

ENGENDERING PEACE? A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE GENDERED
RATIONALE FOR UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325 ON
WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY

by

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(Under the Direction of Jeffrey Berejikian)

ABSTRACT

This project examines United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, which in part seeks to correct the near-universal absence of women from peace negotiations. Two theoretical rationales for increasing the participation of women have been furthered: the first on the basis equal rights and the second on a functionalist justification that frames women as agents of peace and stability whose inherent qualities of nonviolence and conciliation make them particularly well suited to the peacemaking arena. Advocates have increasingly employed the latter perspective in recent years, which this project will examine in two primary ways. First, using Q Methodology, it explores this gendered rationale by conducting a survey of experienced peace mediators and negotiators and employing factor analysis in search of patterns of commonality and consensus amongst their responses. Three “peacemaking perspectives” are revealed, which in part expose the limitations of the essentialist narrative and highlight the importance of identifying “critical actors” who seek to ensure the gender mainstreaming of peace agreements. Secondly, this project seeks to reveal *how* and *why* peace agreements adopt gender provisions. To do so, it first builds upon a pre-existing

framework for identifying the peace processes that have produced agreements with the highest levels of “engendered security” and then examines a number of hypothesized causal factors. It concludes that important conditions include participation by the United Nations and the presence of mediators who serve as “critical gender actors.” Ultimately, while the results serve as a critique of the functionalist aspects of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, they also offer new insights into which peace processes constitute “successes” from 1325’s normative perspective and how success might be replicated in future peace negotiations.

INDEX WORDS: Gender Studies, International Relations, United Nations, UNSCR 1325, Feminist Security Studies, Conflict Resolution, Peace Processes, Peace Negotiations, Women and Peace Hypothesis, Standpoint Feminism, Q Methodology

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DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this project to my family. Given the unexpected circumstances under which I wrote this dissertation, its completion has required an extraordinary effort on behalf of each of you, for which I am eternally grateful. To my mother, an original second wave feminist who inspired my interest in this topic decades before I realized it: thank you for the long and exhausting hours of babysitting a very spirited toddler so that I could work, for coming along to every conference and most importantly, for not letting me give up. This accomplishment is as much yours as it is mine. To my father, thank you for your support, your patience, your cooking and for expending the energy required to be Elodie's favorite playmate. We are so fortunate to have you as an example of everything a father, grandfather and man should be. To my sister, the fiercest general contractor and pilot who breaks every gender stereotype in the book: thank you for your unwavering support, love, and for showing up and taking charge when I felt like I couldn't go on. Finally to Elodie, my loving and lovable little force of nature. It doesn't look like what I planned for you, but it is still filled with happiness and love. I will never stop working to make sure that it always is.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In December of 2011, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that President Barack Obama had signed an executive order calling for an increase in the number of women seated at the negotiating tables of conflicts around the world (United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, 2011). Clinton noted that while women often suffer the worst of war's consequences, they currently comprise less than ten percent of the world's conflict negotiators and mediators. With President Obama's executive order, the U.S. joined a growing number of nations offering official recognition to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (hereafter WPS). Unanimously adopted on October 31, 2000, UNSCR 1325 recognized the differing needs of men and women during periods of armed conflict and post-conflict transitions and called upon states and the international community to ensure that peace processes properly address the particular challenges they face.

Generally, four broad categories – often termed the “Three P’s plus gender mainstreaming” – have been used to describe the goals of UNSCR 1325 and its seven subsequent resolutions: 1) increasing the participation of women at all decision-making levels at all national, regional and international levels and in all mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict; 2) enhancing the protection of women and children from violence; 3) proactively preventing violence against women via the promotion of their rights and 4)

mainstreaming gender perspectives into all aspects of peace processes and related documents (Miller, Pournik and Swaine, 2014).¹ Of these, the “protection pillar” has been the most prominent theme of UNSCR 1325 and its seven subsequent resolutions, which have drawn attention to the issue of sexual violence in armed conflict and promoted measures to ensure the protection of women and girls.²

There should be no doubt that UNSCR 1325 has made enormous progress since its adoption 15 years ago, particularly in a normative sense (Tryggestad, 2009). This is evident, for example, in the fifty-seven countries that have adopted National Action Plans for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 as of 2015³ and in the marked increase in the number of peace agreements that have included gender provisions in recent years (Bell, 2015). However, the “participation pillar” of UNSCR 1325, which sought to address the low numbers of women in formal peace processes, has arguably received the most attention in scholarship and policy work yet is also the area in which progress has undoubtedly lagged. Despite relentless lobbying efforts on behalf of WPS advocates, women continue to be dramatically underrepresented in all aspects of formal peace negotiations – including as representatives of governments and non-state and rebel groups, and as third parties brought in to oversee or mediate the peace negotiations.

There are two theoretical rationales that have been employed in support of UNSCR 1325 broadly and the goal of increasing women’s inclusion in peace negotiations more specifically: an

¹ Gender mainstreaming is defined as “the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes” in order to ensure that “men and women benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.” (ECOSOC, Agreed Conclusions, 1997). The gender mainstreaming of peace negotiations would require recognition of the “special needs of women and girls” and to ensure their human rights during and after a conflict. The adoption of a gender perspective in a peace agreement also entails ‘taking special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict’ (Gibbins, 2011).

² There have been seven subsequent resolutions passed in the wake of 1325: 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1969 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015), each of which offers greater clarity in terms of specific actions and policy prescriptions than does UNSCR 1325. An overview of these resolutions can be found on the UN Peacekeeping’s WPS site located at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/wps.shtml>

³ Peacewomen (2015). “National Action Plans on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.” <http://www.peacewomen.org/member-states>

“equality perspective” and an “effectiveness” perspective” (Olsson and Gizelis, 2015). The first rationale, an “equality” or “rights-based” perspective, calls for a greater female presence in peace processes based on their equal representation in the population and their basic human right to take part, which is valued as an end in itself (Melander and Bjarnegård, 2013). In addition to furthering women’s rights, scholars have noted the benefits to global politics associated with greater gender equality. For example, empirical studies have found that states are less likely to use violence during militarized international disputes (Caprioli, 2000), more likely to limit the intensity of violence employed during times of crisis management (Caprioli and Boyer, 2001), and more likely to experience a successful peacekeeping initiative where women enjoy higher levels of social and political equality (Gizelis, 2009). The second rationale, an “effectiveness” or “functionalist” perspective, argues that the essential qualities of women can help to effectuate international peace and security when women are included in peace processes (for example, see Anderlini, 2007; Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings, 2004; de Jonge Oudraat, 2013). Thus, instead of valuing women’s equality and rights as ends in themselves, they are “instrumentalized” as a means of achieving additional and more desirable ends via public and international policy (Melander and Bjarnegård, 2013).

The origins of 1325’s functionalist aspects can be found in international policy such as the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, which resulted from the UN’s Fourth World Conference on Women and called for a recognition of “women’s contribution to fostering a culture of peace” and their equal participation in decision-making positions (Otto, 2006, pp. 134-135, cited in Charlesworth, 2008). This view that “women should be included because they provide a perspective and offer resources that would otherwise not be considered”⁴ is implicit in Resolution 1325, which recognizes “the important role of women” and “the need to increase

⁴ See Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings (2004).

their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution.”⁵ It is also evident in 1325-related policy, for example, in the U.S. government’s 1325 National Action Plan, which states that “the engagement [sic] of women as *agents of peace and stability* will be **central** to the United States’ efforts to promote security, prevent, respond to, and resolve conflict, and rebuild societies (bold in original, italics added)⁶. Finally, some WPS scholars have also employed a functionalist approach, for example in arguing that women are “transformative leaders” (Anderlini, 2007: 130) who have “higher standards of ethical behavior” (p. 131), and are therefore better able to “bridge political divides” (Bouta, Frerks and Bannon, 2005: 49). Hunt and Posa (2001) argued, “more often than not...peace promoters are women.” Hunt (2013) further argued that stereotypical portrayals of women as mothers who want to “stop war because they bring life into the world” provide women with “moral authority” and thus make them “less threatening” and “not perceived as the enemy” at the negotiating table.

The effectiveness perspective also generally emphasizes women’s “use-value” in bringing new issues to the peace table that would not otherwise reach the discussion (Anderlini, 2007; Castillo-Diaz and Tordjman, 2012; Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings, 2003). While most have recognized the examples of female peacemakers who did not, for various reasons, advocate for the inclusion of gender issues at the negotiating table, it is often still argued that women identify a specific set of priorities during peace processes (Castillo-Diaz, 2012; Rehn and Johnson-Sirleaf, 2003). For example, advocates have argued that not only are women more aware of gender issues and more likely to raise them during peace negotiations, they are also more likely

⁵ UNSCR 1325 (Paragraph 5).

⁶ United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (December 2011). Accessed 6/5/2012 from: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/email-files/US_National_Action_Plan_on_Women_Peace_and_Security.pdf

to raise issues that affect society as a whole, such as land reform, access to loans, and capacity-building (UN, 2002: Paragraph 191, pp. 61).

While the majority of the policy and scholarly literature offers normative support for UNSCR 1325, others, both supporters and critics of 1325 alike, have expressed reservations about functionalist justifications for the initiative. Charlesworth (2008) argues that the current debate on women, peace and security within the United Nations has given rise to an institutional orthodoxy that alleges women's superiority to men in developing and sustaining peace, derived from their natural affinity with nonviolence. This can serve to create a sexual binary that associates men with war, aggression and the political arena and women with peace, victimhood and the private arena (Otto, 2009; Puechguirbal, 2010; Vayrynen, 2004; Vincent, 2003). Many scholars have pointed to recent studies that have shed new light upon women's use of violence in wartime (Cohen, 2013; Coulter et. al, 2008; de Watteville, 2002; Henshaw, 2015; Ibanez, 2001; Lower, 2013; Utas, 2005) in arguing that stereotypes of women as peaceful, passive and conciliatory are misleading. They have also pointed out that these stereotypes can rob women of their agency in post conflict environments and ultimately serve to further women's exclusion from politics and the public realm (Charlesworth, 2008; Puechguirbal, 2010; Tickner, 1999). But despite these concerns, over time the functionalist rationale has surpassed the equality perspective to become the primary theoretical argument employed in support of UNSCR 1325 (Charlesworth, 2008; Olsson and Gizelis, 2015: 2).

The Challenges of Studying UNSCR 1325

Despite the policy community's determination to increase the number of female negotiators and mediators participating in peace negotiations, we lack a full understanding of what a "women's perspective on peacemaking" might entail, how UNSCR 1325's mandate is

understood and incorporated into peace agreements by mediators and negotiators, and whether women are in fact more willing and/or able to ensure the substantive representation of women in peace agreements. Much of the existing research on UNSCR 1325 has relied upon case studies as methodology (e.g. see Anderson, 2010; Fearon, 2002; Mazurana and Carlson, 2004; Ogunsanya, 2007), and covers recurring themes such as efforts to gender mainstream and the challenges that must be overcome (e.g. see Anderlini, 2000, 2010; Burke, Kot and Bunting, 2001; Cohen, 2008; Porter, 2007; Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf, 2002) and the evolution of the UN Security Council's security discourse (e.g. see Hudson, 2005; Shepherd, 2008; Puechguribal, 2010). With the exception of special issues of the international relations journals *International Peacekeeping* (2010, Vol. 17, Issue 2) and *International Interactions* (2013, Vol. 39, Issue 4), most 1325 scholarship has been written mostly by and for women's rights activists and scholars and is published almost exclusively in journals of feminist or gender studies. This serves to further compartmentalize the scholarly debates within international relations, which feminist IR scholars have long criticized (Tryggestad, 2014).

Secondly, there is a dearth of empirical data regarding all aspects of the Women, Peace and Security initiative. The limited attempts at data collection have centered around "counting" the numbers of gender provisions in peace agreements (Bell and O'Rourke, 2011; Bell, 2015) and defining the extent to which peace agreements have incorporated provisions relating specifically to gender issues (Ellerby, 2013; 2015). Much of the problem lies in the inaccessibility of data on the number of women that have participated in peace negotiations, often due to the highly secretive nature of these processes. Even the data upon which Clinton made her assertion that "less than 10% of the world's conflict mediators and negotiators are women" is based upon only 31 peace processes, and in fact the data relating specifically to

female negotiators is derived from a mere sixteen peace negotiations (Castillo-Diaz and Tordjman, 2012).

Plan for this Dissertation

The goal of this dissertation is to fill a number of gaps in the academic and policy research relating to UNSCR 1325. Specifically, it seeks to examine two theoretical assertions made by 1325 advocates that have been situated on shaky or underdeveloped empirical ground. The first is the functionalist assumption that women possess inherent qualities that are a) distinct from male qualities, and b) will manifest at the negotiating table in the form of mediation and negotiation styles or strategies, or in the demonstration of a preference for a particular set of ‘feminine’ concerns. The second is the assumption that a women’s presence at the negotiating table is a requisite for the adoption of gender provisions in peace agreements.

The following chapter (2) will provide an overview of UNSCR 1325, its rationale and how it has been engaged in practice. It will also offer a literature review of the existing policy and academic research on the Women, Peace and Security initiative and highlight the particular shortcomings that exist with regard to the availability and existence of certain data.

Chapters 3 and 4 will provide an exploration of 1325’s theoretical foundations and those of its critics. First, Chapter 3 will introduce the concept of gender as it has been traditionally excluded from the study and conduct of international relations. It will outline feminist research and critiques of the discipline and describe how feminist security studies (FSS) have labored to bring gender issues to the forefront of international relations and studies of war, peace and security more specifically. Chapter 3 will then offer an evaluation of the first of three key functionalist assertions often employed by the Women, Peace and Security initiative: the claim that women are inherently more peaceful than men. While this dissertation will not seek to

empirically test this claim, it is still vitally important to review the existing literature on the topic because it occupies such a central space in the functionalist narrative invoked by some supporters of UNSCR 1325.

It is the remaining two functionalist assertions of WPS advocates that this dissertation will examine empirically. Chapter 4 offers a theoretical evaluation of these two claims: the first, that women possess innate behavioral qualities that will manifest in styles and strategies at the negotiating table that are distinct from men's, and the second, that the gender mainstreaming of peace agreements will result from an increase in the numbers of female participants in peace negotiations. In order to address the first claim, it will draw upon theoretical literature in mediation and negotiation studies, primarily from the discipline of international relations but also other important fields such as law and experimental economics. In order to address the second claim, it will draw upon the existing research in gender and legislative studies, which has sought to answer a very similar question; that is, whether the inclusion of women in national parliaments has improved the quality and quantity of gender-based legislation.

The remaining chapters will offer empirical tests of these two assumptions. Chapter 5 will explore the viewpoints of experienced peace mediators and negotiators in order to capture their perceptions of their own roles at the peace table, how they understand and prioritize the issues raised by UNSCR 1325, and how gender may influence these understandings. In order to do so, it will utilize "Q methodology," which requires 1) conducting a survey of Track I and II peace mediators and negotiators, and 2) the use of factor analysis to uncover discernible patterns of commonality and consensus amongst their responses.

Chapter 6 identifies ten peace processes that have produced agreements incorporating the highest levels of "engendered security," or measures to ensure women's representation,

incorporation, protection and recognition in post-conflict society and government.⁷ In seeking to identify the causal factors that resulted in the engendering of these peace agreements, it will rely on secondary literature in order to examine four variables often discussed in the 1325 literature, including the percentages of women serving as delegates at the negotiating table, the degree to which civil society organizations (CSOs), particularly women's organizations, are formally incorporated into the negotiations, and the role of the United Nations, especially UNIFEM⁸ and UN Women.

Finally, this dissertation will conclude with a summary of its empirical findings and speak to the utility of advocating for the inclusion of a "women's perspective" in peace processes. Ultimately, it will argue that calls for women's inclusion in peace processes should rest upon equality, rather than functionalist arguments. It will also argue that peace processes and agreements offer a promising avenue for enhancing women's equal rights, which may in turn serve to enhance peace and security at the domestic and international levels.

⁷ In order to do so, I rely on a framework devised by Kara Ellerby (2013; 2015) and update her findings to include all peace agreements signed between 1990 and December of 2015.

⁸ UN Women was formally created in July of 2010 from four entities: the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW); the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW); the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI); and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). Any reference to UNIFEM (which played a key role in several peace processes prior to 2010) should be understood to reference the former entity now incorporated into UN Women.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

“Peace means different things to women and men because of their unique experiences as a result of the war, and as a result of how society is structured. Peace to women means putting food on the table, economic empowerment, access to healthcare and education, and that we can speak up against abuse in the home. There is violence in the home, but too often women are silent, that is not peace.”

– Estella Nelson, Founder and President of Liberia Women Media Action Committee (LIWOMAC)

Where are the Women?

Politics is the realm of men. While women’s participation in politics is at its highest level in history, women still hold only 22% of seats in legislatures around the world⁹. This ranges from a high of Rwanda’s parliament, where women hold 63.8% of all legislative seats, to a complete absence of women in parliament in five countries including Qatar, Micronesia and Palau.¹⁰ In thirty-eight nations, women comprise less than 10% of legislators¹¹. Furthermore, only 15.8% of speakers of parliament and 26.7% of deputy speakers of parliament are women¹². And as of January 2015, there were only 10 women serving as Heads of State and 14 serving as

⁹ The Quota Project: Global Database of Quotas for Women. Accessed 15 January 2015 from: <http://www.quotaproject.org/>

¹⁰ Inter-Parliamentary Union. “Women in National Parliaments.” Accessed 15 January 2015 from: <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm>

¹¹ Inter-Parliamentary Union and UN Women. “Women in Politics: 2015”. Accessed 15 January 2015 from: <http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/leadership-and-political-participation/facts-and-figures#notes>

¹² Ibid

Heads of Government, which is a mere 6.6% and 7.3% respectively of all top leadership positions worldwide¹³.

It should come as no surprise that this pattern is also evident in the realm of conflict prevention and resolution. Despite the rigorous efforts of a transnational feminist advocacy network¹⁴ and the proliferation of an increasing number of gender-sensitive men and women in foreign and international policy-making¹⁵, the participation of women in formal peace processes remains rare. A recent UN Women study of 31 peace processes occurring between 1992 – 2010 found that women comprised only 4% of signatories to peace accords; that their participation in negotiating delegations averaged a mere 9%; and that they had served as only 2.4% of chief mediators (Castillo-Diaz and Tordjman, 2012). Women are dramatically under-represented in all aspects of formal peace negotiations, including as representatives of warring governments, as representatives of non-state and rebel groups, and as representatives of international organizations brought in to oversee or mediate the peace negotiations. The adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325 represented the culmination of efforts to achieve official recognition of this fact in the most powerful organ of the United Nations and to initiate international efforts to ensure a “women’s presence” at the negotiating tables of peace processes to end violent civil conflicts around the world.

Civil Society

Efforts to include more women are part of a wider call to democratize peace processes by allowing civil society organizations (CSOs) a seat at the negotiating table. Many advocates from

¹³ Ibid

¹⁴ ‘Transnational advocacy networks’ are defined as ‘those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse and dense exchanges of information and services’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 2). Anderlini (2007), Cohen (2008) and True and Mintrom (2001) have argued that transnational advocacy networks of feminists and women’s rights organizations were largely responsible for the UN Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 1325.

¹⁵ See True (2010).

the non-governmental sector have claimed that entrusting the process to states and warring parties alone doom it to failure. Instead, they argue that basing the process on the needs and concerns of everyday citizens will not only strengthen negotiations but also contribute to the success or durability of peace in the aftermath of a conflict. Civil society is defined to include all social groups that are voluntary and noncoercive (which would exclude only the family and the state), within which individuals form a multitude of associations that are motivated by interest, conviction, or cultural or religious identity; the pursuit of wealth, power or salvation; the aim of advancing some particular good or delivering some general benefit; or to ward off some general evil (Walzer, 2002: 35). Yet for societies in conflict, deciding which civil society organizations deserve recognition during peace processes can pose a number of challenges, for example in the case of groups that have used violence to challenge the state (Orjuela, 2003). Furthermore, identification of representative or influential groups or leaders within civil society can be very difficult. This is illustrated by the South Sudanese negotiations, wherein the “Troika” (US, UK and Norway)¹⁶ responsible for the process sought to avoid the exclusive nature of the 2005 Sudanese negotiations leading to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by pushing for a “multi-stakeholder” process that incorporated civil society. Later however, it was admitted that “we have no idea which chiefs are here; we went with the ones we could get on a plane at the last minute.”¹⁷ For these reasons, many are critical of the “mushrooming normative framework” that the international community has imposed upon peace processes via mandates for inclusion such as UNSCR 1325 (Arnault, 2014). Third parties such as mediators or donors are often reluctant to

¹⁶ The “Troika” countries helped to oversee the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan and South Sudan and eventually the independence of South Sudan in 2011. They have continued to work together to support peace in the region, most recently within the peace talks in South Sudan (Ekerstedt, Malin. 3/7/2014. “South Sudan Women use Lobbying Influence Peace Talks.” *Kvinna till Kvinna*. Accessed online from: <http://kvinnatillkvinna.se/en/2014/03/07/south-sudan-women-use-lobbying-to-influence-peace-talks/http://kvinnatillkvinna.se/en/2014/03/07/south-sudan-women-use-lobbying-to-influence-peace-talks/>

¹⁷ <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/south%20sudan/228-south-sudan-keeping-faith-with-the-igad-peace-process.pdf>

include CSOs for fear of unnecessarily complicating the process and/or reducing the chances of reaching an agreement and putting an end to the violence (O'Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin and Paffenholz, 2015).

However, broadening the scope of inclusion may yield benefits. Empirical studies have demonstrated that peace processes allowing for high levels of participation from civil society, such as religious and women's organizations and human rights groups, create a more durable peace (Wanis St. John and Kew, 2008; Nilsson, 2012). Because exclusion is one of the primary reasons that groups resort to protest and violence, it is argued that the perception of civil society as a representative of *the people* will increase the likelihood that the agreement will be accepted by the broader public (Nilsson, 2012; Paffenholz, 2014). Furthermore, while some have claimed that too many actors at the negotiating table can complicate the process and impede the possibility of reaching an agreement (e.g. see Cunningham, 2013), expanding the scope of participation has been found to increase the likelihood that a peace process will be signed (Nilsson, 2012). A study by Paffenholz (2014) refined these conclusions somewhat by finding that it is not simply *more* parties at the table that makes a difference to the sustainability of peace but the *quality* of their contributions and the influence that they had on the overall peace process. Still, many researchers have been reluctant to embrace these claims because of the limited empirical evidence upon which they have been made.¹⁸ But WPS advocates have highlighted the more optimistic assessments of civil society's participation in peace processes and argued that increasing women's roles should yield similar positive results, particularly on account of the longstanding association of women with peace.

¹⁸ For example, Nilsson's (2012) widely cited study employs only a dichotomous variable to measure the inclusion of civil society, which lumps together all CSO types and does not take into account the quality, context, or extent to which these organizations were allowed to participate in the peace negotiations.

The Women and Peace Hypothesis

The central, although often implicit, gender stereotype that pervades all levels of the WPS framework is that women and peace are intrinsically linked. Certainly, women have participated in a large number of peace initiatives throughout history. Perhaps the best-known feminist peace movement emerged during the First World War, when women from all sides of the conflict came together to protest against the violence by founding the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). At its "Washington Convention" in January of 1915, founder Jane Adams and 3,000 attendees called for a conference of neutral countries to mediate an end to the Europe conflict (Montgomery, 2011). Although they failed to convince the leadership of any of the warring countries to make the first move towards negotiation for fear of appearing 'weak,' the formation (and continued survival)¹⁹ of the WILPF demonstrates the power of the belief that *women* as a group share an interest in peace and have a special role to play in mobilization against armed conflict and the pursuit of non-violence (Otto, 2006). Women's peace work is often associated with their maternal role, and maternal ideologies have spawned peace movements including the *Madres y Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo* in Argentina, the *Committee of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia* against the war in Chechnya, and the nuclear peace camps of the 1980s such as the one at Greenham Commons (Otto, 2006). Other modern conflicts have seen women champion the cause of peace, including the "Women for Peace" movement of Northern Ireland, which succeeded in securing a 13-day ceasefire during "The Troubles" in 1972 and the women's "Peace People" movement that utilized mass street demonstrations, parades and petitions to protest against the violence (Morgan, 1996).

¹⁹ Today, the League is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland and still works towards the achievement of equal rights for women, as well as universal disarmament, racial and economic justice, and the peaceful end to all forms of violence at the local, domestic and international levels (Montgomery, 2011).

Although feminist scholars often lament the sexual nature of the discourses surrounding women, violence and peace,²⁰ women's sexuality has sometimes been used in order to achieve peace and disarmament. The idea for a sexual boycott of war originated with the Greek play "Lysistrata," where the title character convinces women from warring city-states to deny their husbands sex until they halted the Peloponessian war (Rakow and Wackwitz, 2004: 31). Paula Gunn Allen wrote of a similar sexual boycott enacted by Iroquois women in 1600, who declared a moratorium on lovemaking and childbearing in order to put an end to unregulated warfare amongst their men.²¹ Allen labeled their efforts the "first successful feminist rebellion in the New World." In modern times, Liberian women launched similar sexual boycotts, which has been credited with convincing the government and rebel groups to participate in the Arusha peace talks to end the civil war (Morales, 2013). Apart from these sexual tactics, the Liberian women staged pray-ins, nonviolent protests, and even barricaded warring parties inside the negotiating room when they threatened to abandon the peace talks. As a result of their efforts, the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace were widely credited with bringing about an end to the civil war and paving the way for the election of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf²², in spite of the fact that they were formally denied seats at the negotiating table.

The strong association of women with peace throughout history has more recently spawned the "women and peace hypothesis" in academia. This hypothesis refers to a body of literature which finds that that women are more compromising, conciliatory, and less likely to support the use of violence than men (Caprioli and Boyer, 2001; Conover and Sapiro, 1993;

²⁰ For example, see Sjoberg, L., & Gentry, C. E. (2007). *Mothers, monsters, whores: women's violence in global politics*. Zed Books.

²¹ Paula Gunn Allen "Who is your mother? Red roots of white feminism." In Allen, Patricia Gunn. *The Sacred Hoop*. (1986). Boston: Beacon Press.

²² See Nobel Women's Initiative: Meet the Laureates. Leymah Gbowee. Accessed 12 March 2015 from: <http://nobelwomensinitiative.org/meet-the-laureates/leymah-gbowee/>

Hunt and Posa, 2001; Tessler, et. al, 1999; Wilcox, Hewitt and Allsop, 1996). The “female” approach to conflict is thus said to embrace cooperation, accommodation, a high degree of “other-regard,” patience, acceptance and pacifism while the “male” approach is said to entail competition for power, inflexibility and territoriality (Gidengil 1995; Tessler and Warriner 1997). Others have supported these findings but questioned the causal mechanism. For example, Maoz (2009) challenged the assumption that the women and peace hypothesis results from the inherent qualities of women, instead finding that *stereotypes* portraying women as more peace-oriented than men increase women’s peacemaking capabilities because of their greater ability to convince those on the other side of a conflict to support peace.²³

In a closely related argument, empirical studies have demonstrated that states with higher levels of gender equality are less likely to use violence during militarized international disputes (Caprioli, 2000), less likely to use force first in an international dispute (Caprioli, 2003), and less likely to resort to high levels of violence in crisis management (Caprioli and Boyer, 2001). Similarly, states are significantly less likely to become involved in an international dispute or war if they allow greater access to political power for females (Regan and Paskeviciute, 2003). In terms of conflict resolution, UN peacekeeping operations are found to be significantly more effective in societies where women have relatively higher status while peacekeeping efforts in societies where women’s social status is comparatively lower are less likely to succeed (Gizelis, 2009; Melander, 2005; Sambanis, 2006).

However, other tests did not confirm the women and peace hypothesis. For example, Tessler, Natchwey and Grant (1999) found that contrary to findings from Europe and the United States, Middle Eastern women demonstrated no less support for violence and war than their male

²³ Specifically, Moaz found that in a simulation game, Jewish-Israeli participants rated Palestinian female negotiators as significantly more trustworthy than Palestinian males who offered the *same* compromise.

compatriots, suggesting that there are intervening variables of potential importance, such as culture, religion or region. Brounéus (2014) found that in post-conflict Rwanda, women held significantly more negative attitudes towards trust, coexistence and the peacebuilding process than did men, leading the author to question whether women could still be expected to “do more for peace” in these settings. Such findings raise questions about UNSCR 1325’s efforts to increase the numbers of women in peace processes on the assumption that *women* and *peace* hold a special connection.

Notions of a Shared “Womanhood”

A second gender stereotype inherent in the WPS framework is the assumption that “women” (as a monolithic group) share needs and concerns that must be incorporated into the final text of peace agreements if a sustainable peace is to be achieved, and that women’s participation in a peace process will greatly increase the likelihood that the agreement will be gendered. Many feminists have argued against universal notions of womanhood and are particularly critical of claims by white, Western elite feminists to represent *all* women. They argue that in reality, women are set apart not only by their gender but also by race, ethnicity, class, region, and other social and economic dividers – therefore, the needs of women during times of war, transition and peace will vary dramatically by region, culture and time period. In peacetime for example, while parental leave is a top concern for women in the US, Indian women might be concerned with dowry issues and Nigerian women with female genital cutting (FGC). During wartime, former female combatants in Nicaragua struggled to acquire land afforded by disarmament, demobilization and reintegration packages (DDR), while women abducted during the war in Mozambique labored (and failed) to earn the right to return to their own families. For these reasons, some have questioned whether a fixed set of gendered concerns

can be identified through an internationally mandated instrument such as UNSCR 1325 that can properly account for the local needs and realities of women in conflicts across the globe.

Related research programs have faced similar difficulties in addressing the concept of “women’s issues.” The existing research on gender and legislative institutions for example has labored to define “women’s issues” for the purpose of measuring the passage of gender-based legislation. This framework assumes that women do possess particular concerns that stem from their shared experiences, which creates a common set of social or political interests amongst them (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers, 2007; Phillips, 1995). Scholars have defined these interests and concerns in a variety of ways. Some have pointed to issues that affect women for either biological reasons (e.g. reproductive concerns) or social reasons (e.g. the pay gap between men and women) (Lovenduski, 1998). Schwindt-Bayer (2010: 14) divides “political issues” into three categories: “women’s equality issues,” “social or compassion issues,” and “men’s issues. While “men’s issues” are those that have traditionally been considered with “man’s domain” (the economy, employment, and foreign affairs), the first two of Schwindt-Bayer’s categories fall into the “women’s domain.” “Women’s equality issues” are those that seek to improve women’s social, political or economic standing (e.g. policies equalizing the rights of men and women in education, employment and pay, or dealing with issues such as childcare and violence against women). “Social or compassion issues” also fall into the “women’s domain” – the home and private sphere – and include topics covering health, the environment, and public/social welfare.

Some feminists might bemoan the focus upon “women’s issues” as relegating women back to the traditional sphere. Others however, have argued that the *point* of such an endeavor is to recognize that the differential treatment of men and women in society results in different interests for each gender and that such differences require representation in the political arena

(Grey, 2002). Certainly, this is nowhere truer than within the realm of war and conflict. Gender roles in warfare are strikingly consistent across *all* human societies, with men serving as combatants almost exclusively throughout history (Goldstein, 2001: 3). Typically, the needs of male soldiers both during and after combat are addressed by government programs (e.g. providing for health care, psychological counseling and post-service college tuition) and charities (e.g. over 400,000 military charities in the United States assist soldiers in myriad ways, from providing medical care to supporting them with frequent flier miles, comfort blankets and pets).²⁴ In less developed societies, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs often provide financial assistance and a variety of programs to help ease former soldiers' transitions back into society.

Yet historically there have been no equivalent support structures during times of war for women, whose needs are often very different from men's but no less critical to address. For this reason, advocates of the Women, Peace and Security initiative argue that it has provided an urgently needed recognition of the unique concerns that women face both during conflict and in its aftermath, and offered the international community a basic framework for beginning to address their needs. A more specific interpretation of "women's issues," as they apply to conflicts and the peace processes that seek their resolution, will be offered in the sections that follow (see Figure 2.1 for a brief overview).

Peace Processes and Negotiations

The term "peace process" has been defined by celebrated diplomat Harold Sanders as "a political process in which conflicts are resolved by peaceful means." The process itself is a "mixture of politics, diplomacy, changing relations, negotiation, mediation and dialogue in both

²⁴ Association of the U.S. Army. "Charities Supporting Soldiers and their Families." Accessed 10/5/2015 from: <http://www.ausa.org/resources/familyprograms/resources/InternetResources/Pages/CharitiesSupportingSoldiersandtheirFamilies.aspx>

official and unofficial arenas.”²⁵ The primary goal of a peace process is often to reach a formal peace agreement between the warring parties, which “addresses the disputed incompatibility, either by settling all or part of it, or by clearly outlining a process for how the warring parties plan to regulate the incompatibility” (UCDP, 2015). In the post-Cold War era, peace agreements have been increasingly sought as the primary method of ending violent civil conflict. Of the 59 total conflicts that have ended over the past thirty years, peace agreements were employed to terminate 44 (comprising 74.6% of the total), whereas only four ended without a formal peace accord (6.8%) and eleven (18.6%) ended with a military victory. While this “confirms that negotiating an agreement represents the best chance for resolving conflict”²⁶ (Fisas, 2015), there still exists much skepticism about the ability of peace processes to maintain stability in the long term. In the sixty years that followed World War II, a mere 41% of peace processes were successful, as measured by an absence of violence in the two years that followed the agreement (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000).

Making peace in a society torn apart by war is a long process that does not end with the signing of a formal agreement: disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, truth commissions, and the payment of reparations are all a part of a comprehensive peace process. But in popular media accounts and academia, ‘peace process’ is often used as a synonym for “peace negotiations,” which is likely a result of the fact that negotiations are viewed as the central aspect of the overall process. “Peace processes” have been characterized as requiring a variety of elements, including 1) that the negotiations between armed groups are conducted in good faith, 2) that the negotiations should address the underlying causes of the

²⁵ Burgess, Heidi. (2004). “Peace Processes.” *Beyond Intractability*. Accessed 5 June 2013 from: <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/peace-processes>

²⁶ “Negotiations” are “talks that are held between at least two of the warring parties²⁶ in a state based conflict,” that must “be connected to one or more issues related to the armed conflict, such as ceasefires, an exchange of prisoners, or the incompatibility.”

conflict, 3) that the negotiations should include the main combatants, 4) that the negotiating parties should be committed to a sustained commitment to making peace and 5) that the parties disavow the use of force (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2003: 2). The first four of these components of the peace process relate directly to the actual negotiations, suggesting their centrality to the overall process (Brouwer, 2008). The emphasis placed upon negotiations as an important site of inclusion for women by the WPS initiative also reveals the importance and centrality of the negotiating process in establishing the post-conflict power structure.

UNSCR 1325

As late as the mid-1990s, it was difficult to imagine the Security Council addressing issues related to women's human rights or their concerns in international peace and security (Tryggstad, 2014). This is, at least in part, because the Security Council has historically been considered "an overwhelmingly male and masculinized preserve."²⁷ However, the international community was at that time increasingly recognizing that women had become disproportionately affected by wartime violence and that they were playing an active role in the resolution of many conflicts (Klein, 2011). Much of this recognition can be attributed to the efforts of women's rights organizations and a transnational feminist movement, which sought to further awareness of these issues.²⁸ The Fourth World Conference on Women is often cited as having laid the groundwork for UNSCR 1325 in its resulting Beijing Declaration (1995), which affirmed the need to create equality between men and women as a matter of human rights by removing obstacles to women's active participation in all realms of public and private life. It also focused upon women in armed conflict, specifically calling for an increase in the number of women serving in related decision-making bodies. Women's rights in armed conflict were also addressed

²⁷ Cohn, Carol and Cynthia Enloe (2003). "A Conversation with Cynthia Enloe: Feminists Look at Masculinity and the Men Who Wage War." *Signs*. 28 (4). 1187-1207.

²⁸ See Note 11 above.

by the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in 1993,²⁹ the UN Commission on the Status of Women in 1998,³⁰ and UN Security Council Resolution 1265 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in 1999.³¹ Many have argued however, that the greatest success of the transnational women's movement was the "gendering of the agenda" of the numerous (non-gender focused) other conferences and debates of the 1990s (Friedman, 2003).

Despite the impressive momentum built throughout the 1990s on women's protection issues, the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1325 on October 31, 2000 marked the first time that the Security Council had recognized the link between women's experiences in conflict and international peace and security, marking a "major turning point for women's rights and participation in international law and relations in that feminist demands have been institutionalized at the highest levels (O'Rourke, 2014). Resolution 1325 recognized that civilians, and in particular women and children, now account for the "vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict" and the "consequent impact this has upon durable peace and reconciliation." However, in calling upon all Member States and the Secretary General to "ensure increased representation at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict," Resolution 1325 marked an important shift in the Security Council's emphasis on women as victims in need of protection to a recognition of women as political actors and active participants in ending violent conflict.

²⁹ Vienna Declaration and Program of Action: Adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on June 25, 1993. Accessed 5 September 2015 from: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx>

³⁰ The UN Commission on the Status of Women: Women and Armed Conflict. Accessed 15 September 2015 from: http://www.unwomen.org/~media/headquarters/attachments/sections/csw/42/csw42_ii_e_final.pdf?v=1&d=20141222T181619

³¹ UN Security Council Resolution 1265 (1999). Accessed 15 September 2015 from: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/267/94/PDF/N9926794.pdf?OpenElement>

There have been seven subsequent resolutions passed in the wake of 1325: 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1969 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015), each of which offers greater clarity in terms of specific actions and policy prescriptions than does UNSCR 1325. Together, these seven resolutions comprise the UN’s “Women, Peace and Security agenda.” In total, UNSCR 1325 contains eighteen provisions, which have been categorized in various ways by scholars (see e.g. Bell and O’Rourke, 2011; Tryggstad, 2009). Generally, four broad categories – often termed the “Three P’s plus gender mainstreaming – have been used to describe the goals of UNSCR 1325: 1) increasing the **participation** of women at all decision-making levels at all national, regional and international levels and in all mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict; 2) enhancing the **protection** of women and children from violence; 3) proactively **preventing** violence against women via the promotion of their rights and 4) **mainstreaming** gender perspectives into all aspects of peace processes and related documents. Figure 2.1 lists each of these goals and how they are articulated in UNSCR 1325.

Figure 2.1: UNSCR 1325: Key goals and provisions
1) Protection of women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • in emergency and humanitarian situations (such as refugee camps) • through developing and delivering pre-deployment and in-theatre training to peace operations personnel on the rights of women and girls and effective protection measures
2) Prevention of violence against women through the promotion of women’s rights, accountability and law enforcement, including by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • prosecuting those responsible for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and other violations of international law • respecting the civilian and humanitarian nature of refugee camps • excluding sexual violence crimes from amnesty agreements, as they may amount to crimes against humanity, war crimes or genocide • strengthening women’s rights under international law • supporting local women’s peace initiatives
3) Participation of women at all levels of decision-making, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • in national, regional and international institutions

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • in all aspects of conflict prevention, management and resolution • in peace negotiations • in peace operations (as soldiers, police and civilians) • as special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General
<p>4) Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in peace operations by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • appointing Gender Advisors to all UN peace operations • considering the specific needs of women and girls in the development and design of policy in all areas • incorporating the perspectives, contributions and experience of women's organizations in policy and program development.

Source: Miller, Pournik and Swaine, 2014

Because inclusion in peace agreement texts is an important starting point to achieving other political, social and economic gains (Bell and O'Rourke, 2011), each of these four types of gender provisions therefore demonstrate real potential for improving the post-conflict status quo for women.

Protection

Worldwide, one in three women will suffer physical or sexual violence in their lifetime.³² The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women defines “violence against women” as “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women.”³³ This definition includes a wide spectrum of abuses against women and girls that can be committed by intimate partners (such as violence in pregnancy or differential access to food or medical care), by family members (such as physical violence or child sexual abuse), or by ‘others,’ (such as elder abuse, forced prostitution, or rape in wartime). It can also include geographically- or culturally-specific forms of violence such as female genital mutilation (FGM), acid throwing, and “honor killings” (the murder of a woman by

³² United Nations' Secretary General's Campaign to End Violence Against Women. Accessed 13 August 2015 from: <http://www.un.org/en/women/endviolence/pdf/VAW.pdf>

³³ The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (1993). Accessed 13 August 2015 from: <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm>

family members who view her as having brought ‘shame’ upon the family).³⁴ Such violence is often aimed at maintaining the unequal balance of power between men and women (Zimmerman, 2002). Systematic, worldwide violence against women has dramatic implications not only for women’s human rights but also the gender balance between men and women. One study estimated that the number of women having died from gender-selective causes in the twentieth century (including death by virtue of sex-selective abortion, female infanticide, egregious maternal mortality rates, disproportionate childhood mortality and murder/suicide rates) is about 162 million. Thus, the “cost of being female” is greater than the death toll of all wars and civil conflicts in that same period (which includes both World Wars, Stalin’s reign, and Mao’s Great Leap Forward) (Hudson, et. al, 2009).

For many years, the international community and international law did not address the issue of violence against women. Until at least the mid-1990s, all forms of violence against women were regarded as a mere interpersonal matter; in the best case scenario it might have been addressed at the national level, but never the international (Mackinnon, 2012). In one particularly shocking example, the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, adopted in 1979), failed to include the issue of violence against women.³⁵ It took a full 13 years before CEDAW’s implementation committee recognized the “close connection between discrimination against women, gender-based violence, and violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”³⁶ At this time the CEDAW Charter was broadened to include gender-based violence (GBV), or “violence that is directed against

³⁴ Zimmerman, Cathy (2002). Violence Against Women: global scope and magnitude. *The Lancet*. Vol. 359. Pp. 1232 – 1237.

³⁵ UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination of Violence Against Women. Accessed 15 August 2015 from: <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm>

³⁶ General Recommendations made by the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. (General Recommendation #19, 11th Session, 1992). Accessed 15 August 2015 from: <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm>

women or that affects women disproportionately” and includes acts that “inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion, and other deprivations of liberty.”³⁷

The Beijing Platform for Action notes that “while entire communities suffer the consequences of armed conflict and terrorism, women and girls are particularly affected because of their status in society and their sex.”³⁸ It is true that many of the injustices and atrocities suffered by men and women in war are the same. War maims and kills indiscriminately, it forcibly uproots populations, it separates families and it severely limits or altogether prevents the ability to make a living during the conflict. Men can also become victims of sexual violence. However, because women suffer such violence in peacetime as well as times of conflict, when “war is often waged as a nationalist tool with women’s bodies representing the ‘rape of the nation,’” the “quantity and structural nature of the sexual violence that is perpetrated against men is not commensurate with that which is perpetrated against women” (Kouvo and Levine, 2008). Gender-based violence such as rape, slavery, forced impregnation or abortion, kidnapping, trafficking and the deliberate transmission of disease such as HIV/AIDS (Rehn and Johnson-Sirleaf, 2002) have become widespread to the point that they are often acknowledged as “weapons of war.”³⁹ The rape of women and girls is often systematized in order to further wartime policy aims such as ‘ethnic cleansing’ or genocide (Salzman, 1998). The abuse and rape of women also serves as a way to humiliate the male relatives of the victims, who are often forced to watch or even participate in the assault. And particularly in patrilineal societies, women are often raped and forced to bear the children of their attackers in order to destroy its cultural or ethnic fabric (Sabourin, 2009: 61).

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995). Paragraph 135. Accessed 15 August 2015 from: <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20E.pdf>

³⁹ <http://www.unicef.org/sowc96pk/sexviol.htm>

These tactics clearly set violence against women apart from the types of violence suffered by men in warfare. Combined with the fact that gender-based violence has become increasingly commonplace in the wars that have occurred over the past half century, it is clear that gender-specific policies and programs to address the unique concerns of women and girls both during the conflict and in its aftermath are required. How to ensure the inclusion of such concerns is a much more complicated question.

Participation

Historically, peace agreements have been negotiated by political and military elites in secretive processes dominated almost exclusively by men.⁴⁰ This underrepresentation of women has resulted from a variety of factors, which include 1) the small numbers of female leaders in governments and non-state groups, 2) the reluctance of women in CSOs to engage in formal politics, and 3) the narrow-minded focus of most peace negotiations upon achieving an immediate cessation of hostilities rather than a focus upon rebuilding society (Anderlini and Conaway, 2004). Women's near absence from the decision-making structures of governments and non-state actor groups that choose strategies of violence has often meant that they are not perceived as meeting the key "qualification" for participation in peace negotiations. In the Philippines for example, women attempting to secure a cease-fire were asked, "Who are you? Do you have an army?" as a means of judging their legitimacy (Anderlini and Tirman, 2010). Similarly, Sudanese women were barred from boarding a plane heading for Kenya where they planned to participate in the Naivasha negotiations (Abusharaf, 2005). Furthermore, women who do succeed in reaching the negotiating table report a number of obstacles and challenges, which include confronting hostility, discrimination and a lack of recognition from male participants, being perceived as less credible and capable than the men, and finding it difficult to

⁴⁰ See Bell and O'Rourke (2011).

carry out their domestic responsibilities of their daily lives at the same time as participating in the negotiations (Anderlini 2000: 28-31). In some cases, women have been misinformed about meetings and their locations, refused visas, locked out of negotiations and had their proposals ignored (Mazurana, 2013: 186).

These examples demonstrate that the barriers to women's participation are extremely high. Anderlini and Tirman (2010) found that whereas men often need only to have brandished a weapon during the conflict in order to claim legitimacy at the negotiating table, women must meet a much larger set of requirements, including that they: a) are prominent leaders, b) have experience in high-level negotiations, and c) have links to grassroots activist networks with large constituencies. Such gender discrimination has, according to WPS advocates, resulted in a highly-militarized, overtly 'masculine' environment at the negotiating table where primary focus is placed upon "power issues" while the "core issues" that underpin war, such as issues of exclusion/inclusion and social in/justice are minimized.⁴¹ This trend also yields a cycle of exclusion, where women's lack of political power before a conflict leads to their absence from efforts to end it, which ultimately increases the likelihood that they will again be excluded from positions of political decision-making power in the post-conflict society.

WPS advocates have identified peace processes as potential sites of feminist intervention because they offer the opportunity to radically reorganize the power structures that defined society in pre- and conflict phases (Aoláin et al. 2011; Bell and O'Rourke, 2010; Tripp et al. 2009). Anderson and Swiss (2014) for example, found that countries with peace accords in place have more rapidly adopted electoral quotas for women than those countries without agreements, and that peace accords with specific provisions for women's rights have adopted gender quotas even more rapidly. However, women's exclusion from formal peace processes has meant that

⁴¹ For example, see Potter, 2010.

many of their primary issues of concern often do not reach the negotiating table, including their ability to participate in political, economic, social and judicial structures after the conflict. One study has found that overall, only 16% of all peace agreements signed between 1990 and 2010 contained references to women (Bell and O'Rourke, 2010).

Many 1325 advocates have employed case studies to support their argument that where women have been involved in the formal peace process, they have succeeded in placing gender provisions into peace agreements, including the penalization of crimes of sexual violence during war.⁴² For example, Luz Mendez's participation in the Guatemalan peace process of the early to mid- 1990s is often cited as proof that a "lone woman in the formal delegation" was able to "widen... the negotiations to address the needs of many marginalized groups, such as women,"⁴³ and to "advanc[e] a number of gender equality concerns and ensur[e] that they were included in the peace agreement."⁴⁴ Others have claimed that when women are permitted to participate in peace negotiations, they seek to include not only issues specific to themselves but raise issues that affect society as a whole, such as land reform, access to loans and capacity-building.⁴⁵

However, a few critics have pointed out that the sum of research surrounding 1325 has been inconclusive and controversial with regard to the real impact of women's formal participation in peace negotiations, and that the inclusion of women in peace agreements is not a guarantee that women's issues will reach the negotiating table.⁴⁶ For example, during the 1992 peace process in El Salvador, women comprised 30% of the negotiators for the Farabundo Marti National Liberation (FMLN), yet gender equality was not addressed in the peace agreement. In

⁴² <http://nobelwomensinitiative.org/2012/01/activist-spotlight-luz-mendez-guatemala/>

⁴³ See Jessen (2009).

⁴⁴ Castillo-Diaz and Tordjman (2012).

⁴⁵ *Women, Peace and Security (2002)*. Study submitted by the Secretary General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). U.N. Publications. Paragraph 191, pg. 61. Accessed 8 May 2013 from: <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/eWPS.pdf>

⁴⁶ For example, see the mixed nature of the findings in Banerjee (2008), Potter & Mundkur (2012), Thompson (2006), Snyder & Stobbe (2011), and Skjelsbeck (2001).

fact, many discriminatory provisions ended up in the final draft, such as the barring of women from reconstruction programs.⁴⁷ Years after the accords were signed, these female FMLN negotiators expressed regret for their lack of a ‘feminist consciousness,’ which could have guided them in acting as feminist advocates at the time (Conaway & Martínez 2004: 3, 15). Similarly, Edita Tahiri, the only woman involved in the failed negotiations for Serbia that preceded the NATO bombardments, admitted that it was her Albanian nationalist agenda that drove her actions at the negotiating table instead of a feminist agenda. Tahiri, who claimed to have developed a ‘feminist consciousness’ much later, regretfully noted that her contribution would have been much different had she been more gender aware.⁴⁸ And in the case of the sole female negotiator for the Government of Guatemala during the peace negotiations of 1991-1996, Raquel Zelaya has repeatedly noted that she did not view herself as a representative of women’s issues and in fact, the women’s movement from civil society have claimed that their repeated attempts to reach her during the negotiations went ignored (Chang, et. al, 2015). These divergent examples raise serious questions about the ontological rationale for including *women* in peace negotiations with the expectation of securing gendered peace agreements, where individual women may not view themselves as representatives of women or gender issues.

Despite such concerns, the Women, Peace and Security initiative has unquestioningly committed itself to advocating for increased numbers of women in peace processes. This is often referred to as a policy of “gender balancing,” or the goal of ensuring the equal and active participation of women and men in all areas of decision-making, as well as equal access to and control over resources. The United Nations has committed itself to achieving a 50:50 gender

⁴⁷ Women, Peace and Security report (2002). See note 45.

⁴⁸ See Escola de Cultura de Pau. Alerta 2008: Informe sobre conflictos, derechos humanos y construcción de paz. Pp. 140-141.

balance in all posts at the “professional level” and above.⁴⁹ However, while UNSCR 1325 stresses “the importance of [women’s] equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, it stops short of calling for a 50:50 gender balance in the decision-making structures of conflict resolution and prevention efforts. Instead, it mentions the need to “*increase* their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution.” This language fell short of the goal articulated by advocates in the debates preceding the adoption of 1325, and many have pointed out that there are no clear target numbers for women’s participation outlined in the resolution, nor are their strategies or methods for achieving the “increase” in their numbers.

Ultimately, despite some limited successes of the WPS movement, women are still largely excluded from participation in peace negotiations. A closer examination of the highly cited UN Women study demonstrates a very small increase in women’s participation in peace processes from the pre- to the post-1325 era. While the number of female mediators was 0% pre-1325, it increased to only 2.4% after its passage. The number of female negotiators showed only a small increase from 6% before 1325 to 11.8% in its aftermath, meaning that in the span of 10 years, 1325 has had little impact on the number of women negotiating peace processes. Furthermore, this number is largely skewed by the Philippines Peace Process of 2011, where 35% of the negotiators were women. Removing the Philippines example reduces the percentage of post-1325 female negotiators to only 9% and demonstrates that overall, there has been very little change in the number of female participants in peace negotiations between the pre- and post-1325 eras.

⁴⁹ UN Women. Legislative basis for the UN mandate on the representation of women in the UN system. Accessed 12 January 2015 from: <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/fplegbasis.htm>

Prevention

Originally, those seeking the passage of UNSCR 1325 held three central aims: the protection of women in warfare, increasing their participation in related decision-making structures and the gender mainstreaming of the overall peace process. However, many soon pointed out that the protection of women in war and their participation in efforts to end it left the *institution of war itself* firmly in place. As Cora Weiss, Director of Hague Appeal for Peace, noted in an advocates' meeting that preceded the passage of UNSCR 1325, the focus upon protection and participation meant that advocates were fighting to “*make war safe for women*” instead of actively seeking to put an end to the war phenomenon (Cohn, 2008). Therefore, activists sought to add a third “P” to the Women, Peace and Security agenda: the *prevention* of war.

However, it is very difficult to discern exactly what the Women, Peace and Security agenda means by the *prevention* of conflict. UNSCR 1325 itself uses the term only three times, and always in conjunction with the “resolution” of conflict – “prevention” itself is never defined. WPS advocates have identified certain actions contained within 1325 as evidence of prevention strategies, such as the “promotion of women’s rights,” by “prosecuting those responsible for war crimes,” “excluding sexual violence from amnesty agreements,” and “supporting local women’s peace initiatives” (See Figure 2.1 above). Yet none of these provisions articulate a clear strategy for the prevention of conflict.

The United Nations and the international community have tended to use the term “conflict prevention” in a narrow context, such as references to “early warning mechanisms” or to call for “interventionary forces in an impending genocide” (Cohn, 2008). UN Women states that achieving long-term conflict prevention requires “investment in cultures of peace, ” and that

women's participation can "provide a more comprehensive understanding of the causes and alternative solutions to conflict."⁵⁰ However, in describing "our solutions," UN Women provides a variety of vague examples, such as its work in Kyrgyzstan, where activists "regularly monitor violations of women's rights and risks of conflict outbreaks – in one case, they reached out through local television stations to prevent the spread of rumors related to the distribution of housing that might have otherwise fuelled tensions."⁵¹

Since the passage of 1325, it has become apparent that there is no clear strategy for the prevention of conflict. Many have argued that it is the most "overlooked" and "underutilized" tool of the Women, Peace and Security agenda.⁵² In reality, "conflict prevention" should be synonymous with disarmament – something that the Security Council has very little incentive to address since its five permanent members are amongst the biggest arms traders in the world (the US, Russia and China are the first, second and third largest exporters, respectively). In the absence of sincere efforts at disarmament, the ambiguity surrounding 'conflict prevention' as articulated by the Women, Peace and Security initiative is understandable.

Mainstreaming

The final goal of UNSCR 1325 is to "mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations." Whereas anti-discriminations laws and policies aim to remove institutional barriers to women achieving equality with men, 'gender mainstreaming' begins with the recognition that policy processes and outcomes are inherently shaped by gender differences (True, 2003). The UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) defines gender mainstreaming as "the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation,

⁵⁰ UN Women. "Conflict Prevention and Resolution." Accessed 15 October 2015 from: <http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/peace-and-security/conflict-prevention-and-resolution>

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid., and Murabit, Alaa. (September 15, 2015). "The Overlooked Tool in the Prevention of Conflict." Accessed 20 October, 2015 from: <https://www.devex.com/news/the-overlooked-tool-in-efforts-to-prevent-conflict-86906>

policies or programmes in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women and men an integral dimension of design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres.”⁵³ Despite the emphasis on incorporating the experiences and insights of both men and women, mainstreaming does not however aim to replace or override the need for gender units or policies and programs targeted specifically at women. Instead, the goal is to ensure that “women and men benefit equally” from all programs and policies, and that “inequality is not perpetuated.”⁵⁴ The gender mainstreaming of peace negotiations would require that the final peace agreement “recognize the special needs of women and girls’ and to ensure their human rights during and after a conflict. The adoption of a gender perspective in a peace agreement also entails ‘taking special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict’ (Gibbings, 2011).

Advocates have argued that mainstreaming offers opportunities for changing institutional norms in a way that creates gender equality in two primary ways. The first is via the creation of new policy networks at the local and transnational levels that can strengthen the effectiveness of lobbying on gender equality issues. True and Mintrom (2001) point to the more than 100 countries that have created state-level bureaucracies for gender mainstreaming as evidence of how the policy has transformed the normative framework of states. Secondly, advocates claim that mainstreaming is also able to challenge institutional norms by embedding new language in the policy-making world that reflects new norms of gender equality (True, 2003). Tryggestad

⁵³ Economic and Social Council, *Report of the Economic and Social Council for 1997*, UN GAOR, 52nd session. UN Doc A/52/3/Rev.1/Add.1 (18 September 1997).

⁵⁴ Ibid.

(2014) points out that whereas it normally takes decades for a new international norm to emerge and diffuse, UNSCR 1325, within a mere 10 years of its passage, had made the advancement of women's rights, especially their protection from conflict-related sexual violence, a "legitimate international security concern" and has become an "integral part of the discourse on international peace and security."⁵⁵

This is evidenced by the numerous UN policies, institutions and organs into which gender has been 'mainstreamed,' whereas throughout most of the UN's history 'women's concerns' were relegated to bodies and institutions created specifically to address them. Besides the adoption of the WPS framework within the Security Council, the General Assembly has also affirmed its commitment to and the importance of gender mainstreaming within the UN system.⁵⁶ The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has included gender discrimination and violence as examples of 'persecution' that can qualify an individual for refugee status.⁵⁷ The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) has mainstreamed its work, for example, by increasing the gender sensitivity of its field offices and trying to ensure that peace negotiations include women.⁵⁸ The Human Rights Council has mainstreamed its work and now nearly all of the human rights treaty bodies have addressed issues of women's rights in the texts of their treaties.⁵⁹ Nearly all of the specialized agencies throughout the UN system have

⁵⁵ Tryggstad cites the work of Hudson (2010) and Olonisakin (2011) in rendering this assessment.

⁵⁶ E.g. see the *2005 World Summit Outcome*, GA Res 60/1, UN GAOR, 60th session, 8th plenary meeting, Agenda Items 46 and 120, Supp 49, UN Doc A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005) [59]

⁵⁷ UNHCR, *Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the Context of Article 1A(2)*, UN Doc HCR/GIP/02/01 (7 May 2002).

⁵⁸ http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/gm_facts/Dpa.pdf

⁵⁹ E.g. see the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ('CERD'), *General Recommendation No 25: Gender Related Dimensions of Racial Discrimination*, UN Doc A/55/18 (20 March 2000); Human Rights Committee, *General Comment No 28: Equality of Rights between Men and Women (Article 3)*, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (29 March 2000)

instituted policies to mainstream gender into their work, including the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)⁶⁰, the International Labor Organization (ILO)⁶¹, the World Bank⁶² and the World Health Organization (WHO)⁶³. Even the Office for Disarmament Affairs has mainstreamed a gender perspective into its work, for example by recognizing the important role that women play in teaching their children about the dangers of landmines and working to support their activities.⁶⁴

However, despite mainstreaming's success in bringing gender issues to the forefront of policy-making processes, it has received a lot of criticism within feminist circles, which have questioned the extent to which mainstreaming actually empowers women. For example, some have pointed out that mainstreaming can allow for narrow interpretations which create isolated projects to address women's concerns in specific contexts while failing to promote the overall objective of gender equality (True, 2003). Others have worried that the embrace of feminist concerns via UNSCR 1325 within a masculine, hegemonic institution like the Security Council will divest them of their emancipatory potential. Otto (2009) for example, wrote that the United Nations' use of the term "gender" as a synonym for "women's issues" implies that there is a biological cause for inequality. This is in direct opposition to a feminist understanding of gender, which views the differences between men and women that have justified women's inequality as socially and culturally constructed.

Review of Women, Peace and Security Scholarship

Since its passage in 2000, a "cottage industry" of scholarship has sprung up surrounding UNSCR 1325 and its subsequent resolutions. This literature is often either descriptive or

⁶⁰ <http://www.ifad.org/gender/policy/action.htm>

⁶¹ <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/gender/newsite2002/about/action.htm>

⁶² For example, see: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGENDER/Resources/strategypaper.pdf>

⁶³ http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/9789241597708_eng_Text.pdf

⁶⁴ <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/gender/html/14marunmas.htm>

normative, although increasingly it is both. The descriptive literature seeks to describe “where the women are” located in peace processes. Much of this research has examined the connections between women’s anti-war activism and its role in the passage and functioning of UNSCR 1325 (Burke, Kot and Bunting, 2001; Cohen, 2008; Friedman, 2003; Porter, 2007; Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf, 2002). Kaufman and Williams (2010) studied the different (gendered) approaches to peace taken by men and women and demonstrated that women’s exclusion from formal political processes often leads them to create informal networks that ultimately seek an end to war. Cockburn (2007) similarly examined women’s responses to conflicts via movements such as the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), and the more recent Women in Black and Code Pink. She further analyzed the role that the WILPF played in the passage of UNSCR 1325 and the challenges that it was forced to confront in seeking its enforcement. On a broader scale, True and Mintrom’s (2001) examination of 157 country cases found that a transnational feminist movement was largely responsible for the adoption of national and international institutional mechanisms designed to promote gender equality and gender mainstreaming policies, including UNSCR 1325.

The normative literature offers a variety of justifications for the gender balancing and mainstreaming of peace processes. Arguably the foremost author on UNSCR 1325, Sanam Anderlini has written extensively on the project based upon her years of fieldwork and interview research with female practitioners engaged in conflict management and resolution and is a champion of the cause. Like many WPS researchers, Anderlini (2000; 2007) is critical of the gender-neutrality of the traditional security paradigm and expresses optimism about the transformative potential of women in all aspects of conflict prevention, management and resolution. She argues that women can play a role in creating and maintaining peace in a variety

of arenas such as governance, where women are often perceived as more honorable, more trustworthy, less likely to participate in corruption, and more likely to work cooperatively to achieve goals beyond their own self-interest. Similarly, she finds that women's participation in transitional justice programs such as war crimes tribunals and truth commissions can serve to inject more compassion into the overall process.

Anderlini's widely-cited Women Building Peace (2007), employs both of the two normative arguments primarily offered for gendering peace processes: 1) that the exclusion of women from a peace process is incompatible with the post-conflict democratic systems that the process is seeking to create (in simpler terms, that women have the *right* to take part in accordance with democratic ideals), and 2) that women possess (or are at least perceived to possess) inherent qualities that can enrich the peace process and its aftermath. The former argument, derived from functionalist theory and often pointing to the *essential* qualities of women as a causal variable, has become the one increasingly employed by WPS policymakers and scholars. For example, some 1325 advocates have argued that women possess particular skills and assets that can improve peacemaking efforts (Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings, 2004), that their behavior makes positive improvements to group decision-making efforts (Rehn and Sirleaf, 2003), in part because they work more collaboratively than do men (Hunt and Posa, 2001). Anderlini herself wrote that women are "transformative leaders" (p. 130) who are more likely to "seek the middle ground" (p. 129), and "have higher standards of ethical behavior" (p. 131).

Amongst WPS policymakers, such gendered notions are also popular. Affirming women's superiority in conflict resolution, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has been quoted as saying:

*Women, who know the price of conflict so well, are also better equipped than men to prevent or resolve it. For generations, women have served as peace educators, both in their families and in their societies. They have proved instrumental in building bridges rather than walls.*⁶⁵

Upon the adoption of UNSCR 1888 to Combat Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (2009), (former) US Secretary of State Clinton concurred, noting:

*..... let us not forget that it is often women who lead the call for peace in communities shattered by violence. We have seen women in this role from Liberia to Rwanda to Northern Ireland to Guatemala. Even when they suffer terrible losses in conflicts they had no part in starting, women have the will to reach across divisions, find common ground, and foster understanding.*⁶⁶

Such views are at least in part motivated by the opinions and perceptions of local peacemakers or others with on-the-ground experience, who often make similar claims about women's inherent suitability as peacemakers. For example, As Boru Roba, a male leader of a peace committee of elders in Ethiopia commented, "Women are better than men... they can play both a fuelling role and a cooling role in conflict (and) if men get initiated for conflict and women interject, the men might change their minds" (as quoted in McCabe, 2007). Senen Bacani, a (male) negotiator for the Government of the Philippines, has discussed the "woman's touch" that the female members of his delegation brought to the peace table.^{67 68}

Another aspect of WPS research has theorized about the language and discourses surrounding UNSCR 1325, such as those outlined above. Hudson (2005; 2010) examines how

⁶⁵ UN (n.d.) "Ten Stories the World Should Hear More About." Accessed online 4/4/2015 from: <http://www.un.org/events/tenstories/06/story.asp?storyID=700>

⁶⁶ United States Mission to the United Nations (2009). Accessed 2/4/2015 from: <http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2009/september/130054.htm>

⁶⁷ See quote from Senen Bacani, Government of the Philippines Peace Negotiator for talks with Moro Islamic Liberation Front, in Kababaihan at Kapayapaan. March 2014. Accessed 3/7/2015 from <http://www.un.org/news/Press/docs/2000/20001024.sgsm7598.doc.html>. Pg. 16

⁶⁸ All of these arguments point towards a universal 'womanhood' that entails shared inherent qualities of passivity, high regard for others, and a love for peace. The potential pitfalls of this approach will be dissected in much greater detail in the two theoretical chapters (3 and 4) that follow.

progressive transnational women's organizations have 'gendered' the global security discourse where there were once only 'masculine' understandings and cites UNSCR 1325 as the most salient example of gendering the security discourse. Hudson also discusses where 1325 has been put into practice, for example by African women's groups that have used the resolution to convince their own governments to increase their political presence. Shepherd (2008) examines how the discussions taking place within United Nations are able to translate language into real power. Unlike Hudson however, she offers a more critical view of the WPS' gendering of the initiative, arguing that 1325 has furthered harmful essentialist images of women. Puechguribal (2010) concurs that these "stereotyping" images of women continues to subordinate them as victims of males and masculinities. Cornwall, Harrison and Whitehead (2007) examine how the pervasive popularizations of these essentialist notions impact development narratives and practice.

Many other critical studies have examined the various challenges and failures in the implementation of 1325, citing a number of shortcomings: lack of funding (Anderlini, 2010), lack of empirical data and information upon which to base recommendations and policies (Anderlini 2010; Saarinen, 2013), and the failure to fully integrate civil society into the implementation strategies employed by the WPS initiative (Olonisakin, Barnes and Ikpe, 2011). Some are extremely skeptical of the real impact of the Women, Peace and Security initiative. Steinberg (in Kuehnast, et. al, 2011) for example, points out that despite extensive efforts, women are still largely excluded from peace processes, there exists a general lack of political will at the highest levels to implement 1325, and rape is still widely used as a weapon of war. Still others have been critical of the ways in which the WPS initiative has assumed that gender is synonymous with women (Shepherd, 2011), and that women are synonymous with peace

(Vayrynen, 2004; Otto, 2009; Charlesworth, 2008; Puechguirbal, 2010). These criticisms will be analyzed in greater detail in the two theory chapters that follow.

The Existing Quantitative Data on Women's Participation in Peace Processes

Case studies are most often employed by WPS researchers to further their arguments where quantitative empirical data has been lacking. Studies of the peace processes in Northern Ireland (Anderson, 2010; Fearon, 2002), Guatemala (Anderlini, 2004; Pankhurst, 2012), and Papua New Guinea (Sirivi and Mavini, 2004) for example, have proclaimed the successes of women's participation in negotiations. Others have examined where despite women's exclusion from formal processes, they have contributed to peace through informal methods such as in Liberia (Theobald, 2014), Sierra Leone (Mazurana and Carlson, 2004) and Burundi (Falch, 2010). Others have been more cautious in their findings, such as in the case of Sierra Leone (Barnes, 2010) and Côte d'Ivoire (Ogunsanya, 2007).

While quantitative data has been largely missing from WPS research, there have been a few notable exceptions. A number of researchers have attempted to empirically test the assertion that women's presence in peace negotiations will increase the likelihood that gender provisions will be included in the final peace agreement(s). Yet most have noted that the lack of data on individual participation in peace negotiations had forced them to abandon this enterprise.⁶⁹ The closest any researcher appears to have come is Laurel Stone, whose research has not been published by any academic journal at the time of writing.⁷⁰ Examining the participation of women as mediators, negotiators, witnesses and signatories in 182 peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2011, Stone concluded that a female presence in a peace process made the agreement twenty percent more likely to last at least two years and thirty-five percent more

⁶⁹ See for example, Saarinen (2013).

⁷⁰ See Paffenholz's (2015) policy briefing entitled "Fresh Insights on the Quality and Quantity of Women's Inclusion in Peace Processes" for a summary of her (unpublished, at the time of this writing) findings.

likely to last for at least fifteen years. However, Stone measures ‘women’s participation’ with a dichotomous variable that characterizes processes where there may have been a single woman serving in the largely symbolic (“token”) role of witness on the same level as a process that included significant numbers of women on one or more negotiating teams, or one that included a woman as mediator, and using this information to make sweeping generalizations about how gender-balancing a peace process increases the durability of peace. While other widely cited studies have used similar methodologies (e.g. see Nilsson’s (2011) study on the participation of civil society in peace negotiations), this research certainly leaves something to be desired.

More modest attempts at data collection have examined the number and type of gender provisions that have been successfully incorporated into peace agreements. Considering what it means to adopt a “gender perspective” by “counting” the number of gender provisions including in all peace agreements signed between 1990 and 2010, Bell and O’Rourke (2010) compiled a useful database, which found that only 16% of all peace agreements contain references to gender. However, whereas only 11% of agreements contained gender provisions before the passage of UNSCR 1325, that number increases to 27% in the post-1325 era, indicating that the resolution may have had an impact. They also found that references to gender are more likely to occur where the United Nations played a third party role in the peace process. Bell (2015) updated these findings through 2015 with a new “Women and Peace Agreements” dataset (PA-X), published by the Political Settlements Research Programme.⁷¹ Bell concluded that “very few agreements in a very small number of conflicts show any type of comprehensiveness in their provision for women and gender issues.” Bell also offered a limited initial analysis of several causal factors and found that those with the most ‘holistic’ reference to women result from highly internationalized processes where the UN was a signatory to the agreement. However,

⁷¹ The PA-X can be accessed online at: www.peaceagreements.org

Bell notes that “clearly more back-up case study work is needed to find out how and why [these provisions were] included and how well it reflected the scope and depth of women’s concerns.”

Finally, Ellerby (2013) sought to build upon Bell and O’Rourke’s understanding of how peace agreements address women’s concerns by coining the concept of *engendered security*. In Ellerby’s model, “engendered security” is an operationalization of UNSCR 1325 as a three-level concept that classifies the ways women are “brought into” security. Ellerby enlists the concept of engendered security in order to examine all intrastate peace agreements signed between 1991 and 2010 to elucidate where and when women’s issues are addressed in peace processes. In answering the question of *how* peace agreements become engendered however, Ellerby has thus far only employed her own framework to evaluate two peace processes: Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2002) which demonstrates the “negative pole” of “engendered security” by its failure to include gendered provisions, and the Darfur Peace Agreement (2006), which represents the “positive pole” of engendered security by addressing all four types of inclusion she outlines. In the case of the DPA, she found that the presence of a well-articulated women’s agenda, gender-aware actors and the opening of a political space for women were responsible for the successful inclusion of gender provisions in the final agreement.⁷² However, this only offers insight into a singular success story. Furthermore, neither Bell and O’Rourke nor Ellerby examine women’s participation in peace negotiations as a causal factor in the engendering of peace agreements. This question will be addressed in Chapter 6.

⁷² A “women’s agenda” was defined as a set of articulated provisions and priorities proposed to the negotiating parties with the goal of outlining how women should be included in peacebuilding activities. A “political space” represents a continuum of women’s participation in the process, from no involvement to indirect and direct access. A “gender-conscious process” was defined as “some combination of negotiators, mediators and/or both (who are) aware of engendered security and see it as complementary to other peace demands rather than in competition with them” (Ellerby, 2013).

What this Dissertation is Not: the “Other Half” of Gender

Although gender studies in international relations commonly indicate an exclusive focus upon women and women’s issues, this dissertation recognizes that there is a rich literature on men and men’s issues in international relations. For example, feminist scholars have offered extensive analysis of “militarized masculinities” (e.g. see Baaz and Stern, 2009; Dietrich, 2012; Ehrenreich, 1997; Enloe, 2002), whereby militaries promote a particular type of masculinity – one that is “premised on violence and aggression, institutional unity and hierarchy, ‘aggressive heterosexism and homophobia,’ as well as misogyny and racism” (Whitworth, 2005) – in order to socialize reluctant male soldiers to kill. However, this dissertation is narrowly focused upon UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, which as Ellerby (2013) has pointed out, is not “*Gender, Peace and Security.*” UNSCR 1325 acknowledges the absence or underrepresentation of women (not the overrepresentation of men) from existing security concepts and practices and seeks to add women to the discussion. Because men and masculinities are not a part of this discussion, this dissertation offers only a limited analysis of the implications of *being male* within the global system in keeping with its focus on the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

Summary

This chapter has provided an overview of UNSCR 1325, its rationale and how it has been employed in practice. Before advancing to the quantitative and qualitative tests of the Women, Peace and Security initiative’s claims (Chapters 5 and 6), the following two chapters will provide an exploration of its theoretical foundations and those of its critics. Specifically, Chapters 3 and 4 will offer a theoretical evaluation of the three central assertions of the WPS initiative: 1) that women are inherently more peaceful than men, 2) that women possess innate qualities that will

manifest in styles and strategies at the negotiating table that are distinct from men's, and 3) that women participating in peace negotiations will make it a priority to ensure the gender mainstreaming of the peace agreement.

CHAPTER 3

THEORY: PART I

This chapter reviews the theoretical foundations of UNSCR 1325 and the wider Women, Peace and Security initiative. As briefly outlined in Chapter 2, there are two theoretical rationales that have been employed in support of UNSCR 1325 broadly and the goal of increasing women's inclusion in peace negotiations more specifically: an "equality perspective" and an "effectiveness" perspective" (Olsson and Gizelis, 2015). The first rationale, an "equality" or "rights-based" perspective, calls for a greater female presence in peace processes based on their equal representation in the population and their basic human right to take part, which is valued as an end in itself (Melander and Bjarnegård, 2013). This concept originates from the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and was set in action by the UN's Millennium Development Goals. The goal of increasing women's participation in political, social and economic life is also mandated by CEDAW (the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women) and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action articulated at the Fourth World Conference on Women (1995). In addition to furthering women's rights, scholars have noted the benefits to global politics associated with greater gender equality. For example, empirical studies have found that states are less likely to use violence during militarized international disputes (Caprioli, 2000), more likely to limit the intensity of violence employed during times of crisis management (Caprioli and Boyer, 2001), and more likely to experience a successful peacekeeping initiative where women enjoy higher levels of

social and political equality (Gizelis, 2009). The second rationale, an “effectiveness” or “functionalist” perspective, argues that the essential qualities of women can help to effectuate international peace and security when women are included in peace processes (for example, see Anderlini, 2007; Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings, 2004; de Jonge Oudraat, 2013). Thus, instead of valuing women’s equality and rights as ends in themselves, they are “instrumentalized” as a means of achieving additional and more desirable ends via public and international policy (Melander and Bjarnegård, 2013). In feminist international relations’ theory, this viewpoint has long been associated with “standpoint feminism.”

In this chapter, I will delve more deeply into standpoint feminism as it is employed to provide the theoretical grounding for the WPS initiative. Functionalist rationales for the WPS agenda make three separate standpoint feminist claims, all of which attempt to demonstrate the ‘uniqueness’ of the feminine perspective with the ultimate goal of furthering the gender balancing and mainstreaming of peace processes. These three claims are:

- 1) That for both biological reasons such as motherhood and socio-cultural reasons such as their exclusion from decision-making spaces, women are inherently more peaceful than men, giving them a unique role to play during peace processes;
- 2) That men and women have distinct personality traits that result in divergent ‘masculine’ versus ‘feminine’ styles of mediation and negotiation – and because women are so often barred from participation in formal peace processes, their inclusion will change the dynamics at the negotiating table in a positive way; and

- 3) That *women* view themselves as representatives of women and their related concerns, which means that gender balanced peace negotiations will yield better outcomes for women in the final peace agreement(s).

The theoretical literature that follows will be divided into two chapters. Because this dissertation attempts to empirically test only the second and third of the above claims, the present chapter will briefly address the theoretical and empirical research pertaining to the first claim – that women are inherently more peaceful than men. The chapter that follows will provide an in-depth examination of the second and third claims and describe how each will be tested in the remaining substantive chapters (5 and 6). First however, this chapter will briefly describe the marginalization of feminist theory from international relations and more specifically, security theory. Next, it will outline the various feminist approaches to international relations and security theories. Then, it will provide a further exploration of standpoint feminism as it has been employed by the Women, Peace and Security initiative in support of the goals of UNSCR 1325.

Gender

The passage of UNSCR 1325 was the culmination of efforts by a transnational feminist movement to introduce the concept of gender into international relations where it was once absent. The Cold War era focus upon the ideological struggles between the superpowers of the US and the USSR had relegated issues such as ethnic conflict and gender to the backburner of both international politics and international relations' scholarship. During the 1990s, the lid was lifted from the ethnic and tribal conflicts that had simmered during the Cold War era and the number of civilian casualties in war rose to account for a staggering 90% of all deaths.⁷³ As it

⁷³ Machel, G. (1996). *Impact of armed conflict on children*. United Nations.

became increasingly obvious that women and children comprised the bulk of these deaths,⁷⁴ it too became apparent that conflict resolution strategies needed to undertake measures to address this travesty. It also became clear that gender was an important and under-recognized variable in war, security studies, and international relations more broadly.

Contrary to common usage, the term “gender” is not synonymous with “women.” But gender is certainly important because it is perhaps the first thing noticed and used to draw conclusions about an individual in social situations (McRae and Bodenhausen, 2000). According to Charlotte Hooper:

“Gender is neither a thing nor a property of an individual character. It is a property of collectivities, institutions, and historical processes. It is also a linking concept, whereby biological difference is engaged with, and social practices are organized in terms of, or in relation to, reproductive divisions” (2001: 35).

In this conceptualization it is thus understood that gender is “the social construction of sexual differences” (Keohane, 1998). Feminists generally define gender as “a set of socially constructed characteristics describing what men and women *ought* to be” (Tickner and Sjoberg, 2007). In its common usage, *gender* is considered to be only marginally related to *sex* – a biologically determined trait. While this distinction is helpful in that it “helps to detach gender inequalities from any putative inherent or natural bias,” other scholars view it as problematic because it “constructs a false dichotomy between biology and culture, which are highly interdependent.” In reality, the relationship is strongly intermingled: “biology provides diverse potentials and cultures limit, select and channel them” (Goldstein, 2001: 2).

Gender stereotypes, such as the association of men with strength, power and rationality, and the corresponding association of women with submission, emotion and caring, create

⁷⁴ See Neuwirth, Jessica. (2002). Women and Peace and Security: The Implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325. *Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy*. 253.

expectations about the characteristics and ‘proper’ behavior of men and women and offer reinforcement for role consistent behavior (Eagly and Carli, 2007). The expectations created by this ‘gender stereotype’ function as a binary that serves one of our most basic neurological functions: the use of cognitive ‘shortcuts’ that help our brains process and classify mass amounts of information into useable form (for example, see Ripley, 1993). In this way, gender can also be understood as an analytic category that leads us to view social reality in mutually exclusive, dichotomous terms. These dichotomous categories relate to one another in terms of domination/subordination, where the masculine is dominant and the feminine subordinate (Peterson and Runyan, 1993).

Feminists thus view gender as a relationship of power. At the heart of any feminist analysis is the view that the differentiation and relative positioning of women and men permeates every aspect of existing power structures (Enloe, 2004). Gendered power hierarchies privilege men’s knowledge and men’s experiences over those of women, and feminists have argued that this is particularly the case in international relations. Recognition of this fact allows us to understand that masculine and men’s experiences have formed the basis of most of our knowledge about international politics (Tickner, 1992).

International Relations and Security Theories

“In most fields of knowledge we have become accustomed to equating what is human with what is masculine. Nowhere is this more true than in international relations.”
- J. Ann Tickner, 1992

The study of international relations is heavily influenced by rational choice, which emerged from market-driven theories of economics (Tickner, 1992). The dominant IR paradigm, realism, emerged in a post-World War II era amongst European immigrants to the United States dedicated to studying the international system as it was, and not as it “should be.” According to

realist theory, the absence of any type of government between nations resulted in an ‘anarchic’ international system that was plagued by violence and made state governments and *statesmen* alone responsible for securing their populations. In this view, idealist attempts to form a utopian vision of the world á la the League of Nations was misguided and hindered *statesmen*’s ability to pursue power and security free of moral restraints (Morgenthau, 1948).

The shift to a more scientific “neorealism” in the late 1970s diverted focus from the “great man” as protector of the nation and towards a view the state as the central actor within the anarchic international system and the key to security, peace and social stability (Waltz, 1979). The security of the state is the central preoccupation for realists, and the absence of an international government with the ability to thwart the aggressions of others means that a state’s security is equivalent to the amount of (military) power it wields. This state of “self help” often results in a “security dilemma,” whereby the security-boosting measures taken by one state are viewed as threatening by another – ultimately resulting in the buildup of conventional and nuclear arms (“arms races”). In this neorealist worldview, domestic politics and its concerns: political struggles, economic relations, and of course issues such as gender inequality, were deemed all but irrelevant.

During the 1980s, “critical approaches” to the study of international relations began to highlight many important variables, such as race, ethnicity and class inequalities, which were almost entirely disregarded by the dominant realist school-of-thought in international relations. By the 1990s, one of these critical approaches, feminism, began to illuminate and correspondingly denounce the extraordinarily gendered nature of international relations. Feminists pointed out that not only do men dominate the international political system, IR scholarship is an almost exclusively male endeavor and one that adopts and promotes masculine

perspectives as a result of the range of topics it chooses to study, the central concerns of the discipline and its theoretical assumptions (Grant and Newland, 1991; Peterson and Runyan, 1993, 1998; Pettman, 1996; Tickner, 1992). Instead of magically creating gender ‘equality,’ the supposed gender ‘neutrality’ of international relations scholarship instead serves to mask gender subordination and render women and their roles in international relations almost entirely invisible (Enloe, 1990; Peterson, 1992; Tickner, 1992).

Feminists provide numerous examples of such biases. In particular, they fault the realist conception of the nation-state for its roots in a patriarchal system⁷⁵ that supports a hierarchy of relations along social, economic and racial lines (Still, 1998; Stean, 1998). To feminists, the centrality of the nation-state means that concepts such as ‘power’ and ‘security’ are only understood in relation to how they affect those who occupy the top of that power hierarchy. Secondly, realists offer up a number of behavioral prescriptions for states wishing to survive in the anarchic international system that include autonomy, self-reliance and rationality. Feminists argue that it is no coincidence that these qualities are typically associated with a socially constructed, ‘ideal-type’ masculinity (Tickner, 1992). The privileging of these qualities serves to reinforce the belief that military and foreign policy are the areas least appropriate for women, and that the national defense should therefore not be entrusted to them (Tickner, 1992).

Hence to feminists, realism, and international relations broadly construed, are highly gendered enterprises that ignore the varied human experiences that might hold the potential for creating new possibilities and ways of thinking about interstate practices (Young, 2004). They further reject the compartmentalization of ‘international politics’ from ‘domestic politics,’ which

⁷⁵ According to Laguna Puebla scholar Paula Gunn Allen, “patriarchy is an order of domination elevating some men over other men and all men over women.” Code (2002: 378) defines patriarchy as a hierarchical system in which females are subordinate to men in terms of power and status and one that is based upon a belief that “it is right and proper for men to command and women to obey.”

is viewed as forcing the issues that matter to women in war, peace and politics even further outside the disciplinary boundaries. Amongst other prescriptions, feminists have called for a revision of established realist concepts such as ‘security’ and ‘power.’ Ultimately, most believe that as long as gendered power hierarchies continue to dominate international relations and the study of it, it is doubtful that we can achieve a more just and peaceful world (Tickner, 1992).

Feminist Security Studies (FSS)

Conventional IR and security studies view conflict from a systemic, structural or “top down” perspective that focuses upon issues of war and peace between sovereign states. The state is responsible for protecting members of the polity from threats originating outside its borders (Blanchard, 2003) – which are a constant and inevitable result of anarchy. In this rationalist conception, the origins of war are rooted in power asymmetries between states, miscalculations of capabilities or misunderstandings. When there is an absence of war between states, or what Galtung (1996) termed “negative peace,” security scholars are generally content to claim that security exists at the individual (personal) level.

Feminists on the other hand, object to these ‘statist ontologies’ that define security in such dichotomous terms as ‘war’ versus ‘peace’ (Tickner, 2001: 62). Feminist studies of security take a “bottom up” approach to security that begins at the micro-level, examining, for example, the impact that war has on civilians, particularly women. While traditional security studies see peace as the “absence of war,” feminist authors such as Betty Reardon have looked to Galtung’s concept of “positive peace” as more appropriate for describing what peace means to women.⁷⁶ Galtung saw ‘positive peace’ as the cessation of violence *and* the existence of a secure

⁷⁶ For example, see Reardon (2010) *Human Rights Learning: Pedagogies and Politics of Peace*. San Juan, Puerto Rico: UNESCO Chair for Peace Education, University of Puerto Rico, 2010. See also Reardon, Betty and Anthony

society that meets the basic needs of all of its members. To Reardon, this implies a society founded on economic equality, social justice and ecological harmony. Jacoby (2005) examined the range of feminist theories on peace and settled on a definition that pointed to “the elimination of insecurity and danger,” and “the enjoyment of economic and social justice, equality, and the entire range of human rights and fundamental freedoms” and the existence of person to person relationships built upon “trust, cooperation and recognition of interdependence and importance of the common good and mutual interests of all peoples.”⁷⁷ Other feminists such as Brock-Utne (1989) have more radically argued that ‘positive peace’ means a society that is free from the hierarchy of patriarchy and the violence it produces. Hence, the absence of violence and the universal existence of equality between men and women, human rights, freedoms and social justice are required within a feminist conception of peace.

Needless to say, the grim realities of life for women living in both war and peacetime demonstrate that the feminist conception of peace eludes every nation on earth. Gender-based violence during wartime has become common in the post-Cold War era, as evidenced by the horrifying war-time rape statistics in Rwanda (between 250,000 and 500,000 women are estimated to have been raped during the genocide⁷⁸), Burundi (where an average of 25 women per week were raped), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (where estimates have ranged up

Jenkins (2007). *Gender and Peace: Towards a Gender-Inclusive, Holistic Perspective*, in *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies*. Johan Galtung and C. Webel, eds. New York: Routledge.

⁷⁷ Tami Amanda Jacoby, *Women in Zones of Conflict: Power and Resistance in Israel* (Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 13.

⁷⁸ A study of the 1994 Rwandan genocide found that almost 75% of women had experienced sexual violence, typically in the form of rape by individual men or groups of men. See Codou Bop, “Women in Conflicts, Their Gains and Their Losses,” in *The Aftermath: Women in Post Conflict Transformation*, Sheila Meintjes, Anu Pillay, and Meredith Turshen, eds. London: Zed Books.

to 48 women raped *per hour*⁷⁹). As Major General Patrick Cammaert⁸⁰ has noted, “*it has now probably become more dangerous to be a woman than a soldier in modern conflict.*”⁸¹”

That women suffer the excruciating effects of war-related violence should not however draw attention away from the everyday insecurity they face living under a system of global patriarchy. Feminist security scholars are particularly critical of the notion that traditional security policies provide true security in the context of daily life, and much feminist scholarship has aimed to illuminate the normalized, everyday practices that contribute to women’s insecurity. One particularly shocking study found that the cost of “being female” (as measured by the number of women “missing” from the 20th century as a result of sex-selective abortion, female infanticide, egregious maternal mortality rates, disproportionate childhood mortality and murder/suicide rates), is about 162 million: greater than the death toll from all war and civil strife that occurred during 20th century, including both World Wars, Stalin’s reign, and Mao’s Great Leap Forward (Hudson, et. al, 2012). Furthermore, “everyday” gendered violence for many women is found in practices such as honor killings, female genital cutting, dowry-related violence, acid throwing, sexual slavery, sexual harassment and emotional abuse.

However, it is also essential to recognize that gender-based violence is not only a phenomenon in the developing world or in countries embroiled in conflict. Currently in the United States for example, a woman is raped every six minutes, and many of these crimes are committed with impunity: out of every 100 rapes only 32 are reported to police⁸²; 7 lead to an

⁷⁹ This shocking statistic dwarfed numbers reported in previous studies. It estimated the incidence of rape amongst women in the DRC aged 15 to 49 years in the 12 months prior to the survey, which was taken in 2007. See Peterman, Amber, Tia Palermo and Caryn Bredenkamp. (2011). “Estimates and determinants of sexual violence against women in the Democratic Republic of Congo.” *American Journal of Public Health*. 101(6).

⁸⁰ Cammaert was the Eastern Division commander of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). See Cammaert and Blythe (2013).

⁸¹ See UNOCHR report online at: <http://www.ohchr.org/en/newsevents/pages/rapeweaponwar.aspx>

⁸² Justice Department, *National Crime Victimization Survey: 2008-2012*

arrest⁸³; 3 are referred to prosecutors⁸⁴; 2 lead to a felony conviction: sadly, this means that only 2 out of every 100 rapists will spend a day in prison.⁸⁵ Another example of women's everyday insecurity can be seen in the nearly 12,000 American women murdered by their current or ex-partners between 2001 and 2012.⁸⁶ When this number is set beside the total number of American troops killed in the *wars* in Afghanistan and Iraq during the same period – 6,448⁸⁷ – the perils of gender-based violence is clear. Women's insecurity is thus a pervasive, worldwide phenomenon, the implications of which are not fully or accurately recognized.

In light of such revelations, feminist security scholars have questioned exactly *whom* traditional security and international relations theories are securing. They point to the gender-based violence committed in wartime as just one example of how (in)security has shifted to the individual, which ultimately has rendered much of IR's traditional preoccupation with state security dubious (Hansen, 2000). Therefore, feminists have argued that is necessary to employ “gendered lenses” in our analyses of important topics in international relations such as war, security and peace. At the heart of a feminist approach to security is a recognition that, “girls and women experience human insecurity differently from men and are subject to gender hierarchies and power inequities that exacerbate their insecurity” (McKay, 2004: 153). This is not to say that men and boys are not also threatened by a conventional gendered approach to security, only that it is necessary to apply gender lenses to more fully understand the differential ways in which men and women are impacted. But it also necessarily requires the recognition

⁸³ FBI, *Uniform Crime Reports, Arrest Data: 2006-2010*

⁸⁴ FBI, *Uniform Crime Reports, Offenses Cleared Data: 2006-2010*

⁸⁵ Department of Justice, *Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties: 2009*

⁸⁶ US Department of Justice Report (2013). “Intimate Partner Violence.” Accessed online 9/10/2015 from: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BzR_9M-1WtJTWmVrNGs3VTkwUFE/edit

⁸⁷ This point was initially made by Gloria Steinham in an Associated Press article, which can be accessed online here: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/steinem-domestic-violence-discussion-a-positive/2014/10/01/9e3508c6-4951-11e4-a4bf-794ab74e90f0_story.html

that because of their lower status, girls and women are less able to articulate and act upon their security needs, as compared with boys and men (McKay, 2004: 153).

Feminists have also been critical of our gender-biased understandings of peace processes and the negotiation of peace agreements that persist in traditional security studies. Aoláin (2006) for example, has argued that usage of such terminology as “security,” “disarmament” and “violation” are highly gendered. “Security” has referred to *state* instead of *individual* or *human* security, “disarmament” has referred to the removal of arms from the *public* sphere instead of the *private*, and the usage of “violation” has stopped short of naming violence against women as relevant or as falling within the realm of accountability for perpetrators. Furthermore, other feminist authors have challenged traditional notions of a “post-conflict peace” by revealing the numerous forms of violence that persist once “warfare” as traditionally defined have ceased. Schnabel and Tabyshalieva (2013) write:

... “the inequalities, inequities and injustices that have caused much of the violence endured by women before and during the war, often continu[e] unabatedly in the post-war period. . . .Rape and sexual harassment, forced pregnancy, marriage, divorce, prostitution and trafficking do not end with the conclusion of peace dialogues or the signing of a formal peace agreement” (p. 12 – 13).

Because the dominant theories in international relations have turned a blind eye to gender-related issues, they have therefore insufficiently conceptualized important topics such as how to define “war” and “peacetime,” whom should be viewed as the actors in war, and the implications of gender inequalities in fighting wars and making peace (Sjoberg, 2013: 7). And problematically, in cases where ‘mainstream’ IR has examined gender as related to the ‘big issues’ in the discipline such as conflict or peace negotiations, it has most likely been done in very gendered terms with women as portrayed as victims, peacemakers, or pacifists (Kaufman and Williams, 2013). Ultimately, appropriately employing a gender lens leads us to examine a

group of causal variables that are often neglected but which can significantly further our current understandings of international relations, such as structural gender inequality, a cycle of gendered violence, state masculine posturing, the influence of emotion in political interactions, a gendered understanding of power, and states' mistaken understandings of their own autonomy and unitary nature (Sjoberg, 2013: 7).

Multiple Feminisms

Complicating attempts to bring women and gender to the forefront of international relations, war and conflict resolution studies is the fact that there are multiple definitions of feminism and multiple feminist theoretical perspectives. These perspectives largely disagree on what constitutes discrimination and how to overcome it, although they share a common goal in seeking to challenge or even tear down existing distributions of power, particularly where they serve to subordinate women. Feminists understand gender as *power*, and therefore seek to examine the ways that gendered power configures and is configured by political events, whether global or domestic (Sjoberg, 2013: 45). However, the differing epistemological groundings amongst the various types of feminism have also complicated efforts to achieve this common objective.

The goal of liberal feminism is to eliminate legal obstacles to women's inequality. At the center of this viewpoint is an embrace of the capitalist marketplace and a belief in individual autonomy to operate within it. Hence, liberal feminists do not call for any type of radical restructuring of the system; instead, they argue that it is possible to work within the prevailing framework in order to effectuate change (Vincent, 2003). In terms of international relations and security issues, liberal feminists seek to address the invisibility of women and to increase their involvement within the existing framework. Because of the liberal logic of self-interest, it is

assumed that individuals will involve themselves in those public issues that are most likely to impact them personally. Thus, liberal feminist arguments for involving greater numbers of women in conflict resolution hinge on the notion that because women suffer the most from war, women “want” peace more than men (Vincent, 2003).

Radical and Marxist/socialist feminists on the other hand, view the global system of patriarchy as the source of women’s oppression and argue that it is impossible to remedy the power imbalance between men and women by working within the existing framework. Fundamental social transformation is therefore necessary. Interestingly, it was out of this more radical tradition that feminist ‘standpoint’ theory evolved amongst a group of feminists who were disaffected by Marxian thought and practice (Harding, 2004: 2). At its core, standpoint feminism argues that existing social scientific theories have ignored women’s experiences, activities and viewpoints, which are necessarily different from those of men as a consequence of women’s social status and their position within the sexual division of labor. Gender is thus constitutive: women (as a group) are different than men (Hudson, 2005), and in order to correct the injustice of ‘gender blindness,’ it is necessary to identify the set of experiences, activities and patterns of thinking, feeling and acting that can be classified as “female.” In doing so, standpoint feminist theory serves to transform women’s consciousness by legitimizing female activities and experiences in the public realm (Vincent, 2003).

Many feminists are however, uncomfortable with the universal, functionalist and essentialist notions upon which liberal and standpoint feminisms rest. In particular, impoverished women, rural women, women living within the so-called “Third World,” women of color, and lesbians felt that liberal and standpoint feminisms failed to take their lives, concerns and problems into account. At the United Nations conferences to address women’s issues in

Mexico (1975) and Copenhagen (1980), female delegates from the global south lamented that their counterparts from wealthy countries had dramatically over-emphasized issues of sexual and legal equality rather than economic and political ones (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 170). Such failures to account for the complicated ways that race, class and sex inform the category of gender instead “force[d] a false unity of women” (Sandoval, 2000). These critics, collectively known as “postmodern” or “poststructuralist” feminists, deny that any singular category of “women” exists – instead, every individual is comprised of multiple, overlapping identities, all of which are social constructions with no real basis in reality (Vincent, 2003). Obviously, the focus upon women’s multiple identities stands in direct opposition to standpoint feminist claims regarding the existence of a universal “women’s perspective,” and poststructuralists insist that such “master narratives” are ill-advised (Hudson, 2004).

Yet despite postmodern/post-structuralist criticisms, the WPS framework is largely constructed upon both liberal and standpoint feminist claims that point to a universal category of womanhood that encompasses the values of nurturing, empathy, and peacefulness (Vincent, 2003). This is not to say that all supporters of UNSCR 1325 are standpoint feminists, nor that standpoint feminism provides the only feminist rationale for the initiative. The following section will evaluate the ways in which UNSCR 1325 and the corresponding WPS initiative have utilized standpoint feminist theory to back their calls for the gender mainstreaming of peace processes and specifically, the inclusion of more women at the peace table.

UNSCR 1325 and Standpoint Feminism

“In this Encuentro, men cannot participate as note-takers, translators, presenters, spokesmen, or representatives. Men can only work making food, sweeping and cleaning the Caracol and the latrines, taking care of the children, and carrying firewood. On January 1, things will return to normal.”

– signs posted outside the Third Encuentro (Gathering) of the Zapatista People with the People’s of the World Women’s Forum⁸⁸.

As noted in the previous chapter, there are two primary arguments for including women in peace processes: the first is the rights-based framework which advocates for women’s participation in conflict resolution based on their composition of 50% or more of the population. The second is the increasingly employed essentialist and functionalist approach taken by standpoint feminists and UNSCR 1325 advocates more generally (Olsson and Gizelis, 2015: 2). This view is consistent with standpoint feminism, which points to the essential qualities of women as a source for the improvement of policymaking processes and decisions, specifically peace negotiations and agreements in the context of conflict resolution. Standpoint feminism offers two potential reasons that women are more “peaceful,” “cooperative” and “empathetic” than men and thus better equipped to ensure peace in their societies. The first points to biology: women are thought to possess such characteristics by virtue of their ‘womanhood’ and their ability as mothers to ‘bring life into the world,’ which imbue women with a greater capacity for nurturing.⁸⁹ The second argument looks to the socially constructed consequences of being biologically female. In this argument, women are more conscious of gender inequality because of their devalued gender status, which is almost universally lower than that of men’s, and

⁸⁸ Quoted by Tenuto, Mary Ann. (2008). “Zapatista Women Touch our Hearts.” *Chiapas Support Committee Newsletter*. Accessed 4/3/2014 from: <http://www.chiapas-support.org/newsletterApril08.pdf>

⁸⁹ See for example, Hunt (2013). For an earlier conceptualization, see Ruddick (1989).

particularly so in conflict and post-conflict countries.⁹⁰ This has in turn resulted in more negative life experiences and ultimately impelled women to develop a “feminist consciousness.”⁹¹ As esteemed feminist researcher Cynthia Cockburn (1999) put it: “If women have a distinctive angle on peace, it ... [has to] do with knowing oppression when we see it.”⁹²

WPS advocates have roundly criticized “male-dominated” peace processes for their near-exclusive focus on “masculine” power issues and their minimization of the “core” issues of exclusion/inclusion and social in/justice that underpin war in the first place. The exclusion of women also means that important issues such as power-sharing, devolution, autonomy, constitutional reform, parliamentary reform, access to land and property, and security system reform are only partially addressed.⁹³ For WPS advocates, the logical implication of a shared ‘womanhood’ is that increasing women’s participation will impel traditionally masculine institutions to embrace some of these “feminine” principles and concerns. This is posited to work in two ways.

First, it is argued that as women are added to exclusively male decision-making bodies, their positive shared attributes will have an impact upon *process* by improving group dynamics and deliberations (DeGroot, 2001). For example, some WPS advocates have claimed that in decision-making environments, women utilize their inherent ‘feminine’ assets and skills, which can create an environment of greater cooperation and enhance peacebuilding (for example, see Anderlini, 2000, 2007; Cohn, et. al, 2004). In the context of peace negotiations, such claims

⁹⁰ For example, while the global net educational enrollment in primary school for girls is 90%, in conflict and post-conflict countries it is only 73%. While the global maternal mortality rate is 210 women per 100,000 live births, in conflict and post-conflict countries it more than doubles to 531 deaths per 100,000 births. See UN Women infographic on armed conflict, accessed 5/5/2014 from: <http://beijing20.unwomen.org/en/infographic/armed-conflict>

⁹¹ See Martin, et. al (2014).

⁹² Although Cockburn would likely disagree with being labeled a ‘standpoint feminist.’

⁹³ Potter, Antonia, “Gender Sensitivity, Nicety or Necessity in Peace Processes”, Oslo Forum Briefing Pack (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2008), pp. 54-65.

imply that women and men will employ distinct strategic behaviors in their roles as mediators or negotiators. The second argument relates to outcomes, with some WPS advocates arguing that women develop a “feminist consciousness” as a result of the higher levels of oppression suffered amongst them in comparison to men. Accordingly, they claim, women are not only more aware of gender issues and more likely to raise them during peace negotiations but also more likely to raise issues that affect society as a whole, such as land reform, access to loans, and capacity-building.⁹⁴ The logical implications of such arguments are that if women participate in peace negotiations, they will work to ensure that the issues disproportionately affecting women will be included in final peace agreements and that we should see “gender mainstreamed” agreements as a result.

These two distinct hypotheses (i.e. the second and third claims made by standpoint feminists in support of UNSCR 1325 as outlined at the beginning of this chapter) are evaluated empirically in the following chapters of this dissertation. Because this project will not attempt to empirically test standpoint feminist claim #1 (that women are inherently more peaceful than men), the remainder of this chapter will be dedicated to examining the existing research surrounding this question and discussing the implications for the two remaining standpoint feminist claims that this dissertation will test empirically in Chapters 5 and 6.

First Theoretical Claim: Women as Inherently Peaceful

There exists a lengthy history of women’s support for and participation in violence, although that violence is often overlooked or misconstrued by history books, the media, and most significantly to this project, the international policy community. As Joshua Goldstein (1998) notes, “a ‘substantial number of women soldiers have given their lives in wars throughout the

⁹⁴ *Women, Peace and Security*, study submitted by the Secretary General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), U.N. Publ. (2002), Para 191 at 61.

century’, “...women...have always and everywhere been inextricably involved in war, [yet] hidden from history... during wars, women are ubiquitous and highly visible; when wars are over and the war songs are sung, women disappear” (p. 59). The recognition of women in warfare has begun only recently, which Goldstein (p. 59) attributes to the work of feminist scholars.

History is rife with examples of women’s support for warfare. As “patriotic” wives and mothers, women are often responsible for beating the drum for war (Enloe, 1998: 54-55). Women have also been responsible for spreading “hate speech” and instilling a hatred for the enemy in the ‘next generation:’ their children (Fielding, 2014). Recently, much attention has focused upon women’s support for violence committed by the Islamic State (IS, ISIS or ISIL). In particular, curiosity surrounds Western-raised Muslim women who travel to live under the Islamic State, considering its use of violence has repulsed most of the world. A recent study of ISIS women’s conduct on social media has noted that women appear not only “desensitized to the horrific nature of the violent acts” committed by ISIS, but that they seem to “revel in the gore and brutality of the organization.” For example, one female Twitter user and supporter of IS wrote of her pleasure in watching a beheading video: “I was happy to see the beheading of that kaafir [non-believer], I just rewinded to the cutting part. Allahu akbar! [God is the greatest!] I wonder what was he thinking b4 the cut” [sic] and requested “more beheadings please!”⁹⁵

Although it is discussed and written about relatively rarely, women also serve as combatants and perpetrate wartime atrocities. Perhaps this notion is surprising only because of the gendered assumptions that scholars and policymakers often make about women’s capacity to commit violence (Cohen, 2013). This is because “gender discourses dominate today’s increasing recognition of and concern for women’s violence. In these gendered discourses, deviant women

⁹⁵ From Hoyle, C., Bradford, A., & Frenett, R. (2015). *Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to ISIS*. Report of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Accessed 6/8/2014 from: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ISDJ2969_Becoming_Mulan_01.15_WEB.PDF.

are set up in opposition to idealized gender stereotypes” (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007: 7), which paint men as the aggressors and protectors and women as the victims and those in need of protection. Hence, acts of violence committed by women are characterized as the exception to clearly understood gender norms (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007: 7). While the WPS initiative furthers the idealized stereotype of the “peace-loving woman,” many researchers question this – Steans (1998) wrote that it is “probably the case that women’s peacefulness is as mythical as male violence” (p. 92). Others have denounced such notions as “trite” and “misleading” in light of the violence carried out by women, noting that “in violent situations, women can be just as ferocious as men” (Mansaray, 2000).

There should be no question that the image of women as *purely* victims of violent conflict is incorrect and ignores the growing number of female combatants in warfare (Coulter et al. 2008; El Jack 2003; Cockburn 2001; de Watteville 2002; Ibanez, 2001; Krog, 2001; Mason, 2005; Moser 2001; Peteet, 1997). Yet we still lack accurate ways in which to describe female-perpetrated violence, its causes, and how to address it. Therefore, both the scholarly literature and mainstream discourses need to begin with a proper acknowledgement of women’s role in violence and as combatants – only then can we achieve a proper understanding of the gendered dimensions of warfare.

Only very recently has research on international relations and conflict begun to acknowledge the large numbers of women who have participated as combatants both historically and in the modern era. One recent study found that tens of thousands of women and girls from fifty-nine countries have joined armed opposition groups and participated in armed struggles (Mazurana, in Cohen, 2013b: 148). Henshaw’s (2015) cross-national examination of 72 rebel groups active since 1990 finds that women are active participants in over fifty percent of these

movements, carry out attacks in at least one-third, and play leadership roles in one-quarter. Furthermore, women's participation in rebel or non-state actor groups existed in every region of the world, ranging from a low participation rate in 18% of all Sub-Saharan African groups to a 100% rate in Latin America. Women comprise significant proportions of combatants in some of these groups, including an estimated 20% of Maoist rebels in Nepal⁹⁶, and between a startling 40 – 50% of FARC guerillas in Colombia (Stanski, 2006: 140).

The types of violence in which women participate is also surprising and challenges the 'women and peace' discourse. Accounts from victims and other combatants have described some women who were more cruel and more feared than the male combatants (Coulter et al. 2008; Olonisakin 1995; Utas 2005), with terrifying accounts of women like Alice "Cut Hands," who tortured and amputated the limbs of her victims (Mansaray, 2000). In Sierra Leone, women combatants were reported to participate in rape and other forms of sexual violence against other women, by identifying victims for their male counterparts to target, by holding them down to be raped, and sometimes even by participating in the rapes themselves (that is, by inserting objects into the victim's bodies). In fact, female perpetrators were involved in an estimated one in four gang rapes during the conflict (Cohen, 2013). Similarly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 41% of female victims of sexual violence reported that women were amongst their attackers while 10% of male victims reported a female perpetrator (Johnson, et. al, 2010).

The image of the female suicide bomber both fascinates and horrifies the public's imagination, and statistics show that women's participation in such violence is not rare. Women have carried out an estimated 230 suicide attacks between 1985 and 2008 – a number that comprises about a quarter of the total (Bloom, 2012). One recent study shows that this number is

⁹⁶ United Nations' Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) estimate cited in Ariño, M. V. (2008). Nepal: A Gender View of the Armed Conflict and Peace Process. *Quaderns de Construcció de Pau*, (4). Accessed 6/4/2014 from: http://escolapau.uab.es/img/qcp/nepal_conflict_peace.pdf

accelerating, estimating that 50 women carried out suicide attacks between 2000 and 2004 alone (Rush and Schafluetzel-Iles, 2007). Female suicide bombings seem to have begun in Lebanon in the 1980s, Iraq, Palestine, and more recently in Chechnya, where Commander Shamil Basayev has boasted of his command over a battalion of “black widows” ready to sacrifice their lives on his orders (Kurtz and Bartles, 2007). Before its complete destruction at the hands of the Sri Lankan military, the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam also possessed a squad of female suicide bombers. One of these LTTE women, Thenmozhi Rajaratnam (alias “Dhanu”), infamously assassinated Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in a 1991 suicide bombing (Parashar, 2010: 184).

Women and girls’ motivations for joining armed groups are diverse. Some are abducted and forced to support the armed groups’ activities or serve in combat roles. Sierra Leone is a textbook example, where it is estimated that up to 93% of women combatants were kidnapped and forced to into their combatant roles (Cohen, 2013a). Others join because fighting represents a better option than staying home and being harassed, raped or murdered by rebel groups or state security forces. Still others are seeking revenge or redemption: for their humiliation or mistreatment at the hands of state security forces or other armed groups, or for the death of a family member. For example, the loss of a husband has been identified as a major motivating factor for female suicide bombers who see no potential for their future aside from martyrdom (Bloom, 2011). But many more join because it is the ultimate expression of one’s agency, male or female. As Mazurana notes, “militarization can appeal to women and girls because it promises them equality, self-worth, the right to be taken seriously and to operate within an elite, respected force, the opportunity to avenge past (usually gendered) transgressions, and liberation (in Cohen, 2013b: 167).

Male Perpetrated Violence

While it is imperative to challenge inaccurate stereotypes that paint women everywhere as pacifists, it is equally necessary to recognize that statistically speaking, men are still the primary perpetrators of violence. While Goldstein (2001: 59 – 127) scoured the historical record to uncover numerous and fascinating exceptions to all-male fighting forces, the exceptions amount to less than 1% of all warriors in history, causing him to note that “the uniformity of gender in war fighters is striking” (p. 10). But contrary to essentialist portrayals, many have argued that killing in war is no more ‘natural’ for men than it is for women. ‘In all war, on any side, there are men frightened and running, fighting reluctantly and eager to get home, or even courageously resisting their orders to kill’ (Ruddick, 1998: 218, cited in Vojdik, 2002). In World War II, approximately one quarter of troops evacuated to Army facilities were not physically injured, but were overwhelmed by battle, “babbling, crying, shaking, or stunned, unable to hear or talk” (Goldstein, 2001: 258).

Thus, because the military cannot rely on an innate violence within men, cultures develop strict gender roles that equate masculinity with toughness, courage under fire, and patriotism (Goldstein, 2001: 274; Tickner, 1992: 40). Non-state actor groups also rely on recruiting from within certain sectors of society that are militarized in ways that help spur males to believe they are brave protectors of their families and cultures (Mazurana, in Cohen, 2013b). Vojdik (2002) compiled a shocking survey of how militaries compel men to fight through “veritable tests of manliness that challenge men to prove their masculinity by eradicating the feminine.” Such ‘tests’ include recruits being denigrated as ‘sissies’ and ‘fags,’ forced to endure sado-sexual hazing practices, taught to feminize the enemy and sometimes even encouraged or forced to participate in group harassment and gang rape.

In describing these notions of manhood, Connell (1983) coined the term "hegemonic masculinity." While hegemonic masculinity does not describe the actual personality traits of most men, it is a socially constructed and culturally dominant masculinity that subordinates all other masculinities and is used to sustain patriarchal authority and legitimize a patriarchal political and social order. Hegemonic masculinity also stands in opposition to and denigrates femininity (Hooper, 2001). Under such a system, where "femininity is devalued and male expressions of femininity render men's masculinity as suspect, males are under tremendous pressure to prove that they are "real men" (Peterson and Runyan, 2013: 60). Many gender researchers have argued that this global system of hegemonic masculinity is what coerces men to fight and even kill in service of their countries, leaders or ideological movements. Indeed, interviews with many former combatants have revealed that they regretted raping or killing and did so against their own wishes, often because they were ordered to do so to prove their loyalty and to share in culpability.⁹⁷

In light of the increasingly documented examples of female-perpetrated violence and an acknowledgment of the pressures to fight that males face under a system of hegemonic masculinity, many scholars have challenged the longstanding association of women with peace and men with war and violence. It is imperative to recognize that neither men nor women are 'natural perpetrators of violence.' Instead, we must understand that under certain conditions, combatants of both sexes may face enormous social pressure to commit violence and that both sexes are likely to respond to such pressures in similar ways (Cohen, 2013). Many feminist scholars have argued that the proportionally fewer examples of women committing atrocities against other human beings in comparison with their male counterparts can largely be attributed

⁹⁷ See United States Institute of Peace, 2010. Special Report: Rape in War: Motives of Militia in DRC. Accessed 4/5/2015 from: <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/SR243Kelly.pdf>

to their lack of opportunity rather than a lack of natural ability (Mansaray, 2000; Christensen, 2006; Stean, 1992). For example, when given the opportunity (i.e. her position as the National Minister of Family and Women's Affairs for Rwanda), Pauline Nyiramasuhuko participated in violence against members of her own community with the same zeal as did the male ministers (Drumbl, 2012). That women can perpetrate killings and even participate in the rape of both women *and* men serves as a challenge to conventional wisdom and prevailing gender stereotypes. It is therefore imperative that scholars and policy makers adjust essentialist paradigms of violence and direct attention to female perpetrators and male survivors where necessary, especially with regard to ensuring justice for victims and reintegrating former combatants into civilian life. There are a number of implications of the failure to do so.

Challenges Posed to WPS Assumptions by Women's Violence

The stereotyping of men and women's roles and conduct in war and peacetime presents a variety of problems. The 'male' stereotype associated with hegemonic masculinity serves to support a militaristic national agenda where war is always among the policy options in interstate relations (Confortini, 2006). The 'feminine' stereotype not only ignores women's agency in the commission of violence, it does further damage by perpetuating women's marginalization from politics. As Cynthia Enloe (2002) puts it, "militarized masculinity is a model of masculinity that is especially likely to be imagined as requiring feminine complement that excludes women from full and assertive participation in postwar public life" (p. 23).

Tickner (1999) offers a telling example in her rebuke of Francis Fukuyama's (1998) *Women and the Evolution of World Politics* article, where the prolific author praises women's inherently peaceful nature and argues that their increasing numbers as decision-makers in the developed world will lead to a more cooperative and less conflict-prone international relations.

His ultimate agenda however, is to argue that this “feminized” vision of global politics must be avoided because it would leave developed democracies vulnerable to rogue states led by “young, ambitious, unconstrained men,” and that in “anything but a totally feminized world, feminized policies could be a liability” (Fukuyama 1998, 36). Fukuyama’s message is clear: women are wonderful and peaceful, but they must be protected from the man’s realm of politics and war. Even more disturbingly, Fukuyama seems to be arguing that the very institution of democracy must be protected from *women*, whose peace-loving nature might lead them to stand by and allow it to be destroyed.

The logic for keeping women away from the peace table operates in the same way. Instead of successfully securing a female presence at the peace table, the gendered stereotyping often promoted by the WPS initiative can actually serve as a mechanism of exclusion. Research from other disciplines has demonstrated that stereotypical portrayals of women as more peaceful (Tessler et. al, 1999; Togeby, 1994), more tolerant, warm, sympathetic and sensitive to the needs of others (Conaway et. al, 1996; Fiske et. al, 2002), and more cooperative and conciliatory (Kray, Thompson and Galinsky, 2001) can have a downside. Findings have revealed that despite the prevalence of positive stereotypes about women in more traditional employment settings, they are commonly the victims of workplace discrimination (Heilman and Eagly, 2008). Researchers agree that this contradiction likely results from the mismatch of the feminine stereotype with many desirable work behaviors and characteristics (Eagly and Karau, 2002; Heilman, 2001; Koenig and Eagly, 2011; Lyness and Heilman, 2006). We might suspect that furthering essentialist stereotypes of women in conflict resolution will have a similar effect.

As previously noted, peace agreements have historically been negotiated almost exclusively by male political and military elites in secretive processes that have been critiqued by

many as highly-militarized and overtly ‘masculine’ environments where primary focus is placed upon dividing up power amongst warring groups. Essentialist images of women as cooperative and pacific are a direct mismatch with such situational requirements, which may reinforce the belief that they are ill suited to participate in peace negotiations. Hunt (2013) touched on this problem when she noted that, “the warlords” refused to allow female negotiators because they were “afraid the women [would] compromise.” Similarly, in email correspondence that I engaged in as a part of my survey research for Chapter 5 of this dissertation, the lead negotiator for a well-known rebel group in Central Africa told me that UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region Mary Robinson was a “fine” mediator because she was “*competent, rigorous, and firm,*” and that “*the world should expect this way of managing from a woman.*” It is clear that he did not respect Ms. Robinson because she acted in the stereotypically ‘feminine’ way alleged by the WPS community but because she instead acted in a stereotypically ‘masculine’ manner, pinpointing this as the source of her effectiveness. Problematically, the WPS narrative of the cooperative, conciliatory, peace-loving woman may feed into the belief that women are ill-suited to participate in the masculine environment of peace negotiations.

A second consequence of the failure to recognize women’s contributions to combat and violence may present a number of other unintended yet devastating implications. As Lentin (1997) argues, the image of women as “homogenously powerless and as implicit victims does not allow us to theorize women as benefactors of oppression, or the perpetrators of catastrophes” (pg.12). Thus, failing to recognize women as warriors can mean that they both escape punishment for their crimes and that they may be excluded from postwar benefits to which male former combatants are often entitled. Recently in 2011, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko made headlines because she was *the first woman* to be tried and convicted of genocide and crimes against

humanity in an international tribunal for her role in the Rwandan massacres of 1994 (Drumbl, 2012). Although many victims have recounted tales of abuse and killing at the hands of women, few women have been tried and even fewer punished. This was the case for the women of Nazi Germany. In *Hitler's Furies* (2013), Lower recounts many of the horrifying crimes committed by Nazi women, which included murdering children, sometimes by beating them to death with their bare hands. Further violating feminine stereotypes is the fact that many of Germany's 'care workers' were amongst the earliest perpetrators of the Nazi killing spree – an example can be seen in the many nurses who cheerfully obeyed orders to 'euthanize' physically and mentally disabled hospital patients (p. 50-53). However, because these women's roles were often not formalized with an official position within the Nazi killing machinery, there was often insufficient evidence to corroborate witness testimony in order to convict them (p. 188). Furthermore, investigators and judges often found it difficult to believe that many of the accused women, particularly those who appeared 'matronly' or 'meek' were capable of committing such atrocities, and ultimately, very few faced justice for the crimes against humanity that they perpetrated (p. 196). Ultimately, Lower wrote:

“to assume that violence is not a feminine characteristic and that women are not capable of mass murder has obvious appeal: it allows for hope that at least half the human race will not devour the other, that it will protect children and so safeguard the future. But minimising the violent behaviour of women creates a false shield against a more direct confrontation with [violence] and its disconcerting realities.” (p. 158).

Thus, the furthering of essentialist stereotypes of women as inherently peaceful and morally superior shields us from the recognition that women can be as guilty of violence as can men, and furthermore, it can prevent victims from attaining justice.

The third and final consequence of the failure to recognize women's roles in violence is their exclusion from DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) programs made

available to former combatants⁹⁸. DDR programs seek to identify alternative sources of income for former combatants and to ensure that these individuals receive psychological and social support in order to facilitate reintegration into their communities and effective adjustment to life during peacetime.⁹⁹ Unfortunately, DDR programs generally maintain very narrow definitions of ‘combatant’ that does not take into account that women often make up sizeable proportions of insurgent groups (Anderlini and Conaway, 2004). Female ex-combatants fall outside these definitions for a variety of reasons, including that they may not have been issued their own weapon or had been expected to share their weapon during the conflict (whereas surrendering one’s weapon is the usually the key prerequisite for participation in DDR projects under the ‘one-person, one-weapon’ rule), and because they must often rely on their male counterparts to confirm their grade or status (who often see no need to do so) (de Watteville, 2002). Furthermore, because female former combatants are often aware of the stigma that they will face upon returning to their former societies, many of them choose to disappear after the war – “it’s like they never existed” (Bennet, Bexley and Warnock, 1995), which means that they also do not receive any form of assistance offered by DDR programs. These problems are only compounded by the failure of the international community, increasingly guided by the Women, Peace and Security initiative, to view them as combatants.

Obviously, men and women will have different needs within disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes. Evidence suggests that female former combatants are more vulnerable than their male counterparts in a variety of ways, yet they face limited

⁹⁸ The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (1999) defines disarmament as the collection, control and disposal of small arms and light weapons and the development of responsible arms management programs in a post-conflict context. Demobilization is defined as a planned process by which the armed force of the government and/or opposition or factional forces either downsize or completely disband. Reintegration is the process whereby former combatants and their families are integrated into the social, economic and political life of (civilian) communities.

⁹⁹ UNDP: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.

access to benefits during the demobilization and post-conflict phases (de Watteville, 2002). Female former combatants for example, are often more reluctant than the men to give up their arms because weapons afford them a sense of protection and empowerment, especially where they are not guaranteed the same access to DDR assistance as the men (Anderlini and Conaway, 2004). Secondly, DDR programs often fail to acknowledge the women and girls who accompany armed groups, sometimes as ‘bush wives’ or ‘bush families,’ whether by choice or by force. In Mozambique for example, DDR planners made no provision for the women and children who either voluntarily joined or were captured by the Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) forces, meaning that many were forced to become the new “families” of the former combatants, instead of being rightfully returned to their own homes (Mazurana and Cole, 2013: 194). The first and most important step in addressing these problems is a recognition of the diverse roles that women play during times of both war and peace.

Summary

This chapter, the first of two in this dissertation that examine the theoretical foundations of the Women, Peace and Security initiative, has introduced the concept of gender as it has been traditionally excluded from the study and conduct of international relations. It has also outlined feminist research and critiques and described how feminist security studies (FSS) have labored to bring gender issues to the forefront of international relations and studies of war, peace and security more specifically. As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, Women, Peace and Security advocates have made three distinct claims in support of UNSCR 1325 and the gender balancing and mainstreaming of peace agreements: 1) that women are inherently more peaceful than men, 2) that women possess innate qualities that will manifest in styles and strategies at the negotiating table that are distinct from men’s, and 3) that women participating in peace

negotiations will make it a priority to ensure the gender mainstreaming of the peace agreement. Although this dissertation will not attempt to test the first claim empirically, the present chapter has demonstrated that feminist research into the diverse roles that women play in violence and armed conflict cast serious doubt on the essentialist aspects of the WPS narrative that associate men with war, aggression, and protector roles and women with peace, conflict resolution, and victimhood. Because “women’s agency in wartime” means not only their roles as peacemakers but also their roles as war supporters and warriors, continuing to further calls for women’s inclusion based upon the “women-as-peacemakers” image is at best questionable. In the second theoretical part of this dissertation, the next chapter will examine the two remaining claims of the WPS, each of which will be tested in the final two substantive chapters.

CHAPTER 4

THEORY: PART II

The previous chapter (Part I of our theory) has demonstrated that at least one of the three hypotheses furthered by the Women, Peace and Security initiative (that women are inherently peaceful and inextricably linked with peace) can be refuted with a mountain of evidence that continues to grow thanks to new attention from feminist researchers. The present chapter will examine the theoretical foundations of the remaining two assumptions often employed in support of the gender balancing and mainstreaming of peace processes: 2) that women possess innate qualities that will manifest in styles and strategies at the negotiating table that are distinct from men's, and 3) that female participants in peace negotiations will make it a priority to ensure the gender mainstreaming of the peace agreement. In the chapters that follow (5 and 6), each of these claims will be tested empirically.

2nd Theoretical Claim: A Women's Perspective on Peacemaking?

Gender Differences or Similarities?

Gender theorists have long argued that men and women differ in psyche and personality. Over a century ago, Thorndike (1911) wrote that the largest differences between men and women are found “in the relative strength of the interest in things and their mechanisms (stronger in men) and the interest in persons and their feelings (stronger in women)” (p. 32 – cited in Su, Rounds and Armstrong, 2009). Theorists later developed two separate dimensions to describe

these differences¹⁰⁰: a set of female ‘expressive traits,’ which include passivity, cooperation, nurturance, high emotion and an association with egalitarian structures, and a set of male ‘instrumental traits,’ which include dominance, assertiveness, competitiveness, rationality and an association with hierarchical structures¹⁰¹. Early theoretical work suggested that these traits were rooted in biology and thus dictated social gender roles, leaving men in charge of political and social structures and women responsible for the domestic and reproductive realm.

An example of this thinking can be found in Gilligan’s (1982) famous work on the “care ethic,” which has long captured the attention of academia and the public for its assertion that women and men speak in different “moral voices¹⁰².” While she noted that men or women could adhere to either of two moral orientations, Gilligan observed a “care orientation” that was primarily adhered to by females, who were focused upon maintaining relationships, attending to the needs of others and the responsibility to cause no harm, while a “justice orientation” was primarily adhered to by males, who focused more upon individual rights, universal standards of fairness and impartiality. Essentially, proponents of a care ethic believe that the values of caring – attentiveness, responsibility, nurturance, compassion, and meeting others’ needs – which are traditionally associated with women and traditionally excluded from public consideration – offer a vision for the “good society” that draws upon feminist sensibilities and upon traditional “women’s morality” (Tronto, 1994). This “feminist care ethic” has even been identified as a potential framework for post-conflict reconstruction (Ben-Porath, 2008, 2010; Robinson, 1999;

¹⁰⁰ The expressive/instrumental personality spectrum was originally developed by Parsons and Bales (1955). For a more recent application, see Jaggar, A. M. (2001). Feminist ethics. In L. Becker & C. Becker (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of Ethics: PW* (Vol. 3). Taylor & Francis.

¹⁰¹ See for example Bem (1974), Eagly (1995), and Spence and Helmreich (1980). For information on hierarchical/egalitarian structures and gender, see for example, Mast (2004).

¹⁰² Gilligan was making a distinction from her mentor, psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, who defined the path to moral maturity in terms similar to Kant, where notions of autonomy, impartiality of moral judgment, rationality and strict adherence to the rules of “justice,” which included equality and ‘fairness.’ Gilligan problematized this view of moral maturity as ‘masculine,’ and presented a ‘feminine’ version of morality as an alternative.

Sjoberg, 2006) because of its ability to supplement existing ‘masculine’ visions of justice, which often fail to account for the ‘more humane visions’ that arise from women’s experiences and feminist theories and which address personal needs, relations, and preferences (Ben-Porath, 2010). In essence, WPS advocates are invoking this notion of a ‘feminine’ care ethic when they argue for increased spaces for women in peace negotiations based on their “higher standards of ethical behavior” and their ability to “use their capacities and experiences to heal communities torn apart by conflict.”¹⁰³

However, other theorists have expressed skepticism that gender comprises a stable collection of attributes. A number of meta-analyses have reviewed studies on gender differences in personality (Feingold, 1994), self-esteem (Kling, et. al, 1999), and aggression (Archer, 2000) and found that differences between the sexes were in fact quite small. The more recent “gender similarities hypothesis” argues that instead of ‘gender differences,’ men and women are similar on most, although not all, psychological variables. This hypothesis stemmed from Hyde’s (2005) review of forty-six meta-analyses producing 124 effect sizes for gender differences in cognitive variables (such as mathematical or verbal performance), personality and social behaviors (such as emotion, aggression, and helping behavior) and well-being and psychopathology (such as self-esteem), which found that up to 78% of the ‘gender differences’ were small (between 0.11 and 0.35) or close to zero (between 0.0 and 0.10). Hyde suggested that psychological gender differences disappear as the gender gap in labor force participation and care work narrow over time. We would therefore expect to see gender similarities arise in nations with the highest levels of gender equality (Hyde, 2014).

On the other hand, the gender similarities hypothesis has also generated a fair amount of criticism (see for example Carothers & Reis, 2013; Eagly & Wood, 2013; Stewart-Williams &

¹⁰³ As argued in Anderlini (2007).

Thomas, 2013). Lippa (2005) has instead argued for a “gender reality hypothesis,” and found that while many psychological gender differences are small-to-nonexistent, others are moderate, and some are actually quite large (such as in preference for “realistic” occupations, a number of mental illnesses and behavioral problems, and certain childhood behaviors).

At its core, essentialist depictions of the Women, Peace and Security initiative situate gender differences as central to the personalities, patterns of thinking, and actions that define men and women. They maintain that these differences are manifested in the behavior of men and women at the negotiating table, and that as greater numbers of women are permitted to participate, the positive elements of femininity will change the dynamics of a peace process for the better. Although this theory has yet to be tested empirically, decades of research into gender and negotiation in legal, corporate, and other settings provide some insights into how the gender variable might affect negotiations.

Negotiation Styles and Strategies

As noted in Chapter 2, negotiations represent only one aspect of a peace process, but the terms are often used interchangeably as a result of most definitions placing ‘negotiations’ at the core of the peace process. There are generally two distinct roles within a negotiation: that of the negotiator and that of the mediator or ‘third party.’ A negotiator/negotiation party is a person/group of persons with common interests that is attempting to define or redefine the terms of his/their interdependence with another person/group of persons through the negotiation process. Each negotiator acts in accord with his or her interests, which are the preferences for how the resources at the center of the negotiation will be divided (Walton & McKersie, 1965). The negotiators participating in peace processes are the representatives of the warring parties, which can include national governments or any opposition organization or alliance of

organizations that uses armed force to promote its position in the incompatibility (UCDP/PRIO, 2015).

While negotiations have been characterized in many ways, the most common approach distinguishes between *integrative* (positive sum) and *distributive*^{104 105} (zero-sum) negotiations.¹⁰⁶ While the distributive/integrative classification has most commonly been used to describe context¹⁰⁷, it has also been used to describe negotiator behaviors and *strategy*, or “what players do when trying to influence the [negotiation] outcome¹⁰⁸.” However, an increasing body of research has argued that certain individuals are “dispositionally inclined” towards one end of the strategy/behavioral spectrum (Barry & Friedman, 1998; Beersma & De Dreu, 2002; DeRue, Conlon, Moon, & Willaby, 2009); in other words, that negotiators possess certain personality traits that make them particularly well-suited to participation in ‘distributive’ versus ‘integrative’ negotiations to varying degrees¹⁰⁹. For example, Barry and Friedman (1998) found that ‘highly

¹⁰⁴ Besides the terms ‘distributive’ and ‘integrative,’ a variety of labels have been applied to describe this spectrum of behaviors, such as ‘positional versus interest-based’ bargaining (Fisher, Ury and Patton, 1991), ‘bargaining vs. problem-solving’ (Hopmann, 2001) and ‘value-claiming versus value-creating’ (Lax and Sebenius, 1991: 161-180; Odell, 2002). Others have noted their similarities to the classic paradigms within international affairs: realism (which includes behavioral expectations that are similar to those of the distributive/bargaining/value-claiming negotiation strategies) and liberalism (which includes expectations similar to integrative/problem-solving/value-creating strategies). Hopmann notes that bargaining (distributive) behaviors are used more often in international negotiations, which he suggests is a result of the dominance of the realist paradigm of international relations in which most diplomats are schooled.

¹⁰⁵ These classifications have been applied to a variety of settings including labor disputes (Walton and McKersie, 1965), economic negotiations (Hüffmeier, 2014) and international negotiations (Hopmann, 2001), and are similarly appropriate to describe the behavior of negotiators representing various sides in civil conflicts.

¹⁰⁶ First identified by Walton and McKersie (1965). See also Barry & Friedman (1998), DeRue et al. (2009), Hopmann (2001), Lax and Sebenius (1986), Miall (1999) Pruitt (1981).

¹⁰⁷ Negotiation context describes the situational characteristics or environment in which the negotiation takes place.

¹⁰⁸ See Odell (2002). Additionally, researchers have noted that distributive behaviors can include competitive claiming, the use of threats and punitive capabilities, and the communication of persuasive arguments and positional commitments, while integrative behaviors can include the exchange of information about preferences and priorities, logrolling, and the cooperative creation of value (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Lewicki, Saunders, & Minton, 1999; Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).

¹⁰⁹ More specifically, this research examines the strategic responses required by negotiation context and the behaviors that are required in order for the negotiator to fulfill situational requirements. Negotiators that are inherently more competitive, aggressive and manipulative have been found to achieve a greater degree of success in distributive contexts whereas negotiators inclined towards cooperation and communication are more successful in integrative contexts (for example, see Dimotakis, et. al, 2012; Johnston, 1982; Lewicki et al., 1999).

agreeable' negotiators (one of the 5-factor personality traits) are better suited to and thus more successful in integrative negotiations than less agreeable negotiators. Similarly, studies have found that 'prosocially-motivated' negotiators who value inclusiveness and equality in outcome distributions demonstrate integrative negotiation behaviors while 'egoistically-motivated' negotiators who are less other-regarding and value personal success demonstrate distributive behaviors (Beersma & De Dreu, 1999; De Dreu et al., 2000; Giebels et al., 2000; Van Lange, 1999). Thus, it is useful to conceive of negotiation styles as falling along a spectrum that ranges from integrative to distributive personality types.

At the 'integrative' end of the spectrum are strategies and actions designed to reconcile conflicting positions and to meet the needs, values and interests of all parties involved. An 'integrative' negotiator would seek to create an agreement that made both sides, not just one's own, better off (Odell, 2002¹¹⁰). The integrative bargainer is more open to communication and remaining engaged with the other side by exchanging information and exploring options (Barry and Friedman, 1998). An integrative bargainer will also aim for a solution that meets their own needs at as little cost to the other side as possible by conveying their 'underlying interests,' which are their true goals and needs (Fisher, Ury and Patton, 1991), without attempting to deceive the other party. At the 'distributive' end of the spectrum are strategies and behaviors designed to promote the attainment of one's goals at the expense of the other (Odell, 2002). This can include competitive actions such as manipulation of information to disguise true preferences, issuing threats and promises concerning rewards and punishments, and forgoing agreements that are perceived to be benefiting the other side more than one's own (Hopmann, 1995)¹¹¹. In reality,

¹¹⁰ Although Odell (2002) refers to integrative strategies as 'value-creating' and distributive as 'value-claiming' in his discussion of international negotiations, he acknowledges they fit within the distributive/integrative paradigm.

¹¹¹ Hopmann discusses the distributive and integrative paradigms of negotiation, which he refers to as 'bargaining' and 'problem-solving' in the context of international negotiations between states, but they should also be

most negotiations will include both distributive and integrative elements and negotiators will use a variety of strategies to bring parties through the process (Hopmann 2001: 445-469, Miall et al. 1999: 167). But it is generally assumed/agreed that negotiators possess basic predispositions towards their opponent(s) and motivations for their actions, which influence their choice of strategy, willingness to compromise, propensity towards concession-making, and the overall degree to which ‘tough’ versus ‘soft’ negotiating positions are taken (e.g. see Dimotakis, Conlon and Ilies, 2012; Johnston, 1982; Lewicki et al., 1999).

Gender Differences in Negotiation Styles and Strategies?

The theory of ‘gender differences’ would lead to the conclusion that men are more likely to fall near the distributive end of the negotiation behavioral spectrum while women are more likely to fall at the integrative pole. Negotiation researchers have noted that many of the ‘instrumental’ traits stereotypically associated with men and masculinity (e.g. rationality, dominance and assertiveness) are the same traits associated with effective negotiating skills, leading to speculation that men are more successful in negotiation than women (Kray and Thompson, 2005). While findings from individual experiments and case studies yielded mixed outcomes and confusion as to the extent that gender influences negotiation behavior and performance, several meta-analyses¹¹² ultimately confirmed that men do indeed act more competitively and achieve better negotiating outcomes for themselves than do women

considered appropriate to discussions of intrastate negotiations, where one conflicting party is often a state and the other a rebel or non-state actor group that is fighting for political recognition and power.

¹¹² Individual studies into gender effects on negotiation have sometimes yielded contradictory findings. Kray and Thomson (2005) suggest that this confusion results from the numerous types of negotiation tasks being employed, the application of different theoretical lenses and differing measures of process and performance. Therefore, it is preferable to use “meta-analyses” in our conclusions about whether gender matters, when it matters, and how much. Hyde (2014) explains that meta-analyses offer substantial advantages when evaluating gender differences because they a) assess whether multiple studies replicate the same result; b) estimate the magnitude of the gender difference; and c) systematically explore moderators, such as social context, that may contribute to the presence or absence of gender differences.

(Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998; Kray and Thompson, 2005; Kolb, 2009). Furthermore, meta-analyses have also confirmed that women are more relationship-focused in negotiation and more adept at resolving disputes (Kray and Thomson, 2005; Kolb, 2009).

Kray and Thompson's (2005) thorough review of nearly 100 studies from a number of disciplines including psychology, law and economics lead them to conclude that the "gender belief system permeates virtually all aspects of the negotiation process for both women and men and, as such, often dictates how agreements unfold at the bargaining table." Klein's (2012) literature review concurred that the gender variable matters and theorized about the implications for gender and peace processes and the lessons that could be applied to better implement UNSCR 1325. While she argued that 'feminine' negotiating traits such as a greater tendency to cooperate and the ability to work across socio-economic divides could lead to more sustainable peace agreements, she also worried that these same traits could disadvantage women in the 'male dominated,' 'distributi[ve]' negotiation settings that we would typically expect to characterize a peace process. This analysis reflects a tendency to associate women with more cooperative behaviors and strategies at the negotiating table and men with competitive strategies and behaviors, which parallels a more general description of negotiating behaviors as falling along a continuum that runs from competitive and self-interested behaviors to cooperative, 'softer' behaviors (Kolb, 2009).

Mediator Styles

Because negotiators and mediators have different interests and play different roles in a peace process, we might reasonably expect that including women on a negotiating team will have a very different impact than would the selection of a woman to mediate the entire peace

process. But unlike the “gender and negotiation” literature, there have been few studies into how gender might influence the behavior of mediators or the outcome of mediations. Mediation is defined as “a process of conflict management where the disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical violence or invoking the authority of the law” (Bercovitch, 1992; 8). Mediation studies span a wide range of disciplines including law, sociology and economics, but the research that is relevant to this study pertain to the mediation of international violent civil and international conflicts. Beardsley, et. al (2006) point out that while the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset shows that only 128 of the 434 (30%) international crises that occurred between 1918 and 2001 experienced some form of mediation, that number increases to nearly half (46%) of the crises that occurred in the post-Cold War era. But while the international community has demonstrated an increasing willingness to intervene in violent conflicts, it has not been similarly willing to allow women the chance to serve as mediators in them. A very small number of women have had this opportunity. Some exceptions include the 2008 Kenyan peace process, where Graca Machel served as one of three mediators, the 2012 negotiations for Darfur where Aichatou Mindaoudou served as Joint Chief Mediator and the 2013 Great Lakes peace process where Mary Robinson became the first woman from the UN to lead a peace process in her role as Special Envoy in the region.

Researchers have attempted to identify the criteria that make for successful mediations, such as the nature of the dispute¹¹³ (e.g. whether the issue of contention is territorial, ideological,

¹¹³ For example, see Bercovitch, J and Houston, A. Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation, *Journal of Peace Research*, 1996; and “The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence,” by Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston. Bercovitch J. and DeBrouen K. 2004 “Mediation in Internationalized Ethnic Conflicts: Assessing the Determinants of a Successful Process. *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2004 pp. 147-170 - Bercovitch J. 2004. “International Mediation and Intractable Conflict, Beyond Intractability, Eds. Guy Burgess, Heidi Burgess, Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. 2004.

sovereignty, ethnic or resource-based) and the ‘ripeness’ of a conflict¹¹⁴ (e.g. whether disputants have arrived at the point of a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’¹¹⁵). However, in examining the potential gendered dimensions of peacemaking, this study is primarily concerned with the mediator as an individual: his or her style, choice of strategy, and overall perception of the mediation task. Research has found that personality – even the subtlest aspects of affect and manner – can play a big role in helping the mediator to ‘bring peace into the room.’¹¹⁶ Other theorists have contended that a mediator’s choice of strategy is paramount, and have distinguished between ‘facilitative,’ ‘formulative’ and ‘manipulative strategies that a mediator can employ (for example, see Beardsley, et. al., 2006; Bercovitch, 1992; Bercovitch and Wells, 1993; Touval and Zartman, 1985; Quinn, et. al, 2011). Others have argued that these strategies can be more easily understood as methods¹¹⁷ that fall on a spectrum ranging from a passive ‘hands-off’ approach to mediating the conflict to a more active or ‘forceful’ conflict management style, using the terminology of ‘forcing’ versus ‘fostering’ styles¹¹⁸. At the passive extreme of the spectrum is the “fostering” style of mediation, whereby the mediator chooses to remain in a neutral role, attempts to capitalize on the positive dimensions of a conflict, focuses on improving the relationships between parties, and looks for opportunities to create joint gains between the parties. At the “forcing” end of the spectrum a mediator uses his clout to pressure, threaten and/or impose deadlines in order to bring about an end to the mediation effort. Mediators who tend towards these behaviors view the achievement of an agreement as the most important goal.

¹¹⁴ Zartman, I. William. “Ripeness.” Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: August 2003.

¹¹⁵ Crocker, C, Hampson F.O, Aall, P.R. Ready for Prime Time: The When, Who, and Why of International Mediation, *Negotiation Journal*, April 2003

¹¹⁶ See Bowling, Daniel and David Hoffman. (2000) *Bringing Peace into the Room: The Personal Qualities of the Mediator and Their Impact on the Mediation*. *Negotiation Journal*. 16(1). Pp. 5 – 28. See also: Martin, Harriet. (2006). *Kings of Peace, Pawns of War*. Continuum International.

¹¹⁷ Svensson and Wallensteen define this as a mediator’s “method:” or the “stylistic dimension of how mediators try to influence the parties perception of the mediation process” (2010, p. 17).

¹¹⁸ See for example Curran, Sebenius and Watkins, 2004; Svensson and Wallensteen, 2010).

While the ‘fostering’ style captures attempts to enhance communication between disputants, others believe in the potential of mediators to generate transformative effects for the parties and society. Such a transformation in the relationship between conflicting parties can be achieved by a mediator who “develop[s] a mindset and habits of practice that concentrate on opportunities that arise during the process for party empowerment and interparty recognition” (Bush and Folger, 1996). “Empowerment” occurs when disputants are given maximum autonomy and the opportunity to define their own interests and options, and “recognition” is achieved through the enhancement of parties’ interpersonal communication and ability to relate to one another. The true goal of the ‘transformative’ mediator is to help the parties to achieve moral growth and become more empathetic and compassionate towards the other party or parties; reaching a settlement may be seen as only a secondary goal (Bush and Folger, 1994).

Gender Differences in Mediator Styles?

Undoubtedly, the particular actions or strategies that a mediator chooses depend, at least in part, upon the context and particularities of the conflict at hand. However, Bercovitch and Wells (1993) argue that while context does influence mediator behavior, mediators intervene in a dispute from within their own ‘cultural framework’ (which the authors define as their own specific conception of the world and of the dispute), and this “conscious or unconscious” interpretive framework can be said to determine the strategies chosen for mediation. Similarly, Kressel (1994) reports that a mediator acts “without fully recognizing the underlying coherence of ‘logic’ behind their style’ (p. 72), and Kressel (2000) found that as a result of this unconscious style preference, mediators were often consistent in their style from case to case, even given a wide range of case dynamics and issues. For example, Svensson and Wallensteen’s (2010) analysis of six mediations undertaken by famed “go-between” Jan Eliasson found that Eliasson

primarily employed a “fostering” style rather than forcing an agreement upon the parties *across cases*. Therefore, we can expect that a mediator’s strategy is at least partially determined by his or her personality traits, which are in turn, according to the theories of gender differences, influenced by the gender variable.

As with the association of women with integrative negotiation strategies and men with distributive negotiation strategies, theories of gender differences would lead us to assume that women will gravitate towards ‘fostering’ or ‘transformative’ styles of mediation and men towards ‘forcing’ styles. While some empirical evidence suggests that women are indeed more transformative (e.g. see Nelson, Zarankin and Ben Ari, 2010), research on this topic has been limited. The chapter that follows will attempt to address this question empirically and thus fill an existing gap in the literature.

3rd Theoretical Claim: Female Representatives as Actors *For Women*

As I write this chapter of my dissertation in August of 2015, CNN blares in the background with the latest news on the Republican primary battle where Donald Trump has emerged as the clear frontrunner, (though hopefully he will be all but a historical footnote by the time anyone reads this). Several times over the past few weeks, Trump has called Fox News’ Meghan Kelly a ‘bimbo’ and insinuated that she must be menstruating for questioning him during a Republican primary debate about his demeaning and sexist comments about a number of women over the years. Yet such sexist attitudes did not hurt his support amongst women at all, in fact, he continues to lead the GOP field amongst women. A Gallup poll showed that there was virtually no change in his support amongst Republican women from before the debate (30%) to after it (29%). Furthermore, the singular female candidate in the pack of sixteen Republicans, former Hewlett-Packard CEO Carly Fiorina, can hardly be viewed as an advocate *for* women, at

least not in a *feminist* sense. Although she views herself as a champion of women's rights, Fiorina does not advocate women's right to paid maternity leave, she has vowed to shut down the government until she is able to defund Planned Parenthood and when asked which woman she would place on the \$20 bill during a Republican primary debate, she insisted that she would not choose any woman because she deemed it a 'token' gesture. Both Trump's continued support amongst women and Fiorina's anti-feminist viewpoints raise questions about one of the central tenets of the standpoint feminism that undergirds the Women, Peace and Security initiative: that is, can we really expect that female representatives, by virtue of being biologically female, will ensure that women and women's issues are represented in peace processes? How does such representation occur and how can we measure it?

Does the Descriptive Representation of Women Result in their Substantive Representation?

In order to address these questions, WPS research could benefit greatly from a critical assessment of the scholarly debate that has developed over the past few decades regarding women's representation in political legislatures. Although WPS scholars have largely ignored this research, the central question is the same; that is, when, and under what conditions, can female representatives be expected to "act for" women? For scholars of gender and legislative politics, answering this question required a definition of *political representation*, and Hannah Pitkin's (1967) "four types of political representation" has provided the primary guidance. These include: 1) formal (or authorized), where a representative is vested the legal or institutional authority to act for the represented; 2) descriptive, whereby a representative acts on behalf of members of a group that shares his/her race, ethnicity, region, gender or et cetera; 3) substantive, whereby a representative carries out the task of ensuring that a group's interests are addressed via policy outcomes; and 4) symbolic, whereby a group shares subjective feelings of being fairly

and effectively represented. Although Pitkin herself, in keeping with the trend of her contemporaries, never addressed the issue of gender, feminists subsequently adopted her taxonomy, particularly representation via descriptive and substantive means, in their efforts to address whether an increase in the number of female representatives in legislatures would necessarily yield an increase in the number and quality of legislation that address women's concerns.

At least initially, many gender researchers assumed that if given the opportunity to participate in political decision-making bodies, women's descriptive representation would result in the substantive representation of their interests (Cowell-Meyers, 2001). This idea originated with the Anne Phillips' (1995) book, The Politics of Presence, which asserted that:

There are particular needs, interests, and concerns that arise from women's experiences and these will be inadequately addressed in a politics that is dominated by men. Equal rights to a vote have not proved strong enough to deal with this problem; there must also be equality among those elected to office. (Phillips 1995: 66)¹¹⁹

A fair amount of theoretical research formed around this claim, which reasoned that shared gendered experiences motivated female representatives to act on behalf of women (Childs and Lovenduski, 2012). Mansbridge (1999) for example, argued that because female representatives share the "outward signs of having lived through" the experiences of their female constituents, they are able to "forge bonds of trust" with them, even if in reality they haven't lived their same experiences (pg. 641).

Empirical research also began to address this question. Broadly speaking, many studies have concluded that gender differences between male and female legislators do exist. For example, findings demonstrated that female legislators hold more liberal policy opinions than their male counterparts and are more likely to support more liberal public policies in areas such as

¹¹⁹ See Chapter II for a discussion of the difficulties in defining "women's issues" in general and how they can be defined in the context of peace processes and post-conflict societies.

education, health and welfare (see for example Carey, Niemi, and Powell, 1998; Diamond, 1977; Leader, 1977; Mandel and Dodson, 1993; Mezey, 1994; Poggione, 2004; Sapiro, 1981; Thomas, 1994; Thomas and Welch, 1991). But more specifically, a number of studies demonstrated that women consistently place more importance upon “women’s issues” than do men and that the policy priorities and viewpoints of women representatives are more closely aligned with female voters (Bratton & Ray 2002; Childs 2004, 2008; Diaz 2005; Dodson 2006; Lovenduski & Norris 2003; Reingold 2000; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler 2005; Schwindt-Bayer, 2005; 2010; Swers, 2004; Wängnerud 2009; Wängnerud & Sundell 2011). Women are also more likely than men to advocate for “feminist” policy change (Bratton, 2002; Tremblay, 1998; Wangnerud, 2000; 2012). Such gender differences have been supported cross-nationally; for example, Schwindt-Bayer (2006) found that women introduce a greater number of women-friendly and family bills (e.g. on issues such as domestic violence, women’s equality and child sex crimes) in Argentina, Costa Rica and Colombia. Similarly, in Norway, female representatives were more likely to raise the issue of quality daycare in their legislation than were men (Skjeie, 1991). Swers’ (2013) analysis of women in the U.S. Senate concluded that gender plays an important role in determining women’s policy priorities.

However, while the studies outlined above generally reveal gender differences in attitudes, policy preferences and to a lesser extent that women are more likely to *introduce* ‘women-friendly’ legislation, there is far less empirical support for the hypothesis that women’s descriptive representation actually results in the substantive representation of women (often referred to as the “SRW”). While a few studies have found that a female presence in the legislature significantly impacts the passage of legislation related to women’s and children’s issues, for example, maternity and child leave policies (Bratton and Ray, 2002; Kittilson, 2008),

others have found women's legislative presence had little effect upon policy outcomes (Childs, 2006). Some studies have demonstrated that even where women's presence in legislative bodies increases, there are few changes in the amount and quality of policies aimed at addressing 'women's concerns' and that furthermore, many of the political norms and behaviors that serve to maintain women's subordination within the legislatures themselves remain unchanged (Goetz 2003; Marx, Borner and Caminotti 2007; Piscopo 2006; Vincent 2004). One study of women in the UK Parliament revealed that while women were more likely to raise issues related to women's equality, women's (relatively inferior) economic position and childcare, they were largely unsuccessful in translating their concerns into policy outcomes (Squires and Wickham-Jones, 2001). Similarly, the dramatic increase of women in Rwanda's parliament has stimulated discussions of women's concerns yet yielded very little in terms of actual policy outcomes (Devlin and Elgie, 2008).

Critical Mass Theory

Two distinct theories have sought to explain why the *politics of presence* (i.e. the descriptive representation of women) is not always sufficient to ensure the substantive representation of women. The first is *critical mass theory*, which originated with the work of Rosabeth Moss Kantor (1977) – although her work was imported into political science and given the 'critical mass' label by Dahlerup (1988).^{120, 121} The second is a theory on the *politics of awareness* (Wangnerud; 2012), which originates with the work of Iris Marion Young (2000). Critical mass theory posits that "sheer numbers" of elected women ('descriptive representation')

¹²⁰ While Kantor is often referenced and serves as something of a foundation in the political science literature, it should be pointed out that her research was conducted on women within corporations and not political legislatures.

¹²¹ Dahlerup (1988) identified four different circumstances that could be expected to affect the potential influence of minorities within a political context. "Uniform groups" (where one group dominates all others in terms of numbers), "skewed groups" (where minorities constitute less than 15% of representatives), "tilted groups" (where minorities approach up to 40% of representatives), and "balanced groups" (where the dominant/minority group ratios range within a 60%/40% split).

are required before the presence of female representatives will be successful in facilitating policy-making in issues of concern to women ('substantive representation') (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers, 2007). Kantor had argued that as long as women occupy a 'token' status within an organization, they would be compelled to conform to the culture of the dominant group. Women as 'tokens' would therefore serve as little more than symbolic representatives of their minority group and would not succeed in altering the culture or outputs of that organization. Thus, in order for women to successfully represent their gender, they would need to occupy a sizeable minority. This idea that a 'critical mass' must be reached before tangible institutional change can occur generated much excitement amongst legislative researchers,¹²² who suggested various numerical goals for women's representation, which ranged anywhere from ten to thirty-five percent.¹²³

However, tests to substantiate critical mass theory empirically have been mixed at best. While some have found evidence in support (Bratton and Haynie, 1999; Bratton, 2005; Swers 2002; Thomas 1994), others have found that the theory did not hold up to empirical scrutiny (Broughton & Palmieri 1999; Dahlerup, 1988; Considine & Deutchman 1996; Kanthak and Krause, 2012; Norris 1996; Skjeie 1991; Studlar and McAllister, 2002; Trimble 1998; Whip 1991; Young 1997). Some studies found that despite a professed interest in 'women's issues,' women's legislative behavior did not match their rhetoric (e.g. see Reingold, 2000). Another strand of research yielded counterintuitive findings: that a few 'token women' within a political legislature were *more* successful in achieving the substantive representation of women than was a critical mass of female representatives (e.g. see Crowley (2004); Grey (2001); Kanthak and Krause (2012); and Reingold (1992). Crowley (2004) argued that these results demonstrate that a

¹²² See for example Dahlerup (1988), Grey (2001), Thomas (1991), (1994), Thomas & Welch (1991).

¹²³ For example, Dahlerup (1988) argued that 30% constituted a 'critical mass' for women in a legislature. See also Dahlerup (2005); Studlar and Matland (1996); Thomas (1991).

few ‘token women’ are more apt to influence policy changes as a result of their severe underrepresentation, which provides a greater incentive to ‘act for women.’

A number of scholars have attempted to explain these puzzling findings. Some researchers have found that as the number of women within a legislature rises, so too does their diversity, which can result in a lack of interest in pursuing women-friendly legislation, perhaps because individual representatives believe they can leave the task up to other women (e.g. Carroll, 2001; Schwindt-Bayer, 2006). Another possibility is that male legislators may view rising numbers of women as a threat and seek to frustrate their attempts to pass women-friendly legislation or to gain leadership roles within the legislature (Crowley, 2004; Hawkesworth, 2003; Kanthak and Krause, 2010). Saward (2006) argued that female representatives are neither necessary nor sufficient to defend the interests of women – instead, such “claims-making” for the substantive representation of women can originate with a number of political actors, including party leaders, interest groups, NGOs and even celebrities. Others have argued that an exclusive focus upon women as the “claims-makers” for the SRW essentializes women and ignores their differences while also overlooking men’s potential to act for women (Celis et. al, 2008; Squires, 2008).

The Politics of Awareness and *Critical Actors*

Besides critical mass, the other theory that seeks to explain why the presence of women in a representative body does not always result in the SRW emerged from Iris Marion Young’s Inclusion and Democracy (2000), which focuses upon the *awareness* and *capabilities* of a representative to work on behalf of a particular group. In her research, which spawned the research program in critical mass originally, Kantor had touched on this idea with her acknowledgment that it may not be possible to overcome ‘tokenism’ unless members of the

minority group are *highly identified with their own social group* (pg. 987, emphasis added). Findings from a number of authors have supported the idea it is not necessarily the presence of *women* but the presence of *feminists* that is required in order for women's concerns to be addressed (Beckwith, 2007; Chaney 2006, 2012; Childs, 2004; Cowell-Meyers, 2007). Thus, a theory of a *politics of awareness* suggests that a *feminist consciousness* is the key variable in ensuring the substantive representation of women. This is because feminists share a stronger ideological commitment to representing women's interests and are therefore more likely to invest the scarce resources that are required to effect policy change in a 'feminist' way (Tremblay and Pelletier, 2000).

In this vein, recent research has argued that it is imperative to shift focus away from the unsubstantiated expectations that a 'critical mass' of women necessarily results in the 'substantive representation of women.' Instead, many researchers have suggested the necessity of identifying 'critical actors,' who "act individually or collectively to bring about women-friendly policy change" (Childs and Krook, 2008, 2009. See also Beckwith, 2007; Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers, 2007; Chaney, 2006, 2012). More specifically, critical actors are 'legislators who initiate policy proposals on their own and/or embolden others to take steps to promote policies for women, regardless of the number of female representatives (Childs and Krook, 2009: 138), although Chaney (2012) has noted the importance of the interaction between critical actors with a critical mass of female representatives. This theoretical reconfiguration moves us away from essentialist narratives and recognizes what has often been observed in practice: that women do not always fight for women's rights while at the same time, some men do (Childs and Krook, 2009). The focus is thus shifted away from a search for a 'critical mass' of women and towards

an exploration of the many ways in which women *and men* can further the substantive representation of women within institutions.

In addition to a search for critical actors, research has suggested a number of other variables that are thought to influence the substantive representation of women. The most important of these is effort on behalf of leftists to represent women's interests, which is thought to stem from the emphasis upon equality within leftist ideologies (e.g. Beckwith; 1986; Duverger, 1954, 1955; Matland and Studlar, 1996). Leftist political parties have also historically maintained close ties with women's movements (Jensen, 1982) and are more likely to send female representatives to parliament (Caul, 1999). Furthermore, leftist political parties are more likely to produce and support legislation regarding 'women's issues' (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers, 2007), and more likely to translate the demands of the women's movement into public policy (Lovenduski, 2005).

Secondly, research has suggested that a political culture of gender equality is more conducive to women's representation in parliament. Inglehart and Norris (2003) for example, demonstrate that cultures that afford women opportunities for upward mobility and whose citizens express more positive attitudes towards women's equality are most likely to have larger numbers of female political representatives. Third, a political environment that is conducive to representation from civil society and particularly feminist movements is thought to increase the likelihood that women's issues will achieve substantive representation in parliament (Celis, et. al, 2008; Chappell, 2002; Lovenduski, et. al, 2005; Mackay, 2004; Rai, 2003).

Does the descriptive representation of women in peace negotiations result in the substantive representation of women in peace agreements?

The research that has developed over the past several decades in the area of legislative gender studies asks a very similar question to the one that is now being debated amongst

Women, Peace and Security researchers and advocates. That is, does the presence of women in representative bodies allow for the issues of concern to women to be articulated within those bodies? Will it result substantive representation in the form of concrete policy outcomes? But despite the fact that both research agendas seek to answer the same question, WPS researchers have largely neglected to take into account the theoretical debates and empirical research that has evolved within the parallel research program, which is decades older and much better developed.

Within the “gender and development” literature, some research has examined the role of critical actors (commonly referred to as “gender entrepreneurs” or “gender heroes”) (e.g. see Kardam 2000; Razavi and Miller 1995; Woodward, 2001), who often garner support amongst outside constituencies in order to persuade policymakers within development institutions to implement gender initiatives (True, 2003). True identified Madeleine Albright during her tenure as U.S. Secretary of State and James Wolfensohn as President of the World Bank as examples of gender entrepreneurs who worked tirelessly to bring about positive policy change for women. However, despite True’s (2003) interest in this topic, there has been no further discussion of ‘critical actors/gender entrepreneurs’ amongst 1325 researchers. Instead, focus has progressively narrowed to enquire as to “where the *women* are,” who are sometimes uncritically assumed to be solely responsible for securing gendered peace agreements. Furthermore, while the existing literature on this topic has generally explored the importance of these entrepreneurs with regard to their ability to enact gender legislation within national and international development institutions, 1325 researchers have largely ignored the roles of *critical actors* within peace negotiations, except where a singular woman (e.g. Luz Mendez of Guatemala) or a small group of women (e.g. in the Darfur negotiations) have achieved significant provisions for women in the final peace agreement.

The final empirical chapter of this dissertation will seek to address these issues. Adapting a theoretical framework designed by Ellerby (2013; 2015) for identifying the level of “engendered security,” or provisions designed to ensure women’s representation, incorporation, protection and recognition in peace agreements, Chapter 6 will seek to identify *how* and *why* the substantive representation of women in peace agreements occurs. It will take into account the variables that have been identified as potentially crucial within both the “gender and legislative institutions” and 1325 literature, such as the presence female representatives (in this case, as negotiating delegates), the participation of “critical actors” or “gender entrepreneurs,” and a strong feminist movement within civil society in order to identify the causal factors that help to create engendered peace agreements. Because the question of how peace agreements become gendered is so central to the entire Women, Peace and Security initiative but has still yet to be answered, this dissertation make a significant contribution to our understanding of these issues.

Summary

The previous chapter sought to describe the marginalization of feminist theory from international relations and more specifically, security theory. It also outlined the various feminist approaches to international relations and security theories. Its primary purpose was to explore the ways in which standpoint feminism has been employed by the Women, Peace and Security initiative in support of the gender balancing and mainstreaming of peace agreements via three primary theoretical claims. The first claim, which is not to be empirically tested by this dissertation, is that women possess an inherent passivity that can be drawn upon to enhance peace and security in a manner that male peacemakers cannot. Chapter 3 demonstrated that previous feminist enquiry into this topic casts doubt upon that narrative. This second theoretical chapter has explored the remaining two claims of the WPS initiative: a) that women possess

innate qualities that manifest in styles and strategies at the negotiating table that are distinct from men's, and b) that women participating in peace negotiations will make it a priority to ensure the gender mainstreaming of the peace agreement.

The following chapter will examine the potential existence of a 'feminine' peacemaking subjectivity as conceptualized by many UNSCR 1325 advocates. In order to accomplish this, Chapter 5 will utilize Q methodology to explore the various subjective constructions of gender amongst individuals that have participated in Track I and II peace processes.

CHAPTER 5

USING Q METHODOLOGY TO EXPLORE THE U.N.'S GENDERED RATIONALE FOR UNSCR 1325

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the issues raised by the Women, Peace and Security initiative and to provide a deeper understanding of how they are conceptualized and prioritized by peacemakers given the range of issues they must address at the negotiating table. Additionally, although the Q method is limited in its ability to make broad generalizations about the wider population of peacemakers, it can still allow us to explore how the gender of the peacemakers in this study may influence their subjective understandings of these issues. Finally, it will allow for an exploration of how viewpoints on the Women, Peace and Security initiative may vary amongst the various 'types' of mediators and negotiators theorized by the academic literature on these subjects.

Q-Methodology

In this chapter, Q methodology is employed to study the subjectivities of an elite group of peacemakers with experience in civil conflict resolution. Originating with the work of psychologist William Stephenson (1953), the Q method is a both qualitative and quantitative process that seeks to elicit the subjective or "first person" viewpoints extant amongst a group of people with regard to a specific topic. Q studies are relevant to questions about personal experience and matters of taste, values, preferences, judgments and beliefs (Watts and Stenner, 2012: 178), and are particularly well suited to the study of individuals who are experts in their fields (Shinebourne and Adams, 2007; Watts and Stenner, 2012: 31 & 126). The phenomena of

interest to Q are the various accounts or “discourses” surrounding a particular topic or issue. Q operates on the assumption that there are a finite number of discourses about a subject matter and allows the researcher to discover whether there are in fact any subjective patterns to them that are shared across individuals (Barry and Proops, 1999). Q methodology accomplishes this via a two-part process: 1) the collection of data in the form of “Q sorts,” and 2) the subsequent intercorrelation and by-person factor analysis of those Q sorts (Watts and Stenner, 2012).

A Q sort is a collection of statements that are sorted by a participant according to a subjective scale such as “most like how I think/least like how I think,” or “agreement/disagreement” (Stenner, et. al., 2003). The group of statements presented to the respondent is prepared by the researcher in advance, and usually derived from a literature review and/or interviews with a smaller set of relevant laypersons or experts. A complete set of scale items constructed by previous research can also be used to create a ready-made Q set (Watts and Stenner, 2005). Once a Q sort has been collected for each participant, the different sorting patterns are compared and contrasted through the statistical process of factor analysis, which will allow any shared modes of engagement, orientations, or forms of understanding to be detected (Stenner, et. al, 2003).

In the discipline of political science, the Q method has been used to study the subjective understandings of a variety of political phenomena, such as to investigate how individuals conceptualize democracy and their own political roles within it (Dryzek and Berejikian, 1993) and to study the opinions of the political elite with regard to foreign policy (McKeown, Blum and Carlson, 1995/1996; Aleprete and Rhoads, 2011). Gender and feminist research has also employed Q methodology, for example in studies of women’s perspectives on feminism (Snelling, 1999), gender inequality (Breinlinger and Kelly, 1994), mathematics (Oswald and

Harvey, 2003), and even female genital cutting (FGC) (Shabila, et. al, 2014). Recently, Coffé (2012) employed Q methodology to study conceptions of female political representation held by women in Rwanda's Parliament.

The Q method is appropriate for an exploration of the issues surrounding the Women, Peace and Security initiative for two primary reasons. First, the ability to conduct standard survey research is limited by the very small numbers of women that have participated in formal peace negotiations – the small participant numbers typically required by Q thus offers an innovative solution to this problem. Secondly, Q is preferable to address this subject matter because unlike most survey methods, which ask a respondent to express a view on isolated statements, Q asks individuals to react to statements in the context of *all* statements included in the study. Not only do participants react to the statements themselves, each statement is ranked in relation to the others. This provides a researcher with more nuanced and holistic perspective of a person's subjectivity regarding the research question (Webler, Tuler and Krueger, 2001). Q is therefore well suited to an exploration of how experienced peacemakers think about the Women, Peace and Security agenda in the context of the range of issues raised during a peace process and how their styles and strategies at the negotiating table may interact with these preferences.

Method

Twenty-seven individuals¹²⁴ voluntarily participated in this study. Participants were identified from a variety of resources¹²⁵ and selected for their role as either a mediator or

¹²⁴ Brown (1980) explains that while small sample sizes are not sufficient for standard survey research, they are appropriate for Q methodology. He argued that because "selection of subjects in Q methodology is not based on sampling theory, but instead on experimental principles, factor strength is a statistical artifact of little to no interest" (p. 43). In fact, many Q studies rely on fewer than 20 participants (e.g. Thomas and Baas, 1992; Webler, et. al, 2009; Coffé, 2012). This is in part because the unit of analysis in a Q study is the *perspectives* (or factors) that emerge from the analysis instead of persons as in typical survey research.

negotiator in a Track I or Track II peace process¹²⁶ aimed at ending a civil conflict. The underlying goal in participant recruitment is to maximize the possibility of capturing all potential viewpoints that may exist. Therefore, as Watts and Stenner (2012: 71) advise, a solid participant recruitment strategy involves seeking out participants that the researcher suspects may represent one particular point-of-view of the topic or subject matter. For this reason, every attempt was made to recruit participants representing all regions of the world, government and opposition delegates, third party mediators and civil society organizations, and both male and female peacemakers.

Due to the status of the individuals required for this study, the process of gaining participants was lengthy and difficult (taking nearly six months). In total, nearly 150 individuals were personally contacted via email. Ultimately, the 27 respondents included mostly Track I negotiation participants: three negotiators from the CODESA and multiparty talks in South Africa, three government negotiators from the various peace talks in the Philippines, one negotiator from the FARC delegation in Colombia, one negotiator from the Good Friday peace talks for Northern Ireland, one mediator from the Sudanese peace process, one government negotiator for Guatemala, one negotiator for the opposition Maoists in Nepal, one mediator who participated in the Aceh, Indonesia peace talks, a leading negotiator for the GAM rebel group in Aceh, the chief negotiator for a well-known rebel group in Central Africa, one negotiator for the West Papua/Indonesia peace talks, and a key figure in the Oslo Accords. Of these Track I

¹²⁵ This includes individuals listed as signatories on peace agreements, by official government sources [for example, the Office of the Presidential Advisor to the Philippines (OPAPP)], and others that have identified themselves in interviews and other pre-existing literature and media reports on the peace agreements.

¹²⁶ Track I negotiations involve direct government to government, or government to warring group, interaction on the official level. Track II negotiations generally involve informal interaction with influential unofficial actors from civil society, business or religious communities and local leaders and politicians who are considered to be experts in the area or issue being discussed. Track II diplomacy often seeks to supplement Track I efforts by working with middle and lower levels of society and often involves non-traditional methods, such as meetings that include participants from both government and non-government institutions (Nan, 2003; 1).

participants, five indicated that they had also participated in Track II initiatives at various points in their careers. A few respondents had participated only in Track II initiatives that had run parallel to official negotiations in: Sri Lanka (2 individuals), Sudan (2), Kashmir (3) and Afghanistan (this individual was a member of the U.S. military attempting to mediate tribal conflict). Additionally, two individuals from the UN's Standby Team of Mediation Experts responded to the survey (and each indicated participation in both Track I and Track II initiatives), as well as one member of an international NGO who has overseen a number of Track II initiatives. Of the total number of participants, 15 were male and 12 were female.

One of the biggest critiques of the research surrounding UNSCR 1325 is that few studies have actually included the viewpoints of women with experience in formal peace negotiations. For example, one critical study surveyed the bulk of published articles on this topic and found that of the 18 studies that used an interview- or focus groups- based methodology, only six involved female interviewees who had actually been a part of peace negotiations (and two of these six studies included only women that had participated in informal negotiations) (Saarinen, 2013). This Q study thus represents a substantial improvement to the existing research in that eight of the female respondents have participated in formal, Track I peace processes.

In developing a balanced "Q set" of statements to be presented to participants for sorting, the researcher should ensure that it "come[s] very close to capturing the full gamut of possible opinion and perspective in relation to [a] research question" (Watts and Stenner, 2012: 58). Here the topic was broadly defined to include the mediation and negotiation of peace processes and the Women, Peace and Security initiative. For the topical subsets relating to mediation and negotiation, pre-constructed theoretical scales were employed, including a forcing/fostering/transformational continuum for mediator style (7 statements) and a

distributive/integrative continuum for negotiator strategy (13 statements). The remaining statements were drawn from published interviews with relevant experts in the peacemaking field (including those attributed to mediators Mary Robinson and Betty Bigombe in the introduction) and a broad literature review that addressed the range of issues typically raised within a peace negotiation, including those relating to inclusion, security and post-conflict reconciliation (20 statements). Critically, this included a number of statements addressing the issues raised by UNSCR 1325 (8 statements). The statements were worded so as to “not appear value-laden or biased towards any particular opinion or viewpoint” (Watts and Stenner, 2012: 58). An initial list of approximately 75 statements was compiled, and several scholars with particular expertise in the various issues covered kindly offered advice on how to narrow down the list to the final 48 statements. Statements were worded such that a respondent who had participated in a peace process solely as a negotiator could still provide his or her opinion on how a mediator should behave based upon their past experiences, and vice-versa.




Figure 5.1: Fixed distribution of the Q set

Participants who responded to an initial email invitation were sent a link to an online program (known as “Qsoftware”), which facilitates the sorting of statements. Initially, respondents were asked to read each statement and place it into one of three categories: 1) those with which they “agree” or believe best represents their point-of-view, 2) those with which they

“disagree” or believe least represents their point of view, and 3) those statements about which they feel “neutral” or ambivalent. They were then asked to refine their initial sort into the form of a quasi-normal distribution by ranking each statement along a continuum from “most agree” (coded +5) to “most disagree” (coded -5). The sorting task required the assignment of each statement to a place along the distribution (see Figure 5.1). The average Q sort took approximately 30 – 40 minutes to complete.

Results

Table 5.1: Subjects’ Factor Loadings

Participant	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
1	0.5552*	0.3350	0.0070
2	0.4938*	0.3140	0.2931
3	0.3590	0.3036	0.5592*
4	0.6818*	0.1129	0.3338
5	0.6803	0.1957	0.5439
6	0.6467*	0.2827	0.2763
7	0.3617	0.1174	0.2454
8	0.1870	0.5715*	0.1146
9	0.7401*	0.2386	0.2617
10	0.5658*	0.1095	0.0896
11	0.5676	0.3067	0.4462
12	0.2722	0.3097	0.6542*
13	0.2650	0.5071*	0.2787
14	0.6606*	0.3642	0.3140
15	0.1187	0.4787*	0.0465
16	0.2445	0.5074*	-0.0138
17	0.2364	0.4724*	-0.0140
18	0.2903	0.7859*	0.1927
19	0.4008*	0.3198	0.1756
20	0.4695*	0.0607	0.2906
21	0.5804*	0.1510	0.0600
22	0.0275	-0.0537	0.7369*
23	0.6645*	0.3295	0.2891
24	0.4954	0.3865	0.5659
25	0.2081	0.0299	0.2322
26	0.7440*	0.1889	0.3421
27	0.4945*	0.2090	0.2050

* indicates a defining sort

The data (the 27 Q sorts) were analyzed using the PQ Method Program. Centroid extraction and the Varimax rotation method were chosen, and a few by-hand adjustments were made. Factors with an Eigenvalue of greater than 1 were included, which is considered standard criteria (Brown, 1980). Three discourses (the “factors”) emerged from the analysis and together explain a healthy 48% of the study variance. Twenty-five of the twenty-seven participants loaded significantly onto at least one factor ($p < 0.01$), while 3 are confounded (significantly loaded onto more than one factor). An “idealized” Q sort can be compiled for each of the three discourses, which represents how a hypothetical peacemaker with a 100% loading on a factor would order the 48 statements presented to them. Table 1 provides the factor loadings of the 27 participants on the three different factors. Table 2 shows the scores for each of the 48 statements on the idealized Q sort for each of the three discourses (Factors A, B, and C). The scores reported (+5, +4...) are effectively factor scores that have been placed back in the original Q sort format.

The factor scores must be interpreted by the placement of each and every item in a factor array in order to deliver genuinely holistic factor interpretations (Stephenson, 1953). Furthermore, the factors are best understood not only by examining where a statement is ranked in comparison to other statements within the same factor, but also by comparing the rank of a statement across factors. Therefore, while the statements ranked at the extreme ends of the distribution by a factor (i.e. +5 and -5) carry the most significance for those participants, at times, a statement ranked at +/-1 or even 0 may be critical in explaining a factor’s viewpoint because of its ranking relative to the other factors, and can be confirmed via reference to other items within the individual factor array.¹²⁷ Q methodology assumes that each discourse represents a coherent

¹²⁷ Some Q methodologists have cautioned against the tendency to assume that items ranked towards the middle or zero point of a distribution are indicative of neutrality, total indifference or a lack of significance. In this study

point-of-view. The three discourses, each of which represents a viewpoint of peacemaking in the aftermath of violent civil conflict, are presented below. (The numbers in parentheses refer to the numbers assigned to statements listed in Table 2).

Table 5.2: Factor Arrays

Statements	F1	F2	F3
1. It is best for a mediator to take a hands-off approach at a peace negotiation, limiting their role to actions such as relaying messages and offers of concessions between parties.	-2	1	-5
2. A mediator should have no preference amongst solutions to the conflict s/he is mediating.	1	3	-2
3. Mediators should use their position and resources in order to actively bring parties to an agreement (for example, by imposing costs or offering benefits to the parties).	0	2	-4
4. A mediator should make substantive suggestions and proposals to the parties during peace talks.	0	4	5
5. A mediator should choose how to supply and filter information to the parties at a peace talk.	-2	4	0
6. A mediator should always maintain a positive view of the parties, their motives and competence to resolve their problems.	3	3	3
7. The role of the mediator is not to orchestrate an agreement but to create conditions for the parties to have a genuine dialogue about whatever it is that each wants to say.	4	5	2
8. A good negotiation strategy is to open with the highest possible demands, even if there is no chance that the other side will agree to these demands.	-2	3	0
9. Issuing threats is often a good negotiation strategy.	-5	-4	0
10. Negotiation should be viewed as a zero-sum game: what one party wins, the other party loses.	-4	-3	-4
11. A negotiator should not care if the terms of a settlement make his opponents worse off than he was at the start of peace negotiations.	-4	-1	0
12. A peace negotiator's goal is to design an agreement that makes all parties, not just his own, better off.	5	1	5
13. Negotiation teams should share information and be transparent in their dealings with one another – deception is harmful to the peace process	3	2	1
14. A negotiator should be very willing to explore concessions that could be exchanged with the other party.	4	4	1
15. If faced with a deadlock in peace negotiations, I would try to search for creative compromises in order to break the impasse.	5	5	2
16. It is more important for a peace negotiation to address the underlying issues that caused the conflict than it is to reach an agreement.	1	2	-4
17. Parties guilty of committing atrocities should be punished and forced to provide reparations to their victims.	-1	-2	1
18. It is more important for negotiators to discuss visions of the future and how to achieve those visions than it is to address the past and how to provide reparations for victims of the conflict.	0	2	4
19. Human security concerns, e.g. access to medical care and education, are every bit as important to address in a peace agreement as issues of state security.	2	0	4

therefore, a statement ranked at 0 may be deemed relevant to Factor 1's viewpoint if Factor 2 and Factor 3 each ranked the same statement at -4 and/or -5. In light of the other factors' strong disagreement, Factor 1's ranking of 0 would indicate cautious agreement (Watts and Stenner, 2005; 2012: 154-155).

20.	Security is first achieved with superior firepower – solving political, economic, social and cultural problems is of secondary importance.	-5	-4	-1
21.	Peace agreements must include provisions related to the well being of women and children.	4	2	0
22.	If we can prevent something bad from happening to other people, we have a responsibility to do so.	2	3	2
23.	Sometimes war is the only option.	-4	-3	-5
24.	Peace agreements should be used as a tool to liberate oppressed groups from structural injustice.	0	1	1
25.	Peace agreements should incorporate international norms as a way to help communities in crisis advance and modernize.	3	-1	3
26.	Discussing emotions opens up the hearts and minds of negotiators at the peace table and is thus an important aspect of any peace negotiation.	1	-2	0
27.	I would be willing to sacrifice the issue of most importance to me if it resulted in a peace agreement that satisfied the greatest number of people.	0	1	2
28.	I sometimes found it difficult to see things from another party's perspective during peace negotiations.	-1	-1	-3
29.	Women hold communities together during times of war and are thus the most effective peacebuilders.	2	-4	2
30.	Men make war so the responsibility for making peace should fall to them.	-3	-5	0
31.	It is easier to get a woman to compromise at the negotiating table than a man.	-2	-5	-1
32.	War has just as many damaging consequences to relations in the home as it does to relations in the public realm.	2	-3	-1
33.	Peace agreements should also aim to improve relationships in the home and family life.	1	-2	-1
34.	Former combatants should be allowed to participate in the post-conflict government, even if they are guilty of committing acts of violence during the conflict.	0	1	-1
35.	I am confident that I personally influenced what happened at the peace table.	1	0	3
36.	I know that I brought something unique to the negotiating table because I raised issues or ideas that had not previously been discussed.	1	0	3
37.	I worried about how the outcome of the peace process would affect my reputation in the eyes of my constituency, colleagues and/or the international community.	-3	-3	-2
38.	Members of a negotiating team should be unified in their opinions and goals before they come to the negotiating table, and dissent amongst the team should not be tolerated.	-1	0	-1
39.	All peace talk participants bear an equal responsibility and accountability for what happens at the negotiating table.	0	1	0
40.	When participating in peace talks, I am consistent in my pursuit of what I know is right and do not feel the need to adapt my goals to every change in circumstances that may arise.	-2	-2	-3
41.	I think it is important to trust your intuition and I did not necessarily feel the need to consult outside sources or experts while negotiating a peace agreement.	-3	-1	-1
42.	A peace agreement will never make everyone happy. Negotiators have to make difficult choices for the good of society and people will just have to understand.	0	0	4
43.	The voices and viewpoints of all participants to the conflict and all parts of civil society must be heard before a peace agreement can be finalized.	2	-1	-3
44.	I value a participatory process at the negotiating table, where each representative has the opportunity to have his or her voice heard.	3	0	-1
45.	The participation of civil society groups in a peace process should be limited or blocked if it makes it more likely that a peace agreement will be signed.	-3	-1	-3
46.	It is my duty to protect the honor of my people at the negotiating table.	-1	0	-3
47.	My involvement with the cause that I defended at the negotiating table represents the most important part of who I am.	-1	0	-3

48. It can be difficult to judge the sincerity of others' statements and actions at the negotiating table, so peace talk participants should always be at least somewhat suspicious of others' motives.	-1	-2	-3
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Factor 1: *The Feminist Peacemonger*

Thirteen of the twenty-seven participants define this factor: eight women and five men. This group of peacemakers believes that the mediator should play a transformative role in the negotiation process by helping to create a genuine dialogue that empowers parties to speak their minds (7, +4) and by maintaining a belief in the ability of the parties to solve their own problems and reach an agreement together (6, +3). Negotiators should care about how a peace agreement will affect the other side as well as their own (11, -4; 12, +5), and view the peace process as an opportunity to achieve mutual gains through an exchange of concessions (10, -4; 14, +4). Negotiators should never resort to deception, withholding information, making excessive demands, or issuing threats (8, -2; 9, -5; 13, +3). Overall, flexibility and creativity are crucial (15, +5). A peace negotiation should be inclusive of all voices and viewpoints, including those of the individual delegates (44, +3) and of civil society (43, +2), even if it makes reaching an agreement more difficult (45, -3). Human security concerns must take precedence over issues of state security (19, +2; 20, -5). Peace agreements should also incorporate international norms as a way to help communities in crisis advance and modernize (25, +3). War should never be considered a viable solution to social problems (23, -4). War is harmful not only to public life but domestic life as well (32, +2); therefore, peace agreements must address issues of concern to women and children (21, +4). The task of making peace should not fall solely to men (30, -3) and because of the important role that women play in their communities during wartime, they are well equipped to achieve peace (29, +2).

Factor 2: *The Rebel without a (Feminist) Cause*

Six male respondents defined this factor. Four of these men served as negotiators for their rebel or non-state actor group in a Track I peace process, and two of them held the distinction of chief negotiator. This factor expresses the view that mediator should play an active role in a peace process (3, +2; 4, +4; 5, +4). However, their most important role is to ensure that all sides have the opportunity to have their voices heard at the negotiating table (7, +5), and they must remain unbiased in order to accomplish this (2, +3). Negotiators should come to the table with a willingness to maintain transparency (13, +2), extend trust to their opponents (48, -3) and to exchange concessions (14, +4). Overall, creativity and a compromising attitude are crucial (15, +5). While a peace negotiation should not be viewed as a zero-sum game (10, -3), negotiators should open with the highest possible demands, even if there is no chance that the other side will consider meeting them (8, +3). War is not a solution to social problems (20, -4; 23, -3), but if we can prevent something bad from happening to other people, we must do so (22, +3). Negotiation should be forward-looking in that is more important for a peace process to focus on the future than the past: blaming, assigning punishments and awarding reparations is not productive (18, +2; 17, -2). In fact, former combatants should be allowed to participate in post-conflict political life (34, +1). In the grand scheme of things, gender issues are not all that relevant to a peace process: the problems that war creates within family life are secondary to the damage it does to public and social life (32, -3), and it is therefore not necessary for peace agreements address the domestic realm (33, -2). However, some attention should perhaps be paid to women's and children's issues (21, +2). There is no room for discussion of 'emotions' at the negotiating table (26, -2). Furthermore, we should not make any universal claims about gender differences: we cannot say that women are any more compromising than are men and the

association of men with war and women with peace is either inaccurate or irrelevant (29, -4; 30, -5; 31, -5).

Factor 3: *The Purely Pragmatic Peacemaker*

Three Track I negotiators define this factor: two men and one woman. This viewpoint believes that the mediator plays a crucial role in the negotiating process and should actively manage the how it unfolds (1, -5; 4, +5). However, the mediator should not try to force an agreement on the parties (3, -4; 7, +2). It is acceptable for the mediator to maintain a bias towards one particular outcome (2, -2). Negotiators should never approach the process with a zero-sum mentality and a negotiator's ultimate goal is to reach an agreement that makes all parties better off (10, -4; 12, +5). Negotiators should come to the table with a willingness to trust the other side (48, -3); however, the use of distributive strategies such as issuing threats or holding back on the sharing of information with the other side should not be ruled out (9, 0). Negotiations should remain focused upon the future and reaching an agreement rather than rehashing the past and who or what bears responsibility for causing the conflict (16, -4; 18, +4). Violence should not be viewed as a viable option to solving social problems (23, -5) and addressing human security in a peace agreement is a greater imperative than addressing state security (19, +4). A peace process should look outside of itself for help: external expertise should be incorporated when drafting the peace agreement (40, -3) and international norms should be incorporated to help post-conflict society modernize (25, +3). Crucially, the burden of making peace rests with the negotiators themselves (35, +3; 36, +3): they must make the tough choices, realize that the outcome will inevitably make some people unhappy, and not worry about how this affects their own image (37, -2; 42, +4). Although civil society should not be barred from participation (45, -3), it is impossible for a peace process to be fully inclusive and all

voices and viewpoints *cannot* be heard at the negotiating table (43, -3; 44, -1). Furthermore, while women may make for effective peacemakers (29, +2), gender concerns are not particularly salient during times of war (32, -1) and it is therefore not necessary for peace agreements to address gender concerns (21, 0; 26, 0; 33, -1).

Discussion

These are the three discourses on peacemaking as they relate to the styles and strategies of mediators and negotiators and the numerous issues pertaining to peace processes and UNSCR 1325. Factor 1, the “Feminist Peacemonger,” is comprised of 13 peacemakers, including eight women and five men. Three had served as mediators and the remainder as negotiators. The negotiators had participated in peace negotiations in Colombia, the Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine. The three mediators hailed from the U.S., Europe, and Canada – two have served as “mediation experts” for the UN. Factor 1’s participants expressed a clear preference for a “transformative” style of mediation as described by Bush and Folger (1994; 1996). The participants comprising this factor emphasized that the mediator should not orchestrate an agreement but instead create a “genuine dialogue” between peace talk participants (7, +4). They also emphasized that the mediator must maintain a positive view of the negotiating parties and their ability to resolve their own problems (6, +3). Their preference for transformative mediation is clarified by their emphasis upon the need to strike a careful balance between purely fostering “hands off” mediation styles (1, -2) and mediation activities that fit with a “forcing” style, such as choosing how to filter information to the parties (5, -2). Some scholars have suggested that women are more likely to typify the ‘transformative’ paradigm because of its similarities to the ‘expressive’ traits said to correspond to the female gender, and at least one empirical study has found some support for this hypothesis.¹²⁸ The

¹²⁸ See Nelson, N., Zarankin, A., & Ben-Ari, R. (2010). Transformative Women, Problem-Solving Men? Not Quite:

majority female composition of this factor is in line with that finding, although men also subscribe to the 'transformative' paradigm.

Similarly, Factor 1 expressed a clear and consistent preference for an 'integrative' negotiation style, disavowing support for 'distributive' strategies such as excessive demand-making (8, -2), the use of threats towards opponents (9, -5), inflexibility (40, -2; 41, -3) and a 'realist' view of negotiations as a zero-sum competition between enemies (10, -4; 11, -4). Conversely, this factor demonstrated a preference for negotiators to share information and remain transparent (13, +3), to maintain a willingness to make compromises and concessions to opponents (14, +4; 15, +5), and to demonstrate a high degree of concern for *all* parties involved in the conflict (12, +5). The individuals typifying this factor also feel that "human security concerns, such as access to medical care and education, are every bit as important to address in a peace agreement as state security" (19, +2). They also strongly disagreed that solving economic, social and cultural problems is any less important than achieving traditional notions of state security (20, -5). Factor 1's participants also clearly feel that the negotiating process should be as open, inclusive and democratic as possible. This is indicated by their support for a participatory process at the negotiating table where all negotiators have the opportunity to make their voices heard (44, +3), and one in which civil society is included (43, +2). Their preference for an inclusive process extends as far as an insistence that civil society participate even in the event that makes reaching an agreement more difficult (45, -3).

Finally, the "Feminist Peacemonger is "gender aware" in that it expressed approval for all of the statements representing the WPS norm, with the exception of the essentialist assertion that it is easier to get women to compromise at the negotiating table (31, -2). It strongly rejects violence as a means to solve social problems (23, -4). Unlike the other two factors, the

“Feminist Peacemonger” is conscious of the impact that war has upon the home and domestic life in addition to the damage it causes in the public realm (32, +2). Participants strongly agree that “peace agreements must address issues of concern to women and children” (21, +4). They also agreed with Mary Robinson that women play an important role in their communities during wartime, which makes them well suited to achieving peace (29, +2).

While the use of Q methodology in this study does not allow for broad generalizations about how *all* female peacemakers or male peacemakers think about the task of negotiating peace, they do allow us to note that the first of the three revealed peacemaker subjectivities is highly representative of the “essentialist” or “effectiveness” theoretical rationale that is increasingly employed in support of UNSCR 1325. The “Feminist Peacemonger” is strongly biased towards “women’s issues” in its awareness that issues of war and peace are highly gendered and its belief that issues of concern to women and children must be included in a peace agreement. It also conformed to paradigms of transformative mediation and integrative negotiation, which functionalist narratives would expect to coincide with feminine ‘expressive’ traits. However, a number of male peacemakers typify this perspective along with women, which to some extent serves to undermine “use-value” arguments for including women based on the assumption that they provide a unique perspective or bring new issues to the peace table that would not otherwise reach the discussion, at least where use-value arguments are used in isolation from other theoretical rationales. As a final observation of this factor, it is interesting to note that the sole female armed combatant amongst this study’s participants (Participant #1), an individual wanted by the international community for the crime of terrorism, typifies the “Feminist Peacemonger.”

Factor 2, the “Rebel without a (Feminist) Cause,” is comprised six male participants: five negotiators and one mediator. This factor was named for the four negotiators from armed non-state or rebel groups that typify this viewpoint. Two of these four are the chief negotiators for their respective groups. The rebels hailed from Indonesia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, New Guinea and Nepal. The other two respondents included a negotiator for the Liberals in the talks to end Apartheid in South Africa and a member of the United States Army who served as a mediator in Track II negotiations to end tribal warfare in Afghanistan. At first glance, Factor 2’s expression of some level of agreement with *all* of the statements pertaining to the role of the mediator appears to be a contradiction. However, upon further evaluation, it becomes apparent that this is a result of Factor 2’s view of the mediator as *the* central figure at the negotiating table and that its ranking of the mediation items can still be interpreted along a continuum of most-to-least agree. The “Rebel without a (Feminist) Cause” envisions an active role for the mediator in a peace negotiation in making substantive proposals (4, +4) and choosing how to supply and filter information to the parties (5, +4). It also voices approval for a “forcing” mediator who uses his or her own influence, such as offering incentives to the parties or even imposing sanctions, in order to reach an agreement (3, +2). However, the mediator’s most important role is to ensure that all sides have the opportunity to have their voices heard at the negotiating table (7, +5), and s/he must remain unbiased in order to accomplish this (2, +3). Because the majority of this factor’s respondents reside on the outside of the political process and have in fact been engaged in armed conflict with their governments, they likely believe that only a forceful, unbiased mediator will allow them to overcome the immediate disadvantages posed by their opposition status.

Like Factor 1, Factor 2 also expresses a general preference for integrative negotiation strategies, supporting the ideas that negotiators should come to the table with a willingness to maintain transparency (13, +2), make compromises (15, +5), exchange concessions (14, +4), and extend trust to their opponents (48, -2). However, while Factor 2 disagrees with the realist notion of a peace negotiation as a zero-sum game (10, -3), it indicates some preference for distributive strategies, such as opening a negotiation by making “the highest possible demands, even if there is no choice that the other side will agree to the demands” (8, +3). Furthermore, Factor 2 expressed a preference for “forward-looking negotiations” that address the issues underlying a conflict (16, +2), but stressed that placing blame, assigning punishments for atrocities committed and awarding reparations to victims is not productive (18, +2; 17, -2).¹²⁹ In fact, Factor 2 indicated tentative support for former combatants, even those that may have committed acts of violence during a conflict, to participate in post-conflict political life (34, +1). It is not difficult to understand why the “Rebel without a (Feminist) Cause” may prefer to forego a transitional justice process where perpetrators of violence might face prosecution and/or punishment. In fact, two of the rebels typifying this factor have been accused of atrocities and one is currently wanted for treason by his government and living in exile in a foreign country.

The “Rebel without a (Feminist) Cause is not “gender aware” in terms of expressing an agreement with the norms that the WPS initiative has furthered. This factor views war’s impact upon family life as secondary to the damage it does to public and social life (32; -3), and does not see a need for peace agreements to address the domestic realm (33, -2). These respondents expressed disagreement with a quote from Betty Bigombe on the importance of the discussion of ‘emotions’ at the negotiating table (26, -2). They also strongly disagreed with Mary Robinson

¹²⁹ For a full explanation of “forward-looking” versus “backward-looking” negotiation viewpoints, see Zartmann and Kremenyuk (2005).

that “women hold communities together during times of war” and are thus “the most effective peacebuilders” (29, -4). Furthermore, Factor 2 seems to disagree with or deem irrelevant universal claims about gender differences: they strongly disagree that women are any more compromising at the negotiating table than are men (31, -5) and view the association of men with war and women with peace as either inaccurate or irrelevant (30, -5). On the other hand, Factor 2 did indicate some agreement that issues specific to women and children should be addressed in a peace agreement (21: +2). However, given this perspective’s overall approach to gender issues, we might suspect that this is entirely consistent with 1325 researchers who point to abundant examples of mediators, negotiators and even international organizations paying little more than ‘lip service’ to gender mainstreaming without making any tangible commitments to back up their lofty declarations (Anderlini, 2010; Pillay, 2006). One possibility for the lack of awareness amongst the respondents comprising the “Rebel without a (Feminist) Cause” is that the leftist orientation of 5 out of 6 of the respondents explains the reluctance to emphasize sex or gender differences¹³⁰. Some have suggested that the Marxist rhetoric on sexual equality has enticed women to join these struggles to escape gender inequality within their societies, and certainly the men within these leftist groups would have been indoctrinated with the same beliefs. However, it is also possible that there is simply a general lack of concern for gender issues or even women’s rights amongst this factor’s respondents. In the post-survey interview, when pressed about the abysmal record of sexual and other violence against women in his country, one *Rebel without a (Feminist) Cause* repeatedly denied it was a serious problem and instead suggested that sexual violence was byproduct of the oppression that ‘men’ suffered at the hands of their government.

¹³⁰ For example, Duverger (1955), Kittilson (2006), and Matland and Studlar (1996) have pointed out that political parties adhering to leftist ideologies are more likely to embrace the cause of women’s equality.

Factor 3, the “Purely Pragmatic Peacemaker,” is comprised of three respondents: two men and one woman. All three had served as negotiators in Track I peace processes. They hailed from Guatemala, the Philippines and Indonesia. Two had also served as mediators in separate processes. Like Factor 2, Factor 3’s participants see the mediator as playing a central role in the negotiating process and should actively manage how it unfolds (1, -5; 4, +5). However, unlike Factor 2, the “Purely Pragmatic Peacemaker” believes that the mediator should not attempt to force an agreement on the parties (3, -4; 7, +2). Also unlike Factor 2, Factor 3 finds it acceptable for the mediator to maintain a certain level of bias towards one particular outcome (2, -2), which underscores the pragmatism of this factor’s viewpoint. While perhaps seemingly counterintuitive because it “undermines the true meaning of mediation,”¹³¹ research has found that biased mediators are better equipped to achieve an agreement (e.g. Rauchaus, 2006). Kydd (2003) argued that unbiased mediators who are “simply interested in minimizing the probability of war” will be seen as less credible than a biased mediator who holds accurate information about both sides and is able to convince ‘his’ or ‘her’ side to make the concessions necessary to reach an agreement. Savun (2006) found empirical support for these arguments.

Factor 3 also demonstrates a general preference for integrative negotiation strategies. Respondents typifying this factor believe that negotiators should never approach the process with a zero-sum mentality and that his or her ultimate goal is to reach an agreement that makes all parties better off (10, -4; 12, +5). They also support the idea that negotiators should come to the table with a willingness to trust the other side (48, -3). They are open to understanding the positions of the opposing party (28, -3). However, in comparison to Factors 1 and 2, Factor 3 does demonstrate some willingness to consider the use of the use of distributive strategies such

¹³¹ Svensson and Wallensteen (2014).

as threat-making (9, 0).¹³² The “Purely Pragmatic Peacemaker” also demonstrates a preference for “forward looking negotiation” that prioritizes a focus upon the future and reaching an agreement rather than belaboring the past and who or what bears responsibility for causing the conflict (16, -4; 18, +4).

The pragmatism of Factor 3’s viewpoint is also underscored by its insistence that peace processes seek out external expertise when drafting an agreement (40, -3) and that international norms should be incorporated into the agreement in order to help post-conflict society modernize (25, +3). However, the “Purely Pragmatic Peacemaker” is highly aware that the individuals sitting at the negotiating table determine the direction of the peace process (35, +3; 36, +3). Ultimately, the negotiators are responsible for making the tough choices; they must realize that the outcome will inevitably make some people unhappy and not worry about how this affects their own image (37, -2; 42, +4). Factor 3’s respondents are therefore wary that an overly inclusive process could prevent them from meeting their responsibility to make peace. Although the “Purely Pragmatic Peacemaker” disagrees that civil society should be entirely barred from participation (45, -3), it disagreed that “the voices and viewpoints of all participants to the conflict and all parts of civil society must be heard before a peace agreement can be finalized” (43, -3). These respondents also expressed some reservations about a fully participatory process amongst those seated at the negotiating table (44, -1).

Finally, in contrast to the gender awareness exhibited by Factor 1’s respondents (high) and Factor 2’s respondent’s (low), the peacemakers typifying Factor 3 responded with indifference to nearly every statement related to gender or the Women, Peace and Security initiative (26, 0; 30, 0), with the exception of one (29, +2). It indicated slight disagreement with the idea that war inflicts as much damage upon domestic life as public life (32, -1), and does not

¹³² See Note 21 for the rationale underlying this interpretation.

see a need for peace agreements to address issues related to the home and family life (33, -1). Perhaps most importantly, while the “Purely Pragmatic Peacemaker” considers issues of human security to be of utmost importance (19, +4), it responded neutrally to the notion that “peace agreements must include provisions related to the well being of women and children” (21, 0). Because of its concern with human security (19, +4), it is likely that the “Purely Pragmatic Peacemaker” assumes that “women and children’s issues” can be appropriately addressed under this framework. However, feminists and other supporters of the WPS agenda have been critical of the “universalizing tendencies and gender silences” that pervade human security discourses, arguing that they provide an incomplete understanding of gender issues and the needs of women (Hudson, 2005). Thus, the respondents typifying Factor 3 represent the type of peacemaker that advocates of UNSCR 1325 must target in their efforts to universalize the Women, Peace and Security norm. Critically however, one of the three individuals typifying this factor (Respondent #12), is a female peacemaker who has been quoted in media reports as saying that her role at the negotiating table had nothing to do with gender: that she was chosen to represent her government for her economic expertise and that she did not view herself as an advocate for women. Her identification with Factor 3 also serves to caution against functionalist arguments calling for women at the table based solely upon their use-value in representing the issues raised by the WPS – in the case of Respondent #12, this would be counterproductive. Tellingly, while research on 1325 often cites the only other female negotiator¹³³ to participate in the post-civil war peace process in Respondent 12’s country as an exemplar of what women can accomplish if given a space at the table, Respondent 12 is almost completely absent from that very same literature. This omission is likely because she does not fit the WPS narrative of the transformative gender advocate.

¹³³ To clarify, she did not participate in this study.

Consensus Statements

Finally, a brief look at the statements in which all factors shared a consensus is warranted. First, all three factors agreed that mediator should “always maintain a positive view of the parties, their motives and competence to solve their own problems (6). They rejected war as a means to solving social problems (23) and supported the notion that opportunities to prevent human tragedy should be pursued (22), which is consistent with the normative framework of the United Nations’ Responsibility to Protect (R2P) project. One of the most surprising findings is that the majority of the ‘distributive’ statements (said to be compatible with a ‘realist’ perspective of international relations) were not ranked very highly by the vast majority of the respondents. Participants rejected the need for suspicion or distrust towards others’ motivations at the negotiating table (48). All rejected the view of peace negotiations as a zero-sum competition between competing parties (10) and the use of violence/war as a means of solving social problems (23). This is despite the fact that five of the 27 participants are combatants or representatives of armed rebel groups. At least two of these respondents are currently wanted for war crimes: one by their own country where they have been labeled a ‘traitor’ for their role as lead negotiator of a well-known rebel group in Africa and the other by the United States where they have been accused of terrorism. Therefore, the relative absence of true ‘realist’ thinking amongst participants is notable and somewhat puzzling given the expectations of traditional theories of negotiation and international relations. The predominance of realist thinking is of course an assumption that feminists and other critics of traditional IR theories have long questioned anyway. It is possible that these individuals did not respond to the survey in an entirely truthful manner, but there was certainly no incentive to be dishonest. Furthermore, statements that each of them have made to the media and to me in personal correspondence

indicate that they do not view themselves as “hardliners” but as legitimate representatives of their people about whom they care deeply. For example, the previously mentioned ‘traitor’ to their African nation, who typified the “Rebel without a (Feminist) Cause,” responded to my post-survey questionnaire as follows:

“I see the suffering of my people. Injustice and exclusion are the two evils behind many conflicts in the world and peace agreements can help to liberate the people from various forms of structural injustice. This is what I want.”

Conclusions

While there exists a large body of literature on the mediation and negotiation of peace processes, there has been very little interaction between this research and the feminist and policy literature on UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. This paper has sought to build a dialogue between these two bodies of research via the use of Q methodology in order to study the attitudes and subjective opinions of experienced peacemakers with regard to their task at the negotiating table and how the concerns addressed by UNSCR 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security factor into those understandings. This study is not meant to be exhaustive in that it explored a sample of the issues that mediators and negotiators from a wide range of conflicts around the world have faced at the peace table. It is however unique in that it offers an empirical investigation into peacemakers’ conceptions of the task of negotiating peace in the aftermath of civil conflict and how the Women, Peace and Security agenda fits within their work. It is also unique in that it surveyed twenty-seven peacemakers, nearly half of whom were women, and the majority of whom had actual experience in Track I peace negotiations.

The results of this Q methodological research project demonstrate that a particular peacemaking subjectivity is indeed highly gender aware and views the gender mainstreaming of peace processes as an imperative. This bias towards gender issues coincides with preferences for

transformative mediation, integrative negotiating strategies, and principles of democracy and inclusion at the peace table. Women *and* men express this subjectivity, lending empirical support to WPS observers, advocates and critics alike who have cautioned against the tendency to promote UNSCR 1325 on essentialist rather than rights-based or equality grounds. It has also highlighted the importance of identifying critical actors, female or male, which will work to ensure that the issues raised by UNSCR 1325 are included in post-conflict peace agreements. Finally, this project has demonstrated the value of Q methodology in studying the subjective opinions and perceptions of peacemakers and has expanded the toolkit for research on the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

CHAPTER 6

CAUSAL FACTORS IN ENGENDERING PEACE AGREEMENTS

Originally, the plan for the final substantive chapter of this dissertation was to test the claim often furthered by 1325 advocates that the descriptive representation of women in peace processes (i.e. increasing their numbers) would result in their substantive representation as well (i.e. gender provisions in the final agreements). This was to be achieved via a quantitative analysis of the percentages of female participants in peace processes and how this impacted the degree to which final peace agreements included gendered provisions. However, this proved challenging, primarily because it can be very difficult to identify delegates in peace processes for various reasons, including for security purposes or because official records are simply not collected (although interestingly, aside from chief negotiators or spokespersons, it is often easier to identify the female delegates by name – this has been increasingly true in recent years as the media and researchers have highlighted the UN’s advocacy of women’s participation). Furthermore, after collecting data on approximately 50 peace agreements I found that the overall number of female participants is still so low that a large-*N* statistical analysis would yield few interesting or substantial findings. Ultimately, these issues led me to abandon my original plan in favor of a qualitative analysis of *how* and *why* certain peace processes have produced agreements that incorporate the gender concerns identified by UNSCR 1325.

This new plan posed another set of challenges. First, the inclusion of gender provisions in peace agreements is relatively rare – Bell and O’Rourke (2010) found that only 18% of all agreements signed between 1990 and January 2010 referenced gender in any form. Secondly,

the treatment of gender concerns in both quantity and quality varies widely from agreement to agreement, making comparison across processes difficult. There has been very little research examining what 1325's "success stories" look like in terms of the gender provisions that are included in peace agreements. However, a few new articles and a database on this topic did emerge while I was in the midst of writing this chapter and in the flurry of research that surrounded the fifteen-year anniversary of UNSCR 1325. Bell (2015) recently published her findings from a brand new "Women and Peace Agreements" dataset that addressed some of the questions that I seek to answer here. Her work considers what it means to adopt a "gender perspective" in peace agreements by "counting" the gender provisions in all peace agreements signed between 1990 and 2015 and concluded that "very few agreements in a very small number of conflicts show any type of comprehensiveness in their provision for women and gender issues."

Engendered Security

However, with the methodological choice of counting gender provisions Bell provides no comprehensive classification scheme for determining which agreements or processes are the most gendered, nor one that could be replicated or built upon by other researchers. Ellerby (2013; 2015) however, does provide such a framework by classifying a peace process' level of "engendered security" according to four distinct forms of inclusion that are mandated by UNSCR 1325: representation, incorporation, protection and recognition.¹³⁴ According to Ellerby, *representation* is addressed by agreements that emphasize granting women access to power as decision makers in formal bodies of government and/or committees dedicated to peacebuilding. She found that agreements focusing upon representation often used terms such as "quota," "nominate," "appoint" or "reform." *Incorporation* is addressed by providing women with access

¹³⁴ See Ellerby (2013) for a full explanation of this classification.

to existing government or peacebuilding bodies, but without an emphasis upon their inclusion in positions of leadership. Such provisions often include pledges to ‘gender balance’ or to improve women’s participation in peace processes and society more generally. *Protection* measures are aimed at alleviating discrimination and violence against women, including both physical and structural violence (such as unequal access to economic resources), and to improve their human rights. These provisions often specifically reference gender-based and sexual violence. Finally, provisions aimed at *recognition* focus upon how a gender perspective informs the creation of laws, policies and constitutions and often identify women as a “vulnerable group” or refer to their “special needs.” Ellerby (2013) then examined the text of peace agreements signed between 1990 and 2010 and classified each according to how many of the four types of inclusion it addressed.

By offering an analytical framework for examining the number and type of gender provisions incorporated into peace agreements, Ellerby’s methodology allows us to identify those peace processes that have yielded the highest levels of engendered security – those that could be considered “success stories” from UNSCR 1325’s normative perspective. I chose to employ this classification scheme because it represents the strongest existing framework for analyzing gendered outcomes in peace agreements to date. Furthermore, 1325 scholarship has a tendency to build upon itself horizontally rather than vertically, and therefore rather than designing *another* alternative method of measurement, I chose it in the hope of creating more unity amongst 1325 research. My contribution in this chapter is thus twofold: first, I will update Ellerby’s data through December of 2015 in order to identify which peace processes taking place from 1990 – 2015 have incorporated the highest levels of engendered security into their final peace agreements. Secondly, I will provide a coherent and consistent explanation of *how* and

why these particular peace processes were successful in yielding the most gender-sensitive final agreements.

Although a few individual case studies have examined how certain peace agreements have come to address women's concerns as mandated by UNSCR 1325, we still lack a coherent story about the circumstances that give rise to highly-engendered peace agreements. While most of the earliest work on 1325 assumed that increased women's participation in peace processes would be largely responsible for creating gendered agreements, recent work has been somewhat more critical of this assumption and sought to paint a more nuanced picture, although it has not done so in a comprehensive manner. Ellerby has thus far only employed her own framework to evaluate two peace processes, the first being Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2002) which demonstrates the "negative pole" of "engendered security" by its failure to include any gendered provisions, and the second being the Darfur Peace Agreement (2006), which represents the "positive pole" of engendered security by addressing all four types of inclusion she outlines. In the case of the CPA, she found that the presence of a well-articulated women's agenda, gender-aware actors and the opening of a political space for women were responsible for the successful inclusion of gender provisions in the final agreement.¹³⁵ However, this of course only offers insight into a singular success story. Other insight on this question can be found in Bell's (2015) introduction to the PA-X dataset,¹³⁶ which examined several causal factors and found that those with the most 'holistic' reference to women result from highly internationalized processes where the UN was a signatory to the agreement. However, Bell notes that "clearly more back-up

¹³⁵ A "women's agenda" was defined as a set of articulated provisions and priorities proposed to the negotiating parties with the goal of outlining how women should be included in peacebuilding activities. A "political space" represents a continuum of women's participation in the process, from no involvement to indirect and direct access. A "gender-conscious process" was defined as "some combination of negotiators, mediators and/or both (who are aware of engendered security and see it as complementary to other peace demands rather than in competition with them" (Ellerby, 2013).

¹³⁶ Bell (2015). The PA-X Peace Agreement Access Tool can be accessed online at: www.peaceagreements.org

case study work is needed to find out how and why [these provisions were] included and how well it reflected the scope and depth of women's concerns.”

Therefore, although the most recent research has provided us with a better idea about the number of peace agreements that address gender concerns, we still lack agreement and a full understanding of which processes provide the most comprehensive treatment of gender and how and why they came to include those references. Did women participate in these processes in large numbers? Can the success be attributed to the role of the international community? Ultimately, the goal of this chapter is to tell a comprehensive story about why particular peace processes yield final agreements that contain high levels of engendered security.

Which Peace Processes Have Produced Agreements with the Highest Levels of Engendered Security?

Scholars have adopted different views on what constitutes a “peace agreement” and various datasets have therefore included varying combinations of documents. Bell (2015) explains that the new “Women and Peace Agreements” database (PA-X), which was specifically designed to examine the gender dimensions of peace agreements, adopts a broad definition which “captures the documentary trail” from pre-negotiation agreements (such as unilateral statements by parties and joint communiqués), to framework agreements (all agreements emerging from formal processes that dealt with key issues in the conflict), to implementation agreements (often designed to extend the framework of the agreement, such as a constitution). But other datasets, which are generally better established and address a broader range of variables than gender specifically, adhere to a more narrow definition. Uppsala University's Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) “Peace Agreement Dataset” for example, includes only those agreements that are “signed by the warring parties in a conflict” (Harbom, et. al, 2006). The “Peace Accords Matrix” collected by Notre Dame's Kroc Institute narrows the definition even

further to include only “comprehensive peace agreements” where: a) the major parties to the conflict were involved in the negotiations and b) the substantive issues underlying the conflict were included in the agreement.¹³⁷

I argue that Ellerby’s choice of UCDP’s definition of a peace agreement as “signed by the warring parties in a[n intrastate] conflict” is best suited for an examination of gender provisions in peace agreements for several reasons. First, the broader “process-tracing” and definitional approach adopted by the PA-X dataset could potentially distort the statistics with regard to a peace process’s treatment of gender issues as Bell (2015) noted. For example, the inclusion of multiple “pre-negotiation agreements” that reference women or gender could make it appear that the peace process’ key agreements adopted a gender perspective when in fact the ‘final’ agreements signed by the parties, which would legally compel them to address women’s concerns, included zero or only a few such references. In the current Colombian peace process for example, the parties have issued numerous singular or joint ‘communiqués’ that reference women extensively, but which should in reality be better understood as unenforceable pledges to address gender concerns in the future. Therefore, while the PA-X database finds that a total of 252 agreements written between 1990 and 2015 have included at least one reference to women, this number may paint an overly optimistic picture as a result of its broad definition of what qualifies as a peace agreement. On the other hand, the definition employed by the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) is so narrow that it reduces the total population of “Comprehensive Peace Agreements” to thirty-four, only seven of which included *any* reference to women or gender, thereby leaving little room for useful comparison. Therefore, following Ellerby, this project

¹³⁷ The Peace Accords Matrix (2015). Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. University of Notre Dame. Accessed online May 5, 2015 from: <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/about>

agrees that it makes sense to adhere to the UCDP's requirement that a peace agreement be "signed by the warring parties to the [intrastate] conflict."

It is important to point out there are two levels of analysis to consider here: the peace agreements that contain the gendered provisions and the peace processes that produce them. Because more than half of all peace processes have yielded multiple agreements, Ellerby collapsed all agreements resulting from the same conflict and process into a single case – resulting in 48 peace processes that could be evaluated for the number of their gender provisions. Admittedly, this does pose some problems, for example, in differentiating between the numbers of women that participated in the overall peace process and the numbers of women who helped to draft those agreements *within* the process that were particularly gender-sensitive. Nevertheless, this would present a challenge even in examining a singular peace agreement, as some negotiations persist for years and delegates rotate in and out of the various rounds of peace talks. Where these challenges do arise I have addressed them in the most satisfactory way possible below in my analysis.

In defining the dependent variable for this study, i.e. the peace processes resulting in agreements containing the highest levels of engendered security, I rely on the results of Ellerby's analysis for all intrastate conflict peace agreements signed between 1991 and mid-2010. I then follow her methodology in order to update the time frame of the peace agreements and processes through December of 2015. Because UCDP's latest "Peace Agreements database" only contains peace data through mid-2011, I had to rely on the UN Peacemaker database for the remaining months of 2011 through December of 2015 (narrowing the list by viewing an original copy of each agreement to determine whether it met the criteria of an intrastate agreement signed by the warring parties). In examining the gendered provisions in each of these agreements I also cross-

referenced this list with the PA-X database, which conveniently lists all of the gender provisions in each agreement through December of 2015. Therefore, I was able to analyze the gendered provisions in each agreement that met the UCDP definition and was signed between 2010 and 2015 and to classify each according to where it fit into Ellerby’s four types of inclusion (representation, incorporation, protection or representation). The data for mid 2010 – December 2015 added an additional 45 agreements and 11 peace processes for analysis. Table 6.1 displays the results of Ellerby’s analysis (for 1990-2010), with the last column containing the updated data from my analysis.

Table 6.1: Peace processes according to their level of engendered security

	1990-1993	1994-1996	1997-1999	2000-2002	2003-2005	2006-2010	2011-2015
No (en)gendered security	Cambodia Slovenia India (Tripur) India (Bodoland) Afghanistan	Georgia Croatia Niger	Bosnia (Croat) Moldova Tajikistan Guinea Bissau Congo Yugoslavia	Djibouti Macedonia Colombia	Comoros Senegal Indonesia	Central African Republic	Chad Myanmar
1 category	El Salvador Mali Mozambique Rwanda Somalia	Bosnia-Serbia Philippines	Bangladesh Israel	Sierra Leone Papua New Guinea Angola	Sudan (CPA)	Ivory Coast Somalia DRC (Kivu)	Central African Republic Philippines (Cordillera) Kenya (Nakuru County)
2 categories		Liberia (LURD)	UK		Liberia (NPF)	Kenya	DRC (M23)
3 categories		Mexico				Zimbabwe	
All categories		Guatemala		Burundi	DRC	Darfur Uganda Nepal	Colombia Mali Philippines/Mindanao South Sudan Sudan(Darfur)

Source: Ellerby (2013; 2015) and author’s own data

There are several discrepancies between Ellerby's classification of peace agreements and my own. First, although Ellerby discusses the treatment of gender in Nepal's peace process several times throughout her paper, she omitted Nepal (seemingly in error) from her table. I have thus added Nepal to the final row (those peace processes including all categories of engendered security) in order to reflect its comprehensive treatment of gender issues. Secondly, Ellerby includes Uganda's peace process with the Lord's Resistance Army (2008), which I have omitted because it does not meet the criteria of being signed by the warring parties.¹³⁸ Finally, there are several differences between Ellerby's (2015) update to this list and my own, resulting from the fact that her analysis ended in May of 2014 and thus did not consider a number of substantive agreements for several major conflicts that occurred after her data collection was complete.¹³⁹

Therefore, amongst the peace processes that have taken place between 1990 and 2015, the following have yielded peace agreements with the highest levels of engendered security: Guatemala (1994-1996), Burundi (1999-2000), DRC (2001-2003), Nepal (2006), Sudan-Darfur (2005-2006), Colombia (2012-ongoing), Mali (2014-2015), the Philippines (Mindanao) (2010-2015), South Sudan (2014-ongoing), and Sudan-Darfur (2011-ongoing). Each of these processes produced agreements that addressed all four types of engendered security in their agreements and therefore, from UNSCR 1325's normative perspective, represent our greatest success stories. While Ellerby (2013) identified five of these cases in her examination of all peace processes that

¹³⁸ Although the LRA initialed the peace agreement on the day it was drafted, LRA leader Joseph Kony eventually refused to sign it and it was therefore never implemented.

¹³⁹ After I had completed the collection of this data, Ellerby published an additional version of her article as a chapter in Olsson and Gizelis, eds., *Gender, Peace and Security* (2015), which updated her findings through April of 2014. However, as several of these processes have produced a number of additional agreements since the time of her writing, the most recent data that I have collected here shifts Colombia's classification from "no engendered security" in Ellerby (2015) to "all categories" and both the Mali and South Sudan processes from "one category" to "all categories" of engendered security, providing us with a greater population of cases to examine in the highest category of 'engendered security.'

took place between 1990 and mid-2010, the remaining five emerged from my analysis of the remaining peace processes from mid-2010 to December 2015. Consistent with other findings (Bell, 2015; Ellerby, 2013; 2015; Perkovitch, 2015), the results indicate that the number of peace processes providing for a comprehensive treatment of gender in their agreements has increased significantly in recent years.

How and Why Do Peace Agreements Become ‘Engendered?’

Identification of these ten peace processes as those producing the most highly engendered final agreements represents an important step in determining the extent to which peace negotiations adopted a gender perspective. However, a full understanding requires knowledge about *how* and *why* these gender provisions got there. As discussed above, individual case studies have identified causal factors such as the formal inclusion of civil society in the peace process (e.g. Olonisakin and Hendricks, 2013) and highly internationalized processes where the UN served as a signatory to the final agreement(s) (Bell, 2015). Ellerby’s use of her ‘engendered security’ framework to examine the CPA (2002) and the DPA (2006) identified a well-articulated women’s agenda, gender-aware actors and the opening of a political space for women were responsible for the successful outcome in the case of Darfur. Here I will build upon these findings in my examination of these ten peace processes incorporating the highest levels of engendered security in their various agreements. In order to do this, I conducted a comprehensive literature review that included case studies, media reports and interviews with key actors for each of these processes.

Based upon the recent findings of other 1325 researchers and my own examination of these cases, I determined the following to be potentially important causal variables in explaining the successful incorporation of gender provisions into the ten processes under examination here:

- 1) the percentages of women’s participation in negotiating delegations;
- 2) the formal participation of civil society organizations and an organized women’s movement in the negotiations;
- 3) the presence of “critical actors” who sought to create a space for women’s voices to be heard in the drafting of the peace agreements; and
- 4) the participation of the United Nations, especially the various funds and organizations dedicated to women’s empowerment (organized under the umbrella of UN Women since 2010).

Table 6.2 briefly summarizes the role of each of these factors in the ten processes under examination here. The findings reveal that what these peace processes held in common was a mediator who served as a “critical actor” (or “gender entrepreneur”) in ensuring either women’s participation in the process, the engendering of the final peace agreement(s), or both, and a high level of participation by the United Nations, particularly UNIFEM (UN Women after 2010). Surprisingly, the participation of female delegates and an organized women’s movement played a much lesser role than much of the literature has asserted.

Table 6.2: Causal factors in creating peace agreements incorporating high levels of engendered security

Process	% of Female Delegates	Level of Participation by Civil Society and Organized Women’s Movement	Mediator as Critical Actor(s)	UN Role, especially UN Women
Guatemala	13%	High	Yes: UN Mediator Jean Arnault	UN Mediation. MINUGUA
Burundi	2%	Low	Yes: AU Mediator Nelson Mandela	UN, UNIFEM
DRC Intercongolese negotiations (“Sun City Agreement”)	0% - 12%	Intermediate	Yes: Organization of African Unity Mediator Sir Ketumile Masire	UN, UNIFEM; UNDP
Darfur - DPA (“Darfur Peace Agreement”)	8%	Low	Yes: African Union Mediator Salim Ahmed Salim	UN, UNIFEM

Nepal	0%	Intermediate	Yes: Swiss Ambassador G. Baechler accepted as informal mediator by parties	None
Colombia	10% - 30%	High	N/A: No mediator (Cuba and Norway are “guarantors”)	UN, UN Women
Philippines/ Mindanao	0% - 33%	High	No: Malaysian facilitators did not seek to promote gender issues. Some intervention from ICG as mediation support team.	None
South Sudan	10% - 20%	Low	No: No evidence that IGAD mediation team sought to promote gender issues.	UN, UN Women
Sudan/Darfur (Doha negotiations)	0%	Intermediate (although barred initially)	Yes: Joint Mediation Support Team of Djibril Bassolé, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Ahmed bin Abdullah Al-Mahmoud	UN Women
Mali	5%	Low	Yes: Team of 11 international mediators including UN, AU, EU, US and UK. ¹⁴⁰	UN, UN Women

I now turn to an examination of each of these individual factors.

Women’s Participation

UN Women’s widely-cited study found that women’s participation as peace negotiators averaged only 9% while they have served as only 2.4% of all chief mediators (Castillo-Diaz and Tordjman, 2012). Their statistic was derived from a ‘random’ sample of 31 peace processes that took place between 1990-2011 for which data was available and included peace processes yielding agreements with levels of engendered security ranging from non-existent (Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia) to low or intermediate levels (El Salvador, Liberia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe) to the highest levels [Guatemala, Burundi, DRC (Sun City), and Darfur (2006)] (as classified in Table 6.1). Given the general expectation that female participants will seek to represent ‘women’s concerns’ broadly defined, we should expect that the population of highly engendered peace agreements under consideration here would have seen greater levels of

¹⁴⁰ Although the lead mediator, Algeria, “could not be convinced of the importance of including women.” (O’Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin and Paffenholz, 2015) and they were largely excluded from the process, I will argue below that the evidence indicates that the international mediation team was largely responsible for writing the agreement and pushing the parties to accept it, meaning that many of the mediator’s interests (including gender provisions) were imposed upon the outcome of the process.

women's participation than in the UN Women study's random sample – I will examine this hypothesis in further detail below. First, it is necessary to point out a few methodological complications.

Identifying exactly how many women participated as negotiating delegates in a peace process raises a number of challenges and is not made any less complicated by the adoption of Ellerby's framework here (which collapses the various agreements resulting from a given peace process into a singular case as described above), because the numbers of women serving as delegates for the negotiation of each agreement *within* the overall process may have varied substantially. However, this presents a problem even when considering a singular peace agreement, because there are often multiple rounds of talks that precede a given agreement and the number of female participants may vary substantially from one to another. Furthermore, the UN Women study (Castillo-Diaz and Tordjman, 2012) also does not appear to address this issue at all – for example, it cites women's participation in the Intercongolese negotiations (2003) at 12%, even though women were excluded from the earliest rounds of these talks and at other times their participation has averaged 9% and later 10%.¹⁴¹ This study will attempt to account for these complications by noting the range of women's participation at various stages of each peace process.

Table 6.2 (Column II) indicates the range of women's participation in the various stages of each peace process from its lowest levels to its highest. First, we should consider women's mean participation in the overall process by averaging the lowest and highest points of their participation for each case. Doing so demonstrates that overall, the mean participation of women as negotiating delegates in the processes resulting in highly engendered agreements under

¹⁴¹ DPKO, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (2010). Ten-Year Impact Study on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace, and Security in Peacekeeping. Accessed 26 December 2015 from: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/10year_impact_study_1325.pdf

consideration here is only about 8.5% -- a slightly smaller rate of participation than in the UN's highly-cited study (Castillo-Diaz and Tordjman, 2012). Even when examining women's participation at its height in each of these processes, the average across these ten cases is only 12% (and at its lowest points it is only about 5%). Surprisingly, this indicates that the most highly engendered peace agreements did not result from higher levels of women's participation as negotiating delegates as many WPS advocates have theorized, and that other factors must therefore be responsible for the successfully engendered outcomes.

Women's participation in these processes ranged from nonexistent to up to nearly one-third of all delegates at certain points. Several cases stand out for nearly or completely excluding women at every stage of the negotiations, including Nepal, Burundi, and the recent Sudan/Darfur negotiations in Doha. Amongst these cases Nepal is particularly surprising because of the important role that women played as members of the Maoist opposition to the government and the rhetoric of gender equality that pervades Maoist ideology. Similarly, while the struggle to include female delegates in the Burundian negotiations has been well documented (e.g. see Heyzer, 2004; Nakaya, 2003), ultimately women's participation never surpassed 2%. And in the most recent negotiations for Darfur (Doha), women were excluded as delegates despite the fact that they had earned a few seats at the negotiating table during the 2005-2006 Sudan/Darfur negotiations.

On the other hand, while the peace talks between the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) excluded women almost entirely when the most recent process began in 2009,¹⁴² they comprised up to one-third of all delegates by the time the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro was signed in 2012. The participation of women in the various peace talks taking place in the Philippines are virtually unprecedented and has slowly

¹⁴² Although the negotiations officially began in 1997, they have been interrupted numerous times by heavy fighting.

evolved as part of an organic process over the years, beginning with the appointment of Emily Marohombsar to a government peace panel in 1997. Part of the acceptance of women as peacemakers seems to result from the Philippines unusually high levels of gender equality¹⁴³ for a lesser-developed country (and one in Asia no less) and as a byproduct of women's comparatively high levels of political participation in other areas of government.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, the government's appointment of women to its negotiating team eventually prompted the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, despite its patriarchal values, to follow the government's lead in appointing several women as official negotiators (Coronel-Ferrer, 2014). Similarly, the Colombian process stands out for its allocation of up to a third of delegate seats to women from both the government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) at various times in the process thus far (a final agreement has not yet been signed at the time of writing but is expected later this year). In the majority of cases here however, women's groups lobbied extensively for the formal participation of female delegates in negotiations but achieved very limited successes (Burundi: 2%; DRC: a low of 0% to a high of 12%; Darfur (2006): 8%; Mali: 6% - 16%; and South Sudan: 10% - 20%¹⁴⁵).

Upon identification of the female delegates in each of these processes, it is imperative to identify the extent to which they actually labored to and did serve as representatives of the issues of importance to women in peace processes as identified by UNSCR 1325's mandate. While women were virtually absent from the table in Burundi, Nepal and the Doha process for Darfur,

¹⁴³ For example, the Philippines has the distinction of ranking in the World Economic Forum's Top 10 of countries with the lowest gender gaps (a list dominated by western, developed countries) for the past ten years of the list's publication.

¹⁴⁴ For example, there have been two female presidents of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001-2010) and Corazon Aquino (1986-1992), and currently women comprise over a quarter of legislators in both houses of government.

¹⁴⁵ Women were initially included only on the opposition delegation for the South Sudan, which is due in part to a mandate within the SPLM to give women active representation in the party – they hold 100 out of 332 seats in the South Sudanese parliament. (Martin, 2014).

further analysis reveals that in nearly all of the other cases, these female delegates did seek to represent women's issues while they served as delegates. For example, much has been written about the women in the Philippines/ Mindanao peace negotiations, which saw Miriam Coronel-Ferrer appointed as the first female in history to head a peace process. In this case the women, particularly on the government delegation, maintained constant efforts and pressure to ensure the gender mainstreaming of the final peace agreements, for example in compelling the male delegates to adopt their wording of women's "meaningful" participation in government and post-conflict institutions (Coronel-Ferrer, 2014). In Colombia, after the signing of a 15-point agreement on political representation, one of which agreed that any final agreement between the government and the FARC would be implemented with a "gender focus and ensure [...] women's participation," President Juan Miguel Santos appointed two women to the government's negotiating panel. The president said that the specific role of Nigeria Rentería, the president's senior advisor on gender equality, would be to "establish a channel of communication with women's organizations to gather their contributions to the peace process."¹⁴⁶

However, in several cases, the female peace talk participants did not act in accordance with essentialist/functionalist expectations, the most notable of which was Raquel Zelaya, delegate for the government of Guatemala during the 1992-1996 peace negotiations. Zelaya's insistence that she did not view herself as a gender advocate during the Guatemalan process has been discussed in previous chapters. A recent study however (Chang, et. al, 2015) recounted accusations from women's civil society organizations that their proposals and requests for meetings with Zelaya went ignored. Although Zelaya denied these accusations, she still noted

¹⁴⁶ Juan Miguel Santos. (11/26/2013). Declaración del Presidente Juan Miguel Santos sobre los nuevos miembros del equipo negociador del Gobierno en La Habana." Accessed 14 November 2015 from: http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Prensa/2013/Noviembre/Paginas/20131126_04-Palabras-del-Presidente-Santos-sobre-los-nuevos-miembros-del-equipo-negociador-del-Gobierno-en-La-Habana.aspx

that the negotiations were between “two parties, not three,” underscoring her lack of interest in promoting “women’s concerns” in the process.

In other cases, women at the negotiating table have failed to unite as a result of their political, ethnic or other competing identities taking precedence. For example, in the Darfur process, although women lobbied relentlessly to ensure their representation as equal partners at the negotiating table, they were “unable to unify themselves across their political differences, which prevented them from forming one persuasive team of female delegates to deliver and negotiate the specific needs of women (Yahia, 2015: 167). A similar story occurred in Burundi, where the extensive lobbying efforts of women succeeded in organizing the All-Party Women’s Conference parallel to the official negotiations that allowed them to formulate a set of women’s recommendations, twenty-three of which were incorporated into the final agreement. However, they could not overcome their political differences in order to select a single delegate to represent them at the according signing, and as a result, no women signed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (Nakaya, 2003).

This section has demonstrated that women were present at the negotiating table in eight of the ten cases of processes producing the highest levels of engendered security in their peace agreements, although their participation rarely exceeded 10% of the total delegates and in several cases seems to indicate nothing more than “tokenism” (e.g. in Burundi, Darfur (2006), and Mali). Furthermore, this section has revealed that women’s average participation in these processes averaged only about 9% -- a number which is no different than the UN’s highly cited study (Castillo-Diaz, 2012) and demonstrates that factors other than women’s equal participation as negotiating delegates must be responsible for the successfully gendered outcomes in these cases. Therefore, it is imperative to examine how and why these female delegates were able to secure a

space at their respective negotiating tables as these factors will likely also illuminate how these processes successfully produced agreements containing the highest levels of engendered security. The following sections will examine three key factors in women gaining formal access to the negotiations. These factors include an organized women's movement within civil society, mediators who advocated on behalf of women and/or their interests and thus represent "critical actors" in engendering the final agreements, and the involvement of the United Nations, particularly the United Nations' Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women).

Civil Society and Women's Organizations

The previous section has demonstrated that women did not participate as formal delegates in several of our cases of highly engendered peace agreements and that where they did, they did not always act "for women" in seeking unity or the inclusion of a women's agenda in the peace agreements. While it seems obvious that where civil society and especially a coordinated network of women's organizations are able to participate in peace negotiations we should see better outcomes for women in the terms of gender provisions in peace agreements (and case studies have confirmed this for several of peace processes, e.g. see Bell and O'Rourke, 2010; Nakaya, 2003), this has yet to be confirmed by a larger comparative study such as this one.

An examination of the role of civil society and especially an organized women's movement within these ten peace processes found that the role of civil society organizations (CSOs), particularly women's groups, was generally lower than expected. However, this varied substantially from case to case and there were a few examples where women's organizations in particular were extremely effective in achieving their objectives. Table 6.2 (Column III) indicates the level of participation by CSOs in each of these peace processes. Civil society's

formal involvement in the negotiations can be classified as *high* in only three cases, *intermediate* in a further three cases, and *low* in four cases.

Guatemala stands out as one of the most inclusive and participatory peace processes, particularly for its formal incorporation of civil society into the negotiations (Nakaya, 2003). The work of CSOs was conducted under the auspices of the Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil (Civil Society Assembly – ASC), which was created under the Framework Accord of 1994 that brought the government and guerillas back to the negotiating table (Krznaric, 1999). The ASC consisted of a wide range of sectors such as labor, business, human rights organizations, and indigenous people’s and women’s movements (Nakaya, 2003), and maintained the formal right to draft documents on the substantive themes of the negotiations such as democratization, constitutional reform, and human rights and to present them to the government and URNG delegations, as well as to endorse the final accords to give them the force of national obligations (Krznaric, 1999). Women’s CSOs were able to effectively use the ASC to their advantage and as a result of their “relentless pressure and advocacy,” they were able to successfully “demand that specific language be included about gender equality and women’s rights” in the peace accords (Chang, et. al, 2015).

The integration of civil society into the peace negotiations in the Phillipines and Colombia can also be classified as high. In the Philippines, civil society organizations have been ‘inherently weak’ historically (Rood, 2005), but CSOs and particularly women’s groups nonetheless played an important role in the formal peace process for Mindanao. Like in Guatemala, women’s civil society organizations were given a formal role in the peace process. For example, through the joint efforts of the Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process (also under the direction of a woman, Secretary Teresita Quintos-Deles) and the CSO

Women Engaged in Action on 1325 (WEACT 1325), a national umbrella organization of women's peace groups, the Philippines became the first country in Asia to develop a National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 (Busran-Lao, 2014). Furthermore, one of the official negotiating delegates for the MILF, Yasmin Busran-Lao, is the founding head of the only Muslim women's non-governmental organization in the country: the Al-Mujadillah Development Foundation (AMDF), which promotes gender-sensitive peace and development strategies amongst the Mindanao communities,¹⁴⁷ also demonstrating the close link between civil society and the peace process. In Colombia, a space in the talks was opened up for delegations of victims of the armed conflict (more than half of whom were women), and in an "unprecedented" move, the female negotiators from both the government and the FARC met and heard testimonies from survivors. Representatives of women's organizations and the LGBT community also participated directly in the talks as gender advisors.¹⁴⁸

The participation of civil society in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nepal should be classified as intermediate. In the DRC, women's groups aligned with human rights activists to organize marches, travel abroad to bring attention to their plight, and to lobby for women's participation in the conflict. Ultimately, their activism was responsible for a few women being permitted to participate in the process (Tripp et. al, 2009: 213). However, while civil society organizations were ultimately incorporated into the talks, the actions of many of the "greedy warlords" who were able to "shoot their way" to the negotiating table forced many of the CSOs to ultimately align themselves with a particular rebel faction, thus limiting their role as peacebuilders and their overall inclusion the negotiations (Rogier, 2004).

¹⁴⁷ <http://www.ncmf.gov.ph/secretary-yasmin-busran-lao-biography.html>

¹⁴⁸ <http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2015/5/women-build-peace-in-colombia>

In Nepal, civil society played an enormous role during the conflict, for example in the mass mobilization against the King of Nepal in the spring of 2006 (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006) and in successfully negotiating the release of citizens by of armed groups (Paffenholz, et. al, 2004). During the formal negotiations civil society also played a direct role in influencing the peace accords: for example, civil society representations heavily influenced the strong wording of the human rights provisions in the 12-Point Agreement of November 2006. In June of 2006, five civil society representatives (none of whom were women), were invited to participate as observers to the talks. While they were able to provide informal input and sometimes break deadlocks, their formal function was limited. Overall, the peace talks were far from democratic and only the “top leaders” played any significant role (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006).

Similarly, the initial stages of the Doha negotiations for Sudan/Darfur were elite-driven and largely focused upon discussions between the Sudanese government and rebel groups (Murphy and Tubiana, 2010). Ultimately however, civil society organizations were able to play a much larger role. The shift came about after a meeting between the Joint Mediation Team and UNAMID (the UN Mission in Darfur), who agreed that civil society should have a voice in the process.¹⁴⁹ The JMST divided civil society in to six categories for the purpose of the talks: CSOs, traditional leaders, IDPs and refugees, youth, nomads and women.¹⁵⁰ Because of their formal inclusion via civil society, women’s groups were able to use this platform to advocate for women’s concerns, such as their equal participation in decision-making positions, to be adequately addressed in the peace agreement. Their participation yielded several positive outcomes for women, including that female representation in the Darfur Regional Authority

¹⁴⁹ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/civilhandbook/Chapter10.pdf>

¹⁵⁰ <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Civil%20Society%20in%20Darfur%20-%20Sept.%202010.pdf>

(DRA) has reached 25% and all of their positions represent high-level offices.¹⁵¹

The gradual inclusion of civil society in the Doha negotiations stands in marked contrast to the Abuja negotiations that led to the first peace agreement in Darfur several years earlier, which represents one of the four cases in which the role of civil society in the negotiations should be classified as low. Although a number of women's groups, such as the Sudanese Women's Voice for Peace (SWVP) and the Sudanese Women's Union did work to support women and promote peace in Abuja (Ellerby, 2012; 2013), civil society was banned from official participation in the peace process by Omar al-Bashir's government (Ellerby, 2013; Itto, 2006; Ibrahim, 2000; Hilhorst and Leeuwen, 2005). Civil society participation in Mali, Burundi and South Sudan was also limited. In Mali, civil society was largely excluded as a result of the mediators giving in to the demands of the negotiating delegations. Although they lobbied relentlessly for inclusion, many civil society organizations, especially women's groups, ultimately decided to boycott the peace process as a result of their exclusion (Foster, 2014).

Civil society's role in the South Sudanese negotiations serves to demonstrate a different set of challenges presented by "broadening participation" in a peace process. The IGAD mediation team initially demonstrated significant interest in incorporating civil society into the talks. However, although women were "well-represented in the civil society delegation," they quickly demanded separate representation in the talks, which occupied a significant amount of the IGAD mediation team's time (International Crisis Group, 2015). In mid-2014 as a result of disagreements concerning the number of civil society representatives allowed on each delegation, negotiations came to a complete halt (Daley, 2015). Ultimately, the women's organizations were permitted to attend the mediation but some have argued that such "chaos" only served to strengthen the warring parties calls for a more exclusive process and that as the

¹⁵¹ <https://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=12180&mid=15888&ItemID=24560>

negotiations wore on, the process increasingly focused upon the combatants (International Crisis Group, 2015).

Finally in Burundi, the role of broader civil society was also low. Women, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) for example, were not permitted to participate in the negotiations. Because of external intervention however, women's organizations ultimately earned a formal role in the process, also allowing other aspects of civil society to be included – such as *female* refugees and IDPs who found representation via the All-Party Women's Conference.¹⁵² Organized alongside the official negotiations, the conference convened to discuss and formulate a set of women's recommendations, such as the protection of women and women's rights, to be formally included in the peace accords. After the recommendations were distributed to the parties and debated in the negotiations, all but one was formally adopted. However, the recommendation that was excluded was arguably the most important – a measure to ensure women's political participation in the post-conflict institutions via a quota system (Bouta, Frerks and Bannon, 2005).

Despite the success of the All-Party Women's Conference, Burundi demonstrates that an organized women's movement within civil society is insufficient to ensure women's participation and the inclusion of gender provisions in the accords – here, mediator Nelson Mandela must be recognized as a “critical actor” in securing the adoption of a gender perspective in the negotiations. In fact, the following section will demonstrate that in nearly 80% of the cases under examination in this chapter, mediators have served as “critical actors” on gender issues. While previous research has acknowledged the role of individual mediators, they have been generally considered “random” factors in achieving gendered successes in individual peace

¹⁵² <http://www.unhcr.org/47e912ae2.pdf>

processes (e.g. see Bell and O'Rourke, 2010). The following section will argue that their efforts are instead essential for the engendering of peace agreements and explain why this finding is concerning from the normative perspective of UNSCR 1325.

Mediators as “Critical Actors”

Although much of the research and advocacy work surrounding UNSCR 1325 has assumed that women's substantive representation in peace agreements will result from women's participation in peace processes because women will “act for” women and their interests, this chapter has demonstrated that highly engendered peace agreements largely did not result from an increase in women's participation as negotiating delegates. However, this represents the failure of functionalist or essentialist expectations only in the case of Guatemala's Raquel Zelaya. In the majority of the remaining cases, significant numbers of women were excluded from the negotiating table as a result of prevailing patriarchal norms, blatant discrimination or on the grounds that they did not constitute “warring parties.”

Assumptions that women's participation in peace processes will yield a more comprehensive treatment of gender issues in peace agreements mirror some of the earlier research on women's representation in legislative bodies (outlined in Chapter 4), which has today largely abandoned that premise and shifted focus to a search for the ‘critical actors’ and ‘critical acts’ that result in the substantive representation of women in policy and legislation. In Chapter 4, ‘critical actors’ were defined as those who “act individually or collectively to bring about women-friendly policy change”.... “regardless of the number of female representatives,”¹⁵³ although the interaction of these critical actors with a critical mass of female representatives has also been identified as crucial in some cases (Chaney, 2012). A qualitative analysis of the

¹⁵³ Childs and Krook (2008, 2009). See also Beckwith (2007); Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers (2007); Chaney (2006, 2012).

peace processes resulting in the most highly engendered agreements reveals that these successes can also be largely attributed to the work of ‘critical actors’ – and that most commonly these actors were the mediators.

In 7 of 9 processes that resulted in peace agreements including all four categories of engendered security, the mediators or mediation teams overseeing the negotiations should be considered directly responsible for the inclusion of gender provisions in the final agreements (Colombia is not included in this analysis because there is no official mediator to the process – Cuba and Norway are serving as “guarantors” only). Table 6.2 (Column IV) indicates the peace processes in which mediators deserve classification as critical actors. In some cases, such as Sudan/Darfur (2006) and the Intercongolese negotiations, the mediator was responsible for opening up a space for women’s direct participation in the process, allowing female delegates and advisors to directly ensure the engendering of the final agreements. In other cases, such as in Mali, women were largely excluded from direct participation in the negotiations, yet the mediators were directly responsible for writing the gendered provisions into the final agreements.¹⁵⁴ Therefore, rather than demonstrating a “random factor” in the gendering of peace agreements as some 1325 researchers have suggested,¹⁵⁵ mediators have served as critical actors in 70% of all peace processes resulting in fully engendered agreements and in nearly 80% of all processes where a mediator or mediation team was present. I will briefly outline the function of the mediator as the critical actor in ensuring that a peace agreement contained a comprehensive treatment of gender in each of the cases under examination here.

Although Luz Mendez, an advisor to the armed group URNG, is often credited with ensuring that Guatemala’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement included numerous gender-based

¹⁵⁴ <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/mali/226-mali-an-imposed-peace.aspx>

¹⁵⁵ Bell and O’Rourke (2010).

provisions, she herself has pointed to the critical role that Jean Arnault, the UN Special Representative to the Secretary-General and mediator of the process, played in ensuring that gender issues were heard at the negotiating table. Upon her return from the Beijing Conference in 1995, Arnault asked Mendez to reflect upon what she had learned at the conference and how the experience could be incorporated into the Guatemalan process (Castillo-Diaz and Tordjman, 2012; Chang, et. al, 2015). He also endorsed the formal tabling of women's concerns and recommendations for the parties' consideration (Castillo-Diaz and Tordjman, 2012) and facilitated consideration of related recommendations put forth by the Assembly of Civil Society.

Although a limited number of civil society organizations were initially permitted to participate in the Burundian peace negotiations of 1999-2000, women were excluded on the grounds that "no group could claim to represent or speak on behalf of all Burundian women (Castillo-Diaz and Tordjman, 2012). However, the death of Julius Nyerere in 1999 saw the role of mediator passed to Nelson Mandela, who has been widely credited as directly responsible for successfully bringing women into the negotiations and ensuring the gendering of the final agreement (Heyzer, 2004). After all sides "categorically refused" to include the women, Mandela requested that a panel of women's representatives brief the delegates on gender concerns (Cohn, 2000: 190). In order to do so, he requested that UNIFEM (now UN Women) organize a women's peace conference (Heyzer, 2004). The All-Party Women's Peace Conference, held simultaneously alongside the Arusha talks in 2000, saw the female members of the 19 negotiating parties, observers, and members of Burundian civil society articulate a united vision for Burundi's peace and reconstruction. Upon receiving the recommendations from the women's conference, Mandela oversaw the incorporation of all but one of the requests into the final peace agreement (UN Development Fund for Women, 2002). Mandela has also been

credited with convincing delegates at the Arusha Conference to enact a 30% gender quota in the legislature, despite the men's assertions that there were not enough qualified women to justify a legislative quota (UN Development Fund for Women, 2002). Dr. Noleen Heyzer, head of UNIFEM during the Burundian negotiations, later noted that Mandela "was one of the first world leaders to truly grasp the importance of the adoption of Resolution 1325.... it was he who helped us breathe life into its implementation" (Holmes, 2013).

Although only 40 out of the 340 total delegates to the Intercongolese Dialogues for the Democratic Republic of Congo in Sun City, South Africa (2002) were women, participants and researchers have noted that this number "would have been lower if the warring parties had not come under pressure from the international community, particularly from UNIFEM and Sir Ketumile Masire, former President of Zambia and facilitator of the Congolese peace process" (Mpoumou, 2004) as many of the men rejected their participation. As mediator, Masire issued a call to the parties to "increase the quota of female representation and to ensure that gender issues are exhaustively addressed in the Dialogue" (UN Development Fund for Women, 2002). Masire then held meetings with UNIFEM (UN Women) to discuss the possibilities for promoting women's participation in the negotiating process (Whitman, 2007) and requested its support for a Gender Expert to provide guidance to the dialogue's various commission on how women's needs and concerns should be taken into account (UN Development Fund for Women, 2002).

Similarly during the 2005-2006 peace negotiations for the Darfur region of the Sudan, Chief Mediator Salim Ahmed Salim has been identified as an "important ally" and "champion of women's participation" in the talks (Inclusive Security, 2013). Upon joining the talks in the fifth round, Salim publicly appealed for the increased participation of women in all of the negotiating delegations (Inclusive Security, 2009). When a group of Darfuri women established a Gender

Expert Support Team (GEST) and presented a position paper entitled “Women’s Priorities in the Peace Process and Reconstruction in Darfur” to a special plenary of the negotiations,¹⁵⁶ Salim strongly urged the delegates to adopt the women’s priorities in their discussions and positions. The document was adopted that day (Inclusive Security, 2013).

Nepal represents a fascinating case because although women were completely excluded as formal delegates in the peace negotiations, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2006 included a large number of gendered provisions representing all four types of engendered security. Several factors contributed to this outcome, including that the all-male delegates for the armed opposition were receptive to hearing the demands of women in civil society as a result of a leftist ideology that strongly advocates equality between men and women, and that women made up a large percentage of the Maoist fighting forces (Cohn, 2013: 202). However, women also had a strong advocate in Günther Baechler, the Swiss Special Advisor to the Peace Process in Nepal. Although there was no official mediator for the peace process, Baechler was accepted as facilitator and mediator by government leader GP Koirala and maoist leader Prachanda in 2005 (Baechler, 2010; Farasat and Hayner, 2009). Convinced that “women related to genuine human security concerns while the male negotiators circled around a superficial peace in order to avoid the hard compromises that would have been necessary,” Baechler sought to empower women in a variety of ways in his role as the mediator. These included conducting mediation and negotiation training seminars with the goal of bringing women to the table, organizing conferences (including some with the UNDP) to address the role(s) of women at all levels and in all institutions of a possible federal system in Nepal, and most importantly, by facilitating

¹⁵⁶ The position paper supported the inclusion of gender issues in the peace talks, and included provisions for wealth-sharing and land rights; affirmative action; physical security; women’s participation in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); compensation and reparations for women and children; and a gender-responsive reconciliation commission.

meetings between delegations of women and Maoist leadership in order to express their demands for the final peace agreements. Interestingly, Baechler's wife was the manager of the international campaign of a global initiative known as the "1000 women for the Nobel Peace Prize" in 2005, which in part sparked his initial interest in gender issues and afforded him contacts with prominent female figures in Nepal's struggle for peace and democracy (Baechler, 2010).

At the Darfur peace negotiations in Doha, the Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) of the UN and the African Union, lead by mediators Djibril Bassolé, Mohamed Ibn Chambas and Ahmed bin Abdullah Al-Mahmoud entered into a direct partnership with UN Women. Chief Mediator Bassolé in particular was dedicated to ensuring the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and that the peace process as a whole was sufficiently engendered, holding numerous meetings and direct workshops with women throughout the process. Bassolé and the JMST also decided that women would constitute one of six categories of civil society groups that would be directly involved in the negotiations.¹⁵⁷

Mali presents an interesting case because it was a relatively exclusive peace process that resulted in a highly engendered final agreement. Although women's civil society groups lobbied extensively for inclusion in the peace negotiations, women's participation averaged only about 5%. There were eleven co-mediators of the process (including the US, UK, African Union, European Union and the United Nations), many of whom were receptive to including women and gender issues. However, the lead mediator, Algeria, insisted upon "keeping the traditional approach with the traditional parties" and largely excluded women for cultural reasons and the fear that they might delay the negotiations (O'Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin and Paffenholz, 2015). Yet the final agreement contains numerous references to gender – more in fact than almost any other

¹⁵⁷ <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Civil%20Society%20in%20Darfur%20-%20Sept.%202010.pdf>

peace agreement ever written – and the mediation team is largely responsible for the outcome. Because the Malian parties refused to engage in direct dialogue, the final peace agreement was written mostly by the international mediation team and thus “reflects the mediator’s own interests” – one of which was the inclusion of gender provisions (International Crisis Group, 2015). The implications of this will be discussed further below.

Finally, the Philippines and South Sudan represent the only two peace processes where the resulting highly engendered peace agreements did not stem from the critical acts of the mediators. In the Philippines/Mindanao peace process, Mediator Tengku Dato Ab Ghafar bin Tengku Mohamed of the Organization of Islamic States did not act to further women’s interests in the negotiations nor was he particularly gender aware – in fact, upon signing the agreement, he remarked that it was the first time in his life that he had shaken a woman’s hand (Coronel-Ferrer, 2014). Despite this, the International Contact Group (ICG), a mediation support unit that provides advice to the mediator and negotiating teams has been very active in supporting the voices and perspectives of women both at the negotiating table and in civil society. Female representatives such as Emma Leslie of Conciliation Resources sat in on the negotiations throughout much of the process and she and other members of the ICG have even been invited to share their input on gender issues during the formal talks (Coronel-Ferrer, 2014). In the Philippines therefore, mediation did play at least some minor role in ensuring the engendering of the resulting agreements, but the mediator himself cannot be considered a critical gender actor.

Because the peace talks in the South Sudan began very recently and are ongoing, much less is known about the role of the mediators in securing women’s inclusion in the process and their role in ensuring the engendering of the final peace agreement. One of the three chief IGAD mediators, General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, a Kenyan envoy who also mediated the Comprehensive

Peace Agreement between North and South Sudan in 2005, has previously indicated his strong support for providing a space for women during peace negotiations (Nderitu and O'Neill, 2013; Sumbeiywo, YEAR). Furthermore, local media reported that in May of 2014, Sumbeiywo traveled to Juba prior to the start of negotiations in order to meet with various civil society groups and arrange for their inclusion in the peace talks. However, he faced enormous criticism both from the government and certain sectors within civil society that he left the country before his scheduled press conference without making any remarks.¹⁵⁸ Beyond this, there is no real evidence to suggest that the three-person mediation team (led by Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia and also including General Mohammed Ahmed Moustafa El Dabi of Sudan) took any steps to include women and my attempts to contact relevant participants for further insight have thus far been unsuccessful. However, a lack of media stories or policy reports from women's advocacy organizations such as UN Women makes it appear that the mediators were ultimately unable or unwilling to serve as critical actors for women in the case of the South Sudan.

As discussed previously, various 1325 researchers have pointed to mediators as important but 'random' factors in determining the gender responsiveness of a particular peace negotiation. However, the fact that mediators have served as the critical actors in engendering the final peace agreements in seven out of nine cases of the highest levels of engendered security demonstrates instead that without their diligent efforts, very few peace agreements would likely address engendered security. This finding is significant for a number of reasons.

First, it raises significant concern for the gender balancing and gender mainstreaming of peace processes because, although there are a few exceptions, most independent international

¹⁵⁸ Radio Tamazuj (May 2014) "IGAD Envoy Wants 'Inclusive' Civil Society Talks." Accessed November 3, 2015 from: <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/igad-envoy-wants-%E2%80%98inclusive%E2%80%99-civil-society-talks>

mediators have not demonstrated significant interest in pursuing this agenda.¹⁵⁹ Mediators are often partial to exclusive processes, and can view inclusive processes as creating unnecessary complications (O'Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin and Paffenholz, 2015). Jean Arnault (2014), despite serving as mediator of the highly inclusive peace process in Guatemala, condemned the “mushrooming normative framework” that the international community has imposed upon peace processes and therefore the mediators, who:

...conduct their work within the framework constituted by the rules of international law that govern the given situation, most prominently global and regional conventions, international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee laws and international criminal law, including, where applicable, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. In addition to binding legal obligations, normative expectations impact on the mediation process, for example regarding justice, truth and reconciliation, the inclusion of civil society, and the empowerment and participation of women in the process (UN Guidance for Effective Mediation, 2012).

Arnault lamented that these are “only a sample of the international demands normally placed upon a peace process,” and wondered why parties would want to involve international actors who promote such an “intrusive agenda.” In addition to the normative pressures placed upon mediators, the short timelines imposed by authorities such as the UN Security Council make the task of creating an inclusive peace process even more unrealistic from the mediator’s point of view (O'Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin and Paffenholz, 2015). Finally, the necessity of including warring parties in the process who do not view the equal rights of women in favorable terms indicates that many mediators will privilege bringing the warring factions to the table in order to reach an agreement over secondary concerns such as inclusivity, as evidenced by NATO’s recent willingness to allow the Taliban to participate in negotiations with the Afghan government.

Mediators’ legitimate concerns about broadening participation in peace negotiations make it clear that they may lack the political will or the practical ability to ensure women’s

¹⁵⁹ O'Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin and Paffenholz (2015) found that such notable exceptions include the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre) and the Conflict Management Initiative (CMI).

participation. Therefore, the fact that nearly 80% of peace processes incorporating the highest levels of engendered security owe their success to the critical acts of the mediators suggests that the overall number of highly engendered peace agreements will inevitably remain low.

UN Participation

In introducing the new “Women and Peace Agreements database” (PA-X), Bell (2015) sought to provide a cursory examination of the extent to which the UN might have “played a role in implementing its own normative standards” in seeking to guarantee gendering of peace agreements in the processes in which the organization took part. While she found that this was indeed the case,¹⁶⁰ this conclusion was reached by examining the text of the final agreements for references to “the UN, a UN agency, or a UN representative” as “a party or signatory to the agreement or declaration, as a mediator, facilitator, observer, witness, or with no clear status.” While this is an interesting finding, it does not provide much insight into the extent of the UN’s role in each process, nor whether UN Women, the UN’s organization dedicated to gender equality and women’s empowerment played a role. Of course, it is much easier to analyze the role of the UN in the 10 cases of peace processes resulting in peace agreements with the highest levels of engendered security under examination here.

This study found that while the UN played an important role during the majority of these peace processes (8 of 10), it was almost completely absent during the peace negotiations in two: Nepal and the Philippines. In the case of Nepal, China and India (the country’s “big brothers”) did not want to accept UN mediation so the UN remained sidelined throughout the process, with the exception of a role monitoring demobilization and human rights (Upreti, 2006).

¹⁶⁰ Bell found that before UNSC Resolution 1325, out of 664 agreements in total, 168 agreements or 16% referenced the UN as some sort of party to the agreement. Out of these, 23, or 14% of agreements signed by a UN party referenced women or gender. After UNSC Resolution 1325, 122 out of 504 agreements, or 24%, referenced the UN as some sort of party. Out of these, 46, or 38% of agreements signed by a UN party referenced women or gender.

Furthermore, few other international actors were involved in the process, meaning that it was an almost exclusively Nepali driven process (Farasat and Hayner, 2009). In the Philippines, the government also preferred to exclude the United Nations, although the process was highly internationalized as a result of direct participation by the International Contact Group (ICG), a mediation support unit that provides advice to the mediator and negotiating teams and has been very active in supporting the voices and perspectives of women both at the table and in civil society. Furthermore, international representatives such as Emma Leslie of Conciliation Resources sat in on the negotiations throughout much of the process and she and other members of the ICG were even invited to share their input on gender issues during the formal talks (Coronel-Ferrer, 2014). Other international actors in the Bangsamoro peace process include the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the International Monitoring Team, the Third Party Monitoring Team, and the additional members of the ICG which include Japan, Saudi Arabia and the UK plus three more international NGOs: the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Muhammadiyah and The Asia Foundation (Busran-Lao, 2014).

In the remaining eight negotiations in which it did participate, the role of the United Nations was substantial and included service as the official mediator (in Guatemala and in Darfur as half of the Joint Mediation Support Team with the AU), sending experts to participate in the talks (Colombia),¹⁶¹ and working to ensure that civil society played a formal role in the process (Guatemala, Mali). More importantly for the gender mainstreaming of these processes however, UN Women (as UNIFEM prior to the creation of UN Women in 2010), played a role in six out of the ten total processes and seems to have been instrumental both in ensuring women's participation and in gaining the inclusion of gender provisions into the peace agreements. In Burundi for example, UNIFEM worked closely with mediator Nelson Mandela to organize the

¹⁶¹ <http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2015/5/women-build-peace-in-colombia>

All Party Women's Conference where the women's recommendations were compiled and eventually incorporated into the final agreement. Prior to the Intercongolese negotiations, UNIFEM convened numerous forums of women from across the DRC that resulted in the "Nairobi Declaration" articulating a cohesive women's agenda for the peace process. It also facilitated leadership and capacity-building workshops for women's organizations, even organizing and funding travel for a meeting with the Women's League of the African National Congress of South Africa so that the Congolese women could learn from their experiences. UNIFEM also secured a space for dozens more women to formally participate at the negotiating table (Mpoumou, 2004).

After UNIFEM's failure to provide sufficient support to the female delegates and women's organizations during the negotiations leading to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan in 2005 (Itto, 2006) (which is not one of the ten cases of highly engendered peace agreements under consideration here), UNIFEM and then UN Women tried to make amends by providing much higher levels of support during the negotiations for the Darfur Peace Agreement (2006), the Doha Agreement (2011) and the most recent South Sudan accords (2014-2015). During the DPA negotiations for example, UNIFEM organized weeks of meetings with invited gender experts and local women's groups to help create a unified women's agenda and succeeded in creating indirect access to the peace negotiations to see the agenda included in the final agreements (Ellerby, 2012).

Conclusions

Although an increasing number of peace agreements have referenced women or gender concerns in recent years, only ten processes have embraced all four types of inclusion – representation, incorporation, protection and recognition – that have been identified as

constituting a holistic approach to “engendered security” in peace agreements. In seeking to explain the factors that led to the “success stories,” four variables that have been repeatedly identified in the 1325 literature were examined. Although we would expect that women’s participation as negotiating delegates in these particular processes would be higher than in the UN Women’s famous survey of a random sample of peace processes, women’s mean participation slightly lower amongst my sample: about 8.5%. This indicates that in most of these cases, other important variables were at work.

Guatemala, the only peace process that produced a set of agreements containing all four categories of engendered security negotiated *prior* to the adoption of UNSCR 1325 was a largely a result of the efforts on behalf of two “critical actors:” Luz Mendez and United Nations mediator Jean Arnault. Both appear to have been inspired by the new international norm that began to emerge at the 1995 *World Conference on Women* in Beijing. The formal involvement of civil society via the Civil Society Assembly (ASC) was also critical for ensuring the inclusion of gendered provisions in the final agreements, although the UN played a very limited role in the process and UNIFEM was absent.

Burundi owes the high level of engendered security in its peace agreement to the work of UNIFEM and mediator Nelson Mandela as a critical actor on behalf of women and gender issues. Other than the All-Party Women’s Conference, civil society was largely excluded from the process and women’s representation as official negotiating delegates never grew beyond 2%. Similar to the causal factors at work in Burundi, the high levels of engendered security in the Sun City Act resulting from the Intercongolese negotiations for the Democratic Republic of Congo is a result of the work of UNIFEM and the work of another mediator as the critical actor for gender, Nelson Mandela. Like Burundi, civil society also played a limited role in the

negotiations. However, the number of women as negotiating delegates was somewhat higher, reaching 12% at certain points in the negotiations, which was also due to the advocacy of Mandela and UNIFEM.

During the first negotiations for Darfur (in Abuja), although civil society was barred by Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and women's participation as negotiating delegates never reached more than 8%, mediator and critical gender actor Salim Ahmed Salim in conjunction with UNIFEM succeeded in ensuring that many gender provisions were included in the final peace agreement. A few years later during the Doha negotiations, although civil society was initially barred again, women were unable to achieve formal representation at the negotiating table as they had in Abuja. However, the mediators, particularly Djibril Bassolé, also served as critical gender actors in working closely with UN Women (formerly UNIFEM) to ensure that the women's agenda was included in the final peace agreement.

As the peace negotiations in the South Sudan began only recently and there has been very little information published by the media and scholars on the process, it is more difficult to discern how several of its agreements came to embrace such high levels of engendered security, and my attempts to contact participants (delegates and members of civil society organizations) have been unsuccessful. What we can tell is that at times women comprised up to 20% of delegates on both sides of the table and that this largely results from the important role that they play in the South Sudanese legislature as a result of gender quotas. Furthermore, while UN Women has worked extensively to promote women's participation in the process, there was little formal space for civil society to officially participate. Finally, although there is some evidence to suggest that one of the three facilitators on the Joint Mediation Support Team, Lazaro Sumbeiywo, strongly supports women's participation in peace negotiations and attempted to

bring civil society and women's organizations into the negotiations, there is still no evidence that he or the other two mediators were able or ultimately even willing to promote women in the South Sudanese process.

The high levels of engendered security included in the various peace agreements for Colombia (although a final agreement has yet to be signed) is a result of the highly inclusive nature of the peace process. Civil society, in particular the women's movement, has been formally incorporated into the negotiations and the UN nations and UN Women are playing a big role in the process. Additionally, relentless lobbying by women's organizations and UN women has seen the number of female delegates rise to nearly one-third of all delegates at certain points. The FARC has included several women as official "plenipotentiaries," and the government has gone a step further in appointing a female delegate for the express purpose of reaching out to the women's movement. Because there is no official mediator of the process, the work of the UN and the high degree of inclusivity in the negotiations seem to be the primary causal factors in the engendering of the agreements.

The Philippines case is similar to that of Colombia's in that there was no mediator as a critical gender actor (the Malaysian facilitator lacked "gender awareness"). The engendering of the peace agreements seemed to have resulted from an inclusive process: civil society has been highly incorporated into the official negotiations and like in Colombia, the number of female negotiators reached nearly one-third of all delegates. However, although a number of international actors were involved in the peace process, neither the UN nor UN Women played a role.

Because Nepal was a mostly domestically-driven process and completely excluded women from the negotiating table as delegates and civil society representatives, it appears that

the extensive treatment of engendered security in the final agreements resulted largely from the work of the informal mediator (Swiss Ambassador Gunther Baechler) who served as a critical gender actor in seeking to further their interests. Additionally, the leftist ideology of the Maoists seemingly left the negotiating delegates open to hearing the concerns of the women's movement. For these reasons, the Nepal process has little in common with the other cases and thus represents a unique example of the incorporation of engendered security in a peace agreement.

And finally, although the peace agreement signed between the government of Mali and the opposition in 2015 referenced all four types of women's inclusion, the success did not result from the genuine participation of women in the process or the true embrace of the principles of engendered security by the parties. Although women did participate via civil society organizations and UN Women was instrumental in promoting gender issues, the number of female negotiating delegates remained low throughout the process. In reality, the agreement was written in haste by the international mediation team who ruled out further talks, imposed a short time horizon on the process and took liberty in ensuring that many of its own interests were included in the final agreement. Therefore, it appears that Mali's peace agreement achieved the highest level of engendered security only as a result of the strong role of the international community in the process. Furthermore, although the mediation team did serve as the "critical actor" in engendering the peace agreement, it seems highly possible that this was only to pay lip service to the international norm imposed by UNSCR 1325 as the mediators did not act to ensure women's genuine participation in the negotiations. At the time of writing, only months have passed since its signature, but it we should likely remain skeptical about prospects for implementation of the gender provisions and the likelihood that the agreement will bring about true transformational change for women and women's rights in Mali.

In summary, these ten peace processes, all of which produced a peace agreement (or combination of peace agreements) containing the highest levels of engendered security, seem to owe their success to a few common factors. Surprisingly, the low numbers of women serving as official negotiating delegates in the majority of these cases indicate that their formal presence at the table is not a necessary condition for the engendering of peace agreements (although it is arguably still highly desirable for other reasons). Nor were high levels of participation by civil society organizations a necessary condition. The most common factors in securing a highly engendered peace agreement were the extensive participation by the United Nations (8 cases) and the presence of a mediator as a “critical gender actor.” In the six cases where UNIFEM or UN Women participated in the negotiations, their advocacy seems to have been essential for securing gendered outcomes. Finally, mediators served as “critical actors” in securing high levels of engendered security in peace agreements in nearly 80% of cases that involved mediation and 70% of *all* processes. As discussed previously, this is concerning considering the obstacles that these particular mediators faced in their gender advocacy and that in general, mediators tend to prefer exclusive processes. If their activism is indeed as necessary as it was in these success stories, it follows that the numbers of peace processes producing agreements with the highest levels of engendered security will remain low.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

Since its passage fifteen years ago, UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security has made enormous progress in bringing women's security and participation concerns to the forefront of international peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives where they were once entirely absent. It has also successfully tied women's personal security and political and social empowerment to domestic and international security discourses. In doing so, it has institutionalized a new international norm of women's participation in conflict resolution in an impressively short period of time. The worthiness of this goal has been demonstrated by research connecting states with higher levels of gender equality to a decreased incidence of both internal violence and international conflict. Because recent research has also demonstrated that countries with peace accords are more likely to have electoral quotas for women in place, and that those countries with peace accords containing specific provisions for women's rights are likely to adopt quotas even more rapidly (Anderson and Swiss, 2014), it is apparent that peace agreements offer an additional method for increasing peace and security at the domestic and international levels via the promotion of women's rights.

Such arguments have been used to further "equality rationales" for United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. However, this dissertation has primarily explored a second set of theoretical justifications for the Women, Peace and Security initiative, which are based upon "essentialist" or "functionalist" notions of women as

agents of peace and stability whose inherent qualities of nonviolence and conciliation make them particularly well suited to the peacemaking arena. While both perspectives were originally used to persuade the Security Council to adopt UNSCR 1325 in 2000, the functionalist/essentialist perspective has come to dominate policy and academic discussions in recent years. This dissertation has sought to examine these assumptions in two ways.

First, it offered an exploration of the attitudes and subjective opinions of experienced peacemakers with regard to their task at the negotiating table and how the concerns addressed by UNSCR 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security factor into those understandings. Using Q methodology, it surveyed 27 experienced Track I and II peace mediators and negotiators and employed factor analysis to uncover patterns of commonality and consensus amongst their responses. Three peacemaking personalities were revealed: the “Feminist Peacemonger,” the “Rebel without a (Feminist) Cause,” and the “Purely Pragmatic Peacemaker.” The results of the Q study demonstrate that one particular peacemaking subjectivity (the “Feminist Peacemonger”) is indeed highly gender aware and views the gender mainstreaming of peace processes as an imperative. This bias towards gender issues coincides with preferences for transformative mediation, integrative negotiating strategies, and principles of democracy and inclusion at the peace table.

While the Q method is limited in its ability to make broad generalizations about the wider population of peacemakers, it still allowed for an understanding how the gender of the peacemakers in this study influenced their subjective understandings of the peacemaking task. Because women *and* men were counted amongst the “Feminist Peacemongers,” this study lent empirical support to WPS observers, advocates and critics alike who have cautioned against the tendency to promote UNSCR 1325 on essentialist rather than rights-based or equality grounds.

It has also highlighted the importance of identifying critical actors, female or male, which will work to ensure that the issues raised by UNSCR 1325 are included in post-conflict peace agreements. Finally, Chapter 5 demonstrated the value of Q methodology in studying the subjective opinions and perceptions of peacemakers and expanded the toolkit for research on the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

Following these results, this dissertation also sought to assess the importance of critical actors in the engendering of peace processes. Specifically, it examined the role of “critical gender actors” in ensuring that gender provisions were included in peace agreements. To do this, it first built upon a framework designed by Ellerby (2013; 2015) for identifying a peace process’s level of “engendered security” according to how its substantive agreements provided for the representation, incorporation, protection and recognition of women in post-conflict political, social and economic institutions. It identified ten peace processes that have incorporated all four types of inclusion and thus represent the highest levels of engendered security: Guatemala (1994-1996), Burundi (1999-2000), DRC (2001-2003), Nepal (2006), Sudan-Darfur (2005-2006), Colombia (2012-ongoing), Mali (2014-2015), the Philippines (Mindanao) (2010-2015), South Sudan (2014-ongoing), and Sudan-Darfur (2011-ongoing). Next, in seeking to identify the causal factors in ensuring the engendering of these processes, it examined a) the percentages of women serving as delegates at the negotiating table in each process, b) the degree to which civil society organizations (CSOs), particularly women’s organizations, were formally incorporated into the negotiations, c) the role of mediators as “critical actors” in ensuring women’s access to the process and/or the inclusion of gendered provisions in the peace accords, and d) the role of the United Nations, especially UNIFEM and UN Women. Surprisingly, the participation of female negotiating delegates and the formal

inclusion of civil society organizations dedicated to women's equality and advancement were remarkably low in these processes. Instead, the most common factors in securing a highly engendered peace agreement were the extensive participation by the United Nations and the presence of a mediator as a "critical gender actor."

There are a number of important implications of these findings. First, blanket calls to include "women" in peace processes on the grounds of their unique and inherent orientation towards peace and conciliation can be ineffective or even counterproductive if the specific women selected for participation do not adhere to a "feminist peacemonger" subjectivity. Secondly, such calls can overlook the importance of critical actors, such as the male mediators identified here who served as critical actors in ensuring the engendering of peace agreements and the opening of a space for women's participation in certain cases. Overall, the findings presented in this dissertation lend empirical support to researchers, supporters, critics and observers of UNSCR 1325 who have cautioned against "instrumentalizing" women's participation in peace processes as a means of achieving additional and more desirable ends and instead argue that women's equal participation should be valued as an end in itself.

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