MOTIVE AND MISSION:

AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S. STATE-BUILDING EFFORTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

by

ANN MEZZELL

(Under the Direction of Loch K. Johnson)

ABSTRACT

Post-Cold War international relations have been largely defined by the security and humanitarian challenges posed by weak and failing states. Great power states, in turn, have come to increasingly accept state-building as a legitimate cause for the use of military force. In this study, I employ process tracing and statistical analyses as means of assessing the links between foreign policy decision makers’ motives for state-building, the subsequent commitment of resources to the intervention, and the ultimate outcome of the engagement. I find that the scope of state-building motives is positively correlated with resource commitments. In turn, I find that resource commitment levels are positively correlated with state-building outcomes.

INDEX WORDS: State-building, Failed states, U.S. foreign policy, Process tracing, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan
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For my family: Mom, Dad, Brian and Amy. And for Dr. Iren Omo-Bare, who sparked my interest in world politics.
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>UNOSOM / UNOSOM-I</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNITAF (Somalia)</td>
<td>United Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council (U.S.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM-II</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<td>PDD</td>
<td>Presidential Decision Directive (U.S.)</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>BSA</td>
<td>Bosnian-Serb Army</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR (Bosnia)</td>
<td>Implementation Force (NATO)</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFOR (Bosnia)</td>
<td>Stabilization Force (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO)</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force (NATO)</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

Much of the literature on contemporary state failure focuses on questions regarding the necessity and viability of the United States’ state-building efforts, the appropriate strategies for such interventions, and the lessons learned from past involvements in failed and failing states. As noted by scholars and policy experts alike, these questions have assumed heightened importance since 1991, and particularly in the post-September 11th environment. Key works from the past several years highlight a critical challenge for those involved in the study and practice of state-building: the need for recognition of and proper responses to state failure not only as it relates to intra-state conflict and humanitarian crises, but as a threat to regional stability and United States national security. While many of these studies point to the need for a reorientation in foreign policy-makers’ understanding of state failure and state-building, few seek to address the ways in which this purported shift in thinking has actually influenced the conduct of United States interventions abroad.

The New Face of State Failure: Post-Cold War Challenges

One of the chief lessons to be drawn from the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, is that failed states have the potential to critically influence neighboring countries, regional stability, and the course of great-power politics. While the dangers associated with governmental weakness and collapse could once be kept isolated and contained, in today’s increasingly interconnected world, failed states now pose threats not just to their own citizens, but to the international community as a whole (Hamre and Sullivan 2002; Rotberg 2002; Carment 2003). Once recognized by scholars and foreign policy makers as little more than hot-spots for intra-
state conflict and humanitarian crises, and consequently thought to be peripheral to the concerns of key international actors, failed states of the post-Cold War environment are now more likely to be viewed as central to the vital interests of great power states. Even among those who continue to conceive of foreign policy decision-making in terms of the distinction between normative options and strategic options, there is a growing understanding of the fact that management of the increasingly comprehensive risks presented by failed states is a necessary commitment for the international community (Zartman 2005).

Though foreign policy makers have been quick to acknowledge the severity of the challenge at hand - the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002, for example, notes that “Americans are now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones” - it seems unclear that international actors have come to appreciate the full extent of the problem of weak and failing governments. In part, this could be because policy debates regarding the appropriate means of responding to state failure remain largely colored by ideological leanings, a trend that tends to reduce the issue to one of seemingly simplistic scope. As Fukuyama notes, conservatives disapprove of the humanitarian state-building interventions championed by liberals in the 1990s; liberals, in turn, criticize more recent security-based interventions as “imperialistic” (2004). One-dimensional conceptions of state failure and major powers’ responses to state failure extend to the academic realm as well. In spite of the range of developments achieved in post-Cold War studies of third-party peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions, a great deal of the research in this area remains centered on realist-idealist theoretical debates (Finnemore 2003). Though academics and policymakers alike have begun to draw attention to the fact that failed states now pose threats to regional and international security as well as to their own populations, few studies, if any, draw attention to the ways in which shifting intervention objectives relate to
subsequent intervention responses, and thus, to intervention outcomes. This shortcoming serves as the basis for the research question posed in this study: How do changed and changing motives for intervention in failed states (on the part of major power actors) influence the outcomes of state building engagements?

**Research Question in Context:**

*Building on Conventional Intervention Literature*

Given the Bush administration’s gradual acceptance of state-building as cause for the use of military force, as well as the fact that interpretations of past interventions and even the concept of state-building itself remain the subject of controversy, it seems as though the relationship between the understanding of and responses to state failure pose questions that are both academically and policy-relevant. While many recent studies draw attention to the new security risks posed by failed states, few, if any, draw attention to the ways in which this shift in the perceptions of state failure relates to the ways in which the United States actually responds to these countries. The significance of how transformations in the United States’ conceptions of failed states relate to trends in United States’ reactions to failed states should not be underestimated. From a theoretical perspective, these changing understandings of state failure provide an opportunity for hypothesis testing, as well as for the generation of new hypotheses. From a policy perspective, new and modified understandings of state failure allow for a re-assessment of past efforts and current engagements.

In the following chapters, I investigate the literature relating to the above research question, develop a series of theoretically and policy-driven hypotheses, assess the strength of my primary and competing arguments using qualitative and quantitative methods, and draw conclusions regarding the results of my case studies and statistical models. The literature reviewed for this work encompasses a broad spectrum of thought, ranging from the purely
academic to the more directly policy-applicable. I highlight the strengths and weaknesses of both bodies of research, and suggest that the new challenges posed by failed states require that we move beyond the traditional divide between realism and liberalism (liberal idealism) inherent to most such studies.

One of the primary characteristics of conventional realist-idealist intervention literature is that it is fundamentally rooted in Cold War notions of strategic versus normative considerations; in the contemporary post-Cold War environment, such options are rarely divorced from each other. In fact, modern day state failure is noteworthy in that it poses risks in which security-strategic and humanitarian-developmental concerns are inextricably linked to one another. As such, I introduce new strands of research - that have not yet been explicitly applied to questions of state failure and external state-building intervention - in hopes of advancing the literature.

Recent studies associated with English School variants of critical theory suggest that intervention efforts are increasingly defined by the rise of the “liberal intervention community,” or the group of great power actors (individuals, states, and international organizations) that have emerged as proponents of political liberalism as the guiding force for post-Cold War international politics. This liberal intervention community views the developing world, and particularly the “new wars” (or civil conflicts) endemic to weak and failing states, in terms of the overlap between vicious cycles of security-strategic and humanitarian-developmental problems. Such grand-scale problems, by their nature, necessitate grand-scale interventions. Thus, third-party intervention is no longer geared toward particularized goals such as the promotion of democratic governance, or the provision of peace-keeping forces, or the mediation of civil disputes; it is aimed at the wholesale reconstruction of states and their societies in the liberal image, i.e., state building. Though proponents of this line of research suggest that the interveners’
objectives are ultimately rooted in self-interest (more specifically, the pursuit of benefits to be derived from the establishment of a liberal international order), they nonetheless highlight one of the emerging facets of post-Cold War state-building: state building is now less likely to be viewed in terms of a goal undertaken for either material interest or normative-ethical objectives, but rather as a comprehensive reaction to the growing range of threats posed by failed states.

Similar ideas can be found in contemporary strands of foreign policy literature; assessments of the U.S. leadership’s revival of just war rhetoric note that such a stance can be linked to the need to win approval for America’s international pursuits from the mass public, members of the foreign policy elite, and international allies and organizations (often referred to as the “American exceptionalism” perspective). According to this line of thought, liberal states are, by virtue of their political structures and values, constrained in the foreign policy arena by the need for favorable public opinion, some degree of cross-branch agreement, and at least nominal support from the international community. As such, foreign policy leaders are not only more likely to acknowledge that U.S. efforts abroad can serve a host of interests, but to exploit this multiplicity of interests for the purpose of selling international pursuits to relevant audiences. Engagements that were, at one time, thought to be secondary to the promotion and protection of vital national interests - democratization, humanitarian intervention, development assistance - are now more likely to be viewed and adopted as part and parcel of the “primary” foreign policy agenda. This body of thought, much like the critical school assessment of liberal intervention, is characterized by an undercurrent of cynicism; it suggests that the purpose for the employment of multi-motive rhetoric in post-Cold War interventions may be far from “pure.” Nonetheless, it too highlights the turn to a new brand of foreign policy rhetoric, seemingly matched by the turn to a new brand of foreign policy action – the reliance on comprehensive or multi-motive intervention.
An Overview of the Primary Hypothesis

It is the seeming overlap between the above-mentioned variants of theoretically driven and policy based research that serves as the basis for my primary hypothesis; I contend that multi-motive state building engagements (those that match with the patterns advanced by liberal intervention theory and policy studies of just war rhetoric) are more likely to result in successful outcomes that are state building interventions driven by a single or overriding objective. The logic behind this assertion stems from a marriage of the key positions advanced by the theoretical and policy-based accounts of post-Cold War third-party intervention; whether for purposes of advancing a liberal world order or of selling a foreign policy agenda (or even out of pure recognition that failed states now pose a greater number and range of threats than they once did in a less interconnected international environment), policy leaders are increasingly likely to recognize and promote state-building intervention as a multi-interest undertaking. State-building endeavors promoted as such will, in all likelihood, be met with a greater resources than those advertised as being guided by minimal interests or singular objectives. Consequently, multi-motive state building operations (undertaken in pursuit of a comprehensive range of objectives) will be more likely to result in successful outcomes than single-purpose state building operations.

I test the strength of this presumed relationship by relying on both qualitative and quantitative methods. I first conduct a five case comparative study of post-Cold War state building engagements. Relying on Mill’s method-of-difference approach, I examine the ways in which ostensibly similar cases of state failure, and consequent intervention, result in varying outcomes; I attempt to discern whether these differences in outcome can be linked to differences in the initial motive for intervention. I build on the standard case study methodology by applying a process-tracing scheme to the cases under investigation. This additional step not only allows
for the examination of greater points of analysis than does the conventional case study design, but provides for a means of establishing step-by-step causal processes at play in the hypothesized motive→resource commitment→outcome relationship.

I further test the strength of my primary hypothesis by turning to statistical modeling. Using a variant (par-P) of a standard count model, I look to verify the existence of a correlation between state-building motive and outcome. Ideally, the inclusion of this statistical model should account for some of the shortcomings inherent to qualitative analyses (the small-n problem); by the same token, the use of case studies should allow for a greater understanding of the causal processes and relationships at play than could be afforded by quantitative methodology.

**An Initial Discussion of the Findings**

The findings presented in this study appear to lend a degree of empirical support to the critical-theoretical arguments on liberal intervention, as well as those associated with the “just war revival” (American exceptionalism) policy perspectives. From a theoretical perspective, alignments between changing perceptions of state failure and state-building outcomes provide an opportunity for hypothesis generation and testing. Further, they provide for efforts to bridge the seeming disconnect between the literature on intervention motives and the literature on intervention characteristics (scale and strategy), as well as to advance the standard rational choice and psychologically driven literature on intervention motive and outcome in ways that move beyond the conventionally assumed “intervention” / “no intervention” outcome. From a policy outlook, potential links between new and modified motivations for great power states’ responses not allow for (re)assessments of past efforts and current engagements, they convey the need for a more comprehensive understanding of state failure and state building among foreign policy experts and decision-makers. As Jentleson (2004) notes, the ability to distinguish between
interventions guided by humanitarian inclinations, underlying strategic objectives, or a combination of motivations highlight key differences in how the mission should be defined, how the forces ought to be structured, and how the various elements of the overarching strategy might best be used together. Accordingly, it seems as though one of the chief lessons at hand is that the manner in which the crisis is conceived of and “sold” - within the administration, among key players in the foreign policy and international communities, and to the American public - holds a potentially significant degree of influence on the subsequent commitment to and outcome of U.S. state building exercises.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW

An Overview of Causes and Characteristics of State Failure

One of the distinguishing features of the literature on contemporary state failure is the apparent schism between the research that attributes post-Cold War governmental weakness to states’ internal dynamics, and that which suggests that collapse is associated with outside-in processes (external or systemic forces). Thus, the literature is largely divided along the lines of the comparative politics and international relations sub-fields.

Internal Dynamics of State Failure: Human Agency, or Elite Predation

In large part, comparative theories of state failure hint at the extent to which human agency, whether intentional or unintentional, plays a role in the decline and ultimate retraction of the state’s institutional apparatus (Hentz 2004). Buzan, for example, identifies illegitimate or tyrannical rule as a root cause of state failure. According to Buzan (1991), strong and legitimate governance is necessarily a product of the loyalty and regulatory capacities of its society - capacities that cannot survive under conditions of authoritarian rule. Others, similarly, contend that the “revealing signposts” of exploitation and predation on the part of political elites are principally related to processes of state failure; that the outward appearance of chaos and dysfunction masks an institutionalized system of corruption, clientelism, and neo-patrimonial rule (Rotberg 2002; Hentz 2004; Maass and Meoham 2004). Accounts of elite predation are primarily associated with instrumental theories of ethnic conflict, which suggest that intra-state war is the product of a leader’s ability motivate members of their ethnic group to engage in violence as a means of fulfilling their own personal political ambitions (Smith 1993).
Though the intentional elite abuse of a state’s weakened structures and functions is often at the heart of governmental failure and collapse, it is also the case that actors may pursue courses of action intended to benefit the state and its citizens, but that for reasons of mismanagement or simple misfortune, may result in negative outcomes. In some cases, leaders pursue damaging policies that result in decreased state capacity, thus rendering the state unable to provide essential public goods (Maass and Mepham 2004; Chesterman et al. 2005).

External Sources of State Failure: Historical Legacy

Alternate theories of state failure point to the role of outside actors - particularly, the influence of great power states or the nature of the international system itself - as having critical implications for underdeveloped states. Perhaps one of the more common themes of this line of research is that a state’s colonial legacy, particularly “imperial exit” by the colonial power and subsequent collapse of the colonial order (especially as is characteristic of African countries), is linked to the collapse of the state itself. In the case of African countries, the failure of colonial powers drew state boundaries across existing tribal, ethnic, and regional alliances – in many cases leaving the newly created states landlocked or subject to other barriers to development – and then withdrew from the new states prior to providing for governmental personnel of adequate numbers or training, thus assuring that basic state functions would go unfulfilled and allowing for illegitimate strong-men to come to power (Failed and Collapsed States in the International System 2003).

An offshoot, or corollary, to the colonial legacy hypothesis attributes certain instances of state failure to the involvement of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the developing world during the Cold War. In many instances, developing states were plagued by Cold War politics, as the rival superpowers inhibited economic development, instigated conflict, or supported anti-
democratic regimes as means of advancing their own geopolitical interests in parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Though great power involvement during the Cold War may have helped to prolong the viability of many developing and newly independent states, 1980s-era withdrawals and assistance cuts only made clearer the gravity of their weaknesses, allowing for increased internal conflict and power-grabs by illegitimate leaders (Helman and Ratner 1992-93; Failed and Collapsed States in the International System 2003).

Recent Contributions: Liberal Versus Critical Accounts of State Failure

While elite-predation and historical legacy perspectives are prevalent in academic and policy circles, they tend to overlook processes of state failure that rest on the relationship between internal and external forces. More contemporary research draws together strains of both inside-out and outside-in accounts of governmental weakness and decline, suggesting that the combination of weak governance from within and increases in trans-border activity (often extra-legal in nature) allows not only for state failure but for the contagion of state failure (Hentz 2004). Perhaps one of the more common themes of this literature is that of the degree to which state failure is linked to processes of globalization and the growing dominance of neo-liberal economics. Studies of this vein diverge in their interpretation of the effects of the spread of neo-liberal economics and ideology, as well as on the effects associated with the “liberal peace.” Neoliberal and liberal-democratic peace scholarship suggest that developing states will come to benefit from their integration into transnational organizational and economic networks and from the spread (exportation) of democratic governance, respectively. Critical theorists, in turn, note that globalization both triggers and reinforces other causes and characteristics of state failure (Kaldor 1999; Duffield 2001).

In general, the new critical variants of state failure literature stem from older arguments
rooted in neo-imperialism and dependency theories. As some note, globalization, coupled with
the influence of neo-liberal ideology, tends to aggravate “the general frailty of regulatory state
functions and state abilities to supply public goods” (Failed and Collapsed States in the
International System 2003). Causes of state failure can be found in the “global dislocation,” or
growing divide between those states who participate in transnational networks, and those who
are excluded from them but are nonetheless subject to their effects. It is the interplay between
those states with weak or non-existent central authority, and the increasingly liberal political and
economic order, that allows for the instigation and perpetuation of state failure (Hentz 2004).
Open markets and borders provide for the influx of weapons, organized criminal elements, and
terrorist actors in those states that are least able to regulate them. Thus, states that are formally
excluded from the core areas of the liberal world order are informally incorporated through
shadow or extra-legal trans-border activities (Castells 1996; Duffield 2001).

An Overview of Causes and Characteristics of Third-Party Intervention

Traditional Perspectives: Realism-Idealism and Instrumentalism-Affectivism

As Zartman observes, the task of state building should ideally be left to those who must
deal with its consequences: the citizens of the state itself (1995; 2005). Yet, failed states are
unable to provide basic public goods – namely, security – for their citizens; this indicates that
they are fundamentally un-equipped for such work. Thus, the responsibility for rehabilitating
collapsed states rests with members of the international community: international organizations,
regional actors, and donor states (Rotberg 2002; Zartman 2005). Traditional research on third-
party intervention tends to be divided along realist-idealist (and instrumental-affective) lines.
Realism vs. Liberal Idealism

Realist theories of foreign policy identify power as the key concern of states in the international system, as power allows for the attainment of states’ most basic objective: self-preservation (Morgenthau 1948). Given the anarchic nature of the international system, states are constantly engaged in a self-help security competition. Consequently, they are consumed by the pursuit of power, as political and military clout enable them to better shape the international environment to their interests (Mearsheimer 1994-1995; Huntington 1993). In such a system, normative concerns – democracy, human rights – are secondary to power-based considerations (Jentleson 2004).

Third-party intervention is a well established instrument of foreign policy, particularly for great power states. Leaders of powerful nations exploit the intervention option in pursuit of their own interests, and often against the will of the target state (Morgenthau 1957). Structural realists as well as hegemonic theorists note that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. regularly intervened in other states as a means of Cold War power-balancing (Kaplan 1957; Pearson 1976; Peterson 1976; Luard 1988). While structural realists focus on balance of power motivations (Kaplan 1957; Pearson 1976), and hegemonic theorists highlight actors’ concerns for their hemispheric zone of influence (Peterson 1976; Luard 1988), both frameworks assume that intervention is prompted by concerns for vital national interests.

Some contend that realist arguments are ill suited to the contemporary international environment; that great power states’ military actions are often geared toward normative rather than purely geo-strategic interests. Realists counter with the argument that non-interventions in post-Cold War crises can be linked to the limited geopolitical and economic threat that they pose to powerful nations (Jentleson 2003; Zartman 2005). As Brown and Rosecrance (1992) note, it is
pleasant to assume that moral impulse will prompt action from outside forces; yet, humanitarianism is often an inadequate basis for intervention. Further, many realists adhere to primordialist views of ethnically-based civil conflicts. They regard such violence as the unpreventable “playing out of history,” and advise external actors to engage in cautious observation rather than direct action (Hoffman 1995). Finally, many realists continue to advance the classical notion of sovereignty as a basis for non-intervention. Relying on the philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, Mill, and Rousseau, modern-day scholars insist that even when states fail to uphold their sovereign duties (protection of their citizens), intervention should be practiced with caution, and in many cases, not at all (Axworthy 2000; Hoffman 1995).

Though most of the realist literature on external intervention literature focuses on great power states’ non-involvement with failing states, some realist studies do offer explanations of when and how interventions do occur. Some (Pei and Kasper 2003), for example, suggest that external actors are more likely to intervene – and to intervene successfully – when the interests of the outside power align with those of the elites and major population groups of the target nation. Other realist arguments bolster this view. Hoffman (1995) and Carment et al. (1998) find that intervention is more likely to occur – and to yield positive outcomes – when great power actors share national and ethnic ties with the peoples of a target state. Thus, they note, most successful U.S. interventions have occurred in or near Europe.

In contrast to realist explanations of external intervention, idealist theories highlight the extent to which normative considerations influence post-Cold War foreign policy. Whereas realism (and to some extent, neo-liberalism) emphasize the role of rational-utilitarian logic, idealism suggests that normative forces can be a powerful motivator for great power action. Though the idealist school draws from various frameworks – classical idealism,
neofunctionalism, neoinstitutionalism, transnationalism, and hegemonic stability theory – it centers on the belief that aggressive state behavior can be altered and diminished through the application of appropriate institutional measures (Henderson 1999).

A good deal of idealist thought is rooted in classical liberal positions on the role of free trade, international law and organizations, and the proliferation of democratic governance. Democratic idealists, particularly Kantians and Wilsonians, contend that Western states’ foreign policies should, and often do, reflect a reliance on right rather than might. In large part, this is due to the influence of domestic institutions; democratic states are more apt to respect international norms and institutions of humanitarianism and rule of law (Kober 1994). Secondly, contemporary leaders recognize that long-term vital interests are well served by principled foreign policy making; i.e., the promotion of liberal values abroad (Nye 1990; Walzer 1995). As such, great power democracies are likely to behave as good global citizens, and accordingly, to intervene in other states when there is “moral cause” for doing so.

New variants of classical liberal theories – in particular, the human security argument – are geared towards explaining post-Cold War interventionism in humanitarian-specific crises (Finnemore 2003). The human security thesis suggests that individuals are not only the responsibility of their respective states, but of the international community as well. When a state is unwilling or unable to provide for its citizens’ rights to peace and security, international actors must intervene (Vance 2000). Within the United Nations, the policy version of this argument is known as the “Annan Doctrine,” which calls for UN intervention when governments cannot protect their citizens, or when governments themselves act as predators toward their citizens.
Instrumental vs. Affective Approaches

Scholars of intra-state conflict typically identify two overarching perspectives - instrumental theories and affective theories - as critical to understanding the “new wars” of the post-Cold War environment. In most instances, this research focuses on questions regarding the onset and duration of internal warfare. More recent studies, however, examine the ways in which external actors influence the course and outcome of intra-state conflict. Such developments are particularly relevant to advancing the knowledge on patterns of state failure and state recovery. Within the context of this study, a review of the two theories can help to shed light on the potential relationship between state-building motive and state-building outcome.

Traditional instrumental accounts of internal violence suggest that the engagement in conflict can be linked to the presumed gains to be derived from such activity. Contemporary studies apply this same logic to the objectives of external-actor involvement in civil conflict. The expectation is that third-parties are motivated to intervene for utilitarian objectives, whether political, economic, or military in nature (Heraclides 1990; Carment and James 1995). Outside-actor intervention, and particularly outside-state intervention, in civil violence may be premised on a range of considerations: domestic political constraints or opportunities, the potential for economic gain, international political stake, or the chance for the assertion or expansion of military clout (Heraclides 1990; Carment 1993). This argument - that rational interest calculations are the most common and salient bases for third-party action - has been further expanded for application to specific categories of intervention and intervenor. Heraclides (1990; 1991), for example, suggests that the single overriding reason for external state involvement in internal conflict is international political gain; he also contends that powerful states are more likely to engage in civil violence for instrumental purposes than are weak states.
Though the instrumental perspective is broadly accepted as the “conventional” approach to understanding outside-actor involvement in internal conflict (Heraclides 1990), scholars now regard affective considerations as critical to a comprehensive understanding of third-party intervention. Some contend that instrumental accounts fail to address the identity-based and normative forces at play in modern political violence (Suhrke and Noble 1977; Heraclides 1991). Particularly in conflicts in which ethnicity is salient, motives for outsider intervention can be colored by a variety of affective considerations: ideological affinity, patterns of historic injustice, religious concerns, personal ties, shared racial-ethnic identity, or humanitarian principle (Smith 1986; Suhrke and Noble 1977).

Many scholars contend that affective factors may be just as likely to influence intervention decisions and actions as instrumental factors. Some suggest that it is entirely possible to reconcile identity-based or normatively-driven behavior with rational utilitarian calculations; that the overlap between the two can act as the driving force behind third-party intervention. According to this line of thought, decisions to intervene are rarely shaped by one single or overriding motive. Rather, they are often the product of mutually reinforcing instrumental and affective concerns (Carment and James 1993). Given the configuration of constraints and opportunities for intervention, policy elites may exploit affective concerns in seemingly utilitarian-based scenarios, or conversely, to play up the “material interests” at stake in seemingly normatively-based scenarios (Carment and James 1996).

**Recent Contributions: Post-Cold War Intra-state Interventions**

Given that instances of state failure are typically complicated by patterns of civil conflict, it is important to note that the resolution of internal wars can be significantly more complicated than that of interstate wars (Licklider 1995). In weak and failing states, governments may lack
the capacity to address the tasks associated with internal conflict resolution. Thus, state-building commitments on the part of the international community are necessary (Zartman 2005). Yet, in the post-Cold War era, international intervention efforts have been largely focused on initial-phase conflict resolution activities (provision of peacekeeping troops, the signing of peace accords), while neglecting the longer-term requirements for successful post-conflict reconstruction. Thus, many peace settlements begin to disintegrate after a brief period of intervention, and already-weakened states slip closer to collapse.

A good deal of the modern conflict resolution literature addresses these shortcomings, advancing new proposals for the achievement of long-term peace and reconstruction. Though some studies focus on the credibility of the intervening actors (Lake and Rothchild 1998), most emphasize the importance of the scale of the intervention itself. Hentz (2004), for example, argues that external actors must devote attention to outside-in (illegal trans-border activities, weak control of outlying territories) as well as to inside-out sources (neo-patrimonial rule) problems of intra-state conflict and failure. Contemporary peace building research also suggests that the scope of the external power’s intervention strategy is critical to the achievement of long-term peace and recovery. The pursuit of multiple and sustained intervention strategies increases the likelihood that peace settlements will endure (Regan 1996; Walters 2002). These results are bolstered by recent policy analyses of U.S. peacekeeping and state building efforts. Studies from RAND and the Brookings Institution support the position that an external power’s willingness adhere to a comprehensive and long-term interventions holds considerable influence on the overall success of the mission.

While the above-mentioned works signal key advancements on the traditional realist-idealist and instrumental-affective intervention literature, they have little to say about outside
actors’ motives for intervention. Contemporary studies which do address intervention motive typically focus on its relationship to the likelihood of intervention, but ignore its impact on the actual course and outcome of intervention. They fail to account for the presence of a potential relationship between the impetus for great power engagements in failed states and actual state building intervention outcomes. Thus, it is critical to seek out avenues for drawing the two bodies of scholarship - traditional and contemporary - together.

Alternative Approaches: “Liberal Intervention” and American Exceptionalism

There are few studies that are explicitly geared towards blending the traditional intervention literature’s emphasis on intervention motive, and the contemporary intervention literature’s emphasis on intervention process and outcome. However, there are two growing areas of research – one theoretical, and one policy-oriented – that hint at the possibility of such an effort. Recent developments in the “liberal intervention” (Duffield 2001) and “American exceptionalism” (Butler 2003) bodies of scholarship help to bridge the motive-process-outcome gaps that exist between the traditional and contemporary intervention literature.

The burgeoning work on liberal intervention is largely critical-constructivist in its theoretical orientation. Research on liberal intervention, or the “new aid paradigm,” is rooted in Hobson-Leninist neo-imperialist theory, dependency theory, and modern anti-globalization theory. Its proponents examine the presumed capitalist influences behind the foreign policy agendas of great power actors (Lenin 1939; Hobson 1954; Barnet and Muller 1974). They contend that powerful states no longer exert direct influence in the developing world as they did during the colonial era and the Cold War era. Rather, these states exert indirect influence in the developing world through the exportation of liberal peace institutions. In essence, the seemingly
enlightened and benevolent actions of liberal Western states are actually a mask for an attempt at hegemony (Clark 2001; Ikenberry 2001; Howard 2002).

Others advance a more radical version of the argument, saying that Western peacekeeping interventions signal the dawn of an epistemic community – academics, policymakers, and international organizational actors – bent on imposing liberal governance and economic models across the developing world (Duffield 2001; Paris 2004; Clapham 2002; Carothers 1999; Diamond 1999; Peceny 1999; Peceny and Stanley 2001). Once these models have been adopted by sufficient numbers of intervention-target states, other states will have no choice but to fall in line, and the U.S. and its liberal allies can reap the benefits of a system designed to serve their interests (Parish and Peceny 2002).

Duffield’s (2001) version of the “liberal aid paradigm” focuses on the growing academic and policy recognition of the convergence between the humanitarian-developmental and security-strategic aspects of the “new wars” of the post-Cold War developing world. Within the liberal aid paradigm, writes Duffield, powerful Western-state actors perceive the “new wars” and associated problems of state weakness – as expansively problematic. They view them as hazardous to the well being of local inhabitants, as well as to the security of surrounding states and regions. Accordingly, they regard these humanitarian-developmental and security-strategic trends as inextricably linked to one another. Such comprehensive threats, in turn, necessitate grand-scale interventions aimed at the total reconstruction of states and their societies in the image of the liberal world (Duffield 2001; Paris 2004; Clapham 2002).

Duffield’s theoretical explanation of multi-motive and massive-scale Western intervention seems to be supported by policy accounts of post-Cold War “American exceptionalism” (Butler 2003). According to proponents of the position, Western liberal actors have long envisioned an
international system defined by the attributes of collective security (to prevent aggression between states) and civil society (to buttress democracy and human rights within states). While liberal rhetoric was common during the Cold War period – policy leaders commonly sold intervention as the “interests plus values” option – the political realities of the time belied the authenticity of U.S.-allied calls for a liberal world order. The collapse of communism, though, has allowed for a new era of active liberalism (Mayall 1991). One of the primary trends of this era, say Kegley and Herman (1996), is the willingness of Western states to rely on intervention as primary tool of foreign policy. They find evidence of a relationship between the spread of liberal governance and the spread of intervention by democracies in recent decades, and particularly since the end of the Cold War (Kegley and Herman 1996; Betts 1994; Gelb 1994; Smith 1994).

This shift, coupled with the changed nature of modern conflict, has sparked a new interest in U.S. interventionism, and the possibility that it is now shaped by policy makers’ rediscovery of the just war tradition. The post-Cold War security environment poses significant challenges for the U.S. and its allies, and necessitates military undertakings in distant and often hostile parts of the world. Such military engagements can be unpopular with the American public and international actors. Thus, statesmen turn to the use of just war rhetoric, emphasizing the importance of liberal values – democracy, development, human rights – to the practice foreign policy. Such tactics allow political leaders to build domestic support for the use of force, as well as secure the political capital necessary to fund and promote the engagement (Payne 1995, Legpold and McKeown 1995, and Russett and Starr 1992 in Butler 2003). The resurgence of “interests plus values” rhetoric enables policy makers to win greater support – both tangible and
intangible – for interventions abroad. This, in turn, increases the likelihood that such military actions will yield successful outcomes.

**Shortcomings of Existing Theory and Literature**

Traditional perspectives on external intervention, particularly those that rest on conventional IR theoretical frameworks, often yield contradictory results when applied to real-world scenarios. Realism, for example, is unable to account for the fact that a number of Western powers opted to intervene in Somalia in the early 1990s. Following the end of the Cold War, Somalia held little geo-strategic or economic value for intervening states. Idealist and liberal peace arguments, similarly, fall short of explaining the failure of Western powers to intervene in Rwanda in 1994. At the time, the ongoing genocide represented a clear violation of international humanitarian norms (Finnemore 2003). Mainstream IR theories are further limited by their failure to address the potential relationship between the external actor’s *impetus* for intervention, and the subsequent *course and outcome* of that intervention. Scholarship of this vein typically examines the correlation between the motive involvement and the subsequent pursuit or non-pursuit of military action; it does not acknowledge the possibility that there are possible links between intervention motive, intervention process, and intervention outcome (Butler 2003).

It seems as though the arguments stemming from the instrumental-affective theoretical debate could be reasonably applied to the research question posed in this study. However, upon closer inspection, it becomes apparent that the body of literature shares a number of conceptual and empirical weaknesses with the related works of the realist-idealist divide. Studies associated with both realist-idealist and instrumental-affective theories fail to identify the nature of the external actor’s goals, to specify the appropriate unit of analysis for such research, and to distinguish between the various population-segments whose interests are being served by the
engagement (Cetinyan 2002). And, just as realist and idealist studies fail to adequately “explain away” cases in which there is a mismatch between motive and the occurrence / non-occurrence of intervention, so too do instrumental and affective perspectives.

The recent literature on third-party intervention is characterized by its own set of limitations. While this research advances on the traditional realist-idealistic and instrumental-affective approaches to the study of military intervention – they examine the practical policy implications of the means of intervention in failed states – they disregard the potential influence of intervention motive. Whereas traditional approaches fail to account for the possible range of intervention outcomes, contemporary intervention studies fail to account for why the intervention initially takes place. The circumstances that shape third-party actors’ reasons for undertaking peacekeeping and state-building missions – the actual processes of foreign policy decision-making – remain neglected (Mullenbach 2005; Findley and Teo 2004). Though some works do incorporate third-party actor-centric perspectives, few of them address the decisions of external state actors as either the theoretical or methodological focus of research. It stands to reason that increased attention to these areas – the initial motives for third-party efforts and the decision making processes behind third-party interventions – could provide scholars with additional insight into the duration and resolution of civil crises, and allow for assessments of the potential relationship between intervention motive and intervention outcome (Findley and Teo 2004).

In sum, both the traditional realist/instrumental-idealistic/affective literature and the contemporary peacekeeping literature fail to establish connections between intervention motive, intervention process, and intervention outcome. It seems as though theoretical accounts of liberal intervention and policy assessments of American exceptionalism could help to bridge those gaps. Yet, neither school provides adequate empirical support for its arguments. In the following
section, I attempt to address these under-developed areas of the post-Cold War intervention literature. I build on the theoretical arguments of the traditional realist-idealist perspectives – as well as the results of the contemporary peacekeeping studies – by seeking to apply and find empirical support for the arguments associated with the liberal intervention and American exceptionalism perspectives. In doing so, I advance a hypothesis centered on the potential relationship between intervention motive, policy process, and state-building outcome.
3. THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS

My primary hypothesis rests on the premise that there are complementary ties between the logic of liberal intervention theory and the policy prescriptions of the American exceptionalism perspective. Given the lack of empirical testing associated with studies of liberal intervention, and the largely atheoretical claims of the American exceptionalism policy analyses, there is an understandable lack of consensus on the merits of such claims. However, it seems plausible that the attempt to marry theoretical rationale with policy-practical implications will provide a basis for advancing the literature in new directions.

**Primary Hypothesis**

I contend that the scope of motives associated with a third-party intervention will influence the degree to which policy makers commit resources to that intervention, and in turn, will have an impact on the likelihood of successful intervention outcome. Stated more specifically, great power states will be more likely to intervene in failed states that pose a broad range of threats (whether security-strategic or humanitarian-developmental in nature) to them; further, their leaders will be more likely to commit adequate levels of resources to the intervention, thus increasing the possibility of a successful state-building outcome. This primary argument stems from the critical-constructivist position that there is an epistemic community – of scholars, policy makers, and organizational actors – whose members perceive post-Cold War problems of state weakness and “new wars” as threats to a range of Western interests. Western leaders, in turn, attempt to promote their own interests in securing a liberal world order by means of “liberal intervention” in the developing world. Though scholars increasingly recognize the
legitimacy of such research, my hypothesis is not geared towards the promotion of this theoretical agenda. Rather, it seeks to employ critical-constructivist logic as a lens for examining patterns of third-party “liberal intervention” in failed states of the post-Cold War era. As Glanville (2001) notes, most accounts of liberal intervention focus on the circumstances in which state and non-state actors view humanitarian intervention as permissible. As such, the literature is largely oriented toward the question of whether or not liberal state or non-state actors will choose to intervene in areas afflicted by threats to human security. While this yes-no investigative approach is certainly warranted, it is nonetheless subject to criticisms of theoretical and empirical truncation. In this work, I attempt to expand on traditional perspectives by advancing hypotheses that incorporate attention to why actors choose to choose to intervene in cases of humanitarian crisis. In other words, I rely on Glanville’s assertion that scholars should look beyond the question of whether or not intervention is permissible; that they should seek to explain why it is prescribed as a course of action, and how such normative motives relate to states’ material self-interests (2001).

The theoretical logic of my primary hypothesis is rooted in the assumption that political leaders’ intervention considerations – normative-ideational and utilitarian-interest - are often complementary. Engagements based on such overlapping concerns will likely yield greater commitment, and thus, more successful outcomes, than those which rest on a single or limited impetus for action. This supposition rests on the following premises: first, both tangible-interest and intangible-ideational objectives matter to states; and second, the interplay between these objectives shapes states’ behaviors differently than does either consideration on its own. The first point leads into the second. The post-Cold War international environment, and the complex array of challenges and opportunities that it presents to state actors, enhances that likelihood that
political elites will weight a range of considerations when deciding on whether to intervene abroad. Thus, there is a heightened chance that foreign policy makers will pursue engagements based on multiple motives, rather than on single or limited motives. This, in turn, provides for the possibility that how elites choose to proceed with the intervention – the degree to which they commit state resources to the engagement – will be a function of “how much is at stake.” One could surmise that policy makers will find it easier to build and maintain support for intervention in those cases in which there are a variety of interests at stake. Thus, the presence of multiple motives for intervention will allow for a greater commitment of initial resources (troops on the ground, foreign aid). Further, it will reduce the likelihood that those resources will be withdrawn in the face of competing concerns, i.e., that international norms favoring intervention will ultimately lose out to domestic preferences for force protection and short-term engagements.

More specifically, I derive my hypothesis from the theoretical and policy arguments of the liberal intervention perspective (both the critical-constructivist and American exceptionalism variants), and from the expectation that these arguments can be linked to the empirical results of contemporary peace-building studies on the relationship between intervention scale and intervention outcome. The liberal intervention school is valuable in that its logical underpinnings are shared by two seemingly incongruous perspectives – critical-constructivist theory and American exceptionalism – both of which highlight the importance that intervention motive plays in post-Cold War engagements. The strategy-specific focus of recent peace building literature is instructive in that its empirical results on intervention scale appear to inform and further bolster the presumed motive-commitment links established by liberal intervention theory.

Most works associated with liberal intervention theory are defined by their emphasis on the correlation between intervention motive and the scale of the subsequent intervention;
however, many indirectly highlight the presumed causal chain that links intervention motive to the means and scope of intervention, and consequently, to intervention outcome. Critical theoretical accounts of post-Cold War “liberal intervention” suggest that intervention motive, or the desire to combat the multiple threats posed by weak and failing states, correlates with the scope of the subsequent engagement; i.e., the multiplicity of threats necessitates “grand scale” involvement. The American exceptionalism perspective, in turn, rests on largely similar contentions, though it does so by means of an opposing logic; policy analysts suggest that post-Cold War U.S. military engagements are characterized by policy makers’ reliance on justice-based rhetoric as a means of garnering support for security-driven military action abroad.

Whether the motive for intervention is genuine or artificial, it seems clear that motive itself holds considerable influence on the means and scope of intervention, and presumably (as is frequently implied), intervention outcome.

I reason that there are likely to be important ties between theoretical and policy driven accounts of “liberal intervention” and the results of recent peace-building studies on intervention commitment levels. While the arguments of these peace-building studies are both intuitive and empirically well-supported, they seem to ignore what might be termed the “initial link” in the chain of events leading to intervention scale and intervention outcome. More specifically, they beg the question: why would a major power state choose to provide for large-scale interventions in certain cases of state failure, and smaller-scale interventions in others? As such, there is a need to account for the role of the potential connections between the basis for intervention scale and intervention outcome. In the above hypothesis, I attempt to bring together the critical theoretical and foreign policy literatures’ mutual emphasis on the impetus for state-building commitments abroad with recent strands of literature that highlight the significance of the scale of such
commitments. In essence, I draw attention to the causal factors at play in the relationship between motive and outcome, and examine the process by which the scope of intervention motive(s) influences intervention success. I present my primary hypothesis as:

\[ H1: \text{Interventions initiated on the basis of multiple motives (those which are directed towards security-strategic as well as humanitarian-developmental concerns) will be more likely to draw greater resource and time commitments than those prompted by a single or overriding motive, and consequently, will be more likely to yield successful outcomes.} \]

Expressed more simply, the underlying theoretical reasoning can be diagramed as:

\[
\text{Motive Breadth} \rightarrow \text{Commitment Level} \rightarrow \text{Outcome}
\]

The hypothesis itself can be diagramed as:

\[
\text{Multiple Motives} \rightarrow \text{Heightened Commitment} \rightarrow \text{Intervention Success}
\]

Thus, rather than focusing exclusively on either of the following previously explored relationships:

- Liberal Intervention:
  \[ \text{Scope of Motive(s)} \rightarrow \text{Scale of Commitment} \rightarrow \text{Outcome} \]

- Peace Building (Strategy):
  \[ \text{Scope of Motive(s)} \rightarrow \text{Scale of Commitment} \rightarrow \text{Outcome} \]

I draw the relationships together, highlighting the causal linkages at play in the hypothesized sequence:

\[
\text{Primary Hypothesis:}
\text{Scope of Motive(s)} \rightarrow \text{Scale of Commitment} \rightarrow \text{Outcome}
\]

As such, the primary hypothesis represents an attempt at theory-building through theory “linking.” It illustrates the possibility that the motive for third-party intervention holds a good
deal of influence on the relative success of that intervention, rather than just the likelihood of the occurrence or non-occurrence of intervention. Second, it provides a basis for the establishment of causal linkages between the processes or sequences in which state building decision making and interventions are carried out.

Assessment of the validity of this predicted relationship will require that I determine the incidence of certain factors indicative of the motive-commitment-outcome process. As “motive” is arguably quite difficult to establish, given the limited number and nature of concrete measures of such a concept, I test for the presence of a composite independent variable. I rely on the following as my main independent variable: 1) the overlap between two or more of the various bases for intervention: security-strategic concerns, expected utility or gains-losses calculations, democratization-developmental or humanitarian impetus, or identity-based considerations; and 2) the subsequent commitment of relatively great or increased time (operation duration) and resources (foreign aid levels and troop numbers) to the intervention.

**Null Hypothesis and Alternate Hypotheses**

In the above section, I contend that the outcome of a state-building engagement is product of the number of motives behind the intervention; that multi-motive engagements are more likely to yield successful results than are those characterized by a single or limited motive for intervention. Consequently, the null hypothesis for this study is:

\[ H_0: \text{There will be no distinction between the outcomes of those state-building engagements premised on multiple motives and those based on a single reason for intervention.} \]

Contrary to the expectations of the primary hypothesis, the logic of null hypothesis would suggest that an intervention characterized by a single basis for intervention will be just as likely to attract the necessary resource commitments as those undertaken for a variety of reasons. There
will be no distinction in the overall level of time and resource expenditure, and accordingly, no
reason to expect that multi-motive interventions will yield success, or conversely, that single-
motive interventions will result in failed outcomes. This line of reasoning implies that the
number of bases for engagement matters less than the degree to which any one particular premise
for action matters to decision makers; that resource commitment is a function of how much a
particular objective matters to foreign policy elites (the state) rather than the potential overlap or
interplay between various intervention objectives.

I further test my primary hypothesis against a series of alternate hypotheses derived from
competing theoretical perspectives on the success of third-party intervention. In order to assess
the strength of these arguments - those based on material-interest calculations (realism and
instrumentalism), normative or identity driven logic (liberal idealism and affectivism), and
strategy-specific claims (peace building literature) - I attempt to determine the presence of
independent variables indicative of the aforementioned, and examine their potential links to my
dependent variable, intervention outcome.

Realist logic dictates that the pursuit and maintenance of power is the guiding force for
state behavior; that states are the primary actors in an anarchic international arena, and in the
absence of a supranational authority, they must seek to ensure their survival by means of self-
help. When faced with the chance to do so, states will take advantage of the opportunity to
enhance their power – economically, militarily, or geo-strategically – by means of intervention in
another region. Realists contend that states will devote greater time, attention, and material
resources to those engagements in which they perceive their own power to be at stake.

Instrumentalists, similarly, suggest that actors’ engagement in - or conversely,
disengagement from - conflict in areas external to their own borders can be linked to the
presumed gains to be derived from such activity. They expect that third-parties intervene in other states’ conflicts for primarily utilitarian objectives: domestic political concerns, international political stake (whether explicitly strategic or otherwise linked to prestige or influence), economic gain, or the assertion or expansion of military clout. Thus, the instrumental approach to third-party intervention is rooted in the assumption that rational interest calculation provides the most salient basis for action, and accordingly, is likely to attract the greatest degree of actual commitment to success. The realist-instrumentalist perspective provides the basis for the following alternate hypothesis:

**AH1**: Interventions based on material interest concerns will yield greater commitment, and thus, greater likelihood of success, than will interventions based on intangible forces (normative-ideational or identity-based concerns).

In order to determine the validity of the prediction that material interest pursuits will most greatly influence state-building outcomes, I test for the presence of a series of realist-instrumental indicators. I look to the following alternate variables as confirming evidence for the above hypothesis: 1) conditions of state failure as a threat to the great power’s ability or opportunity to profit economically from the affected area, 2) conditions of state failure as threat to the great power’s ability to benefit militarily – either itself or through its alliance partnerships and arrangements – from the affected area, and 3) conditions of state failure as a threat to the great power’s ability or opportunity to exert geopolitical influence within the affected area or surrounding region.

Theories of idealism and affectivism are rooted in the notion that intangible concerns – ideas, norms, and identities – play as much of a role, if not more of a role, in shaping states’ international pursuits than do material-utilitarian considerations. When presented with the opportunity to promote liberal-idealist objectives (democratization, development, and
humanitarianism) or to aid a population of shared or similar identity ties, states will devote considerable effort to interventions abroad. Idealist, and particularly liberal-idealistic, theories of state behavior suggest that normative forces will prompt states to view intervention as a means for advancing democratic and humanitarian ideals in other parts of the world. Further, they rest on the implication that “principled” foreign policy making is more than just a moral obligation; that it can ultimately serve states,’ namely Western industrialized democracies,’ interests in peace, prosperity, and power. Affective theories of state behavior rest on the related assumption that identity (or perceived ties of history, race-ethnicity, religion, or nationality) can be a powerful determinant of states’ international engagements. This perspective recognizes identity as more than just a potential source of conflict between or within states, but as a force that prompts outside actors to intervene on behalf of a threatened group. It further draws attention to the fact that traditionally accepted realist-instrumental theories rarely provide comprehensive explanations of phenomena related to the “new wars” of the past two decades; it acknowledges the salience of ethnicity in patterns of post-Cold War conflict and conflict relief. The shared understandings of the liberal idealist and affective schools of thought serve as the basis for the following alternate hypothesis:

AH2: Interventions based on intangible considerations (either normative-ideational or identity-based) will yield greater commitment, and thus, greater likelihood of success, than will interventions based on power-political concerns or material interest calculations.

In order to determine the validity of the prediction that the pursuit of “intangible” objectives will most greatly influence state-building outcomes, I test for the presence of a series of normative-idealistic indicators. I look to the following alternate variables as confirming evidence for the above hypothesis: 1) conditions of state failure as a threat to the great power’s
ability or opportunity to provide for the humanitarian rights or human security of other members
of the “global community,” 2) conditions of state failure as threat to the great power’s ability or
opportunity to promote the liberal agenda of democratization and development (through free
market mechanisms), and 3) conditions of state failure as a threat to the great power’s ability or
opportunity to provide for the protection of a threatened population of a similar identity to the
population of the intervening state.

I further attempt to account for those points that are not explicitly related to either the
realist-instrumental or idealist-affective perspectives. Accordingly, I also test the explanatory
power of arguments stemming from the scholarship on peace building (and from the related body
of policy-oriented analyses of state-building operations). Typically, this literature centers on the
relative importance of particular strategies of peace building. This emphasis on strategy-specific
factors marks a clear divergence from the focus of broader theoretical accounts of third-party
intervention. While the primary hypothesis and preceding alternate hypotheses rest on the
assumption that there are potential links between intervention motive and intervention outcome,
the peace-building literature tends to forgo such reasoning. Works on peace building suggest that
the pursuit of certain strategies – assurances of third-party legitimacy and credibility, separation
of combatants, (re)construction of political institutions, attention to economic development, a
focus on rebuilding trust among one-time enemies and between people and the state, application
of multiple pressure points to antagonists, and the provision for sustained and broad-scope
commitment – has more of a bearing on the outcome of external interventions than do alternate
factors. This literature suggests that the reason for intervention matters less than the actual
process of intervention itself. As such, it hints at the possibility that certain strategy-specific
choices can, in effect, “overcome” the factors associated with intervention motive (for example,
deficiencies in either resource or time commitment), and can independently make for successful state-building results. Given this implication – that the motives behind state action have little bearing on the extent to which that state commits to the actual state-building engagement; that \textit{how} the operation is undertaken matters more than \textit{why} the operation is undertaken – I test for the indicators of the following alternate hypothesis:

\textit{AH3: The outcome of a third-party intervention in a failed state will be a product of the specific strategy by which state-building is undertaken; engagements characterized by attention to factors such as timing, force structure, and long-term objectives will be more likely to yield successful results than those characterized by a focused on the particular motive or set of motives at stake.}

In order to determine the validity of the prediction that strategy-specific conditions of intervention and operation will most greatly influence state-building outcomes, I test for the presence of a series of strategy-specific indicators. I look to the following alternate variables as confirming evidence for the above hypothesis: 1) intervention and operational strategies premised on assurances of the third-party power’s legitimacy and credibility (its “qualification” for engaging in state-building activities), 2) intervention and operational strategies geared towards the short-term objective of separating combatants as the primary means security building, and thus, state-building, 3) intervention and operational strategies focused on the pursuit of long-term (re)construction aims: legitimate and viable political institutions, economic development, stable state infrastructure, and the reconciliation of one-time enemies, and finally 4) intervention and operational strategies directed towards broad-scope pursuits: the reliance on multiple-pressure tactics for the achievement of peace among antagonists, and the provision for resource commitments of a durable and diffuse nature (attention to the geographically expansive territories of the failed state, rather than to the capital city or “critical cities” alone).
4. RESEARCH DESIGN

Overview: A Multi-Method Approach

I test the strength of the presumed (intervention) motive-outcome relationship by relying on both qualitative and quantitative methods. The reliance on a multi-method tactic stems from two needs. First, the data on developing world states, and particularly failed states, are limited both in availability and comprehensiveness. As such, I employ a mixed design as a means of addressing the challenges posed by partial and imperfect information. Second, contemporary international relations scholarship is increasingly defined by the use of both qualitative and quantitative techniques. The application of these contrasting approaches should, ideally, allow for the shortcomings of one to be offset by the strengths of the other (Bennett and Elman 2007).

More specifically, the use of case studies should provide for a deeper understanding of the relationships and process being examined, while the use of quantitative data should provide for a rigorous and overarching assessment of the case study material (Bennett and Elman 2007).

The qualitative component of my research consists of a five-case comparative study of post-Cold War state building engagements. Relying on Mill’s method-of-difference approach, I examine the ways in which ostensibly similar cases of state failure, and consequent intervention, result in varying outcomes. I attempt to discern whether these differences in outcome can be linked to differences in the initial motive for intervention. I build on the standard case study methodology by applying a process-tracing scheme to the cases under investigation. This additional step not only allows for the examination of greater points of analysis than does the conventional case study design, but provides for a means of establishing step-by-step causal
processes at play in the hypothesized motive → resource/time commitment → outcome relationship.

I further test the strength of my primary hypothesis by turning to statistical modeling. Using a two-stage (logit, regression) model, I attempt to verify the existence of a correlation between state-building motive and outcome. Ideally, the inclusion of this statistical model should account for some of the shortcomings inherent to qualitative analyses (the small-n problem). By the same token, the use of case studies should allow for a greater understanding of the causal processes and relationships at play than could be afforded by quantitative methodology.

Case Comparative Analysis

I analyze the five major cases of U.S. state building operations in failed states during the fifteen years of the immediate post-Cold War era (1990 – 2005): Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Both the temporal limitations (start-dates and end-dates) of this study as well as the case-comparative methodology deserve a degree of justification. The cases examined in this work have been chosen from a fifteen-year time period for a number of reasons. First, there are relatively few examples (aside from post-World War II Germany and Japan) of U.S. interventions that clearly qualify as “state building” engagements, at least according to modern understandings of the term. I build my research on recent cases as means of avoiding the possibility of conceptual stretching, or expanding the term beyond its intended designations. Second, the majority of U.S. efforts to intervene in failed states have actually taken place during the post-Cold War era. Thus, the decision to observe post-Cold War interventions is also something of a matter of necessity. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the theoretical arguments being tested in this study are specifically directed at understanding liberal intervention as a product of post-Cold War conditions. Attempting to test the hypothesis on cases
to which it does not apply would do little to capture its actual validity.

I have chosen to employ a case study methodology for reasons somewhat similar to those discussed above. For the most part, the application of case-study analysis is something of a necessity. State building is not only a recent phenomenon in U.S. foreign policy, but has been employed on relatively few occasions (Pei 2003). There have been less than twenty cases of state building efforts in U.S. history. Given the fact that such numbers do not allow for a large-\( n \) study, comparative case analysis is the best available option for testing the primary hypothesis. The benefit of this method is that it allows for the intense examination of existing data (Lijphardt 1971). Further, such an approach can strengthen theory-testing efforts in ways that large-\( n \) methods cannot (Van Evera 1997; Lijphardt 1971). While large-\( n \) methods are capable of telling us \textit{whether} a hypothesis is valid; they cannot tell us \textit{why} that hypothesis is valid (Van Evera 1997). As this study attempts to assess \textit{whether} correlations between intervention motive and intervention outcome, as well as \textit{how} these variables relate to each other, case-study analysis is appropriate here.

While case the case study method is subject to the problem of many variables and few cases (Lijphardt 1971; Van Evera 1997; Achen and Snidal, 1989:156-7), I attempt to overcome this weakness by relying on Mill’s “method of difference” approach. I focus my investigation on cases that are similar across numerous factors, but that differ along relative values of the main independent variable (breadth of intervention motive) and the dependent variable (intervention outcome). The shared characteristics are as follows:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Each country, at the time of U.S. intervention, met the standards widely identified by scholars and policy experts as characteristics of state failure (Rotberg 2001; Rotberg 2002; State Failure Task Force 2004). Specifically, these states exhibited signs of a
\end{itemize}
central government that was either incapable of or unwilling to exert authority within its own borders, or to provide basic public goods and services to significant portions of its population or territory (Rice 2003). Beyond these functional shortcomings, each country’s economic, political, cultural, and social bases were disrupted to such an extent that the viability of the state itself was suspect; at the time of U.S. intervention, the state and its institutions as functioning and legitimate entities had given way to civil conflict, corruption, and chaos (Zartman 1995; Zacarias 1999; Zartman 2005).

- Each possessed the characteristics of a “complex emergency” at the time of intervention. The basis for U.S. involvement was significantly more complicated than that of a traditional peacekeeping mission, necessitating the coordination of political (diplomatic), economic, and military support for the provision of state-building operations (Cline 2002).

- The intervention in each target state was one in which the U.S. played a primary or leading role, as was the case in Somalia and Bosnia, or a predominantly unilateral effort in which the U.S. was the key player, as was the case in Afghanistan (Rotberg 2001; Carment 2003; Pei 2003).

- Each intervention was one in which policy-makers identified the goal of state-building as the ultimate U.S. objective (Dempsey and Fontaine 2001; von Hippel 2000; DiPrizio 2002). As such, U.S. planning and efforts in all five countries were directed towards: restoration of law and order in the absence of legitimate state authority, the reconstruction of state infrastructure, and facilitation of the eventual transfer of power from an interim to an indigenous government (Kumar 1995, U.S. Department of the Army 1994, Boutros-Gali 1992, and Cox 1993 in Diehl, Druckman, and Wall 1998).
I assess the independent variable, the “scope” of motives at stake in a particular intervention, according to the content of public documents - presidential speeches and official letters, congressional floor statements, and intra-administration and congressional-administration debates - for the year-long period preceding the onset of the particular intervention. I assess the dependent variable, the state-building outcome, according to a composite score derived from a series of individual measures: 1) outcome of the initial coercion measures, 2) presence of sustained peace in the target region (Polity IV), 3) pattern of sustained democratic and economic development in the target region (Polity IV), and 4) outside evaluation of the operation outcome (RAND 2001 and 2003). In assessing the values of these independent and dependent variables, I observe the intervention case itself as the unit of analysis. I also seek to establish possible links between intervention motive and intervention outcome; I examine the extent to which the U.S. commits its financial, military, and time resources to the five state building operations. I measure this commitment level according to annual foreign aid per target state inhabitant, peak troop level per target state inhabitant, and mission duration per target state.

I attempt to further bolster the validity of case study results by relying on process-tracing methodology, or the identification of causal pathways between the hypothesized relationship between intervention motive, intervention commitment, and intervention outcome. This approach allows for the incorporation of greater points of analysis than could be examined in a standard case comparative study. It also allows for the identification of causal links between the variables of interest, providing the opportunity to measure their presence and strength at each stage of the hypothesized process (KKV 1994: 86; Sayer 1992; Yee 1996; Njolstad 1990; Achen and Snidal 1989: 156-157; Bennett and George 1997; Dessler 1991; Bennett and Elman 2007). In this study, the primary causal mechanism of concern is intervention motive; the secondary causal
mechanism of concern is the manner and degree of third-party commitment. I attempt to identify connections between the motive for the external power’s intervention in the failed state, the consequent manner by which and degree to which it commits to that state-building engagement, and the ultimate impact that motive and commitment hold on the outcome of the state-building engagement.

I assess motive by looking to the public statements and documents of foreign policy elites - the president, members of congress, and members of the administration (in particular, members of the National Security Council) - for the year-long period preceding the onset of the particular intervention. In order to ensure that public statements and documents are genuine in nature, rather than politicized, I trace the course of intra-administration, intra-congressional, and congressional-administrative debates, and look for evidence of disagreement and/or bargaining between any or all of these actors. I assess commitment according to a range of “cost indicators” – variations in foreign aid spending, troop deployment levels, and intervention duration – over the course of the state-building engagement. In order to ensure that commitment levels can actually be linked to previous statements of motive or shifts in motive, I examine the relationship between pre-intervention statements of motive and the initial intervention, and the subsequent relationship between the shifts in motive shifts and the operational phases of the state-building engagement (over the duration of the intervention).

Statistical Analysis

While the qualitative method employed in this study allows for relative depth of knowledge, it is also subject to the criticisms typically associated with the case study approach: problems of generalizability, the potential for selection bias, etcetera. In order to address at least some of these criticisms, and in an effort to better assess the strength of my primary hypothesis, I
plan to apply basic regression techniques to the data derived from the case studies. While the small number of cases and the temporal bounds of the study do not allow for the employment of sophisticated statistical methods, they do provide reasonable basis for the use of logit and regression analysis.

One of the chief difficulties associated with the study of failed states is that of data availability. While there are abundant statistical measures of state strength for developed countries, such measures are often unavailable for less developed countries. This problem is particularly true of failed states. Further, many scholars regard state failure as a largely a post-Cold War phenomenon. Indeed, one of the primary arguments of this study is that there are distinctive attributes of U.S. interests in failed states in the post-Cold War era; that such interests are likely to be simultaneously realist-instrumentalist and liberal-idealist in nature, and that the presence of such overlapping interests increases the likelihood of intervention. This understanding of state failure allows for a relatively narrow universe of available units of analysis, both in terms of the cross-section of countries available for study, as well as the temporal bounds of the periods available for study.

In the past several years, though, there have been marked improvements in the availability of such data. Perhaps most notably, the Political Instability Task Force (previously the Failed State Task Force) has developed a dataset that covers episodes of state failure during the 1955-2007 time period. As such, it is now possible to study - and perhaps more importantly, for the purposes of this research, to compare - state failure during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. In the following sections, I discuss the statistical models used to assess U.S. interventions in failed states during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.
Two-Part Model: Logit, Regression

In order to test the hypothesized relationship between intervention motive and state-building outcome, I develop a two-part model. In the first stage of the model, I examine the correlation between policy-makers' statements of U.S. interests in the failed state, and the likelihood of U.S. military intervention in that state. In the second stage of the model, I examine the correlation between the statements of motive for intervention, and the actual outcome of the intervention. The first phase of the model provides an assessment of the relationship between U.S. interests in the failed state during a particular year, and the probability of state-building intervention. The second phase of the model provides an assessment of the relationship between U.S. interests in the failed state during a particular year, and the probability that (in cases in which intervention has occurred) the state-building intervention yields positive outcomes. Given the differences in operationalization of the dependent variables in the first and second phases of the model, the first stage of the model employs logistic regression, while the second stage of the model employs standard OLS (ordinary least squares) regression. Given that temporal effects are could influence outcomes, I also re-run the models with a lagged dependent variable.

Units of Analysis

Data for the observed units of analysis - failed state country years - are largely derived from the Political Instability Task Force Consolidated Events List. The Consolidated Events List provides an overview of all cases of state failure (various states, across various years) between the years 1955 and 2007. From this initial list of states, I select a group of states based on categorization as "complex failures." These states are characterized by the occurrence, within the same five year time period, of two or more wars or crises. As such, they are most likely to represent states that are truly failing or failed, rather than those which are simply weak, or those
that are experiencing a temporary crisis of governance. The resulting list contains a total of 1,088 country-years.

**Operationalization: Independent Variables**

The model includes two primary independent variables: "dual motive," or the presence of overlapping realist-instrumental and liberal-idealist interests, and "motive count," or the total number of distinct U.S. interests in the failed state, regardless of realist-instrumental or liberal-idealist leaning. I measure the variables according to the yearly aggregate of Presidential-Administration public statements regarding U.S. interests in the particular state. The documents are taken from the collection of presidential-administration public papers available at the American Presidency Project website. Using Automap text analysis software, I code the documents by country-year (I code intervention motive) according to the frequency of appearance of certain concepts, or indicators of realist-instrumental or liberal-idealist interest. Based on the frequency of the appearance of these concepts, I categorize the yearly collection of documents for a particular failed state as realist-instrumental, liberal-idealist, or dual motive. This provides the measure for the first main independent variable, dual motive (a dummy variable). I also code the yearly collection of documents for a particular failed state according to the count of the separate and distinctive U.S. interests in that state. This, in turn, provides the measure for the second main independent variable, motive count (a categorical variable).

The model also includes a number of alternate independent variables: realist-instrumental motive, liberal-idealist motive, post-Cold War state failure, and period of prior state failure. I measure realist-instrumental motive and liberal-idealist motive in a similar manner to the two primary independent variables. These variables, however, are distinguished from the previous two in that their coding-identification - of U.S. interests in the failed state for a particular year -
estimates the actual direction of U.S. motive for intervention or non-intervention. These variables, like the main independent variables, are coded according to the number of separate and distinctive realist-instrumental or liberal-idealistic interests in the failed state, and as such, they not only provide an indication of the directional nature of the motive(s) at stake, but an indication of the number of instrumental-oriented or idealist-oriented motives involved (as such, they too are categorical variables). These variables, however, do not necessarily overlap with the "motive count" main independent variable, as certain motives cannot be categorized as purely realist-instrumental or liberal-idealistic. The remaining alternate independent variables - post-Cold War state failure and prior period of state failure - are simple binary variables. They are coded as "0" or "1" according to the whether the country-year falls within the post-Cold War era, and whether the country-year represents a first-phase year of state failure or a repeat-phase year of state failure.

**Operationalization: Dependent Variables**

The dependent variable for the first stage of the model is a binary, and is coded as "0" or "1" according to the occurrence or non-occurrence of U.S. state-building intervention for the failed state country-year. The dependent variable for the second stage of the model provides a measure, for those failed state country-years in which intervention occurs, of state-building outcome. I assess state-building outcome along four standard indicators of failed state recovery: politics-government, economy, state infrastructure, and human development (quality of life). These individual dependent variable measures, in turn, provide four sub-models for the assessment of the relationship between intervention motive and the relative success of the state-building mission. I measure political-governmental recovery according to Polity IV scores for autocracy-democracy. I measure economic recovery according to World Bank estimates of GDP
per capita. I measure infrastructure recovery according to World Bank estimates of percent roads paved. Finally, I measure human development recovery according to UN and World Bank estimates of average life expectancy.
5. CASE STUDY - SOMALIA

**Background: State Failure**

In January of 1991, longtime Somali ruler Mohamed Siad Barre was ousted from power by a coalition of opposing clan forces. The leadership position vacant, one-time coalition factions began fighting among themselves. As the conflict continued, warlords gradually assumed authority over various regions of the crumbling state; ultimately, the former British protectorate of Somaliland declared independence. While certain outlying areas were able to settle into their new power arrangements, Mogadishu was plagued by ongoing violence. General Mohamed Farah Aideed and his rival, Ali Madhi Mohamed, fought for control of the capital city. Tens of thousands of people were killed, hundreds of thousands more were driven from their homes, and state institutions were destabilized to such a degree that governmental collapse proved unavoidable. The combined effects of clan warfare and persistent drought conditions resulted in famine, and subsequently, a full-blown humanitarian crisis. By the end of the year, relief organizations were no longer able to ensure the delivery of aid supplies (BBC 2009).

International actors had long overlooked the effects of the crisis in Somalia. When newly elected United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (himself an Egyptian), called for greater attention to the African continent, Western states were forced to reexamine the situation. In April 1992, Boutros-Ghali won support for the initiation of the UN Operation in Somalia, or UNOSOM (I). UN troops were assigned to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu, protect existing UN personnel and supplies in Somalia, and deliver relief supplies. General Aideed’s opposition to the UN presence in Mogadishu, though, proved problematic. When his
supporters attacked a Pakistani contingent of UN peacekeepers - killing twenty-four - in November 1992, Aideed declared that UNOSOM efforts would be met with further strikes. As it became clear that the UN would be unable to provide adequate security for the delivery of humanitarian aid, the Somalia issue worked its way onto the U.S. foreign policy agenda (Dobbins et. al 2003; DiPrizio 2001).

Motives for U.S. Intervention: Congressional Debates, Presidential Papers, and Insider Politicking

Foreign policy leaders in Congress did not regard the crisis in Somalia as a priority consideration. Nonetheless, Congressional debates from the two-year lead-up period to intervention (December 9, 1992) demonstrate that the issue was, in fact, very much on the radar. Beginning with the introduction of the Horn of African Recovery and Food Security Act in March 1991, House members increasingly voiced concern for the “enormous, looming, human tragedy in the countries of Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia” (Wheat 1991). In the Senate, Republican Nancy Kassebaum and Democrat Paul Simon – both members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations – co-sponsored Senate Resolution 115 (April 25, 1991). Though non-binding, it called for President George H.W. Bush to weigh the costs of the humanitarian emergency in Somalia. By July, Senators Joseph Lieberman (D-Connecticut) and Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) had joined the discussion; they argued, respectively, for presidential attention to the “enormity of human suffering” and the “scale of human suffering…” (1991). In November, Senator Claiborne Pell (D-Rhode Island) reported that the 1991 World Refugee Survey listed Somalia as a refugee emergency hot-spot.

Congressional attention to Somalia died down during the early months of 1992, but by April, media scrutiny and public opinion reports prompted a resumption of floor statements on the matter. In the House, Benjamin Gilman (R-New York) and Emerson (R-Missouri) highlighted
the inadequacy of the U.S.’s response to “one of the worst humanitarian crises the world has ever seen.” Senators David Durenberger (R-Minnesota) Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kansas) and Paul Simon (D-Illinois) called for increased efforts to secure relief aid (1992). In August, members of both houses lent their support to Senate Concurrent Resolution 132; a key item called for greater presidential attention to the disaster in Somalia (Bennett Johnston, D-Louisiana; Donald Payne, D-New Jersey; Dennis Hastert, R-Illinois; Timothy Penny, D-Minnesota). In September, a number of Senators urged direct U.S. action to support UN relief efforts (Patrick Leahy, D-Vermont; Claiborne Pell, D-Rhode Island). By early October, the tone of the discussion was much more strident. House and Senate members called for improvements to crippled UN aid delivery system (Donald Riegle, R-Michigan), and direct U.S. support for UNOSOM (Eliot Engel, D-New York; Byron Dorgan, D-North Dakota; Wendell Ford, D-Kentucky). They argued that the U.S. had an “obligation to humanity” to “stop this senseless death” (Simon, D-Illinois; Lieberman, D-Connecticut; Andrew Jacobs, D-Indiana).

Just as Congressional floor debates focused on the U.S.’s humanitarian interests in Somalia, so too did the president’s public statements from the year preceding intervention. The overarching theme of President George H.W. Bush’s seven speeches and papers on the matter was one of humanitarian impulse. Presidential Determination (No. 93-2) conveyed the need to commit funds to “meet the unexpected and urgent needs of refugee victims.” His August 13th announcement that U.S. troops would be deployed to support UNOSOM I, similarly, highlighted his concern for the quarter-million people that had died in the famine. The President noted, “The people of Somalia, especially the children, need our help…We and our allies will ensure that aid gets through…Let me be very clear: our mission is humanitarian.” In an October presidential debate in St. Louis (October 11, 1992), Bush laid out the considerations involved in committing
U.S. troops abroad for humanitarian purposes. Later that month, the president responded to a question on Somalia (October 29, 1992) with the following: “…when you see those ghastly pictures of those starving kids…the pictures…they just kill you.” This theme echoed in later announcements on U.S. participation in the UN delivery of relief supplies (December 3, 1992).

Bush’s personal humanitarian take on the Somalia crisis was perhaps most apparent in his December 4th address to the nation. Announcing the deployment of U.S. troops to spearhead the United Task Force (Operation Restore Hope) mission in Somalia, the President noted the importance of the opportunity to “ease suffering and save lives.” He described the scope of the suffering in Somalia as “hard to imagine,” noting that a more than half a million people were at risk of starving to death in the coming months. The President claimed, “The people of Somalia, especially the children of Somalia, need our help. We’re able to ease their suffering. We must help them live. We must give them hope. America must act.”

While public Congressional and Presidential statements on Somalia indicate that humanitarianism was the overriding U.S. stake in Somalia, it is plausible that the basis for intervention was less clear-cut. An examination of debates within the administration, and between members of the administration and Congress, suggest that there may have been other considerations at play. The crisis in Somalia remained a relatively low-level issue among Bush’s chief advisors until the summer of 1992 (Dobbins et al. 2003). In fact, the Bush administration neglected to acknowledge the matter until Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen declared Somalia a “civil strife disaster” in March 1991 (Robinson 2002: 47-50). When UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali sought to draw Western states’ attention to the issue in January 1992, highlighting the failures of the relief distribution efforts, Bush aides continued to disregard the situation (Lofland 2002).
By early 1992, officials within the Bush administration began to take note of the deteriorating conditions in Somalia. This was, in part, prompted by increasing pressure from foreign and domestic sources. International actors – the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, and UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali – accused Western leaders of holding a bias against Africa. At the domestic level, Smith Hempstone, Jr., the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, lobbied Bush and his advisers to act on the Somalia crisis (Allen 1997). Andrew Natsios, the Assistant Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), testified before the House Select Committee on Hunger, describing the situation in Somalia as the “worst humanitarian crisis in the world” (Lofland 2002). Though Hemptone and Natsios had difficulty winning the attention of Bush aides, Congressional pressure and media scrutiny drew additional public focus to Somalia. During the summer of 1992, House members requested that Bush address Red Cross reports on starvation in Somalia, while Senators Kasselbaum and Simon sponsored a resolution calling for immediate U.S. action in the region (Lofland 2002). On July 31st, the New York Times ran an article on U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance findings that “People are dying in the thousands daily because aid workers cannot move relief food” (Perlez 1992).

Bush reacted by directing National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft to explore the possibility of improved airlift efforts in Somalia, and instructing the State Department to adopt a “forward leaning stance” on the situation. Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger convened a special task force in response to the crisis (Perlez 1992; Dobbins et al. 2001). On August 12th, President Bush met with Secretary of State James Baker, and members of the National Security Council: Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. As Bush aides began discussing the details of what would become Operation Provide Relief,

It could be argued that the administration’s response to the crisis in Somalia was more a product of domestic politics than humanitarian impulse. Bush announced the authorization of Provide Relief just days before the Republic National Convention, and after weeks of taking hits to his reelection campaign for his failure to act on Somalia. Nonetheless, Bush took action on the matter against the advice of key players in the State Department, Pentagon, and National Security Council. When Bush launched Provide Relief in mid-August, John Bolton, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, argued that Congress and the public would oppose the costs of such a peacekeeping operation. Officials at the Pentagon adopted the slogan, “If you liked Beirut, you’ll love Mogadishu” (Dempsey and Fontaine 2001: 25; Lofland 2002). Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, claimed that U.S. troops would be drawn into guerrilla warfare; Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin Powell felt that limited force numbers would leave U.S. troops at greater risk of attack (Lofland 2002).

By the time the shortcomings of Provide Relief prompted renewed debate on Somalia, Bush had lost his bid for reelection, and was free to act in a more decisive manner. Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger assumed a more aggressive stance on the issue than his predecessor James Baker. He supported Bush’s move for direct involvement in the region, saying, “It was very much because of the television pictures of these starving kids” (Robinson 2002: 47-50). The shift at the State Department was accompanied by a similar turnabout at the Pentagon; following a visit to Mogadishu, Powell announced an intervention would be “doable.”
The National Security Council, acting on the advice of Brent Scowcroft, adopted plans for the deployment of up to 28,000 ground troops for a U.S.-led United Task Force (UNITAF), which would safeguard UN relief efforts (Robinson 2002). The UN Security Council authorized Operation Restore Hope (UNSCR 794) on December 3, 1992. The next day, Bush announced plans for the operation, and on December 9th, U.S. troops landed in Mogadishu.

**Minimal Motives, Minimal Mission**

In the weeks following the initiation of Operation Restore Hope, members of the administration moved to minimize the scope of the mission. Apparently concerned for the risks of employing the military for humanitarian purposes, Bush aides publicly and repeatedly stressed the limited nature of Operation Restore Hope. Lawrence Eagleburger, a key proponent of the intervention, backed away from his aggressive stance on Somalia, noting “this debate is around this issue of our national interest and that’s a legitimate issue…” Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney appeared on Meet the Press, saying, “Our mission has a limited objective – to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN peacekeeping force to keep it moving. This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay any longer than is absolutely necessary.” Like Cheney, Powell likened the U.S.’s actions in Somalia to those of a cavalry mission – coming to the rescue of the locals, and then handing over additional responsibilities to the UN (Carpenter 1992). Bush aides advertised January 20th as the desired troop withdrawal date. Though Cheney and other military officials were more conservative in their withdrawal timeline estimates, they also promoted a quick withdrawal plan as the desired alternative to being dragged into the Somalia “quagmire” (Carpenter 1992).

The incoming Clinton foreign policy team, initially opposed to long-term peacekeeping and state-building efforts in Somalia, was soon compelled to adopt a new stance on the matter.
Clinton aides concluded that some form of security provision and post-conflict reconstruction would be necessary for the continued delivery of humanitarian assistance (Glanville 2005). Secretary of State Warren Christopher trumpeted the administration’s “new emphasis on promoting multinational peacekeeping and peacemaking” (Durch 1996: 41). Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright, in turn, described peacekeeping as “instrumental in meeting three fundamental imperatives of our national interest: economic, political, and humanitarian” (Glanville 2005).

Military Commitments

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Figure 1: Timeline for U.S. Military Commitments in Somalia, 1992-1994

In an attempt to correct for the shortcomings of UNOSOM I and Provide Relief, the Bush administration worked to expand the U.S. military presence in Somalia. While Provide Relief allowed for the delivery of more than 48,000 tons of food and aid supplies to the remote areas of Somalia, it was ill-equipped to deal with the problems posed by the growing insecurity in
Mogadishu and surrounding areas. With half a million Somalis dead of famine, and an additional three million at risk of starving to death, Bush responded by launching Operation Restore Hope (the U.S. name for the American-led, UN approved United Task Force, or UNITAF) on December 4, 1992.

The mission initially proved to be effective. Marines landed in Mogadishu on December 9, 1992, and set about establishing the “expeditionary infrastructure” to secure and facilitate the delivery of food aid. The Army, in turn, carried out a series of assault, patrol, security, cordon and search, and combat operations. It also assisted in road and bridge construction, convoy escorts, weapons confiscations, and communications. By March 1993, the 26,000 member force (along with the 10,000 other members of UNITAF), had achieved its primary objectives: the famine had ended, and security levels had improved to the point that steps toward reconciliation were possible.

Despite the successes of Restore Hope, the changing international climate of the post-Cold War era, along with growing public and Congressional opposition to a continued U.S. role in Somalia, prompted Clinton officials to “refocus” attention on the U.S.’s material and strategic interests. Secretary of State Christopher worked to promote “the central purpose of American foreign policy: to protect American interests.” National Security Advisor Anthony Lake followed suit. Eventually, most of the members of Clinton’s National Security Council retreated from their former support for peacekeeping and state-building objectives, opting to leave long-term recovery duties to the UN.

Attempting to lay the groundwork for state-building efforts, but to avoid committing the U.S. to such efforts, Clinton aides assumed the lead in authoring UN Security Council Resolution 814. The Resolution provided for a greatly expanded U.N. follow-up mission to
Restore Hope: cease-fire monitoring, disarmament of former combatants and civilians, security provision, protection of humanitarian relief efforts, repatriation of refugees and internally displaced peoples, rehabilitation of the state’s political institutions, and assistance with economic recovery (Dobbins et al. 2001). Though the proposed mission (UNOSOM II: March 26, 1993 – March 31, 1995) carried a broadened mandate, the Clinton team hoped that the successes of the previous operations could be achieved with reduced troop numbers. When UNOSOM II was officially launched, little more than 1,000 U.S. Army personnel remained in Somalia. This drawdown in military presence was likely a response to waning public support for the U.S. role in Somalia, as well as a concession to those in the Pentagon who opposed the administration’s pro-peacekeeping stance (Gordon and Freidman 1993).

Not surprisingly, the simultaneous expansion in mission tasks and reduction in mission personnel resulted in a number of complications. Coalition members were unsure of how to proceed, and the transition from UNOSOM I to UNOSOM II was poorly managed. The remaining 1,000 Army personnel, tasked with assisting UNOSOM II, were confused by the dual U.S.-UN command structure. Further, the transfer of authority from the U.S.-led UNITAF to the UN-led UNISOM II left the remaining forces feeling abandoned and crippled, as large numbers of well-equipped U.S. troops were replaced by smaller groups of poorly armed Pakistanis.

Emboldened by the circumstances, warlords and one-time combatants, most notably, those associated with the Somali National Alliance, resumed hostilities. Meanwhile, the diminished U.S.-UN security capacity ensured that the remaining forces were increasingly at risk of attack. As they struggled to respond to these new conditions, local civilians came to view the once-impartial peacekeepers as little more than biased intruders. Conditions in Mogadishu worsened.
On June 5, 1993, a group of suspected Aideed-affiliated fighters attacked a group of Pakistani peacekeepers, killing twenty-four of them. UN troops responded by seizing control of Radio Mogadishu and destroying previously seized Somali weapons and equipment. The U.S.’s Task Force Ranger, deployed in August 1993, was charged with capturing (or killing) Aideed. Their efforts, and the consequent Battle of Mogadishu (October 3-4, 1993), resulted in more than 1,000 local casualties and the deaths of eighteen Army Rangers.

The mission in Somalia, which had increasingly become the subject of public opinion and Pentagon disapproval, was virtually done in by the outcome of the Battle of Mogadishu. The deaths of the Army Rangers represented the “nail in the coffin” of the U.S. role in UNOSOM II, and ultimately prompted the withdrawal of the remaining American forces. By March of 1994, all U.S. troops had been withdrawn from Somalia.

**Foreign Aid Commitments**

The U.S.’s allocation of financial aid to Somalia largely parallels trends associated with its commitment of military forces.

<table>
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Figure 2: U.S. Grants and Loans to Somalia (by Million, Constant U.S. Dollars)
As shown above, U.S. aid to Somalia jumped considerably from 1991 to 1992. It peaked at $136.3 million in 1993, at the height of the period of international response to the famine and civil conflict. Yet, by 1994, U.S. grants and loans had dropped by more than $100 million, and remained at consistently low levels until the onset of the War on Terrorism. (By 2003-2004, it was evident that al Qaeda had established a number of cells in the Horn of Africa). It is perhaps noteworthy that aid to Somalia was primarily distributed for purposes of agricultural development. Though certainly a legitimate response to the famine of the early 1990s, subsequent patterns of allocation merit examination: funds directed through USAID (responsible for political, economic, and infrastructure development assistance) were relatively limited, while aid directed through the State Department was virtually negligible.

The State Department’s lack of funding from 1991-1992 can perhaps be attributed to Secretary Baker’s limited attention to Somalia. Yet, the continuation of this trend through the first term of the Clinton administration is puzzling, especially in light of Secretary Christopher’s emphasis on peacekeeping as a U.S. foreign policy objective. So too is the fact that USAID, in spite of Natsios’s lobbying for attention to Somalia, contributed a relatively small percentage of overall funding to the country. Further, it declined by a significant amount between 1993 and 1994, at which point, U.S. officials were working to promote UN state-building efforts (at least, rhetorically) in Somalia.

**Assessment**

The U.S.’s inconsistent stance on long-term efforts in Somalia, coupled with its limited commitments – military, financial, and time – to the crippled state, created a situation in which successful state-building outcomes would have been a practical impossibility. The mandate for UNOSOM II explicitly addressed “nation building.” Yet, neither UNITAF nor UNISOM II took
the necessary steps toward post-conflict reconstruction. There were no provisions for the
institution of civil administration, legitimate institutions of governance, state infrastructure, or
economic recovery and development. When conditions deteriorated to the point that additional
action was necessary (the deployment of Task Force Ranger to track Aideed), the onset of the
Battle of Mogadishu, and the consequent withdrawal of U.S. troops, was perhaps inevitable.

Faced with the poor outcome of the U.S.’s peacekeeping and state-building efforts in
Somalia, Clinton shelved Presidential Decision Directive 13 (which called for broadened U.S.
support for UN peace operations), and instead issued Presidential Decision Directive 25. PDD 25
called for stricter peacekeeping deployment guidelines, emphasizing the need for “highly
disciplined choices” and “rigorous analysis of requirements.” In the wake of the disaster in
Mogadishu, dwindling U.S. support for the ongoing UN mission resulted in poor outcomes.
Attempts at the achievement of a political settlement were limited and misguided, and the UN
was unable to effectively implement efforts such as the March 1993 Addis Ababa Agreement. As
basic conditions of stability were never fully achieved, the UN made little progress towards the
achievement of democratic or economic development. Even the most rudimentary reconstruction
projects proved difficult; when such work took place, it was usually carried out by private
organizations (Dobbins et al. 2001).

An assessment of the overarching pattern of U.S. commitments to Somalia suggests that
its state-building efforts came to an end before they ever actually began. While a number of
different factors were likely influential in this outcome, it is important to note that trends of
limited and declining levels of U.S. support can be clearly linked to preceding periods of focus
on the narrow (purely humanitarian) interests at stake. During the two year period preceding the
initiation of the intervention, the bulk of publicly recorded statements of the foreign policy
community – Presidents Bush and Clinton, their respective administrations, and members of Congress – indicates that military action was prompted by concern for human suffering in the region.

In spite of arguments that the engagement instead signaled the influence of election-year politics, and later, Bush’s concern for his presidential legacy (DiPrizio 2002), subsequent shifts in levels of support for the mission can be linked to concern for the U.S.’s stake in Somalia. Following the initiation of Provide Relief, public and elite concerns for the use of U.S. troops for the pursuit of humanitarian ends resulted in decreased attention to Somalia. The minimally supported operation proved ineffective, necessitating the initiation of Restore Hope during Bush’s last days in office. When the Clinton administration later downgraded state-building to a non-strategic (purely humanitarian) foreign policy objective, attention to and support for Restore Hope waned.

Iterations of this pattern can be seen, on a smaller scale, at virtually every phase of the intervention, save the initial provision of humanitarian relief (Snow 2000; Snow 2003; Diprizio 2002; Art and Cronin 2003; Dobbins et. al 2003). The U.S.’s initial coercive measures – the use of force to support the UN delivery of aid – were limited, particularly when compared to other post-Cold War failed state interventions, and failed to bring about lasting security (Art and Cronin 2003). Later attempts to “expand” the post-conflict objectives for Somalia, by assigning a host of state-building tasks to drastically reduced U.S. and UN forces, resulted in little beyond the delivery of aid to Mogadishu (Dobbins et. al 2003). Finally, the last-ditch effort to capture Aideed (which was characterized by limited planning and limited troop numbers) and stabilize Mogadishu yielded disastrous results for the U.S. and the local population, and ultimately, a premature end to the U.S. presence in the region.
Significantly, the conventional interpretation of the Somalia mission – the loss of American lives was too high a price to pay for non-strategic objectives, and thus undercut the future of U.S. peacekeeping and state-building – is somewhat inaccurate. Attempts to downplay the importance of post-humanitarian relief objectives in Somalia directly preceded the reduction of the U.S.-UN troop presence; the reduced troop presence, in turn, re-invigorated local combatants and threatened regional stability. This shift in circumstances ensured that U.S. troops would be more susceptible to attack. Thus, the loss of American lives was just as much a product of the policy makers’ limited view of state-building as it was cause for their post-Somalia restrictions on future peacekeeping and state-building engagements.

The above facts are perhaps even more worrisome when compared to those associated with some of the more successful state-building missions of the post-Cold War era (such as that which took place in Bosnia). In Somalia, the U.S. provided for a peak military presence of 5 troops per thousand local inhabitants. In contrast, the U.S. committed upwards of 19 troops per thousand local inhabitants to its operations in Bosnia. The duration of the U.S. mission in Somalia was approximately two and a half years; in Bosnia, the U.S. maintained a military presence for more than nine years. Finally, the U.S.’s average annual foreign aid to Somalia across the duration of the mission in Somalia stood at $12.1 per local inhabitant. In comparison, the U.S.’s average foreign aid across the operation duration in Bosnia stood at $43.39 per local inhabitant.

Polity IV scores indicate that Somalia has failed to achieve sustained peace or make progress towards democracy in the years since the U.S. withdrew from Somalia. The U.S.’s limited military, financial, and time commitments to Somalia suggest that foreign policy leaders failed to adequately comprehend the nature of state failure and the tasks required for successful
state-building. Though it could be argued that they faced a steep learning curve - the intervention in Somalia was the U.S.’s first real attempt at post-Cold War state-building - the results of the mission nonetheless reflect the limitations of their commitment to addressing a solely humanitarian crisis (Dobbins et al. 2001). The minimal scope of the intervention motives yielded mission contributions that were similarly limited; ultimately, the U.S.’s efforts in Somalia were flawed and short-lived, and they led to failure.

**Follow Up**

In the year following the U.S.’s March 1994 withdrawal from Somalia, UN peacekeepers – under continuous threat of attack, and having made no progress toward the achievement of state recovery – withdrew as well. The mid to late 1990s were characterized by conditions of violence and anarchy. In 2000, clan leaders peacefully elected Abdulkassim Salat Hassan as president. The subsequent appointment of Prime Minister Ali Khalif Gelayadh hinted at the possibility that order could be restored. Yet, immediately following Gelayadh’s announcement of the transitional government, Somali warlords and their backers in Ethiopia set about forming an opposition government. The subsequent hostilities, coupled with the onset of a drought in southern Somalia, undercut further attempts to restore order.

Signs of progress - the February 2006 meeting of the new transitional parliament, and September 2006 peace talks between government leaders and the opposing Islamists - were followed by flare-ups in hostilities. By the end of the year, conditions had worsened to the extent that the UN authorized African peacekeepers to safeguard the interim government. In response to the ongoing fighting, the Somali government instituted a three-month state of emergency, while the UN Security Council authorized a six-month African Union peacekeeping mission. Red Cross reports indicated that the conflict between government and insurgent forces was the “worst
fighting in fifteen years.” As of now, violence is rampant and the interim government remains under threat.
6. CASE STUDY - HAITI

Background: State Failure

In December of 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide became Haiti’s first democratically elected president. Seven months later (September 30, 1991), Raoul Cedras led a military coup against Aristide. Hundreds were killed during the coup, and Aristide was exiled to the U.S. In the following months, Cedras’s forces arrested, tortured, and murdered Aristide supporters. The Organization of American States, with the U.S.’s support, imposed sanctions on Haiti. Though they were intended to bring an end to the ongoing political and human rights violations, sanctions resulted (presumably, unintentionally) in further suffering for Haiti’s people. Though the Bush administration condemned Cedras’s actions, it failed to back its threats with anything beyond rhetorical support for the OAS sanctions. By the time Bush left office, Haitian refugees had reached American shores, and Clinton faced growing pressure to respond to the crisis.

Initially, Clinton attempted to broker a compromise that would appeal to Haiti’s military rulers, its minority business elite, and Aristide and his supporters. Cedras opposed the terms of the deal, and rejected the plans to facilitate Aristide’s return. The UN responded by imposing a new round of sanctions. When it became clear that the sanctions were ineffective, as Haitian refugees continued to show up on U.S. shores, policymakers were forced to address the issue. The failure to do so, it seemed, would not only ensure that Haitians were subject to new bouts of politicide, but that the consequent refugee crisis would pose domestic problems for the U.S. Recognizing the scope of the issue, Clinton ordered the initiation of Operation Restore Democracy. The intervention was designed to remove Cedras’ military forces from power,
restore Aristide to the presidency, allow for the reinstitution of democratic governance, and bring the humanitarian crisis to an end.

Motives for U.S. Intervention: Congressional Debates, Presidential Papers, and Insider Politicking

In many respects, the U.S.’s response to Haiti was prompted by the same concern that led to the intervention in Somalia: humanitarian crisis. While the majority of the foreign policy leadership’s public speeches and documents on the issue support this account, pre-invasion discussions on Haiti were marked by a number of additional considerations. Proponents of U.S. action argued that the situation posed threats that exceeded human rights considerations; that the course of democratization in the Western Hemisphere was at risk, that Cedras’ defiance placed U.S. credibility at stake, and that refugees and asylum seekers would strain American resources. In other respects as well, the period leading up to intervention in Haiti differed significantly from that preceding action in Somalia. Bush initiated Restore Hope after losing his bid for reelection, and was able to deploy troops – as a lame duck president – free from the usual host of domestic political pressures. Clinton, however, faced intense partisan debate, the onset of the Republican takeover of Congress, and post-Somalia public opposition to overseas peacekeeping and state-building. As such, the lead-up to Operation Restore Democracy involved a good deal of politicking by Clinton and his aides, and a series of lengthy and heated Congressional debates.

Congress took on the “Haiti issue” years before the possibility of intervention was raised; House and Senate members had begun calling for attention to Haiti immediately following the military coup. By early 1993, though, the tone of the discussion had become increasingly caustic. Members not only called for the restoration of democracy (John Conyers, D-Michigan), but attacked the U.S.’s refugee policy - deportation and repatriation - as cruel (Carrie Meek, D-
Florida). Concern for the “human tragedy” (Bob Graham, D-Florida; Meek; Major Owens, D-New York; Corrine Brown, D-Florida; Donald Payne, D-New Jersey; Jerrold Nadler, D-New York; Eva Clayton, D-North Carolina) spread; Senators Carol Moseley-Braun (D-Illinois) and Russell Feingold (D, Wisconsin) submitted Senate Resolution 89 on April 1, which called for the restoration of democracy and provision of humanitarian aid. During the early summer, various members of the House and Senate denounced the lack of attention to Haiti, respectively calling for a formal peacekeeping response to the junta’s human rights abuses, stronger democratization measures, and a reversal of the sanctions and repatriation policies (Graham; Byron Dorgan, D-North Dakota; Claiborne Pell, D-Rhode Island; May 26; Owens; John Mica, R-Florida; Meek; Joseph Kennedy, D-Massachusetts; Ronald Dellums, D-California).

By the time of the two-year anniversary of the Haitian coup, Senators Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) and Patrick Moynihan (D-New York) demanded action to prevent further violence against Haitian civilians, and raised the possibility of a U.S. intervention. In the following months, the sanctions policy remained the primary focus of discussion, but the invasion debate gained steam. Invasion advocates called for the formation of a U.S.-UN peacekeeping force, drawing attention to the U.S.’s “moral commitment” to democratization and humanitarian aid efforts (Graham; Owens; Dellums).

By early 1994, members of Congress had begun to question Clinton’s hesitance to act (Mica; Meek; Joseph Moakley, D-Massachusetts; Delegate Eleanor Norton, D-District of Columbia). They noted the upsurge in violence against Haitian civilians (Eliot Engel, D-New York; Nadler), saying “it is a foreign policy crisis, it is a human rights crisis, and it is a crisis which is producing an erosion of the moral authority of the U.S.” (Owens). Invasion opponents, meanwhile, argued that the proposed intervention was far from necessary, and that it lacked a
clear purpose, exit plan, and chain of command (Porter Goss, D-Florida). They questioned the use of U.S. troops for humanitarian purposes, in light of the disaster in Somalia (Henry Hyde, R-Illinois; Barbara Kennelly, D-Connecticut; E. Clay Shaw, R-Florida).

On May 3, Senator Graham called for a three-step military operation aimed at restoring democracy in Haiti. This prompted swift reaction from Dole (R-Kansas), who argued that military action was unnecessary, given the lack of U.S. vital interests at stake in Haiti. Dole’s supporters argued against humanitarian intervention, again turning to the Somalia example as cause to avoid direct military involvement (Larry Pressler, R-South Dakota; Strom Thurmond, R-South Carolina). In the House, meanwhile, Goss questioned the wisdom of engaging U.S. troops in what was essentially a “Haitian problem.” He highlighted the lack of a national security threat in Haiti, and the seeming inappropriateness of a strategy premised on “forcing Haitians to democracy at gunpoint.” Just as Dole had done in the Senate, Goss won backing from House Republicans and Democrats alike. By late summer of 1994, only Owens and Christopher Dodd (D-Connecticut) continued to support plans for U.S. military action in Haiti.

While the president’s opponents in Congress depicted the Haiti problem as “purely humanitarian,” Clinton attempted to sell the proposed intervention as a “humanitarian-plus” mission. The President’s public speeches and documents from the year leading up to the initiation of Restore Democracy conveyed an underlying concern for the human suffering in Haiti. In the months and weeks immediately preceding the invasion, though, he nonetheless that U.S. vital interests were tied to the outcome of the Haiti crisis. In early 1993, he told reporters that the fundamental mission was “to restore a democratically elected government that will not abuse the human rights of ordinary Haitians…” (February 5), and that he “could not, in good conscience, let hundreds of people die on the high seas…simply because the United States has
not used its muscle to restore democracy” (February 10). Weeks later, he noted, “They are entitled, those people, to human rights protections just like everybody else” (March 13).

By the summer of 1993, though, he began backing his humanitarian intervention arguments with references to the other U.S. interests at stake in Haiti. In June, he noted, “The promotion of democracy…not only reflects our values but also increases our security…” (June 4, 1993). The following month, he justified his ongoing support for UN sanctions with the earlier statements of President Bush, saying that the junta posed a threat to the “national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States” (July 12). He eventually returned to his emphasis on human rights abuses, saying that he hoped to avoid the use of force, but that people were being killed (May 3, 1994 CNN interview); that Cedras’s regime had “murdered innocent civilians” and “crushed political freedom” (May 8, 1994). When this failed to win support for his intervention plans, he resumed his former “humanitarian-plus” message. At a May 19th news conference, he listed the U.S.’s various interests in Haiti as: geographic proximity, the several-thousand Americans living there, anti-drug trafficking goals, the risk of a refugee crisis, and the threat to democracy in the Western Hemisphere. He later argued that the failure to restore democracy to Haiti would have a tangible effect on U.S. national security (August 3). In the days immediately preceding the invasion, he spoke of the need “to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians, to secure our borders, and to preserve stability and promote democracy in our hemisphere and to uphold the reliability of the commitments we make and the commitments others make to us…” (September 15 and September 18).

Like Clinton, members of the administration were unsure of how to perceive and address the crisis in Haiti. The President’s evident preference for domestic policy matters left his aides in a particularly difficult position. As Secretary of State Warren Christopher worked to fend off
criticisms from Senator Helms, and Defense Secretary Les Aspin advised Clinton against knee-jerk reactions to the crisis, National Security Adviser Tony Lake struggled to find a way of “articulating the vision” for the Haiti agenda (Nelan, Carney, McAllister, and van Voorst 1993). Clinton’s October 1993 attempt to send two hundred “civic assistance” troops to Port-au-Prince ended in embarrassment - the troops were unable to enter the city due to riots and gunfire - and prompted Clinton to adopt a decidedly cautious stance on Haiti (Stotzky 1997: 145). He pursued an approach aimed at making intervention unnecessary: he maintained the embargo-asylum policy, ramped up sanctions, froze the junta leaders’ U.S. financial assets, and ordered U.S. warships closer to Haiti’s shores.

The above measures succeeded in temporarily quieting congressional criticisms, but the President balked at the possibility of direct intervention (Friedman, October 18, 1993). His foreign policy team, still rattled by the debacle in Somalia, feared the political fallout that might result from such measures. They advised him to promote Haiti’s relevance to U.S. vital interests; to focus on the threat of authoritarianism “in our own back yard.” While the public relations tactic helped defeat a Senate amendment requiring congressional approval for the use of force in Haiti, Clinton continued to adhere to a circumspect view of the invasion option (Sciolino, August 4, 1994). He sought to address the humanitarian crisis in other ways, most notably, by calling an end to the practice of “forced repatriation” of Haitian refugees (Sciolino, August 4, 1994).

By July of 1994, though, Clinton advisers began insisting on the need for decisive action. Special Envoy on Haiti, William H. Gray, lobbied for a return to the military option. Clinton struggling to achieve a “moral” approach to Haiti, ordered a 2,000 member landing force to the Caribbean in the hopes that the “credible threat” would persuade junta leaders to step down. Plans for further military action were temporarily thwarted by domestic political concerns
(Congress turned to health care reform proposals and the Whitewater hearings, while the administration adjusted to staff changes), but aides soon resumed calls for invasion plans (Jehl, July 19, 1994). This shift coincided with the UN’s July 31st adoption of Security Council Resolution 917, a response to Cedras’ endorsement of the torture and assassination of Aristide supporters, which authorized UN member states to use “all necessary means” to remove Cedras from power. The next day, the Security Council authorized a U.S. invasion of Haiti (UNSCR 940).

With the approval to act, and the assurance that the UN would assume responsibility for subsequent control of the occupation, Clinton aids moved to win support for intervention (Lyons 1994). Administration officials courted Congressional leaders and members of the press. Christopher appeared on Meet the Press (September 12), highlighting the broad international support for the proposed U.S.-UN peacekeeping mission (Lewis, September 12, 1994). Deputy National Security Adviser Sandy Berger and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot attended a demonstration of possible intervention scenarios, using the event to promote the feasibility of invasion. That same day, Lake appeared before the Council on Foreign Relations, asserting that the U.S.’s “essential reliability” was at stake in Haiti (Devroy and Goshko, July 7, 1994).

President Clinton and Vice President Gore, in turn, worked to secure foreign leaders’ commitments to a post-invasion security force (Sciolino, September 20, 1994; Jehl, September 22, 1994; Schmitt and Gordon, September 11, 1994).

The success of the administration’s public relations efforts - which yielded concessions from Congressional opponents, most notably, Senator Bob Dole - allowed Clinton to proceed with presenting his case to the American people. Working against negative public perception (polls showed that two-thirds of Americans disagreed with the planned invasion) of Haiti,
Clinton presented the proposed intervention as an unfortunate but necessary step. In his September 15th address to the nation, Clinton stated, “the U.S. must protect its interests, to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians; to secure our borders and preserve stability and promote democracy in our hemisphere; and to uphold the reliability of our commitments we make and the commitments others make to us.” In keeping with the advice of his Haiti team, he “put a graphic face” on the human rights violations in Haiti, depicting the country as a virtual “killing field” (Jehl, September 15, 1994). On September 19, 1994, he initiated Operation Restore Democracy.

**Limited Motives, Limited Mission**

The lead-up to military action in Haiti was characterized by greater discussion, debate, and planning than that which preceded the engagement in Somalia. Hoping to avoid the risks and negative connotations associated with “mission creep” (which had plagued UNOSOM II), Clinton aides developed a strategy premised on the notion that a sizable invasion force would allow for a limited-duration mission. They theorized that the threat of overwhelming force would shock the junta leaders into acquiescence, thus allowing for a stable environment in which to reestablish democratic governance. Hoping to maintain the limited domestic support they had achieved, they were careful to downplay long-term (state-building) plans for Haiti. Said one Clinton spokesperson, “We are trying to provide Haitian society with a breathing space…We are not saying we can transform Haitian society in that period” (Schmitt and Gordon, September 11, 1994). Clinton, in fact, followed up his invasion announcement with the statement, “This mission will be limited in time and scope. It is clearly designed to provide a secure environment for the restoration of President Aristide and democracy…and to facilitate a quick hand-off to the United Nations…” (September 19, 1994).
Military Commitments

Figure 3: Timeline for U.S. Military Commitments to Haiti, 1994-1996

The success of the invasion itself - coup leaders gave up their offices prior to the arrival of U.S. forces, which entered Haiti with virtually no resistance - garnered House and Senate resolutions applauding the President and U.S. troops. Both resolutions, though, also called for U.S. withdrawal from Haiti “as soon as possible” (Rosenbaum, September 22, 1994). Republican Senators McCain, Gramm, and Dole attacked the President’s decision to act on humanitarian motives alone (Rosenbaum, September 22, 1994). Though Senate Democrats were quick to defend Clinton, they stopped short of opposing calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Perhaps in response to the wavering support for Restore Democracy, Clinton advisers planned for a significant post-invasion troop reduction. They estimated that the U.S.-led phase of the operation would last only seven months; that longer-term recovery efforts would be managed by the UN. Pentagon officials consequently designed Restore Democracy around the belief in the practical and political desirability of a short-term mission with limited objectives. These goals
included the removal of the military regime, the restoration of Aristide to the presidency, and the achievement of stable conditions necessary for the reinstitution of democracy (Schmitt and Gordon, September 11, 1994).

In some respects, the “major force – minimal time frame” strategy behind Operation Restore Democracy was a striking success. The operation itself consisted of 20,000 U.S. military personnel and 2,000 troops from other countries. (It could be argued that policy makers overplayed the size of the U.S. force; in Haiti the U.S. committed roughly four troops per 1,000 locals; in Somalia, it committed five troops per 1,000 locals.) It lasted just over six months (September 19, 1994 - March 21, 1995), and resulted in no U.S. casualties. Perhaps most significantly, each of the major objectives – Cedras’s removal from power, Aristide’s return to office, and the achievement of stable conditions necessary for the reinstitution of democracy – were met within a month of the initial invasion.

In spite of these accomplishments, U.S. leaders were not prepared to tackle longer-term recovery work. In fact, Clinton aides were counting on the fact that the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) would be responsible for the tasks of re-building Haiti’s police force and judiciary, rehabilitating its civil administration, and laying the groundwork for future democratic elections. As such, they relegated U.S. responsibility for these goals – principally, the restoration of law and order – to a small program within the Justice Department. With limited manpower and resources, the Justice Department was unable to provide adequate training and supplies for Haiti’s new police force and judicial officers (Schmitt and Gordon, September 11, 1994). When the U.S. passed leadership of the multi-national intervention force to the UN, it left Haiti with an ill-equipped domestic security force and an anemic system of law and order.

Unlike Operation Restore Hope, Operation Restore Democracy ended in a peaceful
manner. Its limited mandate and carefully designed U.S.-UN transition period ensured that
UNMIH could be initiated under fairly stable conditions. On April 1, 1995, President Clinton
visited Haiti. He endorsed UNMIH and the “effectiveness and the benefits of international
peacekeeping,” promising continued U.S. involvement in Haiti’s democratization efforts. Yet, he
went on to note that Haitians themselves - not UNIMIH - should bear the primary responsibility
for rebuilding their state. UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali later echoed this theme, saying,
“The people of Haiti must maintain their commitment to rebuild their nation…” (Rohter, April 1,
1995). This notion was reflected in UNMIH’s force structure, which was both smaller (6,900
members; reduced from 22,000 members) and significantly less equipped than that of Restore
Democracy.

Despite the nominal success of the transition period, there were signs of underlying
tensions. The ceremony marking the onset of UNMIH took place just days after Mireille
Durocher Bertin, one of Aristide’s chief political opponents, was assassinated. Clinton noted,
“we should applaud his [Aristide] quick and decisive action and let the investigation proceed and
not presume its results…This is a day of celebration…It’s a day of mission accomplished for the
United States, a day of celebration for Haitians.” Many agreed with Clinton’s assessment. Yet,
some interpreted the statement as evidence that U.S. concerns for Haiti’s long-term progress
were somewhat secondary to the immediate goal of a rapid troop withdrawal (Schmitt and
Gordon, September 11, 1994).

Foreign Aid Commitments

It could be argued that U.S. provided significantly greater financial commitments than
military commitments to Haiti. Levels of grants and loans were quite high, particularly as
compared to patterns of aid to Somalia. Further, the structure of aid distribution indicated an
understanding of both the immediate and future concerns for Haiti’s recovery. Some funding was directed toward the accomplishment of short-term objectives; grants directed through the Department of Agriculture, for example, allowed for the provision of immediate food aid to Haitians. A good deal of funding, however, was assigned through USAID (at least in 1995), the agency responsible for overseeing the progress of longer-term political and economic development projects in Haiti. As such, there were indications of an attempt to achieve a balance between short-term and long-term aid allocations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>USAID</th>
<th>Dept. Ag.</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>136.8</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>151.8</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>141.7</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>132.1</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>137.2</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>142.3</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>126.3</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>106.9</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>172.6</td>
<td>110.1</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>230.6</td>
<td>143.1</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>241.6</td>
<td>148.9</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: U.S. Grants and Loans to Haiti (by Million, Constant U.S. Dollars)

Yet, as was the case with Somalia, certain patterns of grant and loan provision seemed to be at odds with the expressed goals of the state-building engagement. Policy makers reasoned that there was no need to extend Operation Restore Democracy beyond its seven month timeframe; that Haitians themselves – with financial assistance from the U.S. – would assume the tasks of post-conflict reconstruction and state-building, thus avoiding the risk of becoming a U.S.-UN protectorate.

In 1995, for example, the U.S. allocated significant funds for the purposes of dismantling Haiti’s remaining military forces, and establishing and developing a local police presence. The
new police force was expected to provide security within Haiti, and serve as the primary
guarantor of law and order within the newly democratized state (thus, U.S. troops would not
have to be dragged into longer-term stabilization operations). Yet, there were drastic reductions in
funded the recruitment and training of new police officers – to $1.4 million in 1996, and then
again to $0.7 million in 1997. Decision makers maintained this pattern of declining aid
commitments by slashing funding for other programs as well. They cut grants and loans directed
through USAID (which were admittedly quite high in 1995) by half from 1995 to 1996.

**Assessment**

The motives for U.S. intervention in Haiti, though hardly expansive, did exceed the scope
of the purely humanitarian impetus for the previous engagement in Somalia. In Haiti, as in
Somalia, there were clearly humanitarian concerns at stake. Cedras relied on torture, rape, and
murder as tools of political intimidation. Indeed, the majority of congressional and presidential
statements on the situation in Haiti (from the period leading up the invasion) centered on
Cedras’s disregard for human rights (DiPrizio 2002; Dobbins et al. 2003).

Clinton’s justifications for action - which focused on concerns beyond the humanitarian
crisis - were no doubt colored by political maneuvering. Faced with public and Congressional
opposition, memories of the debacle in Somalia, and a host of domestic policy concerns, the
President and his aides struggled to market the case for invasion. Officials advertised the crisis in
Haiti as a “humanitarian-plus” problem, highlighting the need to stem the flow of refugees to
U.S. shores, protect democracy in the Western Hemisphere, and maintain U.S. credibility as a
force against authoritarianism (DiPrizio 2002). The effort to sell the invasion as a multi-motive
operation was effective, at least in the short-term. Clinton won the necessary Congressional
support to proceed with plans to act, and managed to secure intervention commitments that far exceeded those of the U.S. operation in Somalia. The credible show of force during the initial invasion phase of Restore Democracy prompted the collapse of the military regime, and allowed for steps toward the restoration of democratic governance (Snow 2000; Art and Cronin 2003).

Nonetheless, the “humanitarian-plus” tactic was less effective in the long-term, as suggested by subsequent links between shifting perceptions of the situation in Haiti and shifting levels of commitment to Operation Restore Democracy and UNMIH. With the overriding (humanitarian, refugee) crisis seemingly resolved, there was a dip in efforts to address the other concerns: protection of democracy in the Western Hemisphere, and the maintenance of U.S. credibility as a force against authoritarianism. Pleased with the initial results of the operation, leaders moved to withdraw most troops just months after invasion, assuming that U.S. foreign aid and support for the follow-on UNMIH would provide for adequate recovery conditions. Yet, they also cut critical segments of the aid budget and troop numbers for UNMIH. The U.S., consequently, fell far short of achieving its long-term goals for democratization and development in Haiti (Snow 2000; Dobbins et al. 2003).

Polity IV scores indicate that Haiti has been unable to achieve sustained peace or democratic development in the wake of the U.S. attempts at state-building “on the cheap.” Policy analyses of the U.S.’s 1994-1996 engagement in Haiti suggest that, unlike the operations in Somalia, Restore Hope and UNMIH were not complete failures. Rather, they were simply “incomplete” – mission objectives were partially fulfilled, but not to the extent that they could allow for successful state-building and recovery (Snow 2000; Art and Cronin 2003; Dobbins et al. 2003).
Follow Up

In the immediate years following the U.S.’s 1994-1996 role in Restore Democracy and UNMIH, UN forces oversaw peaceful democratic elections. In 1995, Aristide supporters won control of parliament, and Rene Preval was voted into the presidency. The initial transition proved to be stable, and Preval’s first year as president was relatively uneventful. By 1997, though, tensions between Preval and the predominantly pro-Aristide parliament had come to a head. Following two years of political deadlock, Preval called an end to the ministers’ terms of office. With the parliament effectively disbanded, and the president distracted by a series of fallouts with his own deputies, Haiti slipped further away from democratic governance. By 1999, Preval had begun to rule by decree.

While the end of Preval’s term disrupted Haiti’s path to legitimate governance, the next year’s presidential election resulted in additional political instability. The resurgence of pro-Aristide forces (the Lavalas movement) helped secure Aristide’s reelection to a second non-consecutive term as president. The 2000 election results, though, were suspect - observers noted that voting irregularities went unchecked. When Aristide assumed office in 2001, he accused former army officers of plotting to overthrow the government, a move that ultimately prompted an armed attack on the National Palace (an apparent coup attempt). Threatened by the attack, and concerned for his powers as president, Aristide turned to increasingly anti-military rhetoric. Eventually, Aristide adopted a number of the same political intimidation tactics that his enemies had used against his supporters in the early 1990s.

By 2004, growing frustration with Aristide’s rule resulted in political violence. Celebrations marking Haiti’s two hundredth year as an independent state were interrupted by anti-Aristide uprisings. Rebel forces seized cities across the country, killing dozens of civilians.
Aristide was again forced into exile, and an interim government assumed control of Haiti. Severe floods, which left 2,000 Haitian missing or dead, further complicated the political turmoil. Though the crisis did garner much-needed international attention – U.S. forces monitored the security situation, UN peacekeepers delivered relief supplies to flood survivors, and the international community pledged more than $1 billion in aid – subsequent flooding resulted in additional instability. By late 2004, political violence had become a constant feature of life in Port-au-Prince. Gangs loyal to Aristide carried out a number of killings; Ravix Remissainthe, an anti-Aristide leader, was killed in the capital city in April 2005.

Though volatile political conditions persisted, general elections took place in February 2006 (the first to be held since Aristide’s ouster in 2004). Preval was ultimately declared the winner, but the decision required extensive negotiation among political insiders, as ballots showed evidence of vote tampering. The newly elected members of parliament, headed by Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis, took office in June. Despite the nominal signs of a return to democratic governance, political violence continued to plague Haiti. In 2007, the UN intervened to address violence in the capital and its surrounding shantytowns. Haiti continues to be plagued by poverty, instability, the ever-present risk of rebel upsurge, and a lack of democratic and economic development. As of now, it remains a state on the brink of collapse.
7. CASE STUDY - BOSNIA

Background: State Failure

When Josep Broz Tito died in 1980, the event triggered the onset of heightened tensions within the six Yugoslav republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Seeing the opportunity to consolidate his own power in the region, Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic rejected the other republics' claims to independence. Milosevic's military aggressions culminated in the Wars of Yugoslav Disintegration. He initially targeted Slovenia, which managed to survive relatively intact. He then turned his attention to Croatia, which fared worse than Slovenia. Finally, he moved against Bosnia, a republic characterized by its ethnically diverse population: 44% Muslim, 31% Serb, and 17% Croat.

Playing on Bosnia Serb's fears of a post-independence Islamic state, Milosevic supported attacks on vulnerable Muslim and Croat regions of the country. Bosnian Muslims and Croats sustained a tenuous alliance during the early phase of the war. Eventually, though, the conflict took on a triangular configuration, with Serbs, Muslims, and Croats all fighting against each other. All parties to the civil war engaged in various forms of atrocity: the use of concentration camps, systematic rape and torture, mass murder, and siege tactics. Most contemporary accounts, however, suggest that Serb forces were the most active aggressors, and that Bosnian Muslims were the most greatly victimized.

When the conflict initially broke out in Bosnia, the Clinton administration encouraged European states to assume the lead in managing the situation. Plagued by the uncertainties of the international arena (ongoing problems in the Middle East and post-Soviet Europe) and the
shortcomings of U.S. efforts in Haiti and Somalia, Clinton hoped to re-focus his attention on domestic issues (DiPrizio 2002). Yet, U.S.-European disagreements about how to best proceed in Bosnia allowed for the spread and intensification of the conflict. Ultimately, direct U.S. involvement became a necessity. In the fall of 1995, Clinton officials announced plans for the introduction of ground forces. That December, the President deployed troops to Bosnia to take part in extensive peacekeeping and state-building operations.

Motives for U.S. Intervention:
Congressional Debates, Presidential Papers, and Insider Politicking

Congressional debates on the Balkans crisis began well before December 1995. In early 1994, increased violence on Bosnia sparked a rash of criticisms. Lawmakers questioned the administration's seemingly inconsistent policy, calling for a response to the "senseless killings" (Frank Wolf, R-Virginia), and enhanced U.S.-NATO leadership on the issue (Steny Hoyer, D-Maryland; Alfonse D'amato, R-New York; John Olver, D-Massachusetts; David Bonior, D-Michigan; Eliot Engel, D-New York; Frank McCloskey, D-Indiana; Jim Moran, D-Virginia). Others pointedly argued that the U.S. was not only morally bound to prevent "genocide in our own time," but strategically compelled to act in defense of "European security interests" (Dennis Deconcini, D-Arizona). House and Senate members latched onto the theme, drawing attention to the host of "moral and security challenges the U.S. faces in the Balkans" (McCloskey; Thomas Foglietta, D-Pennsylvania; John Kerry, D-Massachusetts).

Others were more circumspect. Some encouraged the pursuit of peace negotiations rather than air strikes (Durenberger, R-Minnesota; Patricia Schroeder, D-Colorado; Bob Dole, R-Kansas). Some advised against further military action, opposing the absence of a "workable goal" for the region (J. James Exon, D-Nebraska; Bill Barrett, R-Nebraska; Duke Cunningham,
R-California), the UN command structure for proposed air strike missions (John McCain, R-Arizona; Paul Coverdell, R-Georgia), and the risk of a "repeat Somalia" (John Warner, R-Virginia; Phil Crane, R-Illinois).

As the debate continued, rifts between those who promoted the "credible use of force" in Bosnia (Deconcini; Richardson, D-New Mexico; Schroeder), and those who opposed an interventionist role in the Balkans (Hoyer; Slade Gorton, R-Washington; April 14; Newt Gingrich, R-Georgia; Toricelli, D-New Jersey; Deconcini; Bonior; Dole; Benjamin Gilman, R-New York; Joe Knollenberg, R-Michigan) became increasingly apparent. Advocates highlighted a range of reasons for U.S. fulfillment of its role as the "moral and military leader of the free world" (Dana Rohrabacher, R-California; Cass Ballenger, R-North Carolina; McCloskey): humanitarianism, the protection of U.S.-European security ties, and the prevention of a broader and longer-term war. Opponents, in turn, questioned the wisdom of using force when there were no vital interests at stake in Bosnia (Knollenberg; Gingrich; Goss, R-Florida; Orrin Hatch, R-Utah).

The issue of the arms embargo came to dominate congressional floor debates throughout the late spring and summer of 1994. In spite of this trend, the late 1994 to early 1995 period was also defined by a turn to discussion of an appropriate U.S.-NATO response to continued Serbian aggression. In the Senate, lawmakers argued that the time for concessions, appeasement, and diplomacy had come to an end; that the crisis warranted a show of NATO power (Deconcini; Donald Riegle, D-Michigan; Joseph Lieberman, D-Connecticut; Dole; Claiborne Pell, D-Rhode Island; Patrick Moynihan, D-Vermont). In the House, meanwhile, lawmakers attacked U.S. influence and principles as "irrelevant" and "meaningless" in the absence of real action (Hoyer; Christopher Smith, R-New Jersey). The eventual use of NATO air strikes against the Serbs won
positive reviews (Lieberman; Smith); they also prompted lawmakers to ask whether a follow-on peacekeeping force would be necessary (Lee Hamilton, D-Indiana).

The embargo debate resumed in June of 1995, but was quickly subsumed by heated discussions on the possible deployment of ground troops to the Balkans. The question prompted a return to earlier deliberations on the various justifications - or lack thereof - for the pursuit of a U.S. peacekeeping mission. Numerous lawmakers opposed the plan (Byron Dorgan, D-North Dakota; Dole; John Duncan, R-Tennessee; David Funderburk, R-North Carolina; Charlie Gonzalez, D-Texas). Those who favored an expanded U.S. role in Bosnia, though, cited increasingly comprehensive causes for involvement: America's stake in European security (Joseph Biden, D-Delaware), the massive scope of the humanitarian crisis (Paul Wellstone, D-Minnesota; Harry Reid, D-Nevada), the need to maintain U.S.-NATO credibility in the region (Lieberman; Sam Nunn, D-Georgia; Paul Simon, D-Illinois), and the risk that the violence would spread to other parts of Europe (Solomon, R-New York; Smith). Advocates for increased action, though, did not necessarily advance these arguments in support of ground-level peacekeeping. There was considerable opposition to Clinton's proposal for a peacekeeping mission, and many in Congress attacked his "overlapping interests" (in intervening) as intentionally misleading (Larry Pressler, R-South Dakota; Scott McInnis, R-Colorado).

As it became apparent that Clinton planned to send ground troops to Bosnia, detractors in Congress responded with a series of anti-interventionist arguments. Some opposed the use of the military for purposes that were not explicitly tied to U.S. national security:

- William Baker, R-California; Mark Neumann, R-Wisconsin; September 28; McInnis;

John S. Horn, R-California; Steve Chabot, R-Ohio; Dornan, R-California; Joel Hefley, R-
Colorado; James Traficant, D-Ohio; Donald Manzullo, R-Illinois; Dan Burton, R-Indiana; Cunningham, R-California; Steve Buyer, R-Indiana; Toby Roth, R-Wisconsin; Dornan; Bill Barrett, R-Nevada; Todd Tiarht, R-Kansas; Mark Souder, R-Indiana; Dornan; Funderburk; Jim Inhofe, R-Oklahoma; Ben Nighthorse Campbell, R-Colorado; Gene Taylor, D-Mississippi; Sam Brownback, R-Kansas; Hefley; Jack Metalf, R-Washington; Dornan; Curt Weldon, R-Pennsylvania; Hefley; Dornan; Funderburk; Floyd Spence, R-South Carolina; Funderburk; Duncan; Jim Ramstad, R-Minnesota; Funderburk; Joe Scarborough, R-Florida; Tiarht; Doug Bereuter, R-Nebraska; Marcy Kaptur, D-Ohio; Sue Kelly, R-New York; Scarborough; Ike Skelton, D-Missouri; Dole; Dan Coats, R-Indiana; Dole; Inhofe; Jon Kyl, R-Arizona; Kay Bailey Hutchinson, R-Texas; D'amato.

Others chastised Clinton aides for their refusal to consult with Congress on the proposed military action:

- Traficant; Dole; Byrd, D-West Virginia; Feingold; Warner; Inhofe, Arlen Specter, R-Pennsylvania; Conrad Burns, R-Montana; Thurmond.

Many noted their disagreement with the administration's expanding list of motives for troop deployment (Gorton; Dole; McCain). Supporters, in turn, typically followed the President's lead in playing up the comprehensive list of interests at stake in the region. In the weeks immediately preceding the onset of the peacekeeping mission, the list had grown to include: the need to build on NATO progress in the region (Richardson; Bob Kerrey, D-Nebraska), concern for U.S.-NATO leadership and credibility (Leahy; Lieberman), the U.S. commitment to democratic and humanitarian values (Frank Lautenberg, D-New Jersey), the U.S. dependence on European
security (Simon), and the possible long-term risks of a Europe-wide conflict (Dianne Feinstein, D-California).

By the time peacekeeping advocates in Congress adopted the "overlapping interests" theme, Clinton himself had devoted considerable effort to refining the message. Though critics claimed that his reasons for intervention were greatly exaggerated - that the message was a ploy designed to bolster arguments for an unreasonable proposal for troop deployment - Clinton himself, until the fall of 1995, sought to avoid the ground troop option. Rather, he relied on his "overlapping interests" message as a means of drumming up support for U.S. diplomatic efforts and European-NATO plans for the region.

In the summer of 1995, Clinton worked to find backing for his diplomatic approach to the Bosnian crisis. He touched on various concerns: the U.S.'s "general commitment" to its NATO allies (May 31, The Billings Gazette), its "vital interests...in limiting the spread of the conflict...to minimize the loss of life" (June 3, The President's Radio Address), and the need to preserve U.S.-NATO integrity (June 16, The President's News Conference in Halifax). Congressional leaders, though, called for an end to U.S. participation in the UN arms embargo on Bosnia, saying that Bosnian Muslims should be allowed to defend themselves. Fearing that such a move would prompt European leaders to withdraw their peacekeeping forces from the region, Clinton adjusted his message. He played up the importance of the UN embargo, arguing that an influx of weapons to Bosnia would pose a threat to "the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States" (Letter to Congress, July 18).

Clinton stuck with his newly strengthened Balkans message, focusing on Bosnia's relevance to American values and material interests in future speeches and documents. At a National Public Radio interview, he applied his arguments to the contested issue of the arms
embargo. Withdrawal from the embargo, he argued, would not only allow for the further spread of atrocities - it would pose a threat to European allies, and increase the risk that the U.S. itself would be drawn into the conflict. He depicted the situation in Bosnia as more than a humanitarian crisis; the ongoing violence in the Balkans, he said, posed the "first real security crisis in Europe after the end of the Cold War" (National Public Radio, August 7, 1995).

The President used the same line of reasoning, following a series of Bosnian Serb Army attacks on UN safe areas (in Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Gorazde) to win support for NATO air strikes against the BSA. When leaders from Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia subsequently agreed to take part in peace negotiations, Clinton again built on the "overlapping interests" message. In his September 23rd radio address, he highlighted the U.S.'s dual responsibility to aid the victims of the violence in Bosnia, as well as to prevent the onset of a wider war in Europe (September 26, 1995).

By the end of October, it was clear that the administration would likely have to commit to military involvement in the Balkans. The President, by this point, had begun to refine the theme of his statements on Bosnia. He increasingly emphasized the comprehensive and interrelated nature of the various American concerns in the region. Upon the signing of the Dayton Accords, he highlighted the importance of the U.S.'s commitment to the peace agreement, saying, "Our values, our interests, and our leadership all over the world are at stake" (November 21, 1995). Days later, he employed the same scheme - values + interests + leadership - when announcing plans for the initiation of a U.S.-NATO peacekeeping mission. He noted, "...we can defend our fundamental values as a people and serve our most basic, strategic interests...If we're not there...(conflict) could spread like poison throughout the region, eat away at Europe's stability,
and erode our partnership with our European allies. And America's commitment to leadership will be questioned..." (November 27, 1995).

During the lead-up to troop deployment, Clinton explained his position to European political elites, members of Congress, and the Armed Forces. Following a meeting with European Union allies, he depicted conditions in the Balkans as a humanitarian crisis, a threat to the rest of Europe and U.S.-European security, and cause for the demonstration of U.S. leadership (The President's News Conference in Madrid, December 3, 1995). He later wrote to Congress, arguing that the ongoing Serb atrocities in Bosnia posed "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States" (December 6, 1995). Two days after the initiation of Operation Joint Endeavor, he offered assurances to military servicemen, saying that there was a real purpose behind their role in Bosnia; that "it's consistent with our values to stop suffering...it's very much in our interest to contain and prevent this war...to promote a stable and democratic and free Europe...our leadership of NATO...is very much tied to our willingness to assume a leadership role in this Bosnia mission" (December 22, 1995).

The evolution and refinement of the President's case for intervention in Bosnia was undoubtedly colored by debates within the administration. When Clinton asked his foreign policy advisers to examine the Balkans situation in 1993, their reports not only highlighted the complexity of the crisis, but presented a number of conflicting results. Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin Powell argued that air strikes alone would do little to reduce Serb aggression; Defense Secretary Les Aspin countered that ground involvement would result in a "quagmire." These disagreements were further complicated by growing European dissent on the matter. While Clinton favored an approach based on a cessation of the UN arms embargo (which would allow
Bosnian Muslims to better defend themselves against Serb attacks), European leaders instead favored the alternate Vance-Owen plan, which called for a partitioning of Bosnia along ethnic lines (Engelberg and Gordon, April 4, 1993). Europeans feared that an influx of weapons to Bosnia would leave their peacekeepers vulnerable to attack, while Clinton's advisers felt the Vance-Owen plan unduly "rewarded" the Serb practice of seizing territory through violence.

Hoping to avoid an impasse with NATO allies, Clinton opted for diplomacy, calling for a UN-monitored no-fly zone, tougher economic sanctions, and European commitment to peace enforcement measures. Within the administration, though, this yielded additional tensions. Powell and Aspin preferred to adopt a wait-and-see approach to peacekeeping, while actors at the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency argued that a rapid and sizable troop deployment would be necessary to success. Further, there was minimal Congressional and public support for a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia (Engelburg and Gordon, April 4, 1993).

During the following months, the administration's efforts to develop a Bosnia policy met with little success. Officials moved back and forth on the issue, alternately arguing for defense of the multiple U.S. interests in the region, and for the need to pursue more cautious (non-military) options. Secretary of State Christopher, for example, initially assumed a hard-line commitment to addressing the crisis; he later claimed that the U.S. should avoid involving itself in conflicts based on "ancient tribal hatreds" (Face the Nation, March 28, 1994). It became apparent that neither approach - military action, nor the return to non-involvement - was tenable. Fearful of acting against European preferences, and increasingly vulnerable to congressional criticism, the administration tabled the Bosnia issue, opting to pursue more "workable" international matters (Sciolino, May 12, 1993; Jehl and Sciolino, April 24, 1994).
When Clinton officials resumed plans for comprehensive U.S.-NATO action, they faced two major problems. In Bosnia, violence had increased over the spring and summer of 1994, as Serb forces continued to violate cease-fire agreements. At home, Senate leaders sought to head off calls for direct U.S. involvement in Bosnia; their proposed resolution to end U.S. participation in the arms embargo was widely supported (Jehl and Sciolino, April 24, 1994; Seelye, June 24, 1994).

In spite of these pressures, the administration seemed to find its footing. Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, successfully promoted the issue at the domestic and international levels (Greenhouse, March 19, 1995). Defense Secretary Perry, in turn, denounced claims that the Bosnia crisis was not a matter for U.S. concern, arguing, "This view is not only questionable from a moral standpoint, it is also flat-out wrong from a national security standpoint" (Landon Lecture, April 19, 1995). On June 8, Perry and Joint Chiefs Chairman Shalikashvili appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee, and acknowledged that Clinton had taken steps to increase U.S. military commitments to Bosnia (Sciolino, June 8, 1995; Engelburg, July 20, 1995).

Clinton advisers continued to promote the newly aggressive Bosnia strategy, their efforts bolstered by a series of favorable external factors. Croatia's entry into the conflict (and coalition with Bosnian Muslims) altered the balance of power between the warring parties, providing for conditions more conducive to external intervention. Further, there was a shift in U.S. public opinion on the matter; Americans, it seemed, now felt that U.S.-NATO credibility had been undermined by the Serbs' refusal to bring an end to their campaign of ethnic cleansing and genocide. NATO allies, in turn, were concerned about the onset of winter in Bosnia, and called for immediate U.S. action (Engelburg, July 20, 1995; Sciolino, July 29, 1996). Eventually,
opponents of Clinton's plans for military action realized that direct involvement was inevitable; that either peace enforcement measures or assistance in the withdrawal of UN troops would be necessary (Sciolino, July 29, 1996).

Aware that the new constellation of foreign and domestic factors might allow for intervention, Clinton officials worked to promote the President's Bosnia message. When Christopher spoke before the North Atlantic Council, he assured NATO leaders that he was aware that there was more than humanitarianism at stake; that the U.S. mission would help to "ensure the stability of Europe" and secure continued NATO strength and leadership (December 5, 1995).

It is plausible that the case for state-building in Bosnia - the "overlapping interests" message - was overblown; that Clinton aides were looking to overcome criticisms of poor foreign policy performance (DiPrizio 2002). Indeed, the President himself referred to the situation in the Balkans as the "issue from hell," while advisers feared that it would become a "cancer" on future international ambitions and tarnish Clinton's image in the upcoming presidential campaign. As such, it could be argued that the proposed motives for engagement in Bosnia were less genuinely comprehensive than advertised. Yet, this possibility must be weighed against the fact that the administration's Bosnia message also resulted in political fallout. Opponents regularly decried the list of interests in Bosnia as exaggerated and false. In addition, political observers questioned the wisdom of the approach, describing it as scattered and confused. Given these considerations, it seems likely that the proposed motives for military intervention were genuine; that the Clinton team regarded the Bosnia crisis as a legitimate threat to various moral and strategic interests.
Multiple Motives, Comprehensive Commitment

Though the administration faced persistent opposition in Congress, it built enough support to sustain a multi-year peacekeeping operation, as well as a series of follow-on state-building operations. Clinton opted to extend the objectives and timeline of the mission, arguing that the U.S. should address the “challenges to our interests from rogue regimes...by making long-term investments in security, prosperity, peace, and freedom” (Weiner, October 28, 1996). Attempting to build support for the decision within the administration, Albright also turned to the theme of the U.S.’s “overlapping interests” in Bosnia. The newly appointed Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, employed the same message while lobbying Congress (Bennett, December 18, 1997). The strategy was effective, resulting in extensive post-conflict recovery efforts (Erlanger, October 29, 1997; Bennett, December 18, 1997; Bennett, December 19, 1997).

Military Commitments

**Timeline: US Mission in Bosnia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 1, '92</td>
<td>Bosnia votes for independence from Yugoslav Republic; Bosnian Serbs boycott the referendum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 6, '92</td>
<td>Bosnian Serbs seize capital city of Sarajevo; signals beginning of the war in Bosnia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. '93</td>
<td>Tensions between previously allied Muslims and Croats lead to further violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. '94</td>
<td>UNPROFOR established to provide protection for six UN-declared “safe areas” in Bosnia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 19, '95</td>
<td>Def. Sec. Perry argues that US involvement in Bosnia is necessary both morally and strategically.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May '95</td>
<td>Clinton takes steps to increase military commitments to Bosnia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. '95</td>
<td>Serbs carry out a series of attacks on safe areas in Bosnia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. '95</td>
<td>Initiation of NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 21, '95</td>
<td>Dayton Agreement reached; Clinton notes: “Our values, our interests, and our leadership...are at stake.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 27, '95</td>
<td>Clinton announces mission start: “...we can defend our values...and serve our most basic, strategic interests...”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 5, '95</td>
<td>Christopher tells NATO leaders that humanitarianism, European stability, and NATO strength are at stake.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 20, '95</td>
<td>20,000 US troops deployed to Bosnia for Operation Joint Endeavor / IFOR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 22, '95</td>
<td>Clinton speaks to Armed Forces media; notes that US values, security, and leadership are at stake.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. '96</td>
<td>Clinton expands mission scope (follow-on peacekeeping and state-building operations) and extends its timeline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. '04</td>
<td>Conclusion of US-NATO SFOR presence in Bosnia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: Time for U.S. Military Commitments to Bosnia, 1995-2004
Though the U.S. military had been involved in Bosnia - to varying degrees - since 1992, it was the signing of the Dayton Accords in December 1995 that prompted major force commitments. The U.S. deployed 20,000 military personnel to Bosnia, or roughly nineteen troops per thousand local Bosnians. Task Force Eagle, part of the broader NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), was established to carry out the mandate of Operation Joint Endeavor. From December 1995 to December 1996, U.S. peacekeepers monitored the cease-fire, enforced the zone of separation, oversaw the withdrawal of combatants, secured weapons storage facilities, and supported the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) administration of democratic elections.

While primary peacekeeping responsibilities were concluded in early 1996, Clinton pushed for a continued U.S. presence in Bosnia. A follow-up support effort, Operation Decisive Edge (air enforcement of the no-fly zone) was undertaken in January 1996. When Decisive Edge ended in December 1996, Operation Deliberate Guard was initiated. Deliberate Guard was tasked with a series of operations in support of the newly established Stabilization Force (SFOR, the NATO follow-up to IFOR). U.S. forces monitored the no-fly zone, and collected intelligence for ground commanders. Operation Joint Guard was established in conjunction with Deliberate Guard, and served as the first leg of SFOR; tasks included the monitoring of former combatant groups, and the provision for general stability in the region. When Deliberate Guard and Joint Guard ended in June 1998, Operations Deliberate Forge and Joint Forge were initiated. The partner operations signaled a shift from peacekeeping activities to transitional activities, and coincided with a significant reduction of SFOR numbers.

Joint Forge was tasked with a series of post-peacekeeping duties; it was explicitly geared towards state-building efforts. Though relatively small in size (6,900) troops, it was, notably,
assigned no timeline for withdrawal. It was specifically structured for flexibility, in recognition of its varied responsibilities. During the tenure of Joint Force, the U.S. oversaw efforts to build up the state's physical infrastructure - the (re)construction of schools, roads, and hospitals. The work yielded improvements to everyday life conditions, and consequently, increased stability in the region. This, in turn, allowed for additional reductions in the total number of multinational troops (U.S. included), to just 7,000, from December 2003 to June 2004. In June 2004, NATO leaders concluded SFOR, convinced that Bosnia was on the road to recovery. NATO, however, continues to maintain a U.S.-administered military headquarters in Bosnia; the group monitors and collects intelligence on defense reform activities, counter-terrorism efforts, and the apprehension of war criminals.

**Foreign Aid Commitments**

The breadth and duration of military operations in Bosnia were significantly greater than those undertaken in Haiti and Somalia; the U.S. maintained this pattern in the variety and extent of its foreign aid contributions. The average annual commitment per local inhabitant, $49.39, was two times greater than it had been in Haiti, and more than four times greater than it had been in Somalia. Further, allocations remained fairly consistent over the course of the U.S.'s nine-year involvement; funding decreases were gradual, and appeared to remain consistent with the course of operational requirements. The pattern of grants and loans appears to suggest that decision makers took time to consider the various U.S. interests in the outcome of the Balkans crisis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>USAID</th>
<th>Dept. Ag.</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>111.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>110.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>304.8</td>
<td>181.4</td>
<td>121.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>123.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>226.2</td>
<td>169.3</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>362.0</td>
<td>315.5</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>249.5</td>
<td>221.2</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>136.8</td>
<td>103.1</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>167.8</td>
<td>113.5</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>30.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: U.S. Grants and Loans to Bosnia (by Million, Constant U.S. Dollars)

The above chart indicates that U.S. financial assistance to Bosnia was not only substantial, but was distributed in a relatively "even" manner across the departments and agencies responsible for state recovery efforts, particularly as compared to aid trends for Haiti and Somalia. The numbers, in fact, remained fairly high throughout (and beyond) the duration of U.S. involvement, even subsequent to the achievement of broad security objectives. As attention shifted to other (state-building) issues - the provision for democratic governance, the (re)establishment of state infrastructure, and economic recovery - the flow of aid continued. Significant reductions in assistance did not take place until 2002, following six years of high-level funding, and subsequent to the U.S.-NATO agreement that conditions were sufficiently stable to allow for a reduced SFOR presence.

The pattern of stable and extensive foreign aid to Bosnia (like that of military operations in Bosnia) parallels the pattern of decision-maker assessments of U.S. interests in the region. Prior to the intervention, and throughout the period of major peacekeeping operations, foreign policy elites spoke to the range of U.S. ties to the region. At the onset of direct U.S. involvement, following months of considerations of the range of "overlapping interests" in the Balkans, aid to
Bosnia tripled. And, when violence in neighboring areas (namely, Kosovo) threatened to undermine progress, leaders again considered the U.S.'s multiple links to Bosnia, and aid levels jumped. Thus, trends of aid commitment to state-building in Bosnia differed significantly from those associated with previous failed state interventions.

Assessment

The range of motives for the engagement in Bosnia - U.S.-European security, NATO credibility, U.S. leadership, humanitarianism, and the prevention of further conflict - greatly exceeded those which prompted peacekeeping and state-building efforts on Haiti and Somalia (DiPrizio 2002; Burg in Art and Cronin 2003: 57-117). While the U.S. mission in Bosnia stood out for this reason, it was also noteworthy in that it garnered substantial U.S. commitments, and subsequently, yielded moderately positive results. This pattern - comprehensive motives → comprehensive commitments → effective state-building - can be seen through the various phases of the intervention.

Once the administration succeeded in winning support for its multi-motive intervention message, it adopted plans for a series of air strikes and ground operations. Analysts suggest that the U.S.'s initial show of force in Bosnia in 1995 was largely successful, as the increased strikes and heightened troop presence helped to deter further Serb aggression (Art and Cronin 2003). Hoping to avoid the shortcomings of previous engagements, Clinton pushed for additional peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts in 1996, again highlighting the region's importance to various U.S. interests and values. He maintained substantial force numbers, and won support for continued operations in the Balkans. When tensions erupted in nearby Kosovo in 1998, the administration pushed to protect U.S.-NATO gains in the region, and returned to the "overlapping interests" theme as cause for increased foreign aid to Bosnia.
Ultimately, the U.S. maintained a military presence in Bosnia for nearly a decade. Over the course of the nine year mission, the U.S. and NATO laid the groundwork for post-conflict security, implemented various reconstruction and development projects, and oversaw steps toward democratic governance. During this period, Bosnia's path to recovery was largely stable (Snow 2003; Art and Cronin 2003; Dobbins et al. 2003). The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia began addressing reports of ethnic cleansing and genocide in 1996; by 1998, the first round of war criminals had been convicted. The UN oversaw elections in Bosnia in 1998 and 2000. While both were charged with ethnic tensions, they were nonetheless carried out in an open and democratic manner.

Bosnia was rocked by a series of political upheavals from 2001 to 2003. In 2001, President Ante Jelavic was dismissed from office for his threats to declare a new Croat Republic, and Bosnian Serbs held violent demonstrations in Banja Luka and Trebinje. In 2003, Serbian President Mirko Sarovic was forced to resign, as it was revealed that he had overseen illegal weapons sales to Iraq. In spite of this backsliding, the period also resulted in a series of positive steps. Sarovic was replaced with relatively little turmoil. Bosnian Serb General Radislav Krstic was convicted of genocide and sentenced to forty-six years in prison. And, caving to increased international pressure, one Bosnian Serb political party ousted all members suspected of participation in war crimes.

Follow Up

By 2004, stable conditions allowed for a greatly reduced international presence in Bosnia; that year, the U.S.-NATO state-building mission was officially concluded. Security and governance responsibilities were transferred to smaller multinational forces, as well as to local Bosnians. The UN handed over policing tasks to the EU, while NATO passed on peacekeeping
duties to a European-led contingency of troops (EUFOR). Within the next years, there was progress on other fronts as well. Bosnia established a domestic police force, took steps towards applying for EU membership, and was accepted to NATO's Partnership for Peace program.

Since the time of U.S. withdrawal, there have been signs of economic recovery; though unemployment remains high, leaders have implemented a series of privatization measures and banking reforms. In 2006, years of economic stagnation gave way to growth in key sectors. Further, Polity IV scores provide evidence of patterns of peace and democratic development.
8. CASE STUDY - KOSOVO

**Background: State Failure**

The Yugoslav Constitution of 1946 designated Kosovo as an “autonomous province” of Serbia, and granted its people (primarily, ethnic Albanians) equal status, rights, and political powers. In spite of these nominal legal recognitions, Kosovar Albanians suffered discrimination by Serbian authorities. Following Tito’s death in 1980, Milosevic exploited existing ethnic tensions as a means of consolidating political power. Soon after being elected president of Serbia in 1987, Milosevic rescinded Kosovo’s autonomous status. He passed laws prohibiting Kosovar Albanians from owning property and holding certain types of employment, censored cultural traditions and the Albanian language, and dissolved Kosovo’s legislative assembly.

During the early 1990s, ethnic Albanians pursued forms of peaceful resistance to Milosevic’s repressive measures. In 1995, though, they turned to more violent forms of opposition. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), formed that year, initiated a series of attacks on Serbian officials. In early 1998, Serbian police raided Kosovo, destroying homes, uprooting entire villages, and killing dozens of ethnic Albanian men. Following a period of Serb-KLA skirmishes, Milosevic ordered the use of military force in Kosovo. During the summer and early fall, more than 2,000 Kosovars were killed, and more than 300,000 were displaced.

By October 1998, U.S. and European leaders had come to regard Milosevic’s campaign of violence as an affront to NATO credibility, a threat to peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, and potential source of Europe-wide instability. The threat of NATO air strikes pushed Milosevic to agree to a cease-fire arrangement. When he failed to adhere to its terms, though, the conflict in
Kosovo resumed. March 1999 negotiations in Rambouillet, France, yielded reluctant KLA agreement to a period of NATO occupation, to be followed by an internationally-monitored settlement for Kosovo. Milosevic refused to accept the terms of the Rambouillet accords, and instead positioned 40,000 Serb troops in and around Kosovo. The resulting NATO air campaign yielded acquiescence from the Serbs, and U.S.-UN ground forces moved in to oversee extensive peacekeeping and state-building operations.

**Motives for U.S. Intervention:**

*Congressional Debates, Presidential Papers, and Insider Politicking*

During the two years prior to the onset of ground operations, Congressional debates on Kosovo typically centered on the question of whether the situation merited the type of commitment the U.S. had afforded Bosnia. In the spring of 1998, those calling for a response to the violence drew attention to Milosevic’s disregard for NATO-UN demands (Sue Kelly, R-New York), the threat of escalating Serb attacks (Kelly), and the risk to the host of U.S. values and interests in the Balkans. While many lawmakers supported proposals for bringing an end to the crisis (S. Con. Res. 85), decidedly fewer called for direct U.S. involvement (Joe Biden, D-Delaware; Jim Moran, D-Virginia; Pat Roberts, R-Kansas). Others argued that the circumstances warranted negotiation or sanctions, but not military action; that there were insufficient vital interests at stake to merit such a response (James Traficant, D-Ohio; Russell Feingold, D-Wisconsin; Phil Gramm, R-Texas).

Continued Serb attacks in the fall and winter of 1998-1999 prompted additional demands for action. Again, proponents of involvement turned to highlighting the various interests at stake: human rights violations, NATO credibility (Benjamin Gilman, R-New York), the Western-allied commitment to ending Serb aggression (Eliot Engel, D-New York; Steny Hoyer, D-Maryland; John Warner, R-Virginia), the risk of repeating the Bosnia crisis, and the overlapping strategic-
normative concerns for stability in the Balkans. Yet, just as there was a push to “act now” (John McCain, R-Arizona; Mitch McConnell, R-Kentucky), there was considerable opposition to further military undertakings in the Balkans. Some insisted on an explanation of the vital interests at risk (Roberts; Ron Paul, R-Texas). Others decried the folly of “rushing to war” (Jimmy Duncan, R-Tennessee; Jim Inhofe, R-Oklahoma), shortfalls in the defense budget (Pete Domenici, R-New Mexico; Hutchinson, R-Texas), the lack of a defined goal or exit strategy for military intervention (Roberts; Nickles, R-Oklahoma), and the administration’s failure to seek Congressional input on the matter.

By the spring of 1999, it was clear that Milosevic had no intention of halting Serb attacks in Kosovo. Calling for a show of U.S. resolve (Earl Pomeroy, D-North Dakota; Engel), intervention advocates depicted Milosevic’s tactics as an insult to NATO authority, a threat to democracy in southern Europe, and a violation of international humanitarian norms. When Clinton announced plans for NATO air campaign, pro-interventionists argued that failure to support the move could send a “dangerous” signal to Milosevic, undercutting U.S. national interests in Kosovo. While some Clinton supporters highlighted the multiple motives for action in the region, others adopted Secretary of State Albright’s declaration that the U.S. could not allow the atrocities of Bosnia to be repeated (Major Owens, D-New York; Dick Durbin, D-Illinois).

Detractors, in turn, claimed that such arguments were little more than grandiose political rhetoric (William Goodling, R-Pennsylvania); that Clinton had failed to make a case for action in Kosovo (Robert Byrd, D-West Virginia), and that continued efforts would only exacerbate an already-failed policy. Critics listed a range of objections to further action: the possibility of negotiations with Milosevic, the President’s failure to consult with Congress, the simultaneous
absence of vital objectives and adequate defense spending, the lack of clear goals or an exit strategy, and the dangers of being further plagued by what was essentially “a European problem.”

In the final two months before the onset of peacekeeping operations, opponents of intervention continued to echo the above themes (Richard Shelby, R-Alabama; Don Sherwood, R-Pennsylvania; Jack Kingston, R-Georgia). Supporters, in turn, drew attention to the various and overlapping humanitarian and security-strategic interests at stake. In the weeks immediately preceding the initiation of peacekeeping operations, Congressional criticisms of the administration’s course of action dwindled by a considerable degree.

As Clinton worked to negotiate the Congressional divisions on Kosovo, he was forced to deal with a host of other contentious actors as well: administration members who disagreed on how to address the crisis, Pentagon officials that were hesitant to send additional troops to the Balkans, and international leaders with their own particular and conflicting interests in the outcome of the crisis. When reports of violence in Kosovo initially surfaced in 1998, Clinton opted against the advice of his assertive second-term foreign policy team, and attempted negotiations (via Ambassador Holbrooke) with Milosevic (Jansson 2001: 326-327). When Serb forces subsequently massacred the village of Racak in January 1999, Clinton demanded that Milosevic comply with U.S.-European settlement terms, but again shied away from the threat of force (Statement on the Situation in Kosovo, January 16, 1999). Though he acknowledged that the crisis could potentially result in the “tremendous loss of life” and threats to U.S. security, he nonetheless maintained a course of diplomacy.

When Serb leaders announced their rejection of the peace process, the President turned to plans for a show of force (Jansson 2001: 326-327). Realizing that a U.S.-NATO action was
imminent, Clinton began to present the situation as a “values plus interests” case for intervention. His speeches from the period consistently touched on this theme: “This is a humanitarian crisis, but it is much more…It threatens our national interests,” and “Seeking to end this tragedy…is the right thing to do. It is also the smart thing to do,” and “Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative. It is also important to America’s national interest,” and “[Kosovo is] a threat to regional security…a tinderbox that could ignite a wider European war with dangerous consequences to the U.S.” Following the initiation of the air war (Operation Allied Force) in Yugoslavia, he defended the efforts as a necessary step, a “humanitarian effort” to ensure that “our people will not be called to fight a wider war for someone else’s madness;” to protect the security benefits of the “alliance with a democratic Europe” (Remarks at Barksdale Air Force Base, April 12, 1999).

As Clinton worked to build support for the air campaign, he expanded his list of justifications for U.S. involvement in Kosovo to include the preservation of the NATO alliance. He depicted the engagement in Kosovo as an appropriate undertaking for the year of NATO’s 50th anniversary, noting that Allied Force efforts would help to secure NATO’s continued credibility (Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 15, 1999). He spoke of the U.S.-European role in Kosovo as an opportunity to “strengthen and adapt NATO for the new century;” to build “a new NATO, prepared to deal with the security challenges of the new century…” (Exchange with Reporters, April 22, 1999; The President’s News Conference, April 24, 1999).

In the month preceding the initiation of ground-level peacekeeping, the President further expanded his Kosovo message. This time, it grew to encompass his vision for post-Cold War American foreign policy: “smart humanitarianism.” He argued that intervention in Kosovo would not only serve to promote American interests and values, but to warn future aggressors
against the pursuit of violence. The U.S., said Clinton, should use its strength to ensure that the crisis in the Balkans was “the last typical conflict of the 20th century, rather than the first typical conflict of the 21st” (Letter to Congress, June 5, 1999; Interview With European Journalists at Rhein Main Air Base, May 6, 1999). Speaking to the American public, he depicted the conclusion of the air war and onset of peacekeeping as “a victory for a safer world, for our democratic values, and for a stronger America…a hopeful affirmation of human dignity and human rights for the 21st century” (The President’s Address to the Nation, June 10, 1999).

The evolution and expansion of Clinton’s Kosovo message – from “overlapping interests,” to U.S.-NATO leadership and credibility, to “smart humanitarianism” – was likely influences by debates taking place within the administration. When Milosevic ordered Serb forces into Kosovo in February 1998, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright lobbied for a swift and substantial military response. Defense Secretary William Cohen reluctantly supported the use of air strikes, but argued against longer-term commitments. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, though, favored a more cautious approach. Distracted by the Lewinsky scandal, and hoping to avoid a showdown with Congress, the officials held off on pushing the President to act (Jansson 2001: 235). When Albright responded to Serb attacks with threats of U.S. involvement, she found little support from Clinton or the administration (Erlanger, September 1, 1998).

Albright continued to push for action in Kosovo, depicting U.S. ties to the Balkans as deep-rooted and wide-ranging. In September 1998, following a period of heightened Serb atrocities, the administration stepped up threats against Milosevic, warning that further attacks would trigger NATO air strikes (Schmitt, October 3, 1998). Senate Republicans - Don Nickles, Richard Lugar, and John Warner - opposed the move, insisting that Clinton seek congressional approval for military action (Schmitt, October 3, 1998). Aware of the opposition in Congress,
and fearful that further instability in the region would necessitate the deployment of ground
troops, Clinton dispatched Ambassador Holbrooke to negotiate a temporary agreement between
Milosevic and ethnic Albanian leaders (Perlez, October 11, 1998). Milosevic, though, continued
to act in defiance of U.S.-European demands.

Albright resumed calls for military action, but was unable to overcome the
administration’s preference (namely, Berger’s preference) for a wait-and-see stance. When the
“Status Quo Plus” approach proved ineffective - Serb forces killed 45 civilians in a January 1999
attack on the village of Racak – the National Security Council reconvened, and adopted
Albright’s plan for the use of air strikes against Serbian targets (Jansson 2001: 325; Rothkopf
2005: 373). NATO commander (SACEUR) Wesley Clark struggled to overcome resistance from
Pentagon leaders, who opposed further U.S. involvement in the Balkans (Rothkopf 2005: 373).
(Perlez, January 20, 1999). Clinton advisers, meanwhile, remained divided among themselves, as
well as with Congressional leaders. Further complicating attempts at progress, Britain and France
announced plans to send peacekeeping troops to Kosovo; this fueled tensions with leaders in
Belgrade and Moscow, who viewed a potential NATO ground presence in Kosovo as an affront
to Serbian sovereignty (Whitney, January 29, 1999).

As the conflict in Kosovo intensified, Albright made a last ditch effort at a peace
settlement. Talks in Rambouillet, France yielded nothing but further antagonism from KLA and
Serb leaders; however, Albright managed to convince European allies of the need for NATO
action (Jansson 2001: 325; Perlez, February 12, 1999). At home, administration officials worked
to allay Congressional and Pentagon concerns about the extent of U.S. involvement in the
Balkans. Walter Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for policy, attended a hearing at the
House of Representatives, noting that the proposed air strikes would serve “America’s security
interests” (Becker, February 11, 1999). Clinton, in turn, worked to convince policy elites and the public that “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war” (Televised Address, March 24, 1999; Apple, August 25, 1999; Clymer, March 29, 1999).

Clinton’s efforts to avoid the commitment of troops, however, met with alternate criticisms. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana argued that Western powers could not ignore the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, while Senator McCain claimed that the failure to “exercise every option” would undercut gains in the region (Clymer, March 29, 1999). Clinton officials (National Security Adviser Sandy Berge and Chief of Staff Kohn Podesta), in response, noted that Clinton had “no intention” of ruling out the possibility of ground-level peacekeeping, saying that “plans and assessments could be updated quickly” (Clymer, March 29, 1999). In April, the President met with Joint Chiefs Chairman Shelton to discuss the possibility of sending ground forces to Kosovo (Shenon, April 12, 1999).

As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright worked to secure domestic and international support for a ground presence in Kosovo, she outlined her bases of support for the proposal: European stability was necessary to U.S. security, humanitarian action was critical to U.S. values, and the two factors were inextricably linked to each other (Isaacson, May 17, 1999; Perlez, May 11, 1999). She spoke of the mission as a reaffirmation of “NATO’s core purpose as a defender of democracy, stability and human decency” (Isaacson, May 9, 1999).

By May of 1999, Clinton had come full circle on the issue of ground action in Kosovo. Clark worked with Pentagon leaders on plans for intervention (Apple, August 25, 1999), while Albright sought support for a “mini-Marshall Plan” for post-conflict Kosovo. Congress, in turn, approved an emergency spending bill to help fund the proposed mission. On May 22nd,
administration spokespersons announced the plans for the initiation of peacekeeping operations (Joint Guardian) in Kosovo (Perlez, May 22, 1999; Schmitt and Gordon, May 23, 1999).

**Multiple Motives, Comprehensive Commitment**

The day following the deployment of ground troops to Kosovo, Clinton appeared on PBS’s NewsHour, noting, “it took us four years to mobilize an action against Bosnia…this action against ethnic cleansing was hugely more rapid and more responsive…And that’s why there won’t be nearly as many lives lost.” U.S. efforts in Kosovo, both initially and over the course of the mission, differed from those in Bosnia in a number of ways. The administration responded more quickly and more forcefully to the onset of violence in Kosovo, established ground-level peacekeeping as a key element (rather than a follow-on component) of the intervention, and laid the groundwork for long-term post-conflict assistance.

**Military Commitments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Milosevic withdraws Kosovo's autonomous status, undertakes repressive measures against Kosovar Albanians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2, '99</td>
<td>Unrecognized Kosovo parliament declares “Republic of Kosova” to be an independent state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. '98</td>
<td>In response to KLA activities, Serbs carry out a series of attacks in Kosovo in early 1998.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 15, '99</td>
<td>KLA-Serb tensions culminate in Racak Incident; Serb forces kill 45 Kosovar Albanian civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. '99</td>
<td>UN Security Council adopts Albright’s plans for use of air strikes against Serb forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. '99</td>
<td>Albright argues for ground role; lists US interests: security, humanitarianism, fulfillment of NATO's purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 24, '99</td>
<td>Onset of Allied Force air strikes against Serb forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May '99</td>
<td>Clinton seeks support for action in Kosovo; describes crisis as challenge to NATO and 21st century security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May '99</td>
<td>Pentagon develops plans; Congress passes emergency spending bill; Albright lobbies for “mini Marshall Plan.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 5, '99</td>
<td>Clinton expands on Kosovo message; lists “smart humanitarianism” as critical to post-CW US foreign policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 12, '99</td>
<td>Initiation of ground-level (KFOR) peacekeeping operations; US commits 7,300 troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>US maintains roughly 1,500 troops as part of ongoing KFOR mission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: Timeline for U.S. Military Commitments to Kosovo, 1999-2009
As was the case in Bosnia, the U.S.-NATO intervention in Kosovo consisted of air strikes (Operation Allied Force) and subsequent ground-level peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts (KFOR – Joint Guardian). Aside from this similarity, though, the response to the crisis in Kosovo differed considerably that in Bosnia. First, the span of time between the onset of Serb atrocities in early 1998 and the initial U.S.-NATO show of force (Operation Determined Falcon, June 15-16) action was relatively brief. Defense Secretary Cohen defended the move as a necessary reaction to the “urgent challenge” to NATO members and “stability in the whole region” (Kozaryn, June 17, 1998). The exercise, in fact, prompted a series of concessions from Milosevic.

When Serbian forces eventually resumed attacks in Kosovo, NATO allies initiated Determined Force (October 8, 1998 – March 23, 1999). Clinton committed 260 aircraft to support the preliminary efforts to the air campaign. Fearing the onset of strikes, Milosevic agreed to NATO air surveillance of Yugoslavia (Operation Eagle Eye), which lasted until March 24, 1999. Information obtained in the monitoring exercises helped inform decisions on subsequent U.S.-European efforts in Kosovo; evidence of continued Serb attacks - in conjunction with Milosevic’s refusal to participate in further peace talks - prompted the first round of Allied Force air strikes.

Though Allied Force was initiated during a period of unfavorable domestic political conditions (there disagreements within and between the administration, Congress, and the Pentagon on the issue of U.S. involvement in Kosovo). Yet, concerns for the various interests at stake in the Balkans ensured a comprehensive and continued U.S. commitment to the operation. The U.S. component of Allied Force, Noble Anvil, consisted of 7,300 Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel. Noble Anvil was primarily tasked with security-stabilization objectives.
The larger operation, though, consisted of efforts to halt the atrocities carried out against Albanian Kosovars and deter further KLA-Serb violence. It also included a series of humanitarian operations: Shining Hope, Sustain Hope-Allied Harbor, Provide Refuge, and Open Arms. Ultimately, Milosevic agreed to meet with EU and Russian envoys to discuss settlement terms. On June 10, 1999, NATO authorized the conclusion of Allied Force and the initiation of peacekeeping operations (Kosovo Force, or KFOR).

KFOR was charged with enforcing the cease-fire agreement, demilitarizing the KLA, and providing secure conditions for the return of refugees to Kosovo. Task Force Falcon, which consisted of 7,000 American military personnel, assisted in refugee return operations, the withdrawal of former combatants, and demilitarization support efforts. The multinational forces of Joint Guardian, in turn, assisted in the UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo) transfer of security duties to the local Kosovo Police Service.

The transitions under KFOR were largely successful. Though problems of political violence at the civilian level persisted, the revamped efforts of a multinational brigade yielded positive results. 1,900 Task Force Falcon soldiers took part in operations to patrol streets, assess the needs of outlying areas, and assist in UNMIK provisional governance work. Democratic elections were held in 2004, and in 2005, Kosovar leaders began planning for Kosovo’s final status (independence).

In many respects, U.S. military commitments to Kosovo were similar to those of Bosnia. There was a peak troop presence of 20 soldiers per thousand local civilians (in Bosnia, the ratio was nineteen troops per thousand inhabitants). The U.S. also maintains roughly 1,500 troops as part of the ongoing KFOR peacekeeping mission; as such, there has been a ten-year U.S. ground presence in Kosovo (in Bosnia, the U.S. maintained a military presence for just over nine years).
Yet, the U.S. military involvement in Kosovo also represented attempts to “correct” for the shortcomings of the Bosnia mission: the air campaign was initiated soon after the onset of KLA-Serb violence, flare-ups in hostilities were met with aggressive action, and the peacekeeping mission consisted of a broad range of short-term and long-term recovery efforts.

**Foreign Aid Commitments**

Just as the U.S. committed substantial military resources to the crisis in Kosovo, it provided for substantial grants and loans to the province. While aid allocations were particularly sizable at the onset of peacekeeping and state-building activities, they remained fairly (and consistently) high over the duration of the mission. The one noticeable drop in funding between 2001 and 2002 was followed by a several years of increased spending.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>USAID</th>
<th>Dept. Ag.</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Military</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>191.1</td>
<td>189.9</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>186.9</td>
<td>175.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>72.8</td>
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<td>5.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>92.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>116.5</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>89.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 8: U.S. Grants and Loans to Kosovo (by Million, Constant U.S. Dollars)*

An examination of aid allocation trends reveals that funds were heavily skewed towards USAID projects. This represents something of a departure from more “even” distribution of funds across the various agencies responsible for post-conflict efforts in Bosnia. Yet, it is possible that spending patterns were in keeping with the intended goals for Kosovo’s recovery (unlike spending patterns in Haiti, which worked at cross-purposes with the expressed goals of Restore Democracy and UNMIH). Allocations of military funds, for example, were highest
during the period in which KFOR and UNMIK worked to transfer security duties to newly-trained local police forces. Increases in Department of State spending, in turn, coincided with efforts to assist the Kosovars in laying the foundations for self-governance. Finally, the high level of spending through USAID aligned with Albright’s proposed “mini Marshall Plan” for Kosovo; it spoke to her emphasis on political and economic (re)development as a path to sustained peace in the Balkans.

It should be noted that the overall level of U.S. spending for recovery in Kosovo far exceeded that devoted to other state-building operations of the 1990s. The U.S. committed an annual average of $58.18 per Kosovar during the period from 1999 to 2006 period. While aid to Kosovo easily topped that committed to Somalia and Haiti, it also, significantly, surpassed assistance to Bosnia ($49.39 per local inhabitant).

Assessment

Just as Clinton was willing to let European allies assume the lead role in managing the crisis in Bosnia, he initially opted for the same approach to Kosovo. Yet, there were a number of factors that prompted a turn to more direct involvement in the matter: Albright’s persistent calls for attention to the humanitarian plight in the region, recognition that failure to act could result in the escalation of violence (as had occurred in Bosnia), Milosevic’s continued path of non-compliance with NATO demands, and fear that instability in the Balkans could spread to the rest of Europe. Perhaps most significantly, Clinton’s growing concern for threats to NATO relevance (and U.S.-European security) coincided with Albright’s increasingly vocal insistence on the pursuit of principled internationalism. Ultimately, the upsurge in Serb aggression highlighted the interrelated nature of U.S. interests in security and human rights in Europe; thus, Kosovo became something of a test-case for an evolving foreign policy of “smart humanitarianism.”
As the former Bosnia message of “overlapping interests” was refined and crystallized for Kosovo, growing understanding of the multiple motives for intervention yielded a response that was rapid, forceful, and durable. While the Clinton administration declined to use force in Bosnia until the conflict had dragged on for several years, it reacted to Serbian aggression in Kosovo within months after the onset of hostilities. When Allied Force resulted in the cessation of KLA-Serb violence, the U.S. contributed substantial troop numbers to the subsequent ground-level peacekeeping efforts. Finally, the U.S. maintained a military presence in Kosovo, and continued to fund post-conflict reconstruction and development projects, throughout the following decade.

Analyses of the U.S.’s state-building efforts in Kosovo suggest that the results were largely positive (Dobbins et. al 2003). Further, Polity IV scores indicate that Kosovo has achieved moderate levels of peace and democratic development, though there have been periods of inconsistency and backsliding. Despite being ranked as one of the poorest areas in Europe, Kosovo experienced a period of economic growth following the onset of post-conflict stability. The parliament of the one-time province voted to declare independence from Serbia in February 2008; the Republic of Kosovo is now recognized as an independent state by 56 UN-member countries.

Follow Up

Standard measures suggest that the U.S. mission was a success; an examination of Kosovo’s progress since the cessation of major security-stabilization operations seems to bolster this position. In February 2002, ethnic Albanian political parties arrived at a power sharing arrangement; Kosovo’s parliament subsequently elected Ibrahim Rugova as president. In 2003, Serbian and Kosovar Albanian leaders met for the first time since 1999. In late 2003, conditions were sufficiently stable to allow for the initiation of UN talks on Kosovo’s final status.
The period leading up to the 2005 negotiations on independence for Kosovo, though, was one of political turmoil. As debates on Kosovo’s future intensified, conflict broke out in Mitrovica, resulting in nineteen deaths. Serbs boycotted the general elections in October 2004, and when the majority-Albanian parliament elected Ramush Haradinaj (a former KLA commander) as president, Serb leaders turned to antagonistic rhetoric. The next brought further political violence: an attack on President Rugova’s motorcade, synchronized explosions near UN and parliament buildings, and a shooting incident in which two Serbs were killed. When President Rugova died in January 2006, Kosovo’s future seemed to be in question.

The following months, though, yielded a turn of events. The new president assumed office without incident, there was a drop in political violence, and the UN oversaw initial negotiations on Kosovo’s status. While disagreement on the “Kosovo question” came to dominate political life – Kosovar Albanians favored independence, while the majority Serb population opposed it – the talks continued. When Kosovo’s provisional parliament issued a declaration of the province’s independence in February 2008, Belgrade immediately protested (Bilefsky, February 18, 2008).

Initial tensions died down in the following months, and the new republic succeeded in winning the recognition of the U.S. and other Western powers (though the UN and EU did not formally address the matter). The symbolic victory was matched by tangible gains; Europe pledged to contribute and additional 1,800 troops to Kosovo, while the U.S. committed to increase foreign aid to the new state (Kulish and Chivers, February 19, 2008; Bowley, March 2, 2008). While Kosovo’s future is far from secure, it seems plausible that Western powers will work to protect their investment in the “most ambitious peacekeeping operation in Europe’s history” (Bowley, March 2, 2008; Kulish, April 7, 2008).
9. CASE STUDY – AFGHANISTAN

Background: State Failure

Prior to the onset of Taliban-era state failure, Afghanistan - which straddles the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Indian subcontinent - was subject to centuries of great power and regional political struggles. First recognized as an independent monarchy in 1921, the country was ruled by King Zahir Shah from 1933 until 1973. After Shah was deposed in 1973, Afghanistan fell into a period of civil conflict that lasted until 1978, when communist forces instigated a coup. Fighting between Soviet-backed communist forces and the U.S.-supported mujahideen resistance lasted for a decade. Mujahideen forces overthrew the Communist government in 1992, and following a four year struggle for control of the capital city, the Taliban militia seized Kabul. The militia then extended its reach to other parts of the country, excluding small areas of northern Afghanistan, where the Northern Alliance - a coalition of Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara (and some Pashtun) forces - maintained territorial control.

The Taliban’s religiously conservative leaders imposed strict Sharia law throughout the state. Their repressive measures further aggravated problems in the crippled state: persistent Taliban-Northern Alliance violence, clan-based ethnic conflict, warlord rule in outlying areas, narco-trafficking, poverty, human rights violations, organized crime, and terrorism. The Taliban maintained particularly close ties with the al-Qaeda terrorist network; al-Qaeda provided financial support for the regime, while the government permitted the terrorist group use Afghanistan as a base of operations. This relationship remained intact until October 2001, when the U.S. launched Operation Enduring Freedom in response to the September 11th terrorist
attacks. Within weeks of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, bin Laden’s operatives fled the country, and Taliban rule came to an end.

**Motives for Intervention:**
**Congressional Debates, Presidential Papers, and Insider Politicking**

Congressional floor statements from the two years leading up to Enduring Freedom primarily centered on the risks posed by religious extremism and terrorism. Though lawmakers sporadically drew attention to problems of political repression and human rights abuses, the overarching theme of the period was one of U.S. security-strategic interests in the region. Congressmen variously touched on issues such as bin Laden’s close relationship with the Taliban government, the appropriate strategy for addressing the regime’s threat to regional stability (Ron Paul, R-Texas), and problems of Afghanistan’s state-sanctioned drug trafficking industry (John Mica, R-Florida).

The focus on the security-strategic problems stemming from the failed state continued throughout the spring of 2001. In the Senate, Reid highlighted the Taliban’s role as a safe haven for terrorists (Harry Reid, D-Nevada). In the House, lawmakers called for attention to the spread of religious extremism in Afghanistan central Asia, saying that fundamentalist-terrorist links would undermine Western attempts at preventing the onset of an “energy crisis” (by denying access to oil reserves) (Don Sherwood, R-Pennsylvania). While some decried the ongoing trends of political repression and human rights abuses, the theme was not seriously addressed until the September 11th terrorist attacks prompted talk of war.

When Congress reconvened in mid-September 2001, legislators immediately took up the question of an appropriate U.S. military response to the crisis. Representative Rohrabacher (R-Colorado) called for quick and substantial retribution. Others highlighted the failure of past efforts to win the cooperation of al-Qaeda, calling for a “new national approach to terrorism”
(Arlen Specter, R-Pennsylvania) – one based on broadened executive powers (Brownback, R-Kansas) and the decisive and overwhelming show of strength. Others worked to broaden the debate, tempering calls for revenge with proposals to address human rights issues, increase humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, and promote democracy in the region (Eliot Engel, D-New York; Tom Lantos, D-California).

The reactionary tone of the pro-war statements waned by late October, and some legislators worked to build support for low-cost democratization projects like Radio Free Afghanistan. Nevertheless, many continued to underscore the strategic purpose of Operation Enduring Freedom - the elimination of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan as the first step in a global war on terrorism. House and Senate members outlined the security risks posed by the failed state: the proliferation of political violence in new forms (bio-terrorism), the spread of ethnic hostilities, narcotics production and trafficking, and regional instability (Jay Rockefeller, D-West Virginia; Mark Souder, R-Indiana). Others were more pointed in their arguments, claiming that the primary purpose of Operation Enduring Freedom was the pursuit of terrorists; that it was not a humanitarian intervention. Tom Lantos (a House Democrat, as well as a noted supporter of human rights causes) was, interestingly, a key proponent of this position. Reading from an editorial piece by Henry Kissinger, he noted, “…military operations in Afghanistan should be limited to the shattering of the Taliban and disintegration of the bin Laden network. Using U.S. military forces for nation-building or pacifying the entire country would involve us in a quagmire...The likely – perhaps optimum – outcome is a central Kabul government of limited reach, with tribal autonomy prevailing in the various regions.”

Congressional concerns for the designated purpose of the mission in Afghanistan were largely reflected in the Presidents’ (Clinton’s and Bush’s) position-taking on the matter. Bush
made no public mention of the failed state prior to the September 11th attacks, and only issued two statements on Afghanistan prior to the initiation of invasion (as such, assessment of his motives for intervening in Afghanistan is a practical impossibility). However, the overarching theme of the two statements largely aligned with his predecessor’s approach to the region.

When bin Laden was linked to the August 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, Clinton ordered strikes on his complex in Afghanistan (Bennett, August 21, 1998). The President defended the move as more than act of retribution; it was, he said, necessary to the prevention of future al-Qaeda attacks. He spoke of the need to ensure that, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, “There will be no sanctuary for terrorists” (Bennett, August 21, 1998). The following year, in a letter to congressional leaders, he depicted the Taliban regime’s support for al-Qaeda as “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” He applauded UN sanctions as an appropriate response to Afghanistan (October 15th, 1999); as an effort to undercut the state’s “unusual and extraordinary threat” to the U.S. (Letter to Congress, June 30, 2000).

Bush, in turn, responded to the September 11th attacks with a message that largely mirrored Clinton’s assessment of the Afghanistan problem. Addressing to Congress just one week after the attacks, he condemned the Taliban regime, saying, “It is not only repressing its own people; it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists” (September 20, 2001). While Bush did address the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan; (in this respect, his perception of U.S. interests in the failed state - moral and strategic - was broader than Clinton’s), he did not view it as cause for military action. Rather, he characterized the basis for U.S. intervention in purely security-oriented terms: “The mission is to rout terrorists, to find them and bring them to justice...we’re not into nation-building; we’re focused
on justice…” (September 25, 2001). He returned to this theme at the end of the air campaign, saying, “Afghanistan is just the beginning of the war against terror…” (Bumiller, November 22, 2001). Bush, it seemed, had little intention of undertaking long-term efforts in post-conflict Afghanistan.

The President’s seemingly limited concern for ongoing efforts in the country was likely influenced by debates within the administration. Disagreements chiefly centered on the question of whether the U.S. should pursue Afghanistan as the primary target in the war on terror (www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/paths/bush2.html). Rumsfeld, looking for opportunities to modernize the U.S. defense system, pushed to expand the war on terror beyond Afghanistan - to Iraq. Vice President Cheney supported the move, saying, “…there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction.” Rice, meanwhile, developed a presidential directive outlining the need for the use of “all instruments of national power” against Hussein, though she later warned the President that a more cautious approach might be appropriate (www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/paths/bush2.html). Secretary of State Colin Powell, in turn, opposed the shift in focus. When Bush’s national security advisers met on September 15th, Powell managed to persuade them against the immediate pursuit of war with Iraq. The next day, they came to an agreement: Afghanistan would be the first target in the war on terror (www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/paths/bush2.html).

As Powell attempted to build support for military action among allies, Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz continued to push for war with Iraq (Woodward 2004). President Bush, concerned with the growing public impatience at the lack of a response to the terrorist attacks, called for an actionable proposal. The principals decided on a strategy geared towards the elimination of the terrorist threat in Afghanistan. In practice, it would involve
the use of air strikes against “high value targets,” and if necessary, the deployment of ground

    The administration, though, made no plans for long-term peacekeeping or state-building
operations. Bush aides claimed that such an occupation would anger Islamic militants, and that
relief supplies for civilians would be diverted to Taliban fighters. The primary U.S. objective,
explained Cheney, was to “take down those networks of terrorist organizations” (Gordon,
September 17, 2001). As Pentagon officials struggled to develop options for engaging a non-
traditional enemy (guerilla fighters and terrorists), they faced additional pressures from abroad.
International actors, many of whom were already dissatisfied with the course of the U.S.’s
Middle East policy, were worried about the future of post-war Afghanistan (Tyler and Sciolino,
September 20, 2001).

    European and Middle Eastern allies were troubled by the Bush administration’s vocal
opposition to “nation building,” in Afghanistan and elsewhere, was troublesome to European and
Middle Eastern allies (Tyler, September 23, 2001). Former Russian foreign minister Andrei
Kozyrev argued that the planned war could lead to long-term instability; that further disruptions
to the already-crippled state could give way to a power vacuum. Inattention to the future of the
ungoverned region, he noted, could result in a refugee crisis - at the time, Afghan refugees had
already begun to flee to Iran and Pakistan. Worse yet, he claimed, it could allow for territorial
aggression from neighboring countries (Tyler, September 23, 2001). These concerns, and the
growing hostility of NATO allies (who feared the onset of a wider war), prompted Bush officials
to re-style their Afghanistan strategy as a “military-plus” campaign. They initiated a food aid
operation, and adopted CIA plans for targeted strikes rather than full-scale invasion
When U.S. forces defeated the Taliban – just seven weeks after the October 7th initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom – Bush aides touted the victory as the first step in a multi-phase, multi-target “Global War on Terror.” Focused on projecting a message of American strength and resolve, national security strategists worked to parlay the success in Afghanistan into plans for an expanded war. Wolfowitz proclaimed “…any government that supports or harbors terrorists should be very worried right now,” while Rice hinted that there were plans for an invasion of Iraq. U.S. allies, in turn, continued to call for further attention to Afghanistan. Though administration officials worked to ensure that their favored candidate, Hamid Karzai, was named chairman of the country’s interim government, they did not adopt longer-term plans for reconstruction of Afghanistan (Tyler, November 21, 2001). As such, a number of tasks – provision for an international security force, institution of a formal tax system, disarmament of militia fighters, and pursuit of a settlement with Taliban leaders – remained unaddressed in the wake of the war (www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/paths/bush2.html).

On December 1, White House spokesmen responded to criticisms of their post-war inactivity with the contention that it was too early to deploy ground troops to Afghanistan. Peacekeeping and state-building operations, they proposed, could not be undertaken until conditions were considerably more stable. Rumsfeld noted that the recent defeat of the Taliban had created a situation in which “the danger to coalition forces may actually be increasing.” Further, he stated, it was the responsibility of the Northern Alliance to extend an invitation to other states, as well as provide the necessary security, for international peacekeeping forces. As winter set in, the administration’s refusal to address the humanitarian crisis prompted European
allies, aid organizations, and Afghan leaders to call for action (Eric Schmitt and James Dao, December 1, 2001). Bush deployed ground troops in early December. The Marine force, however, was tasked with tracking terrorists – not with relief support. It was not until 2002 that the International Security Assistance Force was established and post-conflict recovery was initiated (www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/paths/bush2.html).

**Minimal Motives, Casual Commitments**

**Military Commitments**

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 17, ’01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep. 25, ’01</td>
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<tr>
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Figure 9: Timeline for U.S. Military Commitments to Afghanistan, 2001-2009

U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan were meant to serve a narrow and targeted set of objectives: the destruction of al Qaeda (and Taliban) infrastructure, the elimination of suspected al Qaeda activity, and the capture and detainment of al Qaeda leaders. The goals were in keeping with Rumsfeld’s “light footprint” approach, or the reliance on intelligence-driven “smart force”
(rather than overwhelming force, a key component of the Powell Doctrine). The strategy, at least in the immediate sense, was largely successful - the regime was overturned within seven weeks of the first air strikes. In March 2002, Bush officials effectively declared victory, reporting that al-Qaeda and Taliban forces had been driven from the country, and that Afghans had elected a new government (Hersch, 2004).

Subsequent ground-level efforts in Afghanistan conformed to the “light footprint” approach as well. Of the 8,000 infantry deployed to Afghanistan, most were tasked with assisting in ongoing counter-terrorism operations. A smaller contingent was assigned to the UN-established International Security Assistance Force (UNSCR 1386: December 20, 2001), which Bush officials regarded as non-essential to the U.S. mission. Created to carry out post-war stabilization and reconstruction efforts, the force consisted of little more than 4,000 NATO troops stationed in and around Kabul (Rubin 2007). ISAF struggled to exert influence beyond the capital city, and in late 2002, coalition leaders reported that al-Qaeda and the Taliban were still active in the outlying areas of the country. Lowell Jacoby, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, confirmed the reports at a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing. Attacks outside of Kabul, he noted, had “reached their highest levels since the collapse of the Taliban regime.” Concerned by the information, the Department of Defense hired Hy Rothstein, a former general and an expert on unconventional warfare, to assess the situation. Rothstein concluded that the “light footprint” approach was a failure – that limited U.S. attention to post-conflict tasks had allowed al-Qaeda and the Taliban to maintain power in southern and eastern Afghanistan (Hersch 2004).

Rumsfeld, who was initially dismissive of such concerns, sought the advice of Afghanistan expert Marin Strmecki and National Security Council official Zalmay Khalilzad.
Both proposed that the U.S. should provide targeted aid to local citizens; that Afghans themselves should assume the primary tasks of rebuilding the country. The Secretary of Defense, in turn, implemented the “accelerating success” plan. The plan called for the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (made up of ISAF forces), which would assist local Afghans in repairing war-damaged public facilities. "Accelerating success" was essentially a limited version of Powell’s earlier proposal for a series of post-conflict operations, which Bush aides had rejected as “nation building” (Rohde and Sanger, August 12, 2007).

The U.S.'s coalition allies, as well as Afghan leaders, worried that the response was inadequate. Some feared that it was meant to provide the U.S. with a quick "out" from Afghanistan; that Bush advisers were more concerned with redirecting their war efforts to Iraq than they were with following through on post-war Afghanistan (Hersch 2004). Bush's aides did little to dispel such fears. When Wolfowitz visited Kabul in January, he promoted the shift to civilian-driven stability and reconstruction efforts by saying, "There’s no way to go too fast. Faster is better." On May 1, 2003, he participated in a news conference in Kabul, arguing that it was an appropriate time for a new approach, as "The bulk of the country today is permissive, it’s secure." Yet, the security conditions continued to worsen. When ISAF forces began moving into outlying provinces, Taliban attacks increased (Rohde and Sanger, August 12, 2007).

Military leaders initially reacted by reassigning some of the U.S.’s 10,000 troops to the outer regions; many were positioned near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, where bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar were suspected of hiding. By January of 2004, though, Rumsfeld again pushed to resume the "accelerated success" strategy. NATO, he proposed, could assume the responsibility for ongoing security operations in the country (Rubin 2007; Shanker and Myers, December 16, 2007). In September 2005, NATO defense ministers reluctantly agreed to take
over security operations in southern Afghanistan. U.S. defense officials, in turn, promptly announced plans to withdraw 3,200 American troops. European leaders reacted harshly; NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer claimed that the U.S. could not expect its allies to contribute additional forces to Afghanistan when it was reducing its own troop presence there (Shanker and Myers, December 16, 2007). Bush advisers ultimately decided to maintain the current troop presence (roughly 24,000); NATO, subsequently, expanded its role in Afghanistan to include security duties throughout the country.

In December 2007, the new National Security Adviser, Stephen J. Hadley, proposed an overarching review of the U.S.-NATO mission in Afghanistan. The recently appointed Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, sought new approaches for addressing the growing violence in the country. Frustrated with the allies’ reluctance to commit to more aggressive action (and pledged troop numbers), and fearful that the 2001 victory was at risk of being overturned, Gates adopted a new “integrated plan” for Afghanistan (Shanker and Myers, December 16, 2007). He abandoned his predecessor’s “light footprint” strategy in favor of more comprehensive tactics, pressed allies for additional assistance, and supported plans to send another 3,000 Marines to Afghanistan (Myers and Shanker, March 15, 2008). In spite of these efforts, the average annual U.S. troop commitment level remains strikingly low. Over the course of the mission, the U.S. has committed five troops per thousand local Afghans - the same troop level that the U.S. committed to the failed Somalia mission of the early 1990s.

Foreign Aid Commitments

Trends in U.S. foreign aid to Afghanistan mirrored patterns of military commitments: initially modest levels of funding had little positive effect, and thus necessitated drastically increased spending in later years. As shown in the chart below, the U.S. allocated noticeably
lesser amounts during the two-year combat phase of the mission. When fiscal adherence to the "light footprint" strategy yielded poor outcomes - persistent physical and political insecurity - policy makers doubled grants and loans from 2003 to 2004.

The shift in spending levels is noteworthy. Yet, this attempt to correct for the results of the previously limited aid allocations may prove to be "too little, too late." In spite of the fact that the U.S.'s total dollar commitment exceeds that of previous failed state interventions, the average annual rate of foreign aid (per local Afghan) is noticeably lower than that of previous missions. The U.S. engagements in Bosnia and Kosovo, which were arguably less security-driven than Operation Enduring Freedom-ISAF, garnered average annual spending levels that were nearly double those used for Afghanistan ($35.59 per Afghan). Significantly, the average annual spending per Afghan during the first three years of Enduring Freedom-ISAF was similar to that of the failed Haiti and Somalia missions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>USAID</th>
<th>Dept. Ag.</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>115.7</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>563.9</td>
<td>214.3</td>
<td>179.7</td>
<td>159.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>84.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>788.7</td>
<td>560.7</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>154.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>398.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,639.1</td>
<td>1,183.2</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>259.3</td>
<td>131.2</td>
<td>609.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1,830.6</td>
<td>1,329.1</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>377.1</td>
<td>761.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,932.8</td>
<td>1,508.7</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>300.2</td>
<td>1,807</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10: U.S. Grants and Loans to Afghanistan (by Million, Constant Dollars)

The Afghanistan aid program drew considerable criticism. In spite of the interim president's pleas for assistance, the U.S. and other international donors failed to deliver on their pledged commitments. With no money on the state treasury, Karzai was forced to cut deals with the same tribal leaders and local warlords that refused to rerecognize his authority as president. In May of 2003, unpaid government employees held protests in Kabul, threatening to abandon their
posts. Karzai, in turn, declared that he would resign the presidency unless donors upheld their assistance commitments (Rohde and Sanger, August 12, 2007; Hersch 2004). By 2004, it had become apparent that Karzai’s inability to exert political influence was undercutting U.S.-NATO attempts to address poor security conditions in the country. In April of 2004, the UN Development Program reported that absent massive aid, Afghanistan would once again become a “terrorist breeding ground.” Karzai, meanwhile, implored international leaders to follow-through on their aid pledges, claiming that stabilization was virtually impossible in the face of entrenched poverty. Heightened levels of violence and narco-trafficking, he said, threatened "the very existence of the Afghan state" (Schmitt and Gall, December 8, 2004).

Nonetheless, Bush aides reported that funds were being improperly diverted by corrupt officials, and hinted that a continuation of the trend would result in reduced assistance. (Interestingly, NGO officials later discovered that the U.S. military kept a number of Afghan warlords and drug czars on its payroll). In late 2005, the White House Office of Management and Budget proposed cutting foreign aid to Afghanistan by one-third, with Secretary of State Rice citing concerns about the previous year’s “absorption problem” (Hersch 2004; Shanker and Myers, December 16, 2007). The administration sought to reduce aid spending in 2006 as well (by 38%).

Eventually, Bush aides recognized that it would be risky to decrease assistance funds in the face of a strengthened Taliban resurgence. In January 2007, White House spokespersons announced plans to request that Congress allocate an additional $10.6 billion for Afghanistan. The bulk of the funds, they noted, would be used to train and equip the state’s security forces. The remaining $2 billion would be used for various reconstruction, development, and counter-narcotics programs. Bush hailed the plans as a “Marshall Plan” for Afghanistan. Analysts,
though, questioned whether the late surge in aid would be effective; the Congressional Research Service, they argued, projected that the U.S. would ultimately spend less twice as much on efforts in Iraq as it would in Afghanistan. Rice, when asked about the seeming inconsistency of foreign assistance allocations, responded, “I don’t buy the argument that Afghanistan was starved of resources.” She further noted, “I don’t think the U.S. government had what it needed for reconstructing a country. We did it ad hoc in the Balkans, and then in Afghanistan, and then in Iraq” (Shanker and Myers, December 16, 2007).

Assessment

The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan was arguably more security-driven than any prior post-Cold War failed states engagement. President Bush responded to the September 11th attacks by announcing plans for a global campaign against terrorism; the war, he noted, would constitute a key component of this campaign. Administration officials listed the following justifications for action: concern for the risks posed by an ongoing Taliban presence in Afghanistan, the need to eliminate al-Qaeda and other terrorist elements in the country, and the threat of further terrorist attacks on Americans at home and abroad (Crenshaw in Art and Cronin 2003; Dobbins et. al 2003). In his October 7, 2001 address to the American public, the President indicated that his goals for Afghanistan were strategic; that he had no interest in "nation building" (particularly as a task for the U.S. military) as anything other than a means of undercutting future terrorist activities. Operation Enduring Freedom, he argued, would serve as appropriate retribution for the terrorist attacks, as well as bolster U.S. national security for future generations: “The U.S. military has begun strikes against al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime…By destroying camps and disrupting communications, we will make it more difficult for the terror network to train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans…Our military
action is also designed to clear the way for sustained, comprehensive and relentless operations to drive them out and bring them to justice.”

In keeping with these objectives, Rumsfeld pursued a "light footprint" approach for Afghanistan (Frontline 2007). The strategy was meant to account for the immediate strategic objectives of Enduring Freedom, as well as ensure that the U.S. would not be drawn into longer-term post-conflict commitments. Rumsfeld's plan, which was chiefly combat-oriented, was initially successful. The regime collapsed within two months of invasion; the coalition air strikes, coupled with U.S. intelligence-supported Northern Alliance efforts, succeeded in driving Taliban leaders and militia forces from Afghanistan (or, at least, to its outskirts). Yet, the "light footprint" strategy provided little in the way of post-conflict security. As such, violence and lawlessness persisted outside of Kabul, particularly in the southern and eastern regions of the country. This, combined with the failure to deliver adequate levels of aid, let alone pledged levels of aid, meant that steps toward stability were typically undercut by the underfunded and minimally influential provisional government. The administration eventually took steps to compensate for these shortcomings; efforts to regain lost ground, though, necessitated the commitment of substantial aid. Further, Bush advisers were hesitant to commit additional military resources to Enduring Freedom. They were perhaps - as some claimed - distracted by the war in Iraq, and pushed for a reduced troop presence in Afghanistan (Dobbins et al. 2003).

There seems to be limited agreement on the outcome of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan; discrepancies are to be expected, as peacekeeping and state-building operations are still taking place. Many reviews, though, suggest that a number of the U.S.’s original goals for the engagement in Afghanistan have yet to be realized. Assessments of the early combat stages of Enduring Freedom - air strikes and support for Northern Alliance fighters, which resulted in the
collapse of the Taliban and the dispersal of al Qaeda operatives - suggest that the U.S. actually did little to disrupt al-Qaeda-Taliban influence in the country (Crenshaw in Art and Cronin 2003; Art and Cronin 2003). RAND analysts find that many al-Qaeda operatives remain active in the border regions; that some temporarily escaped to Pakistan and then returned to Afghanistan once post-conflict monitoring operations died down. Their studies draw attention to the fact that the Taliban maintains considerable influence in southeastern Afghanistan, and that U.S. attempts to regulate warlords and narco-traffickers (many of them Taliban loyalists or affiliates) have been largely ineffective. Former NSC terrorism adviser Richard Clarke, in particular, argues that “the U.S. has succeeded in stabilizing only two or three cities” (Schmitt and Gall, December 7, 2004).

Evaluations of the U.S.’s performance on longer-term objectives are similarly inconclusive. Some studies convey that Afghanistan is no longer the launch-pad for global terrorism that it once was, and that the foundations for democracy are in place (2005 parliamentary and council elections were judged to be free and fair). Nonetheless, they also draw attention to patterns of backsliding in recent years (Dobbins et. al 2003; Freedom House 2006). Polity IV and Freedom House reports indicate that sustained peace has yet to be achieved, that the new government remains incapable of providing security or exerting political authority outside of Kabul, and that democratic structures are limited in number and effectiveness. Critics contend that these problems can be traced to a decline in the administration's commitment of long-term attention and resources to Afghanistan (state-building) - a shift that coincided with the onset of the war in Iraq (Dobbins et. al 2003). Some suggest that the pattern will likely persist, as the U.S. attempt at “state-building on the cheap…a duct tape approach,” will ultimately fail to “respond to people’s needs so that enemy forces cannot come in and take advantage” (Rohde and Sanger, August 12, 2007).
Follow Up

Definite conclusions on the outcome of the Enduring Freedom and ISAF operations cannot yet be drawn, as state-building efforts in Afghanistan continue today. An examination of events in Afghanistan since 2001, though, lends a degree of credence to skeptics' concerns. In the immediate aftermath of the air campaign, there were signs of progress: Afghan leaders supported the December 2001 Bonn Agreement (which established a semi-representative interim government), and the Loya Jirga (grand assembly) elected Hamid Karzai as the interim president in June 2002. Although the vice president, Hji Abdul Qadir, was assassinated in 2002, conditions – at least in the capital city – remained relatively secure for the rest of the year. By 2003, Afghanistan had become less stable: Taliban forces regained strength in the outlying regions, and Karzai struggled to maintain the newly formed government in Kabul. Nonetheless, in early 2004, the Loya Jirga adopted a new Afghan constitution, and Karzai won pledges of $8.2 billion in international aid.

By the spring of 2004, though, fears of backsliding were realized. Taliban and al Qaeda groups openly resumed activities, Karzai's attempts to exert authority outside of the capital city were ineffective (warlords continued to control most of the provinces), and heroin production reached record levels. (Schmitt and Gall, December 7, 2004). Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S.'s ambassador to Afghanistan, noted that Pakistan was providing refuge and intelligence assistance to the Taliban fighters, who had begun carrying out cross-border attacks on U.S.-NATO troops and civilians in Afghanistan (Shanker and Myers, December 16, 2007). In early 2005, parliamentary and local council elections, as well as the parliament's first session, were overshadowed by humanitarian crises; during the spring, waves of Afghans died of starvation and exposure. By 2006, violence reached its greatest level since the onset of the war, resulting in
a 20% increase in U.S.-NATO fatalities. In large part, the heightened death rate resulted from a series of Taliban attacks in southern Afghanistan. Yet, during the same year, suicide bombings quintupled to 136, while the rate of roadside explosions doubled (Shanker and Myers, December 16, 2007). In addition, civilians began to take part in anti-American protests in Kabul, and drug czars succeeded in processing more than 6,100 metric tons of opium, a 49% increase from 2005 (Rubin, February 15, 2007; Shanker and Myers, December 16, 2007).

By February of 2007, it was widely acknowledged that Taliban forces not only remained active near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, but had regained considerable strength in the area. The U.S.-NATO military leadership indicated that were supported by fundamentalists in the Pashtun belt (with whom they shared religious-tribal ties). Further, U.S. intelligence reports noted that actors within Pakistan's government were providing aid to Taliban fighters in the area. Despite Pakistan's nominal role as a U.S. ally in the war on terror, President Musharraf and other elites were not willing to sacrifice historical political ties to Islamists in the Pashtun region. Pakistan's leaders had long relied on support from the fundamentalists, as it provided a buffer against contending nationalist forces. Thus, Pakistani intelligence officers continued to supply Taliban fighters with reports on U.S.-NATO and Afghan troop locations and activities. Thus, Taliban leaders were able to regain significant portions of territory in Afghanistan, as well as establish unofficial "governments" throughout the southern and eastern parts of the country. Local Afghans, in turn, complied with these Taliban governments; most did so out of fear, while others simply regarded the Taliban rulers as more effective than the official government leaders in Kabul (Rubin, February 15, 2007).

The Bush administration responded to the resurgence with pledges of additional U.S. troops and increased aid, while NATO and Afghan forces initiated an offensive, Operation
Achilles, in southern Afghanistan. Nonetheless, persistent violence - ongoing border disputes, renewed fighting between Afghan and Pakistani forces, and continued Taliban attacks on U.S.-NATO and Afghan troops in the border region resulted in - meant that Afghanistan had become a deadlier war zone than Iraq by the summer of 2008 (Gall, July 14, 2008). As of now, it seems as though the initial emphasis on the immediate security-strategic basis for intervention in Afghanistan, and the subsequent reluctance to provide for broader-scope and longer-term commitments to post-conflict recovery, have undercut initial combat gains; that the U.S. has failed to “transform the region where the global terrorist threat began - and where the global terrorist threat persists” (Rubin, February 15, 2007).
10. SUMMARY OF CASE STUDY FINDINGS

A general overview of the case study findings suggests that they lend credence to the hypothesis: Failed states that present broad-scope motives for intervention yield comprehensive military-aid commitments, and greater levels of military-aid commitment yield positive state-building outcomes (transitions from state failure to state recovery). Or: \textit{multi-motive interventions $\rightarrow$ comprehensive resource commitments $\rightarrow$ successful state-building outcomes.}

Below, I analyze the process-trace results in detail, outlining the various points of comparison (breadth of motive, commitment of resources, and mission outcomes) across the five cases, and highlighting the causal links between these points of comparison.

\textbf{Intervention Motive(s)}

The President's, the administration's and Congress's various - and sometimes competing - assessments of the risks posed by particular failed states present a host of difficulties for attempts at classification. In this study, I classify motive according to the number of considerations listed as cause for failed state intervention. Less formally, I address the substance of the motives listed. To ensure that the public statements of the President and members of Congress are “true” (rather than the product of politicking), I analyze them against the background of related intra-administration, intra-congressional, and administration-congressional debates.

While it is perhaps impossible to provide an entirely accurate measure of \textit{scope of motives for intervention}, a rough estimate can be achieved through the application of simple descriptive statistics. For example, during the year-long period (July 1992 – December 1992) preceding the Somalia mission, President Bush made eleven public spoken and written statements on Somalia.
Of the six speeches in which he mentioned possible reasons for U.S. action, he listed one cause (humanitarianism) in each speech. Thus, there is an “average” of one stated presidential motive for intervention in Somalia. The same technique can be used for Congressional statements on Somalia. During the two-year period leading up to the state-building mission, there were thirty-seven individual floor statements on Somalia. Of the twenty-three in which motive was mentioned, each addressed one cause (humanitarianism) for U.S. action. Consequently, there is an average of one stated congressional motive for intervention in Somalia. Applied to presidential-congressional statements on each of the proposed interventions, *scope of motives for intervention* can be charted as:
While measures such as *average number of motives listed during pre-intervention period* are simplistic, they do provide a useful overview of the differences between the scope and type of causes for action associated with each state-building mission. The pre-intervention periods with the most limited motives (both numerically and substantively) - those which preceded the engagements in Somalia and Afghanistan - yielded limited U.S. commitments of military and financial resources, and resulted in “failed” state-building outcomes. The relative comprehensiveness of the motives discussed during the periods leading up to the engagements in Bosnia and Kosovo were associated with subsequent mission-commitments of substantial U.S.
military and financial resources. The influx of great numbers of troops and funds, in turn, allowed for state-building outcomes of “moderate success” in Bosnia and Kosovo.

The motives discussed during the pre-intervention period for Haiti differed slightly from those of Somalia and Afghanistan (humanitarianism alone prompted the invasion of Somalia, and security was the overriding factor behind the invasion of Afghanistan), and of Bosnia and Kosovo (an umbrella of concerns sparked the Balkans missions). President Clinton frequently depicted the crisis in Haiti as one that presented threats to both human rights and democracy in the Western Hemisphere; his opponents in Congress were less inclined to view the problem in such expansive terms. Nonetheless, the small range of motives addressed yielded a modest commitment of military and financial resources to Haiti; this resulted in a state-building outcome that most characterize as “incomplete.”

The aforementioned comparisons provide useful heuristics for thinking about the relationship between the scope of motives and scope of resource commitments (and outcomes) in the five state-building missions. However, it is important to examine the complexities of the processes at work in each case. The five cases can be differentiated by the numerical-substantive scope of the motive(s) considered prior to failed state intervention; they can also be differentiated by the evolution of the motive(s) considered prior to failed state intervention.

Somalia represents the only case in which there was no debate regarding the nature of its state failure. Lawmakers, Presidents Bush and Clinton, and the members of their respective administrations were unanimous in their assessment: Somalia was in the midst of a humanitarian crisis. Further, the stated purpose of U.S. involvement in Somalia never changed over the course of the 1992 – 1994 time period. The stated motive for action – during the lead-up to intervention,
the course of UNITAF-UNOSOM II, and the early 1994 withdrawal period – was consistently and solely “humanitarian.” prior to the deployment of troops to Somalia in December 1992, President Bush spoke of the U.S.’s ability to avert further human suffering. Later, President Clinton lobbied for UN “nation building” in Somalia by highlighting themes of humanitarian relief. And, following the Battle of Mogadishu, Clinton reminded the American public that the U.S. had intervened in Somalia to “help stop one of the great human tragedies of this time” (October 18, 1993).

The same pattern did not hold true for the period leading up to and during the onset of Operation Restore (Uphold) Democracy in Haiti. President Clinton, for the most part, focused on “humanitarianism” and “restoration of democracy” as his two primary concerns for Haiti. Though he initially hoped to avoid the use of military force in Haiti, the possibility seemed to become increasingly necessary. With the possibility of invasion looming, he sought to play up a host of additional considerations: the potential that the ongoing refugee crisis would place a strain on U.S. resources, the likelihood that Haiti would become a stopping point for narco-trafficking to the U.S., and the notion that inaction would send a signal that the U.S. was not capable of maintaining security “in its own backyard.” Thus, he marketed the Haiti crisis as something of a “humanitarian-plus” issue.

Despite Clinton's efforts, Congress – which largely opposed plans for Restore (Uphold) Democracy, and later, UNMIH – viewed the problem in more limited terms. Though many in Congress highlighted themes of humanitarianism and democracy as cause for action, the proposed intervention was sufficiently contentious (given the fears of a repeat of the disaster in Somalia) that Clinton's opponents in the House and Senate began depicting the Haiti issue as “only humanitarian.” As the U.S. role in Restore Democracy and UMMIH played out, Clinton
reverted to addressing the crisis in Haiti as one of human rights and democracy. When speaking at the ceremony marking the transition from U.S. to UN authority in Haiti, he noted (perhaps prematurely) that the mission objectives – the restoration of democracy, and the protection of Haitian citizens against political intimidation and violence – had been achieved.

The period preceding the U.S. intervention in Bosnia was, like that of Haiti, characterized by a good deal of contention within Congress and the administration, and between both groups. President Clinton described the conflict as “the issue from hell.” Though he hoped to avoid the commitment of U.S. ground forces in the Balkans, he did acknowledge, as did several congressional foreign policy leaders, that the crisis was complex and multi-faceted. The President, as well as a number of House and Senate members, depicted Serb aggression as a threat to both U.S. values and interests; a genocide of Bosnian Muslims, and a destabilizing force “in the heart of Europe” that posed a risk to NATO allies and U.S. geo-strategic concerns.

As diplomatic efforts proved ineffective, and Serbs continued to carry out attacks on UN-designated safe areas, Clinton advisers realized that U.S. use of force would likely be necessary. The President re-tooled his Bosnia message, drawing attention to additional considerations: that inaction would place the future of NATO in doubt, allow for the onset of a wider war (which would, in turn, necessitate massive and long-term U.S. military commitments), and undercut American leadership in the international arena. As the prospect of military action loomed, he increasingly characterized the U.S. interests in Bosnia as overlapping and inter-linked, arguing that the U.S. could simply not afford to do nothing about the situation. Though his opponents in Congress claimed the Clinton's assessment was false and exaggerated, his supporters latched on to his “overlapping interests” message, particularly during the period immediately preceding the deployment of ground troops. Significantly, the President returned to this multi-motive theme
throughout the course of the U.S. mission in Bosnia, using it to lobby for support for a series of additional peacekeeping and state-building operations (first in 1996, and later, in 1997-1998).

The outbreak of conflict in Kosovo prompted Clinton to adopt what was essentially an updated version of his previous arguments for intervention in Bosnia. Yet, perhaps influenced by Albright's call for aggressive action, he solidified and expanded on the “overlapping interests” message. He claimed that the Serb-KLA fighting posed a threat to U.S. interests, values, and leadership, immediately drawing attention to the multi-faceted nature of the crisis, saying that it posed a threat to U.S. interests, values, and leadership. Perhaps spurred on by Albright's push to bring an end to territorial aggression and genocide in Europe, Clinton expanded the list of considerations for action to include: NATO credibility (concern for securing NATO's role in the coming years), a threat to the U.S.-NATO stake in Bosnia, and the need for a new “21st century foreign policy – smart humanitarianism.”

Though congressional debates indicated that there was not strong support for another military engagement in the Balkans, House and Senate foreign policy leaders were, interestingly, more receptive of the President's Kosovo message than were of the previous Bosnia message. When Serb-KLA violence intensified in 1998, Congresspersons typically depicted the conflict as one that presented humanitarian and U.S.-European security concerns. As the crisis continued, supporters of Clinton's plans for military action adopted his “smart humanitarianism” message. Prior to the onset on NATO air strikes, and then again before the deployment of ground troops, proponents of military action listed numerous motives for intervention. Though opponents argued that Clinton's characterization of the need for U.S. involvement was overblown, even the most vocal critics acknowledged that instability in the Balkans posed a number of threats to U.S. interests in the region. This, in turn, translated to substantial commitment of military and
financial resources to U.S. peacekeeping and state-building efforts in Kosovo.

Importantly, the spark for American involvement in Afghanistan was a terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland; in this sense, the response to Afghanistan was more identifiably (and purely) security driven than any previous failed state intervention. President Bush and congressional foreign policy leaders depicted the situation in Afghanistan as a direct threat to U.S. national security. Nonetheless, President Bush and President Clinton, as well as various members of Congress, recognized that the Taliban regime engaged in serious violations of the human rights of Afghan citizens. In this sense, it could be argued that the basis for the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan was not solely security-based; that there were additional considerations at play. Yet, the great bulk of the Clinton-Bush statements on Afghanistan, both before and after the September 11th attacks, focused on the threat posed by the al Qaeda terrorist organization (and its relationship with the Taliban leadership). Similarly, the overriding theme of post-September 11th congressional floor statements on Afghanistan was one of concern for U.S. national security. Interestingly, most Congresspersons addressed the failed state as either a terrorist haven or a hot-spot for human rights abuses; few depicted the two problems in the context of their interrelated nature.

While the overwhelming security emphasis of the proposed intervention initially merited a good deal of attention, it was not met with a significant commitment of military or financial resources. Following the conclusion of the conflict stage of the mission, the administration hesitated to deploy ground troops for peacekeeping and state-building purposes. In keeping with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's “light footprint” strategy, the U.S. committed comparatively few troops to Afghanistan, and only agreed to continue its recovery operations at 2002 levels (rather than downgrade the U.S. military presence) when pressured to do so by NATO allies.
Military and Foreign Aid Commitments

One of the overarching connections between the five pre-intervention periods is that the depiction of the particular crisis at hand – the scope of the stated motive(s) for involvement – also defined the scope of U.S. resource commitments to the failed state. While this pattern is perhaps most noticeable with respect to the relationship between motive and military strategy, it also holds true for the relationship between motive and foreign aid. In the single-motive and minimal-motive interventions, the U.S. deployed relatively few ground troops, undertook limited operations (neglected the tasks necessary to long-term post-conflict state recovery), and either withdrew or attempted to withdraw troops prior to the fulfillment of mission goals. Further, the U.S. provided comparatively little financial assistance during the intervention period. In contrast, the multi-motive interventions were characterized by comprehensive military campaigns and considerable grant-loan packages. While broad-stroke comparisons do lend support to the hypothesis, it is important to note that these findings are further bolstered by an assessment of the evolution of motive-commitment links over time.

From the 1992 debates on troop deployment to the 1993 announcement of troop withdrawal, the consistent emphasis on the humanitarian crisis in Somalia was matched by a similarly consistent emphasis on the limited nature of the U.S.’s military involvement in the country. Bush noted, on the day of troop deployment, “This will not be an open-ended mission.” Clinton, who played a key role in the establishment of the UNOSOM II state-building operation, did so while simultaneously drawing down the U.S. troop presence in Somalia. Finally, in the wake of the Battle of Mogadishu, Clinton asserted that America would uphold its humanitarian commitments to Somalia; faced with the fallout from U.S. casualties, he then announced that U.S. troops would be withdrawn from the country by March of 1994.
The same is true of trends in financial assistance to Somalia. Though it is difficult to draw explicit connections between intervention motive and foreign aid (due to the comparative lack of presidential-congressional statements on aid numbers), it is noteworthy that the overall level of U.S. financial assistance to Somalia was much lower than it was for the other four failed states addressed in this study. Further, the uniform emphasis on the humanitarian nature of the crisis in Somalia was matched by: 1) a consistent concentration of funding for short-term famine relief purposes, and 2) a consistent (and drastic) reduction of foreign aid after 1993.

As was the case with Somalia, the period preceding and during the U.S. intervention in Haiti was characterized by parallel statements on motive and resource commitments. When Clinton announced the initiation of Operation Restore (Uphold) Democracy, he argued that the action was a necessary step towards the restoration of human rights and democracy in Haiti. Yet, he also noted, “This mission will be limited in time and scope” (September 19, 1994). Clinton, on the advice of defense officials, opted to pursue an intervention strategy premised on the notion that the use of overwhelming force would allow for short-term troop presence. Interestingly, though, the number of troops committed was not terribly great (four troops per 1,000 Haitians, as opposed to the previous commitment level of five troops per 1,000 Somalis). Further, Congress called for the withdrawal of troops almost immediate following the entry of Port-au-Prince. Congressional foreign policy leaders applauded the administration's efforts to “restore democracy” to Haiti. Yet, by September 22, both the House and Senate had passed resolutions calling for the withdrawal of U.S. forces “as soon as possible.”

Once U.S. forces secured Haiti against remaining pro-Cedras military factions, and arrangements were made to allow for Aristide's return to the presidency, Clinton aides pursued a course of action that largely mirrored its approach to Somalia. They pushed for the adoption of
state-building measures – to be carried out by a follow-on UN mission (UNMIH) – while simultaneously reducing the U.S. presence in Haiti. The number of U.S. troops in Haiti peaked, at 21,000, during the first week of October 1994. By the end of the month, less than 15,000 U.S. military personnel remained in Haiti. The number dropped to 6,000 by mid-December. Defense Secretary Perry declared the environment to be “safe and secure” on January 17, 1995. On March 31, 1995, in the face of evidence of ongoing instability in Haiti, the U.S. handed over authority for state-building operations to the UN, and withdrew all but 2,400 troops. By March of the next year, with UNMIH still in effect, Clinton withdrew the remaining U.S. troops from Haiti.

The U.S.’s financial commitments to Haiti were significantly greater than those directed to the previous mission in Somalia (an annual average of $24.57 per Haitian, as compared to the annual average of $12.11 per Somali). The administration and Congress structured aid allocations in a manner that reflected the slightly broader basis for U.S. involvement in Haiti: humanitarianism, and the restoration of democracy. Funds were distributed for both immediate food relief needs, as well as for longer-term political and economic recovery objectives. Nonetheless, the overall level of financial aid for state-building in Haiti was comparatively limited. Following the transition to UN authority in Haiti - when Clinton officials concluded that the country was sufficiently secure for the return to democracy - funds for ongoing security and political-economic development programs were reduced.

The host of motives for U.S. action in Bosnia - the prevention of further genocide, the protection of U.S.-European security interests, the concern for U.S.-NATO leadership and credibility, and the need to act against the possibility of a wider war - provided for a military undertaking of considerable scope and duration. During the year preceding the onset of NATO
air strikes and ground-level peacekeeping, Clinton and his aides increasingly argued that U.S. intervention was both a moral and strategic imperative. This resulted in the initial deployment of a relatively significant number of troops: 20,000, or 19 soldiers per 1,000 Bosnians). As the U.S. involvement in Bosnia continued, Clinton consistently relied on the “multi-motive mission” theme – most notably, in 1996 - as justification for the pursuit of additional peacekeeping and state-building operations. Further, congressional foreign policy leaders highlighted the breadth of U.S. interests in the Balkans as cause for the maintenance of a sizable troop presence in Bosnia. Significantly, the U.S. maintained 15,000 troops in Bosnia in 1996, more than 8,000 in 1997, and roughly 6,000 from 1998 to 2000. The number stayed above 3,000 for 2001 to 2003, and troops were not officially withdrawn from Bosnia until 2004 (a full nine years after the initiation of the intervention).

While Clinton aides and congressional actors listed the various U.S. interests in the Balkans as basis for long-term military commitment to the region, they also turned to such arguments when working to secure financial assistance for Bosnia's recovery. While this was particularly true of the period immediately preceding and during the onset of intervention, it continued throughout the course of the U.S. involvement in Bosnia. The average annual aid level ($49.39 per Bosnia) was notably higher than that devoted to either Somalia or Haiti; further, allocations remained fairly consistent over the course of the nine year mission. While funding was particularly high from 1996 to 1998, during the time of major peacekeeping operations, administration officials and congressional leaders again cited “multi-motive mission” arguments when looking to bolster funding for Bosnia in 1999-2000 (when violence in Kosovo threatened to undermine U.S. gains in the Balkans).
When KLA-Serb violence broke out in Kosovo in 1998, Clinton advisers, particularly Albright, worked to promote a more comprehensive version of the multi-motive Bosnia message. The list of interests in Kosovo was expanded to include: protection of U.S. gains in Bosnia, support for democracy in Europe, and the need for a new 21st century foreign policy of “smart humanitarianism.” Though military officials – as well as a number of congressional foreign policy leaders – were initially opposed the pursuit of further action in the Balkans, the administration succeeded in winning support for NATO air strikes and ultimately, more comprehensive peacekeeping and state-building operations. Albright, an outspoken proponent of U.S. attention to the crisis in Kosovo, argued that U.S. ties to the Balkans were deep and wide-ranging; that the U.S. interests in southern Europe merited a muscular and resounding show of military might. While the U.S. committed a seemingly small absolute number of military personnel - 7,300 - the relative troop presence (20 troops per 1,000 Kosovars) was greater than that of the previous three failed state interventions. Further, it remained relatively high throughout the early 2000s, despite the Bush administration’s opposition to nation building.

Just as the broad-scope U.S. interests in Kosovo prompted an extensive military response, they yielded a level of foreign aid that exceeded even that of the Bosnia mission: an annual average of $58.18 per Kosovar. Significantly, it is possible to draw a direct causal relationship between policy makers' assessment of the multiple U.S. interests in the events in Kosovo and the subsequently comprehensive allocation of aid. This is largely due to Albright's insistence on U.S. involvement in the Balkans. In the months before the intervention, the Secretary of State lobbied for substantial funding for post-conflict state-building programs, or what she termed a “mini-Marshall Plan.” While there was a noticeable cutback in aid to Kosovo between 2001 and 2002,
the drop was followed by several years of increased spending. The increased spending levels, in turn, can be traced to congressional debates on the ongoing U.S. interests in the Balkans.

The U.S. military response to Afghanistan was in keeping with the assessment of political leaders that there were minimal motives (in number) for involvement. The statements of President Bush, his advisers, and congressional foreign policy leaders indicated that they regarded the failed state as a “security plus” concern. They acknowledged that there was a humanitarian basis for intervention, but that the primary impetus for action was the security threat posed by the Taliban regime (and its ties to al Qaeda). Bush, who asserted that U.S. action in Afghanistan would be focused on “justice” rather than “nation building,” opted to pursue Rumsfeld's proposed “light footprint” approach (the use of intelligence-driven battle tactics, thus allowing for a limited troop presence). As the war progressed, the administration resisted allies' requests for ground support, claiming that peacekeeping efforts should not be undertaken prior to the achievement of security objectives. Bush ordered the deployment of 8,000 ground troops in January 2002 (troop numbers later peaked at 24,000). The U.S. forces were primarily employed for terrorist tracking activities.

In spite of evidence that Taliban elements remained active outside of Kabul, and concerns that the security-based and force-limited nature of the light footprint strategy was ineffective, the Assistant Secretary of Defense asserted that Afghanistan was largely “permissive” and “secure” (Wolfowitz, May 2003). As administration officials continued to trumpet the security goals of the war in Afghanistan, they simultaneously pushed for a reduced U.S. military presence in the country. Rumsfeld, hoping to refocus efforts on Iraq in 2004, promoted his “accelerated success” plan, which called for NATO assumption of security responsibilities, and a subsequent draw-
down in U.S. troop numbers. By late 2007, repeated Taliban attacks prompted the new Secretary of Defense to reassess the situation, and to call for a new “integrated plan” for Afghanistan.

Just as the minimal-motive basis for U.S. involvement in Afghanistan elicited a relatively limited military response, it yielded a similarly weak commitment of foreign aid: an annual average of $35.59 per Afghan. While Bush officials and congressional leaders claimed that the U.S. would address the needs of the Afghan people, relief spending during the first three years of the Enduring Freedom and ISAF operations barely exceeded that of the Somalia and Haiti missions. Interestingly, Bush aides defended its foreign aid program in much the same way that they responded to criticisms of the light footprint strategy, claiming that it was necessary to achieve “security objectives” before taking on additional peacekeeping and state-building commitments. While UN research indicated that low assistance levels were at the root of ongoing instability, administration officials adopted the opposite position. They suggested that relief funds were being diverted by corrupt local officials, and consequently, that additional foreign aid spending would only strengthen enemy forces. In late 2005, Rice argued that this “absorption problem” warranted reductions in financial assistance to Afghanistan. Though the administration ultimately decided against cutting aid to Afghanistan, they returned to the same argument the next year, seeking to reduce spending by 38% in 2007.
### State-Building Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive</th>
<th>Commitment</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somalia-Single:</td>
<td>Peak Troop Presence: 5 per 1,000</td>
<td>RAND Eval: Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>Avg. Annual Aid: $12.11 per citizen</td>
<td>Sustained Peace: No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operation Duration: 2 years</td>
<td>Dem. Development: No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Econ. Recovery: No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti-Minimal:</td>
<td>Peak Troop Presence: 4 per 1,000</td>
<td>RAND Eval: Incomplete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian “Plus”</td>
<td>Avg. Annual Aid: $24.57 per citizen</td>
<td>Sustained Peace: No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operation Duration: 3 years</td>
<td>Dem. Development: No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Econ. Recovery: No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Multiple:</td>
<td>Peak Troop Presence: 19 per 1,000</td>
<td>RAND Eval: Modest Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hum., Sec., NATO</td>
<td>Avg. Annual Aid: $49.39 per citizen</td>
<td>Sustained Peace: Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operation Duration: 9 years</td>
<td>Dem. Development: Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Econ. Recovery: Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo-Multiple:</td>
<td>Peak Troop Presence: 20 per 1,000</td>
<td>RAND Eval: Modest Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hum., Sec., NATO</td>
<td>Avg. Annual Aid: $58.18 per citizen</td>
<td>Sustained Peace: Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operation Duration: 8 years</td>
<td>Dem. Development: Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Econ. Recovery: Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan-Minimal:</td>
<td>Peak Troop Presence: 5 per 1,000</td>
<td>RAND Eval: Incomplete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security “Plus”</td>
<td>Avg. Annual Aid: $35.59 per citizen</td>
<td>Sustained Peace: No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operation Duration: 7 years</td>
<td>Dem. Development: No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Econ. Recovery: Limited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12: Overview of State-Building Outcomes

The pattern of operational shortcomings in Somalia, as well as the ultimately failed outcome of state-building efforts, mirrored the trends in and overarching level of U.S. military-financial commitments to the country. Though UNOSOM II was explicitly geared towards “nation building,” as favored by the administration, Clinton withdrew a significant number of U.S. military personnel from Somalia during the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. Further, there were drastic reductions in foreign aid to Somalia during this period. Just as the
troop cuts were followed by increased attacks on UN peacekeepers, the foreign aid cuts were followed by a series of failed attempts at a political settlement.

Polity IV reports indicate that, since the end of the U.S. mission, neither sustained peace nor democratic development has been achieved in Somalia. Further, the country remains one of the poorest in the world. Since the mid-1990s, Somalia has been characterized by anarchy and violence; steps toward the restoration of order have been continually undercut by flare-ups in clan warfare and Islamist opposition to the transitional government. In early 2007, Somalia's parliament declared a three-month state of emergency, while the UN, in turn, authorized an African Union peacekeeping mission for the country. In 2008, the Red Cross reported that fighting in Somalia was the worst it had been in fifteen years. Currently, the interim government remains under threat.

As was the case with Somalia, the U.S.’s commitment of limited military-financial resources to Operation Restore Democracy and UNMIH was followed by inconsistent (and ultimately, incomplete) state-building outcomes in Haiti. Though the initial stage of the Haiti mission was well supported, subsequent efforts were not; thus, the success of the invasion was undercut by a number of mis-steps. Clinton, who faced considerable congressional opposition on the U.S.’s involvement in Haiti, and was hoping to avoid a repeat of the disaster in Somalia, opted to reduce troop numbers within weeks of the invasion. And, despite evidence that the country was insufficiently stable to function in the absence of a substantial U.S.-UN presence, the administration pushed for a rapid transition to UN authority in Haiti, and then for a quick return to local governance.

Though Haiti remained relatively stable during the 1994-1996 course of Operation Restore Hope and UNMIH, in 1997 - just one year after the U.S. withdrew from Haiti -
conditions started to deteriorate. In 1999, President Preval began to rule by decree, dropping all attempts at reconciliation with opponents in parliament and his administration. The early 2000s, in turn, were marked by suspect election results, the use of political intimidation tactics by the president's supporters, and frequent outbursts of anti-government violence. Political volatility, coupled with entrenched poverty, prompted the UN to re-intervene in Haiti in 2007. As of now, the country remains a failed state; further, it remains as much on the brink of collapse as it did prior to the U.S.-UN Restore Democracy and UNMIH operations.

The IFOR-SFOR mission in Bosnia, which elicited noticeably greater U.S. commitments than previous efforts in Somalia and Haiti (and represented the largest military undertaking in NATO history), was the first state-building intervention of the 1990s to yield moderately positive results. The course of Joint Endeavor-Guard-Forge was characterized by the alignment between resource allocations and subsequent operations outcomes. The initial series of air strikes in 1995 interrupted the series of Serb attacks on UN safe areas, while the pursuit of additional peacekeeping operations in 1996 allowed for the first steps toward re-stabilization. The upsurge in foreign aid spending in 1998 (which was, in part, a response to the outbreak of hostilities in nearby Kosovo), in turn, helped to ensure that UN-monitored democratic elections could be carried out as planned.

By 2004 - despite the disruptive effects of political scandals in the early 2000s - conditions had normalized to the point that the North Atlantic Council opted to conclude the mission. Since the 2004 transfer of security and governance responsibilities back to Bosnia, the country has established its own police force, applied for EU membership, and been accepted to NATO's Partnership for Peace program. While the pace of country's economic recovery has not matched that of its political recovery (unemployment remains very high), there have been signs
of progress: implementation of privatization measures and banking reforms, increased private sector output and foreign investment, and a GDP growth rate that exceeded 5% per year from 2003-2008.

As was the case with the engagement in Bosnia, the U.S. intervention in Kosovo drew sizable military and foreign aid commitments, and consequently, yielded successful state-building outcomes. Expanded American interests in the region (particularly, those associated with the investment in nearby Bosnia) ensured that the 1999 response to the crisis in Kosovo was more decisive and forceful than that in Bosnia. Within months of the onset of major Serb-KLA hostilities, the U.S. assumed a lead role in the establishment of Allied Force. The Allied Force air strikes resulted in the quick containment of Serb-KLA fighting. The U.S.'s relatively large ground-force peacekeeping contributions, in turn, met with a fast-paced - though not entirely consistent - transition to post-conflict reconstruction.

When the U.S. withdrew from Kosovo in 2004, the region was plagued by a period of political turmoil, largely stemming from the Albanian-Serb disagreement on the matter of the one-time province’s future status. Though a series of violent outbursts threatened to undermine the recovery process, hostilities died down in 2005. When Kosovo's provisional parliament issued a declaration of independence in early 2008, Serbs reacted with largely symbolic protests, and the expected resumption of conflict never materialized. Though Kosovo continues to be plagued by political instability and poverty - Albanian-Serb relations remain tense, and Kosovo ranks as one of the poorest areas in Europe - there are indications of progress. Since 2008, the Republic of Kosovo has been recognized by 56 UN member states, and Western powers have pledged to support its transition to independence with additional troops and foreign aid.

Interestingly, the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, which was arguably more security-driven
than any other failed state intervention of the post-Cold War, was poorly supported in terms of
troop number and foreign aid commitments. The pursuit of the light footprint strategy in
Afghanistan resulted in limited and intermittent gains in the country. During the early stages
Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. succeeded in securing the capital city of Kabul and a
number of Taliban-al Qaeda strongholds. As the war continued, though, the U.S. increasingly lost
its footing, as exemplified by the onset of the 2003 Taliban insurgency. Backsliding was further
complicated by the failure to deliver on pledged foreign aid levels.

Though subsequent troop deployments provided for some degree of stabilization, by
2004, the Taliban and al Qaeda had assumed control of major portions of southern and eastern
Afghanistan. In 2006, violence reached it greatest level since the onset of the war, and in 2007,
Taliban-al Qaeda groups in the border region initiated a series of attacks on U.S.-NATO forces.
By 2008, Afghanistan became a deadlier war zone than Iraq, and by early 2009, violence peaked
again, topping the previous highs of 2006. Though President Obama approved the deployment of
17,000 additional troops in February 2009, there have since been few signs of political or
economic recovery. Steps toward rebuilding the central government have been consistently
undercut by lawlessness in the outer regions of the country. And, according to 2008 measures of
GDP per capita, Afghanistan remains the thirteenth poorest country in the world.
11. SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL FINDINGS

Though the case study findings – both the process-tracing and the cross-comparative analyses – appear to largely support the primary hypothesis of this work, the quantitative results cannot be interpreted in such a clear-cut manner. Indeed, these outcomes (particularly, the results of the second stage of the model) present a decidedly more complicated picture than do the case studies. In large part, this can be attributed to the nature of the data or, perhaps more accurately, to the nature of state failure itself. Because states do not exist in failure indefinitely, but instead move in and out of periods of failure, it is impossible to study failed states using time-series methods (due to the lack of pure panel data). As such, I have constructed a model that attempts to address this difficulty. It should be noted, though, that the model itself is flawed, which is sure to account for some of the insignificant findings in the second-phase regressions. Below, I present the results of the first and second phases of the statistical model, and provide an initial assessment of their implications.

**Part One – Effects on State-Building Intervention**

The first component of this statistical analysis represents an attempt to measure the influence of intervention motive – overlapping motives, or scope of motives – on the likelihood that the U.S. will undertake state-building operations. I include two independent variable measures of “intervention motive.”

- As a dummy variable, in which “0” indicates the presence of a single motive for intervention and “1” indicates the presence of two or more overlapping motives for intervention.
As a categorical variable, in which I count the number of actual listed motives for intervention (the categorical scale ranges from 0 to 8).

A logit regression is used to predict the likelihood of state-building intervention ($dv1statebuild$) from multiple intervention motives ($mivdualmotive$), the number of intervention motives ($miv2motivecount$), the post-Cod War time period ($cvpostcw$), and the period of prior state failure ($cvpriorfailpd$). As described in the following table, both of the main independent variables yield positive coefficients. Further, the effects of both $mivdualmotive$ and $miv2motivecount$ are statistically significant; the former at the 95% confidence interval, and the latter at the 99% confidence level. The coefficients for the control variables $cvpostcw$ and $cvpriorfailpd$ are negative; the effects of both variables are statistically insignificant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dual Motive</td>
<td>1.44483**</td>
<td>0.373473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of Motives</td>
<td>0.9082496***</td>
<td>0.1514749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Cold War</td>
<td>-0.2501581</td>
<td>0.3257524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior State Failure</td>
<td>-1.919853***</td>
<td>0.5381613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.745126***</td>
<td>0.3441445</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 361
LogLikelihood = -136.83812
Percent Correctly Classified = 84.21%
Percent True Positives = 28.79%
Percent True Negatives = 96.61%

Figure 13: Output, Initial Logit Model

A goodness-of-fit test for this logit model for $dv1statebuild$, which includes the two main independent and two control variables, suggests the model is moderately accurate. The classification table indicates that nineteen of the sixty-six “1s” are correctly classified. While
the model does not perform terribly well in terms of the measure of sensitivity, the classification
table indicates that two hundred eighty-five of the two hundred ninety-five “0s” are correctly
classified. As such, the model does perform fairly well, at 96.61%, along the measure for
specificity. Perhaps most importantly, though, the goodness-of-fit test reveals that, overall, the
model correctly classifies 84.21% of cases of state-building intervention.

Significantly, tests of the predicted probability of U.S. state-building intervention, under
varying conditions, provide further support the primary hypothesis. Holding each of the
independent variables constant at their mean values, I examine the effect of changes in value for
the main independent variables. A shift from the minimum value (0) to the maximum value (1)
for the main independent variable \textit{mivdualmotive} increases the likelihood of U.S. state-building
intervention by 15.76%; a shift from the minimum value (1) to the maximum value (8) for the
main independent variable \textit{miv2motivecount} increases the likelihood of U.S. state-building
intervention by 73.10%. In other words, the U.S. is roughly 16% more likely to intervene in
failed states when there are dual (contending) motives at play, or when there are overlapping
realist-instrumental and liberal-idealist motives involved. The U.S. is roughly 73% more likely to
intervene in failed states when the maximum number of motives is at stake, as opposed to when
there is one single or one overriding motive at stake.

I also assess the predicted probability of U.S. state-building intervention as a product of
the interactive effects of the main independent variables, \textit{mivdualmotive} and \textit{miv2motivecount}.
With the control variables \textit{cvpostcw} and \textit{cvpriorfailpd} held constant at their mean values, there is
a considerable increase in the probability of state-building intervention as \textit{mivdualmotive} and
\textit{miv2motivecount} shift from the minimum to their maximum values.
When there are no dual (contending) motives at stake, and only one total motive for involvement, the predicted probability of U.S. intervention is 6%. However, when there are dual (contending) motives at stake, and eight total motives for involvement, the likelihood of U.S. intervention jumps to 90.86%. Based on the results of this table, it seems as though there is a good deal of support for the argument that dual (contending) motives for involvement – the simultaneous existence of realist-instrumental and liberal-idealist concerns – will prompt U.S. state-building intervention. Further, it seems as though there is support for the argument that a greater number of motives for involvement will prompt U.S. state-building intervention.

Given that I am particularly concerned with state-building in the post-Cold War era, I graph the predicted probability of intervention for that time period. As depicted below, the presence of dual (contending) motives for involvement, as well as a greater number of total motives for involvement, increases the predicted odds of U.S. state-building intervention. This holds true, to varying degrees, regardless of whether failed states have experienced periods of prior failure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dual Motive</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0600</td>
<td>0.1003</td>
<td>0.1630</td>
<td>0.2537</td>
<td>0.3726</td>
<td>0.5091</td>
<td>0.6443</td>
<td>0.7598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1670</td>
<td>0.2593</td>
<td>0.3795</td>
<td>0.5164</td>
<td>0.6510</td>
<td>0.7651</td>
<td>0.8505</td>
<td>0.9086</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 14: Predicted Probability of State-Building, Based on Dual (Contending) Motive and Total Motive Count
I build on the results of the first logistic regression model by adapting the model to include two alternate independent variables: \textit{avrincount} (realist-instrumental motives) and \textit{avlidcount} (liberal-idealist motives). A logit regression is used to predict the likelihood of state-building intervention from multiple intervention motives, the number of intervention motives, the number of realist-instrumental motives, the number of liberal-idealist motives, the post-Cold War time period, and the period of prior state failure. As described in the following table, both of main independent variables yield positive coefficients, and are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. The results for the two alternate variables - realist-instrumental motives (\textit{avrincount}), and liberal-idealist motives (\textit{avlidcount}) - are statistically insignificant; the
coefficients for both variables are negative. The control variable $cv_{postcw}$ is statistically significant, while the control variable $cv_{priorfailpd}$ is not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dual Motive</td>
<td>1.236777***</td>
<td>0.3838051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of Motives</td>
<td>0.9082496**</td>
<td>0.3490624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Cold War</td>
<td>-0.2936048</td>
<td>0.3373537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior State Failure</td>
<td>-1.996797***</td>
<td>0.5477209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realist-Instrumental</td>
<td>-.3477678</td>
<td>.3523639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal-Idealist</td>
<td>-.3735612</td>
<td>.3445288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.794751***</td>
<td>0.353429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 355
Log Likelihood = -134.52151
Percent Correctly Classified = 84.79%
Percent True Positives = 30.30%
Percent True Negatives = 97.23%

Figure 16: Output, Adjusted Logit Model

The goodness-of-fit test for the adapted logit model for $dv_{1statebuild}$ (state-building intervention), which includes two alternate independent variables, indicates that the model is somewhat more accurate than the previous model. This version of the model is more sensitive than the previous version; 30.30% of the “1s” are correctly identified. The model is also performs slightly better in terms of specificity; 97.23% of the “0s” are correctly identified. Overall, the model correctly classifies 84.79% cases of state-building intervention.

In this model as well as the previous model, tests of the predicted probability of U.S. state-building intervention, under varying conditions, provide additional support for the primary
hypothesis. With each of the independent variables held constant at their mean values, a shift from the minimum value (0) to the maximum value (1) for the main independent variable \textit{mivdualmotive} increases the likelihood of U.S. state-building intervention by 17.24%; a shift from the minimum value (1) to the maximum value (8) for the main independent variable \textit{miv2motivecount} increases the likelihood of U.S. state-building intervention by 91.47%.

Interestingly, increased values for realist-instrumental motives (\textit{avrincount}) and liberal-idealist motives (\textit{avlidcount}) have a negative influence on the likelihood of U.S. state-building intervention. As \textit{avrincount} shifts from its minimum value to its maximum values, the probability of U.S. intervention decreases by 13.30%; as \textit{avlidcount} shifts from its minimum value to its maximum value, the probability of U.S. intervention decreases by 14.88%.

Again, the predicted probability of U.S. state-building intervention is also examined as a product of the interactive effects of the main independent variables, \textit{mivdualmotive} and \textit{miv2motivecount}. With the control variables \textit{cvpostcw} and \textit{cvpriorfailpd} and alternate variables \textit{avrincount} and \textit{avlidcount} held constant at their mean values, there is still a noteworthy increase in the predicted probability of state-building intervention as \textit{mivdualmotive} and \textit{miv2motivecount} shift from the minimum to their maximum values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dual Motive</th>
<th>Motive Count 1</th>
<th>Motive Count 2</th>
<th>Motive Count 3</th>
<th>Motive Count 4</th>
<th>Motive Count 5</th>
<th>Motive Count 6</th>
<th>Motive Count 7</th>
<th>Motive Count 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0423</td>
<td>0.0987</td>
<td>0.2137</td>
<td>0.4026</td>
<td>0.6256</td>
<td>0.8056</td>
<td>0.9113</td>
<td>0.9622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1321</td>
<td>0.2740</td>
<td>0.4834</td>
<td>0.6989</td>
<td>0.8520</td>
<td>0.9345</td>
<td>0.9725</td>
<td>0.9887</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 17: Predicted Probability of State-Building, Based on Dual (Contending) Motive and Total Motive Count

When there are no dual (contending) motives at stake, and only one total motive for involvement, the predicted probability of U.S. intervention is 4.23%. However, when there are
dual (contending) motives at stake, and eight total motives for involvement, the likelihood of U.S. intervention jumps to 98.87%. The results of this table appear to lend further support to the argument that dual (contending) motives for involvement, as well as greater number of motives for involvement, will be more likely to prompt U.S. state-building intervention than cases in which there are only single motive-types or lesser numbers of motives at stake.

Below, I graph the predicted probability of state-building intervention for the two alternate independent variables, $avarincount$ (the number of realist-instrumental motives for involvement) and $avlidcount$ (the number of liberal-idealist motives for involvement). In keeping with the findings discussed above, these influences appear to have a negative influence on the probability of U.S. state-building intervention. As the scope of solely realist-instrumental motives for intervention increases, the likelihood of intervention decreases; as the scope of solely liberal-idealist motives for intervention increases, the likelihood of intervention decreases.

Figure 18: Graph of Predicted Probability of State-Building Intervention, as a Product of Motive Type (Realist-Instrumental vs. Liberal-Idealist)
Given the fact that the original and adjusted logit models may fail to account for the effects of time-dependency in state-building interventions, I re-run both versions; this time, I incorporate a lagged dependent variable in the models. I also cluster the standard errors by country (by failed state). As demonstrated in the following table, it appears as though time dependency may have some manner of influence on state-building intervention, or the continuation of state-building intervention. However, the nature of this effect varies based on inclusion of the alternate variables, \textit{avrincount} and \textit{avlidcount}.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td>5.482279***</td>
<td>.8069662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual Motive</td>
<td>1.392134**</td>
<td>.5743213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count of Motives</td>
<td>.9327616</td>
<td>.6950520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Cold War</td>
<td>-.1475013</td>
<td>.4672015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior State Failure</td>
<td>-1.196911</td>
<td>.7375715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realist-Instrumental</td>
<td>-.3485388</td>
<td>.6578956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal-Idealist</td>
<td>-.6098723</td>
<td>.5995068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.396134***</td>
<td>.7888057</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 337  
Log Likelihood = -57.415908  
Percent Correctly Classified = 94.66%  
Percent True Positives = 78.69%  
Percent True Negatives = 98.19%

Figure 19: Output, Logit Model With Lagged Dependent Variable

The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable (the effect of time on state-building intervention, or the continuation of state-building intervention) appears to have some degree of influence on the model. While one of the main independent variables, \textit{miv2motivcount}, is no
longer statistically significant, the main independent variable *mivdualmotive* remains statistically significant at the 95% level. When the alternate variables *avrcount* and *avldcount* are excluded from the model, though, the p-value for *miv2motivecount* improves from 0.180 to 0.066. While 0.066 is not statistically significant at the 95% level, it falls within reasonable range of that mark. It seems reasonable to conclude that the model performs moderately well even when time effects are taken into consideration.

A review of the goodness-of-fit measures suggests that the model is more accurate than either of the previous versions. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable (for the model in which the alternate variables are excluded) results in a model sensitivity rate of 78.69%, and a specificity rate of 98.23%. The model correctly classifies 94.75% of cases of state-building intervention. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable (for the model in which all variables are included) results in a sensitivity rate of 78.69% and a specificity rate of 98.19%. The model correctly classifies 94.75% of cases of state-building intervention.

An assessment of the predicted probability of state-building intervention (for the latter model, which includes all variables) indicates that there is still a good deal of support for the primary hypothesis. With the variables held constant at their mean values, a change from the minimum value to the maximum value for the two main independent variables result in a 12.92% increase in the probability of state-building (*mivdualmotive*) and a 92.55% increase in the probability of state-building (*miv2motivecount*). Further, a test of the predicted probability of state-building, given the interactive effects of the two main independent variables, presents similar outcomes. As depicted in the following table, the probability of intervention rests at 2.18% when the values of the two independent variables are held at their minimum values. Yet,
the probability of intervention increases to 98.40% when the two independent variables are at their maximum values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dual Motive</th>
<th>Motive Count</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0218</td>
<td>0.0536</td>
<td>0.1259</td>
<td>0.2679</td>
<td>0.4819</td>
<td>0.7027</td>
<td>0.8573</td>
<td>0.9385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0823</td>
<td>0.1856</td>
<td>0.3668</td>
<td>0.5955</td>
<td>0.7891</td>
<td>0.9049</td>
<td>0.9603</td>
<td>0.9840</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 20: Predicted Probability of State-Building, Based on Dual (Contending) Motive and Total Motive Count**

I also rerun the graph of the predicted probability of state-building in the post-Cold War era (this time, with the lagged dependent variable included in the model). The results of the graph for this version of the model are largely similar to those of the of the model that does not include the lagged dependent variable. The presence of dual (contending) motives for involvement, as well as a greater number of total motives for involvement, still increases the predicted odds of U.S. state-building intervention. Again, this trend holds true regardless of whether failed states have experienced periods of prior failure. As such, I conclude that the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable (a control measure, to account for time dependency) does not unduly influence the model outcome. In other words, time impacts the likelihood of intervention (the continuation of state-building intervention) in an expected manner: state-building interventions are likely to continue in those failed states in which state-building efforts are already underway.
Figure 21: Predicted Probability of Post-Cold War State-Building as a Product of Dual Motive, Motive Count, and Prior State Failure

Part Two – Effects on State-Building Outcome

The first phase of this statistical analysis provides an assessment of the likelihood of state-building intervention, given a set of motives for U.S. involvement in failed states. In the following section, I address the results of the second phase of statistical analysis, which provides an assessment of the relationship between the motives for U.S. involvement in failed states, and the outcome of state-building interventions. I now focus on the effects of motive on the success or failure of state-building intervention, rather than on the effects of motive on the likelihood of intervention. I assess outcome based on four different measure of state-building success: democratic consolidation, economic development, quality of life, and state infrastructure.

The first regression model evaluates the influence of motive(s) for intervention on patterns of democratic consolidation. For state-building interventions characterized by a shift in
dual-motive (from the presence of one single motive-type to contending motive types), the polity score for the failed state improves by 1.064; for state-building interventions characterized by increased numbers of motives, the polity score for the failed state declines by 1.278. However, neither of these results are statistically significant. The same holds true for the alternate variable avrincount; a one-count increase in realist-instrumental motives results in a polity score improvement of 1.660, but the effect is not significant. Interestingly, the effect for a one-count increase in liberal-idealist motives (avlidcount) yields a polity score improvement of 2.253, and is statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval.

While intervention motive(s) appears to have little influence on the likelihood of improvements to democracy in failed states – except in the case of liberal-idealist motives – it seems as though the control variables (cvpostcw and cvpriorfailpd) do impact patterns of democratic consolidation. For those state-building interventions that take place during the post-Cold War rather than the Cold War era, polity scores improve by 2.994. The results for this finding are statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval. Based on this result, it seems reasonable to conclude that there is at least some degree of support for the argument that recognition of state-failure as cause for U.S. military action – and consequently, third-party intervention for purposes of state-building – is something of a post-Cold War phenomenon. Perhaps not surprisingly, state-building interventions which take place in states that have experienced periods of prior failure yield poor results for democracy; when interventions take place in these states, polity scores decline by a startling 6.795. The results of this finding are statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval.

The second regression model assesses the effect of intervention motive on economic development trends in failed states. For state-building interventions characterized by a shift in
dual-motive (from a single motive, or an overriding motive-type, to multiple and contending motives), the GDP per capita for the failed state improves by $466,084. However, the results for this finding are not statistically significant. For state-building interventions in which the motive count increases by one, the GDP per capita for the failed state decreases by $2,556. Again, though, the results for this finding are not statistically significant. The same holds true for the influence of realist-instrumental and liberal-idealist motives; increased counts for both types of motives result in improvements to GDP per capita numbers (by $267,344 and 302,921, respectively), yet neither effect is statistically significant.

As was the case in the previous model, the variables that appear to have the greatest impact on economic development are \textit{cvpostcw} and \textit{cvpriorfailpd}. For those state-building interventions that take place during the post-Cold War rather than the Cold War era, failed state GDP per capita improves by $927,046. The results for this finding are statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval. For those state-building interventions which take place in a state that has experienced a prior period of state failure, the GDP per capita for the failed state decreases by $1337,228. The results of this finding are statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval. Again, these results seem to support the position that the effects of post-Cold War politics and patterns of repeat failure hold considerable impact on the success or failure of state-building interventions.

The third regression model evaluates the influence of intervention motive on quality of life trends in failed states. Interestingly, state-building interventions characterized by dual (contending) motives yield positive effects on failed state life expectancy figures; such interventions yield a 4.244 year improvement to the average life expectancy for failed states. This effect is statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval. It seems as though the total
number of intervention motives is less influential; a one-count increase in the number of motives results in a 3.090 year drop in average life expectancy, but this effect is not significant. In this model, realist-instrumental motives appear to hold a stronger effect on life expectancy changes than do liberal-idealist motives. The presence of increased realist-instrumental motives results in an average life expectancy improvement of 5.652 years, a finding that is statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval. Increased liberal-idealist motives result in an average life expectancy improvement of 2.415 years; however, the effect is not statistically significant.

In this model as well as the previous regression models, the control variables appear to hold some degree of influence on state-building outcomes. State-building interventions that take place during the post-Cold War rather than the Cold War era yield an improvement of 3.409 years for average failed state life expectancy numbers. This finding is statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval. Again, patterns of prior failure hold negative outcomes for state-building outcomes; interventions in previously-failed states yield a 2.924 year drop in failed state average life expectancy rates. However, the p-value for this figure indicates that the finding is statistically insignificant.

The final regression model measures the influence of intervention motive on improvements to failed state infrastructure (as measured by the percent of roads paved). In this model, neither of the main independent variables – mivdualmotive and miv2motivecount - hold statistically significant effects on changes in failed state infrastructure. The same is true of the alternate variables avrincount and avlidcount; greater numbers of realist-instrumental or liberal-idealist motive-types hold no influence on the percent of roads paved in failed states.

As was the case in each of the above regression models, it seems as though the control variables may be responsible for a considerably portion of changes in the percent of roads paved
in failed states. While the effects of the post-Cold War time period are not statistically significant, those interventions which take place in states that have experienced patterns of repeat failure result in improvements to state infrastructure. In these cases, the percent of roads paved in the failed state, surprisingly, increases by 15.963. The results of this finding are statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval.

Taken as a whole, the findings of the second stage of the statistical analysis are much less clear-cut than those of either the first-stage statistics or the case studies. There are a number of possible reasons for this divergence. With respect to differences between the case study results and those of the overarching statistical model, it seems plausible that the dataset itself may be responsible. Significantly, the dataset, which is chiefly drawn from Political Instability Task Force's classification of states in crisis, encompasses a relatively extensive cross-section and time period of failed states. As such, the unit of analysis used here – (failed state) country-year – does not meet the stricter definitional standards of state failure employed for the qualitative portion of this study. As such, conceptual stretching may be responsible for a good deal of the “muddiness” of some of the statistical results.

Second, the dataset suffers from critical limitations. Prior to the recent advancements in the Political Instability Task Force data, information on failed states and the characteristics of state failure was very limited. Further, there are no datasets that explicitly address or provide measures for the influence of third-party motives for intervention in failed states on the actual outcomes of third-party intervention. This study, which provides an overview of the means by which motive translates to intervention, and then intervention translates to state-building outcome, attempts to account for those data gaps. This is achieved, in part, through qualitative
approaches; process-tracing and case-comparative analyses provide for a detailed depiction of the links in this chain. Nonetheless, these links are difficult to quantify.

Finally, I recognize that my attempt to assess state-building success according to a range of different dependent variable measures, rather than a single composite measure, may account for insignificant findings in the regression models. Further, I understand that there is something of a mismatch between the nature of the independent variables and the dependent variables. The independent variables capture relatively short-term effects of state-building motive and state-building commitments, while the dependent variables provide measures of outcomes that are somewhat more long-term in nature. It cannot be expected, for example, that a three-year state-building operation will yield significant shifts in democratic consolidation or economic development, as changes in levels of democracy or economic success are decidedly slow-moving (noticeable shifts are sometimes only truly apparent over periods of decades). In all likelihood, my unit of analysis, country-year, fails to adequately capture these effects. In future versions of this work, I hope to develop a single composite measure of state-building “success,” as well as use event-data that will allow for a more accurate measure of state-building outcomes.

The statistical models presented here incorporate newly developed data (on motives for intervention), recently available data (on state failure), as well as an assortment of traditional measures of state “success” (polity scores, economic indicators, human development statistics, and proxies for infrastructure strength). As such, the results of the models are likely to suffer from possible flaws in the data, or from possible discrepancies arising from the compilation of various types of data. I discuss the possible effects of these limitations in further detail in the concluding remarks of this study.
12. CONCLUSION

Case Studies

The case study findings indicate that there is a discernible relationship between policy leaders' motives for failed-state interventions, the subsequent commitment of resources to state-building efforts, and the ultimate outcome of those operations. The single-motive intervention (in Somalia) and minimal-motive interventions (in Haiti and Afghanistan) prompted limited military and financial commitments; this, in turn, resulted in poor state-building outcomes. The minimal-motive engagements in Haiti and Afghanistan yielded slightly greater military and financial commitments than the single-motive engagement in Somalia. Though all three countries remain crippled by political instability, poverty, and violence, Somalia represents the one truly “collapsed” state of the group. The two multi-motive interventions (in Bosnia and Kosovo), though, resulted in comparatively high military and financial commitments. While both countries are still regarded as weak states, they nonetheless exhibit signs of recovery: a post-conflict period of relatively sustained peace, democratic development, and at least some degree of economic growth.

Though the use of a standard case-comparative (method of difference) approach provides results that support the hypothesis, the application of an additional methodological technique – process tracing – further bolsters the confirmation of the hypothesized motive → commitment → outcome relationship. The U.S.’s military-financial commitments (levels at the initial intervention period, as well as subsequent shifts in commitment levels) can be directly linked to presidential-congressional leaders' stated motive(s) for the respective peacekeeping and state-building
operations. The poor state-building outcomes in Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan, in turn, can be
directly linked to the type of state-building tactics employed in each country: the limited U.S.
troop support for UNITAF and UNOSOM II in Somalia, the rapidly downsized U.S. role in
Restore Democracy and UNMIH in Haiti, and the reliance on the “light footprint” approach in
Afghanistan. Further, flare-ups in violence and political instability in all three countries can be
tied to previous periods of military draw-down and dips in foreign aid.

The same holds true for the positive state-building outcomes in Bosnia and Kosovo. The
comparatively high U.S. contributions to the two missions can be directly traced to statements of
presidential-congressional motives for intervention in both countries: the assessment that the
crises in the Balkans presented numerous and overlapping threats to U.S. interests and values.
The achievement of stability and political-economic recovery, in turn, can be directly traced to
the initially high levels of troop-aid commitments. Further, periods of improvement during the
course of both missions can be linked to preceding periods of additional military-aid
undertakings. Clinton, for example, implemented extra peacekeeping and state-building
operations in Bosnia, which allowed for consistent normalization of security-political conditions
from 1996-2000. Albright, similarly, secured increased foreign assistance for post-conflict
Kosovo, which helped to provide for a quick transition from peacekeeping to state-building
efforts.

In each failed state intervention, the scope of motives for U.S. involvement directly
influenced the commitment of resources to that country; the scope of resource commitments, in
turn, played a determining role in the course and outcome of the state-building mission. This
pattern of relationships, highlighted by the application of the most-like-systems and process
tracing methodologies, supports the primary hypothesis of this work. The fact that the pattern
holds for multiple points of analysis – derived from the cross-case (most-like-systems) and cross-time (process tracing) techniques – further bolsters the strength of the hypothesis. These results are significant in their own right. However, they are also important in that they lend empirical credibility to the largely untested arguments of liberal intervention theory and the American exceptionalism perspective.

With respect to liberal intervention theory, the findings demonstrate that foreign policy leaders' intervention motives, particularly during the post-Cold War era, are likely to be shaped by overlapping rational-utilitarian and normative-ideational concerns. Further, they show such interventions – those prompted by the perception of multiple and interrelated threats to great power states' values and interests – are likely to yield considerable resource commitments. In keeping with Duffield's arguments, American and European leaders regarded the crisis in the Balkans – the disintegration of the former Yugoslav Republic, the onset of “new wars” in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the consequent collapse of political authority in the two areas – as one that necessitated a massive Western military-aid response. And, further supporting Duffield's position, the enormity of the two missions was largely oriented towards the exportation of Western liberal peace institutions. The NATO undertakings were not only directed to the physical tasks of post-conflict reconstruction; they were focused on re-shaping the Balkans in the image of a post-communist Europe: democratic, market-oriented, and EU-integrated. Notably, the attempts at state-building in Haiti and Afghanistan (and Somalia, to the minimal extent that such attempts were made) were not shaped by such concerns. Rather, they were premised on the idea that locals should determine – and assume the primary responsibility for – their respective states' institutional designs.
The findings also align with the American exceptionalism perspective: post-Cold war threats require “unpopular” military interventions; thus, intervention proponents rely on just war rhetoric as a means of building support with the American public and the foreign policy community. This was particularly true, again, of the state-building missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Clinton, his aides, and congressional foreign policy leaders built support for the proposed interventions - even though both were initially contentious - by marketing the engagements as multi-cause cases for action. They argued that the U.S. should act in defense of European stability and NATO credibility and to prevent ethnic cleansing and genocide. And, in both cases, they secured the resources for grand scale and long-term involvements. While there was some attention to just war arguments prior to the engagement in Afghanistan, it was decidedly less pronounced than it was during the lead-up to the Balkans' engagements. Further, it was largely overshadowed by attention to the fundamentally security-based justifications for Operation Enduring Freedom.

Significantly, the case study findings also indicate that there is cause for further investigation of the possible ties between theories of intervention and theories of peacekeeping. The first group of theories identifies intervention motive as a determinant of the occurrence of intervention, and the second identifies intervention method as a determinant of intervention outcome. The results presented here suggest that it is possible, if not beneficial, to conceptualize the separate single-link causal mechanisms (intervention motive → intervention occurrence and intervention method → intervention outcome) as a multi-link process. In other words, it is useful to examine intervention motive as more than a possible cause of intervention itself; to acknowledge that intervention motive can influence intervention method, and in turn, intervention outcome: intervention motive → intervention method → intervention outcome. The
case study support for this predicted relationship process represents an initial step towards
theory-linking, and possibly, theory-building.

**Statistical Models**

The results of the quantitative component of this project are much less clear-cut than
those of the qualitative analysis. There numerous reasons for this. First and foremost, the models
are structured around the limited state-failure and intervention motive data that are available.
Data limitations are largely responsible for the reliance on the logit and regression techniques
employed in this work, as well as for the use of these techniques in conjunction with each other.
Ideally, improved data sources and reliability will allow for future development of the model in
ways that better account for the process-based nature of the research question.

In spite of these weaknesses, some of the statistical models do yield results that support
the primary hypothesis. This is particularly true of the logistic regressions, which lend credibility
to the argument that the presence of dual (contending) motives for state-building intervention
will prompt state-building intervention, and to the sub-argument that increased total numbers of
motives will prompt state-building intervention. The logit models, run under varying conditions
– with alternate variables, control variables, and a lagged dependent variable included –
overwhelmingly produce outcomes in which the two main variables are positively correlated
with state-building intervention, and meet the standards of statistical significance. As such, it is
possible to reject the null hypothesis that the presence of dual (contending) motives for
intervention has no effect on the likelihood of U.S. intervention in failed states.

Further, the logit models suggest that, overall, the main independent variables do a better
job of explaining the probability of U.S. intervention in failed states than do the either of the
alternate variables, or any number of control variables. In most variations of the logit models, the alternate variables fail to have a significant influence on the likelihood of state-building intervention. I conclude that traditional theoretical explanations for third-party intervention do not perform well for conditions of state failure; neither realist-instrumental nor liberal-idealist causes for failed state involvement do a better job of predicting U.S. intervention in failed states than the main independent variables. This holds true, to a certain extent, for the control variables as well. As such, I conclude that the first stage of the statistical model respectably bolsters the primary hypothesis of this study.

Certain versions of the second-stage regression models appear to lend some credibility to the argument that intervention motive influences state-building outcome as well as the likelihood of intervention itself. Yet, they do not support the primary hypothesis in its entirety. The hypothesis rests on the notion that there a process at work behind state-building outcomes. I argue that intervention motive shapes the intervention itself, which in turn impacts the outcome of the state-building mission. In most versions of the regression models (in which I attempt to assess the influence of intervention motive on the likelihood of various types of state-building “success”), though, the presence of dual (contending) motives for intervention or a greater number of motives for intervention has little impact on state recovery. Rather, the control variables, which account for the influence of the post-Cold Wat time period and for preexisting patterns of state-failure, are generally the only variables that produce statistically significant effects. As such, I cannot conclude that this stage of the model supports the primary hypothesis.

Assessment

The premise of this work is that understanding the nature of contemporary state failure is of critical importance in the post-September 11th environment; that policy makers can no longer
conceive of such countries in merely humanitarian terms. In the post-Cold War era, failed states not only pose threats to their own citizens, but to international peace and to U.S. national security. In this study, I find that there is cause to recognize the influence of shifts in policy makers' perceptions of American interests in failed states. According to the case study and quantitative results presented here, the broader the elites' conception of the problems posed by a failed state, the more likely they are to pursue military action (state-building operations) in that state. The statistical analysis suggests that this effect is not necessarily characteristic of the post-Cold War period, thus undercutting one of the arguments on which the theoretical basis for this research rests. However, both the case study and statistical results lend support to the primary hypothesis of this study: that multiple motives for U.S. involvement in failed states, particularly motives which are both realist-instrumental and liberal-idealist in nature, are not only more likely to result in state-building interventions, but successful state-building interventions.

Despite the contradictory findings on intervention motive (the presumed influence of broadened scope and nature of U.S. interests in failed states) as a post-Cold War phenomenon, the results are nonetheless relevant to the growing body of scholarship on state failure and state-building. Further, they could potentially be of interest to foreign policy actors concerned with U.S. military involvements in the developing world. With respect to the literature on Western interests in the developing world, it seems as though arguments regarding policy makers' “narrow” understanding of the threats posed by failed states have been largely overstated. Both the case study and statistical findings suggest that foreign policy actors are quite likely to conceive of state failure as a multi-faceted threat to domestic, regional, and international concerns (particularly, security).
Further, and perhaps more importantly, the findings lend a good deal of support to the arguments associated with the critical-constructivist (English School) approach to security studies. They also bolster the arguments stemming from the recent resurgence in the American exceptionalism (“just war”) literature. While it is not necessarily unexpected that the case study results support these perspectives - given that they cover the post-Cold War time period, with which the two schools are chiefly concerned - it is perhaps somewhat more surprising, and noteworthy, that they seem to apply to the Cold War era as well. Accordingly, it could be argued that the two perspectives actually predict and explain more that they purport to do. While this, in and of itself, is hardly indicative of the theoretical strengths of the liberal intervention or new exceptionalism schools, it does suggest that the arguments linked to the two schools merit additional study.

While the case studies, as well as some of the statistical models, provide important empirical support for the above-mentioned theoretical perspectives, they also hold a number of practical implications for the U.S. foreign policy community. Perhaps one of key lessons of this research is that the way in which political elites conceive of state failure - and subsequently “sell” their message within the policy community and to the American public - has a discernible influence on the occurrence and outcome of state-building intervention. Pro-interventionists, for example, would likely do well to focus on marketing state-building as both a multi-interest and material-normative endeavor (regardless of the extent to which particular instances of state failure actually pose such risks).

Beyond this, the results of this research hint at the possibility that post-Cold War state failure and state-building will continue to occupy the foreign policy agenda. While the statistical component of the study suggests that there are not significant distinctions between how policy
makers conceive of state failure in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, the case studies highlight the degree to which failed states in the post-Cold War era pose serious risks to national and international security. In an increasingly globalized environment, the problems associated with state failure cannot be confined to failed states themselves. They threaten the interests, particularly the security interests, of other states. If we can reasonably expect that failed states will continue to pose threats to the U.S. and its allies, the we can, by extension, anticipate that our foreign policy leaders' approaches understanding and managing these threats will be critical to the future of the U.S.’s international undertakings. Thus, issues of humanitarianism, development, and democratization – and their links to the more explicitly material and security oriented risks of state failure – may play an increasingly prominent role in U.S. foreign policy making.
WORKS CITED AND WORKS CONSULTED


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