GENDER, NATION, AND TRANSNATIONALISM: REPRESENTATIONS OF CUBA IN U.S. NEWSMAGAZINES (TIME AND NEWSWEEK 1959 – 2010)

By

JAMIE LYNN PALMER

(Under the Direction of David Smilde.)

ABSTRACT

This investigation explores how nations are portrayed within the limitations of an international community. Faced with an ever-shrinking world, media in the United States address international political problems through proposals of how to deal with nations and their leaders. Due to theoretical arguments of nations as constructed through differentiating themselves from ideological "others," arguments that nations are embedded within transnational cultural, ideological, and economic structures, and evidence that gender is tied to both, this analysis explores how these phenomena are related through representations of Cuba in United States media. Using all available articles on Cuba in Time and Newsweek from January 1959 - May 2010, the author finds that there are six main themes including (1) *Masculinity/Reason* (United States), (2) *Ineffective Masculinity* (Cuba) (3) *Complicit Femininity* (United States), (4) *Failed Femininity* (Cuba), (5) *International Relations and Nations as Masculine Spaces* (Transnational), and (6) *Proximally Similar Men and Women* (Transnational) for how representations of gender operate in relation to nation and transnational structures. These themes may work to both promote or maintain ideological boundaries or bridge these boundaries.

INDEX WORDS: Transnationalism, Nation, Gender, Masculinity, Femininity, Cuba, International Politics, Representations, United States, Ethnic Politics

GENDER, NATION, AND TRANSNATIONALISM: REPRESENTATIONS OF CUBA IN U.S. NEWSMAGAZINES (TIME AND NEWSWEEK 1959 – 2010)

by

JAMIE LYNN PALMER
BA, Indiana University, 2008

GENDER, NATION, AND TRANSNATIONALISM: REPRESENTATIONS OF CUBA IN U.S. NEWSMAGAZINES (TIME AND NEWSWEEK 1959 – 2010)
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF SOCIOLOGY

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2011

GENDER, NATION, AND TRANSNATIONALISM: REPRESENTATIONS OF CUBA IN U.S. NEWSMAGAZINES (TIME AND NEWSWEEK 1959 – 2010)

by

JAMIE LYNN PALMER

Major Professor:	David Smilde
Committee:	Patricia Richards
	James J. Dowd

Electronic Version Approved:

Maureen Grasso
Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
MAY 2011

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the sociology department at the University of Georgia for their support and feedback in the Master's program. Specifically, I would like to recognize Dr. David Smilde, Dr. Patricia Richards, and Dr. James J. Dowd for all of their feedback and guidance in the development of this project. I would also like to thank Dr. Arlene Diaz and Dr. Brian Powell for supporting me in my pursuits of studying nationhood, Cuba, and United States and Cuban relations as an undergraduate, which helped to lead me to this research. In addition, I would like to recognize all of my friends and family who supported my academic pursuits and helped me through the data collection and coding processes.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS....iv
SECTIONS
1 INTRODUCTION....6
2 CASE: REPRESENTATIONS OF CUBA IN THE U.S. MEDIA....8
3 GENDER, NATION, AND TRANSNATIONALISM....11
4 MEDIA....18
5 METHOD AND SAMPLE....20
6 FINDINGS....26
Gender Representations: Boundaries between Cuba and the U.S. 26
Masculinity-Reason Versus Ineffective Masculinity....29
Complicit Femininity Versus Failed-Femininity....44
Transnational Links Between the U.S. and Cuba....51
Nations/International Relations as Male Spaces....51
Proximally Similar Men (and Women) 53
7 CONCLUSION....60
REFERENCES....66
APPENDICES
A American Newsmagazines Cited....68

SECTION 1

Introduction

"Nation and universal are as contradictory as synonymous" (Alexander 2005). In other words, as political theorist Michael Mosher asks " is there a successful way of reconciling the boundary transgressing character of [globalization] with the boundary maintaining activities of the nation-state?"(Guillén 2001). While many theorists agree that nations are "imagined communities" that maintain their influence and consolidated identity through "othering," there is considerable debate on whether transnationalism, or the linkages between or beyond nation-states, undermine nations (Alexander 2005; Anderson 1991; Enloe 2007; Guillén 2001; GuillÈn 2001; Said 1979). Geertz argues that as the world grows "both more global and more divided, more thoroughly interconnected and more intricately portioned at the same time…whatever it is that defines identity…the order of difference must be somehow maintained" (Geertz 1998). While interest and criticism emerges about the concept of a 'global,' or transnational culture, questions about transnational structures of beliefs, ideology, and values are proposed as means to bridge the micro-macro gaps between, for example, nations and the world-system. In addition, Guillén argues that there is a "great need of further work to clarify the economic, political, cultural, and aesthetic dimensions of globalization" and what consequences it may have on social inequality (Guillén 2001). While previous literature on transnationalism has focused on markets, economy, political structures, consumerism, and even imperialism, very few have analyzed the role of "othering" in both national and transnational imagined communities. Proposals of a transnational, or a global community or culture, like nation must also be at least partially imagined, since most people cannot interact with a world community, or global civil

society, directly (Anderson 1991). These combined literatures result in questions of how nations can be constructed through "othering," or boundary construction, while simultaneously operating within a transnational community of global linkages.

While analyzing portrayals of "imagined" communities is only one means to understand the ways in which the concepts of nations operate in a global sphere of international politics, trade, governments, and ideological structures, it is one important means and an arguably new method, as opposed to the predominate economic, political, or market means, for disentangling these relationships. Drawing from Anderson (1991) and Mayer (2000) who argue that media is a main means in which people realize national and global imaginings, I use newsmagazines to analyze portrayals of Cuba in the United States. I argue that Cuba is a central case for understanding one means of how the concept of nation based on "othering" is constructed and reconstructed through media descriptions and images. The historical and political relationship between the United States and Cuba provides evidence to defend Cuba as one possible ideological other. Within this case, my data supports scholarship illustrating that gender is not only central to the concept of nationhood and understanding transnational linkages but also to representations of Cuba in the United States.

SECTION 2

Case: Representations of Cuba in The United States Media

Several factors make representations of Cuba, as a nation, within the United States an interesting case. First, the United States Government has maintained a unique and harsh political relationship with Cuba for over fifty years. Since the 1960 economic embargo of Cuba by the United States there has been additional legislation passed which has worked to maintain the divisive political and legal relationship including The Torcelli Act of 1992, The Cuban Liberty and Helms-Burton Law (Democracy Act of 1996), and even The Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba organized in 2003 and reconvened in 2005 (Eckstein 2003). Therefore, even though the political, economic, and other perceived threats of Cuba during the Cold War Era have nearly completely dissipated, the official policies of the United States towards Cuba may have become even more restrictive (Eckstein 2003; Pérez 2005). These restrictions on travel, trade, and other exchanges between the two nations and their communities means that while there are numerous interest groups and agendas for maintaining a divisive stance with Cuba, still much of what the United States public knows about Cuba is "imagined" (Anderson 1991).

Second, theorists on post-colonialism argue that one of the main ways that nations are constructed and maintained is through differentiation from an ideological "other" nation, or even adversary (Said 1979). While Said (1979) focuses on the production and maintenance of imperialism and Enloe (1989) focuses on the production and maintenance of nationalism, imperialism, and sexism, they both link these phenomena to a progression of colonial historical relations. The historical colonial relationship between Cuba and the United States clearly has

influenced Cuba's position as an ideological "other" as well as its current political relationship with the United States. There is a clear history of attempts by the United States government to control Cuba, or at minimum the nation's sovereignty, through events such as the Spanish American War, Treaty of Paris, and the Platt Amendment, which gave the United States the right to intervene for the maintenance of "a stable republican government which the United States will assist in maintaining against foreign aggression or domestic disorder…[because] We [the U.S. government] cannot tolerate a condition in which life and property shall be insecure" (Pérez 2005). In addition, Cuba's political connections to the Soviet Union and Cuban Missile crisis make Cuba a more than adequate case as an ideological "other," or even adversary, to the United States during the Cold War Era (Said 1979).

Viewing Cuba as a political or ideological adversary contemporarily maybe less clear; however Lorde (1997) argues that in contemporary American society the "other" group tends to include "black and Third world people, working-class people, older people, and women" in addition to those with different religious, economic, and/or political ideals (Lorde 1997). Images of Cuba as a nation made up of poor black and "third world" people have proliferated the United States since the 1930s World's Fair and facilitated a narrative in the United States of Cuba's "inferiority and dependency" (Pérez 2005) The Commission for a Free Cuba press release in 2006 helps to illuminate how this narrative may still be important to representations of Cuba:

> "Today, we see in Cuba a more active civil society, one energized by a growing sense of what is possible. At the same time, there are clear signs the regime is using money provided by the Chavez government in Venezuela to reactivate its networks in the hemisphere to subvert democratic governments. The Castro regime's international meddling is done at the expense of the needs of the Cuban people. There is a growing sense of frustration among ordinary Cubans with a dictatorship that asks them to sacrifice, but expends considerable resources in the far flung reaches of the hemisphere and beyond…this [United States Commission for a Free Cuba] highlights the urgency of working today to ensure that the Cuban transition is genuine and that the Castro regime's succession strategy does not succeed" (Rice 2006).

The unique political, economic, and legal relationship that has and continues to endure between Cuba and the United States makes Cuba a unique and important case for understanding how American nationalism is portrayed, what ideological nation-state boundaries are constructed, what ideological nation-state boundaries are breached, how these opposing conceptions of nation may have helped to maintain this unique political relationship between the nations of the United States and Cuba, as well as contribute to a better understanding of international relations and policies more generally (Pei 2003).

SECTION 3

Gender, Nation, and Transnationalism

While many theorists of nation have focused on the role of ethnicity, until recently "the literature on nationalism has been gender blind" (Mayer 2000).

Mayer states:

> The nation is comprised of sexed subjects whose 'performativity' constructs not only their own gender identity but the identity of the entire nation as well. Through repetition of accepted norms and behaviors – control over reproduction, militarism and heroism, and heterosexuality – members help to construct the privileged nation; equally the repetitive performance of these acts in the name of the nation helps to construct gender and sexuality. Moreover, because nation, gender and sexuality are all constructed in opposition, or at least in relation to, an (O)ther, they are all part of culturally constructed hierarchies, and all of them involve power. One nation, one gender and one particular sexuality is always favored by the social, political and cultural institutions which it helps to construct and which it benefits from – thus each seeks to occupy the most favored position in their hierarchy (of nation, gender, and sexuality); each tries to achieve hegemony; and each in the process becomes a contested territory, even the arena of battle among nations, genders, and sexualities (2000, p. 5).

Thus, according to many gender and feminist scholars, gender is seen as an essential aspect to the construction of a nation. For instance, Enloe argues that nation has typically "sprung from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation, and masculinized hope" (Enloe 2007). In response to Anderson's imagined community, Chatterjee asked "whose imagined community?" (Balakrishnan 1996). Other researchers have illustrated that the nation is a gendered construct where "men and women have different relationships with the nation in terms of what is expected of them and as regards perceptions of their roles and status"(Elsadda 2007). Many sustain that women have been allocated a marginal position in the national imaginary, because the national narrative is dominated by "hegemonic masculinity," which R. W. Connell states is "always constructed in relation to various subordinated masculinities as well as in relation to women (Connell 1994; Yuval-Davis 1993). Even though masculine identities are so closely intertwined

with that of national imaginaries that men tend to become the personalized image of the nation, Said has shown that colonizing men use women/womanhood to delegitimize, discredit and disempower colonized men and therefore delegitimize, discredit, and disempower their nation (Balakrishnan 1996; Enloe 2007; Said 1979). In sum, most theorists present that despite national boundaries, there is a transnational structure of gender hegemony that supports masculine superiority, or at least naturalizes male domination of politics and international relations (Grant and Newland 1991). While the literatures on gender and nation illustrate that hegemonic masculinity is inevitably tied to nation and in contrast to ideological others whom are women or men, how does the transnational hegemonic structure of masculinity operate while masculinity is simultaneously ranked and differentiated among nations? How do women's roles work in relation to men's, to nation, and to transnational structures of gender hegemony?

Gender scholarship has developed theoretical ways to capture the multiple and overlaying gender hierarchies while simultaneously recognizing their ties to nationality, ethnicity, and/or race. Some have illustrated that there is a transnational gender hegemony that operates through masculinities and femininities which places men's dominance over women at the center and allows for multiple configurations of femininity and masculinity across groups and settings (Connell 1994). Many scholars point out that hegemonic masculinities are conflated with whiteness and middle class status whereas subordinate, or marginalized masculinities are often conflated with femininity or subordinate classes or racial/ethnic groups(Connell 1994; Enloe 2000; Lorde 1997; Said 1979). Schippers puts forth that women are symbolically paired with a complimentary and an inferior quality of femininity in which includes "physical vulnerability, an inability to use violence effectively, and compliance" (Schippers 2007). While Schippers and Connell recognize there are differences in the hierarchies of femininities and masculinities, they

also reaffirm that "masculinity must always remain superior" (96). As such, some theorists state that subordinate or marginalized masculinities are "simply hegemonic femininity embodied by men" (Connell 1994). Other scholars offer a different perspective in that "what actual characteristics and practices are idealized as masculine and feminine are an empirical question" and vary (Schippers 2007). Evidence shows that race and class differences in gender performance can be one means for providing a rationale for placing upper and middle class white men and women in higher status through rendering the gender performances of others as illegitimate (Lorde 1997; McClintock 1997; Said 1979). In addition, researching masculinities and femininities in recognition with their intersections with nationality, ethnicity/race, and class can better capture gender hegemony in local, regional, and global relations.

Definitions of masculinity and femininity that are projected as transnational include hegemonic masculinity, or that "there is no femininity that holds among women the position held by hegemonic masculinity among men" (Connell 1994). Many gender theorists state that national defense whether military or political has been equated with maleness (Connell 1994; Yuval-Davis 1997). On the other hand, femaleness is seen as associated with the need for male protection and fulfilling a contributive role (Grant and Newland 1991; Yuval-Davis 1997). Enloe illustrates that despite the particular nation women are often portrayed as "the nation's most valuable *possessions*; the principal *vehicles* for transmitting the whole nation's values from one generation to the next; *bearers* of the community's future generations – crudely nationalist wombs; the members of the community most *vulnerable* to defilement and exploitation of oppressive alien rulers; and the most susceptible to *assimilation* and cooptation by insidious outsiders" (Enloe 2000). As such, femininity in terms of its ties to nation tend to portray the role of women as the embodiment of national tradition making them often appear "inert, backward-

looking, and natural," while masculinity is tied to nation through the embodiment of progress and modernity. In international relations there is often a particular construction of masculinity, promoted that focuses on the "rational, archetypal human being" who embodies reason and understanding (Grant and Newland 1991). For instance, Enloe goes as far as to point out that "ideas of masculinity have to be perpetuated to justify foreign-policy risk-taking…the national political arena is dominated by men but allows women some select access; the international political arena is a sphere for men only, or for those rare women who can successfully play at being men, or at least not shake masculine assumptions" (Enloe 2000). In addition, many others paint the picture of a patriarchal world where 'real men' are protectors of women and children and where women, often depicted as 'self-sacrificing' mothers are grateful and expectant to their male counterparts (Enloe 2000). Therefore, if masculine hegemony is equated with men's space in politics and as domestic and international protectors, and feminine hegemony is based on motherhood and support of their male counterparts, then how does gender operate as a foundational basis of "othering" among nations as so many scholars argue? (Chatterjee 1993; Enloe 2000; Grant and Newland 1991; Said 1979).

Postcolonial and feminist scholars have worked to capture the complexity of gender hierarchies including how the work to construct national ideological "others" through the intersections of race, class, and gender operates. While Connell emphasized femininity as the dominant femininity where women are portrayed as contributive if not accommodating to the interests and desires of men, often reifying the subordinate position, Schippers offers a deviant or "other" femininity termed pariah femininity, which is seen as contaminating to the relationship between masculinity and femininity (Connell 1994; Schippers 2007). These portrayals are seen as contaminating to social life usually termed by the undesirability of their sexual agency, ability

or willingness to use physical violence, and a marginality that makes their actions less threatening. In contrast, Schippers argues that while there are not pariah masculinities, because ineffective masculinities are masked as decidedly feminine, she borrows the term masculinity insurance, from Eric Anderson, to illustrate how sport, or men as superior athletes, is equally central for overcompensating for masculine deficiencies without threatening the gender hegemony.

In addition, other scholars offer that the Western discourse constructs ideological "others" through race and class differences in gender performance, illustrating that race/ethnicity, class, nationality and gender are inevitably intertwined. One of the means in which these concepts are intertwined is through the role of colonialism. Both Said and Enloe illustrate how colonial portrayals of men's over or under masculine traits were juxtaposed to that of the colonizer in order to justify colonial policies and even imperialism (Enloe 2000; Said 1979). The higher order masculinity they argue was based on "protection of the respectable lady," as well as distance, instrumental engagement, rationality, and independence (Enloe 2000; Molloy 1995). The lower order masculinity is tied to notions of being not manly enough to protect or revere women or too manly in that they are motivated by emotions or ideologies (barbarism and irrationality) over reason (Chatterjee 1993; Enloe 2000).

Similarly Chatterjee illustrates a similar distinction between femininities used in colonization termed the "New Woman" and the "Common Woman." She illustrates that the "Common Woman" is depicted as "course, vulgar, loud, quarrelsome, devoid of superior moral sense, sexually promiscuous, [and] subject to brutal physical oppression by males" (Chatterjee 1993) In contrast, the "New Woman" is described as orderly, thrift, clean, responsible, literate, able to manage the household in spite of physical or economical constraints, and marked by her

consumption in style, eating habits, social demeanor, and religiosity. The "New Woman" is ascribed the roles of mother/sister/wife/daughter, where the highlighted qualities are self-sacrifice, benevolence, and devotion are displayed, differentiating themselves from the worker, sex object, and/or irreligious "common woman" (Chatterjee 1993). While Said, Enloe, and Chatterjee clearly illustrate that portrayals or descriptions of gendered "others," or those that don't meet masculine or feminine norms, have provided colonizers (such as Britain and the United States) support for controlling, managing, punishing, or even undermining other nations (Bengal, India, and the nations of the Banana Republic), many other scholars have shown that it is also at the heart of international politics(Chatterjee 1993; Grewal and Kaplan 1994; Said 1979). Thus, the ways in which gender and nation intersect clearly may have implications for international relations, but questions regarding how gendered portrayals have supported specific relations to Cuba are less clear.

Previous research on the portrayals of men and women in Latin America have illustrated the ways in which gendered portrayals of these people have been characterized by "inferiority." One example is the historical portrayal of Cubans as the "white man's burden," in which Cuba is usually depicted as a small black child that Uncle Sam is caring for whether politically, economically, and/or ideologically (Pérez 2005). In addition to these images, ideas and narratives that Cuban men are "macho," or participate in hyper masculine activities of drinking, smoking, violence, and often infidelities, has been noted amongst scholars as a term or portrayal that has been used to describe the masculinity of many latino men(Fox 1973). In addition to the issue of "macho," or machismo, latino men have also been portrayed as bandits, or violent deviants that are characterized by their physical prowess, daring character, and/or shamelessnes (Fox 1973). Many theorists illustrate the tension in gender portrayals, because they argue that in

many societies the actions or relations that men have with women are a major means in confirming or undermining masculinity. As such, portrayals of Cuban women as "banditas," or armed revolutionaries, is not illustrated as a means to recognize women's achievements or increased recognition for which Cuba's record post-1959 has been impressive in comparison to many other nations, but instead is used as a means of representing enhanced danger or threats (Enloe 2000; Fox 1973; Luciak 2007). The need or use of women as armed revolutionaries or military personnel is seen as working to undermine the abilities of men to perform these, or their, duties as men. In addition to the issue of "banditas," women working in tourism and noted for their "sexiness" is also a means to undermine the ability of men to protect women from "work" and facilitate their maintenance of "sexual purity" (Abbassi 2002; Fox 1973). Therefore, how these portrayals and possibly others work to contrast Cuba to the United States in terms of ideological nations as well as provide linkages between the two nations for understanding or recognizing transnational people or communities is still an open question.

Table 1: Theoretical Relationships between the concepts of the Nation, Transnational, and Gender

Concepts	***Definitions and Examples***
Nation	
Emphasis: Boundaries	Generally made though "othering," or drawing lines of difference Connected to a unique history, culture, religion, language, family, politics, gender, and race/ethnicity
Transnational	
Emphasis: Linkages	Global culture; global civil order; or a global structure Examples: Human Rights Discourse; Colonialism; Capitalism; Consumerism; Transnational Communities
Gender	
Emphasis: Ties to both	
Transnational	Gender hegemony or the subordination of women on an international scale Examples: Men as leaders of nations and states
National	Differences drawn between subordinate, or "pariah" femininities and masculinities

SECTION 4

Media

American newsmagazines, including Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report, have devoted substantial attention to national and global affairs. Since the nation is a largely abstract collectivity that cannot be photographed, interviewed, or interacted with directly, the mass media has taken on a critical role in its promotion including how it is represented, constructed, and imagined (Couldry 2003; Frosh and Wolfsfeld 2007). The media puts together the components of nations' civil society to "provide individuals with a version of what their societies look like as a whole, imparting a seemingly natural sense of how society is and how one is located within it" (Couldry 2003; Frosh and Wolfsfeld 2007; Smith 1996). Even though the media is only one means among many of promoting social discourse, it is argued as possibly the predominant means for the public to understand social conflicts and interests more generally, especially in terms of world and international relations.

While most media scholars argue that media attention is not reflective either in prevalence or impact of the actual severity of a social problem, most do emphasize that media concerns are reflective of wider social issues (Ferrer 1999). Thus, representations of nation, and national identities, in the media are significant sources of information that help individuals locate themselves within a global, national, and local context (Couldry 2003). These portrayals of national community simultaneously reflect and illustrate cultural values and norms about the society in which we live and the world beyond our immediate communities (Couldry 2003). Since social reality is constructed through inter-subjective processes by which meanings are produced and reproduced, how nations are portrayed through linkages of similarity and/or

difference are critical to understanding our social reality (Weninger and Williams 2005). The role of the media in understanding and recreating the social world of nation is particularly important because the processes through which the meanings of social reality are produced and reproduced include face to face interaction with others and institutions as well as interaction mediated through cultural objects[1]. Therefore, even if cultural objects produced by the media reflect the current social world, their frames, which diagnose a problem and assignment of blame, propose solutions, strategies and tactics to address the problem, and provide a motivation for political action, may be at least partially responsible for the reproduction of this social world (Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, and Benford 1986).

[1] This article uses the definition of cultural object as defined by Griswold (1994).

SECTION 5

Method and Sample

Using a textual analysis of a sample of 793 articles and covers on Cuba, the analysis focuses on grounded theory, or an open coding scheme, that allows for the full range of themes to emerge. The sample includes representations of Cuba in the United States from January 1959 to May 2010 in Time magazine and Newsweek. The study focuses on magazines, and more specifically Time and Newsweek, for the following reasons: (1) among all media genres magazines are possibly the most central to the production of national social imaginaries, or the social totality and individuals' relationship with it, because it reports events of key interest to the society as a society; (2) Time and Newsweek are the only flagship magazines that span the whole time period from 1959 to 2010; (3) Time and Newsweek have the status of flagship news magazines meaning that they have the highest readership, generally over four million readers every week independently, and are often held up as quintessentially American news magazines (Seelye)[2]. My sampling frame for articles on Cuba in Time and Newsweek came from The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature Retrospective (1890 to 1982) and The Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature (1983 to Present), which is a reference guide to recently published articles in periodical magazines and scholarly journals, organized by subject.

This analysis focuses on how nations and international relations are portrayed through cultural objects. Cultural objects, which are defined by Griswold's 'shared significance embodied in form,' are located within a larger system of relationships called the 'cultural diamond' (Griswold 1987). The cultural diamond portrays a complex relationship among the

social world, producers, culture objects, and receivers in producing culture (Griswold 1987). While this analysis focuses on cultural objects, the consideration of frames which propose a solution (usually as a course of action to take as a nation), recognition of Time and Newsweek as media institutions, acknowledgement of the goals of journalists, and evidence of steady circulation, offer support that these cultural objects are not only more than a mere reflection of society.

First, Herman and Chomsky (1988) argue that the intensification of conglomerations has resulted in relatively few corporations owning, producing, and distributing what is read and seen in most news, and that these conglomerations restrict the number of discourses, texts, and ideologies presented to a mass audience. Time and Newsweek are no exception to this phenomena with Newsweek acquired and owned by The Washington Post (as of 1954) and Time gaining significant media power with the acquisition of the Home Box Office and Warner Communications (Prendergast and Colvin 1986). These acquisitions have produced a consolidation of news sources including journalists, news beats, and correspondents (Herman and Chomsky 1988).

Second, most journalists historically and currently are trained to work as mediators between the public and policy makers (Lippmann 2008). Their work is seen as pertinent in facilitating a successful democracy, especially as a means to provide adequate information to the public to make voting and other civic choices. As such journalists are viewed as needing to operate freely while simultaneously fulfilling the self-governing principles of a primary obligation to truth, a primary loyalty to citizens, a duty to verification (especially of facts and sources), maintaining independence from those they cover, serving as an independent monitor to power, providing a forum for public criticism and compromise, striving to make news relevant

and interesting, maintaining proportional and comprehensive reporting, and the ability to exercise their own conscience (including the ability to assert an opinion or interpretation or correct a mistake) (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2003). Nevertheless, Lippmann and other scholars illustrate both institutional and ideological restrictions that journalists face including the push to put "truth" second to national interest especially in times of national *insecurity* (Lippmann 2008).



Third, despite institutional shifts, financial woes, and decreased revenues Time and Newsweek have an arguably steady status as quintessentially American and flagship news magazines; yet, their readership still does not capture all demographics equally. Time and

Newsweek have maintained their place among the top twenty-five leading magazines, for at minimum the past three decades, according to circulation statistics (Boyenton 2009). As such Time has had the relatively stable position as top in popularity and numerical readership for newsmagazines, while Newsweek has generally been recognized as the strong second, from 1959 to 2009 (Pew 2004).

In addition to circulation statistics, The Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism provides data regarding the general demographics of news magazine readers for Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report[3] (Pew 2004). In general, information on readership demographics of news magazines is rather limited; however, PEW illustrates that readership, from data on 1995 to 2003, tends to be male, middle-aged, and relatively affluent (Pew 2004). For instance, PEW reports that Time and Newsweek have approximately two million more male readers than female readers. In addition, they illustrate that the average age among readers of Time is approximately 43 and of Newsweek is approximately 44 (Pew 2004). Respectively, Newsweek and Time have average annual incomes of $66,739 and $65,697 (Pew 2004). Not only are these demographics on average more likely to vote, but also there is potential for these discourses and news stories to extend beyond the two newsmagazines due to the institutional structure of media, or conglomeration (Census.gov).

Even though the ways in which individuals receive these cultural objects is not the object of study, the contextualization of these cultural producers, amounts of circulation, and the historical mapping of changes in ideologies and discourses over time, help to illustrate the potential for a dialectical relationship between the ideologies and discourses of the cultural objects and larger society. Through the analysis of these cultural objects, this work aims to

[3] Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism includes data for demographic readership for TIME magazine, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report from 1995-2003 domestically.

address the questions of (1) how, or if, representations of Cuba and the United States are portrayed as distinct nations in opposition; (2) how, or if, the concepts/portrayals of nationhood between the United States and Cuba are bridged; (3) how the distinctions between Cuba and the United States as well as instances of bridging are mitigated by transnational people and spaces; and (4) how or if these discourses and ideologies shift or change over time.

Using textual analysis to focus on the underlying cultural assumptions or "preferred meanings…, the meanings that producers of media images and texts build into [the media] with the intention of shaping the messages derived by the audience," this work uses a grounded theoretical approach to provide an empirical basis for the means to locate hegemonic messages (Dworkin and Wachs 2004). After examining all 793 articles and covers on Cuba in Time and Newsweek from January 1959 to May 2010, as referenced in the Reader's Guide to Periodical Research, the final sample included 763 articles. Thirty of the articles were excluded from the analysis, because they only mentioned Cuba once, usually as a location[4]. Thus, my sampling frame required that the portion of the media text on Cuba be a minimum of one column or paragraph. The number of articles on published on Cuba in Time and Newsweek from 1959 to 2010 varied (see chart below).

From an open coding scheme, I coded these articles into several general categories: nation, international grouping, gender, race, class, leaders, violence, stance in international relations, and many more. In the process of analyzing these categories a full range of themes emerged which proscribed responses on how to deal with the problem of Cuba that was tied to depictions of ineffective leadership and/or the problems of women. After further analysis, six frames emerged for the main ways gender operates in representations of the United States and

[4] This usually occurred in discussing the housing of international criminals (especially during the War in Iraq) at Guantanamo.



Cuba including (1) *Masculinity-Reason* (United States), (2) *Ineffective-Masculinity* (Cuba), (3) *Complicit Femininity* (United States), (4) *Failed Femininity* (Cuba), (5) *Nations as Masculine Spaces* (Transnational-linkage), and (6) *Proximally Similar Men (and Women)* (Transnational-linkage). Some of these archetypes work to draw clear boundaries between the two nations and their people; however, some work to naturalize gender norms and roles on a larger scale bridging the boundaries of the two nations.

SECTION 6

Findings

Gender Representations: Boundaries Between Cuba and the United States

Depictions of gender can work to maintain ideological boundaries between the two nations. Representations of gender within the United States are based on particular definitions of feminity and masculinity, where masculinity is largely based on ideas of reason and femininity on emotion and family. *Masculinity-Reason* is the predominant frame for American men, which largely coincides with R.W. Connell's definition of hegemonic masculinity. It depicts men as natural leaders due to intelligence, charisma, and especially rationality(reason)(Connell 1994). The focus on rationality is portrayed as allowing men to be better at management, decision-making, and negotiations, because it prevents actions resulting from moments of heightened emotions allowing them to be better protectors of domestic and international threats. The articles depict this masculinity as the norm by which others are measured. *Complicit Women* is the predominant frame for American women in which women are depicted as experts on the family and morals. I termed this frame complicit women rather than using "emphasized femininity" from Connell, because while these women are portrayed as contributive to the interests and desires of men they are also featured in terms of the "New Woman"(Chatterjee 1993; Connell 1994) The "New Woman" described as orderly, thrift, clean, responsible, able to manage the household, and marked by her consumption in style eating habits, demeanor, and religiosity may be complicit in the support of her male counterpart (Chatterjee 1993). While they are rarely depicted as official leaders in any capacity, they are often seen as essential advisers to male

leaders whether officially or unofficially, especially as the means of reproduction of American values, morals, and future generations.

In contrast, portrayals of ideological gender differences work to not only essentialize differences between the two nations but also to clarify inadequacies of Cuba as a nation. While portrayals of masculinity for both nations are based on ideas of men as natural leaders, the effectiveness of this leadership is stifled through the framing of Cuban men through *Ineffective-masculinity*. While Schippers argues that there cannot be "pariah," or ineffective, masculinities, because the inadequacies in masculinity are termed feminine, my data offer that there is a subordinate masculinity that is not depicted in feminine terms. The *Ineffective-masculinity* frame depicts Cuban men as insufficient leaders due to their emphasis on violence and force. Depicted as often motivated by anger, rather than reason, they are portrayed as not effective at management, decision-making, or negotiations and as such not suitable protectors/providers of their nation. Over time, the *Ineffective-masculinity* changes from an intense focus on physicality and violence and mild focus on romantic dreams and ideologies (predominately communism or socialism) to an intense focus on the irrationality of holding on to an unrealistic dream and a more mild focus on physicality and violence. The *Ineffective-masculinity* of the Cuban man is illustrated as a reason for military action or negotiating with other nations or organizations in order to manage the problem of Cuba. Similarly, while femininity in Cuba still portrays women as responsible for upholding and reproducing the morals of the nation, and future leaders, the *failed-femininity* frame captures the breadth of representations of Cuban women as deficient in their roles as wives, mothers, contributors to their male counterparts, and producers of the nation. These representations change subtly over time from focusing of the Cuban street-working women, to the mothers who promote/condone violence, to the inability of these women to care

for the home due to poverty. The *failed-femininity* frame emphasizes how the deficiencies of reason by male leaders can hinder women's abilities to fulfill their gender obligations. Thus, both frames point to deficiencies in gender norms as a partial reason for the deficiencies of Cuba as a nation which in turn becomes a problem that requires the United States to intervene on the basis of preserving order, democracy, and security in the Western hemisphere.



Masculinity-Reason versus Ineffective-Masculinity

The *Masculinity-Reason* frame portrays America's leaders as diplomatic, controlled, eloquent, intelligent men who act on behalf of the United States as well as the freedom of all peoples globally. It positions American men as professionals, leaders, negotiators, and protectors not only of domestic issues of law and economics but also of international affairs. AS such, these men are often represented as middle to upper-middle class, professional, white men. These men are largely displayed as military, government or business professionals. As professional American men, they are depicted as forced to deal with the problem of Cuba, which is centered on Cuban leadership, including its support of communism and dictatorship, as a threat to American society and the Western hemisphere; yet, the response and/or solution to the problem of Cuba is portrayed as reasoned diplomacy even when force is necessary. The press uses these men as the backdrop, or the norm to which "others" are compared. While there is some minor variation, the portrayals of these American men remain rather stable.



Much like the images above of these American male professionals (an ambassador, a chief of navel operations, John F. Kennedy, and Dwight Eisenhower) are most often depicted in suits and ties with their official titles accompanying their headshot illustrating their prestige, authority and credentials. The article "Careerman to Havana" from January 26, 1959, that accompanies the left photo above, describes the goals of the U.S. and an American Ambassador to Cuba as "To touchy Cuba, the U.S. State Department last week prepared to rush one of its top careermen, Manhattan-born, Yale-educated, Philip Bonsal, 55... [to] represent the U.S. before a government making an erratic return to democracy and prone to blame all its troubles on Washington" ("The Hemisphere: Careerman to Havana," *Time,* January 26, 1959). Bonsal is described as a man who goes above the requirements of the job, "moved with ease among intellectuals and politicos in Colombia… [and] became a hero among Latin Americans as knowing the difference between dictators and democrats" ("The Hemisphere: Careerman to Havana," *Time,* January 26, 1959). The article accompanying the center image above of George W. Anderson and "The Showdown On Cuba," headlines this Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) as having "Unfaltering Competence and an Uncommon Flair." The accompanying text describes him as follows:

> "The plaque on his desk in the Pentagon's E-Ring reads FAST CHARGER. This was the radio call of the Admiral George W. Anderson Jr. when he was commander of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. It is also appropriate to the man who, as Chief of Naval Operations, holds responsibility for forging and operating the Cuba blockade for he is an aggressive blue-water sailor of unfaltering competence and uncommon flair" ("Nation: The Showdown," *Time*, November 2, 1962).

If Anderson's credentials, experience, and prestige are not enough to show that he can "get the job done" the description of his morale shows his leadership.

> "[The CNO] made his philosophy of command a day-to-day reality. As he explains it: 'One, get a good chief of staff. Two, keep a firm grasp of fundamentals. Three, leave details to the staff. Four, go for morale, which is of almost transcending importance. And next, don't bellyache and don't worry. Show confidence, because if you don't have confidence, certainly your subordinates won't'" ("Nation: The Showdown," *Time*, November 2, 1962).

Not only is Anderson a strong military and political leader, he is also an admirable leader in his moral judgment and conduct.

> His most famous bulletin to all hands was titled: #%&?*!¢. "Foul language," it began, "is not the sign of a man!" It went on to spell out "The Code of the Uncouth" under the head WHY I USE OBSCENE LANGUAGE. Sample sarcasms: "It PLEASES my mother so much. It is a fine mark of MANLINESS."At the same time, Anderson exhibited a human touch. If he heard that a man's wife was ailing, he sent her flowers. When an officer's wife was sent to the hospital, Anderson temporarily transferred the husband to shore duty near by, [because even though he saw the great value in America's power projected overseas, he also understood that]…it meant loneliness for families and wives" ("Nation: The Showdown," *Time*, November 2, 1962).

The descriptions of Bonsal and Anderson are not unique. Numerous other portrayals of American men coincide with pictures of them as career professionals and leaders. Yet divisions are drawn between the leadership styles of American leaders and Communist leaders including that of Cuba. Coinciding with the top right image of Kennedy and Eisenhower is the article illustrating the dilemma of how to maintain diplomacy and reason with those seen as unreasonable.

> President Kennedy came into office cherishing some naive notions about the possibilities of easing cold-war tensions through rational negotiation—and about the extent to which the shrewd tactics that had carried him so far in U.S. politics would serve him in trying to cope with Communism. "Let us never negotiate out of fear," Kennedy said in his inaugural address, "but let us never fear to negotiate." But what had sabotaged negotiations during the Eisenhower Administration was not fear of negotiation; it was the Communists' underlying hostility to the West, and relentless dedication to ultimate world domination. John F. Kennedy has spent his first 100 presidential days in learning such facts of cold war life. Instead of granting the six month lull that Kennedy had asked for, Nikita Khrushchev intensified the cold war, with guerrilla warfare in Laos, subversion in South Viet Nam, and increased arms shipments to Cuba-Propaganda Windfall. When the President tried to halt the Communist thrust in Laos by proposing a cease-fire and a neutral status, with official hints of a U.S. "response" if the Communists did not accept his plan, his countrymen gave him plaudits for his coolness and courage…the lessons of Cuba, in contrast, came with jolting swiftness. Again, Kennedy underestimated his adversary and overestimated the realism of his own expectations" ("Cuba: The Massacre," *Time,* April 28, 1961).

Despite the difficulties of making rational diplomatic decisions in international relations and politics due to the adversaries Kennedy faces, his coolness and courage are revered by other "countrymen," illustrating the differentiation and value put into this style of male leadership. From here Kennedy manages to find a way to maintain this leadership style. In an article "The Americas: Sealing It Off," depicts the approach of United States leaders by stating:

> "Mr. Kennedy views as equally important the "revitalization" of the Organization of American States [because] if military action should become necessary against Castro, it would be infinitely better if it were multilateral rather than unilateral [which] is why the President has embarked on a series of consultations with the ambassadors of Latin American nations and has instructed the ambassadors of the United States to talk with the heads of the governments to which they are accredited" ("The Americas: Sealing It Off," *Newsweek* May 8, 1961).

Much like many of the other articles, the diplomatic rational means of dealing with Cuba is by sending male ambassadors, like Bonsal, to the United Nations, Organization of American States, other international organizations, or nations and supporting isolation of Cuba in terms of trade among other states. Any changes in the relationship of the U.S. and Cuba is portrayed as requiring consideration of domestic repercussions, goals, and negotiations including issues of Cuban Refugees, ending the embargo, or directly negotiating with Castro. These negotiations are depicted as male spaces where plans, actions, and negotiations are planned and decided. These images illustrate the professional, diplomatic, rational American male leader by depicting a group of men all sitting around a table with each of their titles and positions clearly listed.



These portrayals continue with the images and descriptions of American male diplomats and how they deal with the problem of Cuba throughout the years. For instance, in "The Storm Over Cuba" not only is diplomatic rational leadership displayed through the leadership of Jimmy Carter, but also the credentials and influence of other leaders are put on display.

> "Jimmy Carter took to television, both to endorse the Vance warning and to call for 'calm and a sense of proportion.' Said the President: 'We consider the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba to be a very serious matter and that this status quo is not acceptable.' In the terse five-minute statement, Carter confirmed that 'we are seriously pursuing this issue with the Soviet Union.' But the Soviet force, he stressed, is not an assault force and does not have the capability to attack the U.S. Concluded the President: 'This is a time for firm diplomacy, not panic and not exaggeration'…An even louder voice of protest was that of Democrat Frank Church of Idaho, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and thus formal sponsor of the SALT treaty. Church, who first made public the Soviet move on Aug. 30, dramatically postponed the SALT hearings for a day in order to summon Vance and CIA Chief Stansfield Turner to testify about the combat brigade. Said Church: 'There is no likelihood that the Senate would ratify the SALT II treaty as long as Soviet combat troops remain in Cuba.'" ("The Storm Over Cuba," *Time* September 17, 1979).

This article features pictures of eight American male leaders all in suits, all featured as voices of reason, and six of them listed with their professional titles and positions. The two left untitled are well known leaders including President Jimmy Carter and Cyrus Vance, the United States Secretary of State. Their diplomacy is illustrated not in dealing with Cuba or Castro directly, but rather by maintaining their calm and renegotiating with the Soviet Union.

> "Whatever solution is eventually found for the problem of the brigade [in Cuba], the bargaining with Moscow is certain to be tough. Anticipating this, New York's Senator Javits echoed the keep-calm approach that Carter advocated in his TV address. Said Javits: 'We don't know a good deal about the basis on which these troops are in Cuba. There is simply too much at stake to jump to conclusions. An issue like this lends itself too easily to jingoism and demagoguery. But now is the moment to look at the entire situation calmly and diplomatically — and above all, to refrain from exacerbating it.'" ("The Storm Over Cuba," *Time,* September 17, 1979).



The "Storm Over Cuba" Cover illustrates how the professional image of an American Diplomat (Carter Vance, Secretary of State) is juxtaposed to the military dictator of Cuba (Fidel Castro). The illustration here is how little changes in the portrayals or descriptions of American men over time as well as how they are tied to particular relations with Cuba, particularly that they will not let other leaders dictate their foreign policy, especially not Fidel Castro.

> "Within hours of the announcement, Navy ships began collecting refugees intercepted by the Coast Guard and ferrying them to Guantanamo Bay Naval Station. The people of the U.S. 'do not want to see Cuba dictate our immigration policy,' Clinton declared. 'They do not want to see Mr. Castro export his political and economic problems to the United States. We tried it that way once,' he said, referring to the 1980 Mariel boatlift, which brought 125,000 refugees to America in five months. 'It was wrong then, and it's wrong now, and I'm not going to let it happen again'…Clinton enjoyed a certain amount of maneuvering room: there is no significant sentiment in Congress to open up immigration or lift the trade embargo on Cuba. 'The solution is not for 100,000 Cubans to come to the US.;' says New Jersey Democrat Robert Menendez, 'but for one man to leave Cuba, and that is Fidel Castro'" (Gibbs et al., *Time*, August 29, 1994).

The scenario resonates over time in that American leaders are depicted as men, through the frames of *Masculinity-Reason*, which are clean-cut professionals, backed by experience and credentials, and illustrated as diplomatic and intelligent negotiators that are not moved by threats or demands from "others."

While both Cuba and the United States are largely represented in terms of male-leadership and authority, the deficiencies in masculine leadership norms works to de-legitimize the interests, achievements, or goals of Cuba and their leaders. The *Ineffective-Masculine* frame not only illustrates Cuban male-leadership as a problem that the U.S. needs to address, but also characterizes Cuban men as violent, often motivated by anger (especially in contrast to reason), and as letting their passions outweigh their logic or ability to negotiate. The *Ineffective-Masculinity* framing portrays Cuban men as hyper-masculine including things like violent, passionate, and athletic but simultaneously less accomplished, controlled, diplomatic and professional. For instance, Cuban male-leaders are not recognized for their professions as much as their physique and/or personality.

In the accompanying 1959 article "They Beat Batista," not only are all of the leaders of the Cuban Revolution represented as men (see the image above[5]) but also they are described by their physique and inclinations. When or if their professions are mentioned, their success in the profession is depicted as inadequate or of secondary importance. The men that "beat Batista" are described as "a motley band, and in it Cuba could find either talent for the hard job of government or just angry young men with guns" ("They Beat Batista," *Time,* January 12, 1959). One of the Cuban leaders, Raul Castro, is described as a man who

> "sports a Texas hat and shoulder-length hair but could not manage to grow a beard, matched Batista terror for terror, [but] may find it hard to lay his pistol down [and as] a one-time delegate to a student congress behind the Iron Curtain, he denounces U.S. 'imperialism," [and] likes to bait the U.S. (as when he seized 47 U.S. citizens as hostages last summer)" ("They Beat Batista," *Time,* January 12, 1959).

The depiction of Raul is an example of the focus on physique and inclination. While he is described in an aggressive tone in that he "matched Batista terror for terror," he is deficient in his masculinity, because he cannot grow the symbolic beard of the Revolution ("They Beat Batista," *Time,* January 12, 1959).

Other Cuban leaders such as Che Guevara are described as becoming leaders due to military prowess rather than qualifications. An example of this comes from the article "Cuba:

[5] Note the difference in the photo below to that of American men in that they are not listed with their titled professions and the photo is much more impersonal.

Castro's Brain" in which the story of how Che Guevara came to be the head of the National Bank is told:

> "Fidel was winding up a Cabinet meeting when a thought suddenly struck him. 'By the way,' he said. 'I had to fire the head of the National Bank today. Anybody here an economist?' Che's hand shot up. 'I am, chief,' he said. 'All right, Che,' said Fidel, 'you're president of the bank.' The meeting over, Castro stayed behind for a private chat with Che. 'Say, I never knew you were an economist,' said Fidel. 'Economist!' said Che, astounded. 'I thought you said Communist!" ("Cuba: Castro's Brain," *Time,* August 8, 1960).

While the story works to question the authority of the leadership of Cuba, Che comes to be head of the National Bank not due to his qualifications or experience but due to a friendship with Fidel and a misunderstanding. In addition, Che is depicted as the most competent of the "triumvariate" through the statement:

> "He is the most fascinating, and the most dangerous, member of the triumvirate.Wearing a smile of melancholy sweetness that many women find devastating, Che guides Cuba with icy calculation, vast competence, high intelligence and a perceptive sense of humor… [This is how he convinced Castro] with competence, diplomacy and patience. When grenades were needed, Che set up a factory to make them. When bread was wanted, Che set up ovens to bake it. When new recruits needed to learn tactics and discipline, Che taught them. When a school was needed to teach peasants to read and write, Che organized it. If a situation called for a revolutionary expert, Che knew how it had been done in Bolivia or Guatemala. Through the long evenings, without ever appearing to contradict, Che encouraged Castro's leftism, planted the seeds of a deep-cutting and basic grab for power" ("Cuba: Castro's Brain," *Time*, August 8, 1960).

Thus, even though Che is reported as the most dangerous of the leaders, because he is the "brain" behind the administration, or the most competent of Cuba's leaders, his leadership is portrayed as deficient due to his ideological attachment to Marxism/Communism, his thirst for power, and his weaknesses. The articles repeat over time the weakness of Cuban men in terms of human deficiencies, or bodily ailments, failed family backgrounds, and/or a thirst for violence. For instance, the article mentioned above continues:

> "Battle to Breathe [A reference to Che's asthma]. Che's father, Architect Ernesto Rafael Guevara Lynch, also sees some humor in the fact of his son's control of fiscal Cuba. Sitting recently in his Buenos Aires office, the elder Guevara chuckled that 'nobody was more surprised than I when I heard my son was managing the Cuban economy. Any business we Guevaras put money into has always been a failure'…[and, in reference to issues of power and violence the article continues] Banker's Green. Through Castro, Che's revolution got to work. Firing-squad rifles cracked, and 553 Batista 'war criminals' —most of them stalwarts of the old army —fell dead, after drumhead trials. Elections were put off indefinitely" ("Cuba: Castro's Brain," *Time*, August 8, 1960).

The inefficiencies in male leadership in Cuba depicted as over ideological (in reference to Marxism/Communism/Socialism), over aggressive or violent, not experienced in the profession, power hungry, and/or physically ailing in some means continually coincides with issues of how the United States leaders should deal with the "problem of Cuba" which notably is not giving in to their demands.

Similarly, Fidel is largely depicted through descriptions of him as military dictator with harsh punishments as well as a rigid in demeanor which not only makes him an ineffective leader in terms of addressing the needs of his nation but also for international negotiations. The images below are remade over time illustrating Castro in the same vein as a military dictator dressed in his green fatigues, finger raised in the air, and unable to give up his power/dream which is in stark contrast to the previous depictions and examples of American male leadership.

Accompanying the images above are reports of Cuban leaders as ill, dead, or ailing. These reports shift over time to a metaphor for the regimes inevitable fall (see above "Cuba: The Decaying Revolution"). Theories that Castro, or other Revolutionary leaders were dead or ailing

began before the overthrow of Batista and continue up through the 2000's. From the article "Cuba: The Massacre," which recounts the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, illustrates this example:

> There were rumors that there might be important casualties on the other side as well. Ernesto ("Che") Guevara was reported gravely wounded in the head, the result of a suicide attempt following an argument with Castro over command of the armed forces. And the persistent absence of Castro himself from the early victory celebration gave weight to reports that he had been hurt in a bombing attack on Jagüey Grande" ("Cuba: The Massacre," *Time*, April 28, 1961).

In an article titled "A Soother in Havana" from November 8, 1971 the rumors of an ailing leader repeat, debunked, and replaced by the image of Castro as a military leader:

> "Rarely had a rumor died so quickly. Early in the week, word was circulating in some Cuban communities and in the U.S. that Fidel Castro was gravely ill or even dead. Within a matter of hours, however, Cuba's Premier had a tailor-made opportunity to show the world that his is still in the Pink. When Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin flew into Havana from Toronto after a tour of Canada, Fidel was waiting to greet him with hugs and kisses on the cheek. Thirteen newsmen from the Communist nations, including TIME's Geoffrey Stevens, were on hand to note that Castro looked fit, decked out in his customary fatigues and with a gun on his hip" ("A Soother in Havana," *Time,* November 8, 1971).

These rumors become a staple in describing the leadership of Cuba, because if the leaders don't fall by the intervention of other states, or the overthrow of their own people, their regime will collapse with the death of its leaders. In Newsweek August 8, 1960, Fidel is rumored to be ill "is convalescing from surgery-not pneumonia…One story: he was operated on for hemorrhoids and cancer was diagnosed" ("Cuba and the Latins: A Monsterous Scheme?" *Newsweek*, August 8, 1960). In Time August 15, 1960, the ailments of Fidel are also put on display with "What ails Fidel Castro? The diagnosis so far, according to word passed along by one of Castro's consulting physicians, is that Cuba's Premier has a complex of ills of the lower alimentary canal, including hemorrhoids, diverticulitis of the colon and an abscess with fistula" ("Cuba: Ills of the Maximum Leader," *Time,* August 15, 1960). From a June 25th, 1965 article titled "Come Out, Come Out Wherever You Are: Asylum or Asthma" the focus turns to back to Che "Castro's closest confidant and jack of all trouble" and describes the leader as:

> One report has it that he quarreled with Castro at a party in the Soviet embassy, sought asylum there to avoid Fidel's wrath. A second version has Che hiding out in the Mexican embassy. He is variously supposed to have been executed at Castro's orders, slapped into prison, demoted to a junior job. However,

> the theory that the two men have been at odds suffered something of a blow when Fidel and his brother Raul stood next to Che's wife and child at the May Day parade. So other reports say he is merely convalescing from a recurrence of asthma complicated by a heart condition…. "He's resting, and that's all I know," said a Castro Cuban at the U.N., who may—or may not—have more than rumors to go on. "But even while he is resting, he is making trouble for the U.S." ("Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are: Asylum or Asthma," *Time,* June 25, 1965).

Gradually, the narratives shift from the fall of the leader due to physical ailments to that of ideological failures. "Sooner or later the counterrevolution is certain to come to this island. For the moment, however, Castro sits firmly in saddle. And he seems likely to remain in the saddle for months to come" (Lavine, Harold., *Newsweek*, January 30, 1961). The December 6, 1993 Times Cover features "Castro's Cuba: The End of the Dream." The article starts "Castro's socialist dream has turned into a nightmare. Isolated, hungry, and broke, the country hopes that a touch of capitalism will save it (McGeary and Booth, *Time*, December 6, 1993). It ends with a resolution of two main options for those unsatisfied with the current state of the country including "wait until he [Fidel] dies or flee." While there are additional rumors of Castro in poor health including:

> "Ordinary Cubans could only wonder whether Fidel Castro was dead or alive. They had no new photos of their 79-year-old leader convalescing from his reported surgery last Monday for gastrointestinal bleeding, no TV footage, no radio broadcasts of his voice-just one or two uncharacteristically terse statements issued in his name, calling his condition 'stable' along with sporadic official assurances that El Jefe was recovering" (Contreras and Campo-Flores, *Newsweek*, August 14, 2006).

> "Cuba without the Inimitable Fidel? That had been unattainable for 10 American Presidents and unimaginable for generations accustomed to his strutting anti-"Yanqui" ways. But with Castro's health in question…Raul, 75, 'provisionally succeeded the gravely ailing Fidel" (Latell, Brian. *Time*, May 14, 2007)

This sentiment of poor leadership as the cause of Cuba's demise focuses on the failures and ineffectiveness of their male leaders. The resolution is framed as better relations and leadership with the United States, but this is postponed due to Fidel's hold over Raul stating:

> "Any hope of warmer relations with the U.S [and improvement of the lives of the Cuban people]. has been dashed, says Latel: 'Fidel won't be around forever, of course. But as long as he's calling the shots, everyone is exactly where they were three and a half years ago: waiting for Fidel to die" (Campo-Flores, Arian, *Newsweek*, March 15, 2010).

The rumors and descriptions of the ailments of Cuba's leaders, including their internal quarrels over power, and their resilient hold on unattainable dreams are portrayed as undermining their leadership abilities, especially in comparison to American leaders.

In addition to their physical and ideological limitations, the portrayals of Cuba's leaders and Cuban men more generally, including a thirst for violence, power, and a unattainable socialism, not only undermine their rational judgment but also their moral character. The images above illustrate Fidel holding a gun to a Batista supporter with the caption that states "Think of What Could Happen to You If We Weren't Idealists!" and a group of Cuban Rebels that are stopping "along the path of death" in reference to their vengeful move across the nation of rounding up Batista men ("Cuba: The Vengeful Visionary," *Time,* January 26, 1959).

In addition to the aforementioned well-known leaders, "ordinary" Cuban men are portrayed as violent and swept up by the discourse of Revolution. In "Latin America: Cuba Under Castro - And the U.S.," Cuban men are described as excited by the "bloody and exciting time" where Cuban men "came out of the jungles and down from the hills…[to join] the battle-worn men who made up Fidel Castro's army [which] swelled a hundred times by hot-headed

youths with guns who simply wanted to get into the excitement" (*Newsweek* January 12, 1959). These "ordinary" Cuban men are usually featured as guajaros, or rural peasants who are poor and "brown," or not white. While over the five decades these Cuban men become illustrated as more docile, they are still depicted, usually while holding a gun, as not using reason or logic but rather "swayed by the continued discourse of the Revolution and an undying loyalty to their hero (Fidel)" ("Cuba: Pachanga Revised, *Newsweek,* July 24, 1961).



In "Cuba: Pachanga Revised" the guajaros "love their uniforms and guns, and most of all they love the authority and the power the uniforms and guns give them… they are intensely patriotic, ready, almost eager, to die for Cuba. And, for them, Castro *is* Cuba" (*Newsweek*, July 24, 1961).

In "Castro's Ragged Revolution," the article illustrates not only the military prowess of Cuban men but also that in spite of poverty and restricted freedom, Castro's Anti-American discourse works to maintain his power over the Cuban people. The article starts:

> "he calls himself a 'common son' of Cuba. He is young and muscular. He reads Marx in Russian and Kurt Vonnegut in English. He can assemble and load an AK-47 rifle in the dark. And he is afraid of Ronald Reagan. 'I think he means to destroy us,' says the young Cuban teacher" (Nissen,Beth. *Newsweek* June 8, 1981).

This sentiment is again illustrated by Cuban men in the article "Cuba Alone" through a reporter's account of how and why fidelismo is still so strong among the Cuban men, despite the economic and other failures of the government leaders.

> "Cubans take as fierce a pride in their revolutionary heroes as Americans do in the men of 1776: they are the nation's embodiments of freedom and independence. Che Guevara is their Lafayette, Fidel their George Washington. 'He has a place in people's hearts that goes far beyond the Communist Party or government structure,' observes mining executive McGuinty. Bone-thin after four years of declining rations, Mario Caballero, a 52-year-old school administrator in Santiago de Cuba, is one of the older generation whose faith in Fidel is well-nigh religious. If his rhetoric recalls communist dogma of the '50s, it still reflects sentiments deeply etched in the Cuban soul. 'Before, our best land was Yankee. The sugar was Yankee. The electric system was Yankee. The phones were Yankee:' Never mind that the sugar crop is failing for the second year that electricity and phones rarely work. 'We may be living through a special period;' he says, 'but at least all the property is Cuban:' His friend Albert Memo, a retired electronics technician, remains content to entrust the future to Fidel. 'We have a government we like;' he says, Cubans know capitalism, 'and we don't want it:' But if Castro says Cubans have to do things differently, Memo will go along. He leans back and reminisces: 'I am exactly the same age as Fidel, 67. When you meet him, he is so impressive. When he talks, you really trust him, you would follow whatever he decides to do. I love him. Everyone loves him.'" (McGeary, Johanna and Cathy Booth. *Time*, December 6, 1993).

In sum, Cuban men are illustrated as ineffective leaders with men taking positions by which they are not qualified, described as ailing, or unable/unwilling to move to democracy and beyond their dreams of Communism/Socialism. These drawbacks are strongly associated with portrayals of a failing Cuban economy, the hunger of the Cuban people, and desolate conditions that have little signs of improvement. The displays that "ordinary" Cuban men are also swept up in the ideology of the Revolution means that there is little push for change. Therefore, whether as leaders or as constituents, the reason the embargo has failed at causing an internal revolution to overthrow Castro, who is clearly depicted as an ineffective and oppressive leader, is because it has provided support for Castro's Anti-American discourse. The *Masculinity-Reason* and *Ineffective-Masculinity* frames are tied to representations of their respective nations, which depict very different values, norms, culture, and histories as tied to the representations of male leaders and voices. Where Cuban men and their leaders are represented as having a history of dictatorship and violence, American men and leaders are represented as democratic professionals, if not experts, that pass down democratic values and expertise. In essence, boundaries are drawn in leadership style, government style, credentials/expertise, and moral virtues.

Table 2: Dichotomy of American Men and Cuban Men

American Men	***Cuban Men***
Rational	*Irrational/Emotional(Angry)*
Ethical/Moral	*Violent*
Credentials	*Physicality*
Democratic	*Dictators*
Practical	*Ideological (Communism/Socialism)*
Professionals	*Guajaros/Rural/Poor*
White	*"Brown"*

Cuban men and their leaders are portrayed as insufficient, or having ineffective masculinities, due to their emphasis on violence and oppression through both communistic values and ideological goals as well as dictatorship and through a focus on their physical deficiencies in health. The use of the term "ineffective masculinity" is to emphasize that the focus on physicality, emotion/anger, violence, and dictated control is not defined in feminine ways, but is portrayed as insufficient male leadership(Schippers 2007). In the portrayals, Castro is the cause of Cuban economic failure. He is the reason for failed international relations and not because he is feminine, but because he is hyper-masculine ("athlete," "chief," "executioner"). This masculinity cannot be fully captured through the concepts of "macho" or "bandit," because the portrayal are also plagued with descriptions of physical disabilities such as physical ailments, sickness, or even the inability to grow a beard (Fox 1973). In contrast, American men are credentialed democratic leaders who use rational and practical means for negotiation. While they have a moral obligation to family, especially wives and children, their decisions are not based on anger, emotion, or threats. The portrayals of American men as providers, protectors, and leaders features them as the symbol of hegemonic masculinity in that politics are conflated with American men along with "whiteness and middle class status" through subtle photographs, credentials, and occupations(Grant and Newland 1991; Lorde 1997). The distinctions in

American men and Cuban men become even clearer through their relationships to American and Cuban women as well as the lens of *proximal similarity of men (and women)* as a transnational linkage for transnational communities of Cuban Refugees.

Complicit Woman Versus Failed-Femininity

In general whether Cuban or American, women are represented much less frequently than their male counterparts, and they are much less likely to be depicted by name;[6] yet, there are important differences in the way Cuban women and American women are portrayed. While American women may symbolically be the norm by which Cuban women are compared, they are rarely acknowledged or portrayed. *Complicit Woman* is the predominant frame for American women in which American women are depicted as experts on the family and morals. While they are rarely depicted as official leaders, they are often seen as essential advisers and/or supporters to male-leaders whether officially or unofficially. This protrayal of American women illustrates that women bring unique taste and organization to arenas such as public socials and dinners, which alleviate the official American male leaders from additional responsibilities, allowing for better opportunities for reasonably dealing with domestic and foreign policy issues. In the article "The Nation: Foreign Relations," depicts the necessary role of Jackie Kennedy as a wife and home-maker stating:

> "Whatever his other difficulties, Jack Kennedy last week maintained his status as the most fascinating Washington personality in years. Beyond greeting a flock of ceremonial guests, he acted with Jackie, radiant at his side, as a gay and gracious host at the sleekest, best planned reception within White House memory…to the surprise and gratification of capital veterans, there was no tortoise-paced reception line; as Jackie whose idea it was explained: 'If there was a receiving line, it would not be over until 3 in the morning.' Instead of roped-off rooms, guests found open doors [and] were free to inspect Jackie's tasteful changes in décor on the lower floor," ("The Nation: Foreign Relations.," *Time,* April 28, 1961).

[6] When analyzing the covers that coincide with the feature articles on Cuba, American men are featured on the cover 148 times, American women 31 times, Cuban men 18 times, and Cuban women only twice. Of the 199 covers that portray either American or Cuban men or women, 90 percent of them feature men.

The article purposes that since Jackie more than fulfilled her role as a hostess, resulting in happy guests, President Kennedy was able to leave the party and attend to the reports of the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion quietly. Jacqueline Kennedy is featured on the covers (see image below) of these magazines twice where her roles are featured around her including her duties as hostess, mother, and consumer of leisure activities and art ("The Nation: Foreign Relations," *Newsweek* January 1, 1962).

This illustration of moral support to a male leader is not a unique feature of the First Lady. The chief of naval operations wife shows her moral support for her husband who is dealing with the "Cuban crisis" by trying to alleviate his stress through a thoughtful card. The narrative goes:

> "He [George W. Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations] has had little time at his big, 14-room home with his wife since the Cuban crisis broke; his days have been stretched from the routine twelve-hour watch to 18, but he can still laugh when the pressure is on. The other day he found an envelope on his desk, addressed in red: URGENT—TO THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS—PRIVATE. Anderson instantly opened it to find a greeting card that only a Navy man could cherish. IN THESE TIMES OF STRESS, it read. KEEP A COOL HEAD. Inside the card was a drawing of a Navy "head"—a toilet—on which rested a big block of ice. It was signed, "Your sometime wife.'" ("Nation: The Showdown," *Time*, November 2, 1962).

The depictions of American women are mainly as wives and mothers from Jackie Kennedy to Anderson's "sometime wife" to the widows of the "Four Who Didn't Return" from the Bay of

Pigs Invasion and even to the representations of Hilary Clinton. Their primary roles are as wives and mothers who support the sacrifices of their husbands. In the "Four Who Didn't Return" the wives of the men lost are depicted as respectful of their husbands' loyalty to their careers.

> "Thomas Willard Ray, a 30-yearold pilot who worked as an inspector for Hayes International Corp., a Birmingham, Ala., aircraft-servicing firm with government contracts, called his wife one day in the winter of 1960-61 to say mysteriously that he was taking an assignment 'up north.' Ten days before the mid-April Bay of Pigs invasion, he came home to Birmingham with a deep suntan, but his wife Margaret didn' t ask why. She was sure it was classified" ("Four Who Didn't Return," *Newsweek*, March 11, 1963).

While American women, such as Jackie Kennedy, are often depicted as the means of reproduction of American values, morals, and future generations, they are also depicted as a moral/ethical thermometer. "From a woman in a passing car…[crying] 'Krushchev- idiot!'" ("The Nations: Pledging Allegiance," *Time* October 3, 1960). to the failure of Bay of Pigs where "even Eleanor Roosevelt suggested mildly that the CIA 'was not very well informed ("The Press: The Meaning of Freedom," *Time* May 5, 1961)'" as a response to why President Kennedy made such an error in judgement, American women serve as a moral thermometer either in support of American men or as a guiding means. One of the only articles on Cuba featuring an American woman is "On The Trail of Truth: One woman's mission to find out about her father forces the CIA to come clean about the Bay of Pigs" the story illustrates a woman who attempts to recover what happened to her father, an American pilot. Her push to discover what happened to him resulted in "the names of four American pilots who died at the Bay of Pigs, the CIA's greatest fiasco, to be entered in a 'Book of Honor' in a glass case below the stars. 'The CIA's willingness to pay public homage to these men, 37 years after they died, is largely owed to the obsession of a Florida housewife named Janet Ray Weininger" (Thomas, Evan., *Newsweek*, May 11, 1998).

As American women gain more access to the political sphere, they are still relegated to a feminine wife and motherly role, or undermined in their portrayal of leadership. From the INS agent Betty Mills (pictured above right), chosen as the agent to carry Elian back to his father so

that “it would be less tramatic for the boy (Thomas, Evan and Martha Brant, *Newsweek*, May 1, 2000) to the descriptions of Hilary Clinton as “confronting a birthday, and a newly empty nest” embodying the challenges facing baby boom women (Drummond, Tammerlin, *Time*, October 20, 1997), American women are primarily mothers, wives, and daughters.

While femininity in Cuba, similar to that in the U.S., portrays women as responsible for upholding and reproducing the morals of the nation, and future leaders, the *failed-femininity* frame illustrates how the deficiencies of reason by Cuban male leaders can both push women into male domains and facilitate the support of violence even among women. Cuban women are depicted as failing in reproducing strong morals of the nation, because in contrast to American women as a moral/ethical thermometer, Cuban women are portrayed as participating in violence, participating in male domains, and yet ineffective in addressing the Cuban male-leadership(Abbassi 2002; Fox 1973; Luciak 2007).

As such, Cuban women are depicted as not only promoting the violent actions of the Cuban Rebel Army, but also being the source of overwhelming support that “urged the firing squads on” (“Cuba: The Vengeful Visionary,” *Time* January 26, 1959). While the article “Cuba: Anniversary Thoughts” depicts the lack of success of Cuban male leadership through the argument that “survival, in fact, is perhaps Fidel Castro’s most notable achievement,” it simultaneously paints Cuban women as failing to address their Cuban male counterparts (*Newsweek* January 15, 1968). The article paints the picture of Fidel:

> "as he walked with his entourage through the lobby of the Havana Hilton last week, Castro stopped to talk to two old women who blubbered a request that their murdered sons be avenged. 'It is because of people like you,' said Castro, hugging the pair, 'that I am determined to show no mercy" (“Cuba: The Vengeful Visionary,” Time January 26, 1959).

Despite the violent and economic failure of the regime, Cuban women are portrayed as largely supportive. “The young men and women in their early 20s are equally pro-Castro. They are not

quite as blind as the teenagers. They will admit, frankly, that life in Cuba isn't idyllic, but they are certain that it eventually will be. They don't mind whatever sacrifices they have to make to build a new Cuba; on the contrary they glory in it. That's the new version of pachanga" ("Cuba: Pachanga Revised," *Newsweek,* July 24, 1961). It's as if the regime's attempt to make women equal with men is a problem, because Cuban women lack the feminine morality in that they are a source of violence, a symbol of sexual promiscuity, and a measurement of the leader's successes and failures of the nation (Fox 1973). In an article titled, "Castro's Cuba Today" the setting is described as:

> Militiamen and women still guard every building in Havana around the clock. Over a rum Collins at the Libre's Turquino Bar, one off-duty militia girl…told me: 'You're damn right I'd pull the trigger on you if you walked into my building without stopping. You just better learn to ask permission around here," (*Newsweek,* July 12, 1965).

Associated Press

Havana: Woman at arms



Militiawomen pass in review, a billboard warning to be 'Ready!'

The portraits of Cuban women with guns are depicted as troublesome next to the American housewife, because this "added responsibility makes it difficult to fulfill the needs of the family" ("Cuba: The Revolution at 25," *Newsweek*, April 8, 1985).

In addition, the failure of Castro's leadership is clearly displayed in the metaphor of Havana as a woman in the article "Cuba: Lost Soul; New Saints:"

> "Havana is a melancholy woman with a dirty face. If she once sold her body to Yankee imperialism she has now lost her soul to Communist colonialism and her new saints [Castro and Che] so far offer nothing to hope for. The shortages, the privation, the material deterioration are horrendous, but they are symptoms of what has happened in Cuba since Castro arrived on a wave of patriotism…Free lance whores still walk the streets. There is no laughter and little talk" (Reingold, Edwin M., *Newsweek,* February 4, 1963).



Despite the problems in Cuba, Cuban women are displayed as the metaphor that reproduces the nation. It is their economic power among tourists as dancers, predominately as exploits of foreign males (note the image above right and that the communist male leaders get to enjoy the Cuban women) that maintain the meager economy and reproduce the morals of the nation(Abbassi 2002). A reporter draws the metaphor below next to a description of the "whores and harlots" in the picture above ("Castro's Cuba: A Mood to Relax?," *Newsweek*, December 5, 1960).

> "Indeed, as Castro entered his tenth year of power, his countrymen had little to cheer about. True, income in Cuba is more evenly divided now than in the old days, and education and medical care are more readily available to the poor. But by most economic indicators Cuba is actually worse off now than in 1959…[but women] hold "the coffee cuttings, they will plant in Havana's new green belt," ("Cuba: Anniversary Thoughts," *Newsweek* January 15, 1968).

This article reveals that Cuban women are not only active workers in the future and economy of Cuba, because coffee and sugar are central to Cuba's economic success, but also central in perpetuating this bleak future ("Cuba: Anniversary Thoughts," *Newsweek* January 15, 1968). "In Cuba: Castro's Ragged Revolution" despite the decay of the island and economic dependence on Moscow, including Cuban women's dependence on making ends meet by working in nightclubs "where leggy but well-covered showgirls strut their stuff for audiences," (Ogden, Christopher, *Time* May 9, 1977) the women themselves pick up arms to defend the revolution. The journalist Nissen states:

> I saw signs-literally-of a nation on the defensive. Billboards reading 'Listo!' (Ready!) and showing a grim young woman taking aim with an automatic rifle, stand like sentries along the main roads…[the citizen/soldier militia includes an] estimated 60 percent of women on the island, [who] train regularly in their neighborhoods and villages after work and on the weekends (Nissen, Beth. *Newsweek,* June 8, 1981).

'Reagan is a new kind of dragon, instinctively fierce'

Even though Cuban women are sketched as having benefited from better literacy, healthcare, and job opportunities with the new male leadership, they are unsuccessful at dislodging the oppressive regime and at times even participate in it(Luciak 2007). Stories like that of Ana in "Cuba Alone" depict a mother unable to address problems of providing for her child as well as changing the future of her nations depicted as:

> "'We have education and health care, but we don't have food or freedom. What can I give my child?' She feels caged and angry. 'They control everything:' she says, making the gesture of a hand stroking a beard, which is how Cubans silently refer to their supreme leader, Fidel Castro" (McGeary, Johanna and Cathy Booth. *Time* December 6, 1993).

The portrayals of Cuban women are depicted as *failed-femininity*. This frame illustrates that Cuban women are a measurement of the success of their male counterparts. While Cuban women are depicted as more violent and promiscuous that their American counterparts, their actions are largely portrayed as tied to the failed economic and moral leadership of Cuban males. Nevertheless, the descriptions and portrayals of Cuban women are in stark contrast to those of American women. Descriptions of Cuban women as violent, as the face of the Cuban militia, as the face of the Cuban tourist industry, and as ideologically (and physically) reproducing an ineffective nation is very different from the portraits of American women as housewives that serve as a moral and ethical thermometer and support for male leaders.

Table 3: Dichotomies of American Women and Cuban Women

American Women	***Cuban Women***
Mothers	*Violent*
Wives	*Objects of Tourists*
Support to Male Counterparts	*Insufficient as Reproducers of Nation*
Moral	

Transnational links of Gender between US and Cuba

Nations/International Relations as Male Spaces

Despite all of the clear lines drawn between the depictions of men in the United States and Cuba, there is a theme that permeates the two "imagined communities" which is the naturalization of male leadership of nations. The space of International Relations such as the United Nations and Organization of American States portrays the nations as synonymous with their male leaders. Each man is featured as sitting behind a placard with the title of "his" country (Newsweek and Time). The names of nations become interchangeable with leaders. For example, articles like March 13, 1978's "The World's Economic Systems" illustrates a map of the world and the level of economic development including the categories of Marxist-Lenninist,

Socialist Democrat, Third World Socialist, Mixed Economy, and Capitalist. In comparing and discussing the nations the list goes as follows: Britain's Labor Prime Minister James Callaghan, China's Hua Kuo-Feng, Soviet Union's Leonid Brezhnev, Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito, Soares of Portugal, Schmidt of West Germany, Tanzania's "Father of Socialism" President Julius Nyerere, Cuba's Fidel Castro, The United States' Jimmy Carter, and Egypt's Anwar Sadat ("Socialism: Trials and Errors," *Time*, March 13, 1978). There are over 463 references to "Castro's" Cuba and over 331 references to "Cuba's Castro." While the article is just one example, this is a dominant theme in the data. There are over 120 references to Kruschev's Russia and 67 to Kruschev's Soviet Beachhead. There are over 390 references of United States' [insert name] for male leaders (ranging from presidents to military, business, and other leaders). In contrast, women's names are not synonymous with nations. In fact, women are rarely featured with titles or their full names.

The struggles and alliances between nations become interchangeable with portraits of men who represent the nation (See the images above). From Uncle Sam as an icon for the United States to comedic puns of international relations to religious leaders, all the featured

negotiations and leaders are depicted as men. The images above illustrate this point through the covers coinciding with articles on Cuba (including, starting from the left, "Cuba: Castro's Brain," Cuba: Castro and the Reds," and "Cuba: Soviet's Puppet"). These images of males as synonymous with nation and political ideologies such as Communism is illustrated with the relationships of Russia/Khrushchev, China/Mao, and Cuba/Che. Theses portrayals naturalize the relationship between masculinity and politics. The proliferation of the interchangeability of leaders with nations over time illustrates a transnational ideology of politics as male spaces.

Proximally Similar Women and Men

Despite all of the clear lines drawn between the depictions of gender norms and the portrayals of the nations of the United States and Cuba, there is an emergent transnational community of Cuban-Americans. While this group is portrayed as both, not fully American or fully Cuban, whether or not there is support for allowing or aiding Cuban exiles is tied to portraits of proximal similarity. In the beginning of the data (1959), the descriptions and portraits of Cuban Exiles are described in ways that are comparable to that of United States men and women, which seem to lend support for maintaining the airlifts and easing restrictions on migration. The article "Cuba: Outward Bound" illustrates the image of Cuban exiles as:

> By ship and by plane. The greatest exodus from the unhappy island, momentarily halted by invasion, resumed. In the past two years, some 200,000 frightened, disillusioned, or dismayed people have fled into exile… businessman, their wives, and their children have been among the first to leave (*Time*, May 19, 1961).

Accompanying the description of Cuban exiles below is the picture of Cubans arriving in Key West.

REFUGEES ARRIVING IN KEY WEST


RAIMUNDO LÓPEZ STUDYING

The texts reiterate that it is the middle and upper classes that fled Cuba in that "the disillusionment with Castro among his old supporters of the middle and upper classes is becoming obvious" ("Cuba: The First 100 Days," *Time*, April 20, 1959) and "virtually all of Varadero has been deserted by the wealthy Cubans who lived there" (Reingold, Edwin M., *Newsweek*, February 4th 1963). The descriptions of the type of people fleeing Cuba are typically semi-professional or professional men. They occupy a unique space in that these men are often portrayed similarly to American men in racial terms (note the images above); however, they are described as bringing a new vibrant ethnic culture. The article "The New Exodus" features the types of men and women leaving Cuba and their reasons for doing so:

> "Longino Dominguez. 44, was a village woodworker until he was bluntly advised to join the militia or lose his customers. "'I told them, 'I am a carpenter, not a politician.'" said Dominguez last week after sailing to Florida with 16 others. A second refugee…Jose Aurelio Lechuga Villanueva, 53, a fisherman for 36 years: "A fisherman cannot live. I used to be able to sell fish freely. Now everything goes to the Agrarian Reform at their price. You have nothing left with which to eat." One haggard mother recently landed at Key West in a small sailboat with her two children, a son, 11, a daughter, 7. Said she: 'Their father wanted to send them to Russia—they are doing that with many children now'" (*Time*, August 18, 1961).

This narrative continues into the 1970s advocating for the assistance or defending the leniency given to Cuban refugees and immigrants. The article "Cuban Doctor's Dilemma" illustrates this continuation:

> Raimundo López (pictured above on right), a Havana physician, was more interested in practicing medicine than politics. But once Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba, López found himself unable to separate the two. When he refused to join the Communist Party, he lost his job at Havana's Calixto Garcia Hospital. His position was further undermined when his wife's brother was killed as he sought asylum at a foreign embassy. Finally López applied for permission to leave Cuba, was allowed to emigrate in 1969, and after an eight-month stopover in Mexico, arrived in the U.S. in 1970.López, now 52, is just one of more than 2,000 physicians who have fled the country since Castro's takeover. Most of them, like López, came to the U.S., where they were free to do almost anything…[and are] helping to alleviate the shortage of physicians across the nation. ("Cuban Doctor's Dilemma," *Time,* June 11, 1973).

Not only do these narratives show the complimentary ways that Cuban refugees fit the gender norms of American men and women, but they are also featured as being promising potential for the American dream. They are displayed as hardworking professional or semi-professionals who "take six hours of English instruction weekly" who open businesses, become politicians, and in general are bringing economic and cultural wealth to communities ("Cuban Doctor's Dilemma," *Time,* June 11, 1973). The article "Havana, Fl." paints this picture:

> "[Cuban Exiles] come with nothing but the clothes on their backs and what can be stuffed into one small bag; all money is taken from them by the Cuban Government before boarding. What happens to them after they collapse into the arms of relatives, however, is one of the more heartening urban success stories. Not only are the Cuban exiles flourishing remarkably in the Miami soil but they are, in the process, inexorably altering the character of that tinsel tourist town and bv no means for the worse… Back in 1965, when Washington and Havana worked out the arrangements for the airlifting of some 3,500 refugees a month, many Miamians publicly voiced dark fears…of 'economic chaos.' Nobody-least of all politicians talk like that anymore. The Cuban immigrants have added an estimated $350 million a year to the area's economy and provided a pool of skilled labor that, according to many analysts, has accounted for the major upswing in industrial development and investment. Ten years ago, the city's historic Tamiami Trail (southwest Eighth Avenue) was a rotting, largely deserted eyesore. Today the area is a colorful, bustling Cuban enclave known as 'Little Havana.' The newcomers' influence, however, extends well beyond the neighborhood that nurtured them, and their contribution goes far deeper than merely economic *(Newsweek*, September 1, 1969)."

By 1980 the images and narratives take a shift, to that of "ethnic politics" (Alpern et al., *Newsweek*, May 26, 1980). The representation of "ethnic politics" is largely a lens for racial politics in the United States. Cuban immigration, in the 1980s, is now portrayed as a social problem. In Newsweek's article "Carter and The Cuban Influx," the journalists state that the "initial outpouring of Cubans had seemed a clear propaganda victory for the United States, but Castro quickly sought to regain the advantage by encouraging an exodus of hundreds of social misfits and other undesirables. 'Castro, in a way, is using people like bullets aimed at this

country,' said White House Aid Jack Watson" (Alpern et al., *Newsweek*, May 26, 1980). The article includes increasing references and pictures (see image below) of people of color coinciding with the resentment of immigrants by the Klu Klux Klan (Alpern et al., *Newsweek*, May 26, 1980). As such, the portrayals of this wave of refugees are in contrast to the racial representations of the early waves of Cuban immigrants.

For instance, accompanying the image is the statement that "the refugee problem presented a painful dilemma [for the United States] a clash between the traditional role of America as a haven and the imperatives imposed by sheer practicality and consistent policy. If the United States granted political asylum to **all** the refugee Cubans, it could set a precedent, making it difficult to enforce the quotas that apply to Indochinese, Haitians and others seeking refuge" (Alpern et al., *Newsweek*, May 26, 1980).



In a 1981 article "Trouble in Paradise" South Florida is described as hit by "a hurricane of crime, drugs, and refugees" (Kelly, James et al., *Time,* January 23, 1981). These new refugees are no longer pictured as the hard-working middle class immigrants of

the 1960's and 1970's. They are described as poor, "living in tents beneath the overpass" exhausting United States social services, and violent/criminals (Kelly, James et al., *Time,* January 23, 1981). For example, the article "A Cuban Explosion" describes the new migrants as follows:

> "Since the Spring of 1980, when Cuban President Fidel Castro opened the port of Mariel to those who wanted to leave, about 125,000 'Marielitos' have landed in South Florida. In addition, 25,000 refugees have arrived from Haiti; boatloads of half-starved Haitians are washing up on the area's beaches every week. The wave of illegal immigrants has pushed up unemployment, taxed social services, irritated racial tensions and helped send the crime rate to staggering heights. Marielitos are believed to be responsible for half of all violent crime in Miami" (Press, Aric et al., *Newsweek,* December 7, 1987).

In addition to the discussions of these new Cuban refugees, as men that carry guns, usually "one under the coat and one strapped to an ankle" and run cocaine, the chart above is featured (Press, Aric et al., *Newsweek,* December 7, 1987). The article presents the ethnic and racial changes for the area (of Dade County, Miami) suggesting a correlation between the two.

The changing narrative of Cuban refugee men as violent and criminal continues in the description of "A Cuban explosion" where "an especially dangerous mix: 2,400 men without a country who suddenly thought they had, nothing left to lose. Fearful and desperate, these Cuban Marielito refugees seized control of two federal prisons last week, took 122 hostages…setting fires and wielding bolt cutters and blowtorches to sever gates." The refugees from the Mariel boatlift are described as "…many single men, cut loose from the moorings of family and community, drifted into marginal lives. By 1987 roughly 7,600 had passed through U.S. prisons, and more than 1,800, most of whom had committed crimes in the United States, were being detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (lNS)" (Press, Aric et al., *Newsweek,* December 7, 1987).

In the 1994 article "Cubans, Go Home" the two-page spread pictured below is featured. While the narrative of Cuban Refugee men as poor, violent, "brown," or perhaps even black, and desperate continues the role of these Refugees as a social problem remains at the forefront. From

sentiments to punish these refugees by sending them back to Cuba because they were the ones who originally supported the regime and "now that the government is no longer providing everything…they want to come to the United States," to a refusal to let Castro dictate foreign policy, the approach to dealing with these refugees is to take them to Guantanamo (Church, George J., *Time,* September 5, 1994).



The pictures and descriptions that cover the pages are predominately of Cuban Refugee men who left without a country and with nothing to lose are "bored and restless…[producing] an increasingly volatile climate among refugees in Guantanamo Bay" (Church, George J., *Time,* September 5, 1994). Yet accompanying the desperation of poor Cuban refugees who have "no jobs, no clothes, and no food," are the charts and statistics that Americans are largely resistant to more immigration (Church, George J., *Time,* September 5, 1994). The "U.S. with a problem of what to do with the more than 16,000 Cubans at Guantanamo…A TIME/CNN opinion poll last week showed that 74% of Americans do not want to admit the Cubans from Guantanamo-or the Haitians" (Church, George J., *Time,* September 5, 1994).

The issue of violence among these new refugees continues:

> "Could there be violence in these camps…'Yes, there could be. I don't think we're close to a riot. But I think we're probably close to some demonstrations. And when demonstrations start, they're difficult to control.' Cooped up in camps ringed by concertina wire, Guantanamo's inmates have little to do except brood…Williams confirms the presence of several former male felons at the camp… [some that had been] deported to Cuba for criminal activities in the United States" (Church, George J., *Time,* September 5, 1994).

The solution presented is that the United States is working out negotiations with Panama and "11 other Latin American countries to help take the burden [of the refugees] off the United States" (Church, George J., *Time,* September 5, 1994). While Cuban Refugee women are largely absent other than as wives, mothers, or daughters of lost loved ones, it is Cuban Refugee men who remain the proximally similar comparison that works to validate or invalidate the immigration of Cuban Refugees. This proximal similarity of gender norms is intersected by subtle representations of race/ethnicity and class values. When these characteristics do not match the portrayals of American men, the discourse changes to ethnic politics and a rivalry between United States leaders and Castro by which the United States will not succumb to Fidel's dictated foreign policy and it all "cycles back to waiting for Fidel to die" even after he steps down to Raul (Campos-Flores, Arian, *Newsweek,* March 15, 2010).

Conclusion

The frames of *Masculinity-Reason*, *Ineffective-Masculinity*, *Complicit Femininity*, and *Failed-Femininity,* work to illustrate the ideological, moral, and normative differences in the nations through the gendered portraits of its people. In other words, gender and nation work to produce and ideological divide, or "othering." These ideological "boundaries" work as dichotomies for both American men and Cuban men as well as American women and Cuban women.

Table 4: Dichotomy of Nations through Gendered People

American Men	**Cuban Men**
Rational	*Irrational/Emotional (Angry)*
Ethical/Moral	*Violent*
Credentials	*Physicality*
Democratic	*Dictators*
Practical	*Ideological(Communism/Socialism)*
Professionals	*Guajaros/Rural/Poor*
White	*"Brown"*
American Women	**Cuban Women**
Mothers	*Violent*
Wives	*Objects of Tourists*
Support to Male Counterparts	*Insufficient as Reproducers of Nation*
Moral	

Masculinity-Reason is the predominant frame for American men, which largely coincides with R.W. Connell's definition of hegemonic masculinity. It depicts men as natural leaders due to intelligence, charisma, and especially rationality (reason)(Connell 1994; Schippers 2007). It highlights the credentials and professionalism of these men as well as a focus on rationality,

allowing these men to be better at management, decision-making, and negotiations. The articles depict this masculinity as the norm by which others are measured. In stark contrast, the *Ineffective-Masculinity* frame depicts Cuban men as insufficient leaders due to their emphasis on violence and force as well as physical weaknesses such as sickness or even the inability to grow a beard. Depicted as often motivated by anger, rather than reason, they are portrayed as not effective at management, decision-making, or negotiations and as such not suitable protectors/providers of their nation. As such, Castro, often synonymous with Cuba, is depicted as an ideological "other" from United States leaders. Even though over time, the *Ineffective-masculinity* changes in focus from predominately on physicality and violence to romantic dreams and ideologies (predominately communism or socialism), the *Ineffective-masculinity* of the Cuban man is illustrated as a reason for military action or negotiating with other nations or organizations in order to manage the problem of Cuba. In the reference of *Complicit Femininity* women are described as a moral/ethical thermometer, mothers/wives/daughters, and consumers of the household. In contrast, the reference of *Failed Femininity* captures the breadth of representations of Cuban women as deficient in their roles as wives, mothers, contributors to their male counterparts, and producers of the nation. These representations change subtly over time from focusing of the Cuban street-working women, to the mothers who promote/condone violence, to the inability of these women to care for the home due to poverty. The *failed-femininity* frame emphasizes how the deficiencies of reason by male leaders can hinder women's abilities to fulfill their gender obligations. While these portrayals and frames draw stark lines of differentiation between the norms, lives, and values of these two groups of people, the data show that there are more than just references to differentiation. There are two frames that capture ideological structures that are portrayed as superseding the nations of the United States and Cuba

including *International Relations and Politics as Masculine Spaces* and *Proximally Similar Men (and Women).*

The *International Relations and Politics as Masculine Spaces* frame captures transnational linkages of male superiority, or a natural male leadership, as well as evidence that supports that the nation has typically "sprung from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation, and masclinized hope" (Enloe 2000). From the symbolic battles between the nations as between the men that "represent" these nations to recollections of historic figures as predominately men to the synonymous nature of men's names with respective countries, states, and even ideologies (Communism, Democracy, Socialism, and even Catholicism), politics, nation, and international relations becomes a masculinized space where women are largely invisible (Chatterjee 1993; Enloe 2000; Grant and Newland 1991). This invisibility is clear through a lack of recognition of women's contributions to history, politics, or the nation as well as the fact that women referenced are largely left unpictured and without names.

The *Proximally Similar Men (and Women)* frame captures the linkage between Cubans and Americans, through the transnational communities and issues of Cuban refugees. It shows that when Cuban refugees, coming to the United States, are depicted in complimentary ways to the definitions of men and women in the United States, especially in terms of class, race, and gender "morals" there are narratives of support for taking them in and for their continued migration. The term women is in parentheses, because the dominant focus is on the level of proximal similarity of Cuban refugee men, yet references to these men's wives and children work in complimentary ways to the way wives and children are discussed for American men despite the fact that they are nearly invisible. The importance of the frame is that while American definitions of masculinity and femininity may be ideologically conflated with

"whiteness and middle class values" as other theorists have suggested, this only becomes clearly displayed through the issues of immigration (Connell 1994; Enloe 2000; Said 1979).

The proximal similar Cuban refugee is depicted as a semi-professional male, who is married, educated, values democracy, and is white. Even though this is never clearly stated, the shift to dissimilarity and "ethnic politics" reveals the issues of race and ethnicity. Over time, the images of Cuban refugees turn to "people of color" and charts are put into the articles illustrating the racial and ethnic changes in United States immigrant communities and their ties to crime, violence, and poverty. With these portrayals, the narrative changes to one of harsher relations with Cuba, increased pushes to block immigration, political problems for United States leaders due to ethnic tensions in the United States over these immigrants (Note pictures and references to the Klu Klux Klan as well as that Carter and Clinton are depicted in the data above as not being re-elected due to these ethnic battles among Americans and Cuban-Americans.), and a push to help these people empower themselves to overthrow Castro but not to come to the United States. This frame of *Proximally Similar Men (and Women)* shows how a transnational linkage, or the formation of a transnational community and immigration, is supported in the United States when it meets the criteria of gender, race, and class, which are intersectionally represented through the Cuban refugees of the 1960s and 1970s, but breaks when it does not, through the portrayals of the immigrants of the 1980s and 1990s.

In sum, this research adds to the literature on nationalism, transnationalism, and gender. In many ways, it supports much research on the relationship between gender and nation; however, it illustrates a unique means by which transnational linkages can operate in tandem with boundaries drawn by national "othering." The main contribution of this research is that constructions of nations are not dependent solely on the construction of "ideological others." In

many ways the transnational linkages, such as the frame of *Proximally Similar Men (and Women*), work to promote continued ideological differentiation between nations while simultaneously illustrating the bridges between the two spaces, or the Cuban refugee or Cuban-American communities ("men with no nation"). In addition to this contribution, the research also illustrates that there is greater flexibility in the role of gender hegemony than suggested (Connell 1994; Schippers 2007). While it is clear that hegemonic masculinity operates due to the transnational representations of *International Relations and Politics as Masculine Spaces*, the data show that there are "deviant" masculinities that are not conflated with feminine attributes (Connell 1994; Schippers 2007). Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, Raul Castro, and los guajaros, the predominately featured Cuban men, are never depicted in feminine terms. In fact, they are depicted in hyper-masculine terms of violence, aggression, and even physicality. Nevertheless, previous research and concepts that illustrate that latino men are often portrayed as "macho" or "bandits" also do not fully capture the ways in which while these men are being depicted as hyper-masculine, or "macho," they are simultaneously illustrated in terms of physical weakness due to narratives of sickness, death, or other physical inadequacies (Fox 1973). This works to undermine their authority and ability to negotiate with the United States, but it's deviance does not threaten male leadership as a transnational hegemonic structure.

In addition, this research supports previous research in how the issues of international relations are tied to representations of gender and nation as well as constituted within an international structure of hegemonic male authority in politics (Enloe 2000; Grant and Newland 1991). Nearly all the data used to represent Cuban men and women is tied to suggestions on what relationship the United States should have with Cuba as well as what to do about these "problems." Much like the research on post-colonialism, the portrayals of Cubans as different,

and their leaders as inferior, is featured as at least one of the main reasons for failed international negotiations (Enloe 2000; Enloe 2007; Said 1979).

Nevertheless, this work inevitably pushes for further research on the relationships between transnational and national structures as well as how they relate to gender and international politics. While this work predominately focused on the relationship of the structures of gender, the nation, and the transnational, it focused on one particular context. Further research should analyze how or if these relationships appear outside of the context of United States and Cuban relations. They should also analyze how these issues are tied to the concepts of race and class on a national and transnational scale. While quantitative work has captured economic inequalities, at least part of these inequalities stem from how "other" nations and their people are imagined by the countries that have power over capital and labor, it is crucial to analyze these portrayals and relationships in order to better understand the transnational community and inequalities in which we all live (Alexander 2005; Anderson 1991; Calhoun 1997; Enloe 2007; Said 1979).

APPENDIX A

American Newsmagazines Cited

Time

"A Soother in Havana," November 8, 1971.
Church, George J., "Cubans, Go Home," September 5, 1994.
"Come Out, Come Out, Wherever You Are: Asylum or Asthma," June 25, 1965.
"Cuba: Castro's Brain." August 8, 1960.
"Cuba: Ills of the Maximum Leader," August 15, 1960.
"Cuba: Outward Bound," May 19, 1961.
"Cuba: The First 100 Days," April 20, 1959.
"Cuba: The Massacre," April 28, 1961.
"Cuba: The Vengeful Visionary," January 26, 1959.
"Cuban Doctor's Dilemma," June 11, 1973.
Drummond, Tammerline, "Turn the Beat Around," October 20, 1997.
Gibbs et al., "Cuba: Dire Straits," August 29, 1994.
Kelly, James et al., "Trouble in Paradise," January 23, 1981.
Latell, Brian, "Raul Castro. The Successor Who Could Change Cuba," May 14, 2007.
McGeary, Johanna and Cathy Booth, "Castro's Cuba: The End of a Dream," December 6, 1993.
McGeary, Johanna and Cathy Booth, "Cuba Alone," December 6, 1993.
"Nation: The Showdown," November 2, 1962.
Ogden, Christopher, "Cuba: Waiting for that Yankee Dollar," May 5, 1977.
"Socialism: Trials and Errors," March 13, 1978.
"They Beat Batista" January 12, 1959.
"The Hemisphere: Careerman to Havana." January 26, 1959.
"The Press: The Meaning of Freedom," May 5, 1961.
"The Nation: Foreign Relations." April 28, 1961.
"The Nations: Pledging Allegiance." October 3, 1960.
"The New Exodus," August 18, 1961.
"The Storm Over Cuba," September 17, 1979.

Newsweek

Alpern, David M. et al., "Carter and the Cuban Influx," May 26, 1980.
"Castro's Cuba: A Mood to Relax?," December 5, 1960.
"Castro's Cuba Today," July 12, 1965.
Campo-Flores, Arian, "Cuba Can't Quit Castro," March 15, 2010.
Contreras, Joseph and Arian Campo-Flores, "Cuba," August 14, 2006.
Reingold, Edwin M., "Cuba: Lost Soul, New Saints," February 4, 1963

"Cuba and the Latins: A Monsterous Scheme?" August 8, 1960
"Cuba: Anniversary Thoughts." January 15, 1968.
"Cuba: Pachanga Revised," July 24, 1961.
Cuba: The Revolution at 25," April 8, 1985.
"Four Who Didn't Return," March 11, 1963.
"Havana, Fl.," September 1, 1969.
"If Castro Falls Few Will Care – Including Russia." November 26, 1962.
"Latin America: Cuba Under Castro - And the U.S." January 12, 1959.
"Latin America: What Next for Cuba and Its Hero." January 19, 1959.
Lavine, Harold. "The Americas: A Different Castro? – The Prop Under Cuba," January 30, 1961.
Nissen, Beth. "Cuba: Castro's Ragged Revolution." June 8, 1981.
"The Americas: Sealing it Off." May 8, 1961.
"The Nation: Foreign Relations," January 1, 1962.
Thomas, Evan, "On the Trail of the Truth," May 11, 1998.
Thomas, Evan and Martha Brant. "Raid and Reunion." May 1, 2000.
Quindlen, Anna. "The Sins of the Fathers." April 24, 2000.

REFERENCES

Abbassi, Jennifer; Sheryl L. Lutjens. 2002. *Rereading Women in Latin America and the Caribbean: the Political Economy of Gender*: Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc.

Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2005. ""Globalization" as Collective Representation: The New Dream of a Cosmopolitan Civil Sphere." *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 19:81-90.

Anderson, BROG. 1991. *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*: Verso.

Balakrishnan, G. 1996. *Mapping the nation*: Verso Books.

Boyenton, WH. 2009. *Audit Bureau of Circulations*: Audit Bureau of Circulations.

Calhoun, C. 1997. "Nationalism. Buckingham." Open University Press.

Chatterjee, P. 1993. *The nation and its fragments: Colonial and postcolonial histories*: Princeton University Press Princeton NJ.

Connell, RW. 1994. "Gender and power." *Different roles, different voices: women and politics in the United States and Europe*:268.

Couldry, N. 2003. *Media rituals: A critical approach*: Routledge.

Dworkin, SL and FL Wachs. 2004. "Getting your body back." *Gender & Society* 18:610.

Eckstein, S. 2003. *Back from the future: Cuba under Castro*: Psychology Press.

Elsadda, Hoda. 2007. "Imaging The "New Man" Gender and Nation in Arab Literary Narratives in the Early Twentieth Century." *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 3:31-55.

Enloe, CH. 2000. *Bananas, beaches and bases: Making feminist sense of international politics*: Univ of California Pr.

—. 2007. *Globalization and militarism: Feminists make the link*: Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc.

Ferrer, A. 1999. *Insurgent Cuba: race, nation, and revolution, 1868-1898*: The University of North Carolina Press.

Fox, Geoffrey E. 1973. "Honor, Shame, and Women's liberation in Cuba: Views of Working-Class Emigre Men." in *Female and Male in Latin America: Essays*: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979.

Frosh, P and G Wolfsfeld. 2007. "ImagiNation: news discourse, nationhood and civil society." *Media, Culture & Society* 29:105.

Geertz, C. 1998. "The world in pieces: Culture and politics at the end of the century." *Focaal: Tijdschrift voor Antropologie* 32:91-117.

Grant, R and K Newland. 1991. *Gender and international relations*: Indiana Univ Pr.

Grewal, I and C Kaplan. 1994. *Scattered hegemonies: Postmodernity and transnational feminist practices*: Univ Of Minnesota Press.

Griswold, W. 1987. "A methodological framework for the sociology of culture." *Sociological methodology* 17:1-35

Guillén, MF. 2001. "Is globalization civilizing, destructive or feeble? A critique of five key debates in the social science literature." *Annual Review of Sociology* 27:235-260.
GuillÈn, MF. 2001. "Is globalization civilizing, destructive or feeble? A critique of five key debates in the social science literature." *Annual Review of Sociology* 27:235-260.
Herman, ES and N Chomsky. 1988. "Manufacturing consent: The political economy of the mass media." *New York*.
Kovach, B and T Rosenstiel. 2003. *The elements of journalism*: Guardian.
Lippmann, W. 2008. *Liberty and the News*: Princeton Univ Pr.
Lorde, Audre. 1997. "Age, race, class, and sex: Women redefining difference." *Dangerous liaisons: Gender, nation, and postcolonial perspectives*:374-380.
Luciak, I.A. 2007. *Gender and Democracy in Cuba*: University Press of Florida.
Mayer, T. 2000. *Gender ironies of nationalism: Sexing the nation*: Psychology Press.
McClintock, Anne. 1997. ""No Longer in a Future Heaven:" Gender, Race and Nationalism." *Dangerous liaisons: Gender, nation, and postcolonial perspectives*:89-112.
Molloy, M. 1995. "Imagining (the) difference: gender, ethnicity and metaphors of Nation." *Feminist Review*:94-112.
Pei, M. 2003. "The paradoxes of American nationalism." *Foreign Policy*:31-37.
Pérez, LA. 2005. "Cuba between reform and revolution 3/e."
Prendergast, C and G Colvin. 1986. *The World of Time Inc.: The Intimate History of a Changing Enterprise: 1960-1980*: Scribner.
Rice, Condoleezza; Carlos Gutierrez. 2006. "Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba: Report to the President." edited by U. S. S. Department.
Said, EW. 1979. *Orientalism*: Vintage.
Schippers, M. 2007. "Recovering the feminine other: masculinity, femininity, and gender hegemony." *Theory and Society* 36:85-102.
Smith, C. 1996. *Resisting Reagan: The US Central America Peace Movement*: University of Chicago Press.
Snow, DA, EB Rochford Jr, SK Worden, and RD Benford. 1986. "Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation." *American sociological review* 51:464-481.
Weninger, C and JP Williams. 2005. "Cultural representations of minorities in Hungarian textbooks." *Pedagogy, Culture & Society* 13:159-180.
Yuval-Davis, N. 1993. "Gender and nation." *Ethnic and racial studies* 16:621-632.
—. 1997. "Women, citizenship and difference." *Feminist Review (on-Line)* 57:4-27.