DOMESTIC ANARCHY AND CONFLICT

by

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(Under the Direction of Marcus Crepaz)

ABSTRACT

The dissertation applies Alexander Wendt's cultures of anarchy analytical framework to examine the role of anarchy on the state level as a determinant of violent political conflict—including international conflict as well as domestic political violence—and offers a model linking domestic and international conflict. The theory advanced in this paper holds that perceptions of international anarchy, beliefs in the appropriateness and efficacy of the use of force, and decisions on the use of force in reaction to other actors' actions are influenced by the nature of the domestic culture of anarchy and the degree of self-help characterizing interactions on sub-state level. The nature of these interactions forms deeply seated heuristics which are then applied to interactions with international actors. As a result, the effect of the international anarchy is not fixed, as predicted by structural realists, nor is it as flexible as the Wendt's formulation that "anarchy is what states make of it" suggests. Decision makers' perceptions of other international actors and their intentions are influenced by perceptions of the nature of other domestic actors and interactions. States characterized by a greater degree of "self-help" on the domestic level are more likely to perceive the international system as being "self-help" as well, and act accordingly, whereas states with low level of "self-help" similarly do not perceive the international system as a threatening environment. The results indicate that anarchy is an efficient predictor of international conflict initiation on both monadic and dyadic levels of analysis, much more than is regime type or state capabilities. In fact, it would appear that the pacifying effect often attributed to democracy is instead caused by the domestic culture of anarchy. The findings also suggest that conflict initiation is a tempting policy option for governments that lack legitimacy due to their inability or unwillingness to provide public goods for their citizens. These findings have far-reaching implications for a number of theories of international relations, including democratic peace and diversionary war, and provide a novel insight into decision-making processes. In addition, they raise questions concerning the possibility that globalization processes may lead to an increase of conflict.

INDEX WORDS: Anarchy, Social Trust, Conflict, Heuristic, Ideational, Democratic Peace, Diversionary War, Self-Help.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Ever since its appearance in 2000, Robert Putnam's *Bowling Alone* has had a profound impact on our understanding of the importance of social engagement on a variety of domestic social and political phenomena. It demonstrated that healthy and unhealthy societies display radically different patterns of internal behavior, and furthermore showed that regime type alone was not enough to account for certain domestic phenomena. In fact, the success of Putnam and other scholars of social capital, social trust, and civil society begs the question whether a similar theoretical approach, one emphasizing social engagement and cohesion over regime type, to both domestic and international conflict might not yield similarly insightful results.

That such results should be expected is evident from the current state of the domestic and international violent political conflict subfields. While democracy has been one of the more popular domestic variables applied to conflict behavior of states, empirical findings have been ambiguous or even contradictory. For example, the level of democratization has not been conclusively and unambiguously shown to have a salient and profound effect on states' propensity to initiate international conflict, with the exception of the consistently substantiated "democratic peace" hypothesis which, however, has been validated only on dyadic level, and only for actual wars, in other words conflicts with relatively high level of intensity. This relative weakness of a variable as important as regime type has sparked a number of research agendas aimed at investigating other variables, for example the level of economic development, or specific aspects of democratic regimes. So far, however, there has not been a major effort to apply a social capital/social trust-based theoretical framework to the study of conflict. This project aims to fill that gap by following in Robert Putnam's footsteps and further demonstrate the importance of a theoretical focus not merely on the means of government, but also on its ends.
To be sure, this study does not represent a simple application of Putnam's analytical framework to the study of conflict. Whereas Putnam emphasized the importance of civil society and social capital, this study's approach is based on domestic anarchy and social trust. My intent is to show that the former variable, usually treated as a feature of only the international system, has an important ideational effect on the domestic level as well. As so many states in existence today are well-ordered, well-governed polities where anarchy is all but nonexistent, it is sometimes forgotten that not all states in the world are this fortunate, that in many situations the alleviation of domestic state of anarchy has been only partial, and that even many of the well-established states, including major powers, are comparatively recent creations which even in recent past have experienced domestic regimes which embodied many of the features of anarchy. Indeed, arguably the most important purpose of the state, and the source of its legitimacy, is the elimination of anarchy on domestic level. Therefore the influences of anarchy, and its associated phenomenon of generalized social trust, on conflict behavior, both on domestic and international level, are the focus of this study. The use of anarchy as a variable also offers a useful alternative to the oft-used autocracy-democracy continuum inasmuch whereas the latter variables essentially refer to the process of governance, the level of domestic anarchy reflects the outcome of that process. The absence of robust findings, particularly on monadic level, linking democratic regimes to more pacific international policies than those pursued by their authoritarian peers, is likely due to the tremendous variation in the quality of governance among both democratic and authoritarian regimes. The focus on the outcomes of government may help eliminate empirical problems associated with that variation, and add to the very short list of international conflict initiation-influencing variables whose effects are evident on monadic and levels of analysis (Geller, 2000).

The theory advanced within this project holds that presence or absence anarchy on domestic level is causally associated with other phenomena with direct influence on conflict behavior. As the state becomes more effective at combating anarchy within its borders, it also creates the sense of national identity and generalized social trust. The characteristics of generalized social trust in particular, a variable that indicates individual views of other actors' nature and preferences, suggest its applicability to the
study of conflict. On the basis of these characteristics, I argue that the perception of international anarchy, and consequently actions states take in dealing with other states, is essentially a reflection of the state of anarchy prevailing within each state's borders. Long before individuals become exposed to international actors, they are involved in a variety of interactions with other domestic actors. The degree to which these interactions take place under conditions of a domestic self-help, anarchic system, form deeply embedded heuristics that are subsequently employed when dealing with international actors. As a result, states that display differing levels of domestic anarchy will also display radically different forms of conflict behavior, both on domestic and international level regardless of where they fall on the autocracy-democracy continuum.

One of the more controversial aspects of this project is likely to be its interdisciplinary approach with concomitant seemingly free borrowing of concepts and placing them into hitherto unfamiliar contexts. The fragmentation of social sciences into disciplines, fields, and sub-disciplines has hampered the emergence of a truly comprehensive understanding of these phenomena, in no small part due to the sheer proliferation of concepts as each discipline, field, and subfield has developed its own peculiar language. One is reminded here of the old parable on “seeing the elephant”. As a result of the balkanization of social sciences we may have lost sight of not only the fact that there is but one elephant, but also that the various disciplines may often be examining the same aspects of the elephant’s anatomy. Thus, for example, an examination of political science, sociology, and psychology literature reveals that research on the crucial question of intra- and inter-group dynamics and conflict may be found scattered among bodies of literature that address the concepts of anarchy, group identity, nationalism, ethnic conflict, and social capital/social trust. The purpose of this project is to help bridge these already highly developed bodies of research and attempt to ascertain what the impact of the combined wisdom of several social sciences might be on our understanding of domestic and international violent political conflict.

The layout of the dissertation is relatively straightforward. I start by arguing that, despite considerable research dedicated to this issue over past several decades, democracy as a variable has not been found to have a strong and unambiguous effect on state conflict initiation, particularly on the
monadic level. However, a number of more recent works aimed at identifying the weaknesses of the democratic peace theory have indirectly suggested the need to investigate the effects of anarchy as a domestic-level variable. The subsequent chapters examine the question of international and domestic anarchy, including the nature of the phenomenon and its effects, in greater detail, and point toward the considerable ideational effects (suggested by literature on national identity and social trust) of the elimination of manifestations of anarchy from the domestic politics. I then argue that the nature of the phenomenon of social trust, in turn, has considerable implications for domestic and international conflict, leading to several hypotheses on domestic and international conflict initiation and targeting, which in turn are tested and analyzed in the final chapters of the dissertation.
CHAPTER 2

DEMOCRACY AND CONFLICT

Democracy is one of the more popular domestic variables used to explain conflict both on domestic and international level. It has been used as an explanatory variable to address such disparate types of conflict as wars, militarized interstate disputes, ethnic conflict, and political repression. However, the apparent lack of robust findings concerning democracy as a pacifying factor on monadic level has long been the motivation for a fairly large number of works argue that examining conflict using the traditional democracy–autocracy dichotomy should be replaced by more nuanced approaches, by examining specific aspects of domestic political systems, some of which may be found both in autocratic and democratic regimes. The weakness of empirical support for the notion that democracies are inherently more peaceful due to their liberal domestic ideologies and non-violent domestic conflict resolution norms has led some to voice concern that Kant's notion of a pacific union of democracies resting on three pillars of democracy, common moral bonds established between democracies, and the democracies economic cooperation toward mutual advantage may not be inevitable (Sorensen, 1992).

The notion of democracy exercising pacifying influence on state policies also runs counter to the realist theory of international relations which asserts that states are compelled by act in a similar manner regardless of their domestic political system due to either the sameness of their interests (Morgenthau, 1948), or to the structural forces exerted by the system itself (Waltz, 1979). Overall, the logic of realism under which states are unwilling to permit other states, democratic or otherwise, to infringe upon their national interest mitigates against the very idea of democratic peace. The near-wars between France, Britain, and the United States during the 19th century challenge the notion that shared democratic institutions or values are a restraining factor on either the leaders or the masses (Roy, 1993), all the more so since democracies do not reliably externalize their domestic norms of conflict resolution and do not trust or respect one another when there is a clash of interests (Rosato, 2003).
Democracy and conflict-proneness

The bulk of the findings supporting the notion that democracy leads to a more peaceful behavior by states on the international level has been on the dyadic level, specifically, the democratic peace theory which has identified structural and ideational reasons for the apparent lack of open warfare between democracies. The structural argument attributes the existence of democratic to constraints placed on decision makers by democratic institutions, as well as the institutionalized forms of peaceful conflict resolution (Russett, 1993). The ideational argument in favor of democratic peace, on the other hand, rests on the assumption that democratic states view one another as sharing liberal values, which leads to peaceful conflict resolution. While some ideational works on democratic peace focus on elite beliefs and attitudes (Hermann and Kegley, 1995), others extend it to the masses as well. Owen (1994), for example, argues that the citizens of a democratic state are less easily mobilized for conflict against other democratic states due to the individual liberal beliefs. The importance of mutual perceptions of two democracies, where which each actor must clearly perceive that the other is definitely a democracy, is underscored by Starr (1997). A similar, though more detailed, explanation is offered by Van Belle (1997), who attributes the mutual perceptions of the two democracies to the mass media. When two democracies come into conflict, the domestic news media on both sides accept each other as legitimate sources of information. As a result, democratic leaders have far less influence on how the conflict is reported by the media, which in turn raises the political costs of continuing conflict. Van Belle therefore argues that the Spanish-American War occurred because Spain lacked free press, and moreover the technology of the day did not permit rapid and regular transmittal of news. By the same token, covert action among democracies is possible because such actions naturally avoid the scrutiny of the media. (Van Belle, 1997). In a related vein, Weart (2001) argues that criticism of democratic peace theory on the basis of wars fought between ancient democracies fails to acknowledge that arguably Athens did not perceive Syracuse as behaving like a fellow democracy. Although democratic leaders are sometimes alleged to have more benign perceptions of other international actors (a factor sometimes cited as the reason for the existence of the democratic peace phenomenon), and moreover the transparent nature of democratic politics is reputed to account for
benign mutual perceptions by democratic states, the linkage between democracy and perception has been questioned as well (Hagan, 1994).

However, upon closer scrutiny both the ideational and institutional explanations are suspect. Explanations such as Van Belle's of the role of perceptions and the process by which they are shaped are problematic for a number of reasons. They imply that democratic peace phenomenon would not have been observable prior to the emergence of modern communications. Moreover, apart from suggesting that leaders of democracies are either unwilling to acknowledge the democratic character of their adversaries or are pursuing conflictual policies in full awareness of the democratic nature of the adversary probably exaggerates the independent role played by the media during crisis situations. The inherent assumption appears to be that, contrary to the expectation of a rallying effect caused by the conflict, the members of the news media would somehow remain unaffected even as the rest of the country was swept by war fever. Instead, a number of works have suggested that perceptions of other states may vary quite rapidly irrespective of their actual nature. For example, Oren (1995) has demonstrated how even though the nature of the Wilhelmine Germany has not changed, its perceptions in the United States have undergone a dramatic change over a period of time. Oren attributes the perceptions not to the objective nature of the regime in question but rather to subjective interests of key domestic actors in the perceiving state. A similar reversal in perceptions has occurred for similar reasons in regard to the Soviet Union which was perceived as a practically democratic ally during World War 2, then as a totalitarian state immediately in its aftermath (Oren, 1995). Oren's discussion raises the possibility of a motivated bias (Jervis, 1976) influencing the perception of leaders and operating quite irrespective of the objective nature of the state being perceived. Indeed, most works studying the role of misperception in international relations do not distinguish between democracies and autocracies in terms of accuracy of perception of other states and their intentions and motives, with the latter being particularly prone to distortion (Jervis, 1988), not the least due to a stress that is an inherent component of most international crises (Jervis, 1976). Democracies appear to be as likely to misperceive their adversaries as autocracies, and no less likely to view others as more hostile and threatening than they are (Jervis, 1968). Mercer's (1996) study of reputational effects
finds that whereas situational factors are usually seen as accounting for other actors' desirable behaviors, dispositional ones account only for undesired behaviors. Since a regime type is essentially a dispositional, rather than a transient situational, factor (Mercer, 1996), the notion of states attributing positive characteristics to other states on the basis of regime type is questionable.

Nor is it clear that democratic regimes necessarily produce pacific leaders. One of the voices examining the linkage between democracy and aggressiveness brought about by perceptions of other states is Hagan (1994), who questions the premise that democracies are less likely to be governed by aggressive, war-prone leaders than autocracies and, while remaining convinced that international aggressiveness of leaders has roots in domestic politics, seeks to find these roots elsewhere. Hagan breaks down leaders into several categories, on the basis of how they view the world. Leaders with moderate or acquiescent orientations tend to view the world as essentially a benign international environment; conflicts are treated as context-specific and are reacted to on a case by case basis. Leaders with a pragmatic orientation, on the other hand, view the world as conflict prone and requiring vigilance. Leaders whom Hagan classifies as having a militant orientation treat the world as an inherently hostile environment of zero-sum politics, although they do acknowledge the role played by various international regimes in limiting conflict. Finally, state leaders who have the radical orientation view the international system as being populated by evil actors, a perception that implies a moral imperative to engage in warfare. Each of these leader orientations is associated with a different set of behaviors in conflict, in terms of initiation and escalation. While these orientations appear to be associated with political factors, Hagan does not believe that a simple democracy-autocracy continuum can account for this variation in leader perceptions. Instead, he suggests a need to examine in greater detail other aspects of the domestic political system including state strength, the strength of the political opposition, the fragmentation of governing coalitions, and foreign policy orientations of ruling groups to account for the strength and intensity of divisions among leaders and opposition to regime in the broader environment (Hagan, 1994). Hagan is echoed by Hermann and Kegley (1995) who nevertheless argue that the democratic peace phenomenon is caused by leaders’ perceptions and leadership styles. More sanguine than Hagan (1994)
about the linkage between democracy and leaders' perceptions, Hermann and Kegley (1995) rely on the social identity theory to lay out their explanation of how democratic leaders' images and beliefs about other state actors are formed.

Similarly, conflicts between ancient democracies point to the possibility that shared democracy does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of war within the dyad (Weart 2001). The theory has also been subjected to criticism on the grounds that it suffers from design failures (Gates, Knutsen, and Moses, 1996), the pacifying effects of democracies are limited only to those dyads where both states are not only democratic but also have well developed economies (Mousseau, 2000), or only to stable, long-lasting and well consolidated democratic regimes (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Cederman, 2001), and that the findings confirming democratic peace tend to be non-robust, and dependent on variable construction, model specification, and choice of estimation procedure (Gartzke, 2000).

Moreover, the pacifying effect of democracy appears to be supported only on dyadic level. The findings are much weaker when democracy is examined as a monadic variable. Even as a number of authors have argued that democracies are more peaceful and less conflict initiation-prone (Rummel, 1997; Maoz, 1993; Russett and Starr, 2000), others have found that democratic states have proven to be as willing to go to war as autocracies (Roy 1993; Chan 1997), and moreover democratic nations have not exhibited a reduced willingness bear the costs of war (Roy, 1993). Casting further doubt on the impact of democracy on conflict initiation, some have even argued that under conditions such as regime unpopularity democratic states may have greater incentives to engage in international conflict than authoritarian ones (Gelpi, 1997; Hess and Orphanides, 1995; 2001; Russett, 1990).

Linkages between democracy and various forms of domestic conflict have been similarly ambiguous. Although democratization has been linked with a decrease in political repression, for example, due to the existence of other avenues for conflict resolution (Davenport, 1995, 1996, 1999), or the lack of both opportunities and willingness to engage in repression due to their institutional structure (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999), the findings have not been entirely unambiguous, as the level of democracy deters the government's use of repression only at very high indicators of democracy (Davenport and
Armstrong, 2004). Moreover, there appears to exist a curvilinear relationship between democracy and autocracy, with violent repression being less likely both at high levels of democracy and autocracy (Regan and Henderson, 2002). Although the end of the Cold War has produced a wave of democratization across the globe and reduced international conflict, that wave apparently has not led to a noticeable improvement in the overall respect for human rights (Cingranelli and Richards, 1999). Literature on ethnic conflict furthermore suggests that such conflict may be less dependent on the nature of the state's political system, but rather its strength and weakness (Posen 1993; Kaufman 1996; Kaufmann 1996b; Roe 1992; Saideman and Aires 2000; Taras and Ganguly, 2002). In a similar vein, Benson and Kugler (1998) argue that domestic peace is a function of efficient governance, irrespective of its institutional format. They view efficient governance in terms of the level of political extraction, or the ability to extract human and material resources from the society, an activity that is dependent on social trust. Once again, the maturity effects appear to be in evidence concerning domestic conflict, as new democracies tend to be afflicted by internal problems, in the form of ethnic conflict and separatism (Simon and Starr, 2000). This suggests that it is not democracy per se that is responsible for the domestic pacifying effects, but rather a quality peculiar to well-established regimes, whether democratic or autocratic.

Alternative explanations

The problems identified above have contributed to search for alternatives. A number of works have raised the possibility that democratic peace is the product of factors other than democracy itself. While Cederman (2001) points to a steadily growing pacifying effect of dyadic democracy, he also notes that other, non-democratic or mixed dyads experience a similar effect, albeit a weaker one, suggesting systemic factors and maturity effects may be responsible. Others have suggested democratic peace is simply the outcome of regime similarity and that identical pacifying effects may be found among dyads sharing political system similarities (Werner 2000). Chan (1997) finds that both autocratic and democratic dyads are more peaceful than mixed dyads, a result that is supported by Peceny et al. (1997) who discover pacific tendencies among certain types of authoritarian dyads and, on a monadic level, considerable variation in conflict-proneness among different types of authoritarian regimes, indicating that variations
within each regime type may be responsible for variations in conflict behavior. State conflict proneness has also been attributed to policy preference congruence, with no clear linkage between these preferences and the type of regime (Clark, 2000; Gartzke 2000). Finally, regime stability itself may be a factor determining conflict behavior as well (Russett and Starr, 2000); with relationship between democracy and conflict disappearing once political stability is controlled for (Maoz and Russett, 1992).

In the absence of a clear-cut proof that democracies are less conflict-prone there have been suggestions that perhaps the causal arrow runs in the opposite direction. It has been argued that instead of peace being the natural consequence of democracy, democracy may be the natural outcome of prolonged peace (Chan, 1997; Gates, Knutsen and Moses 1996; Rioux 1998). While Mousseau and Shi (1999) do find backing for the pacifying effect of a democratic regime, they acknowledge that conflict may have the effect of undermining a state's democratic regime over the long term, a possibility suggested by Wolfson, James and Stolberg (1991) who argue that individuals in their support of the war aims are willing to abandon domestic freedoms. Similar concerns about war ultimately undermining democratic institutions are voiced by Barzilai (1999).

Another strand of research concerns differences between different types of democracy and their influence on conflict behavior. The propensity of ancient democracies to go to war with one another suggests a need to focus on differences between ancient and modern democracies, which in turn suggests the possibility that intra-democracy differences in general might be important (Robinson, 2001). Specific regime variations singled out for analysis include institutional structure, specific rules of the democratic process (Clark and Nordstrom, 2005), as well as political accountability arrangements (Huth and Allee, 2002). Similarly, the variation in the behavior of both democratic and authoritarian states have led to calls for more sophisticated conceptualizations of both regime types (Rioux, 1998; Clark and Nordstrom, 2005). Moreover, similar to the findings on the relationship between democracy and repression, the relationship between democracy and international conflict appears to be curvilinear in nature, with partially free states being more war-prone than both autocracies and democracies, although there is
disagreement whether the direction of movement (i.e., from autocracy to democracy or vice versa) affects conflict initiation-proneness (Chan 1997; Davies 2002; Mansfield and Snyder 2002).

Finally, the absence of evidence supporting the pacifying effects of democracy has even led to the questioning of whether democracy can be used as an exogenous variable in its own right. Wolfson, James, and Stolberg (1991) have taken the Kantian peace thesis to task on the grounds that it ignores the possibility that democracy is the product of other forces that create an environment in which the democratic process is the preferred choice for political dispute resolution. According to Peet and Simon (2000), the structure of Kant's formula for peace indicates a need to identify a component that is theoretically prior to democracy, liberalism, and international organizations, which provides foundation for these components of Kantian peace (Peet and Simon, 2000). Wealth and other variables appear to have an equally strong explanatory role, accounting for phenomena that were previously thought to have been caused by the presence of democracy (Gartzke, 2000). Attention is also being drawn to material preconditions for democracy (Snyder 2002), specifically the pacifying effect of democratic institutions only under the conditions of affluence (Mousseau 2000), and that wealth and economic growth may be confounding variables (Maoz and Russett, 1993). Mousseau's treatment of the benefits of democratic peace being contingent on the level of economic development within the dyad contains an incisive discussion of the linkages between socioeconomic norms on the one hand and social values and political preferences on the other. Mousseau argues that economic prosperity fosters stable governments, which in turn establish an atmosphere of individualism and the rule of law, which leads to a separate peace among democratic states. Other domestic variables such as intergenerational differences, the aging of the population, and other similar factors (Garnham 1986). Similarly, Braumoeller (1997) argues, on the basis of his discussion of democracy in post-Soviet states, that democratic peace may be viable, but is nevertheless vulnerable to national issues, and to concentration of power in small groups. However, Braumoeller does not discuss under what conditions the particular form of conflict-prone non-universalist liberalism is likely to exist. Nevertheless, Braumoeller’s injunction to consider the context within which a
liberal political system exists likely points in the right direction, as does his argument that the causes of
democratic peace phenomenon likely will not be ascertained by measuring democracy.

Several works exploring alternatives to democracy as a variable influencing conflict behavior
have shown the potential promise of pursuing this line of research. Peet and Simon's (2000) study, for
example, tests whether what they define as "social purpose" of the state accounts for that state's
propensity to engage in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), and whether states with an embedded
liberal social purpose (operationalized as non-military government spending per capita, and the relative
importance of the government or of the free market as the engine of economic growth) are more
cooperative on security issues. The core of Peet and Simon's argument is that political authority is granted
legitimacy if power is exercised in a manner that corresponds to social expectations between the ruler and
the ruled. Governments must use their power in a way that are compatible with the purpose for which this
power was granted, and moreover government actions are constrained by legitimate social purposes.
While a thought-provoking study, Peet and Simon's work does not adequately address the process of the
formation of what constitutes a legitimate social purpose, nor does it explain how and why government
embark on a liberal or an illiberal social purpose. Moreover, the causal mechanism outlined by Peet and
Simon is simply that states that share a basic social objective, it becomes the basis for cooperation and
compromise. Although a compelling argument in explaining democratic peace, it fails to explain why
states with a shared illiberal social purpose should not benefit similarly.

Also focusing on the importance of legitimacy, Simon and Starr's (2000) discussion of how
endangered democracies can improve their prospects of survival against domestic opposition through
improving own legitimacy also recognizes the need to explore other variables that focus on state
performance rather than regime type. In pursuit of legitimacy, instead of deterring or repressing domestic
opponents, democratic states may attempt to buy them off. However, Simon and Starr's treatment suffers
from a not necessarily warranted assumption that democratic states are more legitimate than authoritarian
ones, and the increased legitimacy translates into better ability to extract resources from society for the
purpose of waging war. The literature on democratic advantages in wars is not as unambiguous on this point.

An even more intriguing approach is represented by Holsti's (1995) study of conflict is framed in terms of strong, weak, and failed states, with focus on domestic factors as causes for conflict. Holsti argues that whereas strong states tend to be well integrated entities with a healthy relationship between state and society and strong government legitimacy that have stood the test of time, weak and failing states tend to be the creations of the post-World War 2 era. Weak states are characterized by governments which rule reasonably effectively but whose authority rests upon the goodwill of “strongmen”. Citizens of such states have only a scant identification with the state among their population and lacking in governing power. They exist as states solely because other states recognize them as such. The weakness may be due to both the ends and purposes of governance contested, the existence of two or more nations within a state, or differentially treated communal groups. As a result, the state is incapable of delivering basic services or security and order for the population, and relies on violence, coercion and intimidation. Failed states are characterized by mini-sovereigns within the state and communities waging war and genocide against one another, as in Rwanda in 1994 (Holsti, 1995). The prevalence of each type of state in each region of the world determines the level of conflict in that region. Overall, Holsti finds that regions populated by strong states are peaceful, whereas regions characterized by weak and failed states are plagued by conflict. Holsti’s study differs from this one in a number of important respects. He does not explicitly address the question of initiation, focusing instead on general level of conflict which may be caused both by initiation of wars by states in question, and external intervention due to their internal weakness. This leads to a general conclusion that weak states are more conflict prone, which is rather different from the social trust-based hypothesis advanced below that outline a more complex relationship. Moreover, Holsti’s description of strong state characteristics tends to minimize the difficulties these states experienced in the process of their formation and does not explore the domestic policies necessary for the effective transformation into a strong state. Finally, by focusing on the post-World War 2 era Holsti does not address a potential contradiction to his findings, namely that the two World Wars were initiated and
predominantly fought by states that, using Holsti’s typology, could for the most part only be described as strong.

Despite the differences between these three studies, one of the qualities they share is their focus on states whose internal workings can only be described as anarchic. In doing so, and in identifying differences in their international behavior, they should be seen as paving the way toward a more comprehensive theoretical approach to international effects of domestic anarchy.
CHAPTER 3

ANARCHY

Although anarchy is one of the most studied phenomena in political science, the vast majority of this research concerns its effects on the systemic level with little attention given to its existence on the domestic level. In spite of that attention, there is no consensus on the nature of effects of anarchy. When considered in toto, the various streams of literature on the nature of anarchy do suggest, however, is that anarchy does not appear to have an unambiguous and well defined set of effects, either in terms of incentives or constraints, for state behavior.

International anarchy and conflict

Starting with Thucydides and continuing through contemporary neorealists, the longstanding Realist argument has held that the effects of international anarchy on state actors are fixed and resistant to efforts to change (Ahrensdorf, 2000). Moreover, the effect of anarchy is to make conflict an ineradicable part of Realists claim that in a system where there is no overarching central authority and where all states possess inherent offensive capabilities and therefore the ability to destroy other states, each state as an instrumentally rational and strategic actor must safeguard itself against the possibility of destruction (Grieco, 1988). Since wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them (Waltz, 1988), in the absence of any institution with real power to prevent international aggression anarchy is going to continue to predispose states toward competition and conflict (Grieco, 1988). Even though the international system may not be in a constant state of war, it is nevertheless under a constant threat of war which limits cooperation due to the logic of security competition. The necessity of self-reliance combined with the threats posed by others leads to an overriding concern with relative power position over other states, making cooperation at best temporary and difficult to sustain due to power distribution concerns and fear of cheating (caused by imperfect information and lack of enforcement mechanisms) even among allies. Given these conditions occasional wars are inevitable, sometimes due to miscalculation caused by
imperfect information due to adversaries' incentives to misrepresent own aims and intent, (Mearsheimer, 1994), the security dilemma, and competition for scarce resources needed to ensure both security and prosperity (Roy, 1993). Consequently state leaders cannot indulge in idealism, let alone altruism, as each state’s right of self-preservation overrides individual moral obligation (Jackson, 2005).

While the assertion that the international system is anarchic in the sense that states are not subject to a binding authority capable of enforcing rules of international conduct has remained relatively unchallenged, the same cannot be said for claims regarding the effects of anarchy on the behavior of states. The realist claim that anarchy all but forces states to behave in a competitive or even conflictual manner has been attracting criticism from an increasing number of scholars who have expressed doubts whether the condition of anarchy inevitably leads to a situation of relative gains maximization. In more extreme cases, it has even been suggested that concept of anarchy is irrelevant to international relations, rendering the related problem of relative gains-seeking superfluous (Powell 1993). Others have suggested that international conflict has less to do with any inherent properties of anarchy than with realism becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, as states that are instructed by the theory to assume the worst of others tend to act accordingly and set off a cycle of conflict (Berejikian and Dryzek 2000).

Some of the realist assumptions have also come under scrutiny. Specifically, the assumption that states fear one another's offensive capabilities is countered by arguments that, in contrast to individuals, states are durable and recover from defeats relatively quickly (Nye, 1997), an argument supported by Organski and Kugler's (1977) discussion of the so-called "phoenix factor", namely the states' ability to rapidly recover from wars. Some hope for overcoming the effects of anarchy has also been vested in the power of international organizations, which may transcend the de facto anarchy, even as individual states remain sovereign (Wendt and Friedheim, 1995). Others suggest that states are not the only form of governance, and that the functions of governance may be assumed by non-sovereign political entities (Buzan, Jones, and Little, 1993). The realist notion of power and interest being defined in material terms has also been questioned by proponents of international legitimacy, or a normative belief that a rule or an institution ought to be obeyed, as a component of power (Hurd 1999). Furthermore, Hurd suggests that
due to the similarity between domestic and international institutions and their legitimacy, if legitimacy exists even in parts of the international system, the system is no longer anarchic in the traditional sense. Even in the absence of an overarching governing body, the international system may assume some features of hierarchy and order (Barkdull, 1995; Berejikian and Dryzek, 2000; Lake, 1996; Wendt, 1992).

The existence of security communities such as NATO indicates that a variety of forms of behavior is possible even under the condition of systemic anarchy, with Kantian idealism and Waltzian neorealism not being necessarily mutually exclusive (Sorensen 1992). NATO and other organizations, including the European Union, certainly represent a challenge to the notion of anarchy, consisting as they do of the most powerful states in the international system, consisting moreover of states which used to be rivals and even bitter enemies who engaged in a series of bloody and protracted wars (Jervis, 2002). Furthermore, contrary to Waltz's assumptions on the nature of states as functionally similar, the functional differentiation of states similarly contributes to making the effects of anarchy more nuanced than neorealism allows (Buzan, Jones, and Little, 1993).

Constructivism arguably represents the most comprehensive critique of realist assumptions and propositions to date. The more recent arguments of the constructivist school have held that the definition of state interests is the product of a variety of ideational influences, and is not predetermined by either anarchy or the distribution of power. This line of thinking posits that not only is self-help not a constitutive feature of anarchy, but that actors do not have interests except through their identities. These identities are in turn acquired through interaction with other actors, and become the foundation of interests (Wendt 1992). Due to the variety of possible types of interaction, state egoism implied by the self-help system is not inevitable and, also contrary to realist and neo-realist predictions, interaction among the states leaves open the possibility of the emergence of a collective identity among the states, transforming anarchy into an international state with a transnational political authority structure (Wendt, 1994). Although Wendt shares a number of assumptions of realism, namely the existence of international anarchy, offensive capabilities of states, uncertainty about state intentions, the desire to survive, and rationality, he nevertheless argues for the importance social relationships and social structures in the form
of shared knowledge, material resources, and practices (Wendt 1995). Therefore, depending on the nature of the state’s identity, state actors may act on the basis of not only self-help, but also "other help" (Mercer 1995), which is rooted in a collective self that will produce security practices that are compatible with the security interests of other actors. Self-help therefore is not an inevitable outcome of the anarchic international system (Wendt 1992) and, by the same token, the security dilemma should be understood as but one of several possible types of social structures. Wendt contrasts the self-help security dilemma environment with the concept of security community, with the latter consisting of shared knowledge in which states trust one another to resolve disputes without war (Wendt, 1995). Therefore, self help and other-help represent opposite poles of the security spectrum (Mercer 1995), a notion that reflects Wendt’s (1992) argument that even under anarchy there exists a possibility of a continuum of security systems, which includes a zero-sum game competitive system, an individualistic system where actors are indifferent to other states and a cooperative system, where states positively identify with one another, see each other's security as the responsibility of all.

The apparent range of effects of anarchy is particularly well captured by Wendt's (2003) identification of three cultures of anarchy, which he terms Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. Whereas in Hobbesian culture other states are seen as enemies, in Lockean as rivals, in Kantian they are viewed as partners. Wendt's discussion of the three cultures of anarchy holds that norms and beliefs regarding the use of violence as a tool of international policy differ in each type of anarchy. Whereas a Hobbesian international system is characterized by endemic inter-state violence and high state "mortality", at the other end of the continuum, namely Kantian anarchy, interstate violence is said to be extremely rare.

**Anarchy on domestic level**

While anarchy continues to be predominantly a subject for study on the systemic level, a number of authors have pointed out that anarchy is not only a constant and unchanging phenomenon but also not exclusively an international one. It can be found in domestic politics as well. It should not pass unremarked that, in spite of occasional admonitions that Hobbes' work is misused by scholars who want to use his prescriptions for overcoming the international state of anarchy (Heller 1980), Hobbes' salient
works on the state of nature were written on the basis of his experience of English civil wars. Hobbes’ argument essentially amounts to a recognition of the role played by the strong state in maintaining the cohesion of the state which is closely related to its sovereignty and which, if damaged beyond a certain level, will cause the state to perish. Since, according to Hobbes, the desire for security is the most reliable and rational desire of our nature, a state based on satisfying that desire is fully in harmony with human nature and thus fully capable of solving the problem of anarchy. Hobbes therefore argues that the natural human condition can be overcome, at least on the state level, through political institutions. Far from being a necessary consequence of human nature, anarchy is rather the accidental consequence of erroneous opinions of particular human beings. To the extent that civil war is avoidable through human efforts, it is possible to create a lasting domestic peace (Ahrensdorf, 2000).

While some structural realists, most notably Waltz, draw a sharp distinction between international and national politics (e.g., whereas the former are purportedly characterized by anarchy, the latter by order and hierarchy), a more nuanced understanding of anarchy has since emerged. Milner (1991), for example, convincingly argues that reality is considerably more complex than Waltz’s dichotomy. According to Milner, international relations may have elements of hierarchy and order while domestic relations are sometimes anarchic. The legitimate right to the use of force claimed by governments that Waltz cites as evidence of the difference of domestic politics is not always self-evident, according to Milner. While Waltz argues that force is unimportant as a means of control in domestic politics and instead is used only to serve justice, Milner points out that force is a key element of authoritarian regimes strategy for staying in power. Milner’s argument is actually not all that dissimilar from Morgenthau’s (1946) recognition that the essence of international relations is the same as that of domestic politics, namely the struggle for power, modified only by different circumstances, and E.H. Carr’s (1964) acknowledgment that international and domestic politics are organized along identical principles. In accordance with that interpretation concepts of legitimacy, morality, and law are merely political products of the dominant group which identifies itself with the community as a whole and imposes its view of life on others.
The possibility of anarchy on the sub-state level and the attendant security dilemma that it creates among sub-state actors has long been recognized by segments of ethnic conflict literature which argue that the absence of a strong state capable of providing order and security creates a situation where ethnic minorities gradually (and possibly due to political entrepreneurs exploiting the situation through the manipulation of ethnic identity symbols) come to view each other as potential enemies and act accordingly. Ethnic conflict is therefore attributed to a combination of state inability to protect its citizens creating a self-help environment in which mobilization along ethnic lines may take place which in turn leads to a security dilemma and threat of violent conflict (Posen 1993; Kaufman 1996; Kaufmann 1996b; Roe 1992; Saideman and Aires 2000; Taras and Ganguly, 2002).

Nor are features of anarchy only to be found among failing or failed states, suggesting that it is a continuous rather than a dichotomous variable. The concept of anarchy existing on the domestic level has even been applied in some descriptions of long-established countries, such as the United States. Eidelberg (1970), for example, has described United States of that era as a country verging on anarchy, due to a government that fails to govern, low level of politics and citizenship, fragmentation of society, lawlessness, alienation, and the absence of a common identity.

Given the possibility that domestic politics frequently exhibit characteristics of anarchy and in view of the structural realist argument that the mutual lack of trust among states is the product of anarchy, as characterized by the lack of an overarching authority providing public goods, one has to consider the possibility of a linkage between domestic and international anarchy. If anything, the structural realist claims that the lack of overarching authority and the states’ ability to destroy one another are the factors that lead states to mistrust and fear one another may be even more salient in domestic relations since, as suggested by Nye (1997), whereas states have only limited success in destroying other states, individuals are considerably more fragile and easily killed. Therefore, the fear of the offensive capabilities possessed by others and the mistrust it engenders therefore properly also ought to be the province of domestic, individual actors. Indeed, there already exists considerable research on trust on the domestic level which
strongly suggests that the degree of domestic anarchy strongly influences how individuals relate to one another.

Here it should be noted that other-help, as defined by Mercer (1995) is a construct that strongly implies (or, indeed, requires) the presence of a high level of generalized social trust in order to exist. Mercer’s construct is framed in terms remarkably similar to those used to describe generalized social trust, namely altruism, empathy, taking the perspective of other actors, and identifying with them. It requires, essentially, that other actors be viewed as members of the same "in-group". This also holds true for Wendt’s (1992) discussion of security system continuum, where the positive mutual identification of actors similarly implies both the existence of trust, and a common identity of belonging to the same in-group. This suggests that the suggested various states of international anarchy differ among themselves chiefly in the aggregate level of generalized trust prevalent among the actors in that system.

Crucially, the four factors that, according to Wendt, drive structural change from one type of anarchy to another, include interdependence, common fate, homogenization (sense of alikeness) and self-restraint. Each of these attributes is a feature of a high-trust society, with the sense of common fate being inherent in the concept of moral community (Uslaner, 2003), homogenization implying a sense of shared identity, and self-restraint being an experimentally demonstrated characteristic of high-trust individuals (Brann and Foddy, 1987). Unsurprisingly, in view of the high level of generalized trust that a Kantian anarchy implies, Wendt lists as one of its characteristics the prevalence of generalized norms of reciprocity, which are also an inherent feature of generalized social trust.

**Links Between International and Domestic Anarchy**

The variance in the degree of anarchy on both the domestic and international level, the already cited influence of domestic factors on international behavior, and the relationship between social trust, group identity (including on state level), and conflict raises the question whether there might exist a linkage between the degree of anarchy on the domestic level and the perception of the nature of the anarchic international system (and, by extension, the perception of the motives and interests of other international actors). There is considerable reason to believe such a linkage may exist. For example, as discussed
earlier, most descriptions of the effects of international anarchy use terminology consistent with that used by social trust literature. Such descriptions usually include at least some mention of mutual suspicions and insecurity, fear of other actors' intentions and motives, and the difficulty of establishing cooperation, all indicative of absence of trust. The heuristic nature of social trust further suggests that perceptions formed through domestic interactions could be pressed into service to resolve international decisionmaking problems under conditions of uncertainty.

The linkage between domestic anarchy and international anarchy is all the more plausible due to the long-recognized influences domestic factors have on international behavior of states, international anarchy notwithstanding. To be sure, the proponents of realism have long acknowledged the importance of domestic factors. Morgenthau (1948), for example, recognizes that domestic considerations impinge on international behavior of states, particularly democratic ones, a point on which he differs from Waltz (1979) who, while recognizing that domestic actors may exert pressure on state leaders, has argued that authoritarian leaders are under an even greater popular pressure than democratic ones.

Nevertheless, some of the more recent critiques of realism have argued that the role of domestic factors is rather larger than realists are willing to allow. These critiques posit that the effects of anarchy on the international level may be modified or mitigated by state-level factors. These can be roughly broken down into two categories, emphasizing the material factors and interests of sub-state actors on the one hand, and focusing on the development of ideas and identities on the other. The first set of approaches emphasizes that state actors, far from being unitary actors, are compelled to engage in two-level games (Putnam, 1988), where the winning is defined not only in international terms, but domestic ones as well. In this game, state agents are constrained by both international and domestic structures, and face the security dilemma on both levels since the survival of the regime may be undermined both from within and without. This forces state actors to pursue policies that reproduce the state in such a way as to preserve both the internal and international balance of power (Buzan, Jones, and Little, 1993). Often this takes the form of having to choose between allocating resources to alleviate domestic problems and international ones (Powell 1993). States must simultaneously look inward at their subjects and outward at other states,
cognizant that the chances of state survival may be improved or worsened by internal as well as external forces, with the internal forces being as, if not more, dangerous than the external ones (Spinoza, 2003). Whereas state survival may be threatened by an internal war, foreign aid may be a source of strength. State survival may instead be put in question if it fails to justify its existence by providing for the individual needs of its citizens (Jackson, 2005). Alternately, states may be motivated to go to war due to an ongoing domestic struggle for power, as evidenced by the factors that drove the German foreign policy after 1897 (Levy, 1988). As a result in actuality states rarely operate in a way prescribed by realism, which presumably accounts for the frequency of "miscalculations" referred to by Mearsheimer (1994). Moreover, the two-level security dilemma cannot be defined solely in material terms. It also includes the preservation of the essential character of society, in terms of retaining its historical patterns of culture, language, religion and custom, when faced by threats (Waever et al. 1993).

The possibility of such a domestic-international linkage is suggested by some of Kant's writings, as his solution to the problem of international anarchy entails an institutional arrangement akin to a domestic social contract, a great federation of states where the rule of law prevails. In other words, a still-anarchic international system composed of well-ordered, non-anarchic states with high level of social trust would not display patterns of behavior predicted by structural realists (Jackson, 2005). It is also striking that, even as the well-ordered nation-states of Europe were emerging in the 19th century, the proponents of nationalist ideology were already exploring the theoretical possibility of enlarging the moral community ideal of the nation-state to the regional or even systemic level (Renan, 1995; Hutchinson, 1995; Smith; 1995; Greenfeld, 1995; Gellner, 1995). A more recent vision for overcoming the effects of international anarchy through means which imply a linkage between the domestic and the international is John Rawls' concept of transforming the international system from one consisting of states into a "society of peoples", a plan which Rawls terms a "realistic utopia" (Rawls 1999). According to Rawls, "peoples" are superior to states due to their moral nature and motives. As such, they are more tolerant of one another than states are, more likely to relate to one another in accordance with the principle of reciprocity and, more likely to give one another proper respect as equals. These qualities all
but preclude any possibility of conflict. Moreover, according to Rawls, peoples, in contrast to states, are not moved solely by rational self-interest, a characteristic which leads to a solidarist world where conflicts over basic values are inconceivable (Rawls, 1999). Although Rawls' approach has been criticized (Jackson, 2005) for his failure to acknowledge the existence of belligerent nationalisms which appears to undermine Rawls' argument that peoples are necessarily less belligerent than states, a likely explanation is that Rawls is describing an "ideal" state which most peoples or nations are yet to attain. Rawls' argument groups of people (specifically, "peoples") creating an international system with fundamentally different characteristics is moreover entirely compatible with works that suggest that very strong in-group loyalty is not necessarily accompanied by strong out-group hostility (Yamagishi and Kiyonari, 2000; Orwell, 2000 [1945]; Druckman, 1997).

In addition to these theoretical constructs, there exists additional evidence pointing to the interaction between domestic and international anarchy. It has been argued that the notion of a well-bounded, well-ordered domestic society is possible only due to the identification of a dangerous and disordered state of international anarchy (Buzan, Jones, and Little, 1993). Under this reasoning, international anarchy becomes an out-group in and of itself, and is used by the state to justify the expansion of its role in society. Moreover, by casting the international system in a negative light as a cause of insecurity and other negative phenomena, state elites may find it a useful scapegoat to blame for a variety of domestic problems (Buzan, Jones, and Little, 1993). The recognition of anarchy raging on the domestic level and furthermore influencing the international arena is also recognized by Holsti (1995). Furthermore, the projection of domestic values onto the international system is also apparent in the process of formation and acceptance of international norms, and consistent with argument that international discourse and its components are most likely formed through the formation of domestic operational codes and projection of own experiences onto other actors, in a process of "mirror imaging" (Berejikian and Dryzek, 2000).

This argument is consistent with findings that international norms originate on domestic level, as evidenced, for example, by Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) three-step norm cascade. The literature on
norm acceptance tends to agree that norms are legitimized only when state actors reconceive own interests in accordance to the rule (Hurd, 1999; Cortell and Davis 1996, 2000; Goertz and Diehl, 1992). It is also consistent with the notion that international discourse and its components are most likely formed through domestic experiences, by projecting own experiences onto others (Berejikian and Dryzek, 2000).

This spillover of domestically-formed norms and beliefs into the international sphere has important connotations for Wendt's cultures of anarchy. Despite his stated commitment to the state as a unit of analysis and belief in the importance of systemic theory (Wendt, 1995), Wendt does acknowledge that domestic or even genetic factors may well be more important as determinants of identities and interests than systemic ones. Since states depend on their societies for political survival, self-interest stems from the internal nature of states (Wendt, 1994). Furthermore, the state's embeddedness in the society may also result in domestic welfare commitments being projected outward in the form of altruistic foreign policies (Wendt, 1994). Therefore, in addition to the constitutive process that the state undergoes through interaction with other international actors, each state as a member of the international system is also constituted by its domestic society (Wendt, 1992).
CHAPTER 4
SOCIAL TRUST

The idea of an ideational basis for society enjoys a long and distinguished lineage. The social and political upheavals caused by the industrial revolution led a number of political philosophers of the era to address these problems, with Emile Durkheim identifying the question of an underpinning set of shared ideas and societal cohesion.

Although he did not discuss social trust per se, to the extent Durkheim was concerned with the role of ideas as ties that bind a society together (Giddens, 1971), he may be seen as a forerunner of that school of thought. Specifically, Durkheim argued for the importance of ideals and moral unity in the continuity of society, and viewed the individual as both an active agent and passive recipient of social influences. This was reflected in the dual nature of attachment of individual to society, involving both obligation and positive commitment to ideals (Giddens, 1971). Departing from Rousseau’s conception of individual as capable of being free except in society, Durkheim’s attached particular significance to the concept of conscience collective, or the existence of moral consensus as an essential quality to perpetuation of social order (Giddens, 1971). In doing so, Durkheim argued that, contrary to fears of his contemporaries, modern society did not necessarily tend toward disintegration and likewise took issue with utilitarians who presupposed that society could be built solely on contractual basis (Giddens, 1971). Contrary to utilitarians, society in which every individual pursued own interest would likely disintegrate, according to Durkheim, due to the fluidity of individual interests and absence of moral solidarity (Giddens, 1971).

Definitions and characteristics

Social trust is frequently identified as one of the elements of social capital. According to Putnam (1993), social capital consists of networks, norms, and trust that enable participants to act collectively by facilitating collective action to pursue shared interests. Coleman (1990), lists social capital components as
trust and voluntary networks of social associations. Social capital is inherent in the structure of interpersonal relationships. To Inglehart (1997), social capital implies the existence of a culture of tolerance and trust conducive to voluntary association networks.

This concept has also spawned a considerable body of literature in its own right. The definition of social trust employed here is Uslaner’s (2002) concept of moralistic, or generalized, social trust, which focuses on the individual propensity (or lack thereof) to view people who are complete strangers (and moreover belonging to different social classes or milieus) as trustworthy. Generalized trust is usually conceptualized as a belief that other individuals, including (and especially) complete strangers, are trustworthy. It is a demonstrated faith in others, and a willingness to act in accordance with that belief, without expecting anything specific in return. Rather than a rational prediction of how others will behave, it is an assumption that others will behave in a way consistent with one's belief in their trustworthiness, even though no immediate benefit is expected (Uslaner, 2002). As such, the concept of generalized trust stands in considerable contrast with other conceptions of trust, for example Hardin’s (2001) encapsulated trust, which posits that individuals view one another as trustworthy only when they know cooperation is in the other individual's interest.

Social trust literature is unanimous in confirming the importance of a high level of trust for the health of the society. To cite Uslaner (2002), trust is the “chicken soup of social life”. It is a belief that others will not take advantage of one's willingness to trust and cooperate, based in the good will of others even where there is a prospect of gain by doing so (Uslaner, 2002; Thomas 1996) that exists even in the knowledge that some the benefit may go to bystanders, or free riders (Putnam, 2000). It is a societal resource that links citizens to each other and enables them to pursue their common objectives more effectively (Hooghe and Stolle, 2003), and a perception of underlying common values that makes cooperation easier (Uslaner, 2002) and leads to a generally more efficient society (Putnam, 2000) where individuals are more active and engaged (Uslaner, 2000). It is an ever-present, though rarely noticed, quality of mutual faithfulness on which countless daily interactions depend (Baier 1986; Lewis and Weigert, 1985), and a functional prerequisite for the possibility of society, in the absence of which the
society is bound to sink into chaos and paralysing fear. It functions as a deep assumption underwriting social order (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). Trusting someone is to have an attitude of optimism about her goodwill and to have the confident expectation that when the need arises, the trusted one will act consistent with the expectation of generalized reciprocity. It is more basic for the construction of groups than even a sense of moral obligation. Even though it involves risk and doubt, it is indispensable in social relationships, where it allows social interactions to proceed with confidence (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). The existence of generalized trust implies the existence of a generalized reciprocity norm, or the expectation that one's deeds will not necessarily be reciprocated at the time they are performed, but rather at some unspecified future (Putnam 2000). Generalized trusters have an expansive view of the size of the so-called "moral community", defined as people with whom they have perceived common interests, if not common values (Uslaner, 2000; Crepaz 2006). Trusting strangers means accepting them into one's "moral community" (Uslaner, 2002) and recognizing a mutual obligation and a sense of moral responsibility for their fate (Uslaner, 2002). It connects one to individuals with whom otherwise has no connection, leading to a tolerant, inclusive view of society (Uslaner 2002).

Conversely, just as the presence of trust is associated with a range of positive phenomena, its absence brings a host of problems. Distrust, by contrast, is synonymous with wary suspicion, pessimism about the goodwill and competence of other actors, as well as an expectation that your interests will be harmed (Jones, 1996), and in low trust societies life is fraught with difficulty since the absence of the ability to identify common interests and values in others brings about division and polarization. Individual low trust levels lead to fears of exploitation by others, and beliefs that cooperation with others is dangerous (Uslaner, 2002). Banfield's (1958) research on the Italian village of Montegrano, where the basic bonds of trust have broken down to such a degree that all who are outside of the immediate family are seen and treated as potential enemies is a case in point.

Contemporary literature on social trust supports the notion of using it as a variable that is independent of democracy. Although some links have been discovered between generalized trust and the extent of civil liberties in a country, as well as between authoritarianism and absence thereof, there are
nevertheless significant differences among both democratic and authoritarian states in their ability to generate social trust (Hooghe and Stolle, 2003). The wide variation among democracies in terms of their trust levels suggests that while democratic regimes may enjoy a greater potential for social trust generation, they do not always realize it (Uslaner, 2002; 2003). Of particular concern are the low levels of trust in the newly emergent democracies of formerly Communist states, suggesting that trust and democracy are not always closely paired, as evidenced by cases where the process of democratization has been accompanied by decreases in social trust. (Letki, 2004; Uslaner, 2003). Democracy's ability to create trust among its citizens appears to be confined to only to long-existing democracies (Uslaner, 2003).

Instead, it would appear that while a relationship between social trust and democracy may exist, the causal arrow is likely to run from social trust to democracy, as a high level of social trust appears to be a precondition for the existence of a successful democratic regime. Indeed, the importance of interpersonal trust as a societal factor conducive to democratization has been recognized by Almond and Verba (1963). Polities with high number of trusting individuals tend to have governments that are more efficient and responsive, though with a possibility of a mutually reinforcing feedback loop where high trust leads to more efficient institutions which implement policies that foster social trust (Uslaner, 2003). States with high levels of generalized social trust have been found to have experienced longer durations of their democratic regimes, indicating that trust is a key component of pro-democracy attitudes (Inglehart, 1997). Democratic norms, a variable that is often cited as a cause for more pacific international conflict resolution behavior by democratic states, tend to be more strongly entrenched in states with social trust (Booth and Richard, 1998). The absence of trust, on the other hand, leads to pro-authoritarian attitudes (Uslaner, 2002; Aberbach and Walker, 1970).

A similar relationship exists between generalized social trust and wealth. Social trust is only weakly correlated with economic well-being, and moreover the causal arrow points from trust to economic success, rather than the other way around. Although some have argued that social trust is the property of wealthy nations (Inglehart, 1999), the preponderance of evidence suggests the causal effects run in the opposite direction, namely that wealthy nations became that way due to high levels of social
trust. The level of wealth and economic development a country experiences is the result of social trust which permits economic interaction and cooperation (Putnam, 2000; Uslaner 2003; Fukuyama 1995). In spite of the undoubted role free markets play in the creation of economic well-being, markets cannot operate efficiently (if at all) under the conditions of mutual distrust, where each potential contracting party believes the other is acting in bad faith. A certain level of social trust must pre-exist (Guseva and Rona-Tas, 2001). The importance of social trust as a factor behind economic development is borne out by the example of southern Italy, whose economic lag behind the more prosperous northern regions only grew after the reunification of Italy in the 19th century (A'Hearn, 1998). The disparity in productivity among Italian regions cannot be readily explained by external factors, such as protectionism, population density, etc. The difficulty for Italian south lay in the inability to pool local savings and channel them into industrial investment. The South lacked networks of local businessmen and professionals, and middle class savers, and efforts to mobilize local capital in support of industry were undermined by a lack of trust and inability to cooperate. A degree of social or generalized trust is required to sustain extensive, impersonal forms of cooperation where family and individual bonds are no longer sufficient to constrain behavior. Any effort to pool savings for economic development represents a form of cooperation that is possible only in the presence of social trust. Therefore southern Italy was not lacking in social trust because it was poor, but rather it was poor because of the absence of social trust (A'Hearn, 1998). The results of absence of trust are also evident in a recent study of the Russian credit markets, which shows how Russian banks are suffering from having to operate in a market limited by the low number of business partners perceived as trustworthy (Guseva and Rona-Tas, 2001).

Although material factors do play a role in the formation of social trust (a point that will be expanded upon below), they do so only indirectly. What appears to matter is not the absolute level of wealth, but rather one's relative position in the society. The presence of income and wealth inequalities, specifically, tend to undermine social trust as individuals are more likely to trust those whom they view as their equals (Hooghe and Stolle, 2003; Uslaner, 2003). The Gini index of inequality, in particular, has been found to have a very strong influence on the level of social trust (Uslaner, 2003). Cross-national
variations in trust depend heavily upon a society's distribution of income, with declines in social trust being closely linked to growth in economic inequality (Uslaner, 2002; Chambers and Kopstein, 2001).

**Social trust and anarchy**

Thus while social trust does not appear to be caused by either economic development or democratization (in fact, a much stronger case can be made for a reverse relationship), research to date strongly suggests that a key precondition for the emergence of generalized social trust is the absence of anarchy on the domestic level. To be sure, the literature is not unanimous as to the causes of social trust. The two main competing explanations posit that, as a component of social capital, it is a product of the civil society, or instead that its existence is somehow linked to the strength and performance of formal institutions (Hooghe and Stolle, 2003).

The notion of social trust being the result of informal associations and involvement in the civil society has been embraced by one of the main motivators of the most recent renewal of interest in the questions of civil society, social capital, and social trust, Robert Putnam (Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000). Putnam has argued that the level of trust is caused by the level of involvement in civic organizations, such as parent-teacher associations, unions, even bowling leagues, showing how such involvement has begun to decline in the 1960s due to a wide variety of factors, including television viewership, urban sprawl, competing pressures for both time and money, and related reasons (Putnam, 2000). Such community commitments are important, according to Putnam (1993) because of personal interaction generating perceptions of trustworthiness of other actors and creating a "stock" of social capital. A similar argument has been advanced by Letki (2004) who has argued that low levels of political engagement are due to low social capital, anti-democratic norms, and attitudes learned while living under undemocratic regimes.

However, the associational aspect of Putnam's argument has come under considerable criticism, and it is arguably the least tenable portion of his treatment of the topic. The specific problem lies in the apparent existence of different forms of association and their dissimilar influence on creating generalized social trust. Some forms of civil society appear to do little to create or strengthen liberal norms of tolerance and acceptance of others (Chambers and Kopstein, 2001). For example, whereas communal-
level activism appears to be positively associated with generalized interpersonal trust, civil society activism appears to have little or no effect in this regard. Moreover, civil society activity depresses levels of democratic norms and political involvement, in contrast to active involvement in formal organizations. In other words, there is a possibility that civil society involvement is an indicator of particularized trust among closely knit groups of individuals, rather than a broad attitude of trust toward strangers that generalized trust represents (Booth and Richard, 1998). Instead of creating generalized social trust, civic engagement usually takes the form of association with one's peers, which is a form of activity that does nothing to help one expand the scope of one's "moral community". Consistently socializing with the same narrow circle of individuals may even contribute to the destruction of generalized trust (Uslaner, 2002). The more one is dependent on one's close associates and kin, the more one tends to draw the line dividing the world into "us" and "them" precisely along these lines. Since the main factor distinguishing generalized trust from particularized trust is the size of one's moral community, any sort of activity that promotes particularized trust is unlikely to have the result of promoting generalized trust.

As one might expect, interaction with members of a single and narrowly defined group makes one more likely to have more faith in that particular group but not in people generally and is only likely to create particularized trusters who are wary of dealing with people who are different from themselves, and who have a narrow view of their moral community. For that reason civic engagement alone is insufficient to account for the existence of generalized trust (Uslaner, 2000). Other studies have confirmed that group membership does not make individuals more trusting, or that interpersonal trust encourages group membership (Claibourn and Martin, 2000; Knack and Keefer, 1997). Social trust is instead associated with more equal incomes, effective public institutions, as well as the quality of education (Knack and Keefer, 1997). The linkage between social group membership and generalized trust has also been assailed directly, with findings that while trust has declined in the United States since the 1960s, associations of various types not only have continued to exist but, in certain cases, even increased their membership rolls (Mondak and Mutz, 1997; Jackman and Miller, 1996; Uslaner, 2002). Nor is this absence of relationship
between civic engagement and trust confined to the United States. A similar absence of relationship can also be observed in other countries. Countries with high level of civic participation are not necessarily countries with high levels of generalized social trust. Therefore a decline in group membership pointed to by Putnam is likely unrelated to the decline of generalized trust (Uslaner, 2002).

Putnam's "bottom up" argument that civic engagement builds social trust has also been criticized by proponents of the state's role in establishing civil capacity that Putnam refers to (Hooghe and Stolle 2003). Trustful attitudes toward other individuals appear to be determined by the general record of government performance in certain policy areas. Trust not merely a reflection of basic personality traits or a simple function of general social background factors. The most important explanatory variables behind trust arise from the workings of the social or political system, including expectations of treatment by government officials, general feelings of deprivation and well-being, as well as beliefs about the status and acceptability of one's group in society (Aberbach and Walker, 1970). Socioeconomic factors, such as relative deprivation and the threat of downward mobility, inequality, and diminished expectations for the future, are important in understanding why individuals lack generalized trust or engage in exclusivist civil society associations that promote particularized trust (Chambers and Kopstein, 2001). The willingness to trust others is closely connected the nature and extent of social integration in society, or the way in which people relate to others depending on the expectations of others, and understanding of their own role in society (Hall, 1999). That willingness to trust is unlikely to materialize under conditions of economic inequality (Putnam, 2000; Uslaner, 2000). As a result, one is unlikely to reverse the decline in generalized trust and the rise of particularized trust in the United States in recent decades until individuals begin to feel better about the future, and the trend toward the growth in economic inequality is reversed (Uslaner, 2000). Government performance in addressing these problems is therefore crucial toward creating social trust (Aberbach and Walker, 1970), as greater socio-economic security has been found to lead to increases social tolerance, itself an indicator of generalized trust (Persell, Green, and Gurevich, 2001; Chambers and Kopstein, 2001). The experience of states undergoing democratic transitions that have been accompanied by increases in inequality underscores the linkage between trust and inequality, as the drop
in generalized trust in such states has occurred even as they were becoming freer and more democratic (Uslaner, 2002).

Putnam himself acknowledges the possibility of existence of a "dark side" of social capital, wherein some kinds of associations may actually discourage the creation of generalized social trust. Whereas the purpose of civic engagement is to enable individuals to form "bridging" associations with complete strangers coming from different societal backgrounds, in actuality some forms of civic engagement result in "bonding" with individuals already very much alike oneself (Putnam, 2000). The problem of "bad" civil society therefore represents a serious problem for civil society argument (Chambers and Kopstein, 2001). The answer to the question of the origins of social trust likely lies in the direction pointed to by Granovetter (1973), namely that it is a characteristic of a society where an individual is connected by weak ties to a large number of other individuals, rather than by strong ties to a small number of individuals. Granovetter's "strength of weak ties" argument likewise suggests that not only is group membership not related to generalized social trust, but it may in fact work to diminish it.

Overall, the critiques of Putnam’s discussion of origins of social trust point in the direction of effective governance as a factor behind social trust creation, specifically the effectiveness at combating anarchy on the domestic level. Anarchy, or what Hobbes termed the "state of nature" is a system that evokes the near-total absence of generalized trust. Because of that absence, under conditions of "war of all against all", there is no place for any form of economic cooperation or, indeed, any form of society (Heller, 1980). Instead of social interaction, the factor responsible for the creation of generalized social trust appears to be state action.

The role of the state as an agent of social trust creation is evident in two streams of literature. The first deals with the role of the state as the creator of national identity, and the second discussing the importance of government performance in addressing socioeconomic problems as a way to create generalized social trust. The notion that state governments are capable of producing generalized social trust is implicit in many discussions of the process of establishing and maintaining national identity. As discussed earlier, this process, which requires citizens living within the borders of a single state to define
their identity in terms of that state, implies the existence of a certain level of social trust among its members due to the inherent characteristic of social trust as a property of groups. All states strive to establish and maintain a certain level of trust as a prerequisite to sustaining a sense of national identity, fostering commerce and economic growth. The oft-quoted description of a nation as an "imagined community" implies the existence of a certain minimum level of social trust consistent with individuals regarding other perfect strangers (who moreover may speak a different language, or be of different ethnicity) who merely happen to be living within the same (potentially arbitrary, and in any event socially constructed) borders as in some way the same as themselves. The 19th century nation-building efforts in Europe focused on the creation of a sense of common identity and fate, as well as identification with the state, phenomena that are all consistent with the effects ascribed to high levels of social trust. Moreover, the process of creating a strong national identity required considerably more than the redrawing of borders. It took the form of considerable government-directed in various forms of national infrastructure, including education, transportation systems, and welfare states. (Hobsbawm, 1995; Weber, 1976). Social trust, therefore appears to be the result of effective nation-building by the state, or actors constituting the state.

Indeed, the government's failure to provide for the well-being of their citizens, in other words the failure to ameliorate the state of anarchy, is a certain path toward loss of legitimacy and subsequent collapse of the state (Jackson, 2005). Furthermore, governments facilitate trust generation by enforcing rights, rules, and contracts (Hardin, 1996; Levy, 1998; Guseva and Rona-Tas, 2001), as well as by providing information (Levy, 1998; Hooghe and Stolle, 2003). Political institutions are an important determinant of trust to the extent they are fair and impartial in the way they administer public policies (Rothstein and Stolle, 2003; Mishler and Rose, 1997; Aberbach and Walker, 1970). These aspects of government performance are closely associated with generalized reciprocity and other aspects of social trust (Knack, 2002). Indeed, it appears that social trust appears to be missing precisely where there is absence of effective government. For example, the discussions of the low levels of social trust in Italy tend to mention the weakness of the Italian state as a factor, particularly in the southern regions of the
country (Putnam, 1993; Huysseune, 2003). Under the conditions, corruption and low government performance prevent trust-fostering policies from emerging in a vicious, interlocking circle of mistrust which (Putnam, 1993). Unsurprisingly, it is the most corrupt states that tend to have the lowest levels of generalized social trust (Uslaner, 2003).

In view of the findings that in order to create trust governments must address problems of unequal life chances and other forms of relative deprivation (Chambers and Kopstein, 2001), it is unsurprising that states where inequality is relatively low enjoy elevated levels of generalized social trust (Uslaner, 2002). States displaying high levels of generalized trust are typically characterized by large government bureaucracies engaging in wealth redistribution, education spending, and playing an active role in the economy (Uslaner, 2003). Of particular importance is the degree of inequality in the society as evidenced, for example, by the very high levels of social trust in Scandinavian countries which display low levels of income and gender inequality. Countries with most highly developed institutionalized welfare states also tend to have the highest levels of trust (Hooghe and Stolle, 2003), and are moreover characterized by welfare states that are impartial and which do not pit one group of the population against another by a variety of exclusionary policies and institutional design that either facilitates fraud, or makes access more difficult (Rothstein and Stolle, 2003). The importance of government intervention in the building of social trust is also evidenced by a study testing Putnam's proposition that declining group associations lead to a decline in trust against the experience of Great Britain which has found that, despite the existence of similar problems of time pressure and television, no similar erosion of social capital has taken place in Great Britain. This discrepancy has been attributed to educational reform, transformation of the class structure, and government policies stressing importance of the distributive dimensions of social capital and the impact that governments can have on it. Moreover, the civic sector itself has been reliant on the government involving it in the delivery of variety of social services and providing substantial resources to its maintenance (Hall, 1999).

To be sure, Uslaner's treatment of the role of government policies in the creation of generalized social trust appears to be somewhat inconsistent. While acknowledging the role of state action in reducing
inequality (Uslaner, 2003), Uslaner has argued that governments are not really capable of influencing
trust levels, and that the forcing of citizens to obey the law does not build trust (Uslaner 2002, 2003). At
the same time, Uslaner believes that government policies are perfectly capable of destroying generalized
trust (Uslaner, 2002). Instead, Uslaner (2002, 2003) believes that optimistic individual attitudes are
responsible for trust rather than vice versa. In Uslaner’s view, while optimists are likely to not only
believe in a better future but also in personal political efficacy and translate these feelings into generalized
trust of others, the pessimists' feelings of low efficacy and fearful anticipation of the future are reflected
in generalized mistrust and pro-authoritarian attitudes (Uslaner, 2002). Similarly, Uslaner argues that trust
is responsible for more efficient institutions, not the other way around (Uslaner, 2003). Nevertheless,
while the linkages between optimism, generalized trust, and efficient attitudes that Uslaner outlines are
sound, he does appear to neglect the role the government may play in promoting policies of social
equality, which he acknowledges are an important component of social trust, and he also underestimates
the possibility of existence of a mutually reinforcing loop of efficient institutions that pursue policies
promoting social trust and trusting individuals who support their institutions. Moreover, per Uslaner's
arguments that trust cannot take root in a hierarchy and that rigid social orders and strong class divisions
that persist across generations are inimical to the creation of generalized social trust, as different class
identification undermines the possibility of individuals viewing each other across the class divide as the
same ourselves (Uslaner, 2002), to the extent that governments are capable of breaking down these
dividing lines they are surely agents of trust creation. And, inasmuch government is responsible for
shaping decisions on resource allocation, which Uslaner acknowledges is a determinant of trust (Uslaner,
2002), government is undoubtedly a factor behind trust formation. Uslaner's unwillingness to attribute the
role of social trust promoter to government institutions may be caused by his belief that trust is acquired
early in life and does not change much over time. However, these two propositions are not unnecessarily
incompatible. The notion that social trust is formed early in life and does not change rapidly is supported
by literature on heuristics and schemata, which indicates that these decisionmaking shortcuts are resistant
to conflicting information. Nevertheless, one must acknowledge the possibility that government actions
have shaped the environment in which these schemata (including social trust) undergo the process of initial formation. When one's ideas about the nature of the world and the trustworthiness of other individuals are being formed, one can reasonably expect that the outcome of this formative process will be affected if one becomes politically socialized in a corrupt state governed by a weak government (Uslaner, 2003).

Social Trust and National Identity

As indicated earlier, and consistent with the notion that social trust is the product of anarchy-alleviating state policies and a property of groups, it comes as no surprise to find out that in the process of eliminating anarchy on domestic level states are not only building social trust but national identity as well. Indeed, group identity and trust are concepts that are closely related, where one cannot exist in the absence of the other, as it is difficult to imagine situation where one considers oneself a member of a group without having some form of trusting relationship toward other members of that group, or vice versa. The concept of national identity is crucial to this discussion inasmuch its emergence is very much the result of state efforts to combat anarchy and a factor in conflict behavior, further reinforcing the possibility of relationship between the level of domestic anarchy and the effects of international anarchy.

There is a growing consensus that national identity is something that is built by the state (Tombs, 1996), specifically through its efforts to ameliorate anarchy within its borders, including maintenance of order, law enforcement, and carrying out other policies needed to make possible cohesive existence of individuals within the state’s borders (Kedourie, 1995). Citizens with a sense of belonging in a nation can only be found in states with well developed educational systems (Gellner, 1995). National identification occurs where social conditions permit homogeneous, and centrally sustained high cultures which embrace not only elites but the masses as well (Gellner, 1995). State's role as framework for collective action (again, amelioration of anarchy) is crucial behind the emergence of collective national identity (Hobsbawm, 1995). Print languages create the foundation for national consciousness. National language as a state providing public goods, fostering communication, and thus eliminating anarchy, as well as linguistic diversity (Anderson, 1995).
There is considerable evidence that the primordial sources of identity, such as race or language, are not unshakeable (Renan, 1995), with their strength varying from state to state, person to person, even time to time (Geertz, 1995) with a strong sense of national identity being possible even where there is no common language (Weber, 1995). Despite occasional references to “old” and “new” nations, purporting that nations such as France have led a discrete existence for several centuries and predate the emergence of the nationalist ideology (Seton-Watson, 1995), evidence suggests that national identity in even the so-called “old” nations is a much later creation, dating to only the 19th century (Connor, 1995b). To cite but one example, the French national identity sometimes held (including by Seton-Watson, 1995) to be an ancient one, is a comparatively creation, a product of concerted state action in the 19th century. Prior to these state-led efforts, which included standardizing administration, laws, and education (Weber, 1976; Hobsbawm, 1995), individual identification with France was rather abstract, with individual identity being predominantly tied to one's village or region (Weber, 1976; Connor, 1995b).

However, the corollary that national identity is the product of state action is that the formation of such identity may be incomplete, or entirely nonexistent. It should be noted that not nearly all states have succeeded in establishing the allegiance to the state. The use of the term "nationalism" to signify both identification with the state as well as identification with one's nationality has led to an unwarranted assumption that nationalism, as a force in the service of the state, should operate everywhere with the same strength, including in the new states of Africa and Asia. However, in many situations the state is not the primary source of one's identity (Connor, 1995a). Moreover, very few states are actually "nation-states," in the sense that borders neatly coincide with the territorial distribution of the self-identified national group. Nearly 90% of states contain important minorities, if not majorities, of peoples considering themselves members of nations other than the one constituting the state (Connor, 1995a). Not only are the "nations" of Europe a much later creation, in some cases the creation of nationhood has not yet been achieved (Connor, 1995b). Indeed, literature on nationalism draws distinction between tradition and modern states (Gellner, 1995; Geertz, 1995; Anderson, 1995; Smith, 1995; Giddens, 1995), with the former characterized as having weak tradition of civil politics, absence of government bureaucracies.
(Geertz, 1995; Smith, 1995), government’s inability to maintain the monopoly of force within its borders (even where such monopoly is claimed) (Giddens, 1995), in short, the ability to alleviate the state of anarchy within its borders. Whereas in the modern states national unity is maintained by appeals to allegiance to the civil state, in traditional states primordial ties predominate, with social fissures running along the lines of kin and language (Geertz, 1995). This distinction appears similar to dividing lines drawn even by early proponents of the nationalist ideology, including Herder who distinguished so-called “natural states” which consisted of a single people, and states which were the product of war and conquest, such as Prussia under Frederick the Great (Breuilly, 1995).

Of crucial importance here is that national identity, as a result of state efforts to eliminate domestic anarchy, is a psychological construct. Whereas "state" is a tangible concept, "nation" is not. Famously been described as an “imagined community” (Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1991), it requires a psychological bond to exist among its members, determining whether a given set of individuals self-identifies itself as members of a single nation, with a common ideology and customs, as well as a sense of homogeneity (Renan, 1995; Kohn, 1995; Greenfeld, 1995). It is accompanied by a sense of solidarity, and the predisposition to make sacrifices on behalf of other members of the nation (Renan, 1995; Kohn, 1995). Although a belief in the group's separate origin and evolution apart from other nations may be an important ingredient of national psychology, this belief need not be (and rarely is) factually based, and instead is a social construct (Connor, 1995a). Common suffering is sometimes seen as more important to nation-building than shared happiness, because shared sorrows impose obligations and demand a common effort (Renan, 1995).

Trust as a property of groups

The common origin of national identity and generalized trust is no coincidence, as possession of social trust is closely associated with the sense of group identity, a property which heightens the attractiveness of generalized social trust for investigating conflict. The concept of "moral community" that is inherent in the concept of social trust indicates that the higher the level of individual trust, the larger the size the individual will consider as one's in-group. Group membership implies a certain degree of trust among
members of that group, with interactions between members of the same group are driven by the perception of similarity and homogeneity of the group and its members. Social trust, after all, implies a belief in the underlying commonality of values (Uslaner, 2002). Strong group identity implies sharing, cooperation, mutuality of interest with other group members, as well as a willingness to sacrifice personal interest when the welfare of the group demands it (Mercer, 1995).

Moreover, the level of social trust has a direct influence on the size of that individual's moral community (Uslaner, 2002), a concept which, since it is associated with the norm of generalized reciprocity, should be seen as an operational definition of that individual's self-defined in-group. Group membership implies acceptance of a certain set of norms for dealing with members of the in-group and members of out-groups. What sets these interactions apart is that interactions among in-group members are characterized by the principle of generalized reciprocity (Yamagishi and Kiyonari, 2000). In-group favoritism is based on intuitive understanding of the group as involving a system of generalized exchanges, wherein individuals give favorable treatment to, and expect to receive favorable treatment from, any member of the group, provided that they are accepted as members of that group. It is a reflection of the expectation of in-group reciprocity (Yamagishi and Kiyonari, 2000). This occurs despite the possible problem of free riding, in that the rewards received are not directly contingent on resources provided. Nevertheless, the system does not break down thanks to the demonstrated ability of generalized trust to alleviate the problem of commons dilemma (Brann and Foddy, 1987). Mere identification with social categories or groups is insufficient to induce their members to exhibit in-group favoritism. It only occurs if there is an expectation that in-group member will exhibit such favoritism toward the player, indicating that the existence of social trust must precedes group identification. Groups, therefore, are not so much a means of creating generalized trust and reciprocity norms among their members, but rather serve as "containers" for the expectations of reciprocity, and arise when social trust is already present. In the absence of trust, categorization alone is insufficient to produce such favoritism (Yamagishi and Kiyonari, 2000). Under conditions of social uncertainty, “high trusters” are less likely to form committed relationships characteristic of particularized trust than low trusters. Instead, high levels of generalized
trust have the effect of releasing individuals from the confines of safe but small and closed relationships. When faced with social uncertainty trusting people do not run for the safety of small, closed groups, but remain willing to interact with others (Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe, 1998). They do so because their definition of what constitutes their in-group, or moral community, is larger than that of low-trusting individuals. Individuals have been documented to favor their own groups even in situations where they lost substantially by not cooperating (Druckman, 1997; Vaughan, Tajfel, and Williams, 1981). Loyalty toward a group, like intra-group trust which it implies, includes both emotional and cognitive aspects (Druckman, 1997) and, moreover, reasoning in terms of group identity represents a process of categorization intended to simplify and order perceptions. Stereotyping therefore provides the individual with a well-differentiated and focused world that moreover provides social causality capable of parsimoniously explaining a wide variety of events (Hogg and Abrams, 1988).

**Social trust and rationality**

The above-described properties of trust and behaviors in which trusters and non-trusters engage bring us to another key feature of social trust, namely its non-rational, heuristic nature. The notion of trusting complete strangers on the basis of very little or no knowledge is consistent with the concept of bounded rationality, actors make decisions concerning interaction with others not by carefully weighing all information, but rather through mental shortcuts, invoking analogies, fitting the complexity of the world into simpler schemas, or pre-existing assumptions about the nature of the world (Axelrod, 1973). Such approaches have long posed a challenge to the rational choice framework, with its "as if" assumptions of rationality and utility maximization. Although they offer a formidable combination of parsimony and predictive power (Mintz, 1997), they have been nevertheless exposed to a barrage of criticism, in the form of approaches rooted in cognitive psychology and sociology. The sociologists, in particular, have argued that cultural and structural factors result in variations in individual decisionmaking that rational choice approaches cannot account for. According to Etzioni (1992), one cannot regard decisionmaking as an individualistic event taking place in isolation. Instead, one must also consider social factors and
structures, moral commitments, emotions, as well as values. Etzioni posits that individuals possess more than one utility function, which makes rational choice approaches difficult to apply (Etzioni, 1992).

The psychological critique of rational choice has centered on the problems of complexity and uncertainty, which are the conditions under which much of political decisionmaking takes place. Psychological approaches have been advanced as more effective with dealing with these factors than rational choice, and also offering an improved explanation of situations where decisions are made that do not conform to the rational ideal (Stein and Welch, 1997). In view of the difficulty of estimating risks, for example, individual estimates tend to be based on a series of biases and heuristics (Heimer, 1988). An example of such a simplification is the tendency to assume that one's friends' friends are also one's friends, and enemies' friends are also one's enemies (Axelrod, 1973).

Therefore, when confronted with complex or uncertain situations, individuals fall back on a number of decisionmaking tools, such as heuristics or schemata, which are particularly useful when the actor is faced with the need to evaluate a novel situation (Axelrod, 1973). The attribution theory, for example, describes the operation of schemata that determine how new information is interpreted given pre-existing beliefs. Such schemata, once formed, are resistant to change, even when confronted with strong contrary evidence. While schemata are not immune to change, they are nevertheless highly resistant to it, depending on the schemata centrality, refutability, quality of discrepant information, and cognitive complexity (Stein and Welch, 1997). Important schemata are challenged only when there is no other way to explain inconsistent information. Otherwise such information is incorporated into the schemata only partially, affecting one's definition of conditions under which the schema does not hold true. The likelihood of affecting existing schemata is also influenced by the complexity of the cognitive system, with the effect that experts by virtue of their knowledge, are better able to explain away inconsistent information. As a result, inconsistent information has less impact on their schemata than on those of poorly informed individuals (Stein and Welch, 1997).

Heuristics, in turn, are rules or, in effect, decisionmaking shortcuts, that individuals use to test propositions embedded in their schemata, on the basis of their availability (the tendency to interpret
information that is ambiguous in terms that are most available in their cognitive repertoire),
representativeness (the tendency to exaggerate similarity between one event and another one), and
anchoring (the magnitude of an event estimated by comparing it with an initial value). Decisionmaking is
also influenced by cognitive biases which cause attribution errors exaggerating the importance of
dispositional over situational errors in the actions of others. Even where perfect information is available,
its processing may be affected by deeply felt needs and intense emotions, with one's affect toward the
target influencing whether situation or dispositional information is going to be utilized (Stein and Welch,
1997).

The use of such decisionmaking shortcuts by both elites and masses has been well documented in
both national and international politics. The use of cognitive heuristics has been found among most
voters, particularly in complex situations (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001). Political leaders, even though they
can usually avail themselves of far more complete information than the average voter, nevertheless rely
on multiple heuristics in screening alternatives on the basis of risk minimization and reward maximization
(Mintz and Geva, 1997). In international decisionmaking, political leaders seek out the most relevant
analogies to analyze a novel set of circumstances (Houghton, 1996).

The basic properties of generalized trust are entirely consistent with literature on schemas and
heuristics. Trust, or the belief in the trustworthiness of others, particularly complete strangers about whom
little or no information is available, should be seen as one of these shortcuts. The nature of trust and its
application to solve decisionmaking problems under conditions of insufficient information and time
warrant the attaching the heuristic label to social trust. The "trust as a schema" interpretation suggests that
both high- and low-trusters are limited by bounded rationality and use shortcuts in their decisionmaking
processes. Whether their level of trust is high or low manifests itself as a bias in their decisionmaking by
overriding context-specific information (in situations where it is available) concerning other actor's
motives and intentions.1 In the absence of trust, individual action might be paralyzed by the immense

1 Although there are no indications in the literature that having a high level of trust means that an individual is going
to be less likely to gather information, other theoretical approaches suggest the low trusters' decisionmaking is going
complexity posed by contingent futures. Trust therefore may be viewed as a functional alternative to rational prediction for the reduction of complexity, under conditions of absence of time and other resources to rationally predict and control the effects of contingent outcomes (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). Individuals trust holistically, evaluating other actors along a single dimension (Mishler and Rose, 1997) by projecting assumptions onto other actors (Lewis and Weigert, 1985; Orbell and Davis, 1991).

This feature of trust is also supported by recent research in neuroscience that suggests humans have an advanced ability for predicting the actions of others by attributing their mental states by attempting to simulate mental processes of others in their own brains. This prediction, however, appears to take form of simulation of one’s own actions, if put in the situation of the individual one is trying to simulate (Ramnani and Miall, 2004). Similarly, research on the concept of “mentalizing” suggests that information required for estimating the mental state of other individuals comes from two sources. While one of the sources is, as one might expect, observation of individuals, the other source is one’s own past experiences that are applied to the current situation and, in effect, projected onto other individuals (Frith and Frith, 2003).

The heuristic nature of generalized, or moralistic, trust is a key feature distinguishing it from particularized trust (Uslaner, 2002), which is more context based, built on enforceable contracts and social constraints. In effect, the concept of particularized trust closely resembles Hardin's (1996) idea of encapsulated trust, which holds that trust takes place under conditions where one actor believes, on the basis of tangible available evidence, that it is in another actor's self-interest to behave in a cooperative fashion. It is molded by experience of interaction with that particular actor (Hardin, 1996). Moralistic and encapsulated trust play different roles in resolving collective action problems. Whereas strategic trust is to be impaired, for a number of reasons. Low levels of trust are associated with high levels of stress (after all, the low-truster thinks he's living in a Hobbesian state of nature), and stress is associated with impaired decisionmaking. Also, per prospect theory, having a low-trust level (i.e., expecting everyone around you to attempt to take advantage of you) is also likely to translate into a greater likelihood of considering oneself in a losses frame, and thus in a risk-acceptant state of mind. Therefore, if anything, one should expect the low-trusters to pay even less attention to available information than high-trusters, and be more likely to make decisions influenced by pre-existing biases and beliefs.
based on available information, moralistic trust is based on normative statements and beliefs concerning how people should, and will, behave (Uslaner, 2002).
CHAPTER 5
SOCIAL TRUST AND CONFLICT

The importance of the state as an agent of social trust construction through the elimination of domestic anarchy, along with the heuristic nature of generalized social trust, leads to the possibility that the causal effects of international anarchy may depend on perceptions of other actors that are formed on the basis of individual experience of domestic anarchy (or lack thereof).

It has long been argued that mutual perceptions by international actors are an important factor in explaining conflict, and that moreover perceptual differences may increase or decrease under certain circumstances (Kim and Bueno de Mesquita, 1995; Jervis, 1998). However, the need for more research into the context of use of heuristics has already been identified (Houghton, 1996). Given the wide variety of possible analogies that can be invoked, and the absence of an interest to analogize in a variety of ways in experimental situations, theories on the use of heuristics require additional explanations to account for how the reception of analogies is biased in certain ways in political decisionmaking groups (Houghton, 1996). Social trust helps provide that explanation. That the individual level of trust should affect how the motives and intentions of others are perceived is implied by the various definitions of trust, particularly Inglehart's (1997) equation of trust and tolerance. The belief in the underlying commonality of values and the notion of a moral community all imply that high trusters view others in fundamentally different terms than low trusters. Consistent with the nature of generalized trust which posits that high-trust individuals act toward others on the basis of an assumption that the others are essentially trustworthy, high-trusting individuals are likely to invoke more benign, less confrontational analogies when confronted with novel situations, whereas low-trusters are likely to view novel situations in more confrontational terms.

The notion that societies bereft of social trust tend to be more fraught with conflict is implied by extant literature, which tends to agree that, in the absence of social trust, society becomes less civil. Individuals are more apt to deny their political foes are part of their moral communities and, in the
absence of the generalized reciprocity norm, acrimony increases and the norms of cooperation in governance wane. The unwillingness to compromise leads to a more confrontational style of politics (Uslaner, 2000). Whereas high-trusters have an inclusive view of society and are tolerant, low-trusters (individuals with low generalized trust, though possibly high particularized trust) view society as essentially a cluster of disconnected groups struggling for individual advantage, in what amounts to a state-level struggle for relative gains. Such a society is characterized not by cooperation but by competition (Uslaner, 2002). Unsurprisingly, social trust has been shown to have a significant direct effect on homicide rates (Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer, 2001) and other types of violent crime (Putnam, 2000), as well as attitudes toward the use of violence (Putnam, 2000). Individual trust levels have also been demonstrated to influence the outcomes of game scenarios involving resource consumption in a simulated commons dilemma, with high levels of trust being shown to play a major role in mediating resource consumption. The high trusters expectation of reciprocation led to their reduced consumption of a rapidly deteriorating resource (Brann and Foddy, 1987). Similar results have also been noted in prisoner's dilemma games, where high trusters reacted positively to cooperative messages by increasing cooperation, while low trusters reacted by decreasing cooperation (Parks, Henager, and Scamahorn, 1996).

Moreover, individuals with low and high social trust also tend to have different attitudes toward their country's government. Interpersonal generalized trust has been shown to be closely linked to both trust in government and trust in particular government officials (Lewis and Weigert, 1985; Aberbach and Walker 1970; Hall, 1999; Iyengar, 1980), and even though no government has likely ever had the trust of all its subjects, even the most dictatorial regimes have sought to increase their credibility and popularity. The need for trust to exist between the rulers and the ruled as a precondition for a civil, nonviolent society has been recognized as early as Plato's Republic (Baier, 1986). Resentment and distrust are elements of disaffection and the first step toward violent resistance (Aberbach and Walker, 1970). Distrustful groups tend to demand additional resources and may cause the government to react with repression. Level of trust in government strongly influences what policies and strategies are available to political leaders, and
even the very ability to govern. Even though distrust of government may not always or necessarily have disastrous consequences for the government, it will have consequences in the shape of reduced support for government policies, and thus government efficacy, possibly creating a downward spiral of mutually reinforcing distrust and failed policies ultimately resulting in violence (Hetherington and Globetti, 2002). Moreover, the effects of trust on the attitude toward government appear to be more influential than those of partisanship or ideology (Hetherington and Globetti, 2002).

Generalized trust levels have also been associated with attitudes toward other states, which is an unsurprising finding given that mistrust and fear of other actors have played a crucial role in many explanations of international conflict, including the Cold War (Kydd, 2000). Individuals base opinions about world affairs in part about generalized beliefs about how much their nation can trust other nations. Sometimes referred to as international trust, this form of trust influences preferences toward internationalism or isolationism and threat perceptions of other states. Whereas “high trusters” have been found to view the international system as populated by friendly and trustworthy states, “low-trusters” have a considerably darker view of the intentions and motives of other states. This variable has also been demonstrated to be a strong predictor of support toward US initiation of military action against Iraq in 2003 (Brewer, Gross, Aday, and Willnat, 2004).

In addition to the question of perceptions of other actors, social trust's applicability to the study of conflict lies in the properties of social groups, specifically the already discussed linkage between trust and identity. Individual identity as a member of a group has long been recognized as a possible source of conflict, both domestic and international, particularly since group formation may be inevitable (Mercer, 1995), due to the variety of public goods that groups provide (Guetzkow, 1957), which include security and safety (Druckman, 1997; Wendt, 1994), a sense of positive identity and self esteem, (Hogg, Terry, and White, 1995; Tajfel, 1972, 1981, 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Wendt, 1994). As such, they have a profound impact on individual identity, individual sense of who one is and how one is to relate to others (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Wendt, 1994). Group belongingness, in turn,
generates intra-group attraction, due to the projection of one's positive self-esteem onto other members of the same group (Tajfel, 1981, 1982; Hogg and Abrams, 1988).

However, intra-group attraction has also had certain negative consequences attributed to it, as only minimal conditions are required to trigger intergroup discrimination. No matter how trivial or arbitrary the criterion for division, inter-group discrimination are likely to emerge (Mercer, 1995) even in individuals as young as 7 years (Vaughan, Tajfel, and Williams, 1981). The strong group identity thus developed is likely to result in discrimination against out-group members (Mercer, 1995), and the sense of loyalty built through group socialization process creates negative feelings toward "others" (Druckman, 1994; 1997). While bias toward one's group that comes with loyalty is critical to defining who one is, and occurs in both cooperative and competitive situations, it tends to be stronger in competitive, rather than cooperative, situations (Druckman, 1997). The aggression against out-groups, in turn, may be caused by displacing repressed aggression towards authority is displaced onto the out-group, suggesting the linkage between in-group loyalty and out-group hostility may be difficult to break (Hogg and Abrams, 1988).

However, the various theories of group identity, while explaining intra-group and inter-group dynamics, including cooperation and conflict, are less well suited to explaining why certain group identities and not others are more salient among specific individuals. While the individual needs that group membership satisfies are regarded as universal, the strength of these needs appears to vary in different nations and different individuals. In addition they suggest that mere interpersonal contact between members of different groups is not sufficient to overcome stereotypes. It is, at best, likely to create personal friendships and, at worst, to reinforce existing stereotypes as actions of members of the "out-group" will be made to fit into pre-existing schemata (Hogg and Abrams, 1988).

Moreover, these needs are not limited to national identifications. Individuals frequently opt to identify themselves with groups other than their nations (Terhune, 1965; Druckman, 1997), including one's ethnic identity which frequently represents a stronger component of individual identity than citizenship (Horowitz, 1985; van Evera, 1994; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; Vanhanen, 1991; 1999).
Frequently appeals to ethnically-tinged nationalism, rather than civic citizenship, are utilized as a motivating force in international conflicts (Schulze, 1998).

However, it must be pointed out that the relationship between group membership and aggression is somewhat ambiguous. Although it is sometimes viewed as an inevitable consequence of inter-group loyalty, there are suggestions that groups enter into conflictual situations precisely in order to solidify group identity and cohesion. It has even been suggested that conflict is a necessary component of maintaining group identity (Simmel, 1955). Conflict serves a function of preventing the disappearance of inter-group boundaries, and may be cultivated as a way of preserving a certain status quo. Given the usefulness of conflict to maintaining group identity, it is not surprising that in some situations the object of a conflict or a fight may be the fight itself and its sociological effects on group cohesion. Some competitions or conflicts may even proceed without a competitor or an adversary. The remarkable ease with which hostility can be suggested does indicate a deeply embedded social function of conflict (Simmel, 1955). Polarization through conflict may be pursued in order to achieve not only group convergence, but also homogeneity, through enforced conformity to a (usually fairly extreme) in-group norm. Social competition among different groups tends to arise when an inter-group comparison is perceived as insecure, or when legitimacy or the stability of the in-group hierarchy becomes subject to doubt. Since, in accordance with most group norms, challenging authority figures is illegitimate, a legitimate scapegoat must be found creating a psychological need for the existence of out-group scapegoats. Under such conditions, comparisons with dissimilar groups are made in order to achieve homogenization and convergence, thus stifling in-group instability (Hogg and Abrams, 1988).

The application of group identity theories has been extended to the level of the nation, which constitutes a group that fulfills crucial economic, sociocultural, and political needs, and which is united by common sympathies unlike those that exist between them and members of other nationalities (J.S. Mill in Rawls, 1999). The manner an individual relates to the nation is similar to how he relates to any other group to which he belongs (Druckman, 1997). Indeed, as discussed earlier, a sense of common identity is one of the prerequisites for the existence of a nation (Sorensen, 1992). Individuals derive a sense of
security, a feeling of belonging, and prestige from their affiliation with the nation. Individual needs satisfied by what Wendt (2003) terms the "state-society complex" consist of physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem.

The 19th century nationalist ideal was the nation-state, or a state whose boundaries neatly correspond to that of group identification of its inhabitants, as a means of addressing the problem of the relationship of state to society on the basis of assumption that what appeared to be primordial bonds of blood were sufficient to establish the "in-group", ignoring the possibility that such bonds are actually constructs (Breuilly, 1995). Nation-states in the 19th century consistently pursued, with varying degrees of success, policies of assimilating its subjects and eliminating provincial attachments and loyalties which were to be replaced by loyalty to the state itself (Richmond, 1995).

However, while national identity may be created, as discussed above, through state efforts to eliminate domestic anarchy, it is not the only path to its creation. Since conflict can have group-forming properties including on state level, state formation on occasion taken place through conflict. States have long used various forms of violence to establish and maintain themselves, and have even been described as protection rackets, inasmuch as they tend to perpetuate conflict even to the point of creating or inventing internal or external threats due to the constituting effects of conflict on themselves (Tilly, 1985). The temptation to create internal stability and cohesion in this manner on state-level may even result in the so-called "garrison state", where the entire state revolves around the dominance of specialists in violence, so much so that they become the most powerful sub-state actor and who normalize the perpetual expectation of violence. In such circumstances, the ruling elite maintains itself in power to a significant extent by invoking (real or imaginary) external foes in order to extract internal compliance. This is accomplished through the manipulation of out-group images in order convey a heightened sense of threat (Regan, 1994). If nationalistic fervor cannot be sustained through mass socialization, a resort may be made to an occasional outbreak of violent conflict. Thusly militarized state may even maintain the outward appearance of democracy could be maintained, even as internal decisionmaking usurped by national security apparatus. The ensuing militarization creates a society that is organized around
preparation for war and socialized to accept the continued security elite dominance, and preeminence of the security sector over the rest of society. The prevailing state ideology holds that the use of force is a natural, expected, and effective means of international intercourse, with few effective limits on it (Regan, 1994). Consistent with Simmel's (1955) argument, the society may remain under the dominance of the militarist ideology even long after the threat against which it originally organized itself has vanished due to the active promotion of the virtues of strong military preparation, possibly bolstered by their occasional use (Regan, 1994).

In the context of interaction of conflict and identity, it is unsurprising that the lack of stable identities, and the existence of fragile, multiple, and shifting identities has been identified as a cause of conflict (Suny, 1999). Hobsbawm (1995), for example, draws a contrast between France and Germany in the late 19th century, wherein the former's identity was defined in self-referential terms, while the latter's in juxtaposition to "the other." Indeed, the possible weakness of national identity means that substate actors may have several identities simultaneously. These identities, which may be constituted historically or by the elites, shape the attitudes of actors in both the domestic and international arena (Suny, 1999). Moreover, the nature of national identity may vary from state to state, with considerable effect on domestic and international actors. An exclusivist national identity on the part of a dominant ethnic group contributed to a civil war and the destruction of the country of Georgia. On the other hand, a state like Armenia, with a coherent national identity, was able to conduct an effective and peaceful transition. States with weak national identity, regardless of whether they are ethnically homogeneous (for example, Tajikistan) or heterogeneous (Azerbaijan) experience regional divisions and civil wars (Suny, 1999). National identities may also be transcended by expanding one's definition of the in-group, as is the case with European Union, which has demonstrated that it is possible to expand the definition of self to include other states, even former adversaries (Mercer, 1995).

The waxing and waning strength of national identity points to a weakness of identity theories which, although capable of explaining, given a certain set of identities, the inter- and intra-group dynamics of such groups, are less well suited to explaining where these identities come from or, more
crucially, which are salient at any given moment. Tajfel's "minimum groups" model, in order to be applicable to real world situations, must be supplemented by a model accounting for where the in-group versus out-group cleavages lie. Contrary to the minimum group paradigm, the creation of a national identity requires a somewhat greater effort than simply drawing national borders, given the competing group loyalties every individual must reconcile.

The relationship between group identity and conflict is further complicated by findings that strong in-group loyalty does not necessarily lead to strong out-group hostility (Yamagishi and Kiyonari, 2000), including on national level. Although the term "nationalism" tends to be used to identify all cases of identification with one's nation or state, the literature sometimes distinguishes two forms of identification with one's country, namely patriotism which consists of strong attachment and loyalty toward one's own group without the corresponding hostility toward others, and nationalism where such hostility is de rigeur (Orwell, 2000 [1945]; Druckman, 1997). While individuals who have strong patriotic feelings may be willing to risk their lives for their country, they are not as war-prone as the nationalists, whose attachment toward their nation is established on the basis of a built-in enemy (Druckman, 1997). The apparent compatibility of strong in-group feelings with absence of hostility toward out-groups is also evident in discussions on international cooperation and the spirit of internationalism which are possible even given strong identification with one's nation. Indeed, the spirit of internationalism, or the loyalty to the world at large competing with, if not exceeding, the national loyalty, appears to be the strongest not only among individuals who have extremely low sense of identification with their state (preferring, for example, to identify themselves with their families or ethnic groups), but also among individuals with a very high sense of national identification (Terhune, 1965). It is striking that so many writings on nationalism suppose that the nation-state is but a waypoint toward larger supranational political entities (Richmond, 1995) with no apparent upper limit on the size of such political entities (Gellner, 1995) up to the point of a global community of peoples (Hutchinson, 1995; Smith, 1995; Greenfield, 1995). Already Ernest Renan presupposed that the nations of Europe would eventually be supplanted by a European
confederation (Renan, 1995), a prediction that likely appeared outlandish when it was originally written in the 19th century but looks quite prescient a century later.
CHAPTER 6
THEORY

Having thus demonstrated the interlinked nature of the properties of domestic anarchy, social trust, group identity, nationalism, and international conflict, all that remains is crafting a theory that takes these linkages into consideration. The heuristic nature of social trust suggests a good point of origin would be Wendt’s "alien encounter" (Wendt, 1992) scenario which posits that two actors, each of which is interested in own survival and has certain material capabilities, meeting each other for the first time with no history of prior interaction would not necessarily act in ways predicted by the realist theory. The question that remains to be answered is how would they react to each other’s presence. In the absence of any prior interactions and therefore knowledge of each other’s capabilities and intentions, how would these actors act when confronted with such an utterly unfamiliar scenario? In all likelihood, these actors would not have arrived at the encounter with a cognitive blank slate. The gap in knowledge would be filled by the individual’s level of social trust. The nature of ensuing interaction would have been largely determined by each actor’s prior socialization into their own domestic culture of anarchy. As a result, each actor in such a scenario will fall back on a variety of heuristics, which have been formed by interactions with other actors within one's own state. International interactions on part of domestic state-representing actors should be viewed in a similar light. Since in most cases an individual will have had ample experience of interaction with sub-system level actors (domestic ones in the case of a first encounter with international actors, or international actors in the case of a first encounter with extra-terrestrial ones), the history of these interactions will have created a store of heuristics and schemata for use in continued interactions, including to help deal with unfamiliar situations. A first encounter-type scenario, when one has to formulate an approach to a problem on the basis of inadequate information,

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2 While there is no empirical data on interaction with interstellar civilizations that would confirm or disprove Wendt's assertions, it is striking that Cold War-era science fiction depictions of such contacts (for example, *The Day the Earth Stood Still*) have tended to depict such encounters in terms evoking the US-Soviet confrontation.
would seem like precisely the sort of situation for which these pre-existing heuristics and schemata exist. Rather than becoming utterly confounded by the newness of the situation, the actors would most likely embark on a frantic search of their store of analogies, and would pick the one that they felt represented the best fit to the new situation. Whatever the situation, generalized social trust is likely to have a strong effect on the nature of the analogy picked, with high-trust individuals likely selecting analogies encouraging cooperation, while low-trusters would fall back on analogies that suggest the new situation represents a form of conflict.

In this respect, whereas Wendt's structural constructivist interpretation argues that state behavior is the product of the system-level culture of anarchy, the argument advanced here posits the opposite: since social trust is fundamentally a domestic variable that is constructed through government action through its efforts to eliminate anarchy on the domestic level and forms a major part of the state's identity, it is the domestic rather than international factors that will play the decisive role of how states view other international actors. Individual views (both elite and mass) of the international system and the appropriate norms of behavior regarding international interactions (as well as actual behavior) are therefore conditioned by the level of social trust existing on the national level.

This suggests that, contrary to Wendt, anarchy is not what states make of it. Rather, international anarchy is perceived through the lens of the domestic level of anarchy. Individuals socialized into a particular domestic culture of anarchy use schemata and heuristics formed in the process of socialization onto international situations. They perceive international anarchy, and actions of other actors within that anarchy, using analogies from their experiences first gained in their respective domestic cultures of anarchy, and act accordingly. Beliefs about the state of anarchy and the inherent nature of other actors in the international system are influenced by the already-acquired beliefs concerning the nature of the domestic actors. For example an individual socialized into a state with a high social trust level and an absence of anarchy will have had little or no experience of the negative effects of anarchy. When exposed to the international system for the first time, this individual will be likely to perceive this anarchy in more
benign terms than someone whose political socialization has taken place in a more an anarchic domestic milieu.

The domestic approach, when compared to the structural constructivist one, offers a number of advantages. Firstly, it is testable. Inasmuch generalized social trust is a measurable phenomenon (both directly through surveys and indirectly through a variety of proxies concerning government effectiveness at combating domestic anarchy), it offers a possibility of testing whether Weyd's three cultures of international anarchy, Rawls' "society of peoples", and Kantian peace are realizable in practice. If growth of social trust on domestic level does in fact correspond to a decrease in conflict-proneness, it offers the possibility that the international culture of anarchy, as an emanation of the aggregate domestic cultures of anarchy, can be changed through addressing anarchy on state level. Secondly, the theory offers a framework that explains systemic change. Whereas structural constructivism, which posits that state identities and interests are constituted through the process of mutual interaction has been critiqued for its difficulty in accounting for change, the social trust approach avoids that criticism by attributing change to variation in domestic policies. Thirdly, by not embracing the assumption of states as unitary actors, it is able to address the question of domestic, as well as international, conflict, and examine the interaction between the two.

This is made possible by certain inherent characteristics of generalized social trust, particularly the concept of moral community. It can be essentially conceptualized by placing the individual in the center of a set of concentric circles, with each further circle representing a segment of people further removed (by having less in common, in terms of family ties, ethnicity, national identity, etc.) from the individual. The higher the individual's level of trust, the greater the circle of individuals who are deemed trustworthy and treated accordingly (the so-called "moral community"). The norm of generalized reciprocity applies to individuals within the community, but not those outside that community. This circle, however, need not include nor exclude the bulk of the country's population. In the case of "high-trusters", the circle of people regarded as trustworthy likely extends outside their own country's borders. For low-trusting individuals, however, it is likely to encompass only a small proportion of their own
country's population, and only very few people not sharing some sort of a primordial tie (e.g., family, ethnicity) with the individual in question.

This is significant for the study of conflict since the extent of these trust circles essentially marks the dividing line defining the size of one’s in-group, and therefore should predict the society's violent conflict fault lines. Whereas theories of group identity and minimum group paradigms have greatly furthered our understanding of group interaction, they are unsuited to dealing with situations where an individual can claim multiple, and possibly cross-cutting, group loyalties. The concept of moral community can help clarify which of these competing loyalties will be the salient one. By examining the aggregate level of generalized social trust in each state, one can ascertain whether that state has fragmented into small, mutually distrustful groups which boast high levels of particularized trust, but lack in generalized trust, whether it is held together only by defining itself in opposition to other states, or finally whether the aggregate level of social trust is so high that most individuals' moral community encompasses not only the members of their own states but goes beyond national borders.

The logic of social trust suggests there is a "tipping point" in every society beyond which most individuals' in-groups are so small that the society is fragmented into small, mutually mistrustful or hostile groupings that view one another with at least as much suspicion as they do other states. The society is so divided that "us vs. them" feelings among various sub-state groupings are at least as strong as similar feelings toward other states. Conversely, since the literature on social trust suggests no upper limit on the size of one's moral community, and consistent with studies that indicate very strong identification with one's state is not incompatible with positive feelings toward other states and their citizens, it appears to be theoretically possible for an individual's moral community to encompass the entire planet. It is a situation in which an expansive definition of "us" does not require the existence of "them" for the maintenance of individual or group identity. That such an expansive definition of one’s in-group might be possible is suggested by Druckman (1997) and Orwell (1945).

The implications for the study of conflict are as follows. States can be essentially broken down into three categories, depending on their levels of social trust: high, medium, and low (although it should
be noted that since social trust is a continuous, rather than categorical, variable, these categories necessarily represent a major simplification), broadly corresponding to Wendt's Kantian, Lockean, and Hobbesian cultures of anarchy, respectively. The aggregate generalized social trust level of each state will determine its behavior pertaining in a variety of forms of international conflict (including war initiation, war joining, and war success, as well as militarized interstate dispute (MID) initiation, escalation, and success, and the onset, duration, and resolution of territorial disputes and enduring rivalries) and domestic violent political conflict (including political repression, violent political protest, and inter-ethnic conflict). As the presence of social trust implies a belief that other actors are trustworthy, i.e., that they are not going to take advantage of the individual in question when engaged in cooperation, trust fosters cooperation by ameliorating distributional concerns. Moreover, if one is trusting of others, it also means one is not likely to view violence as a necessary, or even appropriate, means of interaction with others. Other actors are, after all, seen as fundamentally friendly and not disposed to do one harm, a situation in which the resort of violence would not be appropriate. Conversely, absence of trust means a belief that other actors do intend to do one harm in some way, and therefore cooperation with them would be foolish. This in turn leads to a different, more permissive, set of norms on the use of violence, consistent with findings indicating that level of social trust influences attitudes toward the efficacy of the use of force to resolve problems, as well as opinions concerning other countries.

The effects of social trust (or its absence) can be felt on both the elite and mass levels, consistent with two sets of assumptions on which this project relies. The first is that domestic actors enjoy primacy in international relations, in the sense that the configuration of state preferences is the product of societal ideas, institutions, and interests, and that the state itself is that subset of domestic society on the basis of whose interests state preferences are defined (Moravesik, 1997). The second is preservation of power as the main goal of political leaders (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith, 1999; 2003; Goemans, 2000; Mintz and Geva, 1993; Hagan, 1994). These two assumptions, in conjunction with the properties of generalized social trust outlined earlier, have the following implications for policy decisions.
Given that political leaders are motivated primarily by their desire to remain in power, the unifying, rallying, or homogenizing effect of conflict, can be very attractive for political leaders (Barzilai, 1999; Chiozza and Goemans, 2004). Moreover, the homogenizing effects of conflict on the group have authoritarian implications, as conflict tends to lead to an increased state interference in a variety of aspects of political life, legitimizes mandatory mobilization of people and resources, and reduces individual liberties (Barzilai, 1999). All of these may be desirable to embattled political leaders, particularly since the expansion of government powers is likely to be a longer-lasting effect of conflict than the rallying effect. Furthermore, international conflict may be desirable to endangered political leaders due to its ability (however temporary) to give individuals a sense of identity and a mechanism for assimilation (Barzilai, 1999). In other words, conflict may serve as a substitute (albeit a very poor one) for social trust by satisfying certain needs (a sense of identity and a common destiny, both commonly associated with social trust) that are otherwise not being satisfied. However, consistent with arguments that conflict has unifying effects only where the divisions in the society are not too great (Morgan and Anderson, 1999; Morgan and Bickers, 1992), the logic of social trust indicates that at low levels of trust (and, therefore, small size of individual moral communities) it may be impossible to rally citizens of the state around that state's flag. Under such conditions, conflict may be used to solidify group identity at sub-state level, with violent conflict taking intra-state, rather than inter-state, form. The rallying and homogenizing dynamic of conflict appears to work equally well on both state and sub-state levels, as documented by studies that have attributed ethnic conflicts to ethnic entrepreneurs who seek to enhance own power and status by manipulating symbols of ethnicity.

As a result, anarchic states with low level of social trust are more likely to react to international developments in a hostile manner than high-trust states. This is likely to occur as a result of leaders tending to view the international system in more conflictual terms, and/or due to popular support of the more belligerent response to international developments. A study performed on the interaction of social trust and the support for the US invasion of Iraq (Brewer, Gross, Aday, and Willnat, 2004) suggests that low-trust individuals, when faced with two foreign policy options, are more likely to choose the more
belligerent one, whereas the high-trust individuals will tend to opt for the non-belligerent one. In a low-trust state such a state of affairs may lead to process of “out-bidding”, with each political faction seeking to outdo others in promoting confrontational international policies.

**Hypotheses**

Let us begin with states with low levels of trust. Using the notion of trust as a set of concentric circles, in low-trust countries the size of the circle within which individuals are deemed trustworthy is very small, and likely does not extend far outside one's family or clan, or another primordial form of identity. This type of state closely corresponds to Wendt's Hobbesian culture of anarchy on the domestic level. The national identity is weak, and individuals derive their primary identities from other sources (loyalty to a geographic region, ethnic group, social class, etc.). Such a state has little or no social cohesion, and neither the state nor its rulers are viewed as legitimate. The prevailing beliefs regarding human nature are rather negative, and violence is seen as a normal, routine means of interpersonal and intergroup discourse. Per Hagan's (1994) typology, this type of a state is most likely to create leaders with militant or radical orientations.

As a result, low-trust states are likely to display a high propensity to initiate interstate conflicts. The same holds true for domestic violent conflict, as the internal divisions within the state are also the lines of political conflict, leading to high levels of internal political violence in the form of insurgencies, political repression, civil wars, and inter-clan vendettas. Such states are also likely to experience the greatest diversionary incentives as unscrupulous political leaders attempt to stay in power by exploiting internal divisions or invoking external threats (real or imagined).

Medium-trust states are characterized by a different dynamic. States in this category correspond to Wendt's Lockean culture of anarchy, where other actors are seen as rivals, rather than enemies, with correspondingly modified attitudes toward the appropriateness of the use of force as a means of dispute resolution. The individual moral communities tend to be wider, although likely not encompassing the entire state. As far as most individuals are concerned, there are still likely to exist significant in-state groupings that are outside their trust circles. As a result, states with a medium level of trust are less likely
to be initiators of international conflict, although both the mistrustful attitudes toward other states and the existence of diversionary incentives are likely to be reflected in a significant propensity to initiate conflicts. Similarly, the existence of political divisions on the domestic level means medium-trust states will still suffer from domestic political violence, although they will be less likely to experience extremely high levels of domestic political conflict.

Finally, high-trust states are characterized by a cohesive society, with comparatively few major internal “in-group vs. out-group” fissures. These are states where the national identity is strong and positive in nature, where the dominant ideology is patriotic rather than nationalistic in character, not requiring an external threat for its maintenance. Here the trust circles are wide, encompassing the entire state, and possibly even extending beyond it, consistent with findings that strong identification with one's state does not preclude friendly attitudes toward out-groups. High willingness to trust others, even complete strangers, translates into trust toward institutions and leaders and into less belligerent individual attitudes toward other states. Appeals to nationalistic sentiments by unscrupulous leaders are more likely to fall on deaf ears in such states. Consistent with the argument described above, one's perceptions of international anarchy are more likely to be congruent with Wendt's Kantian culture anarchy, where other states are seen as partners, rather than rivals or enemies. Therefore high trust states are characterized by leaders who are politically secure and masses that are less susceptible to nationalistic sentiments. This reduces the willingness of leaders to resort to an international conflict to maintain internal political stability.

Hypothesis 1: Internal conflict

To sum up the theoretical expectations, the relationship between social trust and domestic conflict is expected to be inverse and monotonous in character, with growing social trust resulting in a decrease in domestic political violence. Political conflict in well-ordered societies with high social trust is likely to be less frequent than in anarchic societies with low social trust.

Hypothesis 2: Conflict initiation
The logic of social trust suggests that the higher the level of social trust, the greater the likelihood the moral community of the citizens and the leaders of that state will encompass other states. Given the properties of moral community and the norm of generalized reciprocity, well-ordered states with high levels of social trust are expected to be less likely to initiate conflicts with other states, while anarchic states with low levels of social trust are expected to be more likely to initiate international conflicts. The effect of social trust ought to be observable both on dyadic level, with high-trust dyads demonstrating a considerably reduced propensity to engage in conflicts, and on monadic level, as the properties of high level of social trust are expected to make such states inherently less conflict-prone.

Hypothesis 3: Conflict targeting

The logic of social trust suggests that states with low level of trust perceive themselves as existing in a threatening international systems, with other international actors seen as inherently untrustworthy and threatening. Such beliefs are likely to translate themselves into behaviors that other international actors may interpret as evidence of belligerence and hostile intent. As a result of this signaling, anarchic low-trust states are more likely to find themselves the targets of international conflict than well-ordered high-trust states whose international interactions are less likely to be interpreted as evidence of hostility.

Alternative Hypotheses

Consistent with the conflict literature reviewed earlier, there remains a possibility that the effects attributed to anarchy and social trust can be accounted for by the standard variables used in domestic and international conflict studies. The foremost alternative hypothesis to be tested is the argument that democratic states are more pacific behavior both domestically and internationally, with dyads consisting of mature, consolidated democracies exhibiting considerably less conflict-proneness than other dyads. The second alternative hypothesis concerns the effects of economic growth on conflict, with the expectation that states experiencing such growth ought to experienced reduced domestic and international conflict due to higher government popularity and greater general satisfaction of the population.
CHAPTER 7
RESEARCH DESIGN

Independent Variable
The independent variable, namely domestic anarchy/generalized social trust, is operationalized using the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), compiled by Transparency International (Transparency International, 2007). CPI is a well recognized index which is frequently used in quantitative analyses (for example, Goldsmith, 1999; Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003). This operationalization is strongly supported by literature on corruption, which suggests close links between corruption and domestic anarchy, as well as between corruption (or, more specifically, absence of corruption) and generalized social trust. In short, the presence of corruption indicates the government’s inability or unwillingness to provide public goods, and is incompatible with the existence of generalized social trust, to the extent the latter concept demands adherence to the norm of generalized reciprocity. By its very definition, corruption in the sense of trading of favors in exchange for payment or other services and favoring one set of individuals over another suggests particularized, or encapsulated, trust, and strong out-group discrimination, both incompatible with our understanding of generalized trust. However, the relationship between corruption and social trust should not be seen in terms of causality. Rather, these two phenomena ought to be seen as two mutually complementary phenomena, or two different ways of looking at the condition of civil society. The logic of both corruption and social trust indicate that the presence of one should be seen as evidence of absence of the other, with each phenomenon being an indicator of the state of domestic anarchy.

Corruption is generally defined as behavior that deviates from formal duties of a public role in favor of private or personal gain (Friedrich 1966, Heidenheimver 1989; Nye, 1967), an abuse of public power for private benefit (Lovell, 2005; Harris, 2003; Girling, 1997; Alam, 1989), rather than to serve the interests of the polity (Lazar, 2005; Friedrich, 1972). Most treatments of corruption suggest that it a
problem of political character (Alam, 1989), essentially an indicator of social instability and decay (Lovell, 2005) as well as political degradation (Girling, 1997). It is a phenomenon which afflicts weak, poorly governed states (Shore and Haller, 2005; Lazar, 2005), where the polity is fragmented and lacking cohesion (Williams, 2003). Harris (2003), for example, defines corruption as an interstitial activity, the interstices being cracks in the machinery of the state, and indicators of an immature, incoherent state organization, and/or a weak civil society. The weaker governmental control, the greater the interstices, and therefore corruption. Per Myrdal's (1970) formulation, corruption is a feature of weak, relatively powerless states or, the so-called "soft states". Corruption is intimately tied to the quality of government, not necessarily its size. Some of the least corrupt states also have very large public sectors (Lovell, 2005). It is caused by the failings of the political system itself, rather than failings of individuals (Girling, 1997). Whereas corruption is caused by the weakness of the state (Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000), it can only be cured by government efficiency (Goldsmith, 1999). The departures from such norms of modern bureaucracy, such as rationality and universalism, (Alam, 1989) leads to the failure to provide public goods, such as information, coordination, and enforcement (Shore and Haller, 2005; Girling, 1997; Alam, 1989; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000), increasing transaction costs (Seligson, 2002), and creating an atmosphere of heightened uncertainty (Shore and Haller, 2005). This results in arbitrary and unequal distribution of resources, undermines the principle of equality, and generally creates a system where private gain supersedes public interest, undermining trust and confidence in public institutions (Newell and Bull, 2003). All of the above strongly suggests that states that suffer from high levels of corruption are partly anarchic systems where, in the absence of government-provided public goods, a strong "self-help" ethic predominates. It is therefore unsurprising that corruption is also strongly associated with the absence of generalized social trust.

Indeed, in addition to works that link corruption with a decline in trust in political system (Bull and Newell, 2003; Girling, 1997; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Seligson, 2002; Elliott, 1997), there is also evidence that corruption is incompatible with interpersonal trust as well (Seligson, 2002). Moreover, the exclusionary-type relationships that characterize networks of corruption (Shore and Haller, 2005;
Elliott, 1997; Herzfeld, 1997) are strongly reminiscent of particularized trust, or trust among a small group of individuals who know each other well and may have an interest in behaving in trustworthy manner, rather than trust of the generalized variety, where individuals are willing to assume others are trustworthy even in the absence of evidence. Nye's (1967) specification of anarchy as behavior that deviates from a public role describes the beneficiaries of such behavior as individuals, close families, or private cliques, all categories of groups consistent with the notion of particularized trust. This characterization is echoed by Azfar, Lee, and Swamy (2001). In the same vein, high corruption states are characterized as being dominated by closed and exclusionary networks of clientelism and patronage (Harris, 2003; Shore and Haller, 2005), where relationships must continuously be maintained through face-to-face contact and interaction in some form (Warburton, 2001). Corruption furthermore implies a certain form of cultural intimacy through a shared language and knowledge of the "rules of the game" to which outsiders are not privy (Herzfeld, 1997). It has also been compared to construction of group identity on supralocal levels (Zinn, 2005). Moreover, and contrary to the notion of generalized trust, corruption implies a relationship based on quid pro quo reciprocity (Lovell, 2005; Harris, 2003), where the general expectation is that nothing can be obtained without first paying a bribe or rendering some other type.

One of the key features of corruption is its robustness and durability. This characteristic is also consistent with its relationship with generalized social trust. Putnam, for example, recognized the existence of so-called virtuous and vicious circles, where societies with high levels of trust are able to maintain that trust through a feedback mechanism or, conversely, are unable to break the cycle of low trust and poor government performance. A similar feedback loop is seen in the case of corruption, to the point that it is frequently seen as a cultural characteristic, endemic to certain societies (Shore and Haller, 2005). Due to its self-generating mechanism, once corruption passes a certain threshold it becomes extremely difficult to eradicate (Newell and Bull, 2003). The self-perpetuating properties of corruption are also underscored by Bull and Newell (2003), Harris (2003) and Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000). As a result, while the problem of corruption is not unsolvable, the effects of anti-corruption measures (e.g.,
democratization, transparency, better governance) become apparent only in the very long term, as long as over half a century (Seligson, 2002). Furthermore, the persistence of corruption, together with its links to the concept of generalized social trust, may render moot the debate on whether social trust is a trait or an attitude. If social trust is an attitude, it appears to be a remarkably persistent attitude due to a variety of feedback mechanisms, and as such its effects are indistinguishable, and equally stable, from that of a trait.

Literature on corruption also makes it apparent there is little possibility of endogeneity, inasmuch it indicates that it is domestic, rather than foreign, in origin. Instead, there is considerable evidence to the contrary: states that frequently fight wars (and, in particular, states that do poorly in wars) find themselves under pressure to enact domestic reforms in order to improve the quality of governance and thus military performance in the next conflict. The examples of states motivated by military defeats to improve domestic governance include Prussia in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, France following the 1871 defeat by Prussia (Weber, 1976), and Russia after the defeats in the Crimean War and Russo-Japanese War (Hosking, 1997).

Corruption, moreover, is arguably a better indicator of generalized social trust than World Values Survey (WVS) questions pertaining to interpersonal trust. The key problem with using WVS data to operationalize generalized social trust is that the questions themselves are not worded sufficiently precisely to differentiate generalized and particularized trust. WVS question V66 which evaluates the perception of trustworthiness of others confronts the respondent with having to choose between two statements: "Most individuals are trustworthy" and "You can't be too careful." The problem with that formulation, apart from the binary nature of the question, is that it does not specify the population pool the respondent is supposed to identify as inherently trustworthy or untrustworthy. Since it is not clear whether “most individuals” refers to one’s family, neighbors, ethnic group, region, country, or the entire planet, the respondent in effect is allowed to define that aspect of the question himself/herself. Since one cannot infer from the answer what the respondent’s frame of reference is, it is equally impossible to ascertain whether the answer “most individuals are trustworthy” in fact represents generalized or particularized trust. For example, would an individual who’s a member of a closely knit community in a
heavily fragmented society (one that is characterized by low levels of generalized trust) and who, as is likely the case, regularly interacts only with other members of that closely knit group, not respond that “most individuals (within the group with which the respondent has the most contact)” can be trusted”? That possibility has to be entertained, however, the type of trust the respondent is affirming could not be categorized as generalized.

One must also note that the properties of particularized, or encapsulated, trust do not preclude an individual from responding in the affirmative to the WVS question V66 while at the same time projecting untrustworthiness onto strangers, as postulated by the “alien encounter” scenario discussed earlier. The key difference between particularized and generalized trust is the norm of generalized reciprocity, which is absent from the definition of particularized trust. Instead, particularized trust is present in situations where there is an incentive the other individual has to behave in a trustworthy manner, or history of lengthy interaction between the two individuals. However, such history of interaction does not imply trusting individuals outside that small circle of closely interacting individuals; indeed, the “bad civil society” critiques of Putnam’s argument that associations build social trust center focus precisely on that point and suggest that particularized and generalized trust may be mutually exclusive phenomena in the same manner and corruption and generalized social trust are. In other words, individuals who “trust” only in very specific contexts are in actuality low-trusters (per generalized trust definition) who will consider others untrustworthy except in the presence of a clear incentive to behave otherwise. However, the vagueness of the WVS question V66 allows for the possibility that the responders are referring to those contextualized interactions which may represent the majority of interpersonal interactions of these individuals, consistent with the critiques of social capital approach asserting that willingness to interact with strangers requires a pre-existing high level of generalized social trust. Moreover, there is abundant evidence that in cases of extreme hostility there exists the propensity to “de-humanize” members of the out-group, with the possible consequence that a question that makes a reference to “most people” will be interpreted in such a way as to exclude the members of the out-group from the category of “most people”.
In addition, CPI data is preferable to WVS data for studies at this level of analysis due to aggregation issues. The nature of WVS surveys (telephone interviews) and the variation of social trust from individual to individual indicates the need for a relatively sophisticated method of aggregating individual WVS responses into country-level generalized trust values in order to assure that the sample for each country is representative of the country’s population as a whole or, if not, the surveys are appropriately weighted.

The applicability of corruption as an operationalization of generalized social trust is further confirmed by a simple quantitative model utilizing ordinary least squares (OLS) regression using the aggregate 11-year corruption variable and the World Values Survey variable V66 culled from the 3rd "wave" of the survey (World Values Study Group, 2000). The variable V66 evaluates the perception of trustworthiness of others, and represents a survey question in which the respondent is asked to agree with one of the following statements "Most individuals are trustworthy" and "You can’t be too careful." The OLS regression yields the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption Perception Index</td>
<td>-.031***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0323)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=73. Adj. R-squared=.28. *** indicates p<.001, ** indicates p<.01, * indicates p<.05.

The coefficient is negative and therefore in the expected direction, and the statistical significance is very high. This result supports both the use of CPI values as an operationalization of generalized social trust, and the use of an multi-year aggregate measure of social trust. As expected, given the stability of social trust and stability of corruption, the one-year "snapshot" WVS data point is strongly related to the

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3 CPI scale runs from 0 to 10, with the value of 10 representing a state with no corruption whatsoever. WVS variable V66, on the other hand, has two basic values, where 1 represents a perception of trustworthiness, and value of 2 a perception of untrustworthiness, hence the negative expected sign of the coefficient.
multi-year CPI value. The relatively poor fit of the model indicated by the adjusted R-squared of only .28 is likely the consequence of the WVS question V66 not being a sufficiently precise measure of generalized social trust, as discussed earlier.

**Spatial and Temporal Span**

The temporal span of the study is 1990-2001, essentially the period between the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks. This time period is inherently attractive due to the absence of superpower competition and absence of system-changing major international events. The choice of time period is further dictated by the availability of data, particularly for the independent variable.

**Unit of Analysis**

In this respect, the project follows the path charted by Holsti (1995), whose topic and scope are most closely related to the hypotheses outlined above. In his effort to determine whether state strength and/or maturity, Holsti used, as his dependent variable, the number of conflicts per region over the span of 50 years (1945-1995), with the unit of analysis being both region and state, an approach that has been mirrored by Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002, 2004) who have used five-year increments instead of Holsti’s 50-year block.

Therefore this project uses “state” as the unit of analysis for domestic hypotheses and “directed dyad” for international hypotheses due to the inherently interactive nature of international conflict. The use of “state” and “directed dyad” instead of “state-year” or “directed dyad-year” is also consistent with the nature of the independent variable and the available data. While CPI data is available in country-year format, in many cases yearly country corruption values are calculated on the basis of a small number of surveys. As a result, year-to-year variations may be due more to the small sample size than to the actual changes in the country’s domestic situation, particularly since corruption appears to be a resilient and difficult to change phenomenon. As a result, the use of multi-year averages may be more accurate than relying on single-year values (Seligson, 2002). Studies using multi-year CPI averages include Kuznetsov and Kuznetsova (2003).

**Domestic Conflict Hypothesis**
*Domestic Dependent Variable*

The dependent variable, namely the incidence of domestic violent political conflict, is operationalized in two alternative ways. The first, and the more conventional one, is using the PRIO Uppsala Conflict Data (Sorli, Gleditsch, and Strand; 2005), a frequently used measure of domestic conflict (see, for example, Caprioli 2005). In this instance, the variable represents the number of outbreaks of violent domestic conflicts within each state’s borders during the temporal span of the study. The second, and less conventional, operationalization is the number of Minorities at Risk (MARs) within a given state. Although this variable is often used as a control variable in domestic conflict studies (Caprioli; 2005), here it is also used as a dependent variable, as the number of MARs should not necessarily be considered an exogenous variable. The logic of the theory laid out earlier in this project suggests that anarchic states with low levels of generalized social trust are characterized by societal fragmentation. The existence of a large number of MARs within a state should therefore be interpreted as an indicator of latent political conflict, even if it does not necessarily translate into actual violence. The fact that a minority is characterized as being “at risk” suggests that the possibility of violence exists between politically mobilized ethnic factions.

*Domestic Control Variables*

The control variables used here follow the pattern established by domestic conflict literature, and include:

- **GDP growth rate.** This is a variable that is frequently used in literature as a proxy for regime popularity and, as such, ought to be a reliable predictor of internal conflict. The theoretical expectations here are quite straightforward. Given that high growth rates ought to translate into high regime popularity, a state experiencing a period of strong economic growth ought to be characterized by domestic tranquility, with few outbreaks of domestic conflict. Conversely, since economic recessions are likely to contribute to regime downfall, increased frequency of domestic political violence is a likely consequence (Sorli, Gleditsch, and Strand, 2005; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2002; Caprioli, 2005; Hegre and Sambanis; 2005; Hegre, 2003). Data for this variable is obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) (World Bank 2005).
Natural logarithm of population size, another frequently used control variable (Sorli, Gleditsch, and Strand; 2005; De Rouen and Sobek; 2004; Besancon, 2005; Hegre and Sambanis; 2005; Hafner-Burton, 2005) is used to account for the likelihood that the greater the population of the state, the greater the frequency of outbreaks of domestic conflict. Data for this variable is also provided by WDI (World Bank 2005).

Regime type, in the form of Polity score (Democracy score minus Autocracy score) is used to account for two sets of possibilities. The first possibility is that democratic regimes are less likely to experience domestic conflict, as the existence of democratic organizations provides a venue for peaceful conflict resolution and, moreover, democracy is frequently associated with the existence of peaceful conflict resolution norms. In addition, a squared Polity measure is intended to account for a second possibility, namely that it is not regime type but rather degree of regime consolidation that is responsible for presence or absence of conflict. Whereas consolidated democracies are likely to avoid domestic conflict due to their strong institutions and well-entrenched peaceful conflict resolution norms, consolidated autocracies may be able to accomplish the same goal through ruthless and capable security forces capable of deterring the opposition. (Sorli, Gleditsch, and Strand; 2005; De Rouen and Sobek; 2004; Esty et al. 1995, 1998, Gurr 2000; Hegre and Sambanis; 2005; Hafner-Burton, 2005) Source: Polity IIId data, generated by EUGene software (Bennett and Stam, 2000).

The level of militarization of society (Sambanis 2000; Hegre and Sambanis, 2005), operationalized here as the percentage of GDP dedicated to military expenditure, is used to more directly address state capabilities to influence the level of political violence. Here, too, there are two sets of expectations. On the one hand, one must entertain the possibility that the more militarized states are better able to deter political violence from erupting. On the other hand, the very presence of a robust security apparatus may by itself represent a strong incentive to use it. As a result, heavily militarized states may instead display increased levels of domestic violence. The index of capabilities, a measure frequently used in international conflict, is not used here due to the inapplicability of that measure to domestic conflict. Index of capabilities includes such factors as population, geographical area of the state, iron production
which, while pertinent to inter-state conflict, are not as relevant in situations involving domestic conflict. The source used for this variable is likewise WDI (World Bank 2005).

Finally, domestic conflict variables also include the number of minorities at risk (MARs) within a state (Sorli, Gleditsch, and Strand 2005, Caprioli 2005). The presence of MARs implies the existence of latent conflict within the society, with the greater the number of MARs, the greater the expected number of domestic conflict outbreaks. Source: Minorities at Risk Project (2005).

**International Hypotheses**

**International Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable selected for this hypothesis is the number of occurrences of MID initiation and MID targeting during the temporal span of the study, using Maoz's (2005) Dyadic MID Dataset, generated using EUGene software (Bennett and Stam, 2000). Here it should be noted that both fatal and non-fatal disputes are used, since the goal is to ascertain state actors' propensity to view the use of force or even threats of force as an appropriate means of international discourse. Even a non-fatal MID, given the possibility it might escalate, should be seen as a reflection of deep underlying beliefs on the appropriateness of the use of force. Furthermore, the inclusion of such seemingly insignificant MIDs makes for a much more exacting test of the theory by keeping the threshold for inclusion of armed conflicts extremely low. It should be noted that one of the weaknesses of the democratic peace theory is that the findings of virtual absence of *wars* (conflicts with considerably higher levels of violence than MIDS since, per Correlates of War standard, a conflict only becomes a war once the threshold of 1,000 fatalities is reached) in democratic dyads, the same does not hold true if the threshold of violence is lowered to include MIDs. Indeed, some critiques of the democratic peace theory have argued that the finding of dyadic peace may be more due to the rarity of wars (particularly when using the relatively threshold employed by Correlates of War) rather than to any inherent pacifying effects of democracy. However, if the ideational argument of the democratic peace theory is to hold true, namely that democracies unerringly perceive each other as being friendly, the pacifying effect of joint democracy ought to be detectible even in low threshold of violence conflicts.
**International Control Variables**

Quantitative models for Hypotheses 2 and 3 use the standard array of control variables commonly found in international conflict studies. The list of control variables is as follows:

Contiguity (DeRouen and Goldfinch; 2005; Oneal and Tir, 2006) is used, to account for the inherently greater probability that states that are contiguous have more opportunities to engage in conflict. Contiguous states are more likely to have outstanding territorial disputes, resource conflicts, and other points of friction that may give rise to armed conflict. This variable is generated using EUGene software (Bennett and Stam, 2000), with the highest level of contiguity selected.

Joint democracy (DeRouen and Goldfinch; 2005; Pickering and Kisangani, 2005; Oneal and Tir, 2006) is the standard measure of effects of democratic peace, and therefore it is included to account for the possibility that the effects attributed to anarchy and social trust are instead the result of democratic peace. The democratic peace theory posits that absence of armed conflict between states shared democratic values and/or institutions, as posited by the democratic peace theory. This variable is coded in the standard manner, with the dyad coded as 1 when both states in the dyad have a Polity value of 6 or higher (Source: EU Gene software (Bennett and Stam, 2000)).

Economic growth (Oneal and Tir, 2006; Pickering and Kisangani, 2005), operationalized in terms of per capita GDP growth, is used for two reasons. The first is that, in the absence of reliable data on regime popularity, economic growth is frequently used as a proxy for that variable in, for example, diversionary war literature. Consequently, in accordance with the diversionary war theory, states suffering from low or negative economic growth have an incentive to engage in diversionary violence and therefore ought to exhibit an increased propensity to initiate MIDs. Conversely, and in accordance with a number of critiques of the diversionary war theory, negative economic growth reduces a state's ability to wage wars, and therefore ought to translate into both a reduced propensity to initiate international conflicts and into an increased vulnerability to aggression. Data for this variable is obtained from World Development Indicators (World Bank 2005).
The Capabilities Ratio (DeRouen and Goldfinch; 2005 Pickering and Kisangani, 2005; Oneal and Tir, 2006 Bremer 1992) is operationlized using the composite indicator of national capabilities from the Correlates of War dataset generated by EUGene software (Bennett and Stam, 2000). Here, too, the reason for including the variable is manifold. Whereas some expect conflicts to occur when there is a strong preponderance of power, others believe armed conflict is most likely to occur in conditions of parity. The incorporation of this variable allows one to account for both of these scenarios.

Major Power Status (Rasler and Thompson, 2006; Oneal and Tir, 2006), is another commonly used encountered control variable in international conflict literature, due to the numerous findings suggesting that major powers are likely to be engaged in more international conflicts than other powers. Moreover, given the use of politically relevant directed dyads as the level of analysis in the international conflict hypotheses, and the assumption that a major power will be in a politically relevant dyad with every other state due to its greater capabilities and force projection abilities, it is necessary to control for this increased scope for interaction. Major Power Status data comes from the Correlates of War dataset, as generated by EUGene software (Bennett and Stam, 2000).

Alliance Portfolio (Oneal and Tir, 2006), is operationalized using Correlates of War data unweighted global s-score generated by EUGene software (Bennett and Stam, 2000). This variable is included to test the proposition that peaceful relations between states may not be due to social trust levels, but rather because of close alliance ties within the dyad.

Capital-to-Capital Distance is the final control variable (Stinnett et al., 2002). Even with the level of analysis being politically-relevant directed dyad, it is still necessary to account for the fact that while some dyads may actually share a border, others may be separated by hundreds of miles of ocean and, in the case of dyads involving major powers, by thousands of miles. This variance is likely to have a considerable effect on conflict initiation, given that the greater the distance separating the states, the lower the level of force a state can bring to bear against its target, likely resulting in the discounting of the military option as either unfeasible or unlikely to be successful. Data for this variable is drawn from Correlates of War, as generated by EUGene software (Bennett and Stam, 2000).
CHAPTER 8

RESULTS

Hypothesis 1 Domestic Conflict

The model used here is an event count model (in this instance, a negative binomial regression) which is an accepted model for investigating conflict processes (see, for example Maoz, 2000 and 2001).

Table 2. Dependent Variable: Number of domestic conflict outbreaks, using PRIO-Uppsala conflict data. Model: negative binomial regression.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>.707*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure as Share of GDP</td>
<td>1.650**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.256)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>1.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita, Constant Dollars</td>
<td>.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.478)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Minorities at Risk</td>
<td>1.243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.174)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score</td>
<td>1.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score Squared</td>
<td>.981*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.981)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Log of Population</td>
<td>.0095735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.467)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=114. LR chi-squared (7)=37.35. *** indicates p<.001, ** indicates p<.01, * indicates p<.05.

The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the greater the level of generalized social trust within the country, as a result of effective amelioration of anarchic, self-help features of the system, the lower the level of domestic conflict. Of the control variables, the natural logarithm of population also performs as predicted, with the greater the population size, the greater the likelihood of an outbreak of violence. Similarly, higher squared polity scores, representing more mature and firmly established regimes (irrespective of whether they are democratic or authoritarian), are reflected by a reduction in the
likelihood of domestic conflict which is also in accordance with expectations. After all, the more mature and established regime is, the more likely it is to be an effective provider of public goods. A seemingly more surprising result is the apparently positive relationship between the level of military spending (as percentage of GDP) and domestic conflict. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that military expenditures are, as literature on militarism and militarization suggests, an endogenous, rather than an exogenous, variable. Governments do not spend large sums of money on national security unless there is a perception of threat. Such a perception is more likely to exist in anarchic, self-help, low-trust states. The positive relationship in this instance furthermore indicates that an increased degree of militarization is not an effective method of dealing with domestic conflict. Of the other control variables, the insignificance of the number of MARs as an indicator of domestic conflict suggests that the number of MARs itself may not be an exogenous variable, a proposition that will be tested shortly. Finally, the insignificance of the rate of economic growth is likewise unsurprising, given that social trust has been demonstrated as a prerequisite for economic growth (Putnam, 2000; Uslaner 2003; Fukuyama 1995).

Table 3. Dependent Variable: Number of MARs. Model: Negative Binomial Regression.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>.892*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure as Share of GDP</td>
<td>( .045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>.941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita, Constant dollars</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score</td>
<td>.997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score Squared</td>
<td>1.44***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Log of Population</td>
<td>(.082)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=114. LR chi-squared (7)=56.57. *** indicates p<.001, ** indicates p<.01, * indicates p<.05.

As discussed earlier, operationalizing domestic conflict in terms of the number of MARs rather than actual outbreaks of violence allows us to look at the level of latent violence within a society.
Although the use of the number of MARs as a control variable implies its exogeneity, the theory elaborated above suggests that even ethnicity, which sometimes is treated as a primordial trait, is likely to be the related to the level of anarchy within a state’s borders leading to the formation of communities closely bound by particularized trust. Indeed, the results bear out this prediction. The more anarchic, self-help the state, the greater the number of MARs within its borders, reflecting the fragmented, inherently conflictual nature of social relationships characterized by strong in-group preference and out-group discrimination. Of the control variables, remarkably and unsurprisingly only the natural log of population shows strong results. As one might expect, population size strongly contributes to the number of MARs. However, the results do not indicate that domestic political regime, level of militarization, and economic performance have an influence on the number of MARs. While these variables may have an impact on the actual number of outbreaks of political domestic violence, they do not influence the fundamental level of society’s fragmentation. However, domestic anarchy appears to have an effect on both counts. It is responsible both for the latent level of conflict within a society, and for an increase in the number of acts of violence.

**International Hypotheses--Initiation**

The first model in this section is actually a test of the democratic peace alternative, without the social trust variable, in order to test the viability of the model. If joint democracy shows the expected pacifying effects on the dyad, this will provide a benchmark against which later results can be compared.

**Table 4. Dependent Variable: Number of MID Initiations. Model: Poisson regression.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>.520***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities Ratio</td>
<td>.997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Unweighted Alliance S-score</td>
<td>.744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( 1.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power Status (Initiator)</td>
<td>2.265***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.402)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita Growth (Initiator)</td>
<td>1.116**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital-to-Capital Distance</td>
<td>.999***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00006)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The results are wholly consistent with the democratic peace theory, since shared democracy appears to reduce MID initiations within the dyad by nearly half. It should be noted, however, that the results are not very robust as they become statistically insignificant (although only narrowly so) in the negative binomial regression model (results not reported).

The next model introduces the social trust variable, at first in dyadic form. The joint trust independent variable for this hypothesis was generated by coding all dyads in which both states belong to the highest social trust category with 1, and all others with a 0.

Table 5. Dependent Variable: Number of MID Initiations. Model: Negative Binomial Regression.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Trust</td>
<td>.0811***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>.939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities Ratio</td>
<td>.994*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Unweighted Alliance S-score</td>
<td>.710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power Status (Initiator)</td>
<td>3.135***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita Growth (Initiator)</td>
<td>1.111*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital-to-Capital Distance</td>
<td>.999***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1865. LR chi-squared=144.43. *** indicates p<.001, ** indicates p<.01, * indicates p<.05

Once the joint trust variable is introduced into the model, the results are quite stark. It would appear that the pacifying effects attributed to shared democracy may instead be attributable to generalized social trust, particularly since the effect of joint trust appears to be quite strong. Whereas in the previous model joint democracy accounted for a 50% drop in MID initiations within a dyad, joint trust accounts for a drop of over 90%, or an order of magnitude change. Moreover, whereas joint trust retains a high level of statistical significance, joint democracy becomes insignificant.
Of control variables, the strongest effects are to be found in major power status, which renders the state in question to be more than three times more likely to engage in MID initiation than other states. Capital-to-capital distance likewise has strong statistical significance, with the number of MIDs decreasing with the increase in distance separating the states within a dyad. Economic growth has a slight effect of increasing the likelihood of conflict, a result that runs counter to the predictions of diversionary war theory inasmuch as it predicts that states that suffer from bad economic performance should be more likely to initiate conflicts as their leaders attempt to shore up their flagging political fortunes. Similarly, the greater the capabilities ratio the lower the likelihood of conflict, lending support to the arguments that conflict is more likely at parity. Finally, alliance portfolio does not appear to have a statistically significant effect on conflict although the factor itself suggests that it reduces the incidence of conflict. The weakness of this variable may be attributable to the possibility that the existence of alliances, like the absence of conflict, is the result of shared high level of social trust which promotes cooperation. This is a question that will be addressed in future research.

Next, to ascertain the effects of social trust on monadic level the main independent variable is recoded into a four-category variable [corr_cat], which is then transformed into four dummy variables [corr1 through corr4]. Each of these four categories represents approximately 26 states, divided in accordance with their level of corruption, with corr1 representing the lowest values (in other words, the most corrupt states, or states with the lowest level of social trust), and corr4 the highest values (the least corrupt states, or states with the highest level of generalized social trust).

The increase in the standard error of joint democracy from Table 4 to Table 5 indicates a possible problem with multicollinearity in the model between trust and regime type. However, correlations tables (see Appendix) show a level of correlation between trust and joint democracy of only .3, limiting the likelihood of multicollinearity. It should also be noted that multicollinearity is an issue which violates no regression assumptions and which moreover has no statistical solution (Achen, 1982). Moreover, the Joint Democracy variable also shows a significant drop in its marginal effect from Table 4 to Table 5, with its factor approaching 1. This suggests that the increase in joint democracy's standard error may in
fact be less due to multicollinearity than to its lack of effect independent of social trust. However, if there is a relationship between democracy and social trust, the causal arrow appears to run less from democracy to trust, but rather from trust to democracy (Uslaner, 2002; 2003; Letki, 2004; Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1997; Aberbach and Walker, 1970).

Table 6. Dependent Variable: Number of MID Initiations. Model: Negative Binomial Regression.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust Quartile (Initiator)</td>
<td>.454***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>1.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.241)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities Ratio</td>
<td>.994*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Unweighted Alliance S-score</td>
<td>.139*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power Status (Initiator)</td>
<td>3.759***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita Growth (Initiator)</td>
<td>1.184***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital-to-Capital Distance</td>
<td>.999***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1865 LR chi-squared(7)=176.86. *** indicates p<.001, ** indicates p<.01, * indicates p<.05.

The results hold up on monadic level as well. When examining the potential initiators within the dyad (the first state listed within each directed dyad), it is clear that the initiator’s level of social trust has a strong and independent effect on reducing the number of MIDs within the dyad. Other variables perform in the same manner as in the dyadic hypothesis, with the exception of the alliance portfolio variable which, although weak statistically, shows a strong effect at reducing the incidence of conflict.

To further explore the effects of social trust as a property of individual states, the above model incorporates three out of four categorical social trust variables. The lowest social trust category (corr_11) is left out to serve as the baseline. As noted earlier, each category represents a quartile of states, ranked in accordance with their social trust ratings.
Table 7: Dependent Variable: Number of MID Initiations. Model: Negative Binomial Regression.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust (Initiator) Third Quartile</td>
<td>.452**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( .133)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust (Initiator) Second Quartile</td>
<td>.259***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.091)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust (Initiator) First Quartile</td>
<td>.0858***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0286)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>1.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities Ratio</td>
<td>.994*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Unweighted Alliance S-score</td>
<td>.144*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power Status (Initiator)</td>
<td>4.107***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.244)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita Growth (Initiator)</td>
<td>1.182828***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0556)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital-to-Capital Distance</td>
<td>.999***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 1865. LR chi-squared (9): 177.54. *** indicates p<.001, ** indicates p<.01, * indicates p<.05.

The results show that high-trust states initiate MIDs at a rate over 90% lower than low-trust states, or an order shift in magnitude in the rate of conflict initiation, ceteris paribus. In addition, they show that every social trust category shows a substantively and statistically significant pacifying effect when compared to the baseline bottom quartile. The strong across-the-board effect generalized social trust has on conflict initiation removes the possibility that the result is due to outliers or other statistical anomalies. One is moreover struck by the large differences between the quartiles when it comes to the effects of social trust. Thus, whereas the second-lowest social trust category initiates MIDs at a rate 55% lower than the bottom social trust category, the value for the second highest category is approximately 25%, and for the top category a mere 8%.

The results depart from the predictions in one important respect, namely the absence of the predicted curvilinear relationship, wherein both very low- and very high-trust states exhibit a reduced propensity to initiate MIDs. This discrepancy may be due to one of the two following reasons. The first possibility is that the discrepancy is due to the limitations to using corruptions as an operationalization of
domestic anarchy. A closer examination of the model reveals that states which arguably have experienced a genuine Hobbesian culture of anarchy within their borders during the 1990s (e.g., Afghanistan, Somalia, Rwanda, etc.) are missing from the model. Corruption, inasmuch as it is defined as a departure from the norms of serving public interest, by definition cannot be measured in a country in a state of civil war where such norms are virtually nonexistent. The second possibility, drawing on Migdal's research on state and society⁴, is that very low-trust states, or states with domestic culture of anarchy approaching Hobbesian will, contrary, to predictions made earlier in this project, are actually more, not less, likely to initiate MIDs. In such highly fragmented states, where the state is so weak as to be indistinguishable from non-state societal actors operating within the same borders, international conflicts may well be initiated by such non-state actors, which may additionally claim to be the de-facto state actors. The 2006 Israeli-Lebanese war, which was triggered by Hezbollah capture of Israeli soldiers, may be an example of such a phenomenon. The latter explanation appears to be the more likely one, particularly since it is actually more consistent with the theory advanced in this project, namely that individuals who exist in an anarchic domestic environment are more likely to view other actors as inherently untrustworthy, making cooperation less, and conflict more likely. Therefore a sub-state actor is unlikely to differentiate between actors on the basis of whether they are separated from oneself by a state borders. If violence is the appropriate way of dealing with other actors within the same (semi-anarchic) state, it will also be seen as an appropriate way of dealing with actors outside of that state.

Nevertheless, the degree to which generalized trust affects MID initiation is striking, particularly when one stops to consider that low trust states, from the rational perspective, should be the least likely states to court the prospect of war. A partially anarchic, fragmented state, with low levels of generalized social trust and plagued by corruption is precisely the type of state that is the least likely to do well in actual conflict. The fragmentation, corruption, and ineffectiveness that is plaguing its government is likely to extent to its armed forces as well, with predictable results.

⁴ I owe this insight to my colleague Brian Early.
However, social trust is only one part of the answer. The findings so far suggest that decisions to initiate MIDs consist of both a heuristic/cognitive and rational component. Both the level of trust and the major power status of the state are strong indicators of decisions to initiate MIDs, having strong statistical as well as substantive significance. The weaker, but still positive, relationship between economic growth and MID initiation similarly points to a modicum of rational utility calculation in the decisionmaking. These results should not be necessarily seen as mutually contradictory. Instead, they suggest the applicability of Most and Starr's "opportunity and willingness" framework, with major power status representing opportunity, and generalized trust representing willingness. While low level of social trust may lead to state-level decisionmakers who believe in the inherent malevolence of other actors (as well as masses who share that worldview) and in the appropriateness and the utility of the use of force, willingness by itself does not constitute a sufficient cause for MID initiation. MIDs are most likely to occur when such willingness is accompanied by opportunity in the form of ability to successfully challenge other states militarily. The combination of results suggests that the most likely MID initiator is an anarchic, low-trust major power experiencing a period of significant economic growth, or a state that combines an inherent suspicion and mistrust of others (possibly bordering on xenophobia) with capabilities to confidently give that mistrust a concrete expression in the form of a military challenge.

The findings also have implications for the diversionary war theory which posits that the main reason behind decisions to initiate conflict is to be found in domestic politics. However, where the findings depart from the standard diversionary war theory is in the definition of the independent variable. Diversionary theory posits that leaders initiate international conflicts when their political fortunes are threatened by some adverse developments that undermine their popularity. Thus the dependent variable is usually operationalized in terms of economic growth (on the entirely reasonable and likely correct assumption that, in general, bad economic performance translates into government unpopularity) or, sometimes more directly, using popularity ratings of leaders. However, the findings consistently show that it is economic growth, not economic slumps, that are responsible for increased rates in MID initiation, which runs counter to diversionary theory predictions. Two likely explanations suggest
themselves. The first, and relatively simple, explanation is that there is no diversion per se. If MID initiations flow from an inherent mistrust of others, by definition such MIDs cannot be termed diversionary. It is not a diversion if one really believes the MID target genuinely represents a threat that must be dealt with, and can be dealt with only through use, threat, or demonstration of force. The second, more complex, explanation (and, given the evidence of at least rudimentary rational utility calculation, probably the more likely one) is that leaders of anarchic, self-help states with low levels of social trust are aware of the masses’ sentiments and attempt to channel their latent hostility outward, at external or international targets. The masses, for their part, are likely to support their leaders’ aggressive policies both because such policies are consistent with the worldview held by most individuals in a low-trust society. Moreover, conflict creates the impression that the state is providing public goods in the form of protection against an external foe. This explanation therefore implies that a diversion is a function of not so much unpopularity as of illegitimacy of the regime. This explanation also helps explain the puzzling lack of findings in support of the diversionary theory of war. Legitimate regimes, even when unpopular, do not engage in diversionary activities while for illegitimate regimes the diversionary incentives are ever-present, and are not contingent on economic performance or other indicators of popularity.

Finally, the apparent weakness of relative capabilities as a factor in conflict initiation (particularly when compared to the strength of major power status) suggests that the decision to initiate conflicts may be predominantly a domestic one, with the attributes of the target state playing only a minor role. This possibility will be more fully tested in the next hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 3. International Conflict Targeting**

This hypothesis tests the contention that high-trust states are less likely to become victims of MID initiation, due to their better ability to deter would-be challengers, and/or a different, less confrontational mode of international interaction, which is less threatening and provocative to others. The model is identical to the one used to validate Hypothesis 2, with the exception of the dependent variable. In this case, the dependent variable is the number of MID initiations against the state in question, also from Ze’ev Maoz’s (2005) Dyadic MID Dataset version 2.0.
Table 8: Dependent Variable: Number of times state is MID target. Model: Negative Binomial Regression.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust Quartile (Target)</td>
<td>.687***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>.905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.214)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities Ratio</td>
<td>.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Unweighted Alliance S-score</td>
<td>.314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.279)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power Status (Target)</td>
<td>1.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.3142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita Growth (Target)</td>
<td>1.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0476)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital-to-Capital Distance</td>
<td>.999***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1865. LR chi-squared (7)=113.19. *** indicates p<.001, ** indicates p<.01, * indicates p<.05.

The negative binomial regression model suggests that only two variables, distance and the target’s social trust level influence whether a state within a dyad is likely to become a MID target. The result concerning distance are wholly unsurprising, and confirm earlier findings that the more distant the state is from potential attackers, the less likely it is to become a MID target. Also as predicted, generalized social trust of the target state has a negative effect on MID targeting, with high-trust states being less frequent target for MIDs than low-trust states. More surprisingly, these are the only two variables to have any statistical significance in the model. Of particular interest is the insignificance of the major power variable. Whereas major power status of the initiator was a robust predictor of MID initiation, that same status in a prospective MID target appears to be of no importance.

The juxtaposition of these two results leads to a number of conclusions. Firstly, it does appear that the pacifying effect of social trust level of the target state is more likely due to signaling effects rather than any deterrent effect. The insignificance of such “objective” indicators of state power as capabilities ratio or major power status suggests that potential MID initiators are not dissuaded by the power of the
prospective target. Since these objective measures of power are also more easily observable than something as intangible as social trust, it seems unlikely the effect of social trust is due to anything other than signaling effects. Secondly, the relative weakness of target variables reinforces the conclusion tentatively drawn in the analysis of results of Hypothesis 2 that domestic characteristics of the MID initiator are of more significance than the characteristics of the target. Such an conclusion is entirely consistent with the diversionary theory of war, as well as with the neoliberal argument that state preferences are the product of domestic political processes.

Table 9: Dependent Variable: Number of times state is MID target. Model: Negative Binomial Regression.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust (Target) Third Quartile</td>
<td>.505*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust (Target) Second Quartile</td>
<td>.337**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust (Target) First Quartile</td>
<td>.339**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>.914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.216)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities Ratio</td>
<td>.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Unweighted Alliance S-score</td>
<td>.372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.334)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power Status (Target)</td>
<td>.983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.292)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita Growth (Target)</td>
<td>1.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital-to-Capital Distance</td>
<td>.999***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1865. LR chi-squared (9)=115.18. *** indicates p<.001, ** indicates p<.01, * indicates p<.05.

When broken down into categorical variables, the social trust variable continues to have an effect, although both the substantive and statistical significance appear to be somewhat diminished. In substantive terms, while states in the second-lowest social trust category are the targets of only about half as many MID initiations (ceteris paribus), and those in the uppermost category are targeted at a rate two
thirds lower than the baseline, there is no discernible difference between the two topmost categories, which is a major difference from the results on MID initiation.

However, overall the results support the main hypothesis, showing that high-trust states are indeed less likely to be victims of MID initiations. This is also consistent with findings by Parks, Henager, and Scamahorn (1996), who found that low-trust actors in prisoner’s dilemma games are much more receptive to other actors’ signaling of intent to defect than to cooperate. Moreover, the relative weakness (compared to the strength of findings in support of H2) of these results suggests that attributes of international conflict targets are a rather weak predictor of international conflict, consistent with Moravcsik’s (1997) argument that the sources of state preferences are to be found in domestic politics.

Thus the ideal “profile” of a MID target is an anarchic, self-help state with a low level of generalized social trust that is geographically located in a close proximity to an anarchic, self-help major power experiencing a period of economic growth.
CHAPTER 8

QUALITATIVE CASE STUDY: THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR I

Arguably the best case study to illustrate the dynamics of the impact of social trust and other factors identified in the quantitative analyses above is the interaction of European major powers leading up to the outbreak of World War I. With the centennial of the outbreak of the First World War rapidly approaching, it is perhaps appropriate to reflect on the causes of that system-altering conflict, all the more so many of the factors that contributed to its outbreak persist even to this day.

One of these factors is the impact of economic development and interdependence on international conflict. Whereas today, in the era of globalization, there exists considerable optimism that the combination of democracy, universal hospitality, and international institutions (the three components of Kantian peace) have all but banished conflict at least among the states that are well integrated into the international economic system (Jervis, 2002), one should not forget that similar predictions were being made prior to 1914. That staggeringly destructive and costly war took place in spite of predictions that such conflict was extremely unlikely to occur due to interdependence, growing wealth of nations, and the increased costs of major conflict (Wolf, 2005). To the extent that a similar prescription for peace is being offered today, the failure of optimistic prognoses prior to 1914 should be a cause for concern, not the least due to the painful social disruptions and dislocations that have accompanied both the industrial revolution of the 19th and early 20th centuries, and the globalization processes of the 20th/early 21st centuries. Even as the modern states were emerging, their societies were undergoing a painful transition from local, traditional, relatively immobile societies, to mass modern ones, causing considerable political upheaval in their wake. These political upheavals, in the form of revolutionary movements sweeping Europe in the 19th century (arguably starting with the French Revolution and ending with the Nazi Machtergreifung of 1933) all represented the “growing pains” of the emergence of modern societies. It is that fraying of the traditional “conscience collective” that prompted Durkheim and others to begin considering the
importance of the moral foundational of society and ways to restore it in the wake of changes wrought by industrialization. A similar unraveling is a possible, consequence of globalization processes in their current form. A number of experts have already observed that globalization has caused growth in intra- and inter-state inequality, and has reduced the states’ ability to provide public goods in a number of important policy areas (Scott, 2001; Naim, 2003). Clearly, the role of social trust as a determinant of conflict was as central a century ago as it is today.

Furthermore, the outbreak of World War I is an attractive case to study the influence generalized social trust largely because the major powers of Europe have by then been engaged in nearly a century-long effort at social trust creation within their borders. The "strong" states of Europe were, in 1914, a comparatively recent creation. A mere century earlier, governments of European states could only make a weak claim to exercising full internal sovereignty that was purportedly their due according to the Treaty of Westphalia. The 19th century was to be characterized by a feverish cycle of revolutions and nation-building efforts, which resulted in the emergence of modern states that would appear familiar in their shape and function to modern observers. However, while European states in the 17th and 18th centuries fell far short of the ideal of internal sovereignty, or having the monopoly on the internal use of force, they gradually acquired these powers over the course of the 19th century. Only in the late 18th and 19th centuries did technology permit the rapid transmission of information and goods, allowing states make good on their claim to internal sovereignty (Schulze, 2002).

The incentive for such exercises in nation-building as documented, for example, by Eugen Weber in his seminal “Peasants into Frenchmen” were twofold. The fear of revolution induced by the disruptive effects of the industrial revolution certainly played a role (Lincoln, 1983). However, an older and probably even more powerful factor driving these reforms was the growing reforms that states with increased social trust make for formidable opponents in wartime. The wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon’s First Empire confronted the rest of Europe with the vision of a state with a powerful bureaucracy capable of considerable (by the standards of early 19th century Europe, at any rate) resource extraction and public good provision and a population that was less inclined to see their own government
as an “out-group” (Broers, 1996). The implications for military effectiveness of the more extensive social contract of the French Revolution, under which both the individual and the state undertook extensive mutual obligations were such that no state in Europe could afford to ignore the French example. Karl von Clausewitz’s discussion of the Napoleonic wars included the realization that wars ceased to be the province of sovereigns and their armies. Instead, they became the business of entire peoples (Clausewitz, 2004). Consequently, the remainder of the 19th century was characterized by an arms race among the major powers in which they sought military advantage over one another not only through superior technology, but also by seeking to outdo one another in the effectiveness of their nation-building through increasingly more extensive and elaborate provision of public goods. In this respect, Weber’s process of turning “peasants into Frenchmen” (or, depending on the country, Germans, Russians, Italians, etc.) appears to have been a step in the larger process of turning peasants into soldiers. Clearly, a “nation in arms” approach to defense could only be successfully implemented if the bulk of the inhabitants of a state viewed themselves as members of a single nation. The ineffectiveness of ancien regime armies composed of long-term professionals officered by aristocrats when confronted with masses of citizen-soldiers commanded by citizen-officers made the process of nation-building imperative. Moreover, since compulsory universal military service requires the existence of a culture of generalized reciprocity, it is evident that the imposition of such a burden on the population could only be implemented as part of a broader provision of public goods.

If the 19th century literature is any guide, the inhabitants of that era were well aware of the importance of the bond between the state and society, the need for an extensive social contract between the leaders and the led, to the state’s military fortunes. To cite but a few examples, while Leo Tolstoy’s

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5 In contrast to long-term professional soldiers who were paid respectable sums of money for their service (which considerably reduced the size of armies states could field, and rendered them quite casualty-averse which reduced the likelihood of decisive battlefield victories), draftee/conscript soldiers historically and in virtually all historical milieus were paid what can be termed symbolic sums of money. Therefore widespread acceptance of universal military service can only be explained in terms of generalized reciprocity. There is no direct monetary (or otherwise) reward for service. Instead, one serves the state in the expectation that the state’s existence and security will at some future date be of some as-yet undefined benefit to the individual. Willingness to submit oneself to universal military service also implies willingness to sacrifice on behalf of others (Bessel, 1997).
epic “War and Peace” describes the events of Napoleonic era, the book was written in the aftermath of the Russian military defeat in the Crimean War and must be viewed through the lens of the debate that took place following that defeat. Tolstoy’s invocation of the myth of Russian popular resistance, and the warning about the inexorable forces of history remaking the world are a well concealed (given the political implications of Tolstoy’s recommendations, they had to be) call for social reform in Russia, lest it be left behind by other major powers and thus subjected to further defeats. Emile Zola’s great novel of the Franco Prussian War “The Debacle”, although sometimes described as a pacifist novel due to its unsparing criticism of the flaws of the French military during that war, likewise represents a call on France to recapture its Napoleonic greatness, with social reforms aimed at exploiting the latent French national spirit (reforms whose implementation is the subject of “Peasants into Frenchmen”) presented as a necessity if France is to do better the next time it is pitted against the unified Germany. Ernest Renan’s statement that German victories in 1870/71 were to the credit of the “Prussian schoolmaster” is likewise a recognition of the growing importance of the provision of public goods to the effectiveness of national mobilization in time of war.

This case is also attractive due to the relatively high unit homogeneity among the five major powers that went to war in 1914. The differences between domestic political regimes of these states were not as pronounced. Whereas during World War II, or the Cold War, the spectrum ran the gamut from full democracies to solidly totalitarian states, in 1914 that spectrum was considerably more narrow. Even the democratic states like France and Great Britain enjoyed only a limited franchise, while the absolutist Russian Tsar was forced to acquiesce to the State Duma which took over a number of governing functions. All the major powers were members of one of the two major opposing alliance systems whose cumulative capabilities were approximately equal (as evidenced by the prolonged and inconclusive nature of fighting between 1914 and 1918). There was also a universal agreement as to how the future war was going to be fought. All the major powers expected that a future conflict would be short and decided by an all-out offensive. The belief in the ascendancy of the offensive, furthermore, created an incentive to initiate hostilities, rather than to await its initiation by its adversary. It was also a war in which the
ultimate outcome was won not so much on the battlefield as on the “home front”. Furthermore, on the eve of war all the major powers’ armies were almost identically equipped and organized, with neither side in the conflict enjoying a pronounced qualitative or quantitative advantage. This, in contrast to World War II, made the hoped-for rapid war of movement followed by a quick and relatively bloodless victory elusive. Consequently, none of the major powers suffered a clear-cut, decisive defeat on the battlefield. The war quickly turned into one of attrition where success would go to the side that could tolerate the strain the longest. As a result, defeat came only as the combatants gradually succumbed to the stresses of the war, which tested their national cohesion and the legitimacy of their regimes. Since individual participation in a military mobilization or a national war effort essentially represents willingness to sacrifice on behalf of others (Bessel, 1997), it is evident that the level of generalized social trust that characterizes a society will have a direct impact on the effectiveness of that war effort.

The processes of state- and nation-building did not proceed at the same pace, or even in the same direction, in every European state. The outbreak of World War I represented to a large extent the spillover of the "growing pains" of the emerging modern nation-states of Europe. The tragic irony of 1914 is that the nation-building efforts of the European major powers were sufficiently advanced to turn these states into extremely resilient warfighters (to cite but one statistic, each major power lost, on average, around 1,000 soldiers killed in action per day, every day, for the duration of the war), yet not sufficiently advanced for their “moral communities” to transcend national borders. Mass warfare was already possible, transnational “in-group” formation has not yet arrived.

Thus the Sarajevo assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, found the major powers of Europe already on a near-war footing, the result of decades of dedicated preparation. The effectiveness of these preparations would be made evident in the swiftness of mobilization and the rapidity with which armies of hundreds of thousands of troops would be dispatched from their peacetime garrisons into war. However, the events of particular interest are the actions of the major powers in the immediate run-up to the war, specifically their reactions to the assassination. Clearly, it is probably inevitable that a terrorist act of this magnitude was going to have profound consequences.
Yet it was not self-evident at the time that it was going to lead to a general European war. While similar crises and provocations had occurred in the preceding decade (for example, the Agadir Incident, the Balkan Wars, etc.), all of which led to talk of war, ultimately these crises were defused through diplomatic means. The Sarajevo assassination proved to be an exception. This ultimately costly exception was due to the fact that while some of the major powers sought to avoid a war, others appeared determined to seize this opportunity to launch one.

**The Actors**

Before the question of conflict initiation is addressed directly, one must consider which of the major powers fit in the conflict initiator “profile” identified above, namely a major power with a high level of domestic “self-help” experiencing a period of economic growth. Since all the five states (Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, and Russia) whose actions will be considered here are generally acknowledged to have had major power status, this leaves only economic growth and societal cohesion to be considered.

**Germany**

In terms of satisfying the criterion of a major power undergoing a period of steady economic growth, Germany unquestioningly does so. Thanks to several decades of strong industrial expansion and population growth, both in relative and absolute terms, by 1914 it was arguably the most powerful state on the European continent. While it was inferior to both Russia and the United States in terms of population (Kennedy, 1989), in industrial terms it was second only to the United States. Moreover, its growth rate was staggeringly rapid, allowing it to more than maintain its relative position in the international system. Between 1880 and 1913, German per-capita industrialization increased by a factor of more than 3, or at a rate comfortably greater than any other major power, and its share of world manufacturing output increased from 8.5% to 14.7% (Kennedy, 1989). In terms of iron and steel production, a major yardstick of military capability for industrial-era armies (and, in fact, still used as a component of composite capability indices), in 1913 Germany was second only to the United States, a considerable improvement over 1890 when it was a distant third to Great Britain. Germany also
comfortably maintained its relative position of exceeding Russia's steel production by a factor of 3 or 4, and significantly increased its relative superiority over France (Kennedy, 1989). Whereas it was only scarcely ahead of Russia in 1880, in 1913 its industrial production exceeded that of Russia by a factor of 2 (Kennedy, 1989). This factor is of crucial importance, particularly since it was the purported growth of Russian power that German war faction found so troubling (Taylor, 1980).

Therefore, given the apparent existence of a rational component of the decisionmaking that takes into consideration material factors, German leadership was in a strong position to contemplate conflict as a means of improving its international position. Germany’s strength meant that opportunities existed for it to successfully exercise its power.

The industrial potential translated into a short-term (i.e., absent a prolonged industrial mobilization, the United States military potential was still minor) warmaking capacity second to none in 1914, so much so that in peacetime the German leadership did not even fully exploit its economic potential. In contrast to France, for example, Germany did not call up all eligible recruits. Germany's total military expenditure represented a proportionally smaller share of its national income than most other powers'. Whereas Germany allocated only 4.6% of its national income to defense, France allocated 4.8%, Austria-Hungary 6.1%, and Russia 6.3%. This indicates that Germany had some spare capacity left to meet the perceived threat of the power of Russia, which was driven by a defense burden nearly 50% higher than Germany's (Taylor, 1980). In spite of the reduced level of spending, the German forces were the best equipped, both in terms of quality and quantity, in Europe. Even the German reserve forces, alone among all major powers, were equipped and trained nearly as well as the regular forces, so much so that they were deemed capable of taking the field alongside the regular forces, in contrast to other armies who used their reserve divisions and corps for essentially security duties. This extra capability proved a crucial advantage in the opening battles of 1914, although clearly not enough of a margin to ensure victory (Kennedy, 1989).

Nevertheless, this rapid growth of German military capability (which, it should be added, included the transformation of the German navy from essentially a coast-defense force that was effectively blockaded by the French during the War of 1870 to a top-rank navy capable of threatening the
British naval supremacy) did not breed a sense of security. For all its power, Germany was a remarkably insecure major power, and the growth of its power seemed to correspond with growing feelings of encirclement and menace. Given the growth in Germany’s stature since 1871, one might have expected the emergence of the sense of security based on Germany’s enviable material resources. Yet, in 1914, Germany’s leaders appeared convinced, contrary to evidence, that they were losing ground and that time was not on their side (Taylor, 1980). The anti-war factions in Germany, after all, viewed Germany’s international position in far more positive (and, arguably, objective) terms, felt that there was no need for war, and did not regard Germany's encirclement as real, with the German industry winning the battle for the control of continent all by itself (Taylor, 1980).

The reason for this sense of impending doom that engulfed the German leadership lay in the still low degree of social trust within the German state. For all its economic success, Germany was not able to create a strong sense of nationhood among its still-diverse population. To be sure, in large part this was due to the historically fragmented nature of peoples which eventually were encompassed by the borders of the nascent German state. Prior to the mid-19th century, close mutual identification of the German nation with the German state was not possible due in large measure to the historical absence of existence of a “German” state. As late as the final decades of the 18th century, it was considered self-evident that Germans, on the score of their inherent individualism, were unsuited to living within a single centralized state (Schulze, 2002). Partly as a result of these inauspicious beginnings, Germany was not as successful at inventing a national myth as France. The German state had to resort to relying on a secular national enemy against whom German people had to struggle to retain unity, and the concept of conquest or cultural and military supremacy. German identity was a function of who its enemies were (Hobsbawm, 1994), and German nationalism was built chiefly on military unification (White, 1996). Bismarck's creation of a unified German state was the only national historical experience which all citizens of the new Empire had in common. The Franco-Prussian War, an event of central importance in the founding myth of the German nation, was elevated to mythic status, complete with annual commemorations of the Sedan Day, the date on which Emperor Napoleon III surrendered himself and his encircled army to the
combined German forces. The craving for national consensus, the fear of dissolution, was stronger in Germany than in other European countries (Schulze, 2002).

Thus on the eve of World War I, despite its impressive economic development, Germany remained internally fragmented. Under the veneer of the German unity there persisted strong territorial and denominational differences that were enshrined in the legal system. The continued existence of noble privilege played havoc with the notion of the rule of law (Brose, 2001). Germany also lacked the generalized sense a middle class culture of common sense and generalized practices (Schulze, 2002). The Imperial German military was the only institution that could claim a truly pan-German character (although here too, as will be shown later, the effects of continued fragmentation of the German polity were keenly felt) and, as a consequence, one of the key functions of the German military was to maintain the existing social and political regime (Deist, 1997; Goemans, 2000). This entailed safeguarding the German state against its purported domestic enemies, including Social Democrats, Catholics (fully 40% of the German population, in itself a sign of the failure to create a sense of common destiny), Polish nationalists, Jews (who were discriminated against in a number of ways, including the ban on obtaining officer commissions except in cases of converts to Christianity), inhabitants of the newly conquered formerly French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, and “liberals” (Schulze, 2002). Fear of domestic opponents of the ruling regime appears to have been was at least as great as the fear of external enemies (Goemans, 2000). Due to the apparent inability to create a strong sense of identity with the German state, the German state was forced to resort to coercive policies, for example the infamous Kulturkampf, in order to force recalcitrant minorities into line with state policy (Schulze, 2002). The experience of German sovereignty over Alsace-Lorraine, in particular, demonstrated the difficulty the Second Reich experienced in establishing an overarching national identity that trumped its regional ones. In the years leading up to the outbreak of World War I and during its early states, the inhabitants of these two provinces were widely suspected of pro-French sympathies, and throughout the 1871-1914 period the supposedly unified German military engaged in discriminatory practices toward recruits from these provinces (Kramer, 1997). Although the experience of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine was arguably
the most extreme example of the regional distinctions and peculiarities within the Wilhelmine armed forces, one is struck by the extent to which the German military (with the exception of the navy) retained the corporate identities of pre-Unification German states. The German military’s effort to establish its pan-German identity was severely undermined by the territorial nature of recruitment and other regional distinctions. German army units wore uniforms which retained unique identifying features of the armies of pre-Unification German states. In Bavaria the German army’s regionalism went so far as to permit the maintenance of individually numbered Bavarian army corps. Even the Imperial Guard Corps, the army’s elite, showpiece, and most certain path to officer advancement, was recruited from Prussian provinces in proximity to Berlin. Thus Prussians served only with Prussians, Bavarians with Bavarians, etc., hampering the development of pan-German national identity (Haythornthwaite, 1992). The comparatively lower percentage of eligible German draftees actually called up alluded to earlier was in no small part due to the unwillingness of the German military to provide military training to members of suspect ethnic groups and social classes (Kramer, 1997), a clear demonstration of the direct impact of social trust on military effectiveness.

The fragmented nature of the German state came into full view once the hostilities began. The so-called "spirit of 1914", as the rally around the flag effect in Germany was described, was not quite as widespread or enthusiastic as it has often been depicted. While anti-war demonstrations were suppressed by government forces, displays of pro-war enthusiasm were actively encouraged (Verhey, 2000). What pro-war enthusiasm there was quickly began to fade once the hardships of the war began to be felt, in the form of growing casualty lists and shortages of foodstuffs and other goods. The mobilization effort of the Wilhelmine Germany failed to sustain widespread support for the war. Instead, policies adopted by the government only served to gradually exacerbate the already existing divisions within society. Jews, who already were one of the targets of the German Kulturkampf in the late 19th and early 20th century, bore the brunt of the official blame for wartime misfortunes. Jewish scapegoating began as early as 1914 (albeit in an unofficial form, by various nationalist organizations), but in late 1916 the military, smarting from the failure of the Verdun offensive to break the French resistance, joined the effort by launching
"investigations" into whether Jews were attempting to evade military service or otherwise undermine the war effort (Hoffman, 1997).

The Burgfrieden, or an attempt to create a unified political front for the time of war, completely collapsed in the last two years of the war (Chickering, 2004; Bessel, 1997). In these final years Germany experienced an increase in crime, desertion, draft evasion, black marketeering, food riots, and other indicators of flagging national morale (Bessel, 1997). The German military also suffered a gradual decline in morale and, starting in late 1916, desertion began to be a significant problem (Goemans, 2000). While it did not suffer widespread mutinies (with the exception of the naval mutiny in Wilhelmshaven), by 1918 German army units were experiencing ever higher rates of desertion and disobedience, with many recorded cases of German units refusing to carry out orders to engage in offensive operations. During the redeployment of German troops from the defeated Russia following the October Revolution and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, German units suffered desertion rates of up to 10% while in transit to the Western Front (Deist, 1997). The unraveling of the German society and military is remarkable in that it took place against the backdrop of comparative military success. Unlike their foes, the German armed forces could boast of having a number of significant accomplishments to their credit, some of only propagandistic value (for example, the aerial bombardment of London), but others of considerable strategic importance (the defeats of Serbia, Rumania and, eventually, Russia). Moreover, throughout the conflict, the combat operations of the German military took place almost exclusively on the territory of other states, be it allies (Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire) or enemies (France, Belgium, Russia, Serbia, Italy, Rumania). Even at the November 1918 Armistice the all-important Western Front still ran considerable distance from the pre-1914 German territory.

*Austria-Hungary*

In comparison with Germany, Austria-Hungary’s economic performance was considerably less successful. While Austria-Hungary's population was larger than that of Great Britain and France, its industrial capability remained inferior (Kennedy, 1989). Austria-Hungary's power was eclipsed already in
the 19th century. Its economic growth can at best be described as mediocre. In the period between 1880 and 1914, Austria-Hungary’s economic performance, in terms of its rate of growth, was inferior to that of Germany, United States, and Russia, but on a par with that of other major powers. Its share of world manufacturing output actually declined between 1900 and 1913, from 4.7% to 4.4% (Kennedy, 1989).

In terms of the creation of cohesive national identity, the domestic affairs of Austria-Hungary were in an even greater disarray. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was relatively unsuccessful in producing an overarching national identity and what loyalty to the state there existed was centered on the person of Emperor Franz Josef whose death in 1916 preceded that of his Empire's by less than two years (Rothenberg, 1976). By 1914 the Austro-Hungarian Empire actually consisted of two states, Austria (Cisleithania) and Hungary (Transleithania), each with a separate administration, and sharing only an army, an emperor, and foreign policy/national security apparatus. Three common ministries of foreign affairs, war (which however did not control the Landwehr or the Honved, or the territorial forces of Austria and Hungary, respectively, each with a separate administration and corporate identity, though organizationally and doctrinally similar to the Common Army), and finance (which presided only over joint expenditures, not internal finances of either country) (Haythornthwaite, 1992). Unsurprisingly, Austria-Hungary suffered from major differences in economic development, governance among its regions, differential treatment of various ethnic groups, and consequently from the absence of national cultural cohesion (Kennedy, 1989). Although Austria became the second state, after France, to introduce conscription, this did little to cement its unity (Schulze, 2002). Loyalty of many, mainly Slav, ethnic groups within the Empire was suspected already in 1914. The outbreak of the war swiftly laid bare the underlying fissures of the Austro-Hungarian state, whose military performance as a result was quite mediocre. The poor unit cohesion led to a number of cases of mass surrenders to the Russian Army, so much so that by the end of the war the Russian military formed an entire Czech army corps consisting wholly of former Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war of Czech nationality. The Austro-Hungarian military might have collapsed even faster than it did historically if it were not for the extensive aid (to the point of virtually taking over full control of the Austro-Hungarian military) rendered by Germany (Cornwall,
1997). Under these conditions, the Ausgleich, or the Austro-Hungarian attempt to maintain political unity for the duration of the war, proved a short-lived failure, with component ethnic groups of the Empire preferring to seek independent statehood (Rothenberg, 1976).

**France**

French economic performance during the pre-1914 period was comparatively weak, in fact among the weakest when compared to other major powers. France’s slow economic growth meant that France was slowly losing its relative position, falling further and further behind Germany. In terms of population, it has already fallen behind all other major European powers and its industrial growth was insufficient to prevent it from losing relative position in the global economy, in terms of percentage share of global output. France’s relative share of world manufacturing declined from 7.8% to 6.1% between 1880 and 1913 (Kennedy, 1989).

In spite of its uninspiring economic performance, France was quite successful in establishing a strong sense of national identity. In large measure the French program of nation-building was a direct consequence of the defeat in the Franco-Prussian War which revealed the weakness of not only the French army but also of its national institutions and its ability to rally the French masses to the defense of the state. The rather low sense of national identity in France prior to 1870 very directly impacted on its ability to wage war against a better mobilized Prussian state, fact that was recognized by Ernest Renan, Emile Zola, and others. The French Army's effectiveness in that conflict was very directly impacted by the need to maintain its reliability as an internal security force. In order to prevent close bonds from forming between the troops and local inhabitants, which might render them unreliable when called upon to quell civil unrest, French regiments were frequently shuffled from one garrison to another. This, however, played havoc with French mobilization plans, as regiments found themselves far from their projected assembly areas. Although conscription existed, in contrast to the Prussian model of universal military service the French state could not impose a similar system on its citizens, and moreover substitution was permitted (Holmes, 1984). French political and social reforms in the Third Republic have
done a great deal to close the gap between the state and society that existed under the Second Empire (Porch, 1981; Audoin, 1997).

These reforms, which are described in considerable detail by Weber (1976), included a self-referential national mythology appropriate for a nation whose identity did not require a reference to an external "other" (Hobsbawm, 1994). The outcome of these reforms included a heavily reformed and vastly more capable French military based on a system of universal military service (Porch, 1981). However, the best testimony to the effectiveness of the French nation-building project was France’s ability to sustain the burden of the war. The French government managed to maintain a high level of popular support for war was maintained even among the more radical elements of the society. Even though at times the fortunes of war seemed to disfavor France, particularly during 1917 which was characterized by bloody and failed offensive operations, a near-mutiny of several French Army divisions which refused to follow senseless orders, and Russia’s de-facto surrender to Germany which significantly affected the overall balance of power among the two alliances, its ability to tolerate the strain of war proved superior to that of Germany (Goemans, 2000). The French Union Sacree fared much better at preserving political and societal unity in the face of war better than comparable efforts in Germany or Austria-Hungary (Smith, 1997; Robert, 1997). Indeed, throughout the war, France was not in danger of overthrow from either right or left, and government enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy (Goemans, 2000). French leaders did not operate under the expectation that defeat meant their ouster, or even death. Whatever political opposition remained was focused to predominantly opposition to the war itself, rather than opposition to the regime. Similarly, French labor unrest during 1916 and 1917 did not represent a major threat to the French war effort as the strikers’ demands were limited in nature and did not entail far-reaching changes to national goals or strategy. The domestic challenges to the French government caused by the hardships of the war were not of the same magnitude as the challenges to German, Austro-Hungarian, or Russian regimes (Goemans, 2000).
**Great Britain**

Great Britain’s economic growth in the pre-war period was also unimpressive. Britain, once the world's premier industrial power, has relinquished that position and slipped to the third place and increasingly found itself under economic pressure from newly ascendant world powers. Its relative decline was particularly precipitous, as its share of world manufacturing output declined from the dominant 22.9% in 1880 to mere 13.6% in 1913 (Kennedy, 1989).

However, in Great Britain, as in France, there existed a similar consensus on the ideas of nation, state, and “Britishness” (Schulze, 2002). As a result the war, rather than becoming a challenge to the legitimacy of the state, led to a series of reforms on such issues as suffrage, franchise, and social benefits through which many of the grievances of lower classes were addressed. This occurred even though the war was a major shock for the British society, unaccustomed as it were to waging land campaigns of such a magnitude, and at the cost of hundreds of thousands of casualties (Goemans, 2000). That such measures were possible is indicative of a society which did not view politics as a zero-sum game where any concession was perceived as enhancing the position of one's political enemies rather than addressing grievances and thus resolving the conflict. Redistribution of political power was not equated with a permanent loss of power. Apart from the Irish question, the British government did not fear domestic enemies, and the political rise of the working class was not viewed in the same apocalyptic terms as it was in Germany, for example (Goemans, 2000). Britain’s ability to sustain its war effort is all the more remarkable in that, like France, it sustained a number of significant military failures along the way, including the disastrous amphibious assault on the Dardanelles, failed offensive operations against Ottoman forces in Mesopotamia, the bloody and inconclusive Battle of the Somme, German aerial bombardment of London, and an increasingly effective German submarine blockade (Horne, 1997).

**Russia**

In economic terms, Russia’s performance in the pre-World War 1 period was mixed. Its industrial sector grew between 1880 and 1914 at an impressive annual rate of 5-8%, although these gains were largely offset by the stagnation of its stagnating agricultural sector which even in 1914 still comprised the lion’s
share of Russia’s economic activity. Thus, overall, Russia’s share of global manufacturing increased only slightly between 1880 and 1914, and its real national product grew at a rate of only 1% per year, less than other major powers. However, during the decade immediately prior to World War 1 Russia actually declined in relative terms, its share of global manufacturing output slipping from 8.8% to 8.2% (Kennedy, 1989).

Of the five major powers that went to war in 1914, Russia was arguably the most anarchic. In terms of success at creating a common national identity, Russia fared poorly. Prevailing sources of identity, particularly in the rural areas, were still local and particular, not general (Hosking, 1997; Lincoln, 1983). The scale of domestic violence resembled that described by Weber (1976) as prevailing in France prior to the reforms instituted by the Third Republic in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War. Russia was the scene of continued unrest and even outright sporadic warfare. In 1902 alone, there were 365 incidents in which troops had to be used to quell rural uprisings (Kennedy, 1989). In 1913, 100,000 Russians were arrested for attacking state authority. In 1909, military was used in over 100,000 incidents (Kennedy, 1989). After 1905, the Tsarist regime lived in constant fear of another revolution (Goemans, 2000). Unsurprisingly, the Russian war effort failed to live up to its expected “steamroller” (Taylor, 1980) effect. While the Russian army performed well against Austro-Hungarian forces, it suffered an almost unbroken string of defeats by German forces. The internal weakness and division of the Russian state became quickly evident under the strains of war, as evidenced by the inability to carry out an effective industrial mobilization for the war or to sustain public support for the regime and its war aims. As a result, Russia began to falter politically in 1917, first with the abdication of the Tsar in February and, in October, with a revolution that swept into power a Bolshevik regime dedicated to pulling Russia out of the war. It accomplished that goal with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

**Conflict Initiation**

Following the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo, it is evident that while Austria-Hungary desired a limited conflict against Serbia that preferably would not involve other major powers, its more powerful ally Germany seized this opportunity to push for a broader war. Austria-Hungary’s fear
of impending collapse due to growing forces of Slavic nationalisms, particularly in the Balkans, appears to have created an incentive for conflict in the hopes that a sound defeat of Serbia would extend the life of the empire and stifle the pro-independence aspirations of increasingly restive minorities within the empire. Therefore, following the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo, it was almost inevitable that left to its own devices, Austria-Hungary would attack Serbia. Even though Serbia satisfied nearly all conditions set forth in Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum, these concessions failed to deflect Austria-Hungary from its determined path to war (Taylor, 1980). To be sure, even the most pro-war Austrian decisionmakers had misgivings. The chief of the Austrian General Staff, Conrad von Hoetzendorf, while an advocate of a war against Serbia, feared a larger war. While he saw a war against Serbia alone as necessary to Austria-Hungary's survival, in his estimate a war that involved Russia and/or other major powers would lead to the demise of the Habsburg dynasty and break-up of the empire (Rothenberg, 1976).

However, Austria-Hungary was not left to its own devices. Instead, it was all but prodded toward war by its main ally Germany even as it became clear that the war, if it came, was highly unlikely to remain a limited regional conflict Austria-Hungary desired. Germany essentially gave Austria-Hungary a free hand in dealing with Serbia and assuaged Austria-Hungary’s concerns of Russian involvement by promising that it would work to defuse the Russian threat to come to Serbia's defense (Taylor, 1980). The Austrian order to launch general mobilization on August 31 was issued at German prompting, before the news of Russian mobilization orders reached Vienna. Similarly, the German declaration of war against Russia occurred even before Russia had an opportunity to declare war against Austria-Hungary. Germany declared war on Russia, thus assuring a wider conflict, with only Russian mobilization orders as provocation (Taylor, 1980). The German concerns about the Balkans dated to at least the crisis of 1912, when the German General Staff chief, Helmut von Moltke the Younger, advised Kaiser Wilhelm II to launch a war against Russia in order to discourage it from supporting alleged Serbian aspirations (Haythornthwaite, 1992).
Germany’s interaction with France and Belgium in 1914 appears singularly uninterested in preventing a larger conflagration. Rather, the manner and timing of German ultimata to these two countries suggests these diplomatic maneuvers were treated as a mere formality before the inevitable war. The German ultimatum to Belgium was issued even before the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia (Taylor, 1980). Germany’s request for a French promise of neutrality was couched in terms virtually guaranteed to provoke a French rejection. As insurance, Germany requested that France turn over to its military the French border fortresses of Toul and Verdun (the latter the site of a titanic battle in 1916, which demonstrated the importance of the fortress to France's security) (Taylor, 1980). When that request was predictably rejected, Germany declared war on France on basis of false claims of violation of German territory, (Taylor, 1980), in spite of a French pullback from the German border precisely in order to prevent misunderstandings (Doughty, 2005). German efforts to prevent British entry into war were also unconvincing. Promised not to annex any French territory (though not colonies), nor Belgian territory as long as Belgium did not resist Germany (Taylor, 1980).

In contrast, the Entente powers appeared to be considerably less eager to initiate conflict. The most aggressive of the three appears to have been Russia which declared mobilization in response to Austro-Hungarian moves against Serbia. However, it had war declared against itself by Germany even before it had the opportunity to do so against Austria-Hungary (Taylor, 1980). It should be also noted that a number of Russian leaders warned against involvement in conflict, citing Russia’s continuing internal fragility which was made apparent by Russia’s defeat by Japan in 1905 and subsequent unsuccessful though bloody revolution (Kennedy, 1989). France, even after Germany had declared war against its ally Russia, hesitated to join the growing conflict until Germany declared war against France (Taylor, 1980, and even took measures that threatened its own ability to deliver a shattering first blow its military doctrine demanded in order to avoid engaging in provocative behavior (Doughty, 2005). Finally, Great Britain joined the war almost belatedly, following a prolonged peacemaking effort to and only after it was clear that the balance of power in Europe was being threatened (Taylor, 1980).
Discussion

The above indicates considerable variance in pro-war sentiment among the major power leaderships. Germany appears to have been the most aggressive of the five, as its diplomacy did not leave much room for compromise and in any event its rash declarations of war against Russia and France all but precluded the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the crisis. The pro-war fever ran high in Austria-Hungary as well, an entirely understandable phenomenon given the act of terrorism that was perpetrated against its ruling elite, however Austria-Hungary did not desire a broader conflict that would involve other major powers. Russia, likewise, appears to have been relatively eager to initiate hostilities, although whether it would have declared war on Austria-Hungary must remain a mystery since the German declaration of war took that decision out of the hands of Russian leaders. Great Britain and France, for their part, displayed very little eagerness to precipitate a conflict.

The explanation why a state like Germany, which enjoyed a dominant position in Europe should act as if it were faced by a dire threat to its existence, while states that were gradually losing their previously dominant influence appeared to be satisfied with the state of affairs, lies with the domestic make-up of these states, specifically their domestic “culture of anarchy” which was projected by their sub-state actors onto the international system, and informed their beliefs about the motives of international actors. States that were successful in their nation-building efforts operated internationally with restraint, while states whose governments were plagued by issues of legitimacy were tempted to shore up their standing by engaging in international conflicts. Similarly, states that were experiencing expansion of their capabilities were more confident in their ability to perform well in an armed conflict, and therefore acted in a more provocative, less cautious fashion than their weaker allies and adversaries.

This range of behavior dovetails quite well with the criteria for determining states most likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes, namely the combination of low social trust and strong economic growth. Of the five major powers discussed above two, France and Great Britain satisfy neither of the two criteria. Both powers have experienced relatively low economic growth during the pre-1914 period which contributed to the waning of their relative standing in the European balance of power, and both have
enjoyed relative success in their nation-building policies resulting in strong national cohesion which was displayed in the form of absence of violent domestic conflict and high degree of resilience during World War I. For Austria-Hungary and Russia the indictors are mixed. Both states were highly anarchic polities, with low level of social trust and consequently a low level of individual identification with the state. At the same time, their economic growth was indifferent. While their levels of bellicosity appeared to be higher than those of France and Great Britain, they were tempered by their leadership’s awareness of their internal weakness. The one power that satisfied both criteria, Germany, is also the state that displayed the greatest propensity to pursue a pro-war policy. Its policy was confidently bellicose, driven by a worldview that saw Germany as an encircled power struggling for its very existence and supported by a rapidly growing economy that underpinned a military machine, on the surface, second to none.

Moreover, the pro-war German stance following the Sarajevo assassination was not an exceptional development but rather continuation of a longstanding pattern of international bellicosity which often was counterproductive and only compounded the sense of isolation felt by the German leadership. Although Germany's power has increased considerably both in absolute and relative terms, its ruling elite nevertheless felt Germany was being denied a "place in the sun" and feared its economy was vulnerable to strangulation by the British naval power (Taylor, 1980). However, the most significant consequence of the resulting German naval build-up, combined with revisionist rhetoric targeted at the British naval supremacy, was to compel England to set aside its differences with its hitherto main rivals, France and Russia. The German leadership also chose to ignore France's signaling its interest in a rapprochement, opting instead (for example, during the Morocco Crisis of 1912) to pursue a policy of threatening France, which only backfired by reinforcing France's alliance ties with Russia and Britain. That French signaling was ignored by Germany is consistent with the findings by suggesting that low-trust actors in Prisoner's Dilemma games, for example, ignore other players' signaling intent to cooperate, rather than defect (Parks, Henager, and Scamahorn, 1996). German policies only served to undermine the pro-rapprochement faction in France (Taylor, 1980).
The externalization of German internal atmosphere of political hostility and the worldview held by German military leadership were also illustrated by the German conduct at war, specifically the spate of atrocities German army committed in the opening weeks of the war. Some 5500 civilians were killed in premeditated manner (i.e., by firing squads, after being tried by military tribunals). This violence appears to have been a projection of the domestic norm onto the international arena. With the German military expected to defend the regime against various domestic political factions (as it actually did, for example, in 1848), it tended to view civilians, even German ones, as a potential enemy. This evolved into a set of attitudes toward civilians in occupied countries as well. During the runup to the war, Germany was opposed to provisions in the Hague Convention that afforded combatant status to a variety of irregular home defense forces, which Germans viewed as illegal (Horne and Kramer, 2001).

The strong sense of being under siege felt by the German leadership and the consequent German policies are in stark contrast with the relatively benign assessments of their geopolitical environment by France and Great Britain. These declining major powers, which due to their very decline had greater justification to view the international environment with concern, did not see themselves as hopelessly beset by hostile powers. These contrasting patterns of behavior are remarkable as they are inconsistent with the power transition theory. In accordance with that theory, states that find themselves in danger of being overtaken by others are the most likely to initiate preventive wars in order to maintain their relative position. Yet neither France nor Great Britain exhibited particular interest in containing Germany until German actions began to directly impinge upon their interests. While the British reaction to the German naval build-up (i.e., the joining of the entente cordiale, and the termination of the centuries-long Anglo-French rivalry) superficially resembles behavior predicted by the power transition theory, it should be noted that Germany’s identification as a threat by Great Britain had more to do with German policies than with German capabilities. The simultaneous growth of the US naval power did not, after all, result in a US-British hostility or arms race (Taylor, 1980). France, likewise, did not appear greatly alarmed by its continuing slippage in international standing, and appears to have resigned itself to the loss of provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, so much so that they no longer were a major factor in French domestic politics,
and even toyed with the idea of a rapprochement with its increasingly powerful neighbor (Taylor, 1980). From the realist perspective, this behavior is also remarkable because it runs counter to the predictions of both offensive and defensive realists: not only are France and Great Britain not vying for global, or at least regional, hegemony, they are not taking aggressive action to staunch the progressive loss of their relative position. Conversely, Germany, which appears to be the least likely candidate for conflict initiation under the power transition theory, went to war in an apparent belief it was losing (or about to lose) its relative position in the international system.

While Germany’s belligerence grew, the policies France pursued became more moderate in nature. While Napoleon III was willing to risk war against Prussia-led German coalition (which fielded an army nearly twice the size of France’s own), France of the III Republic achieved reconciliation with Great Britain and even made moves toward reconciling with Germany. Although one might have expected the issue of Alsace and Lorraine to dominate French politics, in the years immediately prior to the war there existed strong factions of French politicians interested in a reconciliation, and even a financial partnership, with Germany. These ideas failed to carry the day due to the opposition to breaking the alliance with Russia a partnership with Germany would have entailed. Worse, Germany itself was not interested. During the Morocco Crisis of 1912, German leadership opted to pursue a policy of threatening France which only backfired by rekindling the anti-German sentiment in France and discrediting the pro-rapprochement faction in France (Taylor, 1980). Nevertheless, in spite of such snubs the idea of reconciliation with Germany persisted in France into 1914 (Taylor, 1980). While, once the war began, the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine promptly became a French war aim (Goemans, 2000), these demands were caused by the outbreak of war, and were not of themselves the reason for war. Prior to the war’s outbreak the issue of Alsace and Lorraine had low political salience in France (Taylor, 1980).

Summary
The pattern of behavior exhibited by the five European major powers in 1914 is strongly consistent with the findings in the quantitative section of this project. Capabilities in the form of economic performance and major power status do appear to have been factors in decision to seek or avoid war, as did the level of
generalized social trust. It is also evident that capabilities alone cannot account for heightened willingness to risk war, as relatively weak state such as Austria-Hungary displayed much greater war-proneness than the considerably stronger France. Power transition theory-derived explanations likewise cannot account for the relative war-proneness, since the growing power Germany was considerably more war-prone than the waning powers France and Great Britain. Instead, the decisions on whether to go to war appear to be a combination of both capabilities and general world-view informed by internal level of social trust.
CHAPTER 9
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the findings do support the voluminous literature claiming that international anarchy does not have a powerful and uniform effect on actors operating in that system. International anarchy is, as Wendt would have it, what we make of it, provided that we recognize that our range of choices as to what to make out of international anarchy is severely constrained by the domestic "culture of anarchy" in which we live. The findings furthermore offer support for the possibility of realizing the concept of Kantian peace. Indeed, it would appear that what Kant's "universal hospitality" listed as one of the three pillars of "perpetual peace" is synonymous with generalized social trust to the extent that it posits identical treatment of, and respect for, all members of humanity.

The results also bear out earlier findings that strong in-group loyalty does not necessarily lead to equally strong out-group hostility (Terhune, 1965; Druckman, 1997; Yamagishi and Kiyonari, 2000). The findings also hold out at least a possibility that Rawls' concept of "community of nations" may likewise be realizable. Indeed, it does appear that the concept of state as a stage toward ever-larger political entities (Richmond, 1995; Hutchison, 1995, Gellner, 1995) is supported by evidence, inasmuch as absence of conflict between states is a necessary condition for their merger into a larger entity. While international cooperation is outside the scope of this project, it does appear plausible that just as states with high levels of social trust are less likely to come into conflict, they should be more likely to enter into cooperative arrangements with other states. The question of social trust as a determinant of international cooperation will be left for future research to answer.

The findings are strongly supportive of Moravcsik's (1995) thesis of domestic origins of national preferences, or, at any rate, preferences toward conflict, and are consistent with the neoliberal theory of international relations. Attributes of individual states display a consistently stronger impact on international conflict initiation than attributes of potential opponents or of the dyad. Indeed, in the
broadest sense, state preferences toward conflict do appear to depend on that state's quality of governance, and its ability to minimize the elements of anarchy and self-help on the domestic level. However, domestic anarchy and its companion generalized social trust by no means explain the problem by themselves. Findings suggest that while generalized social trust creates a predisposition toward viewing others in hostile terms, state actors only act on these feelings if they believe their capabilities are sufficient to threaten military action with low risk. The combination of these two factors indicates a strong possibility that decisionmaking processes consist of both rational and cognitive components, with the implication being that neither rational choice nor cognitive/psychological approaches are capable of explaining decisionmaking on their own.

The implications for realism and, particularly, structural realism, are somewhat more complex. The results of the study suggest that the realist findings concerning the effects of anarchy hold true only for interactions among states characterized by low social trust. The inherently conflictual character of international interaction posited by realism is, however, muted if not necessarily absent in interactions of high-trust states. Similarly, the findings provide an additional insight into the eternal debate on whether and/or when states pursue relative or absolute gains. The logic of the social trust arguments suggests that relative gains would become salient only for low-trust actors. Since such actors tend to ascribe malign intent to others, under such conditions the acquisition of any advantage by another actor would be of concern. For high-trust actors, the dynamic is rather different. Since they are not inherently afraid of others, whether others acquire superior capabilities is a matter of much less concern. Of interest is also the feedback loop between international anarchy and domestic politics. The discussion of the international system in the 19th century indicates that states’ efforts to cope with the effects of an anarchic international system included eliminating features of anarchy and self-help within their own borders. Over time, the domestic transformation has begun to impact the perception of international anarchy that drove the nation-building projects in the first place.
The results also suggest a possibility of integrating the considerable variety of psychological and cognitive approaches toward decisionmaking into a more unified theory of decisionmaking. Of particular interest here are the common features of the existing approaches, particularly their emphasis on framing. Thus, for example, arguably the most crucial and theoretically least understood element of the prospect theory is whether the individual actor in question views his/her position in terms of losses or gains. This is of major importance since while a losses frame leads to risk-seeking behavior, a gains frame results in risk avoidance. Similarly, research on analogical decision depends heavily on selection of an earlier example to which the current situation is compared. Yet here as well the actual process of selection of analogies remains poorly understood, even though, as in prospect theory, this is arguably the most crucial part of the process. Here, too, the selection of the frame, or analogy, has is of far-reaching importance since the analogy invoked is an important predictor of the decision that will be made. And yet studies that examine the process of selection from among a number of alternative courses of action presented by advisors to political decisionmakers offer few generalizable explanations as to why a certain course of action was chosen over another. Since these framing processes remain poorly understood, cognitive and psychological decisionmaking approaches are largely reduced to offering post-hoc explanations of past events. Unfortunately, while a meticulous study of a political event may provide us with an understanding of a frame, or analogy, in which the individual decisionmaker was operating while undertaking a certain decision, we are still at a loss when attempting to predict when particular frames or analogies are likely to be invoked. This failure has long been one of the key weaknesses of psychological and cognitive approaches, as compared to the rational choice approach. Arguably the greatest part of the problem in predicting framing effects is that such effects are to a large extent rooted in one's perception of events, not merely the objective nature of events.

The findings of this project may point to a way forward. Indeed, one way to view generalized social trust is as the "ur-frame", the underlying set of beliefs about actors, relationships, and "how things really are" from which all other analogies and frames spring. It is how individual actors are predisposed to perceive other actors. Therefore, it certainly appears more than plausible that a low-trusting individual,
who by default perceives others as inherently untrustworthy and predisposed toward doing one harm in
some way when given the opportunity, is rather more likely to place oneself in a losses frame in response
to any particular change in the situation (even one that objectively improves his or her position) than a
high trusting individual. It is equally highly plausible that a low-trusting individual is likely to invoke all
manner of analogies supporting the already pre-existing perception of others as untrustworthy. In both
cases, the conflictual alternatives are likely to be the preferred policy options. A closer, "thick
description"-type examination of most, if not all, of the MID initiations that took place within the spatial
and temporal span of this study would likely show that the decisionmakers in question felt themselves to
be in a losses frame and/or were viewing their current predicament through the lens of an analogy that
favored the resort to use of force.

Next to its potential as the "ur-frame", generalized social trust's second attractive feature is that,
unlike other psychological and cognitive variables, it is readily operationalizable for use in large-n studies
that are currently the currency of the realm in international relations, and thus capable of producing
generalizable theoretical predictions.

The results suggest that the rather surprising empirical weakness of the diversionary theory of war
may be due to a flaw in the theory's assumptions. The theory assumes that when seeking a target to be a
“scapegoat” for one’s own failings the decisionmaker is somehow aware that the target is in fact merely a
scapegoat. However, one has to consider this may not be the case and that the diversionary/scapegoating
behavior may be an expression not of rational calculation with the aim of creating a rally around the flag
effect that would relieve the political pressure on the leader but rather an expression of genuine belief that
the targeted party is actually to blame for whatever problems are afflicting the country. Moreover, the
genuine belief in another actor's malevolence and a cynical, instrumentalist approach to conflict are not
necessarily mutually exclusive. It certainly appears that Adolf Hitler, for example, had a genuine hatred of
the Jews particularly since he expressed such beliefs long before he came into power. At the same timer,
Hitler's view on the usefulness and desirability of war reveal an instrumentalist approach. The contempt
for Germany's adversaries that is evident in Hitler's statements suggests that Hitler did not genuinely
consider other states to represent threats to Germany's security. Instead, he appears to have viewed war as a tool of social engineering to be used, in conjunction with eugenics and other similar techniques, as a means for creating the "master race". Similarly, while Slobodan Milosevic is often associated with the idea of ethnic scapegoating it may well be that, once again, he sincerely believed Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians actually posed a threat to Serbia. Nevertheless, his actions reveal considerable sensitivity to his own political fortunes, and a desire to use conflict to cement his political position. If one has a low level of generalized social trust, if one’s belief on the inherent nature of other actors is that they are fundamentally untrustworthy and bent on doing one harm, then blaming other actors for any setbacks one suffers is the natural outcome. Bad events simply become evidence of others’ bad faith, confirmation of an already existing belief in their untrustworthiness and malevolence.

In addition, the weakness of findings in support of the diversionary theory may instead be due by improper specification of the independent variable. Most diversionary war research assumes that variable to be government unpopularity. However, the propensity of anarchic, low-trust states to initiate MIDs at much higher rate suggests that the variable may not be government unpopularity but a more fundamental problem, namely lack of legitimacy. A crisis that threatens the popularity of a regime that enjoys broad legitimacy may not be enough to force that regime to embark on a fundamentally risky venture such as war, particularly since the prospect of losing political office in a high-trust society is likely to be outweighed by the much more dire consequences of losing a war. Conversely, the consequences of losing office in a low-trust state are likely to include imprisonment, banishment, or even death, creating strong diversionary incentives. Furthermore, from the point of view of the regime, an international conflict may seem an effective method of shoring up one’s legitimacy by providing a public good (protection against an enemy) that it otherwise failed to do.

One also must entertain the possibility that the apparent diversionary behavior represents what amounts to populism on part of one or more factions within the ruling elite. The logic of social trust suggests that a significant degree of division is likely even within the ruling elite under conditions of low generalized trust. However, even though the level of state legitimacy may be low, a depressed level of
social trust and concomitant fragmentation of the polity into small in-groups bound by particularized trust implies low likelihood of collective action against the ruling elite. Thus external “diversions” are not necessarily embarked upon in order to shore up the popularity, or even legitimacy, of regime as a whole, but rather to create popular support for a particular faction. International conflict may be the outcome of an ensuing process of outbidding, with none of the ruling elite factions wanting to appear “weak on defense”. The second and third explanations are particularly compelling given the apparent presence of a rational component in the decisions to initiate MIDs.

The third explanation also implies that the state’s failure or refusal to provide public goods may be either due to leaders’ mistrust of likely political enemies and/or a deliberate attempt to implement a “divide and conquer” strategy of political demobilization. While in an anarchic, low-trust society domestic actors may view the state as illegitimate, since they view each other as untrustworthy they are unlikely to band together against the state. This appears to have been the case in Wilhelmine Germany, where the need to maintain universal military service uneasily coexisted with the fear of many of the members of the very classes which filled the bulk of the German military’s ranks. What may have distinguished Germany from, for example, France is that the latter’s unprecedentedly swift military defeat in 1870 changed its ruling elite’s view as to whether their most dangerous enemy was foreign or domestic. The far-reaching reforms of the Third Republic may have been due to the apparent fact that threat of Germany has displaced the threat of revolution as the greatest concern to the French state and ruling class.

A small caveat is in order here. The explanations offered above are not necessarily mutually exclusive. However, the models implemented in this project are not fine-grained enough to distinguish whether conflict initiation is the result of one or more of the above scenarios. This question will be left for future research to answer. However, it is evident that a more comprehensive theory of diversionary conflict must acknowledge the apparent coexistence of cognitive and rational aspects of decisionmaking.

Similarly, the democratic peace may actually be peace between high-trust states with strong, effective governments. The ideational effects attributed to democracy show up strongly in the analysis of
the effects of domestic anarchy. While high-trust states tend to be democratic, it should be noted that some states in the high-trust category of states are not (for example, Singapore), and that democracies are represented toward the lower end of the social trust scale as well. This is unsurprising, given that transitional regimes have long been recognized as being somewhat exempt from the benefits of democratic peace.

Also, this project proposes a new interpretation of the question of conflict externalization. Whereas some studies have argued that states are less likely to initiate international conflicts when beset by domestic strife due to the fragmentation of the polity (Morgan and Bickers 1992) or the need to use repression diverting resources from a possible external use of force (James and Hristoulas 1994, Chiozza and Goemans 2000), while others found that domestic conflict made states more likely to initiate international conflicts (Caprioli and Trumbore 2003) due to diversionary/scapegoating incentives (Heldt 1999, Barzilai 1999) or simple spillover (e.g., “hot pursuit” across international borders), (Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 2007), the findings here suggest that domestic and international conflict go hand in hand due to the individual views on the nature of other actors, be they within or without a given state’s borders. To put it in different terms, individuals regard violence as an appropriate or an inappropriate method of resolving conflicts, and that attitude is applied regardless whether the other party, or parties, to the conflict are separated from the decisionmaker in question by an international border or not.

The variability in perception of other states also has implications for the power transition theory due to its assumption that major powers automatically view other major powers as likely threats, are sensitive to possibility of losing relative position, and therefore may be tempted to launch preventive military action against a would-be challenger. The differing reactions of various major powers to the growth of potential rivals in the decades prior to the outbreak of World War I resulting in acquiescence or indifference in the case of high-trust states and fear and hostility on the part of low-trust states, suggest that the theory has predictive powers only in regard to states with low levels of social trust which in turn increases their sensitivity to relative gains concerns. However, power transitions involving states with
high levels of social trust, and consequently low sensitivity to relative gains, are unlikely to create international tension.

The findings also have rather surprising implications for the deterrence theory. Since decisions to initiate MIDs are not influenced by capabilities or major power status of the opposing party, but only by “signaling” of friendly or hostile intent, the results are more consistent with the “slippery slope” critique of deterrence theory. Sending a “strong message” to a low-trust state might easily have the counterproductive effect of communicating hostile intent, validating the recipient’s views of the nature of international system and making conflict more, not less, likely. Conversely, the results suggest that a conciliatory message would not be interpreted as a sign of weakness but rather as a sign of non-hostile intent, making conflict less likely.

One must also consider the implications of these findings for literature on democratization, democratic transitions, and emerging states. There is considerable evidence that emerging democracies and fragile states in general are more conflict-prone than their democratic status might otherwise indicate. This is evident from, for example, studies on secession movements (Tir, 2005). The findings of this project point in the direction of the desirability of establishing a more sophisticated test of consolidated democracy. A test that would include a measure of anarchy or social trust would also be useful in determining the proper timing of holding elections in peacekeeping/nationbuilding operations in order to prevent the elections from becoming a vehicle of ethnic polarization.

The final set of implications concerns the potential impact of globalization on the international system. In view of the frequency with which 1914 is invoked as an analogy in contemporary globalization literature, often with an eye to demonstrating the differences between the world systems of 1914 and of today, the one analogy that bears examining is the state of the state in 1914 and now. While in 1914 the international system still included many states with relatively high levels of domestic anarchy, one must ask the question whether today domestic anarchy is not making a come-back under the guise of globalization. The literature on globalization often engages in comparisons between the current global situation and one that prevailed prior to 1914 (Frankel, 2000; Wolf, 2005). Yet one must be cognizant
that while prior to 1914 there were voices who confidently claimed that a war among major powers could not break out owing to the great cost of such an endeavor, in 1914 the war came nevertheless, a war that outbreak moved the British Foreign Secretary to presciently remark "the lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime" (Haythornthwaite, 1992).

While the lamps are now burning more brightly than ever, one nevertheless should ask the question whether history is set to repeat itself. Inasmuch as globalization contributes to the weakening of the state and undermining its capacity to build social trust, it may be sowing the seeds for another systemic conflagration. It should be once again pointed out that the "strong" states that exist today, states that effectively eliminate anarchy and self-help on the domestic level, are a comparably recent creation. The positive effects they have, both on the domestic and international arenas, should be neither underestimated or, worse, taken for granted.

In this regard, globalization is a phenomenon whose influence on the international system is still ambiguous. In return for the promise of economic growth and development, states are encouraged to cede control over flows of goods and capital (Rodrik, 2001), reducing the set of policy tools available to them for dealing with domestic problems. To be sure, globalization and expansion of trade likely do contribute to overall global economic growth. However, one also must pose the question whether economic growth is not coming at the cost of increasing domestic anarchy. The sacrifice of sovereignty that globalization implies in turn translates into weakened capacity for dealing with negative aspects of globalization, such as drug trade, international terrorism, etc. (Naim, 2002). Equally worrying from the point of view of social trust, which is known to exist mainly in relatively egalitarian societies, is the growth of inequality within and among states that has been one of the externalities of globalization (Scott, 2001; Garrett, 2004). To be sure, some scholars of globalization argue that the role of the state has not been diminished at all (Waltz, 1999; Gilpin, 2001), citing the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and the role of the US military as the ultimate guarantor of international stability (Waltz, 1999). This argument, however, only points to an imbalance that may be developing due to globalization. One should note that even as states lose control over various aspects of social and economic policies, even as governance on a variety
of economic matters is being transferred to international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, one aspect of state authority remains stubbornly un-globalized: the capacity to wage war. Therefore even as the state's capacity to build social trust may be reduced, its ability to attempt to shore up its legitimacy through international conflict is relatively unaffected. If unchecked, this development could lead to a situation where military force, rather than being the "ultimate argument" of states, might become their first and only. While some globalization studies (e.g., Wolf, 2005) discount the possibility of re-emergence of exclusivist and xenophobic ideologies with mass appeal, the breakdown in social trust would likely have precisely that effect. Studies positing that growth of globalization may lead to an increase in conflict (e.g. Huntington, 1993), might be proven correct in their predictions, although not in the predicted causes of the phenomenon. Rather than the result of a Huntingtonian "clash of civilizations", there is a danger that globalization will cause increased conflict if it serves to undermine the social trust-building role of the state. However, if the path the process of globalization is currently following leads to the undermining of the social trust-building role of the state, the likely result of the increase in domestic and international conflict would be a collapse of globalization itself, a rollback in the level of international integration similar, if not greater in its scope, than the retrenchment experienced following World War I. This, in turn, would likely lead to a vicious spiral of economic and political calamity not unlike the one experienced in the 1930s.

As paradoxical as it may seem, another threat to social trust stems from the end of the Cold War-era superpower rivalry. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that the exercises in social trust creation that states embarked upon during the 19th and 20th centuries, and that led to the relatively pacific high-trust nation-states of today, were to a large extent national security projects. The series of defeats at the hands of the comparably highly efficient Napoleonic France propelled other European powers to emulate the French reforms, in many cases even retaining French modes of administration even after 1815 (Broers, 1996). The 1870 defeat was the spark that prompted French reforms so well described by Eugen Weber (1976). Russian modernization in the latter part of 19th and early part of the 20th century were to a large degree driven by the awareness of backsliding and military vulnerability (Hosking, 1997). The US post-
World War 2 investments in science, education, and infrastructure were likewise driven by the perception of Soviet threat. Therefore, with the apparent disappearance of major power antagonism, the question of what factors motivate states to engage in social trust-creating policies acquires a particular urgency.

Of course, this worst-case scenario is far from inevitable. For one thing, even though the national security-driven nationbuilding projects appear to belong to history, one has to acknowledge the possibility that once generalized social trust passes a certain threshold it becomes a self-sustaining phenomenon as suggested, for example, by Crepaz (2007). However, to date no research has been done to ascertain at what point that “virtuous circle” (Putnam, 1990) begins.

All of the above suggests that the role of the nation-state is evolving, and the consequences of this evolution will be as profound as that of its initial emergence. The final remaining question is whether the trend toward building ever-more cohesive states enjoying high levels of legitimacy and social trust will continue, culminating in greater economic and eventually political integration, or whether it will be reversed. At the moment, the pattern of events does not point clearly toward one set of outcomes. On the one hand, growing political integration among European states, including a number of formerly “ancient enemies”, is a cause for optimism. However, the trend toward weakening of social trust in the recent decades (Putnam, 2000) is worrisome inasmuch as it threatens to undo much of the progress made in the 20th century. If so, the lessons of the 20th century may yet have to be re-learned in the 21st.
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### APPENDIX

#### Table 10: Variable Summary Characteristics, Hypothesis 1

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
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<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>9.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of MARs</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.98</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polity score</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>5.93</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polity score squared</td>
<td>56.37</td>
<td>35.89</td>
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<td>1.37</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>9.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population Log</td>
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<td>1.43</td>
<td>5.59</td>
<td>14.02</td>
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#### Table 11: Variable Pearson Correlations Table, Hypothesis 1. Pairwise correlations, Sidak method.

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<th>Trust</th>
<th>Number of MARs</th>
<th>Polity score</th>
<th>Polity score squared</th>
<th>Military exp. as % of GDP</th>
<th>GDP growth</th>
<th>Population Log</th>
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<td>Trust</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of MARs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polity score</td>
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<td>0.2525 (0.1608)</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity score squared</td>
<td>0.6271 (0.0000)</td>
<td>0.2473 (0.1887)</td>
<td>0.7131 (0.0000)</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military exp. as % of GDP</td>
<td>0.0634 (1.0000)</td>
<td>0.0289 (1.0000)</td>
<td>0.0007 (1.0000)</td>
<td>0.1358 (0.9893)</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>0.1271 (0.9958)</td>
<td>0.0279 - (1.0000)</td>
<td>0.1506 (0.9614)</td>
<td>0.0435 (1.0000)</td>
<td>0.0663 (1.0000)</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Log</td>
<td>-0.2430 (0.2146)</td>
<td>0.5006 (0.0000)</td>
<td>0.2492 (0.1784)</td>
<td>0.1030 (0.9999)</td>
<td>0.1343 (0.9908)</td>
<td>0.1817 (0.7828)</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12: Variable Summary Characteristics, Hypotheses 2 and 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>2.776064</td>
<td>1.189971</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Trust</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.3571664</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>.4723404</td>
<td>.4993672</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities Ratio</td>
<td>36.19821</td>
<td>141.2531</td>
<td>.0003432</td>
<td>2914.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score</td>
<td>5.518076</td>
<td>5.909731</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance score</td>
<td>.7794901</td>
<td>.1930993</td>
<td>.09899</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power Status</td>
<td>.4048759</td>
<td>.490087</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita Growth</td>
<td>1.610113</td>
<td>2.316582</td>
<td>-5.019869</td>
<td>8.201797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital-to-Capital Distance</td>
<td>3566.37</td>
<td>2842</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11989</td>
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</table>

Table 13: Variable Pearson Correlations Table, Hypotheses 2 and 3. Pairwise correlations, Sidak method.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Joint Democracy</th>
<th>Capabilities Ratio</th>
<th>Alliance Score</th>
<th>Major Power Status</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita Growth</th>
<th>Capital-to-Capital Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>0.2990</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities Ratio</td>
<td>0.0533</td>
<td>(0.3569)</td>
<td>0.0280</td>
<td>(0.9954)</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Score</td>
<td>-0.1282</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>-0.0276</td>
<td>(0.9960)</td>
<td>0.0841</td>
<td>(0.0055)</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power Status</td>
<td>0.3528</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>0.0237</td>
<td>(0.9995)</td>
<td>0.2992</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>0.1811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita Growth</td>
<td>0.1591</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>-0.1206</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>0.1428</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>0.0340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital-to-Capital Distance</td>
<td>0.0568</td>
<td>(0.2523)</td>
<td>-0.0941</td>
<td>(0.0009)</td>
<td>0.1227</td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>0.4684</td>
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