

GHOSTS IN THE MACHINE: A FOUCAULTIAN GENEALOGY OF THE COLLEGE
BOARD APPARATUS IN THE PRODUCTION OF ADVANCED PLACEMENT* ENGLISH
COURSES AND SECONDARY ENGLISH LANGUAGE ARTS CURRICULUM

by

JOLINDA MILLER COLLINS

(Under the Direction of Elizabeth St. Pierre)

ABSTRACT

This poststructural analysis used Foucault's theory of genealogy to examine the enabling conditions that have made the power of the College Board and Advanced Placement* English possible in ways that influence secondary school English in order to demonstrate that these subjects functioned as constructs of power and culture. The analysis demonstrated how the instability of the constructs of intelligence and meritocracy undermine the College Board's function and process as the gatekeeper of the American Dream.

INDEX WORDS: Genealogy, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean Baudrillard, Jean-François Lyotard, Nicholas Carr, Terry Eagleton, Henry Jenkins, James Donald, Matthew Arnold, James Elliot Conant, Henry Chauncey, Frederic Taylor, Gerald Bracey, Nicholas Lemann, Robert Scholes, David Coleman, Common Core Curriculum Standards, Poststructuralism, Standardized testing, Intelligence, SAT, Advanced Placement* (AP), Advanced Placement* (AP) English Literature and Composition, Advanced Placement* (AP) English Language and Composition, meritocracy, American Dream, neoliberalism.

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PRODUCTION OF ADVANCED PLACEMENT ENGLISH COURSES AND SECONDARY
SCHOOL ENGLISH

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Looking back, I can doubt my decision to begin a late career doctoral program. At the time it seemed like a good idea. My children were finally grown and out on their own, but I was still working as a teacher and doing supplementary work as a staff development instructor for my school system and as an AP consultant to the College Board. As an English teacher with many essays to grade, I was always busy. Most of my family and friends encouraged me, but others raised concerns and asked me what was I thinking. Thank you to all of you who encouraged me or discouraged me from doing this program because there have been times when the encouragement calmed me and other times when the questioners made more sense to me. When I wanted to give up, I remembered the naysayers and thought, “Well, of course, this is difficult. Remember all the people who thought it was a bad idea? So don’t expect it to be easy.”

I had an unfulfilled promise to keep to my late husband and to my younger self. As a young wife and mother, I taught school and managed the children while my husband worked, finished his B.A. in Religious Studies, his M.A. in Theological Studies, and started his Ph.D. at the Candler School of Theology at Emory University. I also completed my master’s degree during that time period. We had an arrangement. The plan was for him to do his Ph.D. first, and then I would do mine. Unfortunately, he died of a rare cancer shortly after starting his doctoral program. He inspired me, but the responsibility of being a single parent to two young children overwhelmed me. If he couldn’t complete his program, I wanted one of us to finish the plan. I knew, however, that I couldn’t do it alone. I had to wait until the children were grown.

Doris Miller, my mother, has always encouraged with my educational goals. She is now 90 years old and still just as interested in what I am doing as when I was 10. Her brain is sharp.

Her encouragement, and sometimes frustration, with the process were always helpful to me. Even when I thought about giving up, she always knew exactly what to say. I can never remember a time that I didn't know that I was going to college or a time when education was not the number one priority at home. My father died in 1996, two years after I started this program. I am sorry that he did not live to see me finish it.

Mary Lynn Huie has been my colleague in doctoral classes, my sounding board for questions, and my one-woman student cohort and writing committee as first she, and then I, wrote dissertations. I learned so much from her, especially when reading dissertation drafts for her. When she was reading mine, she was so tactful and yet direct with her critiques that she never made me feel inadequate and always helped me understand. When I felt lost in the process, she always managed to re-direct me and give me hope. Her example of finishing the program and graduating gave me hope. I'm not sure that I would have made it if it had not been for her wise, patient, kind help, sense of humor, and an occasional sandwich. She also had the good grace to share the technical expertise of Jerry Eads to answer questions about format and other extraneous computer issues.

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Without Dr. Elizabeth St. Pierre, I would not have finished this project. She never gave up on me, always encouraged me, and sent me off to take a break when she could tell that I needed one. She was unfailingly generous with her time and patient with my delays. There were so many months when I wanted to quit, but she never let me feel like a failure. She was patient with the many family situations with which I had to deal over the nine years I have been working on my doctoral program. When I was near exhaustion with the process, she made sure that I knew what to do next, but she never accepted anything less than acceptable work, which at times

I doubted my ability to do. I have carried her words about difficult reading into my classroom and told my students that it will make them smarter, as she told her graduate students. Her example and accomplishments have inspired me and reminded me to work harder.

At Brookwood High School are some of the most wonderful high school students in the world. During the last nine years of my program at UGA, I have taught about 1500 students. Sometimes my students had to wait an extra week for papers to be graded; sometimes I had to be absent to attend to a doctoral program or family issue. My students always inspire me and make me smile. Thank you.

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Chapter 1

The Problem of the Present

“But what is it impossible to think, and what kind of impossibility are we faced with here?”

(Foucault, 1994/1970, p. xv)

Background of the Problem

The most authoritative educational narratives and experience for my long career as a high school English teacher have come from the College Board, the source of my own authority as a teacher and an important avenue of my professional and personal social mobility. The College Board is an important and influential organization for students, schools, and higher education, having established its discourse and protocols as iconic rites of passage necessary to support the American dream of meritocracy and opportunity. Dreams, however, have the disturbing potential to be illusions or nightmares. As both a student and a teacher, I became both product and producer of those rites of passage that appeared to be inevitable, natural, and logical manifestations of academic excellence. It seemed impossible to think of the process in any other way until I began my doctoral program.

The College Board is a non-profit corporation with three main areas of focus: (1) college readiness, (2) college connection and success, and (3) advocacy and research. The company's website (2013) provides a description of the company's services for students.

The College Board seeks to ensure that every student in the United States has access to a high-quality education and is prepared to succeed in college. Our College Readiness initiatives promote curricula, assessment tools, district and guidance resources that help K-12 students prepare for the academic rigors of higher education. Through Advanced

Placement[®] college-level courses and exams, high-school students can earn college credit and advanced placement.

The company website (2013) also provides a description of the company's relationship to educational institutions: "As a not-for-profit membership association representing more than 6,000 colleges, universities and schools, the College Board leads national and international efforts to improve access to and readiness for higher education." Chapter 2 provides a detailed description of the College Board and its Advanced Placement[®] (AP[®]) Program. Chapter 2 also addresses the relationship of the College Board and the Educational Testing Service (ETS), its affiliate non-profit company that manages the psychometrics, research, and logistics of the products and services offered by the College Board.

My professional career is embedded in a thirty-year relationship with the College Board that involves my work as an AP English teacher and College Board consultant. The professional development and opportunities that have resulted from this relationship have improved and enriched me as a teacher. I have learned a great deal and worked with exceptionally interesting and capable individuals.

Working as an AP Consultant since 1992, I have benefitted from the prestige of the College Board and from consultant fees earned as an instructor for AP workshops and AP Summer Institutes and as an AP Reader for the annual scoring of the national AP exam essays. The College Board/ETS machine is so familiar to me and so much a part of my personal and professional narrative that the AP English program seemed the appropriate starting point for a project that required me to de-familiarize constructs that I took for granted.

When I entered my doctoral program, I had taught high school English for over 25 satisfying and successful years. My experiences as a late-career doctoral student, however, came

at the same time that the demographics in my classes changed so much that Western civilization seemed an odd focus for literature. In addition, years of teaching *Heart of Darkness* (Conrad, 1902/1987) and *Things Fall Apart* (Achebe, 1958/1994) had already de-stabilized my Eurocentric view. My previous focus on British literature had already slipped. Technology had also changed the world so quickly that the meanings of the concepts of reading and writing were no longer stable as the internet changed the way students perceive the creation and delivery of content. There was a significant gap between the completion of my master's degree in 1982 and the beginning of my doctoral program in 2004. I was eager for my new educational experience to fill that gap but surprised at its personal and professional impact. I began to question my previous satisfaction and success. I was unsure whether or not I could or should teach anyone anything.

My uncertainty puzzled and paralyzed me. As an AP English teacher, I had a strong record of high student scores on the AP Exam. I was successful at producing students who were skillful with critical reading, literary analysis, and composition. The eminently rational discourse that produced those categories defined the study of English for me as a student and as a teacher. I had been passionate about the study of literature as the most useful of disciplines to provoke thought from my students, which was my goal as a teacher. Ohmann's (1976/1996) comments could have been directed to this stage of my career: "Literature really is criticism of life, and students and teachers of literature have been the conscience of the culture to an extent that might have satisfied even [Matthew]Arnold" (para. 22). The greater diversity of the student population, however, did not open up that discussion as I expected it to. That was the problem: irrational thoughts gradually emerged that the subject I taught and my identity as a teacher were

inventions, simulations that I had mistaken for reality. Baudrillard (1981/1995) made sense to me:

Today, it is the real which has become the pretext of the model in a world governed by the principle of simulation. And, paradoxically, it is the real which has become our true utopia—but a utopia that is no longer a possibility, a utopia we can do no more than dream about, like a lost object. (p. 21)

As both student and teacher, the conventional discourse of my education and experience had positioned me to reproduce hierarchies that situated me in identities so bound to the system that I had not even recognized them. Having worked diligently to join the congregation of the educated and overcome my working class background, I began to resent my subjection and my uncomprehending willingness to submit “agencies of cultural production . . . [with] a benign appearance capable of commanding spontaneous assent and loyalty from the very objects of its repression” (Spanos, 1993, p. 179). Suspicions emerged about “the essential role played by the literary tradition in extending the hegemony of the repressive state” (Spanos, 1993, p. 177). The pursuit of this new critical and deconstructive bent required me reluctantly to ex-communicate myself from the “cathedral of culture” (Willinsky, 1991), as the poet Matthew Arnold envisioned the study of English during his career as British national school inspector in the nineteenth century.

Previously I had thought of the teaching of English as a practice to sustain the last bastion of Western Civilization, part of the “saving remnant” (Spanos, 1995, p. 176) of humanism. However, I found myself willing to reduce the edifice of English to rubble. I envisioned with Hesse (1996) that “in the future . . . there will be no fixed canons of texts and no fixed epistemological boundaries between disciplines, only paths of inquiry, modes of integration, and

moments of encounter” (pp. 31-32). I agreed with Russo (2005), “It used to be thought that the past created the present; now it is believed that the present creates the past” (p.54). I acquiesced to Eagleton’s (1987) assertion that “we may in the future produce a society which was unable to get anything at all out of Shakespeare” and understood his claim that the great tradition of literature was “a construct, fashioned by particular people for particular reasons at a certain time” (p. 11). As an indication of the extent of my shift, I was neither surprised nor disturbed when my school district announced in 2012 that the new Common Core Standards removed British Literature as the central subject of twelfth grade English Language Arts (ELA) nor when they reversed that position in 2013 after determining that the Common Core Standards for secondary ELA mandated 70% informational texts across the curriculum rather than only in the ELA classroom.

My dissatisfaction prompted me to ask many questions: What is teaching English? What are students really learning? Is the purpose to civilize them and make them to become better people, as Matthew Arnold imagined? Why do even good students avoid reading and depend on Spark Notes? Do they need *this* curriculum to participate in a democracy? Why do we spend so much time trying to socialize students into what *used to be* the dominant culture while the culture has so rapidly become pluralistic, casual, and digital? The AP English curriculum in particular seemed to be haunted by remnants of empire and hierarchy, supported by an irrelevant subjectivity, as Eagleton (1985) might describe it, about nothing in particular.

Donald (1992) described the debate about the role of cultural literacy in support of a democratic culture as “stale oppositions between individuation and socialization, progressivism and traditionalism, liberal education and vocationalism, emancipation and social control” (p. 161). The history of these oppositions and his dismissal of these binaries prompted me to

recognize the ambivalence of my concerns and misgivings about what it means to teach English. My purpose became, following Donald, “to question the existing boundaries of education, and to ask how certain narratives and categories are instituted as authoritative” (p. 15).

I became uncomfortable with my colleagues’ earnest conversations about the moral purposes of teaching English. For many high school teachers, composition and grammar were secondary to literature to the high moral purpose of literature because my peers had learned to psychologize, politicize, and didacticize the study of literature in college. Was there morality in literary analysis? When we have had to justify the presence of literature in the curriculum, Trilling (1965) said, we have slipped easily into the vocabulary of the “whole-man theory” (as cited in Ohmann, 1976/1996, p. 213). That is, we have held the study of literature “to have a unique effectiveness in opening the mind and illuminating it, in purging the mind of prejudices, and received ideas, in making the mind free and active” (p. 213), despite the cultural burden that every body of literature bears. Trilling, however, believed that the ethical result of literature is “an improvement in the intelligence . . . as it touches moral life” (p. 212). According to Ohmann (1976/1996), this argument has proved “remarkably durable since Matthew Arnold gave it its best-remembered articulation, surviving innumerable challenges of the Auschwitz-commandants-read-Goethe variety” (para. 3). Eagleton (1985) described the primary *perceived* purpose of Literature as “to teach one to be moral” (p. 98). I had thought the purpose was to teach one to be civilized, but I now questioned what it meant to be civilized.

For a time I researched the integration of technology and the humanities as a way to re-define a liberal education and sustain the humanities in the new “cathedral of science” (Kluger, 2012) that existed in corporatized, capitalist society. Slowly, however, I realized that Enlightenment value of scientific certainty and capitalism’s corporate profit were the problem

not the answer because they created a positivist reality that no longer made sense to me. I realized my project was not liberal education or the humanities; I refused to submit to those familiar discourses that I had previously accepted without question. To my dismay, I realized that there were valid reasons for replacing them. My inquiry, as my reading revealed to me, was not a new one. Graff (1987), Ohmann (1976/1996), Scholes (1998) and others have thoroughly described the evolution of English as a discipline and as a political pawn and proxy. According to Graff (1996), “changing the world by changing the English department is not [a] far-fetched project” because “whoever controls language controls the way we think and act” (p. ix).

As an undergraduate, substituting literature for religion, as Matthew Arnold suggested, was an easy transition in the late 1960s. Honoring the pursuit of truth in science or literature seemed equally valid to me, and New Criticism’s quasi-scientific approach to literature seemed a logical affirmation of its high purpose. Academic discourse, however, looked very different when I began my doctoral program in 2004. I became skeptical of science and the belief that “Knowledge acquired from the right use of reason will be ‘true’” (Flax, 1990, p.41) or that knowledge “legitimizes itself with reference to some grand narrative,” (Lyotard, 1979/1984, p. xxiii). Paulson (2001) described the grand narratives as “those of humanity’s progressive political emancipation through the democratization of knowledge and of humanity’s intellectual progress and mastery over nature through the free pursuit of scientific and speculative inquiry” (p. 91). Although I had arrived late to the party by starting my doctoral program close to the end of my career, Harvey’s description (1989) of the party now made sense: “a vigorous denunciation of abstract reason and a deep aversion to any project that sought universal human emancipation through the powers of technology, science, and reason” (p.41).

After having previously mistaken the cathedral of culture as authentic, I now found the present haunted by that culture. Applying Baudrillard's (1981/1994) disturbing explanation of the display of a pharaoh's mummy, I recognized that the cathedral of culture had become a corpse:

We require a visible past, a visible continuum, a visible myth of origin, which reassures us about our end. Because finally we have never believed in them. Whence this historic scene of the reception of the mummy at the Orly airport . . . our culture dreams, behind this defunct power that it tries to annex, of an order that would have had nothing to do with it, and it dreams of it because it exterminated it by exhuming it as its own past Everywhere we live in a universe strangely similar to the original – things are doubled by their own scenario. But this doubling does not signify, as it did traditionally, the imminence of death – they are already purged of their death, and better than when they were alive; more cheerful, more authentic, in the light of their model, like the faces in funeral homes. (pp. 10-11)

The haunted remnant of Western civilization persisted as a simulacra. Following St. Pierre (2011), the doppelgangers in the cathedral had become the ghosts of “humanist, modernist, imperialist, representationalist, objectivist, rationalist, epistemological, ontological, and methodological assumptions of Western Enlightenment thought and practice” (p. 10). The horror of these ghosts exceeded that of the dead because they were the undead, a grotesque fake of the real. I had invested so much of my effort in life to earning the badges of civilization and enlightenment that the newly perceived absence of authenticity repulsed me. Although Foucault (1971/1984c) pointed out that humanism is not an error, he explained that “we must not conclude that everything that has ever been linked with humanism is to be rejected, but that the

humanistic thematic is in itself too supple, too diverse, too inconsistent to serve as an axis for rejection” (p. 44). Commenting on Victorian society in the aftermath of the industrial revolution, Southern (1973) explained that “the past ceased to be a repository of true doctrines and became an incoherent heap of errors and inhumanities” (p. 244). I rejected that heap of errors and inhumanities as a legitimate curricular resource. I did not want to perpetuate fraud.

My favorite fictions were gone, including the “fiction of the ego as master of circumstances” (Butler, as cited in Lather, 2007, p. 108). There is no closure. Relinquishing the assumptions of humanism, “the representation of distinctive personhood” (Boyer as cited in Carr, 2010, p. 196), was difficult. Outrage accompanied my grief as I gradually realized how much of my conceptual and material worlds had been produced by inescapable patriarchal and patronage systems. From philosophy to literature, from old boys’ clubs to academia, from the American dream to capitalism, I had consciously and unconsciously deferred and submitted, subjectifying myself with troubling determination to hierarchal but often invisible power. Rationality itself had betrayed me. Shakespeare came to mind as I considered the ruins. Revenge as a dish best served cold could be a metaphor to describe the writing of this dissertation.

My professional deconstruction had become a personal one as well. I mourned the loss of the stability of the ideals and romance of the illusionary metanarratives that seemed to define the human being as an independent adventurer. To replace them with the banality of the accidental, the ordinary, or even evil (in the absence of transcendence or presence) enervated and angered me. Ellul (1954/1964) described these lost metanarratives as “metaphysical idealism, a ruling class, religion, or high culture” (p. 176). Lyotard (1979/1984) explained that “science has always been in conflict with narratives” (p. xxiii) and suggested that metanarratives, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, or human emancipation were obsolete as

legitimation in the postmodern era. “The narrative function,” he wrote, “is losing its function, its great hero, its great dangers, its great voyages, its great goal” (p. xxiv). I was sorry to see these proud images lose their power. Instead, they had become postmodern cartoons or Disney versions of once powerful myths. These metanarratives inhabited Arnold’s cathedral of culture as historical artifacts but no longer holy relics. Their ghosts, candidates for exorcism or reincarnation, haunted the cathedral. The angels and demons in the cathedral were mere political pawns, and I had worked hard to honor these toothless phantoms. I had, however, been duped: the emperor had no clothes.

How had this happened?

Statement of the Problem

This dissertation uses a Foucaultian genealogical analysis to explore some of the historical, political, economic, and power relations between the College Board and the subject, English.

Research Questions

1. How has the history of the College Board and the history of English as a discipline shaped AP English courses and their influence on high school English curriculum?
2. How do connections/tensions between the design of the two AP English courses reflect changes in culture and technology that destabilize the study and status of English?
3. How do the discontinuities within the discourse of AP English courses function within a positivist regime of truth about standardized testing that make the College Board subject to critique?

The significance of this study lies within the complicated relationship of the educational system to politics, economics, demographics, and technology. Discussions of ELA curriculum, the use of standardized testing, theories of intelligence, the internet, the application of business management to schools, and increased emphasis on Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) curriculum could benefit from this study because of its implications. Examination of the role that the College Board has played over the years with one subject, English, including its creation of a two AP English courses, offers a look at the institution's influence on curriculum and at two versions of discourse that reflect changes in the institution and the culture. The tensions between the two AP English courses may stimulate useful conversation about content and process changes in future curriculum that is less Eurocentric and more media-friendly as we consider the changing codes of culture that would have been impossible for previous generations to imagine. With Foucault (1970/1994), I asked, "What kind of impossibility are we faced with here?" (p.xv). This study can be useful in thinking about those impossibilities. Foucault (1970/1994) offered further explanation,

The fundamental codes of a culture – those governing its language, its schemas of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its practices – establish for every man . . . the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and within which he will be at home. At the other extremity of thought, there are the scientific theories or the philosophical interpretations which explain why order exists in general, what universal law it obeys, what principle can account for it, and why this particular order has been established and not some other. (p. xx)

The next chapter offers a thorough examination of the history and operation of the College Board, the AP Program, and the AP English courses.

Chapter 2

CONDITIONS OF THE PRESENT

The Natural Order of Things

Now the world's largest-scale program of mental testing, the College Board's size and influence are so important that Lemann (2000) described it as machinery "so familiar and all-encompassing that it seems almost like a natural phenomenon, or at least an organism that evolved spontaneously in response to conditions" (p. 6). The College Board is so well established in the cultural, educational, and social landscape of the United States that its familiarity and usefulness might make an examination of its conditions of existence appear unnecessary. The College Board's significance, however, has become so important that it has been described as "the central institution in our national life" (Lemann, 2000, p. vii).

This quasi-governmental agency is an "institution born in unashamed Eastern elitism and nourished on the dreams of creating a meritocracy" and has undergone many transformations "to become more of a democratic lever in service to [a] complex, heterogenous America" (Riccards, 2010, p. 108). If the College Board and the Educational Testing Service (ETS), its spinoff enterprise to manage psychometrics and logistics, did not exist, we would have to invent similar agencies to fulfill their roles as long as the nation continues to use the dominant educational paradigm of measurement and meritocracy. Without the College Board/ETS entity, a part of the American dream would be missing: the belief that entrepreneurship and education provide equal opportunities for anyone to join a natural aristocracy based on personal merit rather than hierarchies preserved by inherited wealth or brute force.

The College Board creates the narrative, handles sales and service to students, teachers, administrators, and institutions, and administers tests; ETS manages the operations of preparing, producing, scoring, and analyzing millions of tests. This chapter provides a detailed examination of how this came to be.

There have been concerns, however, since the 1930s that the College Board's standards and requirements were "simply a set of obsolete formulations" (Riccards, 2010, p. 59) that include assumptions about culture, intelligence, standardized testing, curriculum, and socio-economic influences on students and society. The current educational environment accepts these formulations as valid assumptions for the natural order of things. Foucault (1970/1994) offered further explanation for examining this order.

The fundamental codes of a culture – those governing its language, its schemas of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its practices – establish for every man . . . the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and within which he will be at home. At the other extremity of thought, there are the scientific theories or the philosophical interpretations which explain why order exists in general, what universal law it obeys, what principle can account for it, and why this particular order has been established and not some other. (p. xx)

It is useful to acknowledge this well-known order before dismantling it. For example, the College Board's ubiquitous college entrance exam (SAT) is the gatekeeper of college admission. The SAT is the official name of the well-known College Board college admissions test, but the name is no longer an acronym. Originally SAT stood for the Scholastic Aptitude Test and later Scholastic Ability Test. After years of trying to separate the test from its roots in

intelligence testing and charges of lack of test fairness, the College Board removed the words and made SAT simply a brand name.

The College Board's Advanced Placement (AP) Program is the default gatekeeper of curriculum because it "fills the void left by the traditional reluctance to regulate education by the U.S. federal government" (Lacy, 2010, p. 17). The AP Program has served as the closest approximation of a national curriculum until the recent adoption by forty-nine states of the Common Core standards, and yet 80% of the Common Core emerged from the subject standards on the College Board's website (2012), demonstrating the AP Program's continued participation in national curriculum. The most recently appointed president of the College Board, David Coleman, is also one of the key developers and promoters of the Common Core standards (Coleman and Pimentel, 2012) and one of the founders of ACHIEVE, the organization behind the Common Core Standards. The SAT and AP Program represent "two distinct historical trajectories that assessment, curriculum, and academic community have taken this century" (Johanek, 2001, p. xxiii). This chapter explains how this happened.

Before the College Board: Educational Anarchy

In 1893, headmasters of preparatory schools whose students planned to attend college described their situation as "being driven to distraction by divergent college requirements" (Valentine, 1987, p. 9). According to Valentine, a headmaster complained,

How can I treat my students who are looking forward to entering different colleges at which examinations for admission are held at different times, with different requirements and sharply differing definitions of one and the same nominal requirements? (p. 9)

Fuess (1967) described the situation as “educational anarchy” (p. 3). There was little interest on the part of the colleges to standardize subjects or entrance requirements at the time, but efforts toward that goal were already underway by a few individuals, including the president of Harvard.

In his inaugural address as president of Harvard in 1869, Charles William Eliot envisioned the prospect of common entrance examinations to be used by the northeastern universities, probably meaning the Ivy League schools. In 1890, he advocated for the establishment of common admissions standards before the National Education Association. In 1893, he served as the chairman of National Education Association’s Committee of Ten, the work of which is “generally believed to have profoundly influenced the shaping of the American high school curriculum” (Valentine, 1987, p. 8) because it established some organization into school curriculum by defining nine subjects, including Greek and Latin as well as modern subjects, that would “prepare the way for a common examination system” (Valentine, 1987, p. 9). According to Kliebard (1982), critics from the position of science and progress perceived a lack of courage in the Committee of Ten “against an entrenched establishment” that rejected even “moderate reforms [as] monumental challenge to the efficacy of the existing curriculum” (p. 6). Despite criticism, Eliot also received praise for his openmindedness regarding curriculum. Eliot (1905, as cited in Kliebard, 1982) understood that a differentiated curriculum could determine the social and occupational future of students:

Thoughtful students of the psychology of adolescence will refuse to believe that the American public intends to have its children sorted before their teens into clerks, watchmakers, lithographers, telegraph operators, masons, teamsters, farm laborers, and so forth, and treated differently in their schools according to these prophecies of their appropriate life careers. Who are to make these prophecies?

(p. 17)

Without Eliot's influence, the College Board might have never had its chance to be the oracle of education in the United States.

In 1899 the Committee on College Entrance Requirements published a report that called for scholars to create requirements for each subject. In 1900 representatives from twelve higher education institutions attended the first College Entrance Examination Board of the Middle States and Maryland meeting. In attendance were Barnard College, Bryn Mawr College, Columbia University, Cornell University, Johns Hopkins University, New York University, University of Pennsylvania, Rutgers College, Swarthmore College, Union College, Vassar College, and Women's College of Baltimore (now Goucher College). Harvard joined in 1904; Yale in 1909; Princeton in 1910. Nicholas Murray Butler, then president of Columbia University, later analyzed the purpose of the College Board: "bring order out of chaos, . . . more closely relate the work of colleges to that of secondary schools . . . [and] raise standards of secondary instruction throughout the country" (Butler, cited in Valentine, 1987, p. 16). Although the College Board has tried without success at times to refuse the role of educational arbiter, it is fair to say that the College Board has had a significant influence on curriculum and standards since the beginning of the twentieth century.

Although the College Board first influenced U.S. education in 1900 to establish order in the college admission process, the first College Board entrance essay examinations in 1901 served both to standardize college admission and raised the standards of secondary school instruction because preparation for the exams emphasized specific content, according to Valentine (1987, p. 16). Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia University, who also served as the

first president of the College Board from 1900-1945, administered the first College Board entrance essay examinations, which were more like achievement tests than the modern SAT.

In 1901, the College Board approved nine subjects for entrance examinations: chemistry, English, French, German, Greek, history, Latin, mathematics, and physics. The source of the subject definition of English was the National Conference on Uniform Entrance Requirements in English and included a required reading list of ten books and the ability to write “good English,” according to the social standards of the era. Movement toward the development of the Uniform Entrance Requirements had begun as early as 1879. According to Riccards (2010),

In New England, various conferences, including one on English in 1879 and then one on the classics and mathematics in 1881, crafted some statements about requirements in their disciplines. In 1885, the New England Association of Colleges and Preparatory Schools was established to promote liberal learning in colleges and preparatory schools. In 1889, English teachers led the way in that region arguing for common courses [with specific content] In 1895, a joint conference on uniform entrance requirements laid out a full four-year preparatory course work cycle that became the very staple of high school English preparatory courses. (p. 24)

The curriculum defined by the College Board and its members addressed the preparation of mostly male students for elite colleges and universities in the United States; it was more rigorous than the National Conference Uniform Entrance Requirements and privileged Latin and Greek above all other subjects for twenty years after the College Board first met in 1900. The curriculum model in place was based on British interpretations of Enlightenment ideas that were typical for the upper class as preparation for their future as leaders of government and business (Fuess, 1967; Johanek, 2001; Lemann, 2000; Marland, 1975; Riccards, 2010; Valentine, 1987).

The College Board eventually rose to prominence and power, but outsiders initially perceived it, as expressed much later by a competitor, as “tiny, regional, elitist” (Lemann, 2000, p. 62) until after World War II. The academic sorting resulting from College Board tests suggests a complex and often contradictory history of efforts to enhance democracy, establish an intellectual meritocracy, open educational opportunity, and scientifically measure aptitude and achievement, according to several versions of College Board history (College Board, 2013; Fuess, 1967; Johaneck, 2001; Lacy, 2010; Lemann, 2000; Marland, 1975; Riccards, 2010; Valentine, 1987).

Although England’s Matthew Arnold believed traditional literature to be the proper substitute for religion, traces of Matthew Arnold’s ideas as school inspector are present in remarks made by Henry Chauncey, a founding father of both the College Board and its sibling corporation the Educational Testing Service (ETS), who hoped scientific testing could establish “the moral equivalent of religion but based on reason and science rather than on sentiments and tradition” (Lemann, 2000, p.69) to select the future meritocracy. A rigorous combination of both set the stage for the future.

A History of the College Board

Most of the histories of the College Board/ETS have been written by insiders and published by the College Board (College Board, 2013; Fuess, 1967; Johaneck, 2001; Marland, 1975; Valentine, 1987) with the notable exceptions of a Ralph Nader investigative report (Nairn, 1979b), Lemann’s (2000) *The Big Test*, and a recent critique of the AP Program (Sadler Sonnert, Tai, & Klopfenstein, 2010). What is clear from these narratives is that the College Board gradually emerged with the appropriate combination of meritocracy and psychometrics to “represent the rationalization of social life . . . conventionally regarded as *progress*” (Schudson, 1972, p. 37) if progress can be measured in this way. Cohen and Lazerson (1972) challenged the

College Board's self-published reports by identifying the goal of meritocracy as "a capitalist social system to produce workers to fit its occupational hierarchy" or "the extent to which stratification serves special class interests, and the extent to which it is necessary at all"(p. 72). In contrast, Hampel (2001) reported,

Some historians place the origins of ETS within large interpretative frameworks, such as the technocratic visions of philanthropists or the smug designs of an "Eastern Establishment." We are less willing to see the origins of ETS as a manifestation of imperial patterns and forces. (p. 248)

The College Board's history includes educational elitism during the early years, educational establishment in mid-century, and educational reform in the current era of standards-based, data-driven efficiency. The creative destruction of capitalism (Schumpeter, 1950/1976), however, offers challenges to this progressive institution as global economics, demographics, re-definitions of knowledge and its management, and the proliferation of technology expand at an ever increasing rate.

Educational elitism. As mentioned previously in this chapter, the College Board thus began in 1900 as a small nonprofit association of elite colleges, preceded by the Committee of Ten in 1892, that attempted to create voluntary and cooperative order in the college admissions process. In the 1920s, the organization developed the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) that is now an accepted part of school life. Dissatisfied with the usual essay examinations for college admissions for use as scholarship tests, Harvard president James Eliot Conant requested a more portable, efficient scholarship test that could be easily administered in the Midwest where he hoped to find students with superior academic potential outside of New England. He also wanted a test that revealed potential rather than preparation since he sought students whose

families would not have access to elite private prep school educations that emphasized Greek, Latin, and rhetoric (Fuess, 1967; Johaneck, 2001; Lemann, 2000; Marland, 1975; Riccards, 2010; Valentine, 1987).

Despite being president of an elite institution, Conant had an interest in dethroning the hierarchy and creating an academic meritocracy of students to become the nation's future leaders because he had been influenced by Thomas Jefferson's letters to John Adams about the creation of a natural meritocracy from which to develop the country's leaders. Conant positioned himself as the "modern-day champion of opportunity for all Americans" (Lemann, 2000, p.46). Conant appointed assistant dean Henry Chauncey

to figure out a way to select public-school students . . . for his new scholarship program.

This was one of those path-setting moments in which small decisions are made from which great consequences later flow. The means of selection that Chauncey and Bender settled upon would become not just a way of handing out a few scholarships to Harvard, but the basic mechanism for sorting the American population. (Lemann, p. 28)

By 1926, the first SAT (in multiple choice format) was used for a small number of scholarship applicants at Harvard. Chauncey had developed "aptitude tests – meaning, really, IQ tests" (Lemann, 2000, p. 38) derived from early versions of intelligence tests used for World War I but more difficult. By 1934 Harvard used the SAT for all national scholarship applicants. By 1937, Chauncey had convinced other Ivy League schools to use the test for scholarship applicants, unaware that his persuasiveness for this apparently minor action would change "the tenor of the institutions" (p. 39) and the admissions process in a major way. By 1941, Harvard required the SAT for all applicants.

Chauncey's interest in testing was more practical but progressive, and he hoped to build an "enormous testing regime" (Lemann, 2000, p. 60) after his exposure to one of the first college courses about the new science of psychological measurement. To describe him as obsessed with the potential of this new science would not be an overstatement. When he was later appointed the first president of ETS, he hoped eventually to have the resources for a pet project, the Census of Abilities, to be developed with a series of tests to match all students with the most appropriate occupation through a national personnel agency. He believed it would be a major contribution to the nation's economy and the most efficient utilization of individual ability (Lemann, 2000). Although he was not able to implement the idea during his lifetime, he was a man ahead of his time.

A similar idea is currently attached to the new Common Core Standards project and open source college courses such as those offered through Stanford professor and Google research director Sebastian Thrun's Udacity project (Anders, 2012). Thrun has speculated, for example, that financial support for the free courses would be provided by efficiently linking students with the appropriate course work and certified skills to a specific company, which would then pay a hiring fee of 20% of the new employee's first year salary to Udacity as the source of the hire's education. ETS has already established the successful Chauncey Group, its own separate for-profit spin-off business, to administer certifications for professions and private enterprise.

Although the multiple-choice SAT first appeared as a scholarship examination in 1926, colleges continued to use essay examinations for general admission purposes until 1942 when the United States government mobilized ETS to administer millions of multiple choice intelligence tests to sort men for military service in World War II. The success of the speed and volume of the war time testing propelled the postwar SAT exams to the multiple choice format

rather than returning to the essay form after the war. The modern SAT emerged as a thinly disguised derivative of an intelligence test, a controversial application of the early twentieth century trend toward eugenics but marketed as an efficient, inexpensive, convenient way for colleges and the military to assess intellectual potential (Lemann, 2000).

In the 1940s, Chauncey's opportunity to administer mass testing to World War II soldiers radically expanded ideas about the application of mental testing, which the military had used efficiently and quickly to sort men for their best use in the war. The Army and Navy had initially contracted with Chauncey to administer 300,000 tests for officer candidates across the United States on one day, an accomplishment that demonstrated the future feasibility of using the test for nation-wide college admissions test with high school students beyond the New England area. After the war, Chauncey revised the test to focus primarily on verbal and math skills, thus creating the familiar reading and math sections of today's SAT.

After World War II, the GI educational bill motivated mass numbers of veterans to apply for college. The College Board's experience with scientific mass testing during the war made it the logical organization to implement mass multiple choice tests for college admission. As a result, the testing of this historically large group of veterans renewed ideas of a new kind of meritocracy arising simply from the ability to take an academic test that was presumed to transcend social or economic background (College Board, 2010; Fuess, 1967; Johanek, 2001; Lemann, 2000; Marland, 1975; Nairn, 1979b; Lacy, 2010; Riccards, 2010; Valentine, 1987).

The speed and efficiency of the IBM automatic scoring machine made mass testing possible and positioned the College Board and ETS to become financially successful because of the scale of the increased volume of tests. The successful implementation of the wartime testing, the subsequent postwar influx of GI Bill students as college applicants, and the increasing

number of high school graduates proved the practicality and efficiency of the College Board system and the IBM scoring machine. This success and the rapid growth in the volume of test-takers, however, also overwhelmed the small College Board infrastructure and its personnel and demonstrated the importance of this project on a national level. A decade earlier Harvard president James Conant had argued for a single organization devoted to educational research and assessment that could serve as a national center for the progress of education in the United States.

The existence of separate organizations for different tests such as the Graduate Record Exam (GRE) and, in some cases rivals such as the American College Testing agency, also produced some confusion similar to the time of the College Board's beginning in 1900 when chaos existed in the college admissions testing process.

Conversations had started as early as 1938 about merging existing tests from several organizations into one agency such as ETS. At that time College Board president Carl Brigham opposed the merger. Brigham's objections suggested the importance of re-examining how educational policy in the United States arrived at its present state.

the very creation of powerful machinery to do more widely those things that are now being done badly will stifle research, discourage new developments, and establish existing methods, and even existing tests, as the correct ones. . . . If the unhappy day ever comes when teachers point their students toward these newer examinations, and the present weak and restricted procedures get a grip on education, then we may look for the inevitable distortion of education in terms of tests. (Brigham, as cited in Lemann, 2000, pp. 40-41)

Brigham's words foreshadowed education's present conditions that Ravitch (2010) has called "mechanistic and even antithetical to good education" (p. 12) and that have "corrupt[ed] educational values" (p. 14).

In response to a call for a national testing agency in 1947 after Harry Truman appointed a Presidential Special Commission to study the situation, the College Board, the Carnegie Foundation, and the American Council on Education negotiated a merger, including contribution of their various testing programs, a portion of their assets, and a number of key employees, to establish the Educational Testing Service (ETS) in 1947. As the College Board's sibling non-profit corporation, the purpose of ETS is to produce and score the large number of assessments as well as support psychometric research. The College Board classifies itself as a service agency for higher education and high schools, and ETS operates as a scientific psychometric center. The College Board maintains headquarters in New York, NY, but often hosts events at the Chauncey Conference Center on the expansive ETS campus outside of Princeton, NJ, originally purchased by Chauncey during his tenure as the first ETS president.

Both organizations' function, income, and philosophy, however, emerged from the same source, and the two corporations operate as one social entity. They are both officially non-profit organizations and report to separate presidents and boards of directors. There is no general overseer to which they report. The formation of ETS resulted from the collaboration of Harvard president James Bryant Conant, Harvard assistant dean Henry Chauncey, and Carnegie Foundation president Devereaux Josephs, a surprisingly small but influential group of men "with their hands on the levers in education" (Lemann, 2000, p. 61). The College Board handed all of its successful tests to the newly formed ETS; even today the ETS and the College Board share

income. The SAT also joined the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) and other tests under the ETS umbrella.

For the purposes of this project, the interwoven College Board/ETS relationship is implied each time the College Board is mentioned. Riccards (2010) described their relationship:

The difference between the College Board and the ETS is admittedly confusing. Not only are students and their parents confused, but sometimes so is the media and even new employees. At first it seems simple: the College Board is the client and ETS the vendor for the SAT. The former holds the copyright to the test, and the second administers that test. But it was not always so, and the relationships have indeed been intertwined, unclear, and at times competitive – like a marriage more of convenience than of romance. (p. 48)

Ohmann (1976/1996) described the relationship of the College Board and ETS as “an incestuous league” (p. 64). Brill (1974), Nairn (1979b), Nordheimer & Frantz (1997), and Ohmann have also reported on efforts by competitors and customers to sue the College Board and/or ETS in anti-trust actions. None of these efforts have been successful.

A new kind of class system. Although the College Board had to relinquish its tests to ETS and share income, the College Board and ETS both became large, powerful institutions that used their testing programs to mainstream a “new kind of class system even more powerful than the old one” (Lemann, 2000, p.47) of the hereditary upper class. The logistical admissions crisis of sheer numbers initially produced by the large number of World War II veterans who took advantage of the GI Bill inadvertently generated the new system, but the positive reaction to it by colleges and testing agencies solidified the selection of the multiple choice SAT as an efficient, permanent reform of educational testing. Educational reform had been a national concern since

the 1930s and probably would have occurred before 1947 if the Depression and World War II had not intervened.

The postwar increase in college enrollment and the educational apparatus of the College Board established to manage it created conditions of a “quiet but intense competition . . . over the future structure of the country” (Lemann, 2000, p. 5) that was both “idealistic and hubristic” (p. vii) after World War II and in which “one particular system triumphed over other, alternative systems” (p. 6). This victory supported one of the most sweeping social changes in history because the nation greatly expanded “opportunity for ordinary Americans, by making it possible – for the first time, anywhere, any time – for most people to go to college” instead of excluding everyone except “young aristocrats, the way the British did, or for a select group of future scholars, scientists, and upper bureaucrats, like the French” (Lemann, 2000, p. 58). This guarantee of opportunity for all . . . also created a system for serially ranking people by a supposed innate worth expressed in the scores made on standardized intelligence tests, on the basis of which their place in society – their prosperity and their prestige – would be apportioned. This was the fundamental clash: between the promise of more opportunity and the reality that, from a point early in the lives of most people, opportunity would be limited. (p. 65)

Together Conant and Chauncey transformed the College Board and ETS through “substantial changes without going through the arduous business of passing laws and persuading the general public” (Lemann, 2000, p. 60) into the dominant force in education. The result was a paradoxical social vision in which education “reproduce[d] inequality but does so in ways widely accepted as fair and natural” (Ohmann, 1976/1996, p. xxviii). Ohmann also argued,

Though always over some dissent, these ideals [of equal opportunity and merit] have obscured the decisive advantage of family position and wealth, the differential access of young people to cultural capital and networks of privilege, the politics of tracking, and the operation of the hidden curriculum to discourage and demote those not adapted by birth and rearing to the culture of school. (p. xxviii)

Nairn (1979b) was more direct in his criticism of the College Board/ETS regime: “ETS, under the veneer of science, functioned as the opposite of a meritocratic force in American society. It provided an official way for people with money to pass on their status to their children” (p. 227) because of the advantages that higher socioeconomic status provided in terms of experience, education, and test-taking skills to children of privilege. The next decade would provide a stark example.

In the 1950s the United States Selective Service Administration contracted ETS to administer standardized tests, later called intelligence tests using vocabulary (Riccards, 2010, p. 45), to determine which men would be deferred from the draft for the Korean War. Those men whose scores were below the cut point were forced into the military. Test results had literally become dangerous as a social instrument to send men into harm’s way. In the 1960s, a version of this deferral policy based on test scores continued into the Vietnam War era when all males enrolled in college received an automatic draft deferral, reinforcing a class system that required a disproportionate number of poor and minority men to serve in an unpopular war. Protests on college campuses against the war and the draft deferral policy eventually caused a modification of the draft policy to a lottery system. Continued demonstrations eventually ended the draft itself. The educational system and its agencies, however, were implicated with the government establishment. By the end of the decade, the work of the College Board and ETS as a single

corporate engine with functions that are accomplished in most countries by a government agency (Lemann, 2000) had been established.

Although the College Board began its existence as a small, elite organization of exclusive institutions to establish college entrance requirements, it had become a major broker of social and economic change. The College Board gradually became the crucible for educational opportunity for all, especially after World War II, as a rite of passage to the American dream for some or an initiation into the competitive marketplace for others. If scores from standardized tests could be perfect assessments for academic placement, identity, and career, then perhaps the tests could create conditions for equal opportunity.

Those assumptions, however, are questionable. Ravitch (2010) commented, “standardized tests are not precise instruments. . . . The public thinks the tests have scientific validity, like that of a thermometer or a barometer, and that they are objective, not tainted by fallible human judgment” (p. 152). The sorting of human beings does not benefit all individuals because we do not all begin life with the same advantages. The presumed accuracy of standardized testing and the technological efficiency of the IBM scoring machine have misled educators, politicians, business leaders, and the public to think of learning as a product to be measured and evaluated for ways to bring the results to scale for the greatest efficiency and economic benefit. Hirsch (2001) explained,

In the early 1900s, "productivity expert" Frederic Winslow Taylor promoted scientific efficiency as a way of increasing worker productivity. Curriculum theorists and education policy makers as a way of improving educational productivity quickly adopted Taylor's principles and techniques. David Snedden of Massachusetts, a powerful state commissioner in the early part of the century,

argued that schools should aid the economy to function as efficiently as possible by sorting and training students for their "probable destinies" in the workforce.

(para. 14)

Neoliberalism's strong impact on education parallels the impact of Taylor's *Principles of Efficiency* (1901) on education. Peters (1994) described the plight of the individual under neo-liberalism: "the individual is free, free to compete in the market place" (p. 66) even if it destroys rather than rewards the individual. This crucible operates as a powerful system to shape individual lives and society.

The economies of scale and productivity improve efficiency to increase the bottom line in business but have limited application in education. James Vollmer, a former CEO of a major ice cream company, explained what he had learned about trying to apply business principles to education:

I have learned school is not a business. Schools are unable to control the quality of their raw material, they are dependent upon the vagaries of politics for a reliable revenue stream, and they are constantly mauled by a howling horde of disparate, competing customer groups that would send the best CEO screaming into the night. (as cited in Cuban, 2004, p.3)

School may not be a business, but the College Board certainly became a member of the business community as well as the academic one when its regional role changed to a national one, moving the company toward financial security, a strong corporate identity, and its central position in the educational establishment. Of many new products added to the company services, one proved to be as significant as the SAT, which had become the fulcrum of education in the United States. The addition of the Advanced Placement (AP) Program in the late 1950s, although once again a

test initiated at the request of elite educational organizations, would gradually position the College Board as the right engine at the right time for the educational conditions in the nation to address the urgency of a response to the launch of the Soviet Union's Sputnik in 1958, the civil rights movement in the 1960s, the publication of *A Nation At Risk* in 1983, and the advent of the No Child Left Behind Act in 2000. By 2012, the number of AP exams taken exceeded the number of SAT exams. The number of SAT exams was also exceeded by the competition's ACT exams for the first time, thus making AP the College Board's most important product line. According to Butrymowicz (2012), "The College Board's net revenues . . . hit \$65.6 million in 2010 – the last year for which the figure was available from tax filings – up from \$53 million the year before" (para. 3), figures that suggest the remarkable growth of the AP exam despite declining SAT numbers.

Under the leadership of Gaston Caperton from 1999 until 2012, the company "exhibit[ed] a corporate mentality of actively pursuing excess revenue, or profit in the business world" (Lacy, 2010, p. 38) with Caperton as "the embodiment of the neoliberal ideal of melding market orientation with traditional, authentic liberal concern for education" (p. 39). The AP Program was in the forefront of the curricular, political, financial, and educational developments. Today it is the largest segment of the College Board's business with more AP exams being taken than any of the others.

Educational establishment. The SAT initially made the College Board the center of the national educational establishment, but it was the growth of the AP Program that moved the company's influence to higher levels. Like the SAT, the AP Program's previous exclusiveness did not prevent it from eventually becoming an inclusive educational innovation. By the 1990s the AP Program had become synonymous with academic rigor and eventually transformed

perception of the College Board from elitist educational establishment to educational reformer as AP courses were marketed as the chief route to equity and access for minority and underserved students. According to Sadler (2010), the AP Program has earned respect as “an incontrovertible indicator of educational excellence by educators and politicians alike” (p. 3) and has experienced over the last 20 years an annual growth rate of 9.3 percent, making the program the “juggernaut of American high school education” (p. 3).

AP tests include a multiple-choice section, but they also resemble the College Board’s original general college entrance exams in that they required essays using skills and knowledge of specific content areas, more like an achievement test. High AP exam scores enabled students to earn college credit for introductory content-specific courses as well as high school credit.

Valentine (1987) noted,

The basic idea behind the AP program was to give students opportunities while in high school to take freshman-level college courses and to have their performance in such courses taken into account by the colleges they entered. Although it was centered on placement after admission rather on admission, it was strikingly reminiscent of the Board’s original entrance examination program: the AP Program encouraged schools to teach certain courses and offered teachers guidance in teaching those courses. (p. 74)

The College Board’s powerful influence as a major player in education in the United States is illustrated by the rapid growth of AP courses, their importance as an indicator of rigor of schedule on a high school student’s transcript for college admission, and their key role in the annual high school rankings that appear in several news magazines, such as *Newsweek*, *U.S. News and World Report*, and *The Washington Post*. The College Board (2012c) now offers AP Examinations in 37 content areas, including English, American History, statistics, calculus,

music theory, human geography, environmental science, biology, chemistry, physics, art history, and Spanish, for example.

In the 1950s, the AP Program began in elite private boys' schools at the request of Harvard's president for stronger curriculum to better prepare students for college. The AP Program was originally called the Kenyon Plan, and Oden (2000) credits Kenyon College as the "birthplace of the AP Program" (para.4). Beginning in 1947, Kenyon president Gordon K. Chalmers had argued for greater in-depth study of academic disciplines in secondary schools and colleges. In 1951, Chalmers made a presentation to the Private School Association of the Central States. The result was "The School and College Study of Admission with Advanced Standing" to examine a plan to offer "advanced placement to high-school graduates who had demonstrated their competency in various subject areas by successfully passing 'genuine college-level courses'" (Oden, 2000, para. 4) to encourage schools to teach more in-depth content and colleges to place students earlier in more in-depth courses. Chalmers invited twelve colleges to further the plan: Bowdoin, Brown, Carleton, Haverford, Kenyon, Middlebury, MIT, Swarthmore, Wabash, Wesleyan, Williams, and Oberlin. Elwell (1967, as cited in Oden, 2000, para. 5) identified Chalmers as "the key player [who] initiated preliminary meetings that led to a proposal for the experiment; he became the first chairman of the Central Committee of the [School and College] study (as cited in Oden, 2000, para. 4). In 1953, the Kenyon faculty formally voted to participate in the nascent advanced placement program, but the administration of the program was turned over to the College Board in 1955. The Ford Foundation funded the first efforts to introduce the program into the public schools. Through the 1960s and 1970s the program spread slowly through private schools and gifted programs in public schools.

AP participation declined in the 1970s during the same time period that public schools struggled with civil rights issues. In 1970 College Board president William Turnbull had hired C. Sumner (Chuck) Stone, the first non-white College Board executive, “to deal with problems of racial discrimination, both internal – in hiring and personnel policies – and external – in testing and education” (Nairn, 1979a, p. 359) and to implement Turnbull’s Higher Education Access Route (HEAR) plan – to increase minority admission at colleges and universities. Stone insisted that the College Board and its psychometric affiliate ETS should take responsibility for the way in which its tests were used: “strict accountability in the use of its tests and the purposes for which they are constructed. To prevent inadvertent misuse and in some instances, deliberate misinterpretation of scores for minority groups” (p. 360). The College Board also began to hire more minority staff and to use its programs to increase underserved student access to higher education. This time of heightened awareness of civil rights issues in education and the decline in AP participation motivated a company strategy to increase the participation of public schools in the AP Program, a strategy that worked particularly well with the demand for educational reform after *A Nation at Risk* (1983) alarmed politicians and the public about the condition of education.

The AP Program became a model for introducing greater academic rigor into the curriculum. Although the AP classes too often were reserved for a few carefully selected, academically capable students, who tended to be white, persistent accusations of elitism or racism gradually changed by the 1990s as the College Board marketed AP more directly to public schools and encouraged them to expand the number and diversity of students enrolled in AP classes. The increasing number of participating schools dramatically increased the number

of participating students. By the era of No Child Left Behind (2000), the AP Program had left behind its previous image as a gatekeeper program.

Educational reform. Like the SAT, the AP Program's previous exclusiveness did not prevent it from eventually becoming an inclusive educational innovation. By the 1990s the AP Program had become synonymous with academic rigor and eventually transformed perception of the College Board from elitist educational establishment to educational reformer as AP* courses were marketed as the chief route to equity and access for minority and underserved students.

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Knowledge of placement levels for entering freshmen also assisted colleges and universities in planning their curriculum offerings for the next year. The AP exams established specific standards for specific courses, thus setting the bar for acceptable achievement. Although originally "intended for the talented elite, it admirably expanded its mission to include a wider portion of the able" (Lacy, 2010, p.18) and eventually became the centerpiece of the democratization of access to challenging coursework for minorities. The College Board also insisted that schools abolish gatekeeping practices that might discourage motivated minority students from taking AP classes.

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 opened the door for all standardized tests to gain primacy in educational policy, providing additional opportunities for AP growth. The College Board's AP Program collaborated with the U. S. Department of Education to maximize the use

of AP courses as the primary method of increasing rigor of curriculum (higher standards) and opportunity (higher participation by underserved populations) with the help of federal grants.

In 2002, the College Board introduced its official Equity and Access statement. Rather than serving as an agent of class exclusion as its Ivy League beginnings might suggest, now the College Board's Equity and Access Policy (2012c) emphasizes its contemporary commitment to the inclusion of underserved students. Below is the official statement:

AP[®] Access and Equity Initiatives

The College Board and the Advanced Placement Program[®] encourage teachers, AP Coordinators, and school administrators to make equitable access a guiding principle for their AP programs. The College Board is committed to the principle that all students deserve an opportunity to participate in rigorous and academically challenging courses and programs. All students who are willing to accept the challenge of a rigorous academic curriculum should be considered for admission to AP courses. The Board encourages the elimination of barriers that restrict access to AP courses for students from ethnic, racial, and socioeconomic groups that have been traditionally underrepresented in the AP Program. Schools should make every effort to ensure that their AP classes reflect the diversity of their student population. (College Board, 2002)

Toward this end the College Board maintains a close partnership with the United States Department of Education, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Dell Foundation, and others organizations that provide grants for student and teacher training as well as reduced test fees for students who qualify for free/reduced lunch. Foundation grants, for example, were used

to establish College Board high schools in New York in 2004 to serve low-income and underserved students.

Venture philanthropy. Joint ventures between the U.S. Department of Education and the College Board have continued, but they have been joined by wealthy foundations who practice venture philanthropy, also known as “philanthrocapitalism because it borrows concepts from venture capital finance and business management [and] expected measurable results” (Ravitch, 2010, pp. 199-200) as a return on investment. The big three of venture philanthropy are the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Sam Walton Foundation, and the Eli Broad Foundation, who support “reform strategies that mirror their own experience in acquiring huge fortunes, such as competition, choice, deregulation, incentives, and other market-based approaches” (Ravitch, pp. 200). According to Ravitch, they “exercise vast influence over American education . . . and set policy not only for school districts, but also for states and even the U.S. Department of Education” (p. 200).

The College Board’s website (2013) includes the First Annual Philanthropic Stewardship Report, which describes the company’s numerous projects or co-projects with state and federal governments that are funded by foundations. In collaboration with foundations and the Department of Education, the College Board’s philanthropy report also demonstrated how far from its elitist past it has moved. The College Board participated directly or in collaboration with foundations and the Department of Education in over \$31 million dollars of total philanthropic projects, \$16 million of which were directly related to AP Programs.

The acknowledgement by the College Board of the potency and reach of its communication, of its intention to provoke change, and of its implied attention to the underserved is also of interest. The College Board has access to an extensive community across

the education landscape – including students, teachers, counselors, parents and education professionals – and utilizes its access to this audience to communicate powerful messages about education, to nurture students on their path to higher learning and to incite change where it's most needed most.

The italicized words (italics added) in the following section of the company's annual philanthropic stewardship report identify terminology from the discourse of marketing and growth that suggests the usefulness of the language of philanthropic funding to develop company expansion in a neoliberal environment:

The College Board has an ongoing commitment to exploring ideas that will *expand* the *pipeline* of students who are prepared to take an AP class. Funding from our supporters allows us to develop innovative new ideas, shape concepts and *stimulate* improved ways to *offer* the AP experience to *more* students. (College Board, 2012e).

The words *expand*, *pipeline*, *stimulate*, *offer*, and *more* are common to marketing strategies designed to build a steady supply of customers for a product. The College Board's prestige has enough power to make this convenient alignment appear inevitable and natural. The philanthropy report also mentioned the College Board's Advocacy & Policy Center for College Readiness, which is funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

Present Conditions

Students who seek admission into higher education know there is a time-honored national testing ritual to which they must submit. The scores are the crystal balls of their futures, forecasting the likely arrival of either an acceptance or rejection letter from a college. Most students depend on the Educational Testing Service (ETS) and its partner the College Board to administer, score, and report these important entrance tests, symbolic of access to higher

education and thus to opportunity. Law school, medical school, and other graduate school aspirants must also pay homage to testing requirements that serve as the gatekeepers of their professions. The process is accepted as the natural order of things.

The College Board has great power, both formally and informally, over organizations, individuals, curriculum, and assessment in grades 6-12, acting as a gatekeeper of the social order for those who seek upward mobility. Valentine (1987) claimed that the College Board is “our nation’s conscience in matters of educational excellence and equality of educational opportunity” (p. viii). This system appears to be inevitable, rational, and progressive within a positivist, standardized testing era. The importance of this institution to educational policy and practice in the United States is hard to overestimate.

The College Board has positioned itself as the connection between students and their educational futures, the educational liaison between secondary schools, colleges, and graduate schools, and the arbiter of knowledge and skills necessary for the transition to higher education. Although the College Board began in the early twentieth century as a small organization to standardize the college admission process among a few elite private colleges in the northeastern United States, it now services over seven million students per year and claims over 6,000 educational institutions as members from all over the world (College Board, 2012).

The College Board has earned prestige and praise for the impact of its “guiding, standardizing, and controlling effect on school curriculum and teaching” (Powell, 1996, p.132). Marland (1975), a former College Board president, reported that the College Board had become a “universal symbol for academic quality and prestige” (p. 68).

Johanek, (2001) referred to the College Board as a faithful mirror of education in the United States, but it is far from a passive reflection. Over twenty-five percent of high school

graduates in the United States have taken at least one AP exam, according to a College Board report (2012f). In the most recent year (2012) for which numbers are available, 954,070 high school students took at least one AP Exam. The number of AP exams taken at individual schools determines their ranking in influential publications such as *Newsweek*, *U.S. and News World Report*, and the *Washington Post*, annual listing of America's top public high schools, a distinction that matters to parents and school administrators. AP courses on student transcripts also play an important role as a measure of rigor of schedule in the college admissions process. Many state legislatures require AP courses in high school and pay the \$89 (2013) fee for each test for all students.

In 2012 more than three million AP exams in over thirty content areas were taken, generating more than \$222,000,000 in revenue for the College Board, as reported by the College Board's *Ninth Annual AP Report to the Nation* (2012f). Over 730,000 of those AP exams were taken by low income students who qualified for free/reduced lunch. Their exam fees, reduced to \$43 per exam by the College Board, were paid by a combination of federal grants and local money, providing over \$32 million of public money as part of that revenue stream.

The income streams earned by the College Board and its affiliate ETS are large enough to cause concern about motivations. Although there are few critical studies of the College Board, some have questioned the motives of the College Board, noting that a drop in AP participants in the 1970s resulted in a corporate strategy to rebuild the number of AP test-takers while exploiting an increasing call for greater participation by minorities, a move that Lacy (2010) called a typical neoliberal ideal of melding market motivations with the idea of doing good. Lacy commented, "The College Board and ETS appear more revenue driven than beholden to

the idea of liberal education” (p. 40). Despite an acknowledgement that the College Board “democratized the notion of advanced placement in the American educational system,” Lacy criticized the College Board for “turning democratization into growth in market share” (p. 41) and profiting from substantial financial support from government money that pays for test fees for students in underrepresented populations and training for their AP teachers.

The success of the AP program has attracted other critics. Lacy (2010) questioned the contradictions of the company’s role:

The College Board embodies a contradiction to its contemporary critics. On the one hand, it holds forth as a multifaceted, nonprofit, nongovernmental organization engaging in nationwide education standardization activities. Its subsidiary, the Advanced Placement (AP) Program, fills a void left by the traditional reluctance to regulate education by the U.S. federal government. The object of concern for AP in particular, and indeed the College Board in general, is the transitional period from high school to higher education. . . . On the other hand, the College Board has become a huge economic concern and perceived by its critics as a big business. By 2009 it had evolved into a multi-million-dollar organization with every appearance of a corporation. (p. 17)

Lacy further described the College Board as having a neoliberal corporate ethic that produced substantial income (9.6%) above expenses, a “profit” that non-profit companies refer to as a revenue stream and that for-profit companies envy.

The company also kept millions in reserve funds and paid executives princely compensation. David Coleman, the current president of the College Board, for example, has a compensation package of about \$900,000, including \$750,000 in salary (Lewin, 2012). Lacy also reported that the president of ETS earned \$931,605 in 2007. The evolution toward high

corporate executive income began in 1999 when Gaston Caperton became the president of the College Board, the first company CEO to have an extensive business background rather than an academic one. While at the helm, Caperton was widely admired for the data-driven business model that he developed, setting measurable growth and market share goals for each department and regional office.

According to Lacy (2010), the company found many ways to do good and make money at the same time through its influence on education by using AP to increase educational opportunity for minorities. The Board's Equity and Access policy (College Board, 2000), which states the company's commitment to equal opportunity and access to rigorous academic work for all students, including traditionally underrepresented students, has become a powerful force in extending the AP curriculum far beyond the company's original stated intentions (Fuess, 1967; Johaneck, 2001; Lacy, 2010; Marland, 1975; Riccards, 2010) of serving the talented and well-prepared elite. Addressing the needs of the many as opposed to a select few created a new market, especially when federal money was readily available to supplement and expand programs such as AP.

The power of the College Board to define what counts as knowledge, how it will be measured, and who benefits plays a key role in education. Henry Chauncey, a former College Board director and first president of ETS, explained that "moral authority" and "national conscience" were his goals for the organizations. Chauncey's sense of moral mission combined with the need for the company to be solvent evolved into the modern College Board as "the embodiment of the neoliberal ideal of melding market orientation with a traditional, authentic liberal concern for education" (Lacy, 2010, p. 39). Lemann (2000) likens the hybrid work of this

enterprise to a “slow-motion, invisible Constitutional Convention whose result . . . determine[s] the American social structure” (p. 26).

Critics, on the other hand, have found both the College Board and ETS guilty of “cultural bias, abuse of power, deception , cover-up, ageism, classism, racism, elitism, opportunism, incompetence, upholding the status quo, monopolistic practices, mental management, consumer fraud, economic exploitation, corporate arrogance, false advertising, lying, manipulation of facts, and strong-arm tactics” (Volpat, 1989, p. 52). Owen (1985) described ETS as the “most powerful unregulated monopoly in America” whose business compels “people who wish to advance in all of walks of life . . . to pay its fees and take its tests . . . in order to pass various checkpoints in America’s social hierarchy” (p. 7).

Students, however, continue to enter the maw of this “familiar and all-encompassing” machinery (Lemann, 2000, p. 6). The College Board grew, according to Schudson (1972), because “people *believed* the College Board to be important” (p. 61) during the rise in importance of higher education in the nation during the twentieth century and the first decades of the twenty-first. As standardized testing grew in importance, so did the College Board. Lichten (2010) explained, “A dominant feature of American culture is the exaggerated respect awarded to measurability. In psychology its personification has been intelligence measured as IQ. In education it has resulted in a national preoccupation with grades and test scores” (p. 240).

Although there are many negative views of the College Board, the College Board has also participated in social and educational reform on behalf of underserved populations without equal access to higher education. The College Board’s Equity and Access policy (2012c), which states the company’s commitment to equal opportunity and access to rigorous academic work for all students, including traditionally underrepresented students, has become a powerful force in

extending the AP curriculum far beyond the company's original stated intentions of serving the talented and well-prepared elite (Fuess, 1967; Johaneck, 2001; Lacy, 2010; Lemann, 2000; Marland, 1975; Riccards, 2010). According to Lacy (2010), the expansion policy of equity and access represented a classic neoliberal move by the company to do good and make money at the same time through its influence on education by using AP to increase educational opportunity for minorities.

The College Board regularly provides proof of progress toward closing the achievement gap. The 2012 AP Report to the Nation provided detailed information. For example, the total number of AP exams taken has increased since 2002 from 471,404 to 954,070, an increase from 18% to 32.4% of the total number of high school graduates. The percentage of Black/African American, Hispanic/Latino, and American Indian/Alaskan Native who take AP Exams has increased since 2002 from 17.6% to 27.6%. The percentage of these students who are successful with the exams has increased since 2002 from 15.2% to 20.8%

Summary

I have selected one cog in the College Board/ETS machine for closer study as an example of how power can operate within a larger structure and “to question over and over again what is presented as self-evident” (Foucault, 1988b, p. 265). My interest is in the “endless play of dominations” (Foucault, 1984a, p.85) and the “discourses of attitudes, identities, and thinking” (Bielskis, 2009, p. 81) of regimes of truth that make the machine work. The largest and most successful component of that machine is the AP program.

Powell (1996) described AP courses as “the best systemic example of incentive-driven, externally assessed standard-setting in American education” (p.138). This study uses one specific AP subject, Advanced Placement (AP) English, to examine the relationship of forces that

produced definitions of English as a subject and assumptions concerning opportunity, testing, and knowledge that contributed to the College Board's power in curriculum and individual lives. The development of two separate AP English courses at different times in the College Board's history makes AP English a representative subset of the total AP Program for analysis of the College Board's central role in education.

The College Board offers such a large and diverse number of products and services that the researcher must look away from the whole and narrow the topic to the discourses of one representative subset, the College Board's Advanced Placement (AP) program and the specific discourse of the two AP English courses, in order to reduce the scale to a manageable analysis. The context, however, of the College Board's larger history also remains vital to an understanding of why an analysis of a substructure can speak to the whole. The AP Program's transformation into today's flagship of rigorous curriculum and equal access for all students is a reflection of both the College Board's influence on and response to the fluctuating currents of society and education.

Chapter 3

Theoretical Contexts

The purpose of this chapter is to situate my topic and myself as a researcher in the theoretical contexts that influenced my work. I will first discuss my personal theoretical position and then connect it to professional issues in the study. Postmodernism is the best description of my dominant theoretical position because “it is not about displacing one version of truth or science for another. It is about challenging and opening the central premise” (English, 2003, p. 3). Postmodernism rejects “the idea of their being one right way or one right science or one right method of inquiry” (p. 3), and that has been my approach in analysis.

Life as Theory

This chapter includes a discussion of theories that helped me think about the “epistemological unconscious” (Steinmetz, 2005, p. 109) that created the framework of the world I previously believed to exist and now resist. I explained in Chapter One how I reluctantly lost the modern world and gained a postmodern one, a mourning process that at first encompassed the ruins of the cathedral of culture, then the disintegration of my lifelong attempts to become a worthy member of the congregation, and finally the loss of presence and expectation.

The theories in this chapter helped me to see the assumptions and fallacies that had sustained my dedication to the epistemological façade of Western civilization and the Enlightenment in particular. The questions and discontent provoked by the theories to challenge these monoliths would not have occurred without these new ways of thinking. One of my motivations for returning to graduate school in 2004 was to see what I had missed since finishing

my master's degree in 1982. Harraway (1991) provided insight: "Struggles over what will count as rational accounts of the world are struggles over how to see" (p. 587). Recognition of the façade's constructs and their relationship to an individual subject enabled by that structure called for theories that defamiliarized what I knew personally and professionally. Using theory, for example, to think about existing social structures such as the College Board's pre-scripted models of accepted truth narratives created space in which to consider alternatives. In that space I let go of pre-conceived notions of what it means to be educated and what *not* knowing what it means told me about myself as a teacher and an individual. The effect was curiously euphoric, as if I had been robbed and rewarded at the same time.

As an English major, I had valued ambiguity in literature and believed there were many truths, even contradictory ones, from transcendent aesthetic, intellectual, spiritual, or psychological sources, such as the search for self-knowledge. When I realized that there is no independent self, no true autonomy, the study of theory became an indispensable personal process for examining problems of identity and subjectivity. I had believed that education, rationality, ambition, determination, and hard work were the sources of my identity without fully accounting for the power relations at work in my life. I surprised myself with anger for being a perpetrator and dupe of the fraud of faith in the ideologies of educational, political, and social systems that produced my compliance and complicity in what I had believed to be "a supremely civilizing pursuit" as an "alternative to the nightmare of history" (Eagleton, 1987, pp. 49-50). Epistemology had been ontology for me because past personal investment in specific epistemological systems *was* the source of my identity.

Although my constructed identity had motivated me to return to graduate school to pursue another degree, my present plan is to dismantle the Rube Goldberg apparatus of these

academic structures and examine some of the surprises and absurdities that make them tick behind a monolithic façade supported by privilege, assumptions about knowledge and standardized testing, and the perpetuation of power. Early stages of thinking and reading theory in my doctoral classes had inspired me to question everything, even if the consequences included confrontation with the possibility that the independence I valued as an individual was little more than a mirage sustained by the structures on which I depended for purpose and identity. This posture of doubt was an important position from which to consider the powers with which I had willingly cooperated to limit, rather than expand, my purpose and identity within the national narrative of meritocracy and democracy that I believed to be the birthright of citizens in the United States. I had expected a rational, inevitable conclusion to my quest to be an educated person, similar to Gray's (1998) description of

this revolutionary project . . . of the world's last great Enlightenment regime, the United States. The thinkers of the Enlightenment such as Thomas Jefferson, Tom Paine, John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx never doubted that the future for every nation in the world was to accept some version of western institutions and values. A diversity of cultures was not a permanent condition of human life. It was a stage on the way to a universal civilization in which the varied traditions and cultures of the past were superseded by a new, universal community founded on reason" (p. 2)

My experience as a teacher and a graduate student contradicted this inevitable conclusion. Society had changed; demographics had changed; theory had changed. I began to suspect that freedom had always been an illusion for those without power or without awareness of power.

The gates of academia. For me, the epitome of these structures existed within the large, complex, powerful entity that guarded the gates of academia, the College Board. Much like St. Peter's

keys at the gates of a positivist heaven, standardized test scores greatly influence decisions about who to qualify or disqualify when students apply for college admission (including graduate school) or course credit. For over a hundred years, the College Board has played a major role in determining what counts as knowledge by determining what is tested. Bracey (2009) observed, “We measure what we can and come to value what is measured over what is not” (p. 4).

The testing industry, epitomized by the College Board/ETS entity, is big business. Riccards (2010) suggested, “Entering the twenty-first century, the federal government’s well-meaning No Child Left Behind Act could be renamed no company left behind” (p. 113). Framed by the world’s largest-scale program of mental testing, any contemporary discussion of standardized testing should also acknowledge the disguised instability of the concept of intelligence, which is the ancestor of all modern testing that models itself on the segmented, multiple choice testing of the original intelligence tests. We understand very little about the construct of intelligence; we understand even less about the role of culture in assuming what intelligence might be. Most IQ tests were developed in the early twentieth century in an environment of eugenics, logocentrism, and elitism. A thorough examination of the concept of intelligence is beyond the scope of this project, but it is necessary to think about how and why standardized testing and other established educational practices emerged from such dubious ancestry. Ohmann (1976/1996) observed,

IQ tests, which are charged with predicting success in school, have to find some way of predicting that black and brown and poor children will not generally succeed, since the structure of society guarantees that result. . . . We should understand what we are up against: not tests that are arbitrary, but a class society that requires such tests. (p. 65)

Over twenty-five years of classroom experience as a teacher and gifted program coordinator at the high school level have taught me that there is more to intelligence than a test score, even though part of my job includes routine administration of intelligence and achievement tests. Studying theory made it possible for me to understand my longstanding misgivings about the dependability of test scores in a way that studying validity, reliability, and other statistics never accomplished. My research study needed theory to enable rigorous interrogation of accepted ideas about intelligence, education, Western civilization, literature, and meritocracy that formed my previous experience and identity. To examine the topic of this dissertation is to examine myself.

Lehrer (2010) encouraged my skepticism with a discussion of the overlooked instabilities of the scientific method. According to Lehrer, common problems with quantitative data failed to be acknowledged. Relying on accepted scientific principles that require successful replication of an experiment as validation of the data, he followed a large number of studies published as truth in scientific journals. His meta-analysis indicated that scientific journals often refused to publish replication studies that proved the original study to be incorrect. Citing evidence from several studies, he asked a question: "If replication is what separates the rigor of science from the squishiness of pseudoscience, where do we put all these rigorously validated findings that can no longer be proved?" (p. 52). He also cited studies that have documented the gradual, inevitable decline of data in replication studies, demonstrating that the statistics not only failed to repeat the required statistical test of 95% significance for validation but also continued to decrease with each additional replication. According to the standards of quantitative practice, failure to validate the original findings of a study is cause to invalidate its results. Lehrer indicated that scientific journals nevertheless had a tendency to prefer positivist data despite evidence that

suggested that omissions, misperceptions, and manipulation of data caused selective reporting of the data. Lehrer's disclosure reminded me of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Kuhn, 1962/1970). Apparently a "proven" scientific study can be as unstable as any other social phenomenon, although complicated by shifting numbers that are similar to Kuhn's shifting paradigms. Science is not always science.

Lather (2004) explained that current educational research neglects 30 years of "the social critique of science" (p. 17) and the constantly changing definitions and understandings of science. According to Cherryholmes (1988), the structure and order of scientific measurement is "illusory because it is a product of history and power (Foucault) and is analytically unstable (Derrida)" (p. 47). Foucault (1990/1976) described inventors or administrators of the scientific method as often being "without hypocrisy" (p. 95) but unaware of the "tactical polyvalence of discourses . . . [meaning] the multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies" (p. 100). Intelligence tests, for example, that depend on words carry a cultural content that may be outside the familial, ethnic, or economic experience of a test-taker. Even the format of the test (multiple choice questions, bubble in the answers, time limit) may be alien to the perceptions of a test-taker because of mental variations such as autism or cultural reliance on oral traditions. For example, Temple Grandin (2013) is a high-functioning autistic who earned a Ph.D. in animal science, published 13 books, but experienced great frustration with school as a child. Her best subject was art; she could learn geometry and trigonometry but not algebra; her social skills are poor but her cognitive capacity is unusually high. She explained that autistics understand pictures, not words, and focus on highly specific details of their environment. It is possible that the "polyvalence of discourses" and "multiplicity of discursive elements" include many more variations of thinking and ways of being than the current scientific

paradigm includes. The current paradigm of standardized testing, learning, and knowledge lacks vocabulary for alternative discursive elements.

Examination of the conditions that made the dominant discourse possible is central to my research, including the historical, social, and intellectual currents that shaped the prevailing paradigm and the subsequent influence these conditions had on me as a researcher. In this chapter, I describe major and secondary theories that support this genealogical research project and make it possible to study how discourse functions, how it creates power, and how it reveals the history of the present within a power structure.

Major Theories

Positivism. Positivism is important to this dissertation because of what it is *not* rather than what it is, of how it does *not* function rather than how it does. Positivism is a useful perspective for this dissertation because it provides a way to make sense of the accepted narrative of reality, the presumption of scientific certainty in the status quo. Recognizing positivism as only one theory instead of the only theory and undoing its effects on my thinking was an important step in learning to think differently.

Since the Vienna Circle introduced positivism in the early 20th century, positivism has become the dominant paradigm in educational research and practice. Positivism accepts binary certainty that relies on either/or conclusions, restrictions of possibility, and the privileging of statements based on objective, empirical, scientific data as the only valid science. Glesne (1999) explained that positivism “characterizes the world as made up of observable, measurable facts. Positivists assume that a fixed, measurable reality exists external to people” (p. 5). Positivists believe that knowledge is detached and impersonal. They find knowledge; they don’t produce it.

Positivism claims to be objective, theory-free, and value-free. The general understanding of positivism as normal science limits the discussion of many issues, including education. Kuhn (1962/1970) reminded us that normal science supposedly has stable boundaries and predictable phenomena. National magazines and newspapers such as *Newsweek*, *Time*, *U.S. News and World Report*, and the *Washington Post* have convinced educators, parents, and politicians that they can find common ground for understanding headlines based on numbers from positivist research that they believe represents objective reality. They use these statistics to support the standardization of education.

General public conversation about scientific measurement as natural, self-evident, common sense truth does not take into account positivism's self-perpetuating, self-limiting restrictions: scientific measurement is capable of assessing a finite understanding of material phenomena that are within the limited understanding and language of humans at a specific time and place. This kind of measurement, however, is always incomplete and subject to revision. Positivist researchers do not see their work as incomplete and so prove and re-prove their versions of knowledge in order to perpetuate a static comprehension of experience by maintaining a self-reproducing power dependent upon a "complex strategical situation in a particular society" (Foucault, 1976/1990, p. 93). Cherryholmes (1988) described the goal of positivism as follows:

The purpose of the positivist metanarrative was to write a story or set of rules characterizing knowledge. In the process of working toward these goals, however, it undercut the possibility of achieving them. Its categorical distinctions between "the analytical and synthetic, the linguistic and the empirical, theory and observation" (West, 1985, p. 260) were eventually discarded along with hopes of using them to

solve central problems of philosophy. (p. 10)

Kuhn (1962/1970) argued that science is always subjective because it is the work of human beings who are subject to their own context of belief and bias. As explained by Kuhn, the term *paradigm* is used for a consensus of beliefs within a scientific community at a specific time. The culture, values, tools, and language of the community's historical period can limit the practices, curiosity, or imagination of science. New thinking, technology, and research, however, may cause even a well-accepted paradigm to change over time. Sometimes the strength of one paradigm overwhelms competing paradigms, not because of its greater truth but because of its relationship to power at a specific time and place. Popkewitz and Brennan (1998) explained that Kuhn, the continental historians and philosophers of science, and Foucault shifted the focus of inquiry from the intentions of people to the changing principles through which knowledge itself is structured. Scientific change is then located in the manner in which concepts change and the conditions in which concepts change (p. 10).

James (1907/2007) recommended that we give up "the pretence [sic] of the finality of truth, writing that

most, perhaps all, of our [scientific] laws are only approximations. . . . so many rival formulations are proposed in all the branches of science that investigators have become accustomed to the notion that no theory is absolutely a transcript of reality, but that any one of them may from some point of view be useful. Their great use is to summarise [sic] old facts and to lead to new ones. They are only a man-made language, a conceptual shorthand. (p. 42)

Although the study of literature is not a hard science, even twentieth century literary theory was influenced by positivism. New Criticism, for example, attempted a pseudo-scientific approach

by focusing on literary analysis as detached, impersonal, rational truth, and I had been well-schooled with New Criticism. Literary theory after New Criticism abandoned the pretense of the finality of truth. Positivism insists on final truth constructed by science. Positivism made it possible for me to understand how science came to be the way it is. Positivism also made it possible for me to reject the way it is as inevitable.

Positivist research, both quantitative and qualitative, is the current dominant paradigm of education. Rorty (1999), however, observed that “many of the things which common sense thinks are found or discovered are really made or invented. Scientific and moral truths, for example, are described by our opponents as ‘objective,’ meaning that they are in some sense out there waiting to be recognized” (p. xvii). Crotty (1998) explained that “no matter how faithfully the scientist adheres to scientific method, research outcomes are neither totally objective nor unquestionably certain . . . the absoluteness has gone and claims to validity are tentative and qualified” (p. 40).

Nevertheless, the belief exists that positivist definitions of knowledge are uncontestable and that numbers, derived from test scores and scientific management analysis, can define individuals in educational settings. Cherryholmes (1988) explained that the truth or efficiency of the metanarrative of the scientific method demands that “the prescriptions of the metanarrative are executed completely and correctly” (p. 11), suggestive of the operations of a religious ritual or magic formula that will fail if any of the steps or ingredients are not followed exactly. Positivism “offers assurance of unambiguous and accurate knowledge of the world” (Crotty, 1998, p. 18) that is appealing but incomplete because “a way of seeing is a way of not seeing” (Oakley, as cited in Crotty, p. 55).

Current educational practice uses prescriptive applications of quantitative research to define “normal” within a positivist context that is assumed to be incontestable. Among critics of positivism, Lincoln and Guba (1985) explained, “[w]e are all so imbued with the tenets of science that we take its assumptions utterly for granted, so much so that we almost cannot comprehend the possibility that there might be other ways of thinking” (pp. 8-9). These assumptions create a blindness to what “normal” may mean. Foucault’s (1988a, 1976/1990, 1977/1991) genealogical studies of madness, prisons, and sexuality examined “other ways of thinking” about societal norms. Labels such as “normal” or “abnormal” and the cultural expectation for individuals to regulate their own conformity to social norms produce conditions similar to what Foucault examined in his work.

Foucault used the term *governmentality* for a set of practices of the self on the self and others that occurs within social institutions and communities. Governmentality relies on self-discipline and the acceptance of “truth” defined as normal from a specific ideological perspective that disciplines and produces people, practices, and beliefs. Foucault also suggested that the concepts of the norm and normativity are implicated in relations of power, contingent on particular social norms (such as sex and gender). Positivism establishes binaries that define truth within those social norms that present themselves not as norms, but as incontestable conditions and therefore outside of power and immune to critical analysis. Concepts, categories, and principles thus appear to be natural, necessary, and normal truth that simply needs to be accepted, masking the effects of power and inhibiting critique or challenge. Maintaining power and normativity relies on a single discursive and methodological community sharing the same concerns and perspectives. Prado (1995) noted that Foucault did not think of the dominant norm only in

terms of the control of one class or individual over another . . . but also in being the generation of values that allow and support the establishment of hierarchies and of notions like that of liberation from subjugation. Power or power-relations enable both the domination of individuals or classes and the values and ideas employed in effecting and justifying that domination as in resisting it. (p. 37)

Bové (1990) described truth as “the power to produce statements which alone can be judged ‘true’ or ‘false’ within the knowledge/power system that produces ‘truth’ and its criteria within a culture” (p. 50), a way of thinking sustained by a discourse of an “institutionally specific structure of statements, terms, categories, and beliefs” (Scott, 1988, p. 35).

Successful governmentality privileges practices that reinforce the values of the state and encourages individuals to believe in their own freedom even as they discipline themselves according to the ideology of the state’s version of truth, a technical explanation for the conditions from which my own personal and professional identity of the past had emerged. As an AP teacher, I had participated in what Foucault called a game of truth, a game that practiced normalization of both teacher and students through exclusion and classification, as described by Gore (1998):

Particular identities and practices also are excluded, as are ways of constructing knowledge. Very often exclusion and normalization occurred together, where the pathological was named in the process of establishing the norm. . . . A pedagogy that does not set boundaries, that does not normalize and pathologize, is almost inconceivable. . . . Differentiating groups or individuals from one another, classifying them, classifying oneself, is another common technique within Foucault’s elaboration of disciplinary power. (p. 238-239)

Conventional education cannot exist without classification. Gore also discussed individualization (characterizing oneself or another), totalization (specification of collectivities and their collective character), and regulation (explicit assessment) as techniques of pedagogical power. All of these techniques are productive, and some are necessary to normative positions. Gore explained, “Pedagogy’s governmental influence, both within and beyond schooling institutions, is enormously powerful in the control of populations . . . the Foucaultian approach enables us to document what causes us to be what we are in schools, and hence, potentially, to change what we are” (p. 249). To question what appears to be common sense, what appears to be inevitable, what appears to be logical requires a re-examination of rationality and irrationality.

Positivism as the great drama of reason. Although it is a temptation to imagine the ancient Greeks, including Plato and Socrates, as representatives of rationalism and the foundation of Western common sense, Nietzsche (2009/1882) used his well-known explanation of the birth of tragedy to illustrate the great drama of the modern age with an analogy to the Greek stage as a struggle of the tensions between two great forces. Apollo was the god of the sun, light, truth, poetry, and music. Dionysus was the god of nature, wine, drama, and dance. Kreis (2000) summarized Nietzsche’s conception of the Apollonian: “the basis of all analytic distinctions . . . the unique individuality of man or thing; all types of form or structure since form serves to define or individualize that which is formed” (para. 2). Geuss (2009) described Nietzsche’s idea of the Dionysian: “the transgression of limits, the dissolution of boundaries, the destruction of the individuality, and excess” (p. xi).

Nietzsche’s contrast of the two gods is usually assumed to be rationality and irrationality, which appears to be a binary relationship from which individuals must choose. It is not, however, a simple choice nor a simple binary. Dionysian rituals in myth, drama, and the partial

history available about them are more complex than simple drunkenness. Apollonian thought seeks closure, but the openness of Dionysian thought allows closure *or* the lack of closure, even if closure is the violence of dismemberment, such as suffered by Pentheus at the hands of Dionysian celebrants as he searched for his daughter among them. The lack of wholeness caused by dismemberment could appear to be deliberate Dionysian lack of closure. Rather than being either/or, however, the lack of wholeness was Apollonian because the dismemberment created a new order instead of a lack of order, a perception requiring a shift of paradigm to another form of reasoning beyond binaries and beyond synthesis: a new vision, a new perception, a new wholeness that is Other.

Girard (1979/1972) goes beyond Nietzsche: the Dionysian ritual festival eliminated all distinctions between men and women, old and young, freeman and slave, human and animal, god and man and began as a celebration of love and brotherhood. The distinctions between good and evil also vanished as the “good” celebrants joined the collective “sacrificial crisis” (127) that demanded a victim for “violent nondifferentiation” (127) to “achieve violence solely in order to eliminate it” (132). The victim became communal rather than individual, what Nietzsche called the “Dionysiac generality” (p. 102). “The *principium individuationis* is disrupted, subjectivity disappears entirely before the erupting force of the general element in human life” (p. 120), explained Nietzsche. He commented, “[The Apolline Greek’s] entire existence, with all of its beauty and moderation, rested on . . . suffering and knowledge which was exposed to his gaze once more by the Dionysiac. And behold! Apollo could not live without Dionysos the ‘barbaric’ was ultimately just as much of a necessity as the Apolline” (p. 27). Humans needed both. Rational society required a communal sacrifice that disrupted subjectivity with another order of perception.

Although the conventional duality posed between Apollo and Dionysus is in itself an antithesis compatible with Enlightenment thought, Rorty (1999) pointed out that such contrast is a useful strategy of inquiry: “But we are against a certain specific set of distinctions, the Platonic distinctions. We have to admit that these distinctions have become a part of Western common sense” (p. xix). Apollo as the Greek representative of reason perpetuates dualism by rejecting irrationality and creating antithesis. The goal of Dionysus, however, is temporary inclusion accomplished through irrational, sometimes violent, absorption of the Other, even if the resulting fusion is temporary, ambiguous, unfamiliar, or cognitively dissonant. Coming to an awareness of my own distorted subjectivity allowed the Other to enter, but it required the sacrifice of my own identity, perceived as wholeness. The Dionysian pursuit of the incomplete is never final, better suited to postmodern or poststructural thought.

Although Apollo had influenced my earlier history as a student, I have now turned with relief to Dionysus’ methods. For example, Prado (1995) explained Foucault’s work as rethinking “reason, rationality, truth, and knowledge” and rejecting the existing standards of those concepts because they are nothing more than “historical, practice-generated standards and procedures” (p. 46). Foucault’s histories of madness, prison, and sexuality, for example, were counter-histories of how insanity, punishment, and morality came to be named, classified, or defined through practices of reason and power at specific historical points. The inclusion or exclusion of insane, criminal, or sexually different individuals depended upon the place and time in history in which they found themselves. Some societies at different points of history found various ways to include these marginalized individuals by describing their behavior in ways that included them rather than excluding them. Harootunian (1988) commented on Foucault’s work about marginalized populations that society classified as abnormal at different times:

Reason and its “history” establish what is other from itself, different, a distinction that could not be made before the decision to install reason in its privileged place and to favor history, that is, work. The division of reason and its other constitutes the latter as unreason, opposing reason, and it thereby becomes an object submitted to knowledge. Whether it was the mad, the diseased, or even the criminal, it was no different from the Other when it became specified as non-European, non-Western, always its negativity, as something to be incorporated and superceded by the dialectic of identity. (p. 118)

Derrida (1978) suggested the possibility of a history beginning with the relationship to the Other beyond reason and history. Boyne (1994) called the sometimes acrimonious debate between Foucault and Derrida as an attempt to answer one question: “is it possible to imagine a complete restructuring of the way we think?” (p. 1).

Some of their ideas followed Nietzsche (2007/1887) who challenged the “so-called ‘facts’ about morality” (p. xv).

Science, too, rests on a faith, there is absolutely no science without “presuppositions”. . . . where could science find its absolute faith, its conviction on which it rests, that truth is more important than any other thing, even than any other conviction? Precisely this conviction could not have come into being if both truth and untruth were continually to prove themselves useful: as is the case. So – faith in science, which now undoubtedly exists, cannot have taken its origin from such a calculation of utility, but rather in spite of the fact that the uselessness and danger of the “will to truth,” of “truth at any price,” are continually proved the “will to truth” does not mean, “I will not be deceived,” but instead – we have no choice – “I will not deceive, not even myself.” (p. 158-159)

To willingly release reason initially felt like freedom until I realized that there was no truth – no Apollonian clarity – in it, only ambiguity. I prefer, however, to not deceive, not even myself. As Nietzsche explained, metaphysics had not allowed truth to be a problem. The task of genealogy, as he called it, was to call into question the value of truth, to critique the will to truth.

Transition from positivism: Different versions of accepted truths. Kuhn's (1970/1962) examples of scientific beliefs no longer accepted and of independent thinkers, such as Copernicus or Galileo, who endured ridicule, isolation, persecution, or death for offering different versions of accepted truths suggested how difficult it is for paradigms to shift. For example, the simple practice of washing hands before surgery and between patients to prevent the spread of infection did not become standard until the 1870s. (Gloves were not even worn in surgery until ten years later.) The physicians who first advocated antiseptic practices seemed irrational to their nineteenth century colleagues who directed derision and skepticism toward them. Changes in this medical paradigm occurred because of dissident individuals whose medical insight problematized current practice. Educational paradigms seem to change even more slowly.

Questioning accepted truths and practices is the beginning. Critique is useful to stimulate thought, but what is critique without change? Questions of *how* are more important than questions of *what* in research, but I want to ask *why*. There is a price to be paid for the dissolution of false consciousness and the remaking of an identity. For example, after independence had come in the mid-twentieth century to former European colonies in Africa, indigenous people found sudden autonomy to be perilous. Their native cultures forever altered by the cultural invasion of their colonizers, the natives could not successfully restore their tribal order or assimilate the colonial hierarchy. They had become simulacra, as Baudrillard

(1981/1994) might describe them: “It is no longer a question of imitation, nor of reduplication, nor even of parody. It is rather a question of substituting signs of the real for the real itself” (p. 167). Greed and government make a poor mixture undiluted by the authenticity of tribal society, having lost the connections to the past and having no path to the future in the post World War II world.

What is left? Having released the transcendent, the patriarchal, and the self, I asked a question: had I become a simulacrum? I had been colonized by cultural constructs from Western Civilization and myths of the American dream. Native American poet and author Sherman Alexie (as cited in Luscombe, 2012) told an interviewer, “When you’re colonized, you end up exploiting your own spirituality” (p. 76). I am still uneasy, experiencing my own crisis of colonization by patriarchal and social hierarchy and understanding how I am complicit in perpetuating them. There are multiple resolutions available but no stable ones. Habermas’s (1975/1973) description suits the situation:

There exist cognitive dissonances between the traditional world-views in the process of dissolution and the imperatives of a scientific system made binding through generalized formal schooling and congealed to a behaviorally effective syndrome in a kind of positivistic common consciousness . . . dominant elements of the cultural tradition are losing the character of world-views, that is, of interpretations of the world, nature, and history as a whole . . . Philosophy has been stripped of its metaphysical pretension; but in the ruling scientism, those constructions before which a wretched reality must justify itself have also fallen apart. (p.80)

So I left positivism behind. The center could no longer hold. The beast slouched toward Bethlehem, and I wondered if it was a beast of burden or of prey. We may not know until it is too late. Rajchman (1987) suggested what is to come:

Postmodernism is a sign of the loss of the colonial model of a universal culture spread out to educate the world at large. It is rather for a post-colonial world of products made and sold in different places without a center. It is like the lingua franca of this world: it can be made and consumed everywhere and nowhere. (p. 51)

Jameson (1979/1984) saw a parallel economic event: the transcendent appeared to be replaced by the “new primacy of science and technological invention, and of the technocracy generated by that privileged position . . . indices of a new and powerful, original, global expansion of capitalism” (p. xiv) to support that consumption. According to Derrida (1967/1978), the center cannot hold because “the center is not the center” (p. 278):

The entire history of the concept of structure . . . must be thought of as a series of substitutions of center for center, as a linked chain of determinations of the center. Successively, and in a regulated fashion, the center receives different forms or names. The history of metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the history of these metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix . . . is the determination of Being as presence. . . . In the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse. (p. 279)

This disruptive decentering shifted the role of language from meaning present to meaning deferred, the condition of discourse that created the language games described by Lyotard (1984/1979) and that characterize postmodernism.

Poststructuralism/Postmodernism. Poststructuralism is a term often used interchangeably with postmodernism. Lather (2007) commented on the difficulty of defining or

distinguishing these important terms: “Whatever postmodern and poststructural mean these days, they are pervasive, elusive, and marked by a proliferation of conflicting definitions that refuse to settle into meaning” (p. 5). Although *postmodern* could refer to artistic choices in art, music, or architecture as well as academic critiques of foundations and transcendental signifieds, *poststructuralism* usually refers to academic critiques of reason and science as they have been privileged by Enlightenment rationality. In metaphorical terms, poststructuralism is definite about wanting to end its relationship with structuralism; postmodernism, on the other hand, is doubtful that there ever was a relationship or a structure.

Postmodernism includes a variety of theoretical positions but has also been described as “atheoretical – open to consider all claims and theories which may define and support them” (English, 2003, p. 3). Despite her acknowledgement of conflicting definitions, Lather (2007) was more specific about postmodernism: “Postmodern generally refers to the material and historical shifts . . . of the marginalized, the revolution in communication technology, and the fissures of global multinational hyper-capitalism” (p. 5). Rajchman (1987) wrote, “Postmodernism is a sign of the loss of the colonial model of a universal culture spread out to educate the world at large. It is theory for a post-colonial world of products made and sold in different places without a center,” adding that postmodernism is “the supermarket approach to ideas” and “theoretical cannibalism” (p. 51). English (2003) explained, “Postmodernism is about constructing a way of looking at the world of ideas, concepts, and systems of thought through the historicity of context and the shifting nature of linguistic meaning and symbols as they manifest in discursive practices”(p. 3). Postmodernism asks different kinds of questions but does not expect answers, only conversations about possibilities other than the accepted one.

Many versions of postmodernism exist because there are many critiques of positivism across the disciplines, but disciplines themselves are positivist, doing “no more than reiterat[ing] their founding principles and prejudices, and reaffirm[ing] their blindness” (Harootunian, 1988, p. 119). The results sometimes appear to contradict each other, a circumstance that perhaps reveals different responses to power. Butler (1995) speculated, “If postmodernism as a term has some force or meaning within social theory . . . perhaps it can be found in the critical exercise that seeks to show how theory, how philosophy, is always implicated in power” (p. 38). Flax (1990) explained that we become

skeptical about beliefs concerning truth, knowledge, power, the self, and language that are often taken for granted within and serve as legitimation for contemporary Western culture. (p. 465)

Rajchman (1987) claimed that the French philosophers most often connected to postmodernism disliked the term: “Foucault rejected the category; Guattari despises it; Derrida has no use for it. . . Lyotard found it in America” (p. 49). Nevertheless, my thinking could not have progressed without two postmodernist strategies: Foucault’s genealogy and Derrida’s deconstruction.

Power/Knowledge. Much of Foucault’s writing addressed the relationship of power to knowledge. He noted, “The exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power” (Foucault, 1980, p. 52). Foucault often referred to power and/or knowledge as “Power/Knowledge” because he thought of them as inseparable. Burr (1995) clarified the “power/knowledge” combination as follows:

If we think of knowledge as one possible account of events, but one which has received the stamp of 'truth', then to the extent that this version brings with it particular possibilities for acting in the world, it has power implications. For Foucault, then,

knowledge and power always go together as a pair. Where there is knowledge, there is power. The two are so inseparable that they are often written as 'power/knowledge' or referred to as the 'power/knowledge' couple. (pp. 63-64)

Foucault claimed that power interacts with the use and perpetuation of knowledge, although power and knowledge are not synonymous. As Foucault (1976/1990) explained,

[p]ower is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere....power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society. (p. 93)

Knowledge is never neutral because of its strategical relationship to power. As Foucault (1980) explained, "Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation" (p. 98).

Gordon (1980) wrote, "what is at issue is indeed a certain series of historical connections which become visible and intelligible in terms of power" (p. 237) without a violent removal.

Knowledge by itself is not power; knowledge receives power when produced within a discourse that achieved dominance and is consequently viewed as true.

Foucault (1980) argued that "Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to the effects of power which it induces and which extend it"

(p. 133). The relationship is complex and reciprocal. Foucault (1994/1997) observed,

the problem is not just to determine how power subordinates knowledge and makes it serve its ends or how it superimposes itself on it, imposing ideological contents and limitations. No knowledge is formed without a system of communication, registration, accumulation, and displacement that is in itself a form of power, linked in its existence

and its functioning to other forms of power. No power, on the other hand, is exercised without the extraction, appropriation, distribution, or restraint of a knowledge. (p. 17)

For example, Spanos (1993) followed Foucault's use of power/knowledge to discuss humanism as knowledge that restricts power.

Humanism invented a whole series of subjected sovereignties: the soul (ruling the body, but subjected to God), consciousness (sovereign in a context of judgment, but subjected to the necessities of truth), the individual (a titular control of personal rights subjected to the laws of nature and society), basic freedom (sovereign within, but accepting the demands of an outside world). In short, humanism is everything in Western Civilization that restricts the desire for power. (pp. 74-75)

By restricting power, Western Civilization thus disciplined anyone who refused the immutable "preordained norms" (Spanos, 1993, p. 69) of its "subjugated sovereignties" (p. 74), making humanism a regime of truth more like positivistic science.

Power is productive. Even humanism has something to offer, according to Foucault (1984c): "We must not conclude that everything which has ever been linked with humanism is to be rejected, but that the humanistic thematic is in itself too supple, too diverse, too inconsistent to serve as an axis for reflection" (p. 44). Foucault then reflected that he was not faithful to the doctrinal elements of the Enlightenment tradition but to the "permanent reactivation of an attitude—that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era" (p. 42). The result was to turn the Enlightenment's critique back on itself. Rather than accept the "blackmail" of the Enlightenment—an either/or false dichotomy stating that one must either remain within Enlightenment rationalism or become a critic of the Enlightenment and "its principles of rationality" (p. 43), Foucault rejected this dichotomy. He thought it useful

to recognize “ourselves as beings who are historically determined, to a certain extent, by the Enlightenment”(p. 42), an analysis requiring precise historical inquiries about “what is not or is no longer indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects”(p. 41). He described his own project as “rooted in the Enlightenment” as a “type of philosophical interrogation” which “simultaneously problematizes man’s relation to the present, man’s historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as autonomous subject” (p. 42).

Foucault stated that his version of criticism does not seek to make “metaphysics possible” or to make metaphysics a science; rather, it involves an historical analysis of “the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying” (p. 50). We have the power to create ourselves and the knowledge to recognize how and why we have done so. It is likewise knowledge that makes resistance to power possible.

As Foucault (1990/1976) explained, “where there is power, there is resistance” (p. 95). Foucault argued that resistance takes a variety of forms within a “strategic field of power relations” (p. 96). Resistance does not exist outside of power but is instead an effect of power. The many forms of resistance make power visible and require an analysis of the exercise of that power. The disruptions characteristic of Foucault’s genealogical method create a space within which to examine the circulation of power as well as resistance to power. Power circulates in discourse. Foucault (1981) observed that discourse is the “thing for which and by which there is struggle . . . the power which is to be seized” (pp. 52-53), not the mere interpreter of struggle or domination. Following Foucault, Said (1978) provided a more detailed description of discourse: “a collection of statements (frequently, though not exclusively, a body of texts) unified by the designation of a common object of analysis, by particular ways of articulating knowledge about

that object, and by certain connections, especially regularity, order, and systematicity” (15). Discourse is a system of thought that uses language to transform abstract ideas into concrete practices, methods of organization, communication hierarchies, rewards, punishments, assumptions, and symbols.

To control discourse is to control language and language networks and the way in which language is used. To control discourse is to exercise power. Burr (1995) explained that “different discourses construct different things” (p. 49) from “a set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories, statements, and so on that in some way together produce a particular version of events” (p. 48) and include “structures and practices that are lived out in society from day to day” (55). Linking discourse to science, Haraway (1991) proposed that “science . . . is rhetoric, a series of efforts to persuade relevant social actors that one’s manufactured knowledge is a route to a desired form of very objective power” (p. 577). Rhetoric controls the way a subject, action, or system work and perceptions about it. Perception often is reality to those who accept the assumptions on which the perception is based. Thus, the personal reality of positivism became nothing more than the context that made the conditions possible for my previous constructed identity. The next step was to unravel the assumptions that made my perception of determined individuality possible. To do so would require a prolonged examination of how an individual emerges as the subject of her own knowledge.

Subjectivity. Burr (1995) wrote that humanism “refers to the idea that the person is a unified, coherent, and rational agent who is the author of his or her own experience and its meaning . . . assumes that there is an essence at the core of an individual which is unique, coherent, unchanging” (p. 40). In contrast, subjectivity is the “process by which our identities and ourselves as persons are produced by socially and culturally available discourses” (Burr,

1995, p. 40). Examinations of power ask Foucault's questions: "How are we constituted as subjects of our own knowledge? How are we constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral subjects of our own actions?" (318). Foucault (1977/1980) emphasized, "Knowledge is a power over others, the power to define others" (64) to create, to produce subjects. For example, the problematic achievement gap of minority students in comparison with their Asian and white counterparts may be more a function of the kind of tests that are given than the validity of the testing data. What appears as an "achievement gap" is more likely a culture gap arising from minority and immigrant students' less developed skills for "doing school" because of socioeconomic inequities or cultural emphasis on less linear, less quantified skills that have more to do with alternative cultural perspectives in which efficiency and rationality are not the highest values.

Conventional assumptions about what constitutes an educated subject limit other interpretations. Fendler (1998) explained that power relations affect the meaning of *educated*. These meanings become the subjects of power categorized as "socially constructed," "regulated," or "normalized" (p. 40). Fendler (1998) claimed,

In current times it is impossible to think of a normal self without constitutive relation to the social. Social identification as a debatable discursive practice of modernity became increasingly formalized through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and is a virtual assumption in current discourses. As evidence, a subjective identity without relation to the social now is generally regarded as pathological or autistic. . . . This relation did not come about as any sort of necessary result, causal principle, or teleological inevitability. (pp. 58-59)

Although Foucault (1976/1990) used the term “juridico-discursive” (p. 84) to describe the uniformity of the social apparatus that controls sex, the term could describe the effect of the apparatus in educational settings:

From top to bottom, in its over-all decisions and its capillary interventions alike, whatever the devices or institutions on which it relies, it acts in a uniform and comprehensive manner; it operates according to the simple and endlessly reproduced mechanisms of law, taboo, and censorship: . . . from the agencies of social domination to the structures that constitute the subject himself. . . . To the formal homogeneity of power in these various instances corresponds the general form of submission in the one who is constrained by it. . . . A legislative power on one side, and an obedient subject on the other. (p. 85)

The extraordinary feature of this obedience is the subject’s conscious or unconscious submission to the societal norms. Fendler (1998) commented, “Modern exercise of power began to take the form of the control of the subjective self by the subjective self” (p. 49). Identifying Foucault’s notion of governmentality as “technologies of normalization,” Fendler further defined governmentality as “recognition of the productive effects of power in which social relations repeatedly constitute and reconstitute power through subject positions” (p. 59). Prado (1995) explained,

Since the key to regulation by norms (as opposed to coercion) is getting the subject to participate in his or her own surveillance, the subject must not be aware that he or she is being made to adopt or internalize certain norms. Subjects must believe that those norms are manifestations of their own nature, and so despise in themselves any inclination to contravene them. (p. 91)

Students are subject to surveillance; they are observed, tested, quizzed, assigned, and grouped; they also surveil themselves and others. If they believe the norms to be manifestations of their own nature and they fail to succeed, then they see their own nature as failing. Popkewitz and Brennan (1998) observed that “curriculum is continually a practice of inclusion/exclusion, of constructing reason and nonreason that have critical moments in the construction of ‘self’ and the world (p. 27). The analysis of standardized test scores has become the central, national discussion of education. If the tests are used as markers of social worth, students whose experience and cultural practice are misaligned with the practice of bubbling in answers are behind before they start. The norm already defines them as flawed. “Abstruse academic exercises,” claimed Garrison (2009), “do enforce values, and reflect a definite world outlook or social philosophy. For example, within Euro-American thought, written competitive exams reveal a person’s ability to delay gratification, or ‘self-denial’” (p.13). Is it possible that the delay of gratification, or self-denial, and the habits of mind that accompany such an act are the keys to success on a standardized test? If so, education is still a Puritan experience.

Prado’s (1995) discussion of Foucault’s (1976/1990) problematization of normal and abnormal in his genealogical work *The History of Sexuality* can illuminate the contemporary problematization of education if the word *education* is substituted for each use of the word *sex* in the following passage since the problem is power, not sex:

But the most important consequence of [education] becoming a problem of truth was that expertise about [education] enabled and supported claims about discerning the differences between normal and abnormal. Suddenly all [educationally] active persons were vulnerable to classification based on conformity to or deviance from norms generated by an objective [educational] nature. This vulnerability in turn engendered a

deeper vulnerability to self-classification as a certain sort of [educational] being. . . .

What establishes the deployed theories and practices as authoritative is that, in being the object of scientific study, [education] is taken as something to be discovered and unveiled rather than constructed and imposed. (p. 97)

Our educational system measures, classifies, and pronounces the performance of students as normal and abnormal, above standard or below standard, passing or failing. We classify students according to what tests they take and to what constructs we subscribe. Intelligence tests classify students as superior, average, or below average in ability. Achievement tests classify students as above expectation, at expectation, or below expectation in knowledge and skills. These categories further depend on our belief that tests measure what we think they measure.

Cherryholmes (1988) described the ideological orientation of educational testing that organizes and rationalizes beliefs and interpretations about testing:

Beliefs behind production of tests and their consumption by teachers, administrators, students, parents, and social institutions other than schools [are] . . . (1) the importance of testing and evaluation, (2) how testing should be carried out, (3) the content of tests, and (4) what test results mean. (p. 5)

The complexity of the human brain and its relationship to culture and environment, for example, make it highly unlikely that any existing intelligence test is adequate to the task. At best, we get an approximation of skills with one particular set of tasks that may have little relevance to real life and a negative correlation to cultural experiences and values. Foucault (1975/1995) believed that every pronouncement of not measuring up to society's expectations carries within it "an assessment of normality and a technical prescription for a possible normalization" (p. 20).

Prado's comments (1995) about Foucault's study of sexuality (1976/1990) provided an example of how the sacrificial use of history could be applied to contemporary educational practice:

The main burden of regulation is transferred to the individual, who seeks to attain and maintain her or his proper or natural [identity] by acting in specified ways and refraining from acting in ways recast as aberrant. Most central to the legitimation of control . . . is the complicity of subjects in regulating their own behavior. . . . The most effective way to achieve this cognitive end, to get people to believe their very own nature calls for regulation, is to promulgate a scientific conception of human beings as having a specific objective nature, one that is replete with possibilities for unnatural and deleterious expression. (p. 100)

Disrupting subjectivity does not bring freedom. There is no end because a new subjectivity is only an outcome, not liberation. Fendler (1998) categorized "the educated subject of current educational discourse . . . as an assumed composite of socially constructed desires and shifting patterns of governance through effects of power" (p. 59). For example, the College Board produces students as subjects, and as teacher I am implicated in that process as both subject and agent. Foucault (1975/1995) provided a key question for inquiry into the process of subjectivity: "How did a specific mode of subjection produce man as an object of knowledge for a discourse with a scientific status?" (p. 20).

To assist my understanding of that mode of subjection and the discourse through which it operates, deconstruction provided a different way of reading to move my thought beyond what Jameson (1999/2008) called "the false problem of the antithesis between humanism (respect for

the past) and nihilism (end of history, disappearance of the past)” (p. 41). Derrida was necessary for my work of emerging from the ruins.

Deconstruction: Derrida and hauntology. Postmodernism, poststructuralism, and deconstruction are sometimes used interchangeably. Foucault and Derrida both offered ways of reading a text but emphasized different aspects. Flaherty (as cited in Boyne, 1990) described the difference as “extreme tension between ‘textuality’ and ‘discursivity’ as rival reading strategies” (p. 75). He explained,

While Derrida feels that the text must be relentlessly ‘deconstructed,’ so that its network of ‘traces’ can be better exposed as trapped within the ‘prison-house’ of logocentrism, Foucault takes the position that a text can be best read against its context, that is, as part of a larger set of discursive practices that inform the episteme of its specific spatio-temporal configuration. (as cited in Boyne, 1990, p. 75)

Deconstruction is Derrida’s method for revealing what is absent from a language experience: “what these things are not” by “closely reading a piece of text [to show] how its construction relies upon unstated absences” to identify “all the things it is not” in order to make a description of what it is (Burr, 1995, p. 106). Deconstruction is the theory that aligns best with the task of inquiry as described by St. Pierre and Pillow (2000): “ask questions that produce different knowledge and produce knowledge differently, thereby producing different ways of living in the world” (p. 1).

Deconstruction is serious in its goal to subvert the central authoritarian position of a word, phrase, or pair of words, but it is playful in its unsettling of language, looking for its shapeshifting instability when isolated. Derrida’s invention of the non-concept *différance* is useful for examining what is absent from a specific text. To use *différance* is to examine both

difference and deferral of meaning: “meaning is always both dependent upon a signifier’s difference from other signifiers and constantly deferred from one signifier to another in an endless chain” (Burr, 1995, p. 106). For example, the Apollonian meaning of order is restrictive and limited. However, the Dionysian meaning of order is both different and deferred, allowing conditions that make possible other configurations of order. It is the difference of a bullseye on a target and the *différance* of a spider web. Meaning is always incomplete and subject to change. As a researcher, I find it difficult to sustain postmodern thinking without deconstruction as a way to think about it. Deconstruction has been especially useful to someone such as myself who was addicted to the symmetry of binaries and the creative possibilities of synthesis; now deconstruction serves as an early warning system to examine binaries a second and third time for their implications of privileging one term over the other. Deconstruction reminds me to pay attention instead of being seduced by the cleverness and neatness of the word play. Butler (1995) explained,

deconstruction implies only that we suspend all commitments to that to which the term “the subject” refers, and that we consider the linguistic functions it serves in the consolidation and concealment of authority. To deconstruct is not to negate or to dismiss, but to call into question, and perhaps more importantly, to open up a term, like the subject, to a reusage or redeployment that previously has not been authorized. (49)

Re-thinking my personal and professional identity within this project was difficult because it took a long time for me to feel authorized to redeploy my experience or to accept with comfort the uncertainty it was bound to produce. Idealism was an easy casualty of the process, but despair was not an acceptable product of uncertainty. Both Derrida and Foucault challenged the

dominance of Western thought; Derrida was essential to interrupt my inevitable preference for binaries so that I would stop thinking in terms of either/or.

My research also needed to apply Derrida's method of close reading to educational binaries within a closed, marginalizing system of epistemology whose main effect was inclusion or exclusion of individuals, which is evident in educational systems. Jameson (1999/2008) speculated on ways to use Derrida's idea of the specter as a way out of the problem, through the unresolved contradictions, especially those posed by language: "to change the valencies of the problem, to adjust the lens of thought in such a way that suddenly we find ourselves focusing, not on the presumed content of the opposition, but rather on the wellnigh material grain of its arguments" (pp. 40-41). The establishment, for example, of a system of academic meritocracy has benefits for many members of society and appears to support the most familiar constructs of equal opportunity and individuality, but the traces of the silent advantages of some students and the acceptance of the socioeconomic disadvantages of others make meritocracy empty, a failure, a ghost of its promise and potential. Derrida (1993/1994) wrote about the specters of Marx after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and amidst the evidence of the failure of communism to survive as a viable alternative. He made it clear that his "work of mourning" was not for Marxism or communism per se; he no longer considered them viable.

Similarly, I find Marxism to lack practical application in contemporary society, but the discourse of Marxism has been useful to my thinking and informed the contrarian interrogative process helpful for deconstruction of what appears to be inevitable and natural, especially in regard to re-examining the role of capitalism in the metanarrative of the American dream and the subjectification of the general population to the consequences of capitalism. After the recent financial collapse in 2008, CNBC's Wall Street television commentator Jim Cramer remarked,

“The only guy who really called this right was Karl Marx” (cited in Shah, 2010, para. 10). Prior to this dissertation, I would not have fully understood that comment and would have considered it dangerously cavalier. After this project, his comment simply seemed sadly ironic.

My use of Derrida’s work of mourning and the concept of spectrality provided me with an additional way to deconstruct my own political subjects. I do not mourn the politics, business practices, norming, social inequities, or illusions of the machine of my project, the College Board and the smaller cogs of the study of English as a school subject. There is no absence to mourn because there is far too much presence, but the presence is nevertheless haunted by specters of cultural traditions and assumptions that are not dead but empty. In education ghostly presences haunt all texts, the way that we read texts, and the assumptions that construct our perceptions of knowledge and the testing of that assumed knowledge. From these specters come the lines of descent of my research.

One of those specters, for example, is the dinosaur of educational tradition, a petrified fossil, no longer viable in the age of rapid change, demographic shift, and ruthless “optimization of procedures” (Russo, 2005, p. 30). The educational establishment attempts to re-arrange the antique bones of conventional curriculum, standardized testing, and cultural expectations to aim for maximum productivity, which usually looks like a re-boot of “No Child Left Behind.” The bones, however, are simply too heavy and preoccupy educators with replication rather than innovation. Babbitt (as cited in Spanos, 1993) argued that “the first aim is not to be original” but to rely on the “process of imitation [of classicism] . . . for true culture” because education is the “conservative and unifying element in national life” (p. 83). The present U.S. educational apparatus that emerged from specific historical events, technological advances such as the IBM

scoring machine, and unstable concepts of intelligence, standardized testing, meritocracy, and culture continues to imitate the past.

Spanos (1993) argued that the theory and practice of literary critics Matthew Arnold, Irving Babbitt, and I.E. Richards were the chief influences “on the idea and practice of culture in the bourgeois capitalistic Anglo-American world at large” (p. 66) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. According to Spanos, their purpose was the repression of anarchy and disorder that threatened the “dominant social consensus” (p.66) of classical humanism exemplified by Arnold’s Apollonian vision of the pursuit of perfection through “sweetness and light,” “right reason,” “the best that is known and thought in the world,” and “the best self” (Arnold, 1882). The three literary critics required the restoration of Western tradition through “subtle and imperceptible coercion and pacification of multiple differences [the Other]” (p. 66). They saw danger in “the (Dionysiac) dispersal and proliferation of classical (Apollonian) knowledge; that is, the emergence of difference activated by the definitive rupture of the Western tradition” (Spanos, 1993, p. 68) in a decentered society. Spanos (1993) described Matthew Arnold as the “father of humanists” (p. 70) who confronted the “dislocating intellectual, cultural, social, and political irruptions of the industrialized nineteenth century” and saw

the increasing demand for electoral reforms, educational opportunities, and a more equitable distribution of wealth” as “manifestations of decadence . . . symptoms of an incipient catastrophe – a fall from a concentrated state of ideal unity or equilibrium of forces (“Hellenism”) grounded in the absolute origin (arché) into an apparently ungrounded (“provincial”) and immiscible pluralism, an expansive and unbalanced anarchy. (p. 71)

Arnold's cathedral of culture was a place of privilege for some and prejudice against others. In my attempts to become my "best self" and to know the "best that is known and thought in the world," as Arnold had described it, I had unwittingly subjected myself to a culture that desired to discriminate against me as a working class woman and all others from the "unbalanced anarchy" of pluralism. For the sake of the anxiety and fear of a disproportionately small number of the mostly male, white, Western establishment, those aspiring to membership in the cathedral embraced a "perennial nostalgia for a lost origin: the center beyond the reach of free play and the circle it precipitates to enframe and stabilize the differential and volatile 'objects' under scrutiny and to master anxiety" (Spanos, 1993, p. 70).

Said (1983, as cited in Spanos, 1993) wrote that culture is a "system of discriminations and evaluations . . . of exclusions" (p. 77), one that is in the process of disintegrating and leaving behind traces, ghosts empty of viability but still with enough presence to exist beyond their time. If Marx (1852/1913) was correct, the tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. If so, is it possible to see a future different from the present educational apparatus or are we trapped on a haunted loop that stays in the present and never gets to a future?

Derrida's playful word for embracing the spectral was *hauntology*, emerging from the space between the ontological debate of being and non-being. Ghostly cultural traditions are not dead but comatose. They return as full-bodied terrors such as Neo-Nazism or absurd goblins such as the Bugs Bunny/Elmer Fudd cartoon version of Wagnerian opera. Derrida (1999/2008) explained that the "lexicon of ontology is insufficient" (p. 248) and warned to not "re-ontologize" (p. 253).

Derrida (1993/1994) used Shakespeare's *Hamlet* to explain spectrality as the embodiment of his theory of hauntology. The ghost of Hamlet's father (the past) is pervasive, influencing his son's present and causing a disruption between present and future. Hamlet complained the time was out of joint and cursed his fate to set things right, giving voice to Derrida's idea that "right" based on vengeance is indeed an old code that only reproduces the present rather than establishing a justice beyond right: "If right or law stems from vengeance . . . can one not yearn for a justice that one day, a day belonging no longer to history, would finally be removed from the fatality of vengeance?" (p. 25). Derrida's hauntology sought a "critique of presentism, of an existing order that presents itself as immutable . . . in the name of another future and a conception of justice beyond presence, beyond right and calculation" (Postone, 1998, para.9). This position provides a method for refusing to accept the present as necessary even if the future seems impossible without it. Lewis (1999/2008) argued, "If anything seems clear after reading SM [*Specters of Marx*], it is that Derrida views Marxism not as constituting a living tradition but rather as belonging, quite precisely, to the realm of the undead" (p. 137). He added, "Derrida merely asserts his belief that every core concept of Marxist theory and practice deserves burial" except for "a spirit of self-critique" (p. 139). Ahmad (1999/2008) commented,

It is useful to recognize that when Derrida uses the metaphors of "inheritance," of "mourning," and of "promise" he does so from a genuine sense of loss, because the resurgence of the Right has been surely as agonizing for him as it would be, from a very different standpoint, for a Marxist. He has chosen the tone of his writing in this text very carefully. It is the tone of a dirge, a sermon to the vanquished, a language of healing the wounds so that new promises may be made that those promises of old shall be kept, even though in a new way. (p. 99)

The new promises confront “globalism itself which sets the stage for a new kind of politics, along with a new kind of political intervention, [and] the extraordinary new wealth that constitutes the power of the postmodern business establishment” (Jameson, 1999/2008, p. 29), a ruthless, unaware postmodern environment of efficiency and profit. Although positivism had never been a comfortable position for me, postmodernist thought made it possible for me to develop a vocabulary for that discomfort, a name for the Other, and a theoretical position from which to confront the powers that be, including those that emerged from concepts of intelligence, scientific management, technological determinism, the condition of knowledge, and neoliberalism. The next section presents information, vocabulary, and theoretical concepts of these additional influences on my thinking.

Other Theories

Intelligence. The history and theory of intelligence testing are useful to my research because these ideas demonstrated again that our society values what we can measure (Bracey, 2009). The ignorant, ethnocentric, prejudiced assumptions of the time when intelligence tests were new have influenced contemporary notions of intelligence and current tests in direct and indirect ways. Learning, for example, that the first SAT in 1926 was based on the military’s World War I test for soldiers that was itself based on an American adaptation of the original French Binet intelligence test exposed a clear line of descent that made every subsequent denial over the years by the College Board that the SAT was an IQ test suspicious. This information created a higher alert level when I combined it with knowledge I had from very specific and detailed study of intelligence and its assessment during my master’s level work. Much disagreement existed in the academic and school communities about the nature of intelligence and how to measure it. Tests existed and measurements collected, but no one could say for

certain what intelligence was or what was being measured other than a limited set of culture-specific ways of linear thinking, reading, and reasoning. Any standardized testing, including AP exams, faced similar scrutiny. Multicultural educational environments often stimulated questions about these circumstances.

The instability of the apparently inevitable common-sense notion of the College Board/ETS role as arbiter of standardized testing and administration of the meritocracy began to look much more vulnerable to questioning than I had imagined. The rest of this section about intelligence includes a brief history of the development of these theories and a specific explanation of the College Board's IQ connection.

A brief history of theories of intelligence. Cultural definitions of intelligence have always depended on what a particular society valued. According to Davis and Rimm (2004), warrior cultures such as Sparta valued physical perfection first and foremost; Rome valued leadership and engineering; imperial China valued attention to detail; Japan valued social class. Contextual models propose that “intelligence has different meanings in different contexts, especially in different cultures” (Brody, 2000, p. 30). Yet, the construct of intelligence in the United States has become a “scientific” narrative so widely accepted that it still holds a place in educational theory and policy, despite many challenges arising since the civil rights era of the 1960s.

Based on faulty cultural assumptions from the beginning, theories of intelligence have changed little since the nineteenth century. For example, early twentieth century intelligence tests sometimes depended upon speed of processing, a “Western emphasis not shared by many other cultures” (Sternberg, 2000, p. 5), such as counting the number of times a repetitive hand movement could be made in thirty seconds. Unfortunately, some of those assumptions about

speed and ability have not changed. Standardized tests, for example, still insist on time limitations, and a student's score relies not on the accuracy of the questions that were completed in the given time but on the total number of questions on a specific test.

Generally accepted as the pioneer of the contemporary study of intelligence, Galton (1869/1892), contended that intelligence was inherited. He attempted to turn the study of intelligence into science comparable to *The Origin of the Species* (1859), whose author, Charles Darwin, was his cousin. Galton was the first to use the phrase "nature vs. nurture," and he developed several statistical concepts that are essential to modern, normal science, such as the standard error of measurement (SEM) and regression to the mean. Nevertheless, his version of the science of intelligence was deeply flawed by the widespread influence of eugenics and racism during that time period. Later a highly controversial book, *The Bell Curve* (1994) by Herrnstein and Murray, illustrated the continuation of theories concerning the heritability of intelligence and the correlative relationship to various racial groups. The effects of such faulty assumptions continue. For example, minority populations in the United States continue to be underrepresented in the identified gifted population by estimates of 30% to 70% (Davis, Rimm, & Siegle, 2011; Sarouphim, 2004), a condition attributed to identification procedures that largely rely on standardized intelligence tests. Lemann (2000) described the eugenicist beliefs of the early twentieth century held by the original developers of intelligence tests:

Intelligence was the single most important human trait . . . the one around which society should be organized. Intelligence was genetically inherited. Darker-skinned races were inferior in intelligence (including Mediterranean natives). Unintelligent people reproduced at a more rapid rate than intelligent people. New immigrants were inferior

and too numerous. The purpose of intelligence tests was to identify a select few for advanced education and future leadership roles. (p. 23)

These comments were similar to discussion by College Board leaders in the first half of the twentieth century about finding and developing a “select few for advanced education and future leadership roles” whether they were talking about the sons of privilege who typically attended elite colleges or sons of ordinary mid-Westerners who were the first targeted population for scholarships by Harvard. The College Board has long been a key participant in developing and administering tests that its leaders believe to be useful for creating a meritocracy to identify the future leaders of the United States. Lemann noted that political and educational powers understood the idea of meritocracy better than they did of intelligence. Meritocracy was an easier concept that could be turned into practical social application. Meritocracy was a noble cause with egalitarian ambition that found the convenience of standardized testing was efficient and useful if its core relationship to cultural assumptions was overlooked.

Intelligence, on the other hand, was a mutable theory with many different proffered ideas, none of which could claim scientific truth. Although Darwin’s theory of evolution gained scientific credence over the years, his cousin Galton’s eugenicist theory of intelligence did not. Many other proposals, other than those of Galton, about the nature of intelligence also developed, but they remain theories, presumptions, speculations. The next section presents examples of the variety and number of attempts since Galton to establish a scientific understanding of intelligence.

Competing paradigms of intelligence. Other theories that emerged in the twentieth century included a wide variety of ideas, some of which have become more influential than others. For example, in 1904 Spearman proposed the theory of generalized intelligence, known

as *g*, which became the most widely accepted concept, making later single score IQ results feasible. Binet and Simon took this idea a step further by developing (for work with mentally deficient children) the first psychometric intelligence test in 1905, the results of which gave the world the term *intelligence quotient*. Despite the prevalence of this term in psychology and education, Binet doubted beliefs about the ability of “any quantitative index to assess fully the ideographic complexity of intellect” (Brody, 2000, p. 18). After Binet ignored his own skepticism, others did also and built new tests from the presumption of scientific certainty they believed Binet to have established, a presumption that suggested an early error, accident, or belief became part of the paradigm upon which additional work was done because Binet himself doubted the ability of any test to evaluate human intellectual complexity. For example, an American version of Binet’s test was developed in 1925 by Terman, who developed and administered the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale as the American version of the French Binet test.

In addition, Terman’s well-known longitudinal study of gifted children that was the first of its kind, following his subjects for 50 years, became the knowledge base for the characteristics of giftedness until a reality check occurred in the 1990s that revealed the socioeconomic bias of his study: all of his subjects had been the children of privilege whose parents were university deans or professors. Over the same time period Guilford developed in 1950 a theoretical model of intelligence that included 220+ specific abilities, which deserved more attention than it has received because of his attempt to identify multiple aspects of thinking skills. His multi-faceted model was later re-conceived by Gardner (1983) who published his well-known theory of multiple intelligences, a theory which became a wide-spread educational trend with practical

applications that were well-suited to general populations, unlike Terman's misguided assumptions about the skewed sample of his research population.

Another important theory of intelligence was developed in 1977 by Sternberg who proposed the triarchic theory of intelligence, emphasizing components of context, content, and process in relation to the subject's response. An influential academic figure, Sternberg (2000) affirmed that "no one knows for certain what [intelligence] is" (p. 3). Even with many theories of intelligence and an occasional acknowledgement of the lack of certainty about what intelligence is, cognitive ability test scores still dominate as the accepted instrument for evaluating students.

According to Brown, Chen, Gubbins, Renzulli, Siegle, and Zhang (2005), these assumptions about intelligence matter when sorting students:

The tradition of relying on IQ scores to define one's ability carried favor with psychologists and educators as the technology of measurement took hold. Numbers became the determinant of what students could accomplish in school. Using an objective approach to assessing abilities was comfortable. That level of comfort, however, was often challenged when there were dramatic differences between students' academic accomplishments and what the numbers had predicted. The realization was that the prophecy of the numbers was really just for future numbers on the same or similar tests. (p. 75-76)

Validity and reliability studies, which appear to make intelligence tests scientific, only measure the ability of the same numbers to re-appear, not whether the tests themselves accurately measure intelligence. Many of the so-called intelligence tests measure nothing more than exposure to thinking and skills that conform to traditional classroom practice or social class, thus

easily measured because of their predictability and lack of variance. There is also the possibility that the tests reflect habits of mind and particular set of conventional academic skills of the testmakers, who happen to be good at school skills themselves and value convergent thinking above divergent thinking. There are many different ways of thinking and being that do not lend themselves to multiple choice tests or predictability of results. Two examples demonstrate this variety. Einstein, who did not speak until he was four years old, was initially assumed to be mentally deficient. Edison, in contrast, was banned from elementary school because he disrupted class by asking too many questions. He was considered uneducable. Both of these examples illustrate the logocentrism of many theories of intelligence. Einstein offered no proof of intelligence because he did not speak; Edison appeared uneducable because he spoke too much in the interrogative mode rather than the declarative mode of recitation required of students in the first half of the twentieth century and earlier.

Intelligence then and now is a concept based on logocentric norms of predictability and conformity. All multiple choice tests are descendants of the first IQ tests and eugenicist notions of heritability and conformity to cultural norms. If Galton and Binet had not been so influential in the early years of theorizing about intelligence and the making of the first IQ tests, standardized testing might be a different process today. If WWI and WWII had not utilized the convenience of multiple choice testing for sorting men, the multiple choice test might not be the powerful force it is today. If the IBM scoring machine had not been invented, the convenience of multiple choice testing would not have magnified itself. If standardized testing as we know it did not exist, a more holistic process of assessment might be the dominant paradigm. Perhaps educators would be measuring different abilities in different ways that were less dependent upon conformity, cultural norms, and measurability and more reliant on performativity.

The College Board's IQ connection. Even in the early years, the College Board had doubts about the ability of mental ability tests to measure intelligence, an observation that nevertheless did not prevent the company from using mental ability tests as the template for the first SAT. The College Board's 1926 explanation of the first SAT to college admissions officers illustrated why consideration of theories of intelligence became part of my thinking process. Valentine (1987) explained the College Board's uncertainty about intelligence tests and confidence in correlative scores:

While acknowledging [the SAT's] kinship to . . . psychological tests, mental ability tests, and intelligence tests, the [testmakers] noted that whether or not such tests measured intelligence was elusive, whereas the connection between test scores and subsequent academic grades could be determined empirically. They intended the term *scholastic aptitude* to refer to nothing more than the tendency for individual differences in scores to be associated positively with individual differences in subsequent academic attainment.' (p. 35)

This description is perhaps more remarkable for what it omits than what it says: there is no acknowledgement that the SAT was built on the template of an intelligence test derived from another intelligence test. Whatever the intentions, the source of the SAT is clear – a WWI military sorting test that was itself derived from an American adaptation of the original French Binet intelligence test. The original Binet intelligence tests were experiments intended to evaluate French children who at that time were classified as “mentally deficient;” an adapted version of this test became the one used by the United States adapted to sort WW I soldiers. In 1926 Carl C. Brigham of the College Board used this adapted version to make the first SAT in 1926, noting at the time that the tests were similar but that the SAT was more difficult.

The College Board had selected Brigham, a Princeton professor of psychology, to head the committee to a plan for the preparation and administration of the new tests of this type. His doctoral work had taken him to France to study with Binet and Simon, “which led to Binet’s creation of the concept of ‘mental age’ and to his collaboration with Simon in developing tests to measure the ‘intelligence quotient,’ or ‘IQ’ of French pupils” (Valentine, 1987, p. 34). He had also worked with other psychologists for the U.S. government to develop the Army Alpha Test and Beta Test during WWI. The first SAT emerged as a more difficult version of the Alpha test.

Brigham (1923) also wrote *A Study of American Intelligence*, a work that reflected the “prevailing eugenicist theory of the day” (Lemann, 2000, p. 30), causing him to conclude in his book that “American intelligence is declining, and will proceed with an accelerating rate as the racial admixture becomes more and more extensive” (as cited in Lemann, 2000, p. 30). By 1928, however, Brigham experienced an intellectual epiphany: his views changed, rejecting the idea that “the [IQ] test measured a biologically grounded, genetically inherited quality that was tied to ethnicity” (Lemann, 2000, p. 33). In 1930, Brigham formally recanted his previous views after he observed that the experimental work on IQ was being done by

true believers who began by announcing their conclusions (IQ tests were supremely reliable and valid, so much so as to represent one of the great scientific advances in history), and then conducted their studies in an atmosphere of wild unobjectivity.

(Lemann, 2000, p. 33)

He also published *A Study of Error* (1932), a new book that acknowledged the pretentiousness and lack of foundation of his previous work. He tried to distance the SAT from IQ testing. At the suggestion of an assistant, he changed the original single score number, which had been accompanied by a scale to convert it to an IQ score, into two parts, one for verbal and one for

mathematical ability. This familiar combination is now an important part of every high school graduate's experience but one that evolved from a single score converted to an IQ score.

According to Lemann, the "choosing of a particular type of test . . . [meant] choosing a social vision about what the United States would be like" (p. 26) based on the new scientific measurement of human behavior, including education. The choice, however, was an illusion that succeeded primarily because of the misdirection of attention away from the underlying culturally embedded and misguided beliefs about social class, race, and intelligence.

By accident or coincidence, the emergence of theories of intelligence and the first intelligence test happened at a convenient time for practical application for WWI, the first SAT, and WWII. These theories and events coincided with the increasing role of capitalism and the emergence of a business ideology, known as Taylorism or scientific management, that emphasized productivity and profit as the Industrial Revolution heated up with advancements in transportation, communication, and other technology in the early twentieth century. Standardized testing and scientific management were made for each other from the start. From that marriage emerged the measured, sorted, and value-added educational world we know today.

Taylorism: The theory of scientific management. The Industrial Revolution brought many technological advances that transformed the use of energy on a large scale. According to Drucker (1993), however, changes in the way humans work was even more important: "The central point was that production almost overnight moved from being craft-based to being technology-based. As a result, the capitalists moved almost overnight into the center of economy and society" (p. 29). Although many shared Marx's concern about inevitable class conflict, a small book by Frederick Winslow Taylor (1911), *The Principles of Scientific Management*, began what is known today as the Productivity Revolution that changed

everything. According to Drucker (1993), the Productivity Revolution is the reason that the United States achieved the status of world power and the reason that Marx's predicted rise of the proletariat did not occur. Drucker even claimed that the success of Taylor's method explained the failure of Marxism in highly developed countries because the income of blue-collar workers increased so much through productivity that they became middle class.

Taylor (1911) "applied knowledge to the study of *work*, the analysis of work, and the engineering of work" (Drucker, 1993, p. 33), inspired by his observations of the conflict between capitalists and workers. He maintained until his death that his motivation had always been so that ordinary men being paid by the volume of production could improve their lot. Taylor recorded and timed every movement of specific jobs in factories, analyzing each job as a specific sequence of steps and then testing different methods of implementation to find the most efficient and thus productive procedures, as demonstrated by the following quotation:

He set out to make workers productive so that they would earn decent money. Taylor's motivation was not efficiency. It was not the creation of profits for owners. To his very death, he maintained that the major beneficiary of the fruits of productivity had to be the worker, not the owner. His main motivation was the creation of a society in which owners and workers, capitalists and proletarians, could share a common interest in productivity and could build a harmonious relationship on the application of knowledge to work. (Drucker, 1993, p.35)

According to Drucker (1993), "Few figures in intellectual history have had greater impact than Taylor" (p. 34). He explained why.

Within a few years after Taylor began to apply knowledge to work, productivity

began to rise at a rate of 3.5 to 4 per cent compound a year – which means doubling every eighteen years or so. Since Taylor began, productivity has increased some fiftyfold in all advanced countries. On this unprecedented expansion rests all the increases in both standard of living and quality of life in the developed countries. (p. 38)

By 1930 Taylor's scientific management dominated the developed world. Drucker (1993) emphasized that "the application of knowledge to work created developed economies by setting off the productivity explosion of the last hundred years" (p. 39) but that what matters from now on is "the productivity of non-manual workers. And that requires applying knowledge to knowledge" (p. 40) because no more than ten percent of the national economy is now based on labor that makes or moves things. For example, cities are no longer production centers for steel or fabric. They have been replaced by cities that are knowledge management centers for technology (Silicon Valley) or finance (New York City), which are larger sectors of the economy. They have been replaced by the information and marketing cloud cities generated by secret, linked megaservers managed by Google, Amazon, and others that don't have to "be" anywhere. The federal government and education have responded to this change in the job market with No Child Left Behind, data-driven policy and practice, and zero-tolerance efficiency and productivity expectations in the schools, including the demand for value-added work to increase productivity. Callahan (1962) identified 1900 as the approximate date of the adoption of high-status business values and practices by low-status educational administration, part of an ongoing pattern of weak school responses to public criticism and pressure that continues in the present.

Callahan also explained that the persistence and eventual triumph of what was called as early as 1910 "scientific management" (p. 19) and the "gospel of efficiency" (p. 63) is the same

business model that now dominates education and business. In his study of scientific management and school administration, Callahan found that the adoption of business values and practices was the key event in education in the early twentieth:

What was unexpected was the extent, not only of the power of the business industrial groups, but of the strength of the business ideology in the American culture on the one hand and the extreme weakness and vulnerability of the schoolmen, especially school administrators, on the other hand. (pp. vii-viii)

Callahan's research provided interesting and surprising information about the influence of business on education. He would probably not be surprised to hear that parents and students are now referred to as "customers," that education is now a "market," that knowledge is a "commodity," and that a school superintendent is now a "CEO." So how did this happen?

The educational factory. Taylor's scientific management system began its migration from industry to education during the first half of the nineteenth century, presenting data-driven efficiency as a way to analyze teaching and learning for standardized testing. English (2003) claimed that Taylorism made today's educational bureaucracy possible. For example, Taylor asserted that no work is "skilled" because all work can be analyzed and organized in the same way: "work could be studied, analyzed, and divided into a series of simple repetitive motions – each of which had to be done in its one right way, its own best time, and with its own right tools" (Drucker, 1993, p.35), ideas today that echo in scripted teaching and the notion that any individual can learn anything if the content has the right formulaic delivery from the teacher.

Kendall and Wickham (1999) connected educational progressivism and Taylor's methods: "It is unsurprising that Dewey's work opened up a path to recognizably Taylorist strategies in the management of American schools" (p. 134). Progressivism requires efficiency

and productivity, the new metanarrative of education with its own bureaucracy. Cherryholmes (1988) described Taylor's principles of scientific management as a

metanarrative for the narrative of [specific] principles of curriculum development that in turn is a metanarrative for narratives of specific curriculum projects. What some people find troublesome is not that there are layers of narrative and metanarrative but that all we might have are layers of narrative and that possibly there is nothing foundational to anchor theory and practice. (p. 13)

Educational administration textbooks (e.g., Aquino, 1985/1999; English, 2003; Lunenberg and Ornstein, 2007) also reference Taylor (1911) as the father of scientific management and use the terms "Taylorist" and "Neo-Taylorist" to describe the science of educational management.

Taylor's restructuring of industry through the scientific management of work changed society and theorized the potential for a perfectly efficient business utopia for the benefit of the worker and the owner. Educators and business men began to wonder if school could be similarly re-structured. I would argue that the result is the current befuddled condition of education.

Educational policy makers claim they want to do away with the nineteenth century model of school as a factory, but their preferred positivist model constructs children as products to be tested and "fixed" if not up to standards, a model apparently oblivious to quality control used in industry that rejects some products as defective and disposable and blind to the idea that standardization discourages creativity and innovation. Some of the best ideas of the twentieth century came from college dropouts who had not been standardized: as noted earlier, neither Bill Gates nor Steve Jobs earned college degrees. School is sometimes a bad fit for students. Schools cannot reject students, but a factory foreman knows that some of the raw material will have irregularities, some of which are interesting and potentially the source of innovation. The

invention of Post-it notes, for example, was the result of an irregularity during attempts to invent a new kind of super strong glue. Carr (2010) explained that the postindustrial legacy of technology and efficiency does not allow human difference: “Ambiguity is not an opening for insight but a bug to be fixed” (p. 173). Taylorism has no tolerance for the variety and irregularity of human difference; efficiency and productivity define measurement and value. As observed in an earlier section, Bracey (2009) said, “We value what we can measure.”

The importance of Taylor’s influence on education is pervasive. In today’s educational environment, his philosophy is dominant over educational theory and pedagogy. Carr (2010) described Taylor, an engineer by training, as an industrial philosopher: “More than a century after the invention of the steam engine, the Industrial Revolution had at last found its philosophy and its philosopher” (p. 149). Carr identified the importance of Taylor’s scientific management: his “system,” as he liked to call it – was embraced by manufacturers throughout the country and, in time, around the world. Seeking maximum speed, maximum efficiency, and maximum output, factory owners used time-and-motion studies to organize their work and configure the jobs of their workers. The goal, as Taylor defined it in his celebrated 1911 treatise *The Principles of Scientific Management*, was to identify and adopt, for every job, “one best method” of work and thereby to effect the gradual substitution of science for rule of thumb throughout the mechanic arts. (p. 149-150)

It is hard to not consider the “one best method” of work when teachers receive bookmarks printed with a “best pedagogical strategy” for each of 13 identified steps of the learning process. Teachers are knowledge workers, no longer professionals. Taylor’s system has been credited with the creation of the management/worker division that operates on the premise that work itself can be analyzed and designed without concern for its context or situation and that

that workers are “inherently lazy” (English, 2003, p. 105), motivated “only by economics . . . and needed constant direction” (Aquino, 1985/1999, p. 70). Taylor claimed that his system would restructure both industry and society, “creating a utopia of perfect efficiency” (Carr, 2010 p. 150). “In the past the man has been first,” Taylor (as cited in Carr 2010) declared: “In the future the system must be first” (p.150). The effects of Taylor’s system remain powerful in industry, technology, and education. Aquino (1985/1999) claimed that “the key to the scientific management approach is the concept of man-as-machine” (p. 70).

As computer technology gains more influence over intellectual and social life, Carr (2010) argued that Taylorism is at the center of knowledge work. Carr also identified Google’s headquarters as the “Internet’s high church, and the religion practiced inside its walls is Taylorism What Taylor did for the work of the hand, Google is doing for the work of the mind” (p. 150). Taylor’s principles have become a Darwinian guide for education, technology, business, and capitalism.

Technology made possible the efficiency of the scoring machine for mass testing and of computers for multiple millions of computations that would have previously required innumerable human hours or even years of work, thus providing mass data for psychometric statistics. In this way scientific measurement produced efficiency in education. Postman (1992) summarized the six assumptions of Taylor’s system:

that the primary, if not the only, goal of human labor and thought is efficiency; that technical calculation is in all respects superior to human judgment that in fact human judgment cannot be trusted, because it is plagued by laxity, ambiguity, and unnecessary complexity; that subjectivity is an obstacle to clear thinking; that what cannot be

measured either does not exist or is of no value; that the affairs of citizens are best guided and conducted by experts. (p. 51)

Taylor's system of micromanagement is, however, not suitable, for human activities and behaviors such as learning, which involves highly complex social, biological, cognitive, environmental, and psychological interactions. Athletes, for example, win medals at the Olympics for carefully calibrated performances measured in hundredths of a second and produced by rigorous scientific training, although the winner is often not the athlete with the most perfect training regimen or generous resources but the one with the greatest determination. Sports such as gymnastics or ice skating ask human judges to use subjective scoring systems, not a stop watch, to score for artistry as well as skill. The judges' different conceptions of artistry depend on varying definitions of art, which has no international standard. However, the rating of skill development (did the gymnast achieve true vertical? did the skater land on the correct edge of the blade?) depends on the judges' experience and knowledge. Nevertheless, sometimes national favoritism or cultural bias influence the results.

The development of scientific measurement tools was an attempt to remove human error and increase efficiency. However, subjectivity is always present for both the observer and the observed. Current positivist attempts to reduce teaching and learning to robotic formulas of efficiency and measurement resist the intended results because "we are objects of social institutions and processes while we intentionally engage in meaningful behavior" (Cherryholmes, 1988, p. 35). Taylorist strategies produce a script for each job from which the worker is not to depart. The training and management of classroom teachers by school systems attempting to improve their assembly lines now rests on thinly disguised scripts of robotic, pedagogical programming of strategies and regimentation. The forces of industrialism and

capitalism have developed a powerful materialistic schema in which the Taylorist scientific management of knowledges and productivity is the highest goal.

Taylorism also provided a framework within which to understand why there is so much pressure in the schools to emphasize math, science, and engineering at the expense of liberal arts subjects such as English. The STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) subjects lead society to increased economy of scale, efficiency, productivity, and profit. Drucker (1993) was also emphatic about the importance of the change in the world regarding the nature of work:

That knowledge has become the resource, rather than a resource, is what makes our society “post-capitalist.” This fact changes – fundamentally – the structure of society.

It creates new social and economic dynamics. It creates new politics. (p. 45)

This new version of politics – and power – supplies a useful perspective on the old-world, aristocratic model of education as a luxury, no longer appropriate in a society requiring highly specialized technical knowledge: “Traditional knowledge was general. . . . in today’s university the traditional ‘educated people’ are not considered ‘educated’ at all. They are looked down upon as dilettantes” (Drucker, 1993, p. 45). A knowledge of literature, for example, does not produce value unless it can prove its worth through efficiency and productivity, which is difficult to do with “messy, imperfect, inefficient” procedures of the narrative imagination. According to Drucker and other Taylorists, the Socratic notion that the purpose of knowledge is self-knowledge or self-development is literally use-less. The traditional “gentleman’s education” is archaic. What is valued is information that produces efficient results. Drucker dismissed the complaints of humanists who argued for the preservation of liberal arts education, writing that “a bridge to the past is not enough – and that is all the Humanists offer. . . . The Great Tradition [is]

dusty antiquarianism” (p. 212). This dissertation will explore many ways in which that statement has validity in the multicultural, global world in which we live.

A miseducation. In the midst of reading Drucker (1993), I realized that his book, *Post-Capitalist Society*, had led me back to my original concerns about what constitutes an educated person in a rapidly changing technological society: “the greatest change will be the change in knowledge – in its form and content; in its meaning; in its responsibility; and in what it means to be an educated person” (p. 218). To be an educated person had been the driving force of my life, but it had become apparent to me that I was an imposter, more mime than actor in a setting of false pretenses designed to restrict rather than liberate. Now I’m not sure what it means to be an educated person and thus do not know how to re-establish my identity.

This re-definition of an educated person has happened before; I’m willing to experiment with context. For example, before the time of modern medicine, illiterate herbalists were once considered valuable, wise community members because they could read plants and their uses even if they could not read books. I read well, but I’m not sure what the purpose of reading is in a culture where utility, efficiency, and profit are the values that drive who and what we are, even when we think we are freely making choices and decisions. Freedom from at least some false consciousness of my own subjectivity has not made me free. Although Taylorism is apparently an inescapable factor in how identity and freedom shape themselves, genealogy became a powerful resource for examining the “dusty antiquarianism” (mentioned previously by Drucker, 1993 of the Great Tradition of humanism, offering a look at the wizard behind the curtain who pretended to give the questers on the yellow brick road what they wanted but didn’t know they already had.

Genealogy also offered a way to study the enabling conditions as political, economic, and technological rather than as personal philosophical or ideological conflict, thus opening a path of thought that allowed me to see that the situation wasn't really personal at all. For example, Taylorism has turned workers into "human capital" to be resourced, maximized, and exploited for their own good as well as for the business or educational entity for which they work. Their knowledge or generation of knowledge is the measurable quantity of their efficiency. In the process humans become subjects, not agents, of their own productivity because they need jobs. Even the American dream to pursue opportunity became less a freedom and more of a form of subjection under these circumstances, whether the individual is a student being measured by the productivity of her SAT results or an adult being evaluated by a scale of efficiency to produce results. For the individuals, the process of measurement influences socioeconomic status in direct and indirect ways that seek to conform the individual to the relevant politics of educational or business practice. We rarely question what we aspire to. Postrel (2013) explained, "Every unironic evocation of the American dream is an exercise in glamour and, however illusory the dream may sometimes be, the country is better off for the inspiration" (as cited in Diski, 2013, p. 98). Berger (1972) offered a different perspective: "Publicity does not manufacture the dream. All that it does is to propose to each one of us that we are not yet enviable – yet could be" (as cited in Diski, 2013, p. 98). Diski (2013) discussed several objections:

An unironic evocation of the American dream is one that would need to deny almost all discussion over the past half century of the nature of the American dream and how it has actually worked out for individuals, American society, and the rest of the world. . . . from *The Great Gatsby* and *Death of a Salesman* to DeLillo and Pynchon to *The Sopranos* and *Breaking Bad* would have to be disregarded in order to speak unironically of the

American dream. It is impossible to imagine that [Postrel's] deluded, partial, narrow view might inspire a nation. As it stands, Postrel's statement says no more than that unexamined sentimentality is what keeps America dreaming. (p. 98)

Although the recent economic downturn revealed ruthless Taylorist applications of economic efficiency to the lives of ordinary worker/entrepreneurs who lost jobs, businesses, and homes and state governors who cut educational budgets to the bone, the financiers and bankers with the most capital to lose lost the least when the federal government rescued them in the name of protecting the nation's economy. Despite ineffective protest by Occupy Wall Street groups around the country, no one challenged the gross injustice of what happened because we accept the identities given to us by the process and fear the collapse of the structure. The process of critical thought thus subverts itself to neoliberal ideas that justify subjection in the name of doing good *and* earning profit, the twin halves of the American dream that struggle to make capitalism ethical. Any discussion of Taylorism must thus include a discussion of neoliberalism found in the next section.

Neoliberalism. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine all of the existing academic controversies concerning political and economic neoliberalism. However, neoliberalism must be a part of the discussion concerning Taylorism, Foucault's use of governmentality, and Marxist critique. Although this presentation of neoliberalism will focus on political neoliberalism more than economic liberalism, it is sometimes impossible to discuss one without the other and sometimes difficult to separate one from the other. The first part of this discussion provides definitions of neoliberalism, and the second and third parts describe the results of the combined application of Taylorism and neoliberalism to schools, the College Board, and universities.

Definitions of Neoliberalism. To extend a discussion of Taylorism and capitalism into neoliberalism requires additional examination of Foucault’s version of poststructuralism, whose connection to Marxist critique he acknowledged. An interviewer asked Foucault (1988b) if Marx was at work in his own methodology. Foucault replied, “Yes, absolutely” (Foucault, 1988b, p. 46). His simple answer does not suggest why the most common understanding of neoliberalism in the United States (doing good and making money at the same time) is fraught with ethical dilemmas of complexity and ambiguity. His simple answer does not suggest how the discourse of capitalism, efficiency, and globalism have compromised the definition of *good*. Part of the complexity derives from the long history of political liberalism, the modern practice of economic liberalism, and the enthusiastic embrace by right wing conservatives of economic liberalism:

“Liberalism” can refer to political, economic, or even religious ideas. In the U.S. political liberalism has been a strategy to prevent social conflict. It is presented to poor and working people as progressive compared to conservative or Right wing. Economic liberalism is different. Conservative politicians who say they hate “liberals” — meaning the political type — have no real problem with economic liberalism, including neoliberalism. (Martinez and Garcia, cited in Shah, 2010, para. 2)

George (1999) suggested that the neoliberal ideas circulating today would not have been accepted by liberals in the post WWII era in the United States as part of any economic or political plan:

The idea that the market should be allowed to make major social and political decisions; the idea that the State should voluntarily reduce its role in the economy, or that corporations should be given total freedom, that trade unions should be curbed and

citizens given much less rather than more social protection — such ideas were utterly foreign to the spirit of the time. Even if someone actually agreed with these ideas, he or she would have hesitated to take such a position in public and would have had a hard time finding an audience. (George, as cited in Shah, 2010, para. 5)

Springer (2012) provided several summaries of four different theories of neoliberalism, concluding with Foucault's governmentality:

- (1) Neoliberalism as an ideological hegemonic project. . . maintains that elite actors and dominant groups organized around transnational class-based alliances have the capacity to project and circulate a coherent program of interpretations and images of the world onto others. This is not merely subordination to particular coercive impositions, but also involves a degree of willing consent (see Cox, 2002; Duménil & Lévy, 2004; Harvey, 2005; Peet, 2002; Plehwe et al., 2006).
- (2) Neoliberalism as policy and program. . . focuses on the transfer of ownership from the state or public holdings to the private sector or corporate interests, which necessarily involves a conceptual reworking of the meaning these categories hold. . . . premised on the idea that opening collectively held resources to market mediation engenders greater efficiency, including such policy and program as privatization, deregulation, liberalization, depoliticization, and monetarism (see Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Klepeis & Vance, 2003; Martinez & Garcia, 2000).
- (3) Neoliberalism as state form. . . . a process of transformation that states purposefully engage in to remain economically competitive. . . . reconfigure[s] institutional mediations, economic management systems, and invasive social agendas centered on

urban order, surveillance, immigration issues, and policing are ‘rolled out’ (see Peck, 2001; Peck & Tickell, 2002).

- (4) Neoliberalism as governmentality. . . centers on a process in which neoliberalism’s articulat[es] with existing circumstances . . . [of] their socially constructed realities as they are (re)imagined, (re)interpreted, and (re)assembled to influence forms of knowledge through ‘the conduct of conduct’ (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996; Brown, 2003; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Larner, 2003; Lemke, 2002). . . . implies power as a complex, very specific form [of] knowledge production through the ensemble of rationalities, strategies, technologies, and techniques . . . that allow for the de-centering of government through the active role of auto-regulated or auto-correcting selves who facilitate ‘governance at a distance’ (Foucault, 1991a). . . . underpinned by an unquestioned ‘commonsense’, meaning quite literally, a sense held in common. (136-137)

The theories that have influenced my thinking call for a broader definition of neoliberalism than any one of the above. Although Foucault’s definition is the most influential, a combination of elements from each of the four definitions is more useful than any one definition alone. The “coherent program of interpretations and images of the world” and the “willing consent” of the first definition, the “market mediation” and “greater efficiency” of the second definition, the economic competition, “economic management systems, and invasive social agendas centered on urban order, surveillance, immigration” from the third, and the “socially constructed realities power as a complex, very specific form [of] knowledge production . . . auto-regulated selves, [and] . . . unquestioned ‘commonsense’” constitute the necessary neoliberal elements for this project. Genealogy challenges “unquestioned ‘commonsense’” in particular, providing me familiar access to begin asking difficult questions.

Challenges to commonsense. To question the natural order of things concerning college admission, standardized testing, and curriculum is to question common sense – in fact, it seems impossible to think differently in the context of the overwhelming presence of the system and the machine. It is commonsense, for example, that students in our culture voluntarily submit to college entrance examinations, that a large, powerful company administers this process, and that the company’s “customers” (universities and colleges, high schools, parents, and students) accept the results they have “purchased” through examination fees. If the College Board did not exist, there would be a need to invent it as long as the assumptions and perceptions about the world, education, and intelligence that shaped it continue to exist. It is hard to imagine how any other organization could have been more effective, better organized, or more successful in doing exactly what the College Board has done. If globalization and the economics of growth are the most important factors for the future of the world, of nations, and of individuals, the College Board has done an outstanding job of providing information, strategies, and reasons for responding to the call for global education, including increased emphasis on STEM preparation for career and college readiness within the knowledge economy. If adopting scientific methods of management and principles of efficiency make the College Board a natural partner in the application of these methods and principles to education, then the company has applied them effectively to the business of meritocracy and its own growth so well that no one even noticed that seamless transition. If agility in finding ways to make money and do good is useful, then the College Board represents neoliberalism well.

If, however, the economics of human development rather than the economics of growth were to regain power and emphasize health, education, and political rights, as Nussbaum (2010) has argued, the focus of education would drastically change. She also argued the human

development model cultivates critical thinking and freedom of mind that would be dangerous to a power structure dependent upon compliant knowledge workers who contribute to the common good, “a state of affairs where all the subjects without exception obey the laws, accomplish the tasks expected of them, practice the trade to which they are assigned, and respect the established order” (Foucault, 1995/1975, p. 95). These subjects accept with little resistance a system designed to support the model of economic growth, according to Nussbaum (2010):

The United States has never had a pure growth-directed model of education. Some distinctive features of our system positively resist being cast in those terms. . . . From early on, leading U.S. educators connected the liberal arts to the preparation of informed, independent, and sympathetic democratic citizens. . . . Another aspect of the U.S. educational tradition that stubbornly refuses assimilation into the growth-directed model is the characteristic emphasis on the active participation of the child in inquiry and questioning . . . to become active, competent, and thoughtfully critical in a complex world. (pp. 17-18)

Nussbaum further presented the human development model as the economics of democracy and contrasted it to the economics of growth, which she described as the condition of “the moral imagination . . . numbed by technical mastery” (p. 21). Moral imagination and classical preparation for citizenship may appear as unaffordable luxuries in an economic crisis to many people. Social and economic necessity, however, share rather than separate their concerns, according to Braun, Kirsch, Sum, and Yamamoto (2007), who argued that “current skill gaps coupled with demographic trends portend diminishing human capital among the future prime-working-age populations of the United States” (p. 61), conditions that require human

development in order for growth to occur. The report (Braun, et.al, 2007) identified three critical forces at work:

a wide disparity in literacy and numeracy skills between the school-age population and the baby boom adults about to retire; the changes caused by globalization and technology in sources of wealth, patterns of international trade, and a shift in balance between capital and labor that have changed the labor market drastically and shifted 46% of all job growth to work requiring a college degree; the current inequalities in earnings and wealth overall among racial/ethnic subgroups that will increase if millions of adults in the U.S. cannot meet the requirements of the new economy by 2030 and become alienated from the economic mainstream. (p. 61)

Without an increase in the general level of learning skills and a decrease in existing gaps, economic opportunities will not improve for important subgroups of the population; social and political polarization will likely increase as a result. The report (Braun, et.al, 2007) created a neoliberal link between motivations for human and economic development that seemed to suggest that social stability was at risk because of high unemployment concentrated in specific subgroups if education was not able to promote economic growth through employment of all demographic groups in the knowledge economy. According to Friedman (2005, as cited in Braun, et.al, 2007), “Economic growth is not merely the enabler of higher consumption; it is in many ways the wellspring from which democracy and civil society flow” (p. 62). That the report was published by the Educational Testing Service implicated it in neoliberal motivations that manifest themselves in financial and marketing decisions made by the College Board and ETS, even decisions that seem as simple as whether to offer more than one AP English course.

Academic capitalism. More evidence of the influence of neoliberalism is academic capitalism, a phenomenon of the combination of Taylor’s principles of efficiency and productivity with severe budget cuts that have undermined the autonomy of the university by re-ordering financial priorities and requesting value-added performance from every academic department, including the social sciences and humanities. These social and political changes at the university level can best be observed in the decreasing funding and importance of the humanities. English departments, for example, face the same sort of near extinction that Classics departments faced when Greek and Latin were no longer mandatory college classes or admission exams. Academic capitalism becomes important to my work in later sections in which I examine the development of the two AP English courses, one of which belongs to the world of efficiency in which excellence no longer means a fixed standard but a remarkable level of efficiency, a “rhetorical aim” (Readings, 1996, p.23).

Readings (1996) also argued that the increasing influence of business and capitalism in the operational principles of universities meant that the term *excellence* no longer refers to external standards of achievement but to internal measures of efficiency: “excellence is not a fixed standard of judgment but a qualifier whose meaning is fixed in relation to something else . . . a remarkable level of efficiency” (p. 24) or “performativity in an expanded market” (p. 38). He explained, “[Excellence] is the recognition that the University is not just like a corporation; it is a corporation. . . . Excellence appears here as uncontested ground, the rhetorical arm most likely to gain general assent” (p. 23). According to Readings, the lack of an ideological referent for excellence has turned the university into “a simulacrum of the idea of a university” (p. 54). Bok (2003) summarized the situation:

Financial cutbacks undoubtedly acted as a spur to profit-seeking for some universities . . . private enterprise and entrepreneurship that became so prominent in the 1980s helped encourage and legitimate such initiatives. A lack of clarity about academic values opened the door even wider none of these stimuli [have more influence] than the rapid growth of money-making opportunities provided by a more technologically sophisticated knowledge-based economy. (p. 15)

Expanding Bok's idea, Scott (as cited in Readings, 1999) argued that the purpose of the university now is "human resources development for the marketplace . . . to both produce jobs (through research) and provide job training (through instruction)" (p. 12), thus replacing the university's former purpose as a national academic/cultural center. Higher education "has become subservient to the growing power of administration, which more and more responds not to faculty and students, except at the margins, but to political and market forces that claim sovereignty over higher education" (Aronowitz, as cited in Bok, 2003, p. 16). Ohmann (1976/1996) traced academic capitalism to the 1960s when universities first concealed and then admitted as an act of transparency their complicit cooperation with the military/industrial establishment, especially in matters of money and research while still maintaining the façade of an institution of disinterested research for the greater good.

According to Readings (1999), now universities must demonstrate social utility to survive as they adopt the mission of a corporation rather than concerns of knowledge production and disciplinary continuity. Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) made a similar argument that the knowledge/learning shift changed power relations in academic capitalism because professions no longer had to be tied to nonprofit institutions if the professionals demonstrated utility. That which produces gets funding. It follows then that the professor who gets departmental grants has

more job security. The changed power relations also de-stabilize the traditional format of university education as free on-line courses, independent skill certification, and for-profit online institutions alter ideas of a conventional education. The business community grows ever more impatient with the high cost of a conventional college education and with courses perceived to be frivolous and unnecessary such as the humanities. Efficiency in matters of scale, time, and cost has gained much greater importance. In combination with the college and career emphasis of the new Common Core standards for schools, the business community's impatience with course work without value-added has implications for the future of the study of English.

Academic capitalism in K12 public schools appears most visibly in for-profit online and charter schools. Perhaps more subtly, academic capitalism and Taylorism are part of the emphasis on teacher accountability that makes student test score performance more important than traditional degree and certification requirements for a teaching job, despite lack of accounting for student socioeconomic variables, family stresses, and learning habits. Metanarratives of citizenship, leadership, community, and service that once provided value to conventional forms of education are rarely mentioned. The transcendent search for self-knowledge and purpose at the center of liberal arts education cannot provide proof of its efficiency and is thus illegitimate. Again, as Bracey (2009) noted, we value what we can measure.

Lyotard (1979/1984) made the following observation about the new role of efficiency in the legitimation of value:

To the obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of the university institution which in the past relied on it. . . . In matters of social justice and of scientific truth alike, the

legitimation of that power is based on its optimizing the system's performance – efficiency. (p. xxiv)

Business sees academic capitalism as an additional strategy for creating new market. As competition and global markets have multiplied around the world, the ability of business to expand is both greater and riskier. New markets are always necessary. Shah (2010) explained that “Colonialism [became] a recognized solution to the need to expand markets, increase opportunities for investors, and ensure the supply of raw material” (para. 10). The College Board has colonized the general public and schools to accept its products and services as necessary. It has learned to capitalize its most successful programs, the SAT and AP exams, by expanding their product lines as well as maximizing the number of customers, as will be explained in a subsequent chapter using the two AP courses as examples.

Academic capitalism has colonized the universities by buying many of them and turning them into for-profit institutions and by gaining greater control of public institutions of higher learning by targeting research grants that will encourage growth in departments that can produce knowledge and workers that business needs for its own productivity and efficiency. Government can also use grants for similar purposes, including educating students for the most likely job markets in order to decrease unemployment, which aligns labor markets and decreases social tensions. In 1895 Cecil Rhodes (as cited in Shah, 2010), one of the significant players in England's colonization of Africa, commented on the importance of imperialism:

I became more than ever convinced of the importance of imperialismMy cherished idea is a solution for the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands for settling the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced

in factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question.

If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialist. (para. 22)

Rhodes epitomized the neoliberal virtue of doing good, according to his perception of *good*, and making money at the same time, much in the same way that academic capitalism seeks to do good (research), grow academic departments (production of more workers and more jobs), and increase efficiency (productivity and efficiency with grants that have practical value). Academic capitalism opens another market and “new” lands, another place to make money and get workers. Like Rhodes, neoliberals like to think of the process as solving a social problem, but the narrative is small, as small as dollars and cents. Western thought and its metanarratives of freedom and justice no longer have power over the dollars and cents. Is there a legitimate replacement that can attract both rationale and funding?

Lyotard (1979/1984) offered an answer to the question of where legitimacy can reside after the end of the metanarratives: “The operativity criterion is technological” (p. xxv). The goal seems to be to sell every product of a task for profit, and technology creates new knowledge products to sell and new ways to sell them. This new model may open opportunities for the humanities, for example, who no longer study the human but the language experience of the human. Menand (2001) described the situation of the humanities as a “crisis of rationale” with a subsequent “crisis of funding” that requires a “more obvious market utility” (p.1) for disciplines such as English. Adapting the traditional “linear model for transmitting information . . . to a generation of students who are accustomed to dealing with multiple information streams in short bursts” (Menand, 2010, p. 19) is a necessary modification. A combination of online courses and readily available information in vast quantity on the internet also make it more possible for students to bypass a conventional college education.

The traditional boundaries of knowledge have also expanded beyond the Western traditions of the past. Menand (2010) identified 1945-1975 as the Golden Age of higher education, chiefly characterized by expansion, most notably represented by a 500 per cent increase in the number of undergraduates and by the increase of government grants and contracts to universities. The dominant curriculum model of the time included a general core idea: Major works of the Western tradition [in all disciplines] are accessible to all students in more or less the same way; those works constitute a more or less coherent body of thought (or, at least, a coherent debate); and they can serve as a benign cultural ideology in a pluralist nation whose citizens are generally wary of anything overtly ideological. (Menand, 2010, p. 74)

This anti-ideological stance is also an anti-Western position in a world that is no longer Eurocentric. In the sciences “a self-consciously scientific model research” developed that also “reflected the anti-ideological temper of postwar American thought . . . [and] eschewed political implications in research because [researchers] wished not to offend their granting agencies” (Menand, 2010, p. 74-75). By 1975, the number of students declined, but their diversity increased. A curriculum backlash occurred, making ethnic perspectives and the ethical implications of knowledge more important on campus.

The interaction of increasing diversity of the populations and globalism further complicate an understanding of the *humanities* or *literature* because they are associated with Western thought and thus carry the connotation of its colonizing effect. Russo (2005) observed that “Western humanism has declined to the point of irrelevance” (p. 21). Many marginalized cultures, especially in third world countries, emphasize community rather than the individual and find Western civilization’s emphasis on the individual puzzling. Other cultures reject democracy, a situation that puzzles first world inhabitants. For example, the resentment of

military intervention in the name of democracy in other countries, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, bewilders some U.S. citizens. Some countries prefer the order of their own way of life, even if it subjects them to tyranny, rather than their perceived tyranny and chaos of democracy and the capitalism that comes with it. Their order is dependent upon conformity that comprehends individualism as threatening. Such places appear medieval to Western eyes, especially in the United States where individualism and individual rights are part of the national law, politics, and education. Academic capitalism responds to multiculturalism as the opening of new markets and emphasizes the Taylor's principles of scientific management, practices that have no regard for the diminishment of the Western tradition. If global competition is the key issue of the future, then perhaps academic capitalism's directive to change education to a more practical focus is important for the well-being of nations and their people.

Academic capitalism also responds to the need for global education. According to the College Board's report on *Global Education* (2012), the definition of global competency includes the following:

empirically based knowledge and skills such as basic competency and numeracy, science, and technology skills; higher-order cognitive and metacognitive skills such as critical thinking and creative problem solving; global dispositions, perspectives, and attitudes.

(p. 5)

Taylorism and neoliberalism see academic capitalism as a way to preserve national strength, security, and economic power, concerns reflected in the career and college readiness component of the current standards movement, as suggested by the same report. This description makes clear the participation offered by the College Board to help the nation adjust to the shifting

global paradigm, increasing diversity, and curriculum reform. Technology is central to this adjustment, as explained in the following excerpt from the College Board's report:

The skills to survive and thrive in this century have transitioned from a memorizing or banking perspective to that of accessing, navigating, and filtering. Moreover, the primacy of technology to our daily lives and events and phenomena across the globe cause many to rethink how best to prepare students in an education system born out of Prussian and industrial-era influences. . . . organizations such as the College Board can support U.S. education systems (at the local, state, and federal levels) to maintain relevancy amid a shifting paradigm. Moreover, organizations such as the College Board can concurrently increase access and equity to provide more students with greater opportunities to learn and then contribute to the national well-being. . . . at the heart of this movement will be the adoption of global skills in curricula, assessments, and pedagogy. (Balistreri, Di Giacomo, Noisette, and Ptak, 2012, p. 3)

Contrary to debates about the primacy of technology in our lives, the apparent inevitability of technological progress and expansion can become the bridge between the human and a world of expanded markets.

Technological determinism. The apparently inevitable role of technological progress and expansion is the source of the theory of technological determinism, a term coined by Thorstein Veblen, to categorize ideas about the inherent effects of technology on societies because society organizes itself to support and further develop a new technology. Taylorism and technological determinism support each other because they both honor the principles of efficiency and productivity with clear effects on society rather than the effects of society on technology. Postman (1992) used the term *technopoly* to describe the “submission of all forms

of cultural life to the sovereignty of technique and technology” (p. 52) whose goal is to reduce human life to results found in machinery and efficiency. The development of technopoly, according to Postman, resulted from the extrapolation of the first formal book of science for industrial production, Taylor’s (1911) *The Principles of Scientific Management*, discussed in an earlier chapter.

Technological determinism also includes ideas about the Cartesian duality of the natural world and the social world. Technological determinists are often scientists who see social progress as the inevitable course of technological advancement. C.P. Snow (1959) offered a mid-century perspective on a similar idea, describing the world of things (science) in contrast to the world of culture (literature and anthropology), famously calling them “the two cultures.” Berlin (as cited in Paulson, 2001) labeled the contrast “the conflicted heritage of romanticism and the Enlightenment” (p. 176). Paulson argued that it is not advisable to “separate an instrumental, economic, technical sphere from one of . . . power, desire, competition, culture, and language” (p. 176). Rorty (as cited in Paulson, 2001) used the terms “rhetorical and philosophical” for Snow’s contrast of literary and scientific cultures (p. 176), an important distinction that will be useful in Chapter 5.

The debate about technological determinism continues, but rapid technological advances appear to make human change inevitable. According to Russo (2005), there are two general theories about the relationship of humans and technology. Instrumentalism is the perception that technologies are single, value-free, neutral means to chosen ends with no political connections. Substantivism, in contrast, is the view that technology is “a monolithic phenomenon vastly greater than the sum of its parts” that uses human beings as “raw materials to serve the system” in which technological decisions involve “unwitting cultural choices” (p. 27). Ellul (as cited in

Russo, 2005), for example, defined technology as the political, economic, and social reality of “*technique (la technique)*, defined as ‘*the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency . . . in every field of human activity*’ (p. 28). The chief characteristic is the principle of least effort or efficient ordering. This includes rationalization, measurement, standardization, linearity, segmentation, simplification, minimum waste, and speed. Human values are filtered out except where they facilitate the technical means that are omnipotent and often “unfriendly,” thereby requiring the user-friendly convention. No real choice exists “among technical methods: . . . the decision is obvious because technique means the *one best* means or least effort. (Russo, 2005, p. 28)

Reading is slow; images are fast. Many students prefer the images. Ihde (as cited in Russo, 2005) argued that “image technologies overcome the conflict between high and popular cultures, delivering a ‘pluriculture’ or ‘multiple otherness’ . . . in technologically mediated space-time” (p. 33). The technology is another form of diversity, another form of experience, another way of thinking in the classroom that changes the way students relate to each other, the teacher, and the content. Postman (1979) commented on the ability of new technological devices to provide another way of conceptualizing reality. His observation would do well to add the computer and cell phone to his “simple machines:”

The printing press, the computer, and television are not therefore simply machines which convey information. They are metaphors through which we conceptualize reality in one way or another. They will classify the world for us, sequence it, frame it, enlarge it, reduce it, argue a case for what it is like. Through these media metaphors, we do not see the world as it is. We see it as our coding systems are. Such is the power of the form of information. (p. 39)

We participate in this world, perhaps becoming part of a simulacra within it. Within this fabricated hyperreal environment, technology constructs the “technicized individuals that navigate through it” (p. 33). Technological determinism seems to be dominant.

Technological determinism isn't a theoretical debate in my classroom; it is what we live every day. My diverse group of students experiences the world in a very different way than their parents or grandparents because of “an unparalleled shift in adaptive behavior that has happened within the space of a hundred-odd years, from industrial to technological society” (Russo, p. 27). My diverse group of students have very different backgrounds, but in one way they are all alike: they are all what Jenkins (2006) called digital natives, plugged into their world. Born within the last twenty years, they have never known a time without computers or cell phones. Turkel (2010) commented that the rest of us can never be more than naturalized citizens. The rapid development of technology and the cosmopolitan diversity of the school population have altered the classroom in profound ways. My students' world is global, but it is also connected and collective in an electronic universe. In the digital world, all of their worlds meet and share a shifting, moving, reality.

The analog nature of typical classroom instruction fails to establish a strong link to these digital students. Russo (2005) described the 1980s communications/technology revolution as a tectonic “epistemic shift” (p. 6) in personal and social experience based on the dominant technological principles of “least effort, speed, miniaturization, digitization over analogue, interactivity, hypertextuality, virtuality” (p. 6) that have a happy synchronicity with Taylorism. As a teacher, I eventually recognized the discrepancy between my world and this new generation of students and saw that the digital natives of 2012 wanted to apply to education the same principles of speed and efficiency they find in their electronic world. The old technology of

reading is a painfully slow process for most of them. The applications (apps) available for the latest version of their smart phones make them eager for apps to enhance the immediate usefulness of and to create short cuts for the educational process, compounded by a typical youthful desire to avoid school work. Speed and efficiency appear to have become the values by which they judge their academic experience. One could argue that Taylorism and neoliberalism are evident in the social as well as technological interactions of students via their electronic devices.

Turkel (2010) observed, “Technology challenges us to assert our human values, which means that first of all, we have to figure out what they are” (para. 8). Figuring out our human values requires new ways of thinking that respond to the technology (Russo, 2005; Turkel, 2010) about what and how we teach, including the escalating speed of technological change and subsequent greater access of everyone to knowledge of all kinds on the internet, changes that have the potential to destabilize traditional gatekeepers of knowledge, such as universities, who may have to share some of their power as the arbiters of knowledge.

As another example of the inevitability of this change, Lyotard (1979/1984) explained that this was not the end of knowledge, even if the university as we know it dies. On the contrary, he explained, “Data banks are the encyclopedia of tomorrow. They transcend the capacity of each of their users. They are ‘nature’ for postmodern man” (p. 51). He emphasized the importance of using the relevant data for problem-solving and then organizing the data into an efficient strategy: “But in games of perfect information, the best performity [sic] cannot consist in obtaining additional information in this way. It comes rather from arranging data in a new way” (p. 51), resulting in an intellectual move which requires imagination. This re-arrangement could be the future of the study of English, an issue that will be explored in a

subsequent chapter. Lessig (2008) also saw great economic value in the potential re-mix of the arts and humanities with technological advances.

The technology of computer and cell phone become a tool for humans to use, but the tool is shaping the environment to which humans must adapt, a condition that does not demean our humanity but enhances it. Menand (2010) observed, “The ability to create knowledge and put it to use is *the* adaptive characteristic of humans” (p. 13). Technology stimulates the creation of knowledge and its application, thus creating new products and new markets that are simply that: never available, brand new with the potential for new skills, new workers, and new profits. Some of these products emerge within new definitions of literacy resulting from human interaction with the new technologies, not unlike the significant changes that occurred with the invention of the printing press. The comparison of the old technology to the new technology, however, cannot sustain itself because of the escalating rate of change:

Literacy has now come to mean a rapid and continuous process of change in the ways we read, write, view, listen, compose, and communicate information. Thus, literacy acquisition may be defined not by acquiring the ability to take advantage of the literacy potential inherent in any single static technology of literacy (e.g., traditional print technology) but rather by a larger mindset and the ability to continuously adapt to the new literacies required by the new technologies. (Coiro, Knobel, Lankshear, & Leu, 2008, p. 5)

Human adaptability is also a matter of subjectivity and of a willing compliance to it. We may not always know when we have used technology and when it has used us.

The effects of technology and globalization have changed access to and the boundaries of knowledge from a closed system to an open one in which knowing where to find information and

how to apply it is more important than acquiring it. This difference will be important in a subsequent chapter's analysis of examples in two College Board courses. Chow (2005) described the situation as "the consensus that a particular type of knowledge acquisition, dissemination, and preservation is in the process of either a historical mutation to become something quite different, or, as some fear, being erased" (p. 47). The humanities in particular appear impractical to outsiders in business and politics who expect an efficient instructional download of functional literacy into the brains of future workers. Marc (as cited in Russo, 2005) argued, "Perhaps the worst consequence of spiritually based fixation of university education on reading and writing is that it prevents the true functions of literacy in the modern communications market from being determined" (p.54 - 55). Technology's efficiency would dispense with untidy "spiritually based fixation" so that the market value could be determined.

Technology is also creating and streamlining other kinds of markets. Carr (2008) described the Internet's constantly expanding data "cloud" established by Google, Amazon, and Microsoft that provides simple plug-in internet access to anyone with a computer or a smart phone. This massive utility network system functions much like the electrical power grid, making software obsolete and access universal. The heresy of such readily available information freed from the shackles of nationalism or academic authority is already producing a postmodern pastiche of high and low culture that further destabilizes traditional patterns of using English literature to stabilize a cultural center or to civilize the lower classes. Technology will not stabilize knowledge as we have known it for thousands of years.

Postman's (1992) views were similar to Lyotard's (1979/1984) in that the goal of the system is "the optimization of the global relationship of input and output – in other words performativity" (p. 11). Narrative has been the "quintessential form of customary knowledge"

(p. 19), but the desire for wealth, not knowledge, mandated “performance improvement and product realization” (p. 45). Lyotard claimed the question ‘What use is it?’ has replaced the “Is it true?” of the grand narratives of the life of the spirit and the emancipation of humanity. In terms of the mercantilization of knowledge, the question has become “Is it saleable?” or in terms of power, “Is it efficient?” (p. 51).

New kinds of value are being given to new kinds of knowledge generated from new technologies interacting with each other and human beings. Definitions of knowledge have become useless because new ways of generating it emerge weekly. The condition of knowledge is unstable, evolving, and mostly free. The next section includes a discussion of how technological determinism affects the condition of knowledge.

The condition of knowledge. Lyotard (1979/1984) suggested that rapid cultural and technological change gathering speed since the 1950s will likely interrupt the condition of knowledge:

The nature of knowledge cannot survive unchanged within the context of general transformation. It can fit into the new channels and become operational, only if learning is translated into quantities of information. We can predict that anything in the constituted body of knowledge that is not translatable in this way will be abandoned The old principle that the acquisition of knowledge is indissociable from the training (Bildung) of minds, or even of individuals, is becoming obsolete and will become ever more so. . . .

Knowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold. (p. 4)

However, the kind of knowledge to be sold will no longer be determined by the book culture.

According to Paulson (2001), print/written language is “no longer a hegemonic medium” (p. 160), thus introducing ruptures to tradition as ways of knowing collide, paths of knowledge and

skill certification diversify, and unimagined jobs require new kinds of knowledge. Lessig (2008) described the cultural/technological shift as the change from “Read/Only” to “Read/Write” (p. 28): from professional/expert production for consumption to amateur/novice interactivity (and hybrids of the two) to produce new kinds of knowledge and culture. The “Read/Write” mode empowers an individual to make, not just read knowledge. The internet phenomenon of self-publishing with amazon.com and launching a career with youtube.com is evidence of this. The static technology of the book produced educational paradigms based on the codification of Western Civilization, a condition requiring re-evaluation because of demographics, globalization, and technology that change how we know, not just what or when we know. Whereas traditional history documents a discourse as truth, nontraditional history allows other ways of knowing and disrupts the accumulation of discourses established as knowledge. Drucker (1993) observed another equally important impact of these conditions: “The G.I. Bill of Rights – and the enthusiastic response to it on the part of America’s veterans – signaled the shift to the knowledge society. Future historians may well consider it the most important event of the twentieth century” (p. 3). In addition, he added,

The basic economic resource – “the means of production,” to use the economist’s term – is no longer capital, nor natural resources (the economist’s “land”), nor “labor.” It is and will be knowledge . . . Value is now created by “productivity” and “innovation,” both applications of knowledge to work. The leading social groups of the knowledge society will be “knowledge workers” – knowledge executives who know how to allocate knowledge to productive use, just as the capitalists knew how to allocate capital to productive use. (p. 8)

The commendable idea of educational opportunity for all is a Noble Cause that requires as much scrutiny as any other cultural colonization campaign bearing both good intentions and unintended consequences that appear to be “natural.” As noted earlier, postwar use of multiple-choice standardized admissions testing with large numbers of applicants increased because of the use of technology such as the efficient IBM scoring machine. That and the emergence of the knowledge society were conditions that positioned the small College Board and the country to need the creation of a psychometric center (ETS) as its partner to handle the volume and growth of an expanding knowledge business. The two non-profit companies were perfectly situated, for the cause of service and knowledge, to produce and control. “Knowledge is the only meaningful resource today,” explained Drucker (1993). He continued,

Land, labor, and capital have not disappeared, but they have become secondary. They can be obtained easily, provided there is knowledge. And knowledge in this new sense means knowledge as a utility, knowledge as the means to obtain social and economic results” (p. 42).

The unstable condition of knowledge does not suggest despair or fear. Considering the changing possibilities of knowledge remains a useful way of experimenting with identity and subjectification. Curiosity is a far better research tool for re-inventing a world and a self.

Conclusion

Each of these theories described in this chapter contributed to my ability to re-think, re-orient, and re-build a way of looking at the world. The loss of my ideological stability required particularly exacting examination of the assumptions of that world, especially regarding the assumptions that I personally held and that the educational establishment accepted about the College Board and the discipline of English. Components from each of these theories contribute

to my understanding of the network of power/knowledge used in the genealogy and analysis of later chapters. The following chapters include a description of the analysis and what I learned from the analysis.

Chapter 4

Method of the Study

Foucaultian Genealogy

I explained in the previous chapters that I would limit my study to the AP program, one highly successful and visible College Board initiative. Of the thirty-seven AP courses available, I narrowed the study to one AP subject, English, that most closely parallels the history of the College Board. AP English courses and the secondary school curriculum also share my own history. The object of this genealogical study is the discourse of these cultural constructs. The purpose of this chapter is to describe Foucaultian genealogy, the analytic method used in this study. First I will describe Foucault's historical method, genealogy, and explain why it is useful in this study. Then I will describe how I put it to work to describe the alignment of the College Board's history with the AP English courses and secondary school English Language Arts (ELA).

That description will be followed in Chapter 5 by an analysis of the enabling conditions of complex social, educational, economic, and technological interrelationships that produced the College Board itself and the subsequent discourses that produced AP courses and secondary ELA to make them thinkable, widely accepted, obvious, and inevitable as the natural order of things and by extension into the secondary ELA curriculum and my personal and professional life. Chapter 6 follows with analysis of the discontinuities of and afterthoughts about the implications of this study

Why Genealogy?

Foucault developed archaeology and genealogy, two historical methods to tell different kinds of histories about well-established assumptions. Here, I will describe both to illustrate that they work hand-in-hand, even though this study focuses primarily on genealogy. The archaeological method compares different discursive forms to evaluate the contingency of a specific way of thinking. According to Davidson (1986), archaeology describes the “systems of rules, and their transformations, which make different kinds of statements possible” (p. 222) in history, thus suggesting that archaeology is concerned with how disciplinary thinking controls the possibilities of truth statements. Disciplinary thinking can come from an institutional, ideological, or transcendental source.

Genealogy, however, investigates the power of social practice and discourse that formed the statements. The goal of genealogy is not the discovery of an authoritarian source of rationality and truth. Foucault (1979/1980) observed that genealogy is concerned, rather, with the insurrection of knowledges that are opposed primarily not to the contents, methods or concepts of a science, but to the effects of

the centralizing powers which are linked to the institution and functioning of an organized scientific discourse within a society such as ours. Nor does it basically matter all that much that this institutionalization of scientific discourse is embodied in a university, or, more generally, in an educational apparatus, in a theoretical-commercial institution such as psychoanalysis or within the framework of reference that is provided by a political system such as Marxism; for it is really against the effects of the power of a discourse that is considered to be scientific that the genealogy must wage its struggle. (p. 84)

Genealogy is useful for investigating the “centralizing powers” of an institutional matrix and the scientific discourse of, for example, standardized testing and scientific management within a technological, consumerist, global society that claims to support meritocracy and democracy.

Having been educated within hierarchal systems of patriarchal authority for most of my life, I found genealogy particularly helpful in unraveling the topic of this study. I also found it helpful in the midst of my personal disorientation of realizing that the internalized rationality and truths that defined my education had produced me, with my full cooperation, as a unified, rational, educated subject. In other words, archaeology offered a way to understand how this had happened, and genealogy offered a way to understand why. Foucault (1977/1984a) described the "search for descent," one strategy used in genealogy, as "not the erecting of foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself" (p.82). Genealogy had disturbed what I thought was foundational and offered possibilities for thinking differently.

Archaeology and genealogy work more like two stages of one process rather than two different methods. St. Pierre (2000) explained the relationship of archaeology and genealogy: “If Foucault’s archaeology examines the relation between truth and knowledge, his genealogy examines the relation between truth and power” (p. 497). Using the genealogical method, the historian searches meticulously for perhaps random turns of history, chance, and accident that mark the transition from one way of thinking to another. Genealogy does not assume a rational, linear process of improvement or progress. According to Prado (1995), genealogy “find[s] truth, knowledge, rationality reconceived as products of power” (p. 76). Davidson (1986) identified a comment from Foucault as a concise interpretation of genealogy:

“Truth” is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements “truth” is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to the effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A régime of truth. (p. 221)

Genealogy looks at why linguistic and cultural networks within discourses produce, maintain, and extend power.

Genealogy’s focus on the actions and effects of power rather than the assumptions and truth claims identified by archaeology allows examination of the regulators and enforcers of that power, many of which are self-imposed by the subjects of the power. Foucault (1977/1991) described this subjection as “disciplinary power:”

Disciplinary power, on the other hand, is exercised through its invisibility; at the same time it imposes on those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility. In discipline, it is the subjects who have to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold of the power that is exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection. And the examination is the technique by which power, instead of emitting the signs of its potency, instead of imposing its mark on subjects, holds them in a mechanism of objectification. In this space of domination, disciplinary power manifests its potency, essentially, by arranging objects. The examination is, as it were, the ceremony of this objectification. (p. 187)

One can see then, that discourse constructs ceremonies that mark our acceptance as teachers and students of this disciplinary power, and Foucault explicitly notes that examinations are one of the ceremonies that create objects.

The discourse and assumptions of discourse are subject to the disciplinary power of systems of power traced in genealogical study. It is no small matter that “Genealogy is critique as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying” (Mahon, 1996, p. 122). The shock of recognition causes an individual to lose the illusion of an autonomous self and comprehend the self as a product of external forces.

Genealogy is especially useful for an examination of the College Board’s discourse, structure, and resulting conditions that make it possible for it to continue in its present form after historical shifts have produced markedly different and rapidly changing conditions enabled by the discourses of technology, globalism, and business. Foucault (1972) said that we should “question those ready-made syntheses, those groupings we normally accept before any examination, those links whose validity is recognized from the onset” and “question those divisions or groupings with which we have become so familiar” (p. 22). My long term experience as an AP English teacher and a College Board consultant required a research method that will challenge personal and institutional assumptions about education in the larger sense and the teaching of English in particular. A genealogical study looks for the instabilities and tensions behind assumptions and structures, those “pre-existing forms of continuity, all these syntheses that are accepted without question” which must remain “in suspense,” not organic to themselves but “always the result of a construction of rules which must be known, and the justifications of which must be scrutinized” (Foucault, 1972, p. 25).

Genealogy is a method that questions assumptions and the power that sustains them. The goal is to identify the silenced or forgotten details and their backstories, not as a correct version but as an alternative perspective. A genealogy is not a chronological history of unities, totalities,

or relations. Foucault (1972) required the genealogist to question “such unities as ‘science’ or ‘literature’” and to perhaps “regard them as illusions, illegitimate constructions, or ill-acquired results” or maybe as “temporary” (p. 26) or indefinable or disturbing. The recognition of some of my potent illusions about my identity as a teacher, woman, and individual undermined my professional and personal *raison d’être*. Genealogy offered a way for me to unpack my past and reconstruct myself while researching alternative narratives for this project. I cannot do one without the other.

Disruption of Narratives.

In order to disrupt too-familiar narratives, a genealogist must know the inherent assumptions of the standard history of the origin and the linear progression of the system of thought being studied. For readers of this dissertation who might desire a review of the conventional, chronological history of the relevant educational network and its relationship to cultural, technological, and political events, see the timeline in Appendix A. The project also used the most relevant events and documents from that timeline in the genealogical analysis. Readers who prefer a narrative of the College Board’s chronological history can refer to the second chapter. As Bogue (1994), however, indicated, “[Foucault’s] genealogies are histories of the present, studies that commence with an intolerable situation in the contemporary world and seek a moment of discontinuity in the history of that situation, one that will defamiliarize existing practices and make it possible to imagine alternatives to them” (p. 13).

My purpose is to defamiliarize the details of the College Board’s taken-for-granted structure in order to understand the conditions that made the various elements possible. As noted earlier, I share with Mills (1959) a concern for relating personal questions to public issues. My previous values deteriorated under scrutiny and then transformed into an impetus toward social

and educational change. Following Mills, I will use the relationship between the individual and culture to create the necessary “sociological imagination” to understand the connection between “inner life and the external career” (p. 5). My personal stake in this research makes all three modes of genealogy, as described by Foucault (1984b/1979), possible in this study:

Three domains of genealogy are possible. First, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves a subjects of knowledge; second, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; third, a historical ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents. (pp. 351-352)

Foucault (1980/1977) also described genealogy as

a reactivation of local knowledges – of minor knowledges, as Deleuze might call them – in opposition to the scientific hierarchisation of knowledges and the effects intrinsic to their power: this, then, is the project of these disordered and fragmentary genealogies. (p. 85)

Those local, illegitimate, or minor knowledges include language and events omitted from traditional accounts that provide what Foucault called a counter memory. Foucault (1980/1977) offered clarification:

And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history. (p. 117)

Lee (1997) described the alternative to the empty sameness of history: “By refusing the ‘certainty of absolutes,’ genealogy emancipates and enfranchises the knowledges that have been disqualified from voicing uncertainty about or challenging outright those absolutes” (p. 146). A genealogy rejects a unified account of absolutes and looks for multiple accounts without linearity that form lines of descent more like a web, a Foucaultian (1990/1978) metaphor that described “the network of power relations . . . that passes through apparatuses and institutions” (p. 96), multi-layered like a complex spider web, Deleuzian (1987) in nature. My research fractured pre-conceived unities in order to see “reversals of a relationship of forces, usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who had once used it, a feeble domination that poisons itself as it grows lax, the entry of a masked ‘other’” (Foucault, p. 154). Appropriating the language of a monolithic institution and turning that vocabulary against its agencies through meticulous examination of documents and discourse also exposed the disguises of power. This series of reversals constituted what Foucault called effective history in contrast to traditional history. Harootunian (1988) explained, “Foucault believed he had found a strategy that would permit a dissociation from the certainty of absolutes and an engagement with something called ‘effective history,’ that is a history free from constants and self-recognition. ‘Effective history,’ he urged, ‘deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature’” (p. 121).

There are two general narratives that this genealogy will disrupt. The first narrative is my personal story that began with my childhood romance with reading and writing and concludes with the disenchantment of humanism. It includes what Scoles (1998) called the “Story of English – a narrative that begins with Beowulf” (p. 82) and now questions the category of

literature itself and what Graff (1989) calls the “humanist myth” (p. 1). The second narrative is a national story that begins with the American dream and concludes with globalism.

Challenging Legitimation

Claiming all postmodern discourses to be deconstructive, Flax (1990) stated their purpose is to question “truth, knowledge, power, the self, and language that are often taken for granted within and serve as legitimation for contemporary Western culture” (p. 41). The genealogist seeks the ghostly tracings of other interpretations, digressions, accidents that have been hidden by the dominant discourse. Genealogy focuses on the spaces around, beside, within, or between the links rather than the supposed missing links in chains. Genealogy prefers to re-define rather than accept the established definitions.

Genealogy also rejects accepted historical assumptions and uses different assumptions that cause a rearrangement of narratives in order to expose information. A comment by Jameson (1999) aptly suggested my deconstructive purpose to analyze the ghosts of this project as “moments in which the present . . . unexpectedly betrays us” (p. 39). A transgressive theory is the only kind that has the power to reverse traditional binaries so that entirely different thinking can emerge. If, for example, defining the human in other ways is possible, the definition must be something other than the anti-human, as suggested in the posthumanist work of Haraway (1997) and Wolfe (2010), and others writing about technological society, neuroscience, media, knowledge culture, and a post-print world (Baudrillard, 1994; Birkerts, 2006; Carr, 2010; Ellul, 1980; Gomez, 2008; Jenkins, 2006; Lessig, 2008; Lyotard, 1984; McPherson, 2008; Pink, 2005; Russo, 2005; Salen, 2008; Spanos, 1993; Turkel, 2010; Willinsky, 1999).

Prado (1995) described a genealogical study as retelling “the history of a discipline or institution or practice” (p. 25), considering how we arrived where we are and what conditions

existed to allow it. Donald (1992) described Foucault's genealogical method as one that "unpicks the variety of practices that make a particular type of experience historically possible, and then offers a consciously anti-ideological explanation of how the process works" (p. 19). Genealogy is not, however, oppositional; binaries are not useful. Bové (1990) observed that genealogical work is not "simply 'anti-Marxist' or 'anti-Freudian,'" rather, it is interested in describing how these grand oppositional discourses have become authoritative and productive within the large field of humanistic discourse which defines modernity — and in trying to pose other questions" (p. 60). This research is not anti-College Board or pro-College Board: it is *why* College Board?

The centrality of this institution and its practices in the educational life of the nation is a stunning example of power and productivity: protected by high security on the ETS campus is the "largest data bank of personal educational and psychological information in the world" (Nairn, 1980, p. 28) collected from more customers than Ford and General Motors have in a year. That Nairn's comment is from his 1980 study is no less chilling when taken in the context of 2013 and the even greater technological enhancement of the College Board/ETS entity's ability to collect and mine data of many more customers than in 1980. This is the company whose organizational, technological, and political agility over the years developed and sustained Henry Chauncey's vision of a great testing empire. This research seeks to challenge the legitimacy of such a power matrix.

Genealogical Strategies

Foucaultian genealogy rejects the existence of a single past event as the origin of apparently inevitable or commonsense ideas such as *literature, canon, intelligence, standardized testing, school, university, meritocracy, educated*, or even *American dream*. Davidson (1986)

wrote that “as any reader of Foucault learns, [genealogy] shows rather that the origin of what we take to be rational, the bearer of truth, is rooted in domination, subjugation, the relationship of forces – in a word, power” (p. 225). Power functions through lines of descent within a network that produces objects of knowledge such as the College Board or the school subject of English. The relationships within that network constitute “the accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely, the complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations” (Foucault, 1977, p. 146) that are the organization’s effective history.

Foucault suggested that the first step of genealogy was to establish the lines of descent. A genealogical study searches for the tributaries that created the river, not the river itself. There are two stages to this process. According to Bové (1990), genealogy needs a double analysis in which the two parts are not really separate.

First, genealogy tracks down the ways in which discourses constitute “objects” and classes of objects which are available for study. Second and more important, genealogy traces the way in which discourses constitute these objects as subjects of statements which can themselves be judged as “true” or “false” according to the logic, syntax, and semantics of the empowered discourse. (p. 56)

Tracing the lines of descent to discontinuities disrupts the assumption that an object of Knowledge (e.g., “the educated person”) is natural and rational rather than historical and contingent. As explained in Chapter 1, I accepted my identity as teacher and student as natural and rational, not understanding the power of the discourses embedded in an educational apparatus that produced that identity or the cultural networks that maintained that power. In Chapter 2, I described a history of the College Board, the AP Program, and an important AP subject, English, to illustrate what appeared to be their apparently inevitable and progressive

development during the last century, suggesting a variety of practices that made this history possible. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) described Foucault's genealogy "as a method of diagnosing and grasping the significance of social practices from within them Using this new method, theory is not only subordinated to practice but is shown to be one of the essential components through which the organizing practices operate" (p. 6). Thus, theory becomes a workhorse rather than a showhorse.

According to Kendall and Wickham (1999), "Recognizing strangeness in all social arrangements is an important part of using Foucault's methods" (p. 8). Bové (1990) asserted that "[social arrangements] are not 'natural'" (p. 60). Disrupting what is taken-for-granted is the purpose of Foucaultian genealogy. My personal and professional genealogy began on the day when the Western tradition of knowledge and literature, including the accepted practices of standardized testing and my willingness to accept all of it, became strange to me. Looking for shifts and breaks, I traced lines of descent to a variety of documents and events in a network of privilege, power, national events, ideological shifts, social movements, incidentals, and ambition.

Like traditional history, genealogy is document-based research, but its method is quite different. In place of history's search for origins, genealogy "operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times" (Foucault, 1984/1971, p. 76). Flyvbjerg (2001) compared the work of the genealogist to Aristotle's *phronesis*, or practical wisdom, with its emphasis on the particular because "genuinely important interrelationships" (p. 114) live in the deep, concrete detail that the genealogist uses to seek "the large from within the small" (p. 114). I will use the deep concrete detail from a small unit (AP English) within the larger (the College Board) to examine the relationships of knowledge and power.

Bogue's (1994) description of Foucault's methodological starting point in *Discipline and Punish* summarized a useful model of genealogical practice:

Foucault starts with the intolerable institution of the modern prison, traces its history to its problematic formation at the beginning of the nineteenth century, demonstrates its arbitrary logic and its perpetual complicity with movements for prison reform, and hopefully opens up possibilities for undoing this institution. (p. 13)

The intolerable institution of my research is not an individual organization or group. The target is the intolerable institutionalized hypocrisy of a network of norms and practices produced by layers of educational, economic, and political discourse in society. The complex network of power consists of "acts of domination, submission, and resistance" (Prado, 1995, p. 37) of arbitrary logic and complicity in which a genealogist can identify events and discourse that make the present conditions possible.

As explained by Gutting (2008), Foucault demonstrated the beginnings of genealogical research in a similar way in *The History of Madness* (1961) in which he challenged "what was presented as an objective, incontrovertible scientific discovery (that madness is mental illness)" and exposed it as "the product of eminently questionable social and ethical commitments" (p. 4) rather than being an enlightened liberation from the ignorance of earlier eras. Foucault suggested that social and ethical attitudes shaped so-called scientific medical treatments in an effort to control people labeled as insane because their actions challenged conventional morality or beliefs. Foucault posited that society's assumptions about madness were social and political instead of scientific and questioned why strategies of social and political privilege defined madness. Foucault (1988a) explained,

Certain relations to madness or at least to mad people have changed from the sixteenth century to the beginning of the eighteenth century. . . . All that is the social context through which you can understand not why such and such scientific theories have been developed about madness, but why madness became a problem at a certain time. (p. 3)

Strategies of a genealogical study also include detailed examination of the social context and processes of a particular time and place that evoked the discourse of “problem” for a subject that had alternate identities. Genealogy interrogates assumptions of reason based on misguided faith in the inevitability of rationality, the hand of God, or other essentialisms. The tensions of those assumptions are useful to genealogists. Absences and omissions interest genealogists. Genealogy does not serve philosophy or conventional history but reveals that all history is situated in a particular time and place with specific attitudes and interests. Genealogy exposes the “masquerade” (Racevskis, 1980, p. 95) of history.

Tracing Lines of Descent

Foucaultian genealogy rejects the existence of a single past event as the origin of apparently inevitable or commonsense ideas such as *literature, canon, intelligence, standardized testing, school, university, meritocracy, educated*, or even *American dream*. Davidson (1986) wrote that “as any reader of Foucault learns, [genealogy] shows rather that the origin of what we take to be rational, the bearer of truth, is rooted in domination, subjugation, the relationship of forces – in a word, power” (p. 225). As noted earlier, power functions through lines of descent within a network that produces an organization, such as the College Board or a discipline such as English. The relationships within that network constitute “the accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely, the complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations” (Foucault, 1977, p. 146) that are the organization’s effective history. Tracing the

lines of descent to discontinuities disrupts the assumption that an object of knowledge (e.g., “literature”) is natural and rational rather than historical and contingent. For example, the social construct of *intelligence* and its current manifestation in standardized testing as an object of knowledge appears foundational but rests on illegitimate constructs from its eugenicist past and false appraisals that limit the tasks able to demonstrate skill. Each test becomes a ceremony to objectify the subject with a number to define her potential value and rank in society.

Documents as materialized discourse are the primary source in genealogical analysis. However, the multimedia environment in which we live has altered the idea of what a document can be. McCulloch (2004) noted that the widespread use of the internet has changed the traditional notion of a document as paper, vellum, or papyrus. The accessibility of electronic documents has almost eliminated exclusive academic access to research and allowed access by design or accident to the general population. The enthusiasm for and ease of publication of web documents has also made it possible for entities such as the College Board, universities, and corporations to post online their detailed versions of the world that have the capacity inadvertently to expose information that was intended to be internal or to reveal their intentions about other matters by their absence.

According to Prior (2009), document-based research is inadequate without analysis of the patterns and organizations from which they emerge. Prior commented that “the manner in which documents circulate and are accessed serves to mark off social groupings and organizational positions” (p. 67). In addition, he also advocated study of the way in which documents are used, noting that documents as “inert matter offer a very different field of study from documents as agents” (p. 67). For this reason, the researcher must pay careful attention to how documents

mediate and structure events and how documents can be used in “alliances of interest so as to develop and underpin particular visions of the world” (p. 67).

Foucault (1972/1971) described knowledge as found “not only in demonstrations” but also “in fiction, reflexion, narrative accounts, institutional regulations, and political decisions” (p. 183). The detailed retelling of history required of a genealogy is based in “the archives, chronicles, diaries, journals, logbooks, memoirs, official records, and registries that are the historian’s raw material” (Prado, 2000, p. 40). Prior (2009) explained that writing is as important as any verbal form for any kind of text. For example, Prior expanded the concept of document to include “paintings, tapestries, monuments, diaries, shopping lists, stage plays, adverts, rail tickets, film, photographs, videos, engineering drawings, the content of human tissue archives and World Wide Web (WWW) pages” (p. 2). Plummer (2001) elaborated an even greater variety of possible documents:

People keep diaries, send letters, make quilts, take photos, dash off memos, compose auto/biographies, construct web sites, scrawl graffiti, publish their memoirs, write letters, compose CVs, leave suicide notes, film video diaries, inscribe memorials on tombstones, shoot films, paint pictures, make tapes and try to record their personal dreams. (p. 17)

Prior (2009) also added useful personal or found ephemera to this list. He described this category:

Their status as documents depends not so much on features intrinsic to their existence, nor on the intentions of their makers, but on factors and processes that lay beyond their boundaries . . . [moving] away from a consideration of them as stable, static and pre-defined artifacts [to] consider them in terms of fields, frames and networks of

action. In fact, the status of things as “documents” depends precisely on the ways in which such objects are integrated into fields of action, and documents can only be defined in terms of such fields. (p. 2)

These resources can also interact with multiple discourses at the same time. Fairclough (1995) explained the importance of increasingly “multisemiotic” texts in contemporary society: “We can continue regarding the text as a primarily linguistic cultural artifact, but develop ways of analyzing other semiotic forms, which are co-present with language, and especially how different semiotic forms interact in the multisemiotic text” (p. 4). Text increasingly has multiple meanings and multiple media, often with multiple choices of platform and interactivity. This multiplicity, according to McCulloch (2004), emphasized the importance of relating the text to its context. The idea that there is one standard set of meanings no longer applies. The available meanings from any specific communication are potentially multiple. I am particularly concerned with shifts of language, even historic use of specific words such as *literature*, *composition*, *educated*, *humanities*, *intelligence* and others over time.

Prior (2009) recommended consideration of documents as things rather than content in order to focus on the language as an instrument of thought and action, adding that “we should not forget that people burn and ban texts as well as read them” (p. 3). Documents have a dual role as agents to carry information or to cause action through report or manipulation as well as serve as ally or enemy. Since actions, such as reading *or* burning texts, can also be read, the word *document* implies any artifact or action that can be read, including reflexive writing or technology. For example, burning a draft card in the 1960s was read as an act of civil protest.

According to Pillow (2003), reflexivity also participates in the production of knowledge: “To be reflexive, then, not only contributes to producing knowledge that aids in understanding

and gaining insight into the workings of our social world but also provides insight on how this knowledge is produced” (p. 176). Following St. Pierre (2000), researchers can also “use old concepts but ask them to do different work” (p. 1). Prior (2009) also suggested that technology can be read as a document, an electronic text where some of the same questions can apply, but with very different results, as indicated in the following:

By understanding how technology is used, who recruits it and allies themselves with it, how it is adopted, and adapted, and how it circulates, analysis of technology can form a series of key entry points into the investigation of social life. This is especially so when alternative technologies are available in the same time and place. . . . technology is not merely the wires and widgets within the “machine box” It is always hardware plus social relationships that count, and not simply hardware alone. . . . relationships between things and their contexts that determine the shapes and appearance of the elements.

Consequently, what is needed for work with documentation is a focus on relations rather than on the things in isolation. (p. 172)

I examined various texts and their relationship to contexts to seek evidence of discourse adjustments, existing procedures, technological adaptations, or other changes in social practices that facilitated the structures of power. For example, some of the minor details of individual ambitions and actions of a surprisingly small group of men and accidents of history such as wars produced surprisingly deep streams of influence in the development and maintenance of widely accepted educational constructs such as intelligence, standardized testing, and college admissions requirements that seem as natural and necessary as rain to the general public.

Documents and Texts

Here, I list the documents I analyzed in this genealogical study, including print and electronic documents. As explained in Chapter 1, I have had a professional association with the College Board since 1990 and have an extensive personal collection of College Board and AP documents so that some documents I examined were available to me in both paper or electronic form, such as the *Equity and Access Policy*. Also, some documents I used were available in my personal collection but not online.

I used a wide variety of College Board publications and documents available at the College Board website, for example, the *College Board Standards for Language Art*. In addition, I accessed the Common Core Curriculum Standards website to find the *Common Core ELA Standards*. The College Board website and U.S. Department of Education website were useful sources. The length of my study also allowed me to look carefully at the College Board website for the years 2008-2013 and to notice changes in the information on the site, most notably the changes that occurred between 2012 and 2013, the year in which David Coleman, one of the founders of ACHIEVE and the key author of the new Common Core ELA curriculum standards, became president of the College Board. Some of the most interesting documents were research reports and white papers available on the College Board and ETS sites. In some cases I had access to documents in my personal collection of AP consultant materials that had formerly been available online but no longer were accessible online or which had never been online. For example, I used both the *2012 Advanced Placement Course Description*, which is available online, and the *1986 Advanced Placement Course Description*, which is not available online. I used the *2012 AP Report to the Nation*, which is available online, and I also used editions from previous years that are not available online. Various documents such as mission statements,

nonprofit tax forms, conference_proceedings, letters, consultant communications, and other documents from the_College Board and Educational Testing Service were also available to me from online sources as well as my personal collection.

Educational theory and policy texts (e.g., Callahan, 1964; Donald, 1990; Readings, 1996) provided details about the broader contexts of influences and decisions that shaped the administration and organization of education in the United States. Histories and critiques of the College Board and the AP Program were central to my reading (Ashton-Jones, Metzger, & Olson, 1989; Fuess, 1967; Johaneck, 2001; Lemann, 2000; Marland, 1975 Nairn (1976); Riccards, 2010; Sadler, 2010; Valentine, 1987.) Educational reform texts (e.g., Bracey, 2009; Garrison, 2009; Ravitch, 2010; Sacks, 1999) led to other documents and ways of thinking about standardized testing other than the accepted narrative. I also used texts related to the historical and cultural significance of standardized testing (e.g., Garrison, 1999; Lemann, 2000; Nairn, 1979) and of standards development (e.g., Marland, 1975; Riccards, 2010; Valentine, 1987) in relation to the College Board. Several texts about technology, including histories (e.g., Carr, 2008; Jenkins, 2006) proved useful in understanding cultural and educational changes. Texts (e.g., Birkets, 1994; Kirp, 2003; Russo, 2005) specific to the relationship of traditional literary study, business, and technology expanded my ways of thinking. Studies of the discipline of English as a school and university subject (e.g., Applebee, 1974; Eagleton, 1985; Graff, 1989; Miller, 1991; Scoles, 1998; Willinsky, 1991) were helpful in thinking about the position of AP English and secondary ELA in regard to the Common Core ELA standards and how we have arrived at this point. Texts critical of the College Board and the AP Program revealed additional lines of descent (e.g., Nairn, 1979; Sadler, Sonnert, Tai, & Klopfenstein, 2010). The appointment of David Coleman, one of the chief writers of ELA standards for the Common Core, as the

president of the College Board during this time, generated many online newspaper and periodical reports of interest. Scientific management texts (e.g., Drucker, 1993; Taylor, 1911) and texts about the relationship of education and scientific management (Callahan, 1969) contributed important context about why education is in its current condition. In addition, I have also inspected the following informal documents: syllabus samples from high school and college English courses and samples of university admission requirements regarding the study of English from 1900 – 2012.

My own writings, including reflections written for course work, have also contributed to my research. Prior (2009) explained that “writing is as significant as speech in social action” and is “as important as the verbal question, the verbal answer and the command” (p. 26). In a similar fashion, I have included my own writing as source documents because they are social actions pertinent to this research. My speculations and experiments with digital environments and implications for change as discussed by McPherson (2008) and Salen (2008) are also resources. Although my writing has been useful for the generation of connections and ideas, it is also a constant reminder of the subjectivity of my own positions, including “disciplinary training, epistemological orientation, social positionality, institutional imperatives, and funding sources” (Scheurich, 1995, p. 249).

Conclusion

The researcher must question the document about telling the truth, its right to claim the truth, its accuracy or inaccuracy, its information or its ignorance, its authenticity or its falsification. According to Foucault (1972), the document is “the language of a voice since reduced to silence, its fragile, but possibly decipherable trace” (p. 6), even if the document is a few years old or a hundred years old. A genealogical study cannot treat documents as history

does but must be “detached from the image that satisfied it for so long,” rejecting its “anthropological justification: that of an age-old collective consciousness that made use of material documents to refresh its memory” (p. 7). In this study, some of the documents serve the memory of an ancient collective consciousness as the ghosts that haunt the curriculum. A genealogical analysis unlocks the past and rethinks why and how and what indicators of tension and change might look like in order to retell a story of the present.

I have also described the document sources for this study and the key concepts of the analysis. Working with documents should focus on relationships of texts and events, not the text or event in isolation. Genealogy looks for opposition to centralizing powers and facilitates the process of transitioning from one way of thinking to another in order to offer an anti-ideological explanation of the process. Genealogy disturbs presumptions and assumptions, challenging what appears to be truth by examining the relationship of appearance to power. It is possible for truth, knowledge, and rationality to be mutable products of power rather than absolutes that function through domination, subjugation, and a web of disciplinary control. By disrupting familiar, accepted narratives, genealogy opens fissures in narratives that expose the instabilities, tensions, errors, false appraisals, and faulty calculations of effective history in contrast to conventional history. Effective history exists in the logic, syntax, and semantics of an empowered discourse. By examining the spaces around, beside, and within an absolute, genealogy questions validity, justifications, and rationality to create a counter-memory and reactivate local knowledges. Genealogy allowed me to re-construct my own local knowledge about how powerful discourses became so authoritative and productive within a humanistic discourse that defined almost of the absolutes of my personal and professional life. Genealogy gave me the strategies to see how I became visible as an object of power and how the invisibility of that disciplinary power

preserved my condition as a person and professional within larger discourses. In the next chapter, I present the analysis of the enabling conditions of the problem of the present, an effective history of how powerful discourses arrived in their state and what conditions existed to allow it.

Chapter 5

Analysis

Part 1: The Moving Pieces of the Problem

In Chapter 4, I identified the analytical techniques used to examine the network of power generated by education, economics, and politics, a situation in which I have been both a fly caught in a web as well as the one of the spiders who did the weaving of it. I am no longer intrigued or intimidated by the complexity of the web's design, having generated enough confidence to critique the system, believing that I have learned enough to follow Arachne's thread out of the labyrinth. This chapter presents an analysis of the web. Chapter 6 assesses the implications of the web.

Foucault's model of genealogy suggested a plan for my analysis: start with the institution of the College Board, tracing its lines of descent from both a nineteenth century model of education and twentieth century educational reform — both supposedly grounded in the American dream — two projects that include standardized testing, meritocracy, and equity and access; demonstrate the persistent and complex influence of privilege and power and its perpetual complicity with neoliberalism and scientific management; demonstrate through a system of statements generated through the two AP English courses the “discursive regime” (Foucault, 1980/1977) that described and produced “the effects of power peculiar to the play of statements” (p. 113) in College Board, AP course content, and secondary ELA; open possibilities for undoing the status quo by illustrating redescriptions of AP English and ELA, not to destroy but to remix with changes in culture and technology. The previous chapters have focused on the

institution of the College Board as ground zero of education, suggesting its lines of descent from an elite, historical model of education to contemporary educational reform and its central role as the gatekeeper of the American dream. This study has gradually implicated the constructs that support the persistent and complex influence of privilege and power in the manipulation of education, students, and teachers through the circulation of power within neoliberalism, scientific management, and all forms of standardized testing. Chapter 5 has added to this report an analysis of the College Board's power/knowledge relationships within the larger culture and of the discursive regime it imposed on the two AP English courses that reflect the College Board's history and interactions with cultural and technological changes. Chapter 6 reflects on the implications of this study as it redescribes AP English and secondary ELA under different conditions that undo at least some of the status quo.

The first half of this chapter examines the visible and invisible power relations. Bové (1990) reminded us that genealogy begins with a problem in the present, appropriately represented by the complexity and danger of the web of power relations, the external forces that produce institutions and individuals. The problem addressed in this study is most visible in the monolithic, mostly unchallenged power/knowledge of the College Board whose authority is enabled by and supports other networks and assumptions of the educational system that link to ideas about meritocracy, standards, standardized testing, neoliberalism, Taylorism, technological determinism, globalism, and the accepted epistemologies that undergird those ideas. To understand in a general way how the College Board came to be, to exist in the present, it was necessary to trace at least some of the lines of descent and discontinuities in the larger culture that enable and perpetuate its structure of truth about meritocracy, curriculum, and the educated, privileged person. Those lines of descent have worked to normalize the College Board and to

create the web of power/knowledge relationships in which it disciplines people, subjects, and practices.

The speed with which contemporary culture and technology changes also made a careful examination of the *zeitgeist* necessary for me to understand the destabilizing forces at work behind the façade of normalized education. The College Board's taken-for-granted institutional immensity and importance made an analysis of effect rather than cause more useful for understanding its influence on curriculum and its relationship to contemporary culture and technology.

For that reason the second half of this chapter analyzes the effect of the College Board on the discourse of English as a curriculum subject and in relationship to the College Board. This part of the chapter also includes a detailed description of the two AP English courses and how their history and design resulted from the effective history of the College Board, reflecting changes in contemporary culture and technology and raising questions about standardized testing as a regime of truth.

This study began with my own experience with the College Board and the AP Program and my lifelong efforts to become an educated person. With disbelief I began to see how the educational apparatus, including the College Board, had disciplined me, my subject of English, my classroom practices, and my understanding of the characteristics of an educated person. As I learned how this had happened in my personal and professional life, I came to understand the connections of the ELA curriculum, AP English courses, the College Board, and the larger culture. Genealogical, political, and educational artifacts demonstrated the power/knowledge relationships that connect all of the moving pieces of the problem.

Cultural and educational discourse that enabled the machine. To understand in a general way how the College Board came to be, to exist in the present, it was necessary to identify some of the major discourses in the larger culture — what Lyotard (1984) might call metanarratives— that enable, organize, and perpetuate the College Board apparatus. As I studied documents, articles, books, and websites, I identified one major discourse from the larger American culture that is especially pervasive and powerful in College Board documents, though there are surely others: the American dream. This discourse helps to provide the rationale and logic of the deep cultural foundations on which the College Board rests.

In this section, I first described in broad strokes this large cultural discourse. Next, I trace the line of descent from the larger culture to College Board documents by identifying language in the documents themselves that echoes and represents that larger discourse. In other words, I show how the larger discourse permeates and structures the documents that create the College Board and, by extension, the web of real, material practices that constitute the lives of teachers, students, parents, and citizens. I then describe manifestation of the discourse of the American dream in the College Board. Finally, I show the discontinuity in the line of descent by illustrating how the line is disrupted by power relations, special interests, historical accidents, desire, chance, and so on. I was able to identify those discontinuities by putting to work various theories I discussed in Chapter 3 such as positivism, scientific management, academic capitalism, and so on.

The American Dream. The earliest example of the College Board's connection to the American dream can be found in its connection to two past presidents of Harvard, one of America's most prestigious universities. Charles Eliot was instrumental in establishing the College Board in 1900, and James Bryant Conant was president when he instigated the first

SAT, which was administered as Harvard's scholarship test. Both men shared an interest in the idea of a natural American meritocracy as a way to find and train the nation's future leaders who could help its citizenry realize the American dream. As Brewster (2004) explained, Conant and assistant dean Henry Chauncey "initiated an experiment to bring Harvard a new type of student, based not on the connections they or their parents had, but solely on what the students knew and their potential for further learning" (para. 4). It is interesting that that this elite Harvard connection is the most telling line of descent for the College Board's connection to the ordinary American dream of most ordinary citizens.

The telos of American democracy is the American dream, which is generally described as the belief in the accessibility of equal opportunity and rewarded merit, whether merit results from hard work or natural abilities. The American dream imagines the possibility of a better life for each person, earned by independent ability or achievement. Although the American dream may have various manifestations through the centuries, its inspiration seems to be the American declaration of the individual right to the pursuit of happiness through hard work and opportunity. Its articulation is complicated by different definitions of happiness and the failure of most versions of materialism to live up to these definitions. Its implied inclusion with "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" as one of the most famous phrases of the U.S. Declaration of Independence suggests a horizon of individual autonomy wherein freedom is its greatest virtue, assuming that the individual's pursuit is both virtuous and independent of illusions of freedom – an unlikely proposition. It is worth noting that the "pursuit of happiness" suggests that it is the pursuit that is widely available, not the happiness. For those not born to privilege, education is the key to the door of opportunity, the institution responsible for helping citizens acquire the

skills, knowledge, and cultural capital to fulfill the American dream. A free public education is supposed to be the great equalizer of this utopian meritocracy.

However, beginning with its first meeting in 1900 to organize the college admissions process for elite northeastern colleges, the College Board's first goal was to assist colleges with education for families of privilege who sent their sons to a handful of prestigious boys' prep schools, such as Andover, Philips Exeter, St. Paul, and others. If the sorting of soldiers had not occurred during World War I, if Harvard president James Conant had not asked Carl Brigham to adapt the military test for the first SAT in 1926 to facilitate Conant's goal of awarding scholarships to capable students outside of New England, if the IBM scoring machine had not been improved in 1939, and if the U.S. government had not contracted Chauncey for mass testing of World War II soldiers, the College Board might not be the gatekeeper of the American dream as it is today.

The line of descent from the larger discourse that helped to shape the College Board can be traced through language/statements in documents produced by or about the College Board. For example, the College Board's mission statement is "to connect students to college success and opportunity" (College Board, 2013), a concise version of ideas that support the American dream because the testing process implies the hard work and equal access that public education can offer. The company's website (2013) provided many examples of using this important concept as branding for the company. "A Dream Deferred" is the name of The College Board's annual conference about increasing the educational preparation, support, and opportunity of African-American students to increase their enrollment and success in college. The title is also an allusion to Langston Hughes' poem with the same title which in itself is a cynical allusion to the American dream gone wrong. By appropriating the poem's title for its conferences, the

College Board used the phrase to present the proliferation of its programs and its role in education as the remedy to a broken dream. The College Board sponsors two other conferences that reference the American dream: “The American Dream 2.0” about increased community college access and “Reclaiming the American Dream” about increased educational access and opportunity for Hispanic students. In 2008, the College Board issued a report from its task force on admissions in the 21st century, the title of which was “Preserving the Dream of America.” It is also clear from the repetition of the phrase, the American dream, that it is used by the College Board to perpetuate a myth that masks the organization’s not-so-innocent historical connection to privilege and power, including the ethnocentric, eugenicist theories of intelligence that influenced the early twentieth century IQ tests that were later adapted for the first SAT. As mentioned in chapter 3, one of the most important academic authorities on the nature of intelligence, Robert Sternberg, admitted that no one really knows what intelligence is. If experts have no definitive answer, how can anyone know exactly what an IQ test measures other than multiple choice test-taking skills from a single cultural perspective and narrow view of logic? By extension, the SAT’s adaptation from IQ tests suggests that it is likely that even educational experts do not know exactly what the SAT (and other tests based on the same format, culture, and logic such as AP exams) measures.

If the source of the SAT is its IQ test association, a subtle discontinuity in that line of descent emerges. As explained in Chapter 3, the SAT was adapted from intelligence tests that were constructed from particular assumptions about the nature of intelligence. The concept of *intelligence* is an invention of an instrumental positivist social science that aimed to sort people by intelligence by providing convenient numbers with which to rank them with Tayloristic efficiency. After renouncing his earlier views about heredity, race, and intelligence, Carl

Brigham, the author of the first SAT, became so troubled by the correlating IQ scores he had assigned to SAT scores that he removed them and tried to distance the test from the eugenicist discourse that existed in the 1920s regarding intelligence by dividing the test into the familiar verbal and math sections, which still exist today. The correlating IQ scores disappeared, but the structure of the test has not changed over the years except for the removal of analogies after California threatened to ban the SAT if they were not removed. The persuasive writing sample was added six years ago to better compete with the ACT achievement tests, but many colleges and universities routinely ignore it. Each year the SAT appears to assume even more importance on the cultural landscape, but it has to compete harder to stay ahead of the ACT.

Meritocracy, intelligence, and standardized testing. Questions about the assumptions and validity of intelligence and attempts to measure it also troubles the concept of *meritocracy* in this discourse because the hierarchal sorting that takes place after testing identifies who should be rewarded with a superior education and potentially better future and who should be relegated to a lesser education. Rejecting the validity of the hierarchal sorting of meritocracy, Sacks (2000) argued,

In meritocracy's present form, one has merit, in large part, if he or she exhibits superior cognitive and academic abilities and traits, variously measured by IQ tests, employment aptitude tests, college admissions tests, and achievement tests. All are cognitive abstractions, ghostlike doppelgangers for real things and situations, compelling problems, and genuine accomplishment. (p. 267)

These ghostlike doppelgangers bring to mind Derrida's concept of spectrality, "which calls into question the givenness and necessity of the present order of things" (Postone, 1998, para. 4), suggesting a "past that has not passed" and "a future that breaks with the present" (para. 5).

Sacks also noted that the current era's concern with the achievement gap between Caucasians and racial/ethnic subgroups declined little even when data was adjusted for family income, suggesting that the so-called achievement gap is more of a culture gap trapped "within the 'prison-house' of logocentrism" (Flaherty, 1990, p. 75) that privileges the primacy of writing over other forms of communication. The paper-and-pencil culture of school and testing does not address this issue. If the tests were changed, the achievement gap might reveal itself to be less related to intelligence than to different styles of learning, of perception, of responding, and of habits of mind, perhaps all of which could be cultural. For that reason, challenges to intelligence tests as not being culture-fair have been frequent since the 1980s; these challenges have also extended to the SAT. The use of scores from SAT tests as the tea leaves of individual destiny suggests an existing order that presents itself as scientific certainty rather than cultural accident or assumption. Intelligence is a cultural artifact, not the truth, a discontinuity in the "truth" of the American dream.

Derrida's hauntology offered a critique "of an existing order that presents itself as immutable . . . in the name of another future and a conception of justice beyond presence, beyond right and calculation" (Postone, 1998, para.9). The existing order of testing, standards, and reason that seems immutable is only temporal and incidental to human history. Like other traditions, such as the literary canon, they are not viable and belong "to the realm of the undead" (Lewis, 2008, p. 137), as discussed earlier. Since so much of the existing order has a ethnocentric, racist past, it taints the American dream.

Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010) are part of a research countertrend that challenges longheld assumptions about how culture shapes human cognition, another concept on which the concept intelligence is based. Watters (2013) summarized their research as follows:

The growing body of cross-cultural research that the three researchers were compiling suggested that the mind's capacity to mold itself to cultural and environmental settings was far greater than had been assumed. . . . [to] mold our most fundamental conscious and unconscious thinking and perception. (para. 14)

In other words, Henrich, et, al. found that culture is a cognitive as well as social feature of behavior because it shapes thinking and perception. If perception and logic can be so thoroughly influenced by cultural experiences, the chances of a test such as the SAT, with a line of descent from experimental intelligence tests from the early twentieth century, being culturally fair is unlikely. The counter-trend of cross-cultural research suggested a deconstruction of the entire concept of testing because the counter-trend asks different questions about it. Asking what was not in the test or results rather than what was there generates a different kind of discourse.

Given great variations of socioeconomic, ethnic, and historical cultural differences, standardized testing may be just one more experience of a logic that distorts the learning style and responses of an individual whose thoughts and experiences depend on a different logic. The nature of intelligence is an ongoing psychological and political debate that is beyond the scope of my research. It is useful, however, to consider that the French pioneers of intelligence testing recognized its dependency on social conditions. According to Garrison (2009), Binet and Simon, who developed the early intelligence tests, understood that IQ was a “standard constructed on the basis of the link between the value of social positions and the value of individuals and groups” (p. 80). Garrison argued that Binet and Simon developed a definition of intelligence that should have been identified as an “assessment of judgment” (p. 94) in specific cultural contexts rather than an assessment of the ability to learn. He continued that “what is being assessed – that is,

valued – is, in fact, the mode of thought: philosophy” based on the “exigencies of social reproduction” of the time (p. 94).

Contingency or conspiracy?. Genealogy would not claim that there was a deliberate conspiracy or nefarious design to deny children access to the American dream. Rather, genealogy traces how one truth becomes linked to another and another in a discourse that produces objects such as intelligence, standardized testing, and so on. Most educators and the general public accept without question the scientific luster of standardized testing, including intelligence and achievement tests. Most students and the general public accept SAT scores as the measure of a student’s worth and intelligence. What is sanitized, however, by the clean, almost clinical presentation of a student’s SAT or AP score or the national statistics about those scores is the cultural context of testing, including the student’s typical reaction to judge herself by the same standards. If merit and access to the American dream are based on a faulty definition of intelligence as measured by a standardized test grounded in only one cultural discourse, then the dream disintegrates for many students, whether they happen to be from Cameroon or perhaps Alabama. Following Spivak (1974), Van Cleave (2012) explained the contingency of truth,

The idea that something is real, true, or central and that it has a rational beginning is more productively understood as simply a description that we have come to accept as the truth of things. According to Spivak (1974), “[t]he most that can be said ... is that a certain view of the world ... has been accepted as the correct one,” (p. xiii), so any description of the world is contingent. (p. 52)

Diski (2013) noted that humans are the only animals who “as far as we know, edit reality” and observed that expressions such as “ ‘distinctly human’ ” and ‘civilized’ pack a lot of assumptions” (p. 96).

In this section I have illustrated that though the discourse of the College Board appears to support the larger discourse of the American dream, it fails to do so. Some of the most revered of educational traditions and assumptions, even our perception of knowledge, are haunted by cultural artifacts whose shelf life has expired and no one noticed. In fact, in too many cases it prohibits access to that dream for students whose limitations of poverty, place, language, or any other exceptionality to the experience of mainstream cultural expectations and standards affect their response to test questions or educational conventions. The line of descent from the American dream to the good intentions that structure the College Board are disrupted by the discontinuity of “intelligence,” a concept measured as merit thinkable only in cultures that privilege positivist social science.

The College Board’s participation in the establishment and perpetuation of mainstream cultural expectations and educational conventions suggests negative if unaware exercise of power that is also often accompanied by the positive productions of power. Foucault (1975/1995) stipulated four general rules for research in *Discipline and Punish*, that suggested that genealogical study benefits from observation of positive effects as well as negative, of the exercise of power and its technologies, of specific modes of subjection, and of the resulting objects of knowledge. The next section presents both positive and negative analysis of the College Board’s power relationship with the knowledge apparatus.

Power as positive change. According to Foucault (1980), “[w]hat makes power hold good ... is that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces

discourse” (p. 119). Power produces positive discourse and knowledge as well as negative, making necessary an acknowledgement of the College Board’s achievements, including its aggressive pursuit of equity and access for underrepresented populations since the 1990s, even though it initially neglected those populations. To do well and to do *good*, the contemporary mantra of neoliberalism, is apt in this regard, and it is logical for a company to both improve its bottom line by increasing the number of test takers and create worthy benefit to others.

The selective group of men who founded the College Board and turned an IQ test into the SAT and the elite schools who piloted the AP program over half a century ago represented a much larger group of individuals, mostly male, who never questioned their right to privilege and met little to no resistance until the 1960s. This line of descent also included the perpetuation of a nineteenth century model of a gentleman’s classical education, imported from England, that made it possible for them to maintain an ethnocentric, privileged vision of the world. They could easily live their lives without seeing or hearing the marginalized populations who rarely benefited from the rules of the meritocracy of the time. From its first meeting in 1900 until the end of the Golden Age of the university in 1975 as explained earlier by Readings, the College Board gradually but firmly established its control of the academic meritocracy as described in Chapter 2.

By 1975 the underrepresented, marginalized populations had been both seen and heard by the nation, the Civil Rights Act of 1968 became federal law, and the number of college students declined as the diversity of the student population increased. These historical and political disruptions gradually produced change on campuses and in the discourse of the College Board. According to the history on its 2013 website, the College Board began a campaign from 1960-1965 to desegregate its SAT testing centers in the south, a fact that received little notice for many

years. By 2013 this information became part of the lead paragraph of the company's website version of their history as the company continued a skillful, timely marketing shift that began in the 1990s and accelerated as the demographics of the nation changed. Another recent addition to the 2013 history is the establishment of the College Board Educational Opportunity Center in 2012, the first of two federally funded programs providing direct support for low-income students in Washington, D.C. Despite website (2013) claims that "from our earliest days, we have devoted ourselves to educational opportunity and achievement" and that "we have championed innovation, equity, and excellence for generations of students," the pre-1990s discourse of the College Board had been elitist and their targeted market, as explained in Chapter 2, for example, had been prep school and gifted students.

Also discussed in Chapter 2, the decline in the number of college students after 1975 accompanied by the greatly increased diversity of the remaining students presented the College Board with an economic necessity to increase the number of test takers and to expand the pool of students from which the customers came so that the company could reverse the decline in the number of tests taken during the late 1970s and early 1980s. One of the ways to do this was by increasing the number of AP subject area tests, including the addition in 1980 of a second AP English test, the new one to emphasize non-fiction, rhetoric, and expository writing unlike the first AP English test that emphasized literature, poetry, and analytical writing. By 1990, unmistakable evidence of an increasing demographic shift in the number of women and minorities in the student population was present, motivating the College Board's Equity 2000 initiative during the 1990s and its campaign to reverse its reputation as a gatekeeper of elitism by expanding access to the SAT exam and encouraging any motivated student to enroll in AP classes rather than a select few students favored by a teacher.

During the 1990s, another change in discourse occurred during the tenure of Gaston Caperton, the first non-educator College Board president who skillfully negotiated the company from a polite role as academic chaperone to an active role as mover and shaker of educational policy that coincidentally increased the number of exams taken and the productivity of the company's bottom line. Caperton, a successful business man who had also held political office, brought a neoliberal ethic to the College Board that increased its power by making it a political leader as well as an educational leader, accomplishing both aims by turning the AP program specifically into a growth market for curing the ailments of public education, as discussed in Chapter 2. In 2002, Caperton oversaw the establishment of the official Equity and Access policy and soon thereafter signed an agreement with the U.S. Department of Education to put ten AP courses in every school as part of the Equity and Access commitment. In an interesting coup d'état, the College Board appropriated the power of critics of its elitist prep school past by actively soliciting public school participation and the thousands of students who previously would have been excluded as likely candidates for SAT or AP success, making AP courses in particular an agent of change as well as education as explained in Chapter 2. As a non-profit organization, the College Board does not report profit, but its "non-profit" revenue stream in 2012 was over \$900,000,000, according to the company's own documents. Timely responses to social conditions that affected historically disadvantaged subgroups proved to be financially beneficial and morally responsible.

In 2012 David Coleman, a highly educated and successful African American known for his blunt language and the creation of educational policy organizations, became Caperton's successor. One of Coleman's organizations, Achieve, developed the new Common Core Curriculum Standards, whose language arts standards are largely based on College Board

standards, as discussed in Chapter 2. Coleman has announced plans to revise the SAT as a more consumer-friendly product that will be aligned with the new Common Core Curriculum Standards. Caperton's influence made the College Board more financially successful as a business; Coleman's influence seems more visible in social policy. By 2013, the discourse of the College Board's website had also changed its emphasis to the discourse of equity and access, describing the company as "from its earliest days . . . devoted to educational opportunity and achievement" (College Board 2013). Another example from the website positions the College Board as the historical champion of equity in education in the United States:

We have championed innovation, equity, and excellence for generations of students. . . . committed to increasing the number of students who earn a college degree . . . improve[d] access to and readiness for higher education. (2013)

Although debate continues about the challenges of maintaining excellence and equity while expanding the accessibility of AP classes to all students, some of whom have little experience with or preparation for the transition to AP's higher expectations, the AP program is the central engine of these goals, as discussed in Chapter 2. Coleman's policies emphasize the strength of the AP program to raise standards and increase service to traditionally underserved populations in ways previously unavailable. His own impeccable educational qualifications and history with organizing successful policy organizations suggest that he will maintain the prestige and influence of the College Board. Coleman can continue Caperton's successful business model to expand the number of exams taken and increase revenue while focusing the company's educational goals on inclusion and equity. Coleman described his continued focus on college readiness in an interview, speaking more about the AP program than of any other aspect of the

College Board. Using the language of crisis that has driven education for more than fifty years, he explained in a published speech:

We have a crisis in education, and over the next few years, the main thing on the College Board's agenda is to deliver its social mission. The College Board is not just about measuring and testing, but designing high-quality curriculum. The College Board should consider any student in an AP class a student in our care. We need to find better ways to support their success. (as cited in Lewin, 2012)

“High-quality curriculum” and “better ways to support their success” suggest that there are and will be more products that can be sold in the service of the “social mission.” The prestige of the College Board enhances this process.

The prestige of the College Board is such that educators and parents rarely question its particular version of events, even when an alternate version exists that might rightly describe a marketing strategy to increase the number of exams taken. To that end, the company developed an effective neoliberal plan as an appropriate response to its need for business, a change in marketing strategy, and well-intentioned inclusion of populations that had historically been excluded from its corporate boardrooms and from the iconic annual sorting of the student population into their places in the meritocracy. The College Board has a vested interest in the continuation of cultural assumptions about meritocracy and intelligence, on which its business rests. In the process, it has convinced almost everyone that the company is indispensable because it has the power to define what is worth knowing and to use that power to define students, curriculum, and achievement.

As part of the process, the College Board's Equity and Access policy subjectified the underrepresented populations, defining them at the same time that the company tried to prevent

their exclusion from academic opportunity. By defining these groups within the discourse of standardized norms and cultural constructs of intelligence, meritocracy, and Western thought, they have been subjected to one more way of being “less than” or “deviant” or “above/below normal.” Although the College Board expanded academic challenge and opportunity to historically underserved students, the benefits of that inclusion are hampered by the use of mainstream cultural criteria in curriculum and assessment that is likely to be at odds with the experience of underrepresented students, especially if the students must be normalized by standards established by the dominant culture as inevitable, natural, common sense. Inclusion under these conditions is not helpful to the subaltern subgroups because it subjects them repeatedly to the cultural standards that reify them as subaltern every time they participate.

Butler (1992) commented, "if the subject is constituted by power, that power does not cease at the moment the subject is constituted, for that subject is never fully constituted, but is subjected and produced time and again" (p. 13). The repetition of that subjection then becomes a negative reinforcement of self-image rather than a positive one. Thus, a well-intended statement of equity and access could become a hypocritical practice of condescension emerging from cultural constructs of the standardization of intelligence, entrance and placement tests, and curriculum that reinforces rather than disrupts the subjectivity of the non-standardized cultural group. Even well-intended federal policies created to assist subgroups can subjectify those groups by re-defining them as substandard every time a conventional standard is applied to them, perhaps most vividly realized in the unintended consequences of policies from the Bureau of Indian Affairs in a history of the miseducation of native Americans that aimed to suppress all native cultural discourse. Since the U.S. Department of Education did not exist until 1980, it cannot be held accountable for previous policies. In recent years the Department of Education

has increased its influence by making large grants to states who comply with federal guidelines, but it has been the College Board that set the standards.

The abdication of power. Education in the United States is constitutionally a local affair by the omission of any mention of it in the Constitution, thus abdicating power to the states. The omission of education in the Constitution probably made sense to the framers of that document of the time, but that omission created space for a power/knowledge relationship that the College Board was later in a position to fill. By the time the U.S. Department of Education finally became a cabinet-level agency in 1980, the College Board had filled the national void of a central educational agency. The College Board emerged from an environment that lacked federal leadership in education but also harbored longstanding and widespread suspicion of federal interference with education. The College Board, an independent non-profit company, has fulfilled a government role by being in the right place at the right time with the right products to outsource the business of education to itself. The Constitution abdicated federal power over education and so no government official or agency had to approve the gradual ascendancy of the College Board in education and, thereby, in our culture.

The websites of the U.S. Department of Education and of the 48 states participating in the Common Core Curriculum Standards shared the same “Frequently Asked Questions” section that answered “no” to every question that asked if the federal government had created the standards. It was an accurate if somewhat misleading answer that deflected attention away from the role of the College Board as the key national influence on the standards, the company’s longstanding quasi-governmental position, the standing of the AP Program as the default high school curriculum, and the College Board’s intimate connection with the U.S. Department of Education. The College Board’s website (2013) provided information that the company was a major

participant in setting the standards, reassuring educators and the public because of the prestige and authority of the College Board. There are two sets of standards relevant to this project, the College Board Standards for College Success and the College Board Standards for ELA. The College Board's website (2013) stated that 80% of the Common Core ELA standards come from the College Board's ELA standards, as explained in Chapter 2, illustrating again how the company influences national curriculum in ways that the U.S. Department of Education does not. My observation as a public high school teacher is that any ELA curriculum material with the words "College Board" on it is immediately accepted by administration and faculty as the highest authority on the subject, superior to anything a government agency could offer. At this time, the dominance, prestige, and power of the College Board make its name synonymous with quality.

The College Board and its partner ETS maintain large research departments and have the means and staff to do what the federal government could probably not do as well. There are over 200 research articles at any one time on the College Board website, and more than 200 on the ETS web site at any one time. Although the titles of some of the research reports listed on these websites suggest a conflict of interest, such as investigation and analysis of SAT or AP statistics, the federal government does not fund studies to replicate College Board research or challenge it. For example, the College Board's Advocacy and Policy Center website provided an effective example of the quasi-governmental function of the College Board in educational policy with a 37 page report that detailed the changes necessary for global education in the United States. That report on Global Education (Balistreri, Di Giacomo, Noisette, and Ptak, 2012) offered a clear perception of the centrality of science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) courses that society, and the College Board, perceive to have more practical value than ELA or social science

courses. Although the Common Core Curriculum Standards (2013) website includes several traditional skill-based ELA components and the Global Education report mentioned reading and writing as basic competency skills, it is also accurate to note that the demands of the knowledge economy have shifted the connection of higher-order cognitive skills to STEM rather than to liberal arts subjects with which these habits of thought have long been associated. Even at the local level in the high school where I teach, a calculus teacher disparaged ELA as a discipline that lacks higher-order cognitive skills by telling the students, “If [calculus] was easy, we’d call it Language Arts.”

The early College Board entrance exam essays and the first SAT, primarily a vocabulary-based IQ test, both valued the skillful use of words. However, the College Board Global Education report moves STEM subjects to the central place in education and represents a break with lines of descent from the logocentrism of the traditional tests of the early twentieth century. STEM subjects are less dependent on words and more dependent on numbers, formulae, graphs, and scientific prediction, discourse systems that challenge the tyranny of logocentric testing, which stands to lose its power in an international, globalized community where words matter less than numbers. In that case, global education and STEM subjects need no justification and can produce knowledge and power without regard to nationalism or language, thus replacing narratives with more complex numerical transactions and accounting schemes to increase profit. The analytics and algorithms of the stock market, for example, made it possible for U.S. brokers to sell bundled derivatives anywhere in the world on the strength of the math and the percentages of the potential profits rather than a historical narrative and persuasive speech. The success of this financial strategy bears a large part of the blame for the serious financial downturn that began in 2006 and could tempt a well-intentioned English teacher

to think that words in class discussions about novels and poetry might have developed a moral sensibility in the financial experts who exploited people and resources for their own benefit if it were possible to overlook the mistakes of past societies considered civilized and controlled by well-read individuals who nevertheless enacted barbarism of various kinds on other humans.

Such a move, however, would prove to be false and futile because the Matthew Arnold educational model of civilizing the working classes with literature presumed a definition of civilization tied to a patriarchal, national literature that reinforced, if at times unconsciously, the exploitation of people and resources. A judgment of their unethical conduct would also contradict the tenets of neoliberalism, in which capitalism is the highest good in a hyper-competitive global society and the urgency of world-wide competition for jobs and profit supercedes all else as a matter of national security.

Neoliberalism: Corporate power. If, however, the economics of human development rather than the economics of growth were to regain power and emphasize health, education, and political rights, as Nussbaum (2010) has argued, the focus of education would drastically change. She also argued the human development model cultivates critical thinking and freedom of mind that would be dangerous to a power structure dependent upon compliant knowledge workers who contribute to the common good, “a state of affairs where all the subjects without exception obey the laws, accomplish the tasks expected of them, practice the trade to which they are assigned, and respect the established order” (Foucault (1978/1991) p. 95). These subjects accept without question a system designed to support the model of economic growth, according to Nussbaum.

The United States has never had a pure growth-directed model of education. Some distinctive features of our system positively resist being cast in those terms. . . . From early on, leading U.S. educators connected the liberal arts to the preparation of informed,

independent, and sympathetic democratic citizens Another aspect of the U.S. educational tradition that stubbornly refuses assimilation into the growth-directed model is the characteristic emphasis on the active participation of the child in inquiry and questioning. . . . to become active, competent, and thoughtfully critical in a complex world. (pp. 17-18)

Nussbaum further presented the human development model as the economics of democracy and contrasted it to the economics of growth, which she described as the condition of “the moral imagination . . . numbed by technical mastery” (p. 21). Moral imagination and classical preparation for citizenship may appear as unaffordable luxuries in an economic crisis.

Social and economic necessity, however, share rather than separate their concerns, according to Braun, Kirsch, Sum, & Yamamoto (2007) who argued that “current skill gaps coupled with demographic trends portend diminishing human capital among the future prime-working-age populations of the United States” (p. 61), conditions that require human development in order for growth to occur. The report identified three critical forces at work:

a wide disparity in literacy and numeracy skills between the school-age population and the baby boom adults about to retire; the changes caused by globalization and technology in sources of wealth, patterns of international trade, and a shift in balance between capital and labor that have changed the labor market drastically and shifted 46% of all job growth to work requiring a college degree; the current inequalities in earnings and wealth overall among racial/ethnic subgroups that will increase if millions of adults in the U.S. cannot meet the requirements of the new economy by 2030 and become alienated from the economic mainstream. (p. 61)

Without an increase in the general level of learning skills and a decrease in existing gaps, economic opportunities will not improve for important subgroups of the population; social and political polarization will likely increase as a result. The College Board's global education report created a neoliberal link between motivations for human and economic development that seemed to suggest that social stability was at risk because of high unemployment concentrated in specific subgroups if education could not promote economic growth through employment of all demographic groups in the knowledge economy. According to Friedman (2005), "Economic growth is not merely the enabler of higher consumption; it is in many ways the wellspring from which democracy and civil society flow" (as cited in Braun, Kirsch, Sum, & Yamamoto, 2007, p. 62). This statement is a modern version of Matthew Arnold's project as national school inspector to placate the newly risen working classes of the Industrial Revolution with literature as a secular substitute for the failing Victorian religion that had formerly been effective as Marx's "opiate of the masses."

Under these conditions, the necessity of global education has become the equivalent of a harbinger of potential civil unrest, social instability, and dangerous unemployment if it is not addressed with more technical, scientific, practical education in the working population for their own benefit as well as the business owners who want to remain globally competitive. McClay (2012) summarized Tocqueville's nineteenth century analysis of the characteristics of modern democracy in the United States to depict the present era of social transition:

a strikingly middle-class society: feverishly commercial and acquisitive, obsessively practical-minded, jealously egalitarian, and restlessly mobile. Tocqueville saw many things to admire – but also much to fear. Chief among the dangers was [the citizens']

pronounced tendency toward individualism with no higher goal than the pursuit of their own material well-being. (p. 51)

Neoliberalism has used these apparently natural propensities to produce the inequities of an ever increasing economic gap between the majority of the population and an ever increasingly small minority of the wealthy by convincing the majority that global competition compels them to “embrace the concept of self-interest rightly understood” (McClay, 2012, p. 52) to promote their personal advantage. The discourse of the American dream thus becomes appropriated by the wealthy to manipulate the majority by convincing them that their own private interest is served by the public interest in preserving the economic security and power of the United States with practical, technical education that will provide workers for the global economy and thus providing jobs for more citizens and obscuring the benefit to the wealthy. The educational system then becomes complicit in serving the interests of power.

McClay (2012) also pointed out that Tocqueville recognized that education was necessary to a successful democracy and that “self-interest had replaced virtue as the chief force driving human action” (p. 52) rather than governmental or religious authorities. The discourse of the American dream promotes individualism, hard work, and opportunity through education to support the development of technical and knowledge workers in globally competitive enterprises that in turn support the success of the owners of those enterprises. “Belief in [the] conjunction,” explained McClay, “that one could do well by doing good – was exactly what was meant by the ‘right understanding’ of self-interest” (p. 52), epitomizing neoliberalism’s dangerous genius that allows those who financially benefit the most from this right understanding to regard themselves as national benefactors, whose profits result from the shrewd application of doing well by doing good for the public interest. Diski (2013) observed, “There is nothing surprising in the fact that

commerce produces material, imaginable versions of transcendence The great mystery is why people are genuinely beguiled by such transparent manipulation” (p. 99).

The concerns of business interests about rapid changes in technology and global markets have increased the urgency of their call for changes in education. The urgent tone of the College Board’s 37 page report on global education also demonstrates another example of the culture of crisis that has often driven education in the United States.

The culture of crisis. Although the College Board and the AP English courses both emerged from an elite liberal arts background and evolved into the public arena, the prestige and the power of the College Board have made it possible for the company to prosper and transition through each crisis in education, from Sputnik (1958) to *A Nation at Risk* (1983) to No Child Left Behind (2000) to more recent economic and demographic change. The new Common Core Curriculum Standards (CCCS) represent the most recent crisis because they emerged from a Governors’ Conference with its ear to the needs of business. The goal of CCCS is college and career readiness with the emphasis being on college as a practical component of career readiness and not as a separate experience. More so than AP English Literature, AP English Language fully aligns with the CCCS ELA standards and serves STEM subjects with its emphasis on nonfiction, critical reading, argumentation, and persuasive writing. For example, a news story about David Coleman, new president of the College Board and lead co-author of the Common Core ELA standards, implied composition’s relevance to the new business priorities of education:

In progressive education circles, Mr. Coleman is often criticized for his emphasis on "informational texts" over fiction, and his push for students to write fewer personal and opinion pieces. Last year, he gave a speech making that point in strong terms, asserting

that it would be rare, in the working world, for someone to say, "Johnson, I need a market analysis by Friday, but before that I need a compelling account of your childhood."

(Caldwell, 2012, para. 3)

Although Coleman (2013) has since clarified that the 70% informational texts required by the CCCS ELA standards is specifically described as being distributed over all high school subjects and not restricted to ELA class, the ELA standards are associated with nonfiction, as Coleman's remarks above suggested. Coleman has also called this approach evidence-based writing or writing from sources, thus drawing on the larger demand for evidence-based everything. The connection between AP English courses and the Common Core ELA standards is recognizable because both courses must produce evidence-based writing, and even the literary analysis is now frequently referred to as the literary argument.

A reader does not find in the U.S. Department of Education website the kind of specific, comprehensive information for national educational planning and implementation as that found at the websites of the CCCS or the College Board. For example, the thorough Global Education document uses the discourse of policy theory and analysis as well as standards and curriculum for specific content. There are many such documents on the College Board website that speak with authority and expertise to educational issues, but the majority of them have been sponsored or generated by the College Board, putting the College Board in the position of using its prestige to validate its own reports and using the reports to validate its prestige. All of the reports position, implicitly or explicitly, the College Board's products and services as potential agents of participation.

The establishment of the U.S. Department of Education in 1980 never developed into a rivalry or power struggle between the federal government and the College Board. To the contrary, they collaborated over every educational crisis.

Private and public webs of power. The College Board's emergence in 1900 from the privileged collaboration of elite colleges and its continued association with elitist programs such as AP in the 1950s enhanced its prestige. As another line of descent, the luster of the Ivy League remained with the College Board, undiminished by its utilitarian expansion to the general population after World War II or its emphasis on underserved populations today. The AP Program added to that luster by earning respect as "an incontrovertible indicator of educational excellence by educators and politicians alike" (Sadler, 2010, p. 3). The College Board has become a trusted, diligently guarded brand name. The AP Program bears similar prestige not only because of its academic reputation but also because it shares the same pedigree with the College Board: the request and leadership of two Harvard presidents (Eliot and Conant) to improve higher education in cooperation with elite colleges or prep schools in the northeast. The power in that prestige has proved valuable in terms of influence and marketability. There is probably no brand in the educational world that has greater name recognition as a highly respected authority or formidable foe.

The College Board's logo, a stylized acorn, is also ubiquitous. The acorn as a symbol of potential is appropriate. In a curious coincidence, the logo for the U.S. Department of Education is an acorn from which a great tree in full leaf has grown. Most likely accidental, the logo of a great tree grown from an acorn is nevertheless an appropriate logo to express the close relationship of the College Board (whose logo predates the logo of the USDOE) and the governmental agency, even if not intended. Rather than disrupting the College Board's power,

the establishment of the U.S. Department of Education enhanced the reputation of the College Board. Both the earlier absence of a federal Department of Education and the subsequent presence of the Department of Education contributed lines of descent that add to the legitimacy of the College Board's authority.

Because the College Board has existed since 1900 and has continued to function as a quasi-governmental agency, the U.S. Department of Education has benefitted from the preparation, experience, and structure of the College Board. The development of the College Board's policies and programs made it possible for the federal government to join forces with its ongoing operations. However, there was no attempt to replace the College Board or ETS with federal testing management or operations. There was no attempt to add federal regulations or oversight. The private organization and the federal agency continued to collaborate. In 2000, for example, the U.S. Secretary of Education, Richard Riley, and the president of the College Board, Gaston Caperton, announced a joint venture to put ten AP classes in every U.S. high school, a project that has been accompanied by millions of dollars in federal grants. The current federal Race to the Top grants require recipient states to implement the Common Core Curriculum Standards, collect test data, and tie teacher compensation to the test results. Much of the funding has been directed toward Title I high schools where substantial amounts of money have been used to implement AP courses, train AP teachers, and pay AP test fees. There has, however, not been enough effort to support student preparation prior to or during AP classes.

That joint initiative to improve access to college and prepare every U.S. student for college by implementing a program to offer at least ten AP courses in every high school began without adequate student preparation or teacher training in schools that served underserved populations. The College Board's own research (Lichten, 2010) predicted a high rate of failure

for schools with a history of low PSAT scores, but the number of AP examinations continued to increase even in schools where no students passed the exams. The College Board received criticism for not addressing the needs of students from impoverished communities with early intervention and preparation to support student readiness for AP classes. Lichen (2010) noted that many of these schools reported high rates of remediation for students who did go to college. Lichen asked,

How [can] high schools that have graduates in need of remedial college coursework . . . be expected to teach students to succeed on AP exams designed to determine if students may bypass introductory college courses? . . . Yet, despite these incongruities, the College Board (2008, 2009) moved ahead with a recruitment pitch that claimed that “AP isn’t just for top students or those headed for college. AP offers something for everyone.” (p. 234)

This recruitment pitch appeared in a College Board AP brochure. The choice of words for the brochure belonged to the discourse of marketing and sales, but it would be unfair to discount the increase in the number of underserved students who have taken AP exams since 2004. More than one million low income or culturally different students have become AP students since that time. The increase in the participation of underserved students was part of what was known as the AP surge when the number of tests taken dramatically increased in the late 1990s and first decade of the 2000s. However, the number of schools, particularly inner city schools, with dramatic failure rates (not a single student passed the exams in some schools) also increased. The College Board continued to encourage these schools to add AP courses with the help of federal funds to train teachers and pay for exams. They award a \$25,000 grant to Title 1 schools that increase their AP participation the most, and percentages of school enrollment involved in

AP courses has become part of the statistics posted for public evaluation, of the evaluation of schools for inclusion on various publications' lists of top high schools, and of school district evaluations of principals' performance. The luster of the College Board seems to be a lure difficult to refuse, and the College Board has been very effective in marketing its products, especially AP and Pre-AP in school districts eligible for large federal grants to pay for the exams.

The transformation of the AP program into “something for everyone” represented a break with the early elitist narrative of the College Board and with the AP program's reputation of excellence. As with the Lake Wobegone parody of standards that classify every child as above average, the term *excellence* becomes unstable under such conditions. A College Board report (2000) on the future of the AP program cited areas of concern in regard to the egalitarian expansion of the use of the AP program:

Using Pre-AP to track or limit access to challenging course work for some students.

Using AP in college admission and selection. AP Examination grades may be given undue weight in admission decisions, contributing to inequities in admission, especially as not all students have access to AP at their schools. Using AP as a teacher and school accountability measure, without appropriate supports or controls. Assigning all the “best” teachers to AP, leaving less-qualified teachers for the other students. Rushing to install AP courses in schools that have not prepared students and teachers for the rigor of the program. (p. 26)

However, the lack of AP success in some schools did not slow the growth of the AP machine. The AP Program earned a reputation for tackling the achievement gap between students of high and low economic status and among different racial and ethnic sub-groups. According to Sadler

(2010), equalizing educational opportunity by providing access to advanced coursework to as many high school students as possible is recognized by many as a viable route to student success. The College Board thus combined social gains with financial gains as more government money streamed into the company to pay the exam fees. No other educational program besides the AP Program had so specifically applied equity and access for minority students with such tangible and rapid results. Coleman (2012) announced significant improvements in AP expansion:

Since 2004, a million more students have taken AP. A more diverse student body than ever. What was seen as an elite program has broken through and reached a million more students. And what happened is NOT what you would expect when a program expands to a more diverse, larger body of students. The results are in and the news is that performance improved. That is, a million more students took the AP exams since 2004 – the most diverse group of students ever, and scores are higher. Why does that matter? Why, because if this country is to be great, *we must increase diversity and improve performance*. We need to do both. At the center of the College Board, at the center of America, is the idea that we can have both equity and excellence. (para. 2)

Coleman's remarks illustrated the circulating streams of knowledge and power that support the luster and dominance of the College Board, its central position in the nation, and its role as the beating heart of academic meritocracy – a meritocracy now democratized into equity and excellence for the many rather than the few. This version of meritocracy is a disruption of past versions, suggesting that previous attitudes and studies about the influence of socioeconomic status on test scores are flawed.

In 2012, for the first time the number of AP exams taken exceeded the number of SAT exams. The rapid growth, influence, and apparent success of the AP Program, transformed from

an elitist program for exclusive private prep schools to an agent of social justice, attracted the attention of a new force in education, megarich philanthropists with so much money to dispense that no one could afford to ignore them. One of the earliest projects of the Gates Foundation, for example, was to start College Board High Schools, small schools in New York based on AP courses, which are still part of the effort to reform education.

This analysis described the production of some of the lines of descent and discontinuities of the College Board's power. Breaks and discontinuities kept the pieces of the problem moving with the fractures that appeared in the discourses of the American dream found in the instabilities of the constructs of meritocracy, intelligence, and standardized testing. The competition of two cousins, Darwin and Galton, for scientific prestige, the invention of multiple choice testing, eugenicist assumptions about intelligence, historical accidents such as the wartime use of IQ tests to sort men, the surprising intervention of Harvard presidents to recruit atypical students for scholarships, inventions such as the scoring machine, the unintended consequences of a large increase in college enrollment after veterans used the GI bill after the war, and the abdication of power by the federal government challenged the idea of the monolithic inevitability of the College Board and standardized testing. The lack of a U.S. Department of Education until 1980 is an interesting vacuum of power that the College Board had ably filled for 80 years, giving it plenty of time to construct its own network of power. The growing influence of neoliberalism also contributed over time to changes in education and the College Board that allowed business practices of efficiency and maximum profit to become central to national concerns and to destabilize the old aristocratic notions of education.

The next section will offer a similar analysis of the two AP English courses and by extension secondary ELA, subjects with features so aligned to the College Board's history that

the continued analysis will provide clarifying examples of the network of power/knowledge that has made any other arrangement seem impossible.

Part 2: Discontinuities and Disruptions in AP English Courses

This section examines the persistent and complex influence of privilege and power that moves in a circuit of discursive regimes to produce a system of statements as curriculum. The two AP English courses are appropriate venues for this analysis because their history reflects the history of the College Board, the history of English as a discipline, and the impact by extension that the College Board has had on secondary ELA. The three subsections address my statement of the problem and research questions presented in Chapter 1.

Questioning the power to define what counts as knowledge is the first step in examining how the College Board shaped AP English courses and their subsequent influence in the high school classroom. This discussion begins with a brief explanation of how the study of English gained legitimacy and became part of the standard curriculum. Since the beginning of the AP program in the 1950s, for example, the AP English Literature course has been synonymous with the twelfth grade ELA curriculum of “British Literature” during the long reign of British Literature at the top of the hierarchy of the high school ELA grade level studies, the teaching assignment generally coveted by high school teachers. American Literature occupied a secondary position as the traditional eleventh grade course. Until the addition of AP English Language in the 1980s, there was no challenge to this situation. That discussion will be followed by a detailed explanation of the difference between the two AP English courses.

The second part of the discussion is an analysis of how the power relationships among culture, technology, and the College Board contributed to connections and tensions that shaped the two AP English courses. After AP English Literature became a paralyzing influence on

secondary ELA, the addition of AP English Language eventually raised many questions about the incongruity between the AP English Literature course and what was actually being taught in introductory English courses at the university level, as suggested by a survey done by the College Board, Tate (1993), and others. Beginning in the 1970s, the scarcity of college English teaching jobs for new Ph.Ds in combination with fluctuating student enrollment coincided with the conflict of interest and division of labor that separated the high-status professors of literature from the low-status instructors of composition, according to Graff (1987), Miller (1991), Scholes (1998), and others. The emergence of this conflict eventually produced the AP English Language exam in 1980 as composition instructors worked to establish the academic weight of Composition as being comparable in prestige and significance to Literature and eventually resulting in tenure-track Composition teaching jobs (which had not existed previously). This subsection will discuss this schism in college English departments that is reflected in the differences in the two English courses.

The third step is to analyze how the discontinuities within the discourse of the two AP English courses function within a positivist regime of truth about standardized testing and make the subject open to critique. The purpose of the critique will also be discussed.

The AP program began in 1956 with just one AP English course: AP Literature and Composition. In 1980 AP Language and Composition was added. The intervening years between the advent of the first course and the addition of the second offer insight into the tensions and transitions of the College Board's role in society.

A brief history of English as a school subject. I should first acknowledge that thorough, interesting books have been written on the emergence of English as a discipline, including books by Applebee (1974), Graff (1987), Miller (1991), Willinsky (1991), Ohmann

(1996), and Scholes (1998). I am aware that my study provides no new information of this kind. However, the way in which I have organized this information may contribute new connections or insight. Today the presence of English as a school subject seems inevitable, normal, common sense, but it is a relatively new phenomenon when compared to some other school subjects such as history or science. The historical and political brew from which English as a school subject emerged is full of cultural artifacts that are an important part of the discourse that surrounds the ELA classroom. This discourse would perhaps be a sidenote if the discursive elements had not persisted through the years and if they did not continue to exert influence over the shape of the curriculum and the use of testing in the schools. As the schools undergo a major multicultural shift in demographics, the cultural brew of today has become an even more potent mixture that is not compatible with traditional curriculum or assessment.

English as a discipline emerged from the nineteenth century in a time of social unrest and change. The nineteenth century's Arnoldian concept of British literature as a didactic discipline (e.g., Graff, 1987; Willinsky, 1991; Readings, 1996; Scholes, 1998) to improve the working class was similar to curriculum development in the United States. Applebee (1974) placed 1890 as the beginning of institutionalized English studies in the United States. He recounted a history of the teaching of English in this country as ethical, classical, and nonacademic education traditions, identified by the puritanical readers and spellers, the classical pedagogy of rhetoric to exercise mental facilities, and public social institutions encouraged by an active print culture. Moral instruction provided basic literacy, and early vernacular schools often emphasized correct spelling as the indicator of proper literacy, suggesting that correct spelling had more to do with propriety than literacy.

The three strands of ethical, classical, and nonacademic traditions that emerged from the puritanical, classical, and social conditions at the beginning of this country began to lose importance after Harvard established a composition entrance exam in 1874, the results of which established composition itself as a remedial subject and exclusionary agent to control the democratization of education by requiring that students know how to write with propriety (e.g., Applebee, 1974; Fuess, 1967; Graff, 1987; Johaneck, 2001; Marland, 1975; Miller, 1993; Murphy, 2001; Scholes, 1998). *Propriety*, however, was a problematized term dependent upon social class. According to these narratives, composition entrance exams became agents of hierarchy because of their ability to sort lower-class from upper-class students who had already acquired grammatical and class propriety and did not need remediation before serious analytical work. The presence of the AP English Language exam suggests that college composition instructors eventually overcame this hierarchal bias against composition.

According to Lacy (2010), colleges began in the late nineteenth century to use introductory English classes as weeder courses to separate the unqualified and unpolished from the elite, whose socioeconomic advantages qualified and polished them before they arrived on campus. The formation of the College Board in 1900 for the purpose of establishing limited agreement on admissions standards further solidified this practice, which continued through the 1950s. The AP English course that Harvard first requested in the 50s used this elitist template of freshman English as it was at the time as a tool of exclusion.

As Graff (1987) emphasized, “The college spoke for the ruling class, [but] it was a ruling class that felt curiously displaced from the rising sources of power of influence” (p. 21). Donald (1992) recounted the effect of a Harvard English professor’s adamant refusal to teach composition courses. The professor’s insistence on teaching only literature courses and refusing

to teach composition courses established a precedent that has endured for 150 years: the presumption that literature study is advanced and composition remedial. The acrimonious division between composition and literature teachers in college English departments began at this point and extended into the practice and content of the two AP English courses.

As explained by Miller (1993), “nationalistic, abstract ideals of literary study soon dominated as both the goal of and the justification for writing instruction” instead of an “instrumental view of literature to teach grammar and syntax” (p. 31). Applebee (1974) quoted a teacher’s summary of the political ideology of literature:

The first great aim of the literature course is a training for citizenship by a study of our national ideals embodied in the writings of American authors, our race ideals are set forth by the great writers of Anglo-Saxon origin, our universal ideals as we find them in any great work of literary art. (p. 68)

As explained by Willinsky (1991), literature had been the holy relic at the altar of Arnold’s cathedral of culture, built with nineteenth century educational models connected to “a loss of religious faith and the disquieting social dislocations brought on by the triumph of industrial capitalism” (pp. 65-66). Donald (1992) described Arnold’s appropriation of literature as “elitist social engineering” (p. 18), using language and literature as the “social cement” (p. 53) of cultural authority.

As recounted by Scholes (1998), Arnold, with many others of his century, believed that literature could have a civilizing effect on a less religious, lower class population who had gained access to education and democracy with the rise of industrialism. As a vehicle of imperialism as discussed by Donald (1992) and others (e.g., Graff, 1987; Readings, 2006; Scholes, 1998), a civilizing, shared literature was also useful to the state to inculcate nationalism through literature

in which citizens took pride and developed a national identity. Having named the goal of education as cultural unity, Miller (1993) described “the intense and repressive nationalism that was necessarily promoted to accomplish British colonizations” (p. 25) that required both politics and language to make English the “institutionalized masculine locus of nationalistic power” (p. 26). In contrast, Reddings (1996) observed, “The current growth of a separatist movement in composition, concerned to demand its own distinct, disciplinary dignity, is symptomatic of the loosening of the link that ties the study of national literature to the formation of a national subject” (p. 16). First year writing courses, and AP English Language, are not dependent on any one body of literature. Georgia Tech (2012) offers, for example, a first year writing course that uses “zombie literature” as well as one that uses “medical ethics.”

The cultural unity of Arnold’s version of education served the purposes of empire, but the modern world has no use for one dominant culture or empire. Greek and Latin had been important for centuries in elite private boys’ academies, but the substitution of the study of English for classical studies forced a trade of one kind of cultural imperialism for another. The persistence of Western cultural hegemony is an awkward anachronism in a pluralistic world.

Overview of the two AP English courses. A general description of the AP program, its format, and cost of the exams are available in Chapter 2 of this report. For convenience, a brief summary of the tasks faced by students for the AP English course exams is provided in this section. The College Board (2012) web site provided an overall description of the AP English exams as follows:

. . . a three-hour examination that gives students the opportunity to demonstrate their mastery of the skills and abilities previously described [in the course guide]. The AP Examination employs multiple choice questions that test the student’s critical reading of

selected passages (one hour). But the examination also requires writing as a direct measure of the student's ability to interpret literature and to use other forms of discourse effectively. The AP Examination's essay section requires students to write three essays in response to three different writing prompts at one sitting after reading a poem and several reading passages during a time period of 120 minutes.

Students can earn college credit as well as high school credit if their exam scores are high enough. Each college and university determines the minimum AP exam score necessary to earn credit toward graduation.

The following sections describe how the two AP English courses emerged from different motivations of the College Board at different times, how the history of the College Board and the history of English as a discipline shaped AP English courses and their subsequent influence on high school ELA curriculum, how connections and tensions between the design of the two AP English courses reflect changes in culture and technology that destabilize the study and status of English, and how discontinuities within the discourse of the two AP courses further destabilize the regime of truth about standardized testing.

The AP English examinations. The College Board offers AP exams in over 30 subject areas, two of which are AP English Literature (first offered in 1957) and AP English Language (first offered in 1980). By the time that the College Board developed the second AP English course, the company had already established a precedent for two AP courses in the same language because it offered two AP Spanish courses (AP Spanish Literature and AP Spanish Language). The two AP Spanish courses have clearly defined differences in their separate College Board Course Guides (2010), but the two AP English courses do *not* have separate course guides or clear distinctions, even though the single course guide has separate sections for

each course. The AP English course guide acknowledged the great variety of combinations of content of Freshman English courses as the reason for the lack of clarity. The College Board description also does not mention the tensions within college English departments that caused the confusion and ambiguity of descriptions of what college English was, is, and might be. For purposes of clarity, I will refer to the two courses as AP Literature and AP Language.

Emergence of two AP English courses. The historical and philosophical conflict between two cultures as described by Snow (1959) in an earlier chapter later became the symbolic equivalent of the literal tensions in the politics and pedagogy of college English departments. Although the stage had been set by colleges during the nineteenth century for the privileging of literature over composition courses, the situation gradually became so natural, inevitable, and taken-for-granted that no one raised many questions about it until the 1970s and 1980s when college teaching positions for English Ph.Ds began to decline. As discussed in Chapter 2, this decline also coincided with the decline of AP exams taken during the same time period and with a survey taken to determine what was being taught in freshman English classes, and the decision of the College Board to begin an additional AP course to increase the number of exams taken as well as to offer a course that more closely reflected what was being studied in freshman English classes.

The design of the new course, AP English Language, focused on rhetoric and composition (D. Waters, personal communication, June 22, 2009) and aligned itself with argumentation, incorporating the classical Greek precedent that had existed in college education prior to 1920 as well as contemporary rhetorical discourse such as advertising. The irony of renewing classic rhetoric, after its Greek parent had been marginalized in the college curriculum, is that its heritage gives the course an older, even more established tradition than that of AP

Literature, which suddenly seemed like a pretender to the tradition of Literature according to Joseph (2002).

The new course fulfilled many purposes, but it also materialized the two cultures that Snow (1959) delineated earlier. The AP Language course belonged to the culture of science and argumentation. The AP Literature course belonged to the culture of literature, anthropology, history, and analysis. Snow's two cultures contrast strongly in these two AP courses and reflect what has been happening to the secondary ELA curriculum ever since, culminating in the academic extravaganza of the new Common Core standards for ELA in schools, a curriculum that emphasizes informational texts for career and college readiness. In addition, technology and culture now interact in ways that cause them to change each other and people, changes that are part of the AP Language exam and curriculum but not of the AP Literature exam and culture because the AP Literature exam limits students to responses to the print culture of Literature and excludes their personal experience. The traditional study of English is problematic in the face of rapid cultural and technological change that is challenging the very notion of what counts as knowledge. The traditional study of English is also problematic if one considers the current relentless move toward Taylorism that endorses the utmost efficiency and practicality for purposes of global competition, social stability, and prosperity. AP English Literature is showing its age; its polite 1950s pedigree does not fair well in a time of practicality and multiculturalism.

The tensions between the two AP English courses are also part of the long term tensions that exist in college English departments between composition and literature. Miller (1993) explained how Harvard set a precedent in 1879 by using both literature *and* composition as a "test of worthiness" (p. 51) of ability and character, paving the way for freshman English courses

to serve as that screening test. Vernacular literature and composition replaced the classics because they were considered “utilitarian” (p. 51) for national politics and culture. Qualified students could skip the composition course, but those who did not pass the composition test had to take composition as remediation of language *and* culture, suggesting an incorrect verb or lack of knowledge about refined taste was the equivalent of bad manners and lower class that could make an individual unfit for college. Thus, “high” literature courses in college were advanced, and “low” composition courses were elementary, another factor that set the stage for future departmental politics and the existence later of two AP English courses. College composition served literature by indoctrinating “low” students with the proper language and refinement of taste. This division persists to some extent today with first year writing courses using texts that may not be texts at all or texts that may be popular rather than literary selections or may include films and other media of any kind.

The overlapping names shared by the two AP English courses reveal tensions of identity, purpose, and politics that reflect changes in attitude toward the study of English since the 1980s. The time frame from the first AP English course in the 1950s to the second one developed in the 1980s corresponded with Lyotard’s 1984 description of when “the status of knowledge [altered] as societies enter . . . the postindustrial age and cultures enter . . . the postmodern age” (p. 3). These cultural changes happened at the right time to influence the content of AP Language more than AP Literature because the most important changes had taken place in the students and the culture in which they lived. The high school curriculum, and the new Common Core ELA standards, follow the model of AP Language more than they do AP Literature so the College Board’s website (2012) claim that 80% of the ELA Common Core standards come from College

Board ELA standards, these commonalities are best found in AP English Language standards and not in AP Literature.

The addition of the new AP English course further destabilized the traditional curriculum by making the new curriculum official. According to Miller's (1993) discussion of college English department politics, the College Board's survey results were also indicative of the divisiveness and tension between the composition teachers and the English literature faculty. Miller's analysis of the rise of composition in the 1980s with its personal, political, and rhetorical emphasis parallels the curriculum of the AP Language course. On the other hand, the older AP Literature course, which initially replicated the curriculum of traditional Western, primarily British, literature, began to include more world literature and to emphasize ethnic and female writers during the 1990s in an effort to update content. The College Board also relaxed its decades-old ban on works in translation, allowing the translated works of Nobel Prize winners such as Gabriel Garcia Marquez to be used in AP English classes. Kitzhaber (1963) described the first semester of college writing courses as confused in their goals and the second semester freshman course as either unrelated or too similar to the first. He also judged both semesters as lacking rigor and scholarship. His critique of the uncertainty and ambivalence of freshman English college courses could explain the confusion and ambiguity of the College Board's AP English course descriptions.

Both AP English course guides use some of the language of the process model, but both AP exams ignore it because the three exam essays require quick analysis and execution under strict time constraints. Both exams are text-driven. The following description by Rice (2006) of college English also represents a good description of the much broader scope and relevance of the AP Language course and exam:

College English should be the intersection of the various areas of discourse that shape thought and produce knowledge. It should be the study of the mixing and remixing of connections: those connections that move from popular culture to the university, from geography to politics, from literature to film, from theory to theory, from celebrity to noncelebrity, from city to classroom, from the Web into our daily lives, from writing to writing. . . . What should college English be? The network. (p. 133).

Brantlinger (1998) argued that powerful cultural, institutional, and economic forces beyond the control of the English department have caused the field to move away from traditional subjects and toward contemporary culture, but he also discussed the lack of practical or theoretical consensus within the discipline itself in understanding the contemporary role of English studies in the culture. Scholes (1998) appeared to agree with Brantlinger that “the fall of English is the product of changes in the modern world,” (13) as well as the field itself. Boyd (2006) was less kind to the ambiguous condition of English studies:

English and related disciplines will continue to be laughingstock of the academic world that they have been for years because of their obscurantist dogmatism and their coddled and preening pseudo-radicalism. Until they listen to searching criticism of their doctrine, rather than dismissing it as the language of the devil, literature will continue to be betrayed in academe, and academic literary departments will continue to lose students and to isolate themselves from the intellectual advances of our time. (19)

Boyd recognized that the turn to theory in college English departments had not helped the discipline gain credence with the efficiency experts of the world. Professors of literature, for example, constructed layers of complexity and theory between literature and the general public that made it impossible for outsiders to see any relevance or utility in the work of college

professors or the study of literature. In addition, the original college emphasis for freshman composition prior to 1980 asked non-English major students to write with the difficult template of standards established by canonical authors in the literature course. AP Literature also used that template, which in effect requires the professional work of literary analysis from inexperienced students for whom the work is difficult, alien, and impractical because of its limited applicability to their current or future lives. Academic work is not the only work that has value; academic work is not suitable for all people.

On the other hand, the AP Language course emphasizes nonfiction, the writing process, new media, rhetoric, popular culture, argument, and documentation, according to the course description. The content of AP Language is similar to the rhetoric, nonfiction, and media emphasis of modern Freshman English 101, now referred to as First Year Writing (in order to remove the *Freshman* nomenclature). AP Literature is more comparable to Freshman English 102 when it is taught with an emphasis on imaginative fiction, poetry, and drama. AP Language (and thus First Year Writing) avoids the requirements to have inexperienced college freshmen and high school seniors write literary analysis, an incongruous act in an educational environment oriented to business and careers that have little to do with literature.

Thus, AP Language and AP Literature have two separate national AP examinations. The exams share the same format of one hour of close reading and multiple choice questions followed by two hours of essays, although the AP Language exam adds 15 more minutes to the allotted essay time. The two courses share one official College Board course guide that contains a description of each course. However, an examination of the language, suggested reading, and composition objectives reveals that there is great overlap in the descriptions and suggested content.

AP English Literature. AP English Literature, the older course, focuses more on literary fiction, poetry, and drama. AP Literature tends to correspond to the second semester of freshman English on campuses where composition is emphasized first semester and literature the second. Although The College Board (2009) has no required reading list and encourages reading beyond the canon, their description of suitable reading for AP Literature as “works of recognized literary merit” (p. 52) differs from reading lists in most college freshman English classes. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (2010), for example, offered a wide range of primarily nonfiction theme-oriented or interdisciplinary reading choices for its freshman writing courses. Although the College Board’s course description encourages thematic organization of the course, it also informs the teacher that the subject matter includes literature from the Renaissance to the present, obligating the teacher to address about five hundred years of literature. Shakespeare frequently appears on the exam as does John Donne, William Blake, William Wordsworth, and Emily Dickinson. Additionally, Philip Larkin, Sylvia Plath, Rita Dove, Seamus Heaney, Mary Oliver, and other contemporary poets make appearances on the exam. Teachers also have to contend with long passages from eighteenth and nineteenth century works such as *Tom Jones*, *Middlemarch*, *Tess of the d’Urbervilles*, *Lady Windemere’s Fan*, and the occasional twentieth century novel or short story. Passages from Austen, Dickens, and Conrad have also been on the exam, making it nigh unto impossible for the teacher to skip any time period. In the last few years, Latino and little known urban American works have become part of the exam, adding greater diversity to the curriculum and complicating the issue of how to find enough time to visit and re-visit all the possible literature that might be on the exam in a particular year.

Since the AP Literature course description (College Board, 2013) advises using works of recognized literary merit and taking Thoreau’s advice “to read the best books first” (p. 49), AP

Literature courses tend to use more traditional, literary works. The College Board (2013) is clear about expanding the canon to include representative works from all cultures and genders but does not suggest abandoning the canon. The list of 165 suggested authors, however, has few surprises, although its most recent edition includes 15 names not found in every anthology and juxtaposed next to authors from the classic or contemporary canon. Examples include Bharati Mukherjee (between Toni Morrison and Vladimir Nabokov); Edwidge Danticat (between Joseph Conrad and Daniel Defoe); Kazuo Ishiguro (between Zora Neale Hurston and Henry James), Gloria Anzaldua (between Joseph Addison and Matthew Arnold), and Edward Said (between Richard Rodriguez and Lewis Thomas). The course guide includes one and a third pages of suggested authors of “recognized literary merit” (p. 30) categorized by genre (poetry, drama, fiction, and expository prose) but not specific titles. The College Board recently added a new sentence that cautions “that fair representation of issues and peoples may occasionally include controversial material” (p. 50), but the course description has changed little since it was first written in the 1950s.

AP English Language. AP Language is a rhetoric-based course, and its exam questions often ask students to analyze speeches, letters, legislative documents, advertisements, memoir, editorials, political cartoons, or even graphs and charts. The emphasis is on non-fiction, although some novels and plays are read. The multiple choice questions on the exam test skills in the analysis of rhetorical purpose and connotation in prose passages.

AP Language is a more user-friendly course (in contrast to AP Literature’s largely canonical literature) and could possibly be marketed to schools as better suited for nontraditional AP high school audiences experienced with advertisements, digital environments, and social networking. AP Language students, for example, read more nonfiction and nonliterary content,

including images and graphs, than AP Literature students. AP Language emphasizes advertising, persuasion, and argument, a more instrumental approach to the study of English than AP Literature. AP Language has even been nicknamed “AP Journalism.” The College Board’s course guide (2010) also cites the course name given by McPhee of Princeton University to his course in nonfiction writing: “the literature of fact” (Littman, 2005) and Atwan’s description of nonfiction writing as “creative nonfiction,” “prose,” “literary non-fiction”, or “essays and hybrid forms” (p.10).

AP Language teachers are encouraged to have their students read in centuries other than the twenty-first, but their choices do not have to be literary and could, for example, include *The DaVinci Code* or *The Earth is Flat* as easily as *Macbeth*. The suggested list of authors for AP Language includes only two categories, Pre-20th Century and 20th Century to the Present. Many of the suggested authors appear on both AP Literature and AP Language lists, but the AP Language list is notable for the use of nonfiction and its interdisciplinary range. Unlike AP Literature, the AP Language list includes authors from diverse disciplines and careers such as film critic Pauline Kael, philosophers Hannah Arendt and Susan Sontag, media expert Sven Birkerts, historian Shelby Foote, poet Adrienne Rich, anthropologist Loren Eiseley, feminist Mary Wollstonecraft, cancer research scientist Lewis Thomas, novelist Anzia Yezierska, and those with more than one identity such as Martin Luther King, Jr., Barack Obama, Christopher Hitchens, and Cornel West.

Comparison: AP Literature and AP Language. High schools typically offer two different classes to prepare students for each of the two AP examinations. Many schools offer AP Language as an eleventh grade course in conjunction with the traditional American Literature curriculum. AP Literature is more often taught as a twelfth grade course that goes beyond the

typical British Literature course of the senior year by including world and American literature. A few schools, including my own, offer both AP Literature and AP Language to twelfth graders instead of splitting the courses between eleventh and twelfth grade. It is useful to note that both courses emphasize close reading. The College Board's advice to students about choosing one or the other is limited: 1. AP Language students should be interested in writing about nonliterary topics; 2. AP Literature students should be interested in studying literature. (*College Board, 2012*)

Having taught the latter for thirty years and worked closely with teachers of the former, I know that students struggle with the choice and that the overlap of the two courses, including reading selections, is considerable. The two AP English courses are not binaries of each other. Their skill sets overlap, and local curricular requirements frequently mandate similar reading selections. For example, both AP Literature and AP Language classes often read *Heart of Darkness*. AP Language teachers are sometimes just as reluctant as AP Literature teachers to stray too far from traditional literature because of local mandates, although AP Language by design may use any kind of text, including media, images, and the student's personal experience.

The creation of the AP Language course in 1980 was also part of the College Board's business strategy for increasing the number of exams taken after a drop in AP participation in the 1970s. According to Lacy (2010), the addition of new subject exams in the 80s successfully reversed the decline in the number of AP exams taken. The College Board has continued to add subject exams to increase revenue and to respond to the demand from government and business for increased accountability and performativity from the schools.

The convenient timing in the 1980s of the shift toward composition-based first-year college English courses rather than literature-based courses caused AP Literature to lack

alignment with nine out of ten freshman English courses in the United States, as described by Tate (1983). The perception of this shift caused the College Board to commission its own survey to determine what was being taught in freshman English, providing a good reason to develop a second English course. The College Board, however, did not discontinue AP Literature because it generated a large number of tests taken and provided significant revenue. As one of the first AP tests developed in 1956, AP Literature represented the College Board's long association with the most prestigious prep schools, colleges, and universities in its elite past. When the College Board added the second AP English course, it had not yet recognized the potential for market growth that could be gained by inclusion rather than exclusion. It had not yet heard the call for increased rigor that would come with No Child Left Behind and Closing the Achievement Gap. It understood, however, the profitability of keeping schools already on board with AP Literature examinations and expanding the number of tests taken by offering a second course that many schools would adopt as an eleventh grade course in addition to the twelfth grade AP Literature course. Now that the number of AP Language tests has eclipsed the number of AP Literature tests for the first time (College Board, 2012), the ascendancy of AP Language is clear.

Summary

Although the College Board designated AP English Literature as the exam to prove that a high school student had mastered the most difficult content in the ELA secondary curriculum, it became the representative of the top of the hierarchy of high school coursework, especially since it was usually associated with British Literature, which had been privileged over American Literature for many years. The study of *literature*, as it was done in college, was the model, but literary analysis frequently deteriorated into questions of morality or propriety that required conformity. Literature was further privileged by the schism at the university level between the

study of literature and the study of composition, giving the professors of literature prestige and reducing the instructors of composition to a second-class membership in the rank of teachers, especially after English departments and the number of English majors began to decline in the 1970s, a decline which has only increased with the years and made literature positions extremely difficult to find. As more English PhDs had to settle for composition instruction jobs, the level of scholarship regarding composition began to change, and people began to lobby for tenure track positions in composition. Gradually “composition” became its own field at some of the most prestigious colleges.

Soliciting the College Board to create a separate exam for “Language and Composition” was another step in adding prestige and equality for composition in 1980. Changes in demographics in the public schools made AP Language a less intimidating course because many of the selections were more contemporary and nonfiction, selections less likely to ask for the “meaning” and more likely to ask for strategies of argumentation and rhetoric. AP Language represents a turn away from the elitist past of the College Board, with which AP Literature is associated, and a turn toward more inclusive and accessible reading and writing. This change also accompanied the rising diversity of students in the classroom, which AP Language can better accommodate because its curriculum does not have the burden of 500 years of literature.

The addition of AP Language in 1980 also responded to the decline of revenue experienced by the College Board in the 1970s. Several additional subjects were added. By the 1990s the College Board had hired its first non-educator as president, Gaston Caperton, who implemented a business model of Taylorist efficiency with a neoliberal ethic that saw the revenue stream of this non-profit organization reach over nine million dollars by 2011. Caperton also oversaw the establishment of exam goals to secure financial security and a neoliberal

conscience for the company by combining the increased number of exams taken with increased access for underserved student populations and large federal grants to pay for the exams. AP Language played a key role in the immediate increase in exams for underserved populations because it was not only a course that did not require a student to be familiar with eighteenth century prose or Victorian poetry, for example, but also did not require the extensive pre-requisite courses that calculus or physics required. Acting as a joint venture in 2000, Caperton and the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Education agreed to work toward placing 10 AP courses in every high school as one of the initiatives of No Child Left Behind.

The national recession and the growing emphasis on global competition perhaps hastened the Governors' Conference that commissioned the new Common Core Standards Curriculum with its emphasis on college and career readiness. The alignment of 80% of the CCSC ELA standards with AP English courses, especially AP Language and its emphasis on non-fiction, insured the growth of AP Language courses, although the author of those standards, David Coleman, later clarified that the CCSC never eliminated literature and in fact suggested that Shakespeare be taught in the eleventh and twelfth grades. Nevertheless, AP Language experienced significant growth after 48 states adopted the CCSC. The evidence-based writing that the CCSC stressed has always been the format of AP Literature and AP Language composition. AP Language composition appears to be more accessible for more students because understanding the three appeals (ethos, pathos, logos) of rhetoric, sorting the fallacies of logic, and identifying methods of propaganda can have less cultural baggage with well-selected choices of reading, including non-fiction, than the literature and poetry of the other course. The CCCS have made all grade levels (K-12) more aware of using nonfiction in the Language Arts classroom and required it specifically in K-8.

David Coleman's appointment as president of the College Board also signals the direct connection between the College Board, AP English, and the CCCS. His previous experience as founder-director of ACHIEVE also positions him to continue his work with organizations, including the extremely large College Board/ETS organization, to improve underserved teacher and student training for the SAT and AP exams and to expand other College Board programs that facilitate college and career readiness for middle school students. Annual reports suggest that the College Board/ETS entity is on solid financial ground after years of expert business management by Caperton. Coleman's role appears to be more directed toward preparation and equity for an increasingly diverse student population. He has already called for a more "user-friendly SAT" that is less dependent on vocabulary. AP courses are also being revised to a program of study that is deeper and less broad in focus.

A Regime of Truth

The tension and discontinuities within the discipline of English belong to a postmodern sensibility of doubt and discontent that questions everything, including questions about curriculum traditions and cultural change. A traditional curriculum, for example, becomes a standardized version of culture that seems inappropriate for the multi-cultural world. A traditional curriculum that excludes media seems alien to students. A major standardized test such as the AP exam with content reflecting a patriarchal, repressive culture creates double jeopardy for the continuation of any regime of imagined truth because its perpetuation threatens its existence. That standardized testing is the format for evaluating the two AP English courses further undermines the regime of truth that supports this process because the multiple choice section and the essays require a privileged, ethnocentric orientation to reading and logic as well as similarly oriented historical and literary allusions. According to Scholes (2011), "The fall of

English came about because of the alluring but ultimately fatal choice of literature as the central object of the English curriculum. . . . This field cannot regain what it has lost” (p. xiii). Scholes also noted that the

modernist privileging of difficulty as a sign of value has faded. And excellent work in other media clamors for attention. The cultural dominance of the newer media is not simply a matter of celebrity. It is a matter of what people attend to in their moments of leisure. (p. xvii)

Society has already reached the tipping point, a point of no return from technology and the rapid change that it brings. Crowley (2013) explained, “the sense that the future will not at all resemble the past really only comes when advancing technology changes the conditions of life and work within a single generation” (p. 21). That is one of the enabling conditions that has brought us to this point in time that raises questions about the status quo. The high school seniors in my classes have never known a world without cell phones, which now have the capacity to do almost everything that average personal computers could do two years ago and more. The authoritative grand discourses of humanistic discourse cannot withstand the flood of change in technology and demographics. The regime of truth of the past is no longer historically possible. When that regime of truth lives within oppressive narratives of androcentric literature or error-clouded intelligence tests and embeds itself in an educational apparatus such as curriculum or meritocracy, its hypocrisy supports an intolerable false consciousness of who and what we are. Carr (2010), Birkerts (1994), and others have anticipated the changes that technology has brought to the process of reading, as described by McClay (2011):

The Internet’s steady and exclusive use tends to habituate its users – meaning all of us –

to think in increasingly undisciplined and fragmentary ways, that it tends to dull our capacity for sustained and penetrating attentiveness and inhibit our ability to detect larger patterns of meaning. The ‘linear mind’ fostered by the literary culture of books, Carr argues, is being ‘pushed aside by a new kind of mind that wants and needs to take in and dole out information in short, disjointed, often overlapping bursts – the faster, the better.’ If we are not careful, this ‘new kind of mind’ will change for the worse the way we read, the way we write, and the way we think. (p. 53)

As much as Carr’s and Birkerts’s books were important in advancing my own thought for this study, I have to question this assertion. *Linear* can be just another name for a regime of Apollonian rationality that excludes the undisciplined and fragmentary ways of Dionysus. It may be that the autistic mind or the mind of animals have their own valid regime of truth that the linear mind has excluded. Temple Grandin (2013) explained that when she solves problems she does not think in words at all, only in images. How many other people have endured their education as a process of a book culture that was misaligned with their physical or cultural experience of the world? The literary culture, for example, privileges logocentrism and does not fully understand or honor oral cultures. A mind that prefers “the faster the better” is well-suited for the efficiency principles of Taylorism and all that it implies. “This new kind of mind” may change us for the better, not the worse, for the new matrix of media and experience that technology is quickly facilitating.

The College Board has its own regime of truth but one that still interacts with hierarchy, privilege, neoliberalism, and standardized testing. Again proving its agility in adapting to conditions, the College Board/ETS entity has already created Henry Chaucey, Inc., its for-profit company named for the first president of ETS, that produces certification tests and

documentation for industry and business. McClay (2012) explained that higher education itself is in jeopardy because of its incredibly high cost and new models of online delivery. He observed that “radical institutional innovation, along with much greater use of technology” (p. 53) in combination with “online learning, skills-based training, outside of traditional undergraduate degree programs, and tech-enabled community outreach through local colleges and community colleges” (p. 53) will eventually form new models for higher education. The Henry Chauncey Institute will be available to take payment for processing those certifications. Personally I had lived under a regime of truth of what constituted an educated person. In the future even the idea of a bachelor’s, master’s, or doctorate degree may have little if any meaning. They are, after all, designations that have survived from a past in which women were not allowed to go to university. The anachronism of graduation garb represents a past that is more than simply hundreds of years old. Despite my personal affinity for ritual, the speed of change may not allow time for the new to absorb the old in appropriate ways.

In Chapter 6, I will discuss the professional and personal implications of this study in connection to the culture, technology, and curriculum.

Chapter 6

Implications

Reconnections

The beginning of this study was preceded by an identity crisis precipitated by a professional deconstruction that became personal as well. Idealism and rationality no longer seemed adequate for the business of a life that had gradually come to lack natural, inevitable order. So I started the study with one general question: How did this happen? .

My study eventually provided some ways to answer that one question through my research questions:

1. How has a shaped AP English courses and their influence on high school English curriculum?
2. How do connections/tensions between the design of the two AP English courses reflect changes in culture and technology that destabilize the study and status of English?
3. How do the discontinuities within the discourse of AP English courses function within a positivist regime of truth about standardized testing that make the subject open to critique?

These research questions led me to seeking, instead, partial answers that require elaboration because Foucault's genealogy refuses absolutes, seeking incomplete and counterdiscursive histories. My goal was not alternative histories but a deconstructed, contingent history that opened up the processes and operations that made possible the conditions of the present. This chapter summarizes, restates, and extends the study by offering additional examples of how I have answered the research questions. The answers often seemed self-evident after patterns of

power and presumption became visible, and these self-evident patterns become part of what I learned throughout the study.

The conditions created cannot be simply dismissed as mistakes at a particular moment in history. My vested interest was how a particular discourse came to be accepted as true because it was unthinkable for the discourse, for example, of the College Board to be untrue or that the study of English was less than noble, perhaps a fraud foisted on the unsuspecting to accomplish the bidding of the power structure, a distraction from material purposes. What had looked like an invitation into scholarship has been an imprisonment within an illusion. Genealogy helped me to use reverse engineering on my thought process so that I could tolerate the implications of my own blind submission to the normalizing elements of that discourse. I have many years invested as an educator in a regime of truth that appeared to be beyond criticism, a condition that, indeed, made critique dangerous. Understanding how chance, accidents, petty politics, ambition, disagreements, and national events contributed to conditions blunts the double anxiety of knowing there was no great, first foundation and of questioning the randomness that had seemed so deliberate.

Genealogy proved useful to this study to disrupt conventional legitimization narratives of the College Board through the specific analysis of the discourse of the College Board and the two AP English courses that have been produced within the discourse of the College Board. Chapter 5 produced fragments of analysis as I unpacked pieces of familiar ideas that had a strange and alien aspect to them after I looked at the power relationships that sustained them. My analysis challenged the assumption that the conventional historiographies of the AP English courses or the College Board existed on a foundation of facts, examining the continuity of the narratives for historical breaks, overlap, interaction, mismatches, contradictions, conditionals,

and other complications that work both for and against the objects of knowledge. I looked at the discourse statements that constituted these subjects, the rituals of power that maintain their separation, and the social conditions that altered them. For example, the two AP English courses are more political products of specific discourse than they are of privileged pedagogical content. AP Literature preserves the past, and AP Language adapts for the future.

Although the Enlightenment heritage is no longer the desired object of knowledge in my personal and professional life, I appropriated some of that heritage, such as its emphasis on rational autonomy over conformity and dogma and its critical outlook, as Foucault (1984) did, to use reason both to turn the vocabulary of reason back upon itself and to question how these discourses came to be. In the process I also examined how teachers such as myself participated in the production of these school subjects and how the school subjects produced the teachers.

Discontinuities and Contradictions

In previous chapters of this report, I identified several discontinuities in the discourse of the College Board and AP English courses. I used the term *discontinuity* to describe contradictions to the accepted educational narrative of the College Board, the AP English courses, and secondary ELA, a discourse so powerful that to look for any fissures, cracks, disruptions, or exceptions seemed like defying gravity at first. To question the history, prestige, or practice of these institutions is to question the social and political process of education in this country that appears to be a progressive, inevitable scheme of history. The College Board, SAT, and AP program seem as natural as oxygen to the educational environment, taken for granted as the accepted process. Discontinuities contradict the system, revealing instability in structures that appear secure. For example, challenging the construct of intelligence and the multiple choice format that supposedly measures intelligence destabilizes the entire standardized testing structure

from which the SAT and other standardized tests eventually emerged. Carl Brigham, the author of the first SAT, grew so concerned about the connection of the SAT to intelligence testing that he removed the IQ correlations that appeared with the SAT. In the 1970s, so much controversy arose, which has continued, about the fairness and accuracy of SAT testing that the College Board changed the name of it from the Scholastic Aptitude Test to the Scholastic Ability Test, and finally reduced it to simply the SAT, an acronym with no “nym,” in order to distance the test as much as possible from its emergence from intelligence testing. By tracing the development of the construct of intelligence and the history of the College Board and its tests, the linkage of one “truth” to another showed how these conditions came to be constituted and maintained by hierarchal power relations emerging from misinformation, eugenics, cultural bias, and a misguided faith in positivist social science. I traced lines of descent in a network of privilege, power, national events, ideological shifts, social movements, incidentals, and ambition.

Other discontinuities emerged with the rise of the new age of industrialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For example, education was offered to the working classes as a way for them to better themselves through literature and culture even though the so-called edifying effect was to prevent social unrest. Other discontinuities developed from a dependence on the classical Greek past and subsequent educational traditions that used that past as a model. For example, even as Harvard began an innovative scholarship program in 1926 to provide educational opportunity to students from poor, mid-western backgrounds, the delivery of a patrician, gentleman’s education persisted until after World War II.

Spivak (1974) described discontinuity as a “moment that genuinely threatens to collapse the system”(p. xxxv), perhaps best demonstrated by the discrepancy between the AP English Literature curriculum, and by extension the secondary ELA curriculum, and the rapid changes in

technology, demographics, and globalization. These discontinuities could collapse when systems of power set in place from many directions interact to make any other conclusions impossible while society overlooked, neglected, or ignored the discrepancies. Our educational system has arrived at a point wherein the systems of power embodied in the College Board seem so large and secure that a contrarian notion to support a different truth seems impossible.

The discontinuities also reflected the values of powerful influences outside of education. A specific form of rationality, positivist research methods, overwhelmed other possibilities because it fit so well with the political and social discourse of the time, including the non-binary relationships of power to knowledge, adults to children, society to citizen, and virtue to efficiency, that it seems impossible to think in any other way. According to Gutting (2012), “At the core of Foucault's picture of modern ‘disciplinary’ society are three primary techniques of control: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and the examination” (para. 6). The educational system in the United States organized itself around these three techniques.

Discontinuities occurred in the narratives I examined whenever disruptions to these techniques are either explicit or implicit. Challenges to the narratives have arisen over time since the late 1960s, but perhaps the most significant challenge comes from the rapidly increasing diversity and advancing technology of contemporary society, requiring not a progressive solution but an evaluation of how the present system is working.

Literacy in the Age of Aggressive Relevance

Gerald Graff (1987) noted, “Nineteenth-century American colleges followed age-old patterns set by Oxford and Cambridge . . . the idea of professional education scorned vocational concerns in favor of ‘liberal’ studies, studies designed to form a gentlemanly character . . . and saw the study of literature through the classics as a form of acculturation for ‘the cultivated

gentleman” (p. 20). AP Literature follows this model. Twenty-first century business and technology, however, call for “utilitarianism, with its demand that universities be centers of practical professional training” (Lind, 2006, p. 52). Yet there is great outcry from employers that today’s college graduate is only minimally literate. What kind of literacy would satisfy the employer? Scholes (1998) wrote that “what society *wants* . . . at worst, docility and grammatical competence; at best, reliability and a high level of textual skills” p. 19). What society does *not* want is “a group of people imbued with critical skills and values that are frankly antagonistic to those that prevail in our marketplace, courts, and legislative bodies” (p. 19). Employers want compliance. Bay (2006) called for English programs to “do a better job of bridging college English with the world that students will inhabit after graduation [Professional writing internships] that allow students to start the transition from students to professional will help clarify and expand the possibilities” (140). AP Language better fits this model.

Following McLuhan (1967), Rice (2006) explained that the exposition, analysis, persuasion, description, and comparison of traditional modes of “writing feel[s] too limited in an age of total information delivery and connectivity” (p. 129). He also noted the work of McLuhan and Fiore in examining new-media influences on changes in physical, emotional, and intellectual perception in reading and thinking experiences. If new-media can alter perception, the importance of perception in reading makes it likely reading is changing too. Rice also challenged the old ways of defining writing (response essay, analytical paper, personal essay) as not serving “the media society of networks and connections contemporary culture generates *as these definitions of writing are now performed*” (p. 129). Kaestle (1993) wrote that “major shifts in the uses of literacy” are significant because they warn “that reading has not always been what it is today – that the process, the functions, and the modes of reading may have been very

different in past times” and could be very different in the future of “the changing relationship of print to television and computers” (p. 49).

The effects of technology and globalization are also changing access to and the boundaries of knowledge from a closed system to an open one in which knowing where to find information and how to apply it is more important than acquiring it. AP Literature is a closed system of old technologies such as writing, and AP Language is an open one of multiple technologies, including different forms of virtual experience, online collaboration, and traditional writing. Chow (2005) described the situation as “the consensus that a particular type of knowledge acquisition, dissemination, and preservation is in the process of either a historical mutation to become something quite different, or, as some fear, being erased” (p. 47). For example, in Jane Austen’s *Sense and Sensibility*, a young girl practices the recitation of her school lessons, being especially pleased that she can correctly recite the history lesson that every English child of the time was supposed to learn: the names and chronological order of all the English kings. Recitation was indeed once the order of the day in all schools, either aloud or on paper. If that young girl were in school today, she would have no need to memorize the chronology of kings. She could not only find it quickly on the internet anytime she needed it, but she would also find the kings displayed with a copy of a painting or a photo, their genealogical history, their wives and children, the birth and death dates, a photo of the place of burial, the eulogy read at the funeral, copies of speeches or important letters, a coat of arms, photos of armor, weapons, horses, cars, and records of wars or battles. By the time she clicked on the present monarch, Queen Elizabeth II, she would no doubt also find photos of the queen’s favorite corgis and her stable of race horses and news reel footage of the destructive fire at Windsor

Castle several years ago. For this child the technology of memorizing has become the technology of finding.

School system administrators and educational theorists also admonish teachers to not use the lecture method for teaching and learning. The general goal appears to be that the teacher structures the learning so that students locate the information either by close reading a text in front of them or looking on the internet. Then the teacher provides opportunities for the student to use that information in a relevant and appropriate way. This transition may either make us less human because we are dependent on machines or resources placed in front of us or more human because we become more prone to mistakes because of partial or misused information.

ELA: Mutation or Casualty?

Is the study of English at the point of becoming either a historical mutation or a casualty? “English Language Arts” – a name that implies to outsiders an aesthetic fussiness with no instrumental value – appears impractical to outsiders in business and politics who expect an efficient instructional download of functional literacy into the brains of future workers. Outsiders, even from other content areas, admonish students to write clearly, “not like that fluffy stuff your English teachers taught you,” a perception that all AP teachers refute but reminiscent of the first half of the twentieth century when the study of English received the derogatory appellation of “pink sunsets” or even some of the recommendations of the ELA standards from the National Council of Teachers of English (NCTE). It is interesting to note that the new Common Core ELA standards, headed by David Coleman who is now the College Board president, avoided most NCTE standards, implying that NCTE standards relied too much on emotional expression and too little on career readiness. Likewise, the traditional study of English, such as AP Lit and other ELA secondary curriculum that organizes around traditional

national or chronological selections, appears trivial to outsiders who see it in the same category as ballet (anachronistic, useless, and feminine). These outsiders prefer English in a pair of steel-toed work shoes that hammer directness and correctness. English *en pointe* has a limited audience, perhaps the same affluent one that buys tickets for *Swan Lake* and *Die Meistersinger*.

Lyotard (1979/1984) described this time of change as the substitution of skills for ideals in education. The so-called ideals, however, of the study of English developed from a caste system. The ruling class of Matthew Arnold's nineteenth century England surreptitiously facilitated the preservation of historical privilege based on gender and wealth by giving lip service to the expansion of education to the working class. If the study of English had less Eurocentric focus and more skills oriented toward technology, globalism, and business, perhaps the study of English could reclaim a place at the center of the curriculum. Following Lyotard, in the crucible of economic decline and rapid technological change, the study of English apparently must aspire to a productivity that demonstrates stronger practical application than cultural performativity [sic]. That productivity must be something more than the social stability envisioned by Arnold to "civilize" and thus pacify the working class in order to protect the status quo. It must be something more than the market efficiency desired by neoliberalism that would result from an adequate supply of knowledge workers for business to sustain its Taylorist model and who would also make enough money to be good consumers and thus create social stability.

The structure of the study of English created in the last hundred years does not easily accommodate the current rate of change because technological and demographic change has exceeded the culture's ability to assimilate it. In a published interview with Schwartz (1993), Toffler summarized the central argument of *Future Shock* (1970) by remarking, "We were not only saying that accelerating change is hard to adapt to, but that acceleration itself has effects on

the system. . . . It's the speed itself that compels a change in the rate of decision making, and all decision systems have limits as to how fast they can make complex decisions" (p. 2). Jenkins (2006) identified the challenges that society's rapid assimilation of technology posed for schools: "the challenge is not simply to be able to read and write, but being able to participate in the deliberations over what issues matter, what knowledge counts, and what ways of knowing command authority and respect" (p. 259). Graff (1987) claimed that the best pedagogical solution at this time is to argue the issues and stop teaching "literature." I agree with him. I was a history major at one time but switched to English because the study of English seemed at the time to be about the noble pursuit of truth. Now it seems that the study of English will survive if it becomes the study of power and its relationship to words.

Arguing the issues, identifying the strategies of argument, and analyzing the rhetoric argument are the subjects of AP English Language; its content is any effective piece of persuasion, whether it is an advertisement, a music video, a film, a youtube.com clip, a speech, a letter, an email, a cartoon, a literary work, or other yet unimagined, unknown manipulation of the language of words or images for a specific purpose. AP Language is a multimedia, multicultural marketing tool to find out what sells and how to do it. It uses a neoliberal ethic that fits the College Board/ETS economic and social goals. AP Literature is a scheduled tour of iconic historical and cultural moments from past influences on the present that are rapidly losing their relevance because technology and efficiency together are a lethal weapon against the past.

Changes in the 1980s defanged communism, reducing communism to a specter for Derrida (1994). The first Apple computer for consumers became available in 1982. Since that time, nonstop changes in technology, communication, and multiculturalism in the United States have gradually but insistently moved the culture beyond the upheavals of the 1960s and 70s,

providing not a new status quo but a more or less permanent instability of the culture. Change has indeed become the only constant. If there is a status quo, it is the status quo of the global market. The rate of change from one decade to the next alters perception and purpose so much from one generation to the next that I agree with my sources who suggest that there will sooner rather than later be a generation to whom Shakespeare will have no relevance because the language and life of the past will be so culturally far away from a generation of fragmented text messages, multicultural pluralism, and whatever technology comes next to transform human experience from a narrative to a tweet. Tweet users have no patience with narrative or symbolism. High school teachers in the classroom already know this.

A Parable

Describing the contrast of old and new with examples from a classic epic and a cult movie, Jenkins (2006) made this observation: “Homer wrote within a culture of relative consensus and stability. *The Matrix* emerges from a time of rapid change and cultural diversity. Its goals are not so much to preserve cultural traditions as to put together the pieces of the culture in innovative ways” (p. 121). The *Odyssey* belongs to the Western cultural tradition whose boundaries have become porous and fragmented in a postmodern era where the world is flat and the interfaces of knowledge are electronic (e.g., Birkarts, 2006; Carr, 2008; Hayles, 1999; Jenkins, 2006).

Carr (2008) described the Internet’s constantly expanding data “cloud” established by Google, Amazon, and Microsoft that provides simple plug-in internet access to anyone with a computer or a smart phone. This massive utility network functions much like the electrical power grid, making software obsolete and access universal. The heresy of such readily available information freed from the shackles of nationalism or academic authority is already producing a

postmodern pastiche of high and low culture that further challenges the status quo of using the study of English to “civilize,” satisfy, and distract the lower and working classes from noticing their exploitation and manipulation by the top 1% of income producers.

Skills once considered necessary are now moving toward obsolescence. Memorization, for example, is an old technology, now hindered by the limitations of human beings confronted with more information than at any time in history. Digital technologies, on the other hand, allow humans to access quickly an open horizon of stored memory about almost anything, making the need for a satisfactory, individual, managed memory far less necessary. Russo (2005) and Carr (2008) acknowledged that such access also honors speed and efficiency, the first principles of technology. Technological determinism suggests that these changes are inevitable. Most of the curriculum for first-year writing courses in college shows an awareness of change and regularly exploits it for instruction, as could be found in online course examples, as mentioned in previous chapters. The AP Language course is a much better fit than the AP Literature course for a globalized, technological world if apps (instrumentality) become available that are efficient and fast. We will have a bricolage of old and new forms and categories of knowledge (e.g., Birkerts, 2006; Carr, 2008; Jenkins, 2006; Pink, 2005; Russo, 2005) that will disturb no one but the people old enough to remember when knowledge was a closed organizational system instead of an open one with a fluid propensity toward recombination of familiar elements in different ways and toleration of even the logic of apparent disorder, inclusive of Dionysian either/either, not either/or.

Afterthoughts

An aggressive utilitarianism underlies this call for relevance, in which knowledge is a means and not an end, and the pleasure of viewing it as an end is looked down

upon cynically. . . . Our current sense of crisis is partly a crisis of faith in what we are teaching, not just in how we are teaching it. (Kay, 2013, p. 36)

After starting my doctoral courses in 2004, a conclusion to my program appears to be in sight after almost ten years of work, interrupted at times by difficult family situations. The lapse of time from start to finish was probably a necessary component of this experience. If I had finished the program within the four to five year plan I originally planned, I would probably have missed some of my most important reading and arrived at some premature conclusions. Instead, my experience and the conclusions I have made have been transformative, affecting my personal and professional life in ways that I never anticipated. I was disturbed as “those who find their disciplines and canons redescribed out from under them” (Prado, 1995, p. 45). Foucault (1988b) saw the process as creative rather than destructive: “to question over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb people’s mental habits, the way they do and think things, to dissipate what is familiar and accepted, to reexamine rules and institutions” (p. 265).

My long and successful career as an AP English Literature teacher did not prepare me for the anarchy that this study would inspire in my thinking. Gradually, I tried to imagine a world without the teaching of literature and poetry, a Taylorist world where the humanities did not exist as we know them today, a world in which efficiency was the highest value. It was not a pleasing world, but it was practical and simple. There were no questions about the complicity of knowledge with power or high culture’s participation in sustaining social inequality and exclusion. There were no discussions of the value of the cultural capital of literature, which had been my avenue away from my working class family. Instead, I could admit in this new world, following Paulson (2001), that

Literature and its study, and in a broader sense the part of culture that revolves around the printed word, are losing their obviousness, the self-evidence of their existence, and whatever appearance of autonomy they once had. Their status seems to be shifting from dominant to residual. Literature's overt value as a cultural capital for the upper middle class has been declining for generations, to the point that it is futile either to try to prop up its archaic functions as the font of refined, genteel discourse or to claim that one is striking a blow for democratic culture by debunking it. (pp. 13-14)

The culture of the book will never completely die, but we no longer live in a print-based world. All of the humanities must learn how to have an interactive online life with a practical purpose if their existence is to continue, but I no longer feel the need to defend the humanities because I discovered the humanities make us subject to powerful narratives that define the world in narrow ways. We have to make the narratives subject to the learners, not the learners subject to the narratives.

The re-description of literature in particular within the venue of technology to make it a different kind of school subject would be useful. For example, it is easy to imagine a high school English class working with an online "choose your own adventure" game narrative, perhaps a disguised version of a famous work that offers the student a choice of scenarios, choice of styles of language, choice of events, choice of characters, and/or choice of endings, including a choice to write a new ending compatible with the selections made. The choices available would also allow students to select a cultural setting relevant to the individual's ethnicity/heritage if so desired. Each choice directs the student to additional choices pertinent to the selected scenario, a sort of "Second Life" version of a narrative that also allows students to choose point of view and to experience the narrative from the selected point of view, perhaps as even one of the characters

or an additional invented character. The purpose of the game would be for students to evaluate and argue for or against these choices and their results. Students could then compare and contrast their results with other students, debate the relevance and effectiveness, and then choose one or two for a class project to turn the game into a digital format – maybe a graphic novel, rap, song – that could be posted on a public online venue with its own advertisements, blog, tweets, pInterest, or whatever formats exist in the future. In five years time these formats will seem rudimentary to the next generation of digital natives. (Generations are now being “named,” as in Generation X, Generation Y, etc., for each decade rather than the traditional 20 year period.)

Students could also create an virtual store or museum of *pastiche* that combines (“mashups” in current parlance) high and low culture, different international cultures, past and present, or interdisciplinary crossovers. The virtual store would offer badges or tokens, a practice already being used by educational websites, online classrooms, and technical certification businesses, in exchange for successful, detailed submissions that, for example, included a display of items and activities to be offered for “sale” to other users. By “purchasing” a pastiche with tokens or bartering with badges, other users would gain admission to a pastiche and choose a specific purpose for which to use the pastiche. If the SAT, for example, continues to exist, the student could choose an interdisciplinary pastiche of geometry, music, and art. Then the problems would be generated from “music and art” and “SAT geometry review” in a mashup that provided the student with problems with a music and art orientation. Each multiple choice answer would be accompanied by immediate explanations of the connections, parallels, and logic for each answer. Another individual might be seeking inspiration and information for a history report on the 1920s and find a pastiche of information and items in a virtual 1920s store that displayed 1920s furniture, music, clothing, jewelry, architecture, maps, laws, books and movies,

personalities, restaurants, food, cars, sports, and jobs and salaries available at the time in one department of the store and similar 2000-2013 items in a second department. The student's first task would be to compare the 1920s items to each other to find the shared concepts, history, politics, and cultural practices of the 1920s. Then the student would do the same for the 2000-2013, followed by a compare and contrast of the 1920s to the contemporary era and an evaluation of how and why the culture of the two time periods have similarities and differences. Another student might visit an online Renaissance Festival that uses the typical "kissing wench" of such events to explore the status of women or sexual morality of the time period and argue for or against the "kissing wench" as liberated or disciplined by her society to be a "kissing wench" and all that it implies about kissing or wenching. Having set up an online Survivor – style game for my students called "Shakespeare Island," I was amazed at the amount of good information about Shakespeare's life and times as well as the plays that was available online to link into the game. (Students stayed on the island as long as their avatars successfully interacted with other students' avatars online in a series of challenges and blogs that involved research about the time period, including such categories as food, hygiene, the status of women, race relations, attitudes toward sex, education, the Great Chain of Being, navigation, and the play we studied, *Othello*.)

Students who were exiled from the island could use tokens they had earned to gain admission to the "kissing wench" discussion to earn back some of the points they were missing. The game is rudimentary and has no swordfights, shooting, or explosions. So the students are not impressed with my game skills. Some of the challenges are nothing more than taking a quiz on information they were supposed to find. Lacking the technical expertise to make the game more visual, more attractive, more interactive, and more exciting is frustrating, but it gives me a sense of what future re-descriptions of "studying English" might look like. I would welcome

conversation with an expert with the skills to go beyond my limited attempts and the knowledge to make it happen. Every school should have a technical storyteller who can take teacher's ideas to use technology and make it happen. Then the school could sell these products online to other schools and gradually make enough money for the salary of this specialized tech narrator.

Although I value and enjoy the AP English Literature course that I have taught for many years and I like nothing better than a great class discussion about what we are reading, I am now less inclined to participate because a lack of stability in any kind of truth leaves me with little useful to say. I find that I no longer want to "profess" or otherwise intervene in the students' thinking. I also believe that the AP English Literature course needs major revision if it is to survive. The revision would have to be accompanied by revision of the AP Exam because the exam shapes the curriculum. If it is not revised, it should probably be replaced by AP Language, a course that more closely aligns itself to First Year Writing courses in college and to the media saturated world in which we live.

So how did this happen? How did I reach a point of not wanting to teach anyone anything? I mistook conscious and deliberate action for agency, when I had none. The air I breathed was full of the assumptions and inevitabilities of hegemony and hierarchy that produced me without my being aware. Foucaultian genealogy finds the imprint of a discourse on the body, that point "where it installs itself and produces its real effects" (Foucault, 1977/1980, p. 97). The imprint was more real than any other part of the experience. Rather than perceiving the body, however, my presence was disembodied and I felt unmoored, not free, but in danger as if I were floating in outer space.

The secular religion of literature, packaged so well by Matthew Arnold to pacify the growing working class, had been a satisfactory substitute for religious faith until I saw that I was

part of that pacified working class and that not even my education gave me credentials to rise above it because my education and profession had betrayed me instead of elevating me. Instead of wanting to preserve the humanities or protect the study of English, I was willing to let it all go because their time has past. It is no longer business as usual. So where does this leave the study of English?

Whither the Study of English?

Following Derrida's (1993) well-known question about Marxism, this report asks whither the study of English? The College Board's claim to be the faithful mirror of education and its subsequent powerful influence on college and high school English curriculum make each small twist and turn of the relationship of the two AP English courses a possible product of disruption in the conventional history and direction of the study of English. Foucault (1978/1990) described the microstudy of such things in this way: "We must attempt to trace the chronology of these devices: the inventions, the instrumental mutations, and the renovations of previous techniques" (p. 115). He also advised examining the "chronology of their diffusion and of the effects (of subjugation and resistance) they produced" (p. 115). The study of English gradually became a silent monolith built on the accumulation of these devices, barely touched by the changes in the world. The study of English will not disappear, but it will wear a different face. It's all right to lose the old version of English because it was an illusion to begin with, a spectral remnant of a nineteenth century European, patriarchal, ethnocentric paradigm that transformed itself in the United States into a mutant narrative of the American dream that managed nevertheless to reify hegemony in education and society by privileging institutions and traditions that perpetuated the power and profit of the capitalist system. The new version of the study of English must be vital, relevant, and useful in a world mediated by technology, globalism, and

efficiency in the service of profit. The purpose of this project is to recommend multiple, contingent redescriptions of the study of English, not destruction.

The reality is that little will change anytime soon. My colleagues teach ELA because of an aesthetic vision, a moral earnestness, a personal enthusiasm for one specific kind of literature, a fondness of the tidiness of diagramming sentences, or perhaps a literary ambition of their own. There will probably be no real change until some of the current generation of students – who have never known a world without a cell phone and who are plugged in all the time for continuous interaction – have become teachers, standardized testing has more flexibility than a multiple choice response, and the schools have more money to spend on technology and more training to use it. These are three significant conditions. In addition, Russo (2005) identified the technological principles that dominate and probably will continue to dominate this era: “least effort, speed, miniaturization, digitization instead of analogue, interactivity, hypertextuality, and virtuality” (p. 6). Students already prefer those modes of operation, especially the principle of efficiency found in least effort and speed. The schools have analog practices and policies; the students arrive with a digital consciousness and mode of operation.

Russo (2005) argued that pre-industrial tools were made with the human body in mind but that technological tools, including computers, are not. Over the years the result has been a gradual and insistent loss of self, ceded to the machine little by little. He explained, “We no longer become caricatures of ourselves, as in Chaplin [Modern Times]; we cease resembling ourselves” (p. 30). Citing Piperno to explain, Russo continued,

The central aim of information knowledge is not the completeness and coherence of facts and judgments on the world, but rather the optimization of procedures, be they for

decisions, diagnosis, management, or planning. Information knowledge incessantly transforms procedures so that the action may be more effective and, above all, faster.

(as cited in Russo, 2005, p. 30)

Taylor's principles of scientific management have found their most felicitous application in the ever increasing efficiency of the computer. Print culture needs different ways to be part of this transition. Books on Kindle on other ereaders don't really count because the reader is still turning pages and following a specific visual order.

Posthumanists such as Wolfe (2010) suggested that the human is in the process of being decentered and discusses the case of Temple Grandin as a decentered human being because her experience is atypical, slightly off center but positioned so that her experience is atypical but valid. Interesting work is being done by Haraway (1997) regarding the cyborg destiny of human beings in which the decentered human being is more like one of the characters in *The Matrix*, directly acted upon by forces that construct and control that destiny. Haraway and others have also done animal studies that suggest human beings have ignored an important source of observation. Technology is moving so fast that it is impossible to predict the future. It may be that the posthumanist becomes a guide to finding the human in whatever that technological world looks like after we have become part of it. Hayle (1999) argued that "a historically specific construction called *the human is giving way to a different construction called the posthuman*" (italics in original, p. 2). She also claimed that the defining characteristic of the posthuman is "the construction of subjectivity, not the presence of nonbiological components" (p. 4) with the reinscription of "traditional ideas and assumptions even as they articulated something new" (p. 6) that resulted in "in shifting configurations [of human and posthuman] that vary with historically specific contexts" (p. 6). Kurzweil (as cited in Richards, 2002) has posed the question, "Are we

spiritual machines?" (p. 1). I am willing to suspend belief and to think of what is impossible to think.

For example, the culture of reading and the book created a certain kind of human. Although reading is one of my favorite activities and I would be extremely uncomfortable if I were forced to give it up, it seems possible that a nonlinear culture without deep sustained reading would produce a different kind of culture and different kind of human being, perhaps one who would seem alien to me, but my curiosity to see how this being is different from what I know and understand would overcome my anxiety. Reading and the book have defined what school is for centuries, but school doesn't work well for everyone. Deleuze (1987) wrote that a book was a little machine. I hope that the study of English will evolve to a stage wherein the individual is the little machine. I hope to see other researchers expand the ideas of posthumanism as they apply to literacy, technology, and other areas of education.

The future is impossible to predict, but never has the speed of change moved at this pace. Mr. Spock of *Star Trek* might be an avatar for that future: highly intelligent, absolutely rational, but emotionally vacant. Even Spock's self-sacrifice in the second *Star Trek* film was the result of an unemotional logic to use the one to save the many. If I were to ask David Coleman about a school full of Mr. Spocks, he would probably approve and repeat what he said in a speech (with expletives) that students will not be asked to express their life stories, emotions, or philosophy — their bosses will ask them to write a no-nonsense report. If technology has the last word in the evolution of the human, it is possible that it may emasculate and reduce the study of language and composition to a formulaic existence, forced to serve the taskmaster of efficiency and productivity. Nevertheless, technology that appears to threaten may facilitate additional ways of

writing, reading, and publishing that inspire more people than ever to become lifelong readers and writers.

The internet produces a vast array of shared online communities with their own codes of communication. Within some of these shared, self-selected communities will probably be the fluency, expressiveness, and sometimes genius that produced the great writers of the past. Although a new Scott Fitzgerald or Jane Austen would be welcomed by many, the internet will democratize the writing process by granting access to an audience for every kind of writing, no matter how humble, and thus making any child's efforts worthwhile to the child. More writing and more reading than now occurs would probably result. These communities might become an underground of humanity who take advantage of the new online freedoms and possibilities of publication in ways unimaginable now. The gatekeepers, agents, middle men, and publishers would disappear or change. Publishers are beginning to recognize the hybrid nature of pathways to publication and marketing of novels. *Fifty Shades of Gray*, for example, began as fan fiction for the *Twilight* series, evolved to an online publication, moved to successful publication in book form, and now is a movie script for a major film. Although this novel is not Literature as we have thought of it in the past, it has been highly successful and accepted by many readerships, suggesting perhaps that the literature of the future will be more a literature of the culture, of people with limited preparation for verbal complexity but technically adept and ready for the jobs of the future.

Story will never die, but the way in which the narratives are told and the media in which they appear will continue to evolve. The power of words will never disappear. Shakespeare, for example, will never disappear, but he may become a boutique interest in the future, perhaps like opera today, unless his plays can become highly profitable. The endgame is profit.

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TIMELINE

KEY EVENTS, INVENTIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, PUBLICATIONS, AND PEOPLE

- 1767 Collegiate School first offered English grammar, language, and composition with tutors
- 1776 Collegiate School offered *belles lettres* to senior students
- 1803 Boylston Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory established at Harvard
- 1817 Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory established at Yale
- 1831 John Stuart Mill declared that the Western world was entering an age of transition without equal in historical memory. Russo (2005) claimed this transitional period ended in 2005.
- 1839 title of Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory changed to Professor of Rhetoric and English Language at Yale
- photography invented
- 1859 Darwin's *The Origin of the Species* published
- 1863 title of Professor of Rhetoric and English Language changed to Professor of Rhetoric and English Literature at Yale
- 1865 Harvard Commencement speech by President Conant calling for order in the college admissions process.
- 1867 Matthew Arnold presented the mid-Victorian generation as a stalled transition:
 "Wandering between two worlds, one dead, /The other powerless to be born."
"Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse"
- 1869 Sir Francis Galton's *Hereditary Intelligence: An Inquiry into its Law and Consequences*.
- 1870 Charles W. Eliot becomes president of Harvard and opens curriculum to elective system
- 1874 Harvard established essay entrance exam.
- 1876 Yale first requires freshmen to take English Literature and Disputation
- 1882 Matthew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy*
- 1883 Modern Language Association established with 126 members
- 1889 Yale offers more courses in English than in Latin and twice as many as Greek for the first time
- 1892 National Education Association's Committee of Ten
- 1895 joint conference on uniform entrance requirements creates full four-year preparatory course work cycle that became standard for high school
- 1900 College Board organized with twelve colleges

1902	Harvard joins College Board
1904	Yale joins College Board
1905	Binet develops IQ test in France
1908	Babbitt's <i>Literature</i>
1911	Taylor's <i>Principles of Scientific Management</i>
1914	Humanistic education begins slow decline (see Russo, 2005)
1914-1917	World War I
	College Board uses IQ tests to screen for officer candidates
1920	Carl Brigham develops first SAT from IQ tests used to sort officer candidates
1921	Harvard scholarship applicants take first SAT
1926	Henry Chauncey, assistant dean at Harvard
	Henry Chauncey, President of College Board
	Henry Chauncey, President of Educational Testing Service
1939	IBM scoring machine improved to make mass scoring quick and efficient
1941-1945	World War II
	Henry Chauncey receives contract for mass sorting of all soldiers for placement
1946	President Truman signs GI Bill providing education for veterans
1947	Educational Testing Service formed; Henry Chauncey first president
1953	Kenyon University votes to implement first AP program
1955	Carnegie Foundation and Ford Foundation fund Kenyon AP Project
1957	Sputnik
1960s	beginning of steep decline in number of Classical studies and Western civilization courses
1960	Marshall MacLuhan's <i>The Medium is the Message</i>
1966	Dartmouth Conference on English
1968	Student protests, riots, and general strike in Paris; DeGaulle flees France.
1968	Political dissension at Modern Language Association convention
1969	Internet comes into existence
1970s	number of philosophy, English, and religious studies majors begin steady and permanent decline

1970	first minority executive hired at College Board
1970	invention of CD for recording
1971	silicon chip invented
1971	invention of VCR
1973	invention of cell phone
1974	first version of personal computer
1978	invention of CD-ROM
1975	Bill Gates and Paul Allen start Microsoft, Inc.
1976	Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak start Apple, Inc.
1977-1980	expansion of biogenetic engineering, video surgery, magnetic resonance imaging
1979	Iranian Revolution brings Islamic fundamentalism to attention of the West
1980s	critical divide of the past from the present (see Russo, 2005) Unparalleled shift from industrial to technological society
1980s	large, central, room-size computers transition to vast numbers of personal computers
1980s	technological inventions begin to interact with another
1980s	the communications revolution
1980s	spread of deregulation, monetarism, and privatization
1980s	beginning of corporatization of universities
1980s	Eastern bloc regimes falter; cold war ends
1980	U.S. Department of Education established
1980	invention of Walkman
1980	AP English Language added to AP Exam courses
1982	Classics becomes the smallest of 32 graduate programs nationally
1982	<i>Time</i> magazine announces the computer as “machine of year” instead of “person of year”
1983	<i>A Nation At Risk</i>
1983	Harvard University’s Conference on Core Curriculum
1983	Terry Eagleton proposed eliminating literature departments and replacing them with discourse studies of the social origin and political orientation of works of art in his book <i>Literary Theory</i> .

1984	invention of DNA fingerprinting, gene therapy, home video games, high-definition digital television, wireless cable systems, and home computers
1986	new technologies in printing, storage, and digital photography
1986-1990	beginning of rapid increase in globalization
1987	Gerald Graff's <i>Professing Literature</i>
1990	AP Surge
1990	first Web browser
1990s	<i>Newsweek</i> , <i>Time</i> , and others begin national ranking of high schools based on primarily on SAT scores and AP participation
1993	Peter Drucker's <i>Post-capitalist society</i>
1998	Robert Scholes's <i>The Rise and Fall of English: Reconstructing English as a Discipline</i>
2000	No Child Left Behind Act
2000	Walmart Foundation begins to put large sums of money into public education and insists on application of business principles to education, such as Taylor's Scientific Management
2000	The U.S. Department of Education and the College Board agree to a joint venture to place AP courses in every high school
2001	iPod released to consumer market
2002	College Board's Equity and Access policy established
2005	Russo (2005) declared "Western humanism has declined to the point of irrelevance." (p. 21)
2006	The Great Recession begins and causes widespread unemployment, declining property values, foreclosures, local and federal government budget cuts, extending into 2013 and predicted to continue until 2016
2007	first iPhone released
2007	Bill Gates retires from Microsoft CEO position and becomes director of Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which makes large grants to education and insists on application of business principles to education (such as Taylor's Scientific Management)
2008	iPhone App Store opens
2012	Common Core Curriculum Standards adopted by 48 states
2012	David Coleman, key architect of Common Core Standards, is appointed College Board president.