SPATIAL MODELS OF PRESIDENTIAL BEHAVIOR

by

BARRY CLAYTON EDWARDS

(Under the Direction of Keith T. Poole)

ABSTRACT

This project improves estimates of presidential ideal points to conduct case studies as well as empirical analyses of presidential polarization, presidential-congressional relations, and federal court appointments. My work demonstrates the synthesis of behavioral and institutional approaches and significantly increases the domain of presidential studies.

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Chapter 1

FIRST, ASSUME THE PRESIDENT IS A POINT IN SPACE

In the midst of a terribly dry spell, a desperate dairy farmer pleads the nearby university for assistance. A theoretical physicist receives the plea and starts working on a solution to the farmer's problem. A couple of days later, the physicist visits the farm and proudly announces: "I have a solution to your problem. First, assume your cow is a sphere…"

This well-worn joke exposes the unrealistic assumptions used by academics to understand complex systems. The President is no more a point than a cow is a sphere, but making such an assumption allows us to simplify complex systems and examine their essential features. In this work, I ask the reader to assume the president is a point in space and hope to demonstrate that this assumption helps one better understand the complex world of presidential politics.

My research aims to enhance our understanding of presidential behavior. I am particularly interested in the policy decisions of presidents in office, as opposed to on the campaign trail or in their private lives. By radically simplifying the choices presidents make with simple models, I hope to illuminate some interesting trends in presidential behavior, enrich our understanding of particular presidents, and analyze how presidents influence the legislative process and the federal judiciary.

This ambitious undertaking is supported by a wealth of social science research on human behavior. Political science is the great borrower of ideas and our view of political behavior is informed by numerous academic disciplines, including economics, psychology, sociology, and history. I primarily rely upon an economic model that emphasizes utility-

maximizing behavior, but regard utility as a broad concept that encompasses non-monetary rewards, particularly psychological rewards.

Spatial models of decision making are the foundation of this analysis. As discussed in Chapter Two, spatial models are geometric representations of policy choices. The policy space is a continuum of potential outcomes. A potential outcome, like the result of enacting a bill, is identified as a point in the policy space. Individual actors evaluate the utility of an outcome by estimating the distance between the outcome and the point they consider ideal. Nearer outcomes are preferred to distant outcomes; given a choice, the actor will choose the closer outcome. Also in Chapter Two, I discuss the state of presidential studies generally and describe some findings that guide this project.

I use presidents' expressed preferences in support of or in opposition to roll call votes in Congress to compare presidents to members of Congress in terms of their ideal locations in a policy space. I improve existing estimates of presidential ideal points by enlarging the set of observations used to locate presidents in this space. The details of this data coding process are laid out in Chapter Three.

In Chapter Four, I present estimates of the ideal points of all U.S. Presidents. These estimates fill a number of gaps in prior research and offer the first comprehensive measure of presidential ideal points. This enables me to identify the most liberal and conservative presidents. Also in Chapter Four, I discuss how well the spatial model explains presidential decision making. The model is just as successful, if not more successful, than spatial models of congressional roll call voting.

In Chapter Five, I consider the argument that the president's decision to sign or veto a bill is not based on his sincere preferences, but rather strategic calculations that lead him to sign bills he dislikes and veto bills he actually supports. I evaluate evidence of strategic behavior on several levels. I find very little evidence that presidents act contrary to their preferences. I conclude this chapter with some thoughts on why strategic models of presidential behavior work better in theory than they do in practice.

Improved estimates of presidential ideal points can contribute to our understanding of the presidency. In Chapter Six, I consider whether presidents have adopted increasingly extreme stances on political issues over time. I find strong evidence of presidential polarization, particularly in the modern era. In Chapter Seven, I analyze the decision making of the select group of men who have served both in Congress and in the White House. That Chapter asks whether Article II of the U.S. Constitution works as the Founding Fathers intended. Does the office moderate individual preferences so that the president advances the interests of the nation as a whole? I find mixed support for the moderating effect of the office. The office historically moderated members of Congress in the White House but has not done so in the modern era.

There are good reasons to analyze what a president did rather than what he said, or what others say about him. The natural tendency to rationalize decisions is likely accentuated in political circles. Presidents, in particular, must consider public reaction as well as their historical legacies. Presidential behavior is often dissected in critical biographies and I use biographical works to frame parts of this analysis. Rather than emphasize what makes the president unique, however, this work aims to develop relatively simple models of presidential behavior to better understand individual presidents.

In Chapter Eight, I take up a classic debate among biographers of George Washington: Was Washington a Federalist? In his lifetime, Washington strongly disavowed political factions, but some of his biographers claim he fell into the Federalist ranks after Thomas Jefferson resigned his Cabinet position at the beginning of Washington's second term. My analysis indicates that Washington moved in the direction of Federalists during his second term but remained on the fringe of the Federalist faction. In Chapter Nine, I evaluate Herbert Hoover's legislative record in order to assess the claim made by contemporary Hoover biographers that Hoover was a progressive president. I find that Hoover's record belies this claim and suggests Hoover was a conservative Republican. With

these two case studies, I hope to demonstrate how spatial models improve our understanding of particular presidents, potentially resolve ongoing historical debates, and clarify interesting moments of political history. Spatial models can complement the rich tradition of presidential case studies and should not be viewed as the antithesis of qualitative research.

In addition to illuminating aspects of the presidency and answering questions about particular presidents, presidential ideal points can serve as an important explanatory variable in empirical analyses. In Chapter Ten, I evaluate presidential influence on the legislative process. The president's relative location in the policy space may explain why one president was able to collaborate with members of Congress while another president encountered substantial opposition. By controlling for the relative proximity of the president to members of Congress, we can analyze the extent to which some presidents have transcended their political environment by using their individual, partisan, and agenda-setting leadership skills.

In Chapter Eleven, I continue using presidential ideal points as an explanatory variable to better understand American politics. In this chapter, I consider presidential appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Beginning with John Adams' midnight judges, presidents have attempted to shape federal judicial policy by appointing like-minded judges to the federal bench. How effective are these strategies? This research facilitates historical analysis of decision making on the circuit courts because ideal point estimates of federal judges have been derived, in part, from presidential ideal points.

Finally, I conclude in Chapter Twelve with a summary of what this research tells us about the presidency and suggest some future directions for presidential research.

This project originated, as I am sure many dissertations do, while I coded data for another project. I spent the majority of the summer after my first year of graduate school resolving judge identification codes in a massive dataset on court opinions. The idea was that properly identifying the judges would allow me to merge this dataset with another dataset that quantified judges' ideal points. Rather than solving the problem, my work

uncovered another problem: some judges' preferences had never been estimated because the ideal points of their appointing presidents (from whom the judges' ideal points are estimated) were not successfully estimated. Some of these judges, particularly those appointed by Herbert Hoover, decided cases well into the 1960s and 1970s. I was surprised to learn that political scientists had not successfully estimated the ideal point of Herbert Hoover, a twentieth century president who served an eventful full term. To complete that project on judges, I devised a method of estimating Herbert Hoover's ideal point. My work on Hoover and subsequent discovery of Shawn Treier's (2010) analysis of the ideal point estimates of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush convinced me that our estimates of presidential ideal points were not only incomplete but probably mistaken as well. Although I had not planned to spend the better part of graduate school working on this problem, I decided that it presented me with an opportunity to contribute to our understanding of the president's place in American politics. I would like to thank Keith Poole, Susan Haire, Keith Dougherty, John Maltese, and Jamie Carson for their feedback and encouragement at various stages of this project. If I have obtained any new insights on presidential behavior, I owe a debt of gratitude to the political scientists on whose shoulders I attempt to stand.

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Chapter 2

PERSPECTIVES ON PRESIDENTIAL BEHAVIOR

In this chapter, I survey the scholarly literature on presidential decision making with particular focus on how political scientists have characterized presidential behavior. Given the U.S. president's current status as leader of the free world, it is not surprising to find a substantial body of literature on U.S. presidents. Scholars have applied a diversity of methods to studying presidential behavior. To say that presidential scholarship is merely eclectic is a serious understatement.

I am primarily interested in how presidents decide policy matters while in office, as opposed to biographical accounts of how they rose to prominence or conducted themselves in non-policy matters. In this chapter, I contrast the primary modes of scholarly analysis and review the state of research on presidential ideal points.

Current State of Presidential Studies: President v. Presidency Approaches

Scholarly analysis of presidential behavior is divided between two modes of analysis: one school presents the presidents as individual case studies while the other mode adopts a longitudinal perspective on the presidency. Both modes of analysis have merit but are fundamentally incomplete.

The literature reflects two general conceptions of presidential power, according to Walker (2009, p. 550): "Personal presidency scholars tend to emphasize that the identity of the president is indispensable to explain the characteristics of decisions and actions that fall under the general category of leadership style. Institutional presidency scholars often substitute a general model of rational choice for the idiosyncratic traits of the president in

their models of presidential decision making, arguing that the content of the decision influences choices within the White House especially in the domestic political arena."[1]

Within each school, scholars employ a variety of methods. Many works offer biographical accounts of a single president's rise to power or time in office. This mode of research is largely qualitative and historical. Scholars can make use of memoirs, presidential papers, biographies, journalistic accounts. Perhaps no single person leaves a greater paper trail than a U.S. president. Some works present the presidency as a series of individual biographies, the sum of successive individual contributions to the office.

A more recent trend in scholarly literature attempts to apply quantitative methods in presidential research. George Edwards and Gary King, in particular, have argued that political scientists should apply more rigorous statistical analyses to presidential studies (Edwards III, 2009b; G. King & Ragsdale, 1988).

The diversity of approaches to studying presidents and the presidency is perhaps the greatest strength and greatest liability of presidential studies. The subfield tends to view presidents from a variety of perspectives, but rather than integrating those perspectives to improve our understanding of the subject, scholars take sides in methodological debates over which perspective is the superior.

In my view, the apparent tension between the two dominant approaches to studying the president is more the result of empirical limitations than a lack of theory. Scholars have

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[1] These contrasting schools of thought within presidential studies parallel a fundamental divide over the nature of decision making in the social sciences. "On the one hand, some economists argue that the impact of idiosyncratic personality traits and affect are said to 'cancel each other out' at the level of collective decision making and 'are perhaps best ignored as behavioral noise.' On the other hand, social psychologists argue that small groups and large organizations are not simply free markets of ideas but heavily regulated arenas in which variations in leadership and structural features create institutionalized biases in the decision-making processes that produce choices" (Walker, 2009, p. 561).

developed rigorous theories of presidential decision making as well as theories to explain differences among presidents, but these theories about presidents and the presidency cannot be tested with only a handful of cases. Attempts to explain the differences among presidents are confounded by a limited number of observations. Our inability to measure presidential preferences only adds to the "small N" problem in presidential studies.

What Distinguishes Modern and Historic Presidents

In most analyses of the presidency, the effect of a particular president on the quantity of interest is a statistical nuisance to be controlled using one or more dummy variables. Scholars frequently control for the differences among presidential administration using fixed effects – dummy variables for each administration. While this potentially helps isolate the contribution of independent variables, it treats the president as a statistical nuisance, rather than subject of real interest. The president, according to Rockman (2009, p. 787), is reduced to "the residue left over from what it is we can explain in more coherent theoretical ways."

Rather than view individual-level differences among presidents as noise to be controlled, I would argue that it is important to analyze differences among presidents in a systematic manner. Quantitative political science methods can contribute to case studies of individual presidents. Empirical implications of formal models of presidential behavior in the legislative realm can and should be tested with observational data. The two dominant modes of analysis can be coherently incorporated into multi-level models.

What would explain individual-level differences? We should expect the office-holder to respond to his environment.[2] For politicians, winning elections is the critical factor.

[2] I use masculine pronouns referring to U.S. Presidents. While the country will no doubt one day elect a female president, possibly as early as 2016, it has not done so yet. As a result, using the preferable gender neutral form "his or her" in reference to a U.S. president reads awkwardly.

Survival is the most basic instinct. If the survival instinct comes into conflict with other instincts, laws, or social norms, we should expect the individual to do what is necessary to assure his or her survival. Winning and keeping a political office is not a life-or-death matter, but it is likely the basic instinct motivating political life. All other political goals are incident to political survival and thus subservient to winning and keeping office. Just as animals must adapt to survive droughts or blizzards, politicians must adapt their behavior to survive when the political environment changes. We should expect external changes that affect the ability to win election or re-election to the presidency to profoundly change presidential behavior.

These observations about survival instincts are important to presidential studies because the manner of electing presidents has changed substantially over time. I believe that we can roughly divide presidential history into a historical era during which presidents were selected by elites and a modern era characterized by mass participation in presidential elections. While the transition between these eras is the result of many developments and not one sudden change, the break between eras can be identified with some certainty.

The original design for electing presidents empowered a relatively small group of electors to appoint the chief executive (Caeser, 1979, Chapter 1). Hamilton argued, in *Federalist Paper No. 68*, that if this method of appointing the president "be not perfect, it is at least excellent." According to Hamilton, it was important to delegate this important task to a select, small group of men and allow them to deliberate:

> [T]he immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations.
>
> It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. … The choice of SEVERAL, to form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less apt to convulse the community with any

> extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of ONE who was himself to be the final object of the public wishes. And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place.

The characteristics of the Electoral College that Hamilton found so appealing – its small size, expertise, detachment – are all noticeably absent from our modern system of electing presidents. Hundreds of millions of ordinary citizens now participate in presidential elections; presidential campaigns feature passionate, partisan appeals by candidates and culminate in a single day of voting. Although the Electoral College persists in name and may affect campaign strategies, electors are not afforded any discretion to exercise their better judgment. How and when did this radical transformation of presidential selection methods take place?

According to Klinghard (2005), the foundation of the modern presidency is the president's ability to control his own electoral destiny. Rather than passively wait to be selected by elites, modern presidents can win nomination by actively soliciting support from party members. By this measure, the modern presidency begins in the late 1800s. During the historic era, presidential candidates, by and large, did not control their own political destinies. "Presidential candidates of the nineteenth century," King and Ragsdale (1988, pp. 28-29) observed, "were chosen from negotiations among political machines within the two parties largely on the criterion of how well the candidates could award patronage to major local elements of the party. Often those with strong national reputations were passed over because state parties feared loss of control. Thus, the elections were frequently battles between relatively weak or unknown candidates who, once in office, served the patronage needs of state parties, not the policy needs of the nation. Weak candidates became weak presidents."

During the late 1700s and early 1800s, presidential candidates did not actively campaign for office. Outward self-promotion would have been regarded as vulgar in the founding era. Presidents were elected by a relatively small class of land owners. Additionally, the Electoral College system afforded electors some discretion. Although mass parties fueled by the spoils system developed to propel Andrew Jackson to the presidency, power resided in party elites, operating primarily at the state level.

Klinghard (2005) argues that the presidential election of 1888 marks a turning point in presidential politics because incumbent Grover Cleveland was able to secure re-nomination from party members, rather than relying on the party machine that had dominated Democratic politics since the election of Andrew Jackson. In this respect, Cleveland was the first presidential candidate to control his own political destiny. Despite his ambitions, Cleveland was defeated in the 1888 presidential election by Benjamin Harrison, a Republican nominated by then-traditional means (at a convention without having actively campaigned for nomination). Cleveland was defeated but not vanquished; he returned to the White House in 1892 by taking charge of the Democratic Party, becoming the only president to serve non-consecutive terms. Although earlier presidents, such as Lincoln, lead their party-in-government, Cleveland was the first president to take control of his party's national organization.

The specific change within parties described by Klinghard (2005) was accompanied by a host of additional developments that transformed presidential elections (McCormick, 1982). In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, states adopted pledge laws to regulate the electoral college, fixing which candidate their electors would support, eliminating the electors' discretion to select the president according to their better judgment (Silva, 1948). Over the course of the 1800s, public participation in presidential elections increased because of population growth and the expansion of voting rights. During the late 1800s, many states reformed their election procedures, reducing the influence of party machines by issuing government-printed ballots. During the early twentieth century, as

part of the progressive reform movement, states instituted direct primaries, further limiting the power of parties to select candidates through caucuses.

Many scholars view Franklin Roosevelt as the nation's first modern president. During his administration, the executive branch swelled and assumed unprecedented power over foreign and domestic policies (Lowi, 1985). Others have argued that Woodrow Wilson was the first modern president (Caeser, 1979, Chapter 4). If I were studying public relations strategies, foreign policy making, or some other role played by the president, I might define the modern era of the presidency differently. Nearly all presidents, not just Cleveland and FDR, have made some contribution to the office or attempted to govern in some new way. Compared to its enumeration of power of Congress, the Constitution is relatively vague on presidential powers. For present purposes, a significant change in presidential behavior is likely to occur when the means of attaining and holding office changed. In this particular view, Cleveland marks a remarkable transformation.

Foundations of Ideal Point Analysis

As noted above, a number of political scientists have lamented the descriptive nature of presidential studies and have stressed the need for more quantitative rigor. In response to such criticisms, presidential scholars have increasingly turned to rational choice theories. To a large extent, these approaches have succeeded. "In just a few short years, a field mired in isolation and traditionalism has been catapulted into a new scientific realm through a seismic shift in the scope, power, and analytical rigor of its theories" (Moe, 2009, p. 702).

If scholarly work on Congress is any indication, rational choice theories and spatial models can make substantial contributions to our understanding of presidential decision making. Estimating presidential ideal points is, therefore, critical to advancing presidential studies.

A substantial body of political science research undergirds ideal point estimation of political actors. Spatial models conceptualize decision makers as opting for outcomes nearest their ideal points.[3]

Consider, as an illustration, two professors, C and P, deciding how to set a thermostat for their adjoining offices. Each professor has an ideal point, such as a temperature setting that maximizes his or her personal comfort. Perhaps C considers 70 degrees ideal while P, 80 degrees. An individual's utility function maps the relationship between individual utility and various temperature settings; utility is maximized when the thermostat is set at the individual's ideal point and setting the thermostat one degree hotter is just as bad as setting it one degree lower, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1. Individual Utility Functions



Whether C and P can agree on a thermostat setting depends on the weather. If the weather is freezing cold, C and P would both prefer 70 degrees to the freezing cold and no setting makes C happier than 70 degrees. If the weather is very hot, C and P would both prefer 80 degrees and no setting makes P happier. If the outdoor temperature is between

[3] Shepsle and Bonchek (1997), Chapter 5 provide an excellent introduction to spatial models of political decisions.

70 and 80 degrees, C and P may not agree to set the thermostat (in the absence of side payments, etc.) because the air temperature cannot be adjusted without making one of the two parties worse off relative to the status quo (nature).

Of course, humans are not perfectly calibrated thermometers. Moreover, even in this simple example, the weather may change or the air conditioning may not work as well or as quickly as expected. Real world decision making is subject to random variation. Perhaps one of our hypothetical professors dressed for work without checking the weather report and would like to set the thermostat a little higher or lower than he normally would. Given uncertainty and random variation, we may view decision making in terms of distances and probabilities. If the decision maker's ideal point is closer to the status quo (determined by nature) than the proposal, he is likely to vote against change; if he or she is closer to the proposal, he is likely to vote for change. If the decision maker's ideal point is equidistant from nature and the proposal, he or she will find it difficult to make a decision and may resort to the mental equivalent of flipping a coin.

Figure 2.2. Probabilistic Decision Making in Spatial Model



In this example, if relative distances between nature and the proposal are not great, there is some probability the decision maker will actually vote for the option further from

his or her ideal point. The probability of making a decision contrary to that predicted by the spatial model declines as the actor is better able to judge relative distances.

This simple example illustrates the importance of individual preferences in the decision making process. C and P decide whether they prefer a given thermostat setting to the state of nature based on their individual preferences. To the extent that C and P are self-interested, economic agents, we would not expect their utility functions and corresponding decisions to depend on who endorses a particular thermostat setting or how artfully a proposed setting is pitched. Additionally, assuming natural conditions vary, we would expect actors with similar preferences to agree with one another more often than those with dissimilar preferences (measured in terms of difference in their ideal points).

The thermostat setting example is contrived to illustrate the logic of spatial voting, but we could think of C and P as the Congress and the President, each preferring a certain tax rate or spending level. Both branches have ideal points and whether they can reach an agreement depends on where the status quo is located and their decision making procedures. This simple model can be expanded to accommodate larger groups of decision makers; decision making rules (i.e. agenda control, veto power, veto override power) can also be incorporated into spatial models of decision making.

When individuals make decisions, they reveal their preferences. From a series of recorded votes, one can recover estimates of actors' ideal points. The record of roll call votes in Congress is a particularly useful source of information. Congressional scholars have analyzed roll call voting in Congress to successfully estimate the ideal points of Senators and Representatives using a variety of multi-dimensional scaling methods (esp. Clinton, Jackman, & Rivers, 2004; Poole & Rosenthal, 2007). Accurate maps of actors' ideal points have allowed political scientists to test a variety of theories about legislative behavior and inter-branch relations (for overview of some applied works, see Poole & Rosenthal, 2007, Chapter 11).

Work on Presidential Ideal Points

Scholars have used a variety of techniques to estimate presidential ideal points. While methodological approaches vary, nearly all scholars rely on congressional roll call data with supplemental observations to compare the president's preferences to those of members of Congress.

The president's position on a roll call vote provides a "bridge" observation between the executive and legislative which is essential to comparing institutions.[4] The president "votes" yea if he requested legislators to vote yea; if he requested legislators vote nay, the president's vote is coded nay.

Early efforts to estimate presidential ideal points relied upon Congressional Quarterly's annual presidential support scores. Since 1953, CQ has identified the president's public positions on roll call votes, typically through careful analysis of presidential addresses and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Statements of Administration Policy on pending legislation. CQ has identified presidential positions on roll call votes to calculate how often members of Congress supported the president. Some positions will be staked proactively by president or advanced on his behalf by his partisans in Congress. In other instances, the president will react to items that Congress puts on the legislative agenda.

More recently, Swift et al. (2001) analyzed the public papers and addresses of Presidents Washington through H.W. Bush. Based on these sources, Swift et al. compiled a substantial dataset of presidential legislative requests and matched presidential requests to roll call votes in the House and Senate. This ambitious project has enabled scholars to

[4] See e.g. Bailey (2007) and Bailey and Chang (2001) which use executive and legislative branch positions on Supreme Court cases as bridge observations to compare preferences of all three branches; Epstein, Martin, Segal, and Westerland (2007) which utilizes "unconstrained confirmed nominees to the Supreme Court" to calibrate judicial ideal points to NOMINATE scores.

estimate the ideal points of many nineteenth century presidents in relation to members of Congress (e.g. McCarty, 2009).

In addition to analyzing presidential requests over a range of policy domains, scholars have analyzed subsets of presidential decisions. Zupan (1992), for example, coded presidential positions on votes identified by Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) to calculate modern presidents' support for liberal causes. Zupan's "extremely simple" method allowed him to compare presidential liberalism to that of members of Congress. Subsequent scholars have updated Zupan's estimates of presidential ADA scores and devised methods of adjusting ADA scores to facilitate comparisons over time and across institutions (Anderson & Habel, 2009; Groseclose, Levitt, & Snyder Jr, 1999; Kenny & Lotfinia, 2005).

Despite substantial progress estimating presidential ideal points, existing measures of presidential preferences are problematic. The estimates are incomplete; some presidents' ideal points are missing. When an actor casts relatively few votes, it is difficult to pinpoint his or her ideal point. For example, if a legislator predictably votes with his or her party, it may be difficult to say more than which side of the aisle the legislator occupies. Some ideal point estimation methods fix legislator coordinates by minimizing prediction errors; thus, a method like NOMINATE requires some voting errors (Poole, 2005, pp. 155-157; Poole & Rosenthal, 2007, pp. 26-27). Poole and Rosenthal's DW-NOMINATE estimates included all legislators who cast at least 25 votes in a term of Congress (Poole & Rosenthal, 2007, pp. 32-33). This generally presents no problem because members of Congress cast hundreds of roll call votes each session. Because presidents are not typical members, however, the number of votes used for estimation can become an issue. Some presidents' ideal points cannot be estimated based on announced requests alone. The following presidents made too few requests on roll call votes for estimation in the DW-NOMINATE

framework: George Washington, John Adams, William Harrison,[5] Zachary Taylor, Millard Fillmore, Andrew Johnson, Rutherford Hayes, James Garfield,[6] and Herbert Hoover.[7]

Additionally, whether presidents announced positions on hotly contested legislative issues or avoided taking controversial stands appears to be a matter of individual political strategy. Presidents do not take positions on a random sample of votes for the convenience of political science; they choose their legislative priorities selectively. Presidents want to get their way, but Congress may recoil from a domineering executive and the president may suffer a series of legislative defeats. Figure 2.2 plots the total number of presidential requests recorded by CQ and Swift et al. by term of Congress.

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[5] William Harrison died just a few weeks after taking office without taking any positions, making any nominations or treaties, signing or vetoing any bills.

[6] James Garfield was shot less than four months after his inauguration and died having served only 200 days. The 47th House did not take its first roll call vote until December 5, 1881, three months after Garfield's death. The Senate voted by roll 178 times before Garfield's death, but Garfield's position is clear on only eight Senate votes.

[7] Swift et al. identified 158 requests made by President Herbert Hoover on specific legislative items. Hoover's legislative requests correspond to 44 roll call votes during his administration: 8 roll call votes in the 71st House, 21 votes in the 71st Senate, 7 votes in the 72nd House, and 8 roll call votes in the 72nd Senate. These numbers are relatively low, reflecting Hoover's "strange paralysis" with respect to legislative prerogatives (Milkis & Nelson, 2003, pp. 262-265; see also Eisinger, 2000, pp. 645-649; Schwarz, 1974).

Figure 2.3. Volume of Presidential Requests by Term



As the figure above indicates, some presidents made very few requests to Congress while others, like Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson, frequently instructed members of Congress how to vote. One speculates that presidents vary the volume of legislative demands based on political conditions. This potential source of selection bias is problematic insofar as it results in some presidents appearing more ideologically extreme than otherwise suggested and other presidents seeming more moderate than their records would indicate.[8]

While presidential requests are potentially a useful source of information, we must incorporate additional information into our analysis of presidential ideal points. In the next Chapter, I outline my approach to this task.

[8] Another possible reason that modern presidents have more request votes is CQ. Not only does CQ offer comprehensive, detailed reports, it is possible that presidents make more requests because CQ started keeping track of their success rates.

Chapter 3

LEGISLATIVE RECORDS AND ESTIMATION METHODS

In this chapter, I outline how I compiled presidential legislative records to overcome the limitations of present research on presidential ideal points. In my view, the problem is not methodological but rather one of data availability. Accordingly, to address the problem identified in the last Chapter, I recover more observations of presidential behavior and use existing measurement methods to estimate presidential ideal points. In addition to filling gaps in presidential research and reducing the uncertainty of existing estimates, my work addresses the selection bias of request-only votes.

Assumptions about Presidential Decision Making

Theory-driven research requires the analyst to make certain assumptions. The purpose of making these assumptions is to develop theories that generate testable hypotheses. As noted in Chapter One, these assumptions are often unrealistic, omitting countless details. In this section, I identify the assumptions which serve as the starting point of this analysis.

I assume that presidents act in rational pursuit of their interests. Presidents have multiple goals/interests, such as winning re-election, creating a legacy, influencing public opinion, and enacting specific public policies. Presidents maximize expected utility subject to constraints, such as limited time, finite political capital, and competing priorities. While presidents can often abstain from announcing positions, if they pick sides, they are attempting to maximize utility, which encompasses all of their goals.

I also assume that presidents decide whether to sign or veto bills passed by Congress by comparing the utility of the bill and the status quo. How the president behaves, based on this assumption, is a sincere reflection of his preferences.[9]

Rules for Coding the President's Legislative Record

I complete estimates of presidential ideal points by increasing the data used to code presidential votes. I follow these Coding Rules:

(1) Presidential Positions. If the president took a clear position in support or opposition to legislation, his roll call vote mirrors his public position. To implement this coding rule, I incorporated all the presidential positions identified by CQ and Swift el al.

(2) Presidential Proposals. The president votes yea on his own nominees and treaties made by him.[10] This Coding Rule extends the method followed by CQ to all terms of Congress.

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[9] This is not to say that the president strictly maximizes his personal utility like a self-interested economic agent. Rationality is a controversial assumption (Green & Shapiro, 1994). Political scientists generally assume political actors make purposive decisions, rather than economically rational decisions; the actor's preferences are complete and transitive but not necessarily profitable (Ferejohn, 1991; Riker, 1995). A range of inputs may factor in his decision making (Searing, 1991). While presidents may take future job prospects into account (i.e. re-election or future paid engagements), presidential decision making is more likely driven by desire for power than wealth (Howell, 2013).

[10] In addition to nominations and treaties, there are a number of relatively rare roll call votes on presidential reorganization plans, presidential uses of force, and impeachment. Prior to the Supreme Court's finding the legislative veto unconstitutional, presidents had authority to submit reorganization plans for the executive bureaucracy to Congress. Additionally, Congress has occasionally voted to authorize the president's use of force. While no president has conceded this authority to Congress, roll call votes to authorize use of force represent clear cases of Congress expressing preferences on actions supported by the

(3) Vetoes. If the president vetoed a bill (including pocket vetoes)[11] without previously coming out in favor of the bill (see Rule 1), he votes nay on its final passage.[12] If Congress then votes to override the president's veto, the president votes nay (to sustain his veto).

(4) Bill Signings. If the president signs the bill into law without previously coming out against the bill (see Rule 1), he votes yea on its final passage.

Coding Rule One incorporates prior research by CQ and Swift et al. Although request votes are problematic in some respects, they are a rich source of information about presidential preferences. To the extent that a specific requests conflicts with the president's subsequent decision to sign or veto the bill (which occurs very rarely, see Chapter 5), his request prevails for coding purposes. As addressed in Chapter Five, there are instances where the president lobbies for defeat of a bill, but president relents and signs the bill rather

president. Finally, Congress has occasionally voted on Articles of Impeachment and matters related to trial of the president in the Senate. I assume that the president opposes his impeachment and would vote against measurements that advance his impeachment.

[11] A question arises whether pocket vetoes should be considered "nay" votes. Pocket vetoes occur by inaction but one assumes that the president acts purposefully to defeat a bill by refusing to sign it in a timely manner.

[12] If the president signed a bill into law but added a signing statement to the bill, his bill signing is still coded as voting yea (assuming he did not previously come out in opposition to the bill). In general, presidents have not used signing statements to negate substantive legal provisions (like a line-item veto) and courts have not afforded them such force (Ostrander & Sievert, 2013a, 2013b).

Additionally, I coded the few line-item vetoes of bills passed by roll call votes in the 105th Congress as yea votes rather than vetoes. President Clinton did not veto these bills and I determined his line item vetoes left the bulk of the legislation intact. The coding scheme does not allow fractional voting for partial agreement.

than issue a futile veto message. In these cases, the nay request is coded as the president's sincere preference and his subsequent signature, a strategic concession.

Although it is safe to assume the president approves treaties proposed by him, coding treaties does not add too much to the analysis in most terms. Treaties generally pass unanimously or with only one or two nay votes. If all legislators vote the same way, a vote does not distinguish among legislators. If the vote is not used for classification, it does not artificially lower standard errors. However, some treaty ratification votes have been heavily contested, however, and may help us identify the president's ideological location.

Similar considerations exist with respect to votes on the president's nominees. Like votes on treaties, votes to advise and consent to appointments are also unique to the Senate and frequently pass by supermajority votes. However, some nominees are hotly contested and divide the Senate. Again, rather than prejudge a category of votes, I allow the data to inform the analysis.

The Coding Rule for a veto or bill signing is limited to final passage votes where Congress and the president considered legislation in the same form. Often bills and resolutions are subject to multiple roll call votes. In some cases a vote "to pass" a particular bill is different than the version eventually presented to the president. After one chamber passes a bill, the other chamber may amend it. If the other chamber passes an amended bill, the chamber that initially passed the bill may concur in the other chamber's amendment (a final passage), insist the other chamber pass its version, or convene a conference committee to resolve differences. A bill may take many different paths to the president's desk. Determining which (if any) roll call vote passed a proposal in the form it was received by the president requires careful analysis of the roll call record. However, the upside of this work is that it balances the sample of requests presidents chose to make with a substantial number of decisions that Congress compelled them to make.

The process described above considerably enriches the data available to estimate presidential ideal points. Prior work by Congressional Quarterly and Swift et al. identified presidential positions on 6,498 roll call votes in the Senate and 5,193 House votes. I am able to code the president's vote on 4,275 additional roll call votes in the Senate and 4,879 additional roll call votes in the House of Representatives. The contribution is particularly strong for coding the legislative records of presidents who served prior to Eisenhower. Table 3.1 offers a complete breakdown of the data coding with comparisons to prior request coding and the full congressional roll call record.

Table 3.1. Additional Presidential Legislative Decisions Coded

Index	President's Name	Additional Votes		CQ/Swift Votes	% Increase Over CQ/Swift	% All Roll Call Votes
		House	Senate			
1	George Washington	18	31	52	94.2%	14.9%
2	John Adams	31	58	25	356.0%	19.9%
3	Thomas Jefferson	46	56	114	89.5%	19.9%
4	James Madison	83	127	119	176.5%	17.4%
5	James Monroe	43	50	89	104.5%	18.9%
6	John Q. Adams	23	35	96	60.4%	18.9%
7	Andrew Jackson	70	167	147	161.2%	13.3%
8	Martin Van Buren	22	34	95	58.9%	7.7%
9	William H. Harrison	0	0	0	NA	NA
10	John Tyler	69	152	91	242.9%	11.6%
11	James K. Polk	47	72	85	140.0%	11.0%
12	Zachary Taylor	7	14	0	All new	5.8%
13	Millard Fillmore	37	35	51	141.2%	8.1%
14	Franklin Pierce	71	63	70	191.4%	8.8%
15	James Buchanan	65	119	91	202.2%	12.0%
16	Abraham Lincoln	90	193	75	377.3%	13.6%
17	Andrew Johnson	135	169	16	1900.0%	12.6%
18	Ulysses S. Grant	108	164	72	377.8%	7.9%
19	Rutherford B. Hayes	76	157	20	1165.0%	12.8%
20	James A. Garfield	0	8	0	All new	4.5%
21	Chester A. Arthur	83	87	50	340.0%	11.5%
22	Grover Cleveland	72	71	34	420.6%	12.0%
23	Benjamin Harrison	66	60	54	233.3%	11.1%
24	Grover Cleveland	50	52	23	443.5%	9.7%
25	William McKinley	47	40	38	228.9%	14.2%
26	Theodore Roosevelt	93	31	44	281.8%	14.7%
27	William H. Taft	56	36	48	191.7%	12.4%
28	Woodrow Wilson	168	89	165	155.8%	15.0%
29	Warren G. Harding	62	37	38	260.5%	12.3%
30	Calvin Coolidge	60	47	60	178.3%	16.2%
31	Herbert Hoover	35	46	43	188.4%	13.2%
32	Franklin D. Roosevelt	254	152	299	135.8%	29.5%
33	Harry S. Truman	212	130	179	191.1%	25.5%
34	Dwight D. Eisenhower	93	106	819	24.3%	54.0%
35	John F. Kennedy	50	25	564	13.3%	58.9%
36	Lyndon B. Johnson	69	73	1315	10.8%	62.9%
37	Richard M. Nixon	262	259	940	55.4%	32.3%
38	Gerald R. Ford	178	149	406	80.5%	24.6%
39	Jimmy Carter	199	202	971	41.3%	27.3%
40	Ronald Reagan	219	251	1437	32.7%	28.4%
41	George H. W. Bush	127	99	681	33.2%	30.6%
42	William J. Clinton	398	157	1101	50.4%	21.5%
43	George W. Bush	490	126	969	63.6%	20.1%
44	Barack H. Obama	272	72	424	81.1%	17.3%
	TOTALS	**5346**	**4101**	**10702**	**72.9%**	**20.6%**

Although additional votes could reduce the standard errors of presidential ideal point estimates, it is important to analyze clear, expressed preferences. Extrapolating presidential position on a particular amendments or procedural motions based on inference or retrospective information starts the researcher down a slippery slope of subjective judgments.

Some will object to these coding rules, particularly Rules Three and Four, based on game theories which purport to prove that presidents will sign bills they actually oppose (to avoid congressional overrides) and veto bills they actually support (in order to force Congress to pass an even more attractive bill). These objections will be addressed at length in Chapter Five. Let us defer this discussion until then. It should be noted at this point, however, that presidents have frequently made their opposition to a bill known prior to (perhaps reluctantly) signing it into law. In these cases, the coding rule followed his public position of opposition (see Rule 1 above).

Scaling Methods

I use existing methods to derive ideal points from roll call votes, primarily the NOMINATE scaling method development by (Poole and Rosenthal (2000), 2007)). In my case study of Hoover in Chapter Nine, I also estimate ideal point using Optimal Classification and IDEAL. These methods generally yield consistent results, but nonparametric or Bayesian methods may be preferable in some applications, particularly if the number of observations is limited, as is the case with Hoover.

The NOMINATE scaling method is particularly useful because it does not require the analyst to identify the ideological content of votes ahead of time; it allows the individual's voting record to speak for itself as much as possible. Additionally, the DW˙NOMINATE scaling method estimates ideal points based on the entire roll call voting record (with legislators who served multiple terms and in both chambers bridging terms), it allows the analyst to compare legislators and presidents from different time periods.

Standard errors of ideal point estimates can be recovered using the parametric bootstrap method suggested by Lewis and Poole (2004) and Carroll, Lewis, Lo, Poole, and Rosenthal (2009).

One can understand the intuition behind ideal point scaling methods by comparing them to standardized academic testing (although the technical details are not entirely comparable). The reader is surely familiar with taking and perhaps administering tests to assess general aptitude or achievement in a particular subject. Some questions are more difficult than others. If the questions are answered in order of difficulty, a student should answer them correctly until question difficulty exceeds his or her ability at which point the student guesses at random. For example, if a student answers algebra questions correctly, he or she should be able to answer simple arithmetic questions. If the student cannot answer single-variable calculus questions correctly, he or she should not be able to answer multiple-variable calculus questions correctly, etc. Scaling methods allow us to recover estimates of individual abilities as well as the difficulty of the test questions.

Standardized academic tests may reveal that one student is better than another at math, but ideal point estimation of political actors does not show that one politician is "better at politics" than another or that one vote is "more difficult" than another. Rather than discriminate based on academic ability, scaling political choices distinguishes actors and votes based on the latent qualities that cause some to vote yea and others to vote nay. Just as a student may answer increasingly difficult questions correctly until the questions become too difficult, a legislator may support increasingly conservative (or liberal) bills until the bills become too conservative (or liberal) for the legislator.[13] During most periods of

[13] Another difference between Item-Response Theory models developed to measure intellectual abilities and the analysis of roll call voting is the role of individual utility functions. The student does not have an ideal difficulty level that maximizes the probability of answering a question correctly; for all students, the easier the question, the greater the

American politics, the latent dimension is an ideological spectrum corresponding to liberal and conservative political preferences.

Is the Sample Representative of Roll Call Votes?

We should estimate presidential ideal points using a representative sample of roll call votes. In a perfect world, one would estimate the president's preferences relative to Senators and Representatives by recording his votes on all the roll call votes that occurred during his administration. This cannot be accomplished but advises against cherry picking votes for analysis.

Recent research has identified some of the issues that arise in estimating presidential ideal points from request votes only. According to Treier (2010), estimates drawn from presidential requests suffer from selection bias. The president can pick his legislative battles; members of Congress are routinely called to vote yea or nay on a wide variety of issues. Presidents Clinton and G.W. Bush, Treier found, were likely to request legislative action on exceptionally controversial issues. As a result, Clinton and Bush appear more ideologically extreme based on their legislative requests than a broader sample of their legislative behavior suggests. My research on Hoover, reported in Chapter Nine, also suggests that the president's request record may be misleading compared to his entire legislative record, in Hoover's case, making the president appear more moderate than his full record indicates.

The problem with estimating presidents' ideal points from positions and requests only is similar to comparing students who complete a test to those who pick and choose which questions to answer. To the extent a student elects only to answer relatively easy questions that everyone gets right or only difficult questions that stump everyone, the test

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probability of a correct answer. In contrast, from the legislator's perspective, there is a proposal that maximizes utility (and the probability the legislator votes for it).

does not reveal the student's relative standing in the class (the most a teacher may confidently conclude from such a limited sample is that the student is not in the bottom 5% of the class, or in the top 5%). In the political context, one expects senators and representatives to cast roll call votes on a variety of measures; some votes will be relatively easy with one side winning by a lopsided margin; other votes will divide members, revealing significant differences in member preferences.

The question is whether the subset of roll call votes used to compare presidents to members of Congress is representative of roll call votes used to measure congressional preferences. This is different than the question of whether roll call votes are representative of all the votes that Congress might have taken.

One way to assess whether the presidential legislative records used here are representative of all roll call votes is to examine certain properties of the roll call votes analyzed. The NOMINATE scaling routine not only estimates ideal points, it also estimates the cutting lines of roll call votes. A cutting line divides the yeas from the nays and can be summarized in terms of its angle and the point where it intersects the first or second dimension axis.[14] If our presidential legislative records are representative of all roll call votes, then the cutting line angles of the votes analyzed to estimate presidential ideal points will have the same distribution as the full roll call voting record. Bertelli and Grose (2011) similarly considered whether the roll call votes they use to scale agency-head preferences

[14] The NOMINATE scaling routine maximizes likelihood by alternatively estimating legislators' ideal points and cutting lines of roll call votes (Poole 2005, 107-110). In a two-dimensional space, the cutting line can be defined in terms of its angle (from the x-axis) and point where it intersects the x-axis. A vote that pits members on the right against those on the left will have an angle close to 90 degrees. In contrast, the cutting line angle for a cross-cutting vote will be closer to 0 or 180 degrees.

are representative of roll call votes as a whole by examining one-dimensional cut points.[15] Because I employ a two-dimensional representation of policy space, I compare the distributions of cutting line angles in the dataset compiled for this research, prior work by CQ and Swift et al., and the entire roll call record.

Figure 3.1, below, plots the distributions of cutting line angles of roll call votes in the House and the Senate. The distribution of cutting line angles of votes used to estimate presidential ideal points should be comparable to the distribution of votes used to estimate ideal points of Senators and Representatives. The Figure shows that the distribution of cutting line angles in the sample employed here to estimate presidential ideal points is closer to the distribution of cutting line angles in the entire roll call record than the distribution of cutting line angles in presidential votes recorded in CQ/Swift data is to the entire roll call record. The dashed lines are closer to the solid lines than the dotted lines are through the range of possible cutting line angle values. This suggests that the presidential ideal points estimated here are based on a more representative sample of votes than that used in prior research.

Figure 3.1. Distribution of Roll Call Vote Cutting Line Angles in Data Samples



[15] I do not analyze the representativeness of my sample of presidential positions based on vote x-axis cut points because I scale ideal points and cutting lines in two dimensions. Bertelli and Grose (2011) confined their analysis to one dimension.

A visual comparison of the distributions of cutting line angles suggests the presidential legislative records compiled here better reflect the full roll call record than do request-only votes. In both the House and Senate, the cutting line angles of the votes analyzed here to estimate presidential ideal points are closer to the cutting line angles of the full roll call record than are the request votes analyzed in prior works.

The quantities of interest here, the ideal points of individual U.S. Presidents, are not calculated from the entire roll call record, but rather roll call votes of particular terms of Congress. Therefore, we might consider whether the sample of votes used to analyze each president is more in line with the corresponding votes in Congress than are the request-only votes. The distributions of cutting line angles are improved in nearly all presidential administrations.

Figure 3.2. Distribution of Roll Call Vote Cutting Lines, Individual Administrations



Responses to Potential Criticisms

In this final section of the Chapter, I offer my thoughts on some potential criticisms of this design for estimating presidential ideal points.

The scaling method used here weights each vote equally; it does not put particular emphasis on landmark roll call votes. This approach is consistent with prior works on Congress. To some extent, significant legislation plays a greater role distinguishing one legislator from another because these votes are more likely to divide the legislature into well-defined coalitions. Often, very trivial motions (i.e. to name government buildings) are passed unanimously and therefore not used to scale legislators' ideal points.

Related to the issue of significant legislation is the distinction between public and private bills. Throughout the nineteenth century, Congress frequently voted on private relief bills. Typically, these were bills to grant pensions to war veterans or their widows. While many of these votes appear routine and insignificant, some were hotly contested. The contested relief bills appear to embody larger political conflicts (Skocpol, 1995). To the extent that these votes are lopsided and the president sides with the majority, they are simply non-informative.

How do I account for the fact that much of what is done in Congress is not conducted in a recorded vote? For example, many bills pass on voice vote. The number of statutes passed into law in a typical term of Congress exceeds the number of recorded roll call votes. We may assume that motion passes by voice vote when legislators all or nearly all support the motion because any legislator can request that the chamber vote by yeas and nays. The strategic use of unrecorded votes presents problems for scholars interested in using roll call vote data to analyze lawmaking behavior (Carrubba et al., 2006; Madonna, 2011), but it is less problematic when roll call votes are used to estimate relative preferences. Again, votes with full agreement are non-informative (Clinton & Lapinski, 2008). They compare to the situation where a class is graded on a curve; questions that all students missed or answered correctly do not affect their relative rankings.

Although the samples of votes analyzed here to estimate presidents' ideal points better reflect the entire roll call record than request-only votes, we still are not analyzing presidents using a fully random sample of roll call votes. Therefore, it may be worthwhile to comment on some potential approaches to this problem.

The problem is that the president's position on most roll call votes is unknown. Even after coding thousands of additional data points in their legislative records, I still am only able to reliably code presidential positions on 20.6% of all roll call votes. This might be viewed as a missing data problem, but econometric solutions to missing data problems do not seem appropriate here. The data is not truncated or censored. Having estimated presidents' ideal points, we could use these estimates along with the estimated cutting lines of roll call votes to predict how presidents would have voted on the remaining 79.4% of roll call votes. However, filling in the answer we would expect would only artificially inflate our model fit statistics.

The way forward may be to employ some kind of a matching process so that the sample of votes used to estimate presidential ideal points matches the sample of votes used to establish the underlying scale of congressional ideal points. Enriching presidential records in the manner described above improved the sample, but it may be possible to make further improvements. The idea would be to match votes on which the president's position is known to a random sample of the underlying roll call record. The similarity of one vote to another might be assessed in terms of cutting line angles, issue areas, or the number of yea and nay votes. Some known presidential positions might be omitted from our analysis because the vote was unusual. We might reduce our sample of presidential votes somewhat to address a potential source of bias in our estimations. In other words, we might sacrifice some efficiency to reduce bias. This estimation method has not been tried. Given the computationally-intense nature of the estimation procedures used here, it would be advisable to thoroughly test this method of balancing the sample of presidential votes on

small sets of simulated roll call votes before moving forward with this approach on a large scale.

Another potential method of testing whether the set of votes used here is more representative of the entire roll call record than the smaller samples compiled by CQ and Swift et al. would be to compare the distribution of ideal points of members of Congress based on these two different sets of votes to that produced by analyzing the entire roll call record. If the larger set of votes used here is more representative than a limited sample, the ideal point estimates should correlate more highly with ideal points estimated from all votes than those produced by analyzing a subset of votes. This approach may be problematic in some terms where ideal points cannot be estimated from request votes only. Although my thoughts on further improvements to this research are largely speculative, it seems appropriate to note a potential limitation to this research as well as direction for future research.

Chapter 4

ESTIMATED IDEAL POINTS OF U.S. PRESIDENTS

In this Chapter, I identify each president's relative location in policy space compared to his colleagues in the House and Senate. By analyzing additional observations of presidential preferences on roll call votes, I am able to estimate the ideal points of presidents who made very few requests for legislative action. Following the data collection and scaling procedures outlines in Chapter Three, I am able to estimate every president's ideal point in DW-NOMINATE.[16]

In addition to filling gaps, analyzing additional observations also increases the accuracy of estimations of presidential ideal points. Increasing sample size decreases uncertainty. The standard errors of presidential ideal points are relatively large compared to those of members of Congress because presidents express preferences on only a subset of roll call votes.

Also in this Chapter, I begin to analyze these ideal point estimates. Here, I ask a few basic questions: How well does the spatial model explain presidential legislative behavior? How do these estimates compare to ideal points estimates from request votes only? How do these ideal point estimates compare to other prior estimates of presidential preferences? Who are the most liberal and conservative presidents?

[16] I am unable to estimate the ideal points of Presidents William Harrison and James Garfield based on their limited presidential legislative records. Instead, I estimate their ideal points based on their roll call votes as members of Congress.

First Look at the Estimates

My estimates of the ideal points of U.S. Presidents are plotted in Figure 4.1. For reference, prior estimates are also plotted in Figure 4.1. The second dimension is weighted to reflect the relative importance of the first and second dimensions (weighting method explained below). Because the point estimates may be of some interest, I summarize the estimates in an Appendix to this Chapter.

Figure 4.1. Comparing New and Past Estimates of Presidential Ideal Points



These estimates of presidential ideal points generally comport with conventional assessments of presidents. During the two-party era that has dominated American politics since the Civil War, Republican presidents have ideal points to the right of Democratic presidents. The pre-Civil War era witnessed several party realignments and is, therefore, not directly comparable in terms of the interpretation of right and left positions in the policy space. However, it seems appropriate that a Federalist president like John Adams occupies a different space than do the subsequent Jeffersonian Republican presidents.

A handful of these estimates of presidential ideal points fall outside the bootstrapped standard errors of prior estimates, which were based on request votes only. Ideal point estimates for Presidents J. Q. Adams, Polk, Buchanan, Taft, Harding, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Reagan, H.W. Bush, Clinton, and G.W. Bush represent substantial revisions of prior estimates. While only a small number of individual presidents are examined here, this research facilitates critical reassessments of both historical and modern presidencies. A 95% confidence interval of prior estimates would incorporate a wider area than one standard error, so there may be only one case where a revised estimate falls outside the 95% confidence interval of the corresponding prior estimate: President John Tyler.

Why does Tyler move so much? Not only does the revised estimate move from right to left, but he also makes a dramatic move on the second dimension. Tyler is easily the biggest mover in Figure 4.1. My data collection process increased the data point used to estimate Tyler's ideal point by 242%. Tyler's request votes occurred largely in the 27th Congress, at the beginning of his "accidency," and include a sizable number of requests related to funeral arrangements for Harrison. The present research filled out Tyler's legislative record, particularly on roll call votes late in the 27th Congress and throughout the 28th Congress (adding 66 votes to 14 request votes in that term). The difference in estimates is evident in Figure 4.2 which plots Tyler's prior and revised ideal point relative

to members of the 27th and 28th Congresses. These additional data points help document Tyler's rift with the Whig Party.

Tyler was William Harrison's vice president and became president when Harrison unexpectedly died shortly after taking office. Although he served in Congress as a Democrat, he joined the Whigs to balance the "Tippecanoe and Tyler too" ticket in the 1836 presidential election. Whigs leaders assumed Tyler would advance Harrison's program, but he "moved in the opposite direction" (Zarefsky, 2010, p. 64). As president, Tyler repeated clashed with the Whigs, vetoing several key Whig measures, including a National Bank bill. The Whigs, led by Senator Henry Clay, took the unprecedented measure of expelling Tyler from the party and tried to impeach him. Tyler's split from the Whigs, particularly on the dominant dimension, is clear; his odd alignment between the two major parties gives us an idea why he was widely disliked and served only one term. In this case, a simple spatial model of the relationship between Tyler and the members of Congress helps illustrate the consensus view of the Tyler Administration (Chitwood, 1964, Chapter 16; Crapol, 2006; Monroe, 2003; Seager II, 1963, Chapter 7; Zarefsky, 2010).

Figure 4.2. Detailed View of John Tyler's Ideal Point



Despite my best efforts, I am unable to estimate the ideal points of Presidents William Harrison and James Garfield. Both men died early in their terms and did not compile substantial legislative records. Given their brief tenures, their presidencies may not be of great interest, but we have some idea of their political preferences from their congressional service.

William Harrison represented Ohio in the Senate before being elected president. His DW-NOMINATE score based on his Senate service is .111, .994 (with standard errors .184, .705). James Garfield represented Ohio in the House before becoming president. His ideal point from House service is .306, -.263 (standard errors .041, 0.127).

How Well Does the Spatial Model Explain Presidential Behavior?

In this section, I assess the fit of the spatial model of presidential behavior. This relatively simple model of presidential decision making explains a very high percentage of the legislative records of U.S. Presidents.

Existing research on congressional voting provides a baseline to evaluate model fit. Spatial models of congressional roll call voting are widely viewed as successful. To the extent that misclassified votes are simply noise in well specified model, we should not expect a substantial difference between the error rates of presidents and those of members of Congress. However, if presidential decision making is complicated by the unique nature of the office and the president's veto bargaining power, we would expect presidents to defy the expectations of a spatial voting model more often than their colleagues in Congress do.

I compare how well the spatial model explains presidential legislative records to how well it explains congressional roll call voting in Table 4.1. The records of presidents and members of Congress who served more than one term are summed together.

Table 4.1. Comparing Classification Rate for Presidents, Members of Congress

	Presidents	Members of Congress
Votes Classified Correctly	86.69%	85.55%
(SD)	(5.85%)	(6.85%)
N	41	19,043

The simple spatial model explains presidential legislative behavior just as well as it explains congressional voting behavior. The error rate for presidential legislative behavior is, in fact, slightly lower than it is for congressional roll call voting. This means that a very high percentage of presidents' requests for legislative action, nominations, treaties, bill signings, and vetoes can be explained in terms of presidential ideal points. This is a remarkable simplification of presidential behavior. Recall that presidential studies often proceed on a case-by-case basis, explaining each president's legislative decisions in terms of his personality, his advisors, and the nature of the times.

At the same time, spatial models of politics do not perfectly explain voting behavior. Legislators vote for bills one would expect them to oppose and vice versa. In some cases, the legislator may rely on incomplete information; in other cases, voting may be influenced by factors other than his or her political preferences. The president is certainly not the only

politician who must consider more than personal preferences before deciding to support or oppose a bill; certainly Senators and Representatives also suffer under multiple constraints. As a result of imperfect information, personal idiosyncrasies, and legislative bargaining, the spatial model of voting is probabilistic (see Figure 2.2). While the spatial model does not exclude all other theories of presidential behavior, it should be viewed as the benchmark theory of presidential decision making.

Comparison to Request-Only Scaling

Prior research by Treier (2010) indicates that some modern presidents, like George W. Bush and Bill Clinton, will appear more moderate once the analyst accounts for a variety of votes while my research on Herbert Hoover (Chapter Nine) shows analyzing acts other than requests may reveal a more extreme president than his requests would suggest. What do the records of other presidents show?

Some presidents appear more moderate using a larger record as compared to estimating their ideal points from requests only. This is particularly true of modern presidents. However, analyzing full records moves some presidential ideal point estimates toward the extremes: L.B. Johnson (slightly), F. Roosevelt, Hoover, Coolidge, Taft, B. Harrison, Arthur, Grant, Tyler, Van Buren, Jefferson (slightly). Overall, there is not a clear pattern to these revisions. We should not conclude that all presidents will appear more moderate, like G.W. Bush or Clinton, or more extreme, like Hoover, when we incorporate additional data points into our analysis.

The ideal point estimates of modern presidents do not change as much as the estimates of historical presidents because modern presidents have announced more legislative positions than historic presidents. This research added more data points, measured as percentage increase over existing research, to presidents prior to Eisenhower than after Eisenhower (see Table 3.1).

These results cast some doubt on the findings of Bertelli and Grose (2011). Those authors estimated the ideal points of Clinton and G.W. Bush Cabinet appointees and concluded that presidential appointees do not reflect the preferences of their appointing president as principal-agent theories would suggest. This conclusion may arise from inaccurate measurement of presidential ideal points. Although the agency heads studied by Bertelli and Grose demonstrated remarkably heterogeneous preference, the distance between the ideal points of agency heads and presidents is narrowed when we update our estimates of presidential ideal points. This suggests principal-agent theories of appointments are valid. Similarly, the research I present in Chapter Eleven, suggests that the decision making of federal judges reflects the preferences of their appointing presidents.

Interestingly, the error rate for request-only votes is lower than that of full presidential records. Ideal points based on requests only produce an average error rate of just 8.40% with standard deviation of 8.00% based on sample of 73 voting terms. Collapsed by president, the request only estimates classify 91.69% of requests correctly with standard deviation of 6.99% based on 34 presidents.

This very low error rate from classifying only request votes is suspect. 91.69% correctly classification is out of line with congressional voting to which presidents are compared. The president can limit requests to cases where he perceives a substantial difference between yea and nay positions. He can avoid close calls. If the policy outcome is uncertain, he can abstain from voting. In other words, his requests may be limited to votes where his preference clearly translate to a yea or nay vote, resulting in unusually high classification rate in the spatial model. Comparing the fit of spatial models for individual presidents based on request-only and comprehensive legislative records bears this out. Restricted to requests only, scaling methods can identify ideal points for Presidents Cleveland, Grant, Harding, Monroe, Polk, T. Roosevelt, and Wilson that perfectly explain their spare record of requests (12, 25, 18, 10, 33, 13, and 25 requests, respectively). When we fill out these presidents' legislative records, it becomes impossible to identify a single

point that puts the president on the correct side of every cutting line and the proportion of votes correctly classified falls in line with those observed in Congress (0.66, 0.875, 0.936, 0.857, 0.841, 0.905, and 0.849, respectively).

Comparison to Other Estimates of Presidential Preferences

How do the current estimates of presidential ideal points compare to other measures of presidential preferences? Above, I compared my estimates to prior estimates based on request votes only. In this section, I compare my estimates (first dimension only) to other prior estimates, specifically those of Bailey and Chang (2001) and Wood (2009).[17] If the present estimates correlated perfectly with prior works, they would add nothing new to our understanding of the presidency. At the same time, some correlation with prior estimates speaks to the validity of the measurement strategy.

Wood (2009) makes several criticisms of using NOMINATE scores or similar approaches to measure presidential ideology. Wood argues that these measures do not allow scholars to assess whether presidents change their preferences over time. Instead, Wood content analyzes presidential statements and speeches for evidence of partisan leaning. His work may be seen as part of the work on the rhetorical presidency. It is useful to consider how the president attempts to sway public opinions and how he engages the electorate. These public appeals may be ultimately targeted at influencing the legislative process. While Wood's approach may be more appropriate for his research agenda, measurement strategy should depend on the research question asked. While it is no doubt significant how the president represents himself, this analysis focuses on what he does, not what he

[17] Recall from Chapter Two that Bailey (2007) and Bailey and Chang (2001) used executive and legislative branch positions on Supreme Court cases to bridge observations to compare preferences of all three branches. The data discussed in this section can be downloaded from the authors' respective web sites. Because Wood measured presidential liberalism, I invert his measure so it corresponds the left-right scheme employed here.

says or how he characterizes his decisions. In some situations, the president may be motivated to represent that his position is more extreme than it actually is in order to secure leverage in negotiations and create room for compromise.

Because these measures are not all on the same metric, I standardize each using its observed mean and standard deviation and plot each series over the years for which it is presently available.

Figure 4.3. Comparison of Current Estimates to Prior Works



It appears in Figure 4.3 that these various measures of presidential are roughly correlated. By all measures, for example, the Nixon/Ford years are more conservative than the Kennedy/Johnson years and the Reagan/Bush terms are more conservative than Clinton's two terms. The current estimates of presidential ideal points correlate most highly with estimates derived from request-only votes (0.931), followed by Bailey's measure of the president's ideal point (0.913), and (the inverse of) Wood's measure of presidential liberalism (0.664).

Asking which measure is best is like asking a builder which tool is the best. It depends on the job to be done. Of course, I believe the approach followed here has a number of virtues. I would not have undertaken this research if I thought these estimates added no

value to political science research. The measurement strategy used here allows us to estimate the ideal points of all U.S. Presidents. Because we estimate presidential ideal points using roll call votes, the estimates are directly comparable to existing, popular estimates of congressional ideal points. We can estimate presidential ideal points up to any arbitrary number of dimensions and generate standard errors. Finally, the Coding Rules followed here are relatively simple. Although coding hundreds of years of legislative history is time consuming, it can be replicated and for future presidents, and easily updated.

Ideological Rankings of U.S. Presidents

Just as many scholars have ranked history's best and worst presidents (e.g. Nice, 1984; Nichols, 2012), one can compile ideological rankings of the U.S. Presidents. For presidents who have served since the Civil War, we can compare presidents on the familiar left-right continuum of liberalism and conservatism. More generally, we can also compare the relative extremism of all presidents by calculating the diagonal distance between their ideal points in two dimensions and the origin.[18]

When the policy space is mapped in more than one dimension, it makes sense to measure distances along diagonal lines using the Pythagorean Theorem. If scaling ideal points in more than one dimension is justified, we should incorporate this additional information into our analysis. Because the primary dimension is substantively more important than additional dimensions, however, we need to appropriately weight additional dimensions in our distance calculations.

The DW-NOMINATE scaling routine estimates a second-dimension weight that maximizes geometric mean probability (GMP) of observed roll call votes with weight of the first dimension set equal to 1 (Carroll et al., 2009, pp. 267-268; Poole & Rosenthal, 2001,

[18] The origin is the statistical mean of ideal points in the NOMINATE scaling routine. Without this restriction, the estimation equations are not identified.

pp. 25-26). Recall from Chapter 2 that the spatial model used here generates probabilities of voting yea or nay based on the relative positions of actors' ideal points and vote cutting lines (see Figure 2.2). The GMP is the exponential of the average log-likelihood of observed votes; it is a method of weighting some errors more heavily than others in order to estimate a model that makes decisive predictions and avoids gross errors, as opposed to simply maximizing the number of votes correctly classified (Poole & Rosenthal, 2007, p. 38). Because the relative weight of actors' alignment along a second dimension changes the distance between their ideal points and vote cutting lines as well as the GMP of their observed votes. As noted, the DW-NOMINATE scaling routine utilized here automatically calculates a second dimension weight that maximizes GMP. For the present analysis of congressional terms 1 through 112 with the addition of presidential records, the estimated second-dimension weight equals 0.4438.[19]

As a general matter, in American politics, analyzing ideal points in more than two dimensions, although statistically feasible, does not substantially contribute to our understanding of legislative behavior. Additional dimensions do not substantially improve the explanatory power of spatial models of voting compared to one to two-dimensional spatial models of voting and it is difficult to provide substantive interpretations of additional dimensions.[20]

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[19] The case studies of the Washington and Hoover administrations presented in Chapters Eight and Nine are slightly different because the W-NOMINATE scaling routine used in those chapters is a self-contained program that generates its own starting values. In the analysis in those chapters, the second dimension weight equals the estimated second dimension salience weight divided by the estimated first dimension salience weight.

[20] According to Poole and Rosenthal (2007, p. 64): "[E]ither voting is accounted for by a low-dimensional spatial model or it is, in effect, spatially chaotic. There appears to be no middle ground. In other words, there is never a period in American history in which, if we do not obtain a good fit with a one- or two-dimensional model, we can obtain a good fit with a three- or four-dimensional model."

In Figure 4.4, I present ideological rankings of U.S. presidents. Panel (a) ranks presidents from most to least conservative. This analysis is limited to presidents who served after the Civil War. Direct comparisons of presidents who served under different party systems is problematic. The issues that divided Federalists and Jeffersonian-Republicans, for example, do not map directly on to contemporary liberal and conservative ideologies. In panel (b), I employ a more generic measure of presidential extremism by calculating the Euclidian distance between presidents' ideal points and the (0,0) origin point of the policy space. These comparisons, although first cuts, could be refined depending on the framework by which one compares presidential ideologies.

Figure 4.4. Ideological Rankings of U.S. Presidents, One and Two Dimensions



According to this analysis, Republican Presidents G.W. Bush and Reagan are the most conservative and ideologically extreme presidents in the nation's history. Democrat Jimmy Carter ranks as the nation's most liberal (least conservative) president. The generic measure of extremism presented in panel (b) suggests that Presidents A. Johnson, Hayes, Jefferson, Pierce, and Madison were the least extreme presidents. The forces that moderate or amplify presidential preferences deserve further analsyis (see Chapter 7), but it is interesting to briefly note that the least extreme presidents are clustered in periods of political realignment (the party-less Era of Good Feeling and the Civil War).

Another consideration is whether the president's ideal point is extreme compared to those who served in Congress during his administration. An ideal point on the fringe of the Republican Party at one point in time may be in the mainstream of the party at other times. For each president, for example, one can calculate the proportion of then-serving members with ideal points to the right or left of the president's, or perhaps further from the origin. These approaches control for underlying shifts in the distribution of ideal points over time. We might also compare presidents to different subpopulations. For example, we might be interested in comparing presidents in relation to the preferences of members of their party in Congress. Generally, it is thought that the president represents the views of his party in Congress, but this has not always been the case. Like choosing the right measure of presidential preferences, the right metric for comparing presidents depends on the nature of the problem under investigation. It is my impression from testing various approaches to comparing presidential ideologies that we would obtain similar results from other metrics as those reported in Figure 4.4, but the ordering may change by one or two ranks (i.e. Reagan is the most conservative president under some specifications, by other metrics, it is G.W. Bush).

Appendix to Chapter 4

Ideal Point Estimates of U.S. Presidents

Index	ICPSR Codes		Name	DW-NOMINATE	
	Id No.	Party Id.		Dim. 1	Dim. 2
1	99869	5000	Washington	0.441	-0.382
2	99870	1	J. Adams	0.433	-0.058
3	99871	200	Jefferson	0.025	0.273
4	99872	200	Madison	-0.116	0.261
5	99873	200	Monroe	-0.005	0.482
6	99874	22	J.Q. Adams	0.280	0.600
7	99875	555	Jackson	-0.188	0.025
8	99876	100	Van Buren	-0.239	-0.198
9	99877	29	W. Harrison*	0.111	0.994
10	99878	29	Tyler	-0.401	0.874
11	99879	100	Polk	-0.289	-0.177
12	99880	29	Taylor	-0.083	0.991
13	99881	29	Fillmore	0.275	0.226
14	99882	100	Pierce	-0.141	-0.018
15	99883	100	Buchanan	-0.198	0.265
16	99884	200	Lincoln	0.219	-0.057
17	99885	200	A. Johnson	-0.060	0.005
18	99886	200	Grant	0.274	0.159
19	99887	200	Hayes	0.087	-0.038
20	99888	200	Garfield*	0.306	-0.263
21	99889	200	Arthur	0.249	0.043
22	99890	100	Cleveland	-0.323	-0.947
23	99891	200	B. Harrison	0.324	-0.181
24	99890	100	Cleveland	-0.323	-0.947
25	99892	200	McKinley	0.220	-0.097
26	99893	200	T. Roosevelt	0.366	-0.534
27	99894	200	Taft	0.332	-0.089
28	99895	100	Wilson	-0.259	-0.435
29	99896	200	Harding	0.367	-0.118
30	99897	200	Coolidge	0.531	-0.196
31	99898	200	Hoover	0.494	0.096
32	99899	100	F. Roosevelt	-0.406	-0.031
33	99900	100	Truman	-0.321	-0.451
34	99901	200	Eisenhower	0.230	-0.740
35	99902	100	Kennedy	-0.434	-0.101
36	99903	100	L.B. Johnson	-0.370	0.006
37	99904	200	Nixon	0.469	-0.751
38	99905	200	Ford	0.452	-0.813
39	99906	100	Carter	-0.491	0.094
40	99907	200	Reagan	0.549	-0.663
41	99908	200	H.W. Bush	0.437	-0.283
42	99909	100	Clinton	-0.392	-0.055
43	99910	200	G.W. Bush	0.564	-0.579
44	99911	100	Obama	-0.314	-0.202

Note: * = based on prior congressional service

Chapter 5

SOPHISTICATED VOTING AND STRATEGIC BARGAINING

In this Chapter, I use the spatial model of voting to consider the extent of sophisticated voting and strategic bargaining by U.S. presidents. Here, I am concerned with a very particular type of behavior: instances where the president purposely acts in a manner inconsistent with his sincere preferences. Certain game theories predict that the president will behave like a gambler playing a game of high-stakes poker, folding his cards or bluffing to get the better of Congress over a series of interactions.

It is important to assess strategic behavior by the president in order to test the assumption that bills are signed or vetoed sincerely. If presidential decision making is dominated by sophisticated bargaining strategies, spatial models will not help us understand presidential behavior. Just as we might examine residuals from a regression model to assess its performance, we should look closely at the misclassified votes of a spatial model. Examining errors can help us determine whether our assumptions are sound and our model is correctly specified. Strategic behavior is also interesting in its own right and spatial models provide us a lens with which to identify and analyze it.

I begin by defining strategic behavior and discussing how strategic behavior by the president might appear in spatial voting models. I maintain that strategic behavior would appear as misclassified votes in a spatial model, which I term "false positive" and "false negative" votes. I consider several possible manifestations of strategic behavior in this Chapter. I look at insincere requests – cases where the president asked members of Congress to vote one way but did the opposite. Next, I examine the overall pattern of misclassified votes. I then consider president-level variation in false positive and false negative error

rates. Overall, the pattern of false negative and false positive votes supports a probabilistic spatial voting model.

Know When to Hold 'Em, Know When to Fold 'Em

The terms "strategy" and "strategic" are often used loosely which invites confusion over the existence and extent of strategic decision making. In this Chapter, I do not use these terms as a synonyms for negotiation or deliberation. Rather, than simply casting a sincere vote for the alternative closer to his or her ideal point, the strategic actor votes in a manner such that ultimate outcome of bargaining is closest to his or her ideal point. In some cases, sincere and strategic models of behavior yield identical predictions. In this Chapter, I am interested in cases where strategic and sincere models of decision making generate different expectations and therefor define strategic behavior in the narrow and particular sense of purposefully making a decision contrary to one's preferences. The strategic actor makes a seemingly self-defeating decision in one round of interaction to secure some greater, long-term payoff. Strategic behavior necessarily involves extended time periods and repeated interactions.

Referring again to the thermostat-setting example from Chapter Two, professors C and P may threaten and bargain in rational pursuit of their preferred climates without engaging in strategic behavior. P sincerely wants the temperature set 10 degrees warmer than C does and their reaching a compromise may involve some sincere negotiation. If professor C offered to let professor P set the thermostat today in exchange for P allowing C to do so tomorrow, this arrangement may be a genuine compromise (assuming C sincerely prefers the state of nature today), but it may also be a strategic concession (C may feign opposition to trick P into giving up control tomorrow).

As the example suggests, hard bargaining is not necessarily insincere or sophisticated. We see sincere bargaining all the time: between employees and employers, consumers and

producers, plaintiffs and defendants. One side sincerely prefers a high price; the other, a low price. Occasionally, however, the employee, consumer, or litigant may threaten to walk away from a good deal, hoping to get an even better deal. Just as in a game of poker, sometimes this strategy works - the opponent falls for the bluff; other times, the bluff is called and the strategy backfires.

This logic extends to bargaining between the president and Congress over legislation. Often, the president's position is sincere. The president may veto or threaten to veto a bill because he sincerely thinks the bill is a bad idea. Likewise, the president may sign a bill or announce his intention to sign a bill because he sincerely supports the bill. Whether a threat or compromise is sincere or strategic depends on the president's preferences, which he may be reluctant to reveal lest he undercut his leverage in negotiations.

In order to code the legislative records of U.S. Presidents, I followed a set of Coding Rules which were outlined in Chapter 2. I assumed that presidents make sincere decisions with respect to legislative requests, nomination, treaties, bill signings, and vetoes. But is this assumption valid? A substantial literature suggests that a president's decision to sign or veto a bill is not simply a matter of his policy preferences but may result from strategic calculations and political pressures.

There may be some limited instances, where presidents are willing to veto a bill they actually prefer to the status quo given some probability Congress will pass an even more favorable version of the bill (Cameron, 2000, pp. 110-116). But these false negative votes should be rare. The president would only veto a bill he actually prefers to the status quo when he thinks Congress will pass an even better bill (from his perspective) if the bill is vetoed. Therefore, this strategy only works if Congress is likely to make concessions and pass the modified bill before the session is over. According to Cameron (2000), there are typically only one or two veto chains per term of Congress. The legislative process is loaded with sticking points and transaction costs. If Congress does not have time to revise and re-

pass a bill, it does not make sense for the president to attempt to bluff Congress into making concessions.

False positive votes, presidents signing bills they oppose because vetoing would be futile, should be limited to presidents with relatively extreme preference profiles.[21] Given our assumption that utility functions are single peaked, for an override vote to pass the bill would have to divide the president from two-thirds of both chambers. If the president's ideal point is centrally located, there is no cutting line that puts the president in opposition to supermajority coalitions. Only presidents with ideal points located on the periphery of the policy space are vulnerable to veto override votes. Figure 5.1 formalizes when presidents are vulnerable to having their vetoes overridden by Congress.

Figure 5.1. Model of Vulnerable and Veto-Proof Presidents



In Figure 5.1, C_L signifies the ideal point of the 1/3 most liberal member of Congress and C_R, the 1/3 most conservative member.[22] If the president is more liberal than C_L, such

[21] One wonders why a president should fear having his veto overridden. Presidents have vetoed bills that Congress passed in overwhelming numbers. If there are good reasons to veto bill, perhaps the president will be willing to go public with his veto message.

[22] The fact that Congress has two chambers does not necessarily complicate this analysis. Overriding the president's veto requires 2/3 majorities in both chambers. To the extent that the ideal point of the 1/3 most liberal Representative is different than that of

that $P < C_L$, the president is vulnerable to a veto override by the 2/3 of members of Congress who are more conservative than the president. Conversely, if the president is more conservative than C_R, such that $P > C_R$, his veto may be overridden by a 2/3 majority of members who are more liberal than the president. If the president's ideal point is located between C_L and C_R, such that $C_L < P < C_R$, the president's veto cannot be overridden. If a bill is too liberal for such a president who occupies this middle ground, it will also be too liberal for more than 1/3 of members of Congress with ideal points to the president's right. If the bill is too conservative for president of this type, it will also be too conservative for the 1/3 of members to the president's left.[23] Because presidents with ideal points to the left of C_L or to the right of C_R are susceptible to having their vetoes overridden, we should expect these types of presidents to cast more false positive votes than presidents in the middle.[24] We might also expect override-proof presidents to threaten to veto bills they

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the 1/3 most liberal Senator, C_L equals the more liberal of the two because his or her vote would be necessary to override the president. Similar logic applies to C_R.

[23] The model depicted in Figure 5.1 does not indicate what bills get passed by Congress or vetoed by the president. Whether Congress will pass or the president will veto a bill depends on the location of the status quo. Accordingly, the model simply identifies when presidents are vulnerable to potential override votes. Other works offer thorough analysis of expected congressional actions and presidential responses with varying proposal points and status quo locations (e.g. Cameron, 2000; Cameron & McCarty, 2004; Krehbiel, 2010).

[24] It is more difficult to identify presidential ideal points that cannot be overridden if issues are multi-dimensional. The identity of pivotal legislators will change depending on the cutting line angle of a particular vote. Nonetheless, in two-dimensions, there will be some area where the president cannot be divided from more than 2/3 of members by a straight line. The set of presidential ideal points that cannot be overridden by 2/3 majorities in more than one dimension may be unusually shaped because the ideal points of members of Congress are not evenly or symmetrically distributed. This analysis focuses on one dimension only. Many terms of Congress are dominated by a single dimension. If

might sincerely favor in order to force Congress to make concessions in the president's favor. Additionally, we might suspect more false positive votes by historic era presidents. R. J. Spitzer (1988) argues early presidents vetoed bills they considered unconstitutional, not according to their policy preferences.

Before diving into the empirical analysis, it is worth pausing to consider whether the game theorists' objection to a sincere spatial voting model is a theoretical or empirical argument. Because the empirical issue is more serious than the theoretical objection, I will only briefly discuss the theoretical issue.

To construct explanatory models, social scientists make simplifying assumptions about human behavior. We model consumer decisions as expected utility functions although we know shoppers do not consciously compare the utility of consumption and leisure. Strategic and sincere models of voting make different theoretic assumptions about decision making. Some of the theoretical assumptions of game theory models are inconsistent with the theoretical assumptions of sincere spatial voting models. Of course, making assumptions is a far cry from validating them. We should ask: Are the assumptions plausible? Do they help us explain observed behavior?

Even if one believes that some bill signings and vetoes are sometimes strategic, one must concede there must be some cases where the president signs or vetoes bills based on his sincere preferences. The sincere voting assumption is certainly plausible. Some may not object to the theoretical assumption of sincere voting for purposes of constructing a model, but will argue that it cannot possibly explain something as complicated as a president's legislative decisions.

Because the first Coding Rule for estimating presidential ideal points was based on expressed preferences, the issue of insincere signings and vetoes is limited to cases where the

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sophisticated behavior is not evidence in one dimension, we are unlikely to detect it in higher ordered models.

president did not express a preference before Congress voted but was compelled to reveal a preference after the bill passed Congress. "The absence of a presidential position on pending bills or the failure to communicate one is normally interpreted as a sign of indifference by the administration and as a green light for Congress to work its will. … The White House is not shy about making its opinions known" (Wayne, 2009, p. 321). Accordingly, the range of the objection is very narrow. Because expressing disapproval is relatively costless (compared to having a veto overridden) and presidential positions on roll call votes are relatively well documented, the possibility that presidents sign bills while keeping their disapproval secret is limited.

Evidence of Insincere Legislative Requests

So far in this Chapter, I have defined strategic behavior and argued that presidents should rarely resort to sophisticated voting strategies to gain an advantage over Congress. But what does the evidence suggest? In this section, I consider cases where the president made a legislative request while a bill was pending and later had the opportunity to sign or veto the bill. These cases provide us an opportunity to compare what the president said with what the president did.

How often does the president ask members of Congress to support a bill but then veto the bill when the opportunity presents itself? It has been suggested that a reputation for unpredictable behavior can enhance one's bargaining position (Schelling, 1960). Does the president request nay votes but sign bills anyway? Taking a position against a bill is relatively costless but going through with a veto may be costly, particularly if the veto is overridden.

There are examples of presidents requesting one thing and doing another. For example, during the 98th Congress, President Reagan requested House members vote nay

on a bill to extend Head Start programs for children. Nonetheless, the bill passed by a 376 to 6 margin (vote no. 896) and Reagan signed the bill into law rather than veto it.[25]

To determine whether these are isolated examples or part of a pattern of strategic behavior, I identified bills subject to legislative requests that passed Congress and were presented to the president. To obtain a diverse sample, I compared presidential requests and sign/veto decisions by President Hoover in the 71st and 72nd Congresses (unified then divided government), President Eisenhower in the 86th Congress (divided), President Reagan in the 98th Congress (divided), and President Clinton in the 103rd Congress (unified). It is important to note that the president's requesting a nay vote does not necessarily mean he opposes the bill; frequently, the president is requesting members vote against tabling the bill, referring it back to committee, or some other attempt to obstruct passage. If requests and sign/veto decisions are sincere, we would expect the president to sign a bill into law after he advocates passage and veto a bill after he requests defeat. If he vetoes a bill after requesting passage or signs a bill after requesting its defeat, his requests and sign/veto decisions are inconsistent and possibly strategic.

Table 5.1. Sign/Veto Decisions following Requests in Select Terms

President Requested:	President Signed Bill	President Vetoed Bill	Totals
Yea (for passage)	76	1	77
	(98.7%)	(1.3%)	(100%)
Nay (against passage)	7	18	25
	(28.0%)	(72.0%)	(100%)

[25] In this case, I code President Reagan's "vote" on passing Head Start expansion as nay, based on his request. The coding rules followed here are intended to generate the best estimate of the president's sincere preferences. Reagan's subsequently signing the bill is not identified as a false positive vote for the analysis in this Chapter. While this approach to coding presidential legislative decisions may understate certain types of strategic behavior, it produces more reliable estimates of presidential ideal points.

Analysis of the correspondence of requests and sign/veto decisions in these terms supplies some evidence of strategic behavior. Although these presidents more often than not vetoed bills after requesting members of Congress to vote against them, in a sizable share of cases (28%), they signed bills after requesting their defeat. As one might expect, the request nay then sign pattern did not occur during unified government; most of these cases (6 of 7) occurred in the 98th Congress. Figure 4.4 showed that Reagan occupied a relatively extreme position in the policy space compared to then-serving members of Congress. Consistent with strategic theories, it appears that Reagan's concession on extending Head Start was not an aberration – of the nine bills presented to Reagan in this term following nay requests, only three were actually vetoed.

It is also possible that Congress makes concessions in the president's favor to avoid having a bill vetoed. If bill content is modified to appease the president, the cutting line would move the yea side closer to president such that nay votes on president's side turn into yea votes. In some cases, Congress may make concessions, but only to sway the left or right override vote rather than induce the president to sincerely support the bill. The false positive votes identified here would be cases where Congress did not modify bill content enough to put the president on the yea side of the cutting line.

President's Position Relative to Cutting Lines of Misclassified Votes

Existing research on congressional voting, therefore, provides a baseline to evaluate presidential voting "errors." To the extent that these insincere yea or nay votes are simply noise in a well specified model, presidential voting errors should appear close to the observed cutting lines separating yea and nay votes.

We would expect prediction errors to increase when the president's ideal point is close to the cutting line between yea and nay votes. If the president is equidistant between yea and nay, he does not have strong preferences for one outcome over the other. Figure

5.2 below plots the proximity of the president's ideal point to the cutting lines of votes misclassified by the spatial model. If the president's ideal point is on the yea side of the cutting line, the spatial model predicts the president to vote yea, but the president sometimes votes nay (by requesting a nay vote or vetoing the bill). Conversely, the president's ideal point may be on the nay side of the cutting line, but the president supports the bill (by requesting a yea vote, making the proposal, or signing the bill).

If voting errors occur at random, we would expect errors to occur most often when the president's ideal point is equidistant from the yea and nay positions. When the actor is indifferent between yea and nay based on his or her preferences, idiosyncratic factors may be decisive "tie breakers" in the actor's decision making process. More specifically, we would expect presidential voting errors to be normally distributed around the line separating yeas from nays. A normal distribution is single peaked; therefore, we would not expect multiple modes (i.e. presidents capitulating when their ideal points are far from the cutting line).

Figure 5.2. President's Proximity to Cutting Lines of Misclassified Votes



Although many misclassified votes occur when the president's ideal point is close to the cutting line, the distribution of voting errors is not normally distributed around the

cutting line.[26] The tails of this distribution are too thick and the distribution appears bimodal, with a cluster of false positive votes occurring when the president's ideal point is well into nay territory.[27] This analysis provides at least weak support for theories of strategic behavior.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that the volume of misclassified votes that defy the normal distribution of classification errors around the cutting line is relatively small. As noted in Chapter Four, the spatial model of voting explains 86.69% of U.S. presidents' legislative decisions. The distribution plotted in Figure 5.1 is limited to the 13.31% of decisions that the model does not explain and the majority of these decisions are explained by probabilistic voting when the president's ideal point is close to the cutting line. Strategic votes, as defined in this Chapter, number in the hundreds over the course of 112 terms of Congress. This suggests presidents make two or three strategic decisions per term of Congress. While some legislative histories may involve sophisticated strategies, this evidence suggests strategic calculations do not predominate in presidential decision making. To reiterate an observation from Chapter Four, the spatial model of voting does not exclude all other explanations for voting behavior, but it does offer a persuasive account of most legislative decisions.

Thus far, this Chapter has provided largely descriptive evidence of strategic behavior in presidents' legislative records. We have found that presidents sometimes ask members of Congress to do one thing and then do the opposite when the opportunity arises. Additionally, we noticed that some misclassified presidential decisions did not occur when

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[26] An auxiliary Quantile-Quantile plot of the distribution seen in Figure 5.1 against a normal distribution (not show) reveals the misclassified presidential votes are not normally distributed around cutting lines.

[27] The asymmetry of the distribution is also noticeable, but probably does not bear too much mention. The president has more yea opportunities than nay opportunities. Some of his vote types, like his nominations and treaties, are coded yea by rule.

the president's ideal point was near the cutting line. The fact that President Reagan accounted for the majority of the request-nay-then-sign cases during a period of divided government is suggestive but is not a systematic test of strategic voting. In the remainder of this Chapter, I look for systematic patterns in misclassified votes.

Statistical Models of Misclassified Presidential Decisions

The spatial model of presidential decision making allows us to identify and analyze strategic behavior by the president. In particular, we can identify cases where presidents acted contrary to our estimations of their preferences. Why do presidents sign bills they would seem to oppose or veto bills we think they should support? If some misclassified votes are not merely random errors, they may tell us something interesting about presidential behavior. Do some presidents vote more strategically than others do? If so, why do some presidents behave strategically?

The unit of analysis in this section is the misclassification rates of presidential decisions during individual terms of Congress. The total misclassification rate includes the rates of false positive and false negative decisions (calculated as errors/total votes).[28] Table 5.2 provides a sense of the variation in the dependent variables by listing the highest and lowest observed rates of misclassified yea and nay votes in presidential legislative records.

[28] This operationalization of strategic voting would not include the request-nay-then-sign decisions discussed above unless the president was expected to vote yea based on his ideal point. As noted in Chapter Three, if the president made a request, that was coded as his sincere preference. The Coding Rules were designed to yield the best possible estimates of presidential preferences rather than identify all instances of strategic decision making. Accordingly, the misclassifications discussed in the text would be limited to cases where the president did not make his support or opposition known ahead of time and then acted contrary to expectations.

Table 5.2. Highest and Lowest Observed Rates of Presidential Voting Errors

	False Positive Votes:			False Negative Votes:		
	President	Congress	Rate	President	Congress	Rate
Highest Rates:	Tyler	27	43.6%	G.W. Bush	110	25.9%
	Tyler	28	32.0%	Cleveland	54	25.5%
	Polk	30	30.8%	Wilson	66	20.6%
	Jackson	22	30.6%	Pierce	34	19.8%
	Hayes	45	28.6%	Cleveland	50	16.1%
Lowest Rates:	Kennedy	88	0.0%	Obama	111	0.0%
	Obama	111	0.1%	Madison	12	0.0%
	G.W. Bush	108	1.4%	Fillmore	32	0.0%
	Coolidge	69	1.8%	Fillmore	31	0.0%
	Van Buren	26	2.2%	Polk	30	0.0%

Presidential decisions during certain administrations are not explained particularly well by a simple spatial model (e.g. Tyler, Pierce, Cleveland). While some terms of presidential legislative decisions are explained exceptionally well by the spatial model (e.g. Obama). What accounts for the number of misclassified votes in some administrations?

We can use the presidential ideal point estimates to test predictions of a strategic voting model. Specifically we can compare the president's ideal point to those of members of Congress to identify which presidents were situated to make credible veto threats and which presidents were not. This is, of course, a rough typology which does not look at specific bills or consider the president's ability to persuade members to support him, but does offer a basic framework for assessing theories of strategic behavior.

According to theories of strategic behavior, there should be a relationship between the president's standing among legislators and his capacity to issue a credible veto threat. The vitality of the president's veto depends on whether Congress is likely to sustain or override his veto. Presidents situated in the middle of Congress may have the incentive to bluff. If the president's veto is likely to be sustained, the president is in a position to make credible threats; his position may give rise to false negative votes. In contrast, presidents

who occupy relative extreme positions in the policy space should sign bills contrary to their preferences. If the president is in a position to have his veto overridden, one would expect more false positive votes.

Distinguishing between the false positive and false negative votes is important to this analysis because the president's position relative to members of Congress, according to strategic theories, determines which strategies are available to him. The rate of false positive and false negative errors may both be related to ideal point location but the overall error rate, unrelated. That is, the president may have a strategic incentive for false positive votes if his ideal point is extreme relative to Congress or an incentive for false negative votes if his ideal point is centrally located.

Operationalization of Explanatory Variables

The substantive interpretations of relative positions in the policy space vary over the course of American political history, but the constitutional requirement that a 2/3 vote of both chambers is required to override the president's veto has not changed. Accordingly, strategic behavior provides a good opportunity to apply the full run of presidential ideal points.

I calculate the proportion of members of Congress with more extreme first dimension ideal points on the president's side of the primary dimension.[29] For example, if 40% of members are more liberal than a Democratic president, this value is .40; if 20% of members are more conservative than a Republican president, this value is .20.

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[29] In this analysis, I do not separately analyze presidents' positions relative to Representatives and Senators. While the proportions of Representatives and Senators that are more liberal than the president in any given term are likely to diverge somewhat, we can expect these proportions to be highly correlated as the ideological compositions of the House and Senate are both responsive to the electorate.

To control for the nature of the congressional agenda, I calculate the misclassification rate of members of Congress on roll call votes during each term. If the legislative agenda is filled with issues characterized by shifting coalitions and non-ideological voting, we would expect the misclassification rate of presidential decisions to increase.

Another consideration is the changing nature of the presidency. As I argued in Chapter Two, the electoral environment for presidential candidates changed dramatically in the late nineteenth century. This development required a different type of candidate to win election and re-election to the presidency. We might expect modern presidents to be more assertive and less deferential to congressional majorities in the legislative process. Additionally, some have argued that historic era presidents followed different norms with respecting to vetoing legislation (e.g. R. J. Spitzer, 1988); historic era presidents may have been reluctant to veto bills simply on the basis of their policy preferences.

Results of Statistical Model

Does our spatial model of presidential voting help us identify strategic legislative decisions by U.S. Presidents? If so, the incidence of false positive and false negative decisions will correspond to the predictions of strategic theories of behavior. The primary explanatory variable in this analysis is the location of the president's ideal point relative to members of Congress, particularly the president's position relative to congressional veto pivots.

In Figure 5.3, I plot the relationship between the president's position relative to members of Congress and the estimated false positive rates of presidential legislative decisions during terms of Congress. As noted, the expectation is that presidents with ideal points backed by less than one-third of members of Congress are susceptible to having vetoes overridden and therefore will sign bills contrary to their preferences.

Figure 5.3. False Positive Decision Rates and President's Position Relative to Congress



Figure 5.4 shows the relationship between the president's position relative to Congress and observed false negative decision rates. As noted above, distinguishing between false positive and false negative errors is important because our expectations with respect to relative positions are inverted. A president with an ideal point in the inner-third can credibly threaten to veto legislation and should be more inclined to strategically threaten bills to force Congress to make concessions in the president's favor. Additionally, we would expect modern presidents to be more assertive, less deferential, and more inclined to risk good bills to get better bills from Congress.

Figure 5.4. False Negative Decision Rates and President's Position Relative to Congress



Patterns in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 are not immediately clear. In Table 5.3, I present the results of OLS regression analysis of the observed false positive and false negative errors rates as a function of the president's backing in Congress, the misclassification rate of members' votes during the term, and a nominal indicator for modern era presidents. Recall from the theoretical framework above that liberal presidents rely on members to their left to avoid having their vetoes overridden by 2/3 majorities and conservative presidents' vetoes are sustained by members on their right. Accordingly, the key explanatory variable in Table 5.3 cannot be expressed simply in terms of the proportion of members to the left of the president (as in Figures 5.3 and 5.4) but rather is operationalized as the proportion of members protecting the president's veto from being overridden.

Table 5.3. Regression Analysis of Misclassified Presidential Decisions

	False Positive Errors	False Negative Errors
Proportion MC Preventing Veto Override	-0.113*	-0.061
	(0.057)	(0.041)
MC Error Rate in Term	0.069	0.041
	(0.348)	(0.142)
Modern Presidents	-0.092***	0.006
	(0.019)	(0.014)
Intercept	0.189***	0.0059*
	(0.047)	(0.033)
N	118	118
F-statistic(3,114)	13.50	1.912
R^2	0.262	0.048
Adjusted R^2	0.243	0.023

Standard errors in parentheses
* = p < .05 ** = p < .01 *** = p < .001

The ideological location of the president relative to members of Congress helps explain his false positive votes, but not his false negative votes.[30] According to this analysis, presidents tend to capitulate to Congress as the probability of a veto override increases. When members of Congress "have the president's back," the president is less likely to sign a bill contrary to his preferences. Additionally, statistical analysis indicates that modern presidents are less likely to avoid fighting a losing battle against Congress compared to historic era presidents. The difference between modern and historic era presidents with respect to false positive decisions rates is consistent with the view that modern presidents are more assertive and less deferential to Congress. In contrast, neither of these variables explain false negative decisions. Surprisingly, the proportion of misclassified votes by members of Congress in the corresponding term is not significantly related to the rate of misclassified presidential decisions.

[30] The R-Squared statistics of the statistical models of false positive and false negative votes should not be directly compared because these models analyze different dependent variables.

Discussion of Statistical Models

Statistical analysis suggests that some of the "yea" votes in presidents' legislative records do not reflect sincere preferences but rather strategic concessions to the will of Congress. While this suggests the assumption that presidential decisions are sincere is not always true, it is important to keep the issue of strategic voting in proper perspective.

Strategic voting presents a challenge to sincere spatial voting models. Sophisticated, strategic decisions appear as misclassified votes. Despite this challenge, the explanatory power of the spatial model of presidential behavior, as detailed in Chapter Four, is very high and in some terms, offers a nearly perfect account of presidential decision making.

Moreover, the assumption of sincere decision making is very useful. Making the assumption helps us identify when presidents make strategic decisions. Many misclassified votes occur when the president's ideal point is close the cutting line of a roll call vote, consistent with a probabilistic spatial voting model, but the errors are not normally distributed around the cutting lines. Some of these misclassified decisions occurred under the circumstances predicted by strategic voting models. When the president occupies a relatively extreme position and susceptible to a veto override vote, he tends to sign more bills insincerely compared to centrist presidents. The spatial model of presidential behavior provides a tool to understand strategic voting behavior. These strategic maneuvers are relatively rare, but offer another perspective on presidential decision making.

What does this suggest about presidential strategy? Presidents with relatively unpredictable voting records are generally considered weak executives. Presidents Tyler and Pierce were extremely unpopular. Rather than using veto threats to induce legislative concessions, these presidents signed relatively high volumes of legislation they likely opposed. Although Andrew Jackson was a popular, two-term president, in the 22nd Congress, Democrats' control of the Senate was tenuous at best. Calhoun resigned, Congress was gripped by the nullification and national bank crises, and Congress attempted to

censure the president. This session was the low point of the Jackson presidency. Although Reagan provided some examples of strategic decision making, his false positive decision rates (7.9, 15.8, 13.8, and 14.7% over four terms of Congress) were much lower than of these troubled historic era presidents (see Table 5.2).

Perhaps factors other than the president's relationship to Congress affect his propensity for strategic decision making. Do some leadership types employ more strategic behavior than others do? Some scholars have argued that American foreign policy reflects variation in presidents' propensity to take risks (e.g. Kowert & Hermann, 1997). Other researchers have considered the correlates of risk-taking behavior more generally. For example, Nicholson, Soane, Fenton-O'Creevy, and Willman (2005) created a scale of individual propensity to take risks and found that the propensity to take risks correlated, among other things, to occupational choices and individual personality. Based on this research, we might think that presidents have high propensity to take risks. If some presidents are more willing to take risks than others, we would expect substantial variation among presidents, even controlling for the nature of the times in the form of the prevailing error rate of members of Congress.

Conclusion: Strategic Behavior and Motivation Leadership

Although we do find some evidence of strategic behavior, the extent of strategic decision making in the presidential legislative records analyzed here is very limited. I estimate that such behavior is limited to, on average, two or three strategic concessions per term of Congress, a relatively small fraction of the decisions presidents make. Moreover, strategic behavior appears to be a sign of weakness rather than strength. Presidents may sign distasteful bills to avoid losing fights with Congress, but this research disclosed no systematic evidence that presidents bluff and make false threats to get the better of Congress.

It appears that popular presidents who maintain good legislative relations do not bluff and threaten to get their way. These findings challenge the idea that presidential authority is bolstered by sophisticated veto strategies.

While the legislative process requires bargaining between executive and legislative branches of government, we should not expect presidents to make legislative decisions as if playing high-stakes games of poker. Highly strategic behavior is likely incompatible with electoral politics. "Suppose a president cultivated the image of a hothead who vetoed in a fit of pique, even if it meant cutting off his nose to spite his face (in policy terms). Such a reputation might well strengthen his bargaining position with Congress. … But no president, not Nixon or even Andrew Jackson, has tried to build a reputation as an irrational hothead in matters of domestic policy. As a practical matter, impetuous irrationality meshes poorly with the deliberative pace of legislating. A reputation as a loose cannon is probably electoral poison" (Cameron, 2000, pp. 109-110).

Additional factors may limit the president's ability to cultivate a hard-bargaining reputation by acting strategically in the short-term. For the president, the window of opportunity to change policy is limited. The honeymoon period that takes place at the beginning of the president's term is over very quickly. Even a popular president may serve no more than two terms. The legislators the president may seek to impress also eventually leave office. Control of Congress may change from one party to the other during mid-term elections, potentially upsetting the president's reputation-building strategy. Although his legislative decisions are not a one-shot game, there are a number of reasons for the president to heavily discount the long-term benefits of acting strategically.

If the president issues a false veto threat in an attempt to get an even better bill from Congress, his threat may be counterproductive to the extent it undermines congressional support for a bill the president actually likes and lowers the chances that Congress re-passes a bill more favorable to the president. His supporters in Congress may

take him seriously. The president's rhetorical leadership may be important to members of the executive branch (generally Whitford & Yates, 2009). If the president treats his supporters and subordinates as bargaining chips in a high-stakes poker game with Congress, he is likely to lose support and undermine his administration. Strategic behavior relies on the president's not "showing his cards" too early in the game, but he must show his cards to persuade others to support him. This is not to say that presidents do not attempt to influence members of Congress (see Chapter Ten). Rather, the point is that presidents' primary tactic is sincere, consistent policy leadership.

Chapter 6

PRESIDENTIAL POLARIZATION

In recent decades, political scientists have documented the growing divide between Democrats and Republicans in Congress. Although many, if not most, voters consider themselves political moderates, there are few, if any, moderate politicians on the national stage. Scholars debate the causes and consequences of congressional polarization, but its occurrence is not widely contested (Abramowitz, 2010; Jacobson, 2007). Whether U.S. presidents are similarly trending to ideological extremes is not well known. The only significant empirical study of presidential polarization to date, Cohen (2011), does not squarely address the issue. In this chapter, I examine presidential ideal point estimates to assess evidence of presidential polarization. I find that presidential polarization is increasing, that it is related to, but not explained by elite-level polarization, and that it is confined to the modern era.

What is Presidential Polarization?

Most periods of American political history feature two major political parties. Party members express opposing views on issues like the proper role for the government in the economy and preferences are generally centered on two distinct modes. When these two modes are relatively close together, some members of opposing parties have similar preferences their ideal points overlap in the policy space. When the centers of the respective parties are relatively far apart, there is a clear divide between the ideal points of members of opposing parties. If the distance between the parties is increasing, which appears to describe contemporary politics, we say that polarization is increasing.

Polarization of the presidency is analogous to, but analytically distinct from congressional polarization. When congressional scholars study polarization, they typically compare Democrats and Republicans serving contemporaneously in Congress. For example, one might measure the distance between the mean ideal points of Democrats and Republicans in Congress over time. However, we do not observe a bi-modal distribution of preferences within the executive branch; only one party controls the White House at a given time. Instead, it makes more sense to think of presidential polarization as a dynamic process occurring over time. Presidential polarization increases when the distance between the president and the political center increases from one administration to the next. In contemporary terms, this means that Democratic presidents become increasingly liberal and Republican presidents, increasingly conservative.

There are a number of reasons to believe that presidential preferences are moving away from the political center. Political polarization among elites and in Congress is well documented and presidents may reflect this trend. Additionally, since at least the late 1800s, presidents have assumed the mantle of partisan leadership. Modern presidents may find it increasingly difficult to deliver their message to moderate voters with a multitude of media options (Kernell & Rice, 2011). According to some scholars, the president's partisan role is no longer confined to the campaign trail – a "permanent campaign" dictates the organization of the White House staff and the executive branch's policy output (Galvin, 2013; Skinner, 2009).

Figure 6.1, below, plots the first dimension ideal points of U.S. presidents from one administration to the next. The figure gives the general impression of a widening divide between presidents from the Democrat and Republican Parties.

Figure 6.1. Presidential Ideal Points (First Dimension) Over Time



It is important to investigate whether presidential polarization is increasing for several reasons. First, the president plays a key role in the legislative process. Because passing laws generally requires concerted action by Congress and the president, it is difficult to assess the implications of congressional polarization without also examining trends in presidential representation. Spatial models show that the gridlock interval widens as the president occupies an increasingly extreme position within the policy space. This means that laws with majority support are less likely to pass. Second, the president may wield considerable influence on public opinion. Presidents with extreme views may shift public opinion to one extreme or the other. Finally, the president has numerous unilateral powers at his disposal. As the president's policy preferences become increasingly extreme, these unilateral powers assume a sinister character, potentially undermining the democratic process.

Given the potential consequences of presidential polarization, which Cameron (2002, p. 648) deemed "utterly pervasive," the topic has received surprisingly little attention from

political scientists. According to Cohen (2011, p. 501), "rarely has the literature on polarization considered the presidency." Instead, most scholarly work on presidential polarization remains theoretical and exploratory (e.g. Beckmann & Kumar, 2011; Beckmann & McGann, 2008; Galvin, 2013; Skinner, 2009).

Cohen (2011, p. 517) concludes: "Presidents, on average, have not become more extreme in their policy positions despite the growing polarization between the parties of the past several decades." There are, however, several problems with Cohen's analysis. First, his range of observations is limited and the measures he uses for presidential ideal points all utilize potentially misleading subsets of the roll call record. Second, time series analysis does not seem an appropriate tool to analyze successive presidents who make legislative decisions independent of one another. We are not observing a data generating process, like unemployment rates in a labor market, over a series of intervals. Differencing ensures the data are stationary and amenable to time series analysis (Kennedy, 2003, p. 320). The conclusion that presidential polarization is not increasing is, then, an artifact of the statistical method employed rather a genuine characteristic of the presidential politics. Finally, Cohen's conclusion does not follow logically from his results. His results suggest congressional polarization is not a statistically significant cause of presidential extremism, controlling for other factors. His analysis does, however, identify other potential causes of presidential polarization, but fails to test for trends that seem apparent in his descriptive statistics (see Cohen, 2002, Figure 2).

Expanding the number of observations is critical to understanding presidential polarization. Historical data put contemporary politics in perspective. It is difficult to discern statistically significant trends by analyzing only twelve post-WWII presidents. Outlining a research agenda, Cameron (2002, p. 660) argued "it might well be that if one wants to understand the contemporary presidency, almost paradoxically one ought to spend

as much or more time thinking about [Gilded Age presidents] … than more comfortable but arguably irrelevant favorites."

In this chapter, I use my estimates of presidential ideal points to answer three questions about polarization. The first question is whether presidential preferences are becoming more extreme over time. I answer this question in the affirmative. Second, I ask whether presidential polarization simply tracks elite-level polarization, seen as polarization in Congress, or is a significant trend controlling for this possible cause of presidential polarization. I find that presidential polarization is a significant trend controlling for congressional polarization which is a significant explanatory variable in some statistical models. Finally, I ask whether presidential polarization is a time-bound phenomenon, confined to the modern era. Despite the limited number of observations available, I find that presidential polarization is only statistically significant in the modern era. I conclude this chapter by discussing the implications of this research for federal policy making and identify some potential limitations in this analysis.

Quantitative Analysis of Presidential Polarization

Scholars have developed a number of methods of measuring congressional polarization. Typically, one measures distances between Democrats and Republicans serving in Congress at the same time. Because there is only one president at a given time, these measures do not work for presidents.

I measure the relative extremism of presidential preferences two ways. First, I consider the absolute value of the first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores. Like Cohen (2011), I analyze absolute values, rather than relative scores, because the theory predicts negative (liberal) scores to become more negative and positive scores to become more

positive over time.[31] Second, I analyze the Euclidian distance between the president's two-dimensional ideal point and origin using the Pythagorean Theorem with the second-dimension distances appropriately weighted (see discussion of second-dimension weighting in Chapter Four).

The presidential index is a sequence of integers from 1 to 44. The index corresponds to the individual presidents (see the-axis labels of Figure 6.2). If the presidency is polarizing from one administration to the next, the presidential index will be significantly correlated to our measures of presidential polarization.

Does presidential polarization simply reflect elite-level polarization in general? Many presidents have emerged from Congress so a widening gap divide between Democratic and Republican legislators may translate into increasing differences between Democratic and Republican presidents. I control for congressional polarization with variables corresponding to the measures of presidential extremism; I calculate the mean absolute value of first dimension ideal points of legislators who served while each president was in office. I also calculate the average diagonal distance of members during each administration.

Additionally, I consider whether any trend in presidential polarization is limited to the modern era by interacting a nominal variable identifying modern presidents with the presidential index. The partial regression coefficient of the interaction term should disclose whether trends are different in the modern and historic eras.

I use ordinary least squares regression analysis. Although the dependent variable cannot take values less than 0, the actual range of values resembles a normal distribution.

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[31] Cameron (2002) discusses the distance between the president and the median member of the House as evidence of presidential polarization, but this does not seem an appropriate measure. If we measure the distance between the president and Congress over time, these quantities depend on both the location of Congress as well as the president and it is difficult to allocate responsibility for inter-branch distances to one branch or the other.

Additionally, OLS regression coefficients can be interpreted on the scale of the dependent variable.

Results

Referring to Figure 6.1, above, presidential preferences appear to be trending toward ideological extremes. Although this initial analysis suggests polarization of the presidency, we can further analyze these data using statistical models.

Table 6.1 reports the results of regression analysis of presidential polarization. As discussed above, I measure the distance between the president and the political center two ways: as the absolute value of the president's first dimension DW-NOMINATE score and as the diagonal distance between the president's two-dimensional ideal point and the point of origin (with the second dimension appropriately weighted). Models 1 and 3 analyze these dependent variables controlling for preferences in Congress. Models 2 and 4 additionally account for differences in the time periods being analyzed.

Table 6.1. Regression Analysis of Presidential Polarization

	One Dimension		Diagonal Distance	
Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
President Index (i = 1 … 44)	0.007***	-0.003	0.006***	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Congressional Polarization	0.353	0.502		
(Mean Abs. Dim. 1)	(0.384)	(0.381)		
Congressional Polarization			1.036*	1.122*
(Mean Diagonal Distance)			(0.570)	(0.566)
Modern Presidents◦President Index		0.009*		0.010*
		(0.006)		(0.006)
Modern Presidents		-0.126		-0.146
		(0.150)		(0.162)
Intercept	0.032	0.055	-0.209	-0.166
	(0.139)	(0.135)	(0.244)	(0.242)
N	42	42	42	42
F-statistic	12.27	7.722	9.378	6.185
R^2	0.380	0.448	0.319	0.394
Adjusted R^2	0.349	0.390	0.285	0.331

* = p < 0.05 *** = p < 0.001

Statistical analysis indicates that presidents are generally becoming more ideologically extreme. The absolute value of the president's first dimension ideal point score is increasing, on average, by 0.007 for each succeeding president. The diagonal distance between the president's ideal point and the point of origin is also increasing by 0.006 for each succeeding president. Given that ideal points are confined to a unit circle, these are substantively significant trends.

The results suggest that congressional polarization may be positively correlated to presidential polarization. Although the partial regression coefficients for our measure of congressional polarization do not reach conventional levels of statistical significant in the one-dimensional models, the relationship between congressional and presidential polarization is statistically significant in the two-dimensional models. In fact, the relationship between congressional and presidential polarization is nearly 1:1 in two dimensions.

Although the basic Models 1 and 3 suggest a general pattern, Models 2 and 4 indicate presidential polarization is a modern trend. These models incorporate an indicator variable for modern presidents (index = 24 or greater) and interact this indicator with the presidential index to explain presidential polarization in one and two-dimensions. When we account for time periods, the polarization trend is statistically significant for modern presidents but not over the course of American history. The partial regression coefficients on the interaction terms in Models 2 and 4 suggest that the presidential polarization is increasing at a roughly 50% faster rate than the general patterns found in Models 1 and 3.

Figure 6.2 displays the trajectory of presidential ideal points over time with Panel (a) showing the absolute value of one dimension scores and Panel (b), diagonal distances. Panel (a) shows the regression line predicted by Model 2, holding congressional polarization constant at its historic average. Panel (b) does the same for Model 4.

Figure 6.2. Predicted and Actual Values, Presidential Polarization



The statistical models do a reasonable job explaining variation in distances between presidents and the political center over time. The results are similar in one and two-dimensions. Both the one and two-dimensional models suggest the distance between the president and the political center remained fairly constant in the historic era (despite changes in party control) but has increased considerably during the modern era.[32]

[32] It should be noted that I find presidential polarization even after correcting for extremism in the ideal point estimates of Presidents Clinton and G.W. Bush reported by Treier (2010).

It may be the case that dividing the historic and modern era of the presidency at different points in time would improve the fit of the statistical models. For example, if one divided pre and post-Civil War presidents, the modern trend appears more pronounced.[33] My division of the historic and modern eras is based on political history rather than statistical convenience. I contend that the key developments in the presidency for the purposes of explaining changes in presidential behavior occurred in the late 1800s when President Cleveland took control of the Democratic Party in order to re-take the White House. This is an important development because it fundamentally altered what was required to become president and win re-election. It appears that the modern requirement that presidents lead their parties has caused presidents to lead their respective parties further and further away from one another.

Discussion

How does this contribute to our understanding of polarization? If we are concerned about polarization, these results are troubling. The presidency appears to be polarizing, even faster than Congress.[34] The polarization of the presidency has major implications for the legislative process. When the president's ideal point is extreme relative to members of

[33] If we use the Civil War as the dividing line and Lincoln, rather than Cleveland, as the first president in modern series, the slope of the trend line increases by roughly 25% (from 0.009 to 0.011) and the R^2 statistic increases from 0.448 to 0.463. As suggested in text, our theory of presidential behavior, which is rooted in modern electoral conditions, should not be altered to fit the data. Maximizing model fit statistics is not our goal.

[34] It is interesting to note here that the presidency appears to be polarizing even though the additional data points used to estimate presidential ideal points for this analysis moderated the estimates of contemporary presidents' ideal points (see Chapter Four, esp. Figure 4.1). As Treier (2010) previously reported, Clinton and G.W. Bush are less ideologically extreme when one considers more than their legislative requests, but they are nonetheless part of a trend toward ideologically extreme presidents. The estimates of presidential polarization would be been overstated if we had only analyzed request votes.

Congress, he is more likely to veto bills passed by Congress. Because the coalition required to override a presidential veto is larger than the simple majority needed to pass most legislation, the probability of legislative gridlock increases.

To illustrate, consider the president's ideal point location relative to Congress as a whole and relative to members of the president's party in Congress. On average, each successive president moves past 0.7% of members of Congress and 1.5% of members of his own party toward the ideological periphery and presidents are leapfrogging members of Congress even faster in the modern era. While a number of presidents' ideal points have not been within one standard deviation of their party's mean ideal point, it is interesting to note that until the modern era, most party-outlier presidents held substantially more moderate views than members of their parties (e.g. McKinkley, Arthus, Hayes, A. Johnson) and some early presidents were more in line with members of the opposing party than their own parties (e.g. Tyler and Taylor). In contrast, some modern presidents have held views substantially further from the opposing party than members of their own party (e.g. Nixon, Ford, Reagan). The general trend holds for both Democrat and Republican presidents, despite the relatively low number of observations available for analysis. If executive-legislative gridlock were simply a matter of divided government, we would not see presidents becoming more extreme relative to members of their own party.

Congressional scholars frequently compare the level of polarization in Congress today to that of the late 1800s. While the distance between Democrats and Republican in Congress today is comparable to the inter-party distance during the Gilded Age, this research suggests these two periods of government are not as comparable as they seem. Although the distance between parties in Congress was significant in the late 1800s, the presidents of this era were relatively moderate, occupying ideological ground between the two parties. Accordingly, Gilded Age presidents potentially moderated federal policy. Since that time, presidents have trended toward ideological extremes faster than members of

Congress have. Although President Obama appears to be more moderate than the average Democrat in Congress during his administration, he is an exception to the rule that modern presidents are more ideologically extreme than are members of their party in Congress. Dwight Eisenhower is the only other president since Warren Harding occupied the White House to be more moderate than his fellow partisans in Congress. Modern presidents do not serve as a moderating force between highly polarized parties in Congress.

This research overcomes some of the limitations of prior analyses of presidential polarization. As detailed in Chapters 2 and 3, I have substantially enriched the data used to estimate presidential ideal points which yields more reliable estimates of modern presidential preferences and fills numerous gaps in the historical record. Accordingly, this analysis of presidential polarization is based on a data sample that is both more extensive and reliable than that used in prior research. Nevertheless, there are several limitations to this research which should be noted.

First, there may be an issue using the presidential index (index = 1 ... 44) as the measure of preference trends because the distance in years between successive administrations is not uniform. Some presidents did not serve full terms while others served two or more terms. Substituting years of service in place of the index as measure of trends does not substantially change the analysis, although it moderates the trajectory of presidential polarization in the modern era (the distance in years between administrations is greater on average than the intervals between administrations in the historic era).

Second, there are alternative measures of congressional polarization. For instance, rather than measure congressional polarization in terms of average absolute values (as operationalized above to produce Table 6.1), one could measure polarization as the distance between major parties in Congress. How do other measures of congressional polarization affect this analysis? If one substitutes distance between parties in place of average absolute values in the regression analysis reported above, one obtains the same general results with slightly lower model fit. This is just one alternative specification of elite-level polarization,

but the various measures of polarization in Congress are likely to be highly correlated as they attempt to measure the same phenomenon. The partial effect of elite-level polarization may be significant using other metrics, but it a control variable in this analysis, not the focus of this Chapter. Accordingly, I do not place too much weight on my finding that the correlation between congressional and presidential polarization is limited to the two-dimensional models.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I used my estimates of presidential ideal points to answer three questions about presidential polarization. Are presidential preferences become more extreme over time? If so, does presidential polarization simply reflect congressional polarization? Finally, is presidential polarization a time-bound phenomena, confined to the modern era of the presidency? Despite the relatively small number of observations available for this kind of study, the data suggest the answers to these questions are yes, no, and yes. Presidential preferences are gravitating away from the political center. This trend is not fully explained by congressional polarization and is confined to the modern era of the presidency.

One question logically follows the foregoing analysis: Why have presidential preferences become more extreme over time? The literature on congressional polarization identifies a number of causes for the growing divide between Democrats and Republicans, but the analysis in this chapter indicates that congressional polarization does not fully explain presidential polarization. The late 1800s, for example, are a period of significant polarization in Congress, but featured relatively moderate chief executives. There must be some different mechanisms reshaping the presidency than those reshaping Congress. In the next Chapter, I consider the link between legislative and presidential preferences by studying a very select group of individuals: twenty-three men who compiled legislative

records as members of Congress and as presidents. By analyzing these rare cases, we obtain some insight into the unique causes of presidential polarization.

Chapter 7

IDEOLOGICAL MOVEMENT FROM CAPITOL TO WHITE HOUSE

Every president faces a fundamental leadership dilemma. On the one hand, the president is the only official elected by the nation as a whole and the president is uniquely charged with representing the entire country. On the other hand, the president is his party's leader and relies on his party's support and confidence. When the goals and interests of these two groups come into conflict, which side does the president take? Does the president act on behalf of the nation as a whole (including a significant share of the population who voted against him) or does he represent his party?

These questions give rise to a substantial debate. Some aspects of this debate will be explored below, but I would like to start this analysis of presidential representation with a relatively uncontroversial observation: The Framers designed Article II of the U.S. Constitution to insulate the president from the influence of factions and expected the president to serve the entire nation. "The framers envisioned the president as a statesmanlike figure who would detest, or at least be largely indifferent to, the trappings of majoritarian politics" (Nzelibe, 2005, p. 1224) This original vision of the presidency did not rely upon individual largess, but rather attempted to impose constraints on whoever came to occupy the office through institutional design. According to Hamilton's *Federalist Paper No. 77*, the structures and powers of the executive department protect the public from abuses through regular elections, provisions for impeachment, and the checks and balances of other branches of government. Additionally, as discussed in Chapter Two, the Framers viewed the Electoral College as a means of distinguishing true statesmen from popular demagogues. In this chapter, I use my measures of presidential ideal points to assess how

well the Framers' institutional design has worked. Does the design of the presidency curb the tendency of ambitious individuals to align themselves with factions?

Does the President Represent the Entire Country?

Whether the president represents the nation as a whole or advances more narrow partisan interests is a fundamental question about American politics. As noted above, the Framers designed the executive branch to lift the president above political factions. The president would not be chosen by Congress, but rather an electoral college.

Sitting presidents have frequently summoned this original constitutional spirit in defense of controversial decisions. Presidents generally claim to represent the nation as a whole, rather than advance narrow partisan interests. This is a politically appealing image. "Most citizens abhor partisanship and prefer that the president be responsive to the broader public will, rather than simply those responsible for their election" (Wood, 2009, p. 15). Accordingly, candidates frequently promise unity on the campaign trail. Do these claims reflect political reality or ring hollow? Although presidential representation raises important normative issues, we can approach it as an empirical question. Specifically, we can ask whether those elected president moderate their views after they take the oath of office.

According to one school of thought, the executive branch is structured so that the president moderates his ideological preferences. The office constrains the president's opportunities to express extreme preferences. According to (now) Supreme Court Justice Elana Kagan (2000, p. 2335), "[B]ecause the President has a national constituency, he is likely to consider, in setting the direction of administrative policy on an ongoing basis, the preferences of the general public, rather than merely parochial interests." "Elected by a

nationwide constituency," Bond and Smith (2008, p. 461) similarly observe, "the president tends to see issues from a national perspective."[35]

In addition to electoral incentives, the institution of the presidency may impose multiple constraints on the president, particularly with respect to legislative affairs. King and Ragsdale (1988, p. 16) maintain that we should think of the presidency as a plural executive: "[T]he president is only one participant in the presidency." The executive branch is a complex organization. The president gives up some degree of autonomy and control to gain influence and expertise. A lot of executive initiatives are written by professional bureaucrats, not the president or his inner circle.

In contrast, another group of scholars view the president as a partisan force. Rather than adapt his behavior to suit national preferences, the president may use the national stage to influence mass opinion (Nzelibe, 2005). In his recent book, *The Myth of Presidential Representation*, Wood (2009) analyzes the relationship between the president's public statements and public opinion. According to Wood, the president does not adapt his message to the public; instead, the president attempts to shift public opinion in support of his policies. Based on his analysis, Wood rejects the centrist model of representation that emphasizes moderation and concludes that the data support a partisan model of presidential representation.

Although Wood compares the president's views to public opinion rather than his prior legislative experience, the partisan model of presidential representation suggests the president will use the office to amplify his partisan preferences. While members of Congress may be held in line by party whips, there is no constraining leadership structure above the

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[35] Cronin and Genovese (1998, p. 198) emphasize presidential moderation: "Once in office, presidents often bend over backwards in an attempt to minimize the partisan appearance of their actions."

president. Moreover, a second-term president does not have an electoral incentive to moderate his views, but may instead focus on leaving his stamp on the country.

There are some reasons to expect a member of Congress to moderate his views while serving as president and a number of reasons to believe his ideological preferences may become more intense. There are also some reasons to believe these countervailing tendencies may cancel each other out. The office may not change the man. The president is likely to have strongly held beliefs and resist ideological change. The roll call voting records of members of the House of Representatives who graduated to the U.S. Senate are informative on this point. One might suspect they would moderate their policy preferences somewhat because Senators represent a diverse state rather than a homogenous district. But legislative voting records do not bear this out. "Contemporary members of Congress," Poole and Rosenthal (2007, p. 97) found, "do not adapt their positions during their careers but simply enter and maintain a fixed position until they die, retire, or are defeated in their ideological boots."

It is important to know whether the presidency is likely to moderate, amplify, or not affect the ideological positions of someone seeking the office. It is an important question to voters who want to know how a candidate will act in office. Candidates often claim they will think broadly and work with members of the opposite party, but are these empty promises? Is a candidate's record in Congress a reliable indicator of how he or she will act as president?

To the extent that we are troubled by presidential partisanship, particularly its violence to the original vision of constitutional government, it is vital to properly diagnose the source of the problem. Is it a personnel problem or an organizational problem? Recently, Orentlicher (2013) made the case for a two-person, bipartisan presidency. Orentlicher identifies a problem with hyper-partisan presidential representation and proposes institutional reform, but it is not clear that the institution is defective.

I have several criticisms of prior works. First, I think we need to be clear whether we are asking a question about individual actors or the institution. Second, we need to operationalize the terms of the debate clearly to test hypotheses in a rigorous manner and avoid relying on anecdotal evidence. Third, we need to maximize the number of observations under analysis.

Whether the institution moderates individual behavior is distinct from asking whether presidents are moderate. It is possible that the president is not moderate compared to median member of Congress or typical voter, but is more moderate as president than he was as a member of Congress. It could be that we are nominating and electing the wrong candidates or there may be something wrong with the institution. Which is it?

Testing Theories of Presidential Representation

To analyze this issue, let y_i represent an individual's ideal point as president and x_i, his ideal point as a member of Congress. The relationship between y and x is estimated using a simple regression model: $y_i = a + bx_i + e_i$.

One school of thought emphasizes the moderating effect of the office. If the presidency moderates the office holder's expressed preferences, we would expect the slope coefficient, b, to be less than one; in other words, we would expect liberal members of Congress to become somewhat less liberal and conservative members, somewhat less conservative, in the White House. Another school of thought suggests presidents champion partisan causes. If the presidency accentuates or amplified the ideological preferences of the office holder, we would expect b to be greater than 1. If the institution does not affect individual preferences, the estimated slope coefficient would be indistinguishable from 1. For sake of completeness, it may be noted that no model predicts a negative slope coefficient; no extant theory leads one to believe that a member of Congress will invert his preferences after becoming president. The competing hypothesis about presidential representation are depicted in Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1. Hypotheses about Ideological Change



The moderation hypothesis generates the expectation that the slope, b, will be less than 1; in contrast, the amplification hypothesis gives rise to the expectation that the slope will be greater than 1. Under the null hypothesis, the office of the presidency does not affect the ideal point of its occupant; the slope coefficient equals 1.

Although the sample size is limited, it is important to consider whether expectations about presidential representation vary over time. Perhaps moderation describes one era of presidential representation while amplification explains another. As I discussed in Chapter Two, the survival instinct is a most powerful influence on behavior. Accordingly, we might expect dramatic changes in the means of attaining and retaining the office of president to significantly affect presidential representation. As discussed, the political environment changed dramatically at the end of the nineteenth century, compelling would-be presidents to assume the mantle of party leadership. Some have argued that Grover Cleveland was the first president to serve as leader of his party (Klinghard, 2005). Perhaps these changes have eviscerated the Framers' design for a party-less chief executive. These changes would

lead one to expect greater presidential partisanship in the modern era compared to the historic era.

The executive branch has also grown over time. It has greatly expanded to fight wars and respond to economic crises (G. King & Ragsdale, 1988; Ragsdale & Theis III, 1997). To the extent that institutionalization imposes a constraint on the president, we might expect the modern president to moderate the legislative record of modern presidents while their historic predecessors enjoyed greater latitude to indulge their personal preferences. These competing theories of presidential representation present us with an intriguing puzzle.

Data and Methods

I am able to estimate the ideal points of twenty-three individuals who served as both president and member of Congress.[36] Although this is a relatively small sample, it includes slightly more than half of U.S. presidents and covers a long time period.

I focus on the first dimension estimates of these individuals' ideal points. Focusing on first dimension estimates gives us a sense of whether the constraints of the office pulled its occupant away from the partisan extremes. Following my primary results, I analyze and discuss ideological movement from Congress to the White House in two dimensions.

Given the small sample size, the opportunity to add other explanatory variables is limited. As discussed above, however, it is important to consider whether the effect of the institution on presidential behavior is time bound. If this relationship changes over time, the slope coefficient might be less than 1 during the historic era and greater than 1 during the modern era. We can evaluate this consideration by interacting the individuals'

[36] Interestingly, John Quincy Adams represented Massachusetts in the Senate before becoming president and represented his home state again the House of Representatives after his presidency. He is the only president to serve in Congress after his presidency and his congressional ideal point is calculated from both his Senate and House service.

preferences as member of Congress with a time-period indicator. If the effect of the presidency on preferences varies between time periods, the slope coefficients will be significantly different in the modern and historic periods.

What about the other twenty presidents? Presidents William Harrison and James Garfield, as discussed, served in Congress before being elected, but neither compiled sufficient legislative records in the White House to estimate their ideal points as president. Our first three presidents served in the Continental Congress rather than U.S. Congress. What about the other fifteen presidents? Six held no prior elective office: Taylor, Grant, Arthur, Taft, Eisenhower, and Hoover. Cleveland, T. Roosevelt, Wilson, Coolidge, F. Roosevelt, Carter, Reagan, Clinton, G.W. Bush were governors.

Results

Figure 7.2, below, plots the observations, comparing first-dimension ideal point estimates as members of Congress to first-dimension scores as president. Fifteen cases support the moderation hypothesis. Seven cases support the amplification hypothesis; one case (Van Buren) is not expected by any existing theory of presidential representation.

Figure 7.2. Ideal Points as President and Member of Congress



I employ an ordinary least squares regression model to further evaluate the data. Model 1 estimates the relationship between first dimension scores as member of Congress and as president; Model 2 does the same with the addition of a modern president indicator interacted with preferences as members of Congress.

The results of this analysis are reported in Table 7.1. The estimated slope coefficient in Model 1 is significantly less than 1. Although the Model 1 intercept gives the impression that members of Congress (regardless of ideology) become slightly more conservative as presidents, the intercept term is not statistically different than zero.

Table 7.1. Relationship Between Ideal Point as Member of Congress and as President

	Model 1	Model 2
Ideal Point as MC	0.598***	0.377***
	(0.123)	(0.142)
Modern Presidents x Ideal Point as MC		0.598*
		(0.235)
Modern Presidents		0.014
		(0.084)
Intercept	0.027	0.003
	(0.043)	(0.054)
N	23	23
R-Squared	0.531	0.650
F-Statistic	23.76	11.77
P-Value for F	<0.0001	<0.0001

* = p < 0.05 *** = p < 0.001
Note: Slope coefficients tested in relation to 1 (not 0).

Although the sample size is limited, let us evaluate the possibility that the moderation and amplification hypothesis might both find support, just in different time periods. Model 2 indicates that the preferences of historic era presidents were significantly moderated (b = 0.377) but the preferences of modern era presidents roughly correspond to their preferences as members of Congress (b = 0.377 + 0.598 = 0.975, not significantly different than b = 1). The institutional design of the modern presidency does not appear to moderate the behavior of those holding the office. There is no evidence of amplified preferences in any statistical model.

Figure 7.3 below plots the estimated regression lines (based on Model 2) and actual observations for the historic and modern eras of the presidency. Despite the small sample size, the Figure bears out a dramatic change in the nature of presidential representation.

Figure 7.3. Comparing Model Results for Historic Era and Modern Presidents



During the historic era, the office of the president appears to have functioned in the manner intended by the Framers of the U.S. Constitution. The members of Congress who became president during this time period often expressed relatively extreme points of view while serving in the House or Senate, but they significantly moderated their preferences while serving as president. During the modern era, however, these results suggest a dramatic change in presidential representation. The evidence suggests modern presidents do not moderate their political preferences upon taking the presidential oath. Rather, modern presidents act in manner consistent with the partisan preferences they expressed as members of Congress.

It is also worth noting that the ideal points of members during the historic era were not less diverse than they have been during the modern era of the presidency. While members with relatively extreme preferences have been elected president throughout American history, during the modern era, they have not moderated their views while serving as president. In other words, the individuals holding office have not become more extreme, the office has lost its capacity to moderate its occupant's behavior.

Discussion

The data analyzed here suggest that theories of presidential representation are time bound. The view that the presidency moderates preferences appears to fit the historic era; legislators who became president before the late 1800s exhibited a tendency to significantly moderate their legislative records while serving as the nation's chief executive. During the modern era, however, the ideological preferences of members of Congress do not change after inauguration.

These results suggest the presidency has the capacity to moderate individual preferences and did so for approximately one century, consistent with the Framers' design for the executive branch. In the modern era, however, the institution appears to have lost its capacity to moderate individual preferences. As noted above, the legislators who became president in the historic era are really no less extreme than those who have become president in the modern era. To the extent that partisan presidential representation is problematic, the problem arises at an institutional level. Historic presidents were no more attuned to national interests by nature than are modern presidents. To blame individual presidents for an institutional problem may be misguided and unlikely to restore the style of leadership originally envisioned by the Framers.

Several limitations to this analysis should be noted. Only twenty-five men have ever served in both Congress and the Oval Office and two of these men (W. Harrison and Garfield) cannot be analyzed here. The votes and legislative decisions that constitute the raw data for these ideal point estimates span four different centuries. Obviously, the issues of the day have changed dramatically as have our means of acquiring political information and making political decisions.

Given the limited sample size, the prospects for adding observations to this analysis deserve mention. What about presidents who served in the Continental Congress? Extensions of this work could incorporate the nation's first three presidents into the analysis.

Washington, Adams, and Jefferson all served in the Continental Congress (subsequently renamed the Congress of the Confederation) which produced a roll call voting record (Lord, 1984). If one assumes that delegates to Continental Congress who subsequently served in the U.S. Congress maintained fixed ideal points and bridge institutions, one could estimate ideal points for the first three presidents as legislators.[37] Obviously, one could not proceed with the assumption that these presidents maintained fixed ideal points under both governments because that is the proposition to be tested. On the one hand, it would be useful to add three observations to this analysis. On the other hand, the Continental Congress and the U.S. Presidency are not simply different branches of government, they are entirely different governments.[38]

What about presidents who served as governors? It may be possible to analyze ideological change moving from a Governor's Mansion to the White House. Shor and McCarty (2011) have mapped ideal points of state legislators. Although they did not estimate the ideal points of governors, it might be possible to do so. This would add a handful of observations.

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[37] Washington served in the Continental Congress on behalf of Virginia prior to his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army. Washington's service predates the time period covered by Lord (1984) and his roll call votes in the Continental Congress are not recorded. The dataset includes 34 votes by John Adams and 76 votes by Thomas Jefferson. Accordingly, scaling the ideal points of these future presidents from their roll call records in the Continental is statistically possible (Aldrich, Jillson, & Wilson, 2002; Dougherty & Moeller, 2012).

[38] It is not clear, for example, that the vote of a delegate to the Continental Congress had the same effect as the vote of a Senator or Representative. The Continental Congress used a state-unit voting system in which the state's vote was determined by a majority vote of that state's delegates. But see Dougherty and Moeller (2012) (joint scaling of Continental Congress and U.S. Congress).

Additionally, there are more historic era observations in the dataset than modern era observations. Although service in Congress remains a common path to the presidency, modern chief executives have increasingly emerged from governor's offices. This trend generally coincides with the presidency's apparent decline as a moderating force, but it probably does not account for the difference between the historic and modern eras shown above. The governors missing from this analysis were not moderate presidents. F. Roosevelt (-0.406) and Carter (-0.491) rank among the nation's most liberal presidents and Coolidge (0.531), Reagan (0.549), and G.W. Bush (0.564) have been ranked as three of its most conservative. While it is conceivable that these presidents were even more liberal or conservative as governors than they were in the White House, the available qualitative evidence suggests otherwise. Given these y values, there are no plausible x values that would lead one to find no difference between modern presidents and the historic era.

Referring again to Figure 7.2, one observes that James Monroe appears on the far left as a member of Congress (a staunch Jeffersonian Republican) but near-center as president. While Monroe offers a valid observation of legislator-turned-president, one wonders if his extreme example of presidential moderation drives the statistical results reported here. If Monroe is omitted from the regression analysis, the signs and significance of the regression coefficients do not change. Moderation is still evident overall and in the historic era but not among modern presidents. As one might expect, the slope values change if Monroe is omitted; the slope coefficient in Model 1 changes from 0.598 to 0.684, the slope coefficient in Model 2 (not interacted) changes from 0.377 to 0.470. Although his singular example is influential, the analysis does not turn on one case.

As an additional check on the robustness of the statistical model, I analyzed whether ideological moderation in the historic era or lack thereof in the modern era reflected changes in the ideological direction of the country as a whole rather than any factors unique to the presidency. The prevailing mood while the president served as senator or representative

may change when he becomes president. The test this possibility, I calculated the direction and magnitude of change in the mean ideal point in Congress from the time of the individual's service in Congress to his terms as president. For J.Q. Adams, I consider only his terms in Congress before becoming president. This variable was not significant as an additional variable in models 1 or 2 reported in Table 7.1.[39]

I also considered the analysis in terms of distance from the origin in two-dimensional space with the second dimension weighted to reflect its relative significance (see Chapter Four for details on weighting second dimension). Perhaps becoming president moderates the legislator's political attachment to a particular region or on other cross-cutting issues. If so, we might observe moderation along a secondary, rather than primary dimension of the spatial model. The results are indeterminate in two-dimensions and do not clarify the one-dimension results. Figure 7.4(a) displays the relationship between diagonal distance to origin as member of Congress and diagonal distance as president. Because diagonal distances cannot take negative values, the plot area is limited to positive x and y values. Figure 7.4(b) shows the correspondence of second-dimension measurements for the individuals who served as members of Congress and as president.

[39] I evaluate the effect of ideological movement in one-dimension by creating a variable equal to the mean ideal point of members of Congress while the individual was president minus the mean ideal point of members while the individual served in Congress. This variable is not significant as an additional explanatory variable in Model 1 (p=0.32) or Model 1 (p=0.79) reported in Table 7.1.

Figure 7.4. Movement as Diagonal Distance, Second Dimension



When ideological distance is measured as the diagonal distance to the origin, we observe more cases of moderation than amplification (14 compared to 9), but the correlation between ideological distance as member and as president is not statistically significant. Two-dimensional analysis may be problematic given the variation in the subject matter content of the second dimension between the time these individuals served in Congress and served as president. Some presidents (e.g. Monroe, J.Q. Adams, Tyler) reverse signs in second dimension (all had negative second dimension scores as members of Congress and positive second dimension scores as president). In Figure 7.4(b) we observe a number of cases that are not explained by any theory of presidential representation; these cases are relatively far from the cluster of observations near the origin and therefore weigh heavily on statistical analysis.

Conclusion

This Chapter uses the estimated ideal points of U.S. Presidents to answer a fundamental question about the presidency as an institution: Does the presidency moderate the political preferences of the president so that he represents the nation as a whole?

I answer this question by comparing the ideal points of a select group of politicians who compiled voting records in Congress and legislative records in the White House. If the presidency is a moderating institution, their expressed preferences will be less extreme during their presidencies than they were during their terms in Congress. The results depend on the era under consideration. During the historic era, the presidency moderated the preferences of the president, but during the modern era, after the president became his party's leader, the presidency no longer moderates the president. In this Chapter, we find still more evidence that the evolution of presidential elections has significantly changed presidential behavior. This Chapter also helps us understand why we are witnessing the polarization of the modern presidency, as reported in Chapter Six. The presidency is no longer restraining presidents from staking extreme ideological positions.

Chapter 8

GEORGE WASHINGTON: THE NATION'S FIRST PARTISAN PRESIDENT?

"Many things which appear of little importance in themselves … at the beginning may have great and durable consequences, from their having been established at the commencement of a new general government."

- George Washington, Letter to John Adams (in Chernow, 2010, p. 575)

Although his formal education paled in comparison to that of other Founding Fathers, George Washington perhaps best understood the power of appearances. Washington assiduously studied fashions and manners. He carefully cultivated his image and his reputation as a gentleman of the highest order, consistently espousing the virtues of self-denial and public virtue (McDonald, 1999; Schwartz, 1987). Throughout Washington's life, appearances created opportunities. As president, Washington understood that the fragile republic viewed him as the symbol of national unity and attempted to inspire confidence in the new government.

The words of other Founding Fathers may receive more acclaim, but Washington's image is unrivaled. Contemporaries saw him as a natural leader; he had a magnetic power that inspired followers (Schwartz, 1987, pp. 18-24). Washington "looked the part" with "an aura … of invincibility" "almost supernatural" (McDonald, 1999, p. 25) During his lifetime, Washington was viewed as a "superstar" "demigod" and "secular icon." Between 1772 and 1798, Washington posed for at least thirty-two portraits by nineteen different artists (Meschutt, 1999). "In the visual arts," Mitnick (1999, p. 55) observed, "Washington was

depicted as both the nation's Moses and the its Christ." Pavell Svinin, a visiting Russian diplomat, would observe in 1811: "The country is glutted with bust portraits of Washington. … It is noteworthy that every American considers it his sacred duty to have a likeness of Washington in his home, just as we have images of God's saints" (in Mitnick, 1999, p. 59).

In this chapter, I question whether the popular image of Washington is historically accurate. Washington appears to transcend mere politics, but a number of critical biographers have argued that Washington really fell into the Federalist camp during his second term as president. I aim to separate fact from fiction. To purpose of this investigation is not to defile a national hero, but rather to better understand the battles he fought as president. I find that the Washington myth contains the seeds of truth: Washington moved in the direction of the Federalists during his second term but remained on the fringes of the Federalist faction. In spatial models of the early Republic, he appears to be neither a Federalist nor a Jeffersonian Republican.

"The Myth that Happens to Have Been True"

It would be a mistake to assume that Washington did not seek power. Indeed, his appetite for property and social position was nearly insatiable. From an early age, Washington understood that because he was not born into wealth, he needed others to increase his status. Throughout his life, he inspired others to enrich his station in life through marriage, military appointments, and political opportunities (Chernow, 2010).[40]

The opportunity to serve as the nation's first president was the ultimate public honor bestowed on Washington. "It would be no exaggeration to say that, but for George Washington, the office of president might well not exist. … Americans of the Revolutionary

[40] Of course, by the end of his first term, Washington's health was in decline and he only reluctantly served a second term as president.

generation, given their fear and distrust of executive authority, would not have been willing to make the presidency part of the Constitution at all had not Washington been available to fill the office" (McDonald, 1974, p. v). It is as if Washington were destined to play this role in the new government. "[W]e are dealing with a myth that happens also to have been true" (McDonald, 1974, p. vii)

Washington's enormous popularity contributed to several generations of scholarship that perpetuated his mythological image. Biographers presented Washington as a paragon of virtue for young men to emulate (e.g. Swiggett, 1953). The conventional wisdom is that Washington saw factionalism as a threat to national unity and remained above the partisan fray. Despite their battles at the Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates, Federalists and Anti-Federalists were united in their support for Washington. He was the unanimous selection of the Electoral College in 1788 and 1792. Putting the interests of the nation ahead of factions is a consistent theme in his writings and public statements. Rather than take sides between Britain and France and their supporters in the Federalist and Republican ranks,[41] Washington issued the Neutrality Proclamation. Similarly, in his third and final Farewell Address in 1796, Washington issued a warning "in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party."[42]

While Washington's words offer scholars one source of information, it is important to remember that Washington, the most famous and politically powerful man in the country, carefully managed his public persona. Throughout his life, Washington was awarded authority because others trusted him to suppress his selfish interests for the good of the

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[41] A number of terms are used to identify member of Congress during this time period. In this chapter, I use the terms Republican, Democratic-Republican, Jeffersonian, and Jeffersonian-Republican interchangeably. I restrict my usage of the term Anti-Federalist to the time period between the drafting and ratification of the Constitution.

[42] Available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th˙century/washing.asp

country. Above all, Washington wanted other to see him as a noble gentleman. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to think that Washington projected a certain image in his letters and statements as both a psychological defense and campaign for political power. This is not to say that Washington was manipulative or deceiving, but rather that he was sophisticated and understood the value of appearances. It is important to assess his legislative record and not unhesitatingly accept his writings and reputation at face value.

A critical reassessment of the Washington Administration is already underway. A number of scholars (e.g. Chernow, 2010; Hofstadter, 1969; McDonald, 1974) contend that Washington fell into the Federalist camp during his second term and are skeptical of the heroic accounts of the Washington presidency. There are several reasons to believe that Washington changed course during his second term as president.

Jefferson's Resignation

One piece of the puzzle is the composition of Washington's cabinet. To instill confidence in the new government and hear both sides of arguments, Washington drew Cabinet members from both northern and southern states. The Constitution does not specifically mention a Cabinet, but Washington appointed a number of department heads: John Jay to the State Department, Alexander Hamilton to the Treasury Department, Henry Knox to the War Department, Edmund Randolph as Attorney General, and Samuel Osgood as Postmaster General. John Adams served as Washington's Vice President. Thomas Jefferson replaced John Jay as Secretary of State on March 22, 1790.[43]

As members of Washington's cabinet, Jefferson and Hamilton frequently clashed over the direction of foreign and domestic policies (Christman, 1992; Meacham, 2012, Chapter 25; Risjord, 1994, Chapter 4). The struggle between Jefferson and Hamilton to influence

[43] Jay served as Secretary of Foreign Affairs (renamed State) from 1784-1789. Jay might be considered a hold-over from the Continental Congress.

the course of the government is evident in letters Washington exchanged with Jefferson and Hamilton. In a letter dated May 23, 1792, Jefferson complained of a "corrupt squadron" that aimed "to prepare the way for a change, from the present republican form of government, to that of a monarchy" (in Cunningham, 2000, p. 79).

In his letters, Washington urges moderation and compromise. "I would fain hope," Washington wrote Hamilton on August 26, 1792, "that liberal allowances will be made for the political opinions of one another; and instead of those wounding suspicions and irritating charges … there might be mutual forbearances and temporizing yieldings on all sides" (in Christman, 1992, p. 22).

Jefferson had planned to retire at the end of Washington's first term, but stayed in office until the end of 1793 in order to deliver a massive report on commerce to Congress. Jefferson left Philadelphia and returned to his plantation in Virginia. Jefferson biographers offer mixed accounts of Jefferson's resignation. Some have presented his resignation as a "tactical retreat to see whether the larger war could be won" (Meacham, 2012, p. 276). Others emphasize the miserable conditions in Philadelphia, suffering from the "worst yellow fever epidemic in American history," and Jefferson's longing for his idyllic plantation life (Randall, 1994, p. 517; Risjord, 1994, p. 94).

Although Washington praised Jefferson's public service, "privately he felt that Jefferson had betrayed him by resigning" (Chernow, 2010, p. 712). Washington maintained a cordial relationship with Jefferson, but their correspondence turned to their shared interest in planting and declined precipitously (see Table 8.1, below). In 1794, George Washington appointed Edmund Randolph, formerly the Attorney General, to replace Jefferson as Secretary of State. Although Randolph was also a Virginian and accomplished statesman, he did not fill Jefferson's shoes. The carefully balanced Cabinet lost its counterweight to Hamilton just as the Third Congress convened. "Hamilton, without Jefferson around to

interfere and make accusations, rapidly rose in Washington's favor and came to exert far greater influence than ever before. Simultaneously, the president, without Jefferson's strong restraining hand in the Cabinet, became much more of an activist and very nearly became, for all practical purposes, a Hamiltonian Federalist" (McDonald, 1974, p. 139).[44]

The composition of his Cabinet may have played a crucial role in Washington's decision making. Washington was a very deliberate thinker. He relied upon his subordinates to provide expert analysis and methodically weighed competing views on a topic before making a decision.[45] If Jefferson's resignation upset the balance of information supplied to the President, this may have tipped the scales in Washington's decision making process in Hamilton's favor.

Because these men communicated principally through letters, we can obtain a rough idea of their relative influence after Jefferson's resignation by comparing Washington's correspondence with each man. In Table 8.1, I itemize the known correspondence between Hamilton and Washington and between Jefferson and Washington during the time period between Jefferson's resignation and the end of Washington's second term as president.[46]

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[44] Similarly, Chernow (2010, p. 713) writes that Randolph's relative shortcoming "tilted the Cabinet's power balance decisively toward Hamilton, giving a far more Federalist tint to Washington's second term."

[45] Consider Washington's July 29, 1792 letter requesting Hamilton's thoughts on a variety of objections to debt assumption and proposed financial policies. The style of Washington's correspondence is revealing. He does not reveal the source of the objections (Jefferson) nor his personal opinions on the subject matter. Moreover, Washington carefully numbers twenty-one specific issues and asks Hamilton to organize his reply accordingly.

[46] The data on correspondence was compiled from volumes of Catanzariti and Sheridan (1995) and Syrett and Wilson (1969) corresponding to this time frame.

Table 8.1. Washington's Correspondence from Jefferson's Resignation until End of Term

Hamilton-Washington	Jefferson-Washington
1794	1794
Letters from GW: Mar. 4, 18, 21, 22, 31, April 8 (twice), 16, 22, 24 (twice), 27, May 2, 6, 14, 23, 24, 29 (three times), June 7, 10, 11, 16, 30, July 2, 9, 11, 19, Aug. 12, 21, Sept. 3, 27, Oct. 21, 26, 31, Nov. 5, Dec. 24	Letters from GW: Jan. 1, April 24
Letters from AH: Jan. 20, 30, Feb. 10, 12, 28, Mar. 8, 18, 21, 24, 28, April 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19 (twice), 21, 23 (three times), 25 (three times), 26, 28, 29, 30 (twice), May 1, 3 (twice), 5 (twice), 9, 12, 15, 27 (twice), June 4 (twice), 9, 10, 11 (three times), 14, 16, 22, 24, July 8, 10, 11, 13, 23, Aug. 2, 5 (twice), 6, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21 (twice), 27, undated, Sept. 2, 4, 10, 19, 24, 29, Oct. 23, 25, 26, 29, 31, Nov. 3, 8, 11, 15, 17, 19, Dec. 1, 2 (three times), 5, 19, 23 (twice), undated.	Letters from Jefferson: May 14
1795	1795
Letters from GW: Jan. 14, 20, 26, 30 (twice), **AH Resigns 1/31/1795**, Feb. 1, 2, April 21, July 3, 7, 13, 14, 29, Aug. 3, 31, Oct. 29 (twice), Nov. 10, 16, 18, 23, 28 (twice), Dec. 22	Letters from GW: Mar. 15, 30, Oct. 4
Letters from AH: Jan. 12, 14, 20 (twice), 21 (four times), 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31 (four times), Feb. 2, 3, 4, 12, 15, 24, July 7, 13 (three times), 14, 20, 29, Sept. 4, Oct. 16, 26, Nov. 5, 19, 26, Dec. 24, 27	Letters from Jefferson: Feb. 23, Sept. 12
1796	1796
Letters from GW: Feb. 13, Mar. 22, 31, May 8, 15, 29, June 26, Aug. 10, 25, Sept. 1, 6 (twice), Nov. 2, 3, 11, 12, 21	Letters from GW: July 6, Aug. 28
Letters from AH: Jan. 19, Mar. 7, 24, 26, 28, 29, April 2, 8, 9, May 5, 10, 20, June 1, 16, July 5, 30, Aug. 10, Sept. 4, 5, 6, Nov. 4, 5, 10, 11, 19	Letters from Jefferson: June 19
1797	1797
Letters from GW: Jan. 22, **GW second term ends 3/4/1797**	None
Letters from AH: Jan. 25, 31	

Table 8.1 bears out that Washington corresponded far more frequently with Hamilton than he did with Jefferson following Jefferson's resignation and return to Virginia. During this critical time period, there are Hamilton and Washington exchange twenty-three

letters for every one letter between Washington and Jefferson. Hamilton remained in close contact with Washington, even after Hamilton officially resigned his Cabinet post. Rather than stay in contact with Washington, Jefferson corresponded far more frequently with his fellow Republicans, particularly James Madison. Moreover, Washington wrote letters to Hamilton more often than he did to Jefferson during this time period (a 12:1 ratio). The Washington-Jefferson correspondence during this time is polite and more concerned with farming than national affairs. If Washington made policy decisions by weighing information provided to him by his trusted associates, during Washington's second term that process heavily favored Hamilton's Federalist views.

Contemporary students of the American president may find it difficult to believe the resignation of a single cabinet member could fundamentally alter the trajectory of an entire presidential administration. At this time, however, the executive branch was much smaller and there were few, if any, standard operating procedures to ensure policy continuity despite turnover. This was an experimental period of American government with success far from guaranteed. Washington was compelled to "create the office as he went along" (Gregg & Spalding, 1999, p. 16). When Washington took office, there was not a permanent seat of government nor provisions for the president's household. The federal government more closely resembled a start-up company meeting in a dormitory than the awesome force now installed in Washington, DC. As mentioned, there were only four department heads. During the summer of 1793, Philadelphia, the nation's temporary capital, was decimated by a yellow fever epidemic and the government reassembled in Germantown, Pennsylvania. Thomas Jefferson, the nation's Secretary of State, slept "a bed in the corner of a public room in a tavern" (Randall, 1994, p. 517).[47]

[47] Try to picture Secretary of State John Kerry (net worth $200 million) bunking in a tavern!

A cabinet position in the Washington Administration was not a particularly prestigious job. After Jefferson (and later Hamilton) resigned, even the charismatic president had a difficult time attracting qualified men to serve in his administration (Chernow, 2010, p. 713; Staloff, 2005, p. 205).

Changes in Legislative Agenda

Before Jefferson and Hamilton resigned from Washington's Cabinet, they brokered one of the grandest compromises in American political history. At a dinner party hosted by Jefferson in 1790, Hamilton, Representative James Madison, and their host are thought to have reached an agreement to resolve two of the most pressing issues facing the new government: locating the capital and financing Revolutionary War debts. These two issues, locating the capital and financing debt, crippled the Continental Congress and threatened the viability of the new Republic. Democratic assemblies struggle to resolve these kinds of issues because they present classic social choice problems. A democratic assembly has a difficult time locating a capital (which is a financial boon to a particular area) because some alternative location on the map is always closer to another majority. These issues precipitate chaotic voting with endlessly shifting coalitions.[48] We can think financing debt as a divide-the-dollar game. Dividing dollars by majority vote is problematic because every proposal that garners majority support can be defeated by another proposal that sweetens the deal for some legislator in the minority. When these types of issue dominate the legislative agenda, as they did in the Continental Congress and the First Congress, legislators' ideal points will appear dispersed along multiple dimensions and the assembly

[48] For proof for this proposition, see McKelvey (1976). Deciding where to locate the national capital is different than a firm deciding where to locate along a street, which is modelled as a single straight line by (Hotelling, 1929), because the possible capital locations did not fall along a straight line.

will appear party-less and disorganized (Aldrich, 1995; Aldrich & Grant, 1993; Aldrich et al., 2002; Hoadley, 1980).

The compromise reached at Jefferson's famous dinner party resolved the issues most likely to internally divide the Federalists and Republicans by region, debt status, and industry. Having struck this deal, members of Congress could then confront what Aldrich (1995, p. 72) called the "great principle," defining how "powerful and positive the new federal government was to be." In contrast to locating the capital or allocating responsibility for state debts, the great principle sorted members of Congress along a single dimension. Accordingly, beginning in the Second Congress and accelerating during Washington's second term, legislators' ideal points begin to coalesce into well-defined policy spaces. This development had important implications for President Washington. As the policy space forms along a primary dimension, it becomes increasingly difficult for the President to remain "above the fray." As crossing cutting issues are resolved, the relevant policy space collapses, leaving no viable positions above (or below) the partisan divide. The President, then, has to take sides because no position puts him in agreement with substantial numbers of both factions.

Rise of Political Opposition

The changes that occurred within Washington's Cabinet and in Congress, discussed above, were not the only significant developments during the first president's administration. The political scene in and around Philadelphia also changed dramatically. The political environment was decidedly most hostile and partisan during Washington's second term than it was in his first term. The events discussed in this section may have compelled Washington to retreat into the Federalist fold (Hofstadter, 1969, pp. 89-90).

As the patriotic feelings that attended Washington's inauguration and goodwill tour of New England faded, social and economic divisions within the new nation became increasingly apparent. Washington helped topple a king but how far would the nation go to level the old social order? Just as Jefferson feared a "corrupt squadron" would usher in the return of monarchy in the British tradition, Hamilton and other Federalists feared the nation's fragile bonds would be torn apart by angry mobs. These fears appeared justified by the course of the French Revolution. As Washington prepared to start his second term, French King Louis XVI was beheaded before cheering masses in the streets of Paris. The French Revolution did not establish a constitutional democracy, but rather ushered in a Reign of Terror. Jefferson was repeatedly attacked in the newspapers as a Jacobin, fanning fears of lawlessness and social revolt.

In the summer of 1794, citizens in Western Pennsylvania rebelled against the national government's attempt to collect tax on distilled spirits. The tax, part of Hamilton's financial plan, fell particularly hard on small farmers who distilled whiskey. At its peak, thousands of middle and lower class Pennsylvanians participated in the Whiskey Rebellion. Some organizers called for mobs to loot the wealthy in Pittsburgh; some urged the mobs to follow the French example and wheel in the guillotines to mete out justice in the streets of America.

The Rebellion was snuffed out by a federal militia without significant violence, but it provoked Washington to attack his political opponents. Washington attributed this attempted insurrection to nascent Democratic-Republican societies (McDonald, 1974, p. 147). To Washington, such cavalier displays of opposition to the government were unfathomable. According to (Hofstadter, 1969, p. 91), Washington was "bitterly disappointed at the early show of sharp opposition, and in good time, without giving up his conception of himself as a man above party, he became a strong partisan of the views of the Hamiltonian Federalists. So far as he was concerned, the onus for strife … was in the end placed entirely upon the opposition."

During Washington's first term, political divisions were exposed in Cabinet meetings and played out in correspondence with the President. In Washington's second term, these debates were featured in highly partisan newspapers. The *National Gazette* espoused Republican views while the *Gazette of the United States* carried the Federalist banner. For the first time in his life, Washington faced direct and public criticism (Chernow, 2010, p. 665). In particular, these papers sensationalized the controversy over the Jay Treaty with Britain. "For George Washington, American politics had become a strange and disorienting new world" (Chernow, 2010, p. 699)

The changing political climate took a toll on Washington. Visitors frequently commented that he appeared worn out and lifeless during his second term. His health was in steep decline. When Washington took office, his rotting gums held only one natural tooth. Dentures, held in place with wires and springs, distorted his face and garbled his speech. Washington did not deliver his second inaugural address and his famous Farewell Address was delivered in writing. He would die only two years after leaving office. Although Washington does not complain of illness in his letters, we might expect poor health to weaken his mental defenses and leave him vulnerable to his insistent Federalist advisors.

Interestingly, Hamilton also resigned from Washington's Cabinet on January 31, 1795, exactly thirteen months after Jefferson resigned (McDonald, 1974, p. 157). The reasons for Hamilton's resignation are not entirely clear. According to Chernow (2005, p. 479), Hamilton made a snap decision to resign following his wife's miscarriage. "The plain truth," however, "was that Hamilton was indebted and needed money badly" (p. 483). Unlike Jefferson, who distanced himself from the Washington Administration following his resignation from the cabinet, Hamilton hardly missed a beat. From his New York law offices, Hamilton became the "chief tactician and organizer" of the Federalists (Chernow, 2005, p. 501). Washington continued to seek Hamilton's expert analysis of foreign and

domestic policies (see Table 8.1). In particular, Washington sought Hamilton's opinion of the controversial Jay Treaty with Britain. Hamilton, in fact, helped fuel the partisan press, authoring a series of letters as "Camillus" in favor of the Jay Treaty.

These dramatic and unexpected events overshadow what may be the most significant change in Washington's second term: the election of new members of Congress. As the result of the nation's first Census in 1790, thirty-six seats were added to the House of Representatives and apportioned largely to rapidly growing Western states. In the 1792 elections, Federalists picked up twelve seats, but the Jeffersonians gained twenty-four seats and outnumbered the Federalists 54 to 51 in the House to start Washington's second term. Federalists maintained a two-seat advantage in the Third Senate. In the 1794 elections, Republicans increased their House majority while Federalists gained seats in the Senate.

This is a period of low institutionalization and rapid turnover in Congress. At this time, Senators were appointed by state legislators. Far from a notion of vested property rights in offices, some states followed a practice of rotation. Relatively few members of Congress served throughout Washington's administration.

Table 8.2. Continuous Congressional Service during Washington Administration

		Also Served in:					
Served in:	**N**	**House 2**	**House 3**	**House 4**	**Senate 2**	**Senate 3**	**Senate 4**
House 1	66	39	26	20	2	5	9
House 2	72	.	45	33	.	3	8
House 3	110	.	.	66	.	.	7
Senate 1	29	0	1	0	21	12	8
Senate 2	31	.	1	0	.	22	14
Senate 3	33	.	.	1	.	.	23

During Washington's two terms, the turnover rate was roughly 40% in the House and 30% in the Senate. The Senate turn-over rate is particularly striking given that only one-third of Senators would have been up for re-election at any given point in time.

It is important to consider changes in the composition of Congress from Washington's first to second terms because replacement of members may be the primary reasons the preferences of a group, like Republicans or Federalists, change from one term to the next. Studies of subsequent terms of Congress have suggested that group preferences do not change as the result of members changing their preferences, but rather as the result of the electoral process ushering new members into Congress (Poole & Rosenthal, 2000).

Research Hypotheses

We can test competing theories about Washington using spatial models. For the reasons discussed above, some historians claim that Washington moved closer to the Federalists and further from the Republicans during his second term in office. The classic version of Washington's career finds him navigating the divide and warning his fellow patriots to steer clear of political parties.

Distances, of course, are relative. The distance between the president and a group of legislators can increase as a result of either the president or the group moving (or both). The rise of organized opposition during Washington's term suggests that the preferences of Republican members of Congress changed, perhaps at the same time that Washington's preferences evolved. We need to consider the possibility that Washington did not move away from the Jeffersonians, but rather that the Jeffersonians moved away from the president.

Let points R_1 and R_2 represent the location of Republicans and W_1 and W_2, Washington's location, in Washington's first and second terms. Let F1 and F2 represent the Federalists' location during Washington's two terms. Figure 8.1 places these points on a reference line.

Figure 8.1. Model of Preference Change during Washington Administration



The length of segment W_1F_1 represents the distance between Washington and the Federalists during Washington's first term and W_2F_2 the distance during his second term. The length of segment R_1W_1, therefore, represents the distance between Washington and the Republicans in time period 1 and the length of segment R_2W_2, the distance between Washington and the Republicans in time period 2. The historians claim can be stated as the hypothesis that $W_1F_1 > W_2F_2$ (Washington was closer to the Federalists in his second term than he was in his first).[49] Given the rise of an opposition party, we might also consider the possibility that $W_1F_1 = W_2F_2$ but $R_2W_2 > R_1W_1$. Perhaps Republicans perceived

[49] In my discussion of results, I do not evaluate these historical hypotheses applying conventional 90 or 95% confidence interval tests. Here, we are examining claims made in historical biographers rather than claims about medical treatments or public policies where the risks associated with Type I errors are substantial. Washington biographers present two competing theories about his presidency and the purpose of this analysis is to determine which version of events is more likely true.

Washington to move closer to Federalists during this second term because the Republicans moved further away from both Washington and the Federalists.

Data and Methods

I completed a thorough review of Washington's policy decisions and scale Washington's ideal point alongside those of his contemporaries in the House and Senate. As detailed in Chapter Two, I complete Washington's legislative record by identifying his position on congressional roll call votes. I am able to reliably code Washington's position on forty-nine roll call votes during his first term and fifty-two congressional roll call votes during his second term.

To compare Washington to members of Congress, I add President Washington to a roll call record of the first four terms of Congress. Because I am interested in the difference between his first and second terms, Washington appears in two different rows of the dataset. One row includes only his first term decisions; the other row, his second term decisions. During these terms, the House and Senate cast a combined 680 roll call votes (Washington's position is coded for nearly 15% of all roll call votes).

Comparing chambers of Congress over the course of Washington's two terms requires observations that bridge one chamber to the other and one term to the next. As noted above, this is a period of rapid turnover in Congress with relatively few members consistently voting throughout Washington's tenure. Continuing members allow us to compare one term of Congress to the next. Fortunately, a number of representatives also served in the Senate and two Senators subsequently served terms in the House. These members facilitate cross-chamber comparisons (see Table 8.2, above). Washington also

bridges chambers and terms of Congress. In addition to bridging chambers and terms using members, I identify ten occasions where the House and Senate voted on the same measures.[50]

I use the W-NOMINATE scaling routine to estimate legislators' ideal points. This routine varies from the method used to estimate the presidential ideal points reported in Chapter Four in that this analysis is limited to the first four terms of Congress and is not directly comparable to other time periods. I estimate the ideal points of members of Congress as well as points W_1 and W_2 in two dimensions.[51]

I calculate R_1, R_2, F_1, and F_2 as the mean ideal point of members of Congress identified as Republicans and Federalists during Washington's first and second terms as president. I identify the mean of each faction rather than their medians for a number of reasons. The median voter is generally indeterminate in two-dimensions because the median voter can change depending on the cutting line of the vote. Additionally, because neither

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[50] In the First Congress, the House (vote 46) and Senate (vote 30) both voted to indemnify Baron Steuben and to pass the government seat bill (House vote 75, Senate vote 56). In their second terms, both chambers voted to pass a bill raising fund for frontier defense and the Senate's apportionment bill (House votes 54 and 35, Senate votes 20 and 31). In term three, both chambers conducted roll call votes to pass bills increasing military force and duties on carriages (House votes 44 and 43, Senate votes 51 and 54). Finally, in their fourth terms, the House and Senate both voted to pass bills to loan money to the City of Washington, to pay certain debts, to accommodate the president's household, and to prosecute foreign interference with American shipping (House votes 7, 36, 77, and 76, Senate votes 44, 56, 76, and 84).

[51] By fixing the location of Representatives and Senators who served during Washington's first and second terms, I may be underestimating the movement of actors other than Washington from one term to the next. If I were testing the proposition that Washington moved more or less than individual members of Congress it would be necessary to design an experiment to assess individual members' movement (Poole, 2005, pp. 162-173). Here, I am only interested in estimating F_1, F_2, R_1, and R_2. These mean values will vary less than the individual ideal points they summarize. In the text below, I consider the uncertainty of both these estimates as well as my estimates of GW_1 and GW_2.

faction convened as an organized group to control the congressional agenda, the median member of the factions was not in a position of exceptional power. I identify Federalist and Republican members of Congress based on the work of Martis, Rowles, and Pauer (1989).

To measure the distance between Washington, the Republicans, and the Federalists, I calculate the diagonal (Euclidian) distances between ideal points. To avoid overstating the importance of the second dimension, I weight the second dimension distance in this analysis (see Chapter Four for a detailed discussion of weighting dimensions).[52]

Results

Figure 8.2 compares the ideal points of those serving in Washington's first and second terms as president.[53] Point GW_1 in identifies Washington's ideal point in his first term and GW_2, the location of his ideal point in his second term.

[52] In these terms, the second dimension salience weight equals 0.9247142. Cross-cutting issues were a relatively significant component of the legislative agenda, particularly in the First Congress.

[53] Note that the second dimension in this Figure is scaled to reflect its relative importance in this time period.

Figure 8.2. George Washington's First and Second Terms



Early works on the dimensionality of voting and the origins of political parties depicted the First Congress in three dimensions (Hoadley, 1980, Figure 6). Voting in the First Congress has been characterized as "effectively unstructured" and "chaotic" (Aldrich & Grant, 1993, pp. 297, 313). The present analysis, however, suggests that a low-dimensional model successfully explains roll call voting, even in these very early terms of Congress.

The two-dimensional spatial model of roll call voting during the Washington Administration correctly classifies 83.9% of votes with a percentage reduction in error compared to modal (yea) voting of 56.8%. The second dimension improves the percentage of votes correctly classified by roughly 4% and the percentage reduction in error by 12%.[54]

[54] We can use the W-NOMINATE scaling to estimate legislators' ideal points in more than two dimensions. Scaling roll call votes in this time period using three dimensions improves the percentage of votes correctly classified by 2% and increases the percentage reduction in error compared to modal voting by 5%.

Washington's legislative record largely comports with the spatial model of voting. The two-dimensional model correctly classifies 88.5% of Washington's decisions.[55]

These results indicate that Washington's ideal point moved between his first and second terms in office. It does appear that Washington's decision making was influenced by Jefferson's resignation and the shift of Cabinet power to Hamilton. However, in light of dramatic changes which occurred at the same time in both the Federalist and Republican ranks, it is not apparent that Washington moved closer to the Federalists. The growing gap between Washington and the opposition party largely resulted from Jeffersonian-Republicans replacing more centrist members of Congress during Washington's second term.

In Figure 8.2, GW_1 estimates Washington's ideal point from his first term legislative record and GW_2 does the same for his second term. The dashed ellipses mark the mean and standard deviation of the Federalist and Republican ideal points.[56] This analysis suggests Washington had a different ideal point in his first and second terms. Similarly, the centers of both the Republican faction and the Federalist faction of Congress moved during Washington's two terms.

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[55] Interestingly, the model correctly classifies all of Washington's yea votes but predicts opposition to a number of bills he signed or policies he proposed. Washington vetoed two bills and took a nay position on three additional roll call votes. Based on the spatial model of voting, we would expect Washington to oppose and/or veto more bills than he actually did. This is consistent with the view that early presidents were reluctant to veto bills on policy grounds (R. J. Spitzer, 1988) and the finding reported in Table 4.1 that historic presidents were more likely to sign bills contrary to their preferences (false positives) compared to modern presidents.

[56] Note that the ellipses in Figure 8.2 show the standard deviation of members' ideal points, not the standard error of the estimates of R_1, R_2, F_1, and F_2, which are considerably smaller.

These results suggest that Washington was closer to the Federalists in Congress in his second term compared to his first. The distance between points W_1 and F_1 (0.817) is greater than the distance between points W_2 and F_2 (0.593). In his first terms, Washington's ideal point is located on the periphery of the Federalist camp; in his second term, Washington's ideal point moves inside one standard deviation of the center of the Federalist faction. Although there is still substantial uncertainty, it appears that $W_1F_1 > W_2F_2$ (see Figure 8.3, below). Interestingly, the distance between Washington and the Republican members of Congress slightly narrows over the course of the Washington administration. The distance between points R_2 and W_2 (0.944) is slightly less than the distance between points R_1 and W_1 (1.199). Although the distance between Washington and both factions narrowed during the president's second term, Washington's ideal point was closer to Federalist ideal points than those of the Republicans during both his first and second terms.

Washington would have appeared even closer to the Federalist faction in his second term but for the movement of the Federalist center due to legislative turnover. A line from point GW_1 to GW_2 points in the direction of the space occupied by the Federalists in Congress. If the center of the Federalists remained at point F_1, Washington would have moved deep into the space occupied by Federalists. In contrast, the movement of the center of the Republican faction from R_1 to R_2 does not substantially affect the distance between Washington and the Jeffersonian-Republicans (the distance between GW_2 and R_1 is 0.965). Similarly, if I had calculated R and F (no subscripts) as the centers of the respective factions, I would have concluded that Washington moved into the Federalist camp. But the centers of these factions did move and ignoring the impact of legislative turnover would be a serious omission.

The preceding observations underscore the effect of congressional elections on Washington's relationship to Congress. As documented above, this was a period of rapid turn-over in Congress. The 1792 and 1794 elections redefined the collective preferences of

the Republican faction in Congress as well as its Federalist faction. Figure 7.2(b) identifies members of Congress newly elected in Washington's second term as solid-colored points. These new members moved the centers of their rival factions in opposite directions along the primary divide, the scope of national powers. The distance between the rival factions in Washington's first term ($F_1R_1 = 0.686$) grew considerably after Washington was re-elected ($F_2R_2 = 0.918$). Primarily as a result of congressional turn-over, the division over the scope of national power grew while Washington was in office and both factions moved away from the centrist President.

Uncertainty of Distance Estimates

In this section, I consider how the uncertainty of the ideal point estimated for these terms affects the analysis. As discussed above, these protean terms of Congress dealt with some unique issues and, compared to modern terms of Congress, produced sparse roll call voting records.

Because I estimate Washington's ideal point from a limited number of roll call votes, my estimates of his ideal points, GW_1 and GW_2, are relatively uncertain. I obtain standard errors for ideal point estimates and the correlation between the first and second dimensions using the parametric bootstrap method (see Chapter Three for additional details on these methods). The second dimension value of GW_2 is particularly uncertain because, there were relatively few cross-cutting roll call votes in Washington's second term given the changes in the legislative agenda (discussed above).[57]

We can account for uncertainty in this analysis by viewing ideal points as draws from a distribution rather than point estimates and using Monte Carlo simulations to fit

[57] The standard error of the dimension 2 value of GW_1 is 0.089; for GW_2, the standard error is 0.343, roughly four times larger.

the model.[58] GW_1 and GW_2 are straightforward draws from the corresponding distributions centered on Washington's ideal points. I calculate R_1, R_2, F_1, and F_2 as the mean value of the corresponding draws of Republican and Federalist members' ideal points. As before, the distances between Washington and the factions in Congress during his first and second terms are measured as diagonal distances with the second dimension appropriately weighted. I simulate 5,000 ideal point draws to estimate the distributions of the distance measurements. I plot these results in Figure 8.3.

Figure 8.3. Uncertainty of Estimated Distances



Consistent with the results reported above, the distances between Washington and the both the Federalist and Republican factions in Congress are greater during Washington's first term than they are in his second term. The uncertainty of the second dimension value of GW_2 makes our estimates of second term distances relatively uncertain, reflected in the wide confidence intervals in Figure 8.2. In 84.0% of simulations, the distance between Washington and Republicans narrows in the president's second term; in 71.8% of simulations, the distance between Washington and Federalists narrows after Washington's

[58] In two-dimensions, the distribution is modeled as a multivariate normal distribution with correlation between the first and second dimensions. The correlation coefficients are estimated by the parametric bootstrap method (Carroll et al., 2009; Lewis & Poole, 2004).

re-election. The distance between the centers of the Federalist and Republican factions almost certainly widens after Washington's re-election.

To what extent is the analysis of the first presidential administration offered here the result of using W-NOMINATE to scale Washington against his contemporaries rather than another scaling method, such as Poole's (2005, Chapter 3) Optimal Classification or the approach suggested by Clinton et al. (2004) (hereafter "IDEAL"). To answer this question, I scale President Washington in relation to Congress during his first and second terms using these alternate scaling methods. While these scaling methods offer generally consistent impressions of the Washington Administration, they suggest our conclusions depend on what tools we use to analyze this time period. Figure 8.4 shows the results of Optimal Classification analysis of Washington's first and second terms. This scaling method minimizes classification errors (rather than geometric mean errors). This method of analysis strongly supports the claim made by critical Washington biographers: during his first term, Washington appears to occupy a middle position between the Federalist and Republican factions, but makes a dramatic move during his second term to a point near the Federalist core.[59]

[59] The results of the Bayesian scaling method IDEAL (not shown) suggest that Washington occupied a relatively extreme position during both his first and second terms. The IDEAL method may not be well suited to scaling ideal points in more than one dimension. As the authors advised, "[e]stimation becomes progressively more difficult in higher dimensions" (Clinton et al., 2004, p. 357). In one dimension, this method suggests that Washington's ideal point was near the Federalist faction mean during both his first and second terms.

Figure 8.4. Optimal Classification Plot of Washington's First and Second Terms



These results support the assessment of contemporary critical biographers that the Washington's second term had a more Federalist character than his first term did. These results do not, however, support the corresponding belief the division between Washington and the Republican faction increased from his first to second terms. It must be noted, however, that even in his second term, Washington can hardly be considered a Federalist stalwart; his ideal point remains on the fringes of the Federalist camp, roughly one standard deviation from the faction's mean ideal point. As is the case with much of the Washington story, the perception of Washington's shifting political ties may overshadow the reality of substantial continuity. Jeffersonian-Republicans in Congress and in the nascent political media likely became far more sensitive to Washington's proximity to the Federalist camp as they became as organized and outwardly political party. Additionally, given the resolution of major cross-cutting issues early in the Washington Administration,

Washington's natural connection to the Jeffersonian-Republicans as a Virginian planter likely became secondary to his support for strong national power.

Conclusion

Analyzing politics in the Washington Administration is a bit like reconstructing dinosaurs from fossilized bone fragments. Despite his fame, Washington's legislative record is limited and requires the researcher to make rather broad inferences from limited data. In this Chapter, I compare Washington to Federalists and Republicans in Congress to assess whether the President followed his own advice and stayed clear of political parties throughout his administration.

What does this analysis tell us about Washington? The results reported here indicate that decisions in Washington's second term reflect a different set of political preferences than decisions in his first term. Specifically, Washington's second term moved in a Federalist direction. This movement is consistent with the contention of a number of Washington biographers that Thomas Jefferson's resigning his position as Secretary of State tipped the balance of information and power within the executive branch toward Alexander Hamilton.

However, the image of George Washington as a non-partisan president is not inaccurate. Although Washington moved in a Federalist direction in his second term, Washington remained on the fringe of the Federalist camp. New members of Congress, particularly those elected to newly created seats in 1792, hardened the positions of both the Federalist and Jeffersonian-Republican factions, moving both sides of Congress further away from the President. This makes Washington a fairly unique president, but he is not the only president in American political history to stand between congressional factions (see

Figure 6.3).[60] Washington is one of a number of historic precedents for moderate presidential leadership, even in incredibly turbulent times.

This research on the Washington presidency also underscores the importance of how the executive branch is organized and who advises the president. The Washington Administration operated more like a start-up business than a global superpower. His administration was a small group with several brilliant, feuding members who had few, if any, standard operating procedures for guidance. The Administration never met in a permanent location and faced a number of national crises. Given the precarious state of affairs, Washington's observation that "[m]any things which appear of little importance in themselves … may have great and durable consequences" aptly describes spatial models of his presidency.

[60] Washington may appear relatively extreme in the ranking of all presidents (see Chapter Four). After 1800, the Jeffersonian-Republicans became the new center of national politics. Considered in context of his era, Washington was a moderate figure.

Appendix to Chapter 8

Timeline of Events Discussed in Chapter

Washington inaugurated (New York)	April 30, 1789
Storming of the Bastille (Paris)	July 14, 1789
Washington goodwill tour of New England	Oct. – Nov. 1789
Washington moves to Philadelphia	Nov. 1790
Louis XVI arrested (Paris)	Aug. 13, 1792
Washington re-elected	1792/1793
Louis XVI beheaded (Paris)	Jan. 21, 1793
Washington's Second Term starts (Philadelphia)	March 4, 1793
Jefferson announces resignation	July 3, 1793
Jefferson resigns	Dec. 31, 1793
First roll call vote of Third House	Jan. 2, 1794
First roll call vote of Third Senate	Jan. 8, 1794
Tax revolts in W. Pennsylvania (Whiskey Rebellion)	May-Aug. 1794
Federal militia suppresses Whiskey Rebellion	Oct. 1794
John Jay signs Treaty with Britain	Nov. 19, 1794
Congressional elections	1794/1795
Hamilton resigns	January 31, 1795
Special Session of Senate (Jay Treaty debate)	June 1795
Jay Treaty ratified, signed	Aug. 1795
Washington leaves office	March 4, 1797
Washington dies	Dec. 14, 1799

Chapter 9

WAS HERBERT HOOVER A PROGRESSIVE?

If any U.S. President is in need of a public image makeover, surely it is Herbert Hoover. Although experts do not judge him to be the nation's worst president (Nice, 1984; Nichols, 2012), Hoover continues to serve as an object of derision in contemporary debates over economic stimulus and austerity measures.[61] A substantial number of Hoover scholars, however, challenge the portrayal of Hoover as a laissez-faire conservative and maintain that Hoover was a progressive president (Best, 1975; Burner, 1974; Degler, 1963; Jeansonne, 2012; Wilson, 1975). Have we misjudged Hoover? Unfortunately, political scientists have not been able to answer this question. Although we possess sophisticated tools for analyzing political behavior, Hoover has thus far eluded measurement.

In this Chapter, I hope to shed light on this historical controversy by analyzing Hoover's legislative record with modern tools of political science. These tools allow us to map Hoover's ideological preferences relative to other actors and determine whether he stood with the right, left, or center of Republican Party. We can also compare Hoover to progressive members of both parties. Based on the requests he made for legislative action, the bills he signed and vetoed, his nominees and a treaty he proposed, Hoover was significantly more conservative than his contemporaries in the House and Senate on most

[61] Campaigning for re-election, President Obama invoked Hoover to criticize Governor Romney's economic plan: "We have tried that, by the way. We tried it for 10 years. It's part of what got into the mess that we're in. It doesn't work. It didn't work for Herbert Hoover, when it was called trickle-down economics during the Depression" (Washington Post, 2011).

issues. However progressive he may have been in spirit and personal affairs, Hoover did not act like a progressive while in office.

"Excavating" Herbert Hoover

America's economic prospects were so bright in early 1929 that newly inaugurated President Herbert Hoover proclaimed that the end of poverty was near. In hindsight it is clear that Hoover could not have been more wrong. By the end of his administration, the country's gross national product was cut in half, the unemployment rate was 25%, and Hoover was soundly defeated by Franklin Roosevelt in the 1932 presidential election. "Few Americans," Walch (2004, p. 1) aptly observed, "have known greater acclaim or more bitter criticism than Herbert Hoover."

This Chapter will not attempt to diagnose the causes of the Great Depression. Similarly, I will not attempt a psychological analysis of Hoover's personal attitudes and beliefs.[62] Instead, I focus on Hoover's policy making decisions as president.

Conventional wisdom holds that Hoover was a laissez-faire conservative who stubbornly refused to compromise his ideological beliefs in response to the Great Depression (e.g. Leuchtenburg, 2009). Indeed, Hoover has frequently served as a foil for Democratic candidates. According to Okun (1973, p. 275), "Nothing delights a Democratic congressman more than the opportunity to run against Herbert Hoover, and nothing offends the modern

[62] The argument that Hoover was a progressive politician is based in part on his personal values and moral beliefs. My analysis is confined to his legislative record while president, years which represent "only a slice of his life" (Jeansonne, 2012, p. xix), rather than what he did before becoming president (e.g. Clements, 2010; Nash, 1983, 1988, 1996). Although I disagree with the view that Hoover was politically progressive, his biographers reveal his complexity and the incredible challenges he faced while serving his country.

Republican more than to be tarred with the Hoover image." Similarly, Fausold (1984, p. 244) writes, "Democrats, every four years for more than half a century, seemed to be running against Herbert Hoover." In this perspective, Hoover is cast as poster boy for the far right. Liberals charge that conservative economic proposals constitute "Hooverism for the 21st century" and risk precipitating economic collapse (Spitzer, 2011; also see Evans-Pritchard, 2011; King, 2009; Matthews and Salas-Gage, 2012).

But is this conventional account fair? According to Nash (2003, p. 10), Hoover is a "political orphan, unwelcome in liberal and conservative pantheons alike. … Underlying this bipartisan aversion has been a continuing ambiguity in Hoover biography. Who was Hebert Hoover? Somehow, despite all the research and analysis, Hoover remains an elusive figure."[63]

A growing number of scholars challenge this familiar presentation of Hoover as an economic and social conservative. This high point of this movement is *Herbert Hoover Reassessed*, a volume edited by Senator Mark Hatfield (1981) and published by the U.S. Senate to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of Hoover's inauguration. Reviewing a set of Hoover biographies penned by revisionist scholars, Romasco (1984, p. 139) observed, "the restoration of Hoover's reputation is a continuing and deepening historical commitment by Hoover scholars." He colorfully described this work as "the excavation of Hoover from the historical pit into which politically partisan detractors had cast him." Contemporary Hoover scholars challenge the "grotesque image" of Hoover that emerged in the 1932 election (Best, 1983).[64] Political historians have "refurbished" Hoover as part of the "simultaneous

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[63] Similarly, according to Jeansonne (2012, p. xix): "The image of Hoover that permeates the public mind is a paradox."

[64] The President's telegenic granddaughter, Margaret Hoover, appears frequently on television to comment on political events and has authored a book, *American Individualism*

resurrection of the right and repudiation of liberal policies" (Ziegler, 1976; see also Quigley, 2003).

In revisionist interpretations, Hoover is more compassionate and forward-thinking than he appears in textbook accounts. According to these scholars, Hoover was progressive on both economic and social issues. Burner (1974, p. 54) maintained that Hoover was deeply committed to the ideal of equal opportunity and the eradication of poverty. Once in office, Hoover commenced to "fire up the engines of Progressive reform." Degler (1963) argued, "Hoover's principles were distinctly and publicly progressive." In a sweeping reappraisal of Hoover's life, Wilson (1975, p. 209) offered Hoover as a forgotten progressive: "There is a good deal of talk today about a 'new' Hoover. Disparate political groups ranging from the far right to the far left think they are rediscovering him, because his progressive philosophy contained ideas whose time has finally arrived." Wilson traces Hoover's progressivism to his Quaker upbringing, Stanford education, world travels, and forward-thinking administration of the Commerce Department (see also Best, 1975). During the 1928 presidential campaign, Hoover made a concerted effort to appeal to female voters. After his landslide election, Hoover promptly convened a special session of Congress to culminate his "progressive dream for America" (Wilson, 1975, p. 134). According to contemporary scholars, Hoover was particularly concerned about rural poverty, civil liberties (Burner, 1979, Chapter 11), environmental conservation (Hatfield, 1987), and opportunities for African Americans (Grothaus, 1984). The image of Hoover as unremitting conservative, Wilson contended, resulted from his poor relationship with the media during his administration and the 1932 election as well as Hoover's outspoken opposition to Roosevelt's New Deal as an ex-president. More pointedly, Best (1975, p. xv) pronounced

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(2011), the same title as Herbert Hoover's 1923 volume. According to her web site, she is "committed to renewing the Republican Party."

the standard treatment of Hoover the product of "misinformation and distortion" and Lyons (1948, p. 1) lamented the "factually false and humanly unjust" image of Hoover in the public eye.

Both conventional and revisionist Hoover biographers select facts from Hoover's life to support often thinly-veiled partisan agendas. Unfortunately, Hoover studies have been plagued with politicking, making it difficult to determine where the search for truth ends and spin doctoring begins. Nevertheless, the stakes in this debate between "legacy managers" (Ceaser, 2011) are high. If Hoover was a progressive Republican with a liberal record, we need to reconsider our understanding of Hooverism and the origins of New Deal liberalism (Romasco, 1974; Zieger, 1976). To the extent that the electoral realignment of 1932 was a rejection of Hoover, the revisionist interpretation of Hoover as progressive calls into question the political foundation of economic policies launched in Roosevelt's New Deal. Indeed, some observers have gone so far as to argue that the liberal course taken by the Hoover Administration should be avoided to save the national economy from ruin (e.g. Continetti, 2008; Foster, 2011; Horwitz, 2011).

A brief discussion of progressive politics may help us frame the debate over Hoover's legacy. It would be a mistake to judge Hoover's record according to the contemporary definition of progressive; rather, one should consider what the progressive meant in the appropriate context. Progressivism here refers to a popular political movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that targeted monopoly business power, corruption in government, and widespread public immorality.[65] Although the movement briefly organized for presidential campaigns, progressives on the national stage generally operated

[65] One should distinguish the political identifier Progressive from the adjective progressive just as one distinguishes Democratic and Republican (politicians) from democratic and republican (values).

as factions within both the Democratic and Republican parties (Link, 1971). Political historians generally view Theodore Roosevelt's death and America's entry into World War I as the end of the Progressive Party (Mowry, 1946, p. 377). By 1920, however, progressives had already succeeded in passing much of their legislative agenda, leaving the movement at a crossroads without formal organization (Link, 1971, p. 155).[66] Nevertheless, national politicians carried the progressive banner well into the 1920s and 1930s (Link, 1971; Milkis, 2009). There was a substantial liberal wing of the Republican Party in Congress during the Hoover administration, particularly in the Senate. These progressives, headed by Sen. Robert LaFollette, Jr. of Wisconsin, largely hailed from Midwestern farm states as did the Iowa-born Hoover.

What issues set progressive and conservative legislators apart during the 1920s and 1930s? Not surprisingly, these groups clashed over economic policy. Progressives advocated large-scale government programs to develop resources, including electric power, while conservatives favored private-sector development. Progressives advocated more direct and aggressive measures to alleviate hardship during the depression than conservatives did (Oulahan, 1931). Progressives and conservatives maintained diametrically opposed views on the legal rights of corporations and labor unions which led to repeated battles over judicial appointments. It is important to note that progressives at this time supported a number of social reforms that may not be considered progressive today, such as prohibition and curtailing the foreign-born population. As Professor Link (1971, p. 161) observed: "The fact that this movement was motivated in part by racism, nativism, and anti-Semitism … should not blind us to the fact that it was also progressive."

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[66] The Progressive Party did field a presidential candidate in 1924, Senator Robert La Follette, Sr. The Party's platform declared: "The great issue before the American people is control of government and industry by private monopoly" (MacKay, 1972, p. 143). La Follette captured 16% of the popular vote.

Putting Hoover in the proper political context is somewhat complicated by the fact he did not hold elective office before the Republican Party nominated him to be president. He captured national attention as member of a Democratic president's Cabinet. It has been suggested that the Democratic Party even courted the popular Hoover before the 1920 presidential election.

Putting Hoover on the Map

Hoover's absence from spatial models of politics is problematic for several reasons. First, Hoover is a significant political figure with a disputed historic legacy. Second, a reliable estimate of Hoover's ideal point facilitates historical research by political scientists. For example, judicial scholars have been unable to estimate ideal points of federal judges appointed by Hoover which limits their ability to conduct historical analysis of the federal courts, a problem I return to in Chapter Eleven.

Based on Treier's research, we may suspect that Hoover's requests do not accurately reflect the ideological position he generally maintained during his administration.[67] Later, I offer some evidence that the votes analyzed here are more representative of the roll call record than are Hoover's request votes. It appears that scholars used the request votes produced by Swift et al because they were readily available, not because they are the only or best record of presidential preferences.[68]

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[67] The empirical question whether estimating Hoover's ideal point from his legislative requests only explains his other policy decisions is pursued following the main results of this paper as a robustness check. I find that votes Hoover requested were more moderate than the legislative decisions he was compelled by Congress to make, particularly with respect to veterans' relief measures.

[68] In some instances, we may want to explain presidential position taking in which case his requests furnish the best evidence of his preferences. On other occasions, such as the

Two guiding principles discussed in Chapter Three apply here. First, we should estimate Hoover's ideal point using a representative sample of roll call votes. In a perfect world, one would estimate Hoover's preferences relative to Senators and Representatives by recording his votes on all the roll call votes that occurred during his administration. This cannot be accomplished but advises against cherry picking votes for analysis. Second, although one can estimate Hoover's ideal point more precisely with additional votes, it is important to base Hoover's record on clear, expressed preferences. Extrapolating Hoover's position on a particular amendment or procedural tactic based on subsequent events starts the researcher down a slippery slope of subjective judgments.[69]

These guiding principles inform the research design used here to test specific hypotheses about Herbert Hoover. Textbook history provides our null hypothesis: Hoover was a conservative Republican. The critical reappraisals of Hoover's presidency furnish the basis for the alternative hypothesis that Hoover was progressive on both economic and social issues. The research design and data used to test these hypotheses are detailed in the next section.

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present, we may want to assess a president's legislative record based on a broader sample of roll call votes.

[69] For example, the 71st Senate conducted 154 roll call votes on motions to amend the Smoot-Hawley Tariff as senators attempted to protect their native industries before finally passing the amended bill. The House and Senate then reconciled their differences through conference, but only the House voted by roll on the conference committee report (vote no. 60). Hoover did not request yea or nay votes on any floor amendments but did sign the bill into law. Therefore, I only code Hoover's vote on the bill as finally passed by the House. Accordingly, this estimation of Hoover's ideal point does not hinge on whether he sincerely supported the Smoot-Hawley tariff.

Research Design and Data Sources

We can estimate Hoover's ideal point in relation to representatives and senators using roll call votes that took place in the House and Senate during his administration. My estimation strategy is to code Hoover's vote on every roll call vote in the 71st and 72nd terms of Congress for which a reliable basis exists to determine Hoover's position. To code Hoover's legislative record, I follow the Coding Rules outlined in Chapter Three.

Is it fair to assume Hoover's decisions were sincere and not strategic calculations? Hoover, for example, signed the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff into law, but he had serious reservations about the bill and it is thought that Hoover would have preferred a more limited tariff (Jeansonne, 2012). On the surface, Hoover's sparse record provides little evidence of strategic behavior. When Hoover announced support for bills that Congress passed, he signed them into law (7 cases in the roll call record); when Hoover announced his opposition to bills that Congress passed, he vetoed them (4 cases in the roll call record). In any case, this is a model-building assumption; whether this assumption is useful remains to be seen. Later, I discuss how well a sincere preference model explains Hoover's legislative record and consider whether Hoover voted contrary to his preferences more often than members of Congress did.

Table 9.1 summarizes the roll call votes used to estimate Hoover's ideal point. Although this approach enriches the data used to estimate Hoover's ideal point, Hoover's position on the majority of roll call votes during his administration remain unknown. While one may infer that he would have supported or opposed preliminary votes based on his position on final passage, I avoid making these inferences and rely on Hoover's expressed preferences.

Table 9.1. Hoover Votes Used for Estimation

Vote Type	71st Senate	72nd Senate	71st House	72nd House	All Terms
Requests	21	8	8	7	44
Signings	11	8 (1)	9 (3)	13 (3)	41
Vetoes	6 (1)	3 (1)	8 (1)	7 (1)	24 (4)
Nominations	16	6	0	0	22
Treaties	1 (1)	0	0	0	1
Total H.H. Votes	54	23	23	24	124
Roll Call Votes	436	280	103	123	942

Number overlapping requests in parentheses

In order to compare Hoover to his contemporaries, I merge the roll call voting records of the 71st and 72nd Houses and Senates together following Poole's (2005, Chapter 6) suggestion. Chambers and terms are bridged by both rows (individuals) and columns (votes). In addition to legislators who continued in the same chamber from the 71st to 72nd terms, a number of legislators who served in the 71st House subsequently served in the 72nd Senate. Assuming their preferences are stable (for empirical support for this assumption, see Poole & Rosenthal, 2007, pp. 96-100), these cross-over legislators help us compare the House and Senate.[70] Hoover's votes also span the chambers and terms.

I identify a number of instances where the House and Senate voted on the same motion. I determine that the House and Senate had roll call votes on the same conference committee reports one time in their 71st terms and once more in their 72nd terms.[71] Both

[70] Three Representatives from the 71st House subsequently served in the 72nd Senate: Dickinson (R-IA), Hull (D-TN), and White (R-ME). Robsion (R-KY) served in both the chambers during the 71st Congress. The assumption that their preferences are stable is bolstered by the fact that none of these legislators changed parties moving from one chamber to the other. The results are not noticeably different if the individuals who served in both chambers are omitted and only votes (columns) are used to bridge the two chambers.

[71] In the 71st Congress, the House voted on a conference committee report on the Muscle Shoals development project on February 20, 1931 (roll call no. 89); the Senate conducted a roll call vote on the same report three days later (roll call no. 421). In the 72nd Congress, both chambers voted by roll on the conference committee report on a bill broadening the

chambers conducted two roll calls to override presidential vetoes in their 71st terms and one such vote in their 72nd terms.[72] Additionally, the chambers voted to pass the same bill or resolution four times in the 71st Congress and two more times in the 72nd Congress.[73] These roll calls are treated as single votes with all senators and representatives divided by the same cutting lines.[74]

Hoover's ideal point is estimated from his roll call votes using W-NOMINATE. This method assumes actors have symmetric, single peaked utility functions and positions them

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powers of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (roll call vote no. 76 in the House, no. 205 in the Senate).

[72] The House and Senate both voted by roll to override Hoover's veto of a bill for veterans' pensions on June 2, 1930 (House roll call no. 52, Senate roll call no. 342). The following year, the House and Senate both voted by roll to override Hoover's veto of a bill to increase the loan basis of service certificates for veterans (House roll call no. 92, Senate roll call no. 424). In their 72nd terms, the House and Senate had roll call votes to override Hoover's veto of a bill for Philippines' independence (House roll no. 72, Senate roll no. 232).

[73] During the 71st Congress, a number of bills were put to passage votes without amendments in both chambers. The House (roll call vote no. 15) and Senate (roll call vote no. 118) both voted on passage of H.R. 6585 for settlement of French indebtedness, H.R. 1 to establish a Federal Farm Board (House vote no. 2 Senate vote no. 8), H.R. 17054 to increase the loan basis of veterans' service certificates (House vote no. 87, Senate vote no. 418), S.J.R. 3 to amend the Constitution with respect to the timing of congressional sessions (House vote no. 91, Senate vote no. 24), and H.R. 16836 for regulation of oleomargarine (House vote no. 95, Senate vote no. 426). During their 72nd terms, the House and Senate both voted to pass with amendments H.R. 7726 to pay veterans the face value of their adjusted service certificates (House vote no. 64, Senate vote no. 185) and S.J.R. 211 to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment (House vote no. 112, Senate vote no. 272).

[74] Treating votes on conference committee reports and veto override motions as single votes in the House and Senate follows the suggestion of Poole and Rosenthal (2007, pp. 229-230): "Ideally, those roll calls for which the substance was identical in both the House and Senate should be as a single roll call with 535 voters. Examples include veto-override and conference-override votes."

in policy space to minimize the utility lost from voting errors.[75] This method offers a fair test of Hoover's ideology because it does not require us to identify the liberal or conservative sides of issues; it allows Hoover's record for itself as much as possible. Based on prior research, ideal points are estimated in two dimensions. The primary dimension should estimate the relative liberalism or conservatism of Hoover and members of Congress.[76]

How does one operationalize the term "progressive" to evaluate whether a particular politician, like Hoover, was progressive? I use a variety of sources to identify progressive members of Congress and compare the location of their ideal points to Hoover's. Many legislators embraced the progressive label. In March, 1931, Senators Costigan (D-CO), Cutting (R-NM), La Follette, Jr. (R-WI), Norris (R-NE), and Wheeler (D-MT) convened a Progressives' Conference in Washington, D.C. to organize a legislative agenda and look ahead to the 1932 election.[77] The *New York Times* (1931d) published a list of progressive Senators and Representatives who attended the Conference. In addition to the Progressive

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[75] The NOMINATE model specifically assumes legislators have normally distributed utility functions. This assumption is based on response patterns regularly found in psychological research on choice and perception (see Poole, 2005, pp. 90, 198-200 and citations therein). While a single roll call vote only requires the individual to compare two points in the policy space (the yea outcome to the nay outcome), the individual's utility function enables him or her to compare the utility of any two points in the space and make decisions accordingly. I check whether my results are robust to alternate utility functions using Optimal Classification and IDEAL scaling methods.

[76] The second dimension (y-axis) generally taps regional differences in voting behavior (generally motivated by race) which are not explained by the primary dimension of ideology. During this time period, prior research identifies regional differences over agriculture and tax policy (Poole & Rosenthal, 2007, pp. 57-62).

[77] Attendees did not break new ground on policy issues, but "the progressives of 1931 found common ground in their uncompromising and unreserved disapproval of the Hoover administration" (MacKay, 1972, pp. 254-255).

Conference organizers and attendees, I include several members of Congress who were repeatedly identified as progressives by journalists and political scientists at the time: Senators Borah (R-ID) and Nye (R-ID), and Representatives Howard (D-NE) and LaGuardia (R-NY) (Herring, 1932; Macmahon, 1930a, 1930b, 1931; New York Times, 1930c, 1931a, 1931b, 1931c). Finally, historians also identify Senator Brookhart (R-IA) as a progressive member of Congress (MacKay, 1972; Milkis, 2009; Mowry, 1946). If Hoover and these progressive legislators were birds of the same feather, they should have voted together.

I conduct some auxiliary analysis to assess how robust my primary results are to variations on my research design. First, I consider what effect the mix of votes used to estimate Hoover's ideal point has on this analysis. Specifically, I compare an estimate derived from his requests only to the estimate determined from all types of votes. Second, I evaluate the results using difference scaling methods, including Optimal Classification and IDEAL.

Results of Estimation

Figure 9.1 plots President Herbert Hoover's ideal point in relation to members of the 71st and 72nd terms of Congress. As one might suspect, Republicans in the House and Senate are generally more conservative than their Democratic colleagues. Progressives of both parties are located on the left/liberal side of Congress. The Republican majority in these terms is quite heterogeneous. Some of the most liberal members of the 71st and 72nd Senate are Republicans.

Figure 9.1. Hoover's Ideal Point in Relation to 71st and 72nd Congresses



These plots provide some initial evidence as to Hoover's position within the Republican Party but we can analyze this question in more detail. To this end, I evaluate Hoover in relation to other Republican Party members. Figure 9.2 offers density plots of Democrats and Republicans in the House and Senate during the Hoover Administration with Hoover's ideal point indicated.

Figure 9.2. Hoover Relative to Distribution of House and Senate Ideologies



Figure 9.2 panel (b) shows the bi-modal distribution of Republican Senators' ideologies. As discussed, there were a number of progressive Republicans in the Senate at this time. Although progressive Republicans were a force in Congress, Hoover was ideologically distant from them. Hoover appears near the mode of Senate Republicans; however, Hoover is significantly right of the Senate Republican mean.

Figure 9.1 and Figure 9.2 suggest that Hoover was a conservative Republican. The standard errors calculated through the parametric bootstrap method allow us to test our hypotheses. Specifically, we can ask, what is the probability that Hoover was a typical Republican based on his legislative record? Based on Hoover's ideal point estimate and standard error (0.610 +/- 0.147), one is confident that Hoover was more conservative than the average Republican in Congress during his administration (p-value = 0.020). Similarly, one is confident that Hoover was more conservative than the median member of his party in Congress (p-value = 0.026).[78] At the 95% confidence level, one rejects the hypothesis

[78] I compare Hoover to the mean and median Republicans in Congress during his administration. If Hoover is compared only to Republicans in the House or Senate, one still rejects the hypothesis that Hoover's ideal point is equal to that of the mean or median

advanced by revisionist historians that Hoover was progressive as well as the more modest hypothesis that Hoover was a typical Republican.[79]

In the 71st and 72nd Congresses, the legislators' placement on the primary dimension explains 82.0% of their votes (48.6% reduction in errors compared to modal predictions); their alignment on the second dimension explains as additional 3.6% of their votes (58.9% reduction in prediction errors).[80] Hoover's ideal point in the spatial model depicted in Figure

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Republican with confidence. The substantive conclusions do not change if Hoover is compared to Republicans by chamber by term; he appears more conservative than Republicans in the House and Senate in both the 71st and 72nd terms of Congress. If Hoover is compared to the mean or median progressive (of either party), the p-values would be even smaller.

[79] I considered this result in light of the uncertainty of the estimate of the Republican mean. Although the mean is estimated from the full population of Republicans, the parametric bootstrap shows there is some uncertainty associated with each individual legislator's ideal point and thus there is some uncertainty estimating the mean. The uncertainty of the mean estimate reflects the varying standard errors of individual legislators. I tested Hoover's ideal point compared to the Republican mean in light of the joint uncertainty of Hoover ideal point and the Republican mean using 1,000 simulated draws of Republican ideal points based on the W-NOMINATE parametric bootstrap results. The uncertainty of the Republican mean is minute; Hoover's ideal point falls to the right of the party mean in over 99% of cases and the p-value of the hypothesis of Hoover equaling the party mean is 0.009.

[80] Given the unusual nature of the times, it is reasonable to ask whether one observes an ideological breakdown in roll call voting during the Hoover Administration as a result of contentious executive-legislative relations. I consider this possibility by examining whether the error rate of roll call votes increases over the course of these terms. The data suggest a modest but statistically significant increase in voting errors over this period in both the House and Senate. While there is some evidence of ideological breakdown, the model fit remains relative high; by comparison, the spatial voting model explains roughly 70% of roll call votes during the party-less Era of Good Feelings (Poole & Rosenthal, 2007, figure 3.1). Additionally, roll call votes predominately divided the chambers along one dimension.

9.1 explains 93.4% of votes attributed to him. Interestingly, Hoover's decisions are better explained by the spatial model than are the decisions of most members of Congress; this suggests the president's decisions to sign or veto bills were not frequently strategic and insincere, at least no more so than were votes in Congress. Although Hoover is thought to have reluctantly signed the Smoot-Hawley tariff into law (Jeansonne, 2012), the House vote to agree to the conference committee report (vote no. 60 in the 71st House) neatly divided representatives on the primary ideological dimension (the cutting line angle was 96.5°). Nearly all progressives and Democrats voted against the report. Hoover's estimated ideal point is on yea side, relatively far from the cutting line; the spatial model of this vote suggests Hoover's decision to sign the bill into law was consistent with his preferences.[81]

Although roll call voting in these terms had some multi-dimensional quality, I focus here on the primary dimension as it relates to Hoover's asserted progressivism on core issues. Later, I discuss the fact that Hoover and progressive legislators are similar on the second dimension. Restricting the scaling routines to one dimension does not change the results in any appreciable way; presenting ideal point estimates in two dimensions allows one to identify particular individuals like Hoover and known progressives among many actors.

Robustness Checks

In this section, I conduct auxiliary analysis of my primary results to assess whether my conclusions are dramatically affected by the composition of votes analyzed or scaling method used to estimate Hoover's ideal point. I compare an estimate based solely on

[81] Consistent with this view, Hoover vetoed a bill to lower tariffs in the 72nd Congress (vote nos. 8 and 49 in the 72nd House). In his veto message to Congress, Hoover declared: "[T]here never has been a time in the history of the United States when tariff protection was more essential to the welfare of the American people than at present" (Hoover, 1932). According to Link (1971, p. 161), a revenue tariff was not an authentic progressive objective.

Hoover's requests to that derived from Hoover's complete legislative record. Along similar lines, I consider whether the results reported above are driven by Hoover's foreign policy decisions. I then evaluate the results using difference scaling methods, including Optimal Classification and IDEAL.

One can estimate an actor's ideal point based on subsets of votes to test theories about agenda setting effects (Poole, 2005, Chapter 6). In light of past research, one wonders whether the present results are a product of adding votes to Hoover's record of requests. For this analysis, Hoover's roll call voting record is restricted to the 43 requests he made during his administration and scaled using W-NOMINATE.[82] In Figure 1, Hoover's ideal point based on requests only is indicated by "h" and the 95% confidence region of this estimation, by a dashed ellipse. Because this estimation is based on fewer observations, the standard error is larger. Although the confidence region of the ideal point estimated from Hoover's complete voting record overlaps that generated from his requests, the point estimate from requests is more moderate than that reflecting his full voting record (0.541 compared to 0.610). If one restricts analysis to Hoover's requests, one still confidently rejects the revisionists' claim that Hoover was predominately progressive. However, given the large standard error of estimation, one could not confidently reject the hypothesis that Hoover was a typical Republican.

In addition to reducing uncertainty, enlarging the set of votes used to estimate Hoover's ideal point may yield a more accurate point estimate compared to estimating his ideal point on the basis of his requests only. Hoover's ideological position relative to

[82] For this analysis, I add a row to the roll call vote matrix with Hoover voting consistent with his 44 requests but not participating in other House and Senate roll call votes. This approach is comparable to estimating the ideal point of a member of Congress who left office mid-session and only voted on some fraction of the record.

members of Congress is more likely at "H" than "h" in Figure 1 because the enlarged set of votes that yields "H" is representative of the underlying roll call record used to locate members of Congress while his request votes are not. The difference in these sets of votes is borne out by comparing the distributions of their cutting lines to that of the full roll call record.

Figure 9.3. Cutting Line Angles of Roll Call Votes During Hoover Administration



Figure 9.3 shows that Hoover's request votes (the dotted line) were not representative of roll call voting in Congress during his administration (the black line). Incorporating additional data points in the form of Hoover's nominees, bill signings, and vetoes yields a sample of votes (the solid gray line) that better reflects the roll call record than do Hoover's request votes. Statistical tests support the visual evidence; a random sample of roll call votes could yield a distribution of cutting line angles like the gray line (all presidential votes) in Figure 9.3, but not a distribution like the dotted line (request votes).[83]

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[83] I use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test to test the hypotheses that Hoover's request votes and all Hoover's votes come from the same distribution as the 71st and 72nd Congress roll call votes (for details on this test, see Conover, 1999, Chapter 6). Given the sample sizes, one rejects the hypothesis that Hoover's request votes have the same distribution as the roll call votes because the test statistic exceeds the critical value at 95%

The effect of restricting estimation to Hoover's requests is interesting in light of Treier's (2010) finding that estimating the ideal points of Presidents Clinton and G.W. Bush based on their requests (excluding their bill signings and vetoes) makes them appear more ideologically extreme than their full records indicate. While those presidents may have requested legislative action on controversial votes, Hoover apparently made requests on less controversial matters and thus appears more moderate from requests than his full legislative record indicates. This suggests that presidents' use of requests has changed over time or varies from one administration to the next, an interesting development in the exercise of presidential powers. Although the direction of the effect found here is opposite that reported by Treier (2010), this research strongly supports his argument that examining presidents' full voting records better estimates presidents' ideal points than does limiting such analysis to presidential requests.

What if Hoover's foreign policy decisions are excluded? This seems reasonable because contemporary debates focus on Hoover's domestic policies.[84] To check whether foreign policy positions caused the analysis to classify Hoover as a conservative, I scale Hoover's domestic policy votes only using W-NOMINATE (not shown) and compare the results to Figure 9.1. Hoover's estimated ideal point based on domestic issues is substantively similar to the estimate derived from all of his known positions (0.600 compared to 0.610). The primary results presented here are not driven by Hoover's foreign policies.

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confidence ($0.26 > 0.18$); however, one does not reject the hypothesis that votes analyzed here to estimated Hoover's ideal point have the same distribution because the test statistic is less than the critical value ($0.08 < 0.11$).

[84] For this analysis, I consider the issues of tariffs and immigration to be domestic issues because they were raised for domestic considerations. Foreign policy roll call votes include several votes on settling foreign indebtedness to the United States, votes related to Philippines governance, and a treaty vote.

To what extent is the analysis of Hoover offered here the result of using W-NOMINATE to scale Hoover against his contemporaries rather than another scaling method, such as Poole's (2005, Chapter 3) Optimal Classification or the approach suggested by Clinton et al. (2004) (hereafter "IDEAL"). To answer this question, I estimate Hoover's ideal point using these alternate scaling methods.

Optimal Classification (OC) is a non-parametric scaling method that positions actors in policy space to minimize the number of misclassified votes. It does not make assumptions about the specific shape of actors' utility functions (i.e. bell-curved or quadratic) and therefore is an extremely robust method of estimation. I use OC to estimate Hoover's ideal point relative to his contemporaries in the 71st and 72nd Congresses and display the results of this analysis in Appendix A. The results of this analysis are consistent with the results of W-NOMINATE scaling. Hoover is decidedly conservative compared to House Republicans, but flanked on the right by a number of Republican Senators. Because OC is a non-parametric scaling method, one cannot recover standard errors for hypothesis testing. One can, however, consider where Hoover falls in a ranking of Republicans from most liberal to most conservative. Hoover would rank as the 346th most liberal Republican in Congress during his administration (out of 372 Republicans). Using OC, the difference between Hoover's ideal point based on his requests only compared to his full record is modest (0.452 compared to 0.509).

I estimate ideal points for Hoover and members of Congress using the function IDEAL from the R library pscl. This scaling method is similar to fitting educational testing data via an item-response model and uses Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulations to estimate parameters (Clinton et al., 2004). Every 100th MCMC iteration is recorded after a burn-in of 10,000 iterations to produce a sample of 1,000.[85] The ideal points estimated by

[85] This scaling routine (by default) imposes the identification constraint that estimated ideal points have mean zero and standard deviation one in each dimension. I manually

this method for the 71st and 72nd Houses and Senates are plotted in Appendix C. The spatial map produced by IDEAL is consistent with maps produced by W-NOMINATE and OC. The progressive wing of the Republican Party is clearly visible in the Senate. IDEAL scaling discloses more division on regional and racial issues in the House compared to the Senate.[86] This method also places Hoover on the conservative side of the Republican Party. The mean ideal point of congressional Republicans during Hoover's administration is outside the 95% credible interval for Hoover's ideal point (see solid ellipses in Appendix B); thus, we may reject the hypotheses that Hoover was a progressive or mainstream Republican. IDEAL scaling provides additional evidence that Hoover was a conservative Republican.

Discussion of Results

This research informs our understanding of Herbert Hoover's administration. A number of scholars have called into question textbook accounts of Hoover's political ideology and argued that he was a progressive president. I identify Hoover's known positions on roll call votes in the 71st and 72nd Congresses and estimate Hoover's ideal point using W-NOMINATE. My results indicate that Hoover was significantly more conservative than his Republican colleagues. The evidence strongly suggests Hoover was not progressive and that the revisionist accounts of his presidency, however intriguing, do not explain his actions as president.[87]

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rotate the resulting estimates so that the majority of Republicans appear on the right side of the map and Progressives in the upper-left quadrant.

[86] The IDEAL method has a difficult time distinguishing senators on a second dimension during this time period. As the authors advised, "[e]stimation becomes progressively more difficult in higher dimensions" (Clinton et al., 2004, p. 357).

[87] Although the present findings are not based on Hoover's post-presidency behavior, Hoover's behavior after leaving office serves to confirm the results of spatial models. After

In this section, I hope to identify legislative acts that put Hoover in the company of conservative Republicans. Did the issues that divided progressives and conservatives during this time period set Hoover apart from his colleagues in Congress? Votes that pitted Hoover and a minority of Republicans against the super-majorities in the House and Senate push him to the extreme right side of the policy space depicted in Figures 1 and 2. Here, one can use spatial models to gain insights into political history.

Hoover staked out relatively extreme positions on a number of roll call votes related to military veterans. During the 71st Congress, Hoover vetoed Senate Bill 476 which expanded pension eligibility for veterans. The House voted 229-14 to override Hoover's veto; the Senate, 61-18 against Hoover. During the same term, Hoover vetoed House Resolution 17054 which increased the loan basis of service certificates for veterans. HR 17054 passed the House 363 to 39 and the Senate 72 to 12 and both chambers again voted to override Hoover's veto. These votes are remarkable because Hoover's party controlled both the House and Senate in the 71st Congress. Hoover staked extreme positions against veterans' relief which few progressives or mainstream Republicans supported. If Hoover's positions on roll call votes on veterans' issues are excluded from analysis, his ideal point (first dimension) shifts from 0.610 to 0.334, landing him near the center of the Republican Party (see Figure 2).[88]

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leaving office, Hoover applied his energies to a "prolonged campaign to revive the Republican Party," in part, because he hoped the party would nominate him for president in 1936 and 1940 (Romasco, 1984, p. 143). While this does not exclude the possibility that Hoover was a mainstream Republican, it suggests he was not a member of the progressive minority within the Republican Party.

[88] This is not simply a statistical artifact. Relief for veterans was an extremely salient issue during Hoover's term: the conflict between Hoover and the "bonus army" occupied the front page of the *New York Times* 178 times in 1932 (based on a search for front page news stories containing words "Hoover" and "veterans" in New York Times Historical Database).

Although one tends to think that Congress gives the president a great deal of latitude to make appointments (Krutz, Fleisher, & Bond, 1998), Hoover's nominees precipitated a number of intense ideological battles in the Senate. Consider, for example, Hoover's nominees to the Federal Power Commission. Progressive legislators wanted the federal government, not the private sector, to develop electric supplies. Hoover's nominee to head the Commission, George Smith, however, expressed "very definite opposition" to government ownership (New York Times, 1930a).[89] After confirming Smith and Hoover's other nominees, the Senate attempted to rescind its confirmation votes and the appointees filed suit to take their seats (New York Times, 1931e). The Supreme Court ultimately sided with Smith.[90] Although Hoover and progressive were unified in support of creating the Federal Farm Bureau early in the 71st Congress, progressives opposed Hoover's nominees to the Board on the grounds that they represented upper class interests rather than farmers (New York Times, 1929). Hoover's conservative selections for the Supreme Court also caused intense ideological conflicts. Progressive senators passionately opposed the

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The administration openly clashed with the "bonus army" of veterans, accused them of harboring communists, and deployed the army to disperse them with force. These events preceded modern opinion polling, but the 1932 campaign and election results suggest these conflicts hurt Hoover's public image (Tugwell, 1972). It is interesting to note that President Grover Cleveland is often lauded for vetoing private relief bills for veterans during this administration while Hoover is criticized for making comparable decisions.

89 Another example of this conflict over energy policy is Hoover's veto of a progressive proposal to use government property in Muscle Shoals, Alabama to produce inexpensive fertilizer and supply electricity for farmers (Link, 1971, p. 160). In his veto message, Hoover expressed his firm opposition to the federal government entering any business in competition with the private sector (Hoover, 1931). The roll call record includes five votes on the Muscle Shoals proposal.

90 *United States v. Smith*, 286 U.S. 6 (1932).

confirmation of Charles Hughes, Hoover's pick for Chief Justice, and defeated the confirmation of John Parker (New York Times, 1930b; Oulahan, 1930).

What about the second dimension? Referring again to Figure 1, Hoover and most of the progressives have positive y-axis values. This result suggests that Hoover sided with progressives, at least on some issues. There appear to be three policies on which Hoover and the progressives were in agreement: restricting immigration, upholding prohibition, and protecting farm prices.[91] During the 71st Congress, Hoover and progressive legislators were together on five roll call votes advancing legislation to protect native wages against immigrant labor and two roll call votes to supplement alcohol prohibition laws in the District of Columbia.[92] Hoover and the progressives also united to establish a Federal Farm Board (progressives later opposed Hoover's nominees for the Board) as well as a measure to protect dairy farmers by regulating the manufacture and importation of oleomargarine. These votes to protect agriculture are indicative of cross-cutting regional concerns during the Hoover Administration. Members of Congress from the Midwest, Deep South, Mid-Atlantic, and West are significantly higher on the second dimension than members from the New England, the Northeast, and Great Lakes regions. These regional differences existed within both parties and in both chambers.

While some social issues appear in the roll call record, progressive social issues clearly did not dominate the legislative agenda during the Hoover administration. The record was dominated by economic issues on which Hoover sided with conservatives rather than progressives. Hoover did not assert his supposedly progressive views on civil rights

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[91] I identify these issues by analyzing the cutting lines of roll call votes during the Hoover administration. Roll call votes on immigration, prohibition, and agriculture met three criteria: they were cross-cutting, they substantially divided Congress, and Hoover and the progressive voted the same way on them.

[92] By this time, however, progressives were losing their enthusiasm for prohibition. During the 1931 Progressives' Conference, organizers kept this divisive issue off the agenda.

(Grothaus, 1984) and environmental protection (Hatfield, 1987) on the legislative record during his administration, nor were these issues clearly part of the progressive agenda at that time.[93]

Conclusion

In this chapter, I consider the claim advanced by contemporary political historians that Herbert Hoover was a progressive president. According to these accounts, textbook American political history should be revised to credit (or blame, depending on the source) Hoover for the New Deal. Political science methods are uniquely suited to inform this important debate.

I complete a roll call voting record for Hoover using House and Senate votes on his nominations, bills he signed and vetoed, a treaty, as well as votes where Hoover requested legislators vote yea or nay. This research fills a gap in presidential research and shows that the revisionist accounts of the Hoover Administration are wrong. Although there were progressive members of the Republican Party during the Hoover Administration, Herbert Hoover was not one of them. If we analyze Hoover's record in office, it appears that Hoover was significantly more conservative than the average member of his party. I consider the extent to which the conclusions drawn here result from the set of votes analyzed or the method of scaling employed and find that some models indicate Hoover was not significantly more conservative than his fellow Republicans. No research design, however, yields the result that Hoover was progressive; the conclusion presented here may be considered robust.

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[93] Again, it is important to distinguish between the historic and contemporary definitions of progressive politics. Some progressive social policies from Hoover's day may be considered conservative today (e.g. restricting immigration and prohibiting alcohol) while some issues considered progressive today (like environmental protection and civil rights) were not part of the progressive agenda in Hoover's time.

Prior works were unable to estimate Hoover's ideal point because he made relatively few requests for legislative activity. My research demonstrates a solution to this problem which improves our understanding of presidential behavior. This research may reassure students of American political history that textbook accounts of Hoover as a staunch conservative are largely correct. Successfully estimating Hoover's ideal point may make this fascinating period of American politics more amenable to scientific analysis. Although Hoover needs, and perhaps deserves, a public image make-over, this research suggests efforts to recast him as a progressive Republican are misguided.

Although this research focuses on a particular administration, the method used here to estimate Hoover's ideal point may contribute to presidential studies generally. My work on Hoover demonstrates that a presidential ideal point can be estimated using bill signings, vetoes, nominations, and treaties in addition to requests. This approach allows us to estimate the ideal point of a president, such as Hoover, who made few requests and test controversial hypotheses about his presidency. Enriching the data used to estimate ideal points of presidents generally may yield more accurate and certain ideological measures, a useful contribution to many studies of the presidency.

Appendix A to Chapter 9

Hoover's Ideal Point in Relation to 71st and 72nd Congresses
(Using Optimal Classification)



Appendix B to Chapter 9

Hoover's Ideal Point in Relation to 71st and 72nd Congresses

(Using IDEAL)



Chapter 10

PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

Despite scholars' long-standing interest in presidential influence over members of Congress, empirical analysis of presidential leadership has been hampered by measurement problems and poorly specified statistical models. According to Edwards III (2009a, p. 817), "Despite all the attention to leadership, it remains an elusive concept, and there is little consensus even on what leadership is." In this Chapter, I consider how presidential leadership may influence the legislative process and make a preliminary effort to measure the relative influence of U.S. Presidents on members of Congress.

U.S. presidents possess both formal and informal powers to influence the legislative process. The object of exercising these powers is to move policy outcomes in the direction favored by the president; the president wants bills he favors to pass and those he opposes to fail. To influence the legislative process, therefore, the president must induce members of Congress to support bills they would otherwise oppose or vote against bills members would otherwise support. A number of prior works have considered whether, and under what conditions, the president can influence the legislative process in his favor. A number of studies consider the link between presidential popularity and legislative influence, for example, but have yielded mixed results.

Spatial models of the ideal points of members of Congress and presidents enable us to evaluate presidential influence over legislators. Within this framework, we can investigate the effect of presidential position taking while controlling for individual preferences. Legislators with policy preferences closely aligned with the president's preferences can be expected to vote in support of the president's legislative priorities without

having their arms twisted or careers threatened. On the other hand, we may expect legislators on the opposite side of the political spectrum to rarely support the president unless their arms are twisted or they are otherwise induced to support the president. Because some legislators may support the president's position based on their own preferences, raw presidential support scores are not particularly informative. Additionally, exogenous events, like sudden and unexpected shocks, may compel congressional action. While presidents may assume the mantle of leadership during such times, it may be the nature of the times, in some combination with presidential leadership, that compels members of Congress to support the president.

With respect to seemingly successful presidents, one wonders whether their accomplishments can be attributed to individual leadership, a favorably-composed Congress, or the nature of the times? Does a president's failure to win support reveal failed leadership or his misfortune of having few natural allies in Congress? Which presidents, if any, have actually influenced individual members of Congress? In this Chapter, I incorporate estimates of presidential preferences into quantitative analysis of presidential leadership in the legislative realm to offer some preliminary answers to these questions.

Theoretical Accounts of Presidential Influence on the Legislative Process

A number of considerations common to all presidents, such as the power to veto bills, enable the White House to play a prominent role in the legislative process. While these formal powers are important, they do not help us understand why some presidents are more successful than others are because the formal enumeration of powers has not changed since the ratification of the Constitution. Why, then, might some presidents enjoy more influence over members of Congress than do other presidents? The means by which presidents may influence members of Congress are varied but generally fall into three categories: time-varying explanations, partisan and election-based accounts, and theories of individual leadership. These three categories do not necessarily exhaust the range of

possibilities, but offer some theoretical structure for analyzing president leadership. In this section, I briefly discuss time-varying and partisan theories of presidential influence and consider some of the nuances of theories to which I direct most attention: individual leadership.

1. Time Varying Explanations

One school of thought associates presidential influence on the legislative process to the nature of the times and the office of presidency. Presidents are thought to enjoy greater power during war and other times of crisis (Howell & Rogowski, 2013). In terms of the spatial model, one may view wars or economic crises as shocks that move the location of the status quo to extreme locations. During extreme conditions, all legislators may be more inclined to take action. That is, the utility of the status quo for all legislators decreases. As a result, support for presidential proposals that respond to crisis increase across the ideological spectrum.

Because presidents can pick and choose their legislative battles, the nature of the times and the ability to discern the right legislative positions become very important elements of presidential success in the legislative arena. "[T]he White House chooses its priorities carefully on the basis of its promises, political needs, and the partisan environment in which it finds itself" (Wayne, 2009, p. 331). To the extent the president identifies the right issues - issues where status quo policy is extreme or non-existent - his proposals may enjoy widespread support among legislators despite the president's position not affecting the legislator's utility functions. In these policy areas, the status quo position is relatively extreme compared to the preferences of most legislators.

Extensive support from executive offices may also help the president identify the right issues and define presidential positions in terms of proposed legislation. The institutionalization of the presidency, particularly the creation of offices to propose and issue

recommendations on pending legislation, can be expected to increase the president's ability to take advantage of agenda-setting opportunities. One of the distinguishing features of the modern presidency, largely credited to Theodore Roosevelt, is the president's willingness to marshal executive resources to influence the legislative process. Accordingly, one should evaluate whether the determinants of legislative success vary between historic and modern presidents.

The nature of the times and capacity of the office to take popular positions on legislation leads us to expect that presidents at certain times find more agreement across the ideological spectrum than presidents do at other times.

2. Partisan and Election-Based Factors

Partisan or election-based theories of presidential influence on the legislative process are based on the presidents' role as leader of his party. When the president succeeds, he is an asset to his party; when the president fails, he is a political liability to his party. If the party's electoral prospects are tied to presidential success, how are individual legislators likely to behave? Given the common destiny of co-partisans, how are individual legislators likely to behave when the president takes a position in advance of a roll call vote? Rather than simply compare the utility of yea and nay votes based on their own personal utility functions, legislators should also consider how a win or loss for the president will affect them. The president's co-partisans should be more inclined to support the president; members of the opposing party may consider the president's loss to be their gain. Partisan or electoral considerations are not necessarily decisive. The magnitude of the president's legislative influence on his co-partisans may depend on the president's popularity, whether the president takes positions on salient issues, and whether the legislator is electorally vulnerable. Moreover, this explanation for presidential influence on legislative decisions depends on the degree to which the president is viewed as his party's leader.

Edwards III (2009a, pp. 349-351) maintains that those studying the impact of public support for the president on his congressional relations should distinguish members in the president's party from those in the opposing party. What makes the president popular in red states may make him unpopular in blue states (and vice versa). Rising popularity, therefore, may bolster the president's effectiveness on one side of the aisle while lowering it on the other; the analyst who fails to disaggregate members by party is likely to miss these effects and report null results. Applied to the present study, Edwards' argument suggests that presidential leadership skills may be moderated by party; techniques that help the president lead members of his own party may alienate members of the opposing party, leadership characteristics that ingratiate the president to the opposition may alienate members of his own party.

Partisan or election-based theories of presidential influence on the legislative process lead us to expect the president's co-partisans to support his legislative positions at higher levels than members of the opposing party. Additionally, we would expect the greatest partisan differences to occur during the administration of presidents most clearly identified as their party's leader.

3. Individual Leadership Skills

Finally, another school of thought focuses on individual presidents' leadership skills. Although it is difficult to define leadership, one suspects that some presidents have more or better leadership skills than do others. Some presidents are thought to be great leaders, blessed with faculties matching the challenges of their times, while others are thought to lack the qualities necessary to get things done in Washington, D.C. Personal leadership theories suggest that some presidents are significantly more or less successful due to their talents at negotiation, personal charisma, vitality, etc. Popular presidents may be better equipped to persuade legislators who are otherwise on the fence on a given vote (Neustadt,

1991). Political history is replete with accounts of presidents twisting the arms of members of Congress to support the White House. One envisions Lyndon Johnson jabbing his finger into a senator's chest, Ronald Reagan urging citizens to inundate their representatives with phone calls, or Bill Clinton pressing legislators in marathon meetings. Regardless of a president's preferred tactic, the president might influence the legislative process by inducing individual members to support the president's position notwithstanding their personal preferences. Based on congressional scholarship, we would expect the president to target legislators who weakly oppose the president's position because their votes should be the least costly to change. One expects members of the president's party and those in close ideological proximity to the president to vote with him more often, but presidents with strong individual leadership skills may be more successful at influencing legislators who find themselves on the fence than presidents with inferior inter-personal abilities. Presidents likely use multiple tactics to win votes, but their ability to secure votes may be a function of partisan conditions as well as their personal leadership styles.

Despite the challenges inherent in operationalizing a quality as elusive as leadership, presidential scholars have developed a number of typologies of presidential leadership (Greenstein, 1967, 1969). The most prominent effort in this regard is Barber's (1992) typology of presidential personality types. Barber classifies presidents based on their energy and affect. Some presidents have assumed an active role in defining priorities while others respond as situations present themselves. For some, the job is enjoyable; for other, it is a burden to be endured in public service. Barber sorts presidents into four distinct leadership styles: active-positive, active-negative, passive-positive, and passive-negative. Among these categories, those in the active-positive group, such as Presidents Jefferson, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, Carter, should make the most of their opportunities to

influence the legislative process.[94] "The great strength of the active-positive type in politics is his hunger for and attention to results. … The active-positive President … is far more apt to succeed in solving problems simply because he can see what he is doing" (Barber, 1992, pp. 298-299). If Barber's view is correct, the active-positive presidents should exercise more influence over the legislative process than do other types, all else equal.

Leadership is, of course, an elusive concept. Anyone who proposes to distinguish one leadership type from another type confronts borderline cases, measurement problems, rival classification systems, and general suspicion for judging personalities. Subsequent scholars have objected, that Barber's (1992) seminal study of presidential leadership styles misclassified some presidents, that his method cannot be effectively replicated or extended, that other classification systems (often more elaborate) would be more useful, and that Barber's system is biased in favor of liberal, activist presidents. Even if one could reliably identify differences in presidential personalities, the expected effects of personality differences on presidential effectiveness are not clear. In some eras, an active, energetic approach may be preferable; at other times, staying the course is the better option. It may be argued that individual greatness is a quality bestowed on certain presidents after the fact to help observers make sense of complex events. If the president's agenda is successful, observers will highlight biographical details consistent with the narrative of leadership; if his agenda fails, observers will emphasis events consistent with a narrative of failure.

[94] Barber did not analyze presidents subsequent to H.W. Bush. However, those who adhere to his view of presidential personalities have analyzed Presidents Clinton, G.W. Bush, and Obama in terms of their active-passive, positive-negative characteristics and determined that Clinton and Obama are active-positive presidents and G.W. Bush, an active-negative type (Dean, 2004, 2008). This does not mean that G.W. Bush is a negative person, but rather than he viewed public service as a personal sacrifice.

Perhaps leadership abilities cannot be assessed ex ante; they can only be assessed in retrospect, based on others' reactions and the outcomes achieved.

Proper psychoanalysis requires enormous effort. While presidents build significant public records in office, the documentation of events relevant to psychoanalysis may be fragmentary at best.[95] To the psychoanalyst, seemingly trivial events, particularly childhood experiences, are pivotal in one's development. Identifying gross mental defects, however, does not require the analyst to diagnose causes nor outline a treatment plan. Davidson, Connor, and Swartz (2006) present a thorough account of the history of mental illness in the White House based on independent medical reviews of presidential biographies. They confidently report that a handful of presidents suffered persistent symptoms of mental illness that impaired their abilities while in office. The specific manifestations and diagnoses vary, but manifest mental illness would seem likely to diminish the president's ability to lead. Accordingly, we would expect presidents who suffered significant mental illness while in office to enjoy less influence over legislators that than who were unimpaired. Certainly, this logic is reflected in the Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 and Amendment Twenty-Five which empower the Vice President to take charge when the President lacks the ability "to discharge the powers and duties of his office."[96]

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[95] Consider the scholarly analysis of Woodrow Wilson. George and George (1964) trace Wilson's tragic refusal to compromise the League of Nations Treaty to deep insecurities and need for moral authority. This diagnosis is supported by the decade-long analysis of Wilson conducted by Sigmund Freud (Freud & Bullitt, 1967), yet this singular diagnosis is disputed by Wilson scholars (Weinstein, Anderson, & Link, 1978).

[96] As is the case with most theories of leadership, this view is not without controversy. According to some authors, mental illness is not an impediment to political leadership, but rather may enhance the president's ability to influence others. For example, Lilienfeld et al. (2012) argue that psychopathic personality traits correlate to presidential achievement.

Data and Methods

In this section I outline an empirical research design of three theories of presidential influence on the legislative process discussed above: time-varying factors, partisan or election-based accounts, and individual leadership theories. I estimate presidential influence in the legislative arena using a multi-level model of presidential legislative leadership. Before presenting the statistical model, I address two substantial research design issues. Given the central role of preferences in spatial models of political decision making, one must consider the ideological distance between the president and anyone serving in Congress during his administration. Additionally, the analyst must measure presidential success in the legislative arena in a reliable manner.

Spatial models suggest that legislators make decisions by comparing the utility of voting yea to the utility of voting nay and voting to maximize utility. To estimate presidential influence on legislative decision making we must consider how legislators would have acted in the absence of presidential position-taking, based on their own preferences. If a legislator would have supported the president's position in the absence of any White House encouragement, it is difficult to argue that the president influenced the decision.

In this analysis, the ideological distance between the president and those serving in Congress (distance_{ij}) is operationalized as the diagonal (Euclidian) distance between the president's ideal point (idealPoint_i) and the legislator's ideal point (idealPoint_j) in two dimensions.[97] Because prior work by Poole (Poole & Rosenthal, 2000, 2007) suggests a single dimension is dominant, it does not make sense to equate a unit distance along the primary dimension with a unit distance along the second dimension. Therefore, the second dimension is weighted. As stated above, one expects ideological distance to decrease presidential success. The real test of individual leadership theories is whether some

[97] Specifically, $\text{distance}_{ij} = \sqrt{(dim1_i - dim1_j)^2 + (\text{weight2d} \times (dim2_i - dim2_j))^2}$.

presidents lose less support as a result of distance than other presidents do. Presidents with exceptional inter-personal leadership skills can be expected to lose less support as the result of ideological distance compared to other presidents.

I include Presidents William Harrison and James Garfield in this analysis using their ideal point from prior service in Senate and House, respectively.

Quantifying Presidential Success in the Legislative Process

Scholars have measured presidential success in the legislative arena a number of different ways. The first attempts to measure presidential influence in Congress were Congressional Quarterly's annual presidential support score and presidential box score. CQ's presidential support score calculated how often the president succeeded when he took a position on a congressional roll call vote. For example, if the president took a position on 200 roll call votes and his position prevailed in Congress 120 times, his CQ support score was 60%. To generate its presidential box score, CQ estimated how many legislative items in the president's public addresses to Congress were passed into law. The presidential box score measure was discontinued in the 1970s, but CQ has published the presidential support score annually since 1953. The higher the president's score on either measure, the more influence he is thought to have over Congress.

The president's support score is, at best, a rough assessment of his legislative leadership. The support score may reflect a variety of factors other than presidential leadership. For example, congressional support for the president depends on the composition of Congress. The president can expect more support when his preferences are compatible with those of Congress than he can when congressional preferences are dissimilar. To illustrate, in Figure 10.1 I plot the mean diagonal distance between the president and members of Congress during the time period for which CQ presidential support scores are available. Because CQ support scores and ideal point distances are not on the same scale,

I transform both into z-scores by subtracting their mean values and dividing by their standard deviations. How much variation in CQ support scores is explained by the relative proximity of presidential and congressional ideal points? The multiple R^2 for OLS regression of support on ideological proximity is 0.1744.

Figure 10.1. CQ Presidential Support Scores and Ideal Point Proximity, 1953-2010

Of course, this is only a first-pass at explaining variation in presidential support in Congress. Figure 10.1 does not control for the partisan composition of Congress which likely influences legislative support for the president.

Rather than rely on a single annual statistic, Edwards III (2009a, p. 352) suggests calculating presidential support scores for each member of Congress over the course of a year or term of Congress. According to Edwards, this approach "makes it possible to disaggregate the analysis as much as theory and independent variables will allow, and to compute aggregate figures for groups of representatives and senators when it is appropriate to do so."

Statistical Model of Presidential Leadership

Legislative support for the presidents' legislative positions is estimated as a function of three variables: the distance between the ideal points of the members and the president, whether the member and president belong to the same party,[98] and the nature of the times for all members during a given president's administration. To test the impact of these variables on presidential legislative success in U.S. history, the following statistical model is estimated:

$$\text{agreements}_{ijt} \sim \text{bin}(\text{support}_{ijt}, \text{opportunities}_{ijt})$$

$$\text{support}_{ijt} = \frac{\exp(XB_{ijt})}{1+\exp(XB_{ijt})}$$

$$XB_{ijt} = \beta_j \cdot \text{distance}_{ij} + \delta_j \cdot \text{sameParty}_{ij} + \alpha_t + e_{ijt}$$

where

$$\beta_j \sim N(\rho_0 + \rho_1 \cdot \text{mentalIllness}_j + \rho_2 \cdot \text{personalityType}_j, \sigma_\beta),$$

$$\delta_j \sim N(\tau_0 + \tau_1 \cdot \text{mentalIllness}_j + \tau_2 \cdot \text{personalityType}_j, \sigma_\delta),$$

$$\alpha_t \sim N(\mu_\alpha, \sigma_\alpha),$$

i is an index of members of Congress,

j is an index of presidents,

t is an index of terms of Congress.

The dependent variable in this analysis, support_{ijt}, quantifies the legislator i's tendency to support the legislative positions announced by president j during term t. This quantity of interest cannot be directed observed, so it is estimated. When president j takes a public position on a bill in advance of a roll call vote, he creates an opportunity for legislator i to support the president's position ($\text{opportunities}_{ijt}$). We observe the president's

[98] The variable $\text{sameParty}_{ij} = 1$ if president i and MC j from same party, 0 otherwise. Party affiliation of presidents and legislators is based on Martis et al. (1989).

requests as well as the number of times the legislator agreed with the president's requests ($agreements_{ijt}$). The most likely value of $support_{ijt}$ is equal to $agreements_{ij}$ / $opportunities_{ijt,}$ but we can model $support_{ijt}$ as the distribution of values most likely to generate the observed data. This specification prevents us from modelling an unobserved quantity as if we were certain about its value. The president takes many positions that are never subject to a roll call vote and the legislature votes on many matters which the president has not taken a position. It is important to model this uncertainty because some presidents took few legislative positions in advance of roll call votes while others were relatively prolific. Additionally, some terms of Congress are characterized by relatively few roll call votes and rapid legislative turnover. Rather than discard observations falling below an arbitrary number of opportunities for agreement, all legislator-president pairings are analyzed with the uncertainty in attendant small samples explicitly modeled.

To be clear, this dependent variable is limited to votes on which the president takes a position before the House or Senate vote. Although I use a wider range of presidential decisions to estimate presidential ideal points (see Chapter Three), if the president revealed his preference on a bill after it passed Congress, his subsequent action could not have influenced voting in Congress.

Because $support_{ij}$ is a proportion, its values are bounded between 0 and 1. Estimating $support_{ij}$ using ordinary least squares is therefore ill-advised as it may yield predicted individual support scores greater than 1 or less than 0. The logit link function usefully transforms linear predicted values, XB_{ijt}, into values bounded by 0 and 1.

The president-varying coefficients β_j and δ_j are modelled as normally distributed variables with means of $\mu_{\beta[j]}$ and $\mu_{\delta[j]}$, respectively, and standard deviations equal to σ_β and σ_δ. An intercept that varies by term of Congress is modelled as normally distributed with mean μ_α and standard deviation σ_α. I incorporate two variables into the model to explain why the effect of distance, β_j, varies among presidential administration. As noted

above, the mean of the president-varying coefficient $\mu_{\beta[j]} = \rho_0 + \rho_1 \cdot \text{mentalIllness}_j + \rho_2 \cdot \text{personalityType}_j$. This specification allows us to test whether mentally health or personality type has a systematic effect on whether a president loses more or less support in Congress as a result of ideological distance. Similarly, the mean of the distribution of the president-varying coefficient is also specified as a function of mental illness and personality type. The coefficients τ_1 and τ_2 allow us to assess whether mental health and personality type explain variation in presidents' ability to muster support from their fellow partisans in Congress.

Because I am interested in the standard errors of the varying coefficients, I estimate this model in a Bayesian statistical framework using WINBUGS. The prior distributions of the coefficients to be estimated are assumed to be normal distributed. I allow a burn-in period of 5,000 iterations to allow the sampler to converge and below report the results of 10,000 samples of the posterior distributions of the coefficients of interest.

Results

The results of estimating the multi-level statistical model of presidential influence over legislators described above appears in Table 10.1.

Table 10.1. Multi-Level Model of Presidential Influence on Legislators, 1789-2012

Variable	All Presidents	Modern Presidents Only
Ideological Distance:		
Mental Illness (ρ_1)	0.106	-0.071
	(0.383)	(0.386)
Personality Type (ρ_2)	-0.918*	-0.919*
	(0.427)	(0.421)
Constant (ρ_0)	-1.857***	-1.771***
	(0.210)	(0.212)
Partisan Leadership:		
Mental Illness (τ_1)	-0.081	-0.335
	(0.300)	(0.274)
Personality Type (τ_2)	0.150	0.133
	(0.338)	(0.310)
Constant (τ_0)	0.653***	0.656***
	(0.162)	(0.151)
Variation Over Time:		
Mean (μ_α)	1.276***	1.752***
	(0.085)	(0.105)
N	46,890	30,919
Pseudo R^2	0.612	0.652

Dependent variable is linear transformation of proportion of presidential requests supported by member of Congress in a given legislative term.
Standard errors of coefficient estimates reported in parentheses
Pseudo R^2 calculated as reduction in deviance relative to intercept-only model
* = $p < 0.05$ ** = $p < 0.01$ *** = $p < 0.001$ (one-tailed tests)

As expected, legislative support for presidential positions generally declines as the distance between the ideal point of a president and a legislator increases. Also, as expected, support for presidential positions is greater among the president's co-partisans than it is among members of opposing parties. Although this model explains presidential influence on the legislative process in terms of only three factors (ideological distance, partisanship, and time), it reduces deviance significantly compared to an intercept only model (pseudo $R^2 = 0.612$ for all observations and 0.652 in the modern era).

Because we are interested in how regression coefficients vary among presidents, Figures 10.2 and 10.3 show the effect of ideological distance and partisanship during particular administrations (the mean and 95% intervals of the president-varying β_j and δ_j coefficients). The loss in support associated with ideological distance is thought to be

moderated by individual leadership skills (i.e. mental health and personality type) and the effect of partisanship on party support for presidential positions is thought to be a product of the president's party leadership.

Figure 10.2. Effect of Ideological Distance on Support for Presidential Positions



In Figure 10.2, we see that support for the president's legislative agenda typically decreases as the distance between the ideal points of a member of Congress and the president increases. The only exception to general pattern is Franklin Pierce. The relationship between Pierce and the Congress is an unusual case. It also appears that the president's ability to lead individual members of Congress to support presidential positions despite ideological distance is on the wane. The distance between ideal points undercuts support for modern presidents more than it did for historic presidents. Still, expected loss in support due to ideological distance varies considerably from among presidential administrations. For example, we observe that Presidents Eisenhower and Coolidge suffered considerably

less loss of legislative support as a result of ideological distance than did their White House predecessors, Harding and Truman.[99]

In Figure 10.3, we observe that the difference in legislative support between members of the president's party and legislators in opposing parties is significant in some administrations but moderate in others. Indeed, according to this analysis, some presidents, including Andrew Johnson, Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter, received less support from members of their own party than they did from members of the opposing party (controlling for ideological distance and the nature of the times).

[99] The estimated effect of ideological distance on legislative support for President William Harrison's presidential positions helps to clarify the multi-level modeling approach used in this Chapter. Harrison died shortly after taking office and Congress did not vote on any of his legislative positions. The effect of distance on his positions is not informed by any observations and, therefore, takes its mean ($\mu_\beta = -1.936$) and standard deviation ($\sigma_\beta = 1.164$) values from the estimated president-varying coefficients. Our prior assumption about the coefficient β_j (that it is normally distributed per the Central Limit Theorem) is not updated to reflect additional information in Harrison's case. The more information we have to refine our prior assumptions about distributions of president-varying coefficients, the more precise these estimates. Figures 10.2 – 10.4 show more precise coefficient estimates in the modern era because these estimates rely less heavily on prior assumptions than do historic-era estimates.

Figure 10.3. Partisan Support for Presidential Positions



Although the statistical model indicates that presidents have varied substantially in their abilities to induce members of Congress to support presidential positions on legislation, it is not altogether clear why some presidents have been more successful than others have in this regard. According to Barber, the president's psychological orientation is critical to success. However, this analysis indicates that presidents Barber identified as active-positive types suffered substantially more defections in Congress on account of ideological distance than did presidents of other psychological types. Active-positive presidents did not enjoy significantly different levels of support from co-partisans than did other types. Likewise, presidents who experienced mental illness while in office did not fare better or worse in terms of the personal or partisan leadership qualities measured here.[100] Some presidents

[100] The effect of mental illness in office on partisan leadership in the modern era is not significant at conventional confidence levels (p=.189) but does warrant some mention. According to Davidson et al. (2006), a number of modern era presidents have suffered mental illness in office: T. Roosevelt (bipolar I disorder), Taft (breathing-related sleep disorder), Wilson (anxiety disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder, personality change due to stroke), L. Johnson (bipolar I disorder), and Nixon (alcohol abuse). By treating mental illness as a simple nominal variable, this analysis obscures

exhibit higher levels of personal and partisanship leadership than others do, but satisfactory explanations for varying influence remain elusive.

Figure 10.4 plots the mean and 95% intervals of the congressional term-varying coefficients α_t. As discussed above, during particular congressional terms, the extreme nature of the times (i.e. war and economic crisis) produces widespread agreement among the president and members of Congress. During certain time periods, presidents have the opportunity to take positions on issues with widespread appeal.

Figure 10.4. Time-Varying Presidential Influence Coefficients



The results reports in Figure 10.4 strongly support time-varying theories of presidential leadership. This Figure plots variation in congressional support for president positions on a term-by-term controlling for ideological distance and partisanship. Higher values correlate to greater levels of congressional support. Horizontal lines indicate mean support levels for all terms and the modern era. The extent of support the president can expect in Congress appears to fluctuate dramatically over time. For example, it appears

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substantial variation in mental illnesses. Refinements of this analysis may distinguish among types of mental illness, with respect to their impact on inter-personal relationships.

that legislative support for presidential positions increased significantly during the congressional term beginning in 2001. Following the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, there was widespread support in Congress for security measures endorsed by President George W. Bush. The surge in support for presidential positions during these terms (and to a lesser extent the next two terms of Congress) reflects both an external shock and an administration willing and able to support security-related policies. Similarly, there appears a dramatic increase in support for presidential positions during the congressional term beginning in 1963. According to some scholars, the assassination of President Kennedy sparked an era of "creedal passion" for sweeping Great Society legislation (e.g. Huntington, 1981). Again, this time-varying account for presidential success in Congress is both a product of a shocking event as well as an administration willing and able to seize the opportunity to assert timely legislative positions.

Unexpected presidential successions provide interesting opportunities to assess the impact of individual leadership from the White House. For example, when President Harding died unexpectedly in 1923 during the 68th Congress, the individual occupying the Oval Office changed but Congress did not. Given that Harding selected Calvin Coolidge as his running mate, it is no surprise that Harding and Coolidge have similar DW-NOMINATE ideal points (first dimensions scores: 0.471 and 0.369). Harding is generally regarded as corrupt and inept. Coolidge, on the other hand, is thought to have been affable with some talent for public relations. Does Coolidge replacing Harding make a difference in terms of presidential influence on the legislative process? Figure 10.5 compares legislative support for Presidents Harding and Coolidge.

Figure 10.5. Congressional Support for Presidents Harding and Coolidge



Although Presidents Harding and Coolidge have similar ideal points, expected congressional support for these two presidents' legislative priorities varies considerably. Ideological distance cost Harding far more congressional support than it did Coolidge. Based on this analysis, the individual occupying the White House made a substantial difference in terms of congressional support for presidential positions. Coolidge demonstrated greater individual leadership than did Harding; Coolidge was able to secure support for presidential legislative positions from ideologically distant Senators and Representatives while Harding was not. Comparable analysis of instances of presidential succession, including Taylor-Fillmore, Garfield-Arthur, Nixon-Ford, does not reveal such dramatic differences in individual leadership skills. Spatial models of congressional support show that Andrew Johnson received far less support from his fellow Republicans than Lincoln did.

Discussion

What does this analysis tell us about presidential leadership in legislative affairs? The results reported in the previous section generally indicate that presidential success in legislative affairs varies significantly over time and among administrations. During certain

terms of Congress, we observe (see Figure 4) high levels of congressional support for presidential positions. During these terms, opportunity meets preparation. Specific crises shock the nation and some presidents command the institutional resources to advance responsive policy changes. In general, time appears to be on the side of modern presidents; time-varying coefficients are above-average in 23 of the most recent 25 terms of Congress. Assuming the influence of random external shocks averages out over time, the legislative success of modern presidents can largely be attributed to picking the right issues – that is, taking positions on issues likely to find support across the ideological spectrum.

At the same time, these results support president-centered theories of legislative influence. It is generally thought that preferences and parties affect congressional decision making, but this research shows the effects of preferences and parties vary depending on who is president. Ideological distance undercuts congressional support for some presidents' legislative priorities more than it does for other presidents' priorities. Similarly, some presidents receive higher levels of support from their co-partisans in Congress than other presidents do. While trends in individual and party leadership by the president over time are not entirely clear, it appears from Figure 5 that few modern presidents are above-average with respect to president-centered influence over members of Congress. Among post-WWII presidents, this analysis indicates that President Eisenhower is the only president with above-average party and individual leadership abilities. Based on the results reported in Figures 10.2 and 10.3, one observes something of a Golden Age of presidential leadership during the late nineteenth through early twentieth centuries. Starting with Grover Cleveland's second term (beginning 1893) through the Wilson administration (beginning 1913), U.S. presidents consistently scored high in terms of both individual and party leadership. In this time period, the presidency was not highly institutionalized but the president assumed both the mantle of national party leadership and an active role in the legislative process. More can obviously be written about the history of the presidency, but

the accordance between conventional wisdom and these results suggest that the statistical model is generally valid.[101]

Although the statistical model employed here attempts to disaggregate presidential influence over Congress into time-varying, individual, and party-centered components, it is worth reiterating that presidents likely use multiple tactics in legislative affairs. No single explanatory variable provides the ultimate measure of presidential leadership. These components of leadership should be interpreted holistically to compare the leadership qualities of different presidents.

In the remainder of this discussion section, I consider how lopsided roll call votes and voice votes, two types of votes that complicate statistical analysis of presidential influence over Congress. Although Congress considers many controversial issues, many (if not most) roll call votes are unanimous or extremely lopsided. Additionally, Congress frequently decides matters on voice votes without recording yeas and nays by roll. How do lopsided and voice votes affect research on presidential success in Congress? Edwards III (2009a), for example, argues that congressional support measures should exclude lopsided votes. He notes that most scholars have settled on including votes where less than 80% of the votes were on one side (Bond & Fleisher, 1990; Bond, Fleisher, & Wood, 2003; Edwards III, 1990, 2009a).

In this analysis, I do not exclude lopsided votes. For purposes of estimating ideal points, lopsided votes are simply non-informative. Because we locate the president's ideal point relative to members of Congress, it makes no difference whether one includes or excludes lopsided votes.[102] This compares to the situation where a class is graded on a

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[101] Some of the anomalous results appear in the case of unpopular presidents. Support for Franklin Pierce increases with distance which is very unusual. Similarly, Andrew Johnson gets more support from Democrats than from his own party.

[102] Although it is safe to assume president approves treaties proposed by him, coding treaties does not add too much to the analysis in most terms. Treaties generally passed

curve; questions that all students missed or answered correctly do not affect their relative rankings. For purposes of measuring legislators' support for presidential positions, including lopsided votes potentially inflates success scores during a session but I nevertheless include them because my theoretical framework suggests support will vary over time; everyone may agree with the president's position on a bill because the president is responding to crisis and that is an interesting and important source of presidential influence in legislative affairs. As a statistical matter, lopsided votes change the intercept of support during particular terms but do not bias our estimates of individual or party leadership.

How does one account for the fact that much of what is done in Congress is not conducted in recorded votes? While the practice of voice voting may seriously challenge scholarly analysis of certain legislative processes, like the magnitude of obstruction during certain periods, it may not present serious problems in this analysis. Generally, scholars believe that Congress passes matters on which there is widespread agreement by voice vote. If this is the case, voice votes are similar to lopsided or unanimous votes. If the sample of votes used to estimate the relative ideal points of legislators excludes votes on which they all would have agreed, the estimates are unbiased (by analogy, it compares to not including on a curved test a question all students would answer correctly). Voice voting has more serious implications for agreement scores. If members of Congress supported (or opposed) the president's position on legislation through voice votes rather than roll call votes and the probability of voting by voice rather than roll is not constant, the time-varying coefficients reported above may be inaccurate. These time-varying coefficient estimates may be refined by determining whether members of Congress supported presidential positions by voice

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unanimously or with only one or two nay votes. Some treaty ratification votes have been heavily contested, however, and may help us identify the president's ideological location. Similar considerations exist with respect to votes on nominations. Most nominations pass by supermajority votes, but some are hotly contested. Again, rather than prejudge category of votes, I allow the data to inform the analysis.

votes. Although voice votes potentially implicate the term-varying coefficients, the estimates of individual and partisan leadership reported above should not be affected.

Conclusion

In this Chapter, I evaluate presidential influence on the legislative process in terms of a spatial model of decision making. In the spatial model framework, individuals make decisions on the basis of their personal preferences. I argue that presidential influence should be primarily viewed in terms of methods by which presidents cause legislators to vote according to the president's expressed wishes, rather than the legislator's own preferences. Theories of presidential influence over Congress suggest that presidents have three primary means of exercising this kind of influence: they pick the right issues at the right time, they employ inter-personal skills on individual members of Congress, and they unite members of their party in common causes. I test these theories of leadership by analyzing legislative support for policy positions endorsed by U.S. presidents. I find support for each of these three modes of presidential influence in legislative affairs.

This research potentially makes two contributions to scholarly research on the presidency. First, by enlarging the data used to estimate presidential ideal points, this research enables scholars to estimate the ideal points of a number of presidents for the first time (and improve estimates for others). Given the central role of spatial models in the presidency research agenda, this dramatically increases the potential range of analysis. Second, I use a multi-level model of presidential success in Congress to test presidency-centered and president-centered theories of legislative influence at the same time. Rather than treat these schools of thought as distinct or mutually exclusive, I attempt to demonstrate how they can be integrated into statistical analysis and provide the analytical framework for understanding general trends in presidential behavior as well as particular cases (i.e. Harding v. Coolidge). Rather than use dummy variables for individual administrations to control statistical noise, I treat president-level differences as

substantively interesting findings. I consider whether presidential psychology explains observed differences in congressional support for administrative positions on roll call votes. Although the evidence does not clearly support Barber's theory of presidential personality or document the problem of mental illness in the White House, the design used here demonstrates a useful synthesis of president and presidency-centered approaches to presidential studies.

Chapter 11

PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT TO THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS

In the preceding Chapter, I evaluated how presidents influence the legislative process. The legislative process, however, is not the president's only means of influencing public policy. Presidents can also influence public policy by appointing the right judges to the federal judiciary. Because federal judges enjoy life tenure, the president's judicial appointees may make significant decisions long after the president has left office.

In this Chapter, I use the ideal points of presidents reported in Chapter 3 to analyze the decision making of judges on the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. These judges are thought to decide cases in a manner consistent with the preferences of presidents and home state senators (Giles, Hettinger, & Peppers, 2001; Hettinger, Lindquist, & Martinek, 2004, 2007). Current measurement strategies derive judicial ideal point estimates, to a large degree, from presidential ideal points. Therefore, the problems and limitations in presidential research discussed in Chapter 1 inhibit this subfield of political science research. By filling gaps in estimates of presidential preferences, I am able to evaluate the decision making of circuit court judges over a greater period of time than was possible in prior research. This research enriches our understanding of both judicial behavior as well as presidential appointment powers. I find that judicial preferences do not become reliable predictors of decision making on the circuit courts until the 1950s.

Decision Making on the Circuit Courts of Appeals

In this Chapter, I investigate how political preferences have shaped cases decided by the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals since 1925. Prior works offer conflicting accounts of the motivations for federal judicial appointments over the course of the twentieth century. The

political procedures and norms for judicial appointments have evolved over time to suit the president's agenda (Binder, 2007; Primo, Binder, & Maltzman, 2008). However, it is not clear whether growing concern for professionalism and legal expertise has displaced or merely supplemented presidents' partisan policy interests.

On the one hand, it seems that presidents have consistently picked federal judges to advance a partisan agenda. Indeed, the very origins of judicial review emerge from the Federalist Party's attempt to maintain authority through life appointments to the federal judiciary (Hofstadter, 1969). Richardson and Vines (1970, p. 48) contend that "the basic pattern of judicial selection and allocation has not been seriously altered" since 1789. Partisan alignment with the president has long been a prerequisite for a seat on the federal bench. Solomon (1984) identifies William Taft, a former Supreme Court justice, as the first president to appoint circuit court judges to affect policy outcomes.[103] To the extent that the criteria for nomination have changed, we have observed legal expertise emerge as an additional requirement for nomination and confirmation.

On the other hand, presidents have used federal judicial appointments for patronage purposes. Some have argued that presidents in earlier eras generally did not care about the policy preferences of lower federal court judges (Goldman, 1999). If presidents nominated circuit court judges to reward loyal members of their party and close personal friends, these appointments may not make a definitive impact on the direction of federal policy.a

Based on the attitudinal model of judicial decision, we would expect circuit court judges to decide cases in a manner consistent with the preferences of the president who appointed them. With varying intensity, political scientists have maintained that a judge's policy preferences significantly influence how he or she decides cases. But is this

[103] According to Binder (2007, p. 9), Woodrow Wilson was the first president to perceive judicial appointments as a means of advancing his administration's policy agenda.

conventional account of judicial politics historically accurate? Is the attitudinal model of decision making broadly applicable or does it explain only certain eras on the bench?

To analyze changes in the determinants of judicial behavior, I estimate the ideal points of nearly all life-tenure judges appointed to district or circuit courts since the creation of the federal court system. I conduct this analysis to answer two historical questions. Has the influence of policy preferences on judicial decisions changed significantly over time? To what extent have U.S. presidents been able to affect the outcomes of cases heard by the Circuit Courts of Appeal through appointments?

Stated generally, the attitudinal model maintains that judges decide cases according to their individual policy preferences, rather than the application of laws to particular case facts. This model is grounded in cognitive psychology and decision making heuristics (see Moyer, 2012 for concise summary). A judge's personal values are thought to color his or her perception of cases, particularly whether the facts favor a liberal or conservative outcome. This model has helped scholars successfully explain U.S. Supreme Court decisions (e.g. Segal & Spaeth, 2002) and has been advanced by increasingly sophisticated measures of Supreme Court justices' ideal points (esp. Martin & Quinn, 2002; Martin & Quinn, 2007).[104]

Consistent with research on the Supreme Court, political scientists have found that individual policy preferences play a significant role in decision making on the Circuit Courts of Appeals (Cross, 2003; Hettinger et al., 2004, 2007; Kaheny, 2010; Miller & Curry, 2009; Songer & Haire, 1992). At the same time, research suggests that the intermediate nature of these courts limits circuit judges' expression of personal preferences (Zorn & Bowie, 2010).

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[104] Some Supreme Court scholars contend that individual preferences drive judicial behavior to the exclusion of legal precedent and case characteristics. Others (e.g. T. E. George & Epstein, 1992) conceptualize individual preferences as significant forces controlling for other factors, such as precedent, public opinion, and case facts, which sway judicial decision making.

Unfortunately, research on decision making on the Courts of Appeals is largely confined to the contemporary era. Songer and Haire (1992), for example, examined cases decided between 1957 and 1990; Hettinger et al. (2004), cases decided between 1970 to 1988; Miller and Curry (2009), 1997 to 2007; Kaheny (2010), 1958 to 1996; Moyer (2012), 1982 to 2002. Prior research does not offer us an opportunity to assess whether preference-driven decision making is an inherent characteristic of judging or limited to a particular time period.

Challenge of Historical Research on Circuit Courts

Although Congress created some circuit courts in the early eighteen century to hear appeals in different geographic regions,[105] the history of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals really begins in 1891. The Judiciary Act of 1891 relieved Supreme Court justices of their obligations to "ride circuit" (McGuire, 2004, p. 130) and hear all federal appeals (Songer et al., 2000, p. 5), thereby defining circuit courts' unique role in the federal judiciary.[106] According to Richardson and Vines (1970, p. 26), "[t]he creation of the courts of appeals was one of the most enduring struggles in American political history." The institutionalization of intermediate federal courts not only implicates the balance of power

[105] The first recorded roll call vote in the U.S. Senate was to pass a bill establishing the judicial courts of the United States. The Senate approved this measure by a vote of 14 to 6. The original federal courts, much like the Senate, were considerably smaller in 1789 than they are today. "In that initial system, a six-member Supreme Court was created along with three circuit courts and thirteen district courts. … Each circuit court was staffed by two Supreme Court justices and one district judge. Although the first circuit courts had some appellate responsibilities, they were primarily trial courts" (Songer, Sheehan, & Haire, 2000, p. 4).

[106] For further background on the Judiciary Act of 1891, see Richardson and Vines (1970) Chapter 2 and Evans (1944).

between states and the federal government, but also the relationship of the Supreme Court and lower federal courts.

Because responsibility for hearing cases in circuit courts was originally shared by local judges and justices riding circuits, presidents appointed relatively few judges to circuit courts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Figure 11.1 shows the number of life-tenure appointments each U.S. president has made to the circuit courts, district courts, and other federal courts.[107]

Figure 11.1. Presidential Life-Tenure Appointments to Lower Federal Courts



Although the development of the U.S. Supreme Court as an institution is relatively well documented (e.g. McGuire, 2004), our understanding of the institutionalization of circuit courts is limited. Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons to suspect that decision making on the circuit courts has changed substantially since 1891. Over the course of the twentieth century, the circuit courts have developed institutional power by defining federal subject matter jurisdiction, improving judicial compensation, and enacting summary procedures for caseload management.

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[107] The exceptional number of judges appointed to circuit courts by John Adams became a center of controversy in the early republic. The "midnight judges" appointed at the end of the Adams Administration were at issue in the famous *Marbury v. Madison* case.

Why would the institutionalization of U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals affect the decision making of circuit court judges? In other words, why should history of the Circuit Courts motivate us to test the attitudinal model of judges over time? Institutionalization affects decision making because the way an organization carries out its business defines the opportunities its member have to influence outcomes. To the extent an organization institutionalizes its practices it enhances opportunities and incentives for strategic behavior (Shepsle & Bonchek, 1997, p. Chapter 11). McGuire (2004, p. 135) maintained that institutionalization has enabled the Supreme Court to shape federal policy through landmark decisions, particularly those that strike down legislative acts: "[M]odest levels of institutional development should check the justices' policy ambitions; greater degrees should enlarge the Court's institutional capacities, thereby better enabling its members to accomplish their objectives." Applying McGuire's logic to circuit courts, we should expect that modest institutionalization to moderate the expression of judicial attitudes and judicial preferences to become more influential in decision making as the circuit courts have matured. If institutionalization is a necessary precondition to circuit judges' deciding cases according to the policy preferences of appointing presidents and home state senators, the attitudinal model of judging may only explain cases decided after the middle of the twentieth century.

Testing these expectations requires the researcher to estimate the preferences of judges appointed to the federal bench in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A method formulated by Giles et al. (2001) is widely used to estimate ideal points of federal judges and considered the state-of-the-art measure for circuit judge preferences (Epstein et al., 2007, p. 4). In this approach (hereafter GHP), a judge's ideal point is derived from the ideal point of political actors responsible for his or her appointment. These actors, the president and his or her Senate colleagues, look to appoint like-minded judges. Should a vacancy arise in an area represented by a senator in the president's party, presidents are

thought to exercise senatorial courtesy and allow that state's senator(s) to select the nominee.[108] Otherwise, the president nominates judges according to his or her own preferences. Most scholars have conceptualized judicial preferences as points along a single dimension of liberal versus conservative values (e.g. Epstein et al., 2007). I incorporate the GHP method of ideal point estimation in the present research design and describe its mechanics further below.

A virtue of the GHP method of estimation is simplicity. It allows the researcher to make reasonable estimates of preference based on a small number of readily observed variables. Prior research has demonstrated that taking senatorial courtesy into account yields a superior measure than looking simply at appointing presidents (which improved over a binary partisanship variable). Deriving estimates of judicial preferences from those of presidents and senators is a pragmatic approach to studying the behavior of federal judges below the Supreme Court.

At present, ideal points have only been calculated for judges appointed during the Eisenhower Administration or later.[109] Estimation has been limited to contemporary era appointments because the presidential support votes compiled by *Congressional Quarterly* used to estimate presidential preferences date from 1953. This limitation is problematic when one seeks to conduct historical analysis. Judges appointed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries represent a significant share of the federal judicial activity and, given their duration of service, appear in data collected on cases decided well into the twentieth century.

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[108] A judge's home state is determined from his or her biographical information. This determination is simpler than it may seem. Often, an individual nominated to a circuit court will have previously served on a state appellate court or a federal district court that serves all or part of a single state.

[109] Note that judicial scholars have estimated President Truman's ideal point from his Senate service to calculate ideal points of Truman appointees using the GHP approach.

Data and Methods

For this historical analysis of the attitudinal model of judging, I use the Songer (1998) database of Circuit Court decisions which samples cases from 1925 to 1988; data from Kuersten and Haire (2007) for a sample of cases decided between 1989 and 2002; and data I coded with several other for cases decided between 2003 and 2010. These datasets provide a stratified sample of Circuit Court decision making. From 1925 to 1960, the sample includes fifteen randomly selected cases per circuit per year; beginning in 1961, the number of cases sampled per circuit increases to thirty. I reshape the dataset so that each judge on a multi-member circuit panel provides a unique observation.[110] In all, the sample includes decisions by 1,537 federal judges appointed by twenty-two presidents.

I exclude decisions with mixed or indeterminate policy outcomes (per original coding). The dependent variable of interest is whether the judge rendered a conservative decision.[111] Because the dependent variable is a binary outcome (conservative decision = 1, otherwise 0), I employ logistic regression analysis. Additionally, because the observations

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[110] Some cases involve more than one substantive issue. For example, the defendant in an obscenity case may argue his or her actions are protected free speech. Such a case involves both criminal and constitutional law. To the extent that two separate issues were identified, I consider each judge's treatment of each issue a separate observation. A judge could, to continue this example, decide the First Amendment did not protect the defendant but that the evidence used to prosecute him was illegally obtained (a conservative decision on one issue and liberal decision on the other).

[111] The codebook for the dataset clarifies what constitutes a conservative decision: "Many of the directionality codes are consistent with commonly used definitions of 'liberal' and 'conservative.' ... For example, votes in favor of the defendant in a criminal case, or for a newspaper editor opposing an attempt at censorship, or for a union that claims that management violated labor laws when it fired a worker for union organizing activities would all be coded as ... [conservative votes]. However, some issues are not easily categorized along a liberal/conservative dimension (e.g., attorney discipline cases). The directionality codes parallel closely the directionality codes in the Spaeth Supreme Court database" (Songer, 1998, p. 79).

analyzed here were collected through stratified samples of circuit court decisions, I weight the observations in line with random sampling.[112]

Statistical Model

I model judicial decisions as a function of (1) the judge's personal preferences, (2) case characteristics, and (3) collegial influences. The first component of this model presents a challenge to implement in the historical era and my solution to this problem is elaborated below. The second and third components of the model are implemented relatively easily thanks to prior research. As case characteristics, I consider whether the case is a criminal appeal and whether the district court rendered a conservative decision.[113] I control for the collegial influences by determining each panel's median ideal point as well as the median judge in the circuit when the decision was rendered (both of these variables are calculated from relevant set of panel and circuit preferences).[114] I also control for circuit differences and year-to-year variation in the Circuit Courts' decision making environment using dummy

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[112] Sampling weights are calculated so the stratified sample resembles a random sample of all opinions published in a given year. Cases from large circuits are weighted more heavily than cases from small circuits because the former represent a larger share of the population of published opinions than do the latter. For further detail on calculating sampling weights, see Songer (1998, pp. 8-9).

[113] Prior research indicates that conservative decisions are more likely in criminal appeals than in other case areas. The ideological direction of the decision being appealed is a compact summary of the case facts. If the district court judge rendered a conservative judgment, one assumes the case lends itself to a conservative outcome.

[114] The preferences of the median judge on a three judge panel are thought to be pivotal based on Black's Median Voter Theorem (for general explanation of the Theorem, see Shepsle & Bonchek, 1997 Chapter 5). Because a three-judge panel's decision can be reviewed and reversed by the full circuit convening en banc, judges may vote strategically in line with the median judge of their circuit. The empirical support for full circuit influence through en banc proceedings is mixed (Giles, Walker, & Zorn, 2006; Hettinger et al., 2007).

variables for circuits and years. This compact model is the workhorse of my analysis and is used to compare subsets of judicial decisions.

I use this model of judicial decision making to examine changes in the effect of individual policy preference on a year-by-year basis. This approach allows me to capture variables we would expect to influence judicial decisions made contemporaneously, such as public opinion, new federal laws, and changes in Supreme Court composition, in an intercept term that varies from one year to the next.

I conduct auxiliary analysis on the varying effectiveness of different presidents' appointees as policy agents. Because judicial preferences are derived, in large part, from presidential preferences, it does not make sense to incorporate both individual and presidential preferences into this analysis. Nor does it make sense to subset the data by president because that analysis would compare the effect of preference among a president's judges (who presumably have similar preferences) rather than compare the influence of preferences on judges appointed by different presidents. To this end, I model appointing presidents as intercept shifts, considering whether a cohort of judges appointed by the same president have a distinct propensity to decide cases liberally or conservatively compared to other cohorts of judges, controlling for case characteristics and collegial influences.

Locating Judges Appointed Before the Eisenhower Administration

Estimating the effect of individual judicial preferences on cases decided between 1925 and 2010 requires estimating the ideal points of more than 800 different judges appointed before 1953.[115] To this end, I follow the GHP approach. Three pieces of information are

[115] The project requires estimating preferences of many district court judges in addition to circuit court judges given the prevalence of district court judges serving by designation in the time period of study. Including district court judges serving by designation increases

needed to estimate a judge's policy preferences: (1) the president who made the nomination, (2) the Senate term that the judge was appointed in,[116] and (3) the judge's home state.[117] If the judge's home state was served by two senators from the president's party, the judge is determined to have the average, or mid-point, preference of those senators. If the judge's state was represented by one senator from the president's party, the judge is assumed to have the same preferences as that senator. If the judge was nominated for a seat that is not represented by a senator from the president's party, it is assumed that the president nominates an ideological match.[118] If the judge was nominated and appointed to more than

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the political variation among judges; however, these judges decide fewer cases than those permanently seated on circuit courts. Accordingly, I weight observations.

[116] The president who made the nomination can frequently be determined from the Senate term the appointment was made in, but a number of presidents failed to serve complete terms due to death or resignation. Using Senate term rather than year of nomination is preferable because many nominations are made during "lame duck" sessions at the end of president's term during a calendar year largely in the subsequent Senate term.

[117] Identifying judge's home states is straightforward for district court judges nominated to serve a single state. Identifying the home states of judges nominated for circuit courts requires some biographical research because circuit courts serve multiple states. Nominees will often have extensive public service in a particular state prior to nomination. A number of judges were nominated after substantial federal government service in "stateless" Washington DC. Some cases require the researcher's best reading of the judge's biography. All of these determinations are incorporated in the underlying data.

[118] Occasionally, a judge's home state will be represented by more than two senators in a given term, including at least one from the president's party. This situation arises when one or more senators fail to serve full terms due to illness, death or resignation. It also occurs when a senator changes party affiliation mid-term. In these cases, I determined who represented the judge's home state in the Senate at the time he or she was nominated by the president and applied the general rule based on the senator(s) serving at the time of nomination.

one federal court, his or her preference is coded in line with each appointment.[119] The issue of multiple appointments typically arises when a judge is first appointed to a district court and subsequently promoted to a circuit court; this move is not a simple administrative reassignment, it requires presidential nomination and Senate confirmation.

As noted previously, U.S. presidents starting with Dwight Eisenhower and senators from the 77th Senate forward (Franklin Roosevelt's third term) have been assigned Common Space Scores. This leaves a gap in the historical record. Fortunately, we have the opportunity to build on prior research. The DW-NOMINATE constant scaling method developed by Poole and Rosenthal (2001) and McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (1997) provides ideological measures of senators and presidents that extend the duration of the federal judiciary.[120] I utilize DW-NOMINATE rather than Common Space Scores because the former span the entire history of Congress.[121]

As discussed in Chapter Two, scholars have not previously estimated the ideal points of a number of U.S. Presidents. One could only estimate the ideal points of federal judges appointed during these presidents' administrations if they were associated with one or more

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[119] I follow conventional application of the GHP method here, but believe revising preference estimates in light of appointment to another court is needlessly complicated and that the circumstances of initial appointment provide more useful estimates of judicial ideal points. I do not include my analysis of this methodological issue in this paper but interested readers may request it from the author.

[120] Legislators' DW-NOMINATE scores are comparable because this method fixes the ideal points of legislators who served and cast roll call votes in multiple terms at constant locations and locates other legislators (who did not serve concurrently) in comparison to those who served multiple terms.

[121] This should not be read as a slight to Common Space Scores; I outline a simple method of translating the judicial preference estimates used here into the Common Space Scores in an Appendix.

senators in the president's party.[122] Of these "missing" presidents, Herbert Hoover's absence is most troublesome for this analysis. Hoover's judges represent a sizable portion of activity in the U.S. Courts of Appeals dataset. Hoover nominated 34 judges who were appointed to the federal bench without Republican home state senators, 18 of whom appear in the dataset at least once (casting 871 total votes).[123] As detailed in Chapter Nine, I estimate Herbert Hoover's ideal point on the DW-NOMINATE scale by enlarging the scope of presidential activity equivalent to voting yea or nay on roll call votes in the 71st and 72nd Congresses. Having estimated the ideal points of all judges who appear in the datasets, we are now afforded a new perspective on judicial history.

Results of Empirical Analysis

In this research, I consider whether the attitudinal model of decision making is time bound or helps us understand the history of the federal judiciary. I analyze cross sections of decisions rendered in specific years as well as decisions rendered by judges appointed by the same president over the course of their careers.

Estimating this model of judicial decision making using all observations indicates that all explanatory variables are statistically significant. These results, reported in Table 11.1(a), are consistent with our understanding of judicial behavior. I find, however, that the determinants vary considerably over time.

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[122] Applying senatorial courtesy during these administrations, the number of federal judges for whom this research has not produced ideal point estimates is rather small: Hayes judges (11), A. Johnson judges (5), and J. Adams (4). Taylor and Fillmore did not appoint judges without home state senators from the Whig party. William Harrison died shortly after taking office and did not appoint any federal judges (nor make any official requests according to Swift et al).

[123] One appointee of Rutherford Hayes is identified in the codebook for the Songer dataset (James Pickney) but I was unable to locate a decision rendered by him in the dataset.

Table 11.1. Logistic Regression Model of Circuit Court Voting, 1925-2010

Variable	(a) All Cases	(b) 1925-1952	(c) 1953-2010
Judge's Ideal Point	0.238***	0.105	0.281***
	(0.025)	(0.074)	(0.031)
Criminal Law Cases	0.619***	0.556***	0.630***
	(0.019)	(0.063)	(0.022)
District Decision Conservative	0.646***	0.716***	0.672***
	(0.009)	(0.023)	(0.012)
Panel Median	0.219***	0.141*	0.263***
	(0.031)	(0.115)	(0.037)
Circuit Median	0.003	-0.051	0.056**
	(0.036)	(0.135)	(0.051)
Circuit Dummy Variables	INCLUDED IN ALL MODELS		
Year Dummy Variables	INCLUDED IN ALL MODELS		
Constant	-0.223***	-0.545***	-0.222***
	(0.027)	(0.132)	(0.079)
N	71,776	12,757	59,019
Wald $Chi^2(44)$	8721.94	1405.18	5421.92
Prob > Chi^2	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Pseudo R^2	0.088	0.103	0.096

Dependent variable: whether judge voted conservatively (1=yes)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* = p < .05 ** = p < .01 *** = p < .001 (one-tailed tests)

I assess the influence of individual preferences over time by estimating the model using yearly cross-sections of the data. Figure 11.3 plots the partial regression coefficients for individual preferences on decisions made from 1925 to 2010. Solid line segments indicate years in which the analysis determined that judges' personal preferences significantly affected their decision making. The bottom panel of Figure 11.3 displays the difference in the expected probabilities of a typical Republican-appointed judge and typical Democrat-appointed judge voting conservatively from 1925 to 2010 in statistically average cases. The rectangular spaces indicate partisan differences in predicted probabilities of a conservative vote in each year's typical case with the arrow pointing toward the Republican-appointed judge and midpoint representing neutral preferences.

Figure 11.2. Impact of Political Attitudes on Judicial Decisions, 1925-2010



Figure 11.3 allows us to assess the attitudinal model of decision making in the Circuit Courts of Appeals since 1925. Although individual preferences are highly significant in the aggregate (reported in Table 11.1(a)), individual preferences do not significantly influence voting behavior of circuit court judges until 1953.[124] Individual preferences are not

[124] Although this break-point is suggested by the results, it should be noted that the mid-1950s marks a dividing line in several analyses of the circuit courts (e.g. Barrow & Zuk, 1990; Vining, 2009a, 2009b). The proportion of panels including at least one senior status

statistically significant every year after 1953, but their significance is limited to years after 1953.[125] After 1953, a typical Republican-appointee was often 5-10% more likely to render a conservative decision in an average case compared to a typical Democrat appointee.

In columns (b) and (c) of Table 11.1, I compare the determinants of judicial decisions in the contemporary period 1953-2010 with those of the historic period 1925-1952.[126] The data indicate that the determinants of judicial decisions are significantly different in these two time periods. During the historic period, only case characteristics and the median panel preference are statistically significant.[127] In the modern period, case characteristics remain

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judge dramatically increases in the mid-1900s. Rather than retire outright, federal judges, after certain service periods, may assume senior status. Senior judges hear fewer cases and legislation passed in 1948 entitles them to all salary increases given to active service judges. Previously, retirement pay was limited to the judge's salary upon retirement (Baker, 2000). Six years later, judges' financial security was further improved. The Judiciary Act of 1954 entitled judges to assume senior status at age 70 after 10 years of service or at age 65 after 15 years of service. These reforms have had a significant effect on judicial service and judicial careers. Yoon (2006) found that judicial retirement decisions are far more influenced by pension eligibility than the partisanship of the president or other policy considerations.

[125] Sample size affects this analysis to some degree. Songer et al. sampled 15 cases per circuit per year from 1925 to 1960 and 30 cases per year thereafter. Because the number of votes analyzed to estimate partial regression coefficients displayed in Figure 11.3 approximately doubles after 1960, the standard errors are generally smaller from 1961 to 2002 compared to 1925 to 1960. Preferences do not first appear significant in 1961, however, so the results reported in text are not merely a statistical artifact.

[126] An F-test for structural change comparing the model estimated in Table 11.1(a) with one that includes a dummy variable for cases decided in 1953 or later and an interaction of this dummy variable and the first dimension preference measure further supports these results. This F-test yielded a test statistic of 21.56 for the interactive term, corresponding to a p-value of less than 0.0001. In contrast, the test statistic for the first dimension preference variable (effect of preferences before 1953) was less than 0.01, a p-value of 0.9936.

[127] If one operationalizes preferences as a nominal variable, identifying judges with the party of appointing president, rather than a continuous variable as is suggested by contemporary scholars, partisanship is statistically significant in a one-tailed test in the

significant but individual preferences become significant as does the median preference of the entire circuit. In the modern era, conservative policy preferences are substantively and statistically significant with respect to a judge's tendency to vote conservatively.

Figure 11.4 offers a visual summary of the results presented in Table 11.1 columns (b) and (c) aggregated by judge. Panel (a) plots the proportion of conservative decisions each judge rendered from 1925 to 1952 against his or her ideal point; Panel (b) does the same for judges' decisions from 1953 to 2010. The size of each point is proportional to the number of cases decided by each judge and the regression lines included on these plots are weighted by judges' caseloads.

Figure 11.3. Correlation of Judges' Voting Records and Preferences



The relationship between judicial preferences and voting behavior is noticeably different in the time periods depicted in Figure 11.4. The coefficient on the regression line depicted in Panel (a) is modest compared to the relationship between preferences and

historic era ($p = 0.079$). In this analysis, Republican-appointed circuit court judges were 2.2% more likely to vote conservatively than Democrat-appointed judges were from 1925 to 1952. In comparison, the difference between Republican and Democrat-appointed judges more than doubled (to 4.7%) in the contemporary period.

decision making from 1953 to 2010.[128] The coefficient on the regression line depicted in Panel (b) is statistically significant (p-value < 0.001).

How have judges appointed by different presidents voted on the bench? We can compare the voting records of different presidents' appointees and assess whether Wilson's appointees helped carry out a progressive agenda or whether Franklin Roosevelt appointed judges with liberal tendencies during his battles with the federal judiciary.[129] Comparing the cohorts of judges appointed by various presidents, controlling for case characteristics and institutional constraints, we find significant differences.

[128] The slope coefficient for the regression line depicted in Figure 11.4(a) is statistically significant (p-value = 0.04968, two-tailed), but this bivariate relationship does not incorporate control variables. The slope coefficient for the regression line plotted in panel (b) is substantively larger (0.079 compared to 0.026) and statistically more significant (p-value < 0.0001).

[129] There are too few votes by judges appointed by Presidents George W. Bush (24), Grover Cleveland (1), and William McKinley (8) in the data to estimate the determinants of their appointees' decisions.

Table 11.2. Determinants of Circuit Court Voting by Appointing President

Variable	All Cases		No Senatorial Courtesy	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Obama Judges	-0.780	0.650	‡	‡
G.W. Bush Judges	0.295***	0.062	0.019	0.114
Clinton Judges	-0.144***	0.044	-0.170*	0.096
H.W. Bush Judges	0.272***	0.047	0.061	0.087
Reagan Judges	0.173***	0.037	0.009	0.079
Carter Judges	-0.154***	0.040	-0.404***	0.091
Ford Judges	0.109*	0.064	-0.136	0.105
L.B. Johnson Judges	-0.123**	0.042	-0.340***	0.095
Kennedy Judges	-0.155**	0.050	-0.432***	0.100
Eisenhower Judges	-0.007	0.039	-0.261***	0.078
Truman Judges	0.058	0.051	-0.039*	0.092
F. Roosevelt Judges	0.014	0.041	-0.227	0.097
Hoover Judges	0.060	0.051	-0.082	0.101
Coolidge Judges	0.000	0.055	-0.136	0.093
Wilson Judges	0.105	0.067	-0.092	0.128
Criminal Law Cases	0.619***	0.021	0.635***	0.040
Dist. Decision Conservative	0.681***	0.011	0.617***	0.019
Panel Median	0.232***	0.033	0.129*	0.055
Circuit Median	0.078*	0.038	0.027	0.066
Constant	-0.182***	0.029	0.012	0.066
N	62938		18078	
LR $Chi^2(5)$	6099.84		1596.65	
Prob. > Chi^2	<0.0001		<0.0001	
Pseudo R^2	0.0978		0.0890	

Dependent variable is whether judge voted conservatively (1=yes)
Reference category is cohort appointed by President Nixon
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* = p < .05 ** = p < .01 *** = p < .001 (one-tailed tests)
‡ Cannot by estimated

As one might suspect, circuit court judges appointed by Presidents H.W. Bush, Reagan, and Ford showed a significant tendencies to vote conservatively and judges appointed by Carter and Kennedy, to vote liberally. Although political preferences appear to have emerged in the mid-1950s, judges appointed by Dwight Eisenhower (served 1953-1960) did not exhibit significant ideological predispositions. In fact, the cohorts of judges appointed by presidents serving before 1953 did not exhibit significant tendencies to vote either conservatively or liberally. Interestingly, if one limits the analysis to decisions rendered by judges appointed without senatorial courtesy (i.e. the president's preferences),

no modern president appointed a cohort of judges who decided cases in a significantly conservative or liberal manner.

Discussion of Results

The results of this analysis indicate that the attitudinal model of judicial behavior is confined to voting in the relatively modern era of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. My analysis suggests that individual preferences did not begin to exert significant influence on judicial behavior until 1953. Additionally, it is not until this relatively modern era that I detect any significant influence of a judge's panel and circuit colleagues on his or her voting behavior. Prior to the mid-1950s, individual and collegial preferences did not play a substantial role in circuit court adjudication. In this section, I consider some possible limitations of this analysis to check the robustness of my findings.

One must consider whether the results presented here reflect a breakdown in the measurement strategy rather than historical changes. If the measurement strategy employed here does not work for judges who decided cases in the early 1900s, this may cause Type II error. To evaluate this possibility, we can compare the voting of judges appointed without senatorial courtesy in the historic era to that of judges with home state senators in the president's party. If the assumption of senatorial courtesy in the historic era is misleading, we should find preference-driven voting by judges appointed without senatorial courtesy.

Table 11.3 provides a comparison of the determinants of voting by judges appointed with and without home state senators in the historic era of this analysis. This analysis shows remarkably similar voting by judges appointed with and without senatorial courtesy in this era; neither group appears to have been motivated by individual preferences or collegial pressures.

Table 11.3. Determinants of Voting by Appointment Method, 1925-1952

Variable	Senatorial Courtesy	No Senatorial Courtesy
Individual Preferences	0.104	0.098
	(0.084)	(0.147)
Criminal Law Cases	0.500***	0.633***
	(0.071)	(0.123)
District Decision	0.727***	0.648***
Conservative	(0.027)	(0.043)
Panel Median	0.216*	0.114
	(0.129)	(0.225)
Circuit Median	-0.111	-0.209
	(0.125)	(0.228)
Constant	-0.177***	-0.069
	(0.026)	(0.042)
N	9226	3531
Wald Chi-2(5)	1003.77	318.62
Prob > Chi2	<0.0001	<0.0001
Pseudo R2	0.1003	0.0871

Dependent variable is voting conservatively
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* = p < .05 ** = p < .01 *** = p < .001 (one-tailed tests)

The change in voting behavior documented here also did not result from the determined efforts of a single president. While Wilson is thought to be the first president to appoint judges with the aim of shaping policy, based on this analysis, he did not achieve that goal. The first president in this analysis to appoint a cohort of circuit judges with distinct voting tendencies (Kennedy) took office after preferences became a significant factor on the circuit courts. Therefore, the distinction between modern and historic eras on the Circuit Courts appears to result from change in judicial behavior rather than the replacement of judges beginning in the Eisenhower administration.

The evidence here suggests that the determinants of judicial behavior are closely related to the institutional development of the Circuit Courts of Appeals. In cases decided between 1925 and 1952, a period of relatively modest institutionalization, circuit court judges did not vote significantly in line with their political preferences. These empirical results, combined with the institutional history of the Courts, suggests circuit judges did not vote according to their policy preferences until their courts achieved autonomy from the

Supreme Court and state judiciaries, divided labor among judges serving different roles, and developed standard operating procedures to manage a challenging caseload. As a consequence of institutional developments, individual policy goals play a significant role in judicial decision making after 1953. The effect of preferences on decision making was not statistically significant every single year from 1953 on, but the influence of preferences is confined to this contemporary period. This implies the dormant preferences of Circuit Court judges were activated when all indicators of institutionalization reached sufficient levels for judges to act like policy makers.[130]

Of course, the method of estimation used here does not precisely distinguish among judges appointed by the same president (in the absence of senatorial courtesy) and assumes a rather mechanistic appointment process. There are approaches to measuring judicial preferences that are more methodologically sophisticated than the GHP approach. The question is not whether more sophisticated approaches are possible, but rather whether more complex measure yield substantively interesting results. It would be wrong to conclude that the method of measurement used here does not "work" because it fails to detect preference-driven decision making before the 1950s. This type of reasoning leads the researcher to seek validation rather than truth. In this analysis, I find that the attitudinal model of judicial behavior does not explain decisions rendered by circuit court judges prior to 1953. Although the attitudinal model has helped political scientists explain judicial behavior in the modern era, it appears that alternative theories are needed for a full account of judicial decision making.

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[130] According to Ragsdale and Theis III (1997, p. 1284), "[i]t is only when all … indicators reach high levels that it appropriate to designate an organization an institution." Although some judicial behaviors may continue to increase with greater institutionalization, preference-driven decision making appears to rely on a threshold of institutionalization and then stabilize.

Conclusion

This Chapter explores the role of judicial preferences on decision making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. An extensive record of circuit court decisions rendered between 1925 and 2010 suggests that the determinants of judicial behavior have changed substantially over time. While decisions in the contemporary era are consistent with the attitudinal model, the Courts' decisions prior to the mid-1950s are not consistent with the attitudinal model. I find that individual preferences did not significantly influence judges' tendencies to vote conservatively until 1953. The results indicate that the change in voting behavior in the middle of the twentieth century did not result from Presidents Truman or Eisenhower appointing a new breed of judges to the federal bench as neither of their appointees collectively showed significant liberal or conservative tendencies during their tenures on the federal bench.

This Chapter makes two contributions to political science research on law and courts. First, it articulates a measurement strategy to estimate the ideal points of hundreds of federal judges beyond the scope of prior research. This work facilitates longitudinal analysis of lower federal courts. Second, this paper makes a substantive contribution to judicial behavior research. It suggests that the attitudinal model of judicial behavior has limited explanatory power in circuit court decision making until the mid-twentieth century.

One suggested area for future research is the analysis of decision making on the lower federal courts before 1925. The method used here allows us to estimate ideal points of nearly every judge appointed to the federal bench, but we presently lack data to test how these preferences shaped lower federal court decisions in the nineteenth century or very early twentieth century. If institutionalization provided judges the foundation for expressing policy preferences, we should not expect that the attitudinal model explains decision making during the earliest years of the Circuit Courts of Appeals. Scholars could develop a better understanding of how cases were decided before the Circuit Courts became

a formidable political institution and may wish to use the data developed here to control for individual, panel, or circuit preferences.[131]

[131] To help scholars improve upon my research, I make available a web-based application to calculate judicial ideal points by the method described herein based on user-defined variables.

Appendix to Chapter 11

Relationship between DW-NOMINATE and Common Space Scores

By convention, judicial ideal points are estimated as Common Space Scores that compare judges to other branches of government and are comparable over time (Bailey, 2007; Epstein et al., 2007).[132] One can approximate a judge's Common Space Score based on his or her DW-NOMINATE score by linear transformation. I calculate ideal points for 2,291 circuit and district court judges for whom CSS and DW-NOMINATE scores can be calculated using the GHP method. These are judges appointed during Eisenhower administration through the 111th Congress. Figure 11.7 plots their preference estimates in these two scales in the first and second dimensions of policy space.

Figure 0.4. Correspondence of DW-NOMINATE and Common Space Scores



[132] Epstein et al.'s (2007) work on Common Space Scores did not advance an alternative to the GHP method of estimating lower court judges' preferences, but rather extended it and developed a technique of translating Martin-Quinn (2007) scores for Supreme Court justices into the same spaces as other actors. Martin-Quinn scores for Supreme Court justices do not offer an alternative measure to the one used here for Circuit Court judges.

The high degree of correlation between judicial preference estimates in the DW-NOMINATE and CSS scales in both the first and second dimensions facilitates a linear transformation of measures from one scale to the other. I obtain formulas to translate judicial preference estimates using DW-NOMINATE data into Common Space Scores using ordinary least squares regression:

$$CSS_1 = 0.8602 \bullet \text{DW-NOM}_1 - 0.0126$$
$$CSS_2 = 0.7028 \bullet \text{DW-NOM}_2 - 0.0170$$

The scatterplots in Figure 11.7 and impressive model fit statistics suggest this method of extrapolating Common Space Scores is sound. These linear regression equations provide the basis for predicting the CSS scores of over 800 addition federal judges appointed by presidents who served prior to Eisenhower.[133]

[133] The usual caveats in using estimates that are "comparable across time" are applicable here. These are point estimates and do not express the uncertainty of measurements. Comparisons over time generally thought to be limited to periods of stable two-party rule. It does not make sense to compare, for example, the scores of presidents, legislators, or judges who served before and after the Civil War.

Chapter 12

FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES

In the preceding Chapters, I have identified a problem in how political scientists have studied presidents and the presidency, articulated a research design to address problems estimating the ideal points of U.S. presidents, presented those estimates, and applied those ideal points to answer a number of questions about the presidency, individual presidents, and American politics.

This research has shed light on some important aspects of the presidency which are only evident from studying the presidency over a long period of time. I have identified the most conservative and liberal presidents in the nation's history and documented the trend toward more extreme presidents on both the liberal and conservative ends of the political spectrum. The reason for this trend, in my estimation, is the radical change in the manner of electing presidents which took place in the late nineteenth century. Now that getting elected and re-elected requires presidents to assert partisan leadership, the presidency no longer moderates the political preferences of the president.

By estimating the ideal points of Presidents Washington and Hoover for the first time, I am able to address some ongoing points of controversy in presidential biographies. I find that George Washington expressed different political preferences in his first and second terms which may be attributed to Jefferson's resignation from the Cabinet, changes in the legislative agenda, and the rise of organized opposition. Despite these changes, Washington remained on the fringe of the Federalist faction and should not be considered a Federalist. My research also allows me to estimate Herbert Hoover's ideal point for the first time and address the claim made by some Hoover biographers that the 31st President

was a progressive. By plotting Hoover's ideal point against the ideal points of known progressives in Congress, I conclude that these revisionist accounts of the Hoover Administration are misleading. Hoover's legislative record shows that he was a conservative Republican.

In the preceding Chapters, I have also used my estimates of presidential ideal points to investigate presidential influence over the legislative process, introducing the president's proximity to members of Congress as a crucial control variable. Finally, I use my estimates of presidential ideal points to better understand the decision making of federal judges appointed by U.S. presidents.

What have we learned about presidents and the presidency? One consistent theme in this research is that presidential behavior depends, in part, on political context. The most important contextual consideration is the electoral environment; politicians, particularly those with presidential aspirations, must survive elections. The key contextual development for presidents occurred in the late 1800s with it becoming necessary for presidents to campaign for party leadership. Starting with Grover Cleveland's second administration, the requirement for political survival changed. This development, I argue, creates a dividing line between historic and modern presidents. Becoming president in the modern era requires leaders to be more assertive, charismatic, and partisan than it did in the historic era. This is not to say that presidents in the modern era are better or worse than historic era presidents. It is to say, however, that modern era presidents are more likely to try to shape the office than be shaped by the office of the president, more likely to attempt to sway public opinion than be swayed by public opinions, more likely to lobby Congress to support presidential initiatives than rely on formal veto powers.

Political science has long been plagued by an ongoing feud between qualitative and quantitative methods. Within the subfield of presidential studies, this conflict is reflected in the divide between those who emphasize presidents and those who focus on the presidency

as an institution. I maintain that these are false dichotomies and counterproductive distinctions. I hope that my Chapters on Presidents Washington and Hoover demonstrate that quantitative measures can be incorporated into case studies, traditionally the domain of qualitative researchers, to evaluate theories about individual presidents. Likewise, I hope that my analyses of legislative influence and judicial appointments demonstrate that president-varying terms in quantitative models should not be viewed as statistical nuisance, but can illuminate interesting differences in presidential leadership styles and help us understand how presidents shape public policy.

Methodological diversity should be embraced by presidential scholars. The subjects of our research are fascinating on many different levels. A range of disciplines contribute to our understanding of presidential behavior. While integrating varied perspectives on a complex subject is challenging and often generates as much confusion as understanding, political scientists should embrace this challenge and acknowledge that progress in political science has been achieve largely by importing concepts from other fields and applying them to politics.

The ideal point estimates produced in this research will hopefully contribute to advances in our understanding of the presidency, individual presidents, and political processes that involve the president. Some works based on prior presidential ideal point estimates may be reassessed in light of this research. The presidential studies research agenda is broad and there is progress to be made on many fronts.

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