ABSTRACT

Historical factors such as colonialism and neoliberalism are pervasive in the state development of developing countries. The impacts of these factors are exacerbated when global issues such as climate change are present, yet rarely are the effects of these structures acknowledged by external agents such as developed countries and international institutions. However, the actors that work in the internal aid landscape of developing countries are not only conscious of the impacts of these structures but also realize that they shape the work being done in the development spaces in these countries. Therefore, I argue, there exists an analytical bifurcation in the discourse of capacity between developing countries and developed countries. This bifurcation not only hinders developmental progress but also silences colonial history. To address this, I present a post-colonial sociological study that uses the analytical bifurcation of the discourse of capacity to investigate the historical conditions of colonialism and neoliberalism in which it was produced, and subsequently how the discourse represents real-world issues to modern development in Bolivia in the time of climate change.

INDEX WORDS: Bolivia; state capacity; climate change; Development Theory; post-colonial sociology
CHALLENGES TO DEVELOPMENT UNDER CONSTRAINTS OF A COLONIALIST PAST:
BOLIVIA IN THE TIME OF CLIMATE CHANGE

by

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BOLIVIA IN THE TIME OF CLIMATE CHANGE

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my grandparents. I would not be who I am today if it were not for all of you. I miss you all and wish you were here to celebrate with me. Your love and encouragement throughout my life has been a driving force in my accomplishments.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“If the past has nothing to say to the present, history may go on sleeping undisturbed in the closet where the system keeps its old disguises.”

-Eduardo Galeano (1992:123)

Developing countries are forced to contend with a multitude of factors as they pursue socioeconomic development. Colonialism left devastation in its wake and created structural conditions that still affect these countries today along with the added constraints produced by neoliberalism and globalization. These countries are faced with many difficult decisions, which are exacerbated by structural constraints that often function to the benefit of developed countries in the context of the global economy.

Even if we ignore the historical causes for a moment, the current structure of many international institutions adds restrictions that impede advancement in developing countries. For example, according to the United Nations Charter, Article Two Section One, "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members" (UN Charter 1945). This sentiment is echoed by the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on Sustainable Development Goal Indicators (IAEG-1).

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1This project uses the terminology of developed and developing countries. I acknowledge that this does not reflect different stages of development nor does it make specific categories for stages of industrialization. However, this terminology is necessary to have the conversation about impediments to development, regardless of the stage. I felt this is the best terminology available compared to other options such as Global North and Global South and first world and third world. Developing and developed were also chosen because interview participants all referred to Bolivia as still developing, therefore I believe this is the most accurate term for this project.
SDG) which states that the "appropriate indicator to measure progress in meeting the sustainable development goals is the percentage of members and voting rights of developing countries in international organizations" (IAEG-SDG; UNCTAD 2017). Even though research has shown that emerging and developing countries should have an increased amount of representation within governance structures of international institutions (Foundez and Tan 2010; UNCTAD 20107), there is still a significant disparity in the amount of power and representation that is given to developing countries in many international organizations. Without an equal voice, developing countries and their needs are underrepresented on the world stage, which impacts political, economic, and social choices concerning development. Therefore, the options of how to develop in a beneficial way that is specific to the developing country in a globalized world are significantly limited.

Structural factors such as colonialism and neoliberalism hinder development. Further, the impacts of these factors exacerbate other global issues such as climate change, yet rarely are the effects of these structures acknowledged by external agents such as developed countries and international institutions. However, the actors that work in the internal aid landscape of developing countries are not only conscious of the impacts of these structures but also realize that they shape the work being done in the development spaces in these countries. Broadly, this project asks, what impact do these structural constraints have on development progress? More specifically, how do these structural factors of colonialism and neoliberalism effect the response in developing countries to current issues like climate change? It is from these questions that the rest of the project developed.

This project is a post-colonial sociological study that uses a case study of Bolivia, since the election of President Evo Morales, to contextualize the significance of the impacts that
colonialism and neoliberalism still have in developing countries. This project shows that not only do these structures still have an impact in developing countries but that the effects are also exacerbated when faced with global problems like climate change. These impacts are explored through a combination of dependency theory and indigenous transmodernity, which is defined below, to understand the impacts that colonialism and neoliberalism have in a globalized world.

I chose the time frame of the Morales administration for several reasons. First, the election of Evo Morales ushered in a new era in Bolivia that made many people in the country hopeful for the first time in a very long time, given the historical instability of the country prior to his election, which will be addressed below. For the first time in history, an indigenous president was elected in a country where the majority of the population is indigenous. He vowed to lift the country out of poverty and to refute the hold that neoliberalism had for so long over the peoples and their way of life. He also promised to protect Pachamama (Mother Earth) and to implement the necessary requirements to make Buen Vivir or Sumak Kawsay a nation-wide reality\(^2\). Though economic, social, and political stability in the country has improved as a direct result of the policies and strategies implemented by the Morales administration, those policies regarding harmonious living and protection of Pachamama have mostly fallen short. This failure is directly evident in the administration's decision to continue using policies that support extractivism as the focal point in the development strategy. This strong focus on extractivism brings about the second point; even though the administration has not met the expectations of environmental conservation that was proposed during his election, they have been outwardly critical of other countries and international institutions regarding their harmful development

\(^2\) Sumak Kawsay and Buen Vivir refer to the ability to live a good life, in Quechua and Spanish respectively, which means to live in harmony and be respectful of one another as much as it is with Pachamama.
practices. This critique has occurred while Morales has simultaneously promoted Bolivia and his administration as one that values harmonious living. While it is tempting to accuse Morales of dishonesty, as many of his critics have, instead, this project focuses on the question of the possibility to implement these changes by investigating what is actually structurally possible in present-day Bolivia given the constraints of colonialism and neoliberalism³.

I chose to focus on what was structurally possible in Bolivia for two main reasons: First, it represents the most common theme found in my interviews, which were concerns about capacity. Capacity can be broadly defined, as the ability of a government “to implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances” (Evans, Rueschemayer, Skocpol 1985:9). However, there was more to this notion of capacity for my participants. By engaging with them about decisions made by the Morales administration, a structural element became obvious in their responses. They referred to structural constraints, failed promises on the part of developed countries, turbulent histories, missing knowledge and expertise, and broken systems. Even though all participants were critical of some of the decisions made by the administration, they all pointed to structural issues related to international institutions or developed countries as barriers of the administration’s capacity to achieve objectives related to sustainable development⁴, resource stability, and climate change.

Second, while structural conditions predicated by colonialism and neoliberalism affect development progress, they are rarely acknowledged in development practice or sociological

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³ These terms will be defined and put into context in detail in the second section of this introduction.
⁴ For its use in this paper, sustainable development is defined as development that includes “three main pillars: economic development, social development, and environmental protection. Southern countries have utilized the three pillars of sustainable development to demand economic and social justice for their citizens in addition to environmental protection” (Attapatu and Gonzalez 2015:14).
analyses. This failure to recognize the current implications of repressive historical factors in developing countries refers to what Julian Go identifies as an analytical bifurcation (2013). Analytical bifurcation refers to the process of “eliding imperial history” from the analysis of modernization processes and the dilemmas that accompany modernity (Go 2013:36). In other words, an analytical bifurcation is the “repression of imperial history” and the “assumption that Europe (the West) is the sole originator and agent of history without any contributions from other places or in the absence of relations with others” (Go 2013:37). Analytical bifurcations can be dealt with in two main ways: first, by employing a critical lens that “discloses the cultural logics attendant with empire” (Go 2013:29). Then, second, by taking “aim at imperial knowledge and colonialism’s multidimensional structures” through a lens of “present concerns” (Go 2013:30).

This analytical bifurcation exists on two levels in this project. First, it represents a separation in the discourse of capacity. The manner in which capacity is used by my participants acknowledges the effects from colonialism and neoliberalism, yet most of its use in development literature and sociology does not. Second, it represents a bifurcation between the impacts of colonization and the modernity project within sociology. As Go states, “sociology has worked through the repression of colonial/imperial history. Classical sociological works were founded upon attempts to theorize modernity but occluded colonialism or imperialism’s potential role in constituting modernity in the first place” (2013:33). This sentiment is echoed by Bourdieu in his discussion of the notion of the preconstructed, whereby he stresses the importance of understanding the history of the objects of study and the political work behind these objects instead of taking them for granted (1992). Therefore, in this project I use the analytical bifurcation of the discourse of capacity to investigate the historical conditions of colonialism and
neoliberalism in which it was produced, and subsequently how the discourse represents real-world issues to modern development in Bolivia.

The manner in which this project is structured advances towards the solutions Go has identified for addressing analytical bifurcation. First, it offers a genealogy chapter in order to “disclose the cultural logics attendant with empire” through the analysis of capacity in both development literature and social science literature (Go 2013:29). Second, by understanding the discourse of capacity as it is used by actors inside the development space in Bolivia, this project takes “aim at imperial knowledge and colonialism’s multidimensional structures” through the lens of climate change (Go 2013:30). Therefore, this project offers an "analytical connection of ostensibly bifurcated relations, and thus produces new post-colonial accounts of the making and continual remaking of modernity" (Go 2013: 50) in the Bolivian context. In other words, by focusing on colonialism and neoliberalism through the discourse of capacity, this project reconnects historical conditions to real-world development problems by showing that they still impose constraints today. This is especially true when additional global pressures like climate change are present.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: First, I will describe this project, its importance, and elaborate on the theory chosen for this project. Second, I will historicize colonialism and neoliberalism, then further explain why these structures are the focus of this project, and then why they matter in the Bolivian case. Third, I will go over the methods used in this project. Last, I will present the analytical strategy of this project and introduce the substantive chapters.
WHAT IS STRUCTURALLY POSSIBLE

Following Julian Go’s insight on post-colonial sociology, this is a project about the analytical bifurcation of the discourse surrounding capacity in Bolivia. This is relevant because it serves as an example of how the repression of colonial and neoliberal history further reinforces the sociopolitical and economic characteristics of these structures, thereby causing real-world challenges for state development. Go critiques sociology for having an analytical bifurcation between colonization and modernity. He states that because of its “European metrocentrism and analytical bifurcations, much of sociology reproduces and mirrors the wider-culture of Northern dominance” (2013:49). Though post-colonial theories are popular in the humanities, it has largely been excluded in sociology. As Go suggests, some argue that post-colonial theory is not helpful for the discipline and is in fact “incompatible as it offers a critique of sociology” (2013:28). However, Go argues that this claim of incompatibility is not true. Instead “post-colonial theory offers a challenge to sociology-by highlighting sociology’s imperialistic unconscious” (2013:49). By engaging with this challenge, the discipline can move beyond reproducing the same colonial narrative it critiques, and towards a theorization of modernity that considers "colonialism's potential role in constituting modernity in the first place" (Go 2013:33). By making this connection, sociology can then begin to conduct the object of study accurately. In other words, sociology becomes more critical and reflexive of how the object of study originally became a problem and the type of political work it does. Specifically, for Bolivia, this asks how did the discourse of capacity become the social problem in question and how, when, and why was this concept formulated? Further, what is the history of the term capacity and what type of political work has it been engaged with? It is from these questions that the object of this study was crafted.
Theory

In order to study post-colonial sociology, it is crucial to use theories that avoid the bifurcation that positivistic sociology promotes. Instead, the theory needs to consider historical factors and the impacts these factors have on the object of study. In other words, a theory that considers colonialism and neoliberalism within the current development context is necessary to complete this project. As Somers states, “no story can be told, nor any theory proposed that is not responding to prior (implicit or explicit) questions and our questions are always the products of our situated selves (2008: 10). This project takes up dependency theory according to Cardoso and Faletto in combination with indigenous transmodernity, both of which will be defined and elaborated on below⁵. These theories were chosen because they overcome the pitfall of positivist theories of which Go warns. As he states, "sociology's enlightenment assumption of the knowability of all societies from the same "objective" standpoint and its search for totalizing, abstract, trans-societal theories express an imperialistic will to power that fails to acknowledge the socially-situated, embodied incomplete, or ambivalent character of all knowledge" (2013: 34). In fact, Cardoso and Faletto argue against describing dependency as a theory but instead as an analytical framework that could be used in combination with mechanisms specific to the state to understand the way a country had developed (Beigel 2010). It was not meant to be a totalizing theory as it depends on the specific factors of each case study. Below each theory will be defined and explained, and below the mechanisms will be discussed in their relation to colonialism and neoliberalism to exemplify the importance of these structures further.

⁵ The combination of these theories will be explained in the analytical strategy section of the introduction.
Dependency theory

This project uses the version of dependency theory by Cardoso and Faletto. This specific version of dependency theory is chosen because it puts forth the possibility of development within the capitalist system (Cardoso and Faletto 1979) and counters the idea of other dependentistas that contend that no progress is possible within the structure of imperialism (Caporaso 1980; Dietz 1980). As Dietz states, “Cardoso and Faletto argue that dependence is not a “thing” but a process with many dimensions and facets that must be concretely and historically understood” (1980:755). In other words, they argue that the path to development for any given country in Latin America is determined by two groups of political and economic concerns: the external structural factors and internal factors.

Dependency theory, therefore, argues that the development path of a particular country is not only determined by historical structural factors or internal factors but rather it is both that must be considered in order to understand the development progress and path and what hurdles are present that must be overcome to improve situations in developing countries. This approach gives a better indication of what is structurally possible in a given country. Cardoso and Faletto also argue that dependency is not just a political or economic reflection of the time but a reflection of social classes, “the productive system of the state, and its particular historical situation” (Beigel 2015:11; Cardoso and Faletto 1979). Their argument is very much like a “causal analysis that hypothetically identifies mechanisms that account for development blockages” (Heller, Rueschmeyer, and Snyder 2009:288), or mechanisms, that viewed “economic power as an articulation of social and political domination” (Beigel 2015:13). Cardoso and Faletto identify these mechanisms that could influence the development of the country as the insertion to the global economy, the makeup of the population, state-specific
economic limitations, and leadership choices combined with state and political institutions (Cardoso and Faletto 1979), which will be explored further below.

Since political and economic effects were not experienced congruently in the same across countries, the structural effects alone could not determine the fate of a particular developing country. Therefore “one should not look for the determinants of dependency only externally but should rather “dependency should be used as a causal-significant concept, that is suitable to point out relevant structures of power” (Beigel 2015:13), including internal factors. But including mechanisms in the analysis also means including agency of all relevant actors. As Beigel states, “international links limited the possibilities of action within the nation-state, but, at the same time, groups, classes, and social movements could perpetuate, transform, or break those constraints” (2015: 13; Cardoso and Faletto 1975). Therefore, it has been the structural impositions of colonialism and neoliberalism, in combination with the characteristics of Bolivia, mechanisms specific to Bolivia, such as population discrimination, lack of coastal access, insertion into global market, and leadership choices combined with state institutions, that has resulted in the country’s development status.

Indigenous transmodernity

Transmodernity is the recognition of the various forms of social movements throughout the world that are challenging the tenants of colonialism and neoliberalism. It is meant to identify the importance of the Other that has been suppressed throughout history by moving beyond modernity and post-modernity to a place that allows for the “understanding of the emergence of cultures which have been historically depreciated and unvalued and undervalued” (Misoczky 2011:347; Dussel 2002). The indigenous component of this term speaks to the popularity of the indigenous movements and the ongoing influence of indigenous ways of being in Latin America,
specifically to this case, the Andes region. These groups have formed a collective voice in response to structural issues (Ateljevic 2013; Dussel 2002). Indigenous and related movements are becoming increasingly powerful. For example, in Bolivia, the cocalero movement propelled Evo Morales to become elected president. Indigenous transmodernity, therefore, responds to macro-level historical and structural issues. Transmodernity is a theoretical attempt to represent the sociopolitical significance of these indigenous movements (Misoczky 2011). By combining shared beliefs from indigenous cosmovision and current issues within modernity, indigenous transmodernity reflects concerns from multiple levels within society. Given that indigenous transmodernity is a response to structural constraints as well as internal factors, using it as a complement to dependency theory offers a more robust multi-scale analysis in order to fully understand how the macro, meso, and micro levels affect one another. Indigenous transmodernity is important here because it explains the election of Morales, some of the decisions of the administration, the current discontent of some indigenous peoples with the administration, and why it was necessary for a social movement to transform into a political party, while presenting the interests of indigenous peoples and what these interests are rooted in, both from traditional knowledge and impositions of historical structures.

HISTORICIZATION AND MECHANISMS

In this section, I discuss colonialism and neoliberalism and contextualize its use in this project, explain why it matters to the Bolivia case, and then through an exploration of the mechanisms from dependency theory, explore how the legacies of colonialism have affected and continue to affect development in Bolivia. These mechanisms have been summarized into four categories: discrimination of a large percentage of the population, lack of coastal access, insertion into the global market, and moments when local sectors allied or clashed with foreign
interests. I will then explore how climate change has become the new colonialism in developing countries. It is crucial to understand the historical impacts of these structures in order to understand contemporary problems that Bolivia faces. As Somers notes, “it is a folly to try and make sense of the present without recognizing the historical stories that live within it...looking forward at the present world through time and space changes not only what we can actually see, but also the meaning of that world” (2008:10). It is important therefore to understand the legacies that colonialism has left behind. These legacies transform into mechanisms that directly relate to how the state, society, and economy develop. The legacies, therefore, connect not only colonialism and neoliberalism but development challenges and societal advancement. Though discussed separately below, it should be understood that it is the combination of all the mechanisms of colonialism and neoliberalism that explain development in Bolivia and also the subsequent challenges it faces.

Colonialism

In Bolivia, like in many developing countries, colonialism is not restricted to the time of colonization rule, which occurred by the Spanish in the 1530s and stopped at their independence in 1825. Instead, it has been an ongoing process throughout the history of the country that has only taken on new names throughout time. This plundering "was carried out first by the Spanish conquerors, then in the twentieth century by the United States and the transnational corporations that represent the economic interests of a global capitalist elite" (Artaraz 2012:13). This aftermath of this caused "appalling socioeconomic inequalities that continue to dominate Bolivian society, the marginalization and exclusion of large sectors of society, the country's historic chronic political instability and its lack of progress towards delivering minimum levels of well-being to the population at large" (Artaraz 2012:13). It is these oppressions, these legacies
of colonialism, that has influenced neoliberalism, which has largely dictated how they have influenced development in Bolivia. It is therefore essential to start at colonialism since this process began the exploitation of resources and the peoples on the global market.

In the Americas, colonialism began in the fifteenth century. During that time, European interests dominated the world and were, therefore, able to justify the conquest of foreign lands without much resistance. European governing systems were able to use international legal concepts and principles to validate this invasion further. The first international legal mechanism that made colonization possible was the "Doctrine of Discovery that legitimized European Christian powers' exploration, claims, and occupation of non-Christian lands and properties that they "discovered" beyond Europe" (Islam 2015:24). The doctrine made it possible for Europeans to take control of territories of interest, even if they were inhabited by others that were non-European through processes of marginalization. For example, by regarding "European civilization, religions, race, and ethnicity as superior to non-Europeans and non-Christians, European laws were used to extinguish native ownership and title to lands by considering unoccupied lands, or lands that were occupied but not in accordance to European laws empty and subject to discovery claims" (Islam 2015:24). Therefore, forced land ownership created beneficial situations for Europeans as they controlled all the natural resource production.

The economic impact of colonialism was devastating. The doctrine allowed for the creation and implementation of an inequality-driven economic system in the Americas, which still exists today. Europeans were also able to undertake "rapid industrialization by accessing and exploiting colonial natural resources and raw materials and utilizing the labor force from colonies at a minimum wage and under conditions of slave labor" (Islam 2015:30). Europeans effectively created forced global economies within these locations through the appropriation of
land and subsequent natural resources they found valuable while simultaneously marginalizing the peoples through forced poverty, slavery, and the exploitation of labor.

These processes were exacerbated in Bolivia. With its abundance of natural resources, it was one of the central locations exploited by the colonizers, and subsequent elite foreign and local interests, through the mining of silver and tin. Potosi, a city set in the altiplano in Bolivia, served as a focal point for foreign interests (Farthing and Kohl 2014). As Eduardo Galeano notes,

The sword and the cross marched together in the conquest and plunder of Latin America; and captains and ascetics, knights and evangelists, soldiers and monks, came together in Potosi to help themselves to its silver. Molded into cones and ingots, the viscera of the Cerro Rico-the rich hill- substantially fed the development of Europe (1973: 31).

Colonization created an environment whereby the single-commodity of the colonizers' interests drove the economy in Bolivia. This market was interconnected to the mistreatment of Bolivian peoples since their disadvantage equated high profits for foreign and elite interests (Farthing and Kohl 2006). This process did not end with colonization. As Artaraz notes, "even though Bolivia became independent in the nineteenth century, its role in the global economy was already well established" (2012:15). The process of natural resource exportation for a high profit to a small group of elites while the majority of the population suffered in dire poverty became commonplace in Bolivia. In the 1900s, Simón Patiño, a Bolivian tin baron, became "one of the world's wealthiest men while millions were squandered in the conspicuous consumption of goods by a tiny elite (Artaraz 2015:15). While it began with European interests and colonization, this process continued with the United States and imperialism, and transnational corporations and neoliberalism.
Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism refers to "a form of socioeconomic governance broadly characterized by an export-based economic strategy, opening the economy to international investment, elimination, of trade barriers, decentralization, privatization, and the reduction of universal social services" (Richards 2013:71). Tenants of colonialism such as exploitation of peoples forced export-based economic strategies, foundations of privatization, unstable political leadership, and "development" policies became the foundations of neoliberalism. In other words, "the colonial project metamorphosed into the development credo of the 1950s and the 1960s”, (Caouette and Kapoor 2016: 3) which later transformed into neoliberalism during the lost decade of the eighties in South America. The overarching theme of colonization, neoliberalism, and the time in between is the drive to increase economic growth and profit-driven enterprises in developed countries. Colonialism and neoliberalism effectively forced the “perilous movement to organize a society exclusively by market principles” (Somers 2008:5) in developing countries which had a disastrous effect. The exploitation of miners during the tin rush in Bolivia, the single-commodity market structure that has been implemented since colonization, the borrowing terms attached to loans that forces free-market and foreign investment, among others, have all been for increased economic gain and power in developed countries. A weak market structure impacts political, economic, and social aspects of a given country. It also negatively affects state structure, especially as the influence of neoliberalism increased and expanded into globalization.

Given the weak state and political institutions that colonialism created, development in developing countries mostly hinged on borrowing loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. However, the foundations of these loans were based on the structural inequality inherent in colonialism. The loan contingencies reinforced inequalities in the
global market, which reproduced inequality at home in developing countries. "Neoliberal economic policies effectively dominated Latin America for two decades" (Artaraz 2012: 8). The global recession in the late seventies and early eighties had a devastating effect on the economy of many developing countries. The recession caused hyperinflation in many areas, and developing countries could no longer afford the already controversial loans. At the beginning of what is often called the ‘lost' decade in Latin America, the Bolivian economy was in complete disarray" (Kohl and Farthing 2006:54). Bolivia suffered from a large debt burden, economic stagnation, and recessions. As Kohl and Farthing state, "the GDP declined every year between 1981 and 1986, with a 9.2 percent drop in during 1982 alone. By 1982, the foreign debt had grown to US $3.8 billion" (2006 54-55), even though the economic debacle was caused by loan contingencies and the debt crisis (Artaraz 2012: 30). Something had to be "done" to take care of the problem.

The solution to this debt crisis was structural adjustment policies (SAPs). Economists in Washington found that the solution to the debt was more debt. This debt came with additional contingencies that forced neoliberal market characteristics on the economies in the region. SAPs were additional loan contingencies prescribed by the Washington Consensus that forced leaders to open markets to foreign investment, remove barriers to trade, reallocate social spending, among others. "Bolivia was a testing ground for the idea that economic stabilization could be achieved by means of SAPs imposed from the outside" (Artaraz 2012: 8). This neoliberal restructuring through the implementation of the Washington Consensus and SAPs had devastating effects. As Kohl and Farthing write, "the empirical evidence shows that the majority of citizens in countries that have undergone neoliberal restructuring- often in the forms of

International Monetary Fund SAPs- have seen their standard of living fall (2006: 21). Further, in
order to make neoliberal policies more effective, decentralization and *Decreto Supremo* 21060 were executed in Bolivia.

The then president Victor Paz Estenssoro implemented *Decreto Supremo* 21060 in 1985. The decree effectively made it easier to enforce neoliberal policies in Bolivia, specifically a dramatic transfer of public monopolies into private hands (Artaraz 2012; Farthing and Kohl 2015). This transfer had disastrous results and caused several riots, which will be mentioned below. "Even though the neoliberal economic model promised a decrease in poverty reduction and an increase in economic growth, it instead increased social suffering to the extent that a quarter of the population in the region continued to live on less than US $2 per day" (2012:30).

Decentralization was also implemented in Bolivia during the process of neoliberal restructuring. Decentralization is supposed to “improve government efficiency and increase political stability in low-income countries by channeling dissent away from the confrontational public protest and into a more manageable electoral process” (Kohl and Farthing 2006:14). Theorists assume that this is the best way to improve economic performance which will lead to the elimination process. A decentralized government should “increase efficiency, reduce the power of any single government office, thereby reducing its potential coercive power, and allows for improvements in service delivery, as decentralized offices are generally more responsive to local claims” (Kohl and Farthing 2006:29-30). Instead, the neoliberal restructuring process along with decentralization of governments have largely failed to accomplish their claims, ultimately driving poverty up and social spending down along all while decreasing state stability. The process also “fragments the potential opposition to cuts in government services (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 125).
However, there is another side to the decentralization process. Since the process moves power away from centralized government offices, it expanded the number of municipalities in Bolivia, which allowed for an increased number of local elections. Also, "decentralization programs can make citizens more aware of their rights and create opportunities for local counter-hegemonic movements, some of which expand to national prominence" (Kohl and Farthing 2006:125). From the decentralization process, several important changes occurred in Bolivia, First, in 1994, the Law of Popular Participation (LPP) allowed for indigenous peoples to be elected to positions in municipalities. These elections increased the percentage of representation for indigenous and "urban poor" in office (Artaraz 2012; Farthing and Kohl 2014; Kohl and Farthing 2006). Second, in accordance with the increase in municipalities, the LPP designated "20 percent of the national budget and oversight committees to monitor spending. Over 15,000 grassroots territorial organizations (Organizaciones Teritorales de Base) were authorized to participate in local planning, which officially changed the discourse on citizens’ rights” (Kohl and Farthing 2006:126).

Third, there was a shift in the way elections were conducted. The Election law in 1996 switched the election process into a “hybrid proportional representation system” (Kohl and Farthing 2006:126). By 1999, the municipal elections allowed “individuals who previously had been seen simply as local indigenous leaders assumed broader, national level roles. In the process, counter-hegemonic discourses opposing neoliberal policies reached wider audiences, setting the stage for the victories” of campesinos across the country (Kohl and Farthing 2006:127). This movement of strength and representation of indigenous people eventually led to the election of Morales, which will be discussed below.
Mechanisms

The impact of colonialism and neoliberalism discussed above addresses some of the factors that have affected development in Bolivia. The section concentrates mostly on economic impacts since it is the theme that connects colonization and neoliberalism. The economic drive during the histories of these systems had a lot of devastating consequences internal to Bolivia. As dependency theory mentions, it is both the external structures and internal factors combined that offer an understanding of development progress and the choices made by leaders. The importance of mechanisms that are specific to a given country cannot be understated in accounting for development issues as they “provide a fruitful way to understand divergent patterns of development in the contemporary era of globalization” (Heller, Rueschemeyer, and Snyder 2009: 287). Though some were mentioned above, these mechanisms below have been identified as having a substantial impact on development progress.

Therefore, it is not enough to only consider the impact that historical structural conditions have on development nor is it sufficient to combine these conditions with one mechanism, while excluding the others from the analysis. This approach does not identify the unique development challenges to states; rather it only recognizes the broader implications of the structures because it is only considering the part of the story. Instead, by examining the role of mechanisms, both singularly and combined, the analysis then takes into consideration how the role of political and social agency contributes to a state's development path, ultimately impacting the development and advancement of the people. "For Cardoso and Faletto, political and social agency matters; history sets conditions, not outcomes" (Heller et al. 2009: 289). Understanding how different characteristics of different countries and how their state apparatuses may have impacted their
development helps identify and address their specific issues, leading to a more robust understanding of development process and possible solutions.

*Discrimination of a large percentage of the population*

Bolivia has always and still consists largely of peoples that identify as indigenous, ranging from 41 percent to 62 percent, representing 36 different indigenous nations (Bolivia Information Forum; CIA World Fact Book; Indian Country Network; International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs). However, they have been marginalized for hundreds of years. As Postero states, Indigenous peoples were “barred from cultural and political participation…while the white-mestizo political elite wrote all of the constitutions and laws without meaningful representation of the majority of the population” (2017:1). During colonization, as Farthing and Kohl note, “the insatiable hunger for silver took an enormous human toll, with estimates ranging from one to four million indigenous miners dying from accidents, exhaustion, or black lung (2014: 25). Structural inequalities on the basis of race have been built into the state and other institutions. As Postero writes, “Throughout Bolivia’s history, indigenous peoples have been discursively opposed to whites and mestizos and treated as savage obstacles to modernity and progress” (2017:66). There was not any consideration given to their customs or traditions, much less their basic human rights. They were not “sensed as real or important, just noise in the system” (Postero 2017:67). Given that the majority of Bolivia’s population is indigenous, their disenfranchisement has had a tremendous impact on the people and progress in the state. It has also been detrimental to creating efficient state capacity since the state structures were not developed to provide for the majority of its citizens, leaving the institutions under-formed and inefficient.
With his election in 2006, Morales and his administration began to draft a new constitution. This was the first time in history a president sought to make the constitution representative and inclusive of all the peoples in Bolivia. With its approval in 2009, Bolivia became the *Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia*, or the Plurinational State of Bolivia, which, among other implications, means it is the first official recognition by the state of the various indigenous peoples that comprise such a significant percentage of the population. Though there have been strides made towards representation and just treatment, some indigenous peoples are still being marginalized. For example, the most recent example is the TIPNIS conflict. Morales handed over the collective land titles for an area of over 1 million hectares of the Isiboro-Secure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS), which is home to over 1,500 families from the indigenous Yuracare, Chiman, and Mojeño nations" (Artaraz 2012: 137). Yet recently, Morales has moved to "de-protect" the park, claiming that the road will be built at some point and that it is economically beneficial for the entire country, even though most indigenous peoples, environmentalists, and many NGOs in the park are vehemently opposed to the construction (Achtenburg 2017).

*Lack of coastal access*

Prior to 1883, Bolivia was not landlocked, but during the War of the Pacific, Bolivia lost its 250-mile coastline to a defeat by Chile (Artaraz 2012; Kohl and Farthing 2006). This loss Bolivia is now one of two landlocked countries in South America, which increases its vulnerability to climate change. "Direct anthropogenic factors such as overgrazing, over-cultivation, inappropriate land use and deforestation are the major causes and drivers of land degradation and desertification. Factors such as poverty associated with total dependency on climate-sensitive natural resources by the poor are some of the indirect causes driving land
degradation and desertification across many landlocked developing countries” (United Nations 2015: 6). This coupled with impacts of climate change such as glacier melting, flooding, mudslides, and avalanches leave the state and peoples economically vulnerable due to the increased financial burden of these impacts. Landlocked countries also tend to suffer from stunted growth and economic disadvantage since they are usually required to pay around 60 percent more in transportation costs than those that are situated on the coast (The Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade [GFP] 2003). The U.N. states that the absence of “coastline is a major obstacle to development because high transport costs result in low levels of trade and that these countries spend between two to three times as much as non-landlocked nations in the transportation and insurance of their goods.” (TeleSur 2014) This additional burden makes it extremely difficult to develop as landlocked countries are among the poorest in the world (U.N. 2015; World Bank 2008). Morales has specifically noted that a lack of access to the sea is a "violation of the human rights of peoples and countries" (TeleSur 2014). Morales has been pursuing access to the sea vehemently. In 2013 after extensive negotiations with Chile, Bolivia filed a suit against the country in the International Court of Justice in The Hague (TeleSur 2018). Recently, Morales stated that “We are for the first time very close to returning to the Pacific with sovereignty” (TeleSur 2018). This was coupled with a movement for maritime equality where a 124-mile-long flag was presented to commensurate the anniversary of the lawsuit against Chile for sea access (BBC 2018; TeleSur 2018).

Leadership choices and state and political institutions

Bolivia’s history since colonization has been tumultuous, with only brief periods of peace. “Another issue that finds its roots in the country’s history and partly explains its difficulties of governability is the profound institutional weakness of the Bolivia state. The state
has not, at any point in its independent history, exercise control over the entire territory within its borders” (Artaraz 212:39). Since Bolivia's Revolution in 1952, there have been twenty-seven regime changes, with the majority of the changes related to military actions and coups resulting in eight military juntas. In total there have been eighty presidents since 1783 (Gill 2001; Library of Congress; Sachs 1989). This political instability has had pervasive effects on the political, social, and cultural advancement of Bolivia. It has also had a significantly negative impact on the economic development of Bolivia, as it has remained the poorest or second poorest country in South America for at least 60 years (World Bank 2017). The current political state is much more stable than in the past, but in recent years corruption scandals and antiquated development policies have frustrated the public. In the most recent constitutional reformation proposal, the people voted “No” to allow Morales to run for another term. Unfortunately, there are no viable alternatives available to replace him when his term ends in 2019, although his party, Movimiento al Socialismo–Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos or MAS, is actively looking for another way for him to run in 2019, and have gone so far as to nominate him as the party’s candidate (Bonifaz 2017). Even though the political climate has been substantially more stable since Evo Morales took office, there are concerns over some of the development policies that have been put in place. The Morales administration has made incredible strides for both the state and society, some of which will be covered below, yet the main critique he receives both internationally and nationally is linked to the continuation of policies that support extractive development.

*Insertion into the global market*

Bolivia has an abundance of natural resources and is one of the most biodiverse nations in the world. However, “since the Spanish invasion, the country's enormous natural resource
wealth has profited global rather than local, interests" (Farthing and Kohl 2014: 25). Dominant actors have coveted these natural resources since colonization. The colonizers or the elites, depending on the time period, have encouraged the economy to operate within the parameters of a single-commodity export market by heavily supporting the production of one commodity. This has been a historical trend in Bolivia since the importance of silver in the sixteenth century. A single-commodity focus benefits elites by both serving their economic interests and helping them maintain control over the state by stalling the development of a middle class through an economy situated in low-wage extractive industries.

Though slowly diversifying exports and creating stable internal structures would not only stabilize the economy, grow markets, create jobs, among other benefits, it also gives the people more agency and more legitimacy to fight back against oppression because there are better equipped to take advantage of outlets to voice their concerns. Instead, the single-commodity export approach is still an issue in Bolivia today. As many participants noted, the intense focus on extractive development of hydrocarbons is not only bad for the environment and the people; it is also bad for the economy when the reserves run out. It is uncertain when the reserves will be depleted, as there is a significant discrepancy as to how much reserves are left.

Moments when local sectors allied or clashed with foreign interests

Skocpol's work on the state shows that state structures affect the nature of revolutions, and these, in turn, shape historical processes of state formation (1979). Through the majority of its history, the state structure of Bolivia has favored the elites. The underdeveloped or dependent state structure of Bolivia is also a direct reflection of historical structures, political changes, and instability. Because most wealth in Bolivia is derived from international negotiations where elites have the most voice and extractive industries where owners exploit workers, most wealth is
generated and retained by the already-wealthy. These conditions have led to significant revolt from the Bolivian peoples. Social movements formed to counter oppression have been created for centuries in Bolivia. As Dangl notes, “In 1781, the indigenous leader Tupak Katari laid siege to colonial La Paz for over three months. As Katari and his army held their ground in what is now El Alto, the Spanish below were helpless. The rebellion rocked the Andes for both its political and symbolic impact” (2014:256). In 1985, the world price of tin crashed, and the government closed most of the mines in the country. This led to a revolt that strengthened the Bolivian Workers Central party, which was a class-based labor movement (Kohl and Farthing 2006). Following neoliberal suggestions of the privatization of resources, water prices rose by nearly 35 percent after Aguas del Tunari and Bechtel required residents to pay for a new dam (Artarraz 2012; Kohl and Farthing 2006). This increase meant that residents would pay more for water than on food every month (Artarraz 2012). The protested lasted for nearly five months and the Banzer, the president at the time, declared a state of emergency (Artarraz 2012). In the end, the privatization was lifted. These are just a few of the powerful movements in Bolivian history. In fact, “resistance to external domination has been constant” (Farthing and Kohl 2014: 26)

Climate change as the new colonialism

The burden of climate change has been disproportionately placed on developing countries, even as developed countries have created the majority of issues associated with anthropogenic climate change. While location in the southern hemisphere increases the exposure of peoples in developing countries to extreme weather, the ongoing impacts of colonialism make it difficult for the countries in this region to cope with these changes. In other words, even though the detrimental effects of climate change have largely been forced upon developing countries, and even though these countries are only responsible for a fraction of anthropogenic
changes, they have to manage these issues within the ever-present structural constraints of colonization and neoliberalism. It is these constraints that make developing countries most vulnerable to climate change. With determination to develop on their own or at least without the burden of traditional financial encroachments from developed countries, many developing countries have made great strides economically to lift their populations out of poverty, but many of these changes have not been done in a sustainable way.

Arguing that the global response to climate change is reproducing colonialist and neoliberal practices and discourses is not a new concept. Many have argued that climate change has taken this role whereby developing countries are still at an extreme disadvantage when compared to developed countries in resources, technical expertise, knowledge, among others. For example, Edwards and Roberts state, "climate change is now considered a problem that could determine the future development of the [Latin American] region" (2105: 5). Developed countries have caused 79 percent of climate change, yet it is developing countries that are suffering the most (Busch 2015). Systematic impoverishment has prevented the formation of efficient social institutions capable of sufficiently responding to climate change. In addition to these issues, the current cost of climate change is placed on those least responsible, with “developing countries hit with 78 percent of the cost of climate change in 2015, according to Professor William Nordhaus’ RICE model, rising to 87 percent by 2035” (Busch 2015). In the most recent projections, developing countries now are now the ones most responsible for carbon emissions with 63 percent being attributed to their annual emission rate (Busch 2015). In large part, this is due to the failure of developed countries to support developing countries with the technology and knowledge to implement sustainable development practices, rather than
following a development path where industrialization is achieved through extremely high emission processes.

Further alarming statistics for Latin America specifically show that dire ecological consequences are expected throughout the region, which will trigger severe social implications. In the agricultural sector for example, by "the decade of 2050, 50 percent of agricultural lands will be subjected to desertification, and salinization is expected in some areas…with losses estimated in Brazil at $3.1 billion a year, after 2020" (Edwards and Roberts 2015:5). Another area of vulnerability for the region is the loss of glacial water as the main water supply and power source from hydroelectricity, which “sources around half of the electricity generated in Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador”, and this impact for Peru is estimated to cost anywhere between $212 million to $1.5 billion annually (Edwards and Roberts 2015; Kormann 2009). Glaciers have not only shrunk significantly, but these issues are coupled with the difficulties of measuring the remaining glacier size, as there is a large range in estimates of how much glaciers have retreated and the residual amount that is still available. For example, since the 1970s the glaciers in the tropical Andes have shrunk anywhere from 30 to 50 percent (Edwards and Roberts 2015:5). In Peru they have lost more than 20 percent of their glacier mass in the past 35 years, reducing the water flow by 12 percent to the coastal region which houses 60 percent of the population, while in recent decades in Bolivia “20,000-year-old glaciers have been retreating so fast that 80 percent of the ice will be gone before a child born today reaches adulthood” (Kormann 2009).

Of note here is the use of capacity as a tool to reinforce colonialist approaches in developing countries as they struggle to combat climate change. Once again, it is the future of developing countries and the peoples that are put most at risk. Not only are developing countries tasked with the responsibility to develop sustainably, but they also have to manage the impacts of
increased vulnerability of their citizens. For example, it is difficult to estimate the amount of biodiversity and biocultural loss coupled with the increased implications on sources of livelihood such as water. Climate change not only threatens vulnerable populations, but also adds a complex layer of insecurity regarding the exact loss and the subsequent social, political, and economic consequences. Even though there have been historically prominent meetings and initiatives on climate change through international cooperation, many of the agreements have yet to be fulfilled by developed countries. For example, during the Paris Climate Agreement change, developing countries were promised a technology transfer by developed countries that would assist them in adapting and mitigating the impacts of climate change, but this transfer has still not occurred. Developing countries are acutely aware of this and are taking matters into their own hands, but the tremendous difficulties that developing countries are likely to confront are too great to manage alone.

METHODS

This project investigates how structural impositions from colonialism and neoliberalism impede the goals of the Morales administration to make efficient and sustainable development choices. This is conducted by tracing the discourse of capacity throughout history and applying it to the real-world issue of climate change. While this research project consists of a single case study of Bolivia from 2006 to date, it speaks to the larger economic, social, and political implications of colonial and neoliberal ideologies in developing countries. It also serves as an example of the challenges that leaders from developing countries face when dealing with the effects of human security and climate change. This case investigates the interplay of conflicting interests on the local, national, and international levels and the resulting socioenvironmental and sociopolitical concerns that are created from these tensions. Specifically, the research looks at
how the discourse of capacity has been manipulated throughout history, the bifurcation in the meaning of capacity between developing and developed countries, the impacts of the discourse of capacity on development, the tensions that have been created from stunted capacity building and effective policymaking regarding sustainable development, the trade-off between development and sustainability, and the discursive national and international rhetoric concerning the environment.

To appropriately capture the dynamics of the aforementioned tensions, I use interviews and content analysis. Interviews were necessary for this project because they capture the issues and concerns of key actors. They also assist in contextualizing the situation from the viewpoint of the lived experiences of political actors. They effectively direct the rest of the research towards areas that those invested in these issues perceive as important. Content analysis provides historical and cultural insights into the research project. It was used to construct a genealogy of the term of capacity and its effects on development. When combined, for this study specifically, interviews and content analysis offer a thorough insight into the tensions, their causes, effects, and outcomes. They also establish a connection between peoples' lived experiences and concrete uses of capacity throughout history. For example, the apprehension of many participants regarding the adequacy of governmental development policies to adequately address issues concerning indigenous peoples and the environment. By triangulating data, this project can better verify the findings of the interviews and content analysis. Therefore, the results can be better substantiated.

I conducted fourteen semi-structured, in-depth interviews. Given my prior work experience within the country, I was able to utilize previously established networks and connections to assist in locating individuals who would be willing to participate in an interview. I
used convenience, snowball, and purposive sampling to reach participants from different sources. The majority of interviews were conducted in La Paz, Bolivia, the political capital of the country, during July and August in 2016, while several other interviews took place later in August over Skype. Even though Sucre is the country’s capital, La Paz is the center of government activity in the country, housing many non-governmental organizations (NGOs), government agencies, non-profits, and individuals that are active in the political composition of Bolivia. All interviews were recorded and ranged from thirty-five minutes to one and a half hours. The interviews took place at coffee shops, respondents’ homes and offices, and over Skype. All interview locations were chosen by the respondent. Three categories of people participated in the interview process: academics, NGO representatives, and political consultants. The academic group consisted of academics living in Bolivia, Bolivian academics who live abroad, and non-Bolivian experts on the subject matter. The NGO participants were comprised of representatives from national and international NGOs. Finally, the consultants ranged from national government consultants, international government consultants, and local researchers. All participants were concerned that their responses would become public and therefore requested anonymity.

6 I would like to integrate a note about the political climate in the country at the time of my arrival. This is important to acknowledge as it contextualizes the political climate in which participants responded to interview questions. There was a noted difference in the attitude towards the Morales administration since his first election. Considering the revolutionary and social platform that Morales ran on, there was an increased level of frustration toward the administration. Several factors since his last election have increased the hostility in the country around political issues such as the TIPNIS scandal, whereby the administration proposed to build a 200-mile road that would link Cochabamba to far-reaching areas in the Amazon but would pass through a protected national park and indigenous territory. The construction would not only lead to the relocation of indigenous peoples, which would endanger indigenous livelihoods, but also the destruction of one of the most biodiverse regions in the world and endangered species. The proposition at this time, which has become a reality now, further exemplified the frustration of the seemingly contradictory policies of environmentalism and extractivism the administration continues to pursue. The participants made note of the several political situations that were occurring or has just occurred during the time of my fieldwork. There were also several political issues that had worsened immediately prior to my arrival that deeply affected the people and their opinion of the government and its stability, such as additional findings from the corruption scandal from 2015 of the Fondio, or Indigenous Development Fund, and the perceived and/or real increase of persecution of those in opposition to the state. The news regarding the corruption of the indigenous fund first broke in 2015, with a reported US $2.1 million missing (TeleSur 2015). The rural land development and land minister as well as Bolivia’s ambassador to Paraguay were presented as the parties at fault by using the funds for phantom projects (TeleSur 2015). By 2016, the numbers have risen to over US $10 million missing, with over US
with their requests, I offered them the options of a consent form that did not require their signature, interviews that did not require a recording device or the option of not stating their name for the recording. I also assured them that all forms and interviews would be secured and that their names would be changed for privacy purposes.\(^7\)

The second part of the data analysis consisted of analyzing documents surrounding capacity, climate change, discourse, and development projects, both local and international. I reviewed policies, other various government documents, project literature, development reports, development chronologies, and international and national news articles. While much of this material was available online, during interviews, several participants gave me additional content to review to assist in the research. For the genealogy chapter, I reviewed an extensive amount of World Bank documents that ranged from the chronological timelines of the World Bank since its inception to development plans from the past fifty years. I also reviewed documents from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and different branches of the United Nations such as the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC), as well as relevant social science literature on the state for those decades.

In order to gain a thorough understanding of participants' responses and how they related to the project as a whole, I used a mixture of conceptual and relational analysis of primary and

\[14.8\text{ million of economic damage done to the state (TeleSur 2015). This coupled with the scandal around an alleged secret child of Morales', additional corruption tied to Chinese investments, racist allegations against some indigenous people given proposed development projects, and the referendum vote that ultimately decided “No” to a third term for Morales. The people were suffering from desgaste politico, or political exhaustion. In addition to these factors, there was also a fear that the government would persecute anyone who spoke out against the administration. Ultimately, people felt frustrated with these issues, but also believed that they did not have the opportunity to speak out in disapproval, as evidenced by my participants’ requests to use pseudonyms along with several of them asking if anyone in the government would have access to the interviews.}\]

\[\text{Participants also expressed this in the level nervousness during interviews about the transcripts, question about where the consent forms would be stored and who would have access, and sometimes the language they used to responded or the caution they exhibited when responding to certain questions.}\]}
secondary documents. The conceptual or thematic analysis allowed me to identify concepts or themes related to specific meanings or ideas, utilizing both inductive and deductive analysis (Colorado State University 2004). This helped eliminate the possibility of overlooking some ideas expressed by participants in case their response was worded differently from others. I also used relational analysis, which is similar to conceptual analysis but is more detailed as it allows for an investigation into possible relationships between the occurrence of multiple concepts (Colorado State University 2004). Among my data sources, I used both primary and secondary sources. The primary content consisted of the development plan and environmental policies, while the secondary data consisted of newspapers, books, and articles written by experts both within and outside Bolivia, and opinion pieces written about the research topic from various news sources, both internationally and nationally.

All the data analysis was done using ATLASI. There were several reasons for this choice. The program allows data to be sorted and grouped quicker as well as maintained and stored in one central location. The software also offers suggestions for possible links in the data that could be useful for the analysis, allows for exports to quantitative software if needed, and has a multi-function network analysis option to analyze codes and concepts.

While any qualitative software has possible limitations or drawbacks, such as relying too heavily on the software to target essential data points or track relationships between concepts, it also has many advantages, such as data organization, storage, and retrieval. To maintain mindfulness of possible issues due to the use of software and the reconfiguration of the project, I utilized both deductive and inductive coding while analyzing the data. This allowed me to use my preconceived topics of interest to determine if they were, in fact, relevant, while also reading and interpreting the text and assigning new codes to concepts and themes. Coding in this manner
also assisted in maintaining reflexivity throughout the project as it was a constant reminder of whose opinion and what information I was privileging. It is ultimately the decision of the researcher to utilize the program correctly. As Ruben and Ruben note, "software can provide tools to help you analyze qualitative data, but it cannot do the analysis for you, not in the same way that a statistical package like SPSS or SAS can do" (2012: 240). Thus, it is up to the researcher to be mindful of these limitations throughout the data analysis process.

The more significant issue with the project was surrounding the importance of reflexivity, which regarded my role as the researcher and interpreter of the data and research. Bourdieu described an epistemic reflexivity that differs from others in three ways; first, its primary target "is not the individual but the social and intellectual unconscious embedded in analytic tools and operations," second, it must be a "collective enterprise rather than the burden of the lone academic," and third, it seeks not to assault "but to support the epistemological security of sociology" (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 36-38). The first way Bourdieu mentions describes the need to understand how the problems that are studied in social sciences became social problems in the first place and how the concepts used to describe them were formed, and to be conscious of how these terms are utilized in research. This required me to be mindful of the concepts used and the history behind them, as well as how I constructed the project, and possible preconceptions that I brought to the data or developed during the analysis stage. I was allowed the opportunity to structure the project around issues that most concerned my participants, which further allowed me to delineate my role in the project and the biases and preconceptions that I brought to the research.

The second way that Bourdieu suggests maintaining reflexivity is to make the research project a collective endeavor. I did this by integrating my participants as much as possible into
the project. I structured the research and questions around what my respondents found important. Given that I am from the US and do not experience these circumstances in the country and their aftermath directly, it is possible to misinterpret the research from my perspective or to focus too much on topics that are not of particular importance to the participants. Therefore, I strove to maintain consciousness of my role as the researcher throughout the project. I have also kept in contact with my respondents, updated them on the status of the project as it progressed, kept an open line of communication with respondents in case questions arose, and will also be sending the final project to my respondents for comments or feedback. All of these options were requested or agreed upon by the respondents when they were offered. I also avoided topics that made the participants overly uncomfortable and strove to respect their boundaries regarding issues within the country.

The successful use of reflexivity in any project identifies the role of power and its impacts on the research and the participants. Since I, like Richards, "had the power to make myself present, design the research, and ask the questions, respondents had the power to determine the extent to which they would respond and the content of what they would reveal," therefore maintaining reflexivity throughout the project was very important in order to capture the respondents' concerns as much as possible (2004: 21). By being mindful of the two elements mentioned above, we as sociologists can accomplish Bourdieu's third way of reflexivity, which is avoiding what he refers to as ordinary sociology, which bypasses the radical questioning of its own operations and of its own instruments of thinking, by ensuring that reflexive practices further validate sociological work.

It is also important to take the time to acknowledge my positionality during the research. By doing so and remaining aware of how these elements influence the project, I hoped to
account for my influence on the research, thereby allowing the voices of the participants to be the focal point. By recognizing my position, outlined below, I hope to contribute a reliable piece of work to the field thereby reducing the three ways in which the sociological perception can be altered, which according to Bourdieu, are the "social origins and coordinates of the individual researcher," the position that "the researcher occupies in the micro field of academia" and the "intellectual bias that entices us to view the world as a spectacle or a set of significations to be interpreted rather than concrete problems to be solved" (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 39). With that said, I recognize my role as an outsider, a white female who comes from an imperialist country, the strained political relationship between the countries, the consideration of my perceived class, political, and economic status, and the influence those might have on my respondents and my approach to the research. I also realize that the problems in the country were something to which I could not personally relate. I do believe that my prior years of work experience in the country offset some of the challenges of reflexivity in the research by allowing me to view problems from a different perspective. My work experience allowed me to gain knowledge and clarity of the people and issues that they face, as well as the ability to approach the problems with the mindset of how to assist in solving them in an applied and practical way. The positionality of my respondents also contributed in my mindfulness as they had much more knowledge of the subjects discussed, a great deal of experience, and occupied a different economic class than myself.

ANALYTICAL STRATEGY AND CHAPTER INTRODUCTION

In this section, I will further elaborate on why dependency theory and indigenous transmodernity are the best theories for this project, and then introduce the two substantive
chapters and the reasoning behind these choices to represent this post-colonial sociology project of capacity.

One of the shortcomings of classical sociological theories is that by imposing European metrocentrism, it erases colonialism and imperialism from the research context (Go 2013). These theories continue to persist which continues the repression of colonial history and how it has affected modernity in developing countries. Go then suggests that one way to increase the amount of post-colonial sociological work is to avoid theories “that reinscribes a methodological nationalism that occludes expansive relations across space” (2013: 27). Many theories do not suggest a category for colonial society. These theories “do not include societies that encompass colonial variations, the theoretical articulation recognizes no dynamic between the societies; no recognition that "capitalist societies," for instance, often tried to maintain and keep "tribal societies” deliberately intact during colonial rule for political and economic purposes (Go 2013: 37). In other words, these theories mostly fail in capturing the dynamic between the colonizer and the colonized.

Dependency theory in combination with indigenous transmodernity fills this void by consciously identifying the role of the colonizer and colonized at all levels of analysis. Even though dependency theory is often critiqued for not including an individual level analysis, indigenous transmodernity connects local individual community level responses to structural factors at the state and international level. This combination also addresses the specific critique that Go makes about dependency theory. Though his critique is not directly of Cardoso and Faletto's version of the theory, he does state that though it "pays some attention to ideology and culture the primary category remains economic" (Go 2013: 41). Therefore, while dependency theory considers the larger macro-level economic issues like the global economy, foreign
interests, and lack of access to the sea, indigenous transmodernity captures how local levels react to the impacts of colonialism and neoliberalism. These theories are therefore crucial to this project.

In development, issues with capacity are seen to predominately exist at the state level, while being manipulated at the international level which simultaneously affects the local level. Issues that are associated with failure or lack of capacity are usually linked to ineffective structures, but their implications affect other levels of society. The impact of state capacity, then, cannot be evaluated without considering the historic structures that may have affected the state and also its citizens, who are affected by the impacts of poor or effective capacity. The issue is therefore cyclical.

In order to address the questions presented in this introduction, the substantive information is divided into two chapters, as mentioned above. Chapter division in this manner supports Go's suggestion of how to overcome the analytical bifurcation present in sociology. He argues that in order to "reconnect the relations" it involves a project that can accomplish two things: "at the level of social theory, relational or substantialist understandings of the social world, and as historical sociology, the deployment of these relational theories to reconstruct otherwise bifurcated histories and connections" (2013:41). Therefore, the chapters are divided as follows: chapter two of this project is a genealogy of the concept of capacity, and the third chapter is a real-world example of the impacts of the repression of colonialism by looking at its role in climate change adaptation and mitigation.

These two chapters take different tones because they accomplish various aspects related to this project. The genealogy chapter is an academic exercise of understanding the historical underpinnings of the discourse of capacity by tracing it throughout time in both development
literature and social science literature. Since "the great force of history comes from the fact that we carry it within us and are unconsciously controlled by it in many ways, and history Is literally present it all we do" (Somers 2008:8). It provides a review of the concept and explains how the language of the term dominates development practices, but the practices never consider the historical underpinnings of the term, thereby reinforcing the history of repression. By conducting a genealogy of the term, I, like Somers, will conduct a problem-driven history of the present (Somers 2008:8). The chapter concerning climate change mitigation and adaptation reconnects the problem of the discourse of capacity to its colonial history by breaking with its dominate usage and analyzing how capacity is used in the Bolivian landscape in the space of development. This chapter uses a real-world issue and explores how climate change and the discourse of capacity intersect for my participants in the development landscape. This addresses the dynamics of the development space in "colonial society," thereby filling the void in the analysis of modernity in traditional sociological accounts of modernity.

CONCLUSION

This is a post-colonial sociology project that connects the discourse of capacity to colonial and neoliberal structural factors in order to understand current development challenges in Bolivia. In this project, I argue that there exists an analytical bifurcation in the discourse of capacity between developing countries and developed countries. In developed countries and international institutions, the discourse has effectively separated developing countries from their histories by repressing them. This is similar to the way that sociology is often guilty for repression of neoliberal and colonial history in modernity studies. Developing countries and their failures are judged without consideration towards the constrained circumstances in which they operate and are forced to deal with the repercussions alone. These structural issues are
exacerbated when developing countries are presented with global issues like climate change as they do not have the resources to respond efficiently. Therefore, the practice of analytical bifurcation in theory and practice has severe implications for development in developing countries.

In this project, I will contribute to the renewed interest and relevance of dependency theory by adding to the space where "in-depth case studies of particular countries, sectors, policies, or actors" in the theory is needed (Heller et al. 2009:292). In this project I will also make an analytical reconnection of capacity to its colonial and neoliberal history, thereby exposing the negative impacts of this bifurcation process. I also will add to the arguments that focus on structural issues in development policy and literature, while also integrating the state level and community factors. By focusing on failures of developing countries, or by only focusing on part of the actors in the scenario, other factors become overlooked, and the picture is incomplete. Often, state-level issues like capacity are themselves generated by international structural issues and are therefore linked to other problems within the macro, meso, and micro level (Schwartz 2007). Thus, the focus on just meso-level failures is incomplete (Schwartz 2007). I also stress the importance of the effects of historical structural limitations on the ability to adapt to climate change issues.

For Bolivia, the causes and impacts of the discourse of capacity are clear. Political decisions, be they effective or ineffective, are made in a constrained setting because they are made within the context of colonialism and neoliberalism. This situation has created difficulties for the people in Bolivia because it has created a limiting effect on the measures they can take to overcome these issues. In other words, by using the case study of Bolivia, the implications of the intersection of human agency and structural constraints become clearer. By understanding the
issues associated with the intersections of structural constraints and human agency, we can better understand what is required to tackle problems like climate change. As noted by Parks and Roberts, "very simply, solving international environmental problems is not just a matter of engineering efficient institutions; it also requires an understanding of why asymmetric distribution exists and what can be done to mitigate their impact on countries' willingness and ability to engage in cooperative agreements" (2010:149).
CHAPTER 2

A GENEALOGY OF CAPACITY: A KEY CONCEPT IN STATE DEVELOPMENT

Capacity, as a concept, has become fused with the state in development literature over time. The concept has been used in a variety of ways and contexts but, in the development literature, it is most often used to identify characteristics of advancement or deficit regarding the state’s ability to instill progress and development. However, throughout the history of the concept, two transformations have happened: first, there has been a split in the meaning of capacity between developed and developing countries, and second, capacity has come to often be used as a synonym for “good governance.” The transformations in the discourse of capacity have created an increasingly problematic situation for developing countries to make progress. In this chapter, I seek to answer the question of how the discourse of capacity is used, mobilized, and understood by different actors in the development space. In order to do this, I analyze meanings of the concept of capacity through a genealogical analysis that focuses on key development initiatives by decade, beginning in the sixties. Through this exercise, it becomes obvious that there has been a bifurcation in the use of capacity of developing and developed countries. The discourse of international institutions and developed countries have dominated the use of capacity throughout history. Thus, through a review of the term, I argue that the language and the manner in which it has been used by these institutions has dominated development practices and processes. The political work behind the concept has created an analytical bifurcation in the discourse of capacity that has both repressed colonial history in developing countries while charging them with development failures associated with capacity measurements. Therefore,
throughout history, capacity has been used in dominant institutions as a tool to reinforce hegemonic discourse and practices.

Broadly, capacity can be defined as the state's ability to accomplish goals, though more detailed definitions and understandings will be presented later. The use and popularity of capacity has fluctuated over time in social science literature and in development practice. These historical shifts have prompted a change in the understanding that surrounds the concept as well. Why has the most recent discourse surrounding capacity linked it to good governance? How does this affect leadership in developing countries? What impact does this have on developing countries in their attempts to adapt to and mitigate the pressures of the globalized world such as a changing climate, resource scarcity, civil conflicts, or poverty? What impact does the meaning of good governance have in developing countries on the ground? This analysis provides some clarity on these issues by focusing on the historical and political underpinnings of capacity as a concept in the field of development.

The transformations of capacity over time have had a tremendous impact not only on how the word is used but the meanings associated with its use. “Keywords typically carry unspoken assumptions and connotations that can powerfully influence the discourses they permeate - in part by constituting a body of doxa, or taken for granted commonsense belief that escapes critical scrutiny” (Bourdieu 1977; Fraser 1994: 310). In the case of capacity, its popularity continues to grow in development practice while simultaneously spreading to an increased number of disciplines, without a clear idea of the impacts of its use or what its history entails. The definition of capacity itself, as well as its uses, spans over multiple decades, which makes the ideas associated with the concept complex and difficult to understand. It is this unchecked use,
regardless of the intentionality behind it, that has led to the two aforementioned transformations of capacity.

Much of the fracture in the meaning of capacity for developed and developing countries can be attributed to the continuation of globalization. This fissure has changed the meaning and impact of capacity in developing countries by creating a situation of internal and imposed capacity. Internal capacity refers to the experience and meaning-making associated with capacity by the various actors inside the state, while imposed capacity refers to development requirements as defined by developed countries and international institutions. These definitions and expectations are then subsequently imposed on developing countries. Internal capacity reflects the actors inside the state and their confrontations with, understandings of, and misgivings about capacity, how the state operates within a framework of limited capacity, and what is possible to achieve both on the state level, through civil society organizations, and the community level. Imposed capacity is the version of capacity that is most often used as it has been created and enforced by dominating international institutions. Imposed capacity is directly linked to the synonymous use of the concept of good governance with capacity.

The association of capacity with good governance has created a difficult situation for developing countries that have low state capacity as they are now being charged with poor governance. Linking capacity to governance in developing countries also ignores what is possible in these countries given the historical processes that have imposed limits on them, and instead holds the developing country in a suspended state, expecting them to respond to current issues in a way that meets the expectations of development agencies without addressing the ongoing impacts of colonialism and exploitative transnational relations. Therefore, the transformations of meaning in the landscape of capacity have created a hindrance to
development whereby internal capacity operates within a framework that considers structural constraints and impacts of colonial history, while the external association of capacity with good governance completely ignores those constraints and history.

Following the research of Nancy Fraser, Raymond Williams, Pierre Bourdieu, and others, this chapter recognizes the performative aspect that underlies language and concepts that are often used to describe social life and forces. The performance that these concepts take on "are not only used to describe social life but are also active in shaping it" (Fraser 1994: 310; Bourdieu 1977; Williams 1979). It is thus crucial to understand how capacity has acquired certain taken-for-granted truths and how these truths are actually "historical constructs that have their roots in specific social and political agendas" and how these uses have affected development (Foucault: 1984; Saukko 2003:133). Therefore, through a genealogical analysis of the use of capacity, it becomes clear that there is a distinction between its use in developing and developed countries. Since the dominant use is the one by developed countries and international institutions, it has been used to reinforce a globalized hegemonic discourse in developing countries leading to a hindrance to development.

This genealogy is based on an analysis of primary documents from The World Bank, The United Nations, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Since one of the main purposes of this paper is to trace the use of capacity in development processes, using literature and measures of capacity from international organizations that influence development is crucial in understanding the intersection of capacity and developing countries. This is further substantiated by prominent secondary sources of social science literature that have focused on the relevance and meanings of capacity and its role in state building. Further, these sources are accompanied by several interview quotes from participants in Bolivia in order to understand the dynamics of
internal and imposed capacity and the effects of this intersection on governance. This is to demonstrate that this analysis is not merely an abstract exercise, but that the use of capacity affects state structure and policy and has real impacts on the ground in terms of the state’s ability to manage issues, such as adapting to and mitigating climate change. The focus on climate change in this analysis places the transformation of the discourse of capacity within a very serious and time-relevant issue. In order to accomplish this, the chapter proceeds as follows:

First, I offer a historical background on the origins of capacity. I follow this with an exploration of its use throughout history in reference to development progress. This will consist of its role in development research, the fissure of its use between developing and developed countries, and an analysis of the role of internal and imposed capacity. Finally, I will conclude with an investigation of how capacity has come to mean “good governance” and the implication of this use in the development context by analyzing it through the framework of climate change.

TYPES OF MEANING

The use of capacity is varied and associated with many state functions in both the development and social science literature. In order to narrow the understanding of the effect of capacity discourses on developing countries, I make the distinction between ‘state capacity' and ‘capacity of the state.’ Whereas ‘state capacity' is often understood as one of the "defining characteristics of a political system" (Almond and Powell 1966; Katzenstein 1978; Zysman 1983; Migdal 1988; Ikenberry 1988; Organski and Kugler 1980; Wang 1995:89); ‘capacity of the state' is linked to specific outcomes, be it growth and economic performance, technological,
physical, managerial, investment, national, production, industrialization, civil wars and conflict prevention, or adaptive\(^8\).

The reasons for this are three-fold\(^9\): First, ‘state capacity’ has become a cumbersome phrase. Over the years, there have existed many uses of state capacity, but no clear definition of what it is, which had led largely to a generic use of the phrase. “It is a term that has been used extensively, but often without a firm definition” (DeRouen, Ferguson, Norton, Park, Lea, and Streat-Bartlett 2010:334). The generic use of the concept results either in a conflated meaning of different characteristics of the state, or it has the opposite effect of it being used too broadly, integrating other aspects of the state such as government or rule of law. Both drawbacks can imply that state capacity is something that it is not, or that the author did not intend. Second, by linking the language to outcomes used in development literature, we can better see the impacts of the concept in state performance. By reviewing empirical outcomes, we can trace the history of said outcomes to understand how they have impacted development. Third, since the primary documents for this paper stem from an analysis of international development agencies, it is important to keep the language similar to those documents. Since, in the development literature state capacity is largely linked to specific outcomes, such as adaptive capacity or technological capacity, these documents function in a way that makes distinctions among the types of capacity within the state. Therefore, distinguishing state capacity from the measurement of the capacity of the state or determining if the state has achieved a given desired outcome, is not merely an

\(^8\)All of these functions mentioned are pulled from the development reports throughout history.

\(^9\) However, and somewhat ironically, it is the breadth and depth of the study of state capacity throughout multiple disciplines over the past forty years or so that make an analysis of ‘state capacity’ quite difficult. While useful in the social science genealogical portion of this analysis, the use of state capacity will switch to capacity of the state when referring to both development literature and the internal capacity of developing countries. This implies a distinct meaning that is closely related to the meaning interpreted within developing countries while also adhering to the language used in development literature.
academic exercise, but an inquiry into the ability of the state to achieve a set outcome. This brings the analysis back to ask the question of whether the state has the capacity to achieve a specific identified result, instead of signifying purely a generic failure or success of the state. In other words, by considering specific outcomes, the performance of the various discourses of capacity as a mechanism to separate a developing state from its colonial history becomes clearer\textsuperscript{10}.

THE BEGINNINGS

This genealogy begins with a historical overview of how the phrase of state capacity was created and conceptualized in the social science literature. The reasons for this are threefold: First, as previously mentioned, the phrase is useful because it gives a general definition from which to understand its use in development literature. Second, tracing the origin of the concept gives a clear idea of the context in which it was created and for what purpose, thereby referencing its historical underpinnings. Third, we begin here to supplement the development

\textsuperscript{10} This is not to say that the phrase ‘state capacity’ is not useful in general, or in this context specifically. On the contrary, the phrase accomplishes three important tasks that are of note here. First, it gives us a functioning, broad definition in which to frame the analysis. According to Theda Skocpol, state capacity refers to whether a state is “able to implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances” (Evans, Rueschemayer, Skocpol 1985:9). Others have given some consideration to the impact of colonial forces on capacity in developing countries and the role of transnational factors. As Evans states, “Transnational factors have always been central to arguments about the nature and capacity of Third World states” (1985: 194). Second, state capacity directs analysis of capacity to particularly important and significant research moments in the social science literature on the state beginning in the late seventies. Broadly this body of research sought to understand what the state was and was not as well as its functions, limitations, autonomy, legitimacy, and so forth. The understanding of the broad interpretation of state capacity during the resurgence of the state in the social science literature points to a pivotal time in the development of the concept and also offers a comparative point to how the concept was used in early development literature. This use brings up the third point, which is that state capacity was largely treated as a project of development by international development agencies early in the use of the concept. The choice to treat the development of a country as a project is initially how the separation of the discourse of capacity in developed and developing countries began. Because there was a resurgence of research on the state in social science literature, there was a growing focus on what the state could and could not do and its functions. The growing prominence of state capacity in social sciences brought attention to how the concept was being used and its use in development literature. Without the contribution of research on state capacity from the social science literature, the importance of this concept and how it was used in development could have largely been overlooked.
literature on capacity as the concept was not used prior to 1947 in the World Bank archival chronology, and not widely used in the development reports until 1978. Therefore, this genealogy starts with early philosophers of the state to show the breaks in history that led to the concept of state capacity and its evolution in both social science and development literature.

The classic study of the state by philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau was framed in a philosophical manner, supporting the rule of the state through religious underpinnings. The philosophical notion of the state concerns itself with the compatibility of the state within the framework of the religion, linking often the political implementation of the state as a necessity to the success of Christian Commonwealth. This can be seen in the role of Hobbes' Leviathan, which portrays the commonwealth as a gigantic monster built out of the bodies of its citizens with the sovereign as its head (Hobbes and Auckland 2009). Therefore, this early work framed the state as a sovereign actor exercising its will in a political area consisting mostly of other states and invoked both fear and support from the peoples to maintain allegiance. The problem of the focus on sovereignty as the primary identifier of the state is that it offers a singular assessment that by its narrow view excluded other components of the state. As Nettl notes, "the notion of the sovereign state focuses exclusively on its superordinate status vis-à-vis inferior associations and thus obstructs the possibility of analyzing its relationship with other summating concepts such as nation, society, or territory" (1968:562). Thus, another concept, the autonomy of the state, was needed to understand these additional components.

Eventually, autonomy came to occupy this empty space in social science literature. Frederick Watkins wrote about the irrelevancy of sovereignty as a limiting concept and used autonomy to explain the erosion of sovereignty “as a unique political factor” (Nettl 1968: 560; Watkins 1934). Though much work on autonomy and its role in the political space has been done
since then, it was Nettl who introduced the notion of capacity prior to the concept itself. His work on autonomy linked it to state functions. Therefore, it was Nettl’s notion of autonomy of the state that functioned as a precursor to state capacity. It did so by connecting autonomy and a form of Weber’s bureaucracy to reference the capabilities of the state as it directly links to the study of state autonomy and bureaucratic functions. As Nettl notes,

The notion of autonomy is relevant to the emphasis of structural or role specificity. This simply means that a relatively autonomous state tends to proliferate specific institutions both for the adequate fulfillment of functional tasks of primacy within society and for replicating various internal functional requirements within its own autonomous sector such as administrative courts, offices of coordination, civil service commissions, and so on (1968:565).

The functions of bureaucracy were initially studied by Weber in 1922 in *Economy and Society* whereby he discusses an ideal type of organization of the state and the functions and capabilities that would create an effective public administration. By recognizing a necessary but missing component of the state, the societal aspect, Nettl expands the notion of state autonomy in order to acknowledge the constraints that states face from substate, suprastate, and non-state actors. It is also Nettl’s use of autonomy that served as the foundation of Skocpol’s definition of state capacity. As Nettl recognized the relationship of the state’s power to various actors, Skocpol took it a step further and defined state capacity as the ability of the state to implement goals within the constraints that these various actors, that Nettly identified.

The connection of autonomy and state capacity was further developed by Charles Tilly in 1975. The focus in this work was on the European states and the distinction of state autonomy from other sectors by identifying its role and function of a state as having the capacity to raise taxes (Cingolani 2013; Tilly 1975). He referred to the state as having the capacity to "build an apparatus which effectively drew the necessary resources from the local population and checked the population's efforts to resist the extraction of resources" (Cingolani 2013: 4; Tilly 1975: 40).
Though Tilly's work focused mainly on European state development and capacities that are associated with developed states, his work is useful here not only because it traversed large spans of time but also because it was very influential on the development of the concept. Tilly's work was one of the earliest introductions of state capacity into social science research, though the usage of the term has developed over the course of his career; as such, his work is crucial to the genealogy of state capacity. As noted by Cingolani, "the so-called 'bellicist' hypothesis of Tilly fostered many works on the historical determinants of state capacity" (2013: 14). Even though his focus is on war and state formation, other works have spawned from Tilly's discussion that has focused on the capacity of the state in general by producing research about the different functions and outcomes of state capacity and measurements associated with it. Thus, Tilly's work has been useful to see the connection of state capacity and capacity of the state in some areas of research on the state.

The period of the late seventies and early eighties brings us to a critical point in the analysis. This period saw a resurgence of the use and study of state capacity in social science literature and the capacity of the state in development literature. This was primarily due to the increased focus in the study of the state, or rather works that referenced the term of the state. As noted by Evans et al.:

Until recently, dominant theoretical paradigms in the comparative social sciences did not highlight states as organizational structures or as potentially autonomous actors. Indeed, the term “state” was rarely used. Current work, however, increasingly views the state as an actor that, although obviously influenced by the society surrounding it, also shapes social and political processes (1985: vii).

The work on the state at this time separates itself from other work on the state and state capacity. The substantial research conducted towards the role of external influences on the state and what a state is capable of marked a hallmark in the work of the state. This shift in the analysis of the
state is also useful in the genealogical sense since this new state approach attended to the historical, societal, and political processes, not only of the state but processes surrounding the state. It was also in this time period that publications that outlined development goals and choices from development agencies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations were widely available. It was also at this point in the development and social science literature that we can better recognize how capacity has been used, mobilized, and understood by different actors in developing countries in order to understand the transformations of capacity, and how these factors may have hindered development.

ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT

At this point in the analysis, specific decisions have to made about the types of capacity literature that will be included from the social sciences in the remainder of this paper. This analysis does not seek to offer an extensive literature review on state capacity or capacity of the state, as this would span over nearly five decades and multiple disciplines. This is not only outside the scope of this paper but largely excludes development literature, thereby not capturing my area of interest here. Instead, I have made conscious choices about what social science literature to include and exclude. Most development literature on capacity identifies three main points of weak capacity: human resource development, organizational development, and institutional factors. Therefore, this analysis includes the social science literature that speaks to these issues.

The Sixties

The use of capacity in the development literature can be traced back to the late sixties with the 1969 Pearson Commission Report. The World Bank president at that time, Robert S. McNamara, commissioned this report to investigate the effectiveness of the development
assistance that the World Bank provided at that time (Smille 2001; World Bank Archives).

Most of the discussion on capacity at that time consisted of building administrative capacity in developing countries in order for them to adapt to the changing political and social climate (Smille 2001). As reviewed earlier, capacity was not a popular concept in the academic literature on the state at the time, with early ideas about ‘capacity’ not directly identified as such but conceptualized in the form of linking state autonomy with specific bureaucratic roles. Nettl’s use of autonomy reflects the significance placed on administrative capacity in the development literature. Nettl also referenced that the politics of place played a role in the type of state development asserting, “the variable development of stateness in different societies is a crucial factor in specifying the nature of those societies' politics” (1968: 588). However, Nettl focused more on the autonomy of the state and does not consider the ways that certain approaches to capacity are imposed by international institutions.

The conversation around capacity in the development literature at the time was a dialogue around the developing countries, meaning their input was not included. The Pearson Report was commissioned internally and was conducted by the Canadian Prime Minister, Lester B. Pearson. In a response to the request by McNamara, Pearson said "I do not think it is possible to exaggerate the importance of this problem; of the danger to peace and stability of the world becoming increasingly divided into rich and poor, developed and under-developed nations. It is a privilege to take part in such a challenging and important task" (World Bank Archives: 153); assessment by developing countries was not included anywhere in the report. One of the popular solutions for development issues at the time was population control. Regarding population control as a way to decrease economic instability in Latin America, McNamara stated. "I assure you that I tread this thorny path only because I am convinced that unrestricted population growth
cripples economic growth, and this, in fact, degrades the dignity of man… I see no alternative to our direct involvement in this crisis” (World Bank Archives: 155). The meaning-making of capacity in the sixties was concerned with developing an administrative capacity to manage policies that would ready third world nations for the changing world.

The Seventies

In the seventies, capacity played a much more prominent role in the development literature though there was a divergence in meaning in some international institutions. Some were still referring to capacity in administrative terms, such as the 1978 report by the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) within UNESCO. In this report, the authors spoke about treating administrative capacity as a scarce resource in rural communities (IIEP 1978). They believed that administrative capacity had been treated as an infinite resource in these communities. Without recognizing the limitations of administrative capacities within developing countries, and why these limitations existed, the programs at this time were confronted by issues with program adherence and outcomes (IIEP 1978:79).

However, capacity was taking on a much more dynamic meaning in other institutions, as seen in the 1978 World Development Report from the World Bank. The approach and tone of the discussions of capacity in this report was quite different. Here the capacity of a state became associated with outcomes, such as the "physical capacity of strengthening development" or the lack of "national capacity for adaptive research for agricultural concerns" (WDR 1978). The importance of the economy and economic growth generated by imports and exports played a significant role in the report. Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) began in the late seventies, with the first international mention at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development on May 10th, 1979 convened by McNamara (World Bank Archives: 201). Even though the first
SAP was not implemented until the eighties, the WDR from 1978 and 1979 mentioned their importance by referencing the significance of structural adjustment policies to economic growth:

The increasing tendency to rely on protection against imports to cushion the impact of the prolonged recession on employment, thereby delaying some of the difficult structural adjustments that are necessary if there is to be a return to a higher growth path… the growth of the market has been sustained by the developing countries' ability to borrow in international capital markets; and their capacity to service their debt depends on the foreign exchange generated by their exports… these structural relations are as important for their future prospects as the changes which have occurred in their domestic economies (12-14).

Here, capacity to service their debts to industrialized countries by way of participating in structural adjustments and trade is highlighted. By participating in free market trade structures, according to the WDR, developing countries will not only have the increased ability to service their international debts but also to follow a path of higher and faster growth, thereby boosting their economies and production in trade. Nowhere in the report are the needs of local communities mentioned, nor are there consultations with foreign governments outside of developed countries cited in the bibliography. The actors present is this development scenario are international development agencies and developed countries, while the voices and responses of developing countries are largely absent.

In the social science literature, the role of the state as the center of analysis was becoming increasingly popular. Power, coercion, and the reach of state processes became a central focus. Three main characteristics gain importance: the role of the state in war-making, the ability of the state to perform "coercive power monopolization by the central administration, and the formation of professional, permanent, and insulated civil service cadres" which follows Weber's idea of the modern nation-state (Cingolani 2013:4; Tilly 1975; Weber 2006). Weber describes the modern role of state bureaucracy in establishing rules for legal and administrative capacities. He believes that modern bureaucracy is based on the idea of rationalization, and when
implemented efficiently, it works well enough to be difficult to destroy since its function and organization allows it to usually measure everything in an economic means or value (Weber 2006). The state, therefore, implements functions, which in turn result in a bureaucracy that is dehumanizing and autonomous from social pressures.

This trend in the study of the state can be seen in the development literature as well. The focus on administrative capacity of international institutions coupled with the exclusion of community-centered or local knowledge-driven projects followed the predictions of Weber for the modern nation-state and the role of bureaucracy in control over state functions. The role of power and coercion is also central in the development literature but indirectly. The power of developed countries over developing countries is represented not only by the ability to create policies and enforce them in developing countries but also to exclude them in decision-making processes both locally and internationally. Therefore, the capacity is represented in two distinct ways: for developed countries as the ability to coerce other countries, and for developing countries as their ability to adapt to these economic and social changes through administrative capacity. In this way, ongoing colonialism is used to control developing countries by means of economic, social, and political power while also creating the groundwork to hold developing countries accountable for any apparent shortcomings in "capacity" without considering the historical factors that limited their autonomy, to begin with.

The Eighties

The development focus of the eighties was on institutional development and enhancement as well as a sustained focus on administrative capacity. These foci were meant to continue to prepare developing countries for the "necessary structural adjustment" essential to "sustain high levels of investment" and enhanced resource management (WDR 1981, 1982, 1983,
1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989). The phrases institutional development and institutional changes were a precursor to the now-common phrases of institutional capacity, capacity building, and capacity development. In the eighties, however, capacity was linked to SAPs to enhance countries’ capacity for debt service, production, trade, and local level organization, but also to increase capacity for foreign investment through forced institutional changes. At this point in the development literature, institutional development was a necessity to accurately enforce the SAP deemed necessary by the World Bank, IMF, and the developed countries that dominated those institutions. Throughout the decade, however, the use of capacity, along with institutional enhancement, became less frequent in the WDR and the World Bank chronology of events, occurring less in that decade than any other decade prior or subsequent (WDR 1981-1989; WB chronology timeline). This reduction in use may be a direct result of the failures of SAPs throughout the decade.

SAPs were rapidly enforced in the eighties with the first loan approved for Turkey in March 1980 (World Bank chronology timeline). Due to the global recession in the seventies and eighties, global interest rates increased which caused debt payments to rise, creating a situation where most developing countries could not pay back loans. Mexico was the first to announce they could not pay back their loans. This was followed by many other developing countries throughout the world. SAPs were introduced as the required conditions for rescheduling the loans, and they came in the form of additional loans. They were much stricter than the previous conditions and were largely unsuccessful as they were extremely impractical and left developing countries in a much worse economic, political, and social situation than before. Therefore, the insistence of structural changes by The World Bank and IMF to increase the capacity for developing countries to service their debt and increase productive capacity for trade largely
failed. However, the forced institutional changes were not cited as the cause for these failures. In the 1989 WDR, it was instead the weak organizational capacity and human capacity that stemmed from poor resource allocation and the inability to slow population growth that was blamed for stagnated economic growth in developing countries:

This (population growth) strains the capacity of the economy to maintain the standard of living and reduces the ability of the government to provide social services, including education and health. Yet some societies remain unconvinced of the need to reduce population growth...also, their diminished capacity to improve the allocation of resources has contributed to slow growth and has undermined some countries' attempts at structural adjustment. (70-72).

Much of the performance by development literature around capacity in the eighties was centered on fulfilling debts and increasing trade and production while the needs or contributions of the developing countries to increase capacity were largely overlooked. Just as in prior decades there was a large absence of local knowledge, community practices, or acknowledgment of the ongoing impacts of colonialism.

The social science literature in the eighties featured a breakthrough in state-centered research and the abilities, roles, and duties of the state. The seminal work at this time called for an inductive approach to the study of the state in order to fully understand its role and power. *Bringing the State Back In* by Evans, Rueschemayer, and Skocpol was grounded in the premise that the state was an autonomous actor that acted in line with its own interests, therefore it no longer, according to Evans and Stephens "can be reduced to a reflection of class forces" (1988:722). The power derived from this autonomy "is thought to derive principally from its capacity" and is comprised of two forms, despotic and infrastructural (Addison 2009: 2; Mann 1984). These two types of power served different functions for the state. According to Mann, despotic power refers to the abilities the state has to engage in activities that impact society without involving the society and working around them. while infrastructural power is "the
capacity of the state to penetrate and centrally coordinate the activities of civil society through its own infrastructure" (Mann 1984: 191; Migdal 1988:22-23). Thus, despotic power is the power of the state to circumvent society and work above it, while infrastructural power requires the state to work with society to build and maintain a cooperative relationship. Migdal expanded upon the notion of institutional power through avoiding the reference to power specifically. He instead referred to it as ‘social control' whereby the state "has the capability to achieve the kinds of changes in society that their leaders have sought through state planning, policies, and actions. Capabilities include the capacities to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate the use of resources in determined ways" (Migdal 1988:4).

In sum, in the eighties, the concept of capacity was used in multiple ways. In the development literature, capacity was a project that was being implemented in developing countries and the conversation focused again on developing countries and their inadequacies to manage the changing political, social, and economic climate of the increasingly globalized world. Capacity was a prescription to fix the problems that otherwise burdened the developing countries without any consideration towards why the problems existed initially. In social science literature, the language of capacity was concerned with the various types of state power and the autonomous role of the state. In this decade and the ones preceding it, developing countries had limited power when compared to developed countries. This is a trend that continues, though agency in developing countries is becoming more impactful. Developed countries had the capacity to impose despotic power over developing countries by way of international institutions, loans, and debt, but largely utilized infrastructural power among each other since the states are more likely to work with society. The developed countries follow the autonomous model of the
state described in social science literature, but only by stripping away the autonomy of developing countries.

The Nineties

The nineties were a pivotal point in development. Several key moments occurred in the decade that affected development literature, development processes, developing countries, and the social science literature. First, the creation and implementation of the key concept of ‘capacity building’ was introduced into development literature. The idea behind this concept was meant to signify an important shift in development practices, one where development became "participatory." This reconfiguration was presumably a response to the constant failures of forced "development" through SAPs and expanded awareness of the development processes through globalization. Second, this signified an increase in joint development programs across international organizations and developed and developing countries. Third, institutional development and measures were introduced along with capacity building as a way to integrate developing countries and determine the success of capacity building programs. Therefore, the term of capacity building marked an important shift in the concept's history and paved the way for a development style that is still being used today.

The term capacity building first appeared in the World Bank’s archive on June 5th, 1990 and has continued to be frequently used throughout the rest of the archive (257). This marked the day that the African Capacity Building Initiative, a joint program of the World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the African Development Bank convened to design an initiative that would "improve local skills and institutions for policy analysis and economic management in Sub-Saharan Africa" (World Bank Archives 257). Capacity building initiatives came with a set of measurements to determine the success of these new "participatory" programs.
This focus on measurements created a space to determine the success of different types of capacity, such as productive capacity, that was previously focused upon by international organizations but was now specifically included into the framework of capacity building. Though never defined in this time period by the World Bank or IMF, there was also an increased focus on institutional progress and development. As mentioned in the 1996 WDR, "the Claessen's background paper compares the progress in institutional capacity building in transition economies and the relationship between bank quality and the structural characteristics of these economies by comparing the quality of banks in twenty-five transition economies and five comparator countries" (153). This type of project was a representative example of this new style of development that was imposed on developing countries, integrating elements of measurement, institutional focus, and joint efforts.

The nineties also saw a link between capacity building initiatives and sustainable development initiatives. Though sustainable development was first used in the development literature in the late eighties, it was not until the nineties that the concept and associated ideas were featured in development projects and initiatives such as the restructuring of the World Bank in 1992, which produced a vice presidency of 'Environmentally Sustainable Development' (ESD) (World Bank Archives 244, 277). In 1992, the President of the World Bank Lewis Preston declared that "poverty is at the root of the world's environmental and development problems" while pledging to focus on sustainable development. The first WDR that mentioned sustainable development was 1991. However, the manner in which it was mentioned was not a focus on the idea of developing sustainably, but rather using it as an excuse for intervention while maintaining the burden of failure on developing countries:

Government intervention to protect the environment is necessary for sustainable development. In many countries, it would help to privatize many of the state-owned
enterprises. Governments need to let domestic and international competition flourish. At the same time, governments need to do more in those areas where markets alone cannot be relied upon. Above all, this means investing in education, health, nutrition, family planning, and poverty alleviation; building social, physical, administrative, regulatory, and legal infrastructure of better quality; mobilizing the resources to finance public expenditures; and providing a stable macroeconomic foundation, without which little can be achieved (9).

As the decade progressed, the WDRs continued to mention sustainable development with increased detail and definition, but also continuously linked it to the need to reform institutional capacity. As time progressed, the development reports increasingly acknowledged that the brunt of environmental degradation is on developing countries. However, they go on to encourage stronger institutional capacity to enforce “good policies” because the “poor generally have the most to gain from effective environmental policies,” though they “lack the means to defend themselves,” which is the role for the joint development initiatives (WDR 1992: 84; WDR 1994; WDR 1997). Thus, by linking the importance of sustainable development to the inability to enforce these policies due to weak institutions in developing countries, the conclusion was to increase in the number of joint task forces as they could “better” build the necessary capacity to enforce these policies.

Building upon work from the past, the social science literature in the nineties still maintained a state focused research initiative but integrated new analyses. Across the decade a prominent trend was to combine various elements of capacity instead of focusing on one concentration, like the development literature. For example, Geddes focuses on administrative and bureaucratic capacity and the politics that surround this part of state development while referencing the importance of institutional features in this process (Addison 2009; 1994). Peter Evans also incorporated the importance and necessity of proper levels of bureaucratic efficiency combined with intra-state agency and coordination, thereby encouraging development as the “key to economic transformative capacity” (Cingolani 2013:5 ;1995). There was also a
significant focus on the need to consider historical structures and features that were specific to the time period in which capacity development was occurring (Evans 1995; Weiss 1998; Weiss and Hobson 1995). By combing historical factors with the various tools that were available in any particular society and bureaucratic efficiency, a state is able to increase capacity building initiatives. In other words, some scholars in social science literature viewed that in order to develop capacity, local knowledge and tools had to be combined with historical considerations. As Addison states, in “state-centered analyses of political and economic development, state capacity, and more specifically bureaucratic capacity, is seen as both a source of the autonomy of the state as well as a determinant of development” (2009: 2).

Even though the historical shift in development processes in the nineties came from the initiatives driven by international institutions, it seemed to be the social science literature that recognized the importance of historical considerations, efficient local bureaucracy, and local societal resources. Though the development literature did focus on the necessity of integrating developing countries into the conversation and initiated joint programs of capacity building, it appeared it was rooted in the ulterior motives of the benefits developed countries received by increasing institutional capacity in developing countries. The encouragement to adopt ‘green’ development plans and the insistence of building local infrastructure and institutions, and the caution that the failure to do so would ultimately result in economic problems seems to blame developing countries for their predicament. Therefore, these development initiatives removed developing countries from the context of their colonial history. This was a problem that scholars warned about, but it has been ignored in most development initiatives. While scholars were studying the state and determining the necessary components to enhance development and economic capacity of developing countries by integrating local knowledge and accounting for
the ongoing effects of colonialism, international institutions were using capacity building as a tool that ultimately served the interests of donor countries.

The Millennium

Thus far, the turn of the millennium has seen rapid changes in development strategies. International agencies, and developed and developing countries alike, have been confronted with a multitude of pressing issues. The development arena has been dominated by the creation of sustainable development goals, millennium development goals, and climate agreements, in which most aid is supposed to be centered on achieving these goals. Capacity building, along with the creation of the phrase capacity development, has dominated these development enterprises. Since 2000, there has been a rapid increase by international aid organizations of phrases such as capacity building and development, failures and successes, old and new measures, reconfigurations, lessons learned, capacity development evaluation, capacity building initiatives, supporting capacity development, building development governance capacity, strengthening institutional capacity, creating partnerships for capacity building, results-focused capacity development strategy, and capacity development for adaptation. A more recent trend has been linking capacity to governance, as evident in WDRs, the IMF, and the UN, which will be discussed in further detail below.

There has also been a meaningful shift in its use in international organizations. The World Bank has used capacity building and capacity much less in their development reports but have produced countless number of reports on capacity initiatives and analyzing the measurements, failures, and successes of said initiatives. There has also been a prominent shift in the IMF’s use of capacity; in previous decades it was not a popular concept there, and now it plays a central role as the main organizing principle from which policies, decisions, and program
organization is made (IMF). The UN has also been very active in working within capacity building frameworks while also closely linking both the sustainable\textsuperscript{11} and millennium development\textsuperscript{12} goals to capacity building and development. Of all international organizations, the UN has been the most active in incorporating local knowledge and stakeholders into the development process (UNDP 2007). They have taken additional measures to note that their framework of capacity building is distinct from other forms. As stated, “the UNDP approach to supporting capacity development is driven by evidence of what works (and what doesn’t) and consists of a conceptual framework and a methodological approach,” and then goes further to provide eleven components of their approach with a chart that describes said approach (UNDP 2007). These components also mention the importance of “qualitative and quantitative measures”, which is an expanded methodological approach versus other international organizations at that time.

The social science literature has tended to become categorical in its approach to the state and its capacity. This means that the lines between categories within the state have become more defined. Heredia and Schneider make a distinction between building capacity and building the market, which is a distinct approach from the development literature where there is no separation between the two; capacity building for the World Bank and IMF is meant to enhance the market

\textsuperscript{11} The sustainable development goals are no poverty, zero hunger, improved health and well-being, high quality education, garner equality, clean water and sanitation, affordable and clean energy, decent work and economic growth, increase industry innovation and infrastructure, reduce inequality, build or implement sustainable cities and communities, increase responsible consumption and production, increase climate action, increase quality of life in the ocean and on land, increase peace, justice and strong institutions, and increase partnerships to implement these goals (United Nations. Each country part of the agreement made commitments to achieve their targets over the next 15 years from 2015 (United Nations).

\textsuperscript{12} Sustainable development goals consist of eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, universal primary education, gender equality and empowerment of women, reduction in child mortality, improvement of maternal health, combatting HIV/AIDS and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability, and increase global partnerships for development United Nations).
institutions. Adding to the discussion, Addison states, “market-oriented reforms reduce and redefine core state functions and are unconcerned with building capacity. Capacity-enhancing reforms aim to enhance the quality and breadth of public goods provision” (2009:3; Heredia and Schneider 2003). Others have focused on the role of administrative capacity and institutional enhancement in economic development, with some focusing on how the concepts are applicable to specific cases of success in developing countries and the role of neoliberalism (Carpenter 2001; Doner, Ritchie; and Slater 2005; Evans 2007, 2010, 2012, 2013; Hamm and King; Hamm, King and Stuckler 2012; Rauch and Evans 2000).

Most recently the study of state capacity in developing countries has focused directly on the role of empire in development, as featured in The Many Hands of the State (Morgan and Orloff 2017). Morgan and Orloff argue that early studies of states overlooked the impact of empire, and in doing so have produced a biased analysis of development. Ignoring these links oversimplifies states, state development, and the power exchanges that created inequality around the world. By "situating the study of the modern state in the international arena through a focus on empires," the influence of the international structures on states in the developing world is apparent and necessary (Morgan and Orloff 2017). The authors argue that the modern state was born through empire and determined by its historical role in colonialism. This vantage point explains the necessity of understanding and studying states and the legacy of empires in conjunction with specific state characteristics. By considering the role of the state in colonialism, as enforcer or recipient, along with its geospatial location and racial makeup, offers a clearer understanding of how and why the state would develop in that manner during the modernity project. This approach also brings attention to the struggles and experiences of states that experienced colonialism by highlighting their forced development through empires. This is a
new and crucial undertaking on the development of the developing state as the research directly reflects the lived experiences in these countries and considers the implications of history on current and future development.

GOVERNANCE AND CAPACITY: CLIMATE CHANGE IN BOLIVIA

Throughout the history of the concept in the development literature, capacity has been used as a prescription to solve development problems in developing countries. The language has always been about developing countries and ways to “fix” their problems and, until recently, never about what they needed from their perspective. For the most part, the social science literature has suffered a similar fate, though colonialism does get more direct attention in this work. However, the studies are largely rooted in theoretical understandings of state development with colonialism as an aside, like in sociology or political science. This language concerning developing countries that is directed at them informs them of the steps that need to be taken to solve their problems and in turn, has created a bifurcation in what capacity means to developing countries versus the developed countries and international agencies that fund "development."

The discourse has also created a distinct separation in internal and imposed capacity. While imposed capacity is the requirement of capacity that is imposed on them, usually without consideration of the legacies of colonialism, internal capacity represents the lived experience of actors inside the state.

Most recently, capacity has been used alongside governance as a marker of development. The phrases adaptive and mitigative capacity, which refers to the state's ability to respond to climate change by either having the capacity to preemptively adapt and/or mitigate changes in climate, are frequently used by international agencies. Adaptive capacity refers to the view that states should have in place policies, frameworks, offices, among other measures, that can
manage these issues effectively. Adaptive capacity also signals another element within the framework of imposed capacity associated with governance measures, and a type of failure on the developing state's part if these are not present. The inability to have these structures in place, to continue to implement unsustainable development practices, or increase carbon emissions in an unstable world, are seen as inadequacies on the part of the government; that they are in fact responsible for bad governance. In 2010, a background paper was written to supplement the WDR of 2010 titled *Climate Change Governance*. The findings are as follows:

From the late 1960s, modern institutions of environmental governance came into being across the developed world, spreading later to developing countries. But they remain weak compared to more established areas of governance competence. The emergence of climate change now requires a further phase of innovation and adjustment to governance practices...adopting an appropriate response to climate change will increasingly be considered as a standard component of what ‘good governance' at the national level entails. Governments that wish to be regarded as legitimate by their citizens, and by the international community, will have to display their credentials on this front. In other words, governance for climate change is increasingly non-optional. (4-5).

These findings are not only concerning given that climate change impacts are increasing as is the demand for aid, which could lead to failures in capacity building for climate change, they are also problematic because they represent the language that invokes internal and imposed capacity. However, what can be externally interpreted as governance failures can instead be seen as the result of internal constraints stemming from colonialism and neoliberalism.

In Bolivia, internal capacity is an understanding by civil society members that policies operate within the parameters of what is feasible for the administration to achieve. During interviews, most participants expressed dissatisfaction with government choices but also identified historical limitations on what was possible to achieve. Below are several quotes separated by consistent topics that were present in the interviews that identify the various types of internal capacity that actors operate within the Bolivian context.
Many participants mentioned the decisive switch to take aid from China instead of the United States. Here a participant from academia discusses the strategy of this decision.

"International development and investment have merged so significantly because for so long it was tied to a particular kind of foreign investment from the US or the IMF. And these kinds of investments came with significant strings attached and so what Evo has been able to do really smartly though I think it is primarily rhetorical but not necessarily practical, is to say yes we are soliciting these external investments sources but they are not conditional in the way that the IMF funds were. And they’re not imperialist colonialist in the ways you know you imagine the US to have been." (Participant in academia).

Here, the participant is describing the incentives of taking aid from China versus the US; which is a more recent trend in Africa and Latin America because it offers an alternative approach to development than what was forced upon them in the past. This quote speaks directly to the conditions attached to aid from international organizations and developed countries. The participant notes that Morales's intent here is to show that Bolivia has a choice in development now; it is a performance of agency on a stage that Bolivia had not often had access to in the past. It is also a path that represents, to some degree, the alternative-type of development that Morales sought to achieve in his administration since his original platform. It separates Bolivia from the Washington consensus-style of development and leaves space for more agentic responses from the country. However, loans from China often disregard environmental concerns, so developing countries have another type of choice, but one that could still be a categorized as a "choiceless" choice (Aretxaga 1997).

Most participants noted various challenges that stand in the way of accomplishing goals that the administration sets. Here two participants mention structural issues that prohibit some of the desired change.

"There is a desire to get stuff done in, even a radical way, but, but it's just a matter of like coming up against real-life obstacles." (Participant from an international NGO)
"My overall sense of it is just the macroeconomic constraints on like the the the ability to reserve enough capital, including natural capital to be able to move forward economically with economic growth without it stagnating the economy." (Participant from an international NGO)

These quotes directly reference external structural issues that the participants perceive as hindering progress in Bolivia. The first addresses choices made by Morales and his administration in accomplishing part of the goals he initially proposed. For example, the massive loans taken from China or the administration paying for the entire Teleférico themselves at an estimated cost of $234 million, instead of receiving international assistance. The Teleférico was a proposed project by the government that would reduce pollution and make access around the city much more manageable for current commuters as well as create new job opportunities with increased access. The second quote was a reason a participant gave for why the discourse around environmentalism has changed by the government, and why the government has continued to pursue extractivist policies, later referencing a limitation of opportunities to increase economic growth in the country. It is the constraints, the participant notes, of developing within these structures that limit the opportunities or alternative approaches to traditional development.

All participants noted the importance of training, knowledge, and education to not only implement effective policies but also to advance the Bolivian society as a whole. The participants here talk about the need for an increased knowledge on the state level to achieve a better-functioning government, but there seems to be structures that are prohibiting these from occurring.

“All of the policies about Forestry you will find that, if you interview a lot of people, but there are contradictory policies in the development plan. So, we're going to improve the agricultural sector and we are going to have more hectares of cultivation while it says we are also going to conserve the forest. (She laughs) it is contradictory. This is because there are different Ministries and different heads involved. But basically, that is the reality, we lack in education, when it comes to policies and such.” (Participant from a national NGO)
“At different levels in Bolivia its really necessarily to work and that. And I will give you a very short and brief example. When an infrastructure project is planned and they environmental impact analysis is made by the government or by some company that is hired by the government, we use to consider in the least of the environmental impacts in general all the impacts that will happen in the short-term and all the impacts that are considered as the direct impact. We do not use to consider the long-term impact, and we do not use to consider the indirect impact and those kinds of impact use to be the higher or the most important impacts. Sometimes I used to talk with people from the ministries or decision makers or people that are implementing projects, and they don't really know, they don't really have yeah, a clear idea about all the impacts that a project can make in the long-term. So, I think that there's a lack of information and necessity of being able to build capacities in the sector…I think there's a lack of training and information.” (Participant from an international NGO)

“Now the ministry of environment and water has a policy to augment the irrigation systems. They have another policy that says water is a right. So, the people in the city of El Alto are claiming their rights. So they are extending their plumbing equipment but that does not necessarily mean that they will have more water. So, the pressure of the people and the pressure on the resource itself, and they don't have a strategic response for where the water is going to come from and how they're going to recycle it. So right now it’s another issue with the city of El Alto to see if the city has anything to do with a recharging of the aquifers. We have not researched it so we don't know and we are stretching pavement up there. That strategic vision is non-existent. In Cochabamba for example the underground water reserves have been dried out because of water drilling, they drilled out and sucked it all out. Without having a proper geological study to know which went where.” (Participant from a national NGO)

These quotes concern the lack of knowledge that the Bolivian government officials and members of civil society have in executing planned projects. They all reference the difficulties in implementing newer policies in the development plan that are outside the realm of the traditional policies that support extractivism. They all grapple with the plans and policies being there but not enforced and are concerned with the lack of know-how in implementing these necessary changes in the development policy that would lead to a more “green” development approach. In the interviews, they all spoke about an educational capacity that is internally necessary to development and advancement, but one that is largely limited due to external structural forces.
Climate change was one of the main topics guiding my project and therefore all participants spoke about it. These quotes reflect responses by various levels of society to climate change and what is necessary to mitigate some of the impacts associated with climate change.

“In the Altiplano, indigenous people had a lot of knowledge about what they must do, but they expect we will tell them as investigators, that we're going to say, or the studies are going to stay there are not going to be any more rains or no more droughts, but, but instead the objective is that we have to work together, they have to have policies which adapt, they know how to adapt but they have to be stronger and more secure of themselves and have economic means to adapt to the climate change.” (Participant in academia)

"Like our education when it comes to waste management, separating garbage and recyclables, so they have no idea what they are going to do once they separate them, so it winds up together again in the same bunch. those sorts of things happen." (Participant from a national NGO)

Q: “Do you think there are other options available to build capital in the country as an alternative to exploiting oil reserves?”

A: "Sure there are. But we don't even know how to negotiate it. What happened to the transformation of information regarding climate change that we were promised? So there was supposed to be a free technology transfer to developing countries to help the environment, in order to avoid degradation of the environment. So right now in the University, we should be learning alternative energies, solar, self-sustaining energy production methods, We should have highly Advanced electric generators because the ones we have are so slow that we use fuel. But we can't have sustainable development, we don't have the means to make a qualitative jump. the Teleferico could have been financed with the money coming from environmental mitigation but we couldn't. We paid for it in cash.” (Participant from a national NGO)

These quotes address different aspects of reactions to climate change and the requirements that various levels of society need in order to respond to current and future challenges. The first addresses indigenous knowledge and how useful it is in climate variations. Indigenous peoples and local communities have a strong grounding in sustainability through traditional knowledge, but lack the economic resources necessary to face the impending environmental changes in their area" or whatever makes sense given your knowledge of the field. As noted, they need economic means to make these transitions as well as a reinforcement of the power of their traditional knowledge. This is to say that this knowledge is either becoming lost or is undervalued by others,
as it has been for centuries. The second quote references the lack of knowledge for recycling initiatives throughout the country. The push to recycle is spreading throughout the country but there is a lack of knowledge or policies to manage the initiatives. This was tied to the last quote, which is about the technology transfer promised by the PCA but that has yet to happen. Here, again, external forces are responsible for further disadvantaging developing countries and making those countries pay for the inadequacies of these international institutions. Structural constraints are still plaguing these countries and negatively affecting their advancement and ability to protect their state and peoples. Though the constraints in the past look different, there is still a tool of control and manipulation being used to reinforce colonialist structures.

All of these quotes indicate that there is more to the story of capacity than the development literature presents. Therefore, what does capacity mean to actors within Bolivia, and how does this affect their perception of development? While this is a large question, this is the type of question that should be asked before organizing capacity initiatives and programs for a specific area and before assigning a developing country to the fate of bad governance. Actors that produce the knowledge of internal capacity recognize these imposed constraints and how they have negatively affected and continue to affect progress and advancement in the country. They also mention some of the necessary components of this development: technical knowledge capacity, indigenous knowledge capacity, and the capacity of international institutions and developed countries to adhere to agreements and promises made to the developing countries, just to name a few. These types of capacity are quite different than the types of capacity produced by international organizations. In other words, while actors inside the Bolivian development scene acknowledge that capacity is necessary for development, it is extremely different than the development prescription offered by international organizations.
SATURATION AND FAILURES OF CAPACITY

Throughout this chapter, I have argued that the discourse of capacity used by hegemonic institutions and states has dominated development practice, resulting in development issues for developing countries. The narrative of capacity as a tool to enhance development has been predicated by the desires of developed countries and international institutions. That the measurements created by these dominant actors have actually been used to reinforce control over developing countries, have rarely taken into account the needs or types of capacity that they determine they need given their specific challenges. Capacity has been used for nearly seventy years in the development literature and nearly forty years in social science literature, yet there is little clarification of what the term means and for what exactly it is used. There is nearly a new phrase or terminology every decade that in theory is supposed to clarify the meaning, the way it is measured, its purpose, and how to achieve its results, yet the continuous reinvention of the terminology makes it more convoluted than the last. The use of capacity, state capacity, capacity building, capacity development, adaptive capacity become intertwined and overlap constantly, making the clarity of the concept or its implications increasingly difficult to understand.

In the past ten years, there have been countless reports published by international agencies, nongovernmental organizations, civil society organizations, news agencies, and literature reviews by scholars to clarify capacity building in the development arena, what it is used for, suggested framework, and how to measure it. In a recent series of decoding language that is used in development, The Guardian found one of the most confusing terms is capacity building (Guy 2016). It is unclear how the process is completed since the focus of building capacity is on various levels: the individual, institutions, organizations, and societies, making its execution very confusing. "The fact that this is still such a prevalent prescription gives an idea of how hard it has
been to make progress” (Glennie 2011). Even though there is a large amount of confusion surrounding the term it is very clear that a large amount of aid funding is being spent on capacity building and capacity development. "The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development calculated that capacity building accounts for twenty-five% of aid expenditure, representing about US $15 billion (£12 billion) a year” (Guy 2016).

It is clear that there is lack of clarity and purpose that surrounds this idea of capacity, capacity building, and capacity development, but what is really at stake here? To whom does it matter if the definition of the concept is murky? Unfortunately, it is not just an unclear definition that development agencies work with or that populates headlines. It has a substantial effect on the social, political, and economic situations of developing countries. Since there is no agreed definition of the concept or the reasons for its success or failure, it is hard to determine when or if the process is incomplete. So throughout this, governments, civil societies, and peoples of developing countries are expected to persevere through a trial and error situation that does not seem to have an end. What is increasingly worrisome is that capacity building will continue to have a place at the front of aid work and is projected to become even more pertinent as “demand for aid increases faster than supply due to the natural disasters and conflicts and the fiscal policies of western governments (Guy 2016).

The point here is not to say that capacity is unnecessary. It does not seem that it can be argued that an increase in the capabilities of the individual, institutional, or organizational level is not necessary for developing countries or developed ones. This increases knowledge, efficiency, accountability, success, and eventually well-being of those that populate the state. However, that is not enough. What appears to be "success" in one country could not be true in another. Therefore, these prescriptions, measures, and initiatives that surround capacity are
nothing more than words on a screen if they are not adapted to the location in which the issue is occurring, but this is a longstanding failure on the part of development agencies. A recent study at Devex suggests three ways to improve capacity initiatives. First, it involves taking alternative approaches to capacity building like integrating various viewpoints of the actors in the specific country that applies to that situation, not just the government or external funding agencies. To go beyond the limited scope of government actors, it is crucial to get a clear sense of who the locally influential providers are. It would also be helpful to reallocate some of the funds directed towards training within capacity building. It seems clear that the abundance of training is not very efficient given the large extent to which capacity building initiatives have failed, and one can only learn so much from training exercises before doing on the groundwork. In other words, "what is the point in following instructions when the right incentives aren't in place?" (Devex 2015). Lastly, one obvious component of various capacity building projects is the focus on measurements to determine if the success of the project. A heavy reliance on quantitative data leaves essential elements of particular systems that are more qualitative overlooked, like the delivery of a service rather than if the offered service was created and implemented.

Otherwise, the prescription of capacity will "inevitably turn to making low-income states more dependent on their resources to deal with emergencies and poverty reduction, with external support directed primarily towards building resilience and institutional capacity" (Guy 2016). Thus, creating another situation of a "choiceless choice" (Aretxaga 1997) for growth whereby developing countries are forced to make difficult decisions to develop and bring their peoples out of poverty like extractive development, which worsens the dangerous situation of climate change that is already a burden on so many. There is a trend to combine local knowledge, communities,
and governments into capacity projects, but the "success" of this approach by development agencies has yet to be determined.
CHAPTER 3
THE IMPOSITION OF COLONIALIST STRUCTURES ON CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION

The ongoing impacts of colonialism and neoliberalism have hindered the ability of developing countries to create and enforce effective policies that adequately address climate change. Climate change and the complications that accompany it have become a focal point for societies throughout the world. A lack of not only effective climate legislation but also the tools that are necessary to enforce it is becoming an increasingly salient issue. The creation and enforcement of responsible environmental policies that are accompanied by effective legal frameworks is essential in preventing the effects of climate change, however, this is only a solution if governments are capable of doing so. Therefore, it is critical to determine if governments can create and implement such frameworks and policies since this ability is a crucial precursor to combating the impacts of climate change. In this chapter I argue that structural conditions predicated by colonialism and neoliberalism continuously create challenges in developing countries to sustainably develop and stabilize the political, economic and social environments. Further, I argue that these challenges become exacerbated when leaders are faced with serious issues such as climate change and are forced to make compromising development situations that can harm the peoples, the economic stability of the state, or the environment. In order to show this, I reconnect the problem of the discourse of capacity to its colonial history by breaking with its dominate usage and analyzing how capacity is used in the Bolivian landscape in the space of development. In this chapter I use dependency theory and indigenous transmodernity because
they connect historical factors of colonialism and neoliberalism into account which can further be adjusted to the specific case of Bolivia. These theories are also important in this case because they avoid the bifurcation that positivistic sociology promotes by reconnecting the historical to the present.

Since the 2006 election of Evo Morales in Bolivia, the concern for climate change and how to effectively manage it has become an increasingly important topic as its impacts have become more prevalent. This concern is ironic given how adamant Evo Morales was about protecting *Pachamama*, or Mother Earth, at all costs. Towards the end of 2011, almost six years into his presidency, he began to receive substantial criticism regarding the dissonance between his actions and discourse surrounding the administration’s national and international environmental approach. Once hailed as the “World Hero of Mother Earth” by the UN General Assembly and as “a beacon of environmental activism” (Munoz 2015; Munckton 2009), the Morales administration has been responsible for a significant shift in the creation, implementation, and enforcement of environmental policy. Recently, some of the compromising decisions of the administration have led it to being branded with “corrupted idealism,” which has been a response to the environmental sacrifices made to expand hydrocarbon explorations, mostly in protected areas (Munoz 2009). The failure of environmental conservation on the part of the Morales administration has received considerable attention both on a national and international level, especially given the repeated emphasis towards protection of the environment and Mother Earth during his campaigns. However, the question or analysis of the actual

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13 The word “campaigns” is purposively plural in this context. Evo Morales has included environmental stewardship and reiterated the importance of giving respect to Pachamama in his election and all three of his re-election campaigns.
capability of his administration to achieve these environmental endeavors has garnered much less focus.

Though the Morales administration has not been able to implement the Mother Earth law proposed in the 2009 constitution, they have made some impressive economic strides that have drastically improved the lives of its citizens. Until the impact of the economic policies of the Morales administration took effect, Bolivia suffered from the highest levels of poverty and extreme poverty in South America (World Bank 2017). Extreme poverty can be defined as “a condition characterized by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information” that live on “less than $1.90 per day” and poverty can be defined as those that live on “less than $3.10 a day” (United Nations 1989; World Bank 2008). Since Morales took office in 2006, extreme poverty has decreased from 38.2 percent to 16.8 percent in 2016 and the poverty rate has decreased from 59.6 percent to 38.6 percent in 2015, with a plan to reduce extreme poverty to 9.5 percent by 2020 (Johnston and Lefebvre 2014; O’Donnell 2016). The Morales administration has also increased the minimum wage, increased public investment, decreased economic inequality, and increased social spending. The economy of Bolivia has grown faster over the last eleven years under Morales than in any other period over the past three and a half decades (Johnston and Lefebvre 2014).

While Bolivia has increased its education rates, social spending, economic stability, quality of life, and productivity, much of this has been at the expense of biodiversity loss and indigenous peoples’ autonomy due to the impacts of extractive based policies. These policies are contrary to Morales’ original platform. As Postero states, “the new constitution subsumes indigenous local autonomy rights under a liberal government in which the central state retains
decision-making power over most significant matters, especially as regards the extraction of natural resources” (2017:4-5). In addition to biodiversity loss and the violation of indigenous peoples’ rights, another downfall of extractive based policies is the increasing impact of climate change on the country.

Much of the current critique surrounding the Morales administration tends to focus more on the real or perceived failures of his administration to achieve the goals ascribed by his political platform during his initial election and subsequent campaigns. Specifically, these plans included the protection of Pachamama, sustainable development, and preservation of pristine forests, among other assurances, none of which had previously been priorities of the state. In addition to this historical precedence, he promised to accomplish these environmental initiatives outside the framework of neoliberalism and liberal economic policies. As Nancy Postero notes, the Bolivian experiment inspired people across the world because it promised an alternative to both neoliberal economic policies and Western colonial legacies, especially racism. Because it drew from the repertoire of indigenous values and practices, it challenged the fundamental tenets of liberalism, offering a chance to overturn them or at least modify them for the twenty-first century. Yet my research shows that this did not happen (2017: 3-4).

The administration’s response to critiques like those of Postero can be described as a twofold response. First, they have shifted their priorities and goals, to some degree. Though still maintaining a “societal advancement approach”, this priority shift deviates from previous discourse both domestically and internationally. The shift is evident in the most recent discussion and subsequent approval of the TIPNIS road project, which will relocate three indigenous tribes while simultaneously destroying pristine biodiversity and Amazonian forests (Achtenburg 2017). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, has been the shift in how they achieve their ascribed goals, a point stressed in Postero’s The Indigenous State: Race, Politics, and Performance in Plurinational Bolivia. In this discussion, Postero presents a quote from Vice President Alvaro
Garcia Linera, in which he attempts to explain and justify the extractive based policies of the administration, referencing what he denotes as “Andean-Amazonian capitalism”:

It is a question of building a strong state, which can coordinate in a balanced way the three “economic-productive” platforms that coexist in Bolivia: the community based, the family-based and the modern industrial. It is a question of transferring a part of the surplus of the nationalised hydrocarbons [oil and gas] in order to encourage the setting up of forms of self-organization, of self-management and of commercial development that is really Andean and Amazonian. Up to now, these traditional sectors have not been able to develop because of a “modern-industrial” sector that has cornered the surpluses. Our idea is that these traditional sectors should have an economic support, should have access to raw materials and markets, which could then generate prosperity within these artisan and family-based processes. Bolivia will still be capitalist in 50 or 100 years (Postero 2017:94).

Failure to keep promises made on a campaign trail is not a new trend in politics, but the impact of this failure not only depends on the specific objectives that were not met, but also on the context in which they were unsuccessful. In other words, a consideration of the failed environmental goals within the Bolivian context shifts the concern from whether Morales failed to the challenges he faced, from the consequence of his failure to the consequence of the structural barriers to be overcome. Therefore, the tension that exists in the difference between Morales’ national and international discourse on climate change and environmental protection links back not to if he failed, but rather why did he fail in enforcing these promises.

The answers to these questions, then, highlight the need to evaluate state capacity in Bolivia to determine if Morales and his administration had the capability to implement their proposed policies. An investigation into state capacity in the Bolivian context can provide a clearer depiction of the choices available to the Morales administration, which ultimately lead to questioning the effect this has on development. Therefore, in this context, capacity is important for several reasons. Capacity is an element of development that concerns Bolivian citizens who occupy space in civil society, academia, media, and government. Lack of capacity inhibits
development, leaving a state ill-prepared to manage crises. Linking climate change and capacity in this analysis speaks not only to prevalent and popular concerns amongst Bolivian citizens but also to the possible future ability of the state to manage changes and events related to climate change, including the possible issues associated with climate change as a new form of colonialism.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the historical structural constraints of colonialism and neoliberalism on the Morales government’s ability to adapt and mitigate the effects of climate change. This chapter, then, does not directly address the previously identified successes or failures of the Morales administration, or their impacts as these have been thoroughly addressed in other efforts. Nancy Postero’s seminal work, *The Indigenous State: Race, Politics, and Performance in Plurinational Bolivia* (2017) and Linda Farthing and Benjamin Kohl’s *Evo’s Bolivia: Continuity and Change* (2014) offer valuable insight into the actions, or lack thereof, of the Morales administration related to climate change. This chapter instead investigates the combined effects of external structures and internal factors on the successes and failures of environmental policies under Evo Morales. Specifically considered is how the long-term impacts of colonization have affected Bolivia’s capacity to deal with issues associated with climate change. More specifically, does Bolivia have the capacity to mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change without increasing its dependency on extractive resources?\(^{14}\)

Shifting the focus of the Bolivian case towards the influential power of colonialism and neoliberalism, hereafter referred to as historical structures, and the mechanisms which will be

\(^{14}\) This is a topic that is meant for further exploration in future research. It is not the intent of this chapter to produce solutions to this problem.
discussed below, allows for a closer investigation into how these characteristics have combined to affect state capacity of Bolivia, particularly the ability of the state to confront the challenges caused by climate change. To better understand specific choices made by the Morales administration, this chapter combines a critical lens with a multilevel analysis in order to provide a deeper explanation of the intersection of human agency and structural constraints within the Bolivian context. By using Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto’s version of dependency “theory”\(^{15}\) and the indigenous view of transmodernity based on Cosmovision\(^{16}\), I explain how macroscopic, the historical-international level, and mesoscopic, the state level, effects produce microscopic, the community level, outcomes, and the consequences of these outcomes. More specifically, I investigate how historical structural impositions\(^{17}\) have interacted with the Bolivian state to produce constraints on the state's capacity to respond to the problems produced by climate change. By considering the historical structural impositions on the international level (macroscopic) that have historically been placed on Bolivia, the current analysis demonstrates how these structures have exacerbated the effects of the mechanisms specific to the case that have been detrimental to state capacity (mesoscopic). This underdeveloped state capacity has contributed to limitations in the Bolivian government's ability to adapt and mitigate climate change impacts, thereby producing local effects on the Bolivian people (microscopic).

\(^{15}\) The use of quotation marks around theory denotes the opposition of the authors to refer to their version as a theoretical framework. As Cardoso notes, the emphasis of the book was not on dependency, even though it was "read through this prism because of the popularity of the theory at the time, despite our explicit opposition to their simplified version of the theory of imperialism" (2009:298). The use they argued for, and its current use is seen as a framework of analytical strategies to analyze the impacts of historical insertion into the world market, and the possible routes of development given this insertion. This paper will proceed to reference it as a "theory" but should be read as understood above. See brief definition in ‘key concepts’ section.

\(^{16}\) Hereafter referred to as indigenous transmodernity. See brief definition in ‘key concepts’ section.

\(^{17}\) Read structural impositions as the combing forces of colonialism, neoliberalism, and globalization. While this is not meant to conflate these terms or their impacts, it is meant to move the analysis forward to points of contention. Since there has been an exhaustive amount of work analyzing the detrimental impacts of these structural forces, there is little to contest here for this analysis.
The issues associated with climate change in developing countries cannot be analyzed without giving consideration to the historical structural factors that have exacerbated these problems. In other words, while climate change has the greatest impact on the most vulnerable populations, its effects are global. It is therefore undeniably a structural issue. This is particularly evident given the uneven historical exchange of developed and developing countries that has contributed to the production and reproduction of inequality in developing countries.

Climate change is not only a burden on development, but it has also aggravated state capacity issues. While problems with state capacity are intrinsically linked to a range of development issues such as law creation and implementation, efficiency, expertise, ability to respond to stressors, maintaining growth, investment opportunities (Cingolani 2013; Dincecco and Katz 2012; Dincecco and Prado 2012; Evans and Rauch 1999; Hamm and King 2010; Hamm, King and Stuckler 2012; Savoia and Sen 2012), climate change has created another burden on states. This burden weighs especially heavy on those states that have historically been "underdeveloped." The consequences of climate change require the performance of adaptive capacity to appropriately respond to and evolve in such a way that allows for the effective and timely response to emerging issues (Barton 2006; Meadowcroft 2009; Parks and Roberts 2010; World Bank 2009). A structural analysis, then, is necessary to evaluate how historical global inequalities and mechanisms have intensified the issues of climate change, and thereby further hindered state capacity and the state’s ability to adapt and mitigate to climate change.

By using dependency theory in combination with indigenous transmodernity, this paper highlights how the specific macro (international structural impositions and climate change) and meso-effects (state capacity) result in exacerbated inequality and vulnerability in Bolivia. As Cardoso argues, "dependency showed(s) a particular type of articulation between social classes,
the productive system, and the state, in a particular historical situation" (Beigel 2010: 11; Cardoso 1970). Dependency theory not only allows for the "determination of specific problems but encourages methods to be adjusted to concrete situations of the case" (Beigel 2010: 11; Cardoso 1970; Cardoso and Castells 1972; Cardoso and Faletto 1975). The "concrete situations" these authors refer to are the mechanisms that are specific to a particular country which "account for development blockages" (Heller, Patrick, Rueschemeyer, Dietrech, and Snyder, Richard 2009:288). While some critics of dependency theory have conducted analyses of some of the mechanisms that Cardoso and Faletto mention as ineffective in determining path development of states, it is the combination of historical structures and mechanisms that are specific to states that effectively alter and determine their development path. This is because dependency theory situates the development of the state within the confines of the capitalist system while simultaneously taking into account mechanisms that range from entrance into the world economy to social movements. As Beigel notes, "international links limit the possibilities of action within the nation-state, but, at the same time groups, classes, and social movements could perpetuate, break, or transform those constraints…which involves the analysis of historical structures, attention to political power (both internally and externally), and class struggle" (2010: 11-13; Cardoso and Faletto [1969] 1975: 162-163). Therefore, dependency theory offers the flexibility to explore the impacts that historical structures have had on current issues facing the state, and how the state has responded within the context of the capitalist system.

While some critiques of dependency theory question its current relevancy, its lack of microfocus, or its lack of legitimate mechanisms that point to cultural issues and "politics of representation" (Caporaso 1980; Kapoor 2002; Misoczky 2011; Sanchez 2014; Schwartz 2007), it is precisely the flexibility of dependency theory that allows it to be adjusted for the specific
case. It also permits the necessary space to be used in conjunction with the theoretical representation of indigenous movements in the region and modernity (indigenous transmodernity), for a more community-level analysis of outcomes from these international and state level effects. For the Bolivian case, it is crucial to capture the indigenous interests in the analysis. Indigenous transmodernity is a community level response on behalf of the community to multilevel issues. Meaning, since indigenous transmodernity encapsulates the imperative components of both modernity and indigenous beliefs and practices, it constitutes the reaction of some indigenous peoples to modern circumstances that were created during colonialism and are still prevalent today (Davalos 2002; Dussel 2002; Gudynas 2009; Misoczky 2011). In other words, it can be viewed as a response to structural forces on the international and state level. This relates specifically to Bolivia given that Evo Morales’ election was propelled from a social movement and that a large majority of the population is comprised of indigenous people, both of which will be elaborated on further below.

In order to accurately investigate the influence that historical structures have had on mechanisms which, in turn, has substantially influenced the capacity of the Morales administration, and the Bolivian government as a whole, to not only assuage the impacts of climate change but to also have the capability to acclimate to the changing political, economic, and social landscape, this chapter takes the following approach: first, a brief background on mechanisms is presented to offer an understanding of how the impacts have hindered development and state capacity in Bolivia. Next, the chapter shifts, with the support of

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18 I realize that the phrasing ‘indigenous beliefs and practices’ can be construed as deflating to the various indigenous peoples. This is, however, not the intention. ‘Indigenous cultures’ here refers to Cosmovision or shared views or understandings of the various indigenous tribes in South America of the world. Among these are the importance of Buen Vivir, the importance of Pachamama and her protection, and the importance of environmental balance, among other shared beliefs.
interviews, to a multilevel analysis. This section investigates how historical structures in combination with mechanisms have affected the capacity of the state to successfully mitigate and adapt to climate change, how this has affected decisions made by the administration, and the consequences of these decisions and subsequent effects. The chapter then explores what state capacity issues in combination with climate change looks like in the Bolivian landscape. Here, some of the current measurements of adaptation and mitigation strategies are presented and analyzed to determine if the mitigative and adaptive capacity measurements of the Bolivian state have been influenced by historical structures. The final part of the analysis looks at the community level outcomes and how climate change affects local communities by examining the vulnerability of Bolivia and its people and their response to these issues.

MECHANISMS

This section provides a brief introduction of the mechanisms that are specific to Bolivia and have been identified across disciplines as factors that can affect a country’s development progress. It is important to understand these mechanisms in the context of the historical structural implications as well in combination with one another. By adding elements that identify the role of agency in conjunction with history, the analysis provides a better understanding of Bolivia’s current state of development as well as how globalization affects the country, what limitations it might impose, and why the people respond in certain ways. The impacts of these combined factors lead to a low level of state capacity in Bolivia resulting in an inability to efficiently deal with climate change. The mechanisms of interest are the discrimination of a large percentage of the population, Bolivia’s lack of coastal access, insertion into the global market, state and political institutions and leadership choices, and moments when local sectors allied or clashed with foreign interests.
Historical and International Factors

The detrimental impacts that historical structures of colonialism and neoliberalism have had on country development have been well documented. Even though developing states vary in their level of development, they still suffer impacts from these structures, partially because these structures were so harmful to state stability and the population that the effects still remain entrenched in developing countries, but also because these structures still exist and are reinforced constantly by developed countries, a point that will be elaborated on further in the conclusion. Even after the mistreatment of countries and their populations for hundreds of years, industrialized countries were still searching for a way to reach their desired policy and capital goals. The international structures created to reinforce the policy goals of developed countries after World War II encouraged poorer countries to open their borders to free trade and "imitate and import the culture, technology, and business practices of the developed countries"; stating that in doing so would "create the conditions for an ‘economic takeoff’ and ‘late developers' would follow a similar path to the one experienced by the United States and Europe (Parks and Roberts 2010: 140). The World Bank and the IMF reinforced this economic philosophy in the eighties by attaching additional requirements in the form of structural adjustments to the loans they dispersed to the developing countries. These policies ultimately failed as it increased the debt and reliance on developing countries, and exacerbated the inequalities already present in the structure of the international system from previous effects of colonialism.

Another issue that intensified international disparities and directly related to climate change issues in developing countries is the historical forced reliance on natural resources for large percentages of their GDP. Since developed countries largely created the world economy through colonialism and imperialism, it has been structured in a way that keeps core countries
intact and successful in comparison to the developing countries. Developing countries have always been "resource-rich" but those resources have been exploited by unequal exchange with developed countries enforced by historical structural implications, therefore developed countries have actively underdeveloped other countries (Barton 2006; Parks and Roberts 2010; Valencia 2013). As Barton argues, there is a theoretical link between dependency and the "realm of natural resources and environmental issues", describing this dependency as "eco-dependency" (2006:2). Therefore, it has been the developed countries' voracity for natural resources that signified the insertion of the Latin American region into the global political economy, thereby forging the development of the region's economy to the production and exportation of natural resources to the developed countries. This has not only increased environmental issues in the region but also reinforces the dependence on natural capital in regional development (Barton 2006). This 'eco-dependency' has not only reinforced global inequalities but it has influenced policymaking at the state level as well, "whereby environmental and natural resource changes are understood in terms of decision making and socioeconomic criteria" (Burger, Harris, Harper, and Gochfeld 2010; Alimonda 2002; Barton 2006:4; Durham and Painter 1995). Further, this environment creates an unequal exchange on another level that makes capital advancement or growth difficult because there is an inherent deficiency when nations exchange goods as Parks and Roberts note:

The market prices of primary products are often undervalued, and in the course of extracting, moving, and processing products for export there is a massive transfer and degradation of materials and energy that goes unnoticed (Rice 2007; Jorgenson 2009). As a result, trade relations between rich and poor nations remain highly unbalanced because less develop countries export large quantities of underpriced products whose value does not include the environmental and social costs of their extraction, processing, and shipping. This process also effects global climate change because the participation in international trade increases emissions in poorer countries, but lowers them in wealthier countries (Heil and Selden 2001; Roberts and Parks 2007; Roberts and Parks 2010: 142-143).

This issue is exacerbated for Bolivia on multiple levels. First, a high percentage of their exports consist of natural resources, at 67 percent in 2016 (UNCTAD 2016), which is not sustainable.
Second, since capital from natural resources make up most of the GDP (UNCTAD 2016) and current reserve totals of gas and oil cannot be estimated with even near accuracy, it has put enormous pressure on the administration to continue the consistent healthy growth the country has experienced since Morales was elected (World Bank 2016; UNCTAD 2016). As a participant from a prominent NGO noted during the interview:

They are seeing a drop in the reserves. We did a study that is going to be released I think by September that according to British petroleum numbers the ratio between production and reserves is 13.7, so fourteen years more of natural gas. If the current reserves are steady, so no more exploration and no more gas is found and, but also if the production stays steady. So that is assuming that there won't be any investment or natural gas used for industrialization, and that is a very generous calculation of 14 years more of the gas. There are other calculations that say there are going to be 8 years, but is also uncertain how much gas Bolivia has. And that also increases the pressure of exploration. Everywhere in the country.

Since it has been difficult to measure the remaining amount of hydrocarbon in the country, which has the potential to significantly impact the growth and stability of the country if the remaining resources are not enough to maintain the economic growth experienced in the past eleven years. Destabilization of growth increases the vulnerability of the people in general, which in turn makes them exponentially more sensitive to the effects of climate change. Third, this reliance and uncertainty has fueled an increased level in hydrocarbon exploration, as mentioned by the NGO respondent above, which has led to issues on the state level and community levels, as it deviates from various laws such as the proposed treatment of Pachamama and the basic tenants of Buen Vivir. This contributes to political instability both domestically and internationally, as it undermines the faith of the population in the Morales government, decreases biodiversity, contributes to climate change, and most recently, with the approval of the TIPNIS road project and its subsequent impacts, endangers the ways of life of indigenous people. Fourth, Bolivia’s landlocked geography causes additional economic pressure
on costs to export and transport their goods (MacKellar, Wörgötter and Wörz 2000; UNCTAD 2014; World Bank 2008). It drastically limits the economic capabilities of the countries and what and how they are able to trade (GFPTT 2008; UN-OHRLLS 2017), which negatively impacts economic development, thereby putting more pressure on the government to perform.

As can be seen in the above discussion, while the larger structural conditions and global capitalism have affected all countries throughout the Global South, it is the mechanisms specific to Bolivia, combined with those overarching structural conditions, that have drastically affected development. While some countries in the region share some of the mechanisms mentioned, it is the combination of all them and the historical structural conditions together that have negatively impacted growth, stability, and social development. These issues have affected the development of state capacity in Bolivia, further hindering the tools that are available to the administration to solve problems of the state. While state capacity is a meso-level concern as it is a concern for the state and its ability to perform functions, it is undeniably linked to macro level systemic issues as well as mechanisms that when combined have created a poor environment for the development of Bolivia.

State-level Factors

In this section, the analysis turns to the state level issues with capacity that are also related to historical structural factors and mechanisms. First state capacity is discussed, second, the adaptive and mitigative capacity and the materialization of adaptive and mitigative strategies are analyzed, and the third section reflects low state capacity that is represented in the current development plan.

At its basic level, state capacity simply refers to the ability of the state to get things done. More specifically, state capacity refers to the ability to “implement official goals, especially over
the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances” (Skocpol, 1985:9). State capacity encompasses proficiency in bureaucratic and administrative structures, legal structures, development of infrastructure, fiscal proficiency, and military capability (Savoia and Sen 2012; Weber 1922; World Bank 2014). Weak state capacity affects the state’s ability to perform efficiently and to carry out promises of change. Bolivia is categorized as a “state to watch” in a study by the Brookings Institute (2012) and is considered one of the weakest states in the Western Hemisphere (Americas Barometer 2014), with only Haiti, Cuba, Paraguay, and Venezuela ranked below. Bolivia is also considered a “weak state” and displays, with Paraguay, characteristics, such as composition of the economy and high urbanization rates that both qualify and quantify them as having the highest level of climate change vulnerability in South America (Development Bank of Latin America 2014).

States need a certain level of capacity to be able to respond to the needs of their people and development of the country while also contending with external pressures. States with a low level of capacity are put at a greater risk when challenged with unexpected, costly, or extensive issues, as their ability to react, adapt, and mitigate are significantly lower than other states. As a challenge, not only does climate change require a certain level of capacity to respond to the risks associated with its implications, but it also requires the capacity of effective governance to prioritize, create, and enforce its policies, which has been destabilized by several mechanisms such as past leadership choices, insertion into the political economy, and political and economic structures. As Meadowcroft mentions, “the emergence of climate change now requires a further phase of innovation and adjustment by governance practices” (2009: 5). Bolivia’s low state capacity and high vulnerability have significantly hindered the state’s adaptive and mitigative capacity when responding to climate change.
Adaptive and mitigative capabilities of the international community, states, and peoples will become increasingly more important as the impacts of climate change increase. In the adaptation and mitigation literature there are two components that are required as necessities for a state to efficiently create strategies to offset climate change, that of efficient or effective state capacity and efficient governance (Carmin et al. 2015; Cardenas 2010; Erhardt-Martinez et al. 2015; Meadowcroft 2009; Parks and Roberts 2010). As synthesized by the IPCC, “effective implementation depends on policies and cooperation at all scales” yet developing countries are still faced with multiple difficulties that impede capacity and good governance (2014: vii). The necessity of these two factors in climate change management is widespread in the industry literature, yet there is “relatively little knowledge and information that clearly demonstrates the value, challenges, and needs of capacity development for climate change, especially in developing countries” (Huq 2017:44), therefore hindering the ability for actors to effectively create solutions to the issues that developing countries face.

According to the Development Bank of Latin America, "as changes in the climate become ever more apparent, the ability of a country to adjust to these changes or to take advantage of opportunities they present takes on increasing importance" (2014:56). The requirements for adaptive and mitigative strategies "require resources, including financial capital, societal capital (strong institutions, transparent decision-making systems, formal and informal networks that promote collective action), human resources (labor skills, knowledge, and expertise), and natural resources (land, water, raw materials, and biodiversity)" (Brooks and Adger 2006:168). On the Adaptive Capacity Index, Bolivia is at an "extreme risk" because its adaptive and mitigative capacity (AMC) prospects are so low, at which it scores a 2 out a 10 point scale on the measurement of adaptive capacity to climate change (LADB 2014).
indicators of low AMC include the effectiveness of governance and the economy, financial and technical resources, infrastructure adequacy, and natural resource availability (Brooks and Adger 2006; LADB 2014:58). Most of the aforementioned requirements for AMC are intrinsically linked to the state's ability to perform at a certain level, allowing it to accrue financial capital, societal capital, human resources, and natural resources that will help it to respond to the implications of climate change. However, in Bolivia, because the state has been affected by historical structural implications and mechanisms mentioned above, its development of capacity has been arrested.

Issues with financial capital are one of the reasons that Bolivia is rated so low on various capacity measurements against climate change. The generation of financial capital has been at an all-time high since the election of Morales in 2006, but much of this capital has gone to social spending. For example, extreme poverty has decreased from 38.2 percent to 16.8 percent in 2016 and the poverty rate has decreased from 59.6 percent to 38.6 percent in 2015, with a plan to reduce extreme poverty to 9.5 percent by 2020 (Johnston and Lefebvre 2014; O’Donnell 2016; The World Bank 2017). The Morales administration has also increased the minimum wage, increased public investment, decreased economic inequality, increased social spending. The economic growth of Bolivia has increased faster over the last eleven years under Morales than in any other period over the past three and a half decades (Johnston and Lefebvre 2014). Though the economy and well-being of the people have drastically improved under the administration, there are still two main issues. First, a large proportion of the financial capital has been generated from policies that support extractivism, and second, though quality of life and financial stability have improved, there still is not enough expendable income to grow sustainably or to employ AMC strategies to combat climate change since the state must have a certain level of capacity to
do so. Therefore, Bolivia still fluctuates as the poorest country in South America, only rotating with Paraguay.

AMC strategies also require capital and human resources, part of which Bolivia has in its formal and informal networks that promote collective action. Unfortunately, Bolivia is still plagued by weak institutions and the structure of decision-making systems are convoluted while also linked to corruption in some sectors. For example, in appendix A presents a social network analysis of policy networks in Bolivia taken from the World Development Report (WDR) from 2017 (60). The lack of clear communication between branches and the prevalence of informal networks is a known occurrence in the aid landscape. There are several important elements within this diagram that reveal factors that significantly shape the features of social policies and are reflective of social capital and human resources.

First, when comparing the formal policy network to the actual policy network, it is clear that the policymaking institutions are technically weak and complicated, but this is not a failure on the state alone, but rather a reflection of the influence of internal factors and external impositions. As stated in the WDR, “units are typically staffed not by specialists but by political supporters who are subject to frequent turnover and do not necessarily possess the adequate skills. For example, the average tenure of the interviewees in the Bolivian study was 14 months, and 22 percent of them had no prior experience in any social policy-making capacity” (2017: 60). Part of this is because Morales created spaces for women and indigenous peoples in the government that did not formally exist prior to his administration. Another part of this is due to the lack of skills, knowledge, and expertise that many participants referenced coupled with the short tenure of workers. Another is the weak structural institutions resulting from historical
structures and mechanisms. These last two are reflections of poor state capacity, as identified by participants.

Second, it does reflect the presence of various networks that exist in Bolivia, both formally and informally. The state does have a history of strong collective action among different sectors of the population, after all Morales and MAS’ roots are located in a social movement. Initially there was a collective consensus among indigenous people that wanted Morales and his party elected, but there is now a fissure between various indigenous groups that correlates to their current support of Morales’ policies as well as their particular interests. This dynamic reflects the third element of the diagram which is the role of agency in the formal and informal policy networks. Actors that are part of the policymaking process “do not have incentives to coordinate and cooperate with one another but rather they compete to have influence, often hindering the coherence and coordination of policy design as well as the quality of implementation” (WDR 2017: 61). The lack of organization, tools to implement policy effectively, and prevalence of weak institutions further exacerbate capacity issues of the state.

Lastly, AMC requires access and reserves of natural resources, in which Bolivia is rich. Regrettably, the stability of these resources is directly affected by development policies and climate change. Extractive development policies will be addressed further, but ultimately the development of capital in the Bolivian landscape has resulted in decreased natural resources, biodiversity loss, along with an increasing contribution to climate change. The resources that are currently available in Bolivia are being depleted by climate change and causing an unstable political, social, and economic situation for the state. When asked about environmental challenges and concerns, several participants noted that one of the current main concerns are issues connected to water scarcity and cleanliness. They linked problems with water not only to
climate change but also to state capacity. As a participant from a national NGO notes, "the final disposition of this resource [water] is the theme of underground sources and recharging aquifers, these are challenges for us that we know little about, and we need to start taking care of it" (2016). Another participant notes that they have studies that measure the amount of water source that comes from glaciers that range between 10 and 30 percent. When asked why there was such a large discrepancy, she notes that "they cannot actually measure how or when or where about the glacier water comes from as actions such as these are difficult" (2016). The need for natural resource stability is, therefore, becoming an eminent pressure on the state to which the administration will have to adapt and mitigate to ensure the well-being of the Bolivian peoples, which is growing increasingly difficult from the combination of climate change and low state capacity.

The aforementioned adaptation and mitigation strategies of financial and social capital and human and natural resources within the Bolivian context have all been impacted by low state capacity, ultimately affecting the AMC of the state against climate instability. In other words, because historical structural issues and mechanisms have inhibited state capacity, they have also repressed the state's ability to adapt and mitigate to climate change impacts efficiently.

Materialization of AMC in Bolivia’s development plan

The administration has proposed and created landmark laws to protect the environment that not only apply to the Bolivian case but philosophies that could be used throughout the world. Yet much of the critique in the interviews about the Morales administration was concerning his international discourse for the support and respect of Pachamama, while the current national strategies reflect old ways of development that were based on policies that support extractivism that disregarded the importance of climate change and its impacts, even though the beneficiaries
of the revenues of hydrocarbon exploration are different While some laws have been created that reflect the administration’s discourse on Pachamama, many of the policies have not come to fruition. As one participant notes about sustainability, “what we have been unable to do is to think about our own way of sustainable development, we are trying to copy from other cultures, their sustainable development measures and they are in different stages and we get lost” (Government consultant 2016).

According to his platform, Morales set out to create an environment that integrated the indigenous heritage of the Bolivian people. He promised to create laws that reflected the values that indigenous people have in common not only to save the country and its people from further influences of neoliberalism but also to actualize the philosophies which many Bolivian people hold valuable. Specifically, these philosophies refer to Law 300, La Ley Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien, or the Mother Earth Law and Integral Development to Living Well. This law, among other things, proposed a development philosophy that respected Mother Nature and provided a balance between the natural environment and human life. The expressed objective of the law is to "establish the vision and fundamentals of integral development in harmony and balance with Mother Earth to Live Well, guaranteeing the continued capacity of Mother Earth to regenerate natural systems, recuperating and strengthening local and ancestral practices, within the framework of rights, obligations, and responsibilities" (Chavez 2014; London School of Economics 2012). Beyond the cultural and social implications of this law, it was intended to increase awareness of climate change while also monitoring its current and future impacts. It also had the foundational groundwork to create a sustainable development of natural resources. Morales has effectively "positioned indigeneity as a site from
which to defend and protect the nation's national resources and to push for social justice"  
(Canessa 2012; Postero 2017: 6).

However, the Mother Earth law, passed in the Plurinational Legislative Assembly in December 2010, has yet to be implemented (Vidal 2011). The law established the Autoridad Plurinacional de la Madre Tierra, or Plurinational Authority of Mother Earth, which is part of the Ministry of Environment and Water, "as the state entity responsible for much of the development, overseeing and coordination of projects, programmes and research as it relates to climate change and the objectives of the Plurinational Plan for Climate Change" (LSE 2012).

Unfortunately, the authority has not achieved the progress set out by the law creation and are largely still in the development phases of a majority of its stated goals. There have been several speculations as to why this has not been achieved. Some believe that Buen Vivir is too conceptual to be able to put into practice. As one participant noted:

It's [Buen Vivir] a very complex process that took place to actually generate this discourse as such... the context in which it developed, like what does it mean because it's also not defined, it's still a concept under construction, and it's hard-- that's also why it's so hard and challenging to actually put it into practice, because it's very philosophical...(Participant in Academia 2016).

While others believe that there was no intention of putting it into effect, it seems as though the lived reality is that the current development policies that create revenue are the top priority since they generate capital for the state and that Buen Vivir is a discourse that is theoretically green and sustainable but that it would require too much money to enforce. As another participant from an international NGO remarks, making a clear distinction between written laws and actualized laws stating, "but the policy says, well in the real policies not the written policies, that we are a sustainable place, where the idea is to keep the forest and to support the people to make use of the land in the most sustainable way, all this is speech really. How do you say discurso in English?" (2016). It is obvious from participant interviews as well as various scholarly works
that there is much speculation surrounding why the Morales administration has not enforced these laws and continue to extract natural resources. However, what seems to be more of a prevalent issue surrounding environmental policies is the role of international actors and structural limitations.

Even though understanding why the administration has not enforced laws written into the constitution is extremely important, several participants question the feasibility of implementing these laws in the current legal framework. One participant remarking about the lack of innovation to solve problems noted that the "innovative capacity of Bolivia is very low, much lower than other countries in the region" and later infers that this hinders policy implementation (National NGO participant 2016). Here, another participant from an international NGO makes note that the intentions are in fact there but the capacity to enforce these types of policies are not, I think that in general, we have a, I don't know, we have a development plan which is very green and so it considers, I don't know if you read the plan and probably you will think that this government have a lot of concerns about nature and how to conserve nature and in general about the environment but the implementation of that plan does not consider all the things that need to be considered to avoid the long-term impacts on the environment. So in terms of the laws, I think that we have very good laws, but we don't have the capacity to have a right implementation of the laws and at the highest level of the design of the policy, I think that we are considering some environmental issues not all, but some environmental issues, but when the law goes down to the people that needs to implement it, like ministries or vice ministries or directors, they don't have all their resources or financial or human resources to implement a good, to have a good implementation of this project (2016).

This provides yet another reason why Buen Vivir and La Ley Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo, or the concept of “good living” and the framework law of Mother Earth and development, have not been implemented. This quote, however, does not question why it has or has not been implemented, but if it can, in fact, be implemented, returning back to the question of the role of structural limitations. Regardless of why or if it can be implemented, the lack of enforced sustainable policies increases Bolivia’s vulnerability to climate change impacts. This is
further aggravated by the structural limitations of colonialism and neoliberalism, creating an increasingly unstable political situation in the country.

Another issue related to the development plan that has received criticism locally and abroad is the continued use of extractive based development policies. While the reliance on natural resources reflects development plans from past decades, this dependency on natural resource extraction for capital, or eco-dependency, still has a role in development plans for individual states in Latin America, and Bolivia specifically. The reasons for this are threefold and reflect the role of intervening mechanisms, the previously designed development plan, and the pressures of development and growth. First, intervening factors such as political leadership and insertion into the global economy predetermined the economic structure of Bolivia and their role in the global economy. Since historical structures trapped the state in a dependent situation which has subsequently influenced several mechanisms such as the insertion of the global economy and the state structures, developing sectors other than those related to natural resource extraction have not been of importance. Second, since political leadership shifted constantly, the social, political, and economic situation was grim. The reliance on a formal development plan with a preexisting economic model is understandable given the situation of the state.

Third, in Bolivia new leadership was crucial to the reformation of the state. Development pressures played a crucial role in policy design and the strategy on how to move forward. It was, therefore, easier and more feasible to create a development plan that operated within the framework of capitalism instead of creating an alternative style of development that was not based on the extraction of natural resources. As a government consultant notes about the inability to enforce the concept of Buen Vivir into policy creation and historical restrictions,
I think Bolivia has an interesting philosophical approach. They have really interesting and innovative concepts. But the main barrier so far they have is how to convert this philosophical language into technical and what is the Bolivian perspective on climate change is this thing with Mother Earth. Basically what they are suggesting is changing the way of doing things. This is moving towards the basis of development itself. And that is very difficult because probably very few people are able to understand what that entails. And my perception is when you read technical guidelines and when your technicians convert that language into policy or programs, there's no innovation. Or very few innovations. So what they are doing is basically using the wording but not really changing the way they're doing things, with maybe very few perceptions of what are – like, I don't really see anything innovative coming from the technicians.

When asked why he thought this was he responded:

Well, it's a more complex question. It's more of a factor than an issue. One side is that not everyone is at the same stage and second not everyone understands really how to do it. Maybe the majority grasped it, but not really know how to really do it. And, and in the academy, very few are involved in this process, in my perception. If you are not very pro-political party in government, you have very few resources to influence somehow the politics of the government and the political process. On the other side, and which is my main criticism of this mother earth issue, is it works if we can change the timing process everywhere. We still measure our economy GDP per capita, GDP, also we are still part of the natural gas market and we need the revenues for investment. So one of the main difference for a normal country with a normal vision of development at the end when you see indicators there is no really big difference. So we are not an island. The globalization is something that is very present in our lives. So if Bolivia would like to survive somehow, if they really want to still become an energy producer and the energy producer in the heart of South America, it's okay. We still follow the same logic. We cannot be separated from the international situation, so we need to follow the same rules. At least the economical ones and the financial ones. So what do you do when the social aspect within your country is different? When the real distribution of revenues is also different, when every country has the liberty to define that. I think not even US is in the position to say "Well I will change the world and I will do it because – ." No. There are common rules established for financial transactions and for development so you cannot run away from that. And this is one of the main problems for me. So, therefore, going back to your question is, therefore I think the problem for the technician is how to do the same thing that I used to be able to do – that from another angle. That needs more reflection and more technical capacities, basically. And maybe some things could be changed, but others probably not” (2016).

Given the unstable history of Bolivia, Morales, as the longest-running democratically elected leader, and his administration, have been tasked with improving development, increasing capital, social spending, food and human security, decreasing poverty and unemployment, and
responding effectively to climate change. All this has to be accomplished sustainably given the encroachment of elevated levels of climate change while simultaneously moving away from an extractive development plan in the framework of low state capacity and high vulnerability due to the combination of historically structural implications and mechanisms. This has been challenging to accomplish. This challenge becomes more difficult when other factors such as political expertise, experience, or education level are considered. Therefore, not only do AMC issues create problems for the state at a development and policy level but they also increase the vulnerability of the population. This does not mean that improvements cannot be made on the development plan or that there have not been mistakes made by the Morales administration, but sustainable development requires a certain level of state capacity and in order to increase efficiency levels expertise, capital, and technology are needed to create a stable environment in which sustainability can flourish.

The solution to these restrictions, according to Cardoso and Faletto and later investigated and confirmed by Peter Evans, is the reliance on the role of agency of political leaders and social groups alike to find ways to create a counter-narrative within global confines of power and private capital (Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Cardoso 2009; Evans 2009). On the state level, the policies following the model of Andean-Amazonian Capitalism described above by Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera could be an example of political agency within the boundaries of capitalism. The decision to nationalize resources, integrate indigenous concepts of Pachamama and Buen Vivir into the constitution and the development plan, or take aid and investment more prominently from China rather than the United States could also be examples of "existing within the course between structural pessimism and voluntarist utopianism" referred to by Cardoso and Faletto and Evans (Harris 2009). They could be a way of placating the indigenous people that
supported his election, disregarding the pressures of climate change, and greed. While the reasoning surrounding failures to implement climate-friendly policies or policies that show respect to Mother Earth is an important part of the analysis, a portion of it is speculative and does not tell the entire story. Therefore, it is important to first understand what is structurally possible. Critical policy analysis will only promote productive discourse when the context is considered. Realistic solutions are only possible if they are created with a thorough understanding of both historical and current limitations of decision-making.

Community-level Responses

This part of the analysis is meant to serve three purposes. First, it is meant to contribute to an empty space in the current literature. In the field of dependency theory, there is a predominantly macro focus that offers cross-national comparative research to explain the various levels of development across different countries in varying regions with very few case-studies of specific countries (Heller et al. 2009) or specific local responses. This chapter not only gets at a specific case study, but also focuses on the impact of international and state level considerations, and some of the responses on the community level. Second, this section also seeks to understand how structural factors and climate change combined with low state capacity has resulted in increased inequality and vulnerability of the peoples in Bolivia. Third, this section offers a complimentary theory, indigenous transmodernity, which is used to evaluate community-level responses to this heightened vulnerability and inequality. By linking dependency theory, indigenous transmodernity, vulnerability, and political agency to climate change, this section contributes to the discussion of "politics of indigeneity in Bolivia," presented by scholars such as Nancy Postero and Nicole Fabricant, by elaborating on the "broad power relations in which indigenous peoples are immersed, the role of indigenous peoples as political actors, how the
category of indigeneity is constructed and enacted, and how it performs specific forms of power and knowledge” (Postero 2013, 2017).

Bolivia’s vulnerability in relation to climate change is quite high. It is ranked 126th out of 185 countries on its vulnerability to climate change (meaning it is among the most vulnerable) and its readiness to be able to adapt and mitigate the impacts (Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative [ND-GAIN] 2017). According to the ND-GAIN, Bolivia is at risk with high vulnerability coupled with a low readiness capability to be able to respond to climate-related disasters because it "has a great need for investment and innovations to improve readiness and a great urgency for action" (ND-GAIN 2017).

Going beyond measures of vulnerability, we see that the impact of low AMC reverberates down to the community level. From a market perspective, the dependence on natural resources for income leaves communities vulnerable to market fluctuation. The dependence “on natural capital in regional development is so closely interwoven into the capital-labor struggle that it should be regarded as an intrinsic part of the relationship” ultimately leaving workers struggling for stability (Barton 2006: 4; Castree 2002).

From a community perspective, these exchanges and dependency on natural resources as well as the impacts that are already occurring from climate change put human security at risk. Human security can be violated in multiple ways by climate change; at the level of the state whereby issues of territorial sovereignty exist as well as concern over enemy attacks, resource conflicts, the level of population security related to poverty, food scarcity, reduced economic productivity, climate refugees, disease and crime, and vital systems security which consists of concerns around natural disasters, war, energy, water supply, agriculture, and critical infrastructure (Collier and Lakoff 2008; Gilman, Randall, Schwartz 2015). All of these concerns
affect the poorest people first with indigenous people being the most vulnerable, whether it be from natural disasters loss of natural resources or policies that negatively impact their well-being. As stated in the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, “indigenous and local communities are among the first to face the direct adverse consequences of climate change due to their dependence upon and close relationship with natural resources” (Figueroa 2015: 233; UNEP Convention of Biological Diversity 2007). This creates a situation of environmental and climate injustice for these local communities which is exacerbated if the response of the state is not sufficient to protect or assist them appropriately.

Agentic responses

This section focuses on the reason why people respond to climate change in the manner in which they do as well as how their responses are indicative of structural and historical constraints as well as limited state capacity. Indigenous transmodernity encapsulates the most favored parts of modernity such as “emancipation, technological tools, and laws for human rights protection” (Misoczky 2011:357) and combines with certain aspects of cosmovision that considers how communities should live their lives in a holistic vision known as Sumak Kawsay or Buen Vivir. This describes the importance of living in harmony with Pachamama and creating an equilibrium in the community (Misoczky 2011). By taking into consideration modernity and ancestral knowledge, indigenous transmodernity has enabled “the indigenous movements to construct a space of dialogical epistemic difference, in which modernity and coloniality are confronted and subsumed by the values recovered from their ancestral cultures in the process of decoloniality” (Misoczky 2011:358). Therefore, it is important to understand agentic local level responses as a political act in response to structural implications as well as response in the space
that the state should occupy to some degree, that is in the resistance to climate change as well as adaptation measures taken to increase resilience of the population.

Bolivia has a long history of *cocaleros, campesinos*, and other indigenous peoples fighting back against the government in various time periods. The uprising of the Bolivian people in 2000 in response to the privatization of water resources that increased water prices propelled a unique wave of social movements in Bolivia. It was this transition in social movements that eventually overthrew the government and put in its place MAS. "You cannot understand the rise to power of Morales without looking at the water war. It was an event that changed Bolivian history," Hennigan 2014). As McNeish notes, "indigenous leaders and organizations in the highlands and lowlands highlight that while the government talks of their rights and respect for ‘mother earth', in its effort to secure resources for public spending, a significant expansion of infrastructure and extractive industries is taking place that threatens the basis of their livelihoods and hard-won autonomy" (2013: 223). Few academics, members of civil society, and consultants that were interviewed have faith that the government, for various reasons, will put the needs of climate change before development, indicating that for Bolivia at least, the two are separated. Not only do these quotes indicate structural level issues, they also indicate the need for local communities to enact adaptation and mitigation mechanisms to help protect them from the impacts of climate change.

As structural limitations and poor state capacity has created a situation of environmental injustice for local communities in Bolivia, these communities have engaged in measures that utilize their ancestral traditions to assist in combating climate change. “Embedded in environmental and climate injustice is the primary struggle of indigenous peoples to sustain their environmental identity and heritage in the face of threats that shape their living ecology and the
threats to values, beliefs, behaviors, histories, and languages” (Gratani 2016: 234). As one participant recalls a story of the method in which farmers of the Altiplano can determine if the weather will bring a flood or a drought:

“they orientate themselves by their ancient customs by identifying the possible changes in the climate such as droughts, floods, the biological indicators that they have that can somehow prevent the changes or rather the effects of climate change. For example, they say that when this animal is here, the *yaca yaca*, if they put their nest on the ground this means there will be a drought, therefore they plant their crops on low ground. Now if there will be a flood, the *yaca yaca* puts its nest high up and they will plant their crops on high ground” (2016).

Another case study that employs indigenous farmers responding to climate change took place in Quechua-speaking farmer communities near Cochabamba. This study again discusses the meaning the communities ascribed to the changing environment and the lack of governmental resources to address the issues. The authors had three main findings in relation to indigenous communities and their response to climate change. First, farmers often associate their observations of climate change with other social and environmental changes, such as value change in the community, population growth, out-migration, urbanization, and land degradation. Second, some of the people interpret change as part of a cycle, which includes a belief in the return of some characteristics of ancient or mythological times. Third, environmental change is also perceived as the expression of "extra-human intentionalities," or "a reaction of natural or spiritual entities that people consider living beings" that occurs when they are upset with the processes in the world (Boillat and Berkes 2013:18). The authors found "on the basis of these interpretations of change by the farmers and their adaptive strategies indigenous knowledge as a component of adaptive capacity is extremely important” (Boillat and Berkes 2013:17). Thereby enacting forms of ancestral knowledge, local communities become political actors responding to macro level historical structures such as colonialism and neoliberalism, and meso-level weak
state capacity to show that "indigeneity has been and continues to be constructed in the nexus between governance, resistance, and meaning-making" (Postero 2013:118; Postero 2017).

These two cases are not meant to diminish the severe impact that climate change has had in Bolivia to date, nor is it meant to discount the challenges that indigenous peoples and local communities face when challenging the state intertwined with outside structural problems. There is plenty of concern about the impacts of climate change in Bolivia. The region has suffered from floods in the Amazon, droughts in the lowlands, and glacier retreat in the highlands putting two of the largest cities at risk of water insecurity (Hicks and Fabricant 2016; Hoffman 2005; Postero 2013). These cases are rather an example of the power of knowledge that has been enacted by these communities to respond to structural and political restrictions. Cases such as these could better prepare Bolivia for climate change from a micro level, though without a state response, and coordinated international efforts, it is not enough, but it is a meaningful way to start.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I argued that the structural conditions created by colonialism and neoliberalism have continued to burden developing countries with challenges in their attempt to sustainably develop and stabilize the political, economic and social environments. Further, I argued that these challenges are worsened when combined with additional issues such as climate change. This is because states are forced to make compromising development situations that can harm the peoples, the economic stability of the state, and the environment. In the case of Bolivia, these structural conditions have hindered the ability of the Morales administration to implement sustainable development choices.

In this chapter, I have also used the discourse of capacity as a way to understand the analytical bifurcation of the term, and further, to understand how it is used in the various spaces
in developing countries and developed countries and international institutions. I have reconnected the problem of the discourse of capacity to its colonial history by providing an understanding of capacity in a colonial space. By using a real-world issue, I have explored how climate change and the discourse of capacity intersect for my participants in the development landscape. This addresses the dynamics of the development space in "colonial society", thereby filling the void in the analysis of modernity in traditional sociological accounts of modernity. I have also shown that dependency theory is not only still relevant but is very useful when trying to identify development changes for specific countries or to understand why a country developed in the manner it did. Further, when combined with indigenous transmodernity it becomes a framework in which post-colonial society can be produced.

The analysis presented here heavily considers the current relevancy of dependency theory by using structural impositions and state-specific mechanisms to explain both the continuation of extractivist development policies in an otherwise self-identified socialist government and the state's ability to mitigate and adapt to climate change. As previously mentioned, one area that the original dependency theory was critiqued for, as well as its subsequent use has focused largely on the macro level analysis of cross-national comparisons. By integrating intervening mechanisms into the analysis this work integrates more of a meso-level focus to understand the result of low state capacity in Bolivia and its ability to adapt and mitigate the effects of climate change. Taking the analysis a step further, this chapter explains micro-level responses in two ways. First, it turns to investigate how these international and state level factors in Bolivia have increased inequality and vulnerability in its ability to respond to climate change on a community level. Second, it integrates indigenous transmodernity into the discussion as a source of knowledge that combines a response to macro constraints and meso-restrictions and the
importance of ancestral traditions to combat a phenomenon that has mostly been created by developed countries. This integration of micro-level responses not only adds to a scarce place in the research but also shows the power of agency that indigenous people have in a space largely occupied by overarching structural issues. Yet there is a concern among some that bioindicators are not as reliable as they once were, and that traditional knowledge is being lost to urban migration, which could have a severe impact on the ability of this knowledge to mitigate climate change in Bolivia.

The underlying question in this chapter from the beginning has been, what is possible? Created from a tension in international and national discourse about the importance of *Pachamama* to the Morales administration, this chapter was designed to look beyond the failures of the administration to understand whether the government could adhere to promises made to the people of Bolivia and to *Pachamama*. There is not a doubt among the participants of this study that some decisions could have been made differently, but there is a doubt as to what is possible given the structural constraints that were inherited by this administration. Capacity, the ability of the state to adhere to promises made or to effectively enforce laws, seems to be failing in the Bolivian state. The result of hundreds of years of control by international structures combined with intervening mechanisms specific to Bolivian history has left the state largely weak and unable to respond appropriately to current threats to the peoples and country as a whole. Bolivia, under Evo Morales, has undoubtedly been met with waves of success and stability, but at what costs and whose burden? Cardoso and Faletto along with Evans wrote that "future events will depend on collective action guided by political wills that make work what is structurally barely possible" (Carodo and Faletto 1979; Evans 2008:35). Yet is this enough to
combat climate change, and if not does this mean a perpetual future of eco-dependency for Bolivia? Only time will tell.
CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

This thesis has been an example of a post-colonial sociological project. It has used the power of analytical bifurcation in social sciences and development practice as an example of the real-world effects repression of history has in developing countries. It has also reflected Bourdieu's sentiments on the importance of being mindful of the origins of terms instead of taking them for granted. In this project, I have addressed the role of capacity in development as it is understood by a sample of actors that occupy the space in the Bolivian political landscape. These actors consist of academics, governmental consultants, members of international and national NGOs, both Bolivian and non-Bolivian. The theme of capacity presented itself as an overarching concern regarding the Bolivian state and the Morales administration’s ability to efficiently develop in the face of climate change impacts. Capacity was used in this project to bring attention to how the term has been used throughout history and how these structural constraints may hinder progress towards an environmentally sound developmental approach.

In order to understand these structural constraints, this project used a combination of two theories to gain clarity on what is happening in the Bolivian landscape and the reasons behind these occurrences. The first theory used was Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto's version of dependency theory. Though the relevance of dependency theory has often been questioned, recent work has shown a revival of the theory, finding that it is both "a fruitful way to understand divergent patterns of development in the contemporary era of globalization" as
well as a tool to "explain how countries respond to the challenges of globalization and the consequences of these responses" (Heller, Rueschemeyer, Snyder 2009: 287). The use of this theory in the Bolivian case supplies a way to conceptualize the current state of development in Bolivia as well as development choices that are being made, and subsequently the consequences of these decisions. More specifically, it gives clarity to the role of capacity—and the political forces that define and implement policies related to it—from an internal perspective within Bolivia and also from a critical perspective of imposed capacity from international institutions. These perspectives show how capacity as an objective of development has hindered the ability to establish policies that support adaptation and mitigation of climate change impacts, as well as the extractive-based development choices made by the administration and the consequences of these decisions.

The outcomes of these choices are more apparent on the larger macro and meso-levels, but what have been the responses to these consequences on the micro level? One of the valid critiques of dependency theory is its lack of attention to the community or individual level. Therefore, indigenous transmodernity was also used in this project to fill the empty space left by dependency theory. Since indigenous transmodernity is a counterhegemonic response to structural conditions from the micro level, we can better understand how human agency and structural constraints intersect in the Bolivian case. This leads to a better understanding of two elements of the Bolivian case. First, it leads to a clearer understanding of development choices made by the Morales administration and the historical context in which they have been made. It does not fully explain or excuse some of the poor policies that have been created, but it creates a possible place to address the question of what is structurally possible. Second, it provides a context in which the agentic responses of local communities and individual actors are made.
These responses are not only to state-level policies but also to the hegemonic structures on a macro level. As mentioned in chapter three, these responses range from increased social movement participation to embracing traditional knowledge to combat climate change impacts.

Chapter two investigated, through a genealogical analysis of capacity, how the term has been used throughout development history in order to reinforce the interests of international organizations, which has subsequently led to progress being hindered in developing countries. This chapter gave a decade by decade account of how the concept has been used throughout history in development practice and social science literature. The chapter found that the transformation of the term throughout history in both development and social science literature has led to a bifurcation of developing countries and their colonial history by creating an internal and external understanding of capacity. This chapter found that the focus of imposed capacity was on the lack of development or ability to progress in ways deemed necessary by international institutions while internal capacity focused on what was possible given the historical structures that have been ingrained in developing countries.

This split in meaning is most obvious during the nineties when 'capacity' transitioned into capacity building and capacity development, representing a significant transition in policy and the integration of the "voice" of developing countries into development projects. While the integration of agentic roles for developing countries is theoretically a positive transition, most of the development outcomes were and are still void of the meanings agents in developing countries ascribe to capacity and what it means on the ground. It also makes it easier to connect developing countries to development failures.

Lastly, the chapter found that the most recent capacity building projects have transitioned capacity into a requirement that the state must obtain in order to mitigate and adapt to climate
change by linking it with ‘good’ governance. If a state does not take the necessary measures to implement appropriate policies to combat climate change it is a failure of that specific state. By linking external definitions and measures of capacity building to internal failures of the state, it further reinforces the practice of not only separating developing countries from their history but also making it easier to identify the state as the actor to blame. This chapter concludes with participant quotes that identify what capacity means internally to Bolivia, and how this bifurcation of capacity might hinder the ability to mitigate and adapt to climate change.

Chapter three investigated the imposition of historical structures, that are still currently present, on Bolivia’s ability to mitigate and adapt to climate change. This chapter is born out of the discourse surrounding the successes and failures of policies that have been created in order to implement the concept buen vivir throughout Bolivia. However, the main theme of this chapter focuses on what is structurally possible in Bolivia given the power of these historical structures, rather than a focus on successes and failures. This chapter utilized dependency theory to understand the impacts that the combination of historical forces and mechanisms have had on the state’s capacity to mitigate and adapt to climate change. This chapter also integrates indigenous transmodernity to understand the counter-hegemonic response to climate change and poor state capacity that takes place within these historical structures. These findings are highly contrasted to the discourse of capacity that is used outside of these developing countries found in the genealogy chapter.

The arguments from these two chapters places an emphasis of the role of the discourse and policies surrounding the idea of capacity in Bolivia, its role in climate change, and how this affects citizens and the state at various levels. This analysis places emphasis on capacity because it was the most prominent theme from the interviews and was noted by every participant. There
is a serious concern among interviewees regarding Bolivia’s ability to combat climate change at the state and local level. While part of the concern is linked to Morales’ policies, the other is connected to the understanding of capacity and how the current institutions lack the framework and knowledge that is needed to construct efficient tools to implement the necessary changes. Yet these concerns cannot be fully understood without considering the historical processes that have shaped the Bolivian state. In other words, while adaptation and mitigation of climate change is an issue that plagues developing countries worldwide, the specific hurdles or implications that Bolivia faces cannot be understood without considering the “historical-specific occurrences”, or mechanisms, to the state. Further, by considering the implications of historical structures, or ongoing impacts of colonialism and neoliberalism, on capacity development, it makes it apparent that capacity is once again being used as a tool of control over developing countries, meaning that capacity is being used as a tool in the global response to climate change to produce a new form of colonialism.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Given the scope of this project, there are several directions for future research. Since the focus here was on the state, there are two main spaces that are largely missing from the analysis, the role of civil society and local communities. Though part of the analysis of the state includes these sectors, the role of civil society and counter-hegemonic responses of local communities are crucial in understanding the specifics of each case, especially in developing countries. These actors occupy a space that is of crucial importance to the analysis, therefore in order to fully understand development in any given country, these sectors need more attention. Given the limitations within developing countries, understanding and considering the current responses of both civil society and local communities and what they have to offer in the future battle against
climate change could not only increase agency of these actors but also the strength of the country overall.

The second area for future research expands on the current use of dependency theory by going a step further and locating spaces in which the political agency of developing countries can occur. For example, Peter Evans has conducted work on these spaces by analyzing actions taken by Brazil vis-à-vis the WTO whereby Brazil was able to exercise political agency in several cases and enact the power of social democracy in their favor. Over the years they have "succeeded in winning dispute cases against G7 countries forcing the North to withdraw subsidies and special tariffs across a range of different product arenas from cotton to sugar to steel to jet aircraft" (Evans 2009: 329). Evans notes that, "reconstructing global market rules is crucial to the long-run success of globalized social democracies in the South and that such reconstruction, however difficult, lies in the realm of historically viable" (Evans 2009: 318). Adding to this body of work by including other institutions that provide a place for agency is crucial and could provide space to extend the analysis to current issues like climate change.

Lastly, another future direction could be to research the effectiveness of a regional response to the impacts of climate change. This could create a sharing of knowledge of how various countries have responded to the state, civil society, and local communities from different countries. Since human migration, specifically climate refugees, is increasing as the rate of environmental related disasters is increasing, it is only a matter of time before states see an influx of human security-related issues, whether it be resource scarcity, food scarcity, increased violence, or any of the numerous effects of climate change on human security. By creating a shared consortium of knowledge and practices for the region, it increases the opportunities that states have to adapt to and mitigate climate change. This could quite possibly reduce the power
other international institutions have over the region. Since to date, developed countries are largely failing on the promises made during the Paris Climate Agreement, a united regional front may be a way to combat the issue on multiple levels.

In sum, this project analyzes the role of the discourse and practices surrounding the idea of “capacity” and their impact on developing countries. This project has presented a genealogy of the term and offered a real-world example of its impacts on issues faced by not only Bolivia but most developing countries. By identifying the divergence of capacity into inward and outward forms of the concept, the underlying hegemonic powers become more exposed as does the necessity for effective development approaches that integrate local knowledge.
Appendix A:
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