A STUDY OF PRINCIPALS’ TEACHER MOTIVATIONAL TECHNIQUES IN SELECT GEORGIA SCHOOLS

by

KAREN ALLEN HENDERSON

(Under the Direction of C. Thomas Holmes)

ABSTRACT

The state of Georgia had two school-based performance awards, one with a monetary reward and the other without a monetary reward. This study was conducted to determine if a relationship existed between how principals better set and evaluated goals for their staff in performing versus nonperforming schools. This study also sought to determine if a relationship existed between how principals of performing versus nonperforming schools were more likely to share decision-making with their teachers. In addition this study tried to determine if a relationship existed between how principals of performing versus nonperforming schools were more likely to promote professional development for their teachers. This study furthermore attempted to determine if a relationship existed between the more positive beliefs of principals in the ability of their teachers in performing versus nonperforming schools. This study used one independent variable with three levels (nonperforming schools, Pay for Performance schools, and Schools of Excellence schools) and one dependent variable (principals’ motivational techniques). The survey used was formulated by the National Center for Education Statistics. The data collected in the study was analyzed using ANOVA and a post hoc comparison with a
significant $p$ value of .10 or less. The alpha level is .10. The post hoc comparison used the Scheffé method.

INDEX WORDS: school improvement programs, school-based performance awards, teacher motivation, pay for performance, merit pay, teacher compensation, goal-setting, decision-making, professional development, ability and performance
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DEDICATION

To my husband, Bruce, who has enabled me to fulfill my dream with this degree, all of my love. To my children, Sarah Elizabeth and Elisha James, I hope that you always value education and you continue to learn at any age. To my mother, thank you for always believing in me and encouraging me. My mother instilled in me a love for learning at an early age. I hope to pass this on to my children and to the students in whom I teach. I have also been blessed with a supportive network of extended family members in Kentucky - aunts, uncles, and grandparents. Our family has always been a foundation of encouragement for me.

Without the help of God, who has blessed me so richly, nothing could ever be accomplished. Thank you for giving me the ability and the circumstances to complete this degree.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Based on current research, motivation has many separate ingredients. Maslow, Herzberg, Vroom, Lawler, McGregor, and Bandura, among others, described theories which help to explain a person’s motivation. Measuring motivation for teachers and principals is complicated since there are many facets to motivation.

Today’s businesses are encouraged to work in teams and produce high quality products at the lowest price possible. According to Odden (1996) teachers should also be encouraged to work in teams and produce high quality products like their business counterparts. In work, which is collegial and collaborative, merit pay systems have not worked (Odden & Kelley, 1997). Odden (1996) described schools where job performance is a high priority.

In these systems, job-based pay, seniority-based pay, and individual merit and incentive pay are out, and skill-based pay and team-based performance awards are in. In short, compensation has been changed to align itself and the individuals in the work team, to the strategic directions and goals of the organization (pp. 236-237).

Odden and Kelley (1997) noted that teachers in the private sector seem to be less fearful of merit pay than teachers in the public sector. Private school teachers have always understood that pay would not be rewarded solely on number of years of service or academic credit. Public schools may attract individuals who like the assurance of the single-salary schedule. Private school administrators can reward teachers in private versus how their public school counterparts have to reward their teachers (Ballou, 1993; 2001).
The accountability movement is a force with which to be reckoned in all facets of the American society – from business to education. Educators are still looking for ways to adjust to this continually growing movement. Berry, Hoke, and Hirsch (2004) concluded that, with the No Child Left Behind mandating to states that their classrooms should be filled with “highly qualified teachers,” they believed that the following are still obstacles: (1) Teachers need to have better preparation for urban and rural schools; (2) Teachers still have a lack of decision making in some schools; (3) There is less time to teach with more classroom intrusions; and (4) There is weak administrative support.

The single salary structure and merit pay systems have become outdated and are not motivating teachers to change their pedagogy. According to Herzberg (1966), in order for teachers to feel satisfied with their jobs, they need to experience achievement, recognition, and advancement. The single salary schedule teachers only attain achievement by attaining degrees, and those may be few and far between. Teachers are not usually recognized in the job setting even when an honor has been attained. It is just another pay raise on the single salary schedule. After a certain time period, (approximately 15 years of service), most teachers top out on the pay scale in the majority of school districts and have no more room for advancement (Herzberg, 1966; Odden & Kelley, 1997).

As indicated by Odden and Kelley (1997), salaries do matter to teachers, and very low salaries may attract a lower quality of people to education, a loss of teachers to higher-paying districts (poorer districts will not be able to compete for a better quality school teacher), and a loss of teachers to other professions. Merit pay can provide achievement, advancement, and recognition according to Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene theory (Herzberg, 1966). For example, if a teacher perceives that working hard will influence higher student scores and the teacher’s effort is focused on the student achievements, the teacher’s expectancy is greater. Heneman
(1998) suggested, after studying school-based performance awards, that those goals that are perceived as meaningful, clear, specific, and challenging will foster high expectancy perceptions by teachers.

According to research, when developing any type of merit pay plan, if the theories of goal setting, contingency, expectancy, and participative management are adhered to, it should be more motivating than the single salary schedule (Bandura, 2000; Heneman, 1998; Herzberg, 1966; Kelley, Odden, Milanowski, & Heneman, 2000; Lawler, 1969; Maslow, 1943; Odden & Kelley, 1997; & Vroom, 1964). When Kelley (1999) studied the impact of school-based performance awards in Kentucky and Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, valued outcomes and clear goals were two very important motivators for teachers.

Nevertheless, the single salary system does have its practical points. It does not discriminate based upon race, sex, or marital status as did teacher pay systems in the past. The single salary system requires a consistent amount of pay to be set-aside for teachers. Many systems have been under funded when they rely on the state to calculate and/or provide bonus awards (Odden & Kelley, 1997).

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to examine principals’ motivational techniques in working with teachers based on whether they participated in voluntary school improvement programs. The state of Georgia had two school based performance awards – Georgia Pay for Performance with a monetary reward and Georgia Schools of Excellence without a monetary reward. Administrators from Georgia schools participating in these programs and administrators not participating in school improvement programs were surveyed.

The study was guided by these questions:
1. Were principals in Pay for Performance schools and Schools of Excellence schools more likely to set and evaluate goals for their staff than principals who didn’t participate in these programs?

2. Were principals in Pay for Performance schools and Schools of Excellence schools more likely to share decision-making with teachers than principals who didn’t participate in these programs?

3. Were principals in Pay for Performance schools and Schools of Excellence schools more likely to promote professional development for teachers than principals who didn’t participate in these programs?

4. Were principals in Pay for Performance schools and Schools of Excellence schools more likely to express a belief in the teachers’ ability than principals who didn’t participate in these programs?

5. Were principals in schools awarded monetary incentives more likely to use motivational techniques in working with teachers than those which were not awarded monetary incentives?

Limitations

The following limitations of the study are noted:

1. Motivational reactions of administrators in Georgia may not be generalized to other populations.

2. Extrinsic motivation may not be entirely separated from intrinsic motivation.

3. The Georgia Pay for Performance Plan funding ended in 2004. This may have affected the motivation of former participants.

4. The researcher was a former participant in the Georgia Pay for Performance Plan.
Definition of Terms

The following terms are defined as they apply to this study:

- **Principal motivational techniques** – Methods which a principal may use to motivate teachers such as shared decision-making, goal-setting, professional development, and a belief in the teacher’s ability to perform the desired tasks.

- **School-based performance award** - An award system for teachers, which encourages collaborative work of a school to reach specific performance goals.

- **Georgia Pay for Performance** – A school-based performance award in Georgia which awarded teachers with a bonus of approximately $2000.

- **Schools of Excellence** – A school-based performance award in Georgia which did not award teachers monetarily but recognized the exemplary performance of teachers on the school report card.

- **Nonaward-winning school** – A school which did not have a state school improvement award on its school report card.

Justification for the Study

Motivation is not a precise concept, but understanding how principals use different motivational techniques to affect the work of teachers could help states and local districts formulate new school improvement programs or new pay systems, which may support principals and teachers. This direction may in turn positively affect student achievement.

At this time there has not been a study located on two school-based performance awards within the same state - one with a monetary reward and the other without a monetary reward. By surveying administrators, who have participated in school-based performance awards, the researcher expects to find a difference in the teacher motivational techniques used by principals between award-winning and nonaward-winning schools.
Organization of the Report

The report of this study consisted of five chapters. The first chapter presented the statement of the problem with a background of literature in the area of motivation as related to school administrators and teachers, a definition of frequently used terms, and a justification for the study. The second chapter reviews the literature and research currently available on motivation, the history of accountability and teacher compensation, and the changing structure of teacher compensation. The third chapter explains the design of the study including the procedures used for collection and analysis of data. The fourth chapter reports the findings of the study, and the fifth chapter presents the summary and conclusions of the findings, recommendations, and implications for future research.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to examine principals’ motivational techniques in working with teachers based on whether they participated in voluntary school improvement programs. The state of Georgia had two school based performance awards – Georgia Pay for Performance with a monetary reward and Georgia Schools of Excellence without a monetary reward. Although we know of some of the motivational and organizational factors of school-based performance awards (SBPAs), to date, there has not been a study done on similar SBPA programs within the same state (one with a monetary reward and the other without a monetary reward). Administrators from Georgia schools participating in these programs will be surveyed.

This chapter reviews related literature on motivation. This chapter also presents a review of literature and research relevant to the Georgia Pay for Performance and the Georgia Schools of Excellence Programs. Related areas reviewed include role of supervision, teacher preparation and pay history, and the history of educational accountability.

Development of Motivation Concept

According to Vroom (1964) theories of motivation have their origins in the principle of hedonism. The main assumption is that behavior is directed toward pleasure and away from pain. People will select alternatives, which they think will “maximize their pleasure and minimize their pain” (p.9). Vroom (1964) believes that a person will have a preference over another good desire or an attraction toward another outcome. The person will work more for the outcome, which is more positive. A person’s desire or aversion for an outcome is based on his anticipation
of satisfaction or his withdrawal from an activity based on a past history of a negative experience. At any given time there may be a discrepancy between the anticipated satisfaction from an outcome (i.e. its valence) and the actual satisfaction that it provides (i.e., its value)” (Vroom, 1964, p. 15). “Motivation results from a subjective balancing of the various outcomes” (Mohrman & Lawler, 1996, p. 119).

Frederick Herzberg’s Adam and Abraham Theory

Herzberg’s Adam and Abraham theory seems to match the principle of hedonism suggested by Vroom (1964). Herzberg's theory suggested that “man is Adam, that he is an animal and that his overriding goal as an animal is to avoid the pain inevitable in relating to the environment. When we look at man in his totality, however, we find that in addition to his avoidance nature there exists a human being – a human being who seems to be impelled to determine, to discover, to achieve, to actualize to progress and to add to his existence” (Herzberg, 1966, p.168).

Although it is difficult to measure motivation, Vroom (1964) uses an ordinal scale to specify that one level is higher than another but not how much higher. It is also difficult to find the relationship between an amount of motivation and level of performance.

Need for Motivation

Maslow described basic needs of humans as well as how they become self-fulfilled. He believes that to be motivated one has to attain certain basic needs before he can reach self-actualization. Maslow’s list of basic needs includes physiological needs, safety needs, love needs, esteem needs, and the need for self-actualization. “What a man can be, he must be. This need we may call self-actualization” (Maslow, 1943, p. 33). Self-actualization refers to the “desire for self-fulfillment, namely, to the tendency for one to become actualized in what one is
potentially. This tendency might be phrased as the desire to become more and more what one is, to become everything that one is capable of becoming” (Maslow, 1943, p. 33).

According to research people have a need to be challenged. Most people want jobs that require more responsibility and more skills, and they are better adjusted when they obtain those jobs as indicated by Katz (1964). According to Ganzach (2003) after comparing intelligence ratios, educational levels, and facets of job satisfaction, people value intrinsic satisfaction over pay satisfaction. He also found that intelligent people need more complicated work to be intrinsically satisfied.

Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs

All of man’s needs are organized in a series of levels - “at the lowest level, are his physiological needs for rest, exercise, shelter, and protection from the elements” (McGregor, 1957, p. 310). “When man’s physiological needs are satisfied and he is no longer fearful about his physical welfare, his social needs become important motivators of his behavior – for belonging, for association, for acceptance by his fellows, for giving and receiving friendship and love” (McGregor, 1957, p. 311). Above the social needs are the egotistic needs, which consist of self-esteem (needs for self-confidence, for independence, for achievement, for competence, for knowledge) and one’s reputation (needs for status, for recognition, for appreciation, and respect from one’s peers (McGregor, 1957).

If one need is satisfied, then another emerges. This statement might give the false impression that a need must be satisfied 100 percent before the next need emerges. In actual fact, most members of our society who are normal are partially satisfied in all their basic needs and partially unsatisfied in all their basic needs at the same time. A more realistic description of the hierarchy would be in terms of decreasing percentages of satisfaction as we go up the hierarchy of prepotency. (Maslow, 1943, p. 38)
Herzberg’s Hygiene-Motivation Theory

Herzberg’s Hygiene – Motivation theory associates hygiene to Maslow’s lower needs the physiological needs, the need for safety, and the need for belongingness, love and other social needs. Herzberg’s motivators seem to show a relationship with Maslow’s self-esteem needs (McGregor, 1957). The self esteem needs according to Herzberg (1966) are achievement, recognition for achievement, work itself, responsibility, advancement, and possibility of growth. Herzberg (1966) suggests that the hygiene seeker contrasting the motivator seeker, is motivated by the nature of the environment of his job rather than by his responsibilities.

Expectancy Theory

Vroom (1964) and Lawler (1969) described the expectancy theory in detail. Expectancy is defined as a temporary idea concerning the likelihood that a particular act will be followed by a particular outcome. Expectancies may be described in terms of their strength. Maximal strength is indicated by subjective support that the act will be followed by the outcome, while minimal (or zero) strength is indicated by subjective support that the act will not be followed by the outcome.

Individuals form an expectancy of what outcomes they will experience based on the outcomes they have experienced in the past as a result of succeeding or not succeeding in accomplishing a targeted performance. If teachers have had experience working hard to implement new approaches at personal cost and with no recognition or reward, they may expect that successful implementation of new approaches . . . will likewise lead to no positive personal outcomes. (Mohrman & Lawler, 1996, p. 120)

Self-Efficacy Theory

Bandura, (2000) in his self-efficacy concept, explains that when a person is confronted with barriers, delays, and disappointments, those people who question their abilities give up their work and settle for half-hearted solutions.

Those who have a strong belief in their capabilities redouble their effort to master the challenges. . . . Those beset with self-doubts dwell on limited opportunities and many constraints. Those beset dwell on impediments, which they view as obstacles over which they can exert little control, and easily convince themselves
of the futility of effort. They achieve limited success even in environments that provide many opportunities. (Bandura, 2000, pp. 120-121)

Mohrman and Lawler (1996) conclude that educators will experience empowerment if they believe that they can be successful if students attain higher levels of achievement from implementing new approaches to teaching. Along with student success, teachers also need to experience recognition or increased pay as a result of implementing the new strategies.

Purpose of Work

Individuals may be motivated by the outcomes that their work provides. They may believe that their work contributes to the contentment and welfare of man (Vroom, 1964). A person's view of his work will affect his motivation to work. Factors that affect a worker's motivation may include how a worker gains social outcomes such as influencing other people or being liked by other people (Vroom, 1964). The worker may appreciate the standing or reputation that his position gives him, and he may also value his relationships with the other workers whom he comes into contact with (Simon, 1947). A worker's value system can also affect motivation and performance.

Some people value other aspects of their jobs more than they value pay factors such as interesting work, autonomy, desirable location, benefits that meet their needs, or having a boss they love working for. Such individuals will often accept lower pay in order to have what is more important to them in their jobs. (Durham and Bartol, 2000, p. 158)

Working in Groups

Schools are organizations trying to achieve a common goal—providing a quality education for its students. According to Tannenbaum (1966) when working in groups, the group may provide support to their members to help dispel dissatisfaction on the job. McGregor (1957) believes that a close working group may be more effective than the same number of separate working individuals in accomplishing organizational goals. Durham and Bartol (2000) conclude that group incentives are suggested in circumstances where there is a need to align many
individuals into a common goal, or when leadership needs to enhance support at the group level. They believe that group incentive plans are good for associations, which emphasize group achievements. They also believe that group incentives work best when members of an association hold each other accountable and the employees have high intrinsic motivation (Durham & Bartol, 2000).

**Decision Making**

Decision making can make a worker become more intrinsically motivated, and increase his self-efficacy. He becomes more satisfied with his job (Vroom, 1964). Darling-Hammond (1996) suggested that to develop teacher self-efficacy and to motivate a teacher’s efforts the teacher must feel that they are in control of some decisions rather than the administration making all of the decisions for them. Vroom (1964) stated that the quality of decisions made by the worker might be better than when a supervisor makes them on his own. Workers can contribute invaluable information about a job of which a supervisor may not be aware and that the strength of the group is furthermore enhanced by decisions handled by the group. This participation in decision making makes the group feel like a team, which will possess unusual group camaraderie (Likert, 1961).

Dee, Henkin, and Pell (2002) conducted a survey among full-time teachers in a large, urban school district with significant Hispanic and African-American populations in the southeastern United States. Dee, et al. (2002) found positive associations between support for innovation and communication openness, formalization, and teacher autonomy. Some of the suggestions of the group to help teachers in decision making processes were to establish channels of communication between the site council and school personnel, develop curriculum teams for instructional decision making, implement collaborative skills training, and specify expectations and responsibilities for teamwork.
Empowerment is a powerful motivational process. The concept means “to enable” (Conger, 2000, p. 137).

According to Likert (1961) “widespread use of participation is one of the more important approaches employed by the high-producing managers in their efforts to get full benefit from the technical resources of the classical theories of management coupled with high levels of reinforcing motivation. This use of participation applies to all aspects of the job and work, as, for example, in setting work goals and budgets, controlling costs, organizing the work, etc.” (p. 323)

Bakan, Suseno, Pinnington, and Money (2004) conducted a study at a large British retail organization. The British retail organization participated in profit sharing and save-as-you-earn schemes. Bakan, et al. (2004) found that decision making was just as effective on job attitudes as the profit sharing and save-as-you-earn schemes.

Goal-Setting

Goal-setting is another positive reinforcer in the workplace. According to Latham (2000) goal-setting has been found to be the most consistent positive influence in the workplace. Latham (2000) stated that managers should set specific challenging goals to focus their employees so that the employees understand where to exert their efforts. The goals should also be measurable and in alignment with the attainment of the award.

Latham (2000) described a four-step process, which he suggested should be followed for goal-setting.

First, difficult specific goals lead to significantly higher performance than easy goals, no goals, or even the setting of an abstract goal such as urging people to do their best. Second, holding ability constant, as this is a theory of motivation, and given that there is goal commitment, the higher the goal the higher the performance. Third, variables such as praise, feedback, or the involvement of people in decision-making only influence behavior to the extent that it leads to the setting of and commitment to a specific difficult goal. Fourth, goal-setting, in addition to affecting the three mechanisms of motivation, namely, choice, effort, and persistence, can also have a cognitive benefit. It can influence choice, effort, and persistence to discover ways to attain the goal. (p. 107)
Goals need to be put into place, and they should contain explicit instructions and provide informative feedback on how one is doing. Bandura (2000) concluded that goals should be different sizes with different time lengths in order to build intrinsic interest. Goals should include long-range and short-range goals. Sub-goal attainments (short-range goals) provide self-satisfaction and greater knowledge. An indication of progress builds effectiveness, and gratifying experiences build innate enthusiasm.

In order to sustain goal-setting, a leader could include modeling for mastery and persuasion from other coworkers (Latham, 2000). Each learner is unique and brings varied experiences, skills, and backgrounds to the workplace. Each learner will learn at a different pace. A good way to teach new skills is by modeling which can be used to train people. The learners adopt new ways readily if they watch individuals who are similar to them. The person learning the new skill must also put it into practice right away so that he can convince himself of the new knowledge (Bandura, 2000). This is especially important if the person has low self-efficacy because low self-efficacy people are looking for a way to give up on a goal. The failure to the low self-efficacy person provides proof that the goal attainment was not possible. (Latham, 2000). Latham (2000) concluded that high self-efficacy can be attained in the workplace through goal setting by making sure that modeling and assistance from another worker occurred.

Another necessity in goal-setting, to keep frustration at a low level, is to provide all available resources to workers. According to Latham (2000) to reach goals of the organization one needs to make certain that the resources such as time, money, people, and equipment are present.

In conclusion “neither goals without knowing how one is doing, nor knowing how one is doing without any goals is motivating” (Bandura, 2000, p. 132).

According to Likert (1961) to be highly motivated, each member of the organization must feel that the organization’s objectives are of significance and
that his own particular task contributes in an indispensable manner to the organization’s achievement of its objectives. He should see his role as difficult, important, and meaningful. This is necessary if the individual is to achieve and maintain a sense of personal worth and importance. (p.327)

The line of sight is a component of Lawler’s Contingency and Expectancy Theories. Employees can be motivated if they work in a team toward a single goal. If the employee thinks that he can attain the goal reasonably and he has the ability, he is motivated. In addition, he has to see himself contributing to that goal (Lawler, 1973).

Feedback

Feedback is a mechanism, which promotes a learning environment. Feedback, according to Latham (2000), allowed people to distinguish when to continue with a project, when to stop doing a project, or start doing a project to achieve a goal. Mohrman & Lawler (1996) concluded that the organization and work design of many schools isolate teachers and limit the feedback, which encourages continuous teacher development.

According to Bandura (2000) the people need informative feedback about how they are doing. A common problem is that they do not fully observe their own behavior. To produce good results, the feedback must direct attention to the corrective changes that need to be made. It should call attention to successes and improvements and correct deficiencies in a supportive and constructive way so as to strengthen perceived efficacy. Some of the gains accompanying informative feedback result from raising people’s beliefs in their efficacy rather than solely from further skill development. (p. 127)

Feedback is very valuable to employees, but often is overlooked as confirmed in a pilot study done by Milanowski and Heneman (2002). Milanowski and Heneman conducted a pilot study of a new standards-based teacher evaluation system in a medium-sized Midwestern school district. The researchers conducted interviews and surveys. Evaluators were criticized because they failed to provide specific and timely feedback, and there seemed to be an inconsistency among evaluators. Many administrators did not conduct all of the interviews (feedback) because
they thought that they did not have sufficient time. Only in a very few cases did the administrators provide coaching and support.

**Work Anxiety**

A worker's anxiety and his disbelieving perception of his ability to perform an activity can interfere negatively with his motivation, (Vroom, 1964) and “stress, social discomfort, and fatigue” are other “possible negatively valued outcomes” (Mohrman & Lawler, 1996, p. 119). In order to counteract these obstacles, Bandura (2000) recommended that workers jointly perform these intimidating activities for a short period of time. When the activity is less feared, the involvement length is extended. The Georgia Pay for Performance offered a monetary reward for execution of additional and new tasks. As acknowledged by Durham and Bartol (2000) pay for performance can cause frustration, anxiety, and stress if an additional, new task is presented alongside the compensation.

**Ability and Performance**

Ability and motivation definitely interact to affect performance.

According to Vroom (1964) the formula for increased performance is \( \text{Performance} = f(\text{Ability} \times \text{Motivation}) \). It follows from such a formula that, when ability has a low value, increments in motivation will result in smaller increases in performance than when ability has a high value. Furthermore, when motivation has a low value, increments in ability will result in smaller increases in performance than when motivation has a high value. It makes little sense to ask which is the more important determinant of performance – a person’s level of ability or his level of motivation. More is to be gained from increasing the motivation of those who are high in ability than from increasing the motivation of those who are low in ability. Similarly, more is to be gained from increasing the ability of those who are highly motivated than from increasing the ability of those who are relatively unmotivated. (p. 203)

The more motivated the worker, the more effective the worker.
Role of Supervision

Different types of supervision have various effects on a worker’s motivational levels. “One of the most agreed upon principles in the field of organizational behavior is that positive reinforcers consistently administered to critical employee behaviors will lead to performance improvement” (Luthans & Stajkovic, 2000, p. 166). “Praise and encouragement” and “consideration by a supervisor for the needs or feelings of his subordinates has positive effects on their motivation to perform their jobs effectively” (Conger, 2000, p. 142). “The more ‘considerate’, ‘supportive’ or ‘employee-oriented’ the supervisors, the greater the extent to which his subordinates will strive to do their jobs well” (Vroom, 1964, pp. 212-213).

The research findings show, for example, that those supervisors and managers whose pattern of leadership yields consistently favorable attitudes more often think of employees as ‘human beings rather than just as persons to get the work done’. Consistently, in study after study, the data show that treating people as ‘human beings’ rather than as ‘cogs in a machine’ is a variable highly related to the attitudes and motivation of the subordinate at every level in the organization. . . supportive, friendly, and helpful rather than hostile. . . kind but firm, never threatening, genuinely interested in the well-being of subordinates and endeavor to treat people in a sensitive, considerate way. . . just, if not generous . . . endeavors to serve the best interests of his employees as well as of the company. . . shows confidence in the integrity, ability and motivations of subordinates rather than suspicion and distrust. His confidence in subordinates leads him to have high expectations as to their level of performance. With confidence that . . . will not be disappointed, he expects much, not little. (This, again, is fundamentally a supportive rather than a critical or hostile relationship.) . . . helps subordinates be promoted by training them for jobs at the next level. This involves giving them relevant experience and coaching whenever the opportunity offers. (Likert, 1961, p. 324)

The best managers realize that workers can be trained, and each employee has special talents. As indicated by Likert (1961) the high producing manager aids employees whose performance is inadequate. He tries to place the employee in a different position, which is best suited for the employee. Likert's (1961) 'empowerment interventions' take into consideration the person, his talents, and the nature of the job. Empowerment will depend upon the individual to some extent. According to Conger (2000) the empowerment process will also depend upon the
worker's self-reflection expertise. High-producing managers convey support and recognition to the worker acknowledging his worth as a person (Likert, 1961).

In contrast “The low producing managers . . . feel that the way to motivate and direct behavior is to exercise control through authority. Jobs are organized, methods are prescribed, standards are set, and performance goals and budgets are established. Compliance with them is sought through the use of hierarchical and economic pressures” (Likert, 1961, p. 323). This type of manager tries to control man’s physiological and safety needs (McGregor, 1957). But “it fails because direction and control are useless methods of motivating people whose physiological and safety needs are reasonably satisfied and whose social, egoistic and self-fulfillment needs are predominant” (McGregor, 1957, p. 315).

For these reasons McGregor (1957) proposes a different theory of the task of managing people – “Theory Y”.
1. Management is responsible for organizing the elements of productive enterprise-money, materials, equipment, and people – in the interest of economic ends.
2. People are not by nature passive or resistant to organizational needs. They have become so as a result of experience in organizations.
3. The motivation, the potential for development, the capacity for assuming responsibility, the readiness to direct behavior towards organizational goals are all present in people. Management does not put them there. It is a responsibility of management to make it possible for people to recognize and develop these human characteristics for themselves.
4. The essential task of management is to arrange organizational conditions and methods of operation so that people can achieve their own goals best by directing their own efforts toward organizational objectives. This is a process primarily of creating opportunities, releasing potential, removing obstacles, encouraging growth, and providing guidance (p. 315).

Financial Motivation

Money can be a motivator and a demotivator. According to the National Center for Education Statistics from a statistical analysis report of *Job Satisfaction among America’s Teachers*, teacher satisfaction showed a weak relationship with salary and benefits (National Center for Education Statistics, 1997). Financial motivation is an issue, which can be deceiving
to its recipients. “When workers are asked to describe what makes them satisfied or dissatisfied with their jobs, wages are found to be the most frequent source of dissatisfaction but the least frequent source of satisfaction” (Vroom, 1964, p. 150). Herzberg also agreed that salary can be a demotivator. “As an affector of job attitudes, salary has more potency as a job dissatisfier than as a job satisfier” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 126).

Salary is the most visible, communicable and advertised factor in all the world of work. Salary permeates the thoughts and expressions of people when they view their jobs. In such a circumstance, it is hardly surprising that salary often seems to be a satisfier to the individual. If so many hygiene needs can be fulfilled by money, then it is difficult not to conceive of it as a source of happiness. And conversely, so much unhappiness is caused by the lack of money that the alleviation of this unhappiness is easily viewed as a period of happiness (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 127-128).

Herzberg (1966) emphasized that money could have a “heroine-like” feel and that “it would take more and more to produce less and less” (p. 169) in effect the excitement from receiving a pay raise is short-lived. Extrinsic rewards only satisfy the immediate and topical problem while the intrinsic reward promotes and encourages innate behaviors such as pride in one's work. The extrinsic versus the intrinsic rewards can be an immediate and powerful motivator, but the effect will not necessarily last long and can include both rewards and punishments. When an organization’s “goals become directed to the worker who is hygiene-oriented rather than to the worker who is motivator-oriented” . . . the work has less “creativity” and “spirit” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 192).

If money becomes the only available reward, “people will make insistent demands for more money. . . It becomes more important than ever to buy the material goods and services which can provide limited satisfaction of the thwarted needs. . . Unless there are opportunities at work to satisfy . . . higher-level needs, people will be deprived; and their behavior will reflect this deprivation. (McGregor, 1957, p. 313)

One cannot always say that it was the money, which motivated because it can never be an isolated event (Opsahl & Dunnette, 1966). There will always be additional changes when money
is added to the equation. Factors such as new program evaluation, structure of pay systems, and possibly more steps in the evaluation system will change the program indefinitely; for that reason, when testing the result of adding the monetary compensation, it will not be the only factor tested.

Teacher Preparation and Pay History

In the early to mid-1800s teachers received part of their pay from the parents of students, which could consist of free room and board from their students’ parents. By the late 1800s teachers were receiving preparation from training institutes, typically their county or city institutes, where the school superintendent oversaw the instruction. Usually, a state would adopt teacher licensing, and the superintendent would administer the exam. By and large, teachers merely graduated from high school (Odden & Kelley, 1997).

As indicated by Odden & Kelley (1997) several changes were occurring inside of and outside of the educational community. The schools were consolidating and becoming larger. There were fewer one-room schoolhouses. The superintendent became the instructional leader and was responsible for the direction of the schools. At the same time the makeup of the nation was changing. The nation was becoming more urban. This consolidation helped rural and urban students receive a similar education. Rural classrooms generally had fewer resources than urban classrooms.

Throughout the late 1800s teachers’ pay was determined by factors such as number of years of experience, gender, race, and the grade level that they taught. A principal would decide if a teacher earned more or less upon the principal’s own judgment. This judgment habitually favored males over females and whites over blacks when it came to teachers receiving pay for their work. Many principals and superintendents (typically male) thought that men should receive more pay since they were the heads of the household. Some people argued that women
were intellectually inferior anyway and that more pay would encourage women to work instead of getting married (Odden & Kelley, 1997).

Single Salary Schedule

The Women’s Movement in the early 1900s helped to bring inequality in pay to the forefront. New York finally passed a bill in 1911 to equalize pay for male and female teachers. This became the first single salary schedule for teachers (Odden & Kelley, 1997).

By the 1920s the single salary schedule had been adopted in many states. The single salary schedule provided many needs for teachers. The pay was now equitable among all – regardless of gender, subject taught, grade level taught, or family status. Teachers, by the single salary schedule, were encouraged to attend college and to graduate. All teachers had an equal and fair chance to receive pay raises. Pay increases did not depend on an administrator’s opinion of a teacher’s pedagogy. Teachers were released to teach what they deemed worthy in the classroom. Teaching salaries became predictable, and the single salary schedule eliminated competition among teachers. Teachers are paid according to education units, university degrees, and years of teaching experience. All of these factors are easily measured. These aspects of the single salary schedule have made the single salary schedule resistant to changes (Odden & Kelley, 1997).

In the 1950s the schools encouraged teachers to attain a college degree and a state license, which tested for minimal skills. Teachers still had fewer skills than their business counterparts. Teachers taught with “teacher-proof curriculum” and were only responsible for getting students ready for employment and democratic participation (Odden & Kelley, 1997).

Odden and Kelley (1997) stated that traditional school organizational structures did little to focus teachers on the development of certain skills to improve student achievement.
Traditional schools required less professional growth from teachers and therefore could use a uniform pay scale.

However, the single salary schedule is a base pay for teachers; and, if the schedule is changed, this may cause more inadequacies in school systems. For example, the wealthiest school districts have the better prepared teachers due to better teacher recruitment. Odden (2003) stated that funds need to be there for teacher recruitment to all types of schools, but unequal access to a local tax base for education exists in most states. Odden (2003) admitted that usually the poorest school systems have the least prepared teachers. Odden, Archibald, Fermanich, and Gallagher (2002) said that research links professional development programs to boosting student achievement, and Killeen, Monk, and Plecki (2002) found in a study of information obtained from the United States Census Bureau that urban areas spend more money on professional development than rural areas. If the single salary system is replaced poorer school districts risk the chance of having inadequately prepared teachers.

History of Accountability

In the early 1900s educational experts developed rating procedures to measure teachers’ performance. After the 1920s there was a lull in activity in the 1930s and 1940s. The Great Depression, World War II, and the rebuilding of the American economy after the war may have influenced this quiet time. But accountability was “reawakened” in the late 1950s after the Sputnik Challenge. The Soviet Union shocked America in 1957, and American education increased its emphasis on mathematics and science education. This movement to catch up increased accountability for teachers and students (Hansen, 1993).

Project TALENT, sponsored by USOE in 1959, was the first large-scale effort in modern school output evaluation. Prior to this the emphasis had been on input variables, such as number of students served, number of hours or days of instruction, teacher education levels, and costs per student. Project TALENT analyzed the performance of students from a large number of schools on uniform objective and traditional tests, against such variables as levels of expenditure, size
of classes, qualifications of teachers, and student socioeconomic background. Although TALENT was a research study and was not intended as an accountability effort, it had a profound effect on accountability legislation that would follow such as the Title Programs from the federal government. (Hansen, 1993, p. 16)

In the 1960s and early 1970s mandated federal programs were developed such as ESEA Title I and Title VII-Bilingual and Title VIII – Dropout prevention. These programs required outcome measures, based on previously established student performance goals (Hansen, 1993). These federal programs also increased accountability in schools.

In 1970 the first nationwide reporting agency was formed – National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). NAEP reports student performance on a broad sampling of what students are expected to know. Every two years, states participate in assessments in reading and mathematics at the fourth and eighth grades. States can use NAEP results to compare their students’ performance over time and to the performance of students nationally and by state. Federal law requires all states that receive Title I funds to participate in NAEP reading and mathematics assessments at fourth and eighth grade levels. All other NAEP assessments are voluntary unless required by the state (National Center for Education Statistics, 2004).

NAEP is mandated by the U.S. Congress and is administered by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), within the Institute of Education Sciences at the U.S. Department of Education. The National Assessment Governing Board (NAGB), whose members are appointed by the Secretary of Education, sets policies for NAEP. NAEP provides state and national student performance results in reading, math, science, and writing; national student performance results in U.S. history, geography, civics, the arts, foreign language, world history, and economics; trends in national student performance in reading, math, and science over the past 30 years; and comparisons in student performance based on such factors as race/ethnicity, gender, public and private schools, level of parental education, prior course-taking and classroom
and school conditions and practices. NAEP provides a variety of publications and data, which include national and state report cards on student performance. It captures the public’s attention when it is reported through the media. These same scores have been used to compare our schools globally (Hansen, 1993 & National Center for Education Statistics, 2004). Educational accountability had come into the forefront with the reporting of standardized test scores. Therefore, teacher work became more noticeable due to the publishing of test scores (National Center for Education Statistics, 2004).

When *A Nation at Risk* (United States Department of Education, 1983) was published, it recommended that the nation’s teachers needed to be competitive and it “sparked” school reform movements in the federal, state, and local levels (Hansen, 1993; Odden, 1996). Some of the recommendations of *A Nation at Risk* (1983) included a call for rigorous content and high standards in some basic subjects. It recommended a system of curriculum-based exams to examine how well students were performing to standards. It mentioned that colleges had very low expectations, and many students who entered education were of a low academic caliber.

Shanker (1993) observed that *A Nation at Risk* (1983) also addressed the students. The report told the students that “in the end it is your work that determines how much and how well you learn.” Shanker thinks that we need to agree on standards for what students should know, assess them on their achievement of those standards, and give them a reason to work hard in school by linking their achievement with what they want – access to college or to jobs (Shanker, 1993).

On January 8, 2002, President Bush signed the *No Child Left Behind Act* (NCLB) of 2001 that reauthorized the *Elementary and Secondary Education Act* (ESEA). NCLB significantly raises expectations for states, local school systems, and schools in that all students will meet or exceed state standards in reading and mathematics within twelve years. NCLB requires all states
to establish state academic standards and a state testing system that meets federal requirements. Each state has to have its state accountability plan approved by the United States Department of Education (United States Department of Education, 2004).

No Child Left Behind Act objectives include (1) Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) – a measure of year-to-year student achievement on statewide assessments, (2) Public School Choice – children who attend public schools that have not made AYP for two or more consecutive years and have thus been designated for Needs Improvement have the option of moving to a higher performing public school, (3) Supplemental Services – children in schools that have been in Needs Improvement status for two or more years may receive supplemental services that include before- and after-school tutoring or remedial classes in reading, language arts, & math, (4) Unsafe School Choice Option (USCO) – must allow public school choice for students who have been victims of a violent criminal offense or who attend a school that meets the definition of a “persistently dangerous” school, (5) Exceptional Students – ensuring that no student with disabilities is Left Behind Under No Child Left Behind, (6) School Improvement – to develop a statewide system of support for improvement, and (7) Limited English Proficiency Students – students with LEP will become proficient in English and reach high academic standards (United States Department of Education, 2004).

According to an article published in the Phi Delta Kappa, the public wants improvement to come through existing public school systems but does not want to spend any more money. The public wants the emphasis to be on identifying those schools and students in need of improvement and then provide them with some assistance (Policy Implications, 2003).

Weaknesses of the Single Salary Schedule

At present the teacher’s role is to produce a high level of student achievement along with being a school leader and sharing decision making within her school. With the advanced
curriculum teachers must possess advanced disciplinary content training. Teachers are also expected to have training in pedagogy, leadership, management, and decision making skills. Teachers are to prepare all students for high competency and problem-solving skills (Odden & Kelley, 1997).

With these new higher standards, the single salary schedule becomes inadequate in some areas of the pay plan. Teachers are not rewarded for continuing to improve their teaching in the classroom. All teachers are rewarded equally no matter how advanced their pedagogical skills. The traditional single salary schedule is closer to being a membership for teachers than a competency pay for all teachers (Odden & Kelley, 1997). Odden (2000) suggested that now is the time to challenge teachers because we have many programs in place to evaluate teachers such as the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards, PRAXIS tests, INTASC, and the Danielson teaching objectives.

A study conducted by Eberts, Hollenbeck, and Stone (2002) confirmed the effectiveness of a merit pay system over a traditional single salary schedule in Michigan in promoting student performance. Eberts, et al. (2002) acquired data from a Michigan high school that implemented a merit pay system in 1996 and a comparable high school that maintained a traditional compensation system. According to Eberts, et al. (2002), in the school that implemented the merit pay system there was a higher retention rate of students who were more likely to drop out.

At present the No Child Left Behind Act is the driving force of many accountability measures taken in the states. By the beginning of 2004 most of the states had formed policies to adapt to the NCLB Act. Many used their own state assessment to set AYP (adequate yearly progress). There are few accommodations made for the degree of a student’s disability, but each child will have information on his progress (Christie, 2004). One of the requirements of the NCLB Act is to have a qualified teacher in every classroom. Presently, 25% of teachers are
teaching out of their subject areas. NCLB does not concur with the old seniority system of paying teachers. The Teaching Commission Report led by ex-IBM Chairman Louis V. Gerstner recommended teachers should be paid more for serving in tough inner-city schools or for teaching math and science (Symonds, 2004; Vedder, 2003).

Goldhaber and Brewer (2000) found that teacher certification could not be connected to student learning. Goldhaber and Brewer (2000) tested twelfth grade students of teachers with probationary certification, emergency certification, private school certification, or no certification in their subject area. Some students of teachers with emergency certification performed as well as those students of standard certification. Math was the only subject where there was a clear implication of low student achievement with out-of-field teachers. Ballou and Podgursky (1998) think that increasing certification requirements may discourage individuals who might be attracted to teaching. Einstein would have had to return to college for twelve months to teach high school physics. This standard for teacher performance will discourage top graduates or mid-career applicants from applying to the teaching profession (“Paying teachers more,” 2000).

Darling-Hammond, Berry, and Thoreson (2001) dispute Goldhaber and Brewer’s (2000) findings that teacher certification does not affect student performance. Darling-Hammond and associates (2001) found that teachers who have more educational training appear to do better in producing student achievement.

According to Goldhaber and Brewer (2002) compensation structure needs to challenge educators to perform better. There is little evidence that certifications and educational levels affect student performance. There is some evidence that years of experience may affect student achievement, but it levels off after a few years of experience. Those students who chose to go into the education field had lower SAT scores than those entering technical professions, and
within the last 25 years there were fewer master’s and doctoral degrees in education. Evidence suggests that teacher quality is the most important school factor in explaining differences in student performance (Goldhaber, 2002). High teacher test scores on SATs, ACTs, and verbal ability tests are positively linked to student achievement scores (Schacter & Thum, 2004). These indicators of teacher performance should be a good gauge to ensure that we have quality teachers.

Merit Pay

The first merit pay programs began in the early 1900s (Hansen, 1993). Merit pay rewards individual instructors for superior performance. Performance is typically evaluated by classroom observation, though student achievement is sometimes used (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993). Merit pay seems “fair, because it pays more to those who contribute more. In turn, it attracts individuals who can perform at high levels and, by recognizing and rewarding them for doing so, makes them want to remain” and “attracts employees of better caliber” (Durham & Bartol, 2000, p. 162). However, merit pay programs should clearly define what good teaching includes plus have clear measurable goals. According to teachers, it is always difficult to train administrators to judge teachers fairly (Odden & Kelley, 1997).

“Teachers have held in contempt teacher evaluations because evaluators have not been adequately trained in curriculum and instruction, feedback is either absent or of low quality, and teacher evaluations rarely improve instruction” (Fraser & Streshly, 1994, p. 55). Teachers have, in addition, been affected by the “politics of favoritism” (Blase, 1988).

Data point out that favoritism by superintendents reduced opportunities for advancement, which appeared to influence indirectly the teachers’ orientation to the classroom: Although they taught their students that education and hard work were the way to achieve goals, status, and the American Dream, teachers felt this formula really had not worked in their own situation. (Blase, 1988, p. 167)
Schacter and Thum (2004) evaluated 52 teacher volunteers eight times each in the classroom. Trained evaluators rated them, and then the students’ test scores were evaluated for achievement gains. The most student achievement occurred in classrooms where teachers’ evaluation ratings were higher. As indicated by Odden and Kelley (1997) a teacher evaluation system can be meaningful and a good “catalyst” for school improvement.

Davis, Ellett, and Annunziata (2002) found when performing case studies on two different leadership styles, the following were common factors in the evaluation systems that worked:

- collaborative group engagement
- opportunities to improve student learning
- processes for improving student achievement
- positive organizational change
- greater program coherence
- strong professional relationships that strengthen leadership density
- individual and collective efficacy beliefs.

The authors stated that teacher evaluation has been a “narrow procedural or technical perspective” that has failed to recognize schools as complex organizations and systems (Davis et al., 2002).

Critics of merit pay say that it is impossible to evaluate a teacher’s ability. But merit pay is commonplace in universities, and professors’ teaching is evaluated. In large universities professors’ salaries may differentiate in the same department from between 50% to 100%. Test scores, enrollment figures, and college placement test are used to evaluate college professors (Vedder, 2003). Test scores could also evaluate teachers in K-12.
According to Danielson (2004) if a “blueprint” for teacher evaluation is followed, then teacher evaluation could be successful. Some of her points included (1) a clear definition of teaching, (2) instruments and procedures that provided evidence of teaching, (3) trained evaluators who could make consistent judgments based on evidence, (4) a process for teachers to understand the evaluative criteria, and (5) a process for making final judgments. Milanowski & Kimball (2004) suggested in their research to ensure reliability and validity of teacher evaluation systems that the evaluators would also be evaluated.

Ballou and Podgursky (1993) used data from the 1987-1988 the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), a comprehensive survey of approximately 9,300 public and 3,500 private schools, to conduct their research. Response rates were high: 83% among public school teachers and 73% among private school teachers. Their research showed that teachers in the private sector are far more favorably inclined toward merit pay than are public school teachers (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993 & Ballou & Podgursky, 2001). Ballou and Podgursky (1993) hypothesized that public schools may attract relatively risk-averse individuals who like the certainty of the single salary schedule; private schools may draw individuals who are not so strongly committed to making a career of teaching and who therefore have less interest in compensation policies that reward seniority. There could be three reasons why this is the result:

(1) There is greater red tape in the public schools with documenting the merit pay system.

(2) In contrast to public school teachers, teachers can be rewarded discreetly in private sectors.

(3) Private schools must attract and retain quality teachers in order to attract students.

The study found that teachers of disadvantaged students are more supportive of merit pay than the average teacher, and teachers who have had experience with merit pay plans are not more defensive to merit pay plans (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993).
Murnane and Cohen (1986) conducted surveys among teachers in six merit pay districts. Those districts, which were found to have merit pay the longest, had the following working conditions in common:

1. They gave extra pay for more work - sometimes requiring teachers to produce documents to show the work’s appropriateness for their teaching content area.
2. They did not force teachers to participate in the merit pay scheme.
3. Teachers were involved in planning the schemes, so there was general acceptance of the criteria for the awards and a feeling of ownership.

Morice and Murray (2003) investigated a school district in suburban St. Louis, Missouri, which celebrated its 50th anniversary of its teacher evaluation and salary program. Reasons for the possible success were (1) teacher and administrator committees used to “design, revise, and monitor” the program; (2) the plan has never tried to link the compensation of individual teachers to student achievement; (3) the district does not use a teacher salary schedule or salary guide and (4) the district does not set a maximum salary. A point system is used to determine salary levels. The system does not award extra money for additional coursework or degrees. The district has a tuition reimbursement program for up to $6000 per degree program. The teacher can receive an unlimited number of degrees. The absence of quotas has led to a high retention rate of teachers.

According to Odden and Kelley (1997) many teachers think that they need to leave teaching for administration to obtain higher pay and more recognition. They think that their career has topped out along with the salary. In Arizona, the Milken Teacher Advancement Program, (TAP) is trying to attract, retain and motivate high-quality educators. The schools will develop different career paths for teachers, a new teacher evaluation system, and a school compensation model with enhanced base salaries and incentive pay. One of the goals of this
program is to help teachers advance without leaving the classroom (Education Commission of the States, 2001). The majority of merit pay programs fail due to lack of funding. Most programs start out under funded and then are dropped altogether when the state or federal government quit funding projects (Odden & Kelley, 1997).

Teacher Career Ladders

Career ladders are a progression of steps through which the teacher advances in the course of a career. The Teacher Career Ladder Program was started in the 1980s to provide teachers, who had demonstrated exemplary skills in teaching, the possibility of attaining leadership positions in curriculum or professional development (Odden & Kelley, 1997). Eligibility may be based on education and years of service, but advancement itself is determined in part by merit. Teachers at higher rungs of the career ladder are paid more and/or assigned extra duties, some of which take them out of the classroom (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993). The Teacher Career Ladder has had problems such as quotas (only a set number could be given leadership positions), failed funding, poor assessment instruments along with poor administrative judgment of teaching, and increased competition among teachers (which broke down collegial relationships). In addition, the teachers’ unions opposed career ladders based on the competition among teachers and poor assessment (Odden & Kelley, 1997).

In 1987 Cincinnati framed its first career ladder program. During this ten-year period the program experienced success. In1997 the Cincinnati Education Board and the Cincinnati Federation of Teachers renewed their contract on career ladders for two years. This Career in Teaching Program provided incentives to attract quality teachers in the profession, encourage professional growth, expand teacher’s responsibilities, and improve student achievement (American Federation of Teachers, 1997).
The Cincinnati program consisted of four levels, which included: Intern, Resident, Career, and Lead teacher. (1) The Intern Level consisted of newly hired teachers who went through an induction process. The new teacher was coached, mentored, assisted and appraised through the evaluation process for approximately two years. (2) The Resident Level consisted of a two-year time period, where the teacher continued to enhance his teaching skills, following evaluation. (3) The Career Level was a period of at least five years where teachers were permitted to carry out instruction with less supervision. They were also expected to participate in professional growth activities in their field of teaching such as observing other school systems, attending conferences, and completing university courses. Career Level teachers had priority over the previous two levels in consideration for summer school, sabbatical leave, and vacancies in night school instruction. (4) At the Lead Teacher Level teachers were considered the highest quality level of teachers in the system. Teachers could acquire positions such as assessors, consulting teachers, trained teacher observers, developers, curriculum specialists, consultants, student specialists, parent education specialists, demonstrators, demonstration teachers, clinical faculty, coordinators, subject area leaders, program facilitators, and educational service personnel specialists. The duties of each position were indicated, and the application process was explained to teachers and administrators. The review board consisted of six teachers and administrators to review processes of teacher evaluations at each level (American Federation of Teachers, 1997).

Cornett and Gaines (1992) observed that lawmakers initially supported career ladders as a way to reward teachers who do the best teaching. In the 1991 National Survey of Incentive Programs and Career Ladders, teachers thought that career ladders improved teaching, provided resources and encouragement for teachers to take on new roles, and helped teachers think about teaching in new ways.
Competency-Based Pay

Competency-based pay reinforces continual improvement of the teachers who work within the school by developing skills and knowledge in curriculum and instruction. Other competencies could include guidance counseling, parent outreach, and site-based management; involving “running meetings, gaining consensus, developing and monitoring budgets, strategic planning, and program evaluation” (Odden & Kelley, 1997, p. 77). Teachers are rewarded for enhancing their skills to help the school achieve its goals. Areas that might enhance teacher ability and improve school achievement are a possible teacher’s license in a second area or a shortage area, computer skills, reading recovery, cooperative learning, or certification from National Board for Professional Teaching Standards. Teachers are then rewarded a certain amount of pay for the competency that they have completed (Odden & Kelley, 1997).

Contingency-Based Pay

Contingency-based pay is different from merit pay. “A district would identify one, two or perhaps three critical/core activities in which all or nearly all individuals should engage and, by including them in the compensation structure, elevate them to priority levels” (Odden & Kelley, 1997, p. 102). A portion of teacher base pay would be set-aside to reward teachers for core activities such as engaging in professional development and ongoing training. Another portion of teacher base pay would be set aside to reward teachers for critical activities such as assisting the school in attaining student achievement goals for the school or district (Odden & Kelley, 1997).

Herzberg recommends that teachers need to have recognition for achievement plus more professional responsibility and growth to promote self-esteem. Competency and contingency pay would reward teachers and give them that fulfillment needed as indicated by Herzberg (1966).
School-Based Performance Award Definition and Rationales

School-based performance awards (SBPA) are strategies, which reward teachers for improving their instructional abilities, which in turn should help their students learn more (Heneman, 1998). In school-based performance awards, the teachers could work together as team units to organize the best way to advance student achievement. Each team could make performance goals, which would be within reach for the team. "Pay for performance communicates what factors are most important to the company’s success and focuses employees’ attention and effort on those factors" (Durham & Bartol, 2000, p. 162). "It focuses attention on performances that achieve targets and results in improvement in these areas" (Mohrman & Lawler, 1996, p. 124).

The Consortium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE) has its Teacher Compensation Project based at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Allan Odden is Head of this Wisconsin Center for Educational Research. CPRE research shows that successful schools took actions to achieve success by analyzing test results to identify weaknesses, setting targets, changing the curriculum, and using professional development effectively. These schools had high levels of teacher knowledge and skill, teacher involvement in decision-making and strong leadership. The award did appear to act as an important signal to teachers indicating that the state took accountability goals seriously (Tomlinson, 2000).

When Kelley (1999) conducted research in Kentucky, North Carolina, Colorado, and Maryland on school-based performance awards, she found that teachers were motivated by clear goals, resource alignment, and changes in their teaching practices. Other researchers, for example King and Mathers (1997), found in studying performance-based systems in Kentucky, Indiana, South Carolina, and Texas that intrinsic desires to improve student learning were stronger than extrinsic rewards. Teachers reported that their own desire to see students achieve
was more valuable to them than monetary rewards. In addition, the teachers reported that good and bad publicity was a motivator. Kelley, Odden, Milanowski, and Heneman (2000) studied Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) and Kentucky teachers’ motivational reactions to school-based performance awards. They found that it motivated teachers in their individual effort if their effort would lead to increases in school wide student performance. It was motivating for them if the school-based performance award systems were fair and the award amount was worth the extra effort and stress. The teachers stated that they must also believe that they would get the award if they could produce the improved performance results. The SBPA programs focused attention on goals, motivated teachers, and channeled organizational resources. In Kentucky, Maryland, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, and Dallas school districts, school-based performance awards were found to boost student performance (Odden, 2001).

Odden, Kellor, Heneman, and Milanowski (1998) developed a checklist for creating a more successful SBPA program. The checklist included providing feedback of past assessments to help teachers refine curriculum and instruction, establishing a consistent source of funding for the SBPA awards, making sure SBPA goals do not compete with other school goals, setting the bonus amount high enough to compensate for more work, involving teachers in the design, measuring every performance goal in a valid and reliable way, selecting equitable measures that address student differences, attaining the support of the principal, and evaluating and adjusting the SBPA program as needed.

Durham and Bartol (2000) make the following recommendations on what it takes to make pay for performance work for teachers and administrators.

1. Identify explicitly what performance is desired.

2. Have the appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform at the desired level.
3. Make pay systems commensurate with employees’ values – pay for performance will only work if the rewards being offered are valued and the amount is viewed as sufficient.

4. Use non-financial motivators too- such as providing interesting and important work assignments, assigning challenging goals in conjunction with ongoing performance feedback, granting autonomy regarding how a job is accomplished, and providing public and/or private recognition for outstanding contributions.

5. Target the appropriate organization level and use good performance measure (pp. 160-163).

Mathers and King (2001) examined Colorado teachers’ perceptions of accountability. The teachers’ highest sense of accountability was to themselves and almost equally to their students. Teachers felt more accountable for items under their direct control such as curriculum, learning climate and student achievement than items not under their direct control such as parent involvement and student attendance. Odden (2000) also reported that teachers needed to be reassured of strong principal leadership guiding the school-based performance award.

Knowledge and Skill-Based Pay Designs

Knowledge and skill-based pay is unlike the traditional single salary schedule, where teachers progress through the salary schedule based on years of experience and degrees or college credits. Pay progression is based on mastering a sequence of knowledge and skills that represent better pedagogy. The purpose of the knowledge and skill-based pay is to supplement or replace the traditional single salary schedule with a pay scale, which motivates teachers to contribute to school improvement. Merit pay is usually allotted per year based on an evaluator’s judgment, but there may be a pool of money for which the teachers compete. Knowledge and skills-based pay is very new to education. There are only a few plans in the nation (Milanowski,
2003 & Wallace, 2004). Milanowski (2003) compiled research on seven new district pay systems for K-12 teachers from CPRE at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. In his study of these seven Knowledge and Skills-Based Pay (KSBP) programs, the teachers were involved in the design of the program. Many used outside evaluators to assess teaching skills such as NBPTS assessments. None of the cases took away seniority or graduate degree pay progression. Most of the cases cost more to initiate with the cost continuing to rise as more teachers become involved in the programs. Milanowski hypothesized that it would be better if a whole state pay system adopted a KSBP system rather than just a few districts within a state.

For 12 years Cincinnati has had a knowledge and skills-based salary structure. When forming this new salary system, a steering committee and subcommittees of teachers revamped the teacher evaluation system. A new salary schedule included five teacher categories – apprentice, novice, career, advanced, and accomplished. The structure uses teacher evaluations, degrees, National Board Certification, licensure in more than one field, and a school-based performance award (Odden, 2002).

In Rutland Northeast, Vermont another knowledge and skills-based salary structure was started which took four years to implement. The plan seemed to work better since they took into account the cultural history of the area. A teacher portfolio along with the teacher evaluation system was added (Mathis, 2001).

In Los Angeles, California, a charter school, Vaughn, has incorporated a knowledge and skills-based pay system. Teachers can earn an extra $13,100 per year, and the teachers in that system overwhelmingly voted to continue the program with a 75% majority vote (Odden, 2001).

Teachers’ Unions

Teachers’ unions have traditionally opposed merit pay and career ladders. The unions state that they undermine collegiality and that administrator’s cannot be impartial when judging
teaching. Rewards can also be so small that they do not motivate the teacher to perform. The teacher may think that the reward is not worth the time. Funding is uncertain in many states, because state legislators may vote to discontinue funding during any assembly (Conley & Gould, 1997).

The teachers’ union, according to Spring (1998), may express high ideals in education for the students, but in actuality, the union is solely supportive of the welfare of the teacher. The union is concerned with seniority and salary increases for its teachers. The unions are only powerful and influential as long as their numbers are large. Protection of seniority rights and salaries are the most important priorities of most unions. (p. 154)

Along with Spring (1998), Summers (2002) believes that teachers are the foremost school input in spending in school systems and on student learning. Teachers should not be excluded from the evaluation process. This leaves the educational system without any accountability.

Conley, Gould, Muncey, and White (2001) conducted interviews with union negotiators in Brevard County, Florida in 1999. Some of the negotiators thought that no one should suffer a loss in pay, and that the pay for performance program should be used as a reward not as a punishment. Also, teachers should have other ways to make more money such as individual and group awards for better student achievement and professional development related to the teachers’ content area. The negotiators felt that teachers should be involved in the process and that teachers should have a choice whether they participated in the pay for performance program. Outside evaluators should be used as in the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards, which would lower the chances of preferential treatment.

While teachers’ unions protect the salaries of teachers and claim that teachers are underpaid, there are those who believe the opposite. Podgursky (2003) claims that teachers have a shorter workday, a shorter workweek, and longer vacations than most professions. He thinks that teachers have good retirement and health insurance. He does not believe that it is fair for a high school physics teacher to earn the same pay as an elementary teacher. He disputes the
American Federation of Teacher’s claim that teachers are underpaid with few fringe benefits. Vedder (2003) states that teachers of average quality are probably overpaid, while teachers who are very effective are underpaid. These highly effective teachers are earning less than equally skilled workers in other professions.

In 2000 the Kentucky General Assembly introduced legislation, which would change the current single salary pay scale. The new legislation paid teachers higher salaries in shortage fields such as math, science, and foreign language, and the legislation directed schools to pay teachers more for teaching in rural areas. The legislation allowed individual districts to decide how they would design their own pay scales, and they could make the scales performance based. The National Education Association (NEA) debated against the bill and it did not pass. The NEA said that a differentiated pay plan would be unfair and divisive to employees (Hoff, 2002).

In the past the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) has been another teachers’ union, which has opposed merit pay schemes. The reasons the American Federation of Teachers (2001) have opposed merit pay schemes:

1. lack of funding, resulting in financially insignificant rewards;
2. quotas for rewarding teachers;
3. difficult-to-understand assessment procedures for evaluating teaching, resulting in perceptions that favoritism rather than merit was driving the system;
4. no gradations of merit – only “winners” and “losers;”
5. rewards went to teachers in the wealthiest schools more often than to those serving the neediest students;
6. student performance was not improved and was unconnected to outcomes; and
7. teacher morale problems - stemming from the creation of unfair competition in a system where cooperation and collaboration are valued.
With merit pay there could be possible legal problems schools will have to address, such as: due process. Due process practices should include the following: (1) compliance with statutes and collective bargaining agreements; (2) notice; (3) documentation; (4) assistance for improvement; (5) reasonable time for improvement; (6) evaluation summaries; (7) fair hearing; and, (8) trained evaluators (Desander, 2000).

But the AFT believed that the single salary schedule has “severe drawbacks.” Teachers frequently are rewarded for more college credits regardless of the content area. The traditional salary system does not reward additional skills such as licensure in multiple teaching fields, teaching in hard-to-staff schools, or shortages in particular teaching fields. Some systems do not reward teachers for exemplary teaching as in the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards. In February 2001 the AFT executive council approved a landmark resolution, based on the work of its Task Force on Professional Compensation for Teachers that calls for enhancing the traditional teacher compensation schedule. The resolution maintains that the AFT thinks that it is time to investigate practical, fair, and reliable teacher compensation options (American Federation of Teachers, 2001).

The resolution goes on to state that a professional teacher compensation system could include financial incentives to teachers who acquire additional knowledge and skills; advanced skills such as National Board for Professional Teaching Standards certification; or who agree to teach in low-performing and hard-to-staff schools. The AFT believes that compensation proposals could include increased pay for school wide improvement, mentoring new and veteran teachers, and teaching in shortage areas (American Federation of Teachers, 2001).

Criticisms of Pay for Performance

Chamberlin, Wragg, Haynes, and Wragg (2002) summarized research on performance–related pay and came to some assumptions: (1) schools may not want to hire teachers who are
only motivated by money. However, a number of teachers may not admit to this motivation. In their research new teachers were more motivated by salary than were more experienced teachers. (2) When there are fixed measurable objectives, employees forget about other facets of their job. Teachers will be more concerned with the test used to measure objectives, which will narrow student learning. (3) Pay for performance will cost more administratively due to more teacher evaluations and student testing. The new administrative tasks will consume more of the funding. (4) Relations between management and employee may be more strained since pay raises depend on evaluations. (5) Music and physical education classes may suffer because they will be downplayed as less important. As a result the morale of the physical education and music teachers may decline, and these courses may be cut out all together.

Young (2003) surveyed administrators and supervisors in six school districts and conducted thirty minute structured interviews with 575 employees about their pay for performance systems. Eight themes were found. (1) A basic lack of knowledge of the evaluation process by school officials. (2) The teachers were used to a single salary schedule. (3) The teachers were concerned about the supervisor’s ability or experience; for example, one teacher noted, “My supervisor understands secondary education very well but has no direct experience with elementary school children and understands little about my phase of the educational process” (p.41). (4) Many supervisors said that a lack of time worried them. (5) Principals thought that they should have more control of hiring employees since they were being held more accountable for the student outcomes. (6) Teachers also thought that they had little control of their work flow and that they would be ruled by a pay for performance system. (7) Many teachers and principals thought that the pay for performance systems were a “cost containment” rather than a “cost enhancement” program. (8) Pay for performance should not be legislated against the will of any employees.
Holt (2001) warned that pay for performance could be very destructive to schools. According to him, the United States needs to examine the history of the British merit pay system. The British merit pay system was criticized as taking all freedom from teachers, and it took 33 years to stop the use of the British merit pay system. Holt cautions that there are many outside forces other than the teacher and the student in learning. Outside factors include lack of breakfast for a student, bullies in the school, playing on a team sport, time available for teacher preparation, and the climate of the school. Holt (2001) counters that Odden is incorrect in his assumption that the single salary structure is under attack. Holt believes that there has never been a time that something in the educational system has not been under attack and that the traditional single salary schedule has virtually remained unchanged. He warns that teachers are more than steps - they are “human resources” (Holt, 2001).

In Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools (CMS) a school-based performance award (SBPA) program was initiated in the early 1990s. The school had not previously linked school improvement reforms to student achievement. Smith and Mickelson (2000) compared SAT scores and drop out rates of students to other comparable North Carolina schools. Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools only improved on the first year of the adoption of the school-based performance award program. Smith and Mickelson (2000) believe that this small increase was due in part to statewide reforms rather than CMS’s adoption of the SBPA.

The Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System (TVAAS) defines effective teachers as those who produce increases in test scores. As to date, no research group has been allowed in to evaluate the TVAAS system (Bracey, 2004). Some of the possible problems with the TVAAS system could be that teachers are measured incorrectly. A weak teacher in a weak school system could be considered good, but a good teacher in a strong school system could be considered weak. Many weak teachers are assigned to low-achieving students, and the more effective
teachers are assigned to high-achieving students. Teachers may become competitive for different classes. Also, teachers may only want to work with the students who they think will bring up their test scores. Teachers assigned to white students received more effective teacher scores while teachers assigned to black students received fewer effective teacher scores (Bracey, 2004).

Many states want to improve teachers’ salaries and boost student achievement scores, but many cannot fund the new salary system. Arizona’s Proposition 301 received voter approval on May 31, 2001, and the state sales tax increased by six-tenths percent. Proposition 301 did not define what constituted good teacher performance. Proposition 301 allowed the district to define good teacher performance and to design its own plans. By the end of that year, the state sales tax fell below the projected levels and the state had to reduce funding. Many districts, which had designed a performance-based pay system, were left short and were unable to fund it (Schilling & Lawton, 2002).

Goldhaber and Hannaway (2004) studied five schools using focus groups of parents and teachers and interviews with principals about the A+ Accountability Plan implemented in Florida in 1999. The plan wanted to invoke a market force among schools. If the school’s test scores, where the student attended, were below standard the student could receive vouchers to go to a different public or private school. According to the parents, teachers, and principals interviewed, most thought that the A+ Accountability Plan narrowed instructional focus. The threat of the vouchers motivated the principals and district officials more than the teachers or parents. The social stigma of being labeled as a low-performing school seemed to be more motivating for teachers than the vouchers.

King and Mathers (1999), in several interviews with schools financed based on performance based measures, they uncovered some concerns such as the curriculum narrowing, purposes of testing changing (the purpose would be more for the public instead of for the
student), unethical and illegal practices becoming more prevalent with high-stakes testing, the creation of morale problems, and divisions among personnel. Another concern is the lack of finance for the schools, which are not the award-winning schools. Since more money is going to top performing schools, the lower performing schools will need more money to help them to improve. King and Mathers (1999) deduce that the underprivileged student may suffer.

Georgia Pay for Performance

The Georgia State Legislature passed rule 20-2-213.1 which authorized a pay for performance plan for rewarding group activity to be initiated by December 31, 1992. The criteria would relate to the overall educational performance of the school in areas related to student outcomes and achievement. The criteria reflected the six national goals for education in Goals 2000, which had then been adopted by Georgia under Georgia 2000 (Georgia Department of Education, 2000).

School systems would submit a letter of intent based on the criteria. The school would be notified if its application had been accepted by May 1 of the preceding school year for which the proposal was created. The performance of the school is evaluated in the summer, and the award notice is given no later than September 1. Awards would be approximately $2000 per teacher and would be made to the successful school no later than December 1. The local school’s certified personnel could choose to have bonuses, faculty sabbaticals, instructional or other equipment, staff development, and distribution to other school staff in the form of bonuses, or any other expenditure deemed appropriate by the local school’s certified personnel. The State Board of Education would submit a proposal for funding the pay-for-performance program for rewarding group productivity each year with its budget request (Georgia Department of Education, 2000).
Applicants would address each of the following: (a) Academic achievement criteria 50-70%, (b) Client involvement criteria 10-30%, (c) Educational programming criteria 10-30%, (d) Resource development criteria 10-30%, and (e) Exemplary performance criteria 10-30% (Georgia Department of Education, 2000).

**Academic achievement objectives** – The school should exhibit exemplary performance of student achievement when compared with schools with comparable demographic makeup.

**Client involvement objectives** – The school might focus on areas such as: promoting student participation in activities outside regular classes which are designed to promote learning, especially for those students who are at risk of dropping out; promoting parent participation in activities which improve student learning and/or parents’ interest in their own education; promoting participation of the general public in activities that encourage a clearer understanding of the role of the school and its program; promoting direct assistance in school-approved efforts that directly enhance the education of students; and linking school to business or other important segments of the general public to accomplish the school’s mission (Georgia Department of Education, 2000).

**Educational programming objectives** – The school might focus on areas such as: implementing the design of a program which shows promise for students in circumstances that typify the proposing school or the exemplary performance of a school program that is examined by an outside, independent evaluator/team and found to be outstanding (Georgia Department of Education, 2000).

**Resource development objectives** – The school emphasizes the importance of human and material resource development regarding student outcomes. The category may include staff and administration professional development, procurement of grants or other funds, improvement or
development of instructional materials, and improvements in the physical plant (Georgia Department of Education, 2000).

**Exemplary performance objectives** – The school may indicate exemplary performance at the school site in one of two ways: (1) school productivity is exemplary based on its program mission (the students being served and clear measurable outcomes of student progress), or (2) the school is making significant progress in improving its productivity so that the school is exemplary in its demonstrated improvement (Georgia Department of Education, 2000).

Findings of studies conducted by the Georgia Department of Education (2000) in the winter and spring of 2000 indicated that the Pay for Performance Program (PfP) functioned as an effective incentive for school improvement. The PfP provided faculties with strategic plans to improve student learning. In the 1996-1997, 1997-1998, and 1998-1999 cycles, average Iowa Test of Basic Skills Total Reading and Total math test scores of PfP schools were significantly higher than scores of other schools in the state at grades three, five, and eight. Survey data collected from PfP schools indicated long-term improvements such as improved student achievement, increased faculty collaboration, increased focus on important school goals, improved faculty morale, increased professionalism, improved student morale, improved school climate, increased parent involvement, increased community involvement, improved use of technology, and increased ability to evaluate the school. Controls for differences in students’ entry-level academic performance were provided in schools with a high percentage of students receiving free lunch in order to provide an unbiased evaluation of school effectiveness.

The Pay for Performance Program went through an important change in the 2003-2004 school year. The program will only be available to schools with Grades 9 – 12 (Georgia Department of Education, 2000). This school-based performance award is printed on the school report cards, which are shared with the public, as awards or recognitions of high-achieving
schools. The Georgia Pay for Performance Program ended in 2004 after a meeting of the Georgia General Assembly.

Georgia Schools of Excellence

The Georgia Schools of Excellence is another school-based performance award, which recognizes schools’ achievements, but does not have a monetary reward attached to it. The prestige and popularity of the Georgia Schools of Excellence Program has grown steadily since its beginning in 1984. This program identifies and honors successful public schools throughout the entire state of Georgia. The Georgia Schools of Excellence program is modeled after the National Blue Ribbon Schools Program. General categories which are addressed in the Georgia Schools of Excellence are student focus and support, school organization and culture, challenging standards and curriculum, active teaching and learning, professional community, leadership and educational vitality, school, family, and community partnerships, and indicators of success.

- Student focus and support category includes the description of the student population and the students’ needs and how they are met.
- School organization and culture category focuses on a caring, safe, and orderly school environment, and a climate focused on the welfare and achievement of the students and staff.
- Challenging standards and curriculum category consists of the school using curriculum and goals together to drive the school improvement to reach high student achievement.
- Active teaching and learning category proves that there is a discernable link between teaching strategies and student achievement.
- Professional community category promotes teacher collaboration through professional development and activities to promote student achievement.
• Leadership and educational vitality category embraces how leadership, the school, and community are involved in continuous school improvement focused on student learning by creating a vision through using data, research, effective practice, and continual monitoring and assessment that has resulted in high levels of student achievement.

• School, family, and community partnerships category recognizes the important role that families and communities play in supporting the role of learning. The school implements strategies to include these partners.

• Indicators for success category shows improvements made since the last application. Adjustments are made for low socioeconomic students (Georgia Department of Education, 2004).

The Georgia Schools of Excellence Program is undergoing revisions to more closely align with the federal “No Child Left Behind – Blue ribbon Schools” program. Schools will be selected by the Georgia State Board of Education based on demonstrated excellence in student achievement and/or in greatest gains in improving student achievement. Once identified, these schools will submit a brief information packet to complete the process. The Georgia Schools of Excellence (SOE) program is awarded only once every five years with thirty-three state winners. This school-based performance award is printed on the school report cards, which is shared with the public, as awards or recognitions of high-achieving schools (Georgia Department of Education, 2004).

Summary

Motivation has many separate ingredients. Maslow, Herzberg, Vroom, Lawler, McGregor, and Bandura all have described theories, which help to explain a person’s motivation. Measuring motivation for teachers will be complicated since there are so many facets to motivation. According to Herzberg (1966) in order for teachers to feel satisfied with their jobs,
they need to experience achievement, recognition, and advancement. The single salary schedule is only minimally able to help the teacher achieve these experiences. Achievement is only accomplished by attaining degrees, and those may be few and far between. Usually no one recognizes you in the job setting when you have attained this honor. It is just another pay raise on the single salary schedule. After a certain time period, (approximately 15 years of service), the teacher tops out on the pay scale and has no more room for advancement (Herzberg, 1966; Odden & Kelley, 1997).

As indicated by Odden and Kelley (1997) salaries do matter to teachers, and very low salaries may attract a lower quality of people to education, a loss of teachers to higher-paying districts (poorer districts will not be able to compete for a better quality school teacher), and a loss of teachers to other professions. Merit pay can provide achievement, advancement, and recognition according to Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene theory (Herzberg, 1966). For example, if a teacher perceives that working hard will influence higher student scores and the teacher’s effort is focused on the student achievements, the teacher’s expectancy is greater (Heneman, 1998). Heneman (1998) suggests, after studying school-based performance awards, those goals that are perceived as meaningful, clear, specific, and challenging will foster high expectancy perceptions by teachers.

If the theories of goal setting, contingency, expectancy, and participative management are adhered to when developing any type of merit pay plan, it should be more motivating than just the single salary schedule. When Kelley (1999) studied the impact of school-based performance awards in Kentucky and Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, valued outcomes and clear goals were two very important motivators for teachers.

The single salary system does have its practical points. It does not discriminate based upon race, sex, or marital status as did pay systems in the past for teachers. The single salary
system requires a consistent amount of pay to be set-aside for teachers. Many systems have been under funded when they rely on the state to calculate and/or provide bonus awards.

The purpose of this study was to examine principals’ motivational and organizational behavior levels based on whether they participated in voluntary school improvement programs. The state of Georgia had two school based performance awards – Georgia Pay for Performance with a monetary reward and Georgia Schools of Excellence without a monetary reward. Administrators from Georgia schools participating in these programs will be surveyed. In the next chapter there will be a discussion of research methodology used in this study.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

Justification for the Study

Motivation is not a precise concept, but understanding how principals use different motivational techniques to affect the work of teachers could help states and local districts formulate new school improvement programs or new pay systems, which may support principals and teachers. This direction may in turn positively affect student achievement.

At this time there has not been a study located on two school-based performance awards within the same state - one with a monetary reward and the other without a monetary reward. By surveying administrators, who have participated in school-based performance awards, the researcher expects to find a difference in the teacher motivational techniques used by principals between award-winning and nonaward-winning schools.

The Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to examine principals’ motivational techniques in working with teachers based on whether they participated in voluntary school improvement programs. The state of Georgia had two school-based performance awards – Georgia Pay for Performance with a monetary reward and Georgia Schools of Excellence without a monetary reward. Administrators from Georgia schools participating in these school recognition programs and administrators not participating in these programs were surveyed.

The study was guided by these questions:
1. Were principals in Pay for Performance schools and Schools of Excellence schools more likely to set and evaluate goals for their staff than principals who didn’t participate in these programs?

2. Were principals in Pay for Performance schools and Schools of Excellence schools more likely to share decision-making with teachers than principals who didn’t participate in these programs?

3. Were principals in Pay for Performance schools and Schools of Excellence schools more likely to express a belief in the teachers’ ability than principals who didn’t participate in these programs?

4. Were principals in Pay for Performance schools and Schools of Excellence schools more likely to promote professional development for teachers than principals who didn’t participate in these programs?

5. Were principals in schools awarded monetary incentives more likely to use motivational techniques in working with teachers than those which were not awarded monetary incentives?

Research Design and Rationale

The purpose of this study was to examine principals’ motivational techniques in working with teachers based on whether they participated in voluntary school improvement programs. A cross-sectional survey was used. A sample of principals who have completed the recognition award and a sample of those who have not completed any school recognition awards were surveyed.

A mailed survey was chosen so that many administrators would have the opportunity to participate in the study. The survey gave the participant time to devote to the questions in the survey. A disadvantage of the survey was a low response rate.
Data Collection

The survey was mailed to the administrators of Georgia Schools of Excellence and Georgia Pay for Performance schools. Principals of schools that participated in both programs were not included in the sample. The survey was also mailed to the administrators of schools who did not achieve school improvement recognition awards.

Population/Sample

The school sample was chosen by using lists from the Georgia Department of Education. The lists used were Georgia Pay for Performance 2002-2003 and 2001-2002 winners and Georgia Schools of Excellence 2002, 2003, and 2004 winners. The survey was mailed to administrators of all participants of Georgia Pay for Performance and Georgia Schools of Excellence. Sixty schools without any school improvement recognition awards were chosen from the Georgia Needs Improvement list. Administrators from the Needs Improvement list were mailed surveys.

Data Collection Procedures

According to Fowler (1984) the questionnaire should include four practical standards:

1. Is this a question that can be asked exactly the way it is written?
2. Is this a question that will mean the same thing to everyone?
3. Is this a question that people can answer?
4. Is this a question that people will be willing to answer, given the data-collection procedures?

A cover letter was sent to potential respondents in a mail survey explaining the purpose of the survey questionnaire. The cover letter was brief and to the point. It explained the purpose of the survey and the importance of the topic of the research (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003). Confidentiality and anonymity were assured. A deadline was indicated and the researcher signed...
the letter. The return of the survey was made as easy as possible. The questionnaire contained a stamped, addressed envelope. Each respondent received an identical questionnaire at the same time of the school year, so that all participants had similar opportunities to respond.

Data Analysis

Closed-end questions were used. These are effective for measuring ratings of opinions, attitudes, and knowledge. Closed-end questions are effective to use, score, and code for analysis on a computer (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003). Other suggestions from Fraenkel & Wallen (2003) for improving closed-end questions included:

1. Be sure the question is unambiguous.
2. Keep the focus as simple as possible.
3. Keep the questions short.
4. Use common language.
5. Avoid the use of terms that might bias responses.
6. Avoid leading questions.
7. Avoid double negatives.

The questionnaire was uncluttered and easy for the respondents to read. According to Fraenkel & Wallen (2003) when the respondents have to spend a lot of time reading then they may become discouraged and discontinue. After the answers to the survey questions were recorded, then the responses were summarized. The total size of the sample was reported, along with overall percentage of returns. The means were compared between groups. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) compares the variation due to specific sources with the variation among individuals who should be similar. ANOVA test whether several populations have the same mean by comparing how far apart the sample means are with how much variation there is within the samples (Moore, 2004).
Validity

“Validity has been defined as referring to the appropriateness, correctness, meaningfulness, and usefulness of the specific inferences researchers make based on the data they collect” (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003, p. 158). According to Fraenkel & Wallen (2003) there are three steps involved in obtaining construct-related evidence of validity:

(1) The variable being measured is clearly defined; (2) hypotheses, based on a theory underlying the variable, are formed about how people who possess a “lot” versus a “little” of the variable will behave in a particular situation; and (3) the hypotheses are tested both logically and empirically. (p.164)

Three professors from the University of Georgia reviewed the survey questionnaire and the survey was correlated with professional research taken from motivational and organizational theories. The survey questions used were from the Schools and Staffing Survey formulated by the National Center for Education Statistics. The questionnaire used from SASS has been used in each cross-sectional cycle of the principal survey since 1987. This allows researchers to investigate trends over time. Some items have been added or deleted since 1987. SASS is the nation’s largest sample survey of America’s elementary and secondary schools (NCES, 2005). Nonresponse is a threat to validity in a mailed survey. The researcher controlled nonresponse by mailing a reminder letter to the respondents and then followed up the mailing of the survey with a phone call to nonrespondents.

Reliability

“Reliability refers to the consistency of the scores obtained-how consistent they are for each individual from one administration of an instrument to another and from one set of items to another” (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003, p.165). A separate item analysis was performed for each question.
Limitations

The following limitations of the study are noted:

1. Motivational reactions of administrators in Georgia may not be generalized to other populations.
2. Extrinsic motivation may not be entirely separated from intrinsic motivation.
3. The Georgia Pay for Performance Plan funding ended in 2004. This may have affected the motivation of former participants.
4. The researcher was a former participant in the Georgia Pay for Performance Plan.
5. The research had some nonrespondents.

Summary

The purpose of this study was to examine principals’ motivational techniques in working with teachers based on whether they participated in voluntary school improvement programs. The state of Georgia had two school based performance awards – Georgia Pay for Performance with a monetary reward and Georgia Schools of Excellence without a monetary reward. Administrators from Georgia schools participating in these programs and administrators not participating in these programs were surveyed.

In Chapter One there was a brief introduction including the statement of the problem and the purpose of the study. In Chapter Two the literature was reviewed which related to motivation, decision making, goal-setting, financial motivation, and the history of accountability. In Chapter Three there was a brief discussion of the survey questionnaire to be used along with the sample population. The discussion included how the sample population was to be chosen and how the data was collected. Reliability, validity, and limitations issues were also discussed. In the next chapter there will be a reporting of the findings used in this study.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

The purpose of this chapter was to present an analysis of the data gathered as a result of this study. There were four alternative hypotheses. (1) This study was conducted to determine if a relationship existed between how principals better set and evaluated goals for their staff in performing versus nonperforming schools. (2) This study also sought to determine if a relationship existed between how principals of performing versus nonperforming schools were more likely to share decision-making with their teachers. (3) In addition this study tried to determine if a relationship existed between how principals of performing versus nonperforming schools were more likely to promote professional development for their teachers. (4) This study furthermore attempted to determine if a relationship existed between the more positive beliefs of principals in the ability of their teachers in performing versus nonperforming schools. This study used one independent variable with three levels (nonperforming schools, Pay for Performance schools, and Schools of Excellence schools) and one dependent variable (principals’ motivational techniques). The survey used was formulated by the National Center for Education Statistics. The data collected in the study was analyzed using ANOVA and a post hoc comparison with a significant $p$ value of .10 or less. The alpha level is .10. The post hoc comparison used the Scheffe method.

Population and Sample

The state of Georgia had two school-based performance awards – Georgia Pay for Performance with a monetary reward and Georgia Schools of Excellence without a monetary reward. Administrators from Georgia schools participating in these school recognition programs
and administrators not participating in these programs were surveyed with a cross-sectional survey. A mailed survey was chosen so that many administrators would have the opportunity to participate in the study. The survey gave the participant time to devote to the questions in the survey. Surveys were mailed to all 2002-2003 and 2001-2002 award recipients for the Pay for Performance grant which were not listed on the Georgia Department of Education needs improvement list or who received the Schools of Excellence award. Surveys were also mailed to the recipients of all 2002, 2003, and 2004 Schools of Excellence award winners, but who did not participate in the Pay for Performance program or were listed on Georgia’s needs improvement list. Schools, which had not received the Schools of Excellence and Pay for Performance awards, were chosen from the Georgia Department of Education needs improvement list. These schools were chosen from the same geographical areas as the award winners of the Pay for Performance and Schools of Excellence awards.

A cover letter (Appendix A) was sent to potential respondents in a mail survey explaining the purpose of the survey questionnaire. Confidentiality and anonymity were assured. The return of the survey was made as easy as possible. The questionnaire contained a stamped, addressed envelope. Each respondent received the same questionnaire at the same time of the school year. After the surveys were mailed, those who did not respond, received a phone call from the researcher asking for voluntary participation. The surveys were mailed again two weeks after the first surveys were mailed. 165 surveys were mailed – 58 nonperforming schools, 58 Pay for Performance schools, and 49 Schools of Excellence schools. Seventy-three total schools responded – 17 nonperforming schools (29%), 28 Pay for Performance schools (48%), and 28 Schools of Excellence schools (57%).
Statement of the Null Hypotheses

Four null hypotheses were developed for this study:

Null Hypothesis 1: There will not be a difference between the relationship of how principals of nonperforming versus performing schools set and evaluated goals for their staff.

Null Hypothesis 2: There will not be a difference between the relationship of how principals of nonperforming versus performing schools shared decision-making with their teachers.

Null Hypothesis 3: There will not be a difference between the relationship of how principals of nonperforming versus performing schools promoted professional development for their teachers.

Null Hypothesis 4: There will not be a difference between the relationship of the beliefs of principals in their teachers’ ability in nonperforming versus performing schools.

Findings

Statistical analysis was completed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) program. A closed end survey (Appendix B) was mailed to principals in select schools. Each question in the survey was analyzed for mean and standard deviation (Table 1) according to type of school. Results of the ANOVA (Table 2) were compared using each question’s F statistic and p value. The p value was set for the .10 level. Questions 1B, 4D, 3C, 4A, and 5 were found significant at the .10 level. The ANOVA F statistic tests the null hypothesis that all populations have the same mean. Null is never proven to be true or false by means of hypothesis testing. Regardless of the decision made about the null hypotheses after the calculated and critical values are compared, it is possible that the wrong decision could have been reached.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics by School Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Nonperforming Mean (SD)</th>
<th>School of Excellence Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Pay for Performance Mean (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1A</td>
<td>3.53 (.94)</td>
<td>3.43 (.88)</td>
<td>3.46 (.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1B</td>
<td>3.47 (.80)</td>
<td>2.96 (.84)</td>
<td>3.36 (.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1C</td>
<td>3.71 (.47)</td>
<td>3.64 (.68)</td>
<td>3.79 (.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1D</td>
<td>3.88 (.33)</td>
<td>3.68 (.72)</td>
<td>3.71 (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2A</td>
<td>3.29 (.99)</td>
<td>3.39 (.88)</td>
<td>3.39 (.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2B</td>
<td>3.00 (.80)</td>
<td>3.00 (.94)</td>
<td>3.21 (.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2C</td>
<td>3.41 (.94)</td>
<td>3.36 (.78)</td>
<td>3.39 (.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2D</td>
<td>2.71 (.59)</td>
<td>2.86 (.76)</td>
<td>2.96 (.69)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q3A</td>
<td>4.24 (.66)</td>
<td>4.18 (.48)</td>
<td>4.36 (.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3B</td>
<td>4.18 (.81)</td>
<td>3.86 (.59)</td>
<td>4.21 (.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3C</td>
<td>4.12 (.70)</td>
<td>3.82 (.67)</td>
<td>4.25 (.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3D</td>
<td>3.82 (.95)</td>
<td>3.75 (.70)</td>
<td>3.86 (.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3E</td>
<td>3.24 (.90)</td>
<td>3.41 (.64)</td>
<td>3.46 (.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3F</td>
<td>3.65 (.70)</td>
<td>3.56 (.51)</td>
<td>3.71 (.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3G</td>
<td>3.47 (.87)</td>
<td>3.67 (.62)</td>
<td>3.71 (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4A</td>
<td>3.06 (.75)</td>
<td>3.15 (.66)</td>
<td>3.57 (.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4B</td>
<td>3.53 (.72)</td>
<td>3.59 (.69)</td>
<td>3.64 (.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4C</td>
<td>2.71 (.69)</td>
<td>2.85 (.77)</td>
<td>3.07 (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4D</td>
<td>2.76 (.66)</td>
<td>2.33 (.48)</td>
<td>2.52 (.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4E</td>
<td>3.41 (.62)</td>
<td>3.15 (.77)</td>
<td>3.18 (.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4F</td>
<td>3.53 (.72)</td>
<td>3.93 (.27)</td>
<td>3.93 (.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5</td>
<td>78.75 (17.38)</td>
<td>82.22 (14.00)</td>
<td>91.39 (13.06)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2

Results of ANOVA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1A</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1B</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>.098*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1C</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1D</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2A</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2B</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2C</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2D</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3A</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3B</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3C</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>.04**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3D</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3E</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3F</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3G</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4A</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>.02**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4B</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4C</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4D</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>.07**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4E</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4F</td>
<td>5.94</td>
<td>.004**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>.012**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p< .10
** p< .05
To further evaluate the significance of these findings a post hoc comparison was done with the Scheffé test. The F statistics of each of these questions (1B, 4D, 3C, 4A, 4F, and 5) were analyzed in the Scheffé test. Question 1B found no significance in multiple comparisons (Table 3). In Question 3C the mean difference was found significant at the .05 level (Table 4). The Scheffé test found no significance in multiple comparisons in Question 4A (Table 5). There was also no significance found in multiple comparisons with Q4D (Table 6). The mean difference among schools was found significant at the .05 level in both Questions 4F and 5 in the Scheffé test (Tables 7 & 8).

Within this research, it was hypothesized that there would not be a difference between the relationship of how principals of nonperforming versus performing schools set and evaluated goals for their staff. According to principals in this survey, principals of performing schools engaged in managing school facilities, resources, and procedures such as maintenance, budgets, and schedules more often than principals of nonperforming schools.

Within this research, it was hypothesized that there would not be a difference between the relationship of how principals of nonperforming versus performing schools shared decision-making with their teachers. However, this was not the case. There was not a statistically significant relationship in how principals of either type of school shared decision-making with their staff.

Within this research, it was hypothesized that there would not be a difference between the relationship of how principals of nonperforming versus performing schools promoted professional development for teachers. There was a statistically significant relationship found between Pay for Performance schools and Schools of Excellence schools. Principals of Pay for Performance schools designed or chose professional development which supported the
Table 3

Q1B ANOVA with Scheffé follow-up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
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<th>df</th>
<th>ms</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Model</td>
<td>3.413*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.706</td>
<td>2.407</td>
<td>.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>736.139</td>
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<td>736.139</td>
<td>1038.316</td>
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<tr>
<td>Types of Schools</td>
<td>3.413</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.706</td>
<td>2.407</td>
<td>.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>49.628</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>.709</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>816.000</td>
<td>73</td>
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<td>Corrected Total</td>
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<td>72</td>
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</table>

*R squared = .064 (Adjusted R squared = .038)

Scheffé

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOE</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NON</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>-.39</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

No significance in multiple comparisons
Table 4
Q3C ANOVA with Scheffé follow-up

<table>
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<th>df</th>
<th>ms</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Model</td>
<td>2.659*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.329</td>
<td>3.431</td>
<td>.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1140.662</td>
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<td>1140.662</td>
<td>2943.985</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of Schools</td>
<td>2.659</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.329</td>
<td>3.431</td>
<td>.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>27.122</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>.387</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1230.000</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Corrected Total</td>
<td>29.781</td>
<td>72</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*R squared = .089 (Adjusted R squared = .063)

Scheffé

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<td>NON</td>
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<td>-.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
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<td>- .43*</td>
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*The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. (p=.042)
Table 5
Q4A ANOVA with Scheffé follow-up

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<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Model</td>
<td>3.669*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.835</td>
<td>4.057</td>
<td>.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>726.713</td>
<td>1606.858</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of Schools</td>
<td>3.669</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.835</td>
<td>4.057</td>
<td>.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>31.206</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>.452</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>72</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Total</td>
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</table>

*R squared = .105 (Adjusted R squared = .079)

Scheffé

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NON</td>
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<td>-.51</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
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<td>-.42</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

No significance in multiple comparisons
Table 6

Scheffé follow-up ANOVA

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>df</th>
<th>ms</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Model</td>
<td>1.947*</td>
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<td>.973</td>
<td>2.781</td>
<td>.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>436.516</td>
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<td>436.516</td>
<td>1247.212</td>
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<tr>
<td>Types of Schools</td>
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<td>.973</td>
<td>2.781</td>
<td>.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>23.800</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>.350</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Corrected Total</td>
<td>25.746</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*R squared = .076 (Adjusted R squared = .048)
Table 7

Q4F ANOVA with Scheffé follow-up

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<tr>
<th>Source</th>
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<th>ms</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Corrected Model</td>
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<td>1.028</td>
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<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>984.940</td>
<td>5689.823</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of Schools</td>
<td>2.056</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.028</td>
<td>5.938</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
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<td>69</td>
<td>.173</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Total</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Total</td>
<td>14.000</td>
<td>71</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*R squared = .147 (Adjusted R squared = .122)

Scheffé

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>PFP</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>NON</td>
<td>-.40*</td>
<td>-.40*</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
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<td>.00</td>
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</table>

*The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

NON/SOE  p=.012
NON/PFP  p=.011
Table 8

Q5 ANOVA with Scheffé follow-up

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>p</th>
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<td>988.715</td>
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<td>.012</td>
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<td>Types of Schools</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>988.715</td>
<td>4.726</td>
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<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>14226.345</td>
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<td>209.211</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>Corrected Total</td>
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*R squared = .122 (Adjusted R squared = .096)

Scheffé

<table>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NON</td>
<td>-3.47</td>
<td>-12.64*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td></td>
<td>-9.17</td>
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</table>

*The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. (p=.025)
implementation of state or local standards more often than their Schools of Excellence counterparts.

Within this research, it was hypothesized that there would not be a difference between the relationship of the beliefs of principals in their teachers’ ability in nonperforming versus performing schools. Principals were asked, “What percentage of your faculty is presently teaching to high academic standards?” There was a significant statistical relationship between Pay for Performance schools and nonperforming schools. Pay for Performance principals believed that their faculty was teaching to higher academic standards than did principals of nonperforming schools.
CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Discussion

Within this research, it was hypothesized that there would be a relationship between how principals better set and evaluated goals for their staff in performing versus nonperforming schools. As indicated by this survey of principals, principals of performing schools engaged in managing school facilities, resources, and procedures such as maintenance, budgets, and schedules more often than principals of nonperforming schools. According to Latham (2000), a necessity in goal-setting is to provide all available resources to workers and in order to reach goals of the organization one needs to make certain that the resources such as time, money, people, and equipment are present. McGregor (1957) proposed a theory of managing people called “Theory Y”. He stated that “management is responsible for organizing the elements of productive enterprise-money, materials, equipment, and people” and he stated that “the essential task of management is to arrange organizational conditions.”

Within this research, it was hypothesized that there would be a relationship between how principals of performing versus nonperforming schools were more likely to share decision-making with their teachers. However, this was not the case. There was not a statistically significant relationship in how principals of either type of school shared decision-making with their staff. This finding did not support the research on decision-making. According to Vroom (1964) decision making can make a worker become more intrinsically motivated, and increase his self-efficacy. He becomes more satisfied with his job. Darling-Hammond (1996) suggested that to develop teacher self-efficacy and to motivate a teacher’s efforts the teacher must believe
that they are in control of some decisions rather than the administration making all of the decisions for them. Vroom (1964) stated that the quality of decisions made by the worker might be better than when a supervisor makes them on his own. Workers can contribute invaluable information about a job of which a supervisor may not be aware and that the strength of the group is furthermore enhanced by decisions handled by the group. This participation in decision making makes the group feel like a team, which will possess unusual group camaraderie (Likert, 1961).

Within this research, it was hypothesized that there would be a relationship between how principals of performing versus nonperforming schools were more likely to promote professional development for their teachers. There was a statistically significant relationship found between Pay for Performance schools and Schools of Excellence schools. Pay for Performance schools designed or chose professional development which supported the implementation of state or local standards more often than their Schools of Excellence counterparts. Recognition could be a reason since the Pay for Performance award was annual instead of every five years as in the Schools of Excellence award. The self esteem needs according to Herzberg’s motivation theory (1966) are achievement, recognition for achievement, work itself, responsibility, advancement, and possibility of growth.

It may have been easier for principals in Pay for Performance schools to promote more professional development to a staff which would be compensated for extra work. Durham and Bartol (2000) believe that group incentive plans are good for associations, which emphasize group achievements. They also believe that group incentives work best when members of an association hold each other accountable and the employees have high intrinsic motivation. Also, merit pay can provide achievement, advancement, and recognition according to Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene theory (Herzberg, 1966). Heneman (1998) suggests, after studying school-
based performance awards, that those goals that are perceived as meaningful, clear, specific, and challenging will foster high expectancy perceptions by teachers. As indicated by research, when developing any type of merit pay plan, if the theories of goal setting, contingency, expectancy, and participative management are adhered to, it should be more motivating than just the single salary schedule (Bandura, 2000; Heneman, 1998; Herzberg, 1966; Kelley, Odden, Milanowski, & Heneman, 2000; Lawler, 1969; Maslow, 1943; Odden & Kelley, 1997; & Vroom, 1964). For this reason, it may be easier for principals of Pay for Performance schools to set more challenging goals for teachers, when they are being additionally compensated, than when they are not being further compensated.

Within this research, it was hypothesized that there would be a relationship between the more positive beliefs of principals in the ability of their teachers in performing versus nonperforming schools. Principals were asked, “What percentage of your faculty is presently teaching to high academic standards?” There was a significant statistical relationship between Pay for Performance schools and nonperforming schools. Pay for Performance principals believed that their faculty was teaching to higher academic standards than did principals of nonperforming schools. This could be a self-fulfilling prophecy. If a person believes that they are able to perform then they will be able to perform. The better managers realize that workers can be trained, and each employee has special talents. As indicated by Likert (1961) the high producing manager aids employees whose performance is inadequate. He tries to place the employee in a different position, which is best suited for the employee. Likert's (1961) "empowerment interventions" take into consideration the person, his talents, and the nature of the job. This belief in the ability of the teachers by the Pay for Performance principals could reflect back to this survey’s question on professional development. Pay for Performance schools, according to this study, outperformed other schools at developing professional development for
their teachers which aligned with state or local standards. Pay for Performance principals may feel more confident about their teachers, since they know that they have been trained to meet the challenges of the state and local departments.

Recommendations

If this study is replicated, it is recommended that schools would be studied closer for socioeconomic status, race, or gender of the students, faculty, and administration. This question was not attempted by the researcher.

Another recommendation would be to survey the teachers on their opinions of different types of leadership within the school. In particular, the survey question about the percentage of teachers who are performing to high academic standards. This question may be flawed by reactions of principals to their nonperforming schools.
REFERENCES


APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Cover Letter

August, 2005

Dear Principal:

You are invited to participate in a research study titled “A Study of Principals’ Teacher Motivational Techniques in Select Georgia Schools” conducted by Karen A. Henderson, doctoral student, Department of Educational Leadership, University of Georgia, (706) 542-0913 under the direction of Dr. C. Thomas Holmes, Department of Educational Leadership, University of Georgia, 122 River’s Crossing, Athens, Georgia 30602-4808.

The purpose of this research study is to examine principals’ motivational techniques in working with teachers based on whether they participated in voluntary school improvement programs. Understanding how principals use different motivational techniques to affect the work of teachers could help states and local districts to formulate new school improvement programs or new pay systems.

If you should choose to participate in this study, your participation will involve the following:

- Completing a survey that includes basic questions on supervision techniques and their frequency of use.

Completion of the survey is expected to take a maximum of 10 minutes. The information which you submit will be confidential. When reporting the findings the names of participants and schools will be changed. I will store them in a locked cabinet in my home and will destroy them and any names and contact information that I have by August, 2006. Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain confidential except as required by law.

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. Please fill out the enclosed copy of the survey by hand and mail it to me in the enclosed stamped addressed envelope. A survey reminder will be mailed in two weeks.

If you have any questions do not hesitate to ask now or at a later date. You may contact Karen Henderson at (706) 491-7835 or khenderson@stephenscountyschools.com.

Thank you for the invaluable help that you are providing by participating in this research study.

Sincerely,

Karen A. Henderson
Doctoral Candidate
Educational Leadership
University of Georgia
122 River’s Crossing
Athens, GA 30602-4808
khenderson@stephenscountyschools.com
(706) 491-7835

Additional questions or problems regarding your rights as a research participant should be addressed to The Chairperson, Institutional Review Board, University of Georgia, 612 Boyd Graduate Studies Research Center, Athens, Georgia 30603-7411; Telephone (706) 542-3199; E-Mail Address IRB@uga.edu.
APPENDIX B

Survey Questions

1. How much ACTUAL influence do you as PRINCIPAL have on decisions concerning the following activities?
   a. setting performance standards for students at this school
   b. establishing curriculum at this school
   c. determining the content of in-service professional development programs for teachers at this school
   d. deciding how your school budget will be spent

2. How much ACTUAL influence do TEACHERS have on decisions concerning the following activities?
   a. setting performance standards for students at this school
   b. establishing curriculum at this school
   c. determining the content of in-service professional development programs for teachers at this school
   d. deciding how your school budget will be spent

3. How often is professional development for teachers at this school –
   a. designed or chosen to support the school’s improvement goals?
   b. designed or chosen to support the district’s improvement goals?
   c. designed or chosen to support the implementation of state or local standards?
   d. evaluated for evidence of improvement in teacher classroom practice?
   e. planned by teachers in this school or district?
   f. presented by teachers in this school or district?
   g. accompanied by the resources that teachers need (e.g., time and materials) to make changes in the classroom?

4. IN A TYPICAL MONTH, approximately how often do you engage in the following activities in your role as principal of this school?
   a. facilitate achievement of the school’s mission through such activities as consensus building, planning, obtaining, resources, monitoring progress, etc.
   b. supervise and evaluate faculty and other staff
   c. guide the development and evaluation of curriculum and instruction
   d. provide and engage staff in professional development activities
   e. build professional community among faculty and other staff
   f. manage school facilities, resources, procedures (e.g., maintenance, budget, schedule)

5. In your opinion, what percentage of your faculty are presently teaching to high academic standards?