FOREIGN AID TO THE MEDIA IN UKRAINE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN THE COUNTRY.

by

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(Under the Direction of Lee Becker)

ABSTRACT

This study examines the impact of the international media assistance on the
democratization of the press in Ukraine. Ukrainian government has been notorious for years for
the suppression of the press and for censoring the content of the nation's media. Vital issues of
the country, such as corruption, political and economic reforms, and opposition actions, have
been ignored by the media because of the censorship. This study examines how Ukrainian online
publications supported by the international donors differ from the unsupported media. Textual
analyses shows that the supported online publications practice fair journalism and do not practice
self-censorship, unlike the unsupported media that are under the governmental control.

INDEX WORDS: Media assistance, democratization, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Internet
publications, donor organizations, censorship, freedom of speech.
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DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN THE COUNTRY.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the problem

Free and independent media are considered to be crucial to the growth of democracy because they give a more equal voice to citizens, expose corruption in government, and reinforce democratic practices. Ukraine, being a relatively new country, which became independent only 13 years ago, could hardly ever enjoy the benefits of democracy. Being under the Soviet rule for about seven decades, Ukrainian media was as suppressed as the media of the rest of former USSR in the whole: the freedom of speech was not practiced and the expression of ideas other than promoting communism was prosecuted. Media’s only role was to propagate the ideology of the Soviet government. The status quo began changing during the rule of the first president of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, who declared the reform of the government and of the societal structure.

Since 1991 financial aid has been provided to the media in Ukraine. Ever since the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, due to its important geopolitical position, was receiving media grants and other forms of support from international donors. However few studies have been made to show the relationship between financial aid and its effect on the level of democratization in the country.
The purpose of this work is to study the forms of assistance the international donors provide in the field of media and to see how these contributions may have affected the process of democratization in Ukraine using the Internet field as an example. This study will focus on the programs of journalists training and on the effect of these training programs on the performance of a number of online publications.

The first part of the work gives a narrative of the changing structural environment of the media when Ukraine abolished its Communist regime and started to create democratic institutions. It also gives the description of the existing media programs sponsored by international donors. The second part focuses on the theoretical framework; here I draw a connection between the media assistance, development of the media and the role of journalistic training in the development process. Here I argue that the financial assistance to the media and journalism training in particular have had impact on Ukrainian media and Ukrainian political developments. The third part explains the methodology used to assess the effectiveness of the training programs. The fourth part analyses the effects of these programs through studying the Internet media outlets. Special attention is paid to the recent ‘Orange Revolution’ that occurred at the time of the latest presidential elections in the fall of 2004. The thesis ends in conclusions in the form of the discussion of the findings.

**Media Landscape. Brief history of the media situation in Soviet Ukraine. Glasnost.**

During the communism era, the press played a vital role in maintaining the political and economic apparatus. Most of the publications had enormous circulations. And most of the adults were required to subscribe to the main newspapers. Not infrequently the Soviet citizens had to do
that involuntarily – through automatic wage and pension deductions (Obermayer, 2000). The two main media used for communism propaganda were newspapers and radio. The style of the reporting was quite different from the Western-style journalism. Such practices as fact checking or granting sides equal opportunities for expression were not carried out in the Soviet Union. The governmental sources give the often false information. Different points of view simply were not covered in the Soviet media. Journalism in the USSR did not have objectivism as a goal; all the materials were presented through the perspective of an author, who, most of the time, would talk about his or her attitudes to the events, rather than talk about the facts. This type of subjectivist reporting was widely practiced in the USSR, and the government only had to monitor that the journalists’ view corresponded to the ideology of the Communist party (Smaele, 1999).

There were two ways for a person to go into the journalist career, either after graduating from a five-year University program, or joining the editorial right after the high school and gradually working his or her way up. But no matter where the new journalists came from, they were all trained in Marxism–Leninism. The University degree program mainly focused on the Russian language, Russian literature, World literature, Foreign languages (the students had a choice primarily between three languages: English, German, and French), History of the Communist party, Philosophy and Political Economy. Usually the University instructors in journalism did not have any experience in the field. Nevertheless, the schools of journalism were rather prestigious, and it was very hard to enroll for the journalism program, as it was considered as a first and a right step into the bigger Soviet political arena.

Throughout the entire period of Communism, ever since the time of the establishment of the first Soviet school of journalism in 1947 at the Moscow State University, to the late 1990s,
the Universities across the territory of the USSR were training students according to this model. Consequently, the majority of the journalists working at the media outlets at present have not had access to the other approaches of journalism practice (Morrison, 94).

All the media was state owned, therefore the quality and the character of the information pouring onto the citizens were controlled by a group of Communist politicians. However there were some attempts to resist the governmental control over information. The most successful way to present alternative source of information was through Samizdat, or self-published materials, of anti-Soviet content. Samizdat was usually printed on a cheapest paper in a format of a bulletin. Over the years Samizdat gained much popularity, but at the same time, the publication was harassed by the government. The international sources of information like Voice of America, BBC and others were hardly available to the Soviet citizenry, as the government jammed the radio frequencies and made it impossible to tune in.

According to criticized and yet widely referred to work of Fred S. Siebert, ‘Four Theories of the Press’ the Soviet-Communist theory is described as the system where the media played down everything negative about communism and at the same time played up everything negative in the democratic countries (Siebert, 1956). For example, the Soviet media did not emphasize accidents like train wrecks, ship sinking or the consequences of the natural disasters, simply because it would make the government look bad.

One of the latest and biggest disasters silenced by the Communist party was the explosion of the nuclear reactor in Chernobyl in May, 1986. Chernobyl, which is usually referred to as the world’s worst nuclear disaster (BBC, 1987), is located only 110 miles north of Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine. However, the residents of the endangered zone and the rest of the Ukrainian population as well as USSR learned about this disaster and its possible health hazards only
several weeks later, after the news was already spread in the rest of the world, first of all in the Scandinavian countries, which happened to have been considerably affected by the nuclear waste from Chernobyl. Only then the Soviet media addressed the issue of Chernobyl. And still the risks and losses were played down.

It would be wrong to say that the ruling apparatus of the USSR was unaware of the breaches in the Soviet economic, political and environment protection systems. The numerous reforms implemented by successive general secretariats of the communist party were always intended to reduce the degree to which the USSR lagged behind the capitalist countries (Downing, 1994).

The first attempts of the transformation of the media from Soviet into democratic began in mid 1980s, when Michail Gorbachev, the general secretary of the Communist party, declared glasnost, a term which stems from the Russian word “voice”. The concept stands for openness, transparency, and publicity. It was implanted in a comprehensive program of political, economic and social reforms. The Communist Party acknowledged the principles of glasnost at its party Convention in February, 1986 (Downing, 1994).

But even though Gorbachev’s ideas concerning glasnost were radical, the proclamation of public openness was not revolutionary, but rather necessary. As John Downing said in his book ‘Transition, power, culture. Reflections on the media in Russia, Poland and Hungary’, the combination of economic and political crisis and deterioration of the Soviet system would inevitably lead to the breakdown of the system.

It is a commonplace now that the Soviet bloc economies were at various levels of disarray and disintegration, some such as Poland and Hungary even running giant deficits with Western Balkans, and with not a single one evincing the dramatic growth-rates of earlier decades. The causes were multiple, and cannot be solely ascribed to bureaucratism, even through that was the overriding problem of the economic structure. Nonetheless, this economic stagnation was probably the
primary cause of the collapse of the regimes even through it was mediated to the public in numerous ways (Downing, 1994).

As was mentioned above, during the Soviet rule there were two main media to influence the citizens: radio and newspapers. It was only at the end of perestroika, when the Communist party began to seriously consider TV as a powerful tool for its ideology. Perestroika or restructuring was the term attached to the attempts (1985–91) by Mikhail Gorbachev to transform the stagnant, inefficient command economy of the Soviet Union into a decentralized market-oriented economy. Industrial managers and local government and party officials were granted greater autonomy, and open elections were introduced in an attempt to democratize the Communist party organization (Columbia Encyclopedia, 2005). And Gorbachev was among the first Soviet politicians who took advantage of this medium. He learned how to use the camera and appeal to the citizens directly. Noticing a camera in the hall, for example, Gorbachev would carefully orient himself toward it, a skill acquired by politicians worldwide. Glasnost at first was not a goal in its right, but a tool for democratization and political reforms that were supposed to strengthen the socialist system in the USSR (I. Zassoursky, 2004). In reality, a freer, but still controlled press turned out to be the only helper Gorbachev had in his fight with the old school party communists (I. Zassoursky, 2004).

Gorbachev never intended to grant the press a truly independent status. Instead, similar to his predecessors, he regarded the media as instruments for mobilizing mass support, though in this case for the goals of perestroika. Consequently, the press under Gorbachev was still controlled, albeit the style of supervision changed from a confrontational to a cooperative relationship (Steinsdorff, 1994).

For only about two years, the media enjoyed the freedom from the government and was able to freely fulfill its duties. But it became impossible for the press to achieve the status of free
media because of both political and economic forces that were trying to get control over the media in order to gain advantages in their struggle for power and influence. The ‘honeymoon’ between 1989 and 1991, when journalists experienced unprecedented opportunities for reporting, was followed by an economic collapse triggered by the liberalization of the prices in January 1992 and subsequent hyperinflation (McNair, 1994).

When the Soviet Union fell apart, press control passed from the Communist party to local governments. Transfer of ownership was a two-step process. Soviet style worker cells took over at each publication when the party went out of business (FIEJ, 1996). But after a while it became apparent that the workers had neither the capital, nor the management and financial skills, to run publications. Newspapers were compelled to raise prices in order to compensate for the dramatic increase in production costs. Since wages dropped simultaneously, newspapers suffered a dramatic decline in circulation of about 70 percent (FIEJ, 1996). Just as significant, although less apparent, was the fact that there were no Western-type department stores, food supermarkets, car dealerships, or fashion boutiques that depend on considerable quantity of newspaper advertising to carry on their business (Trepper, 1996). At the same time, the production of consumer goods was – and still is – underdeveloped, so that advertising revenues did not provide a sufficient basis for the media’s economic survival. Therefore, most newspapers remained dependent on state subsidies. Since the government did not develop a general scheme of allocation, subsidies are granted selectively, often to secure or reward support (Trepper, 1996).

As a consequence, many papers, which initially had been taken over by editorial collectives, were forced to look for financially potent sponsors. Unlike in many countries of the Eastern European Block, Ukraine managed to attract only a few western investors (Szilágyi, 2004). Instead, the newly evolving oligarchs in Ukraine discovered the power of public opinion
and started to supplement their financial empires with media empires. This scenario is not better than governmental support, because almost all of the oligarchs regard the newspapers and other media as the means of influencing public opinion and eventually the overall political situation, as well as government decision-making. In addition, the oligarchs developed very close business and often blood relationships with the governmental officials and therefore supported the government in their media (Szilágyi, 2004).

**Media in Independent Ukraine.**

For the last several years, from 2000 to 2004, years Ukraine has been on the blacklists of some international media watchdogs. Because of its high level of corruption, lack of the freedom of speech and stagnation of the reforms, which are vital for a democratization process, Ukraine has been a concern for the civil rights groups.

According to the Freedom House rating for the past several years, the degree of freedom of expression in Ukraine has been unalterably low. Since 1972 Freedom House has been publishing an annual assessment of the state of freedom in most of the countries, known as *Freedom in the World*.

The Freedom House evaluates the freedom of expression and the status of the civil liberties based on a checklist of questions on political rights and civil liberties that are derived in large measure from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Each country is assigned a rating for political rights and a rating for civil liberties based on a scale of one to 7, with one representing the highest degree of freedom present and seven the lowest level of freedom. The
combined average of each country’s political rights and civil liberties ratings determines an overall status of Free, Partly Free, or Not Free (see Table 1).


In the latest 2004 Freedom House report published in 2005, the index of civil rights descended by one point from four to three, which means that in 2004, the nation’s situation with civil rights was somewhat improved (see table 3).

The improvement of the civil liberties can be attributed to the 2004 Presidential elections, the event that ended in a non-violent revolution, labeled as Orange Revolution, named orange after the color of the opposition (Freedom House report, 2005).

Another monitoring organization, Reporters Sans Frontieres, placed Ukraine on the 138th place out of 166 in its third annual Worldwide Press Freedom Index in 2004. The report stated that a number of pro-opposition and foreign media professionals were censored during the October 2004 presidential elections; also, a number of physical attacks on journalists were reported (Reporters Sans Frontieres, 2004). In the same report, Russia is one step below Ukraine. And it is noteworthy that Russian president Putin is on the organization’s watch list for his suppressive ways to deal with the media.
That is six places lower compared to 2003, when the organization positioned Ukraine on 132\textsuperscript{nd} place in its rating. In 2002, in the first report by Reporters Sans Frontieres Ukraine was on 112\textsuperscript{th} place.

The Committee to Protect Journalists put Leonid Kuchma, who acted as a president of Ukraine from 1994 to 2004, on their list of Ten Worst Enemies of the Press in 1999 and 2001, together with the Russia’s president Vladimir Putin. According to the Committee’s report on the top ten offenders of the press, the Kuchma regime used tax and libel laws as instruments to suppress the freedom of expression (Committee to protect Journalists, 2001). Kuchma's government has stepped up its habitual censorship of opposition newspapers and increased attacks and threats against independent journalists. The Committee’s list has not been compiled since 2002.

Based on data drawn from the reports of the three above-mentioned organizations, one may come to a conclusion that Ukraine’s democratic situation deteriorated significantly during the period of only a couple of years.

The overall level of corruption in the country reached its highest point during the rule of the president Kuchma. Ukraine has been reported to be in the top five most corrupt countries in the developed world for the last decade. Despite the fact that a real increase in corruption in the post-1991 is impossible to measure, both administrative corruption and state are considered endemic by a number of perceptions surveys. According to Transparency International Corruption Perception Index of 2005, Ukraine’s rating slipped from 86\textsuperscript{th} position in 2002 to 129th place in 2005 (www.transperancy.org).

According to the World Bank estimations, Ukraine’s blooming alternative or underground economy is likely to be about the same size as the official economy, and the annual
sum of total bribes equals the country’s trade turnover for a two-month period. In a 2000 poll conducted in March 2000 by the Ukrainian Centre of Economic and Political Studies, over 60 percent of private individuals confessed that they had bribed officials to receive services to which they are entitled by law (www.uceps.org.ua). However, these bribes included paying for the medical services, which are supposed to be free, but due to the low salaries in the state hospitals, such thing as free medical service is inexistent. (See chart 2).

Because of the poor economic conditions in the country, corruption penetrated all the levels of human activity. Even the media is corrupt in a way. The lion share of the publications in Ukraine practice ‘ordered stories’, when a journalist takes money from the source to write a story, usually such materials are getting published without proper fact checking and without an adequate critical attitude. The sums that are paid for an ‘ordered story’ go untaxed, and may very well supplement the low salaries journalists make. Consequently this mode of work keeps journalists dependent on the publication and its editorial policy (Szilágyi, 2004).

The infrastructure of the media in the independent Ukraine differs slightly from how media used to operate in the former Soviet Union. If at the time of the USSR it was a handful of political leaders who had the total control over the media, in post-Soviet Ukraine the system becomes more authoritarian.

The media is also controlled by a small group of people, but they represent different business, or oligarchic, groups in Ukraine, or so-called clans. It is noteworthy that all of these clans are quite close in their interests to the former president Kuchma. In fact, Kuchma represented one such clan himself, and his prime minister from 2002 to 2004, Victor Yanukovich, who ran in the 2004 presidential elections, represents another clan. One more clan, for example, is headed by Kuchma’s son-in-law.
All together there are four oligarchic groups in Ukraine, who by 2004 managed to gain control over most of the media in the country. All these clans are closely associated with the ruling party - Social Democratic Party of Ukraine United (SDPU-u) or the Labour Party. (Szilágyi, 2004).

According to numerous reports compiled by international watchdogs, the Kuchma’s regime frequently used the fear tactics, unexpected raids at the editorials of the oppositionist media outlets by tax authorities or fire departments, to retain control over the media.

On the whole, the snowballing result of the intimidation, economic dependence and the inconsistent state policies has created an atmosphere of excessive self-censorship.

According to the survey of journalists, conducted in November 2002 by the Razumkov Center for Political and Economic Studies, among 727 Ukrainian journalists, over 60 percent of the journalists admit to practicing self-censorship on a regular basis (www.uceps.org).

**Issue of political censorship.**

The development of the Ukrainian media between 1991 and 2004 can be divided into three stages. The first stage, from 1991 through 1994, can be characterized as fairly democratic, when media exploited the possibilities to publish different points of view and freedom of speech was highly practiced (Downing, 1994). The second stage lasted from 1995 through 1998. During that time the media was slowly getting under control of politicized oligarchic groups. At the same time, the cases of suppression of the freedom of speech were not widespread and occurred quite seldom. The situation changes in 1999, during the presidential election campaign. At that time the number of reports on suppression on the press skyrocketed and did not slow down after
the elections. It is noteworthy that during the elections, the media practically avoided any negative comments about the acting government.

Years following the 1999 presidential campaign were marked by Temniki, or the ‘themes of the week’. Temniki are supposedly weekly instructions sent to the media from the Presidential Administration on how to cover specific political events and how much attention specific events should get from the media (Freedom House, Country Report, 2003). Temniki raised a big wave of criticism from international community. Many journalists particularly between 2002-2004 began openly protesting against the political pressure and against the use of Temniki in the newsrooms. Some of the opposing journalists formed independent union to fight for their rights (Freedom House, Country Report, 2003).

**The Most Publicized Murder. Tapes.**

One of the most thunderous and most publicized cases of journalism persecution was the murder of the editor of the Ukrainian on-line publication, Ukrainska Pravda (Ukrainian Truth), Heorgy Gongadze. Gongadze was publishing a number of critical investigative pieces on the acting government before he went missing in 2000. A month after his disappearance, his decapitated body was found in the woods not far away from Kyiv. For four years the case of Gongadze’s murder was under the investigation but with no significant results.

Meanwhile, a former bodyguard of the president Kuchma, Mykola Melnichenko, who fled to the United States, said that he had hundreds of hours of recordings of president Kuchma conversations with other Ukrainian officials made secretly in the president’s office. The tapes revealed the corruption and the criminal character of the Kuchma regime. For example, on these
recordings, Kuchma ordered the killing of the oppositionist reporter Gongadze weeks before the journalist went missing (Kyiv Post, 2001).

Even though the authenticity of the tapes is still questionable, the opposition formed its main platform on these accusations and used the criminality of the acting government as a cornerstone of its political campaign.

Gongadze’s case triggered numerous mass protests and oppositionist picketing. The name of Gongadze became a symbol of the obliterated and destroyed Ukrainian society. And dozens of the mass protests took place across Ukraine as a response against the ruling elite. These included attempts to block the Presidential administration together with the parliament and to erect tents in front of the governmental buildings (Kyiv Post, 2001). Many of these protests turned out to be futile; however they did attract some international attention. These protests obviously were preparations before the Orange Revolution of 2004.

The Gongadze case stirred the public both domestically and internationally. The constant obstructions to the investigation of the murder case led to international criticism of Ukraine.

**Foreign Money.**

The Kuchma-Gate scandal dramatically damaged an already dented image of Ukraine. Both the scandal itself and the apparent unwillingness of the government to conduct a thorough investigation caused the country’s alienation by the international community.

Even before the case of a journalist’s murder, Ukraine was sharply criticized by the Council of Europe for not observing the people’s civil liberties and for infringing on human rights. It was acknowledged that the acting government of Ukraine failed to meet the standards
of the organization. Right after the 1999 presidential elections, which were declared to be far in violation of the international standards of fair election campaign, there was a formal initiative within the Council of Europe that proposed to suspend Ukraine’s membership. According to the 2001 report prepared by the Council of Europe’s special committee called ‘Honoring of obligations and commitments by Ukraine’, it was recommended to expel Ukraine from the organization, all for the “repeated aggression against and continuing intimidation of journalists, members of parliament, and opposition politicians” (Council of Europe, 2001).

No legal sanctions were taken against Ukraine, rather the same year of 2001, in its Action Plan for Ukraine, the Council of Europe made another attempt to urge Ukraine to apply its legal framework for the media and to encourage positive changes in the media culture of its officials and journalists (Szilágyi, 2004).

The Council of Europe was not the only organization that openly stated its negative attitude towards the political scandal in Ukraine. OSCE marked the 2002 parliamentary elections as an improvement over the previous elections, but still not void of administrative abuses. The OSCE stated that the censorship and unequal access to the media were still used. Following the authentication of a secret recording in which President Kuchma is heard as approving of the clandestine sale of the "Kolchuga" early warning systems to Iraq; the U.S. Government instituted a temporary pause in new obligations of FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) assistance benefiting the central government of Ukraine.

During the NATO summit in November, 2002, the second official language of the organization, French, was used to seat the participants at the round table. It is a rule that the participants are sat in alphabetical order. The use of French placed Kuchma a distance from the US president George Bush, as according to the French alphabet, Ukraine and the United States do not stand close to each other.

The case of Gangadze’s murder began to appear in the reports of various international organizations, including Reporters sans Frontières, the International Federation of Journalists, the International Press Institute, the Committee to Protect Journalists, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the World Bank Institute. It is important to mention that the Ukrainian media practically did not cover either Gongadze's case or the tape scandal with president Kuchma.

At the same time, despite the fierce criticism of Kuchma’s regime and the strained media situation in Ukraine on the whole, the financial support to Ukraine continued to flow. The United States, together with the European Union remained the biggest donor to Ukraine.

The Main Players.

There are three main types of donors in the media sector: governmental organizations such as USAID and Canadian International Agency for Development (CIDA), intergovernmental agencies represented by the European Union and UN agencies, and private foundations like Soros Foundation and Charles Mott Foundation. As a rule, the donor organizations have implementing partners who administer the programs. These administering organizations in their turn frequently hire another organization to realize the funded project. (See Figure 1).
United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

USAID is the government agency which provides economic development and humanitarian assistance to advance U.S. economic and political interests overseas. USAID has been working in Ukraine since 1992, when the country became free and independent after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991. The United States is one of the largest bilateral donors to Ukraine. Other donors include the World Bank, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

The main areas of USAID activities in Ukraine are economic restructuring, health and social transition, democracy and governance. The biggest focus of the latter is supporting free media and civil organizations. The first two programs address health care, pension reform, anti-trafficking programs, financial sector reform, budget reform, legal reform, agriculture, environment, and small business development (www.usaid.kiev.ua).

According to the USAID official website in Ukraine, the democracy and governance program has five main components (www.usaid.kiev.ua). First is elections. The activities under this component are designed to make parties more responsive and accountable to citizens as well as to increase the participation of Ukrainians, particularly youth and women. USAID also focuses on fostering reform of the legal and regulatory framework. Second is independent media. The program helps independent media, supports advocacy initiatives to improve and uphold the legal and regulatory framework for media, strengthens legal defense for freedom of speech, improves the financial viability through business, marketing and financial management training, and increases the availability of quality news by supporting the production of news and information. Legal aid for media representatives also is provided. The third program is Rule of
Law, in which USAID promotes the protection of citizen rights and supports limited advocacy and technical assistance programs to encourage judicial reform. The fourth program is Civil Society and NGO Development. Within this program USAID seeks to strengthen civil society organizations' (CSOs') advocacy to better protect and defend citizens’ interests and promote more transparent, accountable and responsive governance and improve CSOs’ professionalism through necessary trainings. Municipal Development/Local Government is the fifth element of the democracy and governance program. It focuses on improving the infrastructure of selected areas/cities in Ukraine. Also, the biggest focus of the USAID programs in Ukraine is the election campaigns parliamentary and presidential. In its budget justification in early 2004, the USAID’s prime goals for the media assistance program was to assure more credible and fair presidential elections in 2004 (www.usaid.kiev.ua).

The annual budget of the USAID operations in Ukraine in 1999 was $203,540,000. From 2000 through 2004, the USAID decreased this number to $94,339,000. The sum of the money requested for 2005 is $81,250,000. The decline in funding in 2004 is an intentional move; it is a first step toward the phase-out of FSA assistance to Ukraine in coming years. Altogether, from 1997 through 2004, the USAID spent $1,346,892,000 on all its programs. Approximately $86,778,000, or up to seven percent of all the money provided to Ukraine from 1997 through 2004, was spent on the media assistance projects (www.usaid.kiev.ua). USAID in its work relies greatly on the local NGOs and CSOs both, the ones that were founded during the implementation of the USAID programs and the NGOs with experience in implementing assistance projects. The main partners of USAID in the country are the Eurasia Foundation, the Institute for Sustainable Communities (ISC), the Center for Ukrainian Reform Education, U.S.-Ukraine Foundation, The American Bar Association’s Central & Eastern Europe Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI), Indiana
University, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), Internews Network, and Development Associates, Inc (see Figure 2).

The info on the main implementing partners of the USAID is based on the official USAID annual reports from 2001-2004.

**European Union.**

The European Union is another large donor to Ukraine. Most of the EU’s financial assistance is being given in response to Ukraine’s committeemen to integrate into the Union. In the early 1990s, Ukrainian authorities declared their intentions to become a EU member-state (Jakubowicz, 2001).

At the same time, the Ukrainian authorities pledged their support to a democratic press. A number of attempts were made by the government to adjust the legislation to the European Union standards. However, at a closer look at the revised legislation regarding the regulations of the media field in the country, it is clear that the regulations are rather confusing (Jakubowicz, 2001).

EU relations with Ukraine are to a large extent based on the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, which entered into force in 1998. Technical assistance has been provided since the early 1990s in support of the transition process towards democracy and a market economy, through the TACIS program. According to the official EU website, the EU is the largest donor to Ukraine; over the last 10 years, total assistance amounted to €1.072 billion from the EC, while the member states disbursed around €157 million in the period from 1996 to 1999. This consists of technical assistance through TACIS, macro-financial assistance, and humanitarian assistance.
The overall amount allocated directly to Ukraine in 2002 was €47 million, and in 2003 it was €48 million (see Table 4).

In 2003 for the media related projects only, TACIS spent €22 million. Since there is not a separate program for media development, the money was allocated through the Institutional Legal and Administrative project. The media activities addressed the development of the journalistic skills within a broader aim to support the independent media in Ukraine. The same program addressed the strengthening of the local civil and community-based non-profit organizations, including the support to the various media associations and unions, the area which has been one of the TACIS priorities since 1999.

In addition, Ukraine benefited from a number of specific and regional TACIS programs, totaling some €126 million that year. The National Indicative Program for the years 2004–06 foresees €212 million on further assistance (see Table 5).

With the closure of Chernobyl at the end of 2000 and pending alternative sources coming fully on stream, EU assistance in the energy sector has included additional support for Ukrainian fuel imports (Fuel Gap program), along with a major contribution to the Chernobyl Shelter Fund managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

It is noteworthy that the EU has not developed a separate budget for media assistance. The main areas the EU is providing assistance to are the following: legislative approximation, energy and nuclear safety, trade, environmental co-operation, transport integration process, science and technology.

Since the beginning of the 2004, the year of the Ukrainian presidential elections, the EU has allocated €1,000,000 through various technical assistance projects to the Central Election Committee of Ukraine. The program contained media development elements. Other projects in
relation to the 2004 presidential elections were mostly voter-oriented, implemented with the help of different media, like 15-minute long videos, posters, audio materials, and various projects on training for journalists, as well as for lawyers and local officials.

Another EU’s program is Erasmus Mundus. The program is aimed at the students who want to pursue higher, primarily master’s level courses, in the EU countries. The duration of the program is five years (2004–2008) with a planned financial envelope of €230 million for the whole period. (See tables 6).

**Soros Foundation/International Renaissance Foundation.**

The International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) was founded in 1990. IRF is a part of the international Soros network. The IRF Mass Media Program has been in force since 1993. It is oriented toward the support, establishment and realization of the principle of freedom of speech and establishment and development of an independent and professional mass media in Ukraine. As a result of the Program, the first ever non-governmental mass media and news agencies have appeared in Ukraine during the period 1993–1994. According to Media and Elections Strategy of the IRF, the Program supported NGO initiatives on unprejudiced information campaign drives on the eve of the parliamentary elections. For the last four years, from 2000 to 2003, the IRF supported about 200 media projects by donating $2,805,852, which is on average about 12% of the total financial support IRF provided to Ukraine in the areas ranging from education to infrastructure development, over the period of time from 2000 to 2003.
**Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).**

CIDA has been active in Ukraine since 1997. CIDA's program in Ukraine provides funding to Canadian firms, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and public institutions on a cost-shared basis to undertake projects. Canada's technical cooperation program is a concrete demonstration of Canada's commitment to assisting the process of reform and transition in Ukraine. Apart from strategic, foreign policy and security interests, Canada's interest in and understanding of Ukraine also stems from Canada's large community of Canadians of Ukrainian origin. Like some other donor agencies, CIDA does not have a separate budget for media assistance. But the organization is active in the field of strengthening the civil society and democratic institutions and practices. CIDA has also been involved in a number of projects related to the Ukrainian electoral processes.

**Other international organizations. Section summary.**

Other significant organizations that support independent media in Ukraine are UN agencies, the World Bank, US-based Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, and German Fredrick Ebert’s Foundation. The biggest implementers of the media assistance programs are Eurasia Foundation – Ukraine, Internews - Ukraine, Freedom House, and Irex-Promedia Ukraine.

Most of these organizations, for example, Eurasia Foundation and Freedom House, grew into the sustainable and separate entities after having been branches of international organizations. Now these organizations themselves apply for grants and at the same time commit
other smaller local NGOs to implement the projects. It is common for the donors and for the implementers to combine their efforts together for a program to be implemented.

Many donors do not have a special media-oriented program, but all of those mentioned above have spent money towards the development of the free and independent media in Ukraine. Most of the media projects have been seen and treated as an integral part of the programs that address the strengthening of the democratic institutions or civic society. Another commonality of the donors is that they tend to support non-governmental media. However, journalists who work at the state-owned media may benefit from the media workshops or trainings as well.

The analysis of the donor support for the Ukrainian media field shows that the main areas that receive much international attention are the support to the independent Internet publications, public radio, specialized TV and radio programming aimed at the promotion of the principles of democracy, or educating the population on the human rights. Trainings for media professionals and technical staff also are available through the grants and technical assistance. As seen from the above, when talking about media assistance, it is important to remember that it is treated in two ways, as a field demanding assistance and as a medium of promoting the democratization in the society. The close relation between the two may explain why donor organizations tend to unite civic society and independent media in one program.
CHAPTER 2.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

**Free Media and Democracy.**

Free media should have economic and political independence, access to channels for a plurality of voices, and provide a benefit to the audience. According to the USAID definition, free media is independent if it has editorial independence, is independent financially, represents different points of view, and serves the public interest (Mughan, 2000).

For Schmitter and Karl (1991) democracy is alive when the rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm of citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives. In democracy, the role of the media, which is an integral part of democracy, is to see to it that the rulers are being held accountable.

The model for development suggested by Everett Rogers (1976) emphasizes the necessity of the support of the grassroots movements, and the support to the development process from bottom up. In other words development is not something that can come from the outside. It is a participatory process of social change within a given society (Rogers, 1976).

In the earlier development model, suggested also by Rogers (1962), the communication paradigm consisted of transmitting the technology necessary for the growth of productivity. In
the second model, it consists of stimulating the potential for change within a community (Rogers, 1976).

The literature on media development indicates that there are four stages of media reform a country should go through to achieve democracy (Rozumilowicz, 2002). The first phase is called a pre-transition stage, when the media is freer than before and the government seems to be more tolerant towards the criticism. The second stage is called primary transition stage, when the culture of censorship is disrupted and the necessary media legislation is adopted. The third stage is called secondary stage. During that period both the officials and journalists take part in training to make sense of the new order; journalists receive more training on the development of their activities and also develop the networks. The last stage is called mature. At this point all the legal issues are resolved, and journalists have enough opportunities to advance their skills (Rozumilowicz, 2002).

Studying the situation in Ukraine, one may come to the conclusion that the country is far from the final stage of the democratization, but at the same time it is not on in its first phase either. Taking into account the recent disruption of the political censorship, the change of the government due to the Orange Revolution, and the journalism training that is offered at present and was available to the media professionals before the revolution, one may conclude that the current media situation in the country bears the qualities of the two middle stages, i.e., primary transition and a secondary stage (Rozumilowicz, 2002).

The main role of the media during the transition stage is to act as a witness of the change, or to publish the changes taking place in the government and in society (Rozumilowicz, 2002).

Rozumilowicz (1992) sees media independence as the outcome of a process of a media reform. She maintains that a media that is free of interference from government, business, or
dominant social groups “is better able to maintain and support the competitive and participative elements that define the concept of democracy and the related process of democratization.”

According to Carothers (1999), U.S. aid is seen to be most successful in two circumstances. When independent media are threatened by an authoritarian regime, aid can help to keep such media in existence (Carothers, 1999). The second successful setting is when political and economic reform is adequate aid can help advance the process.

In the case with Ukraine one may observe the first situation. According to various international media reports and domestic Ukrainian polls from the early 1990s to 2004, Ukrainian journalists are limited in their work, and practice self-censorship, since it is risky to be critical of the government (Razumkov Center, 2002).

Americans who are involved in training assistance programs often see the U.S. media model as the standard (Carothers, 1999). Thus a few core principles are emphasized: the importance of nonpartisanship and objectivity, the value of investigative reporting, and the preference of privately – rather than publicly – owned media (Carothers, 1999).

However these are the main features of the U.S. media, and the ones that are most often promoted as necessary for a successful media system. The media representatives from the other western countries, such as France and Great Britain, may disagree, as these countries have a long history of newspaper partisanship.

One of four components of the "Four Theories of the Press" is a Libertarian mode, currently used as a basis in the US. It is a market driven model, where media is privately owned and commercially funded. This approach leaves little room for the government control, and the idea of freedom is a cornerstone concept, or a ‘natural right’ (Siebert, 1956).
The European model of social responsibility is similar in its commitment to freedom, but media has moral obligations and is responsible to the society. There are privately owned media, and the state supports publicly owned media. The public is seen more as a group of citizens rather than consumers.

The fact-based journalism is promoted both in the US and in the Western Europe, although the European model tends to be more interpretative than the American (Smaele, 1999).

Some scholars agree that in the Eastern Europe a new media model, a hybrid of both, will emerge. The culture of Ukraine may be seen as the product of several cross-cultures: it is neither Western European, nor wholly Eastern. It is the place where conflicting ideas clashed with one another and the numerous influences were present. Some date back to the Byzantine Empire (adoption of Christianity in 988), some to the 13th century Mongol-Tatar occupation, and some to the 19th century war of two schools of thought, Westerners and Slavophiles (Smaele, 1999). However, the latest developments point to the willingness of the nation to move towards the West.

Meanwhile media assistance and media training are being provided to Ukraine. While creating laws is a task of the governmental organizations, the donors focus on building up the civil society and have a dramatic impact on building the media in an organized manner. Milkos Sukosd argues in his book Reinventing Media (Sukosd, 2003), in which he analyzed the mistakes the donors made trying to develop democracy in Kosovo, that “instead of supporting numerical pluralism of the media, they should concentrate on its quality and on building professionalism among journalists…” Sukosd argues that the donor organizations tend to be more concerned with the media assistance that is easy to measure than with difficult-to-measure, overall quality of democracy benchmarks which are visible only years later.
Even though no studies have been made to address the journalistic needs of Ukrainian media professionals, journalism training is a common act the donors are willing to spend money on. A study on the transition in journalism was conducted in the Russian republic of Tatarstan, in 1998. The study showed the growing importance of the notion of professionalism in Russian journalism. Journalists recognize the importance of providing accurate factual information. They showed openness to new, often western, ideas and practices and expressed a growing recognition of the audience (Davis, 1998).

A number of studies conducted amongst journalists in the United States show that journalism training is the first necessity for the majority of the practicing journalists. There are many ways for the workers in the media field to improve their skills and gain new knowledge. One of them is to get journalism training. In addition to the formal training and education at the journalism schools there are mid-career training programs for media professionals as well. For Ukrainian journalists the way to learn about the western style of reporting there are special programs offered by the international organizations since the programs of local schools do not focus on the journalism styles in general.

According to the existing theory there is a direct link between journalism training and the performance of the media. In the study Mid Career Training of Journalists: Evaluating its Impact on Journalistic Work (Becker, 2004), the effect of the journalism training on what the journalists do once they return to work is examined.

The findings of the Freedom Forum that conducted a survey of the American newspaper journalists in 1993 also points out the need of journalists to have an opportunity for continuing education.
Ramsey (1990) found that journalism training is one of the most important aspects for the journalists to be satisfied with their jobs.

Also the theoretical framework in other fields shows that training positively effects the further job performance of the trainees. Yamnil and McLean (1995) offer their explanation of why people might want to change their performance after receiving the trainings. They use the Holton’s model (1995) that which says there are three factors affecting the transfer of training: motivation to transfer, transfer design, and transfer climate.

Many scholars come to the same conclusion that the opportunity of journalism training is important to the professional journalists (Winter, 1993). Also journalism training is vital for the overall journalists' satisfaction with their jobs and serves as a battery charger (Hart, 1990). Many journalists name journalism training and continuation of their education as beneficial for their professional growth and self realization (Russ-Mohl, 1993).

Other US studies examine more narrow questions, i.e., in what fields exactly journalists want to study. And in the countries with well-established democracy, the first places are given to health care and environmental issues (Ramsey, 1990). The journalists in the developing countries, including Ukraine, get the training in basic skills and the issues urgent for the nation in particular. For example for Ukraine, apart from the basic skills trainings, the training on covering elections, which take place every two years, is very important and is held regularly by different organizations.
Classification of Media Assistance.

At present media assistance is an integral part of western aid for democratic development, although is a rather recent phenomenon. Media assistance as such has roots in the earlier decades. However such efforts were limited. In 1990s, particularly with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening up of East-central Europe, media assistance is now considered vital in the development of democratic societies. Media aid has progressed from fairly small projects providing computer equipment and educational visits for journalists to long-term, complex programs with multi-million dollar budgets.

The justification of every media program regardless of the donor, from United Nations to the European Union, is the recognition of the vital role the free media plays in a democratic society and its importance in the election processes and in holding the authorities accountable. These donor governments regard efforts to support democratic governance and assist media as an essential part of international development work, along with more traditional efforts to provide disaster relief or humanitarian aid.

Usually there are two ways the donors support media. The first one is indirect support through activities such as civic and health communication programs that make use of the mass media. The second is the direct support aimed at the media sector. Media sector support includes training for media professionals and students, reforming media laws, removing barriers to access, strengthening reform efforts, and funding initiatives. Some organizations support media through providing legal consultations and defense to the media outlets or individual journalists.

Depending on a donor organization and on the moneys available, the media assistance can be found either as a separate sector of the organization’s activities, or as a subgroup or as an
element of a bigger program. As a rule, media support projects are covered by governance, civil society, democratization, or similar sections.

The media assistance to Ukraine is supposed to ease the country’s transition process. The exposure of the western style media content, broadcasted directly into the country, for instance Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, and the BBC World, can also be classified as media assistance.

In this work the definition of the media assistance includes the following.

- **Journalism training and education.** This activity is aimed at reporters and editors of print and broadcast media outlets. This includes technical training, advanced training for investigative journalism, training in specialist subjects such as human rights, environment, economics, HIV/AIDS, and training in professional media ethics, accountability, and professionalism. Also included are assistance to the development of new journalism schools, the reform of existing journalism faculties and curriculum, the development of press centers, and training offered by local media NGOs. The training could be both an on-site one and long-term study programs.

- **Training in marketing, business management, and efforts to ensure financial independence.** The goal is to help organizations develop into commercially sustainable media. This includes: business training, advertising development, management training, loan programs, and grants for supplies.

- **Training of the media professionals on election related issues.** These are short-term projects for the journalists before parliamentary and presidential elections to help ensure fair and balanced coverage of the election campaigns.

- **Support to the development of the public service media outlets.**
o **Material assistance.** The goal is to help develop the infrastructure required for continued media independence. Activities include: assistance to secure continuous technical operations (email, Internet, computers, software, cameras, and subscription to the wire services, etc).

o **Assistance and advice in building democratic regulatory frameworks for media.** The goal is to help carry on the necessary social reforms, provide advice and background documents for regulatory bodies, offer legal advice and analysis to international governmental organizations and media freedom activists, and train lawyers, journalists, and judges on relevant legal issues. This includes supporting indigenous advocacy groups such as free speech NGOs. Sometimes these projects are part of larger legal reform program.

o **Legal defense.** This includes support or training for the legal defense of journalists and news organizations suffering harassment by government.

o **Support for legal advocacy.** The goal is to support media monitoring and watchdog groups that monitor press freedom and provide protection for journalists.

o **Social and cultural development.** That helps development of community-based radio and journalism.

o **New communications assistance.** Included are assistance in developing information technology, building new Internet sites, helping ensure unrestrictive regulation, and Internet access. Support for the existing and emerging opposition Internet publications also is included.

The literature on democratization suggests that democracy is usually affected by two types of factors: domestic and the ones that take place outside the country (Di Palma, 1990). The external
factors can be represented by the levels of how democracy is developed in the neighbouring countries, as the democracy “does not happen in an international vacuum” (Di Palma, 1990). The organized media assistance is directed towards addressing the internal factors. (See Figure 3).

A brief outline of the media in the Soviet and then independent Ukraine shows how the mass media was manipulated by the government to retain its authority over the people, at first during communism and then during the pseudo-democracy, which in reality turned out to be a regime very close to the authoritarian one. The international community, represented by such organizations as USAID, EU, and the Soros Foundation, tries to counteract Ukraine’s authoritarian approach to the media by supporting free and independent media through journalistic trainings and financing the media outlets.

The international Donors have spent considerable amounts of money to consolidate Ukrainian society through supporting local initiatives. Many of the existing programs do not distinguish between the civic society and media. Many of them see these two components as a whole.

Due to the fact that in Ukraine there are election campaigns every two years, presidential and parliamentary, there is a pattern of how the media assistance is distributed. More efforts and focus are being made during the election years on journalism training and training of the officials who have to work closely with the media. The other years enjoy the programs of a more general character such as technical assistance and financing of the ongoing operations.
At the same time, the same pattern is present in the field of CSOs activities. CSO is Civil Society organization. Although there are legal differences between non-governmental organization and CSO, in this study the two terms are interchangeable.

During the election years the CSOs are running numerous awareness campaigns on the election regulation and on the voters’ rights and trainings; and during the off years their activities are focused more on implementing the ongoing projects.

It is noteworthy that the CSOs, when running their awareness campaigns, rely more on the media, with the reputation of independent or, in other words and for the most part, the media that were supported by the same donor community. The reason why it happens is because the state-controlled or government owned media often practice self-censorship and tend to ignore coverage of the CSOs movements.

The necessity of the journalism programs is vital for the development of the media in Ukraine. The main reason for that is the lack of proper journalism programs in the school system of the country. As a rule the journalism departments are located and often combined with the department of Philology/Philosophy. Usually the same instructors and professors who teach languages and literature teach also the journalism classes. The professors at the journalism schools are as a rule people who never practiced journalism and do not possess journalistic background. This is when the journalism training offered by the international donors comes in handy. These programs are the only way to get skills in western style journalism to Ukrainian journalists.
It is important to acknowledge that journalism training alone cannot solve the problem of freedom of the press. While the journalism training can give media workers proper skills for their trade, truly free media will be able to operate only if it is also financially and ideologically independent. That is why the present study addressed the media support that was provided in two forms: training and funding.

**Research Questions and Hypotheses.**

In the light of the previous research, personal journalistic observations and the lack of work done assessing the impact of the media assistance and media training on the democratization of the press in Ukraine, the following research questions were developed in hopes of discovering potential relationships between media assistance and performance of the media.

RQ1: Will journalism training and media assistance impact the style of the reporting of a media outlet?

H1: Journalists of the media outlets that receive media assistance and media assistance practice objective reporting. This will be indicated by the relation of biased and unbiased information in the media reports after the assistance was provided.

RQ2: Will the credibility of the media outlet increase after its journalists receive media training?
H2: The credibility of the media outlet increases after it receives media support. This will be indicated by the number of times the media outlet was referred to as ‘a reliable source of information in Ukraine’ in the special and annual reports of the international organizations. And the number of times a publication was cited in these reports.
CHAPTER 3.

METHODOLOGY.

The Orange revolution occurred only several months ago. The peaceful protests of fall 2004 brought together millions of people to the center of the Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv. People did not leave the city for 17 days, expressing their refusal to tolerate the corruption and manipulation of the government. Only after it became obvious that the protest was big news did the unsupported media began covering the movement (Columbia Journalism Review, 2005). Soon, almost all the TV channels and other media outlets ‘switched sides’ and gave their airtime and space to the opposition. Many journalists of the openly pro-governmental media began protesting against their editorial censorship and refused to obey the old rules of making news. Unlike only a few days prior to the voting, when the opposition candidate, Victor Yushenko, did not get much media attention, now all the news agencies, including all the major international outlets, were covering the events of December 2004.

According to the various reports and news programs, the main driving force behind the Orange Revolution was the people’s movements. The NGOs, primary, the youth NGO “PORAL” (It’s Time), played a significant role in gathering and encouraging people for the protest. PORAL is similar to the Georgian youth group Kmara (meaning ‘Enough!’), Serbian group Otpor (Resistance) and Belarusian Zubr (Bison). Noteworthy, almost all of them have been financed by international donors.
As to PORA, its financial sources are not disclosed; however, the organization operates under the umbrella of the all Ukrainian coalition Freedom of the Choice, which is supported by USAID and the Renaissance Foundation.

Along with supporting the efforts of the local NGOs to create a common network, the donors also pay special attention to the Internet projects. Most of the internationally backed-up web publications are consistently named among the most popular sources of information in Ukraine. Taking a closer look at this phenomenon, one could see the realization of Jurgen Habermas’s theory (Durham and Kellner, 2003) on the public sphere, which asserts that the public sphere has ideal conditions for discussion if every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse, allowed to question any assertion, allowed to introduce any assertion and allowed to express his or her attitudes, desires and needs, and if no one may be banned from talking or coerced from talking.

According to Natalya Krasnoboka’s study (2004) on the trends of the online journalism in Eastern Europe, this attention towards the online media can be explained by the fact that the state has been ‘neglecting’ the Internet and focusing on censoring the traditional media such as TV, radio and newspapers (Krasnoboka, 2002). The main reason why Internet publications are freer than their traditional peers is because only from 3% to 8% of the population are Internet users in Ukraine, according to different reports (World Bank Report, 2003). And the number of PC owners is just a little smaller as of 2001. (See chart 3).

Several International organizations have committed to support that type of activity, thus recognizing its power. The Canadian Agency for International development, expressing its belief that civil society is related to the issue of press freedom in Ukraine, stated that recently, particularly following the September 2000 disappearance of Internet journalist Heorgy
Gongadze, who was critical of the President, the population has begun to recognize the power of the Internet as a source of more independent information than may be available from the Ukrainian press (www.cida.ca).

The current situation in Ukraine allows almost all the journalists to take part in journalism training, as stated by Internews – Ukraine. The training varies from investigative reporting and interviewing skills for reporters to the practical consultations for the managers on business issues. As a rule, a training session for journalists may last from several hours to a couple of days. The organizers of the training may cover most of the expenses of participants, apart from accommodation and transport expenses, but depending on a situation, these expenses may also be covered. The training can take place on the site of a media company, or the organizers can invite the participants to attend a workshop. The information about the training sessions can be found on the implementers’ websites, or advertised publicly.

As a rule, the international donor organizations, when rendering their assistance, are looking into the ownership of the media outlet. Thus it is highly unlikely that a state-owned media outlet will benefit from the international assistance. Normally either private media or the outlets of the opposition character are being supported. However, the journalists and management of the state owned media can freely take part in the sponsored workshops.

The reviewed literature provides a theoretical framework for a study of the impact of the media assistance on the performance of the media outlet.
Study Design.

FIRST PART.

One of the ways to analyze the difference between media outlets is to look at their online popularity ratings. The existence of special ratings websites in the ex-totalitarian countries is an interesting issue. Regardless of the fact that many media keep their owner’s name a secret, the online media participate in popularity rating competitions. Moreover the ratings of these media are publicly available. That creates a remarkable contrast with Western European media outlets where information of their online popularity is hidden (Krasnoboka, 2002).

The ratings of the Internet news sites from two different companies have been used to check the popularity of the media publications that received media assistance and publications that did not receive media assistance.

The ratings of the online publications are noted at two different points in time, with a difference of one calendar year. Two Ukrainian business companies that deal with the Internet ratings were used for the study. These are the KP publications website, www.bigmir.net, and another Ukrainian portal, www.topping.com.ua. The ratings of the news agencies and online newspapers were extracted at two different points in time: the data were drawn as of March of 2005, for the period of January – March 2005, and as of March 2004, for the period of January – March 2004.

These popularity ratings are based on the total number of hits, or number of unique visits. The ratings were extracted from the category of ‘news web-sites’, which also include the on-line versions of the newspapers and TV-channels.
The ratings of the top 15 Internet news sites of 2004 were compared against the ratings of 2005. Special attention was paid to the Internet news sites that were supported through the media assistance programs.

A way to measure the credibility of a media outlet is to examine whether there are any references made to it in the reports of the international media organization. In other words, whenever the publication is quoted in the report of the international organization, it should be considered a legitimate recognition of its credibility. The main sources for the analysis are the annual and special reports by Internews, Reporters Sans Frontieres, USAID, Freedom House, and the International Federation of Journalists. Only reports released in 2004 were analyzed.

SECOND PART.

Another part of the analyses is the textual analyses of the news reports of the Internet publications that have been supported and of the unsupported publications. Analyzed particularly were the news reports about the developments of the Orange Revolution and the actions of the opposition before and during the revolution.

To collect data I downloaded and saved the articles from the eight online publications to the hard drive, dividing them into eight groups, one for each publication. Then each story was analyzed and information was entered into a table. Eight tables were compiled from the collected data. Each one of them included the information on whether the media outlet in question was covering opposition during the period from October through November, 2005.

A two month period was selected for the textual analyses, October-November 2004. This exact period was chosen because these two months were the most interesting in terms of the
events occurring in the country. This period is significant because it covers the last month of the presidential election campaign. Also it covers the month of the mass protests in the nation, or the first month of the Orange Revolution.

SAMPLE

Even though the media training is open for all media professionals, the international agencies tend to direct their support to journalists and certain publications, that seem to donors more promising and with more potential. Because of this style of media assistance, the supported publications are different from unsupported both in terms of training and in terms of donor belief in their independence from government and viability for.

The sample used for this study is a convenience sample. Since the international donors tend to support the publications that they know and trust, there are only a few publications that can be chosen for the study.

The consequences of the non-random ‘assignment' of Internet sites to the ‘supported’ and ‘unsupported’ conditions is that we cannot determine if training alone produces any observed effect.

Four Internet news sites, which were supported by the international organizations, Ukrainska Pravda, Korrespondent.net, Obkom.net, and Telekritika, were selected as the news sites for the study. These Internet publications are of nation-wide nature and cover the events from the whole territory of Ukraine. Also they are the biggest Internet publications to be supported by the international community.
International Renaissance Foundation, CIDA, USAID and program TACIS, have the biggest share of their financial support to media go to the Internet field. Among the directly supported Internet projects are the website number one in Ukraine “Ukrainska Pravda” (Ukrainian Truth), supported from the funding of the Soros Foundation, Telekritika (Telecritics) supported by the Internews-Ukraine, etc.

Also four unsupported online publications, all nation-wide and most popular were selected for the study. These include: Fakty (Facts) at www.facts.kiev.ua, which is an Internet version of the biggest Ukrainian newspaper. The second publication is Kievskie Vedomosti (Kyiv News), at www.kv.com.ua, which is an Internet version of the second largest newspaper in Ukraine. The third is a newspaper Den (Day), its Internet version at www.day.kiev.ua. The fourth is an online publication Forum at www.for-ua.com. None of the unsupported publications used in this study belong to the government. Their owners, however, have close business and political relations with the government, particularly with the administration of the president.

DESIGN.

The random number of 90 stories out of 202 selected for the textual analyses. These 90 covered the opposition. All media selected for the study are daily publications. The two-month period is comprised of nine weeks. For every week, a day was selected and the stories analyzed. All the stories for the day in the nation section were analyzed on two Mondays, two Tuesdays, two Wednesdays, two Thursdays and on one Friday, for a total of nine days out of nine weeks.

Both the headlines and the text of the stories were analyzed. From these newspapers, comments were analyzed concerning the activities of the opposition. The number of times when
the opposition was mentioned or given the right to speak in the story, including the headline was counted. Of these times, the number of negative characteristics or qualities attributed to the opposition was counted as well. The unbalanced stories were analyzed.

The unbalanced story in this study is considered to be a story written by a journalist, who does not quote or cite any sources when making comments about an event or a person. The unbalanced story is usually full of subjectivism and lacks facts. There is a difference between a critically written story and an unbalanced story. If a journalist writes something negative about an event or a politician and while doing so the journalists quotes sources this story is considered to be critical. If a journalist writes a story and says something negative about an even or a politician and does not refer to any facts and does not quote any sources, in other words when the writing of a story is groundless, this story is considered unbalanced and biased.

The characteristics and qualities of an unbalanced story were counted at the times whenever negative wording was used in the story. Wording has words such as 'violent', 'manipulating', 'corrupt', 'lie' and the like. Both the oppositional politicians and public figures and oppositional media and NGOs or CBOs were included into the concept of opposition in this study.

The questions used in the textual analyses are the following:

- Was the opposition mentioned in the headline?
- Was the opposition mentioned in the story?
- Was the opposition mentioned in a negative way?
- Was the opposition given the chance to talk in the story?
- What are the most common traits of the stories?
CHAPTER 4.
FINDINGS.

A total of eight publications were analyzed. Half of them were the media covered by the media assistance, and half were unsupported media not covered by the media assistance. A total of 72 days of online postings of the news stories was analyzed. The time span of the study was October 1 of 2004 through November 30 of 2004.

Out of 202 stories written on politics during the period of study, 90 covered opposition. I analyzed all the articles of the eight selected publications, primarily their nation or political sections on each selected day.

The findings of the study turned out to be striking. Before beginning to analyze the articles, I had expected that among the unsupported media, the ratio between balanced and unbalanced stories would be at least 80% to 20%. However the ratio turned out to be much lower. Out of 35 articles from unsupported media, 20 were unbalanced or 57%. Thus the majority of the stories published by the unsupported media were unfair towards the opposition.

Another striking finding was the way some of the media presented their information. For instance three out of four unsupported publications wrote practically the same story on the Yushenko poisoning. The three stories used the same structure, same facts and almost the same quotes.
That fact may prove the existence of the so-called Temniki, the guidelines on what and how should be covered in the media that the government sends to the journalists. While the three unsupported publications wrote the story about poisoning using the same outline, the fourth publication ignored the story completely.

Other examples of unprofessional and biased writing were the subjectivism of the stories and one-sidedness of the stories.

**Findings for RQ1 and H1.**

**UN SUPPORTED MEDIA.**

The Ukrainian nation-wide newspaper *Fakty*. It is a privately owned publication. Its online version sits in the top twenty Internet sites in Ukraine as of March 2004.

**Finding for Fakty**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finding for Fakty</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of times opposition mentioned in the headlines</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times opposition mentioned in the story</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of unbalanced stories</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of stories in the political section</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out of 20 stories in the political section 12 news reports covered opposition, 6 of them, or 50% are unbalanced.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the study period, the publication had produced a total of 12 news reports on the opposition. Six of the stories, or 50% of the studied articles, spoke about the opposition in a negative light. About 66% of the times, the opposition made it to the publication headlines. Mostly the oppositionist candidate Victor Yushenko was at the center of the negative characteristics.
Such wordings as “(Yushenko) evasive of the truth,” “began the dirty war during the election campaign,” “Yushenko’s notorious entourage,” “(the opposition wants) revolution – bloodshed,” “manipulating” were used in the stories.

*Kievskie Vedomosti,* is another major privately owned newspaper.

Findings for *Kievskie Vedomosti.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of times opposition mentioned in the headlines</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of times opposition mentioned in the story</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of unbalanced stories</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of stories in the political section</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of 13 stories in the political section 7 news reports covered opposition, 5 of them, or about 70% are unbalanced.

During the studied period, the publication produced seven stories that deal with the opposition. One story, or 15%, had the opposition mentioned in a headline. Five stories, which is about 70%, contained negative attributions towards the opposition.

The wording of the negative qualities included the following: "lies about poisoning," “Yushenko is a changeable politician,” “PORА, the violent group," "youth extremism," “PORА, violence and persecution,” “Yushenko is a populist.”

The general tone of the newspaper was very sarcastic when it came to the opposition, sometimes hysterical, for example, when talking about the NGO ‘PORА’, For example when writing a story about PORА youth movement, a journalist kept repeating the words 'violence' and 'terrorism' and failed to get a comment from any PORА members.
The newspaper *Den*, also privately owned daily.

**Findings for Den**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>Out of 10 political stories 5 news reports covered opposition, no unbalanced stories.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of times opposition</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mentioned in the headlines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times opposition</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mentioned in the story</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of unbalanced stories</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of stories in the</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political section</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the studied period, the publication produced five stories related to the opposition. None of them were unbalanced, and none of them got a headline that mentioned the opposition. It is noteworthy that the publication's coverage of the opposition began after the mass protests started. Before that, the publication ignored the opposition.

*Forum*, privately owned Internet publication, included into the top 15 Internet sites.

**Findings for Forum**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>9</th>
<th>Out of 38 political news stories 11 news reports covered opposition, 9 of them, or about 80% are unbalanced.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of times opposition</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mentioned in the headlines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times opposition</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mentioned in the story</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of unbalanced stories</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of stories in the</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political section</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the period of the study, a total of 11 news stories that relate to the opposition were produced. Nine of them, or about 80%, had the opposition mentioned in the headlines and the same amount, nine stories or 80%, contained negative attributes of the opposition.

The wording included: accusations in "tax evasion," “violent,” “dishonest,” “POPA – terrorists”, Yushenko’s campaign is based on lies,” “violent actions and violent revolution,” et cetera.
SUPPORTED MEDIA.

*Obkom.net.ua* is a relatively new web publication it was supported in the form of provision of finances towards its creation and further assistance at the end of 2001. It is noteworthy, that the main participants of the obkom.net.ua projects are journalists who left the pro-governmental media outlets because of the political censorship issue.

Findings on *obkom.net.ua*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of times opposition mentioned in the headlines</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>Out of 20 political stories 10 news reports covered opposition, none unbalanced.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of times opposition mentioned in the story</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of unbalanced stories</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of stories in the political section</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the period of the study, the website produced ten news stories related to the opposition. None of the stories were biased about the opposition or about the governmental officials. At the same time the stories were not favorable to the opposition but were critical, yet not unbalanced.

*Korrespondent.net* is a popular website, which is privately owned and is included into the top 15 news sites of the Ukrainian Internet. *Korrespondent.net* received its first big portion of media assistance during the parliamentary elections of 2002, and since it is owned by an American citizen its staff has been exposed to the various journalism trainings.

Findings on *Korrespondent.net*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of times opposition mentioned in the headlines</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>Out of 53 political stories, 18 news reports covered opposition, none unbalanced.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of times opposition mentioned in the story</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of unbalanced stories</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of stories in the political section</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A total of 18 news reports were produced during the period of study. This high number can be explained by the fact that the publication operates as a wire service and produces reports almost 24-hours-a-day. None of the stories about the opposition or about the governmental officials are unbalanced. And the coverage of the opposition was even both before and after the first tour of the elections.

*Telekritika*, is another popular website that has been supported by the international donors. The website’s staff, just like the website of *obkom.net.ua*, consists of former pro-governmental journalists and editors. It was founded in 2001, at the peak of the political scandal with Kuchma's attempts to censor media.

**Findings on *Telekritika***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of times opposition mentioned in the headlines</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of times opposition mentioned in the story</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of unbalanced stories</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of stories in the political section</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of 26 political stories, 12 news reports covered opposition, none unbalanced.

*Telekritika* produced a total of 12 stories related to the opposition. None were unbalanced. The coverage was also even both before and after the first tour of the elections.

*Ukrainska Pravda* is the most publicized Internet site. The increase in its popularity began in 1999, right after the disappearance of Gongadze, the site's chief editor. *Ukrainska Pravda* has been a regular recipient of media assistance.
Findings on *Ukrainska Pravda*.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of times opposition mentioned in the headlines</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times opposition mentioned in the story</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of unbalanced stories</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of stories in the political section</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of 22 political stories, 15 news reports covered opposition, none unbalanced.

*Ukrainska Pravda* produced 15 stories, none unbalanced. This website is unlike the other three examined in this study and has a more interpretative way of telling the news. And even though among these 15 selected stories none of them contained negative comments about the opposition, the governmental officials do get presented in the negative light from time to time.

**Findings for RQ2 and H2.**

**POPULARITY.**

According to the both ratings, *Ukrainska Pravda*, the outlet that Gongadze started in 1999, has located on the top of the rating. According to the rating information, the online media outlets share the first top places with the well-known and popular TV –Channels.

Three out of four selected news web sites were rated among the top 15 sites in 2005 and all four were present on the 2004 ratings. (See the ratings below.)

**RATING OF THE NEWS WEB SITES ON MARCH, 2005/MARCH 2004.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating in March 2005</th>
<th>Rating in March 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| 1 Ukrainska Pravda   | 1. Podrobnosti       |
| 2 Obozrevatel        | 2. Ukrainska Pravda  |
| 3 Podrobnosti        | 3. ICTV              |
| 4 Forum              | 4. Zerkalo Nedeli    |
The news sites under study are highlighted in **bold**. As we can see from the ratings above, *Ukrainska Pravda* sits on the high position in both ratings. According to the www.topping.com.ua rating, the site *Korrespondent.net* is not listed in the top 15, its rating is absent from the rating listing completely, due to the specific character of the relationships between the two rating companies. *Obkom.net* is amongst the first positions, which is on average about 8 points below the last year index. The fourth news agency, *Telekritika*, unlike last year disappeared from its top 15 position. It is below 30th position on both of the rating systems.

**RATING OF THE NEWS WEB SITES ON MARCH, 2004.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><a href="http://www.topping.com.ua">www.topping.com.ua</a></th>
<th><a href="http://www.bigmir.net">www.bigmir.net</a></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rating in March 2005</td>
<td>Rating in March 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1</strong> Utro.ru</td>
<td><strong>1.</strong> Ukraïnska Pravda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2</strong> Pravda.ru</td>
<td><strong>2.</strong> Korrespondent.net</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3</strong> Ukraïnska Pravda</td>
<td><strong>3.</strong> Podrobnosti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4</strong> Mignews.com.ua</td>
<td><strong>4.</strong> Novy Kanal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5</strong> Korrespondent.net</td>
<td><strong>5.</strong> ProUA.com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6</strong> Forum</td>
<td><strong>6.</strong> 5 Kanal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7</strong> Podrobnosti</td>
<td><strong>7.</strong> Zerkalo Nedeli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8</strong> Regions Ru</td>
<td><strong>8.</strong> Pravda Ru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9</strong> Vlasti.net</td>
<td><strong>9.</strong> Mignews.com.ua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10</strong> Proua.com</td>
<td><strong>10.</strong> ProUa.com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11</strong> Zerkalo Nedeli</td>
<td><strong>11.</strong> Utro.ru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>12</strong> Obkom.net</td>
<td><strong>12.</strong> UNIAN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52
As shown above, the site of Ukrainska Pravda held its first positions in the rating from 2004. Korrespondent.net is listed in one rating, www.bigmir.net, as number two. Obkom.net, was rated as number 15 and 14 2004, as opposed to nine and 12 in 2005. Telekritika was still present in the top 15 positions in both ratings in 2004.

It is noteworthy that for both years out of 15 top news sites, half of them belong to the different online news groups, whereas the other half is constituted from the sites of the TV channels and online versions of the newspapers. According to Krasnoboka study “Real Journalism Goes Underground,” this situation is quite usual for the former USSR, as the Internet is not controlled by the government as is the traditional media.

As we can see from the ratings, the Internet media outlets that are supported by the international assistance are holding the top positions in both ratings. The difference between the four selected outlets is that Ukrainska Pravda and Korrespondent.net have been founded as privately-owned sites, while the other two, Obkom.net and Telekritika, were started from the beginning with help of Internews-Ukraine efforts.

On the example with the site of Obom.net one could see the dynamic growth of the popularity. The reporters of the site were taking part in a number of Internews journalism trainings, such as investigative journalism, business journalism and other more generic subjects.

Telekritika was launched by Internews Ukraine with the main goal to cover the news on the freedom of expression and follow on the developments in the legislation related to media. Practically the site has the journalists themselves as an audience. The narrow specification of the
site may cause its lower rating in 2005 than in 2004. It is noteworthy that in 2004, the year of the presidential elections, the issue of political censorship and freedom of expression was one of the main heatedly debated issues.

The popularity of the *Ukrainska Pravda* may also be explained by the level of professionalism of its staff. This outlet has been a constant recipient of the financial support from the International Renaissance Foundation, since 2001. And the journalists of the site not only participated in the journalism trainings but also gave a number of seminars to other Ukrainian journalists. *Ukrainska Pravda* was one of the first Internet publications in the country. The death of its editor, Gongadze, and the political scandal that followed it, turned public attention to the site of *Ukrainska Pravda* and to the Internet in General.

*Korrespondent.net* is a news site started by a U.S. citizen in 2000. Through the European Union TACIS program, Korrespondent.net arranged several journalism training sessions both for its staff and for other Ukrainian journalists. The main projects were conducted during the election years in 2002 and 2004.

The Internet publications have more possibilities to work objectively, as the government pressure does not cover the Internet field. The first attempts of control over the World Wide Web were proposed in the form of a bill to the parliament, but it never got enforced.

It is possible to suggest that during the period from the time when the first Internet publication was started in Ukraine up to the Orange Revolution, the online media was trying to fulfill the task of democratization, which is historically the role of the traditional media.
Out of eight online publications, four are mentioned in the International reports. These are the four media outlets that received the media assistance.

Two of them, Korrespondent.net and Ukrainska Pravda, are present in the Freedom House Nations in Transit Report of 2004, where both are referred to as the ‘most influential political media.

Also all four media, Korrespondent.net, Ukrainska Pravda, Obkom.net.ua, and Telekritika, were quoted in the Internews Media Environment reports of 2003 and 2004. However, these four media under study are not the only ones that were cited in the reports. Other Ukrainian publications such as Silski Visti, Vysoky Zamok and others also were quoted.

General table of the findings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unsupported media</th>
<th>Supported Media</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of stories in political sections of the publications</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Stories which cover opposition</td>
<td>35 of 81 (43.2%)</td>
<td>55 of 121 (45.5%)</td>
<td>90 (44.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of unbalanced stories</td>
<td>20 of 35 (57%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20 of 90 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times cited in the reports of the international organizations</td>
<td>0 of 4</td>
<td>4 of 4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Included into top 15 websites (in two Internet rating systems)</td>
<td>1 of 4</td>
<td>4 of 4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A total of 202 stories were published in the eight publications. The major part of the stories were written by the supported media, partly because these news websites operate like news agencies, releasing several stories a day. While the online versions of the newspapers add stories to what was already on paper quite seldom. The number of the stories on opposition from unsupported media and supported is 43.2% and 45.5% respectively. Out of 202 stories, 90 articles covered opposition. Of them the major part, or 57 percent were unbalanced, whereas zero unbalanced stories were observed in the supported media.

None of the four Unsupported publications was cited in the reports of the international organizations. And all four supported publications were cited in such reports.

According to the two Internet rating systems, only one unsupported publication is included into the top 15 Internet rating. And all four supported were in the top 15.
CHAPTER 5.
DISCUSSION.

Media training has an effect on the performance of the media publications under certain circumstances. The Study showed that the supported media produce more professional, western-style reporting. And due to the media assistance they can afford to be editorially independent. The unsupported media suffers from two shortcomings: its unprofessionally written stories, which are usually skewed to the side of the government and filled with bias. The second is their editorial dependence and inability to resist censorship.

It should be acknowledged that the free media is possible when both the media workers are adequately trained and when the ownership of the media outlet allows for free expression. In case of Ukraine, most of the media is under the governmental control. That is why it is important to note that the media assistance is provided in two ways: training for the professional work, and funding for the general operations of the publications.

The purpose of this study was to explore the relationship between media assistance to the press and the performance of the media outlets that have been supported. For that purpose, four unsupported online publications and four online publications that have been covered by the media assistance were analyzed. The four unsupported publications are not owned by the government, but the editorial policy of these publications in under the control of the government, due to the close business and political ties between the owners of the publication and the presidential administrations.

*Obkom.net* has been supported by several organizations, including, Internews – Ukraine, Soros Foundation, Foundation for Democracy Endowment.
Korrespondent.net received financial support from European Union, through its TACIS program. Ukrainska Pravda has been a constant recipient of the funding from Soros Foundation, i.e. Renaissance Foundation. And Telekritika is a project that was started due to the financial help from Internews-Ukraine.

As was mentioned in Chapter 4, such variables as the publication performance, credibility and popularity were affected by the media assistance.

Below are the generalizations of the findings for research question and hypothesis number 1.

The tone of the unsupported news stories is quite ironic and sarcastic when it comes to the opposition actions. As the analyses showed, the stories lack objectivity and are filled with subjectivity, such as “Unfortunately for...,” “Obviously that...,” “Useless actions of the opposition,” “personally speaking,” et cetera. In other words, the writer does not make a distinction between her or his own opinion from the facts and from the opinion of those interviewed. Also the copy of the unsupported media contains many expletives, such as “in principle,” “sort of,” and others. This reinforces the effect of subjectivity. Also, the unsupported media does not give both sides the right to express their views. Three out of four publications covered the opposition with bias, whereas the fourth publication, Den, had a tendency to ignore the opposition entirely. Den began covering the news on opposition when the mass protests in Kyiv and across country gained high visibility, both locally and internationally. This proves the concept that the unsupported media, being under the control of the government, could not practice fair journalism, unless they can afford to be editorially independent. In that sense the supported media are more fortunate, as they get the financial support from the donors as well as training programs.
Unlike the unsupported journalists, the ones from the supported media do not usually allow for the subjectivity and expletives in their stories. For example, none of their stories are unbalanced toward both the government and the opposition. However, they can be critical of both. And they tend to provide the opportunity to talk to both sides, and thus their work appears more professional.

The stories from supported media are balanced, and they do not confuse the writer’s opinion with the facts. In other words the content analyses of the stories from the supported media showed that their style is very close to the western style of reporting, or to what is usually taught at the training sessions.

The research question and hypothesis number 2.

None of the selected stories from the unsupported media appear in either quotes or references in the reports of the international organizations. On the contrary all four of the supported media have been quoted in the Internews-Ukraine report on media environment, and two of them were named amongst the most influential political media in Ukraine.

These findings suggest that on the current stage of the development of the Ukrainian society, media assistance and media training, for the Internet publications in particular, are important for their professional performance. The assistance allows for the very existence of the online media due to its financial support, and therefore allows for almost the only form of professional journalism to prosper in Ukraine.

The problem with this type of media support is that, because of the very small number of Internet users, this type of journalism is not accessible to the rest of the population. And because of the censorship that existed while Kuchma was Ukrainian president, the unsupported media, even when trained by the international organizations, could not practice fair principles of
journalism. The journalists who did not want to stay in the pro-governmental media outlets left their publications to start their own, independent media. Since the Internet was not censored by the government as much as the traditional newspapers were, these new independent publications usually were launched online.

Limitations of the study and future research.

The author of this research was the only coder in the analyses. This is due to the financial restraints of the researcher. The study also could benefit from the personal interviews with the editors of the eight selected media to cover the issues of political censorship and objective journalism. The questions of the editors could include the questions about their own perceptions on the impact of the media training and media assistance in general.

As was mentioned before, there have been no studies made to assess the needs of the media professionals in Ukraine. The media situation in Ukraine is rather complex. However, the main areas of media assistance are the election-related training sessions, caused by the frequency of the election campaigns that occur two times a year. The other most common form of media assistance is the provision of finances.

The lack of professionally gathered information on what the Ukrainian journalists need to better their field does not improve the media situation to its full capacity.
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Case studies of Hungary, Ukraine and Kosovo


**TABLE 1**

Nations in Transit 2004

**UKRAINE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Process</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Media</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.50</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.75</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.25</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.50</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.50</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.50</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Nations in Transit Report prepared by Freedom House (2004).*

**TABLE 2**

A Fifteen Year Timeline (Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Status).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>PF</td>
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<td>PF</td>
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<td>PF</td>
<td>4,3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

PF – partly free.

*Compiled from the Freedom House reports.*

**TABLE 3**

Freedom in the world in 2004.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political rights</th>
<th>Civil liberties</th>
<th>Status</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3   ☢️</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Reported by Freedom House (2004).*
Ukraine’s press freedom, documented by Freedom House.

*EE – Countries of Eastern Europe
**CHART 2**

**Correlation between corruption and media freedom**

(Based on the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, and the Press Freedom index by Freedom House)
FIGURE 1

The mechanism of how the donor support is distributed.

Donors and Actors

Donors & Donor/Implementers

- Governmental Organizations (EC, USAID, DFID, SIDA, etc)
- International Governmental Organizations (UNESCO, OSCE, CoE, World Bank, EBRD)
- Foundations (OSI, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Freedom Forum, etc)
- International Industry Associations (EBU)

Intermediaries Agencies/Contractors

- International NGOs (IREX, Internews, ICFJ, Independent Journalism Foundation)
- Western universities, media outlets, experts, etc., conducting training, exchanges, and partnerships
- Media watchdog and freedom of speech organizations

Local Partners

- Media outlets
- Media organizations and other NGOs
- Professional associations (of journalists, publishers, broadcasters…)
- Journalism schools; Universities
- Policy-makers and government institutions

Based on the study by Monroe E. Price, Bethany Davis Noll, Daniel De Luce. The Program in Comparative Media, University of Oxford 2002.
FIGURE 2

The mechanism of how the USAID media assistance is distributed in Ukraine.
### TABLE 4

**TACIS PROGRAMME OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION - Funds committed for Ukraine**

1. **Funds Allocated through Ukraine Action Programmes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for institutional, legal and administrative reform</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to the private sector and assistance for economic development</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support in addressing the social consequences of transition</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of infrastructure networks (including energy, transport and telecommunications)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of environmental protection and management of natural resources</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of the rural economy</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy advice, Small Project Programmes (SPPs), Etro and reserves</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tempus</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Ukraine AP</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>48</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
<td><strong>48</strong></td>
<td><strong>48</strong></td>
<td><strong>464</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 5

2. **Funds Allocated through Other Programmes**

In addition to the National Action Programmes, other Tacis programmes also allocate funds to Ukraine. Below is an estimate based on the hypothesis that, in case of multi-country programmes, 25% of funds allocated to the CIS concern Ukraine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional and other Programmes *</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>128</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuclear Safety</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Gap</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor Coordination **</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme Implementation Support ***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total from other programmes</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td><strong>63</strong></td>
<td><strong>72</strong></td>
<td><strong>81</strong></td>
<td><strong>64</strong></td>
<td><strong>81</strong></td>
<td><strong>72</strong></td>
<td><strong>88</strong></td>
<td><strong>113</strong></td>
<td><strong>608</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Including the Ukrainian share of the Regional (ex-Inter-State), Cross-Border Cooperation (from 1996 onwards) and Democracy (until 1998) Programmes:

**Including the Science & Technology Centre of Ukraine, 25% of EBRD Bank; other facilities:**

***Including Coordinating Units, Information, Monitoring and Evaluation, STAP facility, ATA (Assistance Technique et Administrative) -

3. **TOTAL FUNDS ALLOCATED to Ukraine**

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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total allocated to Ukraine</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1,072</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.

Map of the freedom according to the Freedom House ranking.

Data from the Freedom House 2004 index.
Chart 3.