Are there different costs for intervening on behalf of opposition groups than on behalf of government groups in civil conflict? Existing literature has focused on intervening generally, rather than assessing the different motivations and implications for intervening on behalf of government or opposition groups in civil conflict. Intervention on behalf of an opposition group is a clear violation of sovereignty; these kinds of interventions suggest that states are willing to engage in internal political change in a sovereign state. Violating sovereignty, arguably the foundational norm in foreign policy and international relations theory, is especially costly. I find that interventions on behalf of rebel groups to be systematically different than interventions on behalf of rebel groups. The second part of this dissertation divides the decision to intervene into two stages. Work stemming from Most and Starr (1989) suggest that states need the opportunity and the willingness to intervene in civil conflict consists of two stages, the opportunity to intervene and the willingness to intervene. In line with Clark and Regan’s (2003) work on interstate war, I argue that defining opportunities to intervene in civil conflict is a crucial part of research on interventions. Using an estimator developed by Bagozzi (Forthcoming), this analysis
aligns theoretical expectations about the opportunities available for intervention and the willingness of states to engage in intervention with quantitative analysis. In line with previous research, I show that power status and distance from the conflict impact the opportunity for states to intervene in civil conflict. Having defined relevant opportunities econometrically, I show that previously employed factors have markedly different impacts on states’ willingness to engage in opposition and government sided interventions.

INDEX WORDS: Conflict, Intrastate Conflict, Intervention, Military intervention, Decision making, Opposition, Government, Rebel, Opportunity, Willingness
THE AFFAIRS OF OTHERS: DECISION MAKING AND THIRD PARTY INTERVENTIONS IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT

by

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May 2015
DEDICATION

I am lucky to have a dad who told his daughter to find a job she loved, even if that meant going to school for more years than I like to count. My dad, Steve Fisher, is someone I love, respect, and admire. I am happy to dedicate this project to him.
I have many people to thank-- far too many to be included here. For this dissertation, I would like to thank Danny for helping me swim through code above my head while matching theoretical arguments with methodological ones. Chad has inspired this project and has been an inspiration in enthusiasm throughout these last few years of grad school. I would like to thank Brock for encouraging me to think analytically, whether through drawing frameworks or anticipating holes in my arguments. Many thanks to Jeff for listening to me ramble at Walker’s and genuinely wanting me to be happy. Jeff-- thank you for being a sharp critic, a kind person, and an excellent advisor.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

U.S. foreign policy leaders and the American public have been debating the merits of military intervention in Syria for several years. In recent months, the Obama administration conducted military operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), but has stopped short of full scale deployment of U.S. troops or forceful military intervention with the primary, expressed goal of removing the sitting government of Syria. As of early 2015, the Obama administration has conducted airstrikes with the primary purpose being to destroy ISIS (Roberts, 2014, September 11) and the U.S. Congress has authorized arming moderate Syrian rebels (Miller, 2014, September 18).

However, several prominent Democrats opposed the measure, arguing that “previous history leads me to conclude that arming Syrian rebels would be an ineffective solution” (P. Kane & O'Keefe, 2014, September 18) and “I do not want America to be dragged into another ground war in the Middle East” (Sargent, 2014, September 14). These comments from the President’s own party reflect the difficult debates in the U.S. Congress and beg the question, what is the goal of such an intervention? Does arming Syrian rebels work to dismantle another non state actor, ISIS? Or will arming Syrian rebels further weaken the Assad regime?

The Obama administration has argued that airstrikes and military advisors are intended to “degrade and destroy” ISIS (P. Kane & O'Keefe, 2014, September 18). But

---

1 Also called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Tharoor, 2014, June 18).
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power has said that aiding moderate rebels will also work towards dismantling the Assad regime (Dann, 2014, September 21). Yet, it remains unclear whether the United States will use explicitly use military force to remove the Assad regime from power. From a strategic point of view, arming moderate Syrian rebels to fight radical Syrian rebels might be beneficial for the Assad regime (Rafizadeh, 2014, October 31). The Assad regime, too, sees ISIS as a threat. For the Assad regime, U.S. involvement against ISIS brings to mind the adage, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” In short, the side on which the United States throws support, as well as the decision to intervene in general, is of crucial importance to other actors in the conflict, U.S. politicians, the American public, and the international community.

This dissertation began observing the conflict in Syria that began in 2011. Russia and Iran provided aid to the Assad regime from nearly the beginning of the conflict, but states were hesitant to aid opposition groups. Given Russia’s desire to keep its naval port in Syria and to continue to sell weapons to government forces, the Russian choice to aid government forces upholds the status quo, a status quo that Russia has an incentive to maintain (Pukhov, 2012). But strategic interests are not so clear when debating intervention on behalf of opposition forces. For the U.S., there have been calls for humanitarian intervention in response to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons and general human rights abuses. The U.S. has been struggling with this choice: what, if anything should the U.S. do in Syria? Does the U.S. have sufficient strategic interests to intervene in this conflict? As the conflict has progressed, there have been a slew of policies proposed. The U.S. might enact sanctions, provide humanitarian or military aid, or ramp up diplomatic efforts. More drastic options could include airstrikes on behalf of
the opposition or even troop deployment. Of these options, U.S. troop deployment seems highly unlikely at the time of this writing. Given the recent, relatively quick opposition sided intervention in Libya, a similar style intervention seemed possible in the early stages of the conflict. But with no chance of a UN resolution, the U.S. can harbor no hope of international approval for intervening to depose a sitting government. Moreover, what-if any- strategic interests does the U.S. have in Syria?

Congressional debates on this question highlight Finnemore’s observation that it is only post intervention, that we as citizens and scholars decide whether an intervention was “strategic.” Before an intervention occurs, it is rare that the national interest is crystal clear. Rather, the national interest is oftentimes “simply indeterminate” (Finnemore, 2003, p. 5). Finnemore goes on to say that “in most cases these opposing conceptions of national interest actually were articulated and strongly pushed on decision makers by groups on different sides of the debate over whether to intervene...” (Finnemore, 2003, p. 5). Politicians and political scientists alike have difficulty defining “national interest.” With regard to Syria, some have framed intervention in the long term interests of the United States while others have staunchly argued that the U.S. has no interests in Syria.

In the early stages of the conflict, the Obama administration criticized the Assad regimes’ crackdown on pro-reform protestors. Obama stated, “We have consistently said that President Assad must lead a democratic transition or get out of the way. He has not led. For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for President Assad to step aside” (Senate, 2012, p. 7). The administration signaled that it would work with Jordan and other states in the region to encourage the Assad regime to step down peacefully.
Aiding opposition groups would reflect that the U.S. is unhappy with the status quo; rather than allow the Assad regime to stay in control, aiding opposition groups violates sovereignty. But, nearly three years later, no such transition has occurred. In 2012, the U.S. outlined the objectives for the Syrian conflict, which included stopping human rights abuses, supporting democratic reform, encouraging the Assad regime to step down, and reduce weapons stockpiles. Yet, the ways in which the U.S. could achieve these goal were unclear. Tools available range from economic sanctions to securing U.N. resolutions and arming opposition groups to U.S. led airstrikes. But, even with Administration support and Congressional willingness, is the U.S. public willing to expend resources to achieve those goals?

For U.S. politicians encouraging intervention, U.S. intervention in touches on U.S. interests in keeping allies in the Middle East, maintaining stability in the region, and stopping terrorism. Humanitarian ideals aside, conflict could spread, threatening Israel, a U.S. ally. In Congressional testimony, Senator Richard Luger stated that “Events in Syria will impact United States National Security and the interests of our close ally Israel” (Relations, 2012, March 1). An Obama administration official stated that in addition to securing U.S. allies in the region, “it is very important to all us in the United States that there not be a country in the region that can be used by extremist organizations to plot against us once again” (Relations, 2013, April 11, p. 25). Others expressed concern for the Assad regimes use of chemical weapons and the possibility of proliferation. Administration officials have expressed concern that “the very large amount of chemical weapons that the Assad regime has, not be allowed to get into the hands of people who could use them against our allies in the region, our friends in
Europe, or us” (Relations, 2013, April 11, p. 25). Using a broader lens, the U.S. might be interested in punishing the Assad regimes’ blatant flaunting of international norms regarding chemical weapons.

Yet, those arguing that the any sort of intervention is against U.S. national interests are just as strong. A Congressman from Texas asked pointedly,

And I ask the question: What is the national security interest of the United States to be involved in someone else’s war? There isn’t one. We don’t have a national security interest to be involved in this war. The United States seems to have a habit in getting involved in other people’s business: and once again, we have made the problem in Syria our problem by being involved and supporting rebel groups” (Poe, 2013, June 19, p. H3762)

This congressperson and many other have expressed opposition to U.S. intervention because it is not in the interests of the United States to intervene in such a conflict. Like Democratic leaders like Elizabeth Warren, the Republican congressman from Texas argued that the U.S. lacks the intelligence, capabilities, and strategic interest to become involved in an intractable conflict. Other public figures, like Henry Kissinger, have warned that the U.S. has no business sending U.S. troops to Syria, but that there is an incentive in sending an international coalition of troops just “not ours” (Rose, 2014, September 11).

Debates surrounding military intervention speak to the core of foreign policy making. Who is to say what the U.S. national interest is? What role do domestic institutions play in the process? Does the U.S. public help define this national interest? Debates about whether the U.S. should intervene, the manner in which the U.S. should
intervene, and the justifications for intervention have waged on in Congress and in the U.S. public (Roberts, 2013, p. 4). These debates illustrate the difficulty of defining national interest and the limits of using national interest as a blanked justification for intervention. Internal debates in the U.S. for these kinds of interventions, the kind of intervention where there is no clear “strategic interest” or “right” and “wrong,” are especially important for the study of interventions. Literature on intervention generally black boxes the decision making process, assuming that intervention is, in some sense, strategic. An intervention that occurs is strategic, whereas no intervention indicates that there was not a strategic incentive to intervene. If the strategic incentive is unclear, what pushes a state to intervene or not to intervene?

As of early 2015, the United States has intervened in the Syrian civil war. What changed? Should political scientists brush aside the arguments against intervention as arguing for something other than the “national interest”? Arguably, the facts on the ground changed. The rise of an opposition group, ISIS, gave the U.S. enough strategic incentive to intervene against such a brutal group. Yet, what is it about ISIS that pushed the U.S. to intervene? The U.S. has been debating intervention for years; why now? Was it ISIS’s “their draconian enforcement of a fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic sharia law” (Wolf, 2014, p. E972)? But, what make the ISIS atrocities more problematic than the Assad atrocities? Perhaps ISIS’s threat to destabilize the region is the reason for the intervention, but this was the same reason for intervention given years ago. Is it the brutal killing of Americans, videotaped for the world to see? Even the ISIS media circus is an insufficient explanation for the change in policy. The Obama administration did not retaliate after the bombing of a U.S. embassy in Benghazi, despite multiple calls to do so.
I argue that there is a simpler explanation for the shift in U.S. policy. The most basic shift in the Syrian conflict is that ISIS, despite its name, is not a sovereign state. Intervention against ISIS is a blow against chaos and terrorism. Although the Islamic State makes claim to statehood, it is has no international recognition. It is not a sovereign state in the traditional sense of the word. This distinction is part of the underlying reason for the shift in U.S. policy. Policymakers have fewer qualms intervening against a non-state actor, whereas there are underlying normative biases against intervening explicitly against a state. In his address to the U.S. public, President Obama made it clear that the so-called Islamic State is not a sovereign entity. He stated:

Now, let’s make two things clear: ISIL is not ‘Islamic.’ No religion condones the killing of innocents. And the vast majority of ISL’s victims have been Muslim. And ISIL is certainly not a state . . . It is recognized by no government, nor by the people it subjugates. ISIL is a terrorist organization, pure and simple. And it has no vision other than the slaughter of all who stand in its way (House, 2014, September 10)

Obama’s statement alludes to the notions of sovereignty and legitimacy. Although the Islamic State controls some territory, Obama suggests that controlling a territory does not a state make. But, why should this matter? If the Islamic State were recognized by its citizens and the international community, would the U.S. still be willing to intervene? Intervening against a state violates sovereignty and challenges the status quo, and policy makers are sensitive to these implications. The Obama administration’s insistence that ISIL is not a traditional state actor illustrates the importance of sovereignty in the decision to intervene.
Guiding Questions

At the early stages of the Syrian conflict, I could not shake a nagging question- if the tables had been turned, if an opposition group had been committing atrocities and violating international law, would the U.S. have stepped in? Would the U.S. and other Western countries still have the same qualms about intervening despite lack of authorization from international organizations, lack of clear strategic interests? In other words, does the side matter?

My hunch was that yes, the side on which an intervention occurs matters very deeply for decision makers contemplating intervention. While the Russian government may have fewer scruples for intervening on behalf of opposition forces, the international community has treated Russian and Iranian involvement in the Syrian war as fairly commonplace. And, this is not only due to the character of the Russian and Iranian regimes. Russian intervention in Ukraine, for instance, has been met with strong international outcry. Intervening on behalf of government forces upholds the status quo and respects state sovereignty, arguably the organizing principle of international law. Intervention on behalf of opposition forces, I argue, is an inherently messier enterprise. Intervention on behalf of opposition forces violates sovereignty and challenges the status quo. Thus, the motivation and costs of intervention on behalf of opposition forces, both domestically and internationally, should be different for government and rebel sided forces. This dissertation seeks to test this claim.
Breaking Apart Willingness

Strong states have always intervened in the affairs of others when it was in their best interest to do so. The United States has a history of military intervention around the globe, whether on behalf of the Taliban in Afghanistan during the Cold War or in Libya on behalf of opposition forces during the Obama administration. In recent decades, however, military intervention into the domestic affairs of other states have been costly foreign policy choices. French intervention in Cote d’Ivoire and UN resolution backed intervention in Libya illustrate that both states and international organizations have opportunities and—sometimes—the willingness to intervene in civil conflict. Yet, other conflicts, such as the ongoing civil conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the continuing civil war crisis in Syria see hesitation on the part of the states and international organizations (Jentleson, 2012). Scholarship on intervention suggests that the decision to intervene or not to intervene is strategic (Fordham, 2008) and that military interventions are risky choices for political leaders (van der Maat, 2011). From a theoretical perspective, “intervention policies lie at the boundary of peace and war in international politics” and “define the limits of sovereign control” (Finnemore, 2003, p. vii). The distinction between an intervention and a war, for example, seems to do with the motivations and end goal of a military action. Is a state at war when aiding a government in putting down a rebellion? Are sitting governments still sovereign in states experiencing civil war? In addition, the “limits of sovereign control” refers to several theoretical notions. First, intervention in civil conflict shows the reach of third party leaders or “sovereigns.” Second, interventions illustrate that sovereignty as an
international norm, the notion that leaders have control within their borders and freedom from outside intervention, is imperfect. Sovereignty has its limits.

Answering these questions and exploring these concepts requires a renewed approach to actor centric intervention behavior (Findley & Tze, 2006). Foreign policy decision makers in potential third party states weigh the costs and benefits of intervention in civil conflicts. These costs are reflective of a variety of motivations for intervention; a third party may have an economic interest in the civil war state, a fear that violence will spill over into neighboring states, or a desire to change the ruling party of a civil war state. Previous work on intervention in civil conflict assumes that the primary motivation for intervention is to end the conflict (van der Maat, 2011), but focusing on the side on which an intervention occurs allows scholars to study an even more basic motivation. Intervening to support the government of a fellow state reflects a foreign policy preference for protection of sovereignty and, subsequently, the status quo. Intervening on behalf of an opposition group is a clear violation of a sovereign state, a more costly foreign policy decision, and an overall riskier option than doing nothing or intervention on behalf of a government.

Existing literature on intervention has largely overlooked this distinction, labeling motivations for intervention as primarily strategic (Fordham, 2008). As a blanket category, strategic interventions has no variation. Given some strategic goal, assumed to be ending the conflict, states choose the best option at their disposal. Assuming that interventions are strategic sidesteps the decision making process. Having a strategic interest in a particular civil conflict might be a necessary condition for intervention, but it is not sufficient. States must be willing to intervene in civil conflict. In breaking apart
the side on which a state could intervene, we can test whether states are more willing to intervene on a particular side and what factors make them more or less likely to intervene on a particular sided. Focusing on the intervention itself helps explain why foreign policy leaders in the U.S. and other states have been hesitant to assist opposition groups in Syria whereas the Syrian government has received aid from Russia and Iran since nearly the beginning of the conflict (AP, 2012, November 13). Focusing on sovereignty also illuminates more recent U.S. focus on intervention against an opposition group rather than advertising the secondary goal of destabilizing a sovereign government.

Foreign policy decision makers and ordinary citizens take the decision to use military force seriously (Jentleson 1998). Jentleson and Britton (1998) argue that there are three primary motivations for the use of force: foreign policy restraint, internal political change, and humanitarian intervention. Foreign policy restraint includes the use of force for deterring aggression, whether against the state itself or an ally. For example, the United States’ use of military force during the Gulf War would fall under this category. Pushing Iraqi forces out of Kuwait without pushing for subsequent regime change in Iraq illustrates foreign policy restraint (Jentleson, 1992). Use of force with foreign policy restraint as the main objective “tend[s] to equate with interstate conflicts and classical notions of war” and therefore has some “legitimacy” in the eyes of the international community and ordinary citizens (Jentleson & Britton, 1998, p. 397).

On the other hand, the legitimacy and public perception of the use of force with the primary objective being either internal political change or humanitarian intervention is less clear. Research suggests that “the American public is much more likely to support the use of force for the restraint rather than the remaking of other governments”
(Jentleson, 1992, p. 50). Use of force for the purpose of internal political change is a violation of norms, the most important of these being state sovereignty. Unlike foreign policy restraint, “interventions aimed at IPC [internal political change] are likely to be just the opposite and involve sticky issues such as sovereignty” (Dury, Overby, Ang, & Li, 1992, p. 85). Given experiences in Vietnam-- and more recently Iraq-- the U.S. public perceives internal political change as messy, long-term, and political (Dury et al., 1992). Some have argued that this reflects a “prudent” and “realist” streak in American public opinion on the use of force (Drezner, 2008).

While Jentleson’s formulation views foreign policy restraint as a foreign policy objective for primarily interstate conflicts rather than intrastate conflicts, the logic can be extended to intervention in intrastate conflicts. Working to overthrow a government or aiding groups in clear opposition to a government are examples of the use of military force for the purpose of internal political change. Intervention on behalf of a government, whether weapons, troops, or air support, does not carry the same baggage. Recent debates surrounding intervention in Libya and Syria suggest that choosing a side in internal strife has domestic and international implications. According to one poll, U.S. public support for intervention in civil conflict in Libya in 2011 hovered around 32% just before Qaddafi was captured (Jentleson, 2012). Despite the UN Security Council resolution in the Libyan case, several states including India and Brazil abstained from intervening on behalf of opposition groups in civil conflict. In this case, India and Brazil saw the intervention as a violation of state sovereignty. Brazil and India oppose powerful states’ interventionist tendencies and argue that these states enforce humanitarian norms selectively (Borger, 2011, March 18). In the context of the Syrian civil war, the Russian
government has stated that it regrets its decision in the Libyan case and will not allow the international community to choose sides again (Jentleson, 2012).

Current debates surrounding Syria illustrate the difficulty of determining how—and if—norms matter in international politics. Human rights groups have called for more aid and involvement in Syria since its beginning, most notably when the Assad regime was found to have used chemical weapons on its citizens (Secretary-General, 2013). The Syrian conflict illustrates a normative debate between human rights norms and sovereignty. Human rights norms “challenge state rule over society and national sovereignty” (Risse & Sikkink, 1999, p. 4). National sovereignty is a more entrenched norm than human rights, but, at its core, sovereignty is still a norm. Human rights scholars focus on how human rights norms influence political systems and foreign policy making, but political scientists have overlooked the value placed on sovereignty as the reigning norm in international relations (Krasner, 2001a). Sovereignty is still the general principle through which states interact, but not an iron clad rule that overrides national interests. Intervention on behalf of a government group implicitly or explicitly supports state sovereignty and upholds the status quo. Taking a closer look at intervention behavior can answer some of these questions about the importance of norms in international relations.

**Summary and Roadmap**

This dissertation is divided into two major parts. The first part of the dissertation argues that there are different costs for intervening on behalf of opposition groups and government groups. Previous work on intervention in civil conflict has focused on the
impact intervention has on civil conflict. For example, much of Regan’s work examines intervention’s impact on the conflict duration (Regan, 2002b). Little work has been done on interventions from the point of view of the potential intervener. Moreover, work that does have an actor centric approach to intervention behavior (Findley & Tze, 2006) generally treats intervention on behalf of opposition groups and on behalf of government groups as identical (Shirkey, 2012). I argue that sovereignty makes intervention on behalf of opposition and on behalf of government groups fundamentally different. For third parties interested in intervening in civil conflict aiding an opposition group or groups, violating sovereignty may be beneficial, but this policy option comes with a cost. Violating sovereignty is costly domestically and internationally. Political actors at all levels are attentive to these costs; thus, states with more political constraints will be less likely to intervene on behalf of opposition groups. Chapter 2-4 outline the previous work on interventions and this argument in detail.

In addition to qualitative evidence presented in Chapter 3, this dissertation tests hypotheses using a dataset created from a variety of different sources. Much of the work on interventions uses Regan’s datasets on interventions, which limits analysis to cases in which there was an intervention. This project uses Koga’s (2011) dataset as a basis for testing the likelihood of intervention on behalf of a particular side. Culling together data on interventions and civil wars, the dataset used here includes cases of intervention and cases of nonintervention. The dataset, independent variables, and alternative explanations are discussed at length in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents results from a multinomial logit. Results support the main theoretical argument that government and opposition sided interventions are different. Factors associated with interventions,
including political constraints, alliances, and distance, have different effects on different types of intervention. For example, states with more political constraints are less likely to intervene on behalf of opposition groups.

While results from the standard multinomial logit are promising, determining the relevant dyads for intervention into civil wars has proved problematic for this subfield. Most and Starr (1989) argue that third party joiners for intrastate and interstate conflict can be divided into two stages. States must have the opportunity to intervene in civil conflict; Most and Starr define opportunity primarily in terms of state capacity to intervene militarily. For example, states without a military capable of intervening on the other side of the world do not have the opportunity to intervene; dyads with states incapable of intervention should be deemed non relevant. Chapter 7 details how determined which dyads are relevant using a baseline inflated multinomial logit from Bagozzi (2010). Chapter 8 outlines the factors theorized to influence states’ opportunities to intervene and their willingness to intervene in civil conflict. Finally, Chapter 9 tests these hypotheses using the baseline inflated multinomial logit. Results from this model support results from the standard model, but several factors that were not significant in the first model are statistically significant in the baseline inflated version. For instance, as opposition groups grow in strength relative to the government, intervention on behalf of opposition groups becomes more likely. Chapter 10 offers some conclusions, extensions for future research, and policy implications.
CHAPTER 2
CALCULATING THE COSTS

Are there different costs for intervening on behalf of opposition groups than on behalf of government groups in civil conflict? Existing literature has focused on intervening generally, rather than assessing the different motivations and implications for intervening on behalf of government or opposition groups in civil conflict. Intervention on behalf of an opposition group is a clear violation of sovereignty; these kinds of interventions suggest that states are willing to engage in internal political change in a sovereign state. Violating sovereignty, arguably the foundational norm in foreign policy and international relations theory, is especially costly. As a result, I expect interventions on behalf of rebel groups to be systematically different than interventions on behalf of rebel groups.

Constraints and Intervention

Between 1982 and 1984, Congress refused to approve President Regan’s plan to militarily aid rebels during the Nicaraguan civil conflict (Makarychev, 2008). Despite the communist threat, proximity to the conflict, history of giving aid in similar conflicts, and presidential urging, the U.S. Congress balked. In what has been termed the Boland Amendment, Congress attempted to constrain the president from intervening on behalf of the rebel group, the Contras, attempting to overthrow a “red” regime. The Boland
Amendment specifically prohibited the “use of public funds for purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government” (Scharfen, 1985, p. 1). Congressional leaders saw this policy choice, to arm opposition groups in a sovereign state, as problematic. Leaders did not want to be embroiled in yet another civil conflict, expend precious blood and treasure, and spend political capital on a fringe interest. Congress refused to overtly aid factions seeking to overthrow a sovereign government; the cost was simply too high (Makarychev, 2008). While the Iran-Contra Affair calls in to question the effectiveness of this restraint, Congress challenged the supremacy of the president in foreign policy, sparked a national debate on U.S. foreign policy, and illustrated that aiding insurgents—even communist-fighting insurgents—is a fundamentally different enterprise than aiding government forces (Findley, Nielson, & Sharman, 2013; Makarychev, 2008).

As the vehement debates surrounding intervention in Nicaragua illustrate, the question— to intervene or not to intervene in civil conflict— is indelibly bound to the side on which a state intervenes, whether an intervention supports a government or seeks to overthrow a government. Intervention scholars have largely brushed over differences between these types of interventions, despite theoretical arguments to suggest that intervening to undermine and intervening to support a sovereign government have different motivations, costs, and implications. Are there different costs for intervening on behalf of opposition groups than on behalf of government groups? Do the same factors influence the decision to intervene on behalf of government and opposition groups? When state leaders weigh the costs and benefits of intervention in the affairs of another state, are opposition sided interventions more or less costly than government sided interventions?
Scholars generally assume that intervention—regardless of side—in civil conflict is strategic. Given some goal, generally assumed to be ending conflict (Regan, 1996, 2002a, 2002b), state leaders weigh the costs and benefits of intervention and make a decision accordingly. If the benefits of intervention outweigh the costs of doing nothing, then an intervention is civil conflict is more likely than not. Yet, scholars and decision makers alike know that the decision making process “to intervene or not to intervene” is far from binary (Findley & Tze, 2006; Morgenthau, 1967). Leaders must choose not just “to intervene” but also on what side to intervene, how to intervene, and when to intervene. Rather than focusing on these question, the field has largely focused on the impact of third party intervention rather than a third party’s decision to intervene (Findley & Tze, 2006).

In addition to assuming that interventions are strategic, these designs implicitly assume that the decision calculus for opposition sided or government sided interventions are identical. If it is strategic to intervene on behalf of a government group, there will be an intervention. If there was not a strategic incentive, then there will be no intervention. The same process occurs for opposition sided interventions. Implicitly or explicitly, work generally assumes that government and opposition sided intervention are identical, but this assumption goes largely untested.

This work argues that there are systematic differences when intervening on behalf of opposition groups and on behalf of government groups. Norm violations do not represent the only cost for intervention, but there are the different costs of intervention on behalf of particular sides. Opposition and government sided interventions represent on the one hand, violation of state sovereignty, and on the other, respect for state sovereignty.
during crisis. Although sovereignty has seen challengers in recent years, such as the responsibility to protect, I argue that sovereignty still serves as the basis though which states interact. Sovereignty is still the status quo. In the midst of civil conflict, where a sovereign state is fighting to regain power, third party intervention on behalf of opposition groups is a clear violation of sovereignty. Despite the sovereignty’s ubiquity in international relations and foreign policy rhetoric, this is a fundamental difference in opposition and government sided interventions that previous literature has overlooked.

This article provides a framework for assessing the costs of government and rebel sided interventions. For theoretical and empirical reasons, previous literature has treated these types of intervention as identical. Building off of Regan’s framework for strategic interventions, this article argues that there are different costs for opposition and government sided interventions. These strategic considerations, primarily the violation of sovereignty in rebel sided interventions, make intervention on behalf of rebel groups a more costly foreign policy option than intervention on behalf of government groups.

**Previous Findings**

Much of the work on interventions in civil conflicts has focused on the effect of intervention on civil conflict, rather than on the decision to intervene itself. This focus is path dependent; much of the work on intervention, including this dissertation, began with Regan’s work. The seminal works on intervention by Regan (Regan, 2002a, 2002b) focused on the impact of intervention on the duration of intrastate conflict. Others have followed suit (Wood, Kathman, & Gent, 2012). For those looking at the intervention as the primary unit of interest, work has focused on the impact of particular domestic
variables in third party states still others have focused on the impact of political ideology and media coverage on the termination of interventions in state conflict (Koch & Sullivan, 2010; Perla, 2011). Most relevant to this article, conflict scholars have focused on the likelihood of intervention given certain domestic factors of the intervening state (Berinsky, 2007; Fordham, 2008; Koga, 2011; Regan, 1998; Taliaferro, 2004) or factors specific to the civil conflict state (Cook, 2008; Regan, 1998, 2000, 2002b). These studies focus primarily on the impact of factors such as domestic support for an intervention or the length of the conflict on the overall likelihood of intervention in civil conflict.

This is an important starting point because the focus was primarily on the effect of interventions on civil conflict, not the decision to intervene itself. This focus on either the impact of intervention or the termination of conflict is both theoretical and methodological. Given the moral drive to end conflict and the theoretical focus on conflict processes, focusing on the impact of intervention is understandable. Yet, focusing on duration of conflict or ending interventions also sidesteps a methodological problem that impacts much of conflict research. What dyads are relevant for the study of interventions? Should the United States always be considered a potential intervener? Should Ireland be considered a potential intervener in the Sierra Leone civil conflict during the 1990s? Deciding the universe of potential interveners is not trivial, and a dataset and estimator able to answer these questions would include many cases in which an intervention was simply impossible. This issue is addressed more fully in the second part of this dissertation.

In addition to the methodological problem, work on interventions has generally black boxed the decision to intervene. Work on interventions in civil conflict have
argued that state leaders’ decisions to intervene is strategic. If benefits for intervention outweigh the costs of intervention, a state is more likely to intervene in the affairs of others. There are hints about what kind of factors go in to making “strategic” decisions to intervene, but causal mechanisms remain fuzzy. Factors such as distance or alliances serve as proxies for strategic interest. Moreover, given the standard approach to intervention—treating opposition and government sided interventions as identical—authors implicitly or explicitly argue that these variables impact opposition and government sided interventions identically.

Some of the factors theorized to impact the decision to intervene are fairly self-explanatory; a state is more likely to intervene if the civil conflict is taking place in a neighboring state (Corbetta, 2010; F. S. Pearson, 1974a; Regan, 2000). This makes intuitive sense; states have a vested interest in preventing violence from spreading across borders or might have strong economic ties threatened by unrest. Thus, states are inherently more interested in proximate conflicts. Distance, here, is a sort of proxy for strategic interest. Likewise, the presence or absence of alliances suggests that a third party has a strategic interest, such as strong trade ties, with a state experiencing civil conflict. If a possible intervener has strong alliances with a state experiencing conflict, Corbetta (2010) argues, a state has more strategic interests to protect in the face of civil conflict, and, thus, more incentive to pay the costs of intervention. Studies find that alliances, capabilities, political or ideological similarities, and geographic contiguity are the primary variables determining whether or not states intervene in a conflict (Corbetta, 2010; F. S. Pearson, 1974b). From the point of view of the intervener, these factors are
lumped together as strategic considerations that play the primary role in a state’s decision to intervene in the affairs of another state (Fordham, 2008).

In other words, factors like alliances or geographic contiguity help decision makers discern the possible costs and benefits of a military intervention in civil conflicts. Given that the actual costs of a military intervention are difficult to discern ex ante (Regan, 2000), characteristics of the conflict, the intervener, or the state in which the intervention occurs are particularly valuable for decision makers and for the study of foreign policy. Taken as a whole, these variables influence the foreign policy leaders’ opportunity and willingness to intervene (Most & Starr, 1989). Using Most & Starr’s formulation, opportunity is about a state’s capacity to deal with some issue or problem. The opportunity to intervene is dependent on the “military/coercive, economic, and political resources it can bring to bear” for or against a particular side in a conflict (H. Starr, 1994, pp. 486-487). For example, states with more military capacity are more able to intervene in civil conflict; these states have more opportunities to intervene.

Willingness, on the other hand, “refers to the willingness to choose (even if the choice is no action), and to employ the capabilities to further some policy option over others” (Most & Starr, 1989, p. 23). For states with the opportunity to intervene, what factors push states to intervene in the affairs of others? Ethnic ties between the potential intervener and the conflict state, for instance, influence whether a state is more or less willing to join the fray, but has no bearing on the potential intervener’s capability to do so.

Moving beyond the decision to intervene, the literature on the decision to intervene on a particular side of civil conflict is sparse. Regan (Regan, 1998, 2002b) and others argue that states are more likely to intervene if “(1) there is a reasonable
expectation for success, (2) the projected time horizon for achieving the outcome is short, and (3) there is domestic support for the policy” (Regan, 1998, p. 757). In short, if an opportune moment (in terms of expected utility) emerges in the midst of a conflict, a state would be more likely to intervene- regardless of the side on which the intervention occurs. These parameters for intervention are also tied to the goal of an intervention in civil conflict. Regan (1998) and others have assumed that the goal of an intervention is the “cessation of hostilities” (p. 760). While Regan admits that there are other possible goals for intervention in civil conflict, he argues that “other desired outcomes can often be achieved by stopping the fighting or requiring this as a necessary first step” (1998, p. 760). While Regan does not talk about sidedness, seeing the cessation of hostilities as the primary goal for an intervention effectively sidesteps state preferences for government or opposition forces to prevail. Regan’s primary interest is in the civil conflict, rather than the decision to intervene in civil conflict. This focus allows him to avoid the question of state preferences, but a more actor-centric approach to intervention in civil conflicts requires theorizing about sidedness.

While there are some testable propositions stemming from Regan’s premise, they say nothing about intervention on a particular side. Given that interventions, specifically military interventions, are one of the more complex policy decisions leaders can face (Regan, 2000), systematically determining costs and benefits for interventions in general is a difficult task. The assumption that there are strategic motivations to intervene is a valuable one for those focused one impact of interventions on conflict processes or the duration of civil conflicts. However, this framework is poorly suited to “answer who intervenes, why and on whose side?” because these questions are framed in terms of the
third party, not the conflict” (Findley & Tze, 2006, p. 828). Existing research reveals something about what kinds of factors might make actors more interested in intervening, but little about on what side actors are more likely to intervene in the affairs of others. This is an especially important question because states often intervene on opposing sides of a conflict, suggesting that interveners prefer very different outcomes in a given civil conflict (Findley & Tze, 2006, p. 830).
CHAPTER 3
BREAKING APART INTERVENTION

Evidence suggests that considerations such as geographic proximity or alliances do not provide an adequate account of the decision making process. Recent work has detailed the impact of loss aversion (Taliaferro, 2004), foreign policy leader’s political ideology (Koch & Sullivan, 2010), and public perceptions (Berinsky, 2007; Perla, 2011) on the decision to intervene and the way in which interventions are conducted. Even so, determining how exactly those factors influence the likelihood of intervention has been problematic. In part, this has been due to the field’s focus on the question: “To intervene or not to intervene” (Morgenthau, 1967). While this is a fine starting point, it is time to move beyond this question. We need to not only ask what factors influence the decision to intervene in intrastate conflict but what factors influence how, on what side, or when a state intervenes- or chooses not to intervene. What factors are associated with intervening on behalf of a rebel group or on behalf of government groups?

With few exceptions, existing theoretical motivations make no distinction between interventions on behalf opposition groups or on behalf of government groups. Lumping together government and opposition sided interventions obscures the motivations for intervention and distinct characteristics of government and opposition forces. For instance, does intervening on behalf of an opposition group reveal that a state is unhappy with the current group in power? In addition, treating intervention as a single category muddies the causal mechanisms for factors believed to be associated with
intervention. Do factors such as whether or not the third party intervener was a former colonizer influence the decision to intervene on behalf of opposition groups and on behalf of rebel groups differently? In dichotomizing the outcome variable as “intervention” or “no intervention,” studies assume that various factors, such as distance or alliance patterns, have the same effect on all decisions to intervene.

Yet, the decision to intervene is bound to intervention on a particular side of civil conflict. To use “alliance” as an example, studies that include the presence of an alliance between a civil conflict state and a potential intervener implicitly assume that alliances have the same impact on government sided intervention as opposition sided interventions. In the recent civil conflict in Syria, Russian naval connections and alliances with Syria would have predicted that Syria would be likely to intervene, but in reality, researchers want to say that this alliance made it much more likely to intervene on behalf of the Syrian government. Given the uncertainty surrounding Syrian opposition forces, the Russian government has an incentive to protect its naval base and alliance with the sitting government (Fisher, 2013).

Existing studies that separate government and opposition sided interventions help partially identify motivations for intervention and characteristics of particular actors, but these works just begin to explore the importance of sidedness in intervention behavior. For example, in one of the few studies that focuses on rebel sided interventions versus government sided interventions, Findley and Tze (2006) argue that when a rival intervenes on one side of a civil conflict, a state is more likely to intervene on behalf of the side opposite its rival. If the USSR intervened on behalf of a rebel group during the Cold War, the U.S. was more likely to intervene on behalf of the government. Here, the
motivations for the subsequent intervention is more specific than simply “strategic.”

Given the rivalry between the U.S. and USSR, if the U.S. intervened on behalf of government forces, the larger power struggle between the two powers would motivate the USSR to intervene on the opposite side of the United States. However, this approach does not illuminate the original impetus for the U.S. to intervene on behalf of some group.

For Findley and Tze, geopolitical considerations impact the initial decision to intervene on behalf of a particular group. Characteristics of the group, such as whether the group was an opposition or government group, did not have an impact on the decision. Similarly focused on the decision to intervene, Shirkey (2012) argues that rebel group’s inability to make credible commitments influences the decision to intervene on one side or another. Shirkey is one of the few studies that argues that the opposition and government groups’ different characteristics, in this case, centralization of authority and political legitimacy, impact third party intervention behavior. For Shirkey, opposition groups lack the credibility and legitimacy government groups enjoy. Opposition groups have more difficulty promising outcomes to potential third party interveners. Focusing on these sorts of dynamics is rare in the interventions literature, and this project seeks to build on these approaches.

I argue that there strong theoretical reasons to treat government and opposition sided interventions differently. I now a) provide a theoretical justification for different cost associated with government and opposition sided interventions and b) show that factors posited to influence the decision to intervene have different effects on government and opposition sided interventions.
Theoretical Justification for Differing Motivations and Costs

Are there systematic differences in intervening on behalf of opposition versus government forces? Existing literature reveals little about how factors that impact the initial decision to intervene change when focused on a particular side in civil conflict.

I argue that there are inherent theoretical differences between intervening on behalf of a government group and intervening on behalf of an opposition group. These differences should result in different overall likelihood of intervention on behalf of government and opposition groups and different factors impacting the likelihood of intervention on behalf of a particular side. These differences are primarily due to violation of sovereignty when intervening on behalf of an opposition group. Deciding to intervene on behalf of a government group reflects respect for sovereignty and the desire to maintain the status quo. Intervening on behalf of a rebel group clearly violates state sovereignty, one of the strongest norms in international relations theory and practice.

Intervening against a government is an indication that foreign policy decision makers in the third party state are dissatisfied with the status quo. Most of the time, most states do not intervene in the affairs of others. In other words, respecting sovereignty whether by not intervening or intervening to aid a sovereign government is respecting the status quo. On the other hand, decision makers willing to aid opposition forces reveal a preference for changing the power structures within a state experiencing civil conflict. Supporting the government side reveals a preference for maintaining the particular leaders or institutional structures in a given state. In this sense, supporting a government respects the sovereign—whether a group of individuals or a set of institutions—as the legitimate authority in a state. Focusing on inherent differences between opposition and
government sided interventions allows me to test states’ respect for sovereignty. Willfully violating norms and bucking the status quo incurs costs in terms of domestic public opinion and international audience costs. While these costs may not be prohibitive, political leaders are sensitive to these costs. Sovereignty, then should have a marked influence on the cost/benefit calculation to intervene on a particular side in civil conflict.

Sovereignty and International Relations

In international relations theory, international organizations, and foreign policy rhetoric, sovereignty is pervasive. In order for there to be states to analyze, there must be some level of respect for sovereignty. This is not to say that sovereignty is iron clad, but sovereignty serves as the basis through which states interact. While emerging norms surrounding human rights have caught the academic spotlight in recent years, these norms emerge in a context where sovereignty is the primary norm in international relations theory and law.

Modern conceptions of state sovereignty date back at least to the Peace of Westphalia, but “few ideas are as contested as sovereignty in theory or in practice” (Wendt & Duvall, 2008). Sovereignty has at least two meanings in academic parlance-first as “supreme power” and the second as “autonomy or independence” (Joffe, 1999, p. 122). Defining sovereign as “supreme power” is an old definition; this definition refers to the king or leader of some territory as having supreme power over the land, people, and resources. The second definition, as “autonomy or independence” refers to the relationship a state has with other states. Here, sovereignty has two parts 1) the freedom
to act autonomously within its own borders and 2) the freedom from outside intervention; to be seen as independent of other state’s whims and preferences. State sovereignty denoting independence and ultimate power within a territory is one of the pillars of realist theories of international relations (Waltz, 1979) as well as the basis for international organizations (Ruggie, 1983).

Nonintervention continues to be a “necessary corollary” for sovereignty (Krasner, 2001b, p. 21). Nonintervention is only a norm because there are sovereign states facing the possibility of intervention. Krasner states the principle of nonintervention clearly: “One state does not have the right to intervene in the internal affairs of another” (2001b, p. 21). Defining what constitutes the “internal affairs” of another state and even recognizing the existence of another state is not without problems because sovereignty influences each of these phases. Ruggie (1983) argues that sovereignty is akin to property rights at the domestic level, in the sense that these Lockean principles govern the social and political relationships between the property owners. At a basic level, property rights delineate what can be considered “mine” versus “yours.” The territorially bound sovereign state delineates what is considered “domestic politics” and what is considered “international relations.” Sovereignty not only “orders the minds of policymakers” (Krasner, 1995, p. 115) but also scholars who draw any sort of distinction between domestic and international politics.

In addition to theoretical importance, sovereignty and nonintervention are imbedded in international institutions. Ruggie (1983) argues that sovereignty has developed its own institutional framework. Chiefly among these is the notion of sovereignty enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter. As a framework, this lays out
not just sovereignty as a standard, but also the closely related concept of non-intervention. The UN Charter (1945) states:

> Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.

Interventions into issues that are “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” go against notions of sovereignty as stated in the UN Charter. Although the UN Charter goes on to outline conditions under which nonintervention may be violated, state sovereignty remains a core concept of the UN and international relations generally.

Sovereignty is a constant theme in foreign policy rhetoric. In the policy realm, policymakers routinely deploy sovereignty to justify or undermine interventions in state conflict. The Obama administration stated that Russia’s recent incursion into Ukraine was a “violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” (House, 2014, March 6). In response, the Russian government pointed to the Ukrainian unrest as a coup and argued that Russian intervention was necessary to protect “Ukraine’s sovereignty and constitutional order” (Lynch, 2014, February 22). Sovereignty is at the core of the dispute regarding humanitarian aid to Syria in the ongoing humanitarian crisis. In order for any hope of a UN resolution to pass through the Security Council, states asked for reassurance that Syria’s sovereignty would be respected (Lynch, 2014, February 22). Recent French intervention on behalf of the government in Mali explicitly referenced restoring “sovereignty” as a primary policy objective (Valdmanis, 2013). The harsh debate and criticism over the U.S. use of drones in Pakistan touches on many
aspects of international relations, including arguments that use of drones violates Pakistan’s sovereignty (L. Charbonneau, 2013). While there are certainly myriad factors impacting the decision to intervene in domestic conflict, recent debates surrounding Ukraine, Syria, and Mali illustrate that sovereignty is a consistent part of the foreign policy debate, particularly for states’ decisions involving interventions in the affairs of others.

**Theoretical Justification**

Sovereignty touches almost every aspect of international relations theory and practice, but its impact on foreign policy decisions has yet to be fully tested. Constructivists have long maintained that norms constrain state behavior and explain state interests (Klotz, 1995). In opposition to theories that rest on variation in material capabilities as the explanatory factor, constructivists maintain that “state interests are determined in part by system level-norms” (Klotz, 1995, p. 461). In Klotz’s work on global racial equality’s impact on U.S. policy towards South Africa, she argues that traditional notions of military and economic interests cannot fully account for U.S. policy toward South African during apartheid. As global norms of racial equality pervaded U.S. domestic politics, U.S. policy makers began to reevaluate policy interests in South Africa. Norms impact the “legitimation of certain goals and means” (Klotz, 1995, p. 462). Rather than focus on global racial equality or human rights more generally, I argue that sovereignty impacts the legitimacy of intervention on behalf of government and opposition forces. As one of the oldest, albeit most contested (Wendt & Duvall, 2008),
norms in international relations, sovereignty creates more and less costly foreign policy options for political leaders.

Several cases suggest that the norm of international sovereignty impacts leaders’ decisions to intervene in intrastate conflict. Specifically, violating sovereignty raises the costs of intervention on behalf of opposition groups. One study examining interventions by regional African organizations suggests that even though the decision to act is primarily one of national interest, issues of sovereignty and human rights likely impact the manner and timing of interventions (Tavares, 2011). From a state perspective, Cook (2008) finds that the Clinton administrations’ decision not to intervene militarily in Sierra Leone was in part related to the notion of sovereignty. Intervention in Sierra Leone would have meant intervention in opposition to a sovereign government. Likewise, in a qualitative study of U.S. leaders during the Rwandan Genocide, now UN Ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power argues (2001) that the Clinton administration “passed up countless opportunities to intervene” in part due to a bias to favor sovereign states (Power, 2001, p. 84). Government officials, Power argues, are more likely to trust other governments rather than rebels.

More recently, the Lebanese government clearly stated support for sovereignty in reference to recent unrest in Bahrain. Despite some prominent politicians expressing support for Bahraini opposition, a government official stated,

The Lebanese government supports the sovereignty, independence, and stability of the Kingdom of Bahrain and strengthening the historic relations between the two governments and peoples on the basis of noninterference by any country in the internal affairs of another country (News, 2015, February 26)
This suggests that even though prominent factions in Lebanon would support aiding the opposition movement in Bahrain, the government is striving to remain out of the conflict rather than violate sovereignty. Taken as a whole, these vignettes suggest that leaders see costs to violating sovereignty. While these costs were not the only factors influencing the decision making process, decision makers in states and international organizations must factor in potential costs—both domestic and international—to violating sovereignty.

In general, violating norms in international relations come with a cost. Although the cost may not be prohibitive, the normative context in which decisions occur influences the decision calculus. Finnemore (2003) argues that attributing a military intervention to simple “self-interest” is insufficient. Foreign policy leaders are constrained by a number of factors including normative considerations such as sovereignty. For instance, Donno (2010) found that regional organizations punished member states guilty of violating electoral misconduct domestically. Others argue that great powers are especially keen on enforcing norms—whether norms surrounding abolition of slavery or modern norms surrounding terrorist activity—whether through coercion or persuasion (DeNevers, 2007).

Human rights literature suggests that international organizations can play a role in naming and shaming human rights violators (Lebovic & Voeten, 2009). Risse and Sikkink argue that human rights norms are the perfect test case for norms influencing state behavior because “international human rights norms challenge state rule over society and national sovereignty” (1999, p. 4). They go on to argue that human rights are an especially fruitful area to study norms because “they are contested and compete with other principled ideas” (Risse & Sikkink, 1999, p. 4). I argue that sovereignty is first
among these “other principled ideas.” Testing whether sovereignty has an impact on intervention behavior is, in some ways, the other side of the human rights coin. Forcing governments to protect human rights is problematic because states are viewed as sovereign, because states do not see protection of human rights as in their interests, and because intervening to protect human rights has no success guarantee. Like intervention on behalf of an opposition group, intervening to force a government to respect human rights is violating state sovereignty and bucking the status quo. While a government violating human rights is violating emerging human rights norms, failing to intervene to stop human rights violations is implicitly or explicitly upholding sovereignty norms.

Refraining from intervention and intervening on behalf of a sovereign government upholds sovereignty. Yet, sovereignty’s power can be seen even as states attempt to overthrow sitting governments. Even when states choose to violate non-intervention norms, there is often lip service to these norms and/or political calculations accounting for future costs. For example, the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, and more recent foray into Crimea, illustrate that even though a norm of nonintervention may seem to have failed, Russian political rhetoric rejects the notion that there was an intervention at all. Russian rhetoric continues to claim that Russia is working towards upholding the sovereignty of the people of Georgia (Allison, 2009). In a similar case, the international community has imposed costs on Russia for violating Ukraine’s sovereignty (US Department of State 2014). While these costs may not be enough to prohibit Russian incursions, these costs are factored into the political calculus when deciding to intervene in the affairs of another state. Although previous literature has not taken sovereignty into account, literature on interventions focuses on a policy options costs and benefits. For
interventions specifically, Regan (1998, 2002b) argues that the costs of intervention—such as domestic and international audience costs—matter, especially if the intervention is unsuccessful.
CHAPTER 4

SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION

Theoretical Expectations

Overall, this dissertation argues that government and opposition sided interventions are different. Opposition sided interventions clearly violate sovereignty whereas government sided intervention do not. Building off of previous work on interventions, decision makers try to determine the costs and benefits of intervention ex ante (van der Maat, 2011). As a result, I expect factors associated with intervention to have a different impact on these two types of intervention. Factors such as alliances with a civil conflict state or even the distance between a potential intervener and a civil conflict state should have a different impact on opposition and government sided interventions. While there are a variety of factors that should impact government and opposition sided intervention differently, political constraints will be the first factor examined here.

We know that anticipated audience costs play a role in the decision to intervene in civil conflicts (Regan, 1998, 2002a; van der Maat, 2011). Decision makers who perceive high audience costs, whether due to failed intervention or for an intervention are less likely to choose that policy option. Domestic audience costs stem from two sources, the general public and domestic institutional backlash (Baum & Potter, 2008). In terms of domestic institutions, scholars have theorized that, given regular elections, leaders in democracies face higher audience costs for potential foreign policy mistakes than autocracies (Fearon, 1994). Yet, as work on autocracies has shown, autocracies face
audience costs as well (Weeks, 2008). Audience costs for autocracies and democracies stem from domestic groups’ ability to punish a leader, whether through expulsion of a leader through elections, a coup, or blocking other policy proposals. At its core, audience costs suggest that leaders are not free to choose any option; they are constrained by a variety of domestic factors.

Audience costs are important in two ways. First, audience costs matter when determining the likelihood of success in intervening in civil conflict (Regan, 1998). Given that the likelihood of success is a difficult calculation to make, foreign policy leaders must take audience costs for protracted conflict or complete failures into account. Second, and most important for the purposes of this article, audience costs matter when examining on what side an intervention will occur. Intervening on behalf of an opposition group is a clear violation of sovereignty--whether providing military aid or committing troops--on behalf of a rebel group. Theoretically, sovereignty at the international level is closely related to the notion of non-intervention. Practically, these norms mean that the decision to intervene on behalf of a government is a more domestically and internationally “acceptable” decision. Costs of violating this norm raises the cost of intervening on behalf of opposition groups for actors engaged in the decision making process.

Previous research suggests that public opinion is sensitive to norms surrounding state sovereignty. Although their work is limited to the U.S., Jentleson and Britton (1998) argue that of the primary policy objectives for the use of force, “internal political change” is the unpopular among ordinary citizens. Other foreign policy objectives such as deterring aggression, as the U.S. argued was its primary policy objective during the
Gulf War for instance, are viewed more favorably (Jentleson, 1992; Jentleson & Britton, 1998). U.S. citizens are less comfortable with military intervention with the expressed purpose of internal political change because the U.S. public sees internal political change as messy, long-term, and primarily political rather than military (Dury et al., 1992). In similar studies, the U.S. public reflects a realist perspective on foreign policy (Drezner, 2008). Drezner demonstrates that the American public shows more support for the use of force when reflective of policy objectives that “place great value on state sovereignty” (Drezner, 2008, p. 55). Using force for “humanitarian interventions, multilateral peacekeeping, and intervention in civil conflicts” reflects liberal policy objectives (Drezner, 2008, p. 55); generally, the American public is more wary of these justifications for the use of force.

I argue that this logic can be applied to government and opposition sided interventions in civil conflict. Like others, Drezner does not explicitly make a distinction between government and opposition sided intervention in civil conflict. Yet, intervention on behalf of a government group rather than a non-state actor is “consistent with fundamental international principles regarding sovereignty and self-determination” (Drezner, 2008, p. 59). Since intervention on behalf of an opposition group challenges the sovereignty of a sitting government, these types of intervention reflect different motivations and carry different costs for state leaders. Building on Jentleson’s work, intervention on behalf of a government does not imply any sort of internal political change; instead, supporting the government reflects a foreign policy option that supports the status quo. The basic distinction between supporting internal change through aiding opposition groups and supporting the status quo through aiding a government helps shed
light on the motivations for intervention in civil conflict. In the case of internal political change generally and opposition sided interventions specifically, norms seem to influence public opinion surrounding the use of force (Dury et al., 1992; Jentleson, 1992).

Foreign policy leaders are attentive to domestic and international political context (Farnham, 2004; Finnemore, 2003; Lobell, Ripsman, & Taliaferro, 2009; Regan, 1998). These constraints may be in the form of elections, public opinion, or legislatures. Domestic political constraints like public opinion illustrate one part of the domestic political context decision makers must contend with when creating foreign policy. While there are many ways to examine domestic constraints, a generalizable way to examine constraints on policymaking is through examination of veto points (Henisz, 2010; O'Reilly, 2005; Tsebelis, 2000; Tsebellis & Ha, 2014). Focusing on veto players in a political system allows for comparisons across level of democracy and domestic institutions (presidential or parliamentary, for instance) (Tsebelis, 2000). As more players are included in the foreign policy process, the costs of violating a norm become more apparent for each actor involved. Checks on the executive ensure that these potential costs do not go unnoticed. Thus, costs of intervening on behalf of rebel groups should be especially apparent in states with more political constraints.

Foreign policy costs can stem from veto players imbedded in domestic institutions. Intervention on behalf of opposition groups violates sovereignty and upsets the status quo. Focusing on the veto players in the policy making process provides insight into leaders facing audience costs. As there are more veto players engaged in the policy process, leaders contend with more actors that a) provide input into the decision making process and b) can act as whistleblowers for the general public (Baum & Potter,
Thus, systems with more actors involved in the decision making process generate higher potential audience costs for foreign policy leaders.

In addition to adding to the literature on domestic political constraints, factors that are known the have a negative effect on the likelihood of intervention in civil conflict should have a different effect on the likelihood of intervention on behalf of rebel groups. For example, the presence of alliances, should have a different impact on intervention for or against government forces. Presumably, any sort of formal alliance between two states suggests that the third party intervener would be more likely to aid a government entity than work to undermine a government. While this is a fairly basic supposition, it has yet to be fully explored empirically. In addition, in passing, Drezner (2008) notes that the American public is more supportive of the use of military force in Latin American than elsewhere in the world. Given the geographic proximity, the costs of these military actions are lower and U.S. interest more clear. For example, a potential intervener’s distance from the civil conflict state should have a more pronounced negative effect on interventions on behalf of opposition groups than on behalf of government groups. In addition to focusing on political constraints, I will also examine whether and how each of these factors influence the intervention on a particular side.

**Hypotheses**

This work’s core assumption is that government and opposition sided interventions are fundamentally different. Thus, the first simply hypothesis for this work is:

**H1:** Factors that impact intervention on behalf of governments will be different than factors that impact the interventions on behalf of opposition groups.
This hypothesis is simple, but it is important to illustrate that interventions on behalf of government groups and opposition groups are different empirically and theoretically. Without any covariates, the overall likelihood of intervention on behalf of a government is slightly higher than the likelihood of intervention on behalf of an opposition group, but each of these possibilities is exceedingly rare (less than 1%). Previous studies have largely black boxed sidedness, treating the side on which an intervention occurs as an indicator that certain strategic interests were at play. Yet, scholars generally ignore if and how interests for government and opposition groups differ. This hypothesis simply tests that assumption.

What accounts for the differences that I expect to find in government and opposition sided interventions? I argue that sovereignty as an international norm and institution makes intervening on behalf of rebel groups a higher cost policy option than intervening on behalf of a government group or simply not intervening.

Political constraints are an area in which these differences should be especially apparent. Intervening against a sovereign government violates international norms and represents a shift in the status quo. Political leaders at every level, regardless of level of democracy, are sensitive to these costs. Costs of bucking the status quo and violating norms should be more apparent in states with more political constraints.

H2: All things being equal, states with more political constraints should be less likely to intervene on behalf of opposition groups.

Building off of existing literature, proximity to the conflict has an impact on the decision to intervene in civil conflicts. This cost should be more apparent for opposition sided groups than for government sided groups.
H3: All things being equal, distance will have a greater negative impact on the states interventions on behalf of opposition than intervention on behalf of governments.

Distance, here, is a proxy for strategic interest. States neighboring states are more likely to see an influx of refugees fleeing civil conflict and more likely to have business interests in the state experiencing civil conflict. States more proximate to the conflict also face lower barriers to movement of military equipment and even troops. In terms of logistics, it is cheaper and easier to move supplies a shorter distance than a longer one. While these strategic interests might have an impact on both government and opposition sided interventions, I expect distance to have a greater negative impact on opposition sided intervention. Given the uncertainty surrounding opposition sided intervention, states should be less willing to transport military supplies across long distances for a rebel group. On a related note, I suspect that rebels are more difficult to aid than opposition groups. Rebels groups, especially relatively weak rebel groups, do not generally have a “return address” in the same way that governments, even weak governments, do. In ability to deliver aid after having traveled long distances makes it even less likely for a state to aid far away opposition groups.
CHAPTER 5

EMPIRICS

Data and Methods

In order to test my hypotheses on the differences between rebel and government sided interventions, I use data from various sources. Using Koga’s (2011) dataset as a base, the data on interventions comes from Regan (2002b) and Kisangani and Pickering’s (2008; E. F. P. J. Kisangani, 2007) datasets on military interventions. Combined with data on intrastate conflict according to PRIO (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002; Harbom & Wallensteen, 2008), these data reflect instances of intervention in civil conflict. The term intervention has multiple meanings in everyday parlance and in academic literature. For the purposes of this project, I focus on state sponsored military interventions in intrastate conflict. I use Kisangani and Pickering’s (2008) definition and dataset as the basis for military interventions. Kisangani and Pickering (2008) define military interventions as “the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc.) of one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute” (F. Pearson & Baumann, 1993, p. 1). This does not include economic aid to one side of a conflict or diplomatic interventions (for discussion of these kinds of interventions, see (Regan & Aydin, 2006)). Military interventions are particularly costly foreign policy choices for states (Findley & Tze, 2006; Mullenbach, 2005). Given the high cost, the factors that impact if, how, and when to intervene militarily are important aspects of the foreign policy decision making process.
In addition to focusing exclusively on military interventions, this work also ignores interventions by international organizations. This focus provides information specifically on state interventions rather than estimating one-size-fits-all models that throw state interventions and interventions by international organizations into the same theoretical and empirical framework. There are several theoretical reasons for this separation. First, there is good reason to believe that the mechanism by which the United Nations, for example, chooses to be involved in conflicts is different than the mechanism by which an individual state chooses to be involved in the affairs of another state.

Previous studies have brushed over these differences. For instance, Mullenbach (2005) compares the international influences of third-party peacekeeping missions for United Nations peacekeeping, regional intergovernmental organization peacekeeping, and state peacekeeping missions. To isolate systemic factors that influence the likelihood of intervention, he estimates separate logistic regression models for each type of intervention. Mullenbach operationalized the norm of non-intervention as a simple dummy variable for the Cold War. Setting aside the shaky operationalization of non-intervention as a norm, this variable should have different implications for particular types of interveners. The end of the Cold War likely meant something different to the UN as it did to the United States. Mullenbach’s approach implicitly assumes that the factors that influence the United Nations, regional IOs, and states are identical. Focusing on state interventions alone allows a cleaner theoretical story about interventions and avoids some of the operationalization issues Mullenbach and others have faced.

An additional benefit of focusing on state interventions is that it allows me to employ an actor centric approach to foreign policy (Hudson, 2005). Focusing on the
possible intervening state, rather than exclusively on the civil conflict process, allows me to unpack the decision making process for state leaders, a line of inquiry that needs theoretical and empirical exploration (Findley & Tze, 2006).

The unit of analysis is dyad per civil conflict year. Each dyad contains a state in which a civil conflict occurs and a potential intervener. With this unit of analysis, the dataset contains 147,933 lines. Due to data availability, the models described here utilize 74,054 observations for civil conflicts occurring from 1945 to 1999. The decision to include all possible interveners in the dataset was a conscious and controversial one.

Given the few cases of intervention, a strong critique of this analysis is that I am including many “irrelevant” dyads. In the many cases in which there were no interventions there are plenty of dyads in which it is unrealistic to think of a possible military intervention. One simple solution to this problem would be to use only political relevant dyads rather than all possible dyads in which an intervention was possible in intrastate conflict. In an attempt to do this, I included a “politically relevant” variable from Eugene (Bennett & Stam, 2000). After dropping all political irrelevant dyads, I was left with a condensed dataset, but I was also left with nearly 60 fewer cases of intervention. This suggests that the political relevance variable is poorly measured, and that more work needs to be done to determine what political relevance means in this context (for recent discussion of political relevance in conflict data, see Xiang (2010)). While this is beyond the scope of this chapter, Xiang’s work is a clear path forward for research on civil conflicts.

Before discussing model selection, an examination of descriptive statistics is instructive. Using Kisangani and Pickering’s (E. Kisangani & Pickering, 2008) data on
military interventions and PRIO’s definition of civil conflict, major powers prove to be the most frequent interveners. The United States, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom are in the top five. It is no surprise that Great Powers account for many interventions in state conflict. Great Powers generally have the military capabilities and the worldwide interests that make them more likely to intervene in intrastate conflict. Closer examination of this list does present some potentially interesting cases. China, in comparison to other Great Powers is relatively low on the list (only 7 interventions compared to the 52 for the United States). While it has only been in the last several decades that China has emerged as a major power, this relatively low frequency might be something to investigate in future research. There are also several states with relatively high numbers of interventions outsides of the traditional great powers. Egypt (12 interventions), Pakistan (11 interventions), South Africa (11 interventions), and Iran (10 interventions) all exhibit relatively high frequency for intervention. At first, glance, some of these states have been considered regional hegemons, like Egypt for example. A table with intervention frequency is included in the appendix.

I have included four models in this analysis. Models 1 and 2 are logistic regressions with binary outcomes (intervention on behalf of a particular side or no intervention on behalf of a particular sided). Model 1 codes government sided interventions as one and no intervention or rebel sided intervention as zero. Model 2 codes opposition sided interventions as one and no interventions or government sided interventions as zero. This is in line with other studies on interventions (Koga, 2011; Mullenbach, 2005). However, the simple logit collapses a three category dependent variable into a simple dummy; thus, a multinomial logistic regression allows me to take
advantage of the variation in the dependent variable and more fully test my hypotheses. Model 3 and 4 are multinomial logistic regressions with government sided intervention, opposition sided intervention, and no intervention as outcomes. Model 3 uses no intervention as the base category, and Model 4 uses government sided interventions as the base category.

**Independent Variables and Alternative Explanations**

The main independent variable of interest in this study is a measure of domestic political constraints. This measure comes from Henisz (2010). Higher scores for political constraints indicates a more constrained executive. Henisz’s measure takes several types of constraints into account. The two major aspects of the measure are “the number of independent veto points over policy outcomes” and “the distribution of preferences of the actors that inhabit them” (Heinsz 2005). This measure is particularly appropriate for examining the decision making process for military interventions because it focuses on “the extent to which a given political actor is constrained in his or her choice of future policies” (Henisz, 2005, p. 3). Deciding to intervene in a civil conflict is necessarily a change from the status quo (not intervening in civil conflict). Thus, political discretion is paramount to the likelihood a state chooses to intervene in civil conflicts.

In addition to the discussion of independent variables, I have also included a table of descriptive information below.
The distance variable comes from Eugene (Bennett & Stam, 2000). Other studies have found that neighboring states are more likely to intervene in intrastate conflict (Regan, 2000; van der Maat, 2011). Rather than included a simple dummy variable for neighboring dyads, I included a logged distance measure from Eugene (Aydin, 2012; Bennett & Stam, 2000; Koga, 2011). This variable captures the distance between capital cities in miles between dyads. In keeping with previous literature, I expect this variable to have a negative influence on the likelihood of intervening versus not intervening.

Moreover, I expect that distance’s negative impact will have a more pronounced negative effect on opposition sided interventions rather than government sided interventions. The logic underlying distance’s negative effect suggests that, in general, states have fewer strategic interests in faraway places. Thus, the incentive to intervene is lower for civil
conflicts occurring on the other side of the world. This should impact the overall likelihood of intervention, but may influence the decision to intervene on a particular side. However, logistics play an important role in interventions. Transporting military equipment, troops, and supplies is both costly and difficult. When intervening on behalf of an opposition group, this transport and delivery is all the more difficult. During the recent Syrian conflict, for instance, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry expressed dismay that arms were not flowing to rebel groups as quickly as the U.S. government had hoped (B. Starr, 2013). Thus, I expect this variable to have a more negative effect on opposition sided interventions than government sided interventions.

Rebel Strength

With the introduction of Cunningham, Gleditch, and Salehyan’s (2009) dataset on rebel strength relative to governments during civil conflicts, work on the impact of rebel strength on civil conflict duration and outcome has increased. However, the impact of rebel strength relative to government strength on the likelihood of intervention is unclear. First, rebel strength can be used as a sort of proxy variable for the intensity of the civil conflict. Second, the potential intervener’s intention has a strong impact on the decision to intervene in support of a strong or weak rebel group in any given civil conflict. There are competing theoretical stories about the impact of rebel strength on intervention behavior and civil conflict dynamics, so this variable is included as a control variable in this analysis (Gent, 2008; Shirkey, 2012). Inclusion of rebel strength as a variable in this analysis highlights the need for a categorical dependent variable in the study of interventions. Shirkey (2012) argues that aiding opposition groups is more challenging because opposition groups typically cannot make credible commitments to third parties.
This suggests that as rebel groups become stronger in relation to government forces, the likelihood of intervention on their behalf should rise. In a related vein, if an opposition group is very weak in comparison to the government, a third party observer might conclude that the opposition group is unlikely to win. For leaders considering intervention, previous studies theorize that the higher the likelihood a side “wins” (whatever is defined as winning, here), the higher the likelihood of intervention. Thus, like the credible commitments argument, as opposition groups grow stronger in relation to the government, the likelihood of intervention on their behalf should increase.

Time
Also included in the analysis is the number of years from when the conflict began to the point at which an intervention occurs. Thus far, work on interventions suggests that interveners are more likely to jump into a conflict at the beginning stages of (Regan, 2002b). Despite the use of time as a control variable, questions concerning the timing of interventions in intrastate conflict are generally ignored. Following Regan, most studies expect that timing is entirely a matter of strategy. States will intervene when it is in their best interests to do so. Yet, given the choice to intervene on behalf of government forces or opposition forces, the elapsed time from the beginning of the conflict to the point at which and intervention occurs may vary for interventions on behalf of governments and opposition forces. I argue that constraints govern the timing of interventions, among these- sovereignty as an international norm. While strategic concerns might overcome these considerations, I expect these biases will result in differing patterns of intervention for rebel sided and government sided interventions in terms of timing. Namely, states will be more likely to quickly intervene on behalf of governments than rebel groups.
Deciding to intervene on behalf of rebel groups will take longer to weigh the costs and benefits than a state considering an intervention on behalf governments.

From a theoretical perspective, I expect time to have a linear effect. I expect states to be more likely to intervene on behalf of governments at the very beginning of the conflict and for states to hesitate to intervene on behalf of opposition group. Thus, I have included a simple count of the number of years from the beginning of the conflict to the point at which an intervention occurs. In the appendix, I have also included models with polynomials of time (time, time squared, and time cubed). Time squared is significant in a positive direction. However, the inclusion of time squared and time cubed has no real substantive impact on the other variables.

Polity IV Scores
Like the polity score of the potential intervener, this is a common control variable for studies on intervention in civil conflict (Aydin, 2012; Koga, 2011; Regan, 2002b). This variable comes from Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2010). Additionally, the Polity IV score of the potential intervening state is included as a control variable. In studies focusing on the decision to intervene, including a democracy score is necessary, but also leads to some conflicting expectations. Building off of selectorate theory (Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, 2004), Koga (2011) argues democracies are “likely to intervene militarily in civil conflict when intervention is consistent with the preferences of a significant portion of their citizens and its outcome is likely to satisfy them” (Koga, 2011, p. 1145). Since autocracies are beholden to a smaller selectorate, they are more likely, Koga argues, to intervene generally. Autocracies are beholden to a
smaller selectorate and are thus more able to appease a small group with the spoils of war. For Koga, the spoils of war are primarily lootable resources, such as diamonds.

Yet this part of the story does not assume differences between intervention on behalf of different groups. Rather, the variation has to do with the potential intervener’s estimation of success and the potential intervener’s domestic institutions. In addition, Koga found that democratic states were more likely to intervene on behalf of rebel groups when the rebel forces were strong. While this makes a distinction between opposition and government forces, the reasons for these different patterns are linked to the likelihood of success, not anything inherently different about the side on which a state intervenes. Like others, Koga argues that democratic leaders care about failure, and a strong opposition group suggests that intervention on behalf of rebel forces will be successful. Yet, it is unclear why this logic would not apply to intervention on behalf of a strong government or why this same logic would not apply to autocracies as well. In short, the democratic third party states are shown to be more likely to intervene on a given a strong likelihood of success. This suggests that the rebel strength variable may have more of an impact on democracies, which would be an interesting test for further study. Building off of selectorate theory, however, autocracies are theorized to be more likely to intervene generally than democracies.

Colonial History, Major Power, and Cold War

The dyad’s colonial history is a key variable for the likelihood of intervention (Lemke & Regan, 2004). This variable is coded as one if the potential intervener was once colonized the state in which the civil conflict is occurring. States are expected to be more likely to intervene in the affairs of former colonies. Yet, the literature is fairly quiet on
whether a colonial power is more likely to intervene on a particular side. Economic investment, ties to current leadership, and the desire to keep the “devil you know” in power suggest that intervening on behalf of government forces is generally a wise strategy. Anecdotally, the French, for example have intervened many times on behalf of governments in former colonial holdings in Africa post WWII. Most recently, the French intervened on behalf of the government in Mali after the government requested aid to fight jihadist rebels in the northern part of the country (P. S. Kane, 2014; Singh, 2013). One of the primary reasons given for intervention in Mali was to “restore sovereignty” in the northern, rebel controlled part of the country (Valdmanis, 2013). Former colonial powers may have an incentive to intervene on behalf of the governments put in place in former colonies.

In a related vein, states that are major powers are more likely to intervene in the affairs of others states (Aydin, 2012; Koga, 2011; Regan, 2002a). Major powers have the capacity to intervene everywhere in the world, not just in neighboring states or states within a regional sphere. However, incorporating sovereignty into the equation should not significantly impact a major power’s decision to intervene on a particular side. My argument rests on the notion that all states, regardless of major power status, are sensitive to sovereignty. Major powers are more capable of intervening generally, but major power status should not impact the decision to intervene on one side or another. Finally, a Cold War dummy variable is generally included in quantitative analysis of civil conflicts. This dummy variable captures shifting distribution of capabilities as well as changing international norms post-Cold War (Finnemore, 2003). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the United States and the USSR were more likely to intervene during the
Cold War, but studies suggest that this factor’s impact is unclear. I suspect that intervention, both government and opposition, was more likely during the Cold War.

**Other Intervention**

This variable indicates whether or not there has been a military intervention in a given conflict. While it does not indicate the sidedness of the intervention, this variable indicates that the conflict has attracted more than one intervener (Aydin, 2012; Gent, 2008; Koga, 2011; Regan, 2002b). As recent interventions illustrate, states are especially keen on acquiring either allies or approval from international organizations before intervening, particularly when intervening on behalf of opposition forces. Intervention on behalf of opposition forces in Libya, for example, occurred under the auspices of NATO, and lack of a UN resolution led to a slow and relatively weak intervention on the part of the U.S. and allies. While measure is far from perfect, including the presence and timing of all previous state and international organizations interventions is an excellent addition for future research. In the meantime, the presence of a dummy variable indicating that a civil conflict has already experienced an intervention captures some of this variation. Research suggest that a previous intervention is an indication of the intensity and strategic importance of the conflict (Koga, 2011). While an ideal measure would indicate which actor and on what side an intervention occurred, these data are not readily available. Thus, with the current measure, I do not expect previous interventions to impact opposition sided and government sided interventions differently. I do, however, expect that previous interventions increase the likelihood of intervention on both sides of the conflict. For reasons described above and for reasons Findley and Tze (2006) describe. They argue that during the Cold War, if the USSR got involved in an
internal conflict, the United States was more likely to get involved. Although this variable is far from perfect, some of this joining behavior should be captured in this measure.

**Ethnic Ties & Alliances**

There is substantial evidence that states are more likely to intervene in ongoing conflicts if there is an alliance between the two governments (Corbetta, 2010; F. S. Pearson, 1974b). If a potential intervener has any sort of alliance with a civil conflict state, it is coded as one. No alliance is coded as zero (Koga, 2011). Intuitively, an alliance is between two governments, not a third party government and an opposition group. Thus, one would suspect that the presence of an alliance would increase the likelihood that a third party intervenes on behalf of a government group and decreases the likelihood of intervention on behalf of an opposition group. Similar to alliances, literature suggests that ethnic ties between groups increase the likelihood of intervention. However, data available for these hypotheses are less than ideal. This variable is from Fearon et. al (2007) and Koga (2011). This variable is a coded as one if the leadership of a state experiencing civil war has ethnic ties to the leadership of a potential third party intervener. This is obviously less than ideal given that there is no information on ethnic ties between leadership of opposition group and leadership of potential third party interveners. Thus, I expect that this variable will have a positive effect on government sided intervention but no influence on opposition sided interventions. Likewise, I expect that government sided intervention is more likely when there is an alliance.
CHAPTER 6

RESULTS

Results and Discussion

In short, these results suggest that it is problematic to lump government and opposition sided intervention together; factors that impact one type of intervention may have no bearing on another type of intervention. For example, domestic political constraints have a negative impact on the decision to intervene on behalf of a rebel group, but this factor has no effect on the decision to intervene on behalf of governments. States with more domestic political constraints are less likely to intervene on behalf of rebel groups than government groups and no intervention. This holds for both simple logistic regression results (see Table 2) and for the multinomial regression (see Table 3). This supports my hypothesis that political constraints should have a negative impact on opposition sided interventions and a null effect on government sided interventions. In addition, Model 4 suggests that distance has a negative effect on opposition sided interventions and no effect on government sided interventions. Other variables, such as the presence of alliances have different effects on different types of intervention as well.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Government Sided</th>
<th>Model 2 Opposition Sided</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance (ln)</td>
<td>-0.489**</td>
<td>-1.156***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.202)</td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Constraints</td>
<td>0.502</td>
<td>-2.406**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.608)</td>
<td>(1.103)</td>
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<td>Rebel Strength</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.215)</td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>-0.295***</td>
<td>-0.227***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score of Civil conflict State</td>
<td>-0.059***</td>
<td>-0.065*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score of Potential Intervener</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.111**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
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<td>Colonial History</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.431)</td>
<td>(0.791)</td>
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<td>Major Power (Potential Intervener)</td>
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<td>3.189***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.319)</td>
<td>(0.379)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Intervention</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.225)</td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
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<td>Ethnic Ties</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.538)</td>
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<td>Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.574)</td>
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<td>Cold War</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log-Pseudolikelihood</td>
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<td>-409.602</td>
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* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01
Clustered by dyad. Model 1 & Model 2 standard error adjusted for 6189 clusters.

Detailed Discussion of Results

First, results suggest that factors influencing government and opposition sided interventions are systematically different from one another. Factors such as political
constraints, alliances, colonial history, ethnic ties, and potential intervener’s regime type have an impact on one type of intervention but have no effect on another type of intervention. This finding adds to the growing literature that focuses on the potential intervener’s relationship with the civil conflict state or on the potential intervener alone rather than the civil conflict (Findley & Tze, 2006). In addition, these results add to the growing consensus that intervention behavior must be broken down into subsequent parts. Where other has found that the type of intervention matters, whether economic, diplomatic, or military (Regan & Aydin, 2006), I find that the side on which an intervention occurs matters. These supports my overall argument that opposition and government sided interventions are fundamentally different choices for states that choose to intervene in civil conflicts. Although this finding is somewhat intuitive, there have been few studies that focus 1) primarily on the potential intervener and 2) explicitly break apart interventions in terms of government versus opposition sided interventions.

I will begin with examination of Model 1 and Model 2. Given that these are two separate models, it is inappropriate to compare them directly. However, results from these two models largely support previous research on interventions. For instance, both models suggest that major powers are more likely to intervene in civil conflict. Additionally, both models suggest that if there has been an intervention in a given civil conflict, another intervention is more likely. The literature suggests several reasons for this. First, there is evidence to suggest that during the Cold War, the U.S. and the USSR were prone to intervening on opposing sides of civil conflicts (Findley & Tze, 2006). Second, as models focused on major power suggest, interventions in civil conflicts do not occur in a vacuum. Major powers are especially attuned to intervention behavior of other
states (Gent, 2007). Likewise, these results suggest that the level of democracy in a civil conflict state is related to the decision to intervene in a civil conflict. States with lower Polity IV scores experiencing civil conflict are more likely to see interventions. The “time” variable is statistically significant at the .01 level in both models, suggesting that as the civil conflict wages on, states are less likely to intervene.

In addition to the similarities between factors influencing government and opposition sided intervention, there are several notable differences between the models. For the purposes of this article, the most notable difference is that political constraints have a negative impact on intervening on behalf of opposition forces. This supports my hypothesis that 1) government and opposition sided interventions are different and that 2) governments with more political constraints are less likely to intervene on behalf of opposition groups.

Beyond the primary variable of interest, there are findings that both support and refute previous research on interventions. Model 1, focused on government sided interventions, suggests that states with a colonial tie to a state experiencing a civil conflict are more likely to intervene on behalf of governments than not. Intervening in the affairs of former colonies is nothing new, but it is notable that this variable does not impact opposition sided interventions. On the other hand, ethnic ties between the leader of a potential intervener and the state in which the conflict occurs positively influences the likelihood of intervention on behalf of opposition groups. This variable has no effect on the likelihood of intervention on behalf of government groups. Given the way that this variable is measured, this result is unsurprising. However, this also points to the need for more complete information on ethnic tie in civil conflict.
One puzzling finding from these models is that higher democracy scores on the part of interveners are more likely to intervene on behalf of opposition groups. This finding holds for Models 3 and 4 as well. This finding is not entirely opposed to previous research, but the causal mechanism for this finding is unclear. Why are more democratic states more likely to intervene on behalf of opposition groups? Why does this have no influence on intervention on behalf of governments? One possibility is that the opposition groups more democratic states tend to aid have some commonality. Perhaps these opposition groups are working to overthrow a nondemocratic regime, although the Polity IV score for the state experiencing civil conflict is insignificant in this model. Perhaps democratic states are more dissatisfied with the status quo in conflict prone states, whether democratic or not, and so democratic states are more willing to take a chance on opposition groups. Perhaps this finding reflects work by Kisangani and Pickering (2005) which argues that some types of democracies are prone to the diversionary use of military force. This finding needs more investigation. I am particularly interested if there is an interaction effect between the potential intervener’s level of democracy and conflict state’s level of democracy. I estimated an additional multinomial logit interacting the potential third party’s level of democracy with conflict state’s level of democracy. The interaction term was insignificant. This table is included in the appendix.

Overall, these results suggest that some of the factors that influence government and opposition sided intervention are similar, but that there are important difference between these two policies. Those studying interventions have yet to fully explore these differences, and this analysis urges political scientists to take these differences seriously.
Model 1 and Model 2 suggest which variables impact government and opposition sided interventions, and these estimation technique and results echo some previous work on interventions. However, there are clear downsides to this approach. Namely, the models are not directly comparable. A single model allows for more direct comparison and more closely resembles the decision making process. When a state’s decision makers choose to intervene in civil conflict, the decision is not binary. Rather than to intervene or not to intervene in the affairs of others, state leaders choose between not intervening, intervening on behalf of government groups, and intervening on behalf of opposition groups.\(^2\)

Models 3 and 4 are multinomial logistic regressions with three outcomes: no intervention, intervention on behalf of government force, and intervention on behalf of opposition forces. For ease of interpretation, the two models reflect different estimates given no intervention as the base category (Model 3) and government sided intervention as the base category (Model 4). While most of the results are similar to Models 1 and 2, there are a few notable results. First, political constraints has a negative impact on opposition sided interventions and no impact on government sided intervention.

\(^2\) There are, of course, many other choices. A decision maker may choose to intervene militarily, diplomatically, or not at all. Political scientists are just beginning to examine this menu of choices, and this study suggests 1) that government and opposition sided interventions must be treated as separate choices and 2) that employing a multinomial logit rather than the standard binary outcome approach can answer some of these questions.
Table 3: Multinomial Logistic Regression on Intervention Behavior (No Intervention, Government Sided Intervention, Rebel Sided Intervention)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)</th>
<th>Government Sided</th>
<th>Opposition Sided</th>
<th>Opposition Sided</th>
<th>No Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance (ln)</td>
<td>-0.530**</td>
<td>-1.162***</td>
<td>-0.632**</td>
<td>0.530**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
<td>(0.277)</td>
<td>(0.289)</td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Constraints</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>-2.358**</td>
<td>-2.808**</td>
<td>-0.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.599)</td>
<td>(1.108)</td>
<td>(1.265)</td>
<td>(0.599)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Strength</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
<td>-0.331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.277)</td>
<td>(0.350)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>-0.299***</td>
<td>-0.232***</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>0.299***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score of Civil conflict State</td>
<td>-0.067*</td>
<td>-0.076*</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.067**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score of Potential Intervener</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.110**</td>
<td>0.106**</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial History</td>
<td>1.049**</td>
<td>-0.957</td>
<td>-2.007**</td>
<td>-1.049**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.425)</td>
<td>(0.777)</td>
<td>(0.878)</td>
<td>(0.424)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power (Potential Intervener)</td>
<td>3.049***</td>
<td>3.261***</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>-3.049***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.315)</td>
<td>(0.385)</td>
<td>(0.494)</td>
<td>(0.315)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Intervention</td>
<td>1.130***</td>
<td>1.004***</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
<td>-1.130***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.224)</td>
<td>(0.256)</td>
<td>(0.321)</td>
<td>(0.224)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Ties</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>1.143**</td>
<td>0.737</td>
<td>-0.406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.481)</td>
<td>(0.539)</td>
<td>(0.720)</td>
<td>(0.481)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>1.761***</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>-1.715**</td>
<td>-1.761***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.431)</td>
<td>(0.571)</td>
<td>(0.693)</td>
<td>(0.431)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>0.850*</td>
<td>0.618</td>
<td>-0.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.332)</td>
<td>(0.441)</td>
<td>(0.532)</td>
<td>(.332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.474*</td>
<td>1.304</td>
<td>4.421</td>
<td>3.176*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.700)</td>
<td>(2.012)</td>
<td>(2.507)</td>
<td>(1.700)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Observations: 74054
Log-Pseudolikelihood: -907.886

* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01
Clustered by dyad in a given civil conflict. Model 1 & Model 2 standard error adjusted for 6189 clusters.
Beyond the primary variable of interest, distance from the intervener to the civil conflict has a different effect on rebel interventions in comparison to government interventions. Compared to government sided interventions, distance has a significant negative effect on opposition sided interventions. This is particularly interesting given that distance between potential intervener and a state experiencing a civil conflict is included in virtually all studies on intervention in civil conflicts. What accounts for this difference? I argue that similar to political constraints making states less likely to intervene on behalf of rebel groups, longer distances impose more costs on military interventions. And, given the already higher costs bound to violating sovereignty, states are less willing to pay these costs for opposition groups.

Echoing Model 1 and Model 2, factors such as the major power status of the potential intervener, previous intervention in conflict, and the time since the beginning of the conflict, have an impact on government and opposition sided interventions. However, these variables do not have a statistically different impact on government and opposition sided interventions. Compared to government interventions, however, alliances and colonial history have a negative impact on opposition sided interventions. These findings are particularly interesting. In this model, ethnic ties between the leader of a third party state and the leader of an opposition group increase the likelihood of intervention, but the model suggests that the presence of an alliance makes it more likely that a third party intervenes to aid a government entity. As expected, this variable has no impact on the likelihood of opposition sided intervention. Likewise, variables like Cold War and ethnic ties do not have a significantly different influence on opposition sided interventions with compared to government sided interventions.
Finally, the predicted probabilities for Model 3 provide some indication that government sided intervention are more likely than opposition sided interventions. With no intervention as the base category, the government sided interventions have a predicted probability of 0.001 and opposition sided interventions have a predicted probability of 0.0009. Both of these predicted probabilities are very small, but reflective of the fact that intervention in intrastate conflict is an exceedingly rare event. Moreover, these predicted probabilities are substantively indistinguishable from one another. Even so, factors associated with intervention impact each of these outcomes differently, suggesting that the process by which states leaders decide to intervene in civil conflict differs according to the intervention target.

Extensions

These findings add to the growing literature that suggest that treating military interventions as a single category is problematic. Whereas others have noted that interventions can range from diplomatic interventions to military interventions, this research suggests that state sovereignty results in different costs for opposition and rebel sided interventions. Given both theoretical and empirical evidence that interventions on behalf of government forces are different form interventions on behalf of opposition groups, this study provides a way to move past Morgenthau’s starting question, “to intervene or not to intervene.” Focusing on a multitude of possible choices, to intervene on behalf of opposition groups, intervene on behalf of rebel groups, or not intervene at all, can help us more fully focus on the decision making process for possible interventions in civil conflict.
As in other works on intervention, these findings suggest that the decision to intervene is incredibly complex; a multitude of factors play a role in whether or not state leaders deem intervention a wise strategy. In particular, the side on which and intervention occurs has an impact on foreign policy leaders. Although this may be a frustrating conclusion to draw, this work is a reminder that most modeling approaches can only get at one piece of the puzzle. Where Regan (1996) focused on the impact of intervention, Koch and Sullivan (2010) examined the length of intervention, and Findley and Tze (2006) studied how rivalries played out through interventions, this work looks how different factors influence the side on which and intervention occurs. All of these approaches are necessary to get a clearer picture of when, why, and how states’ intervene in other’s affairs and how those interventions impact civil conflict and international relations more generally.

In future research, I would like to focus especially on the question of “how.” Decision makers must decide how to intervene in civil conflicts. Though this study is focused on military interventions rather than diplomatic or economic interventions (for work on these choices, see (Regan & Aydin, 2006)), deciding whether to call in air strikes or commit troops also carry different costs and benefits that a decision maker must weigh. These decisions are beyond the scope of the project at hand, but I would like to explore some of these questions in future research. The same logic outlined here should apply to the resources expended for an intervention as well. For instance, I would expect that states are more willing to provide economic assistance than military assistance to opposition groups. Likewise, I would expect that states are more willing to commit troops for government sided interventions, for instance, rather than for opposition sided
interventions. I expect this reluctance to be due to several reasons. First, providing economic aid, for example, is less risky than military intervention, likely in terms of both blood and treasure, and potential loss of public support. Second, providing economic assistance to opposition groups may be considered a violation of sovereignty, but it is certainly a “quieter gentler” violation than an airstrikes or troop deployment.

A potential link between the side on which and intervention occurs and the type of aid given has policy implications. If the hunch is correct, and states are more likely to give less aid to opposition groups than government groups, the goals and the tactics available to policymakers may misalign with the goals. For example, former U.S. Ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford argued that the relatively weak military assistance the Obama administration has provided Syrian opposition is ill suited to achieving any sort of goal. Ford writes, “Merely continuing to inject small amounts of aid and men in the fight won’t sustainably contain the jihadis or be sufficient to reach the political negotiation the administration keeps hoping for” (Ford, 2015, March 9). Countries lending military support to elements of the Syrian opposition have done so sporadically, and this has led to a competition between opposition group factions for the scarce resources. This competition for resources among different groups makes the Syrian opposition more fragmented than what would be ideal in the fight against ISIS and/or the Assad regime. In other words, U.S. aid to Syrian opposition forces is “too little and too late” (Ford, 2015, March 9).

Ford’s comment that aid to Syria is “too little and too late” brings up another understudied part of the intervention literature. There is little available data on the timing of interventions. Similar to difference in how third party states aid government and rebel
groups, I expect that sovereignty will govern the timing of interventions. Although the results presented here do not reflect a significant difference in timing between opposition and government groups, I suspect that some of this is due to data quality. Regan’s dataset has some better data on timing, but it is not compatible with other datasets on conflict. More work would need to be done to incorporate a more finely grained measure of timing into work on interventions.

In addition to theoretical extensions of this project, addition research needs to address an empirical hurdle. Other work on conflict has noted that in datasets like the one used here include dyads which would never experience the event of interest. For example, Chile is likely never going to intervene in internal conflict in Tajikistan. Empirically, the preponderance of zeros a one problem in this analysis. While the standard multinomial framework presented here is reasonably suited to examining these questions, there is good reason to want a more nuanced statistical model for intervention behavior. In addition to the zero inflation problem, the theoretical framework suggests at least two stages in the decision making process. First, states must have the opportunity to intervene in civil conflict, and then states must be willing to expend their resources for an intervention. While there are several ways one could approach this problem, I have chosen to address this problem using a baseline inflated multinomial logit, which is the subject of the next part of this dissertation.
CHAPTER 7

ESTIMATING OPPORTUNITY AND WILLINGESS

Work stemming from Most and Starr (1989) suggest that the decision to intervene in civil conflict consists of two stages, the opportunity to intervene and the willingness to intervene. In line with Clark and Regan’s (2003) work on interstate war, I argue that defining opportunities to intervene in civil conflict is a crucial part of research on interventions. Using an estimator developed by Bagozzi (Forthcoming), this analysis aligns theoretical expectations about the opportunities available for intervention and the willingness of states to engage in intervention with quantitative analysis. In line with previous research, I show that power status and distance from the conflict impact the opportunity for states to intervene in civil conflict. Having defined relevant opportunities econometrically, I show that previously employed factors have markedly different impacts on states’ willingness to engage in opposition and government sided interventions.

By mid-2011, the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons led to calls for intervention against the Syrian government. Given the then recent military action on behalf of opposition forces in Libya, intervention aiding or even in conjunction with a nondemocratic leader in the region seemed unlikely for the United States. Given the United States and Western allies’ growing distain for the al-Assad regime, increasing pressure to recognize the Syrian rebel organization, and continuing violation of human rights, what kept individual states from providing military aid to rebel groups? Why
were/are states willing to give monetary support and food aid, but not ship guns and tanks to fight the well-stocked, Iranian and Russian supplied government of Syria (BBC 2012, November 13; MacFarquhar 2012, November 18)?

In August 2012, the United States and others acknowledged Iran and Russia’s growing presence in Syria; Iran and Russia had openly armed and sold weapons to the Syrian government for months. Despite the leader of the Syrian opposition, George Sabra’s clear request “We don’t need food. We don’t need money. We need weapons” (AP 2012, November 13), governments around the world were hesitant to openly aid or formally recognize rebel factions. Early in the conflict, France, the US, and Turkey, particularly worried about the turmoil near its border region, had provided non-military aid, but all had stopped short of military assistance for the rebels.

Only in late 2014 did the United States intervene militarily in the Syrian conflict. Recent reports from the rebel group ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), have further complicated the situation in Syria. Notably, the Obama administration has framed the intervention as primarily against ISIS. UN Ambassador Samantha Power stated that airstrikes and military training the U.S. provides to Syrian opposition forces are aimed at ISIS, but “the training also will service these troops in the same struggle that they’ve been in since the beginning of this conflict against the Assad regime” (Dann, 2014). Recent airstrikes against ISIS have been met with approval from the other Syrian opposition groups, but the Assad regime has also indicated tacit approval of the airstrikes (Black and Roberts 2014, September 12; Rafizadeh 2014, October 31). Given the rise of the Islamic State as an opposition group, the move has been met with international support by many Gulf States and U.S. allies, and analysis suggest that the U.S. is likely to
continue intervening in the conflict (Rafizadeh 2014, October 31; Black and Roberts 2014, September 12).

Yet, as a cursory history illustrates, U.S. involvement in the conflict has not been guaranteed. Analysis, administration officials, and citizens differ on whether or not the U.S. should intervene, how the U.S. should intervene, and whether to pursue regime change or simply perform humanitarian missions. In short, “Syria is a hard one. The argument against the United States taking a more active role in ending the vicious three-year-old conflict there are almost perfectly balanced by those in favor of intervening” (Pollack 2014 September/October). What, then, seems to have tipped the scale? Given the opportunity to intervene in civil conflict, what pushes states to intervene in the affairs of others? What does it mean for the U.S. to intervene to fight an opposition group while at the same time intervening to defeat a government? The recent debates surrounding intervention in Syria illustrate the theoretical basis through which political scientists view intervention behavior. Given an opportunity to intervene, state leaders must then choose whether to intervene, how to intervene, and on what side to intervene.

Previous work has provided a theoretical framework and a collection of factors that provide opportunities for states to intervene in civil conflict and the willingness of states to intervene in civil conflict (Most and Starr 1989). Yet, previous studies have had difficulty defining the “population of potential interveners that reflects a plausible, yet comprehensive pool of cases” (Regan 1998, p.777) necessary for large-n quantitative analysis. Building off Clark and Regan’s (2003) work on interstate war, I argue that defining opportunities to intervene in civil conflict is a crucial part of research on interventions. This article uses a new estimator created by Bagozzi (forthcoming) to
align theoretical expectations about the opportunities available for intervention and the
willingness of states to engage in intervention with quantitative analysis. In line with
previous literature, I demonstrate that power status and distance from the conflict impact
the opportunity for states to intervene in civil conflict. In addition, I add further evidence
to the literature that scholars of intervention must treat intervention on behalf of
opposition groups and the government as fundamentally different processes. Using
Bagozzi’s estimator, factors have different impacts on opposition and government sided
interventions than in the standard multinomial framework.

**Military Intervention as a Rare Event**

Most of the time, most states do not intervene in the internal affairs of others. Given 275
number civil conflicts between 1945 and 2008 (Gleditsch, et al. 2002, Harbom and
Wallensteen 2008), there have been 341 state led military interventions (Kisangani and
Pickering 2008, Pickering and Kisangani 2010). At first glance, the number of
interventions may seem high, yet military intervention in the affairs of others is unusual
behavior for most states. The top five most frequent interveners from 1946-2008, the
United States, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Egypt, account for over one third
of all military interventions. Given the number of times states *could* intervene in civil
wars, interventions occur in less than one percent of cases (Gleditch et al. 2002, Harbom
and Wallensteen 2008; Kisangani and Pickering 2008). To use Most and Starr’s
language (1989), given the opportunity to intervene in state conflict, most states avoid
military intervention most of the time.
Similar to other conflict research, the relative rarity of military interventions has prompted some theoretical and empirical problems. Theoretically, this has led scholars to focus on different parts of the intervention puzzle; most of this work focuses on the impact that intervention has on civil conflict’s duration and outcome. Work by Regan (2002a), for instance, focuses on how interventions impact conflict dynamics. Further work examines how military interventions and other forms of interventions such as diplomatic interventions, impact the duration of civil war (Regan and Aydin 2006, Regan, et al. 2009, Aydin 2012). These works and others like them detail the impact of intervention on civil conflict, but they do not claim to tell us anything about the decision to intervene in civil conflict. Second, we have lumped together intervention stages; we generally test opportunity and willingness in a single stage. Using strategic as a catchall has also provided theoretical justification for models to include all covariates together in a single stage, although theory suggests that the decision to intervene is divided in at least two stages- the opportunities for a state to intervene in civil conflict and the willingness of a state to intervene.

In addition, determining the set of possible interveners is a constant point of contention. In an attempt to focus on the decision to intervene, some studies have looked at a subset of possible interveners. For example, one study focused exclusively on the impact of military major power intervention (Koch and Sullivan 2010). Focusing on a subset of interveners tells us a great deal about many cases of intervention, but still does not paint a clear picture of the decision to intervene in civil conflict. Using major powers as the population of interest, scholars sidestep whether these states had an opportunity to intervene. Major powers like the United States or Russia arguably have the ability and
thus the opportunity to intervene all over the world. But this formulation ignores intervention or possible intervention by regional hegemons, such as Egypt, who have conducted military interventions throughout the post WWII era. Who is a potential intervener for a given conflict? How are we to determine the relevant dyads when it comes to interventions in intrastate conflict?

In addition to determining the list of possible interveners, determining the reasons why a state chooses to intervene (or not intervene) is a thorny question from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. Theoretically, scholars argue that states intervene for “strategic” reasons (Fordham 2008). Yet, defining “strategic” is problematic. Strategic is only an interesting category post intervention. In other words, if an intervention was successful, however defied, researchers and policy makers tend to then consider the intervention strategic. If an intervention either (a) did not occur or (b) was deemed a failure, the intervention was not strategic. From an empirical perspective, assuming strategic motivation for intervention biases research in favor of cases in which there was an intervention, rather than the cases in which there might have been an intervention. To take the Syrian case, the civil war has been going on for years. Throughout that time, the U.S. could have intervened at multiple points. The United Kingdom could have intervened. Turkey could have intervened militarily. But these states, at one point or another, chose not to. Does the U.K’s unwillingness to drop bombs on ISIS necessarily mean that the U.K. deemed this foreign policy option less than strategic? Does Turkey’s willingness to provide weapons but not troop support suggest that they are unwilling or unable to contribute to airstrikes? In order to answer these
questions, scholars need to reexamine the decision to intervene, and in order to do so, we must look at the “dogs that barked” and the “dogs that didn’t bark.”

If political scientists are interested in studying the decision to intervene in civil conflict, focusing just on interventions rather than the universe of cases in which there could have been an intervention is selecting on the dependent variable. Including all cases of possible military intervention solves this selection bias. Substantively, including all cases in which an intervention could have occurred allows us to isolate some of the factors that make states more or less likely to intervene on particular sides during the conflict.

Reliance on “strategic” as a catchall has missed some interesting questions in interventions. As in the case intervention in Syria, the decision to intervene took several years of debate, was impacted by events in the conflict, and was met with skepticism by the American public. Assuming that the Obama administration’s airstrikes were “strategic” is not an informative statement. There were/are plenty of good, arguably “strategic” reasons for not intervening. During recent congressional debates, for example, members of the President’s own party expressed concern and opposition towards aiding any Syrian rebels (Miller, 2014, September 18). As in other debates surrounding the use of force the definition of and the way to achieve the national interest is “simply indeterminate” (Finnemore, 2003, p. 5). Without knowing the outcome, “In [sic] almost any case of intervention, one could impute a very reasonable set of interests that would explain intervention and another equally plausible set that would explain nonintervention” (Finnemore, 2003, p. 5). Assuming that a foreign policy decision, simply by virtue of being made, is in the national interest or is certainly strategic obscures
domestic debate. Finnemore writes that terms like strategic or national interest are not terribly useful because “in most cases these opposing conceptions of national interests actually were articulated and strongly pushed on decision makers by groups on different sides of the debate over whether to intervene” (Finnemore, 2003, p. 5). Decisions to intervene were very often controversial at the time, and focusing on just interventions suggests that cases in which there was an intervention were obviously strategic whereas cases in which there was not an intervention were obviously not strategic. Focusing on all cases of possible interventions should help political scientists determine “what state interests are and which interests intervention serves” (Finnemore, 2003, p. 5).

**Defining Opportunity and Willingness**

The majority of studies focusing on an intervener (or possible intervener) in intrastate conflict implicitly or explicitly assume that strategic considerations drive foreign policy decisions. Although definitions of strategic considerations vary, strategic considerations should be theoretically divided as the opportunity and willingness of decision makers to intervene in a conflict (Most & Starr, 1989). Building on others’ work (Most & Starr, 1989; Regan, 2002b; H. Starr, 1994), this article employs a modeling approach that reflects the two stage process.

The opportunity to act externally, whether initiating a full-fledged war, initiating a limited military intervention in another state, or acting as a mediator in an ongoing dispute is tied to the “military/coercive, economic, and political resources it [a state] can bring to bear against external challenge or internal opposition” (H. Starr, 1994, pp. 486-487). States do not always possess the requisite power—whether military, economic, or
political—to intervene in other state’s affairs. Then, given an opportunity, “the decision to choose and implement some policy (to use one’s capabilities) reflects ‘willingness’” (H. Starr, 1994, p. 487). The opportunity to intervene is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for intervention. In addition to having the capability, states must possess the more intangible quality of “willingness.” Previous literature frames different factors as influencing “opportunity” and/or “willingness.”

Focusing on opportunities, studies argue that the intervener’s military capabilities influence the likelihood that a state should intervene (Corbetta, 2010; F. S. Pearson, 1974b). States with more military might, especially great powers, are more likely to intervene in civil conflict. Regan (Regan, 2000, 2002b) also shows that longer conflicts tend to attract more interventions. In terms of opportunity, longer conflicts offer states more time to decide whether or not to jump into the fray. Geographic proximity to the civil conflict seems to influence both opportunity and willingness to intervene (Corbetta, 2010; F. S. Pearson, 1974b).

For willingness, states proximate to the civil conflict might be worried about an influx of refugees or destabilization of the region more generally. Studies find that alliances and political similarities are the primary variables determining whether or not states intervene in a conflict (Corbetta, 2010; F. S. Pearson, 1974b). From the point of view of the intervener, these factors are lumped together as strategic considerations that play the primary role in a state’s decision to intervene in the affairs of another state (Fordham, 2008). In addition to intervener specific variables, scholars find that the situation “on the ground” also has an impact on whether a state chooses to intervene. Regan (1998), for example finds that the intensity of the conflict reduces the likelihood of
intervention and humanitarian disaster increases the likelihood that a state chooses to intervene.

Previous literature provides theoretical justifications for factors influencing the opportunity and willingness to intervene but provides little guidance for the opportunities and willingness to intervene on a particular side in civil conflict. The few studies that focus on a dependent variable other than intervention/non-intervention treat intervention on behalf of a government and intervention on behalf of an opposition group as distinct, but theoretically similar categories (Findley & Tze, 2006). Findley and Tze (2006), show that the United States and USSR intervened on opposing sides during the Cold War, but the driving force behind choosing government or opposition sided intervention was whether or not the rival state (in this case, the U.S. or USSR) had intervened on the other’s behalf. In other words, the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Findley and Tze’s (2006) research, however, did not argue that the choice of a side- whether aiding opposition groups or government groups- was consequential. In contrast, Shirkey (2012) argues that intervention on behalf of opposition groups represents a credible commitment problem given that opposition group’s fates can be uncertain. Building off of this kind of work, this article further illustrates that factors influencing the willingness to intervene on behalf of a government or on behalf of an opposition force are government and opposition sided interventions are different.

**Problem with Observing Opportunity**

Theoretically, Most and Starr (1989) argue that states must have the opportunity and the willingness to intervene militarily. However, there are no easy definitions with it comes
to a state having the “opportunity” to intervene. To paraphrase Clark and Regan (2014), intervention is the only true indicator that a state had the opportunity to intervene in another state’s affairs. On the other hand, “the absence of conflict could imply either presence or absence of opportunity” (Xiang, 2010, p. 484). Lack of intervention does not necessarily indicate a lack of opportunity.

Observing nonintervention in civil conflict can stem from several sources. First, a state may be unable to intervene militarily in a given conflict; a state may simply not have the military capacity to intervene in every given civil conflict. Given civil conflict A, there are a list of possible interveners 1,2,3…n. The theoretical and empirical question then becomes, are all possible interveners able to intervene in conflict A? It seems that not all states are always capable of intervention. For example, given that Costa Rica does not have a regular military, Costa Rica was effectively unable to intervene in Sierra Leone’s civil war during the 1990s. On the other hand, a cursory glance at empirical studies of military intervention suggest that major powers are capable of intervening around the world. Of the top five states engaged in military interventions, four of the five (the United States, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom) are considered major powers. In quantitative models, should we assume that major powers are always capable of intervention? Studies often include a dummy variable for whether or not the possible intervener is a major power. Are they the only states who are always capable of intervening? Should we limit our analysis to only major power interventions?

This dilemma parallels that of other work on civil conflict. Discerning which dyad years are relevant and which are irrelevant has previously led scholars to include only relevant dyads in their analysis. This approach, however, is problematic given that
these crude measures generally drop cases of interest (Xiang, 2010). In the case of military interventions, using the politically relevant variable from Eugene to cull the dataset drops nearly 60 cases of intervention. Given that the widely used variable for political relevance is problematic, the theoretical problem remains. Data on conflict often include two types of zeros. Some dyad years indicate no intervention because there was no relevant possibility of intervention, while other dyad years coded as zero could have been an intervention. Separating those observations is one of the major goals of this analysis.

Recent work suggests that the best way to account for these zeros is through econometric techniques (Bagozzi, Hill, Moore, & Mukherjee, Forthcoming; Xiang, 2010). For instance, Clark and Regan (2014) use a split population hazard model to determine both the opportunities and a states’ willingness to engage in interstate conflict. More recently, Xiang (2008) employed a split population binary choice model illustrating political relevance as a latent variable. Xiang shows that the relationship between trade and conflict is not a simple positive or negative one; rather, the relationship between conflict and trade is sometimes positive and sometimes negative. In both of these works, the underlying assumption is that the overwhelming number of zeros- for example, a peaceful dyad-year- contains two types of cases. Using Clark and Regan (2014) as an example, there are many dyad-years in which there was no interstate conflict. But it is plausible that some of these zeros could have experienced interstate conflict. It is reasonable to assume that enduring rivals such as India and Pakistan, for example, could have experienced the event of interest. Yet, it seems near impossible that a dyad like Fiji and Iceland would be at war with one another in a given year. The underlying
assumption is that there is something about the collection cases in which there are or could have been conflict and something about the collection cases in which there could have never been a conflict. This latent “something” is political relevance. But, measures of political relevance are problematic. However the criteria are defined, political relevance tends to drop cases of conflict. Dropping cases of conflict indicates that these sorts of control variables are dropping cases that are certainly relevant, as indicated by the intervention, and likely dropping other cases that could have possibility been an intervention. The statistical models seen in Clark and Regan (2014) and Xiang (2008) allow scholars to estimate political relevance in a specific dataset rather than being tied to a less-than-ideal measure of political relevance. Yet, their models are for binary dependent variables rather than a categorical dependent variable necessary for this analysis.

In line with Clark and Regan’s (2014) work on interstate war, I argue that defining opportunities to intervene in civil conflict is a crucial part of research on interventions in civil wars. Using an estimator developed by Bagozzi (2010), this analysis aligns theoretical expectations about the opportunities available for intervention and the willingness of states to engage in intervention with quantitative analysis. In other works, unfettered zero inflation has led to possibly “inaccurate causal mechanisms” (Xiang, 2010). Moreover, the high levels of zero inflation found in this set up leads to biased coefficients if ignored in an ordinary multinomial framework. Using a baseline inflated multinomial logit works to correct for unpredictably biased coefficients while aligning more with theoretical expectations.
Willingness as a Catchall

For states with a relevant opportunity to intervene, lack of intervention indicates lack of willingness to intervene in civil conflict. Opportunity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for intervention in civil conflict. Lack of intervention in any given intrastate conflict might mean that states have no strategic incentive to intervene; the Fiji likely has no military or economic interests in the outcome of civil conflict in Sierra Leone, for instance. Or, there may be cases in which states have strong interests to intervene, whether due to fear of refugees fleeing across borders or fear of general instability in the region. These interests, lumped together as “strategic,” influence how willing a state is to intervene in civil conflict.

However, the literature has not fully taken constraints on decision makers into account. For the most part, scholars depict decision makers as relatively constraint free. While Regan’s theoretic formulation includes a catch-all reference to domestic audience costs, Regan’s (Regan, 1996, 2002b) decision maker does not have to deal with domestic/international benefits/costs when deciding to intervene in a particular conflict. Given a variety of factors, including facts on the ground, such as whether the conflict is ideological or high intensity, the decision maker simply weighs the costs and benefits of intervention and chooses the “optimal strategy” (Regan, 1996, p. 342). In other work, Regan acknowledges that there are both domestic and international costs to intervention, but he couches the international costs in terms of national security (Regan, 1998). Moreover, when choosing the “optimal strategy,” scholars assume that decision makers aim to end the conflict quickly (Regan, 1996).
This purely strategic approach illustrates a theoretical leap. Rather than going back to see how alliances or capabilities impacted a state’s willingness to intervene, it is simply assumed that each factor was a part of a strategic calculation. Part of the problem with assuming calculations are strategic is that they are not clear about what the goal is. Is it fair to assume that the goal of an intervention was to end intrastate conflict? Do goals change when state intervene on behalf of opposition groups or on behalf of government groups? A few studies make explicit arguments about the strategic nature of the decision making process. For instance, Findley and Tze (2006) argue that foreign policy leaders contemplating intervention strategically respond to the other interveners (or possible interveners) when deciding when to intervene and on what side to intervene in conflict. But most of the strategic concerns for potential interveners are under theorized and provide little insight into factors that make states more or less willing to intervene on behalf of a particular side of the conflict.
CHAPTER 8

THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS: OPPORTUNITY & WILLINGESS

The theoretical argument for this part of the dissertation has two stages. Beginning with Most and Starr (Most & Starr, 1989), political scientists have argued that getting involved in conflict, whether interstate conflict of intervention in intrastate conflict has two stages. First, states must have an opportunity. First, I argue that there are three primary factors that should account for opportunities to intervene in civil conflict. These three factors have been theorized to impact the decision to intervene in civil conflict, and this model will provide a test of if and how these factors influence intervention behavior. These three factors are distance, power status, and time. Second, I argue that factors previously found to impact likelihood of intervention impact government sided and opposition sided interventions differently. I argue (1) that there is a status quo bias when states are faced with an opportunity to intervene in civil conflict and (2) aiding opposition groups creates uncertainty. These differences will be especially apparent in two factors: distance and political constraints.

In this modeling approach, the empirical test matches the theoretical story, that states first need an opportunity to intervene and only then does the willingness to intervene matter. One benefit of this model is that we can determine the effect of factors in both the opportunity and the willingness stage. Distance is the most illustrative example. Distance impacts state’s opportunities and willingness to intervene in intrastate conflict. Very simply, states that are close to one another “are better able to interact” (H.
Starr, 2005, p. 390). A state has the greatest ability to utilize its power, especially military power, when it is closest to home. Thus, distance is some “metric in the decline of power” (H. Starr, 2005, p. 390). The further away a conflict is from a potential intervener, the less power a potential intervener will be able to exert in the conflict. If a state does not have a sufficient amount of power, the opportunity to intervene will be nil.

In addition to distance impacting opportunity, distance also has an impact on willingness. Starr argues that distance should have a strong impact on willingness because

. . . states (or any other social units) that are close to each other are also perceived as important or salient to each other. This is so for a combination of reasons. Greater perceptions of threat or gain, or of interdependence, are ways in which proximity can generate salience . . . Such views affect willingness through the expected utility calculations of policymakers. Willingness to interact and to manage subsequent conflicts in different ways, for example, will depend on the importance of salience of an issue or an opponent (H. Starr, 2005, p. 391)

Potential interveners that are proximate to a state experiencing civil conflict are likely to find the conflict more salient than states far from the conflict. Distance influence the likelihood that a state has an opportunity to intervene and the likelihood that a state has the willingness to intervene. Using a simple logistic regression or multinomial logit lumps these theoretical steps together. The baseline inflated multinomial logit allow me to test whether distance impacts opportunities separately from whether distance impacts willingness. Although distance is the only variable included in both stages of the model
in this dissertation, this framework opens up a host of possibilities for other quantitative tests.

**Theorizing Opportunity**

Distance has been shown to have a negative impact on the likelihood of intervention (Corbetta, 2010; F. S. Pearson, 1974b). In line with previous research, I argue that distance should have a negative impact on the opportunity to intervene in civil conflict. In terms of opportunity, states neighboring a civil conflict do not need a military with worldwide reach to intervene. Shorter lines carrying supplies, troops, or munitions lower the cost of intervention in neighboring states, thereby providing more states with a relevant opportunity to intervene. However, engaging in a conflict on the other side of the world requires a well-equipped, highly mobile military. I expect this variable to have a negative effect in the inflation stage.

H1: As the distance between a possible intervener and a state experiencing civil conflict increases, the likelihood that a dyad represents a relevant opportunity decreases. Power status is another well-trodden variable for studies on intervention (Regan 2000, 2002). Major powers have the military capabilities to intervene around the world and/or interests in engaging in power plays through use of intervention (Findley and Tze 2006). An examination of intervention behavior suggests that major powers are responsible for a large chunk of military interventions. Thus, the expectation for the inflation stage is fairly straightforward:

H2: Possible interveners that are considered major powers are more likely to have relevant opportunities to intervene in civil conflict.
Finally, Regan (Regan, 2000, 2002b) argues that longer conflicts attract more interventions. Short conflicts require states to gather relevant information and mobilize military might quickly, whereas longer conflicts provide states with more opportunity to intervene. In addition, we know that states are more likely to intervene in civil conflict after another state has intervened. If Regan’s argument is correct, this means that as a conflict continues, the likelihood of an intervention increases, and thus the likelihood of a subsequent intervention increases as well.

H3: As the length of the conflict increases, the opportunity to intervene in civil conflict increases.

These three variables represent space, power, and time; three crucially important variables for defining opportunity. I am fully aware of other possible factors and ways to measure the factors included here. Some alternatives include using composite index of national capability (CINC) scores rather than major power status, using polynomials of time in addition to time, and exploring other distance measures such as using a contiguous dummy. Some of these approaches have been addressed in other parts of this dissertation, such as using polynomials of time (reference final page number). Others are good starting points for future research. The pros and cons of using a major power dummy variable versus a CINC score further illustrates the benefits of this approach. Rather than view each of these as deterministic, as when using a political relevant dyad dummy variable, each of these factors is probabilistic. In other words, being Egypt does not necessarily preclude the state from being a possible intervener. Whereas, if a dyad was not deemed political relevant by whatever metric, it would be necessarily excluded from analysis.
Theorizing Willingness

I argue that states are more willing to intervene on behalf of governments than rebel groups. This bias has several sources. First, intervening on behalf of rebel forces challenges the status quo. Even in the midst of a civil conflict, the sitting government of a state is generally considered to be sovereign. In the case of Syria for instance, the Assad regime has largely maintained international recognition, despite chemical weapon use, killing of civilians, and increasingly powerful opposition groups. In foreign policy rhetoric, leaders reference notions of sovereignty and territorial integrity when discussing intervention. For instance, Syria’s ambassador to the United Nations argued that “We [the Syrian government] are speaking the language of the UN: territorial integrity of states, equal membership of states. All these sacrosanct terms are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations” (Donnelly, 2014). After intervening in response to conflict in Mali, the French government said that it would remain in Mali until “sovereignty [was] restored” (Valdmanis, 2013). A Lebanese official, despite having strong groups in Lebanon who would approve of intervention in Bahrain, explicitly stated, “The Lebanese government supports the sovereignty, independence, and stability of the Kingdom of Bahrain” (Donnelly, 2014). While potential interveners may choose to violate these norms and change the status quo, intervening on behalf of an opposition group is a costly decision for political leaders.  

Another side effect of intervening on behalf of opposition groups is uncertainty. Intervening on behalf of opposition groups creates uncertainty for several reasons. Although a state may not find the current government of a civil war state to be an ideal

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3 For a more in depth discussion of why opposition sided interventions should be more costly than government sided interventions, see Chapters 3 and 4.
partner, there is no guarantee that a new regime will be a positive change. Although opposition groups and rebel groups operate in the same country, intervening states typically do not have the same relationship with opposition groups as they do with governments. While the relationship between governments may be strained, states generally have open lines of communication between each other, a clear chain of command, and a stable location. These characteristics of opposition groups mean that opposition groups, on average, are more difficult for government to aid.

For these reasons, I expect that states will be less willing to intervene on behalf of government and opposition groups. These differences should be especially apparent when examining distance between a potential intervener and the country in which the civil war occurs and the political constraints in a potential intervener’s state.

H4: As the distance between the potential intervener increases, states will be less likely to intervene on behalf of opposition groups than government groups. Hypothesis 4 illustrates the importance of the baseline inflated multinomial. This setup enables us to test whether and how distance impacts the opportunities to intervene as well as the willingness to intervene in civil conflict.

H5: Potential interveners facing more domestic political constraints are less likely to intervene on behalf of opposition groups. Given that the costs of intervention on behalf of opposition forces is higher, potential interveners seeking to aid opposition forces must convince domestic groups that the intervention is merited. For instance, the Obama administration’s actions in Syria have been met with skepticism and debate at multiple layers of government—within the administration, the U.S. Congress, and even the American public (Black & Roberts,
2014, September 12; Steven, 2014, October 24). These domestic constraints impact states’ willingness to intervene in civil conflict.
CHAPTER 9
RELEVANT DYADS AND POSSIBLE INTERVENERS

The term intervention has multiple meanings in everyday parlance and in academic literature. For the purposes of this project, I focus on state sponsored military interventions in intrastate conflict. I use Kisangani and Pickering’s (2008) definition and dataset as the basis for military interventions. Kisangani and Pickering (2008) define military interventions as “the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc.) of one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute” (F. Pearson & Baumann, 1993, p. 1). Military interventions are particularly costly foreign policy choices for states (Findley & Tze, 2006; Mullenbach, 2005). Given the high cost, the factors that impact if, how, and when to intervene militarily are important aspects of the foreign policy decision making process.

The most widely used data on interventions, Patrick Regan’s dataset (Regan, 2002b), includes only cases of intervention in civil conflict, not all possible cases of intervention. Datasets that include all cases of possible intervention are sparse. The only dataset that includes all cases of possible military interventions in civil conflict alongside cases of intervention is Koga (2011), which is used as a basis for this study. In this dataset, the unit of analysis is dyad year for each case in which there was intrastate conflict according to PRIO (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom & Wallenstein, 2008). The dataset includes “internal armed conflict between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states” (Themner,
“internationalized internal armed conflict between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides” (Themner, 2013, p. 9). For both definitions of conflict, the focus is intrastate rather than interstate conflict. The dataset includes all possible causes in which there could have been an intervention in intrastate conflict. Meaning, there are causes in which there are interventions in state conflict but also cases in which there was no intervention. In colloquial terms, the dataset includes the dogs that barked intervention and the dogs that did not bark. This dataset allows me to focus on a state’s decision to intervene without selecting on the dependent variable.

Among other variables, the dataset includes information on regime type from Polity IV (2012) and material capabilities from the Correlates of War Project (D. Singer, 1987; J. D. Singer, Bremer, & Stuckey, 1972). The dataset also includes information on the physical distance from an intervener to the location of a possible intervention and data on alliances (Bennett & Stam, 2000).

**Model Selection**

Given the two-step theoretical approach, model selection is especially important. A selection model would be one approach (State, 2014). Selection models have been used in work on United Nations interventions (Beardsley & Schmidt, 2012), but this sort of model is inappropriate for this work for several reasons. First, a selection a second model requires that a second decision is dependent on the first. For instance, a leader decides to intervene on behalf of a government and then decides to provide a certain amount of aid. In the case of interventions, we could imagine a selection model with intervention or
nonintervention as the dependent variable for the selection stage. Then, one could treat the outcome stage as intervention on behalf of a government or intervention on behalf of a rebel group. Yet, this setup assumes that the decision to intervene is prior to the decision to intervene on a particular side. This seems unlikely. In the recent case of Syria for example, intervention on behalf of government forces, intervention on behalf of rebel forces, and no intervention represented the choice set, rather than deciding to intervene first and then intervene on a particular side. A selection model does not match decision making process or solve the zero inflation problem.

The ideal model would allow for three category dependent variable and work to minimize the effects of a preponderance of zeros. Work by Clark and Regan (2014), Kisangani and Pickering (E. Kisangani & Pickering, 2008; E. F. P. J. Kisangani, 2007), Xiang (2008), and Bagozzi, Hill, Moore, and Mukherjee (Forthcoming) suggest accounting for zero inflation using statistical techniques. I use a baseline inflated multinomial estimator adapted for political science by Bagozzi (2010). This model allows for a three category dependent variable and estimates relevance to account for zero-inflation. The inflation stage of this model determines “an observation’s likelihood of being baseline inflated (via a binary logit equation)” (Xiang, 2010). In substantive terms, the inflation stage estimates how likely a dyad is to represent a relevant opportunity for an intervention in civil war. The outcome stage models “an observation’s probability of selecting each outcome of nominal choice- conditional on not being baseline-inflated—via a MNL equation” (Xiang, 2010, p. 4). The outcome stage theoretically accounts for the state’s willingness to intervene in a civil conflict, taking into account the likelihood that an observation indicates a relevant opportunity for
intervention. Unlike a selection model, the inflation stage is probabilistic (Xiang, 2010, p. 4). Rather than drop instance in which there was no intervention, this model allows the researcher to define relevant cases without discounting all cases of nonintervention.

**Dependent Variable**

Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variable, whether there was no intervention, an intervention on behalf of the government, a neutral intervention, or an intervention on behalf of a rebel group. Information on military intervention comes from Pearson and Baumann (1993) and Kisangani and Pickering (2008). For the time period 1946 to 2008, there were a total of 194 government sided interventions and 146 rebel sided interventions in intrastate conflict. Looking at the universe of possible interventions, most of the time, there are no interventions in intrastate conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4 Descriptive Statistics: Intervention Behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Sided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Sided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given that the dependent variable contains three possible responses, I opted for a multinominal logistic regression framework. This differs from many other studies on interventions. Most studies use a simple logistic regression and a dependent variable of intervention/non-intervention. Others estimate two models, one focusing on government sided interventions and another focusing on rebel sided interventions. Or, the dependent variable is simply whether or not there was an intervention in state conflict (regardless of
the side on which a third party intervenes). One benefit of the multinomial framework is that each outcome can be examined in a single model.

Using a multinomial framework also more closely approximates the decision making process as opposed to a binary outcome. For states deciding whether to intervene in civil conflict, it is unlikely that the choice set is a) intervene on behalf of a government group and b) not intervene at all. Rather, the choice set more closely approximates a three category dependent variable a) intervene on behalf of a government group, b) intervene on behalf of an opposition group, and c) no intervention. Admittedly, even this choice set is truncated. Decision makers must also choose how to intervene in civil conflict. Does a state send troops, provide military aid, or provide only monetary support? These questions, too, are likely not divorced from the decision to intervene on a particular side- or not. To paraphrase Regan, interventions in civil conflict are some of the most complex foreign policy decisions leaders can make (Regan, 2002b; van der Maat, 2011). This work is a step towards capturing some of that complexity.4

**Description of Independent Variables**

A description of the independent variables included in the inflation stage and the outcomes stage are as follows. Major power status is included in the inflation stage of the model and is expected to have a positive effect on a potential intervener’s opportunity to intervene in civil conflict (Aydin, 2012; Koga, 2011; Regan, 2000; van der Maat, 2011). The distance measure (Bennett & Stam, 2000) indicates the logged distance between two states as defined in Eugene. The variable captures the distance between

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4 Other have tried to capture this complexity using formal modeling. See Carment and Rowlands (1998) for an example.
capital cities in logged miles between dyads. Building off previous studies (Aydn, 2012; Koga, 2011), the logged measure should have a negative impact on intervention behavior. As others have noted, as distance increases, fewer states have opportunities to intervene in civil conflict. This effect is contingent on military strength, but overall, the effect of distance on opportunity should be negative. In addition, I argue that this negative effect should be more pronounced for the states’ willingness to intervene on behalf of opposition groups in civil conflict than on government groups in civil conflict. Thus, the distance measure is included in both the zero inflation stage and the outcome stage. The number of years between when a conflict began and a possible intervention is also included in both stages of this analysis. Work suggests that although interveners are more likely to intervene at beginning stages of the conflict, longer interventions attract more interventions (Regan, 2000). As the length of conflict increases, states have more opportunities to intervene. This variable is also included in the outcome stage.

In addition to time and distance, other factors influence a state’s willingness to intervene in civil conflict. Of primary importance to hypothesis 5, this study includes a measure of political constraints from Henisz (Henisz, 2005, 2010). This variable captures the number of veto points and actors’ differing preferences at the domestic level. This measure should have a negative impact on a states’ willingness to intervene on behalf of opposition groups. In addition to political constraints, a dyad’s colonial history should impact a state’s willingness to intervene. Former colonizers, such as France, have proved to willingly expend resources intervening on in the affairs of their former colonies (B. Charbonneau & Sears, 2014).
Polity IV scores (Marshall et al., 2010) of both the possible intervener and the state in which the conflict is occurring are common control variables for studies on intervention (Aydin, 2012; Koga, 2011; van der Maat, 2011). Selectorate theory (Mesquita et al., 2004) suggests that democracies are more hesitant to intervene in civil conflict given the uncertainty of victory and the costs of intervention (Koga, 2011). The measure of rebel strength comes from Cunningham, Gleditch, and Salehyan’s work on non-state actors in civil conflict (Cunningham et al., 2009). This measure indicates opposition groups’ strength relative to governments during civil conflicts. This variable should be especially important at the outcome/willingness stage of the model. Dyads with alliances and indication of a previous military intervention in a given conflict are also included as control variables. In line with previous research, I expect that previous military interventions will have a positive impact on the willingness of states to intervene in civil conflict (Gent, 2007; Koga, 2011; Regan & Aydin, 2006; van der Maat, 2011). Likewise, potential interveners allied with a state experiencing civil conflict have been shown be more likely interveners (Corbetta, 2010; F. S. Pearson, 1974b). I argue that this should be especially important for intervention on behalf of government groups.

**Discussion of Results**

The hypotheses receive mixed results. For the opportunity stage, both distance and power status were statistically significant (p<0.05 and <0.001 respectively) in the expected direction. These results suggest that major powers have more opportunities to intervene in civil conflict and that countries further away from civil conflict have fewer opportunities to intervene. These findings are in line with previous work, but preliminary
confirmation that these factors impact the opportunity stage can serve as the basis for further theorizing about the opportunity stage for intervention behavior. Examination of the willingness stage suggests that distance has a significant impact on the decision to intervene on behalf of opposition groups (p<0.01), but does not have as much of an effect on the decision to intervene on behalf of governments (p<0.1). The outcome stage provides limited support for the political constraints argument. These results and others will be discussed in more detail below.
Table 5: Comparison of Standard MNL and Baseline Inflated MNL with No Intervention as the base category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
<th>Model 1 Standard MNL</th>
<th>Model 2 Baseline Inflated MNL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government Sided</td>
<td>Opposition Sided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero-Inflation Equation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.665 (1.171)</td>
<td>0.665 (1.171)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance (logged)</td>
<td>-0.454*** (0.165)</td>
<td>-0.454*** (0.165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>-0.261*** (0.429)</td>
<td>-0.261*** (0.429)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>3.263*** (0.429)</td>
<td>3.263*** (0.429)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome Equation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>3.012*** (0.318)</td>
<td>3.249*** (0.412)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance (logged)</td>
<td>-0.514** (0.223)</td>
<td>-1.199*** (0.215)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Constraints</td>
<td>0.266 (0.556)</td>
<td>-2.457** (0.973)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Strength</td>
<td>0.272 (0.198)</td>
<td>0.098 (0.240)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>-0.299*** (0.063)</td>
<td>-0.226*** (0.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score of Civil War</td>
<td>-0.068*** (0.023)</td>
<td>-0.070* (0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.076*** (0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score of Potential Intervener</td>
<td>0.012 (0.026)</td>
<td>0.108** (0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial History</td>
<td>1.051** (0.422)</td>
<td>-0.785 (0.825)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Intervention</td>
<td>1.203*** (0.222)</td>
<td>1.164*** (0.235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>1.943*** (0.350)</td>
<td>0.716 (0.570)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.044* (1.685)</td>
<td>2.479 (1.937)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>75321</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-Pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-927.219</td>
<td>-886.929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1898.438</td>
<td>1821.858</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01

Model 1 clustered by dyad in a given civil war and robust standard errors adjusted for 6189 clusters.
Detailed Discussion of Results

First, results suggest that government and opposition sided interventions are different from one another. While this is a straightforward conclusion, previous work on interventions in civil wars generally use a binary dependent variable rather than examine each type of intervention as an independent choice. Variables such as distance, political constraints, rebel strength, polity score of the potential intervener, and colonial history all have different impacts on the decision to intervene on a particular side of a conflict.

Besides broad differences the hypotheses received mixes results. Both major power status and distance have an impact on the likelihood that a state will have a relevant opportunity to intervene in a civil conflict. Being a major power increases the likelihood that a state will have an actual opportunity to intervene, and as distance increases, states have fewer opportunities to intervene. In addition to support for several factors in the zero inflated stage, there is support for the argument that distance has a more negative effect on the decision to intervene on behalf of an opposition group than on behalf of government groups.

Comparing the models also suggests that distance is a significant predictor for both the opportunity to intervene and the willingness of a state to intervene on a particular side. In Model 1, distance is statistically significant (p<0.01), but Model 2 suggests a different story. Distance was statistically significant in the expected direction at the zero-inflation stage, suggesting far off conflicts are less likely to be a relevant opportunity some potential interveners. For the outcome stage, distance plays another important role. For opposition groups, distance has a negative impact on the likelihood
of intervention (p<0.01), but the story is less clear for government sided groups (only statistically significant at p<0.1). When given the opportunity to intervene, states are more hesitant to aid far flung opposition groups than governments. This is in line with theoretical expectations that aiding opposition groups is an inherently more costly enterprise.

Table 5 provides a side-by-side comparison between a standard multinomial logit, Model 1 and a baseline inflated multinomial logit, Model 2. While many of the variables produce similar estimates, polity scores, previous intervention, and colonial history, there are several notable differences. First, almost all of the statistically significant variables present in Model 1 remained statistically significant in the expected direction and saw a slight increase in coefficient size.

More interestingly, a few variables that were not statistically significant in Model 1 were significant (p<0.1) in Model 2. Rebel strength, for instance, was statistically significant (p<0.1) for government groups in Model 2. This suggests that given a relevant opportunity, states are more likely to intervene on behalf of a government group as the opposition’s strength increases. There is significant theoretical support for this result. Research suggests that third party interveners are hesitant to aid opposition groups due to commitment problems. A government group, even one under siege, can more easily promise future trade deals, alliances, or general cooperation with a third party state (Shirkey, 2012). While this is a preliminary finding, previous theory has suggested that opposition strength might impact the likelihood of intervention, and this model would allow scholars to explore these questions.
In addition, Model 2 provides limited evidence that alliances impact both
government and opposition sided interventions. In Model 1, alliances only impacted the
decision to intervene on behalf of a government. Model 2 suggests that potential
interveners with an alliance to the country in which the conflict is taking place are more
likely to intervene (p<0.01), but the alliance measure make a small impact on the
likelihood of intervention on behalf of a government (p<0.1). This somewhat
counterintuitive funding could suggest that governments should view alliances between
potential interveners as increasing the likelihood of intervention, but not necessarily on
the government’s side. From the perspective of a third party, an alliance with a
government experiencing civil war may indicate that the third party has a military,
economic, or other interest in the government winning, the standard explanation or the
opposition winning. In the latter case, one possibility is that opposition represents
dominant business or military interests in society, the sector of society with which the
third party allied in the first place.

The most puzzling result from these analyses is time. Although Regan has argued
that longer conflicts tend to attract more interventions, we also know that most
interventions occur at the beginning of the conflict (Kisangani and Pickering 2008). This
likely accounts for the negative coefficient in both models.

Finally, examining the zero inflation stage in Model 2 suggests that distance,
time, and major power status all have a significant impact on the opportunities states have
to intervene in civil conflict. Comparing the two models using AICs, Model 2 has a
lower AIC than Model 1 suggesting that Model 2 is a better fit than the standard
multinomial logit. This analysis suggests that the baseline inflated multinomial logit is a better fit in terms of both theory and method.

**Future Work on Interventions and Civil War**

This model is one of the first attempts to separate the relevant opportunities and the willingness to intervene in civil conflict theoretically and quantitatively. Comparing results from a baseline inflated multinomial logit and a standard multinomial logit suggests that zero inflation is a statistically and substantively significant problem in work on interventions. Using Bagozzi’s estimator, this modeling approach more closely approximates theoretical assumptions regarding interventions. Results suggest that factors such as distance and power status impact the opportunities states have to intervene in civil conflict. This article also adds to the literature on the decision to intervene on a particular side in civil conflict. Rather than view intervention as binary— to intervene or not to intervene (Morgenthau, 1967), scholars should explore the different factors that influence the decision to intervene on a particular side. This analysis suggests that distance, for instance, has a different effect on opposition and government sided interventions. Much more work needs to be done to unpack these distinctions, but this work provides evidence that these types of interventions are substantively different.

In future research, I would like to continue to focus on state’s willingness to intervene in civil conflict. We know that other factors, whether domestic institutions, cognitive constraints, or normative considerations, impact intervention behavior. Taliaferro (2004), for example, suggests that loss aversion is a motivating factor for great powers’ intervention in small, seemingly unimportant wars, such as the Soviet
involvement in Afghanistan. Taliaferro argues that loss aversion leads decision-makers to “throw good money after bad” and continue to wage war despite the relatively low impact of such a fight. Koch and Sullivan (2010) temper this finding and note that the political persuasion of democratic leaders has an interactive effect with the decision to withdraw troops or continue fighting. Using the United States, Britain, and France as a case study, they show that executives on the right tend to continue fighting whereas executives on the left of the political spectrum tend to end military engagements. Along a similar vein, Perla (2011) notes that continued public support for interventions depends on the reference point provided to the public via news coverage. Berinsky (2007) argues that when the public senses elite discord over interventions, they are less likely to give unfettered support to the administrations intervention plans. These studies all touch on factors that influence states’ willingness to interfere in other states’ affairs, but more needs to be done to bring them into a cohesive framework for thinking about interventions.
CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

This study argues that intervention on behalf of opposition groups and on behalf of government groups are fundamentally different, and the existing literature has largely ignored these issues. Focusing on the decision to intervene in civil conflict requires scholars to consider sovereignty and begs a whole host of other questions regarding intervention behavior. How does the presence of multiple opposition groups, as illustrated in the current Syrian conflict, impact the decision to intervene? What role do international organizations play as third party states contemplate intervention? Are there normative connotations to the phrase “rebel”? This study provides a framework for answering some of these questions and willingness to intervene in the Syrian civil conflict and future civil wars cuts to basic questions policymakers’ debate regarding intervention. Will the United States expend military resources to remove a sitting government? When and how are policymakers willing to intervene on behalf of governments in civil conflict? On behalf of opposition groups? How do these choices reflect the motivations and costs of intervention in civil conflict?

Willing to take the Risk?

From an empirical perspective, this study calls for a renewed focus on state’s willingness to intervene in civil conflict. The core argument of this dissertation is that states are generally less willing to intervene on behalf of opposition forces. Previous research
suggests that states are also less willing to intervene when the likelihood of success is low. Forecasting the likelihood that the desired side will emerge victorious with or without the foreign intervention is highly subjective; prior to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, analysts placed the likelihood of success between 25 and 75%, far from a reassuring assessment (van der Maat, 2011). A renewed focus on states’ willingness to intervene on a particular side can help scholars learn more about those subjective assessments. Determining these subjective assessments can help determine when are states willing to take such risks intervening in civil conflict.

Given such high degrees of uncertainty, one route is to focus on cognitive biases that influence leader’s willingness to engage in risky behavior. The basis for this project has been to focus on costs and benefit analyses. However, scholars know that humans have systematic biases in assessing risk and reward. Prospect theory is arguably the most influential behavioral theory of decision-making in the social sciences. The theory posits that individuals rarely behave in accordance with the assumptions of expected utility theory. Specifically, human decision making deviates from these assumptions in three ways (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). First, people overvalue losses relative to gains. In other words, the “disutility of relinquishing a good is greater than the utility of acquiring it” (Levy, 1997, p. 89). Second, prospect theory includes the insight that humans respond to probabilities in a nonlinear way. Experiments have shown that humans value certainty over probability. In other words, people would generally rather take the “sure thing” rather than a high probability-independent of potential benefit. Furthermore, individuals’ decision making processes tend to overweight small and underweight moderate to high probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Finally, and most
importantly, people’s risk orientation is reference point-dependent. As a wide range of studies have demonstrated, human decision-making tends to be risk-averse in the domain of gains and risk-acceptant when faced with losses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986).

The literature on state interventions in civil wars has not adequately built on these insights. Most of work explaining intervention decisions relies on purely rationalist frameworks. As notable exception, Taliaferro (2004) argues that loss frames can help explain why great powers engage in risky interventions in the periphery. With perceived losses being a loss “in terms of their [decision makers’] relative power, international status, or prestige” (Taliaferro 2004: 178), decision makers are more risk acceptant in a loss frame. With this decision frame, we should expect leaders in a loss frame to choose a risky strategy “among available policy choices” (Taliaferro 2004: 197). Interventions are one such option. For a powerful state, intervening in the periphery and achieving some strategic goal is a way of gaining back a loss (or perceived loss) of power or status. Although Taliaferro offers theoretical insight on why states intervene in the affairs of others, the scope of his analysis is limited to qualitative case studies. Taliaferro argues that leaders in a loss frame are more likely to intervene.

Given the costs and risks associated with military interventions in civil conflict, focusing on framing and decision making in intervention behavior would be a natural extension of this project. This research could test whether states are more likely to intervene generally while in a losses frame, but there are other extensions. Some public opinion research suggests that the U.S. public is generally unsupportive of internal political change. Yet, the public is more willing to take a risk for the use of force when the primary objective is one of restraining other state actors (Jentleson, 1992). I argue
that intervention on behalf of opposition groups is a riskier behavior than for government
groups. For instance, some commentators have argued that the Obama administration’s
hesitance to aid opposition groups in the ongoing civil war in Syria is due to the
uncertainty surrounding opposition groups’ intentions, degree of control over territory,
and ideological commitments (Black & Roberts, 2014, September 12). Leaders in loss
frames are more likely to choose risky options, military intervention on behalf of
opposition groups being one of them.

Willing to Take the Risk…for What?
The framework presented in this project forces scholars to focus on states’ willingness to
intervene in civil conflict. Military interventions are costly and risky foreign policy
decisions for state leaders, and recent calls for humanitarian intervention in civil conflict
have highlighted a moral component to this already difficult choice. States have long
intervened in the affairs of other states if it was in their best interest to do so, but
emerging norms such as the responsibility to protect give state the political rhetoric if not
the legal cover to intervene for explicitly humanitarian reasons.

The work is centered on determining when states are willing to violate the
sovereignty of another state, for any reason. Focusing on violations of sovereignty
provides an opportunity to examine challengers to sovereignty. Although “state
sovereignty is the fundamental structural feature of international law” (Berman &
Michaelsen, 2012, p. 339), there have always been challenges to state sovereignty—
whether the Catholic Church in the early modern period, military interventions during the
Cold War, or multinational globalizations in an age of globalization. The standard
Westphalian definition of sovereignty cites non-intervention as vital, but redefining sovereignty to incorporate notions of responsibility or to account for humanitarian interventions is nothing novel (Glanville, 2011; Krasner, 1995). In the last decades, some scholars have pointed to the decline of sovereignty as an international norm. For example, Krain notes, “International norms evolved toward an increasing acceptance of interventions at the expense of state sovereignty” (2005). This sentiment is especially common when discussing the merits of humanitarian interventions post natural disasters or in the face of possible genocide. Yet, there is mixed theoretical and empirical evidence to support this claim.

Many human rights scholars and advocates would argue that “there is an apparent contradiction between the notion of non-intervention implicit in the principle of sovereign equality and ‘taking effective collective measures,’” clause found in the United Nations Charter (Minkkinen, 2007, p. 34). Humanitarian interventions are a particularly sticky issue for the “non-interventionist core of classical Westphalian sovereignty” (Minkkinen, 2007, p. 44) because intervening to stop a government from violating human rights flies in the face of the classical view that governments can do what they want within their own border. With this in mind, human rights scholars have emphasized a duties based version of state sovereignty that emphasizes the “right to intervene” and the “responsibility to protect” (Minkkinen, 2007, p. 45).

Examining the differing motivations and costs of intervening on behalf of opposition groups might illuminate some of the debates surrounding responsibility to protect. RtoP refers to the doctrine emerging from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 and the World Summit Outcome
RtoP states that “sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe—from mass murder and rape, from starvation . . .” (Berman & Michaelsen, 2012, p. 340). RtoP emerged in the wake of the Rwandan genocide and NATO intervention in Kosovo. These events highlighted the moral imperative for the international community to halt the mass killing of civilians at the hands of their government and international organization’s ability and willingness to intervene in civil conflict. As of the time of this writing, RtoP has been evoked during UN Peacekeeping in Sudan, Russian intervention in Georgia, French intervention in Myanmar post natural disaster, and briefly mentioned during the recent intervention in Libya (Berman & Michaelsen, 2012).

States’ varied uses of RtoP illustrate that violation of sovereignty and invocation of RtoP go hand in hand. For instance, the United States and Western allies have viewed Russian intervention in Georgia has a violation of sovereignty, yet the Russians argued that intervention was to protect ethnic Russians in Georgia, similar to the rationale given for intervention in Ukraine. Evoking RtoP is shrewd policy framing on the part of Russia, but more clearly humanitarian missions have also prompted discussions of sovereignty. For example, McLachlan-Bent and Langmore’s (2011) case study on the Myanmar government’s response to a 2008 cyclone suggests that even though international law provides guidelines for evoking the responsibility to protect, the actual application of this principle is still contingent on state sovereignty. Myanmar refused to allow international aid workers into the country immediately after the cyclone hit, leading some countries to consider coercive ways of getting aid into Myanmar. In the end, both the UN and ASEAN, were subject to the wishes of Myanmar leaders who only allowed
aid workers access four weeks after the cyclone devastated the country (McLachlan-Bent & Langmore, 2011).

RtoP advocates hold that when states are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, the international community should intervene, by military measures if necessary. RtoP is not legally binding nor does it enjoy the unfettered support of many powerful actors in the international community, such as Russia and China (Berman & Michaelsen, 2012). The core of the debate between advocates and adversaries of RtoP is the definition of state sovereignty. For advocates of RtoP, state sovereignty implies that governments are responsible for their citizens’ wellbeing. When states fail to fulfill this responsibility, the international community has the obligation to intervene to coerce that government. In this sense, invocation or potential use of responsibility to protect necessarily represents an intervention against government forces. For RtoP to be evoked, the third party actor must believe that the government has failed to protect its citizens. This is a fine but key distinction between responsibility to protect and intervention for the protection of civilians, another commonly used motivation for humanitarian intervention. The latter does not necessarily imply that the government is in the wrong, whereas RtoP places the blame squarely on government actors. Thus, intervention for the protection of civilians may be seen as neutral, whereas intervention motivated by the responsibility to protect may be seen as intervention against a government.

Advocates of interventions on the basis of human rights admit that “the ideas of sovereignty and non-intervention are just as entrenched at the international level as stopping gross human rights abuses” (Cook 2008, p. 6). While the “responsibility to protect” may give countries moral justification for intervention against the recognized
government, nagging questions of sovereignty and non-intervention will likely contribute
to different patterns of intervention for and against governments in civil conflict.

**Foreign Policy Rhetoric**

While examining opposition and government sided interventions, policy makers
continually deployed the term “opposition” and “rebel.” While this dissertation used the
terms interchangeably, I suspect that these terms might possess different connotations. I
suspect that the term “rebel” has more negative connotations to a U.S. English speaking
audience than “opposition.” When Obama addressed the U.S. public and announced
airstrikes against ISIL, the statement did not contain the word “rebel.” Instead, the
Obama administration said that the Assad regime lost its “legitimacy” and referred to the
Syrian opposition in the fight against ISIL (House, 2014, September 10). Politicians
arguing that the U.S. should not be involved in Syria seem more likely to use the term
“rebel.” For example, Representative David Jolly said,

> Today’s vote is whether we as a Nation put our reliance on Syrian rebels, and
> that leave

far too many unanswered questions. We tried this in Iraq, to mixed results. We
know Syrian rebels—we know this—some will cooperate with ISIS and, in fact,
contribute to the additional killings of Syrian Christians and religious minorities. .
. What is our Nation’s response, and what is this body’s response? . . . Are we
quietly allying with the Syrian Government a regime we said we wanted to topple
or is this an act of aggression against Syria’s sovereignty? (Jolly, 2014, September
17, p. H7622)
The above statement illustrates several important reasons to oppose intervention. First, the Congressman is portraying arming Syrian rebels as an unwise decision, one that has “far too many unanswered questions.” He expresses concern that some of the rebels will aid a more radical group. Finally, Jolly is also concerned with whether or not these actions are a violation of Syrian sovereignty. This statement add further credence to policy maker’s concern over sovereignty, and illustrates the use of the term rebel with a clear negative connotation. This statement echoed earlier statements in opposition to aiding Syrian rebels. For example, Representative Ted Poe argued, “We don’t even know who we are arming as those rebels [sic]. They could be made up of criminals, patriots, al Qaeda. . .” (Poe, 2013, June 19, p. H3762). In contrast, House Resolution 223, which expressed support for armed opposition in Syria used the term “Syrian Opposition Coalition” throughout the document (House Resolution 223, 2013, May 17).

This bias seems to occur in media coverage as well. To use Foreign Policy magazine as an illustrative example, one article used the term “rebel” to refer to armed individuals in Syria who “would identify themselves as ‘Islamists’ fighting a ‘jihad’” (Lister, 2013, September 9). In the same article, the author used the term “opposition” to stress that even though some groups in Syria would describe themselves as “Islamists,” “this does not [sic] preclude them from being potentially valuable leaders of a future Syria or even as future friends of the West” (Lister, 2013, September 9). Swapping between the use of the term opposition and rebel here is especially interesting because the article is also about language, specifically disaggregating the term “Islamist.” To use another example, a Reuters cable began with the sentence “Syrian rebels dealt a blow to a U.N. envoy’s proposal for a ceasefire” (Afanasieva, 2015, March 3). In title and the
accompanying article, the Syrian rebels are portrayed as uncooperative with the West and international organizations. Another headline reads, “U.S.-Backed Syrian Rebel Group Disbanding, Joining Islamists” (Dettmer, 2015, March 1). This article makes the implicit suggestion that the moderate rebels the U.S. has aided are not as “moderate” as U.S. leaders might have liked. In contrast, another headline proclaiming U.S. and Turkish support for Syrian fighters reads, “Turkey, U.S. sign deal to train, equip Syrian opposition, official says” (Karadeniz & Alexander, 2015, February 19). Here, third party states are aiding “opposition,” not disorganized, untrustworthy “rebels.”

Granted, these headlines and media statements are not chosen at random. But, more importantly, what would these connotations have to do with foreign policy? Other work has suggested that terms like “rogue” decrease likelihood of cooperation between states. For example, when the U.S. labeled Libya a “rogue state,” it arguably “constrained its [the U.S. government’s] own actions, since any attempt to engage the ‘rogues’ was synonymous with ‘appeasement’” (Zoubir, 2002). In addition, the use of the term rogue “hampered U.S. efforts to gain multilateral support for its policies, as it was seen by Europeans and other allies to indicate an American preference for punitive approaches” (Sullivan, 2000). Although the difference between opposition and rebel may not be as distinct as the difference between “rogue state” and the Clinton White Houses’ term “states of concern” (Sullivan, 2000), foreign policy rhetoric can reveal some underlying preferences and motivations for state action.

Should the term “opposition” have more positive connotations, I would expect that states aiding non state actors in a civil conflict would be more likely to use the term “opposition” than “rebel.” In addition, keeping watch on terminology might be a signal
for political scientists and others states that a particular leader is planning on supporting- or not supporting- a particular side in the conflict. I argue that the term opposition simply sounds more legitimate, or at least more democratic. In a democratic state, groups not in power are not generally labeled “rebels” in academic discourse, rather than are termed “opposition.” Besides using content analysis software, I would be interested to conduct a survey experiment using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to gauge ordinary citizen’s reactions to the term opposition and rebel. This would be a fairly simple setup, and might provide some insight into foreign policy rhetoric in the United States. The survey could provide a respondents with a scenario, real or imagined, and randomize the use of the term opposition and rebel. After providing the scenario, the survey could ask respondents how likely/unlikely they are to support intervention on behalf of the “opposition” or “rebels.” Survey experiments could also gauge citizen’s support for certain types of policies on behalf of opposition or government groups, adding to the literature on support for U.S. intervention (Jentleson & Britton, 1998).
REFERENCES


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Appendix A: Including Polynomials of Time

Another way of accounting for time in this set up is to include polynomials of time. The models included in the body of this dissertation include time as a control variable. Here, time is the number of years passed since the beginning of an intervention to the point at which and intervention occurs (or the conflict ends). Table 6 includes all of the covariates included in the main body of this dissertation as well as polynomials of time (time squared and time cubed). The coefficients and standard errors of the original models are included for reference as well. Substantively, there are no interesting differences in the other covariates between the models included in the body of the dissertation and the models including the polynomials of time.

One problem with focusing on time to intervention is data availability. The analysis here includes the number of years passed to the intervention, but I suspect that this is not truly fine grained enough to get at substantial variation. In future research, I would like to focus on case studies where multiple interventions occurred. The vast majority of interventions occur within the first year of conflict beginning, but quantitative research could help parse out what-if any-different patterns might be at play for different types of intervention. Given that “previous intervention” is significant, the order in which intervention occurs should be important. More finely grained data on timing would help answer some of these questions.
Table 6: Multinomial Logistic Regression on Intervention Behavior (No Intervention as base category)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)</th>
<th>Model 3 Government Sided</th>
<th>Model 3 Opposition Sided</th>
<th>Model 5 Government Sided</th>
<th>Model 5 Opposition Sided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance (ln)</td>
<td>-0.530**</td>
<td>-1.162***</td>
<td>-0.521**</td>
<td>-1.171***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
<td>(0.277)</td>
<td>(0.218)</td>
<td>(0.223)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Constraints</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>-2.358**</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>-2.368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.599)</td>
<td>(1.108)</td>
<td>(0.596)</td>
<td>(1.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Strength</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.335</td>
<td>0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.277)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>-0.299***</td>
<td>-0.232***</td>
<td>-0.513***</td>
<td>-0.524**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Squared</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.023*</td>
<td>0.023***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Cubed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score of Civil War</td>
<td>-0.060**</td>
<td>-0.067*</td>
<td>-0.057*</td>
<td>-0.063*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score of Potential Intervener</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.110**</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.108**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial History</td>
<td>1.049**</td>
<td>-0.957</td>
<td>1.082**</td>
<td>-0.976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.425)</td>
<td>(0.777)</td>
<td>(0.426)</td>
<td>(0.763)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power (Potential Intervener)</td>
<td>3.049***</td>
<td>3.261***</td>
<td>3.043***</td>
<td>3.278***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.315)</td>
<td>(0.385)</td>
<td>(0.315)</td>
<td>(0.382)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Intervention</td>
<td>1.130***</td>
<td>1.004***</td>
<td>1.152***</td>
<td>1.006***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.224)</td>
<td>(0.256)</td>
<td>(0.223)</td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic Ties</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>1.143**</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>1.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.481)</td>
<td>(0.539)</td>
<td>(0.483)</td>
<td>(0.520)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>1.761***</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>1.778***</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.431)</td>
<td>(0.571)</td>
<td>(0.432)</td>
<td>(0.431)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>0.850*</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>1.023***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.332)</td>
<td>(0.441)</td>
<td>(0.330)</td>
<td>(0.396)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.474*</td>
<td>1.304</td>
<td>-3.142*</td>
<td>1.546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.700)</td>
<td>(2.012)</td>
<td>(1.723)</td>
<td>(2.106)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Observations 74054 74054
Log-Pseudolikelihood -907.886 -892.606

* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01
Clustered by dyad in a given civil war. Model 3 & Model X standard error adjusted for 6189 clusters.
Appendix B: Focusing on U.S. Intervention in Civil Conflict

Focusing on subsets of intervention can be instructive as well. Whereas (Koch & Sullivan, 2010) focus on major powers, specifically democratic major powers, another common tactic is to focus on the United States. The U.S. has intervened militarily X times since 1945. Model 6 shows the results for a multinomial logistic regression with no intervention as the base category. Model 6 shows the benefits and costs of focusing on one country’s intervention behavior. Model 6 includes all of the covariates in Model 3 and 4 with sufficient variation for time period. Some variables had to be dropped; major power status, for instance is a constant for the United States during this time period.

Overall, this additional test supports the argument that government and opposition sided interventions are different. There are several results of interest. First the logged distance measure has no influence on the likelihood to intervene. This is unsurprising. For the time period included here, the United States is a major power; it has both the capabilities to intervene around the globe. The insignificant result illustrates the benefit of including all possible interveners in the dataset; distance matters for some potential interveners mother than others. The rebel strength variable is also of interest. As opposition groups grow more powerful in relation to the government, the United States is more likely to intervene on behalf of opposition groups. This variable has no impact for intervention on behalf of government groups. This finding is specific to the United States; pooled models provide very limited support for this variable. Generally, scholars argue that decision makers are likely to intervene if the likelihood of intervention is high (van der Maat, 2011). Opposition groups that are weak in relation to the government
might be seen as less likely to win the civil war. On the other hand, the strength of the opposing group had no impact on the likelihood to intervene on behalf of a government.

Finally, another variable of interest is the “alliance” variable. In Models 3 and 4, the alliance measure had positive, significant impact on the likelihood of intervention on behalf of government forces. Just looking at the United States, an alliance with the civil war state has a negative impact on intervention for opposition groups, and no impact for intervention on behalf of governments. In other words, alliances might ensure that the United States does not aid a government’s enemies, but it is no assurance of intervention on a government’s behalf. This also makes intuitive sense, but does not find support in the pooled sample. Overall, however, I argue that the benefits of the pooled model outweigh the benefits of looking at individual countries. While focusing on the United States provides some additional findings, it cannot tell scholars anything about general characteristics of potential interveners. In addition, this setup cannot tell us anything about variables constant over time, such as level of democracy.
Table 7: Multinomial Logistic Regression for U.S. Only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)</th>
<th>Government Sided</th>
<th>Opposition Sided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance (ln)</td>
<td>-0.450 (0.724)</td>
<td>-1.601 (1.180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Strength</td>
<td>0.171* (0.312)</td>
<td>1.038** (0.493)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>-0.120** (0.058)</td>
<td>-0.174*** (0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score of Civil War State</td>
<td>-0.035 (0.029)</td>
<td>-0.310 (0.118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial History</td>
<td>0.147 (0.832)</td>
<td>-16.571*** (2.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Intervention</td>
<td>1.325*** (0.415)</td>
<td>1.200** (0.577)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Ties</td>
<td>0.237 (0.644)</td>
<td>16.471*** (1.163)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>1.069 (0.725)</td>
<td>-13.987*** (1.632)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.828 (6.323)</td>
<td>9.454 (10.187)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Observations 641  
Log-Pseudolikelihood -166.464

* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01
Clustered by civil war. Standard error adjusted for 54 clusters.
## Appendix C - Descriptive Statistics and Discussion

Table 8: Interveners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interveners 1946-2008</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan, South Africa, Syria,</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq, Libya, Thailand, Uganda</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo, Jordan, Vietnam</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Chad, Germany, India,</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq, Libya, Thailand, Uganda</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo, Jordan, Vietnam</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola, Argentina, Cambodia, Japan, Malaysia, Myanmar,</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Vietnam, Sudan, Tanzania, Turkey</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania, Armenia, Belize, Botswana, Burundi, Chile, Costa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rica, Croatia, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nambia, New Zealand, Nicaragua,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain, Taiwan, Togo, Tonga, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Simply examining the frequency at which states intervene in intrastate conflict, Great Powers top the list. The United States, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom are in the top five. It is no surprise that Great Powers account for many interventions in state conflict. Great Powers generally have the military capabilities and the worldwide interests that make them more likely to intervene in intrastate conflict.

Closer examination of this list does present some potentially interesting cases/findings. China, in comparison to other Great Powers is relatively low on the list (only 7 interventions compared to the 52 for the United States). While it has only been in the last several decades that China has become a player on the world stage, this relatively low frequency might be something to investigate.

There are also several states with relatively high numbers of interventions outsides of the traditional great powers. Egypt (12), Pakistan (11), South Africa (11), and Iran (10) all exhibit relatively high frequency for intervention. A closer examination of where these interventions were might be interesting.
Appendix D Location of Intervention

Table 9: Location of Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Intervention 1946-2008</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India, Lebanon</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola, Thailand</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Yemen</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Republic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia, Indonesia, Iran, Laos,</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique, Myanmar, Uganda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia, Pakistan</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ivory</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast, Philippines, Somalia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti,</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia, Nicaragua, Oman, United</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, Georgia, Malaysia, Peru,</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Burundi,</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece, Guatemala, Mauritania,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Vietnam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia, Cameroon, Central</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Republic, Comoros, Costa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rica, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominican</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic, Kenya, Moldova, Morocco,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal, Nigeria, Panama, Senegal,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa, Turkey, Yemen,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix Table 2 illustrates the locations of interventions from 1946 to 2008. Simply eyeballing the list, there are not many surprises. Many of the states in which an intervention occurred were not full democracies and/or developing countries.
Appendix E: Location of U.S. Interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Intervention</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan, Laos, Sudan</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia, Liberia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Thailand</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Congo, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Nicaragua, Panama, Republic of Vietnam, Rwanda, Somalia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A strong critique of my analysis is that my data on interventions is driven by the United States. As noted in Appendix Table A, the United States accounts for 52 of the 353 interventions in the dataset. Once I get further into the empirical analysis, I am curious to see if/how dropping the United States influences my results.

One benefit of having 52 cases for the United States is that it opens up the possibility for matching methods. Being able to hold the intervener constant is beneficial for this sort of analysis.