STATE RESPONSES TO DISSENT: THE CHOICE TO COOPT

by

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(Under the Direction of K. Chad Clay)

ABSTRACT

While a majority of scholarship on a state's response to dissent focuses on repression and accommodation, the latter policy is not always feasible. This study discusses a third possible response to dissent, cooptation, and introduces a conceptual framework to apply to state responses. I conduct an empirical analysis using the costs and benefits of substitutable state responses. The results suggest a substitution between repression and cooptation, as past respect for physical integrity rights is associated with an increase in the number of parties in autocracies facing dissent. This study has important implications for future work on state responses to dissent and autocratic institutions, as well as potential policy recommendations for disincentivizing the use of repression in response to dissent.

INDEX WORDS: Dissent, Cooptation, Repression, Autocracies, Authoritarian Regimes

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

When a state[1] faces threatening dissent, it has a variety of policy options at its disposal

with which to respond. A majority of the existing research on a state's response to dissent

focuses on two policy options: accommodation and repression (e.g. Carey 2010, Davenport

2007, Gartner and Regan 1996, Mason 2004, Moore 2000, Poe 2004). Accommodation,

however, is not always a feasible response to dissent; when the demands of a dissent group are

salient and indivisible, the likelihood of an effective accommodative policy change approaches

zero (Toft 2006). Some issues, according to Fearon (1995), do not allow compromise and can

lead to conflict because the range of acceptable outcomes to both sides do not overlap. In

domestic politics, dissent groups that demand complete regime change or autonomy are largely

making indivisible demands that cannot be accommodated by a state attempting to maintain

power (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, Toft 2006). Even if a bargain is feasible, the inability of

either party to credibly commit to an agreement can lead to further conflict (Powell 2006).

When accommodation is infeasible, is repression the only response to dissent the state

can pursue? Though under-studied, a third potential response for the state exists: cooptation

(Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, Gandhi 2008). When accommodation is not possible because of

the demands of the dissent group, under what conditions will the state choose cooptation as a

response? While recent studies of cooptation have analyzed the institutionalization of opposition

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[1] Because I assume the state to be a unitary actor in its response to dissent, I use the terms "state", "regime", and "leadership" interchangeably

and the policy outcomes that are associated with more inclusive institutions, the tradeoffs

between cooptation and other responses to dissent have not been clarified. Additionally,

different uses of "cooptation" without a consensus definition in past analyses prohibit a unified

understanding of the concept (Corntassel 2007, Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014, Gandhi 2008,

Gershenson and Grossman 2001).

This study attempts to fill these gaps by, first, creating a conceptual framework for

cooptation, and, second, analyzing the state's response to threatening dissent as a cost-benefit

analysis in which cooptation and repression are considered alternative options. Only a few

existing studies specifically analyze the substitutability of the responses to dissent, specifically

the choice between accommodation and repression. The existing research (Gartner and Regan

1996, Moore 2000) focuses on a few, illustrative cases, making this the first large-scale study of

policy substitution in response to dissent.

While any state can theoretically use cooptation as a response to threat, I limit this study

to autocratic regimes.[2] As will be discussed below, dissent-targeted cooptation involves

institutional change, specifically the creation of a legislature or political parties, in order to

include opposition in the regime. Because democratic institutions are, by definition, more

inclusive, a democratic state does not frequently have the option to make institutions *selectively*

more inclusive, coopting a dissent group but not the entire population. While the general process

of cooptation is theoretically possible in democracies, the mechanisms by which dissenters may

be included differ across regime type. In democracies, expanding the franchise and lowering

vote thresholds for parliamentary inclusion may effectively coopt opposition, but further research

is needed to understand the differences in cooptive processes across regime types. Additionally,

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[2] The procedural, minimalist definition used by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) is used here: an autocracy is a regime that violates the minimum criteria for democracy, such that government offices are not filled as a consequence of contested elections.

democracies and autocracies have been shown to use repression as a response to dissent differently (see Carey 2010, Davenport and Armstrong 2004) and including all regimes here would make empirical analysis especially cumbersome. The application of this model of substitution of policy responses in democracies is left to future research.

Though this theory may be applicable across regimes, the institutions by which opposition may be coopted should vary across regime type. Autocrats may use institutions like legislatures and political parties to coopt members of the opposition; however, a semi-inclusive autocratic institution should by no means be considered equivalent to a legislature or political party in a democracy. The uncertainty over electoral outcomes and policy choices in democracies are not present in these institutions (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, Przeworski 1991). Despite the existence of elections, there is no possibility that the leadership will lose power because of an election (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). Even the policies enacted by the legislature are not subject to uncertainty: the likelihood that the legislature will approve the initiatives of the leadership is very high (Gandhi et al. 2003).

Understanding how decision-makers evaluate alternative responses to dissent and what factors influence this decision is important for two reasons. First, many actors, whether states, NGOs, or IOs, promote human rights and attempt to limit states' use of repression. This research attempts to determine how states choose to use repression in response to dissent as well as how domestic and international factors can incentivize alternative responses. Policymakers supporting alternative responses can more effectively limit state reliance on repression by increasing the costs that the state is most vulnerable to. Second, the introduction of different types of cooptation has implications for future study of autocratic institutions. While different types of institutions have been shown to affect regime stability and policy outcomes (see Gandhi

2008, Geddes 1999, and Magaloni and Kricheli 2010), how those institutions were made and who is included will affect these outcomes. This study paves the way for further disaggregation of autocratic institutions.

This study proceeds in four parts. First, I define the concepts of cooptation, accommodation, and repression and argue that the state evaluates the potential costs and benefits of each strategy when responding to dissent. Second, I describe the design of the empirical analysis of the state's use of cooptation as a response to dissent. Third, I analyze the empirical results of an imputed regression estimating the change in the number of political parties in autocratic regimes facing large dissent campaigns. Lastly, I discuss the implications of this research for both the study of autocratic institutions and the state's use of repression.

CHAPTER 2

THE STATE'S RESPONSE: COOPTATION, ACCOMMODATION, AND REPRESSION

Not all political groups are threatening to the state and elicit the state's response. Indeed, groups like workers' associations form and dissipate regularly across time, regions, and regimes. What states respond to is not simply group formation, but political dissent, in which a confrontational group or campaign uses irregular tactics (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, Schock 2003). The important aspect here is that the tactics used are outside the conventional political methods by which grievances are addressed and politics conducted (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, Ritter 2014, Schock 2003). This varies by context, as holding a meeting and expressing political beliefs is considered conventional political action in some states but not in others. Regardless of the type of extra-institutional tactics used, whether violent or nonviolent, the state is likely to respond to a dissenting political group that uses extra-institutional tactics, especially as a dissent group attempts to undermine the legitimacy of the government or damage state resources (DeNardo 1985, Ritter 2014).

Most of the scholarly work on a state's response to dissent focus on two alternative policies: repression and accommodation (e.g. Carey 2006, Davenport 2007, Gartner and Regan 1996, Mason 2004, Moore 2000, Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). A third policy option, cooptation, has only recently begun to be empirically explored (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, Gandhi 2008, Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014). In total, a state has five policy options to respond to an extra-institutional dissent group, each of which has associated costs and benefits that vary by context. First, the state can do nothing, ignoring the group. If the group has difficulty mobilizing recruits

and acquiring resources, it may not pose a real threat to the state and, therefore, any response is likely not worth the costs it would entail. Second, the state can coopt members of the group, often by giving them seats in a legislature or allowing a new political party to join the legislature. Third, the state can accommodate the demands of the group by altering the policies in accordance with the demands. Fourth, the state can repress the group or the population at large by violating or restricting political rights and liberties (Carey 2006). Lastly, the state can pursue mixed strategies, combining policies of repression and accommodation, repression and cooptation, accommodation and cooptation, or all three. While mixed strategies are likely to be most effective (see below), the conditions under which each strategy is optimal or even viable vary across situations. It is necessary to define each of the major policy responses of the state separately to determine the costs and benefits of each. Only then can one explain what strategy is preferred and more likely to be used by a state responding to extra-institutional dissent.

Conceptualization: Cooptation, Accommodation, and Repression

Cooptation

While very few scholars have addressed cooptation as a potential state response to dissent, the research that does include cooptation has yet to come to a definitional consensus. For example, Gandhi (2008) and Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) suggest that cooptation is the institutionalization of opposition groups in an attempt to elicit the cooperation required to maintain the regime. These authors hold that policy concessions, elsewhere referred to as accommodation, require an institutional setting in autocratic regimes in order to avoid further popular mobilization (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, Gandhi 2008). By contrast, Fjelde and de Soysa (2009) suggest that states will coopt political opposition through spending on political goods, thereby creating societal compliance with the government. As opposed to institutional

change, Fjelde and de Soysa (2009) operationalize cooptation as higher government expenditures, as a government that spends more should expect greater compliance from the beneficiaries of those expenditures. The broadest and most widely-used definition (see Corntassel 2007, Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014), however, comes from Lacy (1985), who defines cooptation as occurring "if, in a system of power, the power holder intentionally extends some form of political participation to actors who pose a threat" (p. 83).

Though these definitions and their applications differ, they are not unrelated. Indeed, they fit well into a classical concept-structure as defined by Sartori (1970). First, attributes of the general concept, "cooptation," must be defined. Then one may move down the so-called "ladder of abstraction" to the lower-level concept of interest, "dissent-targeted cooptation" (Sartori 1970). A conceptual structure like the classical structure used here allows for both broad and narrow definitions, as one moves up and down the ladder, while maintaining conceptual clarity.

Concept	Attributes
Cooptation ⬇	• State perceives current or future threat • State extends benefits to citizens via institutionalization • Intention of the extension of benefits is to mitigate the threat by giving more citizens a stake in maintaining the regime
Dissent-Targeted Cooptation	• Threat perceived by the state comes from an identifiable dissent group • Benefits extended by the state via institutionalization are targeted at members of the dissent group • Intention of the extension of benefits is to mitigate the threat of the dissent group

Figure 1

At the highest level of abstraction, the general concept is "cooptation." Because cooptation is an instrumental state policy, the concept must include both defined motivation and the actual policy response. I thus define cooptation as having three attributes. First, a state perceives a current or future threat. Second, the state extends benefits (e.g. financial, policy, power, or some combination thereof) to citizens or groups of citizens by including them in political institutions.[3] Third, the intention of this policy is mitigating the threat by giving more citizens a stake in maintaining the regime.

Moving down the ladder to a narrower concept, one can narrow the concept in a variety of ways. For example, specifying the benefits extended by the state would narrow the concept. For the purposes of this study, however, I narrow the concept of cooptation to "dissent-targeted cooptation." In addition to the broad attributes of cooptation, dissent-targeted cooptation has three additional specifications. First, the threat perceived by the state comes from an identifiable dissenting group. Second, the benefits extended by the state via institutionalization are targeted at members of the dissent group. Third, the intention of the extension of benefits is to mitigate the threat of the dissent group via the reduction of extra-institutional dissent.

The differences between the two levels of cooptation have observable implications. At the higher level, a threat need not be specified and the people being coopted are not necessarily defined *ex ante*. This is consistent with the case of cooptation in the Soviet Union, as studied by Gershenson and Grossman (2001). Gershenson and Grossman (2001) find that broadly perceived threats from foreign enemies and rival ruling elites spurred the leadership of the Communist Party (CPSU) to extend party membership to more citizens. Those who became

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[3] Theoretically, economic institutions could be used to coopt threatening opposition. The coopted group must be included in an economic institution, not simply receive economic transfers. Increased private or public goods transfers do not imply a change to the "rules of the game" and do not constitute a credible commitment. At the time of writing, I do not know of any cases of cooptation via economic institutionalization; the general argument should be applicable to both political and economic institutions.

party members, being formally included in the institution of the CPSU, enjoyed the associated advantages and privileges, acquiring a stake in the survival of the regime (Gershenson and Grossman 2001). The CPSU's policy of cooptation meets the broad definition of the concept, as shown in Figure 1.

Some attributes of dissent-targeted cooptation are also observable, but are more specific. There must be an identifiable dissent group that is sufficiently threatening to the state. The actual extension of benefits to members of that group will likely take on the form of institutional change, as suggested by Gandhi (2008) and Gandhi and Przeworski (2006). While broad cooptation does not necessarily lead to institutional change, as in the example of the CPSU, dissent-targeted cooptation is likely to take the form of the creation of a legislature, political party, or the inclusion of more political parties in the regime. This assumption is based on the nature of the dissent group and its members. An identifiable dissent group has publically stated policy preferences that differ from the state in the form of demands. Members of the group would be unlikely to accept cooptation into the existing regime without any institutional changes: the benefits offered without change include only financial and power benefits. Group members who gave up the cause and joined the existing regime for financial benefit (or for greater personal power) after publically stating policy preferences will be sanctioned by the members of the group who did not receive those benefits. In order to effectively incorporate dissent groups into the regime, the state must allow them to maintain dissenting policy preferences and institutionalize that opposition.

If dissent groups will only accept institutionalized cooptation when institutions are altered to allow more dissent, what incentive does the state have to institutionalize coopted groups? While simple financial (and general private goods) transfers can be effective in

establishing support for the regime (see Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Wintrobe 1998), institutional cooptation is preferred for two reasons. First, institutionalized cooptation allows for more credible commitments for both the state and the dissenting group. The state can more credibly commit to the dissenting group that the extended benefits will continue to be provided. While a state can promise continued transfers of private goods, it can renege on that commitment once the dissent group has demobilized or it has acquired the needed resources and information to effectively repress the group. Institutionalization allows the existing regime to commit to continue the beneficial arrangement and, because of the more regular interactions, allows the coopted individuals to more closely monitor the leadership's behavior. The dissent group is also more credibly committing to demobilization and supporting the regime. When they are coopted, members of the dissent group publically join the regime and would incur social costs as well as foregone benefits by reneging. The regime also has a greater ability to identify and monitor dissenters when they are coopted into state institutions (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014).

A similar, albeit more extreme, argument is put forth in Acemoglu and Robinson's (2006) theory of democratization. They suggest that the threat of revolution can lead to more credible power-sharing commitments through democratization (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). This process should apply to not only extreme cases of revolution but less extreme dissent behavior. The institutional change through which autocrats might coopt opposition should not, however, be seen as democratization. Autocracies can be more or less inclusive without holding free and fair elections or even making progress toward the democratic standard (e.g. see Gandhi 2008, Geddes 1999, Weeks 2014). Thus while more extreme dissent may lead to more extreme institutional change, the state response to lower levels of dissent may follow similar processes.

Second, coopting the group through formal institutionalization makes the dissent less threatening. In a legislative institution, public protests of dissent become non-publicized policy debates (Gandhi 2008). Future policy concessions can be framed as a legalistic compromise and the popular mobilization that threatened the regime can be avoided (Gandhi 2008). The cooptation of members of dissent groups, therefore, should be observable as institutional change that allows for non-threatening, institutionalized dissent.

An illustrative example is the creation of the *Majlis* in Kuwait. The dissent of merchants over tax policies and commercial regulations in the early 20th century threatened the rule of the Kuwaiti emir, Mubarak (Gandhi 2008). The merchants organized politically and created the *Majlis*, or Legislative Assembly, to represent their interests (Gandhi 2008). The emir "consented to the legislative body," altering the institutions of the regime to coopt the merchant group (Gandhi 2008, p. 49). Simple transfers of private goods would not have successfully coopted the merchants because one aspect of their grievances was the arbitrariness of the policy-making of the state: they wanted a check on the emir's power in order to promote policy stability (Gandhi 2008). Not only did successful cooptation require institutionalization in this case, institutional change was also necessary. Before the creation of the *Majlis*, Kuwait was ruled by the royal family; an additional political institution like a legislature had to be created to incorporate any political actors outside the royal family. As this example demonstrates, dissent-targeted cooptation can be observed as institutional change following the formation of an identifiable dissent group.

Accommodation

The second response to dissent available to the state is accommodation. I follow the existing definition of accommodation most commonly used in studies of the state's choice

between repression and accommodation (DeNardo 1985, Gartner and Regan 1996, Moore 2000).

State accommodation of a dissent group is purposive changes in policy that, across a spatial

policy dimension, moves the policy point towards the ideal point of the dissent group. There is,

thus, variation in accommodativeness of the response: a state can move its policy point only

slightly toward the dissent group, or very close to the dissenters' ideal point. The larger the

movement of the salient policy point necessary to satisfy the group (i.e. the greater the difference

between the state's policy and the ideal point of the dissenters), the greater the costs of

accommodation for the state (Gartner and Regan 1996).[4] Whether or not the state will

accommodate the dissent group is, therefore, a function of the demands of the dissent group

relative to the status quo (Gartner and Regan 1996).

While some demands are based on indivisible issues and so far from the status quo the

probability of accommodation approaches zero (e.g. demands for regime change), not all

demands are necessarily extreme (Gartner and Regan 1996, Toft 2006). Even when

accommodation is not too costly, the state still may fail to concede to demands of dissenters

because a lack of visible "progress" can discourage members of the group and decrease support

for dissent (Chong 1991). Though there is consensus among scholars that accommodation is a

potential policy response to dissent, despite the variation in the effectiveness and viability of the

response, systematic empirical studies of accommodation are sparse (Gandhi 2008, Gartner and

Regan 1996, Mason 2004, Moore 2000). This is largely due to the difficulty in observing the

process of accommodation. If a dissent group's demands can be accurately identified, the

subsequent policy movement towards those demands is more difficult to capture. The

instrumentality of the policy change is largely unobservable: the state must be changing the

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[4] This assumes that the state's current policy point is close to the leadership's ideal point. As this study focuses on autocracies, the likelihood that the state's policy would be far from the ideal point of the leader or the median of the leadership group is low.

policy with the purpose of reducing dissent. A responsive state may be forthright in its openness about conceding to the demands of a dissent group, but it is more likely that the state will hope to conceal its accommodation in order to avoid incentivizing future dissent by signaling the effectiveness of the dissent strategy in addressing grievances (Carey 2006).

Because of past conflations of cooptation and accommodation, I will make the differences and potential overlap between the two concepts explicit. First, dissent-targeted cooptation does not imply a policy change: other types of benefits that do not meet the specific demands can be extended to members of the dissent group and the regime can credibly commit to allowing greater influence over policy deliberations without any alteration to the policy of interest. The scenario in which accommodation and dissent-targeted cooptation are truly the same is when the demands of the dissent group include institutional change and representation. In this case, the creation of a legislature or political party to include members of the dissent group *is* moving the regime's policy toward the group's ideal point.

Studies that have combined cooptation and accommodation have done so for good reason: there are many benefits to using the strategies complementarily (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, Gandhi 2008). First, accommodation, or "policy concessions," can be more effective when conducted in an institutional setting in which demands can be clearly revealed and agreements negotiated (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). Accommodation may only be "successful" when there is a reduction in the amount of dissent: enough dissenters are satisfied and the group de-mobilizes. Clear information about the demands of the group will allow the state to use accommodation more effectively because a policy change can move directly toward the group's ideal point.

Second, mixing the strategies of accommodation and cooptation can help mitigate some of the costs of accommodation alone, such as incentivizing further dissent and redistributing finite resources. Policy concessions made in a formal institution can be framed as "legalistic compromise," shielding the leadership from perceptions of weakness from other elites and the society at large (Gandhi 2008). When used alone, accommodation can signal to the populous that dissent is rewarded with policy concessions. Dissent-targeted cooptation obfuscates this signal, decreasing the likelihood of further popular mobilization (Gandhi 2008). The benefits of cooptation as facilitating more credible commitments can be applied to accommodation when the mixed strategy is used. A one-time policy change towards the group's ideal point can be reversed when the group demobilizes. If members of the group are coopted via institutional change, any policy concessions made will be more credible. While there are many benefits to the combination of accommodative and cooptive responses to dissent, extra-institutional accommodation or dissent-targeted cooptation without relevant policy alterations are theoretically possible. The concepts, therefore, must be defined separately as they are here.

<u>Repression</u>

The third policy option the state can use in response to dissent is repression. Conceptual definitions of repression also vary in their specificity. I use the broad concept as defined by Carey (2006): "behavior that is applied by governments in an effort to bring about political quiescence and facilitate the continuity of the regime through some form of restriction or violation of political and civil liberties" (p. 2). Like the other state responses, the definition includes both policy (restriction or violation of political and civil liberties) and intention. Moving down the ladder of abstraction, narrower concepts might be defined using the actual rights being violated, such as differentiation between violations of physical integrity rights and

political rights and liberties (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014, Lupu 2013), differentiation between targeted and indiscriminate repression (Mason 2004), or differentiation between "legal" and "tyrannical" repression (DeNardo 1985).

For this study, I will use the broadly defined concept for two reasons. First, states that choose to repress often violate many specific rights simultaneously. There is little reason to believe a state will choose strategies of political imprisonment and restrictions on assembly in response to dissent without considering restrictions on speech and the use of torture at the same time. Mixed strategies concerning the simultaneous use of repression and accommodation, for example are already difficult to model. However, incorporating mixed strategies for different types of repression is beyond the scope of this paper. I will leave a more intensive conceptual disaggregation of repression for future work.

The second reason for using the broad definition of repression in this study is the potential disconnect between intended state policy and repressive policy outcome. This is specifically applicable to a disaggregation between targeted and indiscriminate repression. While a state may prefer a policy response of repression targeted only at the members (or even leaders) of the dissent group, it may lack the capabilities to do so. A state may lack the information and military capabilities needed to identify and target dissidents. Additionally, the state may lack the ability to control its agents; individual personnel can repress more indiscriminately than the principal's (the state) preference (Bell et al. 2013, Clay and DiGiuseppe n.d., Englehart 2009). Observed outcomes of repression, therefore, do not as clearly correspond to intentional state policy with narrower, disaggregated definitions. While agency loss is an ever-present issue when studying repression, it is not as problematic for this study as the focus

here is the costs and benefits of repression, not an observed outcome of repression. Carey's (2006) broad definition is, therefore, most appropriate for this study.

<div align="center">The Choice: Costs and Benefits</div>

The explanation of the state's response to extra-institutional dissent presented here relies on three assumptions. First, the state is assumed to be a unitary actor. The leader or leadership act as "the state" and has complete control over the decision-making process and implementation of the chosen response. Second, the state is assumed to be a rational utility-maximizer. The state will weigh the expected costs and benefits of each response option as well as the probability of success, attempting to select the response that maximizes benefits while minimizing costs. In the choice of a response to dissent, the preferences pursued by the leadership are to maintain power, reduce current dissent, and reduce future dissent. This preference ordering constitutes the third assumption. The preference of a leader or regime to maintain power is regularly assumed by scholars explaining rational leader behavior (see Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Goemans 2008). In pursuit of these preferences, I argue that the state will attempt to evaluate the best possible response to dissent by weighing the costs and benefits of each option.

The first strategy, cooptation, has both benefits and costs. As previously discussed, institutionalized dissent-targeted cooptation can make commitments between the leadership and the dissent group more credible. The costs of reneging on the new distribution of benefits are higher for leaders that have institutionalized the opposition because of the accumulating benefits to the opposition. Institutionalized opposition can use their new position in the regime to build their own bases of support that can be mobilized against the leader if the commitment is broken (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014). The threat posed by a scorned institutionalized opposition is equal if not greater than the threat of an extra-institutional dissent group because the asymmetry

of resources between the regime and the opposition has likely decreased. Additionally, the opposition can monitor the leadership more easily through the new institution, ensuring that the leadership is keeping their commitment. As the costs of reneging increase, the dissenting group can accept the regime's commitment to the long-term extension of benefits as more credible.

The dissent group's commitment to reduce extra-institutional activities is also more credible when the group is coopted. The costs of reneging on this commitment now include the foregone benefits of inclusion in the regime and the increased costs of dissent, as discussed above. After being institutionalized, an opposition group can be more easily monitored by the leadership and targeted with repression should extra-institutional dissent continue to occur. It is, therefore, highly risky for an institutionalized dissenter to carry on extra-institutional activities, making commitments to reduce these activities more credible.

In addition to the more credible commitments between the leadership and the dissent group, institutional cooptation can mitigate the costs of accommodation, as discussed above. Instead of signaling to the public and potential rivals that the leadership will acquiesce to any extra-institutional demands, the regime that coopts opposition can make concessions less publically, framing concessions as a legal process of compromise (Gandhi 2008). When cooptation can make dissent less threatening, it becomes a viable strategy in response to dissent.

The response of institutionalized dissent-targeted cooptation also has associated costs. Extending benefits to a newly institutionalized opposition reduces the benefits of the existing members of the regime. The costliness of the extension of benefits varies according to the existing power and resource distribution of the regime. In a regime with a very small winning coalition[5], for example, the power and resources of the state are only spread amongst a few

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[5] I define winning coalitions as the group whose "support endows the leader with political power" and receives benefits from the leadership in order to maintain that support (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, p. 51).

people (likely the leader and the "inner sanctum" of elites), thus the concentration of power and resources per individual is very high (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, Gandhi 2008, Svolik 2012). The marginal change in the power and resources any one person holds will be substantially greater when benefits are extended to a dissent group. The relative power and resources given up by a member of a small coalition is greater than the relative power and resources given up by a member of a larger coalition. It is, therefore, very costly for a small coalition with highly concentrated power to extend benefits to a dissent group via cooptation.

At the other end of the spectrum, when coalitions are very large, cooptation becomes costly as well. As power and resources are more widely diffused, the finite resources of the state must be divided into decreasingly smaller portions. Eventually, the state's resources will run out and if any more dissenters are coopted, the benefits provided to other members of the regime will fall below the threshold needed to maintain loyalty. Members of the regime will lose their stake in the maintenance of regime and no longer support the leadership. This potential cost of too much cooptation was demonstrated in Gershenson and Grossman's (2001) study of cooptation in the Soviet Union: as more citizens were coopted into the CPSU, the standard of living for members of the *nomenklatura* decreased. The costs of cooptation, I contend, are a function of the size of the existing winning coalition in a U-shaped relationship. The costs of cooptation are higher for regimes with small coalitions and large coalitions than regimes in between. Thus the likelihood of cooptation is low when the costs are high (i.e. the coalition is very small or very large) and the likelihood of cooptation is high when the costs are low.

H1: The likelihood of cooptation is highest at middling values for the size of the existing winning coalition; or more formally, the marginal effect of the size of the existing winning coalition on the likelihood of cooptation is non-monotonic.

Repression is the alternative strategy a state can pursue in response to dissent. Like the other responses to dissent, the benefits of repression are determined by the effectiveness of the strategy in achieving the preferences defined above. Repression will increase the costs of dissent, limiting the ability of the group to organize and recruit (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014, Tilly 1978). The state's ability to identify and target leaders of the dissent group will make repression most effective (Mason 2004). The benefits of repression, therefore, increase as state capacity increases. If the state lacks the capacity to target repression, a repressive strategy will be more costly. Indiscriminate repression, which requires less state capacity, could generate more support for the dissenters by incentivizing recruitment and cause the group to use more violent tactics (Mason and Krane 1989, Mason 2004). The potential for "backfire," in which repression *increases* dissent, makes a repressive strategy implemented without state capacity to target dissidents unlikely to be effective (DeNardo 1985, Ritter 2014).

The costs of repression can be divided into two categories: domestic costs and international costs. When the regime is reliant on taxes for revenue, widespread repression will carry the cost of lost revenue from foregone citizen taxation (DeMerritt and Young 2013). A regime has greater latitude for action when it has sources of non-tax revenue available, such as resource rents and non-conditional aid (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). Relying heavily on citizen taxation for revenue constrains the regime's ability to repress its citizens. While potential economic losses constitute the expected domestic costs of repression, there are potential

international costs as well. When the level of repression passes some threshold of toleration, the international community may impose sanctions or withhold aid (Gartner and Regan 1996). Additionally, high levels of repression can lead to forgone private investment and foreign direct investment, imposed by private actors as opposed to states. While the international community may attempt to impose costs on any highly repressive regime, the costs endured by the regime vary as the state's vulnerability to these policies varies. For example, the international community's withholding of aid would only be costly for a state that relies on foreign aid. A state that does not need foreign aid would not be vulnerable to this international cost. The general costs and benefits of repression as a strategy vary substantially on a case-by-case basis, centering on variations in state capacity and economic vulnerability.

Clearly, the strategies of cooptation and repression each have associated costs and benefits. Given the previously stated assumptions of utility maximization and state preferences, I argue that *a state facing dissent will attempt to choose the policy response that maximizes the likelihood of effectively realizing its preferences while minimizing the costs*. In a traditional rational choice framework, the state compares the expected costs and benefits of each strategy, combined with the probability of success, and attempts to choose the utility-maximizing strategy. When accommodation is not possible, state that expects repression to carry high domestic and international costs will likely attempt to coopt members of the dissent group instead, choosing the least costly strategy that will still reduce dissent.

H2: When accommodation is unlikely, the likelihood of dissent-targeted cooptation will increase as the costs of repression increase.

The use of mixed strategies adds complexity here. As previously mentioned, combining complementary policies in response to dissent can be highly effective, taking advantage of the benefits of multiple policies while mitigating costs. Cooptation and accommodation, as discussed above, can be used simultaneously to mitigate some of the costs of accommodation while realizing the benefits of both strategies. Repression can be used in conjunction with both cooptation and accommodation, potentially disincentivizing continued dissent while allowing the regime to credibly commit to opposition via cooptation or making small, accommodative policy movements. If the state can accommodate and coopt the more moderate members of the dissent group and repress the others, the repression will likely be targeted and on a generally smaller scale; this can allow the state to avoid some of the potential costs of repression. Limiting the use of repression by pursuing mixed strategies, therefore, may keep state behavior below the threshold of international intolerance, avoiding the potential international costs without sacrificing the benefits (Gartner and Regan 1996).

While the use of mixed strategies is complex and merits further research, multiple simultaneous responses to dissent do not pose serious problems for this study. As previously discussed, this research empirically examines the choice between repression and cooptation. The use of a mixed strategy in which a state chooses to both coopt and repress members of the dissent group is entirely possible and even likely, considering the benefits of mixed strategies. However, the choice of a mixed strategy is also indicative of a cost-benefit calculation. If repression alone were the utility-maximizing choice, the state would repress without employing any combination of strategies. An observation of cooptation indicates that the costs of repression were high enough to eliminate that option as a singular response. Repression is not a dichotomous outcome: there are varying levels of the severity of repression, regardless of type.

For a state to choose to institutionalize dissenters through cooptation, either in conjunction with repression or individually, the costs of repression alone must be quite high. Cooptation should be observed, then, when the costs of repression are high regardless of the utilization of a mixed strategy, given the high costs of accommodation for an indivisible or "difficult" demand.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

To test the argument that states make utility-maximizing choice between cooptation and repression in response to dissent, I proxy the expected utility of repression by using indicators of the expected costs and expected benefits of the strategy. I use an imputed regression model to analyze the occurrence of institutional, dissent-targeted cooptation as a response to dissent, given the costs and benefits of repression in autocracies facing large dissent campaigns from 1981-2008. Contrary to convention, I will discuss my independent variables first, as the operationalization of these measures have important implications for my modeling strategy.

Independent Variables: Dissent, Coalition Size, and the Expected Utility of Repression

An empirical analysis explaining dissent-targeted cooptation has a necessary condition that must be included in the model: dissent. Without dissent, any cooptation that may occur is, by definition, not dissent-targeted. Therefore, a variable for dissent must be included. While there are measures of protest events (Banks 2014) and violent conflicts (PRIO, see Gleditsch et al. 2002), cooptation is targeted at dissent groups, not events. While event counts may indicate the intensity or frequency of dissent, the coherence of the group and its demands are not necessarily captured by an event count or dichotomous measure of civil war. This study will use the NAVCO data (Chenoweth and Lewis) on violent and non-violent campaigns as a measure of dissent. I use country-years of autocracies in which at least one dissent campaign is observed to

define my sample. I also include an independent variable, *Campaign Count*, to capture situations

in which more than one dissent campaign occurred in one country-year.

Using the NAVCO data (Chenoweth and Lewis) has a few advantages. First, the unit of

analysis for NAVCO is "campaign", which is defined as "a series of observable, continuous,

purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective" (Chenoweth and Lewis

Codebook). This allows for additional measures of group size, coherence, and demands that an

event count would not capture. Second, NAVCO includes both primarily violent and primarily

nonviolent campaigns. The costs of the potential state responses to dissent apply to situations

with both primarily violent and primarily nonviolent campaigns. The campaigns included are

not exhaustive: the NAVCO data only include campaigns with "difficult goals," mostly regime

change, significant institutional reform, territorial secession, and greater autonomy (Chenoweth

and Lewis).

While limiting the sample of dissent to large campaigns with "difficult" goals can be

problematic for some empirical work, this limitation presents an advantage in this design. Recall

that there are five possible state responses to dissent: do nothing, coopt, accommodate, repress,

and mixed strategies. Limiting the dissent variable to large campaigns with lofty goals logically

excludes two of these options: doing nothing and accommodation. Because the campaign is

sufficiently large to be included in the NAVCO data, it should also be large enough to draw the

attention of the state and pose a threat. Thus NAVCO's measure of the size of the campaign

limits the options of the state, largely precluding "no response" as a possibility. Second, the

inclusion of only campaigns with "difficult" goals maintains higher costs of accommodation

(Chenoweth and Lewis). Regardless of the nature of the defined goal, the goal is defined as

"difficult" because it is far from the status quo in policy space. As discussed above, the costs of

accommodation are a function of the space between the status quo and the ideal policy point of the dissent group. Only including groups with "difficult" goals effectively limits the probability that accommodation will be used as a response to dissent.

One example of a NAVCO campaign with "difficult goals" is UNITA, the primarily violent campaign against the Angolan government that lasted from 1975 to 2002. The NAVCO data define the goals of this group as "regime change" and the size of the group varies over time from between a category 1 (1,000-9,999) and a category 2 (10,000 to 99,999). Because the goals of UNITA were far from the status quo and the group was sufficiently large, the Angolan regime was limited to the strategies of repression, cooptation, or mixed strategies. The regime largely responded to this dissent campaign with severe repression, which is intuitive because of the non-tax revenue sources (natural resources) available to the Angolan government and the strategic importance of the regime as a "proxy war" in the international system (James 2002, Tvedten 1997).

Using the NAVCO data, therefore limits the most likely options available to the state to cooptation, repression, and mixed strategies. Because cooptation is a dichotomous outcome and repression is not, the expected outcome can still be observed even when mixed strategies are used. The use of a mixed strategy implies that repression alone was too costly, meriting the use of both cooptation and repression, as discussed above. The expectation that cooptation will be observed when the costs of repression are high is consistent, therefore, with the potential use of a mixed strategy.

The first primary independent variable is the size of the existing winning coalition. As stated in *H1*, the likelihood of cooptation is expected to vary with the size of the winning coalition. To operationalize this concept, I use a count of existing number of parties in the

regime (at *t-1*) from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al 2001). The number of parties in the regime prior to cooptation should indicate the number of people or groups receiving benefits from inclusion in the regime. Because of the expectation of a non-monotonic relationship, both the main effect (*Party Count lag*) and the squared term (*Party Count^2 lag*) are included. In summary, the likelihood of cooptation should be lowest when there are no parties or a high number of parties included in the regime.

The second primary independent variable, the expected utility of repression to a state, is inherently unobservable; however, the theorized factors can be used as indicators of the costs and benefits of repression. While a variety of factors can be expected to increase or decrease the costs and benefits of repression, the number of indicators used in this analysis must be limited because of the small sample size. I selected the indicators that I believe have the strongest effect on a state's expected utility of repression.

As discussed above, the state will benefit most from repression when dissidents can be effectively targeted. The ability of a state to identify and target dissidents is a function of state capacity. State capacity has been defined and operationalized in a variety of ways by a variety of authors (see Hendrix 2010; DiGiuseppe, Barry, and Frank 2012, Englehart 2009). For this study, I use Englehart's (2009) definition of state capacity as the "willingness and capability of the state apparatus to carry out government policy" (p. 167). I use one widely accepted operationalization of state capacity: government revenue (*Revenue*), drawn from Cingranelli, Fajardo-Heyward, and Fillipov (2014). *Revenue* is measured as a state's total revenue as a percent of GDP, collected from the World Development Indicators published by the World Bank. A state with more revenue can devote more resources to intelligence gathering and agent control, more effectively targeting dissidents.

The potential costs of repression, as discussed above, can be domestic or international. The indicator I will use for domestic costs of repression, specifically foregone revenue, is the state's reliance on taxes for revenue. When the state represses, it reduces the income received from the domestic population (DeMerritt and Young 2013). Therefore, a state that is more reliant on taxes (*Tax Reliance*), as operationalized as tax revenue/GDP drawn from the World Development Indicators, will anticipate higher costs of repression.

In order to capture a state's vulnerability to the international costs of repression, I use the number of human rights organizations (HROs) that have local members or volunteers in the state in a given year (*HRO Members ln*), collected by Smith and Wiest (2005). The international community can more easily impose these costs when there is information available about repressive activities. According to Murdie and Davis (2012), a strong domestic presence of HROs can improve the human rights practices (reduce repression) of the state in some situations. The number of HROs with members in the state, therefore, will also be included as an indicator for the costs of repression.

Lastly, I include the state's past respect for physical integrity rights (*Respect for Phys. Int. lag*). One of the strongest predictors of a state's use of repression is previous use of repression (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). While not a direct cost or benefit of repressive behavior, past repression indicates the way the state has perceived this cost-benefit analysis in the past. A state that has used repression before likely already has trained security services and decision-making procedures in place to more effectively repress dissenters. While my conceptualization of repression broadly includes the restriction or violation of political and civil liberties, I operationalize this concept using the measure of government respect for physical integrity rights provided by the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). Using

component indicators of respect for each physical integrity right, the index ranges from 0 to 8, with higher values indicating more respect for physical integrity rights. Because this variable is measured as respect for physical integrity rights, it should have a positive relationship with dissent-targeted cooptation: if a state has not violated physical integrity rights in the past, it should be more likely to coopt dissenters than repress them. Both the past respect for physical integrity rights and number of HRO members in the state are drawn from Barry et al (2015).

Dependent Variable: Institutional Dissent-Targeted Cooptation

Because the targeted members of the dissent group will be faced with additional costs if they join the regime as is, institutional change is likely to accompany dissent-targeted repression. The observable outcome of interest, then, is institutional change. To measure the observed changes in the existence of a legislature and the number of political parties in the legislature, I combine the party count from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al 2001) and the Democracy and Dictatorship dataset (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). The Democracy and Dictatorship dataset (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010) includes variables defining the population of autocratic regimes as well as the party and legislative institutions of each state. As discussed above, I expect institutional change to be observed when the expected utility of repression is low.

Additional Controls

I draw other controls from Gandhi's (2008) model of cooptation. There are other potential reasons for institutions to be changed that must be controlled for. First, new leadership may support institutional change without regard for dissent. The institutions could be changed to fit the new leader's preferences, but members of a dissent group may not be included. A control

for leader change is, therefore, necessary (Gandhi 2008). Second, pressure to liberalize

institutions from outside the state could lead to the observed change (Gandhi 2008). Gandhi

(2008) suggests that this pressure will come from other democracies. Following this logic, I

include a control variable for the number of democracies in the world.

Because of missing data, I use chained multiple imputation with five estimates which

were then pooled to impute *Revenue*, *Tax Reliance*, *HRO Members*, and *Respect for Phys. Int.*

lag. As previously mentioned, I use an imputed regression model to empirically test whether my

hypothesis that as the expected utility of repression decreases, a state is more likely to

institutionally coopt members of the dissent group, is valid.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

The results of the regression can be seen in Table 1.[6] The relationship between *Party*

Count² lag and the number of parties is neither statistically significant nor in the expected

direction. I hypothesized a concave relationship in which cooptation is less likely at the extreme

low and high values of previous coalition size (see *H1*), yet the positive coefficient suggests a

convex relationship. *Party Count lag* has a positive and statistically significant effect on the

number of parties, with a p-value of less than 0.1. This suggests that the relationship is

monotonic and increasing, unlike the hypothesized non-monotonic relationship. For every one

unit increase in Party Count lag, the current number of parties is expected to increase by an

average of 0.7102 parties, all else equal. The significant and positive effect of the number of

parties in the previous year indicates a high level of institutional "stickiness," in which the

number of parties is unlikely to change from one year to the next.

Revenue fails to reach statistical significance, though the coefficient is in the expected

direction: as revenue increases in an autocracy facing dissent, the average expected number of

parties decreases. More specifically, for every one unit increase in revenue as a percent of GDP,

the expected number of parties decreases by 0.0543 parties on average, all else equal.

The relationship between tax reliance and the number of parties is in the opposite

direction of the expected relationship and not statistically significant. For a one unit increase in

tax revenue as a percent of GDP, the average expected number of parties decreases by 0.0180

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[6] Alternative model specifications, including a logit with a positive change in the number of parties (1) as the dependent variable and another regression with the change in the number of parties as the dependent variable, did not significantly alter the results. Exclusion of the squared *Party Count lag* also did not affect the general results.

parties, *ceteris paribus*. While increased reliance on tax revenue should theoretically make repression more costly and lead to dissent-targeted cooptation, this model suggests the opposite effect. The sign of the natural log of HRO Members (transformed because of skewness) is also opposite of the expected relationship. While an increase in the number of HROs with members in the state was theorized to make repression more costly and increase the likelihood of cooptation, the results indicate that a one unit increase in the logged number of HROs leads to an average expected 0.2729 decrease in the number of parties, all else equal.

Table 1: Regression of Number of Parties

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Error)
Party Count (lag)	0.7102*	(0.1880)
Party Count^2 (lag)	0.0027	(0.0025)
Revenue	-0.0543	(0.0755)
Tax Reliance	-0.0180	(0.0368)
HRO Members (ln)	-0.2729	(1.3292)
Respect for Phys.Int.(lag)	0.6152*	(0.3604)
Campaign Count	0.6576	(1.5136)
Percent Democracy	23.4534	(14.6782)
Change in Head of State	-1.8098	(1.8275)
Intercept	-8.3492	(6.6170)

n= 473
F-Test: Prob > F = 0.000

* $p < 0.1$ two-tailed test

Past respect for physical integrity rights also reaches statistical significance with a p-value of less than 0.1.   This relationship is in the expected direction, as a one unit increase on the CIRI scale of respect for physical integrity rights results in an average increase of 0.6152 parties in the expected number of parties. More substantively, greater respect for human rights in the past (fewer instances of repression) is associated with the inclusion of more political parties into the legislature when the autocracy faces a large dissent campaign. Moving from the lowest value of past respect for physical integrity rights (0) to the highest value in this sample (7), the expected effect of past respect increases from 0 to 4.3064, all else equal. In other words, the past respect for physical integrity rights in Afghanistan in the 1990s (0) is expected to have no effect on the number of parties while the past respect in Tanzania or Guyana in the 1990s (7) is expected to increase the number of parties by 4.3064, *ceteris paribus*. For the mean value of past respect, 1.8303, the expected average expected effect is an increase in 1.126 parties, all else equal.

This result suggests that the theorized substitution between repression and dissent-targeted cooptation is plausible: as repression is less likely to be used in response to dissent, cooptation via institutional change is more likely to be the state's response. Because past respect for physical integrity rights is a strong indicator of the state's previous evaluation of the costs and benefits of repression, the positive effect of this variable on the number of parties indicates that the state has evaluated the expected utility of repression to be low and responds with an alternative strategy: cooptation.

The count of dissent campaigns in the country-year (*Campaign Count*), the percent of states in the world that are democracies, and a change in the effective head of state in the country-year all fail to reach statistical significance. *Campaign Count* and *Percent Democracy*

both have positive effects on the number of parties, such that as these variables increase, the number of parties is expected to increase. *Change in Head of State*, however, leads to a decrease in the number of parties.

The results for this analysis are generally mixed: some coefficients are in the expected direction while others are not, and only one variable, lagged respect for physical integrity rights, has an effect on the change in the number of parties in an autocracy facing dissent that is statistically distinct from zero. The unclear results are likely caused by problems of data availability. While my sample size is 473, a large portion of the observations include imputed values for both the economic and human rights indicators, which lowers confidence in the estimates. As more data on the human rights practices and political economy of autocratic regimes becomes available, additional analyses might offer more promising results than the current models.

Despite the inconclusive results, the theoretical link between the costs and benefits of responses to dissent and the state's choice to coopt the dissent group is still plausible. One case that follows the expected pattern of behavior is Angola's response to the dissent campaign UNITA, discussed above. While the regime was supported by the Soviet Union and receiving military aid from Cuba, the international costs of repression were very low and Angola responded to UNITA with severe repression (James 2002, Tvedten 1997). After the Cold War ended, however, and the Cuban troops were withdrawn in 1991, the costs of a repressive strategy rose and cooptation became a more viable response. The pursuance of this strategy is observed in an increase in political parties in 1993. The further analysis of cases like Angola may provide evidence for the substitution between repression and cooptation that the above empirical analysis was unable to capture.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

This study has important implications for research on state responses to dissent as well as studies of autocratic institutions. By disaggregating the concept of cooptation, we can distinguish between general cooptation, dissent-targeted cooptation, and, in the future, other types of cooptation. Once a threat is perceived, the state may choose the strategy of extending benefits to citizens to mitigate the threat; the tactic by which benefits are extended can vary. Exploring the different tactics by which states can give coopted persons a stake in maintaining the regime will further define types of cooptation.

The movement toward disaggregating autocratic regimes has lead to a general increase in the study of autocratic institutions (Gandhi 2008, Geddes 1999, Magaloni 2008, Svolik 2012, Weeks 2014). By defining the costs of cooptation, this study can supplement further research on the conditions that will lead to institutional change in autocratic regimes. While different autocratic institutions have been shown to generally impact domestic and foreign policy, understanding with greater specificity how these institutions were formed can add to explanations of policy outcomes (Gandhi 2008, Weeks 2014). Whether legislatures and parties are added because of dissent-targeted cooptation, leader preferences, or international pressure for liberalization can have important implications for the operation of those institutions and the policy outcomes they produce.

Lastly, this study fills a gap in the existing literature on the state's response to dissent. While cooptation is often mentioned as a third option, most research emphasizes a choice

between repression and accommodation (Mason 2004, Moore 1998). By conceptualizing cooptation and placing it in the state response structure, this study offers a framework for future research on the cooptation/accommodation/repression policy choice. This research extends existing, small-scale studies of policy substitution (see Gartner and Regan 1996, Moore 2000) to a larger population of states and across a longer period of time. While this study focuses on the relationship between repression and cooptation, further research is needed to understand the complex, complementary relationship between cooptation and accommodation. If the state is indeed making a rational choice between alternative responses to dissent, policymakers interested in reducing repression can continue attempting to influence the state's perception of the expected utility of repression. Increasing monitoring and the international costs of repression can induce the state to choose alternative strategies in response to dissent. However, because the other policies also have associated costs, there will likely be situations in which repression will be the best (utility-maximizing) response to dissent, regardless of the internationally-imposed costs.

While the empirical results of this study are inconclusive, the potential for extension of this research is promising. Because of the limited cross-national data, more intensive qualitative study may be necessary to fully understand the state's response to dissent. The use of large dissent campaigns with difficult goals proved useful in separating cooptation and accommodation in this research design, yet dissent-targeted cooptation may be more likely to occur in less extreme situations. Further of study of the use of institutional change to coopt smaller dissent groups with less extreme goals is necessary. Despite these shortcomings, the results of this analysis show that the state's past respect for physical integrity rights increase the number of parties when an autocracy faces a large dissent campaign. When the state has

evaluated the expected utility of repression in the past and chosen to respect physical integrity rights, it is more likely to use cooptation in response to dissent. This indicates that the substitution of repression and cooptation as alternative responses to dissent is plausible, though additional work is needed to more accurately proxy the expected costs and benefits of these strategies.

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APPENDIX

CAMPAIGNS IN SAMPLE

Afghan Resistance	Anti-Burnham / Hoyte
Taliban Resistance	Anti-Duvalier
Taliban/ Anti-Government Forces	Hungary pro-dem movement
Albania Anti-Communist	West Papua Anti-Occupation
Islamic Salvation Front	GAM
UNITA	KDPI
Argentina pro-democracy movement	Iranian Mujahideen
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh	Iraqi insurgency
Shanti Bahini	KDP Kurds
Belarus Regime Opposition	Kurdish Secession against Sadam
Benin Anti-Communist	Anti-Arap Moi
Bolivian Anti-Junta	Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement
Serb militias	Hizballah
Diretas ja	Cedar Revolution
Bulgaria Anti-Communist	NPFL & ULIMO
Tutsi supremacists	LURD
Second Hutu Rebellion	National patriotic forces
Third Hutu Rebellion	Anti-Doe rebels
Second Khmer Rouge	Active Forces
Chad rebels	Anti-Banda
Frolinat	Anti-Gayoom
Anti-Pinochet Movement	Tauregs
Tibetan Uprising	Anti-PRI
Denis Sassou Nguesso	Mongolian Anti-communist
PMIC	Renamo
Sacred Union	Kachin rebels
Kabila-ADFL	Karens
Afar insurgency	CPN-M/UPF
Kifaya	Nepalese Anti-government
Salvadoran Civil Conflict	Contras
Somali rebels (Ogaden)	Niger Anti-Military
Eritrean-led rebels	Nigeria Anti-Military
Tigrean People's Liberation Front	Ogoni movement
Rose Revolution	Nigerian Muslim fundamentalists
Gamsakhurdia & Abkhazia	Pakistan pro-dem movement
East Germany pro-dem movement	Anti-Noriega
Marxist rebels (URNG)	Sendero Luminoso (The Shining Path)

Anti-Fujimori
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
New People's Army
People Power
Solidarity
Anti-Ceaucescu rebels
Chechen separatists
Russia pro-dem movement
Tutsi rebels
Croats
Kosovo Albanian
Anti-Milosevic
RUF
Somalia militia insurgencies
Somalia clan factions; SNM
South Africa Second Defiance Campaign
South Korea Anti-Military
LTTE
SPLA-Garang faction
JEM/SLA
Muslim Brotherhood
Taiwan pro-democracy movement
Popular Democratic Army (UTO)
Tanzania pro-democracy movement
Anti-Thaksin
Belarus Anti-Communist
Singing Revolution
LRA
National Resistance Army
Uruguay Anti-Military
Yemen leftists
Kosovo Albanian nationalist movement
Zambia Anti-Single Party
Anti-Chiluba
PF-ZAPU guerillas