THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT ON DEMOCRACY:
IDENTIFYING THE REVERSED CAUSATION OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE

by

DONGSOO KIM

(Under the Direction of Jaroslav Tir)

ABSTRACT

The relationship between regime type and international conflict has been one of the most prolific research topics in contemporary scholarship of international relations (IR). The research has mainly focused on uncovering the pacifying effect of democracy, which is commonly called democratic peace. However, the reversed thesis of democratic peace, that is, the argument that peace causes democracy rather than vice versa, has been given far less attention despite the monumental implications the theory holds for both theory and policy. In this context, this study aims to examine whether or not, and to what extent, peace causes democracy, or conversely, international conflict undermines democracy.

This study purports to demonstrate that, under some conditions, international conflict is likely to have a negative influence on democracy and/or democratic development, arguing that the existing research fails to appropriately specify the conditions under which international conflict has significant influence on democracy. Furthermore, the purpose of the study is to examine the hypothesis that power plays a crucial role as an intervening variable in democratic development because the perception of external threat caused by international conflict is mediated by the power statuses of the states involved.
When it comes to empirical analyses, this study employs both statistical and case study methodologies with the aim of enhancing the purview of the analysis. The statistical analyses find: 1) perceived external threat has a negative impact on democracy; 2) involvement in international conflict has negative influence on democracy-particularly for weak and less democratic states; and 3) national defensive power is positively associated with democracy. The findings of the statistical analyses are strengthened by the case study in which the democratization of South Korea is investigated. The examination of the case of South Korea’s democratization shows: 1) the Korean War undermined the democratic development of South Korea by way of intensifying external threat perception among the South Korean people; and 2) South Korea was finally democratized only after it was freed from external threat posed by the North with its improved economic and military capability.

From the theoretical standpoint, the current study proposes that research related to democratic peace is incomplete until it takes reversed causation into consideration. This study also suggests that international relations and comparative politics, which have been treated as separate research areas, can be understood as having an important common ground within the study of political science. Specifically, this study suggests that variables related to international security have a significant impact on domestic political processes such as democracy and/or democratization. In this sense, this study supports the “second image reversed” thesis. From a practical standpoint, this study implies that the current U.S. foreign policy centering on “proliferation of democracy” should be brought into question due to the potential side effects that coercive methodologies of democratization may cause for some states.

INDEX WORDS: international conflict, democracy, democratization, external threat, power, South Korea, democratic peace, second image reversed
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by

DONGSOO KIM
B.A., YONSEI UNIVERSITY, SOUTH KOREA, 1995
M.A., YONSEI UNIVERSITY, SOUTH KOREA, 1997

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by

DONGSOO KIM

Major Professor:       Jaroslav Tir
Committee:              Han S. Park
                        Damon Cann
                        Douglas Stinnett

Electronic Version Approved:

Maureen Grasso
Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
December 2008
DEDICATION

For my wife,
Sunjung,
and my parents,
Yun-doh Kim and Mae-ja Lee
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Democratic Peace and Its Reversed Causation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Research Questions Guiding the Study</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Review of Previous Research</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Explaining the Negative Impact of International Conflict on Democracy</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Why Study the Impact of International Conflict on Democracy?: Implications of the Study</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 Organization of Dissertation</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 War Making/State Making Argument</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Rally ‘Round the Flag Effect</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 A Modified Model: Combining War Making/State Making, Rally Effect, and Power</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Hypotheses</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>METHODOLOGY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Spatial-Temporal Domains and Unit of Analysis</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Variables, Measurements, and Data</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Democratic Peace and Its Reversed Causation

In his 1994 State of the Union Address President Clinton declared that spreading democracy around the globe would be the best way to guarantee the American security, stating:

...........Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each other. They make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy. That is why we supported, you and I, the democratic reformers in Russia and in the other states of the former Soviet block.¹

As Anthony Lake, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, points out, the containment doctrine of the Cold war was replaced by the enlargement of the world’s democracies as a foreign policy goal (Lake 1993). Indeed, “spreading democracy” has been one of the primary goals of American foreign policy not only during the Clinton administration but also for the succeeding governments of the U.S. It is commonly agreed that the current “proliferation of democracy”-centered foreign policy is based on the democratic peace idea,

which addresses the relationship between regime type and international conflict behavior of states.

The relationship between regime type and international conflict has been one of the most prolific research topics in contemporary scholarship of international relations (IR). The research has mainly focused on uncovering the pacifying effect of democracy. The most tangible fruit of this vast body of research is democratic peace theory, which posits that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war against each other. As Levy (1988) puts it, the democratic peace proposition is often evaluated as having acquired law-like status, which has hardly been observed in IR scholarship. In essence, the democratic peace thesis refers generally to the pacifying effect of democracy\(^2\). And thus the research interest in democratic peace is not limited to the analyses only in terms of the relationship between democracies, so called, the dyadic level, but expanded to the studies at the national level even though its empirical evidence is much weaker than that of dyadic analyses. The recent view of democratic peace maintains that democracies are in general more peaceful than non-democracies not just in their relationship with other democracies.

Although the peaceful effect of democracy has been one of the most enthusiastic research topics in contemporary IR scholarship, whether dyadic or monadic, some doubts still remain as to whether the observed empirical regularity is solely the result of the pacifying effect of democracy (Farber and Gowa 1995; 1997; Rosato 2003). One of the several counterarguments to the democratic peace thesis is that the causal arrow is reversed (Layne 1994; Gates et al. 1996; Chan 1997). Unlike the enormous efforts devoted to the democratic peace research program, studies on the reversed causality have been given far less attention by students of IR. Yet the

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\(^2\)To some scholars democratic peace may refer only to the peaceful relationship between democracies at the dyadic level. However, it is increasingly acknowledged that democratic peace refers to the peaceful effect of democracy in general, whether it is at the dyadic level or monadic level. And as such, it will be treated in this study.
limited attention to the research is surprising, and even undesirable, especially when considering the potential policy implications of the democratic peace thesis.

Advocates of reversed causation hold that peace causes democracy. From this perspective, the exploration of the causal relationship between peace and democracy is not complete until reversed causality, that is, the influence of international conflict on democracy, is taken into consideration. This point brings serious implications for the democratic peace thesis because the verification of the reverse causal relationship suggests that the influence of regime type on international conflict is often spurious or exaggerated.

In this context, this dissertation aims to unveil the impact of international peace or conversely international conflict on democracy and to then appropriately specify its model. Indeed, as will be shown in the following sections, the past research has been far from conclusive, showing many limitations to both the empirical and theoretical understanding of this issue. Some researchers argue that international conflict exerts negative influence on democracy because the states that are more likely to be involved in international conflict tend to adopt autocratic governmental structures for the purpose of making resource mobilization more convenient. By contrast, others claim that war is likely to eventually usher in democracy because war preparation and military mobilization ultimately lead to economic development.

The current research will demonstrate that the existing studies are limited by their failure to specify the conditions under which international conflict has significant influence on democracy. It will also present an argument that international conflict, under some conditions, is likely to have a negative influence on democracy and/or democratic development. This study will explore the crucial role that national power plays as an intervening variable in international conflict and democratic development. Indeed, a case is made that there is a significant difference
strong states and weak states in the level of perceived external threat caused by involvement in international conflict.

Therefore, the purpose of this study is not limited to examining whether or not the reversed causation of democratic peace is real. Rather, this study also aims to specify the conditions under which international conflict has negative influence on democracy. Finally, it will explore the implications that specification and verification of the reversed causation as it applies to the research of democratic peace.

1.2 Research Questions Guiding the Study

As briefly mentioned in the previous section, the question of whether or not peace/international conflict promotes/undermines democracy has largely been neglected by the students of IR until very recently. It is due, in part, to the considerable portion of research energy that has been devoted to discovering the influence of regime type on international conflict behavior. However, despite the low interest by the scholarly community, the issue of the impact of peace on democracy poses an interesting research question – for both theoretical and empirical reasons.

Contradicting theoretical perspectives still compete to explain the influence of peace and war on democracy. One perspective is that peace promotes democracy, while war undermines it (Wright 1964; Hintze 1975b). The proponents of this position claim that “states that are, or that believe they are, in high-threat environments are less likely to be democracies because such states are more likely to be involved in wars, and states that are likely to be involved in wars tend to adopt autocratic governmental structures that enhance their strategic posture” (Layne 1994, 45). By contrast, other scholars assert that war preparation, military mobilization, and foreign
expansion will eventually lead to democratic development by contributing to economic
development and state formation just as happened in early modern Europe (Tilly 1985; 1990). In
essence, this line of argument holds that in the long run war is conducive to democratic
development.

A review of the empirical studies also reveals that their findings are mixed and even
contradictory. While some studies found international conflict to bear a negative influence on
democracy, others found that war promotes democratic transition. Still, other researchers report
no significant relationship between the variables. Ultimately, there is no empirically definitive
conclusion on this issue to date.

This study will attempt to resolve the problem of the relationship between international
conflict and democracy described above. Specifically, answers to two primary questions are
pursued. The first question to be addressed is whether or not and to what extent peace or
international conflict has a meaningful impact on the democratic development of states.
Furthermore, is the relationship between these two variables positive or negative? That is, does
international conflict have a positive or negative influence on democracy? What theory can
successfully explain the association? And why is that theory applicable? The second question is
concerned with the circumstances of the influence of international conflict on democracy – under
what conditions is the influence of international conflict greater or lesser? In other words, is there
a mediating variable between international conflict and democracy?

It is the belief of the author that international conflict has a negative impact on the
democratic development of the states involved and that the effect of international conflict on
democracy is not constant but variegated according to national characteristics such as relative
power. Taking relative power into consideration, it is speculated that the democracies of weak
states are more vulnerable to the destructive effect of militarized conflict than those of strong states because of the different level of external threat perceived by the people of the states. Answering these questions will help identify and verify the reversed causality of democratic peace and determine if the reversed causation can serve as a legitimate counter-argument to the democratic peace thesis.

Finally, the implications of the reversed causation for both theory and policy will be explored. For example, what implications would verification of this reversed causality have in terms of the theoretical development of IR scholarship? What about the implication on the current American foreign policy? What implications would verification of the central role of relative power in that mechanism have? Answering these questions will help to determine what contributions this study can make to the current IR scholarship.

1.3 Review of Previous Research

As mentioned before, unlike the enormous efforts devoted to the democratic peace research program, whether directed at the dyadic or monadic level, the studies on the possibility of reverse causation have drawn far less attention from the students of international relations. This limited attention is undesirable, especially given that it can be a legitimate counterargument of, or a serious threat to, democratic peace theory.

Several studies suggest the possibility of reversed causation or reciprocal influence between peace and democracy (Layne 1994; Gates et al. 1996; Thompson 1996; Chan 1997; Crescenzi and Enterline 1999). However, the current literature does not display a consensus even on the influence of peace or international conflict on democracy, as suggested in the previous section. Findings are mixed and somewhat contradictory. While some argue that peace promotes
democracy, others claim that war leads to democratic transition. Furthermore, some researchers found no relationship between international conflict and democratic development. Detailed discussion follows below.

1.3.1. Peace Promotes Democracy

The first and the most dominant position in this literature is that peace facilitates democratic development or conversely, war undermines democracy (James et al. 1999; Coralesi and Thompson 2003; Crescenzi and Enterline 1999; Midlarsky 1995; Thompson 1996; Horowitz 2003). While these studies differ in terms of methodologies they chose to emply in their research, they share a common argument that international conflict has a negative influence on the democratic development of the states involved.

Thompson (1996) provides an excellent case study in which he asserts that expansionist foreign policy renders democratization less likely. In his war making/state making theory, he argues that “states involved in the pursuit of regional primacy and coercive expansion have been the least likely to develop liberal republican/democratic forms of government” (1996, 146). After examining the four cases of Scandinavia, revolutionary France, North America, and Taisho Japan, he found that “different types of geopolitical constraints, associated with orientations toward regional primacy issues, emerged independently of – prior to – the onset of liberal institutions” (1996, 171). Earlier than Thompson, Layne (1994) similarly maintains that “states that live in a highly threatening external environment are more likely to choose either statist forms of democracy or even authoritarian structure, precisely because national security concerns require that the state have available to it the instruments for mobilizing national power resources” (1994, 45). In a similar vein, Midlarsky (1995) emphasizes the importance of
environmental factors on the genesis and sustainability of early democracy. Colaresi and Thompson (2003) also argue that the presence of external threat provides an unfavorable environment for democratic development. After quantitative testing, they conclude that international conflict as well as external threat significantly decreases the likelihood of democracy. Horowitz (2003) also reports that war has dramatically negative effects on democratization and market reform in his analysis of 28 post-communist states.

In a slightly different fashion, some studies advocate the reciprocal effect between international conflict and democracy. That is, their assertion is that democracy not only influences international conflict but it is also affected by it. James et al. (1999) identifies a simultaneous system of relationship between peace and democracy. In this study, they find that the influence of peace on democracy is stronger than the converse influence of democracy on peace. Likewise, Rasler and Thompson (2004) also report a reciprocal and sequential effect between peace and democracy. They argue that reduced conflict encourages democratization, which subsequently encourages more pacific dyads. Crescenzi and Enterline (1999) also test the hypothesis that democracy, democratization and war are endogenous at the systemic level. They find evidence corroborating the endogeneity of these processes, although it is not as extensive as they anticipated.

The argument that peace promotes democracy does not contradict the conventional wisdom that war has destructive power. This position is one that may offer a significant counterargument democratic peace. As mentioned before, this counterargument is the primary position advocated in this study, which will also attempt to further explicate and refine the proposed influence of peace on democratic development.
1.3.2. War Promotes Peace

Contrary to conventional wisdom, some scholars posit that war facilitates rather than undermines democratic transition. This belief originates from some historical studies by Tilly (1975; 1990; 1985), who argues that war and war preparation leads to democratization by contributing to economic development and state formation. In his analyses of the development of European states, he shows that war is conducive to democratic development. However, his theory demonstrates a serious flaw in terms of generalizability. That is, his hypotheses are limited to the experience of early modern Europe and difficult to generalize beyond its temporal and spatial dimension. As he acknowledges, there is a significantly large gap between the third world of the twentieth century and the Europe of the sixteenth and seventeenth century” (1985, 169).

A more systematic attack to the argument that peace promotes democracy comes from Mitchell, Gates, and Hegre (1999). They argue that “given democracies’ greater propensity to win wars and greater propensity to emerge from defeat with the regime intact, war should lead to greater democratization” (1999, 777). Furthermore, they demonstrate that their argument is supported by empirical evidence utilizing the Kalman filter analysis. However, their study does not pose a serious threat to the current study because their levels of analysis are different. That is, though the influence of international conflict on democracy should be observed at the national level because the dependent variable, democracy, is a national level characteristic, the analysis by Mitchell et al. (1999) was performed at the systemic level. The analyses performed at the different levels of analysis should be considered as mutually exclusive and thus not influential each other.
1.3.3. No empirical relationship

Some studies found no empirical evidence that peace has a significant effect on democracy/democratic development (Mousseau and Shi 1999; Oneal and Russett 2000; Reiter 2001). Using interrupted time series analysis, Mousseau and Shi (1999) report that nations are just as likely to become institutionally autocratic as they are to become more democratic in the periods before the onset of wars. In particular, they claim that the results from their study indicate that democratic peace theory is not underspecified due to possible reversed causation before the onset of wars; therefore, the direction of causation in the relationship between democracy and international conflict is unidirectional, that is, from democracy to international conflict. Similarly, Oneal and Russett (2000), in their response to James et al. (1999), suggest that militarized disputes make no contribution to explaining the character of regimes at the national level. They rightly criticize James et al. (1999) who argue that war undermines democracy for evaluating a theory about phenomena at the national level of analysis using dyadic data. In a monadic test using vector autoregression, they find that militarized interstate conflicts do not have a significant impact on regime type. Reiter’s finding (2001) is also consistent with the two previous studies in that he finds that only the highest level of international conflict – current participation in international war – significantly reduces the chances that a state will make the transition to democracy. In other words, he finds, lower levels of militarized conflict participation do not influence democratic transition or survival, with the exception that participation in war has a negative impact on democratic transition. In sum, several empirical studies using diverse quantitative methods agree that there is no significant relationship between regime type and international conflict behavior.
1.4 Explaining the Negative Impact of International Conflict on Democracy

Whether or not peace promotes democracy, or conversely international conflict undermines democratic development, has been mostly explained by the war making/state making argument. However, the theory is missing some important pieces which link international conflict and its damaging effect on democracy. According to this perspective, states that enjoy a high degree of security (such as Britain and the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century), are able to establish the more liberal and democratic political institutions, because there was no imminent external threat that might mandate a powerful governmental instruments that were designed for resource mobilization for national security purposes (Layne 1994).

This perspective suggests that since states have to adapt their political structure to external pressure, democracies pressed by a hostile security emergency are likely to undergo regime change to a dictatorship. In times of peace, democratic political institutions prosper and governments tend to be agents for the execution of public opinion, while governments are more likely to draw public support for aggressive foreign policy in times of national security emergencies (Wright 1964). Therefore, the argument persists that as the external threats a state faces increase (or believe it does), its foreign policymaking process will become more autocratic, and its political structure will be more centralized (Layne 1994, 45).

Still, the war making/state making theory mistakenly equates war participation with external threat perception. Indeed participation in war can be perceived as a grave security threat to some states, but pose no threat to others, depending on the characteristics of the war and the states involved. In other words, the existing theory of war making/state making is significantly underspecified. What matters more than the simple presence or absence of war participation is how much of a security threat the militarized conflict poses to the participating states.
Furthermore, this theory is born out of the perspective of the ruling elite, disregarding reactions from the ruled public. Because domestic politics are the result of the interactions between ruling group and the ruled people, it is quite misleading to ignore the half of the scheme. In so doing, the war making/state making theory fails to explain how the people and societies respond to crises and the resulting appearance of governments bearing autocratic characteristics.

Alternatively, I propose a modified war making/state making argument combined with the theory of the “rally ’round the flag effect” (or “rally effect”) and the consideration of national power. Rally effect theory is especially useful in this theoretical scheme in that it can explain why and how autocratic regimes, which emerge for the purpose of convenient mobilization of resources in the case of national emergency, avoid resistance and garner support from the ruled public. According to the rally effect theory, war participation provokes threat perception in the populace, which stimulates a “rally phenomenon” among the people even at the cost of the decline of democracy.

And yet, neither the war making/state making theory nor the theory of rally effect resolves the problem presented in this study – that war participation does not necessarily lead to serious external threat. In other words, the extent of external threat that is posed by war participation should be regarded as varying depending upon the characteristics of the states involved. Therefore, when exploring the impact of international conflict on democracy, it is necessary to examine how and to what extent the public perceives the crisis as a grave threat to national security rather than simply to observe the absence or presence of international conflict.

The modified model will take relative power into consideration. According to the realist tradition of international political theory, national power is the only variable that defines a state’s characteristics (Waltz 1979). Survival is the foremost goal of states in an anarchic environment
in which there is no central authority to control the use of violence, and national power is one of the most certain means to ensure the goal. In this sense, it is fair to say that relative national power is the most influential factor in determining the degree of external threat caused by war participation. In other words, the external threat brought on by international conflict should be greater for weak states than for strong states because their security is more seriously threatened by the conflict.3

The addition of the concept of relative power helps to specify the conditions under which power concentration and the rally effect occur. Relative power is a mediating variable that intervenes in the process of power concentration and the rally phenomenon. When it comes to power concentration, strong states are less likely to become autocratized because they are more likely to win wars and thus they have less motivation to concentrate power for war mobilization; however, the opposite is more likely for weak states. Furthermore, the autocratization of weak states caused by involvement in war is less likely to encounter opposition from the ruled public because of the rally effect, which becomes more powerful among the people of more threatened states. In this scenario, the effort by political leaders who will benefit from power concentration is more likely to succeed due to security concern among the ruled populace. By contrast, even in times of war, the people of strong states are less likely to support the autocratization of the state because they do not perceive a serious external threat, unless their opponents are stronger or at least equivalent to themselves in terms of relative power. In this case, even the attempt by the ruling elite to utilize the international security environment for the purpose of benefiting from power concentration is not likely to succeed because of the opposition from the ruled people,

3 The same mechanism can be applied to the relationship between democracy and other kinds of security-related international environment. For instance, the influence of the number and proximity of security rivals on democracy can also be mediated by the relative power of the states, too.
who have less motivation to abandon their right to freedom. In this way, the destructive effect of international conflict on democracy is more salient for weak states than for strong states.

1.5 Why Study the Impact of International Conflict on Democracy?:

Implications of the Study

This study is expected to make several significant contributions to the current literature of both comparative politics and international relations. First, from the perspective of comparative politics, this study helps enrich the already vast democratization literature by identifying a set of security-related variables that influence democratic development such as perceived external threats, international conflict, and relative power. This study finds that international conflict has a negative impact on democracy – especially for weak states – while relative national power is positively associated with democracy. It also finds that perceived external threat is likely to undermine democracy.

Indeed the international security-related variables have rarely been treated as influential in the process of democratization in previous research. However, this study demonstrates that democracy does not work independently from international relations. In this sense, this study helps cultivate an under-developed area of study in political science – the intersection of international relations with comparative politics. While some studies find that international norms and international organizations have significant influence on the democratic development of state (Pevehouse 2002), this study contributes to the growth of the research by suggesting that variables concerning international security also deserve attention.

More importantly, from the perspective of international relations this study brings a noteworthy implication to the study of democratic peace by suggesting that the reversed
causation is also possible. An alternative hypothesis to the democratic peace thesis is that the causal arrow is reversed, that is, peace causes democracy rather than vice versa. The reversed causation cannot be ignored when peace and democracy are so significantly associated as far as it is theoretically plausible. ⁴ Indeed the consideration of the reversed causation is very important because no consideration of the possible reversed causality in a causal equation serves as an omitted variable, which necessarily biases the estimate of an independent variable.

Though it is clear that reverse causality is a crucial part in the research on democratic peace, the degree of significance of differs depending on whether the research is focused at the national or at the dyadic level. The reverse causality is critical to the democratic peace research at the national level. The verification of the argument that peace causes democracy would make it possible to at least partially challenge the democratic peace proposition at the monadic level. Regardless of the robustness of the empirical evidence, the democratic peace research at the national level is not complete without the consideration of reverse causation. The empirical evidence related to reverse causation constitutes firm ground to argue that the democratic peace thesis at the monadic level is entirely spurious or at the very least, that its impact is exaggerated.

In contrast, because their levels of analyses are different, the reverse thesis does not pose a serious threat to the dyadic level proposition that democracies do not fight against each other. In other words, the reverse thesis does not explain the lack of wars between democracies at the dyadic level. Indeed it is nearly impossible to refute a dyadic level thesis using a counterargument at the monadic level. Nevertheless, using the reversed thesis, this study can possibly highlight an interesting counterargument for the proponents of the democratic peace at the dyadic level.

⁴It is understood that there are other possible interpretations for this association, such as, 1) there is a spurious relationship and 2) the association is a result of chance.
A successful argument against the democratic peace at the dyadic level should be able to explain the empirical regularity found in the research without resorting to an argument for joint democracy. In this regard the employment of the concept of relative power of this study provides a useful insight. As Mousseau and Shi (1999) point out, if involvement in war favors predisposes states to autocratization rather than democratization, and this is about to explain the democratic peace at the dyadic level, then democratic states should be less likely to be involved in wars than non-democracies. Yet the empirical reality remains that democracies still do go to war against non-democracies, especially when a nation’s war proneness is equated as ‘war involvement.’ Therefore, in order to challenge the thesis at the dyadic level with the reversed causation argument, it is necessary to explain why democracies can sustain themselves in spite of their continued engagement in war with non-democracies.

An efficient strategy to explain why democracies hold steadfast, even if they fight against non-democracies, would be to demonstrate that democratic states, unlike non-democracies, are not (or are less likely to be) influenced by international crisis in terms of democratic development. Until very recently, democratic states were predominantly strong leading nations whereas many non-democracies were weak and relatively small. Hence, wars between democracies and non-democracies are virtually equivalent to wars between strong major states and small, weak states. Given this dichotomy, the verification of the role of relative power can serve as a firm ground to argue that the democracy of democratic states will not be undermined because wars against non-democracies do not impose a grave threat to democratic states. In sum, the new theory proposed in this study – one which understands the role of relative power – offers a more nuanced understanding of democratic peace and democratic development. The theory hypothesizes that democracies (typically stronger states), are unlikely significantly influenced
when engaged in war against non-democracies (generally weak states), because they maintain a drastically lower level of perceived threat when engaged in international conflict.

In addition to the above-mentioned theoretical implications, the reversed thesis also has significant implications for policy. As mentioned earlier, the democratic peace thesis provides a theoretical underpinning for current U.S. foreign policy – a major tenet of which is the spread of democracy. If the reversed causation challenges the democratic peace thesis, it can also raise questions as to the current “proliferation of democracy” – centered U.S. foreign policy. This study suggests that the effort to transplant democracy even using armed forces may, in fact, enhance the perceived external threat for target states and present significant roadblocks to democratic development. According to the theory and the empirical evidences proposed in this dissertation, in some cases, security guarantees are more effective means to democratization than utilization of armed forces. However, it should be noted that this suggestion does not necessarily negate the validity of the “proliferation of democracy” strategy. Rather, this study highlights the danger of limiting the options in pursuit of democratization to an approach which may effectively stall democratic development. This dissertation strongly recommends a wise and selective use of efficient strategies between transplantation of democracy and stabilization of regional security.

1.6 Organization of Dissertation

The remainder of the dissertation will consist of six chapters. Chapter 2 will deal with conceptual and theoretical issues. After a more thorough examination of the currently predominant war making/state making theory, it will be argued that the theory does not successfully explain the influence of international conflict on democratic development. As an
alternative, a modified framework, which combines the war making/state making theory, the
theory of rally ’round flag effect, and the consideration of relative power, will be presented. The
case will be made that this alternative theoretical framework offers a more thorough accounting
for the dynamics of international conflict, democracy, and power than the simple war
making/state making argument. Finally, several hypotheses will be presented, which are drawn
from this new theoretical framework, to be tested.

The focus of chapter 3 will lie mainly on issues of methodology. A discussion of
variables, measurements, and sources of data will be provided. Specifically, special attention will
be given to variables which are relatively new to the research such as perceived external threat.
This relatively new variable will be measured with several different indicators as opposed to
relying on a definitive single measurement as the concept of perceived external threat eludes
easy operationalization. In addition, other methodological issues including the spatial-temporal
domain, unit of analysis, and appropriate models will also be discussed in this chapter.

In chapter 4, the results of statistical analyses will be reported. Descriptive statistics of
major variables will be reported first for the purpose of providing general sense of data. In
particular, information on mean, standard error, minimum, and maximum will be reported. A set
of correlation analyses will immediately follow. Although correlations analyses do not uncover
the causal relationship between dependent and independent variables, they are still useful in the
sense that they provide information on the general trend of them. And next a series of
appropriate regression models will be established and analyzed to test the hypotheses. The results
of the analyses including relevance of the models, statistical significance of the independent
variables, the magnitude of the influence of the variables etc. will be discussed. And finally, a
summarization of results and the hypothesis tests, and a discussion of their implications to the study of democratic peace will be provided.

In an attempt to complement the quantitative analyses, chapter 5 will present an illustrative case study on the democratization of South Korea. Utilizing a process-tracing methodology, this chapter will demonstrate how the theory of the reversed causation may be applied in a real world case example. This study will illuminate how South Korea’s democratic development was hindered by the experience of the Korean War because of the increased external threat associated with the war. It will also be shown that it was not until recently when South Korea secured superiority in economic and military capability over North Korea that it was able to solidify its democratization. The case study will provide appropriate narrative that is customarily absent in quantitative statistical analyses as a means for strengthening the key argument of this study.

Finally, chapter 6 will provide concluding remarks. In this chapter, theoretical and practical implications of the findings will be elucidated. Particular attention will be given to the implications of this project for the larger body of research related to democratic peace and American foreign policy that are based on the theory of democratic peace. Implications of the findings of this study as they pertain to the broader field of contemporary IR scholarship will also be delineated. Finally, limitations of the current project and suggestions for future research will be explored.
CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, a theoretical and conceptual framework will be advanced which explains the negative impact international conflict on democracy, and the conditioning effect of power in the process of democratization. First, the currently dominant war making/state making argument will be explored and an explanation as to why it is insufficient in linking international conflict and democracy will be offered. A modified theoretical framework that can fix the problems of the current war making/state making argument will also be suggested. And finally, several hypotheses will be presented to be tested based on the new theoretical framework.

How a nation’s international security environment influences democracy is a question that should be jointly pursued by the students of international relations (IR) and comparative politics. However, comparative politics and international relations have traditionally been perceived as areas of independent study rather than being viewed as interconnected. Although this trend is currently changing with the remarkable growth of a body of research aimed to

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5 Some scholars (Mastanduno et al. 1989; Ikenberry 1996) attribute this phenomenon to the prosperity of neorealism in the study of international relations. They claim that neorealism represented by Waltz insists on separation because international politics and domestic politics operate in totally different and separate structure, that is, anarchy and hierarchy respectively.
elucidate domestic sources of foreign policy behavior, theories related to reverse causation, or international sources of domestic outcomes, are relatively underdeveloped.

Gourevitch’s (1978) “second image reversed” thesis has become a cornerstone for systematic theorizing of international sources of domestic politics. He discusses diverse international sources that may determine domestic political outcomes, including international economic trends, and the nature of international system. Electoral outcomes, trade policies, domestic coalition, and regimes changes are all the examples of the domestic political outcomes that can be brought about by international factors. Founded on the idea of “the second image reversed,” a growing body of literature delves into the role of international sources of domestic political consequences. Even if they do not deal directly or explicitly with the influence of peaceful international environment on regime type, the issue can be discussed within the same framework.

Whether or not peace promotes democracy, or conversely international conflict undermines democratic development, has been mostly explained by the war making/state making perspective. However, the theory is missing some important pieces linking international conflict and its damaging effect on democracy. In this chapter the war making/state making argument will be examined and a modified model will be presented

2.1 War Making/State Making Argument

The theoretical foundation of the war making/state making argument originates from the early argument that political structures such as constitutions are highly influenced by external

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6 The work by Allison (1971) on the importance of bureaucratic politics in the conduct of foreign policy is a good example in this regard. A vast and growing number of works on democratic peace may also be classified into this category as well.

7 Almond (1985); Kaztenstein (1985); and Pevehouse (2002), to name just a few among representative works.
forms of state (e.g. foreign policy and international relations). It is posited that it is only when a state secures firm shape of foreign relations that its internal political structure develops (Hintze 1975a; 1975b). Hintze states that (1975b, 162):

…….The life of internal constitution adjusts itself to the condition of the external political existence, and the external shape of the state is a reflection of the situation prevailing at the time of its formation and is the consequence not only of power struggles but also of the geographical situation and the then existing means of communication……………….we can-indeed, must stress that in the life of peoples external events and conditions exercise a decisive influence upon the internal constitution. History does not permit progressive spiritual development, following its own laws, as was supposed by Hegel; there is rather a constant collaboration and interaction of the inner and the outer world……...

According to this view, for example, “states that enjoy a high degree of security, like Britain and the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century, can afford the more minimalist state political structures of classical Anglo-American liberalism, because there is no imminent external threat that necessitates a powerful apparatus to mobilize resources for national security purposes” (Layne 1994, 44-5). States that are exposed to a highly threatening external environment are more likely to assume a more authoritarian political structure so that it is more convenient to mobilize national power resources than the states that are not. In other words, this argument holds that the extent to which a state is exposed to an external security threat is positively associated with the possibility that the state will have more centralized and autocratic domestic political structures.

This perspective suggests that since states have to adapt their political structure to external pressure, democracies pressed by a hostile security emergency are likely to undergo regime change to dictatorship. While in peaceful times, democratic institutions properly,
democratic governments work also as agents to realize the public good with no constraints, same
degree of freedom of governments is less likely in times of national emergency. Instead,
governments are more likely to plead support from the populace for their aggressive foreign
policy (Wright 1964). In sum, the argument holds that the external threats a state faces (or
believes it faces) is positively associated with an autocratic foreign policy making process and
thus centralized domestic political structures. Midlarsky (2003) insightfully suggests several
relevant historical examples to support this argument, stating that (Midlarsky 2003, 14):

……The rise of Communism in Russia and its export temporarily to Bavaria at the end of
World War I was nothing less than traumatic to Bavarians such as Heinrich Himmler, later to be
Reichsführer-SS and an architect of the “Final Solution.” Hitler himself, of course, was deeply
affected by the emergence of Bolshevism in the heart of Europe that required troops of the
German government to defeat. The presence of three Russian-Jewish emissaries at the head of
this Bolshevik regime suggested that the traditional conservative Roman Catholic Bavarian way-
of-life was to be utterly transformed. Germans in other parts of the country felt equally threatened.
In other words, not only the state was subject to political transformation, but the structure and
ordering of society was likely to be changed beyond recognition……

In addition to the case of Germany, a numerous examples can be observed in the history
of the world politics to support this thesis. The United States is a good example of a nation’s
ability to fortify democracy in the absence of serious external threat. As Friedberg (1992) points
out, the continental United States had been beyond the effective reach of hostile power before the
Second World War and it was able to develop its own democratic institutions in the absence of
serious threat on their survival. Additionally, in the contemporary world, democratization of
many third world countries was linked with improved security conditions. For example, many
East European countries were democratized after the end of the Cold War, while the tension
regarding security in the Middle East prevents democratic development of many countries in the

region. As will be shown in the following chapter, the delayed democratization of South Korea can also be explained from the same perspective, that is, South Korea’s democracy was undermined by the military tension with North Korea and real democracy came when it was freed from the external threat posed by the North along with the East-West conciliation.

As shown in these historical examples, the presence (or perception) of external threat, which may be caused by a hostile international environment, constrains the domestic political structures. In essence, this argument linking the threat of external security and domestic political structure provides a starting point to explain the impact of international conflict or war on democracy, although external threat and war may or may not be the same thing.

The early argument advanced by Hintze and Wright was refined and elaborated by the more recent studies that more directly link war and democracy. The famous phrase by Tilly (1975, 51) that “war made state and the state made war” concisely summarizes the role of war in the formation and development of states including the characteristics of regimes. According to his analysis of European state-formation, the imperative of state building is to eliminate or neutralize their own internal and external rivals and thereby provide protection to their clients. In so doing, states are compelled to extract more and more resources from their population to acquire the means of carrying out these tasks. Therefore, war making leads to state making through the expansion of military organization, war industry, and the supporting bureaucracies within state apparatuses.

Particularly during the developmental phase of state building, frequent involvements in international conflict tend to facilitate coercive political institutions. States involved in violent conflict repeatedly tend to develop the characteristics of “garrison state” – that is, “states that maintain large-scale military and/or internal security establishments, and whose elite political
culture sanctions the use of extreme coercion (Gurr 1988, 51). According to this conceptualization of a “garrison state”, under conditions of persistent crisis and preparation for war, there is the potential for every aspect of life to eventually come under the control of military authorities. Therefore, peoples of all nations would eventually be compelled to conform, or face destruction at the hands of their external enemies. In those states, according to Lasswell, who is the originator of the concept, the “specialists on violence” would stimulate overall growth, suppress civilian consumption to a bare minimum, and direct most of the energies of their national economies to sustaining permanently high levels of military mass production.

Eventually, those industries which would be critical in the event of war would be built up and research would focus almost exclusively on “multiplying gadgets specialized to acts of violence” (Lasswell 1947, 153-5). In this way, the successful use of coercive measures consolidates military or autocratic power – the basic characteristics of dictatorial regimes.

It is also worth noting that several detailed mechanisms linking war and democracy have been specified in the research (Thompson 1996; Rasler and Thompson 2004; 2005), as illustrated by the following statement (Thompson 1996, 144):

…….More generally, though, frequent participation in warfare, and especially intensive warfare, tends to concentrate political power within a state because war making encourages and often rewards more authoritarian approaches to resource mobilization and decision making. Even the threat of impending war can make decentralized power-sharing arrangements seem relatively inefficient and undesirable. Whether relatively authoritarian or democratic at the outset, political systems are quite likely to become more authoritarian as they become engaged in crises of national security……..

To wage wars, a state needs two basic types of resources: materials and people. This situation forces states to develop an efficient system for resource mobilization. Bureaucratized
and centralized systems are believed to be better suited for these purposes than decentralized democratic systems. Therefore, resource mobilization and power concentration are the two most notable mechanisms in the war making/state making argument. In addition, expansionist or regional primacy policy constitutes another building block in the argument. That is, because the states with expansionist foreign policy are more likely to be involved in militarized conflict, they are less likely to develop liberalized and democratic political institutions, but instead they tend to develop a highly centralized and authoritarian political institutions that are convenient for resource mobilization (Thompson 1996). In sum, the war making/state making theory consists of several variants of theoretical mechanisms: expansionist foreign policy, resource mobilization, and power concentration. Indeed they are highly intertwined with one another to constitute a compelling theory.

Although the war making/state making theory offers a plausible explanation of the effect of war participation on the characteristics of domestic politics, its theoretical structure leaves some room for criticism. The primary concern is that the theory tends to equate war participation and external threat perception, which may or may not be the same depending on the situations. Indeed war participation can be perceived as a grave security threat to some states, but pose no threat to others. This is ultimately dependent on the characteristics of the war and the states involved. For example, it is not realistic to believe that the war between the United States and Iraq imposes the same degree of security threat and damaging effect on political institutions to both nations. Rather, it seems reasonable to believe that the impact of war on state building and development varies across states, as suggested by Jaggers (1992)\textsuperscript{8}. Thus, the existing theory of war making/state making is underspecified because it overlooks the conditions under which war

\textsuperscript{8}This seems to be the reason why Tilly (1985) found that his analytical model of state building is limited only to a specific spatial and temporal dimension of the European states in the early modern age, observing that the third world of the twentieth century did not resemble the experience of the European states.
causes a serious security threat. What is important more than the simple presence or absence of war participation is how much of a security threat the militarized conflicts pose to the participating states.

The second concern with the war making/state making theory is its narrowly defined domain of explanation. That is, while the theory provides a perspective from the ruling elite, it tends to disregard reactions from the ruled public. Given that domestic politics are the result of the interactions between the ruling group and the rule people, it is misleading to ignore half of the theoretical scheme. More concretely, while the theory can explain the emergence of autocratic regimes when dealing with international conflict or war, it fails to elucidate why the regimes are accepted by the ruled populace in spite of their preference for democracy. In other words, the theory is not able to explain how the people and societies respond to crises and its resulting appearance of governments bearing autocratic characteristics.

Therefore, as shown above, the examination of the current war making/state making argument reveals that the theory is missing some important pieces in its explanatory scheme. While the second problem (a narrowly defined domain) can be relatively easily fixed by adopting the theory of the rally ‘round the flag effect, the first problem (equating war with perception of threat) requires a new conceptual device. The following sections will discuss how to address these problems and present a new explanatory model. At this point, it should be noted that the current theory of war making/state making theory should not be entirely abandoned. The central aspects of the argument still hold steadfast despite these critiques. However, the theory does

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9 One might argue that external threat causes a state to be autocratic in anticipation of war as well as war itself. However, it should be noted that it is considered that war is a cause, not a result, of external threat because this study focuses on unveiling the relationship between international conflict and regime type, and the role of external threat and relative power in the mechanism.
require some modification so that it can enhance empirical validity and systematically explain variation across time and space.

2.2 Rally ’Round the Flag Effect

According to the current war making/state making arguments, war participation or even preparation leads to high levels of power concentration. This power concentration is often proposed to the populace as the most efficient means for resource mobilization, and thus, increased security. However, once a state is characterized by a high level of centralization, the ruling elite that benefit from the centralization of the government are unlikely to voluntarily surrender their privileges. Because the ruling groups wish to stay in power as long as possible, they are ready to use diverse instruments toward the maintenance of their governmental control. International security crisis is a good rationale to convince the populace to support autocratic governments.

Though the war making/state making theory offers great theoretical insight into the formation of autocratic governments, it lacks detailed analysis of how the populace react to highly centralized (potentially autocratic) regimes when external threat arise. The conventional wisdom might suggest that people should oppose the emergence of autocracy because it is very likely to limit their fundamental values such as civil liberties and political rights. However the opposite have been found to occur from time to time in the real world. In this regard, the theory of the rally ’round the flag effect provides a useful insight to systematically explain the response of the public.

The essence of the rally effect is that when a state is involved in international conflict or faces an external threat, the public tends to rally to support the national leadership. The initial
interest in rally effect was originated from the early studies of American politics, especially those concerned with the apparent association of international crisis and presidential popularity (Neustadt 1960; Waltz 1967; Polsby 1964). Even now it is often believed that in times of international crisis such as war, the American public sends full support to the current government to overcome the external crisis, setting aside its disagreement about the incumbent president’s policies or performance.¹⁰

The rally effect has been empirically supported in the history of American politics. During the Cuban Missile Crisis the approval rate for President Kennedy increased up to approximately 75% approximately in 1963. Another poll indicates that the approval rate for President George Bush increased from about 60% to as high as 90% during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. The most dramatic increase in presidential approval during a national crisis was observed right after the September 11 in 2001. Immediately after the tragic terrorist attack on New York City, the support for President George W. Bush skyrocketed up to as high as 90% from a low of 50% (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). Similar effects are also observed outside the US. For example, in the United Kingdom the Falklands War significantly increased Prime Minister Thatcher’s popularity in the early 1980s, helping her to win the 1983 election. Furthermore, in Israel military action often heightens during elections in the expectation of the rally effect. Ariel Sharon, a virtually unthinkable candidate for the Israeli prime minister’s office prior to the onset of Intifada II and suicide bombing, easily defeated the less bellicose candidate, Ehud Barak (Midlarsky 2003). Although it is a small sampling, research does suggest that the rally effect has been a well-know and often-used political dynamic across time and nation.

¹⁰ A related but slightly different proposition from the rally effect is the diversionary theory of war. The hypothesis posits that leaders that assume the presence of the rally effect sometimes initiate international conflict with other states in order to divert attentions from domestic problems. For a detailed review of the diversionary theory of war, see Levy (1989).
The theoretical mechanism of the rally effect is based on the in-group/out group hypothesis originally developed amongst sociologists (Simmel 1955; Coser 1956). The sociological understanding of the rally effect is best expressed in the following statements by Simmel (1955, 92-3):

……. It must be emphasized that while the conflict or war of a group may let it overcome certain discrepancies and individual alienations within it, it often brings out these intra-group relationships with a clarity and decisiveness not otherwise reached………..the group in a state of peace can permit antagonistic members within it to live with one another in an undecided situation because each of them can go his own and can avoid collisions. A state of conflict, however, pulls the members so tightly together and subjects them to such a uniform impulse that they either must completely get along with, or completely repel, one another…….

This view arguing that conflict with an out-group enhances the cohesion and centralization of the in-group was extended to a hypothesis in international relations,\textsuperscript{11} called diversionary theory or the theory of rally ’round the flag effect suggesting that “war with the outside is sometimes the last chance for a state ridden with inner antagonisms to overcome these antagonisms, or else to break up definitely” (Simmel 1955, 93).

The initial argument by Simmel was later refined and elaborated by Coser (1956) who attempts to systemize Simmel’s arguments and to criticize it in the process. Most importantly, he recognizes that external conflict does not necessarily leads to internal cohesion. Instead, he argues that there are preconditions under which the causal relation holds; first, the group must exist before the occurrence of external conflict and must see itself as a group; and second, an

\textsuperscript{11} For a more detailed review of the literature on in-group/out-group hypothesis, see Stein (1976).
outside threat must be recognized and seen as a grave threat to the whole group. Finally, he proposes the following proposition (1956, 95):


…….. Conflict with another group leads to the mobilization of the energies of group members and hence to increased cohesion of the group. Whether increase in centralization accompanies this increase in cohesion depends upon both the character of the conflict and the type of group. Centralization will be more likely to occur in the event of warlike conflict and in differentiated structures requiring marked division of labor………

Beginning with the simple in-group/out-group hypothesis, several characteristics of the rally effect have been elaborated by later studies. The first is that the rally effect is driven by patriotism and a widespread desire to support the national leader. This so called “patriotism” explanation suggests that in times of crisis, that is, when important interests of the nation are at stake, the public of the nation tend to unite uncritically behind the national leadership to show patriotic support (Mueller 1970). The response of the public is also influenced by their fear that their apparent opposition may endanger the nation’s chances of success. Therefore, this interpretation of the response of the public in the face of national crisis is the exact reflection of the general in-group/out-group hypothesis described above that holds that greater conflict with an external enemy enhance internal cohesion of the in-group.

The second line of argument presented by Simmel is that during a crisis, external political opposition mutes internal public critiques of the administration. Thus, as the leadership’s arguments and stated positions grow increasingly unopposed, society’s favorable opinions become more strongly tilted toward the leadership (Brody 1991). This “opinion leadership” explanation presumes that in times of national crisis the public is unable to access appropriate sources of information, which is typically available in normal periods, to make political
judgments. Under this circumstance, the public is more likely to trust their leaders such as President, who are reasonably believed to enjoy access to strategic, political, and military information that others are denied. Furthermore, for similar reasons, the media also acts in favor of national leadership rather than presenting criticisms for similar reasons. As Brody (1991, 66) points out, “when opinion leaders rally to the president or run for cover, the public will be given the implied or explicit message, ‘appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, the president is doing his job well.’”

As the above research shows, when a crisis or external threat presents itself, members of society tend to view their social institutions more favorably. These more favorable views of social, political, and economic conditions are translated into higher rations of approval for leadership. It is also true that to some extent this line of explanation overlaps with the in-group/out-group explanation described above, as conflicts with out-groups influence perception of the in-group.

Beyond pacifying the populace, the use of force could be seen as a sign of competence in public foreign policy, which in turn could raise the public approval of the government (Lai and Reiter 2005, 256-7). When a leader is elected, the public has only rough estimates of the leader’s competence in foreign policy. Thus, the best way for a leader to demonstrate his/her capabilities to handle foreign affairs is through the successful management of international crises and/or the use of force. It should be noted that this line of logic implies that rallies are more likely and of larger magnitude when the uses of force are successful, and/or the public views them to be appropriate.

In spite of the explanatory plausibility of the rally theory, however, its empirical evidence does not enjoy the same sort of strength. While some empirical studies report the presence of the
rally effect in times of national crisis (Mueller 1970; 1973; Stimson 1976; Lee 1977; Kernell 1978; Ostrom and Simon 1985; Marra et al. 1990; Parker 1995; Baum 2002), other most recent studies report only a marginal or insignificant amount of increase in government approval ratings following international crises (Edwards 1990; Lian and Oneal 1993; Oneal and Bryan 1995; James and Rioux 1998; Baker and Oneal 2001). In other words, the evidence on the existence, magnitude, and nature of the rally effect is, at best, mixed.

The second problem of the current war making/state making theory can be resolved by adopting the theory of the rally effect, which offers an explanation as to why the ruled people support the emergence of authoritarian regime in times of national security despite their preference of democracy. The people of the states facing security crisis tend to favorably evaluate their governments even if they demonstrate autocratic characteristics. Fear among the people caused by crisis, and their instinct toward survival, may drive their support for the autocratic regimes. Still, whatever the underlying cause is, it seems obvious that people tend to rally around the flag and support their government when the state faces national crisis – even if the new government assumes autocratic characteristics and limits their civil liberties and political rights.

With the second problem related to the war making/state making theory addressed, however, the first problem still remains unresolved. Just like the current war making/state making theory, the theory of the rally effect tends to equate war participation with national crisis. Yet, as noted earlier, this may not always be the case for every nation. That is, the degree of perceived threat posed by war participation should be considered as variegated, contingent upon the characteristics of the states involved rather than constant. From this standpoint of view the relationship between wars and the rally effect proposed by previous studies has been under-
identified. This may be one reason why the research reveals such varied empirical evidence.

Therefore, in order to resolve the problem, at least some efforts to specify the conditions under which the rally effect is more likely to take place is required. Studies arguing that the rally effect is more likely when the public perceives a direct and serious threat to national interest (Lai and Reiter 2005) or that the rally effect in the U.S. is conspicuous when the Soviet Union is involved (James and Rioux 1998) are very relevant because these studies are more interested in identifying the conditions under which the rally effect is more likely to occur.

2.3 A Modified Model: Combining War Making/State Making, Rally Effect, and Power

As discussed in the previous sections, the examination of the current war making/state making theory reveals the need for modification if it is to successfully explain the influence of international conflict on democracy. The theory needs to explain why and how autocratic regimes, which emerges in response to national crises such as war for the purpose of more convenient resource mobilization, can avoid resistance and garner support from the ruled public. In previous sections it was demonstrated that this problem can be resolved by adopting the theory of the rally effect. According to the theory, war participation provokes threat perceptions of ordinary people, which are supposed to stimulate rally phenomenon among them even at the cost of the decline of democracy.

And yet, neither the war making/state making argument nor the theory of the rally effect addresses the second problem posited in this paper – that participation in war does not necessarily lead to a perception of serious external threat. Instead, it has been argued that the extent of perceived external threats varies depending on the characteristics of states rather than
unavoidably accompanies participation in war. Therefore, it is necessary to examine how and to what extent the public perceive the crisis as a grave threat to national security rather than simply observing the absence or presence of international crisis.

The modified model proposed in this section will take relative power into consideration. As it is well known, power is one of the most central concepts in international politics, especially for the long standing tradition of realism. While there are different perspectives on why power is among the most important concepts in IR, the most relevant one to this study is that it is important, the concept most relevant to this study is that power the most certain means to ensure survival of states. Waltz (Waltz 1979, 91-2) states:

……. I assume that states seek to ensure their survival…….. Beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied; they may range from the ambition to conquer the world to the desire to be left alone. Survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have other than the goal of promoting their own disappearance as political entities. The survival motive is taken as the ground of action in a world where the security of states is not assured, rather than as a realistic description of the impulse that lies behind every act of states…..

In other words, survival is assumed as the prerequisite goal of states, which takes priority over any other motive. Ultimately power is the most efficient instrument to achieve survival: therefore, according to scholars of neo-realism, power is the only variable that defines states’ characteristics. Waltz (Waltz 1979, 96-7) also says:

…….. States are alike in the tasks that they face, though not in their abilities to perform them. The differences are of capability, not of functions………………..The increase of the activities of states is a strong and strikingly uniform international trend. The functions of states are similar, and distinctions among them arise principally from their varied capabilities. International politics consists of like units duplicating one another’s activities……. 
In short, power is the essential means to achieve security, which is the most important goal of states. In this sense, the concept of power provides useful insight to this theoretical framework in the sense that it may be one of the most influential factors in determining the degree of external threat caused by war participation. Employing the concept of power is very useful in this study because it can be reasoned that the impact of international conflict can be conditioned as a function of the power of the states involved. In other words, the use of the power concept makes it possible to advance the argument that the external threat caused by international conflict should be higher and more salient for weak states than for strong states because their security is more seriously threatened by the incidents.\textsuperscript{12} In this perspective, national crises which threaten security are evaluated relative power of states involved rather than being treated as equivalent to war participation.

The addition of the concept of relative power helps to specify the conditions under which power concentration and the rally effect occur. Relative power intervenes in the process of power concentration as well as rally phenomenon. When it comes to power concentration, strong states are less likely become autocratized because they are more likely to win wars, and thus, are less likely to be motivated to concentrate power for war mobilization. The opposite, however, is true for weak states. Furthermore, the autocratization caused by war involvement for weak states is less likely to encounter opposition from the ruled public because of the rally effect, which becomes more conspicuous among the people of more threatened states. In this scenario, the effort by political leaders, who will benefit from power concentration, is more likely to succeed with the help from security concern among the ordinary people. By contrast, the people of strong

\textsuperscript{12} The same mechanism can be applied to the relationship between democracy and other kinds of security related international environment. For example, the influence of the number and proximity of security rivals on democracy can also be mediated by the relative power of the states.
states are less likely to support the autocratization of the state because they do not perceive a grave external threat, even in times of war participation, unless their opponents are stronger or at least equivalent to themselves in terms of relative power. In this case, even the attempt by ruling elites to utilize the international security environment for the purpose of benefiting from power concentration is not likely to succeed because of the opposition from the ruled public, who has less motivation to abandon their rights to freedom. In this way, the destructive effect of international conflict on democracy is more salient for weak states than for strong states.

The consideration of the power concept can explain why the United States did not turn into a “garrison state” when the Cold War began started with a vast stockpile of weapons like “the long-range bomber, the atom bomb and, just over the horizon, the ballistic missile” (Friedberg 1992,111). Many experts expected that the dramatic change in strategic environment with the onset of the Cold War would also entail radical transformation in domestic institutions in the United States. However, even under the intense pressures of its confrontation against the Soviet Union, America did not transform itself into anything like a “garrison state.” The answer to the question might be found in the fact that the United States had already become one of the two super powers in the world and was less sensitive to the change in security environment. The September 11 attack is another illustrative example of this theoretical perspective. In spite of some critics asserting that the Bush administration has used claims about threats to national security to justify excessive and harmful reductions in civil liberties and political rights (Chomsky 2002), the real impact of this attack on the US state and society has not been significantly substantial. This is due in part because it was just a single event, but the lack of an impact on the US may also be due to the successful containment of the crisis, which did not leave the US vulnerable to the external threat associated with the attack.
By contrast, the democracies of weaker states have been extremely vulnerable to the destructive effect of international conflict and the associated external security threat. Among numerous examples, the case of South Korea has been representative of this perspective. Unlike its remarkable economic success, the democratization of South Korea occurred relatively recently. The Korean War hindered the democratic development of South Korea, creating an environment which met the preconditions necessary for an autocratic regime. It was when South Korea was freed from the external security threat, and was able to assume a position of domination over the North, that real democracy came into existence in the country. A more detailed account of this case will be illustrated in the following chapters.

In sum, the complete picture of the impact of international conflict on democracy requires three building blocks: the war making/state making argument, the theory of the rally effect, and the concept of relative power. Combining these three components can completes the explanatory scheme, which elucidates why and how autocratic regimes emerge as a reaction to militarized conflict, why the ruled public acquiesces to the regimes, and how much the influence of international conflict involvement on democracy varies from state to state.

When exploring the impact of international conflict on democracy, it is indispensable to examine whether or not and to what extent the conflict poses an external threat to national security rather than simply observing the absence or presence of the events. Most of the previous studies on this issue tend to overlook this crucial point, only focusing on the simple association between international conflict and the decline/promotion of democracy. It seems to be misleading to assume that militarized conflict involvement necessarily causes serious threat to national security regardless of states and situation. Indeed, the sense of external threat is a more sophisticated concept than the simple absence or presence of militarized conflict. One of the
most relevant and efficient way to address this problem is to take the concept of relative power into serious consideration. In so doing, it is possible to distinguish international conflict involvement and external threat caused by it. Furthermore, the consideration of the concept of power will make it possible to identify the conditions under which international conflict has significant impact on democracy.

Figure 2.1

The theoretical framework described above is expressed in Figure 2.1. According to Figure 2.1, international conflict involvement exerts a damaging effect on democracy, both directly and indirectly through perceived external threat. In the process the direct impact of international conflict is conditioned by relative power of the states involved. Relative power is also hypothesized to have an independent impact on democracy. Indeed, as explained above, national power is supposed to provide a favorable environment for democracy because it reduces the likelihood that hostile environments will pose a significant threat to the state.
2.4 Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical reasoning described in the previous section, several testable hypotheses can be derived as follow:

\[ H_1: \text{Perceived external threat is negatively associated with democracy} \]

The first hypothesis (H₁) tests the association between perceived external threat and democracy. It is hypothesized that perceived external threat is negatively associated with democracy, that is, states in which people perceived high levels of external threats are less likely to be democratic, as suggested in the theoretical framework. This hypothesis tests the damaging effect of external threat perception on democracy.

The examination of the role of perceived external threat on democracy is especially important for several reasons although it is not the single most important independent variable in which I am interested. First, it is important because verification of the role of perceived external threat on democracy enhances the relevance of the theoretical framework advanced in the previous section. According to the theoretical framework, external threat perception is a mediating variable in the damaging effect of international conflict on democracy. In other words, when exploring the impact of international conflict on democracy, the thing to be noted is how much the conflict provokes perception of external threat among the people rather than simple occurrence or non-occurrence of the event. In sum, perceived external threat is the key concept that will determine the soundness of the proposed theoretical argument. Therefore, testing H₁ should be considered as an essential part of this analytical scheme even if it does not directly address the relationship between international conflict and democracy.
Second, $H_1$ is also important in that it provides several reliable measurements of perceived external threat. As I mentioned earlier, the concept of perceived external threat is so abstract that it does not allow convenient operationalization. In testing this hypothesis, some indicators that are believed to appropriately measure perceived external threat are offered. Several different measurements will be provided for the purpose of enhancing reliability of the measurements instead of relying on a single operationalization. These measurements are expected to lay a solid foundation upon which further research can be built.

$H_2$: *International conflict is likely to have a negative influence on democracy of the states involved*

The second hypothesis ($H_2$) directly deals with the relationship between international conflict and democracy. It is postulated that international conflict is likely to undermine democracy of the states involved because it causes not only power concentration and the appearance of autocratic regimes, but also the perception of external threat among the people. The more severe an international conflict a state has with other states, the more seriously a state’s democracy is likely to be damaged.

Indeed, it was suggested above that the perceived external threat caused by international conflict is more important than the participation in the conflict itself. However, it does not necessarily mean that international conflict does not have any meaningful impact on perceived external threat. Rather, what it really means is that the impact of international conflict varies depending on perceived external threat rather than exerting constant effect. The occurrence of international conflict is expected to provoke and intensify the perception of external threat to
some extent, and thus, to undermine democracy in the states involved, although there may be variation in terms of its magnitude and duration.

**H3: National capability is positively associated with democracy**

The third hypothesis intends to identify the role of national power on democracy. As described in the previous section, national power should be positively associated with the level of democracy because the states with more power are likely less sensitive to a hostile external environment in terms of autonomous development of domestic politics. By contrast, democracy of weaker states is more likely to be undermined by an unfriendly international environment. Therefore, it is hypothesized that, all other variables being equal, national power is positively associated with level of democracy.

It will be demonstrated that power, especially material power, is a variable that is relevant not only for security issues but also for domestic issues such as characteristics of regimes. In other words, material power that has been conventionally considered as useful in the area of international relations or security issues also has significant meaning in the area of comparative politics and domestic issues.\(^{13}\) Thereby international relations and domestic politics should not be regarded as separate areas of research but must be seen as interdependent each other to some extent.

**H4: National power is negatively associated with the impact of international conflict involvement on democracy**

\(^{13}\) It should be noted that material power is not the same as economic development, although it is part of the concept. A more detailed explanation can be found in the following chapter.
The fourth and final hypothesis to be tested is concerned with identifying a condition under which involvement in international conflict exerts greater impact on democracy. Especially, H₄ tests the mediating effect of national power in the relationship between international conflict and democracy. According to the theoretical argument advanced in the previous section, national power mediates the impact of international conflict on democracy in the sense that the external threat perception caused by international conflict can be large or small depending on the national power of the states involved: strong states should be less influenced by international conflict involvement in terms of domestic politics such as characteristics of regime than for weak states because the people of strong states perceive less threat than the people of weak states. In other words, the perception of greater threat by the people of weak states will lead to more severe damage to democracy in those states. Therefore, the premise of H₄ is that national power is negatively associated with the negative impact of international conflict on democracy.

The above mentioned four hypotheses are established to test the validity of the new theoretical scheme proposed in this chapter. In next chapter, specific methodological issues for testing the hypotheses will be discussed.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, the methodology utilized to appropriately test the hypotheses proposed in the previous chapter will be discussed. First of all, the spatial-temporal domain of analyses will be specified and the unit of analysis will be clarified. The dependent, main independent, and control variables along with their measurements will also be elucidated. This section will also provide discussion of the main sources of data collection and coding principles utilized in the analyses. Specific regression models employed will also be revealed with the particular emphasis on the relevance of each model.

It should be noted that for the purpose of testing the hypotheses suggested in the previous chapter, this study will employ large-N statistical analyses supplemented by a case study. Although the primary method will be large-N statistical analyses using some appropriate multiple regression modeling, a case study will be used to supplement the limitations of the method. Accordingly, some discussion regarding the selection of material for the case study will be added at the end of the chapter.

Quantitative and qualitative research approach both data collection and analysis from two very different perspectives. Though some feel very strongly regarding the advantages and
disadvantages of each model, for the purpose of this study, they are treated as complementary methods of research. By nature, quantitative methods are said to be useful in abstracting from particular instances to seek general description, or in testing causal hypotheses. Quantitative methods also tend to employ measurements and analyses that are easily replicable by other researchers, a considerable advantage in any field (King et al. 1994). Still, because statistical correlations do not suggest causality, case studies may be useful in assessing whether a statistical correlation between independent and dependent variables is causal (George 1979, 46). In other words, through careful examination of a case in which the targeted dependent and independent variables are present, researchers can show whether and how the independent variable actually causes changes in the dependent variable. In this way, a case study can supplement statistical analysis by offering an explanation for the statistical association.

In this research project quantitative methods were used as the primary form of analysis since the purpose of the study is to test the hypotheses concerning dynamics of international conflict, democracy, and power previously suggested. However, because this project is also interested in identifying the causal mechanisms operating between the variables, an illustrative case study is also employed to illuminate the role of power and international security environment in the process.

### 3.1 Spatial-Temporal Domains and Unit of Analysis

This study intends to analyze the data on democracy and international conflict in all states from 1961 through 1998. The predominant source of data for this project is the “State System Membership,” which contains the list of states in international systems as updated and distributed by Correlates of War Project (2005). It should be noted that the limited time span (1961-1998) is
the result of consideration of data availability, especially data regarding the control variables. Data on democracy and international conflict are not available beyond the year of 2001. The most recent available data on rivalry ends in 1999. Furthermore, data related to some control variables, such as economic development and economic growth, are rare before 1961. It should also be noted that some of the data (i.e. World Value Survey Data) are available only for some countries and only at several specific points in time. Considering the limitations in data availability, the statistical analysis of this study covers the time span of 1961-1998. Unless the problem of data availability prevents the task in special cases, therefore, this study aims to analyze all states all the states from 1960 to 1998.

Ultimately, the purpose of this study is to discover the effect of international conflict on democracy, and thus, the dependent variable is a state’s level of democracy or democratization. It is important to note that because democracy is a national characteristic, this analysis should be performed at the national level.\textsuperscript{14} Also, because variation over time and space is highly important to the research question, the appropriate unit of analysis is country-year, with a panel data structure.

3.2 Variables, Measurements, and Data

In this section, issues concerning variables, operationalizations, and data sources will be discussed. Definitions of key variables and exploration of the types of data sources utilized will also be noted.

\textsuperscript{14}In this regard, James et al. (1998) is erroneous, who analyze the reciprocal effect of international conflict and democracy mistakenly at the dyadic level, as Oneal and Russet (2000) criticize.
3.2.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of this study is the democracy of individual states. This study follows the widely used definition of democracy in this field, that is, “a form of governance where the power of executive is limited by other institutions and where governments are selected either directly or indirectly through competitive elections, with open or unrestricted entry for candidates” (Gleditsch and Ward 2006, 912). Among several options, this study will utilize Polity IV data as the primary democracy index (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). The Polity dataset is the most frequently and comprehensively used in the study of the relationship between international conflict and regime type – whether it is concerned with the democratic peace thesis or its reverse causation. The most recent version of the Polity data (Polity IV) account for the data from 1800-2002.

Polity scores for democracy and autocracy are based on various components such as competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraints of chief executive, and competitiveness of political participation. The scores for both democracy and autocracy can range from 0-10. Once democracy and autocracy scores have been computed, a polity score is created for each state by subtracting their autocracy score from their democracy score. The remaining policy score ranges from -10 (the most autocratic) to 10 (the most democratic). The polity score will be utilized to measure the level of democracy of each state in a given year.

15 Freedom House data (FreedomHouse 2006) is another dataset that is commonly used in the study of democracy and democratization. Its index consists of Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL), each of which ranges 1 (democratic) to 7 (autocratic). The Freedom House index, which combines PR and CL, ranges from 2 (democratic) to 14 (autocratic). Even though the Freedom House dataset seems to be an alternative, I will use Polity IV dataset, because the Freedom House dataset seems to be inferior to Polity IV for two reasons; first, it has shorter time span; second, it has smaller variation.
3.2.2 Main Independent Variables

As mentioned earlier, perceived external threat is a key component of this analysis. As such, it is one of main independent variable. “Threat” is literally defined as an “indication of something impending and usually undesirable and unpleasant as an expression of an intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage on another usually as retribution or punishment for something done or left undone” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary). In the study of international relations the perception of threat is commonly understood as “an anticipation on the part of an observer, the decision maker, of impending harm-usually of a military, strategic, or economic, kind-to the state” (Cohen 1979, 4). What is noteworthy in the discussion of perceived threat is that, as Knorr (1976) points out, it includes both “actual” and “potential” threat. According to Knorr, actual threat can be inferred from more or less determinate acts such as verbal statements, increases in armed forces, and even ultimatums, whereas potential threat is inferred only from a state’s capacity to actually inflict harm.

The literature on threat perception has been highly influenced by the early work of Singer (1958). His conceptualization of threat perception assumes that each state perceives the other as a threat to its national security and that such perception is a function of both estimated capability and estimated intent. Therefore, his conception of threat perception can be portrayed in quasi-mathematical form as:

\[ \text{Threat Perception} = \text{Estimated Capability} \times \text{Estimated Intent} \]
Some studies like Colaresi and Thompson (2003) and Ralser and Thompson (2004) employ a concept of threat perception very similar to Singer’s when measuring perceived external threat.\textsuperscript{16}

Though Singer’s conception of threat perception is vital to this research, it lacks an important component – an understanding of the psychological dimension. As Pruitt (1965) suggests, predispositions to perceive threat are derived from such diverse sources as distrust, past experience, contingency planning, and personal anxiety. In other words, there is no sufficient reason to believe that capability and intent are the sole determinant of threat perception. Rather, it is reasonable to presume that the factors which ultimately lead to a perception of threat are diverse and.

One strategy to overcome the weaknesses discussed above is to utilize multiple measurements rather than relying on a single indicator. Given that no measurement is full proof, using multiple indicators is a legitimate way to validate the operationalized definitions of the concepts used in a given study (Manheim \textit{et al.} 2002, 185). In this way, cross-checking with several different measurements enhances the validity of the variable, reliability of indicators, and robustness of the analyses.

The first measurement to be utilized for perceived external threat is survey data. In this case, annuals survey data on level of perceived external threat for every country would be the most ideal form of measurement. However, such data are not easy to collect, and therefore, are not easy to find in the literature. Despite this potential limitation, the World Value Survey (WVS) data contain a questionnaire similar to the ideal described above. This survey measures the views of populace regarding their desired focus for the country over the next ten-year period. The options listed on this survey are: 1) a high level of economic growth; 2) making sure this country

\textsuperscript{16} Colaresi and Thompson (2003) use the sum of each state’s rivals’ distance-discounted capabilities, and Rasler and Thompson (2004) utilize the combination of strategic rivalry, military capability, and contiguity.
has strong defense forces; 3) seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities; and 4) trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.

The second option, “making sure this country has strong defense forces,” is relevant to the current in that the desire for strong defense is generally believed to reflect the people’s perception of security threat. Based on this assumption, perceived external threat can be operationalized as the percentage of the respondents who choose strong defense as the most important aim for their country. WVS data has information on that issue across states at varied time points in time beginning in 1990. It should be noted that the states included in the surveys differ from year to year. Although it is not a perfect dataset, still, it is the most relevant and available survey data.

Another potential indicator for perceived external threat is to note the amount of resources a state allocates for military purposes. Cohen (1979) delineates four indicators measuring threat perception, one of which is the “coping processes” put into effect by decision-makers in response to a threat including the strengthening or mobilization of military resources.\textsuperscript{17} Following Cohen’s advice, this study will attempt to measure perceived external threat using a state’s effort to strengthen their military capability. The use of this form of measurement is justified on the assumption that the resources put into the military sector is unavoidable expenses to warranty national security that might otherwise be used for developing other aspects of society, and thus, decision makers want to minimize military costs as much as possible.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, the indicator of interest is the percentage of the national budget allocated to

\textsuperscript{17} The other three indicators he discusses are (1) articulation of decision makers-expressions of judgment and of personal reaction to the threatening signal; (2) descriptions by observers (foreign diplomats, officials, etc); (3) exploration by the decision makers of alternative responses to the threat, with the exploration marked by the intensive internal consultation, a general increase in the flow of messages into and out of the actor, and a search for external support, etc. (Cohen 1979,24).

\textsuperscript{18} Hegemonic states such as the US or Soviet Union should be considered as exceptions to this thesis in the sense that they use military resources not only for self defense but also for expansion.
military expenditure in a given year. This data is available from diverse sources such as the yearbook of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the World Development Indicators of World Bank (WorldBank 2006). Furthermore, the use of this indicator has another advantage that it considers the above mentioned psychological aspect that is ignored by the conventional measurements of external threat. Ultimately, it is believed that the investment on military resources reflects a state’s perceived external threat, that is, the higher perceived external threat exists, the more a state invests on military resources. However, it should also be noted that this indicator is not perfect as it reflects not only perceived external threat but also some other factors such as expansionist foreign policies and the arms race. As the security dilemma thesis suggests, it is very difficult to distinguish defensive side and offensive militaristic motivations.

Consideration will also be given to similarities in state foreign policies with regional system leaders as an indicator of perceived external threat. Given that similarity in foreign policy with system leader state suggests a strong intra-state alliance, low compatibility of foreign policy with system leaders can reflect a high degree of perceived external threat of given states. Similarity of state foreign policies is commonly measured by $S$ score at global or regional level (Signorino and Ritter 1999), which is commonly used to measure alliances in the study of international relations.\(^\text{19}\) For the purpose of the current study, the regional level $S$ scores will be employed because they are more directly associated with security of a given state, and thus, should reflect the perceived external threat more appropriately than those at the global level.

\(^\text{19}\) Like Tau-b, $S$ assesses the rank order correlation for two states’ alliance portfolios. However, unlike tau-b, $S$ also takes into consideration both the presence and absence of an alliance in the correlation of calculation. For example, the fact that a state has identical alliance with some states as well as no alliances with identical sets of other states is accounted for in the $S$ calculation, but not in tau-b (Bennett and Stam 2005,15). $S$ is computed based on COW v3.0 alliance data from 1816-2000.
The last indicator to be employed for the purpose of measuring the perceived external threat is a conventional measurement – rivalry (Colaresi and Thompson 2003). When defining rivals and rivalries, in the areas of the study of international conflict, rivalry is commonly defined as “a perceptual categorizing process in which actors identify which states are sufficiently threatening competitors to qualify as enemies” (Thompson 2001, 557). Therefore, for the purpose of this study, when determining what constitutes a rival, three criteria are considered crucial. The states in question must regard each other: 1) competitors; 2) as the source of actual or latent threats that pose some possibility of becoming militarized; and 3) enemies. This definition is distinguished in that its emphasis on perceptions about threatening competitors who are categorized as enemies, whereas other measurements of rivalries require only that a minimal number of militarized disputes have occurred within a given amount of time. Thompson’s definition is especially pertinent for the purpose of this study because its emphasis on perception is compatible with the way this study treats external threats. Based on the data provided by Thompson (Thompson 2001), rivalry is coded as a dichotomous variable, that is, 1 if a state is in a rivalry with other state(s) in a given year, and 0 if no rivalry exists.

Another main independent variable is international conflict. the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset, which was created through Correlates of War project (Jones et al. 1996; Ghosn et al. 2004), will be utilized as the primary source of data. Jones et al. (1996, 168) used the term “militarized interstate disputes” to refer to “united historical cases in which threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state.” Based on this definition, the dataset excludes information on interactions involving non-recognized and non-state actors as well as disputes that did not become militarized. The most
recent MID 3 dataset records information on all the international militarized incidents from 1816 to 2001. All the militarized incidents are classified as a threat, display, use of military force, or war. Incidents are recorded by year and are coded according to the hostility level of the conflicts, ranging from peace (0), to no militarized action (1) to threat of force (2), to displays of force (3), to uses of force (4), to full scale war (5) in a given year. If any single militarized event accrues more than 1000 casualties, it is regarded as a full scale war (Ghosn and Palmer 2003). While there can be multiple ways of operationalizing the variable, the number of conflicts in a given year will be used for the purposes of this study as it is most commonly used in this fashion in the field.

According to the theory proposed previously, power functions as an independent variable that directly influences the level of democracy. It also deserves an intervening variable that indirectly conditions the degree of negative influence of international conflict on democracy. For this variable, the COW dataset on national material capabilities is utilized (Singer et al. 1972; Singer 1988). This variable has three dimensions: demographic, industrial, and military indicators of national capabilities. For the demographic dimension, the total population of the society and the number of people living in an urban area was used. Industrial energy consumption as well as iron and steel production were utilized as measurements of a state’s industrial capabilities. And finally, military personnel on active duty and the military expenditures over the previous five years were used as descriptors for the military dimensions. An index is created by combining the six indicators. The total score of a state is converted into a percentage share for the purpose of normalizing the data in a given year. In addition, major and non major states will be differentiated for this variable. According to the COW project, only
seven countries are considered major states. These are the U.S., Russia, China, France, Britain, Germany, and Japan.

3.2.3 Control Variables

This study will also introduce several control variables known to have influence on the democracy of individual states. In the expanse of literature on democracy or democratization, foremost attention has been given to the impact of economic development on democratization. Since the appearance of the seminal article by Lipset (1959), a number of studies have been carried out to explain the relationship between the two phenomena. The accumulated finding of these studies suggest that there is a strong positive correlation between economic development and democratization whether the relationship is considered to be linear or non-linear (Cutright 1963; Jackman 1973; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994). Diamond (1977) even suggests that the relationship between economic development and democracy must be ranked one of the most powerful and robust in the study of comparative political research. Therefore, economic development must be included in the model as one of the most important control variables. A widely used indicator of economic development is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The primary source of the data will be the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) while Penn World Table (PWT) will serve as a supplementary source (Heston et al. 2006). As previous studies have suggested, economic development is expected to be positively associated with democratic development. Likewise, economic growth is also believed to have a positive influence on democratic development. This concept will be measured by the annual change in GDP per capita as a proportion of total GDP per capita in previous years. The data is taken from the World Development Indicators.
Regional democracy is another control variable that will be included in this analysis. Some scholars have speculated that a state’s democracy is influenced by its neighbors’ regime type (Huntington 1991; Przeworski et al. 2000). This variable will be coded as the average score of democracy indices of states in a given region. Regions will be defined according to the Correlates of War regional definitions: the Americas, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia/Oceania (Benett and Stam 2000).

The importance of political culture cannot be emphasized enough, as consolidation of democracy requires internalization of democratic values by the citizens at large (Tessler 2002). Among various political cultures, the Islamic culture is said to be, especially, at odds with democratic values. Huntington (1984) argues that Islam is inhospitable to democracy because while democracy requires openness, competition, pluralism, and tolerance of diversity, Islam encourages intellectual conformity and uncritical acceptance of authority. Therefore, it seems likely that Islamic culture will demonstrate a negative effect on democratic development. A country in which Islam is the dominant religion will be coded 1, and all others 0, following Barnett (2001).

Several students of democracy have reported that developing countries with the most successful democratic experience after independence are former British colonies (Bollen and Jackman 1985; Muller 1995). Weiner (1987, 18) attributes this to two components of the British model of tutelage: “the establishment of the rule of law through effective (and increasingly indigenous) bureaucratic and judicial institutions and the provision for some system of representation and election that gave educated elites some opportunity for and experience with limited governance.” Thus British colonial heritage will be another dichotomous variable, in which the states that experienced colonization by the British will be coded 1, and those which...
did not will be coded 0. The data on this variable will be taken from the *World Factbook* by the CIA (2006).²⁰

3.3 Research Design

In this section, specific methods of statistical analyses and case study are discussed. The first set of analyses is comprised of descriptive statistics regarding the dependent and main independent variables. Examination of descriptive statistics is expected to provide general information about the important features of the data before looking at the entire dataset. Though these analyses do not indicate whether there is a relationship between the two variables, they will hopefully serve to familiarize the reader with the distribution of values on each variable. Among many different types of descriptive statistics, this study focuses on two set of descriptive statistics: central tendency, or what the “typical” case in the distribution looks like, and dispersion, or how much variation occurs across the data. Central tendency is measured via mean and dispersion will be measured through standard deviation. Finally, value ranges for each variable for each variable will also be presented.

In order to determine the strength of the relationship among the different variables, correlation analyses will also be presented in addition to the descriptive statistics mentioned above. The results of correlation analyses are often used in eliminating some variable from an analysis so that those most useful in accounting for the dependent variable can be studied with greater ease. Correlation analyses can also be useful in determining whether there is detrimental multi-collinearity between independent variables that is believed to undermine statistical

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²⁰ Several other variables such as the level of education, literacy rate, and urbanization are sometimes included in models explaining democratic development. However, they will not be considered in this study for several reasons: first, previous research does not demonstrate any consensus on whether these variables actually influence democratic development. Secondly, they are believed to be highly correlated with economic development and thus have led to a multicollinearity problem. And thirdly, the number of missing data points is so great that the inclusion of the variables will cause a dramatic decrease in the number of observations.
significance of independent variables. The results of correlation analyses will be presented in the correlation matrix that shows the degree of association between variables as well as statistical significance and direction of association. Two slightly different correlation matrixes will be presented: one for all states, and the other for only non-major, weak states. The separate analyses are designed to determine the effect of power of states to the main variables.

Although the descriptive and correlation analyses provide a great deal of information regarding the variables and their relationships, they do not serve as a ground for judging whether to reject or not the hypotheses. Because descriptive and correlation analyses do not take into consideration the control variables that are likely to influence the dependent variable, they are not free from the possibility of spurious relationship of the findings (Przeworski and Teune 1970). In order to deal with this issue and real causal relationship between the dependent and independent variables, series of multiple regression analyses will be performed. More specifically, the technique of generalized estimating equations (GEEs) will be utilized. There are several statistical advantages of using the generalized estimating models with correlated data. First, GEEs can be widely applied to diverse forms of correlated data such as continuous, dichotomous, ordinal, and count variables. Furthermore, because GEEs have the ability to account for intracluster correlations, they can be used for a number of types of data, including panel and time-series cross-section data. GEEs also have the added benefit of convenience, as much of current statistical software is equipped to run these equations. And finally, the interpretation of the estimates of GEEs is identical to that for commonly used models for uncorrelated data (Zorn 2001).

Based on the tenet of the previous discussion in section 3.2, the following regression equation was developed:
Democracy _it = α + β_1( international conflict _it-1) + β_2( Perceived External Threat _it-1) + β_3( national power _it-1) + β_4( economic development _it-1) + β_5( economic growth _it-1) + β_6( regional democracy _it-1) + β_7( Islamic culture _it) + β_8( British colonial heritage _it) + e

State _i_ denotes the state of interest and _t_ denotes the current year. In order to avoid problem related to endogeneity, all of the independent variables are lagged by 1 year. I also employ the AR1 assumption to prevent potential autocorrelational problems. Depending on nearity, some of the independent variables may be log-transformed with the dependent variable. Separate results tables will be presented to illustrate the effect of interaction term of international conflict and. The results of the hypotheses testing will follow the regression analyses.

### 3.4 Case Study

As previously mentioned earlier in this chapter, a case study has also been incorporated into this research to supplement the statistical analyses. Though there are many different types of case studies, an appropriate definition for the current task is commonly defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin 1989, 23). Case studies can be used to provide more concrete explanations for the causal links that are too complex for formal models or statistical analyses. They can also be used to describe the real-life context in which relevant independent and

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21 Correlation (ar1) specifies that, within panels, there is first-order autocorrelation AR(1) and that the coefficient of the AR(1) process is common to all the panels.
dependent variables occurred. And finally, case studies can be used to explore those situations in which multiple variables intervene in the causal process.

Given the above definition, case studies can address some limitations of more rigorous methods such as formal models or statistical methods. Indeed they have several limitations in several points: 1) achieving high conceptual validity; 2) deriving new hypotheses; 3) examining the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms; and finally 4) addressing causal complexity. Case studies offer strengths in these areas. Case studies allow researchers to achieve better conceptual validity for the abstract variables that are not easily measured such as democracy, power, political culture, and so on. Those variables are believed to be better understood in the real world context. Whereas statistical studies risk lumping together dissimilar cases to get a larger sample, case studies allow for conceptual refinement with higher level of validity over a smaller number of cases. Furthermore, case studies offer significant advantages in drawing new hypotheses through the study of deviant or outlier cases. Although statistical methods can identify deviant or outlier cases that may lead to new hypotheses, they are not able to produce plausible explanation which new hypotheses for these variations. Case studies make it possible to perform in-depth analyses of individual cases and establish new theories. Case studies also allow examination of the operation of causal mechanisms. Although theories present causal mechanisms and hypotheses, the theories operate in the actual political. A final advantage of case studies is that they can accommodate complex causal relationships better than simple statistical analyses (George and Bennett 2005, 17-22). In a word, employing a case study method appears to offer a significant supplement to the meaningful, yet limited, statistical methods of this project.

Selection of case is a crucial issue in case study method. One of the most common critiques of a case study method is that it may be exposed to “selection bias.” However, the
problem of selection bias may not significantly affect the current project as the case study serves only to supplement the statistical method, that is, identifying casual mechanics in concrete terms in the real world context. In other words, among many different types of case studies, this study will employ an illustrative case example that describes an actual event in political history (Yin 1989, 25).

Thus, in this study, the case of South Korea’s democratization will be examined, with the intention of illustrating the inter-related dynamics of international conflict (or conversely peace), democracy, and power. The delayed democratization of South Korea vividly illustrates the interactions between international conflict, perceived external threat, power, and democracy. South Korea underwent a full scale war against North Korea from 1950-1953. The effects of the Korean War were so pervasive that the Korean peninsular turned into a social and economic ruin. Its political impact mostly centered on the prospect of democracy – an institution in its mere infancy in the region. President Rhee Syngman took advantage of the unstable security condition in the Korean peninsula to enhance external threat perception among the people. Fueled by the recent war President Rhee was able to justify the power necessary to establish and maintain his dictatorship. The 4.19 Student Uprising that toppled the formidable Rhee administration created the democratic Second Republic. However, it was not long before the short-lived democratic regime was turned over by a military coup and subsequent military regimes. Although South Korea achieved remarkable economic success during the rule of the military regimes, its democracy was even further undermined. As did the Rhee Syngman administration, the military regimes under the rule of Park Jung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan suppressed the opposition of the people and utilized the heightened military tension against North Korea to justify their authoritarian rule.
It was not until dramatic changes in security environment were made in the late 1980s that South Korea was finally democratized. With the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, the harsh confrontation between the East and the West slowly abated and a conciliatory atmosphere (which subsequently ended the Cold War) began to dominate the international political environment. The conciliation between the East and West also exerted a positive influence on the prospect of democratization in South Korea. Indeed, the improved relationship with the Soviet Union allowed the U.S. to pursue democracy-promoting policy rather than security-seeking policy in the Korean peninsula. In addition to the general relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, the friendly inter-Korean relationship also laid a solid foundation for democratic development in South Korea. Most importantly, due to the growing and predominating power of South Korea over the North the South Korean people no longer perceived North Korea as a grave external threat as they did for last several decades. With the treat from both North Korea and the Soviet Union removed, the security rationale so often utilized by authoritarian regimes to justify undemocratic forms of government was no longer applicable. In short, South Korea’s growing power and the changing security environment made democratization possible by overcoming external threat posed by North Korea.

Therefore, the examination of the democratization of South Korea is expected to supplement the statistical analyses by offering a vivid, historical example of the theoretical model presented in earlier in this study. The case study will provide a great deal of insight about how the theory suggested in the previous chapter is applied in the real world.
CHAPTER 4

STATISTICAL ANALYSES: THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT ON DEMOCRACY

This chapter will consist of five sections: 1) descriptive statistics; 2) correlational analyses; 3) regression analyses; 4) discussion of the findings; and 5) implications of the findings. First of all, descriptive statistics for the dependent, the main independent, and the control variables will be presented. They include information on the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values of each variable. The descriptive statistics are valuable information in statistical analysis especially because they can be used to check the validity and reliability of variables and measurements. Following the descriptive statistics, simple correlations between the dependent variable and main independent variables will be explored. In the third section, a series of regression analysis will be presented to uncover causal relations between the dependent and independent variables. And in the final two sections the findings and the relevant implications will be explored.

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in the statistical analyses. The dependent variable for this study is level of democracy as measured in Polity IV. Analyses
of the descriptive statistics for this variable revealed a mean of -0.7, with a standard deviation of 7.64, and ranges from most authoritarian (-10) to most democratic (10). Data is available for most countries, during most years, with a total number of 5048 observations.

The independent variable, militarized conflict, is measured by the total number of instances of conflict in a given year. Scores for this measure are rank in nature and range from 0 (no conflict at all) to 27. The maximum number of conflicts, 27, seems extraordinarily high, especially considering its mean (0.61) and standard deviation (1.23). However, this high number of militarized conflict is concentrated on a few hegemonic states such as the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War and particularly unstable regions like the Middle East. The data is available for most countries, during most years, with 5811 total observations recorded.

The material capability indicator of the Correlation of War project was utilized to measure national power. In principle, material capability should be placed somewhere between 0 and 1, as it represents a portion of global power that a state maintains in a given year. Its real value ranges from 1.00E-06 to 0.210826. Its mean and standard deviation are 0.014652 and 0.0065342 respectively. Not surprisingly, the majority of material capability is maintained by only a few great powers including the United States, the Soviet Union (Russia after 1991), China, Great Britain, and France.

The third independent variable, perceived external threat, is measured in four distinct fashions. Because it is a highly abstract variable, cross-checks between several different indicators were developed to increase reliability. The first measurement of the variable, S score, which measures a state’s compatibility with regional leaders on issues of foreign policy, ranges from -0.98374 to 1. Its mean and standard deviation are 0.321718 and 0.5246633 respectively. The data is available for most countries, during most years. The total number of observations
recorded is 5823. A second measurement for perceived external threat is the percentage of military expenditure in government spending, which ranges from 0 to 55.84. Its mean and standard deviation are approximately 13.08 and 10.15 respectively. Please note that its number of observations is much smaller than those of other variables and thus its usage as a measurement of perceived external threat will be limited only to some forms of analyses such as tests of correlation, while it will be excluded from regression analysis. The third measurement of perceived external threat is rivalry, a dichotomous measurement (0 or 1). Its mean and standard deviation are 0.392684 and 0.4883913 respectively. The final measurement of perceived external threat takes advantage of the World Value Survey data in which respondents answer the questions of “What should be the most important goal of your countries in the next 10 years.” This measurement takes into account the percentages of respondents who answered the question with “strong military security”. While it ranges from 1.2 to 37, its mean and standard deviation are 8.628889 and 7.469131 respectively. Please note that the number of observations for this measurement is quite small (90) because of the nature of the dataset. This survey was extremely limited in its distribution across nation and year. Because of its limited number of observations, this measurement will be excluded from the regression analyses. Despite the limitation of the data, this variable is especially important because it is the most direct measurement of perceived external threat.

There are five control variables to be considered in the regression models; regional democracy, political culture, economic development, economic growth, and British colonial experience. Regional democracy, which is measured by the average Polity score of a given region, ranges from -7.47 to 8.16. Its mean and standard deviation are -0.5239 and 4.210517 respectively. Political culture is a dichotomous variable, which measures whether or not Islam is
a dominant religion in a given state. Its mean is 0.269477, with a standard deviation of 0.4437276. Economic development that, measured by the GDP per capita in 2000 price, ranges from 485.36 to 45797.59. Its mean and standard deviation are 7268.115 and 7674.386 respectively. Economic growth is measured by the percentage of annual growth in GDP per capita. Its mean is 1.505297 and the standard deviation is 6.42134. Considering its modest mean and standard deviation, its range is considerably large to range from -50.49 to 89.83. The last control variable, British colonial experience, is also dichotomous. Its mean and standard deviation are .331021 and .4706224, respectively.

The examination of the descriptive statistics suggests that all measurements, for every variable, reveal are within appropriate range and none of their means and standard deviations is beyond reasonable range. However, it should be noted that some of the variables has only limited number of observations and therefore it may be excluded from some analyses for the sake of improving their credibility.

4.2 Correlation Analyses

Table 4.2 displays the results of correlation analyses for the dependent and the main independent variables. The correlation analyses have several different purposes. The primary purpose of correlation analyses is to observe the general trend of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Observing general trend of the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable through correlation analyses is especially important in this study because some of the measurements of the main independent variables cannot be including the regression analyses due to their small number of observations. Their

22 All the independent variables are 1 year lagged in order to avoid issues of endogeneity and to follow the general rule of causality.
second purpose is to check if there is any significant multicollinearity between independent variables, which may cause serious bias in standard errors of regression estimates. The analyses of correlation demonstrates general trend between the variables such as the degree and direction of correlations between the variables.

The current analyses demonstrate that most of the independent variables are highly correlated with the dependent variable, except militarized conflict measured with the total number of instances, which shows only limited correlation with democracy ($r = 0.0001$). 23

Material capability is also significantly and positively correlated with the dependent variable ($r = 0.1032$). All the measurements of perceived external threat show statistically significant correlation with democracy, and their directions are as expected. S score shows positive correlation with democracy (.2596), which is consistent with my expectation. The percentage of military expenditure in government spending is highly and negatively correlated with democracy ($r = -0.5134$), indicating that states with a high level of military spending may be more likely to be non-democratic. Rivalry is also negatively correlated with democracy ($r = -0.2354$), suggesting that states participating in a rivalry with other states are less likely to be democratic. Finally, the concern of people about national security is also highly, negatively correlated with democracy ($r = -0.4863$).

In sum, with the exception of militarized, all main independent variables show significant correlation with the dependent variable and their directions are consistent with the stated hypotheses. The two variables that show the highest level of correlation with the dependent variable are perceived external threat measured with military spending ($r = -0.5134$) and security concern of people ($r = -0.4863$).

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23 As will be seen in the following analysis, the correlation between militarized conflict and democracy is strong when major states are excluded from the analysis. More detailed discussion will follow.
In a second set of analyses, correlations for non-major states were also explored to examine the effect of power status in the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. As emphasized in the previous chapter, the power status of a state should play an important role in determining the condition in which international conflict exerts negative impact on democracy. Table 4.3 reports the results of the correlation analyses for these target states. In other words, the table shows the results of analyses only for non-major states excluding non-states such the US, the Soviet Union, the Great Britain, etc. It should be noted that some of the results demonstrate significant departure from the previous analysis, while others show a similar pattern.

Unlike the previous analysis which incorporated all states, in the analysis of only non-major states, militarized conflict shows significantly improved (negative) correlation with democracy \( (r = -0.0385) \). Indeed this is a marked change from results in the previous analysis. The remarkable difference indicates that the negative association of international conflict involvement and democracy is conspicuous for weak, non-major states rather than strong, major states. In other words, the analysis suggests the possibility that power status of states will be an intervening factor of the relationship between militarized conflict and democracy.

Material capability maintains strong positive association with democracy \( (r = 0.2113) \). Furthermore, the degree of correlation is much stronger for weak, non-major states than for strong, major states \( (r = 0.2113 \text{ vs. } r = 1.032, \text{ respectively}) \). This may suggest that the role of material capability in the development and maintenance of democracy is more conspicuous for weak, non-major states than for the strong, major states.

This analysis also demonstrates that various measurements of perceived external threat are consistently correlated with the dependent variable, and that their directions are consistent
with expectations. Specifically, whereas $S$ score shows a moderate level of correlation ($r = .2785$), the measurement of military expenditure demonstrates a strong negative correlation with democracy ($r = -.5076$). While both rivalry and people’s concern for national security are significantly, negatively correlated with democracy, the degree of association is much stronger for the latter ($r = -.2479$ and $r = -.4429$, respectively). What is interesting concerning the correlation of perceived external threat and the dependent variable is that there is no noticeable difference between the two analyses, that is, the analyses for all states and that which included only non-major states. As demonstrated before, there is a significant difference in the results for militarized conflict in the two different sets of analyses. While militarized is not significantly correlated with the dependent variable when it was analyzed for all states, the same variable showed significantly improved correlation with the dependent variable when analyzed for weak, non-major states only ($r = 0.0001$ vs. $r = -0.0385$, respectively). However, a comparable difference between the two correlation analyses is not observed for the correlation of perceived external threat and the dependent variable. A possible explanation for this is that the extent to which international conflict provokes perceived external threat may differ as a function of power status of the states involved. In other words, the two sets of analyses suggest that international conflict involvement may not cause serious external threat perception for strong states, while weak states are sensitive to militarized conflict involvement when it comes to the extent it causes external threat perception.

In sum, the two sets of correlation analyses reveal several important points. First, they suggest that perceived external threat is highly correlated with democracy. Second, the correlation of militarized conflict and democracy is different depending on the power status of
the states involved. Third, there is no seriously high multicollinearity among the independent variables that may cause analytic problems.

4.3 Regression Analyses

While correlation analysis reveals general patterns between the independent and dependent variables, correlations do not verify the causal links between the variables in the sense that they do not take control variables into consideration. For the purpose of dealing with these issues, a series of multiple regression analyses were performed, employing the Generalized Estimating Equation models.²⁴

Table 4.4 reports the results of a series of regression analyses. It should be noted that two (military expenditure in total government spending and people’s concern with national security) of the four measurements of perceived external threat are not included in the models due to their limited number of observations as already discussed in the descriptive statistics. However, excluding the two measurements should not produce significant difficulty in the analyses, as the other two measurements (S score and Rivalry) are included in the models. Furthermore, it is not essential to include all four of the measurements because their general pattern with the dependent variable was already discussed in the previous section.

For the purposes of this study, three different types of regressions were performed depending on the sample of the analyses. These three distinct models were chosen to delineate the differing effect of power status on democracy. The preliminary test of the role of power status was done through correlation analyses in the previous section, which suggested the

²⁴It is widely understood among social scientists that even including control variables in the models is not necessarily adequate to indicate a causal link between the dependent and independent variables. The causal relationship between variables must be explained by theory. This study has attempted to illuminate the causal relationship between the current variable via the theoretical perspective in the previous chapter. For more discussion about causality and causal relations, see King, Keohane, and Verba (1994).
determining effect of the variable. The third analysis is done only for non-major and non-democratic states.\textsuperscript{25} This more limited set of sample is based on the argument that democracy once in place is so robust that it is unlikely to be turned over by international conflict (Reiter 2001). The logic behind the argument can be found in the perspectives of democratic consolidation. According to the theorists of democratic consolidation, because the institutional bases for democratic governance lie within a broad societal spectrum including an extensive electorate, free and fair elections, a multiparty political system, a vital legislature, an independent judiciary, an open press and media, and a free civil society, it is more difficult to support return to autocracy in uniform (Diamond et al. 1995). Furthermore, from the micro perspective, people who have already experienced political rights and liberties are less likely to give them up than those who have not. In other words, the security rationale is less likely to work for those who have already experienced the sweetness of political freedom. All the models employ AR1 assumption for correcting potential auto-correlation. As discussed earlier, all the independent variables are 1 year lagged in order to avoid problems of endogeneity.

Model 1A analyzes all states in an effort to determine the role of each independent variable in the development and maintenance of democracy. Most importantly, the variable of militarized conflict does not show statistical significance although its direction is as expected. The results suggest that international conflict may not have a significant effect on democracy in general. Material capability is significantly and negatively associated with regime score – although the association is relatively weak (beta = -23.20654, p<.10). However, it should also be noted that the interpretation of association between material capability and democracy should be

\textsuperscript{25} King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) warn the possibility of underestimating the effect of the independent variables if the range of key variables is intentionally limited. Therefore, it should be noted that the actual statistical significance of the estimates of the independent variables in the regression analyses might be higher than the result tables suggest.
made very cautiously. As discussed in the previous chapters, the variable of material capability is included in this model because it is believed to promote democracy by enhancing defensive capabilities. However, given that material capability is comprised of both offensive and defensive capabilities, it is necessary to distinguish these motivations when attempting to measure perceptions of threat. The problem is that it is not easy to differentiate the two aspects of material capability as demonstrated by the security dilemma thesis (Jervis 1978). Although not entirely sufficient, one way to accomplish this task is to exclude strong, major states from the analyses because they are more likely to build material capability not just for defensive but also for the purpose of expansion and offensive foreign policy. Therefore, when it comes to the interpretation of material capability, analyses for non-major, weak states (model 1B and 1C), instead of all states, should be given more credibility. This principle will be maintained in the following analyses as well.

It is also important to note that both measurements of perceived external threat (S score and Rivalry) reveal a significant, negative impact on democracy, although the level of significance is far greater for Rivalry. These results indicate that the level of democracy is likely to be approximately 2 points lower in Polity Index for state that have participated in a rivalry than that for a state that has not (beta = -2.031597, p<.01). Similarly, the results show that states that have higher foreign policy compatibility with regional leaders are more likely to be democratic than others (beta = .6006482, p<.10).

When it comes to control variables, most of them including economic development, political culture, regional democracy, and British colonial heritage, demonstrate very strong statistical significance with the exception of economic growth. All of regional democracy (beta = .3224115, p<.01), political culture (beta = -6.303759, p<.01), and colonial experience (beta =
2.711237, p<.01) attain statistical significance at the .01 level, while economic development (beta = -.0001165, p<.05) is statistically significant at the .05 level. The achievement of strong statistical significance of control variables is especially important as it indicates that the model is well specified with reference to the existing literature.26

Model 1B analyzes non-major, weak states only. In this model, still, militarized conflict is not statistically significant. By contrast, material capability achieves a substantial degree of statistical significance (beta = 106.4727, p<.05), indicating that states with high defensive capability are likely to be more democratic. As discussed above, when it comes to the interpretation of material capability, the analyses for non-major, weak states only should be given more credibility than the analyses for all states. Both of the measurements for perceived external threat remain significant, while the degree of statistical significance is far stronger for Rivalry (Rivalry beta = -2.053072, p<.01, $S$ score beta = .6101703, p<.10). Finally, most of the control variables, with the exception of economic growth, are statistically significant. In essence, the greatest difference of Model 1B from 1A is that material capability has a significantly positive impact of regime score, indicating that strong states are more likely to be democratic than others.

Model 1C analyzes only non-major and non-democratic states. The threshold of democracy is set to 7 on the Polity index, following the conventional uses in this field (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). Thus, model 1C analyzes the states of which the regime score is 6 or lower among non-major, weak states. As mentioned earlier, this truncated set of sample is based on the argument that once democracy is consolidated, it is so robust that it is unlikely to be subverted by involvement in international conflict. In this model, militarized conflict is shown to have a

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26 As far as model specification is concerned, the control of autocorrelation is also important. Please note that the models appropriately control for the potential autocorrelation problem by assuming it within the panel structure.
significantly strong relationship to democracy (beta = -.1518799, p<.05). The results shows that militarized conflict is negatively associated with regime score for a limited set of sample, that is, non-major and non-democratic states only. In other words, the results indicate that the negative impact of militarized conflict on democracy is true only for non-major and non-democratic states only. Material capability also attains a substantial degree of statistical significance (beta = 136.1398, p<.05) for this truncated set of sample, suggesting that higher defensive, as opposed to offensive, capability is associated with higher Polity score. Perceived external threat is consistently and significantly associated with higher Policy score no matter what the sample is. Both of the measurements, S score (beta = 1.033344, p<.05) and Rivalry (beta = -1.210615, p<.01), show statistical significance to some extent, though the relationship is much stronger between Rivalry and democracy. The results indicate that the states with high foreign policy compatibility with regional leader state is more likely to be democratic than states with no compatibility by approximately 0.6-1.0 point on the democracy index. Likewise, according to the analysis, states with no security rivals are more likely to be democratic than states with rivals by approximately 1.2-2.0 point on the democracy index. When it comes to control variables, the results reveal a similar pattern with previous analyses. While regional democracy (beta = 4752455, p<.01) and British colonial experience (beta = 2.414221, p<.01) attain statistical significance, Islamic political culture, economic development, and economic growth fail to acquire a minimum degree of statistical significance.

In sum, the results of analyses presented in Table 4.4 demonstrate the consistent effects of most of the independent variables, with the exception of militarized conflict. Material capability, foreign policy compatibility, and security rivalry show consistent statistical significance regardless of the samples. However, militarized conflict attains statistical
significance only for more limited sample of states, which are non-major and non-democratic states. The results of the analyses of the role of militarized conflict suggest the significant role of power status, when it comes to democratic vulnerability to militarized conflict. Most of control variables show consistent results regardless of the sample of states, with the exception of economic development, which fails to acquire statistical significance for non-major and non-democratic states.

Table 4.5 presents another set of regression analyses that introduce the interaction effect of militarized conflict and material capability. The interaction term serves as a way of examining the role of the variable of national power to condition the impact of militarized conflict on the dependent variable. The interaction term was computed by multiplying the scores from militarized conflict and those from material capability. This table also presents three different regression analyses depending on the different state samples to be analyzed, just as done in the previous analyses. The only difference between the two sets of analyses is that all models in these analyses include the interaction term of militarized conflict and material capability.

Model 2A analyzes all states. In this analysis, militarized conflict does not show a minimum degree of statistical significance, although its direction is as expected. Material capability is statistically significant, although the strength of this association is marginal (beta = -23.97596, p<.10). However, as emphasized earlier, the interpretation of the material capability variable in this model should be made with caution. Because material capability in this sample may include not only defensive capability but also offensive one, it should not be given more credibility than models analyzing non-major, weak states. The interaction variable constituted by
militarized conflict and material capability fails to achieve even minimal statistical significance.\footnote{The interpretation of interaction variable is somewhat complicated. In principle, the interaction term reveals the conditional effect of the constitutive variables. In other words, the magnitude and significance of the coefficient of the constitutive variables should vary depending on the interaction variable. However, this conditional interpretation is not effective unless the interaction term itself is statistically significant, which is the case in this model. Furthermore, even whether or not the interaction term that is not statistically significant should be included in the model should be determined by how crucial it is in the model considering all possible advantages and disadvantages. For detailed information, see (Brambor et al. 2006).}

In Model 2A both of measurements for perceived external threat, S score (beta = .599695, p<.10) and Rivalry (beta = -2.027605, p<.01), show significant and negative impact on democracy, although their significance is stronger for rivalry. With regard to rivalry, results indicate that the states which have a security rivals are likely to be approximately 2 points lower than states without rival. Similarly, states that have higher foreign policy compatibility with regional leaders are more likely to be democratic than others. When it comes to the control variables, each variable demonstrates a strong statistically significant relationship with democracy, with the exception of economic growth. As noted earlier, the statistical significance of most control variables demonstrates that the model is well specified incorporating the findings of previous studies.

Model 2B analyzes only non-major, weak states. In this model militarized conflict obtains statistical significance although its degree is very weak (beta = -.0722316, p<.10), suggesting that militarized conflict may have a negative impact on democracy for non-major, weak states. Another important point for Model 2B is that material capability has a strong positive association with democracy, indicating that states with higher defensive capability are likely to be more democratic (beta = 105.086, p<.01). The interaction term of militarized conflict and material capability remains statistically insignificant. Both measurements for perceived external threat, S score (beta = .6097126, p<.10) and Rivalry (beta = -2.049975, p<.01), are still
significant. Indeed the theory suggests that regardless of the target for analysis, perceived external threat should have significant negative impact on democracy. Finally, all the control variables with the exception of economic growth are still significant.

Model 2C analyzes only non-major and non-democratic states only. In this model, militarized conflict again fails to acquire statistical significance, while material capability shows strong positive association with democracy (beta = 147.8136, p<05). The interaction variable continues to show no association between this interaction and democracy. As in the two previous analyses, both of the measurements of perceived external threat, S score (beta = 1.014473, p<.05) and Rivalry (beta = -1.231292, p<.01), display strong significance. Some of the control variables fail to acquire statistical significance. While regional democracy (beta = .4752056, p<.01) and British colonial experience (beta = 2.436935, p<.01) are still significant, Islamic political culture, development and economic growth show no statistically significant relationship in this model.

4.4 Summary of Findings and Hypotheses Testing

As described in previous sections, the statistical analyses in this study provide many important findings concerning the relationship between perceived external threat, international conflict, power status, and democracy. Most of these findings are consistent with the theory presented in previous chapters, while some demonstrate inconsistency with anticipated outcomes. In this section, the previously detailed analyses will discussed as they pertain to the previously designated hypotheses.

One of the most significant and consistent findings in the analyses is that perceived external threat has a significantly negative impact on democracy. In other words, according to the analyses, states facing high external threat are less likely to be democratic than states that
maintain a high degree of security assurance. This finding confirms the first hypothesis of this study (H1) that perceived external threat is negatively associated with the level of democracy. This finding is considerably robust as it persists across different measurements, and different samples. Indeed it is essential part of the analyses to cross-check the reliability of measurements, given that perceived external threat is a concept that evades easy operationalization. Using different indicators of perceived external threat such as the presence/absence of security rival, foreign policy compatibility with regional leader, military expenditure in total government spending, and people’s concern about national security, perceived external threat is significantly associated with lower level of democracy.

Unlike the consistent and strong findings of perceived external threat, militarized conflict appears to have more complex relationship to democracy. When the interaction variable of militarized conflict and material capability is included in the analyses (Model 2A-2C), militarized conflict fails to achieve a substantial degree of statistical significance, the only exception being Model 2B (p<.10), which appears to be only mildly associated with democracy. However, it is very likely that the inclusion of the interaction term, which increases the chances of high multi-collinearity between the interaction variable and the component variables, undermines the statistical significance of the constitutive variables. If this is the case, it might be constructive to omit the interaction variable and re-run the model, unless the theory prohibits it (Friedrich 1982). In other words, whether or not an interaction variable should be included in the model should be determined by considering the advantages (such as enhancing statistical significance of constitutive variables) and disadvantages (such as loss of theoretical implication).

In these analyses, the interaction term was introduced in the models to help illuminate the conditional impact of militarized conflict as a function of national power. Given that not only the
interaction variable but also the distinction of different samples depending on power status serves the similar purpose, however, it can be regarded that the models are still specified well enough even if the interaction term is left out of the models. When the interaction variable is omitted from the models (Model 1A-3A), the analyses of militarized conflict present somewhat consistent, although limited, findings. According to the analyses, while the involvement of international conflict does not have significant impact on strong, major states, it is found to exert significant negative impact on democracy for non-major and non-democratic states (Model 1C, p<.05). Therefore, this finding partly supports the second hypotheses (H2) that international conflict is likely to have a negative impact on democracy. Although the proposition does not hold for all states, it appears to be true for more limited span of analysis, that is, weak, non-major and non-democratic states.

Ultimately, this finding specifies the conditions under which militarized conflict has a significantly negative influence on democracy. It suggests that the proposition that international conflict has negative influence on democracy holds under some conditions such as non-major and non-democratic states, rather than universally applied to all states. This finding is also compatible with the previously suggested theoretical framework that perceived external threat amongst populace is crucial when discussing the impact of international conflict on democracy. Because weak, non-major states are more likely to be concerned about, and vulnerable to, a hostile external environment, international conflict increases perceived level of threat, and is thus more likely to have a serious, negative impact on democracy.

Furthermore, according to the analyses, power status is not the only factor that mediates the negative impact of international conflict on democracy. Regime type was also shown to play a mediating role between international conflict and democracy, with non-democratic states
showing more susceptibility to negative impact during international conflict. In other words, the negative impact of international conflict on democracy is observed only for non-democratic states, according to the analyses. This limited applicability was previously explained by the proposition that democracy, once in place, is robust enough to survive militarized conflict.

Another consistently significant finding relates to the impact of national power, especially material power, on democracy. While the analyses of all states reveal a significant, negative impact of material capability on democracy, the effect becomes stronger (p<.05), when the analyses are limited to non-major states only. This finding suggests that defensive capability, as opposed to offensive capability, is positively associated with democracy. Ultimately, this supports the third hypothesis (H3) that defensive national power is positively associated with democracy because defensively strong states are less likely to be vulnerable to external security threats.

The joint condition of non-major and non-democratic states partially confirms the fourth hypothesis (H4) that national power is negatively associated with the impact of international conflict involvement on democracy. Not just power status but also regime type conditions the extent of negative impact of international conflict involvement on democracy, according to the analyses. The interaction term of militarized conflict and material capability was also expected to serve a similar role in the analyses, that is, to test the differing effect of international conflict on democracy depending on the power status of states. However, as observed in the previous section, the interaction term fails to achieve the necessary statistical significance in each model. One of the possible explanations for the failure to acquire statistical significance is the joint condition of power status and regime type, as described above. That is, the extent of the impact of international conflict on democracy is influenced by the joint condition of national power and
regime type, not by the level of power alone. The failure to achieve statistical significance by the interaction term of militarized conflict and material capability, therefore, does not entirely reject the fourth hypothesis of the differing degrees of the effect of international conflict on democracy. Instead, it should be regarded that it is partly supported by the joint conditions.

Overall, the analyses above suggest that a peaceful international security environment is an important facilitator of democracy and/or democratic development. Indeed democracy has long been considered as the outcome of a domestic political process that is not influenced by the external environment and actors. As a result, the area of comparative politics to which democracy/democratization issue is supposed to belong has been regarded as a separate field from international relations. The analyses in this study dictate that this perspective needs to be changed to accommodate the assertion that domestic issues such as democracy should be studied not only as outcomes of domestic political process, but also as the consequences of international politics.

Among many different aspects of international relations, the analyses above focus on security stability for the most part, although some attention was given to some other factors such as regional democracy. Especially, according to the analyses, such factors as international conflict involvement, national power, perceived external threat represented by the presence of security rival and foreign policy compatibility have at least some impact on democracy although its scope and strength are varying.

International conflict involvement demonstrates more limited scope of impact on democracy than was expected in terms of power status and regime type. That is, the negative impact of international conflict involvement on democracy was true only for non-major and non-democratic states. However, this limited finding is not surprising, given that different states
respond to international conflict involvement differently. For example, domestic politics of strong states are less likely to be influenced by conflict with other states, or more advanced and consolidated democracies are robust enough to survive international conflict.

Unlike the limited scope of international conflict involvement, perceived external threat demonstrates a wide range of influence on democracy. Without regard to power status and regime type, perceived external threat is found to exert a negative impact on democracy widely. Specifically, the analyses indicate that foreign policy compatibility with regional leader is an important factor that influences and reflects external threat. Thus, states whose views are highly compatible with regional power states are more likely to be democratic because they should perceive less external threat from the power states. Likewise, the presence of a security rival is also found to have negative impact on democracy by enhancing the external threat perception threat of the states involved. For example, the hostile security rivalries between Arab states and Israel in Middle East, Greece and Turkey, North and South Korea, undermined their potential for democracy for the states as they increases their perception of external threat. These findings are also supported by some evidence on the perception of external threats such as military spending and citizens’ poll on important state goals. Even though the indicators were not included in the regression models because of limited availability of data, the correlation analyses earlier support the results of the regression analyses.

One of the most significant findings of the analyses is the positive role of national power on democracy. The analyses demonstrate that national material power, especially defensive power, has a consistent and positive impact on democracy. Furthermore, the negative impact of international conflict involvement on democracy is not empirically supported for strong, major states, but instead, is limited only to non-major and non-democratic states. In other words, not
only does national power serve as a facilitator of democracy but also as an intervening variable that conditions the negative impact of international conflict involvement on democracy. Indeed the finding is not surprising, given that, other things being equal, strong national power is likely to decrease external threat perception, as presented by the theory in the previous chapters.28

The findings concerning national power are particularly important in that the power variable has been largely overlooked by the previous studies in democracy or democratization and it has been considered only as a security-relevant variable. The findings above suggest that this perspective needs to be changed because power is relevant not only for security, but also in the process of domestic politics such as democracy. This is the ground where international relations and comparative politics meet. The traditional belief about the two major subfields of political science is that they have distinct areas of study, that is, international interaction for IR and domestic politics for comparative politics, and thus there is little room for them to interact with each other. As seen from the case of the significant role by material capability in the process of democracy/democratization in this study, however, a new conception of combining domestic politics and security studies needs to be introduced in the study of political science.

4.5 Implications for the Study of Democratic Peace

It is worth noting that this project bears significant implications for the democratic peace research. In this section, I will discuss how and to what extent this study can influence the research program. While the studies on the relationship between peace and regime type have

28 One may argue that material power is synonymous with economic development and thus the power thesis is exactly the same as the modernization theory – namely, that economic development leads to democracy. However, it should be noted that material power is different from economic development because it is a larger concept that encompasses many different components besides economic development. Indeed, as pointed out earlier, the material capability index generated by Correlates of War project consists of six components including energy consumption, military spending, military personnel, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population.
been performed at the dyadic, monadic, and systemic level (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997), the current discussion will be focused on the dyadic and national levels because systemic level of analyses is not as relevant to this project as the other two.\textsuperscript{29}

As mentioned earlier, the democratic peace theory is often appraised as the most significant contribution of the liberal tradition of IR scholarship. There are very few findings that have influenced current U.S. foreign policy more than this theory. And the research on the relationship between democratic states lies at the heart of the discussion. The democratic peace thesis at the dyadic level states that democratic states do not go to war against each other. This thesis has been repeatedly affirmed by numerous empirical studies subsequent to the appearance of the seminal article by Small and Singer (Small and Singer 1976).\textsuperscript{30} However, unlike the strong empirical regularity of peace between democracies there still remains doubt regarding the relevance of the theoretical perspectives. Indeed, contrary to the eagerness of its proponents, its critics are skeptical about the tendency to describe simple correlation in a causal relationship.

Meanwhile, the national version of the democratic peace theory states that democracies are more peaceful than non-democracies, not just in relationship with other democracies but in general. Unlike the remarkable empirical regularity at the dyadic level, however, the peacefulness of democratic states at the national level is not strongly supported empirically. Rather, the conventional wisdom is, as noted above, that democracies are as war prone as non-democracies in general, while they do not engage in war against each other, as mentioned above.\textsuperscript{31} However, very recently the trend began to shift toward denying the “separate peace.”

\textsuperscript{29} The examination of the literature on the democratic peace is limited to the extent that it is necessary for further discussion rather than expanded to the full review because it is not the main focus of the study.


\textsuperscript{31} This is often called ‘separate peace’ proposition by some scholars including Doyle (1983), and Russett and Oneal (2001a).
series of studies using advanced quantitative methods asserts that democracies are less war prone than other regimes (Benoit 1996; Rummel 1983). Their conclusion becomes more significant when it comes to ‘war initiation’ instead of ‘war involvement’ (Rousseau et al. 1996; Rioux 1998; Schultz 2001). Rousseau et al. (1996, 527) claim that “democracies are less likely to initiate crises with other types of states.” Although the empirical evidence is not as clear as that at the dyadic level, it should be noted that the peaceful effect of democracy at the national level has just begun to be realized.32

The democratic peace project, whether it is directed toward the dyadic or monadic level of research, is criticized because of its divergent theoretical and empirical perspectives. This causes some fervent critics to consider alternative explanations to the empirical regularity (Farber and Gowa 1997; Rosato 2003; Layne 1994; Farber and Gowa 1995). One of strongest alternative hypotheses to the democratic peace thesis is that the causal arrow is reversed, that is, peace causes democracy rather than vice versa. It is indispensable to consider the possibility of the reverse causality when variables A and B demonstrate significant association as long as it is theoretically plausible.33 The consideration of the reversed causation is very important because, as mentioned before, no consideration of the possible reversed causality in a causal equation serves as an omitted variable, which necessarily biases the estimate of an independent variable.

However, the degree of significance of the reversed thesis to the democratic peace research differs depending on whether its target is research at the national level or at the dyadic level. It is critical to the democratic peace research at the national level. Verification of the second hypothesis in this study positing that peace causes democracy would make it possible to

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32 It seems that different perspectives on the presence/absence of the peacefulness of democracies in general stem at least partly from the differing definitions of “war-proneness.” When it is defined as “war involvement, democracies are as war-prone as non-democracies. Yet, when it is defined as “war initiation,” democracies are more peaceful than autocracies.

33 Other possibilities include 1) they are in spurious relationship and 2) the association is the result by chance.
directly challenge the democratic peace proposition at the monadic level advocating the peaceful effect of democracy. Regardless of the robustness of the empirical evidence, the democratic peace research at the national level is not complete without consideration of the reverse causation. The empirical evidence regarding the reverse causation constitutes firm grounds to argue that the democratic peace thesis at the monadic level is entirely spurious or, at least, that its impact is exaggerated.

The empirical analyses of the previous sections suggest that the democratic peace at the monadic level is partially, though not entirely, challenged by the reversed causation. Since the reversed thesis is conditionally supported from the empirical standpoint of view, it is supposed to partly undermine the validity of the democratic peace thesis at the national level. At least for the weak and less democratic states, the thesis that high level of democracy leads to more peaceful foreign policy behavior is questioned because the reversed thesis that international peace causes democracy while conflict leads to autocracy is empirically supported. Given that no consideration of the possible reversed causality in a causal equation serves as an omitted variable, which necessarily biases the estimate of an independent variable, at least for the weak and less democratic states, the democratic peace thesis of the national level should be biased because it fails to take the empirically backed reversed thesis into consideration.

Unlike the national level argument, the reversed thesis does not pose a serious threat on the dyadic level proposition that democracies do not fight against each other since their levels of analyses are different. In other words, it does not explain the lack of wars between democracies at the dyadic level. Indeed it is not easy - almost impossible - to refute a dyadic level thesis using a counter-argument at the monadic level. Nonetheless this study can possibly bring an interesting point to consider to the democratic peace at the dyadic level using the reversed thesis.
Indeed one of the most efficient ways to attack democratic peace at the dyadic level is to explain the empirical regularity without resorting to joint democracy, that is, to argue that the absence of war between democracies is due to something else rather than their common regime characteristics. This strategy has been widely employed by previous studies (James et al. 2006; Farber and Gowa 1995; 1997; Layne 1994; Huth and Allee 2002; Oneal and Tir 2006). Their alternative explanations include common interest (Farber and Gowa 1997), security and power (Layne 1994), and territory (Huth and Allee 2002; Gibler 2007). In a similar but reversed causal context, a study asserts that alliance formation and reduced external threat associated with it is one of the causes of democratic transition (Gibler and Wolford 2006).

Using the reversed thesis for the same purpose seems problematic because the thesis that international conflict undermines democracy, or conversely peace promotes democracy, cannot be a sufficient alternative explanation for the absence of wars between democracies. That is, as Mousseau and Shi (1999) point out, if war involvement favors autocratization over democratization, and this is about to explain the democratic peace at the dyadic level, then democratic states should never or at least less likely to engage in wars with non-democracies. Yet the empirical reality is that democracies still do go to war against non-democracies, especially when war-proneness is equated as ‘war involvement,’ as discussed above. Therefore, in order to challenge the thesis at the dyadic level with the reversed causation argument, it is necessary to show that democracies can sustain themselves in spite of the fact that they fight wars against non-democracies.

The findings of the empirical analyses in the previous sections offer some solutions to the above stated problem. According to the analyses, the negative impact of international conflict is conditionally true only for relatively weak, non-major and less democratic states, while the same
effect is not observed for strong, major or more democratic states. In other words, the previous analyses show, democracy in strong, major states or highly democratic states is not vulnerable to international conflict. This finding is consistent with the condition for which the reversed thesis may challenge the democratic peace of dyadic level as previously suggested. This finding is explained by the theory presented earlier, that is, war participation does not necessarily lead to increased perceived external threat, and/or, democracy is robust enough to survive international conflict. In this sense the empirical analyses of the previous sections provides a legitimate ground to argue that the conditional reversed thesis may raise question to the democratic peace thesis of the dyadic level to some extent. However, a great deal of future research is needed in order to find exactly how, and to what extent, democratic peace is influenced by the conditional reversed thesis.

It should be emphasized that this finding does not entirely negate the validity of the democratic peace thesis. Rather, by presenting an alternative explanation to the empirical regularity on which democratic peace is based, this study attempts to raise a question as to the firmly grounded theory. Indeed the democratic peace research program has survived numerous empirical tests and is still considered as the one of the most important and significant findings in IR scholarship. Thus, not surprisingly, it holds huge implications for US foreign policy, especially the policy of proliferation of democracy after the end of the Cold War as a strategy to enhance the security of the US. Indeed the engagement and enlargement policy under the Clinton administration was largely based on the democratic peace thesis. Furthermore, some might argue that the George W. Bush administration also adopted this strategy by attempting to enlarge the democratic group in diverse ways including the invasion of Iraq.
Raising the issue of the reversed causation offers significant policy implications as well. That is, the reversed causation thesis implies that if a strategy enhances regional security, and thereby decreases external threat perception of the people in the region, it is not likely to succeed in transplanting democracy. Furthermore, coercive diplomacy involving military operation may also work against the original intention of proliferation of democracy for some states like weak and non-democratic states. Increased regional instability caused by coercive diplomacy is likely to decrease their potential for democratic transition by increasing external threat perception. Stabilizing regional security would be a better idea than forcefully transplanting democracy in those countries.

Therefore, the findings of this study suggest that the adoption of relevant strategies to pursue the US foreign policy goals should be made with caution. Exclusive and unconditional reliance on the democratic peace proposition and the strategy of spreading democracy could lead to unwanted consequences depending on the situations. Instead, the combination and selective use of stabilizing regional security and spreading democracy would best serve the US foreign policy goals of enhancing national and global security.
CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDY: EXPLAINING THE DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH KOREA

This chapter will provide a discussion of the democratization of South Korea as a case to illustrate the findings of the statistical analyses in the previous chapter. In so doing, I will attempt to explain South Korea’s democratization with reference to the changing security environment. It is expected that this case study will effectively complement the limitations of the analyses in the previous chapter that are inherent in statistical analyses.

5.1 Brief History before Democratization

South Korea, often referred to as one of the “Asian Four Tigers” because of its remarkable economic success, experienced democratic reform relatively recently. Before the significant democratic reform in 1987, the politics of South Korea were dominated by the struggle between security and democracy. In this section, a brief history of Korean politics before democratization and how security issues served to delay democratization in this country will be discussed.
5.1.1 The Korean War and Rhee Syngman Administration (The First Republic)

As the end of the World War II approached, so did the 35 years of Japanese colonial occupation on the Korean peninsula. Still, the newly independent Korea was divided and dominated by the two prevailing world powers. The southern half of the Korean peninsula was dominated by American troops, while the northern half came under the influence of the Soviet Union. After the division, the first formal Korean constitution was adopted by the National Assembly on July 12, 1948. The constitution stated explicit that the newly independent Republic of Korea “shall be a democratic republic” and that “the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea shall reside in the people from whom all state authority emanate” (Oh 1999, 84). However, despite the democratic features of this first constitution, a series of authoritarian regimes dominated South Korean politics for several decades. These regimes took full advantage of the unstable security environment to remain in power and subjugate the populace until the real democratic transition occurred in 1987.

Rhee Syngman was elected as the first President of South Korea in 1948, while the people of the North chose Kim Il Sung as their leader. The Korean War erupted with a full-scale invasion by Northern forces on June 25, 1950, less than two years after the inauguration of the first Rhee administration in South Korea. The war lasted for over three years until a truce was signed by the United States and North Korea in July 1953. It is suggested that the war cost over one million civilian lives and an estimated three billion dollars of damages for both North and South Korea. Literally, the war had effectively turned the Korean peninsula into a social and economic ruin.

In addition to the social and economic impacts, the war brought significant political consequences as well. The autocracy of the Rhee Syngman government was significantly
strengthened. Indeed, even after the war ended, Rhee took advantage of the unstable security environment associated with the war as the rationale to prolong his tenure. During the war, Rhee proposed a constitutional amendment in which the president is elected by the direct vote of the people instead of the indirect vote by the members of the National Assembly. Although it seemed like a more democratic reform, it had little to do with promoting the political rights of the people. Rather, it was the result of Rhee’s obsession to be reelected. Unlike the National Assembly, who were well aware of the Rhee’s despotic behavior and thus extremely hostile to him, the ordinary people of South Korea still held respect for Rhee as the “Founding Father.” Thus, Rhee judged that direct election by the people would be conducive to his reelection.

In November 1954, Rhee encouraged the adoption of yet another constitutional amendment which allowed Rhee a third four-year presidential term. According to the evaluation by Oh (1999, 40), “as Rhee became absolutely powerful, his regime tuned into a corrupt and arrogant clique that remained aloof from the people, whose lives had hardly improved during Rhee’s twelve-year rule.” Thus, Rhee took advantage of the crisis with the communist North Korea to establish an unchallengeable autocratic regime. The Rhee administration unceasingly infused the people with fear of a second Korean War, and thus the necessity of powerful, united government. Those who already experienced the devastating impact of war easily succumbed to Rhee’s persuasions. “Eradication of Communism” and “Reunification of the Koreas by Marching North” were the two of the most powerful slogans of the Rhee government. During that time, national security was given top priority over anything, and the development of democracy was set aside. The former President, Kim Young Sam, stated about the Rhee Syngman administration as following (1997):
……Under President Rhee Syng Man’s government, even though liberal democracy was adopted in principle as the official political and social system, rigid anti-communism predominated as the working ideology. Whenever tensions occurred between these two ideologies, anti-communism took precedence over liberal democracy. The suppression of democracy actually increased, as the Rhee government tried to hold onto power through constitutional revisions, election fraud, and human rights violations…….

The formidable Rhee administration was toppled by the “4.19 Student Uprising” in 1960. In response to Rhee’s fraudulent reelection efforts, on April 19, 1960 more than three thousands of college students surged into the streets, demanding the resignation of President Rhee. This initial student uprising stimulated severe resentment among the general populace, who later joined in the demonstrations. Not surprisingly, the Rhee government declared martial law and heavily armed forces were brought into Seoul to quell the uprising. Rhee again attempted to employ the security rationale to escape this difficulty and achieve his political goals, blaming the uprising as an attempt by “devilish hands of the communists” to disrupt peaceful society in South Korea. Yet, the hostility of the people was too overwhelming to be appeased by the security rhetoric. More importantly, the U.S. government was opposed to the Rhee government this time. On April 19, the U.S. Secretary of States, Christian A. Herter delivered a message stating that “this government believes that the demonstrations in Korea are a reflection of public dissatisfaction over the conduct of the recent elections and repressive measures unsuited to a free democracy” (U.S. Department of State 1964). Rhee finally resigned on the evening of April 26, 1960 and the Second Republic of South Korea followed the sudden fall of the First Republic.
5.1.2 The 4.19 Student Uprising and Chang Myun Administration (the Second Republic)

The 4.19 Student Uprising was the first movement toward democratization from the bottom in the political history of South Korea. The succeeding Second Republic abandoned the presidential system of government and adopted an elaborate parliamentary system. The initial constitution was drastically amended in June 1960 to accommodate more democratic measures. The national assembly was changed to a bicameral institution, with a newly established political office – prime minister. The prime minister was to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the lower House. This new office was expected to balance power with the power of the President. Furthermore, the new constitution significantly expanded the political rights of the people stating “the people’s press and publications freedom and the freedom of assembly and associations will not be restricted.” As a result of the national election in June 1960, the main opposition party, the Democratic Party, occupied the majority in both bodies of legislatures, and Chang Myun (John M. Chang) was elected as the prime minister on August 19 of the same year.

However, contrary to the high expectation of the people of the 4.19 uprising, the democratic Chang administration demonstrated little capability to appropriately manage political, social, and economic issues. At every turn, authoritative decision making was blocked by cours, students, the press, and leftist partisan politics, and so on. In the end, the Chang administration failed to adequately channel diverse demand from various sectors of the country and was unable to stabilize political processes. As with many cases of premature democracy, participatory politics led to the inflation of demands and resulted in destructive freedom during the Second Republic of South Korea (Choi 1978). The short-lived democratic Second Republic was finally overthrown by a military coup led by Major General Park Jung Hee on May 16, 1961. Park became the third President of South Korea the next year.
5.1.3 The First Military Coup (“The 5.16 Coup”) and the Park Jung Hee Administration
(The Third and Fourth Republic)

The Park Jung Hee administration, initially founded upon a military coup, quickly attempted to compensate for its lack of legitimacy through economic performance. Indeed under the circumstance of severe poverty in which annual per capita income was as little as $82 like South Korea in 1962, the military coup aiming for economic boost easily gained popular approval. This unfortunate phenomenon is surprisingly clear in Park Jung Hee’s statement (Oh 1999, 52):

…… One cannot deny that people are more frightened of poverty and hunger than totalitarianism….. The purpose of this revolution is to reconstruct the nation and establish a self-sustaining economy, and its essential purpose is to restore to all the people the political and economic systems which had become the possession of a few privileged classes……

He started the state-led industrialization project with the slogan of “liberation from poverty.” Thanks to the successful economic take-off, South Korea achieved remarkable economic growth during Park’s tenure, and earned its name as one of the four “Asian Tigers.” By 1996 South Korea became the 12th largest economy in the world and joined the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). GDP per capita skyrocketed from $82 in 1961, the year of the coup, to $1,644 in 1979, when he was shot to death, while the volume of export increased from $50 millions to $15,055 millions for the same time span. An average annual growth rate of GNP of about 10% between 1965 and 1979 during Park’s term laid the foundations for the spectacular economic success. Undoubtedly, South Korea was very successful in fighting against poverty during the Park administration.
However, Park’s undeniable economic achievement did not come without cost. Civil liberties that were restored during the Second Republic – freedom of press, speech, and association – was severely restricted throughout his tenure. The military junta, which executed the coup, has repeatedly arrested the journalists on charges of publishing “false information” and or writing stories “detrimental to the national security” (Scalapino 1962, 32). In particular, Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), the body supposedly responsible for national security, served as a key instrument in manipulating domestic politics and keeping surveillance over all important aspects of Korean life.

Park’s obsession with power brought another constitutional amendment, and eventually, the Fourth Republic in 1972 in which the term limitation of presidency was removed. President Park was given a blanket power of emergency under the new constitution. However, official reasons for this constitution were “to emphasize unity in order to have a dialogue with the North” because South Korea “cannot afford to risk political disunity when North Koreans have complete control over everything their people say and do.” Furthermore, Park attributed the amendment to the need to adapt to the changing international security conditions, such as the rapprochement between the United States and China following President Nixon’s visit to Peking, the normalization of relations between China and Japan, and the breakdown of diplomatic relationship between Japan and Taiwan. He also stated the following:

In order to consolidate national unity, to coalesce national opinion and to enable all people to prepare themselves thoroughly for an impregnable posture of national security, I, hereby, promulgate the Presidential Emergency Measures for Safeguarding National Security and Public Order in accordance with the provisions of Article 53 of the Constitution.

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recent development in Indochina, there emerged a trend among a number of free world nations, of showing uneasiness or misgivings towards defense commitments of the United States. Some of them are even seeking a reappraisal of readjustment of their relations with the United States.

In a word, President Park took advantage of the external security environment to justify the strengthening of his dictatorship, and this strategy was effective in persuading the people to a great extent. Due to a series of instances during the time and continuous military tension against North Korea, the people of South Korea seemed to perceive relatively high degree of security threat whether it is real or just perception. South Koreans were literally shocked when 31 commandos from North Korea nearly succeeded in assassinating President Park in January 1968. Three days later, the U.S. ship Pueblo was seized by North Korea, who refused to return the ship and its crew, charging that the ship intruded its territorial waters with hostile military intentions. Furthermore, the incessant infiltrations by the armed agencies of the North and frequent military collisions near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) strengthened the perception of a security threat among the people of South Korea.

The role of the U.S. foreign policy in the 1970’s also played a key role in the politics of South Korea. The President Carter’s policy centering human rights and withdrawal of American troops from the soil of South Korea appeared to have intensified the perception of security threat in the minds of South Korean people. The perception was not only limited to the policy making sectors but also shared by the public. A survey in 1977 by a newspaper showed that 64.8% of those interviewed stated that their greatest concern was the withdrawal of American troops, followed by inflation (44.4%), children’s education (25.7%), and taxes (22.9%).\textsuperscript{36} The projected withdrawal of the U.S. troops was especially disturbing to the South Korean people because the arms race between the two Koreas was, at that time, evaluated favor of the North (Cho 1969).

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Joonang Ilbo} (The Joongang Daily), September 23, 1977.
In sum, the authoritarian regime under President Park was the result of his obsession with the presidency and the uncertain international security milieu surrounding the Korean peninsula. Park took full advantage of the uncertain security environment and successfully persuaded the vulnerable people of South Korea to accept his autocratic rule. The interplay of these forces ultimately culminated in the politically repressive regime in South Korea.

5.1.4 The Second Military Coup (“The 12.12 Coup”) and the Chun Doo Hwan Administration (The Fifth Republic)

The dictatorial rule of President Park came to an end when he was shot and killed by his subordinate in October 1979. This sudden collapse of the fourth republic brought another chance for democratization in South Korea. Indeed, even under the martial law since 1975, there arose a strong desire among the people of South Korea for a return to democratic government. Immediately following the assassination of President Park, a survey indicated that the majority of the people (approximately 73% of those interviewed) clearly expressed their preference for wide political reforms and the institutions of democratic government. In particular, respondents favored the a direct popular election of the president enhanced authority for legislative and judiciary bodies to provide checks and balances, and a system of local autonomy.37

Despite the rising desire for democratic rule, all hope of such a government evaporated when the second military coup, led by Major General Chun Doo Hwan, took place on December 12, 1979 (the so called “12.12 Coup”). With the successful coup, General Chun quickly seized the power, suppressing numerous attempts at opposition with brute military force. The Kwangju Massacre in May 1980 in which armed soldiers opened fire at the thousands of unarmed demonstrators, was a most alarming signal that Chun had established a “new military regime.”

37 Dong-A Ilbo (The Dong-A Daily) December 25, 1979 and January 3 and 7, 1980.
He was elected president by the National Conference of Unification in August 1980, replacing acting president Choy Kyu Ha.

It is widely accepted that the Fifth Republic, headed by Chun, was one of the harshest authoritarian regimes in contemporary Korean history. The greater protection of human rights established in the constitution of the Fifth Republic were rendered nearly completely ineffective by the laws passed by the Legislative Council for National Security, which suspended the operation of the National Assembly. For example, “the Press Law” passed on December 26, 1980 effectively abolished press freedom, while the “Basic Labor Laws” passed on December 30, 1980 drastically curtailed workers’ rights. Furthermore, torture and other excessive means of force were common practice in political cases to extract a confession. Ultimately, the judicial system functioned to strengthen the authoritarian regime, as opposed to enhancing checks and balance and democracy.

As did his predecessors, President Chun justified his tight control of political activity and repression of dissent in the name of national security. The Kwangju uprising, an attempted democratic revolution, was characterized by a “turmoil engineered by dangerous revolutionaries sympathetic to the Communist northern puppets” (Oh 1999, 83). Similarly, all movements toward democratization were quickly suppressed in the name of national

The national security rationale by the Chun regime was strengthened in part by a series of international instances surrounding the Korean peninsula at that time. In early September 1983 Korean Airlines flight 007, on its way from Anchorage to Seoul, was shot down by a Soviet Jet fighter near Sakhalin. All the 269 persons aboard the aircraft were killed. Even before the shock over the Korean Airlines tragedy had settled down, another violent crisis hit South Korea. Only one month after this tragedy, during President Chun’s 18 day, six-nation trip abroad in October
1983, a powerful bomb exploded in the Martyr’s Mausoleum in Rangoon, Burma. President Chun and his wife were scheduled to visit the Mausoleum for a wreath-laying ceremony and only narrowly escaped this attempted assassination. While President Chun himself escaped death, many of his major staffs including Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Presidential Secretary General died in the attack. The South Korean armed forces and the US troops stationed in South Korea were placed on full alert. The Burmese government ultimately concluded that that the terrorist attack was executed by the North Korean army commandos – further aggravating the already elevated military tension between the two Koreas.

Unlike the early years of President Chun’s regime, some important changes were being made as he approached the end of his 7-year term. The demand for democratization among civil society was growing, and the middle class was beginning to emerge as a significant social force. Most importantly, international security environment such as inter-Korean relations and East-West confrontations was beginning to change. This combination of factors opened the door for democratization to be realized in South Korea.

5.1.5 The Struggle between Security and Democracy

From the examination of the political history before democratization, it is clear that security issues consistently hindered democratic development in South Korea. Rhee, followed by Park and Chun, frequently utilized threats to national security to legitimate their dictatorial regimes against domestic oppositions. Whenever the threat from North Korea became conspicuous or domestic instability would rise in response to the autocratic nature of the regimes, the national police and the military intervened and the elite of South Korea took advantage of the security situations to justify a strong military presence and martial law, stating that those
measures were necessary to maintain national security and social order. Furthermore, the 
undemocratic leadership in South Korea received only limited protestation from the U.S., which 
had significant strategic interest in political stability on Korean peninsula during the Cold War.

The “4.19 Student Uprising” and “The First Military Coup” of the late 1950’s and the 
early 1960’s was a the first critical juncture for democratization in South Korea.. The Rhee 
adминистration, which was seriously threatened by decreasing electoral popularity, resorted to a 
series of anticommunist measures for the purpose of enhancing unity and support amongst the 
people. In December 1958, a new strengthened National Security Law was passed in the name of 
investigating pro-communist activities. However, this law served only to suppress the 
oppositional party and control antigovernment press. In May 1959, the government also ordered 
the shutdown of one of the major newspapers in Korea at the time, Kyonghyang Daily, which 
was highly critical of the Rhee administration throughout the 1950s, arguing that the newspaper 
was detrimental to national security. Another critical anti-communist measure done by the Rhee 
adминистration was to execute Cho Pong Am, the head of the Progressive Party, charging that 
Cho and the Progressive Party under his leadership had colluded with North Korea and thus 
dermined national security. However, the anti-communist measures by the Rhee regime failed 
to garner the success previously achieved in the early 1950s immediately after the Korean War. 
In spite of the harsh anti-communist measures, anti-regime protests rapidly spread across the 
country, and the autocratic Rhee administrations was finally overthrown. Rhee’s resignation was 
undoubtedly influenced by the contemporary American policy. In those years the US began to 
shift from a stance of ‘reluctant tolerance’ to a public condemnation of the Rhee regime’s 
repressive tactics. Ultimately, this shift, combined with a simultaneous call for democratic 
reform, greatly influenced the end of the First Republic (Eckert et al. 1990, 355).
However, the sudden democratic transition was unable to survive the military coup and the democratic Second Republic was only short-lived. The new administration led by Park Jung Hee was also authoritarian in nature just like the Rhee regime. Park employed a set of institutional mechanisms to repress the expansion of anti-government groups in the name of strengthening national security. The powerful Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was very effective in controlling the opposition by student groups and labor unions. Also, the anti-communist law and national security law were strengthened to allow severe punishment of anti-government movement for causing social unrest and undermining national security. The climax of Park’s autocratic rule was his proclamation of an emergency decree called October Yushin in 1972, in which the National Assembly was dissolved and replaced by an emergency cabinet, all political activities were prohibited, and the constitution was amended to strengthened Park’s rule. There is no denying that KCIA, anti-communist law, and national security law were his major instruments in sustaining his dictatorship. In a word, his anti-communism campaign was as effective as the early 1950s in suppressing opposition, as he was successful in converting economic development into political popularity.

The second critical juncture of democratization in South Korea was the period from the late 1970s to the early 1980 when the authoritarian system of Yushin collapsed. With the assassination of President Park in 1979, Chun Doo Hwan took power through a second military coup. Many Koreans expected that Park’s death would bring full democracy in South Korea. However, contrary to the expectation of many Koreans, authoritarian rule on the southern half of the Korean peninsula was extended through Chun’s oppression of the nation wide opposition, which included the “Kwangju Uprising.” After taking power, Chun resorted to diverse anti-communist and national security campaign to silence opposition, just as his predecessors had.
In short, South Korea was unable to achieve solid democratization during these two critical junctures. The first democratizing attempt represented by the “4.19 Student Uprising,” was initially successful, yet later failed when the democratic Second Republic was immediately toppled by the first military coup and the subsequent autocratic Third Republic led by Park was established. Likewise, the second chance for democratic development was squelched by Chun Doo Hwan’s succession following the second military coup. The resulting autocratic regimes had undoubtedly taken advantage of the security rationale to justify their rules. The security rationale was a very successful strategy for each autocratic because the people of South Korea were living in a volatile international environment. Although South Korea began to exceed the North in economic capability late 1970s thanks to the remarkable economic growth during the 1960s and 1970s, it was far from predominant over the North for the period. Rather, for the significant period of time until the mid 1970s, North Korea exceeded the South in economic capability, although it is hard to make precise comparisons because of the paucity of data on North Korea’s economy. Furthermore, the military balance between the two countries was assessed quite even until the late 1970s according to the analysis of the U.S. government. As a matter of fact, for the most period from the division until the mid 1970s, military advantage went in favor of the North, as did economic capability. Therefore, given the inferior or competing economic and military capability, South Korea was exposed to considerable external threat throughout this period. Even if war seemed unlikely, the North Korean capability to initiate subversive operation

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38 According to the comprehensive assessment of the military balance between the two Koreas published by the Congressional Budget Office in May 1978, North Korea had advantage in such areas as numbers of tanks, artillery pieces, air defense system, number of tactical aircraft, and unconventional warfare forces, while South Korea was given the advantage in the areas like ground force manpower, technical capability, and defense positions on advantageous terrain. However, overall they were assessed quite even in military capability (Congressional Budget Office 1978).
created enough external threat for the South Korean people to allow autocratic forms of
government.

The international security environment of this period also intensified South Korea’s
external threat perception. Especially, the U.S. troop withdrawal plan announced by the Carter
administration significantly strengthened the external threat perception of the South Korean
people in the late 1970s. As mentioned earlier, a national poll performed in 1979 indicated that
the withdrawal of the U.S. troops was the primary national concern to them. Although the plan
was not implemented as announced, its discussion itself was serious enough to stimulate security
concern among the people of South Korea, especially given the lack of superiority of the South
over the North in military capability.

In addition to the specific policies of the U.S. government, the general international
security environment of the time also worked against successful democratization of South Korea
during these two critical junctures. The harsh confrontation between the East and the West
during the Cold War preoccupied the consciousness of the U.S. The US foreign policy of the day
placed priority on strategic positioning and regional stability. For example, although Panama was
a dictatorship, the U.S. supported the government because of its strategic importance (Harrison et
al. 1980, 5-8). Though South Korea was strategically important to the US, the promotion of
democracy in the region was limited while focus was placed on maintaining political stability.
Statements by General John Wickham on the “Kwangju Uprising” and President Chun are
representative of the US stance toward autocratic rule of South Korea. He stated as follows
(Shorrock 1986, 1204):

………. Provided that [Chun] comes to power legitimately and demonstrates over time a
broad base of support from the Korean people, and does not jeopardize the security of the
situations, we will support him because that, of course, is what we think the Korean people want…….

In sum, the political history before democratization in South Korea can be characterized as the struggle between democracy and security. The examination of the two critical junctures reveals that security issues hindered smooth democratization of the country. The unstable security condition was fully exploited by the successions of autocratic leaders in South Korea. High external threat perception, brought on by the Korean War and an unstable environment of international security, allowed each of these regimes the opportunity to increase in power and authoritarian rule.

5.2 The Democratic Transition of South Korea

On June 29, 1987 Roh Tae Woo, the presidential candidate of the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) in South Korea declared an eight point democratization package, which included “1) a constitutional amendment for direct election of the president by all Koreans twenty or older; 2) revising the presidential election law to ensure freedom of candidacy and fair competition; 3) amnesty for longtime democratic dissident Kim Dae Jung and other political prisoners, allowing them to resume political activities; 4) protection human dignity and promotion of basic rights, including an unprecedented extension of the writ of habeas corpus; 5) restoring freedom of the press by abolishing the repressive Basic Press Law; 6) educational autonomy and local self-government through the popular election of local assemblies and executive heads of local governments; 7) creating a new political climate for dialogue and compromise, especially among competing political parties; and 8) a commitment to enact bold social reforms to build a clean, honest, and more just society” (Diamond and Shin 2000,6). This
declaration, so called “The 6.29 Declaration,” is considered to be the first step in Korea’s democratic transition since it established independence in 1945.

Following the 6.29 declaration, the National Assembly of Korea drafted and approved a new constitutional framework on October 12, 1987, which was ratified sixteen days later by 93 percent of voters in a national referendum. Moreover, a variety of further liberalizing reforms were adopted during the subsequent Roh Tae Woo administration to safeguard political rights and civil liberties of individuals and associations. Some examples of these reforms include the enactment of new laws allowing assemblies and demonstrations, the establishment of the Constitutional Court in the expectation of preventing the national and local government from abusing political rights and civil liberties guaranteed in the new constitution, the abolishment of the Basic Press Law, which was one of the most repressive tools for the authoritarian Fifth Republic, and a comprehensive and sophisticated system of press censorship. In addition, the intelligence agency, which had served the past authoritarian regimes by monitoring oppositional politicians and dissident movements, pledged to end its anti-democratic domestic surveillance and shift its focus to foreign operations.

The democratic transition during the 6.29 era of Korea was marked by several key changes including increased fairness in electoral process, expanded civil liberties and political rights, and civilian control of the military. Thanks to the appropriate measures in order to realize the liberalizing goals, Korea was evaluated to make a successful transition to democracy during the period (Kim 2000). Some commonly used democracy indices indicate that South Korea achieved considerable democratic development during this period. According to the Polity IV dataset, South Korea’s democracy level improved from 0 in 1986 to 7 in 1988, while its autocracy level decreased from 5 in 1986 to 1 in 1988 (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). Similarly,
the Freedom House index indicates that South Korea’s democracy level improved from “Partly Free” in 1987-88 years to “Free” in 1988-1989 years (FreedomHouse 2006). South Korea’s level of political rights improved from 4 to 2, while the level of civil liberties made progress from 3 to 2. Throughout this time, the democratic development of South Korea became well recognized by the global community.

5.3 Existing Explanations of the Democratization of South Korea

Several different perspectives have been suggested to explain the democratization of South Korea. While some have highlighted the dynamics of domestic politics, others have paid more attention to international factors. The perspectives of domestic factors focus either on the role of elite calculations and interactions, or on the emergence of civil society. The perspectives of international politics tend to emphasize the role of the United States.

One of the perspectives of domestic factors attributes the democratization in 1987 to elite calculations and interactions (Cheng and Kim 1994). This perspective holds that the eight-point democratization package presented by Roh Tae Woo was the result of a grand compromise between the hard-liners and soft-liners in the ruling bloc. In other words, the democratization occurred because the soft-liners in the elite group, who believed democratization was unavoidable, were successful in garnering the support of the elite hard-liners. This line of argument maintains that every democratic transition is the consequence of important divisions within the authoritarian regime, and positions South Korea as another example of the elite paradigm.

Another perspective highlights the role of civil society rather than the elite group (Kim 2000). This line of argument posits that democracy requires the construction of a strong civil
society (Diamond 1992; Linz and Stepan 1996). According to this perspective, the democratization of South Korea was possible because of the active role played by civil society of diverse groups including student groups, labor unions, and religious organizations. In other words, they argue, “Korean democratization has consistently been initiated and promoted by civil society groups. Groups in civil society significantly precipitated – if not directly caused – authoritarian breakdowns, facilitated democratic transitions, and to large extent, also determined the dynamics of post-transitional politics in democratic consolidation” (Kim 2000, 5).

Aside from the domestic political factors, international factors have also drawn interest. These theories tended to focus on the role of the United States in the process. According to this explanation, the U.S. foreign policy centering on the proliferation of democracy (e.g. pro-democracy resolutions by the Senate and the House) and the continued attention from U.S. mass media, prevented another military coup and helped the smooth democratic transition of South Korea (Cheng and Kim 1994). However, their exclusive focus on the role of the U.S. seems problematic as this largely disregards the general security environment which pervaded the Korean peninsular.

As suggested in the previous chapters, the general international security environment, including international conflict and external threat, cannot be overlooked when discussing democratic development. Indeed, despite a great deal of research on democratic transition and the consolidation of South Korea, there have been few attempts to link its democratic development to a changing international security environment (Cha 2003). As shown in the previous sections, South Korea’s threatened national security significantly hindered the democratization process. The military threat from North Korea and heightened tension along the DMZ served to authoritarian rule and hinder the process of democratization.
5.4 Changing International Security Environment and the Democratic Development of South Korea

Whether it was elite group or civil society, or even the United States are to be credited, there is no questioning that the international security environment was a key precondition for the ultimate democratization of South Korea. Indeed a conciliatory atmosphere and lowered tension between the East and the West laid down the solid foundation for democratic transition in South Korea, and the end of the Cold War helped its consolidation. Furthermore, the widening gap in national power between North and South Korea cultivated confidence among the people of South Korea. No longer was the presence of the North perceived as a grave threat to the South.

The emergence of Gorbachev in 1985 drastically changed the East-West relationship of world politics. In particular, the historic November 25, 1985 Geneva summit meeting between General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan opened the new era of the world politics. Reportedly, the Soviet leader expressed readiness for rapid progress toward agreements substantially reducing strategic nuclear weapons on both sides. The following summit meeting also achieved significant reduction of military and ideological tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Soviet behavior under the Gorbachev leadership showed fundamental departure from the previous years in the way of enhancing international peace and interdependence. Accordingly, U.S. behavior under the Reagan’s leadership also changed in the way to enhance the conciliatory atmosphere around the world.

The improved relationship with the Soviet allowed the U.S. to pursue democracy-promoting policy rather than security-seeking policy in the Korean peninsula. The opposite was the case for the Kwangju uprising in 1980, when the U.S. pursued security-promoting policy instead of democracy-enhancing one. Then despite displeasure with Chun’s new military regime,
the highest U.S. authorities in Korea and Carter administration were more concerned about immediate security matters than about the Korean people’s democratic rights. General John Wickham, the Combined Forces Command (CFC) commander stated as following in an interview with the New York Times:

…..Peace and stability are important to the United States here, and national security and internal stability surely come before political liberalization….. I’m not sure democracy the way we understand it is ready for Korea or the Koreans ready for it……. Korea seems to need strong leader. For a variety of reasons, many of the rather curious, Chun seems to have emerged as a leader, an unnatural one – but nonetheless a leader. And leming-like, the people are kind of lining up behind him in all walks of life……

The conciliatory policies by both sides finally led to the termination of the Cold War in 1989. Although the end of the Cold War came after democratic transition in South Korea, there is no doubt that it was conducive to democratic consolidation in the country. Indeed, as seen in the previous sections, the Second Republic, which was the first democratic government of South Korea, was only short-lived and turned over by the military coup headed by Park Jung Hee in 1961. The hostile security environment surrounding the Korean peninsula and around the world during the peak of the Cold War provided a foundation for Park to justify his coup.

In addition to the general East-West international security environment, the inter-Korean relationship should be given special attention, because North Korea has always been the key cause of external security threat in South Korea. Unlike the 1970s and the early 1980s, the relationship between the North and South appeared optimistic along with the general trend around the world. In 1985 the two Koreas exchanged visitors for the first time since their

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division nearly forty years earlier. Since establishing democratic rule, South Korea has made every effort to improve its relationship with the North through multilevel bilateral negotiations on economic, parliamentary, and Red Cross Affairs.

Furthermore, in regards to economic and military capability, the gap between the North and the South was widening in favor of Seoul. Due to this change in power status, the people of South Korea were able to cultivate a sense of confidence over North Korea, which significantly reduced the perception of external threat. Table 5.1 compares GDP per capita and its growth rate of the North and the South from 1970 to 1990. According to the data, the increase in GDP per capita in South Korea far exceeded that of North Korea during this period. GDP per capita of North Korea in 1970 was approximately $410, while that of South Korea was approximately $2,621 in the same year. The difference between the two nations dramatically increases each year and reached approximately $8,000 by 1990. Due to the successful economic planning and development, mostly during the Park Jung Hee regime, South Korea was able to gain economic capabilities far greater superior to the North, overcoming the substantial inferiority in 1950s and 1960s. In 1980s the gap widened even more than 1970s because the Chun Doo Hwan administration once again relied on economic development to justify his rule.

The dramatic economic development of South Korea was also important in cultivating confidence and reducing external threat perception to the degree that it is directly associated with military capability – military spending, in particular. According to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, defense spending in South Korea jumped from $1.1 billion in 1975 to $4.9 billion in 1985 (compared to $.2.0 billion and $.5.4 billion for the North respectively). It is widely perceived by many analysts that Seoul actually has far outspent the North since the mid-
1980s. A policy analyst in Washington D.C analyzes the North-South Korean military balance as such (Bandow 1989, 83-4):

….. U.S. officials acknowledge the shifting balance in favor of Seoul. Four years ago the then U.S. commander in Korea, General William Livsey, agreed that the South would achieve a military edge during the 1990s. And in August 1989 General Louise Menetrey, the current commander of U.S. forces in Korea, said of South Korea’s military modernization plan, “there should be stability on the peninsula without the United States being part of the equation in the mid-1990s…..DPRK will have to funnel 36 percent to 42 percent of its GNP to match Seoul’s expenditure of roughly six to seven percent…..

He also predicted that South Korea’s superiority over North Korea in economic, technological, and military capabilities would grow during the next decade, resulting in a significant shift of balance in favor of the South (Bandow 1989, 84). As the balance of national power began to shift, external security threat that once dominated the national consciousness of South Korea began to reduce significantly.

Though some may suggest that the perception of external security threat may not be the same with the objective security condition, data reveals that the two share a great deal of correspondence. For example, military expenditure measured as percentage of gross domestic product, which is believed to reflect perception of an external security threat among policy makers, shows significant reduction around the time of democratic transition and almost never increased afterwards.40 Also, national survey data for the period demonstrates that, when polled regarding the preferred “top agenda” for the subsequent 10 year-year period, only 9.4 % of the people expressed their preference of “strong defense” over “strong economy,” “advanced

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democracy” or “better environment.” 41 The poll results reflect the security confidence accumulated through economic development and military expansion among the South Korean people.

In sum, a changing security environment functioned as a precondition for democratic transition and consolidation in South Korea. Before democratization the autocratic leaders took advantage of the unstable security environment to justify their regimes and military coups. Their strategy was greatly successful in convincing the South Korean people who already experienced the devastating Korean War incurred by North Korea. The war strengthened the perception of external security of the people and it was continuously utilized by the authoritarian regimes. Indeed, the South Korean people were literally the prisoners of security nightmare, which hindered smooth democratic transition of the country.

It was when the people were freed from the external security threat that actual democratization occurred in South Korea. Since the mid 1980s South Korea has been able to predominate over the North in virtually every sector including the economy, military, and diplomacy. Due to this growing power, especially relative to the North, the South Korean people were able to cultivate confidence in security, which was also intensified by the improved East-West relationships and the end of the Cold War. The enhanced security confidence laid a solid foundation upon which democracy could develop in South Korea.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This study has presented a set of statistical analyses and a case study on the influence of international conflict on democracy along with a new theoretical framework. This chapter will summarize the preceding chapters and the key findings, provide discussion of the implications of the findings both from theoretical and practical perspectives, will note the limitations of this project, and proffer suggestions for future study.

At the beginning of this study, the issue of the influence of international conflict on democracy and/or democratic development was brought to light. Especially, questions such as whether or not and to what extent international conflict (or conversely peace) has significant impact on democracy were raised. After the examination of previous studies, it appears that the current literature does not display consensus on this issue, and that the findings are not only mixed, but somewhat contradictory. That is, some researchers argue that international conflict has negative influence on democracy, while others claim that war leads to democratic transition. Furthermore, some researchers find no relationship between international conflict and democracy. The lack of consensus on this issue is largely due to their failure to appropriately specify the relationship between international conflict and democracy.
In Chapter 2 a new theoretical framework was proposed to address the conceptual and theoretical issues, and to explain the influence of international conflict on democracy and/or democratization. Whether or not peace promotes democracy, or conversely international conflict undermines it, has been mostly explained by the war making/state making argument. According to this perspective, states that enjoy a high degree of security can afford the more democratic political structures because in those states there is no imminent external threat that necessitates powerful, possibly autocratic, government to mobilize resources for national security purposes. However, the war making/state making theory mistakenly equates war participation and external threat perception, which may or may not be equivalent. Indeed, war participation can be perceived as a grave security threat to some states, but pose no threat to others, as the perception of threat is dependent upon the characteristics of the war and of the states involved.

Ultimately, the existing theory of war making/state making to explain the influence of international conflict on democracy is underspecified and therefore, unable to adequately explain the influence of international conflict on democracy. What matters more than the simple presence or absence of war participation is how much of a security threat the militarized conflict poses to the participating states. Furthermore, the theory provides a perspective from the ruling elites, disregarding reactions from the ruled public. Because domestic politics are the result of the interactions between the ruling group and the ruled public, it is quite misleading to ignore one half of the explanatory scheme. In so doing, the theory fails to account for how the people’s response to crisis and the resulting appearance of governments bearing autocratic characteristics.

Alternatively to the current theoretical framework, this research proposes a modified model. This model combines the war making/state making theory, the theory of the rally ’round the flag effect, and national power. Rally effect theory is especially useful in this theoretical
scheme in that it can explain why and how the autocratic regimes, which emerge for the purpose of convenient mobilization of resources in case of national emergency, avoid resistance and garner support from the ruled public. According to the theory of rally effect, war participation provokes threat perception in the populace. This perception of threat then stimulates the rally phenomenon – even at the cost of potential for democracy.

Still, neither the war making/state making theory nor the theory of the rally effect resolves the problem that war participation does not necessarily lead to serious external threat. The addition of the concept of relative power can resolve the issue by suggesting that the extent of external threat posed by war participation differs depending on the power status of the states involved. In other words, the concept of relative power helps to specify the conditions under which power concentration and the rally effect occur. In regards to power concentration, strong states are less likely to become autocratized because they are more likely to win wars, and thus, have less motivation to concentrate power for war mobilization. However, the opposite is more likely to occur for weak states. Furthermore, the autocratization caused by war involvement for weak states is less likely to encounter opposition from the ruled public because of the rally effect, which becomes more conspicuous among the people of more threatened states. In this way, the destructive effect of international conflict on democracy is more salient for weak states than for strong states.

Chapter 3 addresses methodological issues to test a series of hypotheses based upon the new theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter in the previous chapter. Variables, measurements, sources of data as well other methodological issues such as spatial-temporal domain, unit of analysis, and appropriate models were presented and explained in this chapter. Subsequently, in Chapter 4, the results of statistical analyses including descriptive statistics,
correlation analyses, and a series of regression analyses, were outlined. In Chapter 5, the
democratization of South Korea was delineated to illustrate the theoretical implications of this
new theory in global political history. The case study was intended to strengthen the foundation
of this study by providing a historical narrative that is customarily absent in quantitative
statistical analyses.

6.1 Summary of Key Findings

One of the most significant findings of the statistical analyses is that perceived external
threat has significantly negative impact on democracy. In other words, according to the analyses,
the states facing high external threat are less likely to be democratic than the states that enjoy a
high degree of security assurance. This finding is considerably robust since it survives several
different models of different measurements. Using different indicators of perceived external
threat such as the presence/absence of a security rival, foreign policy compatibility with regional
leaders, military expenditure in total government spending, and people’s concern about national
security, produced no significantly different findings.

Unlike the strong and consistent impact of perceived external threat, the effect of
international conflict involvement is found to be more limited than originally expected. The
analyses reveal that while the involvement of international conflict does not have significant
impact on strong, major states, it exerts significant negative impact on democracy for non-major
and non-democratic states. Ultimately, this finding specifies the conditions under which
militarized conflict has a significant, negative influence on democracy. It suggests that the
proposition that international conflict has negative influence on democracy holds under some
conditions such as non-major and non-democratic states, rather than universally applied to all states.

However, this limited finding does not entirely contradict with the previously suggested theoretical framework that argues how much external threat is posed by the instance to the people of the states involved is crucial when discussing the impact of international conflict on democracy, rather than the simple presence/absence of the conflict itself. Because weak, non-major states should be more concerned about, and vulnerable to, a hostile external security environment, international conflict should pose more serious external threat. Furthermore, according to the analyses, power status is not the only factor that conditions the influence of international conflict involvement on democracy. It is also shown that regime type is another important factor that mediates the impact of international conflict on democracy. In other words, the negative impact of international conflict on democracy is observed only for non-democratic states.

Another significant and consistent finding is concerned with the impact of national power, especially material power, on democracy. The analyses indicate that defensive national power has a positive impact on democracy since, as the theory suggests, defensively strong states are less likely to be vulnerable to external security environment. Furthermore, as mentioned above, national power acts not only as a facilitator of democracy but also as an intervening variable that conditions the negative impact of international conflict involvement on democracy. Indeed the finding is not surprising, given that, other things being equal, strong national power is likely to decrease external threat perception.

The findings of the statistical analyses in Chapter 4 are further strengthened by the case study in Chapter 5. The examination of the case of South Korea’s democratization reveals that
international conflict involvement and the enhanced external threat perception associated with it hindered its democratic development. Before democratization autocratic leaders took advantage of the unstable security environment to justify their regimes and military coups. Their strategy was greatly successful in convincing the South Korean people who had already experienced the devastation of the Korean War. The war strengthened the perception of an external threat to security – a phenomenon that was continuously utilized by authoritarian regimes. Indeed, the South Korean people became imprisoned by the perception of an external threat. This national fear undermined the smooth democratic transition of the country.

Furthermore, the case study shows it was not until the people were freed from the external security threat that actual democratization occurred in the late 1980s. Indeed since the mid 1980s South Korea has been able to predominate over the North virtually in every sector. Due to this growing power in relation to the North, the South Korean people were eventually able to cultivate confidence in security, which was also intensified by the improved East-West relationship and the end of the Cold War. The enhanced security confidence laid a solid foundation for democracy to fully develop in South Korea.

In sum, the case study reveals that the Korean War, and perceived external threat associated with it, delayed democratic transition in South Korea, while changing security environment related with the growing power of South Korea and the end of the Cold War functioned as a precondition for the relatively belated democratic development of South Korea. The story of South Korea also effectively illustrates the mechanisms behind the theory established in Chapter 2, and provides a historical base upon which to interpret the findings of the statistical analyses.
6.2 Theoretical Implications

This dissertation holds significant theoretical implications to the current literature for the current literature of both comparative politics and international relations in several aspects. First, from the perspective of international relations, this study sheds light on the current debate as to whether or not international conflict has significant impact on democracy. This study finds that international conflict has negative impact on democracy for weak and less democratic states. This finding may suggest that the contentious issue may be resolved by considering the possibility of conditionality. Therefore, it suggests the necessity of identifying conditions under which international conflict has more significant impact rather than to simply ask whether or not international conflict has an impact on democracy. While this study finds that power status and regime type are important, the conditions may include some other domestic characteristics.

This study also brings a meaningful implication to the study of democratic peace by suggesting that the reversed causation is also possible. The pacifying effect of democracy, especially between democratic states, is often regarded as one of the most significant findings in international relations. There are very few theories that influence the current U.S. foreign policy more than that of democratic peace. However, the democratic peace thesis, whether it is directed toward dyadic or monadic level of research, is criticized because of the divergent theories and empirical evidences. This causes some fervent critics to provide alternative explanations for the empirical regularity. One of the strongest alternative hypotheses to the democratic peace is that its causal arrow is reversed, that is, peace causes democracy rather than vice versa. The consideration of the reversed causation is very important because no consideration of the possible reversed causality in a causal equation serves an omitted variable, which necessarily biases the estimate of an independent variable.
The degree of impact that the reversed thesis has on the democratic peace research differs depending on whether its target is research at the national level or at the dyadic level. The findings of the statistical analyses suggest that the democratic peace at the national level is partially, though not entirely, challenged by reversed causation. Since the reversed thesis asserting peace causes democracy is conditionally supported from the empirical standpoint of view, it has been thought to partially undermine the validity of the democratic peace thesis at the national level. For the weak and less democratic states, the thesis that a high level of democracy leads to more peaceful foreign policy behavior is questioned because the reversed thesis is empirically supported. Given that no consideration of the possible reversed causation may bias the estimates of an independent variable, for the weak and less democratic states, the democratic peace thesis at the national level may be biased because it fails to appropriately take the empirically supported reversed thesis into consideration.

Unlike the national level argument, the reversed thesis does not pose a direct threat on the dyadic level proposition that democracies do not fight against each other, because their levels of analyses are different. Nonetheless this study may bring an interesting consideration to the democratic peace at the dyadic level using the reversed thesis. Indeed, one of the most efficient ways to attack the democratic peace thesis at the dyadic level is to explain the empirical regularity without resorting to joint democracy, that is, to argue that the absence of war between democracies is due to something other than their common regime characteristics. However, using the reversed thesis for the same purpose seems problematic, because the thesis that international conflict undermines democracy cannot be a sufficient alternative explanation for the absence of wars between democracies. If war involvement leads to autocratization over democratization, and this is sufficient to explain the democratic peace at the dyadic level, then democratic states
should never or at least less likely to engage in wars with non-democracies. Yet the empirical reality is that democracies still do go to war against non-democracies. Therefore, in order to challenge the thesis at the dyadic level employing the reversed causation argument, it is necessary to show that democracies can sustain themselves in spite of the fact that they participate in war with non-democracies.

The findings of the empirical analyses in this dissertation may offer a solution to the problem. The finding that the negative impact of international conflict on democracy does not hold for strong or highly advanced democracies may empirically demonstrate that democracy, in already established democratic states, is not vulnerable to international conflict. The finding is explained by the theory presented earlier, that is, war participation does not necessarily lead to increased perceived external threat, or democracy is robust enough to survive international conflict. In this sense, the findings in this study provides a legitimate ground to suspect that the conditional reversed thesis may be a threat to the democratic peace research at the dyadic level to some extent, although not in entirety. However, it is also true that subsequent research is necessary in order to uncover exactly how, and to what extent, the democratic peace thesis is challenged by the reversed thesis.

From the perspective of comparative politics, this study helps enrich the already vast democratization literature by identifying a set of security-related variables that influence democracy and/or democratic development. These include international conflict involvement, perceived external threat, and national material power. This study posits that international conflict involvement has a negative impact on democracy at least for some states, while national material power is positively associated with democracy. It is also found that perceived external threat is likely to undermine democracy.
Indeed, democracy has long been considered as the outcome of a domestic process that is not influenced by the external environment and actors. Furthermore, international security-related variables have not been treated as influential in the process of democratization in the previous literature. Thus, the area of comparative politics to which the democracy/democratization issue is supposed to belong should have been approached separately from an IR perspective. This study suggests that this perspective needs to be changed to accommodate the assertion that democracy should be studied not only as an outcome of domestic political processes, but also as a consequence of international politics. In this sense, it is a very optimistic sign that recent have begun to make efforts to uncover the impact of international forces on democratic development such as international organization (Pevehouse 2002) and international intervention (Gleditsch and Ward 2006).

The findings of this study are certainly consistent with and supports “the second imaged reversed” thesis originally suggested by Gourevitch (1978) in that it finds international security factors influence domestic results such as democracy. Unlike the abundant literature on the “second image” thesis, the “second image reversed” proposition has received relatively less attention in the research. This dissertation implies that the research based upon the “second image reversed” thesis deserve more consideration and should be greatly expanded in the future in both IR and comparative political research.

6.3 Policy Implications

When it comes to implications regarding policy, the findings of this dissertation are mostly concerned with the U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. foreign policy makers have long endeavored to secure and expand the community of democratic nations. This is purported to be
related to a belief that democratic states are far less likely to go to war each other, are more likely
to promote open markets and free trade, and are more likely to respect international law. There is
no question that a significant part of their belief is based on the finding of the democratic peace
and its extension called “triangular peace” (Russett and Oneal 2001b). The U.S. has intervened
in a number of places in the world to promote democracy and human rights, including central
Europe, Central America, Africa, newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, and so
on. While many of these attempts were successful, some of the results were questionable. The
most recent example would be the U.S. effort to promote democracy in Iraq. The U.S. policy
makers attempted to impose democracy (by force) with the expectation that a more democratic
government in Iraq would create a more peaceful foreign policy toward its neighbors in the
region, end its support for terrorist groups, and modulate the longstanding instability in the
region. However, the prospect for Iraqi democracy is still questionable and regional peace in the
Middle East seems unlikely in the near future. Indeed it is reported that imposed democracy by
external forces does not necessarily lead to successful democratization or regional peace
(Enterline and Greig 2005).

The conditional effectiveness of imposed democracy raises the issue of methodology in
promoting democracy. More specifically, the question is whether or not promoting democracy
requires using forces or threat. As shown in the case of Iraq, the U.S. has frequently used force
for the purpose of transplanting democracy in other countries. However, the findings of this
study suggest that using military forces or threat might be unsuccessful in achieving the goal. To
the contrary, forceful strategies are likely to facilitate and strengthen autocratic regimes by
enhancing external threat perception of the people of the states, according to the findings of this
dissertation. Given these results, a more appropriate strategy in the pursuit of democracy in Iraq
may be to stabilize the security environment first, and so, reduce the perception of external threat of the people in the region. Just as the reversed causation thesis of democratic peace suggests, regional security stability can bring democracy in states of the region rather than imposing democracy in the states guarantees peace in the region.

Similar policy recommendations can be made to the relationship with some other hostile states in other areas such as North Korea. The relationship between the U.S. and North Korea has been far from friendly during recent decades surrounding the North Korea’s effort to develop nuclear weapons and its under average human rights condition. When dealing with the hostile autocratic states, the U.S. policy makers might have attempted to topple the Kim Jung II regime using force and impose democracy in the country in the expectation that the strategy would make North Korea more peaceful and liberalized. However, using threat and force for the sake of imposing democracy is likely to lead an unintended result, that is, to strengthen the autocratic regime by enhancing external threat perception of the people in the country. Therefore, a better strategy to promote democracy and thus peaceful foreign policy in North Korea is to stabilize the regional security environment and normalize its relationship with the U.S. so that external threat perception is considerably reduced among the people of the country.

The policy recommendations above do not entirely deny democracy promoting policies based on the democratic peace idea. Indeed this study shows that the democratic peace is not entirely denied by its reversed causation and that its implications are still effective. Rather, the findings and policy recommendations emphasize the importance of strategy and the danger of using force and threat. And more importantly, at least in some cases, efforts to provide regional security stability may be necessary before attempting to transplant democracy. Therefore, American foreign policy concerning promoting democracy throughout the world may need some
adjustment in terms of approach and strategy. Combination and selective use of stabilizing regional security and spreading democracy is more recommended than unconditional reliance upon coercive transplanting democracy.

6.4 Limitations

This section will provide discussions of several limitations that may affect the validity and generalizability of the findings of this study. First, data availability of statistical analyses should be noted. The quantitative data on some variables (economic development, economic growth, military expenditure) are limited to very recent years. The limited years of analysis could, in turn, limit the generalizability of the findings. Furthermore, the limited data availability of some variables limits the number of cases in the statistical analyses, which also limits the generalizability of the findings. As a means of minimizing this problem, some indicators were removed from the regression analyses. Therefore, better data availability would have made the findings of this study more generalizable, although this limitation does not create significant disruption to the integrity of the study.

A second limitation is concerned with issues of measurement, which may affect the validity of the findings. In particular, the measurements of perceived external threat deserve special note. Because perceived external threat is an abstract concept, there is no direct measurement which sufficiently captures its subtleties. Thus, as an alternative, several different indicators were employed which are believed to appropriately reflect the concept. Nonetheless it should be noted that none of the indicators sufficiently measure perceived external threat own their own. An ideal measurement of the variable would be comprehensive survey data on how much they feel security threat over time and across states. Given that such a comprehensive
survey data is not available, an attempt was made to minimize the limitation by observing the more limited World Value Survey data. Whether it is a comprehensive survey data or some other format, it is one of the tasks that future researchers need to address.

Another limitation is concerned with the characteristics of the case study. As alluded to earlier, utilizing a single case study raises the question of “selection bias” by nature, and the case study section of this dissertation is not an exception to the problem. In other words, the findings of the case study on the democratization of South Korea can be weakened by other studies that would find the opposite. Furthermore, the purpose of the case study is limited to illustration of the theory and the findings of the statistical analyses, as opposed to offering a complete explanation. Therefore, the case study does not falsify competing explanations for the purpose of justifying the perspective that is adopted. Although the limited purpose of the case study, which is to illustrate the theory and the findings of the statistical analyses in the real world context, does not seriously undermine the integrity of the entire project, there is no doubt that an explanatory case study or comparative study would have strengthened the findings of the dissertation.

6.5 Suggestions for Future Study

Related with this dissertation, there are many issues that may need further study. Future research is necessary to overcome the limitations of this study and to expand the theoretical and policy implications endemic to this study. Also, a great deal of research may be needed to appropriately understand the impact of international conflict or security environment on democracy, or more broadly speaking, the relationship between security and democracy. In this section, some suggestions for future study will be noted.
First, researchers may focus on developing reliable measurements for perceived external threat. Either comprehensive survey data or a composite index that combines some appropriate indicators, are recommended as the most plausible means for this type of measurement. Whatever the format is, developing the variable of perceived external threat would be a significant contribution in this body of research. Cross-national or time-serial data on external threat perception will be greatly conducive to a greater understanding of the impact of the security environment on diverse political phenomena in international relations and comparative politics including democratic development, economic transactions, alliance formation, and so on.

In developing reliable and valid measurements of perceived external threat, identifying the factors that may affect external threat perception is very important. There must be many factors that influence the people’s perception of external threat in addition to the presence of security rival, foreign policy compatibility with regional leader, and national power. This task will also contribute to better understanding of the influence of the security environment on democracy and/or democratization and thus bridge international relations and comparative politics. For example, alliance and regional security community might be promising candidates to influence domestic political development. Future studies may examine the impact of those factors in domestic politics. Likewise, in the context of interactions between international security and domestic politics, different dependent variables that are relevant and significant other than democracy or democratization might be studied.

Second, future research may specify the conditions under which diversionary theory or the rally effect work. The examination of the existing literature demonstrates divergence on the impact of the rally effect or the diversionary effect. Based upon the theoretical perspective presented in this dissertation, one may hypothesize that the diversionary effect or the rally effect
may be true only under some conditions. Therefore, questions regarding the extent of this effect, and the necessary conditions are relevant in developing a greater understanding of not only this phenomenon, but its impact on democratic development.

Third, cases studies might further expand the understanding of this issue from the comparative perspective. Especially, researchers may perform in-depth case study on the states that are known to have difficulty both in security and democratic development, and examine whether or not, and to what extent, the security issues hinder the democratic development in those countries. Those states that have current security rivals or low levels of foreign policy compatibility may be promising candidates for a single case study or a comparative study. In so doing, researcher may obtain a better understanding of why, how, and to what extent the international security environment influences domestic political processes such as democracy.

Finally, as this study brings significant implications to the democratic peace research, future research may make effort to uncover how much democratic peace and its reversed causation are intertwined each other. In order to properly understand the pacifying effect of democracy, it is indispensible to consider the potential of its reversed causation thesis and to develop appropriate models of mutual influence. The findings of this dissertation lay down a solid foundation for this challenging task.
REFERENCES


Congressional Budget Office, the U.S. 1978. "Force Planning and Budgetary Implications of U.S. Withdrawl from Korea."


APPENDIX A
DATA AND RESULTS TABLES

List of Tables

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables
Table 4.2: Correlation of Dependent and Main Independent Variables for All States
Table 4.3: Correlation between Dependent and Main Independent Variables for Non-major States
Table 4.4: Generalized Estimating Equations Estimates of Regime Score with no Interaction term
Table 4.5: Generalized Estimating Equations Estimates of Regime Score with Interaction Variable
Table 5.1: Comparison of Economic Development of North and South Korea
<table>
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Table 4.2 Correlation of Dependent and Main Independent Variables for All States

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Note: ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10
Table 4.3 Correlation between Dependent and Main Independent Variables for Non-major States

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<td>-0.0040</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.1619***</td>
<td>0.0582</td>
<td>-0.3608***</td>
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<td>6. Perceived External Threat (Rivalry)</td>
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<td>0.3590***</td>
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<td>0.3519***</td>
<td>0.2320**</td>
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Note: ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.01
Table 4.4 Generalized Estimating Equations Estimates of Regime Score with no Interaction term

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<th>Model 1A</th>
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<th>Model 1C</th>
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<td>Non-major &amp; Non-democracy</td>
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<td>(Total number in a given year)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(s score)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived External Threat</td>
<td>-2.031597*** (.3222263)</td>
<td>-2.053072*** (.3307265)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Democracy</td>
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Notes: Cell entries report coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). All significance levels are one-tailed: *** p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10.
Table 4.5 Generalized Estimating Equations Estimates of Regime Score with Interaction Variable

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<th>Model 2C Non-major &amp; Non-democracy</th>
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Notes: Cell entries report coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). All significance levels are one-tailed: *** p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10.
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Source: Penn World Table 6.2
APPENDIX B
STATE SYSTEM MEMBERSHIP

Afghanistan
Albania
Albania
Algeria
Andorra
Angola
Antigua & Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Austria
Austria-Hungary
Azerbaijan
Baden
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Bavaria
Belarus
Belgium
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
German Democratic Republic
German Federal Republic
Germany
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Haiti
Hanover
Hesse Electoral
Hesse Grand Ducal
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Japan
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kiribati
Korea
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mecklenburg Schwerin
Mexico
Modena
Moldova
Monaco
Mongolia
Morocco
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
North Korea
Norway
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Panama
Papal States
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Paraguay
Parma
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Republic of Vietnam
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Samoa
San Marino
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Saxony
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Tuscany
Tuvalu
Two Sicilies
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States of America
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
Wurtemburg
Yemen
Yemen Arab Republic
Yemen People's Republic
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia
Zambia
Zanzibar
Zimbabwe