertación por la Democracia</td>
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<td>57.50</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Chile 2000</td>
<td>123922</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

Source: [http://www.elecciones.gov.cl](http://www.elecciones.gov.cl)
Notes: Only includes parties that received seats in the Chamber, rightwing pact marked with an (R), the Concertación is in bold

### Chile: 1997 Senado de la República

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Senators</th>
<th>% Senators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concertación por la Democracia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Designated Senators: Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>Designated Senators: Former Presidents Pinochet (1998 onward)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: [http://www.elecciones.gov.cl](http://www.elecciones.gov.cl)
Notes: Only includes parties that received seats in the Senate, rightwing pact marked with an (R), the Concertación is in bold
### Chile: 2001 Cámara de Diputados

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>National Vote</th>
<th>% National Vote</th>
<th>Number of Deputies</th>
<th>% Deputies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concertación por la Democracia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alianza por Chile (R)</td>
<td>2720195</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>47.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independientes (outside the pact)</td>
<td>86964</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.83</td>
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</table>

Source: [http://www.elecciones.gov.cl](http://www.elecciones.gov.cl)
Notes: Only includes parties that received seats in the Chamber, rightwing pact marked with an (R), the Concertación is in bold

### Chile: 2001 Senado de la República

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Senators</th>
<th>% Senators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concertación por la Democracia</td>
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<td>36.73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Designated Senators: Armed Forces</td>
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<td>8.16</td>
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<td>Designated Senators: Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Designated Senators: Former Presidents</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pinochet (1998 onward)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frei (2000 onward)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [http://www.elecciones.gov.cl](http://www.elecciones.gov.cl)
Notes: Only includes parties that received seats in the Senate, rightwing pact marked with an (R), the Concertación is in bold
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