JUSTICE, REVERENCE, AND THE NATURAL WORLD: TOWARD A GREEN STOICISM

by

DUSTIN C. ELLIOTT

(Under the Direction of Daniel Kapust)

ABSTRACT

Is the articulation of a green Stoicism theoretically viable—that is, can Stoic virtue ethics provide the basis for an adequate environmental ethic? In my three-part analysis of this question, I argue that Stoicism can, indeed, provide such a basis. First, I explicate the peripheral shortcomings of the arguments posed by those holding that Stoic ethics cannot serve as a foundation for green values. Second, in countering the notion held by many scholars that Stoic ethics is firmly rooted in ancient cosmology, I argue that Stoic ethics is better understood as grounded in human nature (as opposed to cosmic nature)—a view that undercuts many of the central criticisms concerning Stoicism’s ability to foster a green ethos. Third, I demonstrate how the Stoic conceptions of justice, reverence, and flourishing provide a satisfactory framework for recognizing and addressing environmental issues on both anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric grounds.

INDEX WORDS: Stoicism, Environmental ethics, Virtue ethics, Justice, Reverence, Green values, Cosmic nature, Flourishing, Anthropocentrism, Non-anthropocentrism, Transformative values, Eudaimonia, Stoic ethics
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Once upon a time there were gods only, and no mortal creatures. But when the time came that these also should be created, the gods fashioned them out of earth and fire and various mixtures of both elements in the interior of the earth; and when they were about to bring them into the light of day, they ordered Prometheus and Epimetheus to equip them, and to distribute to them severally their proper qualities. Epimetheus said to Prometheus: "Let me distribute, and do you inspect." This was agreed, and Epimetheus made the distribution. There were some to whom he gave strength without swiftness, while he equipped the weaker with swiftness; some he armed, and others he left unarmed; and devised for the latter some other means of preservation, making some large, and having their size as a protection, and others small, whose nature was to fly in the air or burrow in the ground; this was to be their way of escape. Thus did he compensate them with the view of preventing any race from becoming extinct. And when he had provided against their destruction by one another, he contrived also a means of protecting them against the seasons of heaven; clothing them with close hair and thick skins sufficient to defend them against the winter cold and able to rest the summer heat, so that they might have a natural bed of their own when they wanted to rest, also he furnished them with hoofs and hair and hard and callous skins under their feet. Then he gave them varieties of food—herb of the soil to some, to others fruits of trees, and to others roots, and to some again he gave other animals as food. And some he made to have few young ones, while those who were their prey were very prolific; and in this manner the race preserved. Thus did Epimetheus, who, not being very wise, forgot that he had distributed among the brute animals all the qualities which he had to give—and when he came to man, who was still unprovided, he was terribly perplexed. Now while he was in this perplexity, Prometheus came to inspect the distribution, and he found that the other animals were suitably furnished, but that man alone was naked and shoeless, and had neither bed nor arms of defense. The appointed hour was approaching when man in his turn was to go forth into the light of day; and Prometheus, not knowing how he could devise his salvation, stole the mechanical arts of Hephaestus and Athene, and fire with them (they could neither have been acquired nor used without fire), and gave them to man. Thus man had the wisdom necessary to the support of life, but political wisdom he had not; for that was in the keeping of Zeus, and the power of Prometheus did not extend to entering into the citadel of heaven, where Zeus dwelt, who moreover had terrible sentinels; but he did enter by stealth into the common workshop of Athene and Hephaestus' art of working by fire, and also the art of Athene, and gave them to man. And in this way man was supplied with the means of life. But Prometheus is said to have been afterwards prosecuted for theft, owing to the blunder of Epimetheus.

Now man, having a share of the diving attributes, was a first the only one of the animals who had any gods, because he alone was of their kindred; and he would raise altars and images of them. He was not long in inventing articulate speech and names; and he also constructed houses and clothes and shoes and beds, and grew sustenance from the earth. Thus provided, mankind at first lived dispersed, and there were no cities. But the consequence was that they were destroyed by the wild beasts, for they were utterly weak in comparison of them, and their art was only sufficient to provide them with the means of life, and did not enable them to carry on war against the animals; food they had, but not as yet the art of government, of which the art of war is a part. After a while the desire of self-preservation gathered them into cities; but when they were gathered together, having no art of government, they evil entreated one another, and were again in the process of dispersion and destruction. Zeus feared that the entire race would be exterminated, and so he sent Hermes to them, bearing reverence and justice to be the ordering principles of cities and the bonds of friendship and conciliation. Hermes asked Zeus how he should impart justice and reverence among men:—Should he distribute them as the arts are distributed; that is to say, to a favored few only, one skilled individual having enough of medicine or of any other art for many unskilled ones? 'Shall this be the manner in which I am to distribute justice and reverence among men, or shall I give them to all?' 'To all,' said Zeus; 'I should like them all to have a share; for cities cannot exist, if a few only share in the virtues, as in the arts. And further, make a law by my order, that he who has no part in reverence and justice shall be put to death, for he is a plague of the state.'

- Plato, Protagoras
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INTRODUCTION

Can ancient Greek schools of thought inform contemporary environmental ethics? More specifically, can Stoicism, as a particular school within the ancient Western philosophical tradition, provide a basis for the development of a green ethics? In his *How to Be a Green Liberal: Nature, Value and Liberal Philosophy*, Simon Hailwood challenges the notion of a green Stoicism. The Stoic, he argues, views the natural world as outside of the scope of ethics, thereby preventing the establishment of an adequate environmental ethic on Stoic grounds. More broadly, Stoic ethics, Hailwood contends, is rooted in Stoic cosmology—that is, Stoic ethics draws its foundational principles from cosmic nature. Hailwood goes on to suggest that by taking such a position, Stoicism is inconsistent with the ‘otherness’ view of nature that many green theorists regard as a necessary component of any satisfactory green ethics.

There are at least two ways of countering Hailwood’s challenge to Stoicism. One way is to demonstrate that the ‘otherness’ view—the view that nature deserves a type of non-instrumental respect—is not necessary for an adequately ‘green’ system of thought. A second way would be to show that Hailwood’s characterization of Stoicism is inaccurate and, in turn, undercut his conclusions concerning its inability to serve as a basis for green values. Because I agree with Hailwood’s premise that the otherness view of nature is an important part of an environmental ethic, I take the latter route and offer an alternate account of Stoic ethics.

With this goal in mind, I divide my analysis into three parts. Part I delves into an in-depth explication of Hailwood’s argument, detailing both the basis of the otherness
view of nature and his depiction of Stoicism as grounded in cosmology. My focus here concerns Hailwood’s problematic dependence on the dichotomy between intrinsic and instrumental value, in addition to his failure to acknowledge some of the most significant Stoic views of nature.

Part II concentrates on the debate concerning the roots of Stoic ethics. While many scholars argue that Stoic ethical theory is grounded in Stoic cosmology, other scholars hold that Stoic ethics is better understood as grounded in the Stoic conception of human nature rather than cosmic nature. If Stoic ethics is, in fact, grounded in Stoic cosmology, two major problems with incorporating it into contemporary ethical debates quickly emerge. One, Stoic cosmology has been largely discredited by modern science. Two, basing an ethical system on cosmic nature would constitute what Hailwood refers to as “blueprinting”—an approach that fails to acknowledge the ‘otherness’ aspect of the non-human natural world. In addressing those concerns, I hold that Stoic ethics is best understood as connected to but not grounded in Stoic cosmology, thereby avoiding the problems associated with blueprinting.

Part III investigates the Stoic conceptions of justice, reverence, and flourishing, focusing in particular on their potential to play a part in contemporary environmental ethics. While admittedly anthropocentric in essence, the virtue of justice—understood in congruence with the role of other-concern in Stoic ethics—provides a far-reaching basis for the protection and preservation of the natural environment for future generations. The virtue of reverence, I argue, provides the basis for recognizing and appreciating the natural environment as something beyond complete human control. On these grounds, reverence expands the scope of Stoic ethics to cover non-anthropocentric concerns. By
detailing the virtue’s history both within Stoic doctrine and within ancient Western thought as a whole, I explain how the virtue has the potential to change the way we perceive the non-human natural world. In the next to final subsection of Part III, I examine the congruence of (a) the Stoic notion of flourishing and (b) the role of non-human nature in human development. Finally, I discuss in the concluding pages of Part III the non-materialistic aspects of the Stoic notion of happiness.

It is also important to note that, in my explication of Stoic virtue ethics, I draw primarily from Cicero (a later Stoa writer) and middle Stoa writers (e.g., Antipater, Panaetius, Posidonius). From these Stoics in particular, we can see most clearly the potential basis for a green ethos. Moreover, another central objective of this analysis is to call attention to the fact that the historical diversity of Stoic doctrine rules out the type of sweeping characterization that Hailwood attempts to make. Stoicism, I argue, is better understood as a dynamic school of thought that existed and evolved across time.
PART I: HAILWOOD’S CHALLENGE

In his *How to be a Green Liberal: Nature, Value and Liberal Philosophy*, Simon Hailwood advocates an “otherness” view of nature, one in which humans demonstrate a non-instrumental respect for the natural environment. Hailwood distinguishes this otherness view from what he refers to as “blueprinting”—an approach that attempts to derive moral and political principles from nature itself. Blueprinting, Hailwood argues, fails to generate the type of non-instrumental respect for the natural world rendered by the otherness view and, in turn, fails to provide the theoretical tools necessary to tackle many of our most pressing environmental issues. Moreover, insofar as Stoic conceptions of nature constitute a blueprinting doctrine, advancing the notion of a green Stoicism is simply implausible.

In arguing against Hailwood’s depiction of Stoicism as a non-green system of thought, I divide my analysis into two general sections. First, I offer a more detailed explication of both Hailwood’s broader argument against blueprinting and his more specific argument concerning the supposed instrumentalism of Stoicism. Second, I highlight the central shortcomings of Hailwood’s position on Stoicism, noting such worries as (a) his reliance on the dichotomy between intrinsic value and instrumental value and (b) his failure to include all of the relevant Stoic views on nature.

1.1: Hailwood on Blueprinting and Stoicism

Hailwood lays out three different views of nature. He describes the first of these, blueprinting, as “the attempt to identify a certain aspect of independent nature, a natural phenomenon or process as something to be emulated, a model to be copied, a natural
order to be followed, or continued, by human beings in their moral and political lives.”
The second view Hailwood notes is that of “rational landscaping.” This approach makes a point “to know and understand external nature” with the goal being to “better aid humanity and its plans.” The third approach, which Hailwood goes on to advocate over the other two approaches, is an “otherness view” of nature—a view that “involves seeking to know and understand natural processes” while simultaneously being “sensitive to them as owed non-instrumental respect for their own sake” (Hailwood 61). It is the non-instrumental sensitivity aspect of the otherness approach that distinguishes it from the rational landscaping view.

Hailwood highlights some of his chief concerns with the blueprinting view by drawing on the work of John Stuart Mill (with a particular emphasis on Mill’s essay “On Nature”). In arguing for the point that blueprinting is utterly ludicrous, Mill, as Hailwood notes, declares that the order of the natural world “in so far as unmodified by man, is such as no being, whose attributes are justice and benevolence, would have made with the intention that his rational creatures should follow it as an example” (75). Mill continues his argument against blueprinting (albeit he does not refer to the approach as such) by pointing out that “nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another are nature’s everyday performances.” In addition to highlighting the absurdity of blueprinting via Mill’s comments on the subject, Hailwood goes on to note the arbitrary nature of blueprinting. Because “independent nature does and is so many different things,” to select certain natural processes as constituting the central principles to be followed is ultimately arbitrary (77).
Blueprinting, Hailwood concludes, fails to respect nature’s otherness in its attempt to “identify processes and patterns within nature as ‘authentic’ extensions into culture of a wider natural order” (65).

Hailwood goes on to argue that Stoicism, with its emphasis on living “in accordance with universal nature,” is a form of blueprinting. For the Stoic, attaining the good life entails “realizing humanity’s unique essence (that of a rational animal)” as it is situated in “nature as a teleological system” (68). The Stoics differentiate themselves from Aristotle in holding that eudaimonia (roughly translated as happiness) consists of virtuous activity alone. The various contingencies of life (e.g., material goods, health, chance events) are regarded as “indifferents”—things that may be preferred or non-preferred but cannot be regarded as unconditionally good in the same sense as virtue insofar as they are largely out of one’s control.

Hailwood stresses Zeno of Citium’s view that the good life “is a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things” (68, 69). To live the life of virtue, then, one must distinguish between the purely passive material elements of the universe and the active elements (logos), with the ultimate goal being to identify and live in accordance with the latter. In short, it is through an understanding of the rational parts of the universe that one is able to live virtuously.

With this understanding of the Stoic doctrine in mind, Hailwood concludes that Stoicism is inconsistent with the otherness view on the grounds that it is incapable of seeing nature from a non-instrumental perspective. If the Stoic regards the non-human world as an “indifferent” that can at best serve as a material used in the exercise of virtue, nature then becomes a means to an end (rather than an end in itself).
More broadly, the Stoic view, according to Hailwood, represents a form of blueprinting:

[W]hatever way you approach the Stoic notion of living in accordance with nature, it equates with living in accordance with reason, that is, with just that part of nature that is reason or the rational…. This, then, is blueprinting, the conscious living in accordance with an aspect of the wider order of the world, its animating logos. (71)

On these grounds, Hailwood concludes that the Stoic view of nature prohibits it from being a possible foundation for an adequately green system of thought.

1.2: The Shortcomings of Hailwood’s Critique

In holding that Stoicism “is incapable of grounding a non-instrumental eco-philosophy” because it does not account for the intrinsic value of non-human nature, Hailwood establishes a false dichotomy between intrinsic value theory and instrumental value theory. Such a dichotomy ignores (or perhaps implicitly denies) the possibility of a non-instrumental, non-intrinsic type of value. As an example, I point to what Anthony Weston and Piers H. G. Stephens refer to as “immediate values.” Intrinsic value theory, in arguing for the axiological shift in focus from valuing nature as a means to valuing it as an end, fails to account for the way we often experience the valuing of nature. Weston argues that moving beyond the means-end distinction is necessary in order to properly capture our valuing of the spontaneous and episodic essence of the natural world (Weston 237). Stephens explains further how the means-ends distinction fails to encapsulate this sense of immediate or transformative value:
When nature draws us out of ourselves, it seems odd to claim that it doing so makes it either a means or an end. If we have our attention attracted by a squirrel’s jump outside the window, or watch the movements of ants above ground in fascination, what is happening is not an instrumentalization or an acknowledgement of other “ends.” (Stephens 235)

Through such moments, as Stephens stresses, we are drawn out of our “narrowness of focus.” With this type of transformative power, these experiences have the capacity to generate novel understandings of the world around us such that they become remarkably important in the perpetuation of human growth and flourishing. Moreover, while we do not see explicit invocations of immediate value theory in classical Stoic doctrine, such a theory does not appear to be inconsistent with the Stoic view of nature as a whole. The key point here, however, is that a non-intrinsic value theory is not necessarily an instrumental value theory. To lump Stoicism into the instrumental camp just because it does not fit into the intrinsic camp (as Hailwood does) is to suppose that an intermediate category does not exist.

It also seems as though Hailwood is misrepresenting Stoic thought in claiming that, for the Stoic, “the unconscious material world is there simply for the rational” (Hailwood 70). As Clarence Glacken explains in *Traces on the Rhodian Shore*, Stoic conceptions of nature were not necessarily static. Panaetius and his pupil Posidonius moved beyond the “old Stoic anthropocentric belief that the earth has been created for human needs alone” so as to account for an “appreciation of the visible aspects of nature” (51,52). These Stoic thinkers held that
there is joy in the beauty of the earth—of the Greek landscape with its alternation of land and sea, its innumerable islands, its contrasts between the lovely shores and the steep mountains and the rough cliffs, and the variety of plant and animal life existing in this landscape. (Glacken 52)

Hailwood’s criticism of Stoic thought focuses on its supposed favoring of instrumentalism in addition to its tendency to regard patterns found in nature as patterns that should be emulated in our moral and political lives. It is the latter criticism that leads Hailwood to conclude that Stoicism is a blueprinting doctrine and therefore a system of thought incapable of properly respecting the otherness of the natural environment. While I sympathize with Hailwood’s worry regarding instrumentalism, it is important to highlight the point that non-instrumentalism does not equate with intrinsic value theory: the dichotomy that Hailwood establishes between intrinsic and instrumental value mistakenly excludes the possibility of middle ground between the two camps—that is, he fails to recognize the possibility that some non-intrinsic valuations of nature are also non-instrumental. In fact, to focus on intrinsic values exclusively leads one to miss the significance of immediate, transformative values—values that Stoicism could potentially incorporate. Furthermore, as the quote above hints at, Stoic views of nature were far from stationary. While Hailwood makes the mistake of assuming that Stoicism can be understood as a single, unchanging school of thought, my argument that it is better understood as a complex, dynamic philosophical doctrine will further unfold as this analysis progresses.
PART II: ON THE FOUNDATION OF STOIC ETHICS

Stoic ethics, according to many scholars, is best understood as grounded in Stoic cosmology. Under this view, the focus of morality for the Stoic revolves around (i) discovering the principles that govern cosmic nature and (ii) modeling our moral, social, and political lives around those principles. Hailwood refers to this approach as ‘blueprinting’—the attempt to derive moral principles from the natural world, basing our goals and behavior as humans on the processes, systems, and principles found within the cosmos (Hailwood 61). As Hailwood and others have noted, this account presents several problems. To model morality on something external to humans is not altogether plausible from the modern perspective. Moreover, provided that non-human nature constitutes a myriad of different things, to select certain processes or principles as central is problematically arbitrary.

Other contemporary work on Stoicism has explored the development of an alternative foundation for Stoic ethics, one that does not rely on ancient cosmology. In his *A New Stoicism*, for instance, Lawrence Becker outlines what he regards as a modern version of Stoic ethics, one that has evolved beyond ancient Stoic cosmology so as to account for our current knowledge about the natural world. Other contemporary virtue ethicists have added to the resurgence of eudaimonistic theory by offering novel understandings of the foundations of the virtues—understandings that mesh with modern sociological and scientific theory in a way that ancient theories do not.

With this analysis, however, I take a different route. In drawing on Julia Annas’s illumination of Stoic thought in *The Morality of Happiness*, I present Stoic ethics as a
system of thought that does not depend or hinge on the validity of Stoic cosmology, thereby undercutting the need for the development of a more acceptable foundation. From this perspective, cosmic nature is better understood as a component of Stoic thought rather than the basis for Stoic ethics. Articulating Stoic ethics in this manner serves to further destabilize Hailwood’s challenge—most notably his position on the supposed naturalistic elements of Stoic ethical thought.

2.1: Virtue and Cosmology

If ancient accounts of the virtues such as those presented by Aristotle and the Stoics are grounded on metaphysical and cosmological views that have been largely discounted by modern scholars, are those ancient ethical systems no longer viable? Contemporary virtue ethicists have responded to this question in different ways. Alasdair MacIntyre takes up the issue in his *After Virtue*, in which he attempts to generate a neo-Aristotelian account of the virtues by replacing Aristotle’s metaphysics with a contemporary counterpart (one rooted in a type of sociological theory). In an attempt to articulate a neo-Stoic account of the virtues, one might attempt to take MacIntyre’s model and tailor it to Stoic ethical theory, with the ultimate goal being to replace Stoic cosmology in the same way MacIntyre replaces Aristotelian metaphysics.

However, while somewhat promising, this attempt to replace Stoic cosmology as the foundation of Stoic ethics may be unnecessary. In her *The Morality of Happiness*, Julia Annas offers an explication of Stoic doctrine that turns the aforementioned question regarding the contemporary feasibility of Stoic ethics on its head: instead of accepting Stoic views on cosmic nature as foundational to Stoic ethics, Annas argues that cosmic nature is better understood as a non-foundational aspect of Stoic ethics.
Modern scholars, Annas notes, have picked up on the writings of later Stoics—most notably Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius—and have concluded that because these writers seem to give cosmic nature a more fundamental role in their ethical theories, Stoic ethics as a whole positions cosmic nature as foundational. Strangely enough, it is these same later Stoics who have the least to say about cosmology and the nature of the universe outside of ethical discussions (Annas 162). A problem with this approach, as Annas explains, is that, on a certain level, it appears to be incompatible with the eudaimonist character of Stoic ethics:

Ethical theory begins from reflection on the agent’s final good and how this is to be made determinate in a way which will enable the agent to make sense of her life and correctly order her priorities. The appeal to cosmic nature, however, does the opposite of what is required; it pulls the agent away from the kind of attachment to her own concerns which is needed for useful reflection on her final end to be possible. (Annas 161)

It is important to note here that the ancient Greek conception of eudaimonia, often translated as ‘happiness,’ refers not to a state of feeling or enjoyment, and thereby does not reflect most modern notions of happiness; it refers to (and, in a sense, simply serves as a label for) the form of life that is most desirable and satisfying. Understood in this way, eudaimonia is active, whereas our modern conceptions of happiness tend to signify a passive state. Happiness, as the Stoics and most of the ancients suggest, is the final end which all of our personal projects and considered actions are structured around.
With the moral agent’s viewpoint as the starting point in eudaimonist ethics, the cosmic viewpoint becomes relevant only when adopted as a part (rather than as the basis) of a theory that works from the type of individual, personal reflection Annas refers to above. In addition to such methodological problems, there are also problems concerning the content of Stoic ethics when we view cosmic nature as foundational:

If cosmic nature is foundational, then it seems that the Stoic answer to the question, what my happiness consists in, must simply be: conformity to cosmic nature; and this is an unexpectedly thin kind of happiness. What kind of happiness could be supposed to consist simply in conforming my life to some external standard? (Annas 162)

As a proponent of eudaimonist ethics, the Stoic is concerned primarily with flourishing—the kind of internal growth that comes about by living one’s life in accordance with virtuous activity. Simply conforming to external, abstract standards does not seem to capture the richness of the Stoic conception of happiness. Moreover, it is unclear as to how we are to derive the many Stoic theses pertaining to virtue and the ‘indifferents’ from appeals to cosmic nature. As Annas highlights in her discussion of the virtues, the Stoic sees virtue as a skill to do the right thing, at the right time, for the right reason. Virtue is also understood by the Stoic as a “skill of ‘selecting’ among the indifferents”—with virtue having a different type of value than everything else (Annas 162). While later Stoics like Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus posit strategies of connecting these theses to cosmic nature, such versions of Stoic ethical theory are remarkably distinct from earlier versions.
With these considerations in mind, I agree with Annas that we are better off focusing on the earlier sources of Stoic thought in our attempt to understand the basis of Stoic ethics. Arius Didymus, a first century BCE court philosopher to Emperor Augustus, describes Stoic ethics as similar to Aristotelian ethics in the sense that both accounts work along eudaimonist lines:

They say that happiness is the goal: everything is produced for its sake, while it is not produced for the sake of anything else. It consists in living according to virtue, in living in agreement, and in addition, this being the same thing, in living in accordance with nature. Zeno defined happiness in this way: happiness is a smooth flow of life. Cleanthes and all their followers, saying that happiness was nothing other than the happy life, but saying that happiness was set up as the target, while the goal was to achieve happiness, which is the same as being happy. So it is clear from this that ‘living in accord with nature,’ ‘living the good life,’ ‘living well’ are equivalent, as are also ‘the fine and good’ and ‘virtue and what participates in virtue.’ (Didymus 6e11-32)

The goal of ethics from this view is to aid us in discovering and articulating what happiness, as our final end, requires. For the Stoic, then, provided that he or she posits virtue as sufficient for happiness, nature is understood not as the basis for action but as the result of action: to live virtuously—and thereby attain eudaimonia—turns out to involve a type of ‘natural’ development.

However, even if we accept this understanding of Stoic ethics as correct, the question as to how Stoic ethics and Stoic metaphysics fit into Stoic philosophy as a whole remains to be answered. Jacques Brunschwig provides a promising approach to resolving
this issue in his 1991 article “On a Book-Title by Chrysippus: ‘On the Fact That the Ancients Admitted Dialectic along with Demonstrations.’ ” Given that the pedagogical order of Stoic doctrine (namely, logic-ethics-physics) situates ethics as prior to physics, ethics is best regarded, he argues, as a branch of Stoic thought that is initially isolated from Stoic metaphysics (Brunschwig 94). It was only after understanding ethics as independent from cosmology that Stoic pupils moved on to an understanding of the complementary nature of the two branches. Annas supports this assessment in explaining that, for the Stoic, “cosmic nature has a role not as a part of ethical theory, but as part of a study of ethical theory and its place in the wider scheme of Stoic philosophy” (Annas 164).

So, while glimpses of blueprinting appear to manifest themselves with certain later Stoic writers (e.g., Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius), it is important to recognize Stoicism as a dynamic system of thought that evolved in subtle, yet, significant ways from writer to writer, period to period, and culture to culture. Hailwood misses this point on two levels: 1) he draws conclusions about Stoic ethics based on selected quotations from one Stoic writer (Zeno)—quotations that are not entirely situated within the broader context of the philosophical doctrine in which they were drawn from; and 2) Hailwood assumes that those conclusions apply to Stoicism as a whole, as opposed to the particular Stoic in question. In drawing on Annas’s analysis, this section demonstrates why Hailwood’s assumptions concerning the connection between blueprinting and Stoic ethics grossly oversimplify and misrepresent the complexity of Stoic doctrine.
PART III: JUSTICE, REVERENCE, AND FLOURISHING

As the analysis above demonstrates, Hailwood argues that Stoicism—insofar as it attempts to derive moral and political principles from nature—constitutes a blueprinting philosophy. Because such a philosophy fails to generate the type of non-instrumental respect for the natural environment that many green theorists regard as necessary for any adequate environmental ethic, the notion of a green Stoicism is implausible. I argue, however, that such a notion is not implausible. In fact, working from the position I have defended in Part II, it seems as though Hailwood has falsely characterized the grounding of Stoic ethical theory, thus rendering the blueprinting charge unwarranted. While undermining this criticism clears the way for the articulation of a green Stoicism, the question as to how the Stoic is to regard—and on what grounds she is to regard—the natural, non-human world as something to be protected and preserved remains unclear. Moving from the defense of Stoicism presented in Parts I and II to an expression of the green aspects of Stoic ethics will therefore be my focus in this section of the analysis.

My task here is four-fold. First, I argue that the virtue of justice—in particular, the far-reaching Stoic conception of justice—establishes sufficient grounds for taking the interest of both current and future generations of humans into account; on these anthropocentric grounds, environmental preservation becomes intertwined with the virtue of justice. Second, I hold that the virtue of reverence provides the Stoic with a sound basis for both pursuing environmental preservation and for respecting the natural environment in a non-anthropocentric fashion. Next, by drawing on the work of green theorists such as Anthony Weston, Bill McKibben, and Wendell Berry, I highlight the
broader congruence of the Stoic conception of flourishing and the role of non-human nature in our intellectual and psychological development. I conclude by discussing yet another green component of Stoic thought: the non-materialistic aspects of the Stoic notion of happiness.

3.1: Justice, Other-Concern, and Future Generations

Stoicism holds that in order for an individual to attain his or her final end (i.e., *eudaimonia*), the individual must live a virtuous life. This idea, coupled with the Stoic thesis that virtue holds a different type of value than all other things, establishes the virtues as paramount in Stoic doctrine. One of the central virtues not only in Stoic ethics but also within ancient Greco-Roman ethics as a whole is that of *justice*.

I choose here to focus on justice as a virtue of character (or as a virtue of the individual) as opposed to a virtue of institutions. Stoic views on the latter are considerably difficult to decipher, with some scholars concluding (albeit tentatively) that the Stoics had no systematic explanation of the way justice as a virtue of the individual relates to justice as a virtue of institutions (Annas 311). While an attempt to integrate these two conceptions of justice would be an interesting and useful endeavor, such a project will not be pursued in this analysis.

The traditional Stoic definition of justice is the “knowledge of apportioning each his due” (Didymus 5b1.21), or “the allotting to each their deserts (*to kat’axiam hekastōi nemein*)” (Annas 307). In his *On Moral Duties*, Cicero argues that justice requires us to contribute to the public good by the interchange of acts of kindness, now giving, now receiving, and ever eager to employ our talents, industry and resources in strengthening the bonds of human society. (*Duties* 1.7)
While the specific definitions and explications of justice fluxuated subtly from Early to Late Stoa, the foundation of the Stoic conception of justice remained stable throughout the evolution of Stoic doctrine as a whole.

This foundation, articulated by the Stoics via the notion of *oikeiōsis* (familiarization), expresses a developmental theory of other-concern. Broadly speaking, the theory consists of two basic claims: (1) nature familiarizes a human with herself (i.e., one becomes ‘familiar’ with oneself naturally—via a process of natural development); (2) nature familiarizes humans with other humans (i.e., through a process of natural development one becomes ‘familiar’ with others). *Oikeiōsis*, as Julia Annas points out, is distinct from proto-emotion and self-love in that *oikeiōsis* expresses “the tendency we have toward developing other-concern” (Annas 263). The developmental story at work here goes as follows: beginning with a sense of self-preservation (focusing on food, shelter, warmth, and the like), we go on to develop the ability (as rational beings) to “follow rules and to perform ‘due actions,’ and thence to the build-up of a virtuous disposition to do these firmly and reliably” (Annas 263). The final stage entails the recognition that the value of rational activity is different in kind from the value of the consequences that come about as a result of that rational activity. It is at this stage that the human can recognize the distinctness of virtue’s value. Annas emphasizes this type of distinction in value: “realizing the value of virtue is to realize that one has reason to act which is different in kind from a reason that merely promotes one’s own desires and projects” (263).

Through this three-stage process of development, we see the culmination of nature familiarizing a human with himself. The second claim, concerning the
familiarization of humans to other humans, emerges from the Stoic conception of the human instinct to care for one’s offspring. In his essay “The Contradictions of the Stoics” from *Moralia*, Plutarch mentions the view of Chrysippus (an Early Stoa philosopher) regarding this instinct:

How is it that [Chrysippus] keeps irritating us by writing in all of his books—books on physics, for heaven’s sake, as well as on ethics—that we are familiarized with ourselves as soon as we are born, and to our parts and to our own offspring? (Plutarch 1038b)

Here, Plutarch emphasizes the strangeness of the idea that we have instinctual concern for our offspring at a time when we do not have offspring—namely, at the time of birth. While troublesome on a surface-level analysis, such a position is not problematic in the same way if we take the premise to be that humans have a proto-instinct for both self-concern and other-concern at birth, with the latter only fully realizing itself when we do actually produce offspring.

Cicero echoes this line of thought concerning self- and other-concern in *On Moral Ends*.

Now the Stoics consider it important to realize that parents’ love for their children arises naturally. From this starting-point we trace the development of all human society. It should be immediately obvious from the shape and the parts of the human body that procreation is part of nature’s plan. And it would hardly be consistent for nature to wish us to procreate yet be indifferent as to whether we love our offspring. (*Ends* 3.62)
Indeed, the Ciceronian conception of other-concern recognizes many different forms of human fellowship, all which are rooted in the sociable nature of human beings:

There are indeed several degrees of fellowship among men. To move from the one that is unlimited, next there is a closer one of the same race, tribe and tongue, through which men are bound strongly to one another. More intimate still is that of the same city, as citizens have many things that are shared with one another…. A tie narrower still is that of the fellowship between relations: moving from that vast fellowship of the human race we end up with a confined and limited one.

(*Duties* 1.53)

The utility of the virtues, for Cicero, lies largely in their ability to preserve these natural human fellowships—yet another reason why some Stoics (including Cicero) placed less emphasis on the connection between virtue and cosmic or divine nature.

Starting from an instinctual commitment and attachment to our offspring, human sympathy develops further so as to extend to other humans. Such an extension of other-concern continues as we come to realize “that there is no rational stopping place until we have concern for every human just insofar as he or she is human” (Annas 265). It is this type of impartiality—albeit a distinctly anthropocentric form of impartiality—that constitutes the foundation of Stoic justice.

Considering the philosophical tradition from which this theory of *oikeiôsis* emerged, the Stoic position was remarkably original. Aristotle, for instance, holds a much narrower view about the boundaries of justice in arguing that our commitment to the interests of other humans lies only within the context of a *particular* set of other people. In his extensive discussion of friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle
places a substantial restriction on other-concern by consigning a significant role in the
good life to *philia* (*Nicomachean Ethics* VIII-IX). *Philia*, for Aristotle, is an ethical
conception of other-concern that is restricted to those whom one has some form of
personal commitment. Stoic thinkers from both early and later periods have offered
conceptions of justice grounded on *oikeiōsis* that run counter to the Aristotelian position.
Antipater, a prominent philosopher from Middle Stoa, is thought to have articulated
*oikeiōsis* theory as follows:

> If nature tells every man that he ought to treat the interests of any other man, just
> because he is a man, as not alien from himself, that precludes violating those
> interests. (Schofield 450)

While this notion of other-concern further specifies the traditional Stoic definition of
‘assigning to each his own due,’ there remains some uncertainty as to what exactly justice
requires. Cicero’s discussion of justice in *On Moral Duties* adds a degree of clarification
on this point. He notes that the first duty justice enjoins “is to do no violence except
defense, to create no privilege in public rights, and to keep for our private enjoyment only
what is ours. He goes on to distinguish between two different types of injustice—(1) that
of active harm to others and (2) that of failing to prevent harm to others (i.e., passive
harm) (*Duties* 1.7).

Thus, while the articulation of *oikeiōsis* theory has varied slightly from Stoic to
Stoic, the basic notion of impartiality remained central from Early to Late Stoa. Indeed,
many ancient philosophers (e.g., Arius Didymus, Antiochus) regarded the Stoic argument
concerning impartiality as persuasive, considering it a thesis that must be accounted for in
subsequent accounts of morality.
The connection between justice, understood in Stoic terms, and environmentalism is relatively simple. Combined with our contemporary understanding of the way in which humans depend on the health of the natural systems in which they live, Stoic oikeiōsis theory would render a robust basis for pursuing measures to protect nature on at least two grounds. First, with the prohibition of both active and passive harm (as emphasized by Cicero), the Stoic would have to regard environmental protection concerns as intimately interlaced with issues of justice—provided that threats to the natural elements that sustain us (e.g., air, water, soil) constitute threats to the health and well-being of present generations. To be concerned about the active and passive harming of humans, then, is to be concerned about environmental protection.

Second, oikeiōsis theory would seemingly lead to the consideration not only of current generations’ interests, but also to the interests of future generations. With its emphasis on impartiality, the well-being of future generations comes into play when the long-term environmental impact of current generations is taken into consideration. For current generations to fail in protecting the natural environment for future generations would be for present generations to passively harm future generations. Indeed, considering how current generations are now able to understand the way in which they are impacting the natural systems that sustain them (the same systems that future generations will eventually inherit), Stoic justice would seem to require a rigorous push towards environmental sustainability, with current generations striving to lessen their negative impact on natural systems as much as possible.

Critics of this approach may worry that this type of valuation of nature is overly simplistic; after all, how does this view differ significantly from the way we approach
many environmental issues today—an approach that often turns out to be grossly inadequate? The key difference between the Stoic conception of justice and many of our own (non-Stoic) conceptions of justice today does not lie in the content of the virtue itself (as many would agree that justice entails giving each his or her due) but rather in the commitment to the virtue. From the Stoic perspective, living well is inextricably tied to virtue. While the non-Stoic may feel a social obligation to protect the interests of current and future generations, the Stoic views her own happiness and well-being as directly linked to virtuous activity—and therefore linked to pursuing the type of environmental protection that secures the interests of current and future generations. From this view, Stoic virtue ethics may very well provide an individual agent with the kind of motivation to pursue justice (on both environmental and non-environmental grounds) that would otherwise be lacking from the typical modern perspective.

Moreover, it is clear that the ancient Stoics did not have access to the type of ecological knowledge we have today (however limited our current understanding of the natural world and its processes may be). Provided that the ancients did not recognize the scope of the human’s environmental footprint—a footprint that was much smaller in ancient times—the need for a robust account of environmental values never manifested itself. In contemporary times, however, the ability of humans to drastically and negatively alter the natural systems around them has become abundantly clear, so much so that the need for a sound, persuasive theory concerning green values is perhaps more pressing now than ever before.

A neo-Stoic outlook, it seems, would have to take such considerations into account. One’s attempt to live a life in accordance with virtuous activity would at the
very least lead one to protect and preserve the natural environment on anthropocentric
grounds: if current and future generations of humans depend on the protection of the
natural environment for their survival and flourishing, then surely a virtuous individual
(one concerned with justice, generosity, and the like) would strive to protect and preserve
nature. To act virtuously in contemporary society is, in part, to be concerned about the
impact one has on the natural environment (insofar as this impact has the potential to
affect current and future generations).

One potential problem with relying only on the virtue of justice to serve as the
source for environmental values concerns the anthropocentric roots of the approach.
Many green theorists stress the significance of moving toward a non-anthropocentric
valuation of nature, noting that anthropocentric-focused efforts fail to capture the full
value of independent, non-human aspects of the natural world.

3.2: Reverence and the Natural World

Stoic ethical theory, however, is not confined to the virtue of justice. The virtue
of reverence—a prominent virtue in the writings of many ancient Greeks—may provide a
source for the kind of non-anthropocentric valuation green theorists are looking for. In
his book *Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue*, Paul Woodruff comments on the basic
notion of reverence as understood by the ancient Greeks:

Reverence begins in a deep understanding of human limitations; from this grows
the capacity to be in awe of whatever we believe lies outside our control—God,
truth, justice, nature, even death. The capacity of awe, as it grows, brings with it
the capacity for respecting fellow human beings, flaws and all. This in turn
fosters the ability to be ashamed when we show moral flaws exceeding the normal
human allotment…. Simply put, reverence is the virtue that keeps human beings from trying to act like gods. (Woodruff 3, 4)

Reverence understood in this way represents the foil of hubris. From Homer to Aristotle, the Greeks regarded reverence (*aidôs*) as a recognition of one’s limitations as a human. The Stoics, too, emphasized the significance of reverence, with Epictetus proclaiming it to be the virtue that allows us to recognize our relation to the environments around us, a distinctively human capacity for appreciating and evaluating our position in the world (Long 388, Kamtekar 137). Interestingly enough, Epictetus also characterized it as a type of “good emotion” in that it is reverence that permits us to experience awe and shame in the appropriate contexts (Kamtekar 138).

From an environmental perspective, irreverence seems to be a key component of many (if not all) of our current problems. While we are able to manipulate the natural environment in the short term, large-scale environmental issues remind us that we are not capable of controlling the broader natural systems at work (although it *is* clear that we have the capacity to alter these systems—often in negative ways). In his essay “The Making of a Marginal Farm,” green theorist Wendell Berry espouses the need for a resurgence in this virtue of reverence:

> The true remedy for [environmental] mistakes is to keep from making them. It is not in the piecemeal technological solutions that our society now offers, but in a change of cultural (and economic) values that will encourage in the whole population the necessary respect, restraint, and care. (Berry 515)
Berry’s point here echoes the ancient Greek emphasis on the importance of reverence vis-à-vis the non-human world—a reverence that would surely factor into the modern Stoic’s view of the natural environment.

Some Stoic writers did, in fact, express rather explicitly a type of non-anthropocentric reverence for the environment in which they lived. As mentioned in Part I, Panaetius and Posidonius (middle Stoa writers) hinted at the link between this sense of reverence and an appreciation for nature. For clarification and emphasis, I highlight the quote a second time:

[T]here is joy in the beauty of the earth—of the Greek landscape with its alternation of land and sea, its innumerable islands, its contrasts between the lovely shores and the steep mountains and the rough cliffs, and the variety of plant and animal life existing in this landscape. (Glacken 52)

Earlier Stoics conveyed a broader sense of reverence, expressing at times what seems to be a holy regard for the cosmic universe as a whole. Cleanthes, for example, is perhaps most known for his “Hymn to Zeus,” in which he articulates a profound respect for “Nature” as that which is beyond human control.

It is also important to note that all Stoics do not emphasize the virtue of reverence—at least not in the fragmentary records we have managed to preserve over the centuries since the first emergence of Stoic doctrine. As the aforementioned quotations confirm, however, we do find a discussion of reverence in each of the three different periods of Stoicism (i.e., Early, Middle, and Late Stoa). The goal of this portion of the analysis has been to locate the virtue of reverence within the Stoic tradition as a whole, thereby revealing a potential link between Stoic ethics and contemporary green value.
theory. Structuring the analysis in this manner, I argue, further demonstrates not only that Hailwood’s characterization of Stoicism is far too simplistic, but also that Stoic philosophy—when explicated in the context of modern society—contains elements of the axiological framework necessary to support the preservation and appreciation of the natural environment on non-anthropocentric grounds.

3.3: Flourishing and Transformative Values

The next step of my analysis concerns the ancient Greek notion of *eudaimonia*. While scholars disagree about the proper translation of the word, many modern theorists typically regard *flourishing*, *well-being*, and *fulfillment* as suitable replacements. *Eudaimonia* extends beyond conscious states of happiness in the sense that it suggests a type of completeness in the development of the agent in question.

Leading green theorists like Anthony Weston, Bill McKibben, and Wendell Berry have picked up on the idea of human flourishing, paying particular attention to the role that the non-human, natural environment plays in the well-being of both individual humans and in the well-being of society at large. As mentioned in Part I, Weston argues against the legitimacy of the means-ends dichotomy, noting in particular the spontaneous essence of the natural environment. By living within the context of processes and systems characterized by their non-human peculiarities, the natural world is able to draw us out of our “narrowness of focus,” often revealing fresh understandings and ultimately allowing for the perpetuation of our growth as human beings (Stephens 235, Weston 237). In his powerful book on the potential implications of human-induced climate change, *The End of Nature*, Bill McKibben also touches on the relation between nature and the human psyche:
We feel the need for pristine places, places substantially *unaltered* by man. Even if we do not visit them, they matter to us. We need to know that though we are surrounded by buildings, there are vast places where the world goes on as it always has…. One proof of the deep-rooted desire for pristine places is the decision that Americans and others have made to legislate “wilderness”—to set aside vast tracts of land where, in the words of the federal statute, “the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.” (McKibben 55)

To eliminate the non-human aspect of nature is to eliminate the aspect that we revere—or *should* revere—the most. Wendell Berry expresses a similar sentiment in his essay “Preserving Wilderness”:

> In the recovery of culture *and* nature is the knowledge of how to farm well, how to preserve, harvest, and replenish the forests, how to make, build, and use, return and restore. In this *double* recovery, which is the recovery of our humanity, is the hope that the domestic and the wild can exist together in lasting harmony. (Berry 521)

The danger in losing our connection to earth (and thus our ability to *revere* the earth) is, as Berry hints, one involving our own “humanity.” Cicero, too, stressed the significance of maintaining such a connection (although his emphasis concerned worldly things in general, whereas Berry focuses in particular on the role of natural elements such as forests and soil). As Dean Hammer notes in his *Roman Political Thought and Modern Theoretical Interpretations*, we see in Cicero (especially in *On Duties* and *Tusculan Disputations*) an emphasis on the role of the physical world in the moral and intellectual
development of human beings. In seeking to better understand our connection to worldly things, Cicero suggests, “we come to understand ethics as an ethos or attitude toward one’s relationship to the world” and, in turn, “we learn how to care for this world” (Hammer 60).

Cicero’s conceptual contributions to Stoic thought hint at a strong similarity between Stoicism and modern transformative value theory. Through our relations and duties to others, the Stoic argues, we are able to reach our full potential as creatures capable of virtuous activity. Similarly, transformative value theory holds that it is partly through the existence of and interaction with that which is outside of ourselves (i.e., non-human nature) that we are able to grow as moral and intellectual beings.

It is in this way that the Stoic conception of flourishing fits into the contemporary discussions regarding the role of nature in relation to human well-being. Without non-human nature, it is unclear as to how the kind development that Stoics posit as the final good for humans is even possible, provided that the very existence of the non-human environment constitutes a vital element of the context from which flourishing occurs. On these grounds, then, the Stoic would have adequate reasons to both press for environmental protection and also value the natural world from a non-anthropocentric perspective.

3.4: Non-Materialistic Happiness

Another green aspect of Stoic philosophy—namely, its emphasis on non-materialistic values—deserves mentioning here. In distinguishing themselves from the Aristotelian tradition, the Stoics regarded virtuous activity to be the only intrinsic good, thereby excluding materialistic values.
In *On Moral Ends*, Cicero marks a distinction between Aristotle’s mode of thought and that of the Stoics:

The Peripatetics [i.e. the Aristotelians] think that no life is completely happy without bodily well-being. We Stoics could not agree less. In our opinion not even an abundance of those goods which we really do call good makes a difference to the happiness, desirability or value of one’s life. (*Ends* 3.43)

It is not the case, however, that things such as health and wealth are of no concern to the Stoic. These things simply have a different type of value than that of virtue. Because these things are not always good (their value depends, to some degree, on the given circumstances), they are not the same as moral virtue, which *is* always good (independent of the circumstances). Thus, things like health and wealth cannot weigh against moral virtue—nor can they be added to moral virtue in an attempt to improve one’s happiness.

In his essay “Fortitude and Tragedy: The Prospects for a Stoic Environmentalism,” Alan J. Holland expounds this idea in an attempt to demonstrate how the Stoic perspective is not a retreat from reality—it is instead, Holland suggests, a perspective that recognizes the importance of facing the inevitable hardships of the human condition:

[T]he pursuit of self-sufficiency [was not] any form of escape; on the contrary, it was an expression of a keen awareness of “life’s exposure to luck” and a recommendation of how to live life in the face of such exposure. The point was, not to refuse to have anything to do with externals, but simply not to place any reliance in them. (Holland 158)

In this way, then, the Stoic philosophy diverges significantly from the Aristotelian position. Only virtue is good in itself. Everything else falls into what Sextus Empiricus
refers to as either non-preferred or “preferred indifferents” \((M \ 11.61-63)\). One can think of preferred indifferents as conditional goods—the value of which depends on a myriad of different factors. External goods, in other words, are valuable insofar as their respective circumstances allow.

Another way of understanding the difference between external goods and virtuous activity is to regard the former as extrinsically valuable (valuable in relation to something else) and the latter as intrinsically valuable (valuable by its very nature). An example may clarify my point here. Consider that you check into a hotel and have the option to sleep in either a dirty bed or a clean bed. While the clean bed is clearly the most desired option, the value of the clean bed is still extrinsic—that is, its value depends on the condition that, at this given time, you want something comfortable and clean to rest on. Without this set of conditions, the value of the bed diminishes. Virtuous activity is different in the sense that its value does not fluctuate depending on the given circumstances—its value, according to the Stoics, is inherent.

Because material goods can never satisfy the criteria of \textit{eudaimonia} (i.e., completeness and self-sufficiency) the Stoic places no intrinsic value in such goods. This perspective runs counter to the consumer culture many of us find ourselves immersed in today—a culture that has had detrimental effects not only on the individual well-being of humans, but also on the well-being of the natural environment. A non-materialistic lifestyle—one advocated by the Stoic—is a step in the right direction in terms of environmental and personal well-being.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

In Part I of this analysis, I examine the challenge that Simon Hailwood poses to Stoic ethics—namely, his argument that Stoicism constitutes a ‘blueprinting’ philosophy, a system of thought that attempts to derive moral and political principles from the natural environment and its perceived processes. Such a philosophy, Hailwood concludes, is incapable of respecting the ‘otherness’ of the natural environment and is therefore not an adequate basis for an environmental ethic. Following an explication of Hailwood’s challenge, I reveal the peripheral problems of his account. While I sympathize with Hailwood’s worry regarding instrumentalism, he mistakenly assumes that non-instrumentalism equates with intrinsic value theory. To focus on intrinsic values exclusively leads one to exclude the significance of immediate, transformative values—values that neo-Stoic philosophy could potentially include.

My focus in Part II concerns Hailwood’s more fundamental criticism regarding the supposed ‘blueprinting’ character of Stoic ethics. In drawing heavily on Julia Annas’s examination of Stoicism in *The Morality of Happiness*, I argue that Stoic ethics as a whole is not rooted in ancient cosmology and, on these grounds, does not constitute a blueprinting doctrine. Emerging from this analysis are three points concerning the nature of Stoic ethics and Stoic doctrine in general. One, although we do see traces of the blueprinting approach in certain later Stoics such as Marcus Aurelius, most of our fundamental sources of Stoic thought do not ground ethical premises in cosmic nature. Two, not only is it unnecessary to situate Stoic ethics in ancient cosmology, it is also strikingly unclear as to how one could derive the central components Stoic ethics—e.g.,
the thesis that the value of virtue is different in kind than the value of other things—from a cosmological foundation. Three, as substantiated via a review of the complex evolution of Stoic doctrine from Early to Late Stoa, Stoicism is better understood as a dynamic school of thought that existed across time—a recognition that rules out the type of sweeping characterization Hailwood’s critique suggests. Advancing Part II’s argument in this way further undercuts the notion that Stoicism cannot serve as an adequate source for green values.

Part III takes up the following question: is Part II’s articulation of Stoicism positively green—that is, does it encapsulate and promote values that support the protection of and an appreciation for the natural, non-human world? The Stoic virtues of justice and reverence, I argue, provide the axiological frameworks necessary for an environmental ethic. As the foundation of the Stoic conception of justice, oikeiōsis theory advances a far-reaching degree of impartiality that—when the environmental impact of present generations is taken into account—leads the Stoic to consider the interests and well-being of future generations. While Stoic justice offers an anthropocentric basis for pursuing environmental protection, the virtue of reverence offers a non-anthropocentric basis, one that many contemporary green theorists hold to be a necessary component of an adequate environmental ethos.

In addition to the virtues of justice and reverence, the Stoic notion of flourishing represents another green aspect of Stoic thought. Flourishing for the Stoics meant, in some ways, what transformative values mean for certain green theorists: both ideas emphasize the significance of the natural world in the moral, intellectual, and psychological development of human beings. Furthermore, the non-materialistic aspects
of Stoic axiology constitute yet another potential source for green values. In stressing the significance of self-sufficient happiness (i.e., happiness that does not depend on the flux of material goods), Stoic views concerning human happiness run counter to the consumer-driven, non-sustainable ways of life that leading environmentalists continue to advocate against today. Thus, by combining the counterarguments I present in Parts I and II—those that undercut Hailwood’s critique—with Part III’s articulation of justice, reverence, and flourishing, I have etched an outline for the theoretical foundations of a green Stoicism.
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