MEMORY AND μμνήσκομαι IN THE ILIAD

by

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(Under the Direction of Peter O’Connell)

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the nature of memory in the Iliad. Chapter 1 analyzes the meaning of the verb μμνήσκομαι (usually translated as ‘remember, have in mind’); it concludes that this verb refers to an experience which is intrinsically both mental and bodily, and that the verb therefore has a more restricted meaning than English ‘remember’. Chapter 2 discusses the relationship of μμνήσκομαι to memory in general within the Iliad, focusing in particular on the performance of paradigmatic memories by characters within the poem. Chapter 3 uses the results of Chapters 1 and 2 to illuminate a particular literary question: how do memory and the experience referred to by the verb μμνήσκομαι underlie Achilles’ character development in the Iliad.

INDEX WORDS: Homer, Iliad, Memory, Performance, Orality, Memory of Achilles
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For my parents
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In this thesis I study the semantics, pragmatics, and thematic significance of the verb μμνήσσομαι in the Iliad—in other words, what the verb literally means, how it is used, and how it interacts with the poem’s core themes. I take it that providing full answers to these three questions would amount to providing a full description of the cultural and poetic ‘meaning’ of this very important word in the Iliad. I do not claim to have achieved such an exhaustive description in this thesis, but I hope to have established its main contours and also to have filled in some of the most important details. The question of μμνήσσομαι’s significance at the levels of literal meaning, usage, and theme bear on fundamental issues in our understanding of Homeric poetry: the psychology and world-view articulated in the Homeric poems; the relationship between the Homeric poet and the Muses who guide him as he sings; even the basic cultural function of Homeric poetry in Archaic Greece, to the extent that it infuses the present with living connections to the heroic past through performances of memory. While I cannot, of course, fully address these issues in my thesis, I attempt to draw them into consideration wherever possible.

How do characters in the Iliad experience memory? This is the rather vague question I set out to address as I began researching this thesis. It was prompted by puzzlement over common Iliadic phrases like μνήσσομαι δὲ χάρμης—or if this means ‘and they remembered (the joy of) battle’, as is regularly assumed in translations and scholarly discussions, what experience could it possibly refer to? Thinking back on combat experiences after the fact, maybe. But this is not what it refers to in the Iliad (or the Odyssey, where a formulaic variant of it, μνησώμεθα...
χάρμης, occurs once). It does not refer to any kind of mere mental recall, or even a recollection fused with emotions; rather, μνήσαντο δὲ χάρμης describes warriors reexperiencing the state-of-being referred to by the word χάρμη (roughly, ‘combat adrenaline’) in the heat of battle.

Of course, every reader of Homer knows that this is what the phrase describes. The puzzling question is what the phrase means, literally. If it literally means ‘they remembered the joy of battle’, we have to assume that it is nevertheless used without exception in Homer, and with very un-Homeric understatement, to refer to the experience of being flooded with combat adrenaline; or, what is even less likely, that there is something especially intellectual about the way Homeric warriors conduct themselves in warfare, so that for them being a fierce fighter depends crucially on the sharpness of their memory. If we reject these interpretations, our only alternative is to hypothesize that the verb μιμνήσκομαι literally means something other than ‘remember’—something closer to the very bodily experience which it apparently refers to in the phrase μνήσαντο δὲ χάρμης—and then to study its occurrences in the Iliad in order to propose a more suitable literal meaning.

This is the project which I pursue in Chapter 1 of the present thesis. I begin with a brief overview of Homeric psychology, focusing on the family of terms in Homer that apparently refer to the ‘mind’ (φρύν/φρένες, προσπίδες, κήρ, κραδή, ἰτος, θυμός, and νόος). As has often been noted, these terms (with the exception of νόος) can also refer to particular internal organs, or in the case of θυμός, to breath. Following Clarke 1999 and Long 2015, I take this to indicate not that each of these terms has a distinct mental and physical/bodily meaning, but that Homeric culture does not recognize a sharp distinction between ‘the mind’ and ‘the body’; the so-called ‘mental’ terms in Homer never, in fact, refer to experiences that are exclusively ‘mental’ (a concept that Homeric culture does not share with us). As Long puts it, Homeric human beings
are (i.e., feel themselves to be) ‘psychosomatic wholes’ not divisible into ‘minds’ and ‘bodies’. I provide further support for this conclusion by considering the wide range of ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ phenomena that the term μένος can refer to in Homer. In light of these considerations, I argue that the verb μμυνήσχομαι (etymologically related to μένος) fuses mental and physical experience as well. Based on a systematic consideration of all of its occurrences in the Iliad, together with all occurrences of λανθάνομαι, I conclude that the literal meaning of μμυνήσχομαι, when it takes a genitive object X, can be glossed as ‘have [or ‘get’, if aorist] X in one’s thumos’ and be guided/bestirred by it’, and that λανθάνομαι refers to the absence of this experience with respect to a given genitive object. In the few cases where μμυνήσχομαι takes an accusative object, I argue that it does mean something close to ‘remember, recall’—but with the important qualification that, insofar as these English verbs refer to exclusively mental experiences, they imply a sharp distinction between the mind and the body which is inappropriate to the Homeric poems.

If μμυνήσχομαι is not a straightforward semantic equivalent of English ‘remember’, then the question immediately arises of how it relates to the many acts of remembering that we find depicted in the Iliad—for instance, the remembering of genealogies, or of paradigmatic stories from the past. I consider this question in Chapter 2, together with certain aspects of the pragmatics of μμυνήσχομαι (i.e., regularities in how it is used, both in speech-acts performed by characters and in poetic formulas). In the first section of the chapter, I argue that in both the Iliad

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1 I use ‘thumos’ in transliteration, rather than the inappropriate term ‘mind’, to refer to the entire Homeric psychological apparatus, encompassing experiences that we would be likely to distinguish as mental, emotional, or bodily.
and the *Odyssey* a person can be said to μιμνήσκομαι or λανθάνεισθαι something (whether in the genitive or the accusative) only if he or she has previously had direct, living experience of it.

This argument entails a reconsideration of several important scenes in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*—most notably, Phoenix’s telling of the Meleager story in *Iliad* Book 9. In the next section of the chapter, I go on to consider the significance of memory more generally in the *Iliad*, and especially as it is manifested in characters’ performances of stories that have paradigmatic bearing on their present situation. I then situate this ‘performative’ memory of paradigmatic stories within the broader context of paradigmatic thinking in the *Iliad* (manifested also, for example, in the interpretation of omens).

In Chapter 3 I apply the general insights into μιμνήσκομαι and memory gained in the preceding chapters to a specific literary question: the development of Achilles’ character throughout the *Iliad*, and the shifts in his mood which accompany it. It is clear that Achilles moves through three basic stages of development in the poem—μῆνις against Agamemnon, deranged grief at Patroclus’ death, and a final reintegration into human society which begins in the funeral games but is completed only in the supplication scene with Priam in Book 24. In my third and final chapter, I show that the shifts between these three phases of Achilles’ development are correlated with shifts in what Achilles μιμνησκόμενος. First, as he himself states to the embassy in Book 9, Achilles cannot stop μιμνησκόμενος Agamemnon’s mistreatment of

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2 At various points of the thesis, because I find it necessary to avoid translating μιμνήσκομαι as ‘remember’ or ‘recall’, I resort to leaving the verb untranslated and then conjugating it to fit the English sentence in which it occurs (sometimes only loosely). When I require a sense of the word that would be equivalent to an English gerund (e.g., ‘remembering’), I use the present participle μιμνησκόμενος; this, of course, departs from the meaning of such forms in Greek, which are exclusively verbal adjectives and not nouns. I have, unfortunately, not been able to find a less obtrusive solution to this terminological problem.
him, and this fuels a wrath that overrides all other concerns.\(^3\) Next, after Patroclus dies, he turns to obsessively μυμνησχόμενος his dead companion; this experience underlies the extreme grief and berserker rage that he displays from Book 18 through the first half of Book 24. And finally, Achilles is released from his obsessive grief for Patroclus when Priam appears in his hut and μυμνήσξει him of his own father Peleus, while at the same time making Achilles see the fundamental similarity which he, Priam, bears to Peleus. This moves both Achilles and Priam to tears, and the two of them satisfy their desire for mourning by weeping together—the one μυμνησχόμενος Hector, the other μυμνησχόμενος by turns Peleus and Patroclus. In the speech that follows, Achilles reflects on the similar fortunes of Peleus and Priam, and articulates the deepest insights into mortal life found in the *Iliad*. This first exchange between Achilles and Priam, the most powerful scene of the poem, is also the densest in both memories and significant attestations of μυμνήσκομαι. And following it, Achilles at last μυμνήσκεται food—something which he has conspicuously not done since the death of Patroclus.\(^4\) Moreover, he convinces Priam to do the same with tactful compassion by telling him the paradigmatic story of Niobe who also ἐμνήσατο οἰτοῦ (*Il*. 24.602) after wearing herself out with grief. As this abbreviated survey indicates, μυμνήσκομαι plays a central role in Achilles’ development and motivation throughout the *Iliad*. It underlies some of the most consequential transformations of feeling and perspective that he undergoes in the poem. And we can make better sense of this fact if we understand that μυμνήσκομαι does not just mean ‘remember’ in these passages, but instead (literally) refers to an experience that is indivisibly mental, emotional, and physical.


\(^4\) Achilles has, of course, eaten since Patroclus died (*Il*. 23.54-6, 24.475-6); but food remains loathsome to him and he only eats reluctantly (*Il*. 23.48). Even after he has eaten, Thetis still tells him that he is not μεμνημένος…οίτου (*Il*. 24.128).
This final chapter does not, of course, exhaust the thematic significance of μμηνήσκωμαι, let alone the much broader topic of memory, in the Iliad. But I hope that it shows the importance of attending to the real distinctions that exist between these two partially overlapping categories of experience in the Homeric poems—not just for coming to grips with the psychology that the poems embody, but also for encountering their literary power.
CHAPTER 2

THE MEANING OF μιμήσαμαι IN THE ILIAD

1. Introduction

The usual translations of μιμήσαμαι are ‘remember’ and ‘have in mind’, and for classical Greek texts these translations are accurate. But the situation seems to be different in Homer, where μιμήσαμαι often refers to experiences that are not exclusively mental. Indeed, we might expect this to be the case. For human beings in Homer do not recognize a sharp distinction between the mind and the body, whereas we do recognize such a distinction, and the distinction for us runs deep. It structures, on a fundamental level, the set of concepts and vocabulary that we use to reflect on our experience, and to describe it. In line with this distinction, ‘remember’ and ‘have in mind’ refer strictly to mental experience—and specifically to intellectual experience rather than emotional. Though the activity of remembering (like the activity of considering a math problem) always happens in a body, and is always accompanied by a certain emotional state, the word ‘remember’ itself makes no reference to this bodily or emotional experience. Nor is it even just conventionally associated with, without directly

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5 The scholarship on Homeric psychology is vast, and there is much that I have not been able to read. The works I have found most helpful are Jahn 1987, Darcus Sullivan 1988, Williams 1993, Long 2015, and especially Clarke 1999.

6 I do not intend to suggest that English speakers have no words or conventional expressions for referring to experiences that are both bodily and mental at once—we certainly do. I can, for instance, ‘know something in my heart’, or even ‘in my gut’. All of human experience is in a very basic sense strongly unified, and so (to put it in our terms) it is always ‘bodily’ and ‘mental’ at once. This is true for us just as it was for the archaic Greeks. But cultures differ hugely as to how they divide up this experience on less basic levels—the levels at which people intuitively conceptualize their experience, and which their culture and everyday vocabulary reflect.
referring to, certain bodily or emotional experiences. It simply has nothing to say about the body and the emotions.

But in a culture like the one depicted in the Homeric poems, a culture that conceives of no rigid boundaries between intellectual activity, emotions, and bodily experience, it would be surprising if a word nevertheless just happened to refer to one of these areas exclusively. And so we should not assume that the word in Homer which we translate as ‘remember’ or ‘have in mind’ refers to an intellectual experience in the same way that these English expressions do. In this chapter, I attempt to provide a complete description of the literal meaning of μιμήσκομαι in the Iliad. I argue that μιμήσκομαι refers to an experience that is intrinsically both mental and bodily. The English phrase ‘muscle memory’ perhaps comes closest to capturing the bodily meaning of μιμήσκομαι. But this phrase is a metaphorical extension of ‘memory’ to the realm of the bodily experience, whereas μιμήσκομαι involves no such

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7 Even oίδα, usually translated as ‘know’, does not refer exclusively to intellectual experience in Homer. This is indicated both by the fact that it can take a non-human animal as its subject (e.g., at Il. 10.360 two dogs are εἰδότε θήρῃς); and by the fact that it can take objects like χάριμη ‘battle joy’ (e.g., Il. 5.608) and θοντος ἀλκη ‘rushing strength’ (e.g., Il. 11.710, 15.527).

8 My investigation of the meaning of μιμήσκομαι turned out to require a systematic investigation of the meaning of λανθάνομαι as well, but it is not necessary to present the results of that investigation here. The key conclusion is that λανθάνομαι in the middle voice denotes the absence of the experience referred to by μιμήσκομαι (with respect to a given object). There are many passages where these two verbs occur in a proximity to one another that is clearly significant (e.g., Il. 13.721-2, 22.84-5, 24.4-13, 24.429-40, Od. 4.527) and several passages where they straightforwardly gloss one another (e.g., Il. 16.356-7, 22.387-90, 23.648; cf. Hesiod Th. 54-5, 102-3). See pp. 34-6 for further discussion.

9 On this point and many others, I agree with Egbert Bakker’s interpretation of μιμήσκομαι (Bakker 2008; see also Bakker 1999: 17-20, Bakker 2002, and Bakker 2013: 145-50). However, I cannot follow Bakker in taking μιμήσκομαι to mean ‘be in a state of μένος’, ‘be filled with μένος’ or the like (Bakker 2008: 69-71). He is right to point out that μιμήσκομαι and μένος are etymologically related, and, moreover, that they are associated with one another in Homer; nevertheless, I find that these words have substantially different literal meanings.
metaphorical extension—it literally refers to bodily and mental experience at once. A full, albeit clumsy, paraphrase of μμνήσκομαι’s meaning when it takes a genitive object is ‘have in mind/spirit, and be both mentally and corporally guided/bestirred by’. The precise experience that μμνήσκομαι denotes in a given case will depend on the semantic type of its object. For example, when the object is a battle emotion like χάρμη, ‘battle-joy’, the experience referred to is extraordinarily intense—so intense that it is frequently connected with the activity of the gods. But when the object is food (σῖτος, etc.), the experience referred to is less intense, and of a different character. Nevertheless, in both cases the notion of being ‘guided’ or ‘bestirred’ by the genitive object is present. Before turning to a detailed consideration of the evidence for this meaning, I should do more to emphasize the strangeness of the Homeric world-view (relative to our own culture, and also to classical Greek culture). For in the context of such a world-view, the meaning of μμνήσκομαι that I propose does not seem as surprising as it otherwise might.

2.1. The θυμός family and respiration

We get directly at the heart of the issue by asking what the words φρήν/φρένες, προσίδες, κήρ, κραδή, ἔτος, θυμός, and νόος mean. These are the nouns in Homer that refer in some way or other to what we would call the locus of mental activity. If pressed to identify the words that are closest to meaning ‘mind’ in Homer, we would have to point to these. θυμός is the most prominent among them, and so, following Michael Clarke, I will refer to them...

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10 I am grateful to Professor Peter O’Connell for suggesting the muscle memory analogy.

11 For a thorough study of the meaning of φρήν/φρένες in Homer and the Homeric hymns that takes into account the physical and psychological poles (from our point of view) of its meaning, see Darcus Sullivan 1988 (esp. pp. 29-30, 178-83, 194, 198-99). She describes the φρήν/φρένες as a ‘[psychological] faculty indeterminately corporeal’. On the similar but much less common word προσίδες in Homer, see Darcus Sullivan 1987.
as ’the θυμός family’. I do not propose to settle the elusive question of exactly what these words mean—whether individually, or as a group. In fact, Jahn has established that the members of the θυμός family, with the exception of νόος, are deployed according to a system of metrical economy when they describe psychological activity, just like the noun-epithets studied by Milman Parry. So, in a given phrase, the use of a form of θυμός rather than a form of ζηγός, or of the singular φρήν rather than the plural φρένες, will be determined primarily by meter, rather than by semantic distinctions between the various words. As Clarke rightly notes, this does not entail that all the words in the θυμός family mean the same thing—θυμός, for example is especially associated with passionate emotion. But it does suggest that, at least when referring to psychological activity, their meanings overlap enough that they can be treated as interchangeable labels of the same overarching network of psychological experience. We can surmise that this interchangeability is licensed by different relations of synecdoche—even if each word literally refers to a different part or aspect of this network, by synecdoche they can all refer to the network as a whole.

However, the chief peculiarity of the meanings of the θυμός family is that, in addition to referring interchangeably to what some would call the Homeric ‘mind’, a number of them—all but θυμός and νόος—can refer to solid body parts in the torso. And θυμός, it appears, can refer to breath. In fact, many other words in Homer besides those in the θυμός family can refer to (what we would sharply distinguish as) physical/material and psychological/mental/spiritual

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12 Clarke 1999: 63.


14 Clarke 1999: 64.

15 For detailed discussion of these ‘physical’ meanings of the θυμός family, see Clarke 1999: 74-83 (drawing on Onians 1951: 13-83).
phenomena, and they appear to refer to these phenomena with equal literalness. By contrast, our own familiar psychological vocabulary cannot describe material things,\textsuperscript{16} except through metaphorical extension.

Beyond the θυμός family, another striking example of a key Homeric word that straddles the boundary between the psychological and the physical is πέπνυμαι, together with its participle πεπνυμένος. These appear to be perfect forms of πνε(ϝ)ω ‘breathe, inhale’, so they should mean, respectively, ‘I have inhaled’ and ‘having inhaled’. But they seem instead to mean ‘I am thinking wisely’ and ‘thinking wisely’. The semantic difficulty of this (for us) is so severe that Chantraine, Frisk, and Beekes in their etymological dictionaries of Greek have all taken πέπνυμαι to be unrelated to πνε(ϝ).\textsuperscript{17} However, the objections of Chantraine and Frisk are based on their own intuitions of semantic common sense. (Though, as often, Beekes does not provide any reasons for his decision, we may assume that his objections were similar.) But this is problematic, for cultures disagree dramatically over what conforms to ‘common sense’, especially when it comes to the interpretation of unseen internal phenomena like mental activity and its interaction with air inside the chest.\textsuperscript{18} From the standpoint of Indo-European and early Greek morphology, πέπνυμαι would be the expected perfect to πνε(ϝ)ω (whereas the later Greek πέπνευμα shows the innovating -κ- suffix, and is also active rather than medio-passive). So, rather than invoking our own common sense, we should try hard to see whether there are indeed felt semantic connections in Homer between thinking and breathing that would correspond to the

\footnotetext{16}{Perhaps ‘heart’ comes closest. But even with this word we clearly separate the anatomical and psychological senses of the word, whereas there is no such clear separation in the θυμός family.}

\footnotetext{17}{Chantraine s.v., Frisk s.v., Beekes s.v.}

\footnotetext{18}{It does not readily conform to our common sense that Sanskrit ātman should have the meaning ‘self, soul’, but also ‘breath’ (cf. Germ. Atem ‘breath’); and yet this is the case.}
apparent formal connection between πέπνυμαι and πνέω. Clarke has already done this work for us, and he shows that the connections are there; and, further, that they parallel the seamless integration of mental and respiratory activity in θυμός ‘the mind/vital breath’, as well as in φρένες ‘the mind/lungs’ and its derivative (via -φρων) φρονείω ‘think/breathe(?’.

2.2. The meaning of μένος

The full persuasive force of Clarke’s observations can only be felt within the larger context of his discussion of mental life and the body in Homer. But one detail that he adduces which should be mentioned here is the phrase ἐμπνευσε μένος, which always describes a god breathing μένος into a hero or horses. This is yet another example of ‘the psychological’ being described in terms of ‘the respiratory’. It should be obvious by now that in Homeric poetry these cannot be readily distinguished from one another.

Now, what is μένος? From a morphological perspective, it is exactly equivalent to Vedic mánas ‘mind, sense, will, thought’ (and also to Avestan manah- ‘id.’). Moreover the poetic use of μένος shows a host of striking parallels with the poetic use of its Vedic and Avestan

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19 Clarke 1999: 79-89. An alternative derivation of φονείω pointed out to me by Professor Richard Martin would take it not as a denominative formation from φρένvia -φρων, but as a regular causative-iterative formation (o-grade of the root, -έye/o- suffix) from the same root: *b’ron-έye/o-. Most verbs showing this formation in Greek have iterative rather than causative meaning (e.g., φονείω ‘I carry habitually’), and this would correspond well to the meaning of φονείω. On the PIE causative-iterative formation, see Fortson 2010: 99.


21 Il. 10.482, 15.60, 15.262=20.110, 17.456.

22 All of these are straightforward reflexes of the Indo-European neuter s-stem *mén-os, built from *men-, the basic verbal root for mental activity.
cognates. Only two need to be mentioned here. First, the fixed Homeric phrase ἱερὸν μένος ‘vigorous/sacred(?) μένος’ is exactly paralleled by a Vedic phrase isiréṇa...mánasā ‘with vigorous mánas’ (RV 8.48.7). Second, the Homeric idea of gods breathing μένος into humans, ‘in-spiring’ them, finds parallels in Vedic as well (though with a different verb meaning in-spire). These parallels tell us first of all that μένος is a very significant word, full of resonance with the poetic tradition. More specifically, the first parallel indicates that, long before our earliest attested Greek, Proto-Indo-European *ménos could be described as ‘vigorous’ or ‘rushing’. And the second parallel provides more justification for Clarke’s claims that mental and respiratory experience are closely associated—even in distant poetic prehistory, it appears that this was the case.

The question of what μένος itself means is more perplexing, for it means something manifestly different from its Vedic and Avestan cognates, and something that is quite hard to pin down. Most often, it refers to the impetuous battle-drive of a warrior, and it therefore has an

23 For a thorough survey, see Schmitt 1967: 103-22.

24 Almost always as the ‘periphrasis’ for Alcinous ἱερὸν μένος Ἀλκινόοιο, 7x Od. (though there is probably more to this phrase than mere periphrasis).


26 See Schmitt 1967: 115. The parallels are bhadrā́m no ápi vātaya mánah ‘blow in/inspire auspicious mánas for us’ (RV 10.20.1), bhadrā́m no ápi vātaya máno dāksam utā krātum ‘blow in/inspire auspicious mánas, capability, and will-power for us’ (RV 10.25.1ab), mánmā́ni citrā apivatā́yanta eśāṁ bhūta nāvedā ma rtānā́m (RV 1.165.13cd) ‘blowing in/inspiring thoughts, O shimmering ones [=the Maruts, a troop of storm gods], become aware of these truths of mine’. The meaning of the verb vātati (always with the preverb api) is disputed. It has been taken to mean ‘know intimately’, but following Schmitt 1967, Thieme 1954, and Mayrhofer 1956-1980 (s.v. vātati) I have translated it as ‘blow in, inspire’. Mayrhofer relates it to Greek ἀ-υτ-μή ‘breath, vapor’ and Latin vātēs ‘poet-seer’.
undeniable psychological content; in this use it is often said to take hold of, fill, or be thrown/breathed into the θυμός or the φρένες. The meaning of μένος in the fixed phrase ἱερόν μένος seems to belong in this sphere, but at a slightly more abstract level—it is general ‘mental/bodily vigor’. But μένος can also refer to tangible bodily fluids as well as something less tangible that can be breathed into and out of a warrior. And, beyond the human person, μένος can refer to the vigorous impulses of natural phenomena—of fire, rivers, the sun, wind—and of a spear. Further, Zeus is strongly associated with the dispensation of μένος, and he accordingly bears the epithet ὑπερμενής—as do the βασιλῆς who are his particular charge.

Like the other words we have considered, μένος can apparently refer to ‘material’ and ‘spiritual/mental’ phenomena with equal literalness. To try to smooth over this perplexing

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27 For μένος taking hold of (ἔλλαβε θυμόν), cf. Il. 23.468; for μένος filling (μένος φρένες πάμπλαντο), cf. Il. 1.103-4=Od. 661-2; for μένος being thrown into ([god] ἐμβάλε μένος), cf. Il. 10.366, 16.529; for μένος being breathed into ([god] ἐμπνευσε μένος), cf. Il. 10.482, 15.60, 15.262=20.110, 17.456. 

28 Cf. Il. 1.103, 24.319(?), Od. 2.270. 

29 Greek warriors are μένεα πνείοντες at Il. 2.536, 3.8, 11.508, 24.364; and cf. ἐμπνευσε μένος above, n. 27. 


31 There is a suggestive connection between the μένος of fire and the μένος of Zeus in Hesiod’s Theogony, when Zeus withholds the (his?) μένος of fire from mortals:

ἐκ τούτου δὴ πείται χόλον μεμημένος οἰεί
οὐχ ἐδίδοι μελήμα τυρὸς μένος ἀναμάτωι
θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποις οἰ ἐπὶ χθονὶ ναμέταυσιν·

It seems likely that the archaic Greeks perceived a connection between Ζεὺς ὑπερμενής and the μένος of the natural phenomena through which he manifested himself: fire (via lightning), wind, rain (e.g. Th. 869), rivers (via rain—N.B. the epithet of rivers δυσπετής < *Διφει-πετής).

situation by calling one class of usages ‘metaphorical’ goes directly against the grain of the text. If we do that, we are looking in Homer and finding only ourselves. Instead, we should take this as a sign that our scheme of disjunctive categories ‘bare matter’, ‘body-as-opposed-to-mind/soul’ on the one hand, and ‘life’, ‘soul’, ‘spirit’, ‘mind’, on the other, does not apply in Homer. The human person in Homer is a totally unified living body, indivisible into a merely material body and an enlivening soul. To use Merleau-Ponty’s phrase, Homeric people are their bodies, they do not ‘have’ them (which is how we would most readily put it). This is why Homer does not have a word for ‘the body’ of a human being while he or she is alive—as is often remarked, σώμα means only ‘corpse’. Further, as we have seen from the attestations of μένος, even non-human reality is pervaded by some of the same vital (and divine) impulses that flow through human beings.

33 Indeed, the absolute divide between ‘the merely material body’ and ‘the immaterial mind’ as two fundamentally distinct substances has to wait for Descartes and the anti-Aristotelian scientific revolution to really come into its own. Still in Aristotle, the body is far from being ‘mere matter’, i.e., matter whose essence is merely extension (even the four basic elements have their own inherent powers and potentialities). As Code and Moravcsik put it, ‘Aristotle himself does not have a sharp contrast between the psychological and the physical because, in so far as he has a conception of the physical, the physical is just the natural, and so he treats the psychological as a part of the physical’ (Code and Moravcsik 1992: 129).

34 Long uses the term ‘psychosomatic whole’ to capture this: ‘Homer’s men and women, rather than being represented as embodied minds or as having a mind that is distinct from the body, are what I call psychosomatic wholes. They are infused throughout with life. Where they think and feel, and what they think and feel with, are as much parts of their general makeup as are their hearts and their guts’ (Long 2015: 6).

35 It was this fact more than any other which led Bruno Snell to imagine that Homeric man could only conceive of the living human body as a collection of parts, not as a unit (Snell 1948). See Williams 1993: 21-49 for an illuminating discussion of Snell’s confusions.
3. Can μμνήσκομαι mean ‘remember’?

Now that we have a sense of how different Homeric psychology is from our own, we can return to consider the question of what μμνήσκομαι means. The first thing I will try to show is that it cannot just mean ‘remember’, at least when it takes a genitive object.

In examining this question we should begin by noting that there are no words attested in Homer corresponding to what we call ‘the faculty of memory’ or to the ‘memories’ that this faculty stores and accesses. The word that comes closest to meaning either of these things is μνημοσύνη, which occurs only once in Homer, in a passage rich with metapoetic significance (Hector speaking):

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ἀλλ’ ὅτε ξεν δῆ νησαίν ἐπι γλαφυρήν γένωμαι,
μνημοσύνη τις ἔπειτα πυρός δήμοι γενέοθο,
ὡς πυρὶ νῆς ἐνπρόθο (II. 8.180-2)
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Here μνημοσύνη is part of a periphrastic construction for expressing the passive of μμνήσκομαι. It is a nomen actionis derived (via the adjective μνήμων, 2x Od.) from μνή-. It is a nomen actionis derived (via the adjective μνήμων, 2x Od.) from μνή-.

So it refers to an activity, not to anything so abstract as a cognitive faculty or a piece of information. What Hector seems to be commanding here is that a μνημοσύνη πυρός take hold of the past.μνήσκομαι.

36 The periphrasis is necessary, since all medio-passive forms of μμνήσκομαι have middle semantics. And the three aorist passive forms in Homer (Od. 4.118; with ἐπι-, Od. 1.31, 4.189) seem to have middle semantics as well (though it is difficult to say what Od. 4.118 means—see pp. 58-60 for discussion).

37 See Risch 1974: §55a; for the periphrastic expression of the passive with μνημοσύνη, see LfgE s.vv. μμνήσκομαι 4d, μνημοσύνη.

38 See Ford 1992: 53 making a similar point about μνημοσύνη in Hesiod. As Ford puts it, ‘The function of [μνημοσύνη] is not simply preservation of the past but a psychological experience, to change the present frame of awareness’ (my italics). The other word in Homer that might appear to refer to something as abstract as a cognitive faculty or a piece of information is μνήστις (1x, Od. 13.280). But, in fact, it is basically equivalent in meaning to μνημοσύνη, and it functions in a similar periphrastic passive construction; see LfgE s.vv. μμνήσκομαι 4d, μνήστις.
of each soldier, or perhaps even the army itself regarded as a collective psychological whole, so that the Trojans will be guided by Hector’s need for fire at the right moment.

Of course, the archaic Greeks were surely aware that they could remember information, just as every conscious human being everywhere is. But it does not follow from this that their conception of the human ability to remember information corresponded to ours. And even if in everyday speech they had nouns dedicated to referring to this ability, or the information that it accesses, these nouns do not occur in the Homeric poems (at least with the relevant meanings).

3.1. μιμνήσκομαι in the context of battle

Given all of this, let us now consider whether μιμνήσκομαι in the following passage could nevertheless mean just ‘remember’:

δή οὰ τόθ’ οἱ μὲν πρόσθε σῦν ἐντει δαιδαλέωια
μάργαντο Τρωϊῶν τε καὶ Ἕκτορι χαλκοχοροστῆ,
οἱ δ’ ὀπίθεν βάλλοντες ἐλάνθανον· οὐδὲ τι χάρμης
Τόῳς μμιμνήσκοντο· συνεκλόνεον γὰρ ὀίστοι. (Il. 13.719-22)

The Trojans are fighting hand-to-hand before the Achaean fortifications, but οὐ τι χάρμης μμιμνήσκοντο, for (γὰρ) they are confounded by volleys of arrows from archers they cannot see. Can the underlined phrase really mean ‘but the Trojans were not remembering battle-joy’? That they simply were not recalling, in their minds, a certain kind of experience? This seems impossible. Why would arrows make them unable to remember something? Surely we should not say ‘because the arrows were distracting their attention’. And what good would just

39 I am grateful to Professor Andrea Nightingale for pointing this out to me.

40 Professor Richard Martin points out to me that, in the domain of verbs, νοέω covers the meaning ‘remember/recall information’ (though it covers other meanings as well, such as ‘intend’). Like φονεύω, νοέω could be another (causative-)iterative formation (perhaps < *nos-eyel from the root *nes- ‘return, save, heal’, but the etymology is uncertain); cf. p. 12 n. 19 on the PIE causative-iterative formation.
remembering something do them in this situation anyway? It seems, rather, that the passage is telling us that the Trojans were not able to get χάρμη in their thumoi and then be guided in battle by it. And this is because a thick barrage of arrows was actively blocking χάρμη (which apparently refers to intense combat adrenaline—not something one is likely to experience just by recalling the right thing). If this interpretation is even close to right, μιμνήσκομαι cannot refer to mere mental recall.

Uses of μιμνήσκομαι like this one abound in the Iliad. In fact, the central formulaic occurrences of both μιμνήσκομαι and λανθάνομαι involve states or qualities of warriors in battle.41 Before turning to a systematic overview of the meaning of μιμνήσκομαι in the Iliad, let us consider one more example in which it is particularly obvious that it does not just mean ‘remember’:

Αἴας δ’ ἄλλοτε μὲν μνησάσκετο θοῦριδος ἀλκής
αὐτίς ὑποστρεφθείς, καὶ ἐρητόσεσε φάλλαγγας
Τρώων ἵπποδάμων· ὅτε δὲ τρωπάσκετο φεύγειν. (II. 11.566-8)

Here Ajax is gradually retreating from a throng of Trojans. The force of the -σκ- suffix in all of these verbs is iterative: at several points he μνήσκετο θοῦριδος ἀλκής, and then at other points he τρωπάσκετο φεύγειν. This in and of itself makes it doubtful that μιμνήσκομαι means ‘remember’ here. For such a meaning would have us believe that within a span of mere minutes Ajax remembered θοῦριδος ἀλκής, then forgot it again, then remembered it again, then…. And that will not do. So what does the passage mean? I propose that it describes Ajax at several points getting θοῦρις ἀλκή in his thumos and being guided by it accordingly—i.e. turning

41 See appendices B and C, which collect the formulas of μιμνήσκομαι and λανθάνομαι in the Iliad.
against the Trojans and furiously warding them off; and then at other points relinquishing this more aggressive state of being, and turning to retreat.\textsuperscript{42}

Like χάρμη, (θούργις) ἀλκῆ is not a mere state of mind. It is a total state of being of the warrior—he can enter it/put it on,\textsuperscript{43} be ‘clothed’ in it,\textsuperscript{44} and by the power of a god it can literally fill his limbs\textsuperscript{45} or his φρένες.\textsuperscript{46} Further, it has been shown by Derek Collins in his study of ἀλκῆ in the \textit{Iliad} that the state is particularly associated with Ares.\textsuperscript{47} Both χάρμη and ἀλκῆ do not appear to be things that one merely remembers; and yet, as we will see, the core occurrences of

\footnote{\textsuperscript{42} We can note further that the -\textit{σκετο} suffix in \textit{μνησώσκετο} has the effect of iterating a psychosomatic process that is itself already intrinsically iterative, insofar as \textit{μμνησ omegaX} \textit{X} effectively means ‘feel X again’ (when X is a state of being) rather than ‘recall the feeling of X’. I am grateful to Professor Richard Martin for pointing this out to me.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{43} Whether Achilles, in particular, enters ἀλκῆ is of great consequence in the \textit{Iliad}. Cf. Odysseus to Achilles: δείδημεν ἐν δούλῃ δὲ σαυρωθέμεν ἢ ἀπολέσθαι / νής ἐξοσέλμους, εἰ μὴ σὺ γε δύσεαι ἀλκῆν (9.230-31); and likewise, Thetis to Achilles: μὴν ἀποστεῖμαν Αγαμέμνονι ποιμένι λαών / αἴψα μέλ’ ἐς πόλεμον θωρήσασα, δύσει δ’ ἀλκῆν (19.35-6).

\footnote{\textsuperscript{44} Αἰαντές θοῦριν ἐπιεμένοι ἀλκῆν (7.164=8.262=18.157).

\footnote{\textsuperscript{45} δ’ δὲ μὴ Ἀρης / δεινὸς ἐνυσίλος, πλήσθεν δ’ ἄφα ὀι μέλε’ ἐντὸς / ἀλκῆς καὶ οἴνοις (17.210-12). Collins 1998: 18 observes that these lines, occurring just after Hector has donned Achilles’ armor, contain the only direct description in the \textit{Iliad} of a mortal becoming possessed by a god (δ’ δὲ μὴ Ἀρης).

\footnote{\textsuperscript{46} δ’ εὐξάμενος Δί πατρ’ / ἀλκῆς καὶ οἴνοις πλήττῃ φρένας ὁμφὶ μελαίνας (17.498-9).

\footnote{\textsuperscript{47} Collins 1998. In his principal discussion of the evidence (pp. 27-45), Collins claims that ἀλκῆ is only indirectly connected with Ares. Nevertheless, he convincingly establishes the connection throughout the course of his book. He appears to miss, however, a piece of evidence that would dramatically strengthen his case: both ἀλκῆ and Ares are almost uniquely associated with adjectives in θουργ- (θουργις or θουργις) ‘rushing’. The breakdown of all occurrences of θουρ- in Homer is as follows: modifying ἀλκῆ (24x \textit{Il.}, 1x \textit{Od.}), modifying Ares (11x \textit{Il.}), modifying ἀστις or κρις (3x \textit{Il.}). Moreover, each of these occurrences is thoroughly formulaic. This would appear to establish a direct connection between ἀλκη and Ares. This connection, via θουρ-, between ἀλκη and the god of war is not unrelated to the fact that ἀλκη is strongly associated with the \textit{Iliad} (59x \textit{Il.}, 11x \textit{Od.}), and that the phrase θουρδος ἀλκη is essentially Iliadic property (21x \textit{Il.}, 1x \textit{Od.} but in an unmistakably Iliadic formula).}
μμνήσομαι καὶ μαθάνομαι in the Iliad involve precisely these two nouns, together with their antithesis φόβος.

We can go further in our understanding of the states ἀλκή and φόβος if we note that they are personified as divine forces in the Iliad—and φόβος thoroughly so. For example, ἀλκή and φόβος are both visually portrayed on the Aegis of Zeus, which Athena brings with her to battle in Book 5 (5.738-42). And the personification of φόβος goes so far that he is often regarded as a god. He (and Fear, Δείμός) are the sons of Ares by Aphrodite, and they yoke Ares’ horses for him when he prepares for battle. It is also worth pointing out that we find Phobos represented anthropomorphically in Archaic Attic vase painting, most often as a charioteer.

With this in mind, let us consider a pair of examples. At the beginning of Book 9, the Trojans are encamped around the Achaeans' fort with their thousand watchfires blazing, and the Achaeans are gripped by a divine panic:

Ἄχαιοις
θεοπεσὴ ἔχε Φύζα Φόβου χρυσέντος ἐταῖρη (II. 9.1-2)

We should note that both Φύζα and Φόβος are clearly personified here (by the relation of companionship), and that the personified Φύζα is described by the adjective θεοπεσίος (roughly) ‘divine’. Next, let us consider the last line of the following passage, in which Menelaus is desperately searching for Ajax:

παπταίνων Αἴαντα μέγαν Τελαιώνιον νιόν,
τὸν δὲ μᾶλ’ αἰψ’ ἐνόπηε μάχης ἐπ’ ἀριστερὰ πάσης

48 Cf. II. 13.299-300 and Hesiod Th. 933-6.

49 II. 15.119. Other pairings of Φόβος and Δείμος as divinities include 4.440 and 11.37.


51 Departing from Allen’s edition, I have capitalized Φύζα and Φόβου in this passage because of the obvious personification.
Given that φόβος is often personified in the *Iliad*, and further that θεσπέσιος in the previous passage modified Φύζα, the personified companion of Φόβος, it seems likely that φόβος in this passage is felt to refer to a divine being or force—not just the psychological experience ‘fear’ we are familiar with.

From passages like the above, and many others like them, I believe we can infer that most, perhaps all, of what we would call ‘the psychology of battle’ in the *Iliad* is felt to have an intrinsically divine aspect in the world of the poem—that states of being like χάρμη, ἀλκή, and φόβος are on some level always perceived as divine forces interacting with both ‘body’ and ‘mind’.

So when heroes are said to μνήσασθαι or λάθεσθαι them, the experience at issue is one of full psychosomatic guidedness and influence, not just intellectual recall. I believe it is somewhat akin to what is described in the Homeric hymn to Dionysus when the singer proclaims to the god:

οὐδὲ πη ἐστιν
οεὶ’ ἐπιληθόμενον ἱερῆς μεμνήσθαι ἀοιδῆς

(*h. Dion.* frag. D 9-10)

It is not possible for a singer to ‘remember’ (and be guided along the path of) sacred song if he is not aware of and guided by the god. Likewise, it is not possible for a hero in the *Iliad* to fight at

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52 This is in line with the phenomenon of divinities throwing or breathing μένος and οθένος into warriors (see p. 14 n. 27 above). In general, the psychological influence of gods over humans is often described in terms of them ‘throwing something into’ (ἐμβάλε) a hero’s θυμός or φρένες (see further p. 22 n. 54). For examples involving psychological phenomena other than μένος, cf. *Il.* 3.139, 13.82, 17.118, *Od.* 19.10, 19.485.

53 We should compare this with the line that ends approximately half of the Homeric hymns (αὐτάρ ἐγώ καὶ σεῖο καὶ ἄλλης μνήσομ’ ἀοιδῆς) as well as with the first line of the Hymn to Apollo (μνήσομαι οὐδὲ λάθωμαι ‘Ἀπόλλωνος ἐκάτωτοι). See Bakker 2002 for thought-provoking discussion of these lines.
full power if he does not get his thumos—and the rest of his body—into the right (divine) state of being.

An important general point that arises from the preceding examples is that it is not entirely within a warrior’s power to μμνήσκεσθαι a state of being like χάρμη, ἀλκή, or φόβος. This is because, unlike remembering, the experience of μμνήσκομαι does not entirely depend on, or take place within, the mind of the experiencer. Rather, it depends on the thumos, the rest of the body, and forces in external reality (especially the gods) all at once. In this respect at least, it is similar to an aesthetic experience.

4. Systematic Overview of μμνήσκομαι in the Iliad

Now that we have a provisional grasp on what μμνήσκομαι can refer to in Homer, I will present a systematic overview of its meaning in the Iliad. I have restricted my investigation to the Iliad because many of μμνήσκομαι’s core uses (such as formulas in the context of battle) are specific to this poem, and the Iliad furnishes enough attestations of the verb to support substantial conclusions about its meaning. A fuller study of μμνήσκομαι would, of course, go on to investigate its meaning in the Odyssey, and then compare the results of both investigations.

Forms of μμνήσκομαι are built from the Proto-Indo-European verbal root *mneh₂-, a root which Calvert Watkins claims to be ‘the lexical expression’ of the poet’s ‘function of

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54 Professor Peter O’Connell points out to me that when a god is said to ἐμβάλειν φόβον into a group of warriors, this probably describes the same experience as the phrase ‘[warriors] μνήσκομαι φόβοιο’ (e.g., Il. 16.356-7), but from an external rather than an internal point of view. This suggests that the event [WARRIOR] μνήσκομαι [WARRIOR STATE] is the passive equivalent to the active event [GOD] ἐμβάλε/ἐμπνευσε [WARRIOR STATE] (into) [WARRIOR].

55 My overview of μμνήσκομαι’s meaning is based on a study of all occurrences of both μμνήσκομαι and λανθάνομαι in the Iliad.
custodianship and transmittal’ in Proto-Indo-European culture.²⁶ *mneh₂- is itself derived from a more basic form of the root *men- ‘think, be mentally agitated’²⁷ by the appending of a laryngeal as an extension.²⁸ *men- is the prototypical verbal root for mental activity/force in Indo-European languages, and shows a wide range of verbal and nominal reflexes. It furnishes such Homeric catchwords as μέμονα ‘be eager, have one’s thumos fixed upon’ (<*me-món-, also the pre-form of Latin meminit), its participle μέμαως (<*me-mn̥-ōs)⁵⁹, μένος (<*mén-os, discussed above), as well as many less common words.⁶⁰

Compared with *men-, the root variant *mneh₂- has a far more limited distribution in the Indo-European daughter languages—it has reflexes in Luvian (where it means ‘see, experience’) and late Vedic, but it is most extensively attested in Greek. The earliest Greek trace of it is in the Mycenaean name ma-na-si-we-ko [: Μναίσθεμος] ‘who “minds” his work’.⁶¹ Then there are the reflexes in Homer, of which μμνήσκομαι is the most prominent.⁶²

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⁵⁷ For an old but still illuminating treatment of the meaning of this root see Meillet 1897.

⁵⁸ This process is probably observable in a few other pairs of IE roots, such as *seu- ‘press out’ and *seuH- ‘give birth’.

⁵⁹ For a detailed discussion of μέμονα and μέμαως, see Cebrián 1996: 13-47. Cebrián (p. 33) entertains the idea that μέμαως might be related to an unattested Greek present *μαω, and Collins 1998 frequently refers to this purported *μάω. But all of this is unnecessary, because the form μέμαως reflects a totally regular IE perfect active participle *me-mn̥-ōs. Historically, μαίνομαι (<*mn̥-io-) is the only present in Greek that belongs with μέμονα, though by the time of our earliest texts these forms would not be felt to belong to the same verb.

⁶⁰ The less common verbs in Homer which are derived from *men- include μενεαίνω, μενοινάω, μαίνομαι, ἀμενηνόω.


⁶² Other reflexes of *mneh₂- in Homer include: μνήμα, μνημοσύνη, μνήστης, μνήμων, αἰσθημήσθην/αἰθημήσθης, προμνηστίνος. μνάμαι ‘woo’ (Od. only) probably also derives
The three principal linguistic factors that affect the literal meaning of μιμνήσκομαι are its voice, its aspect, and what kind of object argument it takes. In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss each factor in turn, focusing in particular on the object argument. Then, in the following chapter, I will go on to describe the pragmatics of μιμνήσκομαι, including its use in formulas and the pragmatic/poetic connotations of these formulas.

At the most basic level, μιμνήσκομαι in the medio-passive takes two syntactic arguments: a subject denoting who ‘remembers’ and an object denoting the thing that they remember. Since Greek verbs encode the person and number of their subjects, their subject from *mneh₂, but it is difficult to say exactly what the path of semantic development was. At any rate, Chantraine, Frisk, and Beekes in their etymological dictionaries (s.v. μμνήσκω) all follow Benveniste 1954 in deriving it from from *mneh₂. Nevertheless, the alternative derivation of μνήματα ‘woo’ as a denominative of *μνα ‘woman’ < *bnäh(<*g”n-eh₂, ‘woman’, cf. γυνή) first proposed by Osthoff remains phonologically possible and semantically less difficult.

63 The presence of a preverb such as ἐπι- (or κατα- with λανθάνομαι) does not fundamentally change the meaning of μιμνήσκομαι; rather, it appears to intensify the basic meaning. The one exception to this is ἀπο-, which when appended to μιμνήσκομαι significantly changes the meaning and argument structure of the verb. ἀπομνήσκομαι means roughly ‘repay’, and it takes a dative argument denoting the person repaid, as well as the accusative noun χάριν construed with a genitive denoting the benefactions which are repaid. This argument structure is fully expressed at Hesiod Th. 503: οἱ οἱ ἀπεμνήσαντο χάριν εὐεργεσίαν. Other examples of this sort are Thucydides Hist. 1.137.2 and Euripides Alc. 299. In Homer, ἀπομνήσκομαι occurs only once, and with much of its argument structure ellipsed:

64 This discussion is keyed to appendix A, which collects all occurrences of μιμνήσκομαι in the Iliad, sorted by the grammatical type of the object, and then further by the object’s semantic type. Examples from the appendix are referred to by numbers in brackets (e.g., [1]).

65 In the following overview of μιμνήσκομαι’s meaning, I will sometimes translate it as ‘remember’ for ease of expression, but this is just a place-holder for the fuller meaning that I have argued for.
arguments are frequently omitted, and μμιμνήσκομαι is no exception. The subject of μμιμνήσκομαι is, however, always conceptually present; when it is not overtly expressed, it is inferred from context. This is to say that μμιμνήσκομαι cannot be used impersonally. Much less often (4x), and only with participle forms, the object argument of μμιμνήσκομαι is unexpressed.  
But here too it is always conceptually present, inferred from context (the kind of event denoted by μμιμνήσκομαι requires it). μμιμνήσκομαι occurs in the active only twice: once as an aorist participle and once as a finite future.  
In this voice it takes three syntactic arguments: a subject who reminds, an accusative object denoting the person reminded, and a genitive object denoting what they are reminded of.

Forms of μμιμνήσκομαι show three kinds of aspectual semantics. The perfect forms have stative aspect, the present (and imperfect) forms have imperfective aspect, and the aorist forms have perfective aspect.

The object argument of μμιμνήσκομαι comes in a variety of syntactic types (in order of descending frequency): a noun in the genitive case, a clause, a noun in the accusative case (3x), an infinitive (1x), or a directional adverb (1x). I suggest that there are two basically distinct meanings of μμιμνήσκομαι, corresponding to its construal with a genitive argument and its

66 The four instances are [16], [17], [33], [35].
67 Aorist participle: [52]; finite future: [53].
68 Stative: [14], [18], [19], [25], [28], [31], [33]-[38], [45]-[49]; imperfective: [4], [10]-[12], [20], [24], [50]; perfective: [1]-[3], [5]-[9], [13], [15]-[17], [21]-[23], [26], [27], [29], [30], [32], [39]-[44], [51]-[53]. N.B. that the perfect forms of μμιμνήσκομαι are true statives, not resultatives as is sometimes claimed; the modification of the perfect forms in [25] and [36] by the adverb ἀ(ι)εί ‘always’ confirms this. By contrast, the perfect forms of λαλθάνομαι are resultatives, not statives. The examples in the Iliad are: 11.313, 13.269, 16.538, 16.776, 23.69.
69 Genitive: [1]-[43]; clause: [20], [28], [31], [32], [44], [45], [47]; accusative: [46]-[48]; infinitive: [49]; directional adverb: [50].
construal with an accusative argument. When \( \text{μιμνήσκωμαι} \) takes a genitive object \( X \), it means ‘have \( X \) in one’s thumos and be guided/bestirred by it’. But when it takes an accusative object, it means just ‘remember \( X \)’, with no conventionalized implication of being guided or influenced by \( X \) in any particular way. The use with an accusative seems to carry the further implication that the subject will speak out what they remember. The semantics of the three remaining argument-types (clause, infinitive, and directional adverb) seem to fall in line with one or the other of these two basic meanings.

The difference in meaning that I claim exists between uses of \( \text{μιμνήσκωμαι} \) with the genitive and the accusative squares with the basic semantics of these two cases. The relevant parameter according to which we can distinguish the two uses is ‘directness/degree of affectedness’ of the object by the verb. In Greek (and in other Indo-European languages) the accusative is often used for an object that is directly and/or totally affected by the action of the verb, whereas the genitive is often used for an object that is somehow indirectly and/or partially affected. A clear example of this distinction can be found in verbs of consumption. \( \text{πίνει τε οἶνον} \) (Od. 14.109) means ‘and he drank (all of) the wine’ whereas \( \text{ὄφρα πίνει οἶνοι} \) (Od. 22.11) means ‘so that he could drink (some) wine’. In the former sentence, the wine is totally

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70 *pace* Bartolotta 2003: 53-4, who claims that there is no distinction in meaning between \( \text{μιμνήσκωμαι} \) with accusative and genitive arguments. Chantraine 1963: §49.b and Thieme 1980: 127 both note that there is a distinction in meaning, but their accounts of it are slightly different from each other’s, and from mine.

71 With the usual caveat that there must be a subtle but real difference between the meaning of English ‘remember’ or ‘have in mind’ and their closest equivalents in a culture that does not sharply divide the body from the mind.


73 The example is taken from Luraghi 2003: 60.
affected (totally drunk up), whereas in the latter, the wine is partially affected (partially drunk up).\textsuperscript{74} Returning to μιμνήσκομαι, the accusative use indicates that the object is totally and directly affected by the verb (it is fully remembered), whereas the genitive use indicates that the object is indirectly affected; in fact, given what μιμνήσκομαι actually means, its genitive object is not really ‘affected’ at all—the real semantic focus is on how the subject is being affected (guided/bestirred) by the object. Indeed, the use of the genitive with μιμνήσκομαι seems to convey the notion of the source/cause of the experience.\textsuperscript{75} So the use of μιμνήσκομαι with the accusative focuses on what the subject remembers, and the fact that they remember it, whereas its use with the genitive focuses on what is going on within the subject, their experience.

The use of μιμνήσκομαι with a clausal argument in some cases shares the meaning of the accusative use, and in other cases the meaning of the genitive use. This is indicated by the fact that clausal uses of μιμνήσκομαι often also have a nominal or pronominal argument which corefers with their clausal argument—and this extra argument is sometimes in the accusative, and sometimes in the genitive.\textsuperscript{76} When no such extra argument is expressed, it is harder to say precisely what the force of μιμνήσκομαι is. But if the idea that μιμνήσκομαι has two basically distinct meanings is correct, then in such cases the meaning of μιμνήσκομαι is probably felt to fall in line with one or the other of them (rather than somewhere in between).\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{74} English marks this same distinction through the presence or absence of an article: ‘I drank a/the soda’ vs. ‘I drank soda’.

\textsuperscript{75} Cf. Bakker 2008: 68 n.7, Bakker 2013: 147; on the Ancient Greek genitive conveying the notion of cause/source, see Luraghi 2003: 37, 58-9 and Conti 1999.

\textsuperscript{76} In the accusative: [47]; in the genitive: [20], [24], [28], [31], [32].

\textsuperscript{77} Clausal argument that seems to have ‘accusative’ semantics: [44]; clausal argument that seems to have ‘genitive’ semantics: [45].
It is hard to say anything specific about the uses of μιμνήσκομαι with an infinitive or with a directional adverb because of their limited attestation. I believe they fall in line with the genitive use, indicating guidedness rather than mere mental recall. At any rate, it seems clear that when μιμνήσκομαι is construed with a directional adverb (οἱ δ’ ἀλλοι φύγαδε μυνώντο ἔκαστος, Il. 16.697), it definitely cannot mean ‘remember’, or even just ‘have in mind’—rather, the idea seems to be that the subject’s whole being is directed ‘flight-ward’.

4.2 μιμνήσκομαι with a genitive object

Since the most common use of μιμνήσκομαι is with a genitive object, and the meaning I claim for it is unusual, I will discuss the usage further and illustrate it with a few examples. In the Iliad, we can sort uses of μιμνήσκομαι with the genitive into four main groups. First, there are battle uses. These occur in the heat of fighting and take some sort of combat state or quality as their object. The effect of the remembering is that the subject enters and is guided by this state.78 Second, there are social/religious uses, which take as their argument either a person to be kept in mind and regarded, a command to be followed, or a pronoun referring to past events of significance to the parties concerned.79 These events are either assumed to have established some obligation on the part of the subject, to constitute a precedent which the subject should use to guide their behavior, or to have been a violation of proper conduct. These social/religious uses focus on reciprocity, whether between humans, between gods, or between humans and gods. Third, there are uses that take as their argument something considered to be a basic necessity—in

78 [1]-[14].

79 Person to be kept in mind: [25], [41]; command to be followed: [33]-[35]; past events of significance: [28]-[32].
the *Iliad*, the examples are food, drink, sleep, and sex. Fourth and finally, there are uses that concern *friends, family, and home*. Here the object is typically an intimate friend or family member, or something associated with them, and the effect of remembering the object is to elicit a strong emotion, usually longing.

In each of these three groups, the subject is somehow guided or bestirred by the object, but the specific content of the experience varies significantly according to what kind of thing the object is. We have already discussed several examples from the battle group. Let us now take a look at an example from each of the remaining three groups.

As an example of the social/religious use, we may consider the following prayer addressed by Nestor to Zeus:

\[
\text{Zeǔ πάτερ εἰ ποτέ τίς τοι ἐν Ἄργει περὶ πολυπύρῳ ἢ βοὸς ἢ οἶδς κατὰ πίονα μηρία καίον εὐχετό νοστήσα, σὺ δ᾽ ὑπέσχεο καὶ κατένευσας, τῶν μνΗσια καὶ ἀμυνον Ὀλύμπων υἱὲς ἤμαρ μὴδ’ οὔτω Τρώεσιν ἐκ δάμνασθαι Ἀχαιοὺς. (Il. 15.372-6)}
\]

Nestor reminds Zeus of past pledges he may have made to the Argives in response to sacrifices and prayers. Nestor wants to redeem these pledges now, so he beseeches Zeus to μνήσαι them—i.e., to get these pledges in his *thumos* and be guided by them, which in this case means to act in accordance with them and ward off (ἀμυνον) imminent destruction.

An address of Thetis to Achilles furnishes a good example of the basic necessities use:

\[
\text{τέχνον ἐμὸν τέο μέχοις ὀδυρόμενος καὶ ἀχέυων σὴν ἐδεια χραδήν μὲν ἐνημένος οὔτε τι οίτου οὔτ’ εὐνής: (Il. 24.128-30)}
\]

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80 [37]-[40].
81 [15]-[24], [26], [27], [36].
82 For the gods have *thumoi* as well—cf. *Il*. 5.869 (Ares), 17.442 (Zeus), 20.32 (all the Olympians).
Thetis’ question stresses the acute imbalance of Achilles’ mental and bodily state of being. He is still wracked with grief, eating his own heart out—and he is very conspicuously not being guided by the basic bodily necessities of mortal life, food and ‘bed’ (here indicating both rest and sex).

But we can go further. Although it is not made explicit here, Achilles’ imbalanced state, which Thetis attempts to remedy by getting him to ‘remember’ food and bed, is caused by his ‘remembering’ of Patroclus, which occupies his being to the exclusion of everything else. We find a dramatic portrayal of this all-consuming, mental/emotional/bodily ‘remembering’ about a hundred lines before Thetis’ speech, a portrayal which exemplifies the final usage group of μιμνήσκομαι (friends, family, and home):83

83 Lines 2-11 of this passage describe a single night, but lines 12-18 are apparently a description of Achilles’ repeated actions during multiple nights and dawns. The prevalence of the iterative suffix -σκ- indicates this, as does the fact that Apollo’s immediately following protest to the gods occurs on ‘the twelfth dawn’ (24.31). See Richardson 1993 ad loc.
Note first of all that everyone else is taking measures for (μέδομαι)84 dinner and sweet sleep.

But Achilles mourns all night, torn apart by the memory of his fallen companion—indeed, Achilles’ mental and bodily ‘remembering’ is the principal form that his mourning of Patroclus takes in this scene. ‘Guided’ is not an apt word here, but it would at least not be inaccurate to say that Achilles’ whole being is guided by his mental and emotional fixation on Patroclus—he is beside himself (ἀλύων), practically possessed. Patroclus’ absence is felt corporally by Achilles, as though Patroclus had been a part of him and that part has been ripped away.85 All-conquering sleep cannot take him as he twists about with longing for Patroclus’ manliness and vigor, and as he cries, and runs along the shore.

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84 μέδομαι is a more ‘intellectual’ word than μμνήσκομαι, and is thus closer to meaning ‘be mindful of, take thought for’. Indeed, Émile Benveniste argued convincingly that this verb has the more specific meaning ‘take appropriate measures for’. See Benveniste 1969 Vol. 2: 123-32 for a thorough discussion of the various reflexes of PIE *med-; the full definition of the root which he ultimately arrives at is ‘prendre avec autorité les mesures qui sont appropriées à une difficulté actuelle; ramener à la norme—par un moyen consacré—un trouble défini’ (p.129).

85 In this connection, we should compare the following passage from Book 19, in which Achilles addresses the dead Patroclus directly:

μνησάμενος δ’ ἀδινός ἀνενείκατο φώνησέν τε·
η ὡκ νύ μοι ποτε καὶ σὺ δυσάμμορος φίλταθ’ ἐταίρων… (Il. 19.312-3)

As in the above passage, the emphasis here is on how Achilles is affected physically by μνησάμενος his companion—ἀδινός ἀνενείκατο seems to refer to uncontrollable sobbing and gasping for breath. Further, Achilles addresses Patroclus with the adjective δυσάμμορος, which in its three other occurrences as a vocative in Homer is always used by mourners of themselves (Il. 22.428, 22.485, 24.727 — cf. Richardson 1993 ad loc). The superlative φίλτατε ‘dearest/ownmost’ contributes further to this feeling that Patroclus was a part of Achilles. We should also compare the following testimony of a Vietnam veteran who lost his closest friend in combat and then remained in a total psychosomatic state of berserker rage for two years following, consumed by the memory of his fallen friend-in-arms: ‘It was unbelievable, the revenge never left me for a minute. It was there. It was there and it was powerful. And it consumed me. It consumed my mind. It consumed my body. It consumed every part of me. They took…my life. Somebody had to pay them back for that. And it was me, because it was my life’ (Shay 1994: 94-5; the ellipsis marks a pause in the speech, the italics are mine).
The immediate cause of all this behavior is the experience of μεμνημένος Πατρόκλου: the behavior is an expression of that experience. And Achilles further manifests this ‘remembering’ by repeating his desecration of Hector’s body—dragging it, very significantly, around the commemorative σήμα which holds Patroclus (and is soon to hold Achilles). In the middle of this description that is so weighted with ‘memory’, we find a form of λανθάνομαι, in a clause which says ‘the dawn, appearing, did not escape Achilles’ notice’. At first glance, this might just seem to be a beautiful, if very indirect, way of saying that Achilles stayed up all night. But, given the deep mythopoetic significance of the dawn, there is likely to be more going on here. Indeed, if λήθεσκεν can be taken as causative here, perhaps as a punning or secondary meaning suggested by the context (note especially the opposition with forms of μιμνήσκομαι), the line would be saying that not even Dawn, magnificent as she is, could make Achilles stop his all-consuming ‘remembering’ of Patroclus.

We have now finished surveying the evidence, and it has become clear that μιμνήσκομαι with a genitive object does not mean ‘remember’. I have proposed instead that it means ‘have in one’s thumos and be guided/bestirred by’. There may be further nuances of meaning which this paraphrase does not capture, but the notion of being guided/bestirred is certainly always present. By contrast, this notion is absent in the occurrences of μιμνήσκομαι construed with an accusative object, which do indeed just mean ‘remember’.


87 The reduplicated aorist of the verb, at least, has this meaning at Il. 15.60 (where Apollo is directed to cause Hector to forget his pains: λελάθῃ [Ἔκτορα] ὀδυνάων); and, with the preverb ἐκ-, it has a different sort of causative force at Il. 2.600 (where the Muses erase Thamuris’ knowledge of cithara-playing: ἐκλέλαθον κιθαριστύν).
At every point of the investigation, it has been necessary to wrestle with the fundamental differences between the Homeric world view and our own. When we do this, Homer turns out to be stranger, and in many ways more wonderful, than we could have imagined; and yet even today, this dimension of Homer’s distance from us is often disregarded in scholarship. So it appears that there is much work left to be done, and that we can still say what Émile Benveniste said of our knowledge of Homeric vocabulary over forty years ago—it is in its infancy.  

CHAPTER 3

MEMORY AND μιμήσωμαι

Now that we have a grasp on the literal meaning of μιμήσωμαι in the Iliad, we can go on to consider its relation to what we call ‘memory’. Our principal concerns will be, first, to describe where our concept of memory overlaps with that of μιμήσωμαι, and where it does not; and second, to outline a few of the most important functions of memory in the Iliad. Since our concept of memory is really a diverse family of concepts, some of which are only loosely related to one another, an exhaustive description of how memory relates to μιμήσωμαι will not be possible. The aspects of memory which will primarily concern us here are: personal, communicative, and cultural memory; performances (i.e., verbal and gestural displays to an audience) of these various forms of memory; and the importance of such performances for decision-making and social cohesion more generally in the Iliad. We will not be concerned with questions of cognitive psychology, such as how the poet’s memory functioned as he performed, or what mnemonic devices within the poem facilitated this performance.90

But before we discuss these topics, we need to address the issue of how μιμήσωμαι and λανθάνομαι relate to one another, particularly when they are construed with genitive objects. This is by far the most frequent construction for μιμήσωμαι, as we saw in Chapter 1;

89 These terms are defined and discussed below (pp. 61-3); they are adopted from Minchin 2012 and Assmann 2008.

90 On these questions in the Homeric poems see, among others, Minchin 2001 and Clay 2011. On memory (from the perspective of cognitive psychology) in oral traditions generally, see Rubin 1997.
and λανθάνομαι is only construed with a genitive object. In this construction, their relationship is straightforward: λανθάνομαι refers to the absence of the experience referred to by μμνήσχομαι, with respect to the genitive object. So if someone is said to μμνήσχεσθαι an object X in the genitive case, this entails that they do not λανθάνεσθαι X. And conversely, if someone is said to not λανθάνεσθαι X, this entails that they do μμνήσχεσθαι X. We should note the conceptual assymetry implied in this description of their meanings. The meaning of μμνήσχομαι is conceptually prior to that of λανθάνομαι, because the meaning of λανθάνομαι depends on that of μμνήσχομαι, whereas the meaning of μμνήσχομαι does not depend on that of λανθάνομαι. This pair of verbs thus focuses on one experience, which in Chapter 1 I described as ‘having something in one’s thumos and being guided/bestirred by it’. μμνήσχομαι predicates the presence of this experience in a subject, with respect to a genitive object, and λανθάνομαι predicates the absence of it.

The most compelling evidence for the strict semantic complementarity of μμνήσχομαι and λανθάνομαι is furnished by the networks of formulas in which the two verbs participate. A complete formulaic analysis of μμνήσχομαι and λανθάνομαι is not necessary for our present purpose, which is the relationship between μμνήσχομαι and memory in general. But I have conducted such an analysis, and the results are outlined in appendices B and C. A comparison of Formulas I and II of μμνήσχομαι (which I will refer to as μ.I and μ.II) with Formulas I and II of λανθάνομαι (λ.I and λ.II) reveals the semantic complementarity of the two verbs. In particular, it is clear that the phrase οὐ (πω) λήθετο χάρμης in λ.II.1 and λ.II.1 is semantically equivalent to the phrase *μμνήσχετο (ἔτι) χάρμης, which does not occur, but which we can imagine. And

91 Its corresponding active, λανθάνω, takes an accusative object and means ‘escape the notice/regard of’.
correspondingly, the phrase \( \lambda \hat{\eta} \theta\dot{o}m\alpha \) \( \delta\varepsilon \chi\acute{a}m\eta\varsigma \) (\( \lambda.II.3 \)) is semantically equivalent to \( \omicron\upsilon\delta \varepsilon \chi\acute{a}m\eta\varsigma \ldots \mu\mu\nu\acute{e}\chi\acute{o}m\alpha \) (\( \mu.II.B.1 \)).

Since \( \lambda\alpha\nu\theta\acute{a}n\omega\mu\alpha \) is tied to \( \mu\mu\nu\acute{e}\chi\acute{o}m\alpha \) in this way, the present chapter’s discussion of \( \mu\mu\nu\acute{e}\chi\acute{o}m\alpha \) and memory will necessarily also be a discussion of \( \lambda\alpha\nu\theta\acute{a}n\omega\mu\alpha \) and memory. My explicit focus will be on the verb \( \mu\mu\nu\acute{e}\chi\acute{o}m\alpha \), but the results of the discussion will be just as applicable to \( \lambda\alpha\nu\theta\acute{a}n\omega\mu\alpha \).

There are two basic features of \( \mu\mu\nu\acute{e}\chi\acute{o}m\alpha \)’s meaning that determine its relationship to memory in general. The first is what I have called guidedness. As we have seen, when \( \mu\mu\nu\acute{e}\chi\acute{o}m\alpha \) takes a genitive object, its subject is somehow fundamentally guided by that object in both mind and body (i.e., in \textit{thumos}). By contrast, a person is not guided in the same way by everything that he or she can remember. This is, first of all, because one of the things which we can remember is information, and much information is not important enough to fundamentally guide us. We may, for instance, remember the first eight digits of \( \pi \), or what we had for breakfast three days ago. But except under extraordinary circumstances, this information will not fundamentally guide or bestir us if we remember it; nor will we be in serious trouble if we cannot remember it.

Characters in the \textit{Iliad}, of course, remember information too (even trivial and very basic information, though this is never the focus of the poem).\(^{92}\) And we often see them displaying this memory in a verbal performance, when they recount genealogies or past events which they feel have significant (paradigmatic) bearing on their present situation. In almost none of these performances, however, are the characters said to \( \mu\mu\nu\acute{e}\chi\acute{e}\sigma\theta\acute{a}m\alpha \) what they remember. To take

\(^{92}\) We must assume that the heroes in the \textit{Iliad}, like all other human beings, tacitly remember a huge number of trivial facts, and also very basic facts that orient them in the world—for example, what they had for their last meal (trivial), or where their \( \chi\lambda\omicron\mathrm{i} \) is (very basic). It is not surprising that characters’ memory of this information plays no explicit role in the epic.
only the most conspicuous example of a performer of memory, consider Nestor. None of the four major reminiscences from his youth\textsuperscript{93} which he delivers in the \textit{Iliad} is introduced with a form of \textit{μιμνήσκομαι}, nor does Nestor himself ever use the word to identify his reminiscences. That is, Homer never says anything like ‘and then Nestor, \textit{μιμνήσκομενος}, addressed a speech to them’, and Nestor himself never says anything like ‘I \textit{μιμνήσκομαι} these things, how when I was young…’. The same is true of many other notable performances of memory in the \textit{Iliad}. Furthermore, in those two cases where \textit{μιμνήσκομαι} is used to describe the experience of remembering (and then performing) a paradigm from the past, it takes an accusative object.\textsuperscript{94}

These distributional facts make sense in light of what we discovered in Chapter 1 about how the case of \textit{μιμνήσκομαι}’s object affects its meaning. The semantic focus of \textit{μιμνήσκομαι} with a genitive object is on what the subject of the verb is experiencing—how the subject is affected by the object. By contrast, performances of memory (for instance, heroes’ declarations of their genealogies) are aimed at conveying rhetorically pertinent information to their listeners; the focus in such performances is therefore not on what the speaker himself happens to be experiencing at the moment (though, of course, there is always emphasis on the speaker’s rhetorical self-presentation). So in such cases we would not expect a use of \textit{μιμνήσκομαι} with the genitive to describe what the performer remembers. On the other hand, when \textit{μιμνήσκομαι} is construed with an accusative object, there is no indication that the subject of the verb is guided by the accusative object. Rather, the focus is on the object—on what the subject remembers—

\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Il.} 1.260-73, 7.132-56, 11.670-761, 23.629-45. Nestor also mentions a deed from his youth at 4.319 (his killing of Ereuthalion). And at 11.765-89 he recalls the visit he made to Pthia with Odysseus just before the beginning of the Trojan War. I have taken these passages from Minchin 2012: 89.

\textsuperscript{94} The two examples are \textit{Il.} 6.222 (subject = Diomedes) and 9.527 (subject = Phoenix). Both will be discussed below.
and there appears to be an additional implication that the subject will go on to speak out what they remember. And this fits the situation of a memory performance rather well, so it is not surprising that we find two uses of μιμήσαμαι with an accusative in such a situation.

The second basic feature of μιμήσαμαι’s meaning which delimits it with respect to memory concerns the directness of the experiential connection between its subject and object. It seems that a person cannot be said to μιμήσαμαι (or, what is equivalent, not-λανθάνομαι) something unless they have previously had direct, living experience of it. And this appears to be true of all of its uses, not just when it is construed with a genitive object. This generalization is inductively inferred from the fact that all occurrences of μιμήσαμαι and λανθάνομαι in the Iliad (and in the Odyssey as well) take as their object arguments words (or clauses) denoting things of which the subject has had direct, living experience.95

What qualifies as ‘direct, living experience’ cannot be made totally precise, but even so, the restriction unequivocally rules out the possibility that someone could μιμήσαμαι events that happened before they were born. A similar restriction applies to our word ‘remember’ in some of its uses. To take a clear example, I cannot truly say that I remember Abraham Lincoln, or the Battle of Hastings, without extending the meaning of ‘remember’ beyond its basic, literal bounds in such a context. This is because I have never had direct, living experience of either, and it does not matter how much historical knowledge I may happen to have about Abraham Lincoln or the Battle of Hastings. I can, however, truly say that I remember the terrorist attacks.

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95 I believe that this is a fact, based on my interpretation of all the relevant passages. As one might expect, there are a few passages in which it is not obvious from the explicit, local context, that the subject of μιμήσαμαι (or not-λανθάνομαι) has had direct, living experience of the object. These occurrences are indeterminate taken by themselves. But when we take into account additional context (such as unexpressed mythical background, in those precious cases where we can reasonably guess it), I believe that all such occurrences can be shown to fall in line with the occurrences of μιμήσαμαι in which it is obvious that the subject has had direct, living experience of the object. We will examine each of the indeterminate cases below.
of September 11th, because I was alive and cognizant during them, and heard about them, even though I was not physically present during the attacks.96

As will be illustrated with examples below, μμνήσκομαι appears to behave just like ‘remember’ in these respects. But ‘remember’ and μμνήσκομαι diverge on the following point: one can say that one remembers facts about people and events that lived and occurred long before one was born (for instance, that Lincoln delivered a powerful speech at the Gettysburg cemetery), but in the Homeric poems no one is said to μμνήσκεσθαι such things. This means that there are stories which a hero may remember very well, from having heard them told many times, but which he nevertheless cannot be said to μμνήσκεσθαι—that is, if the events of the story took place before he was alive and minimally cognizant. Diomedes, for instance, surely remembers the famous deeds which his father Tydeus is reported to have performed (i.e., the κλέα of Tydeus); but it appears he cannot claim to μμνήσκεσθαι them (or Tydeus himself—see pp. 49-52 below for discussion). And this appears to be a consequence of the meaning of μμνήσκομαι: it can be truly predicated of a subject with respect to an object only if the subject has at some point had direct, living experience of the object.

Two facts about the distribution of μμνήσκομαι and λανθάνομαι in Homer constitute the most important evidence for this claim. First (positively), in all but a few cases it is immediately obvious that the subject of these verbs has had direct experience of the object.97 And

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96 Likewise, Americans who were alive and cognizant in 1941 when Pearl Harbor was attacked will readily say that they remember Pearl Harbor. It does not seem that it is necessary to have seen the event on television, or even to have seen pictures of it in the paper, to be able to say that one remembers it. The important fact is that one was alive in the world when it happened, and one somehow learned about it.

97 μμνήσκομαι occurs 124 times in Homer (57x Od., 67x Il.) with the ‘remember/remind’ meaning (it occurs an additional 19 times with meaning ‘woo’, always in the Odyssey, and always built to the stem μνα-, rather than μμνή-; see p. 23 n. 62 for discussion of the
second (negatively), there are many acts of memory in Homer in which the person remembering has obviously never had direct experience of what they are remembering, and none of these acts of memory is marked with μιμήσαμαι. Book 24 of the Iliad furnishes a telling example of both facts, when Achilles exhorts Priam, together with himself, to μιμήσαμαι δόρπου. He says ‘νῦν δὲ μνησώμεθα δόρπου. / καὶ γάρ τ’ ἡμέρας Νιόβη ἐμνήσατο οίτου’ (24.601-2).

Achilles, Priam, and Niobe are all, of course, experientially familiar with δόρπου and οίτου; accordingly, Achilles can say ‘μνησώμεθα δόρπου’ and ‘Νιόβη ἐμνήσατο οίτου’. But Achilles does not say anything like *μνησώμεθα Νιόβης or *μνησώμεθα ώς Νιόβη πάσατο οίτου (ignoring the issue of metricality)—phrases which we might very well expect, given that Niobe is the paradigmatic figure whom Achilles introduces in order to guide Priam’s emotions and behavior (as well as his own). My claim is that this is not a coincidence, but rather something that is disallowed by the meaning of μιμήσαμαι — for, while both Achilles and Priam are familiar with the story of Niobe and her suffering, neither of them has had direct, living experience of her.

Since the strongest evidence for my claim about μιμήσαμαι/λανθάνομαι and direct experience does not lie in particular examples but in the overall distribution of their occurrences, it will not be possible to present all of the evidence directly. I will begin, then, by making some general observations about their distribution, and then move on to consider a set of examples.

In the last chapter, I suggested that occurrences of μιμήσαμαι with a genitive object in the Iliad fall into four basic categories: (1) battle uses, where the object is a combat state or relationship of μνα- ‘woo’ and μνα-‘remember’). Only for one occurrence of μιμήσαμαι in the Iliad (II. 9.222) and two in the Odyssey (Od. 1.321, 4.118) is it not immediately obvious that the subject has had direct experience of the object. Each of these three cases will be discussed below. λανθάνομαι occurs 51 times in Homer (19x Od., 32x II.) with the ‘forget’ meaning (i.e., in the medio-passive). In all of its occurrences, it is immediately obvious that the subject has had direct experience of the object.
quality, such as ἁλκή or φόβος; (2) social/religious uses, which focus on reciprocity, and where
the object is a person to be regarded, a command to be followed, or certain past events of
significance to the parties concerned; (3) basic necessity uses, where the object is a basic
necessity like οίτος or εὐνή; and (4) friends, family, and home uses, where the object is
typically an intimate friend or family member, events associated with such a person, or one’s
homeland. In all of these cases—that is in all occurrences of μιμνήσκομαι with a genitive object
in the Iliad—it is immediately obvious from the context that the subject has previously had direct
experience of the object.

Let us take as an illustration of this a formula from the social/religious category, ἦ οὖ
μέμνη ὅτε… (μ.ΙΙΙ), which is repeated verbatim three times in the Iliad, always in direct speech,
and is closely related to two further phrases involving μιμνήσκομαι (μ.ΙΙΙ.Α, μ.ΙΙΙ.Β). The
speaker of this formula uses it to chastise and threaten their addressee by recalling past events
which somehow establish a norm or prediction for what will happen in the present situation.
What is relevant to our discussion is that these events are always ones in which both speaker and
adressee have participated—they are never, say, events from the distant mythic past that are felt
to have paradigmatic bearing on the present. For example, when Achilles and Aeneas face off in
Iliad Book 20, Achilles tries to unnerve Aeneas by reminding him of what happened the last time
they encountered one another:

ἦ οὖ μέμνη ὅτε πέρ σε βοῶν ἀπο μοῦνον ἐόντα
σεῦα κατ’ Ίδαίων ὁρέων ταχέεσσι πόδεσσι
καρπάλίμος; τότε δ’ οὖ τι μετατροπαλίξεο φεύγων. (II. 20.188-90)

Here, as in the rest of this speech, Achilles is trying to put Aeneas to flight using words alone
(words backed up, of course, by Achilles’ reputation and imposing physical presence). He
reminds Aeneas, by way of rebuke (ἦ οὖ μέμνη ὅτε… ‘don’t you μέμνη when…’), how Aeneas
fled his onslaught in the past without the slightest hesitation (οὔ τι μετατροπαλίζεο φεύγων), and implies that Aeneas will do the same in the present. The other two occurrences of this formula are similar: Zeus reminds Hera of how he once hung her up in the air, her hands fixed with invincible bonds and her feet weighed down by anvils, as a punishment for meddling with Heracles (Il. 15.18 ff.); and Ares reminds Athena how, in her excessive boldness, she spurred on Diomedes to attack him (in Book 5), and declares that he will pay her back for this presently (Il. 21.396 ff.).

What we do not find are cases in which this formula, or any other phrase employing μιμήσαμαι or λανθάνομαι, is used by a speaker to remind someone of paradigmatic events which they have not both experienced themselves. So, for example, when Athena rebukes Diomedes in Book 5 by comparing him unfavorably with Tydeus and then reminding him of certain deeds which exemplified Tydeus’ fighting spirit (5.800-13), she does not say *η οὖ μέμνῃ ὅτε…Τυδευς…. Nor, when Tlepolemos reminds Sarpedon of how his father Heracles sacked Troy in Laomedon’s time (a very well-known event from the preceding generation), does he say *η οὖ μέμνῃ ὅτε…Ἡρακλής…. Instead, he begins with what ‘they say’ about about Heracles:98

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ἀλλ’ οίνον τινά φασι Βήν Ήρακληείν
εἶναι, ἐμὸν πατέρα θρασυμέμνονα θυμολέοντα·
 отз ποτε δεῦρ’ ἐλθὼν… (Il. 5.638-40)
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Tlepolemus’ purpose in bringing up his father Heracles is twofold: first, he insults Sarpedon, claiming that Sarpedon is not a true son of Zeus because he is far less mighty than Zeus’ most famous son Heracles; second, Tlepolemus implies that he himself will sack Troy because his father did before him. Like Athena’s rebuke of Diomedes, this is a context that seems ripe for a

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98 The precise meaning of the first clause in this passage is not certain. I take it as exclamatory ‘But what sort of man they say strong Heracles [lit ‘the Heraclean strength’] was!’, following Aristophanes, Aristarchus, and Heracleo. See Kirk 1993 ad 5.638-9 (p. 123) for discussion.
Examples like these could be multiplied. The essential point is that there are many passages, in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, where a character adduces paradigmatic past events that they feel have some bearing on the present, and where we therefore might expect a usage of μιμνήσκομαι or λανθάνομαι taking those past events as object; and the passages where we do, in fact, find such usages are only those in which the subject (and also the speaker if he or she is not the subject) have had direct experience of the paradigmatic events.

Let us now turn to an examination of the passages in Homer which, at least on their face, pose a difficulty for my claim about μιμνήσκομαι and direct, living experience. We will begin with the most difficult, which also happens to be the best known. It is Phoenix’s introduction to the story of Meleager, which he tells to Achilles (and the others present) in the embassy scene of Book 9:

In this speech Phoenix is doing his utmost to convince Achilles to return to battle, and the story he tells about Meleager is the climax of his attempt. He begins his introduction of the story by stating a general pattern of heroic behavior to which Achilles should conform, and of which everyone present is aware, because it is enshrined in the κλέα ἄνδρων ἴρων—namely, that when great heroes of the past were overcome by surpassing rage, they nevertheless could be appeased with gifts and persuaded by words. He then turns to a specific, venerably old example (πάλαι οὔ τι νέον γε), which will illustrate the importance of this general principle—the story
of Meleager’s wrathful withdrawal from the Aetolians’ fight against the Curetes, which arose after the Calydonian Boar hunt. And Phoenix claims that he μέμνηται this ancient example.

Now it may appear that Phoenix is talking about something that happened long before his own time, and which he himself knows about only through having heard the κλέα ἀνδρῶν. And if this is true, then my claim about the necessary connection between μιμνήσκεται and direct, living experience is false. But there are, in fact, good reasons for us to understand Phoenix to be narrating a story that occurred during his own lifetime.99 For the ancient evidence concerning Meleager’s genealogy indicates that he belonged to the generation immediately preceding that of the Trojan War.100 Furthermore, it is implied in the Catalogue of the Ships (2.642) that Meleager could have been the leader of the Aetolians at Troy, had he not died early (a detail which Phoenix assiduously suppresses in his telling of the story to Achilles). Phoenix was of this earlier generation as well, as is made clear by the story he tells of how he fled his home as a young man (νέον ἰβίωντα, 9.446), was given refuge by Peleus, and became a sort of foster parent to the infant Achilles. Judging by all of this, it seems likely that Phoenix was alive when the events of the Meleager story took place. In fact, in both Ovid’s and Hyginus’ tellings of the Calydonian boar hunt, Phoenix himself is one of the heroes who was summoned by Meleager to participate

99 There is one other passage in Homer which shows strong similarities to what Phoenix says above (similarities are underlined):

μέμνημαι τάδε πάντα, διοτρέφές, ὡς ἀγορεύεις·
οσι δ’ ἔγω εὖ μάλα πάντα καὶ ἀτρεκέως καταλέξω (Od. 24.122-3)

Here the ψυχή of Amphimedon the suitor is speaking to the ψυχή of Agamemnon in Hades. Agamemnon has just asked Amphimedon to explain how he died, and Amphimedon goes on to retell, in summary form, the adventures and eventual demise of the suitors at Odysseus’ palace on Ithaca. In light of our present discussion, we should note that Amphimedon has directly experienced the events which he says that he μιμνήσκεται.

100 See Hainsworth 1993 ad 9.527 et 9.555-8 (pp. 132, 134-5) for discussion.
in the hunt (Ovid Met. 8.307; Hyginus Fab. 173). This does not appear to be the version of the story we find in the Iliad, since Phoenix never refers to himself as a participant in the events he narrates. Nevertheless, it further supports the idea that Phoenix and Meleager belonged to the same generation.

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101 As far as I can ascertain, these are the only two direct attestations of Phoenix’s participation in the hunt. It is almost certain that Ovid and Hyginus, in listing Phoenix among the boar hunters, were drawing on earlier sources that represented an established tradition. In his commentary on Ovid’s account of the Calydonian boar hunt, William Anderson remarks that Ovid ‘clearly had an even more elaborate source than Apollodorus [who does not list Phoenix]…. [Ovid’s account] constitutes…a doctrina for the poet, a game of identification for those in the audience who are not merely amused with the list itself’ (Anderson 1972 ad Met. 8.299-300). Anderson’s notes on Phoenix’s inclusion in the catalogue are as follows: ‘Phoenix: guardian of Achilles, a likely companion for Peleus [who is listed among the hunters at Met. 8.309]; not in Apollodorus’. Beazley 1986: 30 speculates that Ovid ‘had a good Greek original before him, probably the Meleager of Euripides, and was wise enough to follow it closely’; and that ‘Euripides, in his turn, based his narrative on an earlier poem’. Whether or not this is true, Phoenix does not appear in the extant fragments of the Meleager. There is one fragment (530), from a messenger’s speech, which lists five of the boar-hunters, and which is likely to represent the end of a much longer catalogue. The catalogue was probably much longer because other extant catalogues of the boar-hunters are much longer (Apollodorus’ catalogue (Apollod. 1.8.2-3) lists 19 hunters besides Meleager; Ovid’s lists 36; Hyginus’ incomplete catalogue lists 31). The fragment probably represents the end of the catalogue because it names Telamon, Atalanta, Ancaeus, and Thestius’ two sons, who are some of the key figures in Euripides’ tragedy, and therefore likely to appear at the end of the list. It is, of course, possible that Phoenix appeared earlier in this catalogue. Phoenix does not appear in the fragments of Accius’ Meleager, or the extremely meager fragments of Sophocles’ Meleager. But then again, neither of these collections of fragments includes a catalogue of boar-hunters, so they have little bearing on the question of Phoenix’s participation in the hunt.

Phoenix is not present in Kleitias’ depiction of the hunt on the François Vase (c. 570 BCE). Meleager and Peleus, however, are depicted as the foremost pair of boar hunters on this vase. It thus seems that Phoenix’s close friendship with Peleus, one of the most prominent hunters of the Calydonian boar and comrade of Meleager himself, would provide him with a close connection to this famous hunt even in traditions according to which Phoenix himself was not one of the boar hunters (and recall Anderson’s description of Phoenix above as ‘a likely companion for Peleus’ in the boar hunt). In the artistic record, the association of Phoenix and Peleus is confirmed by their depiction together on an Apulian crater fragment (c. 350, LIMC Peleus 229), in which they are both grown men (though Peleus is bearded and Phoenix is not). Trendall’s comment on the fragment (cited in the LIMC entry) is that ‘it clearly depicts the arrival of Peleus to take Phoenix to Cheiron for healing.’
With all of this background information in mind, let us now consider again Phoenix’s introduction to the Meleager story. I suggest when he says ‘μέμνημαι τόδε ἔργον ἔγὼ πάλαι οὐ τι νέον γε / ὡς ἤν’, Phoenix is making an emphatic assertion that he has a direct, living connection to the story which he is about to relate, which naturally boosts the story’s authority and rhetorical effectiveness. Further, by making this assertion, he implicitly contrasts himself to the other, younger heroes present: they have heard the κλέα ἄνδρῶν, which presumably included the story of Meleager, but they were not alive when the actual events of this story took place.  

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102 My interpretation of this passage differs from the one set out in Nagy 2009: 55-7. I will address Nagy’s interpretation in some detail, because this is an important passage and Nagy makes many interesting proposals. However, I do not find all of them to be supported by adequate evidence. Nagy argues that Phoenix has no special connection to the Meleager story, and that he knows about it, like the younger heroes, through the κλέα ἄνδρῶν. The reason why Phoenix can say that he μέμνημαι the story is that he, like the epic poet, is channeling the omniscient Muses. Further, what Phoenix is really saying here is that he totally recalls the story which he is about to recount, because μιμνήσκομαι with an accusative object refers to total recall, whereas μιμνήσκομαι with a genitive object refers to partial recall. The connection Nagy draws to the Muses is interesting, because it does seem clear that Phoenix is recalling an epic story. But Nagy’s interpretation does not do justice to the strong contrast between the κλέα ἄνδρῶν and μιμνήσκομαι found in the invocation of the Muses (discussed on p. 48 below) and also, I suggest, in the Meleager passage. Further, the explanation of Phoenix’s ability to totally recall the Meleager story as deriving directly from the Muses is not directly supported by any evidence in the text; and we noted above (p. 44 n. 99) Amphimedon’s utterance of very similar lines in the Odyssey concerning events which he himself recently experienced and which he therefore had no need of the Muses’ help in remembering. Moreover, there is an important disanalogy between, on the one hand, Phoenix and μιμνήσκομαι in the Meleager passage, and on the other, the poet and μιμνήσκομαι in the invocation of the Muses. For Phoenix says μέμνημαι τόδε ἔργον ‘I remember this deed’ whereas Homer in the invocation says εἰ μὴ Όλυμπαῖες Μοίσσα Δίως αἰγόχοιο / θυγατέρες μηνοσιάθ’ ὅσοι ὑπὸ Ἰλιον ἡλθον’ ‘If the Muses…did not remind how many came to Troy’. Nagy translates μηνοσιάθ’ in the invocation as ‘remind’ (with the poet understood as accusative object), which has the invocation saying that the Muses cause the poet to μιμνήσκεται all those who came to Troy. But this is not possible, because μηνοσιάθ’ is a medio-passive form. The passage thus says that the Muses μιμνήσκονται who came to Troy, but it does not say that the poet μιμνήσκεται anything (at least explicitly). Finally, a problem for Nagy’s claim about the meaning of μιμνήσκομαι with genitive as opposed to accusative objects is that there are many occurrences of μιμνήσκομαι with the genitive in which there is no reason to think that the verb refers merely to partial recall—for instance, when Achilles obsessively μιμνήσκεται his experiences with Patroclus (II. 24.7-9), or when he declares that he will never λανθάνεται Patroclus and that he will
What is more, Achilles is already well-versed in the κλέα ἀνδρῶν, and Phoenix knows this about him—when the ambassadors arrive at his hut, they famously discover him singing the κλέα ἀνδρῶν (ἐκεῖδε δ ἄφω κλέα ἀνδρῶν, II. 9.189). We might suppose, then, that by telling a story which he μιμνήσκεται, Phoenix is trying to give Achilles something that will be rhetorically stronger even than the κλέα ἀνδρῶν, since Achilles already knows them very well.103

The fact that Phoenix was not himself physically present for the events of the story (at least in the Iliad’s explicit version of it) does not seem to pose a fatal problem for this interpretation. The situation is precisely parallel to the cases we noted above in which someone μιμνήσκεται him even in Hades (II. 22.387-90). It also does not seem to be true that all of the (very few) occurrences of μιμνήσκεται with the accusative in Homer refer to total recall. When Diomedes says that he does not μιμνήσκεται his father Tydeus in the accusative (II. 6.222, discussed on pp. 49-52 below) his point does not seem to be that he does not totally recall his father; for by saying this Diomedes would implicate, by the standard cooperative principles governing conversation (specifically, Grice’s ‘Maxim of Quantity’), that he at least partially recalls Tydeus. Thus, he would be implicating that he μιμνήσκεται Tydeus in the genitive. But if this were the case, then Diomedes would presumably just say so. His point, rather, seems to be that he does not μιμνήσκεται anything at all about Tydeus.

103 I am grateful to Boris Shoshtitaishvili for pointing this out to me. One potential difficulty for my interpretation of Phoenix’s use of μιμνήσκομαι in this passage is the fact that Nestor never uses the verb in any of his own reminiscences about his youth. If my claim about Phoenix’s personal connection to the Meleager story is correct, then Nestor’s situation when he performs these reminiscences is closely parallel to Phoenix’s—he too is an elder who, unlike his younger addressees, was alive for (and, what goes beyond Phoenix’s situation in Book 9, personally experienced) the paradigmatic events that he is about to relate. We might, therefore, expect him to say something like μέμνημα τόδε ἔργον in order to emphasize his uniquely close connection to the significant past. That Phoenix says this and Nestor never does may just be a coincidence. But it could also be a function of subtler differences in their rhetorical situations. Phoenix’s speech in the embassy scene, which he begins in tears (δάκρυν’ ἀναπηθόμας, II. 9.433), is a desperately pleading and emotionally charged attempt to move Achilles, whereas none of Nestor’s speeches are quite like this (his speech to Patroclus in Book 11 comes closest, but it does not reach the same level of urgency as Phoenix’s). In particular, Phoenix’s speech directly follows, and tries to counteract, Achilles’ reply to Agamemnon—the most rhetorically powerful speech in the Iliad. It may be, then, that Phoenix’s emphatic two-line statement of his personal connection to the Meleager story is rhetorically appropriate in this utterly desperate situation, whereas a similar statement in Nestor’s speeches would have been perceived as heavy-handed.
can ‘remember’ the events of September 11th or Pearl Harbor without having been present at them.

If this interpretation is correct, then Phoenix is drawing an implicit distinction regarding the epistemic status of what one knows and remembers merely through κλέος, and what one μιμνήσκεται. I believe that we find Homer drawing precisely the same distinction, and more explicitly, in his invocation of the Muses in Book 2:

ἔσπετε γὺν μοι Μούσαι Ὀλύμπια δόματ’ ἔχουσαι·
ήμεῖς γὰρ θεαὶ ἔστε πάρεστε τε ἱστε τε πάντα,
οἱ πεῖς ἤγεμόνες Δαναών καὶ κοίρανοι ἵσαν·
κλέος οἶον ὑπὸ γνώσιμον οὐδὲ τι ἰδέν·
εἰ μὴ Ὀλυμπιάδες Μούσαι Διὸς αἰγιόχου
θυγατέρες μνησαίαθ’ ὤσοι ὑπὸ Ἰλιὸν ἥλθον·
ἀρχοῦς αὐ την ἔγει την το προπάσας. (II. 2.484-93)

Homer bids the muses to tell him who the leaders of the Danaans were. The Muses are able to do this because they are goddesses—they are present for and know/see all things (πάρεστέ τε ἱστε τε πάντα), in particular, the great deeds of the heroic past. In contrast to them, we mortals hear only the report (κλέος οἶον) and know/see none of these famous deeds. Because of this sharp epistemic difference between how the Muses are aware of the heroic past on the one hand, and how we are aware of it on the other, they can μιμνήσκεσθαι this past, whereas we cannot. This interpretation entails something that is perhaps surprising: the epic poet himself, at least within the imaginative world of epic poetry, does not μιμνήσκεσθαι the events of the Iliad and the Odyssey. Rather, the Muses (or elsewhere, a single Muse) μιμνήσκονται them and then declare them (ἔσπετε) to the poet.104

104 The formula ἔσπετε γὺν μοι Μούσαι Ὀλύμπια δόματ’ ἔχουσαι (II. 2.484, 11.218, 14.508, 16.112) constitutes the poet’s fullest request for information from the Muses in the Iliad. We also
Let us now turn to a crucial moment in the exchange between Glaucus and Diomedes in Book 6, which is the most expansive performance of genealogical memory in Homer. When they encounter one another on the battlefield, Diomedes does not recognize Glaucus and challenges him to identify himself. Glaucus meets this challenge with a long and powerful speech about his ancestors, beginning with his great-great-grandfather Sisyphus, and devoting particular attention to the famous deeds of his grandfather Bellerephon. Glaucus ends his speech by describing how his father Hippolochus sent him to Troy: Hippolochus enjoined him (ἐπέτελλεν, 207) always to be the best and thereby to live up to his superior ancestry. Diomedes is gladdened by Glaucus’ speech, because he now realizes that they are paternal guest-friends. As Diomedes’ explains, his grandfather Oineus once hosted Bellerephon, and the two of

find a shorter request, οὐ μοι ἔννεπε Μοῦσα (Il. 2.761), which is, of course, also found at the beginning of the Odyssey (ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα... Od. 1.1). Despite their apparent difference, ἔννεπε and ἔσπετε are both forms of same verb, (ὁ)ἐπ- ‘report with authority, declare’, with a preverb ἐν(τοῦ). ἔννεπε derives from e-grade *ἐν-σεπ-, and ἔσπετε from zero-grade *ἐν-σπ-τε (Beekes s.v. ἐν(ν)ἔπο). Remarkably, Livius Andronicus begins his rendition of the Odyssey with the exact Latin cognate of ἔννεπε, insece, which must have had similar connotations of authoritative utterance (virum mihi, Camena, insece versutum). Martin 1989: 238 shows that the speech act denoted by ἐν(ν)ἐπο falls squarely in the category of muthos, observing that whenever this verb takes a noun denoting speech as its object, the noun is muthos (Il. 8.412, 11.186, 11.643, 11.839).

105 Il. 6.119-236.

106 Glaucus’ exact words are worth quoting, as a quintessential example both of the power of advice/injunctions given by fathers (almost always marked by the verb ἐπιτέλλειν), and of the force that excellent (ἄριστοι) ancestors exert on their descendants as paradigms to which the descendants must conform (on pain of disgrace for both themselves and their ancestors):

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Ἱππόλοχος δέ μ’ ἔτικτε, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ φήμι γενέσθαι·
πέμπε δέ μ’ ἐς Τροίην, καὶ μοι μάλα πόλλ` ἐπέτελλεν
αἰὲν ἄριστας καὶ ὑπείροχον ἐμμεναί ἄλλων,
μηδὲ γένος πατέρων αἰσχυνέμεν, οἰ μέγ’ ἄριστοι
ἐν τ’ ᾠδῇ ἔγεννοντο καὶ ἐν Λυκίη εὐθεῖρ. (Il. 6.206-10)
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them exchanged fine tokens of hospitality (ξεινήμα καλά, 218). Diomedes goes on to describe these gifts, but also to remark that he does not μιμήσκεται his own father Tydeus:

Οἶνευς μὲν ξοστήρα δίδου φοίνικι φαεινόν,  
Βελλεροφόντης δὲ χοῦσεον δέπας ἀμφικύπελλον  
καὶ μὴν ἐγὼ κατέλειπον ἵνα ἐν δόμασθ' ἐμοῖς.  
Τυδέα δ' ὦ μέμνημαι, ἐπεὶ μ' ἔτι τυπθὸν ἐόντα  
κάλλιφ', ὅτ' ἐν Θῆβῃσιν ἀπώλετο λαὸς Ἀχαιῶν. (I.I. 6.219-23)

In this context, Diomedes is expected to say something about Tydeus, ideally about how Tydeus instructed him before sending him off to Troy, in answer to what Glaucus has just said about his own father Hippolochus. But Diomedes cannot do this, because he never directly experienced his father; and even though he was alive while Tydeus fought at Thebes, he was not fully cognizant during this event.¹⁰⁷ This appears to be part of the force of οὐ μέμνημαι in the above passage.

Diomedes is, of course, acutely aware of his father’s legendary deeds (through their κλέος), and he even alludes to them when he refers to the failed Argive attack on Thebes (ὅτ' ἐν Θῆβῃσιν ἀπώλετο λαὸς Ἀχαιῶν, 223). He surely remembers this story, but he cannot μιμήσκεσθαι it, or anything else about his father.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ We might also note that Diomedes and Tydeus belong, obviously, to different generations; by contrast Meleager and Phoenix belong to the same generation in the mythic imagination. It is possible that Homer and his audience implicitly conceived of heroes from the same generation as sharing in a common stock of experience, comprising the momentous events of that generation. This is supported by the fact that Phoenix appears in some versions of the Calydonian Boar Hunt but not in others, while it is inconceivable that Diomedes, say, could appear in any version of that story.

¹⁰⁸ It is useful to compare here the performance of genealogical memory which Diomedes delivers in Book 14, when he recommends that he and the other wounded Achaean leaders return to the front lines of battle so that they can urge on the other soldiers (II. 14.110-32). As Diomedes states explicitly, his noble ancestry (together with his ability to express it in performance) entitles him to a respectful hearing in the Achaean council, even though he is the youngest. He begins by claiming his descent from Tydeus, again alluding to Tydeus’ exploits at Thebes (πατρός δ' ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐγὼ γένος εὐχομαι ἐἶναι / Τυδέος, ὃν Ἐθήθησα χυτή κατὰ γαία καλύπτει, 113-4). He then briefly traces Tydeus’ ancestry before describing, in some detail, the wealth Tydeus possessed and his preeminence as a spearman. But at the end of all this,
Note, however, that in the passage above Tydeus does make clear that he has himself seen the golden cup which Bellerephon gave to his grandfather Oeneus. The fact that Diomedes’ claim of direct familiarity with the cup is immediately followed by an admission that he does not μιμνήσκεσθαι his father suggests that the cup is, in a certain respect, standing in for his father. Its immediate relevance to the context is, of course, that it is a concrete token of his paternal guest-friendship with Glaucus; but it is also—and very importantly—a concrete token of his father and grandfather which he can actually μιμνήσκεσθαι. Like the many other heirlooms in Homer, it was surely felt to embody its own history, and it would therefore have served for Diomedes as a vivid reminder of his paternal ancestry—especially precious, because it, and other inherited possessions like it, were the only concrete connection Diomedes could ever have to this ancestry. Pursuing this idea a little further, we may also note that Diomedes says that he left the cup at home (κατέλειπον, 221) when he went to Troy, just as many other Achaean (and Trojan) sons left their fathers at home when they went to Troy—and just as Tydeus left he betrays an anxious uncertainty about the qualities he has been describing, and his genealogical memory in general, when he says: τὰ δὲ μελέετ’ ἄριστον, εἰ ἐτέον περ ‘you must have heard these things, if [what I have said] is true’ (125). Here again we are reminded that Diomedes never directly experienced his father. This means that his memories of Tydeus’ deeds do not have the strongest possible epistemic status (the status which is marked by μιμνήσκομαι), and therefore that they lack a certain rhetorical power.

109 If we do not admit this connection, then lines 221-2 (Τυδέας’ οὐ μέμνημαι…) seem to present a non sequitur.

110 On the ‘memory’ that inheres in material objects in Homer see Grethlein 2008, which includes a helpful appendix collecting all of the ‘old’ objects mentioned in both the Iliad and the Odyssey (pp. 47-8).

111 Forms of λείπω, when they refer to the action of leaving a person at home to go to war, most often describe fathers leaving sons at home (e.g., Il. 5.480, Od. 11.174). But there is also a strong and deeply poignant motif, running throughout the Iliad, of sons leaving fathers at home (often never to return). The most obvious examples are Achilles and Peleus (together with Achilles’ unfulfilled promise to Menoetius that he would bring Patroclus home safely (Il. 18.324-7), and
Diomedes at home (καλλιφε, 223), never to return, when he went to Thebes. In a sense, then, Diomedes’ statement about his direct experience of the cup substitutes for the experientially informed statements about his father which he cannot make, and likewise corresponds to Glaucus’ report of what his own father Bellerephon told him when he left for Troy.¹¹²

Let us turn, finally, to another passage which addresses the link of a son to his father through μιμνήσκομαι, this time from Book 1 of the Odyssey. The passage appears to present a serious challenge to my claim about μιμνήσκομαι and direct, living experience, especially in light of Diomedes’ statement that he cannot μιμνήσκεσθαι Tydeus. For Telemachus is in nearly the same situation as Tydeus with regard to his father; and yet, in the passage we are about to examine, Athena ὑπομιμνήσκει Telemachus of Odysseus (i.e., causes Telemachus to μιμνήσκεσθαι Odysseus). One important difference to note from the start is that Odysseus is still alive somewhere, whereas Tydeus is known by Diomedes to be dead and buried. I argue that this, together with a few other differences discussed below, leaves open the possibility that Telemachus can μιμνήσκεσθαι Odysseus without yet having experienced him directly as a father—but only if a living connection can be established between them in the present. As we will see, Athena accomplishes this by imbuing Telemachus with his father’s μένος.

In Book 1, Athena visits Odysseus’ house in order to provide Telemachus with some much-needed guidance, and to spur him on to leave Ithaca in quest of information about his father. She disguises herself as a mortal, claiming to be Mentes, a Taphian trader and a guest-

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¹¹² See p. 49 n. 106 above.

then Hector and Priam. Homer sharpens the pathos in the deaths of countless minor heroes by mentioning their fathers waiting at home (e.g., Il. 5.155-8, 11.328-32). The motif of bereaved parents in the Iliad is discussed with great sensitivity by Griffin 1980: 123-8.
friend of Odysseus (the name, Μεν-της = ‘Reminder’, is very significant here).\(^{113}\) The passage which we will be considering is the poet’s description of Athena’s departure, when she reveals herself to be a goddess:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ἡ μὲν ἄρ’ ὡς εἰποῦσ’ ἀπέβη γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη,} \\
\text{ὀρνίς δ’ ὡς ἀνόπαια διέπτατο· τῷ δ’ ἐνὶ θυμῷ} \\
\text{θῆκε μένος καὶ θάρσος, ὑπέμνησέν τε ἐ πατοὺς} \\
\text{μᾶλλον ἐτ’ ἤ τὸ πάροιχον, ὃ δὲ φρεσὶν ἦρι νοήσας} \\
\text{θάμβησεν κατὰ θυμόν· δίσατο γὰρ θεὸν εἶναι,} \\
\text{αὐτίκα δὲ μνηστήρας ἐπῴχετο ἵσοθεος φῶς.} \quad (Od. 1.319-24)
\end{align*}
\]

Now, we know that Telemachus has never met Odysseus; and further, he has just expressed doubts to Athena about whether Odysseus even is his father.\(^{114}\) So the question immediately arises: how could Telemachus μιμήσεσθαι Odysseus—that is, have Odysseus in his thumos and be guided by him—if it is indeed true that μιμήσομαι requires that its subject has had direct experience its object? This passage appears to falsify the claim I have made about μιμήσομαι and direct experience.

But if we focus our attention on the function of μένος in this passage, I believe we can see that it falls in line with the claim after all. Egbert Bakker has shed light on the meaning of μένος and ὑπέμνησέν in the passage above by comparing two other passages in Homer, both of which involve μένος which is explicitly identified as ‘paternal’.\(^{115}\) In the first, from Iliad Book 5,
Athena rouses Diomedes and tells him that she has put into his στήθεσσι the steady, paternal μένος of Tydeus. In the second, from Odyssey Book 2, Athena in the guise of Mentor tells Telemachus to take heart and trust his abilities, if indeed the good μένος of his father Odysseus has ‘dripped into’ (ἐνέστακται) him; but she also adds that if he is not really the son of Odysseus and Penelope, he will fail. In this second passage, Athena once again disguises herself as someone whose name means roughly ‘Reminder’. But, in keeping with her disguise as a mortal, she does not reveal the extent and certainty of her knowledge—the psychological subtlety of the Telemachia requires that Telemachus discover a confidence in himself, as his father’s son, partly on his own initiative, not just through the intervention of the gods. Thus, Athena declares with certainty that if Telemachus has Odysseus’ μένος in his mind and body (thumos), he will realize his goals; but here she leaves it up to Telemachus to realize and trust that he does indeed have Odysseus’ μένος living within him.

To return, now, to our original passage from Odyssey Book 1, I believe we can understand the μένος which Athena puts into Telemachus to be paternal μένος—that is, the same μένος which is in Odysseus himself. And this μένος, I suggest, amounts to the direct, living connection between Telemachus and Odysseus that makes it possible for Telemachus to

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116 II. 5.124-6:

θαρσῶν νῦν Διόμηδες ἐπὶ Τρώεσσι μάχεσθαι·
ἐν γάρ τοι στήθεσσι μένος πατρώϊον ἤρα
ἄτρομον, οἷον ἔχεσκε σακέσπαλος ἱππότα Τυδεύς·

117 Od. 2.270-5:

Τηλέμαχ’, οὐδ’ ὑπάθεν κακὸς ἔσσεαι οὐδ’ ἀνοήμων·
εἰ δὴ τοι σοῦ πατρὸς ἐνέστακται μένος ἤρα,
οἶος κείνος ἐην τελέσαι ἐργαν τε ἔπος τε,
οὐ τοι ἐπειδ’ ἄλλη ὄδός ἔσσεται οὐδ’ ἀτέλεστος. 
εἰ δ’ οὐ κείνον γ’ ἔσσοί γόνος καὶ Πηνελοπείης,
οὔ σε ἐπειτὰ ἔσσεται τελευτήσειν ἄ μενον τές.
μμιμνήσκεσθαι Odysseus. In this passage μένος is showing its true colors as a substance that
is not just ‘emotional’ and ‘bodily’, but also ‘intellectual’ (to use categories familiar to us, but
not to Homer). In his interpretation of this passage, Bakker fittingly stresses that the experience
which Athena causes in Telemachus is not primarily a recalling of his father. As he puts it, ‘the
“reminding” (ὑπέμνησεν) is not an activation of the memory of his father (whom he, like
Diomedes, has never known), but a shot of paternal μένος, administered by Athene. The shot is
not just physical, like adrenalin, but also mental and spiritual: Telemachos is now seeing that it
was Athene who talked to him.  

Whatever else we make of this passage, it is plain that something extraordinary is going
on. First, Telemachus realizes that he has just been conversing with a goddess. Further, and more
particularly, he now perceives (in his θυμός, 320) the guiding presence of his father Odysseus,
even though he has never met his father and is wracked with doubts about whether his father is

118 Other interpreters take the relationship between μένος and μμιμνήσκομαι to always be the
other way around—roughly, that μμιμνήσκομαι (assumed to refer to the intellectual experience of
‘recalling/remembering’) summons μένος (usually assumed to refer to a more bodily quality,
like ‘power’ or ‘incitement’); see Nagy 1974: 266-7, Collins 1998: 85-7 (who finds a more
intellectual meaning in μένος, as ‘strength of memory/mind’), Frame 2009: 25-8. While I agree
with these scholars that there is a close connection between μμιμνήσκομαι and μένος in this
passage (and elsewhere in Homer), I believe that they import into their interpretations an implicit
distinction between mind and body that does not fit the Homeric poems. And this results in
puzzling conclusions or lack of consensus (for example, Nagy and Frame take μένος to have a
bodily meaning, whereas Collins takes it to have a mental meaning). The problem of linking up
μμιμνήσκομαι and μένος disappears if we recognize that both are psychosomatic terms that
differ only in their emphases. μμιμνήσκομαι focuses more on the mental end of the spectrum of
psychosomatic experience, while μένος focuses more on the bodily end; but both terms are
intrinsically mental and bodily.

119 Here we can glimpse a basic semantic affinity between Homeric μένος and its Vedic and
Avestan cognates (mānas and manah-), which are primarily ‘intellectual’ terms. I am grateful to
Professor Richard Martin for this and other helpful observations on the significance of μένος in
this passage.

120 Bakker 2008: 70-1.
even still alive. Moreover, these two psychological events are intimately connected—Telemachus perceives Athena partly because he now shares in Odysseus’ μένος, and he has the confidence to feel his father’s guiding presence more fully because he now knows that he has the help of a goddess.¹²¹ I believe that the use of μιμνήσκομαι here conveys the extraordinary quality of Telemachus’ experience, because it asserts that he has now, for the first time in his life, experienced a direct, living connection to his father through the divine mediation of Athena. This flash of perception and guidance that Telemachus feels is not a permanent state, and it will soon give way to uncertainty and lack of resolve. But it marks the true starting point of the Telemachia—and with it, the beginning of Telemachus’ fuller awareness of his father, and of himself as his father’s son, which will reach its completion only in the final book of the poem.

If this interpretation seems like special pleading, I believe that it is because this is a special passage, describing an unusual (to us, ‘supernatural’) experience, and fittingly marked by an unusual use of μιμνήσκομαι. In it, the notion of direct, living experience is stretched beyond its everyday bounds—but not, I suggest, beyond the bounds which are conceivable within the world of the Homeric poems.

This interpretation raises a question about the Diomedes passage from Iliad Book 6 that we discussed above. For there Diomedes says to Glaucus that he does not μιμνήσκεται Tydeus. But we have now seen that, already in Book 5, Athena sent the μένος πατρώϊον of Tydeus into Diomedes. So why, we may ask, does this μένος πατρώϊον not provide the living connection to Tydeus which would allow Diomedes to say that he μιμνήσκεται Tydeus? I believe that part of the answer to this is that the experience of μιμνήσκεσθαι through μένος πατρώϊον is fleeting, so that even if Diomedes was flooded with Tydeus’ μένος πατρώϊον at 5.125, this does not

¹²¹ I owe this important point to Professor Peter O’Connell.
guarantee that he would be able to μιμήσεσθαι Tydeus in any sense at 6.222—1006 lines and a great deal of fighting later. We can add to this something that we observed earlier: Tydeus is long dead, whereas Odysseus is still alive. It may be that what I have referred to as the direct or ‘living’ experiential connection required by μιμήσεσθαι could only be established with a living father. Finally and most importantly, when Diomedes says ‘Τυδέα δ’ ού μέμνημαι’, the object Τυδέα is in the accusative; and as we saw in Chapter 1, the usage of μιμήσεσθαι with an accusative object predicates of its subject the recollection of information, rather than an experience of psychosomatic guidedness. Diomedes’ point is that he cannot personally recall anything about his father Tydeus—if he could, he would proudly tell it to Glaucus. By contrast, we have every reason to believe that a shot of μένος πατρώιον would occasion an experience of being psychosomatically guided by one’s father (and thus an experience that would be referred to by μιμήσεσθαι + gen.), rather than the ability to recollect information about one’s father. So, although Athena at Od. 1.321 put paternal μένος into Telemachus and υπέμνησέν him of his father, and Telemachus is therefore somehow guided by his father at that moment, it is unlikely that Telemachus could have then truly said ‘*μεμνημαι ’Οδυσσήα...’ and gone on to recount a story about Odysseus from personal recollection. And so, in this respect he is still like Diomedes at Il. 6.222.

There is one other occurrence of μιμήσεσθαι in Homer that appears to be problematic for my claim about direct experience, and it again concerns Telemachus’ ability to μιμήσεσθαι Odysseus. When Telemachus and Peisistratus visit Menelaus in Book 4 of the Odyssey, Menelaus describes how he frequently mourns and cries for Odysseus—indeed, whenever he μιμήσεται Odysseus, food and sleep become hateful to him122 (like Achilles
when he μιμησαται Patroclus, but with less intensity). One of Menelaus’ reasons for bringing up Odysseus here appears to be his suspicion that Telemachus is in fact Odysseus’ son; and when Telemachus begins to weep at the mention of his father, Menelaus becomes sure of this. But then he does not know what to do—should he let Telemechus μνησθαι Odysseus (in the genitive) on his own, or should he himself question and probe Telemachus about Odysseus?


μερμήριξε δ’ ἔπειτα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν,
唬 ἡ μνησθθαι.
唬 πρῶτ’ ἐξεφόστο ἐκαστὰ τε πειρήσατο. (Od. 4.117-9)

It is difficult to say what μνησθαι, a Homeric hapax, means in this passage. It is one of only three exclusively passive (rather than medio-passive) forms of μιμησομαι in Homer, all of which occur in the Odyssey.123 The Lexicon des frühgriechischen Epos, and both de Jong and Ameis-Hentze in their commentaries on the Odyssey, translate μνησθαι as ‘mention’ (‘Erwähnung machen/tun’).124 If μνησθαι really does just mean ‘mention’ here, then it means something quite different from the 123 other occurrences of μιμησομαι in Homer; and if that is right, then it need not have the same direct experience requirement as other occurrences of

122 Od. 4.104-7:

τῶν πάντων οὐ τόσοιν ὀδύρομαι, ἀχνύμενος περ,
ὡς ἐνός, ἄ τε μοι ὑπνον ἀπεχθαίει καὶ ἐδώδήν,
μυνομένῳ, ἐπεὶ οὐ τὶς Ἀχαιῶν τόσον ἐμόγησεν,
ὅσσ’ Ὅδυσσεὺς ἐμόγησε καὶ ἠματο.

123 The two other passive forms are found at Od. 1.31 and 4.189—both times as the participle ἐπιμησομεθεῖς with a genitive object, having the meaning ‘having gotten X in one’s thumos and being currently guided/bestirred by it’. In both of these cases the subject has obviously had direct experience of the (human) object (who, moreover, happens to be dead in both cases: at Od. 1.31 the subject is Zeus and the object is Aegisthus, and at 4.189 the subject is Peisistratus and the object is his brother Antilochus).

124 LfgrE s.v. μυνήσκω 4d (bottom); de Jong 2004 ad 4.117-20 (p.97); Ameis and Hentze 1908 ad 4.118 (p. 113). Lattimore also translates μνησθαι as ‘mention’. Heubeck, West, and Hainsworth 1988 do not address the question.
μμνήσκομαι, and this passage would pose no problem for my claim (which would then be limited to the 123 occurrences of μμνήσκομαι that do not mean ‘mention’).

But ‘mention’ probably does not capture the meaning of μνηθήναι in this passage—for one thing, we can ‘mention’ things that are totally trivial to us, whereas the object of μμνήσκομαι in the above passage, as everywhere else in Homer, is hugely significant to the subject. Moreover, it seems very likely that the verb μνηθήναι refers to a powerful internal experience—the same experience referred to by all other occurrences of μμνήσκομαι with a genitive object—and not just the performance of a mentioning speech act. In this case, Menelaus would be hesitating about whether to let Telemachus continue having this private experience, or to broach the issue explicitly by questioning Telemachus about his father. If this interpretation of the meaning of μνηθήναι is right, then the passage does appear pose a problem for my claim about μμνήσκομαι and direct experience. But I believe it can be interpreted in a way such that it would be consistent with this claim after all. For ‘πατρὸς μνηθήναι’ is predicated of Telemachus by Menelaus, not directly by Homer; and it could be that Menelaus, unlike the poet, mistakenly thinks that Telemachus has previously had direct experience of Odysseus (i.e., that Telemachus was old enough to be fully cognizant of Odysseus before Odysseus left for Troy), so that it would be possible, in Menelaus’ mind, for Telemachus to μμνήσκεται Odysseus. And indeed, Menelaus may be predisposed to ‘project’ the experience of μμνησκόμενος Odysseus on to Telemachus, because Menelaus has just described himself twelve lines earlier as having this very experience (and weeping as a result, just like Telemachus).125

I do not claim that this second interpretation of the passage is definitely correct—in fact, it does not seem possible to recover the full meaning of this passage. But the important point for

125 For the text of this passage, see n. 122 above.
our present purpose is that, if either of the interpretations we have considered is right, then the passage does not vitiate the claim about μμνήσκομαι and direct experience (at least when μμνήσκομαι does not mean ‘mention’).

We have now examined all the occurrences of μμνήσκομαι in Homer that, at least in isolation, present a significant challenge to the claim that μμνήσκομαι presupposes that its subject has previously had direct, living experience of its object. And we have been able to interpret these passages in a way that suggests they are consistent with the claim after all. We came to discuss this feature of μμνήσκομαι’s meaning in the course of a general discussion of how μμνήσκομαι and the broader concept of memory relate to one another in the Iliad. We identified two features of μμνήσκομαι’s meaning that delimit it with respect to memory: the emphasis of μμνήσκομαι on psychosomatic guidedness when it is construed with a genitive (though not an accusative) object; and the requirement that the subject of μμνήσκομαι has previously had direct, living experience of the object, no matter what its case is. So, when characters in the Iliad remember something that does not strongly guide them in mind and body, their experience will not be described by a use of μμνήσκομαι with the genitive. And when they remember something—say, a deed recorded in the ἀνδρῶν— that they have not themselves experienced, their experience will not be described by any use of μμνήσκομαι at all. The direct experience requirement holds for all uses of μμνήσκομαι, but we should note that it has a special pertinence to the use of μμνήσκομαι with a genitive—for there is a natural overlap between what one has directly experienced in the past (a person, an event, a psychosomatic state, etc.) and what has the potential to strongly guide one, in body and mind (thumos), in the present. It is true that we can be powerfully affected and guided by things that we have never personally

126 As noted above (p. 39 n. 97), none of the 51 occurrences of λανθάνομαι (medio-passive) presents a challenge to this claim.
experienced, through the contact we make with them in language and other media that record human experience; but the base of what most fundamentally guides us will largely be composed of things that we have directly experienced. This fact about human life appears to fundamentally shape the meaning of μιμνήσκομαι.

In a recent paper, Elizabeth Minchin applies to the Homeric poems a three-fold distinction between personal, social/communicative, and cultural memory that was developed by the Egyptologist and cultural theorist Jan Assmann.\textsuperscript{127} It will be instructive to briefly consider how these distinctions relate to our investigation of μιμνήσκομαι and memory. The three types of memory can be briefly characterized as follows. Personal memory refers to our memory of our own experiences (before we have shared it with anyone through speech). Communicative (or ‘social’) memory refers to the common stock of personal memories that have been shared among members of a social group, and serve, in part, to define that group; it generally spans three generations (grandparents can share their early personal memories with their grandchildren).\textsuperscript{128} Cultural memory reaches into the remote past—the past which no one currently alive has personally experienced—and preserves the archetypal stories and ‘timeless’ values that define a culture (where a ‘culture’ comprises a collection of overlapping social groups). The primary bearers of cultural memory (as with all types of memory) are individuals—but, specifically, those individuals who occupy institutionally defined roles designating them somehow as

\textsuperscript{127} Minchin 2012. For a short overview of Assmann’s three-fold distinction, see Assmann 2008.

\textsuperscript{128} An intermediate stage between communicative memory and the next stage recognized in Assmann’s scheme (‘cultural memory’) would span five generations, from grandchildren (generation 1) to their grandparents’ grandparents (generation 5): generation 5 conveys personal memories to their grandchildren (generation 3), who in turn convey these memories to their own grandchildren (generation 1). Thus, a degree of direct transmission is preserved between generations 1 and 5. See Vansina 1985 for thorough discussion of this and other questions pertaining to the historical accuracy of oral traditions.
custodians of their culture. Whereas communicative memory is typically expressed in an informal setting—for example, in conversation or casual story-telling—cultural memory is typically expressed in a (more or less elaborate) ceremony, like a church service, or a performance of epic poetry. Furthermore, artifacts and formalized actions that articulate a culture’s values reaffirm cultural memory as well—it is not only expressed in speech.

In terms of these distinctions, μιμησκόμαι accesses both personal and communicative memory. An example of the former is Achilles μιμησκόμενος the experiences he shared with Patroclus (Il. 24.9). An example of the latter, spanning two generations, is Phoenix telling the story of Meleager to Achilles—sharing with the younger generation a momentous event that he himself was alive for. But it seems that μιμησκόμαι does not access cultural memory, if cultural memory preserves only the remote past (the past which no one living has experienced). Examples of stories preserved in cultural memory are the Niobe story that Achilles tells Priam, and the story of Zeus’ affliction with ātē that Agamemnon tells the Achaean host.

It is not clear, however, that this sharp distinction between communicative and cultural memory really fits the Homeric poems. For one thing, the examples of cultural memory just given (the stories of Niobe and Zeus’ ātē) are no more formalized or ceremonial than many other speeches in Homer. Of course, we do find ceremonial expressions of cultural memory in Homer (sacrifices, ritual laments, burials, paians, etc.); but cultural memory is very often reaffirmed in the ‘ordinary’ speeches. And in the end, we cannot draw an absolute distinction between ordinary/informal speech and formal speech in the Homeric poems—all of the speeches are formal in their own way, shaped by complex sets of conventions that govern their particular discourse context. Furthermore, it does not seem true that the basic values of Homeric culture are felt to derive only from, or to be exemplified most powerfully by, the remote past; indeed, some
of the strongest moral paradigms delivered in the poems stand within the reach of communicative memory (consider, again, Nestor’s reminiscences and Phoenix’s Meleager story). What we find in Homer, rather, is a situation in which both communicative and cultural memory are often called on within the same speech, woven together in highly rhetorical performances. If the performer is a venerable elder, like Nestor or Phoenix, their communicative memory claims the same authority as cultural memory. And in some respects it appears to claim more authority. For, if this were not so, then Nestor’s personal reminiscences would not possess the uncommon rhetorical power that they manifestly do possess—he could just as well have produced exempla from the remote past. And the Meleager story which Phoenix μιμνήσκεται would not have the rhetorical edge over the χλέα ἀνδρῶν that it appears to have (especially, as we have seen, in light of the distinction between χλός and direct experience that Homer draws in his invocation of the Muses).129

Up to this point we have touched on the topic of the performance of memory in the Iliad several times, and we are now in a position to discuss it more fully. Like all human beings, the characters of the Iliad remember a wide variety of things, ranging from the trivial to the vitally important. But the most consequential kind of memory in the Iliad—the kind of memory that the poem focuses our attention on—is the memory of paradigmatic figures and events from the past (whether remote or more recent); and what matters for this kind of memory is not just the content of what is remembered, but also the ability to perform it. Such performances of memory figure prominently in most major speech contexts in the Iliad—advice/deliberation, rebuke, command, ...

129 Professor Richard Martin points out to me that the authority of Nestor’s and Phoenix’s communicative memories in performance derives primarily from the fact that they can present themselves as living guarantors of the truth and wisdom of these memories, in virtue of their personal connection to the events that they recount. Thus, unlike bearers of remote cultural memory, Nestor and Phoenix themselves embody the wisdom contained in the paradigms that they deploy.
exhortation, consolation, prayer, lament, and flyting.\textsuperscript{130} Note that in each of these performance contexts, with the exception of lament and flyting, the speaker’s goal is to get the addressee to do something (or, in the case of consolation, to feel differently about a situation). And each context has a set of conventions that determine what will be rhetorically effective in it. The fact that the performance of memory plays a part in all of them bespeaks a strong, general connection between persuasion and motivation on the one hand, and the ability to remember and deploy the right paradigms on the other.

And not only do paradigmatic stories play an essential role in all forms of persuasive speech in the \textit{Iliad}; this is essentially the only context where they surface in the poem. That is, Homer depicts the memory of paradigmatic figures and events through its expression in \textit{speeches}. We do not find psychological descriptions of how characters are motivated when they remember paradigmatic stories.\textsuperscript{131} Of course we must assume that they \textit{are} motivated by such stories, but Homer does not describe this internal psychosomatic process of motivation (although he does describe other such internal psycho-somatic processes, as we saw in Chapter 1). Instead, he shows us heroes verbally performing their memory of paradigmatic stories—and always before an audience, since in none of the eight cases of self-address in the \textit{Iliad} does the speaker recall a paradigmatic story. In four of the cases, the speaker (always a hero) is deliberating with himself about what to do;\textsuperscript{132} and this is a context in which we might expect him to recall a

\textsuperscript{130} Martin 1989 designates the genre of boast and insult contests between opposing warriors in the \textit{Iliad} with the term ‘flyting’, which is the name for a similar phenomenon in Germanic poetry.

\textsuperscript{131} As noted by Martin 1989: 79.

\textsuperscript{132} The four cases of deliberative self-address are \textit{Il}. 11.404-10 (Odysseus), 17.91-105 (Menelaus), 21.554-70 (Agenor), and 22.99-130 (Hector). The four other cases of self-address are \textit{Il}. 18.6-14 (Achilles), 20.344-52 (Achilles), 21.54-63 (Achilles), 22.297-305 (Hector). In finding these passages I used the extremely helpful companion website created by Deborah Beck.
paradigmatic story that could guide him in the present situation. But, while in all four cases the
speaker does cite a general principle in support of his decision, he never recalls a specific
paradigmatic story. Such recollections, which are often very detailed, seem to be reserved for
speeches to an audience. Indeed, the distribution of these recollections suggests that their
characteristically high level of detail is a function of their essentially performative nature—the
details are rhetorically impressive, and they endow the paradigm with vividness even when they
do not seem to be strictly 'relevant'. In terms of the three-part classification of memory
outlined above, we can say that the memory of paradigmatic stories manifests itself primarily on
the communicative level in the Iliad, rather than on the personal level.

The performance of paradigmatic stories appears to serve two basic rhetorical functions
in the Iliad. First and most obviously, the content of the paradigm motivates the addressee(s).
Second, the felicitous performance of a paradigmatic story confers authority on the speaker. Both
of these functions accord with the fact that elaborate performances of memory fall under the
category of muthos in the Homer. In his nuanced analysis of this term, Richard Martin defines it
as ‘a speech-act indicating authority, performed at length, usually in public, with a focus on full
attention to every detail’, and he shows that it comprises three basic genres of speaking:
command, flyting, and the recitation of remembered events. Naturally, the remembered events

for her book Speech Presentation in Homeric Epic (2012). The search function of the website
can be accessed at http://www.laits.utexas.edu/DeborahBeck/search.

133 The many details which the epic poet himself includes in his rich descriptions have the same
effect. It is likely that part of what motivates their inclusion (beyond their intrinsic splendor) is
the epic poet’s desire to outdo other epic poets in vividness and monumentality (cf. Martin 1989:
238–9).

134 Martin 1989: 12.

135 See Martin 1989 Chapter 2 (pp. 43-88) for detailed discussion of the three muthos genres.
that a hero recites will have a strong relevance to the present speech context—they furnish a paradigm for the present, though, as with Phoenix’s Meleager story, this can be a negative paradigm indicating a mistake to be avoided.

It is important to emphasize here that the remembered events do not need to constitute a highly structured mini-epic like the Meleager story or Nestor’s reminiscence of his fight against the Epeans in Book 11; they simply need to have some kind of paradigmatic bearing on the present situation. Thus, when Odysseus reminds Achilles of what Peleus (supposedly) enjoined upon him when he sent Achilles to Troy, this constitutes a memory muthos. Simply in virtue of performing the speech act denoted by ἐπιτέλλειν, Peleus generated a norm or paradigm exerting moral pressure on his son Achilles to conform to it. Thus, when Odysseus reminds Achilles of Peleus’ injunctions to him (to check his great thumos and relent from strife (9.255-8)), he reactivates this paradigm. Moreover, he rebukes Achilles for not having it in his thumos and letting it guide him, that is for not μιμησάμενος it: ὃς ἐπέτελλ’ ὃ γέρων, σὺ δὲ λήθεαι

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136 ‘As a general rule, characters in the Iliad do not remember anything simply for the pleasure of memory. Recall has an exterior goal’ (Martin 1989: 80).

137 Il. 11.670-762.

138 Of course in context this recollection only forms a part of Odysseus speech, the entirety of which is a muthos (and is identified as such by Achilles at Il. 9.309).

139 Professor Martin points out to me that the speech act ἐπιτέλλειν regularly presupposes an audience of people other than the primary addressee who function as witnesses to the speech act. These witnesses can later re-apply the μῦθος that was delivered in the primary act of ἐπιτέλλειν, which is precisely what Odysseus and Nestor (see below) do. There are several examples of the performative use of the verb ἐπιτέλλειν in the Iliad (present tense, 1st person sg.). A particularly clear one is Il. 9.68, in a speech where Nestor stations several youths as guards outside of the Achaean wall: κούροισιν μὲν ταῦτ’ ἐπιτέλλομαι ‘I hereby enjoin these things upon the youths’.
Nestor rebukes Patroclus with exactly the same line in Book 11 (line 790), while employing the same rhetorical tactic (successfully, unlike Odysseus), and, indeed, recalling the same event (the instructions of Peleus and Menoetius to their sons in the presence of Nestor and Odysseus). Nestor’s recollection is, characteristically, more expansive. He reminds Patroclus both of what Peleus enjoined upon Achilles (to always be the best (Il. 11.784)—very different advice from what Odysseus professed to remember) and, more importantly, of what Patroclus’ own father Menoetius enjoined upon him (to be a shrewd counselor to Achilles (Il. 11.788-9)).

Odysseus displays yet another type of paradigmatic recollection in Book 2, in his muthos (Il. 2.282) about the portent at Aulis. Here the relevant paradigm is not found in the deeds of a past hero, or the injunctions of a father, but rather in a portent sent by Zeus and interpreted by Calchas. In the barest summary: Odysseus describes how, while the Achaeans were sacrificing to the gods at Aulis, a snake emerged from beneath the altar and proceeded to eat a sparrow together with her eight children, and then how Calchas drew out the paradigmatic relations that this event bore to the Achaeans’ expedition to Troy (the number of birds consumed corresponds

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140 In this line, which occurs twice in the Iliad, we see clearly that they way in which a hero properly conforms to the norm established by the speech act ἐπιτέλλειν is by μιμνησκόμενος that norm. The norm can be referred to with a clause (as in the present passage, ὡς ἐπέτελλ’), or with a noun denoting the relevant speech act, as at Il. 5.319-20 (οὐδ’ ὦδ’ Καπανής ἐλήθετο συνθεσίαιον / τάων ὃς ἐπέτελλε βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Διομήδης) and Il. 5.818 (ἀλλ’ ἐτι οὗν μέμνημα ἐφετεῖον ὃς ἐπέτειλας). As demonstrated in Martin 1989, μῦθος is the generic noun for ἐπιτέλλειν speech acts (as well as several other types of speech act). In the passages I have cited, the nouns ἐφετεῖ and συνθεσίαι designate particular subtypes of μῦθοι. Interestingly, we never find the generic term μῦθος itself occurring as the object of μιμνήσκομαι or λανθάνομαι.

Another speech act noun that μιμνήσκομαι/λανθάνομαι takes as genitive object is ἀπειλή ’vaunt/threat’ (Achilles speaking: Μυρμιδόνες μὴ τίς μου ἀπειλῶν λελαθέσθω, / ὃς ἐπὶ νυμοι ποιησόν ἀπειλεῖτε Τρώεσσι, Il. 16.200-1). As this passage indicates, the ἀπειλεῖν constituted a sort of paradigm that must be lived up to. In this case, the corresponding speech-act verb is ἀπειλεῖν (rather than ἐπιτέλλειν, as with ἐφετεῖ and συνθεσίαι).

141 Il. 2.284-332.
to the number of years that will be consumed in war at Troy, before the Achaeans sack the city in the tenth). By recollecting this event and its interpretation as a paradigm by Calchas long ago, Odysseus reactivates its paradigmatic force in the present. He brings the scene (and thus the paradigm) to life again for his listeners with incredible power, weaving in vivid details, and emphasizing at the beginning of his description that all of his listeners were eyewitnesses to the event.\footnote{Odysseus’ language here recalls the description of the Muses’ omniscience at 2.485 (see p. 48):}

\begin{quote}
εὖ γὰρ δὴ τόδε ἴδμεν ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἐστὲ δὲ πάντες μάρτυροι (Il. 2.301-2)
\end{quote}

The phenomenon of portents brings up a significant general point about paradigmatic connections in the Homeric view of the world: they are perceived as real, mind-independent connections that structure the world on every level, and not just the human world. They reveal both how things really are, and, when the question is how someone should act, how things should be. They are perceived by human beings, not constructed by them. Just as past heroic behavior can reveal what should be done in the present, so too can portents reveal what will happen in the future; characters in Homer do not seem to perceive any fundamental difference between these two kinds of paradigmatic relationship. Furthermore, such paradigmatic thinking is a sub-type of a more general style of thinking which pervades the Homeric poems, and which, following Norman Austin, we can call ‘analogical thinking’.\footnote{See Austin 1975 Chapter 2 (pp. 81-129) for extended discussion of this mode of thinking in both the \textit{Iliad} and the \textit{Odyssey}. The term ‘analogical’ cannot be allowed to suggest that the relationships which this thinking perceives are regarded as constructs of the mind. They are perceived as analogies that have objective and, indeed, mind-independent existence. See Lloyd 1966 on analogy in early Greek thought in general (and pp. 180- 209 on Homer and Hesiod in particular).} Similes are one of its most obvious manifestations. In his detailed exploration of this analogical thinking, Austin uncovers
the basic connections that exist between similes, portents/omens, and paradigmatic past figures. But it is important to emphasize that the phenomenon of analogical thinking goes beyond these three areas. One way to see this is to track uses of correlating expressions like ὡς...ὡς… ‘as...so...’ and ὡς καὶ... ‘so too’ as overt markers of analogical thinking. We are likely to associate these expressions with the similes; but they are surprisingly common in other spheres of thought as well, and the similarity of their usage across these various spheres suggests a unified, underlying pattern of thought. Let me illustrate this by presenting a sequence of examples. First, a simile. In Book 9 Achilles compares himself to a bird bringing food to its thankless young:

ёнδ’ ὄρνις ἀπτῆσι ἀποσσοῖς προφέρῃσι,
μάσται' ἐπεί κε λάβησι, κακὼς δ’ ἅρα οἱ πέλει αὐτή,
ὡς καὶ ἔγω πολλὰς μὲν ἀύπνους νύκτας ἴαυνον,
ημάτα δ’ αἰματόεντα διέπρησσον πολεμίζων
ἂνθρόοι μαρνάμενος ὀάρων ἐνεκα σφετεράων. (II. 9.323-7)

Now, a paradigmatic past figure: at the terrible moment in Book 18 when Achilles accepts that he will die at Troy as a consequence of his need to avenge Patroclus, he makes sense of his fate by relating it to the fate of Heracles. He says to his mother Thetis:

χῆρα δ’ ἐγὼ τότε δέξομαι ὁππότε κεν δὴ
Ζεὺς ἐθέλη τελέσαι ἤδ’ ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ ἄλλοι.

Austin 1975 on similes: ‘The simile attempts to make visible the human order by finding a correspondence between it and the order of nature. Similes assume order, reality, and quality in the natural world and human action gains through simile not only visibility but significance’ (p. 116). On omens: ‘The Homeric omen assumes order and meaning in the external world, and sees in one small event a paradigm of that order. It is man’s part to discern that structure from a single clue and then to modify his behavior in accordance with it. Where the simile is descriptive, the omen is prescriptive’ (p. 118). On paradigmatic past figures: ‘The past is cogent because it is human experience fixed and structured. Homeric heroes find in paradigm a permanent pattern which can give shape to their ephemeral lives and actions’ (p. 125). On paradigms, omens, and similes together: ‘Homeric thought is pervaded with symbolic thought. Paradigm, omen, and simile are all expressions of such symbolism. But they are only the most overt expressions. They exemplify the kind of thinking that looks for relationships between one object and another, between persons, between events, between an individual’s separate actions’ (p. 128).
οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ βίη Ἡρακλῆος φύγε κῆρα,
ὸς περὶ φύλατος ἔσκε Διὸ Κρονίων ἄνακτι·
ἀλλὰ ἐ μοίρα δέμασσε καὶ ἄργαλέος χόλος Ὁνῆ.
ὡς καὶ ἔγιν, εἰ δή μοι ὴμοή μοίρα τέτυκται,
κείσομ’ ἐπεὶ κεθάνω. (II. 18.115-21)

And in Book 19, Agamemnon uses the same phrase, ὡς καὶ ἔγιν…, to mark the parallel between his own deception by ἀτέ and that of Zeus.145 Finally, when Hector prays to the gods to make his son Astyanax a great warrior, he sets himself up as the paradigm which should guide Astyanax’s development with the phrase phrase ὡς καὶ ἔγιν.146

Next, a portent—Calchas (in Odysseus’ recollection) interpreting the events at Aulis. He articulates the paradigmatic relationships as follows:

ὡς οὗτος κατὰ τέκνα φάγε στρουθοῖο καὶ αὐτὴν ὄκτῶ, ἀτὰρ μήτηρ ἐνάτη ἦν Ἦ τέχε τέκνα,
ὡς ἴμεῖς τοσοαυτ’ ἔτεα πολεμήσομεν αὐθίν,
τῷ δεκάτῳ δὲ πόλιν αἱρήσομεν εὑρυάγους. (II. 2.326-30)

And in Book 12, Polydamus interprets the portent of the eagle and the snake in the same way: he first states the relevant details of the event that has just taken place, and then, beginning with ὡς ἴμεῖς, describes point-by-point the analogous events that will befall the Trojans in the near future.147

Moving beyond similes, paradigmatic past figures, and portents, we can also observe analogical thinking at work in the following passage, where the ghost of Patroclus tells Achilles that, just as the two of them were raised together in the same home, so should their bones lie together after Achilles’ death:

ἄλλο δὲ τοι ἔφεσκαὶ ἐφήσομαι αἱ κε πίθηαι.

145 Il. 19.134.
146 Il. 6.477.
147 Il. 12.217-29.
μὴ ἐμὰ σῶν ἀπάνευθε τιθήμεναι ὅστε’ Ἀχιλλεῦ, ἄλλ’ ὅμοι ὡς ἐτράφημεν ἐν ὑμετέροις δόμοισιν...

ὃς δὲ καὶ ὅστεα νῶϊν ὁμή σοφὸς ἀμφικαλύπτοι χρύσεος ἀμφιφορεύς, τὸν τοι πόρε πότνια μήτηρ.  (II. 23.82-92)

This analogy resembles a simile in certain respects, but it also has a paradigmatic/normative force that is lacking from similes—the way in which Achilles and Patroclus lived together determines the way in which they should be buried.

Finally, let us consider another passage from Book 23, in which Achilles responds to the fact that his father Peleus’ prayer to the Phthian river Spercheius will go unfulfilled. As in almost every other example of explicit practical reasoning in the Iliad, Achilles’ thought in this passage proceeds analogically:

Σπερχεί’ ἄλλως σοί γε πατήρ ᾱρόσατο Πηλεύς κείσε με νοστήσατα φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαϊαν σοί τε κόμην περεέιν ὃς δ’ ἔρημην ἐκατόμβην, πεντήκοντα δ’ ἔνορχα παρ’ αὐτόθι μήλ’ ἱερευείν ἐς πηγάς, ὃθ’ τοι τέμενος βωμός τε ὑμῖν.

Ἠρᾶθ’ ὃ γέρων, σὺ δέ οἱ νόον οὐκ ἐτέλεσσας, νῦν δ’ ἐτει οὐ νέομαι γε φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαίαν Πατρόκλῳ ἱεροὶ κόμην ὀπάσαιμι φέρεσθαι.  (II. 144-51)

Peleus had pledged to Spercheius a generous sacrifice and a special lock of Achilles’ hair, on condition that Achilles should return home safely. This ritual speech act established a kind of paradigm (ὡς ἱερόθ’ ὁ γέφοιν) which was concretely embodied for Achilles throughout his time at Troy in his growing lock of hair. Since Achilles now realizes Spercheius will not fulfill the paradigm (σὺ δέ οἱ νόον οὐκ ἐτέλεσσας), he feels compelled to cancel it and replace it (νῦν δ’…) with a new paradigm that will match his fate; so he cuts the lock and, in the tenderest moment of the poem, places it in the hands of the dead Patroclus.

There are, of course, many more examples of analogical thinking in the Iliad (as well as in the Odyssey); and not all of them are marked explicitly by a correlative expression. But this
brief survey of examples indicates both how pervasive and how unified this general mode of thought is in Homer. Aspects of it are familiar to us, if in an extremely attenuated form—for instance, the normative force of great figures of the past and the rhetorical effectiveness of citing them, or the iconic power of burying near one another two people who were close in life. But most of Homer’s analogical thinking is deeply alien to us; and even its familiar aspects come to look strange when we recognize their essential affinity to the interpretation of portents and the practice of sympathetic magic. All the same, using our imaginations to think from within this mode of thought to whatever extent we can is an important interpretive task, since analogical thinking underpins much of the practical reasoning we find in Homer. There are many progressions of thought in Homer which are liable to strike us as containing blatant non sequiturs, but which make perfect sense for those who have internalized the relevant analogies and paradigms (and who trust in their mind-independent reality).

To return to the topic with which we began this section—the performance of paradigmatic memory—I believe that the importance of analogical thinking does much to explain its rhetorical power in Homer (and in other traditional societies). It is the fullest manifestation of the intellectual qualities that matter most to the Homeric hero: the ability to perceive the operative paradigmatic relationships in a given situation (portents, relevant past deeds, etc.), and then the rhetorical skill to speak out these perceptions effectively before a discerning audience.

And now to return, once again, to the meaning of μιμνήσκομαι with a genitive object, I believe we can draw a connection between the subject’s experience of being guided by the genitive object of this verb, and the importance for analogical thinking of being guided by the right paradigms at the right time. The formulas of μιμνήσκομαι and λανθάνομαι furnish the
strongest evidence for this connection: most formulas of both verbs feature genitive objects that identify some paradigm which should (or, as in the case of φόβος, should not) guide the subject.\textsuperscript{148} The object may be a battle state like ἀλκή, a necessity like σῖτος, or past events that have some sort of normative significance for the present—a diverse collection of objects, to be sure, but all highlighting the importance of being guided by the right paradigms at the right time. Moreover, if we pay attention to the discourse functions of the formulas that occur in direct speech, most of them are used by speakers to encourage or prod their addressees (and sometimes themselves) into being guided by a paradigm which they feel fits the present situation.\textsuperscript{149} Thus, on the level of both semantics (preferred objects) and pragmatics (use in direct speech), μμνήσκομαι and λανθάνομαι reflect aspects of this basic mode of thought in Homer.

\textsuperscript{148} Of μμνήσκομαι’s nine formulas, eight regularly take a paradigmatic object: μ.I (positive battle state), μ.II (positive battle state), μ.III (paradigmatic past events), μ.IV (paradigmatic past events), μ.V (conspicuous subject of epic song), μ.VI (negative battle state), μ.VII (positive battle state), μ.IX (various paradigmatic objects). The remaining formula μ.VIII takes an assortment of objects that are more or less paradigmatic. Of λανθάνομαι’s five formulas, three regularly take a paradigmatic object: λ.I (positive battle state) λ.II (positive battle state), λ.IV (injunctions of a father).

\textsuperscript{149} See all passages labeled ‘Direct Speech’ in the appendix of formulas.
CHAPTER 4

THE MEMORY OF ACHILLES

We have examined the meaning of μιμνήσκομαι and described its relation to memory more generally in the *Iliad*. And we have outlined the roles that μιμνήσκομαι and memory play both in rhetorical performance and in the analogical mode of thought that pervades the Homeric poems. In this final chapter we will turn to questions of a more literary character, and use the insights gained in the previous chapters to shed light some of the *Iliad*’s central themes. The subject we will focus on is the progression of Achilles’ moods throughout the poem, and the corresponding evolution of his character, which together culminate in the magnificent supplication scene between him and Priam in Book 24. We will pay particular attention to how Achilles’ memory underlies his mood at each stage of the poem. It will gradually become clear that shifts in Achilles’ moods are strongly correlated with shifts in what he μιμνήσκεται. This correlation does not, of course, provide any sort of ‘key’ to Achilles’ actions and moods in the poem, but it does highlight a significant component of what motivates him.

The first book of the *Iliad* begins by unfolding the causes of Achilles’ strife with Agamemnon and his subsequent, enduring μῆνις.\(^{150}\) In an unwarranted use of his kingly power, Agamemnon seizes Briseis, Achilles’ γέρας (‘honorific portion’),\(^{151}\) to compensate himself for having to relinquish his own γέρας Chryseis to her father Chryses. This action galls Achilles


powerfully. He is the best of the Achaeans, and he needs to be recognized as such with a suitably high level of τιμή (‘honor’); but by stripping him of his γέρας, Agamemnon has gravely dishonored him. Achilles’ response is to obtain τιμή from the Achaeans (and especially Agamemnon) another way—by refusing to fight, and forcing them, as they buckle under the pressure of the Trojans, to realize the extent of their dependence on Achilles and of Agamemnon’s ἀτη (‘folly’) in dishonoring him. So he gets his mother Thetis to persuade Zeus to favor the Trojans, and retires to his hut to nurse his anger at Agamemnon’s unjust seizure of Briseis (λῶβη) for the next two-thirds of the poem. Only in Book 19, when Achilles publicly reconciles himself with Agamemnon and forswears his μῆνις, does he decisively turn to other concerns (namely, to battle).

Before discussing how Achilles’ enduring μῆνις relates to μιμνήσκομαι and memory in general, we need to address an issue that lurks in Achilles’ mind throughout the poem and plays

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152 E.g., at Il. 1.412. On the topic of Achilles as the best of the Achaeans, see the fundamental discussion of Nagy 1979, Chapter 2.

153 Il. 1.355-6.

154 In Homer this word appears to retain clear traces of its probable earlier meaning ‘(unjust) seizure’ (if, as is likely, it is an o-grade feminine derivative of the root *sleh₂g*- ‘seize’ found, for example, in λάζομαι and λαμβάνως; see Beekes s.v. λῶβη). Later the word comes to refer more generally to outrageous treatment and disgraceful action (as already at Il. 7.97-8: ἢ μὲν δὴ λῶβη τάδε γ’ ἔσσεται αἰνόθεν αἰνῶς / ἐφὶ μή τις Δαναῶν νῦν Ἐκτόρος ἀντίος εἴσιν).

155 Achilles reconciles himself with Agamemnon and renounces (ἀποειπεῖν) his μῆνις in his speech at Il. 19.56-73. Throughout his speech he emphatically consigns his quarrel with Agamemnon to the past, most notably when he says: αἰτάρ Αχαιῶν / δηρὸν ἐμὴς καὶ οὗς ἔνθες μνήσομαι ὑώ (Il. 19.63-4). In this striking metapoetic prediction, Achilles self-consciously confers paradigmatic status on his strife with Agamemnon. The Achaeans who were present will μιμνήσκομαι it for the rest of their lives, deploying it as a (negative) paradigm in muthoi, as Phoenix did the Meleager story. The Achaeans, of course, are overjoyed that the cloud of Achilles’ μῆνις has passed:

"Ὡς ἐφαθ’, οἱ δ’ ἐχάρισσον ἑξενήματε Ἀχαιοὶ μῆνιν ἀπειπόντος μεγαθύμοι Πηλεώνος. (Il. 19.74-5)
a central role in the development of his character: that of Thetis’ prophecies concerning his fate. With the notable exception of Book 9, it is everywhere agreed in the Iliad that Achilles will die young. In Book 1, the shortness of Achilles’ life is taken by both Thetis and Achilles himself to be the decisive reason why Zeus owes him surpassing τιμή (as a compensation). In the later books, Achilles’ knowledge of his fate takes on a profounder significance for him, as it becomes more concrete. He accepts in full consciousness that he will die soon, at Troy, and that his death will be a direct consequence of his need to avenge Patroclus. Somewhat surprisingly, in view of his attitude in Book 1, Achilles’ concern for his own τιμή fades into the background in the later books, as the fact of his mortality more powerfully asserts itself.

Achilles’ sureness of his own immanent death sets him apart from all other human beings in the Iliad. The other heroes who are fated to be cut down in battle do not know it, and they entertain, tragically, vain hopes of victory and life until their last moments. This is especially true

156 Il. 9.410-6.

157 He alone is described as ὄκυμοφός ‘swift-fated’ among human beings (the adjective is once applied to arrows, at Il. 15.441)—and, moreover, always by Thetis (Il. 1.417, 1.505, 18.95, 18.458). He is therefore, and uniquely among characters in the Iliad, δῆξινός ‘woeful’ (Il. 1.417, again in Thetis’ speech). In his own words, Achilles is μυλυθαθίς ‘short-lived’ (Il. 1.352), and, most strikingly, παναριός ‘all-un timely’ (Il. 24.540—a Homeric hapax).

158 Achilles to Thetis: μήτε, ἕπει μ’ ἐτεχές γε μυλυθαθίον περ ἐόντα, / τιμήν πέρι μοι ὁφελεῖν Ολύμπιος ἐγγυάλξαι / Ζεὺς υψησθεμέτης (Il. 1.352-4); Thetis to Zeus: τιμήν μοι υἱόν, ὅς ὄκυμοφότατος ἀλλόν / ἐπλέτ’ (Il. 1.505-6).

159 By contrast, the significance of Achilles’ fate to Thetis remains constant throughout the poem. It is a cause for deep sorrow (at least, as deep a sorrow as an immortal can feel); and it continues to furnish a reason why gods should grant Achilles special favors (a point Thetis makes explicitly to Hephaestus when she asks him to fashion Achilles’ new armor (Il. 18.436-43)).

160 Achilles fully accepts this consequence first, and most explicitly, in the dramatic exchange with his mother at Il. 18.79-126. Griffin 1980: 163 n. 39 tracks the increasing specificity of predictions of Achilles’ death throughout the Iliad: ‘Achilles will have “a short life”, 1.352, 416, 505; choice of two destinies, 9.411; “after Hector”, 18.95; “a god and a man will slay you”, 19.417; “by Apollo, near the wall”, 21.275; “Paris and Apollo at the Scaean Gates”, 22.359.’
of the great deaths of the later books—of Sarpedon, Patroclus, and, most of all, Hector.\textsuperscript{161} By contrast, Achilles, once he has resolved to return to battle, clings to no such illusions about his fate; and this is both because he has a divine mother who has told it to him many times, and because he eventually finds the strength to accept it. One of the major lines of development that defines the \textit{Iliad} is Achilles’ approach toward this clear-sighted acceptance of his fate. Like any growth in human character, it is prompted by external events—most immediately, the death of Patroclus—but actualized only as Achilles discovers within himself (and through great pain) the resources to deal with these events. Homer depicts this process taking place within Achilles most directly by showing him remembering and grappling with his mother’s prophecies at various points throughout the poem.\textsuperscript{162} In the embassy scene of Book 9, Achilles makes the fullest public statement of what his mother has told him about his fate. And interestingly, this is the only place in the \textit{Iliad} where we encounter a significant variant on what Thetis has told him. Elsewhere, she states or presupposes unequivocally that Achilles will die young; but in Book 9 we hear from Achilles, in his grand, ferocious response to Odysseus, that Thetis told him that he has \textit{two} fates (\textit{κηρες}), mutually exclusive, that can bear him to his end: either he will stay to fight and inevitably die at Troy, losing his homecoming (\textit{νόστος}) but securing unwithering fame (\textit{κλέος ἀφθιτον}); or he will go home at once to Phthia, losing his fame but ensuring that he will live a

\textsuperscript{161} On the difference between Hector and Achilles in this respect, see Griffin 1980: 163-4, Macleod 1982: 10-11.

\textsuperscript{162} Achilles explicitly refers to his own fate—which, it should be kept in mind, is known only from his mother—at II. 1.352 (to Thetis), 9.410-16 (to the embassy), 18.79-93 (to Thetis), 18.114-21 (to Thetis), 21.110-3 (to Lykaon), 21.277-9 (in prayer to Zeus), and 24.540 (describing himself as \textit{παναρώμιος} to Priam). Moreover, Thetis reminds Achilles of this fate at II. 1.417 and 18.95-6. And at II. 18.8-11, Achilles recalls another prophecy of Thetis, that the best of the Myrmidons (after Achilles himself) will die while he is still alive; he appears to first realize only here that the prophecy referred to Patroclus.
long life.\textsuperscript{163} And in this same speech he makes clear that (at least for the moment) he fully intends to choose the latter fate.\textsuperscript{164}

It is a difficult question how we should relate this statement of Achilles’ fate, in which he has two options, to the many other statements and allusions to it in the \textit{Iliad} in which he has only one option: an untimely, heroic death. One thing worth noting is that this is probably the first Odysseus, Phoenix, and Ajax have heard about any specific prophecy by Thetis concerning Achilles’ fate.\textsuperscript{165} So it is not as though they are already familiar with a ‘standard’ version that Achilles proceeds to contradict. Achilles is therefore free to adjust his mother’s prophecies to his rhetorical context, at least in the sense that he will not be caught in a lie if he inserts a second option into Thetis’ prediction. And it is clear that such an adjustment would fit this particular rhetorical context, where what Achilles wants to do more than anything else is to express his rage through refusing to return to battle, and to make his listeners feel the threat of what will become of them and the rest of the Achaeans if he should decide to go home.

However, explaining the divergence merely as an ad hoc invention, knowingly cooked up by Achilles, does not do justice to the psychological complexity of the situation.\textsuperscript{166} If we take

\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Il.} 9.410-6.

\textsuperscript{164} Though already by the end of Book 9, after the speeches of Phoenix and Ajax, Achilles has relented somewhat—he envisions the possibility of returning to the fight, but only when Hector reaches the Achaean ships and sets them ablaze (\textit{Il.} 9.650-55).

\textsuperscript{165} Achilles is even somewhat guarded about sharing what he has heard from Thetis with Patroclus, his second self (see \textit{Il.} 16.36-7 together with 16.49-51).

\textsuperscript{166} Nor does it square easily with Achilles’ character. As he famously says at the beginning of this same speech to Odysseus, as an explanation for why he feels the need to be brutally frank, he ‘hates like the gates of Hades the man who hides one thing in his \textit{phrenes} but says another’ (\textit{Il.} 9.313-4). It is no coincidence that this sort of thing is Odysseus’ specialty. Rhetorically effective lies are, of course, implicitly recognized and accepted as part of the heroic speaker’s arsenal in Homer. But heroes are not clones of one another, and so there is room for variation among them
Achilles’ anger seriously, as we must, the first thing that strikes us is how profoundly disruptive it is.¹⁶⁷ The *Iliad* emphasizes this from its very start, attributing all the terrible events which it will narrate to the baneful wrath of Achilles. It is very much as if the ‘*psukhai* of countless heroes’ mentioned in the proem are sent to Hades by the shock waves of Achilles’ anger. But Achilles’ anger disrupts not only the war at Troy, but also his own character (it disrupts the former because it disrupts the latter). In line with this, I suggest that Achilles’ normal conception of his fate has been disrupted by his anger in Book 9, such that he is sincerely (though, as we know, temporarily) entertaining a different conception of his fate—one in which his unwithering fame is still, as before, tied to his untimely death in battle, but where he now has the option of refusing this untimely death (and thereby losing his fame). According to this interpretation, the inordinate pressure of his anger at Agamemnon, and his consequent revulsion from the ‘heroic

in their attitudes to the various rhetorical tactics that are more or less generally accepted in their culture. One of Achilles’ distinctive characteristics is his general aversion to lying as a rhetorical tactic, at least in those cases where he takes it to be a sign of fundamental dishonesty of character.

The question of whether the divergence is an ad hoc invention of Homer, as opposed to a variation that already existed in the epic tradition, is totally distinct from the literary question of whether we should interpret Achilles, the character, as having knowingly invented this variation merely to support his argument here. On the former, much less determinate question, see Willcock 1977: 48-9 (who does not always keep these two sorts of question as distinct as they need to be kept).

¹⁶⁷ As Muellner 1996: 194 says, ‘*Mēnis* is an emotion that acts to change the world’. This nicely captures the difference between anger as a mere psychological experience (which is the concept of anger we are most familiar with) and the terrible wrath of Achilles that disrupts the very cosmos.

¹⁶⁸ Achilles himself makes this very point—that anger can overwhelm even the stablest character—as part of his famous description of anger as ‘sweeter than honey’ at *Il.* 18.108-10, where he speaks of ‘*χόλος, ὡς τ’ ἐφέηκε πολύφρονα περ χαλεπήνα*’ (‘anger/gall, which causes even a very sensible man to become grievously enraged’).
code’ that he now regards as debased, have constrained him to reinterpret his fate so that it would be consistent with his refusal to be appeased and return to battle.169

When we look into Achilles’ anger, we find memory, and particularly the experience named by μεμνήσομαι, at its core. It is Achilles’ constant dwelling on—that is, having in his thumos and being psychosomatically guided by—his treatment at the hands of Agamemnon, which fuels his disruptive anger and overrides all other concerns (until Patroclus dies).170 Achilles makes this absolutely explicit in his own descriptions of his anger.171 One of his most revealing descriptions, in which he identifies both the cause of his anger and some of its effects

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169 Hainsworth 1993 ad 9.410-16 (pp. 116-7) notes that this is not as drastic a reinterpretation as it might initially seem: ‘The usual point made [by Thetis’ prophecies] is that Akhilleus is short-lived, therefore he has a claim to fame. But it is easy for him (or the poet) to reverse the argument and imply that renouncing fame even at this late date would entail long life’. This is a helpful observation, but the near conflation of Achilles and the poet invites confusion, as do the words ‘point’ and ‘argument’, which frame the whole issue in more rationalistic terms than is appropriate. The variations on Thetis’ prophecy do not represent subtly different tacks in an argument, but rather massive shifts in Achilles’ emotions and his conception of the purpose of his life; and these shifts have little to do with argument.

170 A scholiast, explaining the relevance of the Meleager story to Achilles’ situation, comments on the relationship between anger and obsessive dwelling on injustices: ἀειμνήσοτος ἐπὶ ἀκαθόριστος ποιεὶ τοὺς ὀργιζόμενος ὁ θυμός ‘The thumos leads those who are angry to constantly dwell on the evil [which they have suffered]’ (ΣbT ad Il. 9.527). Though he does not explicitly spell this out, the scholiast implies that the state of being ἀειμνήσοτος ἐπὶ ἀκαθόριστος, triggered by one’s initial anger at the evil one has suffered, goes on to sustain and fuel that anger.

171 Achilles himself never refers to his own μήνις as such—the 9 occurrences of μήνις in the Iliad are in the voice of the narrator or another character (twice addressed to Achilles: Il. 9.517, 19.35). Achilles does, however, use the derivative noun μηνιθμός (Il. 16.62, 16.202) as well as the denominative verb ἀπομηνίω (ἐμεῖ ἀπομηνίσαντος, Il. 9.426, 19.62) to describe himself. But most often Achilles uses the word χόλος to describe his anger. Achilles, apparently, avoids speaking of his own μήνις. In fact, no character in Homer to whom μήνις is attributed speaks of his own μήνις. This apparent avoidance lead Calvert Watkins to argue that there is a tabu in Homer against speaking of one’s own μήνις (Watkins 1977). Leonard Muellner follows Watkins in this (Muellner 1992, 1996). But in his perceptive book length study of μήνις, Muellner makes the important qualification that the tabu cannot be quite as strong as Watkins originally argued; for, as we have noted, Achilles does refer to his own μήνις four times with transparent derivatives of the word, and these references do not appear to be particularly shocking to his listeners (see Muellner 1996: 192-4).
on his motivations, comes at the beginning of his response to Ajax’s speech in the embassy of Book 9. In the very bitter speech to which Achilles is responding, Ajax accused Achilles of ruthlessly ignoring the φιλότης which binds him to the rest of the Achaeans, and with which they honor him above everyone else.\textsuperscript{172} He also observed that even a person whose brother or child has been murdered typically restrains their angry thumos if the murderer offers appropriate compensation (ποινή); whereas Achilles, unreasonably, will not let go of his anger and accept Agamemnon’s ample compensation on account of a ‘mere girl’.\textsuperscript{173} Finally, Ajax appealed to the important fact that he, Odysseus, and Phoenix are under Achilles’ roof earnestly entreating him, as some of his dearest friends, on behalf of the entire Achaean host. The implication is that if Achilles refuses to accept Agamemnon’s compensation and return to battle, he fails in his obligations as a host to his friends.\textsuperscript{174} In responding to all of this, Achilles, surprisingly, admits the validity of everything that Ajax has said. But his rage overrules all of those just considerations when (as he often does) he μυνήσεται how Agamemnon treated him:

\begin{verbatim}
Αἶαν διογενὲς Τελαμώνιε κοίρανε λαῶν
πάντα τί μοι κατὰ θυμόν ἐέισαι μνήσομαι:
άλλά μοι οἰδάνεται κραδίη χόλῳ ὅπποτε κείνων
μυνήσομαι ὃς μ’ ἀσύφηλον ἐν Αργείοισιν ἔρεξεν
Ἀτρεΐδης ὃς εἰ τίν’ ἀτίμητον μετανάστην. (Il. 9.644-8)
\end{verbatim}

Note that κείνων, the nominal object of μυνήσομα, is in the genitive; this indicates that the clause which μυνήσομα takes as its object (ὡς μ’ ἀσύφηλον...) also has genitive semantics.\textsuperscript{175} So what Achilles is saying here is not just ‘whenever I remember those things, (namely) how the

\textsuperscript{172} Il. 9.628-32.

\textsuperscript{173} Il. 9.632-8.

\textsuperscript{174} Il. 9.638-42.

\textsuperscript{175} See p. 27.
son of Atreus…’ but something stronger, and with a definite bodily component. Whenever his thumos is gripped, let us say, by the insulting treatment he suffered at the hands of Agamemnon, Achilles’ χραδή swells with a χόλος that displaces all other thoughts and feelings. The catalyst and also the substrate of this all-consuming, disruptive experience—of the μηνίς of Achilles—is an experience of μυμνήσκομαι. It has the power to overrule some of the central moral considerations of Homeric culture, which Ajax has just articulated, even as Achilles continues to recognize them to a large extent (πάντα τι μοι κατὰ θυμόν ἐείσαο μυθήσασθαι). And here in Book 9 we see that it has even led Achilles to question the validity of the Homeric hero’s fundamental value, which until now has been integral to his self-conception—the value of fighting and dying (young, if necessary) for the sake of θλεος ᾧφητον. This forces Achilles to reinterpret his very fate in a way that would be consistent with his rejection of this value.

In the rest of the Iliad, when Achilles’ anger is referred to (whether by Achilles himself or someone else) its physicality continues to be regularly emphasized—for example, just after the passage quoted above, when Odysseus reports Achilles’ response to Agamemnon. At the beginning of Book 16, we find another illuminating description of Achilles’ anger, shared between Patroclus and Achilles, which has much in common with the passage from Book 9 that we have just examined. Like many other passages, it emphasizes the indivisibly psychosomatic nature of Achilles’ anger; and it further drives home the point that what sustains this anger is his obsessive dwelling on Agamemnon’s treatment of him.

176 Il. 9.677-9:

Ἀτρείδη κύδιστε ἀναξ ἀνδρών Ἀγάμεμνον
κείνος γ’ οὐκ ἐθέλει σβέσσαι χόλον, ἀλλ’ ἐτι μάλλον
πιμπλάνεται μένεος
When Patroclus returns to Achilles after his long visit in Nestor’s tent, he first rebukes Achilles for refusing to help the Achaeans in their dire need, and then begs Achilles to allow him to put on Achilles’ armor and aid the Achaeans in Achilles’ place. As part of his rebuke, Patroclus says:

τοὺς μὲν τ’ ἱπτοὶ πολυφάρμακοι ἀμφιπένονται ἔλκε’ ἀχειόμενοι. οὐ δ’ ἀμήχανος ἑπλευ Ἀχιλλεύ. μὴ ἐμὲ γ’ οὖν οὔτός γε λάβοι χόλος, ὃν σὺ φυλάσσεις, αἰναρέτη. (Il. 16.28-31)

Patroclus contrasts the wounded Achaean heroes, who are being healed by doctors, with Achilles, who is ἀμήχανος. In his study of this word, Richard Martin shows that in this passage it does not just mean ‘unable to be dealt with’, but ‘unable to be dealt with in the way that the wounded are dealt with’, ‘having no cure’. Achilles’ anger cannot be healed, and this, as Achilles made clear in Book 9, is because he cannot stop fueling it (or as Patroclus puts it, ‘guarding’ it—ὁν σὺ φυλάσσεις) by remembering and dwelling on Agamemnon’s anger.

177 Likewise, the base word μῆχος does not just mean ‘solution’ but ‘healing solution’, ‘cure’; see Martin 1983: 18-19, 26-39.

178 Another passage in which the reference of the verb φυλάσσω seems to be similar to that of μιμνήσκω with a genitive object is Il. 16.686-8, where the poet declares that if Patroclus had ‘guarded’ the ἔπος of Achilles (telling Patroclus not to try to sack Troy by himself), Patroclus could have escaped death. But as it happened, he was overpowered by the νόος (‘intention’) of Zeus:

εὶ δὲ ἔπος Πηλημέδαο φυλάξεν ἢ τ’ ἀν ὑπέκφυγε νῆσα κακὴν μέλανος θανάτου. ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ τε Διὸς κρείσσον νόος ἥ περ ἀνδρόν (Il. 16.686-8)

This use of φυλάσσω with ἔπος is closely parallel to a number of uses of μιμνήσκω with words for injunctions and commands. In addition to examples [33]-[35] in appendix A, compare Il. 5.319-20: οὐδ’ υἱὸς Καπανής ἐλήθετο συνθεσίων / τάων ὡς ἐπέτελε βοὴν ἄγαθός Διομήδης. (Also, for μιμνήσκωμαι taking ἔπος as its object, recall the following lines from Andromache’s agonized final address to the slain Hector: οὐδὲ τί μοι εἶπες πυξινὸν ἔπος, οὐ τέ κεν αἰεὶ / μεμνήμην νύκτας τε καὶ ἥματα δάκρυν χέουσα, Il. 24.744-5.)
mistreatment of him. Patroclus expresses the hope that no such intractable and disruptive anger should ever seize him.

Patroclus goes on to suggest that Achilles may instead be avoiding battle because of some prophecy he has heard from his mother, rather than out of anger. But in his reply, Achilles roundly denies this—the reason for his refusal is the pain and anger that overcome him whenever he μιμνήσκεται how Agamemnon treated him. Though Achilles does not use a form of μιμνήσκομαι in this passage, the strong similarities it shows with the Book 9 passage considered above make clear that this is the experience at issue:

οὔτε θεοπροπίς ἐμπάζομαι ἦν τινα οἶδα,
οὔτε τί μοι πάρ Ζηνὸς ἐπέφραδε πότισα μῆτηρ·
 ἀλλὰ τόδ’ αἰνὸν ἄχος κραδίην καὶ θυμὸν ιξάνει,
 ὅππότε δὴ τὸν ὁμοίον ἄνηδ’ ἐθέλησον ἀμέροσαι
 καὶ γέρας ἂψ ἀφελέσθαι, ὃ τε κράτει προβεβήρην·
 αἰνὸν ἄχος τὸ μοι ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ πάθον ἄλγεα θυμῷ.
 κυόρην ἦν ἄρα μοι γέρας ἐξεῖλον νίης Ἀχαιῶν,
 δουρὶ δ’ ἐμῷ κτεάτισσα πόλιν εὐτείχεα πέροις,
tὴν ἂψ ἐκ χειρῶν ἔλετο κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων
 Ἀτρείδης ὡς ἐι’ τίν’ ἀτίμητον μετανάστῃν. (Il. 16.50-9)

I have underlined the most prominent similarities between this passage and the passage from Book 9. First, the lines ἀλλὰ τόδ’ αἰνὸν ἄχος κραδίην καὶ θυμὸν ιξάνει / ὅππότε… show close verbal parallels to ἀλλὰ μοι οἰδάνεται κραδίην χόλῳ ὅππότε κείνων / μνήσομαι ὡς… in the Book 9 speech (Il. 9.646-7). And in terms of their meaning, the two sets of lines are even closer, since we can understand the phrase ἄχος κραδίην καὶ θυμὸν ιξάνει in the passage above to simply be a redescription from a different perspective of the same experience that Achilles described with a form of μμνήσκομαι in Book 9.180

179 Il. 16.36-7.

180 I owe this observation to Professor Peter O’Connell.
Second, the phrase ὡς εἴ τιν’ ἀτίμητον μετανάστην ‘as if an honorless vagabond’ in the above passage is repeated verbatim from Achilles’ speech in Book 9.\(^\text{181}\) And this is not just a coincidence, for the phrase captures precisely what enrages Achilles about Agamemnon’s treatment of him—that he, Achilles, the greatest Achaean hero, has been pushed around by Agamemnon as if he were a nobody. But in the lines immediately following, we see that Achilles has moved closer to letting go of his anger than he was in Book 9. He says:

\[

tά μὲν προτετύχθαι εὔσομεν. οὐδ’ ἄρα πῶς ἦν ἰώμεν σεχολόωθαι ἐνι φρεσίν ἐφιήν γε ὅποτ’ ἂν δῇ νής ἐμάς ἀφίκηται ἀὕτη τε πτόλεμός τε (Il. 16.60-3)
\]

Achilles continues to obsessively think about Agamemnon’s actions, but, as the underlined text indicates, he has begun to realize that he cannot go on doing this forever. Nevertheless, he cannot bring himself to return to battle, because in Book 9 he pledged that he would not do so until Hector reached his ships and set fire to them.\(^\text{182}\) So instead he sends Patroclus to battle, and to his death.

It is only when Achilles hears of Patroclus’ death, at the beginning of Book 18, that he finally suppresses his anger enough to allow himself to return to battle. And here, as in the passage above from Book 16, we find a vivid description of this anger, followed by a

\(^{181}\) Moreover, since the Book 16 occurrence of this line does not fit its syntactic context (it is in the accusative but it is not the direct object of any discernible verb), we can tentatively suppose that it is derived from the Book 9 occurrence (where τιν’ ἀτίμη τον μετανάστην is the direct object of ἔρεξεν). Martin 1992: 18 makes the striking observation that both of the times Achilles uses the word μετανάστης (the only occurrences of this word in Homer), he is speaking to someone who formerly was a μετανάστης (Phoenix, among the other ambassadors, in Book 9; Patroclus in Book 16); and moreover, that both of them were μετανάστης who were kindly received by Peleus. As Martin puts it, ‘[Achilles] elicits sympathy by conjuring up his addressee’s worst fears: if not for his father, they, too, might have been scorned’.

\(^{182}\) Il. 9.650-3.
countervailing recognition of the need to let go of it. But here in Book 18, Achilles actually does let it go, suppressing it out of ‘necessity’ (ἀνάγκη):

\[\text{ὡς ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν ἔκ τ’ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο καὶ χόλος, ὅς τ’ ἐφέτηκε πολύφορα περ χαλεπῆναι, ὅς τε πολύ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοι ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀέξεται ἢμέ καπνός· ὡς ἔμε νῦν ἐχόλωσεν ἀναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν προτετύχθαι ἐάσομεν ἀχνύμενοι περ, θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλον δαμάσαντες ἀνάγκη. (Il. 18.107-13)\]

By now Achilles has attained a certain detachment from his anger, which allows him to reflect on its irresistible and disruptive power in beautiful imagery: ‘much sweeter than dripping honey it rises in men’s chests like smoke’. Continuing to remember Agamemnon’s actions, Achilles still feels this anger (ὡς ἔμε νῦν ἐχόλωσεν ἀναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων). But then he resolves to suppress it, and we find the phrase ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν προτετύχθαι ἐάσομεν repeated from 16.60; but here Achilles really does let Agamemnon’s mistreatment of him ‘be a thing of the past’, whereas in Book 16 he does not. One way of understanding this shift is that Achilles finally ceases to μιμησκόμεθαι (in the genitive) this mistreatment. Of course, Achilles has not forgotten what Agamemnon did; but he has ceased to let it grip his thumos and guide him in the present. Instead, what now guides him is his fallen companion Patroclus, who needs to be avenged. And, not coincidentally, Achilles is portrayed as obsessively μιμησκόμενος Patroclus from Book 18 until the middle of Book 24, when he finally lets go of his all-consuming grief, and his rage against Hector, in the supplication scene with Priam.

At the end of Chapter 1, we examined one of the several striking passages in the Iliad that describe Achilles μιμησκόμενος Patroclus.\footnote{Il. 24.2-18 (see pp. 30-2).} That passage can be taken as representative of the rest, for all of them express, in their own way, the same prevailing mood of Achilles—his
massive grief focused on Patroclus to the exclusion of every other concern, and his consequent murderous rage against Trojans. The experience of μιμνήσκομαι underlies both poles of this complex mood; and further, it constitutes an essential part of Achilles’ mourning for Patroclus, and his sense of what Patroclus is owed now that he is dead. Essentially, everything that Achilles does between Book 18 and the middle of Book 24 is felt by him to be in honor and commemoration of Patroclus—that is, Patroclus fundamentally guides Achilles thoughts, feelings, and motivations throughout these books. Even while he is killing Trojans, and especially when he kills Hector, Achilles makes clear that he is doing it for Patroclus.184 And of course, the cremation, burial, and funeral games are thick with the memory of Patroclus,185 as is

184 For example, when Achilles executes Lycaon, he ‘explains’ why Lycaon must die by telling him: ἀλλὰ φίλος θάνε καὶ σὺ: τί ἦ ὀλοφύρεαι οὕτως; / κάθθανε καὶ Πάτροκλος, ὅ περ οἷον πολλόν ἀμείνον (Il. 21.106-7). And when Achilles expresses to Hector his brutal desire to eat Hector’s raw flesh, he makes clear what is fueling this desire:

‘μή με κύον γούνων γουνάξει μή δὲ τοκήων:
 αἱ γὰρ πως αὐτόν με μένω καὶ θυμός ἀνή
 ὀμί ἀποταμινόμενον χρέα ἔδμεναι, οἷα ἔσογας [i.e., to Patroclus] (Il. 22.345-7)

Hector’s killing of Patroclus is so ever-present to Achilles’ thumos that Achilles feels he can merely allude to it (with the phrase οἷα ἔσογας) in explaining his rage.

185 We find an explicit acknowledgment of the otherwise implicit fact that the guiding point of the funeral games is to honor and preserve the memory of Patroclus when Achilles offers to Nestor the jar (φιάλη) left over as a prize from the chariot race. For as he gives, it Achilles says:

τῆ νῦν, καὶ σοὶ τούτῳ γέφον ειμήλιον ἔστω
 Πατρόκλῳ τάφῳ μνήμη ἐμμέναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐτ’ αὐτόν
 ὑπὲ ἐν Ἀργείου (Il. 23.618-20)

The last phrase of this passage (‘for you will no longer see him among the Argives’) indicates that the ritual commemoration of Patroclus is meant to compensate for the fact that he can no longer be seen (his body is now ash, and his ψυχή is in the home of Α-ίδης ‘the Unseen One’). Once the dead have been cremated and are therefore totally gone from sight (cf. Il. 23.52-3), it is all the more urgent for their loved ones to preserve them in some form through ritual commemoration and μνημοσύνη (i.e., the continued act of μιμνήσκομαι). Achilles charges the
Achilles’ dragging of Hector’s body around Patroclus’ σῶμα (a practice which, as we saw at the end of Chapter 1, is explicitly portrayed as motivated by Achilles’ μιμησθόμενος Patroclus).

In the speech he gives right after he kills Hector, as the other Achaeans are stabbing Hector’s lifeless body, Achilles makes what is arguably the most emphatic use of μιμησθοῦσα found in Homer. At first he proposes that the Achaeans test the Trojans to see if they intend to give up immediately now that Hector is dead. But then he realizes that his thoughts have strayed briefly from Patroclus, who remains unburied by the ships. So Achilles chastizes himself and vows that he will μιμησθοῦσα Patroclus forever—that even if the dead λανθάνονται the dead in Hades, Achilles will defy this law and μιμησθοῦσα Patroclus even there:

This accumulation of occurrences of μιμησθοῦσα and λανθάνονται is unique in Homer, and it is therefore a striking measure of the intensity of Achilles’ experience—his grief, and his determination that Patroclus somehow continue to live on in his own heart. After making this pledge to eternally μιμησθοῦσα Patroclus, Achilles directs the Achaeans to sing a paean as they carry the body of Patroclus’ killer back to the ships. This may appear to be only loosely related to the preceding lines, or even to represent an abrupt change of subject, since on the

\[\text{κειμήλιον that he gives to Nestor with this function when he designates it as a Πατρόκλοιο τάφου μνήμ(α).}\]

\[186 \text{II. 22.381-4.}\]
surface a paean does not appear to have anything to do with Patroclus.\footnote{87} However, I believe we can instead see it as a continuation of what Achilles has just said—that is, as one of the many acts in the latter books of the \textit{Iliad} through which Achilles expresses his honoring and μιμνησκόμενος of Patroclus. As Achilles drags the dead Hector by his heels back to the ships, and the Achaeans sing a paean of thanksgiving for his slaying,\footnote{88} they honor Patroclus. And if we turn to the Homeric hymns, we find evidence confirming that there is a connection between lines 390 and 391. For 390 (αὐτάρ ἐγὼ καὶ κεῖθι φίλου μεμνήσομεν ἐταίρου) is strongly reminiscent of the formula that ends many of the Homeric hymns:\footnote{89} αὐτάρ ἐγὼ καὶ σείο καὶ ἀλλής μνήσομεν ἀοιδής (e.g., \textit{h. Dem.} 495, \textit{h. Ap.} 546), ‘And I will μιμνήσεοθαι both you [=the god addressed in the hymn] and other singing’. These hymns to the gods functioned as \textit{prohoimia} to recitations of epic poetry,\footnote{90} and this final line in particular is the formulaic hinge that joined the two phases of performance together.\footnote{91} Likewise, I suggest that line 390 in Achilles’ speech, encoding similar formulaic meaning and function, is felt to join together the emphatic pledge to

\footnote{87} I follow Richardson in not taking this paean to be addressed to Apollo, on the grounds that a paean can be any ‘song of thanksgiving for relief from trouble’, and in light of the fact that Apollo is consistently hostile to the Greeks and Achilles in the \textit{Iliad} (see Richardson 1993 ad 22.391-4, p. 146).

\footnote{88} That this is the reason for the paean, and not, for instance, anything that Apollo has done for the Greeks, is made explicit by Achilles in the lines immediately following his command to sing the paean, in which he states its occasion:

\begin{quote}

ἡράμεθα μέγα κύδος· ἐπέφνομεν Ἐκτορα δίον,

φ Τρώες κατὰ ἄστυ θεώ ὡς εὐχετόωντο. (II. 22.393-4)

\end{quote}

\footnote{89} I am grateful to Stephen Sansom for pointing this out to me.

\footnote{90} See Nagy 1990: 353-60 for a thorough discussion of the role of \textit{prohoimia} in epic performance.

\footnote{91} West 2003: 3-4, Faulkner 2008 ad 292-3 (p. 298).
μιμνήσκομενος Patroclus with the next phase in Achilles’ honoring of Patroclus: the performance of a paean celebrating the demise of Patroclus’ killer.

In discussing Achilles’ μῆνις earlier, we noted that it was fueled by his dwelling on Agamemnon’s mistreatment of him, and also that it was extremely disruptive. Achilles’ mood in the later books of the Iliad, before the supplication scene with Priam, has a similar character: it is fueled by his dwelling on (μιμνησκόμενος) Patroclus, and it severely disrupts Achilles’ life. Both moods are primarily caused by dwelling on one thing to the exclusion of all else, including many things which (it is felt by those around him) Achilles should be concerned about. When he is in the grip of his μῆνις, Achilles is unconcerned with the plight of his fellow Achaeans. When he is grieving for and μιμνήσκομενος Patroclus, he is unconcerned with food, drink, and sleep—in fact, as the poem emphasizes at several points, he fails to μιμνήσκομενος these necessities of mortal life. When he does finally eat, food remains loathsome to him, and when he finally falls asleep, he is immediately visited by the ψυχή of Patroclus and wakes up in anguish.

At every point Achilles’ behavior is determined by the μνημοσύνη of Patroclus that he cannot escape. His inability to eat furnishes a striking example of this—it is not just a physical symptom of severe grief, but also a consequence of the fact that Patroclus used to prepare

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192 Cf. the disagreement in Book 19 between Achilles and Odysseus over whether the Achaeans should eat before returning to battle (Achilles: ἦ τ᾽ ἄν ἔγωγε / νῦν μὲν ἀνόγοιμι πτωλεμέειν νίας Ἀχαιῶν / νήστιας ἄχεμνους (Il. 19.205-7); Odysseus: ἀλλὰ χοή…μεμνήσθαι πόσιος καὶ ἐδήπτος ὀφρώτερον μᾶλλον / ἀνδράσι οὐδεμενέεις μαχώμεθα νολεμὲς αἰεί (Il. 19.228-31). Also, cf. Thetis’ words to Achilles when she comes to him as Zeus’s messenger in Book 24: τέκνον ἔμοι τέος ὁδυρόμενος καὶ ἀχεύων / σὴν ἔδεαι κραδήν μεμνημένος οὔτε τι ὁπότον / οὔτε εὐνής; (Il. 24.127-9).

193 When Achilles first consents to eat, he says: ἀλλ᾽ ἢτοι νῦν μὲν στυγερῇ πειθώμεθα διατεί (Il. 23.48)

194 Il. 23.62-107.
Achilles’ meals, so that now Achilles cannot bear the thought of eating a meal. He makes this explicit when he addresses Patroclus’ corpse:

\[\text{μνησάμενος} \, \text{δ’} \, \text{ἀδινός} \, \text{ἀνενείκατο} \, \text{φώνησέν} \, \text{τε·} \, \text{ἡ} \, \text{ὅδε} \, \text{μοι} \, \text{ποτε} \, \text{καὶ} \, \text{oú} \, \text{δυσάμμορος} \, \text{φίλταθ’} \, \text{ἐταῖρων} \, \text{αὐτὸς} \, \text{ἐνὶ} \, \text{κλίσι} \, \text{λαρὸ} \, \text{παρὰ} \, \text{δεῖπνον} \, \text{ἔθηκας} \, \text{αἴσθησι} \, \text{καὶ} \, \text{ὀτραλέως}, \, \text{ὅπως} \, \text{σπερχοίατ’} \, \text{Ἀχαιοί} \, \text{Τρωσὶν} \, \text{ἐφ’} \, \text{ἱπποδάμοισι} \, \text{φέρειν} \, \text{πολύδακρυ} \, \text{Ἄρηα}. \, \text{νῦν} \, \text{δὲ} \, \text{oú} \, \text{μὲν} \, \text{κεῖσαι} \, \text{δεδαϊγμένος}, \, \text{αὐτὰ} \, \text{ἐμὸν} \, \text{kῆρ} \, \text{ἄκμηνον} \, \text{πόσιος} \, \text{καὶ} \, \text{ἐδητύος} \, \text{ἔνδον} \, \text{ἐόντων} \, \text{oῆ} \, \text{ποθῆ·} \, \text{(Il. 19.314-21)}\]

The adjective ἄκμηνος is especially apt in this context, if, as is likely, it does not just mean ‘fasting’ or the like, but more specifically ‘not (properly) caring for, neglecting’.195

Achilles’ refusal of the basic necessities of mortal life, together with his relentless attempts to disfigure Hector’s corpse, show how seriously deranged his state of mind is; and this makes his return to sanity in the company of Priam, and his attainment even of deep wisdom, all the more remarkable. But Achilles’ inability to eat and sleep serve another important function as well in preparing him for the supplication scene with Priam. For Priam himself is going through exactly the same harrowing experiences in the wake of Hector’s death.196 More than anything else, it is Achilles’ and Priam’s mutual recognition of the fact that they have both endured the same extreme grief and suffering which makes possible the extraordinary transformations that

195 Beekes s.v. supports the proposal of Blanc 1999 to derive ἄκμηνος from the root *ḫemh₂* (in the sense ‘to care (for)’; cf. κομέω ‘look after, care for’) with privative ἄ-, giving a meaning of ‘not properly cared for, neglected’.

take place within them in the supplication scene. They alone among the characters of the Iliad are portrayed as living through this extreme level of grief. And indeed, Achilles and Priam state outright at several points that they are experiencing the worst grief they will ever know. Until they meet, each of them has been unable to satisfy his desire for mourning; and this is partly because they have been in the company of friends and family whom they feel do not share in or understand this ultimate grief. But then they meet and weep together, and at last they satisfy this desire (though, of course, the satisfaction will not last forever). Following this, they

197 On the grief that connects Priam and Achilles, note the simile that compares Achilles weeping as he cremates Patroclus to a father weeping as he cremates his son:

\[
\text{ὡς δὲ πατὴρ οὗ παιδὸς ὀδύρεται ὀστέα καῖων}
\]
\[
\text{νυμφίου, ὃς τε θανῶν δεῖλους ἀνάχησε τοκῆς,}
\]
\[
\text{ὁς Ἀχιλεὺς ἐτάφῳ ὀδύρητο ὀστέα καῖων,}
\]
\[
\text{ἐφπύζων παρὰ πυρκαϊῆν ἀδινὰ στεναχίζων. (II. 23.222-5)}
\]

198 One of the many parallels between Achilles’ and Priam’s suffering is to be found in the passage discussed above, where Achilles pledges that he will μιμήσεσθαι Patroclus even in Hades. For less than thirty lines later in Book 22, Priam delivers a speech in which he declares that his grief for Hector will bear him down to the house of Hades (οὗ μ᾽ ἀχος ὄξυ κατοίσεται Ἄιδος εἶσο (II. 22.425)).


200 Neither of them says this explicitly, but the feeling seems to be present in both of them. In Achilles it is manifested in his refusal to be consoled by the Achaean leaders (II. 19.310-3), who are themselves mourning Patroclus and their own loved ones (II. 19.338-9); and by the fact that, at multiple points, he alone of all the Achaeans (including the Myrmidons) refuses to eat and/or sleep. Achilles’ suffering and rage at the death of Patroclus is of a different order from everyone else’s, and he knows this. Priam displays the feeling when he says: Πηλεύς, ὃς μὲν ἔτι παρὶ ἐπερεῖ τίμα γενέσθαι / Τρώος: μᾶλιστα δ’ ἐμοὶ περὶ πάντων ἀλγε’ ἔθησε. (II. 22.421-2). And it flares into spiteful rage in Book 24, when he lashes out at the other Trojans who are mourning and then at his own sons. To the Trojans: ἡ ὀνόσσος’ ὅτι μοι Κρονίδῃς Ζεὺς ἀλγε’ ἔδωκε παϊδ’ ὀλέσαι τὸν ἄριστον; (II. 24.241-2). To his own sons: ὁ μοι ἐγὼ πανάποτος, ἐπεὶ τέχον νίας ἄριστος / Τροιῇ ἐν εὐφείῃ, τὼν δ’ ὅτι τινὰ φημὶ λειλεῖφθαι (II. 24.255-6).
share a return to normalcy from the deranged state of grief in which they could find no pleasure in food or sleep: they enjoy a meal together, and then they enjoy sleep.  

Underlying this series of transformations within Priam and Achilles is their shared experience μιμησάμενοι their loved ones and then, eventually, food. It begins with the first word that is spoken between them, in Priam’s opening speech:

μνήσαι πατρός σὸν θεοῖς ἐπείκελ’ Ἀχιλλεύν, τηλίκου ὦς περ ἐγών, ὠλοὺ ἐπὶ γῆραος οὖδῷ. (Il. 24.486-7)

And, after expanding on the similarities between himself and Peleus, while emphasizing that he himself is even more wretched than Achilles’ father, Priam ends by repeating the injunction with which he began:

ἀλλ’ αἰδεῖον θεοὺς Ἀχιλλεύν, αὐτὸν τ’ ἐλέησον μνησάμενος σὸν πατρός· ἐγὼ δ’ οἶ ὀ ὑπὶ τις ἐπιχθόνιος βροτὸς ἄλλος, ἀνδρὸς παιδοφόνου ποτὶ στόμα χεῖρ’ ὑδέγεσθαι. (Il. 24.503-6)

Here Priam explicitly ties the experience of μιμησάμενοι to pity, and drives home his central point that he is even more pitiable, and has endured even greater suffering, than Peleus. The

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201 An inability to τέρπεσθαι (‘enjoy’) anything, and particularly to τέρπεσθαι γόον (‘enjoy mourning’) defines Achilles’ grief for Patroclus. The verb is pregnant with meaning throughout this phase of the poem, as Achilles either refuses (Il. 19.310-4) or attempts in vain (Il. 23.9-10, 23.97-8) to τέρπεσθαι (note especially Achilles’ agony in the last passage, where he tries to embrace Patroclus’ shade and τέρπεσθαι γόον with him). At last, Achilles fulfills his desire to τέρπεσθαι γόον in the company of Priam (Il. 24.513-4, discussed below). And then finally, the two of them ‘take delight’ in marvelling at each other (τάρπησαν ἐς ἀλλήλους ὁρόντες, Il. 24.633), and then Priam urges that they ‘enjoy sweet sleep’ (ὑπνῷ ὑπὸ γῆρες τοιεῖμεθα κοιμηθέντες, Il. 24.636). First person plural subjunctives of τέρπεσθαι are found only in connection with the grief of Achilles and Priam in the Ιliad (Achilles: τεταρπώμεθα, Il. 23.9-10, 23.97-8; Priam: ταρπώμεθα, Il. 24.636). These exhortations contrast sharply in tone with most of the Ιliad’s (very many) exhortations in -όμε(ο)θα, which usually pertain to combat or battle strategy.

202 The urgency in Priam’s speech is palpable, delivering its main point right away with an abrupt imperative, and lacking any introduction. As Macleod 1982 ad 24.486 (p. 127) notes, ‘supplications in Homer are normally introduced in a more elaborate way….The abruptness betokens intense feeling’. 
point reaches Achilles at his core, and his immediate response is to weep. He gently moves Priam to the ground, and the two of them weep together, μιμνησκόμενοι the loved ones whom they will never see again:

"Ὡς φάτο, τῷ δ’ ἀφα πατρός ύψ’ ἵμερον ὕφσε γόοιο· ἀψάμενος δ’ ἀφα χειρός ἀπόδοςτο ἦμα γέροντα. τῷ δὲ μνησαμένο δ’ μὲν Ὁκτωρ οὐδουφόνοι κλαι’ ἀδινά προσάρουθε ποδῶν Αχιλῆος ἐλυσθείς, αὐτῷ Αχιλλεὺς κλαίειν ἐὸν πατέρ’, ἄλλοτε δ’ αὐτὲ Πάτροκλον· τῶν δὲ στοναχῇ κατὰ δώματ’ ὀρώσει. (Il. 24.507-12)

It is impossible, of course, to fully explain what happens to both of them in these astonishing moments, especially to Achilles. But it is clear that the experience referred to by the verb μιμνήσκω plays a central role. The shock of king Priam appearing in Achilles’ hut and causing him both to μιμνήσκεσθαι his father Peleus, and also to recognize the fundamental similarity between Priam and Peleus, somehow releases Achilles from his obsessive grief for Patroclus. Where nothing else could, it breaks the suffocating grip which Patroclus had on Achilles’ thoughts and feelings; and it allows Achilles finally to recognize that Patroclus is not the only one whom he should weep for, and also that he, Achilles, is not the only who has endured such grief. In an instant, Achilles’ horizon of empathy expands from Patroclus and himself alone to embrace all of humanity—and most remarkably Priam, the father of Achilles’ bitterest enemy.

After weeping together with Priam, Achilles’ desire for mourning is finally satisfied, and he is prepared to speak. As we noted earlier, Achilles’ agonized inability to ‘enjoy (τέρπεσθαι) mourning’, and his resulting constant desire for mourning, had been emphasized throughout the
preceding books; and here, where Achilles is finally released from this desire, the poet describes
the experience in two full lines:203

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ ὧν γόοι τετάρπετο δίος Αχιλλεύς,
καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ ποιαίδων ἥλθ’ ἔμερος ἥδ’ ἀπὸ γυίων,
αὐτίκ’ ἀπὸ θρόνου ὠφτο, γέφοντα δὲ χειρὸς ἀνίστι
οἰκτίρων πολιόν τε κάρη πολιόν τε γένειον,
καὶ μιν φωνήσας ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα· (Il. 24.513-7)

In the speech that Achilles goes on to deliver, he reaches the deepest insights into mortal life
found in the Iliad. He structures his speech around a compassionate and sensitive comparison of
the fortunes of Peleus and Priam, through which he shows Priam that the μῦθος (485) that Priam
just delivered, whose central injunction was ‘αὐτόν τ’ ἐλέησον / μνησάμενος σοῦ πατρός’,
has taken effect. But Achilles does much more in this speech than just show Priam that he has
been heard. He also acknowledges the huge suffering which his own actions have caused Priam
and the other Trojans, as well as the ultimate pointlessness of these actions.204 And most

203 On the semantics of the phrase αὐτάρ ἐπεί which opens these lines, see Katz 2007: 75-77.
Based on a comprehensive survey of Homer, Katz claims that αὐτάρ regularly introduces
phrases with the following three kinds of verbs: (1) verbs of motion, (2) verbs of giving, and (3)
verbs of intense emotion and mental activity. (And interestingly, αὐτάρ shows none of this
patterning.) The passage quoted above clearly falls into the third category. Moreover, Katz
shows that very many occurrences of αὐτάρ, and particularly formulas beginning αὐτάρ ἐπεί,
pertain to the cultural sphere of feasting and sacrifice. Katz identifies five basic verb forms that
characterize these formulas, the last two of which are τάρπημεν and τάρπησαν ‘we/they
enjoyed [food and drink]’. Our passage above represents a variation on this formula-type in
which the object of τέρπεσθαι is mourning rather than food and drink.

204 I do not think that pointlessness is too strong a word for what Achilles feels about his career
as a warrior in this moment of powerful insight. For he says:

οὐδὲ νῦν τόν [=Peleus] γε
γηρᾶσκοντα κομίζω, ἐπεὶ μάλα τηλόθι πάτρις
ἡμα ἐν Τροίῃ, σέ τε κήδων ἤδε σά τέχνα. (Il. 24.540-2)

The verb ἢμα ‘sit (idly)’ is regularly used elsewhere in the Iliad to refer to Achilles’ ‘idle’
abstention from battle (Il. 1.329, 416, 421)—most pointedly by Achilles himself when he
laments his failure to ward off death from Patroclus (Il. 18.104). Macleod’s astute comment on
importantly of all, Achilles brings Priam closer to understanding the hard truths which he himself has only just now fully grasped: that living as a mortal means living with suffering dispensed randomly by the gods; that the right response to this is nevertheless not to despair or continually lament, but to bear it; and that, because of this harsh reality, mortals owe one another compassion.

After Achilles prepares Hector’s corpse out of Priam’s sight, he returns into the hut and convinces Priam to eat in spite of his grief by telling him the paradigmatic story of Niobe, who finally μνήσατο food after days of weeping for her slain children. It is a mark of Achilles’ tactful compassion that he shares this meal with Priam even though he has just eaten (cf. lines 475-6). Achilles’ telling of the Niobe story is framed by three occurrences of μιμνήσκωμαι in close succession. He begins with the lines ‘νῦν δὲ μνησόμεθα δόστου, / καὶ γὰρ τ’ ἱήρομος Νιόβη ἐμνήσατο οῖτου’ (Il. 24.602-3), and eleven lines later he repeats the second phrase in a

these lines is worth quoting: ‘It is a bitter paradox that Achilles is now far from idle at Troy, when he is killing Priam’s sons, doing to him the opposite of what he should be doing for Peleus. It is also a fine touch that Achilles sees both Priam’s and Peleus’ suffering as embodied in one and the same person: himself. This reinforces the argument that the two old men’s misfortunes are equal; and it brings out how detached Achilles is from his role as the warrior’ (Macleod 1982 ad 24.542, p. 134).

Achilles does not explicitly state this last point, but he demonstrates it with his actions throughout the entire scene.

Il. 24.601-20.

Sharing a meal with someone was no trivial act in Homeric culture. It was powerful enough to create a bond even between enemies, as is shown by Lycaon’s invocation of this bond in his (unsuccessful) supplication of Achilles:

γουνούμαι σ’ Ἀχιλεῦ: σὺ δὲ μ’ αἴδεο καὶ μ’ ἐλέησον: ἀντί τοι ἐιμ’ ἵκετας διοτρεφεὶς αἰδοίων:
πῶς γὰρ σοι πρότω παιόμην Δημήτερος ἀκτην ἤματι τῷ ὅτε μ’ εἰλές ἐὑκτιμένη ἐν ἄλωῃ (Il. 21.74-7)
The first thing to note about this speech is the profound change that it signals in Achilles. For up until now, Achilles has been the character who conspicuously fails to μιμνήσκεσθαι food because of his all-consuming rage and grief; and yet here he is able to convince his mortal enemy to let go of grief for the time being and share a meal with him. The fact that Achilles himself has just lived through the grief-stricken inability to eat which Priam is currently experiencing allows him to speak with empathy and authority.

Another striking feature of this speech concerns Achilles’ use of formulaic language. For the line-final exhortation μνησώμεθα δόρπου is a transformation of the battle formula μνησώμεθα χάρμης which occurs two times (Il. 15.477, 19.148, the latter spoken by Achilles himself), and which plays a role in the extensive family of μμηνήσκομαι formulas that take χάρμη as their object. All occurrences of this family of formulas in the Iliad are found, naturally enough, in the context of battle (or preparing for battle); and furthermore, they are only ever predicated of (in narration), or addressed to (in direct speech), fellow warriors. A scenario that is typical of the ebb and flow of Homeric battle is one in which the Greeks (for instance) μνήσαντο χάρμης and temporarily take the upper hand against the Trojans. So Achilles’ transformation of this formula, and particularly in its exhortative mode, is remarkable in two major respects: he uses it in a context that is the antithesis of battle (sharing a meal), and he addresses it to one of his gravest enemies.

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208 μ.Π.Α.

209 This family of formulas is collected under the heading μ.Π.

210 Greeks take the upper hand: μ.Π.2, μ.Π.3; Trojans take the upper hand: μ.Π.4.
This is not the first time in the *Iliad* that Achilles has spoken to an enemy in language that is reserved for friends by every other character in the poem. When he confronts Hector, Achilles says to him with bitter sarcasm: \( \text{παντοίης ἀρετῆς μιμήσεως νῦν σε μάλα χρῆ / αἵματίην τ’ ἐμναί καὶ θαφοσαλέον πολεμιστήν} \) (II. 22.267-8). Here Achilles is using well-attested tropes for exhorting fellow soldiers to mock and unnerve his most hated enemy.\(^{211}\) Another example of this sort of pragmatically anomalous use of language by Achilles is found in his address to the Lycaon, the son of Priam who unsuccessfully supplicates Achilles in Book 21. In a famous and deeply chilling line, Achilles addresses Lycaon as ‘\( \text{φίλος}: \text{ἀλλὰ φίλος θάνε καὶ σὺ· τί ἦ ὀλοφύρεαι οὔτως} \)’ (II. 21.106).

But unlike these other examples, Achilles’ utterance of ‘\( \text{μνησώμεθα δόρπου} \)’ to Priam expresses compassion—here we have a formulaic exhortation that normally unites fellow warriors in the murderous frenzy of battle instead being used to unite enemies in the sharing of a meal. And of course, Achilles’ performance of the Niobe story for Priam is itself pragmatically unusual as well—for when a hero addresses a paradigmatic story to an enemy in the *Iliad*, it is regularly with the goal of intimidating and rhetorically embarassing them, not of sympathetically advising them. In fact, almost everything about the supplication scene between Achilles and Priam is pragmatically unusual, and particularly the use of direct speech formulas, just in virtue of the fact that it depicts a compassionate exchange between enemies. This is, of course, precisely what is so moving about the scene, placed, as it is, in the midst of so much bitter warfare and death. We can be sure that for Homer’s original audience, a great deal of the scene’s

\(^{211}\) Martin 1989: 84 describes the unusual rhetorical impact of this as follows: ‘By throwing this familiar encouragement at Hektor, Achilles violates a linguistic constraint, with precisely the same tonal effect as when he uses “winged words” to an enemy. The ultimate rhetorical insult to a warrior is to be infantilized or feminized’. For the other examples of battle exhortation formulas employing \( \text{μιμήσεως καὶ λανθάνουμαι} \), see μ.I.μ.II.A.1-2, μ.II.C, μ.VII, and λ.I.C.1 (all are addressed to fellow warriors).
poetic power would have been felt to derive from the unprecedented, poignant mixture of tonal registers effected as the two great enemies Achilles and Priam address one another in words normally reserved for friends.

We have now surveyed the three major phases of Achilles’ development in the *Iliad*—from μῆνις directed toward Agamemnon, to enraged grief at Patroclus’ death, and finally to pity for his enemy and acceptance of mortal suffering—and we have found that μμνήσκωμαι plays a central role in each of these phases. What seizes Achilles thumos and guides him to the exclusion of all else is, first, Agamemnon’s mistreatment of him, and next, his dead companion Patroclus. In the depth of his grief for Patroclus, he fully accepts for the first time that he will die at Troy; but this only fuels his berserker rage, as he hastens toward his own death cutting down as many Trojans as he can along the way. It is only when Priam finally releases Achilles from this all-consuming grief and rage for Patroclus that Achilles’ own suffering blooms into compassion and wisdom. In the image of two aging fathers grieving terribly for their magnificent sons, Priam makes Achilles see the significance of human suffering for the first time—it is the truest grounds for compassion in mortal life, and it is to be endured, no matter how harrowing it is.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

Let us end by considering again the difficulties involved in establishing μιμνήσκωμαι’s literal meaning, and what these difficulties entail for the interpretation of Homer. When it takes a genitive object X, I have glossed μιμνήσκωμαι as ‘have [or ‘get’, if aorist] X in one’s mind/spirit and be both mentally and corporally guided/bestirred by’. If we use the Homeric concept of thumos we can state this a little more concisely: ‘have X in one’s thumos and be guided/bestirred by it’. These paraphrases are, unfortunately, very clumsy. And for particular subclasses of its uses, it seems possible to gloss the meaning of μιμνήσκωμαι in simpler terms. For example, when its object is something like χάρμη, it refers to reexperiencing χάρμη. Or when its subject is Achilles, and its object is a clause describing Agamemnon’s outrageous confiscation of Briseis (II. 9.646) or a clause describing the adventures that Achilles’ shared with Patroclus (II. 24.9), μιμνήσκωμαι refers to an experience that we might describe as brooding on those events.

The problem with such simpler glosses is that none of them can cover all the occurrences of μιμνήσκωμαι in the Iliad. We simply do not have a word or phrase in English with a similar scope of meaning to this Greek verb. The longer gloss proposed above is the only one which I could find that covers all and only the uses of this verb that are actually attested (with a genitive object). It is intended to capture the abstract core of meaning in the verb that constrains what particular events (in this case, psychosomatic experiences) it can refer to. The gloss could probably be made more accurate—but probably only by making it longer.
We may be resistant to accepting this, since we feel so familiar with Homer in many ways—surely (we might think) we can translate or calque all of Homer’s basic terms into English without losing much of their meaning. But when we keep in mind both how little we know about Homeric culture, and how foreign to us much of what we do know is, we should let go of this assumption. It may be helpful here to consider an extreme example of an untranslatable term, from a family of cultures still alive today that has been extensively studied by linguists and anthropologists. The cultures are those of the indigenous people of central Australia, and the term is *jukurrpa*, which names a central principle of these cultures. In English it is usually referred to with the inadequate tag ‘The Dreaming’ or ‘dream time’ (because its signals are often received in dreams). There have been many sophisticated attempts over the last 60 years to communicate the meaning of this term more fully in English. The linguistically and anthropologically informed *Warlpiri-English Encyclopaedic Dictionary* (2006) describes it as follows:

The term *jukurrpa* may be applied to individual ancestral beings, or to any manifestation of their power and nature, i.e. knowledge of their travels and activities, rituals, designs, songs, places, ceremonies. This provides the model for human and non-human activity, social behavior, natural development. *Jukurrpa* is not conceived as being located in an historical past but as an eternal process which involves the maintenance of these life-forces, symbolized as men and as other natural species.

A more recent attempt, by the linguists/semanticists Cliff Goddard and Anna Wierzbicka, rejects even this extensive definition, on the grounds that it cannot be ‘rendered, clearly and precisely, in the Indigenous languages themselves’ and therefore risks ‘imposing Western categories of

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212 An overview can be found in Goddard and Wierzbicka 2015. The following quote from the *Warlpiri-English Encyclopaedic Dictionary* is taken from Goddard and Wierzbicka’s paper.
understanding’. Goddard and Wierzbicka offer instead a 400 word description of the term composed entirely of ‘semantic primes’ (basic concepts which they claim are common to all human cultures and can therefore be expressed in any language); the final description of jukurrpa which they present in their paper went through 39 previous versions, each of which was criticized and refined in consultation with native Warlpiri speakers.

Now this is a very extreme case (from our cultural point of view), and I do not suggest that μιμνήσκομαι is anything like it. But the case of jukurrpa is generally instructive for the study of Homer—because in it we are confronted with a term of fundamental cultural importance that is essentially impossible to describe in English, in spite of the fact that the cultures who use it have been the object of intense, sophisticated linguistic and anthropological scrutiny for over half a century. It does not need to be said that we know considerably less about Homeric culture, and about the language of the Homeric poems. And, although Homeric culture is probably less foreign to us than Warlpiri culture, we constantly run the risk of underestimating how foreign it really is to us because our evidence is so slim—we tend to consciously fill in the many gaps in our understanding with conceptions of our own (and usually half-baked ones).

But there are, thankfully, many phrases in Homer which militate against this habit. One of them is ‘κακὰ βυσσοδομεύων’, a line-final formula which occurs six times with minor variation (sometimes with φρεστή), all in the Odyssey. It accounts for six of the seven occurrences of βυσσοδομεύω in Homer, and, hyper-literally, it means ‘building-in-the-depth-of-the-sea evils’. But it is never used of anyone building anything in the sea—instead, it always describes a

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213 Goddard and Wierzbicka 2015: 44.

214 The final version can be found on pp. 55-56 of Goddard and Wierzbicka 2015. They present several earlier versions in the article as well.
person who is plotting evils deep in his φρένες. We cannot fully recover the cultural imagination that produced this wonderful idiom, but we can be sure that it is ever-present in the Homeric poems—and that certain corners of it, particularly those which concern human psychology, are very strange to us. In closing, I would put forth the formulas with which this thesis began, μνήσας τοῦ τραχύς and μνήσασθε δὲ θούριδος ἄλκης, as two more examples of that precious Homeric phrase which can startle us out of our sense of easy familiarity.

And in general, the verb βυσσοδομεύω only takes objects that denote a wicked scheme or intention. Before showing up again in late Greek prose, it occurs only three other times in Greek literature outside the six occurrences of ἱκανὸς βυσσοδομεύων: once elsewhere in the Odyssey we find (wicked) μῦθοι as the object of βυσσοδομεύω (μῦθοι, οὖς μνηστήρες ἐνὶ φρεώι βυσσοδόμευν, Od. 4.676) and twice in the Hesiodic corpus we find the line-final phrase δόλον φρεῷ βυσσοδομεύν (Scutum 30, F 195 line 30). All nine of its archaic Greek occurrences are obviously formulaic. But the flexibility displayed by these occurrences (which fall into three basic uses) indicates that none of them was a frozen idiom. This is an important point, because it means that they reflect a living part of the Homeric world view in a way that frozen idioms often do not. For example, the frozen English idiom ‘between the devil and the deep blue sea’ is intelligible to some contemporary English speakers (as basically equivalent to ‘between a rock and a hard place’), but it does not provide any reliable information about how English speakers view the world.
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APPENDIX A: THE OCCURRENCES OF μιμήσαμαι in Iliad (67x)

Medio-passive Voice

I. Genitive argument

A. Combat state of being or quality

i. Good state/quality

•KHARMĒ

τόφρα δ' ἐπὶ Τρώων στίχες ἠλυθον ἀσπιστάων·  
oi δ' αύτις κατὰ τείχες ἐδυν. μυήσαντο δὲ χάρμης. (4.221-2)

οἱ δ' ὡς οὖν εἰδονθ' ὁ τ' ἄρ' ἐκ Διὸς ἠλυθεν ὄρνις,  
μᾶλλον ἐπὶ Τρώεσσα θόρον, μυήσαντο δὲ χάρμης. (8.251-2≈14.440-1≈15.379-80)

ἀλλὰ μυησώμεθα χάρμης (15.477≈19.148)

οἱ δ' ὁπθεν βάλλοντες ἐλάνθανον· οὐδὲ τὶ χάρμης  
Τρώες μυήσακον· συνειλόνεον γὰρ οἶστοί. (13.721-2)

eἰ δὲ που Ἀϊαντός γε βοήν ἀγαθοίο πυθοίμην,  
ἀμφοὶ κ' αὐτὶς ἱόντες ἐπιμηθηκόμεθα χάρμης  
καὶ πρὸς δαίμονα περ., εἰ πὼς ἐρυσαίμηθα νεκρὸν  
Πηλείδη Ἀχιλῆ· κακῶν δὲ κε φέρτατον εἰ. (17.102-5)

•ALKE

ἀνέφες ἐστε φίλοι, μυήσασθε δὲ θοῦωδος ἀλκής  

Ἀῖας δ' ἀλλοτε μὲν μυησάκετο θοῦωδος ἀλκῆς (11.566)

Ἀἷαντο σφώ μὲν τε σαώσετε λαόν Ἀχαιῶν  
ἀλκῆς μυησαμένοι, μὴ δὲ κρυοσοί φόβοι. (13.47-8)
• PHULAKĒ

 νῦν μὲν δόρπον ἔλεοθε κατὰ πτόλιν ὡς τὸ πάρος περ., καὶ φιλακῆς μυήσαθε καὶ ἐγρήγορθε ἐκαστος. (7.370-1≈18.298-99)

• ARETĒ

παντοίης ἀφετῆς μυήσαθε· νῦν σε μάλα χρή αἰχμητήν τ’ ἐμεναι καὶ παροσαλέον πολεμιστήν. (22.267-8)

• POLEMOS

 ἀλλ’ ὦ γ’ οὐ πολέμῳ δυσηχέος ἐμνῶντο· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰς ὀφιν ἐπὶ στίχας ἡγήσατο· (2.686-7)

ii. Bad state/quality

• PHOBOS

 ὃς Τρώεσ καὶ Ἀχαιοὶ ἐπ’ ἀλλήλους θοράντες δῆμον, οὐδ’ ἐτεοὶ μνώντ’ ὀλοοίο φόβοι. (11.70-1=16.770-1)

 ὃς Δαναοὶ Τρώεσιν ἐπέχραον· οἱ δὲ φόβοι δυσκελάδου μυήσαντο, λάθοντο δὲ θούριδος ἀλῆς. (16.356-7)

• ALEŌRĒ

ἐπεὶ οὔ ἐναπξιζομενόν γε κατέκτα, ἀλλά πρὸ Τρώων καὶ Τρωιάδων βαθυκόλπων ἑσταοτ’ οὔτε φόβου μεμνημένον οὔτε ἀλεωσῆ. (24.214-16)

B. Person

i. Family or close friend (intimate)

 ὃ φίλοι ἄνέρες ἦστε καὶ αἰδὼ θέοθ’ ἐνι θυμῶ ἀλλων ἀνθρώπων, ἐπὶ δὲ μυήσαθε ἐκαστος παίδων ἢδ’ ἀλόχων καὶ κτήματος ἢδ’ τοιχῶν (15.661-3)

 οὔδέ τι θυμῶ (object understood) (16)

 τέρπετο, πρὶν πολέμου στόμα δύμεναι αἰματόντος. μυησάμενος ὅ’ ἀδινῶς ἀνενέκατο φώνησέν τε· (19.312-14)

 ὃς ἐφατο κλαίων, ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γέροντες, (object understood) (17)

 μυησάμενοι τὰ ἐκαστος ἐνι μεγάροισιν ἐλειπον· (19.338-9)
τοῦ δ’ οὐκ ἐπιλήσομαι, ὅφει ἂν ἔγωγεν ἡμῶν μετέω καὶ μοι ψύλα γούνατ’ ὀρθῶν.
εἰ δὲ θανόντων περὶ καταλήθοντ’ εἰν Αἴδαο αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ κείθη ψύλου μεμνήσομ”’ ἐταίουν (22.387-90)
κλαῖε ψύλου ἐτάρω μεμνήσονος, οὐδὲ μιν ὑπνός ἢ ρεὶ πανδάματος, ἂλλ’ ἐπτρέφετ’ ἐνθα καὶ ἔνθα Πατρόκλου πολέων ἀνδροτήτα τε καὶ μένος ἢ’ (24.4-6)
θυγατέρες δ’ ἀνὰ δώματ’ ἵδε νυνὶ ὑδέροντο τῶν μεμνησαμέναι οἱ δὴ πολέες τε καὶ ἔσθολοι χερσίν υπ’ Ἀργείων κέατο πυγχάς ὀλέσαντες. (24.166-8)
μνήσεαι πατόος οὐοί θεοὶ ἐπείκελ’ Ἀχιλλεύς, τηλίκου ἔς περ ἐγὼν, ὀλοώ ἐπ’ γῆς οὐδὼ (24.486-7)
ἀλλ’ αἰδεῖο θεοὺς Ἀχιλλεύς, αὐτὸν τ’ ἐλέησον μεμνησάμενος σοῦ πατόος ἐγὼ δ’ ἐλεεινότερός περ (24.503-4)
tὸ δὲ μεμνησαμένο οἱ μὲν Ἑξτοοος ἀνδροφόνοι κλαῖε’ ἀδινὰ προπάροιθέ ποδών Ἀχιλλῆς ἐλυθέες, αὐτὸ Ἀχιλλεὺς κλαίεν ἔοι πατέρ’ ἄλλοτε δ’ αὐτὸ Πάτροκλον. (25.509-12)
i.’ Past adventures with close friend (intimate)
ἠδ’ ὅπως συλλέγευσε σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ πάθεν ἐλγεά ἀνδρῶν τε πολέμους ἀλεγεινά τε χύματα πείρων τῶν μεμνησαμένος θαλερὸν κατὰ δάχρυν εἴβεν (24.7-9)
ii. Elder/fellow basileus (less intimate)
ὦς μεν οὐ οὐκ μεμνησάι ἐγνέος, οὐδὲ χε λήθοι, τιμῆς ἂς τε μ’ ἐοίκε τετμήθηκε μετ’ Ἀχαιοῖς. (23.648)
ii.’ Character quality of a fellow warrior (less intimate)
νῦν τίς ἐγνείς Πατρόκλης δειλοίо μεμνησάθων πάοιν γὰρ ἐπίστατο μελίχος εἶναι ζωός ἐών νῦν αὐ θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα νήμανε. (17.670-2)
C. Place

αὖτικα γὰρ μνήσονται Ἀχαιοὶ πατρίδος αὐς· (4.172)

D. Interpersonally significant past events

i. Events felt by speaker to have established an obligation on the part of the subject

σχέτλιος, αἰὲν ἀλιτρός, ἐμὼν μενέων ἀπερχεύς
οὔδε τι τῶν μέμνηται, ὦ οἱ μᾶλα πολλάκις νιῶν
teiφόμενον σῶσον ὑπ' Ἐὐφυσῆν τιμήλων. (8.361-3)

Ζεὺ πάτερ εἰ ποτέ τίς τοι ἐν Ἀργεί περ πολυπύρῳ
ἡ βόσκῃ οἰός κατὰ πίνα μηρία καίων
eὐχετο νοστήσαι, σὺ δ' ὑπέσχεται καὶ κατένευσας,
tῶν μνῆσαι καὶ ἀμύνων Ὀλυμπε νήλες ἡμαρ (15.372-5)

"Εκτορ σέ τέκνον ἐμὼν τάδε τ' αἴδεο καὶ μ' ἐλέησον
αὐτὴν, εἰ ποτέ τοι λαθικηδέα μαζ' ἐπέσοχον.
tῶν μνῆσαι φίλε σέ τέκνον ἀμύνε δε δήμοι ἄνδρα
tείχεσ έντος ἔως, μῆ δε πρόμος ἰστασο τοῦτω (22.82-5)

ii. Events felt by speaker to constitute a precedent which the subject should use to guide their behavior

οὔδε νυ τῶν περ
μέμνηται ὄσα δὴ πάθομεν κακὰ Ἴλον ἀμφί
μουνο νοῆ θεών (21.441-3)

iii. Events felt by speaker to have been a violation of proper conduct

ὀππότε χείνων
μνήσομαι ὦς μ' ἀσύφηλον ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἔρηξεν (9.645-6)

E. Speech

i. Commands

οὐ δὲ τοῦτον μὲν ώκεας ἰπτους (object understood) (5.261-4; cf. 5.319)
οὐτὲ τί με δέος ἴσχει ἀκήριον οὐτὲ τις ὁχνος, [34]
ἀλλ’ ἐτι σέων μέμημαι ἑφτεμέων ὡς ἐπετείλας (5.817-8)

ὡδε τις ψειων μεμημένοσ ἀνδρι μαχέσθω. (19.15) (object understood) [35]

ιi. Intimate speech

οὐδε τί μοι εἶπες πυκνὸν ἔπος, οὐ τέ κεν αἰει
μεμήμην νύκτας τε καὶ ἡματα δάχρου χέουσα. (24.744-5)

F. Sustenance

ἀλλὰ χρή...

ὀδοι δ’ ἂν πολέμοι περὶ στυγεροῖο λίπωνται
μεμήπθαί πόσιος καὶ ἐδητός, ὅφρ’ ἐτι μάλλον
ἀνδράιοι δυσμενέοι μαγχώμεθα νωλεμές αἰεῖ (19.228-31)

τέκνον ἐμὸν τέο τίς ὠκνός, ὠτί τις δέος
ὁμο ἐπετείλας μεμημένος ὡς τι οίτου
οὔτ’ εὑνῆς; (24.127-9)

ἄψεαι αὐτὸς ἄγων· νῦν δὲ μνησάμεθα δόρουν.
καὶ γάρ τ’ ἴδμος Νιόβῃ ἐμνήσατο οίτου (24.601-2)

ἡ δ’ ἄρα οίτου μνήσατ’. ἔπει κάμε δάχρου χέουσα. (24.613)

G. Conspicuous subjects of epic song (strongly metapoetic usage)

τάχα δὲ μνήσεσθαι ἐμελλον

Ἀργεῖοι παρὰ νησοῦ Φιλοχτήταο Ἄναχτος. (2.724-5)

αὐτάρ Αχαίοις

δηρὸν ἐμῆς καὶ σῆς ἔριδος μνήσεσθαι οἶω. (19.63-4)

νόστου δὴ μνήσαι μεγαθύμου Τυδέος νιὲ

νῆας ἐπὶ γλαφυράς, μῆ καὶ περιβημένος ἔλθης (10.509-10)

II. Clausal argument

A. Clause with ‘accusative’ semantics (see p. 27 above)

οὐδ’ εἴ μοι δέκα μὲν γλώσσαι, δέκα δὲ στόματ’ εἶεν,
φωνὴ δ’ ἄρρηκτος, χάλκεων δέ μοι ἦτορ ἐνείη,
εἴ μὴ Ὁλυμπιάδες Μοῦσα Διὸς αἰγίχου
θυγατέρες μνησίαθ’ ὀσοι ὑπὸ Ἄπλον ἠλθον· (2.489-92)
B. Clause with ‘genitive’ semantics (see p. 27 above)

i. Events felt by speaker to constitute a precedent which the subject should use to guide their behavior

\[ \text{ἡ οὐ μέμνη ὅτε... (15.18=20.188=21.396)} \]  

III. Accusative argument (carries implication that subject will speak out what they remember)

\[ \text{Τυδέα δ’ οὐ μέμνημαι, ἐπεὶ μ’ ἐτι τυτθὸν ἐόντα κάλλιφ’, ὅτ’ ἐν Ὀμῆροις ἀπώλετο λαὸς Ἀχαῖων. (6.222-3)} \]  

\[ \text{μέμνημαι τόδε ἔογον ἐγὼ πάλαι οὐ τι νέον γε ὃς ἤν: ἐν δ’ ὑμῖν ἔρεω πάντες φίλοισι. (9.527-8; cf. Od. 24.122-23)} \]  

\[ \text{ὀς μεμνέφετο δούμους καὶ ἀληθείην ἀποείποι. (23.361)} \]  

IV. Infinitive argument

\[ \text{παιρότεροι δὲ πολὺ φθίνωθον: μνήμαντο γὰρ αἰεὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀν’ ὀμιλον ἀλεξέμεναι φόνον αἰτύν. (17.363-4)} \]  

V. Directional argument

\[ \text{ὁὶ δ’ ἄλλοι φύγαδε μνώντο ἐκαστος. (16.697)} \]  

VI. Dative argument with ἀπομνήμασθαι ≈ ‘repay’ (see p. 24 n. 56 on meaning and construction)

\[ \text{ὥ τέκος, ἢ ὃ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἑναίσιμα δῶρα διδοῦναι ἐπεὶ οὐ ποτ’ ἐμὸς παῖς, εἰ ποτ’ ἤν γε, λήθετ’ ἐνι μεγάρουι θεῶν οὐ Ὀλυμπὸν ἔχουσι· ὁι οἱ ἀπεμνήσαντο καὶ ἐν θανάτῳ περ αἰσθ ᾧ (24.426-30)} \]  

Active Voice

I. Genitive and accusative arguments

A. Interpersonally significant past events

i. Events felt by speaker to have established an obligation on the part of the accusative object

\[ \text{τῶν νῦν μνήσασα παρέξεο καὶ λαβὲ γούνων (1.407)} \]
ii. Events felt by speaker to constitute a precedent which the accusative object should use to guide their behavior

τῶν δ’ αὐτῆς μνήσω ἵν’ ἀπολλῆξης ἀπατάων (15.31)
APPENDIX B: THE FORMULAS OF μιμήσκομαι IN THE ILIAD

The significance of the three types of underlining in appendices B and C is as follows: **single solid underlining** indicates what I take to be the central formulaic content; **dotted underlining** indicates peripheral formulaic content that tends to show up in the vicinity; and **double solid underlining** indicates what I take to be a significant divergence from the central formulaic content. The conception of formula reflected in these appendices is broad and cannot be rigorously defined. Following Hainsworth and Martin (among others), I take the basic relationship which unites the elements of a particular formula to be that of *mutual expectancy*.²¹⁶

By itself, the concept of mutual expectancy is vague; but for my purposes in this thesis it suffices without further specification. In terms of the scheme above, the items comprising the central formulaic content are united by the strongest (most regularly fulfilled) mutual expectations; the peripheral formulaic content is tied to this central content by weaker (less regularly fulfilled) mutual expectations; and the divergences represent failures to fulfill the strongest mutual expectations.

I employ the flexible concept of mutual expectancy not because I believe that it is impossible to develop more rigorous and explicit conceptions of the formula²¹⁷—on the contrary, much progress has been made toward a more precise and theoretically sophisticated

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²¹⁷ This is more or less the position defended by Michael Nagler (Nagler 1967 and 1974: 1-26).
understanding of formularity in Homer since the groundbreaking work of Milman Parry.\footnote{Collected in Parry 1971. In my view, most of the great advances after Parry have been made by those who have recognized the fundamental similarities between formularity in Homer and the pervasive formularity of non-poetic natural language (e.g., Kiparsky 1976, Bozzone 2014).}

Nevertheless, there are two reasons why I do not operate with a more rigorous conception of formularity in this thesis. First, increased rigor is not necessary for my purposes—the added cost of introducing the required formalisms would outweigh the benefit (for this thesis) of the insights that such formalisms could provide. The second reason is that I do not believe that anyone has yet given a precise, theoretically sophisticated account of formularity in Homer that avoids the pitfall of excluding some phenomena that should be recognized as formulaic. For example, Bozzone 2014, an extremely illuminating and fine-grained account of formularity from the perspective of Construction Grammar,\footnote{On Construction Grammar, see Goldberg 2006 and Bybee 2010.} nevertheless fails to give adequate consideration to two phenomena that are highly characteristic of Homeric formularity: the phonological ‘echoes’, tied to particular slots in the hexameter line, that pervade Homeric poetry;\footnote{The term ‘echoes’ is taken from Kiparsky 1976: 90. As Kiparsky describes them, such echoes involve ‘purely phonological repetition, without any necessary lexical or syntactic [or, we should add, semantic] relationship’. One of the examples he gives is:
\[
\text{ἕζετ᾽ ἔπειτ᾽ ἀπάνευθε νεῶν, μετὰ δ᾽ ἵον ἐηκε } (II. 1.48)
\]
vs.
\[
\text{ἕζετ᾽ ἔπειτ᾽ ἀπάνευθε κιὼν ἐπὶ θίνα θαλάσσης } (Od. 6.236)
\]
Where it appears that νεῶν and κιὼν come in the same place of the line sheerly in virtue of the fact that both end in -ων—their syntactic function and meaning are completely different, as indeed, is the grammatical meaning of -ων in each word. Kiparsky, a linguist deeply familiar with a wide range of the world’s literatures, marvels at this Homeric phenomenon: ‘The sovereign disregard of syntactic and phonological categories which these patterns exhibit is, to my knowledge, nowhere paralleled in literary style’ (Kiparsky 1976: 91). The echo phenomenon}
resonances of traditional meaning that inhere in Homeric formulas. Bozzone’s major achievement is to have shown that Homeric formulas can be fruitfully analyzed as constructions (learned pairings of form and function) of the same kind that pervade natural language. However, this focus on the similarities between Homer and natural language leads her to largely ignore the two phenomena I have just mentioned, which are not at all typical of natural language. (She does, nevertheless, give careful consideration to meter—the most obvious feature that distinguishes Homer from natural language.)

Formula I: \[\text{μνήσασθε \ ἔθουριδος \ ἀλκής} \]

I.1  Direct Speech: Hector to Trojans and allies

"Εκτωρ \[\text{δὲ \ Τρώεσσιν} \] \[\text{ἐκέκλετο \ μακρὸν \ ἀύσας} \]
Τρῶες \[\text{ὑπέρθυμοι} \] \[\text{τηλεκλειτοὶ \ τ’} \]
ἐπίκουροι ἀνέρες \[\text{ἐστε} \] θυσίοι,

μνήσασθε \[\text{δὲ \ θούριδος} \] \[\text{ἀλκής}\] (6.110-2)

I.2  Direct Speech: Hector to Trojans and allies

"Εκτωρ \[\text{δὲ \ Τρώεσσιν} \] \[\text{ἐκέκλετο \ μακρὸν} \] \[\text{ἀύσας} \]
Τρῶες καὶ \[\text{Λύκιοι} \] \[\text{καὶ} \]
Δάρδανοι \[\text{ἀγχιμαχηταὶ} \]
ἀνέρες \[\text{ἔστε} \] \[\text{θύσίοι}, \]

μνήσασθε \[\text{δὲ} \] \[\text{θούριδος} \] \[\text{ἀλκής} \]. (8.172-4)

I.3  Direct Speech: Hector to Trojans and allies

"Εκτωρ \[\text{δ’ \ ὡς} \] \[\text{ἐνόησε} \]
Ἀγαμέμνονα \[\text{νόσφι} \]
Τρωσί \[\text{τε} \] \[\text{καὶ} \]
Λυκίοισιν \[\text{ἐκέκλετο} \] \[\text{μακρὸν} \] \[\text{ἀύσας} \]
Τρῶες καὶ \[\text{Λύκιοι} \] \[\text{καὶ} \]
Δάρδανοι \[\text{ἀγχιμαχηταὶ} \]
ἀνέρες \[\text{ἐστε} \] \[\text{θύσίοι}, \]

μνήσασθε \[\text{δὲ} \] \[\text{θούριδος} \] \[\text{ἀλκής} \]. (11.284-7)

was first noted by Milman Parry (Parry 1971: 73, 328). Nagler 1974: 1-13 provides many more striking examples of it.

See Chapter 1 of Foley 1991 on this phenomenon, which Foley calls ‘referential meaning’. In my view, this is not the best choice of terminology, given how central a very different concept of ‘reference’ is to philosophical and linguistic semantics.
I.4 Direct Speech: Hector to Trojans and allies

'Ἑκτώρ δ' ὡς εἶδεν Τεύκρου βλαφθέντα βέλμαν, Ἕκτωρ τε καὶ Λυκίοις ἔκέκλετο μαχρὸν ἁύσας· Ἱπποδρόμους καὶ Δάρδανοι ἀγχιμαχηταὶ ἀνέρες ἔστε φιλοί, μνήσασθε δὲ θούριδος ἀλκής. (15.484-7)

I.5 Direct Speech: Telamonian Ajax to Achaeans

αἰεὶ δὲ σμερδνὸν βοόων Δαναοῖσι κέλευε· οὐ φίλοι Ἱπποδρόμους Δαναοῖ θεράποντες Ἀρηὸς ἀνέρες ἔστε φίλοι, μνήσασθε δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς. (15.732-4)

I.6 Direct Speech: Patroclus to Myrmidons

Πάτροκλος δ' ἑτάροισιν ἔκέκλετο μαχρὸν ἁύσας· Μυρμιδόνες ἑταῖροι Πηληϊάδεω Άχιλής ἀνέρες ἔστε φίλοι, μνήσασθε δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς. (16.268-70)

I.7 Direct Speech: Hector to Trojans and allies

'Ὡς εἰπὼν Τρώεσσιν ἔκέκλετο μαχρὸν ἁύσας· Τρῶες καὶ Δάρδανοι καὶ Λυκίοι ἀγχιμαχηταί, ἀνέρες ἔστε φιλοί, μνήσασθε δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς. (17.183-5)

I.A.1 Direct Speech: Agamemnon to Achaeans

ὡ φίλοι ἀνέρες ἔστε καὶ ἄλλων ἡπεού ἔλεσθε, ἄλληλοις τ' ἅδεισθε κατὰ κρατερὰς νόμιμας; αἰδομένων ἀνδρῶν πλέονες σοῦ ἑῷ πέφανται· φευγόντων δ' ὀύτ' ὅ φίλος ὄντως οὔτε τις ἀλκή. (5.529-32)

I.A.2 Direct Speech: Telamonian Ajax to Achaeans

ὡ φίλοι ἀνέρες ἔστε καὶ αἰδώθεοθ' ἐνι θυμῷ, ἄλληλοις τ' ἅδεισθε κατὰ κρατερὰς νόμιμας; αἰδομένων δ' ἀνδρῶν πλέονες σοῦ ἑῷ πέφανται· φευγόντων δ' ὀύτ' ὅ φίλος ὄντως οὔτε τις ἀλκή. (15.561-4)

I.A.3 Direct Speech: Nestor to Achaeans

ὡ φίλοι ἀνέρες ἔστε καὶ αἰδώθεοθ' ἐνι θυμῷ ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, ἐπὶ δὲ μνήσασθε ἐκαστὸς
παιδών ἢδ' ἄλογων καὶ κτήσιος ἢδ' τοιχίων, ἡμέν ὑπὲρ ζῷοιν καὶ ὑ πατατεθήκασιν, τῶν ὅπερ ἐνθάδ' ἐγὼ γουνάζομαι οὐ παρεόντων ἐστάμεναι κρατερῶς, μή δὲ τρωάνθην φόβου δέ. (15.661-7)

I.B.1 Narration

Αἴας δ' ἄλλοτε μὲν μνησάσκετο θούριδος ἄλκης αὕτης ὑποστρεφθείς, καὶ ἑρητύσασαι φάλαγγας Τρώων ἱπποδάμων· ὁτε δὲ τρωάνθην φεύγειν. (11.566-8)

I.C.1 Direct Speech: Poseidon (in the guise of Calchas) to the Ajaxes

Αἴαντε αφώ μὲν τε σαώσετε λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν ἄλκης μνησαμένω, μὴ δὲ κρυεροῖο φόβοι. (13.47-8)

I.D.1 Narration

οὐδ' οἷς γὰρ ἀναιμωτί γε μάχοντο, παυρότεροι δὲ πολὺ φθίνυθον· μνήσασθ' οἷς αἰεὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀν' ὀμλοὶ ἀλεξέμεναι φόνον αἰπύν. (17.363-5)

Formula II: ἴ mnήσαντο δὲ χάρμης #

II.1 Narration

οἰ δ' αὕτης κατὰ τεύχε' ἐδυν, μνήσαντο δὲ χάρμῃς. ἔνθ' οἷς ἂν βρίζοντα ἰδοὺς Ἀγαμέμνονα διὸν οὐδὲ καταπώσσουσιν' οὐδ' οἷς ἔθελοντα μάχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα σπεύδοντα μάχην ἐς κυδιάνειραν. (4.222-5)

II.2 Narration

οἰ δ' ὡς οὖν εἶδονθ' ὅ τ' ἄρ' ἐκ Διὸς ἐλυθείν ὄρνις, μᾶλλον ἔπι Τρώεσσοι θόρον, μνήσαντο δὲ χάρμῃς. ἔνθ' οἳ τις πρότερος Δαναῶν πολλῶν περ ἐδότων εὔξατο Τυδείδαο πάρος σχέμεν ὑκέας ἵππους τάφρον τ' ἐξελάσαι καὶ ἑναντίμιον μαχέσασθαι. (8.251-5)

II.3 Narration

Ἀργεῖοι δ' ὡς οὖν ἔδων Ἐκτόρα νόσφι χάνοτα μᾶλλον ἔπι Τρώεσσι θόρον, μνήσαντο δὲ χάρμης.
ἔνθα πολύ πρώτιστος Ὄλλης ταχὺς Αἴας
Σάτνιον οὕτασε δουρὶ μετάλμενος ὃξυόεντι (14.440-3)

II.4 Narration

Τρώες δ’ ὡς ἐπύθοντο Διὸς κτύπον αἰγόχοιο,
μᾶλλον ἐπ’ Ἀσκείου θόρον, μνήσαντο δὲ γάρμης. (15.379-80)

II.A.1 Direct Speech: Telamonian Ajax to Teucer

αὐτὰρ χερσὶν ἐλών δολιχὸν δόρυ καὶ σάκος ὄμω
μάρνατε τε Τρώεσσι καὶ ἄλλους ὃρνυθι λαοὺς.
μὴ μᾶν ἀσπουδᾷ γε δαιμοσάμενοι περ ἐλοεν
νήσας εὔσσελμος, ἄλλα μηνίσωμεθα γάρμης. (15.474-77)

II.A.2 Direct Speech: Achilles to Agamemnon and Achaeans

Ἀτρεΐδη κύδιστε ἄναξ ἄνδρων Ἀγάμεμνον
δῶρα μὲν αἰ’ ἑθέλησα παρασχέμεν, ὡς ἑπεικεῖσι,
η’ ἔχεμεν παρὰ σοί· γὰρ δὲ μηνίσωμεθα γάρμης
αινία μάλ’. οὐ γὰρ χρῆ κλοτοπεύειν ἐνθάδ’ ἐόντας
οὐδὲ διατρίβειν· ἐτι γὰρ μέγα ἔργον ἀγεκτον. (19.146-50)

II.A.3 Direct Speech: Achilles to Priam

ὑίος μὲν δὴ τοι λέλυται γέρον ὡς ἐκέλευες,
κεῖται δ’ ἐν λεχέσσ’· ἁμα δ’ ήρα φαινομένῃ
ὅπερ αὐτὸς ἄγον· νῦν δὲ μηνίσωμεθα δόρπου. (24.599-600)

II.B.1 Narration

δὴ ὑπά τόθ’ οἱ μὲν πρόσθε σὺν ἐντεις δαιδαλέοις
μᾶργαντο Τρωοῖν τε καὶ Ἐκτορὶ χαλκοχορυστῇ,
οἱ δ’ ὁπλοὶν βάλλοντες ἐλάνθανον· οὐδὲ τι γάρμης
Τρώες μμινήσκοντο· συνεκλόνεον γὰρ ὀἱστοῖ. (13.719-22)

II.C.1 Direct Speech: Menelaus to himself

εἰ δὲ που Αἴαντός γε βοήν ἄγαθοῖο πυθοίμην,
ἀμφοὶ κ’ αὐτὶς ἰόντες ἀπομηνησάμεθα τρόμη. (17.102-3)
Formula III: # ἦ οὐ μέμνῃ ὅτε

III.1 Direct Speech: Zeus to Hera

η οὐ μέμνῃ ὅτε τ’ ἐκρέμω υψόθεν, ἐκ δὲ ποδοῦν ἀκμονας ἦκα δύω, περὶ χεροί δὲ δεσμὸν ἤλια χρύσεον ἄρφηκτον; (15.18-20)

III.2 Direct Speech: Achilles to Aeneas

η οὐ μέμνῃ ὅτε πέρ ςε βοῶν ἀπο μοῦνον ἐόντα σεῦ κατ’ Ἰδαίων ὅρεων ταχέεσσι πόδεσσι καρπαλίμως; (20.188-90)

III.3 Direct Speech: Ares to Athena

η οὐ μέμνῃ ὅτε Τυδεΐδην Διομήδε’ ἀνήρας οὔταμεναι, αὐτή δὲ πανόψιον ἐγχος ἐλούσα ἤθε σὲ χρώα καλὸν ἐδαψα; (21.396-8)

III.A.1 Direct Speech: Athena to Hera (about Zeus)

ἀλλὰ πατήρ οὐμὸς φρεσκη μαίνεται οὐκ ἀγαθῆς σχέτλιος, αἰεν ἀλτρός, ἐμὼν μενέων ἀπερωφεύς· οὐδὲ τι τῶν μέμνηται, ὁ οί μάλα πολλάκις νιὸν τειρόμενον σώεσκον ὕπτ’ Εὐρυσθὴς ἀέθλων. (8.360-3)

III.B.1 Direct Speech: Poseidon to Apollo

νηπτήτι’ ὃς ἄνων χραδήν ἔχεις· οὐδὲ νῦ τῶν πεο μέμησται δοσά δὴ πάθομεν παρὰ Τήνων ἀμφ’ ἐμὸν νοὶ θεών, ὅτ’ ἀγίνοι Λαομέδοντι πάρ διὸς ἐλόθντες θητεύσαμεν εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν μισθῷ ἐπὶ ὕπτ’ (21.441-5)

Formula IV: # τῶν μνήσαι

IV.1 Direct Speech: Nestor to Zeus

Ζεῦ πάτερ εἰ ποτὲ τίς τοι ἐν Ἀργεί περ πολυπύρῳ
ἣ βοῶς ἢ οἰός κατὰ πίνα μηρία καίων εὔχέτο νοστῆσαι, σοὶ δὲ ὑπέςχεο καὶ κατένευσας, τῶν μνήσαι καὶ ἀμμον Ὀλυμπε νηλεές ἡμαρ. μὴδ’ οὕτω Τρῶεσιν ἐκ δάμνασθαι Αχαιοῦς. (15.372-6)

IV.2 Direct Speech: Hecub to Hector

Ἅκτορ τέκνον ἐμὸν τάδε τ’ αἴδεο καὶ μ’ ἐλέησον αὐτὴν, εἰ ποτὲ τοι λαθικηδέα μαζὼν ἐπέσχον. τῶν μνήσαι φίλε τέκνον ἀμμε νῦν δὲ δήμον ἄνδρα τείχος ἐντὸς εὕν, μὴ δὲ πρόμος ἵστασο τούτῳ σχέτλιος. (22.82-6)

IV.A.1 Direct Speech: Achilles to Thetis (about Zeus)

τῶν νῦν μὲν μνήσασα παρέζεο καὶ λαβὲ γούνων αἱ κέν ποξ ἐθέλησιν ἐπὶ Τρῶεσιν ἀρῆσαι (1.407-8)

IV.A.2 Direct Speech: Zeus to Hera

τῶν ο’ αὕτις μνήσω ἰγ’ ἀπολλήξῃς ἀπατάων, ὄφρα ἰδῇ ἣν τοι χαῖσιμη φιλότης τε καὶ εὐνή (15.31-2)

Formula V: μνήσεσθαι ὅιω/ἐμελλον #

In this strongly metapoetic formula, which accounts for all occurrences of the future infinitive μνήσεσθαι in Homer, the genitive object of μνήσεσθαι is always a topic of epic poetry somehow involving famous suffering.

V.1 Narration

ἀλλ’ ὃ μὲν ἐν νήσῳ κεῖτο κρατέρ’ ἀλγεα πάσχον Λήμυν ἐν ἣγαθή, ὦθι μὲν λίπον ὕπερ Αχαιῶν ἐλκει μοχθίζοντα κακὴ ὀλόφρονος ὢδρον. ἐντ’ ὃ γε κεῖτ’ ἄχεον τάχα δὲ μνήσεσθαι ἐμελλον Ἀργείοι παρὰ νηνοὶ Φιλοκτήταο ἀνακτος. (2.721-5)

V.2 Direct Speech: Achilles to Agamemnon and Achaean

τὴν ὅφελ’ ἐν νήσῳ κατακτάμεν Ἀρτεμὶς ἢ ἤματι τῷ ὄτ’ ἐγὼν ἐλόμην Λυρυνησσὸν ὀλέσας. τῷ κ’ οὐ τόσοι Αχαιοὶ ὀδδὲ ἔλον ἀσπετον οὐδας δυσμενέων ὑπὸ χερσίν ἐμεν ἀπομηνόσαντος. Ἐκτορὶ μὲν καὶ Τρῳ οἱ τὸ κέρδιον. αὐτάρ Αχαιοὺς δηρὸν ἐμής καὶ σῆς ἐρίδος ἐμήσεσθαι ὅιω.
ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν προτετίθηκαν ἕασσαιμον ἀχνύμενοι περὶ
θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεωι φιλὸν δαμάσαντες ἀνάγκης
γνώρις δ᾿ ἦτοι μὲν ἐγὼ παῦσα χόλον, οὐδὲ τί μὲ χρή
ἀσκελέοις αἰεὶ μενεανέμεν· ἀλλ᾿ ἄγε θάσσον
ὁτρυνον πόλεμον δὲ κάρη κυμώντας Ἀχαιοὺς. 

From the Odyssey:

V.3 Direct Speech: Odysseus to his men

ὦ φίλοι, οὐ γὰρ πῶ τι κακῶν ἀδαίμονες εἰμὲν·
οὐ μὲν δὴ τὸδε μείζων ἐπὶ κακῶν, ἢ ὅτε Κύκλωψ
eἰλεῖ ἐνι σπῆι γλαφυρῷ χρατερῷ βήφῳ·
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνθὲν ἐμὴ ἀρετὴ βουλὴ τε νόῳ τε
ἐκφιγομεν, καὶ ποι τῶν δὴ μνήμεσθαι οἴω.

νῦν δ᾿ ἄγεθ᾿ ὡς ἄν ἐγώ εὔπω, πειθώμεθα πάντες. 

(V.3: 19.59-69)

Formula VI: || μνώντ᾿ ὀλοοῖο φόβοιο #

VI.1 Narration

Οἱ δ᾿, ὡς τ᾿ ἀμητήρες ἐναντίοι ἀλλήλων
ἀγμον ἐλαύνουσιν ἀνδρὸς μάχαρος κατ᾿ ἄρουραν
πυρὸν ἢ χρῆν· τὰ δὲ δράγματα ταρφέα πίπτειν
ὡς Τρῶες καὶ Αχαιοὶ ἐπὶ ἀλλήλωι θοροῦς
dήμουν, οὖδ᾿ ἐπεροι μνώντ᾿ ὀλοοῖο φόβοιο. 

(V.6: 12.208-12)

VI.2 Narration

Ὡς δ᾿ Ἐὔρος τε Νότος τ᾿ ἐριδαίνετον ἀλλήλων
οὐφες ἐν βῆσις βαθέν πελεμιζέμεν ὑλὴν
φιγην τε μελὴν τε τανυφλοῖαν τε κράνειαν,
αί τε πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἐβαλον τανυφηκεας ὅζους
ἡχῇ θεσπειή, πάταγος δὲ τε ἀγνυμεανῶν,
ὡς Τρῶες καὶ Αχαιοὶ ἐπὶ ἀλλήλωι θοροῦς
dήμουν, οὖδ᾿ ἐπεροι μνώντ᾿ ὀλοοῖο φόβοιο. 

(VI.2: 16.765-71)

Formula VII: # καὶ φυλακῆς μνήσασθε ||

VII.1 Direct Speech: Priam to Trojans and allies

κέκλυτε μεν Τρῶες καὶ Δάρδανοι ἢδ᾿ ἐπίκουροι,
ὅφρ᾿ εἰπὼ τά με θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσι εκεύει.

νῦν μὲν δόρπον ἔλεσθε κατὰ πτόλιν ὡς τὸ πάρος περο,
καὶ φυλακῆς μνήσασθε καὶ ἕγρηγορθε ἕκαστος (7.368-71)

VII.2 Direct Speech: Hector to Trojans and allies

ἀλλ’ ἀγεθ’ ώς ἂν ἐγὼ εἴπω, πεθώμεθα πάντες.
καὶ φυλακῆς μνήσασθε καὶ ἕγρηγορθε ἕκαστος· (18.298-9)

**Formula VIII:** # μνησάμεν-
The genitive object of the participle μνησάμεν- may be understood from context. Except in the case of VIII.A.1, this object is always a loved one who is far away or recently deceased, and so the subject’s prevailing emotion is sorrow. There are five medio-passive aorist participles of μιμνήσκομαι in the Odyssey (all line-initial), and all of them conform to this pattern (Od. 5.6, 10.199, 12.309, 19.118, 20.205).

VIII.1 Narration

οὖδέ τι θυμῷ
tέρπετο, πρὶν πολέμου στόμα δύμεναι αἷματόεντος.
μνησάμενος δ’ ἀδινώς ἀνενείκατο φώνησεν τε· (19.314)

VIII.2 Narration

Ὣς ἔφατο κλαίων,
ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γέροντες,
μνησάμενοι τὰ ἕκαστος ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἔλειπον· (19.3380-9)

VIII.3 Direct Speech: Priam to Achilles

ἀλλ’ αἰδεῖο θεοὺς Ἀχιλεῦ, αὐτὸν τ’ ἐλέησον
μνησάμενος σοῦ πατρός· ἐγὼ δ’ ἐλεεινότερος περ (24.503-4)

VIII.A.1 (= I.C.1) Direct Speech: Poseidon (in the guise of Calchas) to the Ajaxes

Ἀἴαντε σφὼ μέν τε σαώσετε λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν
ἄλλης μνησαμένω, μὴ δὲ κρυεροῖο φόβοιο. (13.47-8)

VIII.A.2 Narration

τὸ δὲ μνησαμένω ὁ μὲν Ἑκτόρος ἀνδροφόνοιο
κλαῖ’ ἀδινά προπάροιτε ποδὸν Ἀχιλῆος ἐλυσθέεις,
αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλέος κλαῖεν ἐὸν πατέρ’, ἄλλοτε δ’ αὐτὴ
Πάτροκλον. (24.509-12)
**Formula IX:** || μεμνημένος/-ον

IX.1 Direct Speech: Achilles to Agamemnon and Achaeans

 hỏng κέ τις αὐτ’ Ἀχιλῆα μετὰ πρώτων ίδηται ἔγχει χαλκεῖῳ Τρώων ὀλέκοντα φάλαγγας. ὁδὲ τὶς ὑμεῖν μεμνημένος ἀνδρὶ μαχέσθω. (19.151-3)

IX.2 Narration

αὐτάρ Ἀχίλλεὺς κλαῖε φίλου ἑταροῦ μεμνημένος, οὔδὲ μιν ὑπνὸς ἤρει πανδαμάτωρ, ἀλλ’ ἑστρέφετ’ ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα (24.3-5)

IX.3 Direct Speech: Thetis to Achilles

τέκνον ἐμὸν τέο μέχρις ὄδυρόμενος καὶ ἀχεύων σὴν ἔδεαι κραδίην μεμνημένος οὔτέ τι σίτου οὔτ’ εὐνῆς; (24.128-30)

IX.4 Direct Speech: Hecuba mourning Hector

οὔ ξασιζόμενόν γε κατέκτα, ἄλλα πρὸ Τρώων καὶ Τροϊάδων βαθυκόλπων ἐσταότ’ οὔτε φόβου μεμνημένον οὔτ’ ἀλεωρῆς. (24.214-6)
APPENDIX C: THE FORMULAS OF λανθάνομαι IN THE ILIAD

Formula I: II λάθοντο δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς #

I.1 Narration

 difficulté mèn aígída xeroin ἔχ᾿ ἀτρέμα Φοίβος Απόλλων, τόφρα μάλ` ἀμφοτέρων βέλε` ἥπετο, πίπτε δὲ λαός. αὐτάρ ἐπὶ κατ᾿ ἐνόπτι ιδών Δαναών ταχυτύλων οἰοι`, ἐπὶ δ` αὐτὸς ἄποις μάλα μέγα, τοίοι δὲ θυμὸν ἐν στίβοις ἐθέλζε, λάθοντο δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς. οἰ δ` ὦς τ` ἥ λεβον ἀγέλην ὡ ποῦ μέγ` οἰοῖν θῆρε δυὸ χλονέωσι μελαινῆς νυκτὸς ἀμολγῷ ἐλθόντι ἐξαπίνης σημάντορος οὐ παρεόντος, ὡς ἐφοβήθην Αχαιοὶ ἀγάλλμαξες· ἐν γὰρ Απόλλων ἤκη φόβον, Ἰτωσίν δὲ καὶ Ἐκτορὶ κύδος ὁπαξέν. (15.318-27)

I.2 Narration

οὗτοι ἅρ` ἠγεμόνες Δαναών ἔλον ἄνδρα ἕκαστος. ὡς δὲ λύκοι ἀρνεσσιν ἐπέχραον ἡ ἐρίδοιος οἴνται ὑπ` ἐκ μῆλων αἱρεμέναι, αἱ τ` ἐν ὀρέοι πομένος ἀφραδῆς διέταραν· οἱ δὲ ἰδόντες αἰώς διαράζουσιν ἀγάλλμαξα θυμόν ἐχούσας· ὡς Δαναοὶ Τρώεσιν ἐπέχραον· οἱ δὲ φόβῳ δυσκελάδου μνήσαντο, λάθοντο δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς. (16.351-7)

I.A.1 Narration

δούπησεν δὲ πεσὼν· πυκνόν δ` ἄχος ἐλλαβί· Ἀχαιούς, ὡς ἐπεο` ἐσθλὸς ἄνήρ· μέγα δὲ Τρώες κεχάροντο, στᾶν δ` ἀμφ` αὐτὸν ἰδόντες ἀκλέες· οὐδ` ἄρ` Ἀχαιοὶ ἀλκῆς ἐξελάθουστο, μένος δ` ἰδὺς φέροιν αὐτῶν. (16.599-602)

I.B.1 Direct Speech: Hector to Hecuba

μὴ μοι οἴνον ἀειφρο μελιφρον πότνια μήτερ,
μὴ μ’ ἀπογυϊώσῃς μένεος, ἀλκής τε λάθωμαι. (6.264-5)

II.2 Direct Speech: Hector to Achilles

ἀλλά τις ἀρτιεπής καὶ ἐπίκλοπος ἔπεω μύθων,
δορὰ α’ ὑποδείας μένεος ἀλκής τε λάθωμαι. (22.281-2)

II.1 Direct Speech: Odysseus to Diomedes

῾Ενθά κε λοιγός ἔην καὶ ἀμήχανα ἔργα γένοντο,
καὶ νῦ κεν ἐν νήσοι πέον φεύγοντες Ἀχαϊοί,
εἰ μὴ Τυδεῖδη Διομήδει κέκλετ’ Ὀδυσσεύς·
Τυδεῖδη τί παθόντε λελάσμεθα ὁρώντοι ἀλκής; (11.310-3)

(≈μ.1: ἐπέκλεετο μαχρόν ἀύσας...ἀνέρες ἐπέκλεετο μαχρόν ἀύσας)

II.1 Direct Speech: Meriones to Idomeneus

οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ’ ἔμε φημὶ λελασμένων ἐμμεναι ἀλκῆς,
ἀλλὰ μετὰ πρῶτοι μάχην ἀνὰ κυδιάνειραν ἱσταμαι,
οἵπότε νείκος ὁφώρηται πολέμοιο. (13.269-71)

Formula II: (οὖ) λήθετο χάρμης #

II.1 Narration

ὅρνις γὰρ οὐκ ἔπηλθε περησόμεναι μεμαξίων
αἰετὸς ὑψιτήσης ἐπ’ ἀριστερὰ λαὸν ἔφρων
φοινῆντα δράκοντα φέρων ὀνύχιοι πέλωρον
ζώον ἐπ’ ἀσπαίροντα, καὶ οὐ πο λήθετο χάρμης,
χορεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἔχοντα κατὰ στήθος παρὰ δειην
ἰδνωθεὶς ὀπίσω. (12.200-5)

II.2 Narration

Σαρπήδοντι δ’ ἀχος γένετο Γλαύκου ἀπόντος
αὐτίκ’ ἐπεὶ τ’ ἐνόησεν ὄμως δ’ οὐ λήθετο χάρμης (12.392-3)

II.3 Narration

τῶν δ’ ὡς τε ψαρῶν νέφος ἔρχεται ἦ καλοιών
οὐλὸν κεκλήγοντες, ὡτε προὶδοσιν ἰόντα
χήρων, ὁ τε σμικρὴς φῶνον φέρει ὀρνίθεσιν,
ὦς ἄρ’ ὑπ’ Ἀινεία τε καὶ Ἕκτορι κοῦροι Ἀχαιῶν οὐλον πεκλήγοντες ἱσαν, λήθοντο δὲ χάρμης. (17.755-9)

**Formula III:** οὐδὲ σε λήθω #

III.1 Direct Speech: Zeus to Hera

δαμονίη αἰεὶ μὲν οὐδὲ οὐδὲ σε λήθω (1.561)

III.2 Direct Speech: Odysseus (in prayer) to Athena

χλυθί μεν αἰγιόχοι Διὸς τέχος, ἢ τέ μοι αἰεὶ ἐν πάντεσσο πόνοις μερίστασαι, οὐδέ σε λήθω καινύμενος. (10.278-80)

III.3 Direct Speech: Nestor to Achilles

τοῦτο δ’ ἐγὼ πρόφρων δέχομαι, χαίρει δέ μοι ἤτορ, ὡς μεν ἄει μέμνησαι ἐννέος, οὐδέ σε λήθω, τιμής ἢς τέ μ’ ἔουσε τετιμήσασθαι μετ’ Ἀχαιοίς. (23.647-9)

III.A.1 Direct Speech: Achilles to Priam

καὶ δέ σε γιγνώσκω Πρίαμε φρεσίν, οὐδὲ με λήθεις, ὅτι θεών τίς σ’ ἢ γε θοᾶς ἐπ’ ἄγας Ἀχαιῶν. (24.562-3)

**Formula IV:** # ὥς ἐπέτελλ’ ὁ γέρων ἵ σ δὲ λήθεαι

IV.1 Direct Speech: Odysseus to Achilles (reporting the words of Peleus)

τέκνων ἐμὸν χάρτος μὲν Ἀθηναίῃ τε καὶ Ἰηρῇ δόσοις, οὐ δὲ μεγαλήτορα θυμόν ἵσχειν ἐν στήθεσα· φιλοφροσύνη γὰρ ἀμείνων ληγέμεναι δ’ ἔφιδος ἡκασμηχάνου, ὅφικα σε μάλλον τις’ Αρχείων ἠμὲν νέοι ἢδε γέροντες, ὥς ἐπέτελλ’ ἢ γέρων, σὺ δὲ λήθεαι· ἒλλ’ ἐτι καὶ νῦν παύε’, ἐκ δὲ χόλον θυμαλγέα· (9.254-60)

IV.2 Direct Speech: Nestor to Patroclus (reporting the words of Menoetius)

τέκνων ἐμὸν γενεὴ μὲν υπέρτερος ἐστιν Ἀχιλλεύς, πρεσβύτερος δὲ σὺ ἐσοι· βῆ κ’ ἢ δὲ γε πολλὸν ἀμείνων.
ἀλλ’ εὗ ὁι φάσθαι πυκνῶν ἑπος ἕδρ’ ὑποθέσθαι
καὶ ὁι σημαίνειν· ὥ δὲ πεῖσται εἰς ἀγαθὸν περ.
ὡς ἑπέτελλ’ ὁ γέρων, σὺ δὲ λήθειαν ἀλλ’ ἐτὶ καὶ νῦν
ταῦτ’ ἐπίοις Ἀχιλῆ ταῦθαν αἱ κε πιθηται. (11.785-90)

Formula V: # στὴ δ’ εὔφαξ σὺν δουρὶ λαθῶν ||

V.1  Narration (Coön wounds Agamemnon)

στὴ δ’ εὔφαξ σὺν δουρὶ λαθῶν Ἀγαμέμνονα δίων,
νῦξε δὲ μνα κατὰ χείρα μέσην ἀγκώνος ἐνερθε,
ἀντικρὺ δὲ διέσχε φαεινοῦ δουρὸς ἀκωκῆ. (11.251-3)

V.2  Narration (Menelaus kills Dolops)

στὴ δ’ εὔφαξ σὺν δουρὶ λαθῶν, βάλε δ’ ὅμοιν ὀπισθεν·
αἰχμῆ δὲ στέρνοι δέσσετο μαμώσσα
πρόσσω ἰεμένη. (15.541-3)