IN THE SERVICE OF STATE AND AGRICULTURE:
THE AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION IN BAVARIA AND
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF STATE INACTION, 1871-1895

by

MICHAEL FRANCIS HOWELL
(Under the Direction of John H. Morrow, Jr.)

ABSTRACT

By evaluating the activities of the Agricultural Association in Bavaria from 1871 to 1895, one finds that the organization, which functioned in part as an arm of the Bavarian state bureaucracy, played an unsuspecting role in the politicization of that state’s peasant classes. Specifically, because the Agricultural Association did very little to assist Bavaria’s large population of peasant farmers during a time of significant economic difficulties, it inadvertently pushed this group to seek solutions to its problems through more overt political means. Granted, the Bavarian government, which was the Association’s greatest patron, did not help the organization very much, with government leaders often ignoring the Association almost as much as they ignored Bavaria’s agricultural sector. In light of the government’s reticence, the Association did not however push the government to seriously address those economic issues that the peasantry increasingly faced after Germany’s unification. Consequently, by doing almost nothing to help the peasantry for nearly two and a half decades, and by also remaining closely associated with a liberal cabinet and bureaucracy that was often seen as collaborating with the Prussian state, the Association unwittingly helped to keep alive within the peasantry a
political awakening first experienced at the time of Germany’s unification, and which awoke again with the apparent threat of economic ruin in the early 1890s. Similar developments in other parts of Germany suggest that these events were not isolated to Bavaria. Given that most of Germany’s state governments worked together with similar agricultural associations, the example of the Agricultural Association in Bavaria suggests that the individual state bureaucracies of Imperial Germany played a crucial yet inadvertent role in the politicization of Germany’s peasant agricultural producers at the end of the nineteenth century.

INDEX WORDS: The Agricultural Association in Bavaria, the State, Imperial Germany, Agriculture, Peasantry, Bureaucracy.
IN THE SERVICE OF STATE AND AGRICULTURE:
THE AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION IN BAVARIA AND
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF STATE INACTION, 1871-1895

by

MICHAEL FRANCIS HOWELL
BA, Tulane University, 2002
MA, University of Georgia, 2008

A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2013
IN THE SERVICE OF STATE AND AGRICULTURE:
THE AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION IN BAVARIA AND
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF STATE INACTION, 1871-1895

by

MICHAEL FRANCIS HOWELL

Major Professor: John H. Morrow, Jr.
Committee: David D. Roberts
John P. Short
Shane Hamilton

Electronic Version Approved:

Maureen Grasso
Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
August 2013
DEDICATION

To my family on both sides of the ocean, and to my father above.
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There were many times over the course of writing this study that I was asked, “How did you ever come across this topic?” In truth, it took me more than a few years to figure out how to answer that question. I first became interested in Bavaria while writing my master’s thesis, which focused more on agricultural production and peasant identity. Far from having my interests sated, I took up my doctoral studies convinced that I would build upon this work. In a way, I have done that. However, the dissertation that I have produced is admittedly very far from what I thought I would write. While studying for my comprehensive exams, I became enthralled with histories of early modern Europe, world-systems studies, and Michael Mann’s *The Sources of Social Power*, all of which tended to more centrally place the State within their narratives. At the same time, I was also very interested in what William Cronon had accomplished in his study of Chicago, *Nature’s Metropolis*, and how he successfully linked the growth of nineteenth-century Chicago to infrastructural developments that allowed for the city to feed off of the natural abundance of the greater Midwest. Combining these two interests, I was convinced that I could write a similar story about Bavaria, directly linking the growth of agricultural developments back to the rise of infrastructure, but also highlighting the role of the state in the process. In doing all of this, my goal was to provide a reevaluation of our current understanding of the State and its place in modern European history.

However, after spending a year reading in the library of the University of Augsburg, I concluded that I could not write such a study without first understanding more about the ways in
which the Bavarian state directly attempted to encourage the development of agricultural production during the same period in question. This led me to the Agricultural Association in Bavaria, an organization which I had stumbled across before during my readings, but of which I actually knew very little. Digging further, I found that some work had been done on the Agricultural Association, notably by Stefanie Harrecker. However, only scant information was available for the period after unification. Increasingly, I felt that I could not proceed with a study of infrastructure and agriculture in Bavaria without knowing more about this Agricultural Association. After discovering how much material the Association had left behind, I decided to put my earlier concept on hold and focus all of my attention on the Agricultural Association. Placing this narrative within the context of agrarian politics as they played out in the 1890s, that is, as opposed to bringing the study up to 1914 as originally planned, was also only a later development, but one that I felt was appropriate. This is not to say that the Association and its activities up through the First World War do not merit further work. The holdings of the Haus der bayerischen Landwirtschaft (Center for Bavarian Agriculture), where most of the Agricultural Association’s records are kept, are immense, and if anything, they absolutely deserve further investigation.

That being said, the list of names and institutions that made this project possible is long. To begin, I would like to thank the German Historical Institute, Washington D.C., for covering my initial travel costs to Germany and for also providing me with much needed training in reading old German script. For assistance and support specific to my research on the Association, I am very much indebted to the Haus der bayerischen Landwirtschaft, and in particular, the assistance of Dr. Wulf Treiber, the director of the Haus, and also Dr. Tanja Kodisch-Kraft, the Haus’ resident archivist. A special thank you is especially reserved for
Katharina Höninger, the Haus’ librarian, who not only graciously shared her workspace with me for weeks at a time, but also agreed to photocopy and scan documents on more than one occasion. Without the abundant cooperation of these three people, this study would not have been possible. In addition, I believe that the remainder of the Haus’ staff also deserve special praise for their professionalism and their friendliness. I was made not to feel a stranger during my stays at the Haus, but rather as a coworker, a gesture that was unexpected but fruitfully appreciated. Further thanks are also extended to the library at the University of Augsburg, where I spent my first year in research, and also to the Johann Christian Senckenberg Library at the Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main, whose interlibrary loan services were indispensable for acquiring the many antiquated texts on Bavarian agriculture that I needed while living in Frankfurt. A word of acknowledgement also goes out to the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in Munich, a library that may be difficult to navigate, but whose collection of digitized books is incredible. Though most of the publications they have placed online predate unification, that I was able to peruse even these without leaving my home office was incredibly helpful.

Turning for a moment to the United States, I extend a hearty thank you to my Doktorvater, Professor John Morrow, who always and unfailingly supported my ideas, and even took the time to visit me once in Germany to make sure I was still alive and on track. Without his guidance and strong support, I would not have made it very far into this project. Alongside him, I also wish to thank Professor David Roberts for his many years of support, his patience, and the good conversations spent over many good lunches in Athens. A number of other faculty members at the University of Georgia also deserve mention, in particular, Professors Michael Winship, Steve Soper, Michael Kwass, Jake Short, and Shane Hamilton, all of whom wrote recommendation letters for me at some point, or patiently worked with me on draft proposals and
papers. Lastly, I must also extend a word of thanks to Dr. Andreas Wirsching, the chair for Neuere und Neueste Geschichte at the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich, and also his colleagues at the University of Augsburg, Drs. Günther Kronenbitter and Stefan Grüner, for their collegial support and assistance during my year of work in Augsburg. For all of their help, I am very grateful.

Finally, and now moving closer to home, I wish to thank Walter Krug and Brigitte Krug-Oberlader for their unquestioning support for my wife and I after we relocated to Germany. Without their love and faithfulness, much less their financial assistance, I would not have been able to write this study. For accepting me as one of their own and for sacrificing as they did, I am eternally grateful. On a similar note, I also wish to thank my parents, Michael and Barbara Howell, and also my uncle, Richard Howell, for their constant support, for their sacrifice, and for their prayers. Again, it was their love and support that made this study possible. Then there is my wife, Esther, for whom words are not nearly enough. More than just carefully reading my work, editing it, and helping me with reading archival material written in die alte deutsche Schrift, she also took upon herself the primary burden of financially supporting us after we moved to Germany. While I struggled for years to find steady employment to support the completion of this project, it was she, a historian in her own right, who commuted to work and who put food on the table. Though quiet and demure, my wife is a titan among wives, and I am blessed to call her my friend, my companion, and my love. I thank her for all that she has done and made possible.

By way of conclusion, I accept that this study probably could have been better. My grasp of the old German script was much more of a hindrance than I ever imagined, and more than once, I left the archives wondering if I had perhaps missed something important. Working alone
and beyond the collegial atmosphere of my university and without the official support of any other institution for three years also undoubtedly took its toll on the quality of this study. In so many ways, I wish I could have done more, but I do hope that I have at least provided a novel approach to a subject that has not garnered very much attention from historians, and that the implications of this study might have something more to say about current approaches to German history and modern European history in general. A quick note regarding usage of the German language: I used the English variations on geographic place names in Germany, so Munich, not München, the Palatinate, not der Pfalz. Where no English equivalents exist for place names, e.g. Würzburg, I kept the German form. Organizational names and titles, e.g. Landwirtschaftliche Verein or Ökonomierat, are also rendered in English, with their German form usually appearing in parenthesis at the word’s first appearance in the text. The names of people and the titles of literary works are kept in the original German. Where otherwise noted, all quotes are translated from the German by myself, with the original German text being included in the footnotes. Any and all mistakes in this work are, of course, completely my own.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1  THE BAVARIAN STATE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, 1799-1871</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. The political foundations of a subsistence economy</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. The seeds of transition and the end of Bavarian sovereignty</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  THE HISTORY AND VISION OF THE AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BAVARIAN STATE</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. The Agricultural Association in Bavaria, 1810-1871</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. The Association’s vision and its place within the state bureaucracy</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  THE STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP PROFILE OF THE AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Prince Ludwig of Bavaria</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. The General Committee</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. The district and county committees</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION, PART ONE: PRIORITIES, BUDGETS, AND FORUMS OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. The Association’s budgets</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ii. The newsletters of the Agricultural Association.................................120

iii. The Assembly of Bavarian Farmers .....................................................132

5 THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION, PART TWO:

WORKING TOGETHER WITH THE BAVARIAN STATE .......................148

i. Public hail-protection insurance and land consolidation ..................149

ii. Peasant agricultural education ............................................................168

iii. The Central Agricultural Festival ..........................................................181

6 THE ASSOCIATION AND DETERIORATING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN

BAVARIA’S AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ....................................................191

CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................218

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..............................................................................................226

APPENDICES

A MEMBERSHIP TOTALS FOR THE AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION IN

BAVARIA AND THE NUMBER OF COUNTY COMMITTEES BY

DISTRICT, 1871-1895 ..................................................................................244

B SENIOR LEADERSHIP IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE AGRICULTURAL

ASSOCIATION, 1871-1895 ........................................................................245

C NOTABLE MEMBERS OF THE AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION AND OTHER

IMAGES .........................................................................................................247

xi
INTRODUCTION

On April 10th, 1893, a small group of men gathered together in the Lower Bavarian town of Straubing in a beer hall known to the locals as the Kriegerkeller. The reason for their gathering: to write the bylaws for a political interest group that would focus on the needs of the Bavarian peasantry. Only a few weeks earlier, this same group of men, all of them practicing farmers from the area, had gathered in the same place, expecting to be joined by a handful of other local notables. Together, they were to discuss the possibility of forming a local branch of the Agrarian League (*Bund der Landwirte*), a national agricultural interest group that had recently formed in opposition to chancellor Leo von Caprivi’s tariff policies. To their surprise, news of the meeting had quickly spread by word of mouth into the surrounding countryside, and given that the meeting was scheduled to take place on a market day, over six hundred people, many of them peasants, descended on the Kriegerkeller in support of forming a peasant agricultural lobby. What followed was a raucous meeting, but after some hours, a representative from the Agrarian League, a civil agricultural advisor (*Oekonomierat*) by the name of Sodan, simply put forth the question: would the peasants of Lower Bavaria join together with the Agrarian League?¹ Having quickly established local branches all across Germany with thousands of members, it was unclear if the Agrarian League could succeed in Bavaria. Despite the fact that peasants made up the majority of the League’s membership, the organization was largely bankrolled by East Elbian estate owners and controlled by professional politicians. That

¹ This story is based on accounts provided in the *Kurier für Niederbayern*, no. 79 (March 22, 1893) and no. 110 (April 26, 1893), and is also recounted in Anton Hochberger, *Der Bayerische Bauernbund, 1893-1914* (Munich: Beck, 1991), 71-72. For government reports on this incident and other relevant archival sources, see Hochberger.
being the case, it was indeed questionable whether or not the Agrarian League could gain a foothold in Bavaria, a region that was largely Catholic, notoriously anti-Prussian, and whose agricultural sector was almost completely dominated by small and mid-sized producers.  

It was certainly a decisive moment for the peasantry of Bavaria. Twenty-five years earlier, in the face of similar economic tensions and Prussian aggression, the Bavarian peasantry had mobilized *en masse* as part of a wider, grass-roots political movement that took up the banner of political Catholicism, anti-liberalism, and Bavarian particularism. In the end, the movement had produced little in the way of change for the peasantry, and within several years of Bavaria’s formal entry into the German empire, peace had once again been reestablished.  

It was an uneasy peace though, given that the economic issues that had played such an important part in pushing the peasantry into action remained unresolved. Curiously, the Bavarian government failed to take advantage of the relative calm following unification to address the needs of the peasantry. Indeed, the organization which functioned foremost as an interlocutor between the agricultural sector and the Bavarian government, the Agricultural Association in Bavaria

---

2 For more on the Agrarian League and agrarian politics in Wilhelmine Germany, see Hans-Jürgen Pühle, “Lords and Peasants in the Kaiserrich,” in Peasants and Lords in Modern Germany: Recent Studies in Agricultural History, ed. Robert Moeller (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 81-109; and David Blackbourn, “Populists and Patricians.” European History Quarterly, vol. 14 (1984): 47-75; but also Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Agrarische Interessenpolitik und preußischer Konervatismus im wilhelminischen Reich (1893-1914): ein Beitrag zur Analyse des Nationalismus in Deutschland am Beispiel des Bundes der Landwirte und der Deutch-Konservativen Partei (Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1975); Jens Flemming, Landwirtschaftliche Interessen und Demokratie: Ländliche Gesellschaft, Agrarverbände und Staat, 1890-1925 (Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1978); and Sarah Tirrell, German Agrarian Politics after Bismarck’s Fall: The Formation of the Farmers’ League (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951). For comparisons to similar developments in the United States and France, see Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Politische Agrarbewegungen in kapitalistischen Industriegesellschaften: Deutschland, USA, und Frankreich im 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1975). A note on terminology: in the context of late-nineteenth century Bavaria, it is appropriate to refer to small- and mid-sized agricultural producers as ‘peasants’ or ‘peasant-farmers’. As Robert Moeller points out, “Transferred to a North American context and judged by the structure or their land-holdings, these agricultural producers [could] be called farmers.” However, not only did these agricultural producers refer to themselves as peasants, but the term also indicates “their ties to a pre-industrial past that survived — transformed, modified, interpreted — in an industrial society.” Finally, it is also worth noting that despite the appearance of social uniformity that the word *peasantry* belies, the Bavarian peasantry of the nineteenth century, like most peasant societies in other times and other places, embodied within their ranks many different social classes of peasant.

(Landwirtschaftlicher Verein in Bayern), later described the two and a half decades following unification as the most quiet period in the organization’s entire one-hundred year history.\(^4\) This did not mean that the Agricultural Association did absolutely nothing during those years. Between 1871 and 1895, its membership grew, it assisted in passing several important pieces of agricultural legislation, and the Munich Oktoberfest, which the Agricultural Association helped to manage, continued to grow in popularity. But given the events of 1893, it was nonetheless clear that the organization’s activities since unification had failed to allay the fears of the peasantry. By extension, the Bavarian government, which bore the ultimate responsibility for maintaining domestic peace and prosperity within its own borders, had, through its disregard for the agricultural sector, once again pushed the peasantry to form and join peasant political organizations that would better represent peasant interests.

Joining the Agrarian League did present certain advantages to the farmers of Lower Bavaria. For one, the outlook for Bavaria’s agricultural sector remained gloomy. Agricultural prices had fallen for years, and at the same time, small and mid-sized producers, often already overburdened with debt, found it much too difficult to obtain credit needed to expand production. That the Bavarian state maintained high taxes on property owners hardly helped matters. Squeezed from both ends, Bavaria’s large population of peasant farmers struggled to adapt to the greater economic transformations taking place around them. On the one hand, the growing presence of urban markets and ever-improving transportation meant that Bavaria’s agricultural producers could potentially sell more goods and increase profits. However, the rise of increasing competition from more distant producers, such as those in the United States and Russia, had the alarming effect of driving down prices on Bavarian agricultural products, effectively cancelling

\(^4\) Bayerischer Landwirtschaftsrat, eds., Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern (Munich: Manz, 1910), 14.
out whatever gains further access to markets provided. In light of these changes, the older methods of production and rotation proved insufficient, while the additional costs associated with adopting more intensive methods of production were often prohibitive for most peasant producers. Compounding all of these problems, the Reich government’s recent shift on protective tariffs meant that prices on agricultural goods, now less protected by trade barriers, would continue to fall with the increased import of cheap grains from overseas producers. Indeed, for those who went on to form the Agrarian League, the Reich government’s tariff treaties had been the absolute last straw. For the Bavarian peasantry, facing economic turmoil and enjoying almost no political influence whatsoever in either Bavaria or at the Reich level, joining together with the Agrarian League offered real potential.

Ultimately though, the men who gathered together in the Kriegerkeller decided not to join the Agrarian League. Rather, they chose to form an independent peasant association that specifically focused on local needs. Deliberately retaining their independence, the Lower Bavarian Peasants’ League (Niederbayerischer Bauernbund) [as the organization came to be known] did however decide to adopt the Agrarian League’s practice of political agitation and pressuring politicians to adopt measures favorable to the peasantry. Unlike other peasant associations that had come and gone in Bavaria since the late 1860s, these men resolved once and for all to make the political system sit up and take notice of their demands. Moreover, they were not alone. Concurrent with the formation of the Lower Bavarian Peasants’ League, other peasant political organizations similar to the Lower Bavarian Peasants’ League sprang up all

---


6 Hochberger, *Der Bayerische Bauernbund*, 72.
across Bavaria. Within two years, they began to coalesce, largely as a result of their success in the 1893 Bavarian parliamentary elections. Then, in March of 1895, at a gathering of delegates in Regensburg, several of the peasant political organizations decided to unify under one structure and one vision. With that, the Bavarian Peasants’ League (*Bayerischer Bauernbund*), that is, the first peasant political party in all of Germany, was born.

The sudden appearance of the Peasants’ League had both immediate and profound consequences for Bavarian politics. Interestingly though, the greater impact of the Peasants’ League had little to do with the League’s performance at the polls. “Characterized by erratic leadership, contrasting ideological and tactical emphases, and, therefore, by inconsistent relationships with other political parties and organizations,” indeed, the Peasants’ League never won more than fifteen seats at any one time in the Bavarian parliament before the First World War. As a consequence, its ability to directly influence parliamentary decisions in the period before 1914 remained limited. On the other hand though, a viable peasant political party based on “a volatile compound of agrarianism, political egalitarianism and peasant activism” had formed out of virtually nothing in Bavaria in less than two years, and the mere presence of such a party posed both a fundamental challenge to the authority of the Bavarian government and threatened the Center Party’s current hold on peasant voters. Before the mid-1890s, existing political powers had looked on the peasantry with either contempt or had taken their acquiescence for granted. In the eyes of most Center politicians and ministerial bureaucrats, the peasantry embodied a reliably docile segment of the Bavarian population that could be counted

---

9 Farr, “Peasant Protest,” 123.  
10 Ibid.
on to support the status quo, and because of this, they therefore required no special attention. The formation of the Peasants’ League represented an entirely new development, demonstrating that a rather large segment of Bavaria’s rural populations were very frustrated with the status quo and were quite willing to search for solutions to their problems by overt political action.\footnote{The standard work on the Bavarian Peasants’ League before the First World War is Hochberger, but also see Dieter Albrecht, “Von der Reichsgründung bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges (1871-1914),” in Das Neue Bayern, von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart: Staat und Politik, ed. Alois Schmid, vol. 4, bk. 1 of Handbuch der Bayerischen Geschichte, eds. Max Spindler/Andreas Kraus (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2005), 350-353; Hannsjörg Bergmann, Der Bayerische Bauernbund und der Bayerische Christliche Bauernverein, 1919-1928 (Munich: Beck, 1986); Ian Farr, “Peasant Protest in the Empire — The Bavarian Example;” and Alois Hundhammer, Geschichte des Bayerischen Bauernbundes (Munich: Pfeiffer, 1924).}

Fearing the loss of their peasant constituencies, the Center Party moved quickly to realign itself with the peasantry. This was primarily achieved by forming an alliance with the so-called Christian peasant associations (\textit{Christliche Bauernvereine}), that is, other recently-formed peasant associations that had sprung up independent of the Peasants’ League, but which eschewed the League’s more radical tendencies. Largely led by the charismatic Georg Heim, a teacher known to all as the ‘peasant doctor,’ the Christian peasant associations’ reform programs largely mirrored those of the Peasants’ League. However, rather than focusing solely on political solutions, the peasant associations also showed a willingness to supplement their political activities with real material aid. Altogether, a more tempered approach to the peasantry’s problems, coupled with an effective infrastructure, ensured that the peasant associations edged out the Peasants’ League in popularity while also providing the Center Party with a platform through which it too could more adequately reach the peasantry. In the long run, the tactic of cultivating the Christian peasant association proved fruitful for the Center Party. Despite repeated attacks from the Peasants’ League, by 1898, the peasant associations’ membership had grown to almost 38,000 members. Less than ten years later, they claimed over 120,000 members organized into more than 3,000 local associations. “The \textit{Bauernvereine},” according to Ian Farr,
had clearly become “the cornerstone of the Centre Party’s efforts to reconstitute its relationship with the newly politicized peasantry,” and consequently, during the years after 1900, the Center Party would succeed in holding on to most peasant voters.\footnote{Farr, “Peasant Protest in the Empire,” 128. For more on the Christian peasant associations in Bavaria, besides Farr, see Albrecht, “Von der Reichsgründung bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges,” in Schmid, Das Neue Bayern, bk. 1, 353-357; and Bergmann, Der Bayerische Bauernbund und der Bayerische Christliche Bauernverein. Regarding the Center Party in Bavaria during this period, see Albrecht, 336-345; but also David Hendon, The Center Party and the Agrarian Interests in Germany, 1890-1914 (PhD dissertation, Emory University, 1976); and Adalbert Knapp, Das Zentrum in Bayern 1893-1912 (PhD dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 1973). For more on Georg Heim (1865-1938†), see Hermann Renner, Georg Heim, Der Bauern Doktor: Lebensbild eines ungekrönten Königs (Munich: BLV Verlagsgesellschaft, 1960); and Hanssjörg Bergmann, “Georg Heim — der „Bauernherr“ (1865-1938),” in Berühmte Regensburger. Lebensbilder aus zwei Jahrhunderten, eds. Karlheinz Dietz/Gerhard Waldherr (Regensburg: Universitäts-Verlag Regensburg, 1997), 289-298.}

As with the Center Party, the rise of the Peasants’ League quickly moved Bavaria’s ministerial government into taking further action as well. Beginning with a series of studies on economic conditions in rural Bavaria, the government investigated whether more could truly be done to improve the agricultural sector and assist the peasantry, from tax reforms and the increased need for credit, to peasant-level education. A more immediate concern for agriculture was also reflected in the dramatic increase in funds that the government allocated for agricultural production and development after the mid-1890s.\footnote{See Bayerischer Landwirtschaftsrat, eds., Der landwirtschaftliche Verein in Bayern: Sein Werden und Wirken (Munich: Possenbacher, 1905), 118-119, which shows the Bavarian government increasing its expenditures on agriculture by over 250% between 1890 and 1905.} Even the relatively moribund Agricultural Association joined the movement for reform. Under pressure for years to do more to attract peasant farmers into the organization, the Agricultural Association finally changed its bylaws in such a way as to encourage greater peasant participation in the organization’s leading bodies.\footnote{Alois Hundhammer, Die landwirtschaftliche Berufsvertretung in Bayern (Munich: Pfeiffer, 1926), 12.}

These gestures, combined with the Reich government’s eventual reversal on tariff policies and an improving German economy after the turn of the century, ultimately ensured that the sudden escalation of unrest in the mid-1890s died back down again. However, the fact that the peasantry had successfully gained the ear of the government was quite an accomplishment. Agricultural
issues would eventually recede from the forefront of Bavarian and German politics by the first
decade of the twentieth century, but the political powers would no longer ignore the peasantry’s
interests.

Where current historiography remains unclear about all of these events, is what role the
Bavarian government — and by extension, the other state governments in Germany — ultimately
played in pushing the peasantry to political action. Even though contemporary observers and
scholars wrote about the rise of agrarian politics in Wilhelmine Germany before the First World
War, it was the Second World War and especially the rise of Nazism that first caused historians
to revisit the politicization of the German peasantry. Many of these early post World War Two
studies, typified by Alexander Gerschenkron, concluded that the peasantry’s reaction to
deteriorating economic conditions in Bavaria and elsewhere in the 1890s represented nothing
less than a wholesale rejection of modernity, and that the small and mid-sized producers of south
and western Germany formed an alliance with the Prussian Junker for the sake of preserving
older and safer economic and social norms. In doing this, the German peasantry had sacrificed
those advances that they may have gained through liberalism and the free market. For
Gerschenkron, this was a fateful turn of events, given that it showed to what degree the peasantry
willingly supported conservative, anti-modernist movements even before the First World War.
That the peasantry later supported the Nazis should have hardly come as a surprise, he
maintained. Liberalism and progress had been once again sacrificed for the safety of the status
quo.

15 Alexander Gerschenkron, *Bread and Democracy in Germany* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1943). Regarding Gerschenkron’s interpretation and its influence on historians of Germany, see, for
example, Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1973). Also see Robert Moeller, “Introduction: Locating Peasants and
Lords in Modern German Historiography,” in Moeller, *Peasants and Lords in Modern Germany*, 1-17, here 6-8.
A later generation of historians, though they agreed with Gerschenkron’s assessment that the German peasantry was a fundamentally conservative social group, took great exception nonetheless with Gershenkron’s characterization of the peasantry as backward and hesitant to embrace change. Again however, the role that state governments may have played in stirring the peasantry to action remained absent from these later studies as well, given that they deliberately focused more on economic developments and the rise of peasant politics. Specifically, these studies made a point to show that the peasantry had understood exactly why it wanted greater protections through tariffs.\textsuperscript{16} The peasantry, who had in fact shown a certain willingness to adapt to Germany’s rising market economy, had also understood that switching over from traditional forms of production, e.g., the three-field system, required more time and more money than most peasants possessed. Until that time when farmers could more easily adopt intensive agricultural practices, a greater degree of protection was desirable. The decision to pursue greater political action in the 1890s was not, therefore, simply an expression of thoughtless, reactionary opposition. Rather, the peasantry (as well as large landowners) had legitimately reacted to what they perceived as the government’s general lack of concern for the difficulties faced by agricultural producers. In later years, when the peasantry turned to Nazism in large numbers, they did so for a similar reason: though the Nazis appealed to the peasantry’s vanity with talk of

‘Blood and Soil,’ at least they appeared to take agriculture and the issues that agricultural producers faced seriously.\footnote{17}{John Farquharson, “The Agrarian Policy of National Socialist Germany,” in Moeller, Peasants and Lords in Modern Germany, 233-259.}

Placing aside the differences in these approaches, the peasantry’s longing for political voice in the 1890s is a theme that sounds a steady drumbeat in both of the narrative strains produced after the Second World War. Having been officially freed from serfdom and other feudal obligations over the course of the nineteenth century, the peasantry of Wilhelmine Germany had nonetheless remained a rather powerless class. By the 1890s, as the studies mentioned above substantiate, the peasantry had begun to learn how to work within the political system in order to make its demands known, and this was indeed a very important historical development. However, beyond discussions of the Reich government’s tariff policies, what remains almost entirely absent from all of these studies is a clearer evaluation of what role the German state, and in particular, what role the Reich’s provincial state governments played in allowing poor economic conditions to fester into political discontent in the first place. The individual state governments retained, in accordance with the Reich’s constitution, almost total control over their own bureaucracies and their own domestic policies until the outbreak of the First World War.\footnote{18}{See Dieter Albrecht, “Von der Reichsgründung bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges (1871-1914),” in Schmid, Das Neue Bayern, 318-329; and also Gordon Craig, Germany, 1866-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 38-60.} Agricultural production also fell largely within their realm of responsibilities. Furthermore, the state governments did have at their disposal tools needed to encourage development in their agricultural sectors and to sort out problems faced by the same. And yet, the historical record is largely silent on what effect the policies of these provincial state governments had on agricultural production, and it is likewise unclear why the state governments did not do more to stem the peasantry’s fears and frustrations long before the 1890s.
Since the early nineteenth century, governments across Germany had primarily interacted with their respective agricultural sectors by cooperating with semi-public agricultural associations (such as the aforementioned Agricultural Association in Bavaria). After unification, these same governments, though no longer sovereign, continued in their cooperation with the agricultural associations. First and foremost, the stated mission of the agricultural associations was to encourage the further development of agricultural production amongst all agricultural producers, from the largest landowners to the smallest of peasant farmers. By better integrating agricultural producers into Germany’s expanding market economy, these organizations believed that all farmers could increase their profits and also improve their standard of living. The state too would gain from the improvement of agriculture: higher profits not only produced more contented subjects and the possibility of increased economic activity, higher profits also produced the possibility of higher tax revenues. At the same time, the agricultural associations also dialogued with their respective state governments, lobbying for policies that they deemed favorable to agriculture and also advising the governments on existing agricultural policies. In turn, state governments expected the associations to keep them informed on the status and conditions of their agricultural sectors. To further support the work of the associations, state governments provided them with significant financial support.19

Given the lack of studies that have been conducted on these associations during the period in question, it is difficult to ascertain what effect they (and, by extension, provincial state

---

governments) had on the development of agricultural production within their borders.\(^2^0\) Those studies of associations that do exist, or those studies that at times mention the associations in passing, indicate that they all too frequently suffered from a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of many peasant farmers. This was especially true in the western and southern parts of Germany where small peasant farmers continued to make up the majority of all agricultural producers.\(^2^1\) Indeed, the associations were almost always managed and led by aristocrats, bureaucrats, notables and other educated elites, and this often created a rift between the associations and the peasant farmers whom they claimed to represent. Still, despite a questionable popularity amongst the peasantry, many of the associations continued to see their membership grow throughout the nineteenth century. Putting aside for a moment the question of what interest

\(^{20}\) Even though one might find summary histories of the agricultural associations or even a number of books or Denkschrifte that were produced by the associations themselves or by contemporaries, there are almost no comprehensive or more recent studies of the associations that cover their activities during the period in question. There are a number of articles that focus on particular associations or provide an overview of their activities, but then, as articles so often do, they only begin to scratch the surface. This list includes, for example, Friedrich Facius, “Staat und Landwirtschaft in Württemberg, 1780-1920,” in Wege und Forschungen der Agrargesichte, eds., Heinz Haushofer, et al. (Frankfurt am Main: DLG Verlag, 1967), 288-313; Gertrud von Schrötter, “Agrarorganisation und sozialer Wandel dargestellt am Beispiel Schleswig-Holstein,” in Zur soziologischen Theorie und Analyse des 19. Jahrhunderts, ed. Walter Rüegg (Göttingen: Vandenhoek and Ruprecht, 1971), 123-144; and Bernd Wenck, “Die Geschichte der landwirtschaftlichen Vereine im Bereich des heutigen Bundeslandes Hessen.” Land, Agrarwirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Zeitschrift für Land- und Agrarsoziologie, vol. 2 (1985): 105-134. Regarding more extensive works, not only are there very few, but none of them address the problems posed in this study. Wolfram Pyta, for example, discusses the associations in the Rhineland and Westphalia in Landwirtschaftliche Interessenpolitik im deutschen Kaiserreich: Der Einfluss Agrarische Interessen auf die Neorundung der Finanz- und Wirtschaftspolitik am Ende der 1870er Jahre am Beispiel von Rheinland und Westfalen (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991), but his study is not a comprehensive overview of the associations and it is written from within a different context than the state’s influence on agricultural production. Another study, by Marten Pelzer, Landwirtschaftliche Vereine in Nordwestdeutschland: das Beispiel Badbergen; eine Mikrostudie zur Vereins- und Agrargesichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Cloppenburg: Museumsdorf Cloppenburg, 2002), is a micro-study of the associations as seen through the lens of a very specific place, but Pelzer does not otherwise say much about the associations and their relationship with the state. In yet another study, Ernst Bruckmüller, Landwirtschaftliche Organisationen und gesellschaftliche Modernisierung: Vereine, Genossenschaften und politische Mobilisierung der Landwirtschaft Österreichs vom Vormärz bis 1914 (Salzburg: Verlag Wolfgang Neugebauer, 1977), provides an overview of several organizations and their relationship with the government, to include associations, but then, not only is his study set outside of Germany (in Austria), but because he looks at so many different types of agricultural organizations, what he might have to say specifically about agricultural associations comes up short. Finally, there is the study by Stefanie Harrecker, Der Landwirtschaftliche Verein in Bayern, 1810-1870/71 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2006), which is not only very good, but, because it specifically focuses both on the Agricultural Association in Bavaria as well as its ongoing relationship with the government, it also proved to be very helpful for this study. As good as Harrecker’s study is, it does not, however, cover the period after unification.

\(^{21}\) Haushofer, Die deutsche Landwirtschaft im technischen Zeitalter, 211-212.
groups or social classes the associations may have best represented, the agricultural associations also supported a great variety of activities that were in fact meant to encourage agricultural development across all sectors of society. Above all, because of their existing relationships with state governments, the associations exerted a significant degree of influence over the creation and management of domestic agricultural policies, policies that affected not just the more privileged agricultural producers, but also small landowners. For these reasons, in addition to better understanding the role that aristocrats and bureaucrats played in these associations, a detailed examination of the associations’ visions, their structures, their activities — in effect, what influence they had on the development of agricultural production — is needed in order to better understand what role the German state may have played in pushing the peasantry to political agitation in the 1890s.

Placing the state — or more precisely, an arm of the state — at the forefront of the narrative that follows is deliberate. However, this study does not assume that the growth of bureaucracies or the increased scope of state intervention that was so indicative of industrializing countries in the late nineteenth century, meant that the German state, whether at the Reich level or provincial level, necessarily improved on its capacity to manage or grow economic prosperity. Recent historians have done well enough in showing that economic growth in various regions of nineteenth-century Germany oftentimes occurred in spite of the state. Still, to assume that the

---

given activities of any state should be so ineffective as to have absolutely no effect at all would likewise fail to provide a full account of how, why, or to what degree societies changed during second half of nineteenth century. In essence: even unintended consequences and the decision by state authorities to not act deserves some consideration.  

With the associations, one finds that the German state governments possessed a bureaucratic infrastructure capable of affecting agricultural developments within their own borders, and yet the crisis years of the 1890s and the subsequent political unrest that unfolded in rural Germany indicate that these associations fell short in accomplishing that task. If the associations did fall short, then the provincial governments and bureaucracies to whom the associations answered also bear part of the responsibility. It is this that needs to be more clearly stated in the historical record.

Of all the many agricultural associations that existed in Imperial Germany, and there were many, the Agricultural Association in Bavaria particularly lends itself to the purpose of this study.  

In absolute terms, the Agricultural Association in Bavaria was one of the larger

---


Characterizing state action according to what he calls “cock-up” or “foul-up” theory, Michael Mann recognizes that there is “a certain consistency to state blunders as well as state strategies,” a problem that William Sewell refers to as the social scientific and historical “problem of unintended consequences.” For more on this topic and its implication for historians, see Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 53-54; and William Sewell, Logics of History: Socieal Theory and Social Transformations (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 351-372. For additional perspectives, see the essays collected in Peter Evans, et al., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

Regarding the number of associations that were to be found in Germany after unification, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden, for example, each had their own associations, while in Prussia, which was much larger, associations existed at the level of Prussian provinces, e.g., in the Rhineland, Westphalia, or Schleswig-Holstein. For more on the associations in Prussia, see Rudolf Stadelmann, Das landwirtschaftliche Vereinswesen in Preußen (Halle: Waisenhaus, 1874). Secondary sources that reference the Agricultural Association in Bavaria in detail are few. Besides Harrecker’s study of the Association up to unification (mentioned above), there is also Alois Schlögl, ed., Bayerische Agrargeschichte: die Entwicklung der Land- und Forstwirtschaft seit Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts (Munich: Bayerischer Landwirtschaftsverlag, 1954), a textbook on the history of agriculture in Bavaria which includes quite a few scattered bits and pieces of information about the Agricultural Association. Another study also worth mentioning is Alois Hundhammer, Die landwirtschaftliche Berufsvertretung in Bayern (cited above), which includes a section devoted to the history of the Agricultural Association. This short overview by Hundhammer, who was himself a prominent figure in agrarian politics in Bavaria, is the earliest critical analysis of the Association after its fall from grace following the First World War, and unlike Harrecker’s work, Hundhammer does cover the the
associations in Germany, but more importantly, it interacted with a large agricultural sector that was almost completely dominated by small and middle-sized peasant farmers. Considering Bavaria’s relatively small population of roughly six million people, the Bavarian association may have also had the largest membership per capita. Furthermore, not only was it the oldest organization of its kind in Germany, but the abundance of its records attests to how well organized and well managed it was. Unlike many other parts of Germany, the Bavarian association was fairly comprehensive in its coverage of the state. Even though it sometimes struggled in striking a fair balance across the different sections of Bavaria, the Agricultural Association did have a strong presence in every region of Bavaria. And though the Association did sometimes have to compete with other, smaller agricultural organizations, none of them enjoyed as privileged a relationship with the Bavarian state government. Therefore, besides providing a suitable means for measuring to what effect one of Germany’s provincial state governments encouraged the further development of agricultural production between 1871 and 1895, a study of the Agricultural Association in Bavaria suffices in shedding some light on the role that the associations and state governments may have unconsciously played in stirring the German peasantry to political action.

On a more practical note, the Agricultural Association in Bavaria also stood out as a potential subject because not only have a large amount of its records survived intact, but much of these records are located in one place. Even though the Agricultural Association’s operations were terminated by the National Socialist government in 1933, the records of the Association were only acquired by its successor organization, the Bavarian Farmers’ Association (BBV) after 1871. However, Hundhammer’s overview of the Agricultural Association suffers in that it is only roughly thirty pages long, and he was clearly unable to make use of the Association’s records (to which he probably did not have access at the time). For more on Hundhammer, see Oliver Braun, *Konservative Existenz in der Moderne: das politische Weltbild Alois Hundhammers* (Munich: Hanns-Seidel Stiftung, 2006).
(Bayerischer Bauernverband), after the Second World War. In the 1980s, these records, which span the lifetime of the Agricultural Association in its entirety (1810-1933), were then transferred to the BBV’s training and education center, the Haus der bayerischen Landwirtschaft (HdbL) (Center for Bavarian Agriculture), located just outside of Munich. Most of the following study is based on these records, including, but not limited to, the Agricultural Association’s budgets, internal correspondence and correspondence with government authorities, annual reports on agriculture from the Association’s district committees, stenographical reports on meetings and assemblies, voting results for elected positions within the organization, copies of the organization’s bylaws, an entire set of the Agricultural Association’s central newsletter, and also other (incomplete) sets of district newsletters published by the Agricultural Association.

With the exception of Stefanie Harrecker’s invaluable 2006 study on the Agricultural Association in Bavaria (cited above), very few historians have made use of these records. As a supplement to the records found in the Haus der bayerischen Landwirtschaft, holdings in the Bavarian Central State Archives in Munich (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv München) also proved helpful. This included personal records for individuals of interest, government correspondence and reports, and additional copies of the Agricultural Association’s annual reports which were not to be found at the Haus der bayerischen Landwirtschaft. All of the documents consulted in Munich were either located in the records of the Interior Ministry (Ministerium des Innern) or in the records of the Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry (Ministerium für Land- und Forstwirtschaft), which took over those records pertaining to agriculture upon its creation in 1919.

Also of tremendous importance to this study were a series of books compiled or published by the Agricultural Association or with its assistance, the last being published in 1910.
Referred to by Alois Schlögl as *die amtlichen Denkschriften*, these studies were meant to provide an overview of agricultural production in Bavaria at the time of their issue, but they also often included helpful information about the Agricultural Association itself. Finally, a smaller number of other published sources were consulted (usually for cross-referencing), including the Agricultural Association’s popular almanac (*Haus- und Landwirtschafts-Kalender des landwirtschaftlichen Vereins für Bayern*), but also budgets for the Bavarian government, stenographical reports on sittings of the upper and lower houses of the Bavarian Parliament, published summaries of laws and policies pertaining to agriculture in Bavaria, and then lastly, a small number of local and regional newspapers. All of these published sources were either found at the library of the HdbL or at the Bavarian State Library in Munich (*Bayerische Staatsbibliothek München*), the library of the University of Augsburg, or were ordered through the interlibrary loan services of the Johann Christian Senckenberg Library at the Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main.

In order to provide the reader with a modicum of historical context, the study that follows begins with a chapter on the Bavarian state and its involvement in agriculture from the beginning.

---

of the nineteenth century up to unification. For the reader who may be more familiar with this aspect of Bavarian history, he or she may want to skip directly to the second chapter, where the closer analysis of the Agricultural Association actually begins. Chapter two proceeds with a history of the Agricultural Association and its relationship with the Bavarian government up to 1871. It continues with an analysis of the Association’s vision and also takes a closer look at where the Agricultural Association fit within the bureaucratic superstructure of the Bavarian state after unification. Chapter three then proceeds with an analysis of the social profile and structure of the Agricultural Association. Indeed, where chapter two shows that the vision and social make up of the Association were negatively affected by the organization’s ongoing relationship with the Bavarian state, chapter three helps to further explain why and how the aristocratic and bureaucratic elements within the Association maintained their hold on the organization. With this groundwork in place, chapters four and five provide an analysis of the activities of the Agricultural Association. Chapter four begins with a discussion on budgets, then moves on to a study of two of the Agricultural Association’s most important forums of public debate, namely, the organization’s central newsletter and the Assembly of Bavarian Farmers. In this chapter, the priorities of the Association are firmly established. Chapter five, which covers several examples of how the Agricultural Association cooperated with the Bavarian government, further confirms that the Association was capable of encouraging government policies that could affect agriculture in general, but that the organization was, for several reasons, unwilling or unable to seriously engage with the needs of the peasantry. Picking up where the first chapter ends, the final chapter then concludes the study by showing how the Association failed to address those economic concerns that were most pressing to the Bavarian peasantry after unification.
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that this study is about more than just the unintended consequences of state activity in a nineteenth-century German province. For one, because it builds around an arm of the Bavarian bureaucracy that was so strongly influenced by principles of nineteenth-century liberalism, ultimately, this study must also have something to say about German nineteenth-century liberals and the nature of their cooperation with an authoritarian Imperial state. From its inception, the Association was meant to function along principles of constitutional liberalism, and underlying all of the organization’s activities was a conviction that the rural world of nineteenth-century Bavaria could be improved through rational and deliberate action. Many of the men who counted themselves among the Association’s leadership also readily identified as liberals, with some of them even serving as liberal politicians in the Bavarian parliament as well as the Reichstag. Granted, the Association included within its ranks a significant cadre of conservative voices, and it was frequently the case that the power and influence of these men within the organization stood in the way of more radical change. However, to link the Association’s more illiberal tendencies back to its conservative members alone would be neither fair nor accurate, given that the organization’s liberal members had their own reasons for steering the Association away from liberal principles as well as popular politics. Claiming to work “in the name of agriculture and the state,” in the end, the Association did not work for everyone, and as was true of nineteenth-century German liberalism, this ultimately proved to be the Association’s undoing.26

The Bavarian peasantry too would feel the effects of these developments, which takes us to our last point. Before the 1890s, Bavaria’s peasant classes had largely existed as the passive

---

26 For more on liberalism in nineteenth-century Germany, see Dieter Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988); David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); and James Sheehan, *German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century* (London: Methuen, 1982).
object of politics, “restrained by deference and confessional loyalty from openly challenging the structure and priorities of liberal and Catholic Honorationenpolitik.”  

This was certainly not the case after the 1890s. Rather, the Bavarian peasantry and its counterparts in other regions of Germany increasingly embraced the power of rural agitation and anti-elitist populism, thus setting off a trend in German politics that would appear and reappear up through the first half of the twentieth century. To some degree, these developments surely marked the beginning of a fundamental change within the peasants themselves. Though Bavaria’s peasants, for one, continued to fashion themselves as set apart, a “people resisting full incorporation into the world of their conquerors,” by the 1890s, this was quite clearly less true.  

Having embraced the power of mass politics, the Bavarian peasantry inextricably linked itself together with a political system whose boundaries were largely defined by the German state. Much the same can be said for the peasantry’s economic circumstances. Did this make Bavaria’s peasants that much more German? Possibly, but for political developments in both Bavaria and the Reich, the rise of rural dissent and peasant radicalization would have profound repercussions in the coming decades. Without ever having intended it, this was probably the Agricultural Association’s most significant bequest, both to the state which it had so loyally served, but also to the Bavarian peasantry.

---

CHAPTER 1
THE BAVARIAN STATE AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, 1799-1871

The chapter that follows focuses on the Bavarian state and the effects that certain government policies had on agricultural production between 1799 and 1848. It then concludes with a summary of changes experienced by the Bavarian economy, the agricultural sector, and the Bavarian state between 1848 and 1871. Though the purpose of this chapter is to provide pertinent background information and deeper context for the chapters that follow, much of what is described here also prefigures some of the very issues that the Agricultural Association continued to wrestle with after unification. Class and social structures in Bavaria changed relatively little over the course of the nineteenth century, and economic changes, though significant, continued only at a very gradual pace. Agricultural production too, which made up the single largest sector of Bavaria’s economy well into the late nineteenth century, remained relatively unchanged. Where there were attempts by the Agricultural Association and reformers to transform both Bavaria’s economy and the agricultural sector in the first half of the nineteenth century, doing so turned out to be more difficult than imagined. Much to the frustration of reformers, introducing more intensive methods of production and integrating that production into a larger market economy inevitably brought them into conflict with the political and social structures that rested upon more traditional forms of production. Understandably, this was something that most reformers were loath to do, given that criticizing the state in early nineteenth-century Bavaria carried with it potentially grave consequences. Nonetheless, even
though Bavaria’s elites often stood steadfastly opposed to change, the greater economic world around Bavaria was rapidly changing. As the concluding section in this chapter intimates, it was this rapidly transitioning world that the Bavarian peasantry and the Agricultural Association would ultimately have to come to terms with in the decades after unification.

i. The political foundations of a subsistence economy

In the final decade of the eighteenth century, Bavaria’s economy was still, like most of western Europe, overwhelmingly agricultural.1 Even though a highly developed network of rural industries had grown up alongside the agricultural sector, by modern standards, very little had changed in Bavaria since the mid-seventeenth century with the end of the Thirty Years War.2 In that time span, the people of Bavaria had focused on recovery in the wake of a very destructive war. Gradually, a new and fecund life crept back into the battered countryside, and by the beginning of the eighteenth century, most of Bavaria’s villages had once again filled to their earlier capacity. With the return of stability also came the reasserted power of the landed nobility. Just as life had sprung anew from the ashes of war, Bavaria’s peasant classes increasingly found themselves once again under obligations to feudal lords.3 Though this form

1 By the end of the eighteenth century, only about 18 percent of Bavaria’s population lived in towns or markets, while the remainder lived in rural areas and were committed either completely or in part to agricultural production. Only four of Bavaria’s towns — Ingolstadt, Landshut, Straubing, and Munich — exceeded four thousand inhabitants. Munich was by far the largest, having a population of forty thousand in 1801. See Friederike Hausmann, Die Agrarpolitik der Regierung Montgelas: Untersuchung zum gesellschaftlichen Strukturwandel Bayerns um die Wende vom 18. zum 19. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1975), 5; and Friedrich Lütge, Die bayerische Grundherrschaft: Untersuchung über die Agrarverfassung Albayerns im 16. bis 18. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Piscator, 1949), 9.


of late feudalism hardly compared to the harsher conditions of east European serfdom, the reasserted dominance of the nobility in Bavaria carried with it certain expectations. Alongside his own stomach and the mouths of his family, the peasant, that lowly proprietor of agriculture, was expected to pay: taxes, tithes, rents, and feudal dues on the one hand, and toiling with the earth on the other. ⁴

But would conditions stay this way? Even before the mid-eighteenth century, there were some who thought that more needed to be done to diversify and improve Bavaria’s economy. Following what had been a century of recovery, economic slow-down had indeed taken a grip on Bavaria. But then, the latter half of the eighteenth century was also a period thick with potential. It was the age of the enlightened Ökonom, the Physiocrat, the landed gentleman with just enough wealth and just enough education, but also the civil servant and publicist who controlled the power of word and law, men who yearned to transcend current economic limits by maximizing the land’s productive output. ⁵ Where extending agricultural production had perhaps reached its limits in Bavaria by the mid-eighteenth century, this group believed that more intensive methods of cultivation, which had seen success in other parts of western Europe, could prevail in Bavaria. Increased production meant more nutrition and more population growth. Long term, more agricultural production could also translate into more rents, just as well it could translate into more tax revenue. From top to bottom, everyone stood to gain, and if the Bavarian state was to

---


find success in a world of almost constant turmoil, it would be, so thought the reformers, by the rule of enlightened order and with the help of reform-minded men.\(^6\)

But then, as in later years, the reach of both the state and the intentions of well-meaning gentlemen only went so far. Above all, the characteristically difficult situation of the Bavarian peasantry posed a serious obstacle to reformers. The vast majority of the peasantry continued to rely on a subsistence agriculture for survival, consuming most of what they themselves produced.\(^7\) Moreover, in the semi-feudal world that was eighteenth-century Bavaria, the land which was cultivated was not always distributed evenly or in a manner that was most efficient even for individual households. The same reformers who called for improvements in agricultural production were well aware of this, that the prevalence of small holdings, legal restrictions on the breaking up of farms, and other structural issues kept peasants from adopting more efficient agricultural practices.\(^8\) An even more fundamental barrier to agricultural reforms was the state itself, which continued to support a vicious combination of feudal obligations, rents, and heavy tax burdens that starved the peasantry of capital and discouraged even the most ambitious peasant from innovating.\(^9\) Though Bavarian peasants were relatively free, in reality, they still very much belonged to a system that severely disadvantaged them and left them with very few options. And if the Bavarian peasant was in fact a *poor man*, it was largely because of the social system to which he belonged. In short, if the state and reformers wanted to see improvements in

---


Bavaria’s agricultural sector, they would have to cut at the roots of a social structure that hindered peasant production.

Unfortunately for Bavaria’s reformers, like so many other places in eighteenth-century Europe, the peasant was the subject of an authoritarian state that had no interest in further granting peasants or anyone else the right of more active political participation. Likewise, government leaders usually showed little immediate concern for the existential problems faced by the peasantry.\textsuperscript{10} If the peasant experienced any difficulties, most of the landed elite, and by extension, most servants of the state, assumed that it was the peasant who was responsible for his own misery. “The peasants are a middle-thing,” wrote one bureaucrat, “somewhere in between an unruly cow and a human being who lacks in reason, and those who have to deal with them know this.”\textsuperscript{11} For people such as this, it came as no surprise that agricultural production remained as it did. This is not to say that the Bavarian government blindly ignored the peasantry or the condition of rural production. In 1723, Max Emanuel, the elector of Bavaria, enacted the first of several \textit{Kulturmandate} calling for the resettlement of all abandoned farms for the express purpose of “growing much blessed grain.”\textsuperscript{12} Forty years later, another mandate was enacted in order to encourage agricultural production, providing a ten-year tax holiday for those who brought new lands under cultivation. This tax holiday was later raised to thirty years. More intensive methods of agriculture were actively encouraged as a way of boosting production, as


\textsuperscript{11} Anton Wilhelm Ertel, \textit{Von der Niedergerichtsbarkeit} (Nördlingen, 1737), 694. Quoted in Lütge, \textit{Grundherrschaft}, 16-17, here 17. From the German, “Die Bauern sind ein Mittelding zwischen einem unvernünftigen Vieh und Menschen, die da mehr ohne Vernunft, als deren fähig sind, welches die jenigen wissen, die mit ihnen viel zu schaffen hatten.”

\textsuperscript{12} Schloegl, \textit{Bayerische Agrargeschichte}, 12. From the German, “Wir müssen wieder viel liebseligen Getreide bauen.” The word \textit{liebselig} is difficult to translate, being of Bavarian etymology, but pertaining specifically to breads, grains, and their central role in Bavarian culture and diet. See Johann Andreas Schmeller, \textit{Bayerisches Wörterbuch}, vol. 1 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), 1415.
was the exchange of strips of land for those peasants who had too much land to farm, with the prohibition against the sub-division of holdings being lifted by 1772.13

All of these policies ultimately had limited effects on agricultural production because they did not get at the heart of the problem faced by the peasantry. Specifically, the peasantry was still no more free, certainly not free to sell or buy land, and certainly not free from the tremendous financial burdens placed upon it by state and lord alike. Realistically, any reform of agriculture would have to address these two issues. As it turned out though, striking at the privileges of the nobility and church was a conflict in which the Bavarian state was not prepared to engage itself.14 Despite the wishes of reformers, peasant agriculture would for the time being remain as it always had, pinched by the inefficient distribution of land and insufficient capital. Outside of the peasant classes, there were a few wealthy, landed elites who tried to introduce more efficient agricultural practices to their farming operations. They were an absolute minority however, given that most of the nobility in Bavaria had little to do with agriculture directly, being more inclined to see their lands primarily as a source of rent-income or as a place to vacation in the summer.15 The majority of arable lands was therefore divided up amongst varying classes of peasants. While some peasants actually farmed rather sizable holdings, the majority farmed middle-sized holdings, and an equally large number, most commonly referred to

13 Schlögl, Bayerische Agrargeschichte, 12-13; Lee, Population Growth, 112; and Hausmann, Agrarpolitik, 90-93. Regarding the Bavarian government’s involvement in the improvement of agriculture during the late eighteenth century, see Anon., Historisches Rückblicke auf die Landes-Cultur im Königreiche Bayern (Munich: Lenter’schen Buchhandlung, 1828), 6-33. Also see Burkhard Rabel, “Landwirtschaftliche Besitzverteilung und Besitzverschiebung in Altbayern” (Leipzig: Veit, 1915), 21; Joseph von Hazzi, Gekrönte Preisschrift über Güter-Arrondirung (Munich: Fleischmann, 1818), 129; Leopold von Hartmann, Abhandlung von einigen allgemein nützlichen Verbesserung der Staat- und Landwirthschaft in Baiern (Burghausen: Lutzenberger, 1784), 78.


15 Lütge, Grundherrschaft, 15.
as **Söldnern** or **Taglöchner**, farmed holdings that were alone too small to sustain a household.\(^\text{16}\) Besides being the largest class of farmers, these last two groups of middle-sized and small-holders were the ones who were most hindered by the social and political structures of eighteenth-century Bavaria.

Lacking in land and capital, Bavaria’s peasant farmers therefore continued to practice agriculture as they always had, relying on strict rotational schemes to sustain the productive viability of what little land they possessed.\(^\text{17}\) Year in, year out, a consistent pattern of agriculture continued to play out on the Bavarian landscape. In most cases, the village was the lowest working denominator, and tradition dictated that the arable lands available to each village be divided into at least three rotating plots, one for winter grains, one for summer grains, and one to lie fallow.\(^\text{18}\) Depending on the season, the lands being worked were either further subdivided into individual plots or strips accorded to individual households, or were simply farmed for collective purposes. Of the different types of grains that were grown, rye was the most dominant, followed by wheat, barley, dinkel, and oats. Given the scarcity of available feed and the harsh conditions of Bavaria’s winters, the raising of cattle or pigs for anything other than

\(^\text{16}\) Lütge, *Grundherrschaft*, 14; Albrecht, “Staat und Gesellschaft,” 643; and Beck, *Unterfinning*, 323-324. It is difficult to specify exactly how much land different classes of peasants would have typically farmed, given the inaccuracies and overlaps of the tax classification system being used in eighteenth-century Bavaria (known as the *Hoffuß*). Middle-sized farms could have had anywhere in between 30 Tagwerke and 190 Tgw. (1 Tgw. = 0.6 hectares = 1.5 acres), whereas small-farm could have included less than one Tgw. or up to 45 Tgw. Grouped together, these two classes did however make up the majority of farmers in Bavaria. See Lee, *Population Growth*, 112-114.

\(^\text{17}\) In regard to land ownership in early nineteenth-century Bavaria, as in most places in western Europe, most Bavarian peasants did not actually ‘own’ their own land, given that they typically rented their lands from aristocratic landowners. However, despite this prevailing arrangement, most peasants behaved as though they did own the land, passing it down from generation to generation, and even swapping strips of land on a case by case basis. Only after 1848 would the Bavarian peasantry, in general terms, legally possess their own land. See below, page 33.

\(^\text{18}\) Hausmann, *Agrarpolitik*, 34. The land available for cultivation in any given village varied depending on environmental or political conditions. In the case of the Upper Bavarian village of Unterfinning, as Rainer Beck points out, arable lands totaled to only slightly less than a third of those lands that were available to the village, with the rest being taken up by forests, pastures, and garden and living space. Beck, *Unterfinning*, 97-98. In other cases, the percentage used for arable could climb into the eightieth percentile. See Lee, *Population Growth*, 135 for a list of Upper Bavarian villages and the land which they respectively devoted to arable, garden, meadow, heath (moors), and woodland.
personal use was almost unheard of. Stall feeding, that is the practice of keeping cattle and hogs in stalls throughout the year and feeding them on a combination of hay or feeds was not yet a very common practice.\textsuperscript{19} A general exception to this rule would have been found in southern Bavaria along the foothills of the Alps, where climate restrictions and the greater availability of pasturelands supported a more extensive use of cattle alongside more complex rotations of agriculture.\textsuperscript{20} In either case, farmers had to practice a more sustainable agriculture if they expected to survive. A short growing period between April and the end of September provided only half a year for the actual growing of crops. Poor soil quality and a lack of fertilizers all together ensured that yields remained relatively low.\textsuperscript{21}

Surviving under such limited circumstances, Bavaria’s peasant farmers had learned not to stray too far from those time-tested agricultural methods that provided them and their animals with the most sustenance. This in part helps to explain why peasants were sometimes hesitant or downright opposed to adopting more intensive methods. Even though it was widely known in south Germany that fodder plants such as clover improved the quality of the soil, Bavarian farmers did not widely plant fodder crops until the second half of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{22} In one particularly illuminating episode, a group of peasants, after having received clover seeds from their lord, went so far as to throw the seeds into boiling water and then a baking oven “in order to demonstrate,” as William R. Lee describes it, “that [clover] had no place in the


\textsuperscript{20} Borchardt, \textit{Fruchtfolgesysteme}, 32, 144. Also see Peter Blickle, \textit{Deutsche Untertanen. Ein Widerspruch} (Munich: Beck, 1981). On the differentiation between those regions in Bavaria using the three-field system and those where more complex rotations (i.e. \textit{Egartwirtschaft}) were used, see Schlögl, \textit{Bayerische Agrargeschichte}, 89-90.


\textsuperscript{22} Lee, \textit{Population Growth}, 142-144.
traditional pattern of cultivation.”23 These types of fears were not necessarily unfounded. In another case, in the Lower Bavarian village of Kirchdorf, farmers actually tried to adopt more intensive methods, switching over to stall-feeding and taking in pastures and fallows. This particular venture ultimately proved disastrous however for a lack of fodder, and the villagers were forced to switch back to traditional methods.24 Clearly, adopting more intensive methods of agriculture would not come so easily for peasant communities that existed on the edge of survival.

What then did traditional agricultural practices look like? Regardless of how large or small a farmer’s stock of cattle was, or how many acres the peasant farmed, maintaining the productive relationship between his animals and the land was of the foremost importance. Balance was integral. In the words of one reformer, “It is impossible to imagine the cultivation of grains without animal husbandry... and animal husbandry can only be improved with better access to feed.”25 Behind every bushel of grain lay an exchange system that demanded harmonizing. The same could be said for every bucket of milk, or for every single head of cattle whose very existence and health, like that of the peasant, depended upon the fruitfulness of the land. Rightfully, Regina Schulte writes that “the history of peasants is also the history of their fields and animals,” and if the land did not receive its share in manure to correspond to what had been taken out, yields would steadily diminish. “When wanting to sustain crop farming,” to quote another early nineteenth-century observer, “one must fertilize.”26 So peasants made sure

24 Ibid., 133-134; and also G. Vöckl, *Kirchdorf: eine Pfarreigeschichte aus dem Ampertal* (Freising: Freisinger Tagblatt, 1931), 73.
to leave one third of their arable lands fallow every year, turning any given plot of land into fallow after it had been used for producing summer grains. When the next season arrived, the fertilizer that had been deposited on the fallow and the grass that was left on it were plowed under, providing the requisite nourishment that the soil needed in order to continue producing.\textsuperscript{27}

Using fertilizers produced beyond the village played little to no role during this period. Rather, almost all fertilizer came from the cattle or draft animals that a farming family may have possessed, and most of that fertilizer made its way to the field while the animals grazed on it. From early spring until enough grass had grown upon the fallows, the cattle grazed on the personal property of the villagers, or on the pasturelands under the watch of a shepherd. Once a plot of land cycled to fallow, it reverted to communal ownership, to be used by all the villagers for grazing their cattle. Then, when the soil of the fallow was to be turned over, the cattle were moved to the common pasture, or if necessary, the wild pastures or forests. The fallowed land had received what the farmers were able to give it, but naturally, this was not very much.\textsuperscript{28}

Oftentimes, villages in Bavaria did not have sufficient pasture lands, and except in the late summer perhaps, cattle were expected to survive on very little.\textsuperscript{29} When not in pastures, the typical diet for cattle too often comprised of straw, and again, contemporaries were well aware that this was not enough.\textsuperscript{30}

\textit{praktischen Landwirthschaft für Gutsbesitzer, Oekonomen und Landwirthe} (Nürnberg and Vienna: Lampe, 1839), 7. From the German, “Wenn man eine Ackerwirtschaft erhalten will, so bedarf man Dünger.”

\textsuperscript{27} Schlögl, \textit{Bayerische Agrargesichte}, 50.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 50-51; Beck, \textit{Unterfinning}, 104-105. Reber provides a breakdown of typical feeds that farmers in the first half of the nineteenth century could provide their cattle in respect to what quality manure they could then in turn expect for fertilizer. See Reber, \textit{Handbuch}, 13-14.

\textsuperscript{29} Regarding the lack of pasture last in late eighteenth -century Bavaria, see Lee, \textit{Population Growth}, 134-136; and Schlögl, 91. As Schlögl points out, it is also good to remember that most peasants did not always have easy access to pasturelands, considering that they did not necessarily own them.

Like the practice of fixing the soil through planting clover, there was a common agreement among landed elites, educated agriculturalists, bureaucrats and government ministers alike that the increased practice of stall feeding among small farmers would lead to an increase in agricultural output.\textsuperscript{31} If the peasants moved what cattle they had into stalls, increased their head of cattle, put their pasture lands under the plow, and abandoned the practice of letting fields lie fallow, not only could they produce more manure that was also of higher quality, they would have more land to actually farm at one time. An increase in production would naturally follow. However, the relative cost of feeding more cattle and the added costs of building stalls meant that capital-starved peasants, even had they been somewhat inclined to attempt stall feeding, generally avoided it. The rising price of wood and other building materials as well as the relative lack of forest resources helped to seal the fate of stall feeding. Moreover, as even some supporters of agricultural reform were apt to point out, the additional cost of labor necessitated by putting the fallows under cultivation, as well as short-term reductions in the lack of arable needed to raise fodder, canceled out the immediate benefits of stall feeding and intensive farming. To quote William Lee again, “only in those cases where a village benefited from a good and rich soil, and where the tithe exactions would not be levied on the cultivation of new crops, was it really sensible to consider a change in the traditional use of fallow. These prerequisites, however, were seldom present in late eighteenth-century Bavaria.”\textsuperscript{32} In short: as long as the Bavarian peasantry lacked in credit, land, and flexibility, there would be no transformation of the agricultural sector. The cost and gamble simply were not worth it.

The first real opportunity for change finally came between 1795 and 1799, a tumultuous period that began with the invasion of Bavaria by the French Directory, and ended with the rise

\textsuperscript{32} Lee, 131-133, here 132.
of a new prince-elector, Maximilian IV Joseph. Max Joseph made no secret of his sympathies toward France, Napoleon, and the ideals of the Enlightenment. More importantly though, it would be Max Joseph’s most trusted advisor, Maximilian Joseph von Montgelas, who would in the course of centralizing the authority of the Bavarian government, use the state to revolutionize Bavaria. In his attempt to recreate Bavaria in the image of Napoleonic France, Montgelas expressly intended to transform agricultural production, putting into practice many of those same ideas that reformers had called for since the eighteenth century. This included secularizing church lands, abolishing serfdom, reorganizing the tax system, and encouraging the redistribution of lands along the lines of more efficient production.\textsuperscript{33}

From the outset though, political reality dictated which reforms Montgelas could actually see into existence, and in the end, his reforms did not lead to a revolution in the agricultural sector. With the state being in a near-constant state of warfare in the first two decades of the century, the driving principle behind all of Montgelas’ reforms was financial solvency. By 1800, Bavaria’s finances were, to quote one historian, “a catastrophe.”\textsuperscript{34} All reforms were therefore implemented in respect to how much they would boost tax revenues.\textsuperscript{35} If agricultural production in Bavaria needed improving — and Montgelas certainly thought that it did — it was because improvements in agricultural production would yield more taxes. If the tax system itself needed improving, it was not because Montgelas believed that the old tax system was unjust, but because it was inefficient. And when Montgelas decided to largely maintain the status of the


\textsuperscript{35}Hausmann, Agrarpolitik, 100-101.
nobility within Bavaria’s social structure, it was because he needed them in order to carry out the wishes of a state whose bureaucracy was still weak and disorganized. Keeping the aristocracy secure in their social and financial position was a fateful decision. So long as the state supported the aristocracy, agricultural reform would be impossible.

Clearly, the cost of reform had to be weighed in the balance of political reality. Where resistance was weak, reforms were implemented. For example, there was little opposition to Montgelas’ decision to end serfdom because serfdom hardly existed in Bavaria anymore. Likewise, the state could confiscate ecclesiastical properties because, if anything, the state did not need the church. It needed the church’s lands, and the church was an easy target that could no longer defend itself. However, the state could not and did not strike at the local power of the landed aristocracy because the state needed its cooperation if it was to function at all. So Monteglas, who had set out “to create a free and mobile agrarian society by abolishing serfdom,” had to coax and deal with the aristocracy instead. In the meantime, Bavaria’s peasants would continue to carry a disproportionate share of the tax burden, they would continue to pay heavy rents, and they would, in many cases, continue to pay various types of feudal dues. Agricultural production would continue more or less as it had before the reforms.  

Still, where Montgelas failed to liberate the Bavarian peasantry from heavy financial burdens and thus open up the path to further agricultural development, his reforms did succeed in integrating a patchwork of new territories together under the authority of a central Bavarian state.  


doubled in size, and as its political and economic interests distinctly moved further into the heart of south Germany, the state found itself with regions under its administration that had never belonged to Bavaria before.\textsuperscript{38} The arrangement would at times prove awkward in the years to come — the northern, Frankish regions were more protestant, the southern, Old Bavarian regions were staunchly Roman Catholic — but a new constitution that guaranteed confessional freedom, freedom of thought, and equality before the law, and a communal administrative law that strengthened local governments over and against that of the central state would help to keep the kingdom together.\textsuperscript{39}

Though the government had a constitution and a state parliament (\textit{Landtag}), absolute sovereignty nonetheless rested in the headship of the king, with his authority being delegated to a small circle of ministers selected by himself. The parliament, divided into an upper house of appointed lords and a lower house consisting of officials elected by restricted suffrage, was competent in the areas of tax and budgets, but in effect, remained little more than an observing body to the political process.\textsuperscript{40} True power lay with the king and his ministers, and it would

\textsuperscript{38} With the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1805, Bavaria became, for the first time in its history, an independent kingdom. For the next eight years thereafter, the elector Max Joseph (1756-1825) played his relationship with Napoleon very successfully, relying on Napoleon for as long as he could to protect Bavaria from Austrian aggression, and benefitting from his loyalty to Napoleon with rather substantial territorial gains. Max Joseph then went over to the Allies shortly before they defeated Napoleon at the battle of Leipzig (1813). Though this final act was timely, it would not spare Bavaria from having to give significant territories to Austria under the terms dictated by the Vienna Congress. However, in recognition of Bavaria's assistance, the Vienna Congress did allow for Bavaria to keep the other lands that it had secured during the war, compensated Bavaria for its losses to Austria, and also recognized Bavaria as an independent kingdom with Max Joseph, now Maximilian I Joseph, as the king of Bavaria. See Weis, "Die Begründung des modernes bayerischen Staates," in Schmid, \textit{Das Neue Bayern}, bk. 1, 25.


\textsuperscript{40} Though Bavaria had a parliament, it should be mentioned that suffrage was limited to men who were, in the words of Robert Conklin, "citizens of the state, at least twenty-five years old, a resident of the electoral district, and in possession of taxable property, a profession, or a public office." Restrictions to the franchise would change for the better over the course of the nineteenth century, the government gradually granting the right to vote to more people. However, because the king and his ministers, not the \textit{Landtag}, retained the right to initiate policies, the value of the franchise remained somewhat diminished until after the First World War. The \textit{Landtag} would, especially after 1848, gradually gain more influence over the state budget and the authority to tax. However, again, the king's ministers would retain the initiative of government throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth,
more or less remain this way until the collapse of the monarchy in 1918. The ministries were themselves divided up into several areas of responsibility, the names of their offices and various duties changing from time to time. And where their power was theoretically delegated down to provincial and district ministries, local authorities maintained a high degree of autonomy from the government in Munich. Economic affairs shifted in between several ministries over the century, depending largely on the whims of the king and his senior minister, but throughout the period, there was no ministry devoted solely to agricultural production. Rather, at different times, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Commerce and Trade, and then, after 1871, the Ministry of the Interior (again) included agricultural production as part of their responsibilities. Only after 1919, with the founding of the Bavarian Free State, would the government have a ministry expressly devoted to the oversight of agricultural production.

With the dismissal of Montgelas in 1817 — brought down by the animosity of Crown Prince Ludwig and also growing anti-French sentiments amongst government administrators — and then the death of Max Joseph in 1825, Bavaria entered a rather conservative and altogether quiet period in its political history. Similarly, by the end of the decade, the push for liberal reforms from within the government came to stop. On the other hand, the call for agricultural reforms, so distinct in the late eighteenth century, and so close to becoming reality under promulgating budgets and then levying and raising taxes with the oversight of the Landtag. For more on the Landtag and voting rights in Bavaria, see Robert Conklin, “Politics and Politicians in Baden and Bavaria, 1815-1848” (PhD diss., Kent State University, 1972), 55; and Dietrich Thranhardt, Wahlen und politische Strukturen in Bayern, 1848-1953 (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1973).


Montgelas, continued to emanate from the same elements in Bavarian society that had always seen a need for agricultural reform. Only now, the atmosphere was made more poisonous by the upheaval associated with attempted reforms, war, and revolution. Fear was in the air, and given the government’s hostility toward reformers, few were bold enough to directly criticize the government. Indeed, it now seemed as though there was hardly any audience willing to listen to the calls for reform: the central government had no desire to initiate reforms that smacked of enlightened or liberal progress; the aristocracy did not want to upset its own social and economic position; communal governments wanted to protect the old ways and the power that was wrapped up in them; and the peasant classes, confined to the small worlds of their impregnable villages, saw little reason or need to challenge a system that, though disadvantageous to them, was both stable and one that they understood.44

ii. The seeds of transition and the end of Bavarian sovereignty, 1825-1871

Even though agricultural reformers would continue to clamor for the attention of the Bavarian government in the first half of the nineteenth century, they would make little headway. By the end of the 1820s, rather than pursuing policies that could lead to economic reforms, the government took the stance that it would protect traditional means of production and traditional social structures. This meant that for most of the first half of the nineteenth century, communal governments retained a large degree of self-rule. Meanwhile, the central government would do what it could to discourage the creation of an urbanized proletariat (which it increasingly feared), and the structures of agricultural production would go virtually unchanged.45 Bavaria’s entire

economy would remain heavily agricultural throughout this period, dominated as before by small- and mid-size producers who still largely engaged in subsistence agriculture. Only after the revolution of 1848, and even then, only gradually, did the government reassess its stance on policies that affected the further development of the industrial sector.

Of foremost importance was Bavaria’s changing economic relationship with Prussia and other lesser German states via the formation of customs unions. Already during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, Bavaria and other German states had tried their hand at forming various customs unions. However, the politics of Napoleon’s continental system and difficulties between the states that formed the Confederation of the Rhine ensured that a more common German market failed to materialize. By the 1820s, with some semblance of stability having returned, the Bavarian government, for one, was back at the drawing-board. Between 1824 and 1825, it worked out an agreement with neighboring Württemberg, lowering tariffs between the two states and allowing for freer trade. This was followed in 1828 with the two south German states forming a formal customs union, removing significant trade barriers between each other, and joining together under a common tariff policy. At the same time that Bavaria and Württemberg created their customs union, other German states to the north began to independently work through a similar process, lowering tariffs and forming their own customs unions. Finally, by 1834, most of the German states, including Bavaria and also Prussia, were


46 As late as 1840, about two-thirds of Bavaria’s population were still employed either in part or completely in the agricultural sector. Maintaining a subsistence economy would also mean that the Bavarian population’s rate of growth would remain low in the first half of the nineteenth century, especially when compared to other German states. According to Lee, “many regions in Prussia enjoyed a rate of population growth three or four times in excess of that Bavaria.” Only neighboring Württemberg saw a lower rate of growth for its population. Götschmann, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 23-24; Lee, Population Growth, 12; and Seidl, et al., “Die Landwirtschaft,” in Schmid, Das Neue Bayern, bk. 2, 157.

joined together into one, unified German Customs Union (Zollverein). Though this customs union fell far short of creating a unified German economy, for the Bavarian government, it was a fiscal success. For the agricultural sector though, it meant that the price of agricultural products would be increasingly affected by Prussian markets, given that Bavaria primarily traded in natural resources (i.e. lumber) and agricultural products for Prussian manufactured goods. This would be especially significant after 1848, when peasant farmers, and not just Bavaria’s few large farmers, increasingly began to participate in market-oriented production.

Of course, Prussian markets only came into greater play because of improved transportation and the development of railroads. Like Bavaria’s manufacturing sector, railroads in Bavaria remained rather insignificant until the latter decades of the nineteenth century. However, again, what was to be important later in the nineteenth century found its

48 By 1852, only the two Grand Duchies of Mecklenburg, the three Hansa cities of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck, and then also Austria lay outside of the Zollverein. See Sheehan, *German History*, 502.
49 Götschmann, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 39-40; Gömmel, “Gewerbe, Handel und Vekehr,” in Schmid, *Das Neue Bayern*, bk. 2, 218-219; Rudolf Boch, *Staat und Wirtschaft im 19. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004), 12-14. Though the Zollverein was clearly important for Bavaria’s economic development, this chapter does not subscribe to the argument made by some historians, that the Zollverein contributed significantly to the later unification of Germany. At the least, as James Sheehan puts it, it can be said “that the Zollverein, especially in combination with other phenomena, such as railroad construction, helped to promote growth.” This was certainly the case for certain sectors of the Bavarian economy, and also certain districts, such as the Pfalz and the Frankish districts in northern Bavaria. Quote taken from Sheehan, *German History*, 503-504. For a historiographical perspective of the Zollverein, see Boch, *Staat und Wirtschaft*, 72-74. For a history of the Zollverein, see William Henderson, *The Zollverein* (London: Cass, 1984); Hans-Werner Hahn, *Geschichte des deutschen Zollvereins* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1984); and Rolf Horst Dumke, “Intra-German Trade in 1837 and Regional Economic Development,” *Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, vol. 64, no. 4 (1977): 468-496. For more on the Zollverein from a Bavarian political and fiscal perspective, see Angelika Fox, *Die wirtschaftliche Integration Bayerns in das Zweite Deutsche Kaiserreich* (Munich: Beck, 2001), 31-69.
51 Though this paragraph focuses on the development of railroads in Bavaria, it is worth mentioning that the state also began to invest more in streets, roads, and bridges in the first half of the nineteenth century, and this carried on throughout rest of the century. Though it is difficult to measure, contemporary observers were convinced that the improvement of roads helped in the development of agricultural production. See Borcherdt, *Fruchtfolgesysteme*, 39. In addition to roads, the state also invested in the development of canals, notably, the Ludwigs-Donau-Main-Kanals, which connected the Danube (Donau) and Main rivers. However, unlike roads and railroads, canals and river ways had a minimal impact on the agricultural sector in Bavaria, primarily due to their location and, for the canals, their uneconomic costs. For more on these other infrastructural developments, see Gömmel, “Gewerbe,” in Schmid, *Das Neue Bayern*, bk. 2, 224; Götschmann, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 49-59; and, for the development of roads specifically, see Gottfried Hartung, “Die bayerischen Landstrassen: ihre Entwicklung im XIX. Jahrhundert und ihre Zukunft” (Leipzig: Deichert’iche Verlag, 1902).
beginnings in the first half of the century, and the eventual effect that railroads would have on agricultural production cannot be overstated. Primarily, agricultural producers would have to come to terms with new markets made available by railroads, thereby adopting more intensive methods of production in order to remain competitive and meet growing demands.52 But then, the newer markets, predominantly located in Bavarian urban centers, were themselves changing and growing because of the railroads. Supplied with more food, urban areas could sustain larger populations, and there was indeed an incredible swell in the movement of peoples in Bavaria from rural to urban areas after the mid-nineteenth century. This was especially so for Bavaria’s larger cities, with Munich’s population, already the largest in Bavaria, more than doubling between 1840 and 1880.53 In the first half of the nineteenth century, emigrating Bavarians had generally emigrated to North America. After 1854, this number began to drop, and by the 1860s, when the government finally began to roll back restrictive social and economic policies (i.e. craft and residence laws), urban labor markets began to really grow to their potential. Suddenly, for Bavarians in search of employment, the cities looked like a more favorable alternative to emigrating. Indeed, most of the growth that Bavaria’s cities experienced in the nineteenth century was a result of internal migration.54

For those who remained to work in Bavaria’s agricultural sector, little had changed since the eighteenth century. The future, it seemed, was not in the realm of agriculture, and as far as Ludwig’s government had been concerned, the peasantry could take care of itself. The 1848 revolutions changed this to some degree, with Ludwig’s removal at the top opening up the realm

52 Emma Mages, “Strukturwandel in der Landwirtschaft” in Brockhoff and Jahn, Eisenbahn in Bayern, 84-86. Also see Emma Mages, Eisenbahnbau, Siedlung, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in der südlichen Oberpfalz (1850-1920) (Kallmünz: Michael Lassleben, 1984), especially 344-357.
53 Götschmann, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 154. Munich’s population grew from a little over one hundred thousand in 1840 to nearly two hundred and fifty thousand by 1880. Bavaria’s next largest city, Nuremberg, by comparison, also doubled in size during this period, going from a little under fifty thousand in 1840 to a little over one hundred thousand in 1880.
54 Ibid., 148-164.
up possibility. Where the Bavarian government remained firmly under the authority of a monarch after 1848 (Maximilian II, 1848-1864), the government did take the civil unrest of 1848 seriously, and for the next twenty years, it would gradually loosen its stance on civil and economic policies. In regard to the peasantry, the government also finally saw fit to abolish those vestiges of feudalism that had held the peasantry back for so long. Forced tithes, dues, and other holdovers of feudal justice and ‘protection’ were, with the stroke of a pen, officially ended. Moreover, in stark contrast to the abolishment of serfdom in Prussia, in Bavaria, peasants were not forced to acquire their freedom by giving up their claims to the land. Rather, the peasants were allowed to remain on the land, even purchasing it if they wanted to by paying into a state-controlled fund that then redistributed payments at a fixed rate to landlords. Long-term, this meant that the financial status of the peasantry would remain difficult, given that they still had to pay heavy rents or heavy mortgage payments through the state. On the other hand though, peasants were finally free to sell and purchase land, whether it was to make farms more viable or to get out of the business of farming altogether.

55 Ever the romantic, the end of Ludwig I’s (1786-1868?) reign came abruptly in 1848 largely as a result of his relationship with Lola Montez (1821-1861†), the infamous ‘Hispano-Irish’ dancer and courtesan who, with her beauty and charm, had danced her way into Ludwig’s heart. Unfortunately for the king, Ludwig also allowed Montez to influence his political decisions more than he should have. This did not sit well with conservative government administrators, and neither did it go over with certain sectors of Bavarian bourgeois society. Before long, a ground swell of popular opposition, led primarily by university students, began to voice itself against the king. In the face of these protests, which only grew worse after Louis Philippe stepped down in France and revolutions broke out across Europe, the king’s ministers finally turned on Ludwig, forcing him to abdicate in favor of his son, Maximilian II.


57 Wolfgang Zorn, Kleine Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte Bayerns, 1806-1933 (Munich, Pasing: Bayerische Heimaforschung, 1962), 40. Even though the various forms of feudal obligation were officially ended in 1848, as Ian Farr points out, they of course continued to exist in some pockets of Bavaria. For the most part, however, their contribution to the peasantry’s overall debt situation was indeed significantly reduced after 1848. See Ian Farr, “Farmers’ Cooperatives in Bavaria, 1880-1914: ‘State-Help’ and ‘Self-Help’ in Imperial Germany,” Rural History, vol. 18, 2 (2007): 163–182, here 167.

For agricultural developments, all of these changes meant that peasant producers now had enough personal motivation, as well as the possibility — in theory at least — to grow and expand production to match demand. Before, under the constraints of feudal obligations, peasants had seen little reason to expand production. By the mid-1850s however, when Bavaria’s economy began to really take off, there was both enough economic push and pull to motivate peasant farmers into transforming agricultural production on their own. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the state’s financial difficulties had pushed Montgelas and the Bavarian government into attempting agricultural reforms. Ultimately, political expediency vis-à-vis the aristocracy had ensured that these reforms were never actually seen into place. By the mid-nineteenth century, the story was different. With the aristocracy weakened by years of political irrelevance, the state now maneuvered around the aristocracy. The state wanted to see more workers, more efficiency, and enough food to feed Bavaria’s growing, urban production centers. A stagnant agricultural sector protected by feudal and communal laws only stood in the way of these developments.

Between 1848 and 1871, Bavaria’s economy continued to expand, carrying on in trends that had started before 1848, but now moving more rapidly. Though one could hardly categorize these developments as an industrial revolution, a pattern of growth was clearly discernable. The Bavarian railway network tripled in growth between 1848 and 1858, the number of people living in cities continuously grew, and the size of Bavaria’s factory labor force likewise increased. After 1855, Bavaria’s economy blossomed, and this further encouraged the government to finally abandon its restrictive craft and social policies. In 1868 and 1869, the government published new laws governing handcrafts, guilds, residence, sojourn, marriage, poor relief, and communal government, decisively turning the tide against conservative forces that had stood in the way of
industrialization during the first half of the nineteenth century. Though other German-speaking lands, especially Prussia, would far outpace Bavaria’s economic growth after 1848, for Bavaria, the tendency toward industrialization was now clearly set.\footnote{Shorter, “Social Change,” 655-656; and Gömmel, “Gewerbe,” in Schmid, \textit{Das Neue Bayern}, bk. 2, 231-232.}

Along with these changes in economic growth and policy, the agricultural sector too experienced its share in changes, albeit more gradually. Looking back on what had happened since 1848, some found that the growth of Bavaria’s economy and its effects on agriculture were quite noticeable. Writing in January of 1872, Dr. Julius Lehmann, a professor at the Central Agricultural Research Station for Bavaria (\textit{Landwirthschaftliche Centralversuchsstation für Bayern}), suggested that the power of the market had certainly made itself felt on agricultural production, with the relative prices of agricultural products seeming to now dictate what farmers should grow. He noted that the price of wheat, despite the increased costs in inputs and increased output, had fluctuated significantly, suffering as most grains did in the latter half of the nineteenth century from a glut in production, the falling of transport costs, and the lack of protective tariffs. The price of meat, on the other hand, had only risen to match what seemed like an insatiable demand. For Lehmann, raising more cattle, and hence, producing more manure and adopting more intensive methods was the true hallmark of progress, and as other sources note, Bavarian agricultural production was definitely headed in this direction. Alongside cattle, agricultural producers also began to cultivate more potatoes and increasingly planted fodder crops. Village commons were being sold or redistributed, in some places the peasantry were abandoning the three-field system, and over the course of the nineteenth century, one sees a pattern of peasant farmers going into debt in order to consolidate or add to their properties,
usually at the expense of those peasants whose properties were too small to sustain. The market was taking its effect.\textsuperscript{60}

The gradualness of these developments cannot be emphasized enough though. Granted, twenty years earlier, it would have been unlikely for someone such as Adam Müller, the editor of Bavarian Agricultural Association’s newsletter, to boast that, “The perfected English steam-thresher belongs among the most wonderful of modern contributions to agriculture,” and that “No other agricultural machine has found itself so quickly among small- and middle-farmers, especially in Bavaria, as this one.”\textsuperscript{61} For others, however, agricultural production was not keeping pace with developments in other sectors of the Bavarian economy. In an annual report to their headquarters in Munich, the Lower Franconian office of the Agricultural Association complained that, while there was much to be happy about, advances in agricultural production were being “left in the shade.” “While we see here a discovery, [there] an invention… that others quickly put to use… in order to realize enormous amounts of capital, agricultural developments are moving at a snail’s pace.”\textsuperscript{62} Similar words were used to describe the Bavarian


\textsuperscript{62}HdbL GC 22, “Jahresbericht des landwirtschaftlichen Kreiscomités für Unterfranken und Aschaffenburg pro 1872” (Würzburg: Thein’schen Druckerei, 1873), 1. Paraphrased from the German: “Während wir hier eine Entdeckung, eine Erfindung die andere in kürzester Zeit überholen und verdrängen und die gewonnene bessere Erkenntniß sofort und oft mit Aufwendung ganz enormer Kapitalien im praktischen Leben verwirklicht sehen, bewegt sich der landwirthschaftliche Fortschritte wie eine Schnecke im Lande...”
peasantry, who, because they “tenaciously cling to passed-down customs,” made it difficult to actually register any change at all.⁶³

Still, overall agricultural production had increased and the peasants had likewise begun to gradually adopt more intensive methods. However, if the peasantry looked as though they were stuck in place, it was because they actually reaped few major benefits from expanding production. While Bavaria’s few large-owners were better equipped to keep pace with the times, rising labor costs, a steady drop in buying power, increasing indebtedness and a lack of credit deeply plagued peasant-producers, cancelling out most advances that the peasantry may have been able to enjoy after 1848. On top of these problems, a lack of tariff protection exposed peasant-producers to much larger markets, including those beyond Bavaria, and grain prices, as already mentioned, could viciously fluctuate depending on the cost of imports.⁶⁴ The peasantry, a social group that was, according to Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, “the irrevocable power behind the people,” floundered in the turbulent seas of a market-oriented capitalism.⁶⁵ Karl Fraas, an agricultural professor at the Ludwig-Maximilian University in Munich and a colleague of Riehl, took a grim view of the situation. “Hardly concerning themselves with the agricultural proletariat and village poverty,” he, like many other German intellectuals, feared that industrialists and large farmers would eventually destroy the peasantry, “expropriating the peasant to their heart’s

---

⁶³ Die bayerische Landwirtschaft in den letzten zehn Jahren (Munich: Pössenbacher, 1872), 26. From the German, “Der bäuerliche Theil des Volks hängt bekanntlich zäh an ererbter Sitte und es lassen sich daher... große Veränderungen in Kost und Wohnung, in Tracht und Bräuchen, in Lebensweise und Betrieb ihres Geschäfts nicht nachweisen.”

⁶⁴ The Zollverein, which was dominated by Prussian interests, generally pursued a policy of free trade during the 50s and 60s, and they did this against the wishes of the Bavarian government. See Gömmel, “Gewerbe,” in Schmid, Das Neue Bayern, bk. 2, 232-233.

⁶⁵ For a summary of agricultural production in Bavaria in the decade preceding unification, see Die bayerische Landwirtschaft in den letzten zehn Jahren. The quote by Riehl (1823-1897†) was attributed to him by Ludwig III, who studied under Riehl at the Ludwig-Maximilians Universität. See Alfons Beckenbauer, Ludwig III. von Bayern, 1845-1921: Ein König auf der Suche nach seinem Volk (Regensburg: Pustet, 1987), 28.
content, because that is the power and might and glory of capital!”⁶⁶ Laying these fears aside, the Bavarian peasantry was not destroyed by the spread of large landowners or big businesses. Rather, they continued to muddle along as best as they could under less-than-ideal conditions. However, like the revolutions of 1848, political events would soon reveal that a certain level of frustration did exist amongst the peasantry, and that they, among other social groups, were willing to register that frustration through political activism.

In the early 1860s, under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck, the Prussian government had begun to more aggressively pursue policies that would consolidate Prussia’s position over the lesser German states, all at the expense of Austria.⁶⁷ However, because the Prussian government appeared to pursue these ends through rank aggression, it also confirmed the average Bavarian’s greatest prejudices and fears regarding Prussia: that a militaristic Prussian government sympathetic to Protestantism, secular liberalism, and Prussian business interests, was determined to subjugate the lesser German states under Prussian hegemony.⁶⁸ As a group, the Bavarian peasantry easily shared in these convictions. Added to this, however, was a conviction that most of the peasantry’s immediate economic problems were also tied together somehow with this larger issue of Prussia and its place within Germany. For most peasants, Prussia (along with others, i.e. Jews, city-dwellers, etc.) represented almost everything that they

---

⁶⁶ Karl Fraas, *Die Ackerbaukrisen und ihre Heilmittel* (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1866), 254. From the German, “Die Landwirtschaft steht im Begriff, eine Industrie zu werden... und sie wird das Glück des Größgewerbes nich verschmähen; sie wird ihre Vortheile mit den Maschinen im Fabrikbetrieb ihrer Veredlungsarten wachsen sehen, wie jeder Großbetrieb, und sich wenig um den Ackerbauproletarier und den Dorfpauperismus kümmern; sie wird schließlich Latifundien erwerben und den Bauer expropriiren nach Herzenslust, denn das ist die Kraft und Mach und Herrlichkeit des Kapitals!” Also see Sheehan, *German History*, 747-748 for a commentary on intellectuals and their fear of industrialization in the mid-nineteenth century. The Bavarian peasantry’s situation vis-à-vis capitalism was very similar to conditions in the other German lands, and this was a situation that further fed into a traditional strain of anti-industrial sentiment that had already existed among German intellectuals who believed that the rural village was “imperiled by the spread of factory and town.”


found wrong with a quickly modernizing world, and if economic circumstances did not favor the economies of rural Bavaria, it was likely that Prussia was somehow to blame.\textsuperscript{69}

Following Bavaria’s humiliating defeat in the Austro-Prussian war, combined with a general distaste for the liberal, pro-Prussian policies of the royal cabinet in Munich, a popular intransigence against the Bavarian and Prussian governments began, by 1867, to turn into outright political opposition in rural Bavaria.\textsuperscript{70} Led primarily by priests and middle-class Catholics with strong particularist leanings, the Bavarian Patriotic Party officially came into existence two years later, following their takeover of the Bavarian parliament. Standing in opposition to the royal cabinet and all-things liberal or Prussian, this group counted the Bavarian peasantry amongst the strongest of its constituencies. At the same time that political opposition had fomented into an actual political platform, various peasant associations (\textit{Bauernvereine}) had also spontaneously sprouted up all over Bavaria, “organizing the agrarian population,” to quote one historian, “for a co-operative struggle against the problems facing those who lived on the land.”\textsuperscript{71} Generally speaking, these associations were not truly radical, given that they were principally led by aristocrats. They did however agree that “the villains responsible for the


\textsuperscript{70} The Bavarian military had hardly mobilized before Prussia defeated Austria in 1866, and the Prussian army even occupied a few Bavarian cities. As a result of this defeat, Bavaria ceded the Bezirksamt of Gersfeld and the Landgericht of Orb to Prussia, but more importantly, was forced to pay 30 million gulden (that is, approximately one year’s worth of raised taxes) and sign a defensive treaty with Prussia, placing its military under Prussian command in the event that either one of them were attacked. In addition, the German Confederation was disbanded, and with Austria’s power being significantly diminished by these events, it was clear that Bavaria would likely have to seek further protection from Prussia in the future. See Volkert, “Die politische Entwicklung von 1848 bis zur Reichsgründung 1871,” in Schmid, \textit{Das Neue Bayern}, bk. 1, 298-299. In the wake of Bavaria’s loss, the king reorganized the ministry under the leadership of left-leaning Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, who represented the progressive political faction in the Landtag. This group, wanting Bavaria to ‘catch up with the times,’ intended on moving Bavaria more, in the words of Wright, “toward liberalization and entry into the newly created, Prussian dominated North German Confederation.” This did not sit well with many Bavarians. See Wright, “Patriotic Party,” 1-7, here 3.

\textsuperscript{71} Wright, 12.
farmer’s plight were the Liberal bankers, the bureaucracy, and those unrepresentative members of the Landtag whose liberal, urban outlook led to unfair taxation and inequitable inheritance restrictions for those living on the land."\(^{72}\) Populist in tone, these associations showed that the peasantry had suddenly woken to the possibilities of organized political action, and in the elections of 1869, they heavily contributed to the success of Bavarian Patriotic Party.\(^{73}\)

Success would be brief, given that once again, political events beyond Bavaria pushed ahead at an alarming pace, thus forcing the Bavarian government and the Patriots to reassess their relationship with Prussia and greater Germany. In 1870, the French government declared war on Prussia, and in accordance with their standing treaty, the Bavarian government was obliged to support Prussia militarily. It was at first unclear though whether the Bavarians would actually honor their commitments. Ludwig II, Bavaria’s highly temperamental and unstable king who generally avoided political affairs, for once (and perhaps the last time) played a critical role in the political future of Bavaria. Summing up the situation, he, along with his ministers, concluded that if Bavaria failed to support Prussia, that Bavaria would only grow more isolated, and standing alone, Bavaria would eventually succumb to the machination of greater powers. Under these circumstances, the king and his ministers concluded that, rather than delaying the inevitable, it would be better for Bavaria to deal with Prussia on terms of their own choosing, given that Bavaria would surely be asked to formally join Prussia in further political union. The king and the ministers chose to support Prussia. The parliament, now controlled by the Patriots, balked at the king’s decision. Without question, it was understood that the liberal minority within parliament would choose to support Prussia. The Patriots, on the other hand, split over

\(^{72}\) Wright, “Patriotic Party,” 13 and 77-78.

\(^{73}\) For more on the Bavarian Patriotic Party, see Wright, but also Friedrich Hartmannsgruber, Die Bayerische Patriotenpartei, 1868-1887 (Munich: Beck, 1986). For more on the peasant associations during this period specifically, see Gilbert Southern, “The Bavarian Kulturkampf: A Chapter in Government, Church, and Society in the Early Bismarckreich” (PhD diss., University of Massachusetts, 1977), 113-167.
the issue. Being staunch monarchists, many of the Patriots felt obliged to support their king, and this was especially so in matters of war. This meant therefore that a fraction of the Patriots, along with the liberal minority, could form a majority in favor of the war. On the evening of July 18th, 1870, this is exactly what happened. Six months later, under similar circumstances, Bavaria joined the German Empire. 74

For the peasantry, not to mention the Patriots, the events leading up to unification took the wind out of their sails. Even though the Patriots would continue to control the lower house of parliament, they would never again enjoy the wide, unquestionable support that they had seen in 1869. As for the peasant associations, their memberships soon dwindled as well, given that their express purpose in opposition to Prussia had been rendered somewhat moot. Despite the onset of the Kulturkampf and continued disenchantment with the incumbent liberal cabinet, the peasants knew, in the words of Ian Farr, that “the Prussian unification of Germany was irrevocable.” Likewise, the peasantry would not so easily find a solution to their continued economic woes. Perhaps Prussia had not been the major problem after all? More likely, the peasantry required a political party that expressly represented their interests, and did not just subsume them into a wider political agenda. Until then though, the frequency of meetings among the peasant associations would steadily decline, with many being ultimately abandoned “in favor of drinking sessions.” 75 Outside of the of peasant association in the Upper Bavarian village of Tuntenhausen, all of the ‘Bavarian-Patriotic’ associations faded from existence by the

74 Volkert, “Die politische Entwicklung von 1848 bis zur Reichsgründung 1871,” in Schmid, Das Neue Bayern, bk. 1, 308-317. Also see Hans Rall, König Ludwig II. und Bismarcks Ringen um Bayern, 1870/71 (Munich: Beck, 1973). It is worth mentioning that technically, the Bavarian government did not need the Landtag’s approval to go to war. However, the Landtag was required to approve the necessary funding. Also, without the support of the lower house, it could have proven difficult for the ministries to rule in the long-run. Between 1848 and the crises surrounding unification, the ministries learned to deal with the lower house, recruiting them as best as they could to support their policies.
75 Farr, “Peasant Protest,” 116.
mid-1880s.\textsuperscript{76} Try as they might, other peasant associations, especially in the Franconian districts, tried to pick up where these earlier peasant-associations had failed, but they too ultimately found only limited success.\textsuperscript{77} For now, it seemed as though the peasantry, like Bavaria, had quietly accepted its fate.

\textsuperscript{76} Farr, “Peasant Protest,” 115-116; and Alois Hundhammer, \textit{Die landwirtschaftliche Berufsvertretung Bayern} (Munich: Pfeiffer, 1926), 34-36.

CHAPTER 2
THE HISTORY AND VISION OF THE AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION
AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BAVARIAN STATE

The structure and organization of the Bavarian state changed very little as a consequence of unification. Even though the ministries reorganized themselves and the government surrendered certain responsibilities to the Reich government in Berlin (i.e. foreign affairs, tariff policies), the Bavarian government retained the final word on its internal matters, to include agricultural production.\(^1\) Similarly, economic and agricultural trends that began before unification proceeded as before. Even though an economic crash in 1873 initiated what would be a twenty-year period of sluggish growth, Bavaria’s industrial sector continued to develop and expand, city populations swelled, rail lines grew in length, and agriculturalists increasingly integrated their production to match market demands.\(^2\) Still, in spite of these developments, Bavaria’s agricultural sector showed few signs of improvement. Added to this, the steady rise in imported grains from beyond Europe meant that grain prices in Bavaria progressively deteriorated during the decades after 1871. For peasant farmers, this development was particularly onerous, given that it contributed heavily to both a general decrease in income

---


amongst peasant farmers as well as rising levels of debt. In light of these troubles, there was
very little that the Bavarian government could do to control prices on agricultural imports. Tariff
policies were now decided at the national level, and until 1879, the Reich government pursued a
policy of free trade, just as the parliament of the Customs Union had generally done before
unification. In a similar spirit, the Bavarian government generally maintained a ‘hands-off’
approach toward agricultural production (and indeed, economic developments in general). It
wanted those more familiar with local conditions to engage with problems at the most local level
of governance.

Maintaining a hands-off approach did not mean however that the Bavarian government
possessed no mechanisms capable of engaging with the agricultural sector. Rather than
maintaining a large, formal bureaucracy specifically tasked with oversight of the agricultural
sector, the government instead enlisted a private organization to more or less function as an arm
of the state, namely, the Agricultural Association in Bavaria. Founded in 1810 as a private
interest group that promoted the development of agricultural production, the Agricultural
Association had, over the course of the nineteenth century, developed very strong personal and
financial ties with the Bavarian government. For a brief period after 1835, the Bavarian
government took almost complete control over the organization, forcing it to reorganize its
structure so as to better suit and implement government policies. However, after 1848,

236-237.  
Sarah Tirrell, German Agrarian Politics After Bismarck’s Fall: The Formation of the Farmer’s League (New
Götschmann, Wirtschaftsgeschichte Bayerns, 236-239; and Alois Schlögl, ed., Bayerische Agrargeschichte: die
Entwicklung der Land- und Forstwirtschaft seit Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts (Munich: Bayerischer
Landwirtschaftsverlag, 1954), 560.  
Wilhelm Volkert, “Die Staats- und Kommunalverwaltung,” in Das Neue Bayern, von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart:
Spindler/Andreas Kraus (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2007), 74-154, here 117-118; and Wilhelm Volkert, ed., Handbuch
der bayerischen Ämter, Gemeinden und Gerichte, 1799-1980 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1983), 30-34.
circumstances were such that the Agricultural Association freed itself from direct government control and was once again free to implement its own programs. Even after 1848 though, and indeed, after 1871, the Association operated under the implicit understanding that it would refrain from openly challenging or contradicting the government, and in the long run, this unquestioning loyalty to the state would hinder the Association in its attempts to truly represent the interests of all farmers.

i. The Agricultural Association in Bavaria, 1810-1871

Called into existence in the opening decade of the nineteenth century, the Agricultural Association in Bavaria was, despite its nineteenth-century origins, a distinct product of the late Enlightenment.7 Where the founding members of the Agricultural Association were mostly aristocrats and landed elites, they insisted from the very beginning that their organization would be different from earlier, similar organizations that had specialized in agricultural improvement.8 Rather than simply discussing agricultural innovations for the benefit of a select few, the Agricultural Association wanted to put innovations into more widespread practice.9 Taking their inspiration directly from the theories of physiocracy as well as Adam Smith, this meant that the

---

7 It should be said at the outset that this summary history of the Agricultural Association up to 1871 is based largely on the research provided by Stefanie Harrecker in Der Landwirtschaftliche Verein in Bayern, 1810-1870/71 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2006). Also see Bayerischer Landwirtschaftsrat, eds., Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern (Munich: Manz, 1910), which was the last of several official book-length agricultural status reports produced by the Association, and includes a history of the organization up to 1910. Other reliable histories of the Agricultural Association exist, as stated in the introduction, but none of them compare to the detail provided in Harrecker’s study.

8 The first modern agricultural organization to be officially founded in Bavaria was organized in 1769 as the Churbaierische Landesökonomie-Gesellschaft (Old Bavarian Agricultural Society). Like most other organizations of this type and period, it made no attempt to represent the interests of the Bavarian peasantry. Consisting of somewhere in between 100 and 200 members, it remained active until 1794. See Schlögl, Bayerische Agrargeschichte, 554-556; and Heinz Haushofer, “Die Anfänge der Agrarwissenschaft und des landwirtschaftlichen Organisationswesens in Bayern: Zur Gründung der Kurbairischen Landesoekonomiesellschaft, 1765,” in Aus der Bayerischen Agrargeschichte, 1525-1978: Gesammelte Beiträge zur Bayerischen Agrargeschichte von Heinz Haushofer, eds. Pankraz Fried and Wolfgang Zorn (Munich: BLV Verlagsgesellschaft, 1986), 64-70.

Association fully intended to further rationalize Bavarian agriculture and bring it more into line with the practices of free enterprise. In addition, this also meant applying scientific methods to agriculture, and here, the works and writings of Albrecht Thaer, possibly the most influential agricultural scientist of the early nineteenth century, served as the Association’s prime inspiration. In support of these goals, the early Association’s primary modus was facilitating communication between members, through letters, publications, and speaking events, in essence providing a space for the exchange of ideas in the hopes that these discussions would lead to improvements in agricultural production. This was the fundamental praxis of the Association, and lying underneath it all, was an express belief that the Association’s work would help the Bavarian state, not hinder it.

Democratic in principle, the Association well understood that the open discussion of ideas could lead to potential conflict with the very government it wished to support. It was still very much the case in early nineteenth-century Germany that governments looked upon civil organizations such as the Agricultural Association with great suspicion. Indeed, since the late eighteenth century, it was illegal for any organization to form in Bavaria that did not first seek permission from the government. Organizations that were considered ‘political’ in nature were not tolerated at all. Interestingly, the founders of the Association navigated around the gaze of the Bavarian government by defining their activities as ‘economic’ in nature, that is, that their organization had nothing directly to do with politics. Of course, the very idea that any

10 “Grundsätze zu einem landwirtschaftlichen Vereine in Baiern,” 5, 10, here 5. On physiocracy, Adam Smith et al., see footnote 5 in the previous chapter.

11 There are numerous works on Albrecht Thaer (1752-1828†) in German, the most recent being Martin Freilinghaus and Claus Dalchow, eds., Albrecht Daniel Thaer: ein Leben für die Landwirtschaft (Frankfurt am Main: DLG Verlag, 2006). Also see Kathrin Panne, ed., Albrecht Daniel Thaer — der Mann gehört der Welt (Celle: Bomann Museum Celle, 2002), which Harrecker recommends. Thaer’s most famous work, Grundsätze der rationellen Landwirtschaft (Berlin: 1809) can be found in English under the title, The Principles of Practical Agriculture, trans. William Shaw and Cuthbert Johnson (New York: C.M. Saxton, Barker and Co., 1860).

12 Harrecker, Landwirtschaftliche Verein, 25-35; and Alois Hundhammer, Die landwirtschaftliche Berufsvertretung Bayern (Munich: Pfeiffer, 1926), 4-8.
organization that promoted agricultural innovation could remain apolitical was disingenuous at best. This showed in the coming decades, as the Agricultural Association publicly debated issues regarding rents, taxes, and other state-induced financial problems that hindered farmers, especially the peasantry, from adopting modern methods of production.\textsuperscript{13}

The state had its reasons for tolerating the Agricultural Association. Above all, the organization publicly supported the monarchy and the government, appeared to be openly ‘patriotic,’ maintained close individual ties with highly-placed government officials, and did not include very many people from the lower classes in its ranks. In short, the state did not see the Association as a threat, and indeed it was no threat. This fact was further confirmed by the Association’s growing official relationship with the government and the monarchy. Not only did many of the Association’s members have close, personal ties with people in the government (Joseph von Montgelas, the former minister-president, was a member), even the monarch, Maximilian I, assumed the title as ‘Protector’ of the organization shortly after its founding. With this privilege, a sign that the Agricultural Association existed with the official blessing of the government, the organization was granted a fair amount of room to maneuver. Above all, it was allowed to have a public persona, an official stance on matters that could stand above the opinions of individual members. With this protection, individuals could enjoy the privilege of debating all matter of topics, so long as they did so carefully and so long as the organization convincingly maintained an official position of support for the government. In addition, the Association could now also possess its own buildings and conduct the necessary transactions in support of an official program that was, again, meant to support the state. Clearly, even though

\textsuperscript{13} Harrecker, \textit{Landwirtschaftliche Verein}, 37.
the Association remained nominally independent of the government, the organization’s relationship with the monarchy and the government proved indispensable.\textsuperscript{14}

In retrospect however, the Agricultural Association’s close relationship with the state created a confounding image problem for the organization, a dilemma that would prevent it in these early years from ever seriously representing the interests of all farmers in Bavaria. For one, and despite the Association’s best intentions when reaching out to the peasantry, the peasant classes almost entirely avoided the Association in these earlier years. The organization’s high-profile relationship with the government, as well as restrictive membership fees helped to ensure this.\textsuperscript{15} Between 1810 and 1835, total membership rarely exceeded one thousand people, and most members counted as either landed elites or so called “friends of agriculture,” i.e. educated agriculturalists, civil servants, teachers, or priests.\textsuperscript{16} Regionally, the organization also remained largely constrained to Upper Bavaria, that district where the Association’s General Committee was headquartered, followed then by the district of Lower Bavaria, neighboring to the east, and at times, Swabia, lying directly to the west. Structurally, as can be drawn from these numbers, the Association divided itself up to more or less mirror the government’s administrative regions and districts, organizing at least one sub-association (referred to in the French as \textit{Comités}, or committees) in each of Bavaria’s eight regions. However, despite serious attempts to spark an interest in all of Bavaria’s regions, the northern, Frankish regions and the Palatinate remained underrepresented throughout this early period of the Association’s existence.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{14} Harrecker, \textit{Landwirtschaftliche Verein}, 35-38, here 38.  
\textsuperscript{15} At the outset, annual membership fees were set at 11 gulden. Compared to other upper-class organizations in Bavaria, this was not egregiously high, but probably high enough to keep out most peasant-proprietors who on average earned 500 gulden a year. See Harrecker, 42.  
\textsuperscript{16} In the early years, the Association had as many as 1086 members (in 1812/1813), but their official numbers dropped after the first decade, reaching their lowest numbers in 1834/35 at 368. Harrecker, 59; and Hundhammer, \textit{Die landwirtschaftliche Berufsvertretung}, 8-9.  
\textsuperscript{17} Harrecker, 42-61. By 1828, the various district committees (\textit{Kreiscomités}) had consolidated their headquarters in Regensburg (Upper Palatinate), Augsburg (Swabia), Straubing/Passau (Lower Bavaria), Ansbach (Middle
In spite of these hindrances, the Association undertook many activities in its early years, of which the most public and by far the most successful was its newsletter. Where most of the Association’s early projects (including an agricultural school, an attempted credit union, and a silk factory) failed to generate much traction, the newsletter, in various forms, survived the entirety of the Association’s existence. The first agricultural newsletter to be published in Germany by a private organization, the *Wochenblatt des Landwirthschaftlichen Vereins* (Weekly Newsletter of the Agricultural Association) was, in tandem with the Association’s meetings, the organization’s most important forum for debate and ultimately provided the Association with a public persona that was to be taken seriously.¹⁸ Filled with essays that covered a variety of (oftentimes technically-oriented) agricultural topics, the newsletter also differentiated itself in content from other agricultural publications by publishing debates between members alongside official, editorial opinions which themselves often stirred up much debate. Indeed, the critical openness of the newsletter stood in stark contrast to the otherwise repressive political atmosphere of early nineteenth-century Bavaria.¹⁹

Fortunately for the Association, the long-serving editor of the *Wochenblatt* and president of the Association, Joseph von Hazzi, kept close contact with the Interior Ministry, and this

---

Franconia), Bayreuth (Upper Franconia), Würzburg (Lower Franconia), and Speyer (Palatinate). The Association’s central headquarters in Munich doubled as the district committee headquarters for Upper Bavaria, and this would stay true for the remainder of the Association’s existence.

¹⁸ To avoid confusion, it should be pointed out that the name of the Association’s central newsletter changed several times during its existence, from the *Wochenblatt des Landwirthschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern* (1811-1820), to the *Neues Wochenblatt des Landwirthschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern* (1820-1836), to the *Centralblatt des Landwirthschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern* (1836-1853); to the *Zeitschrift des Landwirthschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern* (1853-1896), and finally back to to the *Wochenblatt des Landwirthschaftlichen Vereins* (1896-1933). See Schlögl, *Bayerische Agrargeschichte*, 510-512. A complete collection of this newsletter can be found in the Staatsbibliothek in Munich and also in the Haus der bayerischen Landwirtschaft. For a comparison to other similar newsletters being published in Bavaria at the time, see Gerhard Füsser, “Bauernzeitungen in Bayern und Thüringen von 1818-1848: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des deutschen Bauernstandes und der deutsche Presse” (PhD diss., Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 1934).

ensured that the newsletter could get away with perhaps more than most others would have.\(^{20}\)

The outspoken quality of the Association’s newsletter did not however lead to an increase in membership for the organization or, by consequence, a financial windfall in membership dues. Financial problems plagued the organization in its early years, and this too proved to have long-lasting consequences, pushing the organization further into the arms of the government. The Association’s financial problems could not be blamed on a lack of trying, and repeated attempts to remain solvent showed that the Association was, if anything, very serious in its intentions. In one early attempt to garner new readers for the newsletter and perhaps new members — ultimately unsuccessful — the cost of the newsletter for non-members was lowered to eleven gulden, the same as membership fees. In another effort, this time an attempt to specifically reach more rural inhabitants, the Association decided in 1820 to lower the cost of the newsletter for town and village governments, from eleven florins to five and a quarter. Again, these attempts saw little success, and communal memberships continued to steadily fall. Even strategically giving the paper away to priests, teachers, or other prominent community leaders, in the hopes that they would read it out to audiences or use the material in classrooms, did little to stimulate membership.\(^{21}\) Asked why one village decided to cancel its subscription to the newsletter, the mayor responded by stating that, “Ah, with all these innovations and heresies… everything that does not suit us just brings revolutionaries… [so] we are staying with our traditional God, with

\(^{20}\) Joseph von Hazzi (1768-1845†) was an able bureaucrat who had risen through the ranks of the Montgelas regime, and was then later a prolific writer and political reformer with an agrarian bent (agrarpolitiker). He served as the editor of the Wochenblatt from 1818 to 1836 (while simultaneously serving as president of the Association), and also published several notable books that focused on agricultural production in Bavaria. For partial examinations of his life, see Marion Fröhlich, Leben und Werk Joseph von Hazzis — sein Einfluß auf die Forstwirtschaft (Munich: Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 1990); and Peter Bell, “Josef Hazzi, vol.1: 1768-1806” (Diss., Technisches Hochschule München, 1920).

\(^{21}\) Harrecker, Landwirtschaftliche Verein, 75-77.
traditional ways of cultivation, and with the traditional dyer’s woad!” As ever, the Bavarian peasantry would not be so easily won over.

Finding new members in an unresponsive market was hard enough, but making matters worse, even regular members too often failed to pay their dues. Apparently, frequent reminders about payments, boldly printed in the newsletters, did not work. Indeed, as a non-profit organization, membership fees were the Association’s life-blood, and if the organization could not adequately raise funds though membership dues, it was bound to encounter trouble. Ambitious budgets only made matters worse. In its early years, most of the Association’s funds were used to pay for its newsletter, but also a seed store, rent and office supplies for the general committee, and then the Central Agricultural Festival in Munich (Zentralen Landwirtschaftsfest). The agricultural festival alone, which belonged to the activities of the Oktoberfest, was a perplexing problem because it turned out to be increasingly popular. With more people attending the festival, more money had to be spent on it. Alone, this might not have been a problem. However, because the government failed to keep up with its share in paying for rising costs, the Association was left to foot most of the bills in full. As a result of these of expenses, by 1821, the Association’s outstanding debts had risen to 36,000 gulden, a rather large sum of

---

22 Wochenblatt, vol. XV (1824/25), 270, cited in Harrecker, 76. From the German: “Ei, mit all den Neuerungen, Ketzereien... alles das taugt nicht für uns, bringt nur Revolutionierer... wir bleiben beim alten Gott, beim alten Feldbau und bei den alten Waid!” Waid, which translates to ‘woad’, or more commonly, ‘dyer’s woad’, was a plant that produced indigo and was used to dye fabrics blue.

23 The Central Agricultural Festival, first held in 1811, was from its inception included as part of the Oktoberfest activities and it has remained so up to today. For more on the Oktoberfest, its political uses, and its ties to agriculture, see the final section in chapter five, but also Gerta Möhler, Das Münchner Oktoberfest: vom bayerischen Landwirtschaftsfest zum größten Volksfest der Welt (Munich: BLV, 1981); and Paul Münch, “Fêtes pour le people, rien pour le people: ‘Öffentliche’ Feste im Program der Aufklärung,” in Öffentliche Festkultur. Politische Fest in Deutschland von der Aufklärung bis zum Ersten Welt Krieg, ed. Dieter Düding (Reinbeck: Rowohlt, 1988), 25-45. Also see Ernst von Destouches, Säkular-Chronik des Münchner Oktoberfestes (Zentral-Landwirtschafts-Festes): Festschrift für Hundertjahrfeiter (Munich: J. Lindauersche Buchhandlung, 1910).
money. Without further help from the government, it was clear that the organization’s activities would have to shrink significantly in the face of financial constraints. Four years later, and having spent what remained of its savings on a new headquarters in Munich, the General Committee of the Association finally approached the government in search of financial assistance. However, to their dismay, Association’s leadership discovered that the new regime under Ludwig I was not about to simply throw funds at an organization that had by all appearances turned into a money pit.

Up to this point, the regime in Munich had looked upon the Association as somewhat useful, both for its efforts in promoting the development of agricultural production, but also as a means for the regime to publicly align itself with the agricultural sector. However, the moment the Association needed more money from the government was the moment it became a liability. This did not mean that the Association’s potential usefulness to the government had run out. As opposed to cutting the Association completely loose, Ludwig and his ministers therefore decided to take greater control over it. After ten years of haggling, this is exactly what happened when in 1835, the Association rewrote its bylaws under pressure from the government. Thereafter, the structure of the organization was further decentralized. Each of the district and county committees received more latitude to operate, and with this, the government also expected them to be more financially self-reliant. The Interior Minister, Ludwig von Oettingen-Wallerstein, became the chairman of the Association, and many of the other leadership positions

---

24 To help put the amount of the Association’s debts into perspective, in 1814/1815, the organization only took in 4,500 gulden through membership fees, and these fees made up the majority of the Association’s income. See Wochenblatt, vol. V (1814/1815), 65.
25 Harrecker, Landwirtschaftliche Verein, 125-128.
26 Ibid., 139.
likewise fell to appointed bureaucrats.\textsuperscript{28} To further reduce operational costs, the newspaper was slashed from a weekly to a monthly and then later published every two months, thereby losing much of its character, charm, and potential as a forum of public debate. Though Ludwig’s government refused to provide a steady income for the Association, additional funds did sometimes trickle in from the government, ensuring that, with other provisions, the Association was able to keep its head above water. The cost of survival was high though, considering that the Association was now an arm of the government in all but name.\textsuperscript{29}

If anything, the Association’s closer relationship with the government was ironically substantiated by a sudden rise in popularity after 1835. Total membership sky-rocketed from around two hundred to ten thousand in 1837 alone. In the short term, membership would not always remain this high, but when compared to the earlier period, it was clear that the Association had found a new popularity. The increase in numbers was not, however, because the Association had suddenly broken through to the peasantry. Rather, because of its more significant relationship with the government, the Association picked up more and more civil servants as members. On the one hand, lower membership fees ensured that many of the poorer, lower-level bureaucrats could join. At the same time though, the growing presence of civil servants in an agricultural organization is better explained by career opportunism, given that the Association had clearly become a pet-project of the regime. More teachers and professors also turned to the Association in these years. In 1836, 41 of 59 faculty members from the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich were members of the Association, and again, because they were on the government’s payroll or were in close relationship with the regime, it is possible that

\textsuperscript{28} Even though Karl von Abel (1788-1859\textdagger), who followed Oettingen-Wallerstein as Interior Minister, only briefly assumed chairmanship of the Association, he and Ludwig I would both continue to pull the organization’s strings from behind the curtains. Harrecker, \textit{Landwirtschaftliche Verein}, 152-154.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 128-140.
many felt obligated to join. Those who did not join were the peasants, who continued to rightly view the Association with some skepticism. That the Association was itself transforming into the plaything of major and minor politicians grubbing for more access to power hardly helped the Association’s image. In sum, by the 1840s, the Association, which had started off with so many good intentions, had become a shadow of its former self.30

The upheavals of 1848 and the reorganization of the government that followed provided the Association with a new lease on life. Allowing the Association to revise its bylaws, the new government under Maximilian II bestowed upon the Association the freedom to once again initiate its own programs, and likewise, it allowed the General Committee in Munich to resume its place as the proper head of the organizational structure. Still, though the government returned a significant degree of freedom to the Association, in essence, the organization remained tightly bound as ever to a government that wanted to use the Association in the service of creating more loyal subjects. The leadership of the Association, from top to bottom, remained firmly in the hands of civil servants, and in a continued sign of good faith, the bureaucratic infrastructure of the Association submitted reports and maintained a steady correspondence with the Trade and Commerce Ministry (to whom the Association answered until 1871).31 Prince Maximilian, who had become president of the organization in 1844, stepped down from that position after he became king in 1848. However, he nonetheless continued to carry the title of ‘Protector’ of the Association, and in addition, he continued to receive annual reports from the Association that provided detailed notes on the conditions of agricultural production and rural life. At the same

30 Harrecker, Landwirtschaftliche Verein, 141-204; 250-252. In addition to Oettingen-Wallerstein (1791-1870†), who, long after he had been dismissed as Interior Minister, continued to use his position within the Association to maneuver politically, the crown-prince, Maximilian (1811-1864†), also used the organization in order to network and build up an entourage after he became president of the Association in 1842.

31 HdbL GC 5, 6, and 22; and BayHStA ML 129, correspondence between the Association and the Commerce Ministry regarding budgets, the Association’s bylaws, annual reports, etc. Even though the Association had almost from the very beginning, served as an informal information pool for the government, beginning in 1851, it began to formally compile and submit reports on agriculture to the government. See Harrecker, 260.
time, Maximilian also kept a close eye on the management and activities of the Association to ensure that the organization was doing exactly as he wanted. Beyond the purely bureaucratic, the Association essentially functioned as another means for Maximilian to build up support for his regime amongst agricultural producers. Here, the Association willingly obliged, not necessarily supporting one political faction or another, but wholeheartedly encouraging support for Maximilian and his regime through its various forums of public discourse.\(^{32}\) As for the peasant, according to the vice president of the Palatine district committee, he

> should never cease to be veraciously conservative in his public life, he should be an example in respect for the law and the authorities, he should be firm and steadfast in supporting the principle of monarchy, that safer political system that ensures peace and order, [and] he should be unswerving in his support of and loyalty toward the ancestral royal house and the holy personage of His Majesty the King.\(^{33}\)

In short, it was clear that the Association danced to a tune being conducted by the regime, and for its work, the Association received an annual income of 18,000 gulden from the government, a substantial amount that far exceeded anything which other similar organizations received elsewhere in Germany.\(^{34}\)

> Following the tumult of the mid-nineteenth century, a definite rhythm of administrative work took hold of the Association as it grew more comfortable in its position as the preeminent organization in Bavaria for agricultural concerns. Overall membership also began to see a


\(^{33}\) BayHSnA ML 131, report on the Palatine district assembly and festival in Kaiserslautern, 1858. Cited in Harrecker, 272. From the German: “Er soll nie aufhören, im Staatsleben wahrhaft conservativ zu sein, er soll in Achtung vor Gesetz und Obrigkeit überall mit gutem Beispiel vorangehen, er soll fest und unerschütterlich bleiben in seiner Anhänglichkeit an die monarchischen Einrichtungen, die sichere Bürgerschaft für Ruhe und Ordnung, er soll unerschütterlich bleiben in seiner Anhänglichkeit und Treue an das angestammte Regentenhaus und die geheiligte Person Sr. Majestät des Königs.”

\(^{34}\) Harrecker, *Landwirtschaftliche Verein*, 253-273. The Association’s counterpart in Württemberg, for example, received 13,000 gulden a year from its government, while those in Baden and Saxony received, respectively, 10,000 and 16,000 gulden. See HdbL GC 640, comparisons between the General Committee and its counterparts in Württemberg, Baden, and Saxony.
steady, altogether healthy growth. Where the Association had 7,500 registered members in 1850, four years later, those numbers had doubled. By 1871, membership had nearly reached 32,000. As these numbers suggest, it was indeed after the mid-nineteenth century that the Association finally began to live up to its bureaucratic potential, growing as it did, in the words of Alois Schlögl, into “a mass organization for the peasants.”

Looking at their own numbers in 1868, the General Committee even believed that between 7,000 and 8,000 of the Association’s members actually stemmed from the peasant classes. In this respect, it was possible that the Association’s relationship with teachers had finally paid off, given that they, especially those teachers who taught in village schools, tended to be very involved in the life of individual peasant communities. Also assisting in recruitment were the various agricultural festivals and trade fairs that the Association increasingly organized and hosted across Bavaria. There were also always local newsletters and other publications put out by the regional and county committees that helped to attract newcomers. In all, the Association could finally say on the eve of unification that it was making some headway into Bavarian society at large.

As it turned out though, growth in size and importance did not necessarily translate into a greater influence amongst the peasantry. Anyone could see that the Association’s membership rolls grew, that it was financially solvent, and that it was publishing books, newsletters, and a

---


36 BayHStA ML 135, correspondence from the Commerce Ministry to the General Committee and the district committees.

37 Harrecker, Landwirtschaftliche Verein, 272-278. Regarding numbers, Harrecker points out that teachers made up about ten percent of total membership, though in some regions, they could constitute up to twenty percent. Priests and ministers made up another 6.5 percent, civil servants 15.5, and communal administrators 25 percent. The remaining number, just under 45 percent, was made up of “farmers and tradesmen”, a rather generic designation that constituted a variety of different classes, from large landowners to businessmen to small-time peasant farmers. Also see Heinz Haushofer, “Bäuerliche Führungsschichte in Bayern im 19.-20. Jahrhundert,” in Fried and Zorn, Aus der Bayerischen Agrargeschichte, 39-48, here 40.
popular almanac specifically designed for popular consumption.\textsuperscript{38} In the coming years it would also get more involved in research, support experimental agricultural stations around the countryside, and invest more in agricultural education.\textsuperscript{39} However, no amount of money and activities could convince the peasantry that the Association seriously represented the interests of the peasantry. Indeed, so long as the bureaucratic influence remained paramount within the organization, and so long as the general and district committees continued to tamp down attempts to further politicize the organization, the Association would only continue to arouse, in the words of Ian Farr, “considerable antipathy” among the peasantry.\textsuperscript{40} This became all too obvious during the crisis years leading up to unification, when, in a rather short period of time, possibly tens of thousands of peasants turned to the Bavarian Patriotic Party and other politicized peasant associations in the hopes that they would better represent the political and economic interests of the peasantry.\textsuperscript{41} Having “acted in the name of the regime,” as one such peasant association put it, the Agricultural Association had been unable “to make inroads among the

\textsuperscript{38} For more on the almanac, which went by the title, \textit{Bayerischer Haus- und Landwirtschaftskalender}, see HdbL GC 148-149; and Harrecker, \textit{Landwirtschaftliche Verein}, 159-164. A collected edition of these almanacs can be found at the Staatsbibliothek in Munich.

\textsuperscript{39} The records of the Association present an almost overwhelming number of documents concerning the organization and its involvement in education and agricultural research, even before unification. See, for example, HdbL GC 869-871, correspondence and documents concerning education at the lower levels (i.e. winter schools); or HdbL GC 890-895, the same, concerning university scholarships and the financial support of professors; or HdbL GC 926-930, the same, concerning the central research station at Weihenstephan. For more on agricultural education in Bavaria between 1850 and 1871, also see Hans Dörfler, \textit{Die bäuerliche Berufsbildung, ihre Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft in Bayern} (Munich: Carl Gerber, 1932), 96-156.


\textsuperscript{41} Farr, “Peasant Protest in the Empire,” 115-116. Membership in the Deggendorf Peasant Association, for example, peaked at over 8,000 members alone in 1870. Many of their members were peasants, and moreover, the Deggendorf Association had followers from all over Bavaria. In addition to the Deggendorf Association, there were other notable peasant associations in Bavaria, especially the Weilbach and Tuntenhausen associations. See the government’s report on peasant associations from 1869, located in BayHStA Mlnn 66316; and also Gilbert Southern, “The Bavarian Kulturkampf: A Chapter in Government, Church, and Society in the Early Bismarckreich” (PhD diss., University of Massachusetts, 1977), 113-167; and Frank Wright, “The Bavarian Patriotic Party, 1868-1871” (PhD diss., University of Illinois, 1975).
people.”

What remained open to debate after 1871, was whether the Association would remain on this path.

\textit{ii. The Association’s vision and its place within the state bureaucracy}

Considering that Bavaria’s economy remained largely agricultural after unification, the Association’s continued cooperation with the state certainly lent an air of authority to the Bavarian government and its bureaucracy when it came matters of agricultural concern. But in addition to providing the state with an increased sense of rustic legitimacy, the Association also continued, as before unification, to serendipitously provide the state with the means to reach into rural Bavaria for the sake of affecting change. On the one hand, the Association fed information back to the government and helped to clarify for the government what working and living conditions in rural Bavaria were like. Beyond looking and listening though, it was also clear — to the peasantry, if no one else — that the Association overtly served as a mouthpiece for the government, endorsing the regime (and especially the monarchy) while at the same time promoting an image of self-reliant, loyal subjects who loved their king, loved their land, and dutifully worked the soil. Therefore, in addition to a clearly defined modernization program, there remained infused into the activities of the Association, an implicit state-bureaucratic colorization of the Association’s mission as well as an almost mechanical support of the crown, characteristics that had indeed carried over from the decades preceding unification.

\footnote{60 Jahre Bayerischer, patriotischer Bauernverein Tuntenhausen, 1869-1929 (1929), 5. From the German, “Er konnte nie so recht in das Volk eindringen, da er als Vertreter der Regierung gegolten hat.”}

\footnote{HdbL GC 153, internal correspondence describing attacks made on the Agricultural Association by the newsletter of the Peasant Association in Deggendorf, calling the Association’s credibility with the peasantry into question because of its close relationship with the government; and Farr, “Peasant Protest in the Empire,” 117.}

\footnote{Writing after the First World War, the Association’s general secretary, Hubert Luschka, admitted that the organization had maintained a very close relationship with the royal family, describing how the Central Agricultural Festival “brought princes and the people closer together,” and that “Bavaria’s agriculture owed a great deal of gratitude to the Wittelsbachs.” See Hubert Luschka, “Der Landwirtschaftliche Verein in Bayern,” 	extit{Bayern, Das}}
To be clear, modernizing agricultural production did not mean that the Association wanted to undermine or get rid of the rather large population of peasants that worked Bavaria’s agricultural sector. Similar to the first half of the nineteenth century, there were very few in the government or in the leadership of the Association who wanted to turn the Bavarian peasantry into an industrial workforce or completely industrialize Bavaria’s agricultural production. Rather, within certain limits, the Association wanted to improve the living and working conditions of the peasantry. Introducing modern methods of agriculture was, as many in the Association believed, just one way of helping this group survive and prosper.\textsuperscript{45} This entailed introducing more intensive methods of production to the Bavarian peasantry, in the hopes that it would abandon the three field system; produce or purchase more manure; raise more cattle and better cattle for the sake of producing manure and/or for the purpose of selling cattle on the meat market; gradually adopt mechanized tools and incorporate other cutting edge technologies into production; learn how to navigate Germany’s growing infrastructural network; and match production with growing market demands. Together, the Association expected that more modern means of production would raise the economic standing of the peasantry, thereby raising their living standards as well as producing more taxable revenue for the state. In short, as indicated earlier, the Association’s vision for Bavarian agriculture was more or less defined by the tenets of classical liberalism, with competitive, free individuals spiritedly applying the latest in

\textit{Bauernland: Festschrift zur 29. Ausstellung der Deutschen Landwirtschaftsgesellschaft, Nürnberg 1922}, Hans Dörfler, ed. (Pfaffenhofen: Ilngau Verlag, 1922), 53-56, here 54. Also see Heinz Haushofer, “Der Bayerische Bauernbund (1893-1933)” in Fried and Zorn, \textit{Aus der Bayerischen Agrargeschichte}, 166-182, here 166, for additional details on the Association’s support of the royal house. For more on the cult of the Wittelsbachs and its place in popular Bavarian memory in the nineteenth century, as well as its usefulness to the Bavarian state, see Hans-Michael Körner, \textit{Staat und Geschichte im Königreich Bayern 1806-1918} (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1992). \textsuperscript{45} Alois Seidl/Pankraz Fried and Joachim Ziche, “Die Landwirtschaft,” in Schmid, \textit{Das Neue Bayern}, bk. 2, 155-215, here 186. In addition to the Association’s bylaws, also see for example, the report on the \textit{Wanderversammlung} from 1871, found in the \textit{Zeitschrift des Landwirthschaftliche Vereins in Bayern}, vol. LXL (1871), 1-42, here 4-5, where then President, Dr. Julius von Niethammer, publically states in a speech, a few ways in which the Association intended to continue supporting agriculture following Bavaria’s entry into the empire.
technological advancements for the immediate purpose of individual gain, but to the eventual improvement of all.\textsuperscript{46}

Of course, all of these plans also required that the peasantry buy into the existing socio-political system, and keeping the peasantry happy and preserving them as a docile, conservative social group was in full accordance with the wishes of state leaders who, after 1871, wanted to avert or reduce further populist activity in the Bavarian countryside.\textsuperscript{47} For its part, the Association therefore did what it could to reflect a loyalist image of itself. Within these constraints, it also attempted to define what a ‘good Bavarian farmer’ should look like. This included everything from publishing patronizing articles in its popular almanac on good manners, or on the proper behavior of peasant housewives, or simply making repeated claims that the peasantry needed to better organize, as opposed to looking to the state for financial assistance.\textsuperscript{48} However, where the Association claimed to represent the interests of the peasantry, and where it certainly allowed for internal debate that included some critique of the state, the Association never adopted an official stance that contradicted the state. Similarly, if the peasantry wanted any help from the Association, it had to play by the Association’s rules,

\textsuperscript{46} The Association’s bylaws include an adequate summary of the organization’s vision for agriculture. See HdbL GC 12, “Satzungen” (1874), § 2.
\textsuperscript{47} BayHStA Mn 66316, police reports on the peasant associations. During the crisis years leading up to unification, the Bavarian government became rather concerned with the increased political activity of the peasantry. Their investigations into the nature of peasant associations, for one, clearly indicated a fear of peasant-led disorder in the countryside. See government reports initiated by Interior Ministry in 1869, investigating several peasant associations (Bauernvereine).
\textsuperscript{48} See, for example, “Ueber die Höflichkeit.” Bayerischer Haus- und Landwirtschaftskalender (1869): 75-76; or “Für bäuerliche Hausfrauen.” Idem (1874): 11-12. Regarding ‘self-help’: both the Association and the Bavarian government held strongly to a policy of ‘self-help’ when it came to the peasantry in the late nineteenth century, that is, that the peasantry should look to its own and its own communities for economic support, assistance, and organization, as opposed to seeking further financial assistance from the state. Belonging to this program of self-help was a strict belief that the peasantry should also adopt more modern methods of production, thereby improving their economic state. See Die bayerische Landwirtschaft in den letzten Zehn Jahren: Festgabe für die Mitglieder der XXVIII. Versammlung deutscher Land- und Forstwirthe im Jahre 1872 zu München (Munich: Possenbacher, 1872), 27; or the article, “Zur Lage der Landwirthschaft und deren mögliche Besserung,” in the newsletter for the Upper Bavarian District Committee, Landwirtschaftliche Mittheilungen (1885), 51-52, where the author, a state civil servant, bluntly states that the peasants need to organize themselves and not rely on the state. For more on the policy of ‘self-help’, also see Ian Farr, “Farmers’ Cooperatives in Bavaria, 1880-1914: ‘State-Help’ and ‘Self-Help’ in Imperial Germany.” Rural History, vol. 18, 2 (2007): 163–182, here 169-170.
accepting its paternalistic overtures, and also accepting the fact that Association might help the peasantry by providing, for example, further education, but that it would do so on its own terms, and that it would not push for anything which the government rejected (e.g. more state-financial assistance for the peasantry).49

The Association certainly had its reasons for standing so resolutely by the state and crown, the most obvious being that it continued to receive substantial funding from the government after 1871. In 1870, for example, the government had raised its donation to the General Committee up to 6,000 gulden per annum, and each of the eight districts received 5,000 gulden as well, a total of 46,000 gulden. Along with other miscellaneous state contributions, this meant that the Bavarian government was by far the Association’s primary financial benefactor.50 Ten years later, the Association was receiving about same amount in its annual donation from the state, adjusted accordingly to match the value of the mark.51 Either way, a very large portion of the Association’s budget was being funded by the state. Looking beyond the state’s financial contributions to the organization (which will be dealt with more closely in the next chapter), many of the Association’s members also continued to stem from the Bavarian civil service, and

---

49 See, for example, Otto May, “Umschau.” Editorial, Zeitschrift des Landwirthschaftliche Vereins in Bayern, vol. LXXIII (1883), 62-70, where he, the general secretary of the General Committee, essentially scoffs at other peasant associations for daring to question the Association’s ability to reasonably face up to the problems of the peasantry, especially problems regarding credit, and for thinking that they, the other peasant associations, could find better solutions to these problems than the Association could. Otto May (1833-1914†), who was also an agricultural inspector for the state and a visiting professor at the Technical School in Munich, served as the general secretary for the General Committee and the editor of their newsletter from 1879 to 1909. See Schlögl, Bayerische Agrargeschichte, 871; and Denkschift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern, 18-20; and HdbL 46, documents pertaining to Otto May.

50 Die bayerische Landwirthschaft in den letzten Zehn Jahren, 3; and HdbL GC 100, the General Committee’s budget.

51 HdbL GC 100, the General Committee’s budget for 1880. After 1873, the exchange rate for the gulden was set at 1 Mark 80 Pfennig. See Angelika Fox, Die wirtschaftliche Integration Bayerns in das Zweite Deutsche Kaiserreich: Studien zu den wirtschaftspolitischen Spielräumen eines deutschen Mittelstaates zwischen 1862 und 1875 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2001), 318. In addition to the set amounts of money provided directly to the General and district committees by the state, other state funds were also made available to cover case by case needs (i.e. further support for cattle breeding, or agricultural education).
for obvious reasons, strongly supported the state. In 1882, for example, half of the district presidents were chaired by district officials, with vets, professors, and forestry officers making up much of the rest. At the same time, many landed elites and aristocrats, that is, men who were very close to the establishment, also played prominent roles within the Association. In short, both the leadership of the Association and indeed even many of its members belonged to a social cohort of wealthy, educated, and influential people who somehow owed their wealth, power, and status to the state: either they received money from the government directly for services rendered, or they prospered under social and economic conditions that were both nurtured and protected by the Bavarian government. For many, it was therefore only natural that the Association would support the current government, serving as a lobby organization for a very particular agrarian and pseudo-agrarian sector of Bavarian society.

One of the most important ways in which the Association actively supported the government was, as already stated, through the information it compiled and made available to the government. Every year, the General Committee in Munich assembled annual reports provided by each of its district committees and duly submitted them to the Interior Ministry, who then turned the reports over to the monarch. Given Ludwig II’s eroding interest in governance, and contrary to indications from the Interior Ministry that the king always took a heartfelt interest in the activities of the Association, it was increasingly likely that he only took a passing interest in

---

55 For samples of the annual reports provided to the General Committee by the district committees, see the reports and correspondence collected in HdbL GC 22 and BayHStA ML 134-139, as well as the annual reports collected in HdbL KC Schw. 1.342-1.357. Edited forms of the General Committee’s annual reports were also printed in the Association’s newsletters or included as an insert.
the reports, assuming that he read them at all.\textsuperscript{56} The king’s disinterest notwithstanding, the annual reports did however contain a great deal of information that would have been of interest to the Interior Ministry. This included a status report on the Association itself and a review of its activities, membership numbers, budget and expenses, but then also details on a number of agricultural points of interest, i.e. the number and performance of agricultural schools, agricultural prices, reports on various festivals and exhibitions, and reports on certain problems faced by agriculturalists (i.e. difficulties faced by peasants in obtaining credit). With this information in hand, government ministries could then decide how to act accordingly, especially in regard to how much money they would allot the Association or other agricultural interest groups.

Funneling information to the Interior Ministry did not stop with the annual reports either. The Association’s monthly newsletter alone provided significant insight into the status of Bavarian agricultural production, with numerous articles covering many of the same topics addressed in the annual reports. Indeed, if necessary, both the ministries as well as committees from within the parliament could and frequently did work together with individuals from the Association, soliciting them for advice on agricultural matters, and seamlessly incorporating the Association further into the state bureaucratic mechanism.\textsuperscript{57} Besides a handful of members who were elected to the parliament, e.g. Max von Soden-Fraunhofen, later president of the Association, it was not unusual for prominent figures from within the Association to possess important appointed posts within the government, making themselves very available to provide

\textsuperscript{56} Harrecker, \textit{Landwirtschaftliche Verein}, 332-333, 358; HdbL GC 21, correspondence from the Interior Ministry to the General Committee regarding the annual reports; and BayHStA ML 134-139, correspondence concerning annual reports.

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern}, 10, 16-20.
advice through personal contacts.\textsuperscript{58} Heinrich von Haag, for example, was not only a member of the Association and the General Committee, but served as an official consultant on agricultural matters to the Interior Ministry for sixteen years. Similarly, Eduard von Wolfanger, who was director of the Trade and Commerce Ministry’s Department of Agriculture until 1871, and then thereafter directed the Interior Ministry’s Department for Agriculture, Commerce and Trade, was somehow involved in almost every state policy directive that affected agriculture during his fifty years of service to the state. Not only was he a member of the General Committee, but he had been very involved in rewriting the Association’s bylaws after 1848.\textsuperscript{59}

Beyond the purely bureaucratic, the Association also served the government in other capacities, capacities that were never neatly outlined in any regulation or within its bylaws, but obviously expressed through the activities of the Association. To return to the topic of the Association and its support of the regime, the Association’s newsletters, the almanac, and public exhibitions were all platforms through which the organization attempted to promote stability in rural Bavaria, and where possible, latently reinforced loyalty and support for the monarchy and bureaucracy while also subtly trumpeting the same brand of moral conservatism that it had under

\textsuperscript{58} Max von Soden-Fraunhofen (1844-1922†), who was a close friend of Prince Ludwig, became president of the Association in 1893 and served in that capacity until 1912, when he was appointed Interior Minister in Georg von Hertling’s cabinet. Before becoming president of the Association, he had sat continuously in the lower house of the Bavarian parliament from 1875 to 1892. Beginning in 1895, he joined the upper house, where he sat until the collapse of the empire. See Schlögl, \textit{Bayerische Agrargeschichte}, 878; Möckl, \textit{Prinzregentenzeit}, 52; and the biographical data in Dirk Götschmann and Michael Henker, eds., \textit{Geschichte des Bayerischen Parlaments, 1819-2003}, CD-ROM (Augsburg: Haus der Bayerischen Geschichte, 2005). Also see BayHStA MInn 64866, for records related to his time in office as Interior Minister.

\textsuperscript{59} Eduard von Wolfanger, \textit{Die Bayerische Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung in Bereiche der Landwirtschaft} (Munich: Fleischmann’s Buchhandlung, 1862); \textit{Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern}, 14-18; Schlögl, \textit{Bayerische Agrargeschichte}, 176; and Harrecker, \textit{Landwirtschaftliche Verein}, 272-273. Heinrich von Haag (1838-1928†) served as the secretary for the Upper Bavarian district committee and also briefly as the interim general secretary of the General Committee and editor of the Association’s newsletter following Adam Müller’s death. He followed Wolfanger as Director of the Department for Agriculture and later went on, in 1896, to serve as the president of the government’s chamber for agricultural insurance. He also published several books on topics related to agriculture. See Peter Koch, “Haag, Heinrich Daniel Maria Ritter von” in \textit{Neue Deutsche Biographie} 7 (1966), 367; and \textit{Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern}, 18. For biographical data on Eduard von Wolfanger (1807-1887†), see idem, 14-16; Walter Schärl, \textit{Die Zusammensetzung der bayerischen Beamenschaft von 1806 bis 1918} (Kallmünz: Michael Laßleben, 1955), 144; and also BayHStA MInn 36974, records pertaining to Wolfanger.
Maximilian II. As before unification, a very strong relationship between the Association and the royal house did more than simply protect the Association, it broadcast to the public that the Wittelsbach family and its government generally cared about the Bavarian people and Bavarian agriculture.\(^6\) The Association showed little problem carrying on in this tradition even after Maximilian’s death, with both Ludwig II and Luitpold taking up the title of the Association’s ‘Protector,’ and the Association frequently playing up its official status within the cult of the royal family.\(^6\) As Maximilian II had well understood: to support agriculture was to show support for Bavaria. Likewise, as far as the Association was concerned, to promote the monarch or the bureaucracy not only helped to further the Association’s activities, working together with the state ultimately served to further the purposes of agriculture. “The foundation of a healthy state is a flourishing agriculture,” stated the General Committee’s annual report to the government for 1871, and it was for this reason the Association could confidently say that it felt “compelled to support this lofty and wonderful goal with all our effort and all our might.”\(^6\)

However, what is most intriguing about the Association’s support of the state after 1871 is that it was all more or less unsolicited. As already stated, Maximilian had indeed gone out of his way to incorporate the Association into a wider program that was meant to bolster the image of the monarchy and strengthen the regime’s relationship with the people. But then his successor, Ludwig II, allowed this relationship to flounder out of pure disinterest. Moving beyond the personality of the monarch, the reorganization of the ministries that accompanied Bavaria’s entry into the empire also meant that the Association was no longer automatically

\(^6\) See, for example, the article titled “Das erlauchte Regenten-Haus Wittelsbach, in seinem Beziehung zur bayerischen Volks- und Landwirthschaft.” Zeitschrift, vol. LXX (1880), 407-451.

\(^6\) For more on how Maximilian incorporated agricultural symbolism into the image of his regime, see Harrecker, Landwirtschaftliche Verein, 270-271; 284-286. On Ludwig II and Luitpold and their relationship with the Association, see the following chapter.

\(^6\) Zeitschrift, vol. LXL (1871), 204. From the German, “Die Grundlage einer gedeihlichen Staatswohlfahrt ist eine blühende Landwirthschaft: wir fühlen uns daher auf das dringendste aufgefordert, unser Wirken diesem hohen [u]nd schönen Zweck zu widmen und nach Kräften zur Erreichung desselben beizutragen.”
included in as many decision-making processes as it once had been. Between 1848 and 1871, the Association answered directly to the Trade and Commerce Ministry (*Ministerium des Handels und der öffentlichen Arbeiten*), and under this arrangement, it had had the opportunity to weigh in on far-reaching policy decisions, to include taxation and finances.  However, when Ludwig dissolved the Trade and Commerce Ministry in 1872, many of this ministry’s responsibilities were divided up amongst the other remaining ministries. Despite its protests against the ministerial reorganization, the Association now found itself once again under the direction of the Interior Ministry, answering to a sub-department known as the Department for Agriculture, Commerce and Trade (*Abteilung für Landwirtschaft, Handel und Gewerbe*).

Where the Interior Ministry was a very powerful ministry — its primary responsibility included policing the interior — the Association found that it had increasingly little to offer to a cabinet oligarchy that was, after 1871, primarily embroiled in the seesawing political melees of the *Kulturkampf*. Between 1871 and 1890, the most dominant figure within the cabinet was Johann von Lutz, a staunch liberal who served as both head of the Culture Ministry and then later as Minister President. As the person primarily responsible for prosecuting the *Kulturkampf* in

---


64 Haag, *Die Landwirtschaft in Bayern*, 645-637; *Regierungs-Blatt für das Königreich Bayern* (1871), 1833-1838; and Schärl, *Die Zusammensetzung der bayerischen Beamtenschaft*, 13. Also see Volkert, *Handbuch der bayerischen Ämter, Gemeinden und Gerichte*, 235; and “Umschau.” Editorial, *Zeitschrift*, vol. LXII (1872), 33-34, for perspectives on the Association’s acceptance of the ministerial rearrangements that followed unification. The Department for Agriculture Trade and Industry was initially headed by the Association’s Eduard von Wolfanger and later Heinrich von Haag. However, only a handful of civil servants were ever assigned to this department, and by the mid 1890s, it no longer merited a Ministerial Director and was more or less absorbed into the general activities of the Interior Ministry.

Bavaria throughout the 1870s, Lutz spent little attention on the agricultural sector, itself a bastion of perceived backwardness, particularism, and opposition to his policies.\(^{66}\) Indeed, even though both men who served as Interior Ministers between 1871 and 1895, namely Sigmund von Pfeuffer and Maximilian von Feilitzsch, took some interest in agriculture and were even close to the Association, other issues quite simply dominated the activities of the cabinet to the exclusion of the agricultural sector.\(^{67}\) Either way, as it would have appeared to Lutz and other contemporary observers, Bavaria’s economic future no longer resided with agriculture. Rather, the future resided with Bavaria’s nascent industrial and financial sectors.\(^{68}\) Taken together, these were all enough reason for the cabinet to perhaps pay less attention to Bavaria’s agricultural sector, but in

---

\(^{66}\) For more on Johann von Lutz (1826-1890†), who was probably the most powerful and significant politician in Bavaria between 1871 and 1890, see Walter Grasser, *Johann Freiherr von Lutz: Eine politische Biographie* (Munich: Stadtarchiv München, 1967); but also Karl Möckl, *Prinzregentenzeit*; and Fritz von Rummel, *Das Ministerium Lutz und seine Gegner, 1871-1882: Ein Kampf um Staatskirchentum, Reichstreue und Parlamentsherrschaft* (Munich: Beck, 1935).

\(^{67}\) Sigmund von Pfeuffer (1824-1894†) became Interior Minister in 1871 after having served as district president for the Palatinate for four years. As Interior Minister, he devoted most of his attention to integrating policies according to standards set by the new constitution and the Reich government. After resigning from the Interior Ministry in 1881, he served as district president for Upper Bavaria until his death in 1894. During both of his stints as district president, he served as the president of the Association’s respective district committees. See Andrea Schwarz, “Sigmund Freiherr von Pfeuffer,” in *Die Regierungspräsidenten von Oberbayern im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Stephan Deutinger, et al., eds. (Munich: Regierung von Oberbayern, 2010), 176-183; and BayHStA Mn 64674. Maximilian von Feilitzsch (1834-1913†) followed Sigmund von Pfeuffer as Interior Minister and served in that position from 1881 to 1907. During his time in office, he was very involved in most of the agricultural laws that were legislated, and he was particularly noted by the Association for his assistance in seeing those laws into existence. He became a leading member of the Association in the late 1860s, sitting on the district committee for Upper Bavaria while also serving in the Interior Ministry, and eventually assumed the presidency of Upper Bavaria, the position he held (albeit briefly) before becoming Interior Minister. Trained as a lawyer, Feilitzsch was generally rather conservative and very bureaucratically-minded, but he was also a favorite of the king and faithfully played along with Lutz and the *Kulturkampf* in Bavaria. Following Eduard von Wolfanger’s retirement from the Interior Ministry in 1879, Feilitzsch was probably the Association’s most important connection within the government, even though Feilitzsch, in contrast to Wolfanger, never sat on the General Committee. For biographical data on Feilitzsch, see “Feilitzsch, Maximilian Graf von” in *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, vol. 5 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, Berlin, 1961), 57-58, but also see BayHStA Mn 64225, for government records relating to him; *Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern*, 37, where he is praised by the Association for his service to Bavarian agriculture; Karl Möckl, *Die Prinzregentenzeit*, 94, for an evaluation of Feilitzsch’s political activities; and Andrea Schwarz, “Max Freiherr von Feilitzsch,” in *Die Regierungspräsidenten von Oberbayern*, 166-183.

the meantime, it also meant that, after 1871, the cabinet increasingly ignored the Agricultural Association as well.

And yet, despite being left alone at the dance, bureaucratic paperwork continued to flow across the desks of the Agricultural Association’s committees, and the leadership of the Association continued to awkwardly sing the same tune as though little had changed, supporting the royal house, supporting the Bavarian government, and supporting the bureaucracy, continuing to oblige the hands that fed them. Publicly, no one within the Association lamented the organization’s diminished place vis-à-vis the government, but then, complaining about the government or criticizing it was not something that had ever come easily to the Association. To attack the government in any way would have been to chisel away at the very social and political pillars upon which the Association rested, and for many within the leading bodies of the Association, this was unthinkable. There did of course exist the possibility that the Association could take up the cause of the peasantry, for the organization to find its strength and meaning by more vigorously representing what remained an underrepresented class of agricultural producers. Nonetheless, where there were attempts to open the Association to more influence from the peasantry, the leadership of the Association ultimately proved that it was in no way ready to abandon the government in favor of taking up the peasantry’s cause.⁶⁹

The heated political atmosphere of the *Kulturkampf* in Bavaria and the Association’s relationship with the government left the organization in an understandably awkward position. Between 1848 and 1864, under Maximilian II, the Association had worked together with a government, both ministries and parliament, that had been unified under the leadership of liberal ministers and liberal representatives. Together, they had strongly represented middle-class

---

interests, had generally favored further centralization of government power, had wanted to reduce the power and influence of the Roman Catholic church in Bavaria (especially in education), and had looked to Prussia as a guide and role model in governance. During these years, the leadership of the Association too had taken on a more liberal coloring, with men such as Julius von Niethammer, who served as president of the Association from 1857 to 1882, and Adam Müller, the general-secretary and editor of the newsletter, both holding to generally liberal political views. There were, of course, also men who took a more conservative political stance, and this would become increasingly obvious after 1868, when some of the more conservative-minded members of the Association, such as Karl Fraas and Wilhelm von Thüngen, actually took up leadership roles in organizations whose activities were overtly political and best described as ‘patriotic.’ Still, even after 1871, the Association continued to try and steer a course that somehow remained above politics, the leadership of the organization holding to the same claim that the Association was a non-political organization and had nothing to contribute to politics.

---

71 Harrecker, Landwirtschaftliche Verein, 337-338. A student of Hegel, Julius von Niethammer (1798-1882†) was a large land owner and a professor of economics at the university in Munich from 1826 to 1837. After 1837 he joined the upper house of parliament in Bavaria, a position he occupied until his death. See biographical data provided in Götschmann and Henker, Geschichte des Bayerischen Parlaments; and Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern, 20. Adam Müller (1814-1879†), a friend of Justus von Liebig, served as general secretary as well the editor of the Association’s newsletter from 1865 to 1879. He was also a teacher and published several books on agriculture, including a popular textbook, Lehrbuch der Landwirtschaft (Mainz: Kunze, 1862). Besides serving in the Bavarian parliament from 1849 to 1864, he had also served as the mayor of the village of Gerhardsbrunn, located near Kaiserslautern in the district of the Palatinate, and as an alternate representative to the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848. See his memoir, Bayerischer Landwirtschaftsrat, eds., Adam Müller, 1814-1879: Generalsekretär des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern, 1865-1879 (Munich: Dr. Wild’sche Buckdruckerei, 1914).
72 Thüngen (1805-1871†) and Fraas (1810-1875†), who both sat at different points on the General Committee, were founding members of the Munich branch of the Patriot Party. See Friedrich Hartmannsgruber, Die Bayerische Patriotenpartei, 1868-1887 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1986), 56-59. For more on Fraas, who also published several agricultural books and taught at the university in Munich, see Fritz Zehetmair, Carl Nikolaus Fraas (1810-1875). Ein bayerischer Agrarwissenschaftler und Reformer der intensiven Landwirtschaft (Munich: Uni-Dr., 1995). For more on Thüngen, an influential politician and large landowner, see the respective biographical data provided in Götschmann and Henker, Geschichte des Bayerischen Parlaments, 1819-2003. He is not to be confused with his nephew, Hans Karl von Thüngen, who was also an active and leading member of the Association, and an influential political figure in his own right.
But in a way, political developments left the Association behind. After 1869, as discussed in the previous chapter, the lower house of parliament fell under control of the Bavarian Patriot Party, and from this point on, the Bavarian government remained split between two warring factions: the Patriots on the one side, who staunchly opposed further centralization of government power, extremely distrusted the Prussians, and supported the Roman Catholic church; and on the other side, the ministers of the royal cabinet, who remained faithful to the very ideals that the Patriots opposed. Even with a voting system that disenfranchised many lower-class voters who would have likely voted for the Patriots, the Patriots, who later joined with the national Center Party and adopted that party’s name, remained the largest party in the lower house for the remainder of the kingdom’s existence. Despite the clear, popular mandate given to the Patriots, the monarch continued however to appoint liberal ministers to govern his kingdom. The reasons for this are complicated, but ultimately, neither Ludwig II nor Prince-Regent Luitpold wanted to be seen as kowtowing to the masses. Neither did they exactly trust the populist-leaning Patriot-Center Party. Therefore, and largely under the influence of the existing ministers, the royal secretaries, and even Reich Chancellor Bismarck, the Bavarian monarchs continued to appoint liberal ministers such as Lutz, men whom they saw as ‘their’ men, and men whose views would not upset relations between Munich and Berlin. The Patriot-Center Party in Bavaria, which strongly supported the royal house and the institution of the


74 Albrecht, “Von der Reichsgründung bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges,” in Schmid, Das Neue Bayern, bk. 1, 377-383, 394-410. For an introduction to the personalities and political choices/leanings of Ludwig and Luitpold, and their political consequences, see Möckl, Prinzregentenzeit, 87-169; Wilhelm Liebhart, Bayerns Könige: Königstum und Politik in Bayern (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin: Peter Lang, 1997), 145-211; as well as a historiographical introduction to the topic provided by Hans-Michael Körner, Geschichte des Königreichs Bayern (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2006). In describing the monarchs’ reliance on liberal ministers, Liebhart implies that “Die Krone stützte sich einseitig auf die Liberalen,” because it was, quoting now from the historian Manfred Bosch, the party of “der meisten Studirten, der Beamten, Richter, Advokaten, Notare, Regierungsräthe..., dann der Fabrikanten, Großkaufleute, Kapitalisten, Geldleute...” See Liebhart, Bayerns Könige, 205.
monarchy, was left with little choice but to accept its place in permanent opposition. Under these circumstances, the Agricultural Association discreetly decided to remain on the sidelines, and now more than ever, avoided the wrangling and implications of overt political discourse.

Indeed, for the next twenty years, the activities and vision of the Bavarian government would be preoccupied with the “whip of the Kulturkampf,” blocking attempts by the Patriot-Center Party to reform voting laws, and then also overseeing the numerous bureaucratic reforms related to Bavaria’s integration into the German Empire. Neither Ludwig nor later Luitpold made much of an attempt to alleviate the political impasse in Munich, and for the Reich government, it was just as well that a liberal cabinet remained in place to stymie the political aspirations of a party that was hostile to Prussia and the Reich government. In any event, the Agricultural Association in Bavaria had little to offer to the Bavarian government at times like this. This was especially the case after the activities of the peasant associations had died down again. In the face of these circumstances, the Association quietly continued to accept its funds from the government, and the structure of the organization, fully programmed, continued to function as it always had: heralding agricultural modernization, boosting for the regime, and oozing a type of social conservatism that fit rather easily with the policies of a government that was otherwise too busy to notice the unhappiness and unease over economic circumstances that

75 Albrecht, 369-383, 400-402. Quote taken from 60 Jahre Bayerischer, patriotischer Bauernverein Tuntenhausen, 16.
76 In a very telling episode, after the 1875 elections, Ludwig II actually approached the leader of the Center Party, Georg von und zu Franckenstein auf Ullstadt (1825-1890†), to see if he would lead the royal ministries and form a government in Bavaria. Franckenstein, who was a member of the Reichstag in Berlin, and was perceived by Ludwig to be moderate Catholic and a proponent of federalism (as opposed to Bavarian particularism), politely declined the offer, fearing that that Reich government would still be displeased with the idea of having a Center Party government in power in one of its member states. Bismarck later confirmed Franckenstein’s fears regarding Prussia’s position on an “ultramontane government” in Bavaria: “Either it would be opposed to the Reich, in which case we would force them to kneel or break them in three-months time, or it would… let the Reich government do its job, which would be good.” See Albrecht, “Von der Reichsgründung bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges,” in Schmid, Das Neue Bayern, bk. 1, 379. The Bismarck quote is taken from a letter to Hermann von Mittnacht, and can be found in Otto von Bismarck, Die Gesammelten Werke, vol. VIII (Nendeln: Kraus, 1972), 149. From the German: “Entweder es wäre reichsfeindlich, dann würden wir es in drei Monaten zum Biegen oder Brechen bringen, oder es würde […] dem Reich das Seinige lassen, dann wäre es ja gut.”
was, despite the relative demise of peasant associations, beginning to bubble over in the Bavarian countryside. Muted by its allegiance to the government, the Association, it seemed, had less and less to offer anyone.

---

77 Hanisch, Für Fürst und Vaterland, 400. Hanisch comes to similar conclusions regarding Bavaria’s patriotic traditions in general, that is, that Ludwig I and Maximilian II had done a great deal to institutionalize patriotic traditions and encourage the cult of the Wittelsbachs — both within and outside of the government (including even the Catholic church) — between 1825 and 1864, and that then these traditions more or less carried on with a life of their own under the regimes of Ludwig II and Luitpold, who took much less time and interest in personally fomenting patriotic traditions, but nonetheless enjoyed the fruits of Maximilian’s labors.
CHAPTER 3
THE STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP PROFILE OF
THE AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION

Moving into the period following unification, there was little question that the Association remained loyal to the Bavarian government. Oftentimes though, this very loyalty to the regime worked to the disadvantage of the Association. This was especially true when it came to dealing with the peasantry, who generally doubted that the Association would ever adequately represent peasant interests. In practical terms, the Association’s imposing bulwark of bureaucratic responsibilities demanded that the organization fill its ranks with an adequate number of professionals who were capable enough in time and experience to manage the Association’s operations on a more or less voluntary basis.¹ On the other hand however, the structural arrangements upon which the Association depended, alongside the many personal relationships that crisscrossed the state-civil divide, doubly ensured that the organization remained tightly bound together with the activities of the state, a fact that was not lost on the average observer. Indeed, the very bylaws and structure of the Association, ostensibly built upon democratic principles, ensured that a preponderance of non-peasants held most positions of leadership within the organization, and during the next two and a half decades following unification, these arrangements together made it increasingly difficult for the Association to live up to its own claims of representing all of Bavaria’s agriculturalists.

¹ Alois Hundhammer, Die landwirtschaftliche Berufsvertretung in Bayern (Munich: Pfeiffer, Verlagsgesellschaften, 1926), 15-16.
Just as before unification, the structure of the Association closely mirrored the existing
internal district and county structure of the state. Following a few honorary positions filled by
members of the royal family, the Association was governed from the top, as before, by the
General Committee headquartered in Munich. Beyond the leadership of the General Committee,
the Association was further supported by eight district committees (*Kreiscomités*), each
headquartered in one of Bavaria’s eight district capitals, and each retaining a large degree of
freedom apart from the General Committee. The districts were themselves further sub-divided
into local county or municipal associations, and by unification, the Association had indeed
planted a local branch in almost every one of Bavaria’s counties. In those cases were local
membership was too small, members from several jurisdictions sometimes came together to form
one county-level association.² Each of the county associations (*Bezirks-Vereine*) elected their
own leaders, selected their own members, and also elected representatives to their respective
district committees. Even though they did not elect members to the General Committee — this
was in fact done by the district committees — the county associations were first and foremost
where the Association came into contact with average peasant farmers and through which it
executed its various programs ‘on the ground.’

For many within the Association, it was precisely here, where the Association came into
contact with the peasantry, that the bureaucrats’ control over the Association’s leading bodies
and county committees presented the greatest liability. As with the General Committee and the
district committees, leadership of the county committees remained firmly in the hands of non-
peasants, and this despite any increase in peasants that may have joined the Association after

---
² Hundhammer, *Die landwirtschaftliche Berufsvertretung in Bayern*, 11-12; and *Die bayerische Landwirtschaft in
den letzten Zehn Jahren: Festgabe für die Mitglieder der XXVIII. Versammlung deutscher Land- und Forstwirthe
im Jahre 1872 zu München* (Munich: Possenbacher, 1872), 4. By 1872, the Association counted to its total, 245
separate county associations, usually with an average minimum of 30 to 40 members. See for example, the 1872
annual report for Upper Franconia in HdbL GC 22, where these numbers are provided.
unification. For many even within the Association, this was not a formula for success, and so long as civil servants and other agricultural elites retained control over even the smallest county committees, it was unlikely that the Association would be taken more seriously by the peasantry. Consequently, without more success amongst the peasantry, the Association’s ability to realistically influence a more widespread development of agricultural production would remain limited. However, the leadership of the Association continued to fear that without its more powerful members or those more capable of running the Association’s administrative demands, the Association would drift even further into irrelevance, or worse, cease to function.

Therefore, despite ongoing complaints about the preponderance of non-peasants within the Association, it was precisely non-peasants who retained control over the organization after unification, the county committees essentially following a pattern set by the Association’s highest rungs of power.

i. Prince Ludwig of Bavaria

Given that bureaucrats and aristocrats dominated the Association’s leading bodies, it followed quite naturally that an aristocratic, Reichstreu culture — represented above all by the figure of the monarch and his symbolic headship of the organization — continued to grip the

---

4 See “Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung des General-Comités des landwirthschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern,” in Zeitschrift des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern, vol. LXIII (1873), where this point is made on several occasions by leading members of the General Committee; and Heinrich von Haag, ed., Die Landwirtschaft in Bayern: Denkschrift, nach amtlichen Quellen bearbeitet (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1890), 787, where Ludwig von Lerchenfeld-Köfering, who served as president of the Association from 1882 to 1893, defends the Association’s prominent bureaucratic element. An aristocrat and land-owner from the Upper Palatinate, Ludwig von Lerchenfeld-Köfering (1837-1907†) also sat in the upper house of the Bavarian Parliament beginning in 1866, and besides serving as secretary for that body, he also ultimately served as president from 1893 until his retirement in 1904. For biographical data, see Dirk Götschmann and Michael Henker, eds., Geschichte des Bayerischen Parlaments, 1819-2003, CD-ROM (Augsburg: Haus der Bayerischen Geschichte, 2005).
5 See HdbL KC Schw. 1.429, Eduard von Wolfanger, Rückblicke auf der Förderung der Landwirtschaft in Bayern seit der zweiten Hälfte des XVIII. Jahrhunderts (Munich: Posenbacher, 1885), 15-16, where Wolfanger admits that the Association’s leading bodies, from top to bottom, were dominated by bureaucrats.
entire Association. On the one hand, the Association’s unwavering support of the regime said much about the organization’s priorities. However it also showed that the leadership of the Association intended on working through and within the existing structures of power in late nineteenth-century Bavaria. Interestingly, it was not so much the Association’s longstanding relationship with the Bavarian monarch that offered much hope. Rather, the leadership of the Association pinned their hopes on Prince Ludwig, that is, the cousin of Ludwig II, in the hopes that he would one day return the Association to a position of prominence. Because Ludwig II had failed to produce any heirs, Prince Ludwig, who was the eldest cousin to Ludwig II, stood a very good chance of himself one day becoming king. Therefore it made perfect sense that the Association, an organization largely led by conservative men who wished to avoid the politics of agrarian populism, would attempt to find a solution to the Association’s waning political influence by courting the person of Bavaria’s future monarch.\(^6\)

If the leadership of the Association expected Prince Ludwig to one day return the Association to a place of honor, they were going to have to wait. As before unification, Ludwig II continued to function as the important, albeit predominantly symbolic head of the organization. Even though neither Ludwig II nor his successor as regent, Luitpold, ever really took much interest in the Association, it was important, again, for symbolic reasons, that the Association maintain its formal relationship with the monarch. Indeed, failure to support the monarch would have gone against everything that the Association stood for, and this left the

---

\(^6\) Because Ludwig II never married and never produced any heirs, upon his death, the crown was to pass to his younger brother Otto. However, where Ludwig II possessed serious personal idiosyncrasies, Otto was legitimately mentally ill, and was therefore unable to assume the responsibilities of monarch and he too produced no heirs. Following the mysterious death of Ludwig II in 1886, the crown passed to Otto. However, Luitpold, the younger brother of Maximilian II, took over as prince regent, serving in this capacity for the remainder of his life. For all intents and purposes, after 1886, Luitpold was the recognized monarch of Bavaria. After his death in December of 1912, and without any heirs or other legitimate claimants to the Bavarian throne, the crown passed with the assistance of the Bavarian parliament from the incapacitated Otto (who was still alive) to Luitpold’s eldest son, Prince Ludwig of Bavaria, who was proclaimed Ludwig III in November of 1913.
organization with little other option than to wait for better times. Ludwig II, like his father before him, had gladly taken up the title as Protector of the Association, and had at first even seemed to take an interest in the Association’s doings. After 1869 though, he ceased to even appear any more at the Association’s very popular Central Agricultural Festival, and just as Ludwig increasingly retreated from his responsibilities as ruler of Bavaria, he maintained little formal connection with the Association beyond brief notes and very generic correspondence produced by his secretaries or one of his other ministers. Likewise, once he had settled into the role of prince-regent following the death of Ludwig II, Luitpold too took up the title of Protector of the Association, but beyond this most formal relationship, had little otherwise to do with the Association beyond appearing at the annual Central Agricultural Festival.

Fortunately for the Association, the monarchs’ relative lack of interest in the Association did not mean that the Association was ever in any real danger of the government cutting off its funding or interfering in its business. Also helping matters, at least one member of the royal family, Prince Ludwig, actually took a sincere interest in agriculture, and he also took a very real interest in the Association. After joining the Association in 1868 at the age of 24, the Association’s General Committee had quickly moved to extend the title of ‘Honorary President’ (Ehrenpräsident) to the young man, that is, placing Prince Ludwig one step below ‘Protector.’ Ludwig gladly accepted the title. Taken at face value, there was absolutely nothing spectacular

---

7 Stefanie Harrecker, *Der Landwirtschaftliche Verein in Bayern, 1810-1870/71* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2006), 332-333, 358; and HdbL GC 21, correspondence from the Interior Ministry to the General Committee regarding the annual reports; BayHStA ML 134-139, correspondence between ministers and the king concerning the annual reports submitted by the Association.


9 There was no mention or provision for Prince Luwig’s position as honorary president in the Association’s bylaws, but in addition to the normal privileges of membership, he was allowed full participation in the meetings of the General Committee. See, for example, the report on the General Committee’s meeting from March 26th, 1873, “Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung des General-Comité des landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayarn,” in

---
or surprising about this move, and if anything, it was entirely appropriate that the Association’s leadership provided Prince Ludwig with a place of honor. However, more than simply fulfilling an honorary position, for the next four decades, Prince Ludwig actually focused considerable attention on the Association, devotedly attending the meetings of the General Committee, the Association’s Assembly of Bavarian Farmers (which he only missed once between 1870 and 1912!), and also regularly attending the Central Agricultural Festival and many other agricultural shows scattered across Bavaria. Otherwise, it was clear that Prince Ludwig was content to leave the details of managing the Association to more capable men. Nonetheless, through his connections to the royal house, as well as his faithful presence in the upper house of parliament, Prince Ludwig, the ‘honorary president,’ proved to be a very constant, faithful, and important member of the Association in the decades following unification.

Although Prince Ludwig entirely avoided using the Association as a platform for immediate political gain, this did not mean that he was completely silent when it came to expressing his political opinions. That he longed for more power and political influence was obvious to all. Sometimes labeled as an “ultramontane” by political observers, Prince Ludwig certainly showed no fear in speaking out against Prussia and German unification under Prussian leadership. In one particularly awkward piece of political theater, Prince Ludwig even ran as a member of the Patriot Party for the Reichstag in Berlin, spiting his cousin Ludwig II, who had

---

Zeitschrift, vol. LXIII (1873), S1-58, here S29, where Prince Ludwig participates in a discussion of the General Committee. Also see HdbL GC 7, correspondence dated from December, 1868, from the General Committee and addressed to the district committees, explaining Prince Ludwig’s membership and status.

HdbL GC 7, correspondence concerning Prince Ludwig becoming honorary president of the Association; Schnee, “Die Wanderversammlungen bayerischer Landwirte,” 844; and Harrecker, Landwirtschaftliche Verein, 333.

Bayerischer Landwirtschaftsrat, eds., Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern (Munich: Manz, 1910), 13-14.

Wilhelm Liebhart, Bayerns Könige: Königturn und Politik in Bayern (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin: Peter Lang, 1997), 219.
clearly sided with the liberals who wanted to bring Bavaria into the German Empire.\textsuperscript{13} Even though Prince Ludwig lost the election, he would nonetheless maintain close ties with the Patriots and then later the Center Party throughout his life. For its part, the Center Party in Bavaria hitched its wagon to Prince Ludwig’s star as well, hoping for the day that he would ascend to the throne, break apart the ministerial-bureaucratic cabal that controlled the Munich government, and mobilize the peasant-Center party forces in support of the crown and state.\textsuperscript{14} Eventually, in 1912, the Center got its wish, when Prince Ludwig, now Ludwig III, duly appointed the first ever Center-led royal cabinet to lead the government.

While there is no evidence to directly support it, it is entirely probable that the leadership of the Association was fully aware of Prince Ludwig’s political potential, and for this reason eagerly accepted the young man into their ranks shortly after he had finished his studies at the Maximilian Ludwig University.\textsuperscript{15} However, again, like the Center Party, if the Association wanted to enjoy any political benefits from its relationship with Prince Ludwig, it had to wait. Even though he harbored strong political pretensions, Prince Ludwig did not exactly enjoy the warmest of relations with either Ludwig II or his father Luitpold. For this reason, he remained something of a frustrated political outsider for much of his life. Not until the early 1890s, when he developed a closer relationship with Friedrich von Zoller, Luitpold’s influential minister-


\textsuperscript{14} Beckenbauer, 50.

\textsuperscript{15} HdbL GC 7, correspondence from the General Committee to the district committees, Dec. 1868; and Beckenbauer, Ludwig III. von Bayern, 87. Even though there was precedent for having young, usually aristocratic members join the General Committee, most of the men who sat there were older, established individuals. Motives aside, quickly accepting a young Prince Ludwig into the ranks of the General Committee shows that the Association was indeed interested in placing him in a position of honor.
secretary, did he finally have some access to real political power. Beyond this, Ludwig was forced to exercise patience, participating in politics through his membership in the upper house of parliament (the Reichsrat, where he sat for over forty years), but also using his family name and his position in organizations such as the Association to build up personal connections and develop a public persona.

Outside of politics, or more precisely, alongside his political interests, Ludwig preferred to spend his time dabbling in agriculture. Given that he had studied under the likes of Karl Fraas, Justus von Liebig, and Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, it is not surprising that a man of decidedly Catholic-conservative political persuasions would pursue an interest in agriculture. In 1875, he actually went so far as to buy a farm near Lake Starnberg, and for the rest of his life, he and his wife Maria Therese, who was herself an amateur botanist, proudly attempted to manage it by applying only the most modern methods and techniques. Even though his success as a farmer was later called into some question, no one denied Prince Ludwig’s sincerity or interest in agriculture. All the same, by holding to the image of a farmer-prince, he was surely able to win a few political points, especially with the peasantry. As one peasant put it in 1913, “We know for sure that the peasants and members of the middle class can rely much more on a strong monarch than on some political party, no matter what they call themselves.”

16 Beckenbauer, Ludwig III. von Bayern, 50, 85-86.
17 Harrecker, Landwirtschaftliche Verein, 33-334; and Hans-Michael Körner, “Ludwig III. Totengräber der Monarchie?” in Die Herrscher Bayerns, eds. Alois Schmid and Katharina Weigand (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2001), 376-388. On Prince Ludwig’s activities in the Bavarian Reichsrat, see Beckenbauer, 51-54. Regarding his membership in other organizations, Prince Ludwig was, for example, also an outspoken supporter of canal construction in Bavaria, and was a highly involved member of the Association for the Development of Riverways and Canals in Bavaria (Verein für Hebung der Fluß und Kanalschifffahrt in Bayern).
19 Ibid., 80-83.
Still, Prince Ludwig’s presence within the Association hardly drew a greater number of peasants into the organization, and if anything, the fact that he was accorded such a high place within the leadership of the Association said much about where the priorities of the Association really lay. Ludwig clearly fashioned himself as a defender of a more conservative status quo, and though he was kept on the margins of Bavarian politics, at no point did he attempt to up-end the system or use his position within the Association to foment discontent. Quite the contrary, he accepted the role that he had been accorded, and while quietly and patiently playing the part as king-in-waiting, he built up his image as a loyal and sturdy Bavarian agriculturalist. This of course worked perfectly for the leadership of the Association. They too had quietly accepted the organization’s relative decline in the eyes of the regime. Rather than turning the organization into a populist agitation group, the leadership of the Association preferred to cooperate with the status quo and wait for better times. Putting Prince Ludwig on a pedestal and placing all bets on the hope that he would one day become king therefore made perfect sense: just as Prince Ludwig intended to work his way to power within the social and political structures as they existed in late nineteenth-century Bavaria, so too did the Association.

Even after the First World War, with the Bavarian monarchy abolished and the Association no longer serving the state in an official capacity, the Association persistently clung to the royal house. In an interesting exchange of correspondence from 1924, a leading member of the county association in Aschaffenburg wrote to the Association’s Agricultural Council, formerly known as the General Committee, asking that Crown Prince Rupprecht, the son of Ludwig, be made honorary president just as his father had been. The author of this letter justified his claim by pointing out, albeit incorrectly, that the royal house had always fully

Mittelstandes an einem starken Königtum einen viel sichereren und zuverlässigen Halt haben als an irgend einer politischen Partei, möge sie heißen, wie sie wolle.”
supported the Association since its foundation in 1811, and in essence, it was a shame that this relationship should be broken. “The abominable Revolution,” the author continued, “with its attending ills, is and remains a blemish on the history of Bavaria in its disgraceful ingratitude toward our Bavarian royal house.” In response to this request, Matthäus Mittermeier, the president of the Association, duly pointed out that Ruprecht was still indeed the Honorary President, having followed in his father’s footsteps after Ludwig’s coronation in 1913. “Even though the political situation in Bavaria has complicated the relationship between the Bavarian Agricultural Council and its [honorary] president,” Mittermeier continued, “the internal relations between the Agricultural Association and the Council and the honorary president have effectively remained the same.” The issue resolved, Mittermeier then duly reported the content of this exchange to Prince Rupprecht’s secretary. Despite the “complicated political situation,” Mittermeier wished to show that the Association remained ever the loyal servant, ready to support agricultural production with all of its strength and to the fullest of its capacities.22

**ii. The General Committee**

Following in precedence behind the Protector and Honorary President, true leadership of the Association rested with the General Committee, a body that was composed entirely of men

---

with either middle-class or aristocratic backgrounds, but most of whom, whether they were
themselves landowners, businessmen, or bureaucrats, had some type of relationship with
agriculture.\footnote{The roster of people sitting on the General Committee, occasionally printed in the
newsletter, often included titles next to their names. In the stenographical report for one of the meetings
at the annual central meeting, one sees, besides the ubiquitous aristocratic ‘von’ in many of the names,
listed as present, 4 barons (\textit{Freiherr}), 3 earls or counts (\textit{Graf}), 6 civil servants (one of which was a
\textit{Graf}, another a \textit{Freiherr}), 1 bank inspector, 1 representative to the lower house, 1 district
veterinarian, 1 professor, 1 factory owner, and 7 other men simply listed as \textit{Gutsbesitzer}, a generic
term generally restricted to large land-owners. See “\textit{Stenographischer Bericht der Sitzung des General-
Comité’s des landwirthschaftliche Vereines in Bayern…,”} in \textit{Zeitschrift}, vol. LXVI (1876), S177-212, here S177.}
In the first decade following unification, the steady leadership of Julius von
Niethammer and the influence of men such as Eduard von Wolfanger, Adam Müller, Max von
Lerchenfeld-Aham, Friedrich Pabst, and Matthäus Jodlbauer generally ensured that the General
Committee retained liberal, pro-Prussian sympathies. Still, despite the preponderance of more
liberal voices on the General Committee, and despite some attempts to further decentralize the
authority of the General and district committees, in the end, there was not enough support within
the General Committee to change the Association’s direction in regard to the peasantry. In fact,
given the Association’s administrative needs, it was usually the more liberal members of the
General Committee who believed that the Association’s bureaucratic and more educated
members should retain control over the Association. For them, neither the peasantry nor the
Association was ready for greater peasant influence.\footnote{See, for example, “\textit{Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung des General-Comités des landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern,”} in \textit{Zeitschrift}, vol. LXIII (1873), S1-39, where the matter of peasant involvement in the leading
bodies of the Association is hotly debated by the General Committee.} Therefore, whatever window for change
may have existed within the General Committee to open the Association’s leading bodies to
greater peasant participation, was gradually closed shut during the 1870s. By the mid-1880s,
most of the General Committee’s liberal voices had either died or moved on, and in most cases,
they were replaced by men who were either less outspoken or were decidedly more conservative.
With the gradual loss of liberal voices on the General Committee, the chance for reform also
dwindled, thus leaving the General Committee (and the district and county committees) under the sway and firm control of bureaucratic and aristocratic elites.

In addition to providing centralized leadership for the district and county committees, the General Committee was also primarily responsible for interfacing with the Bavarian state government in Munich, assisting the government, and representing the interests of Bavarian agriculture. Based in Munich, the General Committee generally convened at the Association’s downtown Türkenstrasse address, located only a few blocks over from the State Chancellery (Staatskanzlei), the ministerial seat of the government. Indeed, the only time the General Committee did not meet at the Türkenstrasse address was when they convened at the annual assemblies, which were held at a different location every year, or at the Central Agricultural Festival. Otherwise, according to the bylaws, the General Committee met every eight days, and traditionally, meetings fell on Sundays or Mondays. However, the General Committee did take some liberty with its own rules, at times meeting on a weekly basis as required by the bylaws, but then sometimes meeting twice a month, or even once a month, depending on the necessity of meetings, scheduling conflicts, and of course holidays. Either way, regular meetings could last

---

25 HdbL GC 12, bylaws and rules of order for the General Committee, here, taken from “Satzungen des Landwirthschaftlichen Vereins” (1874), § 21.
26 Regarding the Association’s headquarters, the Association purchased the Türkenstrasse property in 1824, and the General Committee housed their offices and library in the house located there, endearingly known as the ‘Hutterschwaige’ for the next seventy years. Accompanying the house was a rather large amount of property (4 Tagewerk), which was generally used for gardening and other experimental purposes. In 1895/96, the General Committee moved out of the Hutterschwaige and into a larger building at Luwigstrasse No. 1, located one street over from the old property, which continued to be used for gardening and other agricultural purposes. See Wochenblatt, vol. XIV (1824), 519-520; HdbL GC 51, 55, 80 correspondence and bill of sale for the purchase of the Türkenstrasse property and the Luwigstrasse property; Harrecker, Landwirtschaftliche Verein, 77-83; and Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern, 4-5. For other documents concerning this location’s buildings, property, gardens, etc., see HdbL GC 49-83.
27 HdbL GC 12, “Satzungen” (1874), § 30. According to the General Committee’s rules of order, the general secretary would have kept minutes for the General Committee’s meetings, but unfortunately, these minutes no longer appear to exist. In the absence of the General Committee’s minutes, the monthly newsletters often provided summaries of the General Committee’s meetings, including dates. Even though it appears that the General Committee did meet rather regularly, if the summaries are at all accurate, then it is clear that they did not always meet on a weekly basis in accordance with their bylaws.
for quite a few hours, depending on the agenda, and were conducted in an otherwise formal but collegial tone.\textsuperscript{28}

Even though the number of people present at any given meeting could vary, on paper, the General Committee consisted of 24 ‘ordinary’ members and an additional 16 ‘special’ or ‘outstanding’ members who only participated occasionally.\textsuperscript{29} In addition to these two groups, the meetings of the General Committee also remained permanently open to certain individuals, such as Prince Ludwig, but also the president of the Central Agricultural School at Weihenstephan (just outside of Munich), professors of agriculture at the university and technical school in Munich, and the senior government veterinarian (assuming that these people were also members of the Association in good standing).\textsuperscript{30} Leadership of the General Committee was divided into five positions and was only extended to ‘ordinary’ members. Overall leadership of the General Committee belonged to the office of First President. This office was followed then by a vice president, who presided over meetings in those cases when the First President could not attend. Following the two presidents were the General and Second Secretaries, and also the General Editor of the newsletter. After 1850, the positions of General Secretary and the General Editor were traditionally filled by the same person, thus combining the two positions. All of these offices were filled by election from within the General Committee, with the exception of the General Editor/Secretary, who was hired to fill the position, and was consequently the only

\textsuperscript{28} BayHStA ML 128, correspondence from the Commerce Ministry, describing the meetings of the General Committee; \textit{Die bayerische Landwirthschaft in den letzten Zehn Jahren}, 2; and HdbL GC 12, “Geschäfts-Ordnung des General-Comités des landwirthschaftlichen Vereines in Bayern” (1877), § 5. Also see the stenographical reports of the General Committee’s meetings held at the Association’s annual assemblies, which are included in the collected volumes of the central newsletter, and provide something of a hint to the tone of the General Committee’s meetings.

\textsuperscript{29} HdbL GC 12, “Satzungen” (1874), §§ 15, 31.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., § 15.
person who received financial remuneration for his work. All of the other members of the General-Committee held their position on a completely voluntary basis.\textsuperscript{31}

Outside of those members who had a standing invitation to participate in the meetings of the General Committee, the members of the General Committee found their way there by way of a rather complicated process of election or appointment. Of the 24 ‘ordinary’ members, twelve were elected by the district committees in accordance with simple majority rules, while the other twelve positions were filled by members who were selected by the sitting members of the General Committee. Indeed, these 24 ‘ordinary’ members were the heart and soul of the General Committee. However, in addition to the ‘ordinary’ members, each of the Association’s eight districts supplied two more ‘special’ members. These ‘special’ members were meant to ensure that the voices and interests of the various districts were heard within the General Committee. However, they also opened up the possibility that small- or mid-sized farmers might make their voices heard. Only one of two ‘special’ members could be a member of their respective district committee. The other had to come from one of the country associations within the district. With eight districts, the number of ‘special’ members came to a total of 16. Unlike the ‘ordinary’ members, these 16 ‘special members’ were not required to attend every meeting in Munich, though they could attend as many meetings as they wished or could afford. At a minimum, they had to attend at least twice a year, and one of these mandatory attendances was fulfilled at the annual convention. Even though ‘special’ members only occasionally participated in the

\textsuperscript{31} HdbL GC 12, § 22; “Geschäfts-Ordnung” (1877) §§ 16, 17; and Bayerischen Landwirtschaftsrat, eds., Adam Müller, 1814-1879: Generalsekretär des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Baern, 1865-1879 (Munich: Dr. Wild’sche Buckdruckerei, 1914), 60. According to Müller, in 1866, he received 2,000 gulden a year as editor and secretary.
meetings of the General Committee, they received the same speaking and voting privileges as ‘ordinary’ members.\footnote{HdbL GC 12, “Satzungen” (1874), §§ 16, 28, 31.}

Elections for both ‘special’ and ‘ordinary’ members were held every three years, but not every member stood for election simultaneously. Terms for all members of the General Committee were set at six years, and terms were staggered to avoid a complete turnover of personnel at any one time. Therefore, only six positions among the ‘ordinary’ members were ever up for election at once, to be elected by the district committees, while the other six positions were chosen by the sitting members of the General Committee. Regardless of whether members were elected or appointed, the rosters of the General Committee do reveal that there was very little turnover at the top, and indeed, year after year, the same people were either collegially elected or chosen to sit on the General Committee. The same could be said of leadership positions within the General Committee, with the officers generally retaining their positions for very long periods of time, in many cases, even decades. Julius von Niethhammer served as the president of the General Committee from 1857 until his death in 1882, and he was followed by two men who both held onto their positions for over a decade and then two decades, respectively. Matthäus Jodlbauer, a long-standing member of the General Committee served as second secretary from 1860 to 1890, and Otto May, who followed Adam Müller as the general editor/secretary, held onto his position from 1879 to 1909!\footnote{Ibid., §§ 15, 16, 28, 31; “Geschäfts-Ordnung” (1877) § 15; HdbL GC 130, “Bestand des General Comités des landwirthschaftlichen Vereines für die Verwaltungsperiode 1872/74” ; and Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern, 16, 18-20.}

Where the lack of change within the General Committee was nothing new — it was a trend that had begun well before unification — an explanation for it lies, again, within the structure of the organization itself. First, there were no term limits for officers, and leadership
positions within the Association were indeed tightly bound together with time-consuming bureaucratic responsibilities. This gave experienced members of the General Committee a legitimate advantage over potential newcomers.\textsuperscript{34} Given the amount of work associated with the General Committee, and in the absence of pay, there was also very little tussle over open seats. For this reason, elections to the General Committee generally took on the appearance of mere formality.\textsuperscript{35} Besides the heavy load of work associated with the General Committee, there were also other structural arrangements that reduced its appeal. Specifically, the General Committee refused to insert itself into the political battles that consumed the government, and also, because the General Committee did not collect and distribute funds to the district committees, there was actually very little power associated with sitting on the General Committee. Regarding funds, the district committees received their own allotments directly from the government, and of course, they also raised their own monies. Either way, sitting on the General Committee might have offered a modicum of prestige to sitting members, but it also invited a great deal of work and promised very little access to individual gain. Except for those who perhaps wanted to use the General Committee as an opportunity to rub shoulders with a handful of well-placed political and social elites, ultimately, the General Committee offered very few privileges.

In the face of these unappealing circumstances, it is indeed worth mentioning that one of the official requirements for sitting on the General Committee as laid out in the bylaws also ensured that very few people took an interest in joining that body. Technically, there were only two requirements for sittings on the General Committee, the first of course being that members

\textsuperscript{34} Harrecker, \textit{Landwirtschaftliche Verein}, 259.
\textsuperscript{35} HdbL GC 121, 130-136, correspondence and election results for the General Committee, 1871-1895. Also see the opening pages to the “Stenographischer Bericht über die Plenar-Sitzung des General-Comités des landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern…,” in \textit{Zeitschrift}, vol. LXXII (1882), S347-385, which sheds light on the election of the president of the General Committee, and how it was more a less a foregone conclusion who was going to win the election, with the vice-president, Dr. Heinrich von Ranke openly telling the other committee members that they should vote for Ludwig von Lerchenfeld, who of course went on to win the election.
of the General Committee be members of the Association in good standing. The other requirement was tied to a stipulation that attendance at meetings was mandatory. Even though members often excused themselves for various scheduling conflicts, attendance was taken seriously.\textsuperscript{36} On the one hand, it was good that the General Committee took its work seriously enough to stringently enforce attendance. However, as a consequence, this ensured that members of the General Committee had to live in Munich or within its vicinity, and that they were also wealthy enough to afford this cost and the considerable amount of time necessary to attend meetings. Accordingly, the expectation was that those who sat on the General Committee would belong to a certain social class and possessed the capacity and means to support themselves while fulfilling the responsibilities of their position. This principle was flatly expressed in the bylaws.\textsuperscript{37} Of course, it came as no surprise to members of the Association that the General Committee had something of a southern Bavarian tilt to it, given that all of its members resided in Munich. More importantly however, the very administrative requirements and the structure of the General Committee ensured that only landed and educated elites would be able to sit on the General Committee and represent its needs to the government in Munich.

This is not to say that the social standing of individual members of the General Committee completely blinded them from the concerns of peasant farmers. There were more than a few activities initiated by the Association that were meant for a more general audience in the hopes that more peasants would get involved with the Association, and many of these activities were directly organized by the General Committee. This included the almanac, which was edited and compiled by the General Committee’s secretary, and also the Central Agricultural Festival, which was managed by the General Committee and specifically intended to appeal to a

\textsuperscript{36} HdbL GC 12, “Satzungen” (1874), §§ 19, 30.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., §. 28. From the German: “Der Gewählte muß die zur Bekleidung eines bürgerlichen Ehrenamtes gesetzlich erforderlichen Eigenschaften besitzen.”
general audience. That being said however, where the General Committee most certainly drew the line with the peasantry was with political matters that potentially challenged the authority of the state and which could subsequently affect the Association’s standing with the state. “The administrative work of our organization goes hand in hand with the bureaucracy of the state,” Eduard von Wolfanger exclaimed in a particularly heated debate about the number and status of civil servants within the Association, and inherently, there was nothing wrong with this arrangement. However, because the Association’s “friendly cooperation” with the state was of such “incredible worth” to men like Wolfanger, for most members of the General Committee, the state and the Association’s relationship therewith simply outweighed the peasantry in importance.\(^\text{38}\)

As we shall see in the next chapter, a small window of opportunity for change did exist in the 1870s for the General Committee to open the Association’s leading bodies up to more representatives from the peasantry. However, by the mid-1880s, most of the General Committee’s more liberal-leaning members were gone, and with their loss went almost any possibilities of reform. Adam Müller, the general secretary and editor of the newsletter died suddenly in 1879 and was replaced by Otto May, a more conservative man in tone and politics. In the same year that Müller died, Wolfanger stepped down from his position as director of the Interior Ministry’s Department for Agriculture, Commerce and Trade. Even though he remained on the General Committee until his death in 1887, no one of Wolfanger’s stature ever stepped up to replace him in either the Association or the Interior Ministry. Two years after the loss of Müller, the resolute Niethammer too was dead and replaced as president by the more

\(^{38}\)“Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung des General-Comités...,” in *Zeitschrift*, vol. LXIII (1873), S15-16. From the German,“Unsere Vereinsorgane gehen mit der Staatsverwaltung Hand in Hand. Die Regierung ist keine feindliche Macht der Landwirthschaft gegenüber... im Gegenteil fördert sie, wo und wie sie kann, die Landwirthschaft und dieses gemeinsame freundliche Zusammenwirken, meine verehrten Herren, had einen außerordentliche großen Werth.”
conservative aristocrat Ludwig von Lerchenfeld-Köfering. Though Jodlbauer, a colleague of Wolfanger, continued to play an important role within the government and the General Committee throughout the rest of the 1880s, his life too was cut short in 1890 by a sudden heart attack.  

In short, the General Committee, which had never really been that liberal of a body in the first place, only grew more conservative with time as its more liberal voices diminished in number and stature. With their loss, and with the cards already stacked against the peasantry, it grew increasingly unlikely after unification that the General Committee would ever press for changes that would increase the presence of peasants within the leading bodies of the Association.

iii. The district and county committees

When the Bavarian government had first intervened in the Agricultural Association’s activities in the 1830s and forced the organization to reform and decentralize, many of the responsibilities of the General Committee were duly transferred to the district committees. Later, the reforms of the 1850s unquestionably returned the General Committee to its central place as head of the Association. Despite this arrangement, the district and county committees continued to operate, even after unification, with a great deal of flexibility and initiative in support of the Association’s overall program. Where the General Committee set general guidelines for the entire Association, the district and county committees were in principle more responsible for initiating agricultural developments as they saw fit within their given geographic

40 Hundhammer, Die landwirtschaftliche Berufsvertretung, 10. For a closer look at how the district and county committees operated, also see KC Schw. 1.341, 1810-1910, Hundert Jahre landw. Verein in Schwaben: Eine Denkschrift (Augsburg: Pfeiffer, 1910), a commemorative book that was put together for the Swabian district assembly for 1910, and which provides a history and overview of the district and county committees of Swabia and their activities.
areas of responsibility. Divided into eight districts that corresponded exactly with the Bavarian Kreise, each district possessed its own district committee that served as the representative body for that district, and similar to the General Committee, worked closely together with the district-levels of the Bavarian government. Directly beneath the district committees were the many county committees that administered and managed local associations, associations that were themselves diversely varied in membership size and number.\textsuperscript{41} Even though the Agricultural Association had planted local associations in almost every corner of Bavaria, it did not necessarily have an association in every county or city at all times, and sometimes a local association represented several communities that were bound together. On the other hand, neither was it uncommon for some counties or cities (e.g. Munich) to have more than one association within their borders, depending on a given organization’s popularity, population density, and of course other local conditions.\textsuperscript{42}

The rules and regulations governing the election and composition of the district committees were very similar to the rules and regulations of the General Committee. As was the case with the General Committee, average members of the Association did not elect those people who sat on the district committee. Rather they were elected by the county committees or selected by other sitting members of the district committees. Also similar to the General Committee, each of the eight district committees consisted of ordinary and special members, but

\textsuperscript{41} HdbL GC 12, “Satzungen” (1874), §§ 4, 14. Membership numbers for local associations from this period usually numbered in the hundreds, but according to the Association’s bylaws, a local association could consist of as few as six members, which was the minimum number needed to form a county committee. See “Satzungen” (1874), § 17. For the membership numbers of local associations, see any of the annual reports from the districts located in HdbL GC 22, HdbL KC Schw. 1.342-1.357, and BayHSta ML 134-139.

\textsuperscript{42} Die Bayerische Landwirthschaft in den letzten zehn Jahren, 1; and Haag, Die Landwirthschaft in Bayern, 784. Also see, for example, the annual report for the district committee from Upper Bavaria printed in Königlich Bayerisches Kresiantsblatt von Oberbayern, no. 46 (June 1881), here 767-768, which shows Munich with three local associations; and BayHSta ML 146, correspondence between the Interior Ministry and local authorities in the Upper Bavarian county of Bogen and newspaper clippings from 1895, describing the politics surrounding the formation of a new association in a county where one already existed.
instead of 24 ‘ordinary’ members and 16 ‘special’ members, district committees consisted of 12 ‘ordinary’ members and 12 ‘special’ members. Half of the 12 ‘ordinary’ members were selected by the other elected half, and terms were set for six years. Since the terms were staggered, again, like the General Committee, only half of the district committees’ members were ever up for election or selection during a given election cycle, also held every three years.\textsuperscript{43} Ordinary members were required to attend meetings, which were theoretically held every fourteen days, but the special members, who had the same rights and privileges as ordinary members, were only required to attend twice a year.\textsuperscript{44} Even though voting for district committee members was restricted to the county committees, it was not required that members of the district committees come from within the body of county committees. Rather, average members of a county association could be elected or selected to the district committees. Also, after 1862, it was no longer required that district committee members live within three hours of meeting places. This was done, in theory at least, to loosen up the power of the county committees and perhaps open up the district committees to more small farmers. Other people who were allowed to sit on the district committees, assuming they were members of the Association, were the head master or head teacher of any agricultural schools located within the district, as well as the district veterinarians and other district officials.\textsuperscript{45}

Despite serious efforts to add more small farmers to the ranks of the district committees, other circumstances and habits ensured that they remained firmly under the control of agricultural elites. Overall leadership of the district committees was divided into five positions: the First and Second President, the First and Second Secretary, and the General Editor of the district newsletters. In previous years, the government had mandated that the First President of

\textsuperscript{43} HdbL GC 12, “Satzungen” (1874), § 16.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., § 30.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., § 16; and “Satzungen” (1862), § 34.
each district committee be filled by its respective district president (Regierungs-Präsident), that is, the appointed government official who was responsible for the district and who answered directly to the royal cabinet in Munich. After the reforms of the 1850s, this requirement fell from the books. However, an article written into the Association’s bylaws explicitly stated that “the district presidents… could be elected to chair the district committees,” thus leaving an opening for district presidents to nonetheless fill the position of First President. Furthermore, the bylaws also strongly encouraged the district and county committees to actively invite civil servants from the Interior Ministry and local administrations to attend meetings and local festivals hosted by the Association. In due form, many (if not most) of the men elected to chair the district committees were none other than the district presidents, and likewise, most of the other members of the district committees came from within the ranks of the state civil service.

The obvious point behind these regulations was that the Association wanted to further solidify its official relationship with the state bureaucracy. However, these same regulations also encouraged the Association to depend on state bureaucrats to lead and manage the organization even at the district and county levels. Far from helping matters was also the heavy load of administrative paperwork required to run a state-wide organization whose membership exceeded 50,000 people by 1879. Julius von Niethammer, in a rare moment of self-criticism, noticed as early as the 1850s that the bureaucratic load being placed on the Association significantly

---

48 HdbL GC 129-132, 134-136, election results for the district committees, 1869-1895; “Der landwirthschaftliche Verein in Bayern und die ‘Büreaukratie,’” 77; and Hundhammer, Die landwirtschaftliche Berufsvertretung, 14. According to Hundhammer, as late as 1925, five of what had been reduced to seven district committees continued to be chaired by district presidents.
49 Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern, 16.
affected its ability to undertake its primary mission, that is, advancing agricultural developments.\footnote{BayHStA ML 128, undated correspondence from Niethammer, probably written in 1854, and similar to correspondence in HdbL GC 104 that is dated from 1854. Also cited in Harrecker, \textit{Landwirtschaftliche Verein}, 265. Interestingly, Ludwig I had shared similar thoughts about the workload of the committees back in 1835, believing that they were indeed “mit Arbeit überladen.” See Harrecker, 149.} Nowhere was this more clear however than with the district committees, whose primary obligation, to the General Committee at least, were the information-laden annual reports that they had to compile. With every passing year, the size of the annual reports ballooned, as experience taught that more data was increasingly (if only passively) desired from the state ministers who ultimately read the reports.\footnote{HdbL GC 21-23; and BayHStA ML 134-139, and 146-151. Correspondence from the government as well as from within the Association shows a regular back-and-forth of requests for more specific information to be included in reports.} Assembling the information required to fill out the reports was a time-consuming project, given that it involved frequent consultations with a spanning variety of resources, individuals, and other specialist agricultural organizations. Moreover, beyond the annual reports, the district leadership also had to frequently provide answers by mail to single requests from the government or other organizations seeking specific agricultural information. Almost all of this work fell directly on the president and secretaries of the district committees (whose signatures duly and regularly appeared on existing correspondence), and much of it required the approval of the district committees. With the exception of the district secretaries, all of this work was completed on a voluntary basis.\footnote{HdbL GC 12, “Satzungen” (1874), § 24; HdbL GC 21-23; and BayHStA ML 134-139, and 146-151, correspondence and annual reports; and Harrecker, \textit{Landwirtschaftliche Verein}, 260-261.}

The workload of the county committees hardly differed. After 1871, it was not unusual for the membership of a single county association to number in the hundreds, and alone, regularly organizing such a large group of people for meetings or other events would have been a complex undertaking. Outside of regularly held meetings, the county committees were likewise expected to support the improvement of agriculture in their counties \textit{(Kulturverbesserungen)}, to
support other agricultural organizations that had similar interests and goals, and of course, to assemble and submit information to their district committees. However, unlike the district committees, the county committees more frequently worked together with average members, conducting the mission of the Association ‘on the ground.’ This entailed organizing local agricultural festivals and agricultural shows, supervising local education programs, maintaining agricultural libraries, and making attempts on the local level to improve agricultural production or at least more broadly implement modern agricultural methods and techniques. Indeed, if the Association ever wanted to achieve its ambitious goal of improving agricultural production throughout Bavaria, it was imperative that the county committees develop a healthy cooperation with communities and do more to attract peasants into the organization.

Keeping in line with its democratic origins, there were, as before unification, actually very few requirements to join the Association. Beyond paying one’s dues, the bylaws required that members be farmers or a “friend of agriculture.” In other words, membership was virtually open to anyone. Low membership rates also ensured that those with less means could join. In 1866, in response to a slight dip in numbers, the Association had even dropped its normal

---

54 HdbL GC 116, the annual report for Middle Franconia, 1889. This annual report actually lists the agricultural improvement projects undertaken by Middle Franconian county associations in that year, providing an overview of what these improvement projects looked like. Also see the records for the county committees in Weilheim, Hof, and Bamberg in the HdbL, which provide numerous examples of what activities the county committees undertook.
55 One of the General Committee’s annual reports says exactly this, further inviting county committees to get more involved in the activities of their communities, which would further help in growing the Association’s membership numbers. See “Jahresbericht des General-Comités des landwirtschaftlichen Vereins für das Jahr 1875.” Zeitschrift, vol. LXVI (1876), 241-268, here 249-250.
56 HdbL GC 12, “Satzungen” (1874), §§ 6-12. Even though it went unstated in the bylaws, it was understood that only male residents of Bavaria could join the Association. Those who lived outside of Bavaria who were interested in joining the Association could acquire ‘honorary’ memberships with approval of the General Committee. Interestingly, the Association had no problem extending membership to Jews, and occasionally, Jewish members, such as Joel Jakob von Hirsch (1789-1876†), a prominent banker who sat on the General Committee, even occupied leadership positions within the Association. For more on Jewish members as well as the role of the women in the Association, see Harrecker, Landwirtschaftliche Verein, 42-46.
membership rates in order to attract new members.\textsuperscript{57} Sure enough, after 1871, the Association once again saw a rise in membership. Later, after 1876, when Bavaria adopted the mark, the cost of membership remained approximately the same, with members now paying 3 marks, while teachers paid 1 mark, 30 pfennig.\textsuperscript{58} As before, a little over half of these proceeds were used fill the coffers of the county associations, and the remainder went to the district committees, leaving the General Committee to subsist almost entirely off of funds received from the government in Munich. Despite the inadequate amount of funds being raised through membership dues, they remained unchanged until after the First World War.\textsuperscript{59}

Keeping membership rates low helped to ensure that the Association retained a semblance of mass appeal, and in the first decade after unification, the Association did see an impressive growth in its membership, expanding from around 30,000 members in 1871 to over 50,000 in 1881.\textsuperscript{60} However, because the Association did not keep occupational data for its members, it is difficult to ascertain what percentage of these new members may have stemmed from the peasantry. Given that over half of Bavaria’s almost five million residents worked in agriculture around 1880, it is possible that the Association’s growth was the result of more peasants joining the organization, and positive reports from the district and county committees certainly indicated that the peasantry’s presence within Association was in fact growing.\textsuperscript{61} Still,  

\begin{footnotes}
\item[57] Harrecker, \textit{Landwirtschaftliche Verein}, 275-277. Membership rates were dropped from 2 gulden, 45 kreuzer, which had been established in 1850, down to 1 gulden, 45 kreuzer.
\item[58] Regarding Bavaria’s changeover from gulden to marks, see chapter 7, “Harmonisierung des Geld-, Mass-, und Gewichtswesens nach 1871,” in Angelika Fox, \textit{Die wirtschaftliche Integration Bayerns in das Zweite Deutsche Kaiserreich} (Beck: Munich, 2001), 301-356.
\item[59] For more on budgets, see the following chapter.
\item[60] See appendix A, Table I.
\item[61] In 1882, over 2.5 million Bavarians, out of a population of 5 million, were engaged in agricultural production. See \textit{Die Landwirtschaft in Bayern: Nach der Betriebszählung von 12. Juni 1907} (Munich: Lindau, 1910), 2; and Dirk Götschmann, \textit{Wirtschaftsgeschichte Bayerns, 19. und 20. Jahrhundert} (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2010), 239. Also see HdbL KC Schw. 1.341, 1810-1910, \textit{Hundert Jahre landw. Verein in Schwaben}, 37. By 1908, the Swabian district committee reported that of the 17,000 members it counted in its county associations, over 15,000 were farmers, with less than 2000 practicing in non-agricultural trades. Of the 15,000 who were practicing farmers, it is possible that some of these were peasants.
\end{footnotes}
Despite the possibility that peasants increasingly joined the Association after 1871, the public impression was that peasants remained underrepresented in the Association.

For example, even though elections for county committees were completely democratic, any possible increase in peasant members was not reflected in the leadership of the county committees.⁶² Consisting of six to twelve people, elections for all county committee members were held every three years at the annual district assemblies (members who could not make it to the assemblies were allowed to mail in their ballots). Committee members selected their own officers, in this case, a first and second president and then a secretary, but no sitting members of the county committees were selected by the other sitting members, none of the terms were staggered, and there was no differentiation between ‘ordinary’ or ‘special’ members.⁶³ Since the county committees only had to meet once every three months, it may have been difficult for them and local associations to form the same type of camaraderie that developed in the upper echelons of the Association’s leadership. But then, it was not unusual for meetings to take place more frequently than what was minimally required. Either way, it was within the county association where, as already mentioned, committee members actually had an opportunity to mix with people of different classes. This meant therefore that the county committees, in stark contrast to the district and General committees, were more likely to understand something about the problems that plagued not only large farmers, but the Bavarian peasantry as well. Indeed, much of the information that the upper leadership of the Association received concerning the peasantry came to them because the county committees thought that it was important enough to include in their reports.⁶⁴ Conversely, it was very probable that even average members of a

---

⁶³ HdbL GC 12, “Satzungen” (1874), §§ 17, 27.
⁶⁴ See, for example, Jahres-Bericht des Kreis-Comités des landwirtschaffen Vereins von Oberbayern (1882), 4-5, which provides details (in a somewhat patronizing tone) on the dynamics involved in trying to recruit new
county association personally knew the people sitting on their committee, given that the local associations directly elected their own leadership. This meant therefore that members who were not necessarily capable enough in time or talent to lead or run a local association could make their voices heard within the organization by voting for like-minded leaders.65

As it turned out however, civil servants, teachers — almost anyone other than peasants — generally sat on the county committees, and indeed, the social divisions that separated middle-class civil servants and average peasant farmers were oftentimes too much for either side to overcome.66 Even as late as 1925, out of 230 county associations, over half were led by state bureaucrats, while another 17 were led by the local state veterinary. It goes almost without saying that nearly all of the secretarial positions were also occupied by bureaucrats.67 Granted, a lopsided presence of civil servants within the Association did not inevitably doom its relationship with the peasantry, nor did it mean that the peasantry would always mistrust the Association. Unfortunately however, more often than not, working together with the leadership of a given county committee left a bad taste in the mouth of peasants who understandably tired of having to kowtow to men “who know nothing of farming,” or “bureaucrats who don’t know the difference between a harrow and a plow.”68 Likewise, the bureaucrats, wishing to run a tight ship, oftentimes tired of peasants who knew nothing about their administrative work, who knew

members among the peasantry. This particular annual report can be found in bound format in the library of the Haus der bayerischen Landwirtschaft.

65 Hundhammer, Die landwirtschaftliche Berufsvertretung, 15-16.
66 Ministerium des Innern, Die Maßnahmen auf dem Gebiete der landwirtschaftlichen Verwaltung in Bayern, 1890-1897 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1897), 337, 340.
67 Hundhammer, Die landwirtschaftliche Berufsvertretung, 15-16. By comparison, in 1896, out of 226 county associations, 138 county committees were presided over by civil servants, 2 more by assessors, 8 by veterinarians, 8 by mayors, 1 by a judge, 5 by priests or ministers, and 4 by teachers. Only 37 county committee presidents were actually practicing farmers, and it is doubtful any of these stemmed from peasant backgrounds. See Die Maßnahmen (1897), 340.
68 HdbL GC 153, report on peasant associations in Lower Bavaria from 1873 that mentions peasant complaints about the Association; and BayHStA ML 150, correspondence and newspaper clipping from the Fränkische Kurier, dated April 25th, 1893, providing details about a meeting held by a county association in Neustadt in Middle-Franconia. From the German, “...mancher Beamter [die] keinen Pflug von einer Egge unterscheiden könne.”
even less about the world beyond their rural villages, and who, according to one district
president, “operated under a type of delusion” and were otherwise “un-teachable.”69

Either way, considering the democratic structure of the county associations, it is clear that
the peasantry could have done more to make the county committees bend to their will had more
peasants joined the Association. That the county committees did not bend to the will of the
peasantry strongly suggests otherwise, that is, that the peasantry did not join the Association in
increasing numbers. It is possible of course that some peasants joined the Association and had
no issue with following men whom they saw as their ‘natural’ betters, keeping in step with the
time-honored tradition of “knowing one’s place.”70 An equally likely scenario is that peasants
joined the Association but only half-heartedly participated, subsequently leaving the bureaucrats
in control of an organization that was, despite its best efforts, essentially a middle-class and
aristocratic agricultural club. One can easily imagine the intimidation that peasants may have
felt within such an organization, and that, out of shame or pride, avoided joining men who were
surely more educated and more experienced in administration or public speaking than they were.
Whatever the case, looking at the make up of the Association after 1871, it is quite obvious that
the peasantry’s miniscule presence within the leading bodies of the Association confirmed what
most peasants already thought, that is, that the Association would never specifically represent
their interests. Indeed, absent a revolutionary change of course, the leading bodies of the

69 Quoted in Anton Hochberger, Der Bayerische Bauernbund, 1893-1914 (Munich: Beck, 1991), 12. From the
German: “…daß der besser situierte niederbayerische Bauer ‘an einer Art Größenwahn leidet und jeder Belehrung
fast unzugänglich ist.’” Taken from correspondence from Ludwig Fuchs von Bimbach und Dornheim (1883-
1900†), then district president of Lower Bavaria.
70 For more on the peasantry and their acquiescence to the upper classes, see Alois Seidl/Pankraz Fried and Joachim
Schmid, vol. 4, bk. 2 of Handbuch der Bayerischen Geschichte, eds. Max Spindler/Andreas Kraus (Munich: C.H.
Beck, 2007),155-215, here 201; and also Günther Franz, Geschichte des deutschen Bauernstandes, vom frühen
organization remained effectively cut off from the peasantry, and the consequences of this development showed in the coming decades.
CHAPTER 4

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION, PART ONE:
PRIORITIES, BUDGETS, AND FORUMS OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE

The very structure of the Agricultural Association — its bylaws, its overall division of labor, the organizational chain of command — assured that the organization remained firmly in the hands of bureaucrats and landed elites after unification, serving the interests of Bavarian agriculture from within the structure of the state, but rarely taking a direct stand in opposition to the government or in support of the peasantry. In light of these circumstances, the numerous activities of the Association produced a pattern of mixed results. Equally problematic for the Association was the government’s relative lack of concern for agriculture between 1871 and 1914. Even though the government continued to fund much of the Association’s activities, it provided little to no direction. Despite government monies, it was also clear that the Association’s income did not match the organization’s ambitions, nor was the Association capable enough to alleviate the difficulties that Bavaria’s agricultural sector increasingly faced. Neglected by its greatest benefactor and left to operate on a very tight budget, the Association could have perhaps focused its support and efforts on one aspect of agricultural development, such as peasant education. But this was not what it did, and indeed, the Association continued to support a great variety of activities after unification, to the effect that most of the programs that the Association supported were chronically underfunded, received infrequent attention, or lacked adequate resources. As always, the Association continued to strive toward transforming
agricultural production in Bavaria to the assumed betterment of all. However, where the ambitions of the Association remained high, its long-standing relationship with the government, as well as internal tendencies that leaned toward a faithful support of the state, altogether hindered the overall effectiveness of the Association’s activities.

i. The Association’s budgets

Each of the Association’s different organizational levels — the General Committee, the district committees, and the county committees — had their own separate budgets tailored to meet specific needs. Outside of the heavy costs associated with administration, the General Committee generally supported activities that appealed to audiences across the entire state of Bavaria. This included the Association’s central newsletter, the almanac, and the central agricultural festival held every year in conjunction with the Oktoberfest. The district committees, on the other hand, focused their attention on their respective districts, funding district newsletters, district festivals, land consolidation projects, agricultural experiment stations, agricultural education within the districts, and where necessary, cooperated closely together on the ground with subordinate county associations who naturally had a better grasp on local needs. Taken individually, there were certain trends within the budgets of the General Committee, district committees, and county committees that stand out, allowing one to generalize about the Association’s different levels of activity. Looking at the budgets in toto, there are however two particular threads of consistency that weave themselves throughout all of the budgets and at every level of the Association. Specifically, the entire organization, from top to bottom, relied rather heavily on government funding in order to operate, and even then, its monies were spread far too thin over a wide variety of projects. This is particular evident in
regard to peasant-level agricultural education, which, despite the Association’s best intentions, remained chronically underfunded throughout the first two and half decades after unification.

Turning to the specific data provided in the budgets, what stands out above all else are the steady donations provided by the central government to the General and district committees. Beginning in 1850, the Bavarian government had decided to annually provide the Association with 18,000 gulden, with 6,000 gulden going to the General Committee, and 1,500 gulden being distributed to each of the district committees. With this stipend, for the first time in the organization’s history, the General and district committees regularly received money from the government. This firmly establishing a trend of cash flow between the government and the Association, but also added a greater level of stability to the organization’s operating capacity. On top of this regular ‘donation,’ which was increased to 5,000 gulden for the districts in 1873, both the General Committee and the district committees also continued to frequently receive other funds from the government, funds that were usually tied to certain projects, such as the central agricultural festival or, more generically, agricultural education. Where necessary, some of this money did trickle down to the county associations, usually in the form of reimbursements. However, given that the Association continuously lowered membership dues over the course of its existence in order to open membership up to the broadest number of farmers, it was clear that the district and county committees legitimately needed the additional government funds if they intended on supporting larger agricultural projects.

2 For examples of county committee budgets, see HdbL BC Weilh. 1.714, correspondence, budgets, and receipts for the county committee for Weilheim, 1876-1886; and HdbL BC Bamb. 1.684-1.688, the same for the county committee for Bamberg, 1869-1889.
3 See HdbL KC Schw. 1.333, correspondence from after the First World War, which refers to the pre-war period and the district committees’ needs for government funding to cover their activities. Regarding membership dues, after 1866, the normal rate for membership in the Association was set at 1 gulden, 45 kreuzer, while the membership rates
Ironically, it was the General Committee, which was least involved in directly managing agricultural projects, that depended most heavily on government funding. In 1871, roughly 20,000 gulden of the General Committee’s 30,000 gulden budget came from government monies, including the standing donation of 6,000 gulden, but also additional funds intended for specific projects. In other words, around the time of unification, Munich covered roughly two-thirds of the General Committee’s budget. After 1875, this set of affairs would begin to slightly change, with the General Committee taking significant steps to raise more of its own funds. In 1876, the government and the association both officially switched over from the gulden to the mark, and the budget duly reflected this change. The standing donation to the General Committee was now set at 10,286 marks, with other government funding bringing the total of state contributions to almost 30,000 marks. In contrast to previous years however, the increasing popularity of the Association’s almanac boosted the General Committee’s income considerably, to the point that a little less than half of the General Committee’s income came from sales of the almanac. Apparently, a redesign led by the Association’s general secretary, Adam Müller, and plans to expand the publication of the almanac worked. Indeed, the almanac would continue to provide a significant income for the Association in the decades to come, and largely because of the almanac, the General Committee consistently generated between one-half and two-fifths of its own revenue from 1876 to 1895. The rest, as before 1876, was made up by the government.\footnote{HdbL GC 100, correspondence between the government and the General Committee, and budgets from the General Committee, 1871-1897; and Bayerischen Landwirtschaftsrat, eds., \textit{Adam Müller, 1814-1879}:}

---

\footnote{Die bayerische Landwirtschaft in den letzten Zehn Jahren: \textit{Festgabe für die Mitglieder der XXVIII. Versammlung deutscher Land- und Forstwirthe im Jahre 1872 zu München} (Munich: Possenbacher, 1872), 3; and HdbL GC 12, “Satzungen des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereines in Bayern” (1885), §§ 36-38.}

for teachers was set at 1 gulden. Of these dues, for every gulden that stayed with the county committees, 45 kreuzer went to the district committees. After the currency change in 1876, membership dues were set at 3 marks for normal members, and teachers paid 1 mark 30 pfennig. Of the 3 marks paid by normal members, 1 mark 30 pfennig went to the district committees, while 1 mark 70 pfennig stayed with the county committees, and dues paid by teachers stayed entirely with county committees. See \textit{Die bayerische Landwirtschaft in den letzten Zehn Jahren: Festgabe für die Mitglieder der XXVIII. Versammlung deutscher Land- und Forstwirthe im Jahre 1872 zu München} (Munich: Possenbacher, 1872), 3; and HdbL GC 12, “Satzungen des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereines in Bayern” (1885), §§ 36-38.
The almanac’s rise in popularity after 1875 reflected a commensurate increase in money that the General Committee devoted to that publication. In 1871, roughly two-thirds of the General Committee’s budget covered, in descending order, administrative costs, the central agricultural festival that ran in tandem with the Oktoberfest, the almanac, and the newsletter. Another large sum, 5000 gulden, was set for agricultural education (Fortbildung), but this was permanently cut from the budget in 1872. The remaining portions of the General Committee’s budget were spread over various, smaller projects. Five years later, and taking the currency change into account, the General Committee doubled the amount of money it spent on the almanac, bringing the total expense for that publication up to 10,000 gulden, or 17,000 marks. Meanwhile, other specific, generally smaller projects continued with about the same amount of funding or vanished altogether from the budget. Indeed, between 1876 and 1880, the General Committee’s single greatest expense was the almanac, with most of the remaining budget being devoted, again, in descending order, to administrative costs, the central agricultural festival, and then the central newsletter. After 1880, administrative costs once again slipped into the lead as the greatest single expense for the General Committee, covering about a third of its 66,000 mark budget, while about another third went to the almanac. The remainder, as before, largely went to the central agricultural festival and the newsletter. Altogether, the General Committee ran a fairly balanced budget throughout these years, never once going into the red, but usually spending most of what it accrued. However, administrative costs and the almanac, which the

---

Generalsekretär des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Baern, 1865-1879 (Munich: Dr. Wild’sche Buchdruckerei, 1914), 61.

5 The General Committee’s library, located at its headquarters in Munich, would qualify as one of these smaller projects that the General Committee continued to fund throughout its existence. Education or the Water Laws, on the other hand, were slightly larger projects than the library, but the General Committee ceased to receive funding from the state for these projects after 1871 as well.

6 Between 1880 and 1890, the General Committee only had between five and seven thousand marks in savings, though this figure does not take into account the General Committee’s other, non-monetary assets, such as property,
General Committee needed to generate funds, were clearly eating into the lion’s share of the General Committee’s income. This effectively reduced the General Committee’s ability to directly support many agricultural projects itself, and even though the almanac proved to be a significant source of revenue, it was also clear that the General Committee needed continued government support in order to keep above water.⁷

Moving on to the district committees, one finds, as already stated, that they too relied rather heavily on financial support from the government. However, in contrast to the General Committee’s budgets, the budgets of the district committees were much more complex, variegated, and reflected less continuity from year to year and from district to district. On the other hand, the budgets for the district committees also showed that they relied less heavily on government support in order to function. Much of the added complexity of the district budgets was related to the fact that the district committees were more directly involved in carrying out agricultural projects on the ground. Therefore, their outgoing expenditures tended to cover a greater variety of activities. On the income side, the district committees also relied on more numerous and less defined sources of funding than the General Committee, including membership dues. However, the districts also clearly depended on government funding that was spasmodically issued from multiple government sources and often tied to specific activities.⁸

Besides administrative expenses, most of the districts’ expenses went, in no particular order, toward research and animal breeding, agricultural improvement projects (i.e. land consolidation, or draining of moors), agricultural education, agricultural festivals and trade fairs,

---

⁷ See HdbL GC 100, correspondence between the government and the General Committee, and budgets from the General Committee, 1871-1897.
⁸ See HdbL GC 22, 111, 114-117, and 120, annual reports and budgets from the district committees of Upper Bavaria, Swabia, Lower Franconia, Middle Franconia, and the Palatinate, 1871-1895.
and the district newsletters. With some of these projects, the district committees directly oversaw the projects in question, such as the newsletters, the festivals, and even sometimes the research stations. More typically, the district committees simply funneled money to individuals or organizations who were already carrying out existing agricultural projects. This included, besides county associations, other private agricultural organizations that used the money to pursue specific agricultural objectives; but also included other state employees, such as teachers and agricultural engineers (Cultur-Ingenieur), or locally-funded projects such as the winter schools. Unlike the General Committee, the district committees were not as burdened by administrative costs, usually devoting less than a fifth of their budget to administration. Otherwise however, the budgets do make clear that land improvement projects, festivals, trade shows and research, and then, in particular, animal breeding, were what generally tied up the majority of district funds.  

A few examples from the district budgets are enough to illustrate how the districts budgeted their projects and where they tended to focus their attention. In 1885, the district committee for the Palatinate budgeted its total income at 64,800 marks, which was in line with expenditures. Membership dues, which contributed heavily to the total income, totaled 18,800 marks. Another 12,475 marks came from other various revenue sources, such as the sale of cattle, manure, and almanacs, and another 9,500 marks came from investments and money carried over from the previous year. Totaled together, for 1885, the district committee from the Palatinate generated approximately 40,775 marks on its own, which was, in comparison to other budgets, extremely good. The remainder of this district committee’s income for 1885,

---

9 See HdbL GC 22, 111, 114-117, and 120, annual reports and budgets from the district committees of Upper Bavaria, Swabia, Lower Franconia, Middle Franconia, and the Palatinate, 1871-1895.
10 By comparison, in that same year, the district of Swabia budgeted about 20,510 marks of self-generated income, while various government sources provided another 45,000 marks. In Upper Bavaria, the district committee
budgeted at 23,890 marks, or roughly one third of its total income, was provided through various
government funds. Of these funds, the central government provided 13,571 marks: 8,571 marks
as part of the standing donation that each district received from the central government, and
another 5,000 marks specifically designated for cattle breeding. Of the remaining state
contributions, most came from the district government: 2,571 marks for the general
advancement of agriculture, 500 marks for a teacher for horseshoeing (*Hufbeschlaglehre*), 2,570
marks to the district’s agricultural research station, 2,000 marks to organizations that specialized
in animal breeding, and 1,900 marks in support of itinerant agricultural teachers
(*Wanderunterricht*). A smaller sum, totaling 778 marks, came from town and county
governments that had forwarded funds to the district committee in support of land consolidation
projects.\(^{11}\)

The 1890 budget for the Upper Bavarian district committee tells a similar story, but here,
as was more common, government funding made up one half of the district’s expected income.
With a budgeted income set at 58,000 marks, 26,500 marks came from memberships dues, the
district newsletter, and monies carried over from the previous year. The remainder, or roughly
one half of its income, came from the district and central governments in Munich. Of these
funds, the central state government provided 16,421 marks: 8,571 marks as the standard
donation, 6,000 marks for organizations that specialized in animal breeding, and 1,850 marks for
agricultural education. Another 19,000 marks came from the district government, with 2,000
marks being tied to horticulture, 10,000 marks for cattle breeding, 2,000 marks for education in
horseshoeing, 2,800 marks for forestry, 600 marks for a dairy school, 200 marks in support of
students’ stipends at the central agricultural school in Weihenstephan, and finally, 1,500 marks

---

budgeted 17,969 marks in self-generated income, and government sources provided an additional 36,171 marks.
See HdbL GC 111 and 114, budgets for the district committees of Upper Bavaria and Swabia, 1885.

\(^{11}\) HdbL GC 117, budget for the district committee of the Palatinate, 1885.
for general agricultural education.\textsuperscript{12} In sum, the proportion of government funds that contributed to the budgeted incomes in these two examples, that is, between one-third and one-half, was altogether typical for the Association’s district committees. Occasionally, there were exceptions to this rule, but more often than not, the district committees relied heavily on government funding to support their activities and the activities of the county committees. What is also all too apparent, is that agricultural education, especially for peasant farmers, simply fell through the cracks.\textsuperscript{13}

To be clear, the Bavarian government did spend other money on the agricultural sector that did not go through the Association. This was particularly true for horse-related projects, as horses still played a valuable military role, but also education, which was a responsibility that the Association not only shared with local governments, but technically belonged within the operating sphere of Johann von Lutz’ Interior Ministry for Church and Education. Looking at the expenses of the Interior Ministry, that is, the ministry to whom the Association answered, in 1890/91 it devoted 1,441,000 marks to agricultural ends, and of this, nearly 782,000 marks went directly to horse breeding, the stabling of horses, and the general welfare of horses. The Agricultural Association saw none of this money, and of the remaining 659,000 marks spent by the Interior Ministry on agriculture, roughly half went to the Association directly or was funneled through the Association in support of agricultural projects. Specifically, most of this remaining money was designated for the support of animal breeding or for land consolidation or

\textsuperscript{12} HdbL GC 111, budget for the district committee of Upper Bavaria, 1890.

\textsuperscript{13} This corresponds with what contemporaries already noticed about agricultural education in Bavaria, namely, that from 1870 to the 1890s, it was, despite efforts to reform it, below standard. See Hans Dörfler, \textit{Die bäuerliche Berufsbildung: ihre Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft in Bayern} (Munich: Carl Gerber, 1932), 158-159.
the state’s insurance program for hail, the last two being projects that the Association strongly supported.  

The government’s support of agricultural education that specifically focused on the needs of the peasantry tells a similar story of cooperation between the Association and the state. In this case though, not only was the funding in question even lower, but the state also expected that the Association chip in and cover much of the costs. As a rule, state contributions to peasant-level education programs that specialized in agriculture remained low during the period following unification, and it was imperative that local governments and the Association worked together to keep peasant agricultural schools open. For example, in 1885/86, there were 585 rural continuation schools (*landwirtschaftliche Fortbildungsschulen*) that operated throughout the state of Bavaria with a total of 11,000 students who usually attended classes only a few hours a week. The purpose of these schools was to supplement existing elementary education for peasant children with an agricultural-focused curriculum. Altogether, they only cost about 150,288 marks, with local governments covering a little less than half of the costs, while the Association’s district committees covered the rest. The Ministry for Church and Education, ostensibly responsible for education in Bavaria, paid almost nothing. The same can be said for the so-called winter schools, that is, trade schools which were geared toward educating the sons

---

14 Ministerium des Innern, *Die Maßnahmen auf dem Gebiete der landwirtschaftlichen Verwaltung in Bayern, 1890-1897* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1897), 349. Also see Heinrich von Haag, ed., *Die Landwirtschaft in Bayern: Denkschrift, nach amtlichen Quellen bearbeitet* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1890), 672. To add some perspective as to what the Bavarian government spent on agriculture, in 1890/91, the Interior Ministry budgeted 21,384,690 marks to cover its expenses, which, when compared to the other ministries, was second only to the Interior Ministry for Church and Education, which budgeted 22,896,600 marks. (The Bavarian military, which surely spent more, received its funding from the Reich government and was not included in the Bavarian government’s budget.) The Bavarian government’s net income in 1890 was budgeted for 274,677,000 marks. See *Budget des Koenigreiches Bayern für ein Jahr der XX. Finanzperiode 1890 und 1892* (Munich: Hof-Buchdruckerei von E. Mühlthaler, 1889).

15 In most years the Ministry for Church and Education paid nothing toward the rural continuation schools, but in other years, one finds that they did put forward special donations in support of the rural continuation schools. See the data provided in the *Budget des Koenigreiches Bayern für ein Jahr der XX. Finanzperiode 1890 und 1892*; and “Umschau.” Editorial, *Zeitschrift*, vol. LXXIV (1884), 300-309, here 303.
of small-farmers during the off-seasons. In 1885/86, there were only 12 of these schools in all of Bavaria, with 453 students attending all day. Their cost: 102,376 marks, and again, what local government funds did not cover was made up by the Association.16

Where more will be said about education in the following chapter, for the moment, it is enough to say that the budgets of the Association tell us much about the organization’s principle limitations while also shedding light on the Association’s priorities. First, because the Association wanted to represent all of the many different sub-sets of agricultural production, from animal breeding to horticulture to land improvement, much of the organization’s resources were spread far too thin. Therefore, it was often the case that no single project or area of development received enough funding over the long-term. This was especially true for peasant-oriented activities, such as education, which remained chronically underfunded until the mid-1890s. Also evident is that the Association relied very heavily on government funding in order to support its activities. Both of these circumstances — the uneven support of activities and the heavy reliance on government funding — suggest that the Association needed to develop other forms of income, and in some ways, as with the almanac, the Association’s attempts at doing exactly this yielded positive results. At the same time though, as the almanac clearly shows, developing independent sources of income often demanded further investments into those projects, and this too ultimately took away from the Association’s ability to more directly invest in agricultural development. Raising membership rates remained out of the question, given that higher rates could possibly drive away members. Therefore, barring any other paths to greater financial independence, the Association found itself forced to rely on government funds.

ii. The newsletters of the Agricultural Association

Besides its heavy reliance on government funding, what also proved to be something of a paradox for the Association was its forums of public discourse. Dating back to its very inception, one of the most important tasks that the Association undertook — if not its most important task — was the provision and maintenance of public spaces, provided and facilitated primarily through print material, but also through the many public events and committee and association meetings that the organization hosted. By providing public space for the exchange of ideas, the Association hoped to stimulate the development of agriculture. This had been one of its foundational priorities.\(^\text{17}\) However, beyond searching for data or new ideas that could improve agricultural production, the Association — and even the state — stood to discreetly gain from the Association’s direction of public discourse. Naturally, public debates and discussion provided an outlet for agriculturalists who wanted to air their thoughts and concerns, and here, both the government and the Association could easily listen in on the problems and issues faced by rural Bavarians. Moreover, because the Association had the means and capacity to reach out to a very wide audience, the Association’s public spaces revealed quite a bit about the state of agriculture, not just in parts of Bavaria, but across the entire state. Because of its long-standing relationship with the royal house, a well known history of passivity, and the significant presence of state bureaucrats within the organization, the Association (and its members) rarely had to worry about government censorship or even official concern about what happened at its meetings.\(^\text{18}\) Rather, the government trusted that the Association would censor itself, which it


generally did by striking out any criticisms of the state or the government, and avoiding discourse that smacked of politics. This of course undermined the overall effectiveness of the Association’s public forums. However, in the end, these all too common shortcomings were ones that the Association’s leadership willingly accepted because loyalty to the state was of a higher priority.

Beyond a certain limit on discussions of political import, the Association’s platforms for debate were otherwise relatively open: the editors of the central newsletter were not above printing complaints and criticisms of the Association itself, and sure enough, it was not unusual for the Association to sometimes come under fire from its own members. In sum, members of the Association could speak their mind about agriculture and the Association without having to worry too much about falling afoul of the government, that is, as long as they remembered to walk carefully. Specifically, the section that follows will look at two examples of the Association’s forums for public discourse. The first is the Association’s central newsletter, which was circulated throughout the entire period, and in earlier times, had shown a clear potential for initiating agricultural change. The other forum of public discourse that will be discussed is the Assembly of Bavarian Farmers, a separate organization originally founded by members of the Association for the sole purpose of facilitating dialogue and challenging the status quo. Where the Assembly technically remained a separate organization throughout its existence, gradually, the Association reabsorbed this sub-organization started by renegade members, and thus turned its sole activity, that is, its annual meetings, into yet another one of the

vol. 18, no. 3/4 (Sep.-Dec., 1985): 344-359; and Robin Lenman, “Censorship and Society in Munich, 1890-1914” (PhD diss., Oxford University, 1975). While the Association hardly worried about censorship, by way of contrast, the Bavarian government actively spied on the peasant associations during the unrest surrounding unification and confiscated newspapers and newsletters, such as Das Bayerische Vaterland, that smacked of populist activity. See BayHStA Mn 66316, police reports concerning the Deggendorf peasant association; and Paul Hoser, “Das Bayerische Vaterland,” Historisches Lexikon Bayerns, last modified February 28, 2011, http://www.historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de/artikel/artikel_44688.
Association’s forums for public discourse. These two platforms of debate, the central newsletter and the Assembly meetings, showcase how the Association reserved within its capacities the ability to affect real change, while at the same time, also showing how it is that the Association’s relationship with the government limited its capacity for providing honest dialogue.

Of the several public spaces that the Association managed, by far the most prominent was its central newsletter, which by 1871, was known as the Zeitschrift des landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern (Newsletter of the Agricultural Association in Bavaria). Like the Association itself, the central newsletter had undergone more than a few permutations over the course of the century. Between 1820 and 1850, the newsletter appeared in several different forms, going from a weekly to a quarterly, then to a monthly and finally a bimonthly. However, during the reforms of the early 1850s, the General Committee decided to return the newsletter to its monthly form, and it was at this point that it adopted the name, Zeitschrift des landwirtschaftlichen Vereins, a name that it would carry for the next forty years. In the first years after taking its new form, members received a complementary subscription of the newsletter along with their membership. However, in 1866, after hiring Adam Müller, the first paid editor to manage the newsletter, the General Committee decided to institute a small fee for subscriptions to cover the added costs, setting annual subscriptions at the low price of 1 gulden a year for members, and the significantly higher rate of 3 gulden 45 kreuzer for non-members.¹⁹ In 1873, the subscription fee was changed to match Bavaria’s adoption of the Mark, and was then later changed to 3 marks, but otherwise stayed the same until 1895.²⁰ Following Adam Müller’s death in 1879, the editorship was briefly held by an interim editor, but thereafter, the only other person to hold the

position of editor during this period was Otto May, a former state bureaucrat and honorary professor of agriculture at the Technical University. As noted in the previous chapter, May held the position as general editor until his own retirement in 1909.\textsuperscript{21}

Considering the editorial continuity of the newsletter following unification, very little about the \textit{Zeitschrift}’s content changed between 1871 and 1895. Lovingly referred to as “the yellow rag” (\textit{das gelbe Heft}), the heading and layout of the newsletter was very reserved, with no color, no flourishes, and very few illustrations save the infrequent drawing of a farm animal or an agricultural device.\textsuperscript{22} Following occasional messages from the editor about subscription payments or other household matters, the opening pages of the newsletter were often devoted to government notices or reprints of official correspondence that touched on agricultural matters. This included announcements from the Interior Ministry concerning changes to certain laws or policies, or even notes from the monarch or the Interior Minister that thanked the Association for the detailed information provided in its annual reports. Similarly, the General Committee often used the opening pages of the newsletter to print messages concerning organizational matters or announcements for upcoming events. Thereafter, the bulk of the newsletter was devoted to articles of varying content, but usually high in quality, written by leading members of the Association, faculty members from one of Bavaria’s universities, or guest writers from outside of Bavaria.

The content of the articles covered many themes, from social issues to scientific experiments, to evaluations of certain agricultural machines, the tone sometimes journalistic, but more typically academic. There were sometimes articles that covered particular social and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Hundhammer, \textit{Die landwirtschaftliche Berufsvertretung in Bayern}, 16-17; and Bayerischer Landwirtschaftsrat, eds., \textit{Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern} (Munich: Manz, 1910), 16, 18-20. In 1895, the format and name of newsletter changed again, but May remained the editor.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
economic developments inside and outside of Germany, and there were even occasionally articles that touched on domestic political developments, such as the need for a body to represent agricultural interests at the national level of German government, or the need for greater government involvement in making credit accessible for farmers. Beyond this however, articles that reported on or took sides in current political battles outside of agriculture were conspicuously absent. Even though the newsletter sometimes published articles that criticized the Association, almost nothing ever printed in the newsletter could be mistaken as politically inflammatory, offensive, or overly critical of the regime in Munich.

Following on the body of articles was a final, almanac-like section that included news, data, and commentary. Most of the material in this section was also innocuous enough, and usually included summary overviews of the General Committee’s meetings, news from the districts that focused on weather, agricultural prices, yields, and other occasional announcements, and finished with the latest trade and transportation costs, reports from the dairy and cattle sectors, and a review of agricultural literature.

Outside of the occasional article that touched on current events, the only other part of the newsletter that consistently dealt with agrarian politics was the editorial article that usually appeared directly before the almanac portion at the end of the paper. Titled “Umschau,” or ‘survey,’ the editorials were the brainchild of Adam Müller. However, like the body of articles, Müller’s editorials were usually rather harmless, providing a running commentary on what was going on in the world of Bavarian agriculture, and even dabbling in commentary on agricultural-

---


24 For criticism of the Association, see “Der landwirtschaftliche Verein in Bayern und die ‘Büreaukratie.’” *Zeitschrift*, vol. LXXII (1882), 77-82.
related policies. More than simply reporting on the monthly status of agriculture, the editorial articles also provided a fairly accurate gauge of the General Committee and where it stood on a range of topics, including potentially politically-sensitive issues such as tax reforms, the need for easier credit, or higher tariffs. Both Müller and later May touched on all of these topics, and Müller in particular, frequently interjected his own opinion into the editorials. This was especially so during the period immediately following unification, when the realm of political possibilities seemed endless.

“May this new phase of our political development be defined as a citizenship of peace and peaceful advancement!” proclaimed Müller excitedly in February of 1871, and it was in this tone exactly that he used his editorials as an occasional, yet suggestive soapbox for reform. Among all of the issues that Müller harped on, his desire to see the Bavarian state overhaul its tax system, to shift from its reliance on property taxes and more toward incomes taxes was, for obvious reasons, probably the most politically sensitive topic that appeared in the pages of his editorials, and indeed, in the entire newsletter. “With the exception of indirect taxes, reducing all taxes into an income tax would be the ideal approach,” wrote Müller in 1874, “and it would be in line with the principles of even the most abrasive financiers: to tax where there is something to

25 Adam Müller, 61. In Müller’s own words, the editorials were meant to “quickly summarize current agricultural and rural economic topics in order to help readers.” A randomly chosen editorial written by Otto May, Müller’s successor, and published in April of 1883, covers reports and effects of winter weather conditions, the need for raising national tariff rates on grains, provides an extended report on the advantages of raising sugar beets, gives a run down on market prices for wood and cows, and finishes up by reporting on local outbreaks of various animal diseases. Another “Umschau”, written by Adam Müller in January of 1879, hardly differs, with familiar themes rounding out the article: a discussion of Chancellor Bismarck and his changing stance on tariffs, announcements for a dairy exhibition in Berlin and a district animal show in Swabia, and an announcement concerning the death of the director of the royal agricultural school at Weihenstephan. See “Umschau.” Editorial, Zeitschrift, vol. LXXIII (1883), 354-363; and idem, vol. LXIX (1879), 21-24.

take! He who has much income, could easily pay more, and he who possessed a meager income, would likewise pay less.”27

Such words definitely bordered on the limits of what the Association might publish in one of its newsletters, but given his position at the head of the newsletter and within the General Committee, Müller obviously enjoyed more leeway than most in printing potentially cheeky editorials. Interestingly though, the issue of tax reforms reveals how the newsletter reacted to the mere possibility of government remonstration. By the early 1880s, the topic of tax reforms had turned taboo within the Association, given that a few of its more outspoken supporters, especially Karl von Thüngen, had attracted too much negative attention to the organization by speaking out over the issue of tax reforms (discussed below).28 Wanting to further avoid the ire of the government, it is no accident that most any mention of tax reforms gradually and inauspiciously slid from the pages of the Zeitschrift by the mid-1880s.

But then, even before Thüngen’s rash behavior had scandalized the topic of tax reforms, declining economic conditions within the agricultural sector had noticeably taken the wind out of

28 Uwe Schnee, “Die Wanderversammlungen bayerischer Landwirte, 1857-1914.” Bayerisches landwirtschaftliches Jahrbuch, vol. 52 (1975): 835-896, here 874-875. Hans Karl von Thüngen (1851-1926†), like his uncle Wilhelm von Thüngen, was something of a constant thorn in the side of the General Committee. The younger Thüngen remained an active and leading member of the Association throughout his life, but because of his own conservativ populist political leanings, often found himself in opposition to the majority of the Association’s leadership. Thüngen, again, like his uncle, was later a representative in the upper house of parliament (1905-1918), and besides being heavily involved in other reformist activities (i.e. tax reforms), he was a founding member of the Franconian Peasant Association and the German Agricultural Society, and was also the first president of the Bavarian Peasants’ League. Details concerning his agitations are numerous and can be found in BayHStA 38982-4, 38987, 38989, 66136. Also see Anton Hochberger, Der Bayerische Bauernbund (Munich: Beck, 1991), 59-60; Ian Farr, “Peasant Protest in the Empire — The Bavarian Example,” in Peasants and Lords in Modern Germany: Recent Studies in Agricultural History, ed. Robert Moeller (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 110-139, here 116 and 122; Alois Schlägl, ed., Bayerische Agrargeschichte: die Entwicklung der Land- und Forstwirtschaft seit Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts (Munich: Bayerischer Landwirtschaftsverlag, 1954), 879-881; and the biographical data in Dirk Götschmann and Michael Henker, eds., Geschichte des Bayerischen Parlaments, 1819-2003, CD-ROM (Augsburg: Haus der Bayerischen Geschichte, 2005).
Müller’s sails, and his outlook on Bavarian and German politics turned equally somber. “The creation of a new and mighty German empire has not caused the people’s will and initiative to fail,” he wrote in July of 1873. “Rather, people have thrown their initiative away on commerce and industry; because of this, not only does agriculture feel left behind, it feels hindered, because it is not capable of keeping up with thriving factories and industrial enterprises.” With Müller, one notices that the novelty and excitement surrounding unification gradually tapered off as the hard reality of democracy’s limits within the Reich became more apparent. It is possible that he was also aware of the Association’s waning light within the spheres of government power. Over the next six years, under a noticeable cloud of pessimism, his political prognostications gradually receded from the editorials. With Müller’s death in 1879, the editorials took on an even more colorless tone under the editorship of Otto May, to the point that they read more like status reports on agriculture. Discussions of politics or the government were usually sacrificed to more academic and purely agricultural extrapolations, or simple reports on the important goings-on of the agricultural world.

Even though Müller had at least dared to write about potentially sensitive topics, what is particularly noticeable about the editorials is that both he and May generally avoided pegging any of the problems faced by the agricultural community on the government, and certainly not on the Bavarian state government. Given the state’s proclivity for shutting down or censoring newspapers who spoke out too boldly against the government, one sees why the editors preferred to remain careful. Indeed, whenever the possibility of criticizing the government arose, both

Müller and May generally placed the blame on easy targets such as industrialization or capital, or wisely avoided talking about the government at all. That being said, the editors clearly believed at times that the German economy was out of balance, that, for example, the manufacturing sector was not being taxed enough, or that tariffs on agricultural products were too low. However, because the Association refused to mobilize Bavaria’s agricultural interest groups in the name of political change, the editors felt obliged to fall in line with this the Association’s most important unwritten rule. Under these circumstances, the only solutions that the editors therefore advised was that the Association continue to press the government through official channels (despite diminishing returns); that the Association continue to support agriculture with the few resources that it had; that members vote for representatives who supported agriculture; and that thrifty farmers self-organize in order to pool their knowledge and resources to better adapt to an economy that was admittedly transforming. This last recommendation, the Association’s final word on the poor status of peasant agriculture, was essentially the same as the government’s approach toward the peasantry and agriculture, that is, self-help.

One of the direct consequences of the central newsletter’s aloofness was that the individual district committees, reacting to complaints that the central newsletter was too ‘academic’, began to publish their own newsletters that were meant to appeal to average members. As early as 1866, district newsletters began to pop up across Bavaria, usually on a weekly basis, and going under such names as Landwirtschaftlichen Mitteilungen, Landwirtschaftliche Blätter, and Bauernfreund. Like the central newsletter, the district papers included space in the front portion for practical information, notices and announcements, while

30 See “Umschau.” Editorial, Zeitschrift, vol. LXIV (1874), 34-42, for Müller’s opinion on industrialization; or idem, vol. LXXIV (1884), 300-309, for May’s take on tariffs; or idem, vol. LXXXIV (1894), 86-98, for May discussing capitalism, debt, rents, and more.
31 Ibid., vol. LXIII (1873), 229-234 and 421-427; idem, vol. LXIV (1874), 34-42; and idem, vol. LXII (1882), 49-59.
data, almanac-like information, and advertisements were reserved for the final pages. Otherwise, these district newsletters were altogether much shorter in content than the central newsletter, usually around four to five pages, and of noticeably lower quality. Again, similar to the central newsletter, the focus of the articles within the district newsletters was still almost purely agricultural, except in this case, they were written more simply and often within a local context. Despite the many complaints directed toward the content of the central newsletter, there was absolutely nothing in the district newsletters that could be perceived as political either.\(^\text{32}\) In a similar fashion, the Association’s widely distributed almanac, the *Bayerischer Haus- und Landwirtschaftskalender*, which nonetheless continued to enjoy popular success, avoided political discussions entirely.\(^\text{33}\)

Interestingly, the apolitical stance of the Association’s newsletters did not reflect accurately on the growing political activism of the Bavarian peasantry, and because the Association refused to engage with political topics, the peasants obviously went elsewhere for their news. Indeed, there were other newspapers in Bavaria during this time that appealed to peasant audiences *and* included among their content political observations and even political commentary. Furthermore, many of these papers were produced and distributed by the Association’s competition. For example, between 1871 and 1879, the populist Deggendorf Peasant Association published a newspaper, *Die Bauern-Zeitung*, that was equally populist in

\(^{32}\) HdbL GC 150, publications of district newsletters from Upper Franconia and Upper Palatinate; and Hundhammer, *Die landwirtschaftliche Berufsvertretung*, 17. Collections of the district newsletters can be found in the Haus der Bayerischen Landwirtschaft and the Staatsbibliothek in Munich. The district newsletters were: *Landwirtschaftlichen Mitteilungen* (appeared separately in Upper Bavaria and Middle Franconia), *Wochenschrift für Landwirtschaft, Industrie und Handel* (Lower Bavaria), *Landwirtschaftliche Blätter* (appeared separately in the Palatinate and Swabia), *Der Bauernfreund* (Upper Palatinate), *Das landwirtschaftliche Vereinsblatt* (Upper Franconia), and *Der fränkische Landwirt* (Lower Franconia).

\(^{33}\) Regarding the almanac and its content, see chapter two; and also Bayerischen Landwirtschaftsrat, *Adam Müller*, 61. In reference to its popularity, according to Müller, 46,000 copies of the almanac were published and sold in 1877. By 1905, that number had doubled, with 90,000 being sold. See Bayerischer Landwirtschaftsrat, eds., *Der landwirtschaftliche Verein in Bayern: Sein Werden und Wirken* (Munich: Possenbacher, 1905), 26.
tone, clearly targeted peasant readers, and fully embraced political discourse. Editorials that referred to the Berlin government as “the Prussian dictatorship,” or were redacted by censors for advocating self-government and Bavarian independence may have lain on the more extreme end of what this newsletter published, but they show that other organizations outside of the Association were willing to fill a perceived vacuum.\(^\text{34}\) The same can be said for *Das Bayerische Vaterland*, another populist, and in this case, virulently anti-Semitic rag that began publishing in Munich at about the same time as the *Bauern-Zeitung*. Where the Deggendorfer *Bauern-Zeitung* was clearly intended for peasants, the *Bayerische Vaterland* was meant for a much wider, more generically Catholic, anti-liberal audience. However, considering that the *Vaterland* was originally founded as a mouthpiece for the Patriot Party, and then later became the official newspaper of the Bavarian Peasant League, it is safe to imagine that peasants read this paper.\(^\text{35}\) And like the *Bauern-Zeitung*, the *Vaterland*, which had a readership that numbered as many as 8,000 well into the 1890s, consistently and openly discussed political topics. Indeed, The *Vaterland* was so polemical that the government felt compelled to confiscate its dailies on more than one occasion.\(^\text{36}\) Another more peasant-oriented paper, the *Niederbayerische Anzeiger*, founded in 1887 and with 2,000 subscriptions, was equally radical and populist, being described by the Lower Bavarian president as simply a “smear sheet of the lowest kind.”\(^\text{37}\)

---

\(^\text{34}\) *Die Bauern-Zeitung*, June 26 and July 3, 1872 (nos. 26 and 27); and BayHStA MI 66316, “Mündliche Kundgebungen des Hochwürdigsten Herrn Bischofes Heinrich von Passau…” (April, 1873). Also see Gilbert Southern, “The Bavarian Kulturkampf: A Chapter in Government, Church, and Society in the Early Bismarckreich” (PhD diss., University of Massachusetts, 1977), 141. A complete collection of *Die Bauern-Zeitung* can be found in the Staatsbibliothek in Munich.

\(^\text{35}\) On literacy rates in rural Bavaria, see below, pages 176-177.

\(^\text{36}\) Hoser, “*Das Bayerische Vaterland.*” According to Hoser, the government confiscated about a third of the *Vaterland*’s published editions in 1870. A complete collection of *Das Bayerische Vaterland* can be found in the Staatsbibliothek in Munich.

Of course, not all peasant-oriented newspapers originating in Bavaria agitated as much as these did, but clearly there was a demand coming from peasant communities for more coverage of political developments that affected them. This was not, however, a niche that the Association was going to waste time or money trying to fill. In its silence on matters of relative political import, the Zeitschrift showed where the Association stood in regard to the political status of the peasantry, and because it chose to remain, as one earlier critic had put it, “a paper of which nine-tenths was devoted to raw insignificance,” it found little popularity beyond academics and the upper echelons of the Association.\(^{38}\) As a result, subscriptions to the newsletter continued to drastically fall after unification, and in spite of the fact that membership numbers grew at a healthy pace. Even before unification, in the late 1860s, when the Association’s had reached 23,000 members, the newsletter had had only 4,000 subscriptions.\(^{39}\) After unification, the newsletter never generated more than about a thousand subscriptions a year.\(^{40}\) As indicated in the previous chapter, there had been times in the past when the newsletter had provided more than white noise, and indeed, the newsletter still had the potential of being a more open forum of public debate, as it had been during the 1820s and 30s. However, due to the Association’s relationship with the government, the newsletter rarely dared to cover topics of significant political import. Instead, the editors safely remained with content that was usually academic or purely agricultural in nature. When the newsletter did dare to question or criticize the conditions

\(^{38}\) HdbL GC 5, compilation of criticisms of the Association, 1862.


\(^{40}\) Even though actual subscription numbers for the newsletter during the period after 1871 are conspicuously absent from the Association’s records, the General Committee’s budgets, which include the total income produced by the newsletter, provide a fairly accurate gauge of the newsletter’s total number of subscriptions. In 1890, the newsletter took in 3000 marks, with annual subscriptions set at 3 marks. This means that the newsletter usually had little more than 1000 subscriptions, and these numbers hardly differed from the 1870s. See HdbL GC 100, budgets from the General Committee. Otto May himself later admitted that the newsletter was not very successful, and in 1895, it would be completely reorganized in yet another attempt to revitalize the newsletter. See “Umshau.” Editorial, Zeitschrift, LXXX (1890), 875-885; and Otto May, “Das Wochenblatt des landwirthschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern.” Wochenblatt des landwirthschaftlihen Vereins in Bayern, vol. 86 (1896), 1-3.
of Bavaria’s agricultural sector, as Adam Müller occasionally did in his editorials, even then, the newsletter blithely tiptoed around the government and refused to point any fingers at it for its failure to alleviate said conditions. In the end, the Zeitschrift may have been one of the oldest and most respected agricultural newsletters in Germany, but the Association’s premier forum for public discourse did little to open the government’s unwilling eyes to the difficulties faced by the peasantry.

iii. The Assembly of Bavarian Farmers

Dating back to the 1850s, a chorus of voices from within the Association, the government, and even from the monarch, questioned if the Association’s central newsletter was the best method and platform for voicing concerns about agriculture. Of course, at this point, no one necessarily questioned the government’s overbearing presence within the Association and how this affected the newsletter. Rather, the primary source of concern was the academic tone of the newsletter, the fact that it only appeared on a monthly basis, and also the growing presence and challenge of local Association newsletters that were undoubtedly better attuned to local conditions.41 Ultimately, as noted above, none of these concerns ever really led to significant changes to the central newsletter. However, where the central newsletter remained more or less unaffected by concerns for reform, there were those from within the Association who channeled their desire for reform in a completely different direction. What the Association truly lacked, so thought this group, was a unifying event where members from across the state could join together to publicly debate agricultural issues and raise concerns before the leadership of the Association. As forebears to such an assembly, several similar organizations in other parts of

41 BayHStA ML 128, correspondence between Maximilian II and Interior Minister von der Pfordten, 1855; Harrecker, Landwirtschaftliche Verein, 261-262.
Germany and Austria had shown that agricultural assemblies could have a positive influence on the development of agriculture.\footnote{Schnee, “Die Wanderversammlungen bayerischer Landwirte,” 839. This section on the Annual Assembly of Bavarian Farmers owes much to Uwe Schnee, whose article on the Assembly pointed toward valuable primary resources, namely, the Berichte über die Wanderversammlung bayerischer Landwirte, and also provided an excellent summary of the assemblies’ history, their debates, and activities.} Most of these assemblies, however, were restricted to elites or otherwise very small groups of people. With the Association, on the other hand, whose membership steadily grew after the mid-nineteenth century, there was potential for an annual assembly to open up the gates of opportunity to more average farmers from across Bavaria, perhaps even peasant farmers, to publicly voice their opinions and concerns.

With the quality and availability of transportation always improving, by the 1850s, it was certainly not beyond the realm of possibility that the Association might host such an assembly, and in 1855, senior members of the Association put together a plan to do just that. Led primarily by Hermann von Gaisberg, an aristocrat and member of the Swabian district committee, a small group of interested members put a proposal forth at the Association’s general assembly (an already existing assembly that was restricted to members of the district and general committees), that an annual assembly for all members could be hosted on a rotating basis by each of the districts.\footnote{Hermann Wilhelm von Gaisberg zu Neudegg (1824-1905†) hailed from a prominent Swabian aristocratic family that also owned significant properties in Württemberg. In 1882, Gaisberg joined the upper house of the Bavarian parliament, where he sat until his death. Despite his falling out over the annual assemblies, he remained a prominent and steadfast member of the Association. See his biographical data provided in Göttschmann and Henker, Geschichte des Bayerschen Parlaments.} To Gaisberg’s disappointment, most of the leadership of the Association received his proposal with little enthusiasm, looking at it as an attempt to undermine the existing leadership of the Association. In the detractors’ defense, the administrative work associated with such an assembly was knowingly significant, and the General Committee for one, was very leery of adding further work to the Association’s existing bureaucratic burdens. Quite tellingly, others also feared that exposing the predominantly aristocratic and bureaucratic leadership of the
Association to the criticisms of average farmers would only serve to undermine existing relationships within an organization that wished to bring so many different classes of agriculturalists together in the first place. None of these fears were necessarily unfounded, especially in the sensitive political atmosphere in the first decade after the 1848 revolutions. Either way, for all involved, it was obvious that Gaisberg’s proposal could conceivably challenge the influence of the government within the organization.44

What exactly unfolded behind the closed doors of the general assembly remains unclear, but in the end, the Association did not support Gaisberg’s motion. From a logical point of view, Niethammer and Ludwig von Lerchenfeld, the once and future presidents of the Association, argued that the county and district festivals already served the purposes of an assembly, and that an additional assembly would simply be superfluous.45 Interestingly though, one year later, the General Committee did grant Gaisberg permission to independently organize an assembly for the Association’s members, with the understanding that the Association would continue to withhold its official support. Alongside their tenuous blessings, the General Committee also promised to include reports of the assembly in its newsletter, so that those members who did not attend could at least read about it. This end of the bargain was not kept up. Indeed, until the 1870s, and as further proof of the bad blood between the Assembly and the General Committee, the newsletter reported almost nothing on the meetings of the annual assembly.

Ignoring the assemblies did not keep them from going away though. To the contrary, the assemblies quickly proved to be very popular, with the first assembly held in the Swabian town of Donauwörth, about 45 kilometers north of Augsburg, having over three hundred participants.

By comparison, a similar assembly, known as the “Assembly of German Farmers and Foresters” (Versammlung deutscher Land- und Forstwirte), which garnered a national audience and had been meeting since 1837, held its assembly in the city of Coburg on the northern border of Bavaria in the following year, but it only attracted about twice the numbers. Subsequent gatherings of the “The Assembly of Bavarian Farmers,” as the assemblies were officially known, proved that the new organization had staying power, as its assemblies were held in different districts and different towns ever year, but consistently attracted between three and five hundred participants, sometimes more.\textsuperscript{46}

With time, the relative popularity of the annual assemblies, and also the regular attendance of Prince Ludwig, forced the General Committee to reconsider the Association’s relationship with the assemblies.\textsuperscript{47} Ostensibly, the annual assembly was an organization unto itself with its own governing body that met once a year during the course of two to three days while the assembly was convened. However, after 1873, with the support of the district committees, the annual assemblies began to convene in conjunction with the respective district animal shows, the central newsletter gradually began to actually report on the assemblies, and even before unification, a special line was included in the bylaws that “strongly recommended” the assemblies.\textsuperscript{48} After 1880, the relationship between the assembly and the Association had improved to such a degree, that the district committees gradually took over the administration of the assemblies, and the government even went so far as to provide return trips by train free of

\textsuperscript{46} HdbL GC 249, papers concerning the establishment of the first assembly; Schnee, “Die Wanderversammlungen bayerischer Landwirte,” 840-841, 868; “Bericht über die erste landwirtschaftliche Wanderversammlung in Bayern.” in Zeitschrift, vol. XLVIII (1858), 171-183, here 172; Martin Haushofer, “Die Versammlung deutscher Land- und Forstwirte (VLF), 1837-1872” (PhD diss., Universität Hohenheim, 1969), appendix no. 5; and Schlögl, Bayerische Agrargeschichte, 561.

\textsuperscript{47} Schnee, “Die Wanderversammlungen bayerischer Landwirte,” 842.

\textsuperscript{48} HdbL GC 12, “Satzungen des landwirtschaftlichen Vereines in Bayern” (1862), § 34.
charge for participants. Of course, Gaisberg, the original initiator of the assemblies, at first resisted the Association’s gradual takeover of an organization that he and a small group of others had so carefully built up. But then, after an exchange of words with an anonymous civil servant and no small amount of openly published criticisms by Gaisberg that were directed toward the Association and — astonishingly! — the government, he too was forced into acquiescence.

Despite being gradually absorbed by the Association, the annual assemblies retained a formal independence from the association throughout their existence. With that, the assemblies also kept the same organizational structure as instituted by the assemblies’ founders. At the top of the assembly sat a president who was elected by the other members who were themselves members by virtue of purchasing a ticket to the assembly, a cost which was set at the high price of three marks. Alongside the president, who was essentially regarded as “primus inter pares,” were various committees, each tasked with different aspects related to putting on the assembly, such as a committee for decorations and a committee for the press. All of the presidents and most all of the committee members stemmed from Bavaria’s aristocracy or were otherwise agricultural elites, people such as Dr. Heinrich von Ranke, a large landowner who was vice-president of the Association for many years, a professor of anthropology and medicine in Munich, and president of the assembly in 1884; or Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, a former minister-president of Bavaria and eventual chancellor of Germany, who hosted in 1882.

51 Heinrich von Ranke (1830-1909†), later raised to knighthood by Luitpold, was a practicing pediatrician who dabbled in anthropology and farming. He wrote several books on all of these subjects but earned his living primarily as a doctor, becoming the first director of the Dr. von Haunersches Kinderspital in 1886, a children’s hospital in Munich that was part of the university. Interestingly, through his service as a young medical intern in London, he had found his way into service as a civilian doctor with the British army in the Crimean War, an experience which he also wrote about. His daughter, Amalie (1857-1951†), was married to Albert Perceval-
Similarly, most of the members of the annual assembly belonged to the who’s who of prominent Bavarian elites, and were themselves often joined by representatives from other prominent agricultural assemblies, prominent members of the Association, and prominent officials from the government. Of the other participants, usually only about half were actually engaged in agriculture, and of these, very few belonged to the peasants classes. Where there were usually peasants in attendance, most of them came from the local vicinity of wherever the assembly happened to be meeting, meaning that very few likely attended regularly from year to year.52

Judging by who attended the assemblies, it would seem that they did not succeed in raising the voice and profile of peasant members within the Association, and neither did they really circumvent or challenge the Association’s position as premier representative of agricultural interests to the government as Gaisberg had hoped. Like most things that were associated with the Association, from the outset, the assemblies assumed an air of tremendous privilege, and ultimately, this largely defeated the purpose of the assemblies. This did not mean that the assemblies accomplished nothing, or that they did not accomplish anything that broadly affected agricultural production throughout Bavaria. Typically meeting every year toward the end of May or in the beginning of June, the high point of every assembly — which shared the

Graves (1846-1931†), was the mother of the British writer and war poet, Robert Graves (1895-1985†). Other famous family members included the noted historian, Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886†), who was Heinrich’s uncle, and his father, Friedrich Heinrich Ranke, a protestant theologian. See “Ranke” in Neue Deutsche Biographie, vol. 21 (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 2003), 143-144. Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst (1819-1901†) led a long and prominent political career, both in Bavaria and with the Reich government. Though it is unknown whether he ever joined the Association, he did own significant properties in Bavaria and would have been befriended with many of its more prominent members. Besides serving as a member of the upper house of the Bavarian parliament, he sat in the lower house of the Reichstag from 1871 to 1881, served as minister-president of Bavaria during the period of unification, and was called to the Reich chancellorship in 1894 where he served until 1900.

BayHStA ML 183, reports on the assemblies; HdbL GC 250 and 251, reports of the annual assemblies, lists of names, and other documents pertaining to them, 1871-1896; HdbL KC Schw. 1.429, reports on the assemblies and lists of attendees; and Schnee, “Die Wanderversammlungen bayerischer Landwirte,” 841-843 and 890-891. As Schnee points out, even as late as 1914, when the last assembly was held in Erlangen, less than ten percent of the participants identified themselves as “Oekonomieräte”, which was a very generic term used to identify farmers, and which could have included peasants. Apparently, the first time a participant at the assembly actually identified himself as a peasant was in 1909.
bill with animal and agricultural exhibitions, tours of local agricultural businesses, local cuisine and other sightseeing opportunities — was the agricultural roundtable (*Fachberatung*), which included reports, lectures, and relevant discussion about issues faced by Bavarian farmers, and usually extended on into two afternoon sessions in order to cover all of the discussion topics. The topics ranged anywhere from the mundane to the very relevant, sometimes focusing on more academic or economic aspects of agriculture, but also covering topics that inevitably hedged into the political realm. Occasionally, the discussions and debates even grew heated, as some of Bavaria’s most prominent agriculturalists clashed over the best direction for the Association or Bavarian agriculture. More than once, it was from this platform that the leadership of the Association, emboldened by debate, instituted reforms of its own organization, or sallied forth to make its case with the government under the banner of reform and progress.

It took some time however for the assemblies to get to a point where they could actually assert formal influence over the Association or the government. Not helping matters, in the first sixteen years of their existence, the assemblies did not even have a formal mechanism for members to check on the progress of issues that had been debated in previous years. With some exceptions, this therefore meant that before unification, the assemblies’ impact on agricultural development was largely informal, and weighed almost entirely on the ability of its more influential members to perhaps see proposals into effect. This was equally true of the assemblies’ ability to reform the Association, which, before unification at least, met with cool disapproval from the Association. Indeed, before 1860, the assemblies had generally avoided talking about the Association at all for fear of upsetting the General Committee or even the
government. Tellingly, at the very first assembly, the topic of reforming the Association was scheduled for debate, but it was scratched from the program.\footnote{Schnee, “Die Wanderversammlungen bayerischer Landwirte,” 868.}

In 1860, the assembly finally dared to entertain questions pertaining to the reform of the Association, primarily as a result of Wilhelm von Thüngen and a farmer by the name of Andreas Matty who publicly organized a separate gathering in Schweinfurt to discuss this very topic in preparation for the assembly. Because Thüngen had properly registered the gathering with the government, an official observer later reported the entire event back to the ministries. In any event, Thüngen’s gathering concluded that it wanted to see the Association provide more financial and decision-making independence to the county committees, and they elected three people who would see to pushing these concerns at the assembly. A few months later, the issue was promptly debated at the assembly in Bayreuth, and surprisingly, it was well received.

Moreover, the government, responding to their informant’s observations, did not reprimand the assembly or the gathering that had been led by Thüngen and Matty. Instead, it approached the General Committee and pressed them to seriously consider the reforms in question. The Assembly, it seemed, had scored a small victory: within two years, the General Committee changed the Association’s bylaws to give more authority to the county committees, but at the cost that the General Committee, having been brazenly challenged and embarrassed, virtually ignored the existence of the assemblies for the next decade.\footnote{This episode is relayed in Harrcker, Landwirtschaftliche Verein, 263-265; and Schnee, “Die Wanderversammlungen bayerischer Landwirte,” 868. Also see BayHStA ML 131, for the report to the government on the Schweinfurt meeting and correspondence from the Trade and Commerce Ministry regarding the Association’s bylaws.}

After unification, the Association saw another attempt by the assembly, this time a more direct attempt, to once again challenge its bylaws. In March of 1873, Friedrich Pabst, a liberal-leaning, large landowner from Middle Franconia and a ‘special’ member to the General
Committee, introduced a motion at a meeting of the General Committee to first get rid of the statutes that differentiated ‘special’ members from ordinary members, and then also amend the statutes that regulated the election of committee members.\textsuperscript{55} In sum, Pabst intended to further democratize the committees that led the Association and open them up to greater influence from average farmers. Naturally, the motion was absolutely denied after a fierce debate between Pabst, Gaisberg, and the more radical Karl von Thüngen on the one side, and the Association’s most powerful men — Prince Ludwig, Wolfanger, Jodlbauer, Niethammer, Lerchenfeld-Köfering — all in resolute opposition.\textsuperscript{56} Not to be completely deterred, this same group of reformers, again under the leadership of Pabst, introduced a similar motion at the assembly held in Middle Franconia (in the town of Weißenburg) two months later, that asked whether or not the bylaws of the Association needed to be reformed at all. This time, and in spite of opposition put forth by the same men as before, Pabst and his group found the majority they were looking for. The motion was approved to see the Association reorganize the committees under more democratic principles.\textsuperscript{57} Of course, in this case, Pabst outflanking the General Committee counted more as a moral victory, given that the Assembly could not, without the help of the government, force the General Committee to lift a finger much less change its bylaws.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{55} Friedrich Pabst (1827-1898†) managed a large farm near Rothenburg ob der Tauber that went under the name Gut Burgstall. He was also an active member of the National Liberal Party and sat in the Reichstag from 1874 to 1881. See Bernd Hausfelder, \textit{Die liberalen Abgeordneten des deutschen Reichstags 1871-1914: Ein biographisches Handbuch} (Münster: Aschendorff, 2004).

\textsuperscript{56} “Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung des General-Comités des landwirthschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern,” in \textit{Zeitschrift}, vol. LXIII (1873), S1-39.

\textsuperscript{57} HdbL GC 250, report on the XV Wanderversammlung, 13 June 1873; and “Umschau.” Editorial, \textit{Zeitschrift}, vol. LXIII (1873), 229-234, here 230-231.

\textsuperscript{58} In reaction to Pabst’ motions at the assembly, the General Committee eventually moved toward reforming the Association’s bylaws, but the reforms seem to have been mostly superficial. For example, ‘special’ members were not dropped from the structure of the committees, but the bylaws were amended to clearly state that the ‘special’ member did indeed have the same rights and privileges as the ordinary committee members. See the insert “Bericht der Sitzung des General Comité’s des landwirtschaftlichen Vereines in Bayern...” in \textit{Zeitschrift}, vol. LXVI (1876), where these changes are debated; HdbL GC 12, “Satzungen” (1884), § 15; and HdbL GC 13, correspondence between the General Committee and the other committees regarding changes to the bylaws, 1875-1877.
anything though, Pabst’ assault on the leadership structures of the Association was a sign of things to come.

It was after this little episode, and in contrast to the General Committee’s response to the Schweinfurt/Bayreuth incidents in 1860, that the Association began to pull itself closer to the assemblies. Where there is no documentation to substantiate whether or not the General Committee deliberately decided to do this, it is safe to imagine that the General Committee’s gradual embrace of the assemblies was done with the intent of better controlling a body that had now proven itself capable of undermining the Association and drawing negative attention to it. Indeed, between 1876 and 1881, the Association’s greatest fears about the Assembly came to pass, as Karl von Thüngen, emboldened by his earlier success, continued to use the assemblies as a platform for debating agro-political issues and specifically pushing for tax reforms that placed a progressive income tax at the center of the Bavarian government’s tax policy. As noted above, there were many within the Association, such as Adam Müller, who sided with Thüngen on some of these issues, especially tax reform. Nonetheless, the Association disapproved of Thüngen’s methods. At no point did the Association’s leadership formally agree to push the government on an income tax, and neither was it going to get embroiled in agricultural politics or allow the Association to be used for political ends.59

Being frustrated by the Association’s foot dragging, Thüngen decided to once again attempt a circumvention of the Association. In 1876, at the assembly in Schweinfurt, he began a public speech by rhetorically putting the question to debate, as to which agricultural organizations in Bavaria, if not the Association, were responsible for handling agro-political

---

59 See “Stenographische Bericht des Sitzung des Plenums des General-Comités des landwirthschaftlichen Vereines,” in Zeitschrift, vol. LXIV (1874), where the topic of tax reforms is discussed, and the General Committee specifically decides to not push the issue of an income tax. For a summary overview of the issues surrounding taxes in Bavaria during this period, see Hochberger, Der Bayerische Bauernbund, 24-30.
issues. Knowing full well that this question placed the Association in an awkward position, he continued with a wholesale assault on Bavaria’s financial and industrial sectors, stating that they had over the years manipulated existing tax laws, banking laws, tariffs, and railroad politics, all of which allowed them to grow fat off of the backs of farmers. Thüngen’s point: Bavaria’s leading agricultural bodies, but namely the Association, had not done enough to address these issues in the political sphere. For this reason, the agricultural sector needed a political party of some kind to represent its interests. This time it was the assembly’s turn to balk, and even Pabst found himself questioning Thüngen’s motives, claiming rightly, that Thüngen was using the Association and the assemblies as a platform for his own conservative-populist political machinations. Motives aside, the assembly was unmoved by Thüngen’s proposals, with the majority of participants unable to agree on whether or not the Association or the assemblies should even bother with issues of political import. In the end, the members concluded that the assembly should not, whatever the case, become the tool of a political party. Both the assemblies and the Association would, forthwith, remain neutral in regard to political parties.

Thüngen, it seemed, had lost the battle. The war, however, was far from over.

60 Schnee, “Die Wanderversammlungen bayerischer Landwirte,” 868-69; Farr, “Peasant Protest in the Empire,” 116, 126; and Karl Möckl, Die Prinzregentenzeit: Gesellschaft und Politik während der Ära des Prinzregenten Luitpold in Bayern (Munich and Vienna: R. Oldenbourg, 1972), 81. Thüngen, who generally attracted a fairly large audience whenever he spoke, was already well known across Bavaria for his rabblerousing political speeches, and his audiences had a tendency to attract a large number of reporters who found that Thüngen was good for business. As mentioned in a previous footnote, Thüngen was very active in a number of agricultural/peasant organizations, trying to establish, in the words of Farr, “a network of subordinate associations designed to promote farmers’ interests and to secure the election of more peasants and artisans to the legislature.” As Karl Möckl points out, he was also not above stoking the type of anti-Semitism that was just beginning to penetrate popular rural politics in Bavaria in the late 1870s and early 1880s. Thüngen, among others, would become known for facilitating a brand of politics whose leaders, to quote Farr again, “used their record of convictions for slander and defamation as proof of their anti-establishment credentials,” and this would have been very distasteful to liberals like Pabst and indeed most of the leadership of the Association. For more on this political environment in which Thüngen was active, besides Farr, also see Donald Schilling, “Politics in a New Key: The Late Nineteenth-Century Transformation of Politics in Northern Bavaria.” German Studies Review, vol. 17, no. 1 (Feb., 1994): 33-57; James Retallack, Notables of the Right: The Conservative Party and Political Mobilization in Germany, 1876-1918 (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988); and David Blackbourn, “Peasants and Politics in Germany, 1871-1914.” European History Quarterly, vol. 14 (1984): 47-75.

61 Bericht über die XVIII. Wanderversammlung bayerischer Landwirte... (Würzburg: Staudinger, 1876), 1-80.
Two years later, at another assembly in Bayreuth, Thüngen was once again on the offensive. This time however, he aimed his barbs, not at the Association or the assembly, but directly at the government. The issue was once again tax reforms. Just the year before, the always outspoken Pabst had led a debate that ended with the assembly concluding that an unfettered free market system was no longer to the advantage of agriculture in Germany. Agriculture, according to Pabst, could only become competitive again if existing taxes and tariffs were changed so as to protect agricultural production. Thüngen’s motion one year later was little different, but this time, the assembly stood behind his populist appeal for change, essentially calling for the government to institute a progressive income tax.62 Realistically, there was very little that the assembly could directly do when it came to challenging tariffs or the Reich government’s policies on free market economics. The best it could hope for, again, was to influence powerful individuals. At times, the personal approach actually worked. Even Bismarck, with whom Thüngen had corresponded, eventually softened to the idea of higher tariffs, and then raised them in 1879 because of the outspoken pleas of men like Thüngen.63 On the other hand, indirectly affecting government policies through the influence of powerful men sometimes only went so far, especially if the men in question refused to budge on given issues, as was the case with the Bavarian government and its tax policies.

Having found success with the Reich chancellor, Thüngen, whose politics and practices grew increasingly radical and anti-establishment by the late 1870s, refused to relinquish the debate regarding state taxes, and the annual assembly reliably remained one of his public venues.

---

62 HdbL GC 250, correspondence and a report on the XX. Wanderversammlung (1878) which was submitted to the Interior ministry and also a printed sheet of Thüngen’s resolutions; and Schnee, “Die Wanderversammlungen bayerischer Landwirte,” 874-875.
In 1880, at the assembly in Würzburg, he once again took the podium in the name of reform. As usual, Thüngen dominated the debate, and he did not refrain from criticizing the Bavarian government, whom he accused of privileging the industrial and financial sectors at the expense of agriculture. Because Thüngen was himself an aristocrat, the government was perhaps inclined to look the other way when it came to men like him who chose to tiptoe on the line of established propriety. Unwisely however, Thüngen also included in his speech, a personal attack on Emil von Riedel, the Bavarian Finance Minister, whom Thüngen accused of not doing enough for tax reforms. This, as it turned out, was too far. Even though the audience applauded Thüngen’s speech, Sigmund von Pfeufer, the Interior Minister, who was in attendance, walked out in vociferous protestation.

This was the death-knell for the issue of tax reforms. Even though the assembly responded to Thüngen’s motions by forming a committee which would bring his suggestions to the parliament, and the topic was set to be revisited at the next assembly, the damage had been done.64 In 1880, both houses of the parliament rejected any proposals for a tax on income, choosing instead to revise existing taxes on profits.65 With that, the push for an income tax within the Association stopped cold, and Thüngen, who had not ingratiated himself to the government, noticeably receded from the limelight. The following year, possibly under pressure from the Association, the topic of tax reforms was dropped from the schedule for debate at the assembly. Thüngen lamented that his efforts had been for nothing: “Tant de bruit pour une

---

64 Verhandlungen der XXII. Wanderversammlung bayerischer Landwirthe zu Würzburg (Würzburg: Thein, 1880), 30-121.
omelette?” he rhetorically asked later. Gradually, the Association’s newsletter also ceased to discuss the issue of tax reforms. All was silent.

Like the newsletter, but with perhaps more fireworks than the Association was comfortable, the assemblies had accidentally tripped upon the limits of that which the government was willing to tolerate from one of ‘its’ organizations, and rather than pushing forward in the name of agricultural development, the Association and the assemblies both pulled back for the sake of self-preservation. And although the issue of tax reforms was more fiery than most, the outcome of this particular debate followed an all too familiar pattern. For instance, the need for more practical agricultural education was another topic that seemed to get nowhere. Debated at an assembly meeting in 1880, the assembly even supported a motion to reemphasize practical agriculture over the dominance of agricultural theory in Bavaria’s schools. A renaissance in peasant-oriented agricultural education did not follow however. Other social issues, especially the rising cost of rural wages for farm hands, also came up several times, but here too, the assembly’s conclusions never led to much institutional change or encouraged the state to intervene in any way. More typically, as evidenced through the many debates that centered on academic themes and best agricultural practices, the assemblies were able to influence agricultural production through those participants who took what they learned at an assembly and then put it into practice. The increased institution of agricultural credit unions, for example, was strongly supported by the Association and the assemblies, but the rising popularity and spreading influence of credit unions (Raiffeisen, Genossenschaften) was a phenomenon that

66 HdbL KC Schw. 1.429, Verhandlungen der XXIII. Wanderversammlung bayerische Landwirthe zu Speyer (Speyer: Jäger, 1881), 1-10, here 4-5. Writing in an editorial, Otto May later quoted Finance Minister von Riedel as saying that the issue of taxes had devolved into a battle between interest groups, and that he was prepared to “defend the state” against such interest groups. See “Umschau.” Editorial, Zeitschrift, vol. LXXI (1881), 25-36, here 31.
otherwise developed almost completely apart from government support. Indeed, as the leadership of the Association all too often experienced, if the government was not interested in supporting a particular program, there was little more that the assemblies could realistically do.

That being said, just as there were times that the assemblies failed to produce much in the way of results, there were a few success stories that lead to developments or improvements in the agricultural sector. The most prominent success story of the assemblies was probably the institution of agricultural insurance programs, which were debated and supported by the assemblies, subsequently supported by the Association, and which eventually led to the institution of a state-run agricultural insurance program (discussed in the next chapter). The same can be said for the state’s land consolidation and water improvement programs, the existence of which predated the assemblies, but which were later reformed because of debates held at the assemblies. As previously stated, debates that centered on the need for greater access to credit may not have had much to do with the success of credit unions, but these debates (primarily led by Thüngen) did spur the state to found a credit annuity institution for land improvement in 1884, and then later the Bavarian Agricultural Bank in 1896. Also of great significance, in 1884, Karl von Cetto-Reichertshausen began a series of debates that would eventually lead, eleven years later, to the Association actually rewriting its bylaws in such a way as to open up its leading bodies to more control from the county committees. Among these more significant success stories, there were also lesser successes that surely had a broad effect on the state of Bavarian agriculture, such as the institution of official horseshoeing courses to promote proper horse-shoeing (1879), the institution of state inspections of stud farms and animal breeding (1882, 1888), and the lowering of train rates for the transportation of peat and straw

---

In all, the assemblies, and through them, the Association, could rightly claim to have had a positive affect on the development of agriculture throughout Bavaria.⁶⁸

What the assemblies did not achieve though, was the creation of a more significant platform for peasant farmers to voice their concerns in regard to issues that they faced. Where the assemblies undoubtedly had more effect on agricultural production than, say, the Association’s newsletters, one of the original purposes of the assemblies was to make the Association and the Bavarian government more aware of peasant needs. In the end, this simply did not happen. Rather, almost from their inception, the assemblies turned into another public platform for agricultural elites to debate issues that concerned them, but which may or may not have subsequently affected the peasantry. Similarly, the assemblies’ ability to affect reforms of the Association proved somewhat limited. Indeed, rather than reform the Association, by the 1880s, one could say that the Association had successfully absorbed the assemblies, and as seen in the episode with von Thüngen, the state too remained impervious to the assemblies’ attempts to initiate reform. Only in those cases where the Association and/or the state were receptive to the assemblies’ proposals did the state budge. And because the assemblies, like the Association and its newsletters, refrained from participating or siding in political battles, they could not provide a serious, oppositional voice to the Bavarian government. Indeed, if the peasantry wanted the government to pay greater attention to them and their needs, it would have to do so without the Association’s forums of public discourse.

⁶⁸ Schnee, “Die Wanderversammlungen bayerischer Landwirte,” 883-886 provides a helpful assessment of some of the assemblies’ successes as well as its failures.
CHAPTER 5
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION, PART TWO:
WORKING TOGETHER WITH THE BAVARIAN STATE

As evidenced by the newsletter and the assemblies, one of the Association’s most significant activities was its lobbying of the Bavarian government in the name of agriculture. At times, it was possible that relative outsiders could use platforms such as the assemblies or the newsletters to lobby the government with proposals that were meant to improve agricultural production. However, another perhaps more critical component of the Association’s lobbying efforts was its use of government insiders, that is, men such as Eduard von Wolfanger, Matthäus von Jodlbauer, Heinrich von Haag, Maximilian von Soden-Fraunhofen, and even Prince Ludwig, all men who were well placed within the government and who could potentially push for certain projects from within the halls of power. With the backing of the Association behind them, what followed then in the name of reform was often an almost personal dialogue with the state, a discourse that usually assumed one of two forms. Individuals or small groups either advocated for policies that the Association wanted to see put into place, or senior members of the Association provided advice to the government over the institution and regulation of policies.¹ It was through this form of cooperation that the Association most widely affected agricultural production in Bavaria, and between 1871 and 1895, the Association, helped to produce a number of important programs and policies. Continuing therefore with the theme established in the

¹ Bayerischer Landwirtschaftsrat, eds., Der landwirtschaftliche Verein in Bayern: Sein Werden und Wirken (Munich: Possenbacher, 1905), 20.
previous chapter, a closer examination of these activities, that is, the Association’s cooperation
with the government, will not only shed further light on the effectiveness of the Association, but
indeed, allow for a more effective measurement of the Bavarian state and its ability to initiate
change in Bavaria’s agricultural sector after 1871.

Probably the two most successful episodes of state-Association cooperation were the
institution and management of a government-run hail-protection insurance program, for which
the Association quietly lobbied for two decades, and also the Association’s role in the longer
story of land consolidation. Where it is true that the Association exhibited serious shortcomings
when it came to interacting with the peasantry, as these two examples show, the Association was
much more effective when it came to interacting directly with the Bavarian state. On the other
hand, as often as the Association found success with the state, there were unfortunately times
when its involvement with the state produced little in the way of measurable results. This was
certainly the case with peasant-oriented agricultural education programs, which, as already
indicated in the previous chapter, received far too little attention from both the state and the
Association. Much the same could be said for the many public agricultural festivals and trade
fairs that the Association and the government supported over the years, festivals and fairs that
were specifically meant to promote the further development of agricultural production, but
which, like the Association itself, had a very limited impact on agricultural production overall,
and indeed, even less of an impact amongst the Bavarian peasantry.

i. Public hail-protection insurance and land consolidation

Instituted in 1884, the Bavarian government’s hail-protection insurance program came
about largely because of the success of a similar program designed for fire-protection insurance
which had been instituted in 1875. Hardly a coincidence, the legislation for both of these programs was largely written by Matthäus von Jodlbauer, a senior bureaucrat within the Department for Agriculture, Trade and Industry who also served as a prominent voice within the General Committee for thirty years. Indeed, it was primarily through him that the Association worked to see a hail-insurance program into existence. Looking beyond the role of Jodlbauer, it is also important to note the role that the Association’s forums of public debate played in convincing the government to adopt Jodlbauer’s measures. For the government, public support was important, and the Association’s forums of public debate provided the appearance of exactly that, allowing the government to move forward with greater confidence that it was doing something that matched the will of the public. With the government in agreement, the Association could then change hats and nimbly step into the role of consultant, advising the government as to how the legislation for such a program could be written. From beginning to end, the institution of Bavaria’s public hail-insurance program, which stretched out over roughly thirty years, reflects exactly how the Association cooperated with the government when it came to writing legislation that affected agricultural production.

It was not until after 1875 that the Bavarian government finally began to warm to the idea of initiating a public insurance program to protect against hail damages, and much of this changing attitude was due to the success of the aforementioned public fire-protection insurance program. During the late eighteenth century, well before a modern Bavarian state had even been formed, local and municipal governments within what would eventually become Bavaria began

---

to tinker with public fire-protection insurance programs. Only in 1811, under the initiative of Max Joseph, did the Bavarian government finally create a state-wide, public fire-protection insurance program to exist alongside insurance programs provided by private companies. Nearly twenty-five years later, in 1834, the government decided to establish a state monopoly on fire-protection insurance. However, where the government now had sole charge of fire-protection insurance in Bavaria, all of its programs were still managed at local levels of government, meaning that rates and quality of service varied depending on the locale in question. In 1852, the government took further steps toward centralizing its various fire-protection insurance programs by standardizing the way in which properties were valued for insurance purposes, and then also instituting standards for local police authorities to conduct the necessary inspections of buildings. Nonetheless, by the 1860s, it was clear that the local police authorities were overwhelmed by the task of inspecting buildings for insurance purposes. In the remaining years before unification, the Bavarian parliament finally agreed to support the initiation of a centralized, fire-protection insurance authority to be based in Munich. By 1875, under the guiding pen of Jodlbauer, the necessary legislation was in place, and the Royal Fire Insurance Administration (Königliche Brandversicherungskammer) was placed under the authority of Interior Ministry. Jodlbauer, who had worked so hard to see the agency into existence, was assigned as its first director, and he held that position until his untimely death in 1890.3

Not one to rest on his laurels, Jodlbauer intended to build upon the success of the Fire Insurance Administration by expanding its activities to include hail-protection insurance, and it is here where the Association played a pivotal role in his thinking. The topic of hail-protection insurance had a long-standing history within the Association, having been debated since the

---

earliest years of the organization’s existence, but with little result. In the 1860s, probably because of the debates surrounding fire-protection insurance, the issue of hail-protection gradually bubbled up again within the Association, and indeed, was even introduced several times on the floor of the Bavarian parliament during the course of that same decade. Bavaria, as was well known, was particularly susceptible to hailstorms which could quite potentially devastate large segments of the agricultural sector. Between 1839 and 1848, for example, four significant hail storms struck Bavaria, with the storm from 1846 causing an incredible 7 million gulden worth in damages. Up to this point though, the need for hail protection was generally covered by private insurance companies, with numerous private insurance organizations from within Bavaria as well as from other parts of Germany providing coverage. What all of these private insurance provider’s lacked however was mass participation, which generally meant that they were either unable to adequately cover damages, or they were too expensive for most peasant famers. Considering the prevalence of peasant farming in Bavaia, as well as the common occurrence of hail storms, it became increasingly obvious that a large majority of Bavaria’s agricultural sector operated with little protection from the financial perils that all too often accompanied hail storms.

After 1868, articles in favor of a state-run hail-protection insurance program began to regularly appear in the Association’s central newsletter, with even Adam Müller occasionally

---

4 See HdbL GC 1.093-1.096, correspondence and other documents pertaining to hail insurance and hail insurance associations, 1812-1848; and also Die Landwirtschaft in Regierungsbezirk Oberbayern: gewidmet den Theilnehmern an der XXVI. Wunderversammlung bayer. Landwirthe in Jahre 1885 zu Tolz (Munich: 1885), 512-516.
6 See the above-cited “Bestgemeinter Antrag!”
7 “Ueber Hagelversicherung.” Zeitschrift, vol. LVIII (1868), 377-383; Schmitt-Lermann, Hundert Jahre Bayerische Versicherungskammer, 199-210; and Hans Schmitt-Lermann, Der Hagel und der Hagelversicherung in der Kulturgeschichte (Munich: Bayer. Versicherungskammer, 1984), 225-268. Regarding the difficulties of insuring against hail-damages, Schmitt-Lermann states that between 1788 and 1907, there were 88 hail-protection insurance organizations founded in Germany, and of these, 54 went out of business within the same time period.
providing commentary on the matter. Most of the articles and editorials generally supported the idea of a state-run program, and even other local agricultural organizations, such as the Assembly of Lower Franconian Farmers, began to openly push for just such a program.8 There were of course those who were opposed to the idea, including private hail-insurance organizations, but also those who feared the heavy hand of government interference, or, notably poorer peasant farmers, who feared the additional expenses of paying into a mandatory state-run program.9 Despite these misgivings, those in favor of the program relentlessly pursued the goal of founding a public hail-protection insurance program. One particularly vocal proponent of a state-run program was Wilhelm von Neuffer, a large landowner and beer brewer from Upper Palatinate, and himself an influential member of the upper house of the Bavarian parliament.10 In a stream of articles published in the Association’s newsletter, as well as a culminating speech in 1874 that he gave before the Assembly of Bavarian Farmers, Neuffer consistently beat the same rhetorical drum: private insurance organizations would never alone suffice in matters of hail insurance; therefore, solidarity in hard times trumped individual concerns for fairness. “Only the State and mutual assistance can help in times of unforeseen crisis,” wrote Neuffer in 1871. “Existing insurance organizations,” on the other hand, “are too dependent on the wealthy, and because even their money is often insufficient, premiums cannot be set at a lower price.”11

---

10 Wilhelm von Neuffer (1810-1893) sat in the lower house of parliament from 1845 to 1869 and was a member of several influential committees during his tenure there, including committees for taxes, debt, and finances. Politically, Neuffer identified as a liberal, and was generally Reichstreu. He took his seat in the upper house in 1871, where he sat until his death. He was an active member of the Association, sitting in the district committee for Upper Palatinate as the vice-president, and even hosting the Assembly of Bavarian Farmers in 1864. Castle Eichofen, where Neuffer established his brewery, continues to operate as a brewery and restaurant to this day. See biographical data in Dirk Götschmann and Michael Henker, eds., Geschichte des Bayerischen Parlaments, 1819-2003, CD-ROM (Augsburg: Haus der Bayerischen Geschichte, 2005).
By the mid-1870s, through a variety of public debates, the Association had made it clear to the government that there was significant demand for a public hail-protection insurance program. With the government’s fire-protection insurance program firmly in place, the momentum to see the government set up a similar hail-protection insurance program had finally reached critical mass. In 1873, the same year that Jodlbauer had begun to write the legislation for the Fire Insurance Administration, the lower house of the Bavarian parliament put together a proposal to the cabinet that the government create a hail insurance program, and the cabinet responded positively to the idea. For his part, in a speech given in 1879 at the Upper Bavarian district assembly, Jodlbauer too publicly supported the creation of a public hail-protection insurance program, and he was even willing to write the necessary legislation.12 By this point though, the question was really no longer if the state should institute some form of hail insurance — in 1881, the parliament once again put a proposal to the cabinet in support of a hail-protection insurance program, and again, the Interior Ministry supported the proposal. Rather, the most serious issue was whether or not participation in such a program would be mandatory.13 This was a significant sticking point, given that it was still unclear as to what the vast majority of farmers, that is, peasant farmers, thought about such a program at all. Both sides, those in favor and those opposed to a government-run hail-protection insurance program, had used the peasantry in the past to support their claims: depending on what one wanted to believe, either

---


the peasantry were strongly opposed to such a program or they were strongly in favor. In short, the government needed definitive answers before it could take further steps in forming a program for hail-protection insurance that matched the success of the Fire Insurance Administration.

In 1882 the government turned to the General Committee with the task of polling its members and gauging what they thought about a mandatory insurance program. Having their orders, the Association did just that, but rather than tallying together a popular vote, it chose the easier route of asking each of the district committees to poll their county committees and then come up with a definitive answer that represented the majority wish in each of their respective districts. To little surprise, the districts of Lower Bavaria, Upper Palatinate, and Middle Franconia — that is, the poorest districts and the ones most affected by hail storms — were strongly in favor of making participation in the program mandatory, while Upper Bavaria and Swabia both ultimately supported mandatory participation, but only if other conditions were first met. Those districts to the north, Lower and Upper Franconia and the Palatinate, that is, the districts least effected by hail storms, were completely opposed to mandatory participation. Given these results, the General Committee decided during the course of several meetings, including a gathering where special members were also present, to follow the course of action that Jodlbauer had laid out some years before. The wisest course of action would be for the government to not include mandatory participation as part of its legislation. With this prescription in hand, Max von Soden-Fraunhofen rallied the lower house while Gaisberg organized votes in the upper house. On February 13th, 1884, the Bavarian parliament approved

14 See, for example, Castell, “Hagelversicherung!”; and Neuffer, “‘Ueber Hagelversicherung,’” both cited above, where the authors use the peasantry to support opposing claims.
15 Die Landwirtschaft in Regierungsbezirk Oberbayern (1885), 513.
16 “Stenographische Bericht über die Plenar-Sitzung des General-Comités des landwirthschaftlichen Vereines in Bayern…,” in Zeitung, LXXII (1882); “Stenographische Bericht der Central-Versammlung des landwirthschaftlichen Vereines in Bayern…,” in Zeitung, LXXIV (1884); Haag, Die Landwirtschaft in Bayern, 649, 560-562; and Schmitt-Lermann, Hundert Jahre Bayerische Versicherungskammer, 208-209.
the Association’s recommendation and a hail-protection insurance program based on optional participation was written into law.\textsuperscript{17}

As it turned out, this was probably the best decision, and in the long run, the quality of the program was ultimately borne out by its own success. The first of its type founded anywhere in the world, the Division of Hail Insurance (\textit{Abteilung für Hagelversicherung}) was created as a sub-department of the Fire Insurance Administration, meaning that it, like the General Committee, belonged within the operating capacity of the Interior Ministry. Within six years of its foundation, over 33,000 individuals, households, and businesses set up accounts with the Division of Hail Insurance. Even though the government provided some financial support, the Division’s hail insurance claims were largely covered by member subscriptions.\textsuperscript{18} Where the government did not set down a monopoly on hail insurance as they had with fire protection insurance, with time, most of the private insurance companies that provided hail-protection coverage retreated from the Bavarian market, leaving the government program as the single largest provider for hail-protection coverage in Bavaria.\textsuperscript{19} In the long run, with so many people participating under one roof, it was possible for the Division to set premiums at a low enough rate, allowing peasant farmers to participate if they so desired. By 1910, with over 163,000 members, it was obvious that the government’s hail-insurance program was a resounding success, and with that many subscriptions, it was also clear that many peasant farmers were participating as well. Such success would also later encourage Jodlbauer’s successors, notably, Heinrich von Haag, another leading member of the General Committee, to expand the types of coverage provided by the Insurance Administration, to eventually include public insurance

\textsuperscript{17} Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern, 215.
\textsuperscript{18} Haag, \textit{Die Landwirtschaft in Bayern}, 565-567.
\textsuperscript{19} Schmitt-Lermann, \textit{Hundert Jahre Bayerische Versicherungskammer}, 212.
program for livestock and then later horses. In setting up all of these programs, the Association was, as it always had been, more than willing to provide assistance.20

Despite the program’s success, what had never really been made clear was the peasantry’s stance on a government-run hail insurance program. Unwilling to even acquire a popular vote within its organization, the Association also never attempted to more broadly inquire with the general public, and neither did the government. In hindsight, because so many bought into the program, it is very likely that many peasant farmers had in fact supported a public hail-insurance program. Moreover, since mandatory participation was not included in the legislation, the government ultimately created a program that did not punish those who chose to abstain. Everything had worked out for the better. Still, as this episode so keenly demonstrates, while the Association was more than capable of cooperating with the state, it was far less willing or capable when it came to dialoguing with the peasantry, whom the Association virtually ignored. As far as the government was concerned, it had been enough to acquire the support of the Association’s leadership, not the peasantry.

The story of land consolidation in nineteenth-century Bavaria tells a similar story, with the Association again playing an important supporting role in the development and institution of a government-run program meant to widely affect and improve agricultural production. Just as government-run insurance programs had long existed before the Bavarian government took an interest in them, the history of government-coordinated land consolidation projects in Bavaria too preceded the creation of the modern Bavarian state. Only in the early nineteenth century, with steady encouragement coming from organizations like the Agricultural Association, did heretofore uncoordinated government management gradually transform into legally mandated,

20 Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern, 212-224.
reliable, bureaucratic oversight of land consolidation (*Arrondierung, Flurbereinigung*).\(^{21}\) In more recent times, it should be stated, the value of land consolidation — its positive and negative effects on the environment, as well as its impact on social and economic conditions — has been called into some question. However, even though the Bavarian government succeeded in creating a bureaucratic and legal framework to manage land consolidation, it should also be noted that relatively few land consolidation projects were actually executed and completed before 1914.\(^{22}\) Indeed, the merit of telling this story of land consolidation is that it points to yet another example of how the Association cooperated with the Bavarian government. If the effect of this cooperation was ultimately very limited, then it should also be clear that the government and the Association were likewise limited in their efforts to affect real change.

Like most places in Europe, historical circumstances had produced complicated patterns of land distribution in Bavaria. Very often, as was still the case in early nineteenth-century Bavaria, village farmlands were divided up into numerous and variegated strips of land, with peasants each usually ‘owning’ multiple strips that were not even necessarily next to one another, but were scattered haphazardly all across village holdings. As Rainer Beck points out,

---

\(^{21}\) On the history of land consolidation in Bavaria up to the mid-nineteenth century, see Alois Schlögl, ed., *Bayerische Agrargeschichte: die Entwicklung der Land- und Forstwirtschaft seit Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich: Bayerischer Landwirtschaftsverlag, 1954), 157-173; Hermann Krimmer, “Frühe Anfänge der Flurbereinigung in Bayern” in *100 Jahre Flurbereinigung in Bayern, 1886-1986*, eds. Bayer. Staats Ministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten (Munich: 1986), 24-48; and Günther Stößner, “Bayerische Gesetzgebung zur Flurbereinigung,” in idem, 49-67. It should be stated, that the term *Arrondierung* (often spelled *Arrondirung*), and then the later-used term, *Flurbereinigung*, were usually used to identify much more than just land consolidation, but rather, were more generally understood to mean ‘land-improvement.’ This included, in addition to land consolidation, the improvement of access to water for purposes of irrigation, improved access to transportation, waterways, and roads, and then also later applied to the renewal or refurbishment of public landmarks or buildings. For the purposes of this study, the following section will focus entirely on the question of land consolidation specifically, which was indeed the most controversial aspect of *Arrondierung*, and will not cover the other details that often popped up in reference to *Arrondierung*. However, the reader should be made aware, that in the debates that surrounded the question of *Arrondierung*, that much more was debated than land consolidation alone.

\(^{22}\) For recent evaluations of land consolidation and its effects on agricultural production, see, for example, Zvi Lerman and Dragoș Cimpoieș, “Land Consolidation as a Factor for Rural Development in Moldova.” *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 58, no. 3 (May, 2006): 439-455; or Amit Hazra, *Land Reforms: Myths and Realities* (New Delhi: Concept Publishing, 2006).
had one asked a nineteenth-century Bavarian peasant how many acres of land he owned, he probably would not have been able to provide a direct answer. Rather, he would have known what strips of land belonged to him.\(^{23}\) By the early nineteenth century, agricultural reformers regarded these older divisions of property as yet another anachronistic barrier and a holdover of feudal relations that barred further commercialization of Bavarian agriculture.\(^{24}\) In 1848, the Bavarian government finally took the first steps toward creating a more rational agriculture when it formally emancipated the peasantry from feudal obligations and made them the owners of their own lands. The next step, as far as the Association was particularly concerned, was for the government to step in and consolidate peasant properties.

Just as it had done before 1848, the Association continued well into the 1850s to speak out in favor of legislation that would rearrange and redistribute agricultural properties amongst all landowners.\(^{25}\) With the peasants legally freed from their old feudal obligations, they now needed to be freed from what Joseph von Hazzi had described as the economic bondage of feudal


\(^{24}\) Schlögl, *Bayerische Agrargeschichte*, 165-173. Also see Joseph von Hazzi, *Gekrönte Preisschrift über Güterarrondierung* (Munich: Franz Seraph Hübenschmann, 1818), which is probably the most concise summary of the Association’s position on land consolidation; and HdbL GC 572-573, for documents pertaining to the Association’s earliest forays into this issue. Regarding the issue of overly-fragmented farms in nineteenth-century Europe, to quote Folke Dovring, “one reason for [land] consolidation was the wish to introduce the new agricultural techniques that had begun to be applied on a large scale in England.” In particular, this included “the new iron ploughs, drawn by a horse or two,” which were “believed to work better on consolidated lots with more breadth and less length than the strips of the old open field system; and the new rotations are also assumed to have been easier to apply on consolidated holdings.” Beyond the desire to put new technologies to better use, there was also concern for a) population growth and the need to feed ever more people, and then also, b) the further fragmentation of the land, which was directly related to population growth. See Folke Dovring, “The Transformation of European Agriculture,” in *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, vol. 6, part 2, eds. Hrothgar Habakkuk and Michael Postan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 604-672, here 626-627.

\(^{25}\) See *Die Landwirthschaft in Bayern: Denkschrift zur Feier des fünfzigjährigen Bestandes des landwirthschaftlichen Vereines in Bayern* (Munich: Possenbacher, 1860), 336-340, for a summary of the Association’s position on land consolidation between 1848 and 1860. In southern Bavaria, local government surveyors who took the initiative on their own to consolidate local village lands prominently led the way in favor of a centralized consolidation program that forced land owners into participating. From their own experiences, which they published in the Association’s central newsletter from time to time (and are also summarized in the *Denkschrift* above, 341-344), they frequently ran into resistance whenever they tried to completely consolidate the lands of entire villages, with a minority of landowners, for a variety of reasons, usually refusing to participate. See, for example, Wenglein, “Ueber die jüngsten Arrondirungen in Oberbayern.” Zeitschrift, vol. XLV (1855), 79-83.
property divisions. Only then, according to reformers, could the peasantry form into a class of independent farmers who could better compete with one another to the improvement of their own economic circumstances and the improvement of the Bavarian economy. Interestingly, from what information the Association gathered over the decades, it also seemed as though most peasant farmers were, at least in theory, in agreement with the Association and generally favored the idea of consolidating lands. As we shall see, making theory and reality meet up was not always the easiest of tasks. In a few isolated cases, local governments had actually consolidated the lands of villages even before 1848, and in general, the experiences had produced positive results. In 1859, for example, in the villages of Groß- und Kleinharden, today a suburb of Munich, locals had even raised up a field cross and publicly dedicated it to the surveyor who had undertaken their consolidation project. Without question, it was (and is) difficult to reliably ascertain what the peasants may have ever collectively thought about anything. But judging from a handful of real-world experiences before the 1860s, land consolidation, as an idea, proved to be appealing across divisions of class.

Practically speaking, there was at least one major issue related to land consolidation that could not be ignored, and this was, again, as it was with the question of hail insurance, as to whether or not the government could or should force villages and landowners into participating (Zwang). In this case, even where most people believed that land consolidation was necessary, there were those who held that a mandatory land consolidation program, following so shortly on the legal emancipation of the peasantry, was not a good idea. Where this was perhaps true, nonetheless, within ten years of the peasantry’s emancipation, the lower house of the parliament

---

26 Hazzi, Gekrönte Preisschrift über Güterarrondierung, 357, 374.
28 Schlögl, Bayerische Agrargeschichte, 176.
was debating the merit of a public land-consolidation program. In 1856, a proposal written by Eduard von Wolfanger was brought before the upper house that intended to empower the state to force landowners to consolidate their properties. Five years later — the original proposal had been set aside by parliament — another bill that had worked its way through the lower house was set before the upper house, and this time, the question of mandatory participation was hotly debated. In the end, the upper house completely rewrote the bill, dropping any mention of mandatory participation or the government forcing landowners to consolidate their lands, and then sent it back to the lower house. There, committees went over the bill again, but also added the principle of forced participation back into the language of the bill. The upper house naturally balked at the lower house’s attempt to force the matter, but after more debate, and given that the articles regarding forced participation included milder conditions than before, the upper house finally agreed to the bill and signed it into law in November of 1861.

Given how contested the principle of compulsory consolidation had been, the new law addressed this sticking point in its opening articles. However, it was also here, in the section that covered compulsory participation, that the law’s own demise was ensured. Originally, Wolfanger’s proposal, which had been put through the debating mechanisms of the Association and had been approved there, had required that three-fourths of those affected by a given land-consolidation proposal had to agree to that proposal in order for it to be put into effect. Furthermore, three-fourths of that number had to be landowners, and three-fourths of the

---

29 See “Bericht des besonderen zur Prüfung des Gesetzentwurfes Zusammenlegung der Grundstücke betreffend” (Beilag LXXXV), in Verhandlungen der Kammer der Abgeordneten des bayerischen Landtages in den Jahren 1859/61, vol. 5 (Munich: 1861), 442-484, which provides the protocols for some of the debates in the lower house that occurred over several months in 1861, and also shows Adam Müller as well as Joseph von Hirschberger and Friedrich von Hegnenberg-Dux, all three prominent members of the Association, along with minister Wolfanger, being listed on the committee that debated this law; and also the, lengthier, relevant protocols for the upper house in Verhandlungen der Kammer der Reichsräthe des Königreiches Bayern, Protokoll-Band 1859/61, vols. 1-3 (Munich: 1861).

30 Ibid.; and Schlögl, Bayerische Agrargeschichte, 176-177.
landowners in agreement had to be landowners who paid taxes on their land. These requirements had not soothed the fears of the upper house though, and it was at this point that the upper house had removed all mention of the government forcing individuals to do anything. In an attempt to bargain with the upper house, among other changes, the lower house therefore raised all requirements from a three-fourths agreement to four-fifths. Also added was a requirement that a minimum number of ten landowners within a village had to even want consolidation. It was under these conditions that the bill passed into law. From the outset though, there were many who were unhappy with the new law, with some members of the government and the Association even wanting to pull it completely back off of the books. Indeed, over the next two decades, experience proved that reservations regarding the law were well founded, as hardly any villages or landowners made use of it.

In 1873, the government finally recognized that the 1861 law was a failure after the Bavarian Bureau of Statistics released a study on agricultural laws, which, among other things, stated that not a single land consolidation project had been put into effect in Bavaria since the

---

31 Schlögl, 176.
32 HdbL GC 575, “Gesetz vom 10. November 1861, die Zusammenlegung der Grundstücke betreffend,” in Die landwirthschaftlichen Gesetze Bayerns (Würzburg: Verlag der Stahlschen Buch- und Kunsthandlung, 1862), 77-87, here 77-78. Between 1868 and 1884, public (and published) criticisms of the 1861 law were numerous, and came from both private organizations as well as from groups of individuals who worked for the government. This included the Association’s district committees for Lower Franconia (1868), Swabia (1873), Upper Franconia (1873), the Association’s General Committee (through their central meeting, 1874, 1878), the Assembly of Bavarian Farmers (1868, 1876, 1884), the Assembly of German Farmers and Foresters (1872), and also the Association for County Surveyors (also an organization of public employees), which published a lengthy criticism of the law in Carl Steppes, ed., Zur Reform des bayrischen Arrondirungsgesetzes vom 10. November 1861 (Munich: literarisch-artistische Anstalt, 1879). See Heinrich von Haag and Friedrich Brettreich, Das Bayerische Gesetz betreffend Flurbereinigung vom 29. Mai 1886, 9. Juni 1899 (Munich: Beck, 1900), 4-5 for a summary of the many organizations that criticized the 1861 law.
33 Given that this very point was brought up by the Assembly of Bavarian Farmers in 1868, even before unification, the common perception was that no land consolidation projects had been put into effect since the 1861 law had been passed. See Bericht über die Eilfte Wanderversammlung bayerischer Landwirte (Rosenheim: Gatzner and Mühlberger, 1868), 5-32; and Uwe Schnee, “Die Wanderversammlungen bayerischer Landwirte, 1857-1914.” Bayerisches landwirtschaftliches Jahrbuch, vol. 52 (1975): 835-896, here 863.
passing of the 1861 law. Where this was not entirely true — there were isolated cases where local surveyors had managed to consolidate properties — the government’s report was enough to push the Interior Ministry into approaching the Association, publicly inviting the organization as well as local government authorities to work together in revisiting the 1861 law. Forthwith, the Association again used its forums of public discourse to address the issue, having it debated almost every year at the annual general assembly and regularly publishing articles in the newsletters and pamphlets that addressed land consolidation. As with the issue of hail insurance, one person in particular stood out in his support for rewriting the 1861 law, and this was Louis Löll, the secretary for the Lower Bavarian district committee and the editor of their newsletter, Fränkischen Landwirt. Whether in his published articles or in the speech he made to the Assembly of Bavarian Farmers in 1876, his argument was always basically the same: the 1861 law had set the requirements needed for compulsory participation too high, so high in fact, that hardly any projects were seen into reality. Before 1861, there had at least been cases of local government surveyors and villages working together on land consolidation. However, after 1861, even most of these clandestine projects had ceased because the rights of even the smallest

---

34 The study in question was Georg Mayr, Statistische Nachweisungen über den Vollzug der Bodenkultur-Gesetze in Bayern, Beiträge zur Statistik Bayern, vol. 24 (Munich: Gotteswinter & Mößl, 1871).
35 Regarding isolated consolidation projects that were completed during the 1860s and 70s, see Haag and Bretteich, Flurbereinigungsge setz, 6-7; Anton Kalchgruber, “Untersuchungen über landwirtschaftliche speziell bäuerliche Verhältnisse in Altbaiern” (Dissertation, Universität München, 1885), 128-130; and also HdbL GC 576, which includes reports on consolidation projects carried out in between 1861 and 1876.
37 Dr. Louis Löll (1823-1899†) was an agricultural teacher from Würzburg, the author of several shorter books on agriculture and taxes, and would also go on to found the first agricultural credit union in Bavaria to the right of the Rhine. He served for a time as secretary for the district committee of Lower Franconia. See HdbL KC Schw. 1.370, contract of service for Louis Löll as secretary for the Lower Franconian district committee.
of minority dissenters had been codified to their protection. For this reason above all others, the 1861 law was a total failure.38

By the end of the 1870s, the Association had adequately proven to the government that a general desire existed to see the land consolidation laws rewritten. However, just as the proceedings surrounding the 1861 law had revealed, there were still many within parliament who simply could not support a law that empowered the government to take away property from some landowners and then, at the discretion of the government, swap it with other, possibly less valuable land. Even the Assembly of Bavarian Farmers, which agreed that a new land consolidation law needed to be written, could not agree on how to implement such a law.39 The same could be said for the Bavarian parliament, which, following a proposal for a new law being put forth in 1879, virtually reenacted the proceedings that had led up to the 1861 law.40 In 1881 and 1883, the bill was debated in the lower house, with the Interior Ministry continuing to fully support the writing of a new land consolidation law, but with no side able to come to any better solutions than before. So once again, the government turned to the Association for an answer. But this time, instead of asking the General Committee to poll the district committees, as it did with the question of hail insurance, the government actually asked the organization to promulgate a draft of the bill in question.41

---

38 Between 1873 and 1878, Löll, along with a few others, published a series of articles that covered his basic arguments, and he publicly presented these on several occasions, including to the Assembly of Bavarian Farmers in 1876. For a report on his 1876 presentation, which also shows the most significant arguments of those who were in opposition, see Bericht über die XVIII. Wanderversammlung bayerischer Landwirte (1876), 84-125. Also, for a convenient summary of Löll’s arguments, see the insert “Anträge der Referenten zu den auf die Tagesordnung der General-Versammlung des bayerischen landwirthschaftlichen Vereines….” in Zeitschrift, vol. LXIV (1874), S8-11.
39 Bericht über die XVIII. Wanderversammlung bayerischer Landwirte (Würzburg: Staudinger, 1876); and Schnee, “Die Wanderversammlungen bayerischer Landwirte,” 863-864.
41 Haag and Breetreich, Flurbereinigungsgesetz, 7-8; Schlögl, Bayerische Agrargeschichte, 183; and Verhandlungen der Kammer der Abgeordneten des bayerischen Landtages im Jahre 1883/84: Stenographische Berichte, vol. 1 (Munich: 1883), 138-140. Also see the stenographical reports for the lower house, 1880/81, vol. 5, beginning on page 300, for the earlier debate.
In the preceding decade, the Association had already shown its desire to include as part of the law, compulsory steps based on a simple majority, and this was the tack they took now. However, moving beyond the minutiae of the law, the Association also ambitiously proposed that a centralized government authority be created to oversee land consolidation. This was a recommendation that had only come up in the early 1880s, surfacing during yet another debate on land consolidation before the Assembly of Bavarian Farmers. But again, by this point, the question was not if the government was going to pass new legislation for the consolidation of land holdings, but rather, how it was going to be done. The idea of creating a central government authority clearly stuck with members of the Association, because within a year, as per the Interior Ministry’s request, the Association wrote a proposal that included the creation of central government authority to oversee land consolidation projects, and this is what the Interior Minister presented before the lower house on October 24th, 1885. After seven months of debate, the bill was accepted by that body and referred to the upper house, who, in complete contrast to the debates leading up to the 1861 law — having been prepared by decades of public discourse hosted by the Association — overwhelmingly agreed to it.

---

42 See the insert “Auszug aus den Regierungs-Vorlagen anlässlich der Ministerial-Entschliessung…,” in Zeitschrift, vol. LXIV (1874), which already shows many of the district committees asking for simple-majority rules for compulsory participation in land consolidation as early as 1874; and the insert “Stenographischer Bericht über die Sitzung des General-Comités des landwirthschaftlichen Vereines in Bayern…,” in Zeitschrift, vol. LXVIII (1878), where the General Committee agrees to propose a law to the government based on existing north-German laws, which used simple-majority rules for compulsory participation in land consolidation. Also see Steppes, Zur Reform des bayerischen Arrondirungsgesetzes vom 10. November 1861, which confirms the Association’s desire to write a new law based on the compulsory participation of a simple majority; and Haag and Brettreich, Flurbereinigung, 8, which provides a convenient summary of the Association’s position on land consolidation circa 1885. Much of the Association’s ideas on land consolidation were based on existing examples found in northern Germany, and to some degree, what was driving the Association and its desire to reform the 1861 laws was no small of embarrassment, that Bavaria appeared ‘behind’ Prussia on this issue of land consolidation.

43 Ernst Lehnert, “Das Bayerische Arrondirungsgesetz.” Zeitschrift, vol. LXXIV (1884), 736-739; and Bericht über die außerordentliche Wanderversammlung bayerischer Landwirthe (Munich: Pössenbacher, 1884).

44 Haag and Brettreich, Flurbereinigungsgesetz, 8-15; and Schlögl, Bayerische Argargeschichte, 184-185. Also see the stenographical reports for the upper house from 1886, beginning on page 657. For a complete bibliographical list of the debates concerning land consolidation that took place in the upper and lower houses in 1885/86, see Haag and Brettreich, 17.
Twenty-five years after the fact, the diligence of the Association, together with the willingness of the Interior Ministry, had seen a new land consolidation law into existence, a law that more significantly empowered the government to force land consolidation, but also provided for the creation of a central government authority that would oversee such work. Above all, the new law lowered the requirements for compulsory participation considerably, down from four-fifths to a simple majority, while stipulating that at least half of the people being affected by a land consolidation proposal had to be land-owners and at least half had to pay taxes on their land.\(^{45}\) Second, with these new conditions firmly in place, the responsibility of managing an expected rise in land consolidation fell primarily to the Interior Ministry. Under the initial guidance of Maximilian von Feilitzsch, the Interior Minister who had presented the bill to the parliament, the Commission for Land Improvement (\textit{Flurbereinigungskommission}) was called into existence.\(^{46}\) Managed by bureaucrats and surveyors (who were also civil servants), the Commission for Land improvement dealt with 124 cases of land consolidation in its first year alone, showing that there had indeed been a demand for land consolidation.\(^{47}\) Considering that the state also carried most of the costs associated with these projects, this too would help to explain the law’s initial popularity. Indeed, between 1886 and 1923, the government performed 896 land consolidation projects, effectively consolidating 312,257 acres of land for 73,400 landowners.\(^{48}\) Granted, in the big scheme of things, 300,000 acres was not that much land, and in later periods, especially after the Second World War, Bavarian agriculture would see a much

\(^{45}\) See “Gestez die Flurbereinigung betreffend,” Articles 3 and 18. A complete copy of the law (edited again in 1899) can be found in Haag and Brettreich, \textit{Flurbereinigungsgesetz}, 18-34.
\(^{46}\) Until after the First World War, the Interior Minister would also oversee the Commission for Land Consolidation. For more on the organization of the Commission for Land Consolidation, see Siegfried Kast, “Organisation und Verwaltung,” in \textit{100 Jahre Flurbereinigung in Bayern}, 68-98, here 68-69, 87; and “Königliche Verordnung, die Flurbereinigungs-Kommission betreffend,” in Haag and Brettreich, \textit{Flurbereinigungsgesetz}, 179-180.
\(^{47}\) Schlögl, \textit{Bayerische Agrargeschichte}, 185.
more significant degree of property consolidation.\textsuperscript{49} In the end, in the period before the First World War, the government was simply overwhelmed by the number of land consolidation cases that it accepted, and before long, a considerable back-log of projects sat on the desk of the Commission for Land Improvement.

This was an unfortunate development that gradually left a negative impression of the commission in the minds of many, given that it could take years for a project to be seen to completion.\textsuperscript{50} However, that any land consolidation happened at all before 1914, or that the Bavarian government was able to create a bureaucracy to oversee land consolidation was largely due to the work of the Agricultural Association, which had used its platforms of public discourse and its network of personal connections within the government to shape and then create the legal structures necessary to perform land consolidation. Even though the government did not ultimately carry out as many land consolidation projects as reformers wanted, later studies indicated that the government had indeed raised the value and production levels of the land by an order of 11 million marks (according to one study published in 1905).\textsuperscript{51} And without a doubt, it was the peasantry whom land consolidation helped the most, given that it was peasant lands which had been most fragmented in the first place. This much was acknowledged years after the fact. As the historian Alois Schlögl points out, the government’s then-representative body for peasant farmers, the \textit{Landesbauernkammer}, recognized that land consolidation had indeed been

\textsuperscript{49} To add some perspective as to how much (or how little) land had been consolidated in Bavaria until 1923, according to the Bavarian Bureau of Statistics, in 1907, about 10,475,383 acres of land in Bavaria were devoted to agricultural production. Assuming this number is relatively similar to the 1923 numbers, one could say that by 1923, the government had consolidated about 3 percent of all agricultural lands. See \textit{Die Landwirtschaft in Bayern: Nach der Betriebszählung von 12. Juni 1907} (Munich: Lindau, 1910), 14. For more on land consolidation as it proceeded after the Second World War, see \textit{100 Jahre Flurbereinigung in Bayern}.


\textsuperscript{51} Friedrich Brettreich, \textit{Die Verhältnisse der Landwirtschaft in Bayern} (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1905), 97. Also see Schlögl, \textit{Bayerische Agrargeschichte}, 187; and Lorenz Bundscherer, ―Förderung der Landwirtschaft: Strukturmängel als Folge der Landnahme," in \textit{100 Jahre Flurbereinigung in Bayern}, 172-184, here 173-174 for similar numbers. According to Schlögl, by 1921, the value of consolidated land in Bavarian was 27 million marks.
one of the government’s most important initiatives for making Bavarian agriculture more productive and for helping to further integrate the Bavarian peasantry into a burgeoning market economy.\textsuperscript{52} But then, creating a legal and bureaucratic structure that managed land consolidation projects was just one step. The next step, that is, reaching out to peasant farmers and convincing enough of them that consolidation was to their advantage, or that the government could adequately perform such a task, turned out to be another story entirely, and as always, was a task for which the Association was less prepared.

\textit{ii. Peasant agricultural education}

For most of the Association’s existence, agricultural education played a logical and important role in the Association’s designs for agricultural development in Bavaria.\textsuperscript{53} However, much of the organization’s focus on agricultural education throughout the nineteenth century was spent on forms of higher education that did not directly benefit the peasantry. Despite the large number of teachers who filled the Association’s ranks, it was not really until the 1890s that the Association found much success with peasant agricultural education. There were several reasons for this, but overall, the story of the Association and its involvement in peasant education is, at its heart, a narrative about the organization’s collective failure to take action. As illustrated in the story of land consolidation laws or hail insurance, the Association was usually very willing to support agricultural programs that benefitted all farmers. This was especially true once the Association had government approval. Peasant education however, quite clearly provided little benefit to large land owners or the government (after unification), and even from the Association’s perspective, there was little immediate gain to be had from further supporting

\textsuperscript{52} Schlägel, \textit{Bayerische Agrargeschichte}, 187.

\textsuperscript{53} HdbL GC 12, “Satzungen des Landwirthschaftlichen Vereines in Bayern” (1874), § 3.
peasant education. Therefore, absent a personal champion (i.e. a Jodlbauer or a Wolfanger) who wished to push for reforms, and also lacking any push for educational reform from below, the Association almost completely ignored agricultural education for the peasantry between 1871 and the early 1890s.

What is perhaps most strange about the Association’s tepid interest in further developing agricultural education for the peasantry, is that the organization actually helped the government to institutionalize educational reforms with some success in the decades leading up to unification.54 Here too developments were slow going. Only after 1848 — the Association had had very little to do with peasant education in the first half of the nineteenth century — and only at the specific behest of the government, did the Association begin to seriously focus on the educational needs of the peasantry.55 Specifically, the government, and Maximilian in particular, wanted to see agricultural schools set up in each of Bavaria’s eight administrative districts that would disseminate modern agricultural techniques amongst the peasantry. Playing an important role in the government’s desire to establish these schools was a clear wish, so shortly after 1848, to strengthen the “moral conservatism” of the peasantry, to bind them more closely together with

54 HdbL GC 936, correspondence between the Commerce Ministry and the Association, and other documents regarding the founding of Kriestackerbauschulen, 1849. Regarding agricultural schools in the first half of the nineteenth century, see Stefanie Harrecker, Der Landwirtschaftliche Verein in Bayern, 1810-1870/71 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2006), 98-105; Schlögl, Bayerische Agrargeschichte, 335-341, 473-480; and Hans Dörfler, Die bäuerliche Berufsbildung: ihre Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft in Bayern (Munich: Carl Gerber, 1932), 1-93. A number of agricultural schools of different types were founded in Bavaria before 1848, the most notable being at Weihenstephan outside of Munich, and many of their teachers and directors were actively involved in the Association. However, none of these earlier schools found much success with the peasantry, generally because their level of education was either too high, too theoretical, or had little to do with agriculture. The costs of the schools were also often very high, and their location usually impractical.

55 HdbL GC 936, correspondence between the Commerce Ministry and the Association, and other documents regarding the founding of Kriestackerbauschulen, 1849. Regarding agricultural schools in the first half of the nineteenth century, see Stefanie Harrecker, Der Landwirtschaftliche Verein in Bayern, 1810-1870/71 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2006), 98-105; Schlögl, Bayerische Agrargeschichte, 335-341, 473-480; and Hans Dörfler, Die bäuerliche Berufsbildung: ihre Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft in Bayern (Munich: Carl Gerber, 1932), 1-93. A number of agricultural schools of different types were founded in Bavaria before 1848, the most notable being at Weihenstephan outside of Munich, and many of their teachers and directors were actively involved in the Association. However, none of these earlier schools found much success with the peasantry, generally because their level of education was either too high, too theoretical, or had little to do with agriculture, while the costs of the schools were also often very high, and their location usually impractical.
the landed aristocracy (who were to also help with funding and leading these institutions). 56

Having their marching orders, the Association was also all too willing to help, and over the next
decade, the organization did a great deal of work in setting up and managing these schools. 57

Beginning with boys as young as fourteen who had finished their primary education, the
plan was that peasant children who qualified for the schools would live together with aristocratic
farmers and learn modern agriculture practices directly from them through observation and
implementation. Agricultural theory was to be minimized, courses restricted to two years. 58

Several of these new schools were eventually started up, but then, none of them ultimately
attracted many students from the peasantry. Rather, their rosters were predominantly filled with
middle class and upper class boys who were either interested in careers as large farmers or
wanted to join the expanding Bavarian bureaucracy. 59

Student numbers remained small, with no
more than a dozen students ever participating at one time. Making matters worse, the support
that had been expected from landed aristocrats was never as forthcoming as planned. By the
early 1860s, all of the schools were being funded and organized by the government or the
Association, and indeed, the entire enterprise verged on disaster. Only five of the schools were
ever actually started, and one of them, the school in Swabia, closed its doors in 1860 due to lack
of financial support. 60

That the Association’s first venture into peasant education started so ignominiously had
much to do with unforeseen logistical and financial issues. However, there were also other
hindrances that lay beyond the Association’s control. Above all, the quality of lower education

56 Harrecker, Landwirtschaftliche Verein, 310-311. Also see Marita Krauss, Herrschaftspraxis in Bayern und
57 See HdbL GC 900-906 for records pertaining to the district agricultural schools (Ackerbauschulen).
58 HdbL GC 936, correspondence between the Commerce Ministry and the Association, August 8, 1849.
60 Harrecker, Landwirtschaftliche Verein, 311, 315-316; Haag, Die Landwirtschaft in Bayern, 679-681; and Die
Landwirtschaft in Regierungsbezirk Oberbayern (1885), 526-535.
in Bavaria in the 1850s was comparatively poor, and this posed a serious barrier to the government and the Association’s plans for peasant education. With literacy rates hovering somewhere around 50 percent in most parts of rural Bavaria, teaching peasant children anything, much less agricultural subjects, proved to be an uphill battle. Then there was also problems with Maximilian. The man who once claimed that he would have become a professor had he not been king, generally held teachers in great suspicion because of the overarching role that they had played in the 1848 revolutions. Though he wanted to improve education, Maximilian first had to overcome his own misgivings about the teachers themselves. With time, Maximilian realized however that he need not fear teachers, but rather, that he could use them to shore up Bavarian patriotism during a time when Bavaria’s identity and political future as an independent state seemed in jeopardy. It was in this spirit that he recruited the Association to assist with the agricultural schools. However, upon discovering how poorly-run Bavaria’s elementary

61 On general education in Bavaria up to unification, see Monika Fenn and Hans-Michael Körner, “Das Schulwesen,” in Das Neue Bayern, von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart: Die Innere Entwicklung, ed. Alois Schmid, vol. 4, bk. 2 of Handbuch der Bayerischen Geschichte, eds. Max Spindler/Andreas Kraus (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2007), 395-435, here 399-411; Max Liedtke, “Von der erneuerten Verordnung der Unterrichtspflicht (1802) bis 1870: Gesamtdarstellung,” in Handbuch der Geschichte des bayerischen Bildungswesens (HGBB), vol. 2, ed. Max Liedtke (Bad Heilbrunn: Klinkhardt, 1993), 11-133; and Karl Schleunes, Schooling and Society: The Politics of Education in Prussia and Bavaria, 1750-1900 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 50-160. In the years before 1848, Ludwig I’s deep mistrust of school teachers had ensured that elementary education for the general population had fallen into virtual nonexistence, especially in large swaths of rural Bavaria. Where literacy rates are difficult to measure for this earlier period, William R. Lee suggests that there were some parts of Bavaria where as much as 60 percent of the population was illiterate, and this was as late as the 1840s. Though this particular number surely represents the extreme — 50-60 percent literacy rates were probably more likely by the 1850s — the point nonetheless stands: education levels amongst the peasantry by the mid-nineteenth century were very low. See William R. Lee, Population Growth, Economic Development and Social Change in Bavaria, 1750-1850 (New York: Arno Press, 1977), 338-355, here 345.

62 Schleunes, Schooling and Society, 140, 147.

63 Manfred Hanisch, Für Fürst und Vaterland: Legitimitätsstiftung in Bayern zwischen Revolution 1848 und deutscher Einheit (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1991), 138; and Schleunes, Schooling and Society, 149. Also see BayHStA Mn 45787, correspondence between Maximilian and the Interior Ministry, which Hanisch and Schleunes both cite.
education system truly was, the government decided to undertake a more serious reform of general education. By the mid 1860s, the Association too was again recruited to help.\textsuperscript{64}

Wanting to pick up where the district agricultural schools had fallen short, in 1867 the government began to funnel funds to county associations which were to be directly invested in rural elementary continuation schools (ländlichen Fortbildungsschulen).\textsuperscript{65} Functioning as a supplement to the regular elementary schools (Volkschulen), the continuation schools basically provided additional training for young peasant boys (6-14 years old) in reading, writing, and basic mathematics. However, all subjects were taught with an agricultural context. This essentially meant that students practiced their reading exercises, for example, from Karl Frass’s agricultural textbook for elementary students, or learned basic math from the perspective of professional needs.\textsuperscript{66} Participation was not mandatory, but as an alternative to the Sunday and holiday schools (Sonn- und Feiertagsschulen), students could opt to enter the elementary continuation schools at no additional costs, with classes also convening in the evenings as often as two or three times a week, and for as long as anywhere from 3 to 10 months.\textsuperscript{67} Teachers, many of whom already taught in the elementary schools (and many of whom were members of

\textsuperscript{64} For more on the development of education under Maximilian II, see Liedtke, “Von der erneuerten Verordnung der Unterrichtspflicht (1802) bis 1870,” in Liedtke, HGBB, vol. 2, 43-48.

\textsuperscript{65} HdbL GC 913, correspondence from the Commerce Ministry to the General Committee, Sept. 5\textsuperscript{th}, 1866. On the government’s wishes to overcome the deficiencies of agricultural education in the late 1860s, see Der landwirtschaftliche Unterricht in Bayern im Jahre 1869 (Munich: Fleischmann, 1870), 1-6. For a general description of the rural elementary continuation schools, see Die Landwirtschaft in Regierungsbezirk Oberbayern (1885), 536-546.


\textsuperscript{67} The Sunday and holiday schools were very similar to the rural elementary continuation schools, in that they simply provided additional elementary education on Sundays and holidays. However, participation in these schools, which in principle were meant to reinforce a confessional education for both boys and girls, was otherwise mandatory, that is, if one did not participate in a professional continuation school, of which the rural elementary schools were one type. See Karlheinz König, “Rahmenbedingungen und Praxis des Unterrichts an den Sonn- und Feiertagschulen in der Residenzstadt München und auf dem Lande,” in Liedtke, HGBB, vol. 2, 282-394.
the Association), received a small sum of money from the government for their work. Oftentimes, their pay was also often supplemented with funds from county associations and local governments.\(^68\) In all cases, class sizes ranged anywhere from four students to 42.\(^69\) As a commentary on the need such schools fulfilled, by 1870, the entire state of Bavaria had around 625 elementary continuation schools with almost 10,000 students in attendance.\(^70\) Five years later, that number was sitting at 1,110 schools with 18,000 students.\(^71\) At face value, this was quite an accomplishment.

In another interesting development, at the same time that the Association and the government focused their attention on elementary continuation schools, another set of schools, known as winter schools (\textit{Winterschulen}), organically sprang up completely apart from any centralized, government directives. As the name suggests, these school convened in the winter months when agricultural work was at a low ebb. Like the elementary continuation schools, they too found success with the peasantry. Though earlier institutions that strongly resembled the winter schools had appeared in Bavaria before, the first school to appear officially as a winter school — and managed to keeps its doors open for more than two years — was founded in 1866 with the help of a local county association in the Middle Franconian town of Ansbach, near Nuremberg.\(^72\) Within the next ten years, their numbers would see a slow increase, up to 13 schools in 1875 with roughly 300 students.\(^73\)

\(^{68}\) Harrecker, \textit{Landwirtschaftliche Verein}, 319; and Dörfler, \textit{Die bäuerliche Berufsbildung}, 119-123. Teachers were paid between 20 and 100 gulden.

\(^{69}\) BayHStA ML 135 and 136, annual reports for 1866 and 1867.


\(^{72}\) HdbL GC 913, statutes and curricula for the Ansbach winter school. According to Schlögl, there were other schools in Bavaria that started up before the one in Ansbach that resembled winter schools, including one in Würzburg in Lower Franconia (1861), Kirchheimbolanden in the Palatinate (1864), and Freising near Munich (1866). Where the Würzburg and Kirchheimbolanden schools were eventually recognized as winter schools, the winter school in Freising, along with one in Nördlingen (1869), closed within a few years of being founded. Besides
The curricula in the winter schools varied from school to school, but all of them generally catered to older students who had completed their course work in the elementary continuation schools. Like the elementary continuation schools, the winter schools also often included subjects in math, reading, and writing. Nonetheless, they did focus more on agricultural education than the continuation schools, offering classes in cultivation, fertilizing, the maintenance of animals, farm machinery, and bookkeeping. The cost of attendance was either free of charge or was covered by scholarships, but students had to pay for their room and board, with some of the schools even providing overnight accommodations. Otherwise, the cost of operating the schools, which was low (classes were usually held in public buildings at no expense), was once again provided with the help of local governments and the Association. Compared to the elementary continuation schools, the growth of the winter schools was admittedly small. However, their presence was enough to catch the attention of the Association’s district committees, which, in reports to the government on agricultural education, included descriptions and assessments of the winter schools. Where these earliest assessments were mixed — some districts supported the schools, others remained skeptical about the quality

Ansbach, Würzburg, and Kirchheimbolanden, by 1875, there were winter schools located in Kaiserlautern and Alsenz in the Palatinate, Rosenheim and Landsberg in Upper Bavaria, Augsburg in Swabia, and in Landshut, Deggendorf, Pfarrkirchen, and Passau in Lower Bavaria. There was no winter school founded in Upper Franconia until 1897, in Bamberg. See Schlögl, Bayerische Agrargeschichte, 342-343, 348. Also see Die Landwirtschaft in Regierungsbezirk Oberbayern (1885), 531-535 for a description of the winter schools, with a focus on the school in Landsberg.

73 Tautphöüs, “Zusammenstellung der landwirtschaftlichen Lehranstalten,” 183. The number of winter school referred to above includes the school founded in Würzburg.
74 HdbL GC 916, “Rechenschaftsbericht der landwirtschaftlichen Winterschule in Regensburg für 1868/69,” which includes a brief history of the winter school, a budget, and also shows what courses were offered. Also see Adam Müller’s commentary in “Umschau.” Editorial, Zeitschrift, vol. LVII (1867), 106; and Der landwirtschaftliche Unterricht in Bayern im Jahre 1869, 130-132, which shows what courses the schools were teaching, who was teaching what courses (many people from the Association), and how long the courses ran for.
75 HdbL GC 917, correspondence from the Commerce Ministry, April 18th, 1868; and Tautphöüs, “Zusammenstellung der landwirtschaftlichen Lehranstalten,” 180-183. Also see Harrecker, Landwirtschaftliche Verein, 318-319.

174
or structure of the education that they provided — the winter schools showed promise. Above all, they attracted peasant children, and if for no other reason, in the long-run, the Association and the government both increasingly threw their support behind winter schools.

In a strange twist though, the gains that the Association found with elementary continuation schools and winter schools came to a near standstill after the mid-1870s. Indeed, going by overall numbers alone, the schools showed serious signs of decline. Over the next fifteen years after unification, the total number of elementary continuation schools dropped precipitously, from over a thousand in 1875, down to 465 by 1892. The number of students attending these schools likewise dwindled, from a high of over twenty thousand in 1873, down to 8,500 students by the early 1890s. The winter schools, while avoiding any serious decline in numbers, also showed signs of hitting a plateau. Their total number of schools and students improved slightly through the 1880s and early 1890s, up to 14 schools and around 450 students by 1890. Nonetheless, adding a few new programs and not even two hundred more students was far from a grand success. When compared to their initial growth in the late 1860s and early 1870s, it was clear that the winter schools had hit a wall. Judging alone from the Association’s mysterious silence on these matters, the push for improving agricultural education among the peasantry, which had shown so much promise in the early 1870s, had clearly run out of steam before the decade was even out. Moreover, as the lack of records indicate, until the mid-1890s,

---

76 See Der landwirtschaftliche Unterricht in Bayern im Jahre 1869; Dörfler, Die bäuerliche Berufsbildung, 136-140; and HdbL GC 913, report from Adam Müller on the winter schools, February 28th, 1869.
77 Dörfler, Die bäuerliche Berufsbildung, 163.
78 Haag, Die Landwirtschaft in Bayern, 682. Only two more winter schools were established between 1873 and 1894, and both were in the Palatinate, with one in Zweibrücken in 1883, and the other in Kirchheimbolanden, which had been established in 1861, but was only officially recognized as a winter school in 1885. See Schlögl, Bayerische Agrargeschichte, 345.
little would be done by either the Association or the government to improve or revive an interest in agricultural education.\textsuperscript{79}

There were several reasons for this sudden reversal, but in sum, a lack of coordinated flexibility in the face of changing circumstances drastically reduced the schools’ ability to reach students. The rapid rise and fall of the elementary continuation schools in particular, might be best explained by improving standards in the elementary schools. In short, higher standards of education largely rendered the elementary continuation schools, which tended to focus on elementary education instead of agricultural education, as superfluous. At the same time that the Association and the government had instituted the elementary continuation schools, the government had also begun to standardize general education, enforce school attendance, and also put a greater emphasis on the education of teachers, expanding the number of seminars where teachers were trained.\textsuperscript{80} The results were undeniably positive. By the early years after unification, and perhaps even before, the Bavarian War Ministry noticed a drastic improvement in literacy rates among its recruits. In Lower Bavaria, for example, where the change was very dramatic, the War Ministry had noted in 1866 that almost 25 percent of its recruits from that district had inadequate schooling, that is, they were unable to read, write, or do basic math. By 1879, that number was reduced to 1.3 percent!\textsuperscript{81} In the atmosphere of such success, the rural continuation schools had essentially rendered themselves unnecessary, and then were too slow in

\textsuperscript{79} The Association was well aware that agricultural education in Bavaria was slipping in the 1880s and 1890s, and Otto May’s editorials, among other sources, attest to the Association’s grasp of the situation. See, for example, “Umschau.” Editorial, \textit{Zeitschrift}, vol. LXXXI (1891), 293-304.

\textsuperscript{80} Shleunes, \textit{Schooling and Society}, 148-150.

\textsuperscript{81} Ministerialblatt für Kirchen- und Schul-Angelegenheiten im Königreich Bayern, 1866, vol. 2 (Munich: Straub), 39; and idem., 1880, vol. 2, 169. Cited in Shleunes, \textit{Schooling and Society}, 150. It should be stated though, in spite of these improving numbers, basic education in Bavaria still left something to be desired. As Adam Müller points out (he was also a school inspector), all too often, children who enrolled in the winter schools showed that their comprehension of elementary subjects was very poor, which then forced the teachers to provide remedial education in material that should have already been learned. See “Umschau.” Editorial, \textit{Zeitschrift}, vol. LXV (1875), 165.
reacting to the improved quality of elementary education by actually teaching more professionally-oriented subjects. Indeed, since the schools were voluntary, many peasant families found it more useful to send their children to the Sunday schools, where at least they learned something different from what was being offered in the normal elementary schools.  

The elementary continuation schools could have changed their curricula to offer something that would have been more useful or practical for young peasant children. However, changing the curricula turned out to be very difficult because most of the existing teachers were hardly qualified to train peasant children further in practical agriculture. That this was this case corresponded with a stream of complaints that stemmed from within several circles, including the Association, but also from peasant communities, that teachers at both the elementary continuation schools and the winter schools either knew too little about agriculture, or they focused far too much on theory as opposed to praxis. Where further training existing teachers or hiring more qualified personnel would have helped to solve this problem, given the collapse of

---

82 Some complaints do indeed substantiate that the continuation schools (and perhaps the winter schools as well) did not teach anything that was not already being offered in the normal elementary schools, and that for this reason, peasant families decided not to send their children to the agricultural schools. See Spies, “Die Schulbildung und ihre Beziehungen zur Landwirtschaft.” *Zeitschrift*, vol. LXVIII (1878), 91-95, here 94, where the author says exactly this. Regarding the Sunday schools, in the rural parts of Bavaria, the number of students participating in the Sunday schools remained high into the 1890s. In 1885/86, for example, they had nearly 240,000 students, while the rural continuation schools’ numbers had dropped to 11,000. This being the case, it is clear that peasant families preferred to send their children to the Sunday schools as opposed to the rural continuation schools, which offered much less practical training than advertised. See König, “Rahmenbedingungen und Praxis des Unterrichts an den Sonn- und Feiertagschulen,” in Liedtke, *HGBB*, vol. 2, 290-291.

83 *Der landwirtschaftliche Verein in Bayern* (1905), 18-19. Also see, for example, HdbL Schw. 1.347, “Jahresbericht des Kreis-Comité des landwirtschaftlichen Vereins von Mittelfranken pro 1871,” 16, where the author substantiates the peasantry’s mistrust of agricultural teachers; and “Umschau.” Editorial, *Zeitschrift*, LXVII (1877), 281-282, where Müller complains about the lower agricultural schools’ emphases on theory, but also complains about parents not staying on top of their children, forcing them to go to all of their courses and receiving the appropriate certifications. On the prevalence of theory in agricultural education, beginning in the 1860s and carrying on through the 1870s, the pedagogical views of Justus von Liebig, which placed an emphasis on more theoretical approaches to agricultural education, held great sway within the Association and amongst educators, and this also helps to explain teachers’ continued emphases on theory. For more on Liebig’s influence within the Association, see Harrecker, *Landwirtschaftliche Verein*, 295-308. On Liebig’s influence over agricultural education, see Schlögl, *Bayerische Agrargeschichte*, 478-479. For more on this debate between theory versus praxis in agricultural education in nineteenth-century Germany, see Jonathan Harwood, *Technology’s Dilemma: Agricultural Colleges between Science and Practice in Germany, 1860-1934* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2005), which includes a chapter on how this debate played out in Bavaria’s agricultural colleges.
the German economy in 1873, and then the twenty-year depression that followed, the
Association ultimately decided to do nothing to reverse the downward slide of the schools. With
no other solutions at hand, the elementary continuation schools continued to function after 1875,
but saw their numbers drastically diminish. The winter schools, which had never been as
popular as the elementary continuation schools anyway, ultimately shared an altogether different fate. Nonetheless, they too would have to survive the lean years that followed 1873. 84

From the perspective of the Association and the government, by the mid-1870s, it was
not immediately clear whether further investment in agricultural education was money well spent. Even before unification, Bavaria’s agricultural sector had shown serious signs of decline in the face of economic change, and the depression of the 1870s did little to improve this situation. Though Bavaria’s industrial sector was still fairly small in the 1870s, it nonetheless outperformed the agricultural sector and raised more capital at a much higher rate, and this despite the depression. 85 Therefore, even though Bavaria’s industrial sector slightly slowed down after unification, no one seriously expected that increased investments in the agricultural education would somehow right the Bavarian economy. 86 In light of these developments, it should be noted however that the government and the Association did not begin to slash funds for education either, and neither was there a noticeable drop in funds that the Association spent on agricultural schools. 87 Rather, at a time when agricultural education needed to reform in

84 Dörfler provides a fairly detailed overview of the problems encountered by the rural continuation schools and the winter schools, and also includes general complaints about them. See Dörfler, *Die bäuerliche Berufsbildung*, 159-214.
87 See and compare the district committee budgets for Upper Bavaria, Swabia, and the Palatinate in HdbL GC 111, 114, and 117. According to Otto May, in 1881/82, over 170,000 marks was spent on the elementary continuation schools and winter schools, with money coming from a variety of sources, but primarily from local governments and the Association. In the previous year, May says that almost 200,000 marks had been spent, but then, by 1882/83, the
order to continue reaching peasant families, the additional money, direction, and personal will to reinforce change was simply not there.

Though difficult to substantiate, it is possible that the *Kulturkampf* also played some role in diminishing the Association’s will to address peasant education. As already noted, the Association generally went out of its way to avoid confrontations with the government, and during the 1870s, education rested squarely in the middle of a conflict between the royal cabinet, the parliament, and the Catholic church. That education served as a political tool was of course nothing new in Bavaria, and the Association had certainly shown little difficulties participating in Maximilian’s efforts to use the education system to bolster up his own regime before unification. Supporting the monarchy was hardly controversial though, and this was just as true in the 1870s and 80s as it had been in the 1860s. The issue in the 1870s was whether or not Bavaria’s churches would continue to play an overarching role in the education system. In keeping with Bismarck’s *Kulturkampf*, Johann von Lutz wanted to completely dissect churches from the realm of education in Bavaria. The Patriot-dominated lower house of parliament, however, did everything in its power to stymie Lutz’s plans, even going so far as to withhold money from the budget that was to be spent on education. From the perspective of the Patriots, it was better that nothing be spent on education at all than to have tax money support an educational system with which they and most Bavarians disagreed. Either way, with the atmosphere surrounding education having turned so toxic, it is little surprise that the Association avoided the issue of agricultural education altogether by the end of the 1870s.

In closing, it should be stated that the Association supported other means of popular education besides schools, including local agricultural libraries, and also traveling agricultural teachers who were usually associated with the winter schools (Wanderlehrer). The agricultural libraries in particular, which were numerous and also cost very little to manage, were surely of tremendous help to peasant farmers who were literate and interested in learning about more modern methods of agricultural production. Overall however, it is clear that the Association’s efforts in popular agricultural education between 1871 and the early 1890s fell extremely short. All too often, this relative standstill in education caused civil servants to react in disgust. But rather than looking more critically at how the government continued to mishandle peasant education, in typical fashion, they placed most of the blame at the feet of peasant farmers, complaining about ignorant peasants who steadfastly held onto older methods and all too slowly integrated their operations into a wider market economy. Where descriptions such as these were likely grounded in experience, without more funding or proper direction from the government, the Association could actually do very little when it came to educating the peasantry. In the short-term, the Bavarian peasantry was generally left to educate itself on the dizzying economic transformations that it was only just beginning to experience. To the dismay of Bavaria’s bureaucrats, this resulted in a transformational process that was often characterized by fits, starts, failures, and a relative lack of change.

89 On agricultural libraries, see the records pertaining to agricultural libraries in BayHStA ML 66; HdbL GC 86; and also the district committee budgets in HdbL GC 111, 114, and 117. The Association first grounded agricultural libraries in the first half of the nineteenth century, and over the years, this was a steady and altogether positive development. They cost very little to operate, and by 1890s, there was a library in nearly every county. On Wanderlehrer, see BayHStA ML 102; and Dörfler, *Die bäuerliche Berufsbildung*, 215-230. Like the winter schools, the appearance of Wanderlehrer in the late 1860s/early 1870s was also a good development, but they were themselves still far too disorganized during these early decades and the teachers often lacked in training and education. Again, like the winter schools, they would take on an increasing importance after the 1890s.

Reflecting on the overall effectiveness of the Association between 1871 and 1895, it is abundantly clear that the Association’s relationship with the government often hindered the organization as much as it may have helped. Because it wished to avoid reproach from a government that otherwise reserved very little consideration for Bavaria’s agricultural sector, the Association effectively reduced its own capacity to further develop agricultural production. This was especially true with the peasantry, who made up the largest class of farmers within Bavaria, but whose interests largely went unrepresented within the Association. This is not to say that everything that the Association did was either a failure in regard to the peasantry, was done to only help agricultural elites, or was done with a lack of care. As with the hail-insurance program or land consolidation projects, there were times when the Association set out to make changes in government policy that had a significant and positive impact on agricultural production. Sometimes, these efforts even went so far as to help the peasantry. Still, even in those areas where the Association found success, it was clear that the organization was very limited in what it could realistically do when it came to encouraging agricultural developments, and the peasantry was the group which suffered the most because of it.

Metaphorically speaking, and by way of concluding this examination of the Association and its activities, nothing reflected the Association’s limitations more than its Central Agricultural Festival, also known as the Oktoberfest. Though it was no longer really true by the 1870s, once upon time, the Munich Oktoberfest had actually been synonymous with agriculture. Having coalesced around a trifecta of festivals being celebrated in October, the Association’s Central Agricultural Festival, first held in 1811, served for a while as the heart and soul of the...
festival that would come to be known as Oktoberfest. Originally intended to promote the development of agriculture through the celebration of agricultural achievements, the Oktoberfest nonetheless found itself gradually co-opted for ulterior purposes. The monarch and the royal family, for one, had always been associated with the festival, but their active participation and growing presence in the festival’s rituals had the effect that the Oktoberfest increasingly resembled a national Volksfest meant to celebrate the royal family and all things Bavarian. The city of Munich too was quick to recognize the commercial potential of the festival, and it was the municipal government of Munich that took over its primary management after 1819. That the imagery and presence of agriculture remained as part of the festival almost went without saying, given the agrarian character of nineteenth-century Bavaria. It was essentially for this reason that the Association’s agricultural festival, which had once occupied the center of the Oktoberfest, continued to enjoy a prominent position alongside the Oktoberfest well into modern times, albeit as a side show.

Overshadowed by the non-agricultural activities of the Oktoberfest, the Association and the Central Agricultural Festival nonetheless benefited from their continued association with the Oktoberfest. Above all, staging the Central Agricultural Festival together with the Oktoberfest

---

91 The origins of the Oktoberfest are complex, with a horse race, the celebration of (then) Prince Ludwig’s marriage, and then the agricultural festival being the primary festivals that eventually turned into the Oktoberfest. See Gerda Möhler, *Das Münchner Oktoberfest: vom bayerischen Landwirtschaftsfest zum größten Volksfest der Welt* (Munich: BLV Verlagsgesellschaft, 1981), 7-8.
92 For more on the history of the Oktoberfest up to 1914, see Möhler, *Das Münchner Oktoberfest*; but also Ernst von Destouches, *Säkular-Chronik des Münchener Oktoberfestes (Zentral-Landwirtschaftsfestes) 1810-1910: Festschrift zur Hundertjahrfeier* (Munich: J. Lindauersche Buchhandlung, 1910). For more on the Agricultural Association and its involvement with the festival up to unification, see Harrecker, *Landwirtschaftliche Verein*, 90-97, 278-290; *Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern*, 256-273; and also the records contained in HdbL GC 208-244, most of which however concentrate on the years between 1900 and 1914. The Association’s newsletter also provides reports on the agricultural festival, including occasional descriptions of its exhibitions and the awarding of prizes. Usually, a copy of the program of events was also included as an insert in the newsletters.
guaranteed that the agricultural festival would benefit from thousands of visitors. Likewise, to be so closely associated with the largest Volksfest in all of Germany, a festival that simultaneously celebrated Bavarian nationalism as well as the royal family, was, as ritual experiences go, quite an honor for the Association. Added to this, the government, which was very keen on keeping the agricultural festival as part of the Oktoberfest, usually covered almost all of the agricultural festival’s costs, thus freeing the Association from having to shoulder what was an altogether heavy expense. As a further sign of support, and to ensure that enough people from around the state participated in the festival’s agricultural competitions and exhibitions, the government even went so far as to provide complementary train transportation for participants and their show animals! Reduced fairs were likewise made available for other persons who wanted to attend. All of this was in stark contrast to the festival’s early years, when the government’s lax financial support had caused serious financial difficulties for the Association. Indeed, given that the Association charged an extra (though inexpensive)

93 Möhler, Das Münchner Oktoberfest, 31; and HdbL GC 211, ledger for the Central Agricultural Festival, ca. 1890. As Destouches shows, the number of people in attendance at the Oktoberfest in the late nineteenth century usually numbered upwards and around 50,000 people, and if only a fraction of that number ever attended the agricultural festival, that would still have been quite a number of people. Also, an undated ledger from around 1890 indicates that the Association planned to sell over 6,000 lottery tickets at the Central Agricultural Festival in one particular year, so if that is any indicator of how many visited, then clearly, total attendance was in the thousands. By comparison, the Association hosted numerous other agricultural festivals around Bavaria, but it is unlikely that any of these would have had as many people in attendance. For comparisons, see Fritsch, Landwirtschaftliche Feste in Unterfranken, where descriptions and occasional numbers for festivals in Lower Franconia are provided.

94 HdbL GC 100, budgets for the General Committee; and HdbL GC 211, correspondence and data pertaining to the agricultural festival, 1867-1890. After unification, the government continued to pay an enormous sum of money to the General Committee in order to cover the expenses of the agricultural festival, indeed, usually as much or more money than the government contributed altogether to the operating budget of the General Committee. That being said, the government’s contributions to the Central Agricultural Festival did not always cover all of the costs, but even in those cases where it did not, the government’s contributions certainly covered most of the costs. Regarding the government’s wish to see the agricultural festival continue in its place with the Oktoberfest, in 1865, the Association approached the government about separating the livestock show away from the main festivities. No less than the king himself however insisted that the animals remain right where they were because, as Ludwig believed, they were an indispensable part of the festival. See Harrecker, Landwirtschaftliche Verein, 289-290.

95 See “Programm zu dem Central-Landwirtschafts-Feste zugleich Kreisfeste für Oberbayern, in München 1875,” in Zeitschrift, vol. LXV (1875), S1-2, where directions for the use of train transportation is provided for those who wanted to attend to the Oktoberfest.

96 See chapter two.
admission for entry into the agricultural festival, there were some years where the Association even made a profit.\textsuperscript{97} This was certainly more than could be said for the festival as a whole, which always consumed an extraordinary amount of funds, and which, year after year, failed to recoup its losses.\textsuperscript{98}

Staged on the left-hand side of the Theresienwiese (the large open field where the Oktoberfest is still held today), the Central Agricultural Festival provided much to see and experience for those who took an interest in agriculture. Lasting from a week to two weeks, the agricultural portion of the Oktoberfest included everything from demonstrations and mock-ups of dairy production to exhibitions on soy beans or potatoes. Agricultural products, usually crafts of various sorts, were also sold, and animals too played an important role in the festivities, with numerous types and breeds of livestock being on display for farmers to examine, from cattle to horses, even fish. Displays of agricultural machines featured very prominently, with companies taking the opportunity to show off their wares, sometimes going so far as to raffle off their machines in the attempt to land a toehold in an untapped market. In some years, the Association managed to secure a spot for some of the festival’s exhibitions in the Glass Palace, a very large and grand exhibition hall constructed by Maximilian II (modeled on London’s Crystal Palace), and which was not located very far from the Theresienwiese. Seminars and lectures on agricultural production were also very common, and indeed, the Association also used the festival as an opportunity to hold sittings of the General Committee, sometimes even opening

\textsuperscript{97} HdbL GC 100, budgets for the General Committee. Admission costs varied, but were never more than a few kreuzer or pfennig.
\textsuperscript{98} See Destouches, \textit{Säkular-Chronik}, which lists the expenses and profits for most every year that Oktoberfest was celebrated.
them to the general membership of the Association so as to facilitate discourse between the leadership and the organization’s members.99

Beyond showcasing model agricultural methods, machines, and products, the agricultural festival was also a chance for the Association to reward the initiatives of those who had supported particular agricultural enterprises over the previous year, and in general, to encourage those who put modern agricultural techniques into practice. The absolute high point of every festival was almost surely the judging of prize cows, which included having the monarch, or later, either Luitpold or Prince Ludwig, handing out the awards, and the winning cow being placed on display behind the royal tent. However, besides the judging of cows and other livestock, the Association also handed out numerous other awards, most of which actually had monetary prizes attached to them.100 Taken together, these awards revealed quite a bit about the ideals of the Association. Awards were handed out to farmers who did the most to improve their farms, meaning, those who had turned their farms into more efficient capitalist enterprises, but also to those who had done the most to try and educate themselves or had successfully applied modern methods of agricultural production on their farms; the Association handed out awards to priests, bureaucrats, and agricultural teachers who introduced methods of agricultural production in their local communities; awards were handed out to agricultural laborers who had gone above and beyond the call of duty, or were given out in recognition of those who had faithfully worked for the same employer for fifteen or thirty years; and lastly, the Association handed out awards to entire communities that had worked together in improving local agricultural production.101 From

99 Möhler, *Das Münchner Oktoberfest*, 31-33. Also see HdbL KC Schw. 1.341, which includes programs, correspondence, and the published personal memories of Max Kolb concerning past festivals.

100 Haag, *Die Landwirthschaft in Bayern*, 791. Between 1871 and 1888, the Association spent over 100,000 marks on prizemoney for the Oktoberfest.

101 The criteria for awards was published ahead of time in the central newsletter and can be found either in the body of the newsletters themselves or as inserts. This particular list of awards and criteria was taken from “Programm zu dem Central-Landwirthschafts-Feste,” in *Zeitschrift*, vol. LXV (1875), but it is more or less identical to the awards
top to bottom, the awards, which were distributed among several hundred recipients, firmly declared to the public what the Association recognized as ‘good’ agriculture, and in the case of the awards for agricultural laborers, went so far as to reinforce older social hierarchies.\textsuperscript{102}

If handing out awards to agricultural laborers for their service was unintentionally patronizing, the royal family’s prominent place within the ceremonies and rituals of the agricultural festival was not a coincidence. Dating back to its earliest years, the kings of Bavaria had always joyfully participated in the agricultural festivities, judging animals and handing out awards. Only Ludwig II rarely participated, but in his stead, either a senior cabinet minister, or later Luitpold or Prince Ludwig prominently featured in the Association’s ritual display of solidarity between the royal house and Bavarian agriculture. Usually, it was a member of the royal house who presided over the opening of the festivities, and likewise, it was the royal tent that presided over the parade of show animals and decorated carts each representing the different districts of Bavaria that passed directly before it. And if all of this was not enough to affirm the Association’s special relationship with the royal house, erasing all doubt was the place of honor that the Association was afforded within the royal tent, with senior members of the General Committee meeting with the king on the first morning before the festival and even joining him in his tent for the opening ceremony.\textsuperscript{103}

All of these festivities were indeed harmless enough, yet it should also be pointed out that the Central Agricultural Festival was not the only agricultural festival that the Association hosted, with many other similar, smaller festivals being staged across Bavaria, often on an

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See “Umschau.” Editorial, \textit{Zeitschrift}, vol. LXVIII (1878), 444-449, here 444-445, where Müller comments on the shrinking number of awards that were handed out to agricultural laborers for years of long service. He explains that fewer people are receiving these awards because advancements in agriculture are gradually rendering the work of agricultural laborers as unnecessary, and that this trend has nothing to do with diminishing quality of the workers.\textsuperscript{102}  
\item Möhler, \textit{Das Münchner Oktoberfest}, 40-42; and “Programm zu dem Central-Landwirthschafts-Feste,” insert in \textit{Zeitschrift}, vol. LXV (1875), S1-2.\textsuperscript{103}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
annual basis.¹⁰⁴ Unlike the Oktoberfest, the heyday of these smaller festivals had definitely come and gone, with the Association intentionally focusing more of its attention on agricultural trade fairs by the 1870s.¹⁰⁵ However, other than a relative lack of festive activities associated with the trade fairs, there was much that was otherwise similar between them and the agricultural festivals. Altogether, there were quite a few of these agricultural shows — both festivals or fairs — that appeared across Bavaria, many of them on an annual basis, and sometimes even joined together with annual district-wide gatherings. Looking at the festivals specifically, they more or less followed the same pattern as laid out by the Central Agricultural Festival. This included, again, agricultural exhibitions, competitions, and agricultural wares for sale, parades, dances, and sometimes even fireworks, all of it packaged in the same agricultural-patriotic flair that shrouded the Oktoberfest.

Neither was it unusual for a representative of the royal family, usually Prince Ludwig, to appear at the festivals and fairs, once again participating in the judging of animals, handing out awards, and inspecting the exhibitions. When a representative of the royal house was unavailable, a high-ranking state official would sometimes take the place of honor. In the meantime, resemblances of the monarch would be prominently displayed somewhere within the grounds of the agricultural shows, and at some point during the ceremonies, the monarch would be publicly honored and praised. Unlike the Oktoberfest, the central government did not usually step in to cover the costs of these lesser festivals and fairs. Instead, it was local governments at the district, county, and municipal levels that covered their expenses, with the Association also

¹⁰⁴ On these smaller agricultural festivals and exhibitions, see, above all, Fritsch, *Landwirtschaftliche Feste in Unterfranken*; but also Harrecker, *Landwirtschaftliche Verein*, 287-290; the records contained in HdbL KC Schw. 1.418-1.421; and the Association’s newsletters, both the central as well as the district newsletters, which provide occasional commentary and descriptions of these exhibitions and smaller festivals.

¹⁰⁵ Between 1848 and the mid 1860s, the number of agricultural festivals throughout Bavaria initially skyrocketed, but then, after no small amount of complaints, including a few coming from the Association, that these festivals were not accomplishing the intended goal of developing agriculture and that they were too expensive, these types of smaller “Oktoberfests” gradually began to recede in number.
lending its support where necessary.\textsuperscript{106} Compared to the Oktoberfest, the overall expense associated with these festivals and trade fairs was considerably smaller. Nonetheless, where these lesser festivals and trade fairs were reduced in scale, their purposes were very similar to the purpose of the Oktoberfest, and that was to encourage both the development of agriculture as well as Bavarian patriotism. That the Association’s loyalist image was oftentimes reaffirmed through these festivals and fairs was simply an added benefit.

What is indeed much more questionable though, is to what degree the Central Agricultural Festival or any of the other many festivals or fairs that the Association hosted actually spurred further development of agricultural production amongst the peasantry. Without a doubt, many farmers of peasant background would have attended the Central Agricultural Festival and the lesser agricultural shows, and perhaps many were even astounded or encouraged by the advances in agricultural production that they saw at the exhibitions. It is unlikely however, given the poor economic state of Bavaria’s peasantry, that very many peasant visitors took what they saw at the festivals and then turned around and put it into practice. Being witness to technological advances was not the same as having the means to put modern agricultural methods into practice, and this was surely the case for Bavaria’s peasantry, who complained bitterly through the 1870s and 1880s about debt and a general lack of credit that too often impeded their ability to implement further developments.\textsuperscript{107} This is not to say that the festivals and trade fairs were a complete waste, even for the peasantry. Ultimately, the impact of these agricultural shows must remain unmeasured. However, that the Association’s plans for agricultural developments wholeheartedly included fairs and festivals while more generally

\textsuperscript{106} Ministerium des Innern, \textit{Die Maßnahmen auf dem Gebiete der landwirtschaftlichen Verwaltung in Bayern, 1897-1903} (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1903), 478.

\textsuperscript{107} For descriptions of the peasantry’s poor financial conditions, see, for example, the data collected in Ministerium des Innern, \textit{Untersuchung der wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse in 24 Gemeinden des Königreiches Bayern} (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1895).
avoiding other more important issues such as peasant credit, peasant debt, or, as noted above, peasant education, said much about where the priorities of the Association lay.

In conclusion, it is fair to say that the Central Agricultural Festival and its junior counterparts scattered across Bavaria accurately reflect how the Association dealt with the peasantry between 1871 and 1895: the Association was very good at putting on a display of what modern agricultural production could look like, but then altogether failed to focus its attention on projects or activities that might empower the very peasantry it wanted to help. When it came to working together with the state, the Association was simply much better situated, and those state-run programs that the Association successfully saw into existence, such as the hail-insurance program or the land consolidation project, duly reflected the good working relationship that the Association enjoyed with the government. Unfortunately however for the Association, its commitment to the government was not always reciprocated with additional responsibilities or more direction, and just as the Central Agricultural Festival was a side show to the Oktoberfest, the Association too remained little more than a side show to Bavarian politics and the interests of the Bavarian government.

Herein lay the greater problem for the Association: for the first two and half decades following Bavaria’s entry into the German Empire, the Bavarian state government simply was not that interested in Bavaria’s agricultural sector. Rather, if that sector of the economy was going to change at all, as government policy officially stated, the peasants would have to change it themselves. Still, putting aside the question as to whether or not the government’s off-hands approach was the wiser choice, what the Association nonetheless failed to do was to adequately represent the voice and needs of the Bavarian peasantry in the context of dramatic economic and social change that marked the first two decades after Bavaria’s entry into the German Reich. For
this reason above all others, the peasantry actually put very little stock in the Association ever affecting real change or representing its interests. Ignored by the government and ignored by the peasantry, the Agricultural Association was, as a result, frozen in place, and so long as this was this case, neither the Association nor the state would be able to do much more to further improve on the development of agricultural production in Bavaria.
CHAPTER 6
THE ASSOCIATION AND DETERIORATING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN BAVARIA’S AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

By the early 1890s, the Association could look back on the period since unification and rightly claim more than a few successes. It had assisted in passing several pieces of agricultural legislation; it continued to publish a popular almanac; the Central Agricultural Festival continued to attract large numbers of visitors every year, as did many of the other smaller festivals and fairs that the Association hosted throughout Bavaria; and by 1895, after 85 years of existence, the Association had grown to over 65,000 members, nearly double that which it had in 1871. For many within the Association, the growth in members was the ultimate sign of success. But then, as successful as the Association seemed to be, it was equally clear to many that the organization had missed the mark when it came to assisting the peasantry. Agricultural education for the peasantry fell off dramatically after the 1870s, peasants remained entirely absent from the leading bodies of the Association, and even though peasants appeared to join the Association in increasing numbers, in a land where over 2 million men and women worked in the agricultural sector, it was abundantly clear that the Association still represented only a small fraction of Bavaria’s agricultural producers.¹ Making matters more difficult for the Association, economic circumstances in the agricultural sector grew significantly worse after 1873, as the German

---

¹ In a lengthy report on agriculture presented to the lower house of parliament in 1891 by the Center Party representative Eugen Jäger, he points out that only about 11 percent of all members of the Association actually practiced agriculture, and among these, “the middle farmer is seldom represented in this agricultural association, the small farmer almost never.” See HdbL GC 202, printed material on various agricultural themes, 1886-1911.
economy plunged into a depression that would only begin to end by the mid-1890s. It was the peasantry that suffered the most from these circumstances, but the chasm that separated the peasantry and the Association almost completely ensured that the Association’s leadership failed to properly appreciate the peasantry’s needs until it was much too late.

Even though a number of issues troubled the peasantry following unification, two problems in particular, that is, rising operating costs generally related to expanding production, and decreasing returns on the sale of agricultural goods, meant that peasant farmers in Bavaria experienced a significant squeeze on household incomes during the 1870s and 80s. Both of these issues presented specific challenges to the Association and the Bavarian government. Indeed, as was the case with falling agricultural prices, there was actually very little that they could even do to address the problem (which was a problem in and of itself). However, the Bavarian government and the Association were not nearly so powerless when it came to tackling the issue of rising production costs. Facing growing demand from urban markets, Bavaria’s large population of cash-strapped peasant farmers desperately needed credit in order to cover costs associated with adopting more intensive methods of production, and as both the Association and the government realized, increasing the availability of credit within the agricultural sector presented an obvious and viable solution to this problem. Predictably, government action on the matter turned out to be less than forthcoming. However, the government’s familiar unwillingness, taken together with the Association’s failure to produce a comprehensive plan otherwise, did not pass without consequence. Rather, as this final chapter shows, the Bavarian government and the Association’s reticence in adequately addressing the issue of agricultural credit helped to breed that very sense of crisis and discontent in rural Bavaria which ultimately
coalesced into the peasant protest movements of the 1890s. State inaction in an environment of economic turmoil proved decisive in creating social action where there had been none.

Describing the approach into Nuremberg by train only a few years after the turn of the twentieth century, a British travel writer by the name of Mrs. Arthur Bell found it striking how the rural landscape through which she traveled embodied a fascinating yet contradictory mixture of both ancient and modern. On the one hand, the rural world of southern Bavaria reflected a certain homely charm. Picturesque villages dotted finely wooded valleys, and “quaint cottages with red-tiled, gabled roofs clustered about equally characteristic churches with lofty spires and turrets.” In the fields and pastures, groups of peasants, “men, women, and children, [were] all equally hard at work… toiling in a primitive fashion with clumsy agricultural implements, such as the hand-sickle, long since abandoned elsewhere.” Meanwhile, on “the well-kept roads, barefooted women walk[ed] to and from their little holdings, bending beneath burdens far too heavy for them, or dragging loads of sticks and fodder in hand-carts of the roughest description.” From time to time, Mrs. Bell admitted, the occasional steam-thresher, or “the rush past of a motor-car or a group of cyclists” struck a jarring note in what were otherwise “scenes of idyllic simplicity,” leaving her to rue that “even in these unsophisticated districts, the train of the serpent of change is already leaving its disfiguring mark.”

Ironically though, it was the railroad itself, that platform from which Mrs. Bell cast her observations that played the central part in initiating the changes that she so regretted, prying open the economic and social orders of a decidedly unmodern, rural world.

---

After unification, the construction of railroads in Bavaria proceeded at an extraordinary rate, and most of this expansion came about directly as result of government investment. In the decades before unification, the Bavarian government had generally encouraged railroad construction by selling contracts to private companies. But then, the depression had obliged it to step back in and take control of all of the state’s railroad assets, which it did in 1875. Not wanting to fall behind, over the next twenty years, the Bavarian government effectively doubled the length of the state’s railroads, and much of this expansion took the form of local spur lines branching off into the recesses of rural Bavaria.\(^3\) For the government, the intent was clear: connecting producers to more markets generated economic activity, and this was just as true for farmers as it was for industrialists.\(^4\) From the perspective of beleaguered peasant farmers, the railroads did seem to offer real opportunity, none more enticing than the possibility of turning a profit and reducing debts. Tellingly, the giant storehouses of earlier times (Schranen) where farmers had traditionally brought excess grains steadily fell out of use. In their stead, farmers increasingly brought their goods to wholesalers (Großhändler) who sold directly to customers, shipped via the railways, and stored their goods in warehouses located near the rail lines (Lagerhäusern). In time, the next town over or the nearest market ceased to be the central location where farmers sold their goods. Rather, the ubiquitous Lagerhaus swallowed everything that farmers could produce, while more distant markets increasingly determined what farmers would grow, and indeed, how they would farm as well.\(^5\)

---


\(^4\) Mages, *Eisenbahnbau*, 5.

\(^5\) Christoph Borcherdt, *Fruchtfolgesysteme und Marktorientierung als gestaltende Kräfte der Agrarlandschaft in Bayern* (Regensburg: Verlag Michael Lassleben, 1960), 40-44. For more on the modernization of agricultural production in Bavaria, see above, pages 41-44.
But in a story that is by now all too familiar, at the same time that railroads offered these new possibilities, they also introduced new problems. For farmers, none was more serious than the effect that railroads [and improved transportation in general] had on agricultural prices. In short, as one member of the Association noted in 1885, because of the bulk trade that railroads made possible, “our yields no longer have the same effect [on prices] that they once had.” And it was not just domestic bulk trade that affected prices. At the same time that farmers were adjusting to the railroads and the influence of more distant markets, they suddenly discovered that they had to share those markets with agricultural producers, not just from other parts of Germany, but from other countries as well. This was especially true of grains such as wheat and rye, which could be easily transported and stored, and which also happened to rest at the heart of Bavarian agricultural production. Beginning in the 1870s, cheaper foreign grains (of often higher quality) from countries such as the United States and Russia flooded German markets, with the effect that grain prices steadily declined well into the 1880s and 90s. Partly in response to this development, in 1879, the Reich government raised tariff rates on almost all imports into Germany, to include agricultural products, and then raised them again in 1885 and 1887. For its part, the leadership of the Association agreed with these moves, in effect, making an exception to

---


their otherwise blind faith in free market economics. Nonetheless, despite higher tariffs, agricultural prices either stagnated or continued to drop throughout the country during the 1880s, to the effect that a discreet sense of crisis descended upon German agriculture as the 1880s wore on. Increased demand bundled together with lower returns did not spell prosperity.

Laying aside the question as to whether or not higher tariffs provided an adequate solution to falling agricultural prices, the entire issue of tariffs revealed a significant problem concerning the structure of the German state and agricultural development. Specifically, the state agricultural associations, and especially the non-Prussian associations, had almost no way of influencing the policies of the Reich government. On the one hand, this was a logical set of affairs. Because most agricultural policies were set by the state governments, the state associations had little need to influence the Reich government. Furthermore, since the Reich government pursued a policy of free trade throughout the 1870s, the one tool by which it could most directly influence agricultural production, namely tariffs, remained unused. Given these circumstances, no body with the comparable influence of the associations ever formed at the Reich level of governance. Nominally speaking, the German Agricultural Council (Deutscher Landwirtschaftsrat), a body composed of representatives from the state associations, advised the Reich government on matters concerning agricultural production; and in the early years after the founding of the empire, the Bavarian Association, for one, took a sincere interest in the Council, sending notable representatives such as Eduard von Wolfanger to participate in its meetings, and

---

9 In 1878, most of participants at the Assembly of Bavarian Farmers stood behind a proposal put forward by Karl von Thüngen, that the German government should abandon its free trade policies in regard to agriculture. See Uwe Schnée, “Die Wanderversammlungen bayerischer Landwirte, 1857-1914.” Bayerisches landwirtschaftliches Jahrbuch, vol. 52 (1975): 835-896, here 875. For an elaboration on Thüngen’s proposal, see his article, “Ueber Getreidezölle.” Zeitschrift des Landwirtschafulichen Vereins in Bayern, vol. LXIX (1879), 41-47.
publishing reports on the activities of the Council in their central newsletter.\(^\text{10}\) However, within a few years of unification, it was apparent to most that the Council was also a very ineffective lobby organization. Similar in composition to the upper house of the federal parliament (the *Bundesrat*), Prussia’s representatives dominated the Agricultural Council. Before long, the lesser associations, including Bavaria’s, realized that their pull within the Council would remain limited. As an indication of its waning interest, by the end of the 1870s, the Bavarian Association ceased to concern itself very much with the Council at all.\(^\text{11}\)

Unfortunately though, when the Reich government decided to reduce tariff rates in the 1890s — an event that was met with a firestorm of protest from Germany’s agricultural corners — there was very little that the Bavarian association or any of the other associations could do about it. Beginning in the 1870s and then throughout the 80s, the associations, under the umbrella of the German Agricultural Council, had all come to the conclusion that protectionist tariff policies best served to protect agricultural production. Until 1890, the Reich government under Bismarck had basically concurred.\(^\text{12}\) Higher tariffs not only helped to keep agriculture solvent, they also placated several constituencies that were important to Bismarck, namely the Prussian Junkers, but then the Center Party as well, whom Bismarck needed and then used to


\(^{\text{11}}\) The German Agricultural Council met only once a year and was composed of 58 members. Given Prussia’s dominant place within the empire, 17 of the representatives came from Prussian associations alone. The Agricultural Association in Bavaria only sent 6 members, but one of its representatives was also a member of the permanent council, an 8-member body which formed something like an executive council. Eduard von Woffanger, together with another representative from Prussia, actually served as the co-chair of the Council. However, because of Prussia’s disproportionate influence within the council, the Association ceased to actively concern itself with it by the end of the 1870s. See Stefanie Harrecker, *Der Landwirtschaftliche Verein in Bayern, 1810-1870/71* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2006), 348; HdbL GC 659-662; and HdbL KC Schw. 1.488, 1.490, and 1.491, documents pertaining to the founding of the German Agricultural Council, its organizational structure, and its activities, 1871-1894. Even though the newsletter continued to print reports on the Council, there is a noticeable decline in correspondence after the 1870s.

break his dependence on the Liberal party by the end of the 1870s. Looking beyond politics, the tariffs also raised much-needed money for a federal government that did not, in accordance with the constitution, have the authority to raise direct taxes on its own. In any event, even though tariffs barely halted the falling prices of most agricultural products, agriculturalists, as well as the associations, could rest easy that the Reich government appeared to be under the control of someone who favored agriculture. After 1890, this all changed. With Bismarck dismissed by Wilhelm II, the government decided — as part of Wilhelm’s ‘New Course’ — to lower tariff rates in spite of agrarian protests. Suddenly, the agricultural associations found themselves in an awkward position, that is, essentially forced into agreement with the Agrarian League and the peasant associations, groups which ultimately challenged the associations’ very legitimacy.

Considering that there was next to nothing that any of the associations could do to affect the policies of the Reich government, it mattered little where they stood on tariff policies. With the credibility of the agricultural associations severely undermined by the agrarian uproar of the 1890s, it was not long before most of the German state governments moved to separate themselves altogether from the agricultural associations. In Prussia and most of northern Germany, the state governments supplanted the associations with so-called Chambers of Agriculture (Landwirtschaftskammern), that is, state-funded agricultural organizations that purposefully appealed to peasant farmers by granting them more voice within the organizations. Meanwhile, on the political front, the Agrarian League maintained its dominant position as agriculture’s foremost lobby organization with access to the Reich government. At the state levels of governance, alongside the Agrarian League, Catholic peasant associations

---

14 For more on Bismarck’s dismissal within the context of agrarian politics, see Tirrell.
ultimately provided an effective lobby platform as well, especially for peasant farmers. Only in Bavaria had the agrarian agitation of the 1890s produced a successful peasant political party in the form of the Peasants’ League. However, even in Bavaria, it was the Catholic peasant associations that generally proved more attractive to peasant farmers. Either way, as this quick survey of agrarian politics indicates, the political upheavals created by the Reich government’s tariff policies all but finished off most of the agricultural associations. By the turn of the twentieth century, the era of the gentleman-farmer clubs had definitely come to an end.

As usual though, events in Bavaria followed a slightly different tack. At the last possible moment, the leadership of the Bavarian association avoided disaster by finally agreeing to reform the organization’s bylaws with the intent of allowing greater peasant influence within the county and district committees. Forthwith, the General Committee changed its name to the Bavarian Agricultural Council, thereby making its relationship with the state government more clearly official, and the district and county committees underwent a similar name change, dropping the French form of Comité from their names in preference for the German ‘Ausschuss.’ More importantly than these aesthetic changes, the new bylaws also stipulated that at least one third of the county committees be composed of men who represented local villages and who actually practiced agriculture. To improve communication between the district and county committees, the district committees would now also include elected representatives from each of their respective county committees, and similarly, the Agricultural Council in Munich too would include four permanent representatives from each of the district committees. For those who did not live in Munich, the district committees would cover the costs of travel.\(^{16}\) Clearly, none of these changes could be classified as revolutionary, and indeed, they hardly ushered in a new

\(^{16}\) HdbL GC 12, “Satzungen des landwirthschaftlichen Vereines in Bayern” (1895); and HdbL GC 14-15, correspondence concerning suggestions for changes between the General Committee, the district committees, and county committees, 1886-1895.
wave of peasant leadership within the Association. Duly reflecting the Association’s capacity to resist reform, even as late as 1910, over half of the county committees were led by presidents who stemmed from the Bavarian civil service. Nonetheless, membership numbers continued to grow, nearing 115,000 members by 1910, and according to the Association’s own account, roughly ninety percent of these members practiced agriculture or worked in agricultural-related businesses.\(^\text{17}\) Surely, with numbers this large, an increasing percentage of the Association’s membership must have stemmed from the peasantry after 1895. Still, despite these changes, what more clearly stands out about the events of the mid-1890s is that Association once again survived a period of political tumult virtually unscathed.

It would be wrong however to conclude that the peasant unrest that flared up in Bavaria in the 1890s came about solely because of the issue of tariff rates and falling agricultural prices, or that the Association in Bavaria had in no way contributed to that decade’s episode of peasant unrest. To the contrary, while farmers watched agricultural prices plummet in the years following unification, a veritable laundry list of related agricultural issues contributed to their growing sense of unease, issues that generally rested well within the prerogative of the Bavarian state government, and which therefore existed within the prerogative of the Association as well. This included, in stark relief to farmers’ decreasing incomes, such issues as high taxes on landowners, risings debts on farms, the rising cost of agricultural labor, and, above all, a chronic lack of credit available to peasant farmers.\(^\text{18}\) Neither the Bavarian government nor the

\(^\text{17}\) Bayerischer Landwirtschaftsrat, eds., Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern (Munich: Manz, 1910), 26.
\(^\text{18}\) Farr, “Farmers’ Cooperatives in Bavaria,” provides an excellent summary of the economic problems faced by Bavarian agricultural producers. Also see HdbL GC 437, which includes a summary of complaints over taxes from 1870 and submitted to the General Committee from several district committee; and also a printed resolution submitted to the General Committee in 1880 from the Association of Tax and Economic Reformers (Vereinigung der Steuer- und Wirthschafts-Reformer).
Association feigned ignorance when it came to understanding the implication of any of these issues. A cursory glance through the records and correspondence of the government and the Association indicate that both comprehended these problems, and of course, the Association’s forums of public discourse frequently served as a platform for more public debate on these very issues. Moreover, both the government and members of the Association also positively concluded at times during the 1870s and 80s that certain issues absolutely necessitated further government action. However, because the government looked with such low regard on the agricultural sector and the peasantry, and because the Association refused to then challenge the government’s inaction or take up the peasantry’s cause, most of these issues duly festered and metastasized into the peasant protest of the 1890s.

Nowhere was this more true than with the issue of credit and the agricultural sector’s lack thereof. Since at least the late eighteenth century, Bavarian officialdom had realized that for agricultural production to improve significantly, the state’s rather large population of capital-deficient small farmers needed more access to credit to cover the costs associated with transferring production over from more traditional methods.\textsuperscript{19} By the 1870s and 80s, this was made even more obvious: at the same time that the growing presence of markets increasingly pressured farmers into adopting more intensive methods of production, the agricultural sector also witnessed a steady increase in financial expenses that often hindered the improvement of production (e.g. taxes, or high levels of mortgage debt). In the words of historian Ian Farr, by the later 1880s, peasant farmers in Bavaria found their household incomes squeezed from both ends, and because they had so little capital, most peasant farmers found it impossible to adopt more intensive methods of production, nor would they be able to simply work their way out from

under their financial difficulties.\textsuperscript{20} If the agricultural sector was to see any kind of change, it needed capital, and this at a time when credit was already tight due to a general economic depression. And if ever there was a moment when the Bavarian government needed to intervene into the agricultural sector, in this case, by either loosening up credit or somehow stopping the agricultural sector from hemorrhaging cash for ends that did not improve productivity, the 1880s or early 1890s was that time.\textsuperscript{21}

Given however that the Bavarian government generally refused to assess or reexamine the financial burdens that it placed on farmers (e.g. heavy taxes), for the Association at least, increasing the availability of credit appeared as the more promising approach to improve the agricultural sector’s financial health.\textsuperscript{22} Of course, this approach was not without its share of problems. For one, most members of the government and the bureaucracy, subscribing as they did to principles of economic liberalism, reserved a certain aversion toward the government directly intervening into the economy. No one outside of the most radical peasant associations believed that funneling government monies directly into the hands of farmers was a good idea. Putting a positive spin on this approach, the government and its allies repeatedly described the absence of state financial assistance as self help (\textit{Selbsthilfe statt Staatshilfe}), and publically at least, the leadership of the Association fell in line behind the government on this matter, encouraging (or chiding) peasant farmers to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. Having put up an almost obligatory façade of austerity, the Association did not however completely give up on the possibility or need for more government intervention into the agricultural sector (as

\textsuperscript{20} Farr, “Farmers’ Cooperatives in Bavaria,” 166-167, here 167.
\textsuperscript{21} For a summary overview of the situation regarding credit in Bavaria after unification, see Karl von Cetto, “Kapital und Kredit,” in \textit{Die Landwirtschaft in Bayern: Denkschrift, nach amtlichen Quellen bearbeitet}, ed. Heinrich von Haag (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1890), 705-757.
\textsuperscript{22} On the government’s reticence in addressing taxes, see chapter four. Also see Anton Hochberger, \textit{Der Bayerische Bauernbund, 1893-1914} (Munich: Beck, 1991), 24-30.
demonstrated by its actions regarding land consolidation and hail insurance). Likewise, many within the Association believed that the government could and should do more to deal with the issue of agricultural credit, effectively using state power to loosen up credit and thereby providing farmers with more opportunity to reinvest in their farms. Indeed, the government’s most serious action regarding agricultural credit after unification, that is, the founding of the Royal Bavarian Land Improvement Credit Annuity Institution (Landeskulturrentenanstalt), came about directly as a result of the Association’s push for just such a program.23

But then, rather than helping to resolve the issue of agricultural credit, the Institution, for which the Association fought for ten years, ultimately said much more about the government’s unwillingness to seriously address the issue of credit from Munich. Signed into law in 1884 and placed under the direction of the Interior Ministry, the government founded the Institution in order to provide credit at reasonable interest rates for land improvement projects (e.g. irrigation, draining marshlands).24 In the long run, the Institution did nothing to alleviate the deteriorating credit situation in Bavaria’s agricultural sector, for the simple reason that its overly-complicated bureaucratic structure and the absence of any publicity ensured that very few people ever used its services during the first decade of its existence.25 Looking beyond what amounted to pure bureaucratic mismanagement, the government — that is, the royal cabinet — also made it very

23 HdbL GC 664-665, documents concerning the founding of the Credit Annuity Institution, 1876-1884; and BayHStA ML 2662, petition to the lower house of parliament from the Association in Hof, 1876, calling for the founding of a Landescultur-Rentenbank. Also see Heinrich Haag, Das bayrische Gesetz vom 21. April 1884 die Landeskultur-Rentenanstalt betreffend erläutert (Nördlingen: Beck, 1884); “Über die staatliche Organisation des Realkredits.” Zeitschrift des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern, vol. LXXIV (1884), 1-4; Otto May, “Umschau.” Idem, 300-309, here 308-309; and Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern, 192.


clear that it only half-heartedly supported the Institution.\textsuperscript{26} As evidence of the government’s lukewarm support, the Institution largely functioned without paid workers: most of its employees stemmed from within the civil service and were assigned to work within the Institution on a completely voluntary basis. Until 1920, the Institution’s operating budget never exceeded a paltry 6,900 marks per year.\textsuperscript{27} To quote one historian, “the Bavarian government could not have come up with a cheaper solution,” and as a direct result of the Institution’s poor situation, it only took on 21 projects and provided less than 100,000 marks in loans during the first five years of its existence.\textsuperscript{28} If it had it not been obvious before, it was all too obvious now: the Bavarian government showed very little interest in seriously engaging with the issue of agricultural credit through a central credit organization. Within three years of its founding, even the General Committee admitted that the Institution was a failure.\textsuperscript{29}

To be clear, the government had not always acted with such tepid indifference when it came to agricultural credit. Following a failed attempt by the Association in the 1820s to found a government-backed credit association, in 1835 — and again with help of the government — private backers opened the Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank, the first banking institution in Bavaria of its kind to offer credit on property.\textsuperscript{30} Initially authorized by the

\textsuperscript{26} Even though the Interior Minister, Max von Feilitzsch, strongly supported the Institution, he would, over the years, encounter serious difficulties with the Finance Minister, Emil von Riedel, who was far less enthusiastic about the project and later blocked attempts by Feilitzsch to expand the amount of money the Institute could loan. See Gotto, “Von den Anfängen bis zur Weltwirtschaftskrise,” 35-36; and BayHStA ML 2670, correspondence from Riedel, March 9\textsuperscript{th}, 1900.

\textsuperscript{27} Gottom, 21; and BayHStA ML 2679, correspondence between Friedrich Edler von Braun (then director of the Department for Agriculture, Commerce and Trade) and the Institution, and between the Institution and the Interior Ministry, 1914-1920.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibíd., 20-24, here 21. From the German: “Billiger hätte der Staat sich seine Institution in der Tat nicht einrichten können.” As Gottom points out, in the early 1920s, the head of the Institute complained that no one even knew how to reach them, and requested from the Interior Ministry that the Institute at least be listed in the phone book. See BayHStA ML 2679, correspondence dated from Dec. 20\textsuperscript{th}, 1921.

\textsuperscript{29} Ibíd., 24.

\textsuperscript{30} On founding of the Bayerische Hypotheken and Wechselbank, see Anselm Debes, \textit{Die Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank in Gemäßheit des Gesetzes vom 1. Juli 1834 und der Statuten vom 18. Juni 1835 dargestellt}
government to release up to 8 million Gulden in banknotes, the Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank proved to be a reliable source of credit for agricultural ventures in the coming years. Building off of its success, the Association subsequently pushed the government through the 1850s and 60s into directing the Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank to both release more credit and to also create a system for writing bonds (Pfandbriefsystem) to support agricultural development.\footnote{Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern, 187-192; and Schlögl, Bayerische Agrargesichte, 596. For more on the Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank, see Hundert Jahre Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank, 1835-1935 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1935).} In fact, between 1835 and 1869, the Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank was the only bank that provided credit on property in Bavaria, releasing tens of millions of Gulden in mortgages and loans into an agricultural sector starved for credit.\footnote{See HdbL GC 195, correspondence from the Association, March 3rd, 1866; HdbL GC 674, correspondence from Gaisberg on the development of a system for writing bonds; and Harrecker, Der Landwirtschaftliche Verein in Bayern, 331.} Clearly, the agricultural sector needed the credit, but more importantly, as this one episode demonstrates, the government also proved itself quite capable of taking some initiative in regard to the matter of agricultural credit, heeding the advice of the Association, and showing a modicum of concern for Bavaria’s agricultural sector.

As seen in previous chapters though, the government’s concern for the agricultural sector noticeably ebbed beginning in the 1860s. With Maximilian no longer king and the Bavarian state entering into a period of political and economic uncertainty, the government pulled back precipitously from the agricultural sector, and this at a time when demand for agricultural credit began to once again outpace its availability. In an attempt to mitigate the issue, two more private banks, the Bayerische Vereinsbank and the Süddeutsche Bodenkreditbank, opened for business in 1869 and 1871 with the express purpose of underwriting agricultural ventures. But then, both of these banks, as well as the older Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank, showed exactly...
why private banks alone did not suffice. Specifically, the few banks that did provide credit to the agricultural sector tended to focus their attention on the state’s small number of large agricultural businesses. Meanwhile, the peasantry, that group which most needed credit, remained generally beyond the purview of these banks, for the simple reason that investing in peasant farmers promised so little on returns.  

At the same time, neither was it very common for members of the peasantry to seek out the service of banks. According to some observers, it was quite possible that many peasant farmers disliked revealing too much about their personal financial circumstances, and that this at least partly explained why most peasant farmers preferred to do business with rural financiers who typically provided loans but at usurious interest rates. Also likely, many peasants simply did not know or understand how to obtain credit through these newer banking institutions, with most of them positioned very far from the daily experiences of the average peasant farmer.  

Either way, as the Association knew all too well, Bavaria’s financial infrastructure as it existed after unification needed serious attention in order to ensure that the peasantry could reap any benefits associated with the modernization of agricultural production. As one member of the Association sardonically put it,

A farmer who just scrapes by, and for whom it is already difficult enough to make good on his debt obligations is understandably hard of hearing when one preaches at him how he could quickly improve his situation by irrigating his property, by setting up a proper location for the production of fertilizer and the careful use of manure, by using artificial fertilizer, by obtaining better draft animals, better seeds, more appropriate machinery; even if [the peasant] does not say it, he thinks it: ‘Yes, if only these things didn’t cost money.’

---


It should be stated that the government’s decision to pull back from the financial needs of the agricultural sector did not inherently constitute a bad decision. First of all, from the perspective of Munich, locals knew much more about local conditions and local needs, and ultimately, local initiatives quite potentially provided better and less expensive solutions. Secondly, at times, the government’s policy of self help actually appeared to work. For example, in 1866, with the support of the government, the Association had established eight credit associations throughout the state for the express purpose of providing credit to farmers through self-organization. Ultimately, none of these associations made much of a dent in the demand for credit, and indeed, within a few years, most of them had either ceased to operate due to a lack of interest, or had transformed into joint stock companies (Aktiengesellschaft). 36 Not so however with many similar associations that started up a little more than a decade later free of any directives from Munich or the General Committee. By the end of the 1870s, peasant farmers began to gradually pool their own (albeit meager) resources under the umbrella of credit cooperatives, effectively increasing the amount of credit available to the agricultural sector, and also collectivizing the burden of risk amongst peasant investors. 37

36 HdbL GC 415 and 675, correspondence related to the creation of the credit associations; HdbL KC Schw. 1.341, 1810-1910 Hundert Jahre Landw. Verein in Schwaben, 111-112; and Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern, 191, 199-200. Also see Ernst Hohenegg, Raiffeisen in Bayern, 1893-1968: 75 Jahre Bayerischer Raiffeisenverband (Munich: Bayerische Raiffeisen-Zentralasse, 1968), 11; Heinrich Rid and Ernst Hohenegg, Die Landwirtschaftlichen Genossenschaften und ihre Organisation in Bayern (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1951), 8; and Schlögl, Bayerische Agrargeschichte, 605.

37 For the sake of clarity, it should be stated that the credit cooperatives were “legally independent, voluntary, open membership-based form of business, controlled by neither the state nor outside investors but democratically, by the people who are affected by the business,” and that the majority of the cooperatives in Bavaria and elsewhere in Germany had unlimited liability, that is, to continue in the words of Brett Fairbairn, “that those who joined [cooperatives] were putting their entire savings and property on the line, not making a casual consumer decision.” Quote taken from Brett Fairbairn, “History from the Ecological Perspective: Gaia Theory and the Problem of Cooperatives in Turn-of-the-Century Germany.” The American Historical Review, vol. 99, no. 4 (Oct., 1994): 1203-1239, here 1215.
development only took hold slowly, but in the long run, this locally-induced cooperative movement produced undeniably positive results. With the assistance of a local branch of the Association, the first of Bavaria’s agricultural credit cooperatives began operating in the Lower Franconian village of Theilheim in 1877, and within a decade, over four hundred more had been established in Bavaria.

In the long run, the cooperative ideal fell on very fertile soil in Bavaria, with the purchasing power and absolute number of cooperatives of every stripe — credit cooperatives, thresher cooperatives, Konsum cooperatives — growing significantly beginning in the 1890s. However, from the perspective of Bavaria’s struggling agricultural sector, this meant that the development of credit cooperatives proceeded far too slowly during the 1880s, not quickly enough to sate the growing demand for credit amongst peasant farmers, and not quickly enough to stem the peasantry’s growing sense of unease. Part of the blame for the halting development of rural credit cooperatives surely rested with the cooperative movement itself. The brainchild of one Wilhelm Raiffeisen, the early rural credit cooperatives first appeared in the Rhineland in the 1860s. More than just banks, Raiffeisen conceived of rural credit cooperatives as a means of re-empowering the communal rural village, that is, by strengthening the bonds of neighborliness and encouraging individuals from within the community to assist in bearing one another’s financial and existential burdens. By the late 1870s however, Raiffeisen’s movement encountered serious legal troubles. Due in part to their rapid success, the Reichstag conducted an investigation into the Raiffeisen cooperatives and exposed the dubious legal foundations of a multi-level cooperative bank resting on unlimited liability. A reorganization of the Raiffeisen cooperatives followed in the 1870s, but by then, the damage had been done. Above all, the Prussian state government, which had wholeheartedly supported Raiffeisen’s cooperatives before
the Reichstag investigation, withdrew its financial and administrative support from the cooperatives. This would all change later, with the passing of a federal law in 1889 that facilitated the creation of cooperative banks with limited liability, thus regularizing the registration, founding, and operation of all cooperatives throughout Germany. Until then though, and without any further state support, the cooperative movement stalled.  

Mirroring the Prussian government’s withdrawal of support from the Raiffeisen movement, the Bavarian government too looked upon the growth of privately-managed rural credit cooperatives with a great deal of suspicion throughout the 1870s, again, at just that moment when cooperatives began to appear in Bavaria. Practically speaking, this therefore meant that neither the General Committee nor the government in Munich generated a central plan to address development of rural credit cooperatives. However, not everyone within the government or the Association had completely given up on the idea of rural credit cooperatives. Specifically, while the government in Munich and the General Committee looked elsewhere for solutions, certain members of the district committee and the district government in Lower Franconia, namely Louis Löll (secretary for the Lower Franconian district committee) and Friedrich von Luxburg (president of the district committee and district government), decided on their own to encourage the development of cooperatives within their district. As a direct result

---

39 See Haag, Die Landwirthschaft in Bayern, 765, where Rudolf Schreiber, a Regierungsassessor, summarizes the government’s concerns regarding the “shady sides” of credit cooperatives; and “Umschau.” Editorial, Zeitschrift, vol. LXXI (1881), 25-36, here 34, where Otto May praises the development of cooperatives, but insists that more aid from the Association or government will not be forthcoming until more is known about the means, goals, and structure of the cooperatives.  
40 Referred to sometimes as “the king of Lower Franconia,” Friedrich von Luxburg (1825-1905†) was a long-time bureaucrat and aristocrat who served as the district president and president of the district committee for Lower Franconia from 1868 to 1901. He also sat in the Reichstag as a member of the National Liberal party between 1871 and 1881. For more on Luxburg, see Walter Schärl, Die Zusammensetzung der bayerischen Beamtenchaft von 1806 bis 1918 (Kallmünz: Michael Laßeben, 1955), 206, 54, 60; and Peter Süß, Regierungspräsident Friedrich
of their support, Bavaria’s first rural credit cooperatives went into operation, and over the next several years, Lower Franconia saw a veritable explosion of rural credit cooperatives within its borders.

Financially backed with the credit of the State Bank of Würzburg and publically supported by the good name of the district government, by 1881, almost all of Bavaria’s rural credit cooperatives were located in the district of Lower Franconia. In turn, the success of Lower Franconia’s rural credit cooperatives prompted the district committee in Swabia to follow its lead, as they too decided to encourage and financially support the budding development of rural credit cooperatives within their district. Comparing Swabia and Lower Franconia to the rest of Bavaria, local government support and oversight clearly proved critical in whether or not credit cooperatives found success. By 1891, out of 438 rural credit cooperatives operating in Bavaria, over 250 were located in Swabia and Lower Franconia alone, that is, in those districts where the district governments and/or district committees had more vigorously stepped in and backed the founding of credit cooperatives. By comparison, in that same year, less than thirty cooperatives operated in either Lower Bavaria or Upper Franconia, and only six operated in the Upper Palatinate.

Having seemingly found a recipe for success that combined both the best of self help with just enough state help, by the 1880s, the Association and the government were prepared to accept that locally organized, state-backed credit cooperatives provided an adequate solution to

---

Graf von Luxburg (Würzburg: Freunde Mainfränkischer Kunst und Geschichte, 2008). For biographical information regarding Louis Lüll, see the previous chapter.
41 In 1881, 38 rural credit cooperatives were located in Lower Franconia, while the other districts together only had four. Regarding the relationship between the Bank of Würzburg and the cooperatives, see Hohenegg, Raiffeisen in Bayern, 21.
42 HdbL KC Schw. 1.341, 1810-1910 Hundert Jahre Landw. Verein in Schwaben, 112-113; Haag, Die Landwirtschaft in Bayern, 770; and HdbL KC Schw. 1498, correspondence addressed to the district committee of Swabia pertaining to the organization and status of a variety of credit institutions, 1886-1887.
43 Haag, Die Landwirtschaft in Bayern, 768.
44 Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern, 201.
the issue of agricultural credit. But then, for the remainder of the 1880s, a number of obstacles cropped up which prevented Munich from throwing more support behind the cooperative movement. Above all, both the Bavarian government and the Association insisted that Bavaria’s rural credit cooperatives place themselves under more government oversight, a move intended to provide the cooperatives with an added degree of legitimacy and boost the confidence of members and other investors.\textsuperscript{45} However, from the perspective of the cooperatives, submitting to government oversight quite clearly spelled a loss of independence, and most of the cooperatives flatly resisted the government’s gestures of support for this reason alone. Further complicating matters, not all of the cooperatives operated under the same guiding principles, nor were they all so willing to give up on existing partnerships both inside and outside of Bavaria. In some places, as in Lower Franconia, the cooperatives came together to form one district association of cooperatives, and these cooperatives quite naturally hesitated in giving up on an organization that they themselves had constructed from nothing. In others places, the cooperatives officially banded together with the larger organization of Raiffeisen banks. And in yet other cases, there were cooperatives that maintained a complete independence from any larger cooperative organization.\textsuperscript{46} Either way, getting all of these clocks to chime at once proved quite daunting. Convincing the cooperatives to submit to government oversight proved nearly impossible.

Surprisingly, by the mid-1890s, the Association began to achieve the impossible. Responding to a public overture in 1891 by the Interior Minister, Max von Feilitzsch, that all of Bavaria’s rural credit cooperatives should join together under one Bavarian roof, a representative

\textsuperscript{45} Rid and Hohenegg, \textit{Die Landwirtschaftlichen Genossenschaften und ihre Organisation in Bayern}, 14; and Ernst Hohenegg, \textit{Die Landesorganisation des landwirtschaftlichen Genossenschaftswesens in Bayern} (Munich: Bayer. Zentral-Darlehenskasse, 1927), 10. Also see, for example, in \textit{Stenographischer Bericht über die Plenar-Sitzung des General Comités des landwirtschaftlichen Vereines in Bayern}, insert in \textit{Zeitschrift}, vol. XXI (1887), S359-477, here S411, where the General Committee discusses credit cooperatives and Karl von Cetto mentions their need for greater government oversight; and HdbL GC 418, reports and data pertaining to the same meeting and other correspondence.

\textsuperscript{46} Hohenegg, \textit{Raiffeisen in Bayern}, 21-23.
of the unified Raiffeisen cooperatives in Bavaria approached the district committee for Upper Bavaria and then the General Committee about the possibility of creating and joining such an organization. In short, ten years of limited growth finally convinced the Raiffeisen cooperatives to embrace the benefit of state cooperation. Two years later, and with the full support of Prince Ludwig and also the Interior Minister, the Bavarian Federation of Agricultural Loan Associations (Bayerischer Landesverband landwirtschaftlicher Darlehenskassenvereine) went into business, offering a unified credit structure under government support exclusively open to Bavarian cooperatives. Working very closely together with the Agricultural Association — which provided significant legal and administrative support — the Federation of Agricultural Loan Associations proved decisive in initiating the boom of rural credit cooperatives that followed after the mid 1890s. With only 139 cooperatives joining the Federal Loan Association at its outset, three years later, over one thousand credit cooperatives, that is, almost two-thirds of the registered credit cooperatives in Bavaria, had joined its ranks. By 1903, that number had doubled again, a growth that was equally matched by an impressive expansion of cooperative economic activity in Bavaria. Headed by the Association’s very own Max von Soden-Fraunhofen, the Federation of Agricultural Loan Associations clearly counted as a resounding success. With time, even the Lower Franconian credit cooperatives — led by the indomitable

---

49 See HdbL GC 669, the bylaws for Bavarian Federation of Agricultural Loan Associations, and also correspondence from the General Committee to the district committees concerning the founding of the Federation, December 1893 and January 1894.
50 Farr, “Farmers’ Cooperatives in Bavaria,” 172, 175-176; and HdbL GC 669, documents pertaining to the operations of the Federation of Loan Associations. As Ian Farr points out, “between 1896 and 1898, the value of collective purchases [in Bavaria] increased from 6.6 million marks to more than 10 million marks, while the value of agricultural produce sold cooperatively rose from 2.2 to 6.3 million marks.” After the turn of the century, the cooperative sale of grain and the procurement of fertilizers, feed, and machinery exceeded 42 million marks, that is, an increase of 260% since 1898!
Karl von Thüngen—decided to join. Louis Löll and the Lower Franconian district committee had been right after all: the future of Bavarian agriculture rested with state-backed credit cooperatives.

Besides the take-off of rural credit cooperatives, other successes in the realm of agricultural credit followed beginning in the mid-1890s. After the Federation of Agricultural Loan Associations, probably the most significant development was the government’s decision to found Bavaria’s first central agricultural bank. Created in 1896 as an incorporated cooperative bank (eingetragene Genossenschaft) placed under state control and supervision, the Bavarian Agricultural Bank (Bayerische Landwirtschaftsbank) essentially served to ensure that state-backed credit flowed to the newly organized rural credit cooperatives at minimal interest rates. As with the Federation of Loan Associations, another prominent member of the Agricultural Association, Karl von Cetto-Reichertshausen, sat as its head. Not to be forgotten, the Credit Annuity Institution also received much-needed reforms around this time, with both houses of parliament agreeing to a simplification of its administration in 1896, and also agreeing to provide it with more necessary funds. In a more indirect but no less important move, both the government and the Association also invested in a series of in-depth studies on rural communities and agricultural production in the 1890s. Gathering their data through a bevy of village surveys and government reports, the specific intent of these studies was to put together a more accurate picture of the agricultural sector and to identify the needs of the peasantry as a basis for future intervention. Either way, as all of these activities indicate, by the mid-1890s,

---

52 Schlögl, Bayerische Agrargeschichte, 597; and Farr, “Farmers’ Cooperatives in Bavaria,” 174.
53 Gotto, “Von den Anfängen bis zur Weltwirtschaftskrise,” 23-25. It would be a few years however before the Institution underwent these reforms, with its financial activities only picking up noticeably after the turn of the century.
the Association and the government were at last committed to supporting agricultural production through greater cooperation with Bavaria’s peasant agricultural producers.

It should also be noted that this sudden rush of government activity — “which stood in stark contrast to the apparent equanimity with which [the government] had previously regarded the accumulating problems of the Bavarian peasantry,” to quote Ian Farr — did not come about because the Association suddenly convinced the government to show more interest in agricultural production.\(^{55}\) Rather, as indicated earlier, the government’s sudden change of heart had everything do with the rise of peasant discontent in the 1890s and the challenges raised by the Peasants’ League.\(^{56}\) Fearing a reprise of the peasant activities that it witnessed during the years surrounding unification, the Bavarian government moved swiftly to placate its peasant constituencies. Leading the charge on the side of the government was the Center Party, which saw the rise of the Peasants’ League as an acute political threat to its otherwise dominant position in the parliament. Also moving rather quickly though, now that the government provided it with marching orders, was the Association, which happily placed its network of resources and expertise at the government’s disposal, consulting on the promulgation of laws, and sitting on the various boards created to head up the government’s new programs.

Not ones to waste an opportunity, the leadership of the Association also jumped to promote just how much they and their organization supported all of these new developments, usually playing up the role of the Association in the creation of the government’s new programs while minimizing the sluggishness with which the organization had moved over the previous

\(^{55}\) Farr, “Farmers’ Cooperatives in Bavaria,” 127. For a full account of the agricultural policy changes made by the government in the 1890s, see Ministerium des Innern, Die Maßnahmen auf dem Gebiete der landwirtschaftlichen Verwaltung in Bayern, 1897-1903 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1903); and Die Maßnahmen auf dem Gebiete der landwirtschaftlichen Verwaltung in Bayern, 1890-1897 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1897).

decade. In the Association’s defense, many of the government’s new agricultural policies had in fact originated with the Association, or, at the least, had been seriously discussed and considered by the Association in the decades preceding the 1890s. Still, the entire situation surrounding the sudden politicization of the peasantry was humiliating, given that these developments made it painfully obvious that the government could do more to support agricultural production once the proper pressure was applied. In sum, the Association had moved too slowly during the 1880s in addressing the issue of agricultural credit, and, more generally, had failed to convince the government as to the seriousness of deteriorating economic conditions in the agricultural sector.

Between 1881 and 1891, for example, prominent members of the Association had discussed the issue of agricultural credit no less than three times before the Assembly of Bavarian Farmers, and similarly, the General Committee also openly debated agricultural credit several times at its annual central meeting. In all of these cases, neither the Assembly nor the General Committee ever resolved to more actively support rural credit cooperatives. Indeed, even though two district committees had shown that more localized state assistance facilitated the safe expansion of rural credit cooperatives, the Association chose to focus its efforts on either the creation of the Credit Annuity Institution or attempts to reform Bavaria’s existing system of bond distribution. In the short term, neither of these developments did very much to expand the amount of credit available to peasant farmers, and subsequently, as economic conditions deteriorated through the 1880s, the peasantry showed an increasing willingness to voice their

---

57 See, for example, the Association’s summary of its activities in Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern, 20-39; Bayerischer Landwirtschaftsrat, eds., Der landwirtschaftliche Verein in Bayern: Sein Werden und Wirken (Munich: Possenbacher, 1905), 20-22; and Otto May, “Umschau.” Editorial, Zeitschrift des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern, vol. LXXXIV (1894), 86-98.

58 For a summary of the meetings hosted by the Assembly that dealt with the issue of credit, see Schnee, “Die Wanderversammlungen bayerischer Landwirte.” 871-873; and for the General Committee, see Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern, 192-194.
concerns through overt political means. When the Agrarian League, at the height of the tariff crisis, turned to the Bavarian peasantry in search of support, it found a populace of small farmers more than willing to lash out at their government.

In conclusion, we might say that the financial crisis of the 1890s exposed all of the Association’s weaknesses. Since the structures and mechanisms of the Reich government limited the Association’s role at the federal level of governance, the organization could do little to influence policies that would slow the fall of agricultural prices. Then, because the Association could not or would not push hard enough against the Bavarian government, lowering taxes or securing more state funds for the agricultural sector also proved nearly impossible. Finally, there was the Association’s public image. Viewed by the peasantry as a congress of bureaucrats and agricultural elites, the Association’s poor rapport with the peasantry hardly helped the organization in its attempts to develop all levels of Bavaria’s agricultural production. This particularly showed during the 1880s, when the Association wished to incorporate Bavaria’s rural credit cooperatives under one government-supported roof. Requiring both greater government assistance and local cooperation to address most of the agricultural sector’s problems, the Association found neither.

Fully aware of this conundrum, the Association’s leaders did not however attempt to side with the peasantry. As always, they chose to keep their silence in the hopes that better times awaited just around the corner. Unfortunately, those better times never materialized. For a brief period perhaps, after the turn of the century, economic conditions did improve, earning some respite for the Association and the Bavarian government. And then, in 1912, Prince Ludwig was at last crowned as Bavaria’s monarch, ushering in a government more favorable to both agriculture and the Association. From a political perspective however, the Association’s
reputation never recovered from crisis of the 1890s. Even though the Association’s privileged status remained intact after that decade, the collapse of the German Empire and the Bavarian monarchy in 1918 ended both the Association’s special relationship with the government and its role as the primary interest group for Bavarian agriculture.\textsuperscript{59} Thereafter, the Association fell on hard times, essentially ending its existence looking much like it had at the time of its founding: as an interest group for a small number of agricultural elites.\textsuperscript{60} Finally, in 1933, when there was hardly anyone left who might have cared, the National Socialist government unceremoniously disbanded the Association.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{59} On the Association’s break with the Bavarian government in 1918, see Bayerischer Landwirtschaftsrat, eds., Sitzungsberichte des Jahres 1918 (Munich: Possenbacher, 1919); Sitzungsberichte des Jahres 1919 (Munich: Possenbacher, 1919); and HdbL GC 16, changes to the Agricultural Association’s bylaws, 1920.

\textsuperscript{60} Following the First World War, the Association led something of a shadow existence, and because its record keeping fell off precipitously, it is difficult to piece together a picture of the organization during the period from 1918 to 1933. However, because the Association ceased to receive funding from the government, it did have to double its membership rates, effectively giving up on the idea that peasants might join its ranks. See HdbL GC 12, bylaws from 1920; and also Georg Nebesky, “Der Landwirtschaftliche Verein in Bayern,” in Die Landwirtschaft in Bayern: Eine Sammlung von Darstellungen über Entwicklung und Stand der bayerischen Landwirtschaft, ed. Hans Dörfler (Freising: Datterer, 1929), 114-116, for a self-perspective on the Association’s activities after the First World War (Nebesky was the Association’s last General Secretary and editor of the newsletter). Also see Hannsjörg Bergmann, Der Bayerische Bauernbund und der Bayerische Christliche Bauernverein, 1919-1928 (Munich: Beck, 1986); and Hundhammer, Die landwirtschaftliche Berufsvertretung in Bayern, where the Association is mentioned as working together with the newly established Bauernkammern.

\textsuperscript{61} See Wochenblatt des landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern, vol. 123, no. 51 (Dec. 1933), 779-780; and Schlögl, Bayerische Agrargeschichte, 583. In 1933, with the creation of the Reichsnährstand, all agricultural interest groups in Germany were joined together under the umbrella of the National Socialist government or were otherwise disbanded.
CONCLUSION

From the earliest years of the Oktoberfest, the Association often distributed prizes for agricultural work that included gold or silver commemorative coins. One side of the coin usually bore the image of a simple wheeled plow and the name of the Association running along the coin’s edge. On the coin’s opposite side was written, “Dem Verdienste um die vaterländische Landwirtschaft.” Roughly translated, the phrase is rendered: “In the service of a patriotic agriculture,” which corresponds exactly with the opening words of the Association’s bylaws: “The purpose of the Association is to encourage a patriotic agriculture in all its forms.” The word vaterländisch, translated here in both cases as ‘patriotic,’ says quite a bit about the Agricultural Association’s mission and sense of identity. However, the word is difficult to translate into English, given that it has no immediate cognate. One could literally translate it as ‘fatherland-ish’, and the word is certainly loaded with the obvious patriotic and chauvinistic overtones. Included too in its meaning is a sense of defensiveness, that is, by promoting agriculture, the Association also promoted a mystic set of values closely bound together with the history, people, and place of Bavaria. Put yet another way, and also considering how closely the state and monarch were woven together with the image of Bavaria in the nineteenth century, one might also imagine the phrase as, “In the service of state and agriculture,” a rendering which would certainly correspond more closely to the image that the Association projected of itself. Considering the special commemorative coin which the Association distributed in 1910 for its one-hundred-year anniversary, this translation seems particularly apt. Gone were the words, “In
the service of…,” and in their place was an image of the monarch and the words, “Prince Luitpold of Bavaria — Protector.”

In evaluating the activities of the Association after unification, one finds that its service to the state, agriculture, and to the people of Bavaria fell rather short of the organization’s ideals. In the Association’s defense, the Bavarian government, upon whom the Association depended for its survival, did not give the organization significant help. Government leaders usually ignored the Association almost as much as they ignored the agricultural sector. Nonetheless, in light of the government’s actions, the Association could have pushed the government to seriously address the issues faced by the peasantry. Rather than taking up the cause of the peasantry, the leadership of the Association remained firmly in the camp of the state, refusing to risk its financial backing on a hope that the combined power of the peasantry would supplant the power of the crown. Indeed, to bow to the whims of populists such as Karl von Thüngen would have been to betray all that the Association stood for. In the end however, the Agricultural Association in Bavaria did play an unexpected role in shaping the peasantry of late nineteenth-century Bavaria. By doing almost nothing to help the peasantry for two and a half decades, and by associating itself so closely with a liberal cabinet and bureaucracy often perceived as being in bed with the Prussian state, the Association unwittingly helped to keep alive within the peasantry a political awakening first experienced at the time of unification, and which reawakened with the apparent threat of economic ruin in the early 1890s.

This does not mean that the Association’s failures were a foregone conclusion. Founded as the first organization of its kind in Germany, the Agricultural Association in Bavaria enjoyed a long-standing, privileged relationship with both the Bavarian government and the royal family;

---

1 Bayerischer Landwirtschaftsrat, eds., Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern (Munich: Manz, 1910), 39, and 256-273. The coins were sometimes distributed as medals.
relationships which provided it with almost unfettered access to power. Added to this, the Association was one of the best-funded agricultural associations in Germany, with much of its money coming directly from the government and designated specifically for agricultural projects. The Association’s membership also included influential bureaucrats and politicians, that is, men with direct access to the mechanisms of state. With such men actively taking part in the activities of the Association, the organization often worked together with the government to direct policies and enact laws that were designed to improve agricultural production. Indeed, the most successful of these initiatives, Bavaria’s public-hail insurance program, was not only the first of its kind anywhere in the world, it was completely designed and implemented by members of the Association.

Moving beyond policy and public works, the Association also did much to introduce more modern methods of production to the general public. It published a popular almanac, a respected newsletter, was often involved in numerous other agricultural publications, and also supported numerous agricultural festivals and fairs. The largest of these, which was held in conjunction with the Munich Oktoberfest (and further subsidized by the government), drew thousands of attendees, and also provided the Association with an annual opportunity to publicly solidify its relationship with the government and the royal family. One could say that the Association was not only powerful, but that it was also uniquely privileged as a mediator between the government and Bavarian agriculture, to include even Bavaria’s lowliest peasant agriculturalists.

And yet, despite its many successes, it was the Association’s longstanding relationship with the government that often kept it from truly addressing the needs of the peasantry. Given the large number of people in the Association who filled appointments in the bureaucracy or held
seats in parliament, and also the organization’s dependence on government financial support, most of the Association’s leading members were loath to criticize the government.

Subsequently, the Association never took an official stance in opposition to the government, and generally, it was the peasantry who suffered the most because of it. Adding to the peasantry’s dilemma was its lack of voice within the Association, a problem that was encouraged by both the Association’s bylaws as well as those in positions of power who repeatedly blocked peasant members from taking on greater positions of leadership within the organization. Excluded from the Association’s leading bodies, the peasantry was therefore forced to depend on the agricultural elites of the Association to speak for them. However, in the years following unification, it became increasingly clear to the peasantry that the leadership of the Association would not press the government on issues that most affected the peasantry, namely on tax reforms, but also with the issue of credit and the peasantry’s lack thereof. For these reasons, the peasantry largely avoided the Association during the decades following unification, and it is for this reason that the peasantry, beginning in the 1890s, flocked to more politically-oriented peasant organizations that showed a willingness to take up its cause.

Similar problems between the peasantry and associations existed in other parts of Germany. This, coupled with the nationwide surge of peasant political activity in the 1890s, suggest that the Bavarian state was not alone in inadvertently pushing the peasantry toward political action. In a situation that repeated itself across the country, state connections and the exclusive membership of the associations severely limited the ability of the associations to represent the interests of all agricultural producers. At the same time, and largely because of the associations’ semi-official status and exclusive membership, peasant farmers harbored no expectations that the associations might seriously address issues specific to the peasantry. In end
effect, because there was so little dialogue between the associations and the peasantry throughout Germany, none of the state governments had a structure or organization capable of representing the economic interests of the peasantry. Shunned by their state governments and suffering under the burden of growing economic pressures, the peasant farmers in Germany began to increasingly look for alternatives to the associations, a process which rapidly accelerated after the Reich government’s decision to lower tariff rates in the 1890s. Taking advantage of the associations’ failures to incorporate peasant interests, populist agitation groups such as the Agrarian League, the Bavarian Peasants’ League, and the Christian peasant associations quickly found acceptance among peasant communities all across the country. Reacting in fear to the sudden rise of peasant agitation, both the Reich government as well as the state governments finally moved to seriously address peasant economic interests, and for most of the associations, these developments cost them their exclusive relationship with the state governments. Indeed, by the end of the 1890s, most of the German states had replaced the associations with organizations more inclined to the peasantry. Such were the unintended consequences of state inaction.

As noted above, the Bavarian association outlasted the tumult of the 1890s. The organization’s deep connections to the Bavarian monarchy and other political elites — which had caused it so much trouble over the previous century — ironically helped to ensure its survival. However, in hindsight, it is clear that the Association only delayed its demise. With the collapse of the monarchy in 1918, the Association finally stepped aside, allowing for a new, more peasant-oriented agricultural administration to take its place within the Bavarian bureaucracy. Although demeaned in status, at least now the Association could be completely up front about its relationship with the Bavarian government. In an effort to receive further
clarification on this very matter, in 1929, a representative from the Deutsche Bücherrei wrote to the Bavarian Agricultural Council, once the leading body of the Association. Specifically, the representative, who was head of the department for government publications, wanted to know if Bavaria’s Agricultural Council “retained the character of a public institution, or if it was to be seen as an independent, club-like organization.” Furthermore, he wished to know whether or not the Association’s weekly newsletter functioned as an official or semi-official government publication. Writing in response, Matthäus Mittermeier, who was both a member of the Council and also president of the Association, pointed out that the Agricultural Council had nothing to do with the Association anymore, and was indeed a public institution. As for the Association’s newsletter, it, like the Association itself, “retained no official character.”

What did these developments mean for the Bavarian peasantry? With the Association pushed to the side after the First World War, other more politically-oriented peasant organizations such as the Peasants’ League and the Christian peasant associations could now make serious inroads into Bavaria’s bureaucracy, a process which they primarily accomplished by working more closely together with the newly-formed peasant chambers (Bauernkammern), who in turn answered to the Bavarian government’s newly-created Agricultural Ministry (Staatsministerium für Landwirtschaft). Still, despite the peasantry’s growing political influence in Bavaria, greater access to power did not immediately solve the peasantry’s problems. Throughout the 1920s, deteriorating economic conditions in the agricultural sector


3 For more on these developments, see Hanssjörg Bergmann, Der Bayerische Bauernbund und der Bayerische Christliche Bauernverein, 1919-1928 (Munich: Beck, 1986); and Alois Hundhammer, Die landwirtschaftliche Berufsvertretung in Bayern (Munich: Pfeiffer, 1926).
only caused a further splintering among Bavaria’s peasant political organizations, and, in some cases, further radicalization. For various reasons, peasant agitation simmered down between 1924 and 1929, but by the end of the decade, poor economic conditions once again plunged Bavaria’s peasants into the arena of discontent. Disaffected by the failure of Weimar’s political parties and also the failure of existing peasant organizations and their attempts to protect agrarian interests, a significant number of peasants in Bavaria and elsewhere began to embrace the radical policies and actions of the National Socialists, a turn of events which would later play a pivotal role in the Nazi’s rise to power in the early 1930s. This is not to suggest that the Association or Bavaria’s pre-war government were somehow responsible for these later developments. However, what this study has made clear is that both the Association and the Bavarian government played a pivotal role in initiating the pattern of rural agitation that began in the 1890s, and which subsequently carried on through the first half of the twentieth century. For better or worse, these unintended consequences were perhaps the Agricultural Association’s greatest legacy to the Bavarian peasantry.

Panning out from Bavaria and the Agricultural Association, one could come to similar conclusions regarding nineteenth-century German liberalism in general, that is, the ideological framework which had guided the Association throughout its existence. A movement that had begun with such high hopes in the beginning of the nineteenth century, Germany’s proponents of liberalism gradually learned how to accommodate themselves to Germany’s various political

---

5 For an introduction to the topic of peasant disaffection in Bavaria and National Socialism, see Theresia Bauer, Nationalsozialistische Agrarpolitik und bäuerliches Verhalten im Zweiten Weltkrieg: eine Regionalstudie zur ländlichen Gesellschaft in Bayern (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1996); but also Larry Jones, “Crisis and Realignment: Agrarian Splinter Parties in the Late Weimar Republic, 1928-1933” and John Farquharson, “The Agrarian Policy of National Socialist Germany,” both in Moeller, Peasants and Lords in Modern Germany, 198-232, and 233-259 respectively.
power structures that were, despite the occasional trappings of constitutional liberalism, dominated by their more authoritarian features. To be sure, this situation hardly changed following unification either, as Germany’s liberal voices learned how to function within the constraints of the Imperial constitution. On the one hand, as Geoff Eley and David Blackbourne have convincingly argued, this did not necessarily constitute a failure of German liberalism anymore than it constituted a failure for the Agricultural Association in Bavaria. By cooperating with the state, as the Agricultural Association did, German liberals gained much access to state power, and through this power, they were oftentimes able to see their principles and programs into reality. However, as Eley and Blackbourne also concede, the rise of liberals within the German state structure, combined with Germany’s rapid urbanization in the late nineteenth century and the effects that this had on Germany’s peasant classes, caused traditional peasant grievances to be recast into a new light. The traditional figures of exploitation — the money-lenders, the grain dealers, and the landlords — were updated to include the voices of liberalism who were now so closely aligned with the German state. And as the peasantry turned to political activism in the 1890s, it was, as the story of the Agricultural Association has shown us, largely because liberal-minded men failed to adequately represent peasant interests. Looking at the story of Germany liberalism from this angle, it is fair to conclude that German nineteenth-century liberalism, so often maligned for its impotence, nonetheless produced its own fair share of inadvertent results.

---

7 Ibid., 272-273.
Archival Sources

Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv München (BayHStA):
Mlnn (Staatsministerium des Innern)
36974; 38982; 38983; 38984; 38987; 38989; 41079; 45787; 66316; 64225; 64674; 64866

ML (Staatsministerium für Landwirtschaft)
66; 102; 110; 114; 115; 116; 128; 129; 131; 134; 135; 136; 137; 138; 139; 146; 147; 148; 149;
150; 151; 183; 1878; 1955; 2662; 2670; 2677; 2679

Haus der bayerischen Landwirtschaft (HdbL):
GC (Generalcomité)
5; 6; 7; 12; 13; 14; 15; 16; 21; 22; 23; 43; 49; 50; 51; 52; 53; 54; 55; 56; 57; 58; 59; 60; 61; 62;
63; 64; 65; 66; 67; 68; 69; 70; 71; 72; 73; 74; 75; 76; 77; 78; 79; 80; 86; 100; 111; 114; 115; 116;
117; 104; 116; 120; 129; 130; 131; 132; 133; 134; 135; 136; 148; 149; 150; 153; 195; 208; 209;
210; 211; 212; 213; 214; 215; 216; 217; 218; 219; 220; 221; 222; 223; 224; 225; 226; 227; 228;
229; 230; 231; 232; 233; 234; 235; 236; 237; 238; 239; 240; 241; 242; 243; 244; 249; 250; 251;
415; 418; 437; 572; 573; 575; 576; 640; 659, 660, 661; 662; 664; 665; 667; 669; 671; 672; 673;
674; 675; 869; 870; 871; 890; 891; 892; 893; 894; 895; 900; 901; 902; 903; 904; 905; 906; 913;
916; 917; 926; 927; 928; 929; 930; 936; 1.093; 1.094; 1.095; 1.096

KC Schw. (Kreiscomité Schwaben)
1.333; 1.341; 1.342; 1.343; 1.344; 1.345; 1.346; 1.347; 1.348; 1.349; 1.350; 1.351; 1.352; 1.353;
1.354; 1.355; 1.356; 1.357; 1.370; 1.378; 1.418; 1.419; 1.420; 1.421; 1.429; 1.488; 1.490; 1.491;
1.498

BC Bamb. (Bezirkscomité Bamberg)
1.684; 1.685; 1.686; 1.687; 1.688

BC Weilh. (Bezirkscomité Weilheim)
1.714

Published Primary Sources

60 Jahre Bayerischer, patriotischer Bauernverein Tuntenhausen, 1869-1929. 1929.


———. *Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern*. Munich: Manz, 1910.


*Bericht über die Wanderversammlung bayerischer Landwirte.*


*Budget des Königreiches Bayern.*


*Der landwirtschaftliche Unterricht in Bayern im Jahre 1869*. Munich: Fleischmann, 1870.


*Sitzungsberichte des Bayerischen Landwirtschaftsrates*


*Verhandlungen der Kammer der Abgeordneten des bayerischen Landtages.*

*Verhandlungen der Kammer der Reichsräthe des Königreiches Bayern.*
Verhandlungen der Wanderversammlung Bayerischer Landwirte.


Newspapers and Other Print Material

Bayerischer Haus- und Landwirtschaftskalender

Die Bauern-Zeitung

Jahres-Bericht des Kreis-Comités des landwirtschaftlichen Vereins von Oberbayern

Königlich Bayerisches Kresiamtsblatt von Oberbayern

Kurier für Niederbayern

Landwirtschaftliche Mittheilungen

Ministerialblatt für Kirchen- und Schul-Angelegenheiten im Königreich Bayern

Regierungs-Blatt für das Königreich Bayern

Wochenblatt des landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern

Wochenblatt des landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Baiern

Zeitschrift des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern

Secondary Sources


———. *Geschichte des Bayerischen Bauernbundes*. Munich: Pfeiffer, 1924.


———. “Self-Help and the State: Rural Cooperatives in Imperial Germany.” *Central European History*, vol. 21, no. 3 (Sep., 1988): 244-266.


APPENDICES

Appendix A. Membership Totals for the Agricultural Association in Bavaria and the Number of County Associations by District, 1871-1895

Table 1. Membership Totals by District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Upper Bavaria</th>
<th>Lower Bavaria</th>
<th>Palatinate</th>
<th>Upper Palatinate</th>
<th>Upper Franconia</th>
<th>Middle Franconia</th>
<th>Lower Franconia</th>
<th>Swabia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>5771</td>
<td>2945</td>
<td>3730</td>
<td>3097</td>
<td>3272</td>
<td>3306</td>
<td>4747</td>
<td>4910</td>
<td>31778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>5760</td>
<td>3062</td>
<td>3989</td>
<td>3567</td>
<td>3282</td>
<td>3401</td>
<td>4981</td>
<td>5026</td>
<td>33068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>6515</td>
<td>4235</td>
<td>4246</td>
<td>4249</td>
<td>3567</td>
<td>3457</td>
<td>4947</td>
<td>5263</td>
<td>36479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>7188</td>
<td>4965</td>
<td>4962</td>
<td>4395</td>
<td>3582</td>
<td>3622</td>
<td>4923</td>
<td>5466</td>
<td>39103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>7988</td>
<td>6136</td>
<td>5905</td>
<td>4675</td>
<td>3580</td>
<td>4153</td>
<td>4855</td>
<td>5671</td>
<td>42963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>9152</td>
<td>6665</td>
<td>6181</td>
<td>4561</td>
<td>3597</td>
<td>4309</td>
<td>4755</td>
<td>5901</td>
<td>45121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>9751</td>
<td>6900</td>
<td>6162</td>
<td>4592</td>
<td>3949</td>
<td>4595</td>
<td>4620</td>
<td>6101</td>
<td>46670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>10309</td>
<td>7179</td>
<td>6508</td>
<td>4575</td>
<td>4464</td>
<td>4946</td>
<td>4986</td>
<td>6283</td>
<td>49250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>10265</td>
<td>7413</td>
<td>6714</td>
<td>4659</td>
<td>4885</td>
<td>4995</td>
<td>5251</td>
<td>6300</td>
<td>50482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>10293</td>
<td>7205</td>
<td>6543</td>
<td>4787</td>
<td>5014</td>
<td>4945</td>
<td>5141</td>
<td>6235</td>
<td>50163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>10110</td>
<td>7068</td>
<td>6616</td>
<td>4700</td>
<td>5083</td>
<td>5112</td>
<td>5075</td>
<td>6316</td>
<td>50080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>10069</td>
<td>6944</td>
<td>6569</td>
<td>4690</td>
<td>5210</td>
<td>5459</td>
<td>4989</td>
<td>6220</td>
<td>50150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>10154</td>
<td>6843</td>
<td>6558</td>
<td>4823</td>
<td>5364</td>
<td>5658</td>
<td>5069</td>
<td>6320</td>
<td>50789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>10204</td>
<td>6915</td>
<td>6579</td>
<td>5061</td>
<td>5540</td>
<td>6185</td>
<td>5149</td>
<td>6449</td>
<td>52082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>10300</td>
<td>6905</td>
<td>6632</td>
<td>5183</td>
<td>5742</td>
<td>6701</td>
<td>5132</td>
<td>6623</td>
<td>53218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>10371</td>
<td>6927</td>
<td>6644</td>
<td>5464</td>
<td>5826</td>
<td>7100</td>
<td>5477</td>
<td>6665</td>
<td>54474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>10655</td>
<td>7018</td>
<td>6681</td>
<td>5541</td>
<td>5850</td>
<td>7237</td>
<td>5628</td>
<td>6840</td>
<td>55450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>10941</td>
<td>7080</td>
<td>6575</td>
<td>5608</td>
<td>5903</td>
<td>7415</td>
<td>6027</td>
<td>6918</td>
<td>56467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>11179</td>
<td>6967</td>
<td>6614</td>
<td>5560</td>
<td>6005</td>
<td>7306</td>
<td>6467</td>
<td>7042</td>
<td>57140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>11521</td>
<td>7027</td>
<td>6808</td>
<td>5581</td>
<td>6110</td>
<td>7464</td>
<td>7074</td>
<td>7221</td>
<td>58806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>11744</td>
<td>7016</td>
<td>7034</td>
<td>5659</td>
<td>6486</td>
<td>7579</td>
<td>7876</td>
<td>7362</td>
<td>60756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>12228</td>
<td>7228</td>
<td>7142</td>
<td>5766</td>
<td>6579</td>
<td>7409</td>
<td>8641</td>
<td>7506</td>
<td>62499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>12595</td>
<td>7074</td>
<td>7223</td>
<td>6236</td>
<td>6886</td>
<td>8056</td>
<td>9152</td>
<td>7625</td>
<td>64847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>13170</td>
<td>7256</td>
<td>7257</td>
<td>6494</td>
<td>6853</td>
<td>8102</td>
<td>9121</td>
<td>7787</td>
<td>66040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>13700</td>
<td>7373</td>
<td>7399</td>
<td>6434</td>
<td>6939</td>
<td>7969</td>
<td>8698</td>
<td>8027</td>
<td>66539</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 These two tables were compiled using data provided in the annual reports from the Zeitschrift des Landwirthschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern, 1872-1895; in Ministerium des Innern, Die Maßnahmen auf dem Gebiete der landwirtschaftlichen Verwaltung in Bayern, 1890-1897 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1897); and also in Hdbl KC Schw. 1.347, annual reports.
Table 2. Number of County Committees by District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Upper Bavaria</th>
<th>Lower Bavaria</th>
<th>Palatinate</th>
<th>Upper Franconia</th>
<th>Middle Franconia</th>
<th>Lower Franconia</th>
<th>Swabia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix B. Senior Leadership in the Government and the Agricultural Association, 1871-1895

Bavarian Monarchs and Senior Government Officials placed over the Agricultural Association

Bavarian Monarchs (Protectors of the Agricultural Association)
Ludwig II, 1864-1886†
Otto I, 1886-1913 / Luitpold, 1886-1912† (as regent)

Minister Presidents
Friedrich von Hegnenberg-Dux, 1871-1872†*
Adolph von Pfretzschner, 1872 – 1880
Johann von Lutz, 1880 – 1890
Friedrich von Crailsheim, 1890 – 1903*

Interior Ministers
Sigmund von Pfeufer, 1871-1881*
Maximilian von Feilitzsch, 1881-1907*

Directors of the Department for Agriculture, Commerce and Industry
Eduard von Wolfanger, 1871-1879*
Heinrich von Haag, 1880-1896*

---

2 A * denotes those government officials who were also at some point members of the Agricultural Association. The list of names presented here was compiled using a variety of sources. A list of Bavarian monarchs, Minister Presidents, and Interior Ministers can be found in a number of published Bavarian histories or reference books. The other government personnel listed here as well the officers of the General Committee were identified primarily in Bayerischer Landwirtschaftsrat, eds., Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern (Munich: Manz, 1910); and also the Zeitschrift des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern.
Officers of the General Committee

Honorary President
Prince Ludwig, 1869-1912

Presidents
Julius von Niethammer, 1857-1882†
Ludwig von Lerchenfeld-Køfering, 1882-1893
Maximilian von Soden-Fraunhofen, 1893-1912

Vice Presidents
Maximilian von Lerchenfeld-Aham, 1869-1878
Heinrich von Ranke, 1878-1908

General Secretaries and Editors
Adam Müller, 1866-1879†
Heinrich von Haag, 1879 (Interim)
Otto May, 1879-1909

Second Secretaries
Matthäus von Jodlbauer, 1860-1890†
Adolf Otto, 1890-1894
Johann Feser, 1894-1896†
Appendix C. Notable Members of the Agricultural Association and other Images

Maximilian von Feilitzsch

Julius von Niethammer

Eduard von Wolfanger

Adam Müller

---

3 All of the images reproduced here were found in Denkschrift zur Feier des 100 jährigen Bestehens des Landwirtschaftlichen Vereins in Bayern (Munich: Manz, 1910); or were provided courtesy of Dirk Götschmann and Michael Henker, eds., Geschichte des Bayersichen Parlaments, 1819-2003, CD-ROM (Augsburg: Haus der Bayerischen Geschichte, 2005).
The Agricultural Association in Bavaria One-Hundred Year Anniversary Commemorative Coin, with a profile of Prince Luitpold on the front, and a picture of a wheeled plow on the back.

The Agricultural Association’s humble Munich headquarters, affectionately known as the “Hutterschwaige.” Located in downtown Munich on the block bordered by Türkenstraße and Theresienstraße, this structure served as the Association’s headquarters from 1824 to 1895. This image can also be found in the Stadtarchiv München, Fotosammlung C 1893169.
Moving up in the world. The Agricultural Association’s Munich Headquarters after 1895, located at Prinz Ludwigstraße 1. The Agricultural Bank, established in 1896 and managed in part by the Association, occupied the building to the right. Though modified significantly, both of these buildings are still standing today.
The parade of prize animals before the royal tent at the Oktoberfest, circa 1910. Notable members of the Association would have joined representatives of the royal family here.

Anjelo Jank’s poster celebrating the one-hundred year anniversary of the Association and the Central Agricultural Festival, 1910. The imagery in this work says much about how the Association saw itself in relation to the Bavarian peasantry, even after the mid-1890s. An original copy of this poster can be found in the Stadtarchiv München, Plakatsammlung 12743.