THE IMPACT OF THE ACADEMIC PROGRESS RATE (APR) ON LOW RESOURCE OR
NON-BCS INSTITUTIONS AS IT RELATES TO FOOTBALL AND/OR MEN’S
BASKETBALL PROGRAMS

by
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(Under the Direction of Billy Hawkins)

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to research the impact of the NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR) on low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs. This issue is pertinent from an athletic administrative perspective because there is currently a dearth of scholarly research concerning the NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR), and the little research has only been done from a BCS member institutional perspective.

This study focused on the impact of the APR on athletic and academic administrators as it relates only to the two “revenue generating” sports of football and men’s basketball.

In conducting the study, APR scores from 2005-2009 were used, financial information from the “Equity in Athletics” website was collected, and an online survey was sent to 882 athletic and academic administrators at 275 low resource or non-BCS institutions in the United States. A total of 297 participants completed all or a majority of the survey questions for a 33.6%
response rate. Survey responses were analyzed using phenomenological commitments and categorized by identical or similar information, emergent themes, and significant best practices.

The most significant results showed that: 28.83% of the participants believed the impact of the APR on these institutions as it related to football and/or men’s basketball programs were “negative/tremendously negative”. In addition, from this 28.83% of responses, triangulation showed that 67.79% (40) of these participants’ football and/or men’s basketball programs also have had underperforming APR scores and negative profit at some point from 2005-2009. Almost 60% of all academic support personnel said they are more involved with academic improvements and have more work because of APR compliance pressures, there is more pressure on them to help improve APR scores, and their work with men’s basketball programs has greatly increased. Finally, contradictory results within the study implied that not all low resource or non-BCS institutional athletic departments had football and/or men’s basketball programs with BOTH underperforming APR scores and negative net profit, and not all can claim the direct correlation between lack of financial resources and poor APR performance as far as these two sports are concerned.

INDEX OF WORDS: NCAA, Compliance, APR (Academic Progress Rate), Low Resource Institution
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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my incredible wife Emily. Thank you sweetheart for all of the prayer, love, encouragement, and support as I started and finished this two year research and writing adventure. It is neat to see how the Lord brought you into my life when I first started formulating dissertation ideas, and by His grace, He has blessed my life forever with you. I love you Em!
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Many of the intercollegiate athletic programs at NCAA Division I institutions, specifically sports known as “revenue generating sports” such as football and men’s basketball, have in many ways today become a commercialized product sought to generate large amounts of revenue for institutions of higher education, while still promoting an outward appearance of existing as an extracurricular activity serving as part of a “student athletes” holistic college experience. Duderstadt (2000) took this idea further when he wrote how colleges and universities across the United States have sport programs ranging from the varsity level to intramurals, and then they have football and basketball. He went on to say that the former sport entities exist for recreation and serve as a part of the educational mission of schools, whereas football and men’s basketball, in our current culture, serve as commercialized business products catering to fans and television audiences, and operate as profit maximizing entities for athletic departments and universities. Thus, this commercialization of football and men’s basketball at the NCAA Division I level has at times changed the focus from preparing young men to be thoughtful and well educated citizens of this country poised to join the American work force, and instead placed the focus on athletic performance and the illusions of professional sport opportunities sold to many of these young men.

There needs to be a drastic change in direction with intercollegiate football and men’s basketball programs if reformists want to see student athletes take advantage of their educational
opportunities, succeed in school, and grow as men. This drastic change starts with college and university Presidents *wanting* and initiating change, but then specifically the athletic administrators in charge of both the athletic programs and the academic support for these student athletes have to hire effective personnel, implement programs, and mentor these young men so that these student athletes are not just eligible to play, but rather learn to take initiative for their own academic journeys and be taught that success in the classroom will lead to both personal growth and professional opportunity (Duderstadt, 2000). This academic and personal growth stems from keeping student athletes in school, eligible, and pursuing appropriate four year degrees, and the NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR) was instituted to help monitor and accomplish these things.

*NCAA.*

The National Collegiate Athletic Association, or NCAA, is the largest and most influential governing body of intercollegiate athletics in the United States. The NCAA essentially exists to promote fair athletic competition and sportsmanship among amateur athletes, while reinforcing intercollegiate athletics as a part of a student’s overall undergraduate experience (NCAA, 2010). The NCAA is governed by its own member institutions and representatives from these institutions, and the association is divided into three different classifications (Division I, II, III) which choose their own rules and regulations for things such as: academic compliance, athletic competition and practicing, financial aid, recruiting, eligibility, etc.
NCAA Division I.

NCAA Division I is the highest classification of athletics sponsored by the NCAA. Any Division I institution must meet strict criteria for entrance into Division I and comply with the same standards to maintain ongoing membership. Division I institutions must sponsor at least fourteen sports (seven men’s teams and seven women’s teams, or six men’s and eight women’s teams), as well as sponsor at least two team sports (such as football, basketball, volleyball) per gender (NCAA, 2010). In addition, Division I institutions must consistently offer male and female sports that compete in each of the fall, winter, and spring semesters of every year.

In terms of NCAA Division I athletic financial aid requirements, football bowl subdivision (FBS), men’s and women’s basketball, women’s volleyball, women’s gymnastics, and women’s tennis are considered head-count sports, meaning their athletic scholarships are based on one scholarship per person. The rest of the participating sports teams in Division I can take individual full scholarships and divide them into partial scholarships distributed at the discretion of the head coach and athletic department.

In addition, NCAA Division I institutions have the choice between two different subdivisions if they want to sponsor football, and one additional subdivision if they decide to not sponsor football. The following are the subdivisions of NCAA Division I athletics:

Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS).

The first category is the football bowl subdivision, before 2006 known as Division IA football. These programs are members of the BCS post-season format, are required to sponsor a total of sixteen sports at their institution instead of the NCAA minimum of fourteen, and they
must meet certain NCAA attendance standards (such as seating capacities and certain ticket sales) for their football games to be recognized in this category (NCAA, 2010).

*Football Championship Subdivision (FCS).*

The FCS, IAA before 2006, refers to the subdivision which determines their national champion through a playoff of qualifying teams at the end of the football season. This subdivision is also widely recognized by most to be the second tier football subdivision. Relative to the FBS, these programs generate much smaller amounts of revenue and do not receive wide television and media coverage. Thus, due to lack of revenue and often financial hardships, these FCS institutions comprise many of the APR underperforming institutions that are labeled as “low resource or non-BCS institutions” (Moltz, 2010; Forde, 2006).

The third category of Division I institutions are schools that choose to not sponsor football programs. These schools traditionally sponsor other major sports such as men’s and women’s basketball, softball and baseball, gymnastic, men’s and women’s tennis, volleyball, etc. These schools, for the most part, do not receive large amounts of revenue from athletics, and many are often referred to as low resource institutions (Moltz, 2010).

*Bowl Championship Series (BCS).*

The Bowl Championship Series, or BCS is a system for the Football Bowl Subdivision (formerly known as Division IA, and now referred to as FBS) football programs where a “true” national champion can be crowned each year through rankings obtained using a computer system of multiple computer formulas combined with two voting polls (BCS, 2010). The BCS originated in the mid 1990’s when the sports media, fans, and some coaches started to loudly complain how the current voting system (of coaches and media) was not determining a true
national champion. Consequently after a playoff system was rejected, many large and influential institutions decided instead to join with the existing bowl game operators to create a score based ranking system.

The BCS system creates a score to rank the top twenty-five teams in the FBS, starting right after week 7 of the college football season. This scoring system is then used to determine the top ten teams that will play in the five BCS bowl games at the end of the football season, with the top two teams playing in the national championship game. The BCS bowl games are: The Rose Bowl, The Orange Bowl, The Sugar Bowl, The Fiesta Bowl, and the National Championship Game (BCS, 2010).

This is an extremely lucrative system for the football programs that make these BCS games and for the conferences they represent. This is especially true for the large and influential “power six” conferences: the ACC, Big East, Big 10, Big 12, Pac 12, and SEC. These six conferences were the ones who initially pushed for the development of the BCS system, and they usually dominate the college football landscape by placing their teams in the majority of the BCS games each year. Thus, the largest portions of the BCS revenue even go to a smaller percentage of institutions, and end up usually with institutions from the power six conferences. Whereas the rest of the athletic conferences in the BCS hardly ever have one of their member programs make a BCS game and receive the financial windfalls that come with it.

As a result, for the football programs from smaller BCS conferences who do not make these games, or for the Division I athletic departments that do not even sponsor football at all, the reality seems to be that they do not get to benefit from either the lucrative television contracts for the “power six” athletic conferences, or the bowl revenue that is shared in the BCS model.
Consequently, less revenue is present for both of these specific types of athletic departments, which results in less funding for athletic services such as academic support for student athletes.

It is for this very reason that athletic programs who either don’t qualify or don’t participate in the BCS are often lagging in athletic department resources, and one of the main services hit hardest by this lack of resources is academic support because they either cannot hire the personnel needed to tutor and mentor student athletes, or they cannot keep up with the ongoing monitoring, advising, and oversight needed to have strong academic services for student athlete (Associated Press, 2010). Yet the NCAA mandates that all of these schools (those that benefit from the BCS and those that don’t) comply with the same academic standards and meet the same academic progress requirements for their athletes. Thus, the pressure is tremendous for a multitude of athletic departments to accomplish this with low operating resources, and consequently certain departments and programs are starting to fall below the NCAA’s most recent quantifiably driven academic reform measure, the Academic Progress Rate (APR) (Hosick, 2010; Moltz, 2010).

*Academic Progress Rate.*

The Academic Progress Rate, or APR is the latest (first used in 2005) academic measure used by the NCAA to measure scholarship student athletes’ semester by semester academic achievement (NCAA, 2009). It is designed to show educational and athletic administrators, coaches, and support personnel how student athletes are progressing in school based on two main factors: academic eligibility, and retention. In addition, it is supposed to encourage coaches and administrators to recruit student athletes capable of making progress towards a college degree, while at the same time holding athletic departments and the academic services for student
athletes responsible for preparing these student athletes to do well in their classes and keep them enrolled in school (Brown, 2005). It is important to note that this academic measure is only being used for NCAA Division I member institutions, and only applies to scholarship athletes.

The APR formula essentially works as follows. Every term (two terms a year) each scholarship student athlete gets one point for being academically eligible to play sports under NCAA’s standards, and then one point for staying in school at the same institution. The point totals for the year are then added up for each team and divided by the number of points possible. Finally, the number from there is multiplied by one thousand to get a team’s yearly APR score. There have been minor changes recently such as student athletes that transfer to other schools BUT are academically eligible, do not penalize the team they left with a point reduction, thus still earning all the possible points.

From 2005-2011, there were two minimum threshold scores designated by the NCAA that carried certain penalties with them such as scholarship or practice time reductions. A score below 925 (which translates to a 50% graduation success rate or half of a team’s players being eligible and graduating) for any program meant they may face immediate penalty by the NCAA because a player or players were counted as “0 for 2’s” (NCAA, 2011). This meant a player or players were ineligible to play AND also did not return to school, thus decreasing a team’s overall retention and graduation rate. This was only applied when a program scored under 925 and did not retain a player or players. There was also a roughly 10% limit for an immediate penalty that could only be as stiff as 10% of a program’s scholarship allotment, so men’s basketball for example could only lose a maximum of two scholarships in a given year since they may only offer 13 total (NCAA, 2010).
In addition, a score below 900 (which translates to a 40% graduation success rate) for any program meant they faced historical penalties, which carried stiffer consequences from the NCAA towards a program, and got more severe based on the number of years a program had fallen below the 900 score cut line. The historical penalty consequences handed down by the NCAA were as follows:

Programs scoring under 900 in their first year usually received a public reprimand from the NCAA. In the second year, if teams scored under 900 then they may have received practice and scholarship reduction. In a third straight year, a team may have received a post-season ban on competition. Finally, if a fourth straight year below a 900 score took place; the specific team could have their program’s membership restricted by the NCAA (NCAA, 2009).

The APR formula changed in October of 2011 when the NCAA Division I Board of Directors met and voted on stiffer academic requirements and regulations concerning the cut scores and penalty structure of the existing academic measure. The changes as of October 27, 2011 will take effect in the 2012-2013 academic year and are as follows (Hosick, 2011):

a. There will be a two year implementation period before the new academic minimum “benchmark” increases from a score of 900 to 930. This new benchmark will actually do away with the two current APR cut scores of 925 and 900, and only have a 930 APR score as a measuring stick moving forward (Hosick, 2011). In addition, the new 930 cut score will translate out to a 50% Graduate Success Rate (GSR), thereby holding institutions and their sport programs more accountable towards matriculating student athletes and graduating them at a higher percentage.
b. For the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 academic years, there will be two new components for determining post season eligibility for Division I sport programs. First, sport programs can be eligible for post season competition by having a multi-year (four year) average APR score of 900 or greater. Second, sport programs can also achieve the same post season eligibility by having an average APR score of 930 over the two most recent years of their APR data (Hosick, 2011).

c. For the 2014-2015 academic year, the multi year average minimum APR score increases to 930 for a sport program to eligible for post season competition, or a two year average of 940 to be post season eligible (Hosick, 2011).

d. Finally, for the 2015-2016 academic year, the 930 post season competition APR score would be implemented fully into NCAA Division I athletics, along with a new penalty structure (Hosick, 2011).

e. The new three tiered penalty structure approved also by the NCAA Division I Board of Directors now looks like this:

1. In addition to post season ineligibility, for the first year a sport program is under 930, there will be a reduction in allowable practice time each week from 20 hours to 16 hours, and the reduced four hours will instead be used for academic support activities for the specific sport program’s student athletes. “This represents a reduction of hours and one day per week of practice time” (Hosick, 2011).

2. In the second year where a sport program is under the 930 cut score, in addition to being ineligible for post season competition, the sport program will also be subject to
“competition reduction in the traditional or nontraditional season”, which may mean regular season, holiday tournament, or conference game reduction (Hosick, 2011).

3. Finally, if a sport program is under the 930 APR cut score for a third straight year, they will not only continue to be ineligible for post season play, but they will also be susceptible to a variety of actions taken by the NCAA, including: “coaching suspensions, financial aid reductions, and restricted NCAA membership” (Hosick, 2011).

Interestingly enough, while changing the APR minimum threshold scores and adding a new three tiered penalty structure, the NCAA Division I Board of Directors left room for grace for certain low resource or non-BCS institutions including Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU’s). The board declared that while these penalty structures are purposeful and swift, they still will leave room “for some adjustments for teams that improve once they enter the second level of penalties”, and they will be open to giving “special allowances” to certain HBCU’s and other low resource or non-BCS institutions struggling with financial resources and poor academic support (Hosick, 2011). This continues to support the notion that low resource and non-BCS institutions are continuing to be negatively impacted by the universally applied APR measure given their lack of financial resource for academic support services for student athletes.

**Statement of the Problem**

The issue for Division I athletic departments, and specifically football and/or men’s basketball programs, is that effective and successful academic support for student athletes depends on institutions’ financial resources, or the lack thereof. The vast revenue gap among Division I institutions and the means to support specific funding for academic support for student
athletes is increasing, yet the NCAA still holds all Division I athletic programs (whether financially successful or not) to the same academic standards for compliance with the Academic Progress Rate.

This situation compounds the generally existing problem of poor academic preparation for student athletes, and intensifies debate whether it is even possible for low resource or non-BCS institutions, and specifically their football and/or men’s basketball programs, to comply with the same academic standards as BCS institutions (Forde, 2006). Consequently, low resource and non-BCS institutions not only lack the financial means in many cases to have strong academic support programs for their student athletes, but they face great pressures to comply to these academic standards set forth by the NCAA, specifically the Academic Progress Rate (Christy, K., Seifried, C., & Pastore, D. L., 2008; Forde, 2006).

These pressures shift the focus of athletic directors, administrators, and support staff from the quality of their work regarding academic support for football and men’s basketball players AND from the relationship building which is essential to reach these young men, and instead forces them to focus squarely on barely getting by with less. This is the case because these institutions must comply with the APR standards or else they will have possible sanctions, and they know they don’t often have the financial resources or personnel to help their entire student athletes excel academically at a high level. Thus, many choose instead to focus their small amounts of financial resources and personnel on helping these young men stay eligible for athletic competition, instead of having academic eligibility and matriculation be a byproduct of outstanding academic support, mentoring, tutoring, and life skills preparation that often comes with the luxury of more available academic support personnel and larger amounts of financial resources.
Consequently, as Brown (2010, 2005), Hosick (2010), Johnson (2010), Moltz (2010), the
NCAA (2010), Christy (2008, 2007), and Wolverton (2007) recommended based on their
findings and scholarly research (only analyzing BCS member institutions), further research is
needed in investigating the impact of the APR on low resource or non-BCS institutions and their
athletic departments in a multitude of different areas as it relates to the under-performing
“revenue producing” sports of football and men’s basketball.

**Need for the Study**

As Forde (2006) first predicted, and as the NCAA (2011, 2010) has admitted recently,
low resource and non-BCS institutions are literally not measuring up to the NCAA Academic
Progress Rate (APR) standards, due largely to the lack of availability of financial resources to
put towards academic support services for student athletes (Hosick, 2010). The primary sport
programs that are affected at these specific institutions are football and men’s basketball, and
these sport programs and their student athletes are suffering with very little hope of quickly
changing this problem (NCAA, 2011, 2010; Powell, 2009).

Consequently, as Christy (2008) recommended based on his preliminary research (only
analyzing BCS member institutions), further research is needed in investigating the impact of the
APR on low resource or non-BCS athletic departments holistically as it relates to their football
and/or men’s basketball programs given their generally tough financial situations and
underachieving academic track records.

In addition, Castle’s (2010) research on individual Director of Football Operations
personnel, and Christy’s (2008) research on individual athletic administrators, coaches, and
faculty athletic representatives, all at BCS member or FBS affiliated institutions, suggested that
research was also needed to gauge how these certain pressures affect the individual positions of: athletic directors, athletic administrators, athletic academic support staff, and faculty athletic representatives as they work with football and/or men’s basketball programs at under-researched low resource or non-BCS institutions.

Research is also needed to confirm Castle (2010), Johnson (2010), Wolverton (2007), and Brown’s (2005) arguments that the APR has undoubtedly impacted the type of student athlete that BCS member, FBS affiliated, and low resource or non-BCS institutions and their athletic departments recruit, and that the recruiting strategies involved in this process have changed. Specifically, Castle (2010), when analyzing the impact of the APR on BCS member or FBS affiliated football programs, stated that “45.6% of BCS member and FBS affiliated programs changed their recruiting strategy”, and “64.1% of these same football programs were slightly less, less, or extremely less likely to recruit academically challenged prospects” (p. vii). Thus, research is needed to test the credibility of these scholars’ beliefs, to apply their findings to low resource and non-BCS institutions, and truly see if the APR is not only impacting athletic departments and individual positions, but also the recruiting philosophies and strategies of these low resource and non-BCS athletic departments (that are under-researched). This will then show if the APR is having a great influence on what type of student athlete these specific institutions are now recruiting.

Additionally, research is needed to analyze and identify the positive changes or best practices that have been, or are being, implemented by athletic departments regarding compliance with the APR concerning the revenue generating sports of football and/or men’s basketball programs. The impetus for additional research stems from the comments of: Brown (2010), Hosick (2010), Moltz (2010), the NCAA (2010), and Rosen (2010) as they all pointed
out various ways that low resource or non-BCS institutions are working to improve their APR scores, and how they are being creative in designing academic improvement plans that meet mandated NCAA goals for APR increases. If one can analyze and capture best practices for APR improvement, then the creative ideas and improvement plans can be shared with other institutions in similar situations so that more athletic departments can benefit.

Finally, based on Castle’s (2010) research that showed “75.7% of BCS member and FBS affiliated athletic departments have increased either the amount of money or resources to their academic budgets because of the APR legislation” (p. vii), as well as Christy’s (2007) recommendation for additional study into athletic administrative financial issues, research is also needed to see where these under-researched athletic departments are spending their net profits (if applicable). In addition, related factors for research are whether a portion or all of their net profits are being put back into academic support for student athletes, and whether their APR scores reflect additional financial support.

These needs exist because thus far the relatively small amount of scholarly research regarding the APR has been generated from BCS institutions’ perspectives. Low resource and non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments and specifically their revenue generating sports (football and basketball) must be analyzed and evaluated in regards to their APR compliance if other institutions with similar financial and academic problems want to ever learn how to improve in these areas (Castle, 2010; Christy, 2007).

Thus, this research study covers a scholarly need for new research, as well as a practitioner need in that the governing body of intercollegiate athletics (the NCAA), sports scholars and writers, institutional Presidents, athletic directors, and athletic departments have all
been outspoken in their belief that low resource and non-BCS institutions are failing in APR compliance. Consequently, finances must be examined and best practices shared if any of these athletic departments and their football and/or men’s basketball programs are going to improve their academic situations.

**Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of this research study is to evaluate and examine the impact of the Academic Progress Rate (APR) on low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs in light of the five research areas: athletic departments, individual positions, recruiting, potential APR compliance best practices, and possible net profit. The study is based on an interest in athletic administrative leadership, and analyzes the most significant NCAA academic reform measure to date (the APR) in order to see how it impacts athletic departments, athletic administrators, and faculty athletic representatives at low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to their direct work or involvement with the “revenue generating” sports of football and/or men’s basketball. Consequently, based largely on the research and recommendations of Dr. Keith Christy (2008, 2007), as well as indirectly from Dr. Josh Castle’s (2010) research, this study was thus created.

As Patton (2002) pointed out, summative evaluation research measures the overall effectiveness of a program or entity, and speaks on whether the processes equal the outcomes that are desired and expected. In the same manner, this research study is a summative evaluation in that the Academic Progress Rate is evaluated by its’ impact on these low resource or non-BCS athletic departments, how it affects athletic directors and athletic administrators in their specific positions, how it impacts the recruiting philosophy regarding student athletes at these
institutions, how it has possibly brought on positive NCAA compliance implementation measures for these athletic departments, and how it affects the financial bottom lines of these athletic departments and whether net profits (if applicable) are being used to help comply with the APR.

Thus, this specific summative evaluation study researches the impact of the APR on these specific institutions, but also whether the pressures of APR compliance produce improved outcomes for academic support services for these specific student athletes in football and men’s basketball.

**Research Questions and Goals for the Study:**

The specific research questions are as follows, and the goals of this research study are expounded upon below under their appropriate research question:

**RQ1:** How has the APR impacted low resource or non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments as it relates to football and/ or men’s basketball?

**RQ2:** How have the pressures of complying with the APR affected one’s direct work or involvement with the football and/ or men’s basketball program?

**RQ3:** How has the APR impacted the type of student athlete your coaches now recruit?

**RQ4:** What are any positive changes in implementation measures for academic support concerning football and/ or men’s basketball that resulted from the pressures of APR compliance?
RQ5: Where are low resource or non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments spending their net profit (if applicable), and is a portion or all of the net profit being put back into academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball student athletes?

RQ1: How has the APR impacted low resource or non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball?

This first research question serves as the backbone for the whole research study, and the idea for this question (and research study) comes directly from Dr. Keith Christy’s work (2008, 2007) in analyzing the impact of the APR on BCS member institutions and their athletic administrators and coaches, and indirectly from Dr. Josh Castle’s work (2010) in investigating the impact of the APR on football programs of BCS member or FBS affiliated institutions. The goal of this question is to invert what Christy (2008, 2007) has done, and illuminate the impact of a major NCAA compliance measure (APR) on a section of low resource or non-BCS Division I institutions’ football and men’s basketball programs that are both (scholarly) under researched and (practitioner wise) are failing from an athletic administrative perspective to meet minimum APR compliance cut scores (Christy, 2007). In addition, this research question also compiles individuals’ responses regarding their athletic departments as a whole, and may possibly generate new and insightful information holistically that would otherwise not come to light if the respondents were only asked about the impact on their specific positions.
RQ2: How have the pressures of complying with the APR affected one’s direct work or involvement with the football and/or men’s basketball program?

This second research question also stems from Castle’s (2010) and Christy’s (2008) studies specifically analyzing the impact of the APR on individual athletic and academic administrators at BCS member or FBS affiliated institutions. This question uses the idea of analyzing individual job positions, and seeks to specifically address the pressures of APR compliance on athletic directors, athletic administrators (such as assistant athletic directors, senior woman administrators, compliance directors, and academic support service directors), as well as faculty athletic representatives. The goal of this question is to understand the various outcomes of how APR compliance pressures affect different athletic administrative positions, and to illuminate the different levels of pressures that different job positions undertake when dealing with or overseeing APR compliance.

RQ3: How has the APR impacted the type of student athlete your coaches now recruit?

This third research question stems from the comments of Castle (2010), Johnson (2010), Wolverton (2007), and Brown (2005) which stated that athletic administrators and coaches are and always should be concerned with what type of student athlete their institutions are recruiting, and these student athletes should always be men and women capable of succeeding academically and matriculating towards a college degree. Castle (2010), Wolverton (2007) and Brown (2005) went on say that with the implementation of the APR, coaches and athletic administrators can no longer afford (due to the current NCAA penalty structure) to recruit and take chances on academically risky prospective student athletes. Consequently, the APR and its’ impact are and should be influencing athletic directors and coaches to only recruit student athletes with proven
track records of being able to stay academically eligible and retained in school. Thus, this question seeks to draw this information out in a more specific way to see if the impact of the APR is indeed affecting who is being recruited, and whether this “new accountability” for athletic administrators and coaches is really present at the under-researched low resource and non-BCS institutions.

**RQ4:** What are any positive changes in implementation measures for academic support concerning football and/or men’s basketball that resulted from the pressures of APR compliance?

This fourth research question is the most positive and potentially helpful question of this research study, and the goals for this question are to actually help other low resource or non-BCS institutions better handle the pressures of the APR, and implement new and positive changes towards improved APR compliance. The idea for this question stems from the comments of Brown (2010), Hosick (2010), Moltz (2010), the NCAA (2010), and Rosen (2010) in that all of these scholars or writers laid out how low resource or non-BCS institutions were struggling with APR compliance, yet trying to come up with creative and cost effective ways and new best practices to improve academic support for football and men’s basketball programs. Thus, this question essentially serves as both a gathering tool of positive change implementation measures towards APR compliance, as well as a sharing model of these best practices so that other colleges and universities negatively affected by the APR can learn to possibly improve their specific situations.
RQ5: Where are low resource or non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments spending their net profit (if applicable), and is a portion or all of the net profit being put back into academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball student athletes?

Finally, this last research question seeks to tie in all three types of data (survey responses, APR scores, and institutional financial information) by asking the various athletic directors, athletic administrators, and faculty athletic representatives: if they do turn a net profit athletically, and if so, where is the net profit being spent, and is it being spent on academic support services for student athletes in underperforming APR sport programs such as football and/or men’s basketball? This question derives from Castle’s (2010) research which showed that “75.7% of BCS member and FBS affiliated athletic departments had increased either money or resources to their academic budgets because of the APR legislation”, as well as Christy’s (2007) recommendation for further research into the financial issues of intercollegiate athletic departments as it ties into possible academic reform. Christy (2007) cited coaching salaries as just one of many financial variables that may affect or take away from academic reform and academic support services, but finding out where net profit (if applicable) is being spent will not only shed light on where the money is going, but also what is truly being valued within these low resource or non-BCS athletic departments.

Consequently, the goal of this final question is to first compile responses of whether any of these low resource or non-BCS institutions do actually turn a net profit, and if they do, find out where they spend their money, and if their academic support services and football and/or men’s basketball APR scores reflect that financial support. It also helps fill a void in the lack of athletic administrative financial research at low resource or non-BCS institutions based on the recommendations of Dr. Keith Christy in his previous APR research study (2007).
Significance of the Study

The significance of this study relates directly back to NCAA admittances in June of 2011 and 2010 that low resource and non-BCS institutions are having significant problems with APR compliance concerning football and men’s basketball (NCAA, 2011; Hosick, 2009). These NCAA Division I institutions that are either FCS members or do not sponsor football, currently as a whole, do not have the financial resources to maintain strong academic support programs for their student athletes or comply with the current APR standards, and consequently many of their student athletes are suffering. Student athletes from the revenue generating sports of football and men’s basketball are particularly suffering since these young men are being asked to participate in grueling and demanding practice and travel schedules, but they are not adequately being mentored and taught to excel in their classes, or sufficiently helped in making progress towards degrees and becoming men in the American work force. These demands and struggles definitely existed before the APR was in place, but since these pressures affect student athletes’ eligibility and retention, they now directly affect programs’ APR scores as well.

In addition, based on my review of the literature, all of the scholarly research in this field to date (which is little) has been done from the perspective of BCS member institutions or institutions from FBS conferences that generally have greater financial resources to maintain strong academic support programs (Castle, 2010; Christy, K., Seifried, C., & Pastore, D. L., 2008; Christy, 2007). This includes Dr. Keith Christy’s research study on the impact of the APR on athletic departments of BCS member institutions, as well as Dr. Josh Castle’s study on the impact of the APR on football programs at BCS member institutions and FBS programs (Castle, 2010; Castle & Barnes, 2010; Christy, 2007). Thus, even from a scholarly standpoint, the voices of the “have-nots” are continuing to be drowned out (Forde, 2006).
Consequently, the outcome of this study seeks to help low resource and non-BCS institutions understand how to improve their academic support for football and men’s basketball programs by first shedding light on the impact of the APR on these very athletic departments as it relates to these specific sports. One cannot know where to start in initiating change unless the impact of something is known and analyzed.

In addition, by researching and analyzing the pressures faced by athletic departments as it relates to APR issues for football and men’s basketball, athletic department leaders at low resource and non-BCS institutions will hopefully be able to first identify and then work to minimize these very pressures that plague progress in helping these young men succeed in the classroom and in life.

Finally, the last and possibly greatest significance of this study is for these low resource and non-BCS institutions to learn from their peers on how to handle these pressures better, how to focus in their academic support to better serve the needs of the very student athletes who are performing the worst, and to learn how to efficiently maximize the scarce resources these institutions have in order to more successfully implement positive academic support measures to increase academic productivity among football and men’s basketball programs.

**Limitations**

There were a few known limitations with this study. The first limitation was that this study only researches the APR and its pressures as it relates to football and men’s basketball at low resource or non-BCS institutions, and there are other APR under-performing sports at many of these same institutions such as baseball that are not included in this study. Football and men’s
basketball are chosen as revenue generating sports that have stark APR under performance, but other sports could be chosen as well.

A second limitation is that this study does not research or examine coaches’ opinions or perceptions about any of the previously mentioned issues. The purpose here is that this research is purely from an athletic administrative or departmental leadership perspective, but I do acknowledge that coaches may too have potentially significant insights into these issues.

Other methodological limitations are mentioned in greater detail in Chapter Three of this research study.

**Operational Definitions**

*National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).*

The NCAA is the dominant governing body of intercollegiate athletics in the United States of America, and is comprised of three different divisions or classifications of sport programs: Division I, II, and III. The NCAA is used in this research as the sole regulating body for Division I athletic competition, and specifically for the revenue generating sports of football and men’s basketball.

*NCAA Division I.*

This is the highest classification of NCAA sport programs and these programs typically generate the largest amounts of revenue in college sports, get the most media attention, and have the largest fan bases and national audiences. For this research study, the revenue generating sports of football and men’s basketball are the only Division I sport programs being analyzed.
Revenue Generating Sport Programs.

The NCAA Division I sports of football and men’s basketball are often referred to as “revenue generating” sports in that they have the highest fan attendance numbers and ticket demands, they generate the most lucrative and longest term television, radio, and media contracts, have the highest paid coaches on average, and often generate enough revenue for athletic departments to cover not only the costs of those programs, but the costs of other sponsored sports as well.

Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS).

This refers to the highest subdivision of NCAA Division I institutions and athletic departments that choose to sponsor football. These institutions have to meet strict requirements for sport sponsorship, fan attendance, and financial aid allotment, in addition to the benefit of being a part of the Bowl Championship Series. Larger state and private institutions are often associated with the Football Bowl Subdivision system.

Bowl Championship Series (BCS).

The Bowl Championship Series, or BCS is the FBS post season format to determine a “true” national champion, with the majority of the highest ranked teams playing in the five BCS games. The revenue from these games, in addition to the revenue from media contracts is shared annually among qualifying institutions’ athletic departments and their respective conference members.
Football Championship Subdivision (FCS).

This category refers to the subdivision that used to be known as Division IAA, and is comprised of smaller, lower revenue generating football programs who determine their national champion through a playoff of qualifying teams at the end of the football season.

Low Resource or Non-BCS Institutions.

The NCAA defines these types of institutions as: “institutions whose athletic departments spend in the bottom ten percent per capita on their athletes and also have high Pell Grant eligibility”, as Football Championship Subdivision (FCS) institutions whose football programs are not part of the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS), and thus would never qualify for a BCS bowl game or have the opportunity to share in BCS revenue sharing agreements, or as non-BCS member institutions that do not sponsor football at all (Moltz, 2010). For this research study, low resource or non-BCS institutions were categorized using the above criteria, and used for the purpose of analyzing the impact of the APR on their athletic departments as it related to their football and/or men’s basketball programs.

Athletic Directors and Athletic Administrators.

Athletic Directors refer to the top decision makers in NCAA Division I athletic departments, who typically report to presidents and chancellors of colleges or universities, and are responsible for the daily operation of the athletic department and implementation of all athletic policies and programs.

Athletic administrators, such as senior woman administrators, associate or assistant athletic directors, or athletic support personnel are also surveyed in this research. These positions
usually oversee branches of the athletic department such as: business operations, NCAA compliance, facilities, game operations, sports media information, and academic support for student athletes among other things. This group refers only to senior women administrators, athletic administrators and athletic support personnel in charge of or involved with academic support and student services for student athletes.

*Faculty Athletic Representatives.*

For this research, faculty athletic representatives refer to full time faculty at low resource or non-BCS institutions that are appointed by presidents or chancellors, and serve as independent liaisons between the athletic departments, the faculty, and presidents/chancellors.

*Student Athletes.*

For the purpose of this study, student athletes refer to the undergraduate students who participate in football and/or men’s basketball at NCAA Division I, low resource or non-BCS institutions.

*Academic Progress Rate (APR).*

The Academic Progress Rate, or APR is the NCAA created academic measure, first used in 2005, to evaluate all NCAA Division I student athlete’s annual eligibility and retention. For the purposes of this study, the APR will be analyzed and evaluated for NCAA Division I low resource and non-BCS athletic institutions’ football and/or men’s basketball programs.
Chapter Summary

There is a vast difference between the academic support programs for student athletes at FBS institutions compared to low resource or non-BCS institutions. This vast difference specifically shows itself with the sports of football and men’s basketball at these low resource or non-BCS institutions, and largely due to lack of financial resources, these specific men’s programs are failing at maintaining NCAA compliance as it relates to the measures outlined for the NCAA Academic Progress Rate. These specific programs and their respective athletic departments on a whole cannot afford to provide the staff and institutional support needed to maintain APR requirements, thus football and men’s basketball at these schools are often struggling academically due to their inability to meet these certain NCAA standards. These low resource and non-BCS institutions can learn from each other on how to effectively handle the pressures associated with NCAA and APR compliance, and by examining successful and efficient programs among a few institutions; the hope then is that many institutions can learn to more efficiently use the little that they have to help a large number of young men in football and basketball.
CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Introduction

The nature of college sports today might be best captured as follows: There are sports at the varsity, club, intramural levels, and then there are football and basketball. The former provide valuable educational and recreational experiences for many students. The latter have become entertainment businesses largely designed to satisfy the appetite of the spectator and television viewer, while maximizing financial returns from the commercial marketplace. (Duderstadt, 2000, p. 45)

This chapter provides a review of literature that starts by addressing the literature that discusses current need for reform in intercollegiate athletics, especially in the “revenue generating sports” of football and men’s basketball. The direct effect of reform on athletic administration leaders, compliance personnel, and academic support personnel is reviewed since their jobs and duties are shaped by the institutional parameters for intercollegiate athletics set forth by institutional Presidents and the NCAA. This review is followed by an historical outline and discussion of the NCAA and all major reform documents in intercollegiate athletics over the last one hundred and ten years, the themes and events associated with reform, and the role of key groups and specific institutions in intercollegiate athletics. Finally, this chapter will conclude with the history of the NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR) and specific details of the APR as the newest NCAA academic reform measure to date.
Reforming Athletics- Why it is Needed

We can have sane and sensible athletics in an intellectually stimulating and educationally sound academic environment. It will take effort and dedication, but the times call for a solution to the abuses we have seen in intercollegiate athletic (Childs, 1987, p. 38)

Vast literature suggests that in the current intercollegiate athletic climate, (especially at Division I institutions where revenue producing sports such as football and men’s basketball dominate headlines and the popularity) reform is needed. This reform is not simply a tweaking of certain rules or fine tuning policies, but rather, as scholars point out, this needed reform must be an awakening call to the academic community and their institutions for them to reshuffle their priorities and reestablish the primacy of academic pursuit and intellectual excellence over athletic accomplishments. NCAA President Mark Emmert illustrated this point well when he says: “It’s time for creative solutions to the significant issues facing intercollegiate athletics. In order to protect student-athlete success, the collegiate model, amateurism, and competitive equity, there must be substantive change to the enterprise” (Vincent, 2011, para. 14).

One creative and relatively new solution for dealing with problems of academic eligibility and retention was the NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR), adopted first in 2005 and used to gauge yearly academic progress for all Division I scholarship student athletes (NCAA, 2011). The APR was instituted largely because certain student athletes at the NCAA Division I level were not maintaining their academic eligibility, were transferring while academically ineligible, and were not making adequate progress towards graduation (NCAA, 2010; Lapchick, Lopresti, & Reshard, 2009; Hayes, 2005). Many of these issues regarding transferring, academic ineligibility, and lack of interest in matriculation often stem from
commercialistic influences in intercollegiate athletics and a primacy of athletic notoriety and success over education and personal growth (Duderstadt, 2000).

Jones (2010) addressed this effectively when he talks about how often education for the student athletes is viewed as something that fits around football or other sports, and consequently gets not only neglected in terms of attention, but gets relegated or entirely removed in terms of importance. He proceeds to write how in theory, athletes trade their talents for an education at Division I institutions, but so often their sports end up taking the majority of their time and energy, thus their educational pursuits get placed on the back burner or vanish altogether. Yost (2010) and Kurpius and Rose (1982) illustrated how it is the institution’s responsibility to not only bring athletes in as students, but to feel a strong sense of duty in placing them in academic situations and with academic tutoring where they can not only get by, but thrive academically, and ultimately graduate with a hard-earned degree and a sense of accomplishment. However, in many cases, athletics and academics are separate at the majority of Division I institutions. Coaches often, with no thought to academic preparedness, recruit high school athletes who do not even work with the admissions offices or college counselors, and if admitted, are often unprepared for the rigors of college coursework due to many factors including poor academic performance and unpreparedness dating back to high school (Turner & Wharton, 2007; Sperber, 2004; Shulman & Bowen, 2001; Peltier, Laden, & Matranga, 1999). All the while, athletic departments and individual sport programs benefit because they bring in highly skilled athletes who add talent for winning purposes, even though these athletes may be educationally disadvantaged, or not capable of doing the required academic work (Splitt, 2006; Howe, 1987).

This is especially true in revenue producing sports such as football and men’s basketball, where incoming student-athletes, as well as matriculating student-athletes, have been found to
have lower entrance scores, cognitive ability scores, and lower levels of writing and critical thinking skills (Pascarella, Truckenmiller, Nora, Terenzini, Edison, & Hagedorn, 1999; Purdy, Eitzen, & Hufnagel, 1982). In addition, Division I male athletes as a whole have been found to have less “educational or collaborative learning activities” or opportunities compared to male student athletes at smaller athletic institutions such as Division III institutions (Umbach, Palmer, Kuh, & Hannah, 2006, p. 720).

The majority of student athletes in revenue producing sports are African American males who come from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds, and consequently are more likely to be unprepared for rigorous college coursework due to a variety of factors, including: “lower levels of parental education, family income, and lower educational tracking at early stages of development” (Upthegrove, Roscigno, & Charles, 1999, p. 721). Literature has shown that these factors and many more are extremely important in terms of academic preparation and achievement. Especially parental education and family background, which has a dramatic affect on both study habits and student achievement (Camp, 1990). In addition, African American males, especially in revenue producing sports such as football and men’s basketball, often feel isolated on college campuses and feel they only fit into a “sport culture” with other athletes, especially on large, predominately white campuses (Hawkins, 2010; Rhoden, 1990).

Furthermore, McCormick and McCormick (2006) argued that many admitted athletes are more suitably characterized as essentially working for academic institutions as athletic employees instead of students, because in the admissions process their academic backgrounds were not analyzed, and their current academic pursuits are not emphasized. In addition, many of these athletes are used to promote the growing commercialism and big business of intercollegiate athletics by participating in revenue producing sports and contributing to the widening divide
between the academic community and the athletic department (Bowen & Levin, 2003; Duderstadt, 2000). Consequently, some scholars have even gone so far as to suggest that Division I institutions who sponsor football and men’s basketball should actually hire these young men officially in the same manner as they hire faculty and staff, and keep their situations separate from traditional students and other student-athletes in non revenue producing sports (Simon, Barloon, Harrington, & Baker, 1987).

So who is responsible for this negative trend of division, and who can reform and change this trend? Well the answers to both questions, according to much of the literature, are the academic institutions’ Presidents (Thelin, 2002; England & Knight, 1982). Sack (2001) argued that sport as a commercialized big business could have never entered the academic realm without institutional Presidents welcoming it with open arms. Since Presidents have always been looking for ways to generate more student support for institutions while trying to raise college and university revenues, and as sports popularity and television viewership grew, they saw the opportunity to do both by emphasizing the importance of intercollegiate athletics while still using the rhetoric of how academic importance is paramount (Odenkirk, 1981). In addition, it is often thought that athletic success can bring more prominence to colleges and universities, which can in turn (and literature shows a positive correlation) result in increased student application rates for academic institutions and help Presidents justify their athletic support (Toma & Cross, 1998; McCormick & Tinsley, 1987).

But, Duderstadt (2000) pointed out the rub here in that according to the NCAA, institutional Presidents are to be the sole persons responsible for institutional control of intercollegiate athletics and academic integrity within athletics, yet they often end up looking like hypocrites by emphasizing academic integrity, but quietly they are more concerned with
fiscal responsibility and increased revenues. Even though as Presidents fully know, the majority of intercollegiate athletic programs and athletic departments lose money individually and collectively for their academic institutions (Thelin, 1996).

Then, there are situations as Sperber (2000) pointed out where intercollegiate athletics simply serve as “all consuming diversions” from the academic goals of Presidents (p. 23), and the only positives experiences Presidents enjoy from intercollegiate athletics is when programs win, compared to the greater negatives Presidents have to endure when there is public confrontation with athletic directors and coaches, or academic scandal (Howe, 1987; Cramer, 1986). Regardless, the literature suggested that it was the Presidents who opened the door for intercollegiate athletics on college and university campuses, it was the same Presidents who helped make sports such as football and men’s basketball commercialized businesses on the Division I level, and it will have to be Presidents working as one to reign in the growing monster of intercollegiate athletics (football and men’s basketball in particular) and re-connect it to the academic missions of institutions (Duderstadt, 2000; Childs, 1987; Cramer 1986; Hanford, 1979). But, the literature does recognize that if intercollegiate athletics can be reformed, it can continue to be valuable as a unifying tool for institutions of general and higher education in the United States (Brand, 2006; Bowen & Levin, 2003; Sack, 2001; Duderstadt, 2000; Knight Foundation, 1991; Staffo, 1991; Childs, 1987; Gardner, 1960). Bowen and Levin (2003) articulated this when they wrote how intercollegiate athletics, when governed properly, can teach valuable lessons for personal maturity and character, prepare young people for leadership roles on campus and in life, build campus spirit and community, generate goodwill among both alumni and surrounding residents, as well as garner positive institutional publicity and notoriety.
The History of the NCAA

Thus, at its founding, the NCAA was not much different from other existing conferences, though it explicitly sought to influence national practices, rather than solely local ones (Stern, 1979, p. 247)

Background.

The idea for the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) originated in 1906 by President Theodore Roosevelt based on his concerns for the brutality of and potential for injury from the game of football (McCormick & McCormick, 2008; Duderstadt, 2000). Roosevelt wanted an association to oversee the safety of football and other intercollegiate athletic contests, but he also wanted an official body to represent and defend the idea of amateurism in intercollegiate athletics, and thus in 1910 (when thirty eight schools officially founded the NCAA) the NCAA quickly found that its’ main goal was preserving amateur values and fighting off the influences of people who wanted to pay student athletes for athletic participation (Stern, 1979). In addition, it has publicly taken a consistent stand against paying student athletes and preserving the amateur aspects of intercollegiate athletics largely because the amateur aspects of intercollegiate athletics should be interwoven with the academic missions of institutions of higher education (The Yale Law Journal, 1978). And to date, the NCAA states that its’ basic purpose is to maintain intercollegiate athletics and the student athlete as an integral part of member institution’s academic missions, and to help maintain a clear line between amateur and professional sports (NCAA, 2010).

The first significant change for the NCAA happened in 1952 when member institutions voted to give the NCAA the right to control intercollegiate athletics through rule making and sanctioning, thus making it an incredibly powerful vehicle for control and influence within the
sphere of intercollegiate athletics (Stern, 1979). Although the control of the NCAA and intercollegiate athletics has since shifted to its member institutions Presidents as of 1996, the NCAA still has maintained incredible power and authority over intercollegiate athletics, due in large part to its ability to adapt and grow as a result of ongoing revenue from overseeing men’s basketball, including the new fourteen year, eleven billion dollar financial windfall they receive from CBS and Turner Broadcasting for the exclusive right to broadcast the NCAA Men’s Basketball tournament (Hiestand, 2010). Consequently, from 1952 to the present day, the NCAA in different ways has grown in size, increased its revenue and media presence, and strengthened its control over intercollegiate athletics from a sports perspective, as well as the academic and eligibility sides of intercollegiate athletics.

More specifically, the NCAA has tried fervently over the last fifty years or so to make academic reforms to intercollegiate athletics, even though many scholars and critics accuse the NCAA of great hypocrisy in that they say they care about students being academically eligible and receiving college degrees, yet they practice profit maximizing and commercialistic practices akin to professional sport leagues (McCormick & McCormick, 2008; Zimbalist, 1999; Sperber, 1991; Baxter and Lambert, 1990). Sperber (1991) even went so far as to say that the NCAA is a cartel that practices “price fixing” against student athletes by allowing them to be eligible under certain standards to play intercollegiate athletics, but does not pay the student athletes as “workers”, rather they just financially benefit from them in a form of exploitation. Regardless, whether the NCAA is genuine or hypocritical, it has gone to great lengths, and spent large amounts of money to “publicly” show support for academic reform, greater academic requirements for student athletes, and stricter eligibility compliance for intercollegiate programs and their athletes.
Academic Reform in Intercollegiate Athletics

1898 - Reform Act.

This first reform movement in intercollegiate athletics originated with eight northeastern colleges holding the Conference on College Athletic Reform, in which the conference committee members recommended that student athletes be traditional students and not paid for their athletic services (Christy, 2007). In addition, the committee recommended that student athletes must be academically eligible to play sports based on appropriate academic standing with institutions, and the committee also had foresight into potential commercialistic pressures when they recommended that athletic departments not seek to make profit from ticket sales at sporting events.

1929 - Savage Report.

On October 24, 1929, Howard Savage and other colleagues published a report which was funded by the Carnegie Foundation, and served as a more in depth follow up study to Savage’s “Twenty College Report” in 1925 (Thelin, 1996). The 1929 Savage Report reemphasized the principle that intercollegiate athletics fell at the doorstep of institutional Presidents, and that abuses and scandal (such as admission abuses and violations of amateur ideals) in intercollegiate athletics were growing, thus causing institutional and societal concern (Hanford, 1979; Savage, Bentley, McGovern, & Smiley, 1929). So much in fact, that the 1929 report was commissioned by the Carnegie Foundation based on the request of the NCAA to “make an investigation of the whole question of intercollegiate athletics and its relation to modern education” (Thelin, 1996, ).

The report (based on three years of research) was specifically designed to flesh out and analyze the key principles of intercollegiate athletics in the United States, and to understand
them within the context of American college and university life (Thelin, 1996). With the ultimate goal of presenting their findings in a report that highlighted and weighed the merits and negative aspects of intercollegiate athletics, as well as recommend reform changes to intercollegiate athletics to better fit it with the educational ideals of higher education (Savage, Bentley, McGovern, & Smiley, 1929).

Two highlighted aspects within the report that still resonate today were institutional relationships with graduates and alumni (boosters as they are often known now), and the newspaper media causing the commercialistic growth of intercollegiate athletics by the amounts of coverage and press it gave (Savage, Bentley, McGovern, & Smiley, 1929). Savage believed these relationships with alumni and “friends” of the programs would lead to more corruption and extra benefit abuses for athletes, and he also foresaw a situation (which we have today) in which college athletics would drift away from their institutions in large part to media coverage that is similar to the coverage of professional sport teams.

There were many recommendations and reform changes that Savage and his colleagues proposed, including administrative control of intercollegiate athletics being turned over to the students themselves, but the major theme of the report was a cry against commercialism in intercollegiate athletics, and a call for institutional Presidents to take control of the situation and bring amateur ideals and principles back into the fabric of college athletics (Thelin, 1996; Hanford, 1979).

While this report did very little in actuality to reform intercollegiate athletics at that point in time, it did garner lots of attention (and controversy), and was able to bring to light the growing commercialistic nature of intercollegiate athletics on a national scale for the first time in
American history (Christy, 2007; Hanford, 1979). Thus, it is deemed as the canon for intercollegiate athletic and academic reform.

1948 - Sanity Code.

As the 1930’s went and the 1940’s and WWII came, intercollegiate athletics unfortunately made little to no progress towards reform, and definitely did not heed the calls for reform outlined in the Savage Report. On the contrary, as interest in sports on the radio grew, combined with post WWII soldiers going to college via the GI Bill, intercollegiate athletics only grew by popularity and participation (Thelin, 1996). In addition, the pressure to win at all costs, radio contracts for intercollegiate athletics, and state school sizes only increased, thus also increasing concern by groups such as the Carnegie Foundation, and the NCAA as the governing body of athletics.

The NCAA and its member institutions agreed at their annual convention in 1948 to establish clear and specific principles and guidelines for everything from amateur principles and recruiting regulations, to statements on institutional control, universal admissions and academic standards for general students as well as students athletes, the awarding of financial aid regardless of a student’s athletic ability, and the primacy of putting students first (Christy, 2007; Brown, 1999; Thelin, 1996). This resulting document was officially titled “Principles for the Conduct of Intercollegiate Athletics”, but became known as the Sanity Code, since it was in essence an honor code by which member institutions would operate by in conducting their intercollegiate athletic programs (Thelin, 1996). The Sanity Code was very important in that it was a landmark act by the NCAA because it gave the NCAA the theoretical power to sanction student athletes and institutions if they did not abide by the stated guidelines of the legislation,
but in reality, too many schools used rhetoric of support for the legislation, yet still practiced unethical recruiting and admission procedures, thus creating large inconsistencies amongst the member institutions. Consequently, the NCAA at that time did not have enough support staff or money to enforce all of these principles on their own, and consequently two years later, in 1950, there was a vote of no confidence for the Sanity Code and it was subsequently abolished (Christy, 2007).

1952- ACE Committee.

Since the Savage Report in 1929, intercollegiate athletics had continued to grow in popularity, in commercialistic natures of profit generation and media promotion, and in the number of academic and recruitment scandals. Thus, intercollegiate athletics programs were only continuing to grow in scale and in distance from the academic institutions they represented, and consequently, the academic community was rocked again in 1951 when two different scandals broke at major universities.

The first scandal involved seven different universities (including the prominent basketball program of University of Kentucky) and specific basketball players linked to a New York City gambling ring and point shaving actions. The second scandal involved an academic cheating scandal at prestigious West Point Military Academy involving over 90 cadets (Christy, 2007). In response to these scandals, as well as the past abuses in intercollegiate athletics, the American Council on Education (ACE) convened with a small executive committee to discuss what changes could be recommended to both the NCAA and institutions of higher education (Thelin, 1996).
In 1952, the ACE committee published the “President’s Report”, which addressed the continuous and growing number of scandals in intercollegiate athletics, and specifically in the sports of football and basketball. They expressed concern for the direction of these sports and how they were directly tied to revenue generation, and among other things, the report called for action by academic institutional Presidents to work together in reducing the importance of intercollegiate athletics on college and university campuses. The report also called for eliminating spring football practice, college football bowl games, and post-season championships, in addition to reforming recruiting guidelines (Christy, 2007; Thelin, 1996; Hanford, 1979).

The 1952 report did at least bring Presidents together in continuing to dialogue about the abuses in intercollegiate athletics, but by and large, the report generated little national interest or action, and thus little changed regarding intercollegiate athletic reform during this time (Christy, 2007). Rather, the only significant event during this time was the creation of the “full ride” athletic scholarship which started in college football, and paid for “all commonly accepted educational expenses” (Duderstadt, 2000). This accepted form of financial aid spread over time to many more varsity sports on the college level, and ultimately has led to many believing that student athletes are athletes first because their financial attachments to their institutions revolve around intercollegiate athletics.

1964 Predictor Scale (Rule).

At the end of 1964 and in the early part of 1965, there was a growing concern by the NCAA that member institutions’ admissions standards for student athletes were becoming too diverse and needed to be more uniform and equitable (Bessette, 1987). So, in January of 1965,
the NCAA made drastic changes regarding academic and eligibility standards for incoming student athletes when it passed the “1.6 Rule”, or “Predictor Rule”, requiring all incoming student athletes to meet a “predicted” grade point average of at least a 1.6 on a 4.0 scale in order to be eligible to receive athletically related financial aid from a member institution (Covell, 2010; Suggs, 1999; Bessette, 1987). The predicted 1.6 GPA was quantified by using both an incoming student athlete’s SAT or ACT score, combined with a student athlete’s high school gpa from his or her sixth, seventh, or eighth semester of high school (Covell, 2010; Bessette, 1987).

These two main criteria then produced a predicted score which would in turn determine whether or not a student athlete could receive any athletically related financial aid, but this rule also had team wide effects as it stated that ANY member institution could not enter a team of competitors in an NCAA sponsored meet unless all incoming student athletes receiving athletically related financial aid met the 1.6 predicted GPA stipulation (Bessette, 1987). Thus, this new rule created national academic and eligibility standards for incoming student athletes, but it also made sure that member institutions were not competing with teams comprised of academically under-performing incoming student athletes who otherwise would have received athletically related financial aid. Consequently, this rule had two new and wide reaching effects on academic and eligibility standards for intercollegiate athletics.

This new rule though by the NCAA had historical precedence in that as early as 1961; the Big Ten Conference had used their own 1.7 GPA “predictor scale” to determine academic eligibility for incoming student athletes as it pertained to athletically related financial aid (Covell, 2010). This predictor scale for the Big Ten came in the same year that the conference decided to start awarding full athletically related grant in aid packages to incoming student athletes. The Big Ten Conference also used incoming student athletes’ SAT or ACT scores to
help determine financial and athletic eligibility, although they were not the first conference to use standardized test scores for these purposes (Covell, 2010).

The Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) first used SAT scores in determining athletic eligibility in 1960 when they mandated that all incoming student athletes receive a minimum of 750 on the SAT to be athletically eligible. This minimum was raised by the ACC to 800 in 1964, but the ACC also stayed consistent on requiring student athletes to maintain a 1.6 GPA minimum throughout their collegiate career to stay athletically eligible for competition.

So in essence, with the creation of the “Predictor Rule”, the NCAA was just following the lead of other major conferences such as the Big Ten and Atlantic Coast Conference, and simply nationalized for all of intercollegiate athletics what a couple of conferences had already been trying to do. Sports Illustrated even went so far as to call this new rule “a long-overdue piece of legislation”, yet as with all overarching and wide sweeping legislation, this rule was met with extreme opposition by some parties (Bessette, 1987, p. 21).

As the 1960’s wore on, many social and civil rights movement ideals started to transform governmental involvement within higher education, causing more federally funded programs and opportunities to be available to NCAA member institutions and their admissions offices (Bessette, 1987). This was seen as a positive in terms of allowing a greater number of young people to be able to attend colleges and universities across the country, and it encouraged these academic institutions to lean more towards “open door” policies of admission so that they could attract more students and receive increased federal funding.

In light of these societal and governmental changes in higher education, many member institutions were extremely unhappy with the “Predictor Rule” in that it essentially decided who
they could and could not accept in terms of incoming student athletes, and many believed this went completely against social movements of inclusion and allowing more disenfranchised individuals the chance at a college education (Bessette, 1987).

In addition, these same unhappy member institutions believed that the “Predictor Rule” took away any sense of autonomy or educational duty in deciding what individuals would be the “best fit” at their academic institutions. Thus, unhappy college and university Presidents and their respective member institutions moved from a position of discontent, to a position of action in trying to get the rule repealed or radically changed. In fact, from 1966 through 1971, multiple proposed legislations were defeated at NCAA Conventions that would have done away with the “Predictor Rule”, but it maintained enough traction to stay into effect until 1973 (Bessette, 1987).

Another large group who was extremely unhappy with the adoption and implementation of the “Predictor Rule” was surprisingly the Ivy League. Even though the low admissions standards of a 1.6 GPA did not seem to pertain to whom these schools admitted, this group of elite academic institutions simply did not want the NCAA involved with their admissions processes or interfering with their academic autonomy (Covell, 2010). Thus, the Ivy League member institutions denounced the new NCAA academic measure, and in 1966 were initially warned by the NCAA, and then given a second chance to comply with the measure or else face possible disqualification from NCAA championships (Covell, 2010; Harvard, 1966).

This stalemate between the Ivy League and the NCAA lasted for two years, and included over a year where the Ivy League member institutions were banned from NCAA competition (Rasmuson, 1968). Finally, in 1968, an amendment was passed by the NCAA which allowed
institutions (such as the Ivy League) to use different academic admissions tables separate from the 1.6 GPA predictor IF “they equal or exceed the NCAA requirement” (Rasmuson, 1968, para. 6).

Regardless, member institutions were upset with the “Predictor Rule” because they believed it prevented social inclusion and diversity in the admissions process, and it limited or abolished institutional autonomy and academic selection, but there was also a third set of member institutions that opposed the rule for another reason.

This third group of member institutions opposed the “Predictor Rule” because they believed it actually gave a strong advantage to institutions with higher or more selective admissions requirements in that these more “academically rigorous” institutions did not have to compete now against student athletes they did not want to admit themselves (Covell, 2010). Thus, member institutions with lower academic admissions standards would possibly have a harder time admitting and certifying incoming student athletes for athletic eligibility, while their competitors with higher academic standards would not be as negatively affected. Consequently, a rule designed to create more athletic competitive equality was perceived by some to have started to create more competitive imbalance between the academically different member institutions.

Then, in the early 1970’s, two significant NCAA actions took place. The first action by the NCAA happened in 1972, and allowed for freshmen to finally be eligible for competition in all intercollegiate sports, amending the previous decision of allowing freshmen to be eligible in any NCAA championship other than basketball or post season football (Suggs, 1999).

The next action by the NCAA happened in 1973, and finally ended the controversy surrounding the “Predictor Rule”. The rule was defeated at the NCAA National Convention by a
vote of 204-187, and was finally eliminated due in large part to: the continued frustration from member institutions regarding the lack of academic autonomy, the lack of accuracy that a 1.6 GPA “predictor table” actually possessed, and the ever increasing belief that incoming student athletes should have the benefit of receiving all the federally funded benefits and programs that other minority and disenfranchised individuals qualified for (Bessette, 1987). Thus, in place of the “Predictor Rule”, the NCAA Convention adopted a new set of academic standards for incoming student athletes that centered on an incoming student athlete possessing at minimum a 2.0 GPA from high school.

2.0 Rule.

At the 1973 NCAA Convention, on the heels of the elimination of the “Predictor Rule”, the “2.0” rule was established, which mandated that all incoming student athletes at minimum have a 2.0 cumulative GPA on all high school coursework if they were to qualify for athletically related financial aid, and placed less emphasis on specific SAT or ACT scores (Bessette, 1987). In addition, any student athlete could only continue to participate in intercollegiate athletics if he or she continued to meet their specific member institution’s requirements of progress towards a degree (Bessette, 1987). Thus, this new rule served for some as more of a lenient academic admissions requirement, but it also still served as an accountability measure in trying to help student athletes remain academically eligible and matriculate towards a college degree.

The new “2.0” rule though did have some detractors. Individuals raised concerns about the rule in terms of being dependent on high school coursework in that high schools across the country varied greatly in academic scope, curriculum, and rigor, thus many individuals questioned whether relying predominantly on high school GPA would be an effective or accurate
predictor (Bessette, 1987). In addition, other critics of this new rule believed that many student athletes in high school received academic preferential treatment any way due to their social status as athletes; so, relying on high school grades could also be faulty since many student athletes’ grades may not be precise and not accurately reflect their actual academic performance (Bessette, 1987).

Regardless, this new “2.0” rule went into effect in 1973 and continued until the early 1980’s. That is not to say that the detractors of this rule sat idly by. There were a multitude of defeated proposals from 1976 through 1980 that would have either drastically revised or done away altogether with the “2.0” rule (Bessette, 1987). In fact, according to the NCAA, as of 1978, the NCAA had heard more cases regarding either the “Predictor Rule” or the “2.0” rule than any other rule ever adopted by the NCAA in its’ history (NCAA, 1978). But, it was not until the early 1980’s when the “2.0” rule would change and the NCAA’s academic standards have a drastic overhaul.

1974- ACE Committee.

In 1974, then ACE head George Hanford led a new and proactive research study into the financial matters of intercollegiate athletics, and published a report showing great concern for the growing commercialism of intercollegiate athletics and the money involved with promoting and sustaining sports such as football and men’s basketball (Christy, 2007; Thelin, 1996). This report, titled “An Inquiry into the need for and Feasibility of a National Study of Intercollegiate Athletics”, was new because it was not a response to athletic abuses or scandals such as the Sanity Code or the 1952 ACE report, but served as a mere forewarning to institutions of higher education in anticipating problems with the growing costs of intercollegiate athletics, the
financial losses of these athletic departments and institutions, and the increasing professionalism with which these programs were being run (Thelin, 1996).

The report was also unique in that it did not look back as much as it tried to predict the bleak financial future of intercollegiate athletics, and used external financial analysts in education to predict how the rising costs of supporting intercollegiate athletics, as well as the new costs of complying with Title IX legislation (equal financial support for women’s and men’s sports) would dramatically and negatively affect institutions in higher education (Christy, 2007; Thelin, 1996). In addition, Hanford and his analysts believed that if the academic community tried to keep up with professional sports leagues and teams in terms of spending on sports, then they would significantly suffer financial setbacks and great losses. The report concluded with calling for an end to “big time” sports of football and men’s basketball in terms of their commercialistic nature, and for academic leaders to admit that they were promoting big business with these sports instead of the academic missions of their institutions (Christy, 2007).


There were several new changes to the NCAA’s academic and eligibility standards adopted at the 1981 NCAA National Convention. The first change centered on satisfactory academic progress for student athletes, and required all student athletes to complete (pass) an average of twelve credit hours per academic term (Bessette, 1987). In addition, student athletes were required to “satisfactorily complete twenty-four semester or thirty-six quarter hours since the beginning of the student-athlete’s last season of competition” (Bessette, 1987, p. 25). In other words, student athletes were required to make satisfactory academic progress every semester to
be athletically eligible and academically progress with every athletic season that falls under an academic calendar year.

The second change in 1981 also dealt with student athletes making progress towards college degrees, and required student athletes to be enrolled in a “minimum full time program of study in order to participate in organized practice sessions”, thus ensuring that any student athlete who was practicing in a varsity sport was enrolled in some type of full time degree program, and not simply taking meaningless classes with no specific purpose (Bessette, 1987, p. 25).

Finally, a very significant change was adopted at the 1981 convention that dealt directly with institutional transparency and the publishing of student athlete academic requirements. The NCAA adopted a new proposal which required all member institutions to publish their specific student athlete requirements for satisfactory academic progress towards a degree that these individuals must meet to be athletically eligible (Bessette, 1987). This was a milestone for NCAA academic standards in that it started to foster greater transparency among member institutions regarding academic requirements for student athletes, but it also helped with honesty in recruiting practices, because it allowed recruits and incoming student athletes to know upfront what was to be expected of them academically in order for them to participate in varsity competition.

Then, in 1982 at the NCAA National Convention, the satisfactory academic progress rule was revised to require that all student athletes “complete an average of twelve hours during each of the academic terms in academic years in which the student athletes were enrolled” (Bessette, 1987). Thus, essentially eliminating the chance for student athletes to “coast” for a semester and
only take a class or two. With this new rule, student athletes would have to pass an average of twelve credit hours every academic term, and apply themselves on a continual basis as they ideally progress towards obtaining a college degree.

*Proposition 48, 42 and Proposal 26.*

At the annual NCAA conference in 1983, the NCAA decided to adopt an academic reform agreement titled Proposition 48, which drastically changed the recruiting landscape of revenue generating sports such as football and men’s basketball by allowing “partial qualifiers” to receive athletic financial aid even though they only “partially” satisfied the then NCAA entrance requirements of a core course GPA of 2.0, and at least a 700 on the SAT (Cross & Koball, 1991; Vernon, Horton, & Alford, 1986). The partial satisfaction requirement was a compromise by the NCAA in letting student athletes who had an overall GPA of 2.0 and at least a 700 on the SAT receive athletic aid, even though they did not have a 2.0 GPA in the core course requirement. Thus, they could be on scholarship, but would have to sit out their freshman season of athletic eligibility, and consequently only be eligible for three more seasons, if their grades permitted and they were making satisfactory progress toward a degree (Christy, 2007). This proposition went into effect three years later in 1986.

Many (including the Committee of Presidents (COP)) believed this new rule was a positive step by the NCAA since it gave student athletes a chance to pay for their college tuition, earn the right to play college sports, and yet still have time to better prepare for the rigors of college academics by sitting out the first year of their eligibility (Baxter & Lambert, 1990; Vernon, Horton, & Alford, 1986).
Others, including athletic administrators, coaches, and even scholars believed that proposition 48 was not just ineffective, but downright racist in that it clearly discriminated against black athletes (the dominant race in revenue producing sports such as football and men’s basketball) in that many black athletes often came from more urban settings, from poorer and less efficient public schools, and often single parent homes, all of which often resulted in being less prepared or trained for college coursework (Christy, 2007; Vernon, Horton, & Alford, 1986). Consequently, the detractors believed that by only “partially” allowing these specific student athletes to be eligible and receive athletic aid, the NCAA discriminated primarily against black athletes who were less prepared, and unfairly penalized them a year of their athletic eligibility.

In addition to the cloud of racism surrounding Proposition 48, other detractors also pointed to the fact that partial qualifiers could still receive athletic financial aid, and that this luxury was actually not penalizing poor academic performance at all because these student athletes were still able to receive scholarship money (Cross & Koball, 1991). Consequently, on the heels of this new disagreement, the NCAA in 1989 at their annual conference presented and instituted Proposition 42 which modified Proposition 48, and declared that partial qualifiers could still be on athletic teams (even though they could not practice or play their first year), but they could not receive any kind of financial aid while they were only partially eligible athletically based on the then NCAA core requirements.

Thus, student athletes went from athletic financial aid with Proposition 48, to no aid at all with Proposition 42. The NCAA later said they meant to specify under Proposition 42 that partial qualifiers could not receive athletic aid but could receive need based aid, but the backlash and criticism already had started with the inception of Proposition 42 (Cross & Koball, 1991).
Consequently, this proposition of no financial aid at all did not sit well with athletic administrators or coaches, and people began to call for a second change to the original Proposition 48. Thus, in 1990 at the NCAA annual convention, they decided to amend Proposition 42 with Proposal 26 which clearly stated that partial qualifiers could receive need-based financial aid, but still could not receive athletic aid, practice or play, and they would still lose one year of athletic eligibility (Cross and Koball, 1991). This final proposal did not quell the outcries of racism and injustice that the original Proposition 48 created, but it did quiet some of the critics who railed on Proposition 42 and the unfair treatment of no financial aid at all.

*Proposition 16.*

As Proposal 26 was coming into existence in 1991, educators and athletic administrators continued to call for increased academic standards for incoming student athletes in determining intercollegiate athletic eligibility. Thus, in 1992 at the NCAA annual convention, the NCAA and its’ member institutions decided to increase the core requirements (for the fall of 1995) with a new proposition titled: Proposition 16 (Zimbalist, 1999). This new proposition made two new and significant changes. First, entering freshmen student athletes starting in 1995 had to have a 2.0 GPA in thirteen core classes instead of the previous eleven. Second, student athletes entering in the fall of 1996 would be subjected to a higher GPA requirement of 2.5 in core courses, but then also be evaluated on a new GPA/test score sliding scale which simply stated that “higher GPA’s could substitute for lower test scores and vice versa” (Zimbalist, 1999, p. 33). So, for example, an entering freshmen student athlete could have a 2.5 GPA in thirteen core courses and a 700 SAT score and be perfectly eligible, but they could also have a 2.0 GPA and a 900 SAT and also be eligible. Thus the sliding scale can work for both evaluation methods.
Most agreed Proposition 16 was a major and positive change for the NCAA and its’ member institutions, but the changes did not stop there. Zimbalist (1999) believes the most significant change for academic and eligibility standards came with the creation of the NCAA Clearinghouse in 1993. The clearinghouse (now known as the NCAA Eligibility Center) became the official judge of high school transcripts and test scores in determining NCAA intercollegiate athletic eligibility, and this new department took the responsibility of certification off the shoulders of its’ member institutions.

Consequently, the clearinghouse instantly became very significant and influential because it not only determined what high school classes counted as core courses (math, english, history, science, foreign language, etc), but it also heard and ruled on appeals from the colleges and universities when an entering student athlete was deemed ineligible.

Then in 1997 through 2002, the requirements were amended again by the NCAA and its’ member institutions’ Presidents, but as of 2002 to date, the new core course requirement for incoming freshmen student athletes is sixteen core courses, and the sliding GPA/test scale now ranges from a 2.0-3.55 GPA and a 400-1010 SAT score, or a 37-86 ACT score (NCAA, 2010; Christy, 2007; Hishinuma & Fremstad, 1997).

To date, the sliding scale still works the same way, with a higher GPA requiring at minimum a lower SAT or ACT score. In addition, these same incoming student athletes must have graduated from an accredited high school, the core courses taken must have been college preparatory level, and they must have a valid high school transcript with official test scores (NCAA, 2010). They must also complete twenty four credit hours with at least a 1.8 GPA by the end of their first year in college, make forty percent progress towards graduation by year two,
sixty percent by year three, and eighty percent by year four to remain athletically eligible (Christy, 2007).

Although these academic and eligibility standards have continued to change and increase in terms of academic strictness, there are some who believe that these stricter requirements continue to be oppressive to minorities and disenfranchised high school students who may not be able to receive quality high school educations (Hishinuma & Fremstad, 1997). In addition, Hishinuma and Fremstad (1997) point out that the NCAA continues to paint every member institution with one academic brush, and possibly require more academically than some of their member institutions would normally require for a student to be eligible.

They believe this is a problem, and is another example of the NCAA exerting their large influence and authority to make blanket rules by which all member institutions should abide, even if some of these rules are not in line with specific academic missions of some member institutions. Regardless, these are the current academic requirements these member institutions have agreed upon if they want to be a part of NCAA Division I intercollegiate athletics.

Themes Associated with Reform in Intercollegiate Athletics


Title IX came about in 1972 through educational legislation amending the 1964 Civil Rights Act. This specific piece of legislation (lobbied against by the NCAA) passed by Congress stated:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving financial assistance (Christy, 2007, p. 40; Zimbalist, 1999, p. 58)

Although this legislation was not officially published until 1975, high schools, colleges, and universities were given a “transition period” of three years by the federal government in order to adequately be able to comply with the equal treatment of male and female student athletes, specifically regarding financial support (Zimbalist, 1999). Thus, Title IX compliance was not required by these various educational entities until the summer of 1978.

Three Prong Test.

Title IX contained three specific guidelines for compliance by higher education institutions that received federal financial assistance, and these three guidelines became known as the “Three Prong Test” (Christy, 2007; Zimbalist, 1999). This test simply stated that in order for an institution to be in compliance with Title IX, it must meet at least one of the three parts: 1) substantially proportionate athletic opportunities for men and women, 2) a history and continuing practice of program extension for women, 3) fully and affectively accommodates the interests and abilities of women (Christy, 2007; Zimbalist, 1999).

The first test of substantially proportionate athletic opportunities simply means that athletic departments had to sponsor and provide intercollegiate athletic programs for men and women that were proportionate to “their specific rates of enrollment” (Zimbalist, 1999, p. 61).

The second test regarding a history of program extension for women is very vague in nature, and deals with the idea that the underrepresented sex (females) in intercollegiate athletics must have a history of expanded opportunities, increased financial support for programs and
scholarships, and increased public recognition of female academic and athletic achievements (Christy, 2007).

The third and final test refers to an athletic department’s ability to gauge and support athletic interests for female students, and justify a lack of athletic interest in female students if there is a decreased female presence among student athletes (Zimbalist, 1999).

Regardless of which or how many of these guidelines an institution complies with, many scholars and administrators have pointed to the vagueness of this test in creating hardships for institutions to comply. Thus, the controversies and lawsuits over the last forty years seem to validate how institutions have either not wanted to comply with Title IX, or have been too puzzled by the vast grey areas to adequately be able to comply.

*Title IX’s impact on Athletic Departments and Administrators.*

Despite the many twists and turns of Title IX over the last forty years, there is no doubt that this legislation has drastically changed the athletic administrative landscape within intercollegiate athletics. No longer could athletic departments and athletic directors direct the majority of their finances around men’s sports (specifically football and men’s basketball), but rather these departments and their leaders had to change their approach and comply by having relatively equal female athletic programs and scholarships compared to men’s sports, in addition to having greater equality with overall athletic budgets, facility improvements, and coaching salaries for female sports (Zimbalist, 1999). Also, federal courts have been clear that athletic directors and athletic departments cannot use financial constraints or tough economic times as excuses for not funding or increasing female sports. Courts have stated that if athletic departments were allowed to slow their compliance of Title IX due to lack of monetary
resources, then that could always be used as an excuse to slow progress, and thus gender equality would stall as well (Zimbalist, 1999).

So, instead the nation has seen an era over the last forty years where athletic costs have increased for a variety of reasons including Title IX compliance, and female athletic programs have increased due to an increase in participation demand from female high school athletes. Interestingly, female intercollegiate athletics has also seen a great increase in male head coaches for their sports, causing scholars such as Zimbalist (1999) to believe that professionalization and commercialization has spilled over into female sports as well on college campuses, with some viewing male coaches as more suited for specific athletic training and mentoring.

Duderstadt (2000) pointed out that Title IX has also created a negative backlash with many athletic administrators and male head coaches who believe that female sports are being unfairly funded with profits from “revenue producing” sports. This perceived unfairness in their minds comes from the simple fact that many female sports do not draw fans or sell tickets, do not make any self-sustaining revenue, and thus have to use other athletic department and sport specific revenues for operation and Title IX compliance purposes. In addition, Christy (2007) pointed out that there has been periodic backlash over the last few decades as some men’s sports have had to be reduced or eliminated in order to field women’s sports for Title IX compliance purposes.

Regardless of what side athletic administrators and coaches take regarding the use and purpose of Title IX and its compliance, it has greatly shaped the last forty plus years of intercollegiate athletics and athletic departments’ financial situations. Thus, it seems reasonable to believe that its legislation and influence will continue to play a significant part for athletic
administrators and their departments as they continue to sponsor and grow intercollegiate athletics.

*Increased Graduation Rate Accountability.*

Just as there was an increased call for reform regarding academic and eligibility standards and equitable financial and athletic opportunities for men and women, there also was an increased call for accountability for graduation rates of student athletes in the mid 1980’s (Shulman & Bowen, 2001). The NCAA was receiving increased pressure by the federal government, educators, scholars, and athletic personnel for greater accountability among intercollegiate athletic programs and athletic departments regarding proof that student athletes were or were not graduating college (Ferris, Finster, & McDonald, 2004, Shulman & Bowen, 2001).

This proof was demanded because there was great concern among the afore mentioned groups that athletes were graduating at an extremely low rate, especially African American student athletes in the revenue generating sports of football and men’s basketball (Lapchick, Kaiser, & Hoff, 2010; Miller & Luebchow, 2009; Christy, 2007; The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, 2006; Ferris, Finster, & McDonald, 2004; Rishe, 2003; Shulman & Bowen, 2001; DeBrock, Lawrence, Hendricks, & Koenker, 1996). The idea was to make public the graduation rates so that institutions would be shamed into doing a better job with academic matriculation for their student athletes (Shulman & Bowen, 2001).

These scholars have some variety in opinion regarding the reason this is the case, but most agreed that African American males in football and men’s basketball too often come with poor high school educations, spend inordinate amounts of time practicing, traveling, and playing
compared to going to class and studying, may place more emphasis on professional aspirations than graduating college, and are possibly told and shown by athletic administrators, coaches, teammates, and fans that their athletic performances are more important than their academic performances or outcomes (Lapchick, Kaiser, & Hoff, 2010; Miller & Luebchow, 2009; Christy, 2007; The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, 2006; Ferris, Finster, & McDonald, 2004; Rishe, 2003; Shulman & Bowen, 2001; DeBrock, Lawrence, Hendricks, & Koenker, 1996).

Mangold, Bean, and Adams (2003) also pointed out that for men’s basketball, the duration of the season is so long and covers two academic semesters, thus many student athletes (predominantly African American males) are spending much more time involved with basketball than they are in class or studying. In addition, they also found that successful sport programs in general may have a negative impact on overall student graduation rates since “big time” sports especially can be a social distraction and time consumer compared to students spending time with their academic studies.

However, Rishe (2003) and The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education (2002) pointed out that research studies have shown that African American male student athletes graduate at a higher rate than general African American male students. One possible reason for this is because student athletes may have MORE motivation to do well in school, be eligible, and reach aspirations of playing professional sports.

Regardless, most of the parties involved called for greater accountability with graduation rates for intercollegiate athletics, and the NCAA working with the federal government felt the pressure to comply by making graduation data of NCAA Division I member institutions
available for the public, and by having tools in place to measure graduation rates (Shulman & Bowen, 2001).

Consequently, as the 2000’s started, graduation data for NCAA Division I member institutions had been available for almost two decades, and the NCAA was starting to put into place graduation measuring tools that would help better track and record graduation rates for student athletes.

Then, in 2005, the NCAA implemented the Graduation Success Rate (GSR) that better measured student athlete graduation rates by not only measuring enrolled student athlete’s graduation successes, but also allowed for transfer students to not be counted in the formula if they transferred out of a member institution and were academically eligible (Lapchick, Kaiser, & Hoff, 2010; NCAA, 2010; Miller & Luebchow, 2009). Thus to date, the NCAA claims that the GSR provides a more accurate description of graduation rates for student athletes compared to the federally mandated rates the NCAA previously published (Lapchick, Kaiser, & Hoff, 2010; NCAA, 2010).

Lapchick, Kaiser, and Hoff (2010) also noted that for NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament teams, there has been a slight but positive increase in graduation rates over the last several years, although there is still an increasing graduation rate gap between African American and White male basketball players.

The Role of Key Groups and Institutions in Intercollegiate Athletics

*But at their worst, big-time college athletics appear to have lost their bearings...With increasing frequency they threaten to overwhelm the universities in whose name they were established and*
to undermine the integrity of one of our fundamental national institutions: higher education

(Knight Foundation, 1991, p. 17)

1991-2010 - Knight Foundation Commission.

In the fall of 1989, many of the trustees of the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation expressed great concern over the abuses in intercollegiate athletics, and of primary concern was the institutional credibility and very foundation of higher education given that intercollegiate athletics (specifically football and basketball) at this point seemed to have drifted away from the very institutions it supposedly represented (Christy, 2007; Thelin, 1996; Knight Foundation, 1991). In 1991, after more than a year of research, study, and consultation with more than 80 individuals, the Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics published the report “Keeping Faith with the Student Athlete”, which essentially called for institutional reform via the college and university Presidents (Knight Foundation, 1991). This conviction was the essence of this report, and the commission also believed that everyone else (athletic departments, conferences, and the NCAA) must know that they (Presidents) were in charge of intercollegiate athletics, its’ principles, and its’ direction (Thelin, 1996; Knight Foundation, 1991).

The major point of action in this report was the proposal for the “One Plus Three model”, which essentially said that academic institutional President’s were the (one) responsible for institutional control of athletics, and presidential control needed to be directed towards (three) main areas: academic integrity, financial integrity, and independent certification (Christy, 2007; Thelin, 1996; Knight Foundation, 1991).

The commission believed that without this type of drastic and much needed change, intercollegiate sports would either continue to live in abuse and scandal, or the federal
government would end up stepping in and regulating intercollegiate athletics. But, with this model and type of Presidential involvement and oversight, Presidents could:

(1) Be heavily involved with the admission standards, eligibility standards, and graduation rates of student athletes, (2) Be in charge of the finances of athletic departments, not let them operate as separate subsidiaries, and be able to spend institutional money on athletics, thus creating more financial control and oversight, and (3) Be in charge of putting athletic departments through an independent certification process where their actions have to line up with the institutional mission of the college or university, their fiscal activities are sound and approved, and where student athletes have to resemble the general student population in terms of admission, academic progress, and graduation (Christy, 2007, pg. 29; Knight Foundation, 1991, pg. 10).

In 1992, the Knight Foundation Commission built on their initial momentum with college and university Presidents, and published “A Solid Start”, which essentially reiterated that big time college sports (football and men’s basketball) were out of control, the need for the one plus three model, and congratulated the NCAA on deciding at their 1992 convention to initiate incremental changes (Knight Foundation, 1992). The incremental changes, among other things, were to create new requirements for student athletes in making progress towards degrees, to give Presidents more authority within the NCAA for rule making purposes, and to initiate stricter eligibility requirements for athletes (Knight Foundation, 1992).

In 1993, the Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics published another report titled: “A New Beginning for a New Century”. This report continued to address the institutional and societal issues of big time sports such as football and men’s basketball, and
also highlighted two main issues, cost containment and gender equity, as important policy issues for Presidents to discuss and handle (Knight Foundation, 1993). The report pointed out that consistent themes have emerged since the writing of the Savage Report in 1929, yet the cost of intercollegiate athletics and big time sports has continued to grow, and the commission believed that Presidents must step in and be the sole decision makers on these and other important issues (Knight Foundation, 1993).

One major step for progress happened in 1996 based on the Knight Foundation Commission’s reports and continuous recommendations. The NCAA voted to completely redo its governance structure, and instead of athletic administrators being in charge of policy and legislation, they transferred sole power of those duties, as well as the NCAA budget over to the Presidents of its’ member institutions. Thus, acknowledging many of the Knight Foundation Commission’s calls for reform, and dramatically changing the influence and decision making of the NCAA (Christy, 2007).

As the dawn of a new century neared, the Knight Foundation Commission continued to research, analyze, and publish reports on reforming intercollegiate athletics and the need for academic integrity and fiscal responsibility. In 2001, the Knight Foundation Commission published “A Call to Action: Reconnecting College Sports and Higher Education”, which pointed out that progress in intercollegiate athletics had been made, but that big time sports and their costs were still out of control, violated the academic missions of institutions, and these problems were growing (Knight Foundation, 2001). The report also called for a new President’s coalition to address new issues of academic standards for student athletes, the growing “arms race” of football and men’s basketball, and the commercialization of big time sports. The report went on to say that their main concern was with football and men’s basketball, and the “money
madness” involved with the institutions, athletic departments, media companies, and the athletes themselves (Knight Foundation, 2001). They concluded this report with a call for all intercollegiate athletic teams to have graduation rates of at least fifty percent in order to be eligible for conference or postseason play (Christy, 2007).

In 2006, the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics published the results of a self-conducted poll which stated that Americans were deeply concerned about the growing professionalism observed in intercollegiate athletics, especially in football and men’s basketball (Knight Commission, 2006). The Commission then moved on this information and decided to sponsor a summit at George Washington University were educational leaders gathered to discuss the modern day experience of college athletes (Knight Commission, 2006).

In addition, the commission published an article in the same year titled: “Academic Requirements and Eligibility: Tougher Standards or Not?” which highlighted and applauded Big East University Presidents for agreeing (via a majority vote) to not allow first year athletes who do not meet initial NCAA eligibility standards to enroll at their universities (Knight Commission, 2006).

Finally, in 2010, the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics published another report titled: “Restoring the Balance: Dollars, Values, and the Future of College Sports”. This report was heavily influenced by the escalating costs of intercollegiate athletics after the first decade of the twenty first century, especially with the “big time” sports of football and men’s basketball (Knight Commission, 2010). The commission again addressed the “breathtaking” amount of spending on football and men’s basketball in particular, and cited research that suggested “median athletics spending per athlete at institutions in each major athletic conference
ranges from four to nearly eleven times more than the median spending on education-related activities per student” (Knight Commission, 2010, pp. 1-4).

The commission also laid out a new blueprint for restoring intercollegiate athletics, and football and men’s basketball in particular. They highlighted three main ways. First, they recommended greater financial transparency within and from athletic departments, and transparency in comparing athletic spending to academic spending. Second, they called for the NCAA, the Bowl Championship Series (BCS), and conferences to reward (especially financially) institutions that practice making academic values a priority. Finally, they reiterated the desperate need to treat athletes as students first and foremost, and not as professional athletes (Knight Commission, 2010).

The report concluded with research that stated most Division I institutional Presidents are for greater financial transparency, and they also called for the NCAA to be more transparent in sharing their financial records. In addition, the commission recommended that at least twenty percent of the BCS revenue be redistributed evenly among all Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) institutions and for the money to be designated as the Academic-Athletics Balance Fund (Knight Commission, 2010). This money then in turn could be used for academic support for student athletes, and could aid in meeting the Knight Commission’s recommendation for all sport programs needing to have Academic Progress Rate (APR) scores that equate to a fifty percent graduation rate or higher (Knight Commission, 2010).

Faculty.

There seems to have always been a tension throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries between the academic centrality of institutions and the growing arm of institutions
known as intercollegiate athletics. This tension has largely resulted because many individuals have acted or felt like intercollegiate athletics is as important, or more important than the academic mission of institutions. It also exists because there are other individuals, often from the academic world, who have viewed intercollegiate athletics as so commercialized and distant, that it either needs to be drastically changed or else it will fall into utter chaos (Atwell, 1991).

Finally, tension has been present because many individuals have straddled the fence, chosen not get involved or share their opinions, and consequently have done nothing (Plant, 1961). Much of the literature suggested that since the rise of intercollegiate athletics after WWII, this final group of passive individuals contributing to the tension and problems surrounding intercollegiate athletics are the actual faculty members at academic institutions (Marco, 1960). To be fair, there are many faculty members who choose to not get involved largely because they feel it is not their place and they believe the Presidents of academic institutions should intervene much more (Plant, 1961). But either way, whether passive or deferential, it is clear that the literature over the past fifty years calls for faculty members to get involved with intercollegiate athletics, and not to just contribute, but to work hard in requiring intercollegiate athletic programs and athletic departments to be aligned with the academic missions of their institutions (Weisart, Kliever, Mason, & Bergmann, 1990).

The literature has given several reasons over the last fifty years why faculty members at academic institutions have chosen to not get involved with reforming intercollegiate athletics and overseeing athletic operations. Marco (1960) suggested that faculty members do not see any professional advantage for their careers in getting involved with athletics. Plant (1961) highlighted how many faculty members believed it is simply not their job, and that Presidents and other academic administrators should be in charge of regulating athletics, whereas Atwell
(1991) pointed out that even if faculty members sometimes wanted to get involved, academic arrogance and egos often get in the way, and faculty members may not work well with academic Presidents.

Gerdy (2002) also pointed out that even when one faculty member wants to get involved with reforming athletics, there may not be communal support amongst his or her peers, thus causing one voice to be drowned out by the opposing majority. Earl (2004) took a different approach and mentioned how even if faculty members are willing to work together, they often feel they will encounter so much opposition from the athletic departments that they may wonder what the utility of their involvement may be. Finally faculty members may be leery to reach out and help reform athletics or even be involved much with student athletes, for fear that they will be viewed as “traitors” to the academic community, or possibly even be accused of involvement with academic fraud or showing favoritism to student athletes (Rogers, 2008).

Regardless, scholars have voiced great concern over the lack of faculty involvement in intercollegiate athletics over the last fifty years, but there are some faculty members and faculty groups who have stood up and answered the call to be actively involved in helping reform intercollegiate athletics, and football and men’s basketball in particular.

1966 - The Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities.

This important piece of legislation was created and adopted by the American Association of University Professors, the American Council on Education (ACE), and the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges. This statement simply expressed the utmost importance for faculty to hold the primary responsibility of overseeing anything involved with educational policy at institutions of higher education, including athletics, information regarding
athletics, and athletes’ educational experiences (Weisart, Kliever, Mason, & Bergmann, 1990). In addition, this statement called for faculty to be heavily involved with the financial and strategic long range planning of academic institutions, including the vision for intercollegiate athletics at these schools.

1980’s - American Association of University Professors.

In the 1980’s, more faculty members continued to get involved with reforming intercollegiate athletics and athletic policy through the forming of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). This association of concerned faculty members continued to publish literature calling for athletic reform and increased faculty involvement, and helped pave the way for greater academic and athletic reform literature in the following years (Christy, 2007).

1999 - Rutgers 1000.

In 1999, a group of concerned faculty members at Rutgers University formed an organization called the Rutgers 1000, with the expressed goal of persuading the Board of Governors to withdraw Rutgers from NCAA Division I competition (Christy, 2007). This group of faculty believed that recruiting practices were being abused, unqualified student athletes were being admitted to the institution, and players in “revenue” sports such as football and men’s basketball were being treated as non-students. Consequently, this group of faculty called for a move to a non-scholarship athletic division, for students only to be allowed to play sports if they possessed an above average SAT score, and for recruiting to be based on academic achievement and not solely athletic ability. While this group called for some radical changes, their suggestions never took hold at Rutgers, or with other similar institutions (Christy, 2007).
The Drake Group was first founded in 1999 by a group of concerned faculty members with the aim of continual lobbying for reform in intercollegiate athletics through the calling for academic, financial, and institutional transparency (Christy, 2007; The Drake Group, 2006). The national group is comprised of faculty members from multiple academic institutions, and it seeks to support other faculty senates and individuals in helping restore the priority of academics over athletics (The Drake Group, 2009).

In addition, the Drake Group believed that the NCAA has a “stranglehold” over football and men’s basketball in particular, and operates as a cartel in promoting commercial and professional interests in intercollegiate athletics (The Drake Group, 2009). The Drake Group has also questioned the new academic measures of the NCAA, most notably the Academic Progress Rate (APR), in that they wonder if the APR and other “cut score” measures are only hiding the fact that student athletes are possibly taking “watered down” curriculums, and even if they stay academically eligible, they may not be getting a superior education (The Drake Group, 2006).

Most recently, the Drake Group has continued to call for increased academic transparency by recommending that students who participate in intercollegiate athletics be required to list their academic major, GPA, advisor, as well as the courses they have previously taken (The Drake Group, 2010). In addition, the group has also suggested a multitude of other ideas including: doing away with the term “student-athlete”, requiring athletic departments to report the SAT and ACT scores for “revenue sport” athletes and have them compared to non-revenue sport athletes, requiring athletes to have one year of residency at an institution before they can be eligible to play, requiring academic support services for athletes to be located in the
same area as for traditional students, and for one year renewable scholarships to be either extended to five year guaranteed scholarships (to ensure graduation), or changed to solely need based financial aid (The Drake Group, 2010).

2002 - Faculty Senates.

One important voice for faculty members across the country has been the faculty senate committees at academic institutions, and these senates have been extremely important in not only speaking out for reform in intercollegiate athletics, but also as a lobbyist group to academic Presidents, conferences, and the NCAA (Gerdy, 2002). Faculty senates can also be a unified voice for faculty (so individuals do not feel isolated), and their increased presence can contribute to help academic Presidents become more proactive as potential leaders for athletic reform (Christy, 2007; Gerdy, 2002).

A great example of this is in 2002, when faculty senates from all the institutions in the Pac Ten conference passed a resolution asking for increased involvement from their institutional Presidents in examining the increased financial expenses of and pressures from football and men’s basketball in particular (Christy, 2007; Gerdy, 2002). In addition, the faculty senates also asked the Presidents to analyze and discuss the increasing athletic budgets at these institutions, and for justification as to why the money was becoming so disproportionate to academic spending. Soon after, the faculty senates at Big Ten conference institutions passed a similar resolution with many of the same principles and questions in mind.


In 2003, as faculty senates started to grow and become more prominent, fifty two faculty senates from around the country formed the Coalition on Intercollegiate Athletics (COIA), with
the sole purpose of “providing a national faculty voice on intercollegiate athletic issues” (Christy, 2007; COAI, 2007, p. 2). The coalition stated that intercollegiate athletics is valuable and can definitely serve the academic institution, but it must be integrated with the academic goals and values of an institution (COAI, 2007). The coalition did not act alone, as it sought to collaborate with groups such as the Knight Commission, the Drake Group, as well as the NCAA itself (Christy, 2007). The coalition also has pushed for stronger academic reform in intercollegiate athletics by recommending that institutions’ faculty senates and governance bodies review athletic departments’ Academic Progress Rate (APR) scores and Graduation Success Rate (GSR) scores on an annual basis (COAI, 2007). In a show of support, the Drake Group also firmly agreed with these recommendations and any changes that would increase academic accountability and scrutiny for students participating in intercollegiate athletics (The Drake Group, 2007).

*Athletic Administration and Leadership.*

Intercollegiate athletics, and especially the revenue producing sports of football and men’s basketball, have grown into a large and financially prosperous machine, and as the literature has shown, the ultimate responsibility for athletics falls at the feet of the institutional presidents (Duderstadt, 2000). But, the literature also pointed out that athletic directors were primarily the ones responsible for the operation of intercollegiate athletics, the hiring and firing of coaches and athletic personnel, and who ultimately had to answer directly to college and university Presidents (Renick, 1974). Athletic directors and other athletic leadership positions also play a significant role in fundraising for not just the athletic department, but also for the college or university itself (Renick, 1974). Thus, the athletic leadership positions of director and
support personnel are crucial to the operation, governance, financial stability, and oversight of intercollegiate athletics.

Sperber (1990) believed that intercollegiate athletics had become a commercialized spectacle, with athletic directors spending whatever amounts of money they wish, only for colleges and universities to financially bail them out of deficits at the end of fiscal years. In addition, he believed that many athletic directors played the game of self-preservation, agreeing publicly with academic Presidents on institutional missions, while privately only concerned about athletic success, prestige, and revenue generation.

Trail and Chelladurai (2002) pointed out however, in defense of athletic directors and athletic leadership personnel, that these individuals were only emphasizing what is being valued around them. For instance, alumni, boosters, students, general fans, and even many college and university Presidents want successful AND financially prosperous athletic teams. Consequently, athletic directors and people in athletic leadership are only doing what is logical and smart by emphasizing athletic success and revenue generation since that is what the majority of their constituents want. These scholars also admit that power and ego often come into play with athletic directors while they are emphasizing these goals, but they are simply providing what is being demanded of them by the culture around them.

Since athletic directors may just be meeting the demand of their constituents, Mahony, Hums, and Riemer (2002) believed it was only logical for athletic directors to financially give or allocate more towards sport programs (such as football and men’s basketball) that can generate revenue in return, even if it means cutting budgets from other, possibly even smaller sports to make this happen. This reflects the old business adage that “it takes money to make money.”
Mahony, Hums, and Riemer (2005) wrote on how athletic directors needed to spend more money on “big time” sports such as football and men’s basketball because these two are not just revenue generators, but are also two of the most competitive sports in NCAA Division I. Thus, these sports require greater revenue allocated to them so that they can continue to hire winning coaches and afford capital improvements, such as: practice fields and complexes, stadium expansions, and academic centers, be able to travel nationally to recruit the best possible athletes who can also qualify academically, and simply keep up with their competitors as other programs improve and change. All of these things take great amounts of money; consequently, athletic directors and athletic administrators know they have to fund the programs up front if they want to see financial returns and winning programs on the back end.

Wolverton (2007) added that intercollegiate athletic expansion and the financial investments these institutional Presidents and athletic directors were putting into sports such as football and men’s basketball cannot last forever. He simply believed that something will have to give, and that something may be the elimination of other sport programs, specifically smaller men’s sports (Title IX legislation would not approve of eliminating women’s sports). He argued that even the most successful and financially prosperous athletic departments cannot continue to fund football and men’s basketball in these ways and afford a bevy of other men’s sports. So, athletic directors and institutional Presidents will have to decide where to spend their money, and history alludes to the fact that they will spend their money on the sports that can get the greatest and quickest financial returns (Wolverton, 2007; Mahony, Hums, & Riemer, 2005; Sperber, 1990).

Brown (2010) and Wolverton (2007) also believed that athletic directors will continue to hold coaches more accountable for academic success of their programs, and link more of their
coaching salaries and performance incentives to NCCA Academic Progress Rate (APR) and Graduation Success Rate (GSR) scores, and not just to wins or national rankings.

Low Resource or Non-BCS Institutions.

As mentioned previously, low resource and non-BCS institutions lack athletic department and sport specific revenue, most notably from the absence of football revenue generated by playing in a Bowl Championship Series (BCS) bowl game, or being tied to a conference with a BCS bowl game qualifier. Thus, these institutions cannot afford many athletic department improvements, including greater academic support for their student athletes (Associated Press, 2010; Holden, 2010; Hosick, 2010; Mills, 2010; Moltz, 2010; Lapchick, Lopresti, and Reshard, 2009; Powell, 2009; Forde, 2006).

An example of this is Alabama State University, a low resource Division I institution seeking to generate more revenue from their football program (Alabama State University, 2000). The journal points out that a school like the University of Alabama may generate $21 million in football revenue in a given year, and other small Division I football schools may generate estimates of $3 million a year, compared to Alabama State University’s yearly football revenue of $671,000. Consequently, Alabama State can barely cover the expenses of their football program, let alone financially afford stadium or facility improvements, greater coaching salaries, or more importantly, greater academic support (study centers, tutors, mentors, etc) for their student athletes. This greatly and negatively affects Alabama State’s ability for their sport programs to have high APR scores and great academic success for their student athletes.

Thus, Alabama State literally cannot afford to improve their academic or athletic situation, yet they have to compete under the same guidelines and comply with the same NCAA
standards as a University of Alabama type institution. Unfortunately, Alabama State serves as one example of many low resource or non-BCS institutions that cannot generate revenue from football and other sports; and, in turn, do not have the money for academic support for their student athletes or for academic improvements to help comply with NCAA measures such as the APR. As a result, the pressures of and the impact from the APR on low resource or non-BCS institutions is tremendous and often greatly troublesome.

**NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR)**

*While the NCAA’s Academic Performance Program and its accompanying Academic Progress Rate have improved student-athlete academic performance, challenges remain regarding the relatively low APRs earned by teams in men’s basketball and the difficulty faced by institutions with fewer resources (Hosick, 2010, para. 1)*

**Background.**

In 2004, as the idea for the Graduation Success Rate (GSR) was being put into place for the NCAA, then NCAA President Myles Brand and the NCAA’s member institutions wanted to also create a real time academic progress measure that could quantify student athlete eligibility and retention (NCAA, 2010; Lapchick, Lopresti, & Reshard, 2009; Hayes, 2005). The purpose behind the APR was that the GSR was only showing the end result (graduation or not), but there was nothing in place to show the incremental academic progress of student athletes and their sport programs.

The NCAA’s solution was the Academic Progress Rate, or APR. The APR worked as a two-fold formula to measure individual student athletes’ (only players on scholarship) term by term (fall and spring) eligibility and retention at their institutions, with the thought that if the
NCAA and its member institutions could quantify yearly academic progress for individuals and sport programs, they could better predict end results, and more importantly, be able to “intercede and help academically challenged student athletes before it is too late” (NCAA, 2009). These challenged student athletes as far as the APR has been concerned have predominantly been found in football, men’s basketball, and baseball (NCAA, 2011; 2010; Powell, 2009).

As soon as the APR was announced, there was instant skepticism by some because detractors believed the APR would then shift coaches’ and athletic administrators’ focus away from mentoring and coaching, and simply place their focus on keeping student athletes eligible, even if this resulted in cheating to do so (Hayes, 2005). Splitt (2007) believed that the APR may be helpful in some ways, but it may not tell one truly about academic progress of student athletes if these same students are simply thrown into easy majors and take unchallenging classes to essentially stay eligible. In addition, Splitt (2007) also believed that the APR may just be a statistic used by the NCAA to give the illusion of academic reform.

Johnson (2010) and Brown (2005) pointed out, however, that coaches should have been and should always pay attention to their student athletes’ academic performance and matriculation toward graduation. So, the APR should not encourage cheating, but rather re-emphasize what should already be in place for coaches and athletic administrators and always be a talking point for academic improvement.

Wolverton (2007) and Brown (2005) also went on to say that with the implementation of the APR, athletic departments and sport programs were forced to reevaluate how they were academically supporting their student athletes and who they were recruiting. Thus, schools and coaches could no longer afford to recruit players who were not only border line academically,
but also were risky in terms of retention. In addition, the APR was a good evaluation tool for
current athletic departments and sport programs because it provided a clear and quantifiable tool
for their current academic situations with their players (Yost, 2010).

APR Formula.

The Academic Progress Rate (APR) measures two components: term-by-term academic
performance for eligibility, and retention of student athletes. The formula for these two measures
is: Each scholarship student athlete, regardless of the sport, gets one point each term for being
academically eligible and one point each term for staying in school at the same school. Then, the
total points for all scholarship student athletes of a sports program are added up, divided by the
total number of points possible for a sports program, and then multiplied by one thousand to
achieve the final score (NCAA, 2009). A perfect score would always be 1000 theoretically
(Christy, 2007).

For example, a men’s basketball team with thirteen scholarship players would have 52
points (1 for eligibility, 1 for retention, each term) for a two-term year. If their program’s total
points equaled 50 because two players were ineligible for the fall semester, then the 50 would be
divided by 52 (total points possible), and then multiplied by 1000 for a score of 961.

APR Scoring and Penalties.

From 2005-2011, there were two cut scores designated by the NCAA that carry penalties
with them. A score below 925 (which translates to a 50% graduation success rate) for any
program meant they may face immediate penalty by the NCAA because a player or players were
counted as “0 for 2’s”, meaning a player or players were ineligible to play AND also did not
return to school. This was only applied when a program scored under 925 and did not retain a
player or players. There was also a roughly 10% limit for an immediate penalty that could only be as stiff as 10% of a program’s scholarship allotment, so men’s basketball for example could only lose 2 scholarships max in a given year since they only offer 13 total (NCAA, 2010).

In addition, a score below 900 (which translates to a 40% graduation success rate) for any program meant they faced what were termed as “historical penalties”, which carried stiffer consequences from the NCAA towards a program, and got more severe based on the number of years a program had fallen below the 900 score cut line. The historical penalty consequences handed down by the NCAA were as follows:

For programs scoring under 900 in their first year, they usually received a public reprimand from the NCAA. In the second year, if teams scored under 900 they may have received practice and scholarship reduction. In a third straight year, a team may have received a post-season ban on competition. Finally, if a fourth straight year below a 900 score took place; the specific team could have their program’s membership restricted by the NCAA (NCAA, 2009).

However, the APR formula changed in October of 2011 when the NCAA Division I Board of Directors met and voted on stiffer academic requirements and regulations concerning the cut scores and penalty structure of the existing academic measure. The changes as of October 27th, 2011 will take effect in the 2012-2013 academic year, and are as follows (Hosick, 2011):

a. There will be a two year implementation period before the new academic minimum “benchmark” increases from a score of 900 to 930. This new benchmark will actually do away with the two current APR cut scores of 925 and 900, and only have a 930 APR score as a measuring stick moving forward (Hosick, 2011). In addition, the new 930 cut score will
translate out to a 50% Graduate Success Rate (GSR), thereby holding institutions and their sport programs more accountable towards matriculating student athletes and graduating them at a higher percentage.

b. For the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 academic years, there will be two new components for determining post season eligibility for Division I sport programs. First, sport programs can be eligible for post season competition by having a multi-year (four year) average APR score of 900 or greater. Second, sport programs can also achieve the same post season eligibility by having an average APR score of 930 over the two most recent years of their APR data (Hosick, 2011).

c. For the 2014-2015 academic year, the multi year average minimum APR score increases to 930 for a sport program to eligible for post season competition, or a two year average of 940 to be post season eligible (Hosick, 2011).

d. Finally, for the 2015-2016 academic year, the 930 post season competition APR score would be implemented fully into NCAA Division I athletics, along with a new penalty structure (Hosick, 2011).

e. The new three tiered penalty structure approved also by the NCAA Division I Board of Directors now looks like this:

1. In addition to post season ineligibility, for the first year a sport program is under 930, there will be a reduction in allowable practice time each week from 20 hours to 16 hours, and the reduced four hours will instead be used for academic support activities for the specific sport program’s student athletes. “This represents a reduction of hours and one day per week of practice time” (Hosick, 2011, para. 11).
2. In the second year where a sport program is under the 930 cut score, in addition to being ineligible for post season competition, the sport program will also be subject to “competition reduction in the traditional or nontraditional season”, which may mean regular season, holiday tournament, or conference game reduction (Hosick, 2011, para. 12).

3. Finally, if a sport program is under the 930 APR cut score for a third straight year, it will not only continue to be ineligible for post season play, but it will also be susceptible to a variety of actions taken by the NCAA, including: “coaching suspensions, financial aid reductions, and restricted NCAA membership” (Hosick, 2011, para. 13).

*APR Challenges and the Future.*

Forde (2006) wrote a landmark piece on the APR when he succinctly predicted that the APR would essentially be the great separator of the “haves and have-nots”. That is, the large Division I schools which generated lots of revenue from the BCS football structure and which could financially support excellent academic support for student athletes would have no problem complying with the APR and keeping their sport programs scores over 925. He predicted that the ones who the APR would not only hurt, but severely punish would be the “have-nots”, or the low resource and non-BCS affiliated Division I institutions which already could barely afford Division I athletics, let alone have the money to increase academic support for student athletes in order to comply with the APR.

Forde (2006) also pointed out that the problem “cuts both ways” because many of these low Division I schools do not truly have the money or the talent to be competing at the Division I level, yet they continue and now place themselves in even more of a precarious position. Forde concluded that once again, the NCAA made a sweeping and generalizing rule for all Division I
sports and did not take into account the staggering financial differences between large schools like University of Tennessee compared to the University of Tennessee-Chattanooga.

Consequently, as the Associated Press (2010), Holden (2010), Mills (2010), Lapchick, Lopresti, and Reshard (2009), and Forde (2006) addressed, the NCAA has and will continue to penalize low resource or non-BCS institutions who fail to comply with the APR standards, but really, the deck is already stacked against these smaller or poorer institutions because, from the start, they cannot financially afford stronger academic support for their student athletes.

Thus, the APR challenge may become a cyclical problem. In addition, Moltz (2010) and Powell (2009) pointed out that all the institutions that received historical APR penalties in 2009 (the first year historical penalties were allowed) were considered low resource or non-BCS institutions.

Hosick (2010) also echoed this point by detailing how the NCAA, as recently as June of 2010, admitted that low resource and non-BCS institutions were having trouble complying with the APR because they do not have the finances to increase academic support services for student athletes. Hosick (2010) and the NCAA (2010) also pointed out that the NCAA has created the Supplemental Support Fund to help these smaller schools with increased academic support costs, as well as required these same schools to turn in Academic Improvement Plans as helpful blueprints showing how they will work to raise their APR scores for sport programs that are not effectively complying.

Rosen (2010) pointed out though that there were some non-BCS institutions like Dayton University which not only complied with the APR’s regulations, but actually ranked above the national average in APR scores for many of their sport programs. But, Rosen mentioned that
Dayton, unlike other non-BCS institutions, has the financial means to be able to build a new study center for student athletes, hire more qualified tutors, and have stricter oversight for APR compliance. Even Conference USA schools have embraced greater APR preparation and academic accountability by having host institutions allow visiting teams to use their study centers and computer labs for academic purposes (Moltz, 2010). These seem to be the exceptions for low resource or non-BCS institutions, not the rule.

Large schools are taking the APR and its compliance rules very seriously as well. Brown (2010) pointed out that University of Iowa recently, in their new head men’s basketball coach’s contract, placed APR incentives for better team performance, showing they are willing to spend more money for a coach who improves his team’s academic performance. In addition, Beard (2010) illustrated how recently the University of North Carolina’s head football Coach, Butch Davis, in the midst of an academic cheating scandal, reemphasized how the APR and his players academic performance was vastly more important than any kind of athletic success or achievement, and that complying with the APR would be a huge step towards academic success.

Another change by the NCAA for the future of intercollegiate athletics is that institutions are now required to attach coaches’ names to their sport program’s APR scores (Associated Press, 2010). This change is designed to not only show how student athletes are doing with their academic performances, but to also publicly hold the coaches accountable for their teams’ academic performances and serve as a healthy fear for coaches to take the APR and their student athletes’ grades seriously.

Oregon State University President Ed Ray even went further by saying how he believed the NCAA will eventually publish lifetime APR scores for all coaches to show their academic
track records at all the schools where they have coached (Bachman, 2010). That way, institutional Presidents and Athletic Directors cannot claim to have not known that a certain coach has a poor track record academically with his or her student athletes.

The hope for the future can be found in the scholarly work of Lapchick, Kaiser, and Hoff (2010) when they wrote how APR scores for NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament teams have improved, and how there are less teams with scores below the cut score of 925. They pointed out that as of the 2010 tournament, there were only nineteen teams below the score of 925, compared to twenty-one in 2009, and thirty five in 2008. In addition, four year average APR scores are up overall for football and men’s basketball (NCAA, 2010). Thus, APR scores seem to be improving within football and men’s basketball, which is a positive sign since these sports (along with baseball) are two of the lowest performing sports historically as far as APR scores go (NCAA, 2010; Powell, 2009).

A study by Christy, Seifried, and Pastore (2008) showed that 64% of athletic administrators and head coaches believe the APR will be a helpful and positive tool for intercollegiate athletics, will provide better accountability for academic performance, and will encourage greater academic support for student athletes among member institutions. It will also encourage coaches and administrators to recruit student athletes who are capable of excelling in the classroom, and handling the academic rigors that college coursework provides. Finally, it will hold institutions more accountable for accurate academic record keeping and institutional grade reporting, which will help raise greater oversight for athletic departments and admissions offices (Brown, 2007).
In addition, a 2010 study by Dr. Josh Castle illustrated that “66% of football programs and 75.7% of BCS member or FBS affiliated athletic departments have increased either money or resources to their academic budgets because of the APR legislation”, and “83.5% of football programs feel they have graduated more student athletes since the inception of the APR” (Castle, 2010, p. 10).

Consequently, this study intends to build on Christy’s (2007) and Castle’s (2010) work regarding Academic Progress Rate (APR) research. More importantly, it intends to fill a void in the lack of APR research in relation to low resource or non-BCS institutions by studying the impact of the APR on these institutional athletic departments as it relates to their two most prominent athletic programs, football and/or men’s basketball. Since there has been no scholarly research to date studying the impact of the APR on these specific institutions, this study not only fills a scholarly need, but also addresses a practitioner need for athletic and academic administrators to learn how to better handle the impact of the APR, especially as it relates to their “revenue generating” sports of football and/or men’s basketball.

**Chapter Summary**

*The single most effective opponent of efforts to “reclaim the game” is inertia. Presidents of colleges and universities have far too much to do; they do not normally seek out issues that they know will be divisive and engender passionate debate, and it is therefore very tempting to just look the other way (Bowen & Levin, 2003, p. 324)*

Intercollegiate athletics has come a tremendously long way since 1906 when President Theodore Roosevelt wanted a governing body to oversee football safety and protect the amateurism of college sports. The NCAA was subsequently established, college sports continued
to grow, and over the last century intercollegiate athletics has grown into a major revenue generating business. However many scholars believed that the growth of intercollegiate athletics has been to the detriment of the academic missions of institutions of higher education. As revenue producing sports such as football and men’s basketball continue to garner national attention and generate hundreds of millions of dollars, student athletes and their educational pursuits often take a backseat to athletic prominence.

These same scholars also believed that college and university Presidents are the ones that were ultimately responsible for letting “big time” college sports grab a foothold on college and university campuses, and these same revenue generating sports of football and men’s basketball are the main culprits in creating a financial divide between major colleges and universities and low resource colleges and universities. Thus, without financial capital, many of these low resource and smaller colleges and universities struggle with achieving academic success with their student athletes.

Consequently, unless these afore mentioned Presidents unite and change the course by reducing the money involved and reemphasizing academic standards, intercollegiate athletics (football and men’s basketball in particular) will continue to grow as more of a professional and commercialistic endeavor instead of being just one part of an undergraduate experience. In turn, low resource college and university athletic departments will continue to financially and academically suffer and lag behind their bigger and more financially prosperous counterparts.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe and illuminate the methodological procedures for this current research study. This specific chapter includes: a). purpose of the study, b). theoretical perspective, c). research design, d). participants, e). instrumentation, f). data collection, g). data analysis, h). research assumptions, i). researcher subjectivity statement, j). limitations, k). logistics/timeline, and l). the chapter summary.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this research study is to evaluate and examine the impact of the Academic Progress Rate (APR) on low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs in light of the five research areas mentioned previously (see Chapter One). The study is based on an interest in athletic administrative leadership, and analyzes the most significant NCAA academic reform measure to date (the APR) in order to see how it impacts athletic departments, athletic administrators, and faculty athletic representatives at low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to their direct work or involvement with the “revenue generating” sports of football and/or men’s basketball. Consequently, based largely on the research and recommendations of Dr. Keith Christy (2008, 2007), as well as indirectly from Dr. Josh Castle’s (2010) research, this study was thus created.
Theoretical Perspective

Pragmatism.

The main theoretical perspective used in this research study was a pragmatic approach to the research topic, instrumentation selection, method design, data triangulation, and data analysis. Creswell (2007) defined pragmatism as a “focus on the outcomes of the research—the actions, situations, and consequences of inquiry—rather than antecedent conditions.” Creswell (2007) went on to say that a pragmatic approach is focused on “solutions to problems,” and the “important aspect of (pragmatic) research is the problem being studied and the questions asked about this problem” (p. 22).

Pragmatism is also geared towards the what and how of research, and four of the five research questions for this study were either what or how questions that sought to be direct in generating data that was intended and purposeful (Creswell, 2007). Finally, Creswell (2009) pointed out that pragmatism uses multiple methods along with different worldviews and a variety of assumptions for various forms of data collection and analysis. He also cited Morgan (2007), Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998), Cherryholmes (1992), Murphy and Rorty (1990), and Rossman and Wilson (1985) as researchers that emphasized pragmatism as an important qualitative theoretical perspective for basic as well as mixed methods research.

I was able to first use pragmatism as a research lens in designing and implementing this study since the desired goals revolved around producing outcomes (emergent themes) that would shed new light on the impact of the APR on low resource or non-BCS institutions as it related to football and/or men’s basketball programs. Second, I was also able to use pragmatism as a lens to simply view the research problem through (possible negative APR impact), and focus on
potential solutions to the problem by asking research questions that were supported with scholarly thought, and were professionally relevant to the research topic. These research questions sought answers that would help information and themes emerge to the forefront, and ultimately provide new clarity regarding the impact of the APR on these institutional athletic departments and specific sport programs. Lastly, as Creswell (2009) pointed out, pragmatism lends itself well to mixed methods research in that it “is not committed to any one system of philosophy and reality” (p. 10), and “applies to mixed methods research in that inquirers draw liberally from both quantities and qualitative assumptions when they engage in their research” (p. 10). Consequently, a pragmatic approach for this study blended well with a simple mixing of research methods, data collection, and analysis, and one believes this mixing ultimately strengthened the chances of significant themes emerging.

Creswell (2007) believed that pragmatism is a strong theoretical perspective for dealing with real world problems. In light of his argument, I thought a pragmatic approach to a real life issue (impact of the APR and APR compliance) would serve well as a balanced and rational approach in combining qualitative commitments of phenomenology (see Chapter Four) with a practical approach to studying individuals’ responses, analyzing financial data from these specific institutions, and comparing these data sets to the institutions’ APR scores for any positive or negative correlations or connections. Thus, pragmatism served as a perspective of real world practice, and can be a great rational balance to theory in conducting research and analyzing data (Patton, 2002).

The second theoretical perspective that was used was phenomenological commitments (mentioned in detail in Chapter Four). The two significant phenomenological commitments (small principles) that were used as lenses to view and interrupt the data were: 1). the idea of
using basic phenomenology to describe how human beings make sense of experiences and phenomena (specifically dealing with the impact of the APR) in order to uncover and draw out hidden insights and emergent themes, and 2). the phenomenological commitment of breaking down the data into a “whole-part-whole” analysis (Vagle, 2009; Patton, 2002).

**Research Design**

As Gratton, Chris, and Jones (2004) and Patton (2002) articulated, there is no one correct or perfect way for doing research. The research topic is based around people’s passions, interests, societal and scholarly needs, and a bevy of other factors. In turn, the research design is created after the topic is introduced, the literature about the subject is read, and the purpose of the research study is clearly established (Gratton, Chris, and Jones, 2004; Patton, 2002).

*Typology.*

Patton (2002) stated that “purpose is the controlling force in research…Therefore the first step in a research process is getting clear about the purpose.” The typology or purpose of this research study was to evaluate and examine the impact of the Academic Progress Rate (APR) on low resource or non-BCS institutions as it related to football and/or men’s basketball programs in light of the five research areas mentioned in Chapter One. The study was based on an interest in athletic administrative leadership, and analyzed the most significant NCAA academic reform measure to date (the APR) in order to see how it impacted athletic departments, athletic administrators, and faculty athletic representatives at low resource or non-BCS institutions as it related to their direct work or involvement with the “revenue generating” sports of football and/or men’s basketball.
As Patton (2002) pointed out, summative evaluation research measures the overall effectiveness of a program or entity, and speaks on whether the processes equal the outcomes that are desired and expected. In the same manner, this research study was a summative evaluation in that the Academic Progress Rate was evaluated by its’ impact on these specific athletic departments, how it has affected athletic directors and athletic administrators in their specific positions, how it has impacted the recruiting philosophy regarding student athletes at these institutions, how it has possibly brought on positive NCAA compliance implementation measures for these athletic departments, and how it has affected the financial bottom lines of these athletic departments and whether net profits (if applicable) are being used to help comply with the APR.

This specific summative evaluation study researched the impact of the APR on low resource or non-BCS institutions, but also whether the pressures of APR compliance produced improved outcomes for academic support services for these specific student athletes in football and men’s basketball. Patton (2002) illustrated this well when he wrote: “Summative evaluations judge overall effectiveness to inform major decisions about whether a program should continue” (p. 216).

Summative Evaluation.

In view of this type of research study, Patton (2002) stated that summative evaluation studies rarely ever rely predominately on qualitative data, but rather use qualitative data as a small part of the bigger statistical and measureable research picture. Therefore, Patton (2002) led to a conclusion that in summative evaluation research, it is frequently accepted and appropriate to use a mixing of both quantitative and qualitative research methods in that qualitative data can
add depth and detail to quantitative findings. Thus, for this research study, the research design was essentially a simple mixed methods design, with two parts of the data being numerical, and one part of the data being open ended responses that were analyzed using simple phenomenological commitments (see Chapter Four) (Vagel, 2009).

Mixed Methods Research.

Mixed methods research can be a very helpful and insightful research design in that by using some measure of both quantitative and qualitative methods, different measures of empirical reality are revealed (Denzin, 1978). In fact, Patton (1987, 1981) believed that by using a mixed methods research approach, it is very possible to not only be creative with data collection and analysis, but also be able to gather the most relevant information possible for evaluation purposes.

In addition, Gratton, Chris, and Jones (2004) believed that historically, qualitative research methods are underused in sport research studies primarily because sport researchers and practitioners have typically preferred statistical data, charts, and tables. But, by using qualitative methods (such as phenomenology) and data (responses to open ended questions), researchers add flexibility to their research study and are able to possibly generate new and hidden information that may tell a deeper story for quantitative data and findings (Gratton, Chris, & Jones, 2004, Jayaratne, 1993).

Smith and Stewart (2001) agreed with this notion when they wrote how quantitative data alone rarely generates deep or hidden information, thus using methods to both statistically analyze and explain a phenomena, and then be able to tell a deeper and richer story about the phenomena, seems very helpful and insightful. In addition, Gratton, Chris, and Jones (2004)
believed that using qualitative methods in conjunction with quantitative methods within the sport research field could only lead to a deeper understanding of information, individuals, and phenomena.

The mixing of research methods occurred between the sets of data and within the different analyses. There were two parts of the research study that used quantitative information (institutional financial information and institutions’ football and/or men’s basketball APR scores), and one part of the research study that used open ended survey questions, which were then qualitatively analyzed using phenomenological commitments (Vagel, 2009).

**Institutional Financial Information.**

The first quantitative data set for this research study came from the federal “Equity in Athletics” website which publishes all higher educational financial data concerning intercollegiate athletics, and ranged from 2003 financial data to 2009 data. This type of quantitative data, broken down by athletic conferences and their specific members, included things such as: average head coaching and assistant coaching salaries, program-specific costs for football and men’s basketball programs per participant, program-specific football and men’s basketball operating expenses and revenues, as well as program specific net profits for these sport programs.

**Institutions’ Football and/or Men’s Basketball APR Scores.**

The second quantitative data set for this research study came from the NCAA website which publishes all of the APR scores for all participating Division I institutions and their specific sport programs. The APR data in this study included low resource or non-BCS football and/or men’s basketball programs single year and multi-year APR scores from 2004-2010.
Online Survey.

The third and qualitative data set for this research study centered on an online survey sent out to a variety of athletic directors, athletic administrators, and faculty athletic representatives at low resource or non-BCS, Division I institutions, and is expounded upon under the “Instrumentation” section.

Purposeful-Criterion Sampling.

The final piece of the research design centered on the sampling procedure, which was purposeful in nature in that it focused on “information rich” individuals who were able to provide answers that illuminated deeper themes and meanings pertaining to the research study (Patton, 2002). In addition, the purposeful sampling used specific criterion to select the targeted individuals for participation in the survey part of the research study.

Participants

According to Sills and Song (2002), Linder, James, Murphy, Tim, and Briers (2001), and Dillman (2000), sampling error can be present in survey research if the targeted sample population does not truly fit the entire specific population, or if there are characteristics in some of the sample population that is not represented in the entire specific population. In addition, Krejcie and Morgan (1970) believed that determining the sample size of a population for survey research should be efficient, specific, and focused. Thus, in order to avoid sampling error, and in the effort to also aid the research study by targeting the specific individuals needed to better understand the impact of the APR on low resource or non-BCS institutions, purposeful, criterion sampling was used to survey only specific individuals with specific occupational duties in athletic administration.
The purposeful, criterion sampling was used to survey only: athletic directors, associate/assistant athletic directors for compliance, associate/assistant athletic directors for academic services, senior woman administrators, compliance/assistant compliance directors, academic services/ assistant academic services directors, and faculty athletic representatives at low resource or non-BCS, Division I institutions that sponsored football and/or men’s basketball.

The participants were both male and female, and were directly involved with a specific branch of athletic administration that either oversaw or dealt in some way with NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR) compliance, or academic support for football and men’s basketball student athletes. The participants were identified by occupational position and title based on information from their institutional or athletic websites.

The participants were recruited from athletic department or academic employees at 275 low resource or non-BCS, Division I institutions, and they were from 21 athletic conferences as well as independent intercollegiate athletic programs. The responses from the participants were kept confidential, the participants’ identities were completely anonymous, and they were only identified by occupational position and athletic conference affiliation.

**Instrumentation**

In addition to the two previously mentioned data sets (institutional financial information and institutions’ APR scores), the instrumentation for the third and qualitative data set was a SurveyMonkey.com, open-ended question survey which featured some basic demographic, occupational, and athletic conference questions, and culminated with the five opened ended questions that were analyzed using phenomenological commitments (see Chapter Four) (Vagel, 2009). This phenomenological analysis was used for the third data set based on the
recommendations of Vagel (2009), and Christy (2007) who articulated the need for further qualitative research into academic reform issues (such as the APR) and athletic administrative leadership.

Web-Based Survey Research.

The World Wide Web has become a very efficient and helpful source for survey research. Kaplowitz, Hadlock, Timothy, and Levine (2004) echoed this point by stating that web-based surveys could be a useful method for scholarly research if used to study groups that regularly use the Internet, in addition to the fact that it can greatly save time and money by providing immediate access to the survey for the participants, and electronic storage capability for information.

In addition, Sills and Song (2002) believed that web-based research surveys sent via email to groups of participants that use email accounts frequently, or on a daily basis, can not only be a powerful research tool, but also can be a great way to generate meaningful and rich results. Gratton and Jones (2004) also believed that a survey or questionnaire in general is an appropriate method for collecting large amounts of data.

Lindner, Murphy, Tim, & Briers (2001) and Dillman (2000) though warned that there are four possible sources for error in sample survey research. They are: 1) sampling error, 2) coverage error, 3) measurement error, 4) and non-response error. Sampling error is a result of non-consistent measuring of characteristics for the participants in the targeted research population. Coverage error exists when the frame from the sample fails to include all the subjects in the population of interest. Measurement error is found in the data collection instrument, and is only reduced when the instrument is valid, reliable, and not confusing to the participants. Non-
response errors exist when participants in the research study fail to provide usable responses, especially when compared with useable and complete responses (Lindner, Murphy, Tim, & Briers, 2001; Dillman, 2000).

On the other hand, Dillman (1991) also wrote how one of the main ways a survey manages to control for error is to ensure that each member of the targeted research population has an equal chance of being included in the research sample. Sills and Song (2002) believed that this inclusion of the targeted research population is more successful when using web based email surveys compared to mail or telephone surveys in that one can reach much more of the targeted research population quicker and more efficiently. Thus, the coverage of a web-based mail survey for the potential participants is greater and allows the researcher to avoid or limit sampling error (Sills & Song, 2002).

For this research study, sampling error was avoided by sending out the survey instrument to an expansive and purposeful criterion sample of athletic directors, athletic administrators, and faculty athletic representatives. In addition, measurement error was reduced by piloting the survey before the final data collection phase to make sure the instrument was valid and reliable. Non-response error was minimized by making the open ended questions short and targeted in nature so that responses could be usable and insightful, and the survey was available to a wide participant pool around the country to generate a larger response base.

Validity.

According to Christy (2007) and Gratton and Jones (2004), validity of the research instrument is one of the most crucial elements to consider when conducting survey research. Validity essentially refers to whether or not the instrument measures what it intends to, and four
of the main subcategories (among others) of validity must be considered in survey research (Christy, 2007; Gratton & Jones, 2004). Those categories are: 1) internal and external validity, 2) construct validity, 3) content validity, 4) and face validity.

Internal validity ensures that one can draw valid conclusions about the effects of one variable on another (Christy, 2007; Gratton & Jones, 2004). External validity refers to whether the findings of a research study can be attributed to participants and environments outside of the targeted research population (Christy, 2007; Gratton & Jones, 2004). For this research study, internal validity was identified by participants’ affirming responses on the pilot study (mentioned later in this chapter) stating that indeed the NCAA APR was impacting low resource or non-BCS institutions as it related to football and/or men’s basketball programs.

Construct validity seeks to establish a connection between the theoretical concepts of the research study and what is being measured on the instrument (Carmines & Zeller, 1979). It was found in this study by structuring the instrument questions in a pragmatic way that worked in harmony with the phenomenological commitments outlined in detail in Chapter Four. This was accomplished by the questions being direct and purposeful, and drawing out insights and meanings of how these participants made sense of their experiences dealing with the APR (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Bentz, Valerie, & Shapiro, 1998). As a result, participants’ responses were also direct, almost always addressed what the questions specifically asked, and were extremely insightful.

Content validity is when questions or items on an instrument represent what is being measured (Christy, 2007; Gratton & Jones, 2004; Carmines & Zeller, 1979). Content validity was identified in two ways: First, it was identified by using other scholars’ work and information
on the APR to formulate and tweak the research questions on a continual basis until the surveys were ready for delivery. Second, it was also identified in the testing phase through the pilot study in that participants’ responses and the financial information led the researcher to believe that the five open ended survey questions specifically addressed and measured the impact, pressures, potential recruiting changes, compliance improvements, and financial issues related to NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR) compliance.

Face validity simply refers to whether the instrument and questions made sense to a participant based on their first impressions, or “first glance” (Christy, 2007; Gratton & Jones, 2004). This type of validity came through piloting the study to see what questions seemed to make sense to the first wave of participants and what questions needed to be improved due to lack of response or confusing response by the participants. It also came through discussion with my doctoral committee about the appropriateness and applicability of the questions, and finally came through a strong response rate (33.6%) by participants in the main dissertation survey showing that indeed the research questions made sense to participants and were straightforward enough to answer.

Reliability.

Reliability refers to the knowledge that the instrument does not contain measurement or random error (Christy, 2007; Carmines & Zeller, 1979). The goal for the instrument is to be reliable in that continual measurements of the instrument promote similar or identical results (Christy, 2007). Christy (2007) and Gratton and Jones (2004) went so far as to say that reliability was simply having the ability to garner the same results if the research study were to be repeated.
For this research study, the reliability was found in the fact that the pilot study essentially generated the information that was sought, giving confidence that the main dissertation survey could produce the same results on a much larger scale. Thus, since the sampling was purposeful-criterion (specific low resource or non-BCS institutions and specific participants), I was confident, based on the pilot study and main dissertation survey results to the open-ended research questions, that both instruments and research questions not only generated similar responses from athletic directors, athletic administrators, and faculty athletic representatives, but showed the initial pilot study data and results to be almost identically the same as the data and results found on a larger national scale. Thus, the instrument proved to be extremely accurate and reliable for both the pilot study and main dissertation survey in that they both showed the APR is tremendously and negatively impacting low resource and non-BCS institutions as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs.

Piloting the Study.

A pilot study refers to a small scale administration of the survey prior to the full research study data collection effort (Gratton & Jones, 2004). Gratton and Jones (2004) believed that an initial pilot study is crucial for the testing of the instrument in that it helps check the wording and sequence of questions, allows the researcher to test a sample of the targeted research population, and gives the researcher practice in analyzing the data in line with one’s specific research methods.

Pilot Study Instrument.

The pilot study survey instrument was initially demographic, occupational, and athletic conference questions in addition to three open ended research questions, and was piloted over a
four week span starting January 10th, 2011 through Sunday, February 6th, 2011. The fourth research question was not added until after analyzing the pilot study and other financial information, and realizing that a question needed to be asked to identify where potential net profits were being spent by these specific athletic departments.

Participants.

The survey was sent out to four low resource or non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments, from three different athletic conferences in the southeastern United States, with a total of 28 participants contacted. Ten participants responded fully to the survey, for a 35.7% response rate. The participants were occupationally categorized on the survey into: 1) Faculty Athletic Representative, 2) Athletic Director, 3) Senior Woman Administrator, 4) Assistant/Associate Athletic Director for Compliance/ Director of Compliance, 5) Director of Academic Services/ Student Services, 6) or other.

Data Collection.

The pilot study data was collected using a modified (five email contacts) Dillman (2000) “Tailored Design Method.” Participants were initially contacted with the first email introducing them to the purpose of the study, explaining why their assistance in the study was beneficial, and directing them to the link for the survey.

A week after participants received the first email, a second contact email was sent again thanking the participants who had already taken the survey, asking for the participants who had not yet taken the survey to please accommodate the research study and fill out the survey, and directing those participants again to the link for the survey.
A week after participants received the second email, a third contact email was sent with the same thankful wishes and survey request, along with the survey link.

Then, after three weeks of contacts, a fourth and final contact email was sent thanking the participants who had completed the survey, and asking the participants who had yet to do so, to please take the time to fill the survey out to aid the research. The link for the survey was also included one final time.

Finally, a fifth email was sent to all the participants simply thanking them for their kindness and cooperation with the pilot study, and for helping to aid in scholarly research regarding the impact of the NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR) on low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs.

Pilot Study Results.

The pilot study was successful in that it not only had a strong response rate (35.7%), but also had responses from both males and females, all six occupational categories, all three conferences, a wide range of participant ages (26-59), a wide range in years of occupational experience (6 months–16 years), and rich and informative responses to the open ended research questions.

Data Collection

For the main dissertation study, the data was collected in three parts: 1) institutional financial information, 2) institutional APR scores for football and men’s basketball programs, 3) and a final, five open ended question survey to athletic directors, athletic administrators, and
faculty athletic representatives at Division I, low resource or non-BCS institutions that sponsor football and/or men’s basketball.

**Institutional Financial Information.**

For the first data set, the institutional financial information was collected from the “Equity in Athletics” federal website, starting around January 17th, 2011. The financial information was collected for each member of specific intercollegiate athletic conferences, and the data was on things such as: 1) average head coach and assistant coach salaries, 2) program-specific athletically related male student aid, 3) program-specific recruiting expenses, 4) program-specific operating expenses per participant, 5) program-specific operating game day expenses, 6) program-specific total expenses, 7) program-specific gross revenues, 8) and program-specific net profits. The available institutional financial information was from 2003-2009.

**NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR) Scores.**

The second data set collected was the multi-year NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR) institutional scores for football and/or men’s basketball programs, from the 2004-2005 season through the 2009-2010 season. The scores were collected for the member institutions and then organized by their conference affiliation, with designations for football and/or men’s basketball APR scores that were under either 925 (first cut score- contemporaneous penalties) or 900 (second cut score- historical penalties).
The third and final data set collected was a five question open-ended survey that had been previously piloted in the early spring of 2011. This survey also included basic demographic, occupational, and conference affiliation questions just like the pilot study survey.

The researcher again used SurveyMonkey.com, and the survey was sent out to athletic directors, athletic administrators, and faculty athletic representatives at 275 low resource or non-BCS institutions from 21 Division I athletic conferences as well as to Division I independents. A modified Dillman “Tailored Design Method” was used for conducting the survey in that there were four email contacts to the targeted participant population, and the contacting was done from October 3rd, 2011 to November 7th, 2011 (Dillman, 2000).

The modified Dillman “Tailored Design Method” was used in that it was recommended by Dr. Keith Christy (2007) in his dissertation work surveying athletic administrators on a variety of intercollegiate athletic topics, and more importantly, the three main participation contacts ensured that appropriate sampling protocols and procedures were used to maximize the response rate from the targeted sample (Dillman, 2000). In addition, Dillman (2000) believed that through this method of multiple contacting with a reliable instrument, the researcher will maximize participation and maintain a high enough response rate where non-response will not be a threat to external validity.

Participants were initially contacted with the first email introducing them to the purpose of the study, explaining why their assistance in the study was beneficial, and directing them to the link for the survey.
A week after participants received the first email, a second contact email was sent again thanking the participants who had already taken the survey, asking for the participants who had not yet taken the survey to please accommodate the research study and fill out the survey, and directing those participants again to the link for the survey.

A week after participants received the second email, a third and final contact email was sent thanking the participants who had completed the survey, and asking the participants who had yet to do so, to please take the time to fill the survey out to aid in the research. The link for the survey was also included one final time.

Finally, a fourth email was sent to all the participants simply thanking them for their kindness and cooperation with the study, and for helping to aid in scholarly research regarding the impact of the NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR) on low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs.

Triangulation.

Triangulation is taking three different data sets or pieces of information and comparing and contrasting them together for emergent results and insights. Thus, collecting three different but insightful data sets (institutional financial information, APR scores, and the open ended question survey) with different methods helped me be able to triangulate or validate the data, and strengthen the power and usefulness of the research study (Denzin, 1978). The main way this was accomplished in my study was that I took participants’ responses to the open ended survey questions, and if participants responded that their programs and athletic departments were losing money, then those specific responses were compared to their programs’ financial information
Data Analysis

The data analysis for this research study was comprised of both quantitative and qualitative research methods in analyzing the three different data sets mentioned previously. The quantitative analysis for the sport program-specific institutional financial information involved basic financial figures, as well as using the APR data for comparison and contrasting purposes with the financial information.

The open ended question survey responses were analyzed using phenomenological commitments to create a data analysis code set used to draw out how the varied athletic directors, athletic administrators, and faculty athletic representatives made sense of the impact and pressures of the APR, how the impact and pressures transformed their beliefs and thoughts, in addition to their daily lives both individually and collectively as part of a group (see Chapter Four). Responses from each question were categorized based on identical or similar information, and then analyzed further for frequency. As a result, the final data from each specific research question stemmed from the creation of the data analysis code set, and resulted in every research questions’ responses being analyzed using phenomenological commitments in order to help insights and beliefs emerge from the data, and then be categorized based on identical or similar information given so that a “whole-part-whole” analysis could be completed (see Chapter Four).

Finally, the institutional financial information and APR scores were also used directly with the survey responses to validate or challenge the athletic directors’, athletic administrators’, and faculty athletic representatives’ responses on a variety of issues involving the impact of and

and APR scores to see if whether their responses were validated by a lack of money and poor APR scores.
pressures from APR compliance as it related to football and/or men’s basketball programs. The specific analysis for each research question appears after each question, and the following research questions guided this entire study:

**RQ1: How has the APR impacted your athletic department as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball?**

**Analysis:** The responses for research question number one were analyzed using phenomenological commitments to draw out themes and meanings regarding the participants’ views of how the APR and its’ compliance has affected their collective athletic departments as it related to football and men’s basketball. The phenomenological lens for this question was looking at their thoughts and beliefs on wide ranging impact as it related to their athletic departments and their football and/or men’s basketball programs.

Further, the program-specific financial data and APR scores were also used for this question in seeking to corroborate potential responses of a negative impact of the APR on an athletic department as it related to football and/or men’s basketball programs in that the researcher could compare low APR scores and financial losses to potential negative impact responses. Thus, using the financial information, APR scores, and responses in the data triangulation to determine how many institutional athletic departments believed they were negatively impacted by the APR as it related to these two sports, and also possessed underperforming APR scores and negative net profits for these sports at some point from 2005-2009.
RQ2: How have the pressures of complying with the APR affected your direct work or involvement with the football and/or men’s basketball program?

Analysis: The responses from research question number two were analyzed using phenomenological commitments to help draw out participants’ thoughts, beliefs, and ideas on the pressures of APR compliance for their specific job positions and direct work or involvement with football and/or men’s basketball. The goal for this question was to analyze responses on a micro level to possibly uncover which occupational positions were being most affected by the pressures of APR compliance.

RQ3: How has the APR impacted the type of student athlete your coaches now recruit?

Analysis: The responses for question three were analyzed using phenomenological commitments to simply see if the impact of the APR had any effect on the type of football or men’s basketball student athletes that low resource or non-BCS institutions are now recruiting, and whether the same APR impact has also affected recruiting philosophies and strategies as it relates to these sport programs.

RQ4: What are any positive changes in implementation measures for academic support concerning football and/or men’s basketball that resulted from the pressures of APR compliance?

Analysis: The responses from research question number four were analyzed using phenomenological commitments to draw out positive change implementation measures that transformed the participants and their athletic departments’ thoughts, beliefs, and actions regarding academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball programs. The goal for this question was a deeper uncovering of best practices by any participants and their athletic
departments that were having success with APR compliance despite possibly losing money athletically.

Then, the APR scores were also used in the analysis to corroborate any positive responses in terms of APR compliance success. Finally, the average institutional financial information was added last in the analysis to see whether the participants’ and athletic departments’ APR compliance had anything to do with positive financial net profits, or whether they were succeeding with APR compliance in some ways despite having financial losses for their football and/or men’s basketball programs.

RQ5: Where is your athletic department spending their net profit (if applicable), and is a portion or all of the net profit being put back into academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball programs?

Analysis: The fifth and final research question responses were analyzed using phenomenological commitments for greater depth into the financial spending of the participants and their athletic departments. The responses were analyzed in two parts: 1). Responses were phenomenologically analyzed to gather insights into where net profits (if applicable) were being spent and whether they were being put back into academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball. 2). Then, after the responses were categorized, the participants’ insights and beliefs (identified based on their institutional email address) were triangulated in the analysis in a few ways:

a). If participants answered “NA”, or “No Net Profit/None” then their responses were compared to their football and/or men’s basketball APR scores and net profits from 2005-2009 to
see if whether their responses of not having net profit correlated with underperforming APR scores and negative net profit for their football and/or men’s basketball programs.

b). In the same way, if the participants answered flatly “No”, then the same triangulation was conducted as in section (a) because I sought to uncover whether these institutions simply did not spend their net profit on academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball, yet may still have had underperforming APR scores and negative net profits at some point from 2005-2009.

c). Finally, if the participants responded “Yes,” or “Money Is Put Back Into Academic Support Services,” then the same data triangulation was conducted as in sections (a) and (b) in order to see if there was a positive change for these institutions regarding whether there was acceptable APR scores and positive net profits at some point from 2005-2009 for their football and/or men’s basketball programs, or whether they possessed underperforming APR scores and negative net profit despite putting money into academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball.

**Research Assumptions**

There are a few assumptions that I possessed in light of this specific research study:

First, I assumed that the admitted problems (by the institutions, the NCAA, and academic scholars) for low resource or non-BCS institutions in terms of NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR) compliance were valid, and the main cause for this poor APR compliance and academic support for football and/or men’s basketball programs and their student athletes is lack of financial resources.
In addition, I believed that through data triangulation, the financial institutional information and open ended survey responses would corroborate the low APR scores for many low resource or non-BCS institutions, and thus prove that the admitted concerns are valid and need to be addressed.

Third, I believed that the specific institutional financial information and open ended survey responses would show that many low resource or non-BCS institutions are not only losing money, but that this loss of money is directly tied to the quality of academic support for football and/or men’s basketball, in addition to the ability (or inability) to handle APR compliance issues for these athletic departments.

This lack of financial resources could be played out in many ways including a lack of support personnel for these specific tasks, but it is assumed that the majority of these problems stem from a lack of net profitability, and a majority of the solutions revolve around generating more money for academic support services and compliance personnel of these affected athletic departments.

Fourth, I assumed that the survey responses from the many participants involved with intercollegiate athletics and academics at these low resource or non-BCS institutions would be very rich, insightful, and honest about the impact of, the pressures from, and the financial problems involving the NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR). I believed that the open ended question format of the survey would be incredibly beneficial in illuminating deeper thoughts, beliefs, meanings, and themes from the participants’ experiences, and I assumed that the participants’ responses would outline a severity involved with APR compliance for low resource
or non-BCS institutions that has not been addressed or illuminated before within the academic world and scholarly works.

Finally, I assumed that through the multitude of open-ended survey responses, some participants would have some positive change implementation measures regarding APR compliance for football and/or men’s basketball programs that could be shared with other athletic directors and athletic administrators in similar institutional and financial situations. Consequently, I assumed that this research study could also help generate and distribute positive APR compliance measures from which other low resource or non-BCS institutions and athletic departments could potentially learn from and even incorporate themselves.

Thus, this research study was assumed to be serving the purpose of new and important research for the academic community, as well as for the practitioner community of Division I intercollegiate athletic directors and administrators at low resource or non-BCS institutions.

Researcher Subjectivity Statement

I am a twenty eight year old, Caucasian male, originally from Athens, Georgia, although he has lived in Chattanooga, Tennessee, as well as Fort Collins, Colorado. I graduated with a bachelor’s degree in History and Secondary Education with a Georgia teaching certification in 2005 from Covenant College in Lookout Mountain, Georgia, and also completed a master’s degree in Sport Management from the University of Georgia in 2008.

For this research study, I had a specific interest in this angle of intercollegiate athletics and athletic administration in that I have spent seven of the last ten years involved with intercollegiate athletics through playing men’s college basketball at the NAIA level as a student athlete, coaching men’s college basketball at the Division I and NAIA levels, and serving as an
athletic administrator at the NAIA level while helping an institution transition to NCAA Division III status.

Thus, I am not only interested in and passionate about intercollegiate athletics and athletic leadership, but I also have experienced life as: a student athlete having to balance academics and men’s basketball playing duties, as a coach having to monitor player academics and interact with academic support services and compliance departments, and as an athletic administrator having to deal with and interpret NCAA legislation as it applies to men’s basketball student athletes, athletic departments, and colleges and universities.

In addition, I have coached at a large Division I institution of twenty two thousand students, but also have a strong understanding of small college or university life having been a student athlete, a head men’s basketball coach, and an athletic administrator at an institution of twelve hundred students.

Consequently, I have a strong understanding of the financial hardships of coaches, athletic directors, and athletic administrators at smaller institutions with low financial resources, and the difficulties to not only operate athletic programs without losing too much money, but also trying to have enough financial resources to pay assistant coaches, support staff, academic tutors, compliance officials, and other individuals who would help with student athlete academic success. Thus, I can empathize with low resource or non-BCS institutions that struggle to financially operate intercollegiate athletics, and whose budgets are incredibly small and tight year to year.

Furthermore, since I have spent multiple years at a mid major Division I institution as one of many men’s basketball coaches on staff, I not only understand the revenue generating sport of
men’s basketball, but also the NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR) and all the details of complying with the academic measure. In addition, I have lived the experiences of dealing with the pressures of APR compliance, have watched as men’s basketball student athletes transfer while ineligible, and have witnessed the negative impact from athletic administrators and the NCAA for failing to comply with APR rules and regulations.

So, I brought a strong background of intercollegiate athletics to the research study at hand, but one of the major things that I was lacking was a direct viewpoint of all the NCAA compliance issues from the standpoint of an athletic director, academic support services or compliance director, or faculty athletic representative. Thus, this research study did not analyze the impact of the APR on coaches at low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs, but rather it was structured towards the thoughts, feelings, viewpoints and beliefs of athletic directors, athletic administrators, and faculty athletic representatives regarding the specific issues at hand.

The athletic administrative leadership area is one area of intercollegiate athletics where I have not spent much time in. Consequently, for new research and learning purposes, I wanted to learn new thoughts and opinions from an athletic administrative standpoint on a current and significant topic, with the possibility of one day having athletic administrative responsibilities as part of an academic career, or pursuing athletic administrative leadership as another possible career option.

Therefore, this research study sought to not only analyze something that has been under-researched academically (the impact of the APR on low resource or non-BCS institutions), and is a major need practitioner wise (admitted by the actual institutions and the NCAA), but also the
research study wanted to be undertaken so that I could gain more knowledge and insight into the lives of athletic directors and athletic administrators for possible career preparation as an academician that interacts with athletics, or as an athletic director at the intercollegiate level.

**Limitations**

The first possible limitation to this study was that the scope and purpose of this research study was very focused and narrow in that it only researched the impact of the NCAA Academic Progress Rate on low resource or non-BCS institutions as it related to *football and/or men’s basketball* programs. Consequently a multitude of other men’s and women’s sports were excluded from this study. Thus, generalizations could not be made from this specific research study and applied to other intercollegiate athletic sports, including other underperforming APR sport programs such as baseball or women’s track and field.

A second possible limitation was this study did not research or examine coaches’ opinions or perceptions regarding the impact of the APR on low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs. This purpose was so that the research would be purely from an athletic administrative leadership perspective, but I do acknowledge that coaches may also have potentially significant insights into these issues.

A third possible limitation was that the open-ended question survey instrument used for the third and qualitative data set only included five open ended response questions, and thus could have lacked potential breadth in terms of the number of questions asked. I could have included more questions on the survey instrument, but one believed that by having only five open ended response questions, the topics were targeted and specific, and yielded only specific answers, not vague responses. I understood that a shorter amount of questions could be very
helpful in framing specific questions with specific answers, but also could be viewed by some as limiting contextual responses or chances for other themes and insights to emerge.

A fourth and final limitation could have been that the open-ended question survey instrument was sent via email to potential participants during the data collection stage. Thus, it could have been limited in some ways due to historically mentioned problems of internet and email based survey research such as: participants deleting the email thinking it was junk mail, incorrect email addresses, internet security issues, internet connectivity and delivery issues, or participants ignoring the email due to busyness and/or overloaded email inboxes (Kaplowitz, Hadlock, Timothy, & Levine, 2004; Sills & Song, 2002). But, as seen in Chapters Four and Five, the overall response rate from participants was 33.6%, thus showing significance in the frequency of responses, and success in terms of delivery.

Logistics/Timeline

The timeline for this research study was as follows:

First, the first two data sets consisting of the institutional financial information and the institution specific APR data started being collected around January 17th, 2011. Both of the data sets were worked on as ongoing projects until the collection of the information was complete. Once the information was complete, it was then paired with the survey data from the third and final data set for analysis and discussion.

Second, the third and final data set consisting of the open-ended five question survey that was analyzed using phenomenological commitments was initially sent out to participants on Monday, October 3rd, 2011. The data collection phase for this specific data set lasted for a total of four weeks, and ended on Monday, October 31st, 2011. The first week of this data collection
phase consisted of an introductory email to the participants explaining the study. The next two weeks consisted of participant contacts asking for their participation in the research study based on their completion of the survey. The four and final week was one last email to the participants thanking them for their help with and participation in the research study.

Finally, after October 31st, 2011, the three data sets were analyzed, compared, and contrasted based on the research theme of: the impact of the NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR) on low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs. Then, based on the data analysis process, the fourth chapter of results, and the fifth and final discussion chapter were subsequently written starting in December of 2011, and finished in the early spring of 2012.

**Chapter Summary**

This research study covered a scholarly need for new research since the NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR) had not been studied from the perspective of low resource or non-BCS institutions, and it also covered a practitioner need in that the NCAA and the actual institutions have admitted that the APR is negatively affecting low resource or non-BCS institutions, especially as it relates to their football and/or men’s basketball programs. Thus, this research study sought to analyze the impact of the APR on these institutions’ athletic departments, as well as their football and/or men’s basketball programs.

The research study was a summative evaluation study in that it researched the impact of the APR on these specific institutions, but it also researched whether the pressures of APR compliance produced improved outcomes for academic support services for these specific student athletes in football and/or men’s basketball.
Five research questions guided this study, and these same five questions were also the questions used on the third data set, which was an open-ended question survey. The responses from the survey were then analyzed using phenomenological commitments within the qualitative research tradition (see Chapter Four).

The other two data sets were quantitative in nature, and encompassed program specific financial data from low resource or non-BCS institutional athletic departments, as well as their football and/or men’s basketball APR scores from the last seven years. The quantitative data was then used to help analyze, validate, or contradict the open-ended survey responses. Thus, this study incorporated data triangulation and was essentially a lighter version of a mixed methods research study.

The sample of participants included athletic directors, athletic administrators, and faculty athletic representatives of all the NCAA Division I institutions that were considered low resource or non-BCS members, and the sampling method was purposeful criterion sampling.

The quantitative data collection phases started around January 17th, 2011, and were intertwined with the third and final qualitative data collection phase for the open ended question, online survey, which lasted from Monday, October 3rd, 2011 to Monday, October 31st, 2011.
CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

The purpose of this research study was to evaluate and examine the impact of the Academic Progress Rate (APR) on low resource or non-BCS institutions as it related to football and/or men’s basketball programs in light of the five research areas mentioned in Chapter 1. The study was based on an interest in athletic administrative leadership, and analyzed the most significant NCAA academic reform measure to date (the APR) in order to see how it impacted athletic departments, athletic administrators, and faculty athletic representatives at low resource or non-BCS institutions as it related to their direct work or involvement with the “revenue generating” sports of football and/or men’s basketball. There was also the hope that positive APR best practices could be gleaned from the research so that the helpful implementation information could be shared with similar institutions facing the same academic support challenges. Consequently, based largely on the research and recommendations of Dr. Keith Christy (2008, 2007), as well as indirectly from Dr. Josh Castle’s (2010) research, this study was thus created.

This chapter provides the results of the study, and is divided into seven sections. 1). data sample information, 2). demographic information of the participants, 3). a brief analysis of the research instrument, 4). phenomenological commitments used in generating the results, 5). the use of the data analysis code set used in categorizing the results and generating frequencies of
responses, 6). results of the five open-ended research questions that guided this study, 7). and a brief summary of the chapter.

**Data Sample**

The entire target population for this research study was 882 potential participants at low resource or non-BCS institutions. The survey targeted: athletic directors, associate/assistant athletic directors for compliance, associate/assistant athletic directors for academic services, senior woman administrators, compliance/assistant compliance directors, academic services/assistant academic services directors, and faculty athletic representatives at low resource or non-BCS, Division I institutions that sponsored football and/or men’s basketball. The institutions were from 21 athletic conferences as well as NCAA Division I institutions. A complete list of the athletic conferences can be found in Table 4.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conference</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. America East Conference</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. *Atlantic 10 Conference</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Atlantic Sun Conference</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Big Sky Conference</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Big South Conference</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Big West Conference</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Colonial Athletic Association</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Great West Conference</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Horizon Conference</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Ivy League</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Metro Atlantic Athletic</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. Missouri Valley Conference</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n. Northeast Conference</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. Ohio Valley Conference</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p. Patriot League</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q. Pioneer Football League</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r. Southern Conference</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s. Southland Conference</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t. Southwestern Athletic</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u. Summit League</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v. West Coast Conference</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w. Division I Independent</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Answered question</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>282</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skipped question</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Denotes Largest Percentage
The participants were initially contacted via email with the first email introducing them to the purpose of the study, explaining why their assistance in the study was beneficial, and directing them to the link for the survey.

A week after participants received the first email, a second contact email was sent again thanking the participants who had already taken the survey, asking for the participants who had not yet taken the survey to please accommodate the research study and fill out the survey, and directing those participants again to the link for the survey.

A week after participants received the second email, a third and final contact email was sent thanking the participants who had completed the survey, and asking the participants who
had yet to do so, to please take the time to fill the survey out to aid in the research. The link for the survey was also included one final time.

Finally, a fourth email was sent to all the participants simply thanking them for their kindness and cooperation with the study, and for helping to aid in scholarly research regarding the impact of the NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR) on low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs.

A total of 297 (out of 882) participants completed the survey or the majority of the survey questions, for a 33.6% response rate. A list of identified participants who completed the survey or the majority of the survey questions can be found in Table 4.2, and the specific details about each answered question will be addressed in the specific tables.

For this research study, sampling error was avoided by sending out the survey instrument to an expansive and purposeful, criterion sample of athletic directors, athletic administrators, and faculty athletic representatives. In addition, measurement error was reduced by piloting the survey before the final data collection phase to make sure the instrument was valid and reliable (see chapter 3). Non-response error was minimized by making the open ended questions short and targeted in nature so that responses could be usable and insightful, and the survey was available to a wide participant pool (882 targeted participants) around the country to generate a larger response base.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Faculty Athletic Rep.</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Athletic Director</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: List of Identified Participants
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c. Senior Woman Administrator</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. *Assistant/Associate Athletic Director for Compliance/</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of Compliance/Compliance Personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Director of Academic Services/Student Services/Academic Support Personnel</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Other (please specify)</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Answered question** 282

**Skipped question** 15

* Denotes Largest Percentage
Demographic Information

Demographic information was collected for this research study for a better understanding of the target population so that one could know specific characteristics about the athletic administrators and faculty athletic representatives involved with the oversight and implementation of the NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR) at these low resource or non-BCS institutions. Each participant was asked to supply the following information: 1) number of years experience at your current institution, 2) number of years with current institution, 3) age, 4) gender, 5) race/ethnicity, 6) position you currently hold, and 7) conference your institution is affiliated with. The collected data showed that 50.9% of the participants were female, while
49.1% of the participants were male. Thus, it was close to an even split in terms of gender representation.

In terms of race/ethnicity, the numbers were overwhelmingly in favor of Caucasian/White participants. 229 participants identified themselves as Caucasian/White (81.5%), 43 participants identified themselves as African American/Black (15.3%), 5 participants identified themselves as Hispanic (1.8%), 3 participants identified themselves as other (1.1%), 2 participants identified themselves as Asian American (0.7%), and 1 participant identified himself or herself as Native American (0.4%).

The average age of the participant was 43.1 years old, and the average number of years of experience at their current position was 7.4 years. Finally, the average number of years with their current institution was 10.9 years. Additional demographic information can be found in tables 4.3 and 4.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Low Range</th>
<th>High Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of years at current position</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of years at current institution</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Female</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answered question</td>
<td></td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Response Percent</td>
<td>Response Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. African American/Black</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. *Caucasian/White</td>
<td>81.5%</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Asian American</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Hispanic</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Native American</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Other (please specify)</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Answered question** 281

**Skipped question** 16

* Denotes Largest Percentage
It is no surprise that the two participant positions with the highest response rates were athletic administrators in compliance and academic support services, the two areas that deal directly with the oversight of the APR and academic support implementation measures. But, one interesting and surprising result from the data was that athletic directors had the third highest response rate, thus showing a clear indication that the top leaders of athletic departments care very much about the impact of the APR on their “revenue producing sports”, as well as showing a possible greater involvement with APR oversight than originally thought. It is clear though from the response data that the impact of the APR on low resource or non-BCS institutions does not just affect compliance and academic support, but rather it affects and involves athletic directors as well.
Phenomenological Commitments

There are a variety of theoretical perspectives considered to be valid and useful in modern research. From a qualitative perspective, Creswell (1998) proposed five theoretical perspectives that he believes to be significant in research: biography, phenomenology, hermeneutics, critical inquiry, and post-modernism. In terms of analyzing the results, the major qualitative commitments came from phenomenological ideals, or as Patton (2002) put it, “focusing on how human beings make sense of experience, and how that experience is transformed into consciousness, both individually and as shared meaning.” This is important in that to study the impact of the NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR), one must first view the impact of the APR through a lens like phenomenology in that one cannot understand anything unless first understanding how something makes sense to someone else, how it transforms their beliefs and thoughts, and how it impacts their actions and daily lives both individually and collectively as part of a group.

In the same manner, Creswell (1998) believed that phenomenology is a major qualitative tradition, and Denzin and Lincoln (2000) believed that phenomenology can also be used as an interpretive theory to better understand hidden meanings and themes. Harper (2000) and Schultz (1970, 1967) elaborated on this when they write how phenomenology can be incredibly useful as a social science analytical perspective, thus making a qualitative theoretical perspective a very rational and clear method of research, instead of it simply lying in the realm of theory. In other words, phenomenology is not just used for theory, but also to logically and rationally analyze information for greater depth into individuals’ lived experiences, thoughts, feelings, and environments.
Bentz and Shapiro (1998) added to the value of phenomenology when they wrote how it is designed to get at a better understanding of individuals’ personal lived experiences by illuminating rich and helpful information based on individuals’ own terms. In other words, phenomenology and its’ commitments should not be used to study a large group or organization only holistically, but rather it is designed to study individuals AND large groups or organizations by starting and ending with the specific individuals involved, and generating information from their personal perspectives.

This idea fit this specific research study perfectly in that the whole goal was to research and understand the impact of the NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR) on low resource or non-BCS institutions and their football and/or men’s basketball programs as viewed and seen by the individuals involved (athletic directors, athletic administrators, and faculty athletic representatives). Thus, in this research study, and specifically in analyzing the data and producing the results, phenomenological commitments served as the “intellectual X-ray” to show the deeper impact of the APR on these individuals, the specific sport programs, and their athletic departments (Bentz & Shapiro, 1998).

Also, as Bentz and Shapiro (1998) stated, phenomenology is supposed to be direct research, with direct questions looking for deep and specific answers. Consequently, this is where phenomenology can both be methodical and analytical, with it serving as a very purposeful theoretical approach to research (Patton, 2002; Harper, 2000; Schultz, 1970, 1967). This was very significant for this research study in that phenomenological commitments were used to analyze the five research questions which sought to be direct and specific in nature, and generate detailed and targeted responses about the impact of the APR and pressures of APR compliance.
Finally, Bentz and Shapiro (1998) pointed out that phenomenology is most useful when analyzing a phenomenon that has not previously been studied or researched. They believed this theoretical perspective serves best when there is nothing closely related to the phenomena, and thus can be the first and initial set of detailed experiences, descriptions, thoughts, and feelings.

This idea validated this research study in that one of the main issues with APR research was that nothing scholarly had been done to this point in terms of analyzing the impact of the APR on low resource or non-BCS institutions (Christy, 2007). The only scholarly research to date had been largely done from the perspective of large, BCS member institutions that generated potentially large amounts of revenue from football (see Chapters One-Three). Consequently, low resource or non-BCS institutions at the Division I level not only struggled financially and with APR compliance, but were under-researched in terms of scholarly production. Thus, phenomenological commitments allowed the researcher to directly understand the impact of the APR on this specific group of individuals and institutions, but it also served as a helpful theoretical perspective in adding new insight into a previously empty phenomena.

It needs to be pointed out that this research study was not a typical or entire phenomenological research study, but rather simple phenomenological commitments (small principles) were used in the data analysis to produce the results expounded upon further in this chapter. The two significant commitments that were used as lenses to view and interrupt the data were the ideas of using basic phenomenology to describe how human beings make sense of experiences and phenomena (specifically dealing with the impact of the APR) in order to uncover and draw out hidden insights and emergent themes, and the phenomenological commitment of breaking down the data into a “whole-part-whole” analysis (Vagle, 2009; Patton, 2002).
As mentioned previously, Patton (2002) did a great job of articulating how a phenomenological commitment can be helpful in interpreting “how human beings make sense of experience and how that experience is then transformed into consciousness both as individual and shared meaning” (p. 104). This fit the data analysis perfect in generating results in that all five open ended questions were trying to get at specific details of how athletic administrators and faculty athletic representatives interacted with the APR and dealt with its’ impact, how it affected them individual and collectively as part of an institution and athletic department, how it affected their financial bottom lines, and what was being done to positively deal with the impact of the APR. By using this phenomenological commitment or “intellectual x ray” to analyze and interpret the data, I was able to better see how these participants interacted with the APR and made sense of its’ impact and ripple effects (Patton, 2002; Bentz & Shapiro, 1998). Consequently, the results that were generated and are presented below better represent the participants’ thoughts, feelings, and beliefs, and more clearly give an insight into the impact of the APR on low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs.

In addition, Vagle’s (2009) phenomenological commitment of using a “whole-part-whole” (pp. 600-601) analysis to generate significant and meaningful results was used so that the results section of this research study could actually show emergent and substantive themes brought on by taking a large phenomena (the impact of the APR) and applying specific and targeted research questions to it, generating participants responses to the questions, and then analyzing the responses for insightful and significant frequencies. Thus, the “whole-part-whole” process is represented by: a) the initial “whole” being the five research questions that guided the study, b). the middle “part” being the participants responses to each specific research question
and categorized by significant and emergent themes, c). and the final and conclusive “whole” being the frequency of each response category within every research question in order to show the most significant and consistent results.

Consequently, these two phenomenological commitments guided the creation of the data analysis code set, helped analyze and generate the insightful data and substantive themes found in this chapter, and led to significant discussion and conclusion points found in Chapter Five.

Data Analysis Code Set

After the survey data was collected, a data analysis code set was created using the previously mentioned phenomenological commitments to guide the process in seeking to accomplish two things: First, the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet code set was created in the data analysis stage so that each response to a specific research question could be analyzed using these phenomenological commitments and then categorized based on emergent and consistent themes. Second, the data analysis code set was also created so that the emergent themes and insights from the participants could be analyzed and evaluated in terms of frequency, in order for me to then be able to categorize the responses into percentages of identical or similar answers for each specific research question. Thus, the results for each specific research question stemmed from the creation of the data analysis code set, and resulted in every research question having phenomenologically analyzed responses that emerged from the data, and then categorized based on identical or similar information given. Consequently, this fulfilled the “whole-part-whole” analysis for generating meaningful results.
In addition, the top seven percentage response categories for each research question were highlighted as extremely significant and consistent, and are addressed below under the appropriate research questions.

**Research Question #1**

The first research question was: “How has the APR impacted your athletic department as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball?” This question was seeking to specially address the impact of the APR on athletic departments as a whole, and the responses were analyzed in two parts: 1). responses were phenomenologically analyzed to see how the APR has impacted these low resource or non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments as it has related to football and/or men’s basketball programs. 2). and if the responses affirmed that the APR has negatively impacted their athletic departments, then these participants’ responses (identified based on their institutional email address) were triangulated by comparing their responses of a negative impact to their football and/or men’s basketball APR scores and net profit from 2005-2009 to see if indeed a response of a negative APR impact correlated with underperforming APR scores and negative net profit for their football and/or men’s basketball programs.

Based on the 274 responses, emergent themes and insights were uncovered in the analysis for this question, and 40 response categories were subsequently generated from the data. The participants’ responses were then aligned within these categories based on the frequency of identical or similar information mentioned, and the top seven response categories were then highlighted by percentage as significant, and can be found in Table 4.5. In addition, the full breakdown of all the response categories with frequencies can be found in Appendix B.
Table 4.5: Top seven response categories based on emergent themes and frequency of informational answers

RQ1: How has the APR impacted your athletic department as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. *Negative/Tremendously Negative Impact</td>
<td>28.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No Significant Impact/No Impact at All</td>
<td>22.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Negative Impact on Men’s Basketball</td>
<td>19.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Recruiting Better Academically Geared SA’s/Less JC Transfers</td>
<td>14.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Very Little Impact/No Impact Yet</td>
<td>8.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Positive Impact/Source of Pride/Led to Improving APR Scores</td>
<td>8.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Increased Financial Resources/Increased Staff and Personnel</td>
<td>7.66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Denotes Largest Percentage

The top percentage response category that emerged in regards to how the APR has impacted their athletic departments as it has related to football and/or men’s basketball was negatively/tremendous negative impact, with this category comprising 28.83% of the responses. In addition, within this 28.83% of responses, the triangulation within the data analysis showed that a little more than 3/5 of these participants (67.79%) not only believed their athletic departments were negatively impacted by the APR as it has related to football and/or men’s basketball, but their football and/or men’s basketball programs also have had both underperforming APR scores and negative profit at some point from 2005-2009. Whereas only a little less than 1/3 of these participants (32.20%) believed their athletic departments had been
negatively impacted by the APR, yet their football and/or men’s basketball programs did not have both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit during this same time frame.

Consequently, the most significant theme and insight that emerged from this largest response category was that almost 30% of participants believed that the APR has negatively impacted their athletic departments as it has related to football and/or men’s basketball AND the majority of this 30% of participants’ football and/or men’s basketball programs possessed both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009. These results give credence to the idea (mentioned in the first 3 chapters) that low resource and non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments have underperforming football and/or men’s basketball APR scores due to a lack of financial resources. The following are some of the participants’ responses representing this category:

*Tremendously, retention has been an issue because of hiring a new basketball coach and athletes leaving.*

*It has heavily impacted us. It is one of the most important things we attend to.*

*We have lost scholarships in M. Basketball and are now in the next phase of penalties with reduced contact time/days. Our previous coaching staff was released as an effect of low APR.*

A full list of the number of football and men’s basketball programs (for research questions #1 and #5) who have been negatively impacted by the APR and possessed both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009 are listed in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Sport programs by year that have been negatively impacted by the APR and have had both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009 (For Research Questions 1 AND 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sport</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th># Of Teams Negatively Impacted With 2 Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Football</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Football</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Football</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Football</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Football</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s Basketball</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s Basketball</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s Basketball</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s Basketball</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s Basketball</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another emergent theme and insight from the data for research question #1 though showed a smaller yet contrary informational frequency of response when compared to the largest response category. Interestingly enough, 22.26% of participants believed that the APR actually had no significant impact/no impact at all on their athletic departments as it related to football and/or men’s basketball programs. These results show that a little more than a fifth of all the participants believed that even though they work at a low resource or non-BCS institutional athletic department, they do not believe the APR had any impact on their department as a whole
as it relates to these two sports. The following are some of the participants’ responses representing this category:

No impact.

*It hasn’t had any substantive impact on our men’s basketball program- our academic profile was and remains stronger than the APR benchmarks.*

*It hasn’t had an impact due to the nature of our strict admission standards.*

In terms of sport specific themes, an insight that emerged from research question #1 was that 19.34% of participants said that the APR has negatively affected their men’s basketball programs compared to only 6.20% of participants stating that it has negatively affected football programs. The following are some of the participants’ responses representing this category:

Men’s Basketball:

*Our Men’s Basketball team is currently facing Historical Penalty 3 because of retention issues.*

*We have faced penalties with our men’s basketball program. As a result, we have had to create improvement plans and re-evaluate our programs.*

*Men's Basketball - Loss of scholarships and loss of 4hrs of practice a week.*

Football:

*Previously, both football and men’s basketball lost scholarships due to low APR scores (related to both eligibility and retention).*

*Much more time and personnel directed to FB/MMB in both recruiting and retention.*

*Significant penalties for football. Significant changes have been made department-wide.*

Finally, a significant theme that emerged from this question in relation to recruiting and student athletes’ academic profiles was that 14.23% of participants believed that the APR has
impacted their athletic departments as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball in that coaches and athletic administrators are much more aware of prospective student athletes’ academic backgrounds and profiles, less junior college players are being recruited since they are viewed as more academically “risky”, student athletes are being targeted in recruiting that are a better “fit” with the academic missions of the institutions, and recruiting is monitored more closely as coaches and athletic administrators work more in tandem with registrars offices. The following are some of the participants’ responses representing this category:

Greater focus on recruiting students who can be successful at our institution, addition of learning specialist in academic study center.

It has contributed to being very careful when recruiting at risk student athletes.

We now stack athletic and academic money to encourage recruitment of academically stronger students. We also pay a lot more attention to retention.

Research Question #2

The second research question for the dissertation survey was: “How have the pressures of complying with the APR affected your direct work or involvement with the football and/or men’s basketball program?” This question was seeking to specially address the impact of the APR on individual athletic and academic administrative positions, and it was analyzed in three parts: 1). Responses were categorized first based on identical or similar themes and information given. 2) Then, responses were sorted by the six occupational position choices on the survey, thus seeking emergent themes, hidden insights, and opinions from each occupational position in athletic or academic administration. 3). Finally, within the specific occupational categories, the responses were analyzed for frequency of emerging themes and information given, with the top seven response categories for each occupational position highlighted by percentage as the most significant.
Based on the 273 responses, with emergent themes and insights uncovered in the analysis for this question, 48 response categories were subsequently generated from the data. The participants’ responses were then aligned within these categories based on the frequency of identical or similar information mentioned, and the top seven response categories for each occupational position were highlighted as significant, and can be found in Table 4.7. In addition, the full breakdown of all the response categories and occupational responses with frequencies can be found in Appendix C.

Table 4.7: Top seven response categories (categorized by occupational position) based on emergent themes and frequency of informational answers

RQ2: How have the pressures of complying with the APR affected your direct work or involvement with the football and/or men’s basketball program?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Position</th>
<th>Response Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Faculty Athletic Rep:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. No Pressure/No Impact</td>
<td>24.24%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. More Involved w/ Academics…</td>
<td>24.24%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Positive Impact/Work with Staff…</td>
<td>15.15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Affects Recruiting/ Philosophy…</td>
<td>12.12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Yes/Very Much</td>
<td>9.09%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. NA/Not Sure</td>
<td>9.09%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Led to Improvement Plans…</td>
<td>9.09%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Athletic Directors:
1. *Not Really a Factor… 23.52%
2. No Pressure/No Impact 19.60%
3. More Involved w/ Academics… 13.72%
4. More Talk w/ Coaches about APR 9.80%
5. Affects Recruiting/Philosophy… 7.84%
6. No 5.88%
7. Positive Impact/Work with Staff…3.92%

c. Senior Woman Administrator:

1. *No Pressure/No Impact 35.00%
2. More Time, Work with FB 15.00%
3. More Involved w/ Academics… 15.00%
4. More Time, Work with MBB 12.50%
5. Not Really a Factor… 10.00%
6. Increased $ Resources, Staff… 10.00%
7. More Talk w/ Coaches about APR 10.00%

d. Compliance Personnel:

1. *No Pressure/No Impact 21.79%
2. Affects Recruiting/Philosophy… 16.66%

3. More Involved w/ Academics… 12.82%

4. More Talk w/ Coaches about APR 12.82%

5. Not Really a Factor… 11.53%

6. NA/Not Sure 7.69%

7. Has Strained Relationships in Dept. 5.12%

e. Academic Support Services Personnel:

1. * More Involved w/ Academics… 22.38%

2. More Anxiety and Pressure… 19.40%

3. More Time, Work with MBB 16.41%

4. Affects Accountability, Retention. 10.44%

5. No Pressure/No Impact 8.95%

6. Not Really a Factor… 8.95%

7. NA/Not Sure 8.95%

f. Other:

1. *No Pressure/No Impact 25.80%

2. NA/Not Sure 19.35%
3. More Time, Work with MBB 16.12%

4. More Involved w/ Academics… 16.12%

5. Increased $ Resources, Staff… 16.12%

6. More Anxiety and Pressure… 16.12%

7. More Talk w/ Coaches about APR 9.67%

* Denotes Largest Percentage

The top emerging theme and response category for 4 of the 6 occupations was *no pressure/no impact at all/no effect* as it related to their direct work or involvement with football and/or men’s basketball programs, with 24.24% of faculty athletic representatives stating this, 35.00% of senior woman administrators, 21.79% of compliance personnel, and 25.80% of occupational positions in the “other” category. Athletic directors were on the fringe of this category as it was their second highest response category, with 19.60% agreeing that the impact of the APR had *no pressure/no impact* on their direct work or involvement with football and/or men’s basketball programs. And athletic directors’ highest category was very similar, with 23.52% of the participants believing that the impact of the APR was *not really a factor/little if any/not much* as it pertained to their direct work or involvement with the two “revenue generating sports”. The participants’ responses representing these categories can be found in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: APR impact on direct work or involvement (categorized by occupational position) based on emergent themes and frequency of informational answers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Position</th>
<th>Response Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faculty Athletic Representative:</td>
<td><em>It has not impacted me directly</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Woman Administrator:</td>
<td><em>Don't believe it has affected work with men's basketball. We do not have football.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance Personnel:</td>
<td><em>No affect.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td><em>No impact.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletic Director:</td>
<td><em>It hasn't had an impact due to the nature of strict admission here.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The disparity showed itself though with the final occupational category, as only 8.95% of academic support services personnel agreed that the APR had no pressure/no impact on their specific positions. Rather, academic support personnel’s highest response category was increased work, time, and monitoring/increased focus on academics, more involved/more time consuming as it related to their direct work or involvement with football and/or men’s basketball programs, with 22.38% of participants sharing these thoughts and feelings. The following are some of the academic support personnel’s responses representing this category:

*It has created tremendous pressure to spend a great deal of time on our MBB program with minimal personnel increases (only increases in student-assistants, no professional staff have been hired to help with the extra workload).*

*It’s babysitting 101. You become more of an enabler instead of empowering because now I and our resources have to take on just as much responsibility as the student-athlete, if not more.*

*I think it has created a bit more pressure and stress in the academic services department as many feel partly responsible for the APR of each team.*

It should be noted that every occupational category also did responded highly to an APR impact of increased work, time, and monitoring/increased focus on academics, more
involved/more time consuming, with 13.72% of athletic directors stating this, 15.00% of senior woman administrators, 12.82% of compliance personnel, as well as 16.12% of occupations in the “other” category. Ironically, faculty athletic representatives had the highest response rate in this category (even higher than academic support services personnel), with 24.24% of the participants also believing that the APR impacted their specific positions and direct involvement as it related to football and/or men’s basketball programs. But, the biggest disparity was still found in academic support personnel’s answers between the impact of the APR having no pressure/no impact at 8.95%, compared to 22.38% of the same participants stating that the impact and pressures of the APR increased their work, time, and involvement as it related to football and/or men’s basketball programs.

This is a very interesting insight into these specific occupations in that these responses show that the impact of the APR does not affect or touch the majority of athletic administrators nearly as much as it affects academic support services personnel and the actually athletic employees working everyday to academically prepare football and/or men’s basketball student athletes. It also shows that faculty athletic representatives have greater involvement with the APR than originally thought, and that the impact and pressure it has on specific positions goes beyond the athletic departments. Although faculty athletic representatives’ top two response categories are the same percentage and contradict each other, thus the true insight into their occupational position is still unclear as it relates to this specific question.

But based on the results and given the daily time commitments and energy spent, I believe academic support services personnel still feel the majority of the impact of the APR on their specific positions and individual work and involvement with football and/or men’s
basketball student athletes. Thus, the impact and pressure of the APR, based on these results, falls largely on the academic support services personnel. This is not surprising since they are the same people that already spend inordinate amounts of time tutoring, mentoring, and meeting with student athletes to better prepare them academically for the rigors of college coursework, but it may be alarming in that this could lead to further fatigue or work related burn out for these men and women.

Another interesting and emergent theme and insight from the occupational responses was that 4 of the 6 occupational categories believed that the impact of the APR affected their direct work or involvement with football and/or men’s basketball programs as it related to better communication between coaches/more articulation of rules education/seeing more cooperation from coaches. This was shown in the results by 9.80% of athletic directors stating this, 10.00% of senior woman administrators, 12.82% of compliance personnel, and 9.67% of occupational positions in the “other” category, which was comprised of a multitude of other academic and compliance support positions. The participants’ responses representing this category can be found in Table 4.9.

Table 4.9: APR impact resulting in better communication (categorized by occupational position) based on emergent themes and frequency of informational answers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Position</th>
<th>Response Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Athletic Director:</td>
<td>The issues faced with these programs have caused me as an Athletic Director to spend more time providing direct oversight to each program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Woman Administrator:</td>
<td>Coaches are much more involved/concerned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance Personnel:</td>
<td>More involved with head coaches of both sports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td>More education with coaches and more interaction on personnel that will directly affect APR.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, an interesting insight that was uncovered through the data analysis of this question was that 3 of 6 occupational positions responded that the impact of the APR on their direct work or involvement with football and/or men’s basketball programs was felt in the category of “affects recruiting and coaches’ recruiting philosophy/recruiting higher caliber SA’s/limits risky SA’s or JC transfers/evaluate transcripts and before offering a scholarship/have a strategic approach in recruiting” in that these occupational positions all were involved with or oversaw parts of the recruiting process. This was illustrated by 12.12% of faculty athletic representatives articulating this, 7.84% of athletic directors, and 16.66% of compliance personnel. The participants’ responses representing this category can be found in Table 4.10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Position</th>
<th>Response Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faculty Athletic Representative:</td>
<td><em>In the areas of recruitment.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletic Director:</td>
<td><em>It influences our admissions decisions to insure that we are enrolling student athletes who can be academically successful.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance Personnel:</td>
<td><em>I now review more thoroughly a PSA’s academic profile prior to an institutional offer of aid. I make decisions based on how they might impact APR.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Research Question #3**

The third research question for the dissertation survey was: “How has the APR impacted the type of student athlete your coaches now recruit?” This question was seeking to uncover whether the impact of the APR has affected recruiting for football and/or men’s basketball programs at low resource or non-BCS institutions in any way, and whether in light of these institutions having underperforming APR scores, was a “better” student athlete now being
recruited? The responses were analyzed in two ways: 1). Responses were phenomenologically analyzed to see the beliefs and insights into how the APR has impacted recruiting and the recruiting philosophies of athletic departments as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs at low resource or non-BCS institutions. 2). Responses were also then analyzed for frequency of emergent themes and information given, with the top seven response categories highlighted by percentage as the most significant.

Based on the 271 responses, emergent themes and insights were uncovered in the analysis for this question, and 54 response categories were subsequently generated from the data. The participants’ responses were then aligned within these categories based on the frequency of identical or similar information mentioned, and the top seven response categories, highlighted by percentage as significant, can be found in Table 4.11. In addition, the full breakdown of all the response categories with frequencies can be found in Appendix D.

Table 4.11: Top seven response categories based on emergent themes and frequency of informational answers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RQ3: How has the APR impacted the type of student athlete your coaches now recruit?</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Response Category</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. *Recruiting Better Student Athletes/More Aware of Academic Performance</td>
<td>33.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No Impact At All/Has Not Changed Our Recruiting Habits…</td>
<td>22.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. More Impacted by Our Own Standards and Processes…</td>
<td>9.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. We Never or Hardly Ever Take “Risky” Student Athletes…</td>
<td>6.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Not Necessarily/Not Much…</td>
<td>5.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Looking Less at Junior College Transfers/Cautious with JC’s</td>
<td>5.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Encourage Coaches to Only Recruit SA’s with Academic Skill, Motivation</td>
<td>5.16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The most significant and emergent theme that resulted from this research question was that roughly 1/3 of the participants all articulated that the APR has definitely impacted recruiting for football and/or men’s basketball programs at low resource or non-BCS institutions. Specially, 33.20% of participants’ responses fell into the category of recruiting better student athletes/more aware of academic performance and preparedness, which seems to show that the APR has greatly impacted how these sport programs and athletic departments not only evaluate prospective student athletes (PSA’s), but also their philosophy on who they offer scholarships, and if they believe the PSA’s can succeed academically and matriculate towards graduation. The following are some of the athletic and academic administrators’ responses representing this category:

*It forces low income schools to recruit a better quality student. Although our goal is to recruit someone who may be a better student rather than a great athlete, we will consider recruiting great students first.*

*Have to look at a much better student - and for those "at risk" students- really need to look at their work ethic and desire to succeed.*

*We continually talk about the type of student they are recruiting and that we need to be sure that they can be admitted and succeed in the academic programs that the institution offers.*

Interestingly enough though, the second most frequent response for this research question actually articulated the contrary to the first category of response, and articulated that the APR had not had an impact on recruiting at all. Specifically, 22.80% of participants’ responses fell into the category of no impact at all/has not changed our recruiting habits, thus showing that even though 1/3 of participants believe the APR has impacted recruiting greatly, roughly 1/5 still
believed it has not. The following are some of the participants’ responses representing this category:

*It has not had an impact.*

*It hasn't changed.*

*It has not impacted the type of student-athletes our coaches currently recruit.*

Consequently, half of the total participants’ responses were split between the APR having a significant impact on recruiting, and not having an impact at all as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs at low resource or non-BCS institutions. But, the more frequent response at 33.20% recruiting better student athletes… seems to make more sense given these sport programs’ history of underperforming APR performance to date.

Finally, another significant insight and emergent theme that resulted from the participant’s responses was that instead of the APR impacting low resource and non-BCS institutions’ football and/or men’s basketball recruiting and the type of student athlete being brought in, it was rather the academic institutions’ admission standards and academic requirements that actually carried more weight in the recruiting process. This was evidenced by 9.22% of the participants responding that the recruiting for these two sports was actually more impacted by our own standards and processes than the actual APR, thus showing that some of these institutions have higher academic entrance standards than what the NCAA even mandates. The following are some of the participants’ responses representing this category:

*I don't believe the APR per se has impacted the type of student-athletes our coaches recruit. Recruiting strategies are more impacted by our institution's admissions standards and processes.*

*No real change as our academic standards are high.*
Has not. We only recruit student-athletes with high GPA and test scores who can succeed in our academic environment.

Research Question #4

The fourth research question for the dissertation survey was: “What are any positive changes in implementation measures for academic support concerning football and/or men’s basketball that resulted from the pressures of APR compliance?” The goal of this question was to simply uncover any best practices within these athletic departments that have resulted in improved academic support services and successful APR compliance for low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to their football and/or men’s basketball programs in the face of APR pressure or lack of financial resources. As the researcher, if I can uncover best practices and positive implementation measures that are being carried out in spite of difficult financial circumstances for these institutions, then these best practices can possibly also be shared in helpful ways to aid similar institutions dealing with the related issues of lack of financial resources and underperforming APR scores.

The responses were analyzed in two ways: 1). Responses were phenomenologically analyzed to uncover insights into what best practices, if any, were being carried out by low resource or non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments in regards to APR compliance for football and/or men’s basketball programs despite the difficult conditions (lack of financial resources) facing these institutions. 2). Responses then were analyzed for frequency of emergent themes and best practices mentioned, with the top seven response categories highlighted by percentage as the most significant.

Based on the 259 responses, insights and best practices were uncovered in the analysis for this question, and 51 response categories of best practices were subsequently generated from the data. The participants’ responses were then aligned within these categories based on the
frequency of identical or similar information mentioned, and the top seven response categories were highlighted by percentage as significant, and can be found in Table 4.12. In addition, the full breakdown of all the response categories of best practices and positive implementation measures with frequencies can be found in Appendix E.

Table 4.12: Top seven response categories for positive implementation measures/best practices based on emergent themes and frequency of informational answers

RQ4: What are any positive changes in implementation measures for academic support concerning football and/or men’s basketball that resulted from the pressures of APR compliance?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. *Increased Financial Support for Hiring of New Academic Personnel…</td>
<td>19.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No changes or Positive Implementation Measures…</td>
<td>14.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Improved Tutorial Services, Academic Programs, Monitoring…</td>
<td>13.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Higher Awareness of Retention, Eligibility Issues/Sense of Urgency…</td>
<td>11.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Better Screening of SA’s in Recruiting/Less “At Risk” SA’s…</td>
<td>10.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Coaches More Aware of APR/Paying Attention to Academic Reforms…</td>
<td>9.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. MBB Has Their Own Tutor/Tutor Works and Travels with Team…</td>
<td>9.26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Denotes Largest Percentage

The most significant response category of a positive implementation measure that was uncovered from the data for this research question was that participants articulated how there has been increased financial support for the hiring of new academic personnel and staff to deal with the pressures of APR compliance. In fact, 19.69% of participants articulated some kind of positive change dealing with funding increases for the hiring of new academic support staff as one helpful way to deal with the many different angles of complying with the APR. The following are some of the participants’ responses representing this category:
We recently hired a new academic enhancement coordinator, and we are on track to hire a learning specialist. We will also put in the budget to hire graduate assistants from our sport administration program.

Obviously, it has forced many institutions to add staff.

Our academic staff has increased from two fulltime to six fulltime to help with the workload. We have credibility with the entire athletic department.

Ironically though, the second most frequent response category of best practices again states the contrary to the most significant category (see Research Questions 1 and 3). Participants in the second most frequent response category stated that there have been no changes or positive implementation measures that have resulted from the pressures of APR compliance as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs at low resource or non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments. The percentage for this category was only about 5 percentage points lower than the most significant and frequent category, with a response percentage of 14.67%. The following are some of the participants’ responses representing this category:

No changes.

More awareness…but no real changes.

No change as a result of APR 'pressures’.

Thus, the difference in participants having seen positive implementation measures being put into place in terms of increased funding for the hiring of new academic support personnel, and having seen no changes in positive implementation measures was very small. Yet, the increased funding for new academic support services personnel still bears significance since it was designed to help combat the pressures of APR compliance as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs in low resource or non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments.
Finally, another significant and emergent theme of best practices or positive implementation measures for academic support as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs at low resource or non-BCS institutions can be found in the participants’ responses stating that due to the pressures of APR compliance, there has been improved tutorial services, academic programs, and monitoring policies put into place. This was articulated by 13.51% of the participants, and the best practices mentioned in this response category ranged from improved tutoring and mentoring programs, to more individualized support programs for student athletes, to having more efficient and focused academic monitoring and academic support software. The following are some of the participants’ responses representing this category:

*We now have an Athletic Department policy that mandates tutors in every class for all student athletes who are brought in under special exception. In other words, if a kid is not regularly admissible to the institution, the coach must request admission through a lengthy "special admit" process. Any kid who gains admission this way must have tutors provided to him/her until he/she demonstrates he/she no longer needs the tutor. The coach must pay for the tutor.*

*Academic Services for Athletes had a working group look at the FLAG report and came up with a plan to work specifically target "at risk" students and identify how we can work with them more closely to ensure a positive academic outcome for them. It was determined that 1st generation college students and low income were big targets and we are working to more closely work with them. FB and MBB players do have SA's in these categories.*

*Many, we have been able to expand staff and resources over the past few years with the addition of staff focusing on Life Skills coordination with the Freshman, Tutors for writing, math and those courses that we have students struggling in each semester. We have become more flexible in that we can adapt to our student's needs more easily.*

**Research Question #5**

The fifth and final research question for the dissertation survey was: “Where is your athletic department spending their net profit (if applicable), and is a portion or all of the net profit
being put back into academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball programs?”
This financial question was seeking to uncover where low resource or non-BCS institutions’
athletic departments were spending their net profit if indeed they even had any. Thus, hoping to
figure out whether these institutions and their football and/or men’s basketball programs had
poor APR scores despite spending net profit on academic support services for these sports,
whether they had poor APR scores because they did not spend net profit on academic support
services for these sports, or whether quite simply there was no available net profit for academic
support services for these sports, which possibly contributed (among many factors) to academic
underperformance and poor APR scores.

The responses were analyzed in two parts: 1). Responses were phenomenologically
analyzed to gather insights into where net profit (if applicable) was being spent and whether it
was being put back into academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball. 2). Then,
after the responses were categorized, the participants’ insights and beliefs (identified based on
their institutional email address) were triangulated in the analysis in a few ways:

a). If participants answered NA, or No Net Profit/None, then their responses were
compared to their football and/or men’s basketball APR scores and net profit from 2005-2009 to
see if whether their responses of not having net profit correlated with underperforming APR
scores and negative net profit for their football and/or men’s basketball programs.

b). In the same way, if the participants answered flatly No, then the same triangulation
was conducted as in section (a) because I sought to uncover whether these institutions simply did
not spend their net profit on academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball, yet
may still have had underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009.

c). Finally, if the participants responded Yes, or *Money Is Put Back Into Academic Support Services*, then the same data triangulation was conducted as in sections (a) and (b) in order to see if there was a positive change for these institutions regarding whether there was acceptable APR scores and positive net profit at some point from 2005-2009 for their football and/or men’s basketball programs, or whether they possessed underperforming APR scores and negative net profit despite putting money into academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball.

Based on the 254 responses, emergent themes and insights were uncovered in the analysis for this question, and 35 response categories were subsequently generated from the data. The participants’ responses were then aligned within these categories based on the frequency of identical or similar information mentioned, and the top seven response categories were highlighted by percentage as significant, and can be found in Table 4.13. In addition, the full breakdown of all the response categories with frequencies can be found in Appendix F.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.13: Top seven response categories based on emergent themes and frequency of informational answers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

RQ5: Where is your athletic department spending their net profit (if applicable), and is a portion or all of the net profit being put back into academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. *NA/ Not Available</td>
<td>36.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No Net Profit/ None</td>
<td>30.70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Unsure/Don’t Know/Unknown 11.81%
4. Money Is Put Back into Academic Support Services 8.66%
5. Hired New Academic Support Staff/New Personnel 4.72%
6. We Rely on the University for $/Supported by the Institution 4.33%
7. NCAA Academic Enhancement Fund Provides Additional $... 3.14%

* Denotes Largest Percentage

The most significant and frequent insight and theme that emerged from the data for this research question was that 36.61% of all participants answered NA, or Not Available in regards to their athletic departments even having net profit in the first place, let alone being able to use a portion or all of the net profit to put towards academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball. Interestingly enough though, out of this 36.61%, only a little less than 3/7 of these institutions’ athletic departments (41.33%) had football and/or men’s basketball programs with underperforming APR scores AND negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009, compared with slightly more than 4/7 of institutions’ athletic departments (58.66%) which sponsored football and/or men’s basketball yet did NOT have either one of these sport programs posses both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009.

Thus, even though net profit was Not Available for all of these institutions’ athletic departments, a smaller percentage (41.33%) of athletic departments was adversely affected in terms of underperforming APR scores and negative profit as it relates to their football and/or men’s basketball programs, compared to 58.66% of these institutions’ athletic departments whose football and/or men’s basketball programs did not possess underperforming APR scores
and negative net profit even though they too did not have any net profit to speak of. The following are some of the participants’ responses representing this category:

*N/A for net profit, as far as I know.*

*NA.*

*Not applicable.*

In the same manner, another significant insight and theme that emerged from the data was that 30.70% of participants answered *No Net Profit/None* in response to this final research question, showing that another large portion of the participants believed their institutions and athletic departments had no net profit to speak of, despite being aware of the great academic support services challenges that they faced with their football and/or men’s basketball programs. After data triangulation for this category, the results showed that within the 30.70% of participants who responded this way, only slightly less than 1/2 of participants and their institutions’ athletic departments (47.76%) did not have both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009 as it related to their football and/or men’s basketball programs. Compared to slightly more than 1/2 of participants and their institutions’ athletic departments (52.23%) that did possess both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009 as it related to their football and/or men’s basketball programs.

This deeper triangulation showed an almost even split in percentages, with a slight increased percentage for low resource or non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments that answered *No Net Profit/None* as it related to their football and/or men’s basketball programs, and as the literature has suggested (see chapters 1-3), also possessed underperforming APR scores
and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009 in relation to the same sport programs. The following are some of the participants’ responses representing this category:

There is no net profit at a small 1-A non football school. Trying to rub to nickels together.

No net profit from athletics.

Department operates at a loss.

We have limited resources so there is no real net profit. The school supports as it can and generally gives us what we need.

Another much smaller yet related category of responses was that 2.36% participants answered flatly NO in relation to the idea of their athletic departments spending a portion or all of their net profit on academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball programs. Interestingly enough, out of this 2.36% of institutions’ athletic departments, not one possessed both underperforming APR scores and negative profit at some point from 2005-2009 as it related to their football and/or men’s basketball programs. Thus, even with a very small percentage, the results showed that for this 2.36% of institutions’ athletic departments, not spending net profit on academic support for football and/or men’s basketball programs did not correlate with underperforming APR scores, and did not relate at all to negative net profit as far as their football and/or men’s basketball programs were concerned.

The final significant emergent theme and insight dealt with answers in the affirmative, and showed some very interesting results:

First, 8.66% of all participants responded to this question by answering within the category of Money Is Put Back into Academic Support Services, stating that financial resources and possibly even net profit was being put back into academic support services for football
and/or men’s basketball in some capacity. Interestingly enough, out of this 8.66% of participants’ responses, only a little more than 1/3 of these participants (37.50%) who stated that financial resources within their athletic departments were being put back into academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball programs also were in athletic departments that had both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009 as it related to the same sport programs.

On the contrary, the other 2/3 of these same participants (62.50%) for this category of responses were from athletic departments that not only put financial resources, and possibly net profit back into their academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball programs, but were also from institutional athletic departments that did not have both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009 as it related to these two sport programs. The following are some of the participants’ responses representing this category:

I believe it is being put into the academic support area.
We are spending more resources on summer schools and academic enhancement.

We invest approximately $75,000 in academic support for student-athletes which is implemented through our campus office for academic support.

Second, another smaller yet related category of responses saw 1.96% of all participants answered Yes to this final research question, with a clear indication that their institutional athletic departments did spend a portion or all of their net profit on academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball programs. Within this 1.96%, ¾ of all participants (75%) represented athletic departments that did not possess underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009 as it related to football and/or men’s basketball
programs. Thus, showing agreement in the fact that these institutions did not possess negative net profit, but rather spent their net profit on academic support services, and resulting in positive academic outcomes.

On the contrary, ¼ of these same participants (25%) in this response category were from athletic departments that did possess both underperforming APR scores and negative profit at some point from 2005-2009 as it related to football and/or men’s basketball programs, thus showing a discrepancy between participants’ answers of Yes to having net profit, yet the financial numbers showing otherwise in regards to having a negative net profit.

**Chapter Summary**

The purpose of this chapter was to present the results from the five open ended response questions that were analyzed using phenomenological commitments. These two phenomenological commitments stemmed first from Patton’s (2002) belief that phenomenology as a principle can help analyze “how human beings make sense of experience, and how that experience is transformed into consciousness, both individually and as shared meaning” (p. 104). Second, they came from Vagel’s (2009) “whole-part-whole” (pp. 600-601) analysis model where the data was broken down first as a “whole” by each research question, then viewed in “part” by the participants’ answers to each question, and finally pieced back together as a “whole” by detailing the frequency of responses to each question in order to show dominant responses and significant insights into the impact of the APR on low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs.

Data analysis for Research Question 1 showed the most dominant response and significant insight that emerged from this first question was that almost 30% of participants
believed that the APR has negatively impacted their athletic departments as it has related to football and/or men’s basketball AND their football and/or men’s basketball programs possessed both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009.

Research Question 2 showed the most dominant response category for 4 of the 6 athletic or academic occupations was *no pressure/no impact at all/no effect* as it related to their direct work or involvement with football and/or men’s basketball programs, with 24.24% of faculty athletic representatives stating this, 35.00% of senior woman administrators, 21.79% of compliance personnel, and 25.80% of occupational positions in the “other” category. Athletic directors were on the fringe of this category as it was their second highest response category, with 19.60% agreeing that the impact of the APR had *no pressure/no impact* on their direct work or involvement with football and/or men’s basketball programs, while 23.52% athletic directors believed that the impact of the APR was *not really a factor/little if any/not much* as it pertained to their direct work or involvement with the two “revenue producing sports”.

Research Question 3 showed the most dominant response and significant insight to be that roughly 1/3 of the participants all articulated that the APR has definitely impacted recruiting for football and/or men’s basketball programs at low resource or non-BCS institutions. Specially, 33.20% of participants’ responses fell into the category of *recruiting better student athletes/more aware of academic performance and preparedness*.

Research Question 4 showed the most dominant and significant response category of a positive implementation measure that was uncovered from the data was that 19.69% of participants articulated how there had been *increased financial support for the hiring of new academic personnel and staff* to deal with the pressures of APR compliance.
Finally, Research Question 5 showed the most dominant response and significant insight that emerged from the data for this research question was that 36.61% of all participants answered *NA or Not Available* in regards to their athletic departments even having net profit in the first place, let alone being able to use a portion or all of the net profit to put towards academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball. Interestingly enough though, out of this 36.61%, only a little less than 3/7 of these institutions’ athletic departments (41.33%) had football and/or men’s basketball programs with underperforming APR scores AND negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009, compared with slightly more than 4/7 of institutions’ athletic departments (58.66%) which sponsored football and/or men’s basketball yet did NOT have either one of these sport programs posses both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009.
CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

The purpose of this research study was to evaluate and examine the impact of the Academic Progress Rate (APR) on low resource or non-BCS institutions as it related to football and/or men’s basketball programs in light of the five research areas mentioned in Chapter One. The study was based on an interest in athletic administrative leadership and analyzed the most significant NCAA academic reform measure to date (the APR), in order to see how it impacted athletic departments, athletic administrators, and faculty athletic representatives at low resource or non-BCS institutions as it related to their direct work or involvement with the “revenue generating” sports of football and/or men’s basketball. There were five specific open-ended research questions that guided this study, and each question is labeled below in section two with its own specific discussion of results.

This chapter is divided into five sections: 1). results of the data sampling and demographic information for the study, 2). in depth discussion regarding the results for each of the five research questions, 3). implications of the study, 4). some ideas for future research based on the findings from this study, 5). and the final section summarizing the chapter.
Data Sample.

The first interesting result from the data sampling was that the top two highest response rates of participants, broken down by athletic conference, were from the Atlantic 10 Conference (9.9% response rate) and the Colonial Athletic Association (7.4% response rate), demonstrating that even “mid major” (as they are commonly referred to due to their mid size athletic stature and financial availability) athletic conferences, which are not part of the Bowl Championship Series (BCS), still take a great interest in the Academic Progress Rate (APR) and the impact that it has on football and/or men’s basketball.

In addition, all the response rates for the athletic conferences showed relatively consistent results, with 14 of the 21 athletic conferences having response rates between 3.5% and 7.1%, with a few outliers ranging from 1.1% to the highest response rate of 9.9%. Altogether, the relatively consistent response rates helped the researcher feel secure about participants from all over the country contributing to the research for this study, in addition to athletic conferences from both “mid major” and “low resource” institutions being represented.

As to occupational participation, a few interesting and significant results emerged in terms of who participated in the study. First, as briefly mentioned in Chapter Four, not surprisingly, compliance personnel (27.7% response rate) and academic support services personnel (23.8% response rate) participated the most due to the fact that both of these occupational categories deal with the NCAA APR on a consistent basis given that it is an academic reform measure that involves strict compliance from athletic administrators as well as coaches. However, it is interesting to note that academic support services personnel had the
lower response rate (23.8%) between the two categories given that academic support services personnel are mostly responsible (along with coaches) for the preparation and implementation of academic tutoring and mentoring plans for football and/or men’s basketball programs. Yet, it was compliance personnel that participated more in the study (27.7% response rate), possibly showing that even though compliance personnel are less involved with the day to day academic tutoring and mentoring on the front end, they are slightly more interested or invested in the APR because they would be involved more if there were negative academic outcomes for football and/or men’s basketball student athletes that resulted in poor academic eligibility or retention issues.

Second, another interesting and somewhat surprising result was the large athletic directors’ response rate, with 18.1% of all participants being athletic directors at low resource or non-BCS institutions. At almost 20%, having this many athletic directors was a pleasantly surprising result; helpful in gathering insights and beliefs from the top administrators in these athletic departments, but surprising since I was not initially sure how much involvement an athletic director had with APR compliance and its many details as it related to football and/or men’s basketball programs. But, clearly from the results, athletic directors definitely pay attention to the APR and certainly feel the impact that it has on the two biggest “revenue generating” sports of football and men’s basketball. This result also validates what Mahony, Hums, and Riener (2005) pointed out when they articulated how athletic directors need to give more attention to the “revenue generating” sports of football and men’s basketball given their financial significance and athletic prominence.

Thus, I conclude, since almost 1 in 5 participants were athletic directors, they definitely take an interest in APR issues, care about complying with the APR as it relates to football and/or
men’s basketball programs, and have to deal with the impact of the APR and its’ effects on these two sports and their student athletes. This finding is in agreement with Trail and Chelladurai (2002) when they illustrated how athletic directors simply emphasize what is being valued in their positions, and since APR issues are paramount today in intercollegiate athletics and are valued above any other academic measure, athletic directors have taken notice and are more involved with APR oversight and compliance.

In addition, I can also infer that since athletic directors usually are in charge of (or have significant say in) hiring and firing coaches, and since NCAA APR scores are now directly tied by year to sport programs’ head coaches, athletic directors care more about the APR since they are the ones deciding what coaches to hire or fire. These decisions are often based on the academic performance of their sport programs in the department, especially ones as high profile and “revenue generating” as football and/or men’s basketball. This point would be in agreement with Brown (2010) and Wolverton (2007) which states that athletic directors will continue to hold coaches more accountable for their teams’ APR scores, especially high profile sports such as football and men’s basketball.

Third, more than 1 in every 9 participants (11.7%) were faculty athletic representatives in that having these individuals participate in the study gave great insight into the purely “academic” institutional perspective of APR compliance and APR impact as it related to football and/or men’s basketball programs. By having faculty members in the research study who dealt with APR compliance on a consistent basis as it relates to these specific sport programs, it subsequently gave the results credibility in that emergent themes were not only coming from athletic department individuals, but also individuals whose job is primarily to educate young people, and care about football and men’s basketball players succeeding in school and graduating
with college degrees. Thus, it was helpful to have participants with both athletic and academic viewpoints and responsibilities involved with the study, and answering questions about the impact of the APR as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs and their direct work or involvement with the two sports.

Finally, another interesting result correlating to occupational position was the average number of years that participants had been in their respective job, and at their respective institutional athletic department. Participants had been in their actual position an average of 7.4 years, and they had been at their institutional athletic department for an average of 10.9 years. Thus, the insights and emergent themes that were developed from these participants’ responses were not based on lack of experience or lack of knowledge of the institutions represented, but rather the data was gathered from participants who knew academic support services, compliance details, athletic administrative leadership responsibilities, and faculty perspectives as it all related to football and/or men’s basketball programs.

**Demographic Information**

Gender representation of the participants was almost an even split, with 50.9% of the participants being female, and 49.1% of the participants being male. This was consistent with Christy’s (2007) study on athletic reform, and was not surprising in that based my experience in intercollegiate athletics, I seem to often find females in occupational positions such as senior woman administrators, compliance directors, and academic support services workers, whereas I often find men in positions such as athletic directors, faculty athletic representatives, and also academic support services personnel. Thus, it can be concluded that the participants would be
almost evenly split in regards to gender representation given the frequent (but not always) trends of where men and woman work in intercollegiate athletics.

In terms of race representation, it is interesting and a little disappointing that there were so few African American/Black participants (15.3%) that participated in the study, or possibly even were in the target population to begin with. Since 81.5% of all the participants identified themselves as White/Caucasian, I wonder if there are simply very few African American men and women in intercollegiate athletic administrative leadership positions given their small representation in this study. If this is the case, one (among many) potential negative of this underrepresentation is that since the majority of student athletes in the “revenue generating” sports of football and men’s basketball are African American males, it would be great then for these young men to have more African American athletic administrators in their daily lives to possibly better relate to them, and help mentor and teach them how to grow as men, students, and athletes (Upthegrove, Roscigno, & Charles, 1999; Rhoden, 1990). This type of relating, mentoring, and teaching can obviously take place between athletic administrators and student athletes regardless of race, but from a human relationship sense, it does help at times when someone who is more similar to another individual (in terms of race, background, social dynamics) can come alongside the individual and simply relate. This was simply an observation and thought that I had after analyzing the results.
Research Question #1

RQ1: How has the APR impacted low resource or non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball?

For this first open-ended response question, 274 participants responded, and 40 response categories were generated from the insights and emergent themes. In light of Vagel’s (2009) “whole-part-whole” analysis, the last and conclusive “whole” of the data analysis represents the frequencies of significant insights and emergent themes for each question. It is important to note that although there were several interesting and insightful frequencies of responses, the results showed three main significant and “conclusive” insights that all stemmed from participant response percentages of roughly 20% or higher. The rest of the frequent insights were still interesting, but not as statistically significant since they originated from smaller participant response percentages.

1). The most significant and frequent theme for this question that emerged through the data analysis to help form the conclusive “whole” was that 28.83% affirmed exactly what the literature has stated up to this point, which is that the NCAA’s APR has negatively, or even tremendously negatively impacted low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to the “revenue generating” sports of football and/or men’s basketball. This result affirmed what Forde (2006) predicted, and what many scholars and writers have since agreed with in that the APR does not negatively impact BCS member institutions and their athletic departments nearly as much as it negatively impacts low resource and non-BCS institutions that do not generate significant revenue from football, and consequently often do not have any net profit left over to
put back into academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball programs

Results from this study indicate that almost 30% of all athletic administrators and faculty
athletic representatives believe that the APR has negatively affected their athletic departments as
it relates to these two primary sports, but since these same institutions do not have the financial
resources to improve their academic support services, sports like football and men’s basketball
continue to academically suffer, and lag behind other sports in terms of academic eligibility and
retention (the two factors in the APR formula). This agrees with what the NCAA has also
admitted in the past couple of years, and I believe this negative impact will only change when the
NCAA realizes that there cannot be a “one-size-fits-all” mentality when it comes to an academic
measure like the APR (NCAA, 2011; Hishinuma and Fremstad, 1997). As long as the BCS and
FBS college football continues to grow in popularity and financial stature, low resource and non-
BCS institutions who either do not make revenue off FCS football or do not sponsor football at
all will continue to lag behind in academic eligibility and retention. This is especially true in
sports like football and men’s basketball where their student athletes are predominately African
American males, and come from often from more urban areas with poor social and educational
backgrounds (Upthegrove, Roscigno, & Charles, 1999).

In addition, through data triangulation of open ended responses, APR scores, and
institutional athletic department financial information, the results seem to prove what the
scholars have suggested in that out of this 28.83% of participants who believed the APR has
negatively affected their athletic departments as it related to football and/or men’s basketball
programs, almost 3/5 of the institutions’ athletic departments (67.79%) represented by these
participants also had football and/or men’s basketball programs with both underperforming APR
scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009. Consequently, the premise of lack of financial resources leading to poor APR scores and negative APR impact seems to be more true than less true for participants in this research study given that the majority of these participants represent institutional athletic departments that state the APR has negatively impacted them as far as football and/or men’s basketball has been concerned, and the same sport programs have had poor APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009.

Thus, the data does seem to show that more often than not, low resource and non-BCS institutional athletic departments which sponsor football and/or men’s basketball have a relatively high chance of possessing both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit for these primary sports given the current makeup and penalty structure of the NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR).

2). The second most frequent theme was interesting largely because it was contradictory to the most significant theme, and showed that 22.26% of all participants did not feel the APR had any significant impact or even no impact at all on their athletic departments as it related to football and/or men’s basketball. This emergent theme goes against the scholarly data previously mentioned which has suggested that the APR negatively impacts low resource and non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments as it relates to these two sports. In my opinion, one possible reason for this theme could be the participants who responded this way actually do not deal day to day with APR issues (even though their occupational title may suggest otherwise) and consequently would not know of its impact. I believe this could be likely in certain situations where some faculty athletic representatives or athletic administrators simply focus on their specific roles, and do not have any involvement with academic support issues for these two sports.
I also believe another possible idea for this large response rate could be that the individuals who responded this way may (roughly 1 in every 5) not have seen the APR have a negative impact yet, but that does not mean that the institutions’ they represent and the sport programs they work with may not see a negative APR impact in the future. The results do not show this specifically, but I have seen this scenario play out when I coached men’s college basketball at Colorado State University. In my opinion, all it takes is for a couple student athletes to transfer as ineligible students, or for a coaching change to happen and 1/3 to ½ of basketball players transfer from or quit a basketball team, and then the program and athletic department are slammed with APR penalties, a potential public relations nightmare, and a negative impact is felt. Regardless, this significant insight and emergent theme is quite interesting, and would be an area for further research down the road.

3). The third most frequent and significant theme showed a great insight into the difference of the APR impact between men’s basketball and football. Specifically, 19.34% of participants responded that the APR has negatively impacted men’s basketball programs at low resource or non-BCS institutions, compared to only 6.20% of participants responding that it has negatively impacted football programs at the same institutions. In addition, data triangulation showed that from 2005-2009, ever year men’s basketball had more programs with both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit compared with football programs, and in some years the numerical difference was double. Thus, the data strongly shows that the APR has negatively impacted low resource or non-BCS institutions’ men’s basketball programs greater compared to football programs at the same institutions.

One reason for this may be that out of all the low resource or non-BCS institutions surveyed, not all of them even sponsor football, thus there are more men’s basketball programs
available to be impacted by the APR, and to have negative net profit. Another reason may simply be that men’s basketball programs have drastically fewer scholarship athletes compared to football. Consequently, when one or two basketball players became academically ineligible or even transfer while ineligible, the APR hit becomes much more severe for a basketball program since a larger percentage of their smaller team is academically ineligible. Simply put, with fewer players, a smaller team (men’s basketball) can take a larger APR hit for one or two players’ academic problems, compared to a larger team (football) where a couple players’ problems will not affect them as a whole very much. Either way, the data (within this research context) showed men’s basketball programs to be much more adversely affected compared to football programs, and this should serve as a warning for low resource and non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments as they move forward with academic support services and APR compliance.

The following additional frequent insights and emergent themes generated from the results were still very interesting and thought provoking, but were less conclusive since they stemmed from smaller participant response percentages:

An interesting insight regarding the impact of the APR dealt with participants’ views on recruiting football and/or men’s basketball student athletes. Specifically, 14.23% of all participants who answered this question believed their athletic departments as whole entities have either required their football and/or men’s basketball programs to recruit better academically geared/prepared student athletes, or else the coaches of these two sports themselves have decided (based on the impact of the APR) to recruit better academically geared/prepared student athletes. In the same manner, the athletic administrators, coaches, or both have also started to focus less on recruiting junior college and two year transfers due to the same negative possibilities of poor academic preparedness, social immaturity, and potential discipline issues.
This is a significant result in that the numbers show how athletic administrators and faculty athletic representatives recognize that part of the issue of succeeding with the APR and having academically eligible and engaged football and/or men’s basketball student athletes is to be able to have them in academic support systems from their freshmen year on, and enroll student athletes who do not just “get by” academically, but succeed and matriculate towards graduation.

In other words, football and/or men’s basketball players (due to hectic practice and travel schedules among other factors), need to have the academic preparedness from high school to succeed in undergraduate work, and many (not all) potentially also need four or five years of academic support mentoring, tutoring, and life skill preparation to help them not only acclimate to college life and coursework, but to also succeed in working towards and obtaining a college degree. These processes normally can only be effective if these student athletes come in as freshmen, get themselves immersed into how their tutoring and mentoring schedules operate, and hopefully learn from their coaches and administrators how to “properly” balance school and sports. Unfortunately, I believe this “proper” balance is not always present in this current “sport crazed” culture of America today. Nonetheless, recruiting better academically geared/prepared student athletes will help low resource and non-BCS institutions’ football and/or men’s basketball student athletes succeed more with APR compliance.

Another frequent and insightful theme that emerged from the data was that 8.75% of the participants felt that the impact of the APR on their athletic departments as it related to football and/or men’s basketball programs was very little if any, or had yet to even be present. I believe the best answer for this response is simply that these specific institutions’ athletic departments have not had any trouble with APR compliance as it relates to their football and/or men’s basketball programs, or they have not had any academic trouble with them yet. This idea of not
happening *yet* was not shown in the results, but I believe based on my athletic administrative and coaching experiences that it is very easy for a program to slip into underperforming APR territory and receive NCAA reprimand or certain levels of penalties, which then suddenly affects the athletic departments also as whole entities. But, at least for this moment, these participants’ athletic departments have been blessed without major APR problems as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs.

An additional frequent and significant theme that emerged for this research question showed that all of the APR impact on these athletic departments as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball has not been all negative. Rather, 8.75% of participants believed the impact of the APR on their athletic departments has been positive in relation to these two sports, and has caused positive publicity for their athletic departments, campus pride, and communal recognition. This result is much less, but loosely related, to Christy’s (2007) finding that many BCS member institutions’ athletic administrators and coaches believed the APR would have a positive impact on intercollegiate athletics, even though Christy’s study was done from a BCS member institutional perspective and not with low resource or non-BCS institutions. Regardless, this result showed that not just athletic administrators at large schools think the APR could be helpful and have a positive impact, but also athletic administrators and faculty athletic representatives at low resource or non-BCS institutions have seen the APR have a positive impact, and that is impressive considering their institutions and athletic departments are typically the poorest and have the worst APR scores.

A final interesting and frequently mentioned insight dealt with the idea of having increases in financial resources, or academic or compliance personnel as a result of the impact of the APR on these athletic departments as it related to football and/or men’s basketball programs.
This seems like a reasonable finding given that often companies, athletic departments, or other entities seem to think that the problem will just go away if more money is thrown at it, and this falls in line with what Mahony, Hums, and Riemer (2005) talked about when they addressed how athletic directors will be willing to spend more money on football and/or men’s basketball programs to help in any capacity (academic support included) so that they can continue to operate well, win, and maintain high profile statuses on college and university campuses. The only question that arose based on the result was the following: “If the majority of these athletic departments do not have any net profit, then where are they getting this extra money to either increased budgets or personnel? The answer to this question is currently unknown, but I believe only three scenarios are possible. The academic institutions are financially bailing out the athletic departments, athletic departments have to fundraise to generate extra revenue, or most likely, they are “robbing Peter to pay Paul” and shifting current monies around to solve these problems. Regardless, it is a great question for further research.

**Research Question #2**

RQ2: How have the pressures of complying with the APR affected one’s direct work or involvement with the football and/or men’s basketball program?

For this second research question, 273 participants responded and 48 response categories were generated from the insights and emergent themes based on the frequency of identical or similar responses. In addition, since this question dealt with individual occupational thoughts and feelings, responses were also sorted based on occupational position thus seeking the same emergent themes, hidden insights, and opinions from each occupational position in athletic or academic administration. Consequently, the conclusive “whole” was put together using the
frequencies while being cognizant of the occupational positions behind the responses. The results showed one main significant and “conclusive” insight that stemmed from participant response percentages almost entirely of 20% or higher. The rest of the frequent insights were still interesting, but not as statistically significant since they originated from smaller participant response percentages.

1). The most frequent, significant, and surprising theme for this question that emerged through the data analysis to help form the conclusive “whole” was that 4 out of 6 occupational positions at low resource or non-BCS institutions responded that they felt no pressure or impact at all as it related to the impact of the APR on their direct work or involvement with football and/or men’s basketball programs. Specifically, 24.24% of faculty athletic representatives stated this, 35.00% of senior woman administrators, 21.79% of compliance personnel, and 25.80% of occupational positions in the “other” (similar job duties but different titles) category. Athletic directors were on the fringe of this category as it was their second highest response category, with 19.60% also agreeing, while 23.52% of athletic directors said the impact of the APR was not really a factor as it pertained to their direct work or involvement with football and/or men’s basketball programs.

I was very surprised that essentially 5 out of 6 athletic or academic occupational positions at low resource or non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments responded the most to not feeling any or much impact at all on their direct work or involvement with football and/or men’s basketball programs in regards to the pressures of APR compliance (although all occupational categories did show some percentage of academic work increase). Oddly enough though, faculty athletic representatives also had exactly the same response rate (24.24%) for being more involved with academic support due to the pressures of APR compliance as they did for not
feeling any pressure at all. Thus, faculty athletic representatives’ true role as it relates to this specific question is still not very clear, although as the literature also calls for, it would be very helpful to have faculty members more involved with intercollegiate athletics so they can help with mentoring, transparency, and accountability (Weisart, Kliever, Mason, & Bergmann, 1990).

Regardless, I would have thought that compliance personnel would also have felt some of the pressures from the impact of the APR given that it is an academic reform measure created, mandated, and overseen by the NCAA, and compliance personnel are the direct liaisons for athletic departments to the NCAA. But, the results showed otherwise.

This was a major insight in that what this result showed clearly was that the pressures of APR compliance, in terms of individual responsibility, fall largely on the shoulders of academic support services personnel, and the remaining results correlate to this emerging truth. So much so in fact, that 22.38% of academic support services personnel responded (their largest response category) that indeed they were more involved with academic support and academic related work due to the pressures of APR compliance as it related to their direct work or involvement with football and/or men’s basketball programs. In addition, 19.40% of academic support services personnel also responded (their second largest response category) that due to these same APR pressures from these two sports, they felt more anxiety and work related pressure to not only work harder and longer, but also better academically prepare and help football and/or men’s basketball student athletes. Finally, 16.41% of academic support services personnel also responded (their third largest response category) that they now work more with men’s basketball student athletes due to the pressures of APR compliance, so for these individuals, their work is not unchanged or slowing down, but rather greatly increased, and probably at the expense of
their personal and family lives due to the typical nature of night time study halls and tutoring sessions.

Thus, the results are clear in that academic support services personnel bear the brunt of the pressures associated with the impact of the APR at low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to their direct work or involvement with football and/or men’s basketball programs, and I believe this cannot be a healthy thing for morale or occupational longevity as far as these academic support services personnel are concerned. Also, I believe these findings regarding academic support services personnel also may reflect a lack of coaches taking initiative to aid academic support services departments in terms of the academic monitoring of their own student athletes. When instead, as Johnson (2010) and Brown (2005) articulated, coaches should be very aware and on top of their own student athletes’ academic situations, and should also be monitoring academic factors that would affect their programs’ APR scores. The responsibility should not solely fall on the academic support services personnel.

The following additional frequent insights and emergent themes generated from the results were still very interesting and thought provoking, but were less conclusive since they stem from smaller participant response percentages:

Interestingly enough, 4 of 6 occupational positions believed that the pressures from the impact of the APR as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs have improved communications and rule articulations between athletic administrators and coaches. This was shown in the results by 9.80% of athletic directors stating this, 10.00% of senior woman administrators, 12.82% of compliance personnel, and 9.67% of occupational positions in the
“other” category, which was comprised of a multitude of other academic and compliance support positions.

This is extremely positive and significant in that one of the only ways for pressures to be defused, and APR compliance handled better is by first and foremost increasing communication between the administration and coaches so that it happens on a frequent basis, and then also by having more focused and detailed communication where strategic plans, goals, and policies are better articulated and presented to the coaches. These principles of communication are significant in a multitude of ways, but the main significance is that it is the coaches who see the student athletes the most, who have the most influence in their lives, who can discipline them in ways that will get the student athletes’ attention, and who should be helping these young men prioritize the pursuits in their life. Thus, if communication is increasing with the coaches due to the pressures of APR compliance, and if the increased communication is positive, informative, and helpful to the coaches, then I would imagine that football and/or men’s basketball players would know more of what is expected of them in the classroom, and with tutoring and mentoring appointments. Consequently, student athletes’ grades would have a higher chance of improving, which would help improve eligibility and retention issues, and lead to improved APR scores.

Another significant and frequent theme that emerged from the data analysis for this question was that 3 of 6 occupational positions articulated that due to pressures from the impact of the APR on low resource or non-BCS institutions, their direct work or involvement has been affected in some capacity as: they have seen recruiting philosophies improve, better academically prepared student athletes be brought in, transcript evaluations become more focused, and less of an emphasis placed on recruiting junior college transfers, all as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs. This was illustrated by 12.12% of faculty athletic
representatives articulating this, 7.84% of athletic directors, and 16.66% of compliance personnel, all verbalizing that their direct work or involvement with the recruiting process (of football and/or men’s basketball student athletes) has been affected by the pressure of complying with the APR.

As mentioned in Research Question 1, this is significant in that academic eligibility and retention will improve as better “students” are brought in to play football and/or men’s basketball, which will in turn greatly increase APR scores and decrease pressures for these athletic departments. Obviously, recruiting is not the only issue with this complex APR puzzle, but as Yost (2010) also articulated, the solution definitely starts with recruiting, and athletic departments’ focus on whom will be represent their football and/or men’s basketball programs. If low resource and non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments start to get more serious about recruiting football and/or men’s basketball players that want to be in school to get an education first and foremost, then a lot of the other academic support services problems associated with a lack of financial resources will not be as influential because these student athletes are self-motivated to do well in the classroom and obtain a college degree. Thus, so much of a student athletes’ academic success does not come down to IQ as much as motivation to succeed, and a willingness to be disciplined with their time, and persevere through challenging material as it is presented. If these things are valued, coaches and athletic administrators can measure many of these successful principles in the recruiting process.

The final interesting and frequent theme that emerged from the data analysis for this question showed itself again by differentiating between football and men’s basketball programs. Specifically, 3 out of 6 occupational positions articulated in their top seven response categories that they have seen an increase in their direct work or involvement with men’s basketball student
athletes due to the pressures of APR compliance, compared to only 1 out of 6 occupational positions articulate in their top seven response categories that they saw an increase in working with football student athletes due to the same pressures. Specifically, 16.41% of academic support services personnel frequently mentioned their increased work with men’s basketball student athletes, 16.12% of “other” positions felt the same way, and 12.50% of senior woman administrators also agreed. On the other side, only 15.00% of Senior Woman Administrators articulated in their top seven response categories that their direct work or involvement with football programs has increased due to the pressures of APR compliance.

This once again (see Research Question 1) showed that at low resource or non-BCS institutions, men’s basketball programs have not only been more negatively impacted by the APR on a consistent basis in relation to football, but they also have consistently generated more negative net profit. Also the results showed men’s basketball requiring increased attention and direct work involvement by senior woman administrators, academic support services personnel, and “other” athletic administrators due to APR compliance pressures, compared to just senior woman administrators having to increase their work with football programs.

Thus, based on these results, it seems that men’s basketball programs at low resource or non-BCS institutions have been more negatively impacted in a variety of ways due to APR compliance pressures when compared to football programs at the same institutions. This again may be because there are simply many more low resource or non-BCS men’s basketball programs compared to FCS football programs, but regardless, the data has shown a larger negative impact for these men’s basketball programs when comparing them both. This also would be in line with what Mangold, Bean, and Adams (2003) talked about when they wrote how men’s basketball programs long seasons, travel schedules, and “big time” sport culture only
contribute to academic issues and a lack of educational interest for men’s basketball student athletes.

**Research Question #3**

RQ3: How has the APR impacted the type of student athlete your coaches now recruit?

For the third research question, 271 participants responded and 54 response categories were generated from the insights and emergent themes based on the frequency of identical or similar responses to help construct the conclusive “whole” of the analysis. The results showed two significant and “conclusive” insights that stemmed from participant response percentages of 20% or higher. The rest of the frequent insights were still insightful, but not as statistically significant since they originated from smaller participant response percentages.

1). The most frequent theme or insight that emerged from the data was that participants articulated what I expected, which is that due to the impact of the APR on football and/or men’s basketball programs at low resource or non-BCS institutions, recruiting has changed for these programs, and better academically prepared student athletes are being targeted now in the recruiting process. Specifically, 33.20% of all participants responded identically or similarly to this point, and these athletic and academic administrators also articulated why the recruiting process has changed for these two sport programs. The need for better “students” first is becoming more paramount as these athletic and academic administrators become more aware of the APR, and how academic eligibility and retention can be influenced, both positively by improved academic support services, and negatively by lack of academic oversight or apathy among student athletes. Thus, essentially 1 in every 3 participants who answered this research question believed that the APR has impacted the type of student athlete being recruited in that it
has made them more aware of what they need in a student athlete, and then these athletic departments and their coaches are becoming more focused and organized to go out and find those intangibles in football and/or men’s basketball student athletes.

Consequently, these athletic and academic administrators believed the impact of the APR has led to more academically geared recruiting, and a heightened awareness of what academic and motivational skills a student athlete needs to possess in order for them to be recruited to a low resource or non-BCS institution to play football and/or men’s basketball. In addition, with this change in recruiting philosophy and whom these athletic departments and coaches target in the recruiting process, the hope then is that APR scores will start to increase as academic ineligibility and poor retention decreases, thus also creating academically sound practices and habits for these football and/or men’s basketball programs.

2). The second most frequent theme or insight that emerged was also the most surprising in that 22.80% of all participants responded that the APR has not at all impacted the type of student athlete that they recruit, specifically as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball student athletes. I was very surprised at how high this percentage was (more than 1 in every 5 participants) given the general logic that if the APR has negatively affected low resource and non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs, and if the APR measures scholarship student athletes’ eligibility and retention, then one main way, in theory, to help academic eligibility and retention would be to recruit student athletes with the necessary skills to make better grades and matriculate in school. But, this 22.80% of participants did not feel this way based on their responses, and leads to some interesting conclusions:
First, these individuals could claim that it has not impacted recruiting at all since they feel their recruiting has been strong in terms of bringing in academically prepared football and/or men’s basketball student athletes. In other words, whether their APR scores are high or not, they feel like their recruiting is not the main issue, and has not been impacted by the APR relative to other factors in the athletic department that may need addressing down the road, such as compliance or academic support services.

Second, these individuals may feel like the APR has not impacted recruiting because they simply have not seen it up close and personal in their direct work or involvement with football and/or men’s basketball programs. Rather, it is possible that these individuals have seen the APR impact things like coaching changes, budgets, and other personnel changes, but because they have never seen coaches’ and athletic administrators’ recruiting philosophies change or place an emphasis on changing recruiting, they may not believe the APR does impact it very much at all. This idea would again be in line with what Trail and Chelladurai (2002) stated in that from a top down perspective, what is seen and changed is only what is emphasized and valued in intercollegiate athletics. Thus, if no one ever sees it or feels that an emphasis is placed on something like changing recruiting, then they are not going to feel like it is impacted much by anything, including the APR.

Finally, I believe these individuals may have answered this way because they simply are fragmented in their own area of academic support services, compliance, financial aid, overall leadership, academic duties, and they truly have no interaction or very little with football and/or men’s basketball coaches, and thus have no clue about what really goes on in recruiting. I have witnessed this first hand working in several athletic departments, and having noticed this fragmentation between coaches and other athletic administrative areas. Thus, these participants
could have answered “no impact at all”, when really it should sound more like “no interaction at all” with coaches, which would therefore give them little knowledge of recruiting and whether the APR has impacted the type of football and/or men’s basketball student athletes being brought in or not. Regardless, the fact that 22.80% of all participants answered this way for this specific question was very surprising, and would be a great place to delve more into down the road.

The following additional frequent insights and emergent themes generated from the results were still very interesting and thought provoking, but were less conclusive since they stem from smaller participant response percentages:

An initial frequent insight showed that for some, the greatest impact has not been from the APR, but rather it has been from their institutions’ and athletic departments’ internal admissions standards and criteria for incoming football and/or men’s basketball student athletes. Specifically, 9.22% of all participants espoused this belief, and articulated that due to high or strict admissions standards and recruiting criteria, football and/or men’s basketball coaches can only recruit very specific student athletes with even higher GPA’s and test scores than what the NCAA counts as minimum criteria. Thus, these athletic and academic administrators feel that the APR does not have any impact on their recruiting as it relates to football and men’s basketball programs given that their own standards are more stringent and focused compared to the NCAA’s initial eligibility requirements.

This philosophy could definitely make sense coming from Ivy League athletic or academic administrators, or a few other “high profile” academically geared athletic conferences, and groups like the Knight Commission (2006) have even called for more athletic conferences to operate with similar stricter standards compared to the NCAA. Nonetheless, as a response rate
with less than 10% shows, this is a not a highly frequent response among athletic or academic administrators at low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to their football and/or men’s basketball programs.

Another interesting theme revolved around the fact that more low resource and non-BCS athletic departments are cracking down when it comes to football and/or men’s basketball programs recruiting “risky” prospective student athletes. Specifically, 6.64% of all participants responded in this way, and articulated that the APR has impacted their athletic departments and their “revenue generating” sports by making them re-evaluate how they define “risky” in regards to recruiting, whether it is a student athletes’ academic issues, or whether there may be character, personal, or family issues involved also in the situation.

This is an important impact of the APR in that from an athletic administrative standpoint, recruiting less “risky” student athletes does not just include high school students, but junior college transfers as well as transfers from four year institutions. Since the word “risky” can be broadly defined, this category of responses shows that these athletic administrators are more than likely evaluating character and personal background into the equation just as much now as academic preparedness and school background as it relates to recruiting football and/or men’s basketball student athletes. These potentially “risky” factors in recruiting football and/or men’s basketball student athletes (whom are predominantly African American) also reflect what many scholars have previously wrote about concerning the type of student athlete that plays football and/or men’s basketball, and whom are often “used” in the “revenue producing” sport culture of intercollegiate athletics (Pascarella, Truckenmiller, Nora, Terenzini, Edison, & Hagedorn, 1999; Upthegrove, Roscigno, & Charles, 1999; Camp, 1990; Purdy, Eitzen, & Hufnagel, 1982).
A further frequent response simply showed that 5.53% of all participants felt that the APR did *not necessarily* or not really impact the type of student athlete being recruited by football and/or men’s basketball programs at low resource or non-BCS institutions. This answer of *not necessarily* or *not much* could show participants’ lack of knowledge into the subject of recruiting, or it could simply show that they believe the APR impact is a small factor in everything that goes on in athletic departments (including recruitment), but not enough of an impact or influence to merit much consideration at this point.

A specific insight referenced the APR impacting junior college transfers and two year college graduates as they relate to the recruiting process at low resource or non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments. Particularly, 5.16% of the participants for this question articulated that due to the impact of the APR, these athletic departments and their football and/or men’s basketball programs now look less at junior college transfers and two year college graduates in the recruiting process, often because these types of prospective student athletes (PSA’s) have had poor academic preparedness at the junior college level, and may not be ready for the rigors of four year college or university coursework.

This has been an issue going back thirty years with the inception of Proposition 48 (see Chapter Two), and whether non-qualifying high school student athletes decide to go to four year schools and sit out till they are academically eligible, or go to junior colleges with the hope of playing sports and passing enough classes to meet initial NCAA requirements (Baxter & Lambert, 1990; Vernon, Horton, & Alford, 1986). In addition, I can personally attest to multiple experiences in intercollegiate athletics where I have witnessed the recruitment of junior college transfers whom were not academically prepared for four year undergraduate coursework, or personally mature enough to handle the rigors of hard work and time management associated
with being a true “student” athlete. Thus, more often than not, I have seen junior college transfers come to four year institutions and either not graduate at all, or not even make it past one year or even in some cases, one semester.

Also, by having more high school student athletes recruited into football and/or men’s basketball programs at low resource or non-BCS institutions, it gives them more years of involvement with these athletic departments’ academic support services programs, even if these programs are poorly funded and operated on “bare bones” type budgets. Any academic support exposure for incoming student athletes is better than nothing, or better than possibly being at previous academic institutions where academic success is not even emphasized at all.

Consequently, as this 5.16% of participants espoused, low resource and non-BCS institutions (who already have existing retention problems) and their athletic departments are trending towards recruiting less junior college transfers and two year college graduates in light of APR impact, and more towards recruiting prospective student athletes who come straight out of high school. These individuals can normally benefit the most from multiple years of academic support services, tutoring, and mentoring, and are usually better long term compliments to helping improve academic eligibility and retention for football and/or men’s basketball programs.

The final frequent theme that emerged from the data analysis for this question was that 5.16% of all participants said that in light of the impact of the APR on recruiting, athletic and academic administrators are now encouraging coaches to recruit student athletes with more academic skill, but also greater motivation for academic success, and more willingness to put the time into studying and ultimately graduating from college. The problem arises though when the
“revenue generating” sports of football and/or men’s basketball recruit student athletes who only want to play sports, be around a “consumption” type culture, and fit education into a small part of their college life (Jones, 2010). Instead of these student athletes caring about their academic responsibilities, and being motivated to work hard in school first, and in sports second, in that specific order.

In addition, this problem only gets exacerbated at low resource or non-BCS institutions where there are little financial resources for academic support services to help these student athletes (specifically football and/or men’s basketball players) not only succeed academically, but care about succeeding academically. As a result, many of these student athletes who do not care end up being academically ineligible, transfer from these sport programs, and kill football and/or men’s basketball programs’ APR scores, and continue a negative cycle.

Thus, based on this result of 5.16% of athletic and academic administrators taking the initiative to talk with these coaches and encourage them to recruit student athletes with academic intangibles and motivation to succeed, I am encouraged that some percentage of participants not only care about this, but that the intangible of motivation (evaluated in recruiting) is even on their radar screens to begin with. This is a positive trend for athletic and academic administrators at low resource or non-BCS institutional athletic departments, and one hopes that this 5.16% of individuals can continue to influence football and/or men’s basketball coaches and the other 95% of athletic and academic administrators to the reality that APR scores decrease with apathetic student athletes. But, APR scores rise and programs succeed with student athletes who care about their personal educations, and are motivated to work hard and meet challenges head on.
Research Question #4

RQ4: What are any positive changes in implementation measures for academic support concerning football and/or men’s basketball that resulted from the pressures of APR compliance?

For the fourth research question, 259 participants responded and 51 response categories were generated from the insights and emergent themes based on the frequency of identical or similar responses. The purpose of this question was to be able to capture best practices and positive implementation measures for academic support for football and/or men’s basketball programs as it relates to compliance with the APR. With the ultimate goal of being able to share these great ideas and practices so that similar institutions dealing with similar problems could benefit from the collective knowledge gathered from this question. The results showed three significant and “conclusive” insights that stemmed from participant response percentages close to 15% or higher. The rest of the frequent insights were still insightful, but not as statistically significant since they originated from smaller participant response percentages.

1). The most frequent theme or insight that emerged from the data in helping form the conclusive “whole” of the analysis was that 19.69% of all participants articulated that due to APR pressures for football and/or men’s basketball programs, there has been an increase in financial resources for the hiring of new academic support services personnel and compliance personnel (including tutors and graduate assistants). This is very interesting and significant given that it was the most frequent theme that emerged from this research question, and it clearly points to the fact that even at low resource or non-BCS institutions where their athletic
departments do not usually generate net profit, money still gets redistributed and allocated for new things based upon significant need.

Consequently, I can only figure that one of three things is happening:

a). The actual academic institutions end up giving the athletic departments additional resources (from their revenue streams) to reinvest into academic support services and compliance work as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs, in essence subsidizing the efforts of athletic departments and their administrative offices (Sperber, 1990). A resource for these type of subsidizing effort is student fees, with an institution increasing either general student fees, or instituting an “athletic” fee to help pay for intercollegiate athletic endeavors. I have witnessed this at a couple of academic institutions, and it is a standard practice at large and small institutions to help athletic departments pay for escalating costs and a variety of improvements.

b). Athletic departments at low resource or non-BCS institutions are having to go out and fundraise in the local communities surrounding their colleges and universities, with the expressed purpose of generating additional revenue to help pay for additional academic resources, academic support services personnel, and compliance personnel. While this is one of the main duties of an athletic director and athletic departments, it does not seem to be the normal mode of operation for low resource and non-BCS institutions given that so many of these schools barely sell tickets to the majority of their sporting events, let alone have the ability to fundraise for lots of ancillary needs such as more academic support and compliance staff (Renick, 1974). However, some of these institutions use fundraising for multiple purposes, and they will go out and raise money for new athletic department offices (which sounds like a major need), but also add a new computer lab and study hall rooms on to the back side of the building, and an extra
couple of offices for new staff members, thus using privately raised money to also help academic support services and compliance departments behind the scene. But again, on a whole, low resource and non-BCS institutions do not normally have the communal support, alumni bases, and development staff members in place to be major players in athletic fundraising efforts, although every one of them would like this ability if possessed.

c). I believe the most plausible answer to why almost 20% of participants responded this way is that when it comes to APR pressures for the two most visible sports (football and/or men’s basketball), low resource and non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments simply do what a ton of other business entities do, and that is cut one area’s budget to give to another area. In other words, almost 20% of participants at these athletic departments do not witness windfalls of cash coming in from their sport programs or private donors, but rather when there is a significant need or crisis (APR pressures), they witness money being taken from other areas (such as travel, marketing, business operations, etc) in order to diminish or eliminate the need or crisis that arises. This would also fall in line with what Forde (2006) has written regarding low resource and non-BCS institutions’ financial situations and their lack of financial resources, thus these institutions would have very little chances of generating new revenue, but rather shifting little amounts of money around seems to be more plausible to me.

In the case of low resource and non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments, the crisis is APR underperformance for their football and/or men’s basketball programs, and as evidenced by these responses, one major solution is to throw money into the hiring of new academic support and compliance positions, and provide better academic support services. If the additional money does not come from athletic departments’ net profit, or from the institution, nor fundraising, then it must come from some other area inside athletic departments, which results in a scenario of
“robbing Peter to pay Paul”, or shifting around existing money to the detriment of some other person or group. This shows though, as Hums and Riemer (2002), and Trail and Chelladurai (2002) have articulated, that athletic directors as leaders will spend financial resources on whatever is currently being valued or emphasized around them in order to create appeasement as well as to solve issues (APR impact), especially if this involves high profile sports such as football and/or men’s basketball.

2). The second most frequent theme that emerged from the data analysis in response to this question was that 14.67% of all participants stated there had been no changes or positive implementation measures for APR compliance as of a result of APR pressures for football and/or men’s basketball programs. I believe this response percentage seemed a little high given that so many of these low resource or non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments had football and/or men’s basketball programs with APR issues, but this insight could be saying two things:

1). There may be no changes or positive implementation measures as it relates to APR compliance for these athletic departments’ football and/or men’s basketball programs simply because they do not have any net profit or extra financial resources. Thus, without the “easy” answer of just spending more money on problems, they are out of answers because there may be no creativity or “out of the box” thinking when it comes to helping solve the issues surrounding poor APR compliance, academic ineligibility, and low retention among football and/or men’s basketball programs.

2). It may also show that from a leadership standpoint, there simply is no vision, the right personnel are not in place, and athletic departments at low resource or non-BCS institutions may not be well integrated with the academic missions of their institutions. These issues of poor
leadership and detachment from academic institutions have been espoused by many scholars over time such as Duderstadt (2000), Sperber (2000), and Thelin (1996), as well as from the Knight Foundation (1991-2011), who has consistently called for greater Presidential leadership in forcing athletic departments, and the high profile sports of football and men’s basketball in particular, to be reconnected to college and university campuses and the academic principles which the institutions supposedly stand for.

Thus, I can easily see how, even in the face of great challenges and crises (like poor academic support and APR issues), nothing gets created or implemented if no leader initiates change, and if athletic departments at low resource or non-BCS institutions do not focus on reconnecting to their academic institutional purposes. This is one of the only ways that best practices will come about, and specifically for football and/or men’s basketball programs, this is one of the only ways that their academic support services will be improved, and APR scores start to increase.

3). The third most significant and frequent insight that resulted from this question was that 13.51% of participants articulated that as a result of APR pressures concerning football and/or men’s basketball programs, tutorial services, academic programs, and academic monitoring improved. Here are some responses exemplifying some of these positive implementation measures:

*We have a contract for Mental health evaluations as well as psycho-educational evaluations, which were not in place before APR (or my time in the dept).*

*Constantly review program and identify those who are first generation college students. Between faculty, athletic staff, and coaches continue to engage those student-athletes.*
Better tracking of student athletes study hours is now the norm. Additional workshops, guest speakers, and presentations are done to assist the student athlete on their academic journey. For high risk student athletes, more contact with mentors and faculty is now the norm.

I believe our relationships and connections with key areas of campus (Campus administration; faculty in most cases; advising; Registrar’s office, etc) have been enhanced due to the need for campus support of the progress of our student-athletes.

We now have a Athletic Department policy that mandates tutors in every class for all student athletes who are brought in under special exception. In other words, if a kid is not regularly admissible to the institution, the coach must request admission through a lengthy "special admit" process. Any kid who gains admission this way must have tutors provided to him/her until he/she demonstrates he/she no longer needs the tutor. The coach must pay for the tutor.

In light of these responses, I can definitely believe that 13.51% of all participants have seen positive implementation measures created and improved on by: a) providing more tutors, mentors, and inspirational speakers for the student athletes, b) performing mental health evaluations on student athletes, c) identifying who are first generation college students, d) and by strengthening relationships and connections on campus with the advising and registrars offices. These improvements and enhanced best practices will only help academic support services personnel at low resource or non-BCS institutional athletic departments improve their methods and focus their attention in on football and/or men’s basketball players, and ultimately, I believe with some of these practices, APR scores will also improve. This also is one of many improved implementation measures that scholars such as Duderstadt (2000) have called for.

The following additional frequent insights and emergent themes generated from the results were still very interesting and thought provoking, but were less conclusive since they stem from smaller participant response percentages:
The initial frequent yet less conclusive theme that emerged from the data showed that 11.96% of all participants have worked to have a higher understanding of eligibility, retention, and transfer issues, and these same participants also articulated a greater sense of urgency in knowing how the APR works, how it affects programs like football and/or men’s basketball, and how to improve these programs’ semester by semester eligibility, and overall retention numbers. This is a positive and significant insight in that if these athletic and academic administrators can first work together to better understand the detailed APR rules and penalty structures, and then second, work their way backwards in figuring out how to abide by the rules and avoid penalties, then APR scores will have a great chance of increasing. This can definitely happen if this 11.96% of participants continue to study and more clearly understand eligibility and retention issues (specifically for football and/or men’s basketball) and what causes problems with these two significant factors, and then all athletic departments will also benefit if these same individuals can take the knowledge they are learning, and help other support staff around them apply the principles to all other sport programs and to department wide policies.

Another interesting insight into improved best practices or positive implementation measures as it relates to academic support, that have resulted from APR pressures for football and/or men’s basketball, is that 10.81% of all participants stated there is better screening of prospective student athletes in the recruiting process, and less “at risk” student athletes are being recruited. I have already spoken at length about the recruiting process in this chapter, but it is worth briefly mentioning again the following: If athletic and academic administrators continue to be more cognizant of the type of “student” being recruited, and if football and/or men’s basketball coaches continue to also be more aware of the academic profiles of these student athletes and understand what their administrators expect, then better students will be brought in,
and APR football and/or men’s basketball APR scores will have a better chance of increasing. I believe this academically inspired recruiting is a must since scholars such as Rishe (2003) and Debrock, Hendricks, and Koenker (1996) believed student athletes in football and men’s basketball are often underprepared academically, and need to hear from coaches that their academic credentials are now being more valued in the recruiting process.

An additional insight goes hand in hand with the previous one, and revolves around football and/or men’s basketball coaches’ awareness of the APR and how their recruiting practices and program rules affect eligibility and retention. Specifically, 9.26% of all participants said they have seen football and/or men’s basketball coaches be more aware of the APR and pay more attention to academic reform measures in general as a result of the pressures of APR compliance.

This is very interesting in that this is what scholars like Johnson (2010) and Brown (2005), and reform groups like The Drake Group (2010) and the Knight Foundation (1996, 1991) have wanted to happen for a long time. Thus, it is a positive sign when administrators volunteer to share their personal beliefs that some football and/or men’s basketball coaches have started to improve their understanding of and focus towards academic support measures like the APR. If football and/or men’s basketball coaches start to care more about the APR and how academic reform measures affect their programs, then it may also mean that these same coaches will start to care more for the players they recruit and coach, thus hopefully strengthening relationships and increasing opportunities for mentoring and caring for these young men. In addition, as the Associated Press (2010) pointed out, now that coaches have their programs’ APR scores tied to their coaching history, I believe it simply adds one more incentive for them to care about who
they recruit and how their actions affect eligibility and retention. I believe these are all positive things.

The final frequent theme that emerged from the data analysis for this question was that 9.26% of participants articulated that due to the pressures of APR compliance at these low resource or non-BCS institutional athletic departments, there has been an increase in tutors working with the men’s basketball programs and traveling with the teams on road trips. As stated previously in Chapter Four and now multiple times in this chapter, the results from these five research questions have shown that the APR has negatively impacted men’s basketball programs at low resource or non-BCS institutions more when compared to football programs at the same institutions. Thus, I am not surprised that 9.26% of participants for this fourth research question responded that a significant implementation change as far as academic support is concerned is that more tutors are working with men’s basketball programs, and also traveling with them on road trips to better ensure studying is still taken place away from campus and normal routines.

This again is a positive implementation change for academic support services as it relates to men’s basketball programs at these institutions, and it seems that it has taken APR underperformance and pressures to lead to this tutoring and traveling increase. Regardless, as I have overseen study halls for men’s basketball programs on road trips, I can say that this only helps student athletes grasp the gravity of their academic situations, and helps lead to better study habits and personal discipline in bringing school work along on road trips.

This idea of increasing tutoring for men’s basketball programs and having tutors travel with the teams also leads to deeper and more established relationships between academic support services personnel and student athletes, which in turn leads to greater trust between both parties.
This is critical because if student athletes believe that academic support services personnel and coaches really know them, believe in them and their academic abilities, and want the best for their lives, then it often (like all people) will inspire student athletes (in this case men’s basketball players) to be motivated to study harder and perform better, which again leads to growth in their lives, and higher academic eligibility and retention for these specific programs.

Lastly, regarding Research Question 4, it is important to note the two most significant and creative best practices or positive implementation measures that resulted from the pressures of APR compliance as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs. These two positive implementation measures are comprised from the three following responses:

**We have developed a class withdrawal policy that disallows our student-athletes to drop classes prior to the withdrawal deadline unless the student-athlete can show they have exhausted all academic resources possible such as, "meeting with their respective instructors, attending regularly scheduled study hall, signing up for tutorial support, going to class - first and foremost." I will meet with students individually to map out a plan of attack for the remaining semester to determine whether a drop is warranted, but not before the day of the deadline. That way it ensures the students will "fight" for every opportunity to perform and not just simply drop a class at the first sign of obstacles. It has worked wonders for our football team in terms of matching attempted credits with earned credits by semester's end.**

**We have instituted an APR Scholarship Review Committee which requires the approval of a committee of faculty members outside the athletic department before a team with APR issues can award financial aid.**

**The focus is heavily on the type of PSA coaches are recruiting. Because of low APR scores we established an APR Committee to evaluate and receive approval before a coach is permitted to sign a PSA to a scholarship and/or bring on an official visit.**

It seems that these two main ideas (gathered from the three responses) for best practices are incredibly smart and helpful positive implementation measures for academic support services
and compliance offices as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs at low resource or non-BCS institutional athletic departments. First, the practice of not letting student athletes drop a class until they have exhausted every avenue of study and communication possible, and to have these avenues have to be documented before anything can take place is tremendously astute and anticipatory in relation to potential APR issues of academic eligibility and retention.

Second, the other creative and helpful idea is having an APR scholarship committee, comprised of faculty outside of the athletic department, review academic profiles of recruits from sport programs with underperforming APR scores before any on campus visit or scholarship offer can take place. This agrees with Atwell (1991) who believed faculty should be more concerned with student athlete academic achievement and academic progress, and I believe this is great in three ways:

   a). It serves as an accountability measure for the coaches. b). It is a great way for athletic departments to reach out to the faculty on campus and show that they are serious about academic achievement of their student athletes, and they value the input and expertise of the faculty. This connects athletics to the institutions in a serious way, and shows commitment towards academics and excellence (Weisart, Kliever, Mason, & Bergmann, 1990). c). It obviously also helps better academically prepared student athletes be offered scholarships, and it helps weed out “at risk” student athletes who may not be capable of succeeding in four year college coursework.

Both of these positive implementation measures stemmed from creative ideas and “out of the box” thinking as answers to APR pressures for football and men’s basketball programs at low resource or non-BCS institutions. Thus, I believe that all of these institutions’ athletic departments should adopt these two best practices as they are incredibly helpful, would not cost
large amounts of money to implement, and would be extremely positive in helping keep all involved parties accountable to the mission of developing sharp and successful football and/or men’s basketball student athletes, with the ultimate goal of moving these men towards graduation.

**Research Question #5**

RQ5: Where is your athletic department spending their net profit (if applicable), and is a portion or all of the net profit being put back into academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball programs?

For the fifth and final research question, 254 participants responded and 35 response categories were generated from the insights and emergent themes based on the frequency of identical or similar responses. This financial question was seeking to uncover where low resource or non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments were spending their net profit if indeed they even had any. Thus, hoping to figure out whether these institutions and their football and/or men’s basketball programs had poor APR scores despite spending net profit on academic support services for these sports. Whether they had poor APR scores because they did not spend net profit on academic support services for these sports, or whether quite simply there was no available net profit for academic support services for these sports, which possibly contributed (among many factors) to academic underperformance and poor APR scores. The results showed two significant and “conclusive” insights that stemmed from participant response percentages 30% or higher. The rest of the frequent insights were still insightful, but not as statistically significant since they originated from smaller participant response percentages.
1). The two most frequent and significant themes that emerged from the data in helping form the conclusive “whole” of the analysis was that first, 36.61% of all participants responded *NA/Not Available* to this research question in relation to the idea of their athletic departments even having net profit, let alone being able to use net profit to put towards academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball. In addition, 30.70% of participants also answered specifically that their athletic departments had *No Net Profit/None* as it related to this final research question. Consequently, the top two response categories for this research question clearly showed that for more than 66% of the participants and the low resource or non-BCS institutional athletic departments they represented, there was no way they could spend net profit on academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball programs since they did not posses any to begin with.

Thus, these two significant emergent themes and insights confirm that the majority of low resource or non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments (including their football and/or men’s basketball programs) do not generate net profit at all, let alone have any extra money to put towards academic support services for academically underperforming sport programs like football and/or men’s basketball. These significant results fall right in line with the NCAA (2011) has admitted as recently as June of 2011, and also agree with a multitude of scholars who have written that low resource and non-BCS institutions will continue to have lower APR scores in relation to football and/or men’s basketball programs due to a lack of financial resources (Associated Press, 2010; Holden, 2010; Hosick, 2010; Mills, 2010; Moltz, 2010; Lapchick, Lopresti, and Reshard, 2009; Powell, 2009; Forde, 2006).

Furthermore, after data triangulation took place in the analysis, these top two response categories showed some deeper insights that were both significant and yet somewhat surprising.
First, within the top response category (36.61% of all participants) of NA/Not Available, only 3/7 of these participants’ institutional athletic departments (41.33%) had football and/or men’s basketball programs with both underperforming APR scores AND negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009, compared to slightly more than 4/7 of institutional athletic departments (58.66%) which sponsored football and/or men’s basketball and yet did NOT have these same sport programs possess both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009.

This was somewhat surprising in that I would have thought out of 36.61% of total participants who responded not having net profit available, more than the roughly 41% of their athletic departments’ football and/or men’s basketball programs would have also possessed underperforming APR scores at some point from 2005-2009. Yet, the results showed the opposite, and presented new data which expressed rather that more of these low resource or non-BCS institutional athletic departments (58.66%) had football and/or men’s basketball programs with no net profit available, but still positive APR scores for the same sport programs.

2). Along the same lines, the second most frequent response category that showed 30.70% of all participants stating that their athletic departments did not have any net profit also had significant and deeper insights after data triangulation. Out of this 30.70% of participants whose athletic departments had no net profit, slightly more than ½ of these participants’ athletic departments (52.23%) had football and/or men’s basketball programs with both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009, compared to slightly less than ½ of these participants’ athletic departments (47.76%) who had football and/or men’s basketball programs who did NOT have both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009.
This second set of deeper insights made somewhat more sense in that I have always thought (based on the literature-see Chapter Two) that if these low resource or non-BCS institutional athletic departments did not have any net profit at all, then they also would have a higher percentage of football and/or men’s basketball programs with both underperforming APR scores (lack of $ equals poorer academic support services) AND negative net profit. Consequently, the deeper insights for the second response category (even though it is only slightly more than ½) show that more than half of the institutional athletic departments (52.23%) who clearly do not have any net profit and who sponsor football and/or men’s basketball programs have had both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009 in relation to these two sport programs.

Thus for a small majority who clearly do not have any net profit, also showing on the back end what the NCAA (2011) and scholars such as Forde (2006) have assumed: that low resource or non-BCS institutional athletic departments that sponsor football and/or men’s basketball lack the financial resources to improve much of anything, including academic support services. Consequently, for the two most prominent sport programs (football and/or men’s basketball) at these institutions, the result has often been underperforming APR scores due to (among other factors) a lack of financial resources (net profit) for academic support services.

The larger insight though that was gleaned through deeper analysis and data triangulation was that for both of these top two response categories of NA/Not Available and No Net Profit/None, each had either above or close to 50% of their categories participants come from low resource or non-BCS institutional athletic departments that did NOT have both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009 as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs. In other words, roughly ½ or almost ½ of the
participants for each of the top two response categories did NOT represent low resource or non-BCS institutional athletic departments that possessed BOTH underperforming APR scores AND negative net profit as it relates to their football and/or men’s basketball programs.

Consequently, the results clearly showed that as a whole, it is not conclusive from this study that I can say a significant majority of low resource or non-BCS institutions’ athletic departments who sponsored football and/or men’s basketball also possessed BOTH underperforming APR scores AND negative net profit at some point in time from 2005-2009 as it related to those two sport programs. Rather, I can only say with confidence based on the results from this study, that for participants who were from low resource or non-BCS institutional athletic departments and answered No Net Profit/None, there is a slight and significant majority of these institutions who DID possess both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009 as it related to their football and/or men’s basketball programs. Thus showing that NOT ALL of these institutional athletic departments and their football and/or men’s basketball programs had underperforming APR scores AND negative net profit, leading to the conclusion that it is not clear for me to say that a lack of financial resources at these institutions simply leads to poor academic support services and academic performance among football and/or men’s basketball student athletes.

The following additional frequent insights and emergent themes generated from the results were still very interesting and thought provoking, but were less conclusive since they stem from smaller participant response percentages:

An initial frequent yet less conclusive theme that emerged from the data for this research question was that 11.81% of participants simply responded that they were Unsure/Didn’t Know
as it related to the idea of where their net profit (if applicable) was being spent. This response may simply have been because the participants were unsure if their athletic departments even had net profit to being with, or it may have been a result of lack of knowledge into the spending habits of their athletic departments. Either way, the results show that slightly more than 1 out of every 10 participants was unsure about the idea of net profit at all at low resource or non-BCS institution’s athletic departments as it related to football and/or men’s basketball programs.

The next emergent theme was interesting, and related back to the first two categorical responses. Specifically, 8.66% of all participants for this research question stated that their athletic departments invested money back into academic support services, and affirmed that whether it was net profit or simply the way the budgets were allocated, some type of money was being reinvested back into the academic support services of their athletic departments, and specifically for football and/or men’s basketball programs.

This was intriguing in that it showed only a little less than 10% of all participants for this question had positive knowledge that their athletic departments reinvested money back into academic support services, and therefore were confident that their academic support services were getting a much needed increase of support as it related to football and/or men’s basketball programs. But it did show that a small portion of athletic departments are reinvesting money back into academic support for football and/or men’s basketball programs, and this insight would fall in line with what Mahony, Rums, and Riemer (2002) articulated when they suggested that athletic directors and departments will reinvest current money into sport programs that are considered more financially significant because they can potentially generate their own revenue. I was surprised though how low this response category was considering the responses did not always articulate the reinvested monies were from net profits, but rather the majority of the
answers simply affirmed that money was being reinvested. Given this fact, I would have thought that this response category would have had a higher percentage because even low resource or non-BCS institutional athletic departments with no net profit could have still reinvested monies from some of their current operational budgets back into academic support services. Yet, less than 1 out of every 10 participants said this practice has happened.

Interestingly though, after data triangulation was conducted for the final analysis for this specific response category, the results also showed out of this 8.66% of participants’ responses, only a little more than 1/3 of these participants (37.50%) who stated that financial resources within their athletic departments were being put back into academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball programs ALSO were in athletic departments that had both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009 as it related to the same sport programs. Thus, showing that even though money was being put back into academic support services for these two sports, it was not necessarily net profit that was being spent, and it was still not helping APR performance on a consistent basis from 2005-2009.

On the contrary, the other 2/3 of these same participants (62.50%) for this category of responses were from athletic departments that not only put financial resources (possibly net profit) back into their academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball programs, but were also from institutional athletic departments that did NOT have both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009 as it related to these two sport programs.

Consequently, I can infer that from the results for this specific response category based on data from 2005-2009, there was a higher percentage of athletic departments that spent money
on academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball programs and saw better academic performance for their student athletes. In addition, these same athletic departments also had a greater chance of either breaking even financially or possessing positive net profit.

Another frequent insight and emergent theme for this research question was that 4.72% of all participants articulated that their net profit was being used to hire new academic support staff/personnel as it related to working with football and/or men’s basketball student athletes specifically and other student athletes generally. I believe this is a positive sign for low resource and non-BCS institutional athletic departments given their often difficult financial situations (Forde, 2006). Specifically, if some of these athletic departments reinvest net profit (no matter how small) back into the hiring of new academic support services personnel and/or compliance personnel, then more football and/or men’s basketball student athletes will be able to have more personal attention, better communication and mentoring can take place, and hopefully better academic results will come from increases in the number of full time employees working with these student athletes. I must point out though that these positives and increases are all predicated on athletic departments hiring motivated individuals, who have a strong interest in the personal growth of young men (in this case), and who also are willing to put the necessary time in to developing great relationships and mutual trust. Strong relationships can only happen where there has been time invested and energy expended, and if these results for hiring increases reflect those principles, then they will ultimately be deemed as positive steps at these low resource or non-BCS athletic departments as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs.

The last two frequent yet less conclusive response categories with emergent themes dealt with participants who represented low resource or non-BCS institutional athletic departments that did not have any net profit as it applied to the research question. Rather, 4.33% of the
participants for the sixth response category articulated that their actual academic institutions support them financially and they rely on the colleges and universities to subsidize their athletic expenses. In addition, 3.14% of the participants for the seventh response category stated that the NCAA Academic Enhancement Fund provides additional monies for their athletic departments, and helps offset expenses and negative net profits in their departments.

Both of these final response categories were interesting in that it gave me insight into how low resource or non-BCS institutional athletic departments and their football and/or men’s basketball programs operate when no net profit is being generated. In addition, these insights support the claim of Thelin (1996) when he wrote about how academic institutions end up financially supporting a large majority of institutional athletic departments given that the majority of them operate at a financial loss. This financial subsidizing also reinforces what the Knight Commission (2010) has claimed for a long time in that institutional spending for intercollegiate athletics often is vastly greater than institutional spending on education related activities for students, especially at larger, BCS member institutions. Thus, the consequences of this continued institutional subsidizing in the future could be detrimental, and Wolverton (2007), Mahony, Hums, & Riemer (2005), and Sperber (1990), all believed the main detriment to this type of institutional spending will be a cutting of other “less important” sports so that football and/or men’s basketball can continue to maintain its’ lofty statuses as potential “revenue generating” sports. Even though (based on the results of this research study) these “revenue generating” sports, especially at low resource or non-BCS institutions, end up being “revenue consuming” sports that often do not end up “producing” net profit, or academically geared student athletes poised to graduate and enter the work force of American society.
I believe this may be the ultimate irony regarding the “production” of football and/or men’s basketball at low resource and non-BCS institutions. Unless both academic and athletic administrators start to shift their priorities away from FCS playoff berths and NCAA tournament appearances, one will continue to see low resource and non-BCS institutions’ football and/or men’s basketball programs lag behind academically while suffering financially, or at least “claim” to not be able to progress in the classroom or in competition due to a lack of financial resources.

**Implications of the Study**

Based on the results of this study, numerous implications can be extracted for intercollegiate athletic practitioners as well as academic scholars regarding the impact of the NCAA Academic Progress Rate (APR) on low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs. First, this study will help show that the impact of the APR is not only felt by what the NCAA terms “low resource” institutions, but also by small and “mid major” institutions that are members of athletic conferences not associated with the Bowl Championship Series (BCS). This study was comprised of 9 athletic conferences (*Atlantic 10 Conference, Colonial Athletic Association, Horizon Conference, Ivy League, Metro Atlantic Athletic Conference, Missouri Valley Conference, Ohio Valley Conference, Summit League, and the West Coast Conference*) with institutions that tend to be considered “mid major” in size and financial status, yet still are somewhat affected by the APR (on a case by case basis) as it relates to their football and/or men’s basketball programs. This is significant in that up until this point, the NCAA and other scholars have suggested that predominantly only low resource institutions were negatively impacted by the APR, yet this study shows different, and leads me to believe
that many athletic and academic administrators from a multitude of “mid major” AND low resource institutions care about the APR and its’ possible negative impact.

The participants from these institutions affirmed this fact with their responses to the five open-ended research questions, and the results from this study seem to in certain cases represent “mid major” and other non-BCS institutions as much as it represents “low resource” institutions and “Historically Black Colleges and Universities” (HBCU’s). So, I believe future studies could analyze the impact of the APR on specific “mid major” athletic departments and sport programs also since they too seem to care about the APR and have to deal with its’ consequences.

A second implication of this study is that it makes athletic practitioners and academic scholars more aware of how the APR impacts athletic directors at low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to their football and/or men’s basketball programs. Almost 20% of the participants in this study were athletic directors, and many of the concerns regarding the negative impact of the APR as it relates to these two sports programs came from athletic directors. This is very significant since on the surface, someone may simply think the APR impacts academic support services personnel and compliance personnel, yet the results of this study, along with the emergent themes from the open ended responses, seem to show that the APR impacts the leaders of these athletic departments significantly as well. I believe this implication moving forward will be very important to athletic administrators since it shows that the men and women in the very tops of athletic departments who deal with a multitude of high level issues still care about the daily tasks surrounding academic support and academic eligibility, especially when it comes to the “revenue generating” sports of football and men’s basketball. This high response rate intimates that these athletic directors no longer deal with only high level issues, but rather are more involved on a daily basis with academic issues reserved in the past for lower level athletic
employees. Thus, in the future, athletic directors and athletic administrators at similar institutions can take heed of this heightened awareness and involvement of their peers regarding the APR and academic issues, and they can be quicker to lead in resolving academic eligibility problems and strengthening their own academic support services departments.

A third implication of this study also involves the expanded impact of the APR at these institutions, and deals with the increased involvement of faculty in regards to APR compliance for football and/or men’s basketball programs at low resource or non-BCS institutions. The results of the study show that 11.7% of all participants were faculty athletic representatives. A decent response percentage considering faculty members are not technically employed by athletic departments, nor do they answer directly for APR compliance. Yet, this participation percentage implies that faculty members of these specific institutions are more involved with intercollegiate athletic issues on some level, and scholars such as Weisart, Kliever, Mason, & Bergmann (1990) believed this increased involvement and oversight has been needed in intercollegiate athletics for a long time. The results have shown that the APR (and other academic issues) has caused faculty members, and specifically faculty athletic representatives, to serve on scholarship review committees, hiring committees for athletic personnel, as well as be more involved with tutoring and mentoring sessions, as well as meetings with football and/or men’s basketball student athletes. I believe this implication is positive in that it helps the academic missions of the institutions be more intertwined with athletic departments. It also adds a necessary layer of academic accountability to the recruitment and matriculation of student athletes in football and/or men’s basketball programs, but the possible downside for them is that it also places more responsibility on certain faculty athletic representatives as they try to balance their “hired” duties with athletic oversight responsibilities. Thus, it seems faculty athletic
representatives moving forward can expect to be involved more with academic monitoring of student athletes since the NCAA is only tightening their academic standards and oversight regarding academic measures such as the APR.

A fourth implication from the demographic results of this study is that there are very few African American men and women in athletic administrative positions at low resource or non-BCS institutions. Only 15.3% of participants identified themselves as African American/Black, while 81.5% of all participants identified themselves as White/Caucasian. This large disparity is significant, and I believe it implies the need for more African American men and women in athletic administrative roles considering a the majority of football and/or men’s basketball players at the NCAA Division I level are African American (Upthegrove, Roscigno, & Charles, 1999). Thus, having more racially similar influences and role models for these men can only help them feel more comfortable and less isolated on campuses that are often predominately white (Rhoden, 1990). It is my hope that more African Americans will be present in athletic administration as time progresses, and specifically that African American student athletes in football and men’s basketball will continue to have more men and women as mentors that can naturally relate to their personal backgrounds, thoughts, and feelings.

A fifth implication of this study is that there are some participants (roughly 30%) at low resource or non-BCS institutions that feel the APR has negatively impacted their athletic departments as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs. In addition, out of all the institutional athletic departments that these participants represented, further triangulation showed that 3/5 of the institutional athletic departments (67.79%) also had football and/or men’s basketball programs with both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009.
This significance implies that for slightly less than 1/3 of these institutions’ represented, the APR definitely has negative impacts and effects, and poor APR compliance does indeed correlate to a lack of financial resources for the institutions that have articulated and exhibited this negative APR impact. But, having only a 1/3 of the participants articulate this response allows me as a researcher to move forward knowing that not all low resource or non-BCS institutions are negatively impacted by the APR, and that is very different than what many current practitioners and scholars theorize. In addition, these results also allow me to move forward believing that if participants say their football and/or men’s basketball programs are being negatively impacted by the APR, then there is a chance that these programs may also possess both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit. But, this “chance” is not entirely conclusive or appropriate to mention across the board when dealing with low resource or non-BCS institutions.

In the same vein, the sixth implication of this study though cautions individuals to assume that all low resource and non-BCS institutions feel a negative impact from the APR as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs, or that all of these institutional athletic departments have had poor APR compliance for these two sports and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009. Rather, the results showed that 22.26% of all participants and their institutions have not felt any APR impact at all as it has related to football and/or men’s basketball programs, whereas 8.75% of participants have felt very little impact, and another 8.75% of participants have felt a positive impact from the APR as it has related to these two sport programs.

Thus, these results imply that unless it was clearly stated that the APR has negatively impacted low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball
programs, and unless the data triangulation specifically showed a positive correlation between APR underperformance and negative net profit, one cannot automatically assume that these specific results attribute on the whole to all low resource or non-BCS institutional athletic departments and their football and/or men’s basketball programs. So, for future research, I can move forward with the mindset that not all low resource or non-BCS institutions are both poor and underperforming academically, and that can help me focus more on identifying the smaller percentage that has both financial and academic problems.

The seventh implication of this study, based on the results, shows that at low resource or non-BCS institutions, men’s basketball programs are affected more negatively in relation to APR compliance than football programs. The results showed that 19.34% of participants said the APR has negatively affected their men’s basketball programs compared to only 6.20% of participants stating that it has negatively affected their football programs. In addition, from 2005-2009, there has been 71 low resource or non-BCS men’s basketball programs with underperforming APR scores and negative net profit, compared to 43 football programs with the same criteria. Thus, this implies that men’s basketball programs at these institutions have worse APR compliance (compared to football) and are more often to also possess negative net profit, which in turn greatly inhibits their ability to have strong academic support services for their student athletes.

This is significant moving forward in that men’s basketball programs at NCAA Division I institutions have a greater chance of helping their athletic departments financially by making the NCAA tournament and receiving the financial windfalls that come with it, compared to FCS football programs who participate in a largely non-lucrative playoff format or institutions who choose to not sponsor football at all (Hiestand, 2010). If men’s basketball programs are more negatively impacted by the APR when compared to football, then financially speaking, it is even
more critical to keep men’s basketball players eligible and retained so that their programs cannot only comply with APR standards, but also through team continuity, have greater chances at sustained success that could ultimately aid in making the NCAA tournament and greatly helping their athletic departments’ financial situations. Thus, from a financial standpoint, if low resource and non-BCS institutions want to generate more revenue from their football and/or men’s basketball programs, then I believe these results would suggest focusing their efforts on improving the academic situations for their men’s basketball programs, thereby having more eligible and inspired student athletes which can create more team continuity and on court success. This success then in turn increases the chances of winning, making the NCAA tournament, and reaping the financial benefits of doing so.

The eighth implication of this study is that academic support services personnel (out of all athletic administrators) at low resource or non-BCS institutional athletic departments are the most impacted and affected by the APR and its’ compliance pressures. Specifically, almost 60% of all academic support services personnel articulated that they are more involved with academic improvements and have more work because of APR compliance pressures, there is more anxiety and pressure on them to help improve APR scores, and their work with men’s basketball programs in particular has greatly increased. I believe this is significant moving forward in that if academic support services personnel continue to be the main group of people dealing with the impact of the APR on a daily basis and continue to see their workloads with football and/or men’s basketball student athletes increase, it seems reasonable to suggest then that the burn out rate for these positions will be higher. In addition, these positions typically in my experience are considered for entry level jobs with lower paying salaries, and increased workloads and higher anxiety and pressure combined with low salaries will only cause these positions to continue
turning over, yet the student athletes need consistency in terms of whom they interact and work with. Other athletic administrators must share the workload with academic support services personnel if they want their academic support programs to flourish, their football and/or men’s basketball players to improve in their academic skills, and their academic support services personnel to stay satisfied in their jobs over the long run.

The ninth implication of this study is that due to the impact of the APR on low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball, recruiting for these two sport programs has definitely been affected. Specifically, the conclusive whole of 33.20% of all participants stated that better academically prepared student athletes are now being recruited, 5.16% of all participants stated that less junior college transfers are being recruited, and 5.16 of all participants also said that coaches are being encouraged to only recruit football and/or men’s basketball student athletes with the necessary academic skills and innate motivation to succeed in the classroom and ultimately graduate.

This is very significant moving forward in that athletic administrators and faculty athletic representatives both seem to believe the impact of the APR has changed recruiting for the foreseeable future at many of low resource or non-BCS institutions, and that many football and/or men’s basketball student athletes entering these academic institutions will no longer be able to be marginal students or barely get by with their coursework. Rather, athletic and academic administrators at low resource or non-BCS institutions are placing more of an emphasis on student athletes’ academic abilities, and choosing to view their athletic prowess as secondary. I can state that from personal experience, this often greatly frustrates the coaches who recruit these student athletes in that the coaches feel their jobs are evaluated largely on whether their programs win or lose, and the difference between winning and losing often falls on how
talented a programs’ players are. Yet, now because of the APR, the recruiting must change towards more of an academically geared student athlete, yet the pressures to win and still get talented recruits has not blended with the improved academic expectations. This is a great disconnect between the academic and athletic goals of many NCAA DI athletic departments, and I believe it will continue to be a great frustration to a multitude of football and men’s basketball coaches unless these coaches are evaluated more on how their players academically matriculate and personally grow as men.

The tenth implication of this study deals with positive best practices being implemented at these institutions for football and/or men’s basketball programs as a result of APR compliance pressures. Roughly 20% of all participants said that financial resources are being invested into academic support services and compliance for the expressed purpose of hiring additional support staff to work with these student athletes and ultimately help raise APR scores. This implies a shortage of personnel in the areas of academic support services and compliance at these institutions, and also implies the idea that more workers can better monitor and more personally work with football and/or men’s basketball student athletes in helping them stay academically eligible and retained at their institutions. I believe though this is misleading moving forward in that it is probably not new revenue being generated and placed back into academic support services, but rather it is monies given by their academic institutions or redistributed athletic department monies. Regardless, I believe that on a whole, this financial investing towards academic support may simply deplete another arm of athletic departments, and ultimately be “robbing Peter to pay Paul.”

In addition, other significant best practices such as establishing faculty scholarship committees to approve financial aid offers for APR penalized sport programs, and creating
extensive, documentable criteria for student athletes to meet before they can drop classes implies that these institutions are more serious about recruiting better academically geared student athletes, and making sure they stay in their classes and pass.

Finally, the last implication of this study, based on the results, shows that after data triangulation took place in the analysis regarding potential net profit, the top response category (36.61% of all participants) of NA/Not Available, had only 3/7 of these participants’ institutional athletic departments (41.33%) have football and/or men’s basketball programs with both underperforming APR scores AND negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009, compared to slightly more than 4/7 of institutional athletic departments (58.66%) which sponsored football and/or men’s basketball and yet did NOT have these same sport programs possess both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009.

Along the same lines, the second most frequent response category showed 30.70% of all participants stating that their athletic departments did not have any net profit at all. Out of this 30.70% of participants whose athletic departments had no net profit, slightly more than ½ of these participants’ athletic departments (52.23%) had football and/or men’s basketball programs with both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009, compared to slightly less than ½ of these participants’ athletic departments (47.76%) who had football and/or men’s basketball programs who did NOT have both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit at some point from 2005-2009.

These results show that there is somewhat of a correlation between underperforming APR scores and negative net profit for some low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to their football and/or men’s basketball programs. But, these contradictory results imply again that not
all low resource and non-BCS institutional athletic departments (from 2005-2009) have football and/or men’s basketball programs with BOTH underperforming APR scores and negative net profit, and not all can claim the direct correlation between lack of financial resources and poor APR performance as far as these two sports are concerned.

This is significant for future practitioner thinking as well as scholarly research in that up until this study, the small amount of scholarly knowledge on the APR has theorized that all low resource or non-BCS institutions struggle with APR compliance, lose money, and have poor APR scores. The results of this study showed that is not conclusive, and someone cannot use a broad brush to paint all low resource or non-BCS institutions as financially poor schools with academically underperforming football and/or men’s basketball programs. Rather, each institution should be analyzed on a case by case basis in the future, and asked how they can be helped on an individual basis to strengthen their academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball programs while trying to better their athletic departments’ finances.

Recommendations for Future Research

I believe the results of this study definitely shed light on the impact of the Academic Progress Rate (APR) on low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs, and led to key insights and emergent themes which formed a conclusive “whole” for athletic administrators and faculty members to analyze and hopefully be helped by. But, there are still (as with all research) areas for future research that dovetail out of this specific study, and areas that would be extremely helpful for future scholars to delve into and uncover.
The first recommendation for future research would be to look at how the APR has impacted other sport programs such as baseball, women’s basketball, or women’s track and field. All of these other sports have had underperforming APR scores in the past, and it would be interesting to see how these sport programs have been impacted by the APR at the BCS member institutional level, as well as at low resource or non-BCS institutions.

A second recommendation for future research would be to do a similar study as this one, but purely from a football and men’s basketball coaching standpoint. In other words, survey the football and men’s basketball head coaches and assistant coaches at low resource or non-BCS institutions, and ask them how the APR has impacted their athletic departments, specific programs, direct coaching duties, their recruiting philosophies and strategies, and their sport budgets (if applicable). This would be an interesting and new angle for APR research at low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to the “revenue producing” sports of football and men’s basketball, and could help add data to create a fuller picture of the impact of the APR on these institutional athletic departments and sport programs.

A third recommendation for future research would be to do a purely qualitative research study with the same topic in mind, and interview select athletic administrators and faculty athletic representatives to gain deeper insights into their thoughts, feelings, and beliefs regarding the impact of the APR on low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs.

A fourth recommendation for future research, based on an idea from Dr. Keith Christy (2007), would be to take this research study and similarly survey all low resource and non-BCS institutions’ Presidents or Chancellors regarding the impact of the APR on these institutional
athletic departments as it relates to football and men’s basketball, or on all the sport programs of athletic departments in general. Duderstadt (2000) believed the ultimate responsibility for intercollegiate athletic programs falls at the feet of institutional presidents. Thus surveying these top academic institutional leaders might provide greater insight into the “top-down” thoughts, feelings, and beliefs on the impact of the APR and how to best comply with it.

A fifth recommendation for future research would be to analyze the Academic Progress Rate (APR) from the perspective of actual NCAA administrators and compliance personnel. I believe it would be fascinating to survey these individuals and gather their thoughts on the APR, how they view the academic measure going forward, and glean whether or not they believe low resource and non-BCS institutions are truly hurt by the APR in the short or long term.

A final recommendation for future research would be to elaborate on what Christy (2008, 2007) has done, and do a full scale research study on the impact of the APR on BCS member institutions as it relates to their true “revenue generating” sports of football and men’s basketball. Christy (2008, 2007) never did a full scale study on the impact of the APR on BCS member institutions (also known as “high major”) institutions in general, let alone as it relates to football and men’s basketball. Since some of these specific sport programs do generate net profit at this level, it would be very interesting to truly gauge the impact of the APR on these athletic departments as it relates to these two sports, and see if their positive net profits help their academic support services, or whether the monies get prioritized in other places based on a variety of influences and pressures.
Chapter Summary

The purpose of this final chapter was to discuss the results of the research study presented in Chapter Four, and then address the significance and implications of the results as they formed a conclusive whole. The goal of the study was to better understand how the APR has impacted low resource or non-BCS institutions as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball programs, and the viewpoint of this study was taken from an athletic administrative leadership standpoint.

I believe the study had strong significance since percentages of response rate, conference representation, occupational position representation, and gender representation were all strong. In addition, key insights were gathered in the demographic results showing that compliance personnel and academic support services personnel had the two highest participation rates, which is no surprise given that these two occupation positions interact with APR compliance the most. Surprisingly though, athletic directors and faculty athletic representatives also possessed high participation rates, showing that athletic department leaders and faculty members also care about the impact of the APR.

As far as racial representation goes, the vast majority of participants were White/Caucasian, thus showing a great disparity in athletic administrative leadership between the white majority population and minority races such as African Americans.

In terms of significance, the results showed that almost 1/3 of these institutions were negatively affected by the APR as it relates to these two sport programs, and 3/5 of these same institutions also had underperforming APR scores and negative net profit for these two sport programs. This insight implied a positive correlation between underperforming APR scores and a lack of financial resources for some of these institutions.
Other results showed that roughly 1/5 of the participants though did not feel like the APR has negatively impacted their athletic departments as it related to these two sport programs, implying that the negative impact of poor APR scores and negative net profit is not universal for all of these institutions.

Men’s basketball programs were shown to have a larger negative APR impact than compared to football programs, and academic support services personnel were shown to have been most negatively impacted by the APR in terms of their direct work or involvement with APR compliance for these sport programs.

The biggest change in recruiting in light of the impact of the APR is that these sport programs are recruiting more academically geared student athletes who possess greater academic ability and innate motivation to succeed. In addition, less junior college transfers are being recruited due to academic unpreparedness.

The most significant best practice or positive implementation measure due to the pressures of APR compliance as it relates to these two sport programs is that more financial resources are being invested into the hiring of new academic support services personnel and compliance personnel.

Finally, more than 66% of all participants articulated that they represented athletic departments that did not have any net profit at their disposable, let alone have the financial ability to reinvest it back into academic support services for these two sport programs. In addition, of these participants, roughly 1/2 come from athletic departments whose football and/or men’s basketball programs did not possess both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit. Thus, as a conclusive whole, I cannot say that a majority of all these institutions have
football and/or men’s basketball programs with both underperforming APR scores and negative profit.

There were many important implications of this study, but the most significant one, based on the results, is that several of these institutions are definitely impacted negatively by the APR as it relates to these two sport programs, and some of these same institutional athletic departments also have negative net profit for these sports and underperforming APR scores across the board. But, many similar institutions are either not impacted negatively by the APR, or do not have football and/or men’s basketball programs with both underperforming APR scores and negative net profit.

This point implies that one broad brush cannot be applied to all these institutions. Consequently, this study does not prove conclusively that a lack of financial resources for these institutional athletic departments directly correlates to poor academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball programs, and subsequent underperforming APR scores.
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APPENDIX A

DISSERTATION SURVEY INSTRUMENT

The Following are demographic questions the participants were asked to complete on the survey:

1. Number of years experience at your current position: _______years

2. Number of years with current institution: _______years

3. Age: _______

4. Sex: (Check One)
   a. Male ____
   b. Female ____

5. Race/Ethnicity: (Check One)
   a. African American/Black ____
   b. Caucasian/White ____
   c. Asian American ____
   d. Hispanic ____
   e. Native American ____
   f. Other (Please specify) ________________

6. What position do you currently hold? (Check One)
   a. Faculty Athletic Representative _____
   b. Athletic Director _____
   c. Senior Woman Administrator _____
d. Assistant/Associate Athletic Director for Compliance/ Director of Compliance ______
e. Director of Academic Services/ Student Services
f. Other_____________ (Please fill in if applicable)

8. Currently what conference is your institution affiliated with? (Check One)
a. America East Conference________
b. Atlantic 10 Conference________
c. Atlantic Sun Conference________
d. Big Sky Conference___________
e. Big South Conference__________
f. Big West Conference___________
g. Colonial Athletic Association____
h. Great West Conference_________
i. Horizon Conference___________
j. Ivy League__________________
k. Metro Atlantic Athletic Conference___
l. Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference____
m. Missouri Valley Conference_____

9. What level of administering do you handle?

a. Division I _________
b. Division II _________
c. Division III _________
d. Other _______________ (Please fill in if applicable)
Research Questions:

The following research questions were used on the survey to guide this study:

RQ1: How has the APR impacted your athletic department as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball?

RQ2: How have the pressures of complying with the APR affected your direct work or involvement with the football and/or men’s basketball program?

RQ3: How has the APR impacted the type of student athlete your coaches now recruit?

RQ4: What are any positive changes in implementation measures for academic support concerning football and/or men’s basketball that resulted from the pressures of APR compliance?

RQ5: Where is your athletic department spending their net profit (if applicable), and is a portion or all of the net profit being put back into academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball programs?
APPENDIX B

RESPONSE CATEGORIES WITH PERCENTAGES FOR RESEARCH QUESTION #1

RQ1:  How has the APR impacted your athletic department as it relates to football and/ or men’s basketball?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. *Negative/Tremendously Negative Impact</td>
<td>28.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No Significant Impact/No Impact at All</td>
<td>22.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Negative Impact on Men’s Basketball</td>
<td>19.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Recruiting Better Academically Geared SA’s/Less JC Transfers</td>
<td>14.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Very Little Impact/No Impact Yet</td>
<td>8.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Positive Impact/Source of Pride/Led to Improving APR Scores</td>
<td>8.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Increased Financial Resources/Increased Staff and Personnel</td>
<td>7.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. All Personnel More Aware of the APR/ APR is Daily Focus</td>
<td>7.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Increased Academic Monitoring/More Focused on SA’s Graduating</td>
<td>6.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Negative Impact on Football</td>
<td>6.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Retention and Transfer Issues</td>
<td>5.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Used to Hold Coaches Accountable/Caused Coaching Changes</td>
<td>5.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Led to or Facing Contemporaneous Penalties</td>
<td>5.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Led to or Facing Historical Penalties</td>
<td>4.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Less Transfers, Player Turnover/More Aware of Roster Management</td>
<td>4.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Led to New Improvement Plans/New Curriculum Plans, Programs</td>
<td>3.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Validates What We do Academically/Always Had Higher Standards</td>
<td>3.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Creates Pressure/Tension Between Coaches And Administrators</td>
<td>2.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. NA/Not Sure</td>
<td>2.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. APR Caused New Standards, Practices, Transformation</td>
<td>1.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Led to Documenting Issues Before Signing of NLI</td>
<td>1.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Have Formed APR and Scholarship Review Committees</td>
<td>1.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Coaching Hires Always Cause Turnover</td>
<td>1.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Coaches More Reluctant to Dismiss Players Due to Discipline</td>
<td>1.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Negative Impact of SA’s Changing Majors/Majoring in Eligibility</td>
<td>.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. More Media Coverage and Articles on APR Reports</td>
<td>.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Added Financial Resources to Attend Summer School</td>
<td>.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Don’t Have the Money for SA’s to Attend Summer School</td>
<td>.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Additional Academic Programs in the Summer Before Freshmen Year</td>
<td>.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Aligns Incentives for Coaches and Faculty</td>
<td>.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. MBB Lowered Overall APR Performance for All Other Sports</td>
<td>.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. APR Has Helped Track APR Performance Over Time</td>
<td>.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. APR Has Helped Secure Early Registration for SA’s</td>
<td>.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Led to Less Recruitment of SA’s Far Away/ Home Sickness Issues</td>
<td>.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Now Examining Culture of all Men’s Sports, Not Just FB and MBB</td>
<td>.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. More Aware of Public Nature and Awareness of FB and MBB</td>
<td>.36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
37. Well Versed on APR Matters as a Reclassifying Institution .36%

38. Affects Athletic Department since School’s Costly, and SA’s Transfer .36%

39. We Now Stack Academic and Athletic Money to Attract Better SA’s .36%

40. It Hampers the Mission of Giving Students a Chance .36%

* Denotes Largest Percentage
APPENDIX C

RESPONSE CATEGORIES BY OCCUPATIONAL POSITION, WITH PERCENTAGES FOR RESEARCH QUESTION #2

RQ2: How have the pressures of complying with the APR affected your direct work or involvement with the football and/or men’s basketball program?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Faculty Athletic Rep:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. *No Pressure/No Impact</td>
<td>24.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. More Involved w/ Academics…</td>
<td>24.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Positive Impact/Work with Staff…</td>
<td>15.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Affects Recruiting/ Philosophy…</td>
<td>12.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Yes/Very Much</td>
<td>9.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. NA/Not Sure</td>
<td>9.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Led to Improvement Plans…</td>
<td>9.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Working More w/ Other Depts…</td>
<td>6.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. More Meetings/More Committees…</td>
<td>6.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. No</td>
<td>6.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. More Summer School Emphasis</td>
<td>3.03%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12. It’s the Same 3.03%
13. Increased $ Resources/Staff… 3.03%
14. More APR Training for Coaches… 3.03%
15. Affects Accountability/Retention 3.03%

b. Athletic Directors:

1. *Not Really a Factor… 23.52%
2. No Pressure/No Impact 19.60%
3. More Involved w/ Academics… 13.72%
4. More Talk w/ Coaches about APR 9.80%
5. Affects Recruiting/Philosophy… 7.84%
6. No 5.88%
7. Positive Impact/Work with Staff… 3.92%
8. More Time/Work w/ MBB… 3.92%
9. More Anxiety/Pressure… 3.92%
10. Need More Summer School… 3.92%
11. Affects Accountability/Retention 3.92%
12. Babysitting 101/Baby Sit Players 3.92%
13. Yes/Very Much/Greatly 1.96%

14. More Time/Work w/ FB 1.96%

15. More Meetings/More Committees 1.96%

16. Increased $ Resources/Staff… 1.96%

17. Pressure of Public Perceptions… 1.96%

18. Led to Coaches Being Fired 1.96%

19. Working More w/ Other Depts… 1.96%

20. Less Time for Fundraising… 1.96%

21. Changed All Academic Policies… 1.96%

22. APR Compliance Tied to $ Bonuses 1.96%

23. Strained Relationships w/ Coaches 1.96%

24. Academics Turn into APR #’s 1.96%

c. Senior Woman Administrator:

1. *No Pressure/No Impact 35.00%

2. More Time, Work with FB 15.00%

3. More Involved w/ Academics… 15.00%

4. More Time, Work with MBB 12.50%
5. Not Really a Factor… 10.00%
6. Increased $ Resources, Staff… 10.00%
7. More Talk w/ Coaches about APR 10.00%
8. More Meetings/More Committees 7.50%
9. Affects Recruiting/Philosophy… 7.50%
10. Yes/Very Much/Greatly 5.00%
11. No 5.00%
12. Affects Accountability/Retention 5.00%
13. NA/Not Sure 2.50%
14. Positive Impact on Working w/ Staff 2.50%
15. More Help w/ SA’s After Grad… 2.50%
16. Coaches Can’t Run Off SA’s 2.50%
17. Forced Coaches to Keep SA’s… 2.50%
18. Working More w/ Other Depts… 2.50%
19. More Anxiety/Pressure… 2.50%
20. Greater Summer School Emphasis 2.50%
21. Strained Relationships w/ Coaches 2.50%
22. 20% of People Causing Extra Work  2.50%

d. Compliance Personnel:

1. *No Pressure/No Impact  21.79%

2. Affects Recruiting/ Philosophy…  16.66%

3. More Involved w/ Academics…  12.82%

4. More Talk w/ Coaches about APR  12.82%

5. Not Really a Factor…  11.53%

6. NA/Not Sure  7.69%

7. Has Strained Relationships in Dept…  5.12%

8. More Time, Work with MBB  5.12%

9. More Time, Work with FB  3.84%

10. Predict APR Scores for Coaches  3.84%

11. Forced Coaches to Keep SA’s…  3.84%

12. Yes/Very Much/Greatly  2.56%

13. No  2.56%

14. Positive Impact on Working w/ Staff…  2.56%

15. More Help w/ SA’s After Grad…  2.56%
16. Led to Improvement Plans… 2.56%
17. More Anxiety/Pressure… 2.56%
18. Every Sport Has a Staff Member 2.56%
19. Meet w/ At Risk SA’s at Registration 2.56%
20. More Meetings/More Committees 1.28%
21. Increased $ Resources, Staff… 1.28%
22. Pressure of Public Perceptions… 1.28%
23. Put More Pressure on Coaches… 1.28%
24. Forced Coaches to Keep SA’s… 1.28%
25. Babysitting 101/Baby Sit Players 1.28%
26. Changed All Academic Policies… 1.28%
27. APR Compliance Tied to $ Bonuses 1.28%
28. APR Should be Outside Athletic Dept. 1.28%
29. Has Now Slowed Entry of At Risk SA’s 1.28%
30. Academics Turn into APR #’s 1.28%

e. Academic Support Services Personnel:

1. * More Involved w/ Academics… 22.38%
2. More Anxiety and Pressure… 19.40%
3. More Time, Work with MBB 16.41%
4. Affects Accountability, Retention 10.44%
5. No Pressure/No Impact 8.95%
6. Not Really a Factor… 8.95%
7. NA/Not Sure 8.95%
8. More Time, Work with FB 7.46%
9. More Talk w/ Coaches about APR 7.46%
10. Has Impacted the Way We Advise 7.46%
11. Changed All Academic Policies… 5.97%
12. More Help w/ SA’s After Grad… 4.47%
13. Affects Recruiting/ Philosophy… 4.47%
14. Greater Summer School Emphasis 4.47%
15. Positive Impact on Working w/ Staff… 2.98%
16. More Meetings/More Committees 2.98%
17. Increased $ Resources, Staff… 2.98%
18. Babysitting 101/Baby Sit Players… 2.98%
19. APR Compliance Tied to $ Bonuses 2.98%

20. Has Strained Relationships in Dept… 2.98%

21. Yes/Very Much/Greatly 1.49%

22. Led to Improvement Plans… 1.49%

23. Pressure of Public Perceptions… 1.49%

24. Put More Pressure on Coaches… 1.49%

25. Predict APR Scores for Coaches 1.49%

26. Forced Coaches to Keep SA’s… 1.49%

27. No Support From Coaches… 1.49%

28. Working More w/ Other Depts… 1.49%

29. Need More Summer School… 1.49%

30. AD is More Involved… 1.49%

31. Increased Travel w/ these Sport Teams 1.49%

32. More Stress During Certain Times 1.49%

33. We Have to Document Everything… 1.49%

34. Pressure to Academically Compete… 1.49%

f. Other:
1. *No Pressure/No Impact 25.80%
2. NA/Not Sure 19.35%
3. More Time, Work with MBB 16.12%
4. More Involved w/ Academics… 16.12%
5. Increased $ Resources, Staff… 16.12%
6. More Anxiety and Pressure… 16.12%
7. More Talk w/ Coaches about APR 9.67%
8. More Meetings/More Committees 6.45%
9. Affects Recruiting/ Philosophy… 6.45%
10. Working More w/ Other Depts… 6.45%
11. Greater Summer School Emphasis 6.45%
12. Not Really a Factor… 3.22%
13. More Time, Work with FB 3.22%
14. Predict APR Scores for Coaches 3.22%
15. Affects Accountability, Retention 3.22%
16. Has Impacted the Way We Advise 3.22%
17. APR Compliance Tied to $ Bonuses 3.22%
18. Let a SA Graduate Just Because of APR 3.22%
19. More Stress During Certain Times 3.22%

* Denotes Largest Percentage
APPENDIX D

RESPONSE CATEGORIES WITH PERCENTAGES FOR RESEARCH QUESTION #3

RQ3: How has the APR impacted the type of student athlete your coaches now recruit?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. *Recruiting Better Student Athletes/More Aware of Academic Performance</td>
<td>33.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No Impact at All/Has Not Changed Our Recruiting Habits…</td>
<td>22.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. More Impacted by Our Own Standards and Processes…</td>
<td>9.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. We Never or Hardly Ever Take “Risky” Student Athletes…</td>
<td>6.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Not Necessarily/Not Much…</td>
<td>5.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Looking Less at Junior College Transfers/Cautious with JC’s</td>
<td>5.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Encourage Coaches to Only Recruit SA’s with Academic Skill, Motivation</td>
<td>5.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Unsure/ Not Enough Time to Tell Yet</td>
<td>4.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Positive, Improved FB Recruiting…</td>
<td>3.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. It Has Put More Pressure on Academic Support…</td>
<td>2.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Positively/For the Better…</td>
<td>2.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Has Changed Recruiting Dramatically/ Made a Huge Difference</td>
<td>2.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. The Pressure to Win Affects Recruiting More…</td>
<td>2.21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14. Yes 1.84%
15. Affected Men’s Basketball Recruiting 1.84%
16. No 1.47%
17. Our University Does Not Have Any Conditional Exceptions… 1.47%
18. Has Not Affected Men’s Basketball Recruiting… 1.47%
19. Increased Communication with Coaches about APR and Recruiting… 1.47%
20. Must Have a Balance in Recruiting… 1.47%
21. May Have Affected Recruiting on the Retention Side… 1.47%
22. We Discuss a PSA’s Academic Profile Prior to an Official Visit… 1.10%
23. Better Academic Recruiting Reduces Pool of PSA’s at this Level 1.10%
24. We Evaluate Coaches on Bringing in SA’s that Want to Succeed 1.10%
25. A Minimum Academic Profile was Developed and Enforced… 1.10%
26. NA .73%
27. Has Not Affected Football Recruiting .73%
28. Graduation is the Focus, Not the APR… .73%
29. Coaches More Aware of the APR When Speaking to Families… .73%
30. We Have Established an APR Committee to Review PSA… .73%
31. We Develop Plans for “At Risk” SA’s to Graduate…  .73%
32. Coaches Don’t Care as long as They are Avoiding Penalties…  .73%
33. Coaches Still Expect the Academic Support Staff to Help SA’s…  .73%
34. We are Continually Talking About Meeting SA’s Needs…  .73%
35. We Don’t Have the Resources to Compete with Bigger Schools  .73%
36. Each Head Coach is Given a Number of Conditional Admits  .46%
37. Coaches Can Only Recruit Freshmen and First Time Qualifiers…  .46%
38. More Attention is Paid Towards Tests Scores Than GPA’s…  .46%
39. PSA’s are Met with Multiple Times to Better Understand Them…  .46%
40. Coaches Have to Find SA’s that Can Handle Rural Areas/Strict Rules  .46%
41. We Still Worry About Too Many Transfers  .46%
42. We Worry About Cuts in Funding to Overall Budget Due to the APR…  .46%
43. PSA’s More Conscious of Their Grades Coming Out of High School  .46%
44. We Need the Resources and Support in Place to Serve the SA’s…  .46%
45. It Has Had More of an Impact on How SA’s are Treated Upon Arrival  .46%
46. We Have Increased Core Requirements to Receive $ from a Poor APR Sport  .46%
47. It’s a Gamble/You Never Know How a SA Will Perform Until Arrival  .46%
48. Coaching Stability Helps Recruitment of Better Academic SA’s .46%

49. Made Us Think About How New Coaches Embrace Current Players .46%

50. As a Reclassifying DI Program, We Have Had Time to Prepare for the APR .46%

51. Having Presidential Support Really Helps Us Do a Good Job… .46%

52. We Have Been Successful in Recruiting SA’s who Value Strong APR Scores .46%

53. We Try to Project How a SA Will Perform Academically and Athletically .46%

54. Coaches are Now More Hands on with Their Players and Academic Progress .46%

* Denotes Largest Percentage
APPENDIX E

RESPONSE CATEGORIES OF POSITIVE IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES/BEST PRACTICES WITH PERCENTAGES FOR RESEARCH QUESTION #4

RQ4: What are any positive changes in implementation measures for academic support concerning football and/or men’s basketball that resulted from the pressures of APR compliance?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Increased Financial Support for Hiring of New Academic Personnel…</td>
<td>19.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No changes or Positive Implementation Measures…</td>
<td>14.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Improved Tutorial Services, Academic Programs, Monitoring…</td>
<td>13.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Higher Awareness of Retention, Eligibility Issues/Sense of Urgency…</td>
<td>11.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Better Screening of SA’s in Recruiting/Less “At Risk” SA’s…</td>
<td>10.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Coaches More Aware of APR/Paying Attention to Academic Reforms…</td>
<td>9.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. MBB Has Their Own Tutor/Tutor Works and Travels with Team…</td>
<td>9.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Increased Financial Resources for Academic Achievement/Tutors…</td>
<td>6.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. NA</td>
<td>5.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Made Coaches Accountable for Their SA’s Academic Success…</td>
<td>4.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Higher APR Scores…</td>
<td>3.86%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12. Higher Graduating Rates/SA’s Returning to Graduate… 3.47%
13. Ensuring Graduation of SA’s in Four or Five Years… 3.47%
14. SA’s are Transferring Less/ We Stay on SA’s Trying to Transfer… 3.08%
15. Communication Between Coaches and Staff Has Increased, Improved… 2.70%
16. More Academic Success is Being Achieved by SA’s, including higher GPA’s 2.70%
17. Increased Summer School Funding and Attendance… 2.70%
18. All Positive for the Student Athletes… 2.31%
19. Coaches and Academic Staff Have Improved Relationships and Connections 2.31%
20. FB Specific: Increased Team GPA’s and APR Scores… 2.31%
21. No Positive Changes… 1.93%
22. The Only Academic Support is what is Provided for All Students… 1.93%
23. Just Reinforces Our Specific Institutional Mission… 1.93%
24. PSA’s and SA’s are More Aware of Eligibility Requirements… 1.93%
25. We were Already Doing Significant Work with These Two Sports… 1.54%
26. Have Added an Athletic Advising Office… 1.54%
27. Working Specifically with First Generation, Low Income SA’s… 1.15%
28. More Class, Academic Performance, and Tutoring Checks… 1.15%
29. Unsure   .77%

30. Changed Staff Responsibilities/ Assigned New Duties…  .77%

31. President is Committed to Academic Success for All SA’s   .77%

32. Academic Support Credibility with the Whole Department has Increased…  .77%

33. Faculty Also Continue to Engage Students   .77%

34. Lazy Student Athletes and Bad Attitudes Will Kill Teams…   .77%

35. Too Much Focus on End Goals, and Not Enough Focus on Attitudes/Behavior   .77%

36. Not Yet   .38%

37. Very Few Changes   .38%

38. Life Skills Coordination with Freshmen   .38%

39. Purchasing of New Academic Software   .38%

40. Have Added Mental Health and Psycho-educational Evaluations for all SA’s   .38%

41. Coaches Have Cut Down on Practice Time…   .38%

42. Travel Distances for Competition Have Decreased…   .38%

43. Things Have Improved Having Participated in Academic Improvement Plans   .38%

44. There is More Accountability with Increased Financial Aid…   .38%

45. Students Still Majoring in Easy Majors for Eligibility Purposes   .38%
46. Increased Media Attention and Visibility Has Helped Improve Things .38%

47. Formed an APR Scholarship Review Committee .38%

48. APR Has Added a Quantifiable Standard to the Academic Monitoring Process .38%

49. Positive Changes Have Come From Transitioning From NAIA to NCAA .38%

50. We Have Developed a Very Effective Class Withdrawal Policy for All SA’s .38%

51. There is Now Campus Wide Compliance and Academic Rules Education .38%

* Denotes Largest Percentage
APPENDIX F

RESPONSE CATEGORIES WITH PERCENTAGES FOR RESEARCH QUESTION #5

RQ5: Where is your athletic department spending their net profit (if applicable), and is a portion or all of the net profit being put back into academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball programs?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. *NA/ Not Available</td>
<td>36.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No Net Profit/ None</td>
<td>30.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Unsure/Don’t Know/Unknown</td>
<td>11.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Money Is Put Back into Academic Support Services</td>
<td>8.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Hired New Academic Support Staff/New Personnel</td>
<td>4.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. We Rely on the University for $/Supported by the Institution</td>
<td>4.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. NCAA Academic Enhancement Fund Provides Additional $...</td>
<td>3.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Facilities/Facility Improvement/Facilities are the Priority</td>
<td>2.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. No</td>
<td>2.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. We Assist All SA’s Equally, Not Just FB and MBB SA’s</td>
<td>2.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Yes</td>
<td>1.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Net Profit is Given to Both Football and Men’s Basketball</td>
<td>1.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. We Spend Money on the Entire Athletic Department, Including Academics</td>
<td>1.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Summer School is Important, and Summer School Spending is Increased</td>
<td>1.18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15. All Additional Funding Goes to Athletic Scholarships 1.18%
16. Team Travel/Travel for Sport Teams .78%
17. Not Much .39%
18. Profit is Not Attainable in the Near Future .39%
19. Salaries .39%
20. We Return All Revenue to the Institution for General Operations .39%
21. Increased Funding for Compliance and Rules Education .39%
22. A Small Portion of the Opportunity Fund Supports Our Mental Health Staff .39%
23. I Have Never Been Turned Down in Regards to Money for Academic Support .39%
24. Money is Given to Men’s Basketball and Women’s Basketball .39%
25. 20% to 30% Goes to Football and Men’s Basketball .39%
26. $75,000 is Invested in Academic Support, Implemented by Campus Office .39%
27. Any New Money Goes to Helping SA’s Graduate, or Generate Additional $ .39%
28. Had to Pay Outside Salaries for Academic Support Professionals, Tutors .39%
29. Use Guarantee Game Money to Pay for Summer School .39%
30. We Provided 5th Year Completion Funding for SA’s for Tuition and Fees .39%
31. Campus Quality Fees Provide Financial Support .39%
32. Money Went to Computer Software to Track Student Athletes (SA’s) .39%
33. Men’s Basketball Fundraises to Pay for Summer School for SA’s .39%
34. The Success of Men’s Basketball Helps to Fund the Rest of Our Sports .39%
35. Any Success from our NCAA Tournament Appearance went to our Conference .39%
* Denotes Largest Percentage
APPENDIX G

OPEN ENDED RESPONSES FOR RESEARCH QUESTION #1

RQ1: How has the APR impacted your athletic department as it relates to football and/or men’s basketball?

1. Our Men's Basketball team is currently facing Historical Penalty 3 because of retention issues.
2. Implemented attendance policy, hired additional academic counselor.
3. Our men's basketball program suffered it's first penalty last year due to our multiyear rate dropping over a 4 yr period. Football has gone up and down over the last 3 years reaching just above 925 and dropping below last year 2009-2010 academic year.
5. We do not have football. Our men's basketball program has never been impacted by APR.
6. Far more pressure on academic staff to ensure student-athletes are eligible; far more pressure to ensure they are taking majors that will most likely allow them to be eligible rather than challenge them; increased tension between coaching staff and academic staff; the amount of money spent on academic resources.
7. Unsure as I don't do APR reports for MBB or Football
8. Don’t have football - early on impacted basketball but much stronger now
9. No impact other than validation of our model and increased awareness of our academic success.
10. No impact.
11. Tremendously, retention has been an issue because of hiring a new basketball coach and athletes leaving
12. Made the coaches more aware of exactly who they can/should recruit.
Our Associate Athletic Director for compliance handles all APR data, and her opinion would more appropriately articulate the intricacies of our APR.

Yes/men's basketball

Greater focus on recruiting students who can be successful at our institution, addition of learning specialist in academic study center

We have met the APR academic standards and have not yet been in jeopardy of penalty...although we have lost points for eligibility and/or retention throughout the years and gained some graduation points for returners. We are not a high resource academic support program but have been able to manage. I believe coaches are more cognizant of the students they offer scholarship to and are more conscious of ensuring positive progress throughout the terms, so are holding their SA's more accountable.

We have faced penalties within our men's basketball program. As a result, we have had to create improvement plans and re-evaluate our programs.

We have not suffered any consequences of the APR score, but we are focusing on making sure the 5th year men's basketball student-athletes graduate and contribute to the score.

Lost one scholarship for one year in MBB. Do not have football

Historical penalties

Raised the academic profile of our recruits

It has impacted it a lot.

We have been fortunate in avoiding issues in MBB.

We have begun to recruit better academic performing student-athletes to improve APR scores. We have also experienced increases in academic oversight and monitoring because of the concerns with posting APR scores that are sufficient.

APR has reduced the amount of student-athlete turnover in the last several years. Previously, both football and men's basketball lost scholarships due to low APR scores (related to both retention and eligibility).

Has not impacted it significantly.

We are below the current number of 925, we were currently under the first penalty structure
It hasn't had any substantive impact on our men's basketball program--our academic profile was and remains stronger than the APR benchmarks.

We have added additional money to allow basketball student-athletes to attend summer school.

Not at all

It hasn't had an impact due to the nature of our strict admission standards

MBB in top 10% 3 years in a row!

Not significantly

None

Document potential issues before we sign prospects to NLI, academic programs for basketball players in the summer prior to full-time enrollment

It has had a positive impact on our MBB program. Since receiving penalties we have improved to in GPA and graduation rates.

Very little....we had strong academic indicators prior to APR and this has not changed.

It hasn’t really affected the department. Yet.

Football has been ok, but needs to improve. MBB was hit really bad in 2006 and has since improved to well above the 925 mark

It has not had an impact.

Thankfully our scores have been solid. So in terms of impacting our programs thankfully it hasn't as of yet.

MBB is the only sport impacted we are in an occasion 3 no playoffs

N/A

Very positive

We have hired more staff and learning specialist.

Has not affected

Yes. Men's Basketball fell below target (by a single point - 924/925), requiring
corrective measures. Their case has served as an example to all other sports, football included.

48 Aligns incentives for coaches and faculty.

49 We don't have football here but is has had an impact on our Men's Basketball program. We constantly emphasize to all of our coaches the importance of recruiting high character young people who are serious about academic achievement and athletic success.

50 Our department has formed a committee solely to monitor APR. It is a main focus daily within the academic staff, compliance and all coaching staffs. We put a lot of energy into improving (or maintaining if at 1000) the scores of each team.

51 Positive

52 Caused us to be more diligent about recruiting better students and making sure that students are working towards a degree and graduating

53 The men's basketball data lower the overall results of all teams’ performance

54 It has not impacted our men's basketball team and we do not have football.

55 Loss of 2 scholarships last year

56 Impacted it greatly

57 It has heavily impacted us. It is one of the most important things we attend to.

58 We have lost scholarships in M. Basketball and are now in the next phase of penalties with reduced contact time/days. Our previous coaching staff was released as an effect of low APR.

59 APR has helped track our MBB academic performance over time. We do not sponsor football.

60 No impact

61 We provide more academic support services and have added personnel in this area. Our coaches also recruit students who are more academically prepared to enroll at our institution. We also were able to secure early registration for student-athletes.

62 In both of our cases, the APR has increased as both teams are now above 925.

63 Has not impacted yet as we have not suffered any penalties in these sports.
64 Very little

65 Although we do review the data yearly for all sports there has been no significant change with regard to the impact the APR has had on men's basketball.

66 We had a coaching change which led to departures from our MBB program, which in turn led to a lower APR score. Since the new coaching staff has been here we have seen improvement in the APR.

67 Made us more aware of APR for all the teams.

68 Men's Basketball - Loss of scholarships and loss of 4hrs of practice a week

69 We will have to do an APR Improvement Plan for Men's Basketball this year but no other impact yet.

70 It has been an issue especially in football.

71 It has definitely made our job more important as it relates to keeping student athletes eligible and on track to graduate.

72 Made coaches more diligent in recruitment and more diligent when students elect to transfer, do not play, or quit the team.

73 We are more cognizant of roster management and making sure students are eligible before they transfer

74 We do not sponsor football. Men's basketball has not suffered due to APR.

75 Positively - APR provides leverage to academic services personnel and has changed the way resources are distributed within our department

76 It really has not impacted us.

77 No

78 We do not have football however, our MBB program has been below 925 for three years in a row.

79 Yes

80 Loss of scholarships have occurred in past years

81 I believe that the administration and coaches have a heightened awareness of what their APR is and how each class impacts it. We've had several players transfer and everyone is aware of their impact on the APR.
We do not have football. The APR for MBB has been satisfactory, hence it has no effect on the department. Other sports have had a larger effect.

Source of pride for the University

The men's basketball team was penalized by 2 scholarships due to APR purposes

More discussion on the impact of APR when a student-athlete requests permission to transfer or if a student-athlete is not on track to graduate after exhausting their eligibility

We do not have FB. However our MBB team has managed to adjust fine.

As of now, no major impact outside of the public notice that they are below the 925 cut score. Our graduation rate has prevented any sanctions from being levied against the programs. This has led to a not so serious approach from both teams.

Neutral impact to date...we do very well academically in both of these programs.

Positive Impact. Forced coaches to consider recruits for their potential to succeed academically, rather than just athletically.

The major effect was a negative score early on because we asked several basketball players to leave school--non-academic reasons.

No impact to men's basketball and we do not have football.

Basketball: Many more individuals are paying attention to student-athletes academic success than before.

Financially, we have hired additional academic support personnel for oversight. More academic evaluation is taking place before prospects are signed.

Fortunately we have had high enough APR's in both sports that we have not been impacted negatively.

So far no major impact on football, but basketball has been penalized.

It may result in loss of scholarships/practice time depending on the correction phase.
I am not sure

The department went through a complete transformation because of the APR challenges of the Men's Basketball team. New standards, practices, and procedures were adopted to adjust to the APR after years of scores below the benchmark.

More careful in recruitment, especially junior college transfers

Scholarship Penalty

There has been no impact to our department

The APR is a great tool/reason to graduate student-athletes, especially those who've exhausted their eligibility. We have seen more student-athletes return to receive their degrees than ever before.

It has made us focus on the retention piece in particular but also helped to increase our academic requirements.

APR has impacted our athletic department tremendously. Our football program is in H3 and our Men's Basketball program is in H2.

It has helped redouble efforts towards academic success.

We are a reclassifying institution so we will feel the impact this year for the first time. We have also received the benefit of the squad size adjustment to this point.

Important to maintain a constant review.

We have endured sanctions in both sports over the past two years resulting in loss of scholarships and reduced practice time in both sports. Each program has recovered from sanctions and have been restored to full scholarships and practice time. The men’s basketball was awarded a waiver from occasion 3 penalties for the 2010-2011 school year. There has been significant impact to the programs.

Not at all

It has encouraged the institution to add greater support to athletic academic performance.

We do not sponsor Football. I don't believe that APR has really impacted our Men's Basketball program other than the coaches are more aware of it and its potential implications.
Coaches are more attuned to how their student-athletes are performing in the classroom.

Has not affected our department

Creates a greater focus on how the student-athlete is doing academically. This can be good and bad thing. Good because coaches and staff focus more on academics and encourage student-athletes to pursue academic excellence. Bad because some student-athletes will change their major to a much easier one just to ensure they will not have any issues with eligibility.

More attention paid to recruiting, monitoring academic progress and the coaches know their point ranges

There have been some penalties levied in these sports in the past several years. However, due to the necessitation of improvement plans and the overall awareness of the academic progress of our students that this process provided, we believe we're in a better position now because of these consequences.

The APR has impacted our athletic department in many ways. The most important aspect to mention involves the recruitment of prospective student athletes. In addition to athletics ability, member institutions need to thoroughly evaluate the academic credentials of all prospective student-athletes. If a prospect can't prove him/herself in the classroom, it is a very risky move as they become collegiate athletes and the NCAA will penalize an institution for their poor performance. Also, prospective student-athletes who move several miles away from home are very risky. It happens several times where a prospective student-athlete will attend classes, get home sick and transfer to an institution closer to home; hurting our APR.

Positively; more accountability by coaches and student-athletes regarding grades and academic success than before APR was instated.

It has contributed to being very careful when recruiting at risk student athletes.

We have never had a penalty and our APR has improved in both men's basketball and FB since the inception of the APR.

Have added a part-time academic adviser mainly for men's basketball

It has actually been good for all of our sports. The biggest impact I have seen is with the student-athletes that don't graduate after 4 years of eligibility. The APR has made us much more aware of these students and we actively track these students and try to help them graduate.

APR has allowed us to examine the culture of men's programs as a whole
instead of just as a microcosm of those two sports. We have examined the recruiting models in both sports and have focused on bringing in student-athletes that fit with the campus mission and who have degree aspirations among our offerings. We have worked with campus in order to expand the resources that we offer to all student-athletes due to the public nature of football and men's basketball.

125 We have incurred contemporaneous penalties, but no historical penalties. It has changed the way we award scholarships, and we also have an APR committee.

126 Do not have football. No impact on men's basketball.

127 APR has affected the way that we recruit student-athletes

128 Continue to focus on achieving highest score possible, trying to ensure retention.

129 We have no football; basketball has not had any penalties

130 Slightly and currently not adversely

131 Both teams were at or near penalties in the beginning. The APR issues allowed us to argue for an additional advising position. We also were able to convince coaches how their approach to recruiting had to change. APR is a pain and creates a lot of extra pressure, work and drama in our office, but overall it likely has helped us and coaches.

132 We have had to put a lot more resources in our Academic Services area along with summer school and exhausted eligibility aid, It has changed our recruiting philosophy and was a big factor in replacing a coach.

133 No impact. All scores well above cut-off rate. High academic standards at institution.

134 We are a Division I reclassifying institution, so this is just our third year of APR reporting. As we geared up for Division I as an institution, we ensured that we were well educated on APR and its applications, potential impacts, etc. In particular, for the sports of FB and BB, we have monitored recruiting decisions and then the retention and eligibility of student-athletes in those sports closely. Fortunately, both FB and MBB have had very positive outcomes in our first three years of APR reports (i.e. at or above national averages).

135 Much more time and personnel directed to fb/mbb in both recruiting and retention

136 It has impacted negatively due to not meeting the minimum threshold but with the improvement plans, emphasis by administration to coaches has turned into a
positive.

137  We restructured our academic support program and hired more staff.

138  No impact

139  Adversely. We do not have football, but we do have basketball and because we are a small school, retention is our problem.

140  Too open ended of a question to answer, to be honest. APR has impacted everyone, as we have worked to education coaches on the possible impacts and encouraged decisions to be made with APR in mind.

141  We are currently in Penalty Phase 3

142  No real negative impact other than coaches are much more reluctant to dismiss student athletes from teams for disciplinary purposes because it could negatively effect the APR.

143  Has changed the landscape a little bit on recruiting and increased a lot more pressure on academic advising services, in which we have limited resources

144  Significant penalties for football. Significant changes have been made department-wide.

145  We do not have football. Our Men's Basketball program is very selective on the student-athlete that we recruit. Incoming students are monitored for high school GPA and SAT scores to ensure their academic success in college.

146  Made recruiting good HS grades/ACT/SAT important. Cannot take any at-risk students.

147  Most problem with APR is the financial stress that our college has with high tuition bill and not fully funded in sports other than Basketball our SA have a financial burden that sometimes forces them to transfer and retention is an issue

148  It's been business as usual for us as we are still admitting student-athletes who fit within our academic profile.

149  Better programs for retention and academic improvement has been implemented to meet APR targets. Greater expectations for academic success is now the norm instead of the exception. It also appears that there are more articles from media sources about how football and basketball players are doing academically.

150  It has caused all of our sports (not just M Basketball) to be mindful of roster
Institution is providing additional academic resources specific to men's and women's basketball. In addition, we have instituted an APR Scholarship Review Committee which requires the approval of a committee of faculty members outside the athletic department before a team with APR issues can award financial aid.

Have had to implement a NCAA recovery plan for MBB and hire additional academic staff

We recruit players in basketball who will not hurt out APR. We do not have football.

It hasn't really

We now stack athletic and academic money to encourage recruitment of academically stronger students. We also pay a lot more attention to retention.

Our APR numbers are generally very positive, and we share this positive news with the university community. It reinforces that football and men's basketball student-athletes are good students.

None

We don't have Football, no issues with Men's Basketball. The university has an average SAT of 1175 with no exceptions or chancellor's admissions so typically our student-athletes are good students. we are not a large Division I institution so most of our players attend college with the goal of earning a degree.

We do not have a football team but our basketball team is pretty much on track and doesn't really impact out APR negatively

We have been fairly strong but certainly has been a focus for our coaching staffs and administration.

None. Our institution is academically oriented for all students. As a general rule, our student-athletes perform well in regards to retention and eligibility.

Increased emphasis on academics changed the way we recruit

Yes for Men's basketball; we do not have football

It has had a significant impact on our men's basketball team.

We have not had any issues with our APR scores in these sports (we don't have football).
Improved graduation rates

We have been fortunate to avoid penalty. But the coaches constantly feel under pressure and put pressure on academic staff to babysit the kids more.

Do not sponsor football; no issues with basketball.

It hasn't really. None of our teams have ever fallen below the 925 minimum.

Our men's basketball team has ranked in the top 10% nationally with its APR scores and received public recognition from the NCAA each year since they started the program. Our team's high APR scores have been a tremendous recruiting tool for our coaches.

Required that we annually report on eligibility and retention.

It has raised consciousness of the importance of academic achievement and retention.

At the onset of data collection, men's basketball had a severe rate deficit, but a coaching change has raised the rate out of the danger zone for a number of years. With non-scholarship football, there is no disincentive for my coach to reach 925--he will never incur a scholarship penalty. He's hovered above 900, which keeps him out of the historical penalty zone. Football has continued to submit plans for improvement each year.

We have been proud of our recent scores in both sports. Specifically with football, it has made us take a closer look at transfers.

It has just added another benchmark for us to maintain.

Much more aware of importance of the academic center and its services.

Little - we are aware of the standards that have been imposed, but our expectations have always been higher than those measure by the APR.

It took a while to get a few coaches to realize that they needed to take the academic success of their athletes more seriously because it would (and did) result in sanctions against them.

It has impacted the way a Division I institution operates.

Has caused us to retain student-athletes who would ordinarily be dismissed for disciplinary reasons.
We are currently under H2 penalties for MBK.

Only slight impact.

We have had to increase personnel in support of academics. From June until the end of September, we have been involved in APR Review, APP, and the Adjustment period for APP. We also had to do an APR Improvement Plan that summarily affect all sports.

Our Institution has been below the Multiyear 925 benchmark in both MFB & MBB over the past four years; however, the institution has not had to take penalties on either sport because the scores and graduation rates are significantly higher than that of the overall student body.

Basketball has been challenging, in part because we do not have monies to send kids to summer school.

It's been positive.

The APR has created a more intentional focus on Academic measures and accountability which have enhanced the success of both football and men's basketball.

It has not. We are consistently above the minimums in basketball. We have no football.

We have a history of academic success within our program. The impact of the APR has been seen more in recruiting and retention. There has been an emphasis in recruiting fewer at risk prospects. I believe a downside is that we focus so much on the "here and now" of APR or eligibility that we put extenuating pressure on the Student-Athletes and our support staff. Also, the focus on retention becomes about an APR score rather than each individual's academic pursuit (e.g., We have to place or keep them strictly in a curriculum where they will not fail).

We have faced a few cases in Men's Basketball where we needed to devise formal curriculum plans to insure that players maintained eligibility.

No football--has changed our recruiting philosophy and base.

Football - 2003-04 below 925 (930 or above 2010-11 Basketball- below 930 last two years. No penalty.

Negligible - our academic performance has always been high.

Somewhat.
MBB is struggling to get out of penalty numbers.

It hampers the mission of giving students a chance

Has made coaches and other athletics administrators more accountable for academic success of student athletes

We hired additional academic support staff to work primarily with Men's and Women's Basketball and a subset of football.

Unknown on specifics since I work academic support

Hasn't really...we are fine with both APR's and have historically had good graduation and retention rates.

Our men's basketball current APR is 980 with a multiyear of 975 and football is 981 with a multiyear of 964

It hasn't. APR has been at or above 940 for past 6 years.

The APR scores are a concern for all teams, with particular focus on football and M/W basketball. With the implementation of APR, our football teams scores were not where we expected them to be, so our Athletic Director stressed the focus of recruiting academically prepared students for their team.

We haven't been negatively affected by APR in either sport to date. We certainly keep a very close eye on it.

Not at all. It merely gives us some additional data points to demonstrate what we have always tried to keep as a primary focus - developing success-driven student athletes.

Our men's football team is currently in phase 3 of NCAA penalties due to poor APR. A new coaching hire in the last semester has drastically changed the culture of the football team and the spring showed dramatic improvement in both GPA and retention. The men's basketball team is also struggling to meet the 925 average, due to lack of retention following completion of eligibility

We do not have football- it has not impacted MBB.

Little to no impact

Men's Basketball will be suffering a loss of scholarship as a result of declining APR. Football has not been penalized but scores decreased over time.
Positive impact for both programs

No impact.

Affects recruiting and academic support....we continue to monitor SAS who leave programs..

Football APR is great, has been the best in our conference. Basketball is struggling, but on the upswing. Had a coaching change which has affected it.

We have had no issues in those sports making the standards set forth by the NCAA and APR standards.

We have not had any issues

Greater attention in the recruiting process, greater evaluation of prospects prior to extending admissions, increase in academic resources provided to all student athletes, greater encouragement to coaches for student-athletes to utilize those resources.

Due to a low APR score by MBB 5 years ago, we were able to add 1 academic position.

Football currently in historical penalty 3

A positive impact; more scrutiny of academic performance

We have had good APR thus far. No penalties.

Not at all. We are a national leader in his metric.

Since our institution does not offer football as a varsity sport I will just comment on the APR's impact on Men's Basketball. Since the inception of the APR our Men's Basketball team has never lost an APR eligibility point. So from an eligibility standpoint I believe our University and department were doing everything correctly prior to the APR. It has certainly made us more mindful as far transfers are concerned. The impact on the APR definitely is addressed when an athlete is making plans to transfer out. It has not prevented an athlete from transferring but the discussion occurs when the transfer process is taking place.

It has impacted my men's basketball program with the loss of two scholarships and practice time.

Not at all

We had to do one improvement plan as 1 team had a 924. Took lot time for many people.
Greater emphasis on retention. Target minimum GPA of 2.6 as goal for all team members to maintain.

Not at all.

Very little. No fb. Never below 960 in bb. This year 1000

APR has caused our programs to focus a lot of attention on academics. Men's basketball at our institution has historically done well with APR. Football is usually a roller coaster, and requires a lot of time and effort from the entire coaching staff and the 2 full-time academic coordinators. We have yet to receive a penalty for either team.

Minimally.

Only positively--shows we are recruiting, retaining, developing and graduating outstanding student-athletes.

Men's basketball served one year post season ban during 2010-11 for historical penalty, but this has been lifted for 2011-12. Men's basketball posted perfect 1000 APR for 2009-10 and for 2010-11.

Positive focus on academic achievement for men's basketball

We have been in football penalties for the last few years. Basketball has managed to stay out of penalties, but they are always on the brink

YES

The importance of APR has led to our department moving into a new academic center and hiring more academic support staff.

Accelerated academic support efforts. Produced additional computers for student usage.

Our APR in both sports has been pretty good. We have not added staff or made many changes to our department during my time at the institution.

We don't have football. Men's basketball, somewhat with a previous coach that carried over, but scores have been solid lately.

Made coaches more aware of academic progress. Influenced kind of student athlete recruited

We do not have football but our m/w basketball program has been affected in a negative way by loss of scholarships.
APR is a daily conversation with coaches in regards to recruiting student athletes, or if a current student-athlete is thinking about leaving the program.

We've won national recognition in both sports.

Our first year to file was last year.

We have had only one instance where we fell below 925 in either sport, and it was 924 with men's basketball. We believed that it was due to retention of student-athletes as opposed to academic requirements.

We have struggled up until recently with our Football APR, however, in the last couple of semesters the football team has really done an outstanding job to understand the APR and to work each semester to improve upon the academic status of the football team. We currently struggle with Men's Basketball.

Both had scores a bit below the 925 cut line several years ago, but these scores have since elevated to above the cut line. The increased emphasis on the APR has led us to change the recruiting strategies we employ to some degree.

No impact.

 Mostly positive. However when a new coach comes to the University, there is almost always a high turnover rate. Not sure that a new coach should be responsible for the previous coach recruiting mistakes.

It has made us more selective during the recruiting process and forced us to take a closer look at the academic background of incoming prospective student athletes. In addition, APR has caused the coaches to consider their numbers before they release a student.

Well, we had some struggles with the APR with men's basketball after a coaching transition, but have not incurred penalties. In general, its impact has been minimal in those areas.

Coaches and administrators pay attention to academic outcomes in these sports more so than they used to.

It has not really impacted us that much yet? It has made our coaches recruit and retain student athletes who will help their APR.

We have to think more about how we deal with students-athletes that are dismissed from the team or want to either quit or transfer.

APR is a part of the language in our department. We have had department wide
education and our football team has experiences loss of scholarships and practice time. It is a constant concern to keep football's APR up.

256 We only have Men's Basketball. Although our BB-M team has had a perfect APR every year, the cost has been extremely large due to the need to employ an Academic Specialist that has developed a tutoring/mentoring program. In addition, the amount of time spent by the coaching staff, the Student-Athlete Advisor with an assistant has been extraordinary. We have had a perfect APR since the rules were implemented

257 Its a non-issue. We have always considered academics and important part of our institutional and department mission.

258 At first Coaches did not get the fit with school. Now they do and we do well

259 Men's Basketball is in penalty two and football has had the highest APR

260 No impact.

261 Positively. Without it, the student athletes would not even pretend to be students

262 At the present time it hasn't had a negative impact, we have had to look at making decisions on what to do with scholarship dollars when evaluating at risk student-athletes. We remain cognizant of the impact APR can have negatively on our programs.

263 We have not had any teams below the cut score

264 We do not have football, but it does impact men's basketball; a separate academic counselor has been added to just work with that team.

265 Not been a problem with our men's basketball program.

266 Data coordination with our registrar. No other impact, aside from positive press releases.

267 No impact - our scores are above cutline

268 APR has had no impact. We are national leaders in APR.

269 No significant impact.

270 Men's Basketball has been a low performer however neither of our programs has suffered penalties due to APR.

271 Men's basketball in historical penalty
It is included in the evaluation of every coach on this campus.

I do not deal directly with men's basketball but can tell you APR is always a thought when it relates to basketball.

We have lost scholarships in basketball. Football has been fine.
APPENDIX H

OPEN ENDED RESPONSES FOR RESEARCH QUESTION #2

RQ2: How have the pressures of complying with the APR affected your direct work or involvement with the football/and or men’s basketball program?

1. There is a lot of monitoring that takes place with a small staff of two, and we had to make tough decisions so that we could slow progression.

2. Involvement on improvement plans for APR.

3. We've had to focus more Rules Education sessions on APR and its significance. Denied a few non-renewals in all efforts to receive 2 out of 4 points for retention, when coaches wanted to cut a student-athlete's scholarship.

4. Yes

5. It enabled us to hire a MBB advisor and more players are attending summer school.

6. Far more difficult to find support in holding student-athletes academically accountable; no support from coaches, just want them eligible; very little understanding/support for academic standards.

7. No

8. It really limits the "at-risk" student-athletes that you can take on because of the limited resources to support them.

9. No

10. We are more involved.

11. Very much so. A lot more resources are being funneled into academics

12. No

13. Our Associate Athletic Director for compliance handles all APR data, and her opinion would more appropriately articulate the intricacies of our APR.
Spend inordinate amount of time working with campus entities who are working to help correct issues.

It's the same

A bit more anxiety to meet standards, I take the successes and outcomes personally, so as the director do feel the pressure myself. The communication and collaboration with coaches and SA's has improved as we are all accountable for the outcomes. We don't have any more money but have been creative in getting "people" help, i.e. mentors, tutors, other academic supports in place. We need institutional help in offering summer courses that are major applicable...so there are pressures to help SA's become eligible in the summer, not always easily done!

The pressure has been overwhelming at times because of the conflicting expectations.

We have allocated a mentor who works specifically with men's basketball. The mentor meets with the men's basketball student-athletes, runs study hall, provides progress reports, and works directly with me and the coach.

Monitor Academic progress closer.

Increased the amount of time speaking with coaches about academics

In a way it has because we have to be on them a lot more.

Not really a factor - maybe strengthened our focus on academics on the front end

I have been more involved with football academics more than any other sport.

We evaluate every prospective student-athlete's transcript prior to issuing scholarship paperwork in these two sports.

N/A

Accountability and retention are the issues we have.

The greatest issue is being more cognizant of the potential impact of transfers out of the program and attempting to minimize the negative impact that has on our APR.
None

No pressure

It hasn't had an impact due to the nature of our strict admission standards

Our goal is to graduate our student-athletes in 5 or fewer years. We do not stress over APR

It hasn't

None

We ask that any students who do not meet our admissions standards after their junior year in high school send us updated grade reports and involve the overseeing AD of each sport; make sure everyone is aware of the academic concerns the academic and compliance office have for each prospect.

It has created tremendous pressure to spend a great deal of time on our MBB program with minimal personnel increases (only increases in student-assistants, no professional staff have been hired to help with the extra workload).

No impact.

It's babysitting 101. You become more of an enabler than empowering because now myself and our resources have to take on just as much responsibility as the student-athlete, if not more.

It is a primary focus on our campus

It has not had an impact.

It provides added pressure in making sure we reach our APR goals.

Pressures to comply have not affected the compliance office directly what has changed is the time I have had to spend on meetings around academic planning for the team but I don't feel any pressure related to complying.

N/A

APR is a weekly discussion with all sports

Have to make sure coaches don't run players off teams

Yes. When Men's Basketball fell below their target APR and we had to construct and improvement plan, that prompted substantial, additional work on the part of
many persons associated with our Athletics program.

47 Positively

48 We try to have a strategic approach in identifying incoming SA's that we deem to be "at risk." This requires additional academic support personnel, strong monitoring systems and many times summer school opportunities.

49 APR has impacted the way I advise student-athletes with regards to dropping or withdrawing from courses. We are pushed towards advising students to take a GPA hit rather than doing what's actually best for their academic careers.

50 Good communication

51 More pressure to keep students from transferring and being eligible and heading towards graduation

52 I checked more often the men's basketball team academic performance

53 It has not affected my direct work with the men's basketball program other than during October I have less time to help them.

54 Stronger efforts put in to recruiting and academic support

55 Greatly - has caused policy changes, etc.

56 We are constantly working to increase our APR.

57 I do not work directly with M. Basketball, so it has not affected my work.

58 I don't feel a significant amount of pressure to comply with APR requirements (other than data submission), as our MBB program has performed well in the classroom and is not at risk for sanctions based on APR results.

59 None

60 I now review more thoroughly a PSA's academic profile prior to an institutional offer of aid. I make decisions based on how they might impact APR. We have gotten better at the level of academic support we provide. We implemented a new "at-risk" program and meet with each SA during registration to prepare for any academic eligibility issues. This is only possible with the additional full-time positions we have added to the Academic Support area.

61 They really haven't. Our coaches have financial incentives to have a good APR.

62 Advising in eligibility. Students are in majors to keep them eligible and not
necessarily in majors that they want to pursue.

63 We have had to push one student to get through to "save the APR" when in reality he was far from actually deserving a degree and was not proactive in his degree completion whatsoever.

64 No major issues. It has actually allowed me the ability to have more frank conversations about academics with the head coach.

65 It hasn't impacted SASS.

66 Football - Getting the coaches and players to understand the severity of the 9hr Rule. Men's Basketball - I now travel to all away games.

67 None other than continue to encourage coaches to recruit academically prepared student-athletes.

68 It has affected directly our efforts to develop a football and men's basketball program.

69 I think it has created a bit more pressure and stress in the academic services department, as many feel partly responsible for the APR of each team.

70 More pressure and time commitment on the small compliance and academic staff.

71 For me, since I work directly with men's basketball, actually compiling the APR data takes away my time with the team in study hall/tutoring/advising. The team takes a back seat because I have to input the data every Fall.

72 We do not sponsor football. Men's basketball receives the same academic support as every other sport and all sports received academic support prior to APR.

73 I have more interaction with the coaching staff - there are increased reporting and assessment responsibilities and I work longer hours generally.

74 There is a lot of pressure put on the academic support service departments to make sure everyone stays eligible and progressing towards their degrees.

75 There have not been compliance pressures.

76 No.

77 It has not impacted it that much however there has been tension due to the quality of student versus the quality of athlete.
Yes

None

We have a more hands-on approach with Men's Basketball, meeting with every day.

Not at all.

It has not been an issue

I believe the institution and athletic department has taken a closer look at the type of student-athlete coaches are recruiting.

More hands on work with student-athletes from both sports. Additional services provided to both teams. Additional staff working with football.

We have managed to be proactive with the caliber of SA that is brought in and we have more tutors available

The pressure of showing them the impact and the years of decline in the scores. I brought in a different approach to viewing the scores and they are looking at the program differently.

Haven't felt any pressure, although we do discuss APR.

Little if any.

There is always the worry that we will achieve the score. However, since the cohort has changed and the students who left are no longer in the cohort we have been fine. It is more of a concern for us regarding transfers out.

Not at all

Certain times of the academic year are more time consuming. Stress builds to get APR related things done.

It has caused some issues, because a coach will want to remove a player based on team rules, but we will require them to keep the student engaged so as to no lose APR points. Real conflict of interests - APR over Team

I don't directly work with either sport. Our sport administrator with Director of FB Ops work with the coaches and academic advisor on staying on top of APR and in their recruiting.

Not at all
Coaches have now begun to recruit a higher quality student-athlete.

We changed almost every practice and policy from reviewing prospective student athletes to dropping classes.

No difference

Closer watch on the recruits for men's basketball.

No change

The retention process requires more work, but encouraging student-athletes to do well academically was already a priority.

I feel pressure to assist the team to reach their greatest potential academically. Monitoring their academic performance takes a lot of work and communication with teachers has increased a lot.

We are in constant communication with our head coaches and their staffs. We implemented a program that must be followed by sports that are in historical penalty phases. The coaches have "bought in" to the program, which has improved our APR significantly.

I have only been involved while APR has been in place.

I oversee MBB for sort supervision, but deal very directly with FB as well. We allocate a staff member to each sport program, not just because of APR but due to the nature and demands of the sport and the national trend.

Not much.

The issues faced with these programs has caused me as an Athletic Director to spend more time providing direct oversight to each program.

Not at all

I don't believe that has been any impact on my direct work with our Men's Basketball program. I continue to evaluate transcripts of any prospects that they
ask me too. APR pressures may have changed how the deal with the evaluations that I provide them.

112 More pressure on myself and my staff to make sure everyone is eligible.

114 My focus is primarily on academics for football, basketball, baseball, and track/field anyways so it does not add any additional pressure or stress to my job.

115 More meetings, more educating related groups (e.g., Faculty Subcommittee on Athletics)

116 There is more consciousness on the part of the coaches in these sports as to how their APR is affected by their actions and those of their team members. This has affected all areas of the programs, from recruiting to support and discipline to more monitoring of academic progress by members of each coaching staff.

117 Please refer to my previous answer. Doesn't hurt my direct work, more so with coaches who do the actual recruiting.

118 It is stressful to know that APR minimum must be met but it also validates our work with the coaches and students. We hold regular meetings with the coaches and predict what the APR could look like for the year. It is nice to have a predictor, using what we know from fall and what has to be done in spring to meet goals.

119 You need to focus more attention on scholarship student athletes particularly those with smaller rosters with at risk students (i.e. Men's basketball) are priorities. We have a full-time employee dedicated to working primarily with Men's Basketball.

120 We have more closely monitored our decisions on who to cut/retain in each program, we have worked more closely with the academic advisors in each program, and we have worked very closely with our compliance staff to continually educate our coaching staffs on the residual effects of any/all of their decisions/eligibility of their athletes.

121 It hasn't

122 Again, I think the biggest impact is with the student-athletes that don't graduate when they are through with their eligibility. We are very active in helping them find a way to graduate.
With our responsibilities distribution the Assistant A.D. for Academic Success has responsibilities for advising and eligibility checks, however due to my responsibilities with regards to the APR I actually do work with the team.

No pressure because I have always demanded 100% academic effort from my players, and as long as my expectations are high, the achievement will come close to meeting the goals. The key to reaching the APR benchmark and beyond is complete cooperation from the coaching staff.

No pressures.

There is more Micro-managing in MBB now with emphasis placed on outside activities that could lead an athlete to transfer as well as academic issues.

Has not

Not really - a few points lost here and there, but mostly for students who transfer. Only real problem is trying to get them to leave with 2.6

The way my position is structured, not too much. However, others have increased burdens.

The pressure is probably more intense, but the APR is always the excuse we can conveniently use to force coaches to look at things from a more academic perspective. We seem to have settled into a good mutual understanding between my office, the coaches and the Athletic Department on what must be done to achieve APR scores above the 925/930 range.

As an institution that progressed into Occasion III Historical Penalties with our football program, the pressure of turning our situation around

None.

Again, for the sports of FB and BB, we have monitored recruiting decisions and then the retention and eligibility of student-athletes in those sports closely. Our athletic academic advisors and sport supervisors have responded well to the pressure and expectations of closely monitoring student-athletes (in particular, high-risk student-athletes) in these programs. Fortunately, both FB and MBB have had very positive outcomes in our first three years of APR reports (i.e. at or above national averages).

Yes

No pressure. It’s a matter of fact that one needs to comply with the APR regulations and it is important to have communication and a plan in place to assist the coaches to be successful and succeed.
Requires a very proactive plan and education of coaches and student-athletes.

We have not had any issues or concerns regarding the APR of football or men's basketball.

It has caused my academic team to have to take on tutoring responsibilities as well.

Not too much, I have always been very involved with our highest profile, most at risk student populations.

I am the advisor who works directly with men's basketball. We have formed a subcommittee that meets monthly to make sure the team is meeting academic standards. There are also weekly meetings between the academic specialist, myself, and the men's basketball person who is directly responsible for academics (men's basketball academic coach)... All men's basketball players are required to attend summer school (including FTF).

Very little, but ours have been very good.

Much more point focused and less round based

At times, strained relations. It has also necessitated the termination of wayward coaches.

Evaluating every recruit for initial eligibility purposes and academic success at our institution.

I am more involved.

We make sure that our student-athletes file paperwork to graduate in a timely manner, file waivers and track where they went to more closely than we did pre-APR.

It has not influence my work to be any different as my position is newly created to address all student athletes academic and cultural needs at the institution.

It has put some more work on me to forecast the impact certain roster moves may have on M Basketball.

Serve on the APR Scholarship Review Committee mentioned above.

Supervise academics so monitor more carefully academic success of MBB student-athletes.
We are lucky to have good coaches who stay on top of their players, but I do pay very close attention to the academic performance of our MBB players.

No affect

Not at all.

Has not affected my direct work or involvement with the teams.

APR should be completed outside of the athletic department

A low score from one year has brought heightened evaluations of prospective student-athletes in the recruitment process including transcript evaluation and conversations of academic course offerings.

It is a stressful situation that fortunately I have a lot of control over because our Men's basketball staff is 100% supportive of everything I do to help their athletes.

We discuss it on a periodic basis but since we have been fairly strong I would not say it has had a tremendous impact.

None. Our football team is recognized as being in the top 10% of teams nationwide in regard to APR. Our Men's Basketball team has an APR score well above the standard.

More involvement in how coaches manage their squad membership

I work with them to improve academics- including progress to graduation.

Efforts have been dramatically increased for men's basketball's academic success and retention.

Our program has always been aware of rigorous academic standards, as our institution’s academic standards are high.

Coaches are much more involved/concerned

The coaches expect much more babysitting from the academic staff. They expect more resources.

No

It hasn't yet. That may change once it goes to 930 but even at that level we should be fine.
Our men's basketball team has no issues complying with the APR. They currently have a multi-year rate of 1000. As the staff member responsible for reporting our institution's APR data, I feel a tremendous amount of pressure to meet reporting deadlines, etc.

Does not feel like a pressure - it is an opportunity to engage coaches in conversation about program direction and the success/fit of their student athletes.

Minimally. It has, however, placed an increased strain on the relationship between the men's basketball coaching staff and the team's academic advisor.

I've been cussed out by my football coach because year after year he still does not grasp how the cohort is determined for a non-scholarship team, even though I explain it ad nauseum each year. He doesn't get it and somehow that's my fault.

More education with coaches and more interaction on personnel moves that will directly affect APR.

It has not been a problem.

Spend many more hours working with these two groups.

Relatively little. We have always tried to recruit student-athletes that are a slice of the student population.

As in most administrative jobs, 80% of the extra work is caused by 20% of the people.

Based on APR penalties, it forces us to put a system in place that monitors student athletes class attendance, courses taken, study hall hours and transfer credit from other institution.

Very little

It has lead to the hiring of a new counselor to work solely with MBK.

TIME-CONSUMING report!!!

More involvement with assistant and head coaches. We have to provide documentation of everything done to support athletes' academic experience because of the pressure on coaches, then ultimately on the academic support program. Coaches get the accolades or blame for poor APR scores externally from the school. On campus and with the constituencies of the university, it’s the academic support program that gets the blame for poor APRs. Not the coaches.
In Men's Basketball, although our office is a small staffed office, one of the Academic Personnel traveled with the team in Fall 2010 on an extensive road trip where the students missed 8 days of classes.

We have to change the way we do business.

No.

I don't feel that the pressures of complying with the APR have affected my direct work in the same fashion it has with Compliance and Academic Services.

No

APR is reflected in our objectives, goals, bonuses and performance evaluations. However, it is about a number achieved as opposed to the individual academic achievement and career preparation.

NA

At first the APR concept was a bit difficult to implement, but now it is merely a useful structure to demonstrate accountability; I view this as a positive thing.

None whatsoever

Had a hard time in the beginning. They now understand and happy because we have had no penalties and no embarrassment to our university

No

Somewhat

There is a strain, the coaching staff is under a lot of pressure to win and improve The APR.

N/A

We now work closely on scheduling to make sure students are in class as much as possible. We also work together with students who are a threat of failing or transferring.

In the areas of recruitment

We hired additional academic support staff to work primarily with Men's and Women's Basketball and a subset of football.
None, since I work with non-revenue generating sports.

Again, there isn't a big pressure. We speak with our coaches annually on APR rates but at this time we are not worried.

Added emphasis from Coaches on their athletes to stay eligible and monitor eligibility as well as the request for additional staff in non coaching areas to assist with this. Also we are very low staffed in our academic support areas and this had added a very high level of stress and hours to monitor our athletes and the APR.

Full-time academic advisor for men's and women's basketball hired in the past decade.

We pay close attention to the academic records of prospective student-athlete's who are coming in on official visits. If a student has a poor academic record, we will share his/her transcripts with our FAR, who has the final call on whether to allow a visit or not.

We need to be very aware of the numbers not only for the welfare of the students but also the public perception if you happen to fall below.

Again, not at all.

Yes. in both good and bad ways.

It has not.

Little to no additional pressure

"Blame" placed on administrators for poor APR scores as opposed to accountability for coaching staff members.

More involved with head coaches of both sports

Not affected.

Have a great working relationship with both. Meet on a pretty consistent basis about APR.

With the new 9 credit limit in the fall for football, it has heighten the awareness and made the football coaches nervous. The new regulations for Men's basketball for transfers has not affected my staff as it is very clear who is eligible. It has affected how the coaches recruit.

I can only speak to Football since I do not work with Men's Basketball, but APR has not really affected football since it's non-scholarship here.
Increased the academic resources provided to all student-athletes. It is the responsibility of the student-athlete to utilize those resources. Increased attention to the capabilities of prospective student-athletes.

There has been more involvement with these 2 sports. 1 advisor oversees MBB and FB

Increased the interaction

Adds more work but it is worth it

Greatly

Not at all.

Not at all

No

Not at all

We always have APR in mind, so much more time utilized analyzing actions on APR.

Greater emphasis on retention and 2.6 GPA.

No.

None

Since men's basketball typically does well, we are not as involved with them directly as we are with football. Football takes up majority of our time, as the two academic coordinators on staff split up football for advising purposes. Majority of our mentoring program is taken up by football, and the academic staff meets for about 3 hours once a week with the football coaches on academically-related topics/issues.

Minimally.

No negative impact.

It has not affected my direct work with either team; however, it has directly affected and increased the work load for our athletic academic advisors. For each identified "conditional admit" student athlete to the university, an academic plan
must be written by one of our athletic academic advisors and that plan monitored by the
athletic academic advisor to assure the student athlete stays on track.

232 Careful monitoring- quarterly meetings with the President, FAR, AD, Senior Vice
Provost, Eligibility Certification Officer, Senior Associate Athletic Director for
Academics, Compliance and Student Welfare / SWA and the Assistant Athletics
Director for Academic Support Services

233 We have had to change the recruiting philosophies and it has created a lot of
resentment from both sports coaching staffs.

234 Slightly more time

235 We discuss APR with those coaches and staff as well as the academic support
staff for those schools every day. Most every discussion about an at risk
student resolves around how will impact our APR.

236 No affect.

237 Some pressure to keep students on course to graduate, but not by guiding them
towards majors they don't want to pursue. I try to put our student-athletes in
position to be successful each semester. Sometimes that means recommending
summer school in order to put them in better position to succeed during
fall/spring semesters.

238 Coaching staff and compliance offer has taken APR seriously and we've had few
discussions; there's trust involved and we have good academic
plans/infrastructure/recruiting in place.

239 Has not had a profound effect.

240 The need to implement more specific academic support services.

241 Much more involved with decisions....there may be a player they would like to
not have on their team, and we have actually told them they need to keep them
because of APR numbers

242 We must always be cognizant of the academic profile of our students.

243 It has taken time away from other areas such as fund raising.

244 We have put more pressure on our coaches to ensure the retention and
academics success of our student-athletes, which they believe put constraints on
their on-field success.
Compliance is necessary and an integral component of Academic Progress Reporting. The challenge of not having the resources as some of the bigger schools has its challenges, however, we are still expected to compete even in the classroom.

Minimally, only to the extent of strategizing with the coaches once or twice per year.

No impact

Over sight of the academic side is extremely important. Our Academic Student Services for student athletes is not funded well. We do not have funding for fifth year aid or summer school scholarships, therefore the pressures to complete school for our student athletes are sometimes unrealistic.

I have not seen a direct correlation between APR and involvement with football/men's basketball.

I think they have had a negative impact, especially with transfers regarding their degree percentage. It has put us in a situation where we have had to make student-athletes make tougher choices regarding majors simply to be eligible and not hurt our APR.

It’s even more important that I follow this and be 100% accurate with my calculations, what information I provide, etc. We have long watched academic readiness on the front-end but the whole APR thing has not slowed the entry of very at-risk individuals particularly in MBB

It has just made us to keep our coaches updated on the pros and cons of the APR.

We have to offer services to students even when they are dismissed or quit teams

APR has an impact on everyone involved. Most of the pressure lands on the shoulders of the administration and coaches. Administration has had to get involved in the recruiting process and the academic make up of the student athletes we bring in.

Refer to Question 8. Additionally, the BB-M coaching staff and the Student-Athlete Services Staff meet weekly to review each student-athlete on the team. Besides the one-on-one advising, the BB-M have academic mentors that review their course syllabi and go through each and every assignment with the student athlete.

It influences our admissions decisions to insure that we are enrolling student athletes who can be academically successful.
More involvement and better communications

It has not yet affected our department, we have been pretty lucky with both programs so far.

There has been no effect. Both programs are well above the minimum standards set by the NCAA.

None; just a part of our jobs

It is probably more thought about than some areas but other than the time needed to ensure accurate data I wouldn't say it puts an extensive amount of pressure on me.

Coaches reflect more before making a decision to run out a student

It has not affected my direct work; the academic standards of the university is what the coaching staff has to work with.

None

No pressures.

It affects scheduling of student-athletes - it is a challenge to always find a student the "safest" schedule

APR has had no impact.

No significant impact.

APR has forced us to waste resources on students that have quit team in order to get them to a 2.6 so they may transfer. We have denied releases to students who would otherwise cause us to lose APR points.

We must accelerate and accentuate advising to PTD and eligibility requirements.

We have hired several new positions to help with data aggregation and tracking of all athletes

NA

Football has been fine. Basketball coach certainly feels the pressure of APR.
APPENDIX I

OPEN ENDED RESPONSES FOR RESEARCH QUESTION #3

RQ3: How has the APR impacted the type of student athlete your coaches now recruit?

1. It forces low income schools to recruit a better quality student. Although our goal is to recruit someone who may be a better student rather than a great athlete, we will consider recruiting great students first.

2. Looking less at Junior college students.

3. The focus is heavily on the type of PSA coaches are recruiting. Because of low APR scores we established an APR Committee to evaluate and receive approval before a coach is permitted to sign a PSA to a scholarship and/or bring on an official visit.

4. Still worry about too many transfers. Worry about cuts in funding to overall budget with increasing APR concerns.

5. Our recruiting habits have not changed because of APR.

6. None at all.

7. Unsure

8. Have to look at a much better student - and for those "at risk" students- really need to look at their work ethic and desire to succeed.

9. No

10. Keeps them conscious of grades coming out of high school.

11. Not enough time to tell because of new coach

12. Yes

13. I am responsible for approving all official visits for all our programs. In the last year I have noticed a significant increase in the test scores and CGPA of our recruits for all programs. However, most sports will still recruit an individual with low scores if they believe that PSA is a difference maker on the field or on the
court. When performing a cost/benefit analysis of a PSA's athletic ability to academic achievements, coaches will often side with athletic ability and hope our academic support team can help the PSA succeed in the classroom.

14 Yes

15 Fewer "risky" students

16 We continually talk about the type of student they are recruiting and that we need to be sure that they can be admitted and succeed in the academic programs that the institution offers. They have to be especially cautious of 2 year transfers. Our institution needs to understand that once SA's are admitted that we need to serve them through to graduation, so the resources and supports need to be in place. One year builds on another and we are continually talking about "saturation" levels and our ability to meet all needs with a very small staff.

17 It has not necessarily impacted the type of recruit. Instead it has put more pressure on Academic Affairs to support the needs of both high and low achieving students.

18 The coaches have always recruited good students. APR is a reminder to have a balance in each recruiting class. We have the resources to work with student athletes with a less than ideal academic background as long as other freshmen and upper classmen are well-prepared for college. The same goes for JUCO transfers. Coach has always had that outlook, but it's even more important now.

19 Our admissions standards are high enough to prevent recruiting SAs that cannot be successful here. May have affected the recruitment on the retention side.

20 Has not changed

21 They are better equipped academically to succeed. They are taking fewer risks on SA’s that are borderline. They are paying closer attention to the academic performance of their SA's

22 Not yet

23 We haven't changed recruiting much - again, fortunate that our coaches have recruited very few academic risks.

24 We have increased core course GPA requirements to receive a scholarship for sports that have lower APR scores.

25 Our institution has attempted to ensure that the two aforementioned programs only recruit student-athletes that have a legitimate shot at graduating from our
Not much of a change, but we encourage our coaches to always consider APR implications when recruiting junior college transfers.

Recruiting has changed dramatically.

The APR and the progress toward a degree requirements have sharpened our focus on identifying young people who have the ability and desire to succeed in a challenging academic environment.

Our University Admissions standards has always been the factor by which the coaches can recruit.

Better student

It hasn't had an impact due to the nature of our strict admission standards

Graduation is the focus not APR

It really hasn't

None

Everyone is talking APR and what services we have on campus to assist each prospect.

The coaches have recruited more academically prepared students.

No impact.

Not at all.

It has made a big impact on the type of SA we recruit.

It has not had an impact.

It hasn't changed in that respect

Big impact at this point the MBB is restricted from recruiting transfers

N/A

It has affected to recruit a more academically inclined student

It hasn't changed
Coaches have to think more about student athlete’s ability to academically succeed.

You'd have to ask the coaches for full details. I have noticed a slight but steady improvement in high school GPA and test scores among our football freshman classes in recent years.

Positively

Our mission is to graduate our SA's and we hold our coaches accountable for bringing in students that are serious about graduating and doing the right things. This plays a big part in the evaluations of our coaches. We are not interested in a lot of attrition particularly when it relates to SA's leaving due to ineligibility or behavior issues. Unfortunately, some kids do transfer and we are less concerned if they leave in good academic standing.

Coaches are much more focused on the probability of success of the student athletes they recruit. We spend more time discussing the academic level of the students, their transcripts and test scores prior to official visits.

Awareness

They seem to be recruiting better students.

Coaches now look deeper the academia background than before

It has not impacted the type of student-athletes our coaches currently recruit.

New coach in and he is recruiting students that are stronger in the academic area.

For the better - hopefully

We encourage our coaches to recruit a specific type of student-athlete who will succeed on and off the field.

The coaches are now looking for student-athletes with a much more solid academic record.

I don't believe the APR per se has impacted the type of student-athletes our coaches recruit. Recruiting strategies are more impacted by our institution's admissions standards and processes.

No impact

We now recruit students who are better prepared academically and develop
plans for at-risk student-athletes (especially transfers) on how they are going to reach graduation.

62 It hasn't really, but our coaches have done more homework before we bring a kid into our program.

63 It is not as much the APR as it is the pressure to win. Coaches sometimes recruit students to get wins and the students struggle academically (then they are put in majors to keep them eligible).

64 It hasn't.

65 No real change as our academic standards are high.

66 It hasn't impacted recruiting.

67 Hopefully, our coaches will start recruiting future student-athletes that already have a strong academic base coming out of high school.

68 Increased academic standards for recruitment.

69 We have adjusted the standards in both sports in an effort to bring in a higher achieving SA.

70 I think we are still going to sign PSA's that can help us win championships as long as they will be admitted to school. I don't think much has changed here.

71 Has not changed dramatically. We always had a high graduation and retention rate.

72 Unfortunately, it has not.

73 No change, coaches always recruited student-athletes with strong academic profiles because the university would not accept inadequate students for the university mission.

74 APR has improved the academic quality of the student we recruit - coaches are more aware as they're speaking with families and high school counselors.

75 It hasn't.

76 No

77 They are being more conscious of who they bring in because they know that the compliance office will deny anyone that is too low academically.

78 Yes
Definitely has created much more awareness

Hasn't had an impact.

Not sure.

Not an issue

The coaching staff looks to recruit student-athletes that promote good conduct on-and-off the playing field. The coaching staff looks to bring in student-athletes that are likely to persist.

The type of student-athlete has remained the same for football; however in regards to basketball, the focus has switched from community college transfers to freshmen who are qualifiers out of high school.

We recruit better prepared PSA’s. We never take a chance or risk

This year's recruiting class was better in a sense that football did not go after as many non-qualifiers out of high school. Men's basketball is still heavy on transfer student-athletes

No impact

We are recruiting stronger students now, and not taking as many "risks" with potential academic or character issues.

I do not believe it has changed recruiting at all. Coaches still basically expect academic support to work with and succeed with any students they bring in.

The quality of our recruits has improved.

More attention is now given to the academic success of recruits. If this recruit has the academic skills to succeed at the college level.

They have to look for stronger academic traits, which at our level really reduces the field of available prospects.

Our recruiting has improved particularly in FB on the type of student they recruit. Basketball still needs more work by the coaches on the type of student they recruit. Their academic advisor strongly pushes for them to improve the quality of student they want to bring in.

Not at all
I think it has had a positive impact on the type of student our coaches recruit.

We have started to recruit student athlete's that have a higher GPA and Test Scores.

Our coaches have to find student-athlete who will be able to handle the rural nature and relatively strict code of ethics established by our university. The overall retention rate of the general student body is pretty poor and student athletes are higher, but this still doesn't mean that our APR is great.

Yes. A minimum academic profile was developed and enforced for every sport.

More motivated to get a degree student-athletes

Moving to high school seniors from junior college transfers.

No change

We have seen increase in football's APR, the men's basketball program is on course with all other institution's.

The coaches are trying to recruit better student-athletes which includes a lot of different factors including academics.

Our coaches understand that they have to recruit "better" student-athletes.

The coaches are recruiting better students, now they have to learn the balance of better students and the same caliber if not better of athletes.

Maintains a full comprehension of overall quality needed.

The APR has caused each coach to commit to significant change to how and who they recruit into each program by expanding their background checks, academic profiling, and PSA knowledge before they are brought to campus. Each coach has been required to significantly reduce the number of non-qualifiers and 2 year transfers that come into the programs. More oversight of recruiting has been implemented as well as better analysis of PSA's academic success indicators before entering the University.

Not at all

Hard to say--we believe the academic support we offer is the real key.

I think coaches make more of an effort to predict academic success in the recruiting process and aren't as willing to take as many chances in the recruiting process.
It has not.

Has had no impact that I have seen

They focus on recruiting student-athletes that are stronger academically, especially when it comes to those that are considered to be non-qualifiers.

Less likely to take a "risk" on a prospective student due to APR rates, more understanding of the coaches role, parents still confused

The coaches have always recruited PSAs who fit the program and the school, but APR has driven the focus even further into the realm of academic preparedness and excellence.

It's a gamble and you never truly know how well a student-athlete is going to perform until they get to campus. Collegiate coaches at my institution are becoming more inclined to evaluate a PSA’s academic record.

In football, the coaching staff has remain stable and it has made a significant difference in who they recruit. Our men's basketball coaching staff has changed and the staff is somewhat young and have not had much experience with APR yet. It will have an impact when numbers are real and they believe what I have been trying to tell them.

More attention is paid to the standardized test scores (ACT/SAT) and less to high school/junior college GPAs. They do more research

Has not changed the type of student we recruit.

Still determining

Our coaches have always recruited great student-athletes and I don't think the APR has impacted that.

We have examined the recruiting models in both sports and have focused on bringing in student-athletes that fit with the campus mission and who have degree aspirations among our offerings. Additionally, PSAs are met with multiple times in order to fully understand them as best as possible.

Greatly, because a committee approves scholarships and if the committee believes that the student can't successfully matriculate through the university, the student usually doesn't get approved.

Never had an APR issue yet for men's basketball so no impact yet.
Our university does not have special exceptions for student-athletes.

Has not. As a strong academic institution we only recruit student-athletes with high GPA and test scores who can succeed in our academic environment.

No

In my view, not much.

See above comments. APR changes the whole process. Sometimes it's a pain but mostly it makes the coaches think twice.

It has changed our recruiting philosophy as we are not as apt to take a chance on a kid that we once would have

None. Due to academic standards, recruit those who will be successful at our institution

I believe we were in a unique position as a reclassifying Division I institution to be able to plan for/gear up for the Division I transition, to include the enhanced degree progress standards and then the impact those standards have on APR (eligibility and retention). I believe our coaches were prepared for (in most cases) and have crafted/shifted recruiting strategies to meet Division I talent level as well as Division I academic standards. There are always exceptions, but the APR scores for our sports have shown that this is the case overall (for our first three years.. and we expect/hope that it will continue.. always with diligence and monitoring from administration and advisors).

We don't have the resources to compete with the bigger schools....we are all recruiting the same kids now

Our coaches are better prepared to recruit students who are prepared for college by looking at more variables during the recruiting process to learn all they can about the student.

Has impacted the type of student-athlete recruited. We focus more on retention.

None

Athletic ability is second to academics.

It should impact it more, but since we haven't had penalties yet, it hasn't been as impactful. The new reform will reach coaches quickly.

Our coaches are only allowed to recruit first time freshman qualifier student athletes. No more transfers are allowed to come unless they have above a 2.70...
overall GPA and meet all NCAA and admissions requirements (no special admits for this team are allowed).

140 No-but the coaches are aware that if they take risks on the admissions side they will be held accountable on the APR side. However, we have had that type of "Track Record" relationship well before the APR was put in place.

141 Academics have to be much more in front and they have to choose wisely on any risks...

142 It has required us to recruit a different type of student-athlete.

143 Our coaches now have to be very selective in the type of athlete they recruit. The school must be a good fit both in the classroom and out of it. We need our athletes to want to stay for 4 years and graduate. We cannot recruit any students that will not make it academically.

144 Must meet our admissions standards; no more conditional admits.

145 It will in the future, But as of now our college standards help with APR

146 It's been business as usual for us as we are still admitting student-athletes who fit within our academic profile.

147 I'm not directly involved with the recruitment decisions that coaches make, but recruits now have to meet a minimum benchmark and if not, the recruitment of that student athlete stops. I believe this protocol has impacted how the coaches review potential recruits as academic potential is first, then athletic ability is now second, with fitting into the school environment third. I believe coaches now might go after a student who does not meet their playing expectations but will meet the APR standards and the minimum standards at our school. I have heard coaches say that this has prevented them from fielding the best team possible to win.

148 The coaches, in conjunction with new standards for our school in general, are being mindful of recruiting higher quality students.

149 Coaches are recruiting student-athletes that are better prepared for college.

150 Stronger student-athlete with more academic assistance

151 We don't recruit players who can't get it done in the classroom. We recruit players who are not prepared for college, but we have a network of academic support that is remarkable. Basketball can pay for tutors and they do. At our institution, every team is above 925 and no coach wants to be the first to blow that record. Our president would have their hide! Support and expectations at
the top really helps us do a good job the right way.

They are academically more sound but we still have a few who are at-risk that are brought in.

We are seeking academically stronger students.

Due to the academic rigors of our institution, our coaches constantly recruit student-athletes who will be academically successful.

Academic standing is an important component. Coaches typically can't afford to take a chance on several student-athletes in the same recruiting class.

Not sure.

We have always recruited young men and women that can achieve the academic rigors of our institution and we believe can be retained for their collegiate career.

None; we were already recruiting academically oriented students.

More attention to HS academic record.

Our new coach is recruiting a higher quality student-athlete in terms of academic performance. We are discouraging transfers.

They are now recruiting more academically prepared prospects and fewer two year college transfers.

We only bring in prospects that we believe will be academically successful. Our institution is challenging academically and graduation is extremely important to our department as a whole.

Somewhat but there is just better academic support.

They are less likely to take risks.

Current coach compromises academic promise very little. Recent recruits have performed well.

Still recruiting the same way that that they have always recruited.

Because of our competitive admission standards, our coaches have always recruited student-athletes with strong academic records. The APR has really had no impact on recruiting, except that we've actually been able to successfully recruit players who were considering other programs until they discovered the
difference in the APR scores. As our head men's basketball coach puts it, the APR scores tell a story; they let you know what's going on in a program, both good and bad.

168 The institutional academic standards are more influential than the APR, so it has had little effect.

169 I don't feel like it has impacted who they bring in. It has had more impact on how they are treated once they get here.

170 The current men's basketball coach recruits very few, if any, 2-4 transfers, which was the Achilles heel of the previous head coach. Our football coaching staff is very careful not to trigger recruitment (second phone call) of those PSAs they do not want to be accountable for in the APR cohort.

171 Negligible.

172 It has not

173 HUGE difference! Recruiting students with better grades and ACT scores.

174 It has honestly caused us to think about how new coaches (when a coaching change is made) embrace those athletes who are already in the program

175 No doubt they are looking for a more well rounded student-athlete.

176 Yes

177 Most sports are not impacted. Some sports that have lower multiyear scores have been required to sign student-athletes that meet specified academic criteria.

178 We currently do not recruit any Presidential Exceptions and each recruit is scrutinized at a higher level.

179 No

180 Not sure that it has yet. We are still recruiting to win and we are doing so with quite a few transfer students.

181 For Football, the coaches may offer only books to students receiving high academic honors and academic scholarships out of high school. For Men's Basketball, the head coach will offer one student-athlete of strong academic standing a scholarship. Last year, two student-athletes on MBB obtained athletic scholarship as both were comfortably admitted into the institution ready for college level classes.
Tremendously

Our coaches rarely recruit student-athletes that are high threats to affect APR.

We are more intentional about communicating to the coaches the need for thorough academic assessment of the PSA before making any levels of commitment.

We try for a higher academic profile

There is a slight impact in that they at least consider the recruitment of at risk students. They also measure the impact or risk of transfer possibilities.

One thing we say often is that life is easier if you recruit good, smart students who will not face APR issues; for the most part, we accomplish this

Better student, not as good a player, diminished the available pool

Yes, especially transfers

No impact

We are more diligent in analyzing a PSA's academic profile

After several years of bringing in high-risk players, this last recruiting cycle finally showed a majority of capable students that were ultimately signed.

They can’t take the chances on students anymore.

Seem to be recruiting students with better academic backgrounds

More selective academically

It has not.

Unknown

Recruiting same type of student-athletes...our institution is not a place with can "hide" anyone nor do we have a ton of extra support academically so we must recruit student-athletes who we believe can be successful.

Much more emphasis on recruiting athletes that have the better chance of graduating although still taking some high risk athletes but that adds more pressure on our academic staff to monitor.

Coaches are aware that the overall team profile cannot include a majority of "at
risk" student-athletes.

201 Our coaches do pay closer attention to academics and social conduct now. We try to project how a student will fair several years down the road, not just athletically, but academically as well.

202 As of now it hasn't. I think that will certainly change with the new eligibility standards more so than APR.

203 We recruit the same type of SA as we always have - those that can compete in the classroom.

204 Our department has but tougher standards for incoming student-athletes than the university or NCAA. Prospective SA's must have certain test scores and GPA’s in order to be offered athletic aid or have money spent on them by coaches. This is even if they are an NCAA qualifier and get admitted into our institution.

205 We have a new coaching staff, so it is hard to say.

206 We need to be more thoughtful about fit, need to reduce the number of potential transfers

207 Recruiting restrictions have been developed in order to address deficiencies.

208 No change

209 No impact.

210 Student Athlete’s are recruited with APR in mind...student athletes must be able to succeed academically and who will stay

211 They have learned how to recruit the correct athlete.

212 Men’s basketball has modified which transfers they recruit because of the standards. As of right now in football we have not seen a difference in their recruiting, I would assume it will be coming in the near future.

213 Our coaches have always recruited good character students, who mostly have solid academic backgrounds

214 Slightly less risk taking. Coaches are now more hands on with student-athletes and their academic progress, in some cases providing their own academic monitoring and follow-up.

215 Coaches recruit students with better academic potential now.
Increased the academic level

Not sure it has - we have been consistent

None

No change. We recruit for academic success, competitive success and character.

Not at all. Our coaches have continued to recruit the same type of student and athlete over the six years I have been employed at the University.

We have to use our evaluation periods looking more at a prospective student athlete academic achievements than his athletic abilities on the field or court.

Not at all

None

Limited the number of inbound transfers, both JUCO and 4-year transfers

No. But the institution's emphasis on academics and the poor performance of one recruiting class surely has.

We generally recruit student athletes with good probability of success, and we have strong basketball success

APR hasn't affected our recruiting in football and basketball as much as other sports that have received penalties, or are nearing the benchmark to earn penalties. I would say football puts more effort into recruiting good students than before, and will recruit less of the "academically at-risk" students.

Not at all.

No change

With admission standards being raised for the entire university, each coach is given a limited number of "conditional admits" for their team, which has limited the number of potentially "at risk" PSA's our coaches would recruit into their programs.

Careful analysis of the academic record and test scores of all prospective student-athletes, particularly those at high academic risk

We can only go after strong academic candidates and we are moving away from junior college players as much as we can.
Coaches give more scrutiny to high school transcripts and test scores. Significantly. Our institution has high academic standards and the screening process forces the coaches to recruit students who have the potential to be successful at our institution. Somewhat, especially with regard to transfers. We are recruiting better prepared student-athletes. Not really! We just have to do things differently academically which includes all entering M/W Basketball players being enrolled in a summer start program. Hasn't made the difference in the type of player being recruited, however it has changed the way we "prep" to get a player. We go through quite a thorough evaluation of PSA transcript and test score, and let the coaches know how we feel the prospects are for a PSA to be successful. It is still the coaches’ choice to recruit. Any viable recruit must have a strong academic profile. We are more conscious of the type of athlete we bring in and are less likely to take a chance. We have asked them to minimize the recruitment of "chance" players and focus on athletes who will be able to maintain eligibility and focus on academics. There is a delicate balance of bringing in student-athletes who are not going to meet initial eligibility standards; who may have to go before Admissions Review committee as opposed to restricting recruitment to those who will not only meet our University Admissions policies but also those set forth by the NCAA. Our coaches do a fine job understanding the academic impact recruiting an academically marginal student has not only on the team's profile but the University as a whole. Somewhat fewer "high risk" athletes. No impact Coaches are very aware of the need to recruit quality student athletes. But
schools like ours do not have the facilities, staff or other bells and whistles that many schools have, therefore, we are not on a level playing field even though we are expected to compete and perform with those schools.

248 Coaches are more cognizant of the academic profile of students they're bringing in and also considering "flight risks" when looking at international students and non-African American students who may leave after a year attending a HBCU.

249 I do not think it has changed it very much. I think coaches are aware, but as long as we are avoiding penalties, they are okay.

250 No change............they are just playing the odds and hoping to stay over the threshold and keep their jobs.

251 Now they look at whether or not this student-athlete is a good fit athletically and academically.

252 It has not impacted at all.

253 For football we have had to increase the GPA required to be on the team. We are an open enrollment institution.

254 As with most if not all coaches in NCAA, DI, they must be successful. Therefore, although the coaches understand the necessary preparedness to be successful, they still recruit the best athletic recruit possible. The coaches understand that it is a partnership between them and the academic advising/support side.

255 It has helped us do a better job of recruiting students that can graduate

256 We just have to focus on recruiting STUDENT-athletes and not ATHLETE-students

257 I don't think so. We've always recruited students capable of progressing toward graduation. Not all do, of course, but those numbers are small. Having said that, though, everyone is aware of the APR numbers, and coaches don't want their team APR to be on the low end of our very high overall APR for all student athletes. So, I guess that's some form of pressure.

258 Has forced coaches to recruit players who can fulfill the academic requirements

259 Less likely to take a risk if you have a low number in a year. Constantly having to evaluate the position you are in with APR scores and what an at risk student athlete would do in that position.

260 As our institution is academically rigorous we have to find prospects that meet our admissions standards.
They are being more aware of the type of student that is recruited as some of their recruitment decisions have adversely impacted the APR.

Hasn't

No impact.

It hasn't changed.

We have always recruited academically high profile student-athletes.

Conference standards dictate the type of SA our coaches recruit more so than APR.

Has not had huge impact. Our institution has always had fairly stringent admissions policy and we make few if any exceptions for athletics.

We now have a minimum academic profile for all sports, and we may increase it.

Graduation rates, recruitment and retention efforts are all a part of the hiring process

I do believe that coaches really take a closer look at academics when it comes to recruiting especially if it effects the APR.

Not much at all
APPENDIX J

OPEN ENDED RESPONSES FOR RESEARCH QUESTION #4

RQ4: What are any positive changes in implementation measures for academic support concerning football and/or men’s basketball that resulted from the pressures of APR compliance?

1  We recently hired a new academic enhancement coordinator, and we on track to hire a learning specialist. We will also put in the budget to hire graduate assistants from our sport administration program.

2  Yes - hopefully less at risk student-athletes will be recruited.

3  We have since hired 3 new Advisors, improved on our tutorial services and put a few things in place to make our coaches more accountable for their student athlete's academic success.

4  Increased size of staff.

5  Academic staff has grown; new academic programming; academic staff has built better relations across campus to help student-athletes.

6  Unsure

7  At a small school - there have not been the necessary changes -250 athletes - 1.5 academic people. Not enough!

8  We do not provide academic support beyond what is available to all students at our school.

9  Higher Graduation Rate

10  Hired more staff and received SSF

11  Men's basketball has an academic mentor who directly monitors their academic progress

12  Our Associate Athletic Director for compliance handles all APR data, and her opinion would more appropriately articulate the intricacies of our APR.
Will add two academic services employees if funding is approved through university in tough budget time.

We were already doing significant work with these 2 sports.

We are not only addressing FB and MBB in our changes. We have added a learning specialist type position since implementation. We have a contract for mental health evaluations as well as psychoeducational evaluations, which were not in place before APR (or my time in the dept). These are two extremely important additions to our services and are available to all SA's through our internal referral system. The result, we feel has helped to maintain good APR outcomes in addition to retaining eligible SA's both on and not on scholarship. The APR appears to have more coaches paying attention to academic reforms and maybe even their own head coaches APR. We are communicating better and I believe coaches are taking a more "critical" look at SA's they recruit. With athletic success of the teams though, this could be a precarious position as they may want to take more risk to get a higher caliber SA who may not be as academically prepared, because they can now get them to look at the institution. With this then, our program would need understanding and more resources (people and money) from the institution to meet the needs.

Due to our participation in an Academic Improvement Plan, we were able to identify specific departmental needs including personnel, programs, and resources that we needed. As a result, our ability to offer support has improved significantly.

We have the mentor specifically for men's basketball. We also have a second full time Academic Advisor.

Higher awareness of retention and eligibility issues.

Additional staff.

Able to hire one more academic professional.

The coaches are more in tune and willing to help. I also believe they understand the issue they can arise if the APR scores doesn't rise.

N/A.

Student-athletes are more aware of eligibility requirements because of the pressures of APR compliance. There is more academic success being achieved by student-athletes.

The football and men's basketball coaching staff are attempting to recruit better students to our university.
We are attentive to the academic circumstances and needs of our men's basketball student-athletes, but not more so than our other student-athletes.

Accountability for higher aid, to insure graduation within 4 to 5 years.

A generally higher level of awareness that has created more of a sense of urgency in our academic support program.

Summer School attendance has decreased the number of classes in which the basketball student-athletes must be enrolled in during the regular fall and spring semesters.

No changes

Obviously, It has forced many institutions to add staff.

In 2003, we implemented a program with a focus on individual student support especially for struggling student-athletes.

None

Not applicable. Student-athletes receive same academic support as general students.

Communication has increased.

Higher Team GPA's and higher graduation rates.

No impact.

More academic support such as tutoring.

We have better SA on our campus

There has been no need to make significant changes.

Accountability from the coaching staff in regards to academic support. It has helped them become aware of the academic standards because the APR does affect them.

The positive impact has been the 1000 MBB had for 10-11

N/A

Graduation rates are increasing annually
Again more staff has been hired

Coaches more accountable

Yes. Men's Basketball has had a 1000 APR score each of the last two years. Football had their highest overall GPA in school history last term.

Upgraded academic advising and academic support staff. Hired a full time academic certifying officer. Overall more resources devoted to academic progress and achievement.

It just helps reinforce our continued emphasis on recruiting and retaining SA's that fit our mission.

The overall GPA of our teams have steadily increased due to the recruitment of academically strong students and the enforcement of APR.

Awareness strength

The majority of the students seem to be students.

More frequent checks on student-athletes performance and tutoring

None.

More money placed in the academic support area.

With the new policy changes hopefully this will make an impact later on down the road

The type of student-athlete we have been recruiting for the past couple of years has continued to get better each year.

We have increased our academic support staff which benefits all of our programs, not just MBB.

N/A

No change as a result of APR 'pressures'

We have added staff and developed better programming.

Our scores increased.

Hired more staff and changed some responsibilities to monitor eligibility better.
The academic area has increased their efforts across all programs due to the APR, not just men's basketball.

Paying attention to how it is affecting all the teams at the university.

Academic Advisor and Learning specialist hired to assist Basketball teams alone.

Scores have improved.

It does seem to hold coaches/programs accountable for academic success.

More support for summer school.

We monitor academic progress much more closely.

No positive or negative effect. Added responsibility for office staff but expectations for student-athletes has not changed.

Absolutely - there are improvements that could be made, but APR holds teams accountable

None.

More awareness...but no real changes

Student-athletes are transferring less and graduating more.

Greater awareness and involvement of coaches and student athletes regarding academic goals APR compliance

We were able to hire a full time learning specialist. Budget for tutoring has increased.

Overall APR has caused Athletics to be more intensive with respect to academics, e.g. improved study hall, academic intervention, the hiring of more academic support staff.

Not an issue

Increase in tutors as well as graduate assistants in academic office. The required study hours has increased for all sports as a result of APR. Acquisition
of GradesFirst software, a student-athlete retention software

Retention

Men's basketball is projected to have 1000 APR for the year. Football will have to go under a plan as their scores have dropped again.

We support the concept of APR and setting high standards.

I am not certain that is has changed anything. We expect our basketball players to graduate and they typically do--though some with a lot of work. We would be doing the same things with or without the APR, which I do not think measures any kind of real success.

We have put more financial resources into our Academic Services.

More staff is involved in the monitoring of the academic success of men's basketball.

No sure there really have been any positive changes. I see more athletes being directed to easy degree fields for eligibility reasons, then when students REALLY CHOOSE the degree area they wanted to pursue. I don’t see how this is a good thing.

Academic Services for Athletes had a working group look at a major report and came up with a plan to work specifically target "at risk" students and identify how we can work with them more closely to ensure a positive academic outcome for them. It was determined that 1st generation college students and low income were big targets and we are working to more closely work with them. FB and MBB players do have SA's in these categories.

None

We now have an athletic advising office that closely monitors the progress of our student athletes and provides tutoring and assistance as needed.

We have added additional staff members. In addition, coaches have now started to require Study Hall for all student athletes.

Not yet.

The type of student-athlete the program recruits is academically stronger.

Good way to monitor academic performance of recruited student-athletes

We use a better screening process to make sure the prospective-student
athlete will have an interest in graduating.

No changes

As previously stated, we have had a significant increase in student-athletes returning to graduate.

A focus on recruitment and who the coaches are recruiting is the biggest factor.

Both sports have their own academic counselors. The Men's Basketball advisor was hired last year and the Football advisor was hired this summer.

We added a football specific academic advisor.

Coaches take more initiative to monitor academic success and catch deficiencies earlier. Now that they have a report card that travels with them it is even better. They also don't try to skirt the 20 HR rule, as it hurts them in the long run. We have also seen a decrease in the departure time for away competition.

None

The Department of Athletics and the University has committed more resources to assist S/A's with academic activities, coaches have learned to commit more time to the academic lives of their S/A's through implementing academic action plans, the university community is more actively involved in the execution of the academic improvement plan, there is now campus wide academic and compliance rules education, and president is committed to the academic success of all student-athletes.

No changes

More staff members

Our academic support staff has doubled.

Coaches care more about their academic progress.

Has made it easier for us to make the case for additional personnel in academic support and compliance

There are fewer student-athletes that "milk" the system by taking easy classes that will not lead to a college degree.

More attention and visibility to the culture of men's basketball overall (e.g., media rights, practice and competition schedules)
More oversight from the academic support staff has benefitted all student athletes, not just in these sports. With the increased focus on academic progress stemming from the APR, all coaches and administrators are aware of the importance of eligibility and retention and strive to improve the student athlete experience accordingly.

Our academic staff has increased from two fulltime to six fulltime to help with the workload. We have credibility with the entire athletic department.

Hiring a full time employee to handle Men's Basketball. Meeting with the coaching staff once a week to inform him of the players' academic standing.

Just more general awareness of each student-athlete's particular journey from recruitment to graduation (and/or transfer).

Adding a part-time academic adviser who deals just with men's basketball and women's volleyball.

We did get to add another position to the academic support office.

Many, we have been able to expand staff and resources over the past few years with the addition of staff focusing on Life Skills coordination with the Freshman, Tutors for writing, math and those courses that we have students struggling in each semester. We have become more flexible in that we can adapt to our student's needs more easily.

APR committee, Scholarship committee, Recruitment of players who can strive academically

Coaches are aware of APR and want to maintain a good APR. I would say in the way transfers are treated is a positive change.

None

They stay on the kids that are leaving...that's the only thing I can think of

Virtually none due to extreme financial constraints.

See above.

Great resources for Academic Services and bring better students into our institution

Constantly review program and identify those who are first generation college students. Between faculty, athletic staff, and coaches continue to engage those student-athletes.
Not directly as a result of APR, but the enhanced Division I academic standards (vs. the DII standards we were previously under) and need for strong advising/support has led to more/better student-athlete study space in our Academic Commons. Also, I believe our relationships and connections with key areas of campus (Campus administration; faculty (in most cases); advising; Registrars office, etc) have been enhanced due to the need for campus support of the progress of our student-athletes.

Maybe the high schools and the AAU programs will get the message to be academic prepared for college work

Recruiting guidelines, Better assistance for 5th year student athletes, Study Hall procedures and academic processes in conjunction with on campus services, Working with Multicultural Office to better assist diverse students on campus

Both our football and men's basketball APR scores are much improved.

No changes made as a result of APR.

We have acquired more study hall space and course-specific study labs have been created to help with problem areas.

Coaches at least get the concept that if they are going to push a kid out, it would help if he has a 2.6 GPA.

Men's basketball team GPAs have improved to above a 3.0 cumulative. Due to summer school, all are on track for 4 year graduation and 2 are on track to graduate in 3 years. Last year, the team earned 100% APR.

None

Higher on eligibility rates, especially during off-season semesters.

The University has invested in us for academic purposes. Further, a culture change has ensued with the changes.

We have 2 academic advisors for athletes that monitor the progress of athletes on a daily basis. Athletes have weekly meetings if they are at risk to ensure completion of homework and to go over grades on exams. Tutor sessions are easily available.

More study hall; tutoring. More funding for academics.

We make sure that our student-athletes file paperwork to graduate in a timely manner, file waivers and track where they went to more closely than we did pre-
APR.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Text</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>It no longer a sink or swim attitude that is being shared with student athletes. If they are recruited and accepted into our institution, then we have the responsibility to assist these student athletes in being successful. Better tracking of student athletes study hours is now the norm. Additional workshops, guest speakers, and presentations are done to assist the student athlete on their academic journey. For high risk student athletes, more contact with mentors and faculty is now the norm. In my opinion, more dollars are now being committed to academic support than before and we now have a better relationship with the academic side of the institution. Proof of this is my position which is new and was created to address certification and APR issues we had.</td>
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<tr>
<td>142</td>
<td>See Above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>Increased graduation as MBB typically do not have strong financial opportunity to continue playing after college</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144</td>
<td>We now have a Athletic Department policy that mandates tutors in every class for all student athletes who are brought in under special exception. In other words, if a kid is not regularly admissible to the institution, the coach must request admission through a lengthy &quot;special admit&quot; process. Any kid who gains admission this way must have tutors provided to him/her until he/she demonstrates he/she no longer needs the tutor. The coach must pay for the tutor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>145</td>
<td>More involvement with coaches in academics, more support for academic services personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>146</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147</td>
<td>The addition of a staff person in the academic advising office has been created.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148</td>
<td>I have always had great support from the men's bball program in regards to academics. Our APR has always been good since I've been here.</td>
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<tr>
<td>149</td>
<td>We have tried to identify academic issues and potential retention issues earlier so they can be addressed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>None.</td>
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<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>More financial support</td>
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<td>152</td>
<td>There is more focus on academics.</td>
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<tr>
<td>153</td>
<td>Higher quality recruits academically.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
We have always had outstanding academic support systems in place (prior to APR).

More Coaches involvement

More focus on tutoring rather than study halls.

More awareness by coaching staffs.

N/A

None at our institution.

APR has not impacted academic support for football or men's basketball.

It has brought an increased awareness of the importance of academic achievement and retention, but we are still constrained by the resources we have. Our department is also very conscious of "fairness" and tries not to treat our teams differently. This includes providing men's-basketball-specific services, although the advisor who works with the men's basketball team spends approximately 80% of his time on men's basketball and 20% of his time on the other sports he works with.

I think there is an expectation for higher GPAs. The coaching staffs have engaged in checking class attendance. Basketball received the benefit of PSAs and continuing SAs attending summer school each year--this has significantly helped with PTD.

We have always monitored incoming PSAs and current student-athletes academic capabilities and progress, but APR has put a quantifiable standard in place for that evaluation.

NA

We now have a nice new academic center with a study hall area.

We have added an academic person specifically for basketball in part because we were recruiting athletes that needed some extra support

We are a low resource DI institution. No doubt getting the best "bang for our buck" is a constant challenge especially in these difficult times, but overall we will have the highest APR total that this institution has seen since its inception. So we know we are moving in the right direction.

Men's Basketball hired an Academic Advisor to ensure that TSU educate and
graduate our students athletes

169 The retention aspect has helped reduce the likelihood of a coach "running off" a player to make room for an incoming athlete.

170 A new position

171 Extra money for summer school

172 Coaches with multiyear scores below (2 or more) the standard appear to feel that there is a relationship with performance on the field/court and off that can have a direct impact on tenure for the S-A. Coaches are more open to, and in tuned to info related to student-athlete fully participating in their own academic development rather than making it someone else's responsibility.

173 Football and Men's Basketball hold individual team study halls for their student athletes and Academic Services continue to provide their services at the venue of the coaches' choice.

174 More research on the student athlete before we bring athlete to our university.

175 The coaches are usually very good with utilizing academic support.

176 The Academic Services unit has been more strategic with study measures; i.e. location, time and duration. They have also taken on the responsibility of traveling with Men's Basketball when out for an extended time period.

177 None

178 None - We have had no increase of funding for academic support to fulfill any of the objectives, goals and outcomes of APR compliance.

179 We are able to act proactively in order to provide necessary services/interventions before a problem materializes

180 Full-time academic guy for basketball

181 Recruiting a more academic prepared student athlete and more concern with getting those graduation points

182 We already were receiving academic awards, so APR did not improve academic performance

183 The biggest thing would be that we have a new basketball coaching staff that has placed more emphasis on academics
After several years of bare-bones funding, there are now moves to make our academic services more robust (staffing and facility improvement).

The coaches spend more time in the recruiting phase. No more last minute signees.

Increased focus on academic success

Unknown

N/A

It has helped in some ways as we have had to add staff in the academic support areas for two reasons. One is the keep up and track correctly APR and the other is to assist with at risk students but we are still very low staffed, only 3 full time staff, to monitor all of this time and effort to keep athletes eligible and on track for graduation.

See #9

Have not seen any changes in this area.

From Presidents on down, no one wants to be below the measurement line as it relates to the APR. That helps in getting the university community to realize this isn't just an athletic issue, but an institutional issue.

Again, none.

A better quality of student is coming in. The minimum test scores are designed to keep students out of remedial classes. As a personal belief, Students-athletes that do not work hard in one aspect of their life (job, academics, etc) are not going to work to their potential on the court as well. A lackadaisical person often is incapable of compartmentalizing that attitude for what they see fit.

Support for summer schooling, to ensure that students graduate.

More emphasis on finding student-athletes who are the right fit academically.

There has been progress made but progress is still needed in order to fully address current issues.

All positive for the student-athletes

None.

Additional monitoring
We have been able to add more Academic Advisors. Still need some help with tutors.

We have grown in staff numbers to try and accommodate the student-athletes need for help.

Again, football and men's basketball have not really been affected by APR. Our student-athletes carry a very high overall GPA and both of these teams' GPAs are very good.

APR is a noble effort, but right now many (focusing on a macro-scale, not specific to my programs per say) are focused just on the end goal of getting the right APR or GPA and not focusing on right behaviors and attitudes towards academic performance of lower achieving sports.

Scores have increased and both sports currently sit between 935-940.

Hopefully increasing our level of s/a graduation

Added a staff person in office of academic support of SAs

Constant interaction throughout the semester b/t Student-athlete services & student-athletes

See above

APR compliance has not pressured our academic support unit to make any changes either positive or negative.

Focus more on the academic success of the prospective student-athlete through evaluating their transcripts. Also, take full advantage of the contact period and official visit process for retention.

None

Added an additional academic advisor position.

Higher overall team GPA.

None. APR simply has not been an issue for us, although I fully support the concept.

We have added to academic support staff-an assistant, an additional GA, several mentors, expanded tutoring program

Our graduation rate for football has improved tremendously - men's basketball
has typically been good, and continues to be good. Last year our football team also recorded the biggest turnaround in APR in our conference.

218 None.

219 See answer to question #8.

220 More accountability and attention to academics for their teams by the head coaches.

221 Careful evaluation of PSA’s, additional monitoring of academic progress of all student-athletes, elimination of most high risk PSAs, quarterly meetings with University Administration on student-athlete academic progress, enhanced academic support services and additional academic advisors/ student development specialists.

222 The university has put more resources into the academic areas in athletics. Also, we are slowing changing the culture to a more academic one.

223 Better student athletes

224 New academic support staff and new staff.

225 Additional tutors and study hall usage.

226 More funding for tutorial and other support services. More funding for summer school and to possibly bring in freshman for summer school prior to their first fall semester.

227 We have beefed up our academic support staff in recent years, which has helped.

228 Better academic preparation, coaches work harder with student-athletes to monitor progress, not so eager to make students transfer.

229 With the Summer Start Program Requirement in place the prospects get adjusted earlier to the academic rigors of the institution before fall quarter/semester starts. The results academically have proven that this program is a big help to new student-athletes.

230 More communication between coaches/academic and compliance office on PSA’s. We have also increased our compliance and academic staff by 1.5 people.

231 We have no academic support under the athletics department.
The positive changes have all come about as a transition from NAIA to Div. I.

I believe it has trickled down to the high school level. PSA's understand the importance that ALL coaches, even at smaller schools, have to recruit an athlete who is committed academically.

We have developed a class withdrawal policy that disallows our student-athletes to drop classes prior to the withdrawal deadline unless the student-athlete can show they have exhausted all academic resources possible such as, "meeting with their respective instructors, attending regularly scheduled study hall, signing up for tutorial support, going to class - first and foremost." I will meet with students individual to map out a plan of attack for the remaining semester to determine whether a drop is warranted, but not before the day of the deadline. That way it ensures the students will "fight" for every opportunity to perform and not just simply drop a class at the first sign of obstacles. It has worked wonders for our football team in terms of matching attempted credits with earned credits by semester's end.

None significant.

APR results have not impacted the academic support provided for football and/or men's basketball

APR numbers are up in some sports.

Academic staff has increased from 1 person to 2 full-time and 2 interns, coaches have become more involved in class checking and the academic outcomes of their student-athletes.

None. While our academic support program has grown, it has been more about recruiting and not the APR.

More staff hired in the Study Center using the APR as the rationale

N/A

None

We are seeing improvements in many areas but the restraints are frustrating to the coaches. We have really had ramp up our academic support which is straining for a small staff.

As it was necessary to employ an outstanding Academic Specialist (Ph.D.) to assist the Basketball program, all the teams have been able to utilize the skills, workshops, tutoring, etc.
Better student-athletes

More pressure has been placed on coaches to focus on academics and academics have now been placed in the coaches annual contract

At our school, very few changes at all. A few years ago, however, we did add an academic advisor devoted solely to football. We did this not because we were under any APR pressures. Instead, we were bringing in a larger number of players with lower test scores. These players need more academic assistance.

Forced coaches and others to see that student athletes succeed as students; go to class, maintain a 2.0 etc.

We have created new programs to help, not sure if this is positive however. Requires you to still watch over student-athletes to the point that they don't learn how to handle situations on their own. We are constantly asking for when assignments are due and verifying they are getting done.

Coaches make a more concerted effort to academically support a student

The hiring of another academic adviser whose primary concern is men's basketball.

No impact.

No change

No specific changes, MBB student-athletes are treated the same way as all our SAs, and all receive academic support services.

We were able to add an additional staff member.

Better and tighter coordination between coaching and academic staff.

Graduation rates up, retention rates up, coaches are more concerned with academic issues, has been very positive here.

For men's basketball, an increase in study hall hours required for each athlete and weekly meetings with their academic advisor.

Coaches are more aware of the negative effects associated with having a low APR
APPENDIX K

OPEN ENDED RESPONSES FOR RESEARCH QUESTION #5

RQ5: Where is your athletic department spending their net profit (if applicable), and is a portion or all of the net profit being put back into academic support services for football and/or men’s basketball programs?

1   N/A
2   N/A
3   Unfortunately, most of our net goes toward travel for our 18 sports and salaries. We rely heavily on the services our university offers to students for academic services and needs.
4   What profit?
5   No net profit.
6   Unsure
7   There is no net profit at a small 1-A non football school. Trying to rub to nickels together.
8   Facility renewal
9   N/A
10  No profit
11  N/A
12  No net profit received.
13  N/A
14  No net profit, but we invest heavily in academic support services and have recently added several new positions
We do not report to the athletic department so get no funds from it...but I do know that they do not have a net profit! The athl. dept. does commit a small portion of the NCAA Opportunity fund for the contract for our mental health professional.

N/A

N/A for net profit, as far as I know.

NA

No net profit

NA

I believe it is being put into the academic support area.

N/A

N/A

Academic support is a priority for all of our teams, not specifically just for men's basketball, although again, we are cognizant of the needs of student-athletes whose academic performance is below average. We assist all student-athletes in that category equally.

N/A

We provide our academic support services area the resources they feel are necessary to handle the needs of our student-athlete population. Our investment in that area has grown steadily over the past ten years or so.

N/A

NA

No profit.

NA

NA

Not applicable.
34  N/A
35  None that I am aware of.
36  No profit.
37  No
38  N/A
39  We do not target spending for academic support solely for football or men's basketball.
40  I don't believe so. However, I have never been turned down in regards money for academic support - tutors, academic evaluations...ect.
41  I don't think this applies to our institution
42  Unknown
43  NA
44  Both programs
45  Not applicable
46  Facilities are the priority.
47  Athletic program does not run a net profit but is supported generously by university general funds.
48  There is no net profit in athletics at the IAAA level. Academic support is always a high priority in the budget allocation process. One spending area that is extremely costly is summer school. This is always an area of concern and properly funding this can certainly have an impact on APR.
49  I am not sure.
50  Yes
51  Do not know
52  We do not have a net profit but still we put the resources where they are needed
53  None.
Yes, a portion of the profits are given to each department and program.

Our athletic program does not garner a net profit. However, resources have been increased for academic support of all student-athletes over the past 10 years.

We don't have a net profit, but we employee three full time people in academic services.

Not sure.

Don't know

We are spending more resources on summer schools and academic enhancement.

No net profit from athletics.

We are spending more resources on summer schools and academic enhancement.

Department operates at a loss.

Not applicable

We do not have any net profit. We invest approximately $75,000 in academic support for student-athletes which is implemented through our campus office for academic support.

No
We are renovating our academic support building for student-athletes as well as discussing adding more personnel to monitor the S-A.

I think that is hard to specify as our Academic Support Service must work with all of our athletic programs at the same time, but I would guess somewhere between 20 and 30 %

N/A - we function outside the Athletic Department.

No net profit.

We do not generate a profit.

NA

Yes

We do not make a profit. All additional fund focus goes to scholarships.

We have added an Asst AD for Academics and a new building to support academics for all programs.

We have no net profits. However, any new monies are invested in areas which either 1 - help students graduate or 2 - help generate additional revenues.

We have limited resources so there is no real net profit. The school supports as it can and generally gives us what we need.

We are not profitable.

? 

There is no NET PROFIT.

Even though our Academic Services for Student-Athletes area is not under Athletics, we have had to pay salaries for some of their staff (with the economic constraints the University is in). We are having to pay for the tutoring costs for our SA's this year as well.

N/A

NA

We have added two staff members for Academic Support Services and plan to add another.
Not sure, but it doesn't seem likely. We currently only have two staff members working with over 400 student-athletes.

N/A

No net profit

Additional scholarships and academic support.

Not sure. Our academic support services are funded from an University allocation.

N/A

We do not have a net profit but we do have a budget for academic support services.

NA

Team travel, scholarships, and personnel.

No net profit. However, as a new D1 institution, we comprehend the importance of investing in this key area and have increased resources accordingly (elevated our 3/4 athletic academic advisor to full-time a year ago and just added a similar second full-time position).

The Department of Athletics now allocates funds for the support of academics in the following ways: use of guaranteed game revenue to fund summer on a limited basis (tuition and fees only for 6 hours per S/A); the university provides 5th year degree completion funding for tuition and fees only; and the department has committed to expanding the academic support staff by funding 2 GA's to assist 2 full time staff.

No profit

I have no knowledge of how the money is spent

We do not generate a profit.

We don't have a net profit, but we spend money as needed for academic support services for football and men's basketball.

No net profit

I don't know.
Not the best to answer, perception is that revenue is supporting all of athletics but not necessarily on true academic support services

N/A

Additional academic support has been given to men's basketball and football but has also been shared with other teams.

No net profit.

NA

Don't know

N/A

Unsure.

N/A

No profit...

None. Our academic support program is outside of the athletic department.

We do not have a net profit. It would be nice to see bonuses given to academic advisors for APR stuff. :)

We operate at a significant loss in terms of needing about 75% of our support from the University. Hence, any so-called profits are just used to 'pay the bills'.

We NEVER make a profit, but we did get additional support 3 years ago and we also use the bulk of our NCAA academic enhancement and a lot of our SAO fund in areas that influence APR---summer and 5th year scholarships, intensified tutoring and mentoring program, etc.

No net profits

N/A

We do not have a net profit as an athletic department. We utilize campus financial support to meet our budget demands. We do all we can to support our student-athlete academically and athletically, but do not have the benefit of net profit directly from athletic revenues.
127  N/A
128  Academic support for sure
129  Not sure.
130  N/A
131  I don't know if this is applicable to us, but if it is I couldn't answer that question.
132  Net profit? Nope, not in our world.
133  Our spending comes from a variety of resources including campus quality fees, special NCAA grant assistance, and university support. We are considered a low resource school.
134  No net profit
135  Facilities and No!
136  A significant amount is being put back into academic support, although our funding for such is very limited.
137  N/A
138  N/A
139  Not applicable.
140  Sorry but I do not have any factual information to really address this question accurately. If however you are interested in my opinion on the question, then I would say a larger % is going to facility upgrade and development because that is the biggest negative in our recruitment process shared by potential recruits we lose. An increase but still smaller % is flowing into academic support service but not nearly enough.
141  N/A
142  Profit? Who makes profit in this game? We are not a BCS school :) Our Athletic Department, along with Academic Affairs, purchased the program "Grades First" which really helps us track student success. It is the best investment we have made in my five years here.
143  N/A
Unsure
Not applicable.
No idea where the money is going but it certainly hasn't come my way.
We do not have a net profit.
All revenue is returned to the institution for general operations of the college.
What net profit?
Yes
Don't know.
N/A
NA
Not specifically to football or mbb. We have added an additional staff member in our academic support unit.
N/A
N/A
Not applicable
There is no net profit.
Not applicable.
Our department runs a deficit. We spend NCAA academic enhancement monies on tutoring and academic services for all of our sports--we do not single out specific sports.
N/A
Don't know!
We don't net a profit.
The are no net profits here. In fact we have been running deficits every year.
NA
We do not net a profit.

I am not privy to that information.

There is no profit, and no portions of new monies are coming into academic support services for athletes other than grants from the NCAA.

Zero. Any money received to support Football and Men's Basketball Academic Services have been granted to the institution from the NCAA's Supplemental Support Fund and the Low Resource Institution grant. With the exception of full time staff salaries, all academic support money is provided by grants through the NCAA.

We do not have any profits.

Not sure.

NA

No profit

No specific revenue or funding is being expended for academic support specific to men's basketball.

I am not certain; everything related to budget appears to be tight, but academic support services is "getting by".

No profit but no money is being redirected to academics because of APR concerns.

No

N/A

N/A

We have no net profit.

Net profit is N/A; however, we have increased funding in academic support and compliance, rules education.

There are no net profits.

Unknown
No profits here!

We have no net profit in our athletic program.

N/A

This is not applicable for our institution.

As a FCS school, I am sorry to say we don't have a net profit. That said, we continue to invest the dollars we receive from the University as well as what we self generate so that we can make the greatest possible impact on academic success of our student athletes.

"Profit" in the strict financial sense is not attainable in the near future.

NA

N/A

No net profit

Academic support services have been increased in order to address the overarching concern of academic progress and academic success.

N/A

No profit.

N/A

We do not have a "net profit". We are using the NCAA Academic money to help with support services.

We have seen an increase in need by the student-athletes and we have increased our staff by two graduate assistants. Our department has grown because of the need and rules and we will need to continue that growth as more rules and regulations are implemented.

N/A - question for administration

NA

No net profit.

N/A
Athletic Division spending net profit on the entire athletics program, including academic services.

I don't know anything about profit but all of our student-athletes have the same support services and resources available to them regardless of athletic team.

We have created a position for men's basketball through outside funding to help with academics and retention of the student-athletes.

No net profit.

No net profit at all. We've really not had to change the amount of academic support we provide.

Putting some additional $ in academic support to increase success rate

At this time, a portion of the profit is not being put back into academics specifically for football or men's basketball. Academics has a $15,000 which includes expenses mainly for CHAMPS/Life Skills and academic support such as the purchase of planners and GradesFirst. However, the administration knows the importance of academics, and would find money if money were needed. For example, two years ago, as a result of the stress of APR, the administration paid for (and continues to pay annually) an academic graduate assistant.

The department has no "net profit"; however, additional funding resources have been placed into our athletic academic services for use by all of our student athletes.

A primary focus of our athletics budget is on academic support services

We don't have a lot of net profit. However, it is being put into hiring more advisors and summer school funding increases.

The budgeting is spread throughout - including academic support.

Not applicable.

No net profit. The institution provides multiple resources to address remediation needs.
220  N/A

221  We aren't profitable.

222  Only 19 or 20 schools in the country turn a profit. We are not one of them.

223  The cost for academic support programs is funded mainly by the NCAA ACADEMIC ENHANCEMENT FUND. The M/W Basketball program will fund raises to pay for incoming prospects to attend the Summer Start Program.

224  Our academic support services is inclusive of all student athletes, not just football and basketball. We do not have a counselor specific to these sports, though they are held to a higher scrutiny than the other sports, and more time is spent working with them.

225  All revenues fund our operating budgets and there are no significant reserves.

226  N/A

227  NA

228  No funds are being provided to our academic support services program. We utilize the funding provided by the NCAA Academic Enhancement Fund to support our program. While it is not much in comparison to what an athletic department with a large budget can provide; if used in the manner for which it has been distributed by the NCAA, $66,000 or so can go a long way in terms of providing academic support. It forces me to be creative with how I use funds and how many volunteer opportunities I can create to provide additional assistance for our student-athletes who struggle academically.

229  N/A

230  Not much profit from football and basketball. Our challenge is that our Student Academic Services does not report through the Athletics Department. There is no funding or direct evaluation of Academic Services employees. Academic Student Services is funded by and responsible to the Provost's office. Therefore, Athletics Department has minimal influence in that area.

231  The department is using the NCAA's supplemental support fund to augment programs associated with academics specifically to help increase APR across all sports. Overall net profits go into each sport budgets for recruiting or team travel.

232  No profit.

233  Facilities upgrades across all athletic venues and services
235 Any additional monies are put into women's and men's basketball programs. None has been added to academic support.

236 We do not make a net profit. And when we do we are not currently putting it towards academic support for those two teams. We have had to rely on University approved funding to support our new academic initiatives that have stemmed from APR.

237 That is a difficult question to answer. Student-Athlete Services comes under the Division of Academic Affairs, not Athletics. Thus, Academic Affairs has always funded this program at a much higher level than Athletics. It is my understanding that we do not have any net profit.

238 N/A at this level

239 More monies have gone back into the academic support program. Over the last two years we have hired 2 full-time individuals and now have 2 interns.

240 No net profit.

241 Yes it is.

242 Not applicable

243 We are adding an additional position in academic support. Also it erased the tutoring budget.

244 Not applicable

245 The success of our men's basketball program helps to fund all of our men's/women's programs.

246 No profit. Any proceeds from postseason play did not accrue to the university, rather, accrued to the conference office.

247 N/A

248 N/A

249 NA

250 N/A
No net profit to spend

All profit is spent on athletics. Profit also funds APR efforts

Not sure, but academic support services are a major plus for each athlete.

Net profits are not being put into Academics.