VALUES EDUCATION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
AN OVERVIEW WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

by

DOUGLAS STEPHENS ESKEW

(Under the Direction of Jo Blase)

ABSTRACT

In the history of the American public school, teachers have consistently played a major role in the transmission of values and that function continues today. Yet there is a great deal of conflict in the arena of values education over the question: Which values are to be taught? Following the traditional Rankean historicist method of historical research, this study features a detailed examination of the history of values education in the United States as well as the philosophy of those involved in selecting the values to be taught. The focus is upon the differing views between those of a more conservative paradigm who consider themselves traditionalists and those with a more liberal paradigm who consider themselves multiculturalists. Included is an overview of current policies and practices and a presentation of values education principles and practices across the nation that have potential to unite Americans of all perspectives.

INDEX WORDS: Character Education, Civic Education, Traditionalism, Multiculturalism, Higher Law, Natural Rights, Rule of Law, Democratic Values, Relativism, Absolutes, Race, Sexuality
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DEDICATION

This labor of love is dedicated to my family: to my mother and father who have always been my faithful supporters; to my three wonderful sons Ryan, Parker, and William, who have not had my fullest attention these past months, I will make it up to you; and especially to my beloved wife, Harriet, who has sacrificed so much and covered for me so many times so that I could work. I love you always and forever. Finally, I dedicate this work to America; may she always seek to live up to her ideals.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION TO VALUES EDUCATION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Values Education in American Public Schools</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statement of the Problem and Purpose of the Study</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Research Questions</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assumptions and Theoretical Framework</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Definition of Terms</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significance and Limitations of the Study</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organization of the Study</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>REVIEW OF CURRENT LITERATURE ON VALUES EDUCATION</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Need for Values Education</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obstacles to Values Education</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alternative Methods of Teaching Values</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Philosophy Behind Values Education</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current Formal Values Education Programs</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF VALUES EDUCATION</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE HISTORY OF VALUES EDUCATION IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
SCHOOL IN CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT CONFLICT BETWEEN
TRADITIONALISTS AND MULTICULTURALISTS ........................................51
Foundational Values: Colonial America.......................................................51
Foundational Values: Revolutionary America..............................................54
Constitutional Foundations, Jeffersonian Democracy, and American Values .....57
Early Nineteenth Century: The Common School ...........................................64
Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century: Americanization................66
John Dewey and the Progressive Movement.................................................67
Schools as Inculcators of Americanism: The Forties and Fifties ...............72
Introduction to Turmoil: The Sixties and Seventies ....................................74
The Reagan Years: A Conservative Revolution .........................................79
The Conflict Widens: The Nineties and into the Twenty First Century .....81
Sexualization........................................................................................................168
Policies and Programs..........................................................................................170
Which Content?: Curricular Decisions.................................................................172
The Purposes of Schooling ..................................................................................177
What is Democracy? ............................................................................................179
Americanization...................................................................................................183
The American Race? ............................................................................................185
The Re-education of the Oppressed Mind ...........................................................191
The Role of Teachers ...........................................................................................194
Common Ground? ...............................................................................................198
Not in an Election Year! ......................................................................................201
Current Values Education Programs....................................................................204
Concluding Considerations: The Future ..............................................................209
REFERENCES........................................................................................................215
APPENDICES
A PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATISM....................................................................246
B TERMINOLOGY FOR VALUES EDUCATION .................................................249
C ELEVEN PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE CHARACTER.................................259
D THE HISTORICAL METHOD AND EDUCATIONAL HISTORIOGRAPHY FOR TRADITIONAL HISTORICISTS..........................................................260
E VALUES EDUCATION POLL FROM THE 31ST ANNUAL PHI DELTA KAPPA/GALLUP POLL OF THE PUBLIC’S ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS ..........................................................264
F 12-POINT COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CHARACTER EDUCATION

.........................................................................................................................265
Values Education in American Public Schools

Throughout the United States, schools at every level are teaching more than the basics of reading, writing, and mathematics. We are not referring to fine arts or electives here, rather to the growing practice of values inculcation. In schools across the land, teachers are inculcating what are often deeply felt principles through formal and informal instruction, much of this simply by how they relate to students. It is impossible for any sentient human being to be completely value neutral; thus, anyone who teaches will teach values, even if it is only done so informally (Heslep, 1989; Passe, 1999). Aside from these informal, albeit often intentional, transmissions of values, there are formal programs ongoing, some stemming from recent traumatic events, others dating back to the sixties and seventies. Historically, the overriding purposes of education have included some form of values instruction but have largely focused upon preparation for the work world. Government sponsored school reform efforts have, for the past ten to fifteen years, emphasized academic standards, testing, and school accountability geared to improve economic efficiency and insure a competent work force. The meritocracy envisioned by educational psychologists of the past such as Edward Thorndike even got support from both Presidential candidates in the 2000 election (Spring, 2001). Yet while this emphasis on academic performance has not subsided, the barrage of events during this same time period has created what is often called a “post-Columbine, post-9/11 world.” This has inspired many educators, parents, and the public at large to express the need for formal values education, sometimes called
character education, ethics education, or civic education. Even with the significant pressure on educators regarding test scores, values education is a topic of increasing interest nationwide.

In the history of the American public school, teachers have consistently played a major role in the transmission of values and the practice continues today. As we travail through the rigors of a seemingly endless barrage of school reform movements, some being helpful and others not, it is of great significance that while calls for student success, teacher accountability, and overall academic excellence rise and fall to different degrees, Americans continue to show a serious interest in values education. Yet there is a great deal of conflict in the arena of values education. The obvious question comes to mind: which values are to be taught? This brings us to an even more all-encompassing question: What is the purpose of education? While few would argue the economic preparation function of schooling, prominent education-focused Americans, from Thomas Jefferson to Eleanor Roosevelt to George W. Bush, have called upon public schools to assist families in building character and citizenship in children (Bush, 1999; Jefferson, 1816; Roosevelt, 1930). In this study, I will seek to provide an overview of the efforts of past and present American educators to answer that call, with a focus upon the inherent conflict in values education, taking a hopeful look at some ways to bridge the gap between combatants.

Statement of the Problem and Purpose of the Study

The nature of values education in American public schools seems to reflect the general philosophical conflict in the country. In a society as diverse as ours, the variance of opinion regarding the what and how of values education can easily become a major focus of these disagreements. Many people support the role of the school in teaching values, but there seems to be little consistent agreement on which values should be taught. Looking across ever-widening gaps, the various combatants appear to be unable to find much common ground. Considering the
pluralistic nature of the school community (including just about everyone from parents to educators, from business leaders to politicians), it would be practical to establish a dialogue in order to find common ground, but this is an immense challenge. Carl Glickman, in his treatise on democratic change in education, *Revolutionizing America’s Schools* (1998), told us that there is little “reasonable discourse” between citizens of various interest groups and that thoughts regarding social reform have hardened into “mere dogma” (p. 2). It seems as if there is a culture war going on, and the battleground is the public school house beginning at the elementary level and continuing all the way through post-graduate studies in major universities.

There are a number of active battles in values education at present. Included among these are those in the arenas of race and ethnicity, culture, class, politics, sexuality and gender, and religion. These issues are at the core of our personal and corporate identities. Needless to say, this often becomes a lively discussion, as differing elements of society vie for primacy in the development of curriculum and pedagogy for values inculcation to use in schools. Trying to examine any conflict in the United States from the perspective of only two positions might be seen as an oversimplification of the complexities of a pluralistic society. Yet, this is the situation that we are in today, as the discussion has broken down into a near war, as two major philosophical positions, *traditionalism* and *multiculturalism*, have come to represent the most visible components of the values education conflict (Heslep, 1989, 2002; Schlesinger, 1998; Schmidt, 1997). Keeping in mind that there are multiple layers in between the extremes, we shall seek to discover the most clearly definable values positions. All of this is controversial, with heated and emotional debate being the norm, rather than the exception. This is a conflict that does not appear to be going away anytime soon. It is especially worth noting here that the outcome of this conflict may well determine the direction of the nation in the new century. The
values we teach students in public schools will have a direct impact on how they see the world and their roles in it. As Schlesinger (1998) put it, “The debate about the curriculum [regarding values education] is a debate about what it means to be an American” (p. 22). The fact that this conflict exists is not surprising. In a democratic state with a diverse population, there will be a continuance of debate over both the values that are to be considered central and the role of schools for values inculcation. While there is a historical tradition for schools in the United States to be involved in values education, the specific values to be taught have changed to reflect the core values in American society at any given time (Heslep, 1989). Thus, we are faced with an immense problem. Considering the changes in American society during the past forty years, the conflict has become almost beyond any realistic solution. There is a need for educators who can somehow get past the conflict and provide solutions to the crisis. Even considering the distance between the combatants, perhaps we can find some common ground where most everyone can stand. In this study, I have explicated the scope and nature of the battle, and have attempted to identify potential solutions to the conflict.

Research Questions

The primary focus of this study is the following: What is the role of American public schools in values education? I have approached this question from a philosophical and historical perspective, seeking to discover the values inculcation function in schooling today and throughout American history. Other questions have arisen as a result of this study. These were considered as they appeared. Questions for possible consideration are nearly without end and include the following:

1. What are the values that are being taught in American public schools?
2. How are values taught in American public schools?
3. Is there an identifiable set of values acceptable to the majority of Americans for public school values inculcation?

4. What input is coming from government, parents, and the educational hierarchy?

5. What was the thinking of American Founders regarding the values necessary to preserve the republic?

6. What are the current policies, curriculums, and practices for values inculcation?

In the context of the primary question, I have attempted to answer as many ancillary questions as possible, while certainly leaving many more for future study.

Assumptions and Theoretical Framework

As with any study, there are a number of assumptions that must be stipulated as true before specific questions can be answered. In this study, a basic assumption has been that anyone who teaches will teach values of some sort. It is impossible for any human being to be completely value neutral; thus, anyone who teaches will teach values, even if it is only done so informally. As one scholar opined, “everything we do reflects our values, every decision is a choice between competing values” (Passe, 1999, p. 124). Teachers teach values every time they step into the classroom, through the manner in which they address the students, how they relate to them, the policies they enact in classroom procedures, and certainly how they represent their own political and philosophical views (Lyons, Rodriguez, Catallozzi, & Benson, 1998; McLaren, 1994). A second assumption in this study has been that in the battle over values education, everyone thinks he or she is right. Nowhere is this more evident than in examining the conflict between multiculturalists and traditionalists (Bennett, 1992; Glickman, 1998; Heslep, 1996; Spring, 2002). One does not have to look at the conflict for very long to realize the great distance separating these two dominant camps. In this study, I have explicated the conflict and have taken on the much more difficult task of trying to find some common ground. A third assumption for
this study, despite the existence of the conflict, has been that America is an idea worth saving. Regardless of the failures that we have experienced, the fact remains that the principles upon which our republic is based are sound and can work for all people if applied properly (Bennett, 2003; Dayton & Glickman, 1994; Schlesinger, 1998). My final assumption was that it truly matters what direction we take in values education because our course shall determine the destiny of America (Callan, 1997; D’Souza, 2002; Maxcy, 1995; Schlesinger, 1998; Schmidt, 1997). The debate over values education is central to the larger debate in American society.

The theoretical framework for this study stems from both the historical method (as explained in chapter 3) and certain principles embraced by a number of American Founders. Since there is no existing formal structure for this framework, I have attempted to clarify its components under the seemingly contradictory title Progressive Conservatism [PC]. This framework shares common ground with a number of other theoretical positions, while at the same time being clearly different from those positions. The schema in Appendix A should prove helpful in understanding the framework.

In the case of PC, it is extremely difficult to separate the theoretical framework from the methodological approach and the philosophies supporting the position. To begin with, being progressive, this framework is characterized as open (i.e., open for discussion), in a willingness to engage in dialogue with those of contrary points of view, in order to make better decisions for teaching values. Also, it is open to a somewhat pragmatic approach in embracing innovation and to a diverse perspective in order to find ways to benefit as many people as possible. Here we can see an element of Bentham and Mill’s utilitarianism, without the hedonistic calculations model (Fonsecca & Ussher, 2003b) and something of Rawls’s original position philosophy (Callan, 1997), even though those two frameworks are in contrast. Being conservative, PC is both
dialectical, sharing common ground with Hegel’s systematic thought and structuralism (Duquette, 2001), and discursive, leaning upon reason more than intuition or emotion (Miller et al., 2003). Yet this reliance upon reason is not absolute. Implicit here is the idea that while a posteriori conclusions are useful in complex situations, correct a priori conclusions are indeed possible. Furthermore, even though PC is consistent with the traditional foundationalist epistemology of Plato, Augustine, and Descartes, it is only somewhat related to rationalism (i.e., reason is supreme), but more closely tied to the “unseen reality” perspective of Platonism and Augustinian thought. This follows the idea that “there is absolute truth or a real world that we do not construct” (McGrew, 2003, para. 1), implying a rejection of cognitive relativism. This position shares little common ground with the “science is all” paradigm of positivism and scientism, which are also considered foundationalist. Yet we can see something of objective idealism, which has roots in Plato, Hegel, Kant, and Berkeley and “accepts common sense realism (i.e., the view that material objects exist), but rejects naturalism (according to which the mind and spiritual values have emerged from material things)” and subjectivism (Dolhenty, 1998, para. 1). Inherent in the PC paradigm is the concept of absolutism, a supporting pillar of the structuralism and foundationalism already mentioned. This, of course, is not a reference to political absolutism but epistemological absolutism, defined as a belief in “an absolute doctrine, principle, or standard” (American Heritage Dictionary [AHD], 2000, para. 1). This is consistent with a form of modernism that embraces “an implied availability of truth” (Bentley, 1999, p. 128). The PC paradigm can perhaps be understood best by establishing its opposition to other theoretical frameworks. In addition to the aforementioned lack of agreement with relativism, subjectivism, and positivism, we can add phenomenology, social constructionism, existentialism, nihilism, empiricism, naturalism, Marxism, deconstructionist philosophy, and most anything else
that supports a postmodernist view of knowledge. There is additional insight regarding this framework provided in chapter 3, where I discuss methodology.

Definition of Terms

There are a number of concepts that are foundational for this study and that must be defined. This is not to assume readers are unfamiliar with the concepts, rather that since words often have multiple definitions, it is important for readers to understand how a concept is applied for purposes of this study. I address several of these in Chapter 1 and others throughout this paper. They may also be found in Appendix B. When referring to values education, the terms character, ethics, or civic education are often used interchangeably, yet while certainly similar, there is a significant difference in the meanings. Character can be defined as “moral strength” (AHD, 2000) and embraces a specific set of principles, implying judgment of actions by a fixed moral code. In this paradigm, one might say that according to the predominant moral code of this society, a person demonstrates character by returning a lost wallet to its owner intact. In other words, character is a strength built on the inside and shows in one’s behavior. Ethics does not place value judgments on behavior because it is generally considered the “philosophical study of morals,” although one could say “she has solid ethics,” which would then make them equivalent to morals (AHD, 2000). In this study, ethics will be considered as a study of value systems. Civic education specifically refers to training in citizenship to ensure the continuation of the society. Learning about the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights would be a part of civic education in the United States. Both character education and civic education would imply absolutes. Ethics would imply relativism. So what do we mean by values education and how does it relate to these concepts? Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (MWCD) calls values “desirable principles” (2000, para. 1), supporting the aforementioned statement that everyone has
values; for even people who are “unprincipled” have standards that they live by, though those standards might be abhorrent to the rest of society. Values education would include character education, with its focus of building moral strength and producing ethical behavior, as well as civic education, with its focus of strengthening our democratic republic and insuring its continuance. Thus, for this study, I have defined values education as: the process by which American society instills specific desirable principles regarding moral behavior and civic responsibility into the citizenry, particularly, the children. Still the question remains: which principles are desirable? The answers to this and the previous questions would be impossible to reach without examining the variance of thought and practice that exists in American education regarding values inculcation. Consequently, in this paper I have analyzed the broad range of opinion regarding values education, paying particular attention to the philosophies of the educators, as well as the practices used in the schools.

Included here are the concepts of multicultural education, ethnocentrism, cultural pluralism, multiculturalism, and traditionalism. Multicultural education is simply learning about and seeking to understand diverse cultures: It “presents and examines the values and practices of other cultures objectively and critically” (Schmidt, 1997, p. 3) The implication here is that there should be no specific political agenda in genuine multicultural education, yet we may rightly question if this is possible, since one might incline to emphasize the positive aspects of some cultures while focusing on the negative aspects of others. This assumes that there is the possibility of ethnocentric attitudes in teachers. Ethnocentrism is defined by MWCD (2000) as “the attitude that one’s culture is superior to another culture.” It would be logical to conclude that most people prefer their own particular culture, for if that were not the case, one would expect wholesale culture swapping to take place continually, as people discovered new cultures
they preferred. Thus, in a sense, most everyone could be considered at least marginally ethnocentric, making objective multicultural education difficult. The term *cultural pluralism* was coined in 1915 by Horace Kallen in response to Israel Zangwill’s play, *The Melting Pot* (Schlesinger, 1998). In Zangwill’s analogy, each group leaves behind their individual cultural differences to become Americans. Americanization, or socialization into mainstream American culture, was a major goal in public education for much of the twentieth century, with an emphasis on efficiency, cost effectiveness, and conformity (Maxcy, 1995). Kallen, however, argued that what made America great was ethnic diversity and that people should seek to keep their cultural heritage alive. He did not see us as one people but as many, where each group would maintain its specific cultural differences while participating in society at large, much like instruments in an orchestra. This is not cultural pluralism as we see it today, for it seems, in consideration of the orchestra analogy, we are not all playing the same piece. Today’s cultural pluralism is more correctly defined as *multiculturalism* (D’Souza, 2002; Maxcy, 1995; Schlesinger, 1998). For the purposes of this study, multiculturalism (a.k.a., *radical pluralism*) is a political agenda and is a radically different concept than multicultural education or traditional cultural pluralism (a.k.a, *reasonable pluralism*), which is more closely related to ethnic diversity.

Heslep (2002) distinguished multiculturalism (MC) from traditional cultural pluralism (CP). In traditional CP, there is a common culture, with sub-cultures allowing for variance within the bounds of the common culture. In MC, each culture group maintains its uniqueness on an equal basis with all others; no common culture exists. In CP education, students are taught how to appreciate and get along with others of different cultural perspectives, with an emphasis on tolerance and critical thinking, while remaining part of the common national culture. In MC education, the majority culture is portrayed as oppressive, and teaching centers on elevating the
minority cultures and reshaping society to full cultural equality of all cultures (Heslep, 2002). The political agenda inherent in multiculturalism involves overturning the hegemony of the existing majority, thereby increasing minority power (Paringer, 1990; Sehr, 1997).

Multiculturalism sits directly opposed to traditionalism. To understand American traditionalism, one needs look no further than our nation’s foundational documents and those of like principles that have followed. The Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, some of the writings of the Founders of the American republic, some of the treatises written by later well-known Americans such as Abraham Lincoln, Frederick Douglas, Theodore Roosevelt, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Martin Luther King, Jr., all of these documents spelled out the paradigm for traditionalism, which seeks to maintain and strengthen the existing American culture (Maxcy, 1995; Nash, 1986). This, of course, is somewhat of an oversimplification of the two positions, considering the broad range of opinion regarding values in America. Not all multiculturalists have supported every plank of the multiculturalism platform, nor does every traditionalist support all the tenets of traditionalism. Certainly, there are varying degrees of these positions, and one could actually be torn between the two sides. Despite these considerations, the trend in both instances is fairly consistent. I address the philosophical positions of both of these in detail in chapter 5.

Significance and Limitations of the Study

Can America’s public schools help fill the vacuum for character education? There is overwhelming evidence of the need for schools to teach good character as part of values education. Consider the following data as presented by Berreth and Ernst (2001):

In a nationwide survey conducted in 1997 [by Public Agenda], 78 percent of academically successful U.S. high school students admitted to cheating in school. Forty percent of 9th graders said they had already had sexual intercourse, and there has been a concomitant rise in teen pregnancy. Young people rated themselves as significantly more
selfish and materialistic than they did in 1970, and there has been an increase in hostility, bigotry, sexual harassment, disrespect, defiance, and peer cruelty. (para. 10)

Furthermore, consider the observations of teachers and parents who deal with today’s children on a consistent basis:

In Public Agenda’s 1999 survey on parental involvement, Playing Their Parts, the respondents stated that too many youngsters today lack values, character, and basic civility. . . . [In addition,] both parents and teachers also reported that the most fundamental and indispensable job for parents is raising well-behaved children who want to learn. For both groups, the same basic lessons—respect, effort, and self-control—emerge over and over as the essentials that every child must master before academic learning can ever begin. (para. 11-12)

Have there been changes since the nineties? Perhaps an in-depth study would uncover the answer. Despite the fact that there is strong support for character education, many lament that there is a dearth of solid character education in public schools. In light of the apparent need, why is there a shortage of formal values education? The answer lies partly in the controversy surrounding values inculcation. The challenge is as complex as American society with its “bewildering pluralism” for educators considering the content and pedagogy of teaching values (Callan, 1997, p. 196). Yet schools must be in a position to inculcate values. Neutral values programs are ineffective at best and have earned the spite of the American public (Strike, 1990).

Considering the wide range of opinion regarding values education, especially between those of a more conservative paradigm who consider themselves traditionalists and those of a more liberal paradigm who consider themselves multiculturalists, what I have attempted to do in this study is difficult. Is finding common ground possible? Are there values education programs in existence that could gain consensus among Americans? With the near war seen today over values education, it becomes critical to find ways to bridge gaps between opposing elements of American society. Yet in doing so, we must not forsake the principles that have made us a vibrant democratic republic. Considering the stakes, this study is of primary importance. Yet
there are limitations to any study, particularly to one that proposes to find answers to broad educational problems. The focus will be threefold: (a) to examine the conflict between multiculturalists and traditionalists regarding values education, (b) to explicate the history and philosophy behind each position, and (c) to discover values education principles and practices across the nation that have potential to unite Americans of all perspectives. That goal (i.e., unity) is limiting to the extent that the study may prove it to be impossible. As a starting point, I must admit that while one may seek to be objective, the nature of the values conflict in American schools is such that it is virtually impossible to maintain complete objectivity. The wide gap between multiculturalism and traditionalism clearly leaves even the most objective researcher little room to maneuver outside that of taking a specific philosophical position. Therefore, while I have attempted to present a fair analysis, my stated position has been consistent throughout: the best course for American public schools is to support a progressive form of traditional values inculcation, helping children to have a firm foundation of American principles, while also helping them develop the intellectual confidence to think through complex issues, so as to empower them to make legitimate values choices throughout their lives. I found no evidence to overrule my position and believe that the validity of this study remains intact. To have approached this controversial topic without stating my position up front would have been intellectually dishonest.

Organization of the Study

This study is organized in six sections, beginning with this chapter as a general explanation of the scope and procedure of the study and an introduction to the concept of values education in American public schools. Chapter 2 is an initial review of the current literature pertaining to the need for values education, including a brief examination of the philosophical
background and current practice of values education, serving as an introduction to the presentation of the final two chapters of this study. Chapter 3 features a presentation of the historical research method as used for this study, with the supporting philosophical background necessary to support the approach. In Chapter 4, I detail the history of American values education, especially as it relates to today’s philosophy and pedagogy. Chapter 5 is an examination of the conflict between multiculturalists and traditionalists, using specific examples from schools across the nation, with illumination for the philosophical background of both positions. Finally, in Chapter 6, I discuss the conflict as it exists today and attempt to present potential solutions to the values education crisis, providing a launching point for additional research.
CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF CURRENT LITERATURE ON VALUES EDUCATION

The Need for Values Education

Today there is a vast body of literature relating to values education, especially focusing upon programs dealing with character and civic development, although little is revealed on a broad scale in terms of the results of these programs to date. This of course reflects that today’s values education has only been emphasized in formal programs for roughly the past ten years. Prior to the nineties, values inculcation was largely an informal function, dependent upon the values of the individual teachers. This does not take into account use of Values Clarification during the seventies and part of the eighties (Simon, Howe, & Kirschenbaum, 1972), which a number of educators say was not designed to teach character or civic duty, but rather, to teach children to create their own values based upon their experiences and personal beliefs (Spring, 2002). Actually, Simon et al. (1972) made it clear that this was not an attempt to teach children to develop their own values but rather an attempt to inculcate their own values paradigm: “The schools must not be allowed to continue fostering the immorality of morality. An entirely different set of values must be nourished” (p. 20, emphasis mine). But by the late eighties and early nineties, Values Clarification had come to be scorned by many due to its relativism as a contributing factor to the moral vacuum in the nation’s youth (Callan, 1997; Strike, 1990).

During the past decade, many politicians, educators, parents, and the general public have expressed the need for values education. In Sylvia Hewlett’s book When the Bough Breaks: The Cost of Neglecting Our Children (1991), we saw disturbing news regarding the neglect of
American children. Reflecting on this volume, Lickona (1993) stated, “Overall, child well-being has declined despite a decrease in the number of children per family, an increase in the educational level of parents, and historically high levels of public spending in education” (p. 8). Lickona (1993) saw the decline of the family as children’s “primary moral teacher” and as “thus creating a moral vacuum” (p. 8). In 1993, he explained that increasing numbers of people across the ideological spectrum believe that our society is in deep moral trouble. The disheartening signs are everywhere: the breakdown of the family; the deterioration of civility in everyday life; rampant greed at a time when one in five children is poor; an omnipresent sexual culture that fills our television and movie screens with sleaze, beckoning the young toward sexual activity at ever earlier ages; the enormous betrayal of children through sexual abuse; and the 1992 report of the National Research Council that says the United States is now the most violent of all industrialized nations. (p. 6)

Consistent with this view, Whitehead (1993) presented a synopsis of the decline of the family and subsequent problems faced by American children, fostering a need for schools to teach positive values. Has the need for values education changed in the past few years? If anything, the need seems to have increased, as indicated in the Berreth and Ernst study (2001) mentioned in Chapter 1. There is indeed overwhelming evidence reflecting the need for schools to embrace values education, with an emphasis on character.

Society at large is certainly not helping to build character or citizenship in the young. With scandals abounding in the government, in the lives of the rich and famous, and in the lives of many everyday Americans, what are we to expect from our children? The breakdown of the family is having a major impact, as children are sometimes not learning basic societal values at home (Lickona, 1993). Predictably, poor ethics are evident in behavior at school as well. It often starts at the top, where administrators are all too often found to become abusive towards teachers (Blase & Blase, 2002). Thus, there are major implications for today’s school leaders. As Maxcy (2002) opined, “Schools cannot be moral or ethical places when leaders are unethical and...
immoral themselves” (p. 39). Ethical standards must also be applied to teachers and students. Stories abound of teachers who have improper relations with students and of students who participate in violence, stealing, bullying, plagiarism, and a general disrespect of others (Maxcy, 2002). Some are saying that schools must change their culture and seek to fill the moral vacuum in today’s society: “Schools, in order to conduct teaching and learning, must become caring moral communities that help children from unhappy homes focus on their work, control their anger, feel cared about, and become responsible students” (Lickona, 1993, p. 8). Reflecting on thirty-plus years of moral decline and need for values education, Lickona (2003) observed that we need a “society-wide effort to restore the moral fabric” (para. 3).

Obstacles to Values Education

Even with the decline of Values Clarification, teachers and schools seemed hesitant to embrace values education prior to the early nineteen nineties. There are a number of causes of this phenomenon to consider, and many of these apply to the limits of values education today. Wynne (1989) discovered that despite the general societal discomfort with the relativism of Values Clarification type methods, some teachers continued to struggle with the idea of formal values inculcation. In respect to this struggle, teacher desire to avoid conflict has been a major factor. Singletary (1992) found that teachers often avoided teaching specific values, especially if there is any controversy involved. This is often tied in with another factor that began contributing to schools” reluctance during the nineties: an increase in cultural pluralism (Leming, 1993). Lickona (1993) agreed that in addition to the other changes that have taken place in American society, two primary barriers to schools fulfilling their role in values inculcation are “the rapidly intensifying pluralism of American society . . . and the increasing secularization of the public arena” (p. 6). The challenge for educators is as complex as American society. In considering the
content and pedagogy for teaching values, there are a number of perspectives. Callan (1997) opined, “Real moral dialogue is risky business” due to the reality that students are vulnerable to suggestions and that the public is always watching for schools to fail: “The excursions of teachers into the hazardous territory of moral dialogue are naturally viewed with suspicion in societies that distrust the ability of schools to do even the easy things well” (p. 196). Depending on the character and knowledge that students bring with them to the classroom and the values of the teacher, these excursions “may seem corrupting” to some, even if a consensus is found. (p. 196). Yet “a moral education cleansed of everything that might give offence is not a coherent possibility” (p. 202). Even students’ perspectives come into play. Often values education is not emphasized due to student perceptions. Some studies have shown that students are often bored with politics (Walker, 1996) or suspicious of authorities (Emler & Reicher, 1987). Of course, as mentioned previously, a major barrier to consensus on values education is the conflict between multiculturalists and traditionalists. In this conflict, values education can have radically different meanings, from teaching students to overturn existing hegemony and recreate American culture (Boykin, 1994; Sehr, 1997), to the inculcation of traditional American values for the preservation of society (Lickona, 2003; Schlesinger, 1998). I will address the conflict more fully in chapters 4 and 5. In conclusion to this brief examination of obstacles, the legal environment has not always been a friendly one for values education. A number of Supreme Court cases focusing on the establishment clause of the First Amendment gave pause to those interested in teaching morality-based values education in the public schools. Fear of reprisal by secularist organizations kept schools paralyzed and unable to foster values education programs (Leming, 1993). The environment is much more inductive to formal programs today.
Alternative Methods of Teaching Values

In addition to formal programs, it appears that schools may contribute to the values inculcation process both in and out of the classroom in alternative ways. Some researchers have discovered a positive values component in extracurricular activities. Based upon his studies of character education in schools, Lickona (1996) opined that by facing challenges outside the classroom, “students develop practical understanding of the requirements of fairness, cooperation, and respect” (p. 95). In a review of the research done on the effects of extracurricular activities upon students’ values, Holland and Andre (1987) concluded that among the values learned were cooperation, participation, and respect for others. Another study found that those involved in extracurricular activities in high school were less likely to have substance abuse problems (Shilts, 1991). Additionally, extracurricular activities can help teach positive values to those who do not do well academically (Holland & Andre, 1994), as well as to those with special needs (Murtaugh, 1988). Wynne (1989) found that there are a number of extracurricular activities involving clubs, sports, and community service that are seen as helpful in values development. Indeed, most of the extracurricular programs seem to include strong character education components that support positive values (Wynne, 1989). Additionally, for a number of years, studies have shown that the school environment can have a positive effect on the development of student values (Johnson, Maruyama, Johnson, Nelson, & Skon, 1981; Slavin, 1990). This includes schools that succeed in creating a democratic environment (Blase, Blase, Anderson, & Dunyan, 1995; Mulkeen, Cambron-McCabe, & Anderson, 1994) and an ethos of care (Eisner, 1994; Schaps, 2003).
General Philosophy Behind Values Education

During the past ten years, there has been much written regarding the philosophy behind values education. There is a lot of common ground for those in support of values education. This includes consideration of citizenship (Callan, 1997; Kymlica, 1999), democracy (Tamir, 1995; White, 1996), and virtue (Beck, 1998; Bennett, 2003). Others have seen values education as a natural component of teaching (Passe, 1999). As mentioned previously, teachers teach values every day through their relationship with students and how they represent their own political and philosophical views. Herein lies the controversy. Informal values education has taken place in America since public schooling began, indeed often by design, as we can see by looking back to the nineteen thirties, when Dewey disciple George Counts argued that for a teacher, “a neutral stance toward the teaching of values was impossible.” In fact, the “imposition of values upon students was necessary and desirable” to preserve Counts’s vision of democracy (Lyons et al., 1998, p. 108). But even in this there can be a conflict among educators, for Counts was one who “advocated the reconstruction of American society through the establishment of democratic socialism” (p. 107). Like Dewey, he saw existing inequities in American society during the Progressive Era. Counts took this as a sign that democracy needed to follow a Marxist progression toward socialism. Teachers were to have prime responsibility in transforming society: “He considered teaching an inherently political act” (p. 108). The conflict here seems to be less about whether we have values education than about which values should be taught. I shall address this conflict more fully in chapter 5. However, not all educators believe that the conflict over values curriculum will doom the process. Lickona (1993) said that despite these barriers, reaching a consensus is possible and necessary if the schools are to recapture their character education function. Components of this model as seen in schools should include the teacher as
model, developing a moral classroom community, positive peer relationships, using discipline as a tool for character development, and building a democratic classroom (Lickona, 2003). In this paradigm, the idea of a community atmosphere, where all members of the school have shared values could prove to be a good one. There seems to be a growing body of empirical research showing great benefit in community atmosphere for schools. Students in these schools have increased academic motivation (Solomon, Battistich, Watson, Schaps, & Lewis, 2000), ethical and altruistic behavior (Schaps et al., 1997), social and emotional maturity (Solomon et al., 2000), and a reduction of drug use and violence and other problem behaviors (Resnick et al., 1997). This trend might prove to be a point of emphasis for future study.

In recent years, a number of scholars have spoken of the need for “good” schools, in an ethical and artistic sense (Jackson, 1998). Indeed, a school can function as a beacon of hope in the community, a kind of “moral commonwealth” (Selznick, 1992), which can help us to construct an improved vision for our collective future (Maxcy, 2002). Much of what has been proposed for the making of “good” schools focuses upon the good defined as effective and successful (Finn, 1991). Recently, however, many researchers are finding that “good” schools are necessarily ethical, as well (Jackson, Boostrum, & Hansen, 1993; Murry, 1995; Roy, 1996). Furthermore, Sergiovanni (1992) discovered that “the evidence from research on school effectiveness . . . and school culture . . . increasingly suggests that effective schools have virtuous qualities that account for a large measure of their success” (p. 99). Likewise, some have found that an orderly school environment with a just discipline program contributes to values education (Leming, 1993), and others have seen the importance of the teacher as an example of positive values for students to emulate (Williams, 1993).
Finally, it seems that values education is most effective if there is an emphasis placed upon character development in early childhood. It is worth mentioning here that during the twentieth century, there was a great deal of work done by psychologists and sociologists regarding the development of moral values in children. Moral reasoning was the focus of much research on the development of ethical standards in children and adults: “That research began with Jean Piaget’s 1932 book, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, and has continued through the work of Lawrence Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan, William Damon, Nancy Eisenberg, James Rest, Mary Brabeck, and others” (Lickona, 2001, p. 239). This can be a limiting factor in that children experience significant moral development in the early years of life, even prior to beginning formal schooling (Buzzelli, 1993; Kagan & Lamb, 1987), further establishing the importance of early childhood values education (Brooks & Goble, 1997).

**Current Formal Values Education Programs**

As mentioned previously, the major challenge in establishing values education programs is reflected in the wide range of values in American society. If there exists some common ground, perhaps it exists in one particular aspect of values education: character education. Yet even here, there have been continuing debates “about what constitutes quality, who controls content and the values being taught, and how federal, state, and local mandates influence character education” (Berreth & Ernst, 2001, para. 1). But there is promise in the idea that schools can teach children the “attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors” that comprise the “core values [that] form the basis of good character” (Boston, 1997). The Character Education Partnership (CEP), a nonpartisan organization that promotes ethical development in young people, has defined *character education* as “the deliberate effort by schools, families, and communities to help young people understand, care about, and act upon, core ethical values” (Lickona, 1999,
para. 1). CEP seems to have a broad appeal with both traditionalists and multiculturalists, as seen in a diverse advisory panel including Barbara Bush, John Gardner, George Gallup, and Jesse Jackson, among others. The foundational element of the organization is a document entitled *Eleven Principles of Effective Character Education* (see Appendix C), organized by developmental psychologist and education professor Thomas Lickona, head of the Developmental Studies Center [DSC] Eric Schaps, and senior research scientist Catherine Lewis, from Mills University (Lickona, Schaps, & Lewis, 1999a).

In a real sense, the CEP program and others like it are seeking to go beyond theoretical considerations. For example, Lickona (2001) referred to a program in Baltimore that has established twenty-one ethical values, “such as compassion, honesty, justice, respect for others’ rights, responsible citizenship, due process, and the rule of law—values that are viewed as consistent with the U.S. Constitution and as beneficial to both the individual and society” (p. 239). In addition, a number of other programs are attempting to answer the call for values education. The values they express seem consistent with those expressed in the CEP agenda. Schaps’s Developmental Studies Center features a Caring School Community program, with a character education element using the *Eleven Principles* (Schaps, 2002); Josephson Institute of Ethics’s *Character Counts* provides numerous materials and programs emphasizing “Six Pillars of Character”: *trustworthiness, respect, responsibility, fairness, caring, and citizenship* (Hanson, 2002); Ethics Resource Center has produced practical applications for values education with a focus upon *empathy, integrity, perseverance, responsibility, respect, and teamwork* (Harned & Sutliff, 2002); Former Values Clarification co-creator Howard Kirschenbaum (1992), now a proponent of inculcating traditional values, advocated “comprehensive” values education, which he said is both conservative and progressive in method and scope (p. 775). Also consider Morse
Elementary School in Cambridge. They created a *Core Virtues* program “to achieve the school’s mission of shaping informed and responsible citizens. . . . The program has proven so successful, it’s been adopted at more than 100 other schools nationwide” (Farnsworth, 2001, para. 8).

Another example can be seen in a charter school group, the Advantage Schools, in places such as New Jersey, Texas, and Arizona. They have made character education “a key part of the school day,” using a “*code of civility* that identifies ten virtues, including truth, responsibility, respect, and fairness. The code is used to support an orderly learning environment and reinforce high academic standards” (Farnsworth, 2001, para. 9). Numerous other examples exist nationwide that show attempts on the part of educators to inculcate specific values in American school children. There is more consideration of particular values education programs and how schools are using them in Chapter 6 of this study.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF VALUES EDUCATION

Introduction to the Historical Method

The writing of history has long been instrumental in the growth and development of societies and nations. Scholars from the time of Herodotus and Thucydides in ancient Greece have written about people and events in an attempt to understand the course of history and the nature of the interactions between the diverse cultures of humankind. The historical method of research has evolved over time as the purpose of historical knowledge has changed from one of a purely self-serving political expediency to one of unadulterated historical scholarship. In the case of using history as a political tool, the goal of research has typically been to perpetuate societal or nationalistic agendas. Alternatively, honest historical scholarship has as its goal an objective and accurate depiction of events, which allows the reader to see life as it actually was. Some historians see no need to go beyond the facts of history, with the simple objective of studying history for its own sake. For most, however, there are lessons to be learned by individuals and societies as we seek to avoid the mistakes of past generations while emulating their successes. Noted historian Arthur Schlesinger (1998) has defined this perspective as national memory: a nation that cannot accurately remember its history is akin to the person who cannot remember his own past and is therefore lost and confused, without clear direction for the future.

Chronology of Historians and Their Contributions to the Historical Method

Writing a chronology of important historians is a complex task, considering how many people from different fields have laid claim to the title of historian. Philosophers, sociologists,
psychologists, economists, and every other type of social or behavioral scientist can be seen offering their versions of the past for a confused public to consume. With the advent of postmodernism in the 1970’s and the absorption of diverse methodologies from various fields, giving way to multiple interpretations and diverse views, the discipline of history has become fractured (Bentley, 1999). Just as in the conflict over values education, there seem to be two radically different perspectives regarding the historical method today. The significance of the philosophy behind these perspectives cannot be overstated. I have therefore focused much attention upon philosophical considerations while tracing the history of the historical method throughout this chapter.

In Classical and Renaissance writing, using historical events to illustrate moral lessons was a common form of writing history. Change was pioneered beginning in the 18th century, as the writing of history began to conform to the concepts of modernity. Historians, believing themselves to have advanced from the primitive past to the sophisticated present, began using enquiries involving source criticism, preponderance of evidence, and the scientific method (Bentley, 1999). The most notable developments were pioneered by Leopold von Ranke and others in the German historicist school. In Ranke, we find the greatest emphasis on standards in the profession of history. Ranke sought to examine the past as it had actually happened, avoiding the presentism of the Enlightenment writers (Bruch, 1999). In his historicism, Ranke insisted upon primary sources, albeit only those of official record, and practiced “exhaustive archival research” and “philological criticism of sources” (Lagasse, 2001, para. 1). In calling for the thorough research of documents and objective historical analysis, he was seen by many as “revolutionary and radical, placing history finally and firmly on a ‘scientific’ footing” (Arnold, 2000, p. 51). However, on the Continent during the late nineteenth century, due to the influence
of a number of counter-Romantic thinkers, historians experienced a crisis over methodological approach. Historians struggled with social, economic, and political perspectives using alternatively scientific and philosophical methods (Bentley, 1999). Through the influence of Karl Marx and the others, political and legal history would begin to take a back seat to economic history and other social sciences such as sociology and psychology, setting a radical new historical paradigm for the twentieth century that would threaten to destroy the credibility of the profession (Arnold, 2000).

During the twentieth century, the precise meaning of *historical method* became the source of a great deal of controversy among scholars and philosophers of history. Most everything that was once considered absolute truth faced increasing challenges from those inside and outside the field. Indeed, the world of the historian seemed to have turned upside down. Of first consideration, the concept of the *people’s history* became an object of widespread interest, especially after World War II. Looking beyond traditional historical content, historians began to consider the “masses” and those “disempowered,” as critics of the more traditional studies charged that focusing on “outstanding individuals” ignores the experiences and viewpoints of the average person (Brundage, 1997, p. 8). The phrase *history from below* was coined in 1966 by British Historian Edward Thompson in an article of that title in the *London Times Literary Supplement* (Sharpe, 2001, p. 26). Here the focus shifted from the rich and powerful to the average human being. Histories of working class women in London and of front line soldiers in Napoleon’s army began to appear in books and periodicals. Still, all that had changed here was the focus of the research; the methodology stayed the same until it too came under assault.

Even as the century began, philosophers and historians began to question the validity of traditional historical research. Can one genuinely “know the truth” about the past or is everything
merely personal interpretation? The controversy that began with those such as the historians of the Annales school of thought in 1920s France continued throughout the century as diverse thinkers applied the approaches of various social sciences and questioned traditional methodology. In the 1970s and beyond, the proponents of postmodernist thinking fully rejected the idea that truth could be known, giving way to pluralistic interpretations. In recent years, some have applied literary methodology through post-structuralism and discourse theory, threatening to destroy the discipline of history altogether (Bentley, 1999). Yet the historicist approach is still used by traditional historians, and it is this paradigm that I will follow as the method for this study. At this point, it would be helpful to explicate the philosophical foundations of this approach to the historical method. One challenge here is in establishing clearly the concepts that can be used to build the foundation. In understanding the historical method, some specific terminology must be delineated in its proper historical context in order to develop an epistemological framework from which we can craft a methodological approach. Among the most vital of these would include hermeneutics, historiography, and historicism.

**Hermeneutics**

The *Oxford Companion to Philosophy* defines *hermeneutics* as “the in depth interpretation of a text by understanding the background and context in which it was written” (Honderich, 1995, p. 350). The term *hermeneutics* was originally used during the 17th century based upon the Greek *hermeneuein*, (to interpret) (Mallery, Hurwitz, & Duffy, 1986a). This could refer to translating a foreign language or explaining a particular situation. *Hermeneuein* itself derived from the name of Hermes, the winged messenger god of ancient Greece, who both delivered and explained the messages of the other gods (Mallery et al., 1986a). In its original
form, hermeneutics was simply an attempt to add meaning to the understanding of the ancient
texts, especially the Christian Bible.

A classic example of this can be found in the Biblical account of the life of Jesus. After a
wealthy man decides that he cannot humble himself in order to follow God, Jesus makes a
statement that might be rather confusing without some knowledge of the historical context. In the
book of Luke, chapter 18, verse 25, Jesus says, “it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a
needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God” (New International Version [NIV],
1978). At this point, most readers would try to imagine a camel fitting through the eye of a
sewing needle, yet if one knows the historical setting, a different picture comes to mind. In the
wall that surrounded many ancient Middle Eastern cities, there was sometimes a small
passageway beside the larger gate called the eye of a needle, which was designed for human use
only. If necessary, a camel could, in some cases, have been forced to crawl through the gate on
its knees, but it was an extremely challenging exercise. As a result, many Biblical scholars have
interpreted the passage in Luke to imply that the “rich man” could enter heaven only if he truly
humbled himself and forsook his wealth, something the rich man in the story could not bring
himself to do. Others scholars have believed that the word camel could have been translated
rope, with the story referring to an actual sewing needle, making the exercise even more
impossible (Kaiser, Davids, Bruce, & Brauch, 1996; Stimpson, 1999). Either way, the story gives
the reader no hope of salvation without God’s provision. It was this type of illumination that
hermeneutics was originally designed to provide (Geisler, 1983).

Hermeneutics has seen a radical transformation in the past one hundred years. From its
original function as a tool of historical scholarship for early nineteenth-century German
philosophers, who sought better understanding of the Biblical text and classical Greek and
Roman writing, hermeneutics has become a springboard for existential philosophers who wrestle with questions on the reality of reality and the meaning of life. Initially, under the leadership of Plato scholar and Protestant theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), what developed was a systematic theory of the interpretation of texts and speech. His work became foundational for another Plato scholar, Friedrich Ast (1778-1841). Ast established the lofty goal of understanding the text more completely than did its author. This might seem an impossible task, yet without direct knowledge the author’s thoughts, we might become aware of much of the circumstances surrounding the written account of which he himself may have been unaware. A text is thus “interpreted from two points of view: ‘grammatical,’ in relation to the language in which it is written, and ‘psychological,’ in relation to the mentality and development of the author” (Honderich, 1995, p. 350). In this process of interpretation, we cannot hope to understand either the text or the author without due consideration of the contributing factors that influence both. Nor can we understand the influencing factors in isolation, without due consideration of the overall scenario. With rigorous research, however, we can create a hermeneutical circle so as to increase our understanding. This “continual reciprocity between whole and parts” can be quite illuminating (Honderich, 1995, p. 350). This was the method and function of traditional hermeneutics in historical research, but sweeping changes would take place in the field beginning in the Industrial Age.

The first adaptation originated from Schleiermacher’s biographer, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911). Dilthey, who has been linked with the secularization of German scholarship (Pannenberg, 1996), expanded hermeneutics to include both history and the natural sciences. The philosophy he developed encompassed all human interactions and attempted to avoid the ahistorical explanations typical of the natural sciences in examining human behavior. He argued
that our common human nature with writers of previous eras would allow us to relive the past through the text, not directly, but through own analogies in “imaginative sympathy” (Honderich, 1995, p. 350). This is a common practice even today, with historians, as well as their readers, seeking to imagine how they would fare in past scenarios. This might explain the fascination with historical movies such as *Braveheart* or *Glory*. As time passed, Dilthey came under criticism from other thinkers of his day. As a result, he eventually tempered his theory with the idea “that texts and actions were as much products of their times as expressions of individuals, and their meanings were consequently constrained by . . . [the] values of their period” (Mallery, Hurwitz, & Duffy, 1986b, para. 3). Still, Dilthey’s approach to the historical method was within the mainstream of Schleiermacher’s and other historians’ philosophy and practice.

The next adaptation of hermeneutical scholarship went far from the path that had been taken before. This paradigm shift is credited to Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), who also developed existential phenomenology. Even though he later repudiated that position, his work became a foundation for later existentialists such as Sartre as well as postmodernists, poststructuralists, and other philosophers who reject the idea of absolute truth. Heidegger first learned of hermeneutics from his theological training and from Dilthey. Later, due to various influences such as those of Nietzsche and Husserl, he moved his hermeneutical approach away from its traditional basis and helped found a radical hermeneutics that questioned the reliability of facts and interpretability of the text. Whereas the methodological hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Dilthey sought to identify the meaning of a text by uncovering the historical setting and the author’s world-view, Heidegger turned away from the tenets of traditional Western civilization and embraced Nietzsche and Husserl’s nihilistic relativism, which fit squarely within the philosophy of his new associates in Germany’s Nazi party during the 1930s.
(Farias, 1989; Leithart, 1994; Sluga, 1993). However, for the purposes of this study, I shall adhere to Schleiermacher’s original hermeneutical philosophy and methodology, which is one that supports the historical scholarship that rests squarely on the foundations of the Western tradition rather than the ahistorical philosophical tenets of the German thinkers who gave birth to Communism, Nazism, and nihilism. The former embraces research in comparative texts, objectivity, and a commitment to find the truth while the latter emphasizes “the dissolution of the self, the claim that the individual is a fiction, . . . the creation of bourgeois ideology, . . . and the belief, derived from Nietzsche and filtered through Heidegger, that there are no facts, only interpretation” (Hirsch, 1991, p. 17).

Historicism

Historicism appears in the literature of most every social science, from anthropology to psychology, typically as a school of thought from the Romantic or Victorian Era, can have a number of different meanings, and can even be found in literature studies such as New historicism under Foucault’s hyper-relativistic chaos. For this study, the focus is upon Rankean historicism as it applies to the historical method. In this context, the concept of historicism dates back to nineteenth-century Germany and was, in part, a reaction to the lawlessness of the French Revolution and the resulting Napoleonic Wars (Tosh, 2000). Despite the realities of having German nationalism as motivation and even though much of the practice was already taking place, Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) is widely acclaimed as the founder of the historicist tradition (Arnold, 2000). Generally considered the first modern historian because of his critical analysis of a wide range of sources, Ranke, first published in 1824 and began a distinguished teaching career in 1835. His extensive focus on archives from throughout Europe and his historical research seminars led to significant developments in the historical method (Pleuger,
Historicism, like many of the concepts relating to historical research, seems to be redefined continually to fit the views of the writer. This can be seen in the different definitions ascribed to historicism in the *AHD* (2000). One definition says that historicism is “a theory that events are determined or influenced by conditions and inherent processes beyond the control of humans.” This would imply a philosophical paradigm consistent with Marxian thought and embrace the nihilistic tenets of Nietzsche and Husserl mentioned previously, leaving little for the historian to discover anything, save the impersonal patterns running throughout time.

The second definition *AHD* (2000) offers presents historicism as “a theory that stresses the significant influence of history as a criterion of value.” In other words, this portrays the events of history as a measuring stick for present decision-making. This definition of historicism is more consistent with the historicist tradition that began in the time of Ranke, when those of his persuasion saw the actions of French radicals as a sign that they had forgotten history. It also fits the paradigm of twentieth century historians such as Jacques Barzun and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who see the importance of learning the lessons of the past to guide us today. In their classic guide to the historical method, *The Modern Researcher* (1985), Barzun and Graff referred to the famous jurist Learned Hand, who saw history as the “cornerstone of liberal education” and the “begetter of social wisdom” (p. 51): “For a whole society to lose its sense of history would be tantamount to giving up its civilization” (p. 9). Philosopher George Santayana (1953) perhaps said it best, just after the turn of the twentieth century: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” (p. 82). Yet even this second definition refers only to the nature of historicism, leaving us to look elsewhere for the practical methodology for which Ranke is famous.
Whereas the first two definitions refer to historicism as a theory, the third that *AHD* (2000) offers comes under the sub-heading of philosophy; however, it also provides a hint of the method of historicism as practiced by Ranke and other traditional historians. Here, historicism is seen as “the view that historical periods should be studied without imposing anachronistic categories of evaluation.” Ranke’s goal was no less than objectively telling the stories of the past as they had happened, in a sense “stepping in their shoes, seeing the world through their eyes, and as far as possible judging it by their standards” (Tosh, 2000, p. 5). This emphasizes a central tenet of the historicist paradigm: to insure proper context by keeping people and events in their time to avoid anachronism (i.e., *presentism*) and to insure accurate interpretation (Tosh, 2000, p. 132). Ranke’s commitment to the scientific method in the writing of history and to the avoidance of presentism was so strong that, in an apparent contradiction, he often would not address what could be learned for current application (Arnold, 2000; Barzun & Graff, 1985; Bentley, 1999; Howell & Prevenier, 2001). History had long been used as a tool of political expediency, but in nineteenth-century Germany, Ranke focused historians not so much upon the lessons of history but upon history itself and an objective view of what had actually happened, with the overriding premise of seeking insulation from presentism. With an accurate picture of the past, the application would be evident. This was the beginning of history as a profession, but more work was yet to be done. John Lewis Gaddis (1995) pointed out that “the standard of objectivity left little room for controversial subjects in history,” causing many to avoid the study of the recent past, “where passions of the present might still hold sway” (p. 10). We cannot say that the development of the historical method ended with Ranke, but we can say that his 19th century historicism was truly a revolution in historical research and that his work guides us still.
Historiography

The nature and meaning of historia
graphy have as much variance as do the numerous
historians who have tried to explain it. Brundage (1997) acknowledged this when he said that
historiography includes “the various ways scholars have approached a particular subject [in
history]” (p. 14). Historiography can be considered scientific (Barzun & Graff, 1985), subject to
bias (Brickman, 1982), and susceptible to the intellectual and political shifts of the era (Bentley,
1999). Despite the potential problems, most traditional historians view Western historiography as
the key to professionalism in their craft, and this will be the paradigm for my study. AHD (2000)
provides a working definition of historiography that is suitable for the purposes of this study:
“the writing of history; especially: the writing of history based on the critical examination of
sources, the selection of particulars from the authentic materials, and the synthesis of particulars
into a narrative that will stand the test of critical methods.” This definition allows us to begin
with the end in mind of seeking to write that which will stand the test of time.

Philosophy of History

All historians have a philosophy of history that will directly impact their epistemological
position, which in turn, will dictate much of their method. For my purposes, I have sought to
elucidate the philosophies of a wide range of historians, so as to define the philosophy supporting
my method clearly. It is essential to emphasize that no written reflection upon past events can be
totally separated from the philosophical perspective of the writer. Indeed, our “philosophy of
history becomes an essential part of our philosophy of life” (Stern, 1962, p. 7). Or perhaps our
philosophy of history stems from our philosophy of life. There are a number of different
philosophies behind the myriad historical perspectives. As a background for explicating the
traditional historicist method, I will explain the most prominent positions after briefly looking at
the history of the philosophy of history. The phrase *philosophy of history* was coined during the eighteenth century by Voltaire, who was speaking of “a type of historical thinking in which the historian made up his mind for himself instead of repeating whatever stories he found in old books” (Collingswood, 1993, p. 1). Voltaire, like many historians today, most valued independent thinking, creativity, and a critical view of the past, in keeping with a desire to do away with the old order. The phrase is more consistently attributed to Hegel and others later, regarding it as *universal* history or history from a metaphysically objective view: “Hegel had high regard for the achievements of his era; “nationalism, romanticism, protestantism, and idealism” were, to Hegel, “the culmination of all that had gone before,” with, of course, his philosophical project being “its highest expression” (Collingswood, 1993, p. 1). Hegel’s philosophy of history was manifest in the optimism of the nineteenth-century, “full of self-confidence in the possibilities of rationality and enlightenment” (Kemerling, 1997a, para. 26).

Still another application is seen in late nineteenth-century positivism, where “the philosophy of history was the discovery of general laws governing the course of the events which it was history’s business to recount.” What Voltaire and Hegel sought in their philosophy could be worked out by “history itself,” whereas “the positivists were attempting to make out of history, not a philosophy, but an empirical science, like meteorology” (Collingswood, 1993, p. 1).

As mentioned previously, historians through the ages have written under various auspices and motivations. Hegel was a supporter of German nationalism; Descartes was a mathematician, seeking a “mathematically-based scientific knowledge of the material world” (Burnham, 2001, para. 3); Kierkegaard sought to renew the Christian faith by showing the modern relevance of Biblical figures (McDonald, 1996); Commager was an unabashed supporter of the American way; Charles Beard supported a “collectivist democracy,” also known as *socialism* (Garraghan,
1946, p. 370), and Howard Zinn (1999) still does. When all has been said, despite the variety of historical perspectives that exist, it seems that there are two primary philosophies of history behind today’s history research and writing, which I shall refer to as traditional historicism (which is the methodological position for this study) and postmodernism, which I only mention to clarify the method I have chosen. Earlier, I defined historicism as “the view that historical periods should be studied without imposing anachronistic categories of evaluation” and as the “theory that stresses the significant influence of history as a criterion of value.” Adding to these elements Ranke’s intense study of archival sources, we have the three pillars of today’s historicism: exhaustive research, avoidance of presentism, and gleaned lessons for application. In contrast, postmodernism often focuses upon constructivism (i.e., all people build their own reality), cognitive relativism (i.e., the truth does not exist or cannot be known if it does exist), and post-rational criticism (i.e., the rejection of all Western ideas and institutions). Rejecting the assault on the traditions of the Western historicist position, I will now proceed to explicate the historical method, beginning with the philosophy behind the method.

Historicist Philosophy

Throughout this discussion, I have mentioned a number of principles consistent with traditional Western historicism as practiced by Commager, Schlesinger, Barzun, and others. Before outlining the historical method as seen here, let us consider the philosophy of history of the professional historicist of today. Similar to the postmodernist foundations, the historicist philosophical position is built upon a number of principles that represent some of the ideas of Western civilization’s most influential thinkers. Needless to say, the historicist philosophy is based on entirely different ideas than those behind the postmodernist position, even though those ideas originate with some of the same thinkers. Today’s historicists are fundamentally
teleological (Redding, 2002), are largely structuralist (Arnold, 2000), and have an appreciation of traditional hermeneutics. Like Schleiermacher, they believe that the text should be studied in historical context but are not supportive of Heidegger’s existential phenomenology (Honderich, 1995). Like Hamann, historicists are skeptical about neutrality in writing, but not to the point of Derridan subjectivism (Griffith-Dickson, 2002; Reynolds, 2002). While not fully supportive of Jacobi’s ideas, historicists approve of his observation of the subjectivist and nihilistic nature of some Enlightenment thinking and share his appreciation of the British economic and political system of his day (Giovanni, 2001). They tend to disagree with Kant’s empiricist notion that we are limited to scientific knowledge, but agree with some of his ideas on deontology: “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (McCormick, 2001, para. 39).

Historicists have agreed with Hobbes’s observation that man, left to his own devises without proper training, will do evil, but they do not agree with his solution (i.e., might makes right with no regard for natural rights or higher law), nor with Hume, Bentham, & Darwin’s hedonistic theory that people are simply beasts under the control of pleasure and pain calculations (Morris, 2001). Speaking of Hume, while most historicists would certainly disagree with his constructionist views, they would support his contention that “when one makes no assumptions, all conclusions are empty”; in this contention is the assumption of “objective truth and an intelligible world,” without which all that remains is nihilistic meaninglessness (Geuras, 1995, para. 41). Another strong pillar of historicism is that reality exists outside human understanding. This places them at odds with Berkeley’s materialist conception that a “tree falling in the quad” would make no noise unless someone heard it (Fonseca & Ussher, 2003a, para. 1). Berkeley’s opinion violates not only the principle of reality existing outside of human
understanding but also contradicts obvious scientific laws, reason, and logic, all of which have a place in historicist thought. There is an implication in the idea of reality that there exists that which is permanent and unchanging. As one historicist opined, “Objective knowledge and interpretation assumes a framework that involves both change and permanence. Without some account of permanence, we lose rationality, ethics, meaning, and knowledge” (Jones, 1995, para. 13).

Much like some of their postmodernist counterparts, many historicists’ philosophy of history leaks over into their political philosophy. Historicists value the central tenets of Western civilization, and while different historicists might have differing beliefs on political issues (e.g., Democrats, Republicans, Libertarians, Independents, etc.), they all share common foundations. Much of this can be found in a number of Western documents, such as the Constitutions of the United States and Great Britain, and include such concepts as higher law, natural rights, and rule of law. Briefly, higher law (a.k.a., natural law—not to be confused with the law of nature or natural man concepts used by many philosophers) implies that the laws of people are subservient to universal principles and that if a governmental law is unjust (not unfair, but unjust), it is to be considered void due to the fact that it violates a higher principle (Kirk, 1993). Natural rights are those that all human beings deserve at the moment of their existence, simply because they are human beings (Adams, 1772; Smith, 2003). Both of these concepts have been explicated in the writings of Algernon Sidney, John Locke, Edmund Burke, Lord Acton, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams, among many others and have been repeated in the years since by individuals such as Abraham Lincoln, Winston Churchill, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Martin Luther King, Jr. Rule of law is what keeps individual rights under societal control. Akin to justice and a component of the social contract, this is the proper function of government, to use power to protect the rights of its
citizens by preventing the rights of one from denying the rights of another (Johnston, 2003).

Natural rights and rule of law work together to maintain liberty, under the standards of higher law. Law without rights is tyranny; rights without law is anarchy. Higher law applies to all individuals and governments, without which both experience relativism. Let us now consider the philosophy of historicists further in examining their historical method.

The Historical Method

The importance of the historical method becomes clear when examining other forms of research. Indeed, historical research is foundational for all modern research. As Barzun and Graff (1995) have said, “all research implies previous research . . . sifting evidence, balancing testimony, verifying assertions” (p. 49). While each historian has a slightly different technique, the historical method, as practiced by today’s historicists, is comprised of three basic steps. As explicated by traditional historian Gilbert Garraghan (1946), the historical method can be defined as, “systematic body of principles and rules designed to aid effectively in gathering the source-materials of history, appraising them critically, and presenting a synthesis . . . of the results achieved” (p. 33). I shall now examine each of the three steps, beginning with the gathering of materials. It is important when studying sources that several procedures are followed. First of all, the historian must decide what type of history to pursue. Intellectual history, or the history of ideas, has the longest pedigree and includes studies in political, social, economic, theological, scientific, and historical thought. Political thought has centered on “the power of ideas to shape human destiny,” including natural rights, representative democracy, etc. (Tosh, 2000, p. 178). The idea-centered approach has been attacked by proponents of Freudian theory, who suggest that human actions are not based on intellectual assent to principles or beliefs, but the natural
result of biological urges. It has also been criticized by those embracing a Marxist interpretation, suggesting that human actions are based on class struggles in the economic realm (Tosh, 2000).

Next, there are two approaches to sorting through the voluminous records that are available to today’s historian: (a) extract everything possible from all sources on the topic (i.e., source-oriented approach), or (b) formulate a specific historical question and then study relevant sources to discover an answer (i.e., problem-oriented approach). The latter approach is the most common strategy due to the shear volume available, although many choose to do a little of both (Brickman, 1982; Tosh, 2000). Finally, once the approach is determined, the historicist must make sure to keep context in mind, refraining from removing an event from its setting while keeping a sense of the whole in understanding the parts, to recognize the historical process by relating events over time, and to classify the source as primary or secondary, as well as other specific classifications, in an effort to determine authenticity and relation to the events or people in question (Howell & Prevenier, 2001; Tosh, 2000), gathering as much material as possible so that one source may validate another (Barzun & Graff, 1985). It is also important to remember that some of the most helpful sources are those not intended for posterity, which Marc Bloch in *The Historian’s Craft* (1954) has designated “the evidence of witnesses in spite of themselves” (Tosh, 2000, p. 39; see also Howell & Prevenier, 2001). Some of the more relied upon sources here include autobiographies, memoirs, press reports, government records, and literature (Tosh, 2000). Some historians seek to use oral history as part of their presentation. Professional historians have typically been skeptical regarding oral history for a variety of reasons. Proponents claim the value of securing the views of the disenfranchised, for whom written records often do not exist. Professional historians now accept some oral history, especially primary sources. If improperly handled however, the testimony can present a false history (Prins,
For this and other reasons, most historicists do not generally rely upon oral history. As Barzun and Graff (1985) have claimed, written history is important because it “reports things that actually took place” (p. 47); thus, it is not at the mercy of collective memory as is oral history.

The second step of the historical method is analyzing the sources gathered (i.e., source criticism). Historicists have regarded “critical analysis of sources as the basis of good historical scholarship” (Howell & Prevenier, 2001, p. 2). As first pioneered by Ranke, the critical examination of sources is what distinguishes the historian of professional standing from one who is an amateur (Tosh, 2000). This is what Marc Bloch called “the struggle with the documents” (Bloch, 1954, p. 86). Several considerations come in to play here. The first test for any historical work is to compare it with the existing evidence, especially primary source evidence, which is broken down into classes: published (printed) or unpublished (manuscript), government authored or privately authored (Tosh, 2000). Then there needs to be a two-stage analysis: (a) external criticism, evaluating a document by testing its authenticity, and (b) internal criticism, examining the writer’s intentions and biases (Brickman, 1982; Howell & Prevenier, 2001; Tosh, 2000). A number of factors must be considerations when doing this analysis. Historians should state the facts regardless of how anyone might feel about it. Lord Acton said the impartial historian can have no friends (Garraghan, 1946). This includes how the historian might feel about it as well: “what is crucial is that our firmly held convictions be the result of our scholarly labors and not a set of prejudices resolutely fortified by turning a blind eye to contrary or even unpleasant evidence” (Brundage, 1997, p. 77).

It is critically important here for the historian to keep in mind that even the objective writer will have certain prejudices and sympathies and will write in reference to his own
principles and philosophy (Garraghan, 1946). Everyone begins with a philosophy of history; everyone has social and political agendas, and historians are honor bound to admit their particular perspective in their work. Tosh (2000) called this “maintaining self awareness” (p. 132). Additionally, the historian should seek to discover the evidence before drawing a conclusion: “Proof demands decisive evidence; this means evidence that confirms one view and excludes its rivals” (Barzun & Graff, 1985, p. 174). The historian should gather as much evidence as possible to verify a source. A comparison of several sources reflecting an event adds validity to the thesis (Howell & Prevenier, 2001). The historicist position is that truth, while not easily discovered, is, with much effort, discernable, and that “truth rests not on possibility nor on plausibility but on probability,” by the preponderance of the evidence (Barzun & Graff, 1985, p. 175). Historians should leave no stone unturned to discover the truth about the past and then truthfully present the findings. Scholarly history always employs proper technique, is always honest, is always verifiable, and thus includes proper references (Garraghan, 1946). There is one other major factor to professional historicity, one critical component that sets one apart from those who merely write opinions: The historian should avoid anachronism (presentism), realizing the gulf separating us from the past and thus not applying today’s social and cultural viewpoints to previous generations (Gaddis, 1995; Howell & Prevenier, 2001; Saxe, 1998; Tosh, 2000). While the standards of higher law should remain constant throughout history, we cannot expect those from the past to have the knowledge and insight of the lessons learned to this very day, nor can we make direct comparisons of people from entirely different eras.

Noted historians Jacques Barzun and Henry Graff (1985) listed six virtues to which every historian should aspire: (a) accuracy, attending to every detail to insure a factual presentation, (b) love of order, taking the time to keep information organized, (c) logic, following a research
pattern that makes sense, (d) self-awareness, lessening the influence of bias by revealing his standards, judgments, and assumptions clearly upfront and seeking to avoid emotional response to behavior or ideas one finds repugnant, (e) imagination, making the jump from what you know to what you wish to learn, and perhaps most importantly, (f) honesty, as explicated in detail for historians in *The Modern Researcher*:

Elsewhere honesty may be the best policy, but in research it is the only one. Unless you put down with complete candor what you find to be true, you are completely nullifying the very result you aim at, which is the discovery of the past as embedded in records. You may have a hypothesis, which the new fact shatters, but that is what hypothesis are for—to be destroyed and remolded closer to the reality. The troublesome fact may go against your moral purpose or prejudice, but nothing is healthier for the mind than to have either challenged. You are a searcher after truth, which should reconcile you to every discovery. And even if you decide to become an advocate of a cause, you had better know beforehand all the evidence your side will have to face. For if one fact is there obstructing your path, you may be fairly sure others to the same effect will be turned up, possibly by your adversary. It is the nature of reality to be mixed, and the research scholar is the person on whom we rely to chart it. Accuracy about neutral details is of little worth if we cannot trust the writer’s honesty about significant ones. (p. 58)

There are, additionally, some tools of the trade in the bag of every historian, available to improve their craft. Included here would be technical tools to authenticate sources, such as paleography (handwriting), diplomatics (legal documents), archaeology (relics), and statistics (data) (Howell & Prevenier, 2001). Also worth considering are some of the innovations of alternative historians such as Marx’s presentation of social history, the Annalistes’ emphasis on patterns of culture and societal values outside event-oriented history, the Cliometricians’ employment of “quantification to reveal historical pattern and meaning,” Pshycohistorians’ application of the question of motives of individuals and groups to the study of past events, and even the Postmodernist skepticism and focus on people and events previously left unattended (Brundage, 1997, p. 10).

These tools can support the historian in the quest to find and present the truth. However, the primary tools continue to be an understanding of structures (frameworks) for categorization of
information, an appreciation of the overall chronology of a given time period of study, comprehension of traditional hermeneutical techniques, a commitment to documentation, proper archival procedures, a preference for the preponderance of evidence (manuscripts), and total adherence to honesty in reporting the facts. These are the goals of every historian who seeks to follow historicist methodology.

When all is done of research and analysis, the historian can take the final step: the presentation of results achieved. This is part of how the historian can contribute to the well being of society. Historian James M. Banner (2000) argued that

no human events can be understood fully unless understood historically. For want of historical contextualization, the full significance and implications of breaking news events often escape us. Professional historians have a responsibility to help people understand events historically, for if they don’t, others less knowledgeable than they will surely try to do so and probably make a mess of it. Historians ought to offer their knowledge to others without waiting to be asked for it. (para. 3)

Some might complain that, even with much research, history is presented through the eyes of the researcher and each historian will view events in a slightly, if not largely different way. As Weber (1994) stated, “We in particular succumb readily to a special kind of illusion, namely that we are able to refrain entirely from making conscious value judgments of our own” (p. 19). This is not to say that there is not a truth in history. As Brundage (1997) opined, “Of course there is objective truth in history; it may be elusive but it is usually accessible and must be rigorously pursued. Truth in history resides in those ascertainable facts that make up the superstructure of any historical account” (p. 85). Indeed, even though all historians are captive to their own time and place, they must still seek objectivity and avoid anachronistic presentation. Non-historicist Carl L. Becker disagreed, saying that history is “an imaginative creation, a personal possession which each of us . . . fashions out of his individual experience . . . to suit his aesthetic tastes” (Gaddis, 1995, pp. 11-12). Casting aside Ranke’s adherence to objectivity, Becker and others
asserted that historical accounts are entirely relative to the perspective of the writer. Yet this presentist view of history allows Orwellian rewrites by future Hitlers and Stalins to suit their political needs, as was done in both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, by which millions were annihilated based on false histories. Here Gaddis (1995) was referring to George Orwell’s quote in *1984*: “Who controls the past controls the future” (p. 13). This refusal to pursue professional objectivity for fear of being biased disables the historian from seeking valuable lessons from history so as to avoid past mistakes; thus some historians focus only upon the recent past; as Bloch (1954) pointed out, we “would have to have a structure so malleable as to be virtually invertebrate” (p. 40), the very conditions that allowed a Hitler to rise to power (Gaddis, 1995).

In the end, the historian must present the best possible conclusions based on the evidence. Oftentimes, we are left with gaps in the information or with perplexing statements or events to interpret. Accordingly, we should pursue thoroughness in research and seek to compare and contrast the available sources to reach the most logical synthesis available on a particular topic. Inevitably, however, we might find the need to make a heuristic assumption, which, though an *educated* guess, is still a guess. This “guessing suggests a degree of uncertainty about the historiographical process. It might even suggest that at times historians get things wrong” (Arnold, 2000, p. 12). Obviously, historians are as fallible as any researcher and can misinterpret or misunderstand a text or the meaning of a source. One might even surmise that since we cannot guarantee one hundred percent accuracy all of the time, we are always wrong in our assumptions. Despite the reality of historical uncertainty, it remains critical that we always make honest efforts to pursue accuracy. We should focus on “what we think the evidence actually says, . . . search out all the available material, . . . [and] never fabricate the facts” (Arnold, 2000, p. 12). In the historicist presentation of history, the reader is to be given “the facts”; as Ranke said, tell “how it
actually happened” (Burke, 2001, p. 5), a history without bias. As Lord Action claimed in *Cambridge Modern History* “our Waterloo must be one that satisfies French and English, Germans and Dutch alike,” such that readers cannot tell which contributor wrote the story because of its factual presentation (Burke, 2001, p. 6).

Applications for Educational Historiography

In the historicist view, educational historiography is “that branch of history which is concerned with the significant events and thought of the past with reference to the character formation and imparting of facts, ideas, and skills to persons of all ages in society” (Brickman, 1982, p. 257). Educational historiography is also the historical method applied to educational history. As a result, the philosophy and method would be consistent with one’s overall philosophy of history and historical method: “The history of education is history, having the same ends, accepting the same standards, using like materials, and employing the same critical and constructive processes” (Good, 1930, p. 9). The steps involved for historicists studying the history of education are as follows:

1. *Examination of primary sources* (e.g., legislation, court decisions and records, school and educational records, newspapers and magazines, non-educational documents, personal documents, and remains [buildings, furniture, pictures, forms, etc.]) and *secondary sources* (e.g., textbooks and monographs containing ample primary references) (Brickman, 1982). There are several potential problems to overcome, including undated documents, which usually have no value for historical purposes unless the date can be determined from information within the document, and without knowing the source of a educational writer’s knowledge and inspiration, it may be difficult to understand his ideas correctly (Brickman, 1982).

2. *Interpretation of research findings.* This may be assisted by (a) analogy, where one can compare one situation to a previous one, as in the educational systems of ancient Sparta and Nazi Germany, realizing, of course, that the analogy might break down at some point; (b) generalization, a form of inductive reasoning where one can state “many or most,” as in the case of the preservation of classical manuscripts by medieval monasteries, being careful not to make broad, sweeping statements based on insufficient data; (c) hypothesis, a tentative explanation as one progresses in discovering interrelations between facts such that they can be verified through
continued research, with great care taken not to have the facts conform to a previously imagined hypothesis; (d) argumentum ex silentio (i.e., evidence from silence), where no contemporary source of the time studied mentions the alleged fact, with exception of intentional or unintentional poor communication between individuals of that period about issues considered unimportant to the people of that period to account for the absence of the facts in period writings; (e) argument a priori (i.e., evidence because of former knowledge), where one can conclude something about a person or event because of prior knowledge; and (f) bias, where preconceived notions exist and an attempt to prove the theory with selected facts is not impartial historiography (Brickman, 1982).

3. Synthesis (i.e., tying the facts together). Components of this include (a) selection of data, choosing which data is relevant to the purpose of the study; (b) sequence, whether chronological or topically organized; (c) causality, or what caused a particular event to happen, including immediate and underlying causes; and (d) historical trends, showing a tendency over time, being careful of broad generalizations as well as unreliable justifications here (Brickman, 1982; Garraghan, 1946).

In short, we find that educational historiography is simply a branch of history, with the same application of the same standards as any other branch. Without the professional standards of historicism, what will pass for the history of schooling is whatever a writer says it is, that is, until someone deconstructs what is said.

The Historical Method As Applied

The historical method from a traditional historicist perspective is a rigorous and unforgiving taskmaster. When using this approach, one does not have the luxury of holding so closely to a priori arguments that evidence cannot sway. Nor can one withhold information that might render initial assumptions irrelevant or incorrect. However, intellectual honesty demands that a historian recognize personal sympathies and biases up front (Garraghan, 1946; Tosh, 2000). I believe that I have been straightforward about my position as a progressive conservative (PC), while at the same time, having sought to avoid pursuing a line of research that would simply support my philosophy, developing convictions about sources through “scholarly labors” rather than from biases (Brundage, 1997, p. 77). Yet in doing so, I must admit that absolute
objectivity is not possible, thus I have attempted to give fair hearing to those with whom I disagree, going to great lengths to be sure of my facts, especially as relates to the statements and actions of those with whom I disagree. As I have encountered statements purported to be facts, I have painstakingly labored to be sure of the source and the evidence. In doing this, I have engaged in extensive research to verify the validity and verifiability of the information, using both internal criticism, in examining the writer’s intentions and biases, and external criticism, comparing new information with that already obtained (Brickman, 1982; Howell & Prevenier, 2001; Tosh, 2000).

Even so, I am sure that those with a philosophical position contrary to my own would find that my analysis of values education to be either incomplete or just down right wrong. Considering the breadth and depth of knowledge in the universe, I wholly support the premise that no individual is omniscient, and I fully accept that limitation. Thus, I would welcome a dialogue with any who would find themselves in opposition to my view or my method and enthusiastically support the right of any who care to criticize my work, believing that freedom of thought and speech is essential for knowledge to grow in liberty. But I will encourage said critique to come well armed with supporting evidence beyond mere opinion, for this paper is just the tip of the iceberg regarding my research on values education and the cultural conflict ongoing in the United States. I have used the problem-oriented approach to historical research (Brickman, 1982; Tosh, 2000) in seeking to build a voluminous record on values education. In seeking to gather ample materials so that one source may validate another (Howell & Prevenier, 2001; Tosh, 2000), I have recorded information and taken detailed notes from a multitude of books, journals, magazines, newspapers, pamphlets, papers, speeches, web sites, official documents, letters, and dissertations in an amount that is more than one-hundredfold this paper, in efforts to
build a body of evidence that confirms “one view and excludes its rivals” (Barzun & Graff, 1985, p. 174). I have attempted to use primary source materials as much as time would allow, seeking to verify the legitimacy of every purported statement by finding the original and/or supporting documentation in other sources. In this effort, I have gone beyond the most obvious materials, seeking sought sources not directly addressing the values education conflict in America, those Bloch called “the evidence of witnesses in spite of themselves” (Tosh, 2000, p. 39). I will, however, readily admit that due to the breadth of this study and my status as a full-time K-12 educator, I did not have the time to find as many as I would have preferred (which would have been exclusively primary source). Perhaps in the future, I will have opportunity to engage in more extensive study, allowing me the luxury of holding more closely to the goal of focusing upon primary source materials. As it is, I have attempted to use secondary sources that meet the criteria of traditional historicism and have reported my research based upon the preponderance of the evidence, following Barzun and Graff’s (1995) paradigm: “Truth rests not on possibility nor on plausibility but on probability” (p. 175). For the purposes of this study, I have constructed a chronological scheme (see Appendix D) so as to lay a foundation for explicating my method.
CHAPTER 4
THE HISTORY OF VALUES EDUCATION IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL
IN CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT CONFLICT BETWEEN TRADITIONALISTS AND MULTICULTURALISTS

Foundational Values: Colonial America

In order to understand the current dialogue regarding values education, we must thoroughly examine the history of values inculcation in American schools. In this examination, we shall observe that there has always been values inculcation in American schools and that just the content has changed. Indeed, there is a long history of values inculcation here dating back to 1620. Prior to the establishment of this republic, the earliest colonial educators had specific purposes for the establishment of common schools, particularly in the Puritan colonies of New England. The primary functions of schooling there, as decreed by law, were, first, to insure literacy among the population, for the purpose of reading the Bible, and second, to instill Christian values in the children, including the value of working hard, which was seen as not only godly behavior, but also benefited the economy (Garraty & McCaughey, 1989).

The first two legislative attempts to create a standard for education occurred in Puritan New England, with the Massachusetts Law of 1642, which placed the responsibility of educating the young with parents, and the Massachusetts Law of 1647, which required townships of fifty or more families to hire a teacher, and those with one hundred or more to start a grammar school. Throughout Puritan society, the parents bore the primary educational responsibility, as noted in the 1690 Connecticut Law, requiring them to teach their children to read so that they would not
be “incapable to read the holy Word of God or the good laws of this colony” (Barton, 2002, p. 81). Puritan education was thus focused on learning and obeying the Bible and governmental law, other colonies being not too far astray from this purpose, even though variance could sometimes be found in the Southern colonies (Spring, 2001). As Spring explained, the purpose of education in early Puritan society can be seen as “individual instruction for the development of piety with the goal of creating ‘the good society’” (p. 9). This is clearly values inculcation and sets the stage for nineteenth and twentieth century educators, who saw schooling as the solution to societal problems and the vehicle for maintaining social order (Spring, 2001). Of course, the philosophy of education of American colonists was consistent with the societal norms at the time. The emphasis in education, both at home and at school, was on children learning the Word of God and applying it to their lives through obedience and hard work. The emphasis on the values of morality and obedience continued in higher education as illustrated in one of the 1636 rules of Harvard: “Everyone shall so exercise himself in reading the Scriptures twice a day that he shall be ready to give such an account of his proficiency therein” (Barton, 2002, p. 81). Similar admonitions can be found in the rules and charters of other colleges throughout the colonies, such as Yale (Connecticut, 1699), William and Mary (Virginia, 1692), Princeton (New Jersey, 1746), and Dartmouth (New Hampshire, 1754). King’s College (New York, 1754), whose name was changed to Columbia in 1787, required that students “…render into English…the Gospels from Greek…” (Barton, 2002, p. 84).

In addition to instruction in the Christian Bible, selected Greek and Roman classical works were included in the studies of middle and upper class children, for the purpose of maintaining class distinction and the “development of civic character and [to] be a preparation for leadership” (Spring, 2001, p. 15). Naturally, with such a strong emphasis on learning to read
and write, the New England colonies had a higher literacy rate than did Middle and Southern Colonies, and for many, education did not end there. Once beyond childhood, the student could enter Harvard or some other colonial college in hopes of becoming a minister, lawyer, or potentially, a legislator (Cremin, 1970; Spring, 2001). Aside from the preeminence of the Bible and classical literature, colonial policies emphasized the supremacy of English culture from the start. It is of interest in context of this study to consider the existence of cultural conflict even at this early stage of our history, with competition between the English Protestant settlers to New England, Pennsylvania, and Virginia and those of German or Catholic origins. Colonial education became an instrument in the hands of the majority population (English Protestants) for the establishment and maintenance of cultural norms and practices (Spring, 2001). The historical conflicts between England and those on the European continent continued during the colonial era, thus naturally those conflicts, whether political, religious, or social, found their way to North America. Naturally, people of English origin were the primary settlers for England’s American colonies. As one might expect, they were not likely to yield to another culture in their schools or in the society at large. It strikes one as quite unique that these early colonists saw so clearly the value of education for the development and maintenance of their cultural norms. Clearly, the same knowledge existed is Europe, but not everyone had access. In most European nations, education was the province of the aristocrats, so as to keep the populace under control, using ignorance rather than literacy for the maintenance of social order. This was the Old World way, preventing the diffusion of ideas such as liberty and justice. Yet in the New World, Americans were applying a different paradigm, reasoning that an educated populace would have no trouble distinguishing truth from lies if their foundation in the truth was sufficient. They believed that
with consistent inculcation of Biblical and Classical knowledge, they would be able to secure a bright republican future for succeeding generations (Millard, 1991; Spring, 2001).

Of course, as compared to New England, where basic education was available for most males, in colonial Virginia, education was primarily for the wealthy, something Jefferson sought to change in later years. The lower class, many of them initially indentured servants, were only taught enough to be competent in their work and to insure obedience to their masters and the civil authority. It is worth noting that Nathaniel Bacon and his associates, who rebelled against the Governor in 1676, must not have learned their lessons very well (Garraty & McCaughey, 1989). As mentioned earlier, children of the upper class throughout the colonies were able to enjoy both elementary and secondary education, often through private tutoring, as well as higher education in one of the young nation’s institutions such as Harvard or Yale or back in England or, in later years, even in Jefferson’s University of Virginia, to be trained as a minister, lawyer, or other professional. Of course, at this time any education beyond literacy was for men only, except for a few dame schools in New England and the occasional wealthy father who wanted his daughter to receive private instruction from a tutor, or taught her himself, as was the case with Abigail Adams, with help from her maternal grandmother, and due in no small part to her insatiable curiosity and love of reading (IMC, 2003; Levin, 1987; Spring, 2001).

Foundational Values: Revolutionary America

A familiar chord had sounded throughout all the colonies regarding the purpose of education. Regardless of societal position or level of schooling, values inculcation was a primary component of early American education. Morality, obedience to God and the authorities, including parents, and the benefit of hard work: these were the values taught in much of our nation’s early educational environment. After the Revolutionary period, some educators began to
introduce the new values of nationalism and reform to their students. As education began to be viewed as a government function, a number of schools, especially in New England, became an instrument for shaping national, rather than just local society (Spring, 2001). Part of this change was brought about by differing concepts of childhood, as envisioned by Rousseau and Locke. Contrary to the prevailing Protestant view that children (like all people) were basically sinners, needing strict training and moral instruction to bring about transformation and to teach them to embrace the good, those who followed Rousseau’s ideas believed that children were basically good and needed no moral instruction until adolescence. As he opined in his book on education *Emile*, “There is no original perversity in the human heart” (Rousseau, 1762/1957, para. 267). Furthermore, “the first education ought thus to be purely negative. It consists not at all in teaching virtue or truth, but in preserving the heart from vice and the mind from error” (Rousseau, 1762/1957, para. 272). This was also contrary to the tenets of the Founders of our nation, men such as Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and Madison, who adhered to the concepts of higher law (absolutes) and natural rights (God-given liberties), as well as the teaching of moral principles to those of every walk of life. This can be seen in numerous essays, letters, speeches, and legal documents written by Founders of every conceivable (at that time) philosophical persuasion (Birrell, 2002; Clinton, 1999; Keyes, 2001). Consider the Northwest Ordinance of 1787: “Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged” (Northwest Ordinance, 1787, sec. 14, art. 3). Clearly the Founders of our republic saw value in values inculcation. Of course, these ideas were not their inventions. Rather, they had been procured through their insatiable thirst for the knowledge of the truth. The American Founders were bibliophiles and consumed volumes of classical Greek and Roman philosophy, often in
their original languages, including the works of Aristotle, Plato, Polybius, Tacitus, and Cicero, European Enlightenment tomes written by those such as Montesquieu, the English legal and governmental philosophy of Coke, Bacon, Hooker, and Hobbes, as well as Sidney and Locke, Hume, Blackstone, and Adam Smith and numerous Biblical and Christian texts (McCullough, 2002; Skousen, 1985; West, 1997; Wiltshire, 1992). In his First Inaugural Address, George Washington stated, “There exists in the economy and course of nature an indissoluble union between virtue and happiness . . . [and that the] smiles of Heaven can never be expected on a nation that disregards the eternal rules of order and right, which Heaven itself has ordained” (Eliot, 1909, para. 4). Even though the Founders adopted some of Rousseau’s ideas, apparently, they did not agree with his contention that virtue should not be taught to children. Indeed, if the Founders wanted American citizens to be prepared to carry out what Washington called “the experiment entrusted to the hands of the American people” (Eliot, 1909, para. 4), then an education complete with moral teaching would help them overcome their lesser selves. As John Adams explicated, “We have no government armed with power capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality and religion” (Adams, 1854, p. 229). With a different mindset than Rousseau, Locke simply stated that children were neither good nor evil, but rather a blank slate in need of shaping into a moral person (making moral training worthwhile): “I imagine the Minds of Children as easily turned this or that way, as Water it self” (Axtell, 1968, p. 115). Regardless of the thoughts of the Founders, the ideas of Rousseau and Locke would have a great deal of influence on future educators of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries such as Horace Mann and John Dewey (Spring, 2001).
Constitutional Foundations, Jeffersonian Democracy, and American Values

In the early colonial years, Massachusetts had set the standard for the use of public education as values inculcator. Later, other colonies followed suit in providing for public education of the young, as was the case in Virginia, where Thomas Jefferson was among the first Americans to see the need for universal education as a safety net for the preservation of democratic freedoms (Maxcy, 1995; Sehr, 1997). In a letter to Phillip Yancey, late in life, he reflected, “If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be” (Coates, 2001, para. 32). Again, we see the inculcation of values, this time not only for religious and moral instruction, but also for the purpose of spreading democratic ideals among the common people. Suffice it to say, it is certain that “a well-educated populace will not guarantee either a strong economy or global security or even a democracy” (Graham, 2003, para. 17), as we saw in Nazi Germany during the nineteen thirties and forties. However, it is also historically evident that without an educated populace, liberty cannot survive.

In a letter to James Madison, Jefferson explained his belief that the only true safeguard for the continuance of the republic was for the average man to be educated:

educate and inform the whole mass of the people. Enable them to see that it is their interest to preserve peace and order, and they will preserve them. And it requires no very high degree of education to convince them of this. They are the only sure reliance for the preservation of our liberty. (Coates, 2001, para. 23)

In later years, Jefferson saw education for the common man as the key to breaking the stranglehold of the aristocracy on the national political life. He believed that any man who was educated was capable of participating in the democratic processes of the government. He referred to these people as a “natural aristocracy,” not based on birth, but on virtue, talent and hard work (Jefferson, 1813, para. 3). Thus, as more men became educated, the nation would become stronger. Much of this was about making Americans out of its children. As Guy pointed out in
Dayton & Glickman (1994), since the “War of Independence, Americans sought to create institutions that would be uniquely American,” particularly seeing public schools “as an ideal vehicle” for democratic values inculcation (p. 64). It is no small thing that Jefferson, who most eloquently penned some of our country’s most closely held values in the Declaration of Independence, was an early proponent of universal education as a vehicle to instill those values. Clearly, Jefferson realized as many do today that all American children will not come to understand American principles “if these principles are not taught, modeled, and practiced in our public schools” (Dayton & Glickman, 1994, p. 64). The implication here is that democratic values are best instilled when experienced by the students.

When considering the foundations of values inculcation in American education, one must examine the Founders philosophies, including the concept of higher law, especially in light of today’s values education conflict. Focusing upon foundational values becomes an important part of assuring that there is a standard upon which the laws of society can be based and also as a balance for preventing anarchy or tyranny, in that it applies to both individuals and the government. Multiculturalist educational writer Joel Spring mentioned the Founders’ belief that “a well-functioning democracy depends on the morality of the individual” (Spring, 2002, p. 7). The application for schools here is that the values of proper ethical behavior are not naturally acquired, but must be taught. Furthermore, from this perspective, the survival of a democratic society depends upon common values and a shared culture, including behavioral norms. This concept centers upon the power of ideas to shape society (Spring, 2002). There is even a tie in to the function of religion in values education, as traditionalist William Bennett revealed in The Devaluing of America. Bennett (1992) pointed to George Washington’s farewell address to support this position: “Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity,
And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion” (p. 206). Needless to say, it is not the function of today’s public school, as an instrument of the government operating under the constraints of the First Amendment, to establish any particular religion, but it has not been interpreted by the courts under those same restraints that schools cannot inculcate moral values, many of which are based on particular religious teachings (Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988). Nord and Haynes (1998) referred to Bellah’s 1985 study in which Americans were thought to “speak two quite different moral languages,” one “derived from our civic and religious traditions” that is not often used and the other from our “individualism” (para. 49). Their argument was that “this language of individualism is not nearly rich enough . . . to speak meaningfully about virtue and duty, love and self-sacrifice, community and justice” (para. 49). Yet many today would rail against any influence of religion in general, and Christianity in particular, claiming it violates the principles of democracy.

It is of note that even though our form of government is a republic, rather than a democracy, both traditionalists and multiculturalists often lay claim to democracy as a central tenet, which presents an important question in the historical context: what is democracy? In examining this, it is simple to see that there are multiple understandings, so let us consider the possibilities. Some of the earliest competing understandings of democratic citizenship can be seen in the political competition between Federalists and Republicans in general, and between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson in particular, during the seventeen nineties and early eighteen hundreds. Hamilton and other Federalist thinkers, such as John Adams, George Washington, and James Madison, before his partnership with Jefferson, saw grave danger in the excess of democracy (often thought of as mob rule), a view gleaned largely from observing not
only history, but of their familiarity of the lawlessness of the French Revolution (Madison, 1787; Zakaria, 1997). Jefferson and the Republicans had greater faith in the common man, and believed him capable of participating in self-rule (Glickman, 1998). In contrast, consider Madison’s comments about democracy in his essay in support of the new Federal Constitution, *The Federalist No. 10*:

> Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions. (para. 13)

Madison brought up an interesting point. If we are to support the idea of inculcating democratic values, what do we mean? Is it simply majority rule, or perhaps something more? Carl Glickman (1998), in his treatise on school improvement, *Revolutionizing America’s Schools*, saw the need to embrace democracy, which has three characteristics: (a) *equality*, meaning “every member of society has the same power and worth in regard to influence, decision making, justice, and due process”; (b) *liberty*, meaning everyone is free to formulate opinions, with no discrimination; and (c) *fraternity*, meaning that all participate in the social contract (p. 3). Yet in consideration of this, one has to ask are these all possible in a large, ever growing and diversifying society? Can we truly expect everyone to commit to the personal responsibility side of the social contract? Are we ready to grant *every* member of society the same power, including those who through ignorance or malice, would seek to harm either individuals or society at large; is this wise; is this even possible?

Glickman (1998), who has had some wonderful ideas for school reform, went on to refer to the “founders of American democracy” as not understanding the “full ramifications of the
exposed principles” of their work (p. 17), as if they had not thought of the inconsistencies between their philosophy of government and the realities of an eighteenth century world that included slavery and other injustices that future citizens would have to confront. Like many recent critiques of the Founders, Glickman appears somewhat presentist in his commentary, an observation Glickman readily shows to be confirmed by Dayton: “This is often a problem with presentism, calling into question all acts and motivations of persons out of historical context and applying contemporary standards” (p. 19). Furthermore, he implied that the Founders intended that the people democratically decide the rights, rather than having natural rights, not granted by people or governments, as previously mentioned and as clearly explicated in the Declaration of Independence. Finally, he also referred to Jefferson’s vision for America but missed the point that Jefferson was an ideologue and idealist and, certainly like others of his day, unable to envision a nation of almost three hundred million people (the total population in 1790 was under four million), making questionable Jefferson’s idyllic democratic state. This is not to say that Glickman or Jefferson’s vision for the public school as democratic values inculcator is impossible. But the questions still remain: what type of democracy shall we teach in the process and what values should be inculcated? There is a wide range of opinion: some advocate a socialist democracy (Paringer, 1990), a cultural democracy, (Giroux, 1994; Maxcy, 1995), an ecological democracy (Goodlad, 2001), or even a multicultural democracy (Marable, 1992; Sehr, 1997). I will revisit this question of democracy as it applies to schools in Chapter 6.

Following the thinking of Marx, a number of multiculturalists have examined this issue from an economic viewpoint. Most American Founders supported what multiculturalist David Sehr (1997) called a privatized democracy, as explicated in Hobbes and Locke, as well as in Madison, Hamilton, and Jay’s The Federalist, and seen still later in the work of free market
economists. This is a type of individualist consumerism, supporting prosperity as the backbone of American fulfillment (Sehr, 1997). This somewhat stems from the Protestant work ethic component of early American culture, as well as the independent entrepreneur spirit of the colonial experience. This is contrasted with what Sehr (1997) called public democracy, based on the writings of Rousseau, Jefferson, Dewey, and feminist writers, embracing an active public participation in government and “an ethic of care and responsibility, not only for oneself as an isolated individual, but for one's fellow citizens as co-builders and co-beneficiaries of the public good” (p. 4). This sounds good, but what did he mean by this? Would his ideas be consistent with the ideas of most Founders? Sehr admitted that they had no desire to create a true democracy: “The impulse to contain the presumed evils of participatory democracy is built into the foundation of American government, the Constitution” (Sehr, 1997, p. 5, emphasis mine). He was correct in saying that the Founders saw potential danger in democracy, with an inclination toward mob rule, where the evils therein are well more than presumed. He also rightly pointed out that Jefferson, too, supported a republican government, stating in a letter to George Wythe that people should be left “free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement” (Sehr, 1997, p. 12). Sehr further stated that the narrow focus of protecting rights (which was the primary purpose of government according to the Founders), is not sufficient to deal with the problems of the postindustrial economy, and wants to see government work within education, in the spirit of Gramsci, postmodernists such as Aronowitz and Giroux, and “social activist organizations of feminists, people of color, environmentalists, and others,” to construct “a new hegemony of public democracy” and to re-create American culture (Sehr, 1997, p. 35). Is this the kind of democracy that American Founders envisioned in 1776 or 1787? Is this what today’s Americans mean by democracy?
Even though many people today appeal to both democracy and Jefferson in their arguments, not everyone seems to agree with the idea of the public school being the ideal vehicle for inculcating the genuine values of our democratic republic, but rather as the vehicle for inculcating a radically different set of values. We have already seen what Sehr had in mind. Another highly influential multiculturalist educator, Henry Giroux (1994), has seen nothing of value in preparing students to become responsible American citizens, or at least seems to have a view rather different from even Jefferson’s idealist notions, having said that we should resist “bloated calls to force students to say the pledge of allegiance” in favor of having schools be places to “prepare students to push against the oppressive boundaries of gender, class, race, and age domination” and to support “cultural democracy” (pp. 32-33). With radical multiculturalists such as Giroux and Sehr, it is not about democracy, which they never seem to define in any way that would be recognized by the American Founders; it is about absolute relativism, a seemingly contradictory concept that defines the world-view of those of their un-paradigm. They have incorrectly used the term democracy and erroneously laid claim to Jefferson in their efforts to destroy the existing cultural, social, and political hegemony, so as to replace them with ones of their own construction.

Two primary tools for the type of societal change envisioned by multiculturalists are social constructivism and critical pedagogy, both clearly within the realm of postmodern relativism. Social constructivism teaches that meaning is socially constructed and impossible without human experience (humanism) and that people interact based upon those meanings. This philosophy is rooted in phenomenology. Husserl, Dewey, Harre, and Schutz, have all had philosophies consistent with social constructivism. Pedagogy based on this philosophical position emphasizes “the natural attitude, the in-group’s system of relevances, reflective
thinking” and personally constructed meaning (Heslep, 2002, p. 96). Critical pedagogy features student reflection, an emphasis on action and communication, and is grounded in critical theory with not a little influence from Marx, Freud and Weber. Foundational in this is the concept that existence is purely physical without any spiritual dimension. Critical theory differs from positivism in that adds in a social element to the scientific and is focused on oppression. Humans are in control of their actions and their results. In critical pedagogy, following Paulo Freire’s theories, only oppressive societies view students as void of knowledge and teachers as instruments of knowledge acquisition (Heslep, 2002). Being postmodernist in conception, this approach is supportive of cultural relativity and is not historically consistent with American foundational principles.

Early Nineteenth Century: The Common School

From the time of Horace Mann (1796-1859), the purpose of American education has been to equip the common man to be a functioning part of a capitalistic and democratic society. As Bowles and Gentis (1976) put it in Schooling in Capitalist America, “formal education, by extending to the masses what has been throughout human history the privilege of the few, opens the upper levels in the job hierarchy to all with the ability and willingness to obtain such skills” (p. 23). Thus, education becomes the leveler of the economic playing field. Another dynamic of the system is the conservative emphasis on order and the liberal emphasis on freedom (Dewey, 1916). These principles have continued unabated ever since and, according to Paringer, “cannot support a transformational pedagogy” (Paringer, 1990, p. 9). Despite what some might say, American education has spread beyond the confines of the rich and powerful to broad application. It did take quite a bit of time, however, to make Jefferson’s dream of universal education for democratic values inculcation a reality. Since most Americans lived and worked on
the farm during the nineteenth century, there was little time for extensive education beyond the basics and the few elementary schools existed before the Civil War were closely tied with the families and churches in local communities. Again, the primary function of these schools was to support the teaching of reading, Protestant morality, and republican virtues, reflecting the closely held values of a majority of Americans from colonization into the twentieth century (Mulkeen, 1994). There were some reforms during this era, though little that would change the values inculcation function.

The common school movement of the first half of the 1800’s featured centralization of control, a uniform curriculum and teaching methods. Horace Mann and Henry Barnard were the leaders of this movement, bringing the application of industry and science to the management of schools (Maxcy, 1995). Also, in places such as Massachusetts, Horace Mann and others established policies for schools to be used as instruments of Americanization of Irish-Catholic immigrants, where traditional values, scholarship, and conformity were ideals (Maxcy, 1995). A number of others saw little need to educate the masses. Prominent educator William T. Harris (1882) argued against those who saw no value in the education of the common laborers. Rather, he saw this as instrumental to the preservation of democracy: “We are accustomed to accept without dissent the proposition that, in a government founded on the ballot box, universal education is the only safeguard” (p. 7). Harris knew what those such as Jefferson had preached earlier in the century, that a republic cannot survive with an illiterate populace. History has also shown this to be true worldwide (consider Southeast Asia and Africa). Furthermore, Harris wanted the rich and powerful to understand that even their positions depended on insuring the education of the common man: “We have permitted universal suffrage. If we do not have universal education, we shall all suffer for it” (Harris, 1882, p. 12). Harris’ reason for this
concern lies in his understanding that in modern society, the needs of the general population cannot be ignored: “we are tethered to the lowest stratum of our population, and must accept their influence in our politics. Nothing but education will ameliorate it” (p. 12). This concept relates less to values inculcation than to the need for general education. But implied in his general education are the very ideas that Jefferson wanted taught, such that people were well versed in history and governmental principles, among other subjects, making them the epitome of Jefferson’s *Natural Aristocrat*, as Harris opined: “An ignorant people can be governed, but only a wise people can govern itself” (p. 14). In this day of increasing democracy, how much more important it is for our children to become wise through proper values inculcation.

Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century: Americanization

In the later years of the nineteenth century, an emerging industrial and technological economy developed, and the resulting mass immigration and urbanization created a need for trained workers and cultural conformity. The values that were emphasized did not change completely. There still was the emphasis on hard work and obedience, thus schools served to meet the need for trained and socialized workers. Schools supported the need to categorize students by ability and channel them into the appropriate vocational slots, whether professional or labor, again the values of the Gilded Age being focused more upon material gain than on democratic participation. As we entered the twentieth century, the schools took on the rather onerous task of Americanization of the myriad of immigrant children, mostly from Southern and Eastern Europe, with their diverse and very different cultures (Mulkeen, 1994). This movement in schools was guided by those such as Stanford professor and *father of school administration*, Ellwood Patterson Cubberley, under whose leadership educators went to great lengths to assure Americanization of immigrants would occur. Many believed that the American culture could
only be preserved by teaching American values and cultural norms to these immigrants because of the sheer volume and with diverse cultures (Maxcy, 1995).

Americanization was originally a benign program, designed to expedite assimilation with language, history and citizenship classes for the polyglot immigrants but later became more coercive after World War 1 broke out. Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, both of whom were immigrant friendly, strongly supported Americanization, believing, as Roosevelt said, that “we Americans are children of the crucible. The crucible does not work unless it turns out those cast into it in one national mould” (Schlesinger, 1998, p. 41). This paradigm is certainly contrary to the multiculturalist perspective but supportive of the traditionalist tent of national described earlier. Much of the mindset of Americanization came from the aforementioned Israel Zangwill play, *The Melting Pot*. Zangwill, an English writer of Russian/Jewish origin wrote the play to celebrate the harmonious interweaving of races in America, in the spirit of Crevecoeur. The play and the concept were wildly popular, finding support from those such as Roosevelt and Jane Addams, who thought it a great service to the nation (Schlesinger, 1998). As mentioned earlier, there were opponents of this paradigm such as Horace Kallen, who wrote an essay published in *The Nation* in 1915 entitled “Democracy Verses the Melting Pot” as an early supporter of the cultural democracy later championed by Dewey and then Giroux (Schlesinger, 1998).

John Dewey and the Progressive Movement

Beginning with the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt and running through around nineteen twenty, the Progressive Era was a time of social and government reform more radical than anything in American history until that time. Beginning during this era, roughly around nineteen ten and running through nineteen seventy, is a period historians call, the Modern Era. In
modernism, social scientists and those studying literature and philosophy rejected metaphysics and religion, embracing the availability of truth and rationalism through reason and the scientific method. The basic idea was to use foundational truth to bring order where there was chaos. John Dewey’s pragmatic paradigm was a product of this school of thought although some of his ideas also fit the postmodernist paradigm (where truth generally does not exist, but can sometimes be found, only as relative to the situation) (Bentley, 1999). Coinciding with the beginning of modernism and the Progressive Era, the progressive education movement was a brief period of experimental methodology that soon faded with the application of a state educational bureaucracy and a scientific/business/industrial approach to school management (Maxcy, 1995).

John Dewey (1859-1952), like many of the Progressives of the early twentieth century had such a tremendous confidence in the ability of education to change the individual and society that he bordered on Wilsonian idealism. His commentary sometimes seems so lofty and difficult to interpret that it makes one wonder if he was either too brilliant to be comprehended by the average person, or if his idealism had moved him into the realm of the philosophers, who are, let us say, somewhat ungrounded in reality and whose major value is to cause us to think about the possibilities of innovation. Dewey was not one to go into teaching without due reflection before, during, and after his efforts. His methods were radically different than most educators at that time and he was a strong proponent for teaching democracy in the classroom through experience. Interestingly, Dewey originally held that absolute truth was discernable, stating that there existed “principle which, true on its own account, may also serve to judge the truth of all besides” (Boydston, 1970, p. 21). This position is consistent with the concept of higher law I described earlier. Dewey later abandoned his absolutism for naturalism, supporting a biological and anthropological approach, and engineered his own form of optimistic pragmatic inquiry, where
nothing could be accepted as absolute truth other than the idea that truth was relative and always changing (Boydston, 1970). However, Dewey did see a values function for schools.

Axtelle & Burnett (1970) saw Dewey as having specific functions in values education. First, schools should contribute to the child’s cultural understanding by presenting the most important elements of the culture in a simplified manner. Second, schools should impart important social values such as honesty, justice, and decency. Third, schools should help children to understand and appreciate the various differences within society. Fourth, that the school should teach children to embrace the differences between groups as acceptable (Axtelle & Burnett, 1970). Clearly, Dewey had values inculcation in mind, emphasizing a different set of values than many other educators of his day. In looking at Dewey’s concept of values education, one can see some key concepts, among them, democracy, cultural diversity, and growth.

In Democracy and Education (1916), Dewey outlined two important aspects of a democratic society: (a) “the extent in which the interests of the group are shared by all its members” and (b) “the fullness and freedom with which it interacts with other groups.” Furthermore, education in a democratic society “makes provision for participation . . . [for the] good of all its members on equal terms and . . . secures flexible readjustment of its institutions” to insure that participation (p. 99). According to Paringer (1990), Dewey’s vision of democracy was that of a pragmatic reality; other systems had not worked; therefore, they were not truth. Pragmatism was the operating system for Dewey’s educational philosophy. Richard Rorty, in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982), saw Dewey as asking us to give up traditional philosophical foundations for religion, morality, and politics, and to reestablish our beliefs in pragmatic empiricism. For Dewey, there was no difference between morality and science (Paringer, 1990; Rorty, 1982). Dewey envisioned the progressive teacher as the “prophet of the
true god, and the usherer in of the kingdom of God” (Dewey, 1897, p. 84). Dewey’s vision was one of democratic utopia, consistent with many of the progressive era ideologues. Teachers in the common school were the prophets and facilitators of that utopia, and Dewey was their master prophet, explicating the correct pedagogical methodology for their sacred task (Callan, 1997). Dewey’s democratic ideal was also one of cultural diversity. John Dewey was one of the first educational theorists to embrace a culturally diverse America. In a 1916 address to the annual convention of the NEA, Dewey spoke of a new concept, the hyphenated American, where by a person might have a number of ethnic, religious, racial, etc. interests that define them more than the term American. He was not seeing us a pluralistic society, but rather as people who found meaning in particular aspects of our heritage. He saw schools as places where these interests could be freely expressed and explored. He did not see American culture as static, but fluid, a place where neither radical pluralism nor cultural centrism could survive (Maxcy, 1995).

Finally, according to Axtelle and Burnett, the major criterion for judging the behavior of the individual for Dewey was growth. The Deweyan components of growth were outlined by Axtelle in a previous article entitled “John Dewey’s Conception of the Religious,” found in a 1967 publication of the American Humanist Association. Here Axtelle listed Dewey’s components of growth: “flexibility, openness to new insights, new possibilities, hospitality to novelty, to the imaginative and to the creative” (Axtelle, & Burnett, 1970, p. 264). He added “integrity, balance, proportion, dynamic equilibrium, a unified wholeness of character. It involves the integral expression of all the resources and powers of the self” (p. 264). Dewey saw the school as a foundational institution for progress and growth in a democratic society. Schools, according to Dewey, should apply practical methods to the task of building democratic growth in children, albeit with room left for flexibility for the opportunity of individual creative expression.
Continuing on the theme of school purpose, Dewey explicated several general arenas for consideration, among which schools become the primary educative institution (replacing family and church) for moral education (Axtelle & Burnett, 1970). He did not recommend teaching morality, but the study of ethics, such that the child’s “natural desire to give out, to do, to serve” might be given room to blossom (Dewey, 1909, p. 22). This seems somewhat idealistic and does not sit very well with a philosophy of pragmatism. Furthermore, Dewey resisted the idea of moralizing (moral lessons); rather, he maintained the idea that children will grow to their best self if allowed full freedom and self expression (his version of democracy). Morality is not to be associated with religion, but is simply a habit that is developed over time through pragmatic exercise (Axtelle & Burnett, 1970).

Apparently, Dewey’s liberal paradigm is not radical enough for some educational theorists. In describing the 1987 Education for Democracy Project of the American Federation of Teachers, Paringer (1990) referred to the project as having objectives that were Deweyan in their conception and as falling short of transformational (Paringer, 1990). The project seemingly had a positive paradigm, portraying the political heritage of the United States as a “vision of a common life in liberty, justice and equality, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution” (Paringer, 1990, p. 64). It went further to prescribe that “values like human dignity and freedom, equal rights, social and economic justice, and the rule of law, civility, truth, toleration of others, cooperation, civic responsibility, self-respect and self restraint” needed to be taught, learned and practiced (Paringer, 1990, p. 66). One would expect both multiculturalists and traditionalists to have found some common ground there. But Paringer found fault, especially when the project wanted students to be taught more of American history and of
American heroes and that the existing power structures were the one’s that should be there (Paringer, 1990). He then proceeded to dismiss it as one that

fails to examine the daily contradictions of democracy in student experience of the world, . . . fails to create an environment in which praxis is established as a pedagogical practice, . . . [and] continues to maintain the division of power, the leadership of the few, and the hierarchy of knowledges that have historically preserved inequality, possessive individualism, and the disempowerment of students. (Paringer, 1990, p. 65)

What Paringer recommended instead is a postmodern approach to “social justice” or “peace” education; he also suggested a “global” education, and although he did not use the specific term, multiculturalism comes to mind (p. 138). In the end, Paringer was seeking the “praxis of social justice” in the effort to rid the world of any semblance of traditional hegemony (p. 140). He denied that Dewey’s ideas were transformational and advocated full democracy with no groups having dominance in what still seems a radical socialist view (Paringer, 1990). Paringer’s vision for schools was certainly not the vision of those in control of education during the time of modernism, and as the years passed, national leaders would continue to link schools with growing citizens.

Schools as Inculcators of Americanism: The Forties and Fifties

After the Progressive Era, most schools, other than those of John Dewey’s philosophy, were committed to instilling traditional American values. Eleanor Roosevelt once spoke about the purpose of education, which was, by her appraisal, to help turn children into citizens, as she reflected upon “the statement made not long ago, before a group of English headmasters, by the Archbishop of York, that the true purpose of education is to produce citizens” (Roosevelt, 1930, para. 1). Dewey and Kallan had argued for cultural democracy, hoping to see broad acceptance of multiple cultures in society and broad application of cultural relativism in values inculcation. Dewey and Kallan’s ideas notwithstanding, cultural pluralism as a concept was largely confined
to those in the arts and to academia, with little practical application for the average person or the average school for many years, especially during the twenties return to normalcy, and through the depression and war years. Most American’s saw the need to rally together as national unity was critical during those latter crises (Schlesinger, 1998). As President Franklin Roosevelt said in 1943,

the principle on which this country was founded and by which it has always been governed is that Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart; Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race and ancestry. A good American is one who is loyal to this country and to our creed of liberty and democracy. (Schlesinger, 1998, p. 45)

During these years, there were actions taken to balance the call for Americanism with Constitutional principles of liberty. Consider the U.S. Supreme Court case, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943); the Court sought to guarantee that values inculcation was not accomplished at the expense of individual freedoms. Speaking for the Court, Justice Jackson said,

The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures - Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes. (para. 20)

Yet, traditional values were still taught in most of the nation’s schools, with personal liberty being simply a component of those values, not something prohibited by them, as some multiculturalists today seem to believe. The year after the Barnette case, the famous jurist Learned Hand (1944) spoke about liberty balanced by personal responsibility as relates to the importance of values:

What do we mean when we say that first of all we seek liberty? I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon laws, and upon courts. These are false hopes; believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men and
women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it. And what is this liberty which must lie in the hearts of men and women? It is not the ruthless, the unbridled will; it is not freedom to do as one likes. That is the denial of liberty, and leads straight to its overthrow. A society in which men recognize no check upon their freedom soon becomes a society where freedom is the possession of only a savage few; as we have learned to our sorrow. (para. 28)

As time went by, schools became viewed as institutions to be run like a factory, with production and efficiency being the key norms. Some change in values inculcation had taken place in the schools influenced by Dewey and other progressives, with an emphasis upon the Jeffersonian concept of training students for democratic participation, but by and large, the values of taught from 1920 until 1960 were those of hard work, conformity, patriotism, and self-sacrifice, with democracy limited to voting (Sehr, 1997). President Eisenhower’s Science Advisory Committee report of May 24, 1959 summarized this paradigm, saying that schools must always have as its primary objective the development of men and women of noble character and high moral purpose who have also the intellectual capacities and the sense of values to lead fruitful and satisfying lives in modern society. (Heslep, 1989, p. 133)

Introduction to Turmoil: The Sixties and Seventies

In the latter years of the twentieth century, America made the change from an industrial based production economy to a technology based information management economy and thus the basic function of the American school had changed from preparing industrial workers to preparing technological information managers (Mulkeen, 1994). The values inculcation function as relates to economic production still existed, as students were taught to function in a capitalist society. However since the 1960’s and 1970’s, when the nation experienced the turmoil of the Vietnam War, the Civil Rights Movement, Watergate, and the beginnings of global terrorism, there has been a continuous battle over values, a battle that has been often fought in American schools. Prior to the 1960’s, the Eisenhower committee’s vision of developing noble character,
high moral purpose, and intellectual capacities for participation in society went relatively unquestioned. A radical values shift occurred during the turbulent sixties however, as many philosophers, social scientists, and their students began to question the traditions, institutions, and the very foundational principles of American society (D’Souza, 2002: Maxcy, 1995). The new paradigm was one of questions rather than answers. The proponents of this new paradigm were partly responding to the violence and turmoil in society, drawing conclusions that the American capitalist system was broken and the values behind the system needed replacing.

One of the most influential socio-political philosophies during the sixties was Marxism. In the ideas of Marx, sixties revolutionaries worldwide and in the halls of American universities found a rallying point for resisting imperialism and oppression, destroying existing political, social, and cultural hegemony in the process. Much of this thought found its way into American public schools, as many college and high school students embraced the counter culture movement, resisting the inculcation of traditional values that they felt were inadequate to explain the turmoil they saw around them. Yet the Marxist paradigm also represents values, and these were being inculcated in American universities. In regards to the relation between these Marxist values and debates today over values education, one liberal cultural pluralist (in contrast with multiculturalist) who opposes the practice of making race an issue, Robert Hughes, observed: “Marxism has passed through the fires of its own dissolution and is reborn as a ‘hero with a thousand faces’- multiculturalism” (Sisk, 1993, p. 46). Do multiculturalists absorb the principles of Marx in their philosophy? Schmidt (1997) explicated this paradigm with application for today’s conflict between multiculturalists and traditionalists: in substituting the word consciousness for objective knowledge or truth, it becomes apparent that Marx jettisoned the Judeo-Christian/ Western concept of knowledge and truth. For Marx, knowledge or truth arises only out of people's social existence. Thus different social situations (social classes, as Marx would say) produce different knowledge or truth, and
so truth is always relative; it is never absolute. Truth neither transcends nor applies to all people's social experiences or to their cultures; truth, knowledge, or morality are all culturally relative. And since knowledge or truth arises from people's social existence, it is a product of their interaction and thus created by them. Knowledge or truth is therefore a servant of the people just as is any other product created by them. This means that people no longer are servants of the truth, as Western philosophy has held for centuries. Now, as multiculturalists say, truth must serve the peoples. (p. 31)

Note here the use of the word peoples rather than people. One can see this subtle shift time and time again in multiculturalist literature. For those who support the traditional concept of cultural pluralism, the American people, while diverse in background and experience, are still united together.

During the nineteen sixties, the mindset for many was the following: Marxist revolutions are occurring around the world; why not have one here, at least philosophically! Indeed, revolution was as hot a concept as existed at the time. Since it was hot in colleges and universities, it would filter down to every level of education. As new teachers came from those halls of inculcation to teach the children in elementary and secondary schools, they brought the new paradigm with them. The classic representation of this revolution in values education was found in Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies for Teachers and Students (Simon et al., 1972). This volume asserted that there are no values that students should universally accept, including their parents’ values; rather, children should create their own values based upon their experiences and personal beliefs. The central premise behind values clarification and much of sixties philosophy was relativism, which stood in direct opposition to the traditional American philosophical tenets as espoused by the Founders and embraced by the majority of the population at that time (Spring, 2002). The intent of the creators of Values Clarification is clear. Simon et al. decried limitations on personal choice as he sought a paradigm shift in values education: “The schools must not be allowed to continue fostering the immorality
of morality. An entirely different set of values must be nourished” (p. 20, emphasis mine). Another proponent of relativism of that era wrote that “our efforts as educators must not be directed to restoring the past order of morality but to participating in creating a new one. . . . When it is shed, there will be a new moral order to take it's place, . . . a counterculture that will burst through the surface” (Ash, 1971, p. 112). Interestingly, one of the creators of Values Clarification, Howard Kirschenbaum (1992) did an about face, revealing that “our position was theoretically flawed and, as history showed, politically untenable”; he then sought a different paradigm: “We must return to inculcating traditional values in our young people” (p. 774).

Adding fuel to the fire in the values crisis of that time, the famed, and now highly suspect Kinsey Reports, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male (1948) and Sexual Behavior in the Human Female (1953), gave birth to the sexual revolution, including the homosexual movement (Reisman, 1996). This brought about changes seen most clearly in the proliferation of sex education in public schools, with very specific non-traditional values being taught. It is of note that Kinsey’s research is now seen by many scientists as being fraudulent, even criminal (Masters, Johnson, & Kolodny, 1977), “a deliberate effort to manufacture statistics showing a high rate of homosexuality in the male population” to accommodate a particular social agenda (Muir & Court, 1992, para. 34). Needless to say, the Kinsey Institute disagrees with all such criticisms. Nevertheless, the evidence is substantial of serious problems with Kinsey’s research (Lickona, 2000). Gershom Legman (1964), a former Kinsey associate, wrote about Kinsey’s “statistical hokum” to hide his “propagandistic purpose of respectabilizing homosexuality and certain sexual perversions” (pp. 125-126). In addition, Stanford’s Paul Robinson (1976) opined that Kinsey's statistics were engineered “to undermine the traditional sexual order” (p. 59). As relates to children and schools, Kinsey’s report “threatened . . . the long-standing societal
prohibition on adult-child sexual contact” (Muir & Court, 1992, para. 34). As Kinsey put it, according to a biographer, “I shall aim to distinguish the scientific data in this field from the moralistic claptrap which has invaded our schoolroom” (Christenson, 1971, p. 118).

Discontentment in the traditional structure of schools lead to several other attempted changes during the sixties, including the open classroom, which was a singular failure because of the perception of disorder, and during the seventies, criticism of schools over their apparent inability to change society led social reformers to look elsewhere to make changes, largely in the courts (Maxcy, 1995). Schlesinger referred to additional challenges to the traditional paradigm in the sixties including legislative and judicial mandates for schools to provide instruction in languages other than English, such as the Bilingual Education Act of 1968, which provided guidelines and funding for helping children to move more quickly from bilingual to all English classes over time and the 1974 Supreme Court decision in *Lau v. Nichols*, requiring districts to provide special programs for non-English speaking children (Schlesinger, 1998). In the end, he saw this as creating a special interest lobby and a new political ethnicity which like Afrocentrism “nourishes self-ghettoization and racial antagonism,” alienating minorities from the rest of American society (Schlesinger, 1998, p. 112). Not everyone would agree with his analysis of ESOL programs. Some multiculturalists might see racism in any attempt to emphasize one language over another, whereas some traditionalists might see the value of Americanizing immigrants, so as to help them assimilate into society. Nonetheless, throughout the 1970’s, following the paradigm set by those advocating cultural relativity, sexual freedom, and destruction of hegemony using tools such as Values Clarification, many schools followed a course that would bring about a strong public reaction in the years that followed.
The Reagan years: A Conservative Revolution

With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the nation experienced a conservative reaction to the radical shift of values that had taken place during the sixties and seventies. The return to traditional values is a consistent theme in American history when there has been either serious national trauma or significant alteration of the national value system. The sixties and seventies featured both, leading to a decade of conservatism not unlike the time prior to those years. Reagan’s Secretary of Education, William Bennett, was a leading conservative spokesperson and saw the need to “teach morality and Western cultural values” as a way to address the problems of our society (Spring, 2002, p. 6). Often called the Reagan Revolution, the 1980’s had a focus on traditional values, including that of personal responsibility, the hegemony of family, and unfettered capitalism. Schools had long been considered training grounds for the work world, and in 1983, serious accusations of education’s failure to prepare workers for life were brought forth due to a very controversial, yet influential report. Educators were placed front and center as accountable for national economic shortcomings in the 1983 report *A Nation at Risk*, which implied the failure of public schools. This led the country toward restructuring of schools and a pursuit in *excellence in education* through accountability for teachers and research-based restructuring (Maxcy, 1995). Educators adapted to the changes but many rejected the findings of the report, as an “unproven and oft-repeated claim that the poor quality of schools was responsible for the difficulties U.S. corporations were experiencing” (Spring, 2002, p. 62).

There was also an aspect of *A Nation at Risk* that was revolutionary in the values inculcation arena. During the same time period, there were studies in other countries showing that successful school systems held students responsible for their achievement. The *Nation at Risk* report reflected this emphasis as it concluded with a call for student accountability: “When
you give only the minimum to learning, you get only the minimum in return. Even with your parents’ best example and your teachers’ best efforts, in the end it is your work that determines how much and how well you learn” (Shanker, 1993, para. 8).

The call for student accountability is representative of the traditionalist emphasis upon personal responsibility. This relates to the mixed perception of root causes for problems in schools. Traditionalists often attribute poor student behavior and performance to values issues, whereas multiculturalists see overpowering societal forces as being to blame for student problems (Spring, 2002). For traditionalists, there must be an emphasis on rule of law, for as Heslep (1989) put it, “It will do the state little good to count moral philosophers among its membership while the majority of its members have no moral respect for its laws” (p. 194). Thus, “education in a democracy will not perform a moral role unless the citizens of the state help decide that it should; and the citizens are not likely to do this unless they are educated to do so” (Heslep, 1989, p. 220).

In seeming contradiction to the new wave of government controlled accountability advocated in *A Nation at Risk*, the ideas of Austrian economist, Friedrich Hayek and his disciples brought a form of capitalism into conservative American thought during this period that advocated replacing government control with a free-market economy. During the Reagan years, this would be applied to schools, as well as other institutions. The idea was that competition in the marketplace would create ideal institutions, free from government interference. As Spring explained, “Applied to schooling, this meant no government provision or control of education. Instead, entrepreneurs would organize schools and compete for students while the ‘invisible hand’ of the marketplace determined what forms of schooling were best” (Spring, 2002, p. 35). Hayek’s disciples believed that the educational bureaucracies were most responsible for the
problems in schools and helped create a desire for private school growth, charter schools, and the voucher program, with individual families having the ability to choose among the various alternatives (Spring, 2002).

Another major values education conflict in schools, that of parental rights in their children’s education is illustrated in the “flash-point” court case, Mozert v. Hawkins (1987), where a “group of conservative Christian parents” sought exemption for their children from a program that contradicted their beliefs (Callan, 1997, p. 141). Traditionalists would support the concept that parents should have final say regarding their children’s education, but according to Callan (1997),

the highly protective upbringing that the plaintiffs in Mozert wanted for their children, with its scrupulous avoidance of all that conflicted with the parents’ fundamentalist faith, might obstruct the long-term development of civic virtues that are essential to mutually respectful cooperation in a diverse society. (pp. 146-147)

Callan then went on to castigate the parents, painting as despotism, the servile child yielding always to their parent. The Christian concept of children, obey your parents, is akin to immoral behavior for Callan. He opined, “Children have a right to an education that includes an understanding of ethical diversity that the parents in Mozert wrongly wished to block” (p. 158, emphasis mine). Is this what multiculturalists have in mind when calling for diversity? Callan would say so; others might be inclined to disagree. Either way, the Mozert case remains a point of contention for legal scholars and educators as they attempt to bridge the gap between the traditionalist and multiculturalist perspective.

The Conflict Widens: The Nineties and into the Twenty First Century

Since Bill Clinton’s election in 1992, as a representative of the New Left, seen as a more centrist version of 1960’s radicals, the conflict over values inculcation has widened. This is certainly reflective of the broader disagreement regarding values among various groups
throughout society. Standing opposed to the New Left are the Compassionate Conservatives, such as George W. Bush, seen as a more centrist version of 1950’s traditionalists. These two groups, despite the existence of other more radical groups, have control of the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively. Thus, they are the primary governmental voice regarding school policy, including the policies on teaching values. While few people are seeking a return to the fifties or the sixties, there is a near war in education over what values to teach students. Radical factions on both sides seek to pull majority opinion their way, demonizing those with the opposing view. Occupying the middle ground seems to be the safest stance as educational policy makers seek to win approval of the public. Both the New Left and the Compassionate Conservatives seek to occupy that ever-shifting ground, while not deserting their most closely held principles. The Compassionate Conservatives embrace the teaching of traditional values as safeguard against the pitfalls of what they see as relativism in education. Explicating this perspective, Manhattan Institute scholar, Myron Magnet, painted the 1960’s and 1970’s as wasteland where traditional values were trashed in favor of a leftist agenda that eroded the moral fiber of the nation. Again, this view is contrary to the ideas of the New Left, that people are subject to overpowering systems of which they have no control. In Magnet’s perspective, liberals try to change the system they say oppresses the poor rather than the improper values that cause their problems (Spring, 2002). For many of these liberals, as Patricia White put it her 1996 guide for schools, Civic Virtues and Public Schooling: Educating Citizens for a Democratic Society, “the future is an open one characterized by value pluralism,” a position that is in stark contrast to the traditionalist paradigm of standard values for all (p. 11).

The wide rift between traditionalists and multiculturalists regarding values education has shown no sign of narrowing. The conflict rages today, due somewhat to the exacerbating
influence of the most extreme positions on each side of the equation, but largely due to the breadth and depth of the contrast. The battle is certainly not limited to just two perspectives, indeed, there are a plethora of viewpoints ranging to extremes from every angle. All of these come together on one of the most hotly contested battlegrounds in the United States today: the American public school. In chapter five, I will specifically examine the conflict between multiculturalists and traditionalists, using specific examples from schools across the nation, explicating the philosophical background of both positions.
CHAPTER 5
THE VALUES EDUCATION CONFLICT BETWEEN
MULTICULTURALISTS AND TRADITIONALISTS

The Beginning of Controversy in Values Inculcation

As seen in Chapter 4, there is a continuing history of values inculcation in schools, yet with the societal changes of the Post-World War II years, the content of values education changed, gradually at first, then radically. The questions I will now address center upon the specific values that are being instilled in the minds of American children and the philosophies behind those values. In this chapter, I specifically examine what is being proposed and used for values education at the various levels of schooling, from elementary through high school to collegiate, the latter being important in that the teachers of the future are experiencing values inculcation there.

To repeat a point made previously, teachers are instilling values in the minds of children through both formal and informal instruction. It is impossible for any person to be to completely value neutral, thus anyone who teaches will teach values, even if it is only done so informally. As mentioned before, “everything we do reflects our values, every decision is a choice between competing values” (Passe, 1999). To repeat another point, values are taught every time teachers step into the class, by the manner in which they address the students, how they relate to them, the policies they enact in classroom procedures, and certainly in how they represent their own political and philosophical views (Lyons et al., 1998). Indeed this is often by design, as Dewey disciple, George Counts saw it; as a teacher, “a neutral stance toward the teaching of values was
impossible” (Lyons et al., 1998, p. 108). In fact for Counts, the “imposition of values upon students was necessary and desirable” to foster the “reconstruction of American society through the establishment of democratic socialism” (Lyons et al., 1998, pp. 107-108). Like Dewey, he saw existing inequities in American society during the Progressive Era. Counts took this as a sign that democracy needed to follow Marxian progression toward socialism. Teachers were to have prime responsibility in transforming society: “He considered teaching an inherently political act” (Lyons et al., 1998, p. 108). Thus, the mid-Twentieth Century was the beginning of a trend in American educational history, as the theories of Marx became significant upon the philosophies and practices of teachers. This influence would have an impact on many teachers during the sixties and seventies and that would help give birth to a new paradigm. Aside from these informal, albeit often intentional, transmissions of values, there are formal programs ongoing, some stemming from recent issues such as Columbine or 9/11, others dating back to the sixties and seventies. I will examine some of these here and others in Chapter Six.

Finding the controversy is not a difficult task. Even to the casual observer, it is clear that there are extreme philosophical differences between conservatives and liberals as regards values education. I certainly acknowledge that there are multiple layers in between the extremes, but the central theme across all topics appears to be the conflict between those who are multicultural relativists (multiculturalists) and those who are common culture absolutists (traditionalists), despite what might be seen as an oversimplification of the complexities of a pluralistic society. I have already pointed out that not all multiculturalists support every plank of the platform of multiculturalism, nor does every traditionalist support all the tenets of traditionalism. Certainly, there are varying degrees of these positions and one could actually be split between the two sides. Despite those considerations, the trend in both instances is fairly consistent. Needless to
say, all discussion of values education is rather controversial, with heated and emotional debate being the norm, rather than the exception. Much of the debate is couched in terms of race and ethnicity, culture, class, politics, sexuality and gender, and religion. In this study, I shall focus upon specific examples regarding values education as pertains to sexuality and race, leaving other areas to future study. To begin with, no topic is more controversial than that of sexuality. This has become a major focus of the debate regarding values inculcation in schools. There is an outright war between those who would generally count themselves in the multiculturalist camp and want the schools to be a primary provider of information and values regarding sexuality such as Planned Parenthood, SIECUS (Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States), and NARAL Pro Choice America (formerly the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League), against those who consider themselves traditionalists and believe that parents in the home are the best inculcators of that knowledge and training, including Eagle Forum, the Hoover Institution, and the NRLC (National Right to Life Committee).

Polls, Surveys, and Other “Scientific” Data

Regarding public support, Abraham Lincoln perhaps put it best: “In this age, in this country, public sentiment is everything. With it, nothing can fail; against it, nothing can succeed. Whoever molds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes, or pronounces judicial decisions” (Jaffa, 1959, p. 119). As is always the case in a democratic society, it is best to be positioned with the majority if one hopes to have success in political agendas. We can see this in the polls that are presented as evidence for justification of specific values programs in schools. Both sides of the sex education debate claim majority approval of their position and both claim to care about the health, safety, and future of the children. We must emphasize here the importance of polls regarding values inculcation in schools. The politicians and school boards
that make decisions about what our children will be taught are strongly influenced by their perception of public opinion. Other than direct community involvement through attendance at board meetings and through contact with legislators, polls are often seen as the major reflection of public opinion and can be taken as gospel by these decision makers. For the careful researcher, it is difficult to give credence to claims based on evidence that is suspect. Polls are well known to be instruments of manipulation when the evidence is scarce or the motives of the pollsters are suspect; this can be seen most readily in politics.

In addition to knowing the agenda of the pollster, it is also important to know who is sponsoring the poll and what questions were asked. In their Statement of Disclosure, the National Council on Public Polls (NCPP), a non-regulatory professional standards organization for pollsters, advised that those pollsters releasing poll results to the public must include the name of the poll’s sponsor and “complete wording of questions upon which the release is based” (National Council on Public Polls [NCPP], 2002, para. 5), as part of insuring “reliability and validity” (NCPP, 2002, para. 1). This is an admission of the fact that polls can be very subjective, and as such, can be used to mislead a public that often does not look much past the headlines of a story. The adage from Mark Twain’s autobiography that he attributed to nineteenth century British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli might apply: “There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics” (Twain, 2001, para. 15). This should be a wake up call for educators who use polls as an indicator of what to do regarding sex education or any other controversial issue. The NCPP guide to journalists warned that “polls are not conducted for the good of the world. They are conducted for a reason – either to gain helpful information or to advance a particular cause” (NCPP, 2002b, para. 12). Even if one trusts in the objectivity of the pollster and the sponsor of the poll, we must examine the methods, including, as NCPP stated, the “complete
wording of questions” asked (NCPP, 2002, para. 5). Clearly, pollsters are often hired to help push an agenda. One pollster respected by both Republicans and Democrats, second only to Gallup, John Zogby, readily admitted: “Indeed, in the world of interest-group polling, clients often submit proposed questions or concepts, but much of what they are buying is the polling firm's expertise in devising wording that produces results” (Mooney, 2003, para. 8, emphasis mine).

As stated previously, in the conflict over how sexuality should be handled in education, both sides claim to have the support of the American public. The conflict is directly related to the multiculturalist-traditionalist war and is largely definable in partisan terms. On the multiculturalist side of the debate, the claim, according to Planned Parenthood’s Othmer Institute’s Get the Facts publication on their web site, is that “the overwhelming majority of U.S. voters want comprehensive sex education” (Othmer Institute, 2002, para. 6). The website does not explain what is meant by comprehensive. This is something that I will explicate later in this chapter. The evidence provided on the web site to support the claim is from one survey taken by Lake, Snell, Perry, & Associates (LSPA) (2003), whose web site states that their “principals are among the Democratic party's leading strategists” (LSPA, 2003, para. 1). In this survey, commissioned by the Othmer Institute, 800 “active and attentive” voters were polled, and according to those behind the survey, 90% want comprehensive sex education “beginning in the early grades” (Othmer Institute, 2002, para. 1). In the article on the Othmer web site, entitled “Even Anti-Choice Voters Support Sex Education that Includes Abstinence AND Contraception: Congress Prepared to Mislead Nation's Youth, Defy Voter Demand for Medically Accurate Sex Education,” very little information from the poll was presented. Most of the publication was simply venting anger toward the Congress and the President for their support of abstinence-only
programs (Othmer Institute, 2002), despite the fact that in 2002, the Federal government spent 12 times as much for contraceptive promotion than for teaching abstinence (4 times as much for teens) (RSC, 2002). The details of the Othmer poll seem to be unavailable for public viewing. In another survey from October of the same year, SIECUS (2002) issued a press release boldly proclaiming, *National Poll Shows Parents Overwhelmingly Support Comprehensive Sex Education Over Abstinence-Only-Until-Marriage by 5 to 1 Margin*. This poll, also taken by Lake, Snell, Perry, & Associates, was done by telephone with 803 low income parents or guardians of children, ages 5-18, with an over-sampling of Hispanics and African-Americans, “to allow for racial and ethnic comparisons” (LSPA for SEICUS, 2002, p. 6). NARAL also claimed an overwhelming majority for the sex education initiative. They cited several surveys in addition to referring to the two Lake & Associates studies in their publication, *Americans Support Responsible Sex Education*. Included there was one done by Democratic Party pollster Hickman-Brown, another by the Alan Guttmacher Institute, an affiliate of Planned Parenthood, a third sponsored by Durex, a condom manufacturer, and a fourth by the Kaiser Foundation, an active pro-choice supporter of comprehensive sex education, as well as a number of multiculturalist programs (NARAL, 2003).

The only non-partisan pollster cited by the comprehensive sex education platform regarding public opinion was a 1998 poll taken by the one most respected by both camps: Gallup. In the *Thirtieth Annual Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll of the Public’s Attitude Toward the Public Schools*, “Eighty-seven percent of those surveyed believe sex education should be included in high school instructional programs. The respondents expressed strong support for presenting virtually all topics, including AIDS, homosexuality, and teen pregnancy” (Rose & Gallup, 1998a, para. 13). The NARAL publication did not reveal the two questions in the poll or
possible answers. The two questions upon which the statement was based can be found in Phi Delta Kappa’s publications. One question was: “Do you feel the public high schools should or should not include sex education in their instructional programs?” (Answers were categorized as yes, no, or I don’t know). The other question was “which of the following topics, if any, should be included for high school students?” (Rose & Gallup, 1998b, para. 5). A number of topics were presented including teen pregnancy, premarital sex, and birth control. One might note that there is no mention in the poll about sex education for children in grades K-8, nor is there mention of graphic descriptions of sexual activity for any students, or the right or responsibility of schools to distribute contraceptives or condoms. Yet in examining publications of comprehensive sexuality education proponents, including many of those in the medical specialties, it seems that they see the critical need for all of these programs, although, if the 1999 PDK/Gallup poll is to be believed, most Americans do not. According to that poll, only two percent of those surveyed believed that sex and pregnancy was a big problem for schools (Rose & Gallup, 1999). Indeed, teen pregnancy rates are dropping, which, according to NARAL, is due to a combination of abstinence and comprehensive sexuality education (NARAL, 2002). Others have found different reasons for the drop. A team of doctors who believe that “certain areas of public health policy are often based more on political agendas and social ideology than on medical and scientific fact” (Physicians Consortium, 2003, para. 2) found that “the contention that these declines are due to increased contraceptive use by teenagers does not withstand critical analysis and review” (Jones et al., 1999, para. 3); rather, “abstinence and decreased sexual activity among sexually active adolescents are primarily responsible for the decline” (Jones et al., 1999, para. 5).

It seems that not all those interested in health education agree with the assertion that comprehensive sex education is good for children or that most people approve of inculcating the
values contained therein in the public schools. On the traditionalist side of the debate, the Coalition for Adolescent Sexual Health (CASH), a partnership of a number of activist conservative organizations including James Dobson’s Focus on the Family and Phyllis Schlafly’s Eagle Forum, claimed that most parents would reject comprehensive sex education if they knew what it was. The conflict is thus less about whether to teach sex education than about what to include in the curriculum. The Coalition dismissed the assertions of SEICUS, Planned Parenthood, and others, saying, “These groups have supported this claim of parental support by conducting surveys that describe comprehensive sex education in innocuous, vague, euphemistic, even compassionate language” (CASH, 2003a, para. 2). As a result, they sponsored their own Zogby poll, this time using some of the very guidelines created by SEICUS, Planned Parenthood, and others. “Zogby created questions using verbatim the topics contained in the Guidelines for Comprehensive Sexuality Education” as well as the CDC’s Programs that Work and other sexuality education curriculums (CASH, 2003a, para. 3). Findings reported differed greatly than those of the previously mentioned polls. In examining those results, the fact that the Zogby poll used “verbatim” language from these curriculum guides, brings added understanding of what is meant by comprehensive sex education to those who propose it for K-12 schools.

Specific Guidelines for Values Inculcation

The National Guidelines Task Force (NGTF) (1996), working through SEICUS, stated in the introduction to the Guidelines for Comprehensive Sexuality Education that while not specifically a curriculum, “the Guidelines provide a framework to create a new program or improve existing programs” (National Guidelines Task Force [NGTF], 1996, p. 5). SEICUS saw the Guidelines as “a starting point for curriculum development” at both state and local levels. Furthermore, “classroom teachers may use them to provide a theoretical basis for daily
programs. They can be used in teacher preparation or in-service education” (NGTF, 1996, p. 5). The Guidelines have widespread support among a number of prominent organizations, including the AMA, the APA, the NASP, and the NSBA (CASH, 2003b). The stated goal of the Guidelines is “the promotion of sexual health” for every person, including all children K-12, which includes the right to “receive sexual information and to consider accepting sexual relationships for pleasure as well as for procreation” (NGTF, 1996, p. 6). The authors of the Guidelines claimed that their sexuality education program “respects the diversity of values and beliefs represented in the community” (NGTF, 1996, p. 6), although the specific information contained in the Guidelines seems to contradict many American communities values and beliefs. They claim that parents should be the primary provider of sexuality education and that the Guidelines “will complement [implying that something is lacking] and augment [implying that it will be better] the sexuality education children receive from their families” (NGTF, 1996, p. 6). However, the depth and scope of the Guidelines does not leave much for parents to teach. Clearly, SEICUS was positioning the Guidelines for use in American classrooms as the primary resource for inculcation of values regarding sexuality.

What guidelines can be found in the Guidelines? To begin with, the Guidelines divides children into four groups. Level one is ages 5-8, primary school; level two is ages 9-11, elementary school; level three is ages 12-14, middle school; and level four is ages 15-18, high school. Knowledge to be disseminated to the four age groups is then broken into “age appropriate” segments as part of a “comprehensive approach to sexuality education” (NGTF, 1996, p. 5). Without detailing the entire fifty-page document, let us examine, in context of the total publication, a selection of pertinent items, especially as relates to the questions presented in CASH’s Zogby poll. To begin with, the Guidelines recommend teaching children all of the
basics of reproduction and sexual pleasure, in stages, beginning at age five. This includes teaching all children, five to eight years old that “both boys and girls have body parts that feel good when touched” (NGTF, 1996, p. 13), “vaginal intercourse occurs when a man and woman place the penis inside the vagina” (NGTF, 1996, p. 14), “touching and rubbing one’s own genitals to feel good is called masturbation,” and “masturbation should be done in a private place,” among others (NGTF, 1996, p. 30). Predictably, parental response on the Zogby poll indicated a strong disapproval of disseminating this information to young children. In questions seven through eleven of the poll, over 70% disapproved or strongly disapproved of teaching this content in K-3 classrooms (Zogby, 2003). Other items from the Guidelines were also used in the poll relating to orgasm, erotic fantasy, and homosexuality, with the graphic nature of the content increasing with the age groups. Parents consistently (over 70%) disapproved of teaching details on these topics in the K-12 classroom. Several questions were also selected from other comprehensive sexuality education resources, including a CDC program, for urban African-American students called Focus on Kids, and another curriculum, Be Proud, be Responsible, also targeted at urban African-American teenagers. The extremely graphic nature of the items from these programs does not warrant repeating here (CASH, 2003c).

Even considering the graphic nature of the materials designated for teenagers, of perhaps greatest concern here, is the early sexualization of children. The Guidelines advocate explicit sexual information for children as young as five, despite the fact that based on a study of over 17,000 girls in the United States, Herman-Giddens and colleagues found that the average age for the first menstrual period is twelve years, eleven months for Caucasian girls and twelve years, two months for African-American girls (Munroe, 2002). Many believe that this early “sexualization can be harmful to a child’s emotional development because they are not equipped
psychologically to interpret the sexual behaviour and conduct of . . . adults (HSC, 1999, para. 1). Furthermore, Congressional findings on sexual exploitation of children indicate that “sexualization of minors creates an unwholesome environment which affects the psychological, mental and emotional development of children and undermines the efforts of parents and families to encourage the sound mental, moral and emotional development of children” (US Code 18: 2251, 1999, para. 18). Children often learn by doing and this level of information can encourage premature sexual activity. In something of a contradiction, when speaking about the early onset of puberty in girls compared to previous generations, Marcia Herman-Giddens, an advocate for comprehensive sexuality education, condemned the sexualization of children in American society: “This is like a terrible experiment being played out on our children and we don't know where it’s going” (Munroe, 2002, para. 11).

As to the rest of the Guidelines, it is abundantly clear that SEICUS, as well as other comprehensive sexuality education advocates, sought to instill the value of sexual freedom rather than any traditional norms regarding the place of sex in society. The Zogby poll provides a glimpse into the American mind and it seems that the public does not want their young children sexualized. Yet the graphic nature of some sexuality education makes it seem as if there are those who are attempting to do just that! If we applied the movie ratings standards to school classrooms, those using the materials provided by SEICUS, Planned Parenthood, or the CDC, might well be empty of children under seventeen, unless accompanied by a parent or guardian. As relates to teenagers, the public is more open to the teaching of sex education, but in a non-graphic way. In the battle over the control of the curriculum, the traditionalists advocate abstinence only, while the multiculturalists support comprehensive, sometimes called responsible sex education.
There are some who seemingly are trying to find a middle ground between the two sides. The National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy (NCPTP) has experienced some support from both sides. With a stated goal to reduce teen pregnancy by one third between 1996 and 2005, NCPTP has worked actively with schools, families and individuals and encouraged teenagers not only to choose abstinence but also to use contraceptives if they choose otherwise on the grounds that “sex has consequences” (National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy [NCPTP], 2003, para 1). On the home page of their website, the message reads, “Not ready to become someone’s father? It’s simple: don’t have sex. But if you do, use protection every time” (NCPTP, 2003, para 1). What is not clear is how much abstinence promotion exists in this and other abstinence-first programs (Howell, 2001). While it is true that teen pregnancy rates have dropped in recent years (United States Department of Health and Human Services [USDHHS], 2002), there is wide disagreement about the cause. NCPTP cited studies showing that neither abstinence-only education nor relying on contraceptives is sufficient for preventing teen pregnancy, but a program using both (Kirby, 2002). These would contradict claims from those on each side. The comprehensive sexuality education advocates see abstinence only programs as dangerous, offering the following analysis: “There is no credible evidence that abstinence-only education delays sex or reduces teen pregnancy while there is evidence that comprehensive sex education does work” (National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Association [NFPRHA], 2003, para. 9). Those advocating abstinence say studies tell them something entirely different: “The evidence points to sexual abstinence, not increased contraceptive use, as the primary reason for the decline in teen pregnancy and birth rates throughout the 1990s” (Jones et al., 1999, para. 63). Both sides appear unyielding in this confrontation. How will there ever be
something in the way of common ground? It seems that these and other issues are completely immersed in the philosophical positions of the two sides, leaving little room for compromise.

In seeking to reduce the conflict between traditionalists and multiculturalists, the NCPTP has the potential to become a meeting place for the two sides, but it appears to be largely controlled by those supporting comprehensive sexuality education. It has advocated the inculcation of abstinence as a value: “abstinence should be strongly stressed as the best choice for teens because of its effectiveness and its consistency with the beliefs of adults and teens” (NCRTP, 2003b, para. 8). This is a view that most in the comprehensive sex education camp do not support and thus, they would like that to be a minor part of the overall program. However, they would strongly agree with what NCPTP has also said: “teens should also be provided with information about — and access to — contraception” (NCRTP, 2003b, para. 8). Needless to say, abstinence-only advocates would disagree with that part of the formula. Despite the fact that there have been efforts of some on both sides to attempt to find a middle ground, this values issue is nowhere close to being decided. The multiculturalists, such as Planned Parenthood president, Gloria Feldt, tend to see the traditionalists as people with a “narrow ideology” who are “putting our children in grave danger” (Othmer Institute, 2002, para. 4). Traditionalists, such as abstinence educator Scott Phelps, teaching in Chicago’s public schools, see those who support comprehensive sex education as simply promoters of sexual activity, sending a “narrow message which focuses primarily on some of the physical aspects of sexuality to the detriment of teens who have not had the benefit of being taught about the broader implications of these activities” (Phelps, 2000, para. 20). The result of this conflict has potential to dramatically effect schools and the values that are taught to children.
So far, we have seen some of the debate regarding specific values inculcation relating to sex education for American school children. In consideration of the issue of sexuality as it relates to the public school, it might be interesting to note that in the 31st Annual PDK/Gallup Poll, this item was included:

I am going to read off a list of different values that might be taught in the public schools. For each one, please tell me whether you think it should be taught, or should not be taught, to all students in the public schools of your community? (Rose & Gallup, 1999, para.13)

A number of values were then presented, including the value: *sexual abstinence outside of marriage*. Sixty-eight percent of those questioned wanted sexual abstinence outside of marriage taught as a value in their schools, up from sixty-six percent in 1993 (Rose & Gallup, 1999). As we have shown, traditionalists consider abstinence as the best approach to address teen sexuality issues, while comprehensive sexuality education proponents include teaching abstinence as a small part of their overall program, and there is little room for agreement. While there are a variety of approaches to sex education taken by schools across the spectrum from abstinence-only to comprehensive sexuality education, the debate rages in the public form over what is best for America’s children. This conflict creates some interesting questions. Does it really matter which of the two sides wins out on this issue? What impact can the early sexualization of children have upon our nation? Is this simply a small change in American culture, part of the weakening of our national moral fiber, or simply representative of the variety of opinions that exist in our society? How these questions are answered will have a powerful effect upon values education and the future of our nation.

Orientation: Safe Schools or Graphic Sexuality?

Perhaps an even more controversial issue in the area of sexuality and values inculcation relates to sexual orientation and gender identity. In discussing this, a number of alternative
sexual lifestyles are included under the general category of homosexuality (as opposed to traditional heterosexuality), but prefer to be designated as gay (male), lesbian (female), bisexual (either gender), male identifying as female, female identifying as male, all taken together under the banner of Lesbigays. In general, this can be seen one of three ways: as orientation (as in born that way or developed as such), behavior, or some combination thereof. There is widespread disagreement on whether this is a behavioral choice or part of one’s biological nature. Both sides claim to have science, law, religion, and societal support for their cause. What successes have the Lesbigays had? Consider this Cambridge, Massachusetts ordinance:

When [an unmistakably male] person identifies as a woman, and makes obvious attempts to be perceived as such, however ineffective, it is generally hurtful to categorize such a person as other than a woman, whereas categorizing this person as a woman does not in and of itself hurt others. Rather than traumatize the individual by exclusion, it is intended that we honor their obvious visible attempts to be womanly, and their self-identity as a woman, despite our expectations of how a woman should appear. (Gender Advocates, 2003, para. 10)

The Lesbigay lobby has already succeeded in making entry into American government, now the target is American education. Why should we focus on the specifics of this minority culture group, as homosexuals like to position themselves? The reason is clear: to discover the values that are being instilled in America’s children. Homosexuals, who claim to have solid research behind the physiological legitimacy of their lifestyle, have succeeded in claiming minority group status in the minds of many. Yet abundant studies exist regarding the questions of the numbers of homosexuals (the famed Kinsey report estimated 10%, a number widely dismissed today, with more realistic estimates varying between 1% and 4%) (Gebhart, 1972; Guerra, 2002; Painter, 1993; Smith, 1998). There is also much debate about whether homosexuality is determined in one’s biological nature or is simply a mode of behavior (Byne & Parsons, 1993; Epstein, 2003; Murray, 2001; NARTH, 2002;
Throckmorton, 2002). Even Kirk and Madsen (1989), the pioneers of homosexual activist strategies, admitted as much: “We argue that, for all practical purposes, gays should be considered to have been born gay [for political expediency], even though sexual orientation, for most humans, seems to be the product of a complex interaction between innate predispositions and environmental factors during childhood and early adolescence” (p. 184).

In addition, despite claims by the homosexual lobby that sexual orientation is immutable, there is a significant body of research to the contrary (Byrd & Olsen, 2002; Epstein, 2003; Rosik, 2003; Yarhouse & Throckmorton, 2002). This research is not publicized widely, due to the current environment regarding speech codes and political correctness. As one researcher explained,

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Unfortunately, many therapists and the general public have been misled to believe that homosexuality is not changeable. Evidence suggests that this perception is heavily influenced by political decisions, not by true scientific research, and that this political pressure is still present today. (Byrd & Olsen, 2002, p. 554)
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Sidestepping the debate, homosexuals have positioned themselves as a celebrated part of the multiculturalist lobby and are seeking to secure full legal and social acceptance in the name of diversity. This is nowhere more evident than in the public schools.

Can there be doubt as to the significance of this particular point of conflict over values in the public schools and its effect on our future? Homosexual activists seek to have gay themes integrated into the curriculum under the banner of insuring school safety through appreciation of sexual diversity. This is based on a claim that gay and lesbian youth are subjected to more violence and harassment than the average student, yet some studies show that homosexuals are at greater risk from other homosexuals than from heterosexuals (Reisman, 2002). The movement for sexual diversity has the backing of powerful forces in the educational arena such as The National Association of School Psychologists, the American Psychological Association, and the
National Education Association, among others. In presenting themselves as an oppressed minority, homosexual activists have sought to follow the example of the civil rights movement that began fifty years ago. However, there is a significant difference: “ethnicity is [purely] genetic, homosexuality is not (Carpenter, 2002, para. 71), a difference found in a significant body of research (Bailey & Pillard, 1995; Mann, 1994; Satinover, 1996; Whitehead & Whitehead, 1999). One might differ slightly here in saying that both ethnicity and homosexuality have genetic as well as sociological causation, a point Carpenter made later, thus the insertion of [purely]. He continued, arguing that “to teach homosexuality in the same vein as civil rights erroneously perpetuates the genetic idea of homosexuality” (Carpenter, 2002, para. 72). Some researchers have even seen genetic influence as having no more than a ten percent influence on sexual orientation (Whitehead & Whitehead, 1999), yet many educators with multiculturalist perspectives have disregarded these studies and continued to inculcate students with the values of sexual diversity as determined by biology. However, if secondary schools went beyond genetic factors and “discuss the realities contributing to someone's homosexuality, namely psycho-sociological factors” (Carpenter, 2002, para. 72), a spirit of tolerance could be created. By taking this measure, “students could come to understand homosexuals do not choose their sexuality as they choose what to eat for breakfast. If students understand the severe conditions contributing to homosexuality, some will see the need for compassion and tolerance” (Carpenter, 2002, para. 72). However, the Lesbigay agenda is not about compassion and tolerance, but about full social acceptance, something that is not likely to happen as long as a majority of Americans see themselves more as traditionalists than as multiculturalists. However, it would certainly be a tenet of traditionalist thinking to insure safe schools and the just treatment of all people.
This is not to say that all teasing, bullying, and harassment can be eliminated entirely. Most students face some form of harassment at some point in time. An American Association of University Women (AAUW) study (2001) found that eighty-three percent of all girls and seventy-nine percent of all boys report having ever experienced harassment. What is needed is a reduction of all harassment, not providing special protection for a few. AAUW Executive Director, Jacqueline Woods, made it clear that this is not an issue for any particular group: “Sexual harassment is part of everyday life for boys and girls at school” (AAUW, 2001, para. 3). Furthermore, she argued that “parents, teachers, and administrators need to do a better job educating children on what is and what isn't appropriate” (AAUW, 2001, para. 3). While multiculturalists want safe schools programs to designate ethnic and sexual orientation minorities as groups in need of special protection, traditionalists believe that all students should be kept safe from harassment and that diversity training regarding sexual orientation will not help bring that about, rather, they believe teaching values will. As Carpenter explicated, “To teach explicitly the differences among students and the factors contributing to those differences carries the potential to separate rather than integrate, as does emphasizing differences in any domain” (Carpenter, 2002, para. 73). Instead, traditionalists would seek to create a safe environment through “a standard of civil behavior” that applies to all equally (Carpenter, 2002, para. 73). Thus the emphasis is on teaching students that “all persons are deserving of respect due to our common humanity” (Carpenter, 2002, para. 73). Carpenter continued, “Students should be taught to recognize that at our essence we differ not. With young children, this lesson can be as simple as the Golden Rule, while older children hold the capacity of discussing it philosophically and sociologically” (Carpenter, 2002, para. 73). Interestingly, the 1999 Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll of the Public’s Attitude Toward the Public Schools (see Appendix E) found that 86% of
those surveyed wanted The Golden Rule taught to children in their public school (Rose & Gallup, 1999). However, teaching students to treat others with kindness is not sufficient in the minds of the multiculturalist lobby as relates to sexuality. Rather, nothing less than a dismantling of cultural hegemony will be acceptable, an event that traditionalists do not want to have happen.

Anti-discrimination codes prohibit discrimination on the grounds of race, creed, religion, gender, and national origin, but during the 1990’s, alternative lifestyle advocates made sexual orientation an issue of debate, claiming minority status and seeking union with the multiculturalist lobby. This effort has found its way into the public schools. The Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Education Network (GLSEN), which claimed to be “the largest national network of parents, students, educators and others ending discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity/expression in K-12 schools” (Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Education Network [GLSEN], 2000), stated that their mission is “to assure that each member of every school community is valued and respected regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity/expression” (GLSEN, 2000, para. 2). This includes students, staff, and parents who consider themselves gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender (GLSEN, 2000). Again, we see the reason to address the place of homosexuality in the schools: this self-described culture group is seeking to inculcate their values in American public schools. GLSEN is a welcome partner for the NEA and the State of Massachusetts Department of Education, among others, and is seen as a valuable resource by some educators and policy makers in addressing sexuality issues in schools. Other organizations seeking to reform public schools regarding sexuality include PERSON (Public Education Regarding Sexual Orientation Nationally), PFLAG (Parents, Families, and Friends of Lesbians and Gays), and (NEA/GLC) the National Education Association Gay and Lesbian Caucus, among others.
In 2001, the Connecticut State Department of Education’s Bureau of Special Education and Pupil Services office compiled a list of resources entitled *Gays, Lesbians, and Bisexuals*. It is of note here that out of 141 suggested books, articles, and guides, not one seems to be a counter to full acceptance of sexual orientation as identity and the gay and lesbian agenda as appropriate for all students from K-12 (Krasner, 2001). Indeed, those who have a different view are often excluded from the discussion. In 1996, the *Harvard Educational Review* published a special issue entitled *Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender People and Education*. Included in the publication was an interview with Cornell West, professor of African-American studies and philosophy of religion at Harvard University. West, a noted writer and lecturer on race issues, has taken the position that heterosexism is comparable to racism and characterized American capitalism as oppressive, preferring a form of democratic socialism that would grant equality to all people (Eisen & Kenyatta, 1996). All of these organizations provide materials for schools, teachers, and students regarding ways to support the lesbian, bisexual, gay agenda in education. Many publications focus on sexual harassment issues and relate ways to reduce violence against students and staff. Certainly, there is a need to reduce violence in schools and create a positive and safe environment for all students, teachers, and parents. But it seems that the push for sexual freedom goes beyond these issues.

In an article from *The Education Digest*, condensed from *Young Children*, Betsy J. Cahill and Rachel Theilheimer, who were, at the time, assistant professors of early childhood education at New Mexico State University and who both have an expressed interest in gay and lesbian issues, gave advice to teachers of young children, pre-K and up, regarding sexual orientation. The article begins with the story of a teacher who does not know how to answer the question supposedly asked by a five year old: “Can Tommy and Sam get married?” (Cahill &
Theilheimer, 1999, p. 50). The story (the authors did not say whether it actually occurred) continues with the teacher deciding that the best person to go to for help on answering this is not the parents, who have a legal right to make decisions regarding the sexualization of their children, but rather a “lesbian colleague” (Cahill & Theilheimer, 1999, p. 50). The next step was to find resources such as might be provided by homosexual activist organizations, “such as a chapter of Parents, Family, and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG)” (Cahill & Theilheimer, 1999, p. 51). These organizations could provide resources that include “practical articles [to] inform teachers about talking to children about sexuality, including gay and lesbian family members in programs, and how a child develops a homosexual orientation” (Cahill & Theilheimer, 1999, p. 52). Fundamental and irreconcilable differences exist between the multiculturalist and traditionalist perspectives on these matters. The multiculturalist paradigm, particularly with respect to sexuality follows a relativist mentality, granting full acceptance to all manner of sexual identity, whereas the traditionalists embrace specific moral absolutes that apply to all people. Traditionalism would see sexuality as something that should be addressed by parents, when they believe that it is the right time to address it, sometime near puberty, although basic differences between males and females would be made clear at an earlier age. Cahill and Theilheimer (1999) dismissed this perspective by saying, “Although parents should know about their child's questions [regarding sexuality] and how a teacher handled them, responsibility for answering remains with the teacher,” adding that the parent and teacher could “negotiate” what might be said in such a discussion, ignoring legal and moral traditions of parental rights (p. 54). Apparently, the teacher should be guided as follows: “In their constructions of gender roles, adults often assume boys are masculine; girls, feminine. A gender role has many components, including activity choice, interests, skills, dress, and sexual partner” (p. 53). They went on to
encourage teachers to help five to eight year old children to pursue their own construction of reality regarding sexuality regardless of their “traditional gender designations” or parental wishes. The authors also advised teachers to “learn more about children's developing sexuality in general and the particular child's situation” so as to guide them in this process (p. 55). Yet they openly stated, “Human sexuality has received almost no attention in child development literature because, prior to puberty, the constructs of sexual attraction and choice of sexual partner cannot be studied” (p. 55). If this is true, then what is to be gained from this foray into children’s values regarding sexuality? It is also quite disturbing that these experts in elementary education continue by referring to research, without giving any citations. They did admit in considering said research that “there are no consistent findings on how a child develops sexual orientation” (p. 54). Perhaps, one might consider a traditionalist approach, in which gender could be construed from an ultrasound about 16-20 weeks after conception. These values educators continue with another classroom story (again, no mention of real or hypothetical or of how the teacher was able to keep their job once the news got out), where the teacher prompted a student-led class discussion by asking the five and six year olds, “Can a man marry a man?” Their description of the event is most enlightening:

The discussion, with very little teacher intervention, touched on marriage versus living together, marriage rituals such as weddings and accompanying conventions, parenting and children, adoption, laws in the U.S. and elsewhere, love, and divorce. Children asked each other to define terms. Here the teacher raised an issue to all the children, including those not bringing it up. More views led to a richer discussion. (p. 55)

While reasonable people might disagree about the place of sexuality education in schools, it is hard to imagine five year olds having such a deep, complex discussion.

For the past fifteen years, the homosexual lobby has actively sought to convert Americans to their way of thinking. In 1989, Kirk and Madsen pioneered a three part strategy:
desensitization, jamming, and conversion in *After the ball, How America will conquer its fear and hatred of gays in the ‘90s*. Activists were first encouraged to desensitize Americans through repetitive marketing of the message that homosexuality is normal, so that they would see it as “just another thing–meriting no more than a shrug of the shoulders–then your battle for legal and social rights is virtually won” (p. 177). Second, jamming was the process of making the public feel guilty for bigotry or hatred, silencing any opposition; “our effect is achieved without reference to facts, logic, or proof” (p. 151), whereas “propagandistic advertisement can depict homophobic and homo-hating bigots as crude loudmouths” (p. 153). In the end, conversion is the goal, meaning “conversion of the average American's emotions, mind, and will, through a planned psychological attack, in the form of propaganda fed to the nation via the media” (p. 154). The authors admitted that there is no need for honesty in this message, so long as the end is secured: “But it makes no difference that the ads are lies; not to us, because we’re using them to ethically good effect” (p. 155). It seems, based on recent history, that they have partially succeeded in converting Americans, such as six of those sitting on the U.S. Supreme Court (*Lawrence et al. v. Texas*, 2003), but not enough to gain full acceptance by the majority of voters. In fact, they have perhaps stirred the hornet’s nest, with both state and federal governments considering constitutional amendments regarding marriage. Since they are having limited success convincing the adult population of the justice of their cause (*Quinnapiac*, 2003; *Saad*, 2003), homosexual activists are seeking to change society by changing the values of the children. As mentioned previously, this often comes as part of a safe schools campaign or to increase tolerance and diversity in schools.

Much of the research on gay and lesbian issues in schools seems to revolve around the responsibility of school districts to be proactive in protecting gay and lesbian students from
harassment or violence. State and Federal statutes, as well as a number of court cases, protect all students, and adults for that matter, from violence and abuse. This is what is behind many of the campaigns for tolerance and acceptance of others, as kind of a reaction to a history of violence toward immigrants, minorities, or those somehow different. As far as decisions and guidelines regarding the appropriateness of a topic such as sexual orientation in policy and curriculum, the local school boards are given control, so as to best reflect the interests and opinions of the communities that they serve (Jones, 2000; Simpson, 2003). Title IX, the 14th amendment, and equal access are used as basis for lawsuits against school districts. A number of court cases demonstrate the necessity for schools to protect all students. From what is considered a landmark case for protection of gays in schools, Nabozny v. Podlesny, to Aurelia Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education in 1999, courts have held schools districts “liable if school employees are deliberately indifferent to complaints of peer-to-peer sexual harassment. The victim in Davis was a girl and the harassers were boys, but school attorneys say the same standards would apply in same-sex harassment cases” (Jones, 2000, para. 8). Other research exists regarding sexual harassment in schools as relates to values inculcation that I will leave for examination in a future study. Suffice it to say that violence has always been a problem in society and that which occurs in schools is, as always, a reflection of larger societal trends.

So is it truly just about creating a safe environment for students and staff? Perhaps if we examine the ways the values of GLSEN and others are worked into the curriculum, we might be able to discern the agenda. What types of activities does GLSEN recommend for K-12 schools and what values are being inculcated during these activities? One guidebook published by the Network, authored by a California independent school administrator, suggested that schools and districts should have sensitivity workshops, such as are required in Massachusetts, that would
include sessions on “sexuality in general and its many components (sexual behavior, biological
gender, gender identity, gender roles, affectional orientation, erotic orientation, and cultural
aspects of sexuality)” (Riddle, 2003, p. 11). The guidebook went on to cite recommendations for
available workshop and classroom materials for use with faculty, parents, and students, including
elementary students; however, the author regretted that “unfortunately, elementary librarians
must use caution in choosing these books” (Riddle, 2003, p. 19). Some of these materials are
available from organizations such as the NEA, Planned Parenthood, ASCD, and of course,
GLSEN. Included are curriculum units available for use in a variety of subjects and grade levels.
It might serve well to cite some examples of the materials recommended by GLSEN and used in
American classrooms. These materials and books follow a number of themes apparently
supported by GLSEN. These values, such as the early sexualization of children, the right of
sexual freedom at any age, and adult encouragement of sexual experimentation among children
are consistent themes found in GLSEN recommended materials. In one book that is
recommended for seventh graders, Growing Up Gay/ Growing Up Lesbian, among other related
stories, there is a graphic description of homosexual acts between two ten year old boys (Singer,
1994). In a story entitled “The Cure for Curtis” found in Love & Sex: Ten Stories of Truth, one
finds graphic representations of homosexual and heterosexual pornography, sexual fantasy, and
sexual acts (Cart, 2001). Yet another book details a group sex encounter between a teenage girl
and two homosexual men, out of which comes a pregnancy (Block, 1998). Again, GLSEN’s
website recommends these books for seventh graders.

It seems as if the messages relate more to sexuality than to creating safe schools, but let’s
look at some other curriculum items used in schools. In Ohio, one teacher encouraged ninth
grade students “to read Entries From a Hot Pink Notebook, a teen coming-out story that includes
a graphic depiction of sex between two 14-year-old boys” (King, 2003, para. 19). Also, in the town of Newton, Massachusetts, another public school teacher assigned tenth graders *The Perks of Being a Wallflower,* “a farrago of sexual confusion, featuring an episode of bestiality as one of its highlights” (King, 2003, para. 19). GLSEN has recommended that teachers, counselors, and other youth workers encourage students to pursue their homosexual desires, without, of course, any parental notification. In *Free Your Mind: The Book for Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Youth and Their Allies,* one fourteen year old student told of a “really cool” social worker who “opened the door” for her to get involved in gay and lesbian activities (Bass & Kaufman, 1996, p. 35), while in *One Teacher In Ten: Gay and Lesbian Educators Tell Their Stories,* a Gay, HIV-positive teacher, Gary Dowd told how he mentored one of his students, taking him out to “dinner at a nice, gay cafe. We made quite an entrance with Danny looking all of fifteen and I looking all of thirty-one” (Jennings, 1994, p. 67). Other books supply educators with stories of homosexual families and children’s sexual encounters, as is the case in *Queering Elementary Education,* where a mother describes her daughter’s masturbation and a party where they were both attracted to the same twelve year old girl (Letts & Sears, 1999).

As far as activities other than resources, GLSEN also sponsors an annual day of silence to protest harassment and discrimination toward homosexuals. This event has been taken into the classroom, a measure that has not played well with many parents and legal groups. Pro-Family Law Center (PFLC) president Scott Lively warned California superintendents that allowing a group to present its political agenda during class time obligates schools to allow all groups in, taking away from the purpose of schooling. Lively warned of potential legal troubles ahead if school systems allowed this sort of political action:

When political demonstrations enter the classroom, with the endorsement of the school, they have crossed the line, and they are essentially taking advantage of a captive audience
of students to force a political message upon kids who don't have any choice but to be there. It's wrong, it's illegal, and schools that allow it to happen are setting themselves up for litigation. (Bluey, 2003, para. 14)

PFLC’s response to GLSEN’s foray into the classroom is only part of a larger movement by parents and conservative activists who do not agree with the homosexual agenda for values education in schools. Another conservative legal organization, the United States Justice Foundation (USJF), is also standing against the agenda of GLSEN and other homosexual advocacy groups that seek to create the curriculum for schools regarding sexuality, warning of legal liability. USJF attorney Richard Ackerman opined,

Call it what you will: “diversity,” “multiculturalism,” “safe-schools,” any effort to manipulate the minds of children to make them pro-gay is actionable and frankly legally foolish. We want to help school officials understand that protecting kids from homosexuality will also protect schools from lawsuits (NARTH, 2003, para. 6).

In California, much like Massachusetts, known for supporting the multicultural and homosexual agenda, the legislature proposed several laws in 1999 and 2000, making sexual orientation the equivalent of race or gender as relates to discrimination and violence in schools. In addition, laws were proposed and money allocated to engage outside speakers from the homosexual community and sponsor “field trips” to educate students in sensitivity so as to overcome intolerance of those with different sexual orientations (Foster, 2000, para. 10). Yet this instruction cannot be required and must be subject to parental discretion. According to the California code 51240 regarding education,

Whenever any part of the instruction in health, family life education, and sex education conflicts with the religious training and beliefs of the parent or guardian of any pupil, the pupil, on written request of the parent or guardian, shall be excused from the part of the training which conflicts with such religious training and beliefs. As used in this section, “religious training and beliefs” includes personal moral convictions. (CA 51240, para. 1)

In addition, California law does not allow any student to be tested regarding these values, without parental permission (CA 51240). To insure their parental rights in this matter, many
California parents are participating in the California Student Exemption Project, which created a legal document to inform schools of parental wishes to filter sexual content for their children (LLDF, 2001). Schools have not uniformly obeyed California law or parental wishes. A lawsuit was filed by the Pacific Justice Institute, representing parents in Novato, California, against the Novato Unified School District, “for authorizing pro-homosexual assemblies without any prior notice or parental consent. The suit alleges the parents' fundamental constitutional and civil rights to direct the upbringing of their children and the free exercise of religion were violated” (Lynne, 2002, para. 2). The courts seem to be the ongoing venue for deciding the question of what may be taught in values education.

Prior to the changes in California law that led to increased homosexual education in K-12 schooling, steps had been taken to gain entry into the classroom. In 1996, a San Francisco-based multiculturalist activist group called Women’s Educational Media (WEM) released a film entitled *It’s Elementary: Talking about Gay Issues in Schools*, designed for teaching adults to address homosexuality in the first through eighth grades. According to WEM, the film was shown on over 100 public television stations, “has been acquired by nearly 2000 educational institutions, and has received widespread acclaim from educators, policy makers, parents and religious leaders” (Women’s Educational Media [WEM], 2003a, para. 3). In their film, which apparently was made in actual elementary classrooms, methods on inculcating the values of the homosexual lobby are demonstrated for teacher use, as described on their website. In one classroom, presumably first or second grade, the children present with pride, *Everybody Is Equal*. This is described as a booklet the children created, leading to what they say is a “rich discussion about a gay rights march,” Nazis, and being teased for differences, all in a first or second grade classroom (WEM, 2003b, para. 6). As we have already seen from legitimate
polling, most Americans object to having their seven year olds being taught sexuality of any sort, yet the film goes on to give an example of what is supposedly an actual parent, explaining “why she opposes schools asking parents’ permission to discuss these issues” (WEM, 2003b, para. 6).

Of course, in American schools, any attempt to inculcate values is subject to parental oversight, a right that is protected by the laws of most states as well as federal law, a concept that is apparently not clear to the producers of the film. In addition to state laws prohibiting schools from skirting parental rights, Title Twenty of the United States Code (USC), section 1232h, states,

> All instructional materials, including teacher's manuals, films, tapes, or other supplementary material which will be used in connection with any survey, analysis, or evaluation as part of any applicable program shall be available for inspection by the parents or guardians of the children. (USC 20:1232h, para. 1)

Furthermore, “no student shall be required, as part of any applicable program, to submit to a survey, analysis, or evaluation that reveals information concerning . . . [among other things,] sex behavior and attitudes” (USC 20:1232h, para. 1). There are numerous other specific examples of resources that are available and often used to inculcate the values of those supporting comprehensive sexuality education, as well as parental efforts to resist such inculcation. As previously mentioned, this study is confined to providing an overview of values education in the United States. Later research might well discover the extent of the use of these materials.

There is one more aspect to the sexuality issue that needs to be addressed. Recently, Senator Rick Santorum came under fire from multiculturalists nationwide for his assertion that the U.S. Supreme Court was going to set a bad precedent if they overturned a Texas law against homosexual activity. Santorum, who has a history of inclusion toward those in the gay community, was simply stating an obvious principle that can be seen throughout American history. As a nation, we have made a steady movement toward openness, allowing more people
to have access to social, legal, and economic opportunities. A classic example is that of the franchise: where originally, only white male property owners, age twenty-one or older, were allowed to vote. As time, and America’s wisdom, progressed, each of those restrictions was dropped such that all citizens who have reached age eighteen may now cast their ballot. In his comments, Santorum was making people aware of a simple principle. If the Court ruled that the government cannot limit moral behavior at one level, then it would not be able to limit it at the next level. The next level is exactly where certain members of the multiculturalist community are going in American public schools.

“Intergenerational Intimacy”

While it seems that an emphasis on the reduction of violence and the creation of a nurturing environment for children is a common value throughout the nation, not everyone agrees with the legitimacy of the homosexual agenda in accomplishing this in values education. One opponent, retired Illinois sociology professor, Albert Schmidt questioned the legitimacy of what gay and lesbian advocates embrace as facts: “University administrators and professors, who repeatedly tell taxpayers that universities are research institutions, should give more honor to research by examining what scientific medical studies have revealed about homosexual behavior” (Schmidt, 1997, p. 74). He referred to research that calls homosexual behavior “so unnatural that heterosexuals often find it hard to believe” (Schmidt, 1997, p. 75). Studies throughout the past thirty years indicate a significant number of homosexuals have been and continue to be engaged in rampant promiscuity and bizarre forms of sex, including that which would be deemed extremely vile by many people (Jay & Young, 1979; King, 2003; Marshall, 1991; Melanokos, 2002; Satinover, 1996; Xiridou, Geskus, de Wit, Coutinho, & Kretzschmar, 2003). These studies have shown up in respected journals such as The Lancet and can even be
found in *The Kinsey Report*, which as mentioned previously, was engineered to normalize homosexuality, among other sexual behaviors. Included in this behavior is the practice of engaging children in their sexual activities. While not generally accepted as being linked by many mainstream psychologists (Groth & Birnbaum, 1978; McConaghy, 1998), there is also a body of research that has found links between homosexuality and child molestation (clinically known as pedophilia) (Cameron, Cameron, & Procter, 1989; Erickson, Walbek, & Seely, 1988; Freund & Watson, 1992; Gebhart & Johnson, 1979; Graupner, 1999; Klassen, Williams, & Levitt, 1989; United States Department of Justice, 2001). David Thorstad, homosexual activist and founding member of the *North American Man Boy Love Association* (NAMBLA) stated that even though man/boy love “represents a minority within the gay subculture, it is far from unusual” (Thorstad, 1990, p. 253). Others support his opinion with similar ideas (Califia, 1980; Jones, 1990). Schmidt (1997) referred to Thorstad’s support of his claim by citing a study showing that “25 percent of white homosexual males and 14 percent of black homosexual men had sex with boys 16 years or younger” (p. 76). Schmidt also referred to another study that revealed that “23 percent of a sample of 4,329 male homosexuals had sex with boys under 16 years of age” (p. 76). In 1990, the *Journal of Homosexuality* devoted an entire issue to man/boy homosexuality, without a single article presenting a contrary view. One essay even doubted the idea that sexual contact between a child and an adult is harmful or traumatic. In addition, child sexual abuse and pedophilia were contrasted, implying that pedophilia was not improper (Jones, 1990; Schmidt, 1997). As is typical of those who seek to downplay the significance of cultural change, proponents of adult-child sexual relations have devised new terminology, previously turning *child molestation* into *pedophilia*, and now into *intergenerational intimacy*. As one
supporter opined, “I fail to see what is wrong with erotic fondling with any age” (Paglia, 1995, para. 48).

There is a division within the gay and lesbian community over pedophilia. While most would scorn the idea of child-adult relations, there is an ever-increasing movement afoot (Graupner, 1999). Representing this growing sub-culture, one activist opined, “It strikes me that there is a contradiction in supporting children's liberation while maintaining paternalistic age of consent laws and stigmatizing adults who have erotic relations with young people” (Blasius, 2003, para. 12). Another, Patrick Califia-Rice, the writer formerly known as Pat Califia, a self-proclaimed sex educator identifying as a bisexual transgendered person, argued that “boy-lovers and the lesbians who have young lovers are the only people offering a hand to help young women and men cross the difficult terrain between straight society and the gay community. They are not child molesters” (Califia, 1980, para. 1). This pedophilia activist had more to say on this matter: “The child abusers are priests, teachers, therapists, cops and parents who force their stale morality onto the young people in their custody. Instead of condemning pedophiles for their involvement with lesbian and gay youth, we should be supporting them” (Califia, 1980, para. 1). This sort of thinking is not a recent phenomenon, considering the graphic studies authored by Kinsey in 1948. In describing sexual experimentation with children, the Kinsey team revealed the depth of their research by listing children’s reactions: (a) “extreme tension with violent convulsion”; (b) “violent cries, sometimes with an abundance of tears (especially among younger children)”; (c) “extreme trembling, collapse, loss of color, and sometimes fainting of subject”; (d) “will fight away from the partner” (Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948, p. 161). Despite the details in the report, and information subsequently revealed by former team members, The Kinsey Institute officially denied any sexual experiments were done on children, a denial the
Kinsey Report overrides. Muir and Court (1992) laments, “This is the only example in Western scientific literature where data from the sexual abuse of infants and children are used to substantiate currently taught theories of human development - in this case normal sexual development” (para. 2). Again, the relevance of such studies to this topic is that they are supportive of some types of values education.

More recent studies, including one by Timothy Dailey, senior fellow for culture studies at the conservative Family Research Council, have pointed out that NAMBLA was admitted as a member in New York's council of Lesbian and Gay Organizations and the International Gay Association by 1985 and has wide acceptance in the gay community at large (Dailey, 2002). Not everyone agrees with the tie-in as many mainstream research groups reject Dailey’s findings. Some, however, do “view pedophilia in value-neutral terms” (Schuster, 2002, para. 6). The American Psychiatric Association removed pedophilia from its list of sexual perversions in 1994, while in 1999, the American Psychological Association (APA) published a report, *A Meta-Analytic Examination of Assumed Properties of Child Sexual Abuse Using College Samples*, which “claimed child sexual abuse could be harmless and beneficial” as reported in a “1999 World Net Daily column by noted researcher Dr. Judith Reisman” (Schuster, 2002, para. 6). One of the authors of the study, Robert Bauserman, had even published an article in *Paidika: The Journal of Pedophilia*, “a publication advocating the legalization of sex with ‘willing’ children” entitled “*Man-Boy Sexual Relationships in a Cross-Cultural Perspective*” (Congressional Record, 1999, p. 5341). Needless to say, the release of the APA report caused an immediate outrage in the U.S. Congress. Both Congress and the Supreme Court have gone on record for moral absolutes, standing against pedophilia. The Court had previously stated that “sexually exploited children are unable to develop healthy affectionate relationships in later life, have
sexual dysfunctions, and have a tendency to become sexual abusers as adults” (New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 1982, footnote 9). Congress responded to the 1999 APA report with a House resolution, the Senate concurring, denouncing the report and stating that “sexual relations between children and adults are abusive, exploitive, and reprehensible, and should never be considered or labeled as harmless or acceptable” and condemning any attempt to use the study to further the agenda of pedophiles (Congressional Record, 1999, p. 5341).

It is of note that following the backlash caused by the release of the report, the APA admitted its error and made a strong absolutist statement against what many saw as a flawed study, saying: “it is the position of APA that child sexual abuse is never trivial, never justifiable, and always wrong” (APA Online, 1999, para. 3). One has to wonder why they published such a questionable study in the first place. Nevertheless, they quickly began seeking research to counter the study and totally separated themselves from anyone that would seek to validate a pedophilia position by it. In their response to the study, they stated, “certain pro-pedophilia organizations have referred to the Rind et al. article as providing support for pedophilia” (APA Online, 1999, para. 5). The APA went on to state their position as follows in the APA Resolution Opposing Child Sexual Abuse: “The American Psychological Association repudiates and disassociates itself from any organization or publication that advocates sexual interaction between children and adults” (APA Online, 1999, para. 5). Furthermore, they had their lawyers send a letter “rejecting the use of this article and forbidding the use of our name in justifying their reprehensible position” (APA Online, 1999, para. 5). Unfortunately, there are still a number of psychologists and psychiatrists who advocate normalizing pedophilia and other aberrant sexual behaviors. This was a topic of discussion at the recent American Psychiatric Association
convention in San Francisco. In words attributed to an imminent psychiatrist, “Any sexual interest can be healthy and life-enhancing” (Nicolosi, 2003, para. 9).

Parents have been successful to some extent in shielding their children from forced inculcation in the K-12 arena. However, at the university level, students or faculty who embrace traditional values, wherein homosexuality is seen as an errant lifestyle, are particularly vulnerable to attack by those who seek to enforce what is considered politically correct speech and thought. University of Pennsylvania history professor, Alan Charles Kors (1998), coauthor of The Shadow University: The Betrayal of Liberty on America's Campuses, lamented the decline of academic freedom, saying that “A nation that does not educate in freedom will not survive in freedom and will not even know when it has lost it” (Kors, 1998, para. 3). Apparently, even mentioning the phenomenon of political correctness on campus is a risk; Kors revealed in a 1998 lecture that, according to an American Association of University Professors report, “claims of political correctness were merely smokescreens to hide the true agenda of such critics: a racist and sexist desire to thwart the aspirations of minorities and women in the academic enterprise” (Kors, 1998, para. 2). Kors gave an example of the enforcement of speech codes on campus: a student at Sarah Lawrence College, who had laughed at something said by another student, was “ordered as a condition of remaining at the college, to read a book entitled Homophobia on Campus and to see a movie and write a paper about homophobia” (Kors, 1998, para. 2). It seems that in the name of diversity, some on both the high school and university campuses would seek to control freedom of speech, thought, and expression, long tenets of liberal educational policy. Commenting on the tendency toward thought control in academia, one student opined, “While
universities boast diversity in superficial areas like skin color, they demand a homogenous culture in ideology” (Khalsa, 2003, para. 19).

If recent polls and the 2000 Presidential election have told us anything, it’s that America is fairly evenly divided between liberal and conservative in general, although this might have shifted toward the right somewhat since September 11, 2001. Nonetheless, Americans have a wide range of opinion regarding these controversial issues and this becomes abundantly clear as we focus on values inculcation in schools. While believing themselves to epitomize tolerance, many scholars on the left show no willingness for dialogue with their philosophical opponents. Even using the word *homophobia* puts forth a definable philosophical position and marginalizes those who see the homosexual agenda as problematic. Some conservatives might even define the use of that term as *hate speech*. While there are attempts to bring representative diversity to numerous aspects of American society, such that all sides might be given fair hearing, there seems to be a dearth of conservative thought in many university faculties. Christina Hoff Sommers (2002), formerly of Clark University, and now a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy research, wrote of the need for balance on campus: “conservative scholars have effectively been marginalized, silenced, and rendered invisible on most campuses.” Furthermore, many “students can now go through four years of college without encountering a scholar of pronounced conservative views” (para. 5). It seems, if polling figures taken in recent years are representative, an overwhelming majority of university professors are of a liberal persuasion. According to Sommers’s research, a 1998 poll of social science and humanities professors at the University of Colorado found 184 of 190 of those with party affiliation to be Democrats. Other surveys taken at Cornell, Dartmouth, and Stanford had similar results (Sommers, 2002). This pattern has been confirmed by sixties liberal turned conservative,
David Horowitz (2003) commented about his speaking engagements around the nation. He mentioned that Tulane Law School has “not a single Republican or conservative faculty member” and that Duquesne Law School has just one (para. 3). “The students I met at the University of Michigan could not identify a single conservative on their faculty, although they could name several Marxists,” while Bowling Green’s conservative professors “were isolated in a research center that has no teaching responsibilities” (para. 3). Furthermore, out of fifteen political science professors at the University of Richmond, “a private school with a decidedly conservative student body, . . . [there is only] one Republican” (para. 3).

This is important to consider for the purposes of this study since universities are the training ground for K-12 teachers and the birthplace of much policy, curriculum and pedagogy for K-12 schools. As Sommers pointed out, a number of prominent liberals are even calling for an end to the systematic exclusion of conservatives on campus. Democrats Richard Redding, a professor of psychology at Villanova University, and the longtime liberal law professor Alan Dershowitz have called for the end of the censorship. Redding’s question is insightful:

Do we want a professional world where our liberal worldview prevents us from considering valuable strengths of conservative approaches to social problems . . . where conservatives are reluctant to enter the profession and we tacitly discriminate against them if they do? That, in fact, is the academic world we now have. (Sommers, 2002, para. 10)

Sommers lamented the death of true liberal thought: “The classical liberalism articulated by John Stuart Mill in his book On Liberty is no longer alive on campuses” (para. 12). She claimed that true liberalism has “died of the very disease Mr. Mill warned of when he pointed out that ideas not freely and openly debated become dead dogmas” (para. 12). It seems that Mill wanted the “intellectually free person” to sit in the “mental position of those who think differently” and that
“dissident ideas are best understood [if one hears] them from persons who actually believe them” (para. 12).

As Dinesh D’Souza pointed out, many advocates of multiculturalism in American schools and colleges represent their agenda as “nothing more than a program for teaching young people about other cultures” (Schmidt, 1997, p. ix). Where would the controversy be in simply broadening knowledge? Would anyone seriously protest “undergraduates going beyond Plato and Shakespeare and energetically grappling with the *Analects* of Confucius, the *Muquaddimah* of Ibn Khaldun, and Rabindranath Tagore *Gitanjali*?” (Schmidt, 1997, p. ix). D’Souza argued that the controversy in multiculturalism, “as an educational program and . . . basis for identity,” is in its establishment of “a specific paradigm for understanding . . . cultures”; likewise, it proposes “an ideological lens for interpreting conflicts about race, gender, and sexual orientation in the United States” (Schmidt, 1997, p. ix). Thus, the multicultural debate is about defining our understanding of ourselves and of the world.

One final point here is that multiculturalists use of the word *multicultural*, leaves unclear what is meant by *culture*. One cannot ignore existing definitions of culture, as used by anthropologists and sociologists, that is, “a society's established and institutionalized values, beliefs, knowledge, and practices that are learned through human interaction.” By this definition, a culture belongs to a society or a nation, within given geographic boundaries. However, we have seen multiculturalists define culture as “almost any group that has some behavioral variations from that of another.” In this sense, the culture of minority groups appear to be “entities separate from their country's culture at large, when in fact they are only sub-cultural groups,” and therefore do not fit the traditional definition of culture (Schmidt, 1997, p. 15). Of course,
multiculturalists are not daunted by this fact. Under their philosophy, which I shall next address, they can simply redefine the meaning of the word.

Philosophical Background of Multiculturalism

Philosophy is a search for wisdom that relies upon reasoning. Western philosophical foundations, once respected, have come under criticism, being seen as subjective and illogical, and certainly not useful in providing a basis for educational practice. By their very nature, foundational principles would be both objective and absolute. Even if many of those foundational philosophers who expressed interest in education have had varying visions for these principles, they generally followed the same practices of reasoning, building upon the work of others in laying their own particular foundational layer. During the past century, philosophers have attacked the idea of foundational principles as being illogical, characterizing them as guilty of circular reasoning and arbitrariness, and immoral, due to its elitist and undemocratic nature (Heslep, 2002). What are the philosophies that are supportive of multiculturalism? How do those philosophies differ from those supporting traditionalism? What are the philosophies behind the values being inculcated in American schools? In a nation as free and diverse as the United States, trying to fully comprehend the variety of philosophical positions of the various participants upon the educational stage is not unlike trying to find the proverbial needle in a haystack: it would be very easy to get stuck. Nevertheless, I will proceed with a consideration of the myriad philosophies behind the different voices in values education, beginning with the philosophies supporting multiculturalism.

As stated previously, for the purposes of this study, multicultural education (embracing traditional cultural pluralism or reasonable pluralism) is a radically different concept than multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is distinguishable from multicultural or culturally plural
education in that it is an *ideologically driven political agenda* (Schmidt, 1997), opposing the idea of a common culture and rejecting assimilation or integration, claiming an immutability of separate ethic distinctions (Schlesinger, 1998). Al Gore’s classic misinterpretation made the paradigm clear: “We can build a collective civic space large enough for all our separate identities, that we can be e pluribus unum -- out of one, many” (Barone, 2001, para. 2). Values to be inculcated here would include freedom, happiness, peace, diversity, respect, tolerance, unity, openness, global awareness, ecology, and economic and social equality, among others. Cultural relativism is the philosophy behind multiculturalism. *Relativism*, which can be attached to any other concept, can be defined as the theory that conceptions of truth are not absolute but are relative to the persons or groups holding them: “Cultural relativism is the view that each culture has its own worldview and that none of these can be regarded as more or less privileged or ‘authentic’ in its representation of ‘reality’ than another” (Chandler, 1994, para. 3). Most cultural relativists would claim not to be ethical relativists although a thorough examination of their position might prove otherwise: “Cultural relativists tend also to be linguistic relativists, arguing that dominant cultural worldviews are reflected in ontologies which are built into the language of that culture” (Chandler, 1994, para. 3). This relationship to linguistic relativism is a key to understanding cultural relativism. The origin of linguistic, as well as, cultural relativism, can be found in *postmodernism*.

Postmodernism is a rather “slippery term” that practically resists definition, in that it is not a unified movement nor does it present as a unified theory. Even though “highly fragmented,” most postmodernists do share common ground as relates to the idea of *truth* (Chandler, 1994, para. 16). Postmodernism (which could be viewed as reconstituted relativism) rejects modernism (basically 1910-1970) and the idea that there can be truth or that if it exists, it
can be known. In modernism, social scientists and those studying literature, philosophy, etc. rejected metaphysics and religion, embracing the availability of truth and rationalism through reason and the scientific method. The basic idea was to use foundational truth to bring order where there was chaos. John Dewey’s pragmatic paradigm was a product of this school of thought although some of his ideas also fit the postmodernist paradigm (where truth can be found, but only as relative to the situation). Postmodernism (1970s and beyond) rejects the idea that you can know yourself and is preoccupied with gender, race, sexuality, and undermining the current hegemony in favor of the unempowered elements of society. In recent years, some have applied literary methods (the linguistic turn) such as poststructuralism (rejecting the idea of intellectual categories) and deconstruction (rejecting the idea of truth and meaning in texts), seeking to rewrite history, philosophy, science, and religion, so as to destroy existing social hegemony (Bentley, 1999). U.C.L.A. cultural historian, Sol Cohen, a cultural relativist himself, explicated further the linguistic turn from postmodernism that dominates much of multicultural thinking. As Cohen (1999) explained, “there is neither a primary world nor one true representation of the world that becomes the touchstone for the ‘real’ or for the veracity of the diverse kinds of representation of reality” (p. 127). The idea here is that reality is merely constructed by individuals and groups and thus there is no objective truth or absolute. This fits well with the philosophies of moral relativism and multiculturalism, leaving the individual, or cultural group, as the determiner of right and wrong. Cohen credited Jean-François Lyotard's book The Postmodern Condition, first published in 1979, with helping pioneer postmodernism. Quoting Lyotard, Cohen suggested that “postmodernism cannot exist . . . without discovery of the ‘lack of reality of reality,’ together with the invention of other realities” (Cohen 1999, p. 127). Postmodernism also includes elements of antifoundationalism (where truth may sometimes
be taught, but only as it can be proven to be effective in the specific situation), existentialism (either there is no meaning to life or we must define our own because no truth can be found outside of one’s self) and subjectivism (where nothing can be known for certain). Heslep (2002) explained how postmodern scholars rewrote the paradigm of scholarship: “Absolutistic principles often were dismissed as nothing more than culturally relative principles that are imposed, by imperialist domination, upon oppressed groups” (p. 2). In this view, any claim to a standard is seen simply as a culturally constructed viewpoint, in no way superior to any other viewpoint. It follows that any educator who wished to avoid criticisms of being “intellectually oppressive or incompetent” would have to embrace “personal or cultural relativism,” even though these theories would give no guidance in decision-making and increase exponentially the opportunity for conflict (Heslep, 2002, p. 2).

Man as Moral Sovereign

Postmodernism, like all philosophical positions, has roots in previous ways of thinking, which in turn, have roots in philosophies dating back to the beginnings of written history. Contrary to the tenets of traditionalism, and those of the American Founders, which will be explicated later, much of postmodernist philosophy, and subsequently multiculturalism, views human beings as the determiner of any truth, if it even can be found at all (D’Souza, 2002). The writings of varied philosopher/thinkers such as Voltaire (1694-1788), Kant (1724-1804), and Hume (1711-1776) of Enlightenment fame, who rejected metaphysics and Biblical Christianity, and nineteenth and twentieth century radicals such as Marx (1818-1883), Nietzsche (1844-1900), Freud 1856-1939, and Sartre (1905-1980), who rejected political and social orthodoxies, contributed to the literature postmodernists have relied upon to develop their position. Leading postmodernist thinkers such as Foucault (1926-1984), Feyerabend (1924-1994), and Derrida (b.
1930) continued the assault against traditionalist views in rejecting rationalism in recent years. Certainly, a number of these men had their own personal issues that contributed to their philosophical positions, but that is a study for another day. For now, it would be worthwhile to look more closely at a couple of the ideas behind this philosophical position that supports multiculturalism, specifically: the nature of man and the role of the state in values inculcation.

One of the most clearly defined roots of Postmodernism dates back to seventeenth and eighteenth century France and can be couched in the context of a cultural war of the time. During this time period, England and France were in literal bloody war countless times, as they each sought to be the dominant power in Europe, and subsequently, the world. This ongoing war was more than just physical, as each sought to be the center of the philosophical world, as well. Contrary to the ordered world of the English, as evidenced by the writings of Hobbes, Burke, Sidney, and Locke, which had its basis in Biblical Christianity and classical Greek and Roman philosophy (natural law and natural rights combining with representative government), the French pursued a more liberal paradigm, with an emphasis on individuality, artistic endeavor, emotiveness, and freedom of expression, with an inclination toward democracy. Much of this may be seen in the writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), whose work provided the philosophical underpinnings of the French Revolution (an event radically liberal as compared to the American Revolution). Rousseau was a complex individual, full of contradictions. He helped pioneer the idea of the social contract, where the state protects the rights of individuals while those individuals yield obedience to the state. He had the belief that people were born morally pure, yet were corruptible by society at large and that the state had the responsibility to instill morality (Boyd, 1963; Rousseau, 1762/1957). This concept of the state as the inculcator of ethics was seized upon by John Dewey and other progressives in the U.S.
during the early twentieth century and is also supportive of much of today’s character education, something that I shall explore more fully in Chapter 6. A major component of Rousseau’s thesis was that man is inherently good and is the source of morality. Interestingly, while agreeing that good morals were important in society, Rousseau himself was considered morally inept, having fathered five children out of wedlock and abandoning them to the state orphanage, justifying his actions by explicating the responsibility of the state for values inculcation and child-rearing (Johnson, 1989; Rousseau, 1762/1957).

The concept of man as moral sovereign has been present throughout history and can be seen clearly in the principles of Marxism: “our morality is entirely subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat. Everything that contributes to the building of a Communist society is moral, everything that hinders it is immoral” (Lenin, 1920, para. 25). The supporting concept of the inherent goodness of man was also embraced by Dewey, was a lynchpin of the humanist movement, and found favor during the nineteen-sixties, as liberal society construed liberty to mean license and when morality became personally constructed (D’Souza, 2002). A clear positional statement appeared in the Humanist Manifesto II:

We affirm that moral values derive their source from human experience. Ethics is autonomous and situational needing no theological or ideological sanction. Ethics stems from human need and interest. To deny this distorts the whole basis of life. Human life has meaning because we create and develop our futures (AHA, 1973, para. 17).

The development and use of the Values Clarification model was one of the initial educational applications of this concept at that time. This philosophy of self as the constructor of right and wrong was subsequently embraced by postmodernists and later, by multicultural relativists during the nineteen-nineties and has continued to be a pillar of postmodern multiculturalism. Unfortunately, this has also become a feature of American society and her public schools, as administrators, teachers and students seem to be getting quite skilled at unethical behavior,
justifying their actions with Rousseau's construction (Bennett, 2003; Blase & Blase, 2002; Callan, 1997; Maxcy, 2002).

Cultural Relativism

In considering the philosophy of multicultural postmodernism, one of the more important issues worth investigation is cultural relativism. Cultural relativism is a form of cognitive relativism, which asserts that rationality and knowledge are relative to a conceptual scheme or theoretical framework of communities of people and “that no one set of epistemic norms is metaphysically privileged over any other” (Westacott, 2001, para. 5). In other words, each cultural group is free to construct its own truth that will meet their specific needs, without submitting any universal standard. Predictably, this is consistent with the ideas that reality is socially constructed (see Lyotard) and that man is moral sovereign (see Rousseau). As mentioned previously, most cultural relativists (multiculturalists) would disavow any association with moral relativism. However, that is a difficult bond to break without adhering to a universal standard of truth as a foundation, which would in turn not truly allow one to be a cultural relativist. Few theorists will admit to being relativists because of the inherent weakness of the philosophical position (relativists must admit that relativism is both true and false) and the implicit anarchy of moral/ethical relativism that must result from cognitive relativism. One might wonder, with the apparent weakness of the position, how it came to dominate the thinking of multiculturalists and other postmodernists, including many highly intellectual and learned individuals.

The first mention of relativism in philosophy is often credited to the Sophists in Greece, particularly Protagoras (490-420 B.C.), who wrote: “Man is the measure of all things” (Westacott, 2001, para. 2). This establishes the principle seized upon by postmodernists that knowledge is relative to the knower. It is of note that “few philosophers in the Western tradition
have espoused any form of cognitive relativism until relatively recent times” (para. 2). For centuries, the Judeo-Christian/Western tradition held that truth was absolute and that people were “purposefully created by God” with the ability to discover “universal, objective knowledge.” It is important to consider that “this knowledge and truth were not bound to any social class, group, or culture, and they were indeed discernible through sound human reason and logic if people would seriously examine the evidence” (Schmidt, 1997, p. 31). Yet, over time, a combination of the works of the previously mentioned philosophers from Voltaire to Derrida, the intermingling of cultures, and increasing knowledge about those cultures through linguistics and the social sciences brought about changes that would have significant impact in American public schools. Among these causes, one could argue that Karl Marx did the most significant work toward relativism. First of all, Marx argued that God does not exist, and second, that knowledge comes from social existence, thus neither objective knowledge nor universal truth exists; it is all relative to the situation. How does this help shape the multiculturalist philosophy? Quite simply, if “truth neither transcends nor applies to all people's social experiences or to their cultures,” then “truth, knowledge, [and] morality are all culturally relative” (Schmidt, 1997, p. 31). Thus knowledge becomes subservient to the peoples rather than the other way around. As illustrated by one of Adolph Hitler's henchmen, Joseph Goebbels, “Truth is that which serves the German people” (Schmidt, 1997, p. 81). The new understanding of the social construction of truth is having a significant impact upon American schooling, beginning at the university level, where truth was once revered, and seeping down to the kindergarten classroom. Slowly, but surely, people at every level of American education have retreated from traditional American values and embraced the humanistic relativism of multiculturalism. As Robert Hughes put it: “Marxism has
passed through the fires of its own dissolution and is reborn as a ‘hero with a thousand faces’ – multiculturalism” (Sisk, 1993, p. 46).

Applications of Relativism for Schools

Many educators, as well as those in the public at large, regret the withdrawal from American foundational principles. It seems that many see a connection between the new relativistic values and societal decline. As Heslep (2002) opined, “The acute unsettledness in society at large and in individual lives makes it very difficult for students to make sense not only of their own lives but of life in general” (p. 12). This retreat from traditional values has had predictable results. The societal confusion resulting from the failure of adults to communicate any sense of foundational stability has led students to create their own ethical foundations. In the 1960’s, students embraced hedonistic freedom, in the 1970’s individual fulfillment, in the 1980’s, pursuit of wealth, in the 1990’s, a nihilistic survival mentality. All of these pursuits have resulted from a lack of ethical foundations in society and in the schools (Heslep, 2002). How are these changes showing up in schools? In examining current application of postmodern thought in American public schooling, let’s begin by examining the beliefs and practices of the social scientists and educational theorists who are setting the paradigm for values inculcation. Postmodernism dominates the thinking of many scientists today, especially behavioral scientists, such as those in the psychological profession. Previously, we discussed sex education in public schools. Psychologist Michael Wertheimer, a supporter of comprehensive sexuality education and homosexual rights, applied postmodern thinking to his practice: “psychological health and disorder are largely socially constructed, rather than objectively true or false” (NARTH, 2002b, para. 4). Thus, even pedophilia, while problematic for society, is not a disorder in his mind. He explained the postmodern nature of science in an interview with Dr. Joseph Nicolosi:
Science doesn't deal with absolute ideals; it is a matter of taking an objective approach to interesting phenomena from the stance of dispassionate and humble curiosity, looking for facts and their theoretical implications. “Normal” and “abnormal” are, from a scientific point of view, tentative categories that some may find useful for certain purposes in certain settings. They are not absolute and immutable, but are constructions by people living in a given time in a given society who are trying to make sense of certain phenomena. And such constructions change appropriately as convincing evidence becomes available that bears upon their tenability and utility. (NARTH, 2002, para. 29)

This kind of cognitive relativism clearly transforms into ethical relativism, as behavior is no longer controlled by absolute standards.

We must consider here why Americans might object to the multiculturalist agenda for educating children in relativistic values. If all cultures are all to be considered of equal value, why not just lay them all out in total to allow for an objective judgment to be made on the merits of each culture. First of all, multiculturalists would say that too many Americans are racist, sexist, homophobes, who cannot be objective. The main reason some of the details about cultures are left out of the presentation, however, resides in their goal to glorify multiculturalism. When multiculturalists present cultures as all being equal, they leave out the facts of barbarism inherent in many cultures. Examples abound of brutality and oppression, but there are a few that stand out. First of all, consider female clitoridectomies (known as female genital mutilation), a centuries-old cultural practice in many African countries and in other parts of the Muslim world.

The practice has been outlawed in many Western countries (Schmidt, 1997, p. 37):

Minimally, clitoridectomy involves the removal of a girl's clitoris. Frequently, however, the act also includes removing the inner and outer labia, and sometimes almost all of the girl's genitalia are cut away and the remaining flesh from the outer labia is sewn together, or infibulated, and the girl's legs are bound from ankle to waist for several weeks while scar tissue closes up the vagina almost completely. (Burstyn, 1995, para. 22)

One physician even saw the procedure as “anatomically equivalent to amputation of the penis” (Toubia, 1994, p. 712). This barbaric practice is done for cultural reasons. In seeking to justify it, some have tried to equate male circumcision with this practice, saying both are simply cultural.
The difference, as explained by the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) (1998), is that clitoridectomy “has serious, life-threatening health risks for children and women,” while male circumcision, which is “not essential to the child's current well-being,” does have “potential medical benefits” and is certainly not harmful (para. 1). Other past and present cultural practices from around the world would include slavery, the caste system, the ancient Aztec rituals of human sacrifice and cannibalism, and sati, the tradition of burning widows alive in India, a practice outlawed, but still performed nonetheless, as well as countless others. Fully accepting all cultures, without condemnation for barbaric practices allies multiculturalism with tyranny (D’Souza, 2002; Schmidt, 1997). Multiculturalists are quick to distance themselves from such practices, but in doing so they are supporting the idea of moral absolutes and thus wreaking havoc with their entire philosophical position.

The implications for values education are enormous if teachers embrace cultural relativism as they support multiculturalist agendas. Educators who embrace the postmodernist, multiculturalist agenda are also supported by theorists such as E. D. Hirsch and those of the cultural literacy school of thought as well Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren. These and other theorists encourage a radical change in American culture. The predominant view here seems to be consistent with Dewey’s vision of schools as places of social engineering. These educational theorists for change, such as Spencer Maxcy (1995), have called for a new “pedagogy that allows educators to refuse to accept the older dominant meaning systems,” and then to embrace the knowledge of other cultures instead, with the purpose of “liberating oppressed individuals and groups,” so as to create an “alliance-building multicultural democracy” (p. 118-19). In other words, get rid of traditional American culture and reshape society into a type of relativistic anarchy that allows only cultures that embrace all others without any standard of judgment.
except diversity. To accomplish this agenda in schools, Maxcy (1995) placed much emphasis on “cultural meanings” (p. 131), such as those found in narratives that he encourages teachers to use. These narratives do not have to be factual or based on any standard, but rather can be myths (something he values for culture sustenance), icons (such as graffiti) that help instill pride in origins and help maintain culture, and ritual (like greeting), to develop cultural awareness. One might question the value of these considering historical applications of such narratives as seen with the Nazis and the Aryan superiority myth in Germany or gang-related graffiti in American urban ghettos. Maxcy (1995) did have a values component in his schema, although it was described in ambiguous terminology, without any real standards for behavior. Ethos, somehow, refers to maintaining cultural identity and building a “cultural moral-ethical character,” though he did not explain what that means (p. 133). It seems that with many theorists, the relativistic nature of their vision does not allow them to define morals or ethics, for to do so would be absolutist. These visions for schools, while replete with glittering generalities and vague euphemisms, have little practical input for those seeking to build ethical learning communities. They are highly organized, however, in terms of the strategies used to reshape society.

Two primary tools for the type of societal change envisioned by multiculturalists are social constructivism and critical pedagogy, both clearly within the realm of postmodern relativism. Social constructivism teaches that meaning is socially constructed and impossible without human experience (humanism) and that people interact based upon those meanings. This philosophy is rooted in phenomenology. Husserl, Dewey, Harre, and Shutz all have a philosophy consistent with social constructivism. Pedagogy based on this philosophical position emphasizes “the natural attitude, the in-group’s system of relevances, reflective thinking” and personally constructed meaning. (Heslep, 2002, p. 96). Critical pedagogy features student reflection, an
emphasis on action and communication and is grounded in critical theory with not a little influence from Marx, Freud and Weber. Foundational in this is the concept that existence is purely physical without any spiritual dimension. Critical theory differs from positivism in that it adds in a social element to the scientific and is focused on oppression. Humans are in control of their actions and their results. In critical pedagogy, following Paulo Freire’s theories, only oppressive societies view students as void of knowledge and teachers as instruments of knowledge acquisition (Heslep, 2002). Being postmodernist in conception, this approach is supportive of cultural relativity. A clear example of cultural relativity in action was apparent in multiculturalists’ efforts at values inculcation in the New York City schools in nineteen ninety-three. In the so-called *Rainbow Curriculum*, multiculturalists sought board and parental approval for “equal educational consideration” for all cultures, including homosexuals, because all cultures deserved to be “equally valued” (Schmidt, 1997, p. 33). The school board rejected the curriculum plans and the curriculum designer was fired largely due to the protests of irate parents of all races.

**Constructions of “Reality”**

A major component of postmodernism in education is that of using constructivism (literary and social) to rewrite history to suit current political needs. Some rewriting of history has been necessary to correct unreliable reports based upon poorly researched history or in cases of blatant racial or gender discrimination. However, there is an application here of the Machiavellian principle that the end justifies the means in the struggle to overcome the dominant cultural hegemony. For those of this paradigm, history as written is unreliable and biased toward the Eurocentric perspective. Likewise, in postmodern thought, no text or narrative is trustworthy (written history is unreliable), thus there is a need to rewrite history to meet the needs of specific
groups. Thus, the teaching of history, much like the teaching of sex education, has become a major battleground in the war between traditionalists and multiculturalists, with one group rewriting history to suit their agenda and the other writing counter-revisionist history to suit theirs. As Longtime A.F.T. President Albert Shanker opined, “No other nation in the world teaches a national history that leaves its children feeling negative about their own country—this would be the first” (Leo, 1995, p. 23). This is an expansive topic, worthy of lengthy consideration in our examination of values inculcation in schools. However, due to the breadth of the task, I must be content to merely introduce the battle here and in Chapter 6, saving the bulk of the research for future study.

A primary force behind multiculturalism, and a primary force in revisionist history is Afrocentric theory, (as proposed in the Portland Baseline Essays by Asa Hilliard and John Henrik Clarke among others), designed by separatist African-Americans to replace traditional Western civilization, which they call Eurocentric. In Afrocentrism, ethnicity is all-important and the presentation is that European culture (of white people) is primarily evil, with the only redeeming aspects of Western civilization being stolen from Africa (Schmidt, 1997). Some of those rejecting the Eurocentric or Anglocentric curriculum for an Afrocentric one will actually use the same biological determinism to support a position of racial superiority that their ancestors have been subject to in the past from whites. For these historians, Afrocentricity is their reality and they feel that they must portray every story in that view (Schlesinger, 1998). The evidence these scholars use relates to factors such as melanin levels that contribute to the racial superiority of those of African descent (Schmidt, 1997). This approach is clearly racist according to Anne Wortham, an African American who opposes Afrocentrism, in that it “resembles the claims of Nazi leaders, who preached German racial superiority” (Wortham, 1992, p. 45).
Not only could such an approach be considered racist, but academically dishonest. What Afrocentric ideologues propose for curriculum is not as much cultural pluralism or multiculturalism as it is ethnocentrism. The *Civilization Began in Africa* campaign is based on the proposition that Egypt was a black African country, thus identifying African-Americans with Egypt (ignoring the reality that slaves came from West Africa, which had fine civilizations themselves). Often cited is Martin Bernal’s *Black Athena*, attributing Egyptian influence on the Greeks, who makes no major case on skin pigmentation. Many classical scholars, such as Frank Yurco, an Egyptologist at the Field Museum of Natural History in Chicago, have pointed out that skin color in ancient Egypt would have been similar to that today, a variance from light Mediterranean to dark Nubian, a difference that would have been meaningless to them (Schlesinger, 1998). Others, such as noted Greek scholar, Mary Lefkowitz, in *Not Out of Africa*, have gone far to put the fantasies of *Black Athena* in clear view. Needless to say, while Afrocentrists are quick to point out the outstanding contributions in literature, art, and science, they are just as quick to ignore the tribal massacres, tyrannical rule, and the continuance of slavery and corruption occurring then and to this very day in African society. We are all guilty of ethnocentrism if we point out only the good in our heritage (Schlesinger, 1998). Of note as well is the irony that “Black Athena's emphasis upon race and ethnic origins unwittingly returns to the nineteenth-century style of ‘race’-bound and ethnocentric historiography that Bernal himself . . . has so rightly questioned” (Rogers, 1996, p. 440).

Why would certain multiculturalists embrace a history that is both racist and poorly supported? The answer seems clear: to meet the political objective of overturning current hegemony in favor of multiculturalism. It is the position of multiculturalist educators that the system is biased against minorities. In two studies by Boykin, as reported by the APA, it was
concluded that “there is a fundamental conflict between certain aspects of African-American culture on the one hand and the implicit cultural commitments of most American schools on the other” (Neisser, 1995, para. 68). Boykin found that when African-American children are expected to “do their own work” and are “prompted to tell what they know and not how they feel,” that they are being sent “cultural messages,” and when they are held “responsible for their own success or failure,” that they are “pervasively having cultural lessons imposed on them” (Boykin, 1994, p. 180-181). The idea that the system is culturally biased is foundational to Afrocentric thinking. In other words, Afrocentrists believe that minority children are not culturally adapted to Eurocentric ideas of schooling and need to have both adaptations to insure their success and revised historical stories (myths) that will improve their self-esteem. In attempts to change the curriculum and pedagogy for schools, Afrocentrists have brought about a new paradigm for teachers. The focus is on differing intelligences and biological variances. This could include black students who exhibit according to Asa Hilliard of Georgia State University “high levels of energy, impulsive interrupting, and loud talking” even including profanity (Schlesinger, 1998, p. 69). Some went so far as to suggest that forcing minority children to learn in standard English was harmful. This motivated a short-lived Ebonics campaign in Oakland, California in 1996, as some had claimed a West African tie to seek acceptance of the inner city slang speak as an official language (Schlesinger, 1998). Needless to say, many see this approach as only exacerbating existing racial conflict. Historically, black Americans from Frederick Douglas to Martin Luther King, Jr. have distanced themselves from being tied with Africa and clung to their American identity. If anyone deserves the title American, it is those who have toiled and bled for her survival for so many years (Schlesinger, 1998). Schools would better serve minorities by inculcating the values that will aide minorities in their quest to gain full
social and economic equality rather than trying to construct a reality that does not coincide with what students will face when they enter the real world of adulthood in the United States.

Not that it is unimportant for all children to have self-esteem. Many researchers would support the position of Hilliard and Boykin, saying that without an Afrocentric approach, children of African heritage, no matter how distant, cannot have self-esteem and are thus doomed to failure (Kuykendall, 2001). According to Rawls (1971), self-esteem is that which “includes a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out” (p. 440). Multiculturalists would say that American society communicates a sense of valuelessness to people of color, while traditionalists would see a message of the value of all people, without regard to race, from the basic principles put forth in our foundational documents. Rawls also defined self-esteem as “a confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions” (p. 440). The multiculturalist perspective is that people of color are disenfranchised, while traditionalists would support the idea that in this land of opportunity, success is within the reach of everyone who has the basic ability and desire to reach their goals.

In 1963, Martin Luther King, Jr. spoke of a color-blind society where character would be the measuring stick of judgment for individuals. It seems that many of his philosophical descendents have gotten off track by focusing on differences rather than similarities and further, refusing to allow for fixed standards of value. Is the future of this nation to be one of a Balkanized society with no overarching American culture, and with no common values to unite us? If one embraces the postmodernist philosophy of many multiculturalist educators, then that future is upon us. Dr. King’s dream of a people united above ethnic considerations in common cause cannot be realized if schools are encouraging what might be called “cultural and linguistic
apartheid” (Schlesinger, 1998, p. 147) while refusing to teach the values that preserve civil society (Lickona, 2003). King’s dream is part of the idea of America, when individuals of various backgrounds can come together and seek liberty and justice for each person. With the founding of this nation, the idea of America became a beacon and a hope for many throughout the world. For America as an idea to continue in the United States, we must find a common place to stand. As Ravitch (2002) opined,

The public schools exist to build an American community, to help both newcomers and native-born children prepare for adulthood as fellow citizens. Strategies that divide children along racial and ethnic lines encourage resentment and alienation rather than mutual respect. The ultimate democratic lesson is human equality, and the schools must teach our children that we are all in the same boat, all members of one society, regardless of race, ethnicity, or place of origin. (p. 3)

Indeed, values education has the potential to help unite us as a people, if we can be one people and agree upon the values to be taught.

Philosophy of Traditionalism

As illuminated previously, multiculturalism is the combination of cultural pluralism and postmodernism. In postmodernism, which can also be considered cultural relativism with political flavor, there can be no attainment of objective truth, unless it benefits the oppressed. Everything is seen to be socially or culturally constructed and facts of history are irrelevant (Schmidt, 1997). Traditionalists do not embrace postmodernism or any of its tenets. The primary philosophies behind traditionalism can be found in the foundational documents of the United States such as the U.S. Constitution and Declaration of Independence, as well as subsequent texts of note, such as Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, King’s, I Have a Dream speech, and various songs, poems and essays celebrating the American spirit and include such concepts as higher law, natural rights, and rule of law. Values to be inculcated might include: liberty, justice, responsibility, self-control, honesty, loyalty, respect, charity, duty, patriotism, generosity, and
honor, among others. Briefly, higher law (sometimes called natural law) implies that the laws of people are subservient to universal principles. For example, if a government establishes a law that disallows a person from eating in a diner due to their race, that law is to be considered void due to the fact that it violates a higher principle, \((\text{all people are of equal worth, regardless of race})\). Obviously, the United States has lived with laws that violate higher law from time to time, but the principle remains, nonetheless, and is invaluable in overturning such laws. Natural rights are those that every human being deserves at the moment of their existence. These have been explicated in the writings of Algernon Sidney and John Locke and can be found most eloquently stated in the Declaration of Independence. Rule of law is what keeps individual rights under societal control. Akin to justice and a component of the social contract, this is the proper function of government, to use power to protect the rights of its citizens by preventing the rights of one from denying the rights of another. A little repetition regarding how these three work together is warranted: Natural rights and rule of law work together to maintain liberty. Law without rights is tyranny, rights without law is anarchy. Higher law provides a standard for both individuals and governments.

There is another important principle worth examining in light of traditionalism: national unity. As expressed in the motto on the Great Seal of the United States: \(E\text{ Pluribus Unum}\), which multiculturalist interpretations aside (see Gore quote), means out of many, one, national unity is a critical tenet in the minds of traditionalists. This is contrary to the philosophy of multiculturalism and holds that even though a pluralistic society, Americans are unified under a common national culture that is not based upon race, ethnicity, or any sexual classification, but rather is based upon foundational principals that apply to all people. This concept was not understood by the terrorists who attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, believing us
to be too divided to pull together an actual response. This unity does not imply that individuals
cannot celebrate their ethnic origins and customs. Freedom of religion, speech, and assembly are
foundational principles and Americans are among the freest people in the world when it comes to
celebrating cultural practices. However, there is an overarching national consciousness, uniting
Americans of every conceivable ethnic background, and the foundational principles combine to
make the substance of E Pluribus Unum. Americans who embrace traditional values have
learned to ask themselves a very important question, as phrased by historian Arthur Schlesinger
(1998): “What happens when people of different ethnic origins, speaking different languages and
professing different religions, settle in the same geographical locality and live under the same
political sovereignty?” The answer is simple: “Unless a common purpose binds them together,
tribal antagonisms will drive them apart” (p. 13). J. Hector St John de Crevecoeur was the first to
write of the American Race, which was multi-ethnic from the start, but was united behind
American principles, leaving behind the ways of their countries of origin. The reality is that the
United States has always had a degree of ethnic diversity. From the beginning, as Crevecoeur
wrote in Letters from an American Farmer in 1782:

What then is the American, this new man? He is either a European, or the descendant of a
European, hence that strange mixture of blood, which you will find in no other country. I
could point out to you a family whose grandfather was an Englishman, whose wife was
Dutch, whose son married a French woman, and whose present four sons have now four
wives of different nations. Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of
men, whose labors and posterity will one day cause great changes in the world.
(Crevecoeur, 1782)

The European mixture was only the beginning, as our nation has long struggled within to become
more inclusive, first with African-Americans, and later with immigrants from every corner of the
earth. It is clear that every group has made significant contributions and had profound influence
upon every facet of our society (Glickman, 1998). Yet, even with the diversity, the unifying
element has not been the preservation of old cultures but the creating of a new one (*E Pluribus Unum*). Ethnic struggles exist worldwide and even Canadians admit that their inability to establish what it means to *be a Canadian* has made it difficult for them to mirror the unity of Americans. Americans have a greater sense of their history than do many other peoples, even though it is shorter than most. (Schlesinger, 1998) This unification is a two-way street. Both the minorities and the majority must embrace unity, with neither side choosing the racism of ethnic exclusivity, rather choosing to be tied together, as Dr. King said, in a “single garment of destiny” (King, 1963b, para. 4) Since each American’s destiny is “inextricably bound” (King, 1963a, p. 2) to that of every other American, we must have common ground: unifying principles that hold us together.

This is not to say that America has always lived up to her principles or to Crevecoeur’s vision, with a history of racism against minorities in our customs, practices, policies, laws and institutions. It has been the stain on our garment and the glaring contradiction in the American experiment. Still, over time, two important trends have developed within the framework of our foundational principles. First of all, the minority cultures have been able to influence and flavor the American culture to help make it very different from the British culture from which she primarily came. Just one look at the public school, Congress, or pop culture will make this abundantly clear, especially compared to most other nations. Secondly, America has become more inclusive and just through the years in her laws and in her general society. The American military is a good example of these trends where once there was segregation by race, now there is unity without regard to race. Since the nineteen sixties, however, the American Race has been broken up with what might be called an “eruption of ethnicity” (Schlesinger, 1998, p. 19) and a desire for separate ethnic communities within the overall society. This has some good effects,
expanding economic opportunity for some minorities and giving recognition to the contributions of peoples of color in American history, but has also yielded negative consequences, such as the new ethnically imposed segregation we have been describing (Schlesinger, 1998). The question remains to be answered if America can find healing for her racial wounds, especially between black and white.

American foundational principles, as seen in the United States Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and other writings of American Founders such as Jefferson, Madison, Adams, and Washington, can be clearly distinguished from the principles of multiculturalism. Unlike the Rousseauian relativism of multiculturalists, traditionalists embrace the foundational tenets of Western civilization that were revered by the American Founders. These remarkable men devised a governmental system that has kept the United States, and much of the world, free and prosperous since seventeen eighty-nine. A number of these principles can be found in traditionalists’ values for inculcation, not the least of which is the idea of representative government (a democratic republic as opposed to a democracy). As Sehr (1997) pointed out, “Jefferson, like Madison, was not an advocate of direct democracy, either as practiced by the ancient Greeks or as championed by Rousseau. Jefferson, with Madison, simply didn’t believe it could be practiced on a scale beyond that of a town.” Furthermore, “both favored representative democracy as a means of extending the principal of popular rule over a large nation. This puts both at odds with Rousseau, who believed that representative government was entirely incompatible with democracy” (p. 39). Indeed, the system devised by the Founders was one that had numerous checks and balances so as to keep any individual or group from taking control of everyone else. These checks applied not only to the government (which the Constitution was designed to limit), but to the public as well, for
throughout history (consider Rome and Paris), the public had become a mob and threatened liberty as much as a tyrant. Of course, there does not appear to be a check in the power of the U.S. Supreme Court, where five appointed individuals can thwart the will of the people and their popularly elected representatives, something that works for and against both traditionalists and multiculturalists. Of course, not every judge has seen the need to run roughshod over the Constitution. Recently, Judge Stanley Birch (2004) of the United States Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit, wrote about the role of the courts, citing a previous case in the process: “we do not sit as a superlegislature ‘to award by judicial decree what was not achievable by political consensus’ Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 923 (4th Cir. 1996)” (p. 47).

Many multiculturalists object to traditional American culture due to the fact that they consider it Eurocentric (or Anglocentric), due to its basis in Western civilization. Despite the Anglocentric element of American culture, the principles espoused in the Declaration of Independence and U.S. Constitution have been foundational for members of all races and ethnic groups to take hold of the promise of America and use those principles as a launching vehicle for their own liberation from the tyranny of the Old World ways (Schlesinger, 1998). Appeals to the principles of liberty and justice, as explicated in American foundational documents, have been successfully made by women and people of color in seeking equal treatment in society and under the law. Classic examples include the campaign for the vote by women from 1848 at the Seneca Falls Convention, where women crafted a document based upon the Declaration of Independence to the Civil Rights Movement of the nineteen fifties and sixties, where Dr. King and others leaned time and time again upon the Declaration and Constitution, as well as the Bible, classical texts, and other components of Western civilization in their campaign to secure justice.
Multiculturalists might counter with the fact that Dr. King also relied upon the strategies of Gandhi in their campaign, as well. Indeed, a key to their success was imitating Gandhi’s non-violent protest. Yet, even this pays homage to the tenets of Western civilization, for it was a British (also American) principle, not always practiced, but closely held nonetheless, that allowed Gandhi (and King) to succeed through their passive resistance strategy. The idea that one does not harm the innocent is a moral absolute that has been embraced by traditionalists and was the key to ending the worst practices of the West. It was by self-incrimination and guilt that colonialism, slavery, and racial discrimination ended (D’Souza, 2002). When enough American people realized the injustice of forced segregation, after watching their evening news to see abusive policeman using dogs and fire hoses to break up peaceful voting rights demonstrations, the laws and practices were changed. Traditionalist Dinesh D’Souza, a naturalized American citizen from India, asks us to consider: What if Gandhi’s pacifist approach had been attempted on one such as Genghis Kahn or Adolph Hitler (or anyone else whose people did not embrace these values)? Would the results have been the same? (D’Souza, 2002). Yet, some would ignore the realities of history to fit a political agenda.

President Theodore Roosevelt once said, “The one absolutely certain way of bringing this nation to ruin, of preventing all possibility of its continuing to be a nation at all, would be to permit it to become a tangle of squabbling nationalities” (Schlesinger, 1998, p. 124). Traditionalists want to maintain America as an idea and as a sovereign nation, while multiculturalists want to make America a member of the socialist global village. As pertains to values education, traditionalists seek to inculcate American values in schools to maintain the historical foundations of American society and follow the words of the Preamble of the U.S. Constitution: “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity”; multiculturalists
want to “change American culture” and “establish a new hegemonic order, under new ideological conceptions and practices of [socialist] democracy” by “the work of feminist, environmental, African-American, Latino, Asian-American, [Lesbigay], and other organized subordinate social groups,” doing this “inside the public education system” (Sehr, 1997, p. 27-28). Perhaps a balance can be struck, as California Superintendent Bill Honig put it: “This country has been able to celebrate pluralism but keep some sense of the collective that holds us together. . . . Democracy has certain core ideas—freedom of speech, law, procedural rights, the way we deal with each other” (Spring, 2002, p. 68). Without the foundational principles upon which she was based, America will cease to exist as an ideal and as a nation. Without the participation of the public schools in American values education, the timeless principles of our republic will be lost to our posterity. As Woodrow Wilson (1913) once pointed out,

The great melting pot of America, the place where we are all made Americans of, is the public school, where men of every race and of every origin and of every station in life send their children, or ought to send their children, and where being mixed together, the youngsters are all infused with the American spirit and developed into American men and American women. (p. 97)

Along with the family, the church, and community organizations, the public school has long been an important component in the maintenance of these principles.

The Conflict Continues

As the battle for cultural supremacy continues, the combatants remain highly focused upon the importance of inculcating specific values in classrooms across the nation. Values are being taught daily in schools in every conceivable manner, but nowhere is the battle more tense than in social studies classroom. As Spring (2002) opined, it seems that “history has proved to be the most politically contentious subject. . . . Because history is shaped by and contains political values, the debate over history standards reflects broad divisions in political ideas.” An early test
case came during 1987 in California, where they decided to rewrite the state social studies curriculum. It seems that there was great controversy in the way the framework portrayed the United States, “as a land of immigrants sharing a common set of values.” In this dispute, we can see the wide gap between what conservatives and liberals want in the teaching and interpretation of U.S. history. Traditionalists would see “the major purpose in teaching history is creating national unity by teaching a common set of political and social values,” that would be “based on the beliefs underlying American institutions” (p. 68). As mentioned previously, multiculturalists see greater value in presenting the failures of America in living up to her standards, with an emphasis on a need for radical change from Eurocentric thinking. Not all those in favor of multicultural education see an issue in the Eurocentric charge. As Robert Hughes pointed out, “When the polemical cultural separatists talk about something called Eurocentric values, they're trying to make out that there is a solid block which constitutes European culture. Which is just not true” (Reynolds, 1993, para. 14). The negative reaction against Eurocentrism is a major theme for multiculturalists and seems to be nothing more than an attempt to replace existing hegemony.

The attack on Eurocentrism is worth some additional examination in our attempt to understand the values education conflict. The multiculturalist perspective is that Western civilization is “defined by oppression” (D’Souza, 2002, p. 26). The presentation is “American history as an uninterrupted series of crimes visited on blacks, American Indians, Hispanics, women, and natives of the Third World” (D’Souza, 2002, p. 27). One can find this theme in Howard Zinn's popular high school text, *A People's History of the United States* (2001) (D’Souza, 2002). Zinn's ideas can also be found elsewhere in numerous multiculturalist academic publications. Cornel West, a Black Studies professor at Harvard, characterized
American society as “chronically racist, sexist and homophobic” (West, 1993, p. 236). Ali Mazrui (1997), an Islamic political scientist, charged that the United States is a “a breeding ground for racism, exploitation, and genocide” (para. 10). D’Souza (2002) pointed out that multiculturalists often see a historical reason behind our bad behavior: “that the American founders were slave owners and racists” (p. 27). One writer went so far as to call America, “a model totalitarian society” (Huggins, 1990, p. 113). It is no wonder that many multiculturalists have negative feelings about the future of our nation in its current form, and seek a radical paradigm shift. According to D’Souza (2002), “Multiculturalists insist that immigrants and minorities should not assimilate to the American mainstream because to do so is to give up one's identity and to succumb to racism.” He suggested that the values function is obvious: teach minority students to “cultivate their separate identities” and teach majority students to “accept and even cherish these differences.” Thus, diversity becomes “the basis for American identity”; in other words, under this philosophy, “All we have in common is our diversity” (p. 28).

One effect is of this attack on Eurocentrism is revealed in Schmidt’s observation regarding university curriculum. He pointed out that the traditional works of European writers that “have been the staple of Western education for centuries” (Homer, Sophocles, Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, Dante, Luther, Locke, Shakespeare, Hobbes, Milton, and Bunyan) are considered unworthy to a great degree because these ‘dead white European males’ (DWEMs) are not relevant to “defined victims of inequality”; their literature is often considered “sexist, racist, class-biased, and homophobic” (Schmidt, 1997, p. 27). As Schmidt acknowledged, W.E.B. DuBois had a different perspective:

I sit with Shakespeare and he winces not. Across the color line I move arm in arm with Balzac and Dumas. . . . I summon Aristotle and Aurelius and what soul I will, and they
come all graciously with no scorn nor condescension. So, wed with Truth, I dwell above the veil.” (Dubois, 1903, p. 89)

Many Americans of every ethnic origin embrace the traditional works and the tenets of Western civilization.

Likewise, not everyone of minority race in the United States would support wholesale rejection of Western/American culture. Indeed, the democracy that almost everyone in the values education argument clings to is a product of Western civilization and the principles espoused in that civilization are the basis for the liberties that we hold dear today. Yet, as mentioned previously, traditionalists have some concerns about unbridled democracy, but are in support of these democratic principles within the context of an ordered society. In contrast, despite claims to the contrary, some would say that “multiculturalists are actually opposed to traditional democracy” (Schmidt, 1997, p. 20). As noted by traditionalist civic education specialist John Fonte (1995), “Multiculturalists are extremely uncomfortable with any form of majoritarianism . . . and even with the very idea of an American people.” He pointed to the curriculum guide for the state of New York, picturing the U.S. as one nation, many peoples. It seems that in the guide, one can find peoples but not the American people. Fonte opined, “If there is no ‘people’, but rather many ‘peoples’, the concepts of popular sovereignty and majority rule become meaningless (p. 49). Schmidt (1997) extended this theme:

To champion the rights of ‘peoples’, as multiculturalism does, is contrary to the foundations of traditional democratic freedoms which have their roots in individual rights, not group or peoples' rights. The suppression of individual rights in history, for example, in Nazi Germany and the former Soviet Union, also brought the death of democracy and freedom. Thus the rhetoric of multiculturalism that portrays its goals as democratic is false. Once individuals and their rights are subordinated to a group or some collectivity, democracy becomes an empty term. (p. 20)

But the question remains: will this charge fall on deaf ears as Multiculturalists pursue their own version of democracy, whether it be cultural, or socialist?
As the new century unfurls, those interested in values education are negotiating difficult terrain. There is a great risk in taking a stand upon principle, especially if not coinciding with the prevailing winds. There was a time when liberal academics and social critiques were threatened with censure for their views if considered extreme. However, today the threat has proceeded in the opposite direction. Schlesinger (1998) offered the thesis that the most scathing attack is by radical multiculturalists against the First Amendment, as they seek to prevent politically incorrect expression. We must remember that it is the speech with which we don’t agree that needs protection, under the Constitution. The Court has come down time and again on the side of this most basic of rights. Regarding freedom of expression, Justice Holmes (1919) said in Schenck v. United States: “The question in every case is whether the words . . . create a clear and present danger” (para. 5), where by Justice Brandeis added in a 1927 decision, that the evil born of free speech could not be construed a clear and present danger unless it was so imminent that it could not be prevented by a reasoned discussion, such that “the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence” (*Whitney v. California*, 1927, para. 36). Later, during World War II, when men were fighting and dying for the flag, the Court held fast to the principles again by striking down a West Virginia statute requiring school children to pledge allegiance to that same flag. As Justice Jackson stated, “freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order” (*West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, 1943, para. 31). First Amendment considerations aside, free speech is regulated in instances of libel, perjury, false advertising, etc. Now there is a new instance that springs from the PC police termed, *hate speech*. Some are going so far as to seek to change our understanding of just whom the Constitution protects. It seems that a number of multiculturalists want to take
away application from individuals and give it to groups, so as to protect marginalized special
interest groups through censorship of all sorts of free speech (Schlesinger, 1998). This type of
government-supported censorship has been practiced in Germany, Canada, and Great Britain but
has proven ineffective in stopping the expressions of racism. The conscience cannot be
controlled by the state. As Schlesinger (1998) opined, “it is ironic that what the multiculturalists
began as a joyous celebration of diversity ends as a grim crusade for conformity” (p. 162). The
question remains in the arena of values education of whether students will be presented with a
choice between multiculturalism and traditionalism. The conflict continues and the results may
well determine the future of our nation. I shall examine current formal values education
programs in Chapter 6, seeking potential solutions to the values education crisis.
CHAPTER 6
AN EXAMINATION OF VALUES EDUCATION TODAY WITH CONSIDERATION
OF SOLUTIONS FOR THE CURRENT CONFLICT

The Need for Values Education

As discussed in chapter 2, never has the need for values education been more evident. A juvenile judge in Detroit related the story of our times: “When I ask young men today, ‘Didn’t anyone ever teach you the difference between right and wrong?’ they answer, ‘No sir’ (Bennett, 2003, para. 3). The violence, vice, and general incivility of American society is a bane to all of us, even if we are to blame for the situation. The effects of our ethical malaise have reached into our homes, churches, and businesses, and predictably, poor ethics are also evident in behavior in our schools. It often starts with those in charge of schools, where administrators are all too often found to become abusive towards teachers (Blase & Blase, 2002). Thus, there is a call for today’s school leaders to step up and lead schools in the right direction. Repeating Maxcy’s (2002) charge, “Schools cannot be moral or ethical places when leaders are unethical and immoral themselves” (p. 39). As both Berkowitz and Etzioni pointed out, in separate entries in William Damon’s Bringing in a New Era in Character Education (2002), that character education is ineffective if poor character demonstrated by adults in their school and community.

Teachers and students must also take up the mantle for ethical standards. Stories of teachers having improper relations with students and of students participating in violence, stealing, bullying, plagiarism, and a general disrespect of others must become a rarity (Maxcy, 2002). Some are saying that schools must change their culture and seek to fill the moral vacuum
in today’s society: “Schools, in order to conduct teaching and learning, must become caring moral communities that help children from unhappy homes focus on their work, control their anger, feel cared about, and become responsible students” (Lickona, 1993, p. 8). Reflecting on thirty-plus years of moral decline and need for values education, Lickona (2003) observed that we need a “society-wide effort to restore the moral fabric” (para. 3). In words attributed to Theodore Roosevelt, “To educate a person in mind and not in morals is to educate a menace to society” (Kerber, 1968, p. 139).

While values education has always been a part of American schooling, the obvious “increases in disaffected students in school, school violence, voter apathy, declining test scores, and disinterest in community involvement,” according to Otten (2000) has garnered renewed interest in formal character and civic education. Schools and communities are finding the need to be proactive, in order to “help re-engage our students, deal with conflict, keep students on task in the learning environment, and reinvest the community with active participation by citizens in political and civic life” (para. 18). More and more, American citizens are lining up to echo the call for values education. Indeed if recent polls are any indication, a strong majority of Americans see the value in teaching values at school (Rose & Gallup, 1999). National leaders are also supportive. Congress stepped to the front in passing the Character Learning and Student Success Act in 2001 for the study and implementation of character education programs while President’s Clinton and Bush have each tripled the Federal expenditures for character/civic education. Consider the remarks of the President at last year’s White House Conference on Character and Community:

Americans believe in character education because we want more for our children than apathy or cynicism. We've got higher aspirations for every child in America. We want them to understand the difference between right and wrong. We want them to live lives of integrity and idealism. Family is the first place where these values are learned. Our
parents expect schools to be allies in the moral education of our children. That's what they expect, and that's what we must give them. (Bush, 2002, para. 12)

The relativists who lament the overwhelming call to values education are no longer holding sway with educators or policymakers. As the Manhattan Institute’s Kay Hymowitz (2003) opined, “Clearly, character education is now high on the education agenda” (p. 105).

The Call for Values Education

Currently, the United States is seeing a push for values (both character and civic) education like nothing since the early years of the Cold War. As of 2000, “Over 30 states in the United States have received U.S. Department of Education character education state grants. Sixteen states have legislation regarding character education” (Otten, 2000, para. 15). In 2001, Congress passed the Character Learning and Student Success Act (CLASS Act) to study and implement character education programs. Referring to his continuing call for character education, President Bush (2002) proclaimed regarding children, “We want them to understand the difference between right and wrong” (para. 12). Not only are national leaders calling for values education, but numerous educational theorists and researchers have determined that students will become more productive citizens if their education includes character development. (Cochran-Smith, 2000; Goodlad, 1990, 1997; Goodlad, Soder, & Sirotnik, 1990; Soder, 1996).

In contrast to even the recent past, today there seems to be a plethora of character education organizations replete with resources available to schools. A short list would include (a) the Character Education Partnership, (b) the Josephson Institute, (c) the Center for the 4th and 5th Rs, (d) Character Counts, (e) Goodlad’s Center for Educational Renewal (CER) at the University of Washington, (f) the National Service Learning Clearinghouse, (g) the Giraffe Project, (h) Citizenship Central (from the National Council of the Social Studies), (i) the Center for Democracy and Citizenship, (j) the Center for Civic Education, (k) Active Citizenship, (l)
American Promise, (m) Character Development Group, and (n) the Bonner Center for Character Education and Citizenship, to name only a few. There is seemingly an unending supply of choices, yet the questions regarding consensus persist.

As mentioned previously, Lickona (1993) claimed that reaching a consensus between the combatants is possible and necessary if the schools are to recapture their character education function. This function centers upon maintaining a moral classroom community, positive peer relationships, using discipline as a tool for character development, and building a democratic classroom (Lickona, 2003). In this paradigm, the idea of a community atmosphere, where all members of the school have shared values could prove to be a good one. There seems to be a growing body of empirical research showing great benefit in community atmosphere for schools. Students in these schools have increased academic motivation (Solomon et al., 2000), ethical and altruistic behavior (Schaps et al., 1997), social and emotional maturity (Solomon et al., 2000), and a reduction of drug use and violence and other problem behaviors (Resnick et al., 1997). Empirical studies are also beginning to show a relationship between character education and academic achievement (Solomon, Battistich, Watson, Schaps, & Lewis, 2000; Elliot, 1999).

In recent years, a number of scholars have shown that schools can function as a beacon of hope in the community (Selznick, 1992), with a strong emphasis upon an ethical atmosphere (Jackson, Boostrum, & Hansen, 1993; Murry, 1995; Roy, 1996). Furthermore, Sergiovanni (1992) discovered that “the evidence from research on school effectiveness . . . and school culture . . . increasingly suggests that effective schools have virtuous qualities that account for a large measure of their success” (p. 99). Likewise, some have found that an orderly school environment with a just discipline program contributes to values education (Leming, 1993), and others have seen the importance of the teacher as an example of positive values for students to
emulate (Williams, 1993). Williams (2000) also noted that the character traits taught would be
not be retained if those in charge did not demonstrate them in their own lives.

Obstacles to Values Education

Yet, there are obstacles to effective values education. While it is clear from public polls
and national leaders’ actions that Americans want the schools to help foster students’ moral
development, there is some “question of whether Americans have decided what exactly they
mean by moral standards” (Hymowitz, 2003, p. 105). In this study, I have defined values
education as the process by which American society instills specific desirable principles
regarding moral behavior and civic responsibility into the citizenry, particularly, the children.
But within three important questions we find a great deal of conflict. Who is to determine those
principles? Which principles are desirable? What role is to be played by the school in teaching
those principles? We have seen the conflict in just how these questions are answered by various
people from different philosophical persuasions, particularly multiculturalism and traditionalism.

Wynne (1989) found that some teachers struggled with the idea of formal values
inculcation. Regarding this struggle, teacher desire to avoid conflict has been a major factor.
Singletary (1992) confirmed this finding in discovering that teachers often avoided teaching
specific values, especially if there is controversy. One factor leading to reluctance during the
nineties was an increase in cultural pluralism (Leming, 1993). Lickona (1993) agreed that in
addition to the other changes that have taken place in American society, two primary barriers to
schools fulfilling their role in values inculcation are “the rapidly intensifying pluralism of
American society . . . and the increasing secularization of the public arena” (p. 6). Callan (1997)
pointed to the public pressure on schools to succeed as a strong limiting factor, as he opined,
“The excursions of teachers into the hazardous territory of moral dialogue are naturally viewed
with suspicion in societies that distrust the ability of schools to do even the easy things well” (p. 196). Other obstacles include the character and knowledge that students bring with them to the classroom and the values of the teacher. Even students’ perspectives come into play. Often values education is not emphasized due to student perceptions. Some studies have shown that students are often bored with politics (Walker, 1996) or suspicious of authorities (Emler & Reicher, 1987). Of course, as mentioned previously, a major barrier to consensus on values education is the conflict between multiculturalists and traditionalists. In this conflict, values education can have radically different meanings, from teaching students to overturn existing hegemony and recreate American culture (Boykin, 1994; Sehr, 1997), to the inculcation of traditional American values for the preservation of society (Lickona, 2003; Schlesinger, 1998).

A final obstacle is that of the structure of public education and “academic standards as a whole” (Berreth & Ernst, 2001, para. 23). All people have become self-proclaimed experts regarding education and yet, no one wants to be answerable for the reforms if they don’t work. Stanford University professor, Michael Kirst calls the resulting cumbersome educational bureaucracy a “political system with everybody and nobody in charge” (Olson, 2000, p. 232). While teachers may support character and civic education, they often “feel overwhelmed by the demands of their state standards”; furthermore, “some schools are reluctant to undertake any initiatives that don't demonstrate immediate increases in academic achievement” since the empirical “links between character education and academic achievement” are “just emerging (Berreth & Ernst, 2001, para. 23).

From Whence We Came

Since the nation’s beginnings values education has occurred in classrooms, but in the 1960’s, societal changes, especially on college and university campuses lead to a new form of
values education that was based upon a relativistic approach to morality and a Marxist understanding of the social sciences. Values inculcation was largely an informal function until the new un-paradigm of Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum’s Values Clarification beginning in the seventies. This was an ideologically driven program under the guise of critical thinking, based upon the musings of Harvard psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg and loosely following the liberal humanist educational theories of Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Dewey, an ideology embraced by many in the multiculturalist camp today. This philosophy of education encourages children to construct their own values based upon their experiences and personal beliefs rather than have their parents’ values passed on to them through moral instruction (Spring, 2002).

Actually, the creators of Values Clarification made it clear that this was not an attempt to teach children to develop their own values but rather an attempt to inculcate their own values paradigm: “The schools must not be allowed to continue fostering the immorality of morality. An entirely different set of values must be nourished” (Simon et al., 1972, p. 20, emphasis mine). Once Americans understood the scope of the moral vacuum created by sixties relativism and Values Clarification, the method and its philosophy were roundly rejected (Callan, 1997; Strike, 1990). Hopefully, Kirschenbaum’s 1992 admission regarding the failure of their paradigm will not fall on deaf ears today: “our position was theoretically flawed and, as history showed, politically untenable” (p. 774), and then sought a different paradigm, saying “we must return to inculcating traditional values in our young people” (p. 774).

Reflecting upon the aforementioned “the immorality of morality,” it is of note that rarely can one find such honesty in those seeking to recreate American culture as we saw in Simon’s admission as change agent in 1972. Those with such an agenda today often speak in “innocuous, vague, euphemistic . . . language” (CASH, 2003a, para. 2), so as to soften their message. It is
easier to respect those who proudly reveal their relativistic position and boldly proclaim their place in the war to overturn American culture than those who follow a more insidious course and seek to gain hegemony through treachery and deceit. In the case of Values Clarification, I find it significant that the authors allowed themselves to be convicted out of their own mouths by calling morality, immoral. This position is of course is consistent with Kohlberg’s ideas, where “rational thinking and autonomous judgment” became the basis of morality (Hymowitz, 2003, p. 105). Kohlberg “scoffed at the idea of teaching children good habits or established moral truths” (an opinion espoused earlier by Rousseau and then Dewey); thus, his theories became a foundation for the “child-centered approaches of progressive educators” (Hymowitz, 2003, p. 105). Although Kohn (1997) related that Kohlberg “was not much enamored of Values Clarification . . . and [that] he spent a fair amount of time arguing against relativism in general” (p. 435), one would not know that based upon his work or his followers. Some empirical studies in recent years have concluded that his moral dilemma approach to values is of little effect in helping students to live ethical lives (Leming, 1993).

Kohlberg’s theories also found favor “among civil libertarians who sought to remove all signs of religion from the schools and who championed the civil and personal rights of students over school authorities” (Hymowitz, 2003, p. 105). Needless to say the results of the relativistic approach were predictable. As Sommers (2002) reflected,

What happens when democratic societies deprive children of the moral knowledge that took civilized man centuries to understand? What happens when educators celebrate children’s creativity and innate goodness but abandon the ancestral responsibility to discipline, train, and civilize them? Unfortunately, we know the answer: we are just emerging from a thirty-year laissez-aller experiment in moral deregulation. (pp. 23-24)

Indeed, we are all paying a heavy toll for that experiment. As Sommers opined, “Had the . . . Littleton [Colorado] schools seen it as their routine duty to civilize the students in their care, they
would never have overlooked the bizarre, antisocial behavior” of the two boys who would later go on a shooting spree at Columbine High School (p. 36). Perhaps, if the adults there had cared more about building character in children than insuring their right to free expression, the wearing of “T-shirts with the words “Serial Killer” emblazoned on them” would have been addressed (p. 36). It seems that “in many high schools, students are [so] confident that their right to free expression will be protected” that they believe that they can do or say anything. Often, “administrators, fearful of challenges by litigious parents, who would be backed by the ACLU and other zealous guardians of students’ rights,” avoid taking any action at all (Sommers, 2002, p. 36). Consider the recent case of the verbal assault of a principal by a student in Michigan, an assault the ACLU supported. The school took appropriate action and ended up in court (Smith v. Mt. Pleasant, 2003). Is it possible that traditionalists are correct in saying that a K-12 curriculum infused with moral content might have created a climate that would make a massacre [like Columbine] unthinkable. For such a depraved and immoral act was indeed unthinkable in the simpleminded days before the schools cast aside their mission of moral edification. An insistence on character education might have diminished the derisive mistreatment at the hands of more popular students suffered by the perpetrators, which apparently was one incitement for their gruesome actions (Sommers, 2002, p. 36).

Unfortunately for the children and adults in Littlefield, we shall never know, but perhaps we have learned from our past and can seek to build a better tomorrow from that knowledge. Yet despite this and other lessons, the conflict continues.

Which Values?

The combatants are often smiling and polite, but the conflict is real for it goes deep into the American psyche. As Fonte (2001) told us, “On the surface, politicians [educational policymakers] seem increasingly inclined to converge on the center. Beneath, however, lies a deeper conflict that is *ideological in the most profound sense of the term*, and that will surely continue in decades to come” (para. 57, emphasis mine). The conflict between multiculturalists
and traditionalists is over control of the curriculum and it is winner take all. The combatant that can seize the moral high ground will capture the hearts and minds of the American people. But how can Americans make a sound judgment? In a revealing essay by the Hudson Institute’s John Fonte, the culture war between multiculturalists and traditionalists is described in terms of “Gramscian and Tocquevillian,” acknowledging the contributions of Italian Marxist intellectual and politician Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) and the French thinker and admirer of American democracy Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859). Fonte (2001) claimed, regarding this culture war, that “the stakes in the battle between the intellectual heirs of these two men are no less than what kind of country the United States will be in decades to come” (para. 2).

The Gramsican vs. Tocquevillian view of the conflict is worth some additional consideration and expands upon what I have explicated throughout this paper regarding the wide rift between the two dominant philosophies in the values education debate. According to Fonte (2001), “Gramsci’s main legacy arises through his departures from orthodox Marxism” (para. 4). Gramsci did follow Marxian thinking that society is divided into two camps: the privileged oppressor and the marginalized oppressed. However, “Gramsci expanded Marx’s ranks of the oppressed” to include “not only the economically oppressed, but also women, racial minorities and many criminals” (para. 5). One does not have to look far in multiculturalist literature to find mention of oppressed or marginalized groups (always groups, never individuals). Thus in Marx and Gramsci we have the concept of group identity: the people, the oppressed groups who “lack unity and, often, even consciousness of their own oppression,” who also need revolutionary leaders to “reverse the correlation of power from the privileged to the marginalized” (para. 4). Multiculturalists, of course, have gone one step further, making the peoples the new paradigm for American identity.
How did this marginalization come about? Gramsci’s analysis was that throughout history, the oppressors had used “power” and “hegemony” to force the oppressed to “internalize the value systems and world views of the privileged groups,” therefore “consent[ing] to their own marginalization” (Fonte, 2001, para. 5). In order to overturn existing power structures, “Gramsci believed that it was necessary first to delegitimize the dominant belief systems of the predominant groups” through a sustained conscious effort and establish a new hegemony—one favoring marginalized groups. Furthermore, the battle to transform society was to be taken to every institution and every social structure, such as, the family, “schools, churches, the media, voluntary associations,” every realm of existence, including “private life, the work place, religion, philosophy, art, and literature, and civil society, in general” (para. 6).

Of course in Gramsci, we see classic relativistic thinking, consistent with the postmodernist un-paradigm of multiculturalists. As Fonte (2001) pointed out, “Gramsci describes his position as absolute historicism,” which has nothing to do with absolutes or historicism. His position is that “morals, values, truths, standards and human nature itself are products of different historical epochs. For Gramsci and his postmodernist decendents, “there are no absolute moral standards that are universally true for all human beings outside of a particular historical context; rather, morality is socially constructed” (para. 9). An example of how Gramsci pays out today is in “jury nullification, a notion which now enjoys the support of law professors at leading universities” (para. 12). The argument is “that minorities serving on juries should use their power as jurors to refuse to convict minority defendants regardless of the evidence presented in court, because the minority defendants have been powerless, lifelong victims of an oppressive system that is skewed in favor of dominant groups, such as white males” (para. 12). A practical application for schools of this mindset can be seen in the ever-popular postmodernist philosophy
and approach to upend hegemony: *critical theory*. Critical theory is a product of “Gramscian and Hegelian-Marxist thinking — is widely influential in both law and education” (para. 13). “Its subcategories include critical race theory and feminist legal theory . . . [seeking to] ‘deconstruct’ . . . ideas that serve as instruments of power for the dominant groups . . . [so as to] serve the interests of the subordinate groups” (para. 13). Fonte goes on to explain how feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon have used critical theory to turn the individual criminal atrocity of “rape” into “group subjugation” and long-standing tenets of American culture such as “rule of law” into nothing more than men having power over women (para. 14). This becomes significant for values education when the U.S. Supreme Court embraces this paradigm, as in its “interpretation of sexual harassment . . . in the [1986] landmark [case], *Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson*” (Para. 15). As Fonte opined, “This is only one example of how major American social policy has come to be based not on Judeo-Christian precepts nor on Kantian-Enlightenment ethics, but on Gramscian and Hegelian-Marxist concepts of group power” (para. 15). As schools make decisions regarding which values to teach, they may well find themselves in court, facing a hostile judge, unless they pay homage to the postmodernist agenda, a situation that is occurring even now.

Traditionalists believe that students benefit from learning and experiencing our cultural practices. Scorning traditional values, many of today’s educational trendsetters prefer the multiculturalist agenda. Self-proclaimed *progressive* educator Alfie Kohn (1997) once gave us an example of this mind set as he likened having children say the Pledge of Allegiance to “reciting a loyalty oath to [Hitler’s] . . . Fatherland” (p. 433). Kohn and those of his paradigm would have educators avoid “indoctrination” (p. 429) of traditional values and instead embrace a
constructivist approach to ethics that allows students to create their own values, something he does not seem to think is relativistic (Kohn, 1997).

In examining the conflict over which values to teach, there is clear distinction between the multiculturalist and traditionalist approach. The controversy surrounding values education can be found even in the definition of a word. It is interesting to note the multicultural nature of the previously mentioned Guidelines for Comprehensive Sexuality Education in one of a number of “developmental messages” (knowledge to be learned and values to be inculcated) presented in the document. According to the Guidelines, a family is “two or more people who care for each other in many ways” (NGTF, 1996, p. 18). This loose definition of family fits the multiculturalist agenda. In a society where the divorce rate pushes fifty percent (even higher for the African American community) and where many who do not marry live together, it seems as if the multiculturalists are simply embracing the problem, rather than trying to make repairs. Even so, this definition would not suit all Americans. As one traditionalist wrote,

The concept of the traditional family in Western or American culture refers to the marriage of two heterosexual adults, who from such a union have children by birth or adoption, who are responsible for the nurture, education, and welfare of their children, and who are sexually and economically faithful to one another. (Schmidt, 1997, p. 8)

This definition would be offensive to the multiculturalist camp, as Sehr (1997) opined, “the conservative ‘family values’ discourse has become a thinly veiled drive to weaken or ban a number of private, individual rights such as women's control over reproductive decisions, freedom of artistic expression, and freedom to choose one's sexual orientation” (p. 69). These individual rights seem to be more about license than liberty. Historically speaking, the two-parent family (one of each gender) has been a major stabilizing force in societies and when the family structure of a society breaks down because of sexual promiscuity, that society is bound to come apart as well.
Suffice it to say, not everyone has the opportunity to grow up in a two-parent family. Many lose fathers or mothers through divorce or death, while others are born out of wedlock. There certainly needs to be a broad acceptance for these children within the school community and society at large, but this is not the purpose of the multiculturalists. The attempt to redefine the meaning of *family* is more closely tied to gaining acceptance for other social agendas, such as that of the gay and lesbian lobby, the radical feminists, and the socialists. Others would say that there is an adaptation to the traditional definition that would help it fit more people. In a speech delivered at Hillsdale College, William Bennett (2003) talked about families:

> We all know, based on countless studies as well as common sense, that if you want to raise happy and successful children, the best formula is a two-parent family. Despite the fact that not all of us have that opportunity – my brother and I were raised by a single parent who was married several times – it’s nevertheless true. But the statistic I discovered when writing my book was that children who lose a father in the line of duty – because the father is a police officer or a soldier, for example – are indistinguishable from children who grow up in intact two-parent families. Why is that? It is because the moral example doesn’t have to be there physically. *It can be in the mind and in the heart.* As a result of Lisa Beamer saying, “Be like him,” then, Todd Beamer will be in the minds and hearts of his kids. (para. 12, emphasis mine)

Clearly it is the duty of educators to teach each child placed in their care and to show genuine acceptance and respect, regardless of the background or experience of the child. Both multiculturalists and traditionalists would embrace that view. However, when it comes to values, the paths seldom cross.

A traditionalist perspective would support having schools teach students the ethical and behavioral norms of American society. A multiculturalist perspective would be more supportive of allowing children to discover their own values, so long as the ones they discover are not traditionalist in nature, thus guiding the child toward becoming a citizen of the world (Heslep, 2002). As explicated by multiculturalist philosopher Martha Nussbaum in a number of publications, attachment to one nationality is a destructive tendency of the old order and that
we should help students to shift their moral allegiance to the global community (Nussbaum, 1999, 2003a). In this perspective, the “fundamental identity we have is as members of a moral world of human beings” (Nussbaum, 2003a, para. 8). Like many multiculturalists, she urges the United States to broaden its understanding of other legal and economic systems, so as to adapt our institutions to better fit the world model (Nussbaum, 2002, 2003b). This model has even found favor in the hearts of some U.S. Supreme Court Justices, as they seek to move from basing their decisions wholly upon the U.S. Constitution to considering “foreign experience” as they move toward “globalization” (Breyer, 2003, para. 2, 5). This is consistent with the multiculturalist concept of remaking American culture, which is in opposition to the traditionalist model of maintaining American culture by teaching specific American values so as to help develop hearts and minds toward participatory American citizenship.

One consideration in this conflict is the place of religion, specifically Christianity, which was a foundational component of higher law as embraced by the American Founders. While it is clear that the public schools cannot Constitutionally teach the acceptance of a particular religion as an absolute, they can and should help students understand that this nation was founded upon a number of principles, including those with a religious origin. Traditionalists would support allowing schools to teach about all religions, in the belief that students could clearly see origins of American principles, specifically as evidenced by the writings of the Founders. Rather than risk allowing students to see value in traditional philosophies, many multiculturalists would portray the United States as a non-religious society. In Revolutionizing America’s schools (1998), Glickman stated that we are a “secular humanist society” (p. 95) and that people who argue that secular humanism is a religion are guilty of an argument that is “ridiculous in its circular reasoning” (p. 95). I suppose that he would not approve of Merriam-Webster’s definition
of religion as “a cause, principle, or system of beliefs held to with ardor and faith” (2003, para. 1). Further they define secular humanism as “humanistic philosophy viewed as a nontheistic religion antagonistic to traditional religion” (2003, para. 1). Even the courts have referred to atheism and secular humanism in the context of religious beliefs (Allegheny v. ACLU, 1989; Grove v. Mead School District, 1985; Malnak v. Yogi, 1977; Theriault v. Silber, 1977; Torasco v. Watkins, 1961). It seems that Glickman (1998) is supporting the position of the multiculturalists, allowing for decisions about values education to be “freely debated” (p. 96), in the “marketplace of ideas” (p. 97), so long as those with a traditional view are marginalized and not allowed to influence the outcome. Yet he seems to change direction by saying that he is “troubled that we haven’t acknowledged that there is a common core of virtue for American education, rooted in religious, spiritual, and private conscience” (p. 98). Even amidst his argument, one can see the absurdity of concluding that we are a secular humanist society. Polls tell us differently as does even a cursory examination of our history and the lives of every day Americans. Secularists would prefer to have an impenetrable wall of separation between any hint of religion and the public arena, a virtual Berlin Wall, bristling with armaments ready to slay any who dare an encroachment. This is a concept not found in the Constitution, yet often attributed to it by secularist and multiculturalist judges sitting on a few federal courts. Even so, as many point out, absolutes can still be seen as universal, outside of a religious context, as is indicated in the political and business world (Coyne & Coyne, 2001). However, it seems that for some, the idea of absolutes are too limiting, even though, without any absolutes, values education is doomed to collapse. Yet, perhaps there is hope because according to Glickman (1998), “the only absolute value is democracy” (p. 106), which is a concept that appears have a multitude of interpretations.
In the end, the question of which values to teach cannot be solved easily. Some might disagree, saying that the solution is quite obvious: “We teach everyone's values” (Nord & Haynes, 1998, para. 18). In other words, we seek consensus on a core set of beliefs and focus our energies there. The strategy would be the following: “When we agree with each other we teach the importance and rightness of those consensus values. When we disagree, we teach about the alternatives and withhold judgment” (Nord & Haynes, 1998, para. 18). It seems that an overwhelming amount of judgment must then be withheld. Perhaps those with the compromising mind do not acknowledge the scope of the conflict. For the combatants, the conflict appears to be a winner-take-all war for the hearts and minds of American children, and thus the nation’s future.

Sexualization

In the public arena and across the educational community, there is great concern about the state of our children’s values and implications for the future. Thomas Lickona (2003) commented in a recent interview with Scholastic Early Childhood Today: “Civilizations decline when their moral core deteriorates. One of our most basic responsibilities as adults is to sustain our civilization by passing on the values that are the foundation of our society” (para. 1). Are there specific American values that are, as Lickona put it “the foundation of our society” (para. 1)? The problem, of course, comes with getting everyone to embrace the same values. Lickona, a strong proponent of character education and an advocate to minimize sexual education content, opined ten years ago that our foundations are being shaken by “an omnipresent sexual culture that fills our television and movie screens with sleaze, beckoning the young toward sexual activity at ever-earlier ages” (p. 6). Where does the school come in on this issue? Should
educators embrace the programs of SEICUS, Planned Parenthood, and GLSEN, continuing the
sexualization of children?

What has been the result of our thirty-plus year affair with teaching young children to
embrace their sexuality long before they are emotionally ready to handle the consequences?
Lickona (2000) gave an answer:

sexual promiscuity, teen pregnancy, unwed births, the highest teen abortion rate in the
developed world, an explosion of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), a cluster of
emotional and behavioral problems associated with premature sex, widespread sexual
harassment, an enormous pornography industry, and the sexual abuse of children. (p. 61)

Other consequences include higher suicide and poverty rates (Rector, Johnson, Noyes, & Martin,
2003). This should not be the future, according to Lickona (2000) and many other traditionalists.
As he opined, “if families and schools don't form an alliance against a highly sexualized media
culture, we are throwing our children to the wolves” (p. 60).

According to Leming (1993) and a myriad of others, sexuality education taught without a
strong values component is ineffective. Despite the arguments of secularists, this is not about
bringing religion into the classroom. As Nord and Haynes (1998) opined,

Given our civic framework, it is not permissible for a public school to institutionalize a
moral or religious position on a divisive issue and teach it to children uncritically. Given
our educational framework, students must learn about the alternative positions when we
disagree; all the major voices must be included in the discussion. (para. 40)

In a society that is pluralistic but not relativistic, we can respect each individual, allowing for
diverse opinions on controversial topics. Nord and Haynes (1998) continued:

The civic ground rules of our democracy and the ideal of liberal education require that we
respect the pluralistic nature of our society and take seriously the various participants in
our cultural conversation about what is morally required of us. But teachers must not take
this to mean that all moral positions are equally good or true. The fact that we disagree
about the nature of morality doesn't mean there are not better and worse ways of thinking
about it. (para. 46)
Lickona and other traditionalists have ideas regarding character-based sex education that have proven to be effective and widely embraced by a majority of parents and their children. While dialogue must continue, sexual experimentation with our children’s future is a bad idea. There clearly need to be democratically arrived at solutions to values inculcation conflicts, but the solutions we find must be based upon the common principles of our republic. The challenge is in finding these without having civil war and without allowing our children to be devoured.

Policies and Programs

The conflict can be seen in policies and programs carried out in schools across the nation. In the public schools of Oakland, California, a letter written by a fifth-grader from Sequoia Elementary School to President Bush appeared in the Oakland Tribune. The school system there took a strong stand against the war in Iraq. The letter states, “When you go to war, you are setting a bad example for all the kids in the U.S.A. Wars and fights are not right” (Hymowitz, 2003, p. 108). Perhaps this child learned these values from home, at school, or both. If the school is indeed taking a particular stand regarding the war, either for or against, then values are being taught. Traditionalists would support the right of local communities to teach their children their own values. Oakland is certainly a center of multiculturalist philosophy, considering that their Congressional Representative, Barbara Lee (2003) is arguably one of the more liberal of politicians. Thus, if the people of Oakland want to teach globalization and peace education, that would be their right under the Tenth Amendment: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” However, this situation brings some questions to mind: Is there a double standard regarding values education in California? Would multiculturalists support the
right of traditionalist communities to teach traditional values? When Breen Elementary School in Rocklin, California displayed “God Bless America” in front of their school in wake of the 9/11 attacks, the ACLU demanded its removal, calling the display a “hurtful, devise message” (Brown, 2001, para. 2). Members of both the Democratic and Republican parties overwhelmingly showed their approval for the display, passing a supporting resolution 404-0 (Brown, 2001). Later, in June, 2002, California’s ultra-liberal Ninth Circuit Court ordered the words “Under God” removed from the Pledge of Allegiance for the region’s schools. Should the Federal court there allow the multiculturalist values inculcation in Oakland while denying traditionalist values inculcation in every community within its nine state jurisdiction? The Court, later amended the decision under severe political and public outrage, saying it only applied to “the California law requiring a teacher lead recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in that state’s public elementary schools” (AHA, 2003, para. 3). Is the inculcation of one set of values inculcation while the inculcating of another set simply freedom of speech? The answers depend upon the philosophy. While multiculturalists might consider the situation in Oakland exemplary, traditionalists might well find the values education there “vastly insufficient” (Hymowitz, 2003, p. 109). As one traditionalist opined, “tolerance, peacefulness, and equality may be key democratic virtues,” but the picture is not complete “without honesty, courage, and personal responsibility” (Hymowitz, 2003, p. 109). Whether multiculturalist or traditionalist, it seems that teachers are actively teaching values in schools.

In examining the conflict, the battleground seems to move from the schools into the courts frequently as evidenced from cases such as in 1999, when the State College Area School District (Pennsylvania) adopted an all-encompassing policy against harassment which considered harassment as “…verbal or physical conduct based on race, sex, national origin, sexual
orientation or other personal characteristics that has the effect of creating an intimidating or hostile environment” (Hudson, 2002, para. 5). Any number of behaviors could be considered harassment, such as “…unsolicited derogatory remarks, jokes, demeaning comments or behaviors, slurs, mimicking, name calling, graffiti, innuendo, gestures…” as well as “…clothing, physical appearance, social skills, peer group, intellect, educational program, hobbies or values” (Hudson, 2002, para. 6). A suit was filed by Penn State professor David Warren Saxe as the “legal guardian of two students in the school district” on the grounds that “their religion taught that homosexuality was a sin and that the school board's policy interfered with their right to speak out about their religious beliefs” (Zernike, 2001, p. A10). It seems that Saxe believed that the district was trying to promote homosexuality and attempting to silence parents, teachers, and students who opposed their agenda by issuing the policy which was in addition to what he believed were ample anti-bullying laws already in existence. Reversing a lower court decision in Saxe v. State College Area School District (2001), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals “ruled unanimously . . . that the policy of the State College Area School District was vague and overbroad and would punish students for ‘simple acts of teasing and name calling’” (Zernike, 2001, p. A10).

Which Content?: Curricular Decisions

In the culture war being fought in American schools, it is more than the policies and procedures that determine the values to be inculcated, one must also consider the content of the curriculum. There is a great deal of controversy about the curriculum in just about every subject. There have been longstanding arguments about values issues in history, health, literature, and even in biology. What is amazing is that many refuse to even grant dialogue to those of opposing views. This is painfully clear, for example, in the curricular decisions regarding the origin of life.
Many secular scientists, educators, commentators, and politicians go absolutely ballistic at the mention of intelligent design or even the slightest doubt voiced about the validity of evolutionary theory, this despite the existence of a growing number of scientists who question the status quo (Behe, 1996, 2002; Dembski, 2003; Denton, 1998). This debate has existed for years, even among scientists who largely accept evolution as fact. Consider the statement of University of Oklahoma professor emeritus David B. Kitts (1979):

> The fossil record doesn't even provide any evidence in support of Darwinian theory except in the weak sense that the fossil record is compatible with it, just as it is compatible with other evolutionary theories, and revolutionary theories and special creationist theories and even historical theories. (p. 353)

Intellectually honest scholars will admit that one cannot scientifically prove all of the components of evolutionary theory any more than one can prove all of the facets of other origin of life theories. Yet dialogue is not allowed by the scientific majority, effectively marginalizing any who disagree with their views.

The most vociferous debate, however, is in the social studies. The American Political Science Association (APSA) (1998) weighed in regarding the value of teaching values through the social studies curriculum by saying

> we believe that the factual political knowledge we do and must teach can only become meaningful in political practice when presented within a valuational framework. We believe we must therefore teach the specific virtues on which effective political practice depends. (p. 637)

These virtues would include “human liberation and human dignity,” without which a “healthy democratic polity” cannot be achieved (p. 637). In this approach, values to be taught would include tolerance, collaboration, analysis, and our traditions. This is a position made a little more clear in their articulation statement: “Teach the motivation and competence to engage actively in public problem-solving” (APSA, 1998, p. 636). Yet what remains unclear is the meaning of
words such as *traditions* in context of the culture war. Just what does it mean to be an American and what representation of our nation is presented in social studies classrooms?

We can gain some insight from a study from Cornbleth (2002), who sought to determine student perceptions of the nation and the future. Twenty-five students from 3 high schools in upstate New York were interviewed and observed during social studies classes and other times. One school was predominately white, one mostly African-American and one which was more diverse, with a majority Hispanic population. The results of the study could have been predicted, based upon the location of the study, the cultural orientation of the participants, and the size of the sample. While all three groups recognized the existence of discrimination and social inequities in the U.S., the African-American and Hispanic students had a less optimistic view of the future than did the students of European descent. It is interesting to point out that even with this view, most of the minority students had a view that freedom and opportunity were synonymous terms with *America*. Most of those surveyed felt good about their individual possibilities for the future and were generally supportive of maintaining a degree of patriotism. Studies such as this one show that students seem to recognize the cultural factors contributing to the combative nature of decision-making regarding public schooling in America. While conclusions were reached about student perceptions, nothing was sought (and thus nothing discovered) regarding the nature of the content presented to these students by their high school teachers and the political orientation of their respective parents and communities (save one brief mention of state history standards). It would have been interesting to compare their perceptions with their instruction. Only then could one truly know the origins of their opinions.

In short, this study provides no new revelation regarding our considerations of the culture war. Considering the liberal bent of most social studies departments and teacher preparation
programs at the university level, it is expected that students learning U.S. history in American public high schools will learn of the wrongs of slavery, the abuses of the industrial age, and ethnic and gender discrimination, among other injustices throughout our history. What cannot be assumed is that these same students will learn much of the benefits of living in a land where inalienable rights exist along side rule of law and other timeless principles upon which our nation was founded. Cornbleth concluded her article with an assertion that schools are incapable of, and should not be in the business of the inculcation of cultural norms. Yet, she contradicted her assertion by insisting that schools should embrace diverse cultural norms. She advocated that our classrooms be forums where diverse thought can enlighten people of traditional American thinking. There seems to be a desire to reshape the nation into something different than it was designed to be. For those of Cornbleth’s paradigm, the teaching of American history should focus on the failures, inconsistencies, and inequities of our past and present, with very little consideration given to the principles upon which our republic is based.

This is not a new call, for many voices today cry out for freedom (to get what I want), justice (to have revenge for perceived slights), and equality (by lowering standards, expectations, and even other people if necessary). In short, I believe that this author has a worthwhile point, that we would do well to maintain a “dialogue among differences” so as to gain maximum benefit from our diversity. At the same time, she totally misses the concept of one nation, undivided, with a foundation upon which to stand, by refusing to allow for schools to attempt to “impose commonality of any stripe” (Cornbleth, 2002, p. 549). In such presentations, one can clearly observe that there are major philosophical differences between multiculturalists and traditionalists as relate to their respective views of America and the need for values inculcation.
Multiculturalists focus on diverse and relativistic values as held by groups claiming ethnic, gender and other differences, while traditionalists focus on unity through common values.

The multiculturalist view is more than a little critical of traditional Western civilization, seeing all the evils of humankind wrapped up in the American flag. Postmodernist philosopher, William Paringer summed up the multiculturalist position. Paringer (1990) saw nothing revolutionary about America, calling it racist, sexist, and classist, decrying that there is no democracy until “egalitarian conditions and structures have been prioritized, after the absence of discrimination toward women and minority populations, the gross disparities of economic distribution are rebalanced, and the welfare of the planet to sustain life is insured” (p. 42). Multiculturalists would have schools inculcate students in the values of liberal cultural democracy, with an emphasis on ethnicity, class, and gender issues. Traditionalists, on the other hand, are fully supportive of American foundational values; as Schlesinger (1998) offered, these values “are anchored in our national experience, in our great national documents, in our national heroes, in our folkways, traditions, and standards” (p. 147). The values we embrace were born in our nation’s turbulent past. As Schlesinger (1998) pointed out, we have not come to the time when our values are “fully realized for every citizen,” but the principles are foundational for all that we do (p. 147). Yet it is also worth remembering that there is danger in our attempts to secure the rights of every individual, the danger of sacrificing the rights of the majority. This argument is taken up in Philip K. Howard’s *The Lost Art of Drawing the Line: How fairness Went Too Far* (2001). His position is that we have lost the ability to draw the line between the public good and individual rights, a concept that has perhaps escaped the courts and the ACLU.

Perhaps Fonte’s (2001) analysis is all too true: “Tocquevillians [traditionalists] and Gramscians [multiculturalists] clash on almost everything that matters. Tocquevillians believe
that there are objective moral truths applicable to all people at all times. Gramscians believe that moral truths [read opinions] are subjective and depend upon historical circumstances.”

Traditionalists believe that “civic and moral truths must be revitalized in order to remoralize society” while those of a multiculturalist philosophy support the postmodernist idea “that civic and moral truths must be socially constructed by subordinate groups in order to achieve political and cultural liberation.” Fonte summarizes the traditionalist view of the conflict in saying that “Tocquevillians favor the transmission of the American regime” (American values inculcation), while “Gramscians [favor] its transformation” (multiculturalist values inculcation) (para. 58).

Coming to America has been and continues to be the dream of many around the world because it meant political and religious freedom as well as economic and social opportunity. That freedom and opportunity has existed because of the absolute principles upon which we were founded. Natural rights, higher law, and rule of law as explicated in this paper are the backbone of American society and that dream embraced by so many people. If the dream is to remain alive, then America’s public schools must foster a sense of ethical character and civic competence in students. To fail in this task is to bring about an end to the idea of America and the dreams of millions of people here and throughout the world. As Fonte put it:

America would at last become Europeanized: statist, thoroughly secular, post-patriotic, and concerned with group hierarchies and group rights in which the idea of equality before the law as traditionally understood by Americans would finally be abandoned. Beneath the surface of our seemingly placid times, the ideological, political, and historical stakes are enormous (para. 59)

The idea of America can only survive if each new generation learns and takes to heart the principles therein.

The Purposes of Schooling

Historically, the overriding purposes of education have included some form of values instruction but have largely focused upon preparation for the work world. Government sponsored
school reform efforts have, for the past ten to fifteen years, emphasized academic standards, testing, and school accountability geared to improve economic efficiency and insure a competent work force. Goodlad (1997) argued that the purpose of education in America should be is to develop “collective as well as individual democratic character” (p. 126) and that it must be “routinely fostered by the culture” (p. 127). We can indeed see broad agreement within the government and civil society regarding the importance of schools in the values education process (Ambach v. Norwick, 1979; Dayton, 1994). As Dayton pointed out, “Clearly public schools cannot indoctrinate dogmatic beliefs, but may legitimately inculcate democratic values.” Quoting Stewart, Dayton referred to the need for balanced values education: “students must be shown that there exists a middle ground between blind adherence to a monolithic orthodoxy and the nihilistic belief that no idea is better than any other” (p. 7).

Soder (2001) agreed: “The fundamental purpose of schools, on this view, is to teach children their moral and intellectual responsibilities for living and working in a democracy” (p. 194). However, others such as Labaree (1997) have pointed out that schools are in the awkward position of being all things to all people. This presents often mutually exclusive goals that schools are expected to reach. The public has come to demand schools should be accountable to shape students into a functioning member to fit the greater society’s need (social efficiency), insure that students have maximum opportunity to reach their highest potential (social mobility), and safeguard all liberties, including absolute equal access to every part of the socio-economic system to all groups (democratic equality) (Labaree, 1997). In short, the culture war has been brought into the classroom. All three goals cannot be accomplished equally. If we are to follow Labaree’s thinking, the war in education has become a fight between individual advancement and public good, with knowledge being the main casualty. Much of his complaint centers upon
the loss of scholarship, a charge many traditionalists would support. He opined, “We have consciously created an education system based on attaining formal markers of success -- grades, credits, and degrees -- rather than one based on acquiring substantive knowledge” (Labaree, 2000, para. 18). Thus, in an attempt to meet everyone’s expectations, schools may well find themselves meeting no one’s.

A number of multiculturalists believe that a primary purpose for public schools is “the protection, strengthening, celebration and perpetuation of ethnic origins and identities,” with academic subjects such as history and literature not taught as intellectual disciplines, but rather as “therapies whose function is to raise minority self-esteem” (Schlesinger, 1998, p. 22). Traditionalists, on the other hand, believe that schools should teach these subjects “as part of the intellectual equipment for civilized persons,” not degrading them by “allowing . . . content to be dictated by pressure groups, whether ideological, economic, religious, or ethnic” (Schlesinger, 1998, p. 146). If we truly understand the negative effects of segregation upon racial attitudes, then separatism will not be our course. As Spencer Maxcy (2002) put it, “what began as a monolithic educational space in the early nineteenth century, dominated by one culture and one set of values, has moved through phases of cultural pluralism, the melting pot, cultural diversity, cultural identity, and now cultural isolation” (p. 4).

What is Democracy?

One particular irony is that everyone in the debate seems to use the term democracy to describe his or her approach to these matters. John Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy lent itself to democratic cultural pluralism, but one that was more traditional than today’s political multiculturalism. How democracy is defined today depends upon whom you ask. Perhaps the greatest casualty in the struggle to determine the school’s function in values inculcation, outside
of knowledge, is our understanding of democracy. As explicated in Chapter 4, there is a wide range of opinion regarding the meaning of democracy and what type is best suited for the United States and her schools. The basic disagreement seems to be between a freedom-oriented democracy as envisioned by Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence, which for some is more like the democracy of the French Revolution, against that of an order-oriented democracy of Madison’s paradigm in the Constitution, based upon rule of law and moral absolutes (Maxcy, 1995). Aside from these two there are a plethora of reformers ready to capture hegemony. Some reformers would advocate a socialist democracy (Paringer, 1990), others a cultural democracy (Giroux, 1994; Maxcy, 1995), and still others, an ecological democracy (Goodlad, 2001). Most predictably, each of these could fit well under the banner of a multicultural democracy (Marable, 1992; Sehr, 1997). Furthermore, some would see little consistency in the basic principles of democracy as Dixon (1997) determined that democracy does not appear to be “rooted in any particular set of cultural values, nor does it have “any agreed upon institutions or processes” (p. 6). This would fly in the face of the perspective of traditionalists who see democracy as a strong feature of American culture.

In examining the meaning of democracy, definitions of other terms become critical. Consider extremist and radical. Many on the left would say that the so-called right wing traditionalists are the extremists, while many on the right would see extremists as leftist multiculturalists. Sehr (1997) referred to liberal sociologist Robert Bellah in his obvious contempt for the traditional American values of rule of law and the right to property. “These attitudes, which Bellah and his co-authors trace to ‘Lockean individualism,’ might be understood more simply as part of an ideology of irresponsible individualism” (p. 173). So for Sehr and
many multiculturalists, people who embrace the foundational tenets of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution are the extremists. Furthermore, according to Sehr,

Irresponsible individualism contributes to, and helps justify, individual and collective inertia in the face of the decay of the nation's economic infrastructure; the deterioration of our cities; mounting social inequality; heightening bias-related conflict stemming from racism, sexism, and homophobia; and mushrooming violence throughout the nation. Irresponsible individualism exacerbates these centrifugal social forces, which threaten to tear our society apart. (p. 173)

Thus for those of Sehr’s position (multiculturalists), the traditionalists have become the radicals, causing many problems by our undemocratic values. He lauds cultural diversity, while standing against anything remotely related to the traditional majority American culture. Consider an ideal course at what he considers a model urban school: “Non-European Traditions: Stability and Change in Selected Asian, Central American, and African States” (p. 175). Americans might benefit from understanding “non-European traditions,” yet those European (read: English) traditions were part of what our Founders used to help build the American democratic republic.

Dayton (1994) argued that our nation’s democratic foundations are built largely upon the U.S. Constitution, thus the foundation for our schools should be the U.S. Constitution as well. His central point is that the values inherent in the Constitution are “derived from the perpetual human struggle for freedom” and that they have been “thoroughly tested through human history before and after the adoption of the Constitution,” being “as relevant today as they were when they were adopted” (p. 9). Among the values to be inculcated if a Constitutional democracy based upon rule of law is to be embraced: freedom of speech and expression, tolerance of different views, civility in disagreements, the embrace of not only rights, but also responsibilities, and the fundamental equality of all individuals. If the diversity of our nation is to be a strength rather than a weakness, then democratic value inculcation must be the “sworn duty of the public schools” as well as the “sacred trust of each generation of Americans” (p. 22).
There seem to be at least a few common themes when considering democratic themes as many from both the left and right would agree with Dayton’s paradigm. Patricia White (1997) opined, “democracy is distinguished by its values—justice, freedom, and respect for personal autonomy” (p. 1). While her terminology might find broad acceptance, one may legitimately question whether liberals and conservatives would agree with the meaning of the words. Consider these terms in context of such topics as the death penalty, affirmative action, and abortion for example. Clearly people do construct their own understanding of words. This is not to say that I give any credence to the relativistic constructivism that would deny the existence of a true meaning of any word or thought, just that finding a definition that we can agree upon is difficult. I will agree with Glickman (1998) however, that if the postmodernists have a point, it is that “analytical, causal, objective reasoning does limit discourse, and puts artificial boundaries on what should be examined and discussed” (p. 91). What is needed is a Jeffersonian willingness to accept error in discussion. “If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it” (Jefferson, 1801, para. 2).

In attempting to define democracy, others have a more thorough definition. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Glickman (1998) says democracy has three characteristics: equality, meaning “every member of society has the same power and worth in regard to influence, decision making, justice, and due process,” liberty, meaning everyone is free to formulate opinions, with no discrimination, and fraternity, meaning that all participate in the social contract (p. 3). Others still might see a more simple meaning. Hoffert (2001) defines democracy as a society where “every human being has a fundamental value” (p. 28). This seems a reasonable goal. Yet what
environment is necessary for democracy to exist? According to Soder (2001), there are twelve conditions for democracy: (a) “trust” of each other, (b) “exchange” of goods and services, (c) “social capital” (basic provision for all), (d) “respect for equal justice under law,” (e) “respect for civil discourse,” (f) “recognition of the need for E Pluribus Unum,” (g) “free and open inquiry,” (h) “knowledge of rights,” (i) “freedom,” (j) “recognition of the tension between freedom and order,” (k) “recognition of the difference between a persuaded audience and a more thoughtful public,” and (l) “ecological understanding” (p. 189-193). Even in so thorough a list, multiculturalists and traditionalists would find much disagreement.

Americanization

Part of the paradigm of both multiculturalists and traditionalists is to build citizens. The question is, citizens of what? In the multiculturalist perspective, students should be developed into citizens of the world, as multiculturalist law and ethics professor Martha Nussbaum (1996) opined that our “primary allegiance is to the community of human beings in the entire world” (para. 3) and that “making world citizenship, rather than democratic/national citizenship, education’s central focus” (para. 17). Suffice it to say, her desire to share the American values of “respect for human dignity and the opportunity for each person to pursue happiness” (para. 23) with the world are noble and proper, but they fit squarely within the traditionalist paradigm and cannot be accomplished by destroying the national spirit that gave birth to them in the first place. Nussbaum and other multiculturalists are right to insist that “we are morally required to think about what that conception [our belief in higher law natural rights] requires us to do with and for the rest of the world” (para. 21). I believe that we have continually done so.

The United States has been the single largest philanthropic nation in history in terms of humanitarian aid in the face of disaster and military support in the face of violence and continues
to stand beside people around the globe who pursue freedom and peace. A sense of global responsibility continues to be a central tenet in American society. While reasonable citizens have always disagreed about the direction of our nation, we have always been free to debate it. Reflecting upon this idea on a recent trip to Britain, President George W. Bush (2003) was commenting on the actions of some protestors in London: “I've noticed that the tradition of free speech—exercised with enthusiasm—is alive and well here in London. We have that at home, too. They now have that right in Baghdad, as well” (para. 4). While it is true that our history has some wretched stains, it also features liberation and justice for countless millions. Traditionalists want students to know the whole truth about America, the world, and cultures; they need the truth about strengths and weaknesses, successes and failures. Both multiculturalists and traditionalists want values education to include an ethic of care about others here and elsewhere. Students also need to pursue citizenship, so the question is: where shall their allegiance lie? Multiculturalists and traditionalists seem to have different answers to that question.

In contrast to Nussbaum, traditionalist Peter Brimelow argued for replacing today’s multiculturalism with a renewed Americanization in his book on the pitfalls of mass immigration, Alien Nation (1995). Multiculturalist Joel Spring (2002), who has an admittedly Indiocentric viewpoint, found offense in Brimelow’s thesis, calling his ideas “racist” (p. 53). Many might find Spring’s playing of the race card inappropriate and his observation incorrect. Some might even consider having annual limits on immigration and teaching new Americans something of the culture, good ideas. Furthermore, is it racism to preserve the culture and foundational principles of a nation? If so, every nation on earth is guilty. It seems reasonable to assume that the nation that allows immigration to the extent that any other cultural group becomes a majority will become a different nation. For example, if we suddenly imported three
hundred million people from China, would American culture stay the same? If new Americans
don’t learn anything of the existing culture (language, customs, traditions, politics, religion,
principles, laws), can they be expected to help preserve them? For the multiculturalist,
everything is about color and race. For the traditionalist, it’s about preserving culture, the very
thing multiculturalists tell immigrants to do. Where is the racism in teaching children of recent
immigrants how best to not only survive, but also to prosper in our society? Apparently those of
Spring’s philosophy see racism in any attempt to preserve American culture.

Needless to say, those who are unwilling to have dialogue on these and other
controversial issues are only exacerbating the problems we face as a nation. While thoroughly
impressed with his research on educational history, I find Spring’s rhetoric and name calling
rather disturbing. Aside from his accusations of racism, a term that I believe he misrepresents,
Spring referred to the connections between conservative scholars as “a web” (Spring, 2002, pp.
53-54), as in a web of deception or deceit—not a complimentary idea. He even has a web-like
chart with all the names connected. Not that those on the right don’t engage in similar tactics, but
it goes without saying that genuine dialogue cannot include personal attacks.

The American Race?

As discussed in Chapter 5, J. Hector St. John Crevecoeur was the first to write of the
American Race, which was multi-ethnic from the start, but was united behind American
principles, leaving behind the myriad ways of their countries of origin. Yet today, the values
education debate seems to center upon concepts such as race, gender, and class. For
multiculturalism, as I have defined it, these are the components of identity and must be kept front
and center in values education. For traditionalism, as I have defined it, race, gender, and class do
not matter. The principles apply to all without bias. Despite the injustices evident in our nation’s
past, there is no room for racism in the principles of Americanism. Multiculturalists seem to believe that since inconsistencies exist between our foundational principles and our history, that the entire American paradigm is flawed and should be replaced by “world citizenship” (Nussbaum, 1996, para. 17). Traditionalists do not follow the globalist paradigm of Nussbaum, Paringer, Sehr, Spring, and others, as I have described. Yet, despite the fact that the two groups see each other as misguided, dialogue between people of varying perspectives is crucial. As Glickman (1998) pointed out, the perspective of both multiculturalists and traditionalists can be seen in individual lives. It is rather easy to find stories of both successes and failures of our nation to live up to its promise. So outside of philosophies, policies, and practices, is there observable conflict in formal values education?

An examination of one particular program brings insight. There is a vagueness about some values programs today that inclines toward relativism and brings back memories of Values Clarification. Consider Living Values: An Educational Program (LVEP), sponsored by the Brahma Kumaris World Spiritual Organization (BKWSO) and supported by the United Nations. Proponents claim this program to be on the cutting edge of values education and a model for all schools to follow. At first glance traditionalists might approve but multiculturalists might be wary, as the organization claims to support “fundamental core values which are in alignment with natural laws and divine universal principles governing human nature and conduct” (Brahma Kumaris World Spiritual University [BKWSU], 1995a, para. 2). Many of the values expressed in the program seem to be universal: “Cooperation, Freedom, Happiness, Honesty, Humility, Love, Peace, Respect, Responsibility, Simplicity, Tolerance, and Unity” (para. 3). There also appears to be some success in implementing the program. The LVEP website claims the program is being successfully implemented in “66 countries…[with] over 4000 sites” (Living Values: An
Educational Program [LVEP], 2004, para. 7) and that “results from schools indicate that students are responsive to the values activities and become interested in discussing and applying values.” Furthermore, “teachers report not only a decrease in aggressive behavior, but also note that students are more motivated and exhibit an increase in positive and cooperative personal and social skills” (LVEP, 2004, para. 4).

However, upon further review, the relativism of this program shows forth in the questions that are asked, such as, “how do we empower individuals to choose their own set of values” (LVEP, 2004, para. 1). Some additional insight comes in looking at the organization behind the program: the Brahma Kumaris World Spiritual Organization, which sprang from Hinduism and Eastern mysticism in an Indian commune in the late nineteen thirties (BKWSU, 1995b). One of their foundational principles could have just as easily been found in Rousseau or Dewey, while the other comes straight from Eastern religion: “It recognizes the intrinsic goodness of all human beings and teaches meditation to help each one rediscover their inner resources and strengths” (BKWSO, 1995c, para. 1). Where is the ACLU when you need them? Why is the secularist branch of the multiculturalist lobby allowing this religion-based program to venture forth unimpeded? Are these the best principles for values education in the United States? This would certainly seem consistent with the principles of many multiculturalists, but directly opposed to American foundations and those of many traditionalists, which is exactly why the ACLU and other defenders of freedom don’t stand against such programs.

Despite the musings of Nussbaum and others, Americans are generally not looking for ways to adapt their culture to become more like the other cultures of the world. The United States often comes under criticism for trying to make the world like us, but it seems that the multicultural objective is to make us like the rest of the world instead. Most Americans would
reject this idea but it appears, that multiculturalists have been successful in dividing us from much of the rest of the world largely relating to the issue of race. Ethnicity and race have become major points of conflict in the debate over values inculcation. The divide between the two positions is often portrayed as a contrast between European Americans, white people, against everyone else, people of color, yet for most immigrants to the United States, it’s not about color, but about opportunity and liberty.

As Schlesinger (1998) opined, the “cult of ethnicity” has sought to make America a “nation of minorities” (or more correctly, “minority spokesmen”) who are not seeking to join with the majority in the common purpose of strengthening the nation, rather they prefer to declare “oppressive, white, patriarchal, racist, sexist, classist, society” worth destroying in favor of a new hegemony. These ethnic ideologues are inculcating “the illusion that membership in one or another ethnic group is the basic American experience” (p. 118). Eventually, the multiculturalist argument is defeated by those who leave their ancient traditions behind and embrace the culture of the United States. One of the early proponents of relativism, Claude Levi-Strauss wrote for years on the equality of cultures, but as time went on, he saw the people in less advanced cultures leaving their ways and embracing Western culture. In 1975 in Race and History, he admitted, “the dogma of cultural relativism is challenged by the very people for whose moral benefit the anthropologists established it in the first place” (D’Souza, 2002, p. 176).

Admittedly, racism has been a dark stain on our national fabric, as it has been and still is problematic throughout the world. Indeed no nation on earth has fought harder than the United States to combat this moral evil. (A note for our multiculturalist friends: the acknowledgement of racism as a moral evil implies absolutes.) Yet, once again, the definition of a word becomes important. For values education purposes considered here, I define racism as hatred for another
person or persons based upon their ethnicity. I cannot submit to popular conceptions of racism that simply notice a difference in ethnic or cultural practices. Merriam-Webster defines racism as “a belief that race is the primary determinant of human traits and capacities and that racial differences produce an inherent superiority of a particular race” (2003, para. 1). By this definition, it is the multiculturalist perspective that is racist, for it is there we find the primacy of race and the castigating of those who must be considered inferior based upon the injustices perpetrated by their racial ancestors. In their ideological fervor, the proponents of multiculturalism associate cultural differences with skin color. According to Schmidt (1997), this is a truly distorted presentation of culture; as he opined, “one might even call such attempts racist” (p. 15). Schmidt says that in reality, culture does not spring forth from race but rather, “consists of society's institutionalized values, beliefs, and practices that are learned through human interaction, not biologically inherited” (p. 15). Yet this is the association that multiculturalists are making for American schoolchildren as they inculcate values.

The history of the world is replete with examples of racial warfare based upon a supposed superiority. Character is something acquired through learning and experience, not through the genes. It is not racism, however, to recognize cultural differences or to have individual cultural preferences. In this light, it would not be racist to notice the great successes of African-American athletes to a general level beyond European-American athletes or to prefer to dine at a local Chinese restaurant rather than an Indian restaurant. Furthermore, Glickman (1998) pointed out that if a particular racial group is experiencing more disciplinary actions than another, it does not mean that the school is being racist: “An Asian teacher who suspends a white child for throwing a book at her is not automatically a racist” (p. 118). Seeking to preserve the best features of
American culture is not racism. However for some of the multiculturalist perspective, any resistance to their platform is racist.

Generally speaking, Americans are interested in preserving their culture. Yet, if one lays claim to Americanism, the charge of xenophobia will usually follow. Merriam-Webster defines xenophobia as “fear and hatred of strangers or foreigners or of anything that is strange or foreign” (2003, para. 1). In this case, we should consider that Americans have nothing to fear from most people of a foreign origin. Whether one subscribes to the melting pot or mosaic theory or not, it is easy to recognize the glowing contributions of immigrants and the children of immigrants throughout our history, and this includes contributions in the educational arena. Regardless of culture or politics, educators worldwide can participate in a reasonable discourse in order to capture the best ideas for helping schools improve. However, it must be said that if there are saboteurs, literal or figurative, foreign or domestic, who seek to undermine our nation, then a healthy dose of fear might just prevent a tragedy. Aside from being derisively being called racist, and xenophobic, an educator that would teach American principles or from an American perspective might be labeled ethnocentric. For my purpose, I will define ethnocentrism as a strong feeling of the superiority of one’s particular ethnic group. There is certainly no room for ethnocentrism in a multi-ethnic society, yet reasonable cultural pride is not ethnocentrism. Aside from individual self-confidence issues, one would expect that a person would have a sense of pride for the attributes and accomplishments of their particular ancestors. Traditionalist educators would encourage children to appreciate and value people from all ethnic groups, indeed to look beyond ethnic differences to the individual. From this perspective, Horace Mann was not a white pioneer for the common school; he was an American pioneer. Booker T. Washington was not a
great black educator, he was a great American educator who overcame tremendous hardships. Yet for many multiculturalists, this would be the worst sort of oppression.

The Re-Education of the Oppressed Mind

A variety of values are being taught in K-12 classrooms. Meanwhile, multiculturalist values inculcation continues on university campuses. Yet as mentioned previously, this model of values education appears to some to be a direct attack upon free thought. As a champion of academic freedom, University Pennsylvania history professor Alan Charles Kors (2000) opined, “From the Inquisition to the political use of Soviet psychiatry, history has taught us to recoil morally from the violation of . . . conscience and private beliefs.” Freedom of thought “truly is the final atom of human liberty. No decent society or person should pursue another human being there. Our colleges and universities do so routinely (para. 25). Are there specific examples of this attack or are these simply the ravings of traditionalists who lament liberal control of academia? Let us consider a few possibilities.

In 1997, the SUNY women’s studies department at New Paltz held a “Revolting Behavior” conference featuring “sex trade entrepreneurs to offer training in . . . lesbian sadomasochism and the use of sex toys” (Wilson, 1999, p. 14). When the campus president was questioned regarding “the academic merits of the workshops, . . . he invoked . . . academic freedom” as his mantle, having granted “faculty-for-a-day status” for the entrepreneurs (p. 14). Some would claim that this is simply a case of freedom of expression (something that is found nowhere in the Constitution despite the rulings of the Court), while others might call it values inculcation. One might expect some negative consequences for the university’s president, but instead he “received the American Association of University Professors’ Alexander Meiklejohn Award for his outstanding contribution to academic freedom” (p. 15, emphasis mine). Consider a
mandatory freshman orientation at Wake Forest in 1999, where students were forced to watch *Blue Eyed*, “a filmed racism awareness workshop in which whites are abused, ridiculed, made to fail, and taught helpless passivity” so as to be able to identify with minorities (Kors, 2000, para. 1). In 1998, Swarthmore College students “were asked to line up by skin color, from lightest to darkest, and to step forward and talk about how they felt concerning their place in that line” (Kors, 2000, para. 1). These and other re-education experiences are all too common for incoming freshman at campuses across the nation.

A result of such multiculturalist inculcation in higher education, it seems that many of “today’s undergraduates think of themselves in terms of their differences rather than their commonalities” (Levine & Cureton, 1999, p. 79). Levine and Cureton compared a seventies study with a nineties study and found that the earlier students “emphasized common generational characteristics or values: being career oriented, wanting material success, caring about appearance and self, being politically disinterested,” whereas today’s students “emphasized the characteristics that made them unique or different: race, gender, geography, sexual orientation, ethnicity, and religion” (p. 79). As an example, they cite the experiences of a Korean-American student who “grew up in a small town in which he was one of a handful of Asian Americans in his school [and who] never thought of his Asian roots as being important until he got to college” (p. 79, emphasis mine). After just one year of having his “internalized oppression” (Kors, 2000, para. 2) uprooted by his *liberators*, he came to the conclusion that his ethnicity “was the most important aspect of his being” (Levine & Cureton, 1999, p. 79).

Bradford P. Wilson (1999), former Executive Director of the National Association of Scholars asks the obvious questions:
How could it be that a student who thought little of his racial and ethnic roots before arriving at his university had, by the end of his freshman year, become convinced that those characteristics defined his essence as a human being? (p. 16)

The answer seems as obvious as the question. Wilson opined, “It is unlikely that this student’s new understanding of what it means to be a human being was arrived at through serious intellectual inquiry” (p. 16). Could it be that scholarship has taken a fall at all levels of education due to the postmodernist assertion that everything is culturally relative? He continued, “One can also reasonably doubt that this student had ever set foot in Asia, that he had ever studied an Asian language, or that he had ever read a serious book on an Asian culture” (p. 16). Is it perhaps more likely that his realization of the importance of his ethnicity was provided for him by others, thus becoming the very values inculcation that the relativists so heartily oppose?

Couldn’t one attribute this to the campaign for diversity? Wilson (1999) claimed to see a more sinister plot that has knowledge as the final casualty:

It would be a mistake to excuse the university’s agency in promoting diversity, thus understood, as simply an accommodation to the multi-ethnic, sexually heterodox nature of today’s student body. The consequences for the intellectual life of the university are serious, so serious as to warrant our viewing the aggressive promotion of the multicultural agenda as an assault on the academic enterprise (p. 16).

These are but a few examples of the re-education that some might call indoctrination taking place on university campuses today.

It seems that a major focus of multiculturalism on campus “is to uproot ‘internalized oppression,’” which like the Marxist “false consciousness” is a “major barrier to progressive change” due to the fact that the “victims of oppression” have absorbed “the very values . . . by which society oppresses them.” By this paradigm, “any desire for assimilation or for individualism” is a part of the old hegemony and must be eliminated (Kors, 2000, para. 2).
Students are being taught to take pride in their ethnic differences and grab hold of what America owes them as victims of oppression. However, as Wilson (1999) pointed out,

there are exceptions: taking pride in and making demands on the basis of one’s European descent, maleness, or heterosexuality will fail to attract the university’s patronage; indeed, such behavior could very well lead to disciplinary proceedings for its racism, sexism, and homophobia. (p. 16)

Whether through the previously mentioned programs, or through those such as Dartmouth’s required “social issues” orientation to stamp out “racism, sexism, [and] classism,” Oberlin’s program to emphasize “differences in race, ethnicity, sexuality, gender, and culture,” or Columbia’s efforts to help students “reevaluate” their “personal beliefs that foster inequality” (Kors, 2000, para. 4), the prophets of multiculturalism have a firm hold on the loudspeakers on many campuses and to follow the thinking of their sixties predecessors they chant in uniform chorus: “hell no, we won’t go.” Adding to this campaign, the recently developed “public relations savvy of universities” allows multiculturalist orientation programs to continue unabated (Kors, 2000, para. 6).

The Role of Teachers

In considering the role of teachers, a great deal of insight can be gained through observing how they are prepared for their craft at the university level. Are teachers being prepared to teach specific values? John Goodlad (2000) opined, “Our recent research into schooling and teacher education revealed a near vacuum with respect to mission…” (p. 88). Just what is the mission of teacher education? In the early nineties, we saw a curriculum consistent with the Values Clarification approach. In one school of education, prospective teachers were given a choice of two models for teaching values to seventh graders: a) have “students to develop their own values and value systems” with “no right or wrong answers” or b) make “a conscious effort to teach specific virtues and character traits such as courage, justice, self-control, honesty,
responsibility, practicing charity, obeying lawful authority” (Glenn & Glenn, 1993, p. 45). As it turns out, 88% of the students chose the first method, scorning the idea of inculcating specific values. Recent polls indicate that this attitude may have changed in that teachers are seeking to teach positive values such as the Golden Rule, a practice that is widely supported by the public (Rose & Gallup, 1999). As Kevin Ryan, head of Boston University’s Center for the Advancement of Ethics and Character, opined, “Society will not put up with value-neutral education” (Sommers, 2002, p. 41). Others such as Goodlad (1990) go further, saying that society cannot survive without the teaching of values in schools.

Indeed such academic organizations as the APSA (1998) have seen the need to return to a traditional paradigm:

Many of us on the task force have come to see that our disciplinary emphasis on ‘value neutrality’ must be adjusted in the civics education classroom to reflect the need to promote and enhance basic democratic values. Our reliance on ‘critical thinking’, without a moral framework within which to think critically, may be part of the problem. It may feed not healthy skepticism but unhealthy cynicism and political disengagement. (p. 637)

Perhaps there is more of a consensus than we have previously seen. Yet, what is the role of dialogue? Purpel (2000) opined, “one of the continuing challenges of any educational program is how to balance the educators' responsibility to have and affirm strong convictions with the responsibility to avoid indoctrination” (p. 4). Despite the need for dialogue and openness, teachers who want to avoid leaving their students in a moral vacuum must distance themselves from value neutrality. To hold the position that there are no right answers abandons one to the overwhelming deficiencies of relativism (McLaughlin & Halstead, 2000; Wilson, 1990).

Many would argue that it is the role of the parents to teach values and that the school should not engage in such a controversial exercise. Writing in Education, Suh and Traiger (1999) disagreed with that sentiment:
Educating children to take personal responsibility for their actions is both a parental and a societal responsibility. Certainly schools can teach the democratic values that help sustain us as a nation: respect for all people, reverence for the sanctity of life, the right of dissent and equality for all people before the law. The school's curricula should also support parental teaching of character and of moral decision-making. (p. 723)

They support their argument with an observation about the difficult environment that many children experience. They even see support from the students themselves and suggest values education for young students:

In a national survey of 40,000 teenagers conducted by USA Weekend, eighty percent think values should be taught in school because parents don't do it or they believe it's the school's responsibility. Almost half believe that it's too late to teach values to teenagers. We need to start earlier, as soon as the child comes to school. Mass media with its glorification of sex and violence has inundated immature minds with examples of poor behavior and immoral character. Schools in America must take a more active role in the teaching of moral values, since other institutions are failing to meet their responsibilities. (Suh & Traiger, 1999, p. 723)

This is a potent argument for teacher involvement as a supporter of parental efforts to develop character and civic competence among children. Teachers must take seriously the influence they wield among their students.

Teachers can accomplish much through creating and maintaining a positive school environment. Civic education professor, John Patrick (1995) talked about the role of a teacher in a democratic society in Civic education for constitutional democracy: An international perspective, citing several responsibilities, including the following:

1. “encourages and protects free and open expression of ideas in an atmosphere of academic freedom”

2. “establishes and applies rules fairly, according to principles of equal protection and due process for each individual”

3. “creates a classroom environment in which the worth and dignity of each person is respected.” (p. 3)

Indeed, creating and maintaining a culture of ethical behavior is necessary prior to attempting any sort of formal inculcation in the curriculum. Some have even found that teachers who can
empathize with students, meeting them where they are, can have a greater degree of success, especially in schools of a diverse student body (McAllister & Irvine, 2002). Furthermore, Babin (1999) found that character education could decrease discipline problems in a school. Others have witnessed increased academic achievement when maintaining character education programs (Gauld, 1995; Smith, 1999).

While much values education is informal and can be built into the school’s environment, Berreth and Ernst (2001) presented further complications by raising the issue of standards and assessments. They asked, “Should schools, school districts, or states adopt standards for character education?” (para. 21). They pointed out that in a standards-focused environment, teachers may not take values education to heart without established standards or assessments. Then what about the question of “for whom should the standards exist” (para. 21)? Should we hold administrators, teachers, students, or everyone accountable? DeRoche and Williams (2001) offered potential standards for teachers in *Character Education: A Primer for Teachers*. One standard reads:

> Teachers need to understand their roles and responsibilities as value transmitters, value critics and role models, and communicate high expectations for all students regarding pro-social behaviors, character development, and democratic values. They should strive, along with students, to eliminate behaviors that are antithetical to good character. (para. 1)

Suffice it to say, if we seek to hold students accountable, teachers and administrators should also have standards if students are to take values education seriously. The complexity is increased still as we consider the limits of character education. We must seek to determine the common ground between character education and civic education, creating a values education that addresses both interpersonal behavior and democratic citizenship.
In a study involving elementary through high school students and teachers, Bulach & Burke (2001) found that formal programs teaching values were less effective because “in the regular setting [they] tend to be knowledge or cognitively based while [those such as] the JROTC curriculum tends to be behavior based” (para. 18). This was because students in JROTC would not only “study what the [particular character trait] word means, but the major emphasis would be watching for behaviors that indicate dependability.” Failing to meet requirements such as being late to class or not bringing homework would earn demerits. In addition, they found that “peer pressure from upperclassmen reinforces desired behaviors” (para. 18). Bulach also divided the “more observable” character values (relating to others), such as “generosity” and “sportsmanship” from the values more difficult to discern (relating to self), such as “motivation” (para. 6), emphasizing the need to focus on character values that are made evident through behavior. This seems to be a confirmation, as if one was needed, of the traditionalist axiom, *without penalty there is no law*. As it is, values concepts are often abstract to students. “Our task is to help young people take the abstract values of respect and responsibility and translate them into concrete moral behaviors in their personal relationships” (Lickona, 2001, p. 239).

**Common Ground?**

Despite the claims of some relativists, there is widespread agreement that future citizens (students) should be educated in virtue. The question is, which virtues and to what degree are they to be embraced? In seeking to find common ground in ethics education, Maxcy (2002) delineates seven different approaches: (a) *traditionalism* (many different types), which is composed of a set of moral/ethical rules based upon the Bible, Koran, Communist Manifesto, etc; (b) *realism*, learned and practiced truths, that need only to be applied to succeed in being ethical; (c) *utilitarianism*, the consequential philosophy of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.
which emphasizes doing the maximum amount of good for the maximum number of people; (d) subjectivism (relativism), where no one is more right than anyone else; (e) existentialism, of French Revolution fame, and credited to Jean-Paul Sartre, with the key tenet being—there is no purpose or meaning to human existence and that we are all alone to decide right from wrong, bearing the responsibility for our decisions; (f) emotivism, Charles L. Stevenson’s adaptation of subjectivism which views morals as simply emotional expressions, which cannot be right or wrong; and (g) naturalism, a creation of social scientists like John Dewey that asserts right and wrong can be determined for future use by looking at the results of our decisions today.

Much of the current thinking in the West regarding ethics and morality, and the ideas about reforming schools, have been influenced by the writing of John Rawls, the recently deceased professor of philosophy at Harvard, especially in his 1971 publication, *A Theory of Justice*. In this voluminous work, Rawls rejected Utilitarianism, which says that an action is right if it fosters happiness in everyone effected by it and wrong if the reverse occurs, as he explicated his position on ethics as a basis for individual and societal actions. His philosophy centers upon the concept of *original position*, whereby when considering the rightness of an action we are to ignore our current position in society and consider what might be best for anyone in any position (thus ignoring existing hegemony). As relates to the conflict, I would argue that traditionalism supports Rawls’ paradigm to a far greater degree than does multiculturalism. In applying this concept to the teaching of values in schools, Callan (1997) noted, “Future citizens need to develop some imaginative sympathy for compatriots whose experience and identity incline them to see political questions in ways that differ systematically from their own” (p. 7). Furthermore, Callan wanted schools to help students develop “respect for reasonable differences” and a “spirit of moderation and compromise” (p. 8). Multiculturalists and traditionalists may agree in
principle on these points; however, the debate may again center on the implied meaning of words such as *reasonable* and *moderation*.

Yet the struggle for consensus continues. Many are finding common ground in a perspective enunciated by the Character Education Partnership that builds from Rawls’ perspective regarding values:

In a school committed to developing character, these core values are treated as a matter of obligation, as having a claim on the conscience of the individual and community. Character education asserts that the validity of these values, and our obligation to uphold them, derive from the fact that such values affirm our human dignity; they promote the development and welfare of the individual person; they serve the common good; they meet the classical tests of reversibility (Would you want to be treated this way?) and universality (Would you want all persons to act this way in a similar situation?); and they define our rights and responsibilities in a democratic society. The school makes clear that these basic human values transcend religious and cultural differences and express our common humanity (Lickona, Schaps, & Lewis, 1999a, para. 2).

For many theorists, the key ingredients to success seem to be *reversibility* and *universality*. For the values inculcated to be reversible is consistent with American’s desire to see such principles as The Golden Rule taught in schools (Rose & Gallup, 1999). For the values inculcated to be universal is consistent with the foundational principle of higher law.

It is a critical enterprise is for us to find common ground that transcends our differences and allows us to collaborate in teaching values. It is also important that the people involved in setting values standards for inculcation be not only from diverse backgrounds (this would be the only requirement for some multiculturalists), but also grounded in American values. Another important component to character education involves creating a sense of community for schools such that faculty, students, and parents can be integral parts of a functioning learning community. Co-creator of the *Eleven Principles* publication, Eric Schaps, explained the value of community for schools: “When a school meets students' basic psychological needs, students become increasingly committed to the school's norms, values, and goals” (Schaps, 2003, p.31).
This concept is consistent with foundational democratic values and additionally, makes a lot of sense. One would be hard pressed to expect students to buy in to values being taught by people who don’t care about them. Furthermore, Glickman (1998) asserted that democratic values are best taught through allowing for student choice and participation. It seems that giving students the opportunity to participate in maintaining community in schools will strengthen social skills for lifetime use (Schaps, 2003).

Aside from environmental and behavioral considerations, there is certainly an academic component to values education. Students must understand a number of concepts that appear to be critical in building a moral, democratic community in schools. Among these could possibly be included “the rule of law, limited government, representative government, individual rights, popular sovereignty, political participation, and civil society” (Patrick, 1995, p. 2). In addition, “students must learn how these key concepts of democratic political theory are institutionalized and practiced” including “how to combine liberty with order, majority rule with minority rights, and private rights with the public good” (p. 2). Yet while there is certainly hope for consensus, the question remains whether Americans who are sharply divided over which values can come together.

Not in an Election Year!

I will agree with Glickman (1998) that it is unfortunate that there seems to be so little dialogue between competing interests on the left and right today. The virulent attacks of one side against the other have little chance of helping the combatants find consensus. Between now and November, the polemically driven tirades are only likely to become more evident. Would our nation truly be better off if one side or the other succeeded in eliminating all opposition? It is the constant pull between left and right that tends to keep our society balanced in the middle, making
America a place where people of all philosophical persuasions can have a say in the direction of the country. Even so, the incessant political rhetoric and name-calling becomes tiring and tends to cloud the issues for those seeking to make curricular and pedagogical decisions for values education.

Yet there is nothing wrong with challenging the philosophical position and actions of those with whom we disagree, especially when so many insist upon seeking to transform society into an image more in keeping with their philosophy, while waging war with so little empirical ammunition. Unless scholarship is to be lost in the battle for hegemony, a free-ranging discussion must be allowed to occur, especially as relates to schools. As I have described, there are a number of active battles in the values education arena at present, including those over race and ethnicity, culture, class, politics, sexuality and gender, and religion. These issues are at the core of our personal and corporate identities and thus evoke strong emotional responses. Needless to say, this often becomes a lively discussion, as differing elements of society vie for primacy in the development of curriculum and pedagogy for values inculcation to use in schools. Despite the general agreement on the importance of teaching democratic values in schools, there is a wide rift today between the left and right. Much of the conflict revolves around the meaning of words like *justice* and *freedom*, words that are used extensively by both sides in the political rhetoric of an election year. In dealing with these differences, many would avoid controversy altogether to reduce conflict. However, as Nord and Haines (1998) pointed out, students need to see the perspectives of the left and the right:

> We disagree deeply about the values of the Republican and Democratic parties, . . . [but] we can't leave politics out of the curriculum simply because it is controversial. If students are to be *educated*, if they are to make informed political decisions, they must learn something about the values . . . of [both] parties. (para. 19)
Those who support this comprehensive approach might echo the authors’ opinion that “schools should teach students about the alternatives fairly. And so it should be with every other major moral or civic issue that divides us” (para. 19). Indeed, while traditionalists and multiculturalists disagree sharply regarding a myriad of issues, it is critical for them both to allow for open dialogue. Charges of hate speech by the left or unpatriotic speech by the right do not contribute to the possibility of solving the crisis. If there is indeed a truth to be found in American democratic philosophy, then it will certainly distinguish itself from the rest if all perspectives are allowed a forum.

There are two additional points of note. First, if one accepts the historical role of local communities and school boards as the managers of education, a role all three branches of the Federal government seem to routinely ignore, then parents in local communities must be allowed to be guardians of their children’s hearts and minds. Under that paradigm, both parents in Oakland who want to teach their children that war is wrong and parents in Rocklin want to teach their children to call for God to bless America, would be allowed to do so. Yet neither side seems willing for that to happen. Second, we must commit to a civilized form of freedom of speech. In a democratic society, no one is free from criticism. We must be free to have input and be willing to endure a critical analysis of our position. Then, decisions can be democratically worked out, within a constitutional framework. Both multiculturalists and traditionalists must avoid launching scathing personal attacks upon those with whom we disagree. Unfortunately, sometimes it seems that attacks and counter attacks are all that exists in the dialogue. The result has become a winner-take-all culture war over values education in K-12 schools. The fact that this conflict exists is not surprising. In a democratic state with a diverse population, there will be a continuance of debate over both the values that are to be considered central and the role of
schools for values inculcation. Considering the wide-ranging opinions, Maxcy (1995) asked a pertinent question: “How shall we make institutions sensitive to differences that are legitimate yet resistant of differences that are illicit and dangerous?” (p. 26). The answer might be found in our similarities rather than our differences.

Current Values Education Programs

Despite the apparent culture war, many educators are finding common ground in values education. Thousands of teachers and administrators have pursued training and purchased materials designed to help them develop character and civic competence in their students. As previously stated, this study is not an exhaustive review of existing formal or informal values education, rather it is an overview of some of the current work being done in values education in context of the general conflict between multiculturalists and traditionalists. The major challenge in establishing values education programs is reflected in the wide range of values in American society. While it is clear that Americans cannot be rigidly divided between the two extremes, the general pattern holds true, and we remain deeply divided over a number of key cultural issues regarding race and ethnicity, culture, class, politics, sexuality and gender, and religion. If there exists some common ground, perhaps it exists in the general application of character education, with civic competence being one facet. Yet even here, there are continuing debates “about what constitutes quality, who controls content and the values being taught, and how federal, state, and local mandates influence character education” (Berreth & Ernst, 2001, para. 1). Some have expressed concern that teaching character education would bring religion into the public schools, yet others have shown that basic character education does not require embracing any particular religion, but rather setting forth essential principles espoused by the larger society (Coyne & Coyne, 2001). But there is promise in the idea that schools can teach children the “attitudes,
beliefs, and behaviors” that comprise the “core values [that] form the basis of good character” so that young people understand, care about, and act upon, core ethical values” (Lickona, 1999, para. 1). At minimum, there does appear to be some consensus in basic character education, with broad appeal with both traditionalists and multiculturalists. Earlier, I referred to this as the concept: “We teach everyone's values” (Nord & Haynes, 1998, para. 18). This type of values education is showing up more and more frequently in K-12 schools across the nation. There are even attempts to bring values education to the community college, although much of this appears to be focused upon moral reasoning and globalist perspectives (Lee, 2000).

Yet the movement for character education in K-12 schools is steadily growing and becoming more organized. Lickona and Davidson (2004) of the Center for the Fourth and Fifth R’s are currently completing a detailed empirical study entitled Smart and Good: Developing Performance Character and Moral Character in America’s High Schools for an August 2004 release. In this study, the authors are making use of:

- a comprehensive review of research on high school reform and adolescent development;
- site visits to pioneering public and private high schools across the country; interviews with teachers, administrators, parents, and students; a distinguished National Experts Panel; and a National Student Leaders Panel [to create a comprehensive picture of K-12 character education and supply applications]. (para. 4)

This study seems to have great potential for those who are interested in character education. Practical application expected from the publication is listed on the web site of the authors’ organization, The Center for the Fourth and Fifth R’s, including:

1. Ways to integrate performance and moral character across the curriculum
2. Connecting character and learning standards
3. Strategies for creating a caring community in the classroom
4. Discipline practices that strengthen character
5. Creating small learning communities

6. Classroom and school-wide practices that promote academic integrity

7. Creating a professional and ethical learning community

8. Strategies for building character through sports

9. Strategies from the “What Works in Character Education” review of evidence-based programs

10. Strategies for assessing the character of the school and the character development of students. (para. 6)

The Center for the Fourth and Fifth R’s is but one of many organizations that support character education efforts. Like other values education organizations, they have developed a highly ordered paradigm (see Appendix F). Their study will add insight to this burgeoning field. Until the study is published, where else can schools currently go to get ideas for values education? The resources seem to be without limit. Numerous programs exist nationwide emphasizing traditional democratic American values. There are over 70 civic education organizations listed on the APSA web site alone! It is up to each school or school system to work within existing state and national guidelines and community standards to devise the program that seems to fit their students best. Many of the existing programs have gone well beyond theoretical considerations. For example, Lickona (2001) referred to a program in Baltimore that has established twenty-one ethical values, “such as compassion, honesty, justice, respect for others’ rights, responsible citizenship, due process, and the rule of law—values that are viewed as consistent with the U.S. Constitution and as beneficial to both the individual and society” (p. 239). Schaps’s Developmental Studies Center features a Caring School Community program, with a character education element using the Eleven Principles (Schaps, 2002); Josephson Institute of Ethics’s Character Counts provides numerous materials and programs emphasizing
“Six Pillars of Character”: trustworthiness, respect, responsibility, fairness, caring, and 
citizenship (Hanson, 2002); Ethics Resource Center has produced practical applications for 
values education with a focus upon empathy, integrity, perseverance, responsibility, respect, and 
teamwork (Harned & Sutliff, 2002); Basic School Network at James Madison University 
suggests integrity, respect for others, responsibility, compassion, self-discipline, perseverance, 
and giving to others through an act of service (Boyer, 1995). Former Values Clarification co-
creator Howard Kirschenbaum (1992), now a proponent of inculcating traditional values, 
advocates “comprehensive” values education, which he says is both conservative and progressive 
in method and scope (p. 775). Also consider Morse Elementary School in Cambridge. They 
created a Core Virtues program “to achieve the school’s mission of shaping informed and 
responsible citizens. . . . The program has proven so successful, it’s been adopted at more than 
100 other schools nationwide” (Farnsworth, 2001, para. 8). Another example can be seen in a 
charter school group, the Advantage Schools, in places such as New Jersey, Texas, and Arizona. 
They have made character education “a key part of the school day,” using a “code of civility” that 
identifies ten virtues, including truth, responsibility, respect, and fairness. The code is used to 
support an orderly learning environment and reinforce high academic standards” (Farnsworth, 
2001, para. 9).

In addition to programs created by various organizations, a number of states have values 
education programs and resources that either reference existing models such as CEP or have 
created their own. For example, the North Carolina Public schools web site has a collection of 
character education lesson plans for each of the core subjects and a few others. Values to be 
inculcated include: respect, responsibility, perseverance, courage, integrity, self-discipline, 
kindness, good judgment, cooperation, determination, citizenship, work ethic, honesty,
trustworthiness, fairness, tolerance, fairness, self-respect, justice, and gratitude (NCDPI, 2003). Their website also has links to the Character Education Partnership, the North Carolina Center for Character Education, and The Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University.

Throughout the country, formal values education programs that are integrated into the curriculum are becoming more common. In one program in Newport News, Virginia, students at Newsome Park Elementary School are required to be part of a “service learning program,” integrating “community service into every aspect of the curriculum” (Starr, 1999, para. 3). The program includes: visiting senior citizens, supplying food and clothes for families I need, and adopting wards in a local hospital (Starr, 1999). Another program at Benjamin Franklin Classical Charter School in Franklin, Massachusetts also employed service to the community in teaching the values of “fortitude, temperance, justice, and prudence” (Starr, 1999, para. 4). Still another school in Adelphi, Maryland, Buck Lodge Middle School, sought to build character by teaching a different virtue each week while also maintaining a “rigorous community service graduation requirement” (Starr, 1999, para. 5). In 1998, each of these three schools received The Business Week Award for Instructional Innovation, an award sponsored by, among others, the CEP, for their combination of character education and traditional academic curriculum (Starr, 1999).

Numerous other programs exist that show attempts on the part of educators in inculcating specific values in American school children and most have the appearance of being non-partisan, with collaborative contributions for a number of different perspectives, yet maintaining consistency with American foundational principles. Hopefully, these can be perceived as win-win situations by both sides of the conflict. I have some hope that it is so. Research is underway to determine the effectiveness of these and other character education programs, part of which will provide data for future studies in this arena. While there is room for negotiation and
compromise between the diverse elements of society, it is critical that we keep values inculcation consistent with the foundational principles of America, otherwise we will cease to be America, but rather some form of polyglot society that cannot survive. This is not about indoctrination, but rather about giving children a solid foundation along with the ability to make sound judgments. As Kirschenbaum (1992) related, “It is essential for us to support the family in teaching our students a number of traditional civic and moral values that most parents, educators, and community members agree are essential” for a democratic society as we also help them develop the skills to think for themselves and make their own responsible decisions” (p. 776).

Concluding Considerations: The Future

In researching the scope and nature of values education in the United States, my focus has been threefold: (a) to examine the conflict between multiculturalists and traditionalists regarding values education, (b) to explicate the history and philosophy behind each position, and (c) to discover values education principles and practices across the nation that have potential to unite Americans of all perspectives. This study began in hopes of finding potential solutions to the values education conflict. In this effort, I have only partially succeeded. Depending on one’s perspective, the glass is either half-empty or half-full. However, I believe that I have fully succeeded in illustrating the breadth and depth of the conflict and the importance of the decisions currently being made regarding values education. I believe that it is abundantly evident that there is an ongoing culture war in American society and that the war has made its way into the public school. Whether I have succeeded is for others to decide. Either way, I believe that even a cursory analysis of the facts leads one to an inescapable conclusion that there is a serious conflict and that the opposing elements of our society need to work at finding some common ground. If I can come to any conclusion from this study regarding the lack of common ground it is this: what
is needed in the values education arena is a dialogue between those of differing viewpoints such as multiculturalists and traditionalists. The refusal of some to even have civil discussions about certain issues does not lead one to see an end to fighting. In short the rift between multiculturalists and traditionalists is too wide to hope for a bridge to connect the two any time soon, if ever. The research that I have done leads me little alternative but to project that one side or the other must win the battle. Perhaps I am wrong in this conclusion and schools will continue to struggle with the question of which values to teach perpetually. As a progressive conservative, I am deeply troubled by the contemptuous assaults launched daily against American values and the near void of dialogue. Yet I am encouraged to see the overwhelming volume of character and civic education programs available to educators and the traditionalist nature of their curricula. If anything, the field is too crowded for educators to make a simple decision. A much-needed future study would involve a detailed analysis comparing existing programs. Also the challenge of finding common ground brings need for further research on how Americans of all perspectives can come together for values inculcation in the public schools. Perhaps Lickona and Davidson’s yet to be released publication, Smart and Good, will be enlightening.

Despite the trend toward character and civic education, the challenge of deciding which values are worth teaching is perplexing to many educators. One can understand the idea of avoiding controversy in not teaching values, yet it is clear that the American public wants certain values inculcated and it is painfully clear that the American nation cannot survive without her children learning the basics of American legal and social norms. Throughout America, teachers are inculcating values, but the values expressed vary, depending on the views of the particular teacher and those of the local community. As we have seen, the battles over the curriculum for sex education courses and in history and other social studies courses are examples of the deep
philosophical differences between multiculturalists and traditionalists in this nation. With the diversity of thought in a democratic and pluralistic society, finding common ground for values inculcation is a daunting task.

As much as one may try, it is virtually impossible to maintain complete objectivity when analyzing the conflict. The wide gap between multiculturalism and traditionalism clearly leaves even the most objective researcher little room to maneuver outside that of taking a specific philosophical position. My stated position was and will continue to be that the best course for American public schools is to support a progressive form of traditional values inculcation, helping children to have a firm foundation of American principles, while also helping them develop the intellectual confidence to think through complex issues, so as to empower them to make good decisions. In this way, they will be able to function effectively as participating citizens in our democratic republic. Based upon my research, I believe that the overwhelming majority of current values education organizations and programs are following the basic progressive conservative paradigm that I have set forth in this paper.

The primary focus of this study has been to discover the role of American public schools in values education. Clearly the role embraced by many educators is to join with families, communities, churches, and other institutions to help build and maintain a just and moral society. Empirical studies have shown some successes in improving student behavior and academic performance in schools where positive American values are actively inculcated. In considering a number of ancillary questions, I have discovered that there are a myriad of values taught in our public schools, many of them in stark contrast to each other. Values are being taught both formally and informally, through the curriculum, formal programs, extracurricular activity, and by the establishment and maintenance of a supportive democratic school culture. In terms of
consensus, I have discovered that in the culture war there is precious little common ground, due to the pluralistic nature of our society and the existence of extremely active and vocal polar spokespersons on each side of the conflict. However, I am encouraged that a majority of Americans do support positive values inculcation and approve of school efforts to help build character and civic competence into children. I am similarly encouraged that the current leaders in our government, while widely differing in perspective, are becoming more focused upon our national ethical crisis and seem willing to take action to address it. The Founders of the American republic, despite their personal and corporate weaknesses were very aware of the need for values education and I believe that they would be proud to see how far we have come in correcting injustices and in how we are striving to build a just and moral society.

Suffice it to say, there are those on both sides who would seek to silence all opposing voices. Multiculturalists would complain of the cultural imperialism of Americans who are not tolerant of those of different perspectives. Traditionalists would lodge as loud a complaint about the politically correct thought police who seek to silence conservative voices with charges of racism, sexism, etc. Both sides have the potential to become totalitarian in disallowing others’ views. This, of course, is not consistent with American foundational principles, where freedom of speech is considered a natural and Constitutional right. So considering the veracity of the debate, what are we to do about teaching values in schools? Judging by the groundswell of values education initiatives, I believe that educators can indeed succeed in helping students to develop character and citizenship, while also encouraging them to engage in critical thinking.

However we accomplish this, perhaps we should say time is up for the relativistic experiment from the days of Values Clarification. We must find a way to agree on a set of common unifying values and then help children to apply them to their own lives. If there is any
benefit here from research on learning, is simply in understanding the diverse ways people learn and applying these to values inculcation. Nonetheless, the values taught must have a firm foundation. We can be constructivist in our learning without being constructivist in our ethics. Reflecting on William Kilpatrick’s *Why Johnny can’t tell right from wrong* (1992), Farnsworth (2001) pointed out that for the past thirty years (forty now, and counting), “students have been taught to identify and celebrate their *own* values, rather than draw upon a common set of morals when making decisions. We taught our youngsters to reason, but we didn’t teach them that there are absolute truths” (para. 5). Anyone who spends much time in America’s public schools can tell you that there is a values crisis there. Administrators, teachers, parents, and students are all susceptible to unethical behavior. The moral vacuum created by nineteen sixties and seventies relativism will not be filled by more relativism in the name of cultural tolerance, diversity or even freedom. The founder of the common school, Horace Mann, has some timeless advise for educators regarding values inculcation. Mann told us that ‘the highest and noblest office of education . . . pertains to our moral nature. Schools, he said, should teach virtue before knowledge” (Boyer, 1995, para. 5).

Educators, political leaders, historians, and philosophers from every era would agree with Mann’s assertion. Values education was, is and will always be at the core of our national identity. The ongoing battle over the content of values education helps determine the character and civic competence of our populace. While have variance in our politics, religion, and preferences, we are united in the timeless principles of our republic: liberty through natural rights, justice through rule of law, and unchanging standards of human worth through higher law. Yet there are those who would bring an end to America, segregate us according to our differences, destroying the very fabric of our civilization, and replace it with relativistic anarchy
and global citizenry. Before complete Balkanization occurs and America ceases to exist as a
genuine nation, Americans must find ways to bridge the gap between enough multiculturalists
and traditionalists to insure the survival of American culture. Despite the current emphasis on
academic standards and accountability, the most critical struggle in schools is over the meaning
and direction of America in the transmission of values. Hopefully, we can learn from the success
and failures of past values inculcation and from the myriad research taking place today in the
areas of learning, decision-making, and moral development and combine them with foundational
American principles to create an environment conducive to building a character and civic
competence in future generations. In the growing values education movement, there are at least a
few square feet of common ground where those of differing positions can stand together to
“secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,” so that we do not find ourselves
living in a Balkanized, polyglot America where, as one multiculturalist slogan put it, “all we
have in common is our diversity” (D’Souza, 2002). I believe that Americans have discovered
common ground in the kind of progressive conservative values education that I have described in
this paper. Only time will tell if we are wise enough to embrace it.
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### APPENDIX A

#### PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATISM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Affiliation</th>
<th>Associated Theorist</th>
<th>Common Ground</th>
<th>Points of Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dialectical</td>
<td>Hegel, Plato</td>
<td>Systematic thinking, Thesis/Antithesis, Power of Ideas</td>
<td>Relativism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discursive Constructivism,</td>
<td>Socrates</td>
<td>Reliance upon reason, Detailed analysis</td>
<td>Social, Cultural Relativism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structuralism</td>
<td>Hegel</td>
<td>Underlying structures</td>
<td>Impersonal systems, People as powerless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundationalism</td>
<td>Plato, Augustine, Descartes</td>
<td>Reality exists, Absolute truth</td>
<td>Other three types (Rationalism, Positivism, Scientism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platonism</td>
<td>Plato, Augustine</td>
<td>Ideal form, Eternal reality</td>
<td>The Noble Lie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idealism</td>
<td>Kant, Hegel</td>
<td>Mind/Spirit over matter</td>
<td>World is an illusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolutism</td>
<td>Augustine</td>
<td>Eternal Truth</td>
<td>Lack of dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernism</td>
<td>Kierkegaard</td>
<td>Availability of truth, Metaphysical Relevance</td>
<td>Humanistic Naturalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatism</td>
<td>Dewey</td>
<td>Innovation, Doing “what works”</td>
<td>Secular Humanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilitarianism</td>
<td>Bentham</td>
<td>Maximizing Benefit</td>
<td>Hedonism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectivity</td>
<td>Rawls</td>
<td>Original Position</td>
<td>Relativism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

246
Some Key Principles of Progressive Conservatism

- Character is destiny. --Heraclitus
- Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. --Lord Acton
- Americanism is a question of principle, of purpose, of idealism, of character. It is not a matter of birthplace or creed or line of descent. --Theodore Roosevelt
- A nation that does not educate in freedom will not survive in freedom and will not even know when it has lost it. --Alan Charles Kors
- We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. --Thomas Jefferson
- The American dream is the promise that if you study hard, work hard, and dedicate yourself, you can be whatever you want to be. --J. C. Watts
- Character cannot be developed in ease and quiet. Only through experience of trial and suffering can the soul be strengthened, vision cleared, ambition inspired, and success achieved. --Helen Keller
- The debate about the curriculum [regarding values education] is a debate about what it means to be an American. --Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
- Learning is not attained by chance, it must be sought for with ardor and attended to with diligence. --Abigail Adams
- Virtues don’t come in our genes, so it is the duty of every generation to pass them on. It is a duty we are not allowed to surrender. --William Bennett
• The job of the schools is to teach the common culture, the history of democracy, and the centrality of freedom and its defense against aggressors. --Chester Finn

• Civic well-being and societal health depend on both the intellectual and moral status of our citizens. --Milton Goldberg

• I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character. --Martin L. King, Jr.

• To educate a person in mind and not in morals is to educate a menace to society. --Theodore Roosevelt

• A society in which men recognize no check upon their freedom soon becomes a society where freedom is the possession of only a savage few, as we have learned to our sorrow. --Learned Hand

• Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. --Immanuel Kant

• Proof demands decisive evidence; this means evidence that confirms one view and excludes its rivals. Truth rests not on possibility nor on plausibility but on probability. --Jacques Barzun

• Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. --Jesus

• If you want respect, act respectful; if you want to be trusted, be trustworthy. --Douglas Eskew
APPENDIX B

TERMINOLOGY FOR VALUES EDUCATION

(including Historical and Philosophical Concepts)

*Americanization*: socialization into mainstream American culture to allow for individual participation and provide societal order.

*Antifoundationalism*: knowledge is created, relative to the individual; the rejection of foundational truth (e.g., Sophism, Pragmatism, Skepticism, Relativism). (Petraglia-Bahri, 1996)

*Antiquarianism*: dealing in or having to do with old or rare books.

*Archival Procedures*: the established way to pursue historical records.

*Character*: a combination of ethical qualities that distinguishes a person. (*American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language [AHD], 2000*)

*Cliometrics*: a method of historical research making much use of statistical information and methods. (*Oxford English Reference Dictionary [OERD], 2002*)

*Cognitive Relativism*: the relativity of truth. No viewpoints have a uniquely privileged status (e.g., Nietzsche and William James). (Westacott, 2001)

*Communitarianism*: critical reaction To Rawls’s liberalism whereby individuals can unite in a populist, secularist, moralist democracy (e.g., John Dewey, Charles Taylor, Amitai Etzioni). (*Encyclopedia of Informal Education [EIE], 2001*)

*Compassionate Conservative*: the philosophy of maintaining traditional social order while also having an ethic of care for those in need. Used by President George W. Bush, and coined by University of Texas journalism professor, Marvin Olasky, the idea supports having
faith-based organizations helping the needy, with some help from government funding, enabling poor children to receive needed care and moral instruction. (Spring, 2002, p. 3)

**Critical Realism:** the idea that there is a reality independent of our thinking about it that science can study.

**Critical Theory:** The theoretical approach of the Frankfurt School of social philosophers. Relying on the work of Hegel and Marx, they tried to exhibit dialectically the contradictions imposed upon modern human beings by varieties of social organization that abuse formal rationality in order to deny power to classes of citizens. (Kemerling, 1997b)

**Cultural Pluralism:** a state of society in which members of diverse ethnic, racial, religious, or social groups maintain an autonomous participation in and development of their traditional culture or special interest within the confines of a common civilization (see *Reasonable Pluralism*). (MWCD, 2000)

**Cultural Relativism:** the idea that all cultures are equal and that truth, knowledge, and morality are all culturally determined and applied.

**Culture:** the shared beliefs, values, history, and behaviors of any particular group (e.g., ethnic, racial, etc.).

**Deconstruction:** a philosophical movement and theory of literary criticism that questions traditional assumptions about certainty, identity, and truth; asserts that words can only refer to other words; and attempts to demonstrate how statements about any text subvert their own meanings (*AHD*): “In deconstruction, the critic claims there is no meaning to be found in the actual text, but only in the various, often mutually irreconcilable, ‘virtual texts’ constructed by readers in their search for meaning.” (Goldstein, 2000)
Deculturalization: the process by which the individual is deprived of his or her culture and then conditioned to other cultural values. (Schlesinger, 1998, p. 67, quoting Felix Boateng)

Democracy: government by the people, especially rule of the majority; also, the common people, especially when constituting the source of political authority; or, the absence of hereditary or arbitrary class distinctions or privileges. (MWCD, 2000)

Dialectical: a method of argument or exposition that systematically weighs contradictory facts or ideas with a view to the resolution of their real or apparent contradictions. (The process especially associated with Hegel of arriving at the truth by stating a thesis, developing a contradictory antithesis, and combining and resolving them into a coherent synthesis) (e.g., Socrates and Plato). (AHD, 2000)

Dialectical Materialism: the Marxian interpretation of reality that views matter as the sole subject of change and all change as the product of a constant conflict between opposites arising from the internal contradictions inherent in all events, ideas, and movements. (AHD, 2000)

Discourse Theory (Discourse Analysis): in literary studies, the analysis of language beyond the sentence. This contrasts with types of analysis more typical of modern linguistics, which are chiefly concerned with the study of smaller bits of language, such as sounds (phonetics and phonology), parts of words (morphology), meaning (semantics), and the order of words in sentences (syntax). (Tannen, 2002)

Discursive: proceeding to a conclusion by reason or argument rather than intuition (Miller et al., 2003)

Documentation: using objective facts to authenticate and substantiate a claim.
Empiricism: the view that experience, especially of the senses, is the only source of knowledge.  

(AHD, 2000)

Ethics: the study of the general nature of morals and systems of morality. (AHD, 2000)

Ethnic Diversity: the existence of various ethnic groups.

Ethnocentrism: characterized by or based on the attitude that one’s own (culture) group is superior. (MWCD, 2000)

Ethnography: the study and systematic recording of human cultures; also, a descriptive work produced from such research (MWCD, 2000); allows understanding of how people interpret events and make sense of the world.

Existentialism: a philosophy that emphasizes the uniqueness and isolation of the individual experience in a hostile or indifferent universe; regards human existence as unexplainable and stresses freedom of choice and responsibility for the consequences of one’s acts (e.g., Nietzsche). (AHD, 2000)

Existential Phenomenology: Heidegger’s existential phenomenology is also often referred to as ontological phenomenology (concerned with being), whereas Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is epistemological (concerned with knowledge) (Manen, 2000). In short, we do not know if we exist, and if we do we do not know who we are or why we are here, so we can do whatever we want so long as we are willing to suffer the consequences for our actions.

Foundationalism: the belief that there is a foundation that all knowledge and truth are based upon (e.g., Rationalism, Platonism, Positivism, Sciencism) (Petraglia-Bahri, 1996); also, the various positions that stand in contrast to relativism, such as the belief that there is absolute truth or a real world that we do not construct. (McGrew, 2003)
**Framework:** a research routine used to process data and specify results. (Maxey, 1995)

**Hermeneutics:** in depth interpretation of a text by understanding the background and context in which it was written (Honderich, 1995); most often applied to studying Biblical text.

**Higher Law:** universal principles that apply to all people, governments, and nations.

**Historical Materialism:** a major tenet in the Marxist theory of history that regards material economic forces as the basis upon which sociopolitical institutions and ideas are built. 

(AHD, 2000)

**Historicism:** a theory that events are determined or influenced by conditions and inherent processes beyond the control of humans; stresses the significant influence of history as a criterion of value; also, the view that historical periods should be studied without imposing anachronistic categories of evaluation (AHD, 2000); according to Ranke, the proper way of studying history (i.e., seeing through the eyes of the experiencer).

**Historiography:** the writing of history; especially the writing of history based on the critical examination of sources, the selection of particulars from the authentic materials, and the synthesis of particulars into a narrative that will stand the test of critical methods.

(MWCD, 2000)

**Idealism:** the theory that the object of external perception, in itself or as perceived, consists of ideas (AHD, 2000); also, the theory that the mind or spirit constitutes fundamental reality. It has taken several distinct but related forms. *Objective idealism* accepts common sense realism (i.e., the view that material objects exist) but rejects naturalism (i.e., the view that the mind and spiritual values have emerged from material things), whereas *subjective idealism* denies that material objects exist independently of human perception and thus stands opposed to both realism and naturalism. (Dolheny, 1998, para. 1)
**Liberal Democracy:** a society in which the majority population determines the political, economic, and social direction of the nation with broad acceptance for change and diverse ideas. In Marx’s theory, the middle class created this along with industrial capitalism, leading to conflict with the working class. (Honderich, 1995)

**Liberalism (comprehensive):** a philosophy of living that organizes all relevant values into a systematic whole, with limitless opportunity for the restructuring of society. (Callan, 1997, p. 13)

**Liberalism (political):** a mode of governance respecting reasonable pluralism, so long as it does not interfere with the stability of the society. (Callan, 1997, p. 13)

**Liberty:** the midpoint between anarchy and tyranny where individuals are free to live as they choose, within the bounds of higher law.

**Manuscripts:** a written or typed document rather than a copy; original source.

**Marxism:** the political and economic philosophy of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in which the concept of class struggle plays a central role in understanding society’s allegedly inevitable development from bourgeois oppression under capitalism to a socialist and ultimately classless society. (*AHD*, 2000)

**Meliorism:** the belief that the world tends to become better and that humans can aid in its betterment (i.e., utopian humanism). (*MWCD*, 2000)

**Modernism:** a practice, usage, or expression peculiar to modern times, a self-conscious break with the past and a search for new forms of expression (*MWCD*, 2000); also refers to the time period 1910-1970, known for “an implied availability of truth” (Bentley, 1999, pp. 138-148)
Metanarratives: a story, narrative, or grand theory with a privileged position that claims to be above the ordinary or local accounts of social life. (Drislane & Parkinson, 2003)

Microhistory: the reduction of the scale of observation; a microscopic analysis and an intensive study of the documentary material. (Levi, 2001, p. 99)

Moral (or Ethical) Relativism: the idea that no moral stance is superior to another (i.e., truth and moral values are not absolute but are relative to the persons or groups holding them).

Multicultural Education: learning about and seeking to understand diverse cultures. (Schlesinger, 1998)

Multiculturalism (Radical or Militant): opposing the idea of a common culture and rejecting assimilation or integration; immutability of separate ethic distinctions toward ethnocentric apartheid. (Schlesinger, 1998, p. 147)

Nativism: the reestablishment or perpetuation of native cultural traits, especially in opposition to acculturation. (AHD, 2000)

Natural Rights: rights possessed by every human being at inception, including, but not limited to, life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness (not always allowed by others), always within the confines of higher law.

New Left: the nineteen nineties version of sixties liberals represented by those such as Bill and Hillary Clinton. (Nash, 1986)

New History: early twentieth-century movement to broaden historicism to social history; later further expanded to include cultural history.

Nihilism: an extreme form of skepticism that denies all existence; a doctrine holding that all values are baseless and that nothing can be known or communicated; rejection of all
distinctions in moral or religious value and a willingness to repudiate all previous
theories of morality or religious belief. (*AHD*, 2000)

*Phenomenology*: a philosophy or method of inquiry based on the premise that reality consists of
objects and events as they are perceived or understood in human consciousness and not of
anything independent of human consciousness (e.g., Husserl). (*AHD*, 2000)

*Philology*: literary study or classical scholarship (e.g., *Historical Linguistics*: the study of
linguistic change over time in language). (*AHD*, 2000)

*Psychohistory*: historical analysis or interpretation employing psychological and psychoanalytic
methods; also, a work of history employing such methods (e.g., Freud).

*Positivism*: in rejection of metaphysics, the position that holds that the goal of knowledge is
simply to describe the phenomena that we experience. The purpose of science is simply
to stick to what we can observe and measure. The positivists believed in *empiricism* (i.e.,
the idea that observation and measurement are the core of scientific endeavor). The key
approach of the scientific method is experimentation, the attempt to discern natural laws
through direct manipulation and observation. (Trochim, 2002)

*Post-Positivism*: the total rejection of the positivist position based upon critical realism,
according to which reality is assumed to exist but difficult to find.

*Postmodernism*: reactions against the philosophy and practices of modernist movements
(*MWCD*, 2000); champions diversity and rails at traditional thought; meta-openness,
nihilism, relativism (i.e., there is no truth).

*Post-structuralism*: rejects intellectual categories and maintains that meanings and intellectual
categories are shifting and unstable.
**Pragmatism**: an American movement in philosophy founded by C. S. Peirce and William James and marked by the doctrines that the meaning of conceptions is to be sought in their practical bearings, that the function of thought is to guide action, and that truth is preeminently to be tested by the practical consequences of belief; touted by John Dewey as the appropriate method for testing educational practices. (*MWCD*, 2000)

**Protoscience**: speculation or hypothesis which has not had time to be tested adequately by the scientific method. (Wikipedia, 2003)

**Pseudoscience**: any body of knowledge purporting to be either both factual and scientific, or of an even higher standard of knowledge, but which fails to comply with the usual scientific tests of repeatability, consistency with existing well-established science and experimental result, experimental accessibility, etc. (Wikipedia, 2003)

**Quantified History**: akin to cleometrics, using statistical methods to verify historical claims (also Marxian).

**Queer Theory**: a deconstructionist theory in Queer studies. It is constructivist (i.e., proposes the theory that one’s sexual identity is partly or wholly socially constructed) and therefore claims that individuals cannot really be described using broad terms such as *homosexual* or *woman*; challenges the common use of compartmentalizing the description of a person to fit into one particular category. (Wikipedia, 2003)

**Radical Democracy**: revolutionary liberal overthrow of hegemony with populist, socialist, cultural movement (e.g., Norm Chomsky, Henry Giroux).

**Rationalism**: the theory that the exercise of reason, rather than experience, authority, or spiritual revelation, provides the primary basis for knowledge. (*AHD*, 2000)
Reasonable Pluralism: inclusion of a range of values and opinions within the context of a stable society, where citizens adjudicate among different viewpoints. (Heslep, 2002)

Rule of Law: societal standards applied to all persons, based on socially agreed-upon written law (e.g., constitutions) rather than the arbitrary pronouncements of a ruler (i.e., rule of man); must be consistent with higher law to be valid.

Sexualization: the initial inculcation of sexuality and sexual activity.

Signification: the established meaning of a word (AHD, 2000); under the new linguistics, becomes the idea that there are no discernable meanings; that words only relate to words.

Social Constructionism: a postmodern school of thought associated with sociology and epistemology that claims that much of what we perceive as reality and progress is socially constructed to be perceived that way and not founded in “truth” or any objective world. (Wikipedia, 2003)

Subjectivism: philosophy that claims there is no reality outside human understanding.

Structuralism: a method of analyzing phenomena, chiefly characterized by contrasting the elemental structures of the phenomena in a system of binary opposition. (AHD, 2000)

Teleology: the study of design or purpose in natural phenomena. (AHD, 2000)

Utilitarianism: the ethical theory that all action should be directed toward achieving the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people (e.g., Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill). (AHD, 2000)

Values Education: generally, the formal and informal inculcation of children with societal values. For Americans, specifically, the process by which American society instills specific desirable principles regarding moral behavior and civic responsibility into the citizenry, particularly, the children.
APPENDIX C

ELEVEN PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE CHARACTER

1. Character education promotes core ethical values as the basis of good character.

2. *Character* must be comprehensively defined to include thinking, feeling, and behavior.

3. Effective character education requires an intentional, proactive, and comprehensive approach that promotes the core values in all phases of school life.

4. The school must be a caring community.

5. To develop character, students need opportunities for moral action.

6. Effective character education includes a meaningful and challenging academic curriculum that respects all learners and helps them succeed.

7. Character education should strive to develop students' intrinsic motivation.

8. The school staff must become a learning and moral community in which all share responsibility for character education and attempt to adhere to the same core values that guide the education of students.

9. Character education requires moral leadership from both staff and students.

10. The school must recruit parents and community members as full partners in the character-building effort.

11. Evaluation of character education should assess the character of the school, the school staff's functioning as character educators, and the extent to which students manifest good character.

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APPENDIX D
THE HISTORICAL METHOD AND EDUCATIONAL HISTORIOGRAPHY
FOR TRADITIONAL HISTORICISTS

The Historical Method for Traditional Historicists

The historical method is a “systematic body of principles and rules designed to aid effectively in gathering the source-materials of history, appraising them critically, and presenting a synthesis of the results achieved” (Garraghan, 1946, p. 33).

Steps in the Historical Method

I. The Gathering of Materials

a. Choose between the source-oriented approach or problem-oriented approach or use application of both. (Brickman, 1982; Tosh, 2000)
b. Keep the context in mind (i.e., refrain from removing an event from its setting).
c. Recognize the historical process, relating events over time (i.e., chronology).
d. Classify the source(s) as primary or secondary to determine authenticity and relation to the events or people in question. (Howell & Prevenier, 2001; Tosh, 2000)
e. Gather ample materials so that one source may validate another.
g. Avoid dependence upon oral history that is not primary. (Barzun & Graff, 1985)

II. Source Criticism

a. Compare materials with the existing evidence, especially primary source evidence. (Howell & Prevenier, 2001; Tosh, 2000)
b. Evaluate documents by testing their authenticity (external criticism).
c. Examine the writer’s intentions and biases (internal criticism). (Brickman, 1982; Howell & Prevenier, 2001; Tosh, 2000)

d. Develop convictions about sources through “scholarly labors” rather than from biases. (Brundage, 1997, p. 77)

e. Seek to discover the evidence before drawing a conclusion. This evidence should confirm “one view and excludes its rivals” (Barzun & Graff, 1985, p. 174).

III. Presentation of the Synthesis

a. Discover the preponderance of the evidence: “Truth rests not on possibility nor on plausibility but on probability.” (Barzun & Graff, 1985, p. 175).

b. Review procedures to insure proper technique, honesty, verifiability, and references. (Garraghan, 1946)

c. Avoid anachronism (presentism) by realizing the gulf separating us from the past and thus not applying today’s social and cultural viewpoints to previous generations. (Gaddis, 1995; Howell & Prevenier, 2001; Saxe, 1998; Tosh, 2000)

d. Recognize personal prejudices and sympathies. (Garraghan, 1946; Tosh, 2000)

Educational Historiography for Traditional Historicists

*Educational Historiography* is “that branch of history which is concerned with the significant events and thought of the past with reference to the character formation and imparting of facts, ideas, and skills to persons of all ages in society.” (Brickman, 1982, p. 257)
Steps for Educational Historiographers:

I. Examination of Primary Sources (i.e., apply Historical Method)

II. Interpretation of Research Findings

   a. Analogy: comparison of one situation to a previous one.
   
   b. Generalization: a form of inductive reasoning where one can state “many or most.”
   
   c. Hypothesis: a tentative explanation as one progresses in discovering interrelations
      between facts such that it can be verified through continued research, with great care
      taken not to have the facts conform to a previously imagined hypothesis.
   
   d. Argumentum ex Silentio (i.e., evidence from silence).
   
   e. Argument a Priori (i.e., evidence because of former knowledge). (Brickman, 1982)
   
   f. Bias: preconceived notions and the attempt to “prove” a theory with selected facts.

III. Synthesis

   a. Selection of data: choosing which data is relevant to the purpose of the study.
   
   b. Sequence: chronological or topical organization.
   
   c. Causality: what caused some event to happen, including immediate and underlying
      causes.
   
   d. Historical trends: patterns over time, not broad generalizations or unreliable
      justifications. (Brickman, 1982; Garraghan, 1946)

Barzun and Graff’s Six Virtues for Historians:

1. Accuracy: attending to every detail to insure a factual presentation;

2. Love of Order: taking the time to keep information organized;

3. Logic: following a research pattern that makes sense;
4. Self-Awareness: lessening the influence of bias by revealing standards, judgments, and assumptions;

5. Imagination: making the jump from what you know to what you wish to learn;

6. Honesty: telling the truth about what is discovered. (Barzun & Graff, 1985)

Some Additional Research Tools for the Historical Methodologists:

1. Paleography (handwriting)
2. Diplomatics (legal documents)
3. Archaeology (relics)

Contributions to the Method by Other Approaches:

1. Marx’s presentation of social history;

2. The Annalistes’ emphasis on patterns of culture and societal values outside event oriented history;

3. Cliometricians’ employment of “quantification to reveal historical pattern and meaning”;

4. Pshycohistorians’ application of the question of motives of individuals and groups to the study of past events;

5. Postmodernist skepticism and focus on people and events previously ignored.
   (Brundage, 1997)
## APPENDIX E

VALUES EDUCATION POLL FROM THE 31\textsuperscript{st} ANNUAL PHI DELTA KAPPA/GALLUP POLL OF THE PUBLIC’S ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From the 31\textsuperscript{st} annual PDK/Gallup Poll-1999</th>
<th>National Totals</th>
<th>No Children In School</th>
<th>Public School Parents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should Be Taught</td>
<td>'99 %</td>
<td>'93 %</td>
<td>'99 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of people of different races and ethnic backgrounds</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caring for friends and family members</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral courage</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotism/love of country</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Golden Rule</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of people who hold different religious beliefs</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of people who hold unpopular or controversial political or social views</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual abstinence outside of marriage</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of people with different sexual orientations; that is, homosexuals or bisexuals</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of the right of a woman to choose abortion</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX F

12-POINT COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CHARACTER EDUCATION

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