

MOLLIE M. LEE

¡Vieques sí, Marina no! Cultural Models and Collective Action Frames in the History of
a Social Movement

(Under the Direction of BEN BLOUNT)

During the past 60 years, a social movement has emerged protesting the U.S. Navy's training activities on the Puerto Rican island of Vieques. The Navy has maintained that bombing and live-fire training on Vieques are essential to military readiness and national security. Many Viequens claim that the Navy's activities on the island harm civilian residents by limiting the amount of available land, preventing economic growth, and causing environmental contamination that leads to health problems. The purpose of this project is to identify the issues that have been central to historical and contemporary protests and analyze how and why these issues change over time. This is accomplished by using the theoretical perspectives offered by cultural models and collective action frames to analyze central issues in this social movement.

INDEX WORDS: Vieques, Navy, Social movement, Cultural models, Collective
action frames

¡VIEQUES SÍ, MARINA NO! CULTURAL MODELS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
FRAMES IN THE HISTORY OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

by

MOLLIE M. LEE

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MOLLIE M. LEE

Approved: August 9, 2001

Major Professor: Ben Blount

Committee: Pete Brosius
Amy Ross

Electronic Version Approved:

Gordhan L. Patel
Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
December 2001

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my grandmother, Jane Greer Lee.

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This project would not have been possible without the assistance of a number of people. I must begin by acknowledging the activists on Vieques who agreed to be interviewed for this research. The most personally satisfying parts of this research project have been those related to these interviews – conducting the interviews, listening to them, reading them, coding them, and using extensive quotations in the thesis. I have learned a great deal from the interviews and other interactions with Viequen activists. Although the vast majority of people interviewed said that their names could be used with anything they said, for reasons of consistency and confidentiality I have not used personal names in this thesis. However, I hope the activists know that I greatly enjoyed getting to know them as people, and I do not think of them as merely interview codes. I would specifically like to thank the members of the Committee for the Rescue and Development of Vieques, the Horsemen for Peace, and the Alliance of Viequen women. The majority of interviews were conducted with residents of Vieques who are working to get the Navy out of Vieques, and this perspective is the focus of the thesis. However, I also thank the Navy representatives and Navy supporters who were interviewed in this project. These interviews were invaluable in articulating a different perspective and providing additional context to the situation on Vieques.

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CHAPTER 1

VIEQUES: AN INTRODUCTION

Vieques is a small island that lies off the coast of Puerto Rico. Politically it is part of Puerto Rico, which is a commonwealth of the United States. During the past 60 years, a social movement has emerged protesting the U.S. Navy's use of the two-thirds of the island that it owns. During the past two years, friction between the Navy and residents of Vieques has only increased. The Navy has maintained that bombing activities on Vieques are essential to military readiness and national security. Many Viequens claim that the Navy's activities on the island require the civilian residents to bear unacceptably high costs to their land, health, and economy. Protests on Vieques have drawn national and international media attention. A July 16, 2001, New York Times article writes that "The extraordinary thing is that the situation in Vieques is nothing new: the Navy has been conducting bombing runs there for the past half century or so," leading the author to wonder "why Vieques and why now?" A few paragraphs later, he decides that the answer to this lies in a simple fact:

"Vieques, simply, is an activist's dream, offering something for everyone. It has the destruction of an ecological system, along with claims that the people are being exposed to toxic chemicals, which environmentalists are seizing upon. It has the specter of American colonialism that human rights advocates and Puerto Rican nationalists are pointing to. It has the suggestion of racism that civil rights activists and Hispanic leaders are up in arms over" (Hernandez 2001).

This thesis finds a slightly different answer to the question of why Vieques and why now. People have been protesting the Navy's presence on the island for over 60 years, and the way that Vieques became "an activist's dream" is anything but simple. To describe it as such undermines the agency of those who have been participating in the movement for decades. In this thesis, I argue that it is possible to appreciate the origins

and complexity of current protest issues on Vieques only by considering the history of ideas in this social movement.

RESEARCH QUESTION

During the time that the United States Navy has been on the island of Vieques, island residents have protested their presence for a number of reasons. This thesis uses the historical and contemporary manifestations of the social movement on Vieques as a case study to examine the effectiveness of using both cultural models and collective action frames to understand social movement issues. The purpose of this study is to identify issues that have been central to the movement on Vieques and analyze how and why they change over time. My primary hypothesis is that the continuity of some issues in relatively unmodified form and the changes or discontinuities in others is the result of diachronic framing processes. A supporting hypothesis is that these movement issues may be understood by considering them as discursive phenomena that reflect the interaction of strategic frames and cultural models. I suggest that underlying cultural models have motivated activists on Vieques to protest the Navy. However, in the act of protesting they use strategic frames that differ from the cultural models originally motivating action. Over time, the strategic frames and/or the cultural models may change, leading to the creation of new movement issues or modification or discarding of old issues. The evolution of frames and cultural models is examined in the context of three reference domains – land, health, and economy.

VIEQUES AS A CASE STUDY

This project will be limited spatially to the island of Vieques and limited temporally to the period during which the Navy has been on the island (1941-present). Although the Navy presence on Vieques has been protested in other locations – most notably San Juan, New York, and Washington, D.C. – by narrowing the focus of the

project to protests originating on the island I will be able to more thoroughly examine their history than would otherwise be possible.

Although there has recently been a great deal of media attention directed towards the conflict on Vieques¹, and scientists have investigated the possible environmental and health impacts of Navy activities, there have been few academic studies of the movement or the protests on the island. This creates an opportunity to use the developing theories of social movements and cognitive anthropology to study a particular case that is clearly defined and well documented. Perhaps due to its unique relationship with the United States, Puerto Rico is often marginalized in studies of social movements both in Latin America and the United States. However, existing studies suggest that there is great potential for further research. Besides contributing to this research gap, the anthropological perspective of this project will allow further demonstration of the utility of anthropological theories and methods in the study of social movements.

Events of the past two years have made this research project particularly timely. Since the April 19, 1999, misplaced bombing that resulted in the death of a Viequen civilian working at a Navy observation tower, protests and publicity regarding the Navy's use of Vieques have increased dramatically and are affecting the U.S. government's policies towards the island. On July 31, 2000, U.S. President Bill Clinton announced that a referendum to determine the future status of the Navy on Vieques would be held by January of 2002. This referendum would offer Viequens the opportunity to vote for one of the following options: The Navy should stay on the island only until 2003 and not use live fire in its training exercises, or they should be able to stay indefinitely and continue to train with live fire. Not satisfied with the delay in the referendum, or with the options it presented, Viequens continued protests calling for "not one more bomb, not one more minute." Less than a year later, the newly elected governor of Puerto Rico, Sila Calderon, announced that a referendum sponsored by the government of Puerto Rico

¹ From April 20, 1999, to December 6, 2000, *El Nuevo Dia* had 1,917 articles concerning Vieques (http://endi.zonai.com/archivo/vieques/archive_titles.asp).

would be held at the end of July 2001. In addition to the options offered in Clinton's referendum, this referendum would offer the option of the immediate and permanent end of Navy activity on Vieques. At the time of this writing, the latest development concerning Vieques is President George W. Bush's announcement that the Navy will leave Vieques by May 2003. As evidenced by continued protests, activists do not view this as an acceptable solution. At the time of this writing, the governor's referendum will be held in a few days, on July 29, 2001.

VIEQUES AS A PLACE

In this chapter, I describe Vieques as I encountered it during fieldwork. There is a dual purpose for this description. First, it is intended to provide the reader with a sense of place that will make the analysis of issues in the following chapters more meaningful. Secondly, Vieques is often used as a metaphor for issues extending far beyond the shores of the island, and this perspective can lead to a reduction of sorts (see Burke 1969), in which Vieques is more symbol than place. Although the focus of this thesis is the struggle that has made Vieques a symbol, it is only by having some sense of the island as a place that one is able to appreciate the multifaceted nature of this struggle².

Vieques is often described as being like a ham sandwich, with Navy territory occupying the eastern and western thirds of the island while the civilian population lives in the middle third.

West

When fieldwork for this project was conducted, the Naval Ammunition Storage Depot (NASD) on the western side of Vieques was being prepared for transfer to civilian

² A protestor who moved to Vieques to become more substantially involved in recent protests expressed a similar sentiment: "And we learned that you cannot divorce the struggle against the Navy, for, as a general social struggle to get a better hold of their resources, and to develop their own economy and their own society as a special type of community bounded to Puerto Rico which is very different than the other municipalities. Certain material differentiation of Vieques from the rest of the municipalities. It's an island, it's an off shore island, and that makes it have its own problems and its own needs... So, we realize that the struggle against the Navy was a national struggle, but it had to be taken from a very local, regional perspective." (Interview #10)

control. As part of a January 31, 1999 Presidential Directive, it was agreed that most of this land would be turned over to the local government, with the exception of potentially contaminated dump sites and conservation zones that will be turned over to the Fish and Wildlife Service.

The only public road into the area is secured at the entrance with a checkpoint, where guards man a small booth. An American flag flies over the booth, and toy soldiers dressed in fatigues point guns and climb on pieces of metal in its shadow. Cars entering the checkpoint are stopped by the guards, who write down driver's license and license plate information. The main roads in the NASD are among the best on Vieques, with fresh pavement and a narrow strip cleared of trees and brush on either side.

Upon entering the NASD, a visitor can choose from a variety of ecologically friendly activities. Walking along the beach, a visitor may encounter an enclosure protecting turtle eggs and baby turtles (see Figure 1.1). A boardwalk leads into a mangrove forest and opens onto a small lagoon, offering bird-watching opportunities and an incredible view of Mt. Pirata, the highest point on Vieques.



Figure 1.1: Enclosure to protect turtle eggs and baby turtles. This enclosure, built by the Navy, is on a beach in the NASD.

For the more adventurous, it is possible to kayak from the beach to the mangroves. If a person is simply seeking a day at the beach, the crystal clear waters at Green Beach offer opportunities for snorkeling, with coral growing beneath the surface. Among the coral, however, an observant snorkeler may notice rusty barrels. Along the roads there are fenced off areas with DANGER signs. As described in an interview:

“And even you go to the western side, and it’s bad... I was just thrilled to see all of the green and the beaches back again, but once you get there you feel even worse because all you see is fences everywhere, “No Trespassing”, explosives, danger, or contamination, whatever. It’s just a labyrinth in there.” (Interview #9)

The landscape itself is altered by what appear to be oddly uniform hills. Upon closer inspection, these hills turn out to be magazines built for the storage of ammunition (see Figure 1.2). The magazines have been emptied of all munitions in preparation for the imminent transfer of this land, but the grass-covered structures themselves will remain even after the transfer. A different window into the history of this land is offered by the crumbling remains of old sugar mills, peeking out of dense vegetation. This is land that used to belong to Viequens and will eventually be returned to them, but for many residents it is not enough.



Figure 1.2: Empty magazines shape the landscape at the NASD.

Middle

The middle portion of the island is the civilian area, marked by the capital city of Isabel Segunda on the northern coast and the town of Esperanza on the southern coast. It is in this area that the approximately 9,500 civilians of Vieques live. While there are distinct differences between these two cities, there is a continuous line of population between them. Isabel Segunda is the center of commercial activity, with the island's only bank, only post office, and largest stores (see Figure 1.3). It is also the center of political activity, with city hall, the mayor's offices, and most governmental offices located near the main plaza. During the day, streets adjacent to the plaza are closed off so that schoolchildren can take their recesses there. Isabel Segunda is also the gateway for civilians entering or leaving Vieques, with the ferry landing in town and the airport nearby.



Figure 1.3: Isabel Segunda. This photograph was taken from El Fortín Conde de Mirasol, an old Spanish Fort located on a hill near town.

Aside from driving, there are several different ways to get around Vieques. *Publicos* are minivans that act as collective taxis and generally charge only \$2 for a ride anywhere in the civilian area. Many distances are within easy walking distance from each other. Finally, hitchhiking feels safer on Vieques than it does in many other

locations. Indeed, the process of getting rides from strangers provided a wonderful way to meet people and chat with them, however briefly, about life on Vieques. I was surprised by how often someone I knew would drive by and give me a ride. More than anything else, this underscored for me the small size of the Viequen population.

Esperanza, located on the southern coast of Vieques, is a fishing community that has been transformed by the island's small but significant tourism industry. A well-maintained boardwalk follows Esperanza's main street, which has restaurants on one side and the Caribbean Ocean on the other (Figure 1.4).



Figure 1.4: Fishermen's Beach in Esperanza. A clothesline is hung with flags praising Vieques and encouraging the Navy to leave.

One of the main roads between Isabel Segunda and Esperanza follows the border of Navy and civilian land. It passes the gate to Camp Garcia, which is the base on the eastern side of the island. This gate has been a site for demonstrations since early in the movement's history. One of the island's most organized protest groups, the Committee for the Rescue and Development of Vieques, established its headquarters in a house directly across from the gate in 2000. Since then, the gate has drawn even more protest activity (see Figure 1.5). The number and type of policemen at the gate have varied

throughout the past year, depending on the state of political negotiations between the Navy and the governor and on what types of protest activity have been planned.



Figure 1.5: Picket line in front of the gates to Camp Garcia. This picket line occurred at the end of the Caravan for Peace.

East

Entering the eastern section of Vieques through the main gate at Camp Garcia, a visitor is met with a more arid landscape than that found in the rest of Vieques. Rolling hills covered with scrubby vegetation continue almost until the beaches. Until events of 1999, many of these beaches were open to civilian visitors when the Navy was not using them for training maneuvers.

Aside from Camp Garcia, there are few buildings on this section of Vieques. A notable exception to this is the observation tower and hurricane locker overlooking the live impact area on the eastern tip of the island (see Figures 1.6 and 1.7). Although maneuvers are practiced at various locations throughout the Navy's land in eastern Vieques, the live impact area is the only location where bombs are supposed to be dropped.



Figure 1.6: The Live Impact Area. This photograph was taken from the hurricane locker.



Figure 1.7: Observation Tower. The checkerboard design is new, and it is intended to prevent another accident like the one that killed David Sanes Rodriguez.

On April 19, 1999, a training exercise at this location went disastrously awry. An unfortunate combination of human error and failure to follow procedure led the pilot of an F-18C Hornet to mistake an observation post for his intended target. He dropped two

500 lb bombs, both of which landed in the vicinity of the staffed observation post and adjacent hurricane locker. A civilian guard, a native of Vieques named David Sanes Rodriguez, was standing on top of this building when the bombs were dropped. The explosions knocked him unconscious and he later died from extensive bleeding.

Within a day, Viequens and Puerto Ricans from the main island had entered the Navy land to place a large white cross on the bombing range as an act of protest and memorial. A Puerto Rican environmental activist named Alberto de Jesus, commonly known as Tito Kayak, declared that he was staying on the range until the Navy left Vieques. Within a month, hundreds of people had joined him in a massive act of civil disobedience that involved entering Navy land and setting up protest camps, most of which were on the bombing range. These camps remained in place for over a year, and during that time the Navy was not able to conduct any training exercises.

CHAPTER SUMMARIES

This chapter has introduced the social movement protesting the U.S. Navy's presence on the island of Vieques. This movement is the case study examined in this thesis, which attempts to identify central issues in the movement and understand some of the reasons and means by which these issues change over time. Vieques is an interesting case study for a number of reasons, including its current status as a significant topic of political and media discussion and the relative marginalization of Puerto Rico in social movement literature. In the hope that subsequent chapters would be more interesting with a sense of Vieques as a place, this chapter briefly described the landscape of Vieques and introduced locations important to the movement.

Chapter Two discusses events in Puerto Rico and Vieques that provide historical context to the movement on Vieques. The first section of this chapter briefly describes important moments in the politics and economy of Vieques and Puerto Rico. While the time period discussed in this section, 1898 – 1939, predates the social movement on Vieques, it provides information that is referenced in certain frames that compare

Vieques society, economy, and land distribution before and after the Navy came to the island. The second section of this chapter is more specifically focused on the social movement on Vieques. It presents a chronological history of this movement from 1940 to the present.

Chapter Three discusses the theories and methods used in this thesis. The theoretical originality of this work is the complementary use of collective action frames and cultural models to understand activist's presentations of the central issues in the history of this movement. The frames analyzed in this thesis are diagnostic frames, which identify a problem and its cause. The diagnostic frames used on Vieques are structured as logical arguments with parts of cultural models as their fundamental premises. When used in conjunction, a diagnostic frame and cultural model present an unacceptable situation that becomes a protest issue. If either a frame or cultural model changes, it is likely that the content or motivational force of a movement issue will also change. Keyword analysis can be used to find reference domains and frames mentioned in interview. It may then be applied to frames to identify the cultural models used in the frames. After frames and cultural models have been explained, it is possible to consider their dynamic interactions across in order to understand changes in movement issues.

In Chapters Four through Six, the analytic process outlined in Chapter Three is used to examine frames and cultural models referencing the domains of land, health and economy. Chapter Four examines land, which has been a movement issue since shortly after the Navy expropriated two-thirds of the island in the 1940s. Since then, the perception of these expropriations has evolved from them being thought of as an unfortunate, but necessary event to being framed as an injustice worthy of protest. The content of this evolving framing is used to present a cultural model of land. The frame and cultural model are then used to narrate the history of land as a movement issue on Vieques. In Chapter Five, framings of health as a movement issue are analyzed to uncover a cultural model of health. While health is a relatively recent topic of protest on Vieques, it has quickly become a central issue in the movement. This is attributed to the

success of the frame in motivating protest. Because of this, problems that were previously seen as isolated have been reframed to become part of the diagnostic frame of health as a problem on Vieques. Chapter Six discusses the framing and cultural model of economy, which unlike land or health has remained relatively unchanged throughout the movement's history. This chapter uses the context provided in the previous chapters and the frame and cultural model of economy to experiment with the presentation of interview data. With minimal explanation, the history of economy on Vieques is presented as current residents remembered it in interviews.

In the concluding chapter, I revisit the central questions of this work in light of the data presented in the body of the thesis. Although the reference domains of land, economy, and health were separated for the purpose of analysis, they overlap cognitively and chronologically. By considering the frames and cultural models of earlier chapters in relation to each other, it is possible to more fully understand the history and complexity of movement issues on Vieques

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

This chapter discusses events occurring on Vieques and Puerto Rico between 1939 and 2001. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to dates and events that are relevant to the struggle on Vieques (see Table 2.1 for a chronology of major events). This discussion covers two distinct time periods in Viequen history: 1898-1939 and 1940-2001.

The first section of this chapter discusses events occurring between 1898 and 1939. Although this time period predates the Navy's arrival in Vieques, and thus the social movement being studied, it is presented here because it provides context for the later struggle. Various aspects of the struggle for control of Vieques have informed or been informed by debates about the political affiliation between Puerto Rico and the United States. The relationship between Vieques, Puerto Rico, and the United States is immensely complex, and in the following few pages it is impossible to do justice to the history of this relationship. Readers wanting to learn more about Puerto Rican and Viequen history are encouraged to consult additional works³.

Whereas the first section of this chapter discusses events that are relevant, but not directly related to Vieques, the second section focuses specifically on Vieques, with particular attention to the Navy presence there. The purpose of this section is to introduce a chronological account of the relationship between the Navy and civilians on

³Recently published works of note about Puerto Rican history in English include Fernandez 1996, Trías Monge 1997, and Rivera Ramos 2001. Histories focused on Vieques include Langhorne 1987 in English, and Amédee Bonnet Benítez 1977 and Meléndez López 2000 in Spanish.

Vieques between 1940 and 2001. This chronology serves as background for subsequent chapters, which will examine specific aspects of the Vieques struggle in more detail.

Table 2.1 – Chronology of Events Relevant to the Struggle on Vieques

Date	Event
1898	In the context of the Spanish American War, the United States military formally takes control of Puerto Rico
1900	U.S. Congress passes the Organic Act for Puerto Rico (also known as the Foraker Act).
1915	Workers at the Puerto Real sugar mill in Vieques stage protest march in front of the hacendado's house. Three workers are killed by police.
1917	U.S. Congress passes another Organic Act for Puerto Rico (known as the Jones Act), which makes Puerto Ricans United States citizens and subject to the draft. The U.S. engages in World War I.
1922	Santa María sugar mill closes on Vieques.
1927	Puerto Real sugar mill closes on Vieques, leaving Playa Grande as the only operating sugar mill.
1938	Popular Democratic Party (PPD) is founded.
1941-1942	Construction of Roosevelt Roads
1941-1943	Expropriations on Vieques
1946	Independence Party (PIP) is founded
1947	Operation Bootstrap, designed to encourage economic development of Puerto Rico, begins.
1947-1950	Expropriations on Vieques
1949	Luis Muñoz Marin becomes the first elected governor of Puerto Rico
1952	Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is established with Puerto Rican Constitution.
1957	Navy decides that the Roosevelt Road Complex will be the Atlantic center of Fleet Guided Missile Training Operations
1961	Dracula Plan proposed: Remove all people, living and dead from the island of Vieques.
1967	In a Puerto Rican plebiscite offering options of statehood, commonwealth, and independence, 60% of the vote goes to commonwealth.
1968	Creation of the New Progressive Party (PNP), which is in favor of continued commonwealth. Navy gives 2600 acres on Vieques to the General Service Administration.
1975	The Navy leaves the nearby island of Culebra
1978-1980	Vieques fishermen confront the Navy at sea
1983	Memorandum of Understanding
1993	Creation of the Comité Pro Rescate y Desarrollo de Vieques (Committee for the Rescue and Development of Vieques)
1999	A bomb dropped at the wrong location kills David Sanes Rodriguez, a civilian guard working for the Navy.

VIEQUES AND PUERTO RICO, 1898-1939

The United States gained control of Puerto Rico during the Spanish American War. A military occupation led by Major General Nelson Miles entered Puerto Rico on July 25, 1898. Three days later, Miles proclaimed to the Puerto Rican people that “the principal aim of the American forces will be to abolish the armed authority of Spain and to give to this beautiful Island the greatest degree of liberty compatible with military occupation” (quoted in Berbusse 1966:79). The first part of Miles proclamation was achieved by means of a peace protocol with Spain on August 14, 1898, which was included in the Treaty of Paris, signed on December 10, 1898 (Trías Monge 1997:27). The implementation of the second, and arguably more difficult, part of Miles statement was left to the military governors who had almost absolute authority in Puerto Rico during the first two years of American control. From October 18, 1898 until May 1, 1900, Puerto Rico was governed by a series of four military generals (Berbusse 1966:78). Without orders from the President or the Secretary of War, or anyone in Washington (Wells 1969:75), these generals instituted a number of reforms in Puerto Rico. Many of these reforms were intended to redesign Puerto Rico’s political structure in a manner consistent with the United States’ philosophy of separation of powers and separation of church and state. Among other things, an executive branch was set up to replace the cabinet, the judiciary was reorganized, and the Catholic Church was no longer supported by state funds (Wells 1969:75).

On Vieques, the initial transition from Spanish to American control and the effects of American military rule in no way foreshadowed that the island would one day be viewed by the U.S. military as being “absolutely critical to the readiness, training and preparation of our forces...” (Vice Admiral William J. Fallon in U.S. House Hearing Sept 22, 1999)⁴. In 1898 U.S. Commander Lt. Cont accepted the peaceful surrender of the Spanish colonel on Vieques (Langhorne 1987:62). In most respects, life on the island

⁴ This was not the case in Culebra, another small island off the coast Puerto Rico. In 1903 a significant portion of Culebra’s land was set aside for military purposes (Fernandez 1994:118).

was unaltered by the change of power, with the population of 5,938 people (Amédée Bonnet 1977:109) continuing to be largely dependent on an agricultural economy dominated by four sugar mills: Santa Maria, Arcadia, Puerto Real, and Playa Grande (Langhorne 1987:52).

The period of military rule in Puerto Rico ended with the implementation of the first Organic Act for Puerto Rico, known as the Foraker Act, on May 1, 1900. Avoiding the question of the future status of Puerto Rico in relation to the United States, the Foraker Act declared the people of Puerto Rico to be Puerto Rican citizens, not subject to federal taxes but able to receive federal money (Wells 1969:84). It also established the United States' version of civil government in Puerto Rico, including the inauguration of Puerto Rico's first civilian governor, Charles Allen. The governor and some members of Puerto Rico's legislative assembly were appointed by the President of the United States, although at least five members of the legislative assembly were to be Puerto Ricans (Wells 1969:83). This act also created the position of Resident Commissioner, who would be an elected but non-voting member of the United States Senate (Trías Monge 1997:43). In addition to formalizing many of the reforms made by the military government, the Foraker Act established free trade between Puerto Rico and the United States.

Although various aspects of the Foraker Act have been revised in the past century, it created an enduring framework for the political relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States. Two of the most important figures in Puerto Rican politics continue to be the governor and resident commissioner, and a century of free trade with the U.S. has had widespread effects. One provision that could have significantly impacted Vieques was the 500 acre act, which stated that any given corporation could not own more than 500 acres of land in Puerto Rico. However, the law did not provide an enforcement mechanism, and it was ignored for the next 40 years (Christopolus 1974:124).

Free trade and access to more competitive technology dramatically changed the sugar industry on Puerto Rico. Unlike coffee, which had been a significant export crop,

sugar was also grown in the United States and was therefore protected under the custom laws⁵ applied to Puerto Rico. This meant that import taxes were not assessed when Puerto Rican sugar entered the U.S. market, giving Puerto Rico a competitive advantage over the rest of the Caribbean. Sugar, which in 1897 had comprised 21% of Puerto Rico's exports, came to represent 50% of the total exports under the American regime (Langhorne 1987:55). The demand for increased sugar production led to a restructuring of the traditional Puerto Rican agricultural system. American corporations that used centralized machines to produce sugar from sugar cane replaced many of the island's small-scale sugar growers (Fernandez 1996:38). This means of production spread to non-American plantation owners as well. In order to be competitive in the new sugar market, most *hacendados*⁶ either emulated the Americans or left the sugar industry (Wells 1969:91).

On Vieques, the same families stayed in control of the island's *centrales* for several decades after the United States entered Puerto Rico. However, the mills showed rapid technological advances⁷ and began to be consolidated. The lack of enforcement of the Foraker Act's 500 acre law is evident in the distribution of land in Vieques at this time, with the majority of the island's land being owned by just a few families. Though this would have important ramifications when the Navy arrived, until then it did not significantly alter the *de facto* population distribution. Some individuals lived on their own land, but many plantation workers and their families lived as tenants on plantation land.

A Marxist analysis of the situation (Quintero Rivera 1974) suggests that the increased use of machines and separation of the worker from the product of his labor would lead to increased class differentiation and eventually revolution. It seems likely that some of these factors were in play when Viequens working at the Puerto Real sugar

⁵ Tobacco was another significant beneficiary of these laws (Wells 1969:91), but was not a significant crop on Vieques and therefore will not be discussed here.

⁶ At this time, sugar mills in Puerto Rico were called *centrales*, and the owners of sugar plantations were called *hacendados*.

⁷ An example of this is the Fulton Mills purchased for Playa Grande. In 1909, a mill was purchased that processed 20 tons of cane in an hour; in 1920 this was replaced by one processing over 33 tons of cane per hour (Langhorne 1987:52).

mill staged a protest march in front of owner Gustavo Mourraille's house on February 16, 1915 (Amédée Bonnet 1977:117). The most significant results of the march were that three workers were killed by local police, there was a slight increase in wages, and Mourraille sold Puerto Real (Langhorne 1987:58). Throughout Puerto Rico, similar discontents led to the organization of the Federación Libre de Trabajadores, which later became Puerto Rico's Socialist Party (Quintero Rivera 1974:198).

While many of the policies implemented by the Foraker Act have remained essentially unchanged until present times, in 1917 a second Organic Act for Puerto Rico, the Jones Act, further modified the political infrastructure of Puerto Rico. Some of these modifications suggested a movement towards self-governance, although presidential appointees retained many positions of power. Perhaps most significantly, the Jones Act declared that Puerto Ricans were now United States citizens. The act passed three months before the United States entered World War I, and the simultaneity of the impending war and the granting of U.S. citizenship, and thus draft eligibility, have been a subject of debate (Trías Monge 1997:75).

By 1920, Vieques had reached a peak population of 11,651 people (Amédée Bonnet 1977:109). The Arcadia mill had shut down, but the island's sugar industry was strong, producing 17,276 tons of sugar that year (118). Vieques had enough work that most residents were employed year-round, and workers from other places came for the harvest season (Langhorne 1987:54). In Vieques, this period is remembered as being a time of wealth and development, with the island known as being the most prosperous community in Eastern Puerto Rico (Anonymous 1977). As described in an interview:

“Vieques used to have work for the people of Vieques and the people from all over. People used to come from the main island, and they used to come from those little islands around the Virgin Islands, to come and work on Vieques. We have some people from Mary's, St. Kitts, St. Croix, St. Thomas, they used to come here to work.” (Interview #3)

Although this is remembered as a golden age in Viequen history, many people in Puerto Rico were struggling with the combined results of a population explosion and

increasing corporate control of agriculture. Theodore Roosevelt Jr., who was the governor of Puerto Rico from 1930-1932, describes the situation that he found upon arriving in 1929:

“It was one of the most densely populated areas per arable square mile in the world. The people still depended upon agriculture as their main means of livelihood. The rich coastal plain was largely in the hands of big sugar companies. The small farmer had been forced back into the rugged and comparatively barren hills. Poverty was widespread and hunger, almost to the verge of starvation, common.” (Roosevelt 1974:168)

Roosevelt’s account of the dominance of large companies in the agricultural industry is supported by the consolidation of Vieques sugar mills during this time period. The Santa Maria sugar mill closed in 1922 and the Puerto Real mill went through a quick succession of owners before it closed its doors in 1927 (Amédée Bonnet 1977:116). With the close of the Puerto Real mill, Playa Grande was the only active sugar mill remaining on Vieques. However, Playa Grande continued to mill enough sugar to temporarily delay the effects of the economic crash that would soon come to the rest of Puerto Rico. Notably, it was in 1926 that the first public reports of Navy interest in Vieques surfaced (Meléndez 2000:18).

In Puerto Rico, the 1930’s proved to be a time of turbulence: economically, politically, and even meteorologically. By this time, Puerto Rico’s economy had strong ties to that of the United States and the stock market crash of 1929 and subsequent depression was felt in Puerto Rico. The hurricane San Cipriano added to the island’s problems when it hit in 1932, and by 1933, 65% of the potential work force was unemployed (Christopulos 1974:135). The hurricane reduced Vieques’s sugar production by over 60% (Langhorne 1987:58), but it went up again briefly before ending entirely.

During this same time period, the independence movement in Puerto Rico gained strength. The elections of 1932 offered voters the option of pro-independence politicians, from the Liberal Party or the Nationalist Party, or pro-statehood politicians from the Republican-Socialist Coalition. Luis Muñoz Marín led the Liberal Party, which supported independence at this time. Muñoz Marín was elected as a senator, and the

Liberal Party received more votes than any other single party. However, the Republican-Socialist coalition carried the elections. Pedro Albizu Campos, the Nationalist Candidate for Resident Commissioner, received less than 3% of the vote, which was nonetheless a higher percentage of the vote than that received by any other Nationalist candidate in this year (Cristopolus 1974:139). This election is significant not so much for the results as for the introduction of Muñoz Marín and Albizu Campos as significant figures in Puerto Rican politics. Both men dealt with the Navy presence on Vieques during their very different political careers.

After the 1932 elections, Muñoz Marín used his political and social connections to encourage inclusion of Puerto Rico in New Deal legislation (Fernandez 1996:114). Muñoz Marín had spent a great deal of time in the States, and he was on good terms with members of the Roosevelt administration (Trías Monge 1997:92). Muñoz Marín soon stopped emphasizing independence, instead focusing on improving Puerto Rico's economy (Fernandez 1996:114). He encouraged the establishment of a commission to investigate the causes and possible solutions of Puerto Rico's economic troubles. The findings of this commission were used by Roosevelt in his decision to establish the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration, with the mandate of reforming the island's economy (Trías Monge 1997:96, Wells 1969:116). In 1939 Muñoz Marín helped found Puerto Rico's Popular Democratic Party, and he became the first elected governor of Puerto Rico in 1949.

Meanwhile, Albizu Campos encouraged the Nationalists to work for Puerto Rican independence by non-electoral means. He became an advocate of revolution, and a number of violent incidents are attributed to his influence. At a speech of his at the University of Puerto Rico in 1935, a riot broke out and three Nationalists were killed by police officers (Cristopolous 1974:140). At their funeral, attended by almost 8,000 people, Albizu Campos blamed these deaths on Francis Riggs, a police officer from the United States serving as the Insular Chief of Police in Puerto Rico (Fernandez 1996:122). In 1936, two Nationalists killed Francis Riggs. The response to Rigg's death was a harsh

crackdown on the activities of the Nationalist party and its leaders. Six weeks after the murder, Albizu Campos and six other Nationalist leaders were arrested for sedition, and they were later sentenced to the maximum penalty of 15 years in jail (Trías Monge 1997:94).

Both Muñoz Marín's concern with Puerto Rico's economic situation and Albizu Campos's call for Puerto Rican independence were soon affected by the United State's involvement in World War II. In 1938, Puerto Rico was discussed as a prime location for air bases that would be crucial for this involvement (Fernandez 1996:138). In May of that year, the Puerto Rican legislature passed a resolution⁸ inviting the United States military to build bases in Puerto Rico (Meléndez López 2000:28). Air bases on the main island began construction, and the Navy decided that it too needed bases in this strategic location. In 1941, Vieques was included in a number of resolutions⁹ passed by the United States Congress to approve the acquisition of land for bases.

VIEQUES 1940-2001

Between 1941 and 1943, eight landowners on Vieques were paid an average of \$47 per acre for over 21,000 acres of land (Langhorne 1987:62). Additional expropriations took place in 1947, resulting in the Navy acquisition of 26,000 of Vieques's 33,000 acres. Tenants living on this land, but not technically owning it, were relocated and given small amounts of money in compensation for their homes. Approximately 825 families, consisting of 3,620 people, were moved to the center portion of the island (Mullenneaux 2000:23). It is estimated that an additional 3,000 individuals were moved to St. Croix (Fernandez 1994:120, Langhorne 1987:63). Many people still active in the struggle were children when these expropriations took place.

⁸ Resolution 144

⁹ On March 17, 1941, Public Law 13 allocated \$35 million for the construction of a base in Vieques; on March 23, 1941 Public Law 22 (H.R. 3325) stated that Vieques would be used for the operations of the Navy; and on August 25, 1941, Public Law 247 (H.R. 5412) approved the Navy's acquisition of land on Vieques at a price set by court (Meléndez López 2000:47-48).

They vividly remember notices given to their parents saying that they had 24 hours to evacuate their houses.

Although many Viequens now consider the expropriations to be one of the Navy's most grievous acts on the island, at the time the acquisition of land met with little resistance. This is sometimes explained as reflecting Viequens' internalization of ideas about American superiority and authority. Another explanation is that the expropriations were considered acceptable given the extenuating circumstances. As in the United States, patriotism in Puerto Rico was very high during World War II. Also, the sugarcane industry was in decline by the time the Navy entered Vieques, and construction of the base provided thousands of jobs for local residents. In addition to base construction, the Navy planned to build a breakwater connecting Vieques and the main island. Plans soon changed, however, and construction on the breakwater ended without its completion, leaving many unemployed. The lack of work and land led some residents to move to the nearby island of St. Croix or mainland Puerto Rico. In many cases, this led to the separation of family members, a pattern that continues today.

Meanwhile, the rest of Puerto Rico was undergoing less dramatic but nonetheless significant transitions. In 1940, the recently founded Popular Democratic Party won more votes than any other party, and Luis Muñoz Marin became the president of Puerto Rico's Senate. In 1941 Guy Rexford Tugwell was appointed governor of Puerto Rico. The economic depression of the 1930s was countered by Operation Bootstrap, which was intended to improve Puerto Rico's economy by encouraging corporate investment in the island. By this time, however, the economy of Vieques was diverging from the economy of the rest of the island. With only 7,000 acres of civilian land, a relatively small population workforce, and the transportation costs of moving products to and from the main island, Vieques had little to offer companies.

In 1943, after the base was completed, Vieques residents organized protests concerning the lack of work on the island. Although these protests asked for assistance from the government of Puerto Rico, unemployment was a particularly serious problem

because the Navy's control of two-thirds of the island created a higher concentration of people in the civilian area. This meant that there was little hope of returning to the agricultural economy of previous decades. In response to these protests, Muñoz Marín established a committee to study problems of unemployment on Vieques (Meléndez López 2000:50). This committee reported to Governor Tugwell that the Navy was one of the factors creating the unemployment, and Tugwell wrote to the Secretary of the Navy asking that local civilians be able to use a portion of their land for agricultural purposes. The Navy did not respond to this request (Meléndez López 2000:53).

In 1944, the Puerto Rican legislature passed a number of laws appropriating money for the purposes of creating employment and encouraging economic development in Vieques. Later that year, the Navy announced that it was turning over a significant amount of land on Vieques to Puerto Rican and federal agencies, although it retained the right to reclaim the land if necessary (Meléndez López 2000:55). During the next decade, a number of projects were implemented that created jobs in Vieques. PRACO, the Puerto Rican Agricultural Development Company, oversaw cattle operations, an egg farm, a pineapple plantation, and coconut groves, among other things. Some of these projects took place on unused Navy land. These projects created many employment opportunities on Vieques, but they ended when a lack of government funds led PRACO to shut down in 1955 (Langhorne 1987:65). The Land Authority of Puerto Rico, which took over PRACO's duties, did continue to lease Navy land to cattle owners, but the employment benefits were not as significant (Langhorne 1987:65).

During the 1950's, relations between the military and the civilians on Vieques became increasingly strained. During this time, large-scale maneuvers brought thousands of soldiers, sailors, and marines to Vieques for elaborately staged mock invasions (see Harris 1980, Beach 1950). Sailors and Marines frequently went into the civilian areas of Vieques when they were on leave. The military presence benefited owners of stores, restaurants, and bars, but led to a variety of problems.

“The Navy used to bring here to the island, sometimes ten, 15,000 people, marines people, and have them at Camp Garcia. Some of these people, they take pass, legally, to Isabel Segunda. 200, 300, sometimes even 500. I don’t know, you have seen Isabel Segunda, it’s not so big. It’s not that big. And these people used to get drunk, women started getting raped in the island, people got killed.” (Interview #4)

In interviews, long-time residents of Vieques describe frequent fights between marines and civilians. Newspaper articles from this decade document fights interrupting local social events (Sánchez Cappa 1959) and sometimes leading to civilian deaths (Vazquez Otero 1952). A related, but somewhat distinct aspect of the increasing tension was harassment of local women by sailors and marines. Women tell of having to be in their houses before dark so that they could lock the doors and bar the windows before men from the military arrived calling for *senoritas* and trying to get into houses:

“As far as I can remember, I remember the Navy men coming out of their ships and trying to get into our homes at night. Because my mother’s fence, my, you know, the farm that belonged to my mother, the fence is the Navy’s fence. So without asking permission, you know that NO TRESPASSING words has to mean a lot to us, but for them, it meant nothing. They just broke into our farms and they wanted to break into our homes, looking for women. I didn’t know that then, I thought they were coming to kill us if they could break into our homes. We were always terrified, because all we thought of was they were gonna kill us. And you know my mother instead of, like, if you go to your home, your mother will take maybe a glass of water to put on your bedside. My mother used to have a long machete so she could take care of us if someone had come into our home.” (Interview #3)

Some governmental recognition of the problem of turning an inhabited island into a practice ground for intensive battles can be seen in re-occurring proposals to move the residents of Vieques to other locations. Declassified documents from 1961 include a series of memorandums and briefs regarding “Real Estate Negotiations,” a proposal to relocate all the civilian residents of Vieques and Culebra (Department of Defense 1961). This plan was known as the Dracula Project because it included a proposal to move the graves on Vieques so that people would have no compelling reasons to return. Luis Munoz Marin, who was by then the governor of Puerto Rico, wrote an eloquent letter to President Kennedy, in which he warned that in addition to causing massive social

upheaval, the move would likely be used to support anti-American rhetoric in Latin America. Muñoz Marín concludes the letter by writing:

“We are, of course, prepared to do everything within our power to contribute to the security of the Nation, but we submit that the project which has been proposed is so drastic, destructive and dangerous that it should not be undertaken unless you are convinced that to forego its effectuation is clearly to imperil the Nation’s ability to defend itself.” (in Melendéz López 2000:189)

Kennedy decided that the nation could defend itself even without total control of Vieques, and in January of 1962 wrote to Muñoz Marín that his arguments had been influential in the decision to leave the civilians on Vieques (Fernandez 1996:204). A slightly different version of events emerges in a declassified document from 1964, which writes that discussion of these plans “were discontinued when it became apparent in late 1962, the required legislation was not going to be immediately forthcoming from Congress” (Department of Defense 1964).

Although Viequenses were not aware of the land acquisition discussed in 1961 (Fernandez 1996:202), they learned of another proposed expropriation in 1964. Plans to expropriate the southern half of the civilian area were discovered by the Antonio Rivera, who was the mayor of Vieques from 1948 until 1972. A group of residents formed the Committee Pro Defensa de Vieques, with Rivera as president. This group organized protests on the island, which were supported by protests on mainland Puerto Rico. Rivera led a group that traveled to Washington, D.C. to petition against the proposed expropriations, which were eventually cancelled.

The next decade was relatively uneventful for the protest movement. In the late 1970’s, however, there was a sudden increase in anti-Navy sentiment and activity. In interviews, the primary explanations given were that people were better educated and no longer felt that the Navy or Americans were superior. Additionally, organized protests on the nearby island of Culebra led the Navy to move out of Culebra in 1975. Despite an executive order that this move should not lead to increased bombing on Vieques without

the permission of the Puerto Rican government (Langhorne 1987:68), common opinion at the time¹⁰ was that this was precisely what happened.

By 1977, frustration with the Navy had reached a point where a group formed specifically to support the movement and the local presidents of Puerto Rico's major political parties¹¹, signed a resolution asking for the immediate exit of the Navy from their islands. This resolution cited the Navy's ownership of over 75% of the island's land and the need for that land to grow and develop, the constant danger of the explosives stored in the NAF, the way that practices had gotten in the way of fishermen working to sustain their families, riots between military and civilians, and significant destruction to the island's flora, fauna, and ecology (Tirado Guevara et al 1977). A 1980 opinion article points to this consensus as a watershed moment in the struggle: "For the first time in history, a local government publicly faced the Navy. The Vieques political leadership agreed on a united front of all four parties to force the Navy to stop the bombing. The crisis began" (Garcia Passalacqua 1980).

Melodramatic tendencies notwithstanding, the end of 1977 marks the beginning of a time of intense protest in Puerto Rico. A similar resolution to the one signed by the local presidents was signed by the Vieques chapter of the Teacher's Federation of Puerto Rico (Federación de Maestros de Puerto Rico 1977). In November of 1977, a group called Viequeses Unidos held pickets outside of the gates to Camp Garcia, which is still one of the primary locations for protest activity.

The fishermen's association, which was founded in 1975 by local fishermen hoping to improve their livelihood by taking advantage of government funds for projects such as building a pier, became the vanguard of the struggle on Vieques in the 1978. Since the expropriations led to a shortage of land on Vieques, many men turned to fishing

¹⁰ A common perception concerning this move is depicted in a 1973 political cartoon that shows Uncle Sam as a pool player. Biting his tongue in concentration, squinting his eyes, and with one leg on the pool table for a better position, he is aiming the cue stick at a ball with a skull on it, which he's hitting towards a ball labeled "Culebra" which will then presumably hit a ball labeled "Vieques" (Rubén 1973). The caption at the top reads "CARAMBOLA!"

¹¹ This included current Mayor Radamés Tirado Guevara (PNP), ex and future mayor Carlos L. Castaño (PDP), José Miguel Rivera Acevedo (PIP) and Ismael Guadalupe Ortiz (PSP).

to provide both food and income for their families (Mullenneaux 2000:31). By the 1970's, fishing was important both economically and culturally. The intensification of maneuvers on Vieques meant that fishermen were subject to more severe restrictions about when and where they could fish (Pala 1979).

During this time period, the Navy's most intense maneuvers usually occurred in January and February with the result that fishermen were restricted from entering certain areas for roughly a month (Berkan 1979). On February 6th, 1978, a group of almost 100 fishermen in approximately 30 boats went into the area that had been announced as a location of that day's exercise (Mullenneaux 2000:32). They used the boats to form a line blocking the Navy ships from the shore, and prevented the intended amphibious landing for several hours (Pala 1979).

Less than a month after the fishermen's actions at sea, a group including the governor Puerto Rico and Vieques mayor Radames Tirado filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of Defense and a group of Navy and Marine officials petitioning that the Navy leave Vieques. In this suit, they alleged that the Navy bombing caused air pollution, water pollution, and noise pollution without having the necessary permits for any of the above (Babcock 1978) and violated a number of environmental regulations¹². Because of the suit, maneuvers that were schedule for May were moved to an offshore location, and there were no more large-scale maneuvers on Vieques for the remainder of the year (Stella 1979).

In early 1979, the Navy resumed its maneuvers on Vieques, and there was a series of confrontations between the fishermen and the Navy. Fishermen took their boats into areas where the Navy had announced they would be doing maneuvers. They stopped the Navy boats with chains, and used slingshots to shoot at Navy ships. The fishermen's protests caught the attention of the national and international media, and turned the

¹² Among others, these acts included the National Environmental Policy Act; the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, the Clean Air Act, the Noise Control Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Endangered Species Act, the National Historic Preservation act, the Coastal Zone Management Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act (Rooklidge 1983).

various concerns of the movement into a photogenic image event (see DeLuca 1999) that was portrayed as the battle of David and Goliath (Mullenneaux 2000:32). In the words of one of the leaders of these actions:

“Remember I told you that we lost 131 traps¹³, we lost them because they tangle up with the big propeller and break the rope. So, when we want to stop the amphibious landing, we took ropes, like the ones we use on all the traps, we took buoys, like the ones we use on the traps, difference was, in the middle of the rope, we had a big piece of chain.

--Tied in to the middle of it?

Once that chain, once the propeller pulled the rope, see, doesn't break the rope because there's no weight on it. With the trap it's a weight, and it gives, the rope gives. But it's no weight on it, keeps pulling the rope. Pulls the rope until it pulls the chain. Once it pulls the chain, the chain tangles up between the propeller and the hull of the ship. And once the propeller tangle up, he can't move anymore, he's dead, that's it. So we start shooting...” (#4)

In addition to these actions at sea, Vieques and people from mainland Puerto Rico began to occupy Navy land. A group called the Cruzada Pro Rescate de Vieques emerged as the leader of these actions. During one of these operations, on May 19, 1979, while a religious service with approximately 150 people attending was taking place on Navy land, 21 people were arrested. Those arrested were the leaders and most active participants in the movement, and approximately half of them were given prison sentences. One of these people was Angel Rodriguez Cristobal, who was very involved in the Puerto Rican Socialist Party and the Puerto Rican Independence movement. He was found hung in this cell at the federal prison in Tallahassee, FL, on November 11, 1979. Officially, the death of Rodriguez Cristobal was declared a suicide but many people believed that he was murdered¹⁴.

¹³This is a reference to an incident in June of 1977. During maneuvers, Navy ships had unintentionally cut buoy lines marking where the traps were located. In addition to losing that days catch, the presence of unclaimed traps in the water meant that they would continue to attract fish, which would die in them, and thus attract more fish. The fishermen sued the Navy, but also prepared for other action.

¹⁴ A report to the United Nations Decolonization Committee hearings assessed the situation in the following manner: “Justice Watch is particularly concerned about the death of Angel Rodríguez Cristobal – in fact, it was his death in a U.S. prison last November that led our representatives to seek a meeting with the U.S. Attorney General. We met with Mr. Benjamin Civiletti to register our concern that the Vieques protester and independence activist had been murdered – and that his death was not the result of suicide” (Puerto Rico Justice Watch 1980).

This death set off a chain of events in which violence was committed by both supporters of struggle and supporters of the Navy. A bus carrying Navy soldiers was bombed on December 9, 1979, and explained as being retaliation for what had happened to Angel Rodriguez Cristobal (Fernandez 1996:246). On January 7, 1980, a group calling itself the Anti-Communist Alliance bombed the Puerto Rico Bar Association building, saying that this act was retaliation for the bus bombing (American Friends Service Committee 1980). On January 25, 1980, three men were arrested for this. One was Roberto López González, a leader of the pro-Navy group on Vieques. Another was Lt. Alex Joseph de la Zerda, who at that time was the Navy's community relations officer on Vieques.

Although the above events are important in Puerto Rican history, and are clearly related to the tensions surrounding Vieques at the time, they are not indicative of what the residents of Vieques were doing on the island. More common were demonstrations and pickets such as the ones at the Fiestas Patronales, the annual celebration in honor of the town's patron saint.

“One time, a few years the marines were a part of that fiesta, and they would come with their band, they would march. In other words, they would conduct the whole fiesta patronal. And then a few persons had to start protesting. And I was one of those protestants.

--Why did you protest?

You figure if it's a fiesta for us, the civilians, why would the marines have to do it there? They don't have to take part in that?

--So it just seemed wrong that they would...

And so after a few years, then they stopped.

--How would you protest, what would you do?

Same like we do now. We make signs, we have signs, you know, saying that we don't want them and saying that this is a fiesta for our people, you know for Vieques people, not the Navy. It wasn't that they, it wasn't their activity. And if we are, we are not allowed to go, to be on their activities, why would they have to be on our activities?" (#7)

In addition to the lawsuits, demonstrations, and fish-ins, Viequens lobbied members of Congress. In July of 1978, Congressman Ronald Dellums (D-California)

visited Vieques, where he met with residents and promised to advocate the issue in Congress. At this meeting, he explained his reasons for supporting the movement:

“As a human being, I understand the pain, and I understand the social, economic, the development problems, the environmental (sic) and ecological issues, the personal and social questions, the economic issues of your lifestyle and well-being. And I think its (sic) incredible that the United States military would engage in such oppressive and devastating tactics.” (Dellums 1978)

Dellums kept his promise, and chaired a Congressional investigation into the situation on Vieques (Mullenneaux 2000:37). On June 26, 1979, Vieques mayor Radamés Tirado and Carlos Zenon, the president of the island’s Fishermen’s Association, met with members of Congress in Washington, D.C. Tirado discussed the socio-economic problems caused by the Navy’s presence on the island, while Zenon discussed the effect of the Navy on the local fishing industry and damage done to the island’s ecology (Tirado and Zenon 1979). Meanwhile, activity on Vieques continued, with the fishermen confronting the Navy for the third consecutive year in January of 1980 (Delgado 1980). By this time, however, ideological differences between various factions were beginning to surface (e.g. Feliciano 1980, Circulo de Trabajo Comunista 1980). In 1980, Radames Tirado, the mayor who had actively supported the movement in Vieques during his term, lost in a close race to Carlos L. Castaño, who was more supportive of the Navy’s presence on the island.

A 1983 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Secretary of the Navy and then governor of Puerto Rico Carlos Romero Barcelo marks the end of this period of protest. In this agreement, the Navy promised to address many of the concerns of Viequens, especially those related to encouraging local industry and protecting the island’s ecosystems (Mulleneaux 2000:122). As mentioned in the governor’s press release regarding the MOU, “the achieved agreement had produced a change in the philosophy and fundamental attitudes for relations between the Navy and the government of Puerto Rico” (La Fortaleza Oficina de Prensa y Comunicaciones 1983). In essence, the movement on Vieques had lost government support at local, commonwealth, and

national levels. On Vieques itself, the promises of the MOU effectively ended this period of protest.

While the lawsuits, pickets, and confrontations at sea would not reoccur in such strength for another two decades, a different kind of activity drew attention to the Navy's presence on Vieques in the late eighties. The rescate movement, in which people claim land by moving onto it and establishing communities, reached its peak in Puerto Rico in the 1970s and early 1980s. Usually, rescates protest unequal distribution of wealth and the inability of many people to have land or homes by rescuing unused land and establishing communities. In Vieques, the action has additional implications, as the unused land being rescued belongs to the Navy. Rescates on Vieques in the 1960's and 1970's led the Navy to turn over land to the Commonwealth, and most families were allowed to stay on the land they had rescued (Puerto Rico Update 1993), although they were not title to the land.

In 1989, hundreds of Viequens participated in a number of well-organized "rescues" of Navy land. There was significant media coverage and an on-going debate about whether the squatters *needed* the land (e.g. Hemlock 1989a), or simply *wanted* it (e.g. Moscoso 1989, Ramirez 1989). This differentiation was seen as relevant to the larger question of whether this activity was inherently anti-Navy. The squatters claimed that they were not anti-Navy, but they did think that the Navy's owning the majority of the island was one factor contributing to a severe shortage of land and housing on the island (Hemlock 1989b).

Tensions between the Navy and the squatters continued throughout the summer and fall of 1989. The situation was somewhat resolved when Hurricane Hugo hit the island on September 17, 1989. Most of the homes that had been constructed on rescued land were destroyed, and the Navy promptly reclaimed the land (Rabin 1992):

"But when Hugo came, the marine corps took advantage of the weather. Because we had another invasion down by the airport used to where the Navy gate is down there. There's a street that is almost gone, that was the original road. We had, our group rescued land by the beach, but then when the hurricane came, they changed it, they

rescued it, they took the land back from us. And knocked the houses and everything else. Because we used to, there've been people here all the time telling us to get back the land, building houses and stuff, you know, little shacks.” (Interview #16)

Contrary to what was publicly stated at the time, in retrospect some activists regard these rescates as a manifestation of the social movement to get the Navy out of Vieques.

The movement began to revive in the early 1990's. In 1991 activists used the 50th anniversary of the first expropriations on the island to bring attention to their concerns (Vieques Update 1991). In 1993, the Comité Pro Rescate y Desarrollo de Vieques (CPRDV) was founded. They collected signatures on a petition asking that the base on Vieques be closed, and they lobbied government officials with the same request (Mullenneaux 2000:39). The goals of the CPRDV have been described as the 4 Ds: Demilitarization, Decontamination, Devolution (return of land), and Development. Although in many respects the CPRDV modeled itself after the Cruzada Pro Rescate de Vieques of the 1970's, new issues had emerged by this time. People had begun to notice what appeared to be an unusually high rate of cancer on Vieques, and health began to be an issue in the struggle:

“When our Committee was formed in '92, '93 I think we talked about the environmental stuff from the beginning and recognized that environmental consciousness had become something really generalized and in many places including Puerto Rico. A situation that didn't exist in the '60s and '70s in Puerto Rico. And as we began to get more information about the relationship between environmental damage and health, we were very conscious that those issues would really be the issues that would get people mobilized. So we consciously focused on those issues. Environment and, particularly, health.” (#17)

The first time this emphasis was used was in protests related to the Navy's installation of a Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar (ROTHR) on its land in Western Vieques:

“While 150 Viequenses picketed, five or six more presented statements denouncing, in front of the military representatives, what they saw as a new threat to the health, the environment and to the struggle to eliminate the military presence in Vieques” (Rabin 1994).

Although the ROTHF protests had significant community support, they were ultimately unsuccessful. The radar was constructed, and for the next several years the movement suffered for not having a focal point. This changed on April 19, 1999, when a civilian working for the Navy as a security guard was killed in an accident during a routine training exercise.

An unfortunate combination of human error and failure to follow procedure led the pilot of an F-18C Hornet to mistake an observation post for his intended target. He dropped two 500 lb bombs, both of which landed in the vicinity of the staffed observation post and adjacent hurricane locker. David Sanes Rodriguez, the civilian guard, was standing on top of the hurricane locker when the bombs were dropped. The explosions knocked him unconscious and he later died from extensive bleeding.

Within a day, Viequenses and Puerto Ricans from the main island had entered the Navy land to place a large white cross on the bombing range as an act of protest and memorial. A Puerto Rican environmental activist named Alberto de Jesus, commonly known as Tito Kayak, declared that he was staying on the range until the Navy left Vieques. Within a month, hundreds of people had joined him in a massive act of civil disobedience that involved entering Navy land and setting up protest camps, most of which were on the bombing range. These camps remained in place for over a year, and during that time the Navy was not able to conduct any training exercises.

In November of 1999, Vieques elected a *new* mayor who was vocally opposed to the Navy's presence on the island. Even before he had officially entered office, Damaso Serrano wrote an open letter to President Clinton asking him to use his powers as Commander in Chief to remove the Navy from Vieques. Others joined in this request, pointing out that George W. Bush would take office in January and likely be much less receptive to their requests (Rabin and Zenon 2000). On January 31, 2000, President Clinton announced the results of negotiations with Governor Pedro Rosello. The key point of the agreement was that a referendum would be held on Vieques within 270 days

of May 1, 2001¹⁵. The referendum would offer Viequens two options: “The first shall be that the Navy will cease all training not later than May 1, 2003. The second will permit continued training, to include live fire training, on terms proposed by the Navy” (Clinton 2000). Protestors objected to the options in the referendum, pointing out that neither of the options was what they had been requesting – an immediate and permanent cessation to all bombing.

The civil disobedience camps remained in place until May 4, 2000, when federal marshals removed hundreds of protestors, arresting those who refused to leave. The movement remained strong, however. As discussed in Chapter 1, when fieldwork was conducted in February and March of 2001 protestors were holding weekly vigils and frequent large events that drew supporters from the main island and elsewhere. During this time, Vieques was mentioned in Puerto Rican papers almost every day. Support for the movement in the continental U.S. has grown, with a number of prominent politicians supporting the protestors, and some political figures joining activists in acts of civil disobedience. At the time of this writing, the latest development is President Bush’s announcement that the Navy will end its training operations on Vieques in May of 2003. The response to this has been similar to that to Clinton’s 2000 directives. Activists insist that they will continue protesting until they are assured that the Navy will leave immediately and pay for what is anticipated to be an extremely costly process of environmental clean-up. The reasons for this conviction are explored in subsequent chapters, which analyze issues that have been central to this movement.

In summary, the first forty years of American rule in Puerto Rico set the stage for the Navy’s arrival on Vieques in 1941. At this time, the sugar industry on Vieques was in decline, but the majority of the island’s land was still owned by only a few families. The expropriation of many Viequens from their homes was a traumatic event, but it was not met with organized protest. Since the 1940’s, lack of land has been perceived as a significant problem on the island, and additional expropriations have been protested.

¹⁵ The date for the referendum was later set at November 16, 2001.

Poor economy and a lack of employment have plagued Vieques for much of the last fifty years. These problems are identified as one of the causes of a period of intense protest in Vieques during the late 1970's. This period of protest ended with a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1983. The movement protesting the Navy's presence on Vieques began to gain strength during the 1990's. When an island resident working for the Navy was killed in 1999 by a mistake made during routine training exercises, the movement gained an attentive and often supportive worldwide audience. Since then, protests have continued. Land and economy continue to be important issues to protestors, and health has emerged as a relatively new but extremely salient issue.

CHAPTER 3

THEORY AND METHODS

“The theory of knowledge is a dimension of political theory because the specifically symbolic power to impose the principles of the construction of reality—in particular, social reality—is a major dimension of political power.” (Bourdieu 1994:161)

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

This thesis is concerned with two concepts, frames and cultural models, used to explain the ways that human thought influences behavior. Sociological literature concerning the use of frames in social movements often references the work of Erving Goffman, who described framing and primary frameworks:

“Taken altogether, the primary frameworks of a particular social group constitute a central element of its culture, particularly insofar as understandings emerge concerning principle classes of schemata, the relations these classes have to one another, and the sum total of forces and agents that these interpretive designs acknowledge to be loose in the world” (1974:27)

As such, primary frameworks share a number of attributes with cultural models, which are the cognitive organization of information shared by members of a cultural group. Note the similarities between Goffman’s use of “primary framework” and Naomi Quinn and Dorothy Holland’s suggestion that it is useful to consider “how cultural models frame experience, supplying interpretations of that experience and inferences about it, and goals for action” (1987:6). Although “primary frameworks” and cultural models seem to refer to the same type of cognitive process, their different disciplinary orientations have led them to different theoretical developments and practical applications. In the following pages, I explore the value of using both frames (as they are currently studied by sociologists) and cultural models (as they are currently studied by

anthropologists) to understand the strategic discourse employed by actors in social movements.

Collective Action Frames

Since Goffman, the majority of the sociological theory concerning frames has developed in the context of work concerned with the ways that social movements employ “collective action frames.” In contrast with Goffman’s primary frameworks, collective action frames involve conscious and often strategic organization of information. The primacy of this type of frame can be seen in a recent definition of framing as “an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction... The resultant products of this framing activity are referred to as collective action frames” (Benford and Snow 2000:614). By regarding people’s understanding of the world as socially constructed, social movement actors recognize that they have the agency to change these understandings. This is done by using a series of frames: diagnostic frames identify a problem and suggest its cause, prognostic frames suggest a course of action, and motivational frames encourage individuals to participate in this action (Snow and Benford 1988, Benford and Snow 2000). In this project, I am particularly interested in the use of diagnostic framing. I suggest that the diagnostic frames used in the Vieques movement take the form of logical arguments connecting specific problems on Vieques to the Navy’s presence there. However, recent analysis of frames in most literature concerning social movements fails to critically engage with the specific cultural context in which frames are produced and modified. In order to achieve a richer analysis of these frames, I draw on work concerned with cultural models.

Cultural Models

Holland and Quinn define cultural models in the following manner:

“Cultural models are presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world that are widely shared (although not necessarily to the exclusion of other, alternative models)

by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in their understanding of that world and their behavior in it.” (1987:4).

This definition includes a number of points important to the use of cultural models in this project. First, the fact that cultural models are taken-for-granted means that they function as ideas that require no further elaboration. This relates to the description of cultural models as presupposed. When a cultural model is employed in routine discourse, it is assumed that both the speaker and the listener are assigning the same meaning to the terms used to express the cultural model. One point requiring further clarification is the assertion that cultural models are widely shared by members of a society. Clearly, cultural models are shared by a critical mass of individuals, but the number of individuals in this critical mass is determined by the information contained in the cultural model and who in a large society uses this information. It is to be expected that cultural models dealing with widespread concerns, such as relationships, would be shared by members of a large-scale society, such as “American society” (see for example Holland and Skinner 1987). However, cultural models dealing with technical or specialized information might more accurately be defined as being shared only by a specific segment of society. This is demonstrated by work that has studied the differences between cultural models used by individuals who are members of the same society but differ in terms of intra-societal interests or affiliations (e.g. Blount 2001, Childers 2001). The final point of the above definition describes the importance of cultural models in influencing individual interpretation and behavior. It is this aspect of cultural model theory that suggests consideration of cultural models in discussions of how social movement organizations use language to motivate people to action.

Diagnostic Frames and Cultural Models

In this project, I am interested in the interaction of frames and cultural models in specific reference domains. By applying a diagnostic frame that links the Navy to a prescriptive cultural model – such as “people should be healthy” – in a negative manner,

activists create issues that are presented to potential movement participants and the general public as the reasons that the Navy should leave Vieques. An issue is extracted from a reference domain by constructing a frame that presents a logical argument with a cultural model as its *sine qua non*. Specifically, I propose that the power of an issue to instigate change is a function of the degree to which a frame is able to tap into an existing cultural model.

Literature concerned with frames has hinted at this idea in discussions of “frame amplification” and “frame resonance.” Frame amplification is described as a frame alignment process that emphasizes certain parts of a frame. Authors presenting this idea suggest that this occurs in two versions, value amplification and belief amplification, but their description of belief amplification is sufficient to describe the basic process they are identifying:

“Since it is sociologically axiomatic that the nature of action toward any object is contingent in part on beliefs about that object, it follows that participation in movement activities to eliminate, control, or change a category of individuals, a lifestyle, or an institutional practice is more likely given a positive articulation between beliefs about the object of action and the nature of that action” (Snow et al 1986:470).

While it is plausible that this process of amplification occurs with frames, it seems likely that this alignment process would have more motivational force when a frame emphasizes the relevant parts of a cultural model. The authors’ description of values as hierarchical and beliefs as referring to relationships between objects suggest that they may have been thinking of something very similar to what in this work is called a cultural model.

Frame resonance is particularly relevant to discussions of master frames, defined as being similar to collective action frames but functioning at a more macro-level: “They are also modes of punctuation, attribution, and articulation, but their punctuations, attributions, articulations may color and constrain those of any number of movement organizations” (Snow and Benford 1992:138). Explanations of the way that these master

frames influence social movements have been criticized as being tautological. Note how the concept of “cultural resonance” is used to correct this problem:

“This shortcoming can be overcome by redefining the master frame concept in terms of resonance—not with the experiences or values of a movement’s mobilization potential... but with the symbolic and political culture of the frame’s historical context. A master frame is thus defined by its resonance with the cultural, political, or historical milieu in which it emerges rather than its adoption by other social movements. Thus, “civil rights” was a master frame during the 1960s, not because it was utilized by a diversity of social movements but because of its cultural resonance with the postwar optimism over the successful defense of freedom, equality, and democracy” (Swart 1995).

Using the earlier discussion of frames and cultural models, I would argue that in Swart’s example civil rights was a successful frame (indicated by its use as a master frame) because it was linked with the cultural models of freedom, equality, and democracy. This interpretation does not change Swart’s essential point; it simply offers a new terminology and explains the means by which cultural resonance is achieved.

Swart’s specification of the 1960s as the time period of his analysis brings up another important point. Because issues are defined by the interaction between a frame and a cultural model, they generally remain constant only as long as the frame and cultural model persist in a relatively unmodified form. The possible exception to this is a situation in which either the frame or the cultural model becomes more like the other. When this occurs, the content of the issue remains unaltered but its authority changes. If a frame becomes similar to a cultural model, usually by modifying the cultural model so that it incorporates the frame or emphasizes the components relevant to the frame, the authority and thus the persuasiveness of the issue increases. If a cultural model becomes more like a frame, usually by becoming a matter of opinion rather than fact, the cultural model loses its value as the fundamental premise of an argument and the persuasiveness of the issue decreases. Pierre Bourdieu’s description of doxa is useful in clarifying this point:

“In a determinate social formation, the stabler the objective structures and the more fully they reproduce themselves in the agents’ dispositions, the greater the extent of the field of doxa, of that which is taken for granted.” (Bourdieu 1994:161)

Later, Boudieu writes:

“the truth of a doxa is only ever fully revealed when negatively constituted by the constitution of a field of opinion, the locus of the confrontation of competing discourses—whose political truth may be overtly declared or may remain hidden, even from the eyes of those engaged in it, under the guise of religious or philosophical oppositions.” (163)

I am not arguing that cultural models exist only in the realm of doxa. If this were the case, it would be impossible for a frame to ever become a cultural model, as the unidirectionality of time means that what has once been known cannot become truly unknown¹. Rather, I am suggesting that the relationship between dogma and doxa presents a useful analogy for the relationship between frames and cultural models. Furthermore, the political implications of an idea leaving the realm of doxa and entering the realm of opinion are similar, although perhaps more radical, to the political implications of a cultural model becoming a frame. Likewise, a frame that becomes a cultural model gives greater credence to an issue for precisely the same reasons that the doxa is larger when objective and subjective world are mutually supportive.

Claudia Strauss has made a similar point in her discussion of the difference between routine motivation and lip-service motivation. She cites the failure of Bourdieu’s distinction between dogma and doxa to explaining how verbalized ideas can lead to routine motivation, and concludes that “in the case of other routine behaviors [ones that are not taken for granted], however, our motivation to perform them rests not only on repeated observation of routine practice but also on internalized social discourses and emotionally laden experiences that shape a person’s self image” (Strauss 1997:238). Here, Strauss’s use of “internalized social discourses” suggests that she is describing a process similar to that in which a frame becomes a cultural model. By using Bourdieu’s distinction between dogma and doxa as an analogy, and not assuming that cultural models are necessarily part of the doxa, I leave open the possibilities of exploring both

¹ I am disregarding here the process of an individual forgetting something, which is a fascinating topic (see Borges 1962, Hernan 1992) but strays too far from the point being made. For similar reasons, I am disregarding knowledge that is lost by physical means (books burned, a person dying). The topic here is general knowledge within a culture during a relatively short timeframe.

Strauss's suggestion of the importance of individual experience and Bourdieu's examination of the political importance of different kinds of knowledge.

A brief example illustrates these possibilities. In the 1940's the Navy acquired two-thirds of the land on Vieques, forcing many people to leave their homes. In the current manifestation of the struggle on Vieques, these expropriations are frequently mentioned as an example of an injustice and one of the reasons that the Navy should leave Vieques. At the time that the expropriations occurred, however, they met with little overt resistance. A common explanation for this was the following:

"What they had in their mind was that the North American people were the greatest people over the world, and nothing was better than them, that we had to run after them in such... That's what the fathers had on their mind, see, like those things." (Interview #14)

Does this mean that American superiority was part of the doxa during the 1940's? Absolutely not. This is articulated in the following quote, which begins with the same explanation for the lack of protests in the 1940's:

"I can suggest some possibilities of might have been widespread beliefs or feelings. It was the second World War. There had been a supra-Americanization process going on here for four decades. Including the imposition of English as the language of instruction in the schools, the imposition of celebration of US patriotic dates, you know like Washington's birthday, etc, the Fourth of July, and simultaneously the ignoring of important elements of Puerto Rican culture. Obviously with the desire, as it was openly stated in some of the documentation related to the education department during the 20s, 30s, and 40s, because they wanted to make good American citizens out of the people of Puerto Rico. And, so, I think probably a lot of people here were, you know, felt that this was a war, and so there wasn't like a lot of open protest. Except within some circles in the early 40s, like those people who were into autonomy for Puerto Rico, or the independence movement of Puerto Rico." (Interview #17)

The people on Vieques who did not protest their expropriation were aware of the independence movement, which challenged the idea that Americans were superior to Puerto Ricans. Yet according to the above quotes, many people on Vieques did not share the independence movement's cultural model of Puerto Rican and American equality. Clearly individuals, even individuals of the same culture, may employ different cultural models. Thus, cultural models are not necessarily part of the doxa. However, the above example also illustrates that the cultural models used by an individual at any point in time

significantly influence his or her behavior. This demonstrates the importance of cultural models to the study of social movements. Additionally, by considering cultural models as they function for individuals, it is possible to appreciate the role that framing plays in creating protest issues.

METHODOLOGY

The previous section discussed how the cognitive theories of frames and cultural models are relevant to the primary question of this thesis: How and why do local activists' perceptions of central issues in the Vieques movement change through time? This section discusses the methods used to answer this question. When considered from a methodological perspective, the question suggests two phases of inquiry. The goal of the first phase was the identification and examination of central issues, frames, and models as they were used by activists. In the second phase of analysis, selected frames were analyzed for chronological changes in content, scope, or degree of association with other frames.

Phase I Inquiry—Identification Central Issues and Reference Domains

I have chosen to use the method of key word analysis to identify issues, frames, and cultural models. Claudia Strauss has described attention to “repeated key words” as part of “voice”, one of three parts of communication she used to identify cognitive schemas² (Strauss 1997:215). In a variety of contexts, formal key word analysis has successfully been used to identify and analyze cultural models (Blount 2001, Childers 2001, etc.). Key word analysis begins with the theoretical premise of cultural models -- human understanding of the world is structured in series of hierarchical models that are employed in discourse (Blount 2000). Analysis of texts or interviews about a specific topic should reveal key words that serve as focal points for explanations, arguments, or

² The other parts of communication examined by Strauss were the content of what people said and the “temporal continuity or discontinuity in the expression of these contents” (Strauss 1997:215).

descriptions. These key words are labels for cultural models used to organize thought and thus behavior. However, using the definitions established in the previous sections, key words analysis should reveal issues and frames in the same manner that it reveals cultural models.

Although there are a number of computer programs designed specifically for qualitative analysis, the sample size of this project was small enough that it was possible to use Microsoft Word to code text. Each interview was transcribed verbatim and saved as a unique file. Coding involved looking for key words used in explanations of why people thought the Navy should leave Vieques at various points in time. Because some interviews were in Spanish and some were in English, and the struggle itself is bi-lingual in many respects, I use the term “key word” in a broad sense³. As key words were coded, I created files for each key word and copied passages related to key words into these files. By the end of this process, I had over 20 files, each representing a key word used in multiple interviews as part of an explanation of why the Navy should leave Vieques. At this point, I began to think about how these key words fit together.

The most consistently used key words turned out to be those referring to reference domains, and I therefore decided to focus my attention there. Because I was interested in the ways and reasons that issues changed, I limited my attention to issues that had been used in the movement for a least a decade. By this point, it was evident that the majority of the issues could be connected to one or more of three reference domains: land, health, or economy. These reference domains were selected for further analysis.

³Because I was interested in the way that frames and issues were constructed, and there is no history of using formal key word analysis to identify these, I considered stretching the coding to the point where some of it might more accurately be described as “key idea” analysis. This turned out to be largely unnecessary, because as suggested by key word analysis of cultural models, most key ideas employ key words. Thus, key ideas – including issues, frames, and cultural models – were selected for further analysis through the process of coding a passage related to a key word.

Phase II Inquiry

I began this phase by organizing the quotes in each reference domain chronologically. It quickly became evident that at various times in the history of the movement on Vieques, one or more of these reference domains emerged as the source of activists' central issues¹⁹. For each reference domain discussed in this thesis, I focused my analysis on these points in its history. By analyzing passages from these distinct points in time, consistent arguments that framed the issue being protested were identified. Because I was interested in why activists were protesting the Navy at various points in time, I focused the analysis on diagnostic frames. The fundamental premises of these frames were cultural models, parts of which could be elucidated by using detail provided in the diagnostic frames.

After identifying specific frames and cultural models employed by activists, it was possible to consider how they changed through time. In this portion of analysis, I focused on frames, which because they are strategically manipulated, would be expected to change more rapidly and more frequently than cultural models. A detailed explanation of the reasons and manner in which frames change can be found in Snow et al's 1986 "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." The authors described various types of frame alignment processes, including frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation. These framing processes are explained as means of mobilizing support for a movement, usually in the context of recruiting individuals to participate in the movement. However, in the conclusion of the paper, the authors mention that the types of framing alignment employed would be expected to vary across a movement's history. They write that:

"the frame alignment process is an uneasy one that is fraught with hazards or vulnerabilities throughout a movement's life history, and particularly at certain

¹⁹ Patrick Mooney and Scott Hunt found a similar phenomenon in their study of the use of master frames in agrarian mobilization (1996). They consider the functioning of master frames in the context of a "repertoire of interactions" and conclude that "at any given historical conjecture, it is likely that one master frame has greater salience than the others and thus acts as the primary interpretive screen through which objects, acts, individuals, conditions, and contingencies are understood" (Mooney and Hunt 1996:178 – [check page numbers, these are from ASP](#)).

critical junctures...The ways in which SMOs manage and control these frame vulnerabilities, as well as interpretive resources in general, thus seem as crucial to the temporal viability and success of an SMO as the acquisition and deployment of more tangible resources” (1986:486).

I explore this idea in detail in subsequent chapters. I am particularly interested in examining whether the success or failure of a specific frame at “critical junctures” in the movement’s history affects the subsequent use of that frame and/or other frames drawing on the same reference domain.

FIELDWORK

The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted from February 12 to March 22, 2001. The majority of the time in the field was spent doing participant observation, conducting interviews, and doing archival research in Vieques, Puerto Rico. Research in other locations in Puerto Rico consisted of one day spent gathering preliminary information and conducting an interview with an ACLU attorney in San Juan, and another day spent conducting an interview with the Navy Public Affairs Officer at Roosevelt Roads in Ceiba. These two interviews were the only ones not conducted on Vieques.

Participant Observation

I spent much of my time on Vieques attending protest activities. These created an opportunity for participant/observation research and provided a way of meeting additional contacts for future interviews. A weekly activity was the vigil every Saturday night at the Peace and Justice camp. During the first week that I was in Vieques I attended a community education presentation in Monte Santo by Jorge Fernandez and Lirio Marquez on February 15 and the unveiling of a sculpture of Angel Rodriguez Cristobal on Esperanza Beach on February 18. On February 24, I participated in the March for Health from the hospital to the Peace and Justice Camp. On March 2 and 9, I attended protests in front of the Post Office. On March 11, I rode with the Caravan for Peace, which began in the capital city of Isabel Segunda and ended at the Peace and

Justice Camp. In addition to attending organized protest activities, I spent a great deal of time at the Peace and Justice Camp, which is the headquarters of the Comité Pro Rescate y Desarrollo de Vieques (CPRDV).

Archival Research

I also devoted a significant amount of time in Vieques to doing archival research at the Historic Archives of the Fort Condin de Mirasol. The director of the fort and curator of the archives is Robert Rabin, who is one of the leaders of the CPRDV. The quality and quantity of documents related to the struggle on Vieques are impressive, and in a short period of time I was able to gather far more documents than I had originally anticipated using. Particularly relevant to this study was a substantial quantity of gray literature – newsletters, press releases, pamphlets and posters – that had been used during various phases of the movement. Archival research was also aided by a number of individuals who kindly shared with me their personal collections of documents related to the struggle.

Interviews

The primary goal of this thesis is examining the changing nature of central issues in the sixty years of protests on Vieques. Because this study is limited to the island of Vieques, the population addressed in this study is composed of residents of Vieques who have participated in one or more protests concerning the Navy. The time depth of this study and the varying nature of the protests makes it difficult to determine the exact size of this population. However, there are approximately 9,500 civilians currently living on Vieques, and the population relevant to this study may be assumed to be less than that number.

Given the nature of this study, and the practical limitations of time and money, it was not feasible to randomly sample of the population under study in order to determine who would be interviewed. Instead, a number of groups and individuals were identified

through newspaper articles, internet websites, and personal networks. In most cases, the individuals most actively involved with the strategic framing of issues are the leaders or core members of various organizations that have protested the Navy's actions on Vieques, and these were the individuals most likely to be identified through this type of research. This allowed me to arrange initial interviews, and additional interviews were arranged through chained referral.

In addition to the leaders of protest groups, a particular effort was made to interview individuals who had witnessed or participated in many of the historical protests on Vieques. Other members of the above groups, as well as protestors who do not identify with a particular group, were also interviewed whenever possible. Additionally, a few interviews were conducted with the specific intent of more fully understanding the context of the situation on Vieques and the responses to the protests. An example of this is the interviews done with individuals in favor of the Navy's presence on Vieques. Although I was only able to arrange two such interviews, they enriched my understanding of the conflict on the island.

Interviews were conducted in locations convenient to the individual being interviewed. Many interviews were conducted in people's homes, and additional interview locales included two protest camps (the Peace and Justice Camp and Camp Luisa Guadalupe), interviewees' offices, the Fajardo-Vieques ferry, a car, and a restaurant. The average length of an interview was one hour, although a few interviews were only half an hour, and one interview lasted over three hours.

Interviews were semi-structured, meaning that I had a prepared list of open-ended questions for discussion (see Table X). It will be noted that some of the questions are designed to elicit the same information. The primary goal of interviews was to elicit individuals' accounts of times of protest against the Navy on Vieques, and I tried to focus discussion on the reasons that people had protested. Most of the interviews began with questions about how long the person had lived on Vieques and when he/she first began to view the Navy as a problem. I then asked a series of questions about why the Navy was a

problem at this time, whether the individual did anything to protest the Navy, and whether and how the issue of concern was resolved. Similar questions were asked about each period in which the interviewee had participated in Navy protests. It will be noted that some of the questions in Table X are designed to elicit the same information. Some individuals were more comfortable responding to questions about protests and then explain the issues being protested, while other individuals preferred to begin by discussing issues and then describe the ways that these issues were protested. Interviews were adjusted accordingly. In the majority of interviews, the questions included in Table X were sufficient to elicit a detailed history of the Navy presence and protest movement on Vieques. Additional questions were asked as necessary for the purposes of follow-up and clarification.

While in Puerto Rico, I interviewed 29 people in a total of 26 interviews²⁰. A total of 21 interviews were transcribed and analyzed for key words marking collective action frames²¹. Of these 21 interviews, two interviews were with individuals who do not currently reside on Vieques but are very active in the struggle. A final point about the interview pool is that in eight cases I did separate interviews with immediate family members. Family networks are an important part of the infrastructure of this movement, and the active participation of multiple family members appears to be a common phenomenon.

In sum, this chapter has outlined the theoretical premises, methodology, and fieldwork methods used in this project. An interest in how and why central issues changed during the course of the social movement on Vieques led to a consideration of collective action frames and cultural models as complementary perspectives for exploring

²⁰ On three occasions, two people participated in the interview. Although I made an attempt to interview people individually when possible, these joint interviews do not create an analytical problem. The information I am interested in is what is culturally shared, and joint interviews should not affect the use of this information

²¹ Of the five interviews not used for analysis, three were conducted with the express purpose of use as background information. One interview was not used because the respondent asked that it not be taped; another was thrown out because the respondent greatly exaggerated personal involvement in protest movement, creating concerns about a higher than acceptable response effect (Bernard 1995:229).

this topic. I suggest that movement issues may be seen as the result of interactions between diagnostic frames and cultural models. A cultural model leads an individual to think that there is a problem, and under the right circumstances she or he will use a diagnostic frame to identify the problem and its cause. Working backwards, it is possible to analyze diagnostic frames for parts of underlying cultural models. Key word analysis was used to identify both diagnostic frames and parts of the cultural models used in the frame. This project arose out of an interest in a particular social movement – that of residents on Vieques Puerto Rico who want the Navy to leave their island. Participant observation, archival research, and interviews were the specific methods used to research this movement.

Table X – Schedule of Interview Questions

<p>Personal Questions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How old are you? • How long have you lived on Vieques? • How has Vieques changed since you were a child? • What do you want to happen after the Navy leaves?
<p>Issue Questions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When did you first start to think that the Navy was a problem for Vieques? Why? Did you act on this? • During the 1940's, did the Navy cause problems on Vieques? What were they? (Repeated for each decade until the present) • What is the biggest problem that the Navy causes on Vieques?
<p>Protest Questions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When was the first time that you protested the Navy? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) What specifically were you protesting? 2) How did you protest? 3) What were the goals of the protest? 4) What were the results of the protest? • When was the next time you protested the Navy? (Followed by Questions 1-4, repeated until arrived at present protests.) • What are some of the differences between protests now and protests in the past?

CHAPTER 4

LAND

The limited amount of land on Vieques has long been recognized as one of its defining characteristics. The name of the island is derived from Amerindian words meaning “small land”²². When the Navy arrived on Vieques, however, the land available to civilians became even smaller. The diagnostic frame of too little land as a problem caused by the Navy is relatively simple and does not use enough detail to allow extraction of a cultural model. However, much of the discourse about land on Vieques focuses on expropriations, and therefore it is possible to use the evolving framing of expropriations to construct a cultural model of land. A number of protests and land-related issues have referenced this cultural model between the 1940’s and the present.

DIAGNOSTIC FRAMING OF LAND

In every interview, problems related to land were cited as one of the reasons that the Navy should leave Vieques. Activists claimed that the Navy’s control of over two-thirds of the island was a problem, though they gave a variety of explanations for why it was a problem. There are two versions of the diagnostic framing of land, but the basic frame is fairly straightforward. In the first frame, it is argued that it is unjust and a violation of Viequens’ rights that they don’t have the land owned by the Navy:

“It’s part of human rights because people here are taking what, thinking, we don’t have the freedom... To start out with, we don’t have the freedom to be able to enjoy our island, and, in fact, and we would love to enjoy our island as a whole, and we’re not being permitted to do that because it’s already being occupied by an army that’s supposed to defend us, but it’s an occupying army, which everybody’s against. So that right there is pretty much you take what you get and we’re giving you this much

²² “Bi” means small, “Ke” means land (García Ramis, Miguel 1973).

land, make the best that you can, but this is ours. Whether you like it or not, we're staying here. And that right there, to me, is violating, even common sense. It's like, how can you just, me, that I've been living here my father who was born and raised here and has lived here pretty much all his life, why does he have to show an I.D. and be checked on every single time he comes upon your fence. This is his own land, he sowed this land before you guys were even here. And he got to enjoy that, with this old man..." (Interview #9)

In the second frame, it is argued that Viequens need the land owned by the Navy:

"We want the Navy to leave the land. We need the Navy to leave the land because the people of Vieques need the land to, to develop. This town is dying, you know. The people need the land to develop, to have economy, to have place to live, to have places to make houses, to make university. To have what the other people have when they have land. And the Navy have the land for nothing, for destroying. So we want the Navy to leave because we think this town need an opportunity of development." (Interview #21)

In both cases, the Navy's ownership of two-thirds of the island's land is identified as a problem and the Navy is the cause of this problem. However, it was difficult to construct a cultural model of "land" by looking at these explanations of why the Navy should leave. A variety of attributes of land emerged from the frames, but there was little consensus among activists about what these attributes were or what they meant. For example, a relatively frequent rationale for the argument that the Navy should leave was that "this is our land," which is the basis of the frame used in Interview #9. However, of the six interviews in which this was mentioned, two interviews provided no further explanation and the other four each provided a different explanation²³. The second version of the frame is somewhat more revealing of the cultural model of land. There was more consensus about why Viequens needed the land than there was about why it was their land. The contrast between the way the Navy uses the land and the way Viequens would use the land suggests that land can be used well or poorly. Explanations about why Viequens needed the land consistently mentioned that Vieques couldn't grow

²³ In one interview, the respondent explained that God had given the land to the Viequens for them to enjoy, not so that it would be bombed. In another interview, it was noted that the land was Vieques land because the Navy didn't ship down their own soil when they came to Vieques. A third respondent suggested that the Navy did not in fact own the land, they just rented it from the government of Puerto Rico. The fourth respondent, who is quoted in the text, said that it was Viequens' land because they had lived there and worked the land.

(a good use of land) because the Navy had the land (and used it poorly). Specifically cited problems were a lack of housing and a lack of industry. This suggests that part of the cultural model of land is that it is a location for these things. However, this is the extent of the cultural model that can be inferred from the diagnostic frame.

FRAMING OF EXPROPRIATIONS

During the 1940's the Navy acquired over two-thirds of the land on Vieques through a series of expropriations. As discussed in Chapter Two, these expropriations did not lead to organized protest when they took place. In the current struggle, however, the expropriations are presented as an injustice that is one of the factors motivating protests. Descriptions of expropriations suggested a hierarchical organization of ideas about land with components that were consistently identified by multiple respondents. In short, the cultural model of land was more explicit in descriptions of expropriations than it was in general statements about land. Upon further consideration, it makes sense that analysis of discussion about expropriations revealed a cultural model that was not evident in more general statements about land. The diagnostic framing of land as a movement issue is relatively simple and therefore does not involve a detailed discussion of land. This simplicity contrasts with the detail used in describing expropriations, which were vividly remembered and provided a greater quantity of information focused on land for analysis.

It is also likely that discussions of expropriations used more of the cultural model of land because the identification of expropriations as a movement issue requires a frame transformation that is achieved by emphasizing parts of the cultural model of land. In essence, I argue that the change in the way expropriations are discussed reflects discourse changing in the following manner:

- 1. A cultural model stating the equality of Puerto Ricans and Americans has replaced a cultural model of American superiority.**

2. **Using this and other new cultural models, the framing of expropriations is transformed so that they are presented as a problem worthy of protest.**
3. **The construction of this new frame is achieved by selectively emphasizing parts of the cultural model of “land.”**

In Chapter Two, it was suggested that one of the reasons the framing of expropriations has changed is that the once dominant cultural model of American superiority has given way to a cultural model of Puerto Rican and American equality. It is important to note that this is not the only possible explanation for the change in framing of expropriations, it is simply the one that was mentioned most frequently in interviews. In the sixty years since the expropriations occurred, Puerto Rican and Viequen society has changed dramatically and it is likely that changes in the way expropriations are framed reflects a multitude of changes in the discourse and in the resources available to protesters. An example of a probable change in discourse would be changes in cultural models dictating when it is appropriate to obey or resist authority. Changes in resources include not only financial resources, but also the widespread use of various technologies that allows protesters to transmit a great deal of information with little or no expense. The best example of this is the internet, which is a frequently used medium of communication for current protesters.

Using newly available resources and discourse, the framing of expropriations has changed from a sad but unpreventable event to an unnecessary and harmful event worthy of protest. This change in framing has occurred through a retrospective transformation of domain-specific interpretive frames:

“By transformation of domain-specific interpretive frames, we refer to fairly self-contained but substantial changes in the way a particular domain of life is framed, such that a domain previously taken for granted is reframed as problematic and in need of repair, or a domain seen as normative or acceptable is reframed as an injustice that warrants change.” (Snow *et al* 1986:474)

The current framing of expropriations is fairly evident in interview statements; it is somewhat more difficult to determine the frame through which expropriations were perceived when they occurred. Documents surviving from this time period are likely to

give the U.S. Navy's version of the expropriations, as the Navy was the dominant force on Vieques and the "voice" of the powerful travels through time more intact than the voice of the disempowered²⁴. While such documents are helpful in understanding the framing of expropriations by those associated with the Navy, it does not appear that these frames were shared by most of the Viequens who were expropriated. Perceptions of expropriations as they were framed when they occurred only rarely came up without prompting in interviews, but the answers respondents gave when asked why people didn't protest expropriations when they occurred suggest likely original frames:

"I think people were probably really, really just overwhelmed by the intense and sudden disruption of life. So, you know, on the one hand I'm sure that was a serious backdrop. I've talked to people here, for instance when Hurricane Hugo hit in '89, some older people suggested to me that it reminded them of the expropriations. This question of all of a sudden having to rebuild your house or take down your house, you know, the movement of a lot of people from where they had been." (Interview #17)

"Right they expropriated it. You know, they just took it. And some of the people they didn't even give nothing to. You know, they just say, well, this is our land. We need this. And the excuse that they used was that they were getting it ready for World War II. You see. So being that the Puerto Ricans had participated, they had been forced already to participate in the first World War, see because my grandfather was in one, he was in the first World War, World War I, so and at that time they used to see Americans, the American government in good eyes because they were supposed to be fighting against old evil, you know, communists and fascism. I mean, they had a hell of a propaganda going on. So people, they said, OK, if it's gonna be used for World War II." (Interview #16)

From these and other interview statements, it is possible to construct an original framing of expropriations that included the following elements:

- 1. Expropriations were a sad and traumatic event.**
- 2. BUT, they were necessary because the American government was fighting a just war.**
 - a. The government has ultimate authority.**
 - b. Americans were superior to Puerto Ricans.**

²⁴The Vieques Breeze, an English-language publication for the United States military personnel and civilians involved in the construction of the base on Vieques, provides one perspective on the expropriations. A member of the Navy Resettlement Program wrote the following in an article for the Vieques Breeze: "Our first month of removing the people was quite a task; we were mistrusted and any time we approached a home we would over-hear such remarks as 'Here comes the walking paper couple'. Luckily we succeeded in doing our job without receiving a scratch!" (Portela 1943).

c. War is an extenuating circumstance requiring personal sacrifice for the greater good.

3. THEREFORE, there was no choice but to accept the expropriations.

While it is likely that not every Viequen expropriated agreed with the cultural models presented in a, b, and c of part 2, enough Viequens agreed with these or similar statements that they did not perceive the protests as something they needed to or were able to protest. Another factor contributing to the lack of protests concerning expropriations may be that in the 1940's there were few well-known examples of protest by a disempowered group affecting a nation's policy decisions²⁵.

In contrast with the way that expropriations were framed when they occurred, present framings emphasize their negative aspects:

“The way that they did it was that they went, they came in here in this island, and they took the people away from their houses, and gave them, they gave them 24 hours to leave their property, everybody. From Santa Maria, here, to Monte Carmelo, all the way to Salinas, because there was a lot of people in there, there was a population of like 24,000 people at that moment, and then they took all the people from the other side, and they gathered them all together like sardines, in town, in the little piece that they left, and they, the people that had wooden houses, they took in big trucks their materials and they brought the materials and threw it there on a piece of land that was not even clean, and they said, do as you can, you know, that's the way they did it. They did not put the people in shelters, they did not have the shelters ready, with water and electricity and a lot of things, they, what they did, they removed them and that's it. They broke their agriculture things, they let go the horses, they let go the cattle, they broke, they bulldozed the cement houses, and then, they left some for target, which they exploded eventually, and they, they um, and that's the way it happened. That's the first thing that happened.” (Interview #8)

“My parents told me that back in the day my grandfather used to live where the navy now got the base. He came, he give, my parents no want to sell the house, the little house they got it, you know the poor house they got it. He give \$25 like that. They broke all the house, like that, you know. It's like they told you, you have to live over here, take the \$25, go. That's it, you know. This is the stories, this is the real, you know. I got married in the Yayi [one of the civil disobedience camps established on Navy land in 1999]. My parents used to live over there, my grandmother, back in the

²⁵ The concurrent Indian independence movement, led by Mahatma Gandhi, used widespread civil disobedience as a protest strategy designed to change the British policy towards India. Although this movement strongly influenced later movements, such as the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa and the civil rights movement in the United States, it was radical at the time that it occurred and had not yet influenced worldwide protest discourse.

day, you know. Over there used to live in the little house, you know, working in the cana de azucar. This is the story.” (Interview #15)

“Well they happened because of the force. They were not... They were never even consulted or anything like that. They happened because it was the pre-war years and the Navy just had the overwhelming force to do it. A lot of people resisted, but to no avail. There is a story of the sister of Luisa Guadalupe died out of just pain to move out of her house. She went to bed the night before they were told they were gonna come in and take them away, and she said something to the effect of “I will never get up.” And next morning she was dead in the bed. There’s stories like that. Women bearing children under some pieces of wood or something under the rain because they were sort of in their last few days of their pregnancy, or they had a miscarriage. But, there are stories of some minor resistance, but it’s obvious that the overwhelming force didn’t allow for much protest or anything.” (Interview #10)

From these quotes, a new frame of expropriations emerges:

- 1. People were removed from their land without their consent.**
- 2. There weren’t organized protests because people didn’t think they should or didn’t have the resources to protest.**
- 3. We think the expropriations were wrong and we are protesting them now.**

Additionally, the process of transforming expropriations from an event to a movement issue involved elaboration of parts of the cultural model of land that were relevant to a retrospective framing of expropriations as an injustice. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the discursive act of emphasizing parts of a cultural model is similar to the frame alignment process of frame amplification. When cultural models are amplified, beliefs about certain components of the model and their relationships with each other are emphasized so that the model is more easily aligned with a frame. These components are presented in the cultural model of land described below.

CULTURAL MODEL OF LAND

The aspects of the cultural model of land emphasized in the framing of expropriations are those related to the nature of land as property and human use of land (see Figure 4.1). This makes sense given that the expropriations are framed as an unjust loss of something of value to those who lost it. As property, land is thought of as a thing that is owned and may be transferred from one owner to another. Interestingly, this

characterization of land identifies what economists consider two of four necessary elements of an effective system of property rights: ownership and transferability²⁶. The components of ownership and transferability emphasized in this model are also used in classic economic theory.




Figure 4.1: Components of Cultural Model of Land Emphasized in Framing of Expropriations

²⁶ Economists identify specification of what rights are part of ownership and enforcement of these rights as the other characteristics of a property rights regime.

In this model, ownership may result from living on land and/or having title to the land. When sugar plantations dominated the island landscape, land tenure followed a tenant system in which plantation owners had title to the land but allowed workers to have homes and live on this land. By the time that the expropriations occurred, the sugar industry was in decline but the land tenure system of sugar plantations was fairly intact, with the majority of land on Vieques being owned by a small number of individuals or families. This is why it was possible for the Navy to acquire 21,000 of 33,000 acres on Vieques by buying land from only eight people (Langhorne 1987:62):

“And then they came to Vieques and they found an economy that was mostly large landholdings, so they were able to pretty easily buy out these large landholders. Benitez, I think, was one of the families, I’m not sure what the other one was. And, umm, they sort of confiscated the small properties of those petty sharecroppers, landless sharecroppers... They were allowed to live on the lands of the landowners in exchange for a certain amount of labor, so they didn’t have title to the land. So they just paid them \$25 for their physical property and destroyed it, well disassembled it and dumped it someplace else and told them, “Well, this is gonna be your place now.” And that’s how they took a large portion of the land.” (Interview #10)

This quote defines owning land as having title to it and distinguishes this from living on land. However, in other interviews living on land was described as a form of ownership:

“It’s important to know what the history of Vieques is. The Navy says they own that land, but they took the land away from the people of Vieques in the 1940s. They put them on trucks and hauled them over here and said here’s where you’re gonna live from now on, you know. Not there, where you lived before. I mean, they forced, it was expropriation, you know. Forced. I think it’s important that everybody know that. When they come around and say, well they own that, the Navy owns that land. Well, they took it away from the people. Chief Sitting Bull said, ‘You have taken our land and made us homeless.’ And that’s a continuation of the history of the United States. The way they’ve done things throughout the history of the United States.” (Interview #11)

In addition to implying that living on land is a form of ownership, this quote suggests a means by which ownership can be transferred. By emphasizing that the expropriations were forced, this activist suggests that the transfer of land can occur coercively or voluntarily. The manner in which people were removed from their homes

was often described in detail, suggesting that the removal of people from their land without their consent is a salient component of the cultural model used in framings of expropriations:

“Because my father had to go to New York to find a job, because when the Navy came and took the land in Vieques, they left our men without a place to work. You know, we had sugarcane plantations, and that’s where all the men worked. Most of them. So they took, they bought this land for whatever they wanted to pay for it. It was not that the people were selling. They just wanted the land and they told them that they were gonna give them whatever they wanted, some 40, 60, 100 dollars for a lot of acres of land because they needed the land. And the land belonged to three or four persons, they were the owners, but they had some people who worked for them, and they were living on the same land, so when these people sold their land, the people who were working for them were left with nothing. Not a piece of land, not a house, nothing. So the Navy had more land than they needed. And they threw some of these persons in Santa Maria, some in Monte Santo, which is from here to the hill. And they give them a letter that said that if they needed that land they would be forced to leave in 24 hours because that was not their land. Up until now, for sixty years the people have been living on this land, where the Navy put them. And when they put them there, it was just a prairie. No water, no light, nothing, no houses. They would pave the houses with a bulldozer, where they were living in the country, they kick the house with a bulldozer, it wasn’t just like this, uh-uh, it was just in pieces. And they put it in a truck, and they just load it in the prairie, and most people have to spend the night in the open prairie because there was not time for them to build a house.” (Interview #3)

This quote uses many components of the land cultural model in addition to those related to ownership. It assumes that land can be useful or not useful. In this case, land that is not useful is described as “prairie.” In other interviews, land that was not useful was described as having vegetation, not being clean, and being *baldio*, a Spanish word meaning uncultivated or wasted. These descriptions emphasized that the land Viequens were moved to was not useful for building houses, which is a good use of land, but one that requires water and electricity. Another good use of land mentioned in the above quote is its nature as a location for agriculture, which includes farming, sugar plantations, and raising cattle. These good uses of land are sometimes contrasted with the Navy’s bad use of the land. A representative statement of this sentiment is “We want the land for

peace, not to make war” (Interview #12). In some interviews, the Navy’s poor use of land is described as radically changing the topography of the island:

“See this area was originally, sixty years ago, the live impact area, almost the eastern tip of the island, was very different from what it is now. Because all the Navy activities have transformed all the topography, all the coastal configuration. Where there were lagoons, there are no more, because they strangled them. Where there were hills, they just leveled them, and where there were level areas they build hills because of the, for example, when they shoot the targets, and after they become useless, then they just put them aside, put soil on top of them, and then put another one on top and so forth, so through the years you get like they were building a small mountain.” (Interview #13)

In other interviews, it was stated that the Navy didn’t really use the land at all:

“They don’t do nothing with it. Why cannot we have it back? There could be a lot of malls there, hotels, you know. They don’t do nothing with this, why cannot we have it and let Vieques grow? Because this would be perfect for big tourism.” (Interview #16)

As this quote demonstrates, framings the way that land should be used in the future make visible different parts of the cultural model than those that are made visible in framings of expropriations. Homes is the consistent element in these framings, with discussions of land in the past and land in the future stating that land is necessary for housing. However, framings of expropriations emphasize the use of land for homes and agriculture, while framings of future land use emphasize that land is necessary for development, which includes both homes and industry. In both framings, land is linked with economy, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. Although development and industry are generally seen as good uses of land, they are thought of as things that require careful planning. The CPRDV and other protest groups have been involved in studies designed to create plans for responsible development.

“I think most, all the peoples think about development, and opportunity, and that’s what we, because we are working with this group of Puerto Rico, who are grupo tecnico, maybe you know it, or you went to the meeting. Well, we start working with that group, too, because we want that group give a vision what you can do with your land. We start working with that group so that they make project and discuss the project with the people of Vieques, an assembly or whatever, so they can discuss for what you want the land. You know, if you have the land, for what you want the land. So the people have a vision of future development, so we are working on that,

because it is true that the people have to have an idea for what you want the land. I want a university, but you have to want it very deeply. It's not that, you know. And you can see the university in some place. You want hospital, so where you want the hospital, you know. And that's the thing, that's what we are working with that group. Apart from the struggle, from the protests, is the proposal." (Interview #21)

Another component of the cultural model of land evident in framings of expropriations was the way that land was perceived as being a factor in creating identity. This identity places an individual in the context of a community or family, and it has both spatial and temporal characteristics. As evident in descriptions of expropriations, when land is used for work or homes it becomes a place for communities and families. Community is most often described as knowing your neighbors well and having lived next to them for a long period of time:

"That's not the Vieques my father used to tell me about. You know my father was a guitar player, and it was the time when they would go and play, around Christmas time mostly. They would go and play and dance at somebody's house. When they got tired of being at this house, they wanted to go somebody else's house, they just go with the owners of this house, and went to play and dance on somebody else's house in another barrio here and they were be dancing and singing for days, all the family together. And that was all broken, because they split the neighborhoods. Some had to go the one place, the others had to go the other place, some people left to St. Croix or St. Thomas, and everybody was split. I think my mother and my father were the only ones that went to that part of Vieques, near Camp Garcia. Some of the others went to Santa Maria, some stayed in Monte Santo around here, but that's when people used to think of the neighbors as relatives, at that time. And whatever people made in their house, like special dinners, they would share with their neighbors. Everybody knew what was eaten in the house because a little plate was always taken to the next house. And that's not used anymore, because people just move to places where they don't know their neighbors, and things changed. The neighborhoods changed. Sometimes you don't even know who's the person that's living next to you, and... Sometimes you don't have anyone around. Vieques still have a little of that, but not as it used to be." (Interview #3)

Family identity comes from the unity of family members, past and present. Living on land that your family has lived on for generations is described as a positive and important component of identity:

"Some people die because of the sadness or whatever. Because when they realize that they were gonna move from their land, which their father were born and raised in there, they were born and raised in there also." (Interview #4)

Contemporary family is also an important part of identity. As already mentioned, land was used for work. A few years after the land was taken over by the Navy, there was very little work and many men left Vieques, significantly changing the structure of families.

LAND IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Although the expropriations of the 1940's were the most frequently referenced issue related to land, land served as a reference domain for a number of issues arising throughout the movement's history. As discussed in Chapter Three, proposed expropriations in the 1960's met with resistance and were never implemented. In 1961, a proposal to remove all of the people of Vieques, living and dead, was not known on the island but was a matter of concern for the governor:

“We call it Dracula project. Can you imagine all the families, and getting all the graves from the cemetery, and going to St. Croix... But then, Munoz Marin was governor, and he was a good friend of Kennedy's, and finally convinced Kennedy that this was, this couldn't be done. Was unconstitutional, the constitution of Puerto Rico says in order to eliminate a town or to add a town, you have to go through a referendum of the people, and, and of course, it wouldn't look very good for the State in the face of the resignation. So finally he convinced him.” (Interview #6)

In 1964, Viequens and Puerto Ricans learned of a plan to expropriate the southern coast of Vieques, and began to protest that. The Committee for the Defense of Vieques was formed in response to this proposed expropriation:

“It started off as a University... some local University students and others from the community and then the sort of more official elements of the community, the Mayor, the superintendent of schools, church officials, land owners who were going to be affected, got together and... land owners from different political persuasions, you know, from different ideologies... but they were all worried about their land. So there was letters written, visits to the Governor, and visits to the President, visits to the White House. They had meetings between the Mayor of Vieques and the... and an official by the name of Belieu. And finally the Navy stopped that project of trying to expropriate the Southern coast.” (Interview #17)

As the response to these proposed expropriations makes clear, by the 1960's the framing of expropriations had been transformed into a frame more similar to the current

one than to the one used in the 1940's. By the 1970's land had gained importance insofar as it was related to development. A program from the 1977 Fiesta Patronales makes an explicit connection between the expropriations of the 1940's and the development challenges of the 1970's:

“Moreover, the expropriation of lands carried out by the marines left the civilian community with only 20% of its territory. More than 20 years have passed in the means of the attempts of various municipal administrations of Vieques to develop the island inside of its narrow territorial frame. According to statements of the Planning Board itself, the scarcity of land in Vieques is the principle obstacle to the development of Vieques in all its aspects.” (Anonymous. Program for Fiestas Patronales de Vieques en Honor a la Virgen del Carmen.)

As more recent events demonstrate, the framing of expropriations is one of several changes that have occurred in the way that land is seen, and used, by protestors. As discussed in Chapter Three, the rescate movement reached its peak in Vieques in the 1980's. In this movement, land that is perceived as being unused is “rescued” by protestors. Framings of rescates have changed during the time that they have occurred on Vieques. As late as the 1980's, those rescuing Navy land often argued that their act was related to problems with the Navy only insofar as there was a lack of land for civilians and a surplus of land for the Navy. In contemporary discourse, however, rescates are often framed as being part of the struggle against the Navy:

“When I was 4 years old, I was removed from my premises with my family, was in what's called Navy land now, Navy took our land. I cried, and inside of me I knew something was wrong, I couldn't figure it out. But when I was 17 years old, I invaded Navy land, the same way they invaded mine, I invaded theirs.

--When was that? What year?

Around '54, '55, '52, something like that. Around the fifties. Around the fifties. I invaded a good piece of land by the old fort and my mother beat the hell out of me. She said that I was acting like a communist, that you should not invade the Navy land.

--And the land that you invaded was by the old fort you said?

Yeah, but that's how far the Navy used to, the Navy land went, all this was Navy land, that land behind you... Took me 35 good years to rescue all that land.”

(Interview #2)

By this point, it is evident that there has been a progression in the way that land is framed on Vieques. In the 1940's, land was taken away from Viequens and there was an organized response. By the 1960's, the framing of expropriations as an injustice had evolved to the point that additional expropriations were protested. By the 1980's a significant amount of land that had been expropriated had been "rescued." Currently, land is both a location for and topic of protest. The central protest technique of the current movement is practicing civil disobedience by going onto Navy land to act as a human shield so that bombing cannot occur. This activity can be seen as using the land for protest to prevent the Navy's use of it for military exercises in the hope that it will one day be used for development.

In sum, there is a diagnostic frame of a lack of land as a problem caused by the Navy. Although this frame is consistent in its identification of the Navy as the cause of the shortage of land on Vieques, the lack of detailed statements about land lead to difficulties in constructing a cultural model of land. However, framings of expropriations are more detailed than general statements about land. These frames reveal parts of a cultural model of land, which may have value as location and/or as property. The framing of expropriations has changed since the 1940's, when they were not met with organized protests. In recent decades, land has become a central movement issue and expropriations are now framed as an unjust event that can and should be protested.

CHAPTER 5

HEALTH

“Outside in the sun of the deserted street, the air you breathe is clean. Vieques is tranquil, and doesn’t have air contamination” 1973 magazine article about Vieques (translated from García Ramis 1973:25).

“We dying every day, people getting contamination, and my family dying. My mother is really sick, you know. I can in my imagination in the future see my mother dead for this thing. I’ll do something crazy, you know. I’m living like in hell. It’s crazy. We do not live in peace over here.” Quote from interview conducted on Vieques in 2001 (Interview #15)

The above quotes are representative of their times. Although it might be supposed that the remark about the clean air in Vieques is a romanticization of the island, in the same article the author writes about Vieques’ problems with the marines, the lack of water, and unemployment. Documents from that time period and recollections in interviews concur: Contamination, as it relates to health, was simply not an issue on Vieques until recently. As is demonstrated by the second quote, however, health problems attributed to contamination are currently a central issue in the struggle on Vieques. In this chapter, I will discuss how health arose as a topic of discussion and present the cultural model and diagnostic frame that have turned health into a movement issue.

DIAGNOSTIC FRAMING OF HEALTH

In early 2001, almost all activists interviewed identified “health” as a central issue in their struggle. Health is an issue in the struggle because of a diagnostic frame linking problems in health with the Navy. As mentioned earlier, movement leaders made a

strategic decision to emphasize their concerns about the Navy's impact on the health of the Vieques population.

"I think we've, you know the Committee, this would be in terms of strategic planning, the Committee for the Rescue and Development of Vieques, I think several years ago, we recognized, I think it was the Radar issue that brought health, you know the health questions and the dangers of electromagnetic contamination, for instance. And now all this more recently, all this stuff about cancer. So we've made a definite strategic determination to push the health issue, you know, to really bring out the health issue, as a topic that attracts people's attention, that makes it easier for people to get involved in the struggle, because a lot of people see the struggle, or saw the struggle as a political issue. Whatever political might mean, but it generally might mean something bad for some people. You know, so to deal with that I think it's important to deal with, you know, we want to bring out some of the more specific things that the Navy presence here means to people's real lives, you know. Like your family dying. So, um, we've done a lot of work around the environmental stuff and the health issues as well." (Interview #17)

This has been translated into action by means of educational presentations, press releases, and marches focused on health. Two individuals describe a community presentation they give in the following manner:

"And telling them the damage that was done there [in the eastern part of Vieques, where the civil disobedience camps were]. And we talk about the lagoons, we talk about the uranium and heavy metals, and we give them data from the Navy, and photographs with what we found. So then people go, oh. --And we try to relate that to the health situation in Vieques. Vieques has a difficult health situation." (Interview #13)

These activists use a diagnostic frame to identify poor health as a problem and suggest the cause of this problem. The key elements of this frame are health, contamination, and the Navy, associated by the causal relationships implied in the above quotations. The structure of the argument is as follows:

- 1. Many people on Vieques have health problems.**
- 2. Many of these health problems are caused by contamination.**
- 3. The Navy is the source of this contamination.**

Using inductive logic, these statements are used to support the conclusion that the Navy should leave Vieques. Note that the argument depends on the unstated premise that under normal circumstances, people should be healthy. The stated argument says that the

health situation in Vieques is not normal and suggests an explanation for this. In interviews, the vast majority of respondents used elements of this diagnostic frame. These elements are examined in detail in the following sections.

Many people on Vieques have health problems.

Many of the activists interviewed made this assertion, although it is not essential to an argument that the Navy should leave Vieques. That could be argued even if only a small number of people had health problems, as long as those problems could be linked to the Navy. However, in emphasizing the number of people with health problems, activists are using the cultural model of health to set up the frame by emphasizing that what has become the normal health situation on Vieques is not really normal²⁷.

“As an educator I have seen students suffer from cancer, or leukemia, I see them die and already we see it from children, adolescents, women, men... It is, it does not discriminate. And this is so concrete that lamentably we have already become accustomed to it. Although as much it hurts us when somebody has cancer, ‘Look they discovered cancer in [name]...’ ‘Oh! Another one.’ It’s no longer the surprise of ‘Oh! Really? Another one!’ Because it has become the norm already. And we are all waiting for those that don’t have cancer, we are waiting that at any moment they might say: ‘I had an analysis because I think that...’ Everybody expects that.”
(Interview #19)

Many of these health problems are caused by contamination.

This part of the frame was the least likely to be articulated. As demonstrated in the following quote, when this component was articulated it was often used to point out how specific health problems on Vieques are caused by Navy activity.

“He said that reason he was there [in court for going onto Navy land to act as a human shield to prevent bombing], and he was there, and he had to be there again, if he had to, was because a picture that he showed to the judge, and to the courtroom... Picture has his daughter, and his little kid, that was there, they are asthmatic, chronic asthmatic, both of them, and... Every time that the Navy bombs, he has to, that’s just a fact, he has to break nights with them in the hospital, giving them therapy... Every time they bomb it happens. To both of them! Both of the kids get sick at the same

²⁷Sometimes this is stated explicitly by noting that the rate of cancer on Vieques is much higher than the rate of cancer on mainland Puerto Rico. Therefore, there must be something different about Vieques that explains its people’s health problems.

time. Has something that looses in the air that they cannot breathe it, or something. That they're very sensitive for it, you know.” (Interview #8)

It is understandable that this component of the frame was articulated less frequently when the fact that it is very similar to part of the cultural model of health is taken into consideration. While parts of the cultural model of health used by activists are specific to Vieques, the statement that health problems can be caused by contamination is considered to be more widely understood²⁸. Therefore, it is likely that speakers often assumed, rather than articulated, this part of the frame.

The Navy is the source of this contamination.

This is perhaps the most crucial part of the argument, and therefore it is not surprising that this statement is frequently explained in more detail. In order to justify this claim, activists use components of the health model by referring to possible sources of contamination in the following statements:

- a) There are no other environmental sources of contamination.**
- b) There are no sources of lifestyle contamination.**

The logic behind these supporting statements is that of process of elimination. If there are no sources of contamination other than the Navy, the Navy must be the contaminator. Therefore, activists consistently identify possible sources of contamination and explain why none except the Navy are plausible explanations for health problems on Vieques.

The reasoning for the elimination of alternate sources of lifestyle contamination is found in two related versions, the individual and the general. When discussing a specific individual who is ill, activists often point out that he or she did not have a lifestyle that would increase the chance of getting a disease. This element of the frame is most

²⁸ As is demonstrated by the following quote, this assumption is supported by depictions of environmental contamination in popular media. “You know I went to see last night the picture of Erin Brokovich. We saw it in town last night. And it's the same thing as here: people being sick, people with tumors, people dying of cancer. Young girls, 20 year old girls with cancer in their wombs having to be operated on, and the company said no, we not doing any of this, like the Navy says. But you know, they won the case, because they could prove that, that they were really contaminating the water and everything. So we hope that the same thing happens here.” (Interview #3)

common in discussion of individuals with cancer. In the following quote a woman who has just described her own cancer says that her husband has cancer, too:

“Now, 2 weeks ago, my husband had a pain, and he had a tumor also, and his tumor was very small, but very, very aggressive. This week he’s gonna start with chemo. And, uh, like our case, there’s so many people here with cancer. We don’t drink, we don’t smoke, I try to cook the most health that I can try to eat the food that’s healthiest as possible, and still.” (Interview #7)

By noting that they don’t drink, smoke, or eat unhealthy food, she rules out a lifestyle explanation for their cancer. At the general level, activists point out that Vieques as a group don’t have a different lifestyle than other Puerto Ricans and therefore shouldn’t have a higher disease rate. Environmental sources of contamination are discussed primarily in terms of how they affect the general population. This is where part one of the frame becomes important. If a higher than expected number of Vieques have health problems and the Vieques lifestyle doesn’t suggest a reason for the increased rate of illness, what else is different about Vieques? Here, activists refer to possible sources of environmental contamination present in the cultural model of health. By this point, it might be assumed that the Navy presence is the obvious answer, but most activists were careful to rule out other possible sources of contamination.

“Many experts has been, how many, done testing of this uranium, and they have found that some can be there, something that is impossible to find in Vieques because we don’t have any activity that can produce that substance. Naturally, in Vieques, that substance cannot be found in Vieques. See. We don’t have any industry, no agricultural activity, nothing, nothing that can produce that type of substance. The finger point just to one thing, the Navy.” (Interview #14)

Once other contamination sources have been eliminated, the diagnostic frame has served its purpose. It has identified a problem in the high rate of illness on Vieques, and it has also identified the Navy as the source of this problem.

HEALTH AS A CULTURAL MODEL

As evident in the previous section, many health problems are perceived by Vieques activists as being caused by the Navy and therefore are a significant reason that

the Navy should leave the island. Although “health” was the keyword consistently used to identify this problem, the lower level cultural models used to describe “health” are all health problems. Thus, health is defined as an issue by its absence. This implies a higher-level and unarticulated model of good health as a normal state of being (see Figure 5.1).




Figure 5.1: Elements of Cultural Model of Health Used by Diagnostic Frame

The parts of the cultural model presented here are those used by the diagnostic frame in the previous section. The phenomenon of parts of the cultural model being

emphasized is similar to the frame alignment process of value amplification, which “refers to the identification, idealization, and elevation of one or more values presumed basic to prospective constituents but which have not inspired collective action for any number of reasons” (Snow et al 1986:469). Value amplification is presented as a way that frames are clarified, but the process is also relevant to cultural models. Although these elements of the health cultural model are used in the related frame, they can be distinguished from the frame because they provide substance rather than structure to the argument that the Navy should leave Vieques.

In some cases, the terms “health problems” or “diseases” were used to describe the absence of health. In other cases, this level of the model was not articulated. “Cancer” was repeatedly mentioned in the majority of interviews and often involved delineation of different kinds of cancer, including lung cancer, liver cancer, and leukemia. Other diseases mentioned by multiple respondents included asthma and diabetes.

As it relates to the Navy, health problems are understood as being caused by “contamination”, a mid-level model that is divided into individual contamination and environmental contamination. In interviews, individual contamination was described as resulting from lifestyle choices that introduced harmful substances into a person’s body. “Smoking” and “drinking” were the most consistently mentioned types of individual contamination, although “eating poorly” was also frequently mentioned. Environmental contamination included sources of contamination, specific contaminants, and the means by which contamination can spread. Activists identified industry, farming or agriculture, and the Navy as possible sources of contamination. Because the model of contamination is presented in the context of problems with the Navy, the most frequently mentioned specific environmental contaminants were ones that were easily linked to the Navy. “Uranium” was by far the most consistently identified contaminant, and it was usually

mentioned in the context of depleted uranium bullets, which at one point the Navy denied and later admitted to using. “Heavy metals” was a category of contaminant mentioned by multiple respondents. “Napalm” is another contaminant identified by multiple respondents, and it often appears as part of a theory shared by a few of those interviewed that the worst contamination began with the Navy’s use of Vieques to test non-conventional weapons.

A basic assumption about contamination is that it can spread from one location to another. In interviews, respondents identified two main contamination pathways. The first is through the air, and the second is through the food chain²⁹. Residents mentioning contamination through the food chain usually cited cows as the possibly contaminated animals that humans might eat.

“They say that everything is so contaminated that even the animal, you know, that grows in the land, when they eat their grass the whole thing is contaminated. And we, we believe that because it looks very, that I would grow a cow, and the cow would eat the grass, they say the contamination is on the, it’s on the ground.”
(Interview #7)

Cows are probably mentioned because a number of cows on Vieques are allowed to graze on Navy land and are therefore exposed to more directly contaminated grass. Interestingly, only one interview mentioned that there were contaminated fish, although this topic came up in several casual conversations. It is possible that people are concerned that talking about contaminated fish would hurt the local fishing industry.

As explained in interviews, air contamination involves the transfer of contaminants from Navy land or the air above it to air in the civilian area, where residents are exposed to the contaminants. A lower-level model of air contamination frequently invokes the fact that wind most often blows from the eastern part of the island, where the live impact area is located, towards the civilian area in the middle of the island.

“I listen and I hear people saying that I have cancer, I’m dying from cancer, my kids, because now they talking about, they intend to use inert bombs. Inert bombs, what

²⁹ Water is not considered to be a likely contamination pathway because the water on Vieques is piped in from the mainland. However, some respondents mentioned concerns about contaminants from the air entering the tanks in which water is stored by means of air-intake valves.

means by inert bombs? Inert bombs means that they gonna kill you slowly. Why slowly? They drop a 500 pound inert bomb into the impact area, which is, which is so contaminated from 1,000 feet high, when it hits the ground it lifts the dust, and right now here we are. Where the wind is blowing? From east to west. Always, from east to west. And the impact area is in the east. Here we are right now in the west. So all that dust, fugitive dust and all that comes all the way down to the civilian area. So which means, they contaminate.” (Interview #4)

HISTORY OF HEALTH AS AN ISSUE

Unlike land, health is a new issue in the struggle on Vieques. A frame of poor health as a problem attributed to the Navy has emerged only within the last two decades. There are a variety of explanations for this. Some activists believe that health problems have grown significantly worse in recent decades because contamination has accumulated in the environment. Other activists point to the time it takes for contamination to translate into poor health and believe that emergence of widespread health problems on Vieques marks the end of a period of lag time between the introduction of contamination into the environment and visible health problems. A third explanation is that health on Vieques has been poor for a long time and simply has not been recognized as a problem until recently.

Besides being beyond the scope of this paper, the question of when health problems on Vieques became quantitatively worse does not explain why people began talking about health as a problem and linking it with the Navy. As studies of social movements have shown, the mere presence of a problem does not automatically lead to it being protested³⁰. In the case of Vieques, it appears that health became an issue because of the synchronicity of the founding of a group working to get the Navy out of Vieques – and therefore looking for issues with mobilization potential – and the arrival of an expert in the area of health who thought that the rate of health problems on Vieques was unusually high and hypothesized that they might be caused by the Navy. This expert, a

³⁰ This is one of the primary points made by political opportunity theory and resource mobilization theory, two distinct schools of thought in social movement theory.

health care professional who moved back to Vieques after his retirement, describes the situation he found upon his return:

“But in [1992], when I came back here, my parents had already passed away. My mother died of leukemia. And my uncle, who lived next door, die of non-Hodgkins lypoma, are related. So I came back and started asking about people. So-and-so, oh, died. Of what came from? Cancer. Oh, so-and-so, oh yes, leukemia. And I remember one day somebody called me to interview with her, young girl, a teacher, had cancer of the breast, she didn’t want to get surgery done. So I had to go in talk to her, I said listen, you’re young woman, you have to kids, I said what are you going to do? Are you going to die, let you die from cancer? Have 2 childs. She finally decided to do the surgery, doing well now, and that’s very good. But this was the situation I saw. So in the committee, I went one of the meetings this time, I brought this up... Said a lot of people die from cancer.” (Interview #6)

The “committee” was the newly formed Comite Pro Rescate y Desarrollo de Vieques, and this quote is from one of its founding members. Interviews with other early members of the CPRDV confirmed that this discussion of cancer in their meetings was the first time health was seriously considered as something that might be linked with the Navy presence. Vieques residents asked the Puerto Rican government to study the frequency of various diseases on the island. Additionally, they began framing certain Navy activities as potential health threats.

This framing was first used in protests about the Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar (ROTHR) transmitter the Navy proposed installing on its land in Western Vieques.

“And the people was care about health. Because, you know, we start educating about the electromagnetic, and how the contamination of the kind of element, and whatever, and we bring many scientists from Puerto Rico, we give literature about that, and then [another activist] was talking about the cancer and the worry about no study about cancer. So that’s the first time the people is worried about that.” (Interview #21)

Although protests about the radar were supported by a number of Viequens, leaders of the movement had difficulty maintaining momentum after the radar was built. Activists continued to gather information about the possible health impacts of Navy activities, but they did not have an audience for this frame until the death of David Sanes Rodriguez drew attention to Vieques.

FRAME ALIGNMENT PROCESSES

Since the death of David Sanes Rodriguez, activists in Vieques have found an audience for their framing of the health problem on the island. In one respect, this is a natural consequence of the media attention focused on Vieques after the death. In another respect, however, the death of David Sanes Rodriguez has been strategically linked with other deaths on the island.

In interviews, activists frequently described fights between civilians and military personnel and accidents in which civilians were harmed by Navy ammunitions. The accidents are vividly remembered and sometimes cited by individuals as one of the reasons that they began to think that the Navy should leave Vieques:

“I established a conversation with him, stuff like that, until I came to the point when I asked him when, when and how that happened, how he lost his arm. And he told me that he was searching for land crabs over at the, over at the ranges, you know, over at the target ranges over there, and that, that, that something exploded, a grenade or something that he touch, he was trying to catch a crab and he got stuck with something. He introduce his hand, his whole arm into the hole, the crab hole, and he touched something and it exploded and it hurts his face and everything, and he almost died. He showed me another marks that he had pieces of iron in his throat. He was almost dead, but his arm, he lost it. Since then, I say, wait, wait, Jesus, you know. I began to you know, really, I never heard something like that from anybody, especially personally like that. And I began to rejecting on the Navy and the marines. I had started to open myself to something, to reality that kids do not see, you know.”
(Interview #8)

Until the accident that killed David Sanes Rodriguez, isolated accidents did not lead to organized protests. However, they are often cited as one of the reasons for current protests. That they are framed this way in contemporary discourse may reflect a retrospective transformation of domain-specific interpretive frames. On Vieques, injuries and deaths caused by military accidents have changed from being viewed as unfortunate but isolated events to being seen as part of the larger health problem that the Navy causes on Vieques. This frame transformation was less dramatic for fights between military personnel and civilians, which were already identified by movement discourse and local politicians as a problem warranting action.

“In the fifties, then there was the big protest. When [Antonio Rivera] got to be the mayor in '48, and when they, when this landing exercises, there was a lot of marines stationed in Vieques. And, they came to town on liberty. They got drunk, and made fights, riots, people killed, civilians, and a lot of prostitution, the women, at that time I was, was in the university, but I remember I came back to Vieques, 5:00 we had to close the doors in the home. My sister and my mother had to go to the last room in the house, I can stay with my father in the balcony for awhile, then we have to go inside and close the door because the marines were obnoxious and drunk and making a lot of things in town. And, finally, [Antonio Rivera] as the mayor had to do something about it. And they gone to the Navy people and said, no, this cannot be. Of course, these marines coming to liberty, they were getting some money, mostly in liquor, and some food, hamburgers – that’s when hamburger was introduced in Vieques. I remember very well, they were big, homemade hamburgers. But they had to do something about it. They said, this is it. By the end of the fifties, the liberties are going down.” (Interview #6)

Although fighting does not require the degree of frame transformation applied to accidents, fighting is changed from being a discreet problem to one incorporated into a larger frame. Deaths caused by accidents and fighting achieve greater resonance by being linked to the highly effective frame of health problems. This linkage was particularly evident at the March for Health, held in Vieques on February 24, 2001. At this event, well over 100 people assembled at the Health Clinic, where organizers handed out large white crosses with names painted on them. If a family member or friend was present, they carried the cross for the person they knew. Organizers explained that there was to be no yelling or chanting during the march because this was a solemn march for the people who had died. Father Nelson, a local priest, led the group in a prayer and gave a short speech.

As requested, there was no chanting, yelling, or singing during the march. People talked to the people next to them, or walked silently. This greatly contrasted with most other protests on Vieques, which usually involved chanting or singing and are often festive events. When the march arrived at the Peace and Justice Camp, located in front of the gates to Camp Garcia, the priest said an invocation and some of the organizers gave short speeches. One speaker said that what was happening in Vieques was genocide. After these speeches, the organizers explained that the crosses were in two groups. The

first group was those who died in accidents, including fights, caused by the negligence of the Navy. The second group was cancer victims and others who were ill from the contamination produced by the Navy. Organizers called out the names on the crosses, and as each name was called the person carrying the cross took it to be put in the ground next to the Navy fence.

Both verbally and visually (see Figure 5.2), accidents and fights were linked with health problems caused by contamination. The crosses are not marked to distinguish between those whose deaths were caused by illness and those whose deaths were caused by injury. Illnesses related to contamination and injuries related to the Navy are literally placed on common ground. This ground is at the gates of the Navy's land on eastern Vieques.



Figure 5.2: These crosses were put next to the entrance of Camp Garcia at the culmination of the March for Health. The left side of the sign reads: “To the memory of the Viequens who have been victims of military accidents and environmental contamination.” The right side of the sign is a quote from the Bible’s Book of Michael: “Nation will not fight against nation and there will be war no more.”

The diagnostic frame of health argues that the frequent occurrence of disease on Vieques is a problem caused by the Navy. This frame links disease with contamination, which is linked to the Navy by eliminating other possible sources of contamination. The framing of health as a movement issue involves selective emphasis of parts of the cultural model of health. These parts include contamination as a source of disease, possible sources of contamination, specific contaminants, and specific diseases. Health has a short history as a movement issue on Vieques. It began to be discussed in this context during the early 1990's. It was used as an issue for the first time in the middle of that decade, and it became one of the movement's most widely used frames after the death of David Sanes Rodriguez in 1999. Since then, injuries and deaths caused by Navy accidents and fights between military personnel and civilians have been incorporated into the framing of health. This is interpreted as an indication of the success of the diagnostic frame of health in attracting attention and support to the movement.

CHAPTER 6

ECONOMY

This chapter differs structurally from the previous two chapters. They emphasized the interactions between cultural models and frames, including the identification of various frame alignment processes, and were organized to bring out these dynamic interactions. However, the framing of economy as a problem on Vieques and parts of the cultural model used in this framing have remained relatively unchanged throughout the movement history. It appears that these parts of the cultural model have not changed and that the frame has been successful enough to resist significant modifications, despite being applied to a variety of specific situations. Because the basic frame and the parts of the cultural model it uses are fairly static, they require relatively less explanation and provide an opportunity to experiment with ethnographic form.

This “experiment” is designed in the following manner: By this point the thesis has presented three versions of the history of the movement on Vieques – a chronological history, a history of land as a reference domain, and a history of health as a reference domain. The first two sections of this chapter present a diagnostic frame of economy as a problem caused by the Navy and parts of the cultural model of economy used in the frame. The third section of this chapter tells the story of the history of the Viequen economy by relying almost entirely on quotes from interviews. If the earlier chapters have provided enough context, and the first two sections of this thesis have successfully explained the key words and the basic structures of the cultural model and the frame of economy, the reader should require little authorial intervention in order to understand and appreciate the narration of history as it is presented by those who have lived it. The ultimate goal of both this chapter and this thesis is that the reader will have sufficient

background in this topic to understand the perspectives informing Viequens' experience of and responses to the Navy presence on their island.

DIAGNOSTIC FRAMING OF ECONOMY

The essence of this diagnostic frame is that the poor economy of Vieques is a problem caused by the Navy. Economy is most often presented as something that is related to unemployment, which is perceived as a problem that has plagued Vieques since the Navy expropriated two-thirds of the island. In interviews, respondents used one of two supporting arguments to describe how lack of employment harms Viequens. The first argument is that Viequens need to work so that they can fulfill their basic needs, such as feeding themselves and their families. The second argument acknowledges that government assistance can help feed the unemployed and their families, but states that this option is not part of a positive identity. The first argument is presented below:

“In '77-'78 I organized a committee that was called Wives of Fishermen, who were those that... But in that, then our struggle was an economic struggle, because, then, the Navy destroyed our spouses' art of fishing, deprived us of food in the home and the ability to cover the necessities.” (Interview #1)

Whereas this respondent viewed necessities such as food as the basic premise of the frame, other respondents claimed that even if these necessities were taken care of it was still important for people to work:

“We were self-supporting, until the Navy came, now most people have to depend on food stamps, and that's not what people like, people like best to work and be able to, you know, support their family with their their own work. And that's why we want to go back to it. You know, to be able to be self-supporting again. To be proud of being Viequenses, not to be begging someone to help us because there's no jobs or anything for us here in Vieques. We want to be able to be proud of us.” (Interview #3)

In this quote, lack of employment is a problem because it is not compatible with the Viequen identity of being self-supporting. Regardless of whether a lack of food or a lack of empowerment is thought of as the most negative result of unemployment, the absence of work is consistently described as a problem caused by the Navy. Another

ramification of this problem is that many people have had to leave Vieques in order to find work:

“Also the situation was the struggle with the economy on Vieques, the people of Vieques began to go away because they destroy the economy, they destroy a lot of the industry, the sugarcane industry, it disappear, and people began to left Vieques.” (Interview #12)

These problems are perceived as being related to the Navy because economy is thought of as being intimately related to land. Since the Navy took away the majority of land on Vieques, they are seen as taking away the majority of actual and potential jobs for island residents.

CULTURAL MODEL OF ECONOMY

The cultural model of economy suggests that the Viequen economy is indicated by the employment status of its residents (see Figure 6.1). In interviews, people said that they have to work because they want to support themselves and their families without depending on federal assistance:

“I want to be living over here, but I no got job over here, so I have to go over here. But I want to stay on Vieques, but I no got job. I have to do something. I no like welfare, I don’t like nothing, I like work. I have to go over there, y work over there, y make money, y come over here, see my family, my mother, and my sister. Anyway, I no like live the welfare, and I no depend the system, I don’t like to be in the system. I work for I did, and for what I done. Si Navy go, and there be a lot of jobs, I be the person most happy on the planet. Living over here and working over here, this is my dream, this is my big dream. And that’s it, you know.” (Interview #15)

As explained in the previous section, food and identity are emphasized in the cultural model because they function as alternate explanations for why unemployment is a problem for Vieques. Regardless of which alternative is used in the frame, employment is important because it provides money that can be used for food and other necessary items. Some of the frames presenting unemployment as an unacceptable option connect it with government assistance, which is most frequently identified as food stamps.

Salient types of employment are often implicitly categorized as those that are directly related to land or sea and those that are only indirectly related. Types of

employment directly related to land/sea include working on sugar plantations, raising cattle, farming, and fishing. As explained in the following quote, this category of employment as a whole is thought to be the most important in the island's economic history. However, the relative importance of the types of employment within this category has varied in recent history.




Figure 6.1: Cultural Model of Economy used in Diagnostic Framing

“But after [the expropriations], the aftermath, might have included some sort of a sense of progress, of change, of modernization, from the sleepy agricultural type of

economy, which remember was very seasonal because sugarcane economy is very seasonal, you have people that plant the sugar cane, but then there's no work except minor artisan work of preparing the plows, or minor technical work in the mills. But, while sugarcane is growing, there really is nothing to do. Now you have work that seems to be wage labor, because they started building for [the base]... But then that stopped and... now they didn't have the agricultural base to fall back on. And then, many of the people that used to be part of the agricultural or artisan economy became fishermen. That was about the only chance they had to get a living. So more or less robust fishing began to happen and that's when the major clashes began, because the Navy was very imperial about the way they had things, and they just told people, 'You can't fish now.' ” (Interview #10)

Another category of employment described in the cultural model is those jobs that are only indirectly related to land or sea. They depend on land and/or sea as a location, but they do not involve resource extraction or cultivation. Jobs in factories or the service industry are found in this category. Factories are most frequently mentioned in the context of the economic development that was promised in the 1983 Memorandum of Understanding between the Puerto Rican government and the Navy. The service industry is most frequently mentioned in the context of one of two time periods – the 1950's when marines frequently came to civilian parts of Vieques and a desired future when Vieques will be able to develop a larger tourism industry. The specific jobs mentioned in the service industry are those from the 1950's – washing clothes, owning a bar, and prostitution. In interviews, none of these jobs were identified as desired types of employment for the future.

ECONOMY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

While the basic argument of the diagnostic frame of economy is simple, this argument is supported with a wealth of historical detail. Relative to framings in the reference domains of land and health, the framing of employment in the reference domain of economy has been extremely consistent throughout the history of the movement. Archival documents corroborate the version of economic history presented in interviews, and there was a high degree of consensus among respondents about what happened when and why.

For these reasons, it is possible to present the economic history of Vieques with very little authorial intervention and therefore give more “voice” to interview respondents. Consideration of representations of indigenous knowledge is relevant to this point:

“Anthropology has typically responded in a variety of ways to representation of indigenous knowledge. Typically these have consisted of giving voice to the indigenous people, of ‘letting them speak for themselves’ (see, for example, essays in Marcus 1992). While this is essential and necessary, it is not always sufficient. To begin with, the voices are not always heard, and if they are heard, they are not necessarily understood. Difficulties, in those regards, abound. One problem is that even if attention is given to indigenous voices, the terms used in discourse carry embedded meanings that are culturally specific. Identical terms can have radically different meanings. In addition, the interpretation of discourse itself, i.e., its significance and what it means, is subject to a host of cultural expectations” (Blount 2001).

It is hoped that the quotes presented below will be able to be understood by the reader. They are presented in the context of a more general history of the movement on Vieques described in previous chapters. The key terms and their meanings have been explained in previous sections of this chapter. Finally, it is assumed that the culture of Viequen activists is not so radically different from the culture of the reader that is unreasonable to expect him or her to be able to use this context to understand the activists’ voices. Given these considerations, the following quotes are presented in the hope that they will successfully translate from the context in which they were spoken to the context in which they are read.

The beginning of economic problems on Vieques was concurrent with the Navy’s expropriations.

“We were not expropriated, but my father had sugarcane, raised sugarcane, so he felt the impact of closing of the Playa Grande factory. So by 1944 there was a big, bad depression in Vieques. Very bad situation. Actually, there are several letters. Even the priests for the Catholic Church saying have to do something, you know about this, the people on Vieques are dying. Not dying, really, but they hungry. And the people to emigrate. Had to emigrate, most to St. Croix, to the States, to the big island. So Vieques, had a population of about 12 hundred thousand in the 1940’s, begin to lose population...” (Interview #6)

Immediately following the first expropriations there were plenty of jobs on the island, but these ended when base construction was completed. The lack of employment led to men being forced to leave Vieques in search of work.

“From here on the problem was very difficult, because the Navy had promised that it would give employment to the people and it was not so. They only gave employment for construction while they finished construction of the facilities, after that, the people began to suffer again from unemployment, so people had to go away to the island of Santa Cruz to live. And the family began to disintegrate, because for example, the head of the family, the husband went away, went away to work in Santa Cruz, leaving his family here with his wife and her babies, and that created many problems. On many occasions the wife was left single all her life since he made his life over there. And we had to fight like the head of the family, pushing on children to go forward, often alone. The people that remained in residence here suffered racial discrimination, and they were thrown unemployment as well... In a way that on one occasion Vieques took out black flags as a sign of the hunger in Vieques.” (Interview #1)

During the 1950's the marines frequently came to civilian areas when they were on leave. There were a number of fights between the marines and civilians, but local service industries benefited from the military visits to town.

Well, a lot of riots, fights, with marines. Especially people went to war, Korean war, veterans of Vieques, they used to fight with them. I remember this particular fight, was, I think was Sunday. These marines got to the ballpark... [Talks about ballpark, fight.] This marine's name was George, he was about 6'5". They hit him with a rock, right back here, was not killed, never got killed, but that was the only way they could control that particular guy, because of fight with the civilians.

--Did people then talk about wanting the Navy to leave?

Yeah, yeah, yeah. Not the whores, not the prostitutes, because that was business. Not even the taxi drivers...

--So who did want them to leave? Who didn't like them?

Politicians. And, um... Not even the owners of the bars, because that was business... [Mentions more owners of local businesses] But few people start growing, open their minds, and make believe, and they were right, that it was better without the Navy here. (Interview #18)

The poor economy was a source of resentment in these fights, which eventually led to the marines being removed from Vieques.

“So those are more or less the sources of malcontent and indignation and protest. The unfulfilled promises of progress and economic well-being for most people who are seeing the large island grow and expand under this arrangement, they feel they are

being left behind because of the Navy. So they had a promise of moving out of the peasant economy into a more wage labor economy and that didn't get fulfilled. They turned to fishing, that gets very arrogantly disrupted, and then you have these undercurrents of hatred and resentment because of these marine activities. Eventually the marines were pulled out from Vieques because of that." (Interview #10)

Although the marines left Vieques, the Navy took over the marine's land on eastern Vieques. During the 1970's, fishermen were subject to increasing restrictions about when and where they could fish. This increase was attributed to the fact that the Navy closed down its training facility on the nearby island of Culebra.

"They transferred them [the Navy from Culebra to Vieques] in '75. But in 1978 we received a notice from the Navy that they were going to do some exercises for 28 days in a row. Most of the exercises they would be from seven o'clock in the morning till twelve o'clock at night. I gathered up the fishermen. I said "What are we..." . Because all the waters are on the island that were going to be restricted. [Interview is interrupted by phone call.] So, as I said before, they were supposed to restrict the water for 28 days around the island of Vieques. The only area that was going to leave open was the area on which the ferry boat went back and forth. --So it was all the way around the island?

All the way around. So, the fishermen were asking me "[Name of Respondent], what are we going to do?" I said, "Well, let me go to Roosevelt Roads". So I went to Roosevelt Roads, and I had a talk with the Rear Admiral, William Flanagan. It was about, I imagine, February the 5th or around there... the 4th... around there. And I explained to him, that the fishermen were very, very mad and that they were worried about what was going to happen to them. How they were going to do they're fishing to support their families, because in those days almost like today the unemployment on the island was close to 50%. 70% of the people living on foodstamps. So, I went to him, I explained to him, I said "Listen, what's going to happen?" I did on those days, which I wouldn't do today at all. We don't want any deal at all, today, with the Navy. [tells story to illustrate this point] So, so I explain to him, I says "What are we going to do?" He says to me, "Carlos, we spend millions of dollars to bring the NATO forces to the island of Vieques. We have to go on with the exercises. We're going to use practically all the waters around the island of Vieques because they're so many ships. And there is going to be an amphibious landing." He explained to me all the facts. Everything they were going to do on those maneuvers, which they call spring board training.

-- Spring board training?

Right. Those maneuvers, that was with the Navy force, in '78 they called it "Spring Board". So I says, "You are telling me about your exercises. You are telling me about your ships. I want to hear something from you what can we do with the fishermen. Can we make any..." On those days I went to him like that. Can we make any deal, anything that you might do some maneuvers like 11 o'clock in the morning one day and let us fish from 7 to 11. Then you continue on with your exercises. He says "No." I continue asking, I said "What are we going to do then?"

[Discuss other topics for a few minutes, return to story.] He told me, 70% of the people living on food stamps on the island of Vieques. Which means that there's a food stamp office in Vieques. I say yes. He says you fishermen can go to the food stamps line until we go on with the exercises.

--So for a month he wanted you to go on the line?

That's the story. I told him, listen Mr. Flanagan: For the first time of the presence of the United States Navy on the island of Vieques, you people gonna have problems. So this fishermen talking to him like this. I'm talking to the rear admiral, which is an official from the biggest, strongest forces in the world. See, he laugh at me. And I repeat it, I repeat it. I says, you can laugh all you want mister. You people gonna have problems. So I came up, came to Vieques, I got in the island of Vieques around 2 o'clock, at 2 o'clock I call a meeting immediately. All the fishermens, especially in the south part of the island, but some fishermen from the north heard about the meeting, I came to the north, to the south, and we all got together." (Interview #4)

The fishermen decided to protest the restrictions by blocking the Navy's maneuvers. During 1978 and 1979, there was a series of confrontations at sea between the fishermen and the Navy. This action was accompanied by protests on Navy land, lawsuits against the Navy, and political negotiations between the governor of Puerto Rico and various Navy officials. In 1983, the governor of Puerto Rico and the Secretary of the Navy signed a Memorandum of Understanding in regarding the conflicts between the Navy and civilians on Vieques. The Navy's promise to encourage local industry was a centerpiece of this agreement.

"You know the Memorandum from 1983?

--Uh-huh.

They offered that they would bring factories here, yeah they was at that time factories, we had a few factories, but only for a couple of years. They don't stay too long.

--Why not, what, do you know...

Because they stop what they, they didn't honor what they promised. See. They was help the people, the developers, they would help them for the first few years. But after that, they wouldn't get the help. And as you see, everything is so hard to get it here. See. Is very, very, the cost is very high. Some people had to leave, they couldn't stay." (Interview #7)

Although the attempted improvements to the island's economy did not have lasting impacts, the protest movement was effectively dismantled. It did not regain strength until the mid 1990's.

“It was the radar. It was a good movement. A very, very good movement. I don’t say like this, because this is like everybody was with some compromise. You know, you see that, people came, stayed here for two hours, three hours. They have a compromise with the struggle. When the radar they participated in the demonstrations, but then thing happened, the company of the radar started offering jobs to the people of Vieques. So, the people of Vieques start working that project too. Because they need money. So, what happened is that the struggle started coming down...” (Interview #21)

The lack of land and poor economy on the island continue to cause many problems for Viequen residents.

“We cannot have many factories or anything because there’s no incentive for them to come to Vieques. And, we lose our children. As soon as they reach your age, they go to college on the main island. Since there are no jobs available here on Vieques, they stay on the main island and we lose them. Because there are no opportunities on Vieques for them. So we have to visit them or they come to visit us when they can, and the families just split. Some men have to go to the main island to work. And sometimes, the families split because sometimes when they are over there they meet somebody else and they forget about the one they have in Vieques.” (Interview #3)

In the time that the Navy has been on Vieques, it has damaged the economy in a number of ways. They have not considered the needs of the people on the island, and they have ignored opportunities to actually improve the island’s economy. By this point, the damage has been done and it is too late for the Navy’s offer of economic assistance to end the protests on Vieques.

“They had big maneuvers with Germany, other countries involved, and the thing that nobody seems to mention is like how much money the Navy, the U.S. government was getting for renting that target range for other countries to participate and to bomb, but none, not a single penny was invested into cleaning up some of the potholes that we have, or park, or anything that shows that the Navy’s like, “Well, we just got a \$25 million check from Germany for bombing here, we’re gonna give you \$500,000 to fix whatever.” It’s like, show something that you are part of the community, that you have done something, perhaps they shouldn’t be in this mess. But they just pretty much assume the attitude that, you know, let sleeping dogs lie and it’s undisturbed if people don’t, you know, just some Viequenses who are protesting, and business as usual. And year after year, you know, that was the same attitude, you know, that I believed that no matter what they do to try to convince that they want to be good neighbors and all that, it doesn’t, you know, it’s just a little bit too late. And even now, it’s like, they’re not doing really enough. Because even this stupid 40 million that they’ve been like trying to you know get people here to vote for them, blah, blah, blah, we’re gonna give you... That’s pocket change for them. It’s stupid. For sixty years, if you do the counting for sixty years, and the possibilities of Vieques

developing into a St. Thomas or St. Croix, and how much money they generate in tourism alone, for sixty years, you don't have enough money to cover that damage, without talking the psychological and the environmental damage. It's that arrogance that they still consider us to be stupid, bunch of hicks who are just ungrateful, and you know, we're just, in the eyes of the world, they're going to try to do something, and, that they want to do better, and blah, blah, blah, and to let them have it, and they have it so good for so long, and I don't think there's a going back. I don't think, regardless of what they try to do, and how they clean up the image, people here are not, are not gonna buy it. They have bought a few people here and there, but the vast majority, you know, can't reflect the scars that all these years have done. And I feel badder for them, and at some point I believe they're gonna give up. They're gonna have to give up." (Interview #9)

As evident in this narrative, economy and employment have been perceived as problems on Vieques since the Navy arrived on the island. The shortage of land caused by expropriations led to a lack of work, with the result that many men left the island to look for employment. When the marines were on Vieques, they supported a local service industry, but their presence created other problems. The marines left, and the Navy's maneuvers intensified. This disrupted fishing, which by the 1970's had become a means for many men to support their families. A period of intense protest in the late 1970's ended with a Memorandum of Understanding in 1983. Although there were attempts to improve the island's economy during the 1980's, most of these projects failed within a few years. Lack of employment continues to be a problem on Vieques.

In conclusion, this chapter has presented a diagnostic frame, cultural model, and historical account of the ways that economy has been referenced in the struggle on Vieques. The diagnostic frame identified the Navy as the cause of the island's unemployment problems, which led to disempowerment of residents and/or difficulties in meeting their basic needs. The cultural model explained these problems in more detail and identified different kinds of employment. The historical account of the island's economy was presented by using extensive quotes from interviews with Viequen residents. If the cultural model and diagnostic frame have served their purpose, these quotes should have been easy for the reader to understand and appreciate.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

The central question of this thesis is “Why and how do central issues in the movement on Vieques change through time?” Complementary hypotheses addressing this question were presented in Chapter One. The first hypothesis addressed the “why” of the question by proposing that movement issues changed because the diagnostic framing of problems changed over time. A corollary hypothesis addressed the “how” of the question by stating that movement issues were created and modified through the interaction of diagnostic frames and cultural models. In order to collect data related to these hypotheses, I conducted interviews with activists on Vieques. In order to test the hypotheses, keyword analysis was used to identify frames and cultural models used by activists. This thesis concludes with a summary of points made in the first section of chapter two and chapter three and a re-presentation of the movement history described in the second half of chapter two, this time using the frames that were discussed in Chapters Four, Five, and Six.

Chapter Two presented a brief history of Vieques, beginning with the United States gaining possession of Puerto Rico in 1898. Relevant events in the history of Vieques and Puerto Rico between 1898 and 1939 were explained to give the reader a sense of the historical path that both Vieques and mainland Puerto Rico were on before the Navy came to Vieques. This is important for two reasons. First, prior to the Navy’s arrival, Vieques was distinguished from the rest of Puerto Rico in two ways: it was an offshore island and its economy was dependent on the sugar industry. Aside from these two points, Vieques was very similar to the rest of Puerto Rico. This is important to note because some diagnostic frames identify the Navy as the cause of various problems by

arguing that it is the primary factor differentiating Vieques from mainland Puerto Rico. The second purpose of describing this time period was to give the reader some idea of the economy, society, and land distribution on Vieques before the arrival of the Navy. This was important because some of the diagnostic frames used in the movement identify the Navy as the cause of various problems by contrasting the way that Vieques was before and after the Navy came to the island. The Navy's arrival on Vieques set off a course of history on the island that was relatively isolated from that of the rest of Puerto Rico. The second section of this chapter focused more specifically on the history of the social movement on Vieques. A chronological history of this movement was presented with the intent of providing the reader with a framework in which to place the events described in detail in later chapters.

Chapter Three presented the theories and methods used in this analysis of the movement on Vieques. It introduced the theoretical premises of frames and cultural models, and proposed that movement issues could be understood as a discursive phenomenon created through the interaction of frames and cultural models. It was suggested that an individual's cultural models might lead him or her to think that there is a problem with a specific situation. However, in order to make the problem into an issue worthy of protest, the cultural model is incorporated into a strategic frame that identifies the problem and its cause using a logical argument with the cultural model as its fundamental premise. Thus, modifications to movement issues may often be traced back to changes in either the cultural model or the diagnostic frame used to create the issue in the first place. Before it was possible to analyze changes in issues central to the movement, it was necessary to identify these issues. This was done by coding interview passages in which activists explained the reasons that the Navy was protested at various points in time. As explained in this chapter, key word analysis was used to code these passages for issues that were central to the movement. Once these issues were identified, they were analyzed structurally in order to elicit the diagnostic frame connecting the

Navy to a problem. The fundamental premise of this frame suggested a cultural model, which could be fleshed out by considering the content of the frame.

During this analytic process, it became evident that the vast majority of frames and cultural models used by activists in discussing movement issues pointed to one or more of three reference domains – land, health, and economy. The frames and cultural models referencing each of these domains were analyzed in Chapters Four, Five, and Six. Although these domains were discussed in separate chapters for analytic purposes, they overlap cognitively and chronologically. In the remainder of the conclusion I will present a summary of the history of the movement on Vieques as it appears when considered in the context of the diagnostic frames and cultural models used in this movement's discourse. By considering the frames and cultural models of earlier chapters in relation to each other, it is possible to more fully understand the history and complexity of movement issues on Vieques.

In the 1940's, the U.S. government expropriated two-thirds of the land on Vieques, using the western third of the island for storage of Navy ammunition and the eastern end for a marine base named Camp Garcia. Although these expropriations were perceived as a traumatic event, they did not result in organized protest. Part of the reason for this may have been that they were viewed through cultural models that would not have supported their being framed as a problem worthy of protest. One such cultural model mentioned in interviews was that Americans were superior to Puerto Ricans. Another cultural model mentioned in interviews was that war was an extenuating circumstance requiring unusual personal sacrifice. In some interviews, it also was suggested that the full extent of the problems caused by expropriations was not immediately apparent. At the same time that the expropriations were taking place, almost all of the island's workforce was employed in base construction. The sugar industry was in decline by this point, and this employment on construction crews was perceived by some to be an improvement to the island's economy.

After base construction was completed, however, many residents were abruptly left unemployed. The island was unable to return to the agricultural base of its earlier economy because of a lack of land. Unemployment became a problem, but the diagnostic frame used at the time identified the Puerto Rican Government as the cause of this problem. In the early 1940's Viequens marched in the streets of Vieques demanding work. The government responded with various projects to revitalize the island's economy and create more jobs. However, few of these projects lasted through the 1950's.

In the 1950's, there was a comparatively high degree of interaction between marines and civilians. The economy benefited from a service industry built up around the presence of the marines, who patronized local bars, restaurants, and prostitutes. However, the high degree of interaction between military and civilians also led to a number of fights. These fights were seen as a problem caused by the Navy presence, but were not related to the reference domains of land or economy. They would later be incorporated into the framing of health problems, but at the time they were seen as an important, but somewhat isolated, issue. The local government complained about the fights, and the marines were eventually removed from Vieques.

The Navy acquired the Marines land on Eastern Vieques, and during the 1960's tried to expropriate additional parts of the island. By this point, the framing of expropriations had been transformed. They were now perceived by Viequens as being neither necessary nor justified. It is likely that this frame transformation reflected changes in relevant cultural models used throughout Puerto Rico. Governor Luis Munoz Marin expressed concerns that a 1961 proposed expropriation of the entire island would involve "political and human dismemberment" and would be "the kind of action which arouses instinctive disapproval" (in Melendez Lopez 2000:186). There is no evidence that such concerns were voiced about the expropriations of the 1940's. The 1961 proposed expropriations were cancelled before Viequens became aware that they were even being discussed. However, in 1964 Viequen residents learned of a plan to

expropriate the southern coast of the island. They organized protests and sent representatives to argue their case in San Juan and Washington, D.C. They used a diagnostic frame to argue that the proposed expropriations were unjust and would cause extreme hardship on the island. These expropriations were also cancelled.

Although the Navy did not acquire more land, activists think that their training on the land they already owned intensified in 1975, when a Navy base on the nearby island of Culebra was closed due to protests there. Unlike the Marines' use of Camp Garcia, the Navy used the eastern side of the island primarily as a bombing range and fewer sailors came to town. The island's unemployment rate was once again extremely high. By this time, Vieques had a local fishermen's association, which was originally founded to improve the island's fishing industry by coordinating the sale of each day's catch. In response to the lack of land caused by the expropriations and the island's poor economy, many men had turned to the sea to provide both food and income for their families. By the seventies, fishing was extremely important both economically and culturally, and increasing Navy restrictions about when and where fishing was permitted met with much resistance. In 1978-79, there were a series of confrontations between the fishermen and the Navy. Fishermen took their boats into areas where the Navy had announced they would be doing maneuvers. They left chains in the water to stop the Navy's propellers and engines, and used slingshots to shoot at Navy ships. These actions succeeded in stopping maneuvers for hours at a time. These activities were presented as protesting the Navy's damage to the island's economy, as exemplified by the harm Navy activities were causing to the fishing industry. The essential diagnostic frame of economy as a problem had not changed since the protests about lack of work in the 1940's, but this time the Navy rather than the Puerto Rican government was identified as the cause of this problem.

The events of 1979, like the expropriations of the 1940s, are key points in narratives of the history of the Navy presence on Vieques. As they are told now, in the 1940s an injustice occurred and people had no means of protesting it. By the late

seventies, increased organization at the community level and a growing tradition of protest in Puerto Rico and elsewhere provided the framework in which these confrontations were possible. However, although the fishermen of Vieques may have won the battle by temporarily stopping Navy maneuvers, they did not succeed in getting the Navy to leave Vieques. In response to this period of intense protest, in 1983 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the Secretary of the Navy and the governor of Puerto Rico. In this agreement, the Navy promised to address the economic concerns expressed by Viequens. Most of these promises were never met, or did not succeed in benefiting the community, but the protest movement lost momentum.

While the protest movement would not attain an equal level of visibility for another 10-20 years, a different form of protest drew attention in the late eighties. The rescate movement in which people occupy unused land continued in Vieques after it waned in other parts of Puerto Rico. Usually, rescates protest unequal distribution of wealth and the inability of many people to have land or homes by rescuing unused land and establishing communities. In Vieques, this action has additional implications, as the unused land being rescued belongs to the Navy. Although the rescates of the 1980's were not framed as protesting the Navy when they occurred, in retrospect they are considered to be part of the movement.

In the early 1990's, health began to be an explicit issue. It was used in protests of a radar system that the Navy wanted to install on Western Vieques in the mid-1990's. Although these protests attracted local participation, they were unsuccessful in their short-term objective and the radar was built. The movement again died down until events of April 19, 1999, when a civilian guard by the name of David Sanes Rodriguez was killed by a bomb dropped on the wrong location.

“Now that this struggle was really blew up this time because the bomb killed David, see. Maybe if the bomb don't kill David maybe everything still some little quarrel or something like that, see. But David dead, that's a struggle, that became like an explosion for the people of Vieques. Everything was in the mind and the heart of the people of Vieques, their suffering, and they had the opportunity to bring that out. And we have, we were lucky that most of the Puerto Rican people hear us in this

claim. The governor sent a commission to study Vieques and that gave us another... The churches, everything. This is the first time that the real situation of Vieques, the true situation that the people of Vieques, has been press all over the world. And this has given us a big opportunity to get the Navy out from here. This is our time. This is our big opportunity.” (Interview #14)

In current protests, health is presented by many activists as the most significant problem caused by the Navy.

“I believe that this is all interrelated, but the argument with most weight, because it is the one that gives us the most fear, is health. Because if I am not contaminated, I am exposing myself. I continue to be here, and they continue bombing and I am exposing myself. And my children, and my grandchildren. And that is the most... because economy then, then I can begin to do odd jobs, I can learn to make sponge cakes, I begin to sew, or they give me coupons me, social services give me coupons , the economy then is manageable. In a certain sense. And the environment then because not everybody is thinking in the end to conserve the environment. Because if we did not conserve it then in some moment there is going to be chaos. Because those who are more directly exposed lose their health, and see their children and grandchildren die.” (Interview #19)

The success of this frame is also demonstrated by its presentation of the injuries caused by the fights and accidents of earlier decades as a health problem. Although health may be the most successful frame in motivating current protests, both land and economy are emphasized in discussions of the future use of the island.

Once the Navy leaves, you know, get responsible people to run business, as far as who is entitled to land, how to develop it, if it's development we're looking for, and what kind of development, and therefore, once it's that people be more content because it's developed that creates jobs, creates a sense of pride or dignity of eventually, you know, a new future. Like it's already I believe like a pioneer vision, I believe from the old days. It's like, wow, you know, we've got all these men, let's get to work. It's like, now there's nothing that can stop us. We're already over the first battle, now the second battle is going to be against the corporations, see this pristine beach here, wants to build a hotel, well the hell with them. That's the second battle. We've got many battles to come. The Navy is the main one, but from there on we've got to fight corporations, the government, weasels who just want to [build] here or there, but I think once people overcome, and get the Navy off here, there's not a single soul in this island who's gonna not believe in themselves that they can accomplish anything. And inside it's gonna be so great because finally we'll get a chance to, wow, go to the east or to the west, it's like, it's just gonna be, I sincerely believe it's gonna become like a booming era, you know, for five, ten years. Then after the first five, ten years Vieques is kind of gonna be the same, like it is now. It's gonna be all the people who were from here originally, who live in the States, who

live in Puerto Rico, who live every place else, they're gonna come back. They'll be eager to develop and to work and to do whatever needs to be done. (Interview #9)

In this quote, cultural models of land and economy are linked to identity. Furthermore, the social movement itself is described as a source of empowerment for Viequens. It is likely that activists will use this identity of themselves as people empowered by their struggle to continue protesting until the Navy has agreed to immediately and permanently leave Vieques. By considering the frames and cultural models used in this struggle, it is possible to more fully understand Vieques activists' convictions about their struggle. Additionally, the analysis presented in this and previous chapters supports the hypotheses examined in this work. Diachronic framing processes explain how some movement issues have changed over time. Conceptualizing these movement issues as discursive phenomena that reflect the interaction of strategic frames and cultural models has proved to be a useful technique for understanding this social movement.

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