
by

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(Under the Direction of ELIZABETH ST. PIERRE)

ABSTRACT

This conceptual history examines how democracy was presented and understood from 1973 to 2012 in the social studies education journal, Theory and Research in Social Education. It is argued that in this archive democracy has primarily been framed by the question of whether curricular models serve to reproduce or transform the existing society.

INDEX WORDS: Democracy, Social Studies Education, Binary, Triads, Emancipation, Progressivism, Conceptual Ontology

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2014

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August 2014
DEDICATION

Sitting on the front porch swing in the long, hot summers of the 1980s, shaded by hundred year old Water Oaks, Grandmama and I spent many hours, after lunch and before I wandered off to play or explore the farm, discussing the mysteries of the Bible and the world. I think it was there more than anywhere else that I developed a taste for asking questions for which there were no simple answers. Someone less amenable to directionless metaphysical speculation, thinking for the pleasure of it – an ideologue who believed she knew all the answers or a younger or more distracted person – would likely not have provided the cloistered and nearly romantic experience of the world afforded to me in those years. For her love and devotion to family, this dissertation is dedicated to Ruby Inez Johnson.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

What I miss most about lost religion is the giving of thanks in prayer. For years, before each
meal and before I went to bed, I would took a little time to appreciate my good fortune. While
much of the thanks given in prayer was perhaps misdirected, the practice was good for my
psychological and emotional health. Lately I spend much of my time being critical and it is nice
to be encouraged to pause and recognize those who have helped me in this endeavor.

Alex: It is said that being a single parent, removed from one’s family and without a social
network can be challenging – whether one is pursuing a PhD or doing something else. I think it
depends upon the child. You could have made this much more difficult. Thank you for your
cooperation.

Kat: Thanks for listening to my continuous droning about binaries, triads, and social justice.
You have helped me to see the world differently and to appreciate viewpoints that I might have
otherwise dismissed or misunderstood. Your perspective has been invaluable.

Daddy: Most of what I have accomplished thus far in my life has been done in no small part to
make you proud. This is no exception.

Family: With the exception of Mickey’s allegation that I might not duly finish, I have had
nothing but support from my family. That includes not only my closest family (Marty, Ashley,
and Connie) but also aunts and uncles who have been very supportive of my writing and my
work.

Bettie, Joe, and Beth: I have the greatest respect for each of the members of my committee. You
are my scholarly role models, and I hope that my future work reflects positively upon yours. I
would like to especially thank Bettie. I appreciate good leadership but cannot endure bad leadership. I asked you to be my chair because I was confident in your ability to push me to do good work, and I was impressed (and perhaps dazzled) by your work ethic. My confidence was affirmed. Thank you.

ETAP faculty, staff, and students: Reality is often the bane of optimists. My experience as a doctoral student in this department far exceeded my expectations however. I learned a great deal, and almost without exception, my encounters with the faculty, staff, and fellow doctoral students at UGA have been pleasant and rewarding.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In 1787, at the conclusion of the United States’ Constitutional Convention, Benjamin Franklin offered a short speech. Much of it concerned the limitations of our individual knowledge and perspective, but some of it, including the following passage, assessed the new constitution, government in general, and the future of constitutional democracy in the United States:

In these Sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution, with all its Faults, if they are such: because I think a General Government necessary for us, and there is no Form of Government but what may be a Blessing to the People if well administered; and I believe farther that this is likely to be well administered for a Course of Years, and can only end in Despotism as other forms have done before it, when the People shall become so corrupted as to need Despotic Government, being incapable of any other. (Franklin, 1787, pp. 3-4)

This remarkable passage from the person often considered to be America’s Enlightenment figure tends to make readers uneasy. First it claims that any form of government can suit is people – a rather different view than those who contend that democracy is the only legitimate form of government and that it should be spread around the world. Democracy, according to Franklin’s view, is good, but it is not the good and is not the end or goal of history.

This view is at odds with that of many especially since Hegel who have imagined social and political progress to be the natural course of history, presuming or believing that human
social organizational systems evolve toward more democratic and equitable arrangements. The social order, as understood in this Hegelian-inspired view common within critical theory, would naturally develop toward equality if not impeded by selfish individuals or groups who seek to preserve the status quo. Franklin’s passage, however, suggests a more cyclical, less universal account of social and political change whereby human societies do not naturally become more democratic. Democracy thus understood is temporary and fleeting, pops in and out of existence, can be sustained only by particular groups of people, and even then, only for a time.

This perspective invites scrutiny of contemporary celebratory, universalist conceptions of democracy that facilitate justifying the toppling of foreign governments on the grounds that they are undemocratic. On a far more mundane scale, the belief that democracy is the goal of history is also responsible for the nearly universal lauding of the teaching of democratic citizenship, despite the great variety of opinion regarding how to best promote democratic citizenship and what democracy and citizenship are and should be. The values associated with democracy, such as equality and liberty, are not deemed the evolutionary goal of history or humanity but are understood to be the goals of certain groups of people living in particular places and times.

Those familiar with Nietzsche will surely see his influence in this dissertation. The study was originally understood as a genealogy inspired by Nietzsche’s desire to discern the signposts provided by language that would allow for an interpretation of the history of the evolution of a concept (1887/2010, p. 34). I sought to study democracy in the same way that Nietzsche analyzed good and evil/bad but on a much smaller scale. The goal was never to explain what democracy really is or should be, because, as Nietzsche suggests, “only something which has no history can be defined” (1887/2010, p. 53). Nor was the goal to explain how democracy ought to be put to use in social studies curricula – as it seems to me that the right way is entirely context-
dependent. This amounts to there being no right or even best way for democracy to be implemented into a curriculum that generalizes beyond individual teachers in a particular school, with a particular group of students, and so forth. The goal of the dissertation even at the earliest stages was only to historicize democracy; that is, to study how our understanding of democracy (an idea that many consider the transcendent center of social studies education) has changed over time.

Historicizing the concept of democracy within all of social studies education is far too large a task for a dissertation and so I chose to study how democracy has changed within a the forty year history of a single journal. The goal of the narrowed but still ambitious scope was to develop an understanding of how particular conceptions of democracy came to hold sway and to gain an awareness of alternative conceptions that failed to gain preeminence. I wanted to know the currently dominant conception of democracy and the history of its ascension. I also wondered if there might be those in the journal’s history who understood democracy in different ways than it is normally understood today. Were there scholars, like Franklin, who suggested that democracy is inherently fleeting? Or might an essay be written by someone who argued, like Nietzsche, that democracy was symptomatic of cultural degeneracy? If such views were offered, a number of interesting questions could be posed, such as how were they argued, what was their stated or unstated intellectual genealogy, how did they attempt to engage with the ongoing conversation, what were the more fashionable conceptions of democracy being discussed during that time, and whether there is any evidence for why they were not taken up as part of the discourse.

I chose the journal *Theory and Research in Social Education (TRSE)* because, as the subtitle insists, it is *The Official Journal of the College and University Faculty Assembly*
[CUFA] of [the] National Council for the Social Studies [NCSS]. It is also the journal in which most of the theoretical work is found. The journal was not chosen because it is representative of the field. On the contrary, there has been an ever-present line of thought flowing through TRSE that those writing in the journal are more radical and less conservative than the broader field of social studies. The left-leaning tendencies of the journal do not, in my opinion, detract from the validity of the study because I do not claim that the journal is representative and because I do not make any methodological claims to validity. There are other journals and practitioner publications in the field, including Social Education, the International Journal of Social Education, The Social Studies, and Social Studies Research and Practice. A comparative study involving these and other journals might make for an interesting study in the future.

To better situate the journal in the field of social studies education, I will provide a brief background and current information. The inaugural year for TRSE was 1973. CUFA and TRSE were developed in response to the proliferation of curriculum models that were developed during the late sixties, largely the result of federal funding initiatives and the desire to house the burgeoning research within a single journal (see Binford & Eisworth, 2013; Cherryholmes & Nelson, 1973). The founding editors of the journal, Cherryholmes and Nelson, led the journal for the first three years (1973-1975), during which the journal published only one issue per year. By 1976, when Ehman and Gillespie took over the journal, it published two issues per year. During the term of Popkewitz and Tabachnick (1979-1981), the journal seems to have been fully established, publishing four issues per year, which is its current publication schedule. For a fuller discussion of the origin and development of the journal, see Binford and Eisworth (2013).

Because democracy and citizenship hold a privileged position within social studies education, articles and books on the topics are plentiful. Examples from the previous year and a
half in TRSE alone are substantial (e.g., Brooks, 2014; Catro, 2013; Journell, 2013; Montgomery, 2014; Peck, 2014). In the longer term, there were well over two hundred articles published in TRSE since 1973 regarding democracy and citizenship education. The primary interpretation offered by this dissertation is that articles discussing democratic citizenship education that have been published in TRSE have often framed their analysis by asking whether curricular models involving democratic or citizenship education have served to reproduce the status quo or to change the social order. This either/or conceptualization I call the reproduce/reconstruct binary. I claim that this binary has become so pervasive and so natural that it structures and guides the entire discourse on democracy and citizenship education. I am not the first person to recognize that social studies education is often discussed in terms of whether curriculum supports the reproduction of the status quo or the transformation of society (e.g., Boyle-Biase, 2003; Chapin, 2005; Dilworth, 2004; Dinkelman, 2001; Houser, 2001; Mathews & Dilworth, 2008; Obenchain et al, 2010; Ritter & Lee, 2009; Ross & Maker, 2005; Silva, 2011; Westheimer & Kahne, 2004). My study is unique, however, in the scope and the approach of the analysis.

Method

What follows is a standard historical interpretation. Essays published in TRSE served as both primary and secondary source documents as I sought to understand how democracy and citizenship education have been understood by scholars publishing in this particular journal. The goal of the dissertation is to explain how democracy and citizenship education have been conceptualized from 1973 to 2012 in TRSE and to discuss and explain the discursive practices that have influenced the continuity and change of the various conceptions of democracy and citizenship.
As I began this study, I envisioned it as a genealogy, in the tradition of Foucault’s (1975/1995) *Discipline and Punish* and Nietzsche’s (1887/2010) *Genealogy of Morals*. However, because the scope of Foucault’s and Nietzsche’s projects were so much broader than this one, I came to question whether calling it a genealogy would be fitting. The broad, sweeping, and speculative style of Nietzsche’s long history seemed poorly suited to the relatively focused and precise historical study undertaken here. A second issue was that because of the influence of Foucault, many associate genealogy with power. I do not. In fact, *power* has become a problematic term for me, and I avoid using it if possible. For these two reasons, I turned to other approaches.

I entertained the notion of putting to use a method suggested by Fuller (2002), who drew on Bourdieu’s (1981, 1984) notion of the circulation of capital, which I referred to as the *differential reproduction of concepts*. The idea was to directly trace the evolution of an idea (concept) from one text to another, making note of whether the idea was *authentically* reproduced or *differentially* reproduced. I found two problems with this method, however. First, I discovered that it was too narrowly-focused for my project. Although the differential reproduction approach is suited to the study of a very few instances of reproduction, I was studying several different iterations of democracy and anticipated finding many different lines of descent for each conception analyzed. Thus I decided that a more discursive and less authorial approach was required. Second, and more importantly, I came to believe that all reproductions are differential reproductions. Because of this, the reliance upon a stark distinction between authentic and differential meant that the differential reproduction approach was irredeemably flawed. In addition, I believe that this criticism holds for all models of reproduction, including those involving social reproduction. In particular, I think that the reproduction/reconstruction
binary is easily deconstructed because all *reconstructions* are also *reproductions* and all reproductions involve reconstruction. The distinction seems to me to be largely rhetorical, and this assessment will be developed throughout the dissertation.

Finally, I decided to think of my analysis as standard, intellectual history, the sort that historians do all the time even though the methods of historical inquiry done in the humanities tradition (supposing that one wanted to understand historical inquiry as a *method*) is usually not as carefully articulated as the method of research is in the social sciences. Rather than using the scientific method to find truth as is usually the practice in the social sciences, historians often suggest that finding and using the proper primary sources is the standard for historiographical validity (e.g., Bentley, 2006; Berger et al, 2003; Bloch, 1953; Breisach, 2007; Cohen, 1999; Hale, 1964; Higham, 1965, Novick, 1988).

In intellectual histories it is not only differences in the sources used, but also differences in philosophies of history that give rise to competing interpretations of an event, period. Issues in the philosophy of history are many and include what is taken to be the purpose or goal of history and also the causes of historical change. Of particular importance are inscriptions of agency and inertness given to historical entities by different analyses. Here I am aligned with Foucault and even more so with Nietzsche in that I consider myself a nominalist (see Jenkins, 1997). That is, I believe that there is no end to which history strives, that historical periods and historical concepts are constructed by historians, and that what counts as historical truth is historical consensus. Drawing again from Nietzsche, I also consider myself an *historical naturalist* and maintain that human endeavors in interpretation are historically, socially, and biologically linked to similar activities undertaken by all other living organisms.
To summarize, I originally decided on the topic of democracy because I wanted to immerse (and center) myself in the social studies education literature. I also wanted to write a history of ideas that would use Nietzsche’s historical perspective. Despite the fact that I have minimized the use of the term genealogy, Nietzsche’s thoughts concerning history, interpretation, ethics, and other ideas have influenced my thinking and analysis, as I note when appropriate in what follows.

After choosing the topic, I used the UGA library website to access electronic copies of articles from TRSE. All forty years are online. I first searched for democracy in the key words field of online articles to retrieve articles of interest. During this initial analysis, I rediscovered that I did not want to base the study on the presence of democracy alone. Because democracy is such a ubiquitous term, scholars might use a more precise word in their key word list. I thus decided to read through the titles of every article in the forty year period. If the title of an article suggested that democracy might be theorized, I then also read the abstract. If the abstract suggested that the paper theorized democracy, I added it to the archive I was building that finally contained about 230 articles from TRSE from 1973 to 2012. Once this list was completed, I read (without taking detailed notes) the articles from the initial collection and determined whether they did, in fact, theorize democracy or contain an implicit conception of democracy such as citizenship or multiculturalism. I made an electronic copy of those articles that did so. With the initial archive thus pared, I reread each article and took notes regarding how democracy was conceptualized as well as other interesting and important matters such as arguments made against or in favor of various conceptions and any historical analysis concerning shifts in the field or discourse offered by the author. My aggregated notes from the first round of reading were 238 pages.
I next analyzed the first and last few years of the journal to try to get a grasp of the overall discourse and how it might have changed (and not) during 40 years. At this point, I began to pay closer attention to the conceptual modeling of democracy. I had a vague sense the conceptual models cited most often (e.g., Barr, Barth, & Shermis, 1977; Westheimer & Kahne, 2004) were similar, but I had yet to work out how, exactly. As I continued analyzing articles from the 1970s, I found that binaries such as reproduce/reconstruct prevailed rather than the triadic models such as transmission-disciplinary-reflective inquiry that I had, after the initial phase of analysis, come to expect. I made note of this and studied the connections between the different binaries and how the binaries themselves were being used. After completing the analysis of how democracy had been conceptualized and presented during the 1970s, I had identified a list of commonly used binaries: good/bad, socialization/counter-socialization, national/global, Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft, thinking/acting, and reproduce/reconstruct.

When I analyzed articles from the 1980s, I found that scholars often discussed democracy in reference to another binary. One side of the binary denoted direct, full, participatory democracy while the other side denoted a less participatory, representative model of democracy. When I completed the analysis of the 1980s, I believed that the conceptual models (binaries and triads) used to present the models and organize the field would be an important part of the dissertation, but I was at first unsure how to integrate a discussion of the conceptual modelling with the discussion of the content of the articles themselves. During this time (November 2013) I attended the NCSS-CUFA conference and presented the preliminary findings of my study. It was while trying to reduce two chapters of research to a twelve minute presentation that I realized that the reproduce/reconstruct binary was not one binary among others but could be understood as the foundation for the other binaries. The belief that the reconstruct/reproduce
binary was the primary binary occurred more or less simultaneously with the realization that this binary provided the structure for the triadic models of social studies and citizenship education.

During the Christmas holiday of 2013-2014, I stopped writing and did more reading. I was still not sure how to use genealogy in my analysis, and I had questions about the reproduce/reconstruct binary: where it came from, why it was presupposed, and so forth. I was particularly stumped by what seemed to me to be the existence of master narrative based on social and moral progress. It seemed to me that this narrative was most often associated with authors writing from a critical perspective, even though Frankfurt School Critical Theorists, so far as I understood them, were rather skeptical of notions of social progress. After tracing sources cited by theorists writing in TRSE, I determined that the emancipatory, progressive narrative was the result of a confluence of two sources: the progressive and the neo-Marxist traditions. The study of (progressive) historiography undertaken as part of this study also allowed me to become comfortable referring to the study as a conceptual history influenced by Nietzsche rather than a Nietzschean genealogy.

Having decided that the reproduce/reconstruct binary provided a structure for the entire discourse and that it had multiple geneses (or at least two) that were not entirely complementary, I was able to move forward. I restructured my analysis of the 1970s and 1980s and began the next round of analysis for the 1990s, which was difficult in its own way.

Upon completing the analysis of the articles on democracy and citizenship from the 1990s in TRSE, I found it difficult to put the pieces together and make a coherent whole. I could not impose a unity upon the various groupings of articles and was left with an uninteresting presentation of one article after another. I grew frustrated with the decade and moved on to the 2000s, leaving my analysis and interpretation of the 1990s incomplete. While examining articles
from the 2000s, I began to develop the idea that the competing conceptions of democracy in TRSE could not be explained well in reference to established (and stable) schools of thought. At some point I put together Gieryn’s (1999) work on boundary maintenance and Nietzsche’s (1968) naturalistic interpretation of interpreting and decided that the theoretical messiness of the 1990s was due to the fact that during this decade the interpretive frameworks themselves were in the process of shifting, of incorporating new ideas and jettisoning old ideas, while trying to hold onto the general framework that supported and was supported by the emancipatory narrative that seemed to guide the discourse of democracy and citizenship in TRSE. Coming to understand the shifting frameworks during the 1990s was the second big breakthrough in analysis.

Understanding the 1990s as a period of theoretical re-structuring enabled a more complex interpretation than one based on the idea that theoretical frameworks are static.

After the analysis of the articles from the 2000s in TRSE was completed and the chapter written, I worked to bring the chapters together. This involved mediating various tensions between telling a cohesive story while representing ideas that did not neatly fit the narrative, providing an exegesis that was strongly grounded in the primary texts themselves, while trying to incorporate the individual articles and chapters into an interesting whole, and presenting the articles in a balanced and fair way while being critical of interpretations and practices with which I disagreed.

**Analysis and Argument**

In Chapter Two of this dissertation I describe the master narrative I believe pervades the interpretation of democracy in the journal, TRSE from the 1970s to the present. In Chapters Three through Six, I provide detailed analyses of articles in TRSE in each decade from the 1970s to the present that explain how authors interpreted democracy and citizenship in social studies
education. In order to help the reader understand the discussion in the chapters that follow, I will briefly discuss the five key points that I identified from my analysis.

The first trend I noted was that within social studies education literature, democracy is usually discussed in association with citizenship education curriculum (that is, how citizenship is to be taught in schools). I began the study expecting to find a considerable amount of explicit theorizing about democracy but was surprised to find that democracy was almost always discussed through citizenship education. I learned that citizenship education is considered by many to be the core of social studies education.

Second, I found changes throughout the decades in topics of interest and in the theoretical framing employed by scholars. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, for example, the critical approach was ascendant, socialization was the topic of interest, and binary conceptualizations abounded. By the middle of the 1980s, increasing political participation took the place of counter-socialization as the primary goal of citizenship education. I associate this change with an increase in the liberal-plural approach and the relative decline of critical approaches. The goal of promoting democratic participation in the larger society continued into the 1990s, but the interest in participation morphed into an interest in multiculturalism. The topic of multiculturalism along with the concurrent introduction of postmodern/nominalist conceptions of identity, subjectivity, and ethics seems to have disrupted theorizing during this period. Multiculturalism was theorized from a variety (liberal, critical, and postmodern) of perspectives, but more often than not, theoretical frameworks were mingled together as scholars selectively incorporated aspects of one perspective into another. The theoretical unrest that characterized TRSE in the 1990s turned, in the 2000s, to an uneasy compromise that has attempted, unsuccessfully in my opinion, to merge the postmodern, liberal, and critical frameworks.
Despite shifting interests in topics and frameworks, a third conclusion I reached is that there has been a remarkable continuity in the manner in which democracy and citizenship have been presented in TRSE. Whether citizenship education has been discussed in reference to socialization, participation, multiculturalism, social justice, or other ideas, the question that is almost always asked of the approach is whether or not it reproduces the social order. Over time, this question has taken on the form of a ritual.

The fourth assessment is that the reproduce/reconstruct binary as used in TRSE is often evaluative. One side of the oppositional binary (the reconstruct pole) is almost universally acknowledged or presumed to be the legitimate goal of citizenship education. That is, scholars generally presume or directly acknowledge that the goal of social studies education is to contribute to the transformation of the social order. The other side (the reproduce pole), in contrast, is viewed negatively, meaning that scholars writing in TRSE about citizenship education generally presuppose that maintaining the current social order is inherently objectionable. Over time, it has become almost unintelligible that the reproduction of society would be intentionally pursued. The repeated use of the reproduce/reconstruct binary as the primary and final question to be asked of citizenship education curriculum has caused the binary to mark the parameters of intelligibility for the discourse. A desire to understand how this came to be led me to ask how and why social reproduction is considered inherently bad and social reconstruction inherently good.

The fifth and most interesting conclusion I have drawn from the study is that the reproduce/reconstruct binary and the emancipatory narrative have been supported by the recurrent deployment of triadic schema to organize the various approaches to democracy and citizenship education. As noted above, social studies and citizenship education scholars
generally presuppose that the goal of citizenship education is the transformation of society. Following that view, scholars have often divided models of citizenship education into three different approaches. This triadic schema has three nodes rather than two, but the reproduce/reconstruct binary is contained within the triad. One might assert that the reproduce/reconstruct binary is reproduced in the first and third nodes of the triad. Likewise, because the structure of the conceptual model is changed, one might simultaneously assert that the reproduce/reconstruct binary is reconstructed in the triad. Like the binary, the triads also have a reproduce and a reconstruct pole. However, whereas the reproduce/reconstruct binary is associated with the contention that all curricular models of citizenship education serve either to reproduce the status quo or to transform society and that there is no middle ground, the reproduce/reconstruct triads allow a place for the discussion of curricula that do not neatly fit within the reproduce/reconstruct binary. Triads, therefore, allow for a more sophisticated theorizing of the field, but one that nonetheless ultimately supports the contention social studies should promote transformation and that all approaches that do not are bad or deficient.

More so than the binary, the *structure* of the triad facilitates progressive narratives by insinuating a trajectory: good, better, best. The newer models are often identified as advanced models that promote social justice and social transformation better than older curricular models. As the older curricular models are supplanted by the new ones, the triad allows the previously good models to become refashioned as models that *unintentionally* reproduce the status quo or that do not do enough to reconstruct society. This form of reconceptualization allows the discourse to more smoothly incorporate changes. In the binary model, if a theory comes to be rejected, it must be moved immediately from the positive pole to the negative pole and be completely reconceptualized – Stalin style. The three nodes of the triadic model allow the
recently discarded or now-questioned model to be slid over to an intermediate space rather than repositioned as the other. By smoothing out the reconceptualization of older models, the triadic schema appears to strengthen rather than detract from the reproduce/reconstruct binary’s ability to direct the narrative.

Each of the five points are developed in reference to the primary goal of the dissertation, which is to make the case that the reproduce/reconstruct binary and the associated narrative of emancipatory social progress has influenced how democracy and citizenship education have been conceptualized within TRSE for the last 40 years. The following chapter provides a brief history of the reproduce/reconstruct binary in TRSE and discusses the theoretical/historical influences of progressive historiography and critical theory.
CHAPTER 2

THE MASTER NARRATIVE

Reproduce and Reconstruct through the Decades

Different topics, including socialization, participation, multiculturalism, and social justice have been discussed in relation to democracy and citizenship education over the last forty years in *TRSE*. Democracy and citizenship education, despite being discussed in these different contexts, have mostly been understood through the narrative of social progress, by way of the question of whether curriculum supports the status quo. Throughout the decades, there have been noticeable changes in the deployment of the binary. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, authors were often comfortable with the explicit use of the oppositional binary. In the 1990s and into the 2000s, conversely, binary-based thinking was often challenged. Those challenges did not result in the abandonment of the reproduce/reconstruct binary, however, because in the 2000s, the emancipatory narrative experienced a revised resurgence. Recent scholarship embodying this retrenchment attempts to commensurate postmodern, nominalist conceptions of ethics and subjectivity with the universalism associated with critical pedagogy.

To this point I have mostly attempted to make the general argument and to introduce my interpretive perspective. In what follows, however, I provide support for my claims. I begin by providing initial evidence for the claim that the field has, in fact, been conceptualized through the reproduce/reconstruct binary. The content of the discourse, so to speak, will be filled out in more detail in chapters three through six.
In the late 1970s, scholars seemed comfortable with the stark divides provided by oppositional binaries. Take, for example, the quintessential question posed by Giroux (1979), at a time when critical theory was being established in TRSE: “should the schools develop young people to fit into present society as it is, or does the school have a revolutionary mission to develop young people who will seek to improve the society” (p. 27)? Giroux emphasized the oppositional nature of the binary by adding that, “whether they realize it or not, social studies educators work in the service of one of the two positions [reproduction or reconstruction] outlined by Tyler (1949) and Friere (1973)” (p. 27). Characteristic of the polemical nature of early critical theory in TRSE, Giroux sought to paint a Manichean world whereby there were but two sides, and his was the side of good.

Scholars in the 1980s continued to be concerned with cultural reproduction and societal transformation (e.g., Cherryholmes, 1982; Gilbert, 1984; Kickbusch, 1985; Wood, 1984). During this decade, progress and emancipation were often related to political participation and efficacy. Often advanced was the notion that schools could be used to strengthen political efficacy and increase political engagement among the disempowered. It was thought that the result of such actions would be a quickening of the rate of social change. This passage from Gordon (1985) illustrates how the goals of developing participation and efficacy were understood through the reproduce/reconstruct binary:

The question is whether we as educators intend for citizenship simply to function as a mode of ideological domination, conforming students to the demands of dominant society; or whether citizenship education should be designed to foster social reconstruction, by helping students (and others) to become creative, critical thinkers and.
active social participants, and to become capable of redefining the nature of their own lives in the society in which they live. (p. 2)

The belief that active participation would hasten social reconstruction continued into the 1990s, even though direct calls for reconstruction diminished. It appeared to many that liberal democracy had just won the Cold War and that the status quo of the United States was the most advanced and efficient form of social organization (see Friedman, 2005; Fukuyama, 1992). The economic and social optimism of the period seems to have made the restructuring of society less appealing and/or necessary for some than it had in earlier years. Partially as a result of this and partially as a result of longer-term changes in social theory, cultural analyses proved more promising for critically minded curriculum theorists during the 1990s. Reconstructing society thus took a back seat to concerns with how power could be shared in our existing pluralistic, multicultural society.iii There were still calls for social activism, but these were more focused on promoting the participation of minorities in politics than encouraging enlightened redeemers to secure the emancipation of members of subject groups. Despite some trending toward reform and away from reconstruction, citizenship education nonetheless continued to be theorized through the dichotomy of reproduction and transformation. This was expressed by calls to transform schooling from “a political institution which maintains and reproduces social inequality” (Dillabough & McAlpine, 1996, p. 169) to one that encourages the prevalence of “transformative intellectuals who engage and empower their students to probe the contradictions and injustices of the larger society” (Preskill, 1997, p. 321).

Interest in multiculturalism was accompanied by an interest in alternative conceptions of identity, subjectivity, and ethics. Nominalist approaches disrupted Left/Right binaries and unsettled both conservative and leftist perspectives. Despite the incorporation of postmodern
ideas into the discourse and its critique of dualisms, the reproduce/reconstruct binary retained its protected place at the center of the discourse, and participatory-based reform that endorsed the acceptance of diverse perspectives was recast as closet conservatism or neoliberalism, as indicated in the following passage from Boyle-Baise (2003):

Most of the discussion about good citizenship proceeds along parallel lines. In one vein, citizenship is reformative: Informed, engaged, political, thoughtful, and temperate individuals work cooperatively with others to improve established systems. Citizens are tolerant of diversity, as is ethical, reasonable, and prudent. … In a second vein, citizenship is transformative: Critical, socially conscious, pluralistic, justice oriented individuals struggle collaboratively to reconstruct communities in ways that extend democratic principles to all. (pp. 52-53)

In addition to illustrating the resurgence of the reproduce/reconstruct binary, this passage also exemplified the schizophrenic attempts made in the 2000s to claim that the emancipatory perspective advocated pluralism, even as it claimed there is but one legitimate goal for citizenship education.

The above passages provide initial provision for the claim that over the last several decades the reproduce/reconstruct binary has influenced the conceptualization of social studies and citizenship, supporting a narrative of emancipatory transformation. The distinction made between reform and transformation illustrated by the passage from Boyle-Baise (2003) is important to note. Especially for those working from a critical perspective, calls for reform have often been seen as insufficient because they do not call for a complete-enough rejection of what has come before. Reform presupposes that the past must provide the raw material for what is to come. To the extent that reproduction and reconstruction are seen as exclusive and
comprehensive categories, reform cannot be endured within the reproduce/reconstruct binary. Reform must occupy one of two positions, and given that reform calls for the existing structure to be carried forward in a modified form, it is often positioned by critical pedagogues as reproducing the existing social order rather than reconstructing it.

The reproduce/reconstruct binary can be found throughout the history of TRSE, is normative, and plays a key role in organizing the discourse of democratic citizenship education in TRSE. In order to explain how this set of ideas come to be united as an assemblage, I next discuss the history of the reproduce/reconstruct binary. I discuss two lineages that have clearly influenced social studies education: progressive historiography and critical theory. Both of these theoretical perspectives can be traced back to the Enlightenment, but the two engage with the notion of social progress very differently.

Social Studies, Social Progress, and the Genealogy of Triads

It is recognized within the social studies literature that social studies education grew up in the context of progressive education and alongside progressive reform movements (see Egan, 1980, 2002; Evans, 2004; Foshay, 1976; Lybarger, 1980, 1991; Nelson, 1997; Whelan, 1994, 1997). Some scholars within TRSE (e.g., Nelson, 1994) have celebrated social studies’ progressive origins, and others (e.g., Leming, 1992) have seen it as unfortunate, but all seem to agree that social studies has, from the beginning, been closely associated with various forms of progressivism.

The most prominent (sub)discipline in the social studies is history. The writing of history has its own history, filled with contending philosophies and practices. Of those, the tradition that is most relevant to the discussion of social studies education is Progressive history. Progressive history developed in the midst of other historiographical competitors, including scientific history.
and the more empirically skeptical, post-scientific historians (see Breisach, 1993; Higham, 1965; Noble, 1985; Novick, 1988).

Scientific history, influenced by Ranke (1895/2010), was taking hold in the United States at about the time it was losing favor in Europe (early 1900s). Scientific history was waning in Europe because historians had become somewhat skeptical of the possibility of discovering historical laws. As a result, European historians began to ask what history would look like if it did not search for laws. In America, however, the situation was different: the scientific historians who maintained and bolstered a faith in the progress of knowledge continued to capture the zeitgeist of the age. America was thought by many to be exceptional, and thus rejected European skepticism. Despite their progressive hopefulness, scientific historians were not without their own problems. As discussed by Breisach (1993), the optimism of discovering the laws of history was sobered by the scientific historians’ belief that it would take a rather long time to do so. The unwillingness of the scientific historians to provide the reading public with immediate, actionable information that supported the progressive worldview did not endear them to progressive reformers. In fact, their calls for detachment and objectivity were somewhat out of step with the activism of the progressive era. The reform-minded reading public wanted history that would be useful and would tell them what works; that is to say, they wanted progressive history.

Progressive historians did not enter the intellectual scene fully formed and self-aware on some particular date in American history. In fact, different historiographers even include and omit different historians in their account of progressive historiography (e.g., Breisach, 1993; Cremin, 1964; Higham, 1965; Noble, 1985). Nonetheless, histories written in the early 1900s associated with progressive history show marked differences in the style of historical writing, the
purpose of writing history, and the general predispositions toward engagement with the public than those associated with scientific/positivist history. While the scientific historians valued detachment, patience, and objectivity, the progressive historians claimed to know the main outline of the law(s) of history: human society was moving toward a collectively organized democracy made possible by advances in science and human rationality.

For an illustration of the differences between the two schools of thought regarding the immediate role of the historian in influencing social reform, we can compare the opening lines from the preface of the Rankean scientific historian, Adams (1896), to a statement from the introduction of a book by the progressive historian, Robinson (1921). Adams first:

In offering to the public a second edition of *The Law of Civilization and Decay*, I take the opportunity to say emphatically that such value as the essay may have lies in its freedom from any preconceived bias. All theories contained in the book, whether religious or economic, are the effect, and not the cause, of the way in which the facts unfolded themselves. I have been passive. The value of history lies not in the multitude of facts collected, but in their relation to each other, and in this respect an author can have no larger responsibility than any other scientific observer. If the sequence of events seems to indicate the existence of a law governing social development, such a law may be suggested, but to approve or disapprove of it would be as futile as to discuss the moral bearings of gravitation. (p. 1)

Now Robinson (1921):

If some magical transformation could be produced in men’s ways of looking at themselves and their fellows, no inconsiderable part of the evils which now afflict society would vanish away or remedy themselves automatically. If the majority of influential
persons held the opinions and occupied the point of view that a few rather influential people [progressive historians] do now, there would, for instance, be no likelihood of another great war; the whole problem of “labor and capital” would be transformed and attenuated … We have available knowledge and ingenuity and material resources to make a far fairer world than that in which we find ourselves. (pp. 1-2)

Adams (1886) clearly identified himself with a vision of the academic who strove for objectivity and detachment rather than social engagement. He maintained a distinction between the academic and the reformer. He believed that historians should not go about promoting moral visions purportedly derived from historical trends or laws. The good historian was understood to be occupied with truth; moralizing should be left to the priests and reform to the politicians.

Adams’s academic detachment was plainly at odds with the social activism embraced by progressive historians such as Robinson (1921), who believed that historians could (and should) provide the age’s reformers with the confidently optimistic message they desired. Robinson (1921) and other progressive historians made no hard and fast distinction between the academic and the reformer, and social reform was considered the worthy goal of each. By explaining which prevailing trends and practices were leading to progress and which should be understood as progress-impeding vestiges of the past, the progressive historian would, according to Robinson, lead the way to social and moral progress. Though perhaps there were problems of application to be worked out, the progressive historians believed that the application of science to social problems would facilitate the continued transformation of society from an agricultural republic to a modern industrial democracy. Note that although both the progressive and the scientific historians had faith that positivist social science could be productively applied to practical social issues, the progressive historians claimed that history could be put to that purpose
immediately, whereas the scientific historians more often claimed that the field of history was too young for applicable conclusions to be drawn.

The notion of progressive social transformation held by the progressive historians continues to guide thinking on democracy and citizenship in social studies education today. The historian Breisach (1993) provided some insight into the prior origins of this perspective in his analysis of the dualistic thinking that characterized progressive historiography in the second decade of the 1900s:

Progressive historians had succeeded in compressing a bewildering array of conflicts … into the dualism of right and wrong they felt so comfortable with. In historical accounts, all societies and social theories, past and present, could be judged according to their attitudes toward the Good Society of the future. Right and wrong or good and evil were separated neatly and rigidly, with no dialectical connection that could turn even a good into a grievous wrong. (p. 102)

One hundred years ago, like today, the progressives embraced a moral and social vision of transformation and sought to categorize competing visions of reformation/transformation as well-meaning agents of conservatism:

In this Manichean scheme, three types of opponents were singled out: first, those who agreed on the need for change but wished to rely on evolution, unguided by human mastery, for a better future; second, those who expected the better future to result from a radical, one-time institutional change; finally, the mass of anonymous resisters to change who were motivated by selfish interests, traditionalism, or sheer inertia. (pp. 102-103)

The goal of maintaining society was understood by the progressives to be held by those who were on the wrong side of history: those who, due either to ignorance or selfishness,
proclaimed that the present social order was good and that change would most likely be bad. In the early 1900s, it was the revolutionaries, who called for immediate revolution rather than political transformation, and the determinists, who believed that transformation was inevitable, who were the unwary agents of social reproduction. The revolutionists believed that historical change came in sudden shifts rather than by the slow progress brought about by the enhancement of human reason. The deterministic varieties of Marxists and millennialists, on the other hand, held that social progress was inevitable. As a result, neither of these groups believed that the path forward required the social reforms espoused by prominent progressive historians. As a result, these views were taken to be antagonistic by the progressive historians, and attempts were made to have their perspectives reinterpreted within the progressive framework.

That reconceptualization involved a two-step process. In the first step, the progress-by-revolution perspective of the millennialists and Marxists was identified as almost good and on the right track because it adhered to the foundational premise that the existing society was bad and that a different one would be better. In order to claim that these competing perspectives were sort of good, the binary had to be broken and expanded: a third place had to be created for the heretofore Manichean universe. As such, the binary conception of good and bad was transformed into the triadic conception of good, bad, and somewhere in between. Then, in a second conceptual move, the binary was reformed by taking the middle position and (re)integrating it into the reproduce pole of the binary. The revolutionary perspective was thus recast as regressive and reconceptualized as a member of the group of positions that intentionally or not reproduced the status quo, restoring the basic meaning structure of binary logic: there are only two sides and you are either with us or against us.
The progressive historians would have felt very much at home in the annals of *TRSE*. They shared a notion of social and moral progress, understood through a binary that was fully normative, and in both cases, reproduction is considered bad and reconstruction is presumed to be good. They rejected academic distance and embraced social activism. They even adopted a strategy of triadic conceptualization to support their binary-based narrative.

**From Reform to Transform**

Progressive history morphed into or was supplanted by what is commonly referred to as *consensus history*. While consensus history is typically dated to the period following the Second World War, progressive history did not live a neat life and die a neat death. Even within the ranks, there had been dissention regarding notions of progress from thinkers such as Becker, who, according to Breisach (1993), saw the collapse of 1929, the Great Depression, and World War II as damning counter-factuals for the progressive vision. Progressive history continued, however, to capture the public’s interest into the 1950s with its dualistic worldview that opposed the forces of good (social progress, emancipation, and increased democracy) to those of evil (tradition, self-interested elites, and capitalism).

The passing of progressive history is often linked to Hofstadter (1968), who began his career as a progressive historian but came to be associated with consensus historians (see Breisach, 1993; Higham, 1990; Noble, 1985). Following World War II, Hofstadter came to reject one after another of progressivism’s tenets from Beard’s (1921) economic interpretation of history, including the binary between the self-interested elites and the virtuous public, and the belief that democracy is good and capitalism is bad. This two-worlds vision, argued consensus historians such as Niebuhr (1944) and Hofstadter, was dangerous because it allowed groups to imagine that their particular version of the good was linked to the universal. Communion with
the good provided groups with the license to spread the word with some abandon, confident that they were operating in the service of goodness, truth, and justice: a trend that was all too familiar to historians and social theorists of the first half of the twentieth century. By the inauguration of TRSE in 1973, however, Hofstadter’s vision of history, which included the belief that a combination of capitalism and cosmopolitanism encouraged rather than hindered democracy, was itself being challenged.

As noted, the progressive historians were engaged in the social activism that marked the period. Beard, in particular, participated in committees that established social studies education as a field and as a subject to be studied in primary and secondary school (Evans, 2004). Social studies education from around 1920 into the 1950s was comfortably nested within progressive education and, during the 1930s, was seen by many as leading the way for progressive education. It is no surprise, then, that the ideas and perspectives of the progressive historians, who actively and intentionally blurred the line between history and social science and between academics and reform, have strongly influenced social studies education and scholarship.

While progressive educators and progressive reformers more broadly make regular appearances in discussions of citizenship education, they are not the only group associated with the reproduce/reconstruct binary. The critical theorists of the Frankfurt School were often cited by those invoking the reproduce/reconstruct binary, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. In the section that follows, therefore, I briefly discuss the history of critical theory as a second origin story for the notions of social progress and democracy in TRSE. I explain how the founders of critical theory traced the idea of progress back to the Enlightenment and Kant, and how the notion of progress evolved from Kant, through Hegel, Marx, and Weber, and the critical
theorists. I conclude with a discussion of the connection between Habermas’s work and the early critical scholars in TRSE.

Critical Theory, Progress, and Emancipation

Critical theory traces its heritage back to the Enlightenment and Kant (1781, 1784) and then up through Hegel (1807), Marx (1867), and Weber (1905). Notions of progress in this lineage are complicated. Kant, Hegel, and Marx were rather optimistic, but other influences, including Weber and Nietzsche (1887), were rather skeptical of the idea that reason or historical evolution brought about social and/or moral progress. I maintain that much of the work in TRSE is at least implicitly progressive in that it promotes the continued advancement of democracy, equality, and social justice, holding these to be both more reasonable and morally superior to other models of social organization. Although the origins of these progressive ideas were discussed in the previous section, that explanation is clearly incomplete, however, because most scholars who advance ideas of social and moral progress self-identify as critical theorists of one type or another. As such, the relationship between these two theoretical positions needs to be clarified.

One key historical difference between critical theory and progressive historiography is that critical theory appeared about the time that progressive history lost its influence. The events surrounding the rise of fascism and World War II were pivotal for the rise of critical theory. There was some lag, however, between the emergence of critical theory and its adoption into the discourse of democracy in TRSE. One obvious reason is that TRSE did not begin until 1973. However, critical theory did not receive the same attention in the first few years of the journal that it garnered at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. While there are surely many reasons for this, one seems to be the ascendance of the work of Habermas (1981).
Consider the following remarks, for example, by Cherryholmes (1982) (an early editor of the journal):

This alternative view of things that is only starting to appear in the American social studies literature (Giroux, 1979, Apple, 1971; Popkewitz, 1978; and Anyon, 1979) comes from the work of the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School especially from the thinking of Jurgen Habermas. (p. 64)

Habermas was not the first critical theorist; he was what might be called a second generation theorist, following behind Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/1997). This is worth noting because from the beginning, there were at least two lines of thought regarding the value of critical theory for social studies education. As the passages below indicate, some, such as Giroux (1979, 1982), connected critical theory very closely with neo-Marxism and promoted it primarily as a theoretical perspective that afforded opportunities to emancipate the oppressed. Cherryholmes (1982), and especially Popkewitz (1978), on the other hand, sought to use critical theory to discuss the relationship between knowledge and power and the limits of knowledge. In the following two passages from their 1979 article, Giroux and Penna made explicit why they valued the Marxist approach:

The neo-Marxist position, it seems to us, provides the most insightful and comprehensive model for a more progressive approach for understanding the nature of schooling and developing an emancipatory program for social education. (p. 23)

If social education is in Kant’s words to be used to educate students for a better society, social studies educators will even have to go farther than democratizing their schools and classrooms. They will have to do more than help develop changes in student consciousness; they will have to help implement the rationale for reconstructing a new
social order whose institutional arrangements, in the final analysis, will provide the basis for a truly humanizing education. (p. 39)

In 1982, Giroux connected the Marxist, emancipatory vision to critical theory:

On the one hand, critical theory refers to the legacy of theoretical work developed by certain members of what can be loosely described as "the Frankfurt School." … On the other hand, the concept of critical theory refers to the nature of self-conscious critique and to the need to develop a discourse of social transformation and emancipation that does not cling dogmatically to its own doctrinal assumptions. In other words, critical theory refers to both a "school of thought" and process of critique. (p. 20)

Giroux clearly sought to use critical theory for emancipatory purposes. Cherryholmes (1982) seemed to share Giroux’s belief that critical theory could transcend its own situatedness, and also found the emancipatory potential appealing, but as illustrated in the following passage, he focused somewhat more on the ramifications of the epistemological vision that he associated with critical theory:

It is not possible, for example, to search for or discuss "true" statements without presuming a normative structure that guides the search or governs the discussion. The norms that guide the search for truth constitute the ideology of the discourse. If these norms change, what we presume to be true about the world is also altered. (p. 58)

Of all of writers to discuss critical theory during the late 1970s and early 1980s, Popkewitz (1982) was most interested in the disciplinary nature of knowledge and put critical theory to use in considering the connection between social epistemology and education:

Where the first two paradigms [empirical and interpretive] involve the development of theories that are to lead directly to the improvement of our social conditions, the latter is
a negative science. For the critical science, the purpose of theory is to uncover the past that is embedded in the present, and that limits the potential and possibilities of our existence. The theoretical purpose and the nature of descriptive and explanatory qualities represented in each of the paradigms represent different but complementary paths to scientific knowledge about our human condition. (p. vi)

Despite the different uses to which critical theory has been put regarding democratic citizenship education, the practice of analyzing the relationship between rational knowledge and social progress were common to most. Horkheimer, an early director of the Frankfurt Institute who is credited with coining critical theory addressed this relationship in the book co-written with Adorno (1944/1997). They began with a discussion of the Enlightenment, and from the first pages of their introduction, it was clear that they believed the connections between reason, progress, and emancipation to be complex:

The dilemma that faced us in our work proved to be the first phenomenon for investigation: the self-destruction of the Enlightenment. We are wholly convinced – and therein lies our petitio principii – that social freedom is inseparable from enlightened thought. Nevertheless, we believe that we have just as clearly recognized that the notion of this very way of thinking, no less than the actual historic forms – the social institutions – with which it is interwoven, already contains the seed of the reversal universally apparent today. If consideration of the destructive aspect of progress is left to its enemies, blindly pragmatized thought loses its transcending quality and its relation to truth. (xiii)

According to Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/1997), the Enlightenment did not need to be conserved or abandoned; it needed “redemption” (p. xv). That is, we need to recognize and
recapture the Enlightenment’s authentic goals (and abandon the pseudo-Enlightenment goals associated with instrumental reason). According to Horkheimer and Adorno, “in the most general sense of progressive thought, the Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty” (p. 3). This understanding of the goal of the Enlightenment was supported by Kant’s (1781/2007) definition of the Enlightenment as “man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity,” (p. 23) which, according to Horkheimer and Adorno was defined as “the inability to use one’s understanding without the guidance of another person” (p. 81). Using one’s own understanding, according to Kant, meant using Reason, or systematic thinking. Because Kant presumed or posited that our faculties match up with the observable world and that reason is transcendental, knowledge was assured, so long as our systems of thought matched our observations of the world, and our systems of thought were sound (not self-contradictory). Progress thus understood flows naturally from the development of non-contradictory philosophical systems that represent and systematize observations of the empirical world.

For Kant (1781/2007), Reason was understood to be universal and ahistorical. It did not change over time. This claim was rejected by Hegel (1837/1952), however, who followed Kant and had a strong influence upon the Frankfort scholars. Rather than grounding knowledge in an unchanging, universal reason as did Kant, Hegel proposed that all things, including reason, evolve over time. This distinction bears heavily upon considerations regarding the relations among reason, progress and emancipation. Kant believed that people who embraced rational thought could be emancipated from superstition and illegitimate authority. Hegel contended, however, that because reason evolved alongside humans, what was reasonable in one era would not be reasonable in another, and emancipation and enlightenment could come only with the
fulfillment of history and of reason. Thus, in Hegel’s vision, emancipation was seen as something to come, whereas for Kant, it had come (to some) already. For Hegel, emancipation was tied up with the history and the destiny of the world. For Kant, the individual who had the courage to think for him or herself could, in the eighteenth century, be emancipated and enlightened. At the risk of oversimplification, it might be said that Kant imagined enlightenment through the individual, while Hegel conceived of enlightenment through the whole. This distinction can still be found today in debates regarding the purpose of social studies education whereby those who promote critical thinking as the goal of social studies education are generally more closely aligned with Kant’s thought, while those who seek to promote social and historical change are, in some ways, more aligned with Hegel’s perspective.

Much of Hegel’s (1837/1952) philosophy of history was incorporated by Marx (Tucker, 1978). Perhaps most importantly, both approaches included a view of history whereby societies develop, through the dialectical process, toward a rational and just society. Differences were had in their understanding of reason, however. Perhaps most importantly, whereas for Hegel, reason was the substance of the universe, for Marx, reason was the result of material conditions (see Hegel, 1807/1977; Tucker, 1978). Both believed that society would become fully rational at the end of history, but Marx insisted that progress and emancipation would be the result rather than the cause, of changing material conditions.

As Marxism developed and diversified, this point of contention (how materialistically or idealistically history should be understood) continued to be debated by those following Hegel and Marx. While the more materialistic reading of Marx held sway in many circles, it was the idealistic vein that most influenced the Frankfort School (see Sherratt, 2006). Of particular importance to the Frankfort School’s understanding of the connection between emancipation and
reason was Hegel’s belief, adopted by Lukacs (see Kardakay, 1995), that social problems were often the result of the underdevelopment of reason. Writing between Marx and Lukacs, however, were a number of thinkers who challenged the idea that moral or social progress was linked to advances in science. Most notable among them, perhaps, were Nietzsche and Weber. Nietzsche (1887/2010) questioned whether the world was making social and moral progress and suggested that the final quarter of the nineteenth century could better be understood as a time of regress than progress and that what were generally deemed moral advances were merely rationalizations of personal and group weaknesses.

The most direct connection to the Frankfort School from those outside of the Kant-Hegel-Marx lineage was Max Weber. Weber’s (1905/2002) critique of rationality targeted a particular aspect of reason: instrumental reason. According to Weber, as instrumental reason was increasingly employed by the state in the realm of political and economic governance, it came to infiltrate all aspects of life and pushed aside all measures of meaning other than instrumental evaluations linked to the promotion of the state through bureaucratic and economic structures. The effect was that contemporary Westerners had become trapped in the iron cage of modernity.

The idea, so familiar to us today and yet in reality far from obvious, that one’s duty consists in pursuing one’s calling, and that the individual should have a commitment to his “professional” activity, whatever it may consist of, irrespective of whether it appears to the detached observer as nothing but utilization of his labor or even of his property (as “capital”), this idea is a characteristic feature of the “social ethic” of capitalist culture. …

Today’s capitalist economic order is a monstrous cosmos, into which the individual is born and which is for him, at least as an individual, simply a given, an iron cage.
which he is obliged to live. It forces on the individual, to the extent that he is caught up in the relationships of the “market,” the norms of its economic activity. (p. 13)

Horkheimer was influenced by Hegel and Marx, but he was also sympathetic to Weber’s notion that the progress and application of rationality had not led to the emancipation of the people. Instead, the scientific rationality associated with the modern state and capitalism rather diminished the mental condition of people by restricting their use of reason to a narrowed range. Horkheimer (1944) believed that social progress was stuck because of the supremacy of instrumental reasoning; but that through critical theory it was possible to overcome the instrumental character of modern rationality and to once again consider issues of purpose. The point of critical theory, then, was to allow us to critique instrumental rationality and the society that had developed as a result of it and to allow us to ask questions about values and purposes – the sorts of questions that had been pushed aside by the dominance of instrumental reason. As such, critical theory would seek to emancipate, but the emancipation would not be understood as a correlative advance of reason, certainly not the sort of reason that had come to dominate Western society and was manifest in Europe and America in the 1940s. Instead, through the process of internal critique, the social critic would confront current institutions and practices with its own claims about what it should accomplish and then compare those claims to what was actually happening. Once confronted with those contradictions or shortcomings, the rational institution would be reformed in accordance with its own principles and goals. Social progress would thus occur not as a result of the general unfolding of reason, but by the intentional application of reason through the practice of social critique.

The most influential member of the Frankfort School for TRSE scholars was Habermas (1981/1984). Habermas incorporated ideas from all the thinkers listed above. Like Weber,
Horkheimer, and Adorno, Habermas believed that while scientific rationality had led to technical and bureaucratic progress, it had not led to continued moral and social progress. For Habermas, the Enlightenment contributed to the development of republican forms of government, and this form of management allowed policy to be subject to public reason. This in turn, however, caused the governments of these societies to come to rely upon instrumental rationality. In time, this form of rationality came to dominate all forms of thinking.

Following Kant (1781/1996), Habermas (1981/1984) organized knowledge into three types. Habermas’s categories reflected what he saw as a tripartite division of human interests: productive/technical interests, communicative/practical interests, and reflective/emancipatory interests. In the past, the three forms of thought operated together as semi-independent spheres of rationality. With the evolution of the market system, however, the practical and reflective forms of thought came to be dominated by technical forms of thought. Invoking images of homeostatic medicine, Habermas claimed that the lifeworld, dominated by instrumental knowledge, had become imbalanced. Because, according to Habermas, each of these modes of thinking occur in their own way and serve different purposes, each is vital to human life. As such, the domination of the communicative and the reflective forms of thought by instrumental forms was seen as endangering functional social life. Habermas thus believed that because reason had become manifest mostly as instrumental reason, the moral or social progress and the human emancipation imagined by Enlightenment thinkers had not come to pass and would not until the communicative and reflective forms of rationality were freed from the tyranny of instrumental reason, so to speak.
Summary

Critical theorists such as Habermas (1981) and Horkheimer and Adorno (1947) argued that instrumental rationality had led to, or was at least associated with, the advance of science and technology, but it had not led to emancipation or enlightenment. In the late 1970s and early 1980s these ideas became notably present in TRSE in discussions regarding democracy and citizenship. Among other tasks, the critically-minded scholars sought to argue against the reproduction of the present society, characterized by inequality, injustice, and instrumental reason, to promote “a comprehensive model for a more progressive approach for understanding the nature of schooling and develop an emancipatory program for social education” (Giroux, 1979, p. 23).

What was not troubled as critical theory was introduced into TRSE was the connection between emancipation, progress, and reason. Indeed, it was presumed that social reconstruction denoted social progress and that social reconstruction could lead to a world that really was more just – not merely more just as understood from a single ideological perspective. Progressive thought and critical theory maintained we have made technical progress. Opinions differed, however, on the matter of social and moral progress. Progressives remained optimistic, while the critical theorists were more pessimistic. This is perhaps mostly due to the influence of Habermas, who suggested that the dialectic of the enlightenment, and hence social stagnation/reproduction, could be overcome by re-instituting the necessary balance between instrumental, communicative, and reflective reason. While, as always, there were a host of socio-political, cultural, and intellectual reasons that converged to allow the reproduce/reconstruct binary to take hold in this discourse when and how it did, the fact that the binary has most often been associated with critical theorists/pedagogues seems due in part to
Habermas. That is, Habermas’s more optimistic version of critical theory allowed the already-present progressivism in social studies education to go largely unchallenged, thus affirming the notion that social progress is both possible and good and that the reproduction of the status quo (associated with both instrumental reason, capitalism, and inequality) is bad. In this way, the Enlightenment narratives of social and moral progress were grafted onto pre-enlightenment and Kantian\(^x\) notions of universal morality, and the reproduce/reconstruct binary was formed. Said differently, the somewhat contradictory notions of universal morality and moral progress have been merged within the discourse on democratic citizenship education to create a narrative whereby social and moral change were understood to be a universal moral good.

What follows are four chapters that present and discuss how democratic citizenship education has been conceived in \textit{TRSE}. In addition to presenting how democracy and citizenship were understood over time, my analysis builds the argument that the reproduce/reconstruct binary structures the discourse, that the use of triadic modeling supports the binary, and that together these maintain and are supported by a narrative of emancipation and social and moral progress.
CHAPTER 3

1970s

During the 1970s, citizenship education essays in TRSE often used oppositional binaries to create the pedagogical or rhetorical effect of making the complex appear to be simple. I open this chapter by briefly introducing five of these binaries: (1) the socialization/counter-socialization binary, (2) the national/global binary, (3) the Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft binary, (4) the thinking/acting binary, and (5) the reproduce/reconstruct binary. I first introduce the binaries. Then I turn to discussing them in more detail as they were associated with democratic citizenship education in TRSE in the 1970s.

Introducing the Binaries

Socialization.

During the 1970s, scholars writing in TRSE were often concerned about and interested in how schools influenced the development of social and political perspectives, constructed subjectivity, or to use the language of the period, socialized students (e.g., Giroux, 1979; Goldenson, 1978; Nelson, 1976). Although there are countless ways in which a student’s subjectivity is constructed during schooling, the analysis in TRSE during the late 1970s and early 1980s, tended toward one reductively narrow question: whether the process of socialization that occurred in schools led either to the reproduction of the status quo or to the transformation of society. Nelson (1976), for example, suggested that schools served as ideological apparatuses and functioned to reproduce the status quo:
The very nature of the relationship between schools and the societies in which they operate virtually precludes the setting of school goals which are radically different from those of the society. Though there are some who argue that the schools have the capacity to reconstruct society, the weight of evidence indicates that schools are essentially reflective of their societies. (p. 33)

Golden (1978) also supported the notion that schools functioned as agents of socialization and contended that science did as well: “political scientists … have evaluated, and made universal generalizations about, the importance of the school as an ‘agent’ of political socialization” (pp. 44-45).

Of interest is how each of these scholars understood socialization through the lens of social reproduction. That is, the pre-understanding of socialization seemed to contain notions of reproduction and reconstruction. Socialization was consistently framed by a narrative of systematic oppression. Anyon (1978) went so far as to explain why the state needed to socialize its citizens through the school system: “the coercive nature of the institutional behavior must be justified to the new generation and maintained in the adult members of society. … For this reason prevailing institutional practices must be fostered in the young and maintained in adults. Such attitudes and beliefs must be developed over time” (p. 42).

As the above passages illustrate, during the 1970s scholars were concerned with how schools socialized students. More precisely, however, the concern was not so much that schools socialized as how they socialized. Socialization was seen as a problem because it was thought to be conservative and reproductive. That scholars were concerned with how schools socialized is evident during the late 1970s and into the 1980s in that they expressed a desire to find ways to have schools socialize differently, or, to counter-socialize.
**Nationalism.**

In the early 1970s, one of the primary concerns of social studies education scholars writing in *TRSE* was their perception that an overly nationalistic citizenship curriculum was being taught by overly nationalistic teachers. To remedy the problem, authors such as Naylor (1973) and Nelson (1976) sought to replace the status quo (nationalism) with a more progressive perspective (globalism). One of the most interesting essays regarding this topic was Nelson’s 1976 article, and as I explain below, Nelson proposed that the only way to have a globally-oriented curriculum adopted by the public school system would be to emphasize the commonalities between national interests and global perspectives.

**Gemeinschaft.**

The discussion of Gemeinschaft was interesting for a number of reasons, but two are most relevant here: it did not fit the standard narrative of social progress, and it was explicitly discussed in only one essay by Robert Johns (1978). In that essay, rather than oppose individualistic to collective models of citizenship, Johns sought to synthesize the social and individual components of citizenship curriculum. Moreover, he cast rationality primarily in a negative light. Given that Johns offered a rare perspective, it is not surprising that the cited influences for this model (e.g., Niebuhr, 1944; Tonnies, 2001; Weber, 1905) were seldom noted in the literature. As discussed below, although Johns did not link social progress to the increased rationalization of society, his binary-informed model did begin with the presumption that the status quo was oppressive, and he also offered a redemptive and emancipatory model to replace it.
Thinking.

The fourth binary from the decade represented the question of whether the ultimate goal of social studies education should be the development of critical thinking skills or the promotion of democratic participation and social action (Feely, 1976; Hurst, 1979; Jones, 1975; Naylor, 1973; Remy, 1978). The development of critical thinking has a long history in social studies education, but it was especially emphasized in the new social studies that developed in the 1960s and was subsequently challenged by those who sought a more emancipatory approach to social studies education. In its most naïve form, the thinking/acting binary divides curriculum models into those that exclusively promote either thinking or acting. Usually, however, the binary was acknowledged only in order to be broken so that thinking could be subsumed under and placed in the service of acting. Highlighting this debate was an exchange between Arthur Foshay (1976) and Cleo Cherryholmes (1977; 1978) in which Foshay argued for implementing a uniform citizenship curriculum based on Rawls’s (1971) *Theory of Justice* and in which Cherryholmes responded that students should not be provided with a single vision of the good society but should be allowed the opportunity to examine multiple visions of the good society and then act in reference to one or more of them if they chose to do so.

Nationalism and Globalism

Around the occasion of the bicentennial, there were surely innumerable expressions of pride in our nation’s history and accomplishments. However, in the wake of Vietnam, Watergate, and other scandals, there were many who were skeptical of the government and opposed to forms of nationalism that called for its unquestioned, obedient support. In the realm of social studies educational theory, distrust of the state also prevailed and was primarily expressed through concerns regarding how the government and other powerful institutions used
the education system to socialize the population. Consider the following passage from Naylor (1973) who claimed that citizenship education itself was involved in the dissemination of patriotic values and an unquestioning allegiance to the nation:

Frequently citizenship education is narrowly perceived as a means of imparting the "right values," of developing a strong, oftentimes unquestioning allegiance to the nation. Such a conception of citizenship education should, however, be more properly regarded as nationalistic instruction. For nationalistic instruction, that instruction designed to instill love and respect for one's country, consists both of the encouragement and cultivation of certain ideas, attitudes and practices considered supportive or pro-national, and the discouragement and prohibition of certain ideas, attitudes and practices considered non-supportive or contra-national. Such instruction is concerned with studying national history in a sympathetic or "patriotic" manner, respecting national symbols, celebrating special events and heroes, singing special songs, reading special addresses, and developing an adherence to certain chosen principles. (p. 59)

Naylor called for replacing nationalistic education with one that would allow students to question and critique national policies: “What is called for is a different conception of citizenship education, a more vigilant, inquiring and dynamic type of citizenship education quite apart from the conception inherent in nationalistic instruction” (p. 60). In addition to criticizing the social studies curriculum for being too nationalist, Naylor’s article discussed a study that suggested teachers actually had more freedom to be critical of the government than they might imagine. The message was that teachers were relatively free to be critical if they chose to do so.

Later in the decade, Mitsakos (1978) reported on a curriculum (named The Family of Man) that sought to incorporate a global perspective with a national one. He suggested that the
curriculum could promote globalism without offending the predominant sentiments of nationalism. He expressed the virtues of the curriculum in the following way:

*The Family of Man* is based on the work of the University of Minnesota Project Social Studies Curriculum Center and is designed to help children learn how to be both nation-minded and world-minded; to help them learn to understand and appreciate differences in human behavior; and to help them learn why people believe in and value different things and why to these people such behavior seems natural and right. In comparing a variety of cultures, children also discover universals and the psychic unity of humankind. (p. 2)

Mitsakos concluded from his study of the curriculum model that “a carefully designed primary grade social studies program with a strong global education dimension can have a significant effect on the understanding that children develop of other nations and other peoples” (p. 12). This was noteworthy because much research indicated that curriculum had no significant effect on socialization. More relevant here, however, is how he set globalism and nationalism up as binaries, only to be shown that the oppositions could be synthesized—and in a way that promoted a global orientation. This was representative of what appeared to be the common perspective: although the socialization of students was generally thought to be quite troubling, it was seen as hopeful if a curriculum could be shown to inculcate students with a global perspective. While there was considerable interest in studying curricula that would promote a global orientation, there was little interest evident in *TRSE* for studying whether the national aspect of the curriculum was successful.

Curriculum makers sought to create courses of study that would replace nationalistic perspectives with global ones. While creating a (globally-oriented) curriculum was understood to be a difficult task in itself, having such a curriculum implemented was thought to be even
more difficult. Nelson (1976) explained that during the previous two centuries, an intimate connection had developed between Western nations and their educational systems. This connection resulted in the proliferation of nationalistic curricula and ensured schools socialized future citizens to be patriotic. The relationship that thus developed between the schools and the state all but precluded the adoption and implementation of any radical curriculum that questioned the legitimacy of the state. Nonetheless, it seemed clear to Nelson that our world was already globalized and that it was becoming more so with each passing year. This, argued Nelson, gave rise to a strategy that could be used to promote globally-oriented education: explaining that traditional forms of nationalistic education had become largely dysfunctional, that they conditioned students for a reality that no longer existed, and they promoted values that did not benefit the state. The hope was that this might convert some skeptics of globally-oriented education who failed to realize that a global perspective was actually in the nation’s best interest.

Nelson explained that much of the nationalism and ultra-conservatism that found its way into social studies education was the result of McCarthy-era fear, and although the association of globalism with communism seemed to be dissipating by 1976, the residual effects of the connection still strongly influenced many people’s conception of globally-oriented education. Because most people were still unwilling to replace the traditional, nationalist curriculum with a globally-oriented one, Nelson saw three possible paths for citizenship education curriculum developers: (1) to accept and promulgate the traditional, patriotic history, (2) to “educate directly for world citizenship as though nation states were insignificant,” (p. 47) or (3) to make it clear that national interests were “served by global conditions of peace, economic development, environmental protection, human justice and the opportunity for free participation in political decisions” (p. 47). Given political perceptions of the general public and the options available,
Nelson discouraged framing globally-oriented curricular models as radical and counter-socializing and advocated emphasizing the common ground between globally-oriented and nationalistic curricula. Doing so was seen as the most transformative option available at that point.

**Socialization and counter-socialization**

Even as Naylor and Nelson promoted a curriculum that would inculcate students with a global perspective, others in the field were explaining that any attempts to socialize were likely to fail. Metzger (1978), for example, noted “there exists a rather long history of research indicating that schools have not had the positive impact on the political socialization of their students that educators have expected” (p. 48). Jones (1975) noted that programs designed to make students become more active citizens had produced little effect on the political awareness and activism of students. Similarly, Goldenson (1978) and Serow (1978) indicated that research found that classroom instruction had “little effect on the development or change of students’ political attitudes or behavior” (Serow, p. 44).

Initially, the standard interpretation for the failure of intentional socialization in schools was that socialization occurred predominately outside the school. Foshay (1976), for example, conjectured that the mass media was far more influential than textbooks.

What has been happening has been, in large measure, the same old thing. What we have to get used to is that children have many sources of information now, not only one, concerning the Republic and its affairs. If what they read and hear in school doesn't square with what they see and hear in the mass media, they believe the media, not the textbook. If both sources are biased, so are the children. (p. 3)
Because of the influences coming from home and elsewhere, Goldenson (1978) suggested that
counter-socialization efforts made by schools must begin at a very young age.

Despite the various explanations for why socialization did not work, authors nonetheless
consistently concerned themselves with how curriculum might be used to socialize or counter-
socialize students. This unremitting interest, despite the evidence, suggests scholars
that research denying the effects socialization was flawed. And indeed their skepticism appears
reasonable. It is hard to imagine that schools do not socialize students who, from kindergarten
through the twelfth grade, spend upwards of 15,000 hours of some of their most formative years
in schools. Perhaps in recognition of this, by the end of the 1970s, the prevailing explanation for
the failure of explicit attempts to change the political perceptions of students was that there was a
hidden curriculum (the unseen practices, procedures, and presumptions of schooling) that
developed a disposition immune to the socializing efforts of any and all explicit but short-term
counter-socialization.

Anyon (1978) explained how the process was thought to work: “by constraining
legitimacy to such actions as voting and letter-writing, [schools] prescribe behavior to a very
narrow range of activities: the actions legitimized are those that will not disrupt the basic
institutional arrangements” (p. 47). Moreover, “the formal knowledge which describes and
‘explains’ social institutions may predispose interpretations of social phenomena in ways which
provide ‘logic’ and coherence, and which serve to maintain the system” (p. 42).

Anyon (1978) suggested that the teaching and learning of facts about a state of affairs, an
event, an institution, or so forth, if presented neutrally or non-critically, had the effect of
legitimizing and normalizing the event or institution. According to Anyon, neutral citizenship
education is actually, therefore, conservative citizenship education. As such, there can be no
middle ground. This conceptualization, whereby all social studies teaching is understood to be either conservative or transformative, as either reproducing or challenging the status quo, invoked both the socialization/counter-socialization binary and the reproduction/reconstruction binary. What this view effectively denied, however, was the possibility that students could be critical thinkers without being provided the correct answers, and suggested that students more or less passively adopted the ideology of their teachers without question or critique. Denied in this perspective was the critical thinking approach traditionally advocated by liberal educators, including the notion that a teacher can present students with information or with access to information and can genuinely and willfully encourage the students to come to their own conclusions – even if those conclusions are contrary to the teacher’s.

This traditional conception of liberal education, memorialized in *sapere aude*, was found wanting by theorists such as Anyon (1978) and Giroux (1979) whose articles promoted the neo-Marxist notion that personal emancipation could only come as the result of social transformation, rather than Kant’s (1784) more individualistic version of emancipation.

**Critical Thinking, Social Action, and Citizenship Curriculum**

The prevailing view in the 1970s and beyond in *TRSE* has been that the socialization that occurs in schools is too conservative. The response to the idea of overly-conservative socialization has varied however. Two leading approaches during the 1970s were the *critical thinking* and the *social action* schools of thought. As the names suggest, the critical thinking approach focused on having students develop the capacity to think critically and to discern better arguments for and against positions, policies, and claims. The social action approach contended that the goal of social studies and citizenship education should be the creation of politically active agents who could transform society.
Feely (1976) provided an image of how critical thinking was understood and theorized (by some) during the 1970s, which I present below. Freely’s support for the critical thinking approach, which linked critical thinking to the promotion of democracy and citizenship, was a justification for critical thinking that has persevered. The idea that the value of critical thinking lies in supporting citizenship was present in the 1970s as well as the 2000s.

Social Studies teachers have a clear mandate to help students learn to think for themselves (NEA, 1962) (NAEP, 1969 & 1970). Whether this "thinking for themselves" has been called problem solving, reflective thinking, discovery, inquiry or critical thinking the goals and rationales have been the same. That is, the demands of citizenship in a democracy and the rapid pace of change which makes knowledge obsolete are grounds for arguing that students need to learn more than what to think; they need to learn how to think. (p. 1)

Despite a fairly standard justification for critical thinking as the goal of social studies education, Feely acknowledged that there have been many ways in which critical thinking has been understood:

There are three meanings of critical thinking which can be observed in the social education literature. Critical thinking is sometimes defined as any mental activity which is "higher" on a taxonomy of objectives than "comprehension" (Sanders, 1966). This is a very broad definition. Another definition equates critical thinking with "reflective thinking" as it was defined by Dewey in his book How We Think (Provus, 1956). Again, given that Dewey's conception of "reflective thinking" encompassed a broad range of thinking activities, this definition includes a large range of activities. A third meaning of critical thinking is that of judging statements based upon a priori criteria (Oliver and
Shaver, 1966). In this case, critical thinking is closest in meaning to the "evaluation" stage of Bloom's Taxonomy. (p. 2)

Feely suggested that teachers should adopt the logical model (Oliver and Shaver) of promoting thinking in students and abandon the mental model (Dewey) of promoting critical thinking. The difference between the two, according to Feely was that the mental model lacked “evidence supporting its construct validity” and lacked “clear implications for instruction and research other than the neo-faculty notion that critical thinking is best taught by stimulating students to think,” (p. 17). The logical model, however, was thought to offer “clear implications for instruction and [an] ease with which research problems can be generated” (p. 17).

I won’t elaborate on the distinctions Feely made among critical thinking models. Worth noting, however, is how different Feely’s approach was to Giroux’s (1979) and Anyon’s (1979) neo-Marxist perspective and even to Nelson’s (1976), Foshay’s (1976), and Cherryholmes’s (1977, 1978) versions of critical thinking and critical theory. Each of the other authors’ citations and approaches indicated the influence of neo-Marxism and/or critical theory. Most (14/24) of Feely’s references, however, were from the 1960s; moreover, these were filled with references from educational psychology. Therefore, if Feely’s detailed review of the critical thinking literature was taken to be representative of this subset of the field, and critical thinking was grounded in quantitative, educational psychology, while the social action approach was grounded in social theory, it could be said that the two groups were approaching education from starkly different perspectives that had relatively little in common. If this were the case it would be likely that they did not share a common language, or a core set of common terms and goals, that could be used to adjudicate both perspectives (Kuhn, 2012). The story is a little more complicated than this, however, as illustrated by an exchange between Foshay (1976, 1977) and Cherryholmes
(1977), which indicated that at least some of those who supported the critical thinking approach were also well-versed in critical social theory.

Foshay (1976), like Feely (1976) and others believed the core of social studies should be citizenship education. He expressed the concern, however, that citizenship education might be abandoned in favor of other approaches to social studies education. The three threats to a social studies grounded in citizenship were that social studies (1) had no core, (2) embraced a traditional form of academic learning, and (3) that citizenship education (as a subset of social studies education) had a sullied history. The first threat to social studies reflected the torturously repeated refrain that because social studies is made up of several, somewhat disparate social science and humanities disciplines (such as history, geography, anthropology, sociology, political science, and economics), it has no core – and it must have a core! Citizenship has often been posited, as by Foshay here, as a potentially unifying core for social studies, ensuring that it does not dissipate into nonexistence.

The second challenge Foshay (1976) saw to citizenship education was the field’s (especially history’s) historical focus on the acquisition of knowledge and the development of critical thinking skills. This academic approach to social education was seen as neutral at best regarding the view that the promotion of social and political activists should be the goal of social studies education.

The field was academic, by the lights of those times. That is, it took erudition to be knowledge, and treated the student as a passive recipient of information. The field continues to be academic in this sense, in the main” (p. 2).

Even more troubling for Foshay than the academic approach to schooling was citizenship education’s own tarnished past: it had “been bent and tortured through our history until it ha[d]...
almost lost its meaning” (p. 3). Foshay lamented the fact that citizenship education had at various times been co-opted by nationalists and other groups whose vision for citizenship were different than his own. To restore the lost integrity and unity of citizenship education, Foshay recommended the adoption of a single, unified program based on Rawls’s (1971) *Theory of Justice*. Foshay was optimistic that the loyalty and justice sponsored by Rawls’s theory provided common ground for the diverse interests and approaches of citizenship-oriented social studies curriculum scholars. By incorporating social visions defined in reference to patriotism and social justice, comparatively, a single program for citizenship education could be established. Once a single vision that promoted justice was in place, dispositions toward social and political activism could be inculcated and Foshay’s vision could be realized.

Because social action was granted ultimate importance, discussing and analyzing competing models of the good society in detail was discouraged. Given time constraints, it was feared that developing various disciplinary models of inquiry and excessive evaluation of various models of the social good would sap the value of having a single model/concept of citizenship and would delay and perhaps deny students the opportunity to engage in the social action projects proposed as the capstone of citizenship education curricula. Social action was the goal.

We propose that the program be oriented around the nature of citizenship, here and elsewhere in the world, with our two criteria (a concept of citizenship, and active participation in the making and remaking of institutions) constantly observed. … It would seek to equip students with the processes of inquiry peculiar to specific disciplines, only as these are instrumental to the clarification of issues and the pursuit of action. (p. 15)

In Foshay’s (1976) curricular model, the goal of education was the development of politically active students who “would not stop with book knowledge [but] would be drawn by degrees into
full participation in the world” (p. 5). To promote this end, social studies needed a unified curriculum that promoted the active pursuit of justice but offered a nod to the development of loyalty.

Cherryholmes (1977) offered a rather strident response to Foshay’s (1976) proposal and claimed that attempts to seek consensus on the purpose of citizenship education or to implement a single, official curriculum, were misguided. He countered that instead of requiring the implementation of a single, official curricular program, teachers should be given access to a variety of curricula and that these should provide a range of accounts of the good society. Providing different accounts of the good society and of good citizens would allow students to explore competing ideas, develop their critical thinking skills, and come to their own conclusions regarding the characteristics and qualities of the good society.

In a follow-up article the next year, Cherryholmes (1978) argued that in an open and pluralistic society, “questions of value are continuously being raised and tentatively resolved in innumerable settings,” and it would not be appropriate, therefore, to let “curriculum developers arbitrarily explicate a narrow range of values to the exclusion of others” (75). Rather than proselytize students, Cherryholmes suggested that teachers should be encouraged to model open-mindedness, thoughtfulness, and critical thinking. In this way, the political nature of citizenship education could be acknowledged without making the categorical mistake of subsuming intellectual work within political activism. Unlike others during the period (e.g., Hurst, 1979), Cherryholmes did not propose an inseparable link between citizenship education and social activism. Whether or not a particular student would decide to become socially or politically active would depend upon the vision of society that the student, after their own more or less careful reflection, adopted.
One means of accounting for the differences in approaches to citizenship education regards how the individual person was understood. Foshay understood the person as a citizen and the citizen as a social activist. Understood in this way, it follows that the goal of citizenship education would be social activism. Cherryholmes, however, was unwilling, in these articles anyway, to define the human person in such narrow terms. A second consequence of the difference in approaches was that Cherryholmes did not argue that the goal of social studies education was to prevent the reproduction of the social order. In what amounts to a rare exception in the *TRSE* literature, Cherryholmes can be understood in the essays from the late 1970s to suggest that social studies educators should have the courage to allow students to inquire and to come to their own conclusions – even if those conclusions do not match our own.

Since the 1970s and before, democratic citizenship education has been posited as the heart of social studies education, as that which holds the disparate disciplines of the social studies together. But what does it mean to promote citizenship? According to the literature in *TRSE*, for most Americans, citizenship has been closely connected to patriotism and support of the status quo. Within *TRSE*, however, citizenship education is usually associated with the transformation of society and thus with social and political activism. If citizenship development is to guide social studies and the goal of citizenship is the promotion of social activism, then a critical thinking approach that is neutral regarding activism can come to be seen, via Anyon’s (1978) analysis, to be conservative. Thus imagined, critical thinking can come to be seen as antithetical to social activism and perhaps even to citizenship education. The thinking/acting binary seemed to be more popular in the 1970s than at other times since then, and although I did not see it mentioned in the literature, I am inclined to believe that the events of Paris, 1968 might
have influenced the acceptance of the thinking/acting binary under the notion that theories don’t go down into the streets and fight for justice.

**Critical Thinking, Social Action, and the Hidden Curriculum**

While some, such as Foshay (1976) and Cherryholmes (1977, 1978), discussed the thinking/acting binary in relation to the official curriculum, by the end of the 1970s, the most engaging discussions of democratic citizenship involved the effect of the hidden curriculum, “the unstated norms, values and beliefs that are transmitted to students through the underlying structure of meaning in both the formal content as well as the social relations of school and classroom life” (Giroux, 1979, p. 22). The hidden curriculum was discussed in relation to socialization/counter-socialization: socialization was associated with the official curriculum, and counter-socialization was associated with attempts to counteract the effects of the hidden curriculum. The hidden curriculum was also discussed in reference to the think/act binary, and that is what will be presented here.

By 1978, some social studies education scholars, notably those working from a neo-Marxist perspective, had come to the conclusion that if any change was to be made in the schools, it would have to be understood that far more influential than the official curriculum was the hidden curriculum. The problem with the socialization provided by the hidden curriculum, according to Giroux (1979), was that it reproduced “the reified consciousness that maintains the cultural and economic interests of a stratified society” (p. 26) through the promotion of competitiveness, individualism, and authoritarianism. Said differently, even though the official curriculum justified the status quo and should be replaced, it was the unnoticed, and to some degree unintentional, inculcation of ideology into the youth through unseen practices and presuppositions that was most responsible for the conservative socialization of students. The hidden curriculum was understood to include lessons learned from witnessing and becoming
accommodated to the power relations existing between principals, teachers, and students; the pedagogical (content delivery) styles of teachers; and the ways in which students were assessed (recall/reproduction of facts about the status quo). Because the rules, procedures, and relationships of school were thought to approximate the broader social and economic world, the practices picked up by the students (without the need for explicit indoctrination) strongly influenced students’ social and political dispositions. It was generally understood by those who spoke of a hidden curriculum that students who had been socialized in ways that legitimated the existing political structure would later act in ways that reproduced the social structure and maintained the status quo.

**Reproduction and Reconstruction**

The success of the hidden curriculum in social studies, according to Anyon (1978), was due to the disciplinary nature of discursive knowledge: “Knowledge which counts as social studies knowledge will tend to be that knowledge which provides formal justification for, and legitimation of, prevailing institutional arrangements” (p. 40). Anyon explained that becoming familiar with a state of affairs had the psychological/sociological effect of normalizing and legitimating that arrangement. As such, argued Anyon, the formal and the hidden curriculum provided students a sense of reality and rationality: “the formal knowledge that ‘explains’ social institutions may predispose interpretations of social phenomena in ways which provide ‘logic’ and coherence, and which serve to maintain the system” (p. 42). An idea, an explanation, or a solution makes sense, according to this perspective, when it is explainable in reference to a set of justifying principles accepted by the hearer.

Anyon’s analysis thus poses the question of what can be done if liberalism and capitalism cause our democracy’s social ills but the explicit and hidden curriculum tell us that their
solutions must be grounded in liberalism and capitalism. That is, what can be done if we are not allowed even to consider viable solutions to our social problems? The first step to transforming our society and solving our social ills through the use of the school system, according to Giroux and Penna’s (1979) program, is to recognize what schools are and what they do. That is, it must be understood that the underlying purpose of school is to maintain the status quo. Once educators recognize that adhering to liberal ideology causes our schools reproduce class stratification in the service of our market economy, then the next step can be taken. This involves rejecting the approach to education that asks what works and what is most efficient and adopting one that asks what is ethical and what is just. Giroux and Penna thus called for a moral perspective to take the place of the instrumental perspective that was thought to dominate social studies education: “the goals of social studies education should be redefined and understood as an extension of ethics” and “social studies developers will have to shift their attention from a technical, ahistorical, view of schooling to a socio-political perspective which focuses on the relationship between schooling and the idea of justice” (p. 23).

Giroux and Penna proposed shifting from an instrumental approach to a socio-political perspective. In order to explain the differences, three analytical perspectives were discussed: the structural-functionalist, the phenomenological, and the neo-Marxist traditions. Giroux and Penna rejected the first two approaches in favor of the third. Structural-functionalism was rejected with the charge that it valued stability over conflict, was apolitical, and posited that problems within society were due not to structural issues, but rather to the fact that sometimes people are not sufficiently socialized. In short, this conservative tradition was rejected because it valued the reproduction of the status quo and did not seek to change it. The phenomenological approach to the hidden curriculum was considered an improvement upon structural-
functionalism because, among other things, it involved an examination of the relationship between power and knowledge. Giroux and Penna saw this approach as fundamentally flawed as well, however, because among other things, it did not discuss class consciousness and did not offer a theory of how social change can occur. The phenomenological approach was understood to be based on the ideas that students construct and develop their own set of values and that no single, objective set of values are correct. In addition to being rejected for not discussing class consciousness or offering a theory of social change, the phenomenological approach was rejected because it was deemed relativistic: “by endorsing the value and relevance of students’ intentionality, the new sociology has succumbed to a notion of cultural relativity” (p. 25).

Giroux and Penna (1979) believed the hidden curriculum supported liberal individualism and suggested that the individualism and relativism be replaced with moralism. Why attempt to inculcate students with one’s own set of moral prescriptions rather than attempt to have them develop their own beliefs? Because the end was not critical thinking, per se, but the realization of a particular social and political order, students could not be allowed to think for themselves and run the risk of coming or continuing to believe that the current system was just. Nor could they come to believe, via a cultural relativism, that one system is as just as another, or via a moral skepticism that justice is constructed by those who have the power to define it. Giroux wanted to be able to claim that his preferred system really was just and that competing systems really were unjust. Any approach that failed to prescribe a moral order would run a greater risk of having students adopt a pluralist position.

Because Giroux and Penna (1979) wished to promote an ethical vision “connected to a notion of justice, one that is capable of articulating how certain unjust social structures can be identified and replaced” (p. 26), they required a theoretical framework that allowed them to make
clear moral distinctions. Giroux and Penna found that “the neo-Marxist position … provides the most insightful and comprehensive model for a more progressive approach for understanding the nature of schooling and developing an emancipatory program for social education” (p. 23). The neo-Marxist position, according to Giroux and Penna, would enable educators to draw a stark moral line that created two sides, occupied respectively by emancipators who sought to make society more just, and oppressors who wished to maintain the status quo: “whether they realize it or not, social studies educators work in the service of one of the two positions outlined [above]” (p. 27). Giroux and Penna concluded that the neo-Marxist analytic could best combat capitalist ideology that is supported by the hidden curriculum and that manipulates the educational system. By allowing emancipatory educators to work against the influences of competitiveness, individualism, and authoritarianism, social studies educators could then help establish “a true human community” (p. 34), and “a truly humanizing education” (p. 39), “where, by acting together, men (and women) can become truly free” (p. 23).

Depending on one’s perspective and purposes, critical thinking can be put into the service of social activism, or the two can be seen as existing on opposite sides of a continuum that posits the end of citizenship education as either thinking or doing. During the 1970s, authors in TRSE were concerned with the effects of socialization. These concerns were expressed in debates over whether schools should teach a nationalistic or globally-oriented citizenship curriculum, an individualistic or communal notion of citizenship, and in the debate on the effects of socialization. The positions regarding socialization included the views that schools should not socialize beyond teaching students how to think critically and that educators should counter-socialize so as to promote a leftist, progressive transformation of the social order. No one in TRSE during this period argued that the curriculum needed to be more nationalistic, more
religious, or more individualistic. One position, whose ideas transgressed the left-right boundary, did stand out.

**The Outlier**

From a genealogical standpoint, one of the most interesting articles in *TRSE* in the 1970s, was written by Johns (1978), whose essay did not sit neatly with others from the period for two main reasons. First, Johns’s sprawling essay made use of theorists such as Niebuhr (1944) and Tonnies (2001) who were otherwise neglected. Secondly, although Johns offered a curriculum that promoted the reconstruction of the social order, his vision of social reconstruction was not progressive. He did not claim that society progresses by becoming more rational. He maintained the opposite: too much rationality dehumanizes society and leads to regress rather than progress.

Johns (1978) drew from a variety of sociological and philosophical sources to promote study of the relationship between the individual and society and to claim that neither individualistic nor justice-oriented approaches alone could provide adequate models for social studies curriculum. Unlike liberal citizenship models that promoted liberty, neoliberal models that promoted efficiency, or justice-oriented models that promoted equality, Johns called for a citizenship model that would synthesize the individualistic and collectivist features of other approaches and encourage a transformation characterized by interconnectedness “between oneself and some larger scheme of things which one values and belongs to” (p. 13). In developing a curriculum model that called for social reconstruction, but not the increased rationality of society, Johns perhaps leaned most heavily on Niebuhr’s three visions of man and on the distinction Tonnies made between *Gemeinschaft* (expressed as a community of interdependent, person-centered relationships) and *Gesellschaft* (impersonal, contractual, independent, mistrusting relationships). Johns’s model rejected market forms of organization,
rational, bureaucratic institutions, but also universal and abstracted moral codes. Johns’s ambivalence toward social and moral progress was thus in sharp contrast to both the conservative perspective that was absent in TRSE and the neo-Marxist, social action perspective.

**Conclusion**

During the 1970s, citizenship education was often discussed in reference to binary oppositions. This chapter examined five of those binaries: socialization/counter-socialization, national/global, Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft, thinking/acting, and reproduce/reconstruct. In this chapter, the reproduce/reconstruct binary was closely linked to socialization. The common conception among scholars writing about democracy and citizenship education in TRSE in the 1970s was that schools socialized students in ways that reproduced the status quo. Anyon (1978) seemed to capture the spirit of this prevailing belief when she argued that politically neutral teaching was, as a matter of result, conservative teaching. Giroux and Penna (1979) expanded this idea by arguing that unless teachers used an emancipatory framework they were operating in the service of oppression. Giroux’s, Penna’s, and Anyon’s perspectives did not allow for a middle position between emancipator and oppressor. As such, the reproduce/reconstruct binary was well established by the end of the 1970s and was tied to a narrative of emancipation.

There were several small resistances or apparent resistances to binary constructions. Nelson (1976), for example, argued that the global/national binary should be deemphasized – but only to promote one side of the binary. Johns (1978) argued that the individual/collective binary should be dissolved, but he replaced it with the Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft binary. The strongest resistance to the idea that the purpose of school was to inculcate a transformative disposition came from Cherryholmes (1978), who argued that a single vision of the social order (from any political perspective) should not be foisted upon students. Instead, he believed that the goal of
social studies education should be to provide students with the opportunity, tools, and resources to examine historical, social, and political issues and then come to their own reasoned conclusions.
CHAPTER 4

1980s

Scholarship on democracy and citizenship education in the 1970s involved the discussion of a number of topics, most often understood in reference to good/bad binaries. Each of the issues examined were connected to the reproduce/reconstruct binary through the issue of socialization. In the early 1980s socialization continued to hold the interest of scholars, but as the decade proceeded, the focus shifted to theorizing democracy in reference to participatory and protectionist models of democracy. Here too, one model was seen to represent the status quo and was therefore seen as bad, while the other was linked to social progress and was promoted by all of the authors who discussed the subject. As the topic of interest shifted from socialization to participation, the theoretical perspectives shifted from critical to liberal-plural.

Participatory and Protectionist Democracy

In the 1980s, democracy was most directly discussed in TRSE in relation to the work of a number of political theorists from the 1970s (e.g., Dahl, 1976; Miller, 1974; Pateman, 1970; Weissberg, 1974) who contrasted representative models to more direct, participatory models of democracy. Although all of the authors published in TRSE supported participatory models, there were some differences in how the two brands were understood. Wood (1985), for example, argued that the participatory model of democracy was the older and more original form and that the representational model was only adopted following World War II. Eyler (1980), on the other hand, saw the representative model as the older version and argued that we should adopt the newer, more progressive, participatory model.
Eyler (1980) sought to ensure civic tolerance by promoting the public’s effective use of democratic procedural norms. Drawing from Dahl (1976), Eyler explained that some political theorists have claimed that the masses are often ideologically inconsistent, unknowledgeable, and intolerant, and it was, therefore, up to society’s political elites to ensure the continuation of democratic values. According to Eyler and Miller (1974), however, dependence upon a representative government comprised of society’s professional politicians and political elites was problematic because the history of democracy was replete with demagogues and persecuted minorities, and moreover, there was no guarantee that the masses will remain politically passive or that political leaders will uniformly support democratic values and procedures.

Eyler (1980) indicated that times were changing and claimed that representative models were increasingly less likely to meet the needs of a populace that had become more knowledgeable and mistrustful of the government and our political institutions. Eyler concluded that because the political elite could not be entrusted with the task of preserving democracy and because the masses were becoming more politically active, students needed to be better schooled in democratic procedural norms so that our government could and would directly involve the citizenry in governance.

Wood (1985) also discussed two models of democracy and used the level of involvement by the general populace as the distinguishing measure. He referred to the two models as the classical (or participatory) model of democracy and the contemporary (or protectionist) model of democracy. Whereas the classical/participatory model posited maximum participation by the populace, contemporary/protectionist models, called for that participation by the masses to be limited to choosing representatives who would govern. Wood, like Eyler (1980), favored the
participatory model of democracy and argued that students should be socialized for political participation.

Drawing from Pateman (1970), however, Wood (1985) explained that since the demise of the Weimar Republic in the early 1930s, democratic theorists had distanced themselves from direct democracy and endorsed more representative forms of governing. Wood explained that recent political changes (since the 1930s) had led to the conclusion that direct versions of democracy were unstable. According to this perspective, history indicates that when political participation swelled and the masses became more involved in politics, the results were generally bad. Schumpeter (1942/2012), for example, argued that it was in times of crisis, when the voting populace wanted simple answers to complex questions, that political participation increased. The result of this increased participation was often the democratic election of undemocratic leaders. Schumpeter argued that because increased participation increases the likelihood that populist and finally totalitarian measures will be implemented and democratic practices and attitudes will be curtailed, participatory democracy is unstable and self-defeating.

Thus, since the 1940s, theorists such as Schumpeter (1942/2012) have argued that a more stable form of democracy would have the populace choose representatives to do the work of governing, without the populace becoming overly involved. The eventual effect of such democratic theorists, according to Wood (1985), was to discourage individual citizens from participating in the political process. Also problematic, according to Wood, was the contemporary (protectionist) model’s tendency to remove all discussion of the structure of the economic and political system from the realm of political consideration. The evisceration of the political realm results in stability and efficiency becoming the primary goals of democratic governance, and participation by the masses is further curtailed.
Although Wood (1985) focused on the theorists of the 1940s, the idea that participatory democracy was unstable did not begin with fall of the Weimar Republic. A generation earlier, Weber (1918) had already argued that democracy inevitably gives rise to demagogues. The reason, according to Weber, was not because politically passive masses fail to protect against the ascendance of demagogues, but rather because politically active masses provide demagogues with victories that would not be obtained if only the educated and politically sophisticated members of society voted. Weber was in turn predated by Nietzsche (1876), who claimed that democracy itself, and thus democracy of all sorts, is inherently susceptible to the allure of anti-democratic tyrants.

At the time of Wood’s (1985) article, one of the latest political theorists to support the protectionist model of democratic theory was Will (1983), who in a now (in)famous one-page article, claimed that not voting could be seen as an indication of contentment and not merely as a sign that people had become alienated from the political system. Will suggested that when people were satisfied with the status quo, they were less likely to vote than when they were irate or troubled and suggested that perhaps it was better that those who didn’t really know or care about some issue not actively participate in the political process. Wood saw the issue differently than Will. Referring back through Pateman (1970) to Rousseau, Wood explained that both the classical model and the contemporary model were self-perpetuating. That is to say that Wood believed that participatory systems of democracy in fact created the desire for political knowledge and the interest in political issues that were needed to motivate the populace to participate in politics. Likewise, democratic systems that limited the influence of the voting populace led the people, over time, to become disinterested and uninformed. Because the system of government affected the disposition and engagement of the populace, the existence of a
disinterested populace should not be taken as a reason to further disenfranchise the people. Wood insisted that what was in fact needed was a political system that was inviting to all; and that the school system, used to encourage rather than discourage political participation, could encourage the participation necessary for a healthy democracy:

Educators need to realize that the social role they play depends upon the conception of democracy, participatory or protective, they choose. On one hand rests a conception of democracy within which the participation of the minority elite is crucial and the non-participation of the apathetic ordinary man is necessary to maintain the system's stability. On the other hand democracy is conceived as encompassing the broadest participation of the people working to develop political efficacy and a sense of belonging in order to further extend and enhance more participation. (p. 43)

Wood thus offered teachers a binary that opposed (1) increased participation in a broadened political sphere to (2) governance that emphasized stability and a diminished scope for the political. The intended effect of having teachers distinguish between the participatory and protectionist models of democracy was to instill into students a participatory mindset, which, in turn, would require a curriculum designed to encourage political engagement.

Although their understanding of the history of participatory and protectionist models of democracy were rather different, in hopes of increasing political participation both Wood (1985) and Eyler (1980) promoted the inculcation of democratic values. Wood understood the protectionist model of democracy to have been advanced only recently and primarily in response to the failures of democracy in the 1930s. His account of the binary differed from Eyler, who imagined the adoption of the participatory model to be an example of social progress.
A third scholar to discuss participatory forms of democracy was Guyton (1988). The point of her paper was to analyze the relationship between critical thinking and the development of democratic dispositions (which she saw as the two goals of social studies education):

Two of the major goals of education in general, and of social studies education in particular, are education for citizenship and development of the ability to think critically. Traditional views focused on a citizen who knows how the government operates, respects authority, has desirable attitudes and has habits which generate support for the system and the status quo. (p. 23)

She also argued that social studies education was not living up to its goals of developing participation and critical thinking:

This narrow view has yielded to contemporary views that emphasize skills in communication, decision-making, conflict resolution, and other areas relevant to citizenship competence and political participation. … These two goals of social studies education, political participation and critical thinking, apparently are not being met. (p. 23)

Like Wood (1985), Guyton considered classical (participatory) democratic citizenship models to be giving way to contemporary (protectionist) models and sought to return to a purer form of democracy. In developing a pedagogical model for citizenship education, Guyton (1988) along with Eyler (1980) made use of Weissberg’s (1974) political theory. From this she derived three versions of democracy: (1) the contemporary understanding, wherein the populace chooses its leaders, (2) an intermediate model, wherein the populace chooses representatives who are responsive to them, and (3) participatory democracy, whereby political participation is understood to extend beyond the government to all other aspects of social living.
At the core of participatory democracy, Weissberg’s third model, is the belief that politics extends beyond the government to any decision-making situation in social life and that people ought to have control over all aspects of their lives. Weissberg advocated this latter model of democracy and asserted that citizens can be educated (implicitly, critical thinking is part of that education) to participate in it, but he concluded that political socialization in the United States, through a reliance on traditional teaching methods which teach factual information and not intellectual skills, is socializing citizens to the electoral competition model. (pp. 29-30)

Following Weissberg, and in accord with Eyler and Wood, Guyton concluded that citizenship education should be changed to emphasize political decision-making and encourage participation rather than limit students to learning factual knowledge of institutions and practices. Each of the scholars promoted a more participatory form of democracy and was critical of the protectionist model, which was understood to reproduce the existing social conditions.

**Conceptual Analysis**

What is to be made of the difference between Guyton’s triadic conceptualization of participatory democracy and the binary conception of participatory education offered by Eyler and Wood? I suggest that this binary/triad can be explained in reference to reproduction and reconstruction.

Guyton’s model begins with the claim that there are two types of democracy: that is, with the participatory/protectionist binary. But because Guyton adds a third, middle term, her model is perhaps better able to account for the fact that the world is much messier than the schema we use to represent them. With the addition of a third node, Guyton’s triad was not necessarily but exceedingly likely to be more complex than a binary model. The middle term in Guyton’s triad
was transparently intermediary. It did not specifically refer to any model, but created an open space, as it were, between participatory and protectionist models of democracy.

An epistemological realist might interpret Guyton’s (Weissman’s) triad as a model that attempts to better refer to the social reality. I am more interested in how Guyton’s triad has influenced the discourse of democracy in TRSE.

Binaries are often used to make the complex appear simple. The goal of making-simple could also be ascribed to the participatory/protectionist binary discussed in this section. As with the binaries from the 1970s, there was, in the 1980s, overwhelming support for one side of the binary (participatory democracy) over the other (protectionist). Although the content of binaries often make the primordial good/bad distinction, this binary was presented in the less stark form of good/better. This suggests that in this discourse democracy is understood to be (nearly) universally good. Even in the negative, protectionist form, democracy was not understood to be bad: the participatory model was just understood to be better. I would contend that given the status of democracy as the radiant core citizenship education, as the transcendental signifier whose referent is almost synonymous with good, it is not surprising that even the less desirable form of democracy were also be seen as good.

Comparative analyses of protectionist/participatory democracy presumed both forms of government to be good. Given our cultural prejudices, however, if the discussion involved a comparison of participatory democracy with fascism, for example, the binary would likely take the good/bad form. Often the point of the good/bad binary is to ascribe a universality to the judgment: fascism is always evil; democracy is always good would be the connotation. Because this binary involved different versions of the unquestioned good, the sense is different. Democracy is for many in social studies education, and in the broader United States, the measure
of political goodness. We often compare historical forms of government to see which one was most democratic. While we might at times question the effectiveness of democracy, very rarely is its goodness questioned. Therefore, when different versions of democracy are considered we do not ask ourselves which is good and which is bad, but which is good and which is better. Thus, comparative analyses of democracy presently lend themselves to progressive narratives whereby the question is which version of democracy is the most advanced. The assertion that one form of democracy is more advanced than another invites the question of how such a measurement is to be made. The answer generally seems to be that the most advanced form of democracy is the most pure form of democracy or the version that is the least undemocratic.

**Critical Thinking and Social Action**

Following Newmann (1985) and Guyton (1988), one might infer that the critical thinking/social action binary from the 1970s continued into the 1980s. Newmann suggested that two of the four curriculum rationales that had critiqued mainstream curriculum in the last twenty years were critical thinking and social action (the other two were social science inquiry and moral development). Guyton, meanwhile, claimed that the two goals of social studies education were political participation and critical thinking. A close look, however, suggests that there were important changes that developed in how the critical thinking/social action binary was understood. Some, such as Newmann and Guyton wrote of critical thinking in the way that Cherryholmes (1978) described it (in the liberal tradition). Others (Cherryholmes, 1982; Giroux, 1982; Kickbusch, 1985, 1987; Romanish, 1983), however, associated critical thinking with critical theory. From the 1970s to the 1980s one change, then, was that during the 1980s, critical thinking was often linked to critical theory and the Frankfurt School, whereas in the 1970s, the
social transformation approach (adopted by many critical theorists) was more often thought to oppose the critical thinking approach.

In his 1982 article on democratic citizenship and critical thinking, for example, Cherryholmes opposed critical thinking not to social activism, but rather to the tradition known as *citizenship transmission*. Made popular by Barr, Barth, & Shermis (1977), citizenship transmission referred to an approach to teaching that favored providing factual information to students and expecting from them the recall of that information. In concert with Barr, Barth & Shermis Cherryholmes argued that the ultimate goal of social studies teachers should not be providing students with the correct answer, but teaching students how to think critically. *Reflective inquiry*, the name given to this critical thinking approach was thus contrasted with rote learning and, importantly, not with the promotion of social activism or political participation. Perhaps due to the increasing influence of Habermas (1981, 1984), critical thinking became associated with social transformation instead of opposed to it.

The newly emphasized connection between critical thinking and critical theory was based on the belief that for social transformation to occur, classrooms had to allow for open dialogue. Cherryhomes (1982) went to some pains to explain that a culture of questioning and openness could not be had in a classroom if the curriculum or the teacher provided the correct answers even on contentious moral and social issues. Turning to Habermas, he noted the following:

Habermas's consensus theory of truth does not aim at a final characterization of the world. Discourse is an on-going process that has no final stage because any utterance purported to be final may be the product of false consciousness; historically and culturally conditioned institutions and processes may be mistaken for fundamental and unchanging social reality. Discourse must be symmetrical and non-dominated. All
parties to the discourse may initiate comments, challenge assertions, and question not only theoretical formulations but meta-theoretical and meta-ethical frameworks as well.

(65)

It is clear that there could be no discourse, as understood by Cherryholmes, if an official model of the good society was implemented in the schools, regardless of whether the model reflected the values and political vision of the right or the left. Despite the acknowledgement that inculcation is practiced along the entire spectrum of political ideology, Cherryholmes’s 1982 approach seemed inconsistent in ways that his 1979 article did not. The problem arose for Cherryholmes because he suggested that the vision of society offered by the critical theorists was somehow freer than other perspectives from the distorting influence of power.

Furthermore, power relations and some social processes bias and distort the search for truth [emphasis added]. If these biases and distortions turn the reflective search for truth into a straightforward reporting of observed regularities, the knowledge generated contributes to the reproduction of existing social institutions and relations. (p. 62)

To claim that the search for truth can be biased and distorted by power relations and some social processes suggests that there are forms of truth-searching that are pure, unbiased, and beyond distortion. To believe, however, that critical theory could see as an eye turned in no particular direction (Nietzsche, 1887) seems to have been premature overexcitement.

The concern expressed by Cherryholmes (1982) in this essay, that some forms of knowledge production contributed to the reproduction of social relations, presumed that reproducing the status quo is bad and that producing something different is good. This evaluation is in line with the progressive tradition of social studies and with the narrative of social progress and emancipation. Nonetheless, to suggest that knowledge produced in the
service of social transformation can transcend bias resembles the ideological obfuscation that Cherryholmes criticized at other points in the essay and is unfounded at best.

Like Cherryholmes (1982), Giroux’s (1982) consideration of the critical was informed by the Frankfurt School, and in particular, by Habermas. Giroux understood the Frankfurt School to carry forward the Marxist approach to social critique, while noting that the oppression and domination could also be found and analyzed in a society’s culture. As with Cherryholmes’s article from the same year, Giroux’s essay understood critical theory to be a theory capable of devotion to social change that did “not cling dogmatically to its own doctrinal assumptions” (p. 20), and that “stressed the importance of critical thinking by arguing that [critical thinking] is a constitutive feature of the struggle for both self-emancipation and social change” (p. 21). It is clear that critical thinking was understood by Giroux to be an inherently political and transformative activity:

According to the Frankfurt School all thought and theory are tied to a specific interest in the development of a society without injustice. Theory, in this case, becomes a transformative activity that views itself as explicitly political and commits itself to the projection of a future that is as yet unfulfilled. Thus, critical theory contains a transcendent element in which critical thought becomes the precondition for human freedom. (30)

Thus, the distinction between critical thinking and social action was bypassed and the heretofore oppositional schools of critical thinking and social action were fused under the banner of critical theory – a perspective that was thought to be able to transcend its own theoretical presuppositions. Critical theory, seen as the potentially transcending product of critical thinking
and social action, was then opposed to positivism, which was offered as the epitome of (non-ethical) forms of rationality incapable of self-critique. According to Giroux:

The suppression of ethics in positivist rationality precludes the possibility for self-critique, or more specifically, the questioning of its own normative structure. The reason for this is because as facts become separated from values, objectivity undermines critique, and the notion that essence and appearance may not coincide is lost in the positivist view of the world. (26)

Positivist rationality was seen as unable to question its own normative structure. What was needed, according to Giroux, was a dialogical approach that could acknowledge the connection between knowledge and power. Giroux noted that although contemporary critiques of positivism were often linked to the sociology of knowledge, these perspectives embraced moral and cultural relativism and thus had to be avoided. Critical theory was thought to avoid the naïve objectivism of positivism and the relativism of the sociology of knowledge and would thus enable scholars and teachers to use knowledge in the service of emancipation by acknowledging “that some knowledge is false, and that the ultimate purpose of critique should be critical thinking in the interest of social change” (p. 29).

In *Schooling for Democracy* (1989), Giroux explained his position in more detail. There he argued that in the 1980s the political Right had taken control of the citizenship education discourse and had supplanted emancipatory concerns with patriotic ones. The change occurred, Giroux suggested, in association with the rising prominence of critical thinking in education. The critical thinking movement emphasized the development of rational arguments; thus the focus was placed on the individual rather than on collective movements. This in turn was favorable to liberal conceptions of the person and society rather than to collective, neo-Marxist
conceptions. As explained by Giroux, in spite of the emergence of the radical student movement of the 1960s and the feminist movement of the 1970s, the language of individualism had once again replaced the language of collective struggle in the late 1970s, and attempts to understand problems in their historical and socioeconomic contexts were replaced by pedagogies aimed at making students either good decision-makers or more fluent in the language of public debate. Giroux thus opposed the critical thinking approach to citizenship with its presumption of, and focus on, developing the rational individual and sought to have it replaced with an emancipatory vision of collective struggle. Critical thinking, thus understood, had value only when placed in the service of social justice and equality. Otherwise it promoted the liberal status quo and perpetuated injustice and inequality.

Following Giroux’s lead, Gordon (1985) discussed “how it is that citizenship education functions either to reproduce the social condition of labor and the mechanisms of social control that reinforce a class-stratified society … or reconstitute society according to the principles of social justice,” (p. 2). She examined Giroux’s (1982) criticism of critical thinking as taken up in social studies education. She explained that Giroux saw the critical thinking approach to citizenship education (often identified as the reflective inquiry model) as an improvement over rote memorization, but the reflective inquiry model was to be criticized for not instilling a social action orientation that politicized all culture and knowledge.

If culture is taken as what people do then discussion of class, social conflict, power and justice are limited. Giroux believes culture should be defined instead in terms of its functional relationship to the dominant social formations and power relations in a given society. (p. 5)
The result of this was two-fold. On the one hand, critical thinking was not linked specifically to reproduction or reconstruction but was seen as a tool that could be used in the service of either. Secondly, claiming that everything social should be read through politics (or understood to be political) allowed the oppression discourse to be expanded so that every event and every theory could be understood as through the oppression/emancipation binary. Because the status quo was associated with oppression and social transformation with emancipation, the reproduce and reconstruct binary was also reinscribed by Gordon.

Kickbusch (1987) also made note of Giroux’s contribution to a critical approach to citizenship education that made the pedagogical more political. The critical pedagogy supported by Giroux and Kickbusch rejected “the limiting, socializing role of mainstream citizenship education… rejects the notion of democracy as a static quality, but rather, defines it as a constant struggle for equality and justice” (p. 176). Kickbusch supported Giroux’s position on ethics and claimed that the “ethical base must support both the critique of the system as well as prescriptions for change” (p. 176). It is the ethical vision of the reproduce/reconstruct binary to which I now turn.

**Ethical Relativism and Absolutism**

The distinction between critical thinking and critical theory is mostly a debate between ethical relativism and ethical absolutism. Generally speaking, the proponents of critical thinking and of critical theory both support social justice and increased equality. The difference rests largely on how that goal is to be accomplished. On the one hand, Giroux (1982) and others criticized the critical thinking/reflective inquiry approach as relativistic, nihilistic, academic, and so forth. These scholars believed that a particular ethical vision should be taught to students. On the other hand, those like Cherryholmes (1977, 1978) at times supported a pluralistic approach
that would allow students to develop their own ethical beliefs without being pressured to make the *correct* (i.e., the teacher’s or curriculum maker’s) ethical perspective. The practice and goal of having students use their own reason to understand different sides of an issue and articulate arguments for and against the positions under consideration are familiar components of a liberal approach to education. Students are encouraged to analyze positions and are not expected to come to the correct decision, precisely because it is presumed that there is no single, correct decision. From this perspective, social issues are understood to involve value judgments, and a person’s value judgments are located within systems of thought that overlap in various places, but are often incommensurable. As Cherryholmes (1978) noted, some people place the highest value on liberty and freedom, while others, for example, value equality and justice.

This conflict between liberal and leftist approaches was exemplified in an exchange between Cornbleth (1980) and Giroux (1980) in which Cornbleth responded to Giroux and Penna’s 1979 *TRSE* essay on the hidden curriculum. Cornbleth raised concerns regarding the vague nature of social change offered by Giroux and Penna (1979) and outright skepticism concerning what she saw as a dangerous single-mindedness regarding the uniform implementation of one particular vision of the good society. She expressed her concern in the following passage:

The authors sketchily indicate the nature of their preferred society but do not elaborate or justify their preferences. They do not specify toward what ends change should be directed, who is to decide, for whom, on what basis. I remain skeptical of imposed egalitarianism, undefined justice, etc. These concepts can be useful analytical and interpretive tools when they are explained, illustrated, and applied. Without such
explication, however, they tend to be meaningless and, perhaps, authoritarian in their own right. (p. 58)

Rather than promote a particular political or social ideology, Cornbleth, like Cherryholmes (1978), suggested that providing for students a plurality of social and political visions was more likely to ensure and promote democracy than was promoting a single model deemed by one or more curricular theorists to be the purest or most authentic form of democracy.

Giroux’s (1980) rejoinder to Cornbleth (1980) highlighted the different ethical perspectives at the core of both the relativism/absolutism debate and the critical thinking/critical theory distinction. The goal for the neo-Marxist critical scholars was to reconstruct society in accordance to conceptions of justice and equality. The critical thinking perspective claimed that there was neither a single conception of the good nor a way to adjudicate from among the competing visions. The critical theorists, alternatively, seemed to suggest that justice and equality could be realized, adjudicated, and that they were universally good. The liberal, critical thinking perspective was criticized for being relativistic by proponents of social justice on the left and supporters of patriotic capitalism on the right. Thus, when Giroux noted, plainly enough, that “Cornbleth’s position is relativistic” (p. 63), he represented the moral-left’s critique of liberal pluralism. For scholars such as Giroux, the problem with allowing students to think for themselves was that they might not see the moral truth and fall prey to the false consciousness that accompanied the belief system held by most social studies teachers and the majority of people at large. To protect against the adoption of an ethical system infected by false consciousness, Giroux held that students must be intentionally and programmatically inculcated with the proper values and the right beliefs about what constituted the good person and the good society. The decision of liberal-pluralists to remain neutral in terms of the good society was seen
by Giroux as evidence that they failed to understand that history and ethics were really about class conflict:

To argue for the equivalency of all views is to posit an equality in which schools and teachers alike appear unaffected and unsullied by the imperatives of class and power. The placid harmony that underlies Cornbleth’s theoretical framework is one that presupposes that society is without those contradictions that are of its essence, contradictions that should be the starting point for any analysis of the role of schooling in this society. (p. 64)

**Traditions and Outliers**

Although the reproduce/reconstruct binary was evident in discussions of democratic citizenship in the 1980s, there was also resistance to the notion of progressive social transformation. The competing viewpoints were apparent in the binaries examined in this chapter. For example, the critical thinking/social action binary of the 1970s became the critical thinking/critical theory binary of the 1980s. The liberal-pluralist perspective retained its positive evaluation of critical thinking; meanwhile, the calls to social action that characterized leftward leaning citizenship during the 1970s became more intellectualized in the 1980s as critical theory became part of the normal discourse. The goal of social transformation “as a constant struggle for equality and justice” (Kickbusch, 1987, p. 176) remained, but it was more closely linked to critical analyses of culture, education, social structures, and so forth than to social activism and economic transformation. Defenders of liberal pluralism such as Cornbleth (1980) remained skeptical of those like Giroux (1980) who claimed to know the good and wished to get to the business of inculcating the youth with the truth. Promoters of the reproduce/reconstruct binary,
on the other hand, associated pluralism with relativism and then dismissed both on the grounds that they stood in the way of social progress.

Some essays related to democracy and citizenship published in TRSE in the 1980s were not linked directly to the conversations highlighted previously in this chapter. I want to make note of them nonetheless to provide a sense of what was being written that did not make its way into the binary-driven narrative that I offered. Long (1980), for example, examined the disaffection of urban youth with the political system, and Avery (1988) discussed the development of political tolerance. Some themes popular from the 1970s, though less extensively discussed, were carried over into the 1980s. Washburn (1986), for example, addressed how schools socialized students; Gilbert (1984) revisited the hidden curriculum; and Barnes and Curlette (1985) compared predispositions toward patriotism and globalism in social studies teachers. Johns (1984) examined the role of the individual as an agent of meaning in history, while Oliner’s (1983) essay was reminiscent of Johns’s 1978 piece in claiming that community, rather than the nation state, should be the focus of citizenship education. Leming (1987) made his way into the journal twice in the 1980s. His 1987 article is especially noteworthy in that it was the only article from this decade that condoned the market economy and tied its preservation to the health of democracy.

Most notable of the outliers, however, were a series of publications by Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977, 1978, 1980, 1981). Although they are grouped along with the outliers, their work was definitely located in the mainstream of the discourse. I have not addressed it prior to this point mostly because their more influential pieces were written outside of the journal. Their conceptual model of the field of social studies is easily one of the most influential ideas in the field. The idea that there were three approaches to social studies education predated the journal
and provided a foundation that has been adopted throughout the journal’s history. As will be discussed below, their Three Traditions triad is still used, with minor modifications, to organize the field. The model held/holds that there are three distinguishable approaches to teaching social studies: (1) citizenship transmission, (2) the disciplinary approach, and (3) reflective inquiry.

The first instance of the Three Traditions appeared in a 1970 piece in the journal, *Social Education*. The article received a lot of attention (see Wesley, 1978) and seemed to reinvigorate the perennial search for a singular and official goal and identity for social studies education. In 1976, the National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS) began a concentrated effort to construct “a new and more powerful rationale for citizenship education” (Mehlinger, 1977, p. iv). Conferences were held and reports were written that discussed the potential goals and identity for social studies education (see Shaver, 1977).

In 1977, NCSS published a monograph that outlined the three traditions model. In 1978, Barr, Barth, and Shermis published a book that discussed the three traditions model in more detail. In it, the authors explained the traditions in reference to classroom vignettes. The first tradition, *citizenship transmission*, was introduced as follows:

The teacher in this classroom episode is deeply involved in transmitting values to his students. He is using films, persuasion, and personal commitment to try to instill within young people what he considers to be basic values. He may see the transmission of these values as the primary and overriding educational outcome of his instructional process and work enthusiastically to insure that his goals are accomplished. In this, he is practicing what we have called, “Citizenship Transmission.” (p. 34)

According to Barr, Barth, and Shermis, the citizenship transmission approach to social studies is adopted by those who seek to transmit a certain set of values to the next generation of
citizens. Although there are a number of psychological and sociological reasons why teachers would want to spread their own version of the gospel and to promote what they think is right and good, Barr, Barth, and Shermis focused on the fear of relativism as a major factor for the citizenship transmission approach.

To proponents of citizenship transmission, such value-laden ideas become the primary, all important instructional goals of the social studies. … They fear that the trend toward objectivity and moral aloofness serves only to cause our society to degenerate into ethical relativism. (p. 34)

This observation is not surprising since pluralistic models had been under attack by conservatives for some time, and were encountering increasing hostility by theorists from the Left. In the writing of the likes of Giroux (1982, 1988), ethical pluralism was disparaged on the grounds that it reproduced the status quo. Such was not the case for Barr, Barth, and Shermis, however, who promoted critical thinking and democratic deliberation as the final goal of social studies education. Barr, Barth, and Shermis provided no explicit moral content and instead advocated pluralism. Even though Barr, Barth, and Shermis did not officially sanction a single model of the good society, the fact that each of the negative illustrations of citizenship transmission involved conservative values indicated that Barr, Barth, and Shermis wrote from a generally progressive perspective. The fact that Barr, Barth, and Shermis indicated their progressive stance without defending it as the correct moral vision or the one that should be adopted by everyone was consistent with their support for the reflective inquiry approach (explained below) that promoted critical thinking in the tradition of liberal pluralism.
The second approach to social studies education, according to Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1978), did not involve citizenship at all. The goal held by proponents of this rationale was to teach students to become junior social scientists.

The social scientist wants young people to perceive the world through the eyes of a social scientist, to ask the kinds of questions that a social scientist asks, and to use the analytical tools and concepts of the social scientist. The social scientist believes that if a student acquires the habits of mind and the thinking patterns associated with a particular social science discipline, he will become more discriminating, make better personal as well as social policy decisions, and ultimately “understand the structure and the processes of our society.” (p. 71)

This approach was also known as the new social studies and as the disciplinary model of social studies education. The new social studies had the goal of making social studies more rigorous and scientific. It was developed in part as a critical response to social studies’ close association with progressive education, which had come under fire during the 1950s and early 1960s and then again in the 1980s. The new social studies was promoted as an improvement upon citizenship transmission because it allowed the student to be a more active learner (a key tenet of progressive education) and it was thought to involve higher level thinking. According to Barr, Barth, & Shermis (1978), the disciplinary model was flawed, however, because it was associated with positivism (which is the source of all evil, as everyone knows), and because the disciplinary curriculum provided both the questions that the students should ask and the answers at which they should arrive. A lack of student engagement with the pre-packaged questions provided by social scientists and a diminished opportunity for students to practice genuine democratic decision-making (seen by Barr, Barth, and Shermis as the point of social studies education) were
among the negative effects of the new social studies curriculums. What was needed, according to the authors, was for students to be able to deliberate on relevant and controversial issues that students found engaging and timely rather than on topics that professional social scientists had previously found interesting.

Our conclusion is that by a clear policy of issue avoidance, many of the social science materials probably miss the concerns of most students. That intellectually gifted students are likely to find many of the newer Social Science materials of interest seems to be a fact. That the majority of students are drawn to the concerns, problems, and techniques of social scientists, however, appears to be an assumption that is dubious, or at best, undemonstrated. (pp. 93-94)

The disciplinary approach to social studies was an improvement upon the citizenship transmission model, according to Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1978). The approach labeled *reflective inquiry* was, however, most admired by Barr, Barth, and Shermis. Whereas citizenship transmitters were understood to do the thinking for students who, in turn, parroted back the teachers’ interpretation of social and historical issues; and social science disciplinarians were understood to provide the issues and methods of analysis that students carried out; teachers practicing reflective inquiry were characterized by providing students with access to information and with believing “that the students should both interpret and act. That is, they should use the information – interpret it according to a certain criteria – and decide what actions, or consequences and implications are to be selected” (p. 99).

Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1978) did not claim that the disciplinary approach was scientific while the reflective inquiry model was unscientific. Both were believed to engage the students in scientific inquiry:
The emphasis in this definition is, first, on dealing with the clearly sensed, felt, and perceived problems of the students; second, on relating these problems to a wider social context; and third, on applying relevant data according to specifically stated criteria, criteria which are derived from what is known as the “scientific method of thinking.” (pp. 99-100)

The difference between the two was that the reflective inquiry model was seen as more sound pedagogically because it allowed students to deliberate on contentious public issues that were of personal interest to the students. The effect of the improved pedagogy was thought to be the development of citizens who would be able to think and deliberate more clearly.

Reflective inquiry advocates are in agreement that the major purpose of the social studies is the enhancement of the students’ decision-making abilities, for decision-making is the most important requirement of citizenship in a political democracy. The citizen, defined as a decision-maker, is one, who, having identified a problem, is able to respond to it in as rational a manner as possible. He is sensitive to the need to employ reliable data and to reflect deliberately rather than to act impulsively or from ingrained and rigid habit.

(111)

Following the distinction discussed earlier in the chapter between critical thinking and critical theory, in the 1977 and 1978 books, Barr, Barth, and Shermis fall into the critical thinking camp of scholars of education. They were more directly interested in the creation of rational individuals than in transforming the structure of society, and in reference to the ethical pluralism/absolutism debate, they sided with the pluralists. Because a large part of the purpose of critical thinking was understood to involve social and political engagement, they can also be
seen as aligned with proponents of participatory rather than protectionist models of democracy. These positions, and particularly the latter, were reiterated in a 1979 article published in *TRSE*:

> Without problem solving, without integration, without decision-making skills, there is no warrant to believe that the social studies is developing competence in what is taken to be its supreme goal: preparing citizens to rule themselves in a complex and shifting environment. (Barr, Barth, & Shermis, p. 13)

In the 1979 article they also reaffirmed their belief in ethical pluralism and the associated practice of allowing students to define and suggest their own answers to social problems as the student saw fit.

> To those who argue that letting a bunch of kids define a problem any way they want is an invitation to chaos, the answer is: requiring students to specify their assumptions and the nature of a deviation from a social norm is the best, the most intellectually respectable and the safest thing that they can do. (p. 14)

The articles published by Barr, Barth, and Shermis in *TRSE* from 1979 and 1980 continued to analyze the history of the relationship between the social sciences and the social studies to critique the social science disciplinary model (*aka*, the new social studies). The Three Traditions model did face at least two lines of criticism during the late 1970s and early 1980s.

First, the accuracy of the model was challenged, and second, the pluralism of the model was contested. Shaver (1977), for example, claimed that the distinctions drawn up by Barr, Barth, and Shermis “seem[ed] too forced and arbitrary” (p. 116). He claimed that the three traditions model was more prescriptive than descriptive, and suggested that the reproduction of culture could not be avoided in reflective inquiry and that the transmission of culture from one generation to the next was not altogether undesirable.
Engle (1977) also questioned the descriptive accuracy of the model, suggesting that there were actually at least five different traditions, but that these five approaches could be broken down into two categories: one for those that reproduce the social order and one for those that reconstruct it:

If one looks from this broadened perspective at all of the philosophic positions enumerated above, as well as at others that might have been included, one is struck by the fact that “transmission” and “social science positivism” are conservative (i.e., preserving the status quo) theories, or, as Gunnar Myrdal said years ago, “do nothing about it theories.” In stark contrast, “inquiry theory,” “social criticism,” and “policy studies” are dynamic theories. They assume change and reform as being the natural proclivity of mankind. … This represents a chasm in thought that neither can nor should be bridged. (p. 104)

Shaver (1977) and Engle (1977) both questioned the accuracy of the model, but added that Barr, Barth, and Shermis had offered a potentially helpful prescriptive model for social studies education – one that would move teachers in the direction of critical thinking. Another contended aspect of the three traditions model was that it was ethically pluralistic. Helburn (1977), for example, argued the following:

The Reflective Inquiry approach seems weak mainly because it devalues social science knowledge and skills, and because of the relativistic position about both knowledge and values in our society. I believe the view is factually inaccurate that there is no formal ideology in United States society, and that there is no formal body of knowledge about the world we live in which is empowering in dealing with every-day life. Furthermore,
that the United States, as a complex, industrial, state-level society is culturally heterogeneous is not the same as saying that it is a pluralistic society. (p. 112)

Helburn took issue with the suggestions that we had a truly pluralistic system and that we needed a model of democracy that promoted ethical pluralism. Clements (1981) was also critical of their supposed relativism when he suggested that Barth and Shermis (1980) were guilty of legitimizing historical inaccuracies found in history and civics textbooks when they argued that debates concerning whether inaccuracies were intentional were less important than understanding the historical pattern of the misrepresentation:

According to Barth and Shermis, social studies materials uncritically celebrate United States institutions, and systematically denigrate minorities in this country and other peoples, cultures and social arrangements. Barth and Shermis associate this pattern of celebration and denigration with the positive evolutionary development of the United States. The argument appears to go like this: We have lied in the past and our institutions have flourished in spite of many difficulties. If we continue to lie, to celebrate, to misinform, we may expect this positive evolutionary process to continue. Our tradition has led to the development of a healthy body politic; if we continue to follow our tradition we may expect even further progress and development. The concerns of Fitzgerald and others are simply beside the point: there is an evolutionary process taking place that only requires the active and intelligent involvement of sympathetic participants to sustain and improve our society. (p. 90)

Barth and Shermis (1981) asserted that Clements completely misread their argument. Indeed it does appear that Clements was annoyed by Barth and Shermis’s claim that the debate was
pointless and that he focused on that particular phrase rather than the argument Barth and Shermis offered in the article:

The point we wished to make – and we made it in the introduction, illustrated it in the development, and stated it bluntly in the last paragraph is this: to understand the issues in social studies requires an historical and philosophical analysis. It requires scholars to discover how different groups and different persons conceive of the social studies. It requires us to understand that there is not and never has been one, unified, consistent, coherent field. It requires us to understand that the social studies function in different ways for different individuals, depending upon their conception of goals, their understanding of democracy and their comprehension of the problem-solving process. (p. 94)

Clements accused Barth and Shermis of adopting a functional, amoral progressivism whereby national cohesion and progress justify misrepresentation. Barth and Shermis were, however, explaining the trend of misrepresentation in order to criticize it, rather than support it. Clements’s desire for normative unanimity and the readiness to attack pluralistic and relativistic approaches further exemplifies feelings of hostility and mistrust directed toward liberal-pluralism by many critically-oriented scholars in the 1980s.

It is noteworthy that the Three Traditions schema has been criticized for its relativism by some even as others praised the prescriptive value of the model (while questioning its descriptive accuracy). It is also worth noting that the model’s ethical pluralism (as shown below) was precisely what was contested by other triadic models that began with, but sought to replace the Three Traditions model with models that more explicitly emphasized the reproduce/reconstruct binary. That is, the three traditions model advocated that students learn to critique and
deliberate, but it did not name social reconstruction as the explicit goal of social studies education. The Three Traditions model stopped short of claiming that the goal of critical thinking should be a certain set of beliefs and values and asked only that students be given the opportunity to consider whether the current society was just.

**Triads**

To close this chapter on the 1980s, I review the protectionist/participatory conceptualization of democracy and citizenship education and the emancipatory approach to citizenship education that are compared and contrasted to the Three Traditions model. I show that each of these triads supported notions of social progress and social justice but did so in different and in more and less direct ways. I explain that in each of the triads discussed from this decade, there is a negative pole associated with transmission, a positive pole associated with transformation, and an intermediate position that serves to provide the triad with a linear or developmental direction.

**Three Traditions.**

To review, the Three Traditions schema (Barr, Barth, & Shermis, 1977, 1978) presents citizenship transmission first. *Citizenship transmission* is the name given to the approach adopted by teachers who seek to bestow the proper and right vision of society, culture, and citizenship to students. This bestowal of a perspective that seeks to conserve society links the citizenship transmission approach to the reproduction of the social and cultural status quo. The pattern that has been repeated throughout the history of the journal is used here: the first model/approach ascribed to social studies or citizenship education is offered but then dismissed because it is said to reproduce the status quo in one way or another. In the Three Traditions
model, it is presumed that most of the transmission that occurs will be of a conservative and thus reproductive nature. As such, the first approach is rejected because it reproduces the status quo.

In the Three Traditions model, as with most other triadic models of democratic citizenship, the second approach offered and then dismissed is presented as better than the first (reproductive) approach, but not as good as the third (reconstructive approach). In the Three Traditions model, the second model, the disciplinary approach, is said to be adopted by teachers who assume the goal of training students to become social scientists. This approach is presented as better than citizenship transmission because critical thinking is promoted. The problem with this approach is said to be that it fails to develop critical thinking because students do not engage.

The third approach, reflective inquiry, is said to be taken by teachers who allow students to determine what social issues are worth studying and to decide for themselves what the best solution for social problems would be. Users of this approach do not begin with a presupposed set of correct solutions to social problems. Of the three approaches addressed in the Three Traditions schema, reflective inquiry most supports the transformation of society. Reconstruction is not explicitly stated as a goal in the model. Transformation is promoted, however, because this approach begins with what in other contexts might be called a deficit model. That is, the model begins with the presumption that there are social problems that need to be solved and that the goal of social studies education is to have students think about these problems and how best to solve them. Beginning with the presumption that there are problems that need to be fixed pushes students in a rather different direction than would a curriculum that began with the presumption that all is well with society and asked students to interrogate why our system works so well relative to other systems. The reflective inquiry model, which is a
problems-based model, is structured to promote social transformation without explicitly calling for it.

When these three approaches are placed alongside one another as is done in the three traditions model, approaches to social studies education are represented along a progressive continuum that starts with the indoctrination of passive students and ends with their self-directed critique of social and political institutions and practices. This triadic arrangement supports the notion that social reproduction is undesirable, that social reconstruction should be pursued, and that each model is progressively better at accomplishing this goal. Thus, the triadic arrangement is progressive in ways that a binary model, for example (which would likely suggest that one approach is good and the other is bad) might not be.

**Participatory triad.**

The second triad from the 1980s to be reviewed was offered by Wood (1985) and Guyton (1988). To be precise, Wood actually advanced a binary rather than a triad, but his conceptualization is important to mention because his protectionist/participatory binary served as the basis for Guyton’s explicitly triadic model of participatory democracy. As discussed above, Wood proposed that two different forms of democracy could be promoted in the schools: (1) a protectionist model that encouraged representation over direct democracy, and (2) a participatory model that encouraged direct democracy and broadened what was open to political debate. The protectionist/participatory binary mirrored the reproduce/reconstruct binary because, according to Wood, adopting and teaching a protectionist model discouraged participation and ensured reproduction while adopting and teaching participatory democracy encouraged political involvement by those who have historically benefitted least from the existing system of governance.
The model that Wood offered in 1985 in *TRSE* did not include an intermediate conception of democracy residing between the protectionist and participatory models. An intermediary conception was provided by Guyton (1988), however, who continued the ritual of presenting three models of democracy, rejecting the first two, and promoting the third. Her three models consisted of (1) the *contemporary* model whereby the populace votes for those who will govern, (2) an *intermediate* model whereby the populace chooses representatives who are responsive to those whom they represent, and (3) *participatory* democracy, whereby direct political participation is understood to extend beyond formal politics and to enable the fullest participation possible in all social matters.

Guyton’s contemporary model of democracy is held by those who support the status quo (protectionist democracy) that discourages political participation by those most likely to call for social transformation and greater equality and social justice. Those who support protectionist models of democracy are thus understood to directly support social reproduction. Guyton’s intermediate model is still representative (rather than direct or participatory), but the elected officials are thought to be responsive. The second model is therefore presented as a little bit better than the first, but not as sufficiently transformative. That quality is reserved for the third model, participatory democracy, which supports the political engagement of all the population and allows for the political and economic structures themselves to be questioned. The third model thus allows for and promotes social reconstruction. A key difference between this model and the emancipatory triads, however, is that this model does not explicitly call for social transformation as the goal of social studies education. It instead calls for increased participation so that those who might benefit most from social transformation will have the opportunity to call for it – if they choose to do so.
Critical triads.

Of all the triadic models of democratic citizenship education found in the 1980s, the ones that most directly support the reproduce/reconstruct binary are the emancipatory models promoted by critical theorists of education such as Giroux (1982) and Gordon (1985). Whereas the three traditions model promoted critical thinking (reflective inquiry) that led students to critique society (but did not name social transformation as the explicit goal of social studies) and Guyton’s participatory triad called for increasing participation in the current system and the possibility of social transformation, scholars such as Giroux and Gordon held social reconstruction as the explicit goal of citizenship education.

Drawing on the work of Giroux (1980), Gordon (1985) argued that there were three epistemological approaches to social studies education: the structural/functionalist approach, the hermeneutic approach, and the emancipatory approach. As explained above, the structural/functionalist models sought to explain the world as it was; the hermeneutic models emphasized meaning construction, and the emancipatory models emphasized social justice. Gordon referred not only to Giroux’s work, but also to Barr, Barth, and Shermis’s Three Traditions model. Gordon suggested that the difference between Barr, Barth, and Shermis’s and Giroux’s conceptualization of the various approaches to citizenship education was that Giroux’s emancipatory model collapsed the first two categories of the Barr, Barth, and Shermis triad (citizenship transmission and the disciplinary approach) into one category, moved the third approach (reflective inquiry) to the middle position, and added an emancipatory category.

According to Gordon, the citizenship transmission and the disciplinary models were grounded in a structural/functionalist mode of rationality that employed technical forms of rationality. Both of these models were rejected by Gordon/Giroux because by attending only to
efficient functioning within the existing social structure, both models ignored the contradictions 
and conflicts of the current social structure. The use of instruction to inform students about the 
structure of society and how things function well within it aided, intentionally or not, in 
legitimating the existing structure, and ultimately in the reproduction the status quo.

Reflective inquiry was Barr, Barth, and Shermis’s preferred approach to teaching social 
studies because it allowed students to deliberate on and come to conclusions regarding social 
issues that were meaningful to them. Gordon (1985) did not accept reflective inquiry as the most 
advanced model, however, because she associated reflective inquiry with the epistemological 
perspective of hermeneutic rationality. Hermeneutic rationality, and thus reflective inquiry, were 
understood by Gordon/Giroux to involve “understanding how the forms, categories and 
assumptions beneath the texture of everyday life contribute to our understanding of each other 
and the world around us” (p. 3). Reflective inquiry thus “tends to overlook how ideological or 
structural constraints in the larger society are reproduced in schools so as to mediate against the 
possibility of critical theory thinking and constructive dialogue” and “it is therefore possible, in 
the reflective inquiry model, that the basic nature of existing social arrangements in the wider 
society may remain unquestioned” (p. 3).

Instead, Gordon (1985) argued that the advanced conception of citizenship education 
should be informed by Giroux’s emancipatory epistemology, which involved both intellectual 
critique and social action. Emancipatory rationality was preferred over other approaches because 
it was thought to be able to transcend the relativism (subjectivism) of self-reflection by 
incorporating a commitment to social “action designed to create the ideological and material 
conditions in which nonalienating and nonexploitative relationship can exist” (3). Thus 
understood, the emancipatory approach, unlike the hermeneutic (reflective inquiry) approach was
grounded in something beyond subjective experience. That is, emancipatory rationality’s commitment to social action gave it a universal element not found in hermeneutic rationality, as understood by Gordon and Giroux.

The emancipatory triad of citizenship education offered by Gordon (1985) was intended to supplement or supplant the Three Traditions model. Like the Three Traditions model, Gordon’s emancipatory triad argued that citizenship transmission is undesirable. The reasons for the rejection of citizenship transmission differ, however. Whereas the three traditions model criticized the passive role assumed by the student in the citizenship education model, the emancipatory model held that the citizenship transmission approach served to reproduce the existing social structure and cultural norms. Secondly, whereas the three traditions model promoted critical thinking (reflective inquiry) as the preferred model, Gordon’s emancipatory model claimed that the hermeneutic rationality underlying liberal critical thinking approaches fell short of the ideal because they, unlike the emancipatory approach to citizenship education, disassociated thinking from acting. As a result, reflective inquiry failed to strongly promote social reconstruction. Therefore, in the emancipatory model, reflective inquiry occupied the intermediate position, as it occupied the middle ground between approaches that lead to the reproduction of the status quo and those that reconstruct society.

All three of the triads discussed begin with a critique of passive transmission in the classroom that continues into the larger society (and vice versa). All three triads, then, contain a reproduce (transmit) pole that houses and nurtures undesirable pedagogical practices that lead to citizens with undesirable perspectives. All three models offer an intermediary approach to citizenship or social studies education that improves upon the practices and effects associated with the reproductive pole. The middle element of the participatory triad leads to less passive
citizens acting in cooperation with a government that at least responds to their wants and needs. The middle element of the three traditions model fails to engage most of the students (future citizenry), although it does lead to more active students (future citizens) than the transmission approach. The middle element of the emancipatory model is understood to create thinkers that might, but then again might not, work to transform society. In each case, the intermediate approach points out the direction toward the ultimate goal of social studies and citizenship education: the adoption of a progressive social and political perspective that presupposes that the continuation of the present social order is bad and that social transformation toward equality and justice is good. The goal is accomplished in the Three Traditions model when the students are allowed to deliberate upon social issues of their choosing in preparation for future, active citizenship – with the presumption that the successful experience in democratic deliberation will result in the adoption of a progressive political perspective that supports the transformation of society toward equality and social justice. The goal is accomplished in the participatory triad when (underprivileged) students/citizens are provided with sufficient political efficacy to transform the system so that they are allowed to participate fully in the governance of the nation. For the emancipatory model, the goal of social reconstruction is explicit and direct.

**Conclusion**

In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the most engaged and theoretically rich discussions regarding democracy and citizenship education involved the question of how schools socialized youth. By the middle of the 1980s, the focus had changed to the issue of political participation. There is a rather stark difference between these two topics. The interest in socialization imagined the government and the school system as inherently dark and acting as the arch-oppressor. By the middle 1980s and into the 1990s, the government was no longer cast as an
agent of oppression, but rather as an instrument, and perhaps even as the primary source, of freedom. No longer were theorists trying to find ways to combat the state apparatus; they were looking for ways to increase participation in it. I find that change to be mildly fascinating, in part, I think, because I have not found a satisfactory explanation for the change. The perspective within the journal, like the broader social perspective, seemed a little more optimistic. Power seemed less to be resisted and more to be had.

Scholarship on democracy and citizenship education during the early as well as the middle and late 1980s continued to be guided by the notion that social reproduction was bad and societal transformation was good; and during this time, two approaches to fighting reproduction and supporting reconstruction began to take their place as the leading contenders for the dominant perspective of the discourse: the liberal-pluralists and the critical theorists. The liberal pluralists held that the purpose of education was to develop rational agency. The social order would then not be mindlessly reproduced but would be constantly challenged and reassessed. The critical theorists generally held that the goal of education was emancipation and social justice. Mind that I do not claim that there were two clearly distinct schools of thought. As the next two chapters indicate, quite the opposite was the case, as theorists working within these broad perspectives sought to incorporate competing perspectives ended up creating a strained, more or less unified perspective. Below I discuss this perspective, which I call critical pluralism, which attempts to combine elements of neo-Marxism, critical theory, liberal-pluralism, and postmodern nominalism.xiv

Nonetheless, the issue that seems to demarcate the discourse that is generally unified by the reproduce/reconstruct binary, progress, and some version of emancipation is the issue of ethical and political pluralism, whereby, generally speaking, the critical theorists wish to
promote a specific set of values and a specific political order, while the liberal-pluralists believe that doing so is self-contradictory and undermines the emancipatory project.
CHAPTER 5

1990s

Of primary concern for social studies educators in the 1980s was advancing participation in the democratic process. This task involved the promotion of participatory models of democracy that were intended to increased political efficacy and broaden the scope of the political arena. During the 1990s, interest in participation evolved into, or was at least folded into, debates concerning multiculturalism. The promotion of participatory democracy and multiculturalism can both be understood as liberal, pluralist endeavors. They sought to broaden and advance the democratic project, deferring the definition of the good society.

It was in the 1990s that postmodern engagements with citizenship began to surface. Neither then, nor any time before or since, did they become the dominant or mainstream approach, but their mere presence called into question the reproduce/reconstruct binary. With the arrival of postmodern theory, the reproduce/reconstruct binary came to be seen (by some) as a metanarrative and was thus able to be objectified, pinned down, and labeled. The universality of the perspective could be called into question. Postmodern theory challenged the notion that history must be understood through the lens of oppression and emancipation, and the narrative was rebuked by former supporters as oppressive in its own right.

The challenges provided by postmodern conceptions of subjectivity and identity influenced thoughts on multiculturalism and seemed to encourage critical multiculturalists to question certain aspects of the emancipatory narrative without really interrogating the narrative itself. Thus, even as the emancipatory framework was externally buttressed with postmodern
insights, the reproduce/reconstruct binary was reinscribed as the disciplinary matrix of the
discourse.

**Multiculturalism**

Participatory democracy continued to be addressed in the 1990s (see Bickmore, 1993;
Gutmann, 1994; Saxe, 1994) and was often addressed in reference to multiculturalism (see, for
example, Alter, 1995; Baber, 1995; Bloom, 1998; Kaltsounis, 1994; Milburn, 1995; Pang et al,
1995). As the preceding dates indicate, much of the attention given to multicultural education
came in the middle of the 1990s, and in 1995 the topic was the focus of a special issue of the
journal. Everyone agreed that multiculturalism, in one form or another, should be promoted.
Under contention was which of the numerous iterations of multiculturalism was best suited for
citizenship education.

Multicultural dialogue often explicitly or implicitly addressed the competing visions of
pluralist reformers and emancipatory transformers. Articles written from these competing and
complementary perspectives discussed ideas such as the role of universals, hegemony, race,
gender, and, of course, reproduction and reconstruction. The multiculturalists at times offered
critiques of the standard emancipatory theory’s connection to universals and essences. Despite
offering criticisms of elements of traditional emancipatory theory, scholars were usually
unwilling to critique the reproduce/reconstruct binary itself.

I argue that the reproduce/reconstruct binary is and has been supported (reproduced) by
triadic citizenship education schemas. If this is a tenable interpretation of the organizational
matrix of this discourse, a similar phenomenon might be expected regarding multicultural
education. That is, if articles that discussed multicultural citizenship education were influenced
by the reproduce/reconstruct binary, then one might expect to find the progressive, triadic
models that have shown up elsewhere. It turns out that both the reproduce/reconstruct binary and its supporting triads were present in multicultural education scholarship in the 1990s. I discuss one of each example: Baber (1995) and Boyle-Baise (1995). Both of these essays, along with Bloom (1988) sought to combine the strengths of liberal pluralism and emancipatory critical theory into a synthesis position that could inform curriculum for citizenship education. Each essay framed multicultural education as an attempt to salvage the embattled emancipatory program by augmenting it with postmodern conceptions of subjectivity. Universals and essences were thus challenged, but the program of emancipation informed by the reproduce/reconstruct binary was left largely unquestioned.

According to Baber (1995), in the middle of the 1990s, there were three leading approaches to multicultural education: “cultural rationalism, cultural pluralism, and cultural criticism” (p. 342). The cultural nationalists were understood to favor one or another hegemonic, unified canon of cultural and political beliefs. The second position, cultural pluralism, was understood to recognize and protect difference. The third approach, labeled cultural criticism, were understood to hold that our nation had an inherent set of democratic ideals that we needed to allow to unfold, Hegelian-style (1807), so that their potential would become realized. The positions were summarized by Baber as follows:

Cultural nationalists favor either western hegemony (e.g., Eurocentric) or a recentered canon (e.g., Afrocentric). Cultural pluralists want "collectively, to forge a new, and vital, common American culture in the twenty-first century" (Gates, 1992, p. xvii). Cultural critics want to work as catalysts for ensuring that our nation's democratic ideals become a reality for all Americans (West, 1993). (p. 342)
The schema established by Baber (1995) took a form very similar to other triadic configurations of democratic citizenship education. The conservative pole was occupied by those who wished to maintain and promote the status quo; the middle space was occupied by those who sought liberal, plural-minded reform, and the reconstruct-pole was reserved for those critical theorists who sought to transform society. The form of Baber’s model is similar to the triads of citizenship education discussed previously, but close attention to the content shows that there were interesting differences between Baber’s categorization and the norm. First, in the conservative pole, she placed both those who wished to retain the European canon as well as those who sought to replace it with an Afrocentric canon. In the standard logic of reproduction and reconstruction, these two goals could not occupy the same spot: retaining the traditional European canon would be seen as promoting the status quo, while promoting an Afrocentric canon would be deemed transformative. For Baber, however, these two goals were not understood as oppositional. They were instead presented together as occupying the same conceptual position. One explanation for the difference between Baber’s (1995) conservative pole and those of the standard model is that Baber tapped into the pluralist and postmodern criticisms of those on the left and on the right who promoted hegemonic programs. Using an organizational criteria that examined the (hegemonic) goal of programs rather than their current (hegemonic) status would lead to all programs that aspired to become official and exclusive being joined together, regardless of their current status as hegemonic or not. Such an approach would oppose models and programs with hegemonic aspirations to those that allowed for difference rather than opposing models and programs currently in power to those that were not (and that could be deemed transformative). In this way, Baber’s triad was unique.
Reproduce/reconstruct triads normally position liberal, critical-thinking approaches in the middle position, where they are presented as allowing for more openness than intentionally reproductive approaches but are simultaneously cast as failing to sufficiently catalyze the transformation of the social order. Both liberal and postmodern approaches to citizenship education, however, reject the notion that reconstructing society is the goal of social studies and citizenship education, maintaining instead that reconstruction is but one possible goal of citizenship education. Postmodern and liberal scholars thus also deny that curricula should be rejected for not explicitly promoting the reconstruction of society, maintaining instead that our existing culture, does in fact, allow for and promote the critique of the existing social order. Criticism is one of the cornerstones of traditional, liberal education, and has been for hundreds of years, and attempts to push all students toward one particular vision of society is exemplary of the closed-minded, totalitarian approaches that liberal education has often resisted since the Enlightenment. Baber’s reproduce pole, therefore, shows a kinship with the liberal tradition more than with critical models whose progressive roots make them more concerned with overturning the status quo than with ensuring against future ideological hegemony.

Despite the preceding indications that Baber’s (1995) triad was associated with the liberal-plural perspective, the essay itself remained entrenched within the emancipatory framework that sought to use multicultural education “to create a community of authentic, emancipatory, liberatory, critical, and transformative voices” (p. 352). Baber’s conception of conservative can be understood as influenced by postmodern scholars, but her theories of identity remained solidly modern. Baber repeatedly made use of notions such as authenticity and voice, signaling settled and stable subject positions. When speaking of knowledge, she indicated that
some positions naturally allowed for authentic self-representations, while others were understood to present *distorted* representations:

> The western hegemonic canon was formed “when scholar-critics were white men, and women and persons of color were voiceless, faceless servants and laborers” (Gates, 1992, p. 17). Since people of color and women have been omitted from the dialogue on knowledge construction, a distorted perspective of their realities has pervaded our society especially in the academy. (p. 343)

The distorted/authentic binary employed by Baber suggests that authentic perspectives reflect reality and that self-knowledge provides a better reflection of reality than observations made by others about our strengths and weaknesses, place in the larger community, and so forth. This standpoint epistemology, having roots in Hegel’s (1807) master-slave dialectic, has been a prominent refrain of the oppression discourse espoused in much theorizing that is identified as critical. Baber identified the connection between authentic representation and emancipation when she explained the relationship between her epistemological perspective and her political aims:

> Social epistemology is a means to the creation of a communal identity and a community where everyone has authentic and emancipatory representation. We must first recover voices from microcultures of color and develop authentic definitions of culturally specific experiences so that we can then forge alliances with progressive voices from the macroculture. (p. 344)

That Baber included in the conservative pole of her triad not only those multicultural scholars who wished to preserve the existing canon but also those who sought to establish a new one suggested movement toward a liberal or postmodern perspective. The essay itself did not
bear that out, however, as Baber remained comfortably situated within the emancipatory school of thought. Focused as it was on the role of scholars of color in promoting multiculturalism, Baber did not, in this essay, develop her ideas regarding the reproductive or the middle nodes of the triad and focused instead on how and why people of color should take the lead role in multicultural education:

It is clear to me that embedded in this role is a leadership position that is less a matter of choice for me than it is for my colleagues from the macroculture. The microcultural roots that I cannot abandon and my ability to participate effectively in the macroculture demand that I help negotiate the construction of civic competency in our multicultural society. (pp. 351-352)

Nonetheless, the configuration of the triad she offered indicates how she understood the organization of the field and perhaps provides some evidence regarding shifts in how the reproduce/reconstruct binary was understood by other scholars of citizenship education.

Although Baber’s reproduce pole indicated movement away from standard conceptions of reproduction, in her model, the liberal-pluralists were understood to occupy the second node of the triad and the transformers occupied the standard reproductive pole. In this configuration, the middle position is associated with individuals working together to build a society that makes everyone happy. This liberal approach, which promotes diversity primarily through individual agency, is contrasted with the third, reconstructive approach held by cultural critics who seek to shepherd our social system toward its true destiny. This distinction, whereby change enacted at the individual and personal level is linked to liberals, while the enactment of structural change by those who have knowledge of our society’s true destiny or the good society is linked to emancipatory critical theorists has been and continues to be a common one.
Even though it differed in some important and interesting ways, Baber’s (1995) conceptualization of approaches to multicultural education took the familiar, triadic form of conservative-liberal-emancipatory. A second author who wrote about multicultural education in *TRSE* in 1995, Boyle-Baise, also presented a familiar schema. Hers was familiar in a different way, however. Boyle-Baise’s model counted five multicultural approaches but then explained that the five models should actually be divided into two categories. Finding five traditions, but then organizing them into two groups was similar to Engle’s (1977) response to the Three Traditions model. Engle proposed that approaches to social studies education could be broken down into the categories of “conservative (i.e., preserving the status quo) theories” and “dynamic theories” that “assume change and reform as being the natural proclivity of mankind” (p. 104). Boyle-Baise’s conceptualization of multicultural education allowed her to organize the scholarship in reference to those whose approaches reproduced the status quo and those whose approaches initiated social transformation:

At present, five primary models or approaches to multicultural education exist (Sleeter & Grant, 1994). Two are additive and do not challenge the existing structure of schools: teaching the exceptional and culturally different, with an emphasis on compensatory education to help culturally different students catch up to the mainstream; and human relations, which focuses on promoting tolerance by teaching all students to appreciate cultural differences. Three other approaches are emancipatory and reconstructive, and have roots in social struggles for equality. (p. 333)

Boyle-Baise’s (1995) model takes the binary form rather than the triadic. The reason her model is not triadic seems to be because in her schema, there is no overtly reproductive pole, as all scholars of multiculturalism are thought to begin with the premise that there needs to be social
change so that our society can become more equitable. There are no multicultural education scholars, it seems, who begin with the belief that the status quo should be reproduced. Boyle-Baise thus breaks the tradition of offering a triad that begins with those who overtly seek to reproduce the status quo. Although her model takes the more basic binary form, retained, however, is the notion that reproduction is promoted in more and less direct ways. It seems clear, for example, that those who favor compensatory education and seek to help culturally different students catch up to the mainstream are understood to reproduce the existing social order in a more direct way than do others (also placed in the reproduce-pole) who promote tolerance by teaching all students to appreciate cultural differences.

I find this configuration interesting. I have been suggesting that the triads support the reproduce/reconstruct binary by reflecting the basic structure of the binaries but also adding a third element that allows for a more complex shifting of ideas and approaches. In Boyle-Baise’s model, this process is seen in the reverse, so to speak, as the triad is subsumed into a binary that has become more complex. Here, the reproduce pole is configured so as to include the most reproductive group (the compensatory approach) and also the liberal-pluralist group (those who support the appreciation of difference). This binary structure more immediately and directly supports the reproduce/reconstruct matrix than would a triadic structure (but with the trade-off of being more open to the charge of oversimplification). Hers, however, is a complex binary: the reproduce-pole is compound. Moreover, in the reproduce-pole those who intentionally reproduce the status quo are completely missing. In their place are those who unintentionally or indirectly reproduce the existing order. The liberal approach in Boyle-Baise’s model, then, is repositioned as the conservative. This is a move that critical theorists have commonly made in
TRSE since the late 1970s. What makes this one different is that instead of lumping the liberal and the conservative together, the conservative position is not represented at all in the model.

As conceived by Boyle-Baise, the field of multicultural education was comprised of those who advocated pluralism and those who promoted the structural transformation of society. She explained the crux of the difference between the pluralists and the reconstructionists as follows: “advocating tolerance is different from moving to reconstruct school knowledge and practices. The former promotes plurality, while the second advances systematic reform” (p. 335). The relation between the liberal pluralists and the emancipatory transformers was similar to Baber’s (1995). Boyle-Baise, however, sought to make a stronger distinction between the pluralists and the emancipators. Citing McCarthy (1998, 1990), she reflected upon his claims that

Schools, state departments, and teacher education programs are moving away from a reconstructive agenda toward a benign pluralism, a human relations focus on cultural understanding. This stance accurately reflects much of what passes for multicultural education. Educators often focus on the celebration of vague notions of diversity and defer issues of oppression. (pp. 334-335)

Boyle-Baise suggested that educators needed to do more than promote tolerance and a respect for diversity. They should actively reconstruct society so that it becomes more just and equitable.

Despite supporting emancipatory over pluralistic models of multicultural education, Boyle-Baise was troubled by the emancipatory narrative and reached out to postmodern conceptions of subjectivity, such as those expressed by Butler (2000). In what made for an interesting connection to Baber’s claim that scholars of color were uniquely qualified to assume a leadership position in multicultural education, Boyle-Baise, a white female multiculturalism scholar, indicated that she felt as though her views on multicultural education were sometimes
dismissed because of her race. Boyle-Baise suggested, in some contrast to Baber, that multicultural theorists would benefit by considering the goal of emancipation through a variety of subject positions, rather than race alone:

One alternative perspective holds that oppression and discrimination operate across groups in ways complicated by interaction among dimensions of group identity such as race, class, and gender. Supporters of this position argue that these factors need to be considered in order to promote academic achievement for all learners. Racism is not seen as less essential to this charge for change, but rather as one key aspect of an emancipatory challenge. (p. 334)

As a member of an oppressor group, Boyle-Baise experienced being on the wrong side of the emancipatory binary and risked having her perspective and work delegitimized. This led her to question the categories of inclusion and exclusion that had developed in the scholarship on emancipatory multiculturalism. Rather than reject the emancipatory perspective, however, Boyle-Baise attempted to repair the approach by infusing it with postmodern conceptions of subjectivity. By continuing to theorize primarily from within the emancipatory narrative, rather than questioning the entire perspective, however, she reinscribed the reproduce/reconstruct binary.

Boyle-Baise sought to claim an identity for herself as something other than oppressor in a discourse organized in reference to an oppressed/oppressor binary. In traditional Marxist frameworks the oppression binary referred to class. In that case, one could relatively easily assume the role of emancipator and thus be on the good side of the binary. When, however, the binary was applied to cultural difference, and based on race, it was apparently more difficult for would-be emancipators to leave behind their oppressor-group identity. Although the desire to
create a new economic and social order based on a vision of the future can be held by anyone, promoting an authentic culture that is not contaminated by the dominant, oppressor culture, is perhaps more challenging. The former is linked to open, future possibilities, while the latter is tied to one’s closed history. Moreover, eradicating class distinctions is based on the dissolution of difference, whereas promoting an authentic culture is based on maintaining difference. Hence the narrative of oppression/emancipation did not smoothly transfer to the issue of multiculturalism. And thus the binary itself became oppressive for those who wished to be emancipators but whose race, gender, or culture placed them on the wrong side of the binary. The notion of authentic voices did not allow for universal goals associated with the common good in the same way that traditional Marxist theory had (see Gitlin, 1995). Multicultural scholars such as Boyle-Baise found themselves resigned to spectating or cheerleading within an emancipatory framework that retained the oppressor/emancipator binary but traded the universal for the authentic. If they were unhappy with that, the options seemed limited to abandoning (the new voice-based) emancipatory theory or to loosening it up by incorporating new ideas, such as postmodern conceptions of subjectivity, into the emancipatory framework. So one trend during the second half of the 1990s was to selectively incorporate elements of postmodern theory, as Boyle-Baise did when she attempted to loosen the relationship between fixed identity (race) and oppressor status. A second trend was to retain the reproduce/reconstruct binary as well as the emancipatory narrative that divided the people of the world into the categories of oppressor and emancipator.

Another example of the trend to incorporate postmodern perspectives into the emancipatory framework is provided by Bloom (1998). Unlike Baber’s (1995) and Boyle-Baise’s (1995), Bloom’s essay was not published in the 1995 TRSE special issue on
multiculturalism, and her literature review did not focus on citizenship education or multicultural education. She instead addressed the literature on universal conceptions of morals and humanness in education literature with the goal of explaining how and why identity theories were problematic for emancipatory multicultural education scholars and argued that universality and essentialism were problematic because they caused identity to be understood as constant and ahistorical. Identity thus conceived, she argued, hindered the political goals of multicultural feminism.

As understood by Bloom (1998), *universality* is based on the idea that there is an essential sameness in all humans. This idea was, in turn, linked to the belief that our common humanity makes us essentially all the same. She argued that belief in universal essences was the legacy of the humanist assumption that all humans have “an essence at the heart of the individual that is unique, fixed and coherent and which makes her what she is” (p. 32). The trouble with universal rights, according to Bloom, was that they reinforced stereotypes, hindered cross-over political coalition building, and supported the status quo. For these reasons, rather than any sort of theoretical purity, it was argued that *difference* rather than *universality* should be accepted as a political strategy to promote multicultural feminism. Bloom claimed that people feared letting go of universals because doing so might lead them to conclude that injustice was not an aberration, but the norm. Bloom countered that accepting difference, and rejecting essence and universality, was the only way to “conceptualize oppression as a systematic, structured, institutional process” and to challenge the claim that all have the same chances in society as humans and that failure to succeed either as a group or individual” (p. 37) was an institutional rather than a group or individual problem.
Bloom claimed it was important to note that moral commitments evolved over time and were not universal. Instead, she argued, morals should be understood as based in a reflective solidarity and should be based on feelings of responsibility for others.

Reflective solidarity suggests, for example, that students be asked to form collectives based on new and emerging understandings of themselves and others, and that these collectives, because they are oriented toward a responsibility for others, accept the obligation for researching inequities in the school and making recommendations for enacting "equivalent rights." (p. 46)

Thus, rather accepting universal morality, which reinforced the notion that everyone should be treated the same, Bloom argued that morals should be understood as based on responsibility toward others. Exactly what that means and how responsibility toward others can be established as a principle without being universalized was not fleshed out; nor was justification for the claim that people have the moral obligation to research inequities. Further confusion arises from the fact that even though universal ethics were rejected, equity appeared to be taken as a universal social good.

Boyle-Baise (1995) buttressed the reproduce/reconstruct binary of the emancipatory framework by including a postmodern conception of subjectivity, and Baber’s (1995) triad was informed by a liberal/postmodern notion of hegemony. One might, as I originally and mistakenly did, see a trend developing in 1990s multiculturalism literature whereby the reproduce/reconstruct binary and the emancipatory narrative were increasingly challenged by postmodern takes on epistemology and ontology. A close reading did not support that view, however. Take Bloom’s work, for example. Rather than indicating a progressive change in the discourse from structural notions of power and emancipatory social change to an understanding
of power as circulating amongst the oppressed as well as the oppressors, Bloom’s essay lurched in a different direction.

To offer a critique “of universality as it is used in public discourse and policy” and to demonstrate “how, despite its apparent orientation toward egalitarianism, universality has failed to secure equal rights for marginalized groups” (Bloom, 1998, p. 30) suggests that the emancipatory project associated in social studies education with the reproduce/reconstruct binary and thus with neo-Marxism, has failed to accomplish its goals. The idea that the emancipatory perspective was thought to be in need of reconceptualizing is only furthered by other passages from Bloom (1998), such as the following:

Universality functions both as a regulative ideal and as a dominant discourse in the United States. As a regulative ideal, it orients us toward egalitarianism, the elimination of social or political inequities in the name of human sameness and for the enactment of human and universal rights. As a dominant discourse, universality provides an acceptable way of talking about a unified "we" who form "our" society. (p. 32)

Especially given the debate in social studies education between liberal-pluralists who supported critical thinking and emancipatory theorists who promoted particular visions of the good society and of morality, one might presume that Bloom was offering a liberal or postmodern critique of the standard emancipatory framework. She was not. Nowhere in the article was the connection between universals and equality associated with the critical, neo-Marxist, emancipatory framework. Instead, it was associated with liberal democratic theory:

While liberal educators may "manage" (Mohanty, 1989-90), evade, celebrate, or teach tolerance of difference and conservative educators may ridicule it as mere games of identity politics or political correctness, multicultural feminism recognizes that difference
must be understood in two ways simultaneously: as a part of a person's complex personal identity that shifts and changes and as a public identity that is socially produced and which has meanings in the daily social lives of people who are marginalized, essentialized, subordinated, or named solely by their differences. For multicultural feminism, the harsh realities of marginalization for individuals – socially constructed and personally felt – are difficult to celebrate or evade and are never simply reduced to ahistorical, essentialized gendered, ethnic, or religious characteristics or identity politics. This thorny question of how difference is and might be understood, constructed, and ultimately engaged more productively in the public discourse, legal system, and political theory is the catalyst from which springs one of the central critiques multicultural feminists have of democracy. (p. 35)

The association of identity politics with liberalism and liberal democracy rather than with the oppression framework of critical theory is odd and interesting, and for me, begs the question of whether the decision was intentional or was an oversight. Given Bloom’s claim that her goals were political rather than intellectual, intentionally omitting the historical association of the emancipatory framework with universality, essentialism, and identity politics could be understood as a political tactic. However, it might be that, working from a critical standpoint, it was natural for Bloom to presuppose that universalism (and any other problem) would be linked to the status quo (liberal democracy) and that the solution would be linked to social transformation. Thus the infusion of nominalist conceptions of subjectivity and identity were understood as a critique of liberalism rather than as a critique of neo-Marxist critical theory.

The articles by Bloom (1998), Boyle-Baise (1995), and Baber (1995) indicate that postmodern insights were incorporated into the discourse on citizenship education but done so in
ways that primarily buttressed the oppression/emancipation framework. Even as some of its tenets were questioned – that hegemonic curriculum is defined in reference to whether it is part of the status quo rather than its aims (Baber, 1995); that identity politics based on binaries creates barriers for would-be emancipators (Boyle-Baise), and that essentialized identities for persons and groups impair cross-group cooperation – the emancipatory narrative that associated oppression with the status quo and emancipation with social transformation was reproduced.

**Emancipation and Pluralism**

Contested ground between liberal pluralism and the emancipatory narrative could be found in the 1990s in articles beyond those discussing multicultural education. Exchanges between Chamberlin (1990) and Ochoa (1990), and Parker (1992) and Leming (1992), as well as a couple of articles by Stanley (1993, 1997) illustrate the theoretical migration and theoretical husbandry undertaken by emancipatory and liberal theorists as they discussed democracy and citizenship education. Even more so than with Baber (1995), Boyle-Baise (1995), and Bloom (1998), some of these authors could not be neatly separated into two distinct and competing ideological positions (such as liberal, critical, or postmodern). Scholars argued from recognized perspectives but sought to assimilate other frameworks and claim the contested ground on the borders of liberal pluralism and emancipatory critical theory as their own. For me, this agonistic contest calls to mind Nietzsche’s (1887/2010) claims that the genealogically-oriented historian would do well to take a naturalistic approach to understanding the ebb and flow of theoretical frameworks in such a period rather than presume that it can be explained in reference to a transcendent order, progress, or direction:

There is no more important proposition for every sort of history than that we arrive at only with great effort but which we really should reach, -- namely that the origin of the
emergence of a thing and its ultimate usefulness, its practical application and incorporation into a system of ends, are *toto coelo* separate; that anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior to it; that everything that occurs in the organic world consists of overpowering, dominating, and in their turn, *overpowering* and *dominating* consist of re-interpretation, adjustment, in the process of which their former ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’ must necessarily be obscured or completely obliterated. (p. 51)

Returning to Nietzsche was particularly helpful for me in making sense of the 1990s, which were difficult to narrate and structure because the boundaries between theoretical positions were shifting. It is easier to organize a chapter when the collection of articles being discussed have clearly defined, oppositional positions. It is difficult to pin down something in flux. But that relates to the connection Nietzsche makes between thinking and natural processes: writing conceptual or intellectual history is the act of interpreting interpretations, and interpretation is not something that we humans invented with writing but an extension of the same sort of boundary production that incessantly occurs in nature and is intimately tied to life itself. Maintenance and reproduction in self-reproducing natural systems, families, societies, and even academic discourses involve struggle and conflict. Seldom is the battle clean and direct: there are small moves here and there; advances and retreats. In single celled organisms as with academic schools of thought, the other is never fully assimilated. The other does not simply cease to exist. It becomes that into which it is assimilated while also changing that which incorporates:

The whole history of a ‘thing’, an organ, a tradition can to this extent be a continuous chain of signs, continually revealing new interpretations and adaptations, the causes of
which need not be connected even amongst themselves, but rather sometimes just follow and replace one another at random. The ‘development’ of a thing, a tradition, an organ is therefore certainly not its progressus towards a goal, still less is it a logical progressus, taking the shortest route with least expenditure of energy and cost, – instead it is a succession of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent processes of subjugation exacted on the thing, added to this the resistances encountered every time, the attempted transformations for the purpose of defense and reaction, and the results, too, of successful countermeasures. The form is fluid, the ‘meaning’ even more so … It is no different inside any individual organism: every time the whole grows appreciably, the ‘meaning’ of the individual organ shifts – sometimes the partial destruction of the organs, the reduction of their number (for example, by intermediary parts) can be a sign of increasing vigor and perfection. (Nietzsche, 1887/2010, p. 51)

If Nietzsche is correct, and I believe he is, theories and frameworks are in constant flux, reacting to what they do not want to become, or more precisely, to what their holders do not wish to believe. Given the larger flux, if a theory is to survive, it must change. The question genealogically-inspired historians would ask is how the theory changed, not to assess its progression or improvement from previous iterations, but to inquire into how the change allowed it to survive in a particular place and time. Understanding how theories consume ideas from other theories and incorporate them into their own perspective is the goal of the conceptual historian, as suggested by Nietzsche. Following that lead, I understand the 1990s as a period of flux when theoretical frameworks were being reconstituted by selectively incorporating elements from the liberal, postmodern, and critical perspectives.
To illustrate this, I offer an exchange between Chamberlin and Ochoa that illustrates shifting perspectives, overlapping in the complementary and competing interpretations and contested ground on the boundary of liberal and emancipatory citizenship education theory. A second exchange, between Leming and Parker pits a conservative view against critical pluralism and discusses the differently interpreted, shifting discourse on citizenship education. While these two exchanges provide a snapshot of a contested discourse, the two articles in Stanley provide an example of theoretical change over time. Together, the six essays build upon the claim that the 1990s can be understood as an unusually unsettled period of citizenship education theorizing.

**Transformation: Chamberlin and Ochoa.**

At the beginning of the decade, Chamberlin (1990) offered a review in *TRSE* of Engle and Ochoa’s (1988) book *Education for Democratic Citizenship*. In it, Chamberlin argued that the curricular vision espoused in the book was not sufficiently emancipatory because it sought to provide students with the opportunity to decide whether society should be reconstructed but did not sufficiently encourage social action. Chamberlin began by contrasting Engle’s (1960) and Ochoa’s (1975) earlier work whereby Ochoa was described as arguing for the development of political efficacy and social action within students, while Engle’s vision, in contrast, focused on the production of thinkers (rather than actors).

[For Engle] the good society would appear to be one in which people were aware of social issues, informed about the relevant facts and values, and capable of making informed and principled decisions on those issues. Period. Engle’s [1960] decision-maker definition of good citizens had no provision for empowerment, development of skills in exerting power and influence, or enhancing a sense of political efficacy. The good citizen knows and judges, but stops short of taking action. (pp. 174-175)
Chamberlin favored Ochoa’s earlier work to Engle’s and expressed disappointment that the 1988 work by Engle and Ochoa was closer to Engle’s critical thinking vision than to Ochoa’s participatory citizenship model. Chamberlin noted that “scattered references to active citizenship goals are heavily outweighed by advocacy of a decision-making process which emphasizes the citizen as thinker and knower, but not doer” (p. 175).

Chamberlin believed that Ochoa’s conception of citizenship education, which sought to increase political efficacy, promote social activism, and ultimately transform society had largely been assimilated into Engle’s critical thinking model. To close the review, Chamberlin suggested that the book was immoral and chided the authors for failing to accommodate the work of neo-Marxist critical scholars:

Engle and Ochoa also fail to adequately strive for the moral principle of equality ... and do too little to end the role of the school in reproducing a society in which a rich, well educated elite dominate a passive working class. They seem to have ignored the work of such critics of the school as Apple, Bernstein, Bowles, Gintis, Giroux, and Friere who point out how it transmits passivity and acceptance of the status quo to working class students. (p. 179)

Chamberlin seems to suggest that his personal moral beliefs are actually universal moral principles that should be acknowledged by all. That equality and justice are presented as moral absolutes and that they can only be realized with the transformation of society is central to the emancipatory narrative that seems to pervade the citizenship discourse in TRSE and the reproduce/reconstruct binary that supports it. Thus, this salvo by Chamberlin can be understood as an exemplar of the emancipatory critique of the liberal-pluralist, critical thinking approach to citizenship education.
In response to Chamberlin’s (1990) claim that their failure to adopt a reconstructionist framework would lead to the reproduction of inequality, Ochoa (1990) emphasized that the ideas in the book were “not at odds with a social action perspective,” (p, 184) but that the promotion of mindless political activism should not be seen as the goal of democratic citizenship education:

**Informed decision-making** … protects citizens from falling prey to non-rational appeals, to superficiality of the media, to peer pressure, and to the seductiveness of charismatic leaders. Without informed decision making a social action component has no substance. … In the last analysis, what we must remember is that the purpose of both the social studies and of the schools is not solely to create activists, but to be sure that those who choose to influence public affairs do so intelligently. (p. 184)

The response offered by Ochoa is interesting for at least a couple of reasons. First, rather than contest Chamberlin’s claim that the goal of citizenship education was to create social activists, she granted him that point. In so doing, she identified herself as beholden to the emancipatory agenda. However, she also resisted the thinking/acting binary that was often associated with emancipation in the 1970s.

Chamberlin (1990) suggested that Ochoa’s commendable, emancipatory vision had been assimilated by a benign liberalism that focused on rational thinking rather than social transformation. By suggesting that non-emancipatory work was immoral and insisting that his favored theorists be cited, Chamberlin attempted to use social pressure to attempt to recapture the theoretical headway that had been lost by neo-Marxist theorists. Ochoa’s self-identification with social activism along with her rejection of the thinking/acting binary indicated that perspectives were in flux. For Ochoa, the former promoter of social activism (as suggested by Chamberlin and confirmed by Ochoa), the goal of social studies was no longer the
transformation of society, but the development of skills that would allow citizens to “influence public affairs … intelligently” (p. 184). Ochoa’s reservations regarding transformation moved her away from the standard emancipatory framework and closer to the liberal, critical thinking approach even as she continued to identify to some degree with the emancipatory perspective. A different response by Ochoa might have taken a form similar to the following passage from Popkewitz (1999) which seems to frame this exchange in a larger discursive dynamic:

It is this confusion between intellectual projects of dialectics and agonistics that often defines the debate about social change and critical traditions. Much of the criticism of postmodern social and political theory functions as solipsism. Such discussions look for the coding that comes along with writing in a Marxist/Hegelian argument, such as the words of contradiction, resistance, conflicts, and contestation of actors as reassurances of the relation of critique to legislation. When texts do not use such words, they are critiqued as “neo-conservativist” postmodern thought. (p. 4)

**Liberalism: Leming and Parker.**

The exchange between Ochoa and Chamberlin can be understood to have involved competing conceptions of a traditional neo-Marxist position and liberal pluralism. This section can be understood to represent the positions of critical-pluralism and liberal-conservatism. I understand the difference between these positions in the following way: the critical pluralist values democratic processes, democratic deliberation, and multiple perspectives, but the openness to a plurality of beliefs is impinged upon by the critical tendency to place a universal value on equality and to narrate the social and the political through the oppression/emancipation binary. The liberal-conservative values critical thinking and democratic processes like the
critical pluralist, but speaks of democracy through market-based forms of organization rather than the oppression/emancipation discourse.

Parker’s (1996, 2003, 2010) approach to citizenship education has often involved promoting political efficacy, increasing the practice of democratic deliberation in the schools, and increasing social and political engagement by all citizens and has often criticized liberal commitments to individualism and market-based forms of organization. Leming, on the other hand, was one of the only authors in the forty year history of TRSE to discuss democracy and citizenship education from an overtly conservative perspective. Leming’s 1987 TRSE article, for example, discussed the relationship between democracy and market economies and argued the school curriculum was inadequately explaining the connection between the existence and growth of market economies and democracy throughout the world. He believed that the two were mutually supportive. Then, in 1992, he published a study that indicated the existence of an ideological gulf between university social studies education professors and high school social studies teachers. He used the findings to support the argument that although times had changed, the neo-Marxist theories of university professors of social studies, which were presumably never valid, were now no longer even fashionable and failed to reflect the current social and political perspectives of the overwhelming majority of the American public. To remedy the problem, he called on the leadership of the field of social studies to articulate a rationale that reflected the goals and interests of most of the social studies teachers outside the academy as well as those of the general populace and to abandon the current one supported only by a handful of ideologues. Phrases suggestive of both boundary maintenance and public relations were scattered throughout the paper:
One reason for this evolving state of affairs is, in my judgment, that the social studies has been defined in such a way that in the public eye it now carries the baggage of a socially progressive agenda. … One of the necessary first steps that must be taken to revitalize an organization and a profession that increasingly finds itself without an effective voice on the national level is to redress those factors that are contributing to this state of affairs. From my perspective, one of the most significant of these factors is the failure of the intellectual leadership to articulate a view of the purposes of the social studies that will gain the support of teachers, the general public and the political establishment. How, therefore, should the intellectual leadership respond to the gradually shifting focus for social studies that is increasingly being influenced from outside the profession? (p. 308)

According to Leming, the political landscape had changed and thus the position of the leadership in social studies should adapt to reflect the population who they claimed to serve; but were unable because the field had become paralyzed by dogma:

Despite their erudition, CUFA [the College and University Faculty Association of the National Council of the Social Studies] members have not been able to mount a politically persuasive counter argument. The dominant ideology that characterizes much of the thinking of the intellectual leadership has become ossified dogma; as a result, a significant portion of the profession has been incapable of responding in a constructive manner to the changing political and educational environment. To the extent that we as a profession are perceived as continuing to operate outside of the center of the contemporary educational debate, we marginalize ourselves. (p. 309)
Although writing from very different ideological perspectives, Leming’s position had many similarities with Chamberlin’s (1990). Both recognized that perceptions about and practices associated with social studies education were shifting, and both suggested that people who acted or thought in opposition to their conception of good risked the censure of immorality. Chamberlin insisted that scholars engage with the emancipatory vision and seek to transform society, and Leming maintained that capitalism promoted democracy. Both argued that their perspective should be adopted by all.

As might be expected, Leming’s (1992) article drew fire. A response to his affirmation of social reproduction, offered by Parker (1992), was published in TRSE. Parker argued that Leming’s vision was anti-democratic and that it too failed to accord with a higher standard. For Parker, that higher standard was the historical advance toward purer forms of democracy:

Leming’s is an antidemocratic solution. It is founded on a politics and philosophy of homogeneity and thus cannot help but sponsor a one-party system. It is a step backward to the melting pot ideology (colonialism dressed up for the industrial age) for it shuns the possibility that pluralism can arise from civic intelligence. (p. 499)

Both Parker and Leming indirectly referred to history to justify their visions. Leming argued that recent history vindicated liberal democracy and highlighted the flaws of more egalitarian, collectivist models of social organization. Parker referred not to actual history but to a theory regarding the progression of history. He indicated that history progresses forward toward multiculturalism and away from more primitive manifestations such as the melting pot. He suggested that Leming’s version of democracy was not real democracy, but instead the evil doppelganger of democracy. Neither bothered questioning the inherent moral goodness of
democracy, and each had his own idea of what democracy really was and how it should be understood.

Notice the difference between Chamberlin’s (1990) criticism of Engle and Ochoa (1988) and Parker’s (1992) criticism of Leming (1992). Those on the left were critical of the pluralists for failing to be emancipatory enough. Leming, on the right, claimed that the neo-Marxist professors were out of touch with reality. Those in the middle of this discourse, the liberal-pluralists, argued against the settled answers offered by those on both the left and the right and supported a plurality of ideas and teaching. Both Parker and Ochoa argued for a version of liberalpluralism, but whereas Ochoa primarily advocated for critical thinking as the goal of citizenship education, Parker promoted a more specific political vision.

Referring to the positions made familiar in discussing the triads, the difference between the two pluralists (Ochoa and Parker) can perhaps be made clearer. Ochoa’s liberalpluralism sought to incorporate the disciplinary model of social studies education with the goals of citizenship education through the creation of rational agents who were seen as necessary for a functioning democracy. Parker’s progressive approach, on the other hand, sought to advance beyond liberalism and to operate between the liberal and the emancipatory schools of thought. Rather than stopping at critical thinking, as did liberals, Parker suggested that students should be resocialized away from weak democracy (liberal democracy) and its associated attachment to individualism and formal neutrality and provided with a curriculum that allowed “a more robust conception of citizenship [to] be forged in young people” (p. 15). This reconceptualization is not exactly the emancipatory transformation of the social order: it is more reformative than transformative and called for the perfection of the current system rather than its replacement.
In 1999, Parker further developed his vision of a democracy aimed at furthering social and economic equality. His goals, to have the government drop claims to procedural neutrality and formal equality and to reign in individual liberty, were clearly aligned with reconstructionist models that called for social transformation in the service of social and economic equality. Parker’s affinity with the reconstructionist position was perhaps strongest when he suggested that liberal democracy was inclined to “reproduce the status quo” and that it served “the interests of whichever groups presently enjoy positions of power” (p. 14). Despite the strong critical influence, however, Parker claimed to be working from the pluralist rather than the emancipatory camp. He sought to retain the progressive element of the emancipatory narrative but also recognized that our social and political system did many things comparatively rather well. He thus sought a middle ground between reconstruction and liberal-pluralism:

Liberal democracy’s basic tenets of individual liberty, law, human dignity, equality, and popular sovereignty need to be preserved, certainly, but extended and deepened. A more robust conception of citizenship could be forged in young people. It aims to embrace individual difference, group difference, and an overarching political community all at once. In order to do this, democrats will not be able merely to replace liberalism’s excessive individual self-interest with a new politics of group self-interest (that would be no gain). (p. 15)

The three perspectives (poles) commonly invoked by the triads are represented in the four authors discussed above. Leming sought to reproduce the current social order; Ochoa and Parker sought something between transformation and critical thinking or participation; Chamberlin argued in favor of the social reconstruction of society. It seems clear, however, that there was a lot of movement occurring in the middle area. The theoretical ground between liberal-pluralism
and emancipation was the site of much incorporation, assimilation, and boundary change, as conceptions of both citizenship education and the theories through which they were understand shifted and were reinterpreted.

**Stanley and a different trajectory.**

Although Stanley (1993, 1997) took a position that was somewhat aligned with liberal-pluralism in the 1990s, he began his career arguing that the purpose of education was to reconstruct an equitable society. In 1981, for example, he published two articles in *TRSE* that told the history of reconstructive educational theorists and compared their approaches to more contemporary ones (1981a, 1981b). Influenced by postmodern thinking and multiculturalism, by 1993, however, Stanley had come to question the emancipatory narrative and moved closer to the pluralists such as Ochoa (1988). Stanley himself continued to hold emancipatory values, but he ceased believing that the goal of social studies was to promote his particular values and vision. After coming to hold that there was an important difference between teaching students how to think critically and intentionally inculcating students with one’s own vision, his position moved toward the liberal, critical thinking school of thought.

In his earlier career, Stanley expressed concerned about the connection between nihilism and relativism, and thus perhaps from personal experience, he suggested in his essays from the 1990s that it was the fear of relativism that drove many conservatives and liberals alike to feel the need to stick their flag in the dirt and take a moral stand on issues for which there was no single right answer:

One might recall the frequent arguments made by critical educators for emancipation, justice, democratic freedom, and equality as taken-for-granted standards against which we can judge the current social order and reform proposals. It seems that many critical
educators, much like their reconstructionist predecessors or current mainstream social educators, harbor a deep fear of relativism. (1993, p. 298)

He now argued that dogmatism was unnecessary, however, because multiculturalism promoted the reconstructive vision without the need for a program of indoctrination. By incorporating postmodern insights regarding truth and subjectivity into the educational practices associated with critical thinking and liberal education, social critique would be allowed to flourish, and the possibility of social transformation would remain. Reflecting the position of Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977), Stanley now held that teaching students to analyze all political and social systems would open the door for the social change without undermining the entire project by promoting the uncritical adoption of a particular vision of the social order.

I now argue that the aim of social studies education should not impose or persuade students to embrace a preferred social order or set of values. … Instead, the primary purpose of social education is to enable students to become competent citizens. Put another way, we need to help students acquire the ability to make critical judgments regarding the nature of their society and how they might act, if necessary, to make it better. The task to determine what our students should become belongs to the students. (p. 295)

Stanley’s converted view was similar to those of Cherryholmes (1977, 1978) and Engle and Ochoa (1988) in arguing that “there is an important difference between seeking to impose a particular social order and identifying a set of social conditions required for humans to develop the critical competence necessary to determine and act to realize their interests” (p. 296). It is common to hear people state that all teaching is impositional and that everything is political, but a difference between the liberal-leaning pluralists and the emancipatory scholars is that the
liberal theorists are likely to acknowledge that there is no view from nowhere, while retaining an appreciation for the discretion and humility involved in resisting the temptation of using the fact of non-objectivity to license indoctrination. To act *as if* one’s students were rational agents and to afford them the respect of treating them as ends unto themselves rather than as means to one’s own social and political agenda can be understood to be an ethical decision; or perhaps more accurately, simply a matter of good taste. That is, one might hold that it would be in bad taste to treat others as means in order to promote a more just society. Stanley (1993) advised resisting the desire to evangelize, for doing so would likely undermine any emancipatory goals that we might have:

No matter how strongly we as social educators have come to feel about particular social values, it is our professional obligation to help enable the next generation to claim its own set of values, even if we hope the values reflect those we presently hold. If education does not enable our students to embrace values via critical reflection, it is little more than a form of dogmatic cultural transmission. However noble the intent, this approach to instruction will serve to undermine the very basis for the democratic culture it seeks to impose. (pp. 298-299)

Stanley’s 1997 *TRSE* essay developed some of the ideas from his 1993 article, particularly the distinction between pluralist and universalist approaches to social studies education. He explained that in earlier years he had been skeptical of the pluralists’ “commitment to such a neutral, instrumentalist approach” that “provided an intellectual rationale for ignoring the radical reforms required for meaningful social change” (p. 364). Over time, however, he began to question the idea that reconstructionists, critical educators, or any group of people could “have the authority or competence to speak for the ‘oppressed’” (p. 365). Stanley
commended the reconstructionists for showing us that schooling was not neutral and that it had the tendency to be conservative. With these critical points he agreed; his complaint was with the solution they offered.

Reconstructionists, as well as many critical educators in the neo-Marxist tradition, have often reduced the process of educational reform to a struggle between groups representing the right values in opposition to other groups representing anti-democratic values. In such instances, radicals, just like their conservative opponents, claim access to foundational values and thus, to universal forms of knowledge to orient their educational projects. But such a priori and transcendental claims cannot be sustained, as much as we might wish they could. (p. 366)

The remark seems perfectly suited as an analysis of the Parker/Leming (1992) exchange whereby Parker used those very words (anti-democratic) to represent Leming’s approach and wherein both authors promoted their own competing, conservative and leftist, moral-laden visions of the good society that each claimed should be taught to all students. Whether or not Stanley had this exchange in mind, he suggested that the common sense view for many within social studies education scholarship was that in order to challenge tyranny or even to critically examine institutions, one must adopt the reconstructionist, neo-Marxist strand of critical theory. With this he disagreed, however, and claimed that a liberal, pluralist approach can address the issues of power, equality, and justice, and can do so without relying upon moral universals.

The uniqueness of Stanley’s position was seen in the critique that he offered of Engle and Ochoa’s (1988) position. Unlike Chamberlin (1990) who criticized the work for its immoral (or more accurately amoral) benign pluralism, Stanley criticized their position for assuming that there was a core set of democratic values neutral and foundational enough to be adopted by all.
His claim that equality, justice, and democracy should not be beyond questioning was, and continues to be, an exceptionally rare position in TRSE. Despite the radical nature of Stanley’s position, he did not assume the label of radical for his perspective, as had the radical reconstructionists in the 1930s and the radical critical theorists from the 1970s:

I do not posit a radical break with the tradition. Such a break is neither necessary nor possible. What I hope for is a continued discussion of these issues that will lead to the progressive reconstructions of social education. Of course, we will need to work through what we mean by progressive in this context. (p. 299)

He preferred to read his approach through the traditions of progressivism and the emancipatory narrative rather than as a radical break. Those who had used the radical label in the past waved it like a flag, trying to rally people to their position, and although Stanley would probably have appreciated people adopting his perspective, his goal was not to rally people around a political cause, even loosely conceived. He wasn’t advocating for transformative change and so did not present himself as radically disruptive. His approach was more judicious.

Nonetheless, I think Stanley’s 1990s essays had the potential to be a transitional point for the field, leading scholarship away from the reproduce/reconstruct binary and the associated narrative of emancipation and toward a synthesizing confluence of liberalplural and postmodern approaches to democracy and citizenship education. This did not happen, however. Instead, as foreshadowed in Bloom (1998) and other articles, postmodern ideas were incorporated into the emancipatory discourse and into a perspective that has come to be referred to as critical postmodernism (e.g., Heilman & Segall, 2010; Segall, 2010). I wonder, however, if Stanley had emphasized the radical nature of his claims, whether the assimilation of sterilized postmodern insights might not have been so easy and whether there might have been more resistance to the
reproduce/reconstruct binary and the emancipatory narrative. I certainly don’t criticize Stanley for his position and empathize with the desire to be conciliatory and inclusive and to recognize the connection of one’s position to preceding ideas, but I wonder, in a field as small as ours, had he (or someone else of his intellectual stature) sought to distance postmodern thinking from emancipatory thinking rather than reconcile the two, whether the field might have developed in a significantly different way. I am not sure; perhaps the reproduce/reconstruct binary was at that time too rooted to be fully contested by those who had been disciplined by that very binary.

Whatever the case, after combing through the literature on democracy and citizenship education, Stanley’s 1993 and 1997 articles stand out as the two that have come closest to directly challenging the reproduce/reconstruct binary. Though Leming (1992) challenged the directionality of the binary when he suggested that the neo-Marxist perspectives of many social studies education scholars were out of touch with historical developments, he did not challenge the binary itself. By promoting one side of the binary, he too reinforced it. By pointing out that both the conservatives and neo-Marxists seek to redeem society and have democracy live up to its true form, Stanley suggested an approach to social studies and citizenship education that would not have relied upon the reproduce/reconstruct binary.

These six essays support the claim that the 1990s can be understood as an unusually unsettled period of citizenship education theorizing and that this unsettling was due in part to the disruptive effect of postmodern conceptions of subjectivity and ethics.

**Triads**

The 1990s can be understood as a period of reconfiguration, when old wine was poured into new skins and vice versa. The use of conceptual structures is the topic of this section, and after reviewing the use of triads as well as single and intersecting binaries, I show that the Three
Traditions model strongly influenced how the field was understood to be organized. In most cases, scholars began with the Barr, Barth, and Shermis model and then adjusted or added to it. Thus, the triadic structures continued to support the reproduce/reconstruct binary and the progressive, emancipatory narrative.

Some authors who used binaries, triads, and other conceptual structures in the 1990s were discussed above. Baber (1995), for example, presented multicultural education through the triad of cultural nationalism, cultural pluralism, and cultural criticism. Her triad took the standard form of reproduce-intermediary-reconstruct. What made her scheme unusual, however, was that even though it had the emancipatory structure, she included in her reproduce-pole those who wanted to replace the status quo with a different hegemony. Boyle-Baise (1995) also had issues with the traditional emancipatory model, but she ultimately organized the field in direct alignment with the reproduce-reconstruct binary.

Other scholars using conceptual structures to make sense of the field included Van Sledright (1994), Chilcoat and Lingon (1994), and Vinson (1998). Chilcoat and Vinson made direct use of Barr, Barth, and Shermis’s triad, while Van Sledright made use of another model that drew from Barr, Barth, and Shermis. Van Sledright (1994) sought to explain various approaches to citizenship education by recycling Cornbleth’s (1982) schema. His analysis contained that classroom citizenship education often takes one of three forms: illusory, technical, or constructive. Van Sledright’s angle was to discuss models of knowledge production and dissemination common to social studies classrooms. His focus was thus a little different from most other models, which sought to study the goals of social studies or citizenship education (rather than classroom practices). Despite this difference, the form of the Van Sledright’s triad was rather familiar. There was a conservative (bad) pole, an intermediate node,
and a good pole. Occupying the conservative pole were students who were understood to passively accept facts about the existing society. These students experienced social studies in classrooms led by teachers who sought to transmit knowledge. The intermediary experience was labeled the technical form of citizenship education. Technical education was understood by Van Sledright to “reflect a political orientation that would likely support change in the interests of efficient management but would not otherwise question the status quo” (p. 329). It is interesting to note the association of epistemological presuppositions and political orientations. The two were, in this case, seen as interchangeable, as Van Sledright suggested that those who supported change in the interest of efficient management (i.e., neoliberals), were likely to hold constructivist theories of knowledge, but only to the extent that efficiency was promoted by their use. The reconstruct pole in Van Sledright’s model was occupied by students who actively constructed their own views regarding society. Reflecting Barr, Barth, and Shermis’s (1978) model, Van Sledright, proposed that an active, constructivist orientation toward learning “encourages critical examination of the political system as well as effective participation in public affairs” (p. 330). Critical thinking and reflective inquiry informed the third, and favored approach to social studies education, and stopping at knowledge construction and participation rather than inculcating students with emancipatory values was good enough for Van Sledright because, like Barr, Barth, and Shermis, he believed that students who had the opportunity to question the status quo would, as a matter of course, decide to reconstruct society – without the need for indoctrination.

Chilcoat and Lingon’s (1994) model for organizing citizenship education also borrowed heavily from the Barr, Barth, and Shermis model. It did so, strangely, in reference to the position they rejected rather than the one they promoted: “Discussions have provided at least three
perspectives on citizenship: as cultural transmission (Shermis & Barth, 1982); as reflective inquiry into social science knowledge (Kickbusch, 1987; White, 1982; Wood, 1984); and as democratic transformation (Wood, 1984)” (p. 129). As has been the custom, the first two nodes of the triad (cultural transmission and reflective inquiry, in this case) were defined and dismissed. The cultural transmission approach was characterized as explicitly reproductive, while the reflective inquiry (critical thinking) approach was characterized as implicitly reproductive:

Briefly defined, citizenship as cultural transmission implies passive student participation; content centered around positive knowledge and uncritical beliefs in loyalty and patriotism; prepackaged textbooks using rote acquisition instruction; reliance upon teacher control and authority; and acceptance of existing or idealized social institutions (Goodlad, 1984; Shermis & Barth, 1982). Citizenship as reflective inquiry into social science knowledge, on the other hand, suggests active student learning; development of critical decision-making skills; and utilization of a social science knowledge base to test and resolve problems by collecting and using relevant data, formulating and testing hypotheses, and drawing conclusions. (Chilcoat and Lingon, 1994, p. 129)

Chilcoat and Lingon, like Van Sledright (1994), associated cultural transmission with passive student engagement. Cultural transmission was also associated with patriotism and thus with conservatism. Noticeably absent from the list of conservative beliefs normally associated with cultural transmission was individualism.

As usual, the intermediary position was rejected because it did not go far enough toward social reconstruction:
Despite its noble aims, the reflective inquiry approach tends to merely recycle the assumptions of citizenship transmission by using safe content that promotes an uncritical examination of established values and beliefs where "the selection of problems, the choice of relevant data and the conclusions, solutions or answers" are usually provided for students by curriculum experts, text writers, and teachers (Shermis & Barth, 1982, pp. 31-32). (p. 129)xvii

The third approach represented the reconstruction pole of the triad and was ascribed to those educators who promoted critical thinking, ethical decision making, and social participation.

Finally, citizenship as democratic transformation suggests a classroom climate that engages students in the "processes of critical thinking, ethical decision making and social participation" (Stanley & Nelson, 1986, p. 532) in order to improve the quality of their lives and their communities (Goodman, 1992; Parker & Jerolimek, 1984; Parker & Kaltsounis, 1986; Wood, 1985). This view rejects both the cultural transmission and reflective inquiry approaches to citizenship as inappropriate because they maintain that democracy is a static quality rather than "a constant struggle for equality and justice," and they support a limited "socializing role of mainstream citizenship education" rather than classroom activities that lead "to civic empowerment and civic courage" (Kickbusch, 1991, p. 176).

Recall that although social activism and the promotion of certain ethical beliefs have traditionally been associated with transformative approaches to citizenship education, critical thinking has traditionally been associated with the reflective inquiry approach. I find it significant that during this decade of theoretical intermingling, incorporation, and boundary maintenance critical thinking was dissociated from its traditional rationale and assimilated by Chilcoat and Lingon into the reconstructive approach. In addition, the phrasing of ideas
traditionally associated with transformation was also altered. Instead of having students come to value social justice, adherents of the transformative approach are presented as involving the students in ethical decision making. Ethical decision making suggests an intermediary position between promoting critical thinking and inculcating the correct values. The approach as described presumed that some decisions are more ethical than others, and yet the fact that they are labeled as decisions suggests that the students will decide for themselves without the teachers telling them which decisions are the most moral or most ethical. Thus, ethical decision making seems to straddle the liberal and postmodern approach of critical thinking and the conservative and emancipatory approach of value-inculcation. Similarly, social participation evokes the idea of social action, the traditional goal of emancipators, but the phrase is softened by substituting participation for action. Whereas activism has traditionally been associated with social change, participation does not have that same connotation.

Finally, the third approach, democratic transformation, was associated with educators who imagined democracy to be a constant struggle for equality and justice and who had civic empowerment and civic courage as their foundational goals. The notion of democracy as a constant struggle for equality and justice is worth considering for at least a couple of reasons. First, it reflects the Hegelian (1837) and some Marxist interpretations of history (see Best, 1995; Rigsby, 2006) whereby society dialectically evolves through struggle to a point of perfect equality amongst humans and the self-consciousness of the Geist. On the other hand, the idea that democracy is a never-ending struggle for justice and equality, while progressive, does not seem to allow for a final, more or less static state. Hegel’s and Chilcoat’s teloi are similar, but whereas Hegel conceived of his end state as the destiny of history, Chilcoat suggests that history is eternal strife. For me, the notion of eternal strife toward equality is unintelligible. If the
historical telos was equality, given sufficient time, that state would be reached. If it is by
definition unreachable, then nature does not strive toward a state of equality and justice.

Although eternal strife toward equality and justice seems to be a self-contradictory
notion, it might yet have political or rhetorical value. That seems to have been the case here as
the idea of a never-ending struggle for democracy was used by Chilcoat and Lingon to counter
claims such as those made by Leming that in the United States we had achieved democracy.
(The claim that no substantial change is needed is inherently conservative.) To counter such
conservative claims, rather than attempt to define what qualities a perfected democracy might
possess, one might speak of a democracy to come (see Derrida, 1997/2001; Friedrich et al,
2010). Suggesting that democracy has yet to come reserves a permanent place for reconstruction
and thus serves to perpetually recreate the reproduce/reconstruct binary.

The triad offered by Chilcoat and Lingon (1994) drew significantly from the Three
Traditions model offered by Barr, Barth, and Shermis and adopted the standard practice of
presenting and rejecting the overtly reproductive approach to citizenship education, presenting
and rejecting an unintentionally reproductive approach to citizenship and then explaining how
the authors’ approach was reconstructive. The (re)positioning of ideas and phrases reflected the
strong trend in the 1990s of incorporating liberal or postmodern language into what remained a
thoroughly neo-Marxist vision of social change and emancipation.

Another conceptual scheme for organizing citizenship education that recycled the Three
Traditions model was offered by Vinson (1998). Vinson’s analysis of classroom education was
based on a framework devised by Martorella (1996). This, in turn, was based on the Three
Traditions model. Martorella suggested that there were five approaches (rather than three) to
citizenship education: citizenship transmission, the disciplinary model, reflective inquiry, social
criticism, and personal development. Martorella’s model, then, began with the three traditions model but added two others. *Citizenship transmission* was seen as a tradition that reproduced the social order. The *disciplinary model*, as the second approach, did the same but had the benefit of promoting higher-level thinking to some degree. *Reflective inquiry* was retained as the third approach. The two traditions that Martorella added, *social criticism* and *personal development*, are discussed below.

By referring to models that came before him, Vinson (1998) provided an indication of how the Three Traditions model from the 1970s was reconceived in the late 1990s. Citizenship transmission continued to be understood to provide students with true knowledge and the proper values. This approach, according to Vinson, was usually taken by conservative teachers and was embraced by conservative critics of education such as Adler (1982), Bennett (1989), Hirsch (1987), and others who opposed multiculturalism in the name of cultural and social unity.

Vinson associated the second model (the social science disciplinary model) with structuralism and the suggestion that systems of meaning are stable, ordered, and universal. He associated the third tradition, *reflective inquiry*, with the work of Dewey and on problem-solving and citizenship. Unity was rejected here because of Dewey’s idea that most of the issues of citizenship did not afford a single, correct solution but were instead open to any number of solutions. Grounded in Dewey’s notion that we learn best by experiencing a multitude of perspectives, and that society flourishes when its organization allows for free and full intellectual intercourse amongst its citizens, proponents of reflective inquiry claimed students should practice the discussion of open-ended questions with no single answer.

Martorella (1996) added a forth tradition, *social criticism*. According to Vinson, this approach was developed from Engle’s (1977) critical response to the Three Traditions scheme
(discussed at the end of the previous chapter). Vinson explained that educators who adopted the social criticism model made explicit provision for the examination and critique of past and present traditions and institutions. According to Vinson, the difference between the social criticism approach and reflective inquiry was the role ascribed to social transformation: in the social criticism model, social transformation is seen as the explicit goal of citizenship education. In contrast, reflective inquiry models see social transformation as a likely, but only potential, result of the development of rational thinkers; it is not given as the explicit goal. In the social criticism model, justice and equality are presumed to be the universally legitimate goals of education, and social change is explicitly promoted. Likewise, the status quo is understood to be unjust and perpetuated by the dissemination a knowledge base that has been generated and approved by society’s elites.

Finally, Martorella’s fifth perspective understood the goal of social studies to be personal development. Nelson and Michaelis (1980) were cited, and this tradition was linked to child-centered, progressive education. Personal development is an idea that has a strong history in education, linked to the Montessori tradition, to Rousseau, to the concept of bildung, and more. It has not, however, had a strong presence in social studies and citizenship education. Presumably this is because the personal development model focuses on the individual while most scholarship in social studies education has focused on the social. Another potential reason for its neglect is that this model does not promote the reconstruction of society. The issue of social reconstruction isn’t an issue for this approach. There are, however, many affinities between the critical thinking model and the personal development model, primarily because both pursue the development of the rational individual. The chief difference lies in the fact that for many, the focus of critical thinking is understood to be thinking about societal organization, whereas
personal development models would not presume a privileged position for considering the social order.

Vinson (1998) gazed upon Barr, Barth, and Shermis’s triadic model of social studies education approaches with an attention to unity and diversity that was not as relevant previously. This re-articulation of the Three Traditions model reflected the decade’s concern with multicultural education. Together, the organizational schema offered by Vinson, Chilcoat and Lingon (1994), and Van Sledright (1994), as well as those provided by Parker (1998), Baber (1995), and Boyle-Baise (1995) illustrate another principle of unity within diversity as theoretical frameworks were stretched in various directions to incorporate new and old ideas while still maintaining and even furthering the dominant narrative of social studies and citizenship education: emancipatory social transformation.

Conclusion

During the 1990s, postmodern, nominalist conceptions of subjectivity and ethics began to be incorporated into the discourse on citizenship education. These ideas were alternatively used to support liberal-pluralist and neo-Marxist critical frameworks. Often nominalist notions of subjectivity, identity, and ethics were used to challenge and extend existing neo-Marxist conceptions without challenging the emancipatory framework itself. The incorporation of postmodern ideas occurred alongside the broader attempt to combine the strengths of liberal pluralism and emancipatory critical theory into a synthesis position that could inform curriculum for citizenship education. In this way the newly-embattled emancipatory program was salvaged through augmentation.

Discussions of and allusions to multiculturalism were often present in citizenship education literature in much the same way that discussions of political participation were ever-
present in the 1980s. Grappling with the theorizing of multiculturalism caused the notion of
group identity to be more closely considered and, as a result, troubled. Theorizing class, race,
and gender became mildly problematic in cases when would-be emancipators were othered by
their own theories. Challenges to neo-Marxist framework were often met with accusations of
immorality, anti-democracy, and closet conservatism. The emancipatory perspective retained
control of the discourse’s narrative by a process of selective incorporation. Because the
reproduce/reconstruct binary was so entrenched, tensions within the emancipatory narrative were
smoothed over and it was not strongly challenged. Perhaps the strongest challenge came from
the former reconstructionist, Stanley (1993, 1997). Rather than pose his challenges as radical
and disruptive, however, Stanley preferred to reform the emancipatory framework. The idea that
the postmodern and the critical were complementary rather than antagonistic perspectives came
to hold sway in the discourse of democratic citizenship in TRSE as the new millennium dawned.
Perhaps long before, but certainly by the year 2000, there were two schools of thought at the forefront of theorizing democratic citizenship education. Those were the liberal and critical perspectives. Despite the fact that distinctions can be made, most starkly regarding whether the goal of education is seen as the development of intellectual agency or the promotion of a more equitable and just world, much of the work in the 2000s sought not to delineate these two schools of thought, but to synthesize them in the hopes of creating a theoretical perspective that could justify the promotion of social justice as the goal of social studies education while respecting the individual person and avoiding charges of ideological indoctrination.

This attempt can be seen in the return of globally-oriented education, the continuation of the now-canonized multiculturalism, the practices of emancipatory belief restructuring, and in the general conceptualization and reconceptualization of the field. In each of these cases, the theoretical ground between liberal-pluralism and emancipatory critical theory was worked by a critical pluralism that sat uneasily between liberal and critical approaches to education. The reproduce/reconstruct binary continued to structure the discourse as theorists were unwilling to disrupt the emancipatory narrative that has, for the duration of the journal, structured the discourse of democratic citizenship education.

**The Return of Global Citizenship**

During the 1970s, the global/national binary was a primary way of addressing citizenship education. Although interest in global education diminished by the end of the 1970s, in the first decade of 2000s, the topic was revived. Possible interpretations for the waxing and waning of
interest in globally-oriented education includes the impact of geopolitical events on the national psyche. During the late sixties and into the 1970s, the nation was divided over the Vietnam War. The desire to move beyond nationalism and wars of national interest fueled interest in global conceptions of citizenship. Similarly, it seems, the impact and fallout from events associated with 9-11 reignited interest in the United States’ role in the world and in how we were perceived by others.

That is one interpretation. Parker and Camicia (2009) offered a different one. According to their study of the history of global and international education, there were roughly three stages of piqued interest in global education, caused in turn by World War II, images of the planet earth taken from space, and economic globalization:

While there was a good deal of activity before World War II, the movement intensified subsequently. A major surge of activity occurred in the 1960s and moderated somewhat by the end of the 1980s, while a second post-war surge—which here we designate the current or new wave—corresponds to contemporary hyperbole about risk and competition in a new "flat" world (Friedman, 2005). (p. 42)

Whereas the televised experiences of Vietnam seem to me to be natural markers for scholarship that called for less naïve patriotism in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the televised events of September 11, 2001 seem to serve a similar purpose for the connections made between multiculturalism and globalism in essays in TRSE from the 2000s, Parker and Camicia sought to shift the narrative. Linking the upsurges of interest in global affairs to Vietnam and 9-11 suggests that our interest in global affairs was linked to a desire to know the other, with all of the standard implications of power, interest, and identity formation associated with knowing the other. Parker and Camicia, seeing the discussion as an opportunity to criticize neoliberalism,
focused on the discourse of globalization and suggested that the impetus for the increased interest in globally-oriented education was more intentional and calculated:

The 1960s wave occurred amid the post-war emergence of world-systems scholarship, publication of the first photos of Earth taken from space, and coinage of keywords such as "global village" (McLuhan, 1962) and "spaceship Earth" (Fuller, 1963). The current wave is linked to "globalization" and such phrases as "our global economy," "world class education," and "our interconnected world" have entered the vernacular. Sparke (in press) calls this "globaloney." He does so not to discount the real and consequential flows and networks operating around the world today but to signify that Globalization is not simply a concept or set of events but a discourse. Discourses simultaneously shape the phenomena they purport to describe; language gets things done. The myths surrounding globaloney, Sparke argues, such as the inevitability of globalization and the notion of a symmetrical playing field, "need to be understood as powerful instruments of political speech that can bring about real political transformations." (pp. 42-43)

The discursive study of global education is an interesting approach with much potential. Of particular interest to me, however, was how differently the 1960s were approached than the 2000s: in particular, how the authors note with evident derision the discursive nature of the globalism of the 2000s, but fail to do so in relation to the globalism of the 1960s. The authors seemed to suggest that whereas the more recent discourse on globalism was agenda-laden and driven by powerful institutions, the globalism associated with the 1960s was apolitical and that phrases such spaceship earth and global village were natural, neutral, and naïve. The globalism discourse of the 1960s is romanticized, and the strange suggestion develops that the discussion did not become a discourse imbued with power and agenda until it was associated with the
interests of global capital. The suggestion is either naïve or else intentionally, rhetorically misleading.

Whichever the case, Parker and Camicia (2009) began with the presumption that globally-oriented (or international) education was infused with a market-oriented, nationalistic agenda, and thus they explained the history of globally-oriented education in reference to the perceived agenda. The goal of examining the influences of neoliberalism on global education perhaps explains the divergence of our interpretations. That is, Parker and Camicia were ostensibly discussing global education but were actually critiquing neoliberalism. As the following passage indicates, Parker and Camicia made note of the environmental aspect of globalism in the 1960s, but even this period is explained in reference to neoliberalism: as the period before neoliberalism:

The earlier post-war surge of the 1960s-80s occurred in its own historic mix of discourses. If high-water marks can be discerned in that wave, we propose that they occurred in 1969 and 1978 and were nested in the broader context of what Sutton (1998) calls "the big blue marble" (p. 10); that is, publication of the first photos of Earth taken from space. That was literally a globalizing phenomenon, and intersecting it were the discourses of "global village" (McLuhan, 1962), "spaceship Earth" (Fuller, 1963), and a pre-Thatcher-Reagan era of Keynesian liberalism as distinct from the neoliberalism of today. (p. 47)

Beginning with the presumption that the nationalism and market systems had infected the new discourse on globalism, Parker and Camicia studied a select group of people in the Northwestern United States and came to the conclusion that contemporary global education was understood in reference to two sets of binaries (civic/entrepreneurial and global/national) that could be
intersected so as to create an analytic model that resembled a Punnett Square. This model posited four different perspectives on the role of global citizenship education: (1) the national civic, (2) the global civic, (3) the global enterprise, and (4) the national enterprise perspective. According to Parker, the national civic group promotes global education because the populace needs more knowledge of the rest of the world in order to protect national security. The global civic group alternatively views nationalism as a hindrance to the solution of global environmental and social issues. The global enterprise community views regulation as the problem and supports global education in order to promote a more open world market system. Finally, there is a national enterprise perspective that, according to Parker and Camicia, values both national interest and free markets and seeks to ensure the economic competitiveness and social health of our nation in an era that is strongly influenced by the global market.

What was the significance of past and current trends regarding global education and how should we move forward with knowledge of the changing discourse in global education? Parker summed up the issue with a rhetorical question that reaffirmed the reproduce/reconstruct binary: "Should educators work to maintain the reputedly natural, warm, and necessary scale of national allegiance, or should they attempt to produce new subjects oriented to Earth and the human family?" (p. 45). And so the revival of interest in global education was tied to a binary that established that the status quo (nationalism) was bad and encouraged readers to transform the field, and by extension the world, by developing new subjects who have the proper worldview.

Among other things, Parker and Camicia (2009) claimed that there had been both change and continuity in the conception of global citizenship education, and that globalism and global education in 1960s were closely linked to ecology and were earth-centered. This line of reasoning was aligned with claims made by Myers (2006). He argued that citizens and the
education system had become receptive to participatory forms of democracy but remained attached to nationalism.

Scholarship on globalization suggests that new forms of democratic citizenship and politics are emerging, yet the U.S. educational system remains resistant to global perspectives in the curriculum and continues to favor national identity and patriotism over learning about the world. (p. 370)

In contrast to Parker and Camicia (2009), Myer claimed that global citizenship education in the United States originated in the 1960s (rather than some earlier period). Myers agreed with Parker and Camicia, however, that Hanvey (1976) was the leading theorist of global education during the 1970s and 1980s and explained Hanvey’s five dimensions for the development of a globally-oriented curriculum: perspective consciousness, ecological awareness, cross-cultural awareness, knowledge of global dynamics, and awareness of human choices. In order to organize approaches to the topic, Myers employed the standard triad rather than the quadrilateral matrix offered by Parker and Camicia. Myers’s triad involved (1) the reproduction of capitalism, (2) ethnocentric knowledge of the world beyond the nation, and (3) the social justice or world system approach. In the first model, the goal of global education was understood to prepare entrepreneurs and workers for success in the global economy:

The goal of international business training is to prepare business leaders and workers for success in the global economy (e.g. Ashton & Green, 1996). This approach, which is part and parcel of the human capital model, conceives of students as future employees and education as skills training for the job market" (Schultz, 1961). As Becker (1993[1975]) noted, "Human capital analysis assumes that schooling raises earnings and productivity mainly by providing knowledge, skills, and a way of analyzing problems" (p. 19). From
this viewpoint, learning about the world is necessary because competition in the market is
global and corporations are multinational. At the secondary level, preparing students for
the global economy has been linked with neoliberal education reforms that make schools
subservient to economic needs and market mechanisms. (p. 373)
The second model, sometimes known as international studies, was understood by Myers to
attend to the rest of the world’s history and culture but generally with a nationalistic focus.
International studies refers to learning about other world regions and nations through
traditional academic disciplines, especially history (e.g., Dunn, 2002). It includes the
ways that the field of area studies has been incorporated in secondary education, although
it now represents a broader range of curriculum approaches than I attempt to capture
here." Educational approaches covered by this category of international studies typically
retain a strong national focus and tend to view the world as a collection of independent
nations in competition for scarce resources and political and economic power. Most of
the current curricula for teaching about the world in secondary education falls into this
category, which includes courses such as world history, geography, government,
economics, and international relations. These courses typically retain an ethnocentric
focus that emphasizes the role of the U.S. in the world and its political interests. (p. 373)
Those who adopted the third model of citizenship education were understood to view the world
as interdependent. Affiliated with this last approach were models that emphasized social justice,
conflict resolution, and human rights education:
The world system approach is based on a conception of the world as interdependent,
focusing on the commonalities and cooperation between nations and fostering
understanding between diverse peoples. Proponents tend to emphasize awareness and
relativistic knowledge of cultural values in arguing that young people will be better prepared to live in a diverse world by studying the shared problems of humanity (e.g., Hicks, 2003; Merryfield & Wilson, 2005). Much of the global education literature within the field of social studies that draw to some extent on Hanvey falls into this category. This strand also includes social justice approaches, such as peace studies, conflict resolution, and human rights education. (p. 373)

Myers contended that the third, social justice, model was the least common in the United States because it was perceived by some as unpatriotic.

In standard form, then, Myers envisioned the three approaches to global citizenship education to involve the reproduction of inequality through capitalism; a middle approach that was concerned with disseminating knowledge but did so in a way that tended to reproduce the status quo; and relativistic awareness of others and social justice. Rather than have the third position represent his own position, Myers added elements in order to construct the approach that he promoted. This involved offering three curricular topics to be incorporated into global citizenship education. He claimed (1) international human rights should be the foundation of global citizenship, (2) the universal should be reconciled with the local, and (3) notions of transnational social and political action should be promoted. Despite the recurrence of what should be done, Myers insisted that his proposed orientation did “not consist of dogmatically expecting students to take up certain causes but would explore emerging aspects of global politics” and “consist of knowledge of the concepts and practices of global governance, global democracy, and global civil society, along with their challenges” (p. 378). Combined with the fact that the third node of the triad included both a relativistic/pluralist element and supported the set of values associated with social justice, Myers’s framing perspective can be located between
the liberal and emancipatory positions. Myers, along with many writing in the 1990s and 2000s, self-identified with the emancipatory perspective but wanted to avoid the dogmatism that often accompanied the inculcation of students with a social justice agenda. To accomplish these competing goals, classroom experience could provide students with a globally-oriented interpretation that would lead them to challenge the status quo without explicitly stating that the global orientation was the right orientation. Requiring students to engage with the idea, but not pressuring them to adopt it provided a workable, if uneasy, compromise between the liberal commitment to ethical pluralism and the emancipatory commitment to promoting social justice.

Myers (2006) and Parker and Camicia (2009) offered similar but somewhat different interpretations of globally-oriented citizenship education. Both agreed that nationalism and market economies represented the status quo and that the alternative was a globally-focused curriculum. The global interest from the 1960s was explained in reference to ecological concerns, thus linking the articles in TRSE from the 1970s to this development. While Myers associated the current interest in global education to economic models, he did not suggest that the history of global education be understood in reference to (global) capital. Both Myers and Parker and Camicia understood approaches to global education as either reproducing the status quo or transforming it.

**Globalism, Multiculturalism, and Critical Pluralism**

In the 2000s, the topics of globalism and multiculturalism were often merged (e.g., Evans, 2003; Mathews & Dilworth, 2008; Merryfield, 2000; Pang & Valle, 2004). Most of these essays took a critical, emancipatory approach to the topic. Merryfield (2000), for example, charged that “one of the most critical failures of social studies teacher educators in the late twentieth century has been our inability to prepare teachers who teach for educational equity,
cultural diversity, and global interconnectedness” (502). The idea that the purpose of social studies teacher education was to inculcate a certain set of values was precisely the notion that was strongly criticized in a book reviewed by Evans (2003) in TRSE. The book, *Where did Social Studies Go Wrong?* was edited by Leming, Elllington, and Porter (2003) and published by the conservative Fordham Foundation. Recall that Leming (1992) was the sole author I found in the archive who explicitly promoted the reproduction of our social structure and the market economy. The book was a polemic against the then current state of social studies education and had chapters devoted to perceived problems with social studies education. Among the topics included one chapter that discussed globalism and two that discussed multiculturalism. In his review, Evans pulled phrases from the forward to the book that he found inflammatory or inaccurate. These included the claim that social studies was wracked by “a pervasive postmodern cultural relativist epistemology” (p. 530). Postmodern relativism was a regular target of emancipatory theorists within the journal, but outside, conservatives were perhaps even more critical of the perspective. Evans defended multiculturalism by suggesting that the criticisms of pluralism and multiculturalism were “reminiscent of the critiques of progressives by red-baiting critics during the 1950s” (p. 531) and his confessing his support for critical pedagogy:

I, for one, wish there were more teachers in K-12 schools rooted in critical pedagogy, teaching for social justice, and raising difficult issues and questions of the past and present (Ayers, 1998). This does not mean that teachers would not build a "sense of reasoned patriotism" and help to create social cohesion (p. 88). Indeed, this is happening already. It does mean that our students should be asked to develop their own
interpretations, grounded in evidence, aware of past and current failures of American life, and aimed at the highest ideals of justice and fair play. (p. 532)

Evans’s response to the conservative critics typifies the tactic and an attempted strategy discussed above whereby emancipatory educators claimed to allow students to choose their own values and worldview even as a specific worldview was promoted. The claim was tactical insofar as the claim to neutrality was intended to deflect charges of indoctrination; it was strategic in that scholars were, I believe, genuinely searching for a way to make this alchemy work. Evans participated by invoking justice as the highest ideal. Laying claim to justice as an uncontested universal to which all should aspire would allow students (people) to have their own interpretations but also enable Evans to retain the moral authority to criticize views that did not match his own.

A change can be seen in the 2000s. Whereas in the 1990s, there seemed to be a halting and hesitating movement away from the emancipatory narrative, in the 2000s the theorizing of citizenship education began to flow once again in the direction of redemptive transformation and ensuring that students adopted the proper values and perspectives. This trend was recognized by Mathews and Dilworth (2008) who noted that “more recent research has begun to examine the experiences within social studies education that contribute to consciousness-raising in ways that transform preservice teachers’ notions of global and multicultural citizenship” (p. 356). Thus, as the 2000s progressed, the discourse once again shifted toward the promotion of a reconstructive agenda and away from the promotion of critical thinking.

By the 2000s, the topic of multiculturalism had become part of the canon. It was often noted in essays, but few addressed it directly and in isolation. It had merged with other topics such as globalism, pluralism, and participatory democracy and had become part of the
established litany of what should be included in civics education but was not (see, for example, Gonzales et al, 2001). The most substantial piece on multiculturalism for the decade-plus seems to have been Dilworth (2004). Attempts to remain open to different perspectives and cultures and to refrain from settling on universal or national ethical truths were carried over from the multicultural discussions of the 1990s into the 2000s. Dilworth (2004) summarized the difficulty of pluralism as follows:

Critiques opposing multicultural education are defined by one of two contrasting positions (see Sleeter, 1995). Conservative critiques are offered by scholars who hold the view that multicultural education is too radical (Bloom, 1987; Ravitch, 1990; Schlesinger, 1991). Primarily, conservative educators have tended to criticize multicultural education as going beyond the primacy of a Eurocentric curriculum. In particular, Ravitch and Bloom criticize liberal educators for what they view as a narrow interpretation and implementation of diversity in the curriculum. Schlesinger (1991) contends that multicultural education is little more than "therapies whose function is to raise minority self-esteem" (p. 17). In their critiques of multicultural education, conservatives argue that diversity is too divisive and that not enough attention is given to factors that unite U.S. citizens. Liberal critiques maintain that multicultural education does not adequately address structural inequality or systems of ongoing oppression and the unequal distribution of economic, social, and political power (Giroux, 1992; Ladson-Billings and Tate, 1995; McCarthy, 1988; Olneck, 1990). (154-155)

Dilworth’s use of liberal suggests the vernacular use of the word rather than the use associated with individualism and free markets. She herself sided with critics of centrist versions of critical theory and viewed multicultural citizenship education as “a transformative curriculum
reform effort that seeks to help students from diverse backgrounds to develop the knowledge and skills needed to mediate and cross cultural borders by engaging in authentic dialogue (Freire, 1993/1979), social action, and active civic engagement” (p. 156). She further contended that multicultural citizenship education programs should go “beyond diversity” and “include attention to: (1) critical cultural consciousness, (2) ethnic identities, (3) cultural pluralism, (4) unequal distribution of resources and opportunities, and (5) sociopolitical problems stemming from long histories of oppression” (p. 156). These and the following remarks place Dilworth comfortably within the critical framework that understands social justice and equality as unquestioned values: “The fundamental goal of multicultural citizenship education is not just the students' awareness of, and participation in, the political aspects of democracy, but also the students' ability to create and live in an ethnically diverse and just community” (p. 157).

Mathews and Dilworth (2008) made reference to Dilworth (2004) and addressed multiculturalism alongside global education while discussing how teacher educators could most effectively instill politically and ethically correct beliefs and commitments into their students. Mathews and Dilworth, for example, spoke of the “challenges that teacher education programs face in promoting multicultural citizenship in predominately white schools of education” (p. 382) and sought to find ways for teacher educators “to confront and transform [alternative] dispositions” (p. 382). Scholars such as Mathews were apparently untroubled by their attempts at belief restructuring by

Constantly remind[ing] [them]selves that multicultural citizenship education is more than expanding individual perspectives or increasing individual intercultural skills. Instead it is part of a larger democratic promise to advance social justice and equality in our nation and in the world. (384)
Said differently, scholars need not be concerned that their attempts to coerce students to adopt their own beliefs be criticized as indoctrination so long as the values being inculcated are done in the name of democracy, social justice, and equality.

**Emancipatory Belief Restructuring**

One of the more striking examples of dogmatism in the form of transformative teaching can be found during the 2000s in essays that discussed successful and unsuccessful attempts at inculcating students with the proper values (e.g., James, 2010; Mathews & Dilworth, 2008; Obenchain et al., 2010; Sevier, 2005; Silva & Langhout, 2011). Silva and Langhout (2011), for example, discussed how a teacher attempted to develop “a critical consciousness toward social change” (p. 62) in her first grade students. Obenchain et al. (2010) discussed her student’s use of *critical constructivism* and sounded the call to be critical and less constructivist. Sevier (2005), Mathews and Dilworth (2008), and James (2010) lamented the fact that college students come into classrooms with their own political and religious beliefs and often resist the ideological transformation planned by their professors. The values to be inculcated varied a little but were all linked to diversity and multiculturalism, social justice, and/or democratic deliberation.

Silva and Langhout (2011) argued that elementary students should “be empowered to work against the matrix that oppresses them” and that teachers should “instill a commitment to collective struggle rather than toward individualistic goals” (pp. 62-63). The essay, an ethnographic report of teaching with these goals in mind, explained how the teacher “utilized her classroom to develop student critical consciousness that moved [the first grade students] from an individualistic to a collectivistic view of their environment, connecting individual acts of power to larger social systems that maintain unequal hierarchical power relations” (p. 85). Presuming for the moment that such a task is both possible and meaningful in the context of a first grade
classroom, the notion of *moving students* from one ideological position to another marks the difference that I have been making between the liberal educator and the critical one. Whereas the liberal educator might be concerned with allowing these young students to see different perspectives and to practice thinking about ideas from different perspectives, the goal would not also be to move the student from the ideological position that they held to that of the teacher.

Obenchain, Pennington, and Orr (2001) likewise discussed moving students from one perspective to another. Their ethnographic report at least partially acknowledged the tension between allowing students to develop their own opinions and attempting to have them adopt the ideology of the teacher. The framework of *critical constructivism*, from which the paper was theorized, failed, however, to synthesize the two goals of encouraging students to construct their own knowledge and encouraging the students to adopt an emancipatory perspective. The tension, and perhaps contradiction, of this position seemed simultaneously recognized and muted in different statements in their paper. This is evident in the following passage that distinguished between right or true emancipatory learning and wrong or false learning that promoted the status quo:

> I believe that true learning often occurs in discomfort, and that education, especially my field of citizenship education, should never be separated completely from the political or the controversial. As educators, we should provide a path to support students’ rights to resist dominant and unfair power structures. (p. 486)

The claim that the knowledge constructed should be transformative prohibits, or at least expresses a desire to inhibit the development or retention of all non-emancipatory perspectives. As such, the constructivism is merely cosmetic and is active only to the degree that it supports the emancipatory agenda. If there is any resistance to the emancipatory vision, the critical
constructivism breaks down and, instead of providing a path to support students' rights to resist dominant and unfair power structures, the teacher becomes the agent of hegemony, dominating her own students.

Obenchain et al. (2004) noted the tension between constructivism and promoting an emancipatory agenda and claimed that educators at all levels should seek to find a balance between the two [emancipation and constructivism] in order to provide students with the means and sophistication to engage in society with a recognition that critique is ultimately designed to move ideas forward” (pp. 509-510).

It is clear, however, that one can’t simultaneously allow students to develop their own beliefs and meanings and encourage students to adopt an emancipatory perspective unless the students, of their own accord, adopt an emancipatory perspective. Obenchain et al. seemed, however, to deny the possibility that critical thinking might lead a student to religious faith, patriotism, racism, ethical relativism, anti-democratic views, or any of a host of positions that do not align with the emancipatory perspective.

While Obenchain et al (2010) recognized the tension between constructivism and emancipatory critical theory and argued in favor of emancipation, another author, Sevier (2005), explained a different paradox of teaching. In a self-study of a social foundations course, he asserted that it was difficult to create social activists in a social foundations class and, given that the purpose of such courses (according to Sevier) was to create social activists, the difficulty was paradoxical.

Researchers, however, have documented a paradox inherent in the class (Pietig, McCormack & Grinberg, 1996; Purpel & Shapiro, 1995; Shor & Friere, 1987). Unlike
methods courses that can provide prospective teachers with actual hands-on materials and tools, the foundations course typically offers little in the way of real-world application. Paradoxically then, the content of the class asks students to imagine themselves as change agents without providing any real sense of the kinds of activities, practices, or even dispositions necessary to challenge the inequities it reveals. Resolving this paradox demands that teacher educators enable prospective teachers to think concretely about how they can use their classroom to pursue social action and justice. (350)

Sevier’s position was not burdened in quite the same way that Obenchain’s was because his goals did not include allowing the students to think for themselves. His goal was simpler: to have the students critique one ideology and accept another:

Gloria Ladson-Billings (2001), for example, asserts that culturally relevant teaching aims “to empower students to critically examine society and to work for social change" (p. 202). The classroom becomes a place where teachers allow students' diverse cultural experiences to reveal the negative effects of the dominant culture. This process, in turn, leads to collective and emancipatory action (Ladson-Billings, 2001). This conception of teaching corresponds nicely with the work of teachers who act as transformative intellectuals. As Henry Giroux and Stanley Aranowitz (1993) argue, transformative intellectuals create classrooms where students simultaneously participate in the examination of social injustices and in the struggle to overcome them. The pedagogical becomes political and vice versa as transformative teachers make the acquisition of knowledge meaningful and work for “the education of a class of intellectuals vital to the development of a democratic society.” (pp. 350-351)
After discussing some of the challenges he faced in attempting to have his students adopt his political perspective, Sevier concluded that the semester succeeded in teaching him that “staying true to [one’s] beliefs requires constant effort” (p. 372).

Although Sevier addressed the paradox of teaching students to be activists in a class setting that was largely abstracted from practice, he seems to have failed to recognize how his goals and conclusion potentially contradict one another. That is, if he believes that we should hold true to our own presuppositions and prejudices, how can we consistently seek to transform others presuppositions and prejudices? According to Sevier’s own stated belief, the students should do all that they can to preserve their own preexisting beliefs and to resist adopting his agenda. Even apart from the issue of *staying true to one’s beliefs*, this essay illustrates the paradox of transformative teaching which runs into all sorts of problems unless the scholar believes that he or she has the correct beliefs and that other beliefs are wrong. In and of itself, this is not a problem. It is often the case that one person has true beliefs and another has false beliefs. In the case of values, morals, and taste, however, it seems far more difficult, at the very least, to prove that one judgment is right/true and another is wrong/false. Nonetheless, during the 2000s, critical scholars have increasingly shifted toward this foundationalist / universalist position and away from the pluralism that was more characteristic of the 1990s.

Another example of an author supporting ideas such as *transformative teaching*, *moving students*, and *belief restructuring* was written by James (2008). This article discussed attempts to have students relinquish their previously-held beliefs about what was developmentally appropriate for elementary students and to adopt views that were supported by “convincing scholarship” (p. 198). The article discussed the difficulty of transforming the notions of students
who desired to \textit{stay true to their beliefs} and offered some practical advice for those who wished to restructure the beliefs of their students.

Particularly helpful are studies that strive to understand when and how teacher education has the greatest impact on belief restructuring and the practical and ethical dilemmas evolving from this process. In her comparative study of two student teachers, Angell (1998) offered a discussion of factors that she contended allowed for the restructuring of old beliefs. Specifically, she pointed to the power of consistency in message across program experiences and the willingness on the part of teachers to consider change as significant in the process of "belief restructuring." (p. 175)

A related essay, written by James in 2010, combined a discussion of belief restructuring and democratic deliberation (see Parker, 2003). The essay focused on one student’s resistance to publically discussing her religious beliefs. The resistance was deemed problematic by James because she believed it was vitally important that teachers be committed to beliefs and dispositions associated with democratic citizenship. If a student was not committed to James’s strongly held beliefs, belief restructuring would be attempted. If the students remained committed to their religious beliefs rather than to the public discussion of political issues it was suggested that they should be deemed unfit to teach in public schools.

Teachers who are committed to and capable of preparing students for democratic citizenship are vitally important. It follows, then that teacher educators who can help prepare teachers for their roles as democratic educators are equally important. An interesting problem of practice arises when some teacher education students refuse to participate in public deliberation of political issues, or further still, resist the very notion that democracy constitutes a worthy end of public education at all. Though certainty
comes in many forms and is problematic regardless of the ideology on which it is founded, I have in my experience most often encountered certainty that is theologically based in Christian doctrine. … In the teacher education context, students' theological certainty raises a number of issues about students' own development as democratic citizens, about their ability to serve as stewards of democracy in public schools, and about the aims and practices of teacher education programs that hold democratic education as their core mission. (p. 619)

Although certainty is always problematic, James expressed with apparent certainty the belief that “because public schools are part of this public sphere and because public school teachers are responsible for the democratic education of other people's children, teachers must be able to engage competently in and model mature democratic citizenship” (620). It appears that what James meant to say was that certainty was problematic when it conflicted with her beliefs.

James note that the student at the center of the discussion indicated that even prior to James’s class, she felt ostracized by the education program. She had come to realize that her conservative worldview was incompatible with the worldview promoted by the program and had as a result become disinclined to openly discuss such matters. James surmised these consequences from the student’s disinclination to participate in political discussion:

First, Christina refused to further her own learning as a democratic citizen capable of engaging in active listening. Second, Christina's withdrawal denied her classmates the benefit of having to work with diverse others in the process of shared sense making and the determination of a right course of action. Their democratic education was thus reduced by her unwillingness to engage. Finally, in Christina's evolution as a public
school teacher, she had yet to demonstrate an understanding of the value of deliberation for fostering understanding and reaching mutually agreeable political judgments. (p. 625)

James’s interpretation of the consequences of the encounter invite closer examination as they illustrate some of the problems with belief restructuring.

The claim that the student refused to further her own learning as a democratic citizen capable of engaging in active listening is contentious at best. A refusal to publically discuss one’s political beliefs does not indicate a student did not learn. It also is not clear what it means to learn as a democratic citizen. Do democratic citizens learn in a significantly different way than persons in a constitutional monarchy, for example, and should students be required to learn as democratic citizens rather than as persons? To claim that we should learn as democratic citizens sounds very much like the claim that we should learn as good Christians or as good Muslims or as good females or persons of color. To make these demands upon students seems to be an attempt to bind them to an identity chosen for them by an external authority. Finally, to claim that the student refused to further her own learning as a democratic citizen capable of engaging in active listening also seems to misrepresent. For a student to choose not to engage in a public discussion of her own political or religious beliefs in an environment that she deems hostile does not mean that she is incapable of active listening. It could mean any of a number of things including that the student has no desire to convert others to her beliefs, or to reach a consensus belief. The opposite requirement (reaching consensus), however, might indicate a fear of diversity or a desire to control and dominate.

The first part of the second claim, that Christina's withdrawal denied her classmates the benefit of having to work with diverse others in the process of shared sense making and the determination of a right course of action is perhaps true. The implied assertion, however, that
we have a moral duty to share our personal beliefs with others so that they might learn (even though doing so might make us uncomfortable or ostracized) seems less than fully justified. The purpose of deliberation might be understood in reference to Habermas’s (1962/1989) call to create a public sphere for deliberation, but exchanges such as these do not occur in a speech situation devoid of power relations. Even if the teacher were not attempting to restructure the student’s beliefs, as was the admitted case here, it is entirely possible that negative consequences could result from sharing a minority opinion. Even more contentious is the second part of the second claim: the students’ democratic education was thus reduced by her unwillingness to engage. This seems to suggest that the Christina’s unwillingness to publically deliberate had no learning value for the other students. I suggest, on the contrary, that her act of resistance might have been more educative than any of the personal opinions shared in the sanctioned act of consensus-building.

The desire to force the public discussion of opinions and to reach consensus seems to be at odds with the trend of the 1990s of allowing students to come to their own reasoned beliefs. From the perspective of a pluralist, this attempt seems rather tyrannical: a blatant attempt to dig up what is different, expose it, and then by force of peer pressure and teacher authority, to normalize the person’s beliefs – or at least to force them to publically confess and convert or else be identified as a heretic. This tendency was, however, aligned with other literature in the period that sought to move students’ beliefs, transform students’ beliefs, or otherwise restructure students’ beliefs regarding the good person, the good society, or ethical beliefs in general. What articles such as Obenchain et al (2010), Sevier (2005), and James (2008, 2010) had in common with many articles on multiculturalism and citizenship education in the 1990s and the 2000s was
a desire to promote the ability to think critically while simultaneously inculcating in students an emancipatory perspective.

**Liberalism and Pluralism**

This section examines models whose approaches were akin to the liberal perspective. I begin with a brief overview of the liberal model of education as I understand it to be manifest in the discourse on citizenship and social studies education and then draw in more socialized versions of the liberal-plural approach. Since the origin of TRSE, the liberal-pluralist position has never embraced a naïve form of objectivity. Scholars writing from a liberal perspective in the journal have understood the production and dissemination of knowledge to be an historical process and humans to be historical subjects. The goal of education from this perspective has been to provide students with (or with access to) information derived from a variety of sources and perspectives and to encourage students, in the spirit of Kant’s *sapere aude*, to critically assess historical, political, and social issues rather than dogmatically hold on to presuppositions or passively accept official interpretations. This is understood to be rather different than providing students with alternative perspectives and then leading them to the proper perspective, worldview, or ethical system. The goal has not been to create self-sufficient rational agents or to have the student remove all bias, but the more humble goal of providing opportunities for the careful consideration of ideas. Emotions are understood to necessarily inform decisions and preconceptions (biases and prejudices) and provide the ground for all perspectives, but these do not negate the goal of providing students with the opportunity to develop their intellectual agency. The goal of education in this tradition is not to lead students to the truth, and certainly not to the teacher’s or the curriculum developer’s truth, but to provide them with opportunities to think about the complexity of issues and to come to reasoned, if tentative, conclusions.
In the discourse of democracy and citizenship education, the goals of liberal education have regularly been associated with the phrase *critical thinking*. During the 1970s, critical thinking was often discussed in contrast to social action, and the critical thinking/social action binary reflected differences in the liberal and critical perspectives. During the 1980s, the thinking/acting binary mostly dissipated as critical thinking was jointly adopted by critical theorists and liberal-pluralists. In place of the thinking/acting binary arose the critical theory/critical thinking dichotomy. This period also saw an increased interest in *participatory democracy*, and critical thinking was incorporated into that discussion as well. The union of discussions regarding participatory democracy and critical thinking yielded topics that came to be known as *democratic decision making* and *democratic deliberation*. The goal of providing students with the intellectual tools and opportunities for critical analysis can itself be attached to different ends, including securing democracy or social justice, or for the sake of personal development.

This school of thought can trace its origin back to the Enlightenment and to the belief that developing rational thinking is the purpose of education. However, whereas critical thinking is generally understood to involve the promotion of the *rational agent* and is considered by some to be too individualistic, democratic decision making begins with the *citizen*. Adopting democratic decision making as the starting point allows the scholar to theorize with an already-socialized subject. For socially-minded theorists, beginning with the citizen is preferable to beginning with the rational agent. The subject is socialized in a particular way, however, and that is in relation to the state. That is to say that while the rational agent carries the baggage of Enlightenment thinking, the citizen carries the baggage of modernism and the nation-state. Developing curricula for the democratic citizen foregrounds democratic decision making or democratic
deliberation and attempts to develop the participating citizen (rather than the rational agent). While both conceptions of the person are linked to providing students with the ability to think critically, the end goals are slightly different. Beginning with the rational agent (who is understood to live in society) places the individual in the foreground and the social order in the background. Beginning with the citizen places the social order in the foreground and individuals in the background. The practices associated with these schools of thought can be different as well. Deliberation focuses on group decisions and consensus building in order to create critically-oriented citizens, but critical thinking focuses more on the development of the individual.

In TRSE articles from the late 1990s and into the 2000s, deliberation and participation were ubiquitous. Combined with the fusion of critical thinking and citizenship development, deliberation and participation came to be offered up as normal and even moral requirements for citizenship education. Consider the development from pluralism to moralism in the following samples from Preskill (1997), Dinkelman (2001), and James (2010):

Open, thoughtful, and highly participatory conversation is a critical feature of democratic society. If the promise of democracy as a school for citizens is finally to be realized, then educators must provide frequent opportunities for students to exchange ideas in a variety of settings with diverse groups of participants. Discussion, deliberation, and individual and group decision making are not only at the heart of participatory democracy, they are an important source of learning and a key to self-development and continuous growth.

(Preskill, 1997, p. 317)

Here, in the late 1990s, Preskill places individually-centered, critical thinking alongside group-oriented activities as essential components for a citizenship education that would support a
healthy democracy. *Highly participatory* conversation amongst chatty extroverts is seen as a requirement not only of democracy but also of personal growth. Deemphasized is the academic rational agent, who, like Descartes, sought solitude and time to think; he is replaced by the democratic, socializing talker who is primarily concerned with consensus-building. For the citizen, the political is foregrounded.

Dinkelman (2001) also began with the student-as-citizen and normalized deliberation, and suggested that the field collectively believed that students *should* discuss social issues and they *ought to* deliberate about the true nature of authentic participation. Deliberation had come to be understood as a quasi-moral act, and it was presupposed that some forms of civic participation were more authentic than others:

> Amidst the disagreements that characterize the field, these common commitments then suggest at least a partial vision of what we might expect to see in the best social studies classrooms. Students should be using their minds well in considering powerful questions, ideas, and social problems. Students should be actively engaged in challenging assumptions, looking for evidence, and considering alternative viewpoints. Students ought to participate in deliberation about what is meant by authentic democratic civic participation. (pp. 619-620)

To the extent that students are provided with opportunities to critically assess ideas, events, and interpretations this vision favors the liberal-pluralist approach to social studies education. The difference between what Dinkelman saw as the collective view of the field and liberal pluralism as I understand it is the field’s reliance upon universal/foundational conceptions of democracy and engagement, the normalization of deliberation, and the essentializing of democracy. Emphasizing the social over the individual is one way in which the liberal-plural approach is
moved toward a critical, emancipatory approach. The granting of a normative status to group deliberation and ascribing a pre-ordained, essentialized conception to democracy do more to distance this view from a pluralist approach and connect it to an emancipatory one.

By infusing moralistic language, scholars who would otherwise be working from a liberal, critical thinking position are able to join their conservative and emancipatory colleagues in alchemically transmuting political indoctrination into the moral duty to provide students with ethical commitments and dispositions. In this way, the liberal goal of having students think for themselves becomes something else, such as the emancipatory goal of ushering in social justice or, as illustrated by James (2010), the critical-pluralist goal of creating students who are committed to one or another conception of democracy or multiculturalism.

Teacher educators have a responsibility to prepare teachers committed to the aims and practices of democracy. Central to this goal is helping teachers understand the relationship between private and public interest, and the importance of deliberation and participation. (p. 618)

During the 1990s and the 2000s, scholars discussing citizenship and democracy in TRSE often sought to combine elements of the liberal approach to education with the emancipatory approach to education. During the 1990s, some elements of the emancipatory vision were called into question. During the 2000s, however, accompanied by phrases such as transformative teaching, moving students’ beliefs, and belief restructuring, the pendulum swung back toward the emancipatory side. The shift back toward the emancipatory framework was accompanied by recasting critical thinking through the notion of democratic deliberation and (re)conceiving the person as a subject of the democratic state rather than as a rational agent.
Triadic and Other Models

As usual, this chapter ends with a discussion of how democracy and citizenship education were understood to be understood, and how they were positioned by scholars writing in TRSE. When scholars writing from 2000-2012 sought to conceptualize the field, three schema were most often cited: the Barr, Barth, and Shermis’s *Three Traditions* model (e.g., Dinkelman, 2001; Houser, 2001; Ritter & Lee, 2009; Ross & Maker, 2005); Westheimer and Kahne’s (2004) *What kind of Citizen?* model (Boyle-Biase, 2003; Chapin, 2005; Dilworth, 2004; Mathews & Dilworth, 2008; Obenchain et al, 2010; Silva, 2011), and Parker’s (2003) *Teaching Democracy* model (James, 2010; Obenchain et al, 2010; Ritter & Lee, 2009).

The Three Traditions model served as a foundation for both of the two other primary models for citizenship (Parker, 2003 and Westheimer & Kahne, 2004) and was the oldest. Recall that the Three Traditions model posited that there were three approaches to teaching social studies: citizenship transmission, the disciplinary approach, and reflective inquiry. Citizenship transmission was characterized by presenting a set of facts and values to students who were then to passively internalize the information and parrot it back to the teacher. Although not exclusively held by conservative teachers, Barr, Barth, and Shermis implicitly connoted the citizenship transmission approach to the dissemination of a conservative worldview. Teachers who adopted the second, disciplinary approach were said to train their students to be junior social scientists. Doing so was thought to be an improvement upon citizenship transmission but flawed because it provided both the problems and the solutions. Moreover, as a result of the packaging, all but the most motivated students failed to engage with the disciplinary curriculum. The third approach, reflective inquiry, was a problems-based approach to social studies. As with the disciplinary model, this approach was understood to provide students with the tools to become
social scientists and asked them to use the scientific method. The key difference, however, was
that this approach allowed the students to define the problems and devise solutions.

As discussed primarily in Chapter Four, there were a number of different criticisms of
this model that served as the bases for a number of other conceptual models. The general form of
these derivative models has been as follows: the first approach was labeled conservative (or as
reproducing the status quo) and was rejected; the second approach was said to improve upon the
first but to still (unintentionally) support the status quo – and was thus rejected; the third model
was then accepted on the basis that it promoted transformation. The way the model was said to
promote transformation was often a good indicator of the school of thought to which it belonged.
The liberal-plural models ended with some form of reflective, critical thinking, while critical-
emancipatory models ended with explicit attempts to transform the social order into one more
just and equal.

The triads contain the organizing-binary, and reproduction and reconstruction occupy the
outer nodes of the model. The repeated use of this form has provided support for the
reproduce/reconstruct binary and the discourse-orienting emancipatory narrative. There have
been a few conceptual models that used a different schema. The triadic modeling has spanned
the duration of the journal, however, and presently shows no signs of abatement. Because the
reproduce/reconstruct conceptualization has become an expected discursive practice, it would at
this point most likely require an intentional act of disruption to propose a different conception of
the field. That is, the field has been understood in this way for so long that if someone just chose
to forego that organization, they would surely be disciplined by reviewers, who would require
that the proper citations be made. As such, the change would be required to incorporate and
explain away the natural approach to organizing the field.
I close this chapter (and thus the body of the dissertation) by comparing and contrasting the Barr, Barth, and Shermis model to an example of how the model was recently re-envisioned and to the two models that have been most often noted in recent literature. I should note here that the two leading models (Parker, 2003; Westheimer & Kahne, 2002, 2004), like the Barr, Barth, and Shermis model (Barth & Shermis, 1970; Barr, Barth, & Shermis, 1977, 1978), were not originally published in the journal. Parker’s (2003) was published in a book and Westheimer and Kahne’s (2004) in a different journal. However, both have been repeatedly cited within TRSE and also developed within the journal by their authors.

The Three Traditions model continues to be cited as the primary source for organizing thinking on citizenship education (Houser, 2001; Ritter, 2009; Ross, 2005). A standard practice has been to organize the field in roughly the same way but to update it by changing or adding one or two categories. One example of a scholar from the 2000s amending the Three Traditions model was Dinkelman (2001), who claimed that the Three Traditions model failed to capture more recent approaches to social studies education:

Mainstream social studies foundations work centers on the "three traditions model" (Barr, Barth, and Shermis, 1978) consisting of social studies for cultural transmission, social studies as social science disciplines, and social studies to promote reflective inquiry. Each tradition favors certain conceptualizations of both the scope and nature of democratic life, and the differences among these views give rise to the particular arguments and recommendations of each camp. Over the past several decades, work rooted in critical, feminist, and post-modern education perspectives has challenged mainstream perspectives on the field (see Ross, 1997). The result is a "radical perspective" (Newmann, 1988) that does not easily fit the three traditions model. With some
exceptions, most of these different intellectual orientations share a general set of common educational commitments, including emphases on decision making (e.g. Engle and Ochoa, 1988); rational deliberation on public issues (e.g. Oliver and Shaver, 1966); active, as opposed to passive, engagement of students in thinking about important social studies content (NCSS, 1994); and preparation for at least minimal participation in civic life (e.g. Newmann, 1975). (p. 619)

The critique offered by Dinkelman was descriptive rather than prescriptive, but it contained a familiar, implicit criticism made by the radical (though rather mainstream within the journal) perspective: the Barr, Barth, and Shermis model did not go far enough in explicitly promoting social change. Dinkelman’s use of the Three Traditions model as a starter for the conceptualization of the field illustrates this common practice as well as the continued influence of the Three Traditions model.

Parker.

One of the most prolific writers on the topic of democracy and citizenship education is Parker (1984, 1986, 1992, 1999, 2003, 2010). Above I discussed the 1999 essay, which was published in TRSE. Cited more often in reference to organizing the field was his book, Teaching Democracy (2003). For this reason, and because it more fully expounds his thoughts on democratic citizenship than the articles offered in TRSE, I discuss it here followed by a chapter from his 2010 book.

In the book, Parker (2003) argued that there have been two leading attempts to organize thinking on democratic citizenship education: the Three Traditions model and another published by Cherryholmes (1980) in Curriculum Theory. Parker began with the Three Traditions model, but then referred to Cherryholmes’s critique of the Barr, Barth, and Shermis model in order to
make the familiar claim that the three approaches would be better understood as two: the reproduce/reconstruct binary:

[Cherryholmes] argued that each tradition described by Barr and his colleagues was epistemologically naïve – the third (reflective inquiry) as much as the first (citizenship transmission); and the second (social sciences) more so than the other two. All three assume positivism; all three ignore the relationship of knowledge to power – to social position, interests, and ideology. Reflective inquiry gets the bulk of Cherryholmes’s criticism, for while it admirably educates students to grapple with society’s problems, it fails to work out a methodological stance that would allow citizens to ‘gain a critical perspective on solutions for which they and others strive’ (p. 136). In other words, it engages students in social problem solving without enabling them to think about which problems are worth solving, according to whom, to what ends, and in whose favor. Cherryholmes thus delineates two basic approaches to citizenship education inside schools: critical and non-critical. (p. 46)

Parker sided with what he took to be Cherryholmes’s claim that approaches to citizenship education can be reduced to a single binary: critical/non-critical. In this case, critical did not refer to critical thinking but to critical theory and thus to the oppression discourse. Therefore, reflective inquiry was deemed not critical enough because it failed to explicitly address reproduction and reconstruction. As Parker developed his approach, he made use of the 2009 analytic discussed previously to conceptualize and analyze approaches to citizenship education. Two binaries were set against one another with one pair horizontally aligned (as the x axis) and the other vertically aligned (as the y axis) so that they formed an intersected square. According
to Parker, the two binaries that organized democratic citizenship education around 2003 were transmission/participation and justice/caring. As explained by Parker:

Participation approaches seek to engage students in the actual activity of democratic politics rather than, as is the case with transmission approaches, preparing them for it. … On the participation end of the curricular dimension is involvement *in* democracy; on the transmission side is learning *about* democracy. (p. 46)

Although Parker was sympathetic to conceiving of citizenship education in terms of an opposition between critical and noncritical approaches, his own model did not exactly utilize the reproduce/reconstruct binary. Transmission did occupy the bad (reproduce) pole, but the positive pole was occupied by participation rather than reconstruction. Participation in the political system calls for engagement within (and perhaps reform of) the existing social and political system rather than its radical transformation. Because of this, the goal of promoting participation is usually associated with reform-minded liberals and is opposed by transformation-seeking reconstructionists who lump reformers in with those who unintentionally reproduce the existing social order.

Placing further distance between himself and the reconstructionists, Parker (2003) also noted that cultural transmission was practiced by those on the political left as well as those on the political right:

Transmission advocates are not found only among conservative educators. Transmission is alive and well among critical educators who focus on multicultural and pro-labor curricula. For example, the problem with an Anglocentric curriculum is that one perspective is uncritically transmitted rather than multiple perspectives being transmitted critically. The problem with a curriculum that celebrates generals and entrepreneurs but
says nothing about labor, antiracist struggles, or economic democracy is not that a set of information is being transmitted but that it is the wrong set or that it privileges one single perspective (one that uncritically advantages the status quo) rather than multiple, competing perspectives that open up the inquiry to other possibilities. (p. 48)

Parker offered the liberal-plural critique of the emancipatory position by noting that liberals are generally critical of cultural transmission because it passes on official and unquestioned beliefs, while those using an emancipatory framework generally criticize cultural transmission because it transmits the wrong set of ideas. As explained by Parker here (but apparently forgotten elsewhere, as discussed above and below), ideologues on the left and the right can be distinguished from the liberal-pluralists to the degree that they propose that there is a single, right set of beliefs about the good society, morals, individual and social goals, and so forth. Just by virtue of noting this, Parker again intentionally distanced himself from the reconstructive camp while making this argument.

Parker argued in favor of participatory approaches to democracy and citizenship education and against approaches that uncritically (now, in the liberal rather than the neo-Marxist sense) transmitted a set of facts and values. After presenting his position, however, he partially deconstructed his own binary by noting that even those like himself who promoted participation rather than transmission necessarily sought to transmit some values. He suggested that any binary that places transmission on one side and something else on the other is thus constructed primarily for rhetorical reasons because all educational scholars (conservatives, liberals, critical theorists, reconstructionists, etc.) sought to transmit some set of values forward to the next generation. Liberal-pluralists, for example, value critical thinking and want to pass on an appreciation for free-thinking. Similarly, critical-pluralists such as Parker value democratic
deliberation and want to transmit it. Again, merely mentioning the neglected fact that everyone seeks to reproduce some element of the cultural or social order served to disrupt the reproduce/reconstruct binary. This, intentionally or otherwise, challenged the notion that approaches, goals, and perspectives could be reduced to one pole or the other and thus opened more space for liberal conceptions that did not attempt such a reduction.

Parker’s 2003 discussion of citizenship education appeared to be of two minds regarding the reproduce/reconstruct binary. On the one hand, he suggested that all approaches could be categorized depending on whether they addressed oppression and emancipation; on the other hand, he made several comments that resisted the reproduce/reconstruct binary.

In 2010, Parker wrote another essay that sought to organize thinking on social studies and citizenship education. In this polemical book chapter, Parker used a linear, developmental triad to discuss citizenship and approaches to citizenship education and relocated himself much further within the realm of emancipatory thinking. He expressed a desire to move “social studies curriculum toward enlightened political engagement” (p. 247). He explained that he understood enlightened political engagement as reflective citizenship rather than uninformed activism or “knowledge without engagement (the alienated expert)” (p. 247). The triad promoted by Parker was idiocy-puberty-citizenship. The triad was based upon the individual/citizen binary, or as Parker wrote: “a powerful opposition: the private individual and the public citizen” (p. 248). Drawing from Greek translations, Parker explained that the idiot is the person who is overly-concerned with private concerns and insufficiently engaged in public concerns. “Their lives are out of balance, disoriented, untethered, and unrealized. Tragically, idiots have not met the challenge of puberty, which is the transition to public life and taking one’s place on the public stage” (p. 248). Puberty, the middle, transitional point in the triad, identified people who had
come to be aware of public issues and who saw themselves as citizens, rather than individuals or family members first.

Parker rhetorically asked how it was that for the Greeks idiocy was rare but for Americans it was the norm. He answered his question by referring to Marx and to alienation, which, through the loose connection between individualism, affluence, and consumerism, he saw as the cause of contemporary idiocy. Parker concluded that the way to solve alienation and idiocy was through proper training in the schools. He proposed that bringing about the sort of citizen and society he would prefer could be accomplished by social studies educators who make sense of historical and social issues through the reproduce/reconstruct binary:

Social studies educators are required to pay attention to the transmission-transformation question: Should the curriculum encourage students to thrive in the current social system or to build a new one? To ignore this question would amount to naivety about the public role of schools. (p. 256)

Parker posited a transformative and emancipatory purpose for public education and intimated, without explicitly stating, that social studies teachers must adopt an emancipatory framework. Presumably recognizing the doctrinaire nature of this position, Parker added a disclaimer:

This is not a neutral approach because particular values are upheld: both democratic (e.g., cooperative decision making) and scientific (e.g., basing claims on evidence). But this does not mean that it aims to indoctrinate students into a particular vision of social welfare (e.g., capitalism or socialism). Rather the method is progressive and open-ended. Having been made more intelligent by their education, students will themselves, quoting Dewey, “take part in the great work of construction and organization that will have to be done.” (p. 257)
The disclaimer attempted to distinguish between non-neutrality and indoctrination. Such a distinction can be made. However, the fact that Parker described those supportive of market economies, individualism, and families as idiots, along with his claim that a person becomes mature and whole only after he or she self-identifies primarily as a citizen of the state, makes it clear that Parker would have a difficult time refraining from inculcating students with the correct values. Parker’s desire to move the social studies curriculum toward enlightened political engagement, whereby enlightenment is defined in reference to a collectivist vision of ethics and social organization, despite protestation to the contrary, clearly expressed a desire to use social studies education as a stage for social transformation.

In both of the essays discussed, Parker attempted to walk the line between promoting pluralism and critical thinking and promoting his own social and ethical beliefs. I think he was unsuccessful, but that is largely beside the two main points that (1) Parker’s influential conceptualization of the field of social studies and citizenship education made use of both binaries and triads and (2) the binaries and triads from both articles supported the reproduce/reconstruct binary albeit in varied ways. This desire to retain the emancipatory vision, despite the contradictions and tensions that it led to, was strong. One might even suggest that emancipatory thinking had come to be understood as rational thinking: that the repeated use of the reproduce/reconstruct binaries and triads made it natural for scholars to think that the purpose of social studies and citizenship education was the reconstruction of the social order and that the bane of social studies was social and cultural reproduction. The result for those who valued critical thinking and who were otherwise predisposed toward a liberal-pluralist vision of education might then have been a cognitive dissonance, whose remedy, in the 1990s and 2000s,
was sought in attempts to merge the critical and the liberal perspectives into a unified framework for democratic citizenship education.

**Westheimer and Kahne.**

Like Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977, 1978), Westheimer and Kahne published several papers that provided an organization scheme for citizenship education. These included Kahne et al. (2000), Westheimer and Kahne (2002), and Westheimer and Kahne (2004). The 2000 article was the only one of these that was published in *TRSE*, but it has been the least cited of the three. In what follows, then, I discuss both the 2000 and the 2004 articles. I compare and contrast the Westheimer and Kahne model to the Three Traditions model and then examine the place that the model assumes in relation to the larger discourse.

In the 2000 essay, Kahne et al. counted at least five approaches to social studies education, including critical thinking, disciplined inquiry, citizenship education, multiculturalism, and reflective inquiry:

Theorists linking education and democracy frequently invoke the importance of 1) developing students' higher order reasoning and analytic skills, 2) engaging students in deep and disciplined inquiry, 3) providing students with opportunities to experience democracy as a way of life, 4) fostering students' respect for and understanding of individuals and groups with differing values, beliefs, and practices and, 5) enabling students to identify social problems, their causes, and possible solutions. These different approaches are not mutually exclusive (many educators want to develop students' analytic skills while providing them with opportunities to experience democracy as a way of life) and the list is not comprehensive. (p. 315)

Kahne et al. notably suggest that the critical thinking model is most popularly held by teachers.
Perhaps the most common link made between education and democracy, a link not limited to social studies, is the notion that schools can promote students' capacity to reason and that this capacity is a fundamental support for a democratic society. (p. 315)

This is at odds with Barr, Barth, and Shermis’s (1977) earlier claim that citizenship transmission, or the inculcation of facts and values, was the approach most commonly adopted by teachers. In the Barr, Barth, and Shermis model, reflective inquiry (critical thinking) was seen as the most advanced model available and as the least reproductive and most reconstructive approach. But here in Kahne et al., critical thinking was repositioned as the most common and therefore as the dominant practice and the status quo. While it has been a common move for justice-oriented scholars to shift the content of the Barr, Barth, and Shermis model back toward the reproduce pole so that what was once considered emancipatory becomes viewed as unintentionally reproductive, this was the only model I have noticed that completely eliminated cultural transmission and associated critical thinking with reproduction. xxii How might this be explained?

It could be the case that the work of Barr, Barth, and Shermis and others has in the last couple of decades led to the rejection of the citizenship transmission approach that was once so popular. Another possible answer is that the repeated, discursive practice of red-shifting the model led to this conception in a process of discursive evolution. That is, critical thinking once occupied the third position, then, in order to make room for more-emancipatory approaches, it was shifted to the middle position; finally, it was shifted to the first position. In order to reside in the first position, however, and retain the integrity of the metanarrative, critical thinking would have to be understood as the dominant approach and the status, and that is what happened. Either of these scenarios is possible, I think, and it is also possible that both occurred. I am not interested
in proving either. I don’t think they can be proven. The whole endeavor is a matter of interpretation anyway.

Relevant, however, is a consideration of the content of Kahne’s (2000) model. If reflective inquiry was shifted to the reproduce pole, what came to occupy the middle position and the reconstructive position? Of particular interest is what came to occupy the middle position that reflective inquiry (critical thinking) has usually held in emancipatory and social justice conceptions of citizenship education. Before that can be explained, however, the five approaches that Kahne suggested must be developed a little more. The first approach, as noted, was critical thinking. The second approach was the disciplinary approach. Recall that the disciplinary approach occupied the second position in the Barr, Barth, and Shermis triad (citizenship transmission – disciplinary – reflective inquiry). Here, however, it is listed after the reflective inquiry model. There are several reasons why this might have been done, but what is more concrete than such speculation is that in the past emancipatory and social justice reconceptualizations of the Barr, Barth, and Shermis model argued that there was no significant difference between the disciplinary approaches and that of reflective inquiry. As such, the social justice triads took the following form: citizenship transmission – disciplinary/reflective inquiry – social justice/emancipation. As it turns out, Kahne et al. did not discuss the disciplinary model in the body of the paper at all. It has generally been understood that there is little difference between the two critical thinking models (reflective inquiry and disciplinary) and so Kahne lists these two as separate, but treats them as more or less the same. Compared to the Barr, Barth, and Shermis model, then, Kahne collapses the second and third approaches (disciplinary and reflective inquiry) into one and moves it over to the reproduce pole, which has been evacuated because Kahne makes no mention of citizenship or cultural transmission.
Moving to the third approach, I return to the question of what came to occupy the middle position, formerly associated with critical thinking. Kahne et al.’s 2000 model placed pluralist approaches (e.g., Parker, 2003) associated with participatory democracy and multiculturalism occupied the middle position. Kahne et al. separated the participatory approaches into two: providing students with opportunities to experience democracy as a way of life and fostering students’ respect for and understanding of individuals and groups with differing values, beliefs, and practices. Together the two emphasized the relationship between democracy and diversity and promoted a lived-diversity that was thought to strengthen our society. The crux for both was Dewey’s notion of democracy as a way of life:

John Dewey's focus on "democracy as a way of life" differs substantially from a focus on fostering higher order thinking. While those who promote this perspective certainly value higher order thinking, they emphasize the importance of social processes that align with civic life more than cognitive capacities. Rather than emphasizing educators’ role in informing future voters, Dewey (1916) emphasized identification and pursuit of shared goals in a manner that reflected the distinct interests and abilities of community members.

(Kahne et al., p. 316)

According to Kahne et al., those who subscribed to the belief that multicultural education was the (or at least a) purpose of social studies education “argue that by fostering respect for and understanding of the perspectives of individuals and groups, schools can provide fundamental support for a democratic society” (318).

The middle position of Kahne et al.’s 2000 conceptualization of social studies and citizenship education was given to multicultural and participatory models. Note that in the 1990s these were the models that were incorporating liberal-pluralist and postmodern ideas and were
challenging (or at least stretching) traditional social justice frameworks. The criticism of these models, even by those emancipatory theorists who sought to incorporate them to some degree, was that they were reform-oriented rather than transformative. As such, they were often placed in the middle position as *not transformative enough* or as unintentionally reproducing the status quo. Given that the third position of the model was occupied by the emancipatory approaches to citizenship education, the question of how the critical thinking approach was moved from the middle section to the reproductive pole can be answered in the following way: First, Kahne et al. did not address citizenship transmission, suggesting perhaps that no one took this approach any more. This opened up the reproductive pole. Then, the middle position, which was for emancipatory theorists normally occupied by critical thinking and/or participatory models, was separated into critical thinking models (which were moved to the reproductive pole) and participatory models (which were left in the middle position). The result was that a distinction could then be made between the participatory models and the critical models. In effect, Kahne et al. sought to keep separated what Parker and others sought to bring together: the emancipatory and the pluralist frameworks.

Before moving on to the 2004 version of this model, the emancipatory approach as explained in the 2000 essay will be examined further. The following extended quote presents the position in the words of Kahne et al.:

> In addition to fostering informed and thoughtful voters, citizens with capacities for and commitments to collective endeavors, and respectful stances towards diversity, some educators emphasize preparation for participation in societal improvement (Rugg, 1921; Counts, 1932). That is, they hope to prepare students for democratic citizenship by expanding their capacity to identify social problems, the causes of problems,
strategies for reform. When appropriate, they would like students to work together to respond to the problems they identify. In short, they take seriously the rhetoric that children must be prepared to solve tomorrow's problems and hope to prepare them by providing opportunities to develop relevant attitudes, knowledge, and skills. Thus, while they value higher order thinking and a wide range of content, they are particularly interested in opportunities to orient students' studies and analysis around identifying and considering responses to social problems.

Although Kahne et al. acknowledge that the reconstructive nature of this approach presumes that the point of education is to condition students to look about for social problems and to presume that the identified problems are structural in nature, they are quick to reassure the reader that the intentional development of such an intellectual disposition does necessarily involve indoctrination: “As Newmann (1975) and others argue, however, one can engage students in thoughtful study of social problems without pushing students to adopt particular solutions” (p. 319).

The need for the disclaimer is related to the scholars cited in reference to this vision. Those who are familiar with the work of Counts and Rugg are aware of the rather radical content of their message: they are often referred to as radicals (see Stanley, 1981). Consider, for example, Counts’s (1932) wonderfully provocative claims made in Dare We Build a New Social Order that progressive educators such as Dewey were “romantic sentimentalists” (p. 8) and that their bourgeois values were the cause of their fear of indoctrinating students with the socialist and communist ideas that would allow for the reconstruction of society:

At heart feeling themselves members of a superior human strain, they do not want their children to mix too freely with the children of the poor or of the less fortunate races. Nor
do they want them to accept radical social doctrines, espouse unpopular causes, or lose themselves in quest of any Holy Grail. According to their views education should deal with life, but with life at a distance or in a highly diluted form. They would generally maintain that life should be kept at arm's length, if it should not be handled with a poker. If Progressive Education is to be genuinely progressive, it must emancipate itself from the influence of this class, face squarely and courageously every social issue, come to grips with life in all its stark reality, establish an organic relation with the community, develop a realistic and comprehensive theory of welfare, fashion, a compelling and challenging vision of human destiny, and become less frightened than it is today at the bogies of imposition and indoctrination. (pp. 9-10)

Even progressive educators such as Dewey were uncomfortable with the indoctrination into collectivist and transformative ideology as promoted by Counts and the reconstructionists, and to cite them would insinuate a controversial trajectory that might require the sort of hedging that was offered by Kahne et al. Even though the authors’ conceptualization of the field made a distinction between the pluralist and critical approaches, and suggested by virtue of order and language that the critical, reconstructivist approach was most desirable, the intellectual climate of the period perhaps made the caveat advisable.

The interpretation offered above – that the five approaches can be understood as three – is supported by the 2004 article written by Westheimer and Kahne, where they explained that a two year study of citizenship programs led them to conclude that there were three approaches to citizenship education: personally responsible, participatory, and justice oriented. Notably, the first conceptual model discussed in some detail was Parker’s (1996) model. This model was not
published in *TRSE* and thus was not discussed above. For that reason, and to clarify their perspective, I include their brief description here.

Walter Parker (1996) describes three very different conceptions of citizen education for a democratic society: "traditional," "progressive," and "advanced." He explains that traditionalists emphasize an understanding of how government works (how a bill becomes a law, for example) and traditional subject area content, as well as commitments to core democratic values – such as freedom of speech or liberty in general (see, for example, Butts, 1988). Progressives share a similar commitment to this knowledge, but they embrace visions such as "strong democracy" (Barber, 1984) and place a greater emphasis on civic participation in its numerous forms (see, for example, Newmann, 1975; Hanna, 1936). Finally, "advanced" citizenship, according to Parker, is one that builds on the progressive perspective but adds careful attention to inherent tensions between pluralism and assimilation or to what Charles Taylor labels the "politics of recognition." (pp. 238-239)

In short, as noted above, Parker sought to combine the pluralist framework with the emancipatory zeal for structural change. Parker’s view was placed in contrast to those on the Left who placed “a greater emphasis on the need for social critique and structural change” and those on the Right “who put forward a connection between citizenship and character” (p. 239). Also noted by Westheimer and Kahne were the liberal position, associated with Rawls (1971) and those, such as Gutmann (1985) who favored democratic deliberation and political participation. Along with Parker, these final two positions are often considered liberal-pluralist, leaning toward the emancipatory from Rawls to Gutmann to Parker.
In regard to their own conceptual model, Westheimer and Kahne noted that their triadic schema was neither fully inclusive nor entirely exclusive, but they did believe that the distinctions were strong enough to warrant the imposed categorization. As indicated below, their rather influential conceptualization of the field took the same form that most social studies and citizenship schema have taken since the Barr, Barth, and Shermis model, and their model, even though developed as a result of new research, was formulated in accordance with standard social justice triads that posit a conservative, reproductive position, a middle, reformative, but insufficiently transformative position, and the preferred justice and equality-oriented transformative position.

The reproductive position in the 2004 scheme was ascribed to those whose approach was given the label of *personally responsible*. This was somewhat different than the 2000 model, which did not discuss attempts to reproduce the existing social order and instead shifted critical thinking to the reproductive pole.

The *personally responsible* citizen acts responsibly in his or her community by, for example, picking up litter, giving blood, recycling, obeying laws, and staying out of debt. The personally responsible citizen contributes to food or clothing drives when asked and volunteers to help those less fortunate, whether in a soup kitchen or a senior center. Programs that seek to develop personally responsible citizens attempt to build character and personal responsibility by emphasizing honesty, integrity, self-discipline, and hard work. (Westheimer and Kahne, 2004, p. 241)

The second approach, associated with *participatory citizenship*, was understood as reflecting attempts to explain the government and to work with and within social and political
organizations at various levels. Social and political efficacy are in this approach the goals of citizenship education:

Other educators see good citizens as those who actively participate in the civic affairs and the social life of the community at the local, state, or national level. We call this kind of citizen the participatory citizen. Proponents of this vision emphasize preparing students to engage in collective, community-based efforts. Educational programs designed to support the development of participatory citizens focus on teaching students how government and community-based organizations work and training them to plan and participate in organized efforts to care for people in need or, for example, to guide school policies. Skills associated with such collective endeavors—such as how to run a meeting—are also viewed as important (Newmann, 1975; also see Verba et al., 1995, for an empirical analysis of the importance of such skills and activities). Whereas the personally responsible citizen would contribute cans of food for the homeless, the participatory citizen might organize the food drive. (pp. 241-242)

The third, justice-oriented, approach was positioned to be the least common approach. As explained by Westheimer and Kahne, this approach uses both critical thinking (opportunities to analyze and understand) and rhetoric to advocate for social justice and to instill in their students an emancipatory perspective. This approach shares with the previous approaches a concern to make things better, but it emphasizes systemic change rather than personal involvement:

Our third image of a good citizen is, perhaps, the perspective that is least commonly pursued. Justice-oriented educators argue that effective democratic citizens need opportunities to analyze and understand the interplay of social, economic, and political forces. We use the term justice-oriented citizen because advocates of these priorities use
rhetoric and analysis that calls explicit attention to matters of injustice and to the importance of pursuing social justice. The vision of the justice-oriented citizen shares with the vision of the participatory citizen an emphasis on collective work related to the life and issues of the community. Its focus on responding to social problems and to structural critique make it somewhat different, however. Building on perspectives like those of Freire and Shor noted earlier, educational programs that emphasize social change seek to prepare students to improve society by critically analyzing and addressing social issues and injustices. These programs are less likely to emphasize the need for charity and volunteerism as ends in themselves and more likely to teach about social movements and how to effect systemic change. (p. 242)

As with the Kahne et al. 2000 essay and Parker’s 2003 discussion, the authors suggest that this approach is not partisan and insist that it does not call for the promotion of a particular ideology:

Although educators aiming to promote justice-oriented citizens may well employ curriculum that makes political issues more explicit than those who emphasize personal responsibility or participatory citizenship, the focus on social change and social justice does not imply an emphasis on particular political perspectives, conclusions, or priorities. (The range of structural approaches for alleviating poverty that exist, for example, spans the political spectrum.) Indeed, those working to prepare justice-oriented citizens for a democracy do not aim to impart a fixed set of truths or critiques regarding the structure of the society. Rather, they work to engage students in informed analysis and discussion regarding social, political, and economic structures. They want students to consider collective strategies for change that challenge injustice and, when possible, address root causes of problems. (p. 242-243)
Their claim that the social justice approaches do not promote a certain perspective seems highly contentious, however, unless one grants that placing social justice as the primary focus of an educational program does not promote a particular political perspective and does not promote a particular set of political and social priorities. The claim, in fact, seems to undermine the implied distinction between the ideology of individual responsibility and social justice. The authors seem to parry such suggestions by claiming that all political parties and ideologies have their own favored solutions for poverty so that a program with social justice as its goal thereby becomes nonpartisan. It is exceedingly unlikely, however, that a proponent of free-market ideology would embrace having students consider collective strategies for change that challenge injustice as their educational goal. The authors seem to attempt to deflect attention from this dubious claim by shifting the focus away from differences in political ideology to a pedagogical process that would reflect the goals of multicultural and liberal-pluralist scholars:

The nature of this discussion is of critical importance. As many theorists of democracy make clear, it is fundamentally important that the process respect the varied voices and priorities of citizens while considering the evidence of experts, the analysis of government leaders, or the particular preferences of a given group or of an individual leader. Similarly, students must learn to weigh the varied opinions and arguments of fellow students and teachers. Because conceptions of the greater good will differ, justice-oriented students must develop the ability to communicate with and learn from those who hold different perspectives. (p. 243)

Westheimer and Kahne proposed that the field of citizenship education could be understood, more or less, in three different ways: as attempts to produce the personally responsible citizen, the politically and socially active citizen, or the citizen who seeks structural change in order to
realize social justice. This triadic conceptualization took the standard form of emancipatory triads in that it proposed that one group (the dominant and conservative group) reproduced the social order by reproducing an ideology informed by individualism and personal responsibility. This was followed by a second position that was an improvement upon the first, and sought social reform. The second, participatory model did not, as did the third, social justice model, explicitly set out to train students to find the structural sources of inequity and injustice. As such, the second model was seen as less advanced than the reconstructive, social justice approach to citizenship education.

Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977, 1978), Westhimer and Kahne (2002, 2004), and Parker (1996, 2003) each offered conceptualizations of social studies and citizenship education that have been very influential recently, and in the case of Barr, Barth and Shermis, for the duration of the journal. Despite differences in specific content and in the preferred outcomes (even within each author’s own corpus), the models presented by these theorists and the collection of scholars who have used their work to formulate their own conception of the field, can be understood to have participated in what has become a standard discursive practice: organizing conceptions of the field based on whether or not the approaches are understood to reproduce the status quo or promote emancipatory social change. This practice has been informed by, but also reinforces, the metanarrative that drives the conversation on citizenship education within TRSE: a narrative that presumes that social change is good and that it will lead to social and moral progress and that tends to presume that equality and justice are universal goods. Having knowledge of the good and of the good society, those promoting the emancipatory agenda for the most part have been comfortable inculcating the youth with the correct values and dispositions (i.e., those associated with the emancipatory perspective). Since the 1990s, there has been some resistance
within the ranks of emancipatory scholars to the universalism and the dogmatism that can be attributed to this position, but rather than reject the framework, the trend has been to incorporate, piecemeal, insights from postmodern theory and to hedge, as well as possible, with (dubious) claims that the emancipatory perspective does not seek to inculcate a specific set of values or a specific worldview. Parker’s and Westheimer and Kahne’s conceptualizations of the field reflect two different approaches to the same goal of merging, to some degree, the emancipatory and liberal frameworks.

**Conclusion**

If the 1990s can be understood as a decade of theoretical disruption and shifting, the 2000s can be understood as a time of resettlement. Although the theoretical shifting suggested and discussed above can surely not be captured in a single essay, the 2000s can be understood as a period of retrenchment wherein the two leading perspectives seem to have merged into an uneasy unity of sorts. I have argued that this position, which claims that students’ beliefs can be transformed, moved, or redeemed cannot consistently be held alongside claims to plural openness. The two are incommensurable.
CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. (Foucault, 1980, p. 131)

Summary

In this dissertation, I have presented and discussed how democracy and citizenship education have been understood over the forty year history of the journal, Theory and Research in Social Education. I have argued that the discourse is strongly influenced by the reproduce/reconstruct binary that promotes the nebulous idea that bad social studies and citizenship education reproduces the status quo, while good social studies and citizenship education transforms the social order. I have further argued that the binary represents, supports, and is supported by a narrative of moral and social progress and of emancipation and that this narrative is supported by the ritual, discursive practice of conceptualizing social studies and citizenship education triadically. This practice, repeated often in TRSE, normally involves three steps. First an approach to social studies and/or citizenship education is presented and rejected because it intentionally reproduces the status quo. This is followed by the presentation and rejection of a second approach to citizenship due to the claim that the second model unintentionally supports the reproduction of the status quo. Third, an approach to social studies
or citizenship education that is thought to allow for or directly lead to the reconstruction of society is presented and advocated.

This practice can be understood in association with mythology (Barthes, 1957/1972) and ritual (Althusser, 1971/2001). Although I am uncomfortable with Barthes’s notion of distortion and other aspects of his structuralism, his discussion of mythical concepts captures something of the nature of the reproduce/reconstruct binary and of the discursive practices that maintain it. The reproduce/reconstruct binary can be understood to code, articulate, or structure a world-historical myth. Following Barthes’s lead, the binary might be understood as a mythical concept:

In this sense, we can say that the fundamental character of the mythical concept is to be appropriated: grammatical exemplarity very precisely concerns a given form of pupils, French imperialism must appeal to such and such group of readers and not another. This concept closely corresponds to a function, it is defined as a tendency. (p. 119)

Barthes suggested that the myth functions within a belief structure to tell a familiar story. They provide us with a variety of ways to tell the same, very simple stories; so simple, in fact, that they aren’t stories so much as announcements. This is good and that is bad is perhaps the most fundamental or primordial of these announcements. Because they reflect and support this structure, binaries are often used in the telling of myths. The myth tells a universal story to a particular audience. The myth allows exclusionary tales to be dressed in moral language. Told in reference to a particular history that helps to provide cohesion to the group and to alienate others, the myth provides our story.

I think the reproduce/reconstruct binary and the emancipatory narrative serves this function in the discourse on democracy and citizenship education in TRSE. Barthes wrote that myth transforms history into nature. In this way a (largely fictional) historical story can come to
be seen as the truest truth the basis for our socially-held values. Long after the motives for the creation of the myth are forgotten, the myth continues to function as a reason for why this is good and that is bad. Over time we forget that the story was created to be an edifying fiction and the myth ever more strongly orients the meaning of the world as we encounter it:

We here reach the very principle of myth: it transforms history into nature. We now understand why, in the eyes of the myth-consumer, the intention, the adhomination of the concept can remain manifest without however appearing to have an interest in the matter: what causes mythical speech to be uttered is perfectly explicit, but it is immediately frozen into something natural; it is not read as a motive, but as a reason. … But for the myth-reader, the outcome is quite different: everything happens as if the picture naturally conjured up the concept, as if the signifier gave a foundation to the signified: the myth exists from the precise moment when French imperiality achieves the natural state: myth is speech justified in excess. (p. 129-130)

The reproduce/reconstruct binary that I have discussed, along with the correlative story of oppression and emancipation can be understood as a myth that orients the discourse on democracy and citizenship in TRSE. Good and bad are understood in terms of the binary which provides a narrative structure which simplifies the world. Because good and bad are already determined and are positioned as universal, the burden of thinking about ends is removed and scholars can focus their energies on deciding whether the curriculum under analysis reproduces or reconstructs society.

Using the notion of myth, as explained by Barthes (1957/1972), provides an angle from which to consider the binary that has over time come to orient how democracy and citizenship are encountered within this discourse. Whereas Barthes can help us understand the structure of
the discourse as a whole, Althusser (1971/2001) can help us think about how the myth or narrative is supported or reinscribed by the ritualized use of triadic modelling. He wrote as follows:

In this way, i.e., by means of the absolutely ideological ‘conceptual’ device (dispositif) thus set up (a subject endowed with a consciousness in which he freely forms or freely recognizes ideas in which he believes), the (material) attitude of the subject concerned naturally follows. … If he believes in Duty, he will have the corresponding attitudes, inscribed in ritual practices ‘according to the correct principles.’ (Althusser, p. 113)

If Duty is replaced by the narrative of emancipation or the reproduce/reconstruct binary, it can be suggested, following Althusser and Barthes, that the scholars of TRSE have, as free subjects participation in a discourse come to support and maintain the emancipatory narrative. The scholars witness (read) the ritual of organizing the field in accordance with the binary and then, when their time comes to write, they participate in the ritual without really questioning it. Doing so is seen as natural and good, and it identifies the scholars as appropriately disciplined members of the group.

The ritual introduction of democratic citizenship education provides support for the belief that the goal of citizenship education is to reconstruct society. The ritual involves three steps. First, the author presents the bad approaches to citizenship education. The explanatory custom has the author discuss one or more discredited approaches to citizenship education, discredited precisely because the approaches are thought to reproduce the status quo. A second approach (or set of approaches) to citizenship education is then presented. The custom demands that the second set of models have some positive qualities (such as promoting critical thinking or increasing participation), but that, alas, they too reproduce the status quo – albeit unintentionally.
The third approach is then presented, and it is explained how this model, unlike the other two, serves to reconstruct or transform society.

This is, of course, not the only way that citizenship is introduced in this literature, nor is it the only way that scholarship in the field has been conceptualized. Sometimes the triad is abandoned altogether, and the reproduce/reconstruct binary is explicitly offered without the middle element. Occasionally, something altogether different is done. However, the prevalence of the triadic modeling is striking, and the narrative it supports orders the entire discourse.

Interpretation

Rorty (1979) wrote that “nothing is so valuable for the hermeneutic inquirer into an exotic culture as the discovery of an epistemology written within that culture” (p. 346). I would add that there is often no more foreign culture than our own. Seeing what is ready-to-hand as what is present-at-hand (Heidegger, 1927/1962) requires a shift in perspective. Seeing what is present-at-hand without any limiting perspective is impossible (Nietzsche, 1887/2010). As such, this study can only be a descriptive interpretation. Of course, those familiar with the ideas of Nietzsche and Heidegger will most likely not fault the essay because it is understood as interpretive.

The study is, of course, focused in breadth and span to one journal. Much has been written on the topic of democracy and citizenship outside this journal. I do not know if the same conclusions would be drawn from a larger sample. I am not concerned by this, however. I think I have discovered an epistemology, written largely in its own language, and I believe that the scope was appropriate to the task. The time scale of the study was short: only forty years. If the journal had a longer history, I might not have had to leave it and study other sources to construct the narrative. However, I think that it is likely that regardless of the duration of the journal, I
would have been compelled to look outside it to understand the intellectual context of the ideas being discussed within it.

I read and analyzed many articles in *TRSE* as part of this study. There was much that did not make it into the dissertation that might have. I suspect I could write two more dissertations focusing only on articles that I mentioned in passing or that never made it into the body of the dissertation at all. Choices had to be made about what was representational, relevant, and interesting. If the scope had been narrower, had I focused only on one or two decades, for example, I could have provided a fuller exegesis of the articles written during those decades. About halfway through the writing of the dissertation I seriously considered that option, thinking that it might be the better path. In the end, inertia, and the fact that I could always return and fill out chapters in more detail in future studies if I so desired, compelled me to move forward with the forty-year study.

I also acknowledge that certain theoretical constructs such as critical-pluralism, liberal-pluralism, and postmodernism could perhaps have been more explicitly theorized. The choice not to do so was intentional, however, and is intimately related to the nominalism that characterizes my perspective. I see no point in precisely pinning these ideas down because I don’t believe there is a single referent for postmodernism, critical-pluralism, or any historied theoretical framework. The terms were used as very tentative place-holders. Nonetheless, it might have benefitted my readers if I had provided a more detailed history of the use of terms such as liberal, pluralism, and critical.

**Contributions to the Field**

I noted in Chapter One that at the National Council for the Social Studies (CUFA) conference in 2013, I was told on a couple of occasions that this sort of historical work was
much needed in the field. The sentiment that much more historical work needed to be done was offered both in and to the journal by Davis (1995), who wrote that “scholarship in the history of social studies in the American school curriculum has increased in quantity and quality. On the other hand, its small corpus suggests but does not constitute a usable past” (p. 53). He also suggested that because social studies scholars (focusing on change and transformation) often see themselves in opposition to history education scholars (whose focus on the past is thought to perpetuate the status quo), they denigrate historical work and have created a void in the field:

Social studies practitioners and researchers alike appear mainly to understand their practice in terms of a current reality only. On those rare occasions when they do think about past practice, practitioners misinterpret their history as an extension of the present.

Presentism continues to shackle the social studies field. (p. 52)

This study was designed to avoid this very problem. Rather than explaining the past as the nascent present, unfolding according to the designs of rational history or Geist, the goal has been to explain the present by understanding the past – with all the caveats that my perspective presupposes.

There have been historical and historiographical studies of social studies (e.g., Binford & Eisworth, 2013; Davis, 1995; Saxe, 1994; Whelan, 1994, 1997) and even of the social studies discourse (Nelson, 1994), both within (Lybarger, 1980; Woyshner, 2009) and outside (Lybarger, 1991; Woyshner et al, 2004) the journal. A conceptual history of democracy and citizenship education in the journal TRSE has not been provided, however. As the dissertation indicates, many have theorized social studies and citizenship education, and some have included a short history of that theorizing (e.g., Parker, 2003; Vinson, 1998), but I am unaware of anything of this scope.
Conceptual Ontology

I would like to apply this analytic to other journals, both domestic and international, to discover the distribution of this phenomenon. I am particularly interested in what I am calling conceptual ontology (for lack of less presumptive phrase), which I understand to be the study of the use binary, triadic, and other forms conceptual structuring. I think there is much productive work that can be done regarding the conceptual study of the history of intellectual (and other) discourses. Similar approaches to this task have already been undertaken by others, especially regarding binaries.

Sartre (1956), for example, began Being and Nothingness by noting that “modern thought has realized considerable progress by reducing the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it. Its aim was to overcome a certain number of dualisms which have embarrassed philosophy and to replace them by the monism of the phenomenon” (xlv). In the remainder of the introduction he questioned whether the attempt to overcome embarrassing dualisms had succeeded. He came to several positive conclusions. Among the advancements made by recent thought were that the dualism of being and appearance had been overcome as people had come to understand that appearances refer only to chains of appearances and not to a hidden reality. The mistake made by those who believed in unseen noumenal realities was that they conceived of the phenomenal (the world as we experience it) as purely negative. The noumenal (that which actually exists, as such, independent of perception) was believed to be the real and the phenomenal was thought to be unreal: illusion, appearance, and error. As Sartre explained, the breakthrough was that the dualism of appearance and essence had been rejected. In its place, essence and appearance were understood to be united, allowing essence to be reinterpreted as an overarching principle derived from the series of appearances of the phenomenon. In effect,
Sartre claimed that the phenomenologists had rid us of the embarrassing appearance/essence dualism by dissolving one side of the dualism (essence) into the other. As discussed in the body of the dissertation and below, Sartre is not the only scholar to attempt to dissolve a dualism by incorporating one side into the other.

Deleuze (1962/1983) also returned to Kant and the phenomenal in order to overcome the essence/appearance duality but did so via Nietzsche’s genealogy. In order to look beyond the duality, he suggested that we substitute the pathos of difference (the differential element) for the Kantian principle of universality. That is, to resolve this particular dualism, we should not seek to find the essential on the appearance side of the duality; instead we should just stop looking for the essential. Rather than finding where the hidden essential is actually hiding out, we should content ourselves with looking at the differences. Put differently, we should assume an historical posture that takes difference as a given, rather than a rationalist one that presumes essences and universalization.

To think genealogically (whether one adopts it as a method or not) is to understand differences in origins. Take, for example, the difference between the noble and the common. To follow Nietzsche’s genealogical approach is to understand the historical construction of these concepts (and perspectives). The goal is emphatically not to search for an essential difference – not to find what is really noble or really common but rather to understand how this opposition has through history, culture, and language become a binary. Thinking in this way does not require the denial of real difference between noble sentiments and common sentiments – but only that these differences are historical and not essential.

Deleuze (1962/1983) thus understood the phenomenon not as “an appearance or even an apparition, but a sign, a symptom, which finds its meaning in an existing force,” and, along with
Nietzsche, substituted “the correlation of sense and phenomenon for the metaphysical duality of appearance and essence” (p. 3). Phenomena are not understood (as with Sartre) as quasi-mystical entities endowed with reality through participation in an infinite chain of appearance but rather more simply as historical signposts that can direct us toward the conceptual history of our own ideas. The signpost or marker should not be understood as a thing in itself but as a footprint that leads to another track that can be followed back to an origin (not the origin). We do not free ourselves from dualities, as they have become part of how we think, but we might trace the use of dualisms within a particular field and learn more about the history of how we have used binaries to think about various ideas.

According to Deleuze and Nietzsche, perception, interpretation, and conceptualization each involve an attempt to appropriate, dominate, and exploit a quantity of reality. The use of the dualism as a conceptual device is no exception. Dualisms, or oppositional binaries, are used to appropriate and distinguish, and to incorporate and distance positions, approaches and concepts. In particular, to deploy a binary is to attempt to restructure the conceptual terrain so as to make the complex appear to be simple – as a way to funnel resources and people through a broad and clearly defined path. The dualism has perhaps been the favored intellectual strategy of monotheistic priesthoods. *There is only one path to god and goodness; all else is evil.* Appropriating all goodness under one banner makes the world simpler and thus more manageable. The remainder which is beyond the *we* (the chaos, the uncoded) becomes the Other. While some seem to believe that the point of *othering* is the oppression of the different, the more primordial purpose seems to have been the creation of a *we* that could be known, understood, and regulated. Providing a community with an identity that is honed, articulated,
and solidified (i.e., defined) in opposition to another group, through the binary opposition, is an
effective, if ancient, political technology.

Today it is in the domain of policy that the support of the uninitiated is most important
and where simplifying, oppositional binaries have the greatest effect. Although overwhelming
an audience with the complex and obscure can sometimes be useful in swaying opinion, it is
often the simple and clear argument that draws upon what we all know to be obviously true that
wins public support. In these cases the complexity of a situation seems most likely to be filtered
and reduced to a simple choice: “all things considered, are we against or for (should we attack or
retreat? Support that proclamation or oppose it? And so on)” (Zizek, 2009, p. 385).

Zizek (2009), in defending lost causes, implores us to “bear in mind that one of the basic
operations of hegemonic ideology is to enforce a false point, to impose on us a false choice” (p.
385). By narrowing thinking down to two choices, the ideologue, demagogue, or what have you
can make other possibilities invisible. Drawing from Lacan, Zizek suggests that when we
encounter dualisms, we should search for the excluded third. To find the excluded third, one
takes the given dualism as a field and then looks to see what both of those have in common and
thus what the dualism excludes or hides. This practice perhaps sets up another dualism –
between the excluded third and the original binary, allowing further deconstruction.

Zizek is prone to speak as though ideology was had by the capitalists, while truth was the
possession of the Marxists, thereby constituting emancipatory politics as the excluded third in the
modern discourse which recognizes the official choices as liberalism and terrorism. It is clearly
liberals who are the unstated architects of the liberal/terrorist binary to which Zizek refers. The
“terrorist” would hardly define his movement in those terms. If constructed by the religious
conservative, the dualism would take the form of the faithful versus the infidel or the virtuous
versus the decadent. Whatever the case, for Zizek, the excluded third would be occupied by a more or less Marxist perspective. That is not surprising since the bourgeois/proletariat binary is one of the most prominent of the last century and a half. That this binary felicitously represents the world is for many a given: one might say that within certain circles the bourgeois/proletarian binary is the noumenal truth to which all social, political, and economic phenomena are thought to refer. Because Zizek works within this perspective, the liberal/terror deconstructed in order to have us see the real binary, consisting of the oppressors (and their assistants) and the oppressed (and their assistants). That is, the liberal/terrorist binary is an appearance, while the bourgeois/proletariat binary is real.

Rather than replacing false binaries with real binaries, this analysis has followed Nietzsche and Deleuze’s lead of regarding the dualism as a signpost for a conceptual study wherein no essences, truths, or underlying realities are posited but where the histories of both concepts and conceptual structures can be examined. This analysis has suggested that the discourse of democracy and citizenship education in the 40-year history of TRSE has been dominated by such a binary. The discourse of democracy and citizenship education has directed at least a couple of generations of social studies education scholars toward the belief that democratic citizenship should be understood in terms of whether it reproduces or transforms society to the extent that this question is the alpha and omega of citizenship education. The binary’s repeated reinscription in reference to what should be the case has caused it to accrue a sort of moral agency. It demands and berates – but not as much as it reassures those who affirm and participate in the judgment. Perhaps a new generation of social science educators might take as their project resistance to a discourse structured by the limits of such a binary.
References

Adams, B. (1896). *The law of civilization and decay*. [Retrieved from Amazon Digital Services, Inc.] doi: B00HN8KCIC.


Franklin, B. (1787/1993). I agree to this constitution, with all its faults. In B. Bailyn, (Ed). *The debate on the constitution: Federalist and antifederalist speeches, articles, and letters during the struggle over ratification*. (pp. 3-5). New York, NY: Putnam.


## Appendix: Triad Chart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citation</th>
<th>Creator of Triad</th>
<th>First Term</th>
<th>Middle Term</th>
<th>Third Term</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barr, Barth, and Shermis, 1977</td>
<td>Barr, Barth, and Shermis</td>
<td>Citizenship Transmission</td>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>Reflective Inquiry</td>
<td>1. Inculcating right values as a framework for making decisions 2. Decision making based on master of social science concepts, processes, and problems 3. Citizenship is best promoted through a process of inquiry in which knowledge is derived from what citizens need to know to make decisions and solve problems. Students decide problems based on own values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzanne Helburn, 1977</td>
<td></td>
<td>Citizenship Transmission</td>
<td>Social Science Inquiry</td>
<td>Reflective Inquiry</td>
<td>Responded to the model in the NCSS bulletin and said that the last two could be collapsed in reality – and that they were separated by an interpretation of history rather than the facts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Shaver, 1977</td>
<td></td>
<td>Citizenship Transmission</td>
<td>Social Science Inquiry</td>
<td>Reflective Inquiry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barth Shermis (1980, p. 47)</td>
<td>Barr, Barth, and Shermis</td>
<td>Citizenship Transmission</td>
<td>Social Science Inquiry</td>
<td>Reflective Inquiry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barth and Shermis, 1981</td>
<td></td>
<td>Citizenship Transmission</td>
<td>Social Science Inquiry</td>
<td>Reflective Inquiry</td>
<td>Citizenship transmission: the oldest tradition within the social studies. We suggest that its origins are with the primeval campfire. CT is an attempt to transmit or persuade the young that there is a model of citizenship that this model of citizenship ought to be adopted by all the young, and that so doing will yield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White, C. S. (1982)</td>
<td>Barr, Barth, and Shermis</td>
<td>Citizenship Transmission</td>
<td>Social Science Inquiry</td>
<td>Reflective Inquiry</td>
<td>The model has a number of problems when taken as descriptive; however, it functions nicely as a prescriptive model. (18)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Shermis, 82 | Barr, Barth, and Shermis | Citizenship Transmission | Social Science Inquiry | Reflective Inquiry | 1. Article was a response to suggestions that the last two categories should be combined.  
2. They emphasize that the difference lies in who chooses the problem to be studied.  
3. Therefore, they “shifted” the focus from the purpose of the tradition (which for both is critical/rational/scientific thinking to how this goal is to be reached.  
4. RI, however, focuses on unresolved conflicts, and draws upon Dewey’s pedagogy.  
5. SSI problems are less likely to reflect the “problems” of the “poor and the politically powerless” than is RI.  
6. “The ground of the RI problem is individual experience.” – Deweyan link between individual and society. Far more individualistic than later models will be. |
| Shermis & Barth, 82 | Citizenship Transmission | Social Science Inquiry | Reflective Inquiry | 1. Reflective Inquiry is equated with Critical Thinking  
2. Democracy is choosing rules and rulers  
3. Pluralism is our way  
4. Pluralism/Democracy call for analysis and |
<p>| Gordon, 85 | Giroux | Technical (Citizenship Transmission and Social Science Model) | Hermeneutic (Reflective Inquiry) Based on the premise that citizenship can best be taught by engaging students in decision-making in the sociopolitical context, i.e., by the “social construction of classroom knowledge.” 3. It is therefore possible, in the reflective inquiry model, that the basic nature of existing social arrangements in the wider society may remain unquestioned. (3) | Emancipatory Similarly, emancipatory rationality augments its interest in self-reflection with social action designed to create the ideological and material conditions in which nonalienating and non-exploitative relationship can exist. (3) | Giroux claims that this mode of rationality [technical rationality] underlies two forms of citizenship education, the “transmission model” and the “social science model.” Giroux argues that both of them ... ignore the contradictions and conflicts that exist in the social order. Absent from both of these models of citizenship education are the “normative, historical, political landscapes that give them meaning.” (3) |
| Wood 85 | Protectionist | Participatory | Wood does not advance a Triad but a Binary. However, I think it is important to list here. He is cited in the future and he has articulated a position that seems strong. |
| Guyton, 88 | Weissberg, 1974 | (1) the contemporary understanding wherein the populace chooses its leaders (2) an intermediate model wherein the populace chooses representatives who are responsive to them (3) participatory democracy, whereby political participation is understood to extend beyond the government to all other aspects of social living. | 233 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source (Year)</th>
<th>Amalgam</th>
<th>Cultural Transmission</th>
<th>Reflective Inquiry into social science knowledge</th>
<th>Democratic Transformation</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chilcoat and Ligon, 1994</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Reflective Inquiry into social science knowledge</td>
<td>Democratic Transformation</td>
<td>1. The middle term, despite being better than the first for some reason, is still Reproductive. 2. The third conception of democratic education has the qualities of the second plus it is Reconstructive and does other good things too that reflect the Marxist/Progressive Narrative. In this case these are ethical decision making and social participation. 3. The first two elements are rejected because they understand democracy to be static rather than a progressive struggle for equality and justice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vansledright, 1994</td>
<td></td>
<td>Illusory</td>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>Constructive</td>
<td>1. The first one is passive and non-participatory. 2. Second element is better because there is more participation, but is rejected because it does not challenge the status quo. 3. The third model encourages critical examination of the political system as well as effective participation in public affairs. 4. These are loosely related to epistemological positions, interestingly, or not.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Baber, 1995)</td>
<td>Amalgam</td>
<td>Cultural nationalism</td>
<td>Cultural pluralism</td>
<td>Cultural Criticism</td>
<td>1. Multiculturalism stands in for Democracy. 2. First group wishes to reproduce the canon or, interestingly, create a new one from a single perspective.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Boyle, 1995 | Amalgam | Teaching the exceptional and culturally different & the Human Relations Model | There is no middle term here because this is based on the R/R Binary and not on a Triad. | 1. At present, five primary models or approaches to multicultural education exist (Sleeter & Grant, 1994).  
2. Two are additive and do not challenge the existing structure, but teach students to be tolerant and accept diversity.  
3. Three other approaches are emancipatory and reconstructive, and have roots in social struggles for equality.  
4. This has the R/R Binary structure rather than a Triadic Structure |
| Vinson, 95 | (Barr, Barth, & Shermis, 1977; Barth & Shermis, 1970; Engle, 1977; Martorella, 1991) | Regime of Truth | 1. Transmission = Reproduction of liberal democracy; social science = academic understanding; RI = academic plus contemporary interest; SC = transformative; personal development (which is rarely discussed) seems Roussean and Bildungian. Gore = regime of truth as 6th option.  
2. This is also not a Triad, but something else.  
3. The advanced model would recast most other models together as it looked specifically at the political and |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Disciplines</th>
<th>Inquiry Type</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vinson, 98</td>
<td>Martorella (1996; Barr, Barth, and Shermis 1977; Barth &amp; Shermis, 1970)</td>
<td>Citizenship Transmission</td>
<td>social studies as social science (or, structuralism)</td>
<td>Reflective Inquiry</td>
<td>1. Todd frames these as reasons for teaching social studies rather than ways of thinking about DC. 2. Radical new stuff doesn’t fit 3. It focuses on critical thinking and political participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Dinkelman, 2001)</td>
<td>(Barr, Barth, and Shermis, 1978)</td>
<td>Cultural Transmission</td>
<td>Social Science Disciplines</td>
<td>Reflective Inquiry</td>
<td>1. Middle term = how to be a good social scientist. 2. Third model calls for decision-making within a sociopolitical context. 3. He claims a postmodern perspective but he talks endlessly about progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houser, 01</td>
<td>Barr, Barth, and Shermis' (1977)</td>
<td>citizenship transmission</td>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>Reflective Inquiry</td>
<td>“The central opposition within the curricular cluster today is participation versus transmission” (p. 46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parker 2003 (cited by Ritter, 09)</td>
<td>Barr, Barth, and Shermis</td>
<td>Citizenship transmission</td>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>Reflective Inquiry</td>
<td>1. She sees middle term as reformative and final as transformative in nature. 2. We can locate social justice and change at the center of our agenda. (53) 3. An integrated participatory, justice-oriented, difference-sensitive stance is the kind of citizenship social studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Boyle-Baise, 2003)</td>
<td>Westheimer and Kahne (2002)</td>
<td>Personally Responsible: politically conservative and obscure systemic problems and defray public response to them</td>
<td>Participatory: sidesteps the social/political critique and action needed to realize democratic ideals, especially for minority or disenfranchise d groups</td>
<td>Justice Oriented: turns critique into social action in order to repress injustice. This kind of citizen is advocated by social reconstructionist s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Educators Ought to Encourage</td>
<td>Personally Responsible Citizen</td>
<td>Participatory Citizen</td>
<td>Justice Oriented Citizen</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Chapin, 2005)</td>
<td>(53-54)</td>
<td>1. three main conceptions of the &quot;good&quot; citizen: (1) personally responsible citizen—one who has good moral character; (2) participatory citizen—one who is an active member of the community; and (3) justice oriented citizen—one who critically assesses structures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Westheimer &amp; Kahne (2002)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personally Responsible Citizen</td>
<td>Participatory Citizen</td>
<td>Justice Oriented Citizen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ross, 05</td>
<td>Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977)</td>
<td>Social Reproduction</td>
<td>Social Reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ross presents a binary (of sorts) rather than a Triad, and so there is no middle term.</td>
<td>While we have to be careful not to construct the conflict in purely dualistic terms, differences among social studies educators can be described along a continuum with polar purposes of &quot;indoctrination&quot; (e.g., what Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977) have famously described as &quot;citizenship transmission&quot;) and &quot;critical thought&quot; (e.g., what Stanley and Nelson (1994) labeled &quot;informed social criticism&quot;).</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In this essay it is taken for granted that the goal is social activism.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abowitz and Harnish (2006): Perspective</td>
<td></td>
<td>are civic republican and liberal democratic</td>
<td>Since its inclusion in the formal and informal school curriculum, citizenship education has been</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Obenchain, 2010)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(201) Ross, 05

Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977)

Ross presents a binary (of sorts) rather than a Triad, and so there is no middle term.

Social Reproduction

Social Reconstruction

While we have to be careful not to construct the conflict in purely dualistic terms, differences among social studies educators can be described along a continuum with polar purposes of "indoctrination" (e.g., what Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977) have famously described as "citizenship transmission") and "critical thought" (e.g., what Stanley and Nelson (1994) labeled "informed social criticism").

Obenchain, 2010

Abowitz and Harnish (2006): Perspective

are civic republican and liberal democratic

Since its inclusion in the formal and informal school curriculum, citizenship education has been
s that inform classrooms Here we have a binary and not a triad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ritter, 2009</td>
<td>(Parker, 2003) Barr, Barth, and Shermis, 1977</td>
<td>traditional participatory advanced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As discussed below, I did not originally ascribe primacy to the reproduce/reconstruct binary, seeing it instead as one of many binaries prevalent during the 1970s. It was only after writing up an initial analysis from the 1980s that the reproduce/reconstruct binary appeared to be the key to understanding the entire discourse.

The conceptualization of democracy and citizenship education was drawn only from the archive; however, in order to understand the origin of these ideas, which preceded the publication of TRSE, I had to go beyond the archive. In order to gain a fuller understanding of the history of progressive historiography and critical theory, I studied a number of sources, including Breisach (1993); Habermas (1981, 1996); Higham (1965); Horkheimer & Adorno, (1997); Noble (1985); Sherratt (2006); and Tucker (1978) to name a few.

Discussions of multiculturalism during the decade included the following: Baber, 1995; Bloom, 1998; Dillabough, 1996; Parker, 1999; Vinson, 1998.

Note that the three references from the late seventies were from TRSE, while Apple 1971 was published elsewhere.

See Sherratt, 2006, p. 105

Except the world spirit, or Geist, which is tranhistorical.

I originally included Freud in this list, but after reviewing Civilization and Its Discontents (1961) again, I now believe that despite the skepticism and pessimism that seem to be attributed to his influence, Freud too was a strong believer in social progress. See his Chapter Three in particular.

In the version listed here, the translators substitute “immutable shell” for iron cage and explain their reasons in the introduction.


Read here as the rationalizer of Christian morality. See Nietzsche’s comments on Kant in The Antichrist (1895), for example.

It is interesting to contrast Wood’s claim here that participatory democracy is an older version of democracy that has recently been replaced by a the protectionist model with Eyler’s claim that
contemporary changes call for the older model (protectionist) to be replaced with a new one (participatory).

Eyler, Wood, and Guyton were not the only authors who, in the 1980s, were interested in changing the way that democracy was commonly understood. Barth and Shermis (1980), for example, concluded that many scholars of citizenship education began with the presumption that our democracy was essentially healthy and mistakenly believed that citizenship educators should work to sustain and improve our current system by promoting active participation in political issues. Gordon (1985), likewise suggested that education should be used to fundamentally change the current society – and pointed out that part of that task was increasing participation by “helping students (and others) to become creative, critical thinkers and active social participants, and to become capable of redefining the nature of their own lives in the society in which they live” (p. 2). Washburn (1986) agreed with Gordon and lamented that public schools do not prepare students to be the “informed, active and responsible participants in the democratic political life of their society,” (p. 52) and reiterated Wood’s conclusion that the “failure to encourage an activist orientation toward politics during the school years might well reduce the probability that future citizens will participate fully in democratic political life as adults” (Washburn, 1986, p. 53). These authors collectively suggested that so long as students continued to internalize a protectionist model of democracy, political withdrawal and apathy would persist as the norm.

Social Education is the social studies publication that existed before Theory and Research in Social Education and now serves as the major practice-oriented publication of the field.

For the sake of this essay, I understand historical nominalism in roughly the way depicted by Sherratt (2006): “Secondly, and relatedly [in nominalism] items have no aspect of their identity that is unchanging through time. … The nominalist believes that all these objects around us, even the human self, have no essential feature that is unchanging throughout history. … Nietzsche’s theory of genealogy is both ontological and nominalist. That is to say, he depicts the nature of existence as historical: all existent objects are historically formed. Moreover, history is nominalist. Throughout history items have no single definition, no unchanging nature, no fixed meaning. Everything exists today due to its formation in history, but this formation is a sequence of chance events, not the unfolding of history” (pp. 132-133).

Taste is used here in order to emphasize what I take to be the practically indistinguishable similarity between moral sentiments and matters of taste – understood both in terms of general taste associated with class and more personal tastes such as color or one’s favorite flavor of ice cream.

Despite being different from most conceptual models, Van Sledright’s is similar to Barr, Barth, and Shermis’s, which is the most often cited.

I will note that this completely misrepresented Barth and Shermis. The passage claims that Barth and Shermis made this argument against Reflective Inquiry, when in fact this is a passage used to argue against the disciplinary approach. Barth and Shermis claimed that Reflective Inquiry was to be preferred over the disciplinary precisely because it did not do this. This confusion is surely related to the fact that Chilcoat and Lingon used the normal practice of shifting the triad. After shifting Reflective Inquiry to the middle spot, Chilcoat and Lingon then used Barth and Shermis’s criticism of the middle spot (which was for them the disciplinary approach) to argue against what was, for Barth and Shermis, the preferred approach.

Punnett Squares are 2 x 2 boxes that are used to predict the transference of genetic traits in sexual reproduction. This quadrilinear graphic conceptualization is similar to binaries and triads.
in that it is a way to structure thoughts. Because it has a different structure, however, it promotes, allows, and resists different ways of thinking than do binaries and triads. This model is especially intriguing for me because of its connection to genealogy and because it provides an additive/sexual element that is different from binaries (which separate rather than add), and it is historical, like the triad; but it emphasizes a material historicity akin to non-teleological evolution rather than emphasizing a single progressive path (which has the tendency to retain an affinity toward an unfolding, Hegelian historicism).


xx The essay seems to have been written in response to Leming and others who were critical of the field, and it was largely reproduced from the first chapter of his 2003 book. The exchange between Parker (1992) and Leming (1992) was discussed above, as was Evans’s (2003) review of a book that Leming (2003) co-edited, and in which Chapter Seven, written by Leming, was entitled “Ignorant Activists.”

xvi As with Barr, Barth and Shermis, I use Westheimer and Kahne here to refer the model in general and not just one article.

xvii Boyle-Baise (1995) however, made a similar move in reference to her multiculturalism binary.

xviii As it must be. If it were common, it could be construed as the dominant approach and supporting it would be considered supporting the status quo. This, of course, would not be in harmony with the emancipatory narrative.